[Senate Hearing 111-869]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-869
BRIEFING ON OPERATION MOSHTARAK IN HELMAND PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 22, 2010
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Briefing on Operation Moshtarak in Helmand Province, Afghanistan
february 22, 2010
Page
Flournoy, Hon. Michele A., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 4
Paxton, Lt. Gen. John M., Jr., USMC, Director for Operations, J-
3, The Joint Staff............................................. 6
(iii)
BRIEFING ON OPERATION MOSHTARAK IN HELMAND PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN
----------
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Hagan, McCain, and LeMieux.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; and David M.
Morriss, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Paul J. Hubbard,
and Jennifer R. Knowles.
Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Greta Lundeberg, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Patrick Hayes and Mike Pevzner, assistants to Senator
Bayh; Tyler Smith, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer
Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Perrin Cooke, assistant to
Senator Hagan; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Jason
Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant
to Senator LeMieux; and Chip Kennett, assistant to Senator
Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. First let us
welcome our briefers this afternoon, Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy Michele Flournoy, and Lieutenant General John
Paxton, Director for Operations, J-3, the Joint Staff. They
will be providing the committee with an update on Operation
Moshtarak in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, which is named for
the Dari word that means ``together.'' This operation is being
conducted by combined International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) and Afghan forces totaling around 15,000, deployed side-
by-side to the central Helmand River Valley, including the
former Taliban stronghold of Marjah, to support extending the
authority of the Government of Afghanistan to the Afghan
population there.
It represents the most significant campaign since President
Obama concluded his strategy review in December and it is a
critical test of the counterinsurgency strategy announced by
the President and implemented by General Stanley McChrystal.
While much of America is watching the Olympics and the
daring of our athletes, we must keep a constant eye on the
extraordinary bravery and skill of our troops and their allies.
An important component of General McChrystal's campaign plan is
the emphasis on putting the Government of Afghanistan and the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in charge of their
country's security. Afghan Government officials, including
President Karzai, Defense Minister Wardak, and Interior
Minister Atmar, have played active roles, apparently, in
planning and approving operations.
According to Marine Brigadier General Larry Nicholson,
Afghan forces are partnered at every level with the marines. He
says these Afghan forces are not ``cosmetic,'' but are in the
fight. News reports have also said that the ratio of Afghan to
U.S. troops in Marjah is almost 1 to 2, one Afghan soldier to
two coalition troops. Now, that's considerable progress from
the 1 to 5 ratio which was the case when I visited the marines
in Helmand Province last September.
I'm particularly interested in hearing this afternoon about
the performance of ANSFs, including the extent to which they
are in the lead in operations.
It appears that ISAF and Afghan forces have made steady
progress in removing the Taliban and restoring security to
Marjah and central Helmand. But this has come at a very heavy
price. Twelve North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
soldiers, including at least eight Americans and three British,
have died in the offensive so far. Many more have been wounded.
The cause they fight for is a vital one to our security. It
is also far more complex than many military operations, because
a key aspect of the counterinsurgency plan is to provide
governance. It has been reported that the Afghans have prepared
a ``government in a box'' to quickly begin providing services
to the Afghan people once security has been reestablished.
General David Petraeus, Commander of U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), has called this operation the ``initial salvo of a
12- to 18-month military campaign.''
Ultimately, as General McChrystal has said, this is a war
of perceptions, which will be measured by whether the Afghan
Government, with our support, succeeds in gaining the trust of
local Afghan people.
Finally, I hope our briefers will address the plans for
providing incentives to low-level Taliban fighters to renounce
violence and reintegrate with Afghan society. Also of interest
would be any developments in the reconciliation process between
the Afghan Government and senior-level Taliban leaders. As
General Petraeus has noted, reconciliation is not done with
one's friends, but with one's enemies.
I want to again thank our briefers for coming this
afternoon. We look forward to hearing from them, and our
thoughts and our prayers are with the men and women who, again
while putting on the uniform of this great Nation, are in
harm's way as we meet here this afternoon.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our
distinguished witnesses for briefing us today on Operation
Moshtarak in Afghanistan. I join you in honoring the brave
Americans, along with our NATO and Afghan allies, who are now
serving and sacrificing in this consequential operation.
The most important thing I think we should remember today
is that the campaign in and around Marjah remains a work in
progress, just like the broader strategy of which it is a part.
There's much work yet to be done. So we should refrain from
drawing firm conclusions at this time, either overly optimistic
or overly pessimistic ones.
First, I would like to address the effectiveness of ANSF.
There have already been press release reports about how much
the Marjah operation has been NATO-led rather than Afghan-led,
and this raises concerns about the ability of the Afghan forces
to operate effectively and professionally on their own one day.
We should remember, I think, that the early operations of the
surge in Iraq were nearly all U.S.-planned, U.S.-led, and U.S.-
fought. It was only by living and fighting and sacrificing
together with American troops over time that Iraqi security
forces (ISF) grew more effective. We should work urgently to
foster a similar development with the Afghan forces, but I
don't think we should expect to see the results that we need
overnight.
The same goes for the Afghan Government. Key pillars of the
Marjah campaign plan are to ``hold'' and to ``build,'' the
civilian effort to help Afghans deliver better governance and
economic opportunity once the Taliban is cleared out. Indeed,
this effort will largely determine the overall success of the
operation itself. We should expect this process of the Afghan
Government reform and capacity-building to be one step forward
and two steps back, and two steps forward and one step back.
I'm eager to hear how our civilian agencies plan over the
coming months to support the Afghan authorities and the success
of Operation Moshtarak.
Finally, Pakistan. The recent capture of Mullah Baradar and
other high-value Afghan Taliban leaders is obviously a good
news story. The question is what does this imply about
Pakistan's strategic orientation. Are the Pakistani Army and
Interservices Intelligence (ISI) taking a more aggressive
stance towards the Afghan Taliban? I'd be cautious about
reading too much into these positive recent developments, but
we certainly are pleased to hear it.
I'm eager to hear how our distinguished witnesses assess
Pakistan's recent success, as well as many others surrounding
our campaign in Afghanistan. I thank the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
After we conclude our hearing here, we will move to a
closed session, which will be in the Capitol Visitor Center,
Room SVC-217.
Again, with thanks, we will call first on you, Secretary
Flournoy.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Ms. Flournoy. Senator Levin, distinguished members of the
committee: Thank you very much for giving us the opportunity to
give you an update on our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan. You
all understand the importance of the challenges that we face
there, and the depth of our commitment to meeting those
challenges.
When President Obama first took office just over a year
ago, we confronted a pretty bleak situation in Afghanistan.
Many of our early gains had eroded, the Taliban was re-
ascendant in many parts of the country, and Afghan confidence
in the coalition was in decline. President Obama ordered an
immediate strategy review and in the course of that preliminary
review we made a number of changes. The United States added
about 30,000 troops last spring and NATO appointed General
McChrystal as the commander of ISAF.
General McChrystal immediately began to emphasize the
importance of counterinsurgency as a strategy and prioritized
protecting the Afghan people over killing the enemy. He issued
a series of new tactical directives for ISAF, everything from
partnering with the Afghans to convoy driving behavior.
So far, the evidence suggests that this fundamental shift
in approach has been extremely successful. The percentage of
Afghan civilian casualties caused by coalition actions has
dropped substantially. This has produced significant shifts in
the Afghan people in terms of their attitudes towards ISAF.
Compared to a year ago, Afghans today report that they are far
more optimistic about the future and have far more confidence
in our ability to prevail over the Taliban and other violent
extremists.
We've seen other positive indications in the last year as
well. Although the Afghan elections in August were certainly
marred by electoral fraud, the new government was ultimately
formed and, despite serious issues such as corruption that
remain, most Afghans have a degree of confidence in their new
government.
In his December speech at West Point, the President
announced a number of refinements to our strategy, which you're
familiar with: the addition of 30,000 additional troops in
places where they're needed most by the summer of 2010,
supplemented by several thousand additional NATO and non-NATO
troops. This strategy refinement focuses on reversing the
insurgency's momentum and accelerating ANSF growth, while also
improving their quality.
We are also surging civilian assistance to develop both
national and sub-national governance capacity, using economic
development to enhance government legitimacy. We've also
assured our Afghan partners that this kind of assistance will
be enduring.
Our refined strategy has received very strong support from
our allies and partners. Our NATO allies and non-NATO partners
have already pledged more than 9,000 additional troops to our
efforts and we have another force generation conference at the
end of this month.
We've also seen some positive steps taken by the Karzai
Government. At the January 28th London conference, President
Karzai reaffirmed his government's commitment to peace,
reconciliation, reintegration, developing its security forces,
good governance, fighting corruption, and so forth. He has said
all the right things.
The London conference also produced a renewed international
commitment to strengthen civil-military cooperation in
Afghanistan. This was reflected in part by the announcement of
a new NATO senior civilian representative, who will be General
McChrystal's civilian counterpart to coordinate things on the
civilian side, as well as a new United Nations special
representative, Stefan de Mistura, representing the Secretary
General in Afghanistan.
Now, of course, none of these steps by themselves
guarantees success. As Senator McCain said, this is a work in
progress. But we are seeing conditions begin to develop that we
believe will ultimately be necessary for success, and for the
first time we believe we have the right mission, the right
strategy, the right leadership, and the right level of
resources in support of the mission.
Our efforts to build the capacity of the ANSF are again a
work in progress, but showing some progress. We believe we're
on track to meet our end strength goals for fiscal year 2010
and that would be 134,000 for the army and about 109,000 for
the police. We recognize, however, serious challenges related
to recruiting, retention, and attrition. But we do see our
Afghan partners beginning to take steps to address issues of
pay and benefits to raise both the retention of the force and
the quality of the force. We have set targets for fiscal year
2011 that we believe are both achievable and sustainable and we
will continue working towards those.
We're also seeing some positive signs, in terms of using or
leveraging our development assistance in support of building
governance capacity. Last week I had the chance to visit the
Arghandab Valley in Regional Command-South (RC-South), which
many used to call the heart of darkness. This is a place with a
storied history, a place where the Soviets never managed to
achieve their goals. It is a place where now, after very
serious fighting in the summer and fall, we have U.S. infantry
soldiers working with a Canadian civil-military detachment, an
operational mentor and liaison team, along with civilians from
State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development,
and Department of Agriculture, partnering very closely with a
Afghan district governor, local tribal leadership, an Afghan
National Army (ANA) kandak, and local Afghan police, to really
begin to develop programs that will provide the foundation for
governance and economic development.
What's there are the seeds of transforming a very tough
environment into what we're trying to achieve in Afghanistan
more broadly. By using development to support Afghan
governance, we see a district governor that's now become an
energetic ally and who's working overtime to resolve disputes
and jump-start projects with the local community.
I don't want to suggest that achieving success will be
simple or easy. Far from it. We have many challenges as we move
forward. We're still struggling to improve retention and
decrease attrition with the ANSF. We have a lot to do to
improve the quality of the training that we offer our Afghan
partners, but we are engaged in very aggressive diplomatic
efforts to get our partners to provide additional trainers and
mentoring teams for the ANSF and we believe we will be
successful there.
Inevitably, we will face some setbacks as we make progress.
We need to prepare for the possibility that things may get
harder before they get better. As additional U.S. and coalition
forces flow into key geographic areas where we have not had an
ISAF presence before, we may well see increases in violence,
and increases in attacks on our forces. Our adversaries are
cunning, they are adaptable, they are tenacious, and we will
need to continually reaffirm our commitment and refine our
tactics in response.
As all of you know, the operations in Helmand are going
well so far. I will leave the specifics to Lieutenant General
Paxton, but I do want to emphasize that this really is the
first large-scale effort to fundamentally change how we are
doing business, to protect the population as the top priority,
to work very closely with our Afghan partners, and to ensure
that the ``clear'' operations that we're conducting actually
pave the way for the ``hold'' and ``build'' with regard to
governance and economic development.
I think you've seen an extraordinary level of civil-
military planning and engagement with Afghan partners in the
preparing of this operation, not only the government, but also
local tribes and populations. But again, these are the early
days, and it is too soon to draw any firm conclusions.
Let me just say, however, in conclusion that at this point
in time I am cautiously optimistic. I do believe that we have
the right mission, the right strategy, the right leadership,
and the right resources. As we move forward, there will be
challenges, but we will continue to adjust and ultimately I
believe we will make progress towards our objectives.
Let me conclude there and turn it over to General Paxton to
provide you more detail on the operations themselves. Thank
you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Flournoy.
General Paxton.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., USMC, DIRECTOR FOR
OPERATIONS, J-3, THE JOINT STAFF
General Paxton. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator
McCain, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for your time today. As Secretary Flournoy noted, my remarks
will focus on the current operations in the Central Helmand
River Valley and I'd like to explain how these operations will
fit into General McChrystal's overall context. From there I'd
like to move to how the operations were planned. The third
point will be how we work with our Afghan partners, and from
there I'll take a look at where the operations are in their
current phase of execution and then explain where we expect
them to go.
In June 2009, after assuming command of ISAF, General
McChrystal embarked on an assessment of the situation in
Afghanistan. He developed the campaign plan to provide a secure
environment that would enable improved governance and
development in all of Afghanistan. At the heart of the campaign
plan were the requirements to: (a) protect the Afghan people;
(b) enable the ANSF; (c) neutralize the malign influences; and
then, (d) support the extension of governance. Our operations
today in the Central Helmand River Valley are directly tied to
all four of those objectives.
In his assessment, General McChrystal identified southern
Afghanistan as the main effort for the campaign. In southern
Afghanistan, we intend to clear high population areas like the
Central Helmand River Valley that are threatened by the
insurgency. Right now our two largest points are to separate
the insurgents from the population and then to demonstrate our
resolve and our commitment to stay, as Senator McCain talked
about earlier, so that we can gain credibility with the people
of Afghanistan.
More importantly, our efforts are trying to build on the
capabilities of the ANSF and the legitimacy of the Afghan
Government. General McChrystal views these operations as
essential to enable ISAF to seize the overall initiative in the
campaign nationwide, to reverse the momentum of the insurgency,
and to demonstrate resolve to the international community and,
most importantly, to the people of Afghanistan.
The operation being executed, as noted by Senator Levin,
Moshtarak, which means ``together,'' is an accurate description
of how the operation was planned and, most importantly, how
it's being conducted today. Operation Moshtarak is the first
operation in Afghanistan where coalition planning has been
fully integrated with our Afghan partners from the very start.
This planning has been integrated at all levels, from the
provincial government, led by Governor Mangal, all the way up
to the national level in Kabul.
It should be noted that the planning was not confined to
just ANSF. Planning for Operation Moshtarak was integrated with
other efforts throughout the Afghan Government. President
Karzai was briefed on these operations and now has cabinet-
level ownership of the operation itself.
Moshtarak is being executed in the four traditional phases
of the counterinsurgency operation: the ``shape,'' the
``clear,'' the ``hold,'' and the ``build.'' Extensive shaping
operations over the last several months were executed prior to
the start of the ``clear'' operation. As noted before, these
were done at not only the army level, but at the police level
and the special operations forces level. So we were partnered
in all three of those evolutions.
Shaping efforts involved Afghan and coalition forces. Most
importantly, these shaping operations involved extensive
interaction with local tribal leaders to ensure that their
concerns were addressed before the start of the clearing
operations as well as the current phase in the operation.
The ``clear'' phase was embarked upon last Saturday,
February 13. The clearing operations are being conducted with
five ANA kandaks, roughly battalion-sized units, and three
Afghan commando companies. In addition to the Afghan Army
units, the operation will make use of about 1,000 Afghan
National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan special police
that is nationally recruited. We are also in the process of
training approximately a thousand new Afghan National Policemen
who will reinforce Nad'Ali and Marjah later in the operation.
If I can at this time, I'd just like to draw your attention
to the map here to my left and to your right, which shows you
the geographic boundaries of the upper Central Helmand River
Valley. It's a triangular area. It's roughly bordered by
Garmser on the south, Lashkar Gah on the northeast, Marjah on
the west, and Nad'Ali in the north. So that's the area where
the operations are currently being confined to.
In order to meet the coalition force requirements for
Operation Moshtarak, we accelerated the deployment of two
Marine battalions from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, which were
made available by President Obama's decision to increase the
force levels in Afghanistan. British forces have also been
brought in, to bring the total size of the force to between
8,000 and 10,000 ISAF and ANSF combined troops.
Prior media announcements of the operation likely persuaded
some of the Taliban leaders to flee the area, which has
decreased the morale of those fighters who have remained.
Within the first days of the clearing operations, the
insurgents appeared to be in disarray. ISAF and ANSF
encountered only sporadic insurgent contact or organized
resistance. The insurgents appear to be focused on self-
preservation rather than on an organized defense of the Central
Helmand River Valley.
Pockets of resistance, however, still remain in Nad'Ali
district. In Marjah there is stiff resistance from the
remaining insurgents. The U.S. Marines, in partnership with the
ANSF, are still fighting a series of intense actions in that
area. Understanding how effective our forces are, the
insurgents will continue to use improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) as their primary weapon system. As many of you know,
between 65 and 70 percent of our casualties continue to come
from the IEDs.
There are encouraging signs that parts of Marjah are now
starting to clear, that the ANCOP forces have been introduced
into the area, and that it's now secure enough, as we noted
last weekend, to even bring Governor Mangal back into Marjah
for a series of successful meetings with the tribal elders.
Ground commanders assess that the population is broadly on our
side and is likely to remain so, as long as they can be
persuaded that we're making a genuine commitment to ensure
their long-term security.
We are satisfied with the pace of operations so far and
have decided to take a very deliberate approach to the
continued clearing operations in order to protect the
population. There have been isolated incidents of regrettable
civilian casualties. We have seen the Taliban use the civilians
as human shields in some cases.
In the weeks ahead, when conditions are appropriate--and I
stress here again the conditions-based aspect of the
operation--we will transition to the ``hold'' and ``build''
phases of Operation Moshtarak. Our efforts during these two
phases will focus on quickly rebuilding damaged infrastructure,
on offering support to local communities, and supporting the
reconstitution of the Afghan Government and all institutions in
Helmand. During the ``hold'' and ``build'' phases of the
operations, the ANSF on the ground will demonstrate the
presence and resolve of the central Afghan Government.
As I conclude my remarks, I would like to reiterate what
both Senator McCain and Secretary Flournoy said, that, in spite
of recent successes, we know that this is going to be a hard
fight. We know that there are going to be pockets of intense
resistance and there will be, as you said, Senator, perhaps one
step forward, two steps back, for a while. But we're committed
to the process and the work that lies ahead in partnership with
our Afghan partners and coalition partners.
Thank you for your time.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
Why don't we try an 8-minute first round.
We've read various reports as to how the Afghan forces are
doing. Some reports indicate that they're doing very well, they
are in the fight, they are brave, they are doing everything
which we would hope that they would do. Other reports are less
positive. A report in the New York Times yesterday was fairly
negative, saying that it's mixed at best, that they're rarely
in the lead, that they wait to be led, that they have not yet
led one effort.
General, can you give us your assessment as to how the
Afghan forces are doing? I'm going to ask you about the
planning of the operation in a moment and whether they're
adequately equipped. But most important is their willingness to
engage.
General Paxton. Thank you, sir. All indications are that
they have been every bit as present as U.S. and coalition
forces and every bit as engaged as U.S. and coalition forces.
Their standards of operation and their training, of course, are
much different than ours and I'm sure that leads to the wealth
of discussions about how effective they have been. But if you
go by the metric, sir, of whether they have been with us
lockstep from the beginning, the answer is yes in terms of not
only the planning, but also the execution. I think the
visibility of the Afghan national forces in the operation is
what's going to lend credence and credibility to a partnered
operation and start to build the confidence of the local
population that there are not just coalition forces in there,
sir.
Chairman Levin. Are we predominant in terms of numbers and
in terms of taking the lead?
General Paxton. We are certainly not predominant in terms
of numbers, sir. The number of Afghan kandaks and commandos is
larger than the number of U.S. and coalition forces by perhaps
1,500 to 2,000. So their physical presence on the ground is
more than ours. Having not been there myself, sir, the
indications are that it has been partnered every step of the
way, sometimes with them in the lead, sometimes with us in the
lead. Obviously, the face that we would like to put forward
during the clear operations is the Afghans in the lead, because
they have the cultural awareness and the ability to work with
the population.
Chairman Levin. That's good to hear. I think when we
visited Afghanistan, as we have on a number of occasions, our
leaders and our troops told us that they have a lot of
confidence in the Afghan forces. There have been some
exceptions to that, but for the most part we were reassured
that they have the willpower, the bravery, and the willingness
to engage. So your report is a good one and it is reassuring.
It's important that that be the case, and that the American
people hear that that's the case, and equally important that
the Afghan people hear that that's the case.
One of the issues which I have focused on is the question
of the Afghan units, how many, what is their capability, the
shortfalls that we have in their numbers, and what the goals
are in terms of numbers. But on our last visit we were given
some pretty startling news, that the number of trainers of
Afghan forces was only at about 37 percent of what was
necessary. That came as a very disturbing bit of news to us,
because there's so little excuse for there not being adequate
trainers.
On February 19, our supreme allied commander, Admiral
Stavridis, said that NATO remains 2,000 trainers short of the
number needed and he was hopeful that NATO would meet those
levels when defense ministers meet in Belgium this week for a
force generation conference.
I believe, Madam Secretary, you indicated that there were
9,000 troops that had been forthcoming altogether from NATO
allies and others. Where are we on the trainers issue?
Ms. Flournoy. We are still trying to fill a shortfall of
about 2,000 trainers. That is the target going into the force
generation conference on February 23. We are working very
actively with our allies. I was on the phone myself with two
ministers of defense this morning and we are making calls,
really trying to put as much emphasis on contributions of
institutional trainers as well as Operational Mentor and
Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Mentoring and
Liaison Teams (POMLTs) as possible.
Training and developing the ANSF is the long pole in the
tent in Afghanistan, and we have to support that effort with a
fully resourced force. So we are pulling out all the stops to
work towards that. We are also reexamining our own
contributions to make sure that we're doing everything we can
to fill that gap.
Chairman Levin. I think we've added 1,000 trainers already,
have we not? The first of the 30,000 have arrived and were put
right into the training issue.
Ms. Flournoy. Yes.
Chairman Levin. The training, as I use the term, really
includes three pieces, right? One is the first kind of 8-week
basic training. Then we have the mentors who are OMLTs, as you
call them, who are with their units. This would be just a
handful of our people with each of the Afghan units. Then,
perhaps the most important part of the training is that
partnering, that in-the-fight togetherness which you have
described. We're 1,000 short of trainers that are not in
combat; they are separated from combat. The idea that NATO has
not carried out their commitments and they've only fulfilled 10
percent of their commitment as of the time we were there is,
frankly, startling, shocking, and unacceptable to me.
I just hope that when you talk to our NATO allies and when
we have these discussions that you can report two things, at
least. One is we're grateful for those NATO allies who are
there in the fight and who have given so much. We have a number
of NATO allies who have done even more than their share. But
many of our NATO allies have not stepped up as they have
committed to, and it is that group of NATO allies that I'm
particularly unhappy about.
My next question has to do with the reintegration and
reconciliation piece and as to whether or not we are involved
already in a reintegration program in Central Helmand as part
of Operation Moshtarak. Have we seen any effort there to
provide some incentives to the low-level Taliban fighters
there, including amnesty and a job, to try to get them to
renounce violence and switch their support from the Taliban to
the Afghan Government?
Has that begun? Is it too early because we're right in the
middle of a fight? Where are we on that?
Ms. Flournoy. First of all, let me say thank you to this
committee for demonstrating leadership in getting us the
authorities to actually use some of our Commander's Emergency
Response Program (CERP) funding for reintegration. We are
putting the mechanisms in place to enable that. It's very much
anticipated to be part of the operations in Helmand and other
parts of Afghanistan as the momentum shifts and as
reintegration becomes more attractive to some of the low-level
fighters who are willing to put down their weapons.
I think these are the early days. I think there have been
some small indications of interest, but that part of the
program is definitely expected. It has yet to take off, I would
say.
Chairman Levin. Just to wind that up, there's a loya jirga
in March as I understand it. Do we expect that there will be a
jointly approved reintegration plan between the Afghan
Government and us and our allies by that March loya jirga?
Ms. Flournoy. I would certainly hope so. That's something
that we set for ourselves as a goal coming out of the London
conference, certainly for reintegration. We hope to have a full
plan in place very soon.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the
witnesses again for being here.
Secretary Flournoy, General McChrystal's initial request
for the troop increase was about 40,000. The number of 30,000,
I believe, was arrived at by counting on significant makeup of
those shortfalls by additional contributions from our allies.
Is that correct?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Now, over the weekend the Dutch Government
collapsed and they announced that they will be withdrawing in
August. That's 2,000 troops. The Canadians will be withdrawing.
What are the prospects of getting sufficient number of troops
to make up that difference between the 40,000 that General
McChrystal recommended and the 30,000 that are actually being
deployed?
Ms. Flournoy. I think that we are seeing NATO allies step
up. The initial estimate was 7,000. It's now up to 9,000.
Senator McCain. Are you taking into consideration the Dutch
decision to pull out?
Ms. Flournoy. Again, that is something that we will have to
see once they form a new government.
Senator McCain. They've announced that they are
withdrawing, Madam Secretary. That's a matter of record.
Ms. Flournoy. That is the government's plan that just fell,
but there will be a new government.
Senator McCain. Do you have any prospect that they will
remain in Afghanistan?
Ms. Flournoy. I think there are prospects that there will
be some significant form of some contribution from the Dutch.
Senator McCain. Anywhere near the 2,000 troops they have
there now? I think we all know what's reported in the media,
Madam Secretary, and I think we ought to plan for it.
Now, the Canadians are leaving as well, is that correct?
Ms. Flournoy. Not until 2011.
General Paxton. Yes, sir. What we have done is endeavor for
those nations that we have a reasonable expectation are leaving
to see if they would pony up folks for trainers and then we
would take the United States or the other coalition and allied
nations that are still there and we would do the differential
by moving some of the existing forces into combat forces, but
we would ask them to maintain on the training side, sir. Some
have indicated that they would do that.
Senator McCain. I say with great respect you are getting
different information than I am, including conversations that I
had in Munich with our NATO allies. I believe that Senator
Lieberman got the same impression.
Look, we might as well face up to the fact that the Dutch
are leaving. That's why their government collapsed. I'm
grateful for their participation and I have great sympathy for
the losses they sustained. But we have to deal with realities
of what the actual allied contribution is going to be and, very
frankly, Madam Secretary, to somehow believe they're going to
make up that difference is very different from the realities of
their domestic political situation.
Steven Coll wrote an article on February 15 in The New
Yorker where he says that the key area in Afghanistan is
Kandahar. Obviously, it's a historical seat of power, it's the
birthplace of the Taliban. I think obviously you know all those
reasons. He questions whether Kandahar shouldn't have been the
focus of our offensive as opposed to the present one. General,
maybe you can respond to that.
General Paxton. Yes, sir. When General McChrystal started
his assessment last July, he had broken the country down into
five potential areas for operations, sir. Some of this we can
get to in the subsequent discussions in the closed session
afterwards. He divided those five areas into three groups: one
where there was a focus of operations that we needed to
initially go after a main effort; then there would be a
supporting effort; and then the third group would be the
economy-of-force effort.
Kandahar area was in that first large group of a main
effort and a place we would go. But the General's assessment,
and based on briefs through the Joint Chiefs and Chairman
Levin, was that the Central Helmand River Valley was where the
insurgency had the most safe havens, the most succor, the area
that we really needed to go after first if we were to open up
the freedom of movement throughout RC-South. So I think you'll
see, sir, that Kandahar will closely follow, but it just was
not the preference for the initial attack, sir.
Senator McCain. I keep hearing reports, General, that the
Rules of Engagement are overly restrictive. Can you clear that
up a little bit for us?
General Paxton. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Senator McCain. In other words, we're hearing reports that
even if they see an armed enemy, they can't fire unless they
are fired upon. I don't know if that's true or not, but maybe
you could clear that up.
General Paxton. Yes, sir. Thanks. There has been much
discussion on this in open sources here. There have been no
changes to the Rules of Engagement, starting at the baseline
for self-defense and the rules for actually engaging an armed
combatant. What General McChrystal has done through a series of
at least three major tactical directives is give all his
subordinate commanders litmus tests to look at to make sure
that in the execution of the mission, they are not taking undue
risk by putting civilian casualties in the equation or
aggravating the mind set of the population by killing innocents
that don't need to be engaged at that time.
Senator McCain. So it's a careful balance between trying to
reduce or eliminate civilian casualties and at the same time
allowing the military to defend themselves.
General Paxton. That's correct.
Senator McCain. Do you think they have the right balance?
General Paxton. I think they do, sir. I think, given the
education of the force and the experience through many years
now in both Afghanistan and Iraq, that our subordinate
commanders can exercise that judgment call and use that litmus
test properly, given the situation that they face, sir.
Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, there are press reports
that the Taliban have been able to build up their strength by
about 35 percent over the past 2 years in the Afghan-Pakistan
border, up by 7,000 more than in 2008 to about 27,000. Are
those reports accurate and what do you attribute it to if they
are?
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I'd rather answer that in closed session
if we could.
Senator McCain. Okay. But it is an area of concern.
General, are we capturing significant numbers of Taliban
fighters?
General Paxton. Senator, we have captured some. I wouldn't
classify it right now as significant. There have been some
killed and some captured, and some have fled the area, if you
will, sir. But we're waiting to assess how many and of what
intelligence value they are, sir.
Senator McCain. But the NATO forces are operating under the
so-called 96-hour rule. They can only be detained for 96 hours
and then they have to be released. Is that a problem?
General Paxton. Sir, I'd have to get out to talk to the
commanders on the ground and go back through General McChrystal
to see if in the last 10 days that has posed a problem over
there. None that I have heard of, sir.
Senator McCain. Has this operation gone pretty much as you
had thought that it would? Have there been any surprises?
General Paxton. No, sir. I would characterize the operation
as according to plan.
Senator McCain. As you expected?
General Paxton. Yes, sir. The expectation that there would
be a large amount of IEDs, that there would be bands to try and
restrict our movement, that there would be focused complex
attacks, all of that was exactly as we anticipated, sir. The
fact that local nationals and the civilian populace have
started to identify to us where those IEDs are, the fact that
some Taliban have departed the area, and the fact that we have
already seen some markets and bazaars start to open as people
entrust their livelihood and their security and safety to the
Afghan forces and the coalition, that's heartening to us, but
we just don't want to put too much stock in it right away. But
we have seen some of that, sir.
Senator McCain. Is there a significant presence of foreign
fighters?
General Paxton. I can't answer that right off the top of my
head, sir. I'll go back and get that answer to find out, of
those that we have killed or captured, what the percentage
would be of foreign fighters as opposed to Taliban or Pashtu or
Dari, sir.
Senator McCain. Thank you. I thank the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, General Paxton, thanks very much for being
here. Secretary Flournoy, I wanted to ask if you could explain
how our operations in Marjah fit into the broader offensive to
retake southern Afghanistan from the Taliban that I know will
unfold as this year goes on.
I begin by asking if I'm correct in thinking that our
operations in Marjah are just a first step in a broader
campaign to break the Taliban's momentum, and that the next
step after Marjah is likely to be to focus on Kandahar?
Ms. Flournoy. General McChrystal has talked about this
being a war of perceptions, and I think Marjah is an opening
salvo. It is a first step. It is designed to begin to create
that shift in momentum. Once we have that in Helmand, the focus
will very much shift to Kandahar Province.
Just having come from the Arghandab, there are pockets
where that shift is already taking place in Kandahar Province.
So I think there is some positive momentum in areas there
already.
Senator Lieberman. My understanding is at this point the
lion's share of the surge forces that have arrived in
Afghanistan are in Helmand, where the population is smaller
than in Kandahar, and Kandahar, as you well know, has a
historic significance to the Taliban as a center of their
operations.
So I want to ask you if you feel that we have enough
forces, basically, to handle both? Can we fulfill General
McChrystal's role or purpose of not just taking a town and then
leaving it, in other words keeping some general presence in
Marjah and Helmand, and also have enough forces to move into
the larger area of Kandahar? General, do you want to start?
General Paxton. Thank you, Senator. I think your assessment
is correct, sir. We do believe, General McChrystal and then the
assessment thereafter, that Marjah, Nad'Ali, and the Helmand
River Valley were the places to start, again because of
sanctuary and safe haven and the fact that we needed to crack
the insurgent stronghold there, to open the freedom of
movement, with a reasonable expectation that Kandahar was still
going to be one of those cities that was part of the main
effort, that we would have to go there.
To your second point, sir, you're absolutely right. There
is a commitment on both the Afghan National Security and the
coalition forces that we have to already lean into the ``hold''
and ``build'' phase while we're doing the ``clear'' phase. So,
consequently, we can't outrun either our capacity or the
limited numeric capability of the Afghan National Security
Forces.
So we are partnered with them with the expectation that
they will stay in the Marjah-Nad'Ali area. Then some operations
will have an overlap, but I wouldn't say they will be
simultaneously. Some of them are going to be more sequential,
sir.
Senator Lieberman. So do you think we have enough troops
there to both ``hold'' and ``build'' in Helmand and move on to
take Kandahar City?
General Paxton. Yes, sir, that is the plan. I'm sure again,
because General McChrystal's assessment was that it would be
conditions-based, I think we will be very careful and
deliberate not to overstretch ourselves by moving on to another
area before we've completely cleared or we have enough resident
capacity to hold that area before we step off and go somewhere
else, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Secretary Flournoy, in this regard I
remember when President Obama announced his decision to surge
our forces, which I appreciated greatly. There was indication
that beyond the 30,000 American troops that were committed and
the hope for 10,000 more, which we hope is realized, that
Secretary Gates would be given the latitude to increase the
American presence beyond the 30,000 troops.
Just remind me if I have that correct, and if so is there
any contemplation at this point, because of the resource-
intensive nature of these drives, particularly if, as seems to
be, and we're all thrilled to see it, we seem to be breaking
the Taliban momentum in Marjah and perhaps have an opportunity
to move on to Kandahar? Does Secretary Gates have that
authority, and if so, is he prepared to use it to seize the
moment as we regain the momentum against the Taliban in
Afghanistan to make sure we have enough troops on the ground?
Ms. Flournoy. When the President approved the additional
forces for Afghanistan, he did give the Secretary of Defense
the flexibility of about 10 percent to request additional
troops should they be required. I think in the Secretary's
mind, given his experience of the last couple of years, he
anticipates that will most likely come in the form of critical
enablers that have to do with force protection, lifesaving, and
mobility. I think that he's very much interested in seeing the
force flow continue through the summer and then have that bit
of flexibility to adjust, should urgent needs emerge at that
time.
Senator Lieberman. Good. That's reassuring to hear.
Let me go to the capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, top
Taliban military commander in the Quetta shura Taliban, who was
seized in the Pakistani city of Karachi. I wonder if either or
both of you could assess for us what you think the operational
impact of the capture of Mullah Baradar will be on the ability
of the Taliban to wage its insurgency in Afghanistan?
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I would be more comfortable
answering this in closed session if that's all right with you.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, that's okay with me. Perhaps with
the next question I was going to ask, you'll feel the same way.
It's rare that we hear anything positive said in this country
about the ISI, the Pakistani Intelligence Service, but it is
true, I gather, that they participated, and were perhaps in the
lead, in the capture of Mullah Baradar. Is that correct?
Ms. Flournoy. Again, I would refer any details to the
closed session. But what I would say is that the ISI has, in
many cases of counterterrorism operations, been a very
important partner for our intelligence agencies and actually
contributed substantially to the capture of a number of high-
level people from terrorist organizations. But I will reserve
comment on any specifics.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your
answer. I think we've learned as we've gone to Pakistan a lot
and talked to our people there, that this is a mixed picture
with the ISI, and that's saying something positive. In other
words, it's not all negative.
Ms. Flournoy. It's not all negative.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, the negative obviously is our
concern that there continue to be contacts between some
elements of the ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba and other terrorist
groups. But on the other hand, it is reassuring to note that
they have contributed significantly to counterterrorist actions
by our own intelligence or military forces.
My time is up. Thank you very much. Thanks to General
McChrystal and the troops. My own sense from here, and it's
validated by what you've said, is that it's early, but we've
begun a turnaround, and that's very significant.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary and General, for being here to answer
our questions today. General Paxton, the news reports indicate
that this effort could take a month or more. Do you have a time
frame when you think that our troops will have achieved the
mission in Marjah?
General Paxton. I do not, Senator. Again, based on my
earlier comments, it will largely be conditions-based and we'll
have to see how these initial operations, particularly in
Marjah and Nad'Ali and Garmser, turn out. But we're going to
continue to press forward in partnership with the Afghans and
with a high degree of energy.
Again, the critical phase here of the four is actually the
``hold'' phase. So the clearing is what gets all the attention
because of the casualties, because of the destruction, because
of the kinetics involved. But it's going to be the transition
from the ``clear'' to the ``hold'' that will be the most
important, and that will be the condition that will allow us to
know when it's time, as Senator Lieberman said, to perhaps look
at another objective.
Senator LeMieux. I think you said earlier that we have
sufficient troops for the ``hold'' phase?
General Paxton. We believe at this time that we do, both
U.S., coalition, and Afghan.
Senator LeMieux. One concern that has been expressed in the
past is that when we fight the Taliban, they sometimes just
throw down their weapons and recede back into the local
civilization and then come out and fight us later. Afghanistan
has traditionally had a fighting season. I think we're earlier
than that. This is still before the fighting season. Is there
any concern that these folks are melting back into the
civilization and are going to come back later?
General Paxton. There is always, sir, a concern that
they'll come back. For right now, though, the ability to
reclaim key terrain, reclaim areas of population, and have them
throw down their arms and leave is perhaps a good thing. If we
can demonstrate a commitment to stay, if the population can
demonstrate a resilience and an agreement to work with the
ANSF, then those who have thrown down their arms and left may
be faced with two opportunities: of either retreating further
or starting to think about reconciliation, which is where we
want to go.
Senator LeMieux. Based on the ratio of the number of folks
that we're capturing or killing, is there anything that would
lead you to think that it's out of the normal based upon our
experience? In other words, are we not capturing enough or
killing enough? Could there be more melting back into
civilization or lack of civilization?
General Paxton. I think, based on 9 or 10 days, it's
probably a little bit premature to make any of those judgments,
although there are some things we can talk about in closed
session that would give us an indication that this may be a
good opportunity that presents itself.
Senator LeMieux. Senator McCain spoke about the Rules of
Engagement. I have in front of me an L.A. Times article from
February 19 that talks about the Marines being warned of rough
treatment or even harsh language aimed at a detainee, that when
making an arrest they are instructed to ask the subject if they
will go voluntarily with them.
Having met with General McChrystal, I understand the need
to handle this in the right way. But do you think that these
Rules of Engagement are appropriate? Are we giving our men and
women the appropriate tools to do the job?
General Paxton. Yes, sir, not only the Rules of Engagement
kinetically about direct fire and indirect fire, but certainly
the rules in terms of handling detainees. There's a clear line
and distinction between what's appropriate for sensitive site
exploitation and handling detainees, and what is not. Again,
it's based on the concept that you want to gain a potential
source of information or a potential ally, as opposed to
alienate some of the population that you may not have
sufficient intelligence or indication right now is truly an
enemy. So discretion is the better part here.
Senator LeMieux. Secretary Flournoy, in the discussions
about forces who are aiding us in the coalition, I wonder if
there are other countries outside of NATO that would be willing
to help. I was in Columbia last week and saw the special
forces, I think there were about 38 of them, who are deploying
to go over to fight with us in Afghanistan. Are you looking at
countries outside of NATO to lend support to our warfighting
effort?
Ms. Flournoy. Absolutely. We have allies like Australia,
and others from Asia. The Koreans are putting in a Provincial
Reconstruction Team. Countries from South America, as well as
some from the Middle East, are also offering their training
facilities as potential training sites over time for the ANSF.
So I think we have many non-NATO partners who are also
contributing importantly.
Senator LeMieux. Can that help us make up the difference if
we lose some of these NATO folks?
Ms. Flournoy. We are certainly moving in that direction,
yes.
Senator LeMieux. The last thing I want to touch on, and
Chairman Levin briefly referenced it, is this notion of
``government in a box.'' Part of that strategy and part of this
whole counterinsurgency strategy is the communications efforts
that we do to win the war of the hearts and minds of the people
who have been under Taliban rule and may wonder whether or not
we're staying and whether or not the information they're
receiving from us is accurate or the information from Taliban
is accurate.
When I was in Afghanistan at the end of October, there was
some concern that we weren't doing as good of a job as we could
be in the information department. We had met with a Colonel
Kraft who was working in Special Forces, who had done a good
job of radio stations and other types of communication to make
sure that the people know what's true and not true.
Are you implementing those efforts in this offensive?
General Paxton. Yes, sir. There's a very conscious
messaging piece to it, and some folks would say we're almost
telegraphing our punch. But it was to try and force people to
make a conscious decision to either cooperate or to leave the
area.
Part of it is the messaging, but the other part is the
actual delivery of goods and services, so that the populace
doesn't feel that they owe allegiance to a shadow government
who provides something that the local government cannot. With
the help of this committee and the help of the forces over
there, we're able to provide the rudimentary assistance for the
start to clinics, to schools, to local governance, which is
what the people seek.
Ms. Flournoy. If I could just add, part of the civilian
surge going into Afghanistan is building up the civilian side
of our ability not only to do our own strategic communications,
but also to help build Afghan capacity, Afghan radio stations,
Afghan media, Afghan press, and so forth. We have some new
leadership going into that effort, some new resources, and I
think that will begin paying off over the coming year as well.
Senator LeMieux. I had a chance to go to CENTCOM not too
long ago in my home State. I think there was some concern that
in the current budget request there's not enough funding for
these efforts going forward. I don't know if you have an
opportunity to review that or have an opinion about it. If not
today, it's something we could talk about in the future.
Ms. Flournoy. We are actually writing a very detailed
report to Congress, as requested, on the whole of information
operations, including in Afghanistan, and we'd be happy to
discuss details for ways we could augment that effort.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you.
General, these folks that we see retreating when we're
fighting them, are they heading south into Pakistan or are they
heading to Kandahar? Is there one central focus of their
migration or are they fleeing everywhere?
General Paxton. Because there are many areas of combat,
they're moving in a lot of different areas. I would tell you
that some of the trend seems that they may be moving north and
east. But we can discuss more of that in the closed session,
sir.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary and General, for your service
and for being here today. Beyond the clearing of, let's say,
Marjah, is there any expectation or have we anticipated how
long the ``hold'' and ``build'' phases might last in terms of
Marjah?
General Paxton. I don't believe we have, sir, simply
because again the ``hold'' phase is the critical one and until
we can see the efficacy of the Afghan security and the Afghan
local government, I'm not sure we can be able to safely predict
that on a timeline, sir.
Ms. Flournoy. If I could, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure.
Ms. Flournoy. One of the unique qualities of this was
bringing in Afghan ministries from the ground up, if you will,
in the planning of this operation. What we're doing is
dovetailing this with their own district development program.
The Afghan ministries that will be coming in to Marjah to set
up district offices are actually going to stay indefinitely.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is that the ``government in a box''?
Ms. Flournoy. That is the reference. It's sort of the
beginning of the Government of Afghanistan's enduring presence
in these areas, that we hope will endure indefinitely.
Senator Ben Nelson. Part of the plan then apparently is to
use as much or as many of the ANSF for the holding, as much as
the ISAF troops; is that accurate?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes. Initially it will be the Afghan National
Police and the ANCOP, and then it will become the local police
over time.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is there anything in particular that
makes us believe that the Afghans are ready for this role of
their own self-governance within some reasonable period of
time?
Ms. Flournoy. Certainly at the subnational level, I think
there's a real eagerness on the part of many populations to see
development, and to see responsive governance. What we're
seeing now is many of the ministries in Kabul stepping up to
build their capacity to be present at the provincial level and
now the district level. They need our help with that. They need
resources for that. But there is certainly an interest and a
willingness, and I think they see this as an opportunity to
move down the road towards achieving that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is there a sense of decentralization
going on here in this process? I don't mean that in a
pejorative sense as much as I do recognizing that the local
control and local interests have to prevail for this to be
successful.
Ms. Flournoy. I think there's a sense that most Afghans
experience governance at the local and district levels, and
that's where you have to really create momentum. It's where the
Afghan Government interfaces with more traditional social
structures, tribes and clan elders and so forth. So I do think
that's where the emphasis is, or much of the emphasis is right
now.
General Paxton. Sir, if I could, I believe there's a sweet
spot in there, because obviously you want the local governance
to flourish, you want the trust and confidence in the local
governance. That's what General McChrystal and his staff have
tried to do by bringing Governor Mangal in for some local
shuras and jirgas.
Part of the reason to go back and brief the entire
operation to President Karzai and to get the ministries to buy
in was to force that connective tissue between the local
government and the national government, so that the local
governance would not be on their own and die on the vine. So
we're trying to force not only the security issue with the
ANSF, but the governance between local and national as well.
Senator Ben Nelson. Are we running into similar problems as
we experienced in Iraq, sectarian differences creating a
challenge to have local governance?
Ms. Flournoy. I guess I would say there are tribal dynamics
at work.
Senator Ben Nelson. But those are different than religious
sectarian.
Ms. Flournoy. Yes. I think that part of the challenge in
Afghanistan is to seek governance processes that will enable
balance at the local level with competing groups that have
sometimes competing interests or histories of grievance. So
that's where having Afghan partners really helps us to work
through those issues at the local level and make sure that
there's a process for adjudicating those. Part of what has
given the Taliban traction is the absence of any kind of
adjudication mechanism, any kind of justice. I think the more
we restore that in terms of local governance, the less room for
the Taliban.
Senator Ben Nelson. We might learn a great deal about the
Helmand Province area. An experience or an education that we
receive there, will that help us in the other provinces?
Because this isn't going to be limited to that central part of
Afghanistan.
Ms. Flournoy. I think many of the players will change, but
I think a lot of the lessons learned will translate.
General Paxton. I was just going to say, sir, we're always
looking to capture success stories, best of breed, and to see
what is transferable. We have to be very cautious. Just as we
didn't want to make sure everything was literally transferable
from Iraq to Afghanistan, in the same way it may not be
transferable between Helmand and Kunar or Kunduz or any of the
other provinces.
We are looking for things that are transferable and, as
Secretary Flournoy indicated, some of the indications in
Afghanistan are that it's more about intimidation, tribal
dynamics, corruption, and neglect than it is about sectarian
issues, as it may have been in Iraq. But we're watching that,
sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. We're hopeful that the ``government in
a box'' concept will be acceptable to those local tribal
leaders. Will there be a general resistance to the central
nature of that ``government in a box''?
Ms. Flournoy. One of the things we're doing is using
development to enhance the reach and legitimacy of the local
government. I can draw on the example of what I saw in
Arghandab. What you have is the development piece creating
momentum that brings people to the district government to be
able to participate. It is really enabling the local government
in a way that it hasn't been enabled before.
Senator Ben Nelson. One final question as it relates to
counterinsurgency. Is the training that's under way for our
troops in Afghanistan, as well as for the Afghan forces,
sufficient for counterinsurgency? Are we closing the knowledge
gap in Afghanistan, as we apparently were doing in Iraq, on
counterinsurgency?
General Paxton. Yes, sir. I think I can assure you that the
training is adequate to the task. That doesn't mean it's
perfect because we're always looking to improve the tactics,
techniques, and procedures we use based on best of breed,
lessons learned, changes to the equipment, and defining things
that work better in certain conditions or environments. We are
capturing that, and all indications from our National Training
Center, our Joint Readiness Training Center, and what we're
doing here in the States, as well as what we do in Europe, are
that it's adequate to the task, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As one of the Senators from North Carolina, I want to
definitely give kudos to our marines from Camp Lejeune that are
leading these efforts in Afghanistan. The 2nd Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of approximately 10,900 marines,
under the command of Brigadier General Nicholson, is doing an
excellent job in Helmand Province and the current Marjah
offensive. There are four Marine task forces under the 2nd
MEB's operational structure and I'm proud to say that the 1st
Battalion of the 6th Marine Regiment was the first unit
deployed to Afghanistan as part of President Obama's decision
to deploy the additional 30,000 troops. I'm also proud of the
Marine Special Operations Command of approximately 300 marines
that's heading the Special Operations Task Force in
Afghanistan.
One of the concerns that I continue to have is the maiming
and killing of a number of our soldiers due to the IEDs. I know
that in Afghanistan they are difficult to detect because of the
small amount of metallic content. But I want to be sure that
our servicemembers have the best defense available to protect
them against what I believe is the greatest source of combat
casualties.
Several weeks ago, when I met with Lieutenant General Oates
and we were talking about this, I was concerned when he stated
that we were only able to detect and mitigate about 50 percent
of the IEDs.
Lieutenant General Paxton, I know that Secretary Gates
mentioned that you are chairing a counter-IED task force with
Under Secretary Carter. What are some of your observations
regarding the types of intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and human intelligence assets that we need to
increase the IED detection and mitigation above this current 50
percent rate? How can we better assist at the brigade and
battalion levels?
General Paxton. Thank you, Senator. I am indeed one of the
co-chairs on the Secretary's counter-IED task force. We are
looking at this through a technology aspect, a training aspect,
and then an equipping aspect. There are at least three
component pieces to the way you defeat.
As I'm sure General Oates passed on to you, ma'am, there
are three things that we look at: actually defeating the
device, developing the network, and then building the
intelligence that goes behind that. We are looking at best of
breed from technology across the United States, whether it's
soil conditions and infrared (IR) and electro-optical (EO) and
different types of photographs that we can take, and taking a
look at how we can work with local nationals to tell us where
they have been.
I think the operations in Marjah so far will tell us that
about 65 or 70 percent of the IEDs that we do detect are being
passed on to us by word of mouth from local nationals. That's a
good sign because they watch and they know where they are, and
they will tell us things that we cannot necessarily pick up
from technology. That goes to the heart of the very reason that
population-centric counterinsurgency and the deliberate piece
of the shaping and clear is so important here. It cuts down on
the number of IEDs present, or at least, improves the
opportunity to find IEDs.
We'll have the opportunity here over the next 3 or 4
months, ma'am, to come back with the IED task force and to
further elaborate both technologically and in training about
where we're going, and the good things that are resident in our
capabilities that we want to capitalize on, either get more of
or get into the fight or pass off to the Afghan National
Security. That's one of our components, is to see what kind of
things the U.S. forces have that we may be able to share with
coalition partners and allies, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. So the human intelligence asset is a great
contributor in this endeavor right now?
General Paxton. Yes, Senator. The human aspect is probably
the most important right now. You always think that you can
rely on technology and there will be a better type of
photograph or a better type of sensor. But eyes on target or
somebody who watched it get emplaced is still the most positive
and most reliable indicator.
Senator Hagan. You mentioned EO. I'm not familiar with
that.
General Paxton. Electro-optical or infrared, all the
different types of photographs and scanning capability we may
have, either from an elevated line of sight platform or
something in the air.
Senator Hagan. Also, I know that in Afghanistan the
ammonium nitrate is part of the component parts. I was curious,
has the Pakistan military taken an active role in countering
the smuggling of this ammonium nitrate into Afghanistan, and if
not, how can we engage them to address this important factor?
Ms. Flournoy. We did succeed in working with the Afghan
Government to ban ammonium nitrate on their side of the border,
and we have raised this issue with the Pakistan Government in
hopes that they will also assist. This has just come about, so
we have yet to hear back from them about their position on this
issue.
General Paxton. If I may, Senator, obviously there are
legitimate uses for it for agriculture and legitimate uses for
it for cratering and quarrying and road construction and things
that they need for infrastructure and development. So we are
now in the process of trying to work with the two governments,
Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as with our intelligence
detection sources, to figure out where it's produced, how much
is necessary, and then how much of it is above and beyond that.
A lot of that may go to the heart of import-export controls and
how those local governments track how much they bring in, how
much they make, and how much they export. There's where I know
Secretary Flournoy, Secretary Carter, and I will continue to
work on that, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Reportedly, elements of the Afghan Taliban high command are
beginning to relocate from the city of Quetta in Pakistan's
Baluchistan Province to the city of Karachi, due in large part
to drone attacks. Obviously, this makes it more difficult to
locate and apprehend the senior Taliban leadership because
Karachi is a major metropolitan city with over 3 million
Pashtuns.
How will the Afghan Taliban high command's relocation to
Karachi impact the U.S.-Pakistani intelligence efforts to
apprehend them?
Ms. Flournoy. I'm not sure I'm the right person to answer
that, because it may be more for some of our intelligence
agency brethren. But we could certainly talk about it more in a
closed session.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Let's just try a fairly brief second round. We'll start
with 5 minutes.
You indicated, General, there were five kandaks, five
battalions, of the Afghans. Do you know offhand and could you
tell us in open session if you do, whether or not those units
are at the highest level of capability, CM-1, or whether
they're CM-2, or whether these are new troops that are coming
in straight from basic training?
General Paxton. Sir, I cannot right now. I think I can get
that answer for you and perhaps in closed session I could pass
that, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right, thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. There is an integrated decisionmaking
process between us and the Afghans, I understand, within that
operational command. Does the Afghan commander approve all
aspects of the operations? Is that a joint decision?
General Paxton. Sir, I know there is an Afghan corps who
developed the concept of operations in parallel with the MEB
commander, with the force commander there, and then briefed it
and did what we call the rehearsal of combat drill with RC-
South. So I know they have been intimately involved in the
collaborative planning.
I do not know, in terms of the command and control
relationships, who has the final say and whether it is single
or collaborative. My estimate is, based on military
experiences, that you can only have one commander at one time.
So they will partner in terms of who controls which piece of
the battle space and who is making a decision on a ``clear''
piece and who on a ``hold'' or who on a ``maneuver'' and who on
a ``fire.'' So they're probably doing that collaboratively,
sir.
Chairman Levin. Would you let us know the answer to that
question for the record?
General Paxton. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
We confirmed that the answer given in the open session was
accurate. International Security Assistance Force commanders sought
recommendations and insights from their Afghan National Security Force
counterparts as full partners throughout this combined operation. The
ultimate C2 for the operation fell to Commander IJC and the RC(S)
commander.
Chairman Levin. There was a very strong surge in recruiting
in the Afghan Army that came right after the President made it
clear in his West Point speech that he was serious in terms of
not being an open-ended commitment, not being an occupation
army, by the way in which he framed the beginning of the
drawdown. Our general there who's in charge of training of the
Afghans was very specific about the surge that came at the end
of 2009 in the Afghan recruits. Do we know whether or not that
recruitment has continued to be strong through January?
General Paxton. Yes, sir, it has. The recruitment,
retention, and reenlistment have continued, sir. Although we
are still behind our fiscal year 2010 goal, we are still
continuing to see increases in recruiting. I think we're up
between 57 and 60 percent on retention, which is below the 65
percent goal, but it's going well, sir.
Chairman Levin. That's great news. Thank you.
Secretary Flournoy, can you give us an idea as to the role
of President Karzai and his cabinet in the run-up to this
operation? How involved were they, including the minister of
defense, Minister Atmar, other ministers, as well as the
president?
How much consultation was there with the villages and
village elders in Helmand Province prior to this operation?
Ms. Flournoy. Consultation with both was extensive. I think
on the Afghan Government side in Kabul, in addition to the
national security ministries, defense, interior, National
Directorate for Security, you also had the ministries that
would really have lead responsibility in the ``hold'' and
``build'' phase also brought into the planning from the start.
So you have a very high level of ownership and involvement at
the cabinet level.
General McChrystal briefed President Karzai several times.
The final time it was really engaging him to approve the
operation and the start time.
Chairman Levin. Was that approval forthcoming?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Was President Karzai accurately quoted when
he said that that was the first time that he had been asked to
make that kind of decision?
Ms. Flournoy. I think it was the first time he had ever
been asked, yes.
At the local level, there were multiple shuras with the
local community, really talking to them about the situation on
the ground, whether they wanted their area to be cleared,
whether they wanted to be rid of the Taliban, whether they
wanted Afghan and coalition forces to come in, and working
through what it would look like and whether they are prepared
for the risk that would be involved.
So I think that also set the conditions for the local
population to have real buy-in into the operation. This wasn't
just something happening to them. This is something that they
actually asked for.
Chairman Levin. Can you characterize the response of the
village elders at those shuras, as to whether they generally
were supportive, whether they were neutral, or whether they
were critical?
Ms. Flournoy. I think initially there was probably some
skepticism, but I think in conversation the vast majority of
them became very supportive. But they were also very clear that
they wanted not just a clearing, they wanted the ``hold'' and
the ``build,'' and they wanted legitimate and responsive
governance at the end of the day when it was all over.
Chairman Levin. When you say ``shape, clear, hold, build,''
I've had some conversations where I've suggested we add the
word ``transfer.''
Ms. Flournoy. ``Transfer'' or ``transition,'' I think that
is very much part of the plan.
Chairman Levin. I've forgotten who it was that said that
they were going to add that fifth stage of transition or
transfer.
Ms. Flournoy. It may take our doctrine a while to catch up,
but that is the idea.
Chairman Levin. I think it's really important to everybody.
It's important to us, it's important to our people, it's
important to the Afghans, that that be seen as a goal of this
mission, not just to ``shape, clear, hold, build,'' but to
``transition.'' So I hope, General, you will add that to your
sequence there.
General Paxton. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, I think it's best I save
my questions for the closed session, though I'm trying to play
Scrabble in my mind with what word I can come up with with
``shape, clear, hold, build, and transition.'' I don't have one
yet, but there's an acronym there somewhere. [Laughter.]
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
My final question here for the open session is the question
of metrics or milestones. Senator Nelson, among others, has
been one of the members of the committee who's put a lot of
focus on this. I misspoke the other day when I said we were not
given milestones, because apparently we had been given
milestones, but they were classified milestones.
If we haven't already made the request for unclassified
milestones, we would make that request now. That would include
the metrics. I don't know if metrics and milestones are
synonymous. But if you could give us some metrics, not today,
as to how we would judge the Afghan people's trust. It may be
impossible. It's not just public opinion polls. Is there any
other way that you can gauge that? If there is it would be
welcome along with those unclassified milestones.
Finally, for both of you, we've worked on a chart which I
think both of you have, which is a matter of milestones. It's a
chart which shows the end strength currently of the Afghan
Army, the objective in October 2010 and July 2011, the
capability status of the Afghan battalions starting with the
baseline of December 2009 for this progress chart. Battalions
are partnered, this is something which is extremely important
in RC-South and RC-East. How many of those partnered battalions
are fully integrated? Lieutenant General Rodriguez gave us some
numbers or is giving us numbers in terms of full integration,
not just the partnering but ``fully integrated'' I believe were
his words. The trainers, which we call ``initial trainers,''
which is the first 8 weeks of training, so he would give us
what is the requirement, how many are assigned, what the
shortfall is.
This is a work in progress, as you would say. We're adding
recruiters and retention. What was the number of recruiters we
already got with the initial trainers column, and what is the
retention?
I'm pretty sure in your offices you will have that chart,
but we will give you an up-to-date one.
Ms. Flournoy. I have not yet seen it, sir, but I will be
happy to help you fill it out.
General Paxton. I just saw the most recent version just
this morning, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Levin. I know you've probably been working on it,
and you've been helpful in getting us those numbers.
We thank you again and we will see you over at the Capitol
Visitor Center.
We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
operation moshtarak
1. Senator McCain. General Paxton, the traditional epicenter of
Taliban influence within Afghanistan has been based in Kandahar. Why
did we decide to devote our manpower and resources to Marja, rather
than controlling Kandahar and bringing the same sort of commitment to
restoring the authority of the Afghan Government and providing good
governance and adequate services and security there?
General Paxton. The first phase of operations targeting Kandahar
was to take away the insurgents' base of operations in Central Helmand
that directly affects the security of Kandahar City. While ongoing
operations in southern Afghanistan are currently focused on Central
Helmand, they serve primarily as shaping efforts for upcoming
operations in Kandahar.
The area of the Central Helmand River Valley has been a historical
stronghold and safe haven for insurgents where they profit from the
narcotics trade and unimpeded freedom of movement. A body of reporting
from the last 12 months suggests the Taliban were using Marja as a
staging area to launch attacks, and smuggle drugs and weapons to
outlying areas. The Taliban had also mined key lines of communication,
fortified fighting positions, stockpiled weapons caches, and
intimidated the local population throughout Nad Ali District. Marja was
a specific area in Central Helmand from which Taliban insurgents were
exploiting the local population and launching attacks against coalition
forces and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as well as
influencing the insurgency within Kandahar City. Helmand also benefits
from stronger provincial leadership than Kandahar. Ghulam Mangal, the
Helmand governor, and much of his staff are supportive of Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), capable of implementing
development programs, and actively compete against malign powerbrokers.
Operations have been ongoing since the beginning of this year to
improve the security in Kandahar and its surrounding areas. Now that
the insurgent base of support in Central Helmand River Valley has been
degraded, our operational focus will increasingly shift to Kandahar
City itself. Operations to secure Kandahar City will commence when the
right force is in place, and the proper shaping efforts have had their
effect.
impact of pakistani captures of afghan taliban leaders
2. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, since the offensive in Marja
began, the media has reported a significant and apparently successful
effort to capture or kill Afghan Taliban leaders within Pakistan. What
can you tell me about these recent efforts?
Secretary Flournoy. We applaud recent operations by the Pakistan
military (PAKMIL). Operations such as these disrupt enemy leadership
and do a great deal to deny militants safe haven. This particular
operation has also highlighted the PAKMIL's ability to successfully
target key militant leaders. We encourage more operations against
militant groups and stand ready to support the Government of Pakistan
if it so requests.
3. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, what led to the decision
from Pakistani authorities to make the move now?
Secretary Flournoy. The Government of Pakistan, as well as the
PAKMIL, has become aware that violent extremist organizations are a
threat to its national security. These operations demonstrate the
PAKMIL's ability to successfully target key militant leaders. We hope
Pakistani authorities continue to engage insurgent leadership, though
it is unclear what effect such operations will have over the long-term.
4. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, what long-term effect do you
think this will have on the Afghan Taliban and their ability to hide in
Pakistan?
Secretary Flournoy. The Afghan Taliban continues to maintain safe-
havens within Pakistan. We continue to work with the Government of
Pakistan and the PAKMIL to advise them and assist with their
counterinsurgency operations. As the operational tempo of PAKMIL forces
continues to increase, U.S. security assistance programs will be of the
utmost importance to Pakistan's stability, security, and ability to
engage all militant groups within its borders effectively.
5. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, will Taliban troops fighting
in Afghanistan be significantly impacted?
Secretary Flournoy. While operations such as these are positive
steps for Pakistan both operationally and politically, the Afghan
Taliban still maintain safe-havens within Pakistan. The long-term
effects of this particular operation are unclear but demonstrate the
PAKMIL's ability to reach the militants it targets. Nevertheless, the
Taliban remain a capable and effective force.
6. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, what do these successful
operations against Afghan Taliban leaders mean to the Pakistani
Taliban?
Secretary Flournoy. The Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are
interconnected. They share support networks and resources to such a
degree that successful action against one may degrade the ability of
the other. Yet until both organizations are defeated, the Pakistani
Taliban will continue to be a significant threat to both the Government
of Pakistan and international security.
rules of engagement and civilian deaths
7. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, despite all efforts to
reduce civilian casualties, there have been reports that civilians have
been killed and President Karzai asked publicly for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to do even more to hold down civilian
casualties. On Sunday, there were reports of a NATO airstrike on a
convoy in a province adjacent to Helmand in which as many as 33
civilians were killed. How many civilians have been killed in the
fighting?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
8. Senator McCain. General Paxton, what has been the major cause of
civilian deaths?
General Paxton. The vast majority of civilian casualties are caused
by insurgent attacks. They show a total disregard for civilians caught
in the cross-fire, or in the callous emplacement of improvised
explosive devices (IED) that have a disproportionate affect on the
local populace. Frequently, insurgents will conduct their attacks
deliberately using civilians as shields, in order to protect themselves
from coalition force counter-fires.
Regarding coalition-caused civilian casualties, the majority have
resulted from the employment of indirect fires and close air support
(CAS). In Central Helmand there have been 21 civilian casualties since
the beginning of Operation Moshtarak. A majority of these (12) occurred
from one incident on 15 February when marines and Afghan National Army
(ANA) were taking casualties in an engagement and requested fire
support. Three High Mobility Artillery Rocket System rockets were
launched in response to the marines' request for fire support. One of
the rockets impacted the purported insurgent fighting position, where
it was later alleged that civilians were present. There is an ongoing
investigation into this incident.
9. Senator McCain. General Paxton, describe the efforts to avoid
air strikes and other measures taken to reduce civilian deaths. Have
new restrictions been applied to other kinds of firepower, such as
multiple launch rocket systems, artillery, or mortars?
General Paxton. Shortly after assuming command of International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General McChrystal, recognizing the
need to take greater measures in order to protect the population,
issued a new Tactical Directive, dated 6 July 2009. This directive
requires all commanders to carefully consider whether or not to use
force in any situation, and to use the most appropriate level and type
of force in close proximity to civilian residential compounds.
Understanding that the population is the center of gravity in a
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, General McChrystal wants commanders
to protect the population from the effects of our fires, while at the
same time providing for appropriate protection of our own forces. This
directive does not preclude the use of CAS or indirect fires (IDF) if
necessary for self-defense. In addition, the Rules of Engagement (ROE)
clearly provide no restrictions on the use of fires to protect our
forces under current or imminent threat, but tempered judgment must be
applied.
There are frequently situations where alternatives to the use of
kinetic fires are more appropriate. Small-arms fire and maneuver,
withdrawal, or deescalation often make more sense than using CAS or
IDF, which may cause extensive collateral damage and risk alienating
the local population. In other situations, doing nothing may be the
best reaction to the enemy, particularly if the enemy is in amongst
noncombatants and civilians--the center of gravity whose hearts and
minds we are trying to win. General McChrystal will continue to
emphasize adherence to tactical directives designed to reduce the
potential of civilian casualties and reinforce his intent at all levels
of command. It is imperative that tactical operations not undermine the
overall strategic effort.
10. Senator McCain. General Paxton, have commanders in the field
asked for any changes to the rules?
General Paxton. There have been no requests from field commanders
in Afghanistan asking for changes to the tactical directive, and no
changes have been made to the ROE, which provide for the inherent right
of self-defense.
taliban resistance
11. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, prior to the battle
starting, Taliban leaders were quoted as being willing to stand and
fight to the death and the media reported new combat forces flowing
into Marja to increase Taliban numbers. Since the battle began,
however, it appears that many of the Taliban may have slipped out of
Marja or may have tried to blend in with the civilian population. Did
the Taliban flee or did they stand and fight?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
12. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, if resistance is less than
expected, will the operation be as decisive as we had hoped in routing
the Taliban so that they don't return?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
13. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, are the citizens of Marja
helping NATO and Afghan forces identify Taliban insurgents and their
IEDs, booby-traps, and weapons caches?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
14. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, what is the sense of where
the Taliban might have gone if they fled?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
15. Senator McCain. General Paxton, will we have to seek another
decisive battle on other ground?
General Paxton. We are at a critical juncture. Our forces are in
the process of trying to reverse the insurgent momentum. The aim is to
separate the population from the insurgents and convince both the
Afghan people and the Taliban that change is inevitable. In order to
accomplish our goals, there may indeed be additional decisive battles
in other places of Afghanistan. In the near-term, the main ISAF effort
will shift from Central Helmand to Kandahar when the right force is in
place, and our shaping efforts have had the proper effect.
performance of the afghan national army
16. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, reports on the performance
of the ANA in support of Operation Moshtarak have been varied thus far.
While there are scattered examples of the ANA performing ably and
courageously, there seem to be just as many, if not more, examples of
the Marine Corps leading and the ANA following in almost every aspect.
On whole, it seems the day when the ANA is capable of taking any
significant role in the command, control, or execution of missions
without robust American assistance is many years away. How would you
assess the performance of the ANA in current operations in Helmand?
Secretary Flournoy. The ISAF continues to conduct operations and
planning with Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to increase
their capabilities so they can eventually conduct independent
operations. The intent over the past year has been to field infantry-
centric forces quickly to get more ANSF into the fight and to delay the
growth of enablers (such as airlift, logistics, intelligence, et
cetera) to future years of development. The ISAF Commander's strategy
involves intense coalition partnership with ANSF in order to make up
for the lack of enablers and other gaps in the force due to the need to
create infantry forces quickly. As we move into fiscal year 2011 and
beyond, ISAF will focus on increasing the capacity of the ANSF and
establishing enabler units to allow them to take a greater leadership
role in conducting independent operations and planning.
17. Senator McCain. General Paxton, what role has the ANA played in
the conduct of operations in Helmand?
General Paxton. We formed an embedded partnership with the ANA for
operations in Central Helmand River Valley. They stood shoulder to
shoulder with coalition forces at all levels through the planning and
execution phases of operations for Central Helmand. This was the first
major operation in Afghanistan in which the ANSF took the lead for
planning and execution. The final operations plan was briefed to
President Karzai, following which he provided his guidance and
approval.
On 13 Mar 10, approximately 750 ANSF conducted an airborne
insertion with coalition forces into Marjah and Nad-e-Ali. As of 06 Mar
10, the 1/215th ANA Brigade (BDE) and the 3/215th ANA BDE, partnered
with Task Force (TF) Leatherneck and TF Helmand respectively, had
successfully cleared the towns of Marjeh and Nad-e-Ali. The ANSF were a
critical component of this operation, and represented GIRoA's committed
involvement and support. The ANSF and coalition forces continue to
provide a secure environment, enabling improved security, governance,
and development in Central Helmand.
18. Senator McCain. General Paxton, is it accurate to say that the
U.S./NATO force is still taking the lead both in the planning and
execution of all missions?
General Paxton. U.S. and NATO forces are partnering with the ANSF
as never before. We are working very closely at all levels of planning
and execution. As the ANSF capabilities improve, they are increasingly
taking a lead role in the planning and execution of operations. The
ANSF do not retain all of the organic capabilities inherent to U.S. and
NATO forces and are limited in their capacity to support certain
specialty functions like route clearance, tactical airlift, and various
other logistic functions. We will continue to provide crucial support
in these areas until ANSF capacity is increased.
19. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, is it realistic to believe
that the ANA will be capable of taking the lead in the planning and
execution of missions by the July 2011 deadline on which U.S. forces
are scheduled to begin withdrawing from the Afghanistan?
Secretary Flournoy. By July 2011, we anticipate that some elements
of the ANA will be capable of taking the lead to plan and execute
missions in some parts of the country. I want to ensure that what has
been said about July 2011 is well understood. As President Obama has
previously indicated, July 2011 will mark the beginning of a transition
of our forces out of Afghanistan and a period in which the Afghan
Government will take on more responsibility. He did not say that after
July 2011 there would be no forces from the United States or allied
countries in Afghanistan. He did not say that we will switch off the
lights and close the door behind us. The pace at which the transition
occurs will depend on conditions on the ground.
governance and reconstruction efforts
20. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, we've been told that the
combat offensive in Marja will be followed by a substantial effort by
U.S. and Afghan civilian agencies to reestablish effective civilian
control over Marja and demonstrate the ability of the Afghan Government
to bring good governance and basic services to its people. Which U.S.
and Afghan civilian agencies are involved in this effort?
Secretary Flournoy. The Department of State is the U.S. Government
lead agency for the integration of civilian agencies in the effort to
build governance and development capacity throughout Afghanistan. The
civilian effort in Helmand is largely led by the Helmand Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) and includes contributions from the U.S.
Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture,
the Department of Treasury, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. The lead
Afghan agency is the Independent Directorate of Local Governance. It is
responsible for implementing the District Delivery Program, with the
local lead being Provincial Governor Gulab Mangal. Governor Mangal
coordinates with the PRT, district governors, and provincial and
district-level line directors from the Ministry of Agriculture,
Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development.
21. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, who is coordinating this
civilian surge?
Secretary Flournoy. A key civilian official in the ISAF leadership
is Ambassador Mark Sedwill, who was recently appointed as the NATO
Senior Civilian Representative. One of his primary responsibilities is
to improve coordination in the delivery of civil effects to the ISAF
campaign. His Afghan counterpart, tasked with improving local
governance, is Mr. Jelani Popal of the Independent Directorate of Local
Governance. This partnered structure is mirrored at lower echelons:
PRTs provide civilian expertise and coordination to ISAF brigade-level
commanders and Afghan provincial governors, and District Support Teams
partner with battalion-level task force commanders and Afghan district
governors.
22. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, what are the specific goals
that are going to be accomplished and what is the timeline for
achieving them?
Secretary Flournoy. The Marja operation anticipated a 30-day
timeline to ``clear'' the main objective area of significant Taliban
influence, followed by ``holding'' and ``building'' phases where the
focus would shift to governance and development initiatives. Key tasks
to be accomplished in the ``hold'' and ``build'' phases include
appointing qualified, capable district governors and line directors;
filling local Afghan National Police tashkiels (manning documents) with
trained officers and policemen; initiating key infrastructure projects
that lead to job creation and provide economic alternatives to poppy
cultivation; and establishing district-level justice systems to provide
legitimate rule of law. The ISAF and the Senior Civilian Representative
are developing metrics that assess progress achieving these goals, and
the decision to transition security lead in Helmand to the ANSFs will
be conditions-based.
23. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, what are the major
obstacles to achieving these goals?
Secretary Flournoy. The long-term presence of the Taliban in Marja
has made governance progress difficult. Despite the presence of the
ISAF and ANSFs, the local population remains fearful of the Taliban and
concerned that they will be subject to retribution if ISAF and ANSF
forces are withdrawn at the end of the operation. The Marja area
includes more than 100 square kilometers of farmland, irrigation
systems, and sub-villages; the large area involved is difficult to
secure and vulnerable to Taliban re-infiltration efforts.
Despite significant advance planning and coordination between ISAF
and the Government of Afghanistan, governance progress has been slower
than expected. Several ministries' progress has been impeded by limited
manpower and resources, and lack of personnel with local ties and the
trust of the population.
24. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, how long will U.S. and NATO
forces remain in Marja to ensure a secure environment?
Secretary Flournoy. Operations in Marja are driven by conditions.
The role and strength of the ISAF and civilian presence are linked to
progress in establishing security and the requisite local governance
capacity to maintain it. In accordance with the NATO Operational Plan,
ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative are establishing clear
metrics to measure progress toward the goal of transitioning the
security and governance lead to Afghan forces in order to ensure this
is not an open-ended commitment. Decisions over U.S. and NATO force
presence and roles will be informed by this process. Although the goal
is to begin transitioning some districts and provinces by the summer of
2011, Marja and Helmand are among the most highly contested regions in
Afghanistan and are unlikely to be early candidates for transition.
poppy production and its impacts
25. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, Marja is a major center of
poppy production in Helmand and the trade in poppy and opium products
have become the basis of the economy for farmers and others living
there. The U.S. military does not see the poppy trade per se as their
target, yet without replacing the poppy with a legitimate form of
agriculture products, the politics and economy of Marja will remain
something that can be used by the Taliban to support the insurgency.
What is the plan to address the poppy issue in Marja?
Secretary Flournoy. Poppy cultivation and narco-trafficking are
major threats to stability and security in Marja, Helmand province.
Addressing the poppy issue in Marja requires first establishing
security and then the delivery of alternative livelihoods and
development. A whole-of-government approach needs to be taken. Unity of
effort is critical for success in Marja and other key locations in
Afghanistan. To address the connection between the Afghan insurgency,
terrorism, corruption, threat finance, and narcotics production and
trafficking, law enforcement and alternative development efforts must
be effectively integrated into U.S. COIN plans. The military will
continue to work with representatives from the United States and the
international community to ensure the proper integration of
counternarcotics efforts into the COIN campaign.
26. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, how do we break the link
between the poppy trade and the Taliban?
Secretary Flournoy. Breaking the link between the poppy trade and
the Taliban requires a unity of effort to provide security and the
development of licit livelihoods.
To address the nexus between the Afghan insurgency and terrorism,
corruption, threat finance, and narcotics production and trafficking,
law enforcement and alternative livelihood efforts must be effectively
integrated into U.S. COIN plans. Our efforts to increase security and
stability are designed to help create an environment where farmers are
no longer coerced into poppy cultivation by the insurgents and where
they have access to licit economic opportunities.
Meanwhile, coordinated interdiction efforts need to continue in
order to increase the pressure and risk on narcotics networks that
support the Taliban. The Department of Defense (DOD), in partnership
with other U.S. departments and agencies, provides training, equipment,
and infrastructure support to the Counternarcotics Police of
Afghanistan in order to develop a more capable, effective, and self
reliant force that can affect the narcotics-insurgency-corruption
nexus.
july 2011 timeline for troop withdrawal
27. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, on Sunday, General Petraeus
described our operations in Marja as the ``initial salvo'' in a
military campaign that could last 12 to 18 months. President Obama has
said, however, that he intends to start withdrawing our troops by July
2011, which is less than 18 months from now. Given the uncertainty we
face regarding how long it may take to achieve our military objectives,
and the even more difficult task of estimating how long it will take to
restore and build government legitimacy and basic services in the areas
we are clearing and holding, do we run the risk of running out of time
for our military and civilian campaign plans if we adhere to plan to
start drawing down troops by July 2011 regardless of where we stand on
the ground?
Secretary Flournoy. The July 2011 timeline is not an end date for
U.S. and NATO involvement in Afghanistan. It represents the beginning
of a process to transition the security lead to the ANSFs. This process
will begin in districts and provinces that enjoy a high degree of
security and adequate governance to preserve those conditions. As more
secure provinces move through the transition process, the ISAF and the
Afghan Government will have the opportunity to refocus resources to
more contested regions such as Helmand province.
28. Senator McCain. General Paxton, where do you think the next
phase of the longer campaign will be focused?
General Paxton. Following operations in Central Helmand, the next
main effort for ISAF will be concentrated in Kandahar. Key districts
and population centers in Kandahar will be the focus in executing the
COIN campaign for the next 12-18 months.
29. Senator McCain. General Paxton, how many more U.S. troops will
be needed from the 30,000 increase to support this next phase?
General Paxton. Detailed planning is being conducted between ISAF
and the ANSF with respect to the numbers and types of units needed for
the next phase of the COIN campaign in Kandahar. However, current plans
have an additional Brigade Combat Team ( 3.5K) deploying to Regional
Command-South in support of these upcoming operations.
30. Senator McCain. General Paxton, when do you think this next
phase will start?
General Paxton. It would be premature to give a specific timeline
as plans are still being developed. With that said, future operations
in Kandahar are projected to begin when proper conditions have been
set. We anticipate this will be the case in the summer of 2010
timeframe.
taliban recruiting gains
31. Senator McCain. General Paxton, recent press reporting cites
U.S. military intelligence forces as estimating that the Taliban have
been able to build their strength by 35 percent over the past 2 years
in the Afghan-Pakistan theater, up by 7,000 more than in 2008 to about
27,000. The number of al Qaeda fighters is estimated to be about 600,
moving between the two countries. What is your estimate of the Taliban
troop strength in the Afghan-Pakistan theater?
General Paxton. While DIA acknowledges those numbers, our current
policy is to not provide estimates of insurgent manpower in Afghanistan
and we have low confidence in any such estimates given the fluid,
dynamic, and multi-faceted nature of the threat. The number of active
insurgent fighters fluctuates based on the time of the year, funds
available, the operational activities of ISAF/Afghan forces, and a
variety of local or regional factors.
32. Senator McCain. General Paxton, has the Taliban been as
successful in recruiting as this article says?
General Paxton. The success of the Taliban's recruiting efforts is
largely dependent on the region in question. The Taliban is moderately
successful in garnering local support in areas which are geographically
excluded from the Afghan Government's sphere of influence and contain
higher concentrations of young, impoverished, Pashtun males. Taliban
recruiters also deliberately target madrassas, or religious schools,
inside Afghanistan. The Taliban separate the younger, more
indoctrinated, male students at these schools and send them to Pakistan
for specialized training, usually for the purpose of building a pool of
available suicide bombers.
33. Senator McCain. General Paxton, according to the military
intelligence official, the Taliban have taken advantage of the lack of
security and government presence in the south and the lack of basic
government services and has offered food and money. They have also made
the point that, ``We will still be here after the infidels have gone.''
What is the plan to break the force of these recruiting tools?
General Paxton. We will continue to pursue our COIN-centric
strategy throughout Afghanistan, but particularly in the south and
where the Taliban have exploited a lack of security to intimidate local
populations into complying with their demands. We will attempt to sever
the Taliban's hold in areas where they currently have influence, and
facilitate GIRoA capacity in these areas. We must be vigilant in
identifying and eliminating Taliban influence and prevent their return
to these areas.
defection of afghan national security forces personnel
34. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, late last week, the New
York Times ran a story about 25 Afghan national police officers in
Wardak province who are believed to have defected to the Taliban along
with their equipment, which included trucks, machine guns, and other
heavy weapons. Have you received any additional information about this
incident? Was this a result of a dispute over pay as some have
asserted, or rather an expression of sympathy/loyalty to the Taliban?
Secretary Flournoy. We were not aware of this incident.
35. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, do you believe such
incidents to be isolated events or part of a larger, systemic pattern
of defection by ANSF as the U.S/NATO offensive efforts increase?
Secretary Flournoy. In a COIN fight such as in Afghanistan,
incidents of security forces defecting would not be unusual--
particularly among police and in insurgent strongholds with high levels
of intimidation--as the goal of both sides is to win the support of the
population. However, DOD does not see a systemic pattern of defections
emerging within the ANSFs.
detention of captured taliban fighters
36. Senator McCain. General Paxton, are we capturing significant
numbers of Taliban fighters? If so, how many?
General Paxton. Presently we have 355 known Taliban (TB) in
detention at the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), and another 300
possible TB affiliates comprised of detainees identified by capturing
units as Anti-Afghan Forces or Anti-Coalition Militia. We are
constantly assessing these detainees to determine in which category
they actually belong--Taliban or other. We currently have 655 in
detention, of which we have confirmed 355 as Taliban. 153 of the 655
have been detained since December 2009, of which 37 were detained
within the last month.
37. Senator McCain. General Paxton, NATO forces have been operating
under the 96-hour rule that requires an Afghan court to review the
grounds for detaining a person and issue authority for detention beyond
96 hours. Have there been any problems complying with the 96-hour rule?
General Paxton. There has never been a requirement for Afghan
courts to review a detention within 96 hours. The ISAF rule (from JFC-
Brunssum) required that detainees be released or turned over to Afghan
authorities within 96 hours of capture. COMISAF has the authority to
grant an extension beyond 96 hours for exceptional circumstances (e.g.,
medical treatment or logistical/transportation issues preventing
release).
Recently, the Secretary of Defense authorized an exception to U.S.
forces that fall under NATO operation control of ISAF. The first U.S.
general/flag officer in the capturing unit's chain-of-command may now
approve detention for up to 14 days, if the detention might yield vital
intelligence.
38. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, where are Taliban being
captured during the Marja operation being held?
Secretary Flournoy. The majority of individuals detained during the
Marja operation have been either captured directly by ANSFs or
transferred to ANSF by the ISAF in accordance with ISAF procedures
within a few days of capture. Such individuals are typically held in
the National Directorate for Security (NDS) facility in Lashkar Gah or
are transferred to other NDS facilities because of capacity limitations
at Lashkar Gah. Individuals captured by U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom
forces who meet the criteria for detention are transferred to the U.S.
Detention Facility in Parwan for detention consistent with the law of
war.
39. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, where is the court
overseeing detention of captured Taliban during this operation?
Secretary Flournoy. The primary-level court in the Marja region is
located in Lashkar Gah. Most detainees held at the NDS facility in
Lashkar Gah would be tried in this court. It is my understanding that,
in some cases, NDS transfers high-level individuals to Kabul for
detention and trial.
u.s. and afghan troops and casualties
40. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, how many U.S. combat forces
are involved in the offensive?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
41. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, how many are Afghans?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
42. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, how many troops are from
NATO partners?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
43. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, how many U.S. casualties
have there been?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
44. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, how many Afghan casualties
have there been?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
45. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, how many NATO casualties
have there been?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
46. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, what is causing most of the
casualties?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
medical issues
47. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, in March 2009, Secretary
Gates directed that medical care and evacuation capabilities in
Afghanistan achieve parity with those available in Iraq. Have we
achieved that goal?
Secretary Flournoy. Medical care and evacuation capabilities in
Afghanistan have achieved parity with those in Iraq. U.S. forces in
Afghanistan have rigorously applied the Secretary of Defense's 1-hour
evacuation standard, from the time of incident to arrival at a
resuscitative surgical care facility. Standardized data collection and
reporting have been implemented with weekly reviews briefed at the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) and Joint Staff level. Accordingly, medical
facilities and evacuation assets were deployed as close as possible to
the population at risk. The result was a substantial decline in the
average evacuation times--which has been maintained at well under one
hour since April 2009--and greatly improved access to definitive care
by deployed U.S. forces.
48. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, what have we done to
increase MEDEVAC and combat medical care in Afghanistan?
Secretary Flournoy. [Deleted.]
49. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, mild traumatic brain injury
(TBI), or concussion, is a common occurrence in the field as a result
of exposure to blast and vehicle accidents. Multiple concussions appear
to greatly increase the risk of long-term injury and psychological
problems. The committee has learned that new protocols are being
developed by the Joint Staff to provide for continuous screening and
evaluation TBI in the field. What guidance have the commanders in
Afghanistan received concerning screening for brain injury in our
fighting servicemembers?
Secretary Flournoy. CENTCOM Individual Protection and Individual/
Unit Deployment Policy dated September 10, 2008 (Sec. 15.K.4. B.1)
delineates theater policy regarding blast injury protocols in which
patients with possible exposure to a blast injury require an evaluation
by a medical provider and annotation of the event in their medical
records. In the near future, DOD-wide guidance will expand on these
protocols. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will release a Directive-
Type Memorandum (DTM) on ``Policy Guidance for Management of
Concussion/Mild Traumatic Brain Injury in the Deployed Setting.'' The
DTM will establish policy, assign responsibilities, and provide
procedures on the medical management of mild TBI in the deployed
setting for all leaders within DOD, servicemembers, and medical
personnel engaged in ongoing DOD missions. It will standardize
terminology, procedures, leadership actions, and medical management to
provide maximum protection of those servicemembers. This document
outlines mandatory evaluation and reporting requirements. CENTCOM will
release a fragmentary order to implement this policy, directing unit-
level leaders to screen servicemembers exposed to potentially
concussive events and track/document the exposure. Additionally,
CENTCOM will develop a potentially concussive event exposure module in
its existing database of record used for reporting significant
activities.
50. Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, what are the operational
implications for servicemembers who continue to fight after having
sustained a mild TBI, as well as those who may have sustained multiple
injuries?
Secretary Flournoy. Current research demonstrates that there is an
increased risk for persistent symptoms with multiple concussions. Per
the draft DTM, ``Policy Guidance for Management of Concussion/Mild
Traumatic Brain Injury in the Deployed Setting,'' and the latest in
concussive injury research, servicemembers who may have been exposed to
a concussive event undergo a Military Acute Concussion Evaluation. If
the servicemember presents no symptoms, he or she is reevaluated and
returned to duty. If a servicemember suffers repeated concussions
within a certain timeframe, he or she undergoes a neurological
evaluation by a qualified provider, neuro-imaging (if appropriate), a
neuropsychological assessment by a psychologist, and a function
assessment by an occupational or physical therapist. Once these
assessments are completed, a neurologist determines the servicemember's
duty status, with one of the following dispositions: (1) Return the
member to the United States; (2) Send the member outside the area of
responsibility (AOR), but within the theater; (3) Maintain the member
in the AOR, but restrict to a base; or (4) Return to full duty.
[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the committee adjourned.]