    [Senate Hearing 111-893]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 111-893

               THE PROTECTIVE FORCES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                                     of the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 3, 2010

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                                   __________

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
    KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
    EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                   Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director

                                     ______

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

                     E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman

    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico

                                      (ii)

    ?

                                C O N T E N T S

                                   __________

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

               The Protective Forces at the Department of Energy

                                 march 3, 2010

                                                                       Page

    Aloise, Eugene E., Director, Office of Natural Resources and
      Environment, Government Accountability Office..................     3
    Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Health, Safety, and
      Security, Department of Energy.................................    57
    Stumbo, Mike, President, National Council of Security Police.....    62

                                     (iii)

               THE PROTECTIVE FORCES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2010

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
    Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Ben Nelson, Begich, and
    Vitter.
        Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Daniel A. Lerner,
    professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional
    staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Paul J.
    Hubbard.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to
    Senator Begich; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions, and
    Michael T. Wong, assistant to Senator Vitter.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, good afternoon. I think we'll go
    ahead and begin, because we're going to be up against the full
    Senate Armed Services Committee beginning at 4:30, and I don't
    want to delay getting to that. So, I call this hearing to
    order.
        Welcome to the hearing of the Subcommittee on Strategic
    Forces.
        I'd like to thank our witnesses for their flexibility in
    accommodating the scheduling needs of the full committee. We
    have an important briefing for the full committee, as I said,
    that we need to make time for, but had some difficulties in
    somehow getting things scheduled, but apparently we've been
    able to succeed.
        It's with great irony and pleasure that, after a 3-year
    stint as chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee, that I note
    the first hearing in my new role as chairman of the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee is on a personnel matter once again. So, as
    Yogi Berra once said, it's like deja vu all over again; here we
    are.
        The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the
    security of nuclear weapons on DOE sites, tons of weapons-grade
    materials, mostly highly-enriched uranium and plutonium, and
    various weapons parts at various locations across the country.
    Even a small amount of this material, in the hands of a
    terrorist, could lead to a horrific result.
        After the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the DOE reviewed
    the security of these sites, and their vulnerability to a
    terrorist attack, and came to the conclusion that the security
    needed to be increased. As a result, DOE adopted a new approach
    for the protective forces, shifting many of them to tactical
    response forces akin to a SWAT team. These new teams were
    trained in offensive combat tactics to move, train,
    communicate, and fight as a team. This was a major shift from
    the previous defensive posture that was taken at the sites.
    With this new focus came new rigorous training and other
    requirements which were not uniformly implemented at the
    various sites and, where implemented, became an issue for the
    protective forces. While the protective forces fully supported
    the need for the increased security, it quickly became apparent
    that the new requirement would be progressively difficult for
    older guard personnel to meet.
        At the same time, DOE had decided to reduce post-retirement
    healthcare benefits and eliminate defined-benefit retirement
    plans for new employees. This misalignment, as the GAO
    describes it, between the protective force personnel systems
    and the increased physical and other demands of a paramilitary
    operation, has become a significant concern, and one of the
    underlying causes for a 44-day strike at the Pantex plant in
    2007.
        The DOE protective forces are all contractors, with the
    management of the force varying from site to site. DOE orders
    establish the security requirements that each site must meet,
    but not how each site will meet those requirements. As a result
    of the growing concern over the protective forces, the security
    at the sites, and the strike at Pantex, this committee asked
    the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a
    comprehensive study of the management of the forces in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.
        GAO completed this study on January 29, and today we'll
    hear from Eugene Aloise, GAO Director, Natural Resources and
    Environment, on the findings and recommendations in the study.
    Also with us, are Glenn Podonsky, the Director of the
    Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety, and Security
    (HSS), the DOE Security Policy and Oversight Office, who has
    worked on these issues for many years, and Mike Stumbo,
    President of the National Council of Security Police, the union
    representing over 2,600 members of the protective force.
        We welcome each of you this afternoon, and look forward to
    getting a clear understanding of the issues and difficulties of
    ensuring that the Nation's stockpile of nuclear weapons
    materials remains secure.
        When Senator Vitter arrives, we will ask him for any
    opening comments that we have.
        I would ask that each of our witnesses give a very short
    opening statement, perhaps 5 minutes, or thereabouts. We've
    received your prepared statements, and, without objection, they
    will all be included in the record, in their entirety.
        Mr. Aloise, we'll begin with you, followed by Mr. Podonsky,
    and later by Mr. Stumbo.
        Mr. Aloise.

      STATEMENT OF EUGENE E. ALOISE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATURAL
      RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Aloise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased
    to be here today to discuss issues with DOE's protective
    forces.
        Over 2,300 heavily-armed protective forces provide security
    for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    at 6 sites, with long-term missions to store and process
    weapons-grade nuclear materials, DOE's highest security threat.
        As mentioned, since September 11, DOE has sought to
    transform its protective forces into an elite fighting force, a
    tactical response force (TRF) with training and capabilities
    similar to the U.S. military. Protective force unions are
    concerned that TRF's more demanding requirements threaten the
    ability of the forces to work until retirement age.
        My remarks today are based on a recently issued report
    (GAO-10-275) which shows that contractor protective forces are
    not uniformly managed, organized, staffed, trained, equipped,
    or compensated across the six DOE sites. These differences
    exist because the forces operate under separate contracts and
    collective bargaining agreements at each site, and because of
    DOE's contracting approach, which allows each site to tailor
    security to site and mission needs.
        Since 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE security
    organizations, among protective force contractors, and force
    unions about the ability of the forces, especially older force
    members, to continue to meet DOE's weapons, physical fitness,
    and medical qualifications.
        Adding to these concerns are DOE's efforts to manage its
    long-term contractor post-retirement and pension liabilities
    which could negatively impact protective forces retirement
    eligibility and benefits. As mentioned, these concerns
    contributed to a 44-day strike in 2007 by protective forces at
    the Pantex plant, where the assembly and disassembly of nuclear
    weapons occurs.
        According to union officials, failure to resolve TRF and
    retirement benefit issues could lead to strikes at three sites
    with over 1,500 protective forces when their collective
    bargaining agreements end in 2012.
        Now, DOE has considered two principal options to more
    effectively manage its protective forces: improving the
    existing contractor system or creating a Federal protective
    force.
        In 2009, NNSA and DOE officials rejected federalization of
    protective forces because they believed it would be too costly
    and would provide little increase in security effectiveness.
    Instead, they supported the continued use of contractor forces,
    but with improvements.
        Our analysis shows that if the forces are well managed,
    either a contractor or a Federal force could result in
    effective and uniform security. Both options have offsetting
    advantages and disadvantages, with neither option emerging as
    clearly superior. A key disadvantage of the contractor system
    is the potential for strikes by contractor forces. However,
    according to NNSA's Administrator, strikes can be effectively
    managed by the use of replacement forces.
        Reliably estimating the cost to compare the two options
    proved difficult and precluded our detailed reporting on it.
    Because contractor and Federal forces could each have numerous
    permutations, choosing any particular option to assess would be
    arbitrary.
        In March 2009, DOE commissioned a group to recommend ways
    to improve the protective force contractor personnel system. In
    June of last year, the group made 29 recommendations designed
    to enable protective force members to reach a normal retirement
    age within the forces, take another job within DOE, or
    transition to a non-DOE career. To date, action by DOE on these
    recommendations has been limited.
        In our view, DOE and its protective force contractors have
    not successfully aligned protective force systems with the
    increased physical and other demands of TRF. Without better
    alignment, there is a greater potential for strikes and
    potential risk to site security when collective bargaining
    agreements expire.
        DOE's study group recommendations are a step forward:
    However, DOE faces the possibility of more strikes by its
    protective forces at some of its highest security-risk
    facilities if these issues are not resolved. Therefore, it is
    imperative that DOE resolve these issues soon, as recommended
    by our report and directed by the full committee in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
        Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I would be
    happy to address any questions you or other members may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:]

                       Prepared Statement by Gene Aloise

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:
        I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy's
    (DOE) contractor guards, also known as protective forces. My testimony
    is based on our recently released report Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to
    Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues \1\ and recent
    discussions with protective force union officials.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces'
    Personnel System Issues, GAO-10-275 (Washington, DC: Jan. 29, 2010).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Protective forces are a key component of security at DOE sites with
    special nuclear material (SNM), which the department considers its
    highest security risk. This material--including plutonium and highly
    enriched uranium--is considered to be Category I when it is weapons
    grade and in specified forms (e.g., nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons
    components, metals, and oxides) and quantities. The risks associated
    with Category I SNM include theft and the potential for sabotage
    through the use of a radioactive dispersal device, also known as a
    ``dirty bomb.'' Currently, DOE and its National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA), an agency within DOE responsible for the safety,
    security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, have
    six contractor-operated sites that possess--and will possess for the
    foreseeable future--Category I SNM (sites with ``enduring''
    missions).\2\ The six sites include four that NNSA is responsible for--
    the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in Los Alamos, NM; the Y-12
    National Security Complex (Y-12), in Oak Ridge, TN; the Pantex Plant,
    near Amarillo, TX; and the Nevada Test Site, outside of Las Vegas, NV.
    In addition, DOE's Office of Environmental Management is responsible
    for the Savannah River Site, near Aiken, SC, and DOE's Office of
    Nuclear Energy is responsible for the Idaho National Laboratory, near
    Idaho Falls, ID.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ We excluded three other DOE Category I SNM sites from our
    review because they are likely to downsize or downgrade their
    protective forces in the near future. These sites include the Office of
    Environmental Management's Hanford Site, near Richland, WA, which
    recently transferred its highest value Category I SNM off site but will
    maintain lower value Category I SNM for the foreseeable future; NNSA's
    Lawrence Livermore's National Laboratory, in Livermore, CA, which plans
    to transfer its Category I SNM off site by the end of fiscal year 2012;
    and the Office of Science's Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in Oak
    Ridge, TN, which plans to dispose of its Category I SNM by the end of
    fiscal year 2015.
        \3\ The Office of Environmental Management is responsible for
    cleaning up former nuclear weapons sites, and the Office of Nuclear
    Energy is primarily responsible for nuclear energy research.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE
    embarked on a multifaceted effort to better secure its sites with
    Category I SNM against a larger and more sophisticated terrorist threat
    by changing policies, such as its Design Basis Threat (DBT)--a
    classified document that specifies the potential size and capabilities
    of adversary forces that the sites must defend against.\4\ Protective
    forces, which accounted for slightly more than 50 percent of DOE's $862
    million for field security funding in fiscal year 2008, also have been
    an important focus of DOE security improvements. DOE has sought to
    improve the effectiveness of its protective forces by deploying
    security technologies, such as sensors capable of detecting adversaries
    at long ranges, and through the use of advanced weaponry, such as belt-
    fed machine guns and grenade launchers. In addition, DOE has sought to
    enhance protective forces' tactical skills--the ability to move, shoot,
    and communicate in a combat environment--through its Tactical Response
    Force (TRF) initiative.\5\ Among other things, TRF revised the
    application of DOE's existing protective force categories to emphasize
    tactical skills and instituted more rigorous weapons and physical
    fitness qualifications for many of DOE's protective forces.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ In 2008, DOE changed the name of its DBT (DOE Order 470.3A) to
    the Graded Security Protection policy (DOE 470.3B).
        \5\ DOE announced this initiative, originally known as ``Elite
    Force'' initiative in 2004, and began to formalize it into policy
    through the issuance of DOE Manual 470.4-3, Protective Force, in 2005.
    DOE revised this policy in 2006 with DOE Manual 470.4-3 Change 1,
    Protective Force. In 2008, DOE further revised this policy, which is
    now contained in DOE Manual 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective Force.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, protective force unions have been concerned that the
    planned implementation of TRF--with its potentially more demanding
    requirements--threatens the ability of protective forces to work until
    retirement age. These concerns contributed to a 44-day protective force
    strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. The strike raised broader issues in
    DOE and Congress about the continued suitability of DOE's model for
    managing its protective forces. Unionized protective forces can strike
    when their collective bargaining agreements end, and strikes may create
    security vulnerabilities at DOE's sites with Category I SNM. In
    addition, DOE's practice of managing its protective forces through
    separate contracts at each site could create disparities in protective
    force performance, pay, and benefits. In 2009, a DOE protective forces
    study group, composed of DOE and union representatives, made a number
    of recommendations that, while maintaining contractor protective
    forces, may better balance protective forces' concerns over their
    careers with DOE's need to provide effective security and control
    costs.
        In this context, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2008 directed us to report on the management of DOE's protective
    forces at its sites with Category I SNM.\6\ Among other things, we (1)
    analyzed information on the management, organization, staffing,
    training and compensation of protective forces; (2) examined the
    implementation of TRF; (3) assessed DOE's two options to more uniformly
    manage DOE protective forces; and (4) reported on DOE's progress in
    addressing protective force issues. Our recent report Nuclear Security:
    DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues
    presents the full findings of our work and includes two recommendations
    to DOE to fully assess and implement, where feasible, recommendations
    made by DOE's 2009 protective forces study group. DOE generally agreed
    with these recommendations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Pub. L. No. 110-181 Sec.  3124 (2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To obtain information on DOE's contractor protective forces, we
    visited three of the sites with enduring Category I SNM missions--
    Pantex, the Savannah River Site, and Los Alamos National Laboratory--
    because each site represented one of the three different types of
    protective force contracts currently in place. We also met with
    protective force contractors, Federal site office officials, and
    protective force union representatives at these sites. We also
    distributed a data collection instrument to protective force
    contractors and Federal site office officials at each of these sites
    and at the other three sites with enduring Category I SNM missions--Y-
    12, the Nevada Test Site, and the Idaho National Laboratory. From this
    instrument, we received site information about the protective forces,
    the status of TRF and DBT implementations, views on DOE options for
    managing the protective forces, and the reliability of site data. Prior
    to this testimony, protective force union officials provided us with
    updated information.
        We conducted our work from April 2008 to March 2010 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards, which require us
    to plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
    evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
    based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained
    provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
    our audit objectives.

       PROTECTIVE FORCES ARE NOT UNIFORMLY MANAGED, ORGANIZED, STAFFED,
                            TRAINED, OR COMPENSATED

        Contractor protective forces--including 2,339 unionized officers
    and their 376 nonunionized supervisors--are not uniformly managed,
    organized, staffed, trained, or compensated across the 6 DOE sites we
    reviewed. For example, we found the following:

             Three different types of protective force contracts
            are in use. These contract types influence how protective force
            operations are overseen by Federal officials and how protective
            force operations are coordinated with other site operations.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ These types of contracts include: (1) direct contracts between
    protective force contractors and DOE or NNSA; (2) a component of
    management and operating (M&O) contracts between M&O contractors and
    DOE or NNSA; and (3) subcontracts between an M&O contractor and a
    protective force contractor.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             The size of sites' protective forces ranges from 233
            to 533 uniformed, unionized officers, and the composition of
            these forces and their associated duties and responsibilities
            vary based on their categorization. Protective forces are
            divided into four categories: \8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Other positions, such as trainers and alarm operators,
    constitute the remaining 3 percent of protective force positions. At
    some sites, personnel in such positions may be SPO qualified, and their
    positions are counted in the appropriate SO categories. All protective
    force numbers were current as of September 30, 2008.

                     Security Officer (SO): Responsible for unarmed
                    security duties such as checking for valid security
                    badges. SOs represent about 5 percent of total
                    unionized protective forces.
                     Security Police Officer-I (SPO-I): Primarily
                    responsible for protecting fixed posts during combat.
                    SPO-Is represent about 34 percent of total unionized
                    protective forces.
                     SPO-II: Primarily responsible for mobile
                    combat to prevent terrorists from reaching their target
                    but can also be assigned to fixed posts. SPO-IIs
                    represent about 39 percent of total unionized
                    protective forces.

             SPO-III: Primarily responsible for mobile combat and
            special response skills, such as those needed to recapture SNM
            (on site) and recover SNM (off site) if terrorists succeed in
            acquiring it. SPO-IIIs are usually organized into special
            response teams, and SPO-IIIs represent about 19 percent of
            total unionized protective forces.
             Each protective force has uniformed, nonunionized
            supervisors, but the duties, responsibilities, and ranks of
            these supervisors are generally site specific and not detailed
            in DOE's protective force policies.
             DOE policy mandates certain protective force training
            but allows sites some flexibility in implementation. For
            example, newly hired protective forces must complete DOE's
            Basic Security Police Officer Training class, but these
            courses, offered by each of the sites we reviewed, range in
            length from 9 to 16 weeks. In addition, we found that one site
            had largely completed the implementation of most aspects of the
            TRF initiative, but others are not expecting to do so until the
            end of fiscal year 2011.
             Pay, based on the site and the category of protective
            forces, ranges from nearly $19 per hour to over $26 per
            hour.\9\ Overtime pay, accrued in different ways at the sites,
            and other premium pay, such as additional pay for night shifts
            and holidays, may significantly increase protective force pay.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ Pay rates were current as of September 30, 2008.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             While all employers contributed to active protective
            force members' medical, dental, and life insurance benefits,
            they differed in the amount of their contributions and in the
            retirement benefits they offered. In general, new hires were
            offered defined contribution plans, such as a 401(k) plan, that
            provides eventual retirement benefits that depend on the amount
            of contributions by the employer or employee, as appropriate,
            as well as the earnings and losses of the invested funds. At
            the time of our review, two sites offered new hires defined
            benefit plans that promised retirees a certain monthly payment
            at retirement. Two other sites had defined benefit plans that
            covered protective force members hired before a particular date
            but were not open to new hires.

        We found two primary reasons for these differences. First,
    protective forces at all six of the sites we reviewed operate under
    separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements. Second, DOE
    has a long-standing contracting approach of defining desired results
    and outcomes--such as effective security--instead of detailed,
    prescriptive guidance on how to achieve those outcomes.\10\ While
    creating some of the differences noted, this approach, as we have
    previously reported, allows security to be closely tailored to site-
    and mission-specific needs.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ DOE Order 251.1C, Departmental Directives Program, specifies
    that DOE directives should focus on results by specifying the goals and
    requirements that must be met and, to the extent possible, refraining
    from mandating how to fulfill the goals and requirements.
        \11\ Our recent review showed that DOE's policy for nuclear weapons
    security provides local officials with greater flexibility than the
    Department of Defense's policy for determining how to best meet
    security standards and has a greater emphasis on cost-benefit analysis
    as a part of the decisionmaking process. See GAO, Homeland Defense:
    Greater Focus on Analysis of Alternatives and Threats Needed to Improve
    DOD's Strategic Nuclear Weapons Security, GAO-09-828 (Washington, DC:
    Sept. 18, 2009).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     TACTICAL RESPONSE FORCE IMPLEMENTATION HAS RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT THE
                     LONGEVITY OF PROTECTIVE FORCES CAREERS

        Since its inception in 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE
    security organizations, among protective force contractors, and in
    protective force unions about the ability of protective forces--
    especially older individuals serving in protective forces--to continue
    meeting DOE's weapons, physical fitness, and medical qualifications. As
    we reported in 2005,\12\ some site security officials recognized they
    would have to carefully craft career transition plans for protective
    force officers who may not be able to meet TRF standards. Adding to
    these concerns are DOE's broader efforts to manage its long-term
    postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors, which could
    have a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for
    protective forces. In 2006, DOE issued its Contractor Pension and
    Medical Benefits Policy (Notice 351.1), which was designed to limit
    DOE's long-term pension and postretirement liabilities. A coalition of
    protective force unions stated that this policy moved them in the
    opposite direction from their desire for early and enhanced retirement
    benefits.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
    Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated
    Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-05-611 (Washington, DC:
    July 15, 2005).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Concerns over TRF implementation and DOE's efforts to limit long-
    term pension and postretirement liabilities contributed to a 44-day
    protective force strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. Initially, Pantex
    contractor security officials designated all of the plant's protective
    force positions as having to meet a more demanding DOE combatant
    standard,\13\ a move that could have disqualified a potentially sizable
    number of protective forces from duty. Under the collective bargaining
    agreement that was eventually negotiated in 2007, some protective
    forces were allowed to meet a less demanding combatant standard. DOE
    has also rescinded its 2006 Contractor Pension and Medical Benefits
    Policy. However, according to protective force union officials, failure
    to resolve issues surrounding TRF implementation and retirement
    benefits could lead to strikes at three sites with large numbers of
    protective forces--Pantex, the Savannah River Site, and Y-12--when
    their collective bargaining agreements expire in 2012.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ DOE's combatant standards are defined by specific physical
    fitness, firearms, and medical qualifications. SPO-Is must meet
    defensive combatant standards, while SPO-IIs and SPO-IIIs must meet
    more demanding offensive combatant standards.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     EITHER IMPROVING THE EXISTING CONTRACTOR FORCES SYSTEM OR CREATING A
      FEDERAL FORCE COULD RESULT IN MORE UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF PROTECTIVE
                                     FORCES

        To manage its protective forces more effectively and uniformly,
    over the past decades DOE has considered two principal options--
    improving elements of the existing contractor system or creating a
    Federal protective force. We identified five major criteria that DOE
    officials, protective force contractors, and union officials have used
    to assess the advantages and disadvantages of these options.\14\
    Overall, in comparing these criteria against the two principal options,
    we found that neither contractor nor Federal forces seems
    overwhelmingly superior, but each has offsetting advantages and
    disadvantages. Either option could result in effective and more uniform
    security if well-managed. However, we identified transitional problems
    with converting the current protective force to a federalized force.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ We reviewed five DOE studies completed between 1992 and 2009,
    as well as responses to our data collection instrument, to identify
    these criteria.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        When assessing whether to improve the existing contractor system or
    federalize protective forces, DOE, protective force contractors, and
    union officials have used the following five criteria:

             A personnel system that supports force resizing and
            ensures high-quality protective force members.
             Greater standardization of protective forces across
            sites to more consistently support high performance and ready
            transfer of personnel between sites.
             Better DOE management and oversight to ensure
            effective security.
             Prevention or better management of protective force
            strikes.
             Containment of the forces' costs within expected
            budgets.
              Evaluating the two principal options--maintaining the current
            security force structure or federalizing the security force--
            against these criteria, we found that if the forces are well-
            managed, either contractor or Federal forces could result in
            effective and more uniform security for several reasons:
             First, both options have offsetting advantages and
            disadvantages, with neither option emerging as clearly
            superior. When compared with a possible federalized protective
            force, a perceived advantage of a contractor force is greater
            flexibility for hiring or terminating an employee to resize the
            forces; a disadvantage is that a contractor force can strike.
            In contrast, federalization could better allow protective
            forces to advance or laterally transfer to other DOE sites to
            meet protective force members' needs or DOE's need to resize
            particular forces, something that is difficult to do under the
            current contractor system.
             Second, a key disadvantage of the current contractor
            system, such as potential strikes for contractor forces, does
            not preclude effective operations if the security force is
            well-managed. For instance, a 2009 memo signed by the NNSA
            administrator stated that NNSA had demonstrated that it can
            effectively manage strikes through the use of replacement
            protective forces.
             Third, distinctions between the two options can be
            overstated by comparing worst- and best-case scenarios, when
            similar conditions might be realized under either option. For
            example, a union coalition advocates federalization to get
            early and enhanced retirement benefits, which are available for
            law enforcement officers and some other Federal positions, to
            ensure a young and vigorous workforce. However, such benefits
            might also be provided to contractor protective forces.
              Reliably estimating the costs to compare protective force
            options proved difficult and precluded our detailed reporting
            on it. Since contractor and Federal forces could each have many
            possible permutations, choosing any particular option to assess
            would be arbitrary. For example, a 2008 NNSA-sponsored study
            identified wide-ranging federalization options, such as
            federalizing all or some SPO positions at some or all
            facilities or reorganizing them under an existing or a new
            agency. In addition, DOE would have to decide on the
            hypothetical options' key cost factors before it could
            reasonably compare costs. For example, when asked about some
            key cost factors for federalization, an NNSA Service Center
            official said that a detailed workforce analysis would be
            needed to decide whether DOE would either continue to use the
            same number of SPOs with high amounts of scheduled overtime or
            hire a larger number of SPOs who would work fewer overtime
            hours. Also, the official said that until management directs a
            particular work schedule for federalized protective forces,
            there is no definitive answer to the applicable overtime rules,
            such as whether overtime begins after 8 hours in a day. The
            amount of overtime and the factors affecting it are crucial to
            a sound cost estimate because overtime pay can now account for
            up to about 50 percent of pay for worked hours.

     FEDERALIZING PROTECTIVE FORCES COULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES EITHER UNDER
        CURRENT LAWS OR WITH SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR ENHANCED RETIREMENT
                                    BENEFITS

        If protective forces were to be federalized under existing law, the
    current forces probably would not be eligible for early and enhanced
    retirement benefits and might face a loss of pay or even their jobs.
    For example:

             According to officials at the Office of Personnel
            Management (OPM) \15\ and NNSA's Service Center,\16\ if
            contractor SPOs were federalized under existing law, they would
            likely be placed into the Federal security guard (GS-0085) job
            series. Although a coalition of unions has sought
            federalization to allow members to have early and enhanced
            retirement benefits, which allows employees in certain Federal
            jobs to retire at age 50 with 20 years of service, Federal
            security guards are not eligible for these benefits.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ OPM is the central human resources agency for the Federal
    government.
        \16\ NNSA's Service Center provides business, technical, financial,
    legal, human resources, and management support to NNSA site
    organizations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Our analysis indicated transitioning protective force
            members may receive lower pay rates as Federal security guards.
            Contractor force members receive top pay rates that could not
            generally be matched under the likely General Schedule pay
            grades.
             If protective forces were federalized, OPM officials
            told us that current members would not be guaranteed a Federal
            job and would have to compete for the new Federal positions;
            thus, they risk not being hired. Nonveteran protective force
            members are particularly at risk because competition for
            Federal security guard positions is restricted to those with
            veterans' preference, if they are available.

        According to OPM officials, legislation would be required to
    provide Federal protective forces with early and enhanced retirement
    benefits because their positions do not fit the current definition of
    law enforcement officers that would trigger such benefits. However, if
    such legislation were enacted, these benefits' usual provisions could
    create hiring and retirement difficulties for older force members.
    Older members might not be rehired because agencies are typically
    authorized to set a maximum age, often age 37, for entry into Federal
    positions with early retirement. In addition, even if there were a
    waiver from the maximum age of hire, older protective forces members
    could not retire at age 50 because they would have had to work 20 years
    to meet the Federal service requirement for ``early'' retirement
    benefits. These forces could retire earlier if they were granted credit
    for their prior years of service under DOE and NNSA contracts. However,
    OPM officials told us OPM would strongly oppose Federal retirement
    benefits being granted for previous years of contractor service
    (retroactive benefits). According to these officials, these retroactive
    benefits would be without precedent and would violate the basic concept
    that service credit for retirement benefits is only available for
    eligible employment at the time it was performed. Moreover, retroactive
    benefits would create an unfunded liability for Federal retirement
    funds.

     DOE SEEKS TO ADDRESS PROTECTIVE FORCE ISSUES BY REFORMING CONTRACTOR
                 FORCES, BUT PROGRESS HAS BEEN LIMITED TO DATE

        In a joint January 2009 memorandum, senior officials from NNSA and
    DOE rejected the federalization of protective forces as an option and
    supported the continued use of contracted protective forces--but with
    improvements. They concluded that, among other things, the transition
    to a Federal force would be costly and would be likely to provide
    little, if any, increase in security effectiveness. However, these
    officials recognized that the current contractor system could be
    improved by addressing some of the issues that federalization might
    have resolved. In particular, they announced the pursuit of an
    initiative to better standardize protective forces' training and
    equipment. According to these officials, more standardization serves to
    increase effectiveness, provide cost savings, and facilitate better
    responses to potential work stoppages. In addition, in March 2009, DOE
    commissioned a study group to recommend ways to overcome the personnel
    system problems that might prevent protective force members from
    working to a normal retirement age, such as 60 to 65, and building
    reasonable retirement benefits.
        In addition, NNSA established a Security Commodity Team to
    establish standardized procurement processes and to identify and test
    security equipment that can be used across sites. According to NNSA
    officials, NNSA established a common mechanism in December 2009 for
    sites to procure ammunition. In addition, to move toward more
    standardized operations and a more centrally managed protective force
    program, NNSA started a broad security review to identify possible
    improvements. As a result, according to NNSA officials in January 2010,
    NNSA has developed a draft standard for protective force operations,
    which is intended to clarify both policy expectations and a consistent
    security approach that is both effective and efficient.
        For the personnel system initiative to enhance career longevity and
    retirement options, in June 2009, the DOE-chartered study group made 29
    recommendations that were generally designed to enable members to reach
    a normal retirement age within the protective force, take another job
    within DOE, or transition to a non-DOE career. The study group
    identified 14 of its 29 career and retirement recommendations as
    involving low- or no-cost actions that could conceivably be implemented
    quickly. For example, some recommendations call for reviews to find
    ways to maximize the number of armed and unarmed positions that SPOs
    can fill when they can no longer meet their current combatant
    requirements. Other recommendations focus on providing training and
    planning assistance for retirement and job transitions. The study group
    also recognized that a majority (15 out of 29) of its personnel system
    recommendations, such as enhancing retirement plans to make them more
    equivalent and portable across sites, may be difficult to implement
    largely because of budget constraints.
        Progress on the 29 recommendations had been limited at the time of
    our review. When senior department officials were briefed on the
    personnel system recommendations in late June 2009, they took them
    under consideration for further action but immediately approved one
    recommendation--to extend the life of the study group by forming a
    standing committee. They directed the standing committee to develop
    implementation strategies for actions that can be done in the near term
    and, for recommendations requiring further analysis, additional
    funding, or other significant actions, to serve as an advisory panel
    for senior department officials. According to a DOE official in early
    December 2009, NNSA and DOE were in varying stages of reviews to
    advance the other 28 recommendations. Later that month, NNSA addressed
    an aspect of one recommendation about standardization, in part by
    formally standardizing protective force uniforms. In the Conference
    Report for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,
    the conferees directed the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of
    the NNSA to develop a comprehensive DOE-wide plan to identify and
    implement the recommendations of the study group.
        In closing, while making changes to reflect the post-September 11
    security environment, DOE and its protective force contractors through
    their collective bargaining agreements have not successfully aligned
    protective force personnel systems--which affect career longevity, job
    transitions, and retirement--with the increased physical and other
    demands of a more paramilitary operation. Without better alignment, in
    our opinion, there is greater potential for a strike at a site, as well
    as potential risk to site security, when protective forces' collective
    bargaining agreements expire. In the event of a strike at one site, the
    differences in protective forces' training and equipment make it
    difficult to readily provide reinforcements from other sites. Even if
    strikes are avoided, the effectiveness of protective forces may be
    reduced if tensions exist between labor and management. These concerns
    have elevated the importance of finding the most effective approach to
    maintaining protective force readiness, including an approach that
    better aligns personnel systems and protective force requirements. At
    the same time, DOE must consider its options for managing protective
    forces in a period of budgetary constraints. With these considerations
    in mind, DOE and NNSA have recognized that the decentralized management
    of protective forces creates some inefficiencies and that some systemic
    career and longevity issues are not being resolved through actions at
    individual sites. NNSA's standardization initiatives and
    recommendations made by a DOE study group offer a step forward.
    However, the possibility in 2012 of strikes at three of its highest
    risk sites makes it imperative, as recommended by our report and
    directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2010, that DOE soon resolve the issues surrounding protective forces'
    personnel system.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
    happy to respond to any questions that you or other members of the
    subcommittee have.

        Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
        Senator Vitter, there are two votes starting at 2:45 p.m.,
    so if we could, maybe we could finish the other opening
    statements, go vote, and then come back and you can give us
    some opening statements.
        Senator Vitter. Sure.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
        Mr. Podonsky.

      STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HEALTH,
               SAFETY, AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Vitter, thank
    you for inviting me to testify about the Department of Energy's
    efforts to address the career-related concerns of our
    protective force.
        This hearing comes at a critical junction in the
    Department's longstanding efforts to evaluate the tactical
    capabilities of the protective forces supported by career and
    retirement opportunities commensurate with the professionalism
    we've come to expect.
        When the Department was created, protective forces were
    essentially industrial security gate guards. In the early
    1980s, the Department acknowledged the potential for more
    serious terrorist threats, and began a dramatic effort to ramp
    up the tactical capabilities of its protective forces. This was
    accompanied by increasing performance expectations for the
    protective force members. Compensation and benefits improved,
    but did not always keep pace with the increasing demands of the
    job.
        In the 1990s, cuts in the protective force numbers became
    part of the post-Cold War peace dividend. The events of
    September 11 ushered in a new focus on security across the DOE
    and the Nation, and a new emphasis on protective forces. The
    Department needed a security posture able to meet much greater
    challenges, including the need for more tactical capability
    security forces.
        In 2004, I recommended to Secretary Abraham that he create
    an initiative called the Elite Force, which included
    federalization of the protective force. The Elite Force concept
    is currently known as the DOE's TRF Initiative. The results, in
    terms of capabilities of this initiative, have been impressive,
    but a practical and affordable path towards improving
    protective force service as a career has not occurred.
        Studies conducted in 2004 identified federalization of the
    Department's protective force as the preferred option, but
    acknowledged that no realistic path forward toward this goal
    existed. The National Council of Security Police (NCSP) came to
    support federalization as a means of advancing its program for
    improved career progression and retirement benefits, but there
    still seemed to be no viable and affordable means for the DOE
    to actually implement this concept.
        Among the difficulties was the need for complex changes to
    legislation and regulations to enable a federalization process
    that would protect incumbents and/or classify personnel as law
    enforcement. At the time, congressional interest in making the
    complex legislative changes necessary was not apparent, so the
    Department felt that most of the major issues should be
    addressed in some manner under the current contract protective
    force model.
        In 2009, I chartered a broad-base protective force career
    options study group to address protective force concerns,
    composed of experts and DOE security professionals and leaders
    from the NCSP. That group made 29 recommendations. The GAO's
    January 2010 study (GAO-10-275) of protective force personnel
    issues seemed to support the recommendations by recommending
    that the Department respond to each of them.
        We have since created the Protective Force Career Options
    Committee to assist policy and line organizations in
    implementing the study group recommendations. The Department
    has drawn together its best expertise to develop an appropriate
    implementation plan for these recommendations.
        I would like to take a moment here just to offer a special
    thank you to the NCSP and the protective force union leaders
    for their dedicated and cooperative efforts over the last year
    to not only help us identify the problems, but also the
    potential solutions.
        Consistent with Secretary Chu's management principle to
    treat our people as our greatest asset, the Department's
    actions reflect a commitment to identify and promote efforts to
    ensure members of the protective forces are treated in a manner
    consistent with their vital role and in recognition of
    professional demands of that role entailing.
        While the Department can cite gains in implementing
    security initiatives that provide more robust asset protection,
    we have not yet made similar progress in efforts to address all
    concerns of the protective force members regarding career
    prospects and related issues.
        Much of the lack of progress actually speaks to the
    complexity and difficulty in resolving these issues. The DOE
    and NNSA are, in fact, addressing the recommendations
    associated with response planning, deployment strategy, force
    restructuring, training needs, and standardization of
    protective force weapons, equipment, and uniforms. Our national
    training center in Albuquerque is developing the curricula for
    protective force career progression and career transition
    training.
        My office is also in the process of reviewing
    recommendations dealing with protective force physical fitness
    standards, medical requirements, and human reliability program.
        Most of the remaining recommendations involve the very
    difficult issue of retirement, mobility among contractors,
    disability retirement, and retraining and placement outside the
    protective force. These areas are further complicated because
    they are mostly defined in collective bargaining agreements
    between the contractors and the unions.
        The Department should explore ways to craft a
    comprehensive, standardized approach to protective force career
    progression and retirement issues that will ensure that
    protective force members, regardless of location, are treated
    equitably and with the assurance that neither age nor injury
    will unfairly disadvantage them, in comparison with the larger
    departmental workforce.
        For example, Mr. Chairman, the Department could consider
    pursuing a program similar to the benefits allowed for
    beryllium workers under 10 CFR 850. That would provide
    retraining and transfer or 2 years' saved pay benefits to
    protective force personnel who are injured or are otherwise
    unable to meet physical standards.
        While my office will continue to assist in resolving these
    complex issues, by their very nature and inherent cost and
    contractual implications, alternate resolution is clearly
    within the purview of the line management. In this regard, I
    should also emphasize that line management is also deeply
    engaged alongside HSS, my organization, in this task.
        In conclusion, the protective force is critical to DOE's
    overall protection, and it is the Department's and the Nation's
    best interest to ensure that protective force personnel are
    treated equitably, and that their legitimate concerns are
    addressed to the greatest possible extent.
        We conducted studies on this topic in 1992, 1997, 2004, and
    2008. DOE is moving to address those issues that can be
    resolved within existing operation on resource constraints.
    Fair resolutions to the more complex and difficult issues will
    require cooperation and compromise by all the principals
    involved--line management, the unions, and Congress.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Glenn S. Podonsky

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: thank you for inviting
    me to testify on the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to deal with
    the interdependence and complexity of protective force personnel
    issues, contracting requirements, and security needs at our national
    security facilities. Specifically, we must fairly address the
    reasonable concerns of protective force personnel for clear and
    attainable career paths to retirement, yet also balance those desires
    with the Department's need to maintain forces capable of securing our
    facilities in a cost effective manner. The Department has been pursuing
    ways to address these overlapping needs for many years.

                                   BACKGROUND

        As early as 2003, my office recognized a number of concerns
    associated with the Department's contractor protective force model.
    Some concerns were expressed by protective force members and their
    unions, and others by the Department's security and line managers.
    Personnel concerns included issues such as the lack of a career path
    that protective force personnel could reasonably be assured of until
    retirement, nominally at age 65, as well as the lack of alternative
    positions available to personnel who, due to job-related injuries,
    other disabilities, or advancing age, could no longer meet the physical
    standards required for armed positions. Management's concerns with the
    contractor force model included the very real potential for protective
    force strikes at the expiration of collective bargaining agreements and
    the inefficiencies associated with a lack of standardization among
    protective forces' weapons, equipment, and training.
        The opportunity to consider and, hopefully, act on these issues was
    one factor in our efforts to have then Secretary Abraham include
    protective force upgrades prominently in his May 2004 comprehensive
    package of security initiatives. The protective force element of the
    security initiative was referred to at the time as the ``elite force''
    initiative and recognized the need to respond to revised perceptions of
    the post-September 11 threat environment by transitioning some
    protective force elements toward a more combat-capable status that
    included mobile response and increased offensive combat capabilities.
        In response to the Deputy Secretary's June 2004 direction to
    develop options to implement the elite force initiative--direction
    which specifically included examining possible federalization of
    protective forces--my office and the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) tasked a Protective Force Working Group to study
    the inherent issues. The Working Group issued papers in August and
    October 2004, and their recommendations included federalization of the
    protective forces. The Working Group's federalization position was
    based on perceived principles associated with elevating protective
    forces to levels of equal status and capability with the nation's elite
    military units; it was not accompanied by a cost/benefit analysis or a
    plan for achieving federalization. Initial analysis of the
    federalization issue indicated that while federalization offered
    potential benefits, it also posed significant difficulties.
        Based largely on the results of the working group, in January 2005
    the Department identified its chosen path forward for implementing the
    elite force initiative. Phase I included actions to enhance policy,
    tactical planning, training and readiness, physical standards, and use
    of security technology. The issue of federalization was deferred, to
    avoid creating instability during a time of already profound change
    affecting the protective forces, and also because the Department had
    concluded that the major benefits of federalization could be achieved
    within the contractor protective forces model so long as the
    contractors and the unions supported the effort to establish and
    maintain an elite force.
        In March 2006, the Department promulgated major policy changes to
    implement the elite force concept, which had become known as the
    Tactical Response Force concept. Initial misinterpretation of these
    changes led to perceptions that a much larger proportion of protective
    force personnel would be compelled to meet the more demanding offensive
    combatant physical standard. This prospect caused concern among some
    protective force personnel and their unions; the changes were seen as
    exacerbating longstanding concerns regarding the ability of aging or
    disabled personnel to meet increased physical performance requirements,
    and hence to remain on the job until retirement age. Protective forces
    unions voiced increasing support for federalization in the belief that
    it would include provisions for an early retirement program as well as
    other benefits associated with existing Federal law enforcement
    programs. A strike by the Pantex Guard Union in the spring of 2007 was
    influenced in part by a narrow interpretation of the new requirements
    of the proposed Tactical Response Force.
        In March 2008, NNSA received the results of a study--``Comparative
    Analysis of Contractor and Federal Protective Forces At Fixed Sites''--
    it had commissioned to examine the contract force/federalization issue.
    In June 2008 NNSA received a follow on ``Cost Analysis and Modeling''
    supplement to the initial report. The study and supplement concluded
    that key union assumptions about federalization--such as 20 year
    retirement, automatic hiring of incumbents, and portability or
    grandfathering of retirement benefits--could not occur under current
    law; converting contract protective forces ``en masse'' to Federal
    forces would require extensive new legislation.
        As the issue of federalization was examined, it became clear that
    federalization would be difficult and would potentially have negative
    consequences for many current protective force members. Federalization
    of the private sector contractor force would require more complex
    legislation, for example, than had an earlier successful effort to give
    nuclear materials couriers, who were already Federal employees,
    retirement benefits equivalent to law enforcement officers under the
    Civil Service Retirement System and the Federal Employees' Retirement
    System.
        The NNSA-commissioned analyses also confirmed that many of the
    concerns associated with the contract force model could be addressed
    constructively within that model. DOE management including NNSA,
    decided not to pursue federalization, but rather to address identified
    problems within the private, contractor force model. In January 2009,
    the Deputy Secretary was informed of the proposed path forward--not to
    federalize the protective forces but to implement standardized
    procedures and practices at NNSA Category I facilities which would
    provide the major benefits of federalization while maintaining
    contractor protective forces.
        Although the Department does not consider the federalization model
    the best option for meeting its security needs, it remains committed to
    addressing the major career path and retirement-related concerns of its
    contractor protective forces, as expressed through their unions and the
    National Council of Security Police, an umbrella organization made up
    of DOE protective force bargaining units. Consequently, in March 2009
    the Office of Health, Safety and Security commissioned a Protective
    Force Career Options Initiative Study Group to examine realistic and
    reasonable options for improving the career opportunities and
    retirement prospects of protective force members while maintaining a
    robust and effective security posture. Response to this initiative was
    positive: representation on the Study Group included the National
    Council of Security Police (represented in the hearing today by Mike
    Stumbo), my office, NNSA, and other DOE headquarters program offices.
    In June of last year, the Study Group made 29 recommendations; 14 are
    considered to be cost neutral and achievable under existing governance
    structures while the other 15 involve additional program costs and/or
    changes to existing management and contractual approaches. The National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Department
    to develop and submit to Congress by April 30, 2010, a comprehensive
    Department-wide plan to implement the Study Group recommendations. We
    intend to submit that plan on time.
        In July 2009, and consistent with one of the Study Group
    recommendations, we created the Protective Force Career Options
    Committee as a standing committee tasked with continuing the work of
    the Study Group by assisting DOE in implementation of the Study Group's
    recommendations.
        In January 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
    published the results of a Congressionally mandated study of the
    management of DOE protective forces. The GAO study recommends that DOE
    respond to the 29 recommendations of the DOE Study Group by developing
    and executing implementation plans for those recommendations identified
    as low- or no-cost, and by planning and conducting research to identify
    the most beneficial and financially feasible options for implementing
    the remaining recommendations that may involve substantial costs or
    contractual and organizational changes. The Department has concurred
    with the findings and recommendations of the GAO report.

                                 CURRENT STATUS

        This brings us to the current status of our efforts to address the
    situation and my assessment of what we have accomplished and what
    remains to be accomplished. First, the Office of Health, Safety and
    Security remains committed to assisting the Department in providing
    levels of security at our facilities that are consistent with the
    assets in our custody and our understanding of the most current
    national threat environment. That commitment includes an effort to
    identify and promote the necessary actions to ensure that the
    protective forces are treated in a manner consistent with their vital
    role and the heavy professional demands it imposes.
        The Department has made significant progress at considerable cost
    in its efforts to provide its protective forces with the tactical and
    technical tools required to implement the Tactical Response Force
    concept and ensure mission success; some of those efforts remain works
    in progress. The Department has made significant investments in
    physical security upgrades such as barriers, advanced sensor systems,
    and hardened defensive positions; in advanced, more capable and longer
    range weapons systems and tactical equipment; in defensive strategies
    and tactical planning to field the Tactical Response Force concept to
    advantage; and in tactical training to improve the skills of the
    personnel who will comprise the Tactical Response Force. These upgrades
    are designed to increase the tactical effectiveness of the protective
    forces while decreasing their vulnerability to adversary actions.
        Implementation of the Tactical Response Force concept as well as
    the weapons and equipment upgrades and personnel training have varied
    from site to site, as expected; some sites continue to adjust their
    implementation efforts to better align with local conditions. This
    remains an ongoing process with more work to be done at some sites
    before they will have fully integrated the old and new approaches.
        The Department has made clear gains in implementing security
    initiatives that provide more robust asset protection and mission-
    related advantages to protective force personnel. The Department has
    not made similar progress, however, in its efforts to address the
    concerns of protective force members regarding their career prospects
    and retirement issues. The Tactical Response Force concept includes a
    requirement for career progression planning for each protective force
    member, although many individual plans are still outstanding.
        I would like to take a minute here to emphasize that our lack of
    progress in some areas does not reflect a lack of commitment or effort
    on our part, but rather reflects the complexity and difficulty of
    determining and maintaining the most appropriate and fair balance among
    issues which affect the well-being of the protective forces and the
    success of our mission to provide highest quality, cost effective
    security. The Department's efforts are and will continue to be aligned
    with the Study Group's 29 recommendations. The Study Group, in fact,
    has evolved into the Protective Force Career Options Committee,
    referenced earlier in this testimony.
        The NNSA, in whose facilities most of the protective forces serve,
    began a Zero Based Security Review in July 2009. This review is
    developing detailed analyses of security programs and needs at each
    NNSA facility, and is expected to be completed by the end of 2010. It
    is expected to provide information and analyses directly applicable to
    many of the Study Group's recommendations.
        In addition, DOE's National Training Center is currently conducting
    analyses and a curriculum development effort to support protective
    force career progression and career transition training. In conjunction
    with this effort, HSS is also working to modify an existing complex-
    wide job register to better accommodate the specific needs of
    protective force personnel.
        Study Group recommendations dealing with protective force physical
    fitness standards, medical requirements, and the Human Reliability
    Program all involve requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations. To
    modify these requirements, the Department must go through a formal
    rulemaking process. The Office of Health, Safety, and Security has
    established a task team to oversee this process. The team is currently
    reviewing the physical fitness standards for proposed revision, has
    nearly completed a set of proposed revisions to the medical standards,
    and has a proposed revision of the Human Reliability Program regulation
    under review in the Department.
        Action on a few recommendations--retirement and (financial)
    retirement planning, portability/mobility among contractors, disability
    retirement, retraining and placement outside of protective forces, and
    various personnel services and actions--is proving difficult. While
    these recommendations pertain to issues of high importance to the
    protective forces and their unions, these are also issues covered in
    the collective bargaining agreements between the private sector
    contractors and the unions. Although the Department can establish the
    overall parameters for future contracts, the Department is prohibited
    by Federal Acquisition Regulations from interfering with collective
    bargaining agreements or dictating the terms of those agreements. Since
    each of the respective protective forces contractors and unions
    negotiate agreements based on their specific interests, significant
    differences exist in the terms and conditions of various contracts from
    site to site. The extent to which unions would be amenable to
    negotiating contracts with common clauses is unknown, although the
    Department would be willing to explore ways to accommodate such an
    effort through the parameters it establishes in future contracts. For
    example, the Department should consider establishing a program--similar
    to the benefits currently allowed for beryllium workers under 10 CFR
    850--that would provide retraining and transfer or 2 year save pay
    benefits for protective force personnel who are injured or otherwise
    unable to meet physical standards. HSS is currently working with line
    management with the goal of crafting a comprehensive, standardized
    approach to protective force career progression and retirement issues.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Of the 29 recommendations, the Department is making good progress
    on those that can be resolved within DOE. We are also moving forward on
    those issues which can be addressed through rulemaking, although that
    process is slower. The Department is still seeking workable solutions
    to the more difficult problems which variously involve contracting and
    collective bargaining. As noted above, the Department intends to
    present a plan to implement all 29 recommendations to Congress in
    April. We recognize that the protective forces are a key element in the
    protection of our most sensitive national security assets. Fair
    resolution of the most difficult protective forces personnel issues
    will necessarily require cooperation and compromise by all parties. The
    Department also believes firmly that needed changes and improvements
    can be made within the contract protective forces model, and that it
    will benefit both the Department and protective forces personnel to
    work together to resolve all outstanding issues in as fair and fast a
    process as possible. The Department is committed to finding solutions
    that ensure the fair and equitable treatment of each protective force
    member.

        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo.

       STATEMENT OF MIKE STUMBO, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
                            SECURITY POLICE

        Mr. Stumbo. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
    my name is Mike Stumbo. I'm pleased to be here to testify, at
    your request, on issues relating to the Department of Energy
    Protective Force.
        I proudly serve as a security police officer (SPO) at the
    Pantex site. Those of you that are not familiar with the Pantex
    site, it is the site of final assembly and disassembly of
    nuclear weapons here in the United States.
        I consider my job, like many of my fellow DOE SPOs, as
    continuing service to my country, defending against adversaries
    who are organized to destroy this country.
        I am also the president of the National Council of Security
    Police, commonly known as the NCSP. Our organization was formed
    by constituent unions as an active collective voice common to
    all DOE SPOs throughout the DOE enterprise. We provide
    unfiltered insight from the field. We call it the ``boots-on-
    the-ground perspective.''
        For the past several years, we have focused on the question
    of Federalizing the protective force, which has been an area of
    extensive discussion and review within DOE for many years.
        As highlighted in the recent GAO report, there are
    significant personnel issues affecting the ability of the
    protective forces to perform their mission that cannot be
    compromised.
        On July 16, 1945, in the early morning hours, near
    Alamogordo, NM, a test code-named ``Trinity'' refashioned our
    world forever. The new weapon became the very fabric of our
    national defense and the primary deterrent of attack from our
    greatest enemies. Our government produces these weapons, and it
    is an inherent government function to protect them.
        Currently, the security of our Nation's nuclear weapons and
    weapons-grade material is contracted out to private security
    contractors. It is the private structure that has not allowed
    these exceptional men and women who protect these weapons of
    mass destruction the ability to enjoy terms and conditions of
    employment that support a shortened career, a career that
    demands the highest physical, medical, and training standards
    in any law enforcement arena.
        Quite frankly, new hires coming out of the military see
    these jobs as a continuation of military service in the private
    sector. But, quickly they find out that there is no incentive
    to make this a career. After investing time, money, and
    clearances, many transition to the law-enforcement
    opportunities that are career-based. This is not a novel or new
    issue; the conflicts that exist between profit versus security,
    when private companies protect nuclear assets, are inherent.
        It was identified in 1990, by the GAO (GAO/RC8D-91-12), to
    adopt federalization as a potential structure; again in 2004,
    by the Department of Energy, again to adopt federalization as
    potential structure. Shortly after that, the DOE chief health,
    safety, and security officer commissioned a team composed of
    DOE line management and NCSP leadership to address career
    opportunities and retirement prospects for SPOs. The
    recommended 29 options are captured in the 2010 GAO report. The
    NCSP commends HSS for having the courage to initiate this
    action among a great deal of controversy.
        Our jobs require a vigorous physical security force that
    must maintain stringent training and medical standards. It will
    require the best 20 years of our lives. We must maintain the
    highest level of security to protect the most powerful weapons
    known to mankind. In that 20 years, our bodies begin to break
    down--knees, ankles; our reactionary skills, target-recognition
    skills start to decrease--it's a natural order--not to mention
    the risk of exposure from radiation, chemicals, and beryllium.
    These hazards are not encountered by our other law-enforcement
    counterparts.
        What I ask of you today is to recognize the uniqueness and
    nature of our work, and the paramount importance of our mission
    to this country. There are three entities that perform the
    mission of protecting nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon-grade
    material: the military, DOE nuclear couriers, and DOE SPOs.
    Only one of those entities is outside of the Federal structure,
    and that is the DOE SPOs.
        Whether we choose to Federalize or maintain the private
    security contractor structure, we must adopt the Federal
    retirement components that support this vital mission. DOE SPOs
    deserve nothing less. Too much time has passed. There have been
    plenty of studies.
        In closing, I wish to thank the committee for giving me the
    opportunity to present our case on behalf of the NCSP. I'm
    prepared to answer any questions you may have.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Stumbo follows:]

                       Prepared Statement by Mike Stumbo

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Mike Stumbo and
    am pleased to be here at your request to testify before you on issues
    relating to the Department of Energy (DOE) protective forces. I am one
    of them proudly serving as a security police officer at the Pantex
    Nuclear Site. I see my job as continuing service to my country by
    defending against adversaries who are organized to destroy our country,
    Today, I am here to represent all of the Protective Forces who proudly
    serve our country throughout the DOE Complex. I serve as the President
    of the National Council of Security Police, commonly known as the NCSP.
    Our organization was formed by constituent unions to act as a
    collective voice on matters that are common to all protective forces
    throughout the DOE Complex. Our mission is not to bargain on behalf of
    labor unions at the sites, but to speak on issues where we have first
    hand personal experience and provide unfiltered insight from the field.
    For the past several years, we have focused on the question of
    Federalizing the protective force which has been an area of extensive
    discussion and review within the DOE for many years. As highlighted in
    the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, there are
    significant personnel issues affecting the ability of the protective
    forces to perform their mission to standards that cannot be
    compromised. We believe the time is now to take the necessary steps to
    correct personnel issues which will insure a battle ready force;
    whether it is through federalization or some other form of legislative
    mandate which accomplishes the same results.
        On July 16, 1945 in the early morning hours near Alamogordo, NM, a
    test code named ``Trinity'' refashioned our world forever. This new
    weapon ended a war and has become the very fabric of our national
    defense and the primary deterrent to an attack from our greatest
    enemies. Our Government produces these weapons of mass destruction as
    part of our defense posture. There is no greater mission than to assure
    these weapons, and their components, are secured and protected so that
    every American can be assured our adversaries have NO access to them.
    The consequences of an event at one of these sites are so dire as to be
    unthinkable. We believe the securing and protection of our nuclear
    arsenal is an inherent government function and must be treated as such.
    Anything less is compromising the proper role of our government and in
    our judgment potentially compromising the security of our nuclear
    assets.
        Currently security of our Nation's nuclear weapons and weapons
    grade materials, which are stored at various facilities near population
    centers throughout the country, is contracted out to private security
    contractors. It is this private structure that has not allowed the
    exceptional men and women who protect this Nation to enjoy terms and
    conditions of employment commensurate with a shortened career resulting
    from the many requirements and demands of their jobs. In the field,
    this means many of the protective force become dissatisfied with their
    job as requirements increase and prospects for career progression or a
    secure retirement do not exist, As it relates to current employment, we
    are seeing a trend toward lowered job performance and increasing
    attrition rates. Quite frankly, new hires coming out of the military
    initially see these jobs as a continuation of military service in the
    private sector. However, once they have experienced the jobs, the jobs
    fall out of favor because there is very little incentive to make this a
    career, After investing all the time, money, and training necessary to
    attain full clearances, many of our qualified protective forces opt to
    transition to local law enforcement careers.
        This is not a new or novel issue. The conflicts of interest,
    including profit versus performance that are inherent when a private
    security company protects nuclear assets has been the subject of
    ongoing discussion and review. As far back as 1990, a GAO report began
    to unveil problems with securing nuclear weapons and weapons grade
    material within a private structure. This report resulted in no action
    after identifying the inherent problems. Years later, in 2004, the
    topic was re-addressed by a working group. I quote from the memo issued
    by the 2004 DOE Protective Force Working Group:
        Memorandum: ``The world-changing events of September 11, 2001,
    decisively subordinated the old industrial security model to a ``combat
    force'' model. This new standard carries profound legal and practical
    implications, all of which tend to support adoption of the Federal
    force option.''
        In 2004, the mandate was clear and the reasons were sound. Again,
    no action.
        Inexplicably, in 2009 the department changed its position yet again
    with a Memorandum dated January 13, 2009 to the acting Deputy Secretary
    of DOE stating ``that Federalizing the protective force is no longer a
    viable option''. The apparent overriding reasons were budgetary and the
    lack of any precedent of Federalizing a group which has been
    historically contracted out. What were not adequately addressed are the
    many serious security issues that relate to the decision to eliminate
    federalization as an option. In our view, the reasoning behind the
    change in direction is flawed. The time is now to right the ship and
    take corrective action to address the serious personnel issues faced by
    DOE.
        Due, in part, to NCSP's efforts, on March 31, 2009, the Chief
    Health, Safety, and Security Officer (HS-1) of the DOE commissioned a
    study to examine ``realistic and reasonable options for improving the
    career opportunities and retirement prospects of protective force
    members. With the support of both DOE line management and the
    leadership of the National Council of Security Police (NCSP), a study
    team was assembled under the leadership of the Office of Health,
    Safety, and Security. The result of the report is captured in the
    January 2010 GAO report'' Nuclear Security DOE Needs to Address
    Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues.''
        I commend the GAO and its staff who committed approximately 18
    months of resources identifying the facts of the current private DOE
    structure. One point that stands out in my mind which is captured in
    the 2010 GAO report is the advantages and disadvantages of a contractor
    structure. Upon a careful reading of Table 7, you will be hard pressed
    to find any rational basis for concluding that the contractor model has
    any ``real'' advantage. At the core of Federalizing protective forces
    is imposing more direct management and standardization throughout the
    complex. No one can argue these objectives will not better prepare
    protective forces to defend against the enemy. Equally important to the
    men and women who serve at our sites, there are Federal benefits which
    better serve them for a shortened law enforcement type career. I know
    from experience how the current system impacts my brothers and sisters.
    It is not uncommon for one of us to reach an age, well before a normal
    retirement age, where we can no longer meet the demands of the job.
    This may be because of an injury where we cannot meet medical
    requirements. Or, it may be just middle age setting in and we cannot
    meet the physical fitness requirements. Many good men and women have
    found themselves without their job and without a real retirement
    option. After giving the best 15 to 20 years of their working lives,
    these men and women find it difficult to survive in today's economy. We
    are looking for a way to give back to them, in some small way, what
    they have given to their country. We now do it for others serving our
    country and we should do it for our protective forces.
        The current protective force is not alone in its struggle to
    achieve a reasonable career path. DOE, in years past had approached the
    U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to determine if ``nuclear
    materials couriers'' were eligible for coverage under the ``law
    enforcement'' category for enhanced retirement benefits under the
    special ``20-Year'' benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System
    (CSRS) and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). Nuclear
    couriers transport the nuclear materials we protect at the sites. The
    medical, physical training, and weapons requirements are nearly
    identical to the requirements and qualifications we must meet. The only
    significant difference in employment is nuclear couriers are Federal
    employees. OPM determined that nuclear materials couriers did not meet
    the definition of ``law enforcement'' for eligibility and coverage
    under the special 20-year retirement benefits.
        Despite this decision, the Department pursued and acquired
    congressional support for including nuclear materials courier positions
    under the special 20-year retirement provisions. Congress acknowledged
    the uniqueness and nature of the work performed by nuclear materials
    couriers, and accepted the Department's rationale for including this
    type of work under the enhanced special 20-Year retirement benefits.
    Consequently, a bill was introduced (1998 HR 3616) that later was
    passed and resulted in establishment of new legislation under Public
    Law 105-261. This law became effective on 10/17/98. The enactment of
    this law established a new category of positions, ``Nuclear Materials
    Courier,'' for inclusion under the enhanced retirement benefits for
    special 20-Year retirement under the CSRS and FERS retirement systems.
    The law authorized retroactive credit of service, for the purpose of
    establishing an entitlement to an annuity, back to the date the DOE was
    established. This date was October 1, 1977.
        I come to you today to again acknowledge the uniqueness of and
    nature of the work performed by the current DOE Security Police Force.
    We are required to maintain the most stringent physical, medical and
    training standards in the law enforcement area. Like nuclear couriers,
    we should have our own Federal classification recognizing the important
    duties and functions we perform for the citizens of our great nation.
    Three entities perform the task of securing nuclear weapons and nuclear
    grade material. They are the military, OST couriers, and DOE Security
    Police Officers. However only one of those entities is outside of a
    Federal structure, the men and women I am here speaking on behalf of,
    DOE Security Police Officers throughout the United States. This is not
    right!
        Our men and women are entrusted to protect the most powerful
    weapons known to mankind. Every workday, no matter how quiet it starts
    or how routine can turn, with or without warning into a terrorist
    attack. Our mission is to turn back and defend such an attack putting
    our lives on the line. There is no second line of defense. In addition
    to combat risks; working at nuclear sites exposes us to radiation,
    beryllium, and other chemicals that are potentially harmful to our
    health. We encounter daily risks not encountered by our counterparts in
    other law enforcement employment. My brothers and sisters who wear the
    DOE Protective Force badge are well aware of these risks and have
    chosen this service. We train, prepare, and are well equipped. We have
    wives, children, and parents who also know the risks and support us
    knowing how important the job we have is to our Nation. We simply are
    looking for a career path and retirement system which provides some
    reasonable measure of financial security when our job comes to an end.
        The current career structure that DOE security police officers must
    be reformed. Over the last 20 years multiple studies demonstrate the
    system is broken. There is no need for more studies or reviews. The
    time has come to fix the system by imposing personnel policies that
    carry out the long-term objectives of our mission. We believe the
    correct fix is Federalizing the protective forces. If that cannot be
    accomplished through legislation, at the very least there needs to be a
    legislative mandate requiring private contractors provide pension and
    retiree health and welfare benefits that mirror Federal benefits. For
    many years, we have been told budgetary restraints drive decisionmaking
    in this area. We disagree that security in this area can be compromised
    because of funding. However, there is a current opportunity to use
    available stimulus money to fund benefits for the protective force. I
    believe that is exactly what President Obama has in mind by allocating
    stimulus monies to DOE. It would serve the dual purpose of working to
    raise the level of protection at nuclear sites and present better
    economic conditions to newly retired security police officers.
        In closing, I wish to thank those men and women that serve as DOE
    security police officers and the privilege it has been to serve them as
    their spokesman in their efforts to secure a better career path. I also
    want to thank this committee for giving me the opportunity to present
    the case on behalf of the NCSP and look forward to answering any
    questions you may have or providing any additional information you may
    need.

        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        I think if we take a break to go and vote, we'll be right
    back. We apologize. That's one thing we have no control over.
    [Recess.]
        Hearing will come back to order.
        First, before the questions, Senator Vitter, any opening
    comments you might like to make?
        Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of getting to
    some questions before we're all pulled away, I will submit my
    opening statement for the record.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator David Vitter

        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in welcoming our
    witnesses today. I welcome you to your first hearing as chairman of
    this subcommittee and I look forward to working with you to strengthen
    our ability to counter all threats, including potential terrorist
    threats to our defensive nuclear capabilities.
        Today's hearing focuses on the personnel management of the
    Department of Energy's (DOE) Protective Force. Responsible for
    protecting some of our Nation's most sensitive materials, the more than
    2,000 brave men and women who comprise this force, represent some of
    the highest quality, best-trained, and best-equipped security personnel
    in the Nation. We are safer and more secure because of their service.
        In its assessment of the challenges associated with the unique
    personnel management structure of the Protective Force, the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) highlights a number of areas that require
    attention and resolution both at DOE and here in Congress and I look
    forward to beginning that discussion in our hearing today. The report
    identifies discrepancies in management, organization, staffing and
    training of the forces across the complex, as well as inconsistencies
    in pay and benefits. It also examines the costs and benefits associated
    with exploring the federalization of the force, to which I conclude is
    neither a prudent nor viable answer.
        Both DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    recognize that the decentralized management of the protective forces
    creates inefficiencies that need to be addressed and that more needs to
    be done to resolve what GAO calls ``systemic carrier and longevity
    issues'' which are not being resolved thorough contractor actions at
    individual sites. This hearing presents an opportunity to acknowledge
    challenges, and I look forward to hearing more from DOE and NNSA on
    their path forward, as well as learning more about workforce concerns.
    But I remain firm in my belief that necessary workforce management
    improvement efforts can be effectively achieved by management and labor
    working together without federalizing the Protective Force, an approach
    that GAO acknowledges could result in negative consequences to the
    capabilities of the force.
        According to GAO, the current privatized management model offers
    some significant advantages that must not be overlooked. While not
    perfect, the current model provides the flexibility necessary to tailor
    the forces to the diverse and distinct security requirements spanning
    the many different sites across the complex. It is a management model
    that, according to GAO, instills an ``emphasis on cost-benefit analysis
    as a part of the decisionmaking process.'' A model which GAO also cites
    as being superior to other government-wide models such as the
    Department of Defense.
        In January 2009, the NNSA and the DOE Chief Health Safety and
    Security Officer jointly acknowledging the need for improvements in
    management of the current civilian contracted model but rejected the
    federalization of the Protective Forces. In the memo, the department
    concludes that the major benefits of federalization can be achieved
    through continued utilization of a contractual based approach; that
    federalization would not improve implementation nor increase the NNSA
    security protection posture; and that federalization in the short term
    would be undeniably costly without any indication in the long term of
    substantial cost savings.
        I concur with the departments findings and agree that personnel
    management improvements must be achieved rapidly, in a spirit of
    cooperation, and in a cost-effective manner. Furthermore, such
    improvements must also be considered with fairness and equity for those
    employees who have served so honorably in the Department's Protective
    Forces in the defense of our Nation.
        The act authorizing this review requires DOE to issue a report on
    the management of its protective forces within 90 days after the
    issuance of GAO's review and recommendations. I look forward to
    reviewing the department's response and I also look forward to further
    discussing ways to address these issues outside of the context of
    federalizing the protective forces. The GAO report highlights some
    significant challenges and I look forward to hearing more from our
    witnesses.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.

        Senator Ben Nelson. Please start off with some questions.
        Senator Vitter. Right. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Aloise--is that the correct pronunciation?
        Mr. Aloise. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. Yes. In the GAO report, you state that a
    federalized force offers no overall advantage to the current
    model, and that, basically, either option could result in
    effective and more uniform security, if it's well managed. To
    that extent, do you assess that the cost of implementing a
    Federalized force, overall, would be higher than the cost of
    fixing the current model?
        Mr. Aloise. Cost was difficult to analyze. We didn't come
    up with a cost estimate, because there are so many variables to
    consider, and we just don't have that data. For example, would
    DOE hire more guards if they federalized, so they wouldn't have
    to spend so much on overtime, or would they keep the number of
    guards they have and utilize overtime? What would those
    overtime rates be? We didn't have that data, and we could not
    come up with a cost estimate.
        Senator Vitter. Okay.
        Mr. Podonsky, do you have any response to the same
    question?
        Mr. Podonsky. We also do not have hard data, in terms of
    the cost. But, what we looked at multiple times, as I said in
    my opening remarks, is, where there would be cost savings and/
    or effectiveness and security, and each time we've looked at
    it, as a department, we've come back in saying Federalizing was
    going to be more difficult than it would be if we cleaned up
    the current contracting situation that we currently have. So,
    one of the solutions, we believe, is to go to model contracts,
    with specific clauses in those contracts to take care of the
    concerns that the security forces are expressing and we agree
    with.
        Senator Vitter. Okay. Let me ask all of you, in whatever
    order you choose. There are these 29 recommendations that have
    been identified jointly by the Department and the unions. We're
    working on those, to some extent. If all of those could be
    accomplished, in your opinions, what would be the remaining
    issues, if any, that were far less than ideal, in terms of
    correcting the current model?
        Mr. Podonsky. Well, I'll go ahead and start, if my
    colleagues agree.
        The 29 recommendations was actually a product of the joint
    standing study group that was, as I said, both security
    professionals and the Department, contractors, and the union.
    So those 29 recommendations was the complete smorgasbord of
    what they felt--the complete group that the Department needed
    to do. My staff have told me, if, in fact, all 29 were
    completed, then there'd be very few, if any, issues remaining.
        Senator Vitter. Okay.
        Mr. Stumbo, what would your answer to the same question be?
        Mr. Stumbo. I sit on that standing committee, and in our
    opinion, based on those 29 recommendations, we identified those
    areas that truly had fractured the structure, that had made it
    dysfunctional. If we were to implement all of those
    recommendations, it would certainly allow us to have a
    structure that would permit the DOE SPOs to have a livable
    retirement, respectful of the mission that they perform.
        Senator Vitter. So, again, if we can check off those 29
    items--and I'm not suggesting that's easy to do or we'd do it
    overnight--would there be any remaining significant categories,
    in your opinion, of real work to be done?
        Mr. Stumbo. Not in my opinion, no, sir.
        Senator Vitter. Okay.
        Mr. Aloise.
        Mr. Aloise. We agree that the 29 recommendations, if
    implemented, would address concerns. The only point I'd like to
    make is, some of those recommendations, as you're aware, are
    potentially high cost.
        Senator Vitter. Right.
        Mr. Stumbo, as I appreciate it, a big part of your
    workforce's concerns are about retirement.
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. I've also heard, and I want to see if it's
    accurate, that a big portion of the workforce do not take full
    advantage of investment opportunities. Do you have a sense of
    what the facts are, with regard to the whole workforce? If
    nonparticpation is any significant factor, what can we do about
    it?
        Mr. Stumbo. Well, the 401(k) system was to be introduced
    and utilized in our collective bargaining agreements as a
    supplement, and only a supplement. So, the baseline, based on
    the shortened careers that each one of our men and women have
    to endure, is really what needs to be focused on. 401(k) is
    great, as long as the markets achieve the success that they can
    achieve, but we all recognize, based on the history of our
    recent markets, that if all of our eggs were in that basket,
    regardless of the participation rate, there's no way that our
    men and women could have retired.
        Senator Vitter. Well, what's the answer to my specific
    factual question about the participation rate? What is it or
    isn't it?
        Mr. Stumbo. I don't have the exact numbers in front of me
    for you. But, I would say, based on the young men and women
    that come out of the military, the 401(k) is probably a 50-50-
    type percentage for those personnel.
        Senator Vitter. What could we do, usefully, to push that a
    lot higher, do you think?
        Mr. Stumbo. Well, I think that we are dealing with young
    men and women who, obviously, are not focused on the future.
    So, I believe that we continue to educate them, and try to
    place a system in place so that the decisions that they do not
    make as young men and women, we have a structure in place that
    will provide for them when they are mature enough and recognize
    the true need of the mission.
        Senator Vitter. Okay.
        Do either of you have a response to those two questions?
    Number one, what are the facts about participation rates?
    Number two, what can we be doing to significantly increase
    participation rates?
        Mr. Aloise. The only thing I would add is that it does vary
    from site to site, on the availability of defined benefits
    versus the contribution plan. We don't have good numbers on
    participation.
        Mr. Podonsky. I have nothing to add to that.
        Senator Vitter. Okay.
        That's all I have right now, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Mr. Podonsky, you've been involved with the oversight of
    security forces and development of security policy for several
    years, and, as such, I know you're aware of the contractual
    evolution from all the protective forces. Nothing is static;
    there are constant changes. As such, is there any advantage or
    any particular reason for having different contractual
    structures today, as opposed to the evolution into a common
    contract, so that there aren't, in fact, differences? Is there
    something advantageous about having them all separate and
    different?
        Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Chairman, my office is responsible for
    independent assessment of the Department's performance, and we
    also promulgate the policy. Clearly, the line functions are the
    ones who set up the contracts with the various structures that
    they have out there.
        From my professional opinion, the only way there's an
    advantage to the contractors that are out there is if, in fact,
    we have a model contract. Right now we have a smorgasbord of
    contracts out there that grew up over many, many decades of the
    way the Department is structured. We believe, from an oversight
    perspective, as well as a policy perspective, that the line
    function should, in fact, take a look at a standardized
    approach; as I said in one of my previous answers, to have a
    model contract that has the contract language in there that has
    clauses to take care of these longstanding issues that the
    Department has been wrestling with since the 1990s.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Aloise, what are your thoughts?
        Mr. Aloise. Well, our perspective is that DOE should go as
    far as it can toward standardization. We called for that
    several years ago, and we still believe that's the way to go.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo?
        Mr. Stumbo. I believe the approach to have a contract that
    will provide those provisions that are necessary for a solid
    retirement structure would obviously be the path that we could
    take, and I do believe that is possible.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That should be a model--everybody
    treated the same? Or could it be different in each of the
    contracts?
        Mr. Stumbo. I think it should be the same, based on the
    retirement structure itself, if we were mirroring something
    that the Federal law enforcement currently have.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
        Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, can I just pick up on that
    quickly?
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes. Please.
        Senator Vitter. Maybe I'm missing something, Mr. Podonsky.
    Is that not within the power of the Department, to clearly,
    forcefully move in that direction?
        Mr. Podonsky. In all due respect, I'm going to have to
    defer to a second hearing that I understand is going to take
    place. Because we are not the implementers of policy, we create
    the policy for the Secretary. But the contractual piece is
    governed, clearly, by the Federal acquisition rules, as well as
    the standards of the contracting world, which is not ours. So,
    in my opinion, yes, I do believe it exists, but that would be
    better answered by the next panel in the next hearing.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Now, my understanding was that the
    latitude of the contractors was limited by the Department of
    Energy to the amount, type, and nature of the pay and benefits
    available to the protective forces. Mr. Podonsky, are you
    saying that if DOE established a standardization, or, in your
    case, your words, a model policy, would it be possible to
    include those in the collective bargaining agreements if that
    was a requirement from the agency to the contractors?
        Mr. Podonsky. I can give you my personal view.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Your personal opinion is all I'm after
    right now.
        Mr. Podonsky. Okay. I believe people make requirements, and
    people can make the requirements adapt to what the situation
    is. As I just told Senator Vitter, this is really something for
    the line to determine, together with the contracting officials
    in the Department. But, when you look at the problem, as Mr.
    Stumbo and Mr. Aloise have articulated and we've also seen from
    our organization, this is a serious problem that has to be
    addressed now. It continues to be studied, and the actions that
    I'm sure we will be taking with the recommendations will help
    move the ball forward. But, we've wasted a lot of time on the
    same subject, and we haven't gotten to where we need to be.
        So, specifically, to your question, I think anything's
    possible if we set our minds to it. As I said in my opening
    testimony, it's going to not only take the union and the line
    working together, but Congress, to make that happen.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Aloise, are you aware of any
    particular stumbling block, other than just the challenges of
    getting something accomplished, but any legal impairment or
    inability of DOE to set the requirements to standardization or
    in model form for the contractors to meet with respect to the
    negotiations on the collective bargaining with the unions?
        Mr. Aloise. We'd have to look at that more closely. But,
    from the work we've done, we don't see anything that would
    preclude that. But, you're talking about six or more collective
    bargaining agreements right now, and many different sites, so
    it would be a challenge to get that done.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Is that something that, in your
    opinion, you could accomplish over some period of time,
    recognizing the different contract dates and times for
    collective bargaining for new contracts?
        Mr. Aloise. It appears it could be done over a period of
    time.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Would it be advisable to end up with a
    common time for the expiration of such contracts?
        Mr. Aloise. It would be helpful, but I'm not sure if it's
    achievable.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo, do you think it's possible
    that some contracts could be for longer periods of time to
    shorter periods of time to achieve a standard timeframe, so
    that you would have standardization and a model approach for
    all of the contracts with the contractors for their employees?
        Mr. Stumbo. Mr. Chairman, we have discussed that exact
    situation and we have assured the Department of Energy that we
    will do whatever is necessary; if we need to open up portions
    of our bargaining agreement now to ensure that we can implement
    that structure, we would do so.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That could include the expiration date,
    so as long as your members were not in some way being
    disadvantaged in the process. Is that fair, too?
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo, how would your workforce
    react if, in this federalization effort, there was a decision
    where each position would be subject to open competition?
        Mr. Stumbo. Obviously, that would be very negative to the
    men and women that have spent their careers and put their lives
    on the line for so long. Obviously, that would be, basically, a
    kick in the face to us, based on what we have done for this
    country.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Podonsky, do you have any thoughts
    about that, from the standpoint of DOE?
        Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Chairman, we looked at both the
    improvement of the existing contracts, as well as the
    federalization. As I've said in my testimony, we felt that the
    negative side of the federalization, and all that comes with
    being compliant with OPM rules and what the current situation
    is, whether the Guards would be grandfathered in or not, what
    pay grade they would be coming in--it appears to us that the
    existing legislation governing federalization would be a
    deterrent for encouraging the existing guard force to come into
    the Federal force.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Begich, would you like to have
    some questions, please?
        Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just remind me again, how many bargaining units are there?
    Or, first, how many sites are there, again? Remind me.
        Mr. Podonsky. There are approximately 26 sites, and then
    those are broken up into facilities.
        Senator Begich. Is there a certain amount of sites that
    have the highest volume of employees?
        Mr. Podonsky. What happens, Senator, is, each site has a
    different mission, and there are different categories of
    attractiveness and materials. You may have a site that's just
    manufacturing of parts, or you have a site, such as Pantex,
    that actually has full-up weapons. So, it runs the
    kaleidoscope.
        Senator Begich. Gamut. About 26.
        Mr. Podonsky. Roughly, in terms of the sites that we're
    talking about, with security officers.
        Senator Begich. Again, remind me, does each site have their
    own, then, contract for each site?
        Mr. Podonsky. No, sir.
        Senator Begich. Some are wrapped together?
        Mr. Podonsky. There are three different approaches. Some
    security officers report directly to the Federal entity, some
    report to the management and operational contractor as a part
    of their company, and then a third one is where there's private
    security----
        Senator Begich. Okay. Private security.
        Mr. Podonsky.--that is contracted with the M&O. So, there
    are three different elements in the model. Then there's the OST
    model that we've talked about, which is a Federalized force.
        Senator Begich. Right, and then, how many different
    bargaining groups are there, within all these organizations?
        Mr. Stumbo. I'd say, totally, between independents and
    internationals, you're probably looking at approximately five
    groups.
        Senator Begich. Five groups.
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. That's actually very good, if there's only
    five.
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. As a former mayor, I had to deal with nine,
    plus another one had eight underneath its one. So, five is a
    piece of cake. So, why I say that is because your comment, ``it
    may be difficult.'' To me, five is a dream. Senator Nelson, you
    were a former Governor, you know what I'm talking about.
        Since we did this, in the city where I was mayor, we
    unified the contracts and timetable of expiration, mostly
    around healthcare issues; we weren't all under the same plan.
    We had multiple jurisdiction issues, and we just staggered out,
    on the back end; once they all got to a certain point, then we
    had a 3-year--in some cases, 5-year deals. So, it created
    consistency, and so forth.
        Is that, when you say, ``opening it up''--and I've
    wondered--I caught your words very carefully here, as a--I've
    been on both sides of the equation here, union and management,
    so certain parts of the contract that you could open up--would
    you mean how to get the timetables adjusted, so everyone can
    expire at the same time, and then get a unified system of when
    these contracts go in, or all the contract terms, meaning that
    you can start unifying systems, pay grades, other things? I
    want to make sure I heard what you said there, because there
    were very carefully picked words, and I want to make sure we're
    on the same page.
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir. What I was trying to get across was
    that each of the collective bargaining agreements have certain
    provisions, particularly those that affect the retirement
    structure. Those particular articles could be opened up, and we
    could implement the correct structures, in our opinion, that
    would fix our problems.
        Senator Begich. Okay.
        Mr. Stumbo. So, by doing that, we could expedite the
    process without waiting for each contract to actually expire
    before we could make that happen.
        Senator Begich. Do you believe the groups would allow that
    to occur without triggering any other aspects of the contract
    and awards? I know, sometimes when you go there, it starts a
    formal process. When you open up a contract for a condition,
    there are conditions within the contract that then start
    triggering timetables. Do you think you would be able to do it
    in such an informal, but yet still formal, way that you would
    not create other issues in the contract that would have to be
    dealt with?
        Mr. Stumbo. Absolutely. Yes, sir, I believe we can.
        Senator Begich. So you feel very confident that all
    bargaining groups would do that.
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes sir, I do.
        Senator Begich. Okay. The last, if I can----
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, sure.
        Senator Begich.--Mr. Chairman, and that is--and your
    comment that it seems like now's the time--I'm new to this;
    I've been here a year-and-a-half. But, as you were, and others
    were, talking about the multiple years of this discussion, the
    question I have is, who will trigger the action to make this
    move forward? In other words, I know we'll have another
    hearing. But, who within the DOE, I'll use as first trigger
    point--who says, ``we're going. We're going to do this,'' and
    set the timetable to get going and sit down with the bargaining
    groups and say, ``We're going to try to figure out how to unify
    this system, create a career path, not in-and-out or, in some
    cases, some people who have been there a long time, but are
    kind of stalled out and not able to move forward. Who makes
    that decision?
        Mr. Podonsky. Well, that's clearly, Senator, the
    prerogatives of the Secretary of Energy. But, let me say, with
    our partnership with the unions and the line functions that I
    mentioned, we're already--those 29 recommendations----
        Senator Begich. Right.
        Mr. Podonsky.--started solidifying some actions that the
    Department should start taking, and we're guardedly optimistic
    that the line functions will continue down that path. But, the
    ultimate decision is going to be the Secretary of Energy, as to
    how far that goes, in partnership with Congress.
        Senator Begich. Okay. It just made me think of two other
    things, Mr. Chairman, if I can.
        One, on the report, is there a timetable you have set
    that--not to just review and look at the actions, but actually
    implement these actions, and then the ones that you can't,
    clearly identify when and at what point you can make that
    decision? Have you set out a time schedule? Do you have a
    working time schedule that you are all using within the
    Department?
        Mr. Podonsky. Well, two things. We owe a report to Congress
    on April 30 for a comprehensive implementation plan for those
    recommendations.
        Senator Begich. Yes.
        Mr. Podonsky. But, we're not waiting for that plan.
        Senator Begich. Okay.
        Mr. Podonsky. We have a committee that was set up to
    address that, with the line functions. Out of the 29
    recommendations, about 17 of them are already underway. The 12
    that are remaining out of the 29 are those that are very
    difficult, having to do with the bigger issues of retirement
    and disability and pension and things of that nature.
        Senator Begich. Well, I'm a believer--when I was mayor and
    when I was on the city council, we dealt with police and fire
    retirement issues, and there's nothing more complicated--
    medical liability, long-term retirement, multiple plans, you
    know survivor--the whole nine yards. We did it. It was no fun.
        The last comment I'd say is, I do believe, and I want to
    echo through the questions that the chairman asked, that I do
    believe if you set the criteria for the contractors, they can
    do that. We did that with security within our community. When
    we had private security, we said, ``Here's what we want. Here's
    the standards of living we want you to make sure are in those
    contracts.'' They were paying them 8 bucks an hour. You
    couldn't--the rollover rate was unbelievable. They had no
    benefits. We said, ``Here's the standards we want you to adhere
    to.'' Of course, that cost, but that was then competitively bid
    to the contractors, and they figured it all out. But, at the
    end of the day, we knew the employee, who was working on behalf
    of the city, securing buildings in our issues, had a standard
    that we felt very confident was equal or close to if you were a
    municipal employee, but being in a private-sector environment.
        So, I know there is some question if it can be done. If
    local governments can do it, sure to heck the Federal
    Government can do it, because you have a lot more power. So, I
    would just encourage you to look at that question and clearly
    define that. Because the contractors respond to what you put in
    the scope of services, and the scope of services said, ``here's
    the 10 things we want you to do for these employees,'' and they
    have to adhere to it or they don't bid. So, I'm a believer in
    this.
        I know you asked it as a question, but I believe that you
    can do it. We did it. Obviously it turned from about a 60-
    percent turnover rate down to 3 percent, and people saw
    opportunity rather than just a part-time job at night and then
    who knows what else they were doing. We wanted to focus on
    security. So, there's my two bits through your question. I
    apologize.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Oh, no, that's quite okay. Thank you.
        Mr. Stumbo, DOE has arranged the protective forces into
    various different categories. Three grades of security police
    officers are SPOs I through III and security officers. Do you
    have any data that shows, generally, when you begin to see an
    inability to meet the--let's say, the highest and most
    demanding grades--SPO II and SPO III?
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir, I can provide----
        Senator Ben Nelson. The breakdown of the ability of the
    individuals in those positions to carry out their duties is
    what I'm----
        Mr. Stumbo. I think the best data will represent that it's
    the collective years, as I identified in my oral statement.
    It's the collective years that actually break down the
    personnel. So, their best years are 20 years. So, probably half
    way into their career, they begin to realize and recognize that
    they cannot maintain that pace. So, from their 10th year to
    their 20th year, obviously they begin to think whether or not
    they should stay in the career, or not.
        Senator Ben Nelson. As a result of that, one of the major
    concerns that both the DOE and the collective bargaining unit
    have would be early retirement and having retirement benefits
    commensurate with early retirement. Is that fair to say?
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, Sir. Based on the inability for us to
    maintain longer careers, that's absolutely true. Yes, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. If you looked at, let's say, retraining
    or moving into new career opportunities, career fields, Mr.
    Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, what are the pros and cons of a career
    field that includes, let's say, a retraining option, so that
    we--as individuals who are no longer able to carry out the
    demanding work requirement for the highest grades, are there
    any contractual barriers to putting something like this
    together that would satisfy the concerns of being able to
    continue in employment until retirement at some standard age,
    consistent with the Federal Government employees? Anything
    contractual that would get in the way of that? Or is that
    really not a wise path to take for bringing the federalization
    of these employees into being?
        Mr. Podonsky. Specifically--and I don't want to sound like
    a broken record, but obviously some of your questions are very
    much geared towards the line, who are implementing and are
    letting out the contracts. I don't know if there's a
    contractual issue there.
        Senator Ben Nelson. You're not aware, are you----
        Mr. Podonsky. I'm not aware of any. However, I would tell
    you, it's just good, sound management in my opinion, from the
    policy and oversight, if we have protective force individuals,
    they have clearances, they know the sites; we should be able to
    transition them to other positions. In fact, sir, that's part
    of the reason that we have the three categories of SPOs
    originally. It wasn't just for safeguards posturing, it was
    also to give a career path, so as people were no longer, say, a
    SPOs III, which is a very offensive tactical group, they could
    perhaps go to a fixed post.
        Senator Ben Nelson. It might be easier to show the career
    path going up than it is to get people to accept a career path
    going back.
        Is that a factor, Mr. Stumbo, with your group?
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir, it certainly is.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Podonsky, I understand that, as
    circumstances change--health changes and what have you--but,
    that apparently is a big stumbling block.
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Is it because of salary, or is it just
    because of the nature of people not wanting to, let's say, move
    backwards, if they don't have to?
        Mr. Stumbo. A lot of it has to do with a great deal of
    pride.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That's what I mean.
        Mr. Stumbo. A great deal of pride for what they feel like
    the commitment that they have made to the United States,
    risking, potentially, their lives, based on a terrorist attack.
    It is a great deal of pride.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I understand. Okay.
        Mr. Aloise, what did your findings reflect?
        Mr. Aloise. Well, we thought that a career path makes
    sense. Right now, if they do fall back to the SO, from a SPO I
    or II, they probably will take a pay cut in that lower
    position. But, a career path, training, and retraining is
    something that we think can be done. We've invested a lot of
    money in these people. They're well trained. They have the high
    level security clearances. They're valuable resources, and we
    should keep them as long as it makes sense to keep them.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So, we have to deal with pride, as well
    as economic reality and a number of other things. That's
    typical of what we deal with, isn't it?
        Well, I think one of the delicate questions is about the
    actual security of the sites, because that's what this is all
    about; the underlying security of the sites. Is there a concern
    about individuals, who have clearance and have knowledge,
    leaving the employment of the contractor, with that knowledge?
    Is that a major concern within DOE, Mr. Podonsky?
        Mr. Podonsky. There's always a concern of what we call the
    ``insider threat.''
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
        Mr. Podonsky. That's something that clearances are supposed
    to help us protect against, but you can never predict what the
    individual is going to do. We don't currently have a high
    concern about people leaving that have clearances to go on to
    other positions. But, occasionally we do have issues, through
    the clearance process, that we find, where people have shared
    classified when they shouldn't have after they left, or they
    kept classified. So, like with any organization, you're going
    to have people problems, and I have seen, in my short 26 years
    in the Department, not a great deal of that, for the numbers of
    people that we have employed.
        Senator Ben Nelson. If we had this career path, which would
    obviously improve retention, would that also reduce the
    concerns about--what did you call it? The inside----
        Mr. Podonsky. The insider threat.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Right.
        Mr. Podonsky. I believe that a career path for the
    protective force, as I said in my testimony, is something that
    we absolutely need to find. Relative to a insider threat,
    that's a whole different subject, as to what motivates people
    to do that. I don't believe that having a career path, or not,
    is going to add to that or take away from that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo, do you have any thoughts
    about the career path and retention?
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I believe that,
    obviously, a career path is good business for the American
    taxpayer. But, we have to be realistic, as well, to understand
    and recognize that there's a limited amount of positions that
    can be made available at any given time. So, in my opinion, it
    is good business. We certainly will help facilitate, entertain
    any method of a career path. At the same time, based on the
    sensitivity and the significance of what takes place at these
    sites, obviously a large output of personnel with the knowledge
    base that they would have would, even in a limited scope,
    certainly be very damaging to the United States. So, yes, we'd
    be very sensitive of that, as well.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Aloise, did the GAO have any
    opportunity to look at how DOD secures its nuclear weapons
    storage areas, to see if there are any lessons learned from DOD
    that would have some application here in the case of DOE?
        Mr. Aloise. We focused on the DOE protective forces for
    this review.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So, any inconsistencies from your
    particular standpoint?
        Mr. Aloise. The DOE forces play a unique role, and it's
    hard to compare them to what the military does because they are
    guarding nuclear materials, nuclear weapons and components and
    full-up nuclear weapons.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I think there was a question raised, as
    well, about the consistent training. Mr. Aloise, can you give
    us your thoughts on how well-trained individuals are, and
    whether there needs to be any improvement in the training of
    the security forces?
        Mr. Aloise. In general, DOE protective forces are a robust
    well-trained force. But, the training varies from site to site.
    Some have more or different training than others. During my
    visits to DOE sites the one thing protective forces were all
    asking for is more, more firearms and tactical training. So, it
    does vary from site to site, and in our view, should be
    standardized, to the extent that it can be.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Podonsky, do you think that, as a
    result of that recommendation, that DOE can work toward
    standardization of the training?
        Mr. Podonsky. We're already doing that, Mr. Chairman. We
    have a Basic Security Police Officer Training course, we call
    ``BSPOT,'' and it's run out of the National Training Center,
    out of Albuquerque, which is in my organization. When the
    officers then go back to their site of assignment, they get
    additional site-specific training. But, definitely, we never do
    enough training. One of the things that's not part of this
    hearing, but I will tell you, we try to introduce technology
    into the Department for becoming what we call a ``force
    multiplier,'' to strengthen the security forces, not to take
    away security forces. Part of the advantages of the technology,
    it not only improves our effectiveness, but also gives us the
    opportunity to increase the training of the security officers
    that would have more time when we have the technology
    equipment, as well. So, there are a lot of advantages and there
    are a lot of complexities to this problem, but nothing that is
    insurmountable.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Podonsky, DOE has also changed from
    a design basis threat (DBT) to a new term, graded security
    policy (GSP). How are these two policies different?
        Mr. Podonsky. Without getting into classified nature of the
    two policies, the graded security protection policy was created
    because the design basis threat was predicated on threat
    statements from the intelligence community, and, as a result of
    every year that we review this, we found that the intelligence
    community was no longer standing behind any particular threat
    statement, in terms of numbers. So, I instructed my policy
    people that we needed to come up with an approach that would
    allow the sites to be effectively protecting against scenarios,
    as opposed to a set number of adversaries.
        So the basic difference is, it gives the sites much more
    flexibility for site-specific protection, as opposed to just
    the postulated threat that we had lived through previously.
        I'd be happy to give you a classified briefing on that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Sure.
        Mr. Podonsky. We feel that it's a much more effective way
    to improve the security posture of the Department right now.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo, do you agree with that?
        Mr. Stumbo. Yes, I do agree with it, but you have to
    recognize and understand that our threats are in evolution;
    they evolve. As the terrorists become more desperate--and we've
    seen a lot of those events of recent times--we have to evolve
    and we have to increase our abilities to be able to defend
    those threats. So, as far as the protective force is concerned,
    we need to improve daily. It's not an achievement where we ever
    really ever get there. It's something that we work on every
    single hour of every day that we are at our sites, because the
    consequences are too great to our Nation to allow one slip-up
    at a site like Pantex.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Aloise, what were your findings in
    conjunction with the changing of the threat approach and how
    it's being maintained and trained for at the present time?
        Mr. Aloise. DOE, over the years, has changed the DBT a
    number of times--it did so in 2003, 2004, 2005, and again in
    2008. A lot of this is tied to money. It's very expensive to
    guard these sites. I understand that DOE believes its sites are
    at a level where DOD believes they should be.
        GAO has done numerous reviews on DOE security, and made
    many recommendations, but, in the end, we have always came back
    to believe it was a very robust force, and still is.
        Senator Ben Nelson. What question haven't I asked that I
    should be asking?
        Each of you.
        Mr. Podonsky?
        Mr. Podonsky. Actually, no other questions for us, but I'm
    looking forward to the questions that will be asked of the
    line, who actually implement the policies and the contracts of
    the Guard force and the security posture of the Department.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Stumbo, have we not asked something
    that we should have?
        Mr. Stumbo. No, Mr. Chairman. I believe that you have asked
    some very good questions. I think, in response from the
    protective force, that we have just waited a very, very long
    time. Many of the men and women are no longer with us, that
    waited for some resolution, based on the commitment they had to
    their country. So, those that are in the system right now, we
    continue to wait and feel like we are at the mercy of Congress
    to do whatever is necessary to ensure that we receive the
    appropriate restructure.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That ``being at the mercy of Congress''
    is not necessarily a very secure feeling, is it?
        Mr. Stumbo. No, sir. [Laughter.]
        No, sir, it is not.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I understand.
        Mr. Aloise, anything?
        Mr. Aloise. I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that the 29
    recommendations DOE has come up with for improving protective
    forces causes is a step in the right direction, but it is going
    to take leadership from the Secretary of Energy to get this
    done.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Any thoughts from any of you about a
    timeframe. If we said, ``today we're going to do it,'' are we
    looking at, certainly not days, but months, and many months, to
    get it in place and implemented?
        Mr. Aloise, do you have some thoughts on that?
        Mr. Aloise. We hope that they start almost immediately,
    because we want to avoid another strike at another site; DOE
    needs to take action now to make sure that doesn't happen.
        Senator Ben Nelson. How long do you think it would take,
    once you make the decision to do it, how long would it take to
    implement it?
        Mr. Aloise. I believe it would take years, not months.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Podonsky?
        Mr. Podonsky. I agree with Mr. Aloise, in terms of the
    actions that we're taking now need to be clear to the unions
    and the Guard forces out there, that the Department is taking
    action and that we're not just talking any longer. But because
    of contractual circumstances, it will take quite a long time.
    We didn't create this problem overnight; it's taken years for
    us to create this problem. That doesn't mean that it should
    take that long to unravel. But, clearly, again, as I said, and
    my colleagues at the witness table have said, in partnership,
    all together, with Congress, we can make this right.
        Mr. Stumbo?
        Mr. Stumbo. Mr. Chairman, the only portion that I would
    disagree from my colleagues is that the necessary resources
    that could be implemented within our collective bargaining
    agreements could be done much quicker if we're provided the
    resources to make that happen. You would have the full
    commitment from labor to ensure that we could make that happen
    long before they have to worry about the next contract
    expiration.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, as I was getting briefed for the
    hearing today, I have to admit that this is one of the most
    byzantine set of arrangements I have ever imagined could exist
    anywhere, let alone within the Federal Government. Usually we
    can find a pretty good way of doing things in a byzantine
    fashion with an awful lot of bureaucracy, but I must confess,
    I've never seen anything quite like this.
        I understand that there are differences in sites and
    requirements--and so, obviously, there are some things that
    absolutely need to be patterned after the needs and be
    specifically tailored to what is done, but not everything. So
    I'm hopeful that, with the next hearing, we'll get more
    information, and perhaps, together, we'll find a way to make
    this happen for everyone.
        Uncertainty benefits nobody, and I'm just certain that
    you've lived with that constant uncertainty for eons. So if it
    is possible to bring this to some sort of a conclusion or
    resolution for everybody's benefit, including the people of the
    United of America, we ought to be seeking to do that, and do so
    in a timely fashion.
        So, I thank you for your participation today, for your
    candid answers. I thank you all for being here.
        We stand adjourned.
        Thank you.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter

                                 FEDERALIZATION

        1. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, in the January 2009 memo from you
    and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA), you examined the costs and benefits associated with
    federalizing the protective force. The memo asserted that the ``most
    important factor to consider when determining the best organizational
    structure for protective forces is which model will result in the most
    effective security for the facilities in a cost effective manner.'' Can
    you please address the role security and cost effectiveness played in
    reaching your conclusion in the 2009 memo that federalization of the
    protective forces is not a viable option?
        Mr. Podonsky. The most recent study of these issues, sponsored by
    NNSA in 2008, did not draw a conclusion regarding the relative merits
    of protective force federalization. A joint Department of Energy (DOE)/
    NNSA study in 2004 recommended that the best long-term organizational
    approach for achieving cost-effective and efficient security of our
    vital national assets was to convert the existing contractor protective
    forces to Federal status. The recommendation to federalize was focused
    explicitly on the provision of a combat-effective protective force,
    designed to defeat a well-armed and dedicated terrorist adversary at
    any DOE facility involved directly in the protection of nuclear
    weapons, special nuclear material (SNM), or other strategic national
    security assets. However, upon further consideration, concerns were
    identified regarding near-term consequences of federalization,
    including near-term instability within the existing force and
    substantial transition costs, while the most significant benefits
    derived from federalization could also be achieved within a contract
    force arrangement. Additional factors that militated against the
    conversion to a Federal force included the time required to convert,
    and the difficulty in reconciling the centralized Federal force model
    with the site-based management model used in the Department. Finally,
    we were sensitive to the possible adverse impact on those current
    members of the force who might not meet some of the Federal employment
    criteria, and, in general, the employment uncertainties that officers
    and their families would face during a protracted transition. In the
    final analysis--and in the absence of a clear-cut cost advantage in
    favor of federalization--the Department made its largely for reasons
    other than cost.

        2. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, in the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) report you assert that a Federal force
    offers no overall advantage to the current model and that either option
    could result in effective and more uniform security if well-managed. To
    that extent, do either of you assess that the cost of implementing a
    federalized force would be higher than the cost of fixing our current
    model?
        Mr. Podonsky. Earlier cost analyses were limited in scope and,
    therefore, comprehensive data is lacking. We do not know, for example,
    what grade level could be assigned, or the extent of transitional costs
    as opposed to the implementation of a performance-based contract. It is
    also not known how many officers would not qualify for Federal
    positions, which would result in an increase in costs for recruiting
    and training new personnel. For a comprehensive answer to this
    question, additional study would be needed on a site-by-site basis.
        Mr. Aloise. We were unable to make the cost comparison needed to
    answer this question. Reliably estimating the costs to compare
    protective force options proved difficult and precluded our detailed
    reporting on it for two broad reasons. First, since contractor and
    Federal forces could each have many possible permutations, choosing any
    particular option to assess would be arbitrary. For example, a 2008
    NNSA-sponsored study identified wide-ranging federalization options,
    such as federalizing all or some SPO positions at some or all
    facilities or reorganizing them under an existing or a new agency.
    Second, DOE will have to decide on the hypothetical options' key cost
    factors before it can reasonably compare costs. Either option could be
    implemented with more or less costly features. For example, adding the
    early and enhanced retirement benefits would increase costs for either
    contractor or Federal protective forces.

        3. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, I understand that
    if a federalization model were pursued the current forces would risk a
    loss in pay and perhaps their jobs as they would be required to
    recompete for the same job under a federalized structure. Could one
    assume that such a transition could have a significant destabilizing
    effect on the current force?
        Mr. Podonsky. Yes. These risks to individual officers are real. If
    each officer had to compete for what is in effect his or her own job,
    we would expect that uncertainty and instability in the workforce would
    be a major issue. Traditional union rules of seniority would not apply
    and certain requirements within the civil service system could further
    complicate hiring actions and contribute to destabilization.
        Mr. Aloise. Yes, transitioning to a Federal force could have a
    significant destabilizing effect on the current force. Under existing
    laws, not only would current force members risk a loss in pay and even
    their jobs, but they would not receive the enhanced and early
    retirement benefits that a coalition of their unions had hoped would
    come with federalization. As force members become aware of these likely
    unpalatable consequences, their morale might be significantly lowered-
    both in anticipation of federalization and after it occurs.

                              RETIREMENT BENEFITS

        4. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, the current protective force is
    well paid, and in many cases is better paid than equivalent Federal
    positions. The current force enjoys generous retirement and health
    benefits including in almost all cases employers contributing to 401(K)
    retirement plans. I was troubled to hear that one issue unaddressed in
    the report may be that some within the protective force are not taking
    advantage and/or using the employer contributing vehicles to save for
    their retirement. I look forward to hearing from you what can be done
    to emphasize the importance of doing so; do you have statistics on the
    percentage of the force who take advantage of their 401(K) benefits?
        Mr. Podonsky. This has been one of our concerns as well. One of the
    primary concerns of the Protective Force Career Options study
    initiative that HSS chartered last year was how to encourage
    contractors to offer educational, financial, and career counseling
    opportunities to contractor workforces. One of the 29 recommendations
    generated by that group explicitly calls for a DOE-wide program of
    retirement counseling and training that would address such issues as
    early and consistent 401(k) participation. This recommendation builds
    upon similar individual programs that already exist at several sites,
    including classes on long-term financial planning in their initial new
    employee orientation and basic training with periodic refresher
    sessions. A notable example of such an existing program is found at the
    Savannah River Site. Additionally, the National Training Center is now
    engaged in the development of standardized methodologies for the
    delivery of these types of materials and information at all sites. It
    should be further noted that available data on protective force member
    participation in 401(k) plans points to reasonably high levels of
    participation already.

        5. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, if it is, in fact, correct that a
    vast majority are not contributing to their retirement plans, what can
    be done to emphasize the importance of doing so?
        Mr. Podonsky. The figures available to us indicate that a
    significant majority of protective force members are, in fact,
    currently contributing to their retirement plans. For example, at the
    Savannah River Site, one of the largest protective forces in the DOE
    complex, the DOE contractor employees have a 401(k) enrollment rate of
    95 percent; Savannah River Site's protective force contractor has a
    highly-developed program to encourage participation. The Hanford Site
    contractor employees have an enrollment rate of about 91 percent, the
    Oak Ridge Complex contractor has a rate of 86 percent, the Idaho
    Complex contractor has a rate of 79 percent, and the Headquarters force
    contractor has a 72 percent rate. DOE and NNSA have asked several line
    management organizations to develop up-to-the-minute participation rate
    figures for contractors at all sites as part of DOE and NNSA current
    initiatives, but these preliminary data do not support the impression
    of widespread non-participation. As noted previously, however, we
    believe that participation can be maximized through the development and
    delivery of standardized materials that can be tailored to specific
    local programs along with more sites implementing mandatory initial
    participation by new hires.

        6. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the Secretary of Energy and the
    Administrator of the NNSA to develop a comprehensive, Department of
    Energy (DOE)-wide plan to identify and implement the recommendations of
    the study group. Furthermore, the legislation cites that it is the lack
    of clear, uniform, and realistic guidance and policy from DOE to the
    various contractors who manage the protective forces that is at the
    root of the problems. Do you agree that the root of the problems with
    the protective force is the lack of clear, uniform, and realistic
    guidance and policy from DOE to the various contractors?
        Mr. Podonsky. DOE and NNSA do not believe that formal DOE
    protective force policy--or the lack thereof--is the primary source of
    these problems, but we do acknowledge that the multiple line management
    programs and individual sites in the implementation of policy has
    contributed to the problem. Additionally, the situation has also been
    affected by changes in other areas such as the administrative policies
    governing procurement. Also, some other important inconsistencies have
    evolved through the course of successive collective bargaining
    agreements at the sites, much of which is outside the purview of policy
    officials. Our recent contractor protective force career options study
    noted that these issues are not the result of anyone's overall
    intentions for protective force members and their careers, but instead
    as a result of the implementation, over time, of patchwork solutions to
    a wide range of individual issues. In this sense, we do agree that the
    time has come to establish clear and consistent performance standards
    for protective force performance, while still maintaining the necessary
    flexibility to permit adaptation to the special needs of line
    management programs and particular site environments.

                          STUDY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS

        7. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, does the DOE intend to pursue the
    implementation of all 29 recommendations cited in the June 2009 report
    on Enhanced Career Longevity and Retirement Options for DOE protective
    forces personnel?
        Mr. Podonsky. DOE has committed to pursuing a course of action that
    leads to satisfactory resolution of the issues that drove the
    recommendations. Achieving satisfactory solutions will depend upon
    close cooperation among all Departmental elements--line management,
    policy, contractors, unions.

        8. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, what is the anticipated timeline
    for implementing those recommendations the Department has already
    agreed to apply?
        Mr. Podonsky. The timeline for implementation is one of the actions
    still being developed. This will be discussed as part of the
    implementation plan due to Congress no later than April 30, 2010. This
    plan and its due date are a result of the Government Accountability
    Office report of March 3, 2010, ``DOE Needs to Fully Address Issues
    Affecting Protective Forces Personnel Systems.''

        9. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, has the Department fully estimated
    the cost implications of doing so, and if so, what is the estimated
    unbudgeted cost, and if not, when will you be able to provide those
    costs to Congress?
        Mr. Podonsky. Possible alternatives to address various options are
    still being developed in coordination with line management and, where
    completed, costs estimates will be reported in the implementation plan
    due to Congress by April 30, 2010. Where necessary, the April 30
    submission will also identify cost analyses that may require additional
    time beyond that date for completion.

                           RECRUITMENT AND ATTRITION

        10. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, is the Department
    having any difficulty in the recruitment or quality of the protective
    force?
        Mr. Podonsky. DOE contractors do not experience difficulty
    attracting and recruiting qualified men and women to constitute our
    protective forces.
        Mr. Aloise. Preliminary data we collected on protective forces at
    the six sites we reviewed did not appear to show any systemic
    recruiting problems. In the absence of apparent problems, we did not
    pursue this issue further. We did not collect any specific information
    on the quality of protective forces or recruits, but note that armed
    DOE protective forces (Security Police Officers-I, -II, and III) must
    undergo extensive background checks and ongoing evaluation since they
    carry high-level security clearances and are enrolled in formal human
    reliability programs, complete extensive initial and annual refresher
    training, and regularly demonstrate that they can meet firearms and
    physical fitness qualifications.

        11. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, are the salaries
    and benefits of the protective force competitive?
        Mr. Podonsky. Our contractor firms consult Department of Labor wage
    tables in order to ascertain the prevailing local wages for protective
    force positions. DOE contractor protective forces are well paid in
    relation to other contractor protective forces, but pay is
    proportionate to the responsibilities inherent in the work.
        Mr. Aloise. Since comparing the salaries and benefits of the
    protective forces with those of similar positions in the private sector
    was not in the scope of our work, we cannot say whether their salaries
    and benefits are competitive. However, based on our review of
    protective forces' pay and benefits, we offer this observation that
    should be considered in such a comparison. Since protective forces' pay
    is often significantly increased by overtime hours, comparisons of
    annual salaries with private sector positions should consider potential
    differences in the number of hours worked annually.

        12. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, how do attrition
    rates for the protective forces compare to similar positions in the
    private sector?
        Mr. Podonsky. Attrition does not appear to be a problem for our
    protective force. Our data indicates that attrition rate for our DOE
    and NNSA contractor protective force officers is well below that of
    related jobs in the local areas where they reside.
        Mr. Aloise. Comparing attrition rates for protective forces and
    comparable private sector positions was not in our scope of work.
    However, the preliminary data on protective forces attrition we
    collected did not appear to show any systemic attrition issues.
    Protective forces at all sites, as well as Federal agents that work for
    the Office of Secure Transportation (OST), all experience attrition,
    but, on the basis of preliminary data, there did not appear to be any
    marked differences, and we did not pursue this issue further.

                         POTENTIAL FOR A FUTURE STRIKE

        13. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, in the event of a potential
    future strike at one or more SNM I sites and in light of lessons
    learned during the security force strike at Pantex in 2007, what are
    the Department's current plans for ensuring continuity of security?
        Mr. Podonsky. From the shared DOE and NNSA perspective and based on
    lessons learned going back to the Rocky Flats protective force work
    stoppage in 1994, my office has developed and maintained a Contingency
    Protective Force guide. This document provides a model for any site
    that may have suffered a natural emergency or a protective force work
    stoppage on how to constitute a contingency protective force from
    onsite and offsite nonbargaining unit officers. This guide was utilized
    at Pantex when work stoppages occurred and at other locations while
    negotiations were ongoing but were subsequently concluded successfully.
    We ensure the document is available to the responsible line management
    organizations and that it is revised based upon lessons learned from
    each work stoppage or potential stoppage.

        14. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky, does the Department foresee any
    scenarios where security at one or more sites could become an issue?
        Mr. Podonsky. DOE planners and our contractors are constantly
    attempting to identify potential vulnerabilities and seeking ways to
    mitigate them. Planning explicitly includes the security implications
    of strike contingency operations. More details or precision would
    require a separate classified submission.

     DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROTECTIVE FORCE AND THE DOE SECURE TRANSPORT
                                     FORCE

        15. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, how do the
    protective force and the secure transport force differ?
        Mr. Podonsky. At the most basic level, the differences are that the
    protective forces are contractor employees who provide security at our
    fixed sites for special nuclear material and weapons, while the Office
    of Secure Transportation (OST) consists of Federal agents who transport
    nuclear weapons and special nuclear material on public roads around the
    United States. In addition, the Federal agents have a responsibility to
    liaise with Federal, State, and local law enforcement and intelligence
    agencies in the States through which they perform their transport
    mission. The multiplicity of jurisdictional interactions associated
    with this ``over-the-road'' mission is in direct contrast to the stable
    set of interactions required at fixed sites. Federal agent status for
    OST personnel is intended, among other things, to ensure that, in the
    event of an incident, the necessary lines of authority are clear.
        Mr. Aloise. Broadly speaking, protective forces and agents differ
    in the following respects:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Characteristics              OST Agents       Protective Forces
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Numbers                           363                 2,339
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Employer                          Federal employees   Contractor
                                                           employees
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Management structure              Centralized         Varies based on
                                       Federal             different
                                       management          contractors and
                                                           different
                                                           contracts
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Collective bargaining status      Cannot              Covered by
                                       collectively        different
                                       bargain             collective
                                                           bargaining
                                                           agreements (CBAs)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pay                               Single pay system   Varies with CBAs
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Benefits                          Federal Employee    Varies with CBA
                                       Health Benefit
                                       Program and
                                       Federal Employee
                                       Retirement
                                       System. Eligible
                                       for early
                                       retirement (at
                                       age 50 after 20
                                       years of service)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mission                           Mobile, public      Fixed facilities
                                       roads
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        16. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, are the
    requirements and stresses of the secure transport force more demanding
    that those of the protective force?
        Mr. Podonsky. The requirements and stresses of the job are
    different for the Federal agents in several areas. From a personal
    standpoint, they spend substantial time away from their homes and
    families. From an operational standpoint, they do not have the natural
    advantage enjoyed by officers at fixed sites, such as fixed barriers,
    hardened fighting positions, deployed technologies, video surveillance
    and assessment, and local terrain knowledge. The secure transport force
    is also subject to the stresses of a long distance trucking operation.
        Mr. Aloise. We found that OST Federal agents' mobile mission
    differs significantly from that of protective forces that guard fixed
    sites. OST agents operate convoys of special tractor trailers and
    special escort vehicles to transport Category I SNM. These agents
    travel on U.S. highways that cross multiple Federal, State, tribal, and
    local law enforcement jurisdictions. They also travel as many as 15
    days each month. Agents may also provide security for weapons
    components that are flown on OST's small fleet of aircraft. In contrast
    to the public setting of agents' work, protective forces that guard
    Category I SNM at fixed sites typically have elaborate physical
    defenses and tightly restricted and monitored public access. As such,
    OST agents operational environment appears to be more ambiguous and
    dynamic than the environment found at Category I SNM sites.

        17. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, is the secure
    transport force subjected to a higher level of training than the
    protective force?
        Mr. Podonsky. Yes. Federal agents must qualify under Department of
    Transportation regulations and maintain their ability to operate 18-
    wheeled secure transport vehicles. Both Federal agents and contractor
    protective forces must meet the same overall firearms and fitness
    requirements but tactical training for Federal agents is dissimilar due
    to the completely different operating environments. All Federal agent
    training must address the various types of terrain (rural and urban) a
    convoy travels through. This includes force-on-force; individual, small
    unit, and convoy tactics; advanced live fire; tactical driving;
    recapture/recovery ops; and Incident Command System.
        Mr. Aloise. We found (pg. 21-22 of GAO-10-275) that OST agents
    undergo longer, more frequent, and more diverse training than do most
    protective forces. For example, OST Federal agents:

             Undergo longer basic training (21 weeks) at OST's
            academy in Fort Chaffee, AR;
             Must complete requirements for a commercial drivers
            license;
             Are required to meet DOE's offensive combatant
            standard throughout their careers;
             Spend more of their time training, including tactical
            training, than do most contractor protective forces.

        18. Senator Vitter. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, does the notion
    that the secure transport force has to transport nuclear materials
    across State lines and in an inherently mobile fashion constitute any
    rationale for requiring that they have full Federal authorities?
        Mr. Podonsky. Yes. As discussed above, Federal agent authority must
    be transjurisdictional. The operating environment leads to the
    necessity for them to have Federal authority. They regularly interact
    with national, tribal, State, county, and local law enforcement
    authorities as well as various intelligence agencies as they seek
    knowledge of any potential threat to them and their cargoes in the
    operating environment.
        Mr. Aloise. OST officials told us that this is an important factor.

        [Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]