[Senate Hearing 111-883]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-883
THE PASSPORT ISSUANCE PROCESS: CLOSING THE DOOR TO FRAUD, PART II
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 29, 2010
__________
Serial No. J-111-104
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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64-705 WASHINGTON : 2011
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20402-0001
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JON KYL, Arizona
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN CORNYN, Texas
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
AL FRANKEN, Minnesota
Bruce A. Cohen, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Brian A. Benzcowski, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin JON KYL, Arizona
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN CORNYN, Texas
AL FRANKEN, Minnesota TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Bill Van Horne, Democratic Chief Counsel
Stephen Higgins, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Maryland....................................................... 1
prepared statement........................................... 52
Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona.......... 3
WITNESSES
Kutz, Gregory D., Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special
Investigations Unit, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Washington, D.C................................................ 4
Sprague, Brenda S., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport
Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, D.C................................................ 6
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Responses of Gregory D. Kutz to questions submitted by Senator
Cardin......................................................... 22
Responses of Brenda S. Sprague to questions submitted by Senator
Cardin......................................................... 27
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Arnold, Robert, National Vice President, National Federation of
Federal Employees (NFFE), Washington, DC, statement............ 45
Kutz, Gregory D., Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special
Investigations Unit, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Washington, D.C., statement.................................... 60
Sprague, Brenda S., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport
Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, D.C., statement.................................... 74
THE PASSPORT ISSUANCE PROCESS: CLOSING THE DOOR TO FRAUD, PART II
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THURSDAY, JULY 29, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Technology and Homeland Security,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin
Cardin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Hatch and Kyl.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. The Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland
Security will come to order. I want to thank our witnesses for
being here today. I want to first thank Senator Kyl and Senator
Feinstein for their strong interest and continuing interest in
this issue of the integrity and security of the passport
issuance process.
On May 5, 2009, over 14 months ago, I chaired the Terrorism
Subcommittee hearing entitled The Passport Issuance Process:
Closing the Door to Fraud. Today we are holding part two of
that hearing. And quite frankly, I didn't anticipate that we
were going to need a second hearing on this subject when I
convened the first hearing 14 months ago.
During that hearing last year, we learned about the
Government Accountability Office's undercover investigation
that had been requested by Senator Kyl and Senator Feinstein to
test the effectiveness of the passport issuance process, and to
determine whether malicious individuals such as terrorists,
spies and other criminals could use counterfeit documents to
obtain a genuine U.S. passport.
What we learned at that time concerned me a great deal. GAO
reported to the Subcommittee, and I'm going to quote from its
2009 report, ``Terrorists or criminals could steal an American
citizen's identity, use basic counterfeiting skills to create
fraudulent documents for the identity, and obtain a genuine
U.S. passport.''
``GAO conducted four tests simulating this approach and was
successful in obtaining a genuine U.S. passport in each case.
In all four tests, GAO used counterfeit and/or fraudulently
obtained documents.''
The May 2009 GAO report went on to note that the State
Department and U.S. postal employees did not identify GAO
documents as counterfeit. And further noted, and I'm quoting,
``GAO investigators later purchased an airline ticket under the
name used of the four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports and
then used that passport as proof of identity to check into his
flight, get a boarding pass and pass through security
checkpoints at a major metropolitan area airport.'' That was
the 2009 report.
But it was not the first report to identify problems with
the passport issuance process. In 2005 and 2007, GAO brought
these issues to light. As a result, the GAO's 2009 report
stated, and again I'm quoting from the GAO report, that ``State
Department officials have known about the vulnerabilities in
the passport issuance process for many years but have failed to
effectively address these vulnerabilities.''
Those were very serious findings back in May of 2009
because the U.S. passport is the gold standard for
identification. A U.S. passport can be used for many purposes
in this country and it gives an individual the ability to
travel internationally which is an important tool for someone
who wants to do us harm, including terrorists, spies and other
criminals.
So the integrity and security of the passport issuance
process is extremely important because it can have a profound
impact on the national security of the United States.
More than 14 months have lapsed since the first GAO report,
and today we will be learning about a new GAO undercover
investigation that I requested along with Senators Kyl,
Feinstein, Lieberman and Collins.
In this new investigation, a GAO undercover, used
fraudulent identity documents including fake drivers licenses
and birth certificates to see if they could obtain genuine U.S.
passports. So what happened this time?
Well, once again U.S. postal and State Department employees
failed to detect the use of fraudulent identity documents. GAO
undercover investigators sought seven passports. Most of them
were approved by the State Department. Moreover, four of the
passport applications that were submitted used a photograph of
the same GAO undercover agent, and two passport applications
that were initially approved used Social Security numbers of
deceased persons.
There is some news that is a credit to the State Department
because the State Department detected two fraudulent passport
applications before they were approved. However, what happened,
happened before, and we were all under notice that this needed
to be changed.
As the Subcommittee attempts to get to the bottom of this,
we must not forget that dedicated people are working very hard
to correct these problems and they take their responsibilities
seriously. But we must do better, much better.
Congress can help by giving the State Department all the
tools it needs. In that regard, I am introducing, along with
Senators Feinstein and Lieberman, legislation that will help to
close the door to passport fraud. Today I'm introducing the
Passport Identity Verification Act. This legislation is a
common sense solution that will give the State Department the
legal authority that it needs to access information contained
in Federal, state and other data banks that can be used to
verify the identity of every passport applicant and to detect
passport fraud without extending the time that the State
Department takes to approve passports.
I also will be submitting for the record a letter from the
National Federation of Federal Employees which has previously
made a number of recommendations to the State Department as to
how to improve the passport issuance process.
And from my perspective, management in the State Department
needs to partner with its employees to ensure that their
helpful, constructive ideas are implemented. I understand that
there is pressure on passport examiners to act quickly. I'm
sure some of that pressure comes from Members of Congress on
behalf of our constituents and I understand that the American
people can become concerned when their travel plans, whether
for leisure or business are linked to their ability to obtain a
passport in a timely fashion.
But we've got to get this right. It is not simply a
question of process, techniques and training. We need to make
sure that the agencies that are responsible for processing
passport application documents are concerned about national
security as well as customer service and we need to make sure
that they have the legal authority, the resources and the
technology to verify the identity of passport applicants and to
detect passport fraud. We simply cannot issue U.S. passports in
this country on the basis of fraudulent documents. There is too
much at stake. We have the technology, and we have the
information to prevent such abuses.
We have with us today two witnesses, one from the GAO and
one from the State Department. Before I introduce our two
witnesses, let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Kyl, and
once again before recognizing Senator Kyl, I want to thank him
for his interest in this issue, not only his interest but his
leadership and the fact that he brought this issue to the
Senate's attention.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
ARIZONA
Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I appreciate
your holding this hearing and the work you've done on the
legislation that you discussed. I also want to thank Senator
Feinstein who can't be here because of a scheduling conflict.
But as the Chairman noted, she too has a continuing commitment
to continue to pursue this issue surrounding fraudulent
passports.
I agree with Chairman Cardin that the GAO, and the GAO,
that the State Department's continued inconsistent application
of data verification and counterfeit fraudulent detection
techniques must be corrected.
This information from GAO makes us all continue to wonder
just how many individuals are fraudulently obtaining U.S.
passports. GAO I think accurately calls this the most sought
after travel document in the world. So we're talking about
something very important.
Back in February of 2008, partially a result of the 2007
Joint Homeland Security FBI Threat Assessment, Senator
Feinstein and I asked GAO to report on passport fraud. In March
of 2009, it reported on state's weaknesses surrounding the
issuance of passports. Senators Cardin, Feinstein, Lieberman
and I asked them in early 2010 for an update on the issue and
that is what we are receiving today.
There are a myriad of corrections the State could make to
correct some of the vulnerabilities in the passport process.
Irrespective of whether State Department passport adjudicators
have law enforcement authority, State could work more
collaboratively with Social Security Administration to ensure
that accurate and appropriate and near real time information
about Social Security members is pursued by those approving
passport applications.
Additionally, the State Department could work more
proactively with the Department of Homeland Security to make
sure that the electronic vital events system project, which
digitizes birth records, is completed and the State Department
in my view should always work to confirm a birth certificate's
authenticity.
It is troubling that DHS was required to complete a
spending plan for 2010 for the $10 million in appropriations
for that consortium project but only yesterday, 10 months into
the fiscal year 2010, sent the spending plan up to Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I want to follow up with some more specific
questions for our witnesses, but I do want to make clear that
the problems that GAO has effectively highlighted both before
and today are really indicative of overall identity theft
issues that we face as a nation. We've got to continue to work
to make sure that individuals cannot fraudulently obtain
drivers licenses, passports, visas, border crossing cards and
other documents in this country.
I very much look forward to the testimony of our witnesses
and again I appreciate your calling this hearing.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much, Senator Kyl. Today we
will be hearing from two witnesses.
Greg Kutz is the Managing Director of GAO's Forensic Audits
and Special Investigation Unit which conducts forensic audits,
evaluates security vulnerabilities and conducts investigations
of fraud, waste and abuse for Congress. He is also a certified
public accountant and certified fraud examiner.
He has been with GAO for nearly two decades and prior to
his present position, he was Director of Financial Management
at GAO.
Brenda Sprague is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport
Services in the Consular Affairs Bureau of the Department of
State. Ms. Sprague has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
since July 20, 2008 and she previously served in the State
Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security in its Office of
Language Services.
She has also served in the foreign service. Ms. Sprague
testified in our hearing on May 5th, 2009. We'll start with Mr.
Kutz.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY D. KUTZ, MANAGING DIRECTOR FORENSIC AUDITS
AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Kutz. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Kyl, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss passport fraud. Today's
testimony highlights the results of our most recent
investigation.
My testimony has two parts. First I will discuss what we
did and second I will discuss the results of our undercover
testing.
First in March of 2009, we reported that State's passport
issuance process was vulnerable to fraud. Specifically, we
obtained four genuine U.S. passports using counterfeit and
fraudulently obtained documents. This is important because as
you mentioned and as this posterboard shows, with a U.S.
passport, the world is yours.
One year later at your request, we submitted seven
fraudulent applications simulating the use of identity theft.
For these tests, we used counterfeit and fraudulently obtained
documents such as drivers licenses and birth certificates.
These documents were prepared using publicly available
hardware, software and materials.
We also used seven different Social Security numbers from
fictitious and deceased individuals. Two undercover agents
applied for passports at six postal service and one State run
location. Our tests were done in five different States and here
in the District of Columbia.
Now that I have said what we did, let me turn to the
results of our undercover testing. As the Chairman mentioned
specifically, State issued passports for five of our seven
tests.
I have in my hand the three genuine passports that we
obtained. The posterboard shows on my right the actual breeder
documents that we used to obtain these genuine U.S. passports.
Some of the key flags that State missed include a 62-year-old
using a Social Security number issued in 2009, counterfeit
drivers licenses and birth certificates as shown on the monitor
to my right there, one application with a vast age difference
between the passport and drivers license photo and one
application with a California mailing address, a West Virginia
permanent address and drivers license, and a Washington, D.C.
telephone number.
This time as you mentioned there was improvement as State
denied two of our applications after determining that they were
fraudulent. For the first one denied according to State, they
identified issues with our Social Security number. Subsequently
they determined that our Florida birth certificate and our West
Virginia drivers licenses were bogus.
For the second denial, State identified discrepancies again
in our Social Security number on our application. This time
there were discrepancies against the birth date and Social
Security records. Once again they determined that our drivers
license and birth certificate were bogus.
It also appears in this case that they had questions as to
why the application was filed in Illinois, but the mailing
address and drivers licenses were from Virginia and West
Virginia.
For the last two applications, physical passports were
issued. However, according to State, these two passports were
flagged when facial recognition technology linked the photos to
our prior applications. State then recovered these two physical
passports from the mail system.
It is not clear why State was in some instances able to
identify fraud and in other instances was not. As you both
mentioned, one of the reasons for us being here today is to
provide you with a status report on State's progress and its
improvement initiatives. Another important benefit from today
is for State to take these seven applications, and use them to
improve their human capital, processes and the use of
technology.
In conclusion, significant concerns remain about State's
ability to prevent passport fraud. With hundreds of different
drivers licenses and birth certificates out there, recognizing
counterfeits is a significant challenge.
We look forward to continuing to work with this
Subcommittee and State to improve passport fraud prevention
controls.
Mr. Chairman, that ends my statement, and I look forward to
your questions.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much. Ms. Sprague.
STATEMENT OF BRENDA S. SPRAGUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
PASSPORT SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Sprague. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
Department of State's response to concerns raised by the
Government Accountability Office in their latest undercover
investigation of passport operations.
Today I also seek your support for initiatives to assist
the Bureau of Consular Affairs to detect and prevent passport
fraud.
We are fully committed to continually improving our system
in order to maintain the most secure passport issuance system
possible. That system, however, is not yet foolproof. We have
made dramatic improvements over the past year and we will
continue to work diligently to improve training, procedures and
oversight of the passport application and adjudication
processes.
Through existing fraud detection procedures, we recently
discovered that the GAO was conducting an undercover
investigative operation of passport services. Investigators
trained in document fraud submitted seven passport
applications. They used legitimately issued Social Security
numbers, counterfeit birth certificates and fake drivers
licenses.
We immediately identified fraud in two of their
applications and identified fraud in two more prior to
delivery. However, they successfully obtained three passports.
Immediately upon discovering this GAO undercover operation,
we took action. We placed all personnel involved in the
issuance of those passports on 100 percent audit, conducted
fraud training for all adjudicators and for the acceptance
facilities involved, accelerated an aggressive deployment
schedule of enhancements to our issuance system, which
incorporated facial recognition technology, strengthened
requirements for use of out of state identity documents, and
developed a training module for all adjudicators on the
adjudication and fraud issues raised by the GAO probe.
We also initiated several longer range projects which
include conducting a pilot of commercial database identity
scoring, acquiring forensic document expertise in the
development and delivery of our training programs, developing
standardized on-line fraud indicator check sheets for our
adjudicators and incorporating enhanced front end data checks
into our document issuance system.
Following a similar GAO operation 2 years ago in which we
failed to detect any of the four applicant's fraudulent
applications, we made process improvements and were more
successful in detecting GAO's latest efforts. Even one passport
issued in error is one too many and I am more upset than anyone
that this has occurred. However, it was exactly the
improvements which we put in place after the 2009 GAO operation
that allowed us to recognize this operation before the GAO
notified us.
Following the first GAO investigation, we undertook the
systematic review of our operations and developed a remedial
plan that included revising adjudication standards and
processes. Recalculating production standards, doubling the
number of personnel devoted to fraud detection, enhancing data
checks as part of our front end processing, introducing facial
recognition technology and expanding the training provided to
both specialists and supervisors in adjudication and in fraud
detection.
We have done much to address the vulnerabilities, but let
me ask your help to eliminate them. The greatest threat to the
integrity of the passport issuance process is document fraud.
We need additional tools and stronger authority.
First, we seek your assistance to pass legislation to
designate Consular Affairs as a law enforcement entity for the
purpose of data sharing. We need full access to state
registries of births and death, and other identity information.
Currently our access is restricted by the lack of such
designation.
Second, we seek the subcommittee's support to encourage
standardization of the birth documents that we accept as proof
of citizenship. There are more than 6,400 jurisdictions issuing
birth certificates in the United States with more than 14,000
versions in circulation.
Thirteen states allow open access to birth records allowing
virtually anyone to purchase copies of birth certificates on
file. Differences in paper, format, signatures and security
features make the detection of fraudulent birth certificates
daunting.
This is a challenge we face, and we face it every day. It
is crucial that Congress encourage standardization of the birth
documents that we accept as proof of citizenship.
Third, we request your support to pass legislation to
mandate that all passport applicants provide their Social
Security numbers. In addition to birth documentation, we rely
heavily on Social Security data to verify the identity of
passport applicants. We seek legislation mandating that
applicants provide Social Security numbers.
Finally, we need your support for continued retention by
the State Department of the WHTI surcharge as requested in the
President's fiscal year 2011 budget. We need these funds to
strengthen our systems and to combat fraud. Our request is part
of a larger fee retention package which is in the President's
2011 budget.
Distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the
constructive approach of this committee. I believe that all of
us in the federal government are committed to enhancing our
services so that they are safe, secure, efficient, equitable
and responsive to the needs of the American people.
I hope that you will support the initiatives I discussed,
for they are essential to detecting and preventing passport
fraud. I am ready to take your questions. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you for your testimony. Mr.
Kutz, let me at least clarify one part of the investigation so
I understand it.
In all seven of the efforts there was a false drivers
license used, am I correct on that?
Mr. Kutz. Yes. Six from West Virginia and the one in D.C.
we used an actual D.C. counterfeit, correct.
Senator Cardin. And none of these fake drivers licenses
triggered the rejection of a passport, is that correct?
Mr. Kutz. Not initially. We understand the two that were
caught were initially because of the Social Security number
discrepancies that then led to further investigation. That's
our understanding.
Senator Cardin. So it was the Social Security number that
triggered the first two, and then there were facial differences
I understand it on the next two that----
Mr. Kutz. Not a facial difference, a facial match. In other
words, we had multiple people, same faces with multiple
passports. That's what we understand triggered the other ones.
Senator Cardin. None of the triggering was, I guess my
point is that you were able to use false, fake drivers licenses
without getting detected basically?
Mr. Kutz. The initial intake of those documents you see on
my right, we don't believe anyone ever recognized those as
counterfeits, that's correct.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, that's helpful. Ms. Sprague, let
me take you back to the May, 2009 hearing. You expressed some
of the same sentiments at that hearing as you are now about how
disappointed you are that you're not 100 percent, and that you
take these issues very, very seriously.
You also said that you were going to use your own red teams
because you knew that the GAO would be back looking and you
wanted to make sure that you were ready for that. Did you use
red teams?
Ms. Sprague. Yes, we did.
Senator Cardin. How well did you do?
Ms. Sprague. There were six attempts and we caught five of
them.
Senator Cardin. So GAO is better than your red teams?
Ms. Sprague. GAO can get real Social Security numbers and
diplomatic security can't.
Senator Cardin. So I guess the other thing that has me a
little bit concerned in your response is that you said that you
detected the two, therefore you knew that GAO was after you, or
at least was doing their investigation, and then you changed
your procedures it looks like in order to counter what GAO was
doing, which is fine.
But we thought you would have the procedures to detect what
terrorists, criminals, those who want to harm us, or those who
just want to get a passport who are not entitled to a passport
would do.
My point is wouldn't you have taken these precautions from
the beginning rather than just as a preemptive measure against
a GAO investigation?
Ms. Sprague. Detecting passport fraud and making certain
that passports don't go to people who aren't entitled to them
is our number one priority. However, we are taking advantage,
if that's the appropriate word, of what we learned from these
tests to make our process better.
We also learned from what diplomatic security did and we
were able to make our process better, so in that sense. But I
do want to clarify one thing and that is that we are in the
process of rolling out facial recognition. It is not rolled out
across the entire system.
After we realized that, or we believed that it was GAO in
process, we wanted to check our system and see if there was
anything more, and we were able at the headquarters level using
software that is at a very early stage to go out and identify
that in fact there were seven pictures that matched prior
attempts. So that's how we identified the additional two.
It wasn't that we changed our procedures because of the
GAO. It was that we took advantage of a tool that is still in
the developmental phase although it is well along and will be
in complete operation by the end of September at all our
agencies. It is already at six of them. Unfortunately those six
were not tested. They were tested at ones where they were not
yet functioning. But we didn't change anything just because of
the GAO, except that I'd certainly like to think that we get
smarter as we go through these things.
Senator Cardin. But you did use that technology that was
being used at other locations, you I guess switched them to
where GAO was active.
Ms. Sprague. No, what we are doing across the board is to
have facial recognition of all incoming passport applications.
We are rolling that out gradually across the network.
However, we have a second tool which is facial recognition
on demand where we can take a single photograph when we suspect
fraud and run that against the entire database.
As of this moment, it is rolled out to all the agencies. It
wasn't there in April and May, but it is a secondary tool.
There are actually two parts to our facial recognition
technology. One, to do it as part of the up front of the
application process, and the other one is to have a secondary
check when we encounter a fraud that we can go back and look
and see if it's there.
Senator Cardin. And the purpose of the facial identity is
to see whether there is duplicate requests or that you have a
visual identification of someone who is not entitled to a
passport?
Ms. Sprague. The real thing it does is to identify if there
have been multiple issuances to the same individual. So far at
the agencies we have, we have not identified anybody using
this.
On the facial recognition on demand, we have successfully
where we suspected fraud actually identified people not who had
passports already, but who were in our Visa lookout file.
So we have used that here and there on spot occasions. That
tool is now available to all our fraud managers. It has been in
development and it was only available to a handful before this.
Senator Cardin. Just one more question on this. This
technology is used where you suspect there is a problem, it is
not used routinely? Even when it is fully implemented it won't
be used routinely for every application? Or will it be used for
every application?
Ms. Sprague. The facial recognition that was part of our
front end process will involve every application that is----
Senator Cardin. And when will that be fully implemented?
Ms. Sprague. By the 15th of September.
Senator Cardin. I guess my last question is what should our
expectations be here? What is a realistic goal? Are you saying
that you can get to 100 percent? I know there is always things
that can get by, but should we be expecting that you have the
capacity to stop the type of fraudulent applications that GAO
is participating in, or is this just a hopeless cause?
Ms. Sprague. I certainly hope it's not a hopeless cause.
Senator Cardin. It's our fourth investigation. It is my
second as Chairman and it is disappointing to see that there
was the success in again compromising our system.
I guess--I have confidence in the work that our people are
doing but I think we need to have an honest assessment as to
whether our passports are going to be safe or not.
Ms. Sprague. I think we have to look at all the aspects of
passport safety. First of all, we have achieved great success
against counterfeiting of our passport document with our new E-
passport and that has been corroborated by studies and we are
very proud of it.
But as we have made our documents more and more counterfeit
proof, and I realize somebody is out there right now trying to
figure out a way to counterfeit it, it makes it harder on the
adjudication side because people attempt to obtain good
passports with bad breeder documents. This is a problem that we
discussed in the international forum at ICAO and others. It is
common to all countries that are issuing travel documentation.
We have got a lot of people working against us and we are
always going to be addressing vulnerabilities. Can we get to
100 percent? That is certainly our objective. It is an uphill
climb. It requires lots of work, it requires focus every day,
it requires resources and we're willing to address all of that.
Senator Cardin. It just seems to me that a drivers license
is a common instrument used and that there needs to be a
capacity at the State Department to identify fraudulent drivers
licenses. To me that seems like a basic security issue.
Ms. Sprague. And it seems like a basic security issue to
me, too. But let me explain to you where we are that we weren't
last year. We have with the sponsorship of the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, we have received limited access to the
nationwide verification system known as N-LES. We don't have
access to all 50 states yet, but we have access to 43. Only one
state has turned us down flat.
It is a big leap for them to have done this because we do
not have law enforcement identification or identity. I am
missing the word there. But they have given us limited access.
Unfortunately, that access, we only have 242 accounts for
the whole world and I have 1,200 passport adjudication
specialists. So we have focused those both here and overseas in
the fraud offices. When we suspect fraud, we can go in and do a
limited check of those drivers licenses.
The second thing that is available to us on drivers
licenses is that there are machines available. We have done
some tests with them and we are moving forward with the
procurement right now for our passport agencies where they will
have the ability to see if the drivers license has been
tampered.
I have to be honest with you, we did two pilots with them
and we didn't catch any counterfeit drivers licenses. We are
going to go ahead anyway. But we only see one of ten drivers
licenses. The other nine go to the postal acceptance agencies
or the non-postal acceptance agencies. They don't have that
capacity. Since our largest partner here is the postal service,
they really aren't in a position to invest in this technology.
We would have to help the postal service in some way. I
would see that as the beginning of the solution. It would
detect counterfeit. It would not detect those drivers license
which people obtain in another identity other than their true
identity. Those will come through as perfect drivers licenses.
That is a much harder challenge for us and that requires each
of the states to tighten their regulations.
Some states like Colorado and Virginia have done a
fantastic job. Other states have not stepped up to the plate.
That is a problem that I cannot solve.
Senator Cardin. Senator Kyl.
Senator Kyl. What state turned you down flat?
Ms. Sprague. South Dakota. But in fairness to the good
people of South Dakota, they have a very rigid privacy
restriction and they absolutely cannot share anything with
someone who is not a law enforcement entity.
Senator Kyl. By the way, is it Kutz? I don't want to
mispronounce your name.
Mr. Kutz. It is Kutz.
Senator Kyl. Kutz. I'm sorry, sir. Well, Mr. Kutz, my
understanding is that in your testimony here you have not
recommended any additional recommendations because of the view
that the previous recommendations have not been implemented.
I wonder if you could tell us your evaluation of the degree
to which there has been implementation of your prior
recommendations.
Mr. Kutz. With respect to training, we understand there has
been training with respect to passports and the breeder
documents that go into getting those. So to the extent that
they have done better recognizing those, I think in most cases
they are not recognizing the counterfeit breeder documents and
that is difficult because there are hundreds or thousands of
different birth certificates and drivers licenses out there.
We do understand that they are doing more of a match with
Social Security and the death records. Two of the cases here we
understand they caught based upon a match. Last time they
weren't checking the death file, for example, so we think that
they've made some progress there.
She talked about getting the ability to validate with the
DMVs and the Vital Statistics on birth certificates. Those are
critical elements of being able to authenticate the hundreds of
different drivers licenses and birth certificates. We certainly
support them doing red team. That was one of the things we
recommended. We would suggest doing more than six tests a year,
but certainly it is up to their discretion to what they do, but
that's a valuable exercise to do the exact same thing that we
do to continually test yourself, especially because things here
are going to emerge.
One of the things I will just mention because there are a
lot of them, but requiring Social Security numbers of people is
important. They don't have the authority at this point to
require a Social Security number. So you have people who can
actually get a U.S. passport without having to provide a Social
Security number. That seems to be a significant issue to us.
Senator Kyl. Let me ask you both. Ms. Sprague, you
indicated I think three specific things here that would be
helpful to you. The standard birth certificate, a legal
requirement for Social Security numbers and I'm not sure what
specifically with respect to real ID drivers licenses, but some
further support for assurance that drivers licenses were not
bad breeder documents, is that correct?
Ms. Sprague. We are asking for designation as law
enforcement so that we can get access to state and local
records verification which we are precluded from because of
privacy.
Senator Kyl. Understood. But even if you had that, if you
had bad breeder documents, you're going to have the same
problem that other agencies have in verifying the fraudulent
nature of the document.
Ms. Sprague. It would only help us with counterfeits. It
would probably not identify breeder documents routinely.
Senator Kyl. Right. But the standard birth certificate
might help in that regard.
Ms. Sprague. It might. And I want to clarify that I am not
asking for a national birth certificate that every state has to
follow. The states, if we just were dealing with 50 birth
certificates, it would be heaven.
Senator Kyl. If they were digitized. In fact maybe you
could, either one of you can relate to this program for
digitization of the records. How far would that go toward
satisfying this requirement?
Ms. Sprague. Well, certainly one of the things that is
holding back EVVE is that the states are in such different
places in terms of how they have recorded and stored their
data. If EVVE could get up and running, that would be a God
send to us because we would be able to verify at least that a
document was not counterfeit. You can only do that
electronically.
So to the extent that the records have not been presented
in a somewhat common electronic format, EVVE'S task is
daunting.
Senator Kyl. With respect to the breeder documents that go
into drivers licenses, what recommendations would you have to
ensure that the document that you receive is a valid document?
This appeared to be 100 percent of the cases you had a bad
drivers license. Is that correct?
Mr. Kutz. Yes. All the drivers licenses were counterfeit.
The one in D.C. actually would have traced back to a real
drivers license we got using counterfeit breeder documents from
another test. So if they did a match on that, they would have
actually determined that that person appeared to be real, but
the actual drivers license we presented here in D.C. was a
counterfeit drivers license.
Senator Kyl. OK. So can you answer my question then, ma'am?
Ms. Sprague. I would really like someone who is smarter
than I am about the specifics of that to get back to you on it.
But I can say in short that we would like the states to make a
serious effort to verify that the person who is standing in
front of them is in fact the person that they say they are.
I can only speak, for example, for the State of Virginia or
the State of Colorado which we are very familiar with because
they have worked with us. In the State of Colorado they
actually fingerprint people. They do facial recognition. Facial
recognition would be terrific for drivers licenses because it
would get people who do repeat drivers licenses.
In addition, in the State of Virginia you have to have
proof of residence, you have to come up with documents that
link you and that gives us a much better trail to go back and
say that the people are who they say they are.
Of course what happens now is that people just avoid states
that are tough and go to states that have a reputation for
being more lenient.
We also very much like those states, Colorado does it,
where they indicate when you first got that drivers license so
you're just not going that this is a renewal. You can see that
the State of Colorado can corroborate this identity back to
when someone was 16 years of age. Our passport specialists love
that.
Senator Kyl. Obviously the percentages in cases where your
folks were fooled are not good percentages. I gather there is
no way of knowing how many fraudulent or how many genuine
passports you might be issuing that are based upon fraudulent
data.
Ms. Sprague. Any study that we have done post issuance or
when we did our live audit last year, we did not, were not able
to discover even when we were going back a significant number.
That means either that we're really not doing very many and I
believe that is true, but I also believe it is true that once
someone gets a good passport with bad documents, it is hard for
anybody to find it.
So I don't know what the numbers are. I would like to
believe that they are low. Every evidence I have is that they
are low, but even one is too many.
Senator Kyl. Would you say that if someone, say a
terrorist, is bound and determined to get a U.S. passport and
has a working knowledge of the kinds of things that you've been
talking about here that it is more likely than not that if they
use the techniques available to them, including the use of bad
breeder documents for obtaining a drivers license, that they
would be able to get a genuine passport from the State
Department?
Ms. Sprague. I would say, I would remind you that there are
two things that we determine. One is identity and the other is
citizenship.
I think it is much more difficult for people to try and
pass themselves off as Americans than it is for Americans to
pass themselves off as other Americans. So if we are looking at
homegrown terrorists who wanted to have a separate identity,
that causes me tremendous concern.
If you are asking me if I thought a foreigner could come in
and easily obtain a passport in his own or another name, I
would like to believe that that would be a far more difficult
challenge. We focus a lot of attention on verifying
citizenship.
I think that, I would return to my comment. It is easier
for an American to pose as another American than it would be
for someone who is not an American to pose as one.
Senator Kyl. All right. You might need to be careful in
view of the judge's decision in Arizona yesterday putting an
extra burden on the United States government when you seek to
verify U.S. citizenship. They seem to be very fragile in this
regard, at least according to the affidavits that were
submitted in the case I say facetiously, thank you very much
for both of you testifying.
Senator Cardin. Senator Hatch.
Senator Hatch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Some of my
questions may have been asked because I got here just a little
bit late, so if they have, I apologize. Just say they've been
answered.
You suggest that the Bureau of Consular Affairs be
designated a law enforcement entity in order to access data
sharing among Federal, state and local governments.
How would this help your consular officers in combating
passport fraud?
Ms. Sprague. I mentioned before but I'm happy to mention it
again because I really would like to leave a very strong
impression.
This is, the various states have privacy regulations and
that is appropriate. Almost all of them have an exception that
data from their vital statistics, be it drivers licenses, birth
certificates or death records can be shared with law
enforcement.
For us, the most effective way to hit against those
databases is at the front end of the process. We can't do that
at this time because there is not an easy work around with each
of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the city of New
York, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to get that other than as
a blanket exception that we are involved in a law enforcement
function.
We are not interested in law enforcement for anything other
than for getting access to records which are otherwise
protected from disclosure because we need them to protect the
people of the United States more than anything else.
Senator Hatch. Now you, I understand you'd like to require
Social Security numbers on all passport applications and I
regularly hear from my constituents about identity theft and
privacy concerns which often stem from the fraudulent use of
Social Security numbers.
So it is hard for me to advocate for another opportunity
for potential misuse. But that being said, I would like to hear
how requiring Social Security numbers would combat fraud within
the passport issuance process, and we know there are so many
false Social Security numbers out there.
Ms. Sprague. Although there are many false Social Security
numbers out there, the Social Security database is still a
source of tremendous, is a tremendous resource for us because
it enables us to quickly identify legitimate Americans, people
who have longstanding identities and that we can issue their
passports expeditiously.
It also enables us to single out into a smaller subset
people about whom we have some question, particularly if
someone is operating with a false Social Security number.
Right now if someone does not submit a Social Security
number, we certainly give that application additional scrutiny.
It takes them longer to get through the process. But our hands
are tied because this data is so useful to us and we don't have
it available to us.
The Social Security Administration is able to confirm back
to us and does on an overnight basis the name, the date of
birth, the Social Security number, whether or not they are
dead, which is obviously an important thing, and their gender.
We lose all those things if we don't have the Social Security
number up front.
I would agree that we have tremendous concerns about the
misuse of Social Security data or privacy data in general and I
will be very candid with the committee. A passport application
is the mother load for somebody who wants to commit identify
theft. It is all there. For that reason, we have been very,
very attentive to the need to protect that data.
Not only by ourselves, but by our colleagues in the
acceptance facilities. This year we required that they begin to
send us all their applications by traceable mail. Our new
acceptance facility oversight program, that is one of the
primary points of their investigations to make sure that this
data is being appropriately protected in the post office.
So your constituents are right to have legitimate concern
about this. We do, too. But we don't know how else we can find
out who they are before we issue them a passport.
Senator Hatch. Part of the initial passport application
process, acceptance agents as the U.S. postal facilities must
review various applicants' identity and citizenship documents
as well as their submitted photos.
These agents are also required to fill out an observation
checklist regarding any concerns about the validity of the
applicant's documents.
In your experience, what are the challenges presented by
using a U.S. postal acceptance agent in the passport process?
Ms. Sprague. The post office and the clerks of court who
support us, 9,400 of them around the country, are good
partners. Obviously it is always a risk when you are entrusting
such an important duty to someone who doesn't work for you
directly.
But I would have to say that almost universally, especially
the postal service has tried very hard to meet our
expectations. Our new acceptance facility oversight program has
gone out. They have been received. In only a little over 6
months we have done over 1,300 inspections. We have been
received enthusiastically. People are anxious to learn, they
are anxious to do it right.
Having said that, they have their own challenges.
Particularly the postal service has many financial strains. As
people leave, the new people are not trained immediately, it
causes them to have a disruption in being able to provide the
service. Some of the people take to this better than other
people and that's why we have the new acceptance facility
oversight program because we are very anxious to make sure they
are doing the best possible job. They don't work for us but
they do a very good job of working with us.
Senator Hatch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate this opportunity.
Senator Cardin. Thank you for your questions. Let me come
back to the point that you raised about greater access to
identification information.
Obviously if someone has used fraudulent documents to get
an ID document, that's not going to show up if you have a valid
drivers license that was obtained through fraudulent means. But
that was not the essence of the concerns at least expressed by
GAO and that is that there is fraudulent documents being used
to obtain a passport.
Looking at drivers licenses, looking at the birth
certificates and also Social Security numbers, that technology
exists to be able to verify that information. Admittedly there
is just so many types of birth certificates that you point out
and we have at least 50 jurisdictions with drivers licenses.
And then I think you pointed out, Ms. Sprague, that the postal
services do not have that equipment readily available.
My question is why not? Why shouldn't we have the ability
to verify the information from a drivers license? We can swipe
cards today pretty quickly. Why don't we have that similar type
of technology that's implemented in terms of passport
verification? The legislation that I mentioned in my opening
statement would designate you as, the Consular Affairs as law
enforcement, so it does take care of the issue that you raised
initially and with Senator Hatch. It also gives you access to a
lot of these databanks.
The question is would you have then the capacity to use
that information? It seems to me, and I guess I'll start with
Mr. Kutz first, isn't that the key here? Doesn't the examiner
have to have access to the databanks in order to be able to
verify the validity of the documents that are being used?
Mr. Kutz. Well, the first line of defense is at the post
office. Most of these passports the post office is the initial
contact. For example, in all of our cases we went to the six
post offices and one of the first things they did was took our
drivers license, went to a copy machine and made a copy of it
and gave the original back.
So right there you are operating with a copy of a
counterfeit document. There is no way you could ever determine
a copy of a counterfeit. So that is something that is very
important why I think you're talking about having the ability
to match with other state records.
If you had real time access to match the drivers license
number with the state database while that person is sitting
right in front of you, that would be critical. That would deter
people from coming in in some cases if they knew that someone
was going to actually do that or if they had the machine there
that was going to actually try to authenticate the drivers
license, that might deter people from even coming in in the
first place which to me, prevention is the most important part
of this.
Senator Cardin. Well, I agree. I think that's the point. If
you make a copy, as you pointed out, make a copy of a
fraudulent document, to be able to trace that later is going to
be very difficult. You have got to do it while the person is
there. The technology exists. So is this a funding issue?
Ms. Sprague. It is a funding issue, but it is also an
access issue. I cannot envision a circumstance in which N-LETS
would enable us to have that kind of verification access at
point of sale, if you will, for the post office.
However, if they can determine if it is counterfeit or not,
which they could do with a very simple device that is available
commercially, that would take us a long way. We would get to
the counterfeit.
Then when the actual drivers license comes into us, we
would be able to hit against N-LETS and at that point we would
be able to figure out if it was in fact a validly issued
drivers license. So you eliminate the counterfeit right at the
beginning and then at the N-LETS point of view as it comes into
passport, we're able to identify it.
We really don't want our postal people to try and confront
people who are committing a fraud. We would rather that be
taken on by skilled professionals. In fact, even at our
agencies when we have someone who is committing fraud, we bring
in reinforcements from diplomatic security and our guards
onsite to handle how that particular apprehension will take
place.
Senator Cardin. So just so I understand before I get Mr.
Kutz's response to this, if I might. If the intake person at
the postal service determined that the drivers license was
fraudulent, what would that person do? Allow the applicant to
leave?
Ms. Sprague. They would, and we would, they would provide
us a check sheet and then we would take it from there. We do
that whenever they suspect fraud and we have had some terrific
leads from postal people and the people in the clerks of court
who have spotted somebody as being suspicious, provided that
back to us and we have successfully traced it back.
Remember, the person really wants to get their passport, so
they are going to be somewhere where they can pick that
passport up. So we do have a second chance at them if we do
want to apprehend them.
In passport fraud, obviously whenever we can, we work with
the U.S. Attorney to prosecute, and that is the best outcome.
But if we are successful in preventing the issuance of the
passport and identifying the person as a fraud, that is too a
very good outcome.
So considering the disbursion and the sensitivity of the
data and the sensitivity of the states to the exposure of their
data, I think that that model would be successful for us.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Kutz, do you have a view about that?
Whether at the intake make a determination on fraudulent on the
drivers license, but then the rest being done at a centralized
location?
Mr. Kutz. I would just say this. I think that if you look
back at history, this goes back, it is almost set up like a
pre-9/11 process in a post-9/11 world. If you were to start
this all over again, would you set this up at the post office
from the security standpoint? Perhaps not.
But we have what we have at this point, so two layers of
defense here. If you had the machines to authenticate the
drivers license and subsequent we have the ability to validate
or authenticate with the DMVs, to me those two together would
work in this environment.
Senator Cardin. So how far away are we from having that
equipment located at the service centers?
Ms. Sprague. At my counters and agencies, as soon as the
procurement is finished we will have it done. It's relatively
straightforward for us to move ahead with that.
The post office wants to do it. They have showed us a
machine that they'd like that actually does a whole lot more
than that, but they simply don't have the capital to invest in
that.
Now, they are paid for what they do for us. The passport
applicant gives them $25 and they use that to cover their
costs. The problem is they need some way to capitalize it up
front.
I am not an expert on these things, but in the back of my
mind I have thought if we could set up some sort of rotating
capital fund which they could reimburse with what they collect
from the applicants, because of course everything we do in
passports and in fact most of what we do in Consular Affairs is
funded, so that we are able to establish what it costs and that
and only that is what we charge to the users of it whether it
is visa applicants, overseas or Americans who are seeking
services.
Senator Cardin. Would you just make available to our
Subcommittee the cost issues here?
Ms. Sprague. I would be happy to do that.
Senator Cardin. Just so we get a better understanding of
that cost.
Senator Kyl.
Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if maybe we
could work with the Committee that Chairman Lieberman and
Ranking Member Collins, Homeland Security, to determine whether
or not postal service has ever requested any assistance from
the Congress, and if so, what has happened to it. If not, why
not and then work with you all to see if we could obtain that.
If it's just a matter of funding for a commercially
available program and it could be as effective as you say it is
and the ramifications of not finding these things are as
serious as the GAO has said and we totally agree with that,
then this is something we ought to pursue.
Do you agree with GAO's assessment that you have not
implemented, not you, but the department has not implemented
the previous recommendations of the GAO?
Ms. Sprague. I would say that we have implemented a great
many of them, but we haven't solved all our problems. For
example, the acceptance facility oversight program is something
that was first recommended in 2005. We rolled it out this year.
I'm very proud of it.
It took us too long, but it's a good program. Some of our
verifications with Social Security we got beat up and we should
have been beat up because we didn't have it a year ago.
We have got an excellent relationship with Social Security.
They are working with us right now to have real time access.
Right now we get 24 hours. They are going to give it to us real
time. We are actually at the point of figuring out how much it
is going to cost and making exchanges of business requirements
and we are very optimistic that we will get this problem
solved.
The only reservation I have when I talk about what we can
and cannot do is, neither the Social Security Administration
nor the states can give us what they don't have.
For example, the death master file is a wonderful thing and
in fact Social Security in our 24-hour turnaround gives us
access to all of the death data that they have. But it isn't
complete. In the case of two of the applications that we looked
at, the people who died were not in the Social Security death
master file.
After the fact, we couldn't figure out why their Social
Security number came up as an absolute perfect match. We did a
little bit of research and our managers figured it out, and it
was that they weren't in the death master file. In this
particular instance we figured out how we can address it. But
the death master file is not perfect. Social Security makes no
claims that it is perfect.
Another tool that we use, and in this instance was not as
successful as we would have hoped, is the SSN validator is what
we call it where you can figure out by using an algorithm when
and where the Social Security number was issued. The GAO likes
to beat us up with that and they beat us up with that again
this time.
Social Security doesn't maintain that. It is sort of a
separate entity and we have to maintain it as separate from
what we get back from Social Security. But it doesn't matter
because Social Security is going to abandon that algorithm for
very good reasons, but it is going to leave us in a hole in
terms of any newly issued Social Security numbers. It is not
only children, it is also immigrants, remember. We won't be
able to tell when it was issued because it won't be in the
algorithm.
Social Security doesn't maintain their data in that way
that they can share it with us. So we've got a big problem that
we can figure out a solution to. We are working very closely
with Social Security, we hope we can find a solution, but we
are anxious about that.
Senator Kyl. Mr. Kutz, do you have a response to what Ms.
Sprague has just said?
Mr. Kutz. Yes. I would say in one area that they did
improve, we used the first four we got last time, one of them
was a child, a legitimate SSN we got with counterfeit documents
several years ago. They didn't catch that last time.
This time we used another child we have that had a
legitimate Social Security number and they did catch it, so
that was an improvement in that Social Security matching. So
that's why I think they're making progress in that issue of
validation of deceased or regular Social Security numbers.
It is not easy, but I think the real time, as real time as
you can get on that access, that is an important element of
this.
Senator Kyl. It just strikes me that you are now
identifying some additional problems that you're going to have
to contend with and you've told us that you are working with
Social Security to try to resolve this last problem that you
mentioned.
I think it might be helpful for us if you could give us a
brief report, memorandum, that tells us all of the things that
you think are necessary for you to do your job the very best in
issuing passports to people only who are entitled to them and
then to the extent that some of those things require the
executive branch to get people together, perhaps it can do
that. To the extent legislation might be necessary, we can
address that.
To the extent that GAO has identified things that your
department can do better, address that in the memo as well. If
you think yes, they're right, you can do better, fine. If you
think there is some reason why you can't would you put that in
the memo for us?
Ms. Sprague. I would be happy to do that.
Senator Kyl. I know I'm asking you to do something here
that the Chairman hasn't requested, but I think probably all of
us could benefit by such a report.
Ms. Sprague. I would be happy to do that.
Senator Kyl. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Senator Hatch.
Senator Hatch. I'm happy with what I heard.
Senator Cardin. Let me just underscore the point that
Senator Kyl made on information. As I try to analyze, and the
question I asked at the end of the first round is what should
our expectations be and it was a serious question.
I understand that this is a process that we can do a lot
better and we need to do a lot better, but what is reasonable
for us to expect here as far as performance is concerned? I
think there have been many worthwhile suggestions that have
been made that don't seem to be overly burdensome from the
point of view of the timeliness of the passport applications
and the cost for processing it.
As you pointed out, Ms. Sprague, this is a fee generated
reimbursement structure, so therefore the people of this Nation
are entitled to get the services for the fees that they are
paying.
What it seems to me is that there are different layers of
protection here. Each one helps us. On the drivers licenses, it
seems to me that the technology is there to be able to
determine a fraudulent document through a relatively efficient
process at the application stage that should be implemented. It
also seems to me that access to the databanks will also help
you detect fraudulent applications. Now, that may need to be
done at a centralized location, but it is a second layer.
On the Social Security numbers, the records kept on those
who are deceased is one method, but as you point out, it's not
foolproof. So therefore you look at the Social Security number
which gives you some indication, but that's not foolproof. So
it seems to me you have to combine all these issues in the most
efficient way and by doing this, the net will be tight enough
that you're going to increase dramatically the denial of those
fraudulent applications.
Then when we get to the birth certificates, I couldn't
agree with you more that this is a task that we really need to
work with local governments, and try to figure out a more
effective way of verification of birth certificates that are
fraudulent. Because again, that information is available, it is
just not in a very useful way and it seems to me we need to
make greater progress there.
As I have been informed, there are other identification
documents that we haven't really gotten to today, but it seems
to me that those are less problematic than some of these other
forms that we're talking about.
I would ask that you get us the information that we
requested. We do have legislation that we're looking at. I
really do know that the people are working extremely hard to
get this right and we know it's not an easy task. Congress
doesn't always show its appreciation in the right way when we
have our budgets that we can take up, but we need to do better.
I think GAO has pointed out that we can do better. It is
not that we should be doing better. So I think all of us are
going to have to sort of work together and figure out a way to
reduce the error rates and to make the passport, which is
considered the gold standard, really the gold standard,
minimizing any fraudulent applications being successful.
Mr. Kutz, I thank you very much for the work that your
agency does. I think it is done in a very up front way with the
Congress. Ms. Sprague, I thank you for the seriousness in which
you have always treated the information, and your presentation
and cooperation with this committee. And we look forward to
working with you for better results.
Senator Kyl. May I just add one more thing? If there is
another 9/11 and people obtain fraudulent documents as they did
in that case like drivers licenses, for example, and people ask
why it happened, I think every one of us has to be able to say
we did everything we could to prevent it from happening.
I think maybe we take it too lightly because it has been a
long time now, but we tend to forget what happened back then
and why it was that people could operate freely in this country
because they had obtained fraudulent documents.
So I think some degree of urgency is required here as well.
Ms. Sprague. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cardin. The hearing record will remain open for 1
week for additional statements and questions for the record. If
there are additional questions that are propounded, I would ask
the witnesses to respond in a timely manner to any of those
written questions. With that, the Subcommittee will stand
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions and answers and submissions for the record
follow.]
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