[Senate Hearing 111-892]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-892
OVERSIGHT OF MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY EFFORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 28, 2010
__________
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Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey, JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
Chairman Member
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BARBARA BOXER, California ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 28, 2010................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 84
Witnesses
Ferro, Hon. Anne S., Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Hersman, Hon. Deborah A.P., Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 15
France, Francis (Buzzy), President, Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance....................................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Gillan, Jacqueline S., Vice President, Advocates for Highway and
Auto Safety.................................................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Osiecki, David J., Senior Vice President, Policy and Regulatory
Affairs, American Trucking Associations, Inc................... 58
Prepared statement........................................... 60
Spencer, Todd, Executive Vice President, Owner-Operator
Independent Drivers Association................................ 69
Prepared statement........................................... 71
Appendix
Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, U.S. Senator from Texas, prepared
statement...................................................... 89
Owings, Stephen, President and Co-Founder, Road Safe America,
prepared statement............................................. 89
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Anne S. Ferro by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 94
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 97
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 101
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 102
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Deborah A.P.
Hersman by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 106
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 118
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 122
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 123
Response to written question submitted to Francis (Buzzy) France
by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 126
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 126
Response to written question submitted to Jacqueline S. Gillan
by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 136
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 136
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 139
Response to written question submitted to David J. Osiecki by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 140
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 141
Response to written question submitted to Todd Spencer by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 142
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 143
OVERSIGHT OF MOTOR CARRIER
SAFETY EFFORTS
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:46 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank
Lautenberg, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, everybody, for being here.
Thank you, Senator Thune, for being here. I want to welcome
everyone to today's hearing as we continue this Subcommittee's
work on truck and bus safety.
On an early Friday morning last month, a tractor trailer in
Kentucky unexpectedly left the lane of the highway it was
driving down, crossed the median, and veered toward oncoming
traffic. The out-of-control truck soon struck a van head on.
The van was carrying 15 members of an extended family on their
way to a relative's wedding. Ten of the passengers onboard that
van died, including parents and children. The 45-year-old truck
driver, who is believed to have fallen asleep behind the wheel,
was also killed. It was Kentucky's worst highway crash in more
than 20 years, but it was not an isolated incident.
The fact is that when a car crashes with a large truck, the
results are often fatal. Crashes with large trucks along our
highways cause an average of 14 Americans to die on the
highways every single day. Just think, big trucks account for
only 3.5 percent of all registered vehicles on our roads, yet
they are involved in more than 11 percent of all of the motor
vehicle crash deaths.
And make no mistake, our economy relies on trucks. They
provide a valuable service and we want them to operate and
continue to help our economy, but we want them to do it safely.
In fact, New Jersey is home to the biggest port on the East
Coast which relies on trucks to transport goods. As important
as trucks are, we have to remember that these vehicles share
the roads with our families and they are more widespread than
ever before.
Between 1980 and 2000, highway capacity in our country
increased by less than 2 percent, but during roughly the same
period, the number of miles traveled by trucks grew by nearly
100 percent. That is from 1980 to the year 2000.
Since 2000, the number of large trucks on our highways has
increased by more than a million newly registered vehicles. As
more trucks clog our highways, we have to make sure that they
are safe. Double- and triple-trailer trucks do not belong on
our highways. Yet, a loophole in our laws allows them to
endanger the public. We need to close that loophole and block
these long, overweight trucks from using our national highway
system. But we also need to make sure that truck drivers are
alert and driving safely.
While the Department of Transportation has taken some steps
recently to increase safety, including moving to ban texting
while driving, we need to do more. It is essential that we take
the danger posed by tired truck drivers seriously.
In the last Congress, we brought to light the flaws in
hours-of-service regulations that were imposed by the Bush
administration. Those regulations allow drivers of large trucks
to remain behind the wheel nearly 30 percent longer each week,
pushing them to the brink of fatigue. These regulations were so
egregious that the court struck them down not once but twice.
The Obama Administration has made the right move by initiating
a new rulemaking on driver hours.
But I want to be clear. When this process is over, we
cannot wind up with the same flawed regulations that the last
Administration designed. And I do not mean that as a political
statement. I am simply saying that we have got to improve
safety on our roads.
A key way to enforce hours-of-service rules, combat driver
fatigue, and hold drivers accountable is with electric on-board
recorders, known as EOBRs. A new rule was recently issued by
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration that is going
to require some trucks and buses to have EOBR. While this
proposal is a modest improvement over what has been suggested,
these new rules still only affect 1.3 percent of all trucking
companies. It is infinitesimally small. And that is far short
of the universal installation which the National Transportation
Safety Board has placed on its Most Wanted List. Electronic on-
board recorders should be installed on every truck and bus to
protect all drivers on the roads, whether they are driving a
truck, a bus, or a family car.
I look forward to working with our witnesses and my
colleagues on the Committee to create common-sense solutions so
that our trucking industry is safe, our economy keeps moving,
and our families are protected.
I call on my colleague, Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding today's hearing.
I am pleased that with this hearing we are beginning our
work to reauthorize the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration. The highway bill, which is the traditional
vehicle for reauthorizing this agency and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, is already past due. I hope that
we will soon begin drafting the motor carrier safety title so
that we are fully prepared when the other authorizing
committees have completed their work and are ready to go to the
floor.
I think it is also important to reflect today on what has
been accomplished since FMCSA was established in 1999.
Significant progress has been made in improving truck safety.
Through 2008, the rate of fatalities involving large trucks per
100 million vehicle miles traveled has declined by 28 percent,
a greater decline than that of passenger vehicles over the
period. The rate of injuries in crashes involving large trucks
has fallen by 29 percent. The work of FMCSA, the industry, and
this committee have all contributed to these positive results.
While FMCSA has experienced some rocky periods, I believe
the agency has turned a corner. I expect there will be a fair
amount of discussion this morning about the agency's CSA 2010
initiative, but it is refreshing to be in the position of
questioning the agency about this important new initiative
rather than to be chastising the FMCSA Administrator for being
behind in over 30 rulemaking and report requirements, which was
the case when Congress last reauthorized the agency. I commend
the current Administrator, as well as the past two
Administrators, John Hill and Annette Sandberg, for the
progress being made.
The Commerce Committee made an important first step on
commercial vehicle safety last December when it reported the
Motor Coach Enhanced Safety Act. While all of the motorcoach
safety provisions may not be practical for the trucking
industry, given its much larger number of trucking companies
and drivers, the bill is a good start and can serve as a guide
in terms of the safety issues that need to be addressed in the
trucking industry.
Some contentious issues will certainly be before us today
as we work to develop comprehensive reauthorization
legislation. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will be able to work
through the difficult issues and achieve constructive solutions
that will promote safety without imposing undue burdens on an
industry that is so vital to the health of the American
economy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thune follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Thune, U.S. Senator from South Dakota
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding today's hearing.
I am pleased that, with this hearing, we are beginning our work to
reauthorize the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA).
The highway bill, the traditional vehicle for reauthorizing this agency
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), is
already past due. I hope that we will soon begin drafting the motor
carrier safety title, so that we are fully prepared when the other
authorizing committees have completed their work and are ready to go to
the floor.
I think it is also important to reflect today on what has been
accomplished since F-M-C-S-A was established in 1999. Significant
progress has been made in improving truck safety. Through 2008, the
rate of fatalities involving large trucks per 100 million vehicle miles
traveled has declined 28 percent, a greater decline than that of
passenger vehicles over the period. The rate of injuries in crashes
involving large trucks has also fallen, by 29 percent. The work of
FMCSA, the industry, and this Committee have all contributed to these
positive results.
While FMCSA has experienced some rocky periods, I believe the
agency has turned a corner. I expect there will be a fair amount of
discussion this morning about the agency's ``CSA 2010'' initiative. But
it is refreshing to be in the position of questioning the agency about
this important new initiative, rather than to be chastising the FMCSA
Administrator for being behind in over 30 rulemaking and report
requirements, which was the case when Congress last reauthorized the
agency. I commend the current Administrator, as well as the past two
Administrators, John Hill and Annette Sandberg, for the progress being
made.
The Commerce Committee made an important first step on commercial
vehicle safety last December when it reported the Motorcoach Enhanced
Safety Act. While all of the motorcoach safety provisions may not be
practical for the trucking industry given its much larger number of
trucking companies and drivers, the bill is a good start and can serve
as a guide in terms of the safety issues that need to be addressed in
the trucking industry.
Some contentious issues will certainly be before us today and as we
work to develop comprehensive reauthorization legislation. I hope, Mr.
Chairman, that we will be able to work through the difficult issues and
achieve constructive solutions that will promote safety, without
imposing undue burdens on an industry that is so vital to the health of
the American economy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Senator Thune.
And now Ms. Anne Ferro, the Administrator of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration. This is your first time
before the Committee since your confirmation. We welcome you.
We are anxious to know what has happened since you took charge,
and we look forward to hearing you. Ms. Hersman, the
Chairperson of the National Transportation Safety Board. We
thank you both for sharing your time and knowledge with the
Committee. We do have a 5-minute limit. We apply the brakes
gently, but firmly. So, Ms. Ferro, if you might begin.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE S. FERRO, ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ms. Ferro. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity to be here, and Ranking Member Thune, thank you.
Before I get started, I would like to quickly talk about
the final gap in my team-building and introduce Bill Bronrott,
our new Deputy Administrator with the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration. He was sworn in yesterday, and now that
he has signed the paper, I know he is going to stay. So we are
very pleased to have him on board.
I am very grateful for the opportunity to address the range
of efforts underway by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration to eliminate severe crashes and fatalities
involving trucks and buses.
During my confirmation hearing last September, Mr.
Chairman, you said that ``every year for the past decade,
nearly 5,000 people have died and 125,000 were injured in
crashes involving a large truck.'' That is 50,000 individuals
over the course of a decade who did not get home to their loved
ones. That is a constant reminder for me and what drives me and
ensures that I am dedicating my vision to achieving our safety
mandate and reducing, eventually eliminating, severe crashes
involving commercial motor vehicles.
Through a strategic focus on research, regulations,
enforcement, grants to States and public outreach, FMCSA's
workforce is committed to fulfilling our mandate. It is my job
as Administrator to set a strategic framework that places the
highest priority on safety, and that framework is shaped by
three core principles: raising the bar to enter the industry,
maintaining a high safety standard to stay in the industry, and
ensuring that high-risk behaviors and high-risk operators are
removed from our roads and highways. These principles apply
whether we are talking about a motor carrier company, a driver,
a vehicle, a service provider, household goods provider.
I would like to share a few examples of the work that we
have underway that works within and supports this framework.
First, with regard to raising the bar to enter the motor
carrier industry, a couple of key examples of new and ongoing
initiatives. We recently strengthened the New Entrant Safety
Assurance Program to identify startup truck and bus companies
who are deficient in key areas that must be addressed in order
to continue operations.
Additionally, about 18 months ago, we implemented a vetting
program to weed out unsafe motorcoach and household goods
carriers who reincarnate to avoid sanctions. Since its start,
about a third of the 2,600 applicants we have received through
this vetting program, applicants for operating authority, have
been either dismissed, denied, or withdrawn. In the future,
with system improvements, we plan to expand this vetting
program to hazardous materials carriers and eventually to all
carriers applying for authority.
With regard to the second principle, maintaining a high
safety standard to stay in the industry, again CSA 2010
absolutely is our agency's new safety fitness determination and
compliance program and it fulfills in a significant way the
concept and principle of maintaining a high standard. It
consists of three core components: a new rating system, safety
fitness determination rulemaking, and a new intervention
process. Combined, these three measures will accelerate
corrections to safety problems before the crash occurs. The
program represents a move from the current one-size-fits-all
compliance review to a dynamic, targeted examination of high-
risk factors, and those are unsafe driving, fatigued driving,
driver fitness, crash history, vehicle maintenance, improper
loading of cargo, and drugs and alcohol.
Our work in the context of ensuring the industry maintains
high standards continues. To accomplish this goal, as you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we have published a final rule that
requires carriers with serious patterns of hours-of-service
violations to install electronic on-board recorders. Work is
already underway to develop a broader mandate to ensure that
EOBRs are applied uniformly across the hours-of-duty status for
carriers.
Critical to this whole concept of maintaining a high
standard is the hours-of-service rule. As you know, FMCSA is
undertaking a new rulemaking on this vitally important
operating factor. Late last year, we set in play a process to
collect and receive information and perspective both through an
open docket, as well as listening sessions around the country.
The process has given us a wide range of perspectives to
incorporate when examining research we are using to develop the
rule.
With regard to high-risk behavior, two key measures I want
to highlight. First is the Department and our administration's
aggressive focus on distracted driving. Under the leadership of
Secretary LaHood, FMCSA very recently issued a proposed rule to
ban texting for commercial motor vehicle drivers. We will soon
follow with a proposed rule on cell phone use.
The second is a proposed rule to create a drug and alcohol
test clearinghouse to mandate stricter reporting requirements
on CDL holders who test positive for drugs and alcohol or who
refuse the test.
On a final note, Ranking Member Thune, again with regard to
reauthorization, I look forward to discussing reauthorization
and FMCSA's programs when Congress considers the
reauthorization of surface transportation funding.
In my travel around the country in these first few months,
I have heard firsthand the budget constraints facing States and
the importance of Federal funding to achieving strong
commercial vehicle safety enforcement. The work of FMCSA comes
together in the field, both at our division level and at the
roadside, and we must support our frontline staff in this
regard, both with tools and resources.
So with all of this to report and more, I believe we are
on, in fact, the path to significant progress in setting the
bar high for motor carrier safety. The employees of FMCSA share
my sense of urgency and they share my commitment to work with
you on the many important challenges we face.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks and
look forward to taking any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ferro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Anne S. Ferro, Administrator, Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to
give an overview of the priorities and programs of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), the successes we have had in
enhancing safety on our Nation's highways, and our continuing
challenges as we strive to significantly reduce severe and fatal
crashes involving commercial motor vehicles.
Introduction
During my confirmation hearing to be Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administrator last September, Chairman Lautenberg pointed out that
``[e]very year for the past decade, nearly, 5,000 people died and
125,000 were injured in crashes with a large truck. That's nearly 14
people a day, or 14 families torn apart by horrible, and often
avoidable accidents.'' Each one of these fatalities and injuries
reflects a tragic loss, pain, suffering, or hardship and is truly
unacceptable. As the head of the Agency responsible for reducing these
fatality and injury rates, I do not waiver in my commitment to prevent
and eliminate these avoidable motor carrier crashes. Under the strong
leadership of Secretary LaHood, Deputy Secretary Porcari, and with the
dedication and support of every man and woman who works for FMCSA, we
are steadfast in achieving the Agency's mission to improve and secure
motor carrier safety.
Core Priorities
As I will describe in further detail, FMCSA has a number of
initiatives and programs underway aimed at achieving our mission. As
the new Administrator, it is my job to set a strategic framework in
which to prioritize our responsibilities and clearly focus our efforts
and resources on a vision of eliminating severe and fatal crashes
involving commercial vehicles. FMCSA must:
1. Raise the safety bar to enter the industry;
2. Require operators to maintain high safety standards to
remain in the industry; and
3. Remove high-risk operators from our roads and highways.
This strategic framework applies to companies, drivers, brokers,
and service-providers alike. To achieve the best outcome within this
framework, FMCSA must improve its program and rule-development
processes, its stakeholder relationships, and the health of the
organization.
While recognizing the important safety work that remains to be
accomplished, I would like to point to some of the recent safety
improvements in motor carrier safety:
Total miles traveled by all vehicles has grown significantly
over the past 10 years, most significantly for large trucks and
buses--there has been a 16 percent increase in miles traveled
by these vehicles from 1998 to 2008. In addition, the number of
large trucks and buses registered has increased 17 percent over
this time period.
Even with the continued growth in commercial vehicle
traffic, the most recent data available show that our Nation's
highways experienced their lowest number of fatalities (4,525
in 2008) from crashes involving large trucks and buses since
fatal crash data collection began in 1975.
Fatalities from large truck or bus crashes have dropped for
3 years in a row, a decline of 15 percent from 2006 to 2008.
Safety improvements have been realized not only in terms of
fatal crashes, but also in injury crashes. In 2008, 113,000
people were injured in crashes involving large trucks and
buses, the lowest number of persons injured in these crashes
since 1988, the first year of injury crash data collection.
The number of people injured in large truck and bus crashes
declined 10 percent from 2006 to 2008.
The reduction in severe and fatal crashes involving commercial
motor vehicles comes about through the dedication and hard work of many
people represented by the stakeholders in this room. We are broadening
the participation of these stakeholders on our Motor Carrier Safety
Advisory Committee (MCSAC) to improve the transparency of the input we
receive about our programs. However, we can and must do more. FMCSA's
employees are passionate about saving lives. With clear priorities and
productive stakeholder relationships, I assure this Committee and the
public that we are on a path to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
passion better than ever.
Overview of FMCSA
FMCSA's primary mission is to prevent commercial motor vehicle
(CMV)-related fatalities and injuries. We achieve this mission through
a mix of programs, rules, and resources that together exert direct and
indirect influence over approximately 500,000 actively registered
commercial motor carriers and 7 million commercial driver licensees.
Our direct influence is made possible by FMCSA's workforce of 1,100
employees, almost 900 of whom are in our field operations utilizing a
suite of strong laws, programs, and resources.
Indirectly, we achieve our mission by making it a priority for
licensing and law enforcement agencies in 50 States and the District of
Columbia through grants, laws, education and partnerships. State
commercial vehicle police and inspectors, Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) employees and examiners, public service commissions, our
employees in the field, and employers are the people closest to
preventing or enabling an unsafe carrier or driver from operating.
The range of FMCSA's authority, programs and activities includes:
Commercial Drivers Licenses: FMCSA develops standards to
test and license CMV drivers and maintain the Commercial Driver
License Information System. Through grants and guidelines
States carry out and administer these programs.
Data and Analysis: FMCSA collects and disseminates safety
performance and crash data to improve motor carrier and
motorcoach safety.
Regulatory Compliance and Enforcement: FMCSA directs an
aggressive compliance and enforcement program to improve safety
performance and remove high-risk carriers from the Nation's
highways through reviews of the motor carrier's compliance with
safety and economic regulations.
Research and Technology: FMCSA works closely with the other
modes within DOT on research and technology projects to
identify best practices and new technologies that improve the
safety of motor carrier operations, CMVs, and drivers.
Safety Assistance Grants: FMCSA provides financial
assistance to conduct roadside inspections, traffic enforcement
and other CMV safety programs. These grants promote motor
vehicle, motorcoach and motor carrier safety and regulatory
uniformity.
Other Activities: FMCSA supports the development of uniform
reciprocal motor carrier safety requirements and procedures
throughout North America. It participates in international
technical organizations and committees to learn about the best
practices in motor carrier and motorcoach safety throughout
North America and the rest of the world. It enforces
regulations, ensuring safe highway transportation of hazardous
materials and enforces statutory and regulatory consumer
protection provisions regarding the transportation and delivery
of household goods in interstate transportation.
A discussion of current developments in FMCSA's programs, rules,
and resources follows.
Programs
Comprehensive Safety Analysis (CSA) 2010
The CSA 2010 initiative, the Agency's new operational enforcement
business model, is a critical and far-reaching component in addressing
the Agency's priorities and meeting its goals. CSA 2010 represents a
move from the current one-size-fits-all compliance review model. Once
implemented, it could help FMCSA achieve a greater reduction in large
truck and bus crashes and fatalities and injuries by enabling the
Agency and our State partners to analyze the safety performance of a
much larger population of motor carriers.
CSA 2010 will allow more comprehensive review, analysis, and
restructuring of FMCSA's current safety fitness determination process
and compliance and enforcement programs. The overall goal is to lead
FMCSA to a more effective and efficient operational model--one that
will have a greater impact on large truck and bus safety while better
using Agency resources. This new operational model includes four major
elements: (1) measurement, (2) intervention, (3) safety fitness
determination, and (4) information technology.
The Agency is planning to begin nationwide CSA 2010 deployment
before the end of 2010. At that time, FMCSA plans to replace its
current Safety Status Measurement System (SafeStat) with the new
Carrier Safety Measurement System (CSMS) and send more comprehensive
information on unsafe motor carriers to roadside inspectors. Through
CSMS, FMCSA will focus on 7 key behaviors that are linked to CMV crash
risk:
Unsafe Driving
Fatigued Driving
Driver Fitness which includes licensing and medical
compliance standards
Crash History
Vehicle Maintenance
Improper Loading and Cargo
Controlled Substances--Drugs and Alcohol
This new measurement system will allow the Agency to identify more
high risk carriers based on improved safety performance data than under
the previous system.
New Entrants to the CMV Industry
FMCSA recently significantly strengthened its New Entrant Safety
Assurance Program by raising the standard for successfully completing
the new entrant safety audit. The Agency identified 16 safety
regulations for which a violation by a new entrant carrier would result
in an automatic failure of the safety audit. Any new entrant that fails
the safety audit must submit a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) in order to
continue to operate in interstate commerce. FMCSA also closely monitors
the new entrant during the initial 18-month period of operation and, if
certain violations are discovered during a roadside inspection, the new
entrant will be subject to an expedited action to correct the
identified safety deficiencies. Compliance with the New Entrant rule
has been required for just over 3 months and the statistics on the new
entrant safety audits to date show:
4,808 New Entrant Carriers underwent safety audits
2,184 New Entrant Carriers failed the safety audit
FMCSA has received approximately 632 Corrective Action Plans
(CAP) to date from new entrant carriers.
Vetting--Passenger and Household Goods Carrier
FMCSA has made significant progress in identifying motorcoach
carriers that operate illegally and place passengers at risk. After the
tragic August 2008 fatal motorcoach crash in Sherman, Texas, FMCSA
initiated its passenger carrier vetting program to examine in detail
the history and background of new applicants for passenger operating
authority to ensure they conform with FMCSA's safety fitness policy. In
addition, the vetting process allows FMCSA to discover reincarnated, or
``chameleon,'' passenger carriers before such carriers are authorized
to engage in for-hire interstate transportation. The Agency
subsequently expanded the program to include interstate household goods
carriers. FMCSA has added additional personnel to participate in this
labor intensive process, which has proven valuable as FMCSA received
over 2,600 applications for operating authority and 879 have had their
applications dismissed, denied or withdrawn. FMCSA is exploring the
resources needed to expand the vetting program to hazardous materials
carriers seeking FMCSA operating authority and eventually to all
applicants for authority.
FMCSA still faces challenges keeping these carriers off the roads,
however. Unfortunately, although our vetting program denied the
application for operating authority from the motorcoach company
involved in a crash that killed 6 people near Phoenix, Arizona, on
March 5, FMCSA's rejection of the application did not stop the carrier
from operating illegally. FMCSA's investigation of this carrier is
continuing, however, the Agency responded swiftly to the carrier's
actions. Working with the Department of Justice, FMCSA was able to get
the carrier to enter into a consent decree on the day of the crash in
which it agreed to immediately cease all interstate and international
passenger service. The following day, FMCSA obtained an order from a
Federal District Judge further enforcing the consent decree and making
any violations subject to the court's contempt powers and associated
criminal and civil penalties. The Agency is examining its current
authorities to determine if more is needed to prevent unsafe or illegal
carriers from operating after authority is denied.
Motorcoach Safety
On April 30, 2009, Secretary LaHood ordered a full departmental
review of motorcoach safety and the development of a departmental
Motorcoach Safety Action Plan. The review considered recommendations
from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and other
transportation stakeholders. On November 16, 2009, the Department
released an Action Plan that contains 7 priority action items derived
from that review. FMCSA is responsible for implementing 4 of these
items: (1) initiating rulemaking to require electronic on-board
recording devices on all motorcoaches to better monitor drivers' duty
hours and manage fatigue, (2) initiating rulemaking to propose
prohibiting texting and limiting the use of cellular telephones and
other devices by motorcoach drivers, (3) enhancing oversight of
carriers attempting to evade sanctions and of other unsafe motorcoach
companies, and (4) establishing minimum knowledge requirements for
passenger transportation authority applicants.
In addition, FMCSA has increased the number of compliance reviews
(CRs) conducted on motorcoach companies. In FY 2005, FMCSA and our
State partners conducted 457 motorcoach company CRs. The FMCSA
increased this number to 646 in FY 2006. The FMCSA conducted 1,304
motorcoach company CRs in FY 2007, which more than doubled the previous
period's efforts. In FY 2008, the Agency completed 1,307 CRs. The FMCSA
completed 1,286 motorcoach company CRs in FY 2009. Given that there are
approximately 3,100 motorcoach companies in the United States, FMCSA
conducted CRs on about one-third of the industry during each of the
past three Fiscal Years.
The FMCSA requires State agencies to include a formal motorcoach
inspection program in their Commercial Vehicle Safety Plan in order to
receive grant funding through the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance
Program (MCSAP). As a result of this initiative, the number of
motorcoach inspections increased annually for the last several years.
In Fiscal Year 2005, States inspected 12,991 motorcoaches and in FY
2009 inspected 28,957 motorcoaches.
Compliance with Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
In late 2008, the Agency sent informational letters to authorized
over-the-road bus companies and over 100 disability stakeholder
organizations about the Over-the-Road Bus Transportation Accessibility
Act of 2007 (OTRBTAA). In compliance with the OTRBTAA, in February
2009, FMCSA and the Department of Justice executed a Memorandum of
Understanding that defines the respective enforcement efforts of both
agencies for accessibility requirements of the ADA.
In March 2009, FMCSA began conducting ADA Reviews (ADARs) to
investigate the regulatory compliance of over-the-road bus companies.
As of February 23, 2010, FMCSA had conducted 33 ADARs on large and
small fixed route over-the-road bus companies. FMCSA had initially
targeted large fixed route companies for ADARs because this industry
sector transports the largest number of passengers. No major violations
have been discovered to date.
Commercial Enforcement of Household Goods (HHG)
The FMCSA regulates household goods carrier and broker compliance
with motor carrier safety regulations, financial responsibility
requirements and commercial regulations. Our authority provides
protection to consumers during interstate moves by defining the rights
and responsibilities of consumers, household goods carriers and
brokers.
In FY 2009, FMCSA Safety Investigators conducted 557 HHG reviews;
responded to 2,127 consumer complaints, many of which were
satisfactorily resolved by HHG staff; and maintained a consumer based
``Protect Your Move'' website (www.protect
yourmove.gov). FMCSA issued an enforcement policy identifying and
targeting the top 100 household goods carriers for compliance reviews.
These carriers are generally those that receive the most consumer
complaints, although some have also been identified as unsafe or as
operating while their authority has been inactivated. For the last 2
years, FMCSA field staff have conducted strike forces on household
goods carriers that have been identified as unsafe and the subject of
various consumer complaints. In FY 2009, the strike force activity
concluded, having completed 224 targeted compliance reviews that
resulted in 50 enforcement cases.
The Government Accountability Office recently published its final
report on the HHG moving industry stating that progress has been made
in enforcement, but indicating that increased focus on consumer
protection is needed. The report identified the enforcement tools used
to regulate the HHG industry, noting that FMCSA conducted 629 HHG
reviews in FY 2008. The report also identifies a provision in the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy
for Users (SAFETEA-LU) that permits State regulatory agencies and State
Attorneys General to bring Federal consumer protection actions against
interstate HHG carriers that has not been implemented by States.
Pre-employment Screening
FMCSA recently launched the initial phase of its Pre-employment
Screening Program (PSP) to provide motor carriers with access to crash
and inspection data found in FMCSA's Motor Carrier Management
Information System (MCMIS) on drivers they are seeking to hire. The
driver must provide his or her prior written consent to have
information released to the motor carrier. The program is expected to
be rolled out next month.
Safety Belt Use
Safety belts save lives and FMCSA is committed to promoting and
educating CMV drivers on the importance of using them. In March, FMCSA
announced that safety belt use for CMV drivers has improved. New data
show that 74 percent of commercial truck and bus drivers currently use
their safety belts, an improvement from the 65 percent of drivers who
were using safety belts in 2007. It is important, however, to note the
key research findings that show there is work yet to be done:
In States where not wearing a safety belt is a primary
offense, 78 percent of CMV drivers and their occupants used
safety belts, compared to a 67 percent usage rate for CMV
drivers and their occupants in States with weaker belt use
laws.
CMV drivers for regional or national fleets showed higher
safety belt use at 78 percent, versus 64 percent for
independent owner-operators.
Safety belt use rates for CMV drivers and their occupants
were highest at 79 percent in the West, compared with 75
percent in the South, 68 percent in the Midwest, and 64 percent
in the Northeast.
Driver Medical Standards--Programs
The FMCSA's medical program promotes the safety of America's
roadways through the development and implementation of medical
qualification standards that ensure physical qualifications of
interstate truck and bus drivers. The Agency receives important advice
and recommendations concerning the physical qualifications and
standards for CMV drivers from its Medical Review Board (MRB), a
Federal Advisory Committee Act committee. FMCSA staff reviews MRB
recommendations in developing regulatory options for future
rulemakings. In the meantime, FMCSA is phasing in new regulatory
requirements issued in December 2008 to combine the medical
certification process with the commercial driver's license (CDL)
issuance and renewal process. The rule requires interstate CDL holders
and those applying for a CDL to operate heavy trucks and buses in
interstate commerce to provide a copy of the medical certificate to the
State licensing agency as proof the individual is medically qualified
to drive commercial vehicles in interstate commerce.
Later this year, FMCSA expects to issue a final rule to establish a
National Registry of Certified Medical Examiners. This rulemaking would
establish minimum training and testing requirements for all healthcare
professionals that issue medical certificates for interstate truck and
bus drivers.
Rulemaking
Hours of Service for Truck Drivers
Regulating the number of hours commercial drivers may work has been
a Federal Government responsibility for 75 years, beginning with the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Through the years, there have
been three reforms of the rules, the most notable of which was the
April 2003 rule, when FMCSA made significant revisions. The 2003 rule
limited driving to 11 hours within a 14-hour, non-extendable window
after coming on duty following 10 consecutive hours off duty (known as
the 11-hour rule). Although the rules concerning weekly limits for on-
duty time were unchanged, drivers were allowed to restart the weekly
limit calculation after they took 34 consecutive hours off duty (known
as the 34-hour restart provision). The rule also extended the requisite
off-duty time from 8 to 10 hours, providing drivers more time for
restorative rest.
As this Subcommittee is well aware, FMCSA's efforts to craft
revised hours of service (HOS) regulations for CMV drivers has been an
arduous process and has resulted in court challenges. In October 2009,
FMCSA entered into a settlement agreement with parties that had
challenged the rule and agreed to undertake a new rulemaking.
One of my top priorities as Administrator has been to elicit the
views of the many individuals and entities affected by this rule and
for the Agency to craft an HOS rule that provides the best framework
for managing fatigue and making our roads as safe as possible.
To that end, in December 2009, FMCSA tasked its MCSAC with
providing the Agency with a list of ideas and concepts that should be
considered in drafting a HOS rule. In January, FMCSA took steps to
encourage all interested parties to help the Agency identify new
research and perspectives. Specifically, the Agency posted the MCSAC's
meeting notes, opened the HOS public docket and held a series of public
``listening sessions'' around the country. Over 3,500 people
participated in the listening sessions--in person, by phone, or web--to
provide a broad range of comments, ideas, information, and relevant
research the Agency might consider in developing a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM). We are committed to using all of the information we
have received to propose a rule that addresses the concerns of our
stakeholders and presents the safest option. FMCSA intends to publish
its NPRM later this year and issue a Final Rule no later than July
2011.
Electronic On-Board Recorders (EOBRs)
On April 5, 2010, the Agency took another step toward reducing the
number of fatigue related crashes by publishing a final rule mandating
the use of EOBRs by carriers that have violated the hours-of-service
rules. This action will reduce the likelihood of falsified or
incomplete records of duty status.
The final rule follows up on the January 2007 NPRM but broadens the
remedial directive to require installation of EOBRs on many more
carriers. It represents a significant step forward in response to
Congressional concerns about the 2007 NPRM, the NTSB Most Wanted Safety
Recommendation concerning EOBRs, and the public comments we received in
response to the proposal. The final rule establishes: (1) a new
performance-oriented standard for EOBR technology; (2) a mandate for
certain motor carriers to use EOBRs to remediate regulatory
noncompliance (a remedial directive); and (3) incentives to promote
voluntary EOBR use by all carriers. The rule will result in
approximately 5,700 motor carriers being required to use EOBRs each
year after the first full year of implementation.
Distracted Driving
Since the Department's historic Distracted Driving Summit last
fall, FMCSA has played an active role in supporting Secretary LaHood's
efforts in bringing to bear all the tools at DOT's disposal to address
this critical safety issue. FMCSA completed its ``Driver Distraction in
Commercial Vehicle Operations'' study and released the final report on
October 1, 2009. The purpose of the study was to investigate the
prevalence of driver distraction in CMV safety-critical events (e.g.,
crashes, near-crashes, unintended lane departures). The study included
over 200 truck drivers and 3 million miles of data. The dataset was
obtained by placing video recorders on vehicles and monitoring the
behavior of real drivers driving in real-world situations.
The study concluded that drivers who engage in texting took their
eyes off the road for an average of 4.6 seconds out of the 6 seconds
prior to a safety-critical event. At 55 miles per hour, this means that
the driver is traveling the length of a football field, including the
end zones, without looking at the road and is 23 times more likely to
have a safety critical event than drivers who do not text while
driving. Because of the safety risks associated with texting while
driving, FMCSA took expedited action. The Agency published regulatory
guidance in the Federal Register on January 27 regarding the
applicability of current regulations to texting by commercial motor
vehicle drivers. The regulatory guidance clarified that truck and bus
drivers operating in interstate commerce who text while driving
commercial vehicles may be subject to civil or criminal penalties of up
to $2,750. FMCSA followed up on the regulatory guidance by publishing a
NPRM with an explicit prohibition against texting on April 1, 2010. The
NPRM also provides driver disqualification penalties that would enable
FMCSA and its State partners to take unsafe drivers off of the road.
As part of our effort to get the maximum amount of public
participation and collaboration in the texting rulemaking, the
Department announced an unprecedented partnership with Cornell
University. The Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative (CeRI) partnership will
make the Federal regulatory process more accessible to the public
through its ``Regulation Room,'' an online public participation
environment where people can learn about and discuss proposed Federal
regulations and provide effective feedback to the Department. This is
an important step toward keeping President Obama's promise of opening
government to more effective public citizen participation.
Drug and Alcohol Database
FMCSA is currently drafting a proposed rule that would mandate
reporting requirements to identify CDL holders who test positive for
drugs or alcohol or otherwise fail to comply with drug and alcohol
testing requirements. The system will also track a driver's compliance
with the return-to-duty requirements of the Department's workplace drug
and alcohol testing programs.
Uniform Carrier Registration Plan and Agreement (UCR)
The UCR is a fee program established under SAFETEA-LU as a means to
provide States with funds equivalent to the revenue they collected
under a previous, State-only program known as Single State Registration
System (SSRS). Many States use UCR fee revenue to pay for motor carrier
enforcement programs.
The UCR law requires FMCSA to set a fee schedule based upon a
recommendation by a governing board composed largely of State and motor
carrier industry members. The fee schedule must be projected to provide
approximately $108 million in revenue to the 41 participating States.
The UCR Board proposed a change in the 2010 fee schedule prompting
a rule-making cycle that has encountered a series of delays. The rule
was published on April 27. The States now have the authority they need
to begin collecting fees for calendar year 2010 to support important
motor carrier safety programs to protect the traveling public.
Resources
Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program
MCSAP grants provide financial assistance to States to help them
reduce the number and severity of CMV involved crashes, fatalities, and
injuries through consistent, uniform, and effective CMV safety
programs. It uses crash and fatality rates as critical performance
measures. One of the strengths of MCSAP is its performance-based
structure. Although FMCSA limits spending eligibility and sets
performance goals in a range of areas based on the Agency's targeted
safety program elements, our State partners have the flexibility to mix
and match a range of strategies that they believe will be most
effective in reducing their CMV fatality and crash rates based on
specific needs of their State. States conduct compliance reviews,
safety audits, roadside inspections, and other programs to improve CMV
safety. While FMCSA provides guidance and direction in a number of
areas based on analyses of nationwide safety data, we do not dictate a
prescriptive program for each State expecting them to produce a
completed, effective plan of action. In FY 2009, MCSAP lead agencies or
sub-grantees employed 13,300 certified CMV inspectors almost 11,000 of
which had traffic enforcement authority. FY 2010 funding for MCSAP is
$212,000,000.
Commercial Driver's License (CDL) Improvement Program
FMCSA works closely with the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators (AAMVA) and the States to improve CDL driver history
record (DHR) data quality and the timely exchange of conviction,
withdrawal, and other DHR data elements. Through a phased
implementation of electronic edit checks that prevent the movement of
bad data from one State to another, and a battery of matrices and
reports that notify States of their compliance with the requirements
for accurate, complete, and timely exchange of information, FMCSA
continues to ensure that the data elements critical to the success of
the CDL program are improving.
FMCSA has expanded fraud prevention through a grant-funded update
of the AAMVA Fraudulent Document Recognition training for frontline
State driver licensing agency employees. The Agency also assisted the
Department of Transportation's Office of the Inspector General in
investigating fraudulent CDL practices throughout the country.
Recently, FMCSA provided grant funds to help enhance and increase usage
of the Fraud Emergency Warning System maintained by AAMVA, which allows
for real-time alerts to State driver licensing agencies on the
potential for fraudulent activities and suspicious documents.
To ensure that States are making continuous improvements in their
compliance with the CDL program requirements, in the coming months,
FMCSA will deploy the Automated Compliance Review System. This web-
based system will provide real-time tracking of State compliance
issues. It will also allow FMCSA to generate reports that document
outstanding compliance issues at the State or national level. Through
this increased reporting, FMCSA can focus its oversight efforts and
provide targeted outreach and education to assist States with specific
compliance issues.
Data Quality
FMCSA relies on high quality data for identifying CMV safety
issues, assessing individual carrier safety performance, and allocating
enforcement and compliance resources. The Agency has developed, an
online system, known as DataQs, that allows motor carriers, commercial
drivers, State agencies, FMCSA staff, and the general public, to
request a review of the accuracy of Federal and State data collected by
FMCSA. With the implementation of CSA 2010, which relies heavily on
high quality data, and the initiation of the Pre-employment Screening
Program, which, as described above, provides drivers' crash and
inspection data to prospective employers, it is important that DataQs
is effective in resolving data issues quickly and responsively. To
assist responsible agencies in meeting data quality requirements, FMCSA
is developing a DataQs operational procedures guide.
New Technologies
FMCSA is continuously developing and researching new technologies
that improve commercial vehicle safety. Such technology resources
include applications that help avoid a crash, prevent rollovers, and
warn of lane departures. The technologies improve CMV operations, limit
technical and mechanical road failures, and reduce the probability of
crashes involving CMVs. Examples of FMCSA's technology resource
development include the following programs and activities:
Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN)--
FMCSA plans to implement an electronic credentialing function.
Electronic credentialing will allow carriers to submit various
credentials, including International Registration Plan and
International Fuel Tax Agreement credentials, to States for
automated electronic processing via Web-based or computer-to-
computer solutions. States that implemented e-credentialing
have reported noticeable benefits.
Onboard Safety System Testing Program--FMCSA has partnered with
motor carriers to test and evaluate several onboard safety
systems and identified those systems that showed promise for
having the greatest impact on reducing crashes.
New Technologies Evaluated at the CMV Roadside Technology
Corridor--In partnership with the Tennessee Department of
Safety, Tennessee Department of Transportation, University of
Tennessee, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Agency
created the Commercial Motor Vehicle Roadside Technology
Corridor in Tennessee. The goal of the Corridor is to provide a
test bed for existing, new, and emerging truck and bus safety
and enforcement technologies and concepts. Currently, the
partnering agencies are evaluating a fully automated inspection
station screening device--(Smart Infrared Inspection System
(SIRIS)--that uses temperature measurements derived from
infrared cameras to identify trucks with potential brake, tire,
or hub defects.
Creating Opportunities, Methods, And Practices To Secure Safety
(COMPASS): Business Improvement And Information Technology
Modernization Program--The COMPASS information technology
modernization effort is a multi-year, FMCSA-wide initiative to
improve data accessibility, data quality, system flexibility,
and business processes. COMPASS and CSA 2010 are closely
integrated efforts within FMCSA. The Agency plans to issue
incremental releases of COMPASS as legacy systems are replaced;
these releases will be closely aligned with the roll-out of the
new CSA measurement system (CSMS) later this year.
Conclusion
In summary, over the course of the Agency's past 10 years, there
have been encouraging results in declining numbers of severe crashes
and fatalities involving commercial vehicles thanks to the dedicated
work and commitment of FMCSA's employees and stakeholders. Yet, we are
not satisfied with the progress to-date. We cannot justify or explain
away the CMV crashes that take lives not ready to leave this earth and
destroy the fabric of their families' joy. With the strategic framework
and expectations I outlined at the beginning of my presentation and the
foundation of programs, rules and resources described herein, we are
poised to achieve more significant gains in saving lives than ever
before.
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the FMCSA's current work and
future programs. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may
have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
Now, Ms. Hersman, we look forward to hearing from you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Hersman. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Lautenberg,
Ranking Member Thune. Let me begin by thanking the Committee
for its hard work on the Motor Coach Enhanced Safety Act which
addressed many of our recommendations to improve crash-
worthiness and the safety of motorcoaches.
It goes without saying that no carrier wants to have an
accident, but we recognize that the economic pressures in the
motor carrier industry can create conditions where safety is
just not guarded as vigilantly as it should be. That is why the
American people need comprehensive and consistent oversight of
the industry.
The Safety Board believes that the two factors that have
the greatest impact on safe motor carrier operations are the
condition of the vehicles and the performance of the drivers.
Let me begin by telling you about an accident that demonstrates
how these rules play out.
In 1995, a motorcoach rolled over in Indianapolis causing 2
fatalities and 13 injuries. The NTSB's investigation concluded
that the motorcoach was operating with only 50 percent braking
efficiency. A postaccident compliance review of the company's
vehicles put all 10 out of 10 vehicles out of service. The
investigation revealed that just a year before the accident,
the company had been reviewed, and even though 63 percent of
the vehicles met out-of-service criteria, FMCSA had given that
operator an overall rating of satisfactory.
The Safety Board believes that an unsatisfactory rating in
either the vehicle or the driver performance area should be
sufficient to place a carrier out of service. We have called
upon FMCSA to fix this deficiency since 1999, and it has been
on our Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements
every year for the last decade.
We also identified FMCSA's ineffective compliance review
system as contributing to the probable cause of a motorcoach
fire that killed 23 elderly passengers near Wilmer, Texas, in
2005. Now, 5 years after that tragedy, the old rules have not
changed.
We have also called on FMCSA to help prevent fatigue-
related accidents. Our studies show that fatigue is the most
commonly cited probable cause or factor in fatal-to-the-driver
crashes. In 2004, a fatigued truck driver ran into a stopped
queue of traffic in a work zone near Chelsea, Michigan. A post-
accident compliance review revealed that 20 percent of the
carrier's driver records were falsified. Yet, the motor carrier
continued to operate under a conditional rating.
We have found the no hours-of-service rule is inadequate
unless it is enforceable. We saw in the Chelsea accident, and
our investigations repeatedly find, that some drivers falsify
their paper log books or keep two sets of log books, and some
motor carriers do not closely monitor their drivers' compliance
with the rules. That is why since 1977 the Safety Board has
advocated the use of electronic on-board recorders for all
drivers.
Our Most Wanted List also advocates the use of technology
to reduce the likelihood or severity of an accident,
improvements to the medical oversight program for CDL holders,
and recommends that cell phone use be prohibited for passenger-
carrying CDL holders.
For the last several years, FMCSA has been working on a
complex set of programs called Comprehensive Safety Analysis
2010, or CSA 2010. We have been told that it will address many
of our concerns associated with oversight and enforcement.
While we commend FMCSA for its efforts to address a wide range
of critical safety issues, CSA 2010 is an ambitious program
with milestones that will be difficult to meet. In 2007, NTSB
recommended that the FMCSA immediately proceed with incremental
rule changes even while moving toward the long-term CSA 2010
implementation. If incremental steps had been made along the
way, it is possible that fatal accidents could have been
prevented.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thune, when we commute to
work, when we load our families in our cars for a trip, we must
be able to trust that the trucks and the buses that are
operating on the roadways next to us are safely designed,
carefully maintained, and expertly operated. Right now, much
more needs to be done to improve motor carrier safety on our
roads and highways.
Thank you, and I will be happy to respond to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chairman Lautenberg and members of the Subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding oversight of
motor carrier safety. I am privileged to represent the men and women of
the NTSB, who work tirelessly to improve the safety of the traveling
public. As you know, the NTSB is charged with investigating major
transportation accidents, including highway accidents, determining
their probable cause, and making recommendations to prevent similar
accidents from happening again. We frequently recommend changes in
highway or vehicle design, driver training, occupant protection, and
regulatory oversight.
Every day, there are thousands of accidents on our Nation's
highways, resulting in tens of thousands of fatalities each year.
Historically, accidents involving large trucks comprise approximately
10 percent of the fatalities on our highways.
Today, I will highlight some specific issues of concern regarding
the safety of trucks and buses.
Motor Carrier Safety Oversight
No carrier wants to have an accident, but strong economic forces
sometimes create an environment in which safety is not always every
carrier's priority. That is why we need comprehensive and consistent
oversight of the motor carrier industry.
The two most important factors related to safe motor carrier
operations are the condition of the vehicles and the performance of the
drivers. Current rules prevent the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) from putting carriers out of service with an
unsatisfactory rating in only one of the 6 rated factors. They must be
unsatisfactory in 2 factors. In other words, they could be
unsatisfactory in either the vehicle or driver areas and still be
allowed to operate. The NTSB believes that an unsatisfactory in either
category should be sufficient cause to place a carrier out of service.
We have been asking the FMCSA to fix this deficiency since 1999.
The NTSB raised this deficiency as the result of our investigation
of an accident involving a motorcoach that had only 50-percent braking
efficiency. The motorcoach rolled over in Indianapolis, Indiana,
killing 2 passengers and injuring 13. A post-accident compliance review
of the motor carrier by the FMCSA resulted in 10 out of 10 vehicles
being placed out of service. Clearly, the motor carrier had some issues
with its vehicle maintenance prior to the accident. It had been
inspected nine times between 1987 and 1995. In 1994, even though 63
percent of the vehicles met the out-of-service criteria, the carrier
received a ``conditional'' rating for the vehicle factors and, because
all the other factors were rated ``satisfactory,'' it was given an
overall rating of ``satisfactory.'' Thus, with the blessing of the
FMCSA, the carrier was able to continue to operate with unsafe
vehicles.
The NTSB recommended that the FMCSA do something relatively simple:
change the safety fitness rating methodology so that adverse vehicle-
or driver performance-based data alone would be sufficient to result in
an overall ``unsatisfactory'' rating for a carrier.\1\ To date, the
FMCSA has not acted on this recommendation. As a result, the NTSB added
this recommendation to our Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety
Improvements in 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Safety Recommendation H-99-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two years after the Indianapolis accident, a truck with poorly
maintained brakes collided with a school bus near Mountainburg,
Arkansas, killing three students. Our investigation found that, prior
to the accident, the FMCSA considered the motor carrier
``satisfactory'' but postaccident, it was rated ``conditional''
overall. The motor carrier profile report showed it had had 29 roadside
inspections in the previous 12 months, which resulted in 4 out-of-
service vehicles (14 percent), all with out-of-adjustment brakes. In
the NTSB's view, 14 percent of a fleet with bad brakes should not be
considered ``satisfactory.'' As a result, the NTSB reiterated our 1999
recommendation.
The Board revisited this recommendation to the FMCSA in a number of
subsequent accidents:
In 2002, a five-fatality motorcoach rollover accident
occurred near Victor, New York, involving a carrier that had
received a favorable compliance review rating despite a long
and consistent history of driver- and vehicle-related
violations.
In 2004, a fatigued tractor-trailer driver ran into a
stopped queue of traffic in a construction zone near Chelsea,
Michigan. A postaccident compliance review by the FMCSA
revealed a 20-percent falsification rate of drivers' logs, yet
the FMCSA allowed the motor carrier to continue to operate with
a ``conditional'' rating.
In 2005, 23 elderly passengers died in a motorcoach fire
near Dallas, Texas, caused by the motor carrier's poor
maintenance of the vehicle's wheel bearings. The Texas
Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the FMCSA both identified
numerous driver and vehicle safety violations prior to the
accident, but they did not shut the carrier down. The FMCSA
gave the carrier a ``satisfactory'' rating. At the time, the
Texas DPS had no authority to force the motor carrier to cease
operations. (They do now.) As a result, the NTSB not only
reiterated the 1999 recommendation, our report cited the
FMCSA's ineffective compliance review system as contributing to
the probable cause of the accident.
In 2007, seven passengers died in a motorcoach accident
involving Bluffton University students in Atlanta, Georgia. A
postaccident compliance review by the FMCSA rated the carrier
``satisfactory.'' However, the NTSB's investigation found that
the driver failed to properly record hours-of-service
information for the trip and that the motor carrier had
numerous earlier driver-related violations.
Just last year, the NTSB completed its investigation of a 2008
motorcoach rollover accident near Victoria, Texas. Again, we found that
the FMCSA safety rating methodology did not provide adequate oversight
of the motor carrier and its leasing partners. The NTSB reclassified
the 1999 recommendation as ``unacceptable'' because we believe the
FMCSA has not made the necessary changes to take problem carriers off
the road.
CSA 2010
To address its oversight shortfalls, the FMCSA has initiated a
complex set of programs called the ``Comprehensive Safety Analysis
2010,'' or ``CSA 2010.'' CSA 2010 is based on the development of new
performance-based systems for determining motor carrier and driver
safety. These changes are long overdue. However, we are concerned
whether the final implementation of CSA 2010 will make the changes
necessary to take problem motor carriers off the road.
The FMCSA should have made incremental changes to its compliance
review process while developing more sweeping changes to its oversight
program through CSA 2010 or some other means. In fact, we issued a
recommendation to that effect in 2007.\2\ The FMCSA's current efforts
represent a comprehensive review of the process of determining the
safety of commercial motor carriers, and the agency should be commended
for that effort. However, CSA 2010 is an ambitious program with
milestones that will be difficult to meet. In fact, just this month,
the FMCSA announced that the start of CSA 2010 will be delayed, with
some portions postponed until 2011. In the meantime, motor carriers
continue to operate with poor management of their drivers and vehicles,
which will lead to more accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Safety Recommendation H-07-3: ``To protect the traveling public
until completion of the Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 Initiative,
immediately issue an Interim Rule to include all Federal Motor Carrier
Safety regulations in the current compliance review process so that all
violations of regulations are reflected in the calculation of a
carrier's final rating.''
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Hours of Service
The NTSB's interest in the fatigue of commercial drivers goes back
more than 30 years. In the 1990s, the NTSB conducted two safety studies
\3\ that found that fatigue was the most frequently cited probable
cause or factor in crashes with driver fatalities. The studies also
found that the most important factors influencing fatigue-related
crashes were the amount of sleep a driver received and whether the
driver was engaging in ``split-sleeps'' (that is, multiple short sleep
episodes rather than one continuous 8-hour period).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ (a) Fatigue, Alcohol, Drugs, and Medical Factors in Fatal-to-
the-Driver Heavy Truck Crashes, Safety Study NTSB/SS-90/01 (Washington,
D.C.: NTSB, 1990); (b) Factors that Affect Fatigue in Heavy Truck
Accidents, Safety Study NTSB/SS-95-01 (Washington, D.C.: NTSB, 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on these studies, the NTSB recommended that the FMCSA use
science-based principles to revise the hours-of-service rule, ensure
that the rule would enable drivers to obtain at least 8 hours of
continuous sleep, and eliminate sleeper berth provisions that allow for
the splitting of sleep periods. In September 2005, the FMCSA issued a
final rule with a provision that drivers using a sleeper berth must
take at least 8 consecutive hours in the sleeper berth, plus 2
consecutive hours either in the sleeper berth, off duty, or in any
combination thereof.
Recent Investigations of Accidents Involving Fatigue
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 Slinger, WI (8-fatality passenger van/
tractor-trailer collision;
fatigued truck driver)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Jackson, TN (1-fatality tractor-trailer
collision with parked state
police vehicle; fatigued
truck driver)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Sulphur Springs, TX (5-fatality multi-vehicle
collisions during road
closure;
fatigued truck driver)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Chelsea, MI (1-fatality tractor-trailer
collision in work zone;
fatigued truck driver)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Turrell, AR (15-fatality motorcoach
rollover accident; fatigued
motorcoach driver)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent Investigations of Accidents Involving Fatigue--Continued
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Lake Butler, FL (7-fatality tractor-trailer/
sedan/school bus collision;
fatigued driver)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Osseo, WI (5-fatality motorcoach
collision with overturned
tractor-
trailer; fatigued truck
driver)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Victoria, TX (1-fatality motorcoach
rollover accident; fatigued
motorcoach driver)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Mexican Hat, UT (9-fatality motorcoach
rollover accident; fatigued
motorcoach driver)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2008, following completion of investigations into
fatigue-related accidents that occurred in Osseo, Wisconsin; Lake
Butler, Florida; and Turrell, Arkansas; the NTSB asked the FMCSA to
develop a plan to deploy technologies in commercial vehicles to reduce
fatigue-related accidents,\4\ and to develop a methodology to assess
the effectiveness of the fatigue management plans implemented by motor
carriers.\5\ The 2008 motorcoach accident in Victoria, Texas, again
demonstrated the serious nature of fatigue-related accidents and the
need for both in-vehicle technologies and effective fatigue management
programs. Upon completion of its investigation of this accident, the
NTSB urged the FMCSA to continue to work on these recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Safety Recommendation H-08-13.
\5\ Safety Recommendation H-08-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Citing many of the accidents mentioned above and several others
from other modes of transportation in which drivers, pilots, and train
engineers had undiagnosed obstructive sleep apnea, in October 2009, the
Board issued recommendations on obstructive sleep apnea to the FMCSA.
In particular, we recommended that the FMCSA: (1) require drivers with
a high risk for obstructive sleep apnea to obtain medical certification
that they have been appropriately evaluated and, if necessary,
effectively treated for that disorder,\6\ and (2) provide guidance for
commercial drivers, employers, and physicians about identifying and
treating individuals at high risk of obstructive sleep apnea.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Safety Recommendation H-09-15.
\7\ Safety Recommendation H-09-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electronic On-Board Recorders for Hours of Service
No hours-of-service rule is adequate unless it is enforceable. In
our investigations, the NTSB has repeatedly found that some drivers
falsify their paper logbooks or keep two sets of books, and some motor
carriers do not closely monitor their drivers' compliance with the
rules. To address these problems, since 1977, the NTSB has advocated
the use of electronic on-board recorders (EOBRs) to allow better
monitoring of hours-of-service and driver fatigue.
In 2007, the NTSB asked the FMCSA to require EOBRs for hours-of-
service monitoring for all interstate commercial carriers following our
investigation of an accident in Chelsea, Michigan. Also in that year,
the FMCSA issued a proposed rulemaking for on-board recorders. However,
the rule mostly promotes voluntary installation of EOBRs, and it only
requires installation for carriers with serious patterns of hours-of-
service violations. The NTSB is concerned that the FMCSA and law
enforcement authorities will have a difficult time identifying such
pattern violators without this technology. We are convinced that the
only way on-board recorders can help stem hours-of-service violations
is if they are mandated for use by all operators. Therefore, in 2008,
the NTSB added EOBRs to its Most Wanted List.
EOBRs have the potential to efficiently and accurately collect and
verify the hours-of-service of all commercial drivers. A universal and
mandatory requirement for EOBRs will create a level playing field for
compliance with hours-of-service rules that will ultimately make our
highways safer for all drivers.
New Entrant Motor Carriers
In 2002, the Board investigated an accident involving a tractor-
semitrailer collision with a Greyhound bus in Loraine, Texas, which
resulted in three deaths. At the time, the FMCSA had essentially no
review or follow-up of new entrant motor carriers. To become a motor
carrier, the owner of a trucking company merely had to fill out an
online form and pay a small fee to receive operating authority from the
FMCSA. In this case, our investigation revealed that when the trucking
company owner submitted his application, he lied about his knowledge of
the regulations, about having systems in place to comply with the
regulations, and about a drug conviction for possession of large
amounts of marijuana the year prior to his application. He also did not
maintain any records on his drivers or vehicles, did not have a drug
and alcohol program, and did not conduct background checks of his
drivers. Further, he knowingly dispatched the accident driver, who did
not have a commercial driver's license or medical certificate.
The NTSB recommended that the FMCSA require new motor carriers to
demonstrate their safety fitness prior to obtaining new entrant
operating authority.\8\ In response to this recommendation, the FMCSA
developed the New Applicant Screening Program under which a new motor
carrier operating in interstate commerce is subject to an 18-month
safety monitoring period and receives a safety audit sometime after its
first 3 months of operation but before it completes 18 months of
operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Safety Recommendation H-03-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2008, the FMCSA began its New Entrant Safety Assurance Program,
under which the agency identified 16 regulations that are essential
elements of basic safety management controls necessary to operate in
interstate commerce and made a carrier's failure to comply with any of
the 16 regulations an automatic failure of the safety audit.
Additionally, if certain violations are discovered during a roadside
inspection, the new entrant is subject to expedited actions to correct
these deficiencies.
Unfortunately, unscrupulous motor carriers use the new entrant
program to evade an enforcement action or an out-of-service order by
going out of business and then reincarnating themselves, as if they are
a brand new motor carrier. The NTSB found that this had occurred with a
motor carrier involved in an accident in 2008, when a motorcoach ran
off a bridge and rolled over in Sherman, Texas, killing 17 passengers.
After losing its authority to operate because of an unsatisfactory
compliance review rating, the motor carrier applied for operating
authority under a new name as a new entrant. The NTSB concluded that
the FMCSA processes were inadequate to identify the carrier as a
company that was simply evading enforcement action. The NTSB issued a
recommendation to the FMCSA to evaluate the effectiveness of its New
Applicant Screening Program.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Safety Recommendation H-09-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB found additional deficiencies with the FMCSA's new entrant
program during its investigation of a 2008 accident in which the driver
fell asleep and the motorcoach overturned in Victoria, Texas, killing
one person. The FMCSA failed to notice that the accident carrier
reincarnated into a new carrier shortly after the accident. As a
result, the NTSB issued three recommendations to the FMCSA that ask the
agency to develop methods to identify reincarnated carriers and seek
authority to deny or revoke their operating authority.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Safety Recommendations H-09-34 through -36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medically Unqualified Commercial Drivers
The NTSB has investigated many accidents involving commercial
drivers with serious preexisting medical conditions that had not been
adequately evaluated. A driver's medical conditions are not always
causal to an accident, but finding these undocumented and unevaluated
conditions in commercial drivers is of significant concern to the NTSB.
The most tragic example of this issue was the 1999 Mother's Day
motorcoach accident in New Orleans, Louisiana, in which a motorcoach
driver lost consciousness while driving on an interstate highway, left
the roadway, and crashed into an embankment, killing 22 passengers and
injuring 21. The driver had multiple known serious medical conditions,
including kidney failure and congestive heart failure, and was
receiving intravenous therapy for 3-4 hours a day, 6 days a week.
The Board recommended that the FMCSA develop a comprehensive
medical oversight program to address the need to:
Ensure that examiners are qualified and know what to look
for;
Track all medical certificate applications;
Enhance oversight and enforcement of invalid certificates;
and
Provide mechanisms for reporting medical conditions.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Safety Recommendations H-01-17 through -24.
The NTSB specified the development of a comprehensive and
systematic oversight program, because a piecemeal approach to the
problem may result in deficiencies that will continue to permit
unqualified drivers to operate on the Nation's highways. Because of its
critical importance and the lack of substantive progress by the FMCSA
on the recommendations, this issue was placed on our Most Wanted List
in 2003.
In response, the FMCSA took two important steps. In November 2008,
the FMCSA proposed a rule that would require all medical examiners who
conduct medical examinations of interstate commercial motor vehicle
drivers to complete training on physical qualification standards, pass
a test to verify an understanding of those standards, and maintain
competence by periodic training and testing. If adopted, the rule will
help ensure that the medical examiners are properly qualified to
evaluate the fitness of commercial drivers. In addition, the FMCSA has
hired its first medical officer, a physician with occupational medical
experience, to provide the necessary expertise to guide its efforts in
establishing a comprehensive medical oversight system.
In December 2008, the FMCSA issued a final rule requiring
interstate commercial drivers to provide a current original or copy of
their medical examiner's certificate to their state drivers' licensing
agency. This rule is an important improvement because law enforcement
officials at the roadside will be able to determine whether a driver
possesses a current medical certificate and will be able to take
appropriate action if the driver does not. The NTSB thus was able to
close two of its eight recommendations on this issue in ``acceptable''
status.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Safety Recommendations H-01-22 and -23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are encouraged by the FMCSA's hiring of a medical officer,
because it indicates that the FMCSA appreciates the importance of this
issue to improving highway safety. I have personally met with the FMCSA
Medical Officer, who has an excellent background to deal with these
issues, and I think this step represents substantial progress.
Although the FMCSA continues to work to address medical issues,
much remains to be done. For example, the national registry of
certified medical examiners should include a tracking mechanism for
driver medical examinations. This step would reduce the current
practice of drivers ``doctor shopping'' to find one who will sign their
medical forms. Likewise, the FMCSA's medical oversight program should
establish a mechanism to review medical certificates, beyond the
examiner evaluating the driver, to identify and correct the
inappropriate issuance of medical certification. Finally, the FMCSA has
taken no action to establish a system for reporting medical conditions
that develop between examinations.
Cell Phone Use
Driver distraction may be one of the least understood causes of
traffic accidents. Recent interest in the effect of cell phone use and
the use of other personal electronic devices while driving has prompted
numerous studies. The explosive growth of text-messaging while driving
has prompted several states and the Federal Government to restrict such
activity.
Most would agree that texting while driving is unsafe. In fact,
Virginia Tech has shown that texting increases the risk of an accident
by 23 times. However, the problem is much bigger than texting. If you
dial a phone number or reach for the phone while you are driving, you
are taking your eyes off the road. You may be able to do this and get
away with it hundreds or even thousands of times, but 1 day, you will
look down at your cell phone at just the wrong moment and become an
accident statistic. When the driver of an 80,000-pound tractor-trailer
or a motorcoach carrying 55 passengers looks away from the road at the
wrong instant, the results can be catastrophic.
The NTSB investigated a passenger car accident in February 2002 in
Largo, Maryland, in which an inexperienced 20-year-old driver lost
control of her high-profile, short-wheelbase vehicle on the Capitol
Beltway. She was talking to her boyfriend, who was speeding in another
vehicle ahead of her. She lost control of her vehicle and crossed over
the median, striking a minivan and killing all four of its occupants
and herself. The cause of the accident was a combination of
inexperience, unfamiliarity with the vehicle, speed, and distraction
caused by use of a handheld wireless telephone. As a result, the NTSB
recommended that the applicable states prohibit holders of learner's
permits and intermediate licenses from using wireless communication
devices while driving, and that they add driver distraction codes to
traffic accident investigation forms.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Safety Recommendations H-03-8 and -9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2004, we investigated an accident in Alexandria, Virginia, in
which an experienced motorcoach driver, who was having a heated
conversation on his hands-free cell phone, failed to move to the center
lane and struck the underside of an arched stone bridge on the George
Washington Parkway. Our investigation found that the driver had
numerous cues to change lanes at the appropriate time. In fact, the
driver was familiar with the road and was following another bus that
had moved to the center lane. Yet, this driver did not notice the well-
marked signage as he approached the arched stone bridge. The accident
was clearly caused by this driver's cognitive distraction, due to his
conversation on his cell phone. The NTSB recommended that the FMCSA and
the 50 states enact laws to prohibit cell phone use by commercial
drivers while driving a passenger-carrying commercial vehicle or school
bus. \14\ We also recommended that motorcoach associations, school bus
organizations, and unions develop formal policies to prohibit cell
phone use by commercial drivers, except in emergencies.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Safety Recommendations H-06-27 and -28.
\15\ Safety Recommendation H-06-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last fall, we participated in the U.S. Department of
Transportation's (DOT) Distracted Driving Summit, which addressed the
dangers of text-messaging and other driving distractions. During the
summit, Secretary LaHood announced a plan to initiate rulemaking that
would consider banning texting altogether and would restrict the use of
cellular telephones by truck and interstate bus operators. A notice of
proposed rulemaking was issued this month. While a ban on texting is
definitely a step in the right safety direction, it does not satisfy
our recommendation to prohibit the use of cellular telephones by
drivers of passenger-carrying motorcoaches or school buses. The NTSB
believes that cell phone use can be just as dangerous as text-
messaging, because it is a cognitive distraction for the driver.
Motorcoach Passenger Protection
Progress in the area of improving the protection for motorcoach
passengers has been disappointing. We continue to investigate
motorcoach accidents in which passengers are thrown from their seats,
striking hard objects within the vehicle, and in which they are ejected
out the windows. In 1999, we recommended that the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) develop performance standards for
motorcoach occupant protection systems and require newly manufactured
motorcoaches to have such systems.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Recommendations H-99-47 and -48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 11 years since we issued these recommendations, we have
investigated more than 30 motorcoach accidents that have caused 140
fatalities and 1,070 injuries.\17\ These accidents have included 259
ejections. NHTSA has not established any meaningful occupant protection
standards for motorcoaches, and last year, the NTSB identified NHTSA's
lack of action in this area as contributing to the probable cause of
the nine-fatality motorcoach accident in Mexican Hat, Utah. Shortly
thereafter, Secretary LaHood directed several of the modal
administrations within DOT, including the FMCSA, NHTSA, the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA), the Research and Innovative Technology
Administration (RITA), and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), to develop a Motorcoach Safety Action Plan. The
NTSB is hopeful that this initiative will lead to meaningful
improvements in the safety protections provided to motorcoach
passengers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Some of the major investigations include the following
accidents: 1999 New Orleans, LA (22 fatal, 21 injured, 10 ejected);
2002 Loraine, TX (3 fatal, 29 injured); 2002 Victor, NY (5 fatal, 41
injured, 6 ejected); 2003 Hewitt, TX (5 fatal, 29 injured, 15 ejected);
2003 Tallulah, LA (8 fatal, 6 injured, 1 ejected); 2004 Turrell, AR (15
fatal, 15 injured, 30 ejected); 2005 Osseo, WI (5 fatal, 35 injured, 1
ejected); 2007 Atlanta, GA (6 fatal, 28 injured, 12 ejected); 2008
Victoria, TX (1 fatal, 46 injured, 1 ejected); 2008 Mexican Hat, UT (9
fatal, 42 injured, 50 ejected); and 2008 Sherman, TX (17 fatal, 39
injured, 4 ejected).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motorcoach Roof Strength
Structural integrity of a motorcoach is as important to the safety
of passengers as occupant protection systems. The NTSB has recommended
that NHTSA develop performance standards for motorcoach roof strength
that provide maximum survival space for all seating positions and that
take into account current typical motorcoach window dimensions.\18\ We
have also recommended that NHTSA revise window glazing requirements for
newly manufactured motorcoaches.\19\ The roof strength recommendations
were added to the NTSB's Most Wanted List in 2000. Because of inaction
by NHTSA on improving roof strength and window glazing, the NTSB
reclassified all of these recommendations as ``unacceptable response''
in 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Safety Recommendations H-99-50 and -51.
\19\ Safety Recommendation H-99-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motorcoach Passenger Egress
Most motorcoaches in the United States have emergency egress
windows. However, in a 1999 study on Selective Motorcoach Issues, the
NTSB found that passengers had difficulty in opening emergency windows
and keeping them open during evacuations. Consequently, in 1999, we
recommended that NHTSA require window exits and other emergency exits
not at floor level to be designed so that they are easy to open and to
keep open during an emergency evacuation, when a motorcoach is either
upright or at unusual attitudes.\20\ This recommendation is on our Most
Wanted List.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Safety Recommendation H-99-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motorcoach Fire Protection
Although injuries or fatalities resulting from motorcoach fires are
relatively uncommon, fires on motorcoaches are very common (about one
motorcoach is lost to fire per day). The importance of fire detection
and suppression came to the forefront of everyone's attention when
elderly motorcoach passengers perished near Dallas, Texas, in 2005
during the evacuation from Hurricane Rita. As a result of that
investigation, the NTSB asked NHTSA to evaluate current emergency
evacuation designs of motorcoaches and buses.\21\ The evaluation should
take into account acceptable egress times for various postaccident
environments, unavailable exit situations, and the current aboveground
height and design of window exits to be used in emergencies by all
potential vehicle occupants. The NTSB also asked NHTSA to develop early
warning detection systems to monitor the temperature of wheel well
compartments in motorcoaches and buses, and to evaluate the need for a
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard to require fire detection and
suppression systems on motorcoaches.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Safety Recommendation H-07-8.
\22\ Safety Recommendations H-07-6 and -7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Event Data Recorders
Event data recorders are a proven technology. They record critical
vehicle movements and driver inputs. Such information greatly helps in
accident reconstruction, leading to better accident prevention
initiatives. Since 1997, the NTSB has issued six recommendations and
participated in or hosted five public forums on the use of data
recording devices in highway transportation.
Following the 2003 pedal misapplication accident in a Santa Monica,
California, farmers' market, which resulted in 10 fatalities and 63
injuries, we recommended that NHTSA make event data recorders mandatory
on newly manufactured light-duty vehicles.\23\ Most manufacturers now
provide these devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Safety Recommendation H-04-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specific to school buses and motorcoaches, the NTSB recommended in
1999 that NHTSA require school buses and motorcoaches manufactured
after January 1, 2003, to be equipped with on-board recording systems
that record a number of vehicle parameters.\24\ We reiterated the
recommendations in 2008, following the seven-fatality motorcoach
accident involving Bluffton University students in Atlanta, Georgia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Safety Recommendations H-99-53 and -54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Crash Avoidance Technologies
Since 1995, the NTSB has advocated collision warning systems and
adaptive cruise control to prevent accidents. In 2001, as part of a
study on Technology for the Prevention of Rear-End Collisions, the NTSB
investigated nine commercial vehicle rear-end collisions in which 20
people died and 181 were injured. Common to all nine accidents was the
degraded perception of traffic conditions ahead by the driver in the
rear. The NTSB recommended that NHTSA issue performance standards for
adaptive cruise control and collision warning systems for new
commercial vehicles.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Safety Recommendations H-01-6 and -7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2003, the NTSB investigated a multivehicle accident near
Hampshire, Illinois, in which a tractor-trailer failed to slow for the
stopped or slow-moving traffic on the approach to the Interstate 90
toll plaza. The tractor-trailer driver was distracted and the tractor-
trailer struck the rear of a specialty bus, killing 8 passengers and
injuring 12. As a result, the Board reiterated the above
recommendations. In 2007, these important safety recommendations were
added to our Most Wanted List. They were reiterated in 2008, in the
NTSB's report on a five-fatality motorcoach and tractor-trailer
accident in Osseo, Wisconsin, as well as a seven-fatality tractor-
trailer/sedan/school bus collision in Lake Butler, Florida, and a 15-
fatality motorcoach rollover accident in Turrell, Arkansas.
Electronic stability control is standard in most automobiles today.
As a result of the Osseo accident investigation, the NTSB recommended
that NHTSA determine whether equipping commercial vehicles with
collision warning systems with active braking and electronic stability
control systems would reduce commercial vehicle accidents, and if so,
require their use on commercial vehicles.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Safety Recommendation H-08-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In many commercial vehicle tires, a small loss of air can degrade
tire carrying capacity and cause sufficient heat build-up to result in
tire failure. In 2008, a motorcoach became uncontrollable after a tire
failure and plunged off a bridge near Sherman, Texas, resulting in 17
fatalities. NHTSA now requires the installation of tire pressure
monitoring systems on passenger cars and light trucks weighing 10,000
pounds or less. As a result of the Sherman accident, the NTSB
recommended that all commercial vehicles weighing over 10,000 pounds be
equipped with tire pressure monitoring systems,\27\ to help avoid
crashes caused by tire failures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Safety Recommendation H-09-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Closing
Many of the issues discussed today have been around for decades,
and much is left to be done to improve highway safety. Immediate action
is needed so that when we load our children into our cars and get out
on the highway, we are surrounded by trucks and buses that are safely
designed, carefully maintained, and expertly operated.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement, and I will be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Ms. Ferro, your agency recently issued
a final rule regarding EOBRs, and while the rule was an
improvement to the previous administration's proposed rule, it
captures a very small percentage, just over one percent, of all
carriers on the road today. The NTSB has called for EOBRs, as
we heard, on all commercial motor vehicles. Why has your agency
not issued a more comprehensive EOBR mandate for all carriers
on the road?
Ms. Ferro. With regard to the current rule that we just
achieved final status on, it was clear from the original notice
of proposed rulemaking several years ago that we were
constrained in how broad we could make the current rule. It was
a very challenging discussion internally because, as you have
seen, through our indications both in our rulemaking website,
as well as my comments today, we are pressing ahead with a
broader mandate across all carriers.
But it was very important to me, if we had the opportunity,
to implement a tool today that could get at the behavior of
high-risk carriers, those violating hours-of-service rules most
egregiously, that we needed to deploy the tool as soon as
possible. It was clear to me that the opportunity to develop a
universal rule, while in play now, would not have been in place
as quickly as this one. So while Chairman Hersman spoke about
incremental achievements, this is incremental, but it was very
important that we get it in place.
Senator Lautenberg. It is hard to accept a condition that
threatens people on the road when we can do something about it.
And the mandatory use of EOBRs, as we heard, is included in the
NTSB's list of Most Wanted Safety Improvements.
Are there any more safety risks that will remain for trucks
that do not fall within the FMCSA's new rule?
Ms. Ferro. The rule that is under development today----
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Ms. Ferro.--that we expect to have a draft by the end of
the year?
I am not sure how to answer that question, but I will be
happy to follow up with regard to any other risks.
Senator Lautenberg. OK, please do. And, Ms. Hersman, we
might ask you the same thing.
The NTSB has found that fatigue is a primary factor in 30
to 40 percent of large truck crashes. How does the current
hours-of-service rule contribute to driver fatigue?
Ms. Hersman. There are many challenges associated with
fatigue. The Safety Board has specifically made recommendations
about the enforcement of the current hours-of-service rule. In
many of our accidents, we find that the rules are not being
observed, whether it is through pressures to get loads there on
time or economic pressures that the drivers feel to continue to
drive additional miles.
There are challenges for roadside inspectors. One of the
concerns that we have is that in roadside inspections, which
are conducted every year, we see about a 7 percent out-of-
service rate for drivers who have not kept accurate logs,
falsified logs, or do not possess logs at all. This has
remained fairly static, and what this says to me is that this
is the cost of doing business, and people are violating these
rules on a regular basis. We do not see that same hours-of-
service violation in other transportation industries. In the
aviation industry, in the railroad industry, there is
accountability on the part of the carriers for their drivers'
hours or their workers' hours. We do not see the same in the
trucking industry.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, in fairness, we have seen fatigue
in the aviation industry as well, and the consequences are very
serious.
Ms. Hersman. We certainly see fatigue in all modes of the
transportation industry, but the violations of the hours-of-
service are not there. Pilots, when they have reached their
duty-day limit, go off-duty. The company is responsible for
making sure that happens.
Senator Lautenberg. They are supposed to. We have to watch
them all.
Ms. Ferro, last fall your agency entered into an agreement
to drop the Bush Administration's hours-of-service rule and
undertake a new rulemaking. What have you done to base this new
rule on sound science?
Ms. Ferro. We must base our work on sound science and sound
research, Mr. Chairman.
The settlement agreement requires us to have an NPRM to the
Office of Management and Budget by July of this year, and we
are well on pace to achieve that.
Our work in getting to the point of submitting that NPRM
has included a nationwide process both of an open docket to
solicit as much new research or comment or perspective that we
may not have already had or been aware of, as well as listening
sessions around the country. We do have some research in place
that we are using, in fact, to analyze the rule, analyze our
findings. And the rule that we produce in July will be based on
that.
Senator Lautenberg. Ms. Ferro, in your testimony you
highlighted the Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010, or CSA
2010, as a new enforcement tool that can help your agency meet
its safety goals. The NTSB has described this new tool as an
ambitious program with milestones that are going to be
difficult to meet. The program has already been delayed and may
not be ready until next year. When will CSA 2010 be ready for
implementation? Do you have the tools and resources for the
program to be put in place effectively?
Ms. Ferro. Two points in that regard. It is an ambitious
program, and for that very reason, I challenged our team to say
we must roll this out to succeed, and significant change is
achieved through incremental processes, much like Chairman
Hersman mentioned. Consequently, we are rolling out the program
in components starting today, actually several weeks ago, with
the initiation of the preview of the data set forth in the
basics that I described focusing on driver fatigue, driver
safety, vehicle maintenance, and some of the other components.
Those components for all carriers are on display today to each
individual carrier. That part of the system is moving forward.
Late this Fall, we will be rolling out the rating system as
the complementary component of the system that is up and
running today.
Following that will be the safety fitness determination
rule, the waiver letter process, and the change management
process that engages our investigators and inspectors, as well
as our law enforcement partners, in a series of intervention
actions that go from warning letter, to targeted intervention,
to full compliance intervention review.
So that schedule is covering a 12-month period. Again, it
includes systems, rule, State rollout. So we are very much on
track with regard to an implementation schedule designed to
succeed.
Senator Lautenberg. In my earlier remarks, I pointed out
that fatalities occur each and every day. That is common
knowledge.
Ms. Ferro. That is right.
Senator Lautenberg. And so there is an urgency to all of
these things.
Ms. Ferro. There is.
Senator Lautenberg. I ask you to move things along as
rapidly and, of course, as efficiently as you can.
Ms. Ferro. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Ms. Hersman, four recommendations on
the NTSB's Most Wanted List are directed at FMCSA, and since
1992, the agency has been cited for 13 unacceptable responses
to recommendations from NTSB investigators.
In the past year, has there been any progress with FMCSA
toward resolving these recommendations?
Ms. Hersman. I will say that we see a lot of good
discussion and some plans to accomplish many of our
recommendations. One of our frustrations is that many of these
recommendations were issued over a decade ago. So, even though
there is a good discussion that is taking place, what we really
want to see is a little less talk and a lot more action. We
want these things to be completed and accomplished.
There are a few things that the FMCSA has done. One that I
pointed out in my testimony was the integration of the medical
certificate and a CDL when drivers go to renew their license.
That is an issue that we focused on as far as medical
certification is concerned, and has been completed. The FMCSA
has initiated action in a number of other issue areas, but the
regulatory process is slow and they have not yet completed
action in those areas.
I am referring to issues like the medical review board that
was instituted at the direction of this committee in
legislation. One of our concerns about that is we have made
recommendations addressing sleep apnea. We know that truck
drivers often are sedentary, and that they may have high body
mass index and thus are more susceptible to sleep apnea than
the general population. Their own medical review board, in
January of 2008, made recommendations about what needed to be
done to address the problem of sleep apnea, and we are still
waiting on their response to those issues.
I think progress has been made in certain areas, but what
we want to see is completion.
Senator Lautenberg. I thank you. And I commend you each for
picking up the pace and making sure that we move along with
these things.
As I look at the situation--I discussed it with my team--
the fact that EOBRs are not compulsory really as part of
original equipment is unacceptable. EBORs have got to be
encouraged in some way, and we must do whatever we can do to
move these things along. It is a safety step that ought to be
taken.
Senator Thune, I have taken more time.
Senator Thune. It is quite all right. You are the Chairman,
Mr. Chairman.
FMCSA's budget justification for Fiscal Year 2011 includes
a description of the agency's safety goals for 2009 through
2011, and there are seven different safety goals that are
mentioned, including goals for reducing fatal crashes involving
large trucks and buses and improving seat belt use by truck
drivers. In every instance, however, the actual results in 2008
actually exceed the goal for 2009, and in most instances,
actual 2008 results exceed the goals for 2010 and 2011.
I guess my question is, why has the agency not set more
aggressive goals for itself and for truck safety improvements?
Ms. Ferro. Well, I think that is a very fair question,
particularly as we are laying the groundwork today both for our
strategic planning, as well as our reauthorization goals. So I
would agree. We need to set stronger stretch goals.
The reason we achieved some of those gains in the past
couple years I would attribute to some rather aggressive
management and focused attention on both the efficiency and
effectiveness of the actions that the FMCSA staff and
leadership at that time were taking.
But I would agree with you that we need to be sure we are
looking at those numbers and setting more aggressive goals
going forward. The 2011 budget was framed up before I came on
board, so I did not have a hand in that.
Senator Thune. FMCSA has indicated that good quality data
is critical to the success of CSA 2010. Since quality data has
been such a problem under the existing rating system, the
SAFESTAT, what is FMCSA doing to safeguard carriers from being
unfairly targeted, subject to intervention, and receiving an
unsatisfactory score as a result of incorrect safety data?
Ms. Ferro. Well, it's along the lines of what gets measured
gets done. Several years ago, FMCSA--I want to say early in
2000--began a very concerted effort, in working with our State
partners, to ensure that the data quality on the inspection
reports, out-of-service and violation reports, as well as
compliance reviews, was on a steady path of improvement. And I
will say today that close to 98-99 percent of the State data
that we are receiving achieves that high quality, green status.
It is a continuing effort. It is an area where we must never
lose our focus, and it is an area that both CVSA, as well as
our own division administrators, are focused on.
CSA 2010 puts a stronger spotlight on the importance of
data quality for the roadside enforcement officer or inspector,
and so to that end, it makes it, again, an even surer outcome
that the data we are achieving are both consistent, as well as
on the improvement path.
That being said, there are some system issues we need to
address that will allow us to ensure consistent implementation
of certain data in those fields coming forward, and CVSA very
recently submitted recommendations in that regard.
Senator Thune. From August 2008 to October 2009, the number
of states that were rated good in terms of data quality rose
from 31 states to 41 states. South Dakota was one of the states
to show an improvement. I guess the question--and you have
touched on it a little bit--is how do you measure data quality
and how high is the bar for the states to get to that next
level.
Ms. Ferro. Well, if I might, I would like to follow up on
the record with a more thorough answer for you. It is an area
through a program called the SADIP grants, S-A-D-I-P, that we
are focused both on evaluating, as well as setting very key
measures for. I do not have that information with me at this
time, but I would like to follow up for the record.
Senator Thune. Do you know how implementation of CSA 2010
will differ with regard to the nine states that still only have
a poor or fair data quality designation?
Ms. Ferro. Well, again, it is rolling number as we continue
to evaluate data quality, and I will say that today that data
is on preview. The opportunity for carriers to request a review
of the data entered on certain violation reports if, in fact,
they think it was the wrong carrier or the wrong vehicle, the
wrong driver is going on today as we speak, which was a part of
the purpose of the preview, not to change the violation, not to
impact that, but to ensure the quality of the data that is on
their record. So again, it is an accountability feature in the
CSA 2010 program, combined with our data query process that
works through our agency to the law enforcement entity that
issued the violation. So, again, on that kind of continuous
loop piece, we expect continuous improvement in those States
that are showing some areas of problems.
Senator Thune. Is it possible that certain carriers who are
considered safe under the current system would not be
considered safe under CSA 2010, and if that were to happen, how
would you intend to work with those carriers to bring them into
compliance?
Ms. Ferro. No, I do not believe that any carrier will be
falsely accused of being unsafe for data quality because these
are continuous points of data. These are carriers that are
receiving inspections or violations or interception points
throughout the country in their travels, and so I would say
across the board, given the quality of the data we have today
and the continuous improvement path, that given the averages
that CSA 2010 identifies using that very recent data, we will
have a process of accurately identifying unsafe carriers, that
it will not be distorted by some inconsistencies. That does not
mean we can let up our focus on continued improvement in the
data quality.
Senator Thune. Ms. Hersman, what recommendations do you
have for further improving CSA 2010?
Ms. Hersman. CSA 2010, as I mentioned, is an ambitious
undertaking and we certainly want to see it succeed.
One of the things that I believe would be very helpful for
the general public, as well as for people who are
participating, is for FMCSA to clarify the purpose and goals of
CSA 2010, and how they are going to be achieved and to identify
the milestones that will be necessary to meet. I think that it
is important for this committee and perhaps other oversight
entities, such as the IG and GAO to periodically review their
progress to make sure those milestones are being achieved as
they implement this program.
Senator Thune. I understand this hearing is primarily
focused on examining the Federal role in motor carrier safety,
but the states also have an important role to play. I guess the
question is, are there areas where NTSB believes that the
states could be doing more?
Ms. Hersman. With respect to inspections and?
Senator Thune. Just with respect to the whole, I guess,
subject of motor carrier safety. There is a responsibility,
obviously, at the Federal level and I guess the states are also
an important and integral part of that sort of partnership. The
questions is, do you see a more expansive role or something
more that the states could be doing in the area of motor
safety?
Ms. Hersman. Absolutely. There are several areas where
FMCSA really has to rely on the States. Certainly one of those
areas is the State inspectors. I know you are going to hear
from CVSA next. They are the ones who conduct the roadside
inspections--the source of all the data--and so they are
extremely critical to the effectiveness of CSA 2010.
I can tell you that through some of our accident
investigations, we have found deficiencies. I will mention a
couple of accidents that we investigated in Texas. States have
some challenges with respect to registration and authorization
of entities who are authorized to provide motor carrier
operations. We have investigated accidents where we found
noncompliant vehicles that enter the U.S. They have entered
through Mexico, they do not meet Federal motor vehicle safety
standards and they have been registered in the states
inappropriately. FMCA needs to do a better job with that
oversight.
Also making sure that the PRISM program is adopted
nationwide would be extremely effective. One of the issues that
Administrator Ferro talked about was chameleon carriers. What
we see with chameleon carriers is they are bad operators who
get put out of business and then they reincarnate. In accidents
we investigated where a chameleon carrier was involved, the
husband typically will be the CEO of the company. That company
will get shut down. They will reopen the company at the same
address under the wife's name and operate with the very same
vehicles that they just got put out of service for operating.
Under the PRISM program, the license plates of those vehicles
are pulled. When someone comes to re-register again, checks can
be made to ensure that it is not the same company, not the same
vehicles, and not essentially a shell for what it used to be.
The PRISM program is certainly something that we think the
states could administer.
There are also some self-inspection programs. We
investigated an accident in Texas involving a motorcoach where
there was a retread front tire on the steering axle of the bus.
You cannot have retread tires on the steering axle. This
motorcoach had passed inspection just weeks before the
accident. It was not clear when the retread tire had been put
on, but the State only authorized them to charge $63 for the
commercial vehicle inspection. How good of an inspection are
you going to get of a bus or a truck for $63? It is critically
important for the states to have good oversight and perhaps
even for FMCSA to look at the states to see if they are doing
an effective job with their oversight responsibilities.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you both. We will keep the record
open for additional questions. As I continue my quest, wearing
another committee hat, to limit the expansion of ever-larger
trucks on the highway system--we look at that as a threat to
those traveling on the same highways. So we will be doing that
as well.
I thank you each for your testimony.
Now Francis France, President of the Commercial Vehicle
Safety Alliance; Jackie Gillan, Vice President of the Advocates
for Highway and Auto Safety; Mr. David Osiecki, Senior Vice
President for Policy and Regulatory Affairs for the American
Trucking Association; and Todd Spencer, Executive Vice
President, Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association.
Thank you all for being here.
Welcome all, and we will start with the same admonition to
keep your testimony as close to 5 minutes as you can. Mr.
France, you are the first and we look forward to hearing from
you.
STATEMENT OF FRANCIS (BUZZY) FRANCE, PRESIDENT,
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SAFETY ALLIANCE
Mr. France. Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for holding this hearing and inviting CVSA to
testify.
I am Buzzy France, President of CVSA, and I am currently an
Administrative Officer with the Maryland State Police.
CVSA represents State, provincial, and Federal officials
responsible for administration and enforcement of commercial
motor carrier safety laws in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.
First, we urge Congress to pass a long-term transportation
bill. We fully support CSA 2010 and give credit to FMCSA for
moving it forward. However, CSA 2010 will require States to
expend more resources to implement it, just as it will FMCSA.
We hope that FMCSA will be sensitive to the needs of the States
in this regard.
EOBR technology and hours-of-service issues are very
closely linked. We believe a universal mandate of EOBRs should
come first so we can ensure a more reliable method of assessing
compliance and enforcement of hours-of-service. This should
happen before making a determination of whether to change the
current hours-of-service rules.
Also, a comprehensive rule should contain important
technical considerations, such as interoperability, data
security, driver identification, tampering, uniformity,
standard interface for law enforcement, and proper
certification for EOBR devices.
Now let me address CVSA's reauthorization priorities. More
flexibility of State grant programs is needed, along with
increased funding. Also, we recommend changing the match in the
MCSAP program from 80/20 to 90/10 in recognition of the
increasing difficulty States are having in coming up with the
match money.
Maintenance of Effort is handcuffing state safety efforts.
The MOE requirements, as they currently exist, are a
significant problem for states and must be revised. The way it
exists now presents in many cases a disincentive for states to
develop new, innovative approaches to commercial vehicle safety
plans. While the basic component of MOE is simple and fair, its
implementation has flaws.
Flexibility also should be given and authorized through
FMCSA to give them the means to waive MOEs under certain
circumstances.
Existing safety exemptions must be reviewed and the process
for granting and reviewing them, as specified in the statute,
must be adhered to.
The proliferation of motor carrier exemptions is out of
control. They are eroding safety and weakening enforcement
efforts at roadside. The exemptions provided in SAFETEA-LU,
allowing a total hours-of-service exemption for utility service
vehicles' drivers beyond a declaration of emergency and
expanding the agricultural hours-of-service exemptions beyond
the original intent of such exemptions must be repealed. These
industries must reapply for these exemptions under procedures
outlined in section 31315, Title 49 of the U.S. Code.
All other safety exemptions, whether granted by statute or
by regulation, should similarly be received accordingly. This
process would be no different than that which the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration exercises with
respect to the HM special permits and approvals.
As a way to get started, we recommend the IG of DOT conduct
a study of the exemption process at FMCSA, just as the IG did
with PHMSA.
Why spend time developing hours-of-service rules and
developing a comprehensive rule for EOBRs to monitor drivers'
hours-of-service if significant segments of the industry are
exempt from the hours-of-service. Fatigue is not caused by the
product hauled or the service provided, but it is caused by the
time spent by drivers behind the wheel and their time on task.
Exemptions are a privilege. They are not a right.
Increased truck size and weight should not be allowed until
more safety data is available. The data is intensifying, yet
still lack the fundamental safety data to make major policy
decisions. I believe there is an opportunity to do this by
strengthening the two pilot programs provided for Maine and
Vermont in the 2010 appropriations bill. Four months after the
bill was signed, the FHWA and State enforcement officials have
begun to conduct meaningful criteria for these pilots. CVSA has
submitted 20 separate recommendations we believe should be
considered for the pilot programs. Until there is meaningful
data for these pilots, as well as additional safety research,
we oppose any similar pilot programs in other states.
More efforts are needed to ensure safety for passenger
carrying motor carriers. CVSA supports many of the provisions
offered in Senate bill 554 that was reported out of the
Commerce Committee on December 17, 2009. We do have a few
concerns with the bill, particularly with respect to unfunded
mandates and time tables on research and rules, as well as the
State preemption issue. In our written statement, we have
offered more specific recommendations.
More emphasis on safety technology will save lives. We
strongly support Senate bill 1582, the Commercial Motor
Vehicles Advanced Safety Technology Tax Act of 2009. It
provides tax incentives for motor carriers to purchase four
basic technologies, brake stroke monitoring systems, vehicle
stability systems, lane departure warning systems, and
collision warning systems. These are tested and proven
technologies.
We also believe a new study of heavy vehicle brake systems
is needed. We recommended NTSB be authorized, along with
provisions of adequate resources, to update their 1992 study to
accurately quantify the magnitude of the brake adjustment and
deficiency brake problems today relative to heavy trucks.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you
again for allowing me to come here and speak before this
committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. France follows:]
Prepared Statement of Francis (Buzzy) France, President,
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for holding
this important hearing and for inviting CVSA to testify.
I am Francis (Buzzy) France, President of CVSA, and Administrative
Officer with the Maryland State Police.
CVSA is an organization of state, provincial and Federal officials
responsible for the administration and enforcement of commercial motor
carrier safety laws in the United States, Canada and Mexico. We work to
improve commercial vehicle safety and security on the highways by
bringing Federal, state, provincial and local truck and bus regulatory,
safety and enforcement agencies together with industry representatives
to solve problems and save lives. Every state in the United States, all
Canadian provinces, the country of Mexico, and all U.S. Territories and
Possessions are CVSA members.
Long Term Transportation Bill Is Needed to Continue the Downward Trend
in Crashes and Deaths
First, there is some good news to report. The large truck fatality
rate dropped by 12.3 percent in 2008, and is down 20.8 percent since
2005. There were more than 1,000 fewer deaths in 2008 from large truck
crashes than there were in 2005. I believe significant credit for this
goes to the more than 12,000 commercial vehicle inspectors in North
America who are working hard each and every day. Credit for this
success also goes to the many responsible members of the truck and bus
industries who are mindful every day of the need to keep our highways
safe.
However, there still were 4,229 deaths in trucks and 307 in buses
in 2008, so we still have plenty of work to do in our march toward zero
deaths on our roadways.
The downturn in the economy certainly has played a role in this,
and my fear is that as it begins to recover, as thankfully it looks to
be the case, we will not have adequate resources to maintain these
numbers, much less improve upon them.
A critical step for ensuring there are adequate resources in place
today and in the future is for the Congress to pass a long term
Transportation bill as soon as possible. Solutions to many of the
issues I will discuss this morning can only happen through enactment of
a long term transportation bill. We look forward to working with this
committee on highway and commercial motor vehicle safety policies to be
included in the bill, and we are pleased that you are signaling the
beginning of this process by holding this hearing today.
Before I do that, I want to comment on issues that you identified
in your letter inviting us to testify.
CSA 2010
We support CSA 2010 and give credit to FMCSA for moving it forward.
It offers significant promise to transform compliance and enforcement
activities to be more ``surgical'' in nature and to allow for more
proactive safety interventions with motor carriers, which will
ultimately save more lives. It also is consistent with one of CVSA's
major reauthorization priorities--to streamline the compliance review
process to make it more effective, as well as to establish a better
safety rating process for motor carriers. The CSA 2010 experience thus
far through the 9 pilot states shows that is it having a positive
impact and is being received well by both enforcement and industry. We
fully understand why FMCSA recently announced that they are modifying
their timelines for implementing this program and fully support their
doing so. A program of this size and scope needs careful planning, as
well as input from all affected parties. Throughout his process FMCSA
has been listening to us and others, and we appreciate them doing so.
However, CSA 2010 will require the states to expend more resources
to implement it, just as it has required the FMCSA to expend additional
resources. We fully understand why FMCSA requested an additional $20
million beyond SAFETEA-LU authorized limits for its Fiscal Year 2011
budget for the purpose of rolling out CSA 2010. We do not understand
why FMCSA is not seeking additional funding for the states as well.
States will need to add additional personnel, upgrade their information
systems, upgrade their processes and resources for data challenges, and
conduct more training to make CSA 2010 a success. We would recommend
that FMCSA direct at least a part of the $20 million they are seeking
to the states, or find other sources of funding, such as the High
Priority grant program, to help the states. We realize this is an issue
for the Appropriations Committee but, nevertheless we wanted to bring
this issue to your attention.
Electronic On-Board Recorders and Hours of Service
Mr. Chairman, in our view, the policy decisions made with respect
to EOBR technology and Hours-of-Service regulations are closely linked.
We are cognizant of the Secretary of Transportation's directive to the
FMCSA to re-open the existing hours-of-service rules to try and make
improvements. We have been and will continue to be committed to
participating in that process and ultimately to enforce whatever the
final outcome may be.
However, we believe universal mandate of electronic logging
technology is critical so we can ensure a more reliable method of
assessing compliance and enforcing hours-of-service, whatever the
ultimate outcome of the rules might be. We advocated this position at
the May 2007 hearing you chaired on the subject of EOBR's. Adoption of
such a rule must also contain critically important technical
considerations such as interoperability, data security, driver
identification, tampering, uniformity, standard interface for law
enforcement, and proper certification of EOBR devices. In our judgment,
the EOBR rule recently issued by FMCSA does not go far enough. It falls
short of a universal mandate and does not do enough in the areas
identified above. While we are aware that FMCSA has publicly stated
that another EOBR rule is forthcoming, we would suggest that
legislation will be needed to ensure a future rule will meet the
ultimate goal of being able to accurately reflect a driver's records of
duty status through the use of electronic logging devices--and one that
is enforceable--on all commercial motor vehicles.
As for the hours-of-service regulations, we would suggest that
taking measures such as mandating electronic logging devices and a
supporting documents rule should be in place for several years, as well
as the collection and evaluation of more performance data on compliance
rates and crashes, before revisiting the regulations. Every time there
is a change in the hours-of-service rules it significantly impacts
enforcement. The first challenge is for all of the states to adopt the
new rule. Most states can do so administratively or through automatic
adoption, but a number of them have to do it through an abbreviated
legislative process and in a few cases during their normal legislative
process. In some cases it can take up to 3 years. This coupled with
education and outreach efforts, changes to software and training
necessary with any rule of such significance, make this a challenge to
the enforcement community. I am not saying that enforcement is not up
to the task, because we are. But it is important to get it right with
respect to what the best hours-of-service regime should be. The last
several years we have seen several changes with respect to the rules
and going through such changes is not an easy task. The last item I
will note is as we go through this process we should consider
harmonizing the rules with respect to those in Canada.
Regulatory and Policy Issues With Respect to FMCSA That Need
Resolution before Reauthorization
Before I discuss these issues, let me say that the new FMCSA
Administrator, Anne Ferro, has been on the job for barely 6 months. The
matters I am about to discuss in most cases precede Administrator
Ferro's arrival on the job. Let me also say that in this short period
Administrator Ferro has been reaching out to CVSA as I know she has
done with other safety partners. When she makes important safety
decisions, whether we all agree with them or not, I think we can be
certain that she has listened to as many people as possible and has
studied the issues carefully. The enforcement community knows that in
Administrator Ferro we have a strong safety voice in this
Administration and in the Department of Transportation. We appreciate
that. I will tell you from our experience with her thus far that she
has been doing an outstanding job.
Regulatory Responsiveness and Timeliness
We all know that regulatory responsiveness and timeliness has been
a problem at FMCSA. While there has been significant improvement in
some areas, more improvement is needed. Since 2007, CVSA has filed 13
petitions for rulemaking with FMCSA that are still pending.
Regulatory Guidance and Policy Memos Issued by FMCSA
We appreciate that FMCSA may have the best of intentions in issuing
a Regulatory Guidance and Enforcement Policy Memorandums in its
attempts to clarify existing rules, be responsive and assist with their
enforcement. However, there is no substitute for rule changes. A recent
example of this was the Regulatory Guidance prohibiting texting for
commercial vehicle drivers. We support the goal of banning texting
while driving for everyone, but I must point out that such guidance is
not a substitute for a rule and states have no authority to enforce
guidance as opposed to a rule. Generally speaking, if guidance is
issued with respect to a rule, there likely is a problem with the rule
that needs to be fixed. In the case with the texting ban, there was no
existing rule. We do appreciate the Agency recently issuing a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on this subject, but we still do not have a rule.
Another recent example was the Regulatory Guidance issued on March 1
allowing states to send out UCR registration notices reflecting the old
2007-2009 fee structure. Again, we appreciate the intent behind this,
but it did not provide the regulatory authority to actually collect the
old fees and opens the door for a potential legal challenge.
The same holds true for Policy Memos issued by FMCSA that direct
state enforcement agencies to make changes in their enforcement
practices. Such policy memos need to be consistent with regulations and
if they are not, the rules need to be changed.
This is not just important for enforcement, but for industry as
well. They need to be sure to know what the rules are so they are able
to comply with them.
I will now discuss our Reauthorization issues.
CVSA Major Reauthorization Issues
More Flexibility in State Grant Programs Is Needed Along With Increased
Funding
With commercial motor vehicle traffic projected to increase
significantly over the next 5 to 10 years, increases in education,
compliance and enforcement efforts are needed to reduce crashes and
fatalities from their existing levels and, overall funding levels and
programmatic flexibility must be increased significantly for states to
make the necessary level of effort to achieve reductions. Many states
believe that as funding levels of takedowns and state grant programs
are increased, they are done so at the expense of the basic Motor
Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) and take away the flexibility
of states to meet changing safety priorities. This also greatly
increases the administrative and accounting burdens on states, which in
turn takes away from their ability to use the funding for efforts that
will directly impact safety.
Several recommendations are offered:
There are currently seven existing categorical state grant
programs including the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program
(MCSAP). There are differing schedules and application
processes and the time-frame for the use of the grant money is
too short.
There should be one uniform application date and the clock
should not start running on the time for use of the grant money
until the day the state receives the grant, and the grant
period should be changed to 3 years.
The existing six state grant programs outside of MCSAP
should be reconfigured into five new programs: Enforcement,
Education, Incentive, Technology, and Driver.
The total funding for the entire grant programs should be
increased from the current $300 million annually to a minimum
of $340 million in the first year and indexed over the life of
the bill.
The current match levels of 80/20 should be changed to 90/
10. As the overall funding levels for the grant programs
increase, the required amount for the match goes up as well,
and that becomes problematic for many states particularly under
current economic conditions.
Costs to conduct the New Entrant program (now a $29 million
takedown from the core MCSAP program) should be pulled out of
MCSAP and the funding to the states for this program should be
covered by the establishment of a new carrier registration fee.
Funding to the states for this program should be maintained at
100 percent and eligible expenses should include not just the
safety audits but also education and awareness activities,
materials and training. Since the New Entrant program is
resource intensive, we recommend that states be allowed the
flexibility to contract with and use certified third-party
auditors to conduct new entrant safety audits should they
choose to do so. We understand that FMCSA has received a
request on behalf of one of the states to conduct a pilot
program for the use of third-party auditors. We endorse this
idea and hope that FMCSA will act favorably on the request.
Maintenance of Effort Requirements Must Be Revised
The Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirements as they currently
exist are a significant problem for the states and must be revised. The
way it exists now presents in many cases a disincentive for many states
to develop new and innovative approaches to their commercial vehicle
safety and enforcement programs. While the basic concept of MOE is
simple and fair, its implementation has flaws:
It preserves the ``relative'' CMV safety efforts among the
states and the ``ratcheting up'' effect serves as a
disincentive for states to invest more in CMV safety. It does
not incent innovative and efficient strategies;
It preserves uneven and non-uniform programs from state to
state rather than promoting uniformity and equality from state
to state; and
As MOE currently is structured it is not based on risk and
performance nor is it outcome-based. It is input and funding
based.
With the passage of SAFETEA-LU in 2005, the MOE base period was
changed to a sliding three-year period beginning with 2001-2003, and
its scope was amended to include enforcement on CMVs without an
inspection as well as traffic enforcement on passenger vehicles when
they affected safe CMV operations.
There are two primary problems this system created. First, states
have no incentive to do anymore than what is necessary to meet their
Federal obligation since any expenditures above and beyond their MOE
only serves to further increase that obligation in future years.
Therefore, a state is better off investing only what it must to meet
its MOE requirements and nothing more. However, this issue is
complicated by the fact that in many states the amount of Federal
funding has not kept pace with the needs of states. When this occurs
states have two choices. They can make up the difference and continue
to run the program at the same level causing their MOE to increase, or
they can reduce the scope of the program. A state that chooses to cut
its program will not see its MOE rise but will not be able to sustain
its current enforcement program.
The formula specified in the House Reauthorization bill already
considered by the Highways and Transit Subcommittee is a step in the
right direction, but needs to go further. That bill provides a standard
MOE formula for all of the safety grant programs including MCSAP. The
formula is based on a 3-year average prior to the date of enactment the
bill and is fixed. The MOE would then be in effect for the life of the
bill.
In an ideal world MOE would be eliminated. While the MOE concept
makes sense, many states contribute much more state dollars to their
commercial vehicle safety programs than the 20 percent MCSAP match
requires. MOE is a good approach to newer Federal-state funding
programs as it is there to help ensure Federal dollars are not used to
replace state dollars. The MCSAP is now a mature program and all of the
states have had and will continue to have robust programs.
Flexibility also should be authorized for FMCSA on this issue to
give them the means to waive MOE under certain circumstances.
Currently, many of the states are in very difficult budget situations
and giving FMCSA this authority will help relieve pressure on the
states to meet their MOE requirements. Consideration also should be
given to an activity-based approach to MOE rather than a financial-
based approach. We urge the Committee to take a hard look at addressing
this issue and to work with FMCSA, CVSA and the states to come up with
an appropriate solution in the next Bill.
Existing Safety Exemptions Must Be Reviewed And the Process for
Granting and
Reviewing Them As Specified in Statute Must be Adhered To
The proliferation of motor carrier safety exemptions is out of
control and the process for granting them must be reformed. They are
eroding safety and weakening enforcement efforts at the roadside.
The most blatant examples can be found in SAFETEA-LU which provided
a total hours-of-service exemption for all utility service vehicle
drivers beyond those periods covered by a declaration of state or
national emergency and greatly expanded the agricultural hours-of-
service exemption well beyond its original intent of providing relief
to farmers during very defined periods of time in the planting and
harvesting seasons.
These statutory exemptions must be repealed in the next
Transportation bill and both the agricultural and utility industries
must re-apply for these exemptions under the Federal regulatory process
outlined in Section 31315 of Title 49, U.S. Code. This process requires
proof that the exemption would provide a level of safety equivalent to,
or greater than, the level achieved without such an exemption. It also
requires that such exemptions be monitored to ensure that safety
performance is maintained. If it is not, then the exemption can be
revoked. Statutory exemptions do not afford the appropriate regulatory
agency the ability to exercise proper oversight.
These, and all other safety exemptions, whether granted by statute
or by regulation, according to Section 31315, must be reviewed by FMCSA
every 2 years and either re-issued or withdrawn based on the safety
data available. This process would be no different than that which the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
exercises with respect to hazardous materials special permits and
approvals.
Mr. Chairman, as a way to get started, we recommend that the
Inspector General (IG) of the Department of Transportation conduct a
study of the exemption process within FMCSA just as the IG has recently
conducted with respect to PHMSA's administration of the hazardous
materials safety permit program. We understand the House T & I
Committee has requested from FMCSA a list of all safety exemptions
going back to the 1950s and that most certainly this information should
be included in the IG study.
Why spend time developing an hours-of-service rule yet continue to
allow significant segments of the trucking industry to be exempted from
the rule? Why spend time developing a comprehensive rule on EOBR's if
there is no need to track the record of duty status of a significant
number of drivers in various segments of the industry? Fatigue is not
caused by the product hauled or service provided but is caused by the
time spent by drivers behind the wheel and their time on task.
I will offer a brief example of how this is impacting on ``real
world'' operations. Recently CVSA's Executive Director took a call from
a driver, and I have included below the text of the e-mail he sent to
me summarizing the discussion:
``I just took a call from a Utility Service Driver pleading for
help in rolling back the HOS exemption. He told me in some
cases him and other drivers in his company have worked 16-18
hours per day and up to 120 hours in 7 days during emergencies.
After these emergencies they are given 8 hours off and asked to
return to work. In these 8 hours he has to drive home (he lives
1 hour from his work location), as well as take care of any
other personal items, allowing him about 4 hours of sleep. He
said often times when he hears stories of drivers being tired
and getting in crashes their company covers up for the
problems. He told me the story of the ``mystery deer'' that
always seems to run in front of their drivers when they are out
working. He also indicated that they have asked for their union
to support them and they have been unwilling to do so, and the
company he works for has no policy on fatigue. He said at least
under the old rules they could get a 24 hour reprieve after an
emergency. Now they get no break either after an emergency or
at any other time.''
We understand FMCSA has recently taken positive action in this
regard with one of the states where the exemption issue was a concern.
This particular state had a regulatory incompatibility that was not
acted upon within the 3 year time-frame afforded under the MCSAP. A
letter was sent to the State encouraging them to act upon the
incompatibility or else they were at risk of losing MCSAP funds. The
state acted and the end result was they came into compliance. This is
an example of where the regulatory agency exercised their authority on
this issue and it worked--when statutory exemptions are in place there
is no recourse for FMCSA. It handcuffs FMCSA and they have no means to
exercise their authority or monitor these motor carriers for compliance
and as a result safety is compromised. This is in our view not just
unacceptable, it is irresponsible.
Exemptions are a privilege, not a right.
Increased Truck Size And Weight Should Not Be Allowed Until More Safety
Data Is Available And More Funding is Needed for Size And
Weight Enforcement
The truck size and weight issue is very much in the forefront as
preparation begins for the next Transportation bill.
CVSA does not support enacting any significant legislative or
regulatory changes to truck size and weight until such time as we have
a more uniform, methodical and science-based approach to evaluate the
safety, infrastructure and environmental costs and benefits through
carefully constructed pilot programs. This has not been done and as a
result we have a patchwork system of regulations, exemptions, and
permit programs that present a challenge for enforcement as well as for
industry to maintain compliance.
CVSA advocates a stronger Federal role in facilitating a framework
for research, policy and performance based regulations and enforcement
for truck size and weight operations. We did not support Section 194 of
the 2010 DOT Appropriations bill that provided for truck size and
weight exemptions (above the national limit of 80,000 lbs.) on sections
of the Interstate Highway System in Maine and in Vermont as it was
written. These were described as 1 year ``pilot'' programs but neither
the statutory or report language provided meaningful criteria on how
the pilots should be carried out except to direct the two states to
work with the Secretary of Transportation to determine the impact on
safety, road durability, commerce, and energy use. We understand the
economic reason for these state pilots, but safety should be an equal
priority.
Four months after the pilots began, the Federal Highway
Administration has begun to work with our state enforcement
representatives in those two states to set up meaningful criteria for
these pilot programs. What hopefully will now be included in the
criteria, and what we told Secretary LaHood in a letter, are 20
separate recommendations that are necessary for any pilot program.
Among them are that motor carriers must be selected to participate in
the pilot based on a proven track record of superior safety performance
and that states participating in the pilot must be fully compliant with
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR). It happens that Maine
receives only 50 percent of its annual MCSAP Federal funding from FMCSA
because it provides exemptions from driver hours-of-service regulations
for all motor carriers operating within 100 air miles from their place
of business. We believe as a condition for participating in the pilot,
Maine should revoke this exemption and become fully compliant.
Until there is meaningful data from these pilots, we oppose any
more similar pilot programs in other states. We have expressed these
concerns to the House and Senate Transportation Appropriations
Subcommittees because we understand they are already being pressed to
extend the pilots to other areas of the country in the 2011 Fiscal
Year. A string of pilots would in all reality be a ``backdoor'' process
to changing the national truck size and weight laws.
Another important component of the size and weight issue is
enforcement. The state safety enforcement agency is charged with the
responsibility of enforcing the Nation's size and weight laws, but may
only use MCSAP funds for such enforcement activity when it is tied to
an inspection. More comprehensive size and weight enforcement must
extend beyond that limitation and depends upon funding from the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA). While a number of state enforcement
agencies do receive the FHWA funding and support through their state
DOTS for overall size and weight enforcement, others have difficulty in
making the necessary agency linkages for such funding support. CVSA's
Size and Weight Committee is working with FHWA on this issue and we
will come back to this Committee with more detailed recommendations to
assist in resolving this problem. One recommendation to consider is
allowing labor for size and weight enforcement to be an eligible
expense under the Federal-aid highway program in Title 23. Currently
this funding eligibility does not exist.
More Efforts Needed to Ensure Safety for Passenger Carrying Motor
Carriers
While historically the transportation of passengers by motorcoach
has been a very safe form of transportation, recent events have caused
this to become a more front and center safety issue. On the whole, the
industry takes great pride in their safety commitment and performance
as they should. However, there is tremendous competition in the
industry and there are a number of rogue operators that do not respect
safety and are cutting corners in order to generate business. We
believe there are some steps that can and should be taken to ensure
that this form of transportation remains as safe as it can be and more
resources are made available to the appropriate Federal and state
agencies for effective oversight, monitoring and enforcement.
CVSA supports many of the provisions offered in Senate Bill 554
that was reported out of the Commerce Committee on December 17, 2009.
We do have a few concerns with the bill, particularly with respect to
unfunded mandates and timetables on research/rules, as well as the
state preemption issue. The following information offers more specifics
on our policy positions on this issue.
Part 350 of the FMCSR should provide more specifics in terms of
what activities are eligible under the MCSAP for motorcoach compliance
and enforcement programs, as well as what elements should be contained
in a state's Commercial vehicle Safety Plan. In this regard, FMCSA
should be cognizant of the states' needs for resources and training as
new motorcoach oversight and safety requirements are instituted. As
part of legislative and regulatory modifications, it should be made
clear that roadside inspection and periodic inspection data on all
buses and school buses (for both inter and intrastate operations) need
to be submitted to FMCSA and maintained in MCMIS to be accounted for in
establishing the motor carrier's safety fitness rating. Congress needs
to authorize and appropriate the necessary resources for these efforts.
Safety belts should be required on all school buses and
motorcoaches. NHTSA and FMCSA need to collaborate on standards for OEM
and retrofit design and installation requirements. Congress needs to
direct a study to examine the costs and benefits associated with
retrofitting all in-use buses with seat belts, and take the findings
and costs into consideration when (assuming the cost-benefit is to the
positive for benefits) the mandate is put in place for retrofits.
Occupant protection and crashworthiness and avoidance standards
need to be pursued for items like window glazing to minimize ejection
through portals in the roof or sides of the vehicle, fire prevention
and suppression systems, roof strength and crush resistance, collision
warning systems, rollover stability systems, lane departure warning
systems and brake stroke monitoring systems. While measures to improve
bus design and occupant protection should be identified, the specifics
of how to implement them should be left to the appropriate regulatory
agency (NHTSA) for action. Incentives should be investigated as a
potential option to help accelerate implementation.
Passing of the New Entrant Safety Audit should be required as a
condition of the carrier being issued their DOT registration/operating
authority. As a part of the New Entrant requirements, consideration
should be given to enacting minimum training standards for drivers as
well as critical passenger motor carrier safety personnel.
There needs to be stronger safety regulation on school buses used
for charter transportation (and school transportation) as well as
public transit buses used in charter transportation. Exemptions from
safety regulations and oversight need to be minimized. States need to
be provided with adequate resources to make sure they have the ability
to conduct the proper amount of inspections and oversight.
The provision in SAFETEA-LU prohibiting motorcoach inspections to
be conducted roadside is overly restrictive and needs to be revisited.
While most states work with origin and destination locations to do
inspections on the premises or nearby before loading or after unloading
passengers, in some cases (for various reasons) this does not always
work effectively. In addition, while conducting motorcoach inspections
roadside or at rest stops/weigh stations is not the preferred solution
due primarily to the safety of the passengers, the outright restriction
should not be in the law. States must be given flexibility to implement
best practices and conduct inspections where they are most needed.
Every effort should be made to minimize risk to the passengers.
Brokers of passenger transportation services need to be regulated
and subject to the same regulatory regime as are freight forwarders are
for the trucking industry. There needs to be appropriate penalty
provisions and enforcement oversight on brokers who fail to comply or
who are negligent in their duties/responsibilities.
Windshield mounted video monitoring systems that help assist with
driver/operator safety need to be able to be installed in a fashion
that do not impede the driver's ability to perform. Regulatory changes
need to be enacted to account for new technologies and changes to
windshield designs.
Standards with respect to passenger carrying driver licensing,
testing, training and certification need to be revisited and likely
strengthened to make sure they are appropriate and effective.
The ``Camioneta'' population (9-15 passenger vehicles and motor
carriers) needs to be subject to a much stronger regulatory framework.
All school buses and motorcoaches should be required to undergo
periodic inspections (at least once annually) in accordance with Part
396 of the FMCSR, and each state should be required to have an
inspection infrastructure/program to support, deliver and oversee these
inspections. This could be accomplished through the use of 3rd parties
should the state choose to do so. Congress needs to authorize and
appropriate resources to the states to establish these programs, but
long term they should be self-sustaining and pay for themselves. The
data resulting from these inspections needs to contained in a
centralized database (MCMIS) to be used for analysis and also should be
accounted for in the safety fitness determination of the motor carrier.
CVSA also supports the Secretary's recent Motorcoach Safety Action
Plan. Of CVSA's 17 Reauthorization recommendations with respect to bus
and motorcoach safety, 11 of them are included in the Plan. In
particular, the process the Secretary used in developing the plan was
commendable and CVSA appreciates being involved in the process. We do
have some concerns relative to whether resources are available in DOT
to meet their projected timelines and funding being made available to
states to deal with the potential mandates.
FMCSA is making good strides in their efforts to increase their
oversight of the industry and put in place programs for enhancing
safety. In particular, the vetting process they have instituted is
having very good success. CVSA fully supports this vetting process, and
FMCSA should be afforded additional resources to help administer this
process in the future and not just for motorcoach operators, but for
ALL motor carriers. Proper due diligence at the front end when a motor
carrier enters the business not only helps to ensure only responsible
motor carriers are able to conduct business, it is important in
identifying and taking appropriate action on ``chameleon'' carriers who
are skirting the law.
More Emphasis on Safety Technology Will Save Lives
The mission and goals of CVSA necessarily focus on better
enforcement as the means to prevent crashes and save lives. At the same
time, however, we also believe that greater use of safety technology
will also help in reaching this goal. CVSA strongly supports Senate
Bill 1582, and its companion bill in the House, H.R. 2024, the
``Commercial Motor Vehicle Advanced Safety Technology Tax Act of
2009.'' It would provide tax incentives for motor carriers to purchase
four basic technologies: brake stroke monitoring systems; vehicle
stability systems; lane departure warning systems; and, collision
warning systems. These technologies have been tested and proven to
work.
As one example of the effectiveness of just one of these
technologies, a DOT analysis has shown that 48 percent of accidents
could be prevented by the use of collision warning systems.
We support this legislation because we believe it is the quickest
way to encourage more widespread use of this technology by the truck
and bus industries. A mandated rule can take three to 5 years. Support
for this bill does not preclude mandates in the future, but the
incentive takes effect the day the bill is signed and we will start
saving lives.
A New Study of Heavy Vehicle Brake Systems Is Needed
The use of safety technology depends on continuing research of
mechanical aspects of truck parts and equipment. FMCSA's Large Truck
Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) indicated that deficient brakes were a
factor in over 29.4 percent of the fatal crashes that they investigated
and ranked brakes as the number one equipment-related cause factors
associated with the crashes. In another recent study of the LTCCS data
sponsored by FMCSA, a brake out of service condition increased the odds
of the truck being assigned the critical reason in the crash by 1.8
times. In rear-end and crossing paths crashes, brake violations,
especially related to adjustment, increased the odds of the truck being
the striking vehicle by 1.8 times.
And the most recent compilation of statistics from CVSA's Operation
Air Brake Program indicate of the more than 2.19 million brake systems
inspected, 17 percent were placed out of service for brake-related
defects.
Yet the last comprehensive study of brake system issues was
conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board back in 1992.
Despite the overall advancement of technology and enhanced enforcement
activities since 1992, there is still evidence that poorly adjusted or
defective brakes still pose a serious threat to highway safety. We
recommend that the NTSB be authorized along with the provision of
adequate resources to update this 18-year old study to accurately
quantify the magnitude of the brake adjustment and deficient brake
problems today relative to heavy trucks.
Additional Reauthorization Issues
While I have spent a good deal of time today in outlining our major
motor carrier safety issues as we all know there is no one silver
bullet to reduce truck and bus fatalities and crashes. There are
multiple approaches that can be taken to improve truck and bus safety
and I want to take this opportunity to briefly review other steps that
can be taken to help us achieve our safety goals.
A single point of carrier registration, credentialing and safety
data access should be established. There are at least six different
credentialing and registration processes at the Federal level for motor
carriers, not to mention various intrastate permits and authorities.
They are the UCR, U.S. DOT #, Operating Authority, Hazmat permitting,
Proof of Insurance, IFTA and IRP. The last 10 years has seen tremendous
growth in technology development and deployment and the government
needs to keep pace by establishing a web portal with FMCSA that
combines the common data elements from each of these six programs.
Helping to streamline and standardize the data entry process will help
FMCSA and the states to have cleaner and more accurate data at the
point the carrier enters into the system, which will then serve to
assist in all aspects of compliance and enforcement.
The distinction between inter and intrastate commerce should be
eliminated. These distinctions have resulted in a complicated web of
applicable regulations, exemptions and inconsistent enforcement
practices.
Education and outreach efforts are a critical element in addressing
safety problems and creating a safety conscious culture. CVSA
recommends additional funding be provided to states for these purposes
over and above the basic safety grant programs to supplement basic
compliance and enforcement strategies. Funding should remain at 100
percent and states should be encouraged to undertake new and innovative
e outreach and awareness initiatives.
FMCSA needs to be provided legislative authority to establish and
fund national drug and alcohol testing clearinghouse, well as the
authority to close down fraudulent drug testing laboratories.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you for your testimony.
Ms. Gillan, good to see you and we look forward to hearing
from you.
STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE S. GILLAN, VICE PRESIDENT,
ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY
Ms. Gillan. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg, and I really
appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning on motor
carrier safety issues. You will have to bear with me because
many of the points that I will raise this morning have already
been addressed, both in your statement and in the statement of
Chairwoman Hersman.
While Advocates welcomes the news about fewer truck crash
deaths and injuries, it still means that we need to move
forward with an overdue and unfinished motor carrier safety
agenda that needs to be adopted if we are really serious about
achieving significant, steady, and sustained reductions in
truck crashes and deaths and injuries.
In my statement, I have a chart which shows, going back 40
years, overall dips in highway fatalities, and they always
coincide with periods of economic downturn. So we are concerned
that this reduction that we have experienced now is going to be
temporary and will certainly go back up as soon as the economy
rebounds.
Another map that we put in our testimony shows that in the
last 10 years, there have been over 55,000 deaths as a result
of truck crashes, and this is both unnecessary and
unacceptable. Some of the issues that are included in my
testimony will go a long ways toward reducing deaths and
injuries related to truck crashes.
My statement for the record that I submitted is very long
and detailed, and I would really like to just spend the next
few minutes highlighting some of the critical issues that we
believe that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
needs to address, as well as leaders in Congress.
Large, heavy trucks are dangerous, destroy our roads and
bridges, and are dramatically overrepresented each year in
severe crashes, particularly fatal crashes. A major step
forward in truck safety is to enact S. 779, the Safe Highways
and Infrastructure Protection Act sponsored by you and other
members of this committee. The bill will stop the deadly race
in States for bigger, heavier, and longer trucks, and this
legislation is supported by over 75 safety, consumer health,
environmental, and law enforcement groups.
Let me now turn to FMCSA's performance as a safety
regulator and identify where congressional oversight and
actions are still needed. As you heard from Chairwoman Hersman,
there are many, many recommendations that NTSB has made to
FMCSA concerning the safety of carriers and drivers. In most
cases, the agency has given no response, the response was
unacceptable, or the response was minimally adequate. And we
feel that Congress should direct FMCSA to fulfill all of the
major outstanding NTSB safety recommendations.
Driver fatigue is still a serious problem in the trucking
industry, and there are two important strategies for addressing
it. One is advancing a safe hours-of-service rule, and the
other is to improve enforcement by requiring electronic on-
board recorders. The current hours-of-service rule has been
overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals in two back-to-back,
unanimous decisions and in each case the court opinion was a
scathing rebuke of the agency's legal reasoning. I am pleased
to report this morning that the long-running dispute is on hold
while a new rule is being developed, and we hope that this new
rule will be issued by August 2011.
It has been 15 years since Congress directed the Secretary
to address electronic on-board recorders (EOBRs). We have
waited too long for this technology, and it is time for
Congress to act and mandate universal use of EOBRs.
Keeping unsafe drivers and unsafe carriers off the road is
critical. There are many rulemakings that Congress has directed
FMCSA to implement concerning minimum requirements for new
entrants, and the need to implement a proficiency examination,
and an entry-level driver training standard. None of these
rules have been issued or, if they have, they have been weak
and we believe ineffective. The agency still has not issued a
final rule requiring sufficient behind-the-wheel driver
training.
Another factor that must be considered is FMCSA still does
not get tough on motor carrier violators. The agency evades the
imposition of stiff penalties that would deter companies from
violating safety rules.
And as has been mentioned before in earlier testimony, we
know the tragic consequences of unsafe and unscrupulous motor
carrier and motorcoach companies that shut down one day and
open for business the next. Unfortunately, there are hundreds
of these so-called reincarnated companies that are still
operating illegally and with impunity in the United States, and
FMCSA needs to develop a new process for stopping this
dangerous practice each and every time.
Let me conclude by saying creation of the new Federal
agency 10 years ago by Congress to oversee motor carrier and
motorcoach safety has not resulted in the rigorous oversight
and enforcement that Congress directed and the public expected.
We are hopeful that CSA 2010 will help address some of these
problems. However, it will still be necessary for Congress to
conduct strong oversight and provide clear direction to this
agency in legislation if we expect any significant progress in
reducing truck crash deaths and injuries.
Thank you very much for your leadership and we look forward
to working with you on advancing motor carrier safety.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gillan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jacqueline S. Gillan, Vice President,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
Fatalities in Crashes Involving Large Trucks
55,377 total fatalities from 1998-2008
Sources: Fatality Analysis Reporting System, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration; Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
U.S. Recession Periods and Motor Vehicle Fatalities
Chart shows correlation between U.S. recessions and
motor vehicle fatalities, 1971-2008.*
Year and Recession Period
*Motor vehicle fatality data only available through 2008.
Sources: The National Bureau of Economic Research, http://
www.nberorg/cycles/cyclesmain.html; Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and members
of the Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security. I am Jacqueline Gillan,
Vice President of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates).
Advocates is a coalition of public health, safety, and consumer
organizations, and insurers and insurer agents that promotes highway
safety through the adoption of safety policies and regulations, and the
enactment of state and Federal traffic safety laws. Advocates is
celebrating 20 years as a unique coalition dedicated to improving
traffic safety by addressing motor vehicle crashes as a public health
issue.
This Subcommittee has been responsible for many of the motor
carrier safety improvements that have been accomplished over the years,
including establishment of a uniform commercial driver license (CDL)
program, mandates for U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) action on
numerous safety rulemakings, strong oversight of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) plans and programs and recently,
full Committee approval of the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act.
I welcome this opportunity to appear before you today to emphasize
that there is still an unfinished safety agenda that needs your
attention and your leadership.
I cannot emphasize enough the critical role that this Subcommittee
and Congress must play in leading our Nation to a safer, more rational
use of its transportation resources. It will take leadership by
Congress to implement a national, uniform approach to truck size and
weights on our federally-assisted National Highway System in order to
enhance safety and protect highway infrastructure; to stop enactment of
piecemeal special interest exemptions from crucially important Federal
safety requirements; and finally, to get the Federal regulatory safety
agency, the FMCSA, off the sidelines and actively back on the field to
improve motor carrier and highway safety.
The Annual Death Toll from Large Truck Crashes Remains Unacceptable
Over the decade from 1998 through 2007, the number of people killed
in truck-involved crashes has averaged 5,145 fatalities.\1\ In 2008,
one of every nine people killed in a traffic crash was a victim of a
large truck crash.\2\ Annual deaths in large truck crashes are
disproportionately represented in our annual traffic fatality data,
with large truck deaths still accounting for about 11-12 percent of all
annual highway fatalities, although large trucks are only three to 4
percent of registered motor vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2007, FMCSA-RRA-09-029, Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) (Jan. 2009).
\2\ Traffic Safety Facts--Large Trucks, DOT HS 811 158, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) (2009).
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Large, heavy trucks are dramatically overrepresented each year in
severe crashes, especially fatal crashes. Although truck crash
fatalities have declined in 2007 and 2008, this reduced death toll is
strongly linked with a major decrease in truck freight demand,
including substantially reduced truck tonnage starting in the latter
part of 2007 and continuing through 2009.\3\ Industry reports over the
last several months have verified this decline in freight tonnage. The
American Trucking Associations (ATA), for example, reported that for-
hire tonnage fell in June 2009 by 13.6 percent over the freight
transported in 2008, and freight analysts do not believe that the
decline will stop until the second half of 2010 at the earliest.\4\
This is consistent with previous tonnage declines associated with
economic recessions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See, e.g., http://www.glgroup.com/News/Leading-Indicator--2008-
North-America-Freight-Market--Truck-Build-Numbers-Down--2009-Predicted-
To-Be-Worse-With-2010-30689.html, demonstrating 7 consecutive quarterly
declines in truck freight tonnage through the third quarter of 2009.
Also see, http://www.ttnews.com/articles/
basetemplate.aspx?storyid=22609, ``ATA's Costello Hopeful Freight
Levels Have Bottomed Out,'' Transport Topics, Aug. 27, 2009, and a
similar, earlier report in Transport Topics, March 2, 2009.
\4\ Freight Tonnage Continues to Decline, Martin's Logistics Blog,
Aug. 3, 2009. http://logistics.about.com/b/2009/08/03/freight-tonnage-
continues-to-decline.htm. Also see, e.g., http://www.glgroup.com/News/
Leading-Indicator--2008-North-America-Freight- Market--Truck-Build
-Numbers-Down--2009-Predicted-To-Be-Worse-With-2010-30689.html,
demonstrating 7 consecutive quarterly declines in truck freight tonnage
through the third quarter of 2009. Also see, http://www.ttnews.com/
articles/basetemplate.aspx?storyid=22609, demonstrating 7 consecutive
quarterly declines in truck freight tonnage through the third quarter
of 2009. Also see, http://www.ttnews.com/articles/
basetemplate.aspx?storyid=22609, ``ATA's Costello Hopeful Freight
Levels Have Bottomed Out,'' Transport Topics, Aug. 27, 2009, and a
similar, earlier report in Transport Topics (March 2, 2009).
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In terms of annual fatalities, I have attached to my testimony a
chart that shows the strong relationship between economic recessions
and declines in total highway deaths since 1971.\5\ As pointed out by
several authorities, including the Honorable David Strickland,
Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), which collects and analyzes national fatality data, the
unprecedented decline in deaths and injuries among all types of motor
vehicles over the last few years is strongly linked to the recent
downturn in the economy.\6\ Just as personal travel will likely
increase as the economy continues to improve, freight traffic will also
resume its upward trend, which means more truck miles of travel each
year that will likely translate into an increase in truck fatalities.
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\5\ U.S. Recession Periods and Motor Vehicle Fatalities, 1971-2008,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (2010).
\6\ ``While these latest trends are encouraging, we do not expect
them to continue once the country rebounds from its current economic
hardships.'' Administrator Strickland emphasized that with an improving
economy, more driving will result with high crash risk exposure. Budget
Estimates Fiscal Year 2011, Statement from the Administrator, at 1-2,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (Jan. 2010).
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While the safety community welcomes the news of recent declines in
truck crash fatalities it is not a reason to delay, defer or discard
pushing forward with a strong motor carrier safety agenda. Aside from
the distinct likelihood that truck deaths will increase as the economy
and freight transportation improve, the fact is that the fatality rate
for large trucks continues to outstrip the rate for light vehicles and
passenger cars. In 2008, the fatality rate for occupants of passenger
cars stood at 0.92 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
while the large truck fatality rate was 1.79 deaths per 100 million
truck VMT--about double that of passenger cars.\7\ The overall national
traffic fatality rate for all traffic crashes was reported at 1.25
deaths per 100 million VMT.\8\
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\7\ Traffic Safety Facts 2008, DOT HS 811 170, NHTSA (2010).
\8\ Id.
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Several years ago, in a stealth move that appeared in FMCSA budget
submissions to Congress, FMCSA attempted to camouflage the actual truck
fatality rate by merging it with the much lower fatality rate for buses
and motorcoaches. The agency then further diluted the very high large
truck fatality rate by measuring the combined rate not against 100
million truck VMT, or even against the total VMT of all commercial
motor vehicles, but against the much more generous figure of all annual
VMT for all vehicles--even including motorcycles. As a result, rather
than state the traditional rate as 1.79 deaths per 100 million truck
VMT for 2008, FMCSA now boasts a rate of just 0.160 fatalities per 100
million VMT, which is an order of magnitude smaller and, conveniently,
already exceeds the agency's ambitious 2011 target for fatality
reduction.\9\ This statistical claim distorts the traditional and fair
means of measuring the truck fatality rate solely based on a truck
exposure measure (truck VMT), and masks the extraordinary over-
representation of large trucks in annual fatal crashes. It's amazing
that the agency believes that Congress will be deceived by this shell
game with numbers to mask the extraordinarily high large truck fatality
rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2011, at I-1, FMCSA (Jan. 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation:
FMCSA should be required to accurately assess and publicly
release the large truck fatality rate by reporting the total
number of truck-involved fatal crash deaths measured against
annual truck vehicle miles traveled.
The Safe Highways and Infrastructure Protection Act (SHIPA) Will
Improve Safety, Protect Infrastructure, Conserve the
Environment,
Enhance Intermodalism
It is up to Congress to take action now that will improve safety,
protect the long-term national investment in our crumbling highway and
bridge infrastructure while also protecting the environment and
providing a more level playing field for intermodal freight
transportation. We are at a crucial juncture in highway and motor
carrier safety in this Congress.
A pending bipartisan Senate bill, S. 779, the Safe Highways and
Infrastructure Preservation Act of 2010, or SHIPA, sponsored by
Chairman Lautenberg, has the potential, if enacted, to dramatically
improve the safety landscape for all motorists, including truck
drivers. SHIPA will stop the relentless cycle of demands and pressure
imposed on the states by the trucking interests for increased tractor-
trailer lengths. If truck lengths are increased again beyond the
industry ``standard'' of 53 feet, it would trigger a cascading effect
of negative outcomes for safety, environmental protection,
infrastructure protection, fuel use, the Highway Trust Fund, and a
balanced, national transportation freight strategy.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Companion bill in the House of Representatives is H.R. 1619,
introduced by Rep. James McGovern (D-MA).
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SHIPA is crucial for curtailing the growth of large trucks and
their expansion to more and more highway miles off the Nation's
Interstate system. One of the two main objectives of the legislation is
to freeze the length of truck trailers at a maximum of 53 feet.
Promoters of much bigger, heavier trucks, such as supporters of current
H.R. 1799,\11\ would allow trucks weighing up to 97,000 pounds and more
throughout the country and melt the 1991 freeze on longer combination
vehicles (LCVs),\12\ while using the specious argument that trucking
will become safer because bigger, heavier trucks mean fewer trucks on
the road. Increases in truck size and weights have never resulted in
fewer trucks. In fact, allowing super-sized heavy trucks on more
highways will make our roads and bridges more dangerous, not safer, and
there will be more, not fewer, trucks than ever before.
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\11\ Safe and Efficient Transportation Act of 2008, introduced by
Rep. Michael Michaud (D-ME).
\12\ Title 23 U.S.C. 127(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, Federal law since the 1982 Surface Transportation
Assistance Act \13\ mandates certain minimum truck sizes, weights, and
configurations, but does not restrict the length of trailers and semi-
trailers in truck combinations.\14\ This has had two particularly
pernicious consequences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ P. L. No. 110-53.
\14\ Title 23 U.S.C. 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, the states are pressured endlessly by the special interests
to increase the length of the semi-trailers used with combination
trucks. This has resulted in the standard semitrailer increasing in
length to 45 feet in the 1960s and 1970s, to 48 feet by the time the
1982 STAA was enacted, to 53 feet by the end of the 1990s, with many
states now allowing 57 feet, and a few states even permitting 59- and
60-foot long trailers.
Second, increasing the volume of a trailer triggers the argument
that some commodities in shorter trailers fall beneath the Federal axle
and gross weight limits on the Interstate highway system in Federal law
\15\ or even the higher maximum weight limits allowed in many states on
their non-Interstate highways. This claim is turned into an incessant
drum beat to raise weight limits in order to take advantage of the
increased volume of the bigger, longer trailers. This strategy is
carried out simultaneously at both state and Congressional levels to
pressure both Federal and state lawmakers. This is the upward
``ratcheting'' that special interests have been so successful at for
decades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The main argument advanced for the supposed advantages of longer,
heavier trucks is that it will result in fewer trucks. Nothing is
further from the truth. Since 1974, every time truck sizes and weights
have been increased by state or by Federal mandate, the result has been
more trucks than ever before.\16\ In fact, from 1972 to 1987 alone, the
number of for-hire trucks increased by nearly 100 percent.\17\ During
this era, an increasing number of states adopted longer, wider, heavier
trucks and trailers on their state highways and also interpreted their
Interstate grandfather rights more liberally to grant more overweight
permits to extra-heavy trucks.\18\
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\16\ For example, the states began to allow bigger, heavier trucks
on their non-Interstate highways in the early 1970s. The Federal-Aid
Highway Act in 1978, Pub. L. 95-599 (Nov. 6, 1978), authorized the
states to allow substantial increases in truck weights on Interstate
highways and bridges. Subsequently, the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982 (1982 STAA), Pub. L. 97-424 (Jan. 6, 1983), pre-
empted state size and weight restrictions both on and off the
Interstate systems by enacting new, higher Federal size and weight
limits. Those new limits applied to a designated National Network
consisting of several hundred thousand miles of interconnected, primary
highways, most of which had never had any Federal control on truck size
and weight. Many states gave up fighting after this sweeping act of
Federal preemption and simply extended the new, higher weight and size
limits to all or most of their highways. Many other exemptions from the
Interstate weight restrictions were enacted in the Surface
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (STURAA),
Pub. L. 100-17 (April 2, 1987); the Truck and Bus Safety and Regulatory
Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690 (Nov. 18, 1988); and the Motor
Carrier Safety Act of 1990, 15, Sanitary Food Transportation Act of
1990, Pub. L. 101-500 (Nov. 3, 1990); and the Motor Carrier Safety Act
of 1991, Title IV, Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991 (ISTEA), Pub. L. 102-240 (Dec. 18, 1991).
\17\ Truck Inventory and Use Survey, U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1974, 1982, 1987.
\18\ This increasingly liberal interpretation of grandfather rights
in many states was the result of a major amendment in the 1982 STAA
that excluded the Federal Highway Administration from overseeing and
enforcing state weight limits on the Interstate highway system. The
amendment allowed the states to determine for themselves the force and
effect of their grandfather rights to vary axle and gross weights, and
bridge load formulas, from the requirements of 23 U.S.C. 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The result is predictable: trucks were bigger and heavier than ever
before, and there were still more of them than ever before. The total
increase in the number of trucks by 1992 was 128 percent over the 1972
baseline.\19\ Longer, larger, heavier trucks kept multiplying. By 1997,
the number of large trucks had grown to 174 percent more than 1972, and
by 2002, the number of for-hire trucks had increased by 228 percent
over the 1972 figure.\20\ According to the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) the number of trucks on the road today is at
least 250 percent or more over 1972 figures.\21\
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\19\ Truck Inventory and Use Survey, op. cit., 1992.
\20\ Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (formerly the Truck Inventory
and Use Survey), U.S. Bureau of the Census (1997).
\21\ Highway Statistics 2008, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
(Jan. 5, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The two actions of putting the lid on truck lengths and freezing
existing state weight practices for the entire NHS are complementary
and both are crucial to achieving SHIPA's goal. While SHIPA extends
current state and Federal weight limits on the Interstate system to the
non-Interstate highways on the National Highway System, it prohibits
any further increases. This not only puts a ceiling on truck weights at
their current levels, but it also recognizes and protects the states'
existing grandfathered rights to allow certain differences in truck
axle and gross weights than the maximum weight figure in Federal law.
SHIPA also restores FHWA to its traditional position as steward of
state and Federal size and weight limits for public safety and
infrastructure protection.
Recommendation:
Congress should enact S. 779, the SHIPA bill.
Special Interest Exemptions Jeopardize Safety and Compromise
Enforcement
Over the years, Congress has granted numerous statutory special
interest exemptions from Federal safety regulations including
exemptions from the maximum driving and on-duty limits, as well as the
logbook requirements, for motor carriers under the hours-of-service
regulations, and from commercial driver physical qualifications and
medical examinations.\22\ These exemptions pose safety issues because
they are untested and unproven deviations from established Federal
safety requirements. Enactment of exemptions on a piecemeal basis
bypasses careful investigation and findings on the impact of these
exemptions on safety. In addition, it creates a patchwork quilt of
disparate regulatory exemptions that make it nearly impossible for
enforcement authorities to determine the status of exempt drivers and
vehicles and to effectively enforce Federal safety requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See, e.g., Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21st Century
(TEA-21), P.L. 105-178 (June 9, 1998) (eliminated major Federal safety
regulations governing drivers of utility service vehicles); National
Highway System Designation Act of 1995, P.L. 104-5 (Nov. 28, 1995)
(exempted drivers transporting agricultural commodities and farm
supplies from maximum driving time, maximum duty time, and minimum off-
duty time hours-of-service requirements, and allowed drivers of ground
water well drilling rigs, of construction materials and equipment, and
of utility service vehicles to use a 24-hour restart for each new work
week rather than the minimum required layover time after a tour of
duty).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advocates is gravely concerned that these exemptions detour from
established safety requirements, are not based on research and
scientific analysis, and pose increased safety risks for commercial
operators and the public. Because they were established by statute
rather than regulation, there has been no thorough examination of the
safety consequences of these exemptions. It is time for the U.S. DOT to
conduct a comprehensive evaluation of each exemption from safety rules.
Fortunately, the mechanism for review of these types of exemptions
already exists in Federal law. In 1998, Congress required U.S. DOT to
review regulatory exemptions from safety requirements using reasonable,
recognized screening criteria.\23\ Under this provision, many special
interest exemption requests addressing motor carrier safety regulations
are reviewed using the expertise of DOT and FMCSA, rather than the
lobbying clout of special interests. The process enacted by Congress
allows the agency to carefully consider the safety requirements and
implications of a proposed exemption and to determine if the exemption
poses a problem for law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ TEA-21, 407, codified at 49 U.S.C. 31315(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even FMCSA itself openly decried the exemptions practice in its
2000 proposed revision of the hours-of-service rule. The agency
concluded that the existing multiple exemptions were not compatible
with reform of the drivers' hours-of-service rule.\24\ These exemptions
are also opposed by the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA)
representing state law enforcement officials who are charged with
ensuring compliance with Federal motor carrier safety rules.
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\24\ 65 FR 22540 (May 2, 2000). See, e.g.: ``The FMCSA has found no
sleep or fatigue research that supports any of the current exceptions
or exemptions, including the 24-hour restart provisions authorized by
the NHS Act.'' Id. at 25559.
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Congress has also granted similar special interest exemptions for
truck size and weight limits. Most recently, Maine and Vermont have
been granted special legislative exemptions as ``pilot programs,''
which allow the operation of 100,000-pound trucks on the northern
section of Maine's I-95 to the Canadian border, and of 120,000-pound
trucks on all of Vermont's Interstate highways.\25\ These exemptions
were adopted despite reams of reliable evidence concerning the adverse
safety effects and increased infrastructure damage that such
excessively heavy combination trucks inflict on roads and bridges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Sections 194(a) and 194(d), Fiscal Year 2010 Transportation,
Housing, and Urban Development Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2009,
P.L. 111-117 (Dec. 16, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety organizations opposed these and other size and weight
exemptions that have been enacted. Granting special interest requests
for specific exemptions from the Federal axle, and both gross and
bridge formula weight limits in Federal highway law undermines national
uniformity, subjects roads and bridges to super-heavy weights that
accelerate highway and bridge deterioration, and constitutes a serious
and unacceptable threat to the traveling public who must operate their
small passenger cars next to these unstable, overweight combination
trucks.
Even U.S. DOT severely criticized the statutory adoption of
exemptions only a few years ago because of the harm it does both to
highway safety and infrastructure protection. In a massive 2004 study
of the effects of overweight and extra-long tractor-trailer trucks, DOT
determined that LCVs damage bridges more severely than ``18-wheelers''
and could have substantially more serious safety consequences. U.S. DOT
concluded that a patchwork quilt of size and weight exemptions for
specific states undermined a coherent, national policy of size and
weight limits.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Western Uniformity Scenario Analysis, U.S. Department of
Transportation (April 2004).
In recent years a number of ad hoc, State-specific exemptions from
Federal truck size and weight laws have been enacted. For instance,
TEA-21 contained special exemptions from Federal size and weight limits
in four States, Colorado, Louisiana, Maine, and New Hampshire. The
Department does not support this kind of piecemeal approach to truck
size and weight policy. It makes enforcement and compliance with truck
size and weight laws more difficult, it often contributes little to
overall productivity, it may have unintended consequences for safety
and highway infrastructure, and it reduces the willingness to work for
more comprehensive solutions that would have much greater benefits.
Id. at XI-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendations:
U.S. DOT and FMCSA should be required to review all existing
statutory exemptions from the Federal motor carrier safety
regulations to determine whether they are safe and enforceable,
have contributed to increased risk of deaths and injuries, and
to make recommendations to Congress about exemptions that pose
an increased public safety risk.
All exemptions from motor carrier safety regulations should
be subject to U.S. DOT and FMCSA review under 31315.
Legislation should be adopted, similar to 31315, that
requires U.S. DOT and FMCSA to evaluate all requests for truck
length exemptions.
A Decade of Failed Leadership, Inadequate Oversight and Ineffective
Safety Rules
Let me turn now to an analysis of FMCSA's performance and an
appraisal of its first decade as a Federal agency. The agency was
established in 2000 with motor carrier safety as its primary mission
and highest priority.\27\ Over its first 10 years the agency compiled a
poor track record that was at odds with its safety mission. FMCSA
exhibited a stark failure of leadership and oversight of the motor
carrier industry, an inability to issue effective safety regulations,
and an inadequate enforcement policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (MCSIA), P.L.
106-159 (Dec. 9, 1999), codified at 49 U.S.C. 113(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While we continue to hope that FMCSA can finally be turned into an
effective force for motor carrier safety under its new leadership,
congressional direction, oversight and guidance will continue to be
needed in order to improve the performance of the agency.
FMCSA Safety Oversight Issues
Failure to Implement NTSB Safety Recommendations: One strong
indication of FMCSA's job performance is whether the agency has
implemented the numerous motor carrier safety recommendations issued by
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Since it began issuing
recommendations in 1968, NTSB has repeatedly called for commonsense and
urgent safety actions by FMCSA and its predecessor agency, FHWA. NTSB
has issued dozens of recommendations that address vehicle operating
systems, equipment, commercial drivers, and motor carrier company
safety administration and oversight. However, many of the
recommendations were finally closed out in exasperation by NTSB because
there was no response, the response was unsatisfactory, or the response
was minimally adequate.
The NTSB's current list of ``Most Wanted Transportation Safety
Improvements'' includes a number of safety recommendations for
commercial motor vehicles.\28\ NTSB has again placed two of the four
FMCSA recommendations in the ``Acceptable Response, Progressing
Slowly'' (yellow) category and two in the ``Unacceptable Response''
(red) category. The two recommendations that were deemed unacceptable
have remained on the list as Code Red responses since 2008. One of
these unacceptable responses on the 2010 Most Wanted List continues to
indicate NTSB's long-term frustration with the U.S. DOT's failure to
require electronic on-board recorders to corroborate commercial driver
compliance with Federal hours-of-service limits.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Available at http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/mostwanted/
Federal_issues.htm. The current, 2010 Most Wanted Transportation Safety
Improvements for motor carriers include the following issues:
Prohibit Cell Phone Use by Motorcoach Drivers:
Acceptable Response Proceeding Slowly
Require Electronic Onboard Data Recorders to Maintain
Accurate Carrier Records on Driver Hours of Service: Unacceptable
Response.
Improve the Safety of Motor Carrier Operations: Action
Needed by FMCSA.
Prevent Medically Unqualified Drivers from Operating
Commercial Vehicles: Action Need by FMCSA.
Prevent Collisions by Using Enhanced Vehicle Safety
Technology: Acceptable Response, Proceeding Slowly.
Enhance Protection for Motorcoach Passengers: Action
Needed by NHTSA.
\29\ For the past 30 years, the Safety Board has advocated the use
of on board data recorders to increase HOS compliance. In 1977, the
Board issued its first recommendation on the use of on board recording
devices for commercial vehicle HOS compliance, in response to FHWA's
withdrawal of an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
concerning the installation of tachographs. NTSB then urged FHWA to
mandate the use of on board recorders in NTSB's 1990 safety study,
Fatigue, Alcohol, Drugs, and Medical Factors in Fatal-to-the-Driver
Heavy Truck Crashes after concluding that on board recording devices
could provide a tamper-proof mechanism to enforce the HOS regulations.
That request for a mandate has been re-issued periodically by NTSB
since 1990. Since 2007, NTSB has raised the need for an EOBR mandate to
its Most Wanted List.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another example of the agency's failure to adopt reasonable NTSB
recommended safety measures includes preventing motor carriers from
operating if they are found to have violated either mechanical safety
standards or driver safety standards. NTSB has listed the agency's
failure to adopt this recommendation as an ``Unacceptable Response.''
\30\ Currently, FMCSA will consider a stop operations order for a motor
carrier only if it finds certain violations of both mechanical and
driver safety standards. A violation of only one of the two categories
will not result in a stop operations order from the agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ According to NTSB:
The NTSB reiterates Safety Recommendation H-07-3 and both
reiterates and reclassifies Safety Recommendation H-99-6 to the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration * * * Change the safety fitness
rating methodology so that adverse vehicle or driver performance-based
data alone are sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating
for a carrier. (H-99-6).
www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2009/H09_32_41.pdf. (Jan. 4, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation:
Congress should direct FMCSA to fulfill major NTSB safety
recommendations on the current Most Wanted List and review and
adopt previously issued NTSB motor carrier safety
recommendations that have not yet been implemented.
FMCSA Has Failed to Monitor and Ensure the Adequacy of State Motor
Carrier Safety Inspection Programs: The Secretary of Transportation is
required to prescribe standards for annual inspection of motorcoaches
and of trucks greater than 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight in
interstate commerce, or approve state inspection programs that are
equally effective.\31\ FMCSA last publicly addressed the state
inspection system in a 2001 Federal Register notice indicating that 25
states have approved periodic inspection programs for trucks.\32\
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\31\ 49 C.F.R. Part 396; MCSIA, 210, codified at 49 U.S.C.
31142.
\32\ 66 FR 32863 (June 18, 2001). See also prior notice issued by
the FHWA, 63 FR 8516 (Feb. 19, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More recent public information does not exist. A recent examination
of the FMCSA website revealed that there were no entries on state truck
and motorcoach inspection programs, nor was there information on the
current status of state compliance with the vehicle inspection and
repair requirements, including any updated listing of states that may
have instituted periodic commercial motor vehicle inspection programs
since 2001.
FMCSA has no reports that are publicly available evaluating how
comprehensive the commercial motor vehicle inspection program may be in
each of the 25 states. Our information is that no audits have been
performed and that none are planned. Timely information on state truck
and motorcoach inspection programs--whether they are still current and
how well and how often they inspect commercial motor vehicles for
safety compliance--is not available to the public on FMCSA's website.
Furthermore, while FMCSA allows motor carriers to ``self-inspect''
and annually certify that the mechanical inspection has been performed,
it appears that the agency does not conduct routine audits to evaluate
a representative sample of these state self-inspection programs.
It should be stressed that the minimum period for the required
inspection is only once a year.\33\ Since it is well known that
inspection of commercial motor vehicles needs to be much more intensive
and frequent than for personal or light motor vehicles, a once-a-year
inspection regime is clearly no guarantee of safe trucks and
motorcoaches. While reputable carriers may conduct more frequent
inspections, others may not. Many companies even in states that have
inspection programs can come into compliance just for an annual
inspection, only to allow major mechanical and safety features of their
vehicles to fall into dangerous disrepair soon after passing the annual
inspection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ 49 U.S.C. 31142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although commercial motor vehicles are subject to random roadside
inspections, they can go for long periods of time without being stopped
for an inspection. Relying on roadside inspections to detect mechanical
defects that pose threats to public safety is simply too late--those
vehicles should never have been on the road from the start.
One example of the serious consequences that can occur as a result
of weak oversight of state-run, state-approved, and company self-
inspections involves the deadly 2008 Sherman, Texas motorcoach crash in
which 17 people died and 39 were injured. The motorcoach was operated
by Angel Tours, Inc., which had been stopped from operating by FMCSA
just weeks earlier, but continued to operate under the name Iguala
Busmex.
Among other Federal violations, the NTSB's investigation of the
crash found that the proximate cause of the crash was a failure of one
of the retreaded tires on the front steering axle of the motorcoach.
The retreaded tire failed, destabilizing the motorcoach, making it
difficult to control, and facilitating its crash into the overpass
guardrail. NTSB speculated that either the tire was not inspected
properly by an extremely perfunctory pre-trip inspection, or that the
tire was punctured in route to its destination. NTSB found that the
motorcoach had been inspected by a Texas state government-certified
private inspection company.\34\ The private inspection cost $62.00, but
failed to detect a number of mechanical defects including the retreaded
tires on the steer axle, under-inflated tag-axle tires, wrong tax-axle
wheels mounted, and a grossly contaminated brake assembly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ The company name is ``Five-Minute Inspection, Inc,'' R.
Accetta, Motorcoach Run Off Bridge and Rollover Sherman, Texas, August
8, 2008, PowerPoint Presentation, Office of Highway Safety, NTSB, Oct.
30, 2009. http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2009/sherman-tx/introduction.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Texas commercial motor vehicle state inspection program was
approved by FMCSA in 1994. NTSB investigators concluded that there was
no FMCSA quality control evaluations of agency-approved state programs,
and no state oversight of the certified inspection companies.
We commend the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee for approving S. 554, the ``Motorcoach Enhanced Safety act of
2009,'' originally introduced by Senators Brown (D-OH) and Hutchison
(R-TX). This legislation, when enacted, will address some of the
inspection oversight concerns with respect to motorcoaches. Similar
action is needed regarding state inspection programs for trucks.
Recommendations:
Congress should direct FMCSA to establish specific standards
for state-authorized, state-operated inspection programs to
determine how well they meet the requirements of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.
Congress should direct FMCSA to conduct annual inspections
of a sample of state-authorized or -operated truck inspection
programs to determine their effectiveness .
Congress should direct FMCSA to audit motor carrier self-
inspection programs in each state to determine how well trucks
are being inspected and maintained for safe mechanical
condition.
FMCSA Regulatory Issues
Electronic On-Board Recorders--A Case Study of Bureaucratic
Bungling: It has been 15 years since Congress in 1995 directed the
Secretary of Transportation to address the issue of Electronic On-Board
Recorders (EOBRs).\35\ After all this time, FMCSA has only recently
produced a weak and ineffective EOBRs regulation which the agency
itself admits will apply to less than one percent of motor
carriers.\36\
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\35\ Sec. 408 of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act
of 1995, P.L. 104-88 (Dec. 29, 1995).
\36\ Electronic On-Board Recorders for Hours-of-Service Compliance,
Final Rule, 64 FR 17208 (Apr. 5, 2010).
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There is strong support for EOBRs from many quarters. At a hearing
before this Subcommittee held May 1, 2007, on the topic of EOBRs,\37\
Senator Lautenberg said in his opening statement: ``We need electronic
on-board recorders in every truck on the road to ensure the safety of
our truck drivers and our families who travel on the highways.'' \38\
Similar sentiments were expressed by the President of CVSA.\39\ The
current Chair of NTSB, Deborah Hersman, has also repeatedly emphasized
the need for a U.S. DOT requirement for EOBRs on all commercial motor
vehicles.\40\ As noted above, NTSB is resolute in continuing to list an
EOBR mandate on its Most Wanted list and to deem the agency's response
``Unacceptable.''
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\37\ U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security. Electronic On-Board Recorders
(EOBR's) and Truck Driver Fatigue Reduction. 110th Cong. Washington:
May 1, 2007.
\38\ Sen. Lautenberg, Frank. Statement to the U.S. Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation. Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and
Security. Electronic On-Board Recorders (EOBR's) and Truck Driver
Fatigue Reduction. 110th Cong. Washington: May 1, 2007.
\39\ ``EOBR technology is proven. More than 50 countries have
mandated Electronic Data Recorders for driving and standby time
recording and/or speed and distance recording.'' Captain John E.
Harrison. Statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security. Electronic On-Board
Recorders (EOBR's) and Truck Driver Fatigue Reduction. 110th Cong.
Washington: May 1, 2007.
\40\ Chairman Deborah Hersman, statement to the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, Motor
Carrier Safety: The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's
Oversight of High Risk Carriers, 110th Cong. Washington: July 11, 2007.
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Yet, FMCSA's response is an extraordinarily weak rule that will
require only about 5,700 motor carriers to install and use EOBRs--but
only after an hours of service (HOS) violation is discovered in the
course of a Compliance Review (CR). This criterion immediately produces
an extremely limited population of truck and motorcoach companies.
Because FMCSA annually conducts CRs on only 2 percent of motor carriers
registered with the agency, the chances of being caught violating HOS
requirements are very remote, and the detection of violations will be
based on examination of logbooks recording duty status, which are
widely known to be regularly falsified by a large percentage of
commercial drivers to conceal violations.
The rule has other serious defects, including the following:
The EOBR Global Positioning System (GPS) function will
record only at 60 minute intervals rather than at 1 minute
intervals--a serious problem that allows carriers to evade
fixed weigh stations, use illegal hazardous materials routes,
and traverse bridges posted for reduced loads, without
detection.
Carriers required to install and use EOBRs will not have to
provide certain supporting record of duty status (RODS)
documents--which reduces the documentation that enforcement
personnel need to determine whether drivers using sleeper
berths complied with minimum off-duty time.
The EOBRs default to ``on-duty not driving status'' when a
commercial vehicle has been stationary for only 5 minutes. This
allows time during intermittent vehicle movement in traffic
congestion or while waiting in loading dock lines, to be
recorded as non-driving time. As a result it will extend the
driver's shift beyond the maximum 11 consecutive hours allowed
by regulation.
EOBRs will not collect speed data thereby reducing the
deterrent effect on speeding by commercial drivers and
undermining the effectiveness of speed limit enforcement by
public authorities.\41\
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\41\ It also undermines the safety management of carriers by
reducing critical information about whether their trucks and
motorcoaches are illegally speeding. Under current FMCSA regulation,
AOBRs are required to record vehicle speeds, so this policy choice by
FMCSA is weaker than the current agency rule.
FMCSA thoroughly fails to address the need for specific
fail-safe controls to ensure that EOBRs are tamper-proof, and
are protected with adequate, security control measures to limit
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access only to appropriate users.
Although FMCSA has indicated that another, expanded rule may be
under consideration,\42\ it appears that the timetable on any further
action has already slipped from this year into next.
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\42\ Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, U.S. Department of
Transportation, DOT HS 811 177, November 2009.
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It is time for Congress to act. As mentioned before, this Committee
has approved a comprehensive motorcoach safety bill that includes a
mandatory requirement for EOBRs on all motorcoaches.\43\ The House of
Representatives has also included an EOBRs requirement for all
commercial motor vehicles in the Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee's draft Surface Transportation Authorization Act.\44\
Advocates supports both of these measures.
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\43\ S. 554, 12(a).
\44\ See 4036, Surface Transportation Authorizing Act of 2009,
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Committee Print,
available at http://transportation.house.gov/.
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Recommendations:
Congress should pass the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act of
2009 mandating EOBRs on all passenger-carrying commercial motor
vehicles under FMCSA jurisdiction.
Congress should enact legislation requiring the FMCSA to
issue a universal EOBR regulatory requirement for all other
commercial motor vehicles in interstate commerce.
Truck Driver Hours of Service and Fatigue: I am pleased to be able
to testify today that the long running dispute over the truck driver
HOS rule is on hold while a new rule is developed. This does not mean
that we have relaxed our opposition or vigilance regarding the serious
safety failings of the current HOS rule. However, we believe that the
quickest way to improve safety and to get a better rule issued is to
work with the new Administration to produce a rule that advances public
safety and not only productivity.
The federal commercial driver HOS rule is of critical importance to
truck safety. The HOS rule governs truck driver working hours, setting
maximum limits for on-duty work time, the number of continuous hours of
driving and work hours allowed per shift, weekly driving hours, and the
minimum required off-duty rest time. Countless studies, and the
National Truck and Bus Safety Summit of 1995, have concluded that
excessive driving and work hours, and inadequate rest time, lead to
driver fatigue which plays a substantial role in large truck crashes.
The current, unsafe HOS rule adopted in 2003 substantially
increased maximum daily and weekly driving and working hours for
truckers.\45\ Driving time for each shift was increased to 11 from 10
consecutive hours of driving. Driver fatigue from this excessively long
driving shift is increased further by allowing an additional three or
more hours in each shift for other work including the loading and
unloading of trucks.
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\45\ Hours of Service of Drivers; Drivers Rest and Sleep for Safe
Operations; Final Rule, 68 FR 22455 (Apr. 28, 2003).
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The danger posed by these provisions to the health and safety of
truck drivers and the motoring public are made even worse by the weekly
``restart'' provision. The restart undermines what previously was a
``hard number'' 60-hour weekly driving cap (70 hours for drivers on an
8-day schedule). Instead, the rule permits drivers to reset their
accumulated weekly driving hours to zero at any point during the work
week after taking only a 34-hour off-duty break, and then start a new
tour of duty. This permits drivers who use the restart provision to
cram an extra 17 hours of driving into their schedule each week,
actually operating their trucks for a total of 77 hours in seven
calendar days instead of the previous limit of 60 hours. Drivers
operating on an 8-day schedule can drive an extra 18 hours--a total of
88 driving hours instead of the previous limit of 70-hours.
The restart permits companies to squeeze these excessive ``bonus''
driving hours out of drivers. Instead of having a full weekend of 48 or
more hours off duty for rest and recovery, which was required under the
previous HOS rule, the restart permits motor carriers to compel drivers
to cash in their rest time for extra driving hours. This dramatically
increases truck driver crash risk exposure, yet FMCSA rationalized this
dramatic increase in daily and weekly driving and work hours as just as
safe as the previous HOS rules when drivers had more end-of-week rest
time.
The current HOS rule was issued by FMCSA despite the findings of
fact by the agency, and its predecessors, that crash risk significantly
increases after eight consecutive hours of driving and that long
driving and work hours promote driver fatigue. FMCSA also failed to
properly take into account driver health impacts and scientific
findings showing that more driving and working hours are dangerous and
lead to an increased risk of crashes, especially among workers in
industries with long hours of shiftwork who have little opportunity for
rest and recovery. Advocates meticulously documented the science
showing that the agency's selective use of research findings was
designed to justify a regulatory outcome prior to any studies FMCSA
marshaled to justify its expansion of driver working and driving hours.
These concerns were echoed by the U.S. Court of Appeals in two
separate, unanimous decisions that vacated the current HOS rule and
remanded the rule to the agency for changes. In each case, the Court
questioned the basis for the agency's decision-making in allowing
longer driving hours despite the safety threat, adverse health effects
and the increased crash risk posed by the rule, indicating that the
current HOS rule was not based on sound reasoning.\46\ And despite back
to back judicial decisions overturning the rule in each case, FMCSA
refused to make changes to the maximum daily and weekly driving and
work hours allowed by the rule.
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\46\ Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. FMCSA, 494 F.3d
188 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Public Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
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On December 19, 2007, this Subcommittee held a hearing on the HOS
rule. The record of that hearing documents the safety concerns about
the HOS rule and its precarious legal status. In 2008, the FMCSA
nevertheless defiantly reissued the same flawed HOS rule for a third
time and, in 2009, Advocates, Public Citizen, the Truck Safety
Coalition and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters filed a third
lawsuit challenging the rule.\47\
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\47\ Petition for Review, filed March 2009, Public Citizen et al.,
v. FMCSA, No. 09-1094 (D.C. Cir.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an effort to expedite the issuance of what safety advocates hope
will be a new, safer HOS rule, and to allow the new administration to
determine the right course on this issue, safety and labor
organizations agreed to hold the lawsuit in abeyance while FMCSA
develops a new rule. Under the terms of the settlement the agency has
agreed to forward a draft proposed rule to the Office of Management and
Budget by the end of this coming July and, after taking public comment,
to issue a new final rule by August, 2011.\48\
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\48\ Id., see Settlement Agreement dated Oct. 26, 2009 and Order
dated March 3, 2010.
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Recommendation:
The Committee should continue rigorous oversight of the
activity and efforts of FMCSA to comply with the HOS legal
settlement and to issue a new rule that enhances the health and
safety of truck drivers and the traveling public.
FMCSA's New Entrant Motor Carrier Program Lacks Critical
Safeguards: In the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999
(MCSIA),\49\ the law that established the FMCSA, Congress directed the
new agency to establish minimum requirements to ensure that new motor
carriers are knowledgeable about the Federal motor carrier safety
standards (FMCSRs).\50\ It also required consideration of the need to
implement a proficiency examination.\51\ National safety organizations
called on the agency to require, prior to making a grant of temporary
operating authority, a proficiency examination to determine how well
new entrant motor carriers understand and are capable of complying with
the FMCSRs and Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs), and whether they
can exercise sound safety management of their fleet, drivers, and
operations.
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\49\ P.L. 106-159 (Dec. 9, 1999).
\50\ Section 210 of MCSIA added 49 U.S.C. 31144(g) which directed
the establishment of regulations requiring each owner or operator with
new operating authority to undergo a safety review within 18 months of
starting operations.
\51\ MCSIA, 210(b).
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FMCSA's new entrant final rule lacked many important aspects of
appropriate agency oversight of new truck and motorcoach companies,
especially the need to mandate an initial safety audit of new carriers
before awarding them temporary operating authority, and performing a CR
at the end of the probationary period of temporary operating authority
with an assigned safety rating.\52\ Advocates and other safety
organizations strongly urged FMCSA to adopt these and other stringent
oversight and enforcement mechanisms as part of the new entrant
program. However, these suggestions were ignored or summarily rejected.
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\52\ 73 FR 76472 (Dec. 16, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the agency rule did not implement the statutory directives
in the MCSIA, and rejected other reasonable safeguards for new
entrants, Advocates filed a petition for reconsideration with the
agency on January 14, 2008.\53\ The petition emphasized that the final
rule contains no data or other information demonstrating that the new
entrant review procedure adopted by FMCSA will improve the operating
safety of new entrants through their knowledge about and compliance
with the FMCSRs and HMRs. The petition also pointed out that the rule
did not include an evaluation of the merits of a proficiency
examination for new entrants, even though the MCSIA required the agency
to consider the need for such an examination.
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\53\ Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Jan. 14, 2008,
``Petition for Reconsideration Filed with the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration Regarding the Order Issued on New Entrant Motor
Carriers Safety Assurance Process, 49 CFR Parts 365, 385, 386, and 390,
73 Federal Register 76472 et seq., December 16, 2008.''
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FMCSA granted Advocates' petition in part as the basis for issuing
an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) asking for preliminary
data, views, and arguments on the need for a proficiency
examination.\54\ While this appears to be a positive step, FMCSA
continues to insist that its efforts to determine the capabilities of
new entrants are adequate, and that the agency has fulfilled the
statutory direction to ensure that applicants for the new entrant
program are ``knowledgeable about applicable safety requirements before
being granted New Entrant authority.'' \55\ In fact, the agency has no
verification of a new entrant's knowledge of or capability to comply
with the FMCSR and HMR because it doesn't ask for any demonstration by
the applicant. The only way to ensure that high-risk carriers are not
allowed to start operating is to test their knowledge, and check their
equipment and drivers to prevent them from threatening public safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ New Entrant Safety Assurance Process; Implementation of
Section 210(b) of the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999,
advance notice of proposed rulemaking, 74 FR 42833 (Aug. 25, 2009).
\55\ Id. at 42834 (emphasis supplied).
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In addition, careful safety evaluation of new entrant applicant
motor carriers before the start of operations and prior to an award of
temporary operating authority will help the agency screen for
``chameleon'' or ``reincarnated'' motor carriers. These are companies
that, as discussed below, went out of business or were forced to cease
operations, but return under the guise of being ``new entrants''. They
conceal the fact that they actually are continuing operations with the
same officers and equipment under a false identity.
Recommendations:
Congress should explicitly require the FMCSA to adopt a
proficiency examination to determine how well a new entrant
knows the FMCSRs and HMRs, and how capable it is to conduct
safe operations.
Congress should mandate that FMCSA conduct a pre-
authorization safety audit of new entrant motor carriers to
determine the quality of their safety management, drivers, and
equipment before awarding temporary operating authority.
Nineteen Years After Congress Ordered Entry-Level Driver Training
Standards, FMCSA Still Has Not Issued a Rule Requiring Behind-the-Wheel
Driver Training: Congress originally directed the FHWA to establish
training standards for entry-level drivers in 1991.\56\ There followed
a long and tortured history of intermittent rulemaking and two
lawsuits, the first for failing to issue a rule,\57\ and the second for
issuing an entirely inadequate, illegal final rule in 2004.\58\ In the
second case, the U.S. Court of Appeals rendered a judgment against the
FMCSA, taking the agency to task for not issuing a training standard
that included an on-the-road, behind-the-wheel training component.
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\56\ ISTEA, 4007(a).
\57\ See settlement agreement dated February, 2003, In Re Citizens
for Reliable and Safe Highways v. Mineta, No. 02-1363 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
\58\ Advocates v. FMCSA, 429 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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FMCSA reopened rulemaking with a new proposed rule published on
December 26, 2007,\59\ 16 years after the original, legislated deadline
for agency action. While the proposed rule represents a minimal
improvement over the unacceptable final rule it is seriously flawed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ 73 FR 73226 (Dec. 26, 2008).
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First, the FMCSA reduced, without explanation, the minimum number
of hours of instruction recommended by the 1985 Model Curriculum,\60\
from the 320 hours or more of instruction to only 120 hours. Second,
the agency provides no justification in the proposal of the content of
the curriculum or the minimum number of hours of instruction that would
be required by the proposed curriculum. Third, the agency requires the
same curriculum for drivers of motorcoaches as for drivers of straight
trucks. Moreover, all curriculum content is indexed to truck driving,
with no specific training and skills for motorcoach operators such as
responsibilities for passenger safety management including emergency
evacuation and combating fires.
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\60\ Model Curriculum for Training Tractor-Trailer Drivers, FHWA
1985.
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Finally, FMCSA's proposal impermissibly restricts the scope of the
entry-level driver training in two ways. First, it restricts the
mandatory training to operators of interstate trucks, buses, and
motorcoaches that have commercial drivers licenses (CDL). Nothing in
the law itself or the legislative history indicates any intent by
Congress to exempt entry-level CDL holders who operate exclusively in
intrastate commerce from driver training.\61\ Second, the proposed rule
applies only to entry-level drivers with a CDL. Again, there is nothing
in the law itself, or the statutory history, permitting FMCSA to
exclude entry-level drivers of commercial vehicles who do not have or
need a CDL from the training required for other commercial drivers.\62\
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\61\ The original legislation creating the commercial driver
license (CDL) explicitly required that CDLs must be issued to both
interstate and intrastate commercial drivers. FMCSA has no statutory
basis for the unilateral exclusion of intrastate CDL holders from
required entry-level driver training. In addition, Congress has
specifically emphasized the need for greater uniformity in motor
carrier safety regulation in Sec. 203 of the Motor Carrier Safety Act
of 1984.
\62\ The provision in the Intermodal Transportation Efficiency Act
of 1991 and accompanying legislative history cannot be construed to
abbreviate the scope of required entry-level training only to drivers
of commercial motor vehicles who also have CDLs.
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FMCSA's weak rulemaking proposal is inadequate and fails to improve
the knowledge and operating skills of entry-level commercial motor
vehicle drivers.
Recommendation:
Congress should direct FMCSA to require a more comprehensive
driver training curriculum and include all entry-level
commercial motor vehicle drivers regardless of whether they
have CDLs or operate in interstate commerce.
FMCSA Enforcement Issues
Compliance Safety Analysis 2010--Unknown and Untested: FMCSA has
argued that enforcement rigor will be substantially increased when its
new enforcement methodology, Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010
(CSA2010), is fully implemented. Because CSA2010 for the first time
will apply real-time roadside inspection data to motor carrier
oversight and enforcement, there is some reason to believe that this
may improve the agency's currently limited, bureaucratic approach to
motor carrier compliance reviews and enforcement interventions. But, at
the present time, most of the information needed to assess how
effective CSA2010 could be is incomplete and not available to the
public.
FMCSA has not finished its nine state pilot-testing of the new
system. When reports on the pilot tests are completed, and released for
public review and comment, a preliminary evaluation will be possible.
Although FMCSA currently is encouraging motor carriers to assess how
they rate using trial evaluations of their safety management
performance, the results of these tests also will not be available to
the public until later this year.\63\
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\63\ 75 FR 18256 (April 9, 2010).
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The General Accountability Office (GAO) has stated that it could
not evaluate the quality of FMCSA's overall CSA2010 effort until the
major actions associated with the operational tests of the new system
were completed in June 2010.\64\
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\64\ GAO letter to Senator Frank Lautenberg dated Dec. 20, 2007GAO-
08-242R, at 9, Motor Carrier Safety (Dec. 20, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the agency is still conducting a feasibility study on
using police accident reports to determine motor carrier crash
accountability before the crash data are entered into the new Carrier
Safety Management System (CSMS) that is to replace the existing Safety
Status Measurement System (SafeStat). Until this analysis is completed,
the agency will continue to follow its current policy under SafeStat:
the crash data will be displayed publicly, but the CSMS assessment of a
motor carrier's crash history will not.\65\ At this time, critical
information about the findings of the feasibility study, its direction
or emphasis, and how police accident report data would be weighted or
entered into the calculus of the CSMS to determine safety performance
ratings is not available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ Id. at 18258.
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In the meantime, until CSA2010 is implemented incrementally in all
states through 2011, FMCSA will still conduct safety fitness audits
using traditional CRs. As a result, any definitive evaluation of the
effectiveness of CSA2010 will not be possible until the full system is
implemented.
It is important to note, however, several safety concerns regarding
a bias that is built into the agency's new CSMS, on which CSA2010
relies, that will skew the resulting enforcement efforts. The new
system will still not ensure that mechanical problems will have parity
with driver violations for stopping dangerous carriers from operating
unsafe trucks or motorcoaches. FMCSA's decision to place heavy emphasis
on driver behavior as the core principle behind CSA2010 \66\ ignores
the fact that mechanical defects are dramatically under-reported.
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\66\ See, 71 FR 61131 (Oct. 17, 2006). Also see,
www.csa2010.fmcsa.dot.gov. Primary data sources available to
researchers and enforcement authorities contain very little information
on vehicle mechanical condition, but lots of detailed information about
driver condition and behavior. In addition, available crash data
systems are not designed to support any analysis of how mechanical
defects played a role in CMV crashes. All well-known crash data sets,
such as the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), the General
Estimates System (GES), and state crash files maintained and sent to
FMCSA as part of each state's requirements under its State Enforcement
Plan to qualify for Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Program (MCSAP)
funds, are based on police reports. These data sets, unsurprisingly,
contain very low percentages of various mechanical defects as
contributing to reported crashes.
Officers on crash scenes do not engage in forensic work to detect
mechanical failures. Police crash reports concentrate overwhelmingly on
supposed driver errors or violations as the proximate reasons for the
crash occurrences. If a report does contain mechanical or equipment
failure information, it probably will involve an obvious, catastrophic
failure and not deterioration of vehicle performance in key operating
systems that cannot be detected by enforcement personnel at the crash
scene. This disregard of mechanical defect involvement in CMV crashes
is even more likely in injury or property-damage-only crashes.
Empirical data highlights the paradox of the radical under-
reporting of CMV mechanical defects: roadside inspections, such as the
annual Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) Roadcheck repeatedly
and consistently show high rates of mechanical defects and out of
service orders issued for such defects. For example, CVSA's Roadcheck
2009 found an average of 1.12 vehicle violations in every roadside
inspection, and 26.1 inspected trucks were placed out of service for
mechanical/equipment violations. http://www.cvsa.org/news/2009--
press.aspx. Severe under-reporting of mechanical defects that
contribute to crashes has been borne out by several investigations.
(Massie and Campbell 1996). It is clear that without special, in-depth
studies keying on mechanical defects, crash data sets available for
research cannot accurately identify the role of mechanical problems
contributing to large truck crashes.
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Studies \67\ show that of the nearly 1,000 truck crashes
investigated by FMCSA, fully 55 percent of them had one or more
mechanical problems, and almost 30 percent had at least one condition
that would trigger an out of service (OOS) order, that is, a directive
to the truck and driver to stop operating. It was also found that just
a brake OOS violation increased the odds of a truck being assigned the
critical reason for precipitating the crash by 1.8 times. The
implications are clear: FMCSA's approach to using its new enforcement
metrics in CSA2010 will result in an unbalanced, excessive emphasis on
driver as opposed to vehicle violations.
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\67\ A. McCartt, et al., ``Use of LTCCS Data in Large Truck
Underride Study,'' Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Society of
Automotive Engineers 2010 Government/Industry Meeting, Washington,
D.C., Jan. 26-29, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One consequence of the heavy emphasis on driver behavior over
vehicle mechanical violations will be that, in practice, the agency is
not accommodating NTSB's recommendation that violations of either
mechanical or driver requirements alone should trigger a stop
operations order.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ [To FMCSA] ``Change the safety fitness rating methodology so
that adverse vehicle and driver performance-based data alone are
sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for the
carrier'' NTSB Rec. H-99-66, Feb. 26, 1999.
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The over-emphasis on driver behavior over mechanical defects has
another collateral consequence when it comes to hours-of-service
enforcement. Because of the current necessity to rely on the use of
driver logbooks that are so often falsified that they are known as
``comic'' books, violations of HOS rules are often missed in roadside
inspections. A high percentage of drivers are able to repeatedly
conceal hours-of-service violations by manipulating the entries in
their logbooks. Even with supplementary documents available to law
enforcement, such as toll and fuel receipts, truck drivers can still
make their logbooks entries appear to be valid. If the CSMS is overly
reliant on driver violations, and enforcement personnel remain unable
to accurately detect this major source of violations, then the data and
accuracy of CSA2010 will be questionable, and its capability to
adequately address ongoing driver and carrier violations will be
suspect.
For this reason, Advocates reiterates the need for Congressional
action to direct FMCSA adoption of a universal EOBR regulatory
requirement. Only the use of EOBRs can address this potential problem
in the CSA2010 approach.
However, Advocates also regards the overwhelming emphasis on driver
issues, not mechanical issues, for measuring compliance and rating
motor carrier safety performance as a critical flaw of CSA2010.
Recommendations:
FMCSA should be directed to re-evaluate the imbalanced
approach to motor carrier violations in CSA2010 that relies too
heavily on driver behavior.
Congress should direct the GAO to assess:
the accuracy and deterrent value of safety performance
findings generated by CSMS;
the progress of CSA2010 and whether the effort is
proceeding in the right direction;
whether safety performance will be evaluated in a more
timely and meaningful manner than the current Compliance
Review regime; and
whether the system will detect a much higher
percentage of dangerous motor carriers that either need
major and immediate reforms to their safety management or
to stop operating.
FMCSA Still Not Imposing Maximum Penalties Allowed by Law: FMCSA
still avoids getting tough with motor carrier violators and we hope
there will be a change with the new leadership. The agency still evades
the imposition of tough penalties that would send a message to all
truck and motorcoach companies that the agency means business. Congress
indicated in the agency's authorizing law that civil penalties had not
been sufficiently used to deter violations.\69\ Stiffer penalties than
are currently levied against offending motor carriers would provide a
strong deterrence to prevent other companies from committing serious
violations.
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\69\ MCSIA, 3(2).
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FMCSA administers civil penalties allowed under the civil penalties
section of the transportation code.\70\ Despite the fact that this
section has been amended a number of times in an effort to strengthen
the legally allowed penalties, the statute affords the agency
considerable discretion in setting the amount of penalties to be
imposed and requires at the threshold only modest maximum penalties.
Motor carriers--the trucking, motorcoach, and bus companies--are liable
for a maximum penalty of $10,000 for each offense, while the motor
carrier employees who are actually responsible for committing the
violations are subject to no more than a fine of $2,500 per
offense.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ 49 U.S.C. 521(b).
\71\ Id. at 521(b)(2)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Historically, the agency has through its policies and
interpretations limited the penalties it has imposed. For example,
Congress made it clear in the agency's enabling legislation that FMCSA
was supposed to assess maximum financial penalties for commission of
certain acute or chronic motor carrier safety regulatory violations
after the commission of two offenses or a pattern of violations.\72\
However, the GAO found that the agency did not assess maximum fines for
a pattern of violations.\73\ The same GAO report also found that the
agency misinterpreted the statutory basis for imposing maximum fines,
assessing maximum fines only after a third violation rather than
following a second violation.
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\72\ MCSIA, 222 states:
(b) Establishment--The Secretary--* * *
(2) shall assess the maximum civil penalty for each violation of a
law referred to in subsection (a) by any person who is found to have
committed a pattern of violations of critical or acute regulations
issued to carry out such a law or to have previously committed the same
or a related violation of critical or acute regulations issued to carry
out such a law.
\73\ Motor Carrier Safety: Federal Agency Identifies Many High-risk
Carriers but Does not Assess Maximum Fines as often as Required by Law,
GAO-07-584, Aug. 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even after FMCSA corrected its policy,\74\ the modified enforcement
policy is not as tough as it looks. A number of roadblocks keep the
agency from imposing maximum penalties for a ``pattern'' of violations.
First, a ``pattern'' of violations must be those that occur when the
FMCSA discovers two or more critical and/or acute violations in each of
three or more different regulatory parts (i.e., a minimum of six acute
and/or critical violations). In practice, the agency again restricted
the assessment of monetary penalties to fewer violators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ 74 FR 14184 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the revised policy again limits maximum penalties for a
pattern of violations only if the carrier has had prior ``contact''
with FMCSA or a state enforcement authority.\75\ This means that a
previous CR had been carried out or that the carrier had undergone a
new entrant motor carrier exit audit (performed before FMCSA accords
permanent operating). But FMCSA specifically excludes the more numerous
roadside inspections as the basis for providing the necessary prior
contact even though the driver and carrier clearly are informed about
violations of safety rules and regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Id. The information is contained in a prefatory note inserted
into the updated Recommendations for Executive Action section of the
Aug. 28, 2007, GAO study. This later insert is itself undated, but it
cites FMCSA's March 2009 supplemental policy published in the FR on
assessing maximum fines that revises the agency's characterization of a
``pattern of violations'' and what violations constitute a ``two
strikes'' ruling by the agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A third condition is that FMCSA must also judge that it is
reasonably likely that previous contact with the agency, through a CR
or a new entrant safety audit, ``alerts'' the carrier to FMCSA's
enforcement and regulatory jurisdiction over certain motor carrier
violations. This in itself is a startling criterion because it directly
implies that the agency may not be able to impose civil penalties for
violations, even repeat violations, on motor carriers who are or claim
to be unaware that their interstate operations fall under FMCSA's
jurisdiction. This means that the carrier has never been adequately
informed of its responsibilities as an interstate motor carrier, or of
the agency's authority to impose penalties. Ensuring that every motor
carrier, starting with new entrants, is aware of this information and
the agency's power to impose penalties for rule violations should be a
routine agency responsibility and failure to do so is appalling and
unacceptable.
One aspect of the new policy is even less demanding than previous
policy. Under the previous fines provision, proposed maximum penalties
could not be settled for less than the amount assessed. However, under
the new policy, all penalties, including patterns and two repeated
violation penalties may be settled with FMCSA suspending a part of the
assessed penalty for a variety of reasons. Also, the criteria for
assessing maximum penalties are limited. Maximum penalties will be only
applied in cases where an acute, not a critical, violation is
discovered during an investigation within 6 years of a previously
closed case that contained a finding of violation of a critical or
acute regulation in the same FMCSRs and/or HMRs part. Violations of
different parts of the FMCSRs or HMRs do not count.
These examples of enforcement policies show that even when FMCSA
obeys the letter of the law, it can find a way to use agency discretion
to undermine both the standards for imposing fines as well as the
amount of the fines themselves.
Finally, FMCSA admits in its updated study on the effectiveness of
monetary penalties that it cannot determine whether the changed penalty
structure and amounts of fines have a beneficial effect on motor
carrier violation rates and on motor carrier safety.\76\ Part of the
problem is that the agency has imposed substantially different amounts
of fines from year to year. Even after the maximum penalty amount was
increased, average nonrecordkeeping penalties plummeted from $5,066 in
2000 to $2,938 in 2006.\77\ The latter figure is only a little more
than 29 percent of the maximum permitted by law. It is clear that
raising penalty ceilings in Federal legislation while allowing broad
agency discretion in the amounts of penalties actually imposed does not
ensure that violations trigger stiff penalties or promote deterrence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ FMCSA states in its study of civil penalties:
[I]t was determined during the original analysis that it is not
possible to isolate the effects of the revisions to the civil penalty
schedule on carrier behavior from other elements of the CR program or
other FMCSA programs (e.g., the roadside inspection program). Other
actions that could be taken against a carrier as a result of a CR
include: placing a carrier out of service (OOS) for reasons other than
nonpayment of fines, and determining that a carrier is unfit to
operate. Also, it is not possible to isolate the effects of TEA-21
penalty revisions from other civil penalty revisions that follow in
later years. Therefore, the 2004 study focused primarily on the impact
of the changes in the revised civil penalty schedule on the dollar
amount of the fines assessed to the carrier and on the number of
violations assessed.
Analysis of FMCSA's Revised Civil Penalties (1995-2006): A Follow-
up Study, FMCSA, U.S. Department of Transportation, Aug. 2009, at v.
\77\ Id., Table 4, at 11.
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Recommendations:
Congress should request a GAO study of FMCSA's imposition of
penalties for motor carrier safety violations to determine:
whether the current higher maximum penalty amounts are
actually deterring motor carriers from committing
violations;
the extent to which FMCSA has reduced or compromised
penalty amounts in a manner that results in lower penalties
per violation and per motor carrier;
the extent to which motor carriers regard current
levels of imposed penalties as acceptable costs of doing
business rather than as a deterrent; and
whether setting statutory minimum required penalties
is necessary and appropriate, and to recommend such minimum
amounts.
FMCSA Does Not Have a Reliable Method to Detect Illegally
``Reincarnated'' or ``Chameleon'' Motor Carriers from Restarting
Operations under a False Identity: At present, it is simply unknown
what is the number of illegally operating carriers that have restarted
their trucking and motorcoach companies as new entrants to mask prior
operations, and to avoid paying large fines and complying with out of
service orders.
It has become increasingly apparent that FMCSA's methods of
detecting whether a motor carrier is legitimately registered with the
agency and has legal operating authority are unreliable and unsafe.
Thousands of motor carriers subject to heavy fines from repeated, past
violations and even given stop operations orders sink out of sight and
then re-appear as supposed new entrants seeking registration and
initial operating authority from FMCSA.
In 2008, the horrific crash of a motorcoach in Sherman, Texas,
resulted in the deaths of 17 passengers and injuries to the driver and
the other 38 passengers. As referenced previously in this testimony,
the motorcoach was operated by Angel Tours, which had been stopped from
operating by FMCSA just weeks prior to the crash but continued to
operate under the new name Iguala Busmex. Angel Tours had an extremely
poor safety record and had been ordered by the agency to cease
operations.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Highway Accident Report--Motorcoach Run-Off-The-Bridge and
Rollover, Sherman Texas, Aug. 8, 2008, NTSB/HAR-09/02, http://
www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2009/har0902.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB investigation found that the numerous safety violations of
the motorcoach and its drivers were a continuation of the company's
exceptionally poor safety record when it registered with FMCSA as a new
company. NTSB determined that FMCSA processes for vetting new entrant
carriers through the use of its New Applicant Screening Program were
inadequate for identifying the motorcoach company as an operation that
had deceptively re-incorporated--a ``reincarnated'' or ``chameleon''
carrier--to evade agency enforcement actions. That failed screening
process had allowed hundreds of motorcoach and trucking companies to
escape detection as illegal, new motor carriers.
In a separate study, GAO tried to determine the number of
motorcoach carriers registered with FMCSA as new entrants in FY 2007
and FY 2008 that are substantially related to previous companies or
are, in fact, the same companies that have ``reincarnated'' themselves
as new operations. GAO found 20 motorcoach companies that had
reappeared as new companies from old companies, representing about 9
percent of 220 interstate motorcoach companies that FMCSA placed out of
service during those two Fiscal Years. (These 220 companies are part of
the approximately 4,000 motorcoach companies registered with FMCSA in
FY 2008.) According to GAO, this percentage is probably an
underestimation of the number of ``chameleon'' carriers in operation
that have disguised their prior, unsafe operations to hide their
reincarnation from the agency.
FMCSA officials admitted to GAO that until the 2008 motorcoach
crash in Sherman, Texas, reincarnating was easy to do and hard to
detect. In fact, five of the 20 carriers identified by GAO were still
operating in May 2009, and GAO referred them to the agency for
investigation. GAO also found another 1,073 trucking companies that
appeared to be reincarnated ``chameleon'' carriers, which FMCSA had not
detected.\79\ Although FMCSA has instituted a new process for detecting
such carriers, GAO has not evaluated its effectiveness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Motor Carrier Safety: Reincarnating Commercial Vehicle
Companies Pose Safety Threat to Motoring Public--Federal Safety Agency
Has Initiated Efforts to Prevent Future Occurrences, GAO-09-924, July
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A follow-up study is badly needed to determine whether FMCSA's new
procedures for detecting ``reincarnated'' carriers has made substantial
inroads on the number of illicit trucking and motorcoach companies
currently operating as new companies.
Recommendations:
Congress should direct FMCSA to require the principal
officers of each new entrant motor carrier to declare, on the
new entrant application, under penalties for perjury, that the
new entrant is not a reincarnated or previously operating motor
carrier with a different DOT registration number;
GAO should conduct a follow up investigation to assess
whether the FMCSA's new process for detecting ``reincarnated''
carriers is effective.
Conclusion
Creation of a new Federal agency to oversee motor carrier and
motorcoach safety has not resulted in the rigorous oversight and
enforcement that Congress directed and the public expected. Safety
goals are not met but merely changed, rulemakings are routinely
overturned in legal challenges because of faulty reasoning and illegal
underpinnings, enforcement is sporadic and weak, and unsafe carriers
and drivers continue to operate with near impunity. Every year
thousands are killed and over 100,000 injured in truck crashes, every
month on average there is a serious motorcoach crash, and every day
tough safety regulations to combat driver fatigue, improve enforcement
and train new commercial drivers are delayed. While we hope the new
leadership team at DOT will set this agency on a new course, it will
still be necessary for Congress to conduct constant oversight and
provide clear direction to this agency if we expect any strong and
sustained progress in reducing deaths and injuries. Advocates thanks
you for your leadership and looks forward to working with you on
advancing motor carrier safety.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
Mr. Osiecki?
STATEMENT OF DAVID J. OSIECKI, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, POLICY
AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC.
Mr. Osiecki. Chairman Lautenberg, my name is Dave Osiecki,
and I am the Senior Vice President for Policy and Regulatory
Affairs for the American Trucking Associations.
Mr. Chairman, we share your goal of keeping unsafe and
unqualified operators off the road. My remarks will summarize
my extensive written statement.
At the outset, it is important to note that the trucking
industry has made great strides and is the safest it has ever
been. In 2008, the latest year for which data is available, the
number of injuries and fatalities in truck-involved crashes
reached their lowest level since the USDOT began keeping
records. There were 1,166 fewer fatalities in 2008 than in
1998, remarkable progress in light of the trucking industry
operating 1.3 million additional trucks and 31 billion more
miles in 2008 compared to 1998. I will also add that is the
year just prior to FMCSA's creation.
While this is excellent progress, we know we can do more.
Improving motor carrier and highway safety is about
understanding the behaviors that cause crashes and addressing
the factors that raise crash risk. Future programs and
Government-issued rules will only succeed to the degree that
they address causation and actual crash risk. This should be a
litmus test for new rules, programs, and new countermeasures.
On the CSA 2010 initiative, ATA also shares its goals. It
is a far more sophisticated system and one that we have
encouraged. Conceptually it is very good because it is based on
mainly on safety performance and it measures specific driver-
related behaviors. It is intended to better focus limited
enforcement resources and it will provide real-time carrier
safety performance ratings. ATA has a number of recommendations
to further improve it.
Number one, we are urging the agency to make crash
accountability or causation determinations on truck-involved
crashes before entering them into a carrier's profile. In other
words, hold carriers and drivers accountable for crashes they
cause.
Number two, vehicle miles traveled in lieu of the number of
trucks should be used as a carrier's exposure measure.
And number three, FMCSA should focus on using actual
citations and not unadjudicated warnings in the system. These
changes will help FMCSA better target carriers and drivers most
in need of Government intervention.
Turning to hours of service, the rules are working and they
should be retained virtually unchanged. The rules have been in
place for 6 years now, and we all have the benefit of real-
world safety and operational data. Comparing 2008 to 2003, the
year before the rules went into effect, there were 807 fewer
fatalities in 2008 and 32,000 fewer injuries. This progress was
made in 2008 versus 2003, even with more than one million
additional large trucks on the road operating an additional 10
billion miles. By providing a longer off-duty period between
work shifts, the rules have provided greater opportunities for
more restorative rest for drivers.
ATA is seeking one of hours-of-service rule change, though.
The rigid sleeper berth rule should be modified to allow
limited flexibility. This would encourage greater use of
circadian-friendly naps which promote safety and driver health.
On the electronic on-board recorder issue, ATA supports the
policy approach of targeting noncompliant companies with a
remedial directive. It is a good first and incremental step and
will allow FMCSA and the industry to capture additional data on
the benefits of these devices to inform future regulatory
actions on this issue.
Moving beyond Government initiatives, ATA has developed its
own safety agenda. All of our recommendations are included in
my written statement, but I would like to briefly highlight
three.
Number one, ATA recommends a return to a national maximum
speed limit of 65 miles per hour for all vehicles.
Number two, the speed of all large trucks manufactured
after 1992 should be electronically limited, or governed in the
industry parlance, at a maximum speed not to exceed 65 miles
per hours.
And number three, ATA recommends 50-State implementation of
FMCSA's selective traffic enforcement program, known as
ticketing aggressive cars and trucks. It targets risky
operating behaviors of both passenger and commercial vehicle
drivers.
ATA fully recognizes the political challenges over the
years of enacting a national speed limit. However, if our
Government does not have the political will to more effectively
address speed and aggressive driving on our Nation's highways,
we will continue to have a huge gap in our national highway
safety strategy.
A few final thoughts. A singular reliance on enforcement of
rules, given the size and diversity of the trucking industry,
will not allow us to achieve our shared safety goals. FMCSA
should not just focus on regulations. It should develop tools
and resources that help foster safety. Using the stick is
clearly necessary for some, and ATA supports its use when
appropriate. Using the carrot is far more effective for the
majority. Government, working with industry, can facilitate a
more effective approach by providing safety management tools
like a drug and alcohol test results clearinghouse and a driver
conviction notification system. These and other tools will help
carriers more actively manage safety. We fully support Senator
Pryor's Safe Road Act, S. 1113, which would establish a drug
and alcohol results clearinghouse. Promoting a more active
safety management approach will facilitate even greater safety
improvements.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I thank you
for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Osiecki follows:]
Prepared Statement of David J. Osiecki, Senior Vice President, Policy
and Regulatory Affairs, American Trucking Associations, Inc.
Introduction
Chairman Lautenberg, Senator Thune, members of the Subcommittee, my
name is Dave Osiecki, and I am the Senior Vice President of Policy and
Regulatory Affairs for the American Trucking Associations (ATA). ATA is
the national trade association for the trucking industry, and is a
federation of affiliated state trucking associations, conferences and
organizations that together have more than 37,000 motor carrier members
representing every type and class of motor carrier in the country.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Mr. Chairman, today I will speak about the trucking industry's
recent safety accomplishments and the remarkable long-term improvement
in the industry's safety record. I will also talk about the need for a
fundamental change in the government's approach to truck safety if we
are to make further, significant safety gains. To bring about further
meaningful improvements in truck safety, as a truck safety community,
we need to move beyond the compliance and enforcement model to a more
proactive safety management model.
I will also discuss ATA's views on FMCSA's oversight programs such
as CSA 2010 and rulemakings such as hours of service. Finally, I will
introduce ATA's progressive safety agenda which, if adopted, will
provide the tools to help the industry move beyond the current model to
a more comprehensive safety management model that will help us achieve
even more significant safety gains.
The Industry's Safety Record
The trucking industry is the safest it has ever been and continues
to get even safer. For example:
The truck-involved fatality rate has decreased 66 percent
since 1975, the first year the USDOT began keeping records.
Over the past decade alone, the truck-involved fatality rate
has dropped by 32 percent.
In actual numbers, there were 1,166 fewer fatalities in 2008
than in 1998--remarkable progress in light of the trucking
industry operating 1.3 million additional trucks and 31 billion
more miles in 2008 (compared to 1998).
The truck-involved injury rate has decreased 58 percent
since 1988, the first year USDOT began keeping records.
Over the past decade alone, the truck-involved injury rate
dropped by 39 percent.
In 2008, the truck-involved fatality and injury rates fell
to their lowest levels since USDOT began keeping statistics.
More importantly, in 2008, the number of injuries and
fatalities in truck-involved crashes reached their lowest ever
levels since USDOT began keeping records.
Comparing 2008 to 2003 (the year before the new hours-of-
service rules became effective) there were 807 fewer fatalities
in 2008 (a 16 percent decrease), and 32,000 fewer injuries (a
26 percent decrease).
Even with this excellent safety progress, some may try to minimize
these accomplishments by telling this Committee, and the public, that
large trucks are significantly over involved in fatal crashes. Should
some organizations make this statement, it is inaccurate and extremely
misleading. Allow me to explain.
Some industry and government critics use truck registration figures
as a measure of exposure, not truck mileage, which is the commonly
accepted measure. Further, they choose not to point out that trucks
have overall crash rates less than half that of other vehicles.
Admittedly, when they do occur, truck crashes are generally more severe
than light vehicle crashes, due to size and weight differences between
large trucks and passenger vehicles. It is important to understand that
trucks are not more likely to be involved in a crash, but truck crashes
are slightly more likely to result in a fatality when they do occur.
This is the case not because trucks are less safe, as some would have
you believe, but due to Newtonian physics.
Necessary Steps for Continued Improvement
ATA and the trucking industry is proud of its safety progress and
we believe it is, at least in part, the result of many safety
initiatives ATA has fought for--and achieved--over the past decades
including mandatory drug and alcohol testing, the commercial driver's
license program, and well-reasoned hours-of-service regulations based
on sound science. Yet, truck safety is about more than regulations. It
is about understanding the factors that create crash risk and the
behaviors and events that precipitate (i.e., cause) crashes. It is
about programs, countermeasures and preventive actions that truly
address those risks and behaviors. Future FMCSA rules and programs will
only succeed to the degree to which they focus on and address crash
risk and causation.
Later in this statement, following discussion of four current FMCSA
initiatives, I will address the future steps ATA believes are necessary
in order to make significant highway safety progress going forward.
Truck Safety Oversight--Current FMCSA Initiatives
ATA appreciates this opportunity to offer its views on some of
FMCSA's current truck safety oversight initiatives, specifically:
Comprehensive Safety Analysis (CSA) 2010
Hours of Service
Electronic Logging
New Entrant Carriers
1. Comprehensive Safety Analysis (CSA) 2010
ATA generally supports the CSA 2010 initiative since: (1) it is
primarily based on safety performance and behaviors rather than
compliance with paperwork requirements; (2) focuses limited enforcement
resources on specific areas of deficiency (rather than comprehensive
on-site audits); and (3) will eventually provide real-time, updated
safety performance measurements. In addition, FMCSA plans to employ
root-cause analysis of safety problems during its interventions with
carriers. In concept, CSA 2010 is very good and could have a positive
impact on truck safety. However, the devil is in the details of this
program, and ATA has a number of concerns with, and recommendations to
improve, ``the details.''
ATA has numerous improvement recommendations, but we are focused on
the three outlined below. ATA believe changes and improvements in these
three key areas will have the greatest impact on motor carriers and
highway safety in general. ATA's intent in highlighting these areas and
making the corresponding recommendations for improvement is to help
ensure that relatively safe carriers are not selected for interventions
and, more importantly, to ensure that unsafe carriers are selected.
A. Risk Exposure Measurement--Power Unit Count vs. Vehicle Miles
Traveled--With respect to carrier exposure, ATA's principle concern is
that FMCSA is planning to use a count of each carrier's power units
(i.e., number of trucks) as the measure of risk exposure rather than
the total number of miles these vehicles travel. As a result, carriers
who employ greater utilization of their trucks will have more true
exposure to crashes and other safety related events, but will be
compared to carriers who have less exposure--though the same number of
trucks. This problem is especially acute for trucking companies that
utilize team drivers to move expedited freight since their trucks
travel more miles and, as a result, have more exposure to adverse
safety events. ATA has been and will continue to urge FMCSA to use
vehicle miles traveled as the exposure measure in CSA 2010.
B. Crash Accountability--In measuring safety performance, CSA 2010
considers all DOT-defined crashes in the scoring and ranking
calculations--including those crashes for which the motor carrier and
professional driver could not reasonably be held accountable. This is a
significant problem in the system since many truck crashes are two
vehicle crashes that are initiated by the actions of the driver of the
other (non-commercial) vehicle involved. Accordingly, a carrier
involved in a number of crashes for which it was not responsible is
judged by CSA 2010 to be just as unsafe as a like-sized carrier who was
involved in the same number of crashes--but caused them. ATA has been
and will continue to urge FMCSA to make crash accountability
determinations on DOT-recordable crashes, and use motor carrier-
accountable crashes in CSA 2010. This process should be in place prior
to full-scale implementation.
C. Warnings for Moving Violations--CSA 2010 counts all moving
violations reported on roadside inspection reports, regardless of
whether or not a citation was ultimately issued to the commercial
driver for the violation. This presents several problems. First, since
these are merely warnings, there is no due process procedure for
drivers to challenge these violations. Second, in some states law
enforcement officers must have probable cause in order to stop a truck
and conduct a vehicle inspection. In these states, it is common
practice for enforcement officials to stop trucks for very minor
speeding offenses (e.g., 3 mph over the limit), and issue warnings as
justification to conduct inspections. As a result, carriers operating
in probable cause states are disproportionately impacted and are very
likely to have worse driver violation scores than carriers who operate
elsewhere. ATA is urging FMCSA to focus on using citation data in the
system and discard ``warnings.''
ATA has identified a number of additional problems with respect to
how the proposed methodology will function. ATA's underlying concern is
that the system will not reliably target truly unsafe carriers for
intervention. However, we are generally supportive of the program since
it focuses on performance-based information and strives to use the
agency's limited resources to more efficiently impact unsafe motor
carriers.
2. Hours of Service
The current hours-of-service rules should be retained virtually
unchanged. ATA's position is based on three primary tenets:
The current hours-of-service rules have provided more
restorative rest for commercial drivers. This has had a
positive impact on highway safety and has improved compliance
with the regulations;
Modifying the interdependent components of the rules in any
substantial way would likely negatively impact highway safety
by disrupting the circadian-friendly sleep patterns the current
rule has helped to establish; and
Changes in the rules that reduce productivity would have
significant economic consequences, upsetting the equilibrium
mandated by Congress and achieved by the current rules.
While it was mentioned above, the excellent safety progress made by
the trucking industry while operating under these new rules is worth
repeating. Comparing 2008 to 2003 (the year before the new hours-of-
service rules took effect) there were 807 fewer fatalities in 2008 (a
16 percent decrease), and 32,000 fewer injuries (a 26 percent
decrease). In addition, in 2008 there were 49 fewer truck occupant
fatalities (a 7 percent decrease) than in 2003. This progress was made
in 2008 (versus 2003) with more than a million additional large trucks
on the road operating almost 10 billion additional miles.
In addition to this safety progress, the data and analysis the
agency has developed over the past nearly 10 years on driver alertness
and hours of service supports retention of the current rule, with one
exception. ATA believes, as do the overwhelming majority of
professional drivers, that FMCSA should modify the current sleeper
berth provision (49 CFR, 395.1 (g)) to allow for additional, limited
flexibility that will ultimately improve driver alertness and
subsequently improve highway safety. Additional flexibility in the
sleeper berth rule would encourage the use of short rest breaks which
would promote safety and driver health by:
Encouraging circadian friendly naps (e.g., naps in the
afternoon);
Promoting shorter continuous driving periods;
Helping to reduce highway congestion; and
Increasing operational flexibility.
Giving drivers limited flexibility based on their use of the
sleeper berth would give them a useful tool to manage fatigue, avoid
times of highway congestion, rest when they feel tired, and otherwise
take actions that would improve the quality of the driving job.
Research conducted since the current rules were issued suggests that
such limited flexibility would ultimately further improve highway
safety.
On April 22, 2010, ATA filed extensive hours-of-service comments
with FMCSA and, following today's hearing, we plan to share these with
the Committee as further information.
3. Electronic Logging \1\
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\1\ The FMCSA refers to such devices as ``electronic on-board
recording devices'' (EOBRs). However, this term is commonly used to
describe comprehensive fleet management systems that do far more than
simply monitor hours-of-service compliance. To distinguish these more
comprehensive systems from the ones that FMCSA intended to address in
this final rule, ATA uses the term ``electronic logging devices'' to
describe devices that merely track hours-of-service compliance.
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ATA has, for years, supported a requirement that seriously non-
compliant carriers be mandated to install electronic logging devices.
We applaud FMCSA's recently released final rule on this matter since it
does just that. ATA also supports meaningful incentives for safe and
compliant carriers to voluntarily adopt use of the devices.
Unfortunately, the incentives offered in the final rule are weak, at
best, and will do little to incent voluntary adoption of the devices.
In our comments to the agency's proposed rule in 2007, ATA offered
many suggestions for incentives FMCSA could offer that would be
effective in promoting voluntary adoption. These incentives included
scheduling flexibility that would allow carriers to extend the 14-hour
on duty period up to 2 hours for rest and meal breaks, and additional
flexibility for drivers using the split sleeper berth provision in the
regulations. However, FMCSA seemed to dismiss these suggestions since
there were neither acknowledged nor mentioned in the final rule.
We also have some concerns with the technical and performance
specifications for these devices as laid out in the final rule. For
instance, the process for assigning driver identification numbers could
lend itself to fraud. Further, the rule does not provide for a strong
certification program to ensure that the devices are compliant and
tamperproof. Finally, the design specifications require that the
devices operate in such a wide temperature range that manufactures will
have to make fairly radical, costly design changes for their devices to
meet the new requirements.
4. New Entrant Carriers
Oversight of new motor carriers is an important FMCSA function. ATA
believes that new motor carrier owners, both interstate and intrastate,
should be required to satisfactorily complete a safety training class
before commencing operation. Further, safety training curricula should
meet uniform standards nationwide. Finally, ATA believes FMCSA's
initial safety inspection of a new motor carrier should be conducted
within 6 months of when a carrier initiates operations, rather than in
the current 18 month timeframe.
Crash Causation and Prevention
FMCSA only regulates part of the highway safety equation:
commercial motor vehicles. Yet the single largest factor impacting
truck safety is the behavior of other motorists. Approximately 85
percent of truck crashes involve other vehicles. Since FMCSA does not
regulate the operation of all vehicles, it is encumbered in its efforts
to reduce truck-involved crashes.
As mentioned earlier, to truly be effective in improving commercial
motor vehicle safety, FMCSA must address the primary causes of crashes.
FMCSA's own research shows that in the majority of large truck/
passenger vehicle crashes, the driver of a passenger vehicle was the
sole party cited for a related factor (e.g., speeding, failure to
yield).\2\ Numerous additional studies have analyzed crash data and
arrived at the same conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Department of Transportation: Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, Report to Congress on the Large Truck Crash Causation
Study, (2006).
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For instance, a University of Michigan Research Institute (UMTRI)
study of 8,309 fatal-car truck crashes examined driver factors in these
crashes and found that car drivers made errors in 81 percent of these
crashes and trucks drivers 26 percent. Some would have you believe that
these figures are slanted because in most instances the truck driver
survives the collision to ``tell his side of the story.'' However, the
same study looked at crashes where both drivers survived (but there was
some other resulting fatality). The result: the driver error
proportions for these crashes were very similar to the entire sample.
In 2002, the AAA Traffic Safety Foundation sponsored research
similar to the aforementioned UMTRI study. The AAA study analyzed more
than 10,000 fatal car-truck crashes that occurred between 1995 and
1998. This study, too, found car drivers to be disproportionately coded
for related factors (e.g., speeding, failure to yield) in these
crashes. Specifically, 80 percent of the car drivers had been
attributed a related factor by the investigating officer while 27
percent of truck drivers had been attributed a related factor in these
events.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, Identifying Unsafe Driver
Actions that Lead to Fatal Car-Truck Crashes, Washington, D.C., (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, two recent studies conducted by the Virginia Tech
Transportation Institute (VTTI) collected data on 210 car/truck
incidents using both video and non-video data. The evidence, much of it
video, showed that 78 percent of these incidents were initiated by car
drivers, while the remaining 22 percent were initiated by truck
drivers.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Virginia Tech Transportation Institute, A Descriptive Analysis
of Light Vehicle-Heavy Vehicle Interactions Using In Situ Driving Data,
(2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since meaningful solutions to commercial motor vehicle safety
require a focus on the primary causes of crashes, FMCSA should direct
even more resources toward awareness, education and traffic enforcement
programs to address the role of passenger vehicles in car/truck
crashes. In light of the agency's statutory limitation on regulating
only commercial motor vehicles, the agency must continue find new and
creative ways to address this part of the truck-involved crash problem.
FMCSA's ``Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks'' program is one such
program, albeit a small program, aimed directly at the high risk
behaviors--those that cause crashes--of both car and truck drivers.
This program that has been evaluated and shown to be effective. As a
result, FMCSA should work to implement it as part of each state's motor
carrier safety assistance program.
Another means FMCSA has to impact truck-involved multi-vehicle
crashes is to give motor carriers the tools to avert them. For example,
regulatory or enforcement-related incentives to adopt crash avoidance
technologies will give motor carriers the means to better prevent such
crashes.
As a matter of practice, the trucking industry holds itself to a
very high standard with respect to crash accountability. Trucking
companies evaluate each crash not merely to establish fault, but to
determine if the crash could have been prevented in any way. In other
terms, they must determine if the driver could have taken any action to
have averted the crash. If the motor carrier finds that the accident
was preventable (based on a set of uniformly accepted industry
criteria), then the driver is held responsible for the crash. FMCSA's
Safety Rating Methodology employs this same standard. Any crash that is
preventable is counted against the carrier in FMCSA's Safety Rating
Methodology.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 49 C.F.R., Part 385, Appendix B, Section II, Subsection B, (e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is worthy of note because motor carriers recognize that the
key to reducing crashes is finding ways to prevent them, regardless of
fault. Congress and FMCSA must adopt this approach as well. In order to
further reduce commercial motor vehicle crashes, as a community, we
must recognize the scope of the problem, understand the primary causes
of these crashes, and have the political will to put programs in place
that address all parts of the truck safety equation.
The Regulatory Compliance and Enforcement Model
Using the regulatory compliance and enforcement model in the future
as the primary means to impact truck safety will yield limited returns,
since it only addresses one of the many essential elements of an
effective safety program. ATA recognizes that this model is necessary,
and we support it. However, this model alone will be insufficient to
achieve maximum results. Other safety interventions and
countermeasures, beyond regulatory compliance, can address the main
causes of crashes even more directly. Taking a broader approach to
safety, that is, moving beyond a compliance and enforcement model, will
enable even greater safety improvements.
This broader approach must embrace a variety of solutions.
Government and industry together can facilitate various active safety
interventions, and in fact, some of these interventions depend on
government and industry action in order to be implemented. In ATA's
view, the most innovative and effective future oversight programs will
be the ones that provide motor carriers with the tools to support
carrier-based safety improvements.
Here are some examples of FMCSA's current approach to truck safety
oversight and how a broader approach to addressing true crash risk and
the behaviors could be more effective.
Hours of Service
The current hours-of-service rules are good rules and have
facilitated safety improvements. As described above, ATA supports these
rules. ATA is concerned, though, that FMCSA is too focused on
regulating time on task (driving hours) as the principal tool to
prevent fatigue-related crashes. Crash statistics show that the vast
majority of fatigue-related crashes occur in the first 8 hours of
driving (i.e., where the actual risk is), not at the end of the
driver's shift, where relative risk may be higher but actual risk is
miniscule. In light of this fact, focusing on driving hours and, more
specifically, focusing on differences in risk between driving in the
9th, 10th or 11th hour of a shift, largely misses the point.
From the medical community ATA has learned that drivers with
certain health issues and poor sleep hygiene habits are far more likely
to suffer from chronic drowsiness. We also know that time of day,
specifically the body's natural circadian rhythms, plays a greater role
in driver alertness than time on task. FMCSA could more effectively
address fatigue-related crashes by incenting carriers to implement
wellness programs, to install alertness monitoring systems, and to
develop fatigue management programs that help drivers understand and
better manage circadian rhythms.
Drug and Alcohol Test Clearinghouse
The current drug and alcohol testing regulations have helped to
ensure that alcohol and drugs play a very limited role in commercial
motor vehicle crashes. However, there is a well-known loophole in the
current testing program that is being exploited by some drug-abusing
drivers. When a driver moves from one trucking company to another, some
``positive'' drug and alcohol test results are not being discovered by
the hiring company because these ``positive'' results and the driver's
work history are self-reported, and not centrally tracked.
To close this loophole, ATA has, for more than a decade, advocated
the development of a clearinghouse for positive drug and alcohol test
results, so that drivers cannot evade the consequences of their actions
by ``job-hopping,'' intentionally mis-communicating their work
histories, or otherwise failing to remove themselves from service.
However, until very recently, neither FMCSA nor the U.S. Department of
Transportation's drug and alcohol policy office seemed to share ATA's
urgency to create such a database, but instead focused its resources on
verifying that motor carriers comply with minimum required random
testing rates.
The Safety Management Model
Today's safety professionals see compliance with safety rules and
regulations as a single component of a more comprehensive safety
management program. The most effective programs are founded on the
principle that the best way to reduce accidents is to focus on
individual behaviors that create the greatest risk. Most crashes are
the result of personal judgments and poor decisions, not compliance or
non-compliance with a regulation.
If every driver were motivated by avoidance of government-imposed
consequences, then the compliance and enforcement model would be
adequate. Yet, individuals respond not only to rules, but to a sense of
personal responsibility, personal enrichment and formal recognition. In
other words, people generally respond better to the carrot versus the
stick. Understanding this key principle, FMCSA could employ creative
initiatives such as a formal recognition of safe drivers in its safety
monitoring systems, advocating a special CDL designation for drivers
with exemplary safety records, and the like.
The National Safety Council promotes 14 Elements of a Successful
Safety and Health Program. Of note, though, is that only one of these
elements is directly related to regulatory compliance. In addition,
FMCSA's own Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee has identified 20
non-regulatory safety practices that can improve commercial motor
vehicle safety. In short, both of these groups recognize that
compliance alone is insufficient for maximum safety.
To be even more effective in its mission, FMCSA should be creative
in evaluating how it can provide tools and resources that will foster
truck safety. For instance, FMCSA could gather and promote the most
common and effective risk avoidance strategies employed by motor
carriers. Also, the agency, with the backing of Congress, should
develop programs that incent carriers to adopt advanced safety
technologies such as collision mitigation systems, lane departure
warning systems, electronic stability control and emergency warning/
braking systems.
Another example is the development of an employer notification
system. Under FMCSA's current compliance and enforcement model, safety
investigators verify that motor carriers have obtained motor vehicle
records on each of their drivers annually. Sometimes these records
reflect violations that occurred as much as eleven months prior. To
provide more timely information, ATA has advocated a nationwide
employer notification system that would promptly alert a motor carrier
each time one its drivers had been convicted of a moving violation or
the like. Access to such timely information would go a long way toward
helping motor carriers swiftly address problem behaviors before they
impact safety.
ATA's Safety Agenda
The highway system is the workplace of millions of hard-working,
professional truck drivers. As such, it is ATA's role to take a
leadership position in making our workplace safer. To that end, ATA has
developed an aggressive safety agenda with the goal of further reducing
the number of motor vehicle fatalities and injuries. The agenda is
comprised of multiple recommendations that address the performance of
both commercial and passenger vehicle drivers, safer vehicles, and
motor carrier performance. These recommendations are as follows:
1. ATA supports the safe use of technologies and encourages
drivers and/or motor carriers to consider a range of policies
and safeguards intended to reduce, minimize and/or eliminate
driver distractions that may be caused by the increased use of
electronic technologies (e.g., global positioning systems,
cellular phones, etc.) during the operation of all types of
motor vehicles. ATA strongly encourages and recommends that
manufacturers of these devices, vehicle manufacturers,
policymakers, motor carriers and organizations representing
motor carriers and the motoring public promote and adopt
awareness, training, and safety policies on the use of such
technologies--unless required by current laws or regulations--
during the operation of a motor vehicle on our Nation's
highways.
2. ATA recommends creation and implementation of national
performance-based commercial driver's licensing testing
standards that are more rigorous than current state standards.
CDL testing standards should be uniform across states and
oversight of third party testing entities should be
strengthened. Compliance monitoring of state CDL programs
should also require strict state compliance with the enhanced
Federal CDL standards. The existing Federal penalty should be
used to ensure state compliance with the new Federal testing
standards.
3. ATA supports a study to evaluate the cognitive functioning
and behaviors of individuals between ages 18 and 25 that could
be used to establish criteria for graduated commercial driver
licensing.
4. ATA recommends creation of more long-term truck parking as
well as smarter parking in places where there is an identified
shortage of parking.
5. ATA recommends a national, maximum 65 mph speed limit for
all motor vehicles.
6. ATA supports strategies to enhance the use of seat belts,
such as primary seat belt laws in all states; incentives and
penalties to motivate states to pass primary seat belt laws;
audible reminders for seat belt use in commercial vehicles;
contrasting colors for seat belts so law enforcement can
quickly identify non-users; state adoption of the failure to
wear a seat belt defense; and denial of workers compensation
for drivers who fail to use seat belts. ATA recommends
exploring incentives and penalties that will motivate states to
pass primary seat belt laws.
7. ATA recommends 50-state implementation of an education and
enforcement program, such as Ticketing Aggressive Cars and
Trucks, that targets the risky operating behaviors of both
passenger and commercial motor vehicle drivers.
8. ATA supports enforcement using red light cameras and
automatic speed enforcement for all vehicles deployed in high-
risk zones, such as high-crash intersections, school zones and
work zones, to reduce crash rates. Motor carriers must receive
timely access to data and photos of the power unit and the
driver. ATA opposes deployment of enforcement technology for
the purpose of revenue generation.
9. ATA supports graduated drivers licensing for non-commercial
teen drivers and wants to ensure states have good, uniform
standards for graduated driver licensing.
10. ATA affirms that members support .08 g/dl. or less as the
legal limit for blood alcohol content (BAC) for passenger
vehicle drivers and .04 g/dl. or less as the legal limit for
commercial drivers (CDL holders). Further, ATA supports
alignment with leading safety advocates on alcohol safety
topics such as administrative license revocation, ignition
interlock devices, and open container laws.
11. Although ATA does not have a position on setting speed
limiters or engine control modules (ECMs) for passenger
vehicles, ATA recommends that states consider setting the speed
limiters on the vehicles of drivers with certain driving
convictions.
12. The speed of all electronically governed class 7 and 8
trucks manufactured after 1992 used in commerce should be
governed at a maximum speed not to exceed 65 mph. Speed
limiters on newly manufactured class 7 and 8 trucks should be
made more tamperproof.
13. ATA supports crashworthiness standards for newly
manufactured class 7 and 8 trucks, and a relative scale against
which to measure a truck's crashworthiness.
14. ATA supports a mandatory national employer notification
system and recommends development of a standard protocol
specifying type, format, and frequency of information required
to be transmitted from the states. Violations/offenses to be
reported to the states should also be standardized. States
should be required to fully participate in this national system
and provide information in a timely fashion. The retention
period for violations/offenses on a driver's motor vehicle
record should be left to the state's discretion.
15. ATA recommends creation of a national clearinghouse for
positive drug and alcohol test results (this has been ATA
policy since 1999). Prior to hiring an employee, employers
would be required to check with the clearinghouse for an
applicant's failed tests and previous refusals to test.
16. ATA supports creation of the National Registry of Certified
Medical Examiners provided the certification requirements are
not unduly burdensome, the supply of examiners is sufficient in
all areas of the country, and the system allows for information
sharing among examiners.
17. ATA recommends following, shepherding, and stewarding the
safety benefits of the Driver Information Resource (DIR). ATA
recommends carriers access this data for drivers and that they
access this data prior to hiring a driver.
18. ATA recommends new motor carrier owners, both interstate
and intrastate, be required to satisfactorily complete a safety
training class before commencing operation. Safety training
curricula should meet uniform standards nationwide. The Task
Force also recommends that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) safety inspection be conducted at 6
months rather than at the current 18 months. Further, the Task
Force recommends requiring new carriers to attach proof of
training to their application for a DOT number.
For more details on each of our18 recommendations, see: http://
www.truck
line.com/Newsroom/Policy%20Papers/Safety%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf
ATA feels strongly that these recommendations should be acted on
quickly, since they will have a certain, positive impact on highway
safety. To that end, we are hopeful that these recommendations will be
a component of the safety title of upcoming highway reauthorization
legislation.
However, if such legislation continues to be delayed due to other
legislative priorities, we urge Congress to act expeditiously on a
separate safety bill that incorporates these items, so that critical
improvements to highway safety will not be delayed.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to offer our views on
how collectively we can further improve truck and highway safety. As I
mentioned at the beginning of my testimony, the trucking industry is
justifiably proud of its recent safety accomplishments as well as its
excellent long-term safety improvement. While as an industry we will
strive to continue this safety progress, it will be incremental at best
if we don't have the political will to change the fundamental
government approach to truck safety oversight.
We must move beyond the current regulatory compliance and
enforcement model as the primary means to improve truck safety.
Instead, we must move toward an active safety management model that
more directly attacks the main causes of crashes. This new model must
be based on understanding the factors that create crash risk and the
behaviors and events that precipitate crashes. It must also focus
resources on giving motor carriers tools, like a drug and alcohol
clearing house and an employer notification system, that will help
motor carriers more effectively facilitate truck and highway safety
improvement.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Mr. Spencer?
STATEMENT OF TODD SPENCER,
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Spencer. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Thune, and very distinguished members of the Subcommittee.
Thank you for inviting me to testify on matters that are
extremely important to our Nation's small business trucking
professionals and professional truck drivers.
I have been involved with trucking for more than 30 years,
first as a driver and then as an owner-operator, and now as a
representative for small business trucking professionals. I am
currently the Executive Vice President of the Owner-Operator
Independent Drivers Association, headquartered in Grain Valley,
Missouri, just outside Kansas City.
The majority of trucking in this country is small business,
as 96 percent of all carriers have less than 20 trucks in their
fleet, and 86 percent of the carriers have fleets of just six
or fewer trucks. In fact, one-truck motor carriers represent
nearly half of the total number of motor carriers operating in
the United States. These small business motor carriers have an
intensely personal and vested interest in highway safety as any
safety-related incident may not only affect their personal
health, but it could put them out of business. As such OOIDA
sincerely desires to see further improvements in highway safety
and significant progress toward the highway safety goals of
this subcommittee and the Department of Transportation.
I want to begin my comments by commending the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration and Administrator Ferro for
holding the recent public hours-of-service listening sessions
and for reaching out to drivers for their real-world
perspective on what is needed and what is not. I hope the
agency heard clearly that drivers need flexibility when they
need to rest and flexibility to accommodate the unpredictable
and grossly inefficient schedules of shippers and receivers.
Some of those trucking stakeholders seem to delight in wasting
drivers' time, and some large receivers have turned their
unloading docks into profit centers. Drivers are not looking
for more hours to work. They simply want to be productive and
paid for the hours that they do work. That will not happen
until all entities in the supply chain are accountable for
their actions.
We also believe that FMCSA's 2010 initiative could be a
much better way to trigger safety audits than we have had in
the past where large carriers with far from the best safety
practices might not be audited for a decade or more. CSA 2010
is a ways from being fully implemented, but it may end up as a
particularly effective use of FMCSA's resources.
We see virtually the opposite with the agency's new entrant
audit program. The current congressional directive is that
every new carrier be audited within 18 months of their being
granted operating authority. I believe there are some 40,000
new authorities granted each year. That means 40,000 new audits
regardless of how safe motor carrier operations may be. We see
this as a tremendous waste of the agency's scarce resources. We
do not believe that any carrier, broker, or freight forwarder
should be able to apply for and receive operating authority
without thorough screening to verify that they will operate
safely and in compliance with all applicable laws and
regulations.
While a cursory review is currently required by
regulations, it is not effective. The bad guys know that.
Unscrupulous carriers and brokers have been free to flaunt the
safety rules and scam small and mid-sized carriers out of
hundreds of thousands of dollars with little fear of
repercussions. When it starts getting hot, they simply go out
of business or apply for a new operating authority under a
different name. Clearly thorough scrutiny by FMCSA needs to
take place before an operator is allowed to begin.
The first step toward achieving more improvements to
trucking industry safety is a commitment by FMCSA to vigorously
enforce all existing regulations governing motor carriers, as
well as freight brokers and other transportation
intermediaries. While we talk continuously about safety in the
trucking industry, historically there has been an acceptance of
the poor safety practices of large motor carriers. Similarly,
there has been a lack of oversight of freight brokers and other
transportation intermediaries that allows many dishonest
entities to take advantage of small business carriers, forcing
those truckers into choosing between safety and making enough
money to support their families. It must be recognized that in
trucking, economics and safety go hand in hand from the
equipment aspect where a driver is unable to pay for repairs to
his truck because he was not properly compensated despite
delivering a load on time and in good order to unrealistic
delivery schedules that put drivers in the position of driving
while fatigued or violating hours-of-service regulations.
FMCSA has jurisdiction over regulations that may be
perceived as outside the safety purview, but in reality,
regulations such as those governing lease agreements, loading/
unloading of trucks, and transportation intermediaries have a
tremendous impact on safety. Those regulations are often
directly related to the driver's bottom line.
Unfortunately, since its inception, the FMCSA has placed
little priority on enforcing these regulations being viewed as
solely economic. In fact, in most instances, the agency has
done little, if anything, to enforce those rules. This has
resulted in a trucking industry where drivers and small players
are regularly preyed on by dishonest entities who have little
fear of recourse or reprisal from the trucker they are
essentially defrauding or the Government agency expected to
oversee them.
There is a chain of responsibility in safety, and FMCSA, in
addition to being given the authority to properly govern it,
must be given the resources to adequately enforce existing
regulations. Enforcement priorities that ignore the
relationship between highway safety and coercive demands of
shippers, receivers, motor carriers, and freight brokers on
drivers are impediments to our overall safety objectives. The
demands and expectations of trucking stakeholders on drivers
are far more influential on safety than any inspection scheme
or schedule of fines that Congress or FMCSA may devise.
Unless those economic issues are addressed, drivers who
become disqualified from driving for violations and other
safety regulations will simply be replaced by new, less
experienced drivers facing the same economic pressures. It is
only by addressing the underlying economic concerns that we
will begin to see significant improvements to highway safety.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Todd Spencer, Executive Vice President,
Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association
Good morning Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to
testify on matters that are extremely important to our Nation's small
business trucking professionals and professional truck drivers.
My name is Todd Spencer. I have been involved with the trucking
industry for more than 30 years, first as a truck driver and an owner-
operator, and then as a representative for small-business trucking
professionals. I am currently the Executive Vice President of the
Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA).
OOIDA is a not-for-profit corporation established in 1973, with its
principal place of business in Grain Valley, Missouri. OOIDA is the
national trade association representing the interests of independent
owner-operators and professional drivers on all issues that affect
small-business truckers. The more than 156,000 members of OOIDA are
small-business men and women in all 50 states who collectively own and
operate more than 200,000 individual heavy-duty trucks. The Association
actively promotes the views of small business truckers through its
interaction with state and Federal regulatory agencies, legislatures,
the courts, other trade associations and private entities to advance an
equitable business environment and safe working conditions for
commercial drivers.
The majority of trucking in this country is small business, as 96
percent of all carriers have less than 20 trucks in their fleet and 86
percent of carriers have fleets of just 6 or fewer trucks. In fact,
one-truck motor carriers represent nearly half of the total number of
motor carriers operating in the United States. These small business
motor carriers have an intensely personal and vested interest in
highway safety as any safety-related incident may not only affect their
personal health, but also dramatically impact their livelihood. As
such, OOIDA sincerely desires to see further improvements in highway
safety and significant progress toward the highway safety goals of the
Subcommittee and the U.S. Department of Transportation.
The first step toward achieving significant improvements is a
commitment by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
to vigorously enforce all existing regulations governing motor carriers
as well as freight brokers and other transportation intermediaries.
While we talk continuously about safety in the trucking industry,
historically there has been an acceptance of the poor safety practices
of large motor carriers. There has also been an acceptance of labor
abuses and perpetual violations of existing leasing regulations by
motor carriers which has lead to industry wide problems such as high
driver turnover rates and the inability to keep safe, experienced
drivers in the industry. Similarly, the lack of oversight of freight
brokers and other transportation intermediaries allows many
unscrupulous entities to regularly take advantage of small business
motor carriers forcing those truckers into choosing between safety and
making enough money to support their families.
It must be recognized that in trucking, economics and safety go
hand in hand. From the equipment aspect where a driver is unable to pay
for repairs to his truck because he was not properly compensated
despite delivering a load on time and in good order to unrealistic
delivery schedules that put drivers in the position of driving while
fatigued or violating hours-of-service rules. There is a chain of
responsibility in safety and FMCSA, in addition to being given the
authority to properly govern it, must be given the resources to
adequately enforce existing regulations.
In addition to committing to enforcement, Congress and the FMCSA
must formulate new rulemakings or modifications to existing regulations
that will have a meaningful impact on the trucking industry and highway
safety such as ensuring that hours-of-service rules hold all industry
stakeholders accountable for their actions and mandating training for
entry-level truck drivers. Optimum trucking and highway safety can only
be achieved by holistically developing a safety culture that
acknowledges the perspectives of people behind the wheel and accounts
for all industry stakeholders.
FMCSA
OOIDA and the trucking professionals we represent are encouraged by
FMCSA's recent efforts to reassess its enforcement activities and to
expand its understanding of driver perspectives. For example, the
considerable time and effort that the agency put into its public hours-
of-service listening sessions should be commended.
However, OOIDA believes that over the past several years the
limited resources of the FMCSA have been somewhat misdirected in a
manner that diverts enforcement priorities away from efforts that would
have a much greater impact on highway safety. For many years the
agency's enforcement priorities have placed an increasing emphasis on
targeting drivers while largely ignoring the enforcement of many
regulations related to corporate motor carriers and transportation
intermediaries. While some progress has been made, this model of
enforcement has kept the trucking industry from achieving its full
safety potential. To reach that potential FMCSA must seek to enforce
all regulations under its authority and Congress must be willing to
expand the agency's jurisdiction to encompass all industry stakeholders
who influence and compromise safety.
You simply cannot divorce safe operations and safety compliance
from the economic realities that truckers must face every day. While
truck drivers certainly should be held accountable for their actions,
the same should be true for the stakeholders who often have more
control over truckers' schedules and activities than the drivers
themselves.
The Department of Transportation and the FMCSA have jurisdiction
over regulations that may be perceived as outside the ``safety''
purview, but in reality regulations such as those governing leasing
agreements, loading/unloading of trucks and transportation
intermediaries have a tremendous impact on safety. Those regulations
are often directly related to a driver's bottom line. Unfortunately,
since its inception the FMCSA has placed little priority on enforcing
regulations perceived as being solely economic. In fact, in most
instances the agency has done little if anything to enforce those
rules. This has resulted in a trucking industry where drivers and small
players are regularly preyed upon by dishonest entities who have little
fear of recourse or of reprisal from the trucker they are essentially
defrauding or the government agency expected to oversee them.
Enforcement priorities that ignore the relationship between highway
safety and the coercive demands of shippers, receivers, motor carriers
and freight brokers upon drivers are impediments to our overall safety
objectives. The demands and expectations of trucking stakeholders on
drivers are far more influential on safety than any inspection scheme
or schedule of fines that Congress or FMCSA may devise. Unless those
economic issues are addressed, drivers who become disqualified from
driving for violating hours-of-service rules and other safety
regulations will simply be replaced by new, less experienced drivers,
facing the same economic pressures. It is only by addressing underlying
economic concerns that we will begin to see significant improvements to
highway safety.
Detention Time
The excessive, uncompensated time truckers spend waiting to be
loaded or unloaded at shipping and receiving facilities represents one
of the greatest examples of how lacking regulatory enforcement and
economic pressures within the industry impact a trucker's ability to
comply with safety regulations. Time spent waiting to be loaded or
unloaded was repeatedly identified by drivers and small motor carriers
at FMCSA's public listening sessions as a major factor that must be
addressed in order to have effective hours-of-service rules. In
addition, excessive time spent waiting to be loaded or unloaded plays a
major role in drivers' continued opposition to the use of electronic
on-board recorders for hours-of-service enforcement.
Under current hours-of-service regulations, the daily 14-hour clock
begins to tick for a truck driver when the driver performs any on-duty
activity, including those duties related to loading and unloading.
However, unlike other industrialized nations throughout the world, most
U.S. based drivers are not compensated by the hour but rather based
upon the number of miles driven. This translates into drivers' time
having essentially no value, particularly to shippers and receivers.
Shippers and receivers also fall outside of FMCSA's authority and are
not held accountable for their actions related to hours-of-service
regulations.
Shippers and receivers routinely make truckers wait for
considerable amounts of time before they allow them to load or unload
their trucks and drivers routinely arrive at loading facilities with
little or no idea how long they will be there. Known in the industry as
``detention time,'' most shippers do not pay for this time and have
little financial or regulatory incentive to make more efficient use of
drivers' time. It is common for a driver to pull into a shipping or
receiving facility with no idea of whether he or she will be there for
2 hours or for 10. In certain industries, it is not unusual for drivers
to wait up to 24 hours before receiving a load. During this waiting
time, it is nearly impossible for a driver to rest. Often, the driver
must wait in line or be ``on call,'' ready to take the load and make
the ``just-in-time'' delivery.
To give you an idea of how significant the detention time problem
is--industry surveys have estimated upwards of 40 hours per truck per
week is wasted waiting to be loaded and unloaded. In fact, as a part of
the Motor Carrier Efficiency Study the FMCSA identified loading and
unloading as the most cited inefficiency in trucking--costing the
industry an estimated $3 billion per year and society over $6.5 billion
annually.
Not only is excessive time waiting to be loaded and unloaded
uncompensated, but it essentially steals the time that drivers have
under the hours-of-service rules to do the work for which they are
paid--driving the truck.
In addition to the monetary cost, in research conducted for the
Department of Transportation, excessive detention is often cited as a
contributor to hours-of-service violations as well as driver fatigue.
Because a driver's time is not accounted for by shippers, drivers are
regularly put in the compromising position of having to choose between
meeting scheduling demands or complying with safety rules such as
hours-of-service regulations. Research shows that often, because of
economic necessity and the structure of the industry, drivers feel
pressured to not keep an accurate log book or to drive while fatigued.
For example, a comprehensive study on shippers' role in driver
regulatory compliance noted that waiting for freight to be loaded/
unloaded can ``impede a driver's ability to effectively meet schedules
and lead to violation of HOS, driver fatigue and loss of income by all
parties involved . . .'' (A Qualitative Assessment of the Role of
Shippers and others in Driver Compliance with Federal Safety
Regulations, 1998).
The General Accountability Office is currently conducting a related
investigation into the potential operational inefficiencies and safety
problems associated with commercial motor vehicles that are detained at
loading docks. The GAO is seeking to learn to what extent detention
time affects trucking industry operations and safety as well as what
Federal actions could be taken to reduce the implications caused by
detention times on trucking industry operations and safety.
From OOIDA's perspective, if the time spent by drivers waiting to
be loaded or unloaded is contemplated and if compensation for excessive
detention time begins to be negotiated or if shippers and receivers are
held accountable under FMCSA regulations, the trucking industry and the
American public will benefit from more efficient freight movement and
dramatically improved highway safety.
Hours-of-Service
To say the least hours-of-service regulations are significant to
the men and women who make their living behind the wheel of commercial
motor vehicles. Those rules have a major impact on the daily lives of
truckers whether they are engaged in activities related to their
livelihood or at home with their families. Truckers have appreciated
FMCSA's genuine interest in hearing their thoughts and concerns as the
agency works toward a new hours-of-service rule.
To achieve significant safety gains as well as reduce non-
compliance, the next hours-of-service rule must be more flexible to
allow drivers to sleep when tired and to work when rested. The rules
must encourage truck drivers to get off the road when they are tired
and must not penalize them for doing so. As such, the most important
factor to consider as the next hours-of-service rule is devised is that
the overwhelming majority of truck drivers governed by the rule are
compensated only for driving even though they are expected to perform
non-driving, uncompensated work that can consume considerable and
unpredictable amounts of their on-duty time.
Under the current hours-of-service regulations the 14-hour clock
begins whenever a driver performs any on-duty activity after taking a
compliant minimum rest. The remaining 10 hours of a 24-hour day is
supposed to be reserved for resting. There are general and
administrative functions that are required of drivers such as
completing paperwork, fueling, undergoing safety inspections and
general maintenance that require daily on-duty, uncompensated time that
counts against their 14-hour on-duty clock. To some extent drivers can
predict and control those duties, but there are many other activities
that occur regularly that are also uncompensated yet highly
unpredictable.
Physically loading or unloading vehicles, manually sorting and
stacking freight and taking care of mechanical breakdowns are a few
examples of these unpredictable, uncompensated activities that count
against the 14-hour clock. In addition there are the delays from
congestion, work zones, detours and inclement weather which reduce
earnings potential because again, drivers are predominantly paid by the
mile and must count this time against their 14-hour clock.
Considering all that they are asked to do, it is easy to understand
that drivers want to get in as much compensated driving time as
possible each day. In a survey done by OOIDA of its members, 66 percent
reported that they forego short rest breaks, naps and meals under the
14-hour rule in order to perform as much compensated driving time as
they can. In fact most drivers report that they seldom drive more than
10 hours per day, but still feel compelled to continue driving when
they would like to take a break to compensate for either planned duties
or unpredictable delays.
Significant reductions in driver fatigue and non-compliance will
not be achieved until drivers are paid for all of their work and
drivers face no economic downside for complying with the rules. If
drivers were compensated for both their driving and non-driving on-duty
work, they would have much less incentive to drive while fatigued.
Additionally, they would have every incentive to record all of their
on-duty time, and concerns with the accuracy of logbooks would
disappear.
Electronic On-Board Recorders
If Electronic On-Board Recorders (EOBRs) could prevent the
manipulation of a driver's work schedule and respect drivers' privacy
rights, OOIDA would consider supporting their use for hours-of-service
reporting. But for now, OOIDA's opposition to EOBRs remains unchanged.
OOIDA remains convinced that EOBRs are no more a reliable or accurate
record of a driver's compliance with the hours-of-service regulations
than paper log books. In our collective mind there remains no rational
basis for the economic burden and unreasonable imposition to personal
privacy presented by requiring drivers to be monitored by EOBRs.
The theory behind the use of EOBRs for hours-of-service enforcement
is that the devices will provide an accurate, tamper-proof record of a
driver's duty status and therefore ensure compliance with the hours-of-
service rules which in turn will make for a safer trucking industry.
This theory is undermined by the fact that EOBRs cannot capture,
without the driver's input, data related to the time a driver spends
conducting on-duty, non-driving activities. The hours-of-service rules
require a record to be kept of both driving time and all non-driving
work activity (waiting to load and unload, inspecting/repairing the
truck, performing the loading and unloading, looking for the next load,
receiving a dispatch, doing paperwork, performing compensated work at
another job, etc.). Even though an EOBR can record how long someone has
operated a truck, if the driver does not manually enter his non-driving
work time into the EOBR, the EOBR will show the driver as available to
drive when he is not under the hours-of-service rules. In fact, EOBRs
will still permit someone performing compensated work for a person
other than the motor carrier to drive, without showing a violation.
The EOBR's reliance on driver input means they provide a no more
accurate or tamper-proof record of a driver's hours-of-service
compliance than paper log books. The substantial costs of EOBRs, costs
that would be especially burdensome to small businesses, cannot be
justified by any perceived improvement in compliance. The costs also
include those to personal privacy. The truck cab is the home away from
home of most long haul truck drivers. They sleep, eat and conduct
personal business in the truck while not driving. They have a
legitimate expectation of privacy that must be afforded to them.
OOIDA is also certain that EOBRs will make it easier for motor
carriers to harass drivers. Congress required FMCSA to ensure that such
devices would not be used to harass truck drivers. Unfortunately, the
EOBR rule that was recently issued seems to ignore this requirement. As
the agency knows, it must ensure that its safety regulations do not
have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of drivers. The
only evidence on the record regarding the potential health effects of
EOBRs are the studies that show that electronic monitoring of employees
can increase the stress of workers. EOBRs can be used to exacerbate
driver fatigue as carriers will be able to notice whenever a driver has
stopped their truck during their on-duty time. Perhaps the driver has
decided to take a break and get rest. Such breaks do not suspend the
running of the 14-hour work-day under the HOS rules. The carrier will
be able to instantly instruct the driver to return to the road and
maximize his or her driving time. Carriers will also be able to
instruct drivers, whenever they want, to log their on-duty, not-driving
work as off-duty, thereby preserving their on-duty driving time. Both
practices remove what little discretion drivers have today to resist
the economic pressure discussed above.
OOIDA encourages lawmakers to seek solutions to motor carrier
safety issues that are much less intrusive and much more effective such
as mandating comprehensive driver training, resolving problems at the
loading docks, revising methods of driver compensation, creating more
flexible hours-of-service rules, and providing adequate truck parking
in those areas around the country where drivers who wish to rest cannot
find such parking today.
Driver Training
An adequately trained driver is the key to any advances in safety
goals. To this end, OOIDA has consistently been a strong proponent of
Federal Government efforts to develop and impose mandatory driver
training and licensing requirements for entry-level truck drivers.
At present, FMCSA regulations require entry-level drivers to be
trained in only four subjects--driver qualifications, hours-of-service,
driver wellness and whistle blower protection--all of them unrelated to
the hands on operation of a commercial motor vehicle. The Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking published in 2008 would expand the required
training for Class A drivers to include a minimum of 44 hours behind
the wheel training in addition to 76 hours of classroom training,
nearly all of it involving subjects pertaining directly to the safe
operation of a commercial motor vehicle. The rulemaking also proposes
the accreditation of driver training schools offering entry-level
courses as well as the establishment of standards for ensuring that
instructors at such schools are qualified to teach those courses. The
goal of these regulatory revisions is to enhance the safety of
commercial motor vehicle operations on the Nation's highways.
Based upon on our continuing, firm belief that minimum training
requirements for entry-level drivers will improve highway safety for
all motorists, private as well as commercial, OOIDA very much supports
the FMCSA's proposal to establish minimum training requirements that
require a specified amount of behind-the-wheel training for entry-level
drivers. OOIDA also believes that the effectiveness of such a training
program can be ensured only if all facilities providing entry-level
driver training programs are accredited by independent agencies and the
instructors providing the training are required to meet relevant
qualification standards. Accordingly, OOIDA also supports the agency's
proposal to regulate training providers.
We sincerely hope FMCSA will soon move forward with its rulemaking
on driver training.
CSA 2010
There has been much misinformation communicated within the trucking
industry concerning FMCSA's Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010
initiative or ``CSA 2010.'' Much of the information seems to have
purposely distorted the basic goal of this initiative--improving
highway safety.
For too long, drivers seem to have been the sole focus of
enforcement at roadside. The large motor carrier community actually
encouraged this one dimensional view because it allowed them to shirk
their shared responsibility for having adequate safety management
practices in place.
CSA 2010 will hold a motor carrier immediately responsible for
actions of their drivers on the highway. Once the initiative is fully
implemented, motor carriers' safety ratings will be tied to actual data
from roadside inspections as opposed to the current practice where they
may face an introspective review of their safety practices once in a
decade--if even then.
For motor carriers that choose to continue with business as usual
through insufficient training of their new drivers and failure to
implement genuine preventive maintenance programs on equipment for
which they own, CSA 2010 will very quickly be able to determine their
indifference to good safety management practices. This is a significant
improvement over the current system which really amounts to a ``catch
me if you can'' and ``catch and release'' enforcement model.
New Entrant Safety Assurance
As a part of its Congressionally mandated efforts to beef up its
New Entrant Safety Assurance efforts, FMCSA is conducting safety audits
of new entrant motor carriers within 18 months of their being granted
operating authority. OOIDA believes that instead of conducting safety
audits well after the granting of operating authority, FMCSA should
focus its limited resources on gathering information during the initial
application process to determine an applicant's ability to comply with
regulations. Prior to granting operating authority, FMCSA can derive
plenty of data regarding an applicant's ability to perform safely and
comply with regulations from evidence of work experience, training,
and/or knowledge of the industry. FMCSA should also enhance current
protest procedures to encourage industry stakeholders, including
States, to provide data and other information that could lead to a more
informed authorization process. This larger body of information could
be checked against existing DOT databases to identify ``chameleon''
carriers and brokers as well as other problem applicants and to deny
them new authorizations.
OOIDA believes it is wrong to lump all new applicants together
either for pre-qualification testing or later safety audit purposes.
OOIDA's experience assisting its members to obtain their first
operating authority has shown that the majority of these new applicants
are experienced commercial motor vehicle drivers with excellent safety
records. They are stable business owners who have for many years been
driving a truck as an owner-operator or employee driver and have,
throughout those years, learned much about applicable safety
regulations and effective safety management procedures.
There's a strong correlation between a carrier's future performance
and its past accident record. Thus, FMCSA should expand the application
form to collect information that will help the agency to identify those
applicants with poor crash records.
All owners (whether individuals, partners or shareholders) as well
as key personnel, especially including, but not limited to, those who
will be responsible for safety compliance and management should be
identified. Their past training, experience, and work histories should
be listed on the application. Applicants should also explain briefly
why they left each employer or, if they were self-employed, why the
business was shut down. This information should go back at least 5
years, and should not be limited to trucking experience as all work
experience will help determine whether the applicant possesses the
character and integrity to conduct safe trucking operations. FMCSA
might also consider requesting the applicant's recent tax returns and/
or contracts and agreements as confirmation of the veracity of
information provided.
FMCSA could also enhance this pre-qualification review process by
modifying current protest procedures to take full advantage of third-
party information about applicants. FMCSA's current practice is to post
in the Federal Register a summary of the application (49 C.F.R.
365.109(b)), which contains only the applicant's name and address, its
designated representative, assigned number, the date of filing, and the
type of authority requested. Interested parties, including States who
would have a direct interest in keeping applicants with poor driving
and accident records from receiving new authority, then have only 10
days to request the full application and file a formal protest.
It is our understanding that well over one hundred applications for
operating authority are filed with FMCSA each day. Thus, the ten-day
review and protest period is far too short to allow stakeholders an
opportunity to contribute in a meaningful way to the decisionmaking
process.
All names, businesses, and equipment identified in an application
or by protesters could then be checked against the substantial pool of
information currently collected in DOT's various computer databases,
such as MCMIS, PRISM, and CDLIS, to confirm past performance and crash
history. Certain types of information, such as evidence that the
applicant is simply seeking to evade prior enforcement actions or out-
of-service orders, or has a history of the 16 types of violations that
now result in denial of permanent authority when discovered in a safety
audit, should result in automatic denial of new entrant authority.
The proposed pre-qualification investigation is analogous to that
currently conducted and effectively used by the Federal Maritime
Commission in its licensing process for ocean transportation
intermediaries. Applicants must demonstrate not only that they possess
the ``necessary experience'' in related activities but the ``necessary
character'' to render such services. 46 C.F.R. 515.11(a)(1) &
515.14. Further, the Federal Maritime Commission investigates the
accuracy of the information, the integrity and financial responsibility
of the applicant, the character of the applicant and its qualifying
individuals, and the length and nature of the applicant's relevant
experience, before granting a license.
Such a thorough pre-qualification review process should eliminate
problem applicants long before the current application and safety audit
procedure might find them.
Distracted Driving
Professional truckers are the safest drivers on the road per
vehicle miles traveled. They have a vested interest in highway safety
as their lives and livelihoods quite literally depend on it. Every day
on roadways across America, professional truckers witness drivers
operating vehicles while engaged in activities that significantly
impede their ability to attend to the task of driving safely.
Experience has shown these professionals that in particular drivers
sending text or e-mail messages while operating a vehicle are a
significant hazard to themselves and other roadway users.
OOIDA supports government efforts to prohibit motorists from
sending text or e-mail messages while operating a moving vehicle. While
we applaud the FMCSA for moving forward with a rulemaking to ban
interstate operators from texting or e-mailing while driving, we do
have some concerns as to whether this ban will be equitably levied on
motor carriers utilizing fleet management devices. The current
rulemaking makes an unfounded assumption that fleets utilizing on-board
management systems do so responsibly.
Many of OOIDA's members who drive for larger fleets tell us a
different story. Our members inform us that it is common for them to be
messaged during their driving hours and in many instances, their
immediate response is required--which they do while their vehicle is in
motion. For example, I recently spoke with a member who desired to take
a short nap during the middle of his duty cycle and was repeatedly
harassed via his on-board dispatch system to ``return to driving''
otherwise he would not make the delivery on-time. He was effectively
kept by his motor carrier from getting the short nap he felt he needed
in order to perform his driving duties safely.
Most everyone understands the danger in ``texting'' with cell-
phones or other handheld communication devices while driving. However,
the reading and sending of alpha-numeric script from a fleet dispatch
system also needs to be specifically prohibited otherwise the intent of
the proposed regulation will be undermined.
Conclusion
We are encouraged by FMCSA's recent efforts to reassess its
enforcement activities and to expand its understanding of driver
perspectives. We hope that the agency and this subcommittee recognize
that enforcement priorities that ignore the relationship between
highway safety and the coercive demands of shippers, receivers, motor
carriers and freight brokers upon drivers are impediments to safety
objectives, that the demands and expectations of trucking stakeholders
on drivers are far more influential on safety than any inspection
scheme or schedule of fines that Congress or FMCSA may devise and that
only by addressing underlying economic concerns that we will begin to
see significant improvements to highway safety.
OOIDA and the hardworking men and women who comprise our membership
sincerely desire to see further improvements in highway safety and
significant progress toward highway safety goals of the Subcommittee
and the U.S. Department of Transportation. To reach the trucking
industry's full safety potential FMCSA must seek to enforce all
regulations under its authority and Congress must be willing to expand
the agency's jurisdiction to encompass all industry stakeholders who
influence and compromise safety.
Thank you again, Chairman Lautenberg and Senator Thune, for the
opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee. I look forward to the
dialogue, and will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you each for your testimony.
There is, obviously, a conflict of views here. Frankly, our
responsibility is to get to the end of the game, and that is to
keep the trucking industry going. It is a very important
element in terms of our commercial enterprise in this country--
but at the same time, we ought to be able to do it in a safer
manner than we have and reduce the risk to the ordinary
passenger on our roads by all kinds of factors.
Ms. Gillan--and I will ask the same question of Mr.
Spencer--large trucks take longer to stop, have higher rates of
rollover, and cause tremendous wear and tear on our crumbling
transportation infrastructure. Yet, some propose relaxing the
ban on large trucks that weigh more than 80,000 pounds or are
longer than 53 feet on our interstate highway system.
What might be the impact on safety if we were allowed these
bigger trucks back on our interstate highway system? I will
first ask Mr. Spencer.
Mr. Spencer. We do not believe the answer to productivity
or efficiency or environmental issues is to make trucks bigger
and heavier. The reality for the people that drive them today
is there is not even any training required to get behind the
wheel of a big truck. A state will give you a commercial driver
license with virtually--well, I mean, actually with no
training. As long as you can basically drive around cones,
somebody will turn you loose----
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Spencer, is there a consequence on
safety if we get these bigger trucks on the road? Is it a
factor that we ought to be looking at?
Mr. Spencer. We do not think it is a good idea to go bigger
and heavier. Again, trucks are hard enough to handle by
seasoned, professional, experienced drivers, and the way our
business works is those seasoned professionals are very much on
the chopping block. They leave the industry because the rewards
are not there. The fair treatment they desire is not there--to
be replaced with new people that may have dire consequences.
Senator Lautenberg. But yet, there are lots of people who
enter the profession independently, obviously, when 86 percent
of carriers have less than six vehicles. So lots of people go
into the business despite the anomalies that you talk about and
apparently make a living doing so.
Mr. Spencer. Trucking is blessed, I suppose, and cursed
with unbelievably high turnover. The economic situation that we
have been dealing with for the past 3 years has taken many,
many, many people off of our highways. See, the people that are
attracted to owning their own truck, to actually being in
business themselves, are not lazy folks. They are not looking
for an easy buck. Many of them have 20, 25, 30 years of
experience and millions of miles of safe drivers.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, I know they take these jobs
because they are available and because they think they can make
a living.
Ms. Gillan, I started the question with what happens to
safety if we allow these larger trucks on our interstate
highway system. What is the risk that we put on our citizens?
Ms. Gillan. Senator, there is a tremendous risk in allowing
trucks to get heavier and longer. There is no question about
it. Right now, large trucks are overrepresented. One out of
nine highway fatalities is a result of a crash with a truck. In
fatal crashes involving a large truck and a passenger car, 98
percent of the fatalities that result from those fatal crashes
are the occupants of passenger cars.
I think what is interesting about this debate right now and
the legislation you have introduced is that it is not only the
safety groups that are supporting your legislation, but the
drivers themselves. The drivers know that these large,
overweight trucks are difficult to handle. They are difficult
to stop. Right now, it takes a fully loaded truck the length of
a football field to come to a complete stop. Why would we
possibly want to jeopardize the safety of drivers and the
public by allowing bigger and heavier trucks? And there are
plenty of studies, which I am happy to submit, showing that
bigger trucks are more dangerous.
Senator Lautenberg. I wanted to ask Mr. Osiecki about
hours-of-service. You say that the rule should remain
unchanged. It contradicts almost every safety organization's
view of the NTSB and the Federal courts. Does the trucking
association really believe that increasing driver time by 30
percent is an effective solution to fatigue?
Mr. Osiecki. What we believe is that the rules are working.
The rules have been in place for about 6 years, a little longer
than that. In large part, the rules are working based on the
data and the safety data because the rules have provided
additional rest time.
One of the things about fatigue is time on task or time
spent driving is not a very good predictor of fatigue. What is
a much better predictor of fatigue is how well a person rests,
how they rested most recently, their most recent extended, what
they call anchor sleep period, and also time of phase,
circadian rhythm factors. Time on task or time driving is a
factor, but it is about fourth or fifth on the list.
Senator Lautenberg. Are you going to give everybody some
sleep consulting and medical exam to see their sleeping habits?
Come on.
Mr. Osiecki. We support better sleep disorder screening.
Senator Lautenberg. And the companies will pay for it. ATA
will recommend the companies pay for that kind of service.
Mr. Osiecki. Yes, sir. There are some companies paying for
it today. There are some companies that are not paying for it
today. But the point is that there are probably more efficient
and more effective ways to address fatigue in the industry, and
one is sleep disorder screening. Another one is effective use
of fatigue management systems or fatigue management programs at
the fleet level, and that is a recommendation that NTSB has
made recently.
Ms. Gillan. Senator, could I just add something to that?
The trucking industry likes to claim that the decrease in truck
fatalities is somehow related to the hours-of-service rule, but
they do not acknowledge that the first 2 years that the hours-
of-service rule was in effect, truck deaths went up. And there
is conclusive research showing that after the eighth hour of
driving, that the risk of a crash for a truck driver increases
dramatically. So these hours-of-service allowing 11 consecutive
hours of driving and a 34-hour restart which allows a driver to
drive upwards of 77 hours in 7 days are clearly contributing to
fatigue, and that is frankly why the courts overturned----
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. France, what do you think? You see
the results out there on the highways.
Mr. France. The results right now that we are seeing over
the last several years seem to substantiate the fact that the
hours-of-service that we currently have on board with the 14-
hour operating rule where you can only operate 14 hours and
then you have to get out from behind the wheel and making them
take 10 hours off has substantially increased our safety factor
on the highway.
Senator Lautenberg. Are these things observed? Are they
really enforced?
Mr. France. Yes, sir. They are being enforced. The current
rules that are in place right now for law enforcement at
roadside--it is a fairly easily enforceable rule.
Senator Lautenberg. Do you think you ought to extend the
hours-of-service?
Mr. France. To extend what we currently have?
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Mr. France. My feeling is yes.
Senator Lautenberg. So you would allow more of the drivers
to be on the road, behind the wheel, for longer hours.
Mr. France. No, no longer than what we are doing now. I am
comparing with what we have.
Senator Lautenberg. I just want to be sure on that record.
What is the electronic on-board recorder cost, Mr. Spencer?
Mr. Spencer. The on-board recorder?
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, the EOBR.
Mr. Spencer. An on-board recorder is simply a----
Senator Lautenberg. No. How much might it cost to install?
Mr. Spencer. Oh, initial cost likely for an operator would
be a couple thousand dollars up front; ongoing costs of
hundreds of dollars every year based on what is being projected
now what a requirement would be.
Senator Lautenberg. I have different information on that.
Do you know anything about that, Mr. Osiecki?
Mr. Osiecki. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The range is somewhere between $500 and $2,000 depending on
the system, $500 obviously being on the very low end with a
very minimally functional device, the $2,000 device and perhaps
even a little bit higher than that----
Senator Lautenberg. What does a truck cost on average? Is
there an average?
Mr. Osiecki. It is north of $100,000.
Senator Lautenberg. North of $100,000?
Mr. Osiecki. Yes.
Senator Lautenberg. And it might cost 500 bucks or
something close to that, some $500 or $1,000 to install an
EBOR? Does it compare to having extra windshield wipers in
places or sufficient horns or lights? They are all safety
issues and safety factors, are they not? I mean, why should
this not be mandatory on vehicles to make sure we know the
rules are being observed? Mr. Osiecki?
Mr. Osiecki. The challenge that ATA and the trucking
industry have regarding a universal mandate for every vehicle
is not necessarily the cost. It is really about is this the
most effective safety-related technology that we can adopt in
the industry. And the reason I say that is because the
challenge that the industry has is the same challenge that the
FMCSA has in moving toward a universal mandate. The agency
itself has done field operational tests of numerous safety-
related technologies, lane departure warning systems, collision
mitigation systems, electronic stability control, and more, and
what they found is there is a true safety benefit and a return-
on-investment for making the investment on some trucks. That
same set of studies and field operational test does not exist
for electronic on-board recorders, and it does not exist
because the data is not there to demonstrate the safety
benefits. I am not saying it cannot work, that it will not
work, but it is just not there. And that has been the challenge
for fleets when they have to make an investment decision in
technology and that has been the challenge for FMCSA in moving
toward a universal mandate.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, safety is the issue. As I said
earlier, the trucking industry is central in our society and we
want them to work effectively and to prosper as well. But the
question of lives on the highways is a whole different thing
when we look at the thousands of people that we lost over a 10-
year period--what was that, Ms. Gillan?
Ms. Gillan. 55,000.
Senator Lautenberg. 55,000 people. And we lost 58,000 in
Vietnam. So it is a fairly substantial penalty that we pay for
lack of safety.
I am going to ask further questions later. I am running a
little over time here. I call on Mr. Thune and then Senator
McCaskill.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Osiecki, your written testimony is silent on the issue
of truck size and weight, which is a safety issue as well as an
economic one. What is ATA's position with respect to
productivity in the next highway bill?
Mr. Osiecki. Well, thank you, Senator.
We certainly support an open debate on this issue. We think
a ``just say no'' answer is not appropriate. We do support
increased productivity for trucks. We support, certainly in the
western States, a harmonization of longer-combination vehicles,
or LCV, regulations at that regional level. We support a number
of other more productive initiatives for a couple of reasons.
We do not think safety and more productive trucks are mutually
exclusive. We think that they can be used in harmony. They are
harmonious. In fact, many fleets--in fact, many of the larger
fleets in this country have demonstrated that over and over
again with their use of LCVs and larger trucks. There are a
host of types of configurations being used today that are being
done safely.
While some have suggested there are reams of studies and
volumes of studies that indicate safety problems, really it is
the reverse. The most recent Federal Highway Administration
study indicated that LCVs or more productive trucks, are a
safer vehicle when they are used in a controlled environment.
The Ohio and Indiana situation is a good example where you have
a lane and it is limited access. It is with operational
controls. And the safety of those larger trucks are terrific.
In fact, the safety record is more than 100 percent better. The
crash rate is half of the typical truck configuration in that
lane.
So there are a lot of opportunities for safety. There are
opportunities for environmental and economic benefits, but most
importantly, we would not be advocating greater use more
productive trucks if we did not think that they could be done
in a safe and responsible way.
Senator Thune. And is that pretty much a consensus position
in the trucking industry?
Mr. Osiecki. That is a terrific question. That has been a
challenge, and in large part, I would say yes. There are
pockets of the industry that do not necessarily agree with
that, but the majority do, yes.
Senator Thune. Are there provisions in the chairman's bill,
his proposal, that ATA supports?
Mr. Osiecki. That we do support?
Senator Thune. Yes.
Mr. Osiecki. For the most part, no, sir.
Senator Thune. What is your view about the appropriate role
for EOBRs in motor carrier safety?
Mr. Osiecki. As I mentioned in my oral statement, as well
as the written testimony, we think that the step that FMCSA has
recently taken is a good first step. It is a good incremental
step. It targets the noncompliant folks, and gets them into
compliance. We can better develop the performance
specifications for the devices. We can collect data as a result
of this rule, and that data, we believe, can inform future
rulemakings on this issue, perhaps moving toward a universal
mandate. But again, the safety data is not there to justify
that at this point.
Senator Thune. Mr. Spencer, the new rule on EOBRs would
only require carriers with a serious history of hours-of-
service violation to have them installed. Is your organization
opposed to EOBRs even for carriers with a history of hours-of-
service violations?
Mr. Spencer. No, we do not oppose the agency's actions in
those areas. Obviously, if you have problems with violations,
that can simply be just another penalty and perhaps a
deterrent.
But, you know, the point that I want to make on EOBRs is
that there is no safety data to show that they enhance highway
safety. They cannot tell if a driver is sleepy. They cannot
tell if a driver needs to rest. They cannot tell whether a
driver is off duty or whether he is physically handling 44,000
pounds of cargo. They are no more reliable than the paper logs
that they would replace.
And to get to the issue of cost, absolutely they would have
the greatest cost impediment on the small business people we
represent, which are most of truckers in the country, including
South Dakota and everywhere else. We think if we are going to
ask people to spend thousands of dollars and a continuing cost,
that there should be a safety benefit to them. It is simply not
there.
Senator Thune. Ms. Gillan, in your written testimony, you
attribute the declines in truck crash fatalities to a decline
in freight demand. Do you agree that the rate of fatal truck
crashes, as measured per one hundred million miles of travel,
has also declined, from 2008 compared to 2007, by about 12.2
percent?
Ms. Gillan. I agree that we have made some progress,
Senator Thune, in reducing the fatality rate. It still remains
the fact, though, that the truck fatality rate is still twice
what the passenger vehicle fatality rate is. So while we have
made some progress, is it enough? Absolutely not. And I think
that we need to do more.
And we also need to keep in mind that the fatality rate is
based on 100 million miles of truck travel. Those are estimates
by the agency. Reporting that information is voluntary by the
states. So I think we always have to also look at the number of
fatalities we have. Now, we have had a drop. As I said, in our
testimony we have a chart showing that overall highway
fatalities have dropped. That always happens in a recession. So
we cannot let this drop in fatalities in any way take our eye
off the ball of advancing truck safety.
Senator Thune. While the rate is not satisfactory, I guess
independent of the drop in freight as a result of the economic
circumstances the country is in, but would you agree that at
least the trend is in the right direction?
Ms. Gillan. Yes, absolutely, and we support that and we
want that to continue.
Senator Thune. Your organization also contends that the
hours-of-service rule that was adopted in 2003 is unsafe, and
yet the rate of fatalities and injuries and crashes that
involve large trucks steadily declining. What is the basis for
that assertion that the rule is unsafe?
Ms. Gillan. Well, the fatality rate is declining, but it
does not have any relationship to the hours-of-service rule. I
mean, to try to make that connection that for some reason
allowing truck drivers now to drive 77 hours in a week has some
way contributed to this drop--is absolutely supplied by
Advocates and other safety groups would say absolutely not.
When the courts overturned that rule in a scathing opinion,
they questioned and criticized the agency.
We have firm research showing that after 8 hours of
driving, the risk of a crash increases dramatically. We have a
whole body of research. We have an FAA that is working to
reduce the number of hours of a pilot in the cockpit because of
fatigue, and yet, in the trucking industry and over at FMCSA,
we issued a rule that allows a truck driver to drive 77 hours
in a week, which is almost a 30 percent increase over the old
hours-of-service rule.
So our group is very concerned about this. At a time where
the Department of Transportation has identified transportation
worker fatigue as a top priority, increasing the number of
hours that a truck driver can drive and work is not the answer
to addressing fatigue.
Senator Thune. I guess the only observation I would make is
that--and your assertion about hours of service being what it
is--the numbers still--I would say independent of the decline
in freight demand--you still have a substantial decline based
on 100 million miles of travel in that one-year period. So at
least the trend is in the right direction notwithstanding the
hours-of-service issue.
Ms. Gillan. And as I said earlier, Senator, the first 2
years that the hours-of-service rule was in effect, truck crash
deaths went up. So I guess if I thought that there was a
connection, you could argue that the hours-of-service rule
caused the increase in fatalities. However, in that case, the
trucking industry said, oh, no, that is not the reason. So I
think we have to separate those two issues.
Senator Thune. One last question, Mr. Chairman, for Mr.
France, and that is, what can be done to simplify and harmonize
the Federal truck size and weight limits?
Mr. France. To be honest with you, I cannot really speak to
that because I do not have all the details. But as an
association, we would be more than glad to get back with this
committee with that information. Like I said, we support the
fact that right now, until there is more data on board, we do
not raise our size and weight limits on the highways because I
do not think we are ready personally to do that.
Senator Thune. OK, very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill?
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to look at the safety issue from the
perspective--and, Mr. Spencer, I would like you to comment on
this--about the practice in this industry to pay for miles
driven as opposed to hours. Clearly that is contributing to
this problem. Loading and unloading time is, in fact,
uncompensated according to what I have learned from your
testimony. Is that correct, Mr. Spencer?
Mr. Spencer. That is correct. You know, I have tried to
characterize--somewhat describe it as the problem it is. But I
mean, there are drivers that lose 30, 40, 44 hours a week just
waiting to get loaded or unloaded. Now, this is all
uncompensated time. Then after putting in all of those hours,
then they have to go out and try to drive. If the only way they
get paid is for miles driven, then you can understand how long
that workweek is.
Senator McCaskill. Yes. I had never really thought about it
from that perspective. I assume if you are waiting 10 or 14
hours to load, you cannot take a nap during that period of
time. Correct?
Mr. Spencer. In most instances, you cannot do that. Again,
this time is unpredictable. We have talked a lot about
efficiencies, finding ways to make the industry more efficient.
That is the most inefficient way to use human resources ever,
and the problem is not getting better on its own and it is not
going to get better on its own.
We talk about safety. We talk about why do we have these
people that work too long, that drive too hard, that drive too
fast. Well, how do we pay them? We only pay for miles that they
drive. Why do you think they want to do that?
Senator McCaskill. Right. If the only way you get paid is
to drive miles, then we are incentivizing the system to drive
as many miles as possible as opposed to compensating drivers
for the time they are spending working at their job. Right?
Mr. Spencer. It makes all the sense in the world to me, and
of course, the reality is--there are economic incentives or
disincentives to wasting a driver's time. Well, the practice
ceases. Drivers become much more efficient. Costs can even go
down, costs to customers, to society. But again, it is doing
things a little different than we have historically done it,
but it is what we have to do.
Senator McCaskill. Let me clarify. The loading and
unloading time does not count toward the 14 hours?
Mr. Spencer. It should if it is recorded as loading and
unloading time.
Senator McCaskill. But that is where somebody is going to
fudge.
Mr. Spencer. Because if a driver is not going to be
compensated for that time, there is going to be a tremendous
temptation----
Senator McCaskill. Incentive to not count it.
Mr. Spencer.--15 minutes.
Senator McCaskill. And that electronic on-board recorder is
not going to help you for your loading and unloading time.
Mr. Spencer. Not in the least.
Senator McCaskill. There is no way that the electronic on-
board recorder is going to be able to capture how many hours
someone is spending before they get in the cab of that truck
getting either loaded or unloaded?
Mr. Spencer. It cannot tell the difference. The only thing
it can tell is if the truck is moving.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
And, Ms. Gillan, what about that? What about us going to a
compensation model for hours worked as opposed to miles driven
as a step forward on safety?
Ms. Gillan. Senator, Advocates does not have a position on
that, but I work with a lot of the truck safety groups.
Clearly, we have set up a situation, as you have aptly
described, by paying truck drivers by the hours, not only do we
encourage them to drive as far as they can, but also----
Senator McCaskill. By the miles you mean.
Ms. Gillan. By the miles, but also drive as fast as they
can. And I think that if the compensation was changed and truck
drivers were paid for overtime, if they were paid for loading
and unloading the truck, that would be a significant step
forward in addressing truck safety.
Senator McCaskill. And, Mr. Osiecki, are you all opposed to
paying by the hour as opposed to miles driven? It seems like to
me we could avoid a lot of problems here because what we are
doing is incentivizing unsafe conduct. We are incentivizing the
way the system is set up.
Mr. Osiecki. Thank you, Senator.
I guess the first thing I would say is there is not a
single silver bullet in the truck safety equation. It is not
driver pay. It is not hours of service. It is not EOBRs. It is
not one single thing.
But getting to your question, we are not aware of any study
that links a particular method of driver pay to improved safety
outcome in the trucking industry. I am aware of one case study,
and it is a fairly significant and large case study, that
looked at a large truck-load company that raised driver pay,
per-mile pay, and got an improved safety outcome as a result of
raising driver pay, and they got it because it reduced their
turnover rate. Drivers stayed with the company longer because
they were getting compensated better, and that resulted in an
improved safety outcome because historically older, more
experienced drivers are better, safer drivers in this industry.
So that is a case study that is meaningful.
But in terms of method of pay, there is nothing that we are
aware of out there that says a driver paid by the hour versus
paid by the mile versus paid by the percentage of the load or
any other method is better than the other.
Senator McCaskill. You know, maybe because nobody wants to
switch to paying by the hour, nobody has done that case study,
and the drivers in this industry are the people who are paying
these trucks to drive. I would certainly encourage someone to
do that study because that would also contribute, I think, to
less driver turnover because these folks are ground down by
only being paid by how far and how quickly you go. The faster
you go, the more miles you can drive within the set period of
time.
It just seems common sense would dictate that if we could
look at paying hourly, because none of these people are lazy
people--it is not like these drivers are, all of a sudden,
going to put their feet up and not do the job. I just think it
would be time--and I would encourage everyone who cares deeply
about truck safety to try to motivate some carrier to look at
payment by the hour as opposed to miles driven and do that case
study. I just don't think there has been a motivation in the
system to even study it because the money driving the system
does not want it. That is what I think.
Would you disagree with that assessment?
Mr. Osiecki. No, I would not disagree but I would simply
add that in the National Master Freight Agreement, there is
actually a difference between over-the-road driver pay and
local driver pay or pick up and delivery driver pay. Over-the-
road is paid by the mile. Local pick up and delivery are paid
by the hour. And there is a reason for that. It is because of
the differing operating environments do not allow a pick up and
delivery driver to really make any money by the mile. He gets
paid much more money being paid by the hour. The over-the-road
makes more money getting paid by the mile. And I am not
intimately familiar with the agreement, but I will tell you
there is a distinction in the Teamsters agreement today which
may form the basis for taking a look at this issue. But, again,
there is not much there.
As I remarked earlier, we really need to make policy
decisions based on data, good data, good analysis, what causes
crashes, what raises crash risk, and right now we do not have
that in this arena.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I would be happy to visit with the
Teamsters about that. I think that everybody ought to cooperate
and see if we could get a decent case study on paying by the
hour because I think we are setting up a system for unsafe
behavior just by the incentives that are inherent in it.
One more question, if you do not mind, Mr. Chairman, to Ms.
Gillan. Senator Thune asked Mr. France about a common-sense
approach in terms of uniform lengths and weights for trucks on
the interstate and national highway system. What about your
perspective on that? I mean, would that not make it simpler
just to have a uniform standard across the board?
Ms. Gillan. Oh, absolutely, Senator. And that is why the
safety groups are so strongly behind adoption of Senator
Lautenberg's bill, which I know you have cosponsored.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Ms. Gillan. In 1992, Congress passed legislation which put
a freeze on the spread of triple-trailer trucks. That was a
significant stop for truck safety where we allowed triple-
trailer trucks in the 12 States that already had them, but we
prevented the spread across the United States. The legislation,
S. 779, would do the same thing right now. Instead of letting
the States race to increase weights and then come to Congress
and say, oh, my gosh, you know, we have this patchwork quilt,
we need to lift everybody's weights to 100,000 pounds, what
that legislation does is say let us take a time out. Let us
take a time out. We should not allow the weights on the
interstate to go above 80,000. There is numerous research and
data showing that they are dangerous. And that is what is
important because if we do not call that time out right now, we
will constantly be faced with different states wanting Congress
to pass exemptions for them because they are unique, and then
it puts pressure on other States. So that is why this
legislation is really important and we really have got to stop
that.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
your leadership on this issue.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much for your
provocative thoughts.
Living in New Jersey where I do, a lot of trucks used to
come from the coal fields of Pennsylvania, and they would be
individual operators trying to make as much money as they could
and drive as far as they could to try and keep their families
going. So the temptation on the other side is great.
Mr. Osiecki, I have to thank you for your ringing
endorsement of my bill.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg. I hear you talk the talk, but I am not
sure I see walking the walk. What part does safety play in the
agenda for the ATA? Do you think things are OK? Is that the
general attitude?
Mr. Osiecki. Thank you, Chairman.
No. We have done pretty well. We can do better. We have a
very extensive safety agenda that is not just about truck
safety and not just about professional truck driver safety. It
is really about highway safety because we all share the road,
cars, trucks, SUVs, motorcycles. We really all do share the
road. We drive the same interstates. And we can do better. We
can reduce speed. We can limit the speed of trucks. We can
better enforce our operating rules.
Senator Lautenberg. I thought I heard you say increase the
speed.
Mr. Osiecki. No. We can reduce the speed.
Senator Lautenberg. No. But did you not earlier say that in
terms of a more efficient system, that we ought to increase
speed limits to 65 miles an hour?
Mr. Osiecki. We support a return to a national maximum
speed limit of 65 miles an hour. And this is politically
unpopular, but bringing the 80-mile-per-hour and the 75-mile-
per hour and the 70-mile-per-hour states back down to 65--and
couple that with limiting large trucks to 65, electronically
limiting those trucks so the trucks cannot go faster than that
and then have greater enforcement of it. So that is a real
issue in our highway safety strategy. It is a real gap. And it
is not just about trucks. It is about all of us operating on
our highway system, and we can do better.
Senator Lautenberg. You are looking at 65 as a maximum.
Mr. Osiecki. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you all very much for your
testimony.
The record will be kept open. We will submit questions to
you and would ask for your prompt response when you get a
question. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
I am very pleased that the Surface Transportation Subcommittee is
holding today's hearing on motor carrier safety. The Commerce Committee
reported legislation last December to address safety problems in the
motorcoach sector of the motor carrier industry, but truck safety also
requires our attention, oversight, and action.
The good news is that the numbers in terms of fatalities and
injuries involving large trucks are moving in the right direction.
Between 1998 and 2008, there was a 16 percent increase in the number of
registered large trucks, but the involvement rate for large trucks in
fatal crashes declined 29 percent, and the involvement rate in injury
crashes fell 36 percent. Still, nearly one in 9 fatalities on our
highways in 2008 resulted from a crash involving large trucks, and when
an accident between a passenger vehicle and a large truck occurs, the
occupants of the passenger vehicle are most likely to be injured or
killed.
As we look ahead to reauthorizing the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) as part of the next highway bill, this hearing
will help us identify gaps and shortcomings in our truck safety
programs. In this regard, I believe there is great commonality between
the trucking and motorcoach industries. S. 554, the Motorcoach Enhanced
Safety Act, for example, identifies new entrants and ``chameleon'' bus
operators--operators taken out of service for safety violations who
simply set up shop under another name--as carriers requiring
significantly more scrutiny. The same holds true for the trucking
industry, although the sheer number of new entrants annually in the
trucking industry may dictate a somewhat different approach to the
problem. Similarly, the motorcoach bill identifies a number of new
technologies that could significantly contribute to motorcoach safety,
including safety belts, electronic stability control, and advanced
window glazing. While the specific types of technologies that could
improve truck safety may be different, new technologies can certainly
enhance truck safety, as the industry itself has acknowledged with
respect to improved crashworthiness for cabs, lane departure warning
systems, and collision avoidance systems.
While today's hearing is focused on truck safety, I want to express
my disappointment over the lack of progress being made at the
Department of Transportation on its Motorcoach Safety Action Plan. Even
though the Plan was issued just 5 months ago, FMCSA and the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) are falling behind on a
number of important initiatives. Of perhaps most concern is the delay
in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to require seat belts on
all motorcoaches. Originally scheduled for the first quarter of 2010,
the NPRM has been delayed until the 3rd quarter of the year. These
delays, which are not the first on these issues, are unacceptable, and
make enactment of S. 554 in the near future even more essential.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to working with you,
Senator Thune, and Chairman Rockefeller on this and all of the safety
programs that will be authorized in the next highway bill.
______
Prepared Statement of Stephen Owings, President and Co-Founder,
Road Safe America
Class 7 and 8 trucks are involved in over 20 percent of all multi-
vehicle fatal crashes. About half of the 43,000 deaths occurring on our
roads each year happen in single vehicle crashes, including nearly all
of the crashes that kill professional truck drivers (approximately 1000
truck drivers die on the job per year). Subtracting these 1000 deaths
from the 5,500 total deaths per year involving heavy commercial trucks
during the last decade means about 4,500 die in multi vehicle crashes
involving large trucks annually. This reveals that the 3.5 percent of
all vehicles that class 7 and 8 trucks represent are involved in over
20 percent ( 4,500/21,500 total deaths in multi-vehicle crashes = 20.9
percent) of all multi vehicle fatal collisions.
Our organization has worked to reduce these statistics by
recommending a number of logical changes, which have already been
implemented in other ``first world countries'' around the globe.
One is the call from NTSB for mandatory electronic logging.
However, EOBRs as they have been implemented in this country do not
appear to be the best approach. The system that is now being upgraded
to its second generation in the EU does. It is a highly secure single-
purpose system that electronically logs time driven by each driver. Its
simplicity makes it highly secure and accurate as well as inexpensive.
Another crucial need is one that is nearly cost-free to the
industry: requiring that every heavy commercial truck (class 7 & 8)
manufactured since 1992, which is the year electronic speed limiters
became standard equipment on all of these vehicles, program these
devices to 65 mph or slower. Programming these devices to this speed,
which is the average speed of all vehicles now on our highways, is not
only safe, it's economical since the equipment is already on the trucks
and the only cost is an incidental programming fee. Many leading
companies already limit the top speed of their fleets to 65 mph or
slower. They share that not only are their crashes, which their driver
caused reduced along with all of the expenses associated with such
events, but also they save money on fuel and maintenance since brakes,
tires and engines all last longer at these top speeds. Please see
attached letters of support from J.B. Hunt and Schneider National.
Also, please note that Japan, Australia, the EU and recently the
populous parts of Canada all have these requirements in place. The EU
Governors are set at 56 mph. Interestingly, according to studies; 55
mph is the most profitable top speed at which to operate a heavy truck
. . .
The insurance requirements for trucking firms must be brought up to
date. They were set in 1980 and have stayed at those levels ever since.
Please adjust them to reflect inflation during the past 30 years and
require that they stay indexed to the CPI going forward. This one
common sense change will go a long way toward getting reckless
participants out of this inherently dangerous business and keeping
``bad actors'' out going forward.
We support the idea of tax credits for implementing safety
technologies. We also think an attractive Federal loan program would be
a great alternative to consider to stimulate the proliferation of the
many amazing safety technologies now available.
There is a need for substantial barriers down to car bumper levels
around four sides of heavy commercial trucks, as are currently required
in the EU. This will become even more important as we work toward
better fuel mileage (and passenger vehicles get smaller).
Passenger vehicle drivers need to be better educated on how to
drive more safely around heavy trucks. All states should be required to
do much more to educate drivers' license applicants about this. Also,
the Federal DOT should fund educational communications campaigns
targeting not only new applicants but also those who are already
licensed, but are woefully ignorant of these life-saving techniques.
Truck drivers should have standardized rigorous training before
being allowed to drive heavy commercial trucks. Their CDL's should be
graduated so that new drivers are ``brought along slowly.'' Also, there
should be continuing education requirements as there are for so many
other licensed professions.
On the topic of allowing heavier trucks, the real issue is that
truck driving has become less and less attractive as is reflected in
the over 100 percent turnover each year at the average company. It is
clear that as dangerous as the grim statistics show 80,000 lb. trucks
to be 100,000 lb. trucks will be exponentially more so. The proponents
of heavier trucks point to the EU as an example of heavier trucks
running safely. However, they fail to mention that in the EU all heavy
trucks are governed at 56 mph and drivers must be paid per hour for all
hours worked including overtime. Drivers in the EU cannot drive nearly
as many hours as here (average there can't exceed 45 hours per week).
Their drive time is electronically tracked by their highly secure and
accurate ``tachogram'' system. Also, every truck there has substantial
barriers around all four sides down to European car bumper levels. Make
all of these changes and we will support heavier trucks, assuming that
our bridges and roads can support them.
Finally, the ``elephant in the room'' in this industry is the
economic dysfunction that exists. It was thrilling to hear Sen.
McCaskill bring this up: paying truck drivers by the mile is clearly
asking for the death and injuries that we experience each year in
crashes involving these trucks. Truck drivers arguably have at least as
much responsibility for public safety as do airline pilots. Yet even
though the causes revealed in the recent Buffalo regional air crash
(unhealthy, exhausted, poorly trained and poorly paid pilots) have been
rampant problems in the trucking industry for decades, there has been
nothing done to ensure that these drivers are treated like the
professionals they are expected to be. At a macro level, much of the
profit that was in the trucking industry has shifted to the shippers/
receivers and brokers. It has been done mainly ``on the backs'' of the
truck drivers. Professional truck drivers provide an economic backbone
service to our country. They should be healthy, alert, well-trained,
and well-paid, including overtime after 40 total hours worked,
including loading & unloading time. Some think that essentially paying
truck drivers more for fewer hours worked will increase prices. We
seriously question that argument (although saving lives and injuries
should make the expense worth it to most Americans). Making the changes
we call for would dramatically reduce the 400,000 crashes these
vehicles have annually. When one calculates the consequential economic
losses for the country including the lost productivity, wasted fuel and
additional carbon in our air due to these massive traffic jams (it
takes an average of 3.5 hours to clear a heavy commercial truck from
the road) it is enormous. Add to this the medical, legal and liability
expenses, as well as the wrecked equipment involved, and one has quite
a bit of savings to more than offset the ``cost'' of paying
professional drivers reasonably for the services they provide.
Please consider these requests as they will result in safer drivers
in safer trucks on safer roads for us all.
Note: DuPre Logistics, a carrier in Louisiana, recently changed
their pay to hourly with overtime. The resulting safety improvements
are quite impressive (see attached article).
______
J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.
November 4, 2009
Stephen C. Owings,
President,
Road Safe America,
Atlanta, GA.
Dear Steve,
J.B. Hunt Transport was proud be a co-petitioner with Road Safe
America pursuing the mandated setting of an electronic speed Governor
of all class 7 & 8 commercial motor vehicles (CMV) manufactured after
1992. These vehicles have standard equipment allowing a maximum
governed speed to be set.
Given the fact standard specifications of Class 7 & 8 CMV provide
the means to electronically govern truck speed, we believe the debate
over the use of speed Governors should center around what the maximum
governed speed should be, not whether or not existing technologies
should be used.
It does not make sense to roll a CMV off the assembly line that
could weight up to 80,000 lbs when loaded and has a much greater
stopping distance requirement than automobiles and place it on
America's highways without a speed Governor set at a reasonable speed.
What is a reasonable speed? 1 believe most Americans would agree that
100 mph, 90 mph or even 80 mph is not reasonable.
Setting a maximum governed truck speed will allow enforcement
resources to be shifted from interstate highways to roadways with lower
speed limits where accidents are more likely to be associated with
driving too fast for conditions. The combination of a maximum governed
truck speed and shifting of enforcement to higher risk areas could
produce a further reduction in motor vehicle accidents and related
fatalities and injuries.
J.B. Hunt has governed our equipment for over 20 years and has
recognized the benefits associated with safety, fuel economy,
maintenance expense and the environment.
Thank you for your continued efforts to bring attention to this
issue.
Sincerely,
R. Greer Woodruff,
Sr. VP Corporate Safety and Security.
______
November 30, 2009
Memorandum for: Steve Owings, Road Safe America
From: Don Osterberg, Senior Vice President, Safety, Schneider National,
Inc.
Subject: Support for Speed Limiter Legislation/Regulations
1. References:
a. Virtual Speed Differentials Safety Impact for Interstate
Highways Using Fleet Data, Dr. Steve Johnson, University of
Arkansas, undated draft.
b. Cost-Benefit Evaluation of Large Truck-Automobile Speed
Limit Differentials on Rural Interstate Highways, Mack-
Blackwell National Rural Transportation Center (MBTC), November
2005.
c. Empirical Study of Truck and Automobile Speed on Rural
Interstates: Impact of Absolute Speeds and Speed Differentials,
Dr. Steven Johnson, University of Arkansas, December 2007.
d. Investigation of Speed related Truck Accidents from Large
Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) Data, Dr. Steve Johnson,
University of Arkansas, December, 2007.
2. Background: Schneider National, Inc., along with several others,
petitioned the FMCSA to mandate that all large trucks be governed at a
maximum speed of 68 MPH. Since that petition, we have revised our
proposal that the maximum speed should be limited to no greater than 65
MPH for all large trucks manufactured after 1993.
3. Facts bearing on the issue:
What is irrefutable are the basics of kinetic energy physics
relevant to this issue. The kinetic energy (KE) to be
dissipated in a crash is the best proxy we have today for crash
severity. The formula for calculating KE is .5 mass X velocity
(speed) squared. Since speed is squared in the formula, its
effects are exponential.
Data from the Large Truck Crash Causation Study suggests
that speed was a causal factor in 26 percent of truck involved
fatalities. . .the highest of any single causal factor.
For those who argue that speed differentials are inherently
unsafe, studies have confirmed that even where speed limits are
uniform for large trucks and automobiles, and no speed limiters
are used, speed differentials occur. Studies have consistently
concluded that automobiles exceed posted speed limits by a
greater margin than do large trucks. The reasons for this are
many and varied, but on this point, the research is consistent
and compelling. Therefore, discussions of vehicles safely
traveling at the same speed is a theoretical--not a practical
argument.
4. Our Experience:
a. Safety: Since reducing the maximum speed of the Schneider
National company trucks, Schneider's overall roadway crash
rates have dropped by 26 percent. Specifically, rear-end
collision rates have dropped by 20 percent. The mean costs of
those rear-end collisions (severity proxy) have been reduced by
85 percent. Additionally, within our fleet we have both company
drivers and independent contractors. They all operate within
the same safety culture, led by the same leaders, incented with
the same bonus criterion, etc. . . What is different is that we
limit the maximum speed of our company trucks and not those of
our ICs. In analyzing our high-severity crash rates, our ICs
are over-represented (relative to company drivers by nearly 100
percent (IC represent 20 percent of our capacity, but are
involved in 40 percent of our high-severity crashes). This is
validation that higher speed leads to higher severity crashes.
b. Fuel savings: Our testing has confirmed that for every 1 MPH
reduction in speed, MPG performance improves by .1. This effect
applied nationally will likely save billions of gallons of
diesel fuel, thus reducing carbon signatures dramatically.
5. Conclusion: Schneider National, Inc. unequivocally supports
limiting the speed of all large trucks. Doing so will save lives,
reduce fuel consumption, and thus will have significant environmental
benefits.
6. If you have any questions, please contact me at 920-592-6000 or
by e-mail, [email protected].
Donald A. Osterberg,
Senior Vice President, Safety
Schneider National, Inc.
______
Truckinginfo.com
March 23, 2010
2010 Truck Fleet innovators: Tom Voelkel, President/COO, Dupre
Logistics
By Diana Britton, Managing Editor
As a child, Tom Voelkel's parents instilled in him a strong work
ethic. The current president and chief operating officer of Dupre
Logistics got his first job, cutting grass, at age 8. ``I quickly
learned I didn't want to make a living cutting grass,'' Voelkel says,
laughing.
After graduating from the University of New Orleans with a
bachelor's in marketing, he went to work for the Lever Brothers
Company, a subsidiary of Unilever, where he served 5 years in sales and
sales management roles.
``Working for a big, national company wasn't really my forte,''
Voelkel says.
He wanted to work for a smaller company, where he could see the
impact he was making. He wanted to be part of building a small company
from the ground up. So when Voelkel was offered a job with Dupre
Logistics in 1983, he took his chance.
Dupre was a small company at the time, with about $2.6 million in
revenue, 34 employees, and a few trucks and trailers. Voelkel started
as an operations manager, before being promoted to general manager and
moving up through the ranks. ``We've grown the company, and everyone
has grown with the company,'' he says.
Dupre boasts $111 million in revenue for 2009, 1,000 employees, 700
drivers and 70 mechanics.
Dupre was launched in 1979 as a petroleum carrier with about five
customers and grew to become a common carrier in Louisiana, where the
company is based. In 1986, Dupre purchased an over-the-road truckload
company. Shortly after, the company bought a food products carrier and
an Arkansas petroleum company. Thanks to deregulation, the company was
able to expand its reach geographically into Mississippi, Tennessee,
Alabama, Texas, and Oklahoma. In the late '80s, the company launched a
brokerage, and it started offering dedicated services in the mid-90s.
About a year ago, Dupre purchased a small truckload company in the
beverage business.
Aside from these few acquisitions, Dupre has grown organically,
Voelkel says.
Servant Leadership
Dupre has been able to do this through its leadership and
longstanding commitment to quality. Voelkel says people know they can
count on Dupre, and this confidence helps the company stand out among
other carriers. ``We work real hard to try to do the right things and
do the right things right,'' he says.
One thing Voelkel has strived to do right is leading the folks that
make up Dupre Logistics. When he thinks about his favorite
accomplishment, he thinks about the growth of the people in the
organization, He looks back on how far they've come, from buying houses
and having kids to seeing those children grow up and be successful
adults.
It's not a surprise that Voelkel's leadership style would be one of
servant leadership. ``I believe you have to serve first before you
lead,'' he says. ``The people aren't there for you; you're there for
the people.''
Dupre trains its leaders to adopt this ``servant leadership''
skillset. The company tries to keep that philosophy alive by holding a
stewardship meeting once a month.
One example of this servant leadership seems to be played out
through the company's pay structure. The company compensates drivers by
the hour, rather than by the mile. a system it says produces better
schedules and safer drivers. The move was also part of a larger
strategy to make Dupre a great place to work, Voelkel says.
``We saw a lot of inefficiencies in the trucking business that was
put on the backs of the drivers,'' he says. For example, if there was
congestion on the highway or if a customer delayed loading or
unloading, ``the driver ate that.''
``If you get paid by the hour. you get paid for your time.''
This pay structure also attracts higher quality drivers who want to
stay--something that may give Dupre a leg up once the recovery shakes
out and the driver shortage comes back with a vengeance. The company's
driver turnover is less than 25 percent, and this figure includes
promotions, retirements, and terminations, as well as those who quit.
Pushing the Envelope
The hourly pay structure is not the only way Dupre has been pushing
the envelope. Early on, the company saw technology as a way to
differentiate itself. ``We keyed in to technology to make our services
better,'' Voelkel says. You have to get out of your comfort zone.''
Dupre has been using electronic log systems across its entire fleet
since the summer of 2007. According to Voelkel, the system puts less
work on the driver, and it holds both the driver and the dispatcher
accountable to the number of hours a driver can work. Drivers have been
able to focus more on their driving, rather than worrying about the
complications and wasted time that comes with having to keep a paper
log.
Another technology Dupre has embraced is Advanced Predictive
Analytics, a modeling system that aggregates data and presents
potential accidents to the fleet's management team--before they happen.
As a result, accidents have been reduced by 67 percent since 2004. The
technology is through Fleet Risk Advisors.
A driver identified in the bottom tier, who goes through the
targeted risk management training, counseling, schedule adjustment or
programs suggested by management, is 50 percent less likely to have an
accident within the next month.
``This is a major factor in moving us closer to our vision of being
the safest transportation and logistics company in North America,''
Voelkel says. ``Predictive modeling helps us see the future today and
gives us the opportunity to create the future that we want tomorrow.''
The primary objective of the Predictive Analytics implementation
has been to combine historical data with the current month's
operational data to predict the next month's safety performance. In
order to accomplish this, computers capture data of a driver in over
400 data elements. Data aggregation and pattern recognition technology
is used to identify risk signatures of drivers, vehicles and schedules.
Other recent developments at Dupre include adding SmartWay-
certified tractors to its fleet for better fuel mileage and
implementing GreenRoad, a driving behavior improvement technology that
continuously measures and analyzes maneuvers that most impact safe
driving, fuel efficiency and emissions, focusing driver-specific
feedback accordingly.
Preparing for the Upturn
Voelkel describes the recession as having one foot on the
accelerator and one foot on the brakes. You're trying to grow the
company and be profitable while trying to pull back on spending. ``You
cannot maximize profits when you do that.''
For Dupre, navigating the downturn was about trying to find that
balance between the accelerator and the brakes. ``It has been a brutal
recession.''
When the upturn comes around, Dupre will be prepared. According to
Voelkel, the company has avoided cutting any muscle out of the
organization during the downturn. It's actually adding to its sales
force and building its operations bench strength. It has also geared up
its information technology.
Looking ahead, Voelkel says they just need to get through 2010, and
2011 should be a pretty good year.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. In an effort to stop distracted driving by truck and
bus drivers, your agency has sought to impose penalties on truckers and
bus drivers who text and drive. Since these penalties have been in
place, how many commercial motor vehicle drivers have been subject to
fines or penalized because of texting while driving?
Answer. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
does not have data concerning the number of commercial motor vehicle
(CMV) drivers who have been cited for texting while driving. The
Agency's data collection systems have not been modified to gather such
data because the enforcement activities would be coded under a general
violation cite based on regulatory guidance, rather than an explicit
Federal rule. On April 1, 2010, FMCSA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) to put into place an explicit prohibition against
texting while driving, which would include driver disqualification
penalties in addition to civil penalties. When the Agency completes the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process later this year, its data
collection systems will be modified to provide a means for gathering
violation data.
On January 27, 2010, FMCSA published regulatory guidance in the
Federal Register concerning texting by CMV drivers. The guidance
explains that the Agency's current regulation prohibiting the use of
equipment that decreases the safety of operation of commercial vehicles
(49 CFR 390.17) may also be applied to CMV drivers' use of electronic
devices for texting. A civil penalty of up to $2,750 may be issued for
violations involving the use of electronic devices that decrease
safety.
Question 2. FMCSA and state law enforcement agency capabilities are
dwarfed by the size of the motor carrier industry and, as a result, are
only able to conduct compliance reviews on about 2 percent of carriers.
What steps can your Agency take to leverage its limited resources to
increase the motor carrier industry's compliance with Federal motor
carrier safety regulations? Should Congress change the barriers to
entry into the motor carrier industry to make sure that the safest
drivers and companies are able to enter the market?
Answer. FMCSA is nearing completion of its operational model test
of the Comprehensive Safety Analysis (CSA) 2010 high-risk carrier
identification and intervention system. CSA 2010 is a major
restructuring of FMCSA's current safety fitness determination process
and compliance and enforcement programs. The goal is to lead FMCSA to a
more effective operational model--one that will have a greater impact
on a larger number of truck and bus companies while optimizing Agency
resources.
The safety compliance review (CR) is currently the Agency's primary
tool for ensuring compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSRs) and Hazardous Materials Regulations. However,
while the CR program is effective, it requires a significant amount of
our human resources, while assessing the safety performance of only a
small fraction of the motor carrier industry--as you mention, less than
2 percent. CSA 2010 is designed to help impact a larger segment of
motor carriers and drivers through a broader array of compliance
interventions, with the expectation of changing unsafe behavior
earlier.
The new CSA2010 operational model includes four major elements: (1)
measurement, (2) intervention, (3) safety fitness determination, and
(4) information technology. In February 2008, FMCSA launched a 30-month
field test of the CSA 2010 Operational Model (Op-Model) with its State
partners--Georgia, Colorado, New Jersey, and Missouri--using
approximately 26 Federal and State investigators. Motor carriers
domiciled in the four test States were randomly placed into a control
or test group, with approximately 34,000 carriers in each group.
Carriers in the test group receive the new CSA 2010 interventions using
the new measurement system, while those in the control group receive
CRs using the current FMCSA operational model.
FMCSA added five States to the test in the spring and fall of
2009--Minnesota, Montana, Kansas, Maryland, and Delaware. Throughout
these States, the test is being run using the CSA 2010 new
interventions and measurement system at 100 percent. The purpose of 100
percent participation in the newest CSA 2010 test States is to identify
any operational issues that might otherwise not become apparent in the
four States that are running both the old and new business models.
Preliminary results are largely positive with strong enthusiasm for
CSA 2010 among the test States, as well as enthusiasm among other
States that are eager to employ this new compliance and enforcement
model.
The Agency is planning to begin nationwide CSA 2010 deployment
before the end of the year. Later this year, FMCSA plans to replace
SafeStat with the new Safety Measurement System (SMS) and send more
comprehensive information regarding the behavior of unsafe motor
carriers to the roadside. Warning letters will be sent out to those
carriers that reach the deficiency thresholds of the new SMS, and
compliance review assignments will be prioritized based on the SMS
results. As each State is trained, the new CSA 2010 interventions will
be employed.
The new SMS will work within the CSA 2010 operational model to
monitor and quantify the safety performance of commercial motor
carriers using information from the FMCSA's Motor Carrier Management
Information System (MCMIS). Under CSA 2010, this data would include
violations found during roadside inspections, traffic enforcement, and
other types of interventions. The new SMS groups the data into 7
Behavior Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories (BASICs): Unsafe
driving, fatigued driving, driver fitness, controlled substances and
alcohol, vehicle maintenance, cargo related, and crash history. In
addition, the CSMS uses all safety-based inspection violations, not
just out-of-service violations and selected moving violations (as in
SafeStat), and uses risk-based violation ratings, where SafeStat does
not.
FMCSA is seeing up to a 35 percent increase in the number of motor
carrier investigations (offsite, onsite focused, or onsite
comprehensive) conducted using the new CSA 2010 approach versus the
Agency's current business model.
In addition to these efforts, I believe it would be helpful to have
a discussion about providing the Agency some discretion about revising
entry requirements into the industry. I have made raising the bar to
entry into the industry to be one of my 3 pillars as the FMCSA
leadership and I believe we should explore this as a mechanism to
improve safety.
Question 3. You recently held a series of public listening sessions
on hours-of-service. Please summarize what FMCSA has learned from these
sessions.
Answer. FMCSA held five public listening sessions in January and
March in Washington, D.C.; Dallas, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Davenport, IA;
and Louisville, KY. The Davenport session was held adjacent to a large
truck stop and the Louisville session was held at the Mid-America
Trucking Show to encourage participation by drivers. The sessions were
webcast, and e-mailed and phoned comments were submitted. Approximately
300 individuals and organizations spoke at the sessions. Almost all of
the speakers were drivers and carriers or associations representing
them. Most of the drivers who spoke were in for-hire, long haul, truck
load operations.
With two exceptions, carriers, drivers, and industry associations
supported the existing rule. The speakers strongly supported 11 hours
of driving per duty period and the 34-hour restart. Carriers and
industry associations stated that the 11 driving hours provided
flexibility and that some carriers had redesigned routes and schedules
to use it; changing to a shorter period would be costly. Drivers
indicated that they use the restart frequently; when away from home,
they may take no more than 34 hours off; at home, the restart is
usually longer. A few drivers argued for a shorter restart (24 hours or
less).
Many, but not all, drivers objected to the fixed 14-hour driving
window saying that it forced them to drive when they were tired because
breaks were included in the calculation of the duty period. They also
said that the rule made it hard to avoid congestion because they had to
drive during rush hours. Under the pre-2003 rule, they could have
pulled off the road and waited until congestion eased without cutting
into their available duty hours. Drivers sought flexibility.
Specifically, they asked FMCSA to make the 14-hour period cumulative
(i.e., off-duty time would not be included in calculation of the
driving window) or allow the driving window to be extended to 16 or 18
hours. A few drivers supported the current 14-hour rule, stating that
it prevented carriers and brokers from forcing them to log waiting time
as off duty time so they could work longer days.
Many drivers and carriers objected to the existing sleeper berth
rule that allows 10 hours off duty to be taken in two periods, one of 8
to 10 consecutive hours in the berth and the other of 2 or more hours,
either in the berth or off duty; the shorter period is included in the
calculation of the driving window. Team drivers in particular wanted
the flexibility to be able to divide their 8-hour sleeper berth time
into shorter periods (4 + 4 hours, 5 + 3 hours, etc.). Drivers who
spoke on this issue asked that the shorter period not be included in
the calculation of the duty period.
Safety advocacy groups and the Teamsters generally supported the
14-consecutive-hour provision, but opposed 11 hours of driving and the
34-hour restart because these provisions allow long days of continuous
work and up to 84 hours of work in 7 days. They urged FMCSA to consider
the body of research on the effects of long hours on performance and
health and to establish a 24-hour circadian schedule.
Drivers also raised several issues that affect them, but are
outside of FMCSA's statutory authority. The number of available areas
where truck drivers can safely stop and rest, although never adequate,
has been reduced in the last few years as some States have closed rest
areas for budgetary reasons. Drivers stated that the lack of safe rest
areas made it difficult for them to find a place to take their 10-hour
off-duty period. A number of drivers also stated that the current
methods of paying many drivers (by the mile or load) provide shippers
with no incentive to load or unload a truck promptly. The independent
owner operators and smaller carriers complained that they could spend
30 to 40 hours a week waiting for shippers, time for which they are not
paid. Finally, drivers stated that anti-idling laws adopted by some
State and local governments to reduce pollution can make it difficult
to sleep because they cannot run their air conditioning or heating.
A complete transcript for each of the listening sessions has been
placed in the rulemaking docket so that all interested parties may
review the information.
Question 4. The Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety claim that
FMCSA's statistics for truck fatalities are artificially low because
FMCSA merges the truck fatality rate with the much lower fatality rate
for buses and motorcoaches. Does FMCSA believe that this is an accurate
way to report this data? Why doesn't your agency report the total
number of truck-involved fatal crash deaths measured against annual
truck vehicle miles traveled?
Answer. The Agency produces and publishes a variety of annual
statistics for CMV fatality rates, including separate fatality rates
for trucks and buses. This information can be found in our annual Large
Truck and Bus Crash Facts publication available at http://
ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/CrashProfile/NationalCrashProfileMain.asp. The
publication shows, for example, that in 2008, the large truck fatality
rate (fatalities in truck crashes divided by truck miles of travel) was
1.86 fatalities per 100 million truck miles traveled (Table 1). In that
same year, the bus fatality rate (total bus fatalities divided by bus
miles) was much higher at 4.32 fatalities per 100 million bus miles
traveled (Table 20) The combined rate, using the fatality and vehicle
miles of travel (VMT) information provided in the publication, is a
truck and bus fatality rate of 1.93 fatalities per 100 million bus and
truck miles traveled, which is higher (not lower) than the truck-only
fatality rate of 1.86. Using data from other years produces similar
results.
In addition to the metrics just mentioned, FMCSA also produces
other performance metrics, on an annual basis, such as all bus and
truck crashes per all vehicle VMT, and all bus and truck fatalities per
all vehicle VMT. These particular performance metrics are included in
the Agency's annual Performance Budget Estimates Submission to
Congress, and were specifically designed to be consistent with
performance metrics used by the other modes of DOT. For example, for
2008, the fatality rate for trucks and buses using all VMT was 0.152
based on the latest data available. This rate represents a 10 percent
improvement from 2007.
Question 5. Most truck drivers are paid by the mile, which tempts
drivers to drive longer than what is permitted under the Hours of
Service regulations, especially if they are delayed at ports and
loading facilities. As we work to reauthorize the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, what additional steps should the Committee take
to reduce this incentive?
Answer. FMCSA acknowledges the influence that compensation has on
employers' and drivers' decisions concerning work schedules. However,
the Agency does not have sufficient information to assess the extent to
which hours-based or mileage-based compensation may impact safety. It
stands to reason that hours-based compensation would deter motor
carriers from requiring or allowing drivers to work excessive hours but
this disincentive to long work hours could be circumvented by employers
offering low hourly wages. FMCSA believes the complex nature of wage
discussions would require collaboration between Federal and State
government agencies, transportation industry groups (including shippers
and receivers), labor unions, and safety advocacy groups to identify
factors that need to be considered in developing a plan to address the
issue.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. Last year I introduced S. 1113, the Safe Roads Act, to
establish a national drug and alcohol testing database for employers to
better select qualified drivers and avoid hiring employees with a drug
or alcohol background.
Under this law, the FMCSA would require medical review officers,
employers, and other service agents to report positive results from
FMCSA required drug or alcohol tests to the database and clearinghouse.
Employers would be required to check the database prior to hiring a
prospective employee. If a prospective employee has a positive result,
an employer would not be allowed to hire the prospect unless he/she has
not violated the requirements of the testing program or he/she has
fully completed a return-to-duty program as required by the testing
program. This law will also require privacy protections and employee
rights of action. Do you support the establishment of a drug and
alcohol test result clearinghouse? Does FMCSA have the authority to
establish such a clearinghouse without Congressional guidance? Is FMCSA
designing a database as part of CSA 2010 that could accommodate such a
database?
Answer. FMCSA believes the establishment of a drug and alcohol test
result clearinghouse to improve the quality of drivers operating
commercial motor vehicles on public roadways would likely bring about
increased levels of compliance with the controlled substances and
alcohol testing rules and thereby improve motor carrier safety.
FMCSA technically has the authority to establish a drug and alcohol
clearinghouse without Congressional guidance, but it lacks the
compliance and enforcement authority necessary to effectively implement
such a clearinghouse. The Agency lacks the authority to assess civil
penalties against medical review officers, and other service agents,
that fail to report drug and alcohol test results and driver recovery
information to a central database. Existing authority to require
service agent compliance with the regulations is limited to a Public
Interest Exclusion (PIE), which is a 150-day administrative process to
require a single service agent to comply. In establishing a new
database with service agent reporting requirements, the Agency would
focus its limited enforcement resources on problem drivers and
employers who directly impact highway safety. Expanded civil penalty
authority for service agents would provide for more effective and
immediate enforcement; the general deterrent effect would promote
service agents voluntarily compliance with the reporting requirements
for the new database.
FMCSA is actively engaged in drafting a notice of proposed
rulemaking and designing a drug and alcohol database that, due to
privacy and security considerations, will be separate and distinct from
CSA 2010. Many of the violations that will be identified, through
matching the drug and alcohol database with traditional roadside
inspection and crash data, will be fed into CSA 2010 to improve the
development of motor carrier and driver profiles. Data gathered through
the drug and alcohol reporting process, will primarily be used to
inform motor carrier employers of problem drivers. This will reduce the
numbers of positive-tested drivers, who continue to operate commercial
vehicles in violation of drug and alcohol testing regulations and will
lead to increased compliance with the DOT drug and alcohol testing
program and its goal of increasing safety by reducing the numbers of
drivers who choose to abuse drugs or alcohol.
FMCSA plans to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding
the national drug and alcohol database in April 2011.
Question 2. During consideration of SAFETEA-LU, I worked closely
with my colleagues to provide consumers with additional resources to
enforce Federal laws against unscrupulous house-hold goods moving
companies. Specifically, provisions I worked on provided State
Attorneys General additional authority to bring Federal consumer
protection actions against interstate HHG carriers. While this
authority has not been utilized much to date, I believe it is an
important authority for States to have at their disposal to protect
consumers in their States. Has FMCSA worked with State officials to
help them implement this provision?
Answer. FMCSA has had some success in coordinating with States in
these enforcement efforts. SAFETEA-LU gave States the authority to
enforce Federal household goods (HHG) laws and regulations. State HHG
regulators may bring actions in either State or Federal venues pursuant
to 49 U.S.C. 14710. State Attorneys General may bring actions in
Federal Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 14711.
To date, no States have used the provisions that permit them to
bring consumer protection actions for the violation of Federal HHG
statutes and regulations. Many of the States reference resource
constraints and a preference for using State courts rather than Federal
courts as why they are not using the SAFETEA-LU authority.
Additionally, the State Attorneys General have indicated that there are
statutory constraints on the use of the authority. FMCSA is currently
engaging in substantial outreach to States in an effort to interest
them in using their authority soon.
Section 4213(a) of SAFETEA-LU required FMCSA to convene a working
group consisting of Federal, State, and local enforcement officials to:
``[D]evelop[ ] practices and procedures to enhance the
Federal-State partnership in enforcement efforts, exchange of
information, and coordination of enforcement efforts with
respect to interstate transportation of household goods. . .
.''
FMCSA implemented a by-product of the working group--an
``Enforcement Assistance Outreach Plan.'' The working group produced an
outreach plan to aid in the coordination and enforcement efforts for
household goods related complaints. FMCSA currently hosts quarterly
coordination meetings to address action items in the plan.
Currently, there are at least four States that have expressed an
interest in working with FMCSA to utilize the provisions in SAFETEA-LU.
They are Louisiana, Ohio, Illinois, and Texas. FMCSA is actively
engaging these States to forge a relationship and determine how best to
implement the SAFETEA-LU provision.
Question 2a. How effective has the ``Protect Your Move'' initiative
at FMCSA been in enforcing consumer protection laws?
Answer. Since 2005, the Protect Your Move Website has had over
19,391,174 hits. This is an average of 11,138 hits a day. The website
is extremely informative for those customers who are taking the
initiative to be proactive in selecting a HHG mover. However, there are
hundreds of unsuspecting consumers who are not being proactive in their
search of a HHG mover and are victims to unscrupulous carriers. FMCSA
is continuously working to improve our outreach efforts and currently
developing a more user friendly Website. The Agency is also
collaborating with State agencies to champion consumer protection. We
are granting State consumer protection agencies user privileges to the
Protect Your Move website to access data on rogue carriers in an effort
to combat fraud and other types of commercial infractions. FMCSA
believes the Protect Your Move Website to be informative and helpful in
enforcing consumer protection laws.
Question 2b. What additional tools or resources does FMCSA need to
enforce consumer protection laws against unscrupulous house-hold goods
moving companies?
Answer. There are over 6,196 household goods carriers/brokers with
active operating authority identified in our MCMIS database. We
continue to believe that finding ways to leverage our limited resources
by empowering and allowing the States to conduct enforcement of the
Federal consumer regulations is the strategy most likely to address
unscrupulous household goods moving companies.
Question 3. I understand that on April 5, 2010, FMCSA developed a
final rule to require the use of EOBRs by carriers that have violated
the hours of service rules. What information is required to be recorded
by the EOBRs? Is there a performance standard? Do you believe all
motor-carriers should be equipped with EOBRs to better comply with
Hours of Service laws? If Congress were to require EOBRs for all
carriers, what information should we require to be recorded?
Answer.
Summary of EOBR Final Rule
On April 5, 2010, FMCSA published a Final Rule amending the FMCSRs
to incorporate new performance standards for electronic on-board
recorders (EOBRs) installed in CMVs manufactured on or after June 4,
2012. Motor carriers that have demonstrated serious noncompliance with
the Hours of Service (HOS) rules will be subject to mandatory
installation of EOBRs meeting the new performance standards. If FMCSA
determines, based on HOS records reviewed during a compliance review,
that a motor carrier has a 10 percent or greater HOS violation rate,
FMCSA will issue the carrier an EOBR remedial directive. The motor
carrier will then be required to install EOBRs in all of its CMVs
regardless of their date of manufacture and use the devices for HOS
recordkeeping for a period of 2 years.
FMCSA also changed the safety fitness standard to take into account
a remedial directive when determining fitness. Additionally, to
encourage industry-wide use of EOBRs, FMCSA revised its compliance
review procedures to permit examination of a random sample of drivers'
records of duty status after the initial sampling, and provides partial
relief from HOS supporting documents requirements, if certain
conditions are satisfied, for motor carriers that voluntarily use
compliant EOBRs.
Finally, because FMCSA recognizes that the potential safety risks
associated with some motor carrier categories, such as passenger
carriers, hazardous materials transporters, and new motor carriers
seeking authority to conduct interstate operations in the United
States, are such that mandatory EOBR use for such operations might be
appropriate, the Agency will initiate a new rulemaking to consider
expanding the scope of mandatory EOBR use beyond the remedial directive
approach adopted as part of the new rule.
Required Information
An EOBR must record the following information:
(1) Name of driver and any co-driver(s), and corresponding
driver identification information (such as a user ID and
password). However, the name of the driver and any co-driver is
not required to be transmitted as part of the downloaded file
during a roadside inspection.
(2) Duty status.
(3) Date and time.
(4) Location of CMV.
(5) Distance traveled.
(6) Name and USDOT Number of motor carrier.
(7) 24-hour period starting time (e.g., midnight, 9 a.m., noon,
3 p.m.).
(8) The multiday basis (7 or 8 days) used by the motor carrier
to compute cumulative duty hours and driving time.
(9) Hours in each duty status for the 24-hour period, and total
hours.
(10) Truck or tractor and trailer number.
(11) Shipping document number(s), or name of shipper and
commodity.
With regard to duty status categories, an EOBR must use the
following duty statuses:
(1) ``Off duty'' or ``OFF.''
(2) ``Sleeper berth'' or ``SB'' to be used only if sleeper
berth is used.
(3) ``Driving'' or ``D.''
(4) ``On-duty not driving'' or ``ON.''
The April 5 Final Rule provides detailed performance specifications
for EOBRs.
Should the EOBR Mandate Be Expanded
FMCSA has announced its intention to issue a new EOBR NPRM to
expand the population of motor carriers that are required to use the
devices to monitor their drivers' hours of service. The Agency has not
determined how broad a mandate will be proposed, but the Agency will
seek public input through a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding
later this year.
Required Information Under a Congressional Mandate
Based on the public comments and technical information FMCSA
considered in developing its April 5 Final Rule, the Agency believes
the data required by the rule is sufficient to ensure accurate
information about commercial motor vehicle operators' driving time and
the date, time and location of changes in duty status.
Question 4. I understand that the USDOT and their Mexican
counterparts have established a working group to potentially redevelop
the cross-border trucking program. Can you provide the Committee with a
status report on the working group? Will you commit to keeping members
of the Committee up to speed with developments of any such program?
What government agencies and outside interest groups are participating
in the working group?
Answer. After Congress terminated the U.S. Department of
Transportation's (DOT's) Cross-Border Truck Demonstration Program in
March 2009, President Obama directed DOT, the State Department, the
U.S. Trade Representative and other relevant agencies to develop a
solution that will ensure the highest degree of safety, satisfy our
NAFTA obligations, facilitate the lifting of tariffs, and advance the
economic interests of the United States. This interagency group is
considering all viable programmatic options based on existing statutory
authority and legal obligations and is working diligently on a proposal
that fulfills President Obama's directive. While our work is not yet
complete, we expect to present a proposed plan in the near future. We
look forward to presenting this proposal to Mexico, Congress and the
public and are hopeful that it will provide a reasonable and workable
path toward resolving this dispute.
Secretary LaHood and Mexican Transport Secretary Molinar agreed to
establish a working group to negotiate the precise terms of a new
cross-border long haul trucking program. We expect the working group to
convene once the United States has presented Mexico with a new cross-
border long haul trucking proposal. Representatives of the U.S.
Government and the government of Mexico will participate in the working
group.
DOT and our interagency partners are committed to being transparent
in the development, implementation and oversight of any new cross-
border long-haul trucking program with Mexico.
Question 5. Over the recess, I met with a group of Arkansas motor-
coach carriers that stated that DOT did not have the resources
available to investigate rogue motor-coach carriers with poor safety
records and that many motor-carriers without interstate transportation
authority were illegally participating in such activities. They believe
that focusing on these operators would dramatically enhance the safety
record of motor-coach carriers. Do you believe FMCSA lacks the
resources to investigate and prosecute rogue motor-coach operators?
Answer. FMCSA dedicates a significant level of its resources to
investigate the compliance of motorcoach operators. In each of the
previous three Fiscal Years, FMCSA conducted approximately 1,300
compliance reviews on motorcoach operators. There are approximately
3,800 interstate, for-hire motorcoach operators. As a result, at this
rate, over one-third of the motorcoach industry has a compliance review
annually.
Question 5a. How does FMCSA investigate reports of motor-carriers
operating outside of their authorities or not in compliance with FMCSA
requirements?
Answer. In August 2008, FMCSA implemented a Passenger Carrier
Prioritization System within its compliance review prioritization
system, SafeStat, to enhance its ability to monitor the safety
performance of passenger carrier companies. Under this revised system,
seven groups of passenger carriers were identified as FMCSA's highest
priorities for compliance reviews. One group includes passenger
carriers with recent interstate operational activity while having no or
inactive operating authority and no or inadequate insurance filing, or
an out of service order in effect. The new SafeStat module identifies
passenger carriers with the highest safety risk and worst compliance
histories without regard to the size or age of the transportation
operation.
Question 5b. Has FMCSA reviewed the provisions in the comprehensive
motor-coach safety enhancement bill passed by the Committee in
December? Would you provide comments to the bill?
Answer. FMCSA conducted a comprehensive review of Senate Bill 554
and worked closely with Committee staff to provide technical assistance
through briefings, conference calls, and electronic documents. In
addition, FMCSA staff has worked in coordination with the Congressional
Budget Office in evaluating the costs of implementing the various
provisions of the bill.
Question 6. Do you believe the current size and weight restrictions
can be increased without compromising highway safety or infrastructure
integrity? Would you comment on your views of increasing the allowable
weight of trucks to 97,000 pounds by adding a third axle to the rear
pair of axles?
Answer. FMCSA is committed to working with the Office of the
Secretary and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to ensure the
potential safety impacts of any legislative proposals concerning the
Federal size and weight statutes are fully considered. The FHWA has
responsibility for implementing the statutory provisions concerning
truck size and weight and assessing the impacts of potential changes on
the Nation's infrastructure, and the FMCSA has responsibility for
working with the FHWA to ensure that safety impacts are considered as
part of the analysis of any legislative proposals concerning truck size
and weight. Both agencies work together to provide recommendations on
truck size and weight issues.
FMCSA acknowledges concerns about the impact that increases in
truck size and weight limits (including the elimination of certain
restrictions on Longer Combination Vehicles (LCVs)) would have on the
Nation's highways. The current statutory restrictions on truck size and
weight and LCV operations appear to strike an appropriate balance among
safety, the efficiency of our transportation system, and minimizing
pavement damage. Also, LCVs continue to have a place on American roads
within the constraints of the current size and weight statutes and the
FHWA's implementing regulations.
With regard to the safety of operation of LCVs, the Agency is not
aware of data or other information that would suggest that highway
safety is compromised by LCVs within the areas in which they are
currently allowed to operate. As with any commercial motor vehicle,
safety depends on the driver having the necessary knowledge and
skills--as validated by LCV drivers' commercial driver's license with
the ``Doubles/Triples'' endorsement--and the vehicle being properly
maintained.
To ensure the safe operation of LCVs, the Department's FMCSA has
regulations (49 CFR Part 380) establishing minimum requirements for LCV
drivers and LCV driver instructors. The rule covers drivers that
operate any combination of a truck tractor and 2 or more trailers and
semitrailers, with a gross combination weight greater than 80,000
pounds, and which operate on the National System of Interstate and
Defense Highways.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. How do you respond to concerns that CSA 2010 gives too
much weight to driver behavior and not enough to mechanical defects?
Answer. The new CSA 2010 Safety Measurement System (SMS) uses all
safety violations discovered during roadside inspections to measure the
relative safety performance of motor carriers. Each violation is
weighted based on its crash risk. SMS groups these data into seven
unsafe behavior areas named Behavior Analysis Safety Improvement
Categories (BASICs). These are: (1) Unsafe Driving; (2) Fatigued
Driving (Hours-of-Service); (3) Driver Fitness; (4) Controlled
Substances/Alcohol; (5) Vehicle Maintenance; (6) Cargo-Related; and (7)
Crash Indicator. Research has shown that driver behavior is a major
contributing causal factor in large truck and bus crashes. FMCSA
analysis shows that among the seven BASICs, there are three that are
the strongest predictors of future crashes: Unsafe Driving, Fatigued
Driving, and the Crash Indicator (past crashes).
Question 2. When measuring a carrier's exposure or risk, FMCSA
currently looks at the number of trucks that carrier uses, not the
number of miles traveled. Some stakeholders argue that mileage is a
more accurate indicator of a carrier's risk. Will FMCSA consider
changing its current practice?
Answer. Two of the seven CSA 2010 BASICs use power units as the
measure of exposure in the current Safety Measurement Methodology.
These are the Unsafe Driving BASIC and the Crash BASIC. Based on
stakeholder feedback and lessons learned from the CSA 2010 field test,
FMCSA is currently revisiting the exposure measure used in these two
BASICs. The Agency's analysis to date indicates that biases are
introduced when either power units or vehicle miles traveled are used
as the sole measure of exposure. FMCSA is currently analyzing this
matter to come up with the most reliable exposure measure that can be
implemented as part of the CSA 2010 rollout later this year.
Question 3. Last November, DOT published a comprehensive Motorcoach
Safety Action Plan at the direction of Secretary LaHood. But it appears
that numerous deadlines set by FMCSA and NHTSA for their agencies are
already slipping. At FMCSA, completion of the motorcoach driver fatigue
study has been delayed 6 months; initiation of a pre-employment
screening study has been pushed back 6 months; the safety fitness
determination rulemaking supporting CSA 2010 has been delayed until
next fall; and rulemaking on State bus inspection programs appears to
be delayed indefinitely. What are the causes of the delays? Were the
deadlines unrealistic to begin with?
Answer. The majority of projects and initiatives contained in the
Motorcoach Safety Action Plan are complete or on schedule. Some of the
initiatives are notice and comment rulemakings which must compete with
other rulemakings for priority and attention. The rulemaking on State
bus inspection programs is pending further action on S. 554, the
Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act of 2009, which includes language on this
program. Target dates for a number of studies were extended to improve
the quality of the study. Overall, progress implementing the Plan is on
track.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. In your oral testimony, you mentioned that FMCSA has an
``open docket'' on the hours of service issue and is seeking additional
scientific research that may be relevant for the Agency to consider as
part of its ongoing review. What new research studies have been
identified by FMCSA since the Agency began its latest review?
Answer. The following is a list of scientific studies is identified
by FMCSA since the Agency began its latest review of the hours of
service rule:
Artazcoz, L., Cortes, I., Escriba-Aguir, V., Cascant, L.,
and Villegas, R. ``Understanding the relationship of long
working hours with health status and health-related
behaviours.'' Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health.
2009 July;63(7):521-7.
Banks, S. and Dinges, D. ``Behavioral and physiological
consequences of sleep restriction.'' Journal of Clinical Sleep
Medicine 2007;3(5):519-28.
Balkin et al., ``Sleep Loss and Sleepiness: Current
Issues.'' Chest 2008; 134-653-660; DOI 10.1378/chest.08-1064.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008 American Time Use Survey
database, available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for
Census Code 9130, Drivers/Sales Workers and Truck Drivers.
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Employment Situation--March
2010. USDL-10-0394. April 2, 2010. http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf, accessed 4/29/10.
Cappuccio, F., Taggart, F., Ngianga-Bakwin, K., Currie, A.,
Peile, E., Stranges, S., and Miller, M. ``Meta-analysis of
short sleep duration and obesity in children and adults.''
Sleep. 2008 May;31(5):619-26.
Cohen et al., ``Uncovering residual effects of chronic sleep
loss on human performance.'' Science Translation Medicine 2
14ra3(2010), DOI 10.1126/scitranslmed.3000458.
Dahl, S., Kaerlev, L., Jensen, A., Tuchsen, F., Hannerz, H.,
Nielsen, P.S., and Olsen, J. ``Hospitalization for lifestyle
related diseases in long haul drivers compared with other truck
drivers and the working population at large.'' Work.
2009;33:345-53.
Di Milia, L. and Mummery, K. ``The association between job
related factors, short sleep and obesity.'' Industrial Health.
2009;47:363-8.
Ferrie, J., Shipley, M., Cappuccio, F., Brunner, E., Miller,
M., Kumari, M., and Marmot, M. ``A prospective study of change
in sleep duration: associations with mortality in the Whitehall
II cohort.'' Sleep. 2007;30(12):1659-66.
Flegal, K., Carroll, M., Ogden, C., et al., ``Prevalence and
trends in obesity among U.S. adults, 1999-2008.'' JAMA.
2010;303(3):235-41
FMCSA, Truck Driver Fatigue Management Survey, May 2006.
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-technology/
report/Truck-Driver-Fatigue-Management-Survey-Report.pdf.
Folkard, S. and D. A. Lombardi. ``Modeling the impact of the
components of long work hours on injuries and ``accidents''.''
American Journal of Industrial Medicine. 49:953-963 (2006); DOI
10.1002/ajim320307.
Fu, J.S., et al. (2010) Improving Heavy-Duty Diesel Truck
Ergonomics to Reduce Fatigue and Improve Driver Health and
Performance, FMCSA Publication No. FMCSA RRR-10-040.
Grandner, M. and Patel, N. ``From sleep duration to
mortality: implications of meta-analysis and future
directions.'' Journal of Sleep Research. 2009;18:145-7.
Hamilton, M., Hamilton, D., and Zderic, T. ``Role of low
energy expenditure and sitting in obesity, metabolic syndrome,
Type 2 diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.'' Diabetes. 2007
November;56:2655-67.
Hanowski et al. ``The sleep of commercial vehicles drivers
under the 2003 revised hours-of-service regulations.'' Accident
Analysis and Prevention 39 (2007) 1140-1145. DOI:10.1016/
j.aap.2007.02.011.
Hauner, H. ``Overweight--not such a big problem?'' Deutsches
Arzteblatt International. 2009;106(40):639-40.
Hayashino, Y., Fukuhara, S., Suzukamo, Y., Okamura, T.,
Tanaka, T., and Ueshima, H. ``Relation between sleep quality
and quantity, quality of life, and risk of developing diabetes
in healthy workers in Japan: the High-risk and Population
Strategy for Occupational Health Promotion (HIPOP-OHP) Study.''
BMC Public Health. 2007 June;7:n.p.
Healy, G., Dunstan, D., Salmon, J., Cerin, E., Shaw, J.,
Zimmet, P., and Owen, N. ``Breaks in sedentary time: beneficial
associations with metabolic risk.'' Diabetes Care. 2008
April;31(4):661-6.
Katzmarzyk, P., Church, T., Craig, C., and Bouchard, C.
``Sitting time and mortality from all causes, cardiovascular
disease, and cancer.'' Medicine and Science in Sports and
Exercise. 2009 May;41(5):998-1005.
Knauth, P. ``Extended Work Periods.'' Industrial Health.
2007;45:126-36.
Knutson, K.L. et al. ``The metabolic consequences of sleep
deprivation.'' Sleep Medicine Review, 2007 June: 11(3): 163-
178.
Lauderdale, D.S. et al. ``Sleep duration: how well do self-
reports reflect objective measures? The CARDIA Sleep Study.''
Epidemiology 2008 November 19(6): 838-845.
Lenz, M., Richter, T., and Muhlhauser, I. ``The morbidity
and mortality associated with overweight and obesity in
adulthood.'' Deutsches Arzteblatt International.
2009;106(40):641-8.
Martin, B., Church, T., Bonnell, R., Ben-Joseph, R., and
Borgstadt, T. ``The impact of overweight and obesity on the
direct medical costs of truck drivers.'' Journal of
Occupational and Environmental Medicine. 2009
February;51(2):180-4.
National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney
Diseases. NIH Publication Number 04-4158. ``Statistics related
to overweight and obesity.'' 2010 February; available at http:/
/win.niddk.nih.gov/statistics.
Patel, S. and Hu, F. ``Short sleep duration and weight gain:
a systematic review.'' Obesity. 2008 March;16(3):643-53.
Rosekind, M., Gregory, K., Mallis, M., Brandt, S., Seal, B.,
and Lerner, D. ``The cost of poor sleep: workplace productivity
loss and associated costs.'' Journal of Occupational and
Environmental Medicine. 2010 January;51(1):91-8.
Tamakoshi, A. and Ohno, Y. ``Self-reported sleep duration as
a predictor of all-cause mortality: results from the JACC
study, Japan.'' Sleep. 2004;27(1):51-4.
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute,
``Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents Factbook 2007,'' (2010).
U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 Commodity Flow Survey.
Van Cauter, E., and Knutson, K. ``Sleep and the epidemic of
obesity in children and adults.'' European Journal of
Endocrinology. 2008;159:S59-66.
Van Dongen, H. and Belenky, G. ``Individual differences in
vulnerability to sleep loss in the work environment.''
Industrial Health. 2009;47:518-26.
Van Dongen, H. et al., 2010
Violanti, J., Burchfiel, C., Hartley, T., Mnatsakanova, A.,
Fekedulegn, D., Andrew, M., Charles, L., and Vila, B.
``Atypical work hours and metabolic syndrome among police
officers.'' Archives of Environmental & Occupational Health
2009 Fall;64(3):194-201.
Wiegand, D. et al. ``Commercial drivers' health: A
naturalistic study of BMI, fatigue, and involvement in safety
critical events.'' Traffic Injury Prevention. 10: 573-579
(2009); DOI:10:1080/15389580903295277.
Question 2. It is the Committee's understanding that testing of the
CSA 2010 operation model will be completed in the 9 pilot States at the
end of June 2010. Will FMCSA receive a final evaluation report on the
effectiveness of the CSA 2010 program in those States, and how will the
report impact the rollout of CSA 2010 to the balance of the States?
Answer. On June 30, 2010, FMCSA will conclude its field test
involving the nine pilot States. The Agency has contracted with the
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) to
provide a formal, independent evaluation of the test results and the
effectiveness of the CSA 2010 model. The UMTRI report is due to FMCSA
in December 2010. During the field test, FMCSA has also monitored the
test results. Those preliminary results indicate that CSA 2010
increases the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency's compliance
and enforcement program, and helps to maximize FMCSA resources as well
as those of its State partners. As the CSA 2010 model is rolled out to
the balance of the States, FMCSA will use the results of the UMTRI
evaluation to improve upon the Agency's application of the model. For
example, the Agency hopes to learn more about which specific types of
CSA 2010 interventions work best for particular types of motor
carriers, and the cost effectiveness of various types of interventions.
This information will be used to improve upon the Agency's application
of the CSA 2010 model as it is implemented throughout the country.
Question 3. When did the agency first interpret the hours of
service exemption for the transportation of agricultural commodities as
only applying to a delivery from a retail store and not from a
distribution point to an intermediate distribution point such as a
storage facility or cooperative, and why?
Answer. The Agency analyzed the legislative history of the Hours of
Service agricultural exemption and formulated the interpretation
described above in April 2005, shortly before it issued its regulatory
guidance in Question 33 under 49 CFR 395.1 (posted at FMCSA's website).
Question 33 under 49 CFR 395.1 describes that the Agricultural
operations exemption applies only to the transportation of farm
supplies (including anhydrous ammonia) from the retailer to the
ultimate consumer. The FMCSA's interpretation is based on the
Conference Report for the National Highway System Designation Act of
1995, the statute that created the exemption for Agricultural
operations. The Conference Report says the following about the House
amendment that was adopted by the conferees:
Subsection (a) [of Sec. 345 of the NHS Designation Act] directs
that waivers be granted from certain Federal motor carrier
regulations. Subsection (a)(1) grants an exemption from the
Federal hours of service regulations for drivers transporting
agricultural supplies or farm supplies during planting and
harvesting seasons operating within a 100 air mile radius of
the source of the commodities or the distribution point of the
supplies. This exemption is intended to operate in a similar
manner as the exemption granted 40 years ago for small
package[s] delivered during the Holiday season in December.
This exemption is limited to the planting and harvesting
seasons, as determined by the Governor [emphasis added].
H.R. Rep. No. 104-345, at 103 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
The ``Holiday season'' exemption at 49 CFR 395.1(f) provides:
(f) Retail store deliveries. The provisions of 395.3(a) and
(b) shall not apply with respect to drivers of commercial motor
vehicles engaged solely in making local deliveries from retail
stores and/or retail catalog businesses to the ultimate
consumer, when driving solely within a 100-air mile radius of
the driver's work-reporting location, during the period from
December 10 to December 25, both inclusive, of each year
[emphasis added].
This is the source of the Agency's Guidance in Question 33 that the
``distribution point for the farm supplies'' in 49 CFR 395.1(k) means
``distribution from a retail distribution point of the farm supply to a
location (farm or other location where the farm supply product would be
used).''
Question 4. Will FMCSA show flexibility with respect to deliveries
of farm supplies? The entire supply chain, not just deliveries from
retail locations, can be critical during planting and harvest seasons.
Answer. On March 17, 2010, FMCSA issued a 90 day waiver for the
delivery of anhydrous ammonia for the 2010 spring planting season. (The
waiver determination was published in the Federal Register on March 22,
2010). The Agency will review if the waiver has achieved a level of
safety that is equivalent to, or greater than, the level that would be
achieved absent such an exemption, based on the terms and conditions
imposed. In addition, the Agency welcomes the opportunity to work with
Congress and stakeholder groups to better understand the needs of the
agricultural industry in providing products for consumers, and the
potential impact on safety if the current agricultural exemption from
the hours-of-service regulations were applied to the entire supply
chain.
Question 5. Last December, this Committee reported legislation to
improve motorcoach safety. For example, new motorcoach entrants would
be required to successfully complete an on-site pre-authorization
safety audit before they could begin operating. While pre-authorization
safety audits may not be practical for the trucking industry, which has
thousands of new entrants each year, what more can be done before a
carrier begins operations to ensure the carrier, its vehicles, and
drivers are in compliance with Federal safety regulations?
Answer. The Agency has considered the possibility of requiring a
pre-screening examination that would ensure that a new entrant motor
carrier has basic knowledge of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations. This examination would be mandatory before the carrier is
issued a USDOT number. This examination could be developed and
implemented via the FMCSA website, as part of the initial registration
process.
This approach, however, has a number of challenges that must be
considered and overcome. For example, the Agency would have to ensure
that: (1) the person taking the examination is an appropriate motor
carrier officer, not a consultant or other party; (2) the prescreening
examination is sufficient to ensure a basic level of safety knowledge;
and (3) motor carriers do not just learn the responses to pass the
test, but rather are applying the FMCSA regulations to establish and
maintain safety operations.
Question 6. Federal law makes FMCSA the Federal agency in charge of
enforcing regulations on fraudulent practices by interstate moving
companies, but also provides for substantial coordination between FMCSA
and state enforcement agencies. Has FMCSA been able to effectively
coordinate with states in these enforcement efforts?
Answer. FMCSA has had some success in coordinating with States in
these enforcement efforts.
SAFETEA-LU gave States the authority to enforce Federal household
goods laws and regulations. State household goods regulators can bring
actions in either State or Federal venues pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
14710. State Attorneys General can bring actions in Federal court
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 14711.
To date, no States have used the provisions that permit them to
bring consumer protection actions for the violation of Federal
household goods statutes and regulations. Many of the States reference
resource constraints and a preference for using State courts rather
than Federal courts as why they are not using the SAFETEA-LU authority.
FMCSA is currently engaging in substantial outreach to States in an
effort to interest them in using their SAFETEA-LU authority. FMCSA is
hopeful that States will begin to use their authority soon.
Section 4213(a) of SAFETEA-LU required FMCSA to convene a working
group consisting of Federal, State, and local enforcement officials to:
``[D]evelop[ ] practices and procedures to enhance the
Federal-State partnership in enforcement efforts, exchange of
information, and coordination of enforcement efforts with
respect to interstate transportation of household goods. . .
.''
FMCSA has been effective in implementing a by-product of the
working group--an ``Enforcement Assistance Outreach Plan.'' The working
group produced an outreach plan to aid in the coordination and
enforcement efforts for household goods related complaints. FMCSA
currently hosts quarterly coordination meetings to address the
following action items contained in the plan:
1. General Communication and Information Sharing
a. FMCSA is working with the States to provide access
to information on household goods carriers that will
facilitate enforcement actions.
2. Information Sharing Related to Federal Laws and Regulations
a. Prepare and share guidance documents related to
Federal laws and regulations with State enforcement
partners.
3. Enforcement-Specific Communication and Information Sharing
With Partners
a. FMCSA is developing a policy to distribute
enforcement information to partners; provide them with
access to enforcement tools and databases; alert them
to ongoing Federal enforcement actions and
investigations; encourage States to notify FMCSA of
actions; and work with partners to establish procedures
to better target and coordinate enforcement actions and
court filings.
Question 7. In your view, is FMCSA the right agency to lead these
efforts?
Answer. Yes. Although FMCSA's primary mission is safety, the
commercial regulations are closely related to its mission. FMCSA has
programmatic operational capabilities necessary to effectively
implement the household goods consumer protection program. We offer the
benefits of a sound programmatic perspective, a national field office
structure and staff, and the regulatory leverage that is necessary to
effectively address household goods industry oversight. As a result,
FMCSA offers the best available location within the Department's
existing organizational structure to address this important consumer
protection function.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question 1. Four recommendations on the NTSB ``Most Wanted'' list
are directed at FMCSA, and since 1992 the agency has been cited for
thirteen unacceptable responses to recommendations from NTSB
investigations. What steps has FMCSA taken in the last year to resolve
these recommendations?
Answer. This question necessitates a two-part answer.
The Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements is
comprised of issue areas that may contain one or more recommendations.
Currently, the Most Wanted List includes four issue areas, encompassing
nine safety recommendations directed to the FMCSA, as follows:
Prohibit Cell Phone Use by Motorcoach Drivers
Require Electronic Onboard Data Recorders to Maintain
Accurate Carrier Records on Driver Hours of Service
Improve the Safety of Motor Carrier Operations
Prevent Medically Unqualified Drivers from Operating
Commercial Vehicles
Below are the individual recommendations associated with each issue
area and a summary of the FMCSA's actions to date to address these
recommendations. Please note that although some of these
recommendations are classified ``Open--Acceptable Response,'' the
overall issue areas may have an ``Unacceptable'' action/timeliness
designation.
Prohibit Cell Phone Use by Motorcoach Drivers
H-06-27
Issued November 30, 2006
Added to the Most Wanted List: 2008
Status: Open--Acceptable Response
Publish regulations prohibiting cellular telephone use by
commercial driver's license holders with a passenger-carrying
or school bus endorsement, while driving under the authority of
that endorsement, except in emergencies. (Source: Investigation
of a Motorcoach Collision with a Bridge Overpass on the George
Washington Memorial Parkway in Alexandria, Virginia, on
November 14, 2004. [NTSB/HAR-06/04])
Summary of Action
The FMCSA initiated a study, conducted by the Virginia Tech
Transportation Institute (VTTI) using naturalistic driving
data, to assess the potential safety benefits of establishing a
Federal rule to restrict the use of cellular telephones by
drivers of commercial motor vehicles and to determine whether
adequate data exists to warrant initiating a rulemaking. VTTI's
portion of the study was completed in July 2009. Despite the
FMCSA's limited jurisdiction over school buses, the NTSB
encouraged the agency to include school bus operations to the
greatest extent possible in its study. The FMCSA also
considered property-carrying CMV drivers and the availability
of adequate data on cellular telephone-caused driving
distractions in the study. Additionally, the FMCSA is
conducting a synthesis of literature and operating safety
practices relating to cellular telephone use (including
limitations on the use of personal digital assistants) in
commercial vehicles. This study was expected to be completed in
February 2010.
The Secretary of Transportation ordered a full departmental
review of motorcoach safety to create a Departmental Motorcoach
Safety Action Plan outlining the additional steps needed to
improve motorcoach safety. Released on November 16, 2009, the
review also considered outstanding recommendations to the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) from the NTSB.
On September 30 and October 1, 2009, the Secretary also
convened a ``Distracted Driving Summit'' to address the dangers
of text-messaging and other driving distractions. During the
summit, the Secretary announced the DOT's plan to create
rulemaking that would consider banning text messaging
altogether and restrict the use of cellular telephones by truck
and interstate bus operators.
Because ``texting'' was identified as the most serious
distracted-driving behavior in the VTTI study mentioned above,
the FMCSA is currently developing a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) prohibiting ``text messaging'' on cellular
telephones and similar devices by operators of commercial motor
vehicles. The NPRM will also propose disqualification of school
bus operators convicted of violating the texting prohibition.
After publication of this NPRM in Spring 2010, the FMCSA
intends to publish a second NPRM to address broader concerns
regarding the use of cellular telephones and similar devices
(including those for hands-free use) and possible differences
in regulatory requirements for truck and bus drivers. Both of
these rulemakings will be given high priority status. A third
rulemaking is planned for a later date to address other
distracted-driving issues involving devices such as fleet
management systems, GPS navigation screens, and laptop
computers.
The FMCSA continues to work consistently to address the issue
of cell phone use by CDL drivers. Although the results of the
naturalistic driving study are encouraging, the NTSB continues
to believe that CDL holders must be prohibited from using a
cellular telephone, even in a hands-free mode, while driving
under the authority of a passenger carrying or school bus
endorsement.
Action Remaining
Prohibit CDL holders from using a cellular telephone while
driving under the authority of a passenger-carrying or school
bus endorsement.
Require Electronic Onboard Data Recorders to Maintain Accurate
Carrier Records on Driver Hours of Service
H-07-41
Issued December 17, 2007
Added to the Most Wanted List: 2008
Status: Open--Unacceptable Response
Require all interstate commercial vehicle carriers to use
electronic onboard recorders that collect and maintain data
concerning driver hours of service in a valid, accurate, and
secure manner under all circumstances, including accident
conditions, to enable the carriers and their regulators to
monitor and assess hours-of-service compliance. (Source:
National Transportation Safety Board, Investigation of the
Rear-end Chain Reaction Collision on Interstate 94 East near
Chelsea, Michigan, on July 16, 2004. [NTSB/HAB-07/01])
Summary of Action
On January 18, 2007, the FMCSA published an NPRM on EOBRs that
included a proposal to establish new performance standards for
EOBRs. These performance standards would include requirements
that the new devices be ``valid'' and ``accurate'' within
certain defined parameters and that they be ``secure'' against
non-evident tampering. Also under the proposal, motor carriers
that have demonstrated a history of serious noncompliance (a
10-percent or greater violation rate) with the HOS rules would
be subject to mandatory installation and use of EOBRs for HOS
recordkeeping for a period of 2 years, unless the carrier
already had equipped its vehicles with recording devices that
met the agency's current requirements under 49 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) 395.15 and could demonstrate to the FMCSA
that its drivers understood how to use the devices. Under the
proposed rule, the FMCSA would also encourage industrywide use
of EOBRs by providing the following incentives for motor
carriers to voluntarily use EOBRs in their commercial motor
vehicles (CMVs): (1) revising the agency's compliance review
procedures to permit examination of a random sample of drivers'
records of duty status and (2) providing partial relief from
HOS supporting documents requirements, if certain conditions
are satisfied.
The NTSB responded with concern that the FMCSA issued an NPRM
on EOBRs that would require only those carriers with a history
of serious HOS violations to install EOBRs in all of their
CMVs; thus, only an estimated 930 of the 700,000 carriers in
operation would be affected by this requirement within the
first 2 years of the rule's enforcement. The NTSB also
expressed its concern that the only effective way for EOBRs to
help stem HOS violations, which the NTSB has linked to numerous
fatigue-related accidents, is to mandate EOBR installation and
use by all operators subject to HOS regulations. EOBRs have the
potential to efficiently and accurately collect and verify HOS
data for all drivers, to establish the proper incentives and a
level playing field for compliance with HOS rules, and,
ultimately, to make our highways safer for all drivers.
On April 10, 2010, the DOT issued a final rule on EOBRs that
established new performance standards and mandated that motor
carriers that demonstrate serious noncompliance with HOS rules
be required to install EOBRs for a period of 2 years. The
Safety Board is generally satisfied with the performance
standards in the rule but the NTSB is still concerned that
compliance reviews will be the only method used to identify
threshold rate violators, when only about 2 percent of all
carriers undergo compliance reviews annually. Furthermore, the
NTSB has identified flaws in the compliance review system,
guaranteeing that many unsafe carriers will continue to evade
even initial identification as an HOS violator. The NTSB has
documented several instances in which carriers have received
favorable compliance review ratings despite long and consistent
histories of driver- and vehicle related violations. With the
paper logs currently in use, it is relatively easy for drivers
or carriers to misrepresent HOS data. As a result, to exceed
HOS limits undetected, many drivers falsify their logs and
subsequently drive in a fatigued state. The NTSB remains
convinced that the only effective means of curbing the many
tragic fatigue-related accidents is to mandate EOBR
installation and use by all operators subject to HOS
regulations. A remedial program that relies on compliance
reviews and the evaluation of paper logs to identify high risk
carriers will have limited success.
The DOT Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, published on November
16, 2009, indicated that the FMCSA is considering the
encouragement of industrywide use of EOBRs by providing
incentives for motor carriers to voluntarily use EOBRs. The
FMCSA is also beginning another rulemaking intended to propose
a more widespread mandate of EOBRs, including mandating that
all motorcoaches be equipped with EOBRs. Although the
increasing scope of the carriers that would potentially be
affected by EOBR rulemaking efforts is encouraging, the NTSB
continues to believe that a mandate for the use of EOBRs by all
motor carriers is necessary for the collection and maintenance
of accurate data on driver HOS.
Action Remaining
Continue efforts to require the use of EOBRs by all motor
carriers to improve monitoring of driver HOS.
Improve the Safety of Motor Carrier Operations
H-99-6
Issued February 26, 1999
Added to the Most Wanted List: 2000
Status: Open--Unacceptable Response
Change the safety fitness rating methodology so that adverse
vehicle and driver performance-based data alone are sufficient
to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for the carrier.
(Source: Selective Motorcoach Issues [NTSB/SIR-99/01])
Summary of Action
The Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 directed the U.S.
Secretary of Transportation to establish a procedure to
determine how safely motor carriers operate. Currently, the
DOT, through the FMCSA, uses a system for determining how
safely a motor carrier operates that does not place sufficient
emphasis on driver or vehicle qualifications.
Under the current compliance review system, when any motor
carrier receives an unsatisfactory rating in two of six factors
(general, driver, operational, vehicle, hazardous materials, or
accident), the carrier receives a proposed unsatisfactory
rating, which becomes effective according to the following time
frames: a passenger or hazardous-materials carrier has 45 days
to correct the noncompliance; freight carriers have 60 days. If
the carrier corrects the noncompliance to the satisfaction of
the FMCSA, the rating is revised to either satisfactory or
conditional. If the carrier does not correct the noncompliance
within the established timeframe, the carrier receives an out-
of-service order and is prohibited from operation.
The NTSB believes that if the carrier receives an adverse
rating (conditional or unsatisfactory) for either the vehicle
or driver factor, regardless of ratings received in any of the
other factors, the overall compliance rating should be
unsatisfactory.
The FMCSA believes that its Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010
Initiative (CSA 2010) will address this issue through the
development of new performance-based systems for determining
motor carrier and driver safety that emphasize preventive
measures, motor carrier education, and early detection of
unsafe driver and carrier conditions. As the FMCSA demonstrated
to stakeholders at an October 2008 public listening session; to
staff members from Congress, the General Accountability Office,
the Office of the Inspector General, and the NTSB at a February
2009 meeting; and during a December 2009 two-part webcast
public listening session, the FMCSA is continuing to develop
CSA 2010 programs to improve enforcement efficiency. The new
Safety Measurement System: (1) measures safety performance
using all roadside inspection safety-based violations, (2)
weights time and severity of violations based on relationship
to crash risk, and (3) calculates safety performance in seven
Behavior Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories (BASIC).
These BASICs include unsafe driving, fatigued driving, driver
fitness, drugs and alcohol, vehicle maintenance, cargo
securement, and crash experience. The Comprehensive
Intervention Process provides tools to educate carriers and
compel safety compliance before crashes occur.
In February 2008, the FMCSA launched a pilot test of the CSA
2010 operational model in four states: Colorado, Georgia,
Missouri, and New Jersey. The tests in these four states
divided the carriers into two groups--a test group, carrying
out CSA 2010 interventions, and a control group, using the
traditional compliance reviews; additional test states are
being added using only CSA 2010 interventions. Preliminary
results indicate that nearly half of the test carriers have
logged onto the Comprehensive Safety Information System website
to view their violations data, as suggested in a warning
letter, and have replied to the FMCSA describing the corrective
actions they have taken or are initiating in response to the
warning. In May 2009, Minnesota and Montana were added to the
pilot test; Maryland and Kansas were added in fall 2009. The
FMCSA expects to complete the pilot test in June 2010 and to
implement CSA 2010 nationwide during July through December
2010. The FMCSA is launching an outreach effort to inform
carriers and drivers of the upcoming change and to encourage
all stakeholders to become more involved.
On March 5, 2007, the FMCSA Administrator appointed experts
from the motor carrier industry, safety advocates, and safety
enforcement officials to serve on the Motor Carrier Safety
Advisory Committee (MCSAC). The MCSAC, which holds quarterly
public meetings, provides advice and recommendations to the
Administrator regarding motor carrier safety programs and motor
carrier safety regulations. On August 6, 2008, after
considering the potential safety benefits and operational
feasibility of the task, the MCSAC recommended that Safety
Recommendation H-99-6 be incorporated into CSA 2010. Based on
the MCSAC's recommendation, the preliminary safety fitness
methodology that is currently being tested, and the progress
that has been made with the CSA 2010 initiative, the FMCSA has
been preparing an NPRM to address Safety Fitness Determination,
the third element of CSA 2010. The NPRM was expected to be
published in February 2009; however, it was delayed for further
analysis, and subsequently has an anticipated publication date
of February 2011. There is as yet no proposed date for
publication of the final rule.
The NTSB is concerned with the FMCSA's continued slow progress
in addressing this issue. Although the FMCSA has made progress
with CSA 2010, during the investigation of a January 2, 2008,
motorcoach rollover on U.S. Highway 59 near Victoria, Texas,
the NTSB again found that the current FMCSA safety rating
methodology did not provide adequate oversight of motor carrier
safety. The NTSB will continue to monitor the FMCSA's actions
to recognize the importance of driver and vehicle factors in
addressing motor carrier safety as the CSA 2010 pilot testing
continues and rulemaking is completed.
Action Remaining
Continue efforts to develop standards that appropriately
recognize the importance of vehicle and driver factors in
measuring the overall safety of a motor carrier's operations.
Prevent Medically Unqualified Drivers from Operating Commercial
Vehicles
H-01-17, 18, 19, 20, 21 24
Issued September 10, 2001
Added to the Most Wanted List: 2003
Status: See below
The NTSB recommended to the FMCSA in 2001 that it develop a
comprehensive medical oversight program that addressed the
following issues:
Establish a comprehensive medical oversight program for
interstate commercial drivers.
Ensure that examiners are qualified and know what to look
for.
Track all medical certificate applications.
Enhance oversight and enforcement of invalid certificates.
Provide mechanisms for reporting medical conditions.
(Source: Investigation of the Motorcoach Run-Off-The-Road, New
Orleans, Louisiana, May 9, 1999. [NTSB/HAR-01/01])
These recommendations are grouped together and specify a
comprehensive oversight program, because the NTSB believes that
only by addressing this issue in a systematic fashion can a
truly effective program of oversight be developed. A piecemeal
approach to the problem may result in deficiencies that will
continue to permit unqualified drivers to operate on the
Nation's highways. The specific recommendations and their
current status are as follows:
Develop a comprehensive medical oversight program for
interstate commercial drivers that contains the following
program elements:
A tracking mechanism be established that ensures that
every prior application by an individual for medical
certification is recorded and reviewed. (H-01-18) [Status:
Open--Unacceptable Response]
The review process prevents, or identifies and corrects,
the inappropriate issuance of medical certification. (H-01-
21) [Status: Open--Unacceptable Response]
Mechanisms for reporting medical conditions to the medical
certification and reviewing authority and for evaluating
these conditions between medical certification exams;
individuals, health care providers, and employers are aware
of these mechanisms. (H-01-24) [Status: Open--Unacceptable
Response]
Individuals performing medical examinations for drivers
are qualified to do so and are educated about occupational
issues for drivers. (H-01-17) [Status: Open--Acceptable
Response]
Medical certification regulations are updated periodically
to permit trained examiners to clearly determine whether
drivers with common medical conditions should be issued a
medical certificate. (H-01-19) [Status: Open--Acceptable
Response]
Individuals performing examinations have specific guidance
and a readily identifiable source of information for
questions on such examinations. (H-01-20) [Status: Open--
Acceptable Response]
The FMCSA has taken steps toward addressing medical fitness of
drivers::
In November 2008, the FMCSA published a proposed rule that
would require that all medical examiners who conduct
medical examinations of interstate commercial motor vehicle
drivers complete certain training on physical qualification
standards, pass a test to verify an understanding of those
standards, and maintain competence by periodic training and
testing. Although the NPRM has certain deficiencies noted
in the NTSB's comments on the rulemaking, this rule, if
adopted, should help to ensure that the individuals
performing examinations are qualified to do so, as
recommended. The FMCSA expects the final rule to be
published in January, 2011. (H-01-17)
The FMCSA has hired its first medical officer, a physician
with occupational medical experience, to provide necessary
expertise to guide its efforts in the establishment of a
comprehensive medical oversight system.
Unfortunately, although the FMCSA continues to work to address
medical issues for commercial vehicle drivers, the agency has
yet to take definitive action regarding the three
recommendations in ``Unacceptable'' status, as noted below.
The NPRM concerning the national registry of certified
medical examiners does not include the establishment of a
tracking mechanism for driver medical examinations, as
recommended in H-01-18, and the FMCSA has no other specific
actions underway to do so. Instead, the agency indicates
that it is laying the groundwork for such a mechanism in
future rulemaking. This important recommendation would
reduce the current practice of driver ``doctor shopping''
from physician to physician to find one willing to sign the
driver's medical form.
Likewise, the NPRM does not require any review of
certificate issuance, beyond the examiner evaluating the
driver, to prevent or identify and correct, the
inappropriate issuance of medical certification, as
recommended in H-01-21. The FMCSA has indicated that such a
process will be included in the national registry program.
Finally, the FMCSA has not taken any action on H-01-24,
which suggests development of a system for reporting
medical conditions between examinations of which
individuals, health care providers, and employers would be
aware. The FMCSA's latest response on this topic indicated
that the agency continues to ``explore the feasibility'' of
such a system.
To address the second part of Senator Lautenberg's question (1),
below is synopsis material concerning the 13 recommendations to the
FMCSA that are currently classified ``Open--Unacceptable Response.''
Five of these recommendations are repeated from the first portion of
the question because they are currently on the Most Wanted List. The
information presented in this second group of recommendations comes
from the NTSB's most recent correspondence with the FMCSA on each
recommendation.
H-99-6 To U.S. DOT: Change the safety fitness rating
methodology so that adverse vehicle and driver performance-
based data alone are sufficient to result in an overall
unsatisfactory rating for the carrier.
The FMCSA believes that its CSA 2010 initiative will address
this issue through the development of new performance-based
systems for determining motor carrier and driver safety that
emphasize preventive measures, motor carrier education, and
early detection of unsafe driver and carrier conditions. As the
FMCSA demonstrated to stakeholders at an October 2008 public
listening session; to staff members from Congress, the
Government Accountability Office, the Office of the Inspector
General, and the NTSB at a February 2009 meeting; and during a
December 2009 two-part webcast public listening session, the
agency is continuing to develop CSA 2010 programs to improve
enforcement efficiency. The new Safety Measurement System: (1)
measures safety performance using all roadside inspection
safety-based violations, (2) weights time and severity of
violations based on relationship to crash risk, and (3)
calculates safety performance in seven BASICs. These BASICs
include unsafe driving, fatigued driving, driver fitness, drugs
and alcohol, vehicle maintenance, cargo securement, and crash
experience. The Comprehensive Intervention Process is designed
to provide tools to educate carriers and compel safety
compliance before crashes occur.
In February 2008, the FMCSA launched a pilot test of the CSA
2010 operational model in Colorado, Georgia, Missouri, and New
Jersey. The tests in these four states are being conducted by
dividing the carriers into two groups--a test group, carrying
out CSA 2010 interventions, and a control group, using the
traditional compliance reviews; additional test states are
being added using only CSA 2010 interventions. Preliminary
results indicate that nearly half of the test carriers have
logged onto the Comprehensive Safety Information System website
to view their violations data, as suggested in a warning
letter, and have replied to the FMCSA describing the corrective
actions they have taken or are initiating in response to the
warning. In May 2009, Minnesota and Montana were added to the
pilot test; Maryland and Kansas were added in fall 2009. The
FMCSA expects to complete the pilot test in June 2010 and to
implement CSA 2010 nationwide during July through December
2010. The FMCSA is launching an outreach effort to inform
carriers and drivers of the upcoming change and to encourage
all stakeholders to become more involved.
On March 5, 2007, the FMCSA Administrator appointed experts
from the motor carrier industry, safety advocates, and safety
enforcement officials to serve on the MCSAC. The MCSAC, which
holds regular quarterly public meetings, provides advice and
recommendations to the Administrator regarding motor carrier
safety programs and motor carrier safety regulations.
On August 6, 2008, after considering the potential safety
benefits and operational feasibility of the task, the MCSAC
recommended that Safety Recommendation H-99-6 be incorporated
into CSA 2010. Based on the MCSAC's recommendation, the
preliminary safety fitness methodology that is currently being
tested, and the progress that has been made with the CSA 2010
initiative, the FMCSA has been preparing an NPRM to address
Safety Fitness Determination, the third element of CSA 2010.
The NPRM was expected to be published in February 2009;
however, it was subsequently delayed for further analysis and
has an anticipated publication date of February, 2011. There is
as yet no proposed date for publication of the final rule.
The NTSB is concerned with the FMCSA's continued slow progress
in addressing improvements with its safety fitness rating
process. Although the agency has plans to begin implementing
this program in early 2011, until the Safety Fitness
Determination rulemaking is complete, the FMCSA must rely on
the current safety rating system, which lacks sufficient driver
and vehicle qualifications emphasis. As a result of our
investigation of a January 2, 2008, motorcoach rollover on U.S.
Highway 59 near Victoria, Texas, the NTSB again found that the
current FMCSA safety rating methodology does not provide
adequate oversight of motor carrier safety. Although the NTSB
recognizes the progress that the FMCSA has made with CSA 2010,
the agency has failed to institute an interim rule that would
make adverse vehicle and driver performance based data alone
sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for a
carrier, while continuing to incorporate the principles of the
NTSB's recommendations into the FMCSA's new system being field
tested and evaluated in CSA 2010. Accordingly, Safety
Recommendation H-99-6 is classified ``Open Unacceptable
Response.''
H-01-18 To FMCSA: Develop a comprehensive medical oversight
program for interstate commercial drivers that contains the
following program elements: a tracking mechanism is established
that ensures that every prior application by an individual for
medical certification is recorded and reviewed.
Based on our investigations of accidents involving drivers with
serious medical conditions, the NTSB has determined that
serious flaws exist in the medical certification process for
commercial vehicle drivers. These flaws can lead to increased
highway fatalities and injuries for commercial vehicle drivers,
their passengers, and the motoring public. The NTSB issued
Safety Recommendations H-01-17 through -24 to the FMCSA as a
result of our investigation of the May 9, 1999, accident
involving a Custom Bus Charters motorcoach in New Orleans,
Louisiana.
An NPRM published in 2008 concerning the national registry of
certified medical examiners does not include the establishment
of a tracking mechanism for driver medical examinations, as
recommended in H-01-18, and the FMCSA has no other specific
actions underway to do so. The agency indicates that it is
laying the groundwork for such a mechanism in future
rulemaking. This important recommendation would reduce the
current practice of driver ``doctor shopping'' from physician
to physician to find one who will sign the driver's medical
form.
H-01-21 To FMCSA: Develop a comprehensive medical oversight
program for interstate commercial drivers that contains the
following program elements: The review process prevents, or
identifies and corrects, the inappropriate issuance of medical
certification.
The FMCSA's NPRM does not require any review of certificate
issuance, beyond the examiner evaluating the driver, to
prevent, or identify and correct, the inappropriate issuance of
medical certification, as recommended in H-01-21. The FMCSA has
indicated that such a process will be included in the future
rulemaking.
H-01-24 To FMCSA: Develop a comprehensive medical oversight
program for interstate commercial drivers that contains the
following program elements: Mechanisms for reporting medical
conditions to the medical certification and reviewing authority
and for evaluating these conditions between medical
certification exams are in place; individuals, health care
providers, and employers are aware of these mechanisms.
The FMCSA has not yet taken any meaningful action on H-01-24,
which proposes development of a system for reporting medical
conditions between examinations of which individuals, health
care providers, and employers are aware. The FMCSA's latest
response on this topic indicated that the agency continues to
``explore the feasibility'' of such a system.
H-01-25 To FMCSA: Develop a system that records all positive
drug and alcohol test results and refusal determinations that
are conducted under the U.S. Department of Transportation
testing requirements, require prospective employers to query
the system before making a hiring decision, and require
certifying authorities to query the system before making a
certification decision.
As a result of the NTSB's recommendation, in 2004, the FMCSA
completed a study of the feasibility and merits of requiring
medical review officers and employers to report positive test
results to state commercial driver's license (CDL) licensing
agencies. The study found that it was feasible to establish a
national database of positive drug test results and that it
should be operated by the Federal Government to ensure
consistency and uniformity. The FMCSA is developing rulemaking
to establish a National Drug and Alcohol Test Results Data
base, which would allow Federal and state governments to
identify drivers who have refused a DOT drug or alcohol test or
who have tested positive for drug(s) and/or alcohol under the
established DOT drug and alcohol testing regulations. Areas of
consideration for the rulemaking include the following: (1)
requiring Medical Review Officers to submit confirmed positive
controlled substances test results to the FMCSA, including
follow-up tests stemming from an initial positive test; (2)
having motor carriers submit information on refusals-to-test,
positive alcohol test results, and annual summaries of their
controlled substances and alcohol testing programs each year;
and (3) requiring all laboratories to submit annual reports to
the FMCSA. Safety Recommendation H-01-25 is currently
classified ``Open--Unacceptable Response'' because of the
FMCSA's slow response time. The recommendation to develop a
database of positive drug and alcohol test results and to
establish requirements for use of the system is now 9 years
old. Although the FMCSA has increased its enforcement action
against commercial motor vehicle drivers who have tested
positive for controlled substances and failed to comply with
the return-to-duty requirements before performing a DOT safety-
sensitive function, and also against motor carriers that use or
have used a driver to perform safety-sensitive functions if the
motor carrier was aware or should have known that the driver
did not comply with return-to-duty requirements, these actions
will be the result of investigations and will, therefore,
affect only a small percentage of the driver and carrier
populations. The NTSB concluded that if motor carriers cannot
check the controlled substance testing backgrounds of
prospective employees, they cannot make well-informed decisions
when attempting to hire safe drivers.
H-02-16 To FMCSA: Require that vehicle inspections of a motor
carrier's fleet be conducted during compliance reviews.
Since 2006, the FMCSA has taken the position that its CSA 2010
Initiative will address this recommendation.
H-05-3 To FMCSA: Revise the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations Appendix G to Subchapter B, Minimum Periodic
Inspection Standards, Part 10: Tires, Sections A(5) and B(7),
to include inspection criteria and specific language to address
a tire's speed rating to ensure that it is appropriate for a
vehicles intended use.
The FMCSA's position is that rulemaking to amend the periodic
inspection standards under 49 CFR Chapter III, Subchapter B,
Appendix G, would be ineffective. The NTSB disagrees. At the
NTSB's public hearing on the Wilmer, Texas, motorcoach fire
accident, which killed 23 passengers, FMCSA representatives
explained that the FMCSA is relying on the carrier to have some
knowledge and understanding of the appropriate maintenance
practices for their vehicles in order to comply with the
regulations. The NTSB's investigation of the 8-fatality
motorcoach accident in Tallulah, Louisiana, found that the
current Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) do
not address the identification and appropriate use of speed-
limited tires. The lack of specific criteria on speed-
restricted tires overlooks an important vehicle safety factor
that can result in commercial vehicles intended for highway use
being operated with tires not suited for highway speeds.
Therefore, it is important that the FMCSRs be updated to offer
complete information regarding speed-limited tires to private
motor carriers of passengers, allowing the carrier to
understand these restrictions and have the opportunity to
comply. The NTSB considers that it is imperative that the motor
carrier be given the opportunity to understand and comply with
specific standards before being cited.
H-05-4 To FMCSA: Conduct a study on the safety effectiveness of
the self- inspection and certification process used by motor
carriers to comply with annual vehicle inspection requirements
and take corrective action, as necessary.
At the NTSB's public hearing on the Wilmer, Texas, motorcoach
fire accident, which killed 23 passengers, FMCSA
representatives explained that the FMCSA is relying on the
motor carrier to ensure that vehicles are maintained in safe
and proper operating condition throughout the year, not only at
the time of the annual inspection. The FMCSA further indicated
that it has not initiated a detailed study to compare the out-
of-service rates of carriers that perform self-inspections
under a state program to those inspected by a third party. The
NTSB's investigation of the 8-fatality motorcoach accident in
Tallulah, Louisiana, found that the self-inspection process
allows motor carriers to inadvertently or knowingly pass
defective vehicles. Because these vehicles are certified and
permitted to remain in operation, current methodology does not
ensure an adequate level of safety, even if some vehicles are
eventually identified as defective in roadside inspections. By
mandating that vehicles undergo annual Federal or state
inspection, the FMCSA would increase the probability that
defects will be found and repaired and that vehicles will be
brought up to an acceptable level of maintenance at least once
a year.
H-05-5 To FMCSA: Develop a method for inspecting motorcoach
passenger seat mounting anchorages and revise the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations Appendix G to Subchapter B, Minimum
Periodic Inspection Standards, to require inspection of these
anchorages.
At the NTSB public hearing on the Wilmer, Texas, motorcoach
fire accident, FMCSA representatives explained that the agency
is relying on the carrier to have appropriate vehicle
maintenance practices in place in order to comply with the
regulations, supported by passenger reports of problem seats
and driver verification of seat securement during the pre-trip
and post-trip inspections by gripping the seatback to see if
the assembly moves. The NTSB's investigation of the 8-fatality
motorcoach accident in Tallulah, Louisiana, found that the
current FMCSRs do not contain procedures or criteria for the
inspection of seat anchorage securement in motorcoaches.
Because no criteria or procedures are available for the
inspection of motorcoach passenger seat anchorage systems,
improperly secured motorcoach passenger seats are not likely to
be identified during commercial vehicle inspections, leading to
an increased risk of failure under higher forces, such as occur
during an accident.
H-07-3 To FMCSA: To protect the traveling public until
completion of the Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010
Initiative, immediately issue an Interim Rule to include all
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations in the current
compliance review process so that all violations of regulations
are reflected in the calculation of a carrier's final rating.
The FMCSA's position has been that its CSA 2010 Initiative will
address this recommendation. The NTSB believes that the current
FMCSA compliance review process does not effectively identify
unsafe motor carriers and prevent them from operating. Although
the NTSB recognizes the progress that the FMCSA has made with
CSA 2010, the NTSB believes that, to maintain safety in the
interim, the FMCSA should focus resources toward changing the
current rating methodology by instituting an interim rule that
makes adverse vehicle and driver performance-based data alone
sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for a
carrier, while continuing to incorporate the principles of the
NTSB's recommendations into the agency's new system being
field-tested and evaluated in CSA 2010. The FMCSA is
responsible for ensuring that motor carriers operate safely,
and temporary measures to improve the compliance review process
should be taken until the new rules are enacted. The FHWA (the
FMCSA's predecessor) set a precedent for the issuance of
interim rules to improve safety programs when, in 1997, the
agency issued an interim final rule to immediately improve the
safety rating methodology without prior notice and comment,
stating that to have done otherwise would have been contrary to
the public interest. Therefore, the NTSB's position is that
deferring action on this recommendation until completion of the
CSA 2010 initiative is not in the best interest of the motoring
public and is therefore unacceptable.
H-07-41 To FMCSA: Require all interstate commercial vehicle
carriers to use electronic on-board recorders that collect and
maintain data concerning driver hours of service in a valid,
accurate, and secure manner under all circumstances, including
accident conditions, to enable the carriers and their
regulators to monitor and assess hours-of-service compliance.
For the past 30 years, the NTSB has advocated the use of
onboard data recorders to increase hours-of-service (HOS)
compliance. We first urged mandatory use of onboard recorders
in our 1990 safety study, Fatigue, Alcohol, Drugs, and Medical
Factors in Fatal-to-the-Driver Heavy Truck Crashes, after
concluding that onboard recording devices could provide a
tamper-proof mechanism to enforce the HOS regulations. As a
result of our investigation of a July 16, 2004, multiple-
vehicle accident near Chelsea, Michigan, the NTSB issued Safety
Recommendation H-07-41 to the FMCSA on December 17, 2007.
On April 10, 2010, the DOT issued a final rule on EOBRs that
established new performance standards and mandated that motor
carriers that demonstrate serious noncompliance with HOS rules
be required to install EOBRs for a period of 2 years. The
Safety Board is generally satisfied with the performance
standards in the rule but the NTSB is still concerned that
compliance reviews will be the only method used to identify
threshold rate violators, when only about 2 percent of all
carriers undergo compliance reviews annually. Furthermore, the
NTSB has identified flaws in the compliance review system,
guaranteeing that many unsafe carriers will continue to evade
even initial identification as an HOS violator. The NTSB has
documented several instances in which carriers have received
favorable compliance review ratings despite long and consistent
histories of driver- and vehicle related violations. With the
paper logs currently in use, it is relatively easy for drivers
or carriers to misrepresent HOS data. As a result, to exceed
HOS limits undetected, many drivers falsify their logs and
subsequently drive in a fatigued state. The NTSB remains
convinced that the only effective means of curbing the many
tragic fatigue-related accidents is to mandate EOBR
installation and use by all operators subject to HOS
regulations. A remedial program that relies on compliance
reviews and the evaluation of paper logs to identify high risk
carriers will have limited success.
In the Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, the FMCSA indicates that
it is considering the encouragement of industrywide use of
EOBRs by providing incentives for motor carriers to voluntarily
use EOBRs. The FMCSA is also beginning rulemaking intended to
propose a more widespread mandate for EOBRs, including
mandating that all motorcoaches be equipped with EOBRs.
The NTSB has stated that the only effective way for EOBRs to
help stem HOS violations, which the NTSB has linked to numerous
fatigue-related accidents, is to mandate EOBR installation and
use by all operators subject to HOS regulations. EOBRs have the
potential to efficiently and accurately collect and verify HOS
for all drivers, to establish the proper incentives and a level
playing field for compliance with HOS rules, and, ultimately,
to make our highways safer for all drivers.
H-07-42 To FMCSA: As an interim measure and until industry-wide
use of electronic on-board recorders is mandated, as
recommended in Safety Recommendation H-07-41, prevent log
tampering and submission of false paper logs by requiring motor
carriers to create and maintain audit control systems that
include, at a minimum, the retention of all original and
corrected paper logs and the use of bound and sequentially
numbered logs.
The NTSB has documented several instances in which carriers
have received favorable compliance review ratings despite long
and consistent histories of driver- and vehicle-related
violations, most recently in our investigation of the Wilmer,
Texas, motorcoach fire that resulted in the deaths of 23
people.
The NTSB remains convinced that the only effective way to help
stem HOS violations, which we have linked to numerous fatigue-
related accidents, is to mandate EOBR installation and use by
all operators subject to HOS regulations. According to the
FMCSA's March 2006 Report to Congress on the Large Truck Crash
Causation Study, 13 percent of large truck drivers involved in
study crashes were believed to be fatigued. In our 1995 safety
study, Factors That Affect Fatigue in Heavy Truck Accidents,
the NTSB found that the incidence of driver fatigue is
underrepresented in the Fatality Analysis Reporting System
database. Law enforcement reporting of the role of fatigue in
accidents is low because of the difficulty of proving that it
is causal to the accident; an officer is more likely to cite a
symptom of fatigue--inattention, excessive speed, illegal lane
maneuver, following too closely, etc.--because these are easier
violations to prove. Because fatigue is extremely difficult to
detect, fatigue-related accidents continue to plague our
Nation's highways. EOBRs hold the potential to efficiently and
accurately collect and verify HOS for all drivers, to establish
the proper incentives and a level playing field for compliance
with HOS rules, and, ultimately, to make our highways safer for
all drivers.
A universal mandate would help improve the FMCSA's oversight of
the current logbook system. As long as the FMCSA continues to
accept the use of paper logbooks without an audit system to
verify the accuracy of a driver's entries, drivers will
continue to tamper with and falsify their records. Until a
universal EOBR requirement is effective, the NTSB recommends
that an interim measure be implemented to monitor driver
records of duty status.
H-08-13 To FMCSA: Develop and implement a plan to deploy
technologies in commercial vehicles to reduce the occurrence of
fatigue-related accidents.
The NTSB is concerned that the FMCSA is attempting to develop a
universal technology solution to reduce the occurrence of
fatigue-related accidents rather than interim measures that may
be currently available. Although there are currently no
commercially available fatigue detection products that could be
used under both daytime and nighttime driving conditions, a
recently published FMCSA review of activities underway to
develop unobtrusive, in-vehicle, real-time, drowsy driver
detection and alertness systems discussed at least five
separate systems that are capable of functioning under a
variety of conditions, both day and night. In addition to
passenger-carrying operations, a substantial proportion of
commercial transportation occurs at night. Given the increased
fatigue risks inherent in nighttime operations, it is
reasonable to believe that even a system that functions only at
night could provide a substantial safety benefit as a stopgap
measure until a universal system is available. Sleep
deprivation and circadian desynchronization can cause drivers
to be susceptible to fatigue even when they are complying with
HOS limits. The NTSB continues to believe that the FMCSA should
consider the deployment of nighttime-based technologies during
the ongoing development of in-vehicle technologies to reduce
fatigue-related accidents.
Question 2. Has the Department of Transportation done enough to
combat distracted driving in commercial motor vehicles?
Answer. The NTSB believes that more can be done. Driver
distractions are probably one of the least understood and imprecisely
documented causes of traffic accidents involving many different
accident scenarios and we have addressed several of them in our
recommendations. Recent interest in the effects of using cell phones
and other electronic devices has prompted numerous studies, and the
explosive growth of texting while driving has prompted several states
and the Federal Government to restrict such activity.
Most would agree that texting while driving is unsafe. In fact,
Virginia Tech has shown that texting while driving increases the risk
of an accident by 23 times. However, the problem is much bigger than
texting. If you dial a phone number or reach for the phone while you
are driving, you are taking your eyes off the road. You may be able to
do this and get away with it hundreds or even thousands of times, but
one day, you will look down at your cell phone at just the wrong moment
and become an accident statistic. When the driver of an 80,000-pound
tractor-trailer or a motorcoach carrying 55 passengers looks away from
the road at the wrong instant, the results can be catastrophic.
The NTSB investigated a passenger car accident in February 2002 in
Largo, Maryland, in which an inexperienced 20-year-old driver lost
control of her high-profile, short-wheelbase vehicle on the Capitol
Beltway. She was following her boyfriend and talking to him on her cell
phone. She lost sight of his speeding vehicle and, as she was
attempting to catch up with him, she lost control of her vehicle and
crossed over the median, striking a minivan and killing all four of its
occupants and herself. The cause of the accident was a combination of
inexperience, unfamiliarity with the vehicle, speed, and distraction
caused by use of a handheld wireless telephone. As a result, the NTSB
recommended that the states prohibit holders of learner's permits and
intermediate licenses from using wireless communication devices while
driving, and that they add driver distraction codes to traffic accident
investigation forms. Specifically, the NTSB issued the following
recommendations to 33 states:
Enact legislation to prohibit holders of learner's permits and
intermediate licenses from using interactive wireless
communication devices while driving. (H-03-8)
Add driver distraction codes, including codes for interactive
wireless communication device use, to your traffic accident
investigation forms. (H-03-9)
In 2004, we investigated an accident in Alexandria, Virginia, in
which an experienced motorcoach driver, who was having a heated
conversation on his hands-free cell phone, failed to move to the center
lane and struck the underside of an arched stone bridge on the George
Washington Parkway. Our investigation found that the driver had
numerous cues to change lanes at the appropriate time. In fact, the
driver was familiar with the road and was following another bus that
had moved to the center lane. Yet, this driver did not notice the well-
marked signage as he approached the arched stone bridge. The accident
was clearly caused by this driver's cognitive distraction, due to his
conversation on his cell phone. The NTSB recommended that the FMCSA and
the 50 states enact laws to prohibit cell phone use by commercial
drivers while driving a passenger-carrying commercial vehicle or school
bus. We also recommended that motorcoach associations, school bus
organizations, and unions develop formal policies to prohibit cell
phone use by commercial drivers, except in emergencies, as follows:
To the FMCSA and the 50 states: Publish regulations (or enact
legislation) to prohibit cellular telephone use by commercial
driver's license holders with a passenger-carrying or school
bus endorsement, while driving under the authority of that
endorsement, except in emergencies. (H-06-27 and -28)
To motorcoach associations, school bus organizations, and
unions: Develop formal policies prohibiting cellular telephone
use by commercial driver's license holders with a passenger-
carrying or school bus endorsement, while driving under the
authority of that endorsement, except in emergencies. (H-06-29)
Last fall, we participated in the DOT Distracted Driving Summit,
which addressed the dangers of text-messaging and other driving
distractions. During the summit, Secretary LaHood announced a plan to
initiate rulemaking that would consider banning texting altogether and
would restrict texting by truck and interstate bus operators. A notice
of proposed rulemaking to ban texting by commercial vehicle drivers was
issued on April 1, 2010. While a ban on texting is definitely a step in
the right safety direction, it does not satisfy our recommendation to
prohibit the use of cellular telephones by drivers of passenger-
carrying motorcoaches or school buses. In fact, the NTSB feels so
strongly about these recommendations that they are both on the Board's
Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements.
Another potential area for reducing distracted driving accident
lies in technology. For example, collision warning systems and adaptive
cruise control could alert a distracted driver of an impending
emergency situation. Since 1995, as part of its Special Investigation
of Collision Warning Technology, the NTSB has advocated the
installation of such systems to prevent accidents. In 2001, as part of
another study on Technology for the Prevention of Rear-End Collisions,
the NTSB investigated nine commercial vehicle rear-end collisions in
which 20 people died and 181 were injured. Common to all nine accidents
was the rear following vehicle driver's degraded perception of traffic
conditions ahead. Therefore, the NTSB recommended that NHTSA take the
following action:
Complete rulemaking on adaptive cruise control and collision
warning system performance standards for new commercial
vehicles. At a minimum, these standards should address obstacle
detection distance, timing of alerts, and human factors
guidelines, such as the mode and type of warning. (H-01-6 and -
7)
In 2003, a multivehicle accident occurred on near Hampshire,
Illinois, in which a tractor-trailer failed to slow for the stopped or
slow-moving traffic on the approach to the Interstate 90 toll plaza.
The tractor-trailer driver was distracted and rear-ended a specialty
bus, killing 8 passengers and injuring 12. As a result, the NTSB
reiterated recommendations H-01-6 and -7.
In 2007, these important safety recommendations were added to the
Board's Most Wanted List. These recommendations were again reiterated
following the Board's 2008 report on a 4-fatality motorcoach and
tractor-trailer accident in, Osseo, Wisconsin, a 7-fatality tractor-
trailer/sedan/school bus collision in Lake Butler, Florida, and the 14-
fatality motorcoach rollover accident in Turrell, Arkansas.
NHTSA is currently in the process of evaluating forward collision
warning systems in field tests to evaluate several human factors
considerations related to integrating safety warning systems in both
heavy and light vehicles.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question 1. Last year I introduced S. 1113, the Safe Roads Act, to
establish a national drug and alcohol testing database for employers to
better select qualified drivers and avoid hiring employees with a drug
or alcohol background.
Under this law, the FMCSA would require medical review officers,
employers, and other service agents to report positive results from
FMCSA required drug or alcohol tests to the database and clearinghouse.
Employers would be required to check the database prior to hiring a
prospective employee. If a prospective employee has a positive result,
an employer would not be allowed to hire the prospect unless he/she has
not violated the requirements of the testing program or he/she has
fully completed a return-to-duty program as required by the testing
program. This law will also require privacy protections and employee
rights of action. Does the NTSB support the establishment of a drug and
alcohol test result clearinghouse? Do you believe the CSA 2010 should
accommodate such a database?
Answer. The NTSB strongly supports the both the establishment of a
drug and alcohol test result clearinghouse and the inclusion of such a
database in the FMCSA's CSA 2010 initiative. The NTSB has supported
this initiative since investigating the 1999 Mother's Day motorcoach
accident in New Orleans, Louisiana. In this accident, the motorcoach
driver lost consciousness while driving on an interstate highway, left
the roadway, and crashed into an embankment, killing 22 passengers and
injuring 21.
By way of background, the driver had multiple known serious medical
conditions, including kidney failure and congestive heart failure, and
he was receiving intravenous therapy for 3-4 hours a day, 6 days a
week. Additionally, when the driver submitted his application to the
motor carrier, he did not mention previous positions he had held with
two other motor carriers where he had been dismissed for testing
positive for marijuana. He explained the gaps in his employment record
by stating that he was a musician in a brass band during those times.
His employer sent requests for information to the two previous
employers, both of whom were authorized by the bus driver to provide
the information. However, neither company responded. Before being hired
by his current employer, the driver took a preemployment drug test; he
subsequently had three random drug tests during his tenure, all with
negative results.
Three problems are evident from the events described above. First,
the driver was able to avoid negative scrutiny from his current
employer by omitting parts of his employment history. Second, his
current employer did not receive a response from any of the former
employers it contacted. Third, no enforcement mechanism or incentive
exists to compel previous employers to comply with information
requests.
Today, it is still possible for drivers to hide positive drug test
results in the manner of the New Orleans driver. Title 49 CFR 391.21
requires drivers to provide carriers with the names and addresses of
employers from their previous 3 years of employment, including their
employment dates and reasons for leaving. However, drivers are unlikely
to provide such history when it might limit their opportunities for
employment. Additionally, enforcing this requirement is difficult
because the only way to detect a false employment history would be to
obtain employment information from someone other than the driver.
Because employees are unlikely to divulge positive drug test
results and because prospective employers may not have sufficient
employment history or the authority to obtain information from previous
employers regarding positive drug tests, the results of tests for
controlled substances performed under the DOT testing guidelines, even
when positive, are often not available to prospective employers, making
it difficult for them to make well-informed hiring decisions.
Drivers who own and operate their own commercial vehicles (owner-
operators) are required by regulation to comply with all the
requirements stipulated for both drivers and employers. Owner-operators
are thus in the precarious position of overseeing their own substance
abuse programs. No Federal requirements exist for reporting drivers who
have tested positive for controlled substances to any regulatory or
certifying authority. Therefore, the only entity with information
regarding a positive test is the employer, who, if an owner-operator,
may also be the individual being tested. Such an arrangement requires
owner-operators who are abusing controlled substances to remove
themselves from driving if they test positive for such substances. It
seems highly unlikely that those owner-operators who are not complying
with the regulations regarding the use of controlled substances will
comply with other sections of the drug testing regulations.
Therefore, the NTSB concluded that the current Federal drug testing
regulations cannot adequately identify owner-operators who abuse
controlled substances. A database that records positive drug and
alcohol test results and refusal determinations for all commercial
drivers would provide an effective way for both employers and
certifying authorities to verify and evaluate the drug test history of
all commercial drivers. Such a database would allow employers to make
better-informed hiring decisions and would allow certifying authorities
to determine whether a driver has a potentially disqualifying medical
condition regarding substance abuse. Therefore, the NTSB made the
following recommendation to the FMCSA:
Develop a system that records all positive drug and alcohol
test results and refusal determinations that are conducted
under the U.S. Department of Transportation testing
requirements, require prospective employers to query the system
before making a hiring decision, and require certifying
authorities to query the system before making a certification
decision. (H-01-25)
Question 2. I understand that on April 5, 2010, the FMCSA developed
a final rule to require the use of EOBRs by carriers that have violated
the hours of service rules. What is the NTSB's view of the new EOBR
rule?
Answer. For the past 30 years, the NTSB has advocated the use of
onboard data recorders to increase HOS compliance. The NTSB first
proposed the use of automatic onboard recorders for commercial vehicle
HOS compliance in 1977. In 1990, the NTSB recommended that they be
required on all commercial vehicles. Although the final rule on EOBRs
is an improvement over what had been proposed in 2007, it still falls
short of industrywide implementation and will not lead to significant
improvements in HOS compliance.
In the final rule, the primary purpose of EOBRs is remedial. The
FMCSA has improved the process described in the NPRM and adopted a more
stringent approach, whereby motor carriers with a 10-percent violation
rate of any 49 CFR Part 385, Appendix C, HOS regulation in any single
compliance review--rather than two consecutive compliance reviews, as
proposed in the NPRM--would be required to equip their fleets for 2
years with EOBRs that meet the parameters described in the final rule
or be prohibited from operating. The FMCSA estimated that the directive
proposed in the NPRM would have resulted in the annual issuance of 465
remedial directives to install EOBRs; it estimates that the final rule
will result in the annual issuance of 5,419 remedial directives,
affecting 104,428 power units.
The NTSB is still concerned that compliance reviews will be the
only method used to identify threshold rate violators, when only about
2 percent of all carriers undergo compliance reviews annually.
Furthermore, the NTSB has identified flaws in the compliance review
system, guaranteeing that many unsafe carriers will continue to evade
even initial identification as an HOS violator. The NTSB has documented
several instances in which carriers have received favorable compliance
review ratings despite long and consistent histories of driver- and
vehicle-related violations. With the paper logs currently in use, it is
relatively easy for drivers or carriers to misrepresent HOS data. As a
result, to exceed HOS limits undetected, many drivers falsify their
logs and subsequently drive in a fatigued state. The NTSB remains
convinced that the only effective means of curbing the many tragic
fatigue-related accidents is to mandate EOBR installation and use by
all operators subject to HOS regulations. A remedial program that
relies on compliance reviews and the evaluation of paper logs to
identify high-risk carriers will have limited success.
It is the NTSB's position that using EOBRs as a form of remediation
or punishment undermines the goal of achieving voluntary industrywide
acceptance and runs counter to the intent of the NTSB's previously
issued safety recommendations and continued support of recording
technologies. The FMCSA lists several incentives that it hopes will
promote the voluntary installation and use of EOBRs. Among these
incentives are new compliance review procedures and exemptions for
certain supporting documentation requirements. The NTSB is in favor of
any incentive that fosters the use of EOBRs without undermining safety;
however, we remain skeptical as to whether the incentives currently
proposed will be strong enough to override the financial motivation
some carriers and drivers have for continuing to circumvent the HOS
regulations and not use EOBRs.
The NTSB understands that the FMCSA is considering publication of a
separate NPRM in the near future, initiating a new rulemaking to expand
the scope of EOBR use beyond what has been set forth in this final
rule. The FMCSA did not propose a timeline for this action, and the
NTSB would like to encourage publication of the notice mandating
industrywide implementation of EOBRs as soon as possible.
The NTSB has urged the FMCSA to continue its work in evaluating
regulatory options for expanding the use of EOBRs by all carriers. The
NTSB believes that it is past time to act and that the use of EOBRs
should be mandatory throughout the industry, as is the case in most of
Europe.
Question 2a. What information should be required to be recorded by
the EOBRs? What should be a minimum performance standard?
Answer. With respect to performance-oriented standards for EOBR
technology, the NTSB is generally satisfied with the FMCSA's final
rule. The FMCSA's decision to require that onboard recording devices be
integrally synchronized to the engine was especially well received and
should help ensure the accuracy of electronic records of duty status.
However, the NTSB is disappointed that the final rule does not include
further standards for EOBR damage resistance and data survivability
beyond those for other electronic components used in trucks and buses
and encourages the FMCSA to revisit this issue in subsequent EOBR
rulemaking.
Question 2b. Should all motor-carriers be equipped with EOBRs to
better comply with Hours of Service laws?
Answer. The NTSB supports mandatory EOBR implementation by all
motor carriers. Although the NTSB does not agree with the FMCSA's
rationale for not implementing an industrywide mandate at this time,
the NTSB understands that the FMCSA plans to publish a separate notice
in the near future initiating a new rulemaking to consider expanding
the scope of EOBR use beyond what has been set forth in the final rule.
The FMCSA did not propose a timeline for this action, and the NTSB has
encouraged the FMCSA to publish an NPRM mandating the industrywide
implementation of EOBRs as soon as possible.
By way of background, the NTSB supports EOBR use by all motor
carriers because it believes that compliance with HOS laws can help
reduce the number of fatigue-related accidents. As you know, fatigue-
related accidents continue to plague our Nation's highways because,
unlike alcohol or drugs, fatigue is extremely difficult to detect. In
fact, fatigue is probably the most underreported causal factor in
highway accidents. Electronic on-board recorders have the potential to
efficiently and accurately collect and verify the hours of service for
all commercial drivers. Mandatory use of EOBRs will also establish the
proper incentives and create a level playing field for compliance with
HOS rules that will ultimately make our highways safer for all drivers.
Question 3. Do you believe the current size and weight restrictions
can be increased without compromising highway safety or infrastructure
integrity? Would you comment on your views of increasing the allowable
weight of trucks to 97,000 pounds by adding a third axle to the rear
pair of axles?
Answer. The NTSB has not evaluated the safety implications, nor has
it taken an official position, on adding a third axle to tractor-
trailers and increasing the weight limit to 97,000 pounds. Most of our
recent recommendations have focused on oversize and overweight vehicles
that require a special permit. In fact, we are currently reviewing an
accident that occurred last Friday, June 11, 2010, involving the lead
escort vehicle for an oversize load traveling on Interstate 74 near the
village of St. Joseph, Illinois. Oversize and overweight ``permitted''
loads require special handling and procedures and the NTSB has made
associated recommendations from accidents that occurred in Glendale,
California, in 2000 and Intercession City, Florida, in 1993. Again,
these accidents involved very specialized vehicles, traveling on
specified routes, and they required special considerations and
oversight.
The NTSB has not made specific recommendations on a general
increase in the current size and weight restrictions. However, many
safety implications should be considered. For example, the NTSB has
numerous outstanding recommendations to the FMCSA, NHTSA, and the FHWA
that involve heavy commercial vehicles, and perhaps some of those
issues should be addressed prior to allowing larger and heaver trucks
on the road. For instance, concerning braking and stopping distances,
larger and heavier vehicles are likely to have longer stopping
distances, and the NTSB has made several recommendations involving
truck brakes and maintenance. For example, our investigation into a
tractor-trailer with bad brakes that collided with a school bus in
Mountainburg, Arkansas, in 2001 illustrated the importance of truck
brake maintenance. Those recommendations to the FMCSA included the
following:
Revise 49 CFR 396.13, Driver Inspection, to require minimum
pre-trip inspection procedures for determining brake
adjustment. (H-02-15)
Require that vehicle inspections of a motor carrier's fleet be
conducted during compliance reviews. (H-02-16)
Revise 49 CFR 396.25, Qualifications of Brake Inspectors, to
require certification after testing as a prerequisite for
qualification and specify, at a minimum, formal training in
brake maintenance and inspection. (H-02-17)
During compliance reviews, rate companies as unsatisfactory in
the vehicle factor category if the mechanics and drivers
responsible for maintaining brake systems are not qualified
brake inspectors. (H-02-18)
Another example includes the NTSB's investigation of a 2003 runaway
truck accident in Glendale, Pennsylvania, that was caused by brake
failure and poor maintenance. The Board recommended that the FMCSA:
Work with the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance to develop and
add to the North American Standard Inspection training
materials a module that emphasizes that manually adjusting
automatic slack adjusters is dangerous and should not be done,
except during installation or in an emergency to move the
vehicle to a repair facility, because manual adjustment of this
brake component: (1) fails to address the true reason why the
brakes are not maintaining adjustment, giving the operator a
false sense of security about the effectiveness of the brakes,
which are likely to go out of adjustment again soon, and (2)
causes abnormal wear to the internal adjusting mechanism for
most automatic slack adjusters, which may lead to failure of
this brake component. (H-06-1)
In general, the NTSB considers that the FMCSA's methodology for
identifying unsafe motor carriers is lacking in several areas, but
specifically, we have reiterated a recommendation to recognize the
importance of vehicle maintenance when evaluating the adequacy of a
motor carrier's operations. That longstanding recommendation to FMCSA
is as follows:
Change the safety fitness rating methodology so that adverse
vehicle and driver performance-based data alone are sufficient
to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for the carrier.
(H-99-6)
This recommendation has been reiterated in several accident
investigation reports and has been on our Most Wanted List for over a
decade. Therefore, until the FMCSA has adequate procedures in place to
monitor motor carrier vehicle maintenance, it seems unlikely that the
Board would support an increase in truck size and weight.
Likewise, the Board is very concerned with fatigued truck and bus
drivers, and for the last 30 years has made recommendations for the
FMCSA to require EOBRs for HOS compliance. This issue was added to our
Most Wanted List in 2008. It was most recently reiterated in a report
of a 9-fatality motorcoach accident in Mexican Hat, Utah. That
recommendation to the FMCSA states:
Require all interstate commercial vehicle carriers to use
electronic on-board recorders for hours of service. (H-07-41)
In addition, as a result of three fatigue-related accidents that
occurred in Osseo, Wisconsin; Lake Butler, Florida; and Turrell,
Arkansas, the NTSB issued a report in 2008 with the following new
recommendations to the FMCSA:
Develop and implement a plan to deploy technologies in
commercial vehicles to reduce the occurrence of fatigue-related
accidents. (H-08-13)
Develop and use a methodology that will continually assess the
effectiveness of the fatigue management plans implemented by
motor carriers. (H-08-14)
Before larger and heavier trucks, with potentially longer stopping
distances, are allowed on the road, we believe that NHTSA should
consider implementing some of the NTSB's recommendations concerning new
technologies that could help prevent large truck and bus accidents.
Those include the implementation of collision warning systems, adaptive
cruise control with active braking, and electronic stability control.
Again, the Most Wanted List contains some of these longstanding
recommendations to NHTSA, including the following:
Complete rulemaking on adaptive cruise control and collision
warning system performance standards for new commercial
vehicles. At a minimum, these standards should address obstacle
detection, timing of alerts, and human factors guidelines, such
as the mode and type of warning. (H-01-6)
Determine whether equipping commercial vehicles with collision
warning systems with active braking and electronic stability
control systems will reduce commercial vehicle accidents. If
these technologies are determined to be effective in reducing
accidents, require their use on commercial vehicles. (H-08-15)
Finally, it goes without saying that increasing truck size and
weight will have implications affecting the highway infrastructure, its
bridges, and general roadway deterioration. The NTSB's investigation of
the Minneapolis bridge collapse showed that a design flaw in that
bridge caused the collapse, but the report also acknowledged the
overall deterioration of the Nation's infrastructure. Similarly, the
NTSB's recent investigation into a motorcoach accident in Sherman,
Texas, illustrated that bridge barriers on many existing bridges are
not adequate to redirect large buses and trucks. Therefore, any
proposal to increase the size and weight of trucks should take into
consideration the adequacy of our highway infrastructure to accommodate
those vehicles. The recommendation from the Sherman accident to the
FHWA is as follows:
Establish, in conjunction with the American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials, performance and
selection guidelines for bridge owners to use to develop
objective warrants for high-performance Test Level Four, Five,
and Six bridge railings applicable to new construction and
rehabilitation projects where railing replacement is determined
to be appropriate. (H-09-17)
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question 1. In your testimony, you state that the NTSB has
recommended that event data recorders (EDRs) be required in all newly
manufactured light duty vehicles. You also state that school buses and
motorcoaches should be required to record specific vehicle parameters.
While many vehicles have these recorders, they are still not required
by NHTSA. Today I introduced legislation, S. 3271 the Vehicle Safety
Improvements Act, which would require that all vehicles, including
medium and heavy-duty vehicles, have an EDR. What are the benefits of
having event data recorders (EDRs) in vehicles?
Answer. An EDR is a device or function that records a vehicle's
dynamic, time-series data just before a crash (vehicle speed versus
time) or during a crash (change in velocity versus time). Intended for
retrieval after the crash event, EDR data can provide critical safety
system performance information. To enhance crash testing with real-
world data, it is important that data from motorcoach crashes be
available for use in postaccident analysis, forensics, and design
evaluation.
EDRs are a proven technology. They record critical vehicle
movements and driver inputs that greatly help in accident
reconstruction and future accident prevention initiatives. That is why
since 1997, the NTSB has issued six recommendations and participated in
and/or hosted five public forums on the use of data recording devices
in highway transportation.
Although the NTSB has been advocating the installation of EDRs for
decades, the importance of such devices has just now become apparent to
members of the general public, as they wrestle with the issue of
unattended acceleration. It is just this type of device that would have
assisted in determining whether the Toyota unintended acceleration
problem was caused by mechanical or human error. NHTSA has maintained
that use of these devices should be voluntary, but the NTSB considers
that they should be mandatory. In fact, we investigated an accident
involving pedal misapplication in 2003 in a Santa Monica, California,
farmers market that caused 10 fatalities and 63 injuries. As a result,
we recommended that NHTSA take the following action:
Once standards for event data recorders are developed, require
their installation in all newly manufactured light-duty
vehicles. (H-04-26)
In addition, the NTSB has advocated the use of EDRs in school buses
and motorcoaches since 1999. Most recently, we reiterated these
recommendations in the report of the 2008 7-fatality motorcoach
accident in Atlanta, Georgia, in which a motorcoach carrying Bluffton
University students launched off a highway overpass, falling to the
roadway below.
That accident illustrated how the lack of valuable crash data
continues to restrict accident investigations. In that case, data
concerning the exact vehicle speed, status of the cruise control and
high beams, throttle position, and driver steering and brake inputs, as
well as several other parameters, could not be precisely determined
based on physical evidence. The NTSB's investigation into the cause of
passenger injuries and the points of ejection was severely limited
because insufficient data were available from which to calculate
reliable crash pulses. An EDR would have provided vehicle dynamics
information throughout the accident sequence. Crash pulses and/or Delta
V are often used to calculate passenger occupant kinematics, help
evaluate injury exposure, and help evaluate passenger protection safety
devices and systems. Using these data, investigators can predict
potential injury mechanisms and the effects of various design elements
on occupant protection systems.
Question 1a. Could requiring that all medium and heavy-duty
vehicles also have EDRs lead to vehicle safety improvements?
As mentioned above, EDRs provide many benefits beyond just
determining the cause of a crash, especially in the areas of
crashworthiness and occupant kinematics research. That is why the NTSB
made the following recommendations in 1999, and we reiterated them as a
result of the Atlanta, Georgia, accident:
Require that all school buses and motorcoaches manufactured
after January 1, 2003, be equipped with on-board recording
systems that record vehicle parameters, including, at a
minimum, lateral acceleration, longitudinal acceleration,
vertical acceleration, heading, vehicle speed, engine speed,
driver's seat belt status, braking input, steering input, gear
selection, turn signal status (left/right), brake light status
(on/off), head/tail light status (on/off), passenger door
status (open/closed), emergency door status (open/closed),
hazard light status (on/off), brake system status (normal/
warning), and flashing red light status (on/off) (school buses
only). For those buses so equipped, the following should also
be recorded: status of additional seat belts, airbag deployment
criteria, airbag deployment time, and airbag deployment energy.
The on-board recording system should record data at a sampling
rate that is sufficient to define vehicle dynamics and should
be capable of preserving data in the event of a vehicle crash
or an electrical power loss. In addition, the on-board
recording system should be mounted to the bus body, not the
chassis, to ensure that the data necessary for defining bus
body motion are recorded. (H-99-53 and -54)
In recent years, NHTSA has made progress in developing EDR data
standards for light vehicles, which include passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles, light trucks, and vans with a gross
vehicle weight rating of 8,500 pounds or less. In August 2006, NHTSA
published a final rule that standardizes the information EDRs collect,
making EDR data retrieval easier, and that addresses the survivability
requirements for EDRs based on crash testing. The final rule was
amended on January 14, 2008, in response to numerous petitions for
reconsideration. Based on this revised rule, compliance dates have been
changed to September 1, 2012, for most light vehicles, and to September
1, 2013, for vehicles manufactured in two or more stages. The new rule,
however, does not address vehicles over 8,500 pounds. Thus, it would
not apply to buses or motorcoaches.
In its comments on the proposed rule, the NTSB highlighted its
concerns that limiting the EDR requirement to vehicles weighing less
than 8,500 pounds will exclude vehicles involved in crashes for which
data from EDRs would be especially beneficial. The NTSB has previously
recommended that school buses and motorcoaches be equipped with EDRs,
and NHTSA indicated in its NPRM that it will address heavy vehicles
later. The NTSB believes that this rulemaking for light vehicles should
have applied to all vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or less and that
heavy-vehicle rulemaking should apply to all vehicles with a gross
vehicle weight rating of 10,001 pounds or more. Thus, no vehicles would
be excluded from EDR requirements.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question. Last December, this Committee reported legislation to
improve motorcoach safety. For example, new motorcoach entrants would
be required to successfully complete an on-site pre-authorization
safety audit before they could begin operating. While pre-authorization
safety audits may not be practical for the trucking industry, which has
thousands of new entrants each year, what more can be done before a
carrier begins operations to ensure the carrier, its vehicles, and
drivers are in compliance with Federal safety regulations? What other
recommendations do you have for improving FMCSA's new entrant program?
Answer. The Committee's initiative last December which emphasized
that FMCSA review a carrier's fitness before they are allowed to engage
in interstate commerce is precisely what the NTSB wants and has asked
for in its recommendations for both passenger and freight operations.
The fact that there are numerous new entrant applications each year
should not be a deterrent. In fact, it is an even greater reason to
establish a program that reviews these applications prior to engaging
in interstate commerce. Otherwise, we are allowing thousands of rookie
operators on the road. Some will certainly be unsafe and thus raise the
risk of accidents for themselves and the traffic around them.
Intervening as soon as possible before their vehicles move onto the
highway reduces those risks.
An example of the danger of allowing a motor carrier to conduct
business before being evaluated on their knowledge of the FMCSRs is
found in the NTSB's investigation of an accident that occurred in 2002
near Loraine, Texas, in which the Safety Board made recommendations to
the FMCSA to establish a program to evaluate new entrants prior to
operating. At the time of this accident, FMCSA had essentially no
program to review or follow-up on new entrant motor carriers. This
accident involved the collision of a motorcoach with a tractor-
semitrailer and resulted in 3 fatalities and 30 injuries. In this case,
our investigation revealed that when the trucking company owner, who
had no previous experience running a motor carrier operation, submitted
his application to FMCSA, he lied about his knowledge of the
regulations, about having systems in place to comply with the
regulations, and about a drug conviction for possession of large
amounts of marijuana the year prior to his application. He also did not
maintain any records on his drivers or vehicles, did not have a company
drug and alcohol program, and did not conduct background checks of his
drivers. Further, he knowingly dispatched the accident driver, who did
not have a commercial driver's license or medical certificate.
As a result of the NTSB's recommendation from this accident,
Congress required the FMCSA to establish a new entrant audit program.
Subsequently, the FMCSA developed the New Entrant Safety Assurance
Program in 2003 under which a new motor carrier, operating in
interstate commerce, is subject to an 18-month safety monitoring period
and receives a safety audit sometime after its first 3 months of
operation but before it completes 18 months of operation.
Unfortunately, this program included very little screening prior to
allowing motor carriers to engage in interstate commerce. Since it
relies on evaluating the performance of the carrier during this 18-
month safety monitoring period, it essentially allows new entrants to
engage in interstate commerce without proving their safety fitness.
The current application process relies on the motor carrier to read
the material and to do what is required. The FMCSA has no way of
determining whether a motor carrier is complying with the FMCSRs until
the safety audit occurs, up to 18 months after the motor carrier begins
operations. In other countries and territories, the new applicant
process is more stringent. In British Columbia, a new motor carrier
must describe the types of systems that are in place and the records
that will be kept. In all member countries of the European Union, a new
motor carrier must take an examination to ensure that he knows the
rules and regulations. In the United Kingdom, the new motor carrier
must inform the licensing agency of its maintenance program and
capabilities and is inspected within 9 months.
In the U.S. motor carrier certification process, no such checks are
in place. The FMCSA does not verify that the motor carrier understands
or has complied with the regulations. While many new motor carriers do
put safety management systems in place to comply with the FMCSRs, the
NTSB is concerned that some carriers will fail to do so. The
application form for a new entrant only requires the carrier to check
``yes'' or ``no'' boxes to verify that he understood the rules and
regulations. The NTSB believes that the FMCSA's New Entrant Safety
Assurance Program lacks meaningful safeguards to ensure that a motor
carrier is aware of, understands, and has a safety management system in
place to comply with the FMCSRs prior to beginning operations. Thus the
Safety Board's recommendation (below), issued to FMCSA after the
Loraine accident, remains valid.
Require all new motor carriers seeking operating authority to
demonstrate their safety fitness prior to obtaining new entrant
operating authority by, at a minimum: (1) passing an
examination demonstrating their knowledge of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations; (2) submitting a comprehensive plan
documenting that the motor carrier has management systems in
place to ensure compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations; and (3) passing a Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration safety audit, including vehicle
inspections. (H-03-02)
This concept of evaluating new entrants prior to allowing them to
engage in interstate commerce was echoed by FMCSA's Motor Carrier
Safety Advisory Committee in September of 2009. The Committee stated:
``Currently, a new entrant may engage in interstate commerce
before the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
conducts any kind of safety assessment (whether a roadside
inspection, safety audit, or compliance review). The Committee
believes that the process for granting new entrant motor
carriers permission to engage in interstate operations should
emphasize safety by improving the knowledge, capabilities, and
commitment of applicants on the front end.''
Another area of concern is when unscrupulous motor carriers use the
new entrant program to evade an enforcement action or an out-of-service
order by going out of business and then reincarnating themselves, as if
they are a brand new motor carrier. The NTSB found that this had
occurred with a motor carrier involved in an accident in 2008, when a
motorcoach ran off a bridge and rolled over in Sherman, Texas, killing
17 passengers. After losing its authority to operate because of an
unsatisfactory compliance review rating, the motor carrier applied for
operating authority under a new name as a new entrant. Although the
application was still in the review process, the carrier began
operating under the new carrier name.
The Sherman accident prompted the FMCSA to develop a vetting
process as part of its New Applicant Screening Program, under which the
agency compares information on new applications against information on
companies previously granted authority. Using this system, the FMCSA is
potentially able to identify carriers who are attempting to reincarnate
themselves.
The Sherman accident also prompted the GAO to study FMCSA's new
entrant program. The GAO report, published in July 2009, found that
roughly 9 percent of the carriers, which FMCSA had previously placed
out of service, attempted to reincarnate themselves as new entrants.
GAO also acknowledged that their conservative methodology in
identifying these reincarnated carriers likely underestimates the
problem.
The NTSB's final report on the Sherman, Texas, accident concluded
that the FMCSA's program for identifying reincarnated carriers would
benefit from a process that evaluated how effective the screening
program was in identifying reincarnated carriers. Therefore, we asked
them to evaluate the effectiveness of the new program by issuing the
following recommendation to the FMCSA:
Develop an evaluation component to determine the effectiveness
of its New Applicant Screening Program. (H-09-21)
In 2008, the NTSB investigated an accident in which the driver fell
asleep and the motorcoach overturned in Victoria, Texas, killing one
person. The Safety Board discovered that FMCSA lacked sufficient
authority to deny or revoke operating authority from a carrier who
failed to disclose a relationship with a prior carrier. The NTSB
concluded that some motor carriers are circumventing the legitimate
corporate succession processes by reapplying for FMCSA interstate
operating authority without declaring previous relationships with
carriers under enforcement actions.
As a result, the NTSB issued a recommendation to the FMCSA that
asks the agency to develop methods to identify reincarnated carriers
that fail to disclose previous transportation operations and to seek
authority to deny or revoke their operating authority:
Seek statutory authority to deny or revoke operating authority
for commercial interstate motor carriers found to have
applications for operating authority in which the applicant
failed to disclose any prior operating relationship with
another motor carrier, operating as another motor carrier, or
being previously assigned a U.S. Department of Transportation
number. (H-09-34)
Also in its Victoria accident investigation, the NTSB identified
motor carriers that owned and operated vehicles that did not meet the
requirements of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). As
such, the NTSB asked the FMCSA to require motor carriers to declare on
their operating authority application that they will only use FMVSS
compliant vehicles. Further, the NTSB asked the FMCSA to seek
legislation allowing the FMCSA to put out of service any company that
uses non-FMVSS compliant vehicles, i.e.:
Require that passenger motor carriers certify on their OP-1(P)
forms (Application for Motor Passenger Carrier Authority) and
initial MCS-150 form (Motor Carrier Identification Report
[Application for USDOT Number]) and subsequent required
biennial submissions that all vehicles operated, owned, or
leased per trip or per term met the FMVSSs in effect at the
time of manufacture. (H-09-40)
Seek statutory authority to suspend, revoke, or withdraw a
motor carrier's operating authority upon discovering the
carrier is operating any non-FMVSS-compliant passenger-carrying
commercial motor vehicles, a violation of the FMVSS-compliant
certification requested in Safety Recommendation H-09-40. (H-
09-41)
Finally, a recurring theme in many of the NTSB's investigations is
vehicle maintenance, and, in fact, all of the above accidents contained
vehicle issues of some sort. Our report on a 2001 collision between a
school bus and a tractor-semitrailer near Mountainburg, AR, in which 3
students were killed, highlighted the ease with which carriers avoid
vehicle inspections. As a result, the Safety Board recommended that the
FMCSA:
Require that vehicle inspection of a motor carrier's fleet be
conducted during compliance reviews. (H-02-16)
None of the above recommendations have been fully implemented by
FMCSA. However, the NTSB believes that all of them would help
contribute to improved vigilance in reviewing and granting operating
authority to new motor carriers.
In summary, there are very few professions where you get to
practice that occupation prior to being licensed or taking some kind of
test. Still, the NTSB recognizes that predicting how safe a motor
carrier will be in the future is difficult. Nevertheless, the risks to
the public from unsafe motor carriers are too high. As our
recommendations indicate, the NTSB believes more can be done to ensure
that only safe, knowledgeable companies are allowed to operate on our
Nation's highways.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Francis (Buzzy) France
Question. Most truck drivers are paid by the mile, which tempts
drivers to drive longer than what is permitted under the Hours of
Service regulations, especially if they are delayed at ports and
loading facilities. As we work to reauthorize the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, what additional steps should the Committee take
to reduce this incentive?
Answer. There are many components to the issue of driver
compensation, both economic and safety. CVSA supports the idea of a
study to look further into the issue as we do the current GAO study of
driver detention time. The guiding principle for CVSA in looking at
driver compensation is the impact it has on safety. CVSA will look
closely at the safety issues raised in the study when it is completed
and make further comments at that time.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Francis (Buzzy) France
Question 1. Last year I introduced S. 1113, the Safe Roads Act, to
establish a national drug and alcohol testing database for employers to
better select qualified drivers and avoid hiring employees with a drug
or alcohol background.
Under this law, the FMCSA would require medical review officers,
employers, and other service agents to report positive results from
FMCSA required drug or alcohol tests to the database and clearing
house. Employers would be required to check the database prior to
hiring a prospective employee. If a prospective employee has a positive
result, an employer would not be allowed to hire the prospect unless
he/she has not violated the requirements of the testing program or he/
she has not violated the requirements of the testing program or he/she
has fully completed a return-to-duty program as required by the testing
program. This law will also require privacy protections and employee
rights of action. Do you support the establishment of a drug and
alcohol test result clearinghouse?
Answer. Yes.
Question 1a. Does FMCSA have the authority to establish such a
clearinghouse without Congressional guidance?
Answer. We believe there is a need for Congress to provide FMCSA
with additional authority to establish the clearinghouse.
Question 1b. Should a drug clearinghouse be a part of CSA 2010?
Answer. A drug and alcohol clearinghouse should be established
irrespective of CSA 2010. However, drug and alcohol driver violations
will be an important factor in implementing CSA 2010. The clearinghouse
will help provide driver data that is important to the new rating
system to be established under CSA 2010.
Question 2. I understand that on April 5, 2010, FMCSA developed a
final rule to require the use of EOBR's by carriers that have violated
the hours of service rules. Do you believe all motor carriers should be
equipped with EOBRs to better comply with Hours of Service laws?
Answer. Yes. We do. However, it is critically important that the
implementing rule should contain important technical considerations,
such as interoperability, data security, driver identification,
tampering, uniformity, standard interface for law enforcement, and
proper certification for EOBR devices.
Question 2a. If Congress were to require EOBRs for all carriers,
what information would we require to be recorded?
Answer. CVSA's comments filed with respect to the original EOBR
rulemaking are attached. They carefully detail what information should
be required and how to obtain this information as accurately as
possible. In addition, as FMCSA's rulemaking on this issue has evolved,
CVSA has been working with a broad partnership to help provide guidance
to achieve uniform performance standards for EOBR's. The purpose and
statement of objectives of this partnership is attached.
Question 3. Do you believe the current size and weight restrictions
can be increased without compromising highway safety or infrastructure
integrity?
Answer. CVSA does not support enacting any legislative or
regulatory changes to truck size and weight until such time as we have
a more uniform, methodical and science-based approach to evaluating the
safety, infrastructure and environmental costs and benefits. CVSA has
adopted a comprehensive size and weight policy in anticipation of
consideration of this issue relative to the upcoming surface
transportation bill. This is attached along with a letter sent to
Secretary of Transportation LaHood in which we ask the Secretary to
apply our criteria for any pilot program that might allow size and
weight standards above the current limitations.
Question 3a. Would you comment on your views of increasing the
allowable weight of trucks to 97,000 pounds by adding a third axle to
the rear pair of axles?
Answer. We would not support increasing the allowable weight under
these circumstances until a pilot study has been conducted according to
the criteria spelled out in our size and weight policy that
demonstrates that highway safety would not be compromised.
______
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
Before the
Department of Transportation
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
Docket No. FMCSA-2004-18940
Electronic On-Board Recorders for Hours-of-Service Compliance
_______________________________________________________________________
Comments submitted on behalf of
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
April 11, 2007
The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (Established in 1982) works
to improve commercial vehicle safety and security on the highways by
bringing Federal, state, provincial and local truck and bus regulatory,
safety and enforcement agencies together with industry representatives
in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Every state in the United
States, all Canadian provinces, the country of Mexico, and all U.S.
Territories and Possessions are CVSA Members. Nearly 350 industry
companies and organizations are CVSA Associate Members.
Background
Since 2000, the regulations regarding commercial driver hours of
service (HOS) have been through a series of formal agency actions, as
well as being challenged on the outside from special interest groups
and the D.C. United Stated Circuit Court of Appeals. Countless hours
have been devoted to this subject, both internal to the agency and by
the public.
We believe the implementation of Electronic Onboard Recorders
(EOBRs) for compliance with HOS regulations holds great promise for
helping improve compliance with HOS regulations and ultimately
providing a positive impact on safety and reducing crashes related to
driver fatigue and other work-related injuries. We also believe that
the wide-scale adoption of EOBRs will also help to curb the challenges
that currently exist with the limited resources available at the state
and Federal levels for overseeing the motor carrier industry. With
nearly 50,000 new motor carriers entering the business each year in the
United States, the implementation of proven safety technologies serves
to assist the law enforcement community in focusing its attention on
high-risk drivers, vehicles and motor carriers.
Key Points
As identified by FMCSA, the intent of the EOBR NPRM is to:
1. Improve CMV safety;
2. Increase use of EOBRs within the motor carrier industry: and
3. Improve HOS compliance.
The FMCSA approach has three components:
1. A new performance-oriented standard for EOBR technology;
2. Use of EOBRs to remediate regulatory noncompliance; and
3. Incentives to promote EOBR use.
CVSA believes that the approach FMCSA has taken with this NPRM will
not measurably impact on the 3 objectives of the NPRM. The universe of
motor carriers required to install EOBRs is a small fraction of the
motor carrier population as a whole. Additionally, we also believe that
their voluntary adoption, even with the incentives offered, will not
occur in large numbers.
Safety
Given the fact that hours of service (HOS) compliance continues to
be a major problem area for many motor carriers, and large truck
crashes related to fatigue are significant, we firmly believe that in
order to have a substantial impact on safety and HOS compliance EOBRs
must be universally used in the motor carrier industry. We believe that
a more prudent and effective option for dealing with the habitual HOS
offenders is stronger enforcement rather than requiring the
installation of EOBRs. HOS non-compliance is indicative of a systemic
management problem within the motor carrier's operation, and the mere
installation of EOBRs will not serve to correct this problem. The
resources expended by government to monitor the motor carriers subject
to mandatory EOBR use will be substantial and in our view, the benefits
will not outweigh the costs.
Level Playing Field
In our view the NPRM will do little to help deploy EOBRs in large
quantities. Most carriers already using these systems are doing them
primarily to help better manage their drivers and not necessarily for
HOS compliance. HOS compliance [to many of them] is a secondary benefit
of these devices. We do not believe this thinking will change much with
the implementation of this NPRM. Most carriers will view this as a cost
item (and a legal liability) that will put them at a competitive
disadvantage with their peers, therefore making them reluctant to
voluntarily invest in these devices. The EOBR vendors will not put much
capital outlay into the development and deployment of these systems
since there is not a clear market for them. Additionally, given the
minimal number of devices that will likely penetrate the market, the
benefit of economies of scale will not be realized, therefore not
putting much pricing pressure or competition in the marketplace. This
will likely result in most of the devices not being an attractive
purchasing option for many small to medium sized fleets, or for those
fleets operating on thin margins. Ultimately, in our view the NPRM will
not enable a level playing field for the motor carrier industry as a
whole, which will cause most fleets to opt not to purchase an EOBR.
Technology
As FMCSA indicates in the NPRM, technology has come a long way in
recent years and is capable of performing many more functions than what
would be needed to monitor and manage HOS compliance. We caution the
Agency to make sure to limit the performance requirements for EOBR
devices to just those areas necessary for HOS compliance. This will
help to keep costs down, and also help to ensure that the display,
evaluation and back office system functionality that will be needed for
enforcement to monitor and evaluate compliance will be made easier and
it will minimize the liability exposure to the industry.
We believe the Agency needs to put more explicit focus and emphasis
on standardizing the performance specifications regarding tamperproof
requirements, information gathering and display, editing and error
recording and reporting, and as well as communication accuracy,
timeliness and redundancy. We are appreciative of the fact that FMCSA
has made GPS a performance requirement, as this will provide some
measure of assistance in accuracy and redundancy. We also appreciate
the agency requiring parallel data streams and making sure that the
original data is kept intact, this should help law enforcement when
reviewing records and during the driver interview process. However, we
still strongly believe there must be a tamperproof requirement. To
assist the agency on this particular issue, FMCSA may want to review
the Information Technology Security Evaluation process Europe has in
place with regards to EOBRs.
A related issue is one of FMCSA's identified seven performance
requirements--identification of the driver and ensuring the EOBR is
able to attach the driver to his/her appropriate hours of service. In
our view this issue is critical and fundamental to helping minimize
falsification and errors/inaccuracies. Although we support providing
flexibility to motor carriers and technology providers on this point,
we strongly believe that FMCSA needs to specify a minimum performance
requirement, to include outlining standardized and explicit test
procedures and expectations. This would be part of the EOBR
certification program (see recommendation section). The EOBR must be
able to correctly identify the driver/employee in all duty status
stages of his/her hours of service and be able to accurately tie the
employee to the vehicle, cargo and motor carrier at all times. This is
especially important for leased drivers and owner/operators.
The NPRM discusses the notion of permitting EOBR devices that are
not integrally synchronized with the vehicle. While we fully understand
that cell phone and other like technologies are available that use
hours of service applications, at this point in time we are not
supportive of permitting them to be used as EOBRs. We are not convinced
that these technologies will effectively minimize the opportunity for
falsification and drivers taking ghost runs. However, as you will see
below in our recommendations, we do believe that these types of devices
are in need of further study to understand how in the future they may
be used in this capacity. We are sensitive to the fact that cell phone
and like technologies are pervasive in the industry and tend to be on
the lower cost end of EOBR devices. We do not want to dismiss out of
hand the fact that once they (and the performance specifications) are
more fully outlined and understood they possibly could be used as an
EOBR.
As for the recording interval, we support the 1 minute increments.
We also support the +/- 1 percent location accuracy. We believe that
EOBRs must use standardized data formats and communications protocols.
We also firmly believe there must be a standardized display using the
graph-grid format, and that non-compliance must be easily identified.
FMCSA may not want to explicitly identify the different types of
communications technologies that are able to be used in the application
of EOBRs, since they are so rapidly changing and evolving. The more
important aspects related to the data in our view are the security
aspects as well as the content and timeliness of the information
availability, and not necessarily the method of communication.
Enforcement
The NPRM upon implementation will likely make it difficult for
enforcement officers. The problem with EOBRs today is that there is no
standardization in terms of how the information is made available for
officers to evaluate compliance, how errors and modifications to
records are recorded and reported, nor is there a rigorous
certification program to ensure they are operating correctly. The
combination of grandfathering existing devices, providing the 2 year
window for voluntary adoption of non-complaint 395.16 devices, and the
likely limited penetration of EOBRs will continue to create
difficulties for enforcement with understanding and accurately
evaluating the operation of all the different device types. We also
believe that the option of using devices not integrally synchronized
with the vehicle presents its own set of challenges for enforcement
that are not yet fully understood. We also strongly believe that EOBRs
must be made tamperproof. Although the NPRM does make an attempt to
correct some of these concerns in the performance specifications, we do
not believe it goes far enough to minimize tampering or to make sure
that officers will feel comfortable with using the devices.
Law enforcement needs the capability to be able to print HOS
records at roadside to more effectively review HOS compliance and
collect evidence. Although we support having EOBRs providing the
functionality to print out the HOS records, we think a more prudent and
cost effective approach is to equip certified inspectors/officers with
the appropriate technologies and printing device to be able to do this
themselves. This will help those officers who do not currently use
laptop or hand held computers (or the software to read the EOBR data
file). Ultimately, this approach will also serve to assist in having
more roadside inspections completed (and uploaded) electronically,
since many inspectors are still completing inspections on paper.
As for access to the HOS data, we agree with FMCSA that EOBRs must
not require the officer to have to enter the cab of the vehicle. If
electronic files are going to be made available for download, they must
adhere to common, uniform and strict standards. In addition, the
officers must be able to read the data on their (for those who have)
laptops or hand held computers. However, we do have concerns with the
possibility of these files introducing a virus or otherwise damaging
the operating system or software.
Recommendations
We believe that in order to meet the intent of the NPRM, EOBRs must
be made mandatory for all commercial vehicles. Most of the developed
and even some undeveloped countries in the world already have this
requirement for commercial motor vehicles and have had positive results
on safety.
FMCSA should work with NHTSA to make these devices standard OEM
equipment. Aftermarket/retrofit installations should only be permitted
if they meet the OEM equipment standards. In order to assist the
manufacturing community and to help minimize the cost impacts to the
industry, we would suggest that the requirement would be put in place
at a point in the future, somewhere on the order to 3-5 years after the
final rule is published. We believe existing devices should be
grandfathered into this new requirement ONLY if they are able to meet
the new OEM standard specifications. We also believe the existing AOBRD
regulations in 395.15 should be sunsetted. Those drivers operating
existing vehicles (those built prior to the new OEM requirement) or
using EOBR devices not compliant with the new standard would be
required to retrofit their vehicles within 3 years to meet the OEM
equipment standards. The paper-based logging system would no longer be
permitted.
In the interim, we would suggest that FMCSA conduct several field
operational tests of different device types (to include those not
integrally synchronized with the vehicle) to understand what the
optimum performance requirements should be, as well as to more fully
evaluate their impact on safety. One option for this test could be to
use the motor carrier population the Agency has suggested in the NPRM
that would be subject to a remedial directive and be required to have
the EOBRs installed--those carriers FMCSA has determined, based on HOS
records reviewed during each of two compliance reviews conducted within
a 2-year period, that the motor carrier has a 10 percent or greater
violation rate (``pattern violation'') for any regulation in proposed
Appendix C to Part 385. Theoretically, once EOBRs are installed on the
habitual offenders' vehicles, they should realize a significant
improvement in safety, both in HOS compliance and in fatigue related
crashes. Another option to consider for the test phase, which is our
preferred option, is to tie EOBR application (for the test phase) to
SafeStat and ISS scores. This approach will broaden the pool of
candidates and will likely also serve as a more representative sample.
We believe that by taking into account BOTH SafeStat and ISS scores,
carriers with demonstrated performance problems, as well as those with
no history can be part of the pool to be evaluated. If the test is
properly carried out and administered, it should effectively
demonstrate how to positively impact HOS compliance for carriers on
both ends of the scale--those who are uninformed about the hours of
service regulations those who are habitual violators.
EOBRs must use standardized data formats and have a standardized
interface for law enforcement so that training, compliance evaluation
and monitoring is effective and simplified.
We also recommend that FMCSA (and NHTSA) create a more rigorous
certification program for EOBRs that is administered by a 3rd party,
and to also create an advisory board that would serve to create and
maintain an approved EOBR list. This advisory group could operate
similarly to those groups who are involved with speed measuring
instruments and breath alcohol testing devices. Wherever possible, EOBR
design and performance specifications should use accepted industry
standards that are verifiable and certifiable.
It is our belief that moving forward with a mandatory requirement
will help on all fronts. It will provide some certainty and competition
in the manufacturing community and likely result in more ``hardened''
and user friendly systems, help keep costs down for the motor carrier
industry through economies of scale, and will assist the enforcement
community since there will be stringent and uniform standards. It also
will provide adequate lead time for both industry and enforcement to
ramp up their operations and provide for training, as well as budget
planning for the procurement of these devices and the development of
back office systems to accept and manage the data output.
Summary
We believe that in order to enable significant positive changes to
hours of service compliance there needs to be universal adoption of
EOBR technology. However, it is critically important the performance
specifications for these devices, and the oversight of those producing
and using them is done in such a manner that enables them to be user
friendly for law enforcement and that there is credibility and
confidence in the accuracy of the data.
We appreciate FMCSA confronting this difficult issue and attempting
to address it. Hours of service continues to be a challenging area for
many motor carriers to make significant strides in improving
compliance. There must be a multi-faceted approach in terms of finding
solutions, and the status quo is just not acceptable. We believe that
the implementation of EOBRs is one of the important elements of such an
approach.
______
Electronic Logging Partnership
Purpose
The purpose of the electronic logging partnership is to promote the
use of technology for recording commercial driver hours of service
throughout North America that will improve regulatory compliance and
save lives.
Principles
The partnership aims to ensure that any future laws and/or
regulations mandating electronic logging devices for hours of service
compliance shall be fully interoperable, tamperproof and easy to use by
drivers, motor carriers and enforcement. In addition, to the extent
possible, existing investments in onboard telematics and safety
management systems that can meet the E-LOG system requirements should
be preserved and leveraged.
The partnership supports future regulations that will:
Standardize the user interfaces (unique and secure driver
ID, data access, transportability and format for law
enforcement), the drivers' data transfer when drivers change
trucks or buses (use of standard portable data carrier), the
data download and storage requirements and the interface(s) to
other onboard telematics;
Require devices to be integrally synchronized with the
vehicle;
Define and require a standard security level for the devices
to be tamperproof (using a methodology endorsed by NIST such as
Common Criteria); and
Require that all devices be certified by a nationally
recognized, independent organization.
Absent these key provisions, any future mandate would result in the
use of devices that are not standardized, are not interoperable with
systems from various vendors, provide unreliable data and would impede
industry and law enforcement efforts to ensure hours of service
compliance and improve safety.
Key Considerations
Standardized enforcement approach--A standard law
enforcement interface with electronic logging systems must be
specified to ensure secure, efficient, and uniform driver hours
of service inspection processes and data integrity.
Apply new controls to meet challenges inherent with
mandate--As the new FMCSA regulatory approach extends
electronic logging to carriers with poor compliance, there will
be new challenges. To assure system integrity and a level
playing field, e-log system standards need to add stronger
controls, including: secure unique national driver ID, secure
portable driver data records, tamperproof devices integrally
synchronized with the vehicle, verifiable independent
certification, secure and controlled processes for system
installation and support.
Preserve existing investments in safety management systems--
Today's electronic driver logs have proven effective in
achieving significant compliance and safety results. Any update
to requirements for electronic logging systems should also
include standards for interoperability and integration with on-
board, wireless systems for safety and fleet management that
support carriers in proactive safety management.
Implementation
In the event a universal mandate is not able to take effect in a
timely manner, consideration should be given in the interim to
accelerating industry-wide implementation of electronic logging devices
by providing:
Financial incentives such as tax credits for the early
adoption of compliant systems;
Relief from some supporting document or ``paperwork''
requirements; and/or
Alternative compliance options for carriers to maintain
accountability and provide efficiencies for those demonstrating
and maintaining superior safety performance.
______
CVSA DOT Reauthorization Policy Issues
Issue #12--Truck Size & Weight
Problem
There has been no significant change in Federal size and weight law
since 1982 except for the 1991 freeze on longer combination vehicles.
However, since 1982 there have been many changes in freight movement
that are also related to truck size and weight such as significant
growth in freight traffic, changes in freight characteristics and
movement patterns, just-in-time delivery, global economics and trade,
intermodalism, economic deregulation, enhanced safety and enforcement
programs and truck equipment advances. In addition, there has been a
tremendous movement in the adoption of technology (in industry and
government), data availability and analytical capabilities and
performance-based program development and delivery. Given the above, as
well the current landscape, it is clear that we need a more
comprehensive approach in the United States to truck size and weight
policy.
Background
The enforcement of truck size and weight limitations has been a
long-standing obligation of the states, performed in conjunction and
with the assistance of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).
Traditionally, the enforcement aspects of truck size and weight have
been viewed through the prism of infrastructure protection and
preservation. While CVSA supports this belief and view, we also believe
more emphasis needs to be placed on the safety performance of vehicles,
drivers and motor carriers who operate larger vehicles--and more
specifically and importantly--those who choose to violate the law and
operate vehicles in excess of the size and weight limitations.
Without question we understand the need to protect and maintain our
Nation's highway infrastructure--and want to continue our compliance
and enforcement efforts in this regard. However, we are also committed
to compliance and enforcement efforts that not only ensure the
protection of our infrastructure, but also ensure the safety of those
vehicles and drivers traveling on our highways.
One of the largest challenges with existing truck size and weight
policies and regulations is the lack of uniformity from state to state,
and sometimes even within states. The problem that exists today is due
to the fact that we have had a patchwork of regulations, exemptions and
permit programs for decades. We cannot allow this to continue. This
often times translates into challenges for enforcement, and it
certainly makes life more difficult for industry to maintain
compliance. Many of these programs have varying requirements associated
with them. As an example, some states require pilot car escorts with
certain types of loads. Some states require law enforcement officials
to escort the load. Some states do not require escorts. We are
encouraged of the efforts of AASHTO, SASHTO and WASHTO with respect to
trying to standardize pilot car escort policies among the states. FHWA
should continue to support this effort and any resulting impacts to the
states from recommended changes should be supported by Federal funds.
From 2006 through 2008, there were 911,101 commercial vehicle size
and weight violations cited by roadside inspectors. These data were for
those situations where a driver/vehicle inspection report was completed
and uploaded to the MCMIS database. This number represents 13.41
percent of the total number of violations cited during driver
inspections over this time period and ranks number 2 on the list in
terms of the most often cited violations.
Solution(s)
1. CVSA does not support enacting any significant legislative or
regulatory changes to truck size and weight until such time as we have
a more uniform, methodical and science-based approach to evaluating the
safety, infrastructure and environmental costs and benefits.
2. There needs to be a stronger Federal role in facilitating a
framework for research, policy and performance based regulations and
the enforcement for truck size & weight operations on the Interstate
portion of the National Highway System.
3. U.S. DOT needs to evaluate and determine the safety nexus to
truck size and weight. Having this will help the state enforcement
agencies make their case for receiving their full measure of support
and resources (state and Federal funding) from the state Departments of
Transportation to carry out their enforcement efforts. While a number
of state enforcement agencies do receive the FHWA funding and support
through their state DOTs for this effort, others have difficulty in
making the necessary agency linkages for such funding support. As a
final point related to resource issues, one of the major cost items for
size and weight enforcement is labor. We are hopeful that as efforts
move ahead to reauthorize the Federal truck size and weight program
that this will be taken into consideration concerning the state
enforcement agency's funding needs.
4. We MUST gain a better understanding of the true impacts that
truck size and weight have to all aspects of our transportation system.
We also need to further examine the various oversize/overweight
exemptions and permit programs to evaluate their costs and benefits.
The more variety there is in regulations and permit programs, the more
difficult the task for enforcement to monitor compliance, initiate
effective enforcement actions and levy appropriate sanctions.
5. Except under extreme circumstances, states and municipalities
should not be permitted to provide exemptions or exceptions for inter
OR intrastate operations on this portion of the National Highway
Network. If the National Network weight threshold were to be increased,
states would be pressured to allow for increases to the state roadway
network. The state roads (and bridges) are not built to the same
standards and therefore could not adequately support the increased
loading. This would present a risk to both the condition of the
infrastructure as well as to safety.
6. More study needs to be completed on the non-interstate portions
of the National Highway System because there are similar infrastructure
and safety concerns on these sections of roadway. In fact, the large
truck-related crash data seems to indicate that are larger proportion
of fatality crashes occurring on non-interstates. Many of our member
enforcement agencies are seeing increases in truck size and weight
violations on these sections of roadways.
7. CVSA supports the recommendation referenced in Transportation
Research Board Special Report No. 267: Regulation of Weights, Lengths,
and Widths of Commercial Motor Vehicles which discusses the creation of
a Commercial Traffic Effects Institute (CTEI). The work that would fall
under the mandate of this organization would help guide and develop a
more comprehensive, rational and equitable national freight policy that
will aid decisionmakers in making more sound and objective judgments
with regards to truck size and weight issues. It will also aid in
establishing more transparency and accountability throughout the
system.
8. CVSA supports a federally supervised, state-administered,
performance-based oversize and overweight permit program for the
operation of heavier and larger vehicles on the public highways.
9. CVSA believes there is merit to the idea of establishing (in
certain locations and circumstances) dedicated truckways for commercial
vehicle operations. As previously mentioned, since many large truck
crashes are multi-vehicle crashes involving smaller vehicles and the
fact that many crashes occur off the interstate system, we believe the
notion of dedicated highway facilities for trucks is worth further
exploration.
10. If Congress were to consider any increase in truck size and
weight, there MUST be at the minimum an equivalent level of safety
established. In particular, there are several specific safety issues
that would concern us with respect to increasing sizes and weights:
a. The potential increases in stopping distances that would
likely result, and how the performance of other vehicle
components will be affected;
b. How size and weight increases to carrying capacity will
impact performance as it relates to manufacturer weight ratings
(i.e., we do not want people overloading vehicles further than
what they were designed for);
c. We already have issues and compliance problems today with
load securement, and there continues to be a large number of
crashes related to this issue--how would size and weight
increases impact on this;
d. Adding axles--while in concept this is helpful to spread the
load to more locations, but in practical terms we have concerns
(today) with air axles (i.e., putting not enough air or too
much air as it hampers vehicle stability and performance) and
lift axles that have the potential of being exacerbated with an
increase to truck sizes and weights; and
e. While we are not experts on the infrastructure-related
issues, we wonder what the impact of increasing truck sizes and
weight would have on the bridges in our country. It is well
documented that many of our bridges are in need of significant
maintenance and upgrade, and the obvious question arises as to
whether increasing truck sizes and weights will add to these
concerns.
f. In addition to the safety issues above, there MUST be
adequate resources made available to the enforcement agencies
so they are able to monitor compliance and take enforcement
action when warranted.
11. With respect to the ``pilot study'' recommendation provided for
in TRB Special Report 267, we suggest the following factors be
considered for the program if that recommendation is to be pursued:
a. Make sure the sample is science-based and that (to the
extent possible) the results can be shown to be statistically
significant;
b. Motor carriers, drivers and vehicles participating in the
pilot study must abide by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations;
c. States participating in the study need to be fully compliant
with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations;
d. Select companies with a proven track record of superior
safety performance;
i. Must have a Satisfactory U.S. DOT Safety Rating;
ii. Cannot be a SafeStat category A-D carrier; and
iii. Must maintain their crash rate per 100 million
miles, and their vehicle and driver out-of-service
rates in the top 25 percent of the national average as
indicated in the Motor Carrier Management Information
System.
e. Ensure there is a control group in order to help assess and
measure the efficacy of the vehicle configuration(s) and
performance;
f. Ensure that the drivers are trained, tested and competent at
operating the vehicles they will be driving and have clean
driving records;
g. Ensure that the drivers are operating the vehicles on
sections or roadways that they are familiar with;
h. Make sure the vehicle size and weight configuration(s) do
not put additional stress on the bridge structures than the
current bridge formula allows;
i. Employ computer modeling and validation testing of vehicle
configuration(s) prior to initiating the pilot vehicle(s) into
operation on the roadways;
j. Consider the establishment of truck-only lanes and/or time
of day restrictions to confine the use of heavier trucks to
these lanes and limit their interaction with smaller vehicles;
k. Require that the vehicles install all 4 of the truck
technologies contemplated in The Commercial Motor Vehicle
Advanced Safety Technology Tax Act of 2009 (H.R. 2024):
collision warning systems, lane departure warning systems,
vehicle stability systems and brake monitoring systems;
l. Provide consideration for time of day operational
limitations;
m. Require vehicle monitoring systems to record and measure
performance data;
n. Instrument vehicles and roadways to measure impacts on the
infrastructure;
o. Require periodic vehicle inspections to evaluate the impacts
on the condition of performance of the vehicles;
p. Consider limitations on length or travel and/or adjustments
to driver hours of service requirements to minimize the
potential for fatigued operators;
q. Consider allowing the vehicles only on sections of roadway
that are major freight corridors;
r. The Federal Government should be charged with creating and
managing the performance standards, evaluating performance and
establishing Federal sanctions for non-compliance, while the
state governmental agencies should be charged with
administration and enforcement of the program;
s. Evaluate the compliance and enforcement resources necessary
to adequately monitor compliance in the event the result(s) of
the pilot would become national standard(s); and
t. Conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit evaluation and to build
what works from the pilot studies into national performance-
based standards.
______
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
January 5, 2010
Hon. Raymond LaHood,
Secretary of Transportation,
U.S. Department of Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary LaHood:
The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) has reviewed Section
194 of the Department of Transportation's 2010 Appropriations Bill that
provides for truck size and weight exemptions on sections of the
Interstate Highway System in Maine and Vermont. Even though the bill
provides for the exemptions to be granted under a 1-year pilot program,
we have some concerns, as well as some suggestions for your
consideration. We are hopeful that you will consider these issues as
soon as possible since the exemptions became effective the day the
President signed the bill.
In particular, the legislative language in Section 194 and the
accompanying report language provide little or no criteria as to how
the pilot program is to be carried out except directing you--in
conjunction with the two states--to study the impact of this pilot
program on safety, road durability, commerce, and energy use. We
presume that you will assemble a team from the Federal Highway
Administration to work with the impacted states in administering this
pilot, although the bill does not specify such action. We would also
suggest that you consider adding representatives from FMCSA as a part
of your review.
We are enclosing a copy of CVSA's comprehensive truck size and
weight policy and urge you and your team to review it. In particular,
we would like to point out the provisions contained in item 11 of our
policy. It includes 20 separate recommendations which we believe are
necessary criteria with respect to safety for any pilot program
regarding truck size and weight. We would like to take this opportunity
to point out several key items:
Motor carriers must be selected to participate in the pilot
based on a proven track record of superior safety performance;
and
States participating in the pilot must be fully compliant
with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR). As you
may know, Maine receives 50 percent of its annual Motor Carrier
Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) Federal funding from FMCSA
because it provides exemptions from commercial driver hours-of-
service regulations for all motor carriers operating within 100
air miles from their place of business, along with other
inconsistencies that have caused an incompatibility issue
between Maine Law and the FMCSR. We believe as a condition for
participating in the pilot, Maine should revoke this exemption
and become fully compliant.
We are hopeful the size and weight issues raised in Section 194 are
a catalyst for a much more comprehensive analysis of the United States'
overall truck size and weight policy. The current situation allows for
a checkerboard of differing regulations and exemptions that make
enforcement difficult and also compromises highway safety.
We believe--if constructed and evaluated properly--comprehensive
and well thought out truck size and weight pilot programs have the
opportunity to provide the necessary data for evaluating safety,
infrastructure and environmental costs and benefits. Having this
information is tantamount before we even consider changes to existing
laws to allow for higher size and weight limitations. We believe having
this data will also allow us to evaluate the current system in the
United States and possibly make some changes so it can be more
effectively managed based on performance and not politics.
We look forward to working on this issue with you and your team,
and would be more than happy to meet with you to discuss it in more
detail.
Sincerely,
Stephen A. Keppler,
Interim Executive Director.
Enclosure
Cc: Administrator Anne S. Ferro, Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration
Administrator Victor Mendez, Federal Highway Administration
Colonel Patrick J. Fleming, Maine State Police
Commissioner David Cole, Maine Department of Transportation
Commissioner Anne H. Jordan, Maine Department of Public Safety
Commissioner Robert Ide, Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles
Francis (Buzzy) France, Maryland State Police; CVSA President
Captain Gary Albus, Texas Department of Public Safety; CVSA Size &
Weight Committee Chairman
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Jacqueline S. Gillan
Question. Most truck drivers are paid by the mile, which tempts
drivers to drive longer than what is permitted under the Hours of
Service regulations, especially if they are delayed at ports and
loading facilities. As we work to reauthorize the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, what additional steps should the Committee take
to reduce this incentive?
Answer. Congress should bring the trucking industry under the Fair
Labor Standards Act to incentivize industry payment by the hour as well
as require overtime pay for hours worked beyond a normal work week.
Congress could also give the Secretary of Transportation authority to
regulate the practices of shippers at loading and unloading facilities
to ensure that time delays in delivering freight, which have a negative
effect on drivers' hours of service, are kept to a minimum. In
addition, commercial driver working and driving hours must be verified
through universal, mandatory installation and use of electronic on-
board recorders (EOBRs) that are highly secured against tampering and
fraud. Enforcement authorities should have unimpeded access to the data
stored in EOBRs to ensure compliance with the limits and other
requirements of commercial driver hours of service. It is crucial that
EOBRs record vehicle speed and not just real-time location and hours
behind the wheel in order to reduce commercial driver speeding to make
unrealistic pick-up and delivery schedules forced by dispatchers,
consignors, and receivers. To date, the U.S. Department of
Transportation has explicitly deleted speed recording as part of the
data acquisition of EOBRs.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Jacqueline S. Gillan
Question 1. Last year I introduced S. 1113, the Safe Roads Act, to
establish a national drug and alcohol testing database for employers to
better select qualified drivers and avoid hiring employees with a drug
or alcohol background.
Under this law, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) would require medical review officers, employers, and other
service agents to report positive results from FMCSA required drug or
alcohol tests to the database and clearinghouse. Employers would be
required to check the database prior to hiring a prospective employee.
If a prospective employee has a positive result, an employer would not
be allowed to hire the prospect unless he/she has not violated the
requirements of the testing program or he/she has fully completed a
return-to-duty program as required by the testing program. This law
will also require privacy protections and employee rights of action. Do
you support the establishment of a drug and alcohol test result
clearinghouse?
Answer. Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety strongly supports
this legislation that is badly needed to prevent commercial drivers who
have violated drug and alcohol requirements, including testing
requirements, from gaining or keeping commercial licenses to drive
large trucks and motorcoaches.
Question 1a. Does FMCSA have the authority to establish such a
clearinghouse without Congressional guidance?
Answer. It appears that under prior legislation the Secretary of
Transportation may have authority to include drug and alcohol test
results in the commercial driver's license information system (CDLIS)
established under Section 31309, Title 49, United States Code. That
section requires the Secretary to establish and maintain a
clearinghouse and depository for information about commercial drivers
licensing, including disqualification of operators, and requires the
system to be coordinated with alcohol and controlled substances testing
activities conducted under Section 31306, Title 49, United States Code.
To date the Secretary has not seen fit to include a drug and alcohol
testing database function in the CDLIS clearinghouse and therefore,
legislation requiring the Secretary to follow through on this
initiative is necessary and appropriate.
Question 1b. Should a drug clearinghouse be part of CSA 2010?
Answer. The results of a drug clearinghouse reporting of drug and
alcohol test results for each commercial driver should become part of
FMCSA's new algorithm and protocol for quantifying and scoring driver
safety, especially in light of the agency's insistence on emphasizing
driver quality under CSA2010 as a primary consideration in reducing
truck and motorcoach crash risk.
Question 2. I understand that on April 5, 2010, FMCSA developed a
final rule to require the use of EOBRs by carriers that have violated
the hours of service rules. Do you believe all motor-carriers should be
equipped with EOBRs to better comply with Hours of Service laws?
Answer. Advocates regards the mandatory, universal installation and
use of EOBRs as crucial to stopping the epidemic of hours of service
violations that produce fatigued, sleep-deprived commercial drivers
pushed by unrealistic schedules so that they are at very high risk of
serious injury and fatal crashes. Having law enforcement officials try
to determine hours of service compliance based on paper logbooks (known
as ``comic'' books), gas, toll and other receipts is like having a
police officer try to determine whether a driver is illegally impaired
without the use of a breathalyzer.
The rule published on April 5, 2010, 75 FR 17208 et seq., is
limited in scope because it is focused only on requiring EOBRs for
those motor carriers in violation of the current hours of service rule
(HOS). Although in this final rule FMCSA has increased the stringency
of its enforcement approach, the agency only predicts that about 5,700
motor carriers out of approximately 700,000 registered interstate truck
and motorcoach companies--less than 1 percent--will annually be cited
for HOS non-compliance and be required to install and use EOBRs. This
rule is clearly insufficient, and Advocates supports Federal
legislation mandating FMCA to issue a rule resulting in a universal
mandate--no exceptions, no exemptions and no excuses.
Safety groups, leaders in the House and Senate and the National
Transportation Safety Board all support a requirement for EOBRs on all
motor carriers. Over 15 years ago, Congress directed action by the U.S.
Department of Transportation. The recent rule will not have a dramatic
impact on truck and bus safety.
Question 2a. If Congress were to require EOBRs for all carriers,
what information should we require to be recorded?
Answer. 1. Time spent behind the wheel. One of the major flaws of
the April 5, 2010 final rule on EOBRs is that the U.S. Department of
Transportation allows an EOBR to turn off after a vehicle does not move
for only a few minutes. This will permit drivers to spend extra,
unrecorded hours at the wheels of their trucks when they move
intermittently either in traffic or to reach loading and unloading
docks. This practice will allow drivers to far exceed the current shift
limitation of 11 consecutive hours of driving.
2. Real time, moment-to-moment vehicle location through the use of
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) technology that is an integral part
of EOBRs. Having real-time information on truck location is crucial in
order to curtail drivers' use of alternate, illegal routes to evade
fixed weigh stations when they are operating illegally overweight.
Drivers often use diversionary routes that have load-posted bridges
whose weight limits are badly exceeded, leading to dramatic reductions
in bridge service lives and increasing the potential for catastrophic
collapse. Drivers also use illegal routes that are not allowed for
transporting placarded quantities of hazardous materials (hazmat). In
addition, given the safety and security implications of hazmat cargo on
large trucks accessing prohibited routes, motor carrier officials and
enforcement authorities must be able to track in real-time the actual
routing used by large trucks transporting hazmat. However, U.S. DOT
regulation on EOBRs only requires hourly confirmation of vehicle
location.
3. Speed data. The April 5, 2010, final rule requiring EOBRs to be
installed and used on motor carriers violating hours of service
requirements explicitly deletes the collection of truck and motorcoach
speed data. Advocates strongly opposes this policy. Even drivers
complying with hours of service requirements will often speed to make
scheduled pickups and deliveries. This places truck drivers and
everyone sharing the road with them at an increased risk of crashes
that will be more severe. Enforcement of speed limits through
collection of EOBR speed data is crucial not only to reduce large truck
crash risk but also to help change the freight transportation culture
that currently intimidates drivers to speed in carrying cargo.
4. Fail-safe driver identification. EOBRs must have unambiguous,
total reliability in identifying and authorizing the driver that
operates a truck or motorcoach with an EOBR. More than 20 years ago,
long before the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, Congress
required the U.S. DOT to develop a unique biometric identifier to
ensure the identification of operators of commercial vehicles, but DOT
did not fulfill that mandate. In connection with this, EOBRs must also
be controlled by regulations ensuring their tamperproof condition and
total security when serviced by authorized personnel.
Question 3. Do you believe the current size and weight restrictions
can be increased without compromising highway safety or infrastructure
integrity?
Answer. No. Advocates does not believe that any increase in gross
and axle weights of large trucks is safety-neutral in its consequences.
Larger trucks are more dangerous and jeopardize safety. Recent studies
by the Transportation Research Board and the National Cooperative
Highway Research Program of the National Academy of Sciences have not
shown any acceptable safety impacts of larger, heavier trucks. These
studies have also shown that trucks in the 100,000-pound range rapidly
increase pavement damage on lower-class roads and dramatically
accelerate the deterioration of bridges that results in severely
reduced bridge service lives. Money diverted to the repeated repair of
destroyed pavement and damaged bridges diverts scarce funds from being
applied to improving the safety of our Nation's infrastructure. Also,
in many cases, reductions in bridge service lives can lead to load
posting bridges for lower weights and raise the chances of catastrophic
bridge collapses. Any increases in the weights of large trucks will
quickly produce an even more staggering backlog of unmet highway
pavement repair and bridge reconstruction needs for which the U.S., at
the present time, has no Federal funding to support the enormous cost
of state maintenance and rehabilitation needs.
The state of Wyoming and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
also have shown the detrimental effects of increasing the weights and
number of trucks on our highways, which is no longer acceptable in
light of the predicted increase in damage to our roads. Wyoming and
FHWA have authored a major report showing that the benefits of
transferring a substantial amount of truck freight to rail movement
will result in major benefits to Wyoming and other western states by
reducing the rate and extent of road damage. Feasibility of a Next-
Generation, Intermodal Rail-Truck Transport System for the Western I-80
Corridor: Engineering, Economic, Environmental, Safety and Security
Policy Considerations--Final Report, FHWA-WY-06/05, Nov. 2006 (FHWA/
Wyoming Truck-to-Rail Study). These substantial benefits were
calculated for road pavement alone without a separate benefit-cost
analysis for bridge protection. The authors believe that additional
quantification of bridge protection benefits from heavy truck loads
would produce even more substantial benefits if freight transfers from
large trucks to rail could be implemented in the near future. As the
authors point out in an initial paragraph,
Although it is considered by some inappropriate for public
officials to favor one mode of freight transport over another,
benefits aside, the fact is that costs borne by the public
(pavement wear, congestion, safety, emissions) from freight
transport on highways are much greater than costs borne by the
public from freight transport on rails.
FHWA/Wyoming Truck-to-Rail Study at v.
The truck freight to rail concept also comprises truck drivers
riding in trains along with their rigs, which the authors believe will
significantly reduce commercial driver fatigue and sleep deprivation,
thereby lowering large truck crash risks. In addition, reducing truck
tonnage on major highways like I-80 is a safety measure because it will
reduce exposure by other motorists sharing the road with big trucks to
the risk of severe and fatal crashes.
Question 3a. Would you comment on your views of increasing the
allowable weight of trucks to 97,000 pounds by adding a third axle to
the rear pair of axles?
Answer. The dangerous safety impacts of larger, heavier trucks with
6 axles can be severe, and conducting an experiment with the safety of
the U.S. people on their roads and bridges by allowing 97,000-100,000-
pound trucks is not acceptable. Everything we know about larger,
heavier trucks and their adverse safety and infrastructure effects
militates against their use. No heavier, larger trucks allowed by
Congress or the states have ever resulted in fewer trucks, contrary to
claims made by trucking and shipping interests. Past census data on the
growth of tractor-trailer combinations alone for the preceding 35
years, for example, proves that each time Congress has increased truck
size and weight limits, the result has been more bigger, heavier trucks
than ever before. Since large, heavy trucks are heavily subsidized by
owners and operators of small passenger vehicles, bigger, heavier
trucks increase the disparity in the equitable distribution of user fee
responsibility by forcing small passenger vehicle owners and operators
to shoulder an even larger share of the highway cost burden.
In addition, bigger, heavier trucks will cause even more rapid
decay of our roads and bridges at a time when both the Federal
Government and the states are unable to raise highway funds to repair
an already badly deteriorated highway system. Larger, heavier trucks
would also further undermine the Nation's major need for a balanced,
multi-modal system of transporting freight, as has been recognized in
pending House legislation for surface transportation re-authorization,
in the U.S. DOT April 2010 Draft Strategic Plan, and in the recent
Congressionally-mandated report, Transportation for Tomorrow, that has
documented the severely imbalanced freight transportation system and
the radical underpayment of appropriate user fees by the trucking
industry. Finally, the FHWA/Wyoming Truck-to-Rail Study discussed in
the answer to the previous question underscores the importance of a
major, initial effort to transfer truck freight to freight rail
movement to gain multiple payoffs in improved safety and infrastructure
protection, reduced congestion and emissions, and fuel conservation. In
short, the motoring public will pay with their lives and their wallets
if Congress permits longer and heavier trucks on our roads and bridges.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Jacqueline S. Gillan
Question 1. In your testimony, you commented that a truck driver's
risk of being involved in a fatigue-related fatal crash increases after
the eighth hour of driving. Are you aware of any empirical data showing
how many fatigue-related fatal truck crashes occur in hours 1-8, and
how many occur in hours 9-11, or even beyond the 11th hours?
Answer: Several studies have been conducted showing that the
relative risk of a crash begins to rise exponentially after the 8th
hour of driving, and that the number of fatal crashes increase in the
later hours of driving in relation to the number of truck drivers
operating their trucks. The greatest risk of a fatal crash occurs in
the 11th hour of driving within legal driving time limits, as
demonstrated in the study conducted by Paul Jovanis for the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA): P. Jovanis, et al.,
Factors Affecting Motor Carrier Crash Risk--Final Report, FMCSA, Sept.
30, 2005. That study found that the crash risk for truck drivers in the
last hour of a now legal 11-hour day behind the wheel is more than
three times higher than during the first hour. In addition, another
study conducted for FMCSA by the University of Michigan Transportation
Research Institute (UMTRI) found that crash risk increased
exponentially as hours of driving increase: K. Campbell and M. Belzer,
Hours of Service Regulatory Evaluation Analytical Support--Task 1:
Baseline Risk Estimates and Carrier Experience, FMCSA, 2000. Also see,
K. Campbell, Estimates of the Prevalence and Risk of Fatigue in Fatal
Accidents Involving Medium and Heavy Trucks, FMCSA, 2003, which reached
the same conclusion using data from the Trucks in Fatal Accidents
(TIFA) system.
Question 2. What empirical data can you provide the Committee to
demonstrate that truck drivers are driving many more hours per week
under the current hours of service rule?
Answer: The most prominent source are the findings of the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) surveys conducted before and after
the amendment of the hours of service regulation that permitted very
large increases in both the number of hours of work over 7 or 8
calendar days, and in the number of driving hours of 25-28 percent over
7 or 8 calendar days. A. McCartt, L. Helinga, M. Solomon, Work
Schedules Before and After 2004 Hours of Service Rule Change and
Predictors of Reported Rule Violations in 2004: Survey of Long-Distance
Truck Drivers, International Truck and Bus Safety and Security
Symposium, November 14-16, 2005. A substantial percentage of drivers
surveyed worked and drove longer hours, both per shift and per tour of
duty, and a substantial percentage were driving more miles per tour of
duty. In addition, the surveys found that drivers also admitted that
they sometimes or often violated the new 14 hours duty ceiling per
shift (11 hours maximum driving plus 3 hours additional work time). The
study was supplemented later in 2006 in an issue of the IIHS
publication, Status Report, which found that:
Nearly one in 5 truck drivers in 2005 drove longer per day
than before the rule took effect in January 2004.
The proportion of drivers that reported falling asleep at
the wheel at least once during the previous month rose from 13
percent in 2003 to 21 percent in 2005.
Status Report 41:6, Oct. 7, 2006, at 6.
In addition, the FMCSA itself has pointed out that drivers are
increasingly making use of the 11th hour of driving and, therefore,
driving more hours than under the previous hours of service rule. The
FMCSA pointed out in the HOS Interim Final Rule that in 2005, just 17
percent of driving periods analyzed involved the 11th hour of driving
but 2 years later, in the agency's 2007 survey, the number of driving
periods in which the 11th hour of driving was used had jumped to 27
percent, an increase of over 50 percent in the number of driving
periods that involved driving the 11th hour. 72 FR 71247, 71265 (Dec.
17, 2007).
Question 3. What studies have been completed on (1) increasing the
current 80,000-pound gross weight limit on the Interstate System, and
(2) Longer Combination Vehicles? What have been the studies'
conclusions with respect to the safety relative to vehicles currently
on the road?
Answer: One of the most prominent studies on the safety of longer,
heavier trucks is the major 2002 Transportation Research Board (TRB)
truck safety study addressing the implications of longer, heavier
combination trucks conducted in 2002: Regulation of Weights, Lengths,
and Widths of Commercial Motor Vehicle, Transportation Research Board
Special Report 267 (Special Report), National Research Council, 2002.
That study was produced by a panel of internationally known truck and
highway safety experts who reviewed every existing study on larger,
heavier trucks, including longer combination vehicles (LCVs), and
reached the following conclusions:
The Committee producing the Special Report could not
demonstrate any equivalent or superior safety benefits of
heavier truck configurations, including B Train doubles, which
are LCVs, and six-axle semi-trailer combinations at weights
similar to those currently being championed in draft
legislation.
The Committee emphasized repeatedly that virtually nothing
is known about the relationship between specific design
configurations, crash risk, and truck handling and stability to
support heavier, longer combination trucks.
The Committee pointed out in several places that using
safety performance standards for allowing bigger, heavier
trucks without specific weight or size limits have no current
operational evidence for their claimed superior effects on
safety, including their ability to control the potentially
adverse safety impacts of longer, heavier combination trucks.
The Committee asserted that even improved models for
analyzing the costs of operating trucks of different designs,
including bigger, heavier trucks, provide only general,
imprecise indications of how institutions, markets, and
technology would react to any regulatory changes allowing
commercial motor vehicles of increased sizes and weights.
The Committee stated that the use of bigger, heavier trucks
could actually produce an increase in the number of trucks on
the road due to the economic stimulus triggered by the use of
trucks that can carry both higher weights and increased freight
volume in their trailers.
Studies conducted to date by the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT) on the safety implications of LCVs, such as the Western
Uniformity Scenario Analysis (Analysis), April 2004, resulted in the
U.S. DOT opposing legislated large truck size and weight increases,
including the use of special exemptions in Federal law for increasing
the sizes and weights of large trucks:
U.S. DOT stated in the Analysis that it does not support
heavy commercial motor vehicle size and weight increases in
general and specifically does not support piecemeal weight law
changes such as Maine's use of extra-heavy trucks on I-95.
U.S. DOT also stressed that the Maine weight exemptions
actually contribute little to overall trucking industry
productivity.
U.S. DOT stated in the Analysis that size and weight
exemptions may have unintended safety and highway
infrastructure consequences.
U.S. DOT determined that increases in truck sizes and
weights, such as those achieved through piecemeal exemptions,
reduce the chances for more comprehensive, planned solutions
that would have greater benefits for all Americans and
businesses.
Similarly, the Federal Highway Administration stated, in background
research for the 1997 Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Study, that
making existing trucks heavier increases crash risk due to poorer
braking and more rollover crashes.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
David J. Osiecki
Question. Most truck drivers are paid by the mile, which tempts
drivers to drive longer than what is permitted under the Hours of
Service regulations, especially if they are delayed at ports and
loading facilities. As we work to reauthorize the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, what additional steps should the Committee take
to reduce this incentive?
Answer. The Committee should consider taking appropriate steps to
collect facts and data on the most common pay methods, including
`hybrid' methods of pay (e.g., a combination of methods depending upon
the nature of the work), employed in the trucking industry and the
percentage of drivers paid under each of these methods. The Committee
could also identify and review existing scientific or case studies that
may have tried to investigate whether different driver pay methods have
resulted in the temptations suggested in the question. ATA supports
facts and data driven policymaking, in lieu of decisions made based on
perceptions and theories. At this time, we are aware of only one
carrier-specific case study on driver pay, and it attempted to answer
broader safety questions than what are contemplated in the question
posed here. In short, this case study found that the amount of pay, and
not the method of pay, had an effect on driver safety.
ATA is also aware of an ongoing GAO study, initiated this year at
the request of Chairman Oberstar and Rep. DeFazio, looking at the size
and scope of the driver detention issue, and whether delays at shippers
or receivers have an effect on a driver's compliance with the hours of
service regulations. ATA is pleased to provide the name of the GAO
project leader upon request.
Lastly, greater use of electronic on-board recorders in the
trucking industry will make enforcement of the hours of service rules
easier and potentially more effective, no matter what might tempt a
driver to violate hours of service rules.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
David J. Osiecki
Question 1. Last year I introduced S. 1113, the Safe Roads Act, to
establish a national drug and alcohol testing database for employers to
better select qualified drivers and avoid hiring employees with a drug
or alcohol background.
Under this law, the FMCSA would require medical review officers,
employers, and other service agents to report positive results from
FMCSA required drug or alcohol tests to the database and clearinghouse.
Employers would be required to check the database prior to hiring a
prospective employee. If a prospective employee has a positive result,
an employer would not be allowed to hire the prospect unless he/she has
not violated the requirements of the testing program or he/she has
fully completed a return-to-duty program as required by the testing
program. This law will also require privacy protections and employee
rights of action. Do you support the establishment of a drug and
alcohol test result clearinghouse?
Answer. Yes. ATA has been actively promoting the creation of a drug
and alcohol test results clearinghouse since 1999.
Question 1a. Does FMCSA have the authority to establish such a
clearinghouse without Congressional guidance?
Answer. While ATA believes FMCSA could reasonably argue it has
authority under 49 U.S.C. Chapters 311 and 313 to establish such a
clearinghouse, ATA also believes Congress should explicitly provide
authority, direction and a timeline for the Agency to complete a
rulemaking establishing a clearinghouse.
Question 1b. Should a drug clearinghouse be part of CSA 2010?
Answer. Yes.
Question 2. I understand that on April 5, 2010, FMCSA developed a
final rule to require the use of EOBRs by carriers that have violated
the hours of service rules. Do you believe all motor-carriers should be
equipped with EOBRs to better comply with Hours of Service laws?
Answer. ATA does not currently support a requirement for all motor
carriers to equip their vehicles with EOBRs. ATA supports cost-
beneficial laws and regulations that have a firm basis in sound
research and data analysis. Neither the industry nor FMCSA has been
able to establish, through research or data analysis, that such a
requirement would be cost-beneficial. The lack of such an analysis on
EOBRs stands in stark contrast to the March 2004 study and report to
Congress on the feasibility, merits and cost-effectiveness of
establishing a national drug and alcohol test results clearinghouse.
Question 2a. If Congress were to require EOBRs for all carriers,
what information should we require to be recorded?
Answer. Congress should review and consider the information
requirements currently contained in 49 C.F.R. Section 395.8(d)(1)
through (11).
Question 3. Do you believe the current size and weight restrictions
can be increased without compromising highway safety or infrastructure
integrity?
Answer. Forty-eight states currently authorize the operation of
trucks which exceed Federal size and/or weight limits. In some cases,
these higher limits precede establishment of Interstate Highway weight
limits in 1956. Over the years, many U.S. and international studies
have been conducted to determine the safety and infrastructure impacts
of these vehicles. Based on the preponderance of the evidence, as well
as carriers' own experience, we believe that responsibly expanding the
operation of trucks with greater size and weight limits than currently
allowed under Federal law would improve highway safety, lower energy
use and emissions and reduce freight costs, without compromising
infrastructure integrity.
Question 3a. Would you comment on your views of increasing the
allowable weight of trucks to 97,000 pounds by adding a third axle to
the rear pair of axles?
Answer. ATA supports giving states the authority to allow the
operation of 6-axle trucks with a gross weight of 97,000 pounds, with
appropriate Federal oversight. The additional axle will result in lower
pavement maintenance costs and ensures that stopping distance is
similar to the trucks they replace. We are not aware of any safety
issues with this vehicle. In fact, the greater carrying capacity of
this truck will reduce vehicle miles traveled, thus lowering crash
exposure. Reducing truck vehicle miles also lowers emissions and energy
use. Furthermore, use of this vehicle will help to level the playing
field for certain industries with high freight transportation costs
that compete with companies in countries that already allow higher
weight limits than is currently authorized by Federal law in the U.S.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Todd Spencer
Question. Most truck drivers are paid by the mile, which tempts
drivers to drive longer than what is permitted under the Hours of
Service regulations, especially if they are delayed at ports and
loading facilities. As we work to reauthorize the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, what additional steps should the Committee take
to reduce this incentive?
Answer. Under current Hours-of-Service (HOS) regulations, the daily
14-hour clock begins to tick for a truck driver when the driver
performs any on-duty activity, including those duties related to
loading and unloading. The Committee is correct, unlike other
industrialized nations throughout the world, most U.S. based drivers
are not compensated by the hour, but by miles driven. This means that
under current practices, many U.S. drivers are forced to give away
countless hours each week waiting to be loaded or unloaded, manually
sorting and stacking freight, or physically loading or unloading the
freight themselves. This egregious practice is a major contributor to
driver fatigue, HOS violations, and the overall deterioration of
highway safety.
It's estimated that truck drivers in the U.S. spend as much as 40
hours per week at shipping docks waiting to for their truck's cargo to
be loaded or unloaded. It is common for a driver to pull into a
shipping or receiving facility with no idea of whether he or she will
be there for 2 hours or 10. In certain industries, it isn't unusual for
drivers to wait up to 24 hours before taking a load. During this
waiting time, it is nearly impossible for a driver to rest. Often, the
driver must wait in line or be ``on call'' ready to take the load and
make the ``just-in-time'' delivery. Excessive ``detention time'' alone
not only costs the trucking industry approximately $3 billion dollars
annually, but the value of this inefficiency doubles to over $6 billion
annually when both motor carrier and societal costs such as
environmental, safety, and mobility costs are included. \1\ In addition
to the monetary cost, in research conducted by the DOT, excessive
detention is often cited as a contributor to fatigue and HOS
violations. Because a driver's time is not accounted for by shippers,
drivers are put in the compromising position of having to choose
between meeting scheduling demands or complying with certain safety
rules such as the Federal Hours-of-Service (HOS) regulations. Research
shows, that often, because of economic necessity and the structure of
the industry, drivers feel pressured to not keep an accurate log book
or to drive while fatigued. \2\ In one research forum conducted by
FMCSA, it was noted that long waiting lines at shipper facilities were
identified by carriers and safety advocates as one way ``shippers can
undermine commercial vehicle safety.'' \3\ In a separate, more
comprehensive study, it was noted that ``the need for drivers to load
or unload their own vehicles can often impede timely completion of a
run and force the driver into excess hours in order to make delivery.
Similarly, delays in accessing the unloading point can result in
drivers feeling a need to make up for lost time.'' The same study also
reported that certain timely goods ``hot freight'' can cause drivers to
``see no alternative other than speeding or exceeding the HOS
regulations in order to make timely delivery.'' (Carriers 1998)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. Department of Transportation-Federal Motor Carrier
Security Administration (2007). The Motor Carrier Efficiency Study
2007: Annual Report to Congress, 2007
\2\ U.S. Department of Transportation- Federal Highway
Administration-Office of Motor Carriers (1998), A Qualitative
Assessment of the Role of Shippers and others in Driver Compliance with
Federal Safety Regulations.
\3\ U.S. Department of Transportation--Federal Motor Carrier
Security Administration--Office of Research and Technology (2003)
Results from 2003 Stakeholder Forums.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So what is the solution to shippers/receivers having the power to
detain drivers excessively in the loading and unloading process?
Simple. Make a driver's time worth something of value in the supply
chain. In the interest of promoting safe trucking practices, as well as
the overall efficiency of goods movement in the U.S., the loading and
unloading process in this Nation must be changed. According to one DOT
study, waiting for freight to be loaded/unloaded can ``impede a
driver's ability to effectively meet schedules and lead to violation of
HOS, driver fatigue and loss of income by all parties involved*'' As of
now, a driver's time is free and although he is ``on the clock,''
shippers do not value this time. Although compensation for excessive
dentition time was standard for a time in the trucking industry prior
to deregulation and compensation for ``demurrage'' is still practiced
in other freight modes, as of now, shippers have no incentive to
improve the efficiency of loading and unloading trucks at their
facilities. If the time spent by drivers waiting to be loaded or
unloaded is contemplated and if compensation for excessive detention
time begins to be negotiated, the trucking industry and the American
public will benefit from efficient freight movement and dramatically
improved highway safety.
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Todd Spencer
Question 1. Last year I introduced S. 1113, the Safe Roads Act, to
establish a national drug and alcohol testing database for employers to
better select qualified drivers and avoid hiring employees with a drug
or alcohol background.
Under this law, the FMCSA would require medical review officers,
employers, and other service agents to report positive results from
FMCSA required drug or alcohol tests to the database and clearinghouse.
Employers would be required to check the database prior to hiring a
prospective employee. If a prospective employee has a positive result,
an employer would not be allowed to hire the prospect unless he/she has
not violated the requirements of the testing program or he/she has
fully completed a return-to-duty program as required by the testing
program. This law will also require privacy protections and employee
rights of action. Do you support the establishment of a drug and
alcohol test result clearinghouse?
Answer. OOIDA believes that drug and alcohol testing for commercial
motor vehicle operators has played an important role in raising the
level of safety on our Nation's highways. However, there are problems
with existing regulations, procedures and enforcement that should be
addressed to ensure that testing programs are effectively employed
while also mindful of the significant harm that may be caused to a
trucker's life and livelihood by errant administration.
OOIDA fully supports the goal of striving to make the trucking
industry free of drug and alcohol abuse. However, we have privacy,
operational, security, and oversight related concerns with the
establishment and administration of a national clearinghouse for
positive drug and alcohol testing results. We realize that your
legislation goes to great lengths to address those concerns however we
remain uncomfortable with how provisions of the legislation may be
implemented by government agencies. If the operational, security and
logistical oversight complications are not adequately addressed when
the proposal is being implemented, the potential to negatively impact
drivers far beyond the scope of those who abuse drugs and alcohol
exists. We would be happy to continue working with you to address the
concerns of the professionals we represent.
Question 1a. Does FMCSA have the authority to establish such a
clearinghouse without Congressional guidance?
Answer. While FMCSA does have the ability to make changes to its
drug and alcohol testing policies our understanding is that the agency
does not have the legal authority to establish a clearinghouse.
Question 1b. Should a drug clearinghouse be part of CSA 2010?
Answer. We do not believe that a drug and alcohol testing
clearinghouse should be a part of the CSA 2010 initiative.
Question 2. I understand that on April 5, 2010, FMCSA developed a
final rule to require the use of EOBRs by carriers that have violated
the hours of service rules. Do you believe all motor-carriers should be
equipped with EOBRs to better comply with Hours of Service laws? If
Congress were to require EOBRs for all carriers, what information
should we require to be recorded?
Answer. From our perspective EOBRs are not safety devices, they are
recordkeeping tools that are subject to the same shortcomings as paper
logbooks. We have seen no evidence that using EOBRs for HOS enforcement
purposes will result in better safety performances or in a reduction of
accidents. We cannot see a justification in burdening the trucking
industry with the significant financial and personal privacy costs of a
universal EOBR mandate especially considering the industry is
predominately made up of small businesses.
Question 3. Do you believe the current size and weight restrictions
can be increased without compromising highway safety or infrastructure
integrity? Would you comment on your views of increasing the allowable
weight of trucks to 97,000 pounds by adding a third axle to the rear
pair of axles?
Answer. Our members know from firsthand experience that further
increases in sizes and weights of commercial motor vehicles can
endanger highway users and hasten the deterioration of our Nation's
roads and bridges. Increasing allowable vehicle weights from 80,000
pounds to 97,000 pounds may be described by some in the private sector
as a minor change, but could have a dramatic impact on the safety and
structural integrity of some Federal aid highways.
Generally speaking stability, mobility and maneuverability are
substantially reduced on bigger and heavier trucks. The larger and
heavier the vehicle, the more problems it has interacting with other
vehicles on the highway. We firmly believe that increases to current
standards could seriously jeopardize the safety of both automobile and
commercial truck drivers.
Specifically, the 97,000 pounds gross weight on 6 axles
configuration presents a serious handling issue due to the fact that
adding a third axle to the trailer will increase the maximum allowable
trailer weight to 51,000 pounds, compared to 34,000 to 40,000 pounds
now. The trailer weight would then exceed the allowable weight of
46,000 pounds on the tractor creating a dangerous kinetic force that
could easily push the tractor out of control when attempting to stop on
icy, snowy and wet road surfaces. Add to that descending a steep
mountain grade in the same conditions and even an experienced driver
will surely be challenged to keep the vehicle under control.
In addition to the well discussed impact that heavier trucks have
on our Nation's deteriorating infrastructure, additional axle
combinations that are necessary to accommodate heavier loads will
increase the damage to road surfaces related to ``scuffing''--this is a
phenomenon associated with certain axle configurations where the
vehicle's tires drag across the road surface when turning. Scuffing is
most prevalent in configurations where a trailer is equipped with a
group of three or more axles. Scuffing is especially damaging in hot
weather, a condition under which one can actually see the pavement
buckle and roll up under stress.
Increases to allowable weight standards will also hasten the
deterioration of trucking equipment. While these issues may not be of
great concern to large corporate motor carriers who turnover their
equipment on a regular basis, it would correspond to significant cost
increases for the small business truckers that comprise the vast
majority of the U.S. trucking industry. Furthermore, the increased wear
on equipment is not only a costly issue, but also represents another
serious safety concern.
Also as the weight of vehicles increase, the number of highways and
bridges that are designed to accommodate them become fewer. If trucks
weights are increased, many routes as well as pickup and delivery
points would become totally inaccessible without substantial, costly
upgrades to accommodate vehicles larger or heavier than currently
allowed under the Federal rules--the already limited number of viable
routes available to commercial motor vehicles would further be
diminished. Efficiency in the trucking industry would be lost, not
gained.