[Senate Hearing 111-893]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-893
THE PROTECTIVE FORCES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 3, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
MARK UDALL, Colorado LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Protective Forces at the Department of Energy
march 3, 2010
Page
Aloise, Eugene E., Director, Office of Natural Resources and
Environment, Government Accountability Office.................. 3
Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Health, Safety, and
Security, Department of Energy................................. 57
Stumbo, Mike, President, National Council of Security Police..... 62
(iii)
THE PROTECTIVE FORCES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Ben Nelson, Begich, and
Vitter.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Paul J.
Hubbard.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to
Senator Begich; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions, and
Michael T. Wong, assistant to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, good afternoon. I think we'll go
ahead and begin, because we're going to be up against the full
Senate Armed Services Committee beginning at 4:30, and I don't
want to delay getting to that. So, I call this hearing to
order.
Welcome to the hearing of the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces.
I'd like to thank our witnesses for their flexibility in
accommodating the scheduling needs of the full committee. We
have an important briefing for the full committee, as I said,
that we need to make time for, but had some difficulties in
somehow getting things scheduled, but apparently we've been
able to succeed.
It's with great irony and pleasure that, after a 3-year
stint as chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee, that I note
the first hearing in my new role as chairman of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee is on a personnel matter once again. So, as
Yogi Berra once said, it's like deja vu all over again; here we
are.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the
security of nuclear weapons on DOE sites, tons of weapons-grade
materials, mostly highly-enriched uranium and plutonium, and
various weapons parts at various locations across the country.
Even a small amount of this material, in the hands of a
terrorist, could lead to a horrific result.
After the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the DOE reviewed
the security of these sites, and their vulnerability to a
terrorist attack, and came to the conclusion that the security
needed to be increased. As a result, DOE adopted a new approach
for the protective forces, shifting many of them to tactical
response forces akin to a SWAT team. These new teams were
trained in offensive combat tactics to move, train,
communicate, and fight as a team. This was a major shift from
the previous defensive posture that was taken at the sites.
With this new focus came new rigorous training and other
requirements which were not uniformly implemented at the
various sites and, where implemented, became an issue for the
protective forces. While the protective forces fully supported
the need for the increased security, it quickly became apparent
that the new requirement would be progressively difficult for
older guard personnel to meet.
At the same time, DOE had decided to reduce post-retirement
healthcare benefits and eliminate defined-benefit retirement
plans for new employees. This misalignment, as the GAO
describes it, between the protective force personnel systems
and the increased physical and other demands of a paramilitary
operation, has become a significant concern, and one of the
underlying causes for a 44-day strike at the Pantex plant in
2007.
The DOE protective forces are all contractors, with the
management of the force varying from site to site. DOE orders
establish the security requirements that each site must meet,
but not how each site will meet those requirements. As a result
of the growing concern over the protective forces, the security
at the sites, and the strike at Pantex, this committee asked
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a
comprehensive study of the management of the forces in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.
GAO completed this study on January 29, and today we'll
hear from Eugene Aloise, GAO Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, on the findings and recommendations in the study.
Also with us, are Glenn Podonsky, the Director of the
Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety, and Security
(HSS), the DOE Security Policy and Oversight Office, who has
worked on these issues for many years, and Mike Stumbo,
President of the National Council of Security Police, the union
representing over 2,600 members of the protective force.
We welcome each of you this afternoon, and look forward to
getting a clear understanding of the issues and difficulties of
ensuring that the Nation's stockpile of nuclear weapons
materials remains secure.
When Senator Vitter arrives, we will ask him for any
opening comments that we have.
I would ask that each of our witnesses give a very short
opening statement, perhaps 5 minutes, or thereabouts. We've
received your prepared statements, and, without objection, they
will all be included in the record, in their entirety.
Mr. Aloise, we'll begin with you, followed by Mr. Podonsky,
and later by Mr. Stumbo.
Mr. Aloise.
STATEMENT OF EUGENE E. ALOISE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Aloise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased
to be here today to discuss issues with DOE's protective
forces.
Over 2,300 heavily-armed protective forces provide security
for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
at 6 sites, with long-term missions to store and process
weapons-grade nuclear materials, DOE's highest security threat.
As mentioned, since September 11, DOE has sought to
transform its protective forces into an elite fighting force, a
tactical response force (TRF) with training and capabilities
similar to the U.S. military. Protective force unions are
concerned that TRF's more demanding requirements threaten the
ability of the forces to work until retirement age.
My remarks today are based on a recently issued report
(GAO-10-275) which shows that contractor protective forces are
not uniformly managed, organized, staffed, trained, equipped,
or compensated across the six DOE sites. These differences
exist because the forces operate under separate contracts and
collective bargaining agreements at each site, and because of
DOE's contracting approach, which allows each site to tailor
security to site and mission needs.
Since 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE security
organizations, among protective force contractors, and force
unions about the ability of the forces, especially older force
members, to continue to meet DOE's weapons, physical fitness,
and medical qualifications.
Adding to these concerns are DOE's efforts to manage its
long-term contractor post-retirement and pension liabilities
which could negatively impact protective forces retirement
eligibility and benefits. As mentioned, these concerns
contributed to a 44-day strike in 2007 by protective forces at
the Pantex plant, where the assembly and disassembly of nuclear
weapons occurs.
According to union officials, failure to resolve TRF and
retirement benefit issues could lead to strikes at three sites
with over 1,500 protective forces when their collective
bargaining agreements end in 2012.
Now, DOE has considered two principal options to more
effectively manage its protective forces: improving the
existing contractor system or creating a Federal protective
force.
In 2009, NNSA and DOE officials rejected federalization of
protective forces because they believed it would be too costly
and would provide little increase in security effectiveness.
Instead, they supported the continued use of contractor forces,
but with improvements.
Our analysis shows that if the forces are well managed,
either a contractor or a Federal force could result in
effective and uniform security. Both options have offsetting
advantages and disadvantages, with neither option emerging as
clearly superior. A key disadvantage of the contractor system
is the potential for strikes by contractor forces. However,
according to NNSA's Administrator, strikes can be effectively
managed by the use of replacement forces.
Reliably estimating the cost to compare the two options
proved difficult and precluded our detailed reporting on it.
Because contractor and Federal forces could each have numerous
permutations, choosing any particular option to assess would be
arbitrary.
In March 2009, DOE commissioned a group to recommend ways
to improve the protective force contractor personnel system. In
June of last year, the group made 29 recommendations designed
to enable protective force members to reach a normal retirement
age within the forces, take another job within DOE, or
transition to a non-DOE career. To date, action by DOE on these
recommendations has been limited.
In our view, DOE and its protective force contractors have
not successfully aligned protective force systems with the
increased physical and other demands of TRF. Without better
alignment, there is a greater potential for strikes and
potential risk to site security when collective bargaining
agreements expire.
DOE's study group recommendations are a step forward:
However, DOE faces the possibility of more strikes by its
protective forces at some of its highest security-risk
facilities if these issues are not resolved. Therefore, it is
imperative that DOE resolve these issues soon, as recommended
by our report and directed by the full committee in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I would be
happy to address any questions you or other members may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gene Aloise
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy's
(DOE) contractor guards, also known as protective forces. My testimony
is based on our recently released report Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to
Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues \1\ and recent
discussions with protective force union officials.
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\1\ GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces'
Personnel System Issues, GAO-10-275 (Washington, DC: Jan. 29, 2010).
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Protective forces are a key component of security at DOE sites with
special nuclear material (SNM), which the department considers its
highest security risk. This material--including plutonium and highly
enriched uranium--is considered to be Category I when it is weapons
grade and in specified forms (e.g., nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons
components, metals, and oxides) and quantities. The risks associated
with Category I SNM include theft and the potential for sabotage
through the use of a radioactive dispersal device, also known as a
``dirty bomb.'' Currently, DOE and its National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), an agency within DOE responsible for the safety,
security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, have
six contractor-operated sites that possess--and will possess for the
foreseeable future--Category I SNM (sites with ``enduring''
missions).\2\ The six sites include four that NNSA is responsible for--
the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in Los Alamos, NM; the Y-12
National Security Complex (Y-12), in Oak Ridge, TN; the Pantex Plant,
near Amarillo, TX; and the Nevada Test Site, outside of Las Vegas, NV.
In addition, DOE's Office of Environmental Management is responsible
for the Savannah River Site, near Aiken, SC, and DOE's Office of
Nuclear Energy is responsible for the Idaho National Laboratory, near
Idaho Falls, ID.\3\
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\2\ We excluded three other DOE Category I SNM sites from our
review because they are likely to downsize or downgrade their
protective forces in the near future. These sites include the Office of
Environmental Management's Hanford Site, near Richland, WA, which
recently transferred its highest value Category I SNM off site but will
maintain lower value Category I SNM for the foreseeable future; NNSA's
Lawrence Livermore's National Laboratory, in Livermore, CA, which plans
to transfer its Category I SNM off site by the end of fiscal year 2012;
and the Office of Science's Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in Oak
Ridge, TN, which plans to dispose of its Category I SNM by the end of
fiscal year 2015.
\3\ The Office of Environmental Management is responsible for
cleaning up former nuclear weapons sites, and the Office of Nuclear
Energy is primarily responsible for nuclear energy research.
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In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE
embarked on a multifaceted effort to better secure its sites with
Category I SNM against a larger and more sophisticated terrorist threat
by changing policies, such as its Design Basis Threat (DBT)--a
classified document that specifies the potential size and capabilities
of adversary forces that the sites must defend against.\4\ Protective
forces, which accounted for slightly more than 50 percent of DOE's $862
million for field security funding in fiscal year 2008, also have been
an important focus of DOE security improvements. DOE has sought to
improve the effectiveness of its protective forces by deploying
security technologies, such as sensors capable of detecting adversaries
at long ranges, and through the use of advanced weaponry, such as belt-
fed machine guns and grenade launchers. In addition, DOE has sought to
enhance protective forces' tactical skills--the ability to move, shoot,
and communicate in a combat environment--through its Tactical Response
Force (TRF) initiative.\5\ Among other things, TRF revised the
application of DOE's existing protective force categories to emphasize
tactical skills and instituted more rigorous weapons and physical
fitness qualifications for many of DOE's protective forces.
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\4\ In 2008, DOE changed the name of its DBT (DOE Order 470.3A) to
the Graded Security Protection policy (DOE 470.3B).
\5\ DOE announced this initiative, originally known as ``Elite
Force'' initiative in 2004, and began to formalize it into policy
through the issuance of DOE Manual 470.4-3, Protective Force, in 2005.
DOE revised this policy in 2006 with DOE Manual 470.4-3 Change 1,
Protective Force. In 2008, DOE further revised this policy, which is
now contained in DOE Manual 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective Force.
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However, protective force unions have been concerned that the
planned implementation of TRF--with its potentially more demanding
requirements--threatens the ability of protective forces to work until
retirement age. These concerns contributed to a 44-day protective force
strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. The strike raised broader issues in
DOE and Congress about the continued suitability of DOE's model for
managing its protective forces. Unionized protective forces can strike
when their collective bargaining agreements end, and strikes may create
security vulnerabilities at DOE's sites with Category I SNM. In
addition, DOE's practice of managing its protective forces through
separate contracts at each site could create disparities in protective
force performance, pay, and benefits. In 2009, a DOE protective forces
study group, composed of DOE and union representatives, made a number
of recommendations that, while maintaining contractor protective
forces, may better balance protective forces' concerns over their
careers with DOE's need to provide effective security and control
costs.
In this context, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008 directed us to report on the management of DOE's protective
forces at its sites with Category I SNM.\6\ Among other things, we (1)
analyzed information on the management, organization, staffing,
training and compensation of protective forces; (2) examined the
implementation of TRF; (3) assessed DOE's two options to more uniformly
manage DOE protective forces; and (4) reported on DOE's progress in
addressing protective force issues. Our recent report Nuclear Security:
DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues
presents the full findings of our work and includes two recommendations
to DOE to fully assess and implement, where feasible, recommendations
made by DOE's 2009 protective forces study group. DOE generally agreed
with these recommendations.
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\6\ Pub. L. No. 110-181 Sec. 3124 (2008).
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To obtain information on DOE's contractor protective forces, we
visited three of the sites with enduring Category I SNM missions--
Pantex, the Savannah River Site, and Los Alamos National Laboratory--
because each site represented one of the three different types of
protective force contracts currently in place. We also met with
protective force contractors, Federal site office officials, and
protective force union representatives at these sites. We also
distributed a data collection instrument to protective force
contractors and Federal site office officials at each of these sites
and at the other three sites with enduring Category I SNM missions--Y-
12, the Nevada Test Site, and the Idaho National Laboratory. From this
instrument, we received site information about the protective forces,
the status of TRF and DBT implementations, views on DOE options for
managing the protective forces, and the reliability of site data. Prior
to this testimony, protective force union officials provided us with
updated information.
We conducted our work from April 2008 to March 2010 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards, which require us
to plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained
provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives.
PROTECTIVE FORCES ARE NOT UNIFORMLY MANAGED, ORGANIZED, STAFFED,
TRAINED, OR COMPENSATED
Contractor protective forces--including 2,339 unionized officers
and their 376 nonunionized supervisors--are not uniformly managed,
organized, staffed, trained, or compensated across the 6 DOE sites we
reviewed. For example, we found the following:
Three different types of protective force contracts
are in use. These contract types influence how protective force
operations are overseen by Federal officials and how protective
force operations are coordinated with other site operations.\7\
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\7\ These types of contracts include: (1) direct contracts between
protective force contractors and DOE or NNSA; (2) a component of
management and operating (M&O) contracts between M&O contractors and
DOE or NNSA; and (3) subcontracts between an M&O contractor and a
protective force contractor.
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The size of sites' protective forces ranges from 233
to 533 uniformed, unionized officers, and the composition of
these forces and their associated duties and responsibilities
vary based on their categorization. Protective forces are
divided into four categories: \8\
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\8\ Other positions, such as trainers and alarm operators,
constitute the remaining 3 percent of protective force positions. At
some sites, personnel in such positions may be SPO qualified, and their
positions are counted in the appropriate SO categories. All protective
force numbers were current as of September 30, 2008.
Security Officer (SO): Responsible for unarmed
security duties such as checking for valid security
badges. SOs represent about 5 percent of total
unionized protective forces.
Security Police Officer-I (SPO-I): Primarily
responsible for protecting fixed posts during combat.
SPO-Is represent about 34 percent of total unionized
protective forces.
SPO-II: Primarily responsible for mobile
combat to prevent terrorists from reaching their target
but can also be assigned to fixed posts. SPO-IIs
represent about 39 percent of total unionized
protective forces.
SPO-III: Primarily responsible for mobile combat and
special response skills, such as those needed to recapture SNM
(on site) and recover SNM (off site) if terrorists succeed in
acquiring it. SPO-IIIs are usually organized into special
response teams, and SPO-IIIs represent about 19 percent of
total unionized protective forces.
Each protective force has uniformed, nonunionized
supervisors, but the duties, responsibilities, and ranks of
these supervisors are generally site specific and not detailed
in DOE's protective force policies.
DOE policy mandates certain protective force training
but allows sites some flexibility in implementation. For
example, newly hired protective forces must complete DOE's
Basic Security Police Officer Training class, but these
courses, offered by each of the sites we reviewed, range in
length from 9 to 16 weeks. In addition, we found that one site
had largely completed the implementation of most aspects of the
TRF initiative, but others are not expecting to do so until the
end of fiscal year 2011.
Pay, based on the site and the category of protective
forces, ranges from nearly $19 per hour to over $26 per
hour.\9\ Overtime pay, accrued in different ways at the sites,
and other premium pay, such as additional pay for night shifts
and holidays, may significantly increase protective force pay.
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\9\ Pay rates were current as of September 30, 2008.
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While all employers contributed to active protective
force members' medical, dental, and life insurance benefits,
they differed in the amount of their contributions and in the
retirement benefits they offered. In general, new hires were
offered defined contribution plans, such as a 401(k) plan, that
provides eventual retirement benefits that depend on the amount
of contributions by the employer or employee, as appropriate,
as well as the earnings and losses of the invested funds. At
the time of our review, two sites offered new hires defined
benefit plans that promised retirees a certain monthly payment
at retirement. Two other sites had defined benefit plans that
covered protective force members hired before a particular date
but were not open to new hires.
We found two primary reasons for these differences. First,
protective forces at all six of the sites we reviewed operate under
separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements. Second, DOE
has a long-standing contracting approach of defining desired results
and outcomes--such as effective security--instead of detailed,
prescriptive guidance on how to achieve those outcomes.\10\ While
creating some of the differences noted, this approach, as we have
previously reported, allows security to be closely tailored to site-
and mission-specific needs.\11\
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\10\ DOE Order 251.1C, Departmental Directives Program, specifies
that DOE directives should focus on results by specifying the goals and
requirements that must be met and, to the extent possible, refraining
from mandating how to fulfill the goals and requirements.
\11\ Our recent review showed that DOE's policy for nuclear weapons
security provides local officials with greater flexibility than the
Department of Defense's policy for determining how to best meet
security standards and has a greater emphasis on cost-benefit analysis
as a part of the decisionmaking process. See GAO, Homeland Defense:
Greater Focus on Analysis of Alternatives and Threats Needed to Improve
DOD's Strategic Nuclear Weapons Security, GAO-09-828 (Washington, DC:
Sept. 18, 2009).
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TACTICAL RESPONSE FORCE IMPLEMENTATION HAS RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT THE
LONGEVITY OF PROTECTIVE FORCES CAREERS
Since its inception in 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE
security organizations, among protective force contractors, and in
protective force unions about the ability of protective forces--
especially older individuals serving in protective forces--to continue
meeting DOE's weapons, physical fitness, and medical qualifications. As
we reported in 2005,\12\ some site security officials recognized they
would have to carefully craft career transition plans for protective
force officers who may not be able to meet TRF standards. Adding to
these concerns are DOE's broader efforts to manage its long-term
postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors, which could
have a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for
protective forces. In 2006, DOE issued its Contractor Pension and
Medical Benefits Policy (Notice 351.1), which was designed to limit
DOE's long-term pension and postretirement liabilities. A coalition of
protective force unions stated that this policy moved them in the
opposite direction from their desire for early and enhanced retirement
benefits.
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\12\ GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated
Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-05-611 (Washington, DC:
July 15, 2005).
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Concerns over TRF implementation and DOE's efforts to limit long-
term pension and postretirement liabilities contributed to a 44-day
protective force strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. Initially, Pantex
contractor security officials designated all of the plant's protective
force positions as having to meet a more demanding DOE combatant
standard,\13\ a move that could have disqualified a potentially sizable
number of protective forces from duty. Under the collective bargaining
agreement that was eventually negotiated in 2007, some protective
forces were allowed to meet a less demanding combatant standard. DOE
has also rescinded its 2006 Contractor Pension and Medical Benefits
Policy. However, according to protective force union officials, failure
to resolve issues surrounding TRF implementation and retirement
benefits could lead to strikes at three sites with large numbers of
protective forces--Pantex, the Savannah River Site, and Y-12--when
their collective bargaining agreements expire in 2012.
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\13\ DOE's combatant standards are defined by specific physical
fitness, firearms, and medical qualifications. SPO-Is must meet
defensive combatant standards, while SPO-IIs and SPO-IIIs must meet
more demanding offensive combatant standards.
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EITHER IMPROVING THE EXISTING CONTRACTOR FORCES SYSTEM OR CREATING A
FEDERAL FORCE COULD RESULT IN MORE UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF PROTECTIVE
FORCES
To manage its protective forces more effectively and uniformly,
over the past decades DOE has considered two principal options--
improving elements of the existing contractor system or creating a
Federal protective force. We identified five major criteria that DOE
officials, protective force contractors, and union officials have used
to assess the advantages and disadvantages of these options.\14\
Overall, in comparing these criteria against the two principal options,
we found that neither contractor nor Federal forces seems
overwhelmingly superior, but each has offsetting advantages and
disadvantages. Either option could result in effective and more uniform
security if well-managed. However, we identified transitional problems
with converting the current protective force to a federalized force.
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\14\ We reviewed five DOE studies completed between 1992 and 2009,
as well as responses to our data collection instrument, to identify
these criteria.
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When assessing whether to improve the existing contractor system or
federalize protective forces, DOE, protective force contractors, and
union officials have used the following five criteria:
A personnel system that supports force resizing and
ensures high-quality protective force members.
Greater standardization of protective forces across
sites to more consistently support high performance and ready
transfer of personnel between sites.
Better DOE management and oversight to ensure
effective security.
Prevention or better management of protective force
strikes.
Containment of the forces' costs within expected
budgets.
Evaluating the two principal options--maintaining the current
security force structure or federalizing the security force--
against these criteria, we found that if the forces are well-
managed, either contractor or Federal forces could result in
effective and more uniform security for several reasons:
First, both options have offsetting advantages and
disadvantages, with neither option emerging as clearly
superior. When compared with a possible federalized protective
force, a perceived advantage of a contractor force is greater
flexibility for hiring or terminating an employee to resize the
forces; a disadvantage is that a contractor force can strike.
In contrast, federalization could better allow protective
forces to advance or laterally transfer to other DOE sites to
meet protective force members' needs or DOE's need to resize
particular forces, something that is difficult to do under the
current contractor system.
Second, a key disadvantage of the current contractor
system, such as potential strikes for contractor forces, does
not preclude effective operations if the security force is
well-managed. For instance, a 2009 memo signed by the NNSA
administrator stated that NNSA had demonstrated that it can
effectively manage strikes through the use of replacement
protective forces.
Third, distinctions between the two options can be
overstated by comparing worst- and best-case scenarios, when
similar conditions might be realized under either option. For
example, a union coalition advocates federalization to get
early and enhanced retirement benefits, which are available for
law enforcement officers and some other Federal positions, to
ensure a young and vigorous workforce. However, such benefits
might also be provided to contractor protective forces.
Reliably estimating the costs to compare protective force
options proved difficult and precluded our detailed reporting
on it. Since contractor and Federal forces could each have many
possible permutations, choosing any particular option to assess
would be arbitrary. For example, a 2008 NNSA-sponsored study
identified wide-ranging federalization options, such as
federalizing all or some SPO positions at some or all
facilities or reorganizing them under an existing or a new
agency. In addition, DOE would have to decide on the
hypothetical options' key cost factors before it could
reasonably compare costs. For example, when asked about some
key cost factors for federalization, an NNSA Service Center
official said that a detailed workforce analysis would be
needed to decide whether DOE would either continue to use the
same number of SPOs with high amounts of scheduled overtime or
hire a larger number of SPOs who would work fewer overtime
hours. Also, the official said that until management directs a
particular work schedule for federalized protective forces,
there is no definitive answer to the applicable overtime rules,
such as whether overtime begins after 8 hours in a day. The
amount of overtime and the factors affecting it are crucial to
a sound cost estimate because overtime pay can now account for
up to about 50 percent of pay for worked hours.
FEDERALIZING PROTECTIVE FORCES COULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES EITHER UNDER
CURRENT LAWS OR WITH SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR ENHANCED RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
If protective forces were to be federalized under existing law, the
current forces probably would not be eligible for early and enhanced
retirement benefits and might face a loss of pay or even their jobs.
For example:
According to officials at the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) \15\ and NNSA's Service Center,\16\ if
contractor SPOs were federalized under existing law, they would
likely be placed into the Federal security guard (GS-0085) job
series. Although a coalition of unions has sought
federalization to allow members to have early and enhanced
retirement benefits, which allows employees in certain Federal
jobs to retire at age 50 with 20 years of service, Federal
security guards are not eligible for these benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ OPM is the central human resources agency for the Federal
government.
\16\ NNSA's Service Center provides business, technical, financial,
legal, human resources, and management support to NNSA site
organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our analysis indicated transitioning protective force
members may receive lower pay rates as Federal security guards.
Contractor force members receive top pay rates that could not
generally be matched under the likely General Schedule pay
grades.
If protective forces were federalized, OPM officials
told us that current members would not be guaranteed a Federal
job and would have to compete for the new Federal positions;
thus, they risk not being hired. Nonveteran protective force
members are particularly at risk because competition for
Federal security guard positions is restricted to those with
veterans' preference, if they are available.
According to OPM officials, legislation would be required to
provide Federal protective forces with early and enhanced retirement
benefits because their positions do not fit the current definition of
law enforcement officers that would trigger such benefits. However, if
such legislation were enacted, these benefits' usual provisions could
create hiring and retirement difficulties for older force members.
Older members might not be rehired because agencies are typically
authorized to set a maximum age, often age 37, for entry into Federal
positions with early retirement. In addition, even if there were a
waiver from the maximum age of hire, older protective forces members
could not retire at age 50 because they would have had to work 20 years
to meet the Federal service requirement for ``early'' retirement
benefits. These forces could retire earlier if they were granted credit
for their prior years of service under DOE and NNSA contracts. However,
OPM officials told us OPM would strongly oppose Federal retirement
benefits being granted for previous years of contractor service
(retroactive benefits). According to these officials, these retroactive
benefits would be without precedent and would violate the basic concept
that service credit for retirement benefits is only available for
eligible employment at the time it was performed. Moreover, retroactive
benefits would create an unfunded liability for Federal retirement
funds.
DOE SEEKS TO ADDRESS PROTECTIVE FORCE ISSUES BY REFORMING CONTRACTOR
FORCES, BUT PROGRESS HAS BEEN LIMITED TO DATE
In a joint January 2009 memorandum, senior officials from NNSA and
DOE rejected the federalization of protective forces as an option and
supported the continued use of contracted protective forces--but with
improvements. They concluded that, among other things, the transition
to a Federal force would be costly and would be likely to provide
little, if any, increase in security effectiveness. However, these
officials recognized that the current contractor system could be
improved by addressing some of the issues that federalization might
have resolved. In particular, they announced the pursuit of an
initiative to better standardize protective forces' training and
equipment. According to these officials, more standardization serves to
increase effectiveness, provide cost savings, and facilitate better
responses to potential work stoppages. In addition, in March 2009, DOE
commissioned a study group to recommend ways to overcome the personnel
system problems that might prevent protective force members from
working to a normal retirement age, such as 60 to 65, and building
reasonable retirement benefits.
In addition, NNSA established a Security Commodity Team to
establish standardized procurement processes and to identify and test
security equipment that can be used across sites. According to NNSA
officials, NNSA established a common mechanism in December 2009 for
sites to procure ammunition. In addition, to move toward more
standardized operations and a more centrally managed protective force
program, NNSA started a broad security review to identify possible
improvements. As a result, according to NNSA officials in January 2010,
NNSA has developed a draft standard for protective force operations,
which is intended to clarify both policy expectations and a consistent
security approach that is both effective and efficient.
For the personnel system initiative to enhance career longevity and
retirement options, in June 2009, the DOE-chartered study group made 29
recommendations that were generally designed to enable members to reach
a normal retirement age within the protective force, take another job
within DOE, or transition to a non-DOE career. The study group
identified 14 of its 29 career and retirement recommendations as
involving low- or no-cost actions that could conceivably be implemented
quickly. For example, some recommendations call for reviews to find
ways to maximize the number of armed and unarmed positions that SPOs
can fill when they can no longer meet their current combatant
requirements. Other recommendations focus on providing training and
planning assistance for retirement and job transitions. The study group
also recognized that a majority (15 out of 29) of its personnel system
recommendations, such as enhancing retirement plans to make them more
equivalent and portable across sites, may be difficult to implement
largely because of budget constraints.
Progress on the 29 recommendations had been limited at the time of
our review. When senior department officials were briefed on the
personnel system recommendations in late June 2009, they took them
under consideration for further action but immediately approved one
recommendation--to extend the life of the study group by forming a
standing committee. They directed the standing committee to develop
implementation strategies for actions that can be done in the near term
and, for recommendations requiring further analysis, additional
funding, or other significant actions, to serve as an advisory panel
for senior department officials. According to a DOE official in early
December 2009, NNSA and DOE were in varying stages of reviews to
advance the other 28 recommendations. Later that month, NNSA addressed
an aspect of one recommendation about standardization, in part by
formally standardizing protective force uniforms. In the Conference
Report for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,
the conferees directed the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of
the NNSA to develop a comprehensive DOE-wide plan to identify and
implement the recommendations of the study group.
In closing, while making changes to reflect the post-September 11
security environment, DOE and its protective force contractors through
their collective bargaining agreements have not successfully aligned
protective force personnel systems--which affect career longevity, job
transitions, and retirement--with the increased physical and other
demands of a more paramilitary operation. Without better alignment, in
our opinion, there is greater potential for a strike at a site, as well
as potential risk to site security, when protective forces' collective
bargaining agreements expire. In the event of a strike at one site, the
differences in protective forces' training and equipment make it
difficult to readily provide reinforcements from other sites. Even if
strikes are avoided, the effectiveness of protective forces may be
reduced if tensions exist between labor and management. These concerns
have elevated the importance of finding the most effective approach to
maintaining protective force readiness, including an approach that
better aligns personnel systems and protective force requirements. At
the same time, DOE must consider its options for managing protective
forces in a period of budgetary constraints. With these considerations
in mind, DOE and NNSA have recognized that the decentralized management
of protective forces creates some inefficiencies and that some systemic
career and longevity issues are not being resolved through actions at
individual sites. NNSA's standardization initiatives and
recommendations made by a DOE study group offer a step forward.
However, the possibility in 2012 of strikes at three of its highest
risk sites makes it imperative, as recommended by our report and
directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, that DOE soon resolve the issues surrounding protective forces'
personnel system.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or other members of the
subcommittee have.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
Senator Vitter, there are two votes starting at 2:45 p.m.,
so if we could, maybe we could finish the other opening
statements, go vote, and then come back and you can give us
some opening statements.
Senator Vitter. Sure.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
Mr. Podonsky.
STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HEALTH,
SAFETY, AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Vitter, thank
you for inviting me to testify about the Department of Energy's
efforts to address the career-related concerns of our
protective force.
This hearing comes at a critical junction in the
Department's longstanding efforts to evaluate the tactical
capabilities of the protective forces supported by career and
retirement opportunities commensurate with the professionalism
we've come to expect.
When the Department was created, protective forces were
essentially industrial security gate guards. In the early
1980s, the Department acknowledged the potential for more
serious terrorist threats, and began a dramatic effort to ramp
up the tactical capabilities of its protective forces. This was
accompanied by increasing performance expectations for the
protective force members. Compensation and benefits improved,
but did not always keep pace with the increasing demands of the
job.
In the 1990s, cuts in the protective force numbers became
part of the post-Cold War peace dividend. The events of
September 11 ushered in a new focus on security across the DOE
and the Nation, and a new emphasis on protective forces. The
Department needed a security posture able to meet much greater
challenges, including the need for more tactical capability
security forces.
In 2004, I recommended to Secretary Abraham that he create
an initiative called the Elite Force, which included
federalization of the protective force. The Elite Force concept
is currently known as the DOE's TRF Initiative. The results, in
terms of capabilities of this initiative, have been impressive,
but a practical and affordable path towards improving
protective force service as a career has not occurred.
Studies conducted in 2004 identified federalization of the
Department's protective force as the preferred option, but
acknowledged that no realistic path forward toward this goal
existed. The National Council of Security Police (NCSP) came to
support federalization as a means of advancing its program for
improved career progression and retirement benefits, but there
still seemed to be no viable and affordable means for the DOE
to actually implement this concept.
Among the difficulties was the need for complex changes to
legislation and regulations to enable a federalization process
that would protect incumbents and/or classify personnel as law
enforcement. At the time, congressional interest in making the
complex legislative changes necessary was not apparent, so the
Department felt that most of the major issues should be
addressed in some manner under the current contract protective
force model.
In 2009, I chartered a broad-base protective force career
options study group to address protective force concerns,
composed of experts and DOE security professionals and leaders
from the NCSP. That group made 29 recommendations. The GAO's
January 2010 study (GAO-10-275) of protective force personnel
issues seemed to support the recommendations by recommending
that the Department respond to each of them.
We have since created the Protective Force Career Options
Committee to assist policy and line organizations in
implementing the study group recommendations. The Department
has drawn together its best expertise to develop an appropriate
implementation plan for these recommendations.
I would like to take a moment here just to offer a special
thank you to the NCSP and the protective force union leaders
for their dedicated and cooperative efforts over the last year
to not only help us identify the problems, but also the
potential solutions.
Consistent with Secretary Chu's management principle to
treat our people as our greatest asset, the Department's
actions reflect a commitment to identify and promote efforts to
ensure members of the protective forces are treated in a manner
consistent with their vital role and in recognition of
professional demands of that role entailing.
While the Department can cite gains in implementing
security initiatives that provide more robust asset protection,
we have not yet made similar progress in efforts to address all
concerns of the protective force members regarding career
prospects and related issues.
Much of the lack of progress actually speaks to the
complexity and difficulty in resolving these issues. The DOE
and NNSA are, in fact, addressing the recommendations
associated with response planning, deployment strategy, force
restructuring, training needs, and standardization of
protective force weapons, equipment, and uniforms. Our national
training center in Albuquerque is developing the curricula for
protective force career progression and career transition
training.
My office is also in the process of reviewing
recommendations dealing with protective force physical fitness
standards, medical requirements, and human reliability program.
Most of the remaining recommendations involve the very
difficult issue of retirement, mobility among contractors,
disability retirement, and retraining and placement outside the
protective force. These areas are further complicated because
they are mostly defined in collective bargaining agreements
between the contractors and the unions.
The Department should explore ways to craft a
comprehensive, standardized approach to protective force career
progression and retirement issues that will ensure that
protective force members, regardless of location, are treated
equitably and with the assurance that neither age nor injury
will unfairly disadvantage them, in comparison with the larger
departmental workforce.
For example, Mr. Chairman, the Department could consider
pursuing a program similar to the benefits allowed for
beryllium workers under 10 CFR 850. That would provide
retraining and transfer or 2 years' saved pay benefits to
protective force personnel who are injured or are otherwise
unable to meet physical standards.
While my office will continue to assist in resolving these
complex issues, by their very nature and inherent cost and
contractual implications, alternate resolution is clearly
within the purview of the line management. In this regard, I
should also emphasize that line management is also deeply
engaged alongside HSS, my organization, in this task.
In conclusion, the protective force is critical to DOE's
overall protection, and it is the Department's and the Nation's
best interest to ensure that protective force personnel are
treated equitably, and that their legitimate concerns are
addressed to the greatest possible extent.
We conducted studies on this topic in 1992, 1997, 2004, and
2008. DOE is moving to address those issues that can be
resolved within existing operation on resource constraints.
Fair resolutions to the more complex and difficult issues will
require cooperation and compromise by all the principals
involved--line management, the unions, and Congress.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky follows:]
Prepared Statement by Glenn S. Podonsky
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: thank you for inviting
me to testify on the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to deal with
the interdependence and complexity of protective force personnel
issues, contracting requirements, and security needs at our national
security facilities. Specifically, we must fairly address the
reasonable concerns of protective force personnel for clear and
attainable career paths to retirement, yet also balance those desires
with the Department's need to maintain forces capable of securing our
facilities in a cost effective manner. The Department has been pursuing
ways to address these overlapping needs for many years.
BACKGROUND
As early as 2003, my office recognized a number of concerns
associated with the Department's contractor protective force model.
Some concerns were expressed by protective force members and their
unions, and others by the Department's security and line managers.
Personnel concerns included issues such as the lack of a career path
that protective force personnel could reasonably be assured of until
retirement, nominally at age 65, as well as the lack of alternative
positions available to personnel who, due to job-related injuries,
other disabilities, or advancing age, could no longer meet the physical
standards required for armed positions. Management's concerns with the
contractor force model included the very real potential for protective
force strikes at the expiration of collective bargaining agreements and
the inefficiencies associated with a lack of standardization among
protective forces' weapons, equipment, and training.
The opportunity to consider and, hopefully, act on these issues was
one factor in our efforts to have then Secretary Abraham include
protective force upgrades prominently in his May 2004 comprehensive
package of security initiatives. The protective force element of the
security initiative was referred to at the time as the ``elite force''
initiative and recognized the need to respond to revised perceptions of
the post-September 11 threat environment by transitioning some
protective force elements toward a more combat-capable status that
included mobile response and increased offensive combat capabilities.
In response to the Deputy Secretary's June 2004 direction to
develop options to implement the elite force initiative--direction
which specifically included examining possible federalization of
protective forces--my office and the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) tasked a Protective Force Working Group to study
the inherent issues. The Working Group issued papers in August and
October 2004, and their recommendations included federalization of the
protective forces. The Working Group's federalization position was
based on perceived principles associated with elevating protective
forces to levels of equal status and capability with the nation's elite
military units; it was not accompanied by a cost/benefit analysis or a
plan for achieving federalization. Initial analysis of the
federalization issue indicated that while federalization offered
potential benefits, it also posed significant difficulties.
Based largely on the results of the working group, in January 2005
the Department identified its chosen path forward for implementing the
elite force initiative. Phase I included actions to enhance policy,
tactical planning, training and readiness, physical standards, and use
of security technology. The issue of federalization was deferred, to
avoid creating instability during a time of already profound change
affecting the protective forces, and also because the Department had
concluded that the major benefits of federalization could be achieved
within the contractor protective forces model so long as the
contractors and the unions supported the effort to establish and
maintain an elite force.
In March 2006, the Department promulgated major policy changes to
implement the elite force concept, which had become known as the
Tactical Response Force concept. Initial misinterpretation of these
changes led to perceptions that a much larger proportion of protective
force personnel would be compelled to meet the more demanding offensive
combatant physical standard. This prospect caused concern among some
protective force personnel and their unions; the changes were seen as
exacerbating longstanding concerns regarding the ability of aging or
disabled personnel to meet increased physical performance requirements,
and hence to remain on the job until retirement age. Protective forces
unions voiced increasing support for federalization in the belief that
it would include provisions for an early retirement program as well as
other benefits associated with existing Federal law enforcement
programs. A strike by the Pantex Guard Union in the spring of 2007 was
influenced in part by a narrow interpretation of the new requirements
of the proposed Tactical Response Force.
In March 2008, NNSA received the results of a study--``Comparative
Analysis of Contractor and Federal Protective Forces At Fixed Sites''--
it had commissioned to examine the contract force/federalization issue.
In June 2008 NNSA received a follow on ``Cost Analysis and Modeling''
supplement to the initial report. The study and supplement concluded
that key union assumptions about federalization--such as 20 year
retirement, automatic hiring of incumbents, and portability or
grandfathering of retirement benefits--could not occur under current
law; converting contract protective forces ``en masse'' to Federal
forces would require extensive new legislation.
As the issue of federalization was examined, it became clear that
federalization would be difficult and would potentially have negative
consequences for many current protective force members. Federalization
of the private sector contractor force would require more complex
legislation, for example, than had an earlier successful effort to give
nuclear materials couriers, who were already Federal employees,
retirement benefits equivalent to law enforcement officers under the
Civil Service Retirement System and the Federal Employees' Retirement
System.
The NNSA-commissioned analyses also confirmed that many of the
concerns associated with the contract force model could be addressed
constructively within that model. DOE management including NNSA,
decided not to pursue federalization, but rather to address identified
problems within the private, contractor force model. In January 2009,
the Deputy Secretary was informed of the proposed path forward--not to
federalize the protective forces but to implement standardized
procedures and practices at NNSA Category I facilities which would
provide the major benefits of federalization while maintaining
contractor protective forces.
Although the Department does not consider the federalization model
the best option for meeting its security needs, it remains committed to
addressing the major career path and retirement-related concerns of its
contractor protective forces, as expressed through their unions and the
National Council of Security Police, an umbrella organization made up
of DOE protective force bargaining units. Consequently, in March 2009
the Office of Health, Safety and Security commissioned a Protective
Force Career Options Initiative Study Group to examine realistic and
reasonable options for improving the career opportunities and
retirement prospects of protective force members while maintaining a
robust and effective security posture. Response to this initiative was
positive: representation on the Study Group included the National
Council of Security Police (represented in the hearing today by Mike
Stumbo), my office, NNSA, and other DOE headquarters program offices.
In June of last year, the Study Group made 29 recommendations; 14 are
considered to be cost neutral and achievable under existing governance
structures while the other 15 involve additional program costs and/or
changes to existing management and contractual approaches. The National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Department
to develop and submit to Congress by April 30, 2010, a comprehensive
Department-wide plan to implement the Study Group recommendations. We
intend to submit that plan on time.
In July 2009, and consistent with one of the Study Group
recommendations, we created the Protective Force Career Options
Committee as a standing committee tasked with continuing the work of
the Study Group by assisting DOE in implementation of the Study Group's
recommendations.
In January 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
published the results of a Congressionally mandated study of the
management of DOE protective forces. The GAO study recommends that DOE
respond to the 29 recommendations of the DOE Study Group by developing
and executing implementation plans for those recommendations identified
as low- or no-cost, and by planning and conducting research to identify
the most beneficial and financially feasible options for implementing
the remaining recommendations that may involve substantial costs or
contractual and organizational changes. The Department has concurred
with the findings and recommendations of the GAO report.
CURRENT STATUS
This brings us to the current status of our efforts to address the
situation and my assessment of what we have accomplished and what
remains to be accomplished. First, the Office of Health, Safety and
Security remains committed to assisting the Department in providing
levels of security at our facilities that are consistent with the
assets in our custody and our understanding of the most current
national threat environment. That commitment includes an effort to
identify and promote the necessary actions to ensure that the
protective forces are treated in a manner consistent with their vital
role and the heavy professional demands it imposes.
The Department has made significant progress at considerable cost
in its efforts to provide its protective forces with the tactical and
technical tools required to implement the Tactical Response Force
concept and ensure mission success; some of those efforts remain works
in progress. The Department has made significant investments in
physical security upgrades such as barriers, advanced sensor systems,
and hardened defensive positions; in advanced, more capable and longer
range weapons systems and tactical equipment; in defensive strategies
and tactical planning to field the Tactical Response Force concept to
advantage; and in tactical training to improve the skills of the
personnel who will comprise the Tactical Response Force. These upgrades
are designed to increase the tactical effectiveness of the protective
forces while decreasing their vulnerability to adversary actions.
Implementation of the Tactical Response Force concept as well as
the weapons and equipment upgrades and personnel training have varied
from site to site, as expected; some sites continue to adjust their
implementation efforts to better align with local conditions. This
remains an ongoing process with more work to be done at some sites
before they will have fully integrated the old and new approaches.
The Department has made clear gains in implementing security
initiatives that provide more robust asset protection and mission-
related advantages to protective force personnel. The Department has
not made similar progress, however, in its efforts to address the
concerns of protective force members regarding their career prospects
and retirement issues. The Tactical Response Force concept includes a
requirement for career progression planning for each protective force
member, although many individual plans are still outstanding.
I would like to take a minute here to emphasize that our lack of
progress in some areas does not reflect a lack of commitment or effort
on our part, but rather reflects the complexity and difficulty of
determining and maintaining the most appropriate and fair balance among
issues which affect the well-being of the protective forces and the
success of our mission to provide highest quality, cost effective
security. The Department's efforts are and will continue to be aligned
with the Study Group's 29 recommendations. The Study Group, in fact,
has evolved into the Protective Force Career Options Committee,
referenced earlier in this testimony.
The NNSA, in whose facilities most of the protective forces serve,
began a Zero Based Security Review in July 2009. This review is
developing detailed analyses of security programs and needs at each
NNSA facility, and is expected to be completed by the end of 2010. It
is expected to provide information and analyses directly applicable to
many of the Study Group's recommendations.
In addition, DOE's National Training Center is currently conducting
analyses and a curriculum development effort to support protective
force career progression and career transition training. In conjunction
with this effort, HSS is also working to modify an existing complex-
wide job register to better accommodate the specific needs of
protective force personnel.
Study Group recommendations dealing with protective force physical
fitness standards, medical requirements, and the Human Reliability
Program all involve requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations. To
modify these requirements, the Department must go through a formal
rulemaking process. The Office of Health, Safety, and Security has
established a task team to oversee this process. The team is currently
reviewing the physical fitness standards for proposed revision, has
nearly completed a set of proposed revisions to the medical standards,
and has a proposed revision of the Human Reliability Program regulation
under review in the Department.
Action on a few recommendations--retirement and (financial)
retirement planning, portability/mobility among contractors, disability
retirement, retraining and placement outside of protective forces, and
various personnel services and actions--is proving difficult. While
these recommendations pertain to issues of high importance to the
protective forces and their unions, these are also issues covered in
the collective bargaining agreements between the private sector
contractors and the unions. Although the Department can establish the
overall parameters for future contracts, the Department is prohibited
by Federal Acquisition Regulations from interfering with collective
bargaining agreements or dictating the terms of those agreements. Since
each of the respective protective forces contractors and unions
negotiate agreements based on their specific interests, significant
differences exist in the terms and conditions of various contracts from
site to site. The extent to which unions would be amenable to
negotiating contracts with common clauses is unknown, although the
Department would be willing to explore ways to accommodate such an
effort through the parameters it establishes in future contracts. For
example, the Department should consider establishing a program--similar
to the benefits currently allowed for beryllium workers under 10 CFR
850--that would provide retraining and transfer or 2 year save pay
benefits for protective force personnel who are injured or otherwise
unable to meet physical standards. HSS is currently working with line
management with the goal of crafting a comprehensive, standardized
approach to protective force career progression and retirement issues.
CONCLUSION
Of the 29 recommendations, the Department is making good progress
on those that can be resolved within DOE. We are also moving forward on
those issues which can be addressed through rulemaking, although that
process is slower. The Department is still seeking workable solutions
to the more difficult problems which variously involve contracting and
collective bargaining. As noted above, the Department intends to
present a plan to implement all 29 recommendations to Congress in
April. We recognize that the protective forces are a key element in the
protection of our most sensitive national security assets. Fair
resolution of the most difficult protective forces personnel issues
will necessarily require cooperation and compromise by all parties. The
Department also believes firmly that needed changes and improvements
can be made within the contract protective forces model, and that it
will benefit both the Department and protective forces personnel to
work together to resolve all outstanding issues in as fair and fast a
process as possible. The Department is committed to finding solutions
that ensure the fair and equitable treatment of each protective force
member.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo.
STATEMENT OF MIKE STUMBO, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
SECURITY POLICE
Mr. Stumbo. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
my name is Mike Stumbo. I'm pleased to be here to testify, at
your request, on issues relating to the Department of Energy
Protective Force.
I proudly serve as a security police officer (SPO) at the
Pantex site. Those of you that are not familiar with the Pantex
site, it is the site of final assembly and disassembly of
nuclear weapons here in the United States.
I consider my job, like many of my fellow DOE SPOs, as
continuing service to my country, defending against adversaries
who are organized to destroy this country.
I am also the president of the National Council of Security
Police, commonly known as the NCSP. Our organization was formed
by constituent unions as an active collective voice common to
all DOE SPOs throughout the DOE enterprise. We provide
unfiltered insight from the field. We call it the ``boots-on-
the-ground perspective.''
For the past several years, we have focused on the question
of Federalizing the protective force, which has been an area of
extensive discussion and review within DOE for many years.
As highlighted in the recent GAO report, there are
significant personnel issues affecting the ability of the
protective forces to perform their mission that cannot be
compromised.
On July 16, 1945, in the early morning hours, near
Alamogordo, NM, a test code-named ``Trinity'' refashioned our
world forever. The new weapon became the very fabric of our
national defense and the primary deterrent of attack from our
greatest enemies. Our government produces these weapons, and it
is an inherent government function to protect them.
Currently, the security of our Nation's nuclear weapons and
weapons-grade material is contracted out to private security
contractors. It is the private structure that has not allowed
these exceptional men and women who protect these weapons of
mass destruction the ability to enjoy terms and conditions of
employment that support a shortened career, a career that
demands the highest physical, medical, and training standards
in any law enforcement arena.
Quite frankly, new hires coming out of the military see
these jobs as a continuation of military service in the private
sector. But, quickly they find out that there is no incentive
to make this a career. After investing time, money, and
clearances, many transition to the law-enforcement
opportunities that are career-based. This is not a novel or new
issue; the conflicts that exist between profit versus security,
when private companies protect nuclear assets, are inherent.
It was identified in 1990, by the GAO (GAO/RC8D-91-12), to
adopt federalization as a potential structure; again in 2004,
by the Department of Energy, again to adopt federalization as
potential structure. Shortly after that, the DOE chief health,
safety, and security officer commissioned a team composed of
DOE line management and NCSP leadership to address career
opportunities and retirement prospects for SPOs. The
recommended 29 options are captured in the 2010 GAO report. The
NCSP commends HSS for having the courage to initiate this
action among a great deal of controversy.
Our jobs require a vigorous physical security force that
must maintain stringent training and medical standards. It will
require the best 20 years of our lives. We must maintain the
highest level of security to protect the most powerful weapons
known to mankind. In that 20 years, our bodies begin to break
down--knees, ankles; our reactionary skills, target-recognition
skills start to decrease--it's a natural order--not to mention
the risk of exposure from radiation, chemicals, and beryllium.
These hazards are not encountered by our other law-enforcement
counterparts.
What I ask of you today is to recognize the uniqueness and
nature of our work, and the paramount importance of our mission
to this country. There are three entities that perform the
mission of protecting nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon-grade
material: the military, DOE nuclear couriers, and DOE SPOs.
Only one of those entities is outside of the Federal structure,
and that is the DOE SPOs.
Whether we choose to Federalize or maintain the private
security contractor structure, we must adopt the Federal
retirement components that support this vital mission. DOE SPOs
deserve nothing less. Too much time has passed. There have been
plenty of studies.
In closing, I wish to thank the committee for giving me the
opportunity to present our case on behalf of the NCSP. I'm
prepared to answer any questions you may have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stumbo follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mike Stumbo
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Mike Stumbo and
am pleased to be here at your request to testify before you on issues
relating to the Department of Energy (DOE) protective forces. I am one
of them proudly serving as a security police officer at the Pantex
Nuclear Site. I see my job as continuing service to my country by
defending against adversaries who are organized to destroy our country,
Today, I am here to represent all of the Protective Forces who proudly
serve our country throughout the DOE Complex. I serve as the President
of the National Council of Security Police, commonly known as the NCSP.
Our organization was formed by constituent unions to act as a
collective voice on matters that are common to all protective forces
throughout the DOE Complex. Our mission is not to bargain on behalf of
labor unions at the sites, but to speak on issues where we have first
hand personal experience and provide unfiltered insight from the field.
For the past several years, we have focused on the question of
Federalizing the protective force which has been an area of extensive
discussion and review within the DOE for many years. As highlighted in
the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, there are
significant personnel issues affecting the ability of the protective
forces to perform their mission to standards that cannot be
compromised. We believe the time is now to take the necessary steps to
correct personnel issues which will insure a battle ready force;
whether it is through federalization or some other form of legislative
mandate which accomplishes the same results.
On July 16, 1945 in the early morning hours near Alamogordo, NM, a
test code named ``Trinity'' refashioned our world forever. This new
weapon ended a war and has become the very fabric of our national
defense and the primary deterrent to an attack from our greatest
enemies. Our Government produces these weapons of mass destruction as
part of our defense posture. There is no greater mission than to assure
these weapons, and their components, are secured and protected so that
every American can be assured our adversaries have NO access to them.
The consequences of an event at one of these sites are so dire as to be
unthinkable. We believe the securing and protection of our nuclear
arsenal is an inherent government function and must be treated as such.
Anything less is compromising the proper role of our government and in
our judgment potentially compromising the security of our nuclear
assets.
Currently security of our Nation's nuclear weapons and weapons
grade materials, which are stored at various facilities near population
centers throughout the country, is contracted out to private security
contractors. It is this private structure that has not allowed the
exceptional men and women who protect this Nation to enjoy terms and
conditions of employment commensurate with a shortened career resulting
from the many requirements and demands of their jobs. In the field,
this means many of the protective force become dissatisfied with their
job as requirements increase and prospects for career progression or a
secure retirement do not exist, As it relates to current employment, we
are seeing a trend toward lowered job performance and increasing
attrition rates. Quite frankly, new hires coming out of the military
initially see these jobs as a continuation of military service in the
private sector. However, once they have experienced the jobs, the jobs
fall out of favor because there is very little incentive to make this a
career, After investing all the time, money, and training necessary to
attain full clearances, many of our qualified protective forces opt to
transition to local law enforcement careers.
This is not a new or novel issue. The conflicts of interest,
including profit versus performance that are inherent when a private
security company protects nuclear assets has been the subject of
ongoing discussion and review. As far back as 1990, a GAO report began
to unveil problems with securing nuclear weapons and weapons grade
material within a private structure. This report resulted in no action
after identifying the inherent problems. Years later, in 2004, the
topic was re-addressed by a working group. I quote from the memo issued
by the 2004 DOE Protective Force Working Group:
Memorandum: ``The world-changing events of September 11, 2001,
decisively subordinated the old industrial security model to a ``combat
force'' model. This new standard carries profound legal and practical
implications, all of which tend to support adoption of the Federal
force option.''
In 2004, the mandate was clear and the reasons were sound. Again,
no action.
Inexplicably, in 2009 the department changed its position yet again
with a Memorandum dated January 13, 2009 to the acting Deputy Secretary
of DOE stating ``that Federalizing the protective force is no longer a
viable option''. The apparent overriding reasons were budgetary and the
lack of any precedent of Federalizing a group which has been
historically contracted out. What were not adequately addressed are the
many serious security issues that relate to the decision to eliminate
federalization as an option. In our view, the reasoning behind the
change in direction is flawed. The time is now to right the ship and
take corrective action to address the serious personnel issues faced by
DOE.
Due, in part, to NCSP's efforts, on March 31, 2009, the Chief
Health, Safety, and Security Officer (HS-1) of the DOE commissioned a
study to examine ``realistic and reasonable options for improving the
career opportunities and retirement prospects of protective force
members. With the support of both DOE line management and the
leadership of the National Council of Security Police (NCSP), a study
team was assembled under the leadership of the Office of Health,
Safety, and Security. The result of the report is captured in the
January 2010 GAO report'' Nuclear Security DOE Needs to Address
Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues.''
I commend the GAO and its staff who committed approximately 18
months of resources identifying the facts of the current private DOE
structure. One point that stands out in my mind which is captured in
the 2010 GAO report is the advantages and disadvantages of a contractor
structure. Upon a careful reading of Table 7, you will be hard pressed
to find any rational basis for concluding that the contractor model has
any ``real'' advantage. At the core of Federalizing protective forces
is imposing more direct management and standardization throughout the
complex. No one can argue these objectives will not better prepare
protective forces to defend against the enemy. Equally important to the
men and women who serve at our sites, there are Federal benefits which
better serve them for a shortened law enforcement type career. I know
from experience how the current system impacts my brothers and sisters.
It is not uncommon for one of us to reach an age, well before a normal
retirement age, where we can no longer meet the demands of the job.
This may be because of an injury where we cannot meet medical
requirements. Or, it may be just middle age setting in and we cannot
meet the physical fitness requirements. Many good men and women have
found themselves without their job and without a real retirement
option. After giving the best 15 to 20 years of their working lives,
these men and women find it difficult to survive in today's economy. We
are looking for a way to give back to them, in some small way, what
they have given to their country. We now do it for others serving our
country and we should do it for our protective forces.
The current protective force is not alone in its struggle to
achieve a reasonable career path. DOE, in years past had approached the
U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to determine if ``nuclear
materials couriers'' were eligible for coverage under the ``law
enforcement'' category for enhanced retirement benefits under the
special ``20-Year'' benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS) and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). Nuclear
couriers transport the nuclear materials we protect at the sites. The
medical, physical training, and weapons requirements are nearly
identical to the requirements and qualifications we must meet. The only
significant difference in employment is nuclear couriers are Federal
employees. OPM determined that nuclear materials couriers did not meet
the definition of ``law enforcement'' for eligibility and coverage
under the special 20-year retirement benefits.
Despite this decision, the Department pursued and acquired
congressional support for including nuclear materials courier positions
under the special 20-year retirement provisions. Congress acknowledged
the uniqueness and nature of the work performed by nuclear materials
couriers, and accepted the Department's rationale for including this
type of work under the enhanced special 20-Year retirement benefits.
Consequently, a bill was introduced (1998 HR 3616) that later was
passed and resulted in establishment of new legislation under Public
Law 105-261. This law became effective on 10/17/98. The enactment of
this law established a new category of positions, ``Nuclear Materials
Courier,'' for inclusion under the enhanced retirement benefits for
special 20-Year retirement under the CSRS and FERS retirement systems.
The law authorized retroactive credit of service, for the purpose of
establishing an entitlement to an annuity, back to the date the DOE was
established. This date was October 1, 1977.
I come to you today to again acknowledge the uniqueness of and
nature of the work performed by the current DOE Security Police Force.
We are required to maintain the most stringent physical, medical and
training standards in the law enforcement area. Like nuclear couriers,
we should have our own Federal classification recognizing the important
duties and functions we perform for the citizens of our great nation.
Three entities perform the task of securing nuclear weapons and nuclear
grade material. They are the military, OST couriers, and DOE Security
Police Officers. However only one of those entities is outside of a
Federal structure, the men and women I am here speaking on behalf of,
DOE Security Police Officers throughout the United States. This is not
right!
Our men and women are entrusted to protect the most powerful
weapons known to mankind. Every workday, no matter how quiet it starts
or how routine can turn, with or without warning into a terrorist
attack. Our mission is to turn back and defend such an attack putting
our lives on the line. There is no second line of defense. In addition
to combat risks; working at nuclear sites exposes us to radiation,
beryllium, and other chemicals that are potentially harmful to our
health. We encounter daily risks not encountered by our counterparts in
other law enforcement employment. My brothers and sisters who wear the
DOE Protective Force badge are well aware of these risks and have
chosen this service. We train, prepare, and are well equipped. We have
wives, children, and parents who also know the risks and support us
knowing how important the job we have is to our Nation. We simply are
looking for a career path and retirement system which provides some
reasonable measure of financial security when our job comes to an end.
The current career structure that DOE security police officers must
be reformed. Over the last 20 years multiple studies demonstrate the
system is broken. There is no need for more studies or reviews. The
time has come to fix the system by imposing personnel policies that
carry out the long-term objectives of our mission. We believe the
correct fix is Federalizing the protective forces. If that cannot be
accomplished through legislation, at the very least there needs to be a
legislative mandate requiring private contractors provide pension and
retiree health and welfare benefits that mirror Federal benefits. For
many years, we have been told budgetary restraints drive decisionmaking
in this area. We disagree that security in this area can be compromised
because of funding. However, there is a current opportunity to use
available stimulus money to fund benefits for the protective force. I
believe that is exactly what President Obama has in mind by allocating
stimulus monies to DOE. It would serve the dual purpose of working to
raise the level of protection at nuclear sites and present better
economic conditions to newly retired security police officers.
In closing, I wish to thank those men and women that serve as DOE
security police officers and the privilege it has been to serve them as
their spokesman in their efforts to secure a better career path. I also
want to thank this committee for giving me the opportunity to present
the case on behalf of the NCSP and look forward to answering any
questions you may have or providing any additional information you may
need.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
I think if we take a break to go and vote, we'll be right
back. We apologize. That's one thing we have no control over.
[Recess.]
Hearing will come back to order.
First, before the questions, Senator Vitter, any opening
comments you might like to make?
Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of getting to
some questions before we're all pulled away, I will submit my
opening statement for the record.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator David Vitter
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in welcoming our
witnesses today. I welcome you to your first hearing as chairman of
this subcommittee and I look forward to working with you to strengthen
our ability to counter all threats, including potential terrorist
threats to our defensive nuclear capabilities.
Today's hearing focuses on the personnel management of the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Protective Force. Responsible for
protecting some of our Nation's most sensitive materials, the more than
2,000 brave men and women who comprise this force, represent some of
the highest quality, best-trained, and best-equipped security personnel
in the Nation. We are safer and more secure because of their service.
In its assessment of the challenges associated with the unique
personnel management structure of the Protective Force, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) highlights a number of areas that require
attention and resolution both at DOE and here in Congress and I look
forward to beginning that discussion in our hearing today. The report
identifies discrepancies in management, organization, staffing and
training of the forces across the complex, as well as inconsistencies
in pay and benefits. It also examines the costs and benefits associated
with exploring the federalization of the force, to which I conclude is
neither a prudent nor viable answer.
Both DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
recognize that the decentralized management of the protective forces
creates inefficiencies that need to be addressed and that more needs to
be done to resolve what GAO calls ``systemic carrier and longevity
issues'' which are not being resolved thorough contractor actions at
individual sites. This hearing presents an opportunity to acknowledge
challenges, and I look forward to hearing more from DOE and NNSA on
their path forward, as well as learning more about workforce concerns.
But I remain firm in my belief that necessary workforce management
improvement efforts can be effectively achieved by management and labor
working together without federalizing the Protective Force, an approach
that GAO acknowledges could result in negative consequences to the
capabilities of the force.
According to GAO, the current privatized management model offers
some significant advantages that must not be overlooked. While not
perfect, the current model provides the flexibility necessary to tailor
the forces to the diverse and distinct security requirements spanning
the many different sites across the complex. It is a management model
that, according to GAO, instills an ``emphasis on cost-benefit analysis
as a part of the decisionmaking process.'' A model which GAO also cites
as being superior to other government-wide models such as the
Department of Defense.
In January 2009, the NNSA and the DOE Chief Health Safety and
Security Officer jointly acknowledging the need for improvements in
management of the current civilian contracted model but rejected the
federalization of the Protective Forces. In the memo, the department
concludes that the major benefits of federalization can be achieved
through continued utilization of a contractual based approach; that
federalization would not improve implementation nor increase the NNSA
security protection posture; and that federalization in the short term
would be undeniably costly without any indication in the long term of
substantial cost savings.
I concur with the departments findings and agree that personnel
management improvements must be achieved rapidly, in a spirit of
cooperation, and in a cost-effective manner. Furthermore, such
improvements must also be considered with fairness and equity for those
employees who have served so honorably in the Department's Protective
Forces in the defense of our Nation.
The act authorizing this review requires DOE to issue a report on
the management of its protective forces within 90 days after the
issuance of GAO's review and recommendations. I look forward to
reviewing the department's response and I also look forward to further
discussing ways to address these issues outside of the context of
federalizing the protective forces. The GAO report highlights some
significant challenges and I look forward to hearing more from our
witnesses.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Please start off with some questions.
Senator Vitter. Right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Aloise--is that the correct pronunciation?
Mr. Aloise. Yes, sir.
Senator Vitter. Yes. In the GAO report, you state that a
federalized force offers no overall advantage to the current
model, and that, basically, either option could result in
effective and more uniform security, if it's well managed. To
that extent, do you assess that the cost of implementing a
Federalized force, overall, would be higher than the cost of
fixing the current model?
Mr. Aloise. Cost was difficult to analyze. We didn't come
up with a cost estimate, because there are so many variables to
consider, and we just don't have that data. For example, would
DOE hire more guards if they federalized, so they wouldn't have
to spend so much on overtime, or would they keep the number of
guards they have and utilize overtime? What would those
overtime rates be? We didn't have that data, and we could not
come up with a cost estimate.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Mr. Podonsky, do you have any response to the same
question?
Mr. Podonsky. We also do not have hard data, in terms of
the cost. But, what we looked at multiple times, as I said in
my opening remarks, is, where there would be cost savings and/
or effectiveness and security, and each time we've looked at
it, as a department, we've come back in saying Federalizing was
going to be more difficult than it would be if we cleaned up
the current contracting situation that we currently have. So,
one of the solutions, we believe, is to go to model contracts,
with specific clauses in those contracts to take care of the
concerns that the security forces are expressing and we agree
with.
Senator Vitter. Okay. Let me ask all of you, in whatever
order you choose. There are these 29 recommendations that have
been identified jointly by the Department and the unions. We're
working on those, to some extent. If all of those could be
accomplished, in your opinions, what would be the remaining
issues, if any, that were far less than ideal, in terms of
correcting the current model?
Mr. Podonsky. Well, I'll go ahead and start, if my
colleagues agree.
The 29 recommendations was actually a product of the joint
standing study group that was, as I said, both security
professionals and the Department, contractors, and the union.
So those 29 recommendations was the complete smorgasbord of
what they felt--the complete group that the Department needed
to do. My staff have told me, if, in fact, all 29 were
completed, then there'd be very few, if any, issues remaining.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Mr. Stumbo, what would your answer to the same question be?
Mr. Stumbo. I sit on that standing committee, and in our
opinion, based on those 29 recommendations, we identified those
areas that truly had fractured the structure, that had made it
dysfunctional. If we were to implement all of those
recommendations, it would certainly allow us to have a
structure that would permit the DOE SPOs to have a livable
retirement, respectful of the mission that they perform.
Senator Vitter. So, again, if we can check off those 29
items--and I'm not suggesting that's easy to do or we'd do it
overnight--would there be any remaining significant categories,
in your opinion, of real work to be done?
Mr. Stumbo. Not in my opinion, no, sir.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Mr. Aloise.
Mr. Aloise. We agree that the 29 recommendations, if
implemented, would address concerns. The only point I'd like to
make is, some of those recommendations, as you're aware, are
potentially high cost.
Senator Vitter. Right.
Mr. Stumbo, as I appreciate it, a big part of your
workforce's concerns are about retirement.
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir.
Senator Vitter. I've also heard, and I want to see if it's
accurate, that a big portion of the workforce do not take full
advantage of investment opportunities. Do you have a sense of
what the facts are, with regard to the whole workforce? If
nonparticpation is any significant factor, what can we do about
it?
Mr. Stumbo. Well, the 401(k) system was to be introduced
and utilized in our collective bargaining agreements as a
supplement, and only a supplement. So, the baseline, based on
the shortened careers that each one of our men and women have
to endure, is really what needs to be focused on. 401(k) is
great, as long as the markets achieve the success that they can
achieve, but we all recognize, based on the history of our
recent markets, that if all of our eggs were in that basket,
regardless of the participation rate, there's no way that our
men and women could have retired.
Senator Vitter. Well, what's the answer to my specific
factual question about the participation rate? What is it or
isn't it?
Mr. Stumbo. I don't have the exact numbers in front of me
for you. But, I would say, based on the young men and women
that come out of the military, the 401(k) is probably a 50-50-
type percentage for those personnel.
Senator Vitter. What could we do, usefully, to push that a
lot higher, do you think?
Mr. Stumbo. Well, I think that we are dealing with young
men and women who, obviously, are not focused on the future.
So, I believe that we continue to educate them, and try to
place a system in place so that the decisions that they do not
make as young men and women, we have a structure in place that
will provide for them when they are mature enough and recognize
the true need of the mission.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Do either of you have a response to those two questions?
Number one, what are the facts about participation rates?
Number two, what can we be doing to significantly increase
participation rates?
Mr. Aloise. The only thing I would add is that it does vary
from site to site, on the availability of defined benefits
versus the contribution plan. We don't have good numbers on
participation.
Mr. Podonsky. I have nothing to add to that.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
That's all I have right now, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Mr. Podonsky, you've been involved with the oversight of
security forces and development of security policy for several
years, and, as such, I know you're aware of the contractual
evolution from all the protective forces. Nothing is static;
there are constant changes. As such, is there any advantage or
any particular reason for having different contractual
structures today, as opposed to the evolution into a common
contract, so that there aren't, in fact, differences? Is there
something advantageous about having them all separate and
different?
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Chairman, my office is responsible for
independent assessment of the Department's performance, and we
also promulgate the policy. Clearly, the line functions are the
ones who set up the contracts with the various structures that
they have out there.
From my professional opinion, the only way there's an
advantage to the contractors that are out there is if, in fact,
we have a model contract. Right now we have a smorgasbord of
contracts out there that grew up over many, many decades of the
way the Department is structured. We believe, from an oversight
perspective, as well as a policy perspective, that the line
function should, in fact, take a look at a standardized
approach; as I said in one of my previous answers, to have a
model contract that has the contract language in there that has
clauses to take care of these longstanding issues that the
Department has been wrestling with since the 1990s.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Aloise, what are your thoughts?
Mr. Aloise. Well, our perspective is that DOE should go as
far as it can toward standardization. We called for that
several years ago, and we still believe that's the way to go.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo?
Mr. Stumbo. I believe the approach to have a contract that
will provide those provisions that are necessary for a solid
retirement structure would obviously be the path that we could
take, and I do believe that is possible.
Senator Ben Nelson. That should be a model--everybody
treated the same? Or could it be different in each of the
contracts?
Mr. Stumbo. I think it should be the same, based on the
retirement structure itself, if we were mirroring something
that the Federal law enforcement currently have.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, can I just pick up on that
quickly?
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes. Please.
Senator Vitter. Maybe I'm missing something, Mr. Podonsky.
Is that not within the power of the Department, to clearly,
forcefully move in that direction?
Mr. Podonsky. In all due respect, I'm going to have to
defer to a second hearing that I understand is going to take
place. Because we are not the implementers of policy, we create
the policy for the Secretary. But the contractual piece is
governed, clearly, by the Federal acquisition rules, as well as
the standards of the contracting world, which is not ours. So,
in my opinion, yes, I do believe it exists, but that would be
better answered by the next panel in the next hearing.
Senator Ben Nelson. Now, my understanding was that the
latitude of the contractors was limited by the Department of
Energy to the amount, type, and nature of the pay and benefits
available to the protective forces. Mr. Podonsky, are you
saying that if DOE established a standardization, or, in your
case, your words, a model policy, would it be possible to
include those in the collective bargaining agreements if that
was a requirement from the agency to the contractors?
Mr. Podonsky. I can give you my personal view.
Senator Ben Nelson. Your personal opinion is all I'm after
right now.
Mr. Podonsky. Okay. I believe people make requirements, and
people can make the requirements adapt to what the situation
is. As I just told Senator Vitter, this is really something for
the line to determine, together with the contracting officials
in the Department. But, when you look at the problem, as Mr.
Stumbo and Mr. Aloise have articulated and we've also seen from
our organization, this is a serious problem that has to be
addressed now. It continues to be studied, and the actions that
I'm sure we will be taking with the recommendations will help
move the ball forward. But, we've wasted a lot of time on the
same subject, and we haven't gotten to where we need to be.
So, specifically, to your question, I think anything's
possible if we set our minds to it. As I said in my opening
testimony, it's going to not only take the union and the line
working together, but Congress, to make that happen.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Aloise, are you aware of any
particular stumbling block, other than just the challenges of
getting something accomplished, but any legal impairment or
inability of DOE to set the requirements to standardization or
in model form for the contractors to meet with respect to the
negotiations on the collective bargaining with the unions?
Mr. Aloise. We'd have to look at that more closely. But,
from the work we've done, we don't see anything that would
preclude that. But, you're talking about six or more collective
bargaining agreements right now, and many different sites, so
it would be a challenge to get that done.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is that something that, in your
opinion, you could accomplish over some period of time,
recognizing the different contract dates and times for
collective bargaining for new contracts?
Mr. Aloise. It appears it could be done over a period of
time.
Senator Ben Nelson. Would it be advisable to end up with a
common time for the expiration of such contracts?
Mr. Aloise. It would be helpful, but I'm not sure if it's
achievable.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo, do you think it's possible
that some contracts could be for longer periods of time to
shorter periods of time to achieve a standard timeframe, so
that you would have standardization and a model approach for
all of the contracts with the contractors for their employees?
Mr. Stumbo. Mr. Chairman, we have discussed that exact
situation and we have assured the Department of Energy that we
will do whatever is necessary; if we need to open up portions
of our bargaining agreement now to ensure that we can implement
that structure, we would do so.
Senator Ben Nelson. That could include the expiration date,
so as long as your members were not in some way being
disadvantaged in the process. Is that fair, too?
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo, how would your workforce
react if, in this federalization effort, there was a decision
where each position would be subject to open competition?
Mr. Stumbo. Obviously, that would be very negative to the
men and women that have spent their careers and put their lives
on the line for so long. Obviously, that would be, basically, a
kick in the face to us, based on what we have done for this
country.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Podonsky, do you have any thoughts
about that, from the standpoint of DOE?
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Chairman, we looked at both the
improvement of the existing contracts, as well as the
federalization. As I've said in my testimony, we felt that the
negative side of the federalization, and all that comes with
being compliant with OPM rules and what the current situation
is, whether the Guards would be grandfathered in or not, what
pay grade they would be coming in--it appears to us that the
existing legislation governing federalization would be a
deterrent for encouraging the existing guard force to come into
the Federal force.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Begich, would you like to have
some questions, please?
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just remind me again, how many bargaining units are there?
Or, first, how many sites are there, again? Remind me.
Mr. Podonsky. There are approximately 26 sites, and then
those are broken up into facilities.
Senator Begich. Is there a certain amount of sites that
have the highest volume of employees?
Mr. Podonsky. What happens, Senator, is, each site has a
different mission, and there are different categories of
attractiveness and materials. You may have a site that's just
manufacturing of parts, or you have a site, such as Pantex,
that actually has full-up weapons. So, it runs the
kaleidoscope.
Senator Begich. Gamut. About 26.
Mr. Podonsky. Roughly, in terms of the sites that we're
talking about, with security officers.
Senator Begich. Again, remind me, does each site have their
own, then, contract for each site?
Mr. Podonsky. No, sir.
Senator Begich. Some are wrapped together?
Mr. Podonsky. There are three different approaches. Some
security officers report directly to the Federal entity, some
report to the management and operational contractor as a part
of their company, and then a third one is where there's private
security----
Senator Begich. Okay. Private security.
Mr. Podonsky.--that is contracted with the M&O. So, there
are three different elements in the model. Then there's the OST
model that we've talked about, which is a Federalized force.
Senator Begich. Right, and then, how many different
bargaining groups are there, within all these organizations?
Mr. Stumbo. I'd say, totally, between independents and
internationals, you're probably looking at approximately five
groups.
Senator Begich. Five groups.
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. That's actually very good, if there's only
five.
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. As a former mayor, I had to deal with nine,
plus another one had eight underneath its one. So, five is a
piece of cake. So, why I say that is because your comment, ``it
may be difficult.'' To me, five is a dream. Senator Nelson, you
were a former Governor, you know what I'm talking about.
Since we did this, in the city where I was mayor, we
unified the contracts and timetable of expiration, mostly
around healthcare issues; we weren't all under the same plan.
We had multiple jurisdiction issues, and we just staggered out,
on the back end; once they all got to a certain point, then we
had a 3-year--in some cases, 5-year deals. So, it created
consistency, and so forth.
Is that, when you say, ``opening it up''--and I've
wondered--I caught your words very carefully here, as a--I've
been on both sides of the equation here, union and management,
so certain parts of the contract that you could open up--would
you mean how to get the timetables adjusted, so everyone can
expire at the same time, and then get a unified system of when
these contracts go in, or all the contract terms, meaning that
you can start unifying systems, pay grades, other things? I
want to make sure I heard what you said there, because there
were very carefully picked words, and I want to make sure we're
on the same page.
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir. What I was trying to get across was
that each of the collective bargaining agreements have certain
provisions, particularly those that affect the retirement
structure. Those particular articles could be opened up, and we
could implement the correct structures, in our opinion, that
would fix our problems.
Senator Begich. Okay.
Mr. Stumbo. So, by doing that, we could expedite the
process without waiting for each contract to actually expire
before we could make that happen.
Senator Begich. Do you believe the groups would allow that
to occur without triggering any other aspects of the contract
and awards? I know, sometimes when you go there, it starts a
formal process. When you open up a contract for a condition,
there are conditions within the contract that then start
triggering timetables. Do you think you would be able to do it
in such an informal, but yet still formal, way that you would
not create other issues in the contract that would have to be
dealt with?
Mr. Stumbo. Absolutely. Yes, sir, I believe we can.
Senator Begich. So you feel very confident that all
bargaining groups would do that.
Mr. Stumbo. Yes sir, I do.
Senator Begich. Okay. The last, if I can----
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, sure.
Senator Begich.--Mr. Chairman, and that is--and your
comment that it seems like now's the time--I'm new to this;
I've been here a year-and-a-half. But, as you were, and others
were, talking about the multiple years of this discussion, the
question I have is, who will trigger the action to make this
move forward? In other words, I know we'll have another
hearing. But, who within the DOE, I'll use as first trigger
point--who says, ``we're going. We're going to do this,'' and
set the timetable to get going and sit down with the bargaining
groups and say, ``We're going to try to figure out how to unify
this system, create a career path, not in-and-out or, in some
cases, some people who have been there a long time, but are
kind of stalled out and not able to move forward. Who makes
that decision?
Mr. Podonsky. Well, that's clearly, Senator, the
prerogatives of the Secretary of Energy. But, let me say, with
our partnership with the unions and the line functions that I
mentioned, we're already--those 29 recommendations----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Podonsky.--started solidifying some actions that the
Department should start taking, and we're guardedly optimistic
that the line functions will continue down that path. But, the
ultimate decision is going to be the Secretary of Energy, as to
how far that goes, in partnership with Congress.
Senator Begich. Okay. It just made me think of two other
things, Mr. Chairman, if I can.
One, on the report, is there a timetable you have set
that--not to just review and look at the actions, but actually
implement these actions, and then the ones that you can't,
clearly identify when and at what point you can make that
decision? Have you set out a time schedule? Do you have a
working time schedule that you are all using within the
Department?
Mr. Podonsky. Well, two things. We owe a report to Congress
on April 30 for a comprehensive implementation plan for those
recommendations.
Senator Begich. Yes.
Mr. Podonsky. But, we're not waiting for that plan.
Senator Begich. Okay.
Mr. Podonsky. We have a committee that was set up to
address that, with the line functions. Out of the 29
recommendations, about 17 of them are already underway. The 12
that are remaining out of the 29 are those that are very
difficult, having to do with the bigger issues of retirement
and disability and pension and things of that nature.
Senator Begich. Well, I'm a believer--when I was mayor and
when I was on the city council, we dealt with police and fire
retirement issues, and there's nothing more complicated--
medical liability, long-term retirement, multiple plans, you
know survivor--the whole nine yards. We did it. It was no fun.
The last comment I'd say is, I do believe, and I want to
echo through the questions that the chairman asked, that I do
believe if you set the criteria for the contractors, they can
do that. We did that with security within our community. When
we had private security, we said, ``Here's what we want. Here's
the standards of living we want you to make sure are in those
contracts.'' They were paying them 8 bucks an hour. You
couldn't--the rollover rate was unbelievable. They had no
benefits. We said, ``Here's the standards we want you to adhere
to.'' Of course, that cost, but that was then competitively bid
to the contractors, and they figured it all out. But, at the
end of the day, we knew the employee, who was working on behalf
of the city, securing buildings in our issues, had a standard
that we felt very confident was equal or close to if you were a
municipal employee, but being in a private-sector environment.
So, I know there is some question if it can be done. If
local governments can do it, sure to heck the Federal
Government can do it, because you have a lot more power. So, I
would just encourage you to look at that question and clearly
define that. Because the contractors respond to what you put in
the scope of services, and the scope of services said, ``here's
the 10 things we want you to do for these employees,'' and they
have to adhere to it or they don't bid. So, I'm a believer in
this.
I know you asked it as a question, but I believe that you
can do it. We did it. Obviously it turned from about a 60-
percent turnover rate down to 3 percent, and people saw
opportunity rather than just a part-time job at night and then
who knows what else they were doing. We wanted to focus on
security. So, there's my two bits through your question. I
apologize.
Senator Ben Nelson. Oh, no, that's quite okay. Thank you.
Mr. Stumbo, DOE has arranged the protective forces into
various different categories. Three grades of security police
officers are SPOs I through III and security officers. Do you
have any data that shows, generally, when you begin to see an
inability to meet the--let's say, the highest and most
demanding grades--SPO II and SPO III?
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir, I can provide----
Senator Ben Nelson. The breakdown of the ability of the
individuals in those positions to carry out their duties is
what I'm----
Mr. Stumbo. I think the best data will represent that it's
the collective years, as I identified in my oral statement.
It's the collective years that actually break down the
personnel. So, their best years are 20 years. So, probably half
way into their career, they begin to realize and recognize that
they cannot maintain that pace. So, from their 10th year to
their 20th year, obviously they begin to think whether or not
they should stay in the career, or not.
Senator Ben Nelson. As a result of that, one of the major
concerns that both the DOE and the collective bargaining unit
have would be early retirement and having retirement benefits
commensurate with early retirement. Is that fair to say?
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, Sir. Based on the inability for us to
maintain longer careers, that's absolutely true. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. If you looked at, let's say, retraining
or moving into new career opportunities, career fields, Mr.
Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, what are the pros and cons of a career
field that includes, let's say, a retraining option, so that
we--as individuals who are no longer able to carry out the
demanding work requirement for the highest grades, are there
any contractual barriers to putting something like this
together that would satisfy the concerns of being able to
continue in employment until retirement at some standard age,
consistent with the Federal Government employees? Anything
contractual that would get in the way of that? Or is that
really not a wise path to take for bringing the federalization
of these employees into being?
Mr. Podonsky. Specifically--and I don't want to sound like
a broken record, but obviously some of your questions are very
much geared towards the line, who are implementing and are
letting out the contracts. I don't know if there's a
contractual issue there.
Senator Ben Nelson. You're not aware, are you----
Mr. Podonsky. I'm not aware of any. However, I would tell
you, it's just good, sound management in my opinion, from the
policy and oversight, if we have protective force individuals,
they have clearances, they know the sites; we should be able to
transition them to other positions. In fact, sir, that's part
of the reason that we have the three categories of SPOs
originally. It wasn't just for safeguards posturing, it was
also to give a career path, so as people were no longer, say, a
SPOs III, which is a very offensive tactical group, they could
perhaps go to a fixed post.
Senator Ben Nelson. It might be easier to show the career
path going up than it is to get people to accept a career path
going back.
Is that a factor, Mr. Stumbo, with your group?
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir, it certainly is.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Podonsky, I understand that, as
circumstances change--health changes and what have you--but,
that apparently is a big stumbling block.
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is it because of salary, or is it just
because of the nature of people not wanting to, let's say, move
backwards, if they don't have to?
Mr. Stumbo. A lot of it has to do with a great deal of
pride.
Senator Ben Nelson. That's what I mean.
Mr. Stumbo. A great deal of pride for what they feel like
the commitment that they have made to the United States,
risking, potentially, their lives, based on a terrorist attack.
It is a great deal of pride.
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand. Okay.
Mr. Aloise, what did your findings reflect?
Mr. Aloise. Well, we thought that a career path makes
sense. Right now, if they do fall back to the SO, from a SPO I
or II, they probably will take a pay cut in that lower
position. But, a career path, training, and retraining is
something that we think can be done. We've invested a lot of
money in these people. They're well trained. They have the high
level security clearances. They're valuable resources, and we
should keep them as long as it makes sense to keep them.
Senator Ben Nelson. So, we have to deal with pride, as well
as economic reality and a number of other things. That's
typical of what we deal with, isn't it?
Well, I think one of the delicate questions is about the
actual security of the sites, because that's what this is all
about; the underlying security of the sites. Is there a concern
about individuals, who have clearance and have knowledge,
leaving the employment of the contractor, with that knowledge?
Is that a major concern within DOE, Mr. Podonsky?
Mr. Podonsky. There's always a concern of what we call the
``insider threat.''
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
Mr. Podonsky. That's something that clearances are supposed
to help us protect against, but you can never predict what the
individual is going to do. We don't currently have a high
concern about people leaving that have clearances to go on to
other positions. But, occasionally we do have issues, through
the clearance process, that we find, where people have shared
classified when they shouldn't have after they left, or they
kept classified. So, like with any organization, you're going
to have people problems, and I have seen, in my short 26 years
in the Department, not a great deal of that, for the numbers of
people that we have employed.
Senator Ben Nelson. If we had this career path, which would
obviously improve retention, would that also reduce the
concerns about--what did you call it? The inside----
Mr. Podonsky. The insider threat.
Senator Ben Nelson. Right.
Mr. Podonsky. I believe that a career path for the
protective force, as I said in my testimony, is something that
we absolutely need to find. Relative to a insider threat,
that's a whole different subject, as to what motivates people
to do that. I don't believe that having a career path, or not,
is going to add to that or take away from that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo, do you have any thoughts
about the career path and retention?
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I believe that,
obviously, a career path is good business for the American
taxpayer. But, we have to be realistic, as well, to understand
and recognize that there's a limited amount of positions that
can be made available at any given time. So, in my opinion, it
is good business. We certainly will help facilitate, entertain
any method of a career path. At the same time, based on the
sensitivity and the significance of what takes place at these
sites, obviously a large output of personnel with the knowledge
base that they would have would, even in a limited scope,
certainly be very damaging to the United States. So, yes, we'd
be very sensitive of that, as well.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Aloise, did the GAO have any
opportunity to look at how DOD secures its nuclear weapons
storage areas, to see if there are any lessons learned from DOD
that would have some application here in the case of DOE?
Mr. Aloise. We focused on the DOE protective forces for
this review.
Senator Ben Nelson. So, any inconsistencies from your
particular standpoint?
Mr. Aloise. The DOE forces play a unique role, and it's
hard to compare them to what the military does because they are
guarding nuclear materials, nuclear weapons and components and
full-up nuclear weapons.
Senator Ben Nelson. I think there was a question raised, as
well, about the consistent training. Mr. Aloise, can you give
us your thoughts on how well-trained individuals are, and
whether there needs to be any improvement in the training of
the security forces?
Mr. Aloise. In general, DOE protective forces are a robust
well-trained force. But, the training varies from site to site.
Some have more or different training than others. During my
visits to DOE sites the one thing protective forces were all
asking for is more, more firearms and tactical training. So, it
does vary from site to site, and in our view, should be
standardized, to the extent that it can be.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Podonsky, do you think that, as a
result of that recommendation, that DOE can work toward
standardization of the training?
Mr. Podonsky. We're already doing that, Mr. Chairman. We
have a Basic Security Police Officer Training course, we call
``BSPOT,'' and it's run out of the National Training Center,
out of Albuquerque, which is in my organization. When the
officers then go back to their site of assignment, they get
additional site-specific training. But, definitely, we never do
enough training. One of the things that's not part of this
hearing, but I will tell you, we try to introduce technology
into the Department for becoming what we call a ``force
multiplier,'' to strengthen the security forces, not to take
away security forces. Part of the advantages of the technology,
it not only improves our effectiveness, but also gives us the
opportunity to increase the training of the security officers
that would have more time when we have the technology
equipment, as well. So, there are a lot of advantages and there
are a lot of complexities to this problem, but nothing that is
insurmountable.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Podonsky, DOE has also changed from
a design basis threat (DBT) to a new term, graded security
policy (GSP). How are these two policies different?
Mr. Podonsky. Without getting into classified nature of the
two policies, the graded security protection policy was created
because the design basis threat was predicated on threat
statements from the intelligence community, and, as a result of
every year that we review this, we found that the intelligence
community was no longer standing behind any particular threat
statement, in terms of numbers. So, I instructed my policy
people that we needed to come up with an approach that would
allow the sites to be effectively protecting against scenarios,
as opposed to a set number of adversaries.
So the basic difference is, it gives the sites much more
flexibility for site-specific protection, as opposed to just
the postulated threat that we had lived through previously.
I'd be happy to give you a classified briefing on that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure.
Mr. Podonsky. We feel that it's a much more effective way
to improve the security posture of the Department right now.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo, do you agree with that?
Mr. Stumbo. Yes, I do agree with it, but you have to
recognize and understand that our threats are in evolution;
they evolve. As the terrorists become more desperate--and we've
seen a lot of those events of recent times--we have to evolve
and we have to increase our abilities to be able to defend
those threats. So, as far as the protective force is concerned,
we need to improve daily. It's not an achievement where we ever
really ever get there. It's something that we work on every
single hour of every day that we are at our sites, because the
consequences are too great to our Nation to allow one slip-up
at a site like Pantex.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Aloise, what were your findings in
conjunction with the changing of the threat approach and how
it's being maintained and trained for at the present time?
Mr. Aloise. DOE, over the years, has changed the DBT a
number of times--it did so in 2003, 2004, 2005, and again in
2008. A lot of this is tied to money. It's very expensive to
guard these sites. I understand that DOE believes its sites are
at a level where DOD believes they should be.
GAO has done numerous reviews on DOE security, and made
many recommendations, but, in the end, we have always came back
to believe it was a very robust force, and still is.
Senator Ben Nelson. What question haven't I asked that I
should be asking?
Each of you.
Mr. Podonsky?
Mr. Podonsky. Actually, no other questions for us, but I'm
looking forward to the questions that will be asked of the
line, who actually implement the policies and the contracts of
the Guard force and the security posture of the Department.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo, have we not asked something
that we should have?
Mr. Stumbo. No, Mr. Chairman. I believe that you have asked
some very good questions. I think, in response from the
protective force, that we have just waited a very, very long
time. Many of the men and women are no longer with us, that
waited for some resolution, based on the commitment they had to
their country. So, those that are in the system right now, we
continue to wait and feel like we are at the mercy of Congress
to do whatever is necessary to ensure that we receive the
appropriate restructure.
Senator Ben Nelson. That ``being at the mercy of Congress''
is not necessarily a very secure feeling, is it?
Mr. Stumbo. No, sir. [Laughter.]
No, sir, it is not.
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand.
Mr. Aloise, anything?
Mr. Aloise. I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that the 29
recommendations DOE has come up with for improving protective
forces causes is a step in the right direction, but it is going
to take leadership from the Secretary of Energy to get this
done.
Senator Ben Nelson. Any thoughts from any of you about a
timeframe. If we said, ``today we're going to do it,'' are we
looking at, certainly not days, but months, and many months, to
get it in place and implemented?
Mr. Aloise, do you have some thoughts on that?
Mr. Aloise. We hope that they start almost immediately,
because we want to avoid another strike at another site; DOE
needs to take action now to make sure that doesn't happen.
Senator Ben Nelson. How long do you think it would take,
once you make the decision to do it, how long would it take to
implement it?
Mr. Aloise. I believe it would take years, not months.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Podonsky?
Mr. Podonsky. I agree with Mr. Aloise, in terms of the
actions that we're taking now need to be clear to the unions
and the Guard forces out there, that the Department is taking
action and that we're not just talking any longer. But because
of contractual circumstances, it will take quite a long time.
We didn't create this problem overnight; it's taken years for
us to create this problem. That doesn't mean that it should
take that long to unravel. But, clearly, again, as I said, and
my colleagues at the witness table have said, in partnership,
all together, with Congress, we can make this right.
Mr. Stumbo?
Mr. Stumbo. Mr. Chairman, the only portion that I would
disagree from my colleagues is that the necessary resources
that could be implemented within our collective bargaining
agreements could be done much quicker if we're provided the
resources to make that happen. You would have the full
commitment from labor to ensure that we could make that happen
long before they have to worry about the next contract
expiration.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, as I was getting briefed for the
hearing today, I have to admit that this is one of the most
byzantine set of arrangements I have ever imagined could exist
anywhere, let alone within the Federal Government. Usually we
can find a pretty good way of doing things in a byzantine
fashion with an awful lot of bureaucracy, but I must confess,
I've never seen anything quite like this.
I understand that there are differences in sites and
requirements--and so, obviously, there are some things that
absolutely need to be patterned after the needs and be
specifically tailored to what is done, but not everything. So
I'm hopeful that, with the next hearing, we'll get more
information, and perhaps, together, we'll find a way to make
this happen for everyone.
Uncertainty benefits nobody, and I'm just certain that
you've lived with that constant uncertainty for eons. So if it
is possible to bring this to some sort of a conclusion or
resolution for everybody's benefit, including the people of the
United of America, we ought to be seeking to do that, and do so
in a timely fashion.
So, I thank you for your participation today, for your
candid answers. I thank you all for being here.
We stand adjourned.
Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
FEDERALIZATION
1. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, in the January 2009 memo from you
and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), you examined the costs and benefits associated with
federalizing the protective force. The memo asserted that the ``most
important factor to consider when determining the best organizational
structure for protective forces is which model will result in the most
effective security for the facilities in a cost effective manner.'' Can
you please address the role security and cost effectiveness played in
reaching your conclusion in the 2009 memo that federalization of the
protective forces is not a viable option?
Mr. Podonsky. The most recent study of these issues, sponsored by
NNSA in 2008, did not draw a conclusion regarding the relative merits
of protective force federalization. A joint Department of Energy (DOE)/
NNSA study in 2004 recommended that the best long-term organizational
approach for achieving cost-effective and efficient security of our
vital national assets was to convert the existing contractor protective
forces to Federal status. The recommendation to federalize was focused
explicitly on the provision of a combat-effective protective force,
designed to defeat a well-armed and dedicated terrorist adversary at
any DOE facility involved directly in the protection of nuclear
weapons, special nuclear material (SNM), or other strategic national
security assets. However, upon further consideration, concerns were
identified regarding near-term consequences of federalization,
including near-term instability within the existing force and
substantial transition costs, while the most significant benefits
derived from federalization could also be achieved within a contract
force arrangement. Additional factors that militated against the
conversion to a Federal force included the time required to convert,
and the difficulty in reconciling the centralized Federal force model
with the site-based management model used in the Department. Finally,
we were sensitive to the possible adverse impact on those current
members of the force who might not meet some of the Federal employment
criteria, and, in general, the employment uncertainties that officers
and their families would face during a protracted transition. In the
final analysis--and in the absence of a clear-cut cost advantage in
favor of federalization--the Department made its largely for reasons
other than cost.
2. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, in the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report you assert that a Federal force
offers no overall advantage to the current model and that either option
could result in effective and more uniform security if well-managed. To
that extent, do either of you assess that the cost of implementing a
federalized force would be higher than the cost of fixing our current
model?
Mr. Podonsky. Earlier cost analyses were limited in scope and,
therefore, comprehensive data is lacking. We do not know, for example,
what grade level could be assigned, or the extent of transitional costs
as opposed to the implementation of a performance-based contract. It is
also not known how many officers would not qualify for Federal
positions, which would result in an increase in costs for recruiting
and training new personnel. For a comprehensive answer to this
question, additional study would be needed on a site-by-site basis.
Mr. Aloise. We were unable to make the cost comparison needed to
answer this question. Reliably estimating the costs to compare
protective force options proved difficult and precluded our detailed
reporting on it for two broad reasons. First, since contractor and
Federal forces could each have many possible permutations, choosing any
particular option to assess would be arbitrary. For example, a 2008
NNSA-sponsored study identified wide-ranging federalization options,
such as federalizing all or some SPO positions at some or all
facilities or reorganizing them under an existing or a new agency.
Second, DOE will have to decide on the hypothetical options' key cost
factors before it can reasonably compare costs. Either option could be
implemented with more or less costly features. For example, adding the
early and enhanced retirement benefits would increase costs for either
contractor or Federal protective forces.
3. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, I understand that
if a federalization model were pursued the current forces would risk a
loss in pay and perhaps their jobs as they would be required to
recompete for the same job under a federalized structure. Could one
assume that such a transition could have a significant destabilizing
effect on the current force?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes. These risks to individual officers are real. If
each officer had to compete for what is in effect his or her own job,
we would expect that uncertainty and instability in the workforce would
be a major issue. Traditional union rules of seniority would not apply
and certain requirements within the civil service system could further
complicate hiring actions and contribute to destabilization.
Mr. Aloise. Yes, transitioning to a Federal force could have a
significant destabilizing effect on the current force. Under existing
laws, not only would current force members risk a loss in pay and even
their jobs, but they would not receive the enhanced and early
retirement benefits that a coalition of their unions had hoped would
come with federalization. As force members become aware of these likely
unpalatable consequences, their morale might be significantly lowered-
both in anticipation of federalization and after it occurs.
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
4. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, the current protective force is
well paid, and in many cases is better paid than equivalent Federal
positions. The current force enjoys generous retirement and health
benefits including in almost all cases employers contributing to 401(K)
retirement plans. I was troubled to hear that one issue unaddressed in
the report may be that some within the protective force are not taking
advantage and/or using the employer contributing vehicles to save for
their retirement. I look forward to hearing from you what can be done
to emphasize the importance of doing so; do you have statistics on the
percentage of the force who take advantage of their 401(K) benefits?
Mr. Podonsky. This has been one of our concerns as well. One of the
primary concerns of the Protective Force Career Options study
initiative that HSS chartered last year was how to encourage
contractors to offer educational, financial, and career counseling
opportunities to contractor workforces. One of the 29 recommendations
generated by that group explicitly calls for a DOE-wide program of
retirement counseling and training that would address such issues as
early and consistent 401(k) participation. This recommendation builds
upon similar individual programs that already exist at several sites,
including classes on long-term financial planning in their initial new
employee orientation and basic training with periodic refresher
sessions. A notable example of such an existing program is found at the
Savannah River Site. Additionally, the National Training Center is now
engaged in the development of standardized methodologies for the
delivery of these types of materials and information at all sites. It
should be further noted that available data on protective force member
participation in 401(k) plans points to reasonably high levels of
participation already.
5. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, if it is, in fact, correct that a
vast majority are not contributing to their retirement plans, what can
be done to emphasize the importance of doing so?
Mr. Podonsky. The figures available to us indicate that a
significant majority of protective force members are, in fact,
currently contributing to their retirement plans. For example, at the
Savannah River Site, one of the largest protective forces in the DOE
complex, the DOE contractor employees have a 401(k) enrollment rate of
95 percent; Savannah River Site's protective force contractor has a
highly-developed program to encourage participation. The Hanford Site
contractor employees have an enrollment rate of about 91 percent, the
Oak Ridge Complex contractor has a rate of 86 percent, the Idaho
Complex contractor has a rate of 79 percent, and the Headquarters force
contractor has a 72 percent rate. DOE and NNSA have asked several line
management organizations to develop up-to-the-minute participation rate
figures for contractors at all sites as part of DOE and NNSA current
initiatives, but these preliminary data do not support the impression
of widespread non-participation. As noted previously, however, we
believe that participation can be maximized through the development and
delivery of standardized materials that can be tailored to specific
local programs along with more sites implementing mandatory initial
participation by new hires.
6. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the Secretary of Energy and the
Administrator of the NNSA to develop a comprehensive, Department of
Energy (DOE)-wide plan to identify and implement the recommendations of
the study group. Furthermore, the legislation cites that it is the lack
of clear, uniform, and realistic guidance and policy from DOE to the
various contractors who manage the protective forces that is at the
root of the problems. Do you agree that the root of the problems with
the protective force is the lack of clear, uniform, and realistic
guidance and policy from DOE to the various contractors?
Mr. Podonsky. DOE and NNSA do not believe that formal DOE
protective force policy--or the lack thereof--is the primary source of
these problems, but we do acknowledge that the multiple line management
programs and individual sites in the implementation of policy has
contributed to the problem. Additionally, the situation has also been
affected by changes in other areas such as the administrative policies
governing procurement. Also, some other important inconsistencies have
evolved through the course of successive collective bargaining
agreements at the sites, much of which is outside the purview of policy
officials. Our recent contractor protective force career options study
noted that these issues are not the result of anyone's overall
intentions for protective force members and their careers, but instead
as a result of the implementation, over time, of patchwork solutions to
a wide range of individual issues. In this sense, we do agree that the
time has come to establish clear and consistent performance standards
for protective force performance, while still maintaining the necessary
flexibility to permit adaptation to the special needs of line
management programs and particular site environments.
STUDY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS
7. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, does the DOE intend to pursue the
implementation of all 29 recommendations cited in the June 2009 report
on Enhanced Career Longevity and Retirement Options for DOE protective
forces personnel?
Mr. Podonsky. DOE has committed to pursuing a course of action that
leads to satisfactory resolution of the issues that drove the
recommendations. Achieving satisfactory solutions will depend upon
close cooperation among all Departmental elements--line management,
policy, contractors, unions.
8. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, what is the anticipated timeline
for implementing those recommendations the Department has already
agreed to apply?
Mr. Podonsky. The timeline for implementation is one of the actions
still being developed. This will be discussed as part of the
implementation plan due to Congress no later than April 30, 2010. This
plan and its due date are a result of the Government Accountability
Office report of March 3, 2010, ``DOE Needs to Fully Address Issues
Affecting Protective Forces Personnel Systems.''
9. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, has the Department fully estimated
the cost implications of doing so, and if so, what is the estimated
unbudgeted cost, and if not, when will you be able to provide those
costs to Congress?
Mr. Podonsky. Possible alternatives to address various options are
still being developed in coordination with line management and, where
completed, costs estimates will be reported in the implementation plan
due to Congress by April 30, 2010. Where necessary, the April 30
submission will also identify cost analyses that may require additional
time beyond that date for completion.
RECRUITMENT AND ATTRITION
10. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, is the Department
having any difficulty in the recruitment or quality of the protective
force?
Mr. Podonsky. DOE contractors do not experience difficulty
attracting and recruiting qualified men and women to constitute our
protective forces.
Mr. Aloise. Preliminary data we collected on protective forces at
the six sites we reviewed did not appear to show any systemic
recruiting problems. In the absence of apparent problems, we did not
pursue this issue further. We did not collect any specific information
on the quality of protective forces or recruits, but note that armed
DOE protective forces (Security Police Officers-I, -II, and III) must
undergo extensive background checks and ongoing evaluation since they
carry high-level security clearances and are enrolled in formal human
reliability programs, complete extensive initial and annual refresher
training, and regularly demonstrate that they can meet firearms and
physical fitness qualifications.
11. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, are the salaries
and benefits of the protective force competitive?
Mr. Podonsky. Our contractor firms consult Department of Labor wage
tables in order to ascertain the prevailing local wages for protective
force positions. DOE contractor protective forces are well paid in
relation to other contractor protective forces, but pay is
proportionate to the responsibilities inherent in the work.
Mr. Aloise. Since comparing the salaries and benefits of the
protective forces with those of similar positions in the private sector
was not in the scope of our work, we cannot say whether their salaries
and benefits are competitive. However, based on our review of
protective forces' pay and benefits, we offer this observation that
should be considered in such a comparison. Since protective forces' pay
is often significantly increased by overtime hours, comparisons of
annual salaries with private sector positions should consider potential
differences in the number of hours worked annually.
12. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, how do attrition
rates for the protective forces compare to similar positions in the
private sector?
Mr. Podonsky. Attrition does not appear to be a problem for our
protective force. Our data indicates that attrition rate for our DOE
and NNSA contractor protective force officers is well below that of
related jobs in the local areas where they reside.
Mr. Aloise. Comparing attrition rates for protective forces and
comparable private sector positions was not in our scope of work.
However, the preliminary data on protective forces attrition we
collected did not appear to show any systemic attrition issues.
Protective forces at all sites, as well as Federal agents that work for
the Office of Secure Transportation (OST), all experience attrition,
but, on the basis of preliminary data, there did not appear to be any
marked differences, and we did not pursue this issue further.
POTENTIAL FOR A FUTURE STRIKE
13. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, in the event of a potential
future strike at one or more SNM I sites and in light of lessons
learned during the security force strike at Pantex in 2007, what are
the Department's current plans for ensuring continuity of security?
Mr. Podonsky. From the shared DOE and NNSA perspective and based on
lessons learned going back to the Rocky Flats protective force work
stoppage in 1994, my office has developed and maintained a Contingency
Protective Force guide. This document provides a model for any site
that may have suffered a natural emergency or a protective force work
stoppage on how to constitute a contingency protective force from
onsite and offsite nonbargaining unit officers. This guide was utilized
at Pantex when work stoppages occurred and at other locations while
negotiations were ongoing but were subsequently concluded successfully.
We ensure the document is available to the responsible line management
organizations and that it is revised based upon lessons learned from
each work stoppage or potential stoppage.
14. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, does the Department foresee any
scenarios where security at one or more sites could become an issue?
Mr. Podonsky. DOE planners and our contractors are constantly
attempting to identify potential vulnerabilities and seeking ways to
mitigate them. Planning explicitly includes the security implications
of strike contingency operations. More details or precision would
require a separate classified submission.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROTECTIVE FORCE AND THE DOE SECURE TRANSPORT
FORCE
15. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, how do the
protective force and the secure transport force differ?
Mr. Podonsky. At the most basic level, the differences are that the
protective forces are contractor employees who provide security at our
fixed sites for special nuclear material and weapons, while the Office
of Secure Transportation (OST) consists of Federal agents who transport
nuclear weapons and special nuclear material on public roads around the
United States. In addition, the Federal agents have a responsibility to
liaise with Federal, State, and local law enforcement and intelligence
agencies in the States through which they perform their transport
mission. The multiplicity of jurisdictional interactions associated
with this ``over-the-road'' mission is in direct contrast to the stable
set of interactions required at fixed sites. Federal agent status for
OST personnel is intended, among other things, to ensure that, in the
event of an incident, the necessary lines of authority are clear.
Mr. Aloise. Broadly speaking, protective forces and agents differ
in the following respects:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Characteristics OST Agents Protective Forces
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Numbers 363 2,339
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employer Federal employees Contractor
employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Management structure Centralized Varies based on
Federal different
management contractors and
different
contracts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Collective bargaining status Cannot Covered by
collectively different
bargain collective
bargaining
agreements (CBAs)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pay Single pay system Varies with CBAs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits Federal Employee Varies with CBA
Health Benefit
Program and
Federal Employee
Retirement
System. Eligible
for early
retirement (at
age 50 after 20
years of service)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission Mobile, public Fixed facilities
roads
------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, are the
requirements and stresses of the secure transport force more demanding
that those of the protective force?
Mr. Podonsky. The requirements and stresses of the job are
different for the Federal agents in several areas. From a personal
standpoint, they spend substantial time away from their homes and
families. From an operational standpoint, they do not have the natural
advantage enjoyed by officers at fixed sites, such as fixed barriers,
hardened fighting positions, deployed technologies, video surveillance
and assessment, and local terrain knowledge. The secure transport force
is also subject to the stresses of a long distance trucking operation.
Mr. Aloise. We found that OST Federal agents' mobile mission
differs significantly from that of protective forces that guard fixed
sites. OST agents operate convoys of special tractor trailers and
special escort vehicles to transport Category I SNM. These agents
travel on U.S. highways that cross multiple Federal, State, tribal, and
local law enforcement jurisdictions. They also travel as many as 15
days each month. Agents may also provide security for weapons
components that are flown on OST's small fleet of aircraft. In contrast
to the public setting of agents' work, protective forces that guard
Category I SNM at fixed sites typically have elaborate physical
defenses and tightly restricted and monitored public access. As such,
OST agents operational environment appears to be more ambiguous and
dynamic than the environment found at Category I SNM sites.
17. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, is the secure
transport force subjected to a higher level of training than the
protective force?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes. Federal agents must qualify under Department of
Transportation regulations and maintain their ability to operate 18-
wheeled secure transport vehicles. Both Federal agents and contractor
protective forces must meet the same overall firearms and fitness
requirements but tactical training for Federal agents is dissimilar due
to the completely different operating environments. All Federal agent
training must address the various types of terrain (rural and urban) a
convoy travels through. This includes force-on-force; individual, small
unit, and convoy tactics; advanced live fire; tactical driving;
recapture/recovery ops; and Incident Command System.
Mr. Aloise. We found (pg. 21-22 of GAO-10-275) that OST agents
undergo longer, more frequent, and more diverse training than do most
protective forces. For example, OST Federal agents:
Undergo longer basic training (21 weeks) at OST's
academy in Fort Chaffee, AR;
Must complete requirements for a commercial drivers
license;
Are required to meet DOE's offensive combatant
standard throughout their careers;
Spend more of their time training, including tactical
training, than do most contractor protective forces.
18. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, does the notion
that the secure transport force has to transport nuclear materials
across State lines and in an inherently mobile fashion constitute any
rationale for requiring that they have full Federal authorities?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes. As discussed above, Federal agent authority must
be transjurisdictional. The operating environment leads to the
necessity for them to have Federal authority. They regularly interact
with national, tribal, State, county, and local law enforcement
authorities as well as various intelligence agencies as they seek
knowledge of any potential threat to them and their cargoes in the
operating environment.
Mr. Aloise. OST officials told us that this is an important factor.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]