[Senate Hearing 111-867]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-867
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 15 AND 16, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Situation in Afghanistan
june 15, 2010
Page
Flournoy, Hon. Michele A., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 9
Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command..... 16
To Continue to Receive Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan
june 16, 2010
Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command..... 28
(iii)
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, Udall, Hagan,
Begich, Bingaman, Kaufman, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss,
Graham, Thune, Wicker, Brown, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Ilona R. Cohen, counsel; William
G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff
member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional
staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member;
David M. Morriss, minority counsel; and Dana W. White,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Christine G.
Lang, and Hannah I. Lloyd.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick
Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Greta Lundeberg, assistant
to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa
Guenov and Stephen C. Hedger, assistants to Senator McCaskill;
Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena,
assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to
Senator Begich; Halie Soifer, assistant to Senator Kaufman;
Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Jason Van Beek, assistant to
Senator Thune; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; Kevin
Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; and Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. This morning the
committee receives testimony on the progress in Afghanistan
from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy and
General David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM).
General Petraeus, please extend to all of the men and women
who are serving under your command the thanks of this committee
for their tremendous service, their valor, their dedication to
the causes of this country. They deserve our support and I know
our committee gives them that full support, and to their
families as well.
General Petraeus. I'll do that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Last month a milestone was reached when it
was announced that for the first time more U.S. troops are
serving in Afghanistan than in Iraq. This month marks 1 year
since General Stanley McChrystal took command of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). The news from Afghanistan in recent
weeks has been largely negative: the increase in casualties
among U.S., coalition, and Afghan security forces, the mixed
results in Marjah, and the apparent return of Taliban
intimidation and assassinations of local officials there, the
failure of Afghan Government officials to deliver much-needed
services to win local allegiances, the delay in the Kandahar
campaign, the resignation of two senior Afghan security
officials who seemingly were among the most competent members
of the cabinet and had strong coalition support, the role of
local power brokers, including members of the Karzai family, in
Kandahar, the growth of militias, and the counterproductive
activities of some U.S.-hired private security contractors,
apparent differences with the Karzai regime over approaches for
reconciliation with the Taliban.
At a press conference last week, General McChrystal
acknowledged these press reports, but he emphasized that ``You
also have to step back and see the trend in direction.'' This
morning we want to hear from our witnesses on how they see
these trends.
My focus is and always has been on getting the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) trained and equipped to take
over the responsibility for their country's security. Doing so
is the key to success in Afghanistan. As General McChrystal
said at a press briefing last week, the ANSF are ``the
strategic main effort and they're key to the long-term
stability in Afghanistan.'' General McChrystal has repeatedly
set out the goal of putting Afghans in the lead and making them
responsible for their future, and Afghan leaders have said they
want to be responsible for their own security and their own
affairs.
At the Consultative Peace Jirga held at the beginning of
this month, the 1,600 Afghan delegates adopted a resolution
calling on the international community to ``expedite the
process of equipping, training, and strengthening the ANSF so
they can get the capability in taking responsibility to provide
security for their own country and people.''
But progress towards the goal of Afghans taking the lead in
operations has been unsatisfactory. Today, operations in
Afghanistan are excessively dependent on coalition forces. The
campaign plan for Kandahar, which is underway, anticipates
increases in Afghan and ISAF forces in and around Kandahar City
to create a ``rising tide of security,'' but at a 1 to 2 ratio,
that is one Afghan soldier or policeman for every two ISAF
troops. That's not good enough. Our partnering goal should be
at least a ratio of 1 to 1 in Kandahar and Afghan troops should
be in the lead in many, if not most, operations.
Having Afghan units in the lead is critical in Kandahar
since the likelihood of success there is based on popular
support. That support is at the heart of the counterinsurgency
strategy which is so well set forth by General Petraeus. The
Afghan National Army (ANA) has broad public support and even
the Afghan Government has more than twice the support that the
United States does. Polling numbers in The New York Times
indicate that 90 percent of Afghans support the Kabul
Government over the Taliban, but only 40 percent of Afghans
have a favorable view of the United States.
The 100 or so elders that we met in a local shura in
southern Afghanistan last year, when we asked what they wanted
the United States to do, told us that we should train and equip
the ANSF to provide for their own security and then depart.
Last week General McChrystal announced that ISAF would slow
the expansion of the Afghan and coalition troop presence in
Kandahar in order to allow time to secure the support of local
tribal leaders for that effort. I trust General McChrystal's
judgment on the timing. He's right that ``It's more important
we get it right than we get it fast,'' and he's also saying
correctly in my judgment that when you go to protect people,
the people have to want you to protect them.
So I'd rather delay a few months and have a few more Afghan
forces in the lead when the security presence is expanded and
operations begin more forcefully than to have an ISAF-dominated
force attempt to secure Kandahar a few months earlier. Our top
priority then must be training, mentoring, and partnering in
the field with Afghan troops and placing them in the lead in
operations against insurgents, backed by U.S. and coalition
support.
Currently, according to ISAF, the growth of the ANSF is on
track. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) under
Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell reports that recruitment for
ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP) now actually exceeds
monthly recruitment goals. These forces are above where they
need to be to meet the end strength goals for October 2010 of
134,000 army and 109,000 police personnel.
What is disturbing and hard to comprehend, however, is that
the training mission still does not have enough trainers to
process all the Afghan recruits who are signing up to join in
the security forces. The most recent available figures show
that, of the more than 5,200 trainers that we need, only about
2,600 are on the ground.
Secretary Gates has deployed 850 U.S. soldiers and marines
to Afghanistan to serve as a stopgap. According to a May 29
report from Lieutenant General Caldwell, the training mission
has yet to receive 750 trainers pledged by NATO members.
Furthermore, last week NATO Secretary General Rasmussen
announced that NATO members have yet to pledge an additional
450 trainers needed to meet training requirements.
It's totally unacceptable that this shortfall persists.
NATO members who, for whatever reason, do not send additional
combat troops or who intend to reduce their combat troop
presence in the near future, should at least be willing to
provide trainers who operate away from the heavy fighting.
The question remains, why are more Afghan forces not in the
lead in Kandahar, using forces that are trained and ready?
According to figures provided by the ISAF Joint Command, 25
Afghan battalions, or kandaks, are able to operate
independently, 42 Afghan kandaks can operate with coalition
support. Now, that's 67 of 113 total ANA kandaks. More recent
ISAF data on Afghan forces' capability casts some doubt on the
accuracy of that assessment of the ANA's capabilities, but they
do not explain why it is U.S. or coalition forces that are
usually leading operations instead of the other way around.
The ANA has about 125,000 troops available, more than we
do. But it is our troops that are concentrated in the areas
where the fighting is heaviest and where Afghanistan's future
may well hang in the balance.
So many questions regarding the ANA remain unanswered and
perhaps we will hear answers today. Why aren't more ANA troops
leading security operations in the south? How many Afghan
combat battalions and how many Afghan combat troops are there
in Kandahar? When will the Afghan units take the lead there?
Why aren't large numbers of ANA troops from other areas moving
to Kandahar in preparation for the push? Why isn't the ratio of
coalition to Afghan troops in Kandahar at least 1 to 1, instead
of two coalition troops to one Afghan?
I know American troops are better equipped and trained than
Afghan troops. But the issue isn't force-on-force. If it were I
would accept our taking the lead most often in Kandahar
operations. The issue is who can best connect with and protect
the population of Kandahar. As Afghanistan Defense Minister
Wardak recently and aptly described the situation in Kandahar,
``It is a different type operation. It is not like Marjah. It
is not going to be that kinetic.''
The ANA can handle the population protection mission
adequately and is equipped to do so. It is the hearts and minds
of Afghans, particularly the Pashtun population in Kandahar,
that must be won over. That population wants security and it
wants that security provided by Afghans. Having Afghan troops
among the Afghan people is more acceptable to them, with
coalition forces in the background providing support for those
Afghan troops. Success in Kandahar will be more likely with
Afghan troops in the lead.
I'm going to put the balance of my statement now in the
record and simply conclude by saying that the Afghan Government
and people need to demonstrate a sense of urgency and
commitment to succeed in building a lasting peace in
Afghanistan. If the Afghan Government and people demonstrate a
willingness to fight and assume increasing responsibility for
their security and affairs, then the American people will be
steadfast partners in that endeavor.
[The prepared statement by Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
Today the committee receives testimony on the progress in
Afghanistan from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy
and General David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command. General
Petraeus, please extend the thanks of all of us on this committee to
the men and women serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the area
of responsibility you command, for their valor, dedication, and service
to the country. They deserve our support and I know this committee will
do everything necessary to give them that support.
Last month a milestone was reached when it was announced that for
the first time, more U.S. troops are serving in Afghanistan than Iraq.
This month marks 1 year since General Stanley McChrystal took command
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The news from Afghanistan in recent
weeks has been largely negative: the increase in casualties among U.S.,
coalition, and Afghan security forces; the mixed results in Marja and
the apparent return of Taliban intimidation and assassinations of local
officials there; the failure of Afghan Government officials to deliver
much-needed services to win local allegiances; the delay in the
Kandahar campaign; the resignation of two senior Afghan security
officials who seemingly were among the most competent members of the
cabinet and had strong coalition support; the role of local
powerbrokers, including members of the Karzai family, in Kandahar; the
growth of militias and the counterproductive activities of some U.S.-
hired private security contractors; and apparent differences with the
Karzai regime over approaches to reconciliation with the Taliban. At a
press conference last week, General McChrystal acknowledged these press
reports, but emphasized that ``you also have to step back and see the
trend in direction.'' We want to hear from our witnesses this morning
on how they see these trends.
My focus is, and always has been, on getting the Afghan National
Security Forces trained and equipped to take over the responsibility
for their country's security. Doing so is the key to success in
Afghanistan. As General McChrystal said at a press briefing last week,
the Afghan security forces are ``the strategic main effort, and they're
key to the long-term stability in'' Afghanistan.
General McChrystal has repeatedly set out the goal of putting
Afghans in the lead and making them responsible for their future, and
Afghan leaders have said they want to be responsible for their own
security and affairs. At the Consultative Peace Jirga held at the
beginning of this month, the 1,600 Afghan delegates adopted a
resolution calling on the international community ``to expedite the
process of equipping, training, and strengthening the Afghan national
security forces, so they can get the capability in taking
responsibility to provide security for their own country and people.''
But progress toward the goal of Afghans taking the lead in operations
has been unsatisfactory.
Today, operations in Afghanistan are excessively dependent on
coalition forces. The campaign plan for Kandahar, which is under way,
anticipates increases in Afghan and ISAF forces in and around Kandahar
city to create a ``rising tide'' of security, but at a 1 to 2 ratio
that is, one Afghan soldier or policeman for every two ISAF troops.
That is not good enough. Our partnering goal should be a ratio of at
least 1 to 1 in Kandahar, and Afghan troops should be in the lead in
many if not most operations.
Having Afghan units in the lead is critical in Kandahar since the
likelihood of success there is based on popular support. That support
is at the heart of the counterinsurgency strategy. The Afghan Army has
broad public support, and even the Afghan Government has more than
twice the support that the United States does. Polling numbers from the
New York Times indicate 90 percent of Afghans support the Kabul
Government over the Taliban, while only 40 percent have a favorable
view of the United States. The 100 or so elders we met at a local shura
in southern Afghanistan last year, when asked what they wanted the
United States to do, told us that we should train and equip the Afghan
security forces to provide for their country's security, and then
depart.
Last week, General McChrystal announced that ISAF would slow the
expansion of the Afghan and coalition troop presence in Kandahar in
order to allow time to secure the support of local tribal leaders for
that effort. I trust General McChrystal's judgment on the timing. He's
right that ``It's more important we get it right than we get it fast,''
and that, ``when you go to protect people, the people have to want you
to protect them.'' I'd rather delay a few months and have more Afghan
forces in the lead when the security presence is expanded and
operations begin more forcefully, than have an ISAF-dominated force
attempt to secure Kandahar a few months earlier.
Our top priority, then, must be the training, mentoring, and
partnering in the field with Afghan troops and placing them in the lead
in operations against insurgents, backed by U.S. and coalition support.
Currently, according to ISAF, the growth of the Afghan security forces
is on track. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) under
Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, reports that recruitment for the
Afghan army and police now actually exceeds monthly recruitment goals.
These forces are above where they need to be to meet the end strength
goals for October 2010 of 134,000 Army and 109,000 police personnel.
What is disturbing and hard to comprehend, however, is that the
training mission still does not have enough trainers to process all the
Afghan recruits who are signing up to join the security forces. The
most recent available figures show that of the more than 5,200 trainers
we need, only about 2,600 are on the ground. Secretary Gates has
deployed 850 U.S. soldiers and marines to Afghanistan to serve as a
stopgap. According to a May 29th report from Lieutenant General
Caldwell, the training mission has yet to receive 750 trainers pledged
by NATO members. Further, last week NATO Secretary General Rasmussen
announced that NATO members have yet to pledge an additional 450
trainers needed to meet training requirements. It's totally
unacceptable that this shortfall persists. NATO members who, for
whatever reason, do not send additional combat troops, or who intend to
reduce their combat troop presence in the near future, should at least
be willing to provide trainers, who operate away from the heavy
fighting.
The question remains: Why are more Afghan forces not in the lead in
Kandahar, using forces that are trained and ready? According to figures
provided by the ISAF Joint Command, 25 Afghan battalions, or kandaks,
are able to operate independently, and 42 Afghan kandaks can operate
with coalition support. That is 67 of 113 total Afghan army kandaks.
More recent ISAF data on Afghan forces' capability casts some doubt on
the accuracy of that assessment of the Afghan army's capabilities, but
they do not explain why it is U.S. or coalition forces that are usually
leading operations, instead of the other way around. The Afghan army
has about 125,000 troops available, more than we do. But it is our
troops who are concentrated in the areas where the fighting is heaviest
and where Afghanistan's future may well hang in the balance.
So, many questions regarding the Afghan National Army remain
unanswered. Perhaps we will hear answers today: Why aren't more Afghan
army troops leading security operations in the south? How many Afghan
combat battalions, and how many Afghan combat troops, are there in
Kandahar? When will the Afghan units take the lead there? Why aren't
large numbers of Afghan army troops from other areas moving to Kandahar
in preparation for the push? And why isn't the ratio of coalition to
Afghan troops in Kandahar at least 1 to 1, instead of two coalition
troops to one Afghan?
I know American troops are better equipped and trained than Afghan
troops. But the issue isn't force-on-force--if it were, I would accept
our taking the lead most often in Kandahar operations. The issue is who
can best connect with and protect the population of Kandahar. As Afghan
Defense Minister Wardak aptly described the situation in Kandahar, ``It
is a different type operation, it is not like Marja, it is not going to
be that kinetic.'' The Afghan army can handle the population protection
mission adequately and is equipped to do so. It is the hearts and minds
of Afghans, particularly the Pashtun population in Kandahar, that must
be won over. That population wants security, and it wants that security
provided by Afghans. Having Afghan troops among the Afghan people is
more accepted by them, with coalition forces in the background
providing support for those Afghan troops.
I am also concerned by evidence that our own contracting practices
may be harming the counterinsurgency effort. Our reliance on private
security contractors--who often draw on militia forces--is empowering
local powerbrokers and warlords who operate outside the government's
control. As stated in one recent military analysis of Kandahar, ``what
used to be called warlord militias are now private security
contractors.''
The widespread hiring of private security contractors undermines
the Afghan security forces' ability to recruit and retain personnel.
Some private security contractors working under Defense Department
contracts, actively recruit those with ANA or ANP experience. Our
committee's investigation into private security contractors in
Afghanistan has revealed that they are frequently paid more than Afghan
security forces. A Department official recently testified that one
reason for high attrition rates among Afghan National Civil Order
Police officers, for example, is that ``many of them are recruited by
higher paying private security firms.''
The threat that security contractors pose to mission success is not
insignificant. In May 2010 the U.S. Central Command's Armed Contractor
Oversight Directorate reported that there were more than 26,000 private
security contractor personnel operating in Afghanistan. Last week,
General McChrystal acknowledged the problems arising from our
contracting practices, specifically private security companies, and
said that ISAF will be looking at what needs to be done. I hope that
review will lay out a path to phase out the use of private security
contractors in Afghanistan and to integrate those personnel into the
Afghan National Security Forces. In his November 2009 inaugural
statement, President Karzai stated that within the next 2 years, he
wanted ``operations by all private, national, and international
security firms to be ended and their duties delegated to Afghan
security entities.'' We and the Afghan Government need to take concrete
steps to achieve that goal.
General McChrystal has emphasized repeatedly that the campaign in
Afghanistan ``is a process that takes time.'' The patience of the
American people is not infinite, and their sacrifices have already been
great. As Secretary Gates said ahead of a NATO defense ministerial
meeting last week, all NATO members, for the sake of their publics,
need to show by the end of this year that ``our strategy is on track,
making some headway.'' He added that ``if we are making progress and
it's clear that we have the right strategy, then the people will be
patient.''
I agree with that assessment, but would add one thing. That is,
that the Afghan Government and people need to demonstrate a sense of
urgency and commitment to succeed in building a lasting peace in
Afghanistan. If the Afghan Government and people demonstrate a
willingness to fight and assume increasing responsibility for their
security and affairs, then the American people will be steadfast
partners in that endeavor.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our
distinguished witnesses for joining us this morning to discuss
events in Afghanistan. Let me thank you for your leadership of
our men and women in uniform, especially those in harm's way.
As is well known, I believe that winning the war in
Afghanistan is a vital national security interest. I've said
for years that the best way to achieve a success is through a
properly resourced counterinsurgency strategy backed by strong
civil, military, and U.S.-Afghan partnerships. For this reason,
I have supported and still do support strongly the President's
decision to increase our commitment in Afghanistan.
I'll be brief, Mr. Chairman, and come right to the point.
As I gauge the progress of any war effort, I look at the
broader trend lines, and it is for this reason that I am deeply
concerned about our campaign in Afghanistan. Many of the key
trends seem to be heading in a bad direction, perhaps even
signaling a mounting crisis.
As an example, 10,000 additional NATO troops are supposed
to deploy along with our surge forces. But we presently have
just over half that number and, more importantly, it's not
clear when or from where the rest of them will arrive. At the
same time, the Dutch and Canadian Governments continue to plan
for an imminent withdrawal of their forces, while just
yesterday the Government of Poland, which has been a major
troop contributor, called on NATO to draw up a timetable to end
the alliance's mission in Afghanistan and withdraw our forces.
In Marjah our troops are performing exceptionally, but it
appears that we and our Afghan partners have not been able to
provide durable, consistent security to the population. Not
surprisingly, governance and development seem to be lagging.
General McChrystal recently referred to Marjah as a ``bleeding
ulcer'' and questioned whether we have enough troops there.
Rather than serving as proof that NATO and the Afghan
Government will succeed, which was the intention, I fear that
Marjah at the moment is sending a much more troubling signal.
In Kandahar, where the success of the war itself could be
determined, I agree with General McChrystal's recent comment
that ``It's more important we get it right than we get it
fast.'' That said, the delay in our operation is not projecting
an air of confidence and success.
To get Kandahar right, we all know that we need an
integrated political-military strategy. But as far as I can
tell, the political part of that strategy still isn't there. I
hear a lot about the number of civilians who will deploy in
Kandahar, but I still haven't heard a convincing explanation
for how we will begin to change the complex balance of power
within the province, the troubling behavior of key local power
brokers, the performance of the ANP in the city, and the
counterproductive contracting practices that we are dependent
on.
Meanwhile, it's very troubling that President Karzai has
decided to remove his minister of interior and his head of
intelligence, two of our most important partners in his
government and two men I know to be upstanding and effective. I
don't know why President Karzai made this decision, but the
explanation given by his former intelligence chief which we
read in the newspaper this weekend seems to have a ring of
truth to it: that President Karzai no longer believes the
United States will succeed and that he is shifting as a result
to a policy of accommodation with the Taliban and the Pakistani
military. If true, this could be very dangerous.
That's the larger trend that underlies all the others, the
mounting loss of confidence in America's commitment to succeed
that seems to be shared by both our friends and enemies in
Afghanistan as well as its neighbors. As our witnesses know,
especially General Petraeus, a counterinsurgency is a battle
for the thoughts and allegiance of people. It's about
demonstrating to those sitting on the fence that they should
throw their lot in with our partners and us because we're going
to win.
No matter how much it's been explained and fixed with
caveats, the decision to begin withdrawing our forces from
Afghanistan, arbitrarily, in July 2011 seems to be having
exactly the effect that many of us predicted it would. It's
convincing the key actors inside and outside of Afghanistan
that the United States is more interested in leaving than
succeeding in this conflict. As a result, they're all making
the necessary accommodations for a post-American Afghanistan.
This is not to say that we cannot succeed. I think we can
and we must. But it is to say that, with ongoing difficulties
in Marjah, a delayed offensive in Kandahar, growing concerns
about the Afghan Government, troop commitments still lagging
from NATO, and the final units of our own surge not set to
reach Afghanistan until the 1st of September, it now seems
increasingly clear that hoping for success on the arbitrary
timeline set by the administration is simply unrealistic.
Again, I'd echo General McChrystal: ``It's more important
we get it right than we get it fast.'' That goes for Kandahar
and for the war itself. It's time for the President to state
unequivocally that we will stay in Afghanistan until we
succeed. We need to begin a realistic debate about what it will
take and how long it will take to achieve our goals. I look
forward to having that discussion with our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Secretary Flournoy.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Secretary Flournoy. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
inviting us here to testify today. I'd like to give you an
update on recent progress and remaining challenges in
Afghanistan. President Obama announced a number of key
refinements to our strategy last December, including the
deployment of an additional 30,000 U.S. service men and women.
Today over 18,000 of these additional troops have deployed and
the remainder will be in place by the end of the summer.
Our own troops will be joined by over 9,000 international
troops. Approximately 60 percent of NATO and partner troops are
currently in place in Afghanistan and more will come in the
coming months.
Currently the main operational effort for ISAF and our
Afghan partners continues to be in the Central Helmand River
Valley and Kandahar. Our focus in these operations is on
protecting the population and fostering Afghan security and
governance capacity. So far, we believe we have been making
gradual but important progress. The coalition is contesting the
insurgency more effectively, in more places, and with more
forces.
But this insurgency is both resilient and resourceful. In
both April and May, we saw insurgent activity resume in Marjah
and much of Central Helmand Province. Nonetheless, the nature
of recent insurgent attacks is beginning to indicate a possible
reduction in some of their operational capacity. For example,
the percentage of complex attacks, those employing more than
one means of attack, has steadily dropped since its peak in
February, and the average number of casualties per attack is
below 2009 levels.
Local Afghans in the region have also shown an increased
willingness to report suspected improvised explosive devices
and insurgent weapons caches, which suggests growing pockets of
confidence among ordinary people and a willingness to support
ISAF and Afghan efforts to establish security and governance.
In Kandahar Province, we are taking a deliberate approach,
gradually expanding our efforts to improve local governance in
key districts as coalition and ANSF operations improve the
security situation gradually.
Some in Congress have expressed concern about the impact of
local power brokers on our efforts in Kandahar. We share this
concern and we recognize that there are ways in which our own
contracting practices have actually had unintended
consequences, concentrating wealth among a relatively small
number of Afghans who control companies large enough to procure
contracts. General Petraeus and Admiral Mullen have created a
two-star task force to examine our contracting practices with a
view to reducing these unintended consequences. When we have
evidence of corruption, we will also work with the Afghan
Government to prosecute those who have violated the law.
Let me turn now to our efforts to build the capability and
capacity of the ANSF. Building an effective ANSF capacity
remains key both to the long-term security and stability of
Afghanistan and to our ability to transition security
responsibility and draw down our forces as conditions allow.
While we are still short about 450 institutional trainers, we
have reduced the instructor-to-trainee ratio from about 1 to 80
to now 1 to 30.
The ANA is on schedule to meet our goal of 134,000 troops
for fiscal year 2010, and nearly 85 percent of the ANA is now
fully partnered with ISAF forces as they operate in the field.
The ANP is on track to reach its goal of 109,000 police by the
end of the fiscal year and we have increased the capacity to
conduct ANP training by 400 percent over the last 12 months,
and follow-on training has been provided to both ANP in 83 key
districts as well as the Afghan Border Police (ABP).
Recent salary and benefit initiatives have addressed pay
disparities between the ANA and the ANP and these initiatives
appear to be improving retention and attrition. Literacy
programs have also proven to be a positive incentive. Further,
we believe that rising end strength numbers and newly
instituted rotation schedules will further reduce attrition.
Consequently, we believe the ANSF end strength goals for 2011
are achievable.
Needless to say, the purpose of these efforts is to ensure
a gradual transition of security responsibility to the Afghan
Government. I want to emphasize here that transition does not
mean abandonment or withdrawal. We are committed to supporting
the people of Afghanistan over the long term and we will not
walk away from this commitment. Nonetheless, we cannot and
should not remain in the lead combat role indefinitely. As the
international military presence begins to shift from a combat
role to an advise and assist role, it will be absolutely vital
to ensure a more robust and long-term international civilian
assistance effort focused on capacity-building, governance, and
development.
We are working closely with the Afghan Government to plan
for the transition process. In May, President Karzai and 14
members of his cabinet were here in Washington for just about a
week for a strategic dialogue. At the Kabul conference in July,
the Afghan Government will present further plans for achieving
progress in governance and development across four ministerial
clusters. We also expect to hear more from President Karzai
regarding actions taken to address corruption as well as plans
for reconciliation and reintegration.
Let me say a few words about reconciliation and
reintegration since I know it's an issue that has generated a
great deal of interest. All parties to the conflict in
Afghanistan recognize that in the end some political resolution
will be required to bring this conflict to a close. This
recognition has driven the Afghan Government to begin to
develop plans to reconcile insurgent leaders and reintegrate
low-level fighters. In early April, President Karzai presented
his interim plans for reintegration. In May, a Consultative
Peace Jirga gave President Karzai a conditional mandate to move
forward in this area.
The United States supports an Afghan-led process that seeks
to bring back into society those who cease violence, break ties
with al Qaeda, and live under the Afghan constitution and all
of its requirements.
Let me conclude by underscoring that our overall assessment
is that we are heading in the right direction in Afghanistan.
Of the 121 key terrain districts identified by ISAF in December
of last year, 70 were assessed at that time to be sympathetic
or neutral to the Afghan Government. By March of this year,
that number had climbed to 73 districts. This and other
indicators suggest that we are beginning to regain the
initiative and the insurgency is beginning to lose momentum.
That said, the outcome is far from determined, and these
are still early days for the administration's new strategy.
It's only a matter of months since the President's
announcement. When I briefed this committee in February, I
said: ``Inevitably, we will face setbacks, even as we achieve
progress.'' None of what we are doing in Afghanistan involves
quick fixes. These are long-term problems and their solutions
will require patience, persistence, and flexibility. But we are
making progress, sometimes slow, but we believe steady. We are
confident that General McChrystal will be able to show more
progress by the end of the year.
We greatly appreciate this committee's continued support
for our efforts, from the Operation Enduring Freedom budget to
our supplemental request. Particularly, we appreciate your
support for full funding for the Afghan security forces, for
coalition support funds, and for the Commanders' Emergency
Response Program authority, which we believe is an absolutely
critical tool in the counterinsurgency fight.
Thank you again for inviting us here today for this
discussion and for your support, your continued support to the
men and women who serve in uniform, and your support to enable
progress in Afghanistan. Thank you and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Michele P. Flournoy
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee: thank
you for inviting us here to testify today, and for reporting out S.
3454, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. I
greatly appreciate this committee's support for authorities that assist
our warfighters in stability, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency
operations. The Commanders' Emergency Response Program and the
authority to reimburse coalition partners are critical to field
commanders, and we're grateful for your ongoing support.
My testimony today will address our efforts to improve the capacity
of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), support the Afghan
Government in improving governance and security, and plan for
reconstruction and economic development. I will also outline the
progress being made in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, and discuss
issues of reconciliation and reintegration.
Let me start by recapping some of the key events and decisions of
the past year and a half. As I noted when I last briefed you in
February, the United States and our Afghan and international partners
were confronted by a bleak situation when President Obama took office.
Early gains against the Taliban had eroded, the Taliban and associated
insurgent groups had reconstituted in safehavens along the border
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Afghan confidence in the
coalition was in decline.
President Obama ordered an immediate strategy review, and in the
course of that preliminary review we made a number of key changes. We
grew our force by 38,000 troops, and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) appointed General McChrystal as Commander of
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (COMISAF). Perhaps most
importantly, General McChrystal quickly implemented a counter-
insurgency strategy that prioritizes protecting the Afghan people over
killing the enemy.
In December of last year, after an extensive strategic review, the
President announced a number of key refinements to our strategy,
including the deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. service men and
women. As of June 2, over 18,000 of these additional troops had already
deployed, and the remainder will be in place by the end of the summer.
Our own troops will be joined by over 9,000 additional NATO and partner
nation troops--some 2,000 more troops than were pledged by our allies
and partners in January 2010. Approximately 60 percent of the NATO and
partner troops are currently in place in Afghanistan, and more will
arrive in the coming months. We are concerned about the possible loss
or reduction of the Dutch contingent in Uruzgan Province, as well as by
the Canadian plan to end their military mission in Afghanistan in 2011.
We continue to work with both nations to find ways through which they
can demonstrate their continued commitment to our shared goals in
Afghanistan.
counterinsurgency in helmand and kandahar provinces
Currently, the main operational effort for ISAF and our Afghan
partners continues to be in the Central Helmand River Valley and
Kandahar. For ISAF and our Afghan partners, the Helmand operations have
been the first large-scale effort to fundamentally change how we do
business. Our focus in these operations is on protecting the population
and fostering security and governance capacity, and our preparations
for the Helmand operation included extraordinary levels of civil-
military planning and engagement with the Afghans--from our ANSF
partners, to Afghan ministries, to local tribes and populations.
Ultimately, the operation was approved and ordered by President Karzai.
We have made significant progress in establishing security, which
is a precondition for enhancing governance and expanding development.
Today, our coalition forces are contesting the insurgency more
effectively, in more places, and with more forces.
But even as we make progress, we face continued challenges. In both
April and May, we saw resumed insurgent activity in Marjah, and an
expansion of insurgent capacity throughout Central Helmand. Insurgents
carried out numerous high profile attacks in Kandahar City. This
renewed insurgent activity has disrupted governance efforts and
prompted several nongovernmental organizations to plan withdrawal from
the area. The insurgency is both resilient and resourceful, and the
upsurge in violence demonstrates this.
Nonetheless, the nature of recent insurgent attacks is beginning to
show trends consistent with a reduction in the insurgents' operational
capability. For example, the percentage of complex attacks (those
employing more than one means of attack) has steadily dropped since a
peak in February and the average number of casualties per attack is
below 2009 levels. As nascent security, governance and development
initiatives begin to unfold, we are also seeing increased signs of
popular resistance to insurgent demands. Insurgents continue to seek to
influence the population through assassination and other intimidation
tactics, but local Afghans in the region have shown an increased
willingness to report suspected improvised explosive devices and
insurgent weapons caches, another indicator that the insurgent attacks
are becoming less effective. These incidents suggest growing pockets of
confidence among ordinary people, and a willingness to support ISAF and
Afghan efforts to establish security and governance in the region.
Let me also say a bit about Kandahar. Kandahar is the heart of the
Pashtun-dominated south, and it is a key population center that serves
as a hub of several major trade routes. It is also the spiritual center
of the Taliban. In Kandahar, we are taking an incremental approach,
gradually expanding efforts to improve local governance in key
districts as Coalition and ANSF operations improve the security
situation.
You have expressed concern about the impact local powerbrokers have
on our efforts in Kandahar. We share this concern. Our goal is to
foster transparent, effective, and accountable democratic governance in
Afghanistan--yet we recognize that there are ways in which our own
contracting practices have had unintended consequences. The large sums
of money spent by the U.S. and other coalition partners to support
operational requirements--including trucking, personal security
contractors, and construction--have concentrated wealth among the
relatively small number of Afghans who control those companies able to
execute the required support operations.
General Petraeus and Admiral Mullen have created a two-star task
force (in coordination with Under Secretary Carter's Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics office) to examine our contracting practices.
Our goal is to find ways to reduce these unintended consequences of our
contracting practices. When we have evidence of corruption, we will
also work with the Afghan Government to prosecute those who have
violated the law.
growing the capacity of the ansf and improving security
Our efforts to increase the strength and capability of the ANSF
remain key both to the long-term security and stability of Afghanistan,
and to our ability to draw our own forces down, in accordance with the
timeline President Obama has laid out.
These efforts are showing progress, though here too, significant
challenges remain. We continue to work to improve retention and
decrease attrition in the ANSF, and to improve the quality of the
force. We are also partnering ISAF with the ANSF at all levels, from
the Ministries of Defense and Interior down to the small unit level,
with the aim of intensively mentoring the ANSF and growing the next
generation of leaders.
In the face of continued shortfalls, we are engaging in aggressive
diplomatic efforts to encourage our international partners to provide
additional institutional trainers and mentoring teams for the ANSF. A
series of NATO meetings over the last 6 months--including last week's
Defense Ministerial--focused heavily on addressing these shortfalls.
Currently, the Afghan National Army (ANA) stands at 125,694
soldiers, which is well above our target of 116,500 for this time
period, and is on schedule to meet our goal of 134,000 for fiscal year
2010. The Afghan National Police (ANP) numbered 105,873 as of early
June, and the Ministry of the Interior is on track to reach its goal of
109,000 police by the end of the fiscal year. Beginning in fiscal year
2011, the security ministries' goals are to build the ANA to 171,600
troops, and the ANP to 134,000 officers. We think these goals are
achievable.
Formed in November 2009 and led by LTG William Caldwell, the NATO
Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) is working closely with the MoD
and MoI on several initiatives to improve recruiting, training,
retention, and attrition. Recent salary and benefit initiatives have
addressed pay disparities between ANA and ANP forces, and our initial
assessment suggests these initiatives have led to improved retention
and attrition rates. Literacy programs have also proven to be a
positive incentive for recruitment and retention.
Further, we believe that rising end-strength numbers will also have
a positive impact on retention and attrition rates. The Afghan Ministry
of Defense and the Ministry of Interior are also instituting ANA and
ANP unit rotation schedules, to reduce the strains associated with
indefinite deployments and to provide greater opportunity for security
personnel to be home with their families. We believe that this effort
will also reduce attrition rates.
Training the police remains our greatest challenge, but we have
taken important steps to ensure that the Afghan police we put into the
field are better trained and more capable. The MoI has implemented a
revised ANP development model so that all recruits receive adequate
training before they are deployed. We have raised the capacity to
conduct ANP training by 400 percent over the course of the past 12
months. Additionally, the MoI has sought to institutionalize best
practices, in part by creating institutions such as the new Recruiting
and Training Commands.
Through the Focused District Development program, we and our
Coalition partners have provided follow-on training for Afghan
Uniformed Police in 83 districts, and the Focused Border Development
program is accomplishing the same for the Afghan Border Police. In
coordination with NTM-A, the MoI has also initiated planning to address
leadership and professional development issues and to identify ways to
counter corruption. The NTM-A/Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is working with the MoI to institute a competitive
officer selection and promotion process that is transparent and merit
based. COMISAF has directed that the Afghan National Civil Order Police
(ANCOP) partnering program be expanded to provide direct mentoring, and
today, nearly 85 percent of the ANA are fully partnered with ISAF
forces as they operate in the field.
transition
We are also working on several other fronts to ensure a gradual
transition of responsibility to the Afghan Government. At NATO's
Tallinn Foreign Ministerial in April, the ministers approved a
framework for transition. Based on this decision, NATO Senior Civilian
Representative Mark Sedwill and General McChrystal are now engaging
more formally and intensively with the Afghan Government to develop a
joint Afghan-international community transition plan. This plan is
expected to be presented during the Kabul Conference in July.
I want to emphasize that ``transition'' does not mean abandonment
or withdrawal. We are committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan
over the long-term, and we will not walk away from this commitment.
Nonetheless, we cannot and should not remain in a combat role
indefinitely. The transition to Afghan responsibility will be a
conditions-based process, one through which the Afghan Government, over
time, assumes increasing responsibility for security and other
government functions throughout the country, with continued ISAF
support.
The scope and pace of that transition will depend on circumstances
on the ground. But as the international military presence begins to
shift from a combat role to an advise-and-assist role, it will be
absolutely vital to ensure a more robust and long-term international
civilian assistance effort focused on capacity building, governance and
development.
u.s. and afghan government long-term partnership
In January 2010, at the London Conference, President Karzai
reaffirmed his government's commitment to establish security and good
governance, fight corruption, increase economic development, and
improve regional cooperation, among other issues. In May, President
Karzai and 14 members of his cabinet visited Washington for a Strategic
Dialogue to follow up on the London conference. Their meetings with
President Obama and U.S. cabinet officials reinforced the long-term and
vital partnership between our two countries, in areas ranging from
security to governance and economic development.
Senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials met with a large cadre
of capable Afghan officials who are implementing programs that meet our
shared objectives. President Karzai's visit underscored international
cooperation and support for the mission in Afghanistan, and also
highlighted the continuing support among Afghans for U.S. Government
involvement in Afghanistan. President Karzai visited Walter Reed Army
Medical Center, where he met with our wounded warriors, and Fort
Campbell, KY, where he thanked soldiers from the 101st Airborne
Division as they departed for Afghanistan. We do feel that our Afghan
partners appreciate the sacrifices being made by U.S. soldiers and
civilians.
The discussions held in May on governance, security, economic and
social development, and regional issues built on past sessions of the
United States-Afghanistan Strategic Dialogue. During these discussions,
President Obama and President Karzai reaffirmed their growing
cooperation and their commitment to the solid, broad, and enduring
strategic partnership between the Governments and peoples of the United
States and Afghanistan. This partnership is based on shared interests
and objectives, as well as mutual respect. The two sides declared that
a sovereign, stable, secure, peaceful, and economically viable
Afghanistan that has friendly relations with all its neighbors and
countries in the region is vital to regional stability and global
security.
President Obama and President Karzai's joint statement of May 12
highlighted several key points in the area of security. The two
Presidents recognized the importance of the Afghan Government to
assuming increasing responsibility for security. They further
recognized that developing ANSF capabilities is necessary to facilitate
an orderly, conditions-based security transition process. Additionally,
the United States reaffirmed its commitment to transitioning
responsibility for detention facilities to the Afghan Government.
Finally, President Obama and President Karzai recognized the importance
of Afghan-led peace and reconciliation efforts.
The Afghan Government's next opportunity to demonstrate progress
toward meeting the commitments made in London will be the Kabul
Conference in July. Eighty international delegations will be on hand
for the Kabul conference, at which the Afghans will present plans for
integrated progress in governance and development across four
ministerial clusters. We also expect to hear from President Karzai
regarding actions taken to address corruption. Finally, we expect to
hear President Karzai's plans for reconciliation and reintegration,
based on the mandate he received from the Consultative Peace Jirga.
afghan attitudes
As a result of General McChrystal`s shift to a counterinsurgency
approach, the percentage of Afghan civilian casualties caused by
Coalition actions has dropped substantially. This improvement has
produced significant shifts in Afghan attitudes towards ISAF and Afghan
forces. Compared to a year ago, polling suggests that Afghans are now
more optimistic about the future and have greater confidence in the
ability of the Afghan Government and their Coalition partners to
prevail over the insurgency.
We have seen other positive indicators in the last year, as well.
Of the 121 key terrain districts identified by ISAF in December 2009,
60 were assessed as sympathetic or neutral to the Afghan Government. By
March of this year, that number had climbed to 73 districts.
Nonetheless, the Afghan public still considers government
corruption a serious problem, and extends the blame to ISAF and the
rest of the international community. Corruption in Afghanistan remains
a widespread problem. As stated in DOD's April 2010, Report on Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Afghanistan has achieved
some progress in its anti-corruption efforts. But substantive change
remains elusive.
Despite this and other serious problems that remain unaddressed,
there are reasons for optimism. A national survey completed in March
indicates that 59 percent of Afghans believe their government is headed
in the right direction, an increase of 8 percent over September 2009.
reintegration and reconciliation
All parties to the conflict in Afghanistan recognize that there is
a limit to what military activities alone can accomplish. In the end,
some political resolution will be required to bring the conflict to a
close. This recognition has driven the Afghan Government's efforts to
reconcile insurgent leaders and reintegrate low-level fighters.
This effort must be Afghan-led. In early April, President Karzai
presented his interim plans for reintegrating lower-level insurgents
who renounce violence and disassociate themselves from terrorists back
into Afghan society. In May, a Consultative Peace Jirga, a traditional
Afghan method of gaining national consensus, was held to address
reconciliation. The Jirga's final report gave President Karzai a
conditional mandate to pursue talks with the Taliban.
In recognition of this progress, the Department has released Afghan
Reintegration Program Authority funding (authorized under the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010) to fund DOD
reintegration activities in support of this Afghan Government
initiative. Along with contributions from the international
reintegration trust fund, co-managed by the British and Japanese
Governments, the Afghan Reintegration Program Authority will play an
important role in supporting reintegration opportunities as they emerge
on the battlefield.
looking forward
Last week, Secretary Gates attended the informal NATO Defense
Ministerial in Brussels. General McChrystal and Ambassador Sedwill have
been charged with coordinating with the Afghan Government to develop a
joint assessment process and a plan to begin a conditions-based
transition process, and in Brussels last week, Ambassador Sedwill, the
NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, presented a concept
for Afghanistan transition that was accepted by the NATO Ministers.
Following the July Kabul Conference, the Afghan Government will
prepare for September Parliamentary elections. The international
community will insist on transparency during this round of elections.
The leadership and membership of the election commission has changed
since the 2009 Presidential elections, and we believe that the Afghan
Government understands the importance of demonstrating real progress in
terms of holding free, fair, and transparent elections.
conclusion
Let me conclude by underscoring our assessment that we are heading
in the right direction in Afghanistan. We are regaining the initiative
and the insurgency is beginning to lose momentum. That said, the
outcome is far from determined. Approximately 54 percent of additional
planned coalition forces are now in place, but those troops still to
come are critical to achieving success.
I want to repeat something I know I have said before: none of what
we are doing in Afghanistan involves quick fixes. These are long-term
problems, and their solutions will require patience, persistence and
flexibility. At this point, though, I remain cautiously optimistic
because the elements key to success are being put in place. As we move
forward, we will continue to adjust--and I believe that we will
continue to make progress. I share Secretary Gates' confidence that
General McChrystal will be able to show demonstrable progress by the
end of this year.
We very much appreciate this committee's continued support for our
efforts. Congress is currently considering the Department of Defense's
fiscal year 2011 budget request, including $110.3 billion for Operation
Enduring Freedom, as well as a supplemental request of $28.8 billion
for fiscal year 2010, and we believe that these funds are critical to
our success in Afghanistan. I appreciate the support this committee has
given, in its mark-up of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011, for full funding of the Afghanistan Security Forces
Fund, and for the extension of Coalition Support Funds to reimburse
Pakistan and other key nations that cooperate in contingency operations
in Afghanistan. I would also encourage full funding of our Commanders'
Emergency Response Program request as we see this authority as a key
nonkinetic weapon in the counterinsurgency fight. I also appreciate the
Senate's passage of the Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2010 last month.
With your help, we have accomplished a great deal over the past
year, but there is a great deal still to do.
Thank you once again for inviting us here today. I look forward to
continuing to work together, and I welcome your questions and comments.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Flournoy.
General Petraeus.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an
update on the situation in Afghanistan and our execution of the
comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign that is
being conducted there. I note that it's a pleasure to do this
with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy,
who I might note was a contributor to the conference at Fort
Leavenworth in January 2006 that launched the effort to develop
and draft the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual.
I'll begin with some brief context. As you'll recall, soon
after the September 11 attacks an international coalition led
by the United States conducted an impressive campaign to defeat
the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other associated extremist groups in
Afghanistan. In the years that followed, however, members of
the Taliban and other extremist elements gradually reconnected
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions and rebuilt the
structures necessary to plan and execute insurgent operations.
In recent years, these groups have engaged in an
increasingly violent campaign against the Afghan people, their
government, and ISAF forces. They have demonstrated symbiotic
relationships, ambitions, and capabilities that pose threats
not just to Afghanistan and the region, but to countries
throughout the world.
In response to the threat posed by these extremists, ISAF
forces and our Afghan partners are engaged in a campaign
intended above all to prevent reestablishment of transnational
extremist sanctuaries in Afghanistan like the ones al Qaeda
enjoyed there when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan prior to
September 11.
To achieve our objectives, we are working with our ISAF and
Afghan partners to wrest the initiative from the Taliban and
other insurgent elements, to improve security for the Afghan
people, to increase the quantity and quality of the ANSF, and
to support establishment of Afghan governance that is seen as
legitimate in the eyes of the people.
Over the past 18 months we and our ISAF partners have
worked hard to get the inputs right in Afghanistan. We have
worked to build the organizations needed to carry out a
comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign. We've
put the best military and civilian leaders in charge of those
organizations. We've refined and, where necessary, developed
the plans and concepts needed to guide the conduct of a
comprehensive effort. We have deployed the substantial
additional resources, military, civilian, funding, and so on,
needed to implement the plans that have been developed.
I note here that the deployment of the 30,000 additional
U.S. forces announced by President Obama last December and
their equipment is slightly ahead of schedule. Nearly 18,300 of
the additional 30,000 as of the latest numbers are now in
Afghanistan, and by the end of August all the additional U.S.
forces will be on the ground except for a headquarters that is
not required until a month or so later.
Meanwhile, the efforts to increase the size and capability
of the ANA and ANP are also now on track, though there clearly
is considerable work to be done in that critical area and to
sustain the gains that have been made recently in recruiting
and attrition.
Even as we continue the effort to complete getting the
inputs right, the actions taken over the last 18 months, which
include tripling the U.S. force contribution and increasing
similarly the U.S. civilian component, have enabled the
initiation of new efforts in key areas in Afghanistan. The
initial main effort has of course been in the Central Helmand
River Valley, and U.S. and U.K. forces have made progress
there, though, predictably, the enemy has fought back as we
have taken away important sanctuaries in Marjah, Nad-i-Ali, and
elsewhere.
The focus is now shifting to Kandahar Province, where the
effort features an integrated civil-military approach to
security, governance, and development. In the months ahead,
we'll see an additional U.S. brigade from the great 101st
Airborne Division deploy into the districts around Kandahar
City together with an additional ANA brigade. We'll see the
introduction of additional ANP and U.S. military police to
secure the city itself, along with other U.S. forces and
civilians who will work together with the impressive Canadian
provincial reconstruction team that has been operating in the
city.
As you have heard General McChrystal explain, the concept
is to provide the people of Kandahar a rising tide of security,
one that will expand over time and establish the foundation of
improved security on which local Afghan governance can be built
and that will enable improvements in the provision of basic
services and other areas as well.
There will be nothing easy about any of this. Indeed, I
noted several months ago during my annual posture hearing that
the going was likely to get harder before it got easier. That
has already been the case, as we have seen recently. But it is
essential that we make progress in the critical southern part
of the country, the part where in fact the September 11 attacks
were planned by al Qaeda during the period when the Taliban
controlled it and much of the rest of the country.
Central to achieving progress in Afghanistan and to setting
the conditions necessary to transition security tasks from the
international coalition to the Afghan Government is increasing
the size and capability of the ANSF. To that end, with the
assistance of the Afghan Security Forces Fund, Afghan security
forces are now on track to meet their targeted end strength
objectives by the end of the year, as the Under Secretary
explained.
In 2009, the ANSF numbered 156,000. Today, there are over
231,000 ANSF members. To help achieve greater quality as well
as greater quantity, General McChrystal has directed much
greater partnering with the ANSF, an emphasis that is on
display daily in operations throughout Afghanistan.
Considerable progress has been made in getting the concepts
right for developing the ANSF and also in developing the
structures needed to implement those concepts.
Improving the ANSF has been facilitated considerably, for
example, by the establishment last November of the NTM-A, the
organization created to help the ANSF expand and
professionalize. It's worth noting that the NTM-A commander,
Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, assessed that in NTM-A's
first 6 months NATO and Afghan security leadership have made
progress in reversing adverse trends in the growth and
professionalization of the ANSF.
Nevertheless, as General Caldwell has also observed, there
is much work remaining to reduce its attrition further and to
develop effective leaders through considerably augmented
partnering, training, education, and recruiting, and
initiatives are being pursued in each of these areas.
In all of our efforts, we and President Karzai continue to
emphasize the importance of inclusivity and transparency on the
part of the Afghan Government and its leadership, especially in
linking nascent local governing structures to the
decisionmaking and financial resources in Kabul.
Needless to say, innumerable challenges exist in all areas
of government and much more needs to be done to help the Afghan
Government assume full responsibility for addressing the
concerns and needs of Afghan citizens. The National
Consultative Peace Jirga held in Kabul earlier this month was a
constructive step in this effort, providing an opportunity for
President Karzai to build consensus, to address some of the
political tensions that fuel the insurgency, and,
appropriately, to promote reconciliation and local
reintegration as means that can contribute to a political
resolution of some of the issues that exist. The shura council
that he conducted on Sunday in Kandahar furthered this process
and the effort to set the political conditions for progress in
Kandahar.
Another critically important part of our joint civil-
military campaign in Afghanistan is promoting broad-based
economic and infrastructure development. We've seen that
improvements in the Afghan Government's ability to deliver
basic services, such as electricity, education, and basic
health care, provide positive effects in other areas, including
security and economic development. We've worked closely with
the international community and the Afghan Government to
support robust strategies for these areas; again water,
governance, energy, education, health, and road programs. We're
now embarking on a project jointly developed by the Government
of Afghanistan and various U.S. Government agencies to
dramatically increase production of electricity for the
Kandahar area and parts of southern and eastern Afghanistan. To
complement this effort, we also promote agriculture and
economic programs to help Afghans bring licit products to
market rather than continuing to grow the poppy.
Again, none of this is easy or without considerable
challenges. However, the mission is, as the members of this
committee clearly recognize, hugely important to the security
of the region and of our country. In view of that, we are
obviously doing all that we can to achieve progress toward
accomplishment of our important objectives in Afghanistan and
we are seeing early progress as we get the inputs right in that
country.
In closing, I want to thank the members of this committee
once again for your unwavering support and abiding concern for
the more than 215,000 troops deployed throughout the CENTCOM
area of responsibility, and for their families as well. Thank
you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN David H. Petraeus, USA
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to provide an update on the situation in
Afghanistan. Today, I will describe our ongoing efforts in support of
the comprehensive civil-military campaign that is being conducted in
Afghanistan.
I'll begin by setting my remarks in context. As you will recall,
soon after the September 11 attacks, an international coalition led by
the United States conducted an impressive campaign to defeat the
Taliban, al Qaeda, and other associated extremist groups in
Afghanistan. In the years that followed, however, members of the
Taliban and the other extremist elements gradually reconnected in
Afghanistan's and Pakistan's border regions and rebuilt the structures
necessary to communicate, plan, and carry out operations.
In recent years, these groups have engaged in an increasingly
violent campaign against the Afghan people, their government, and
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces, and they have
developed symbiotic, relationships that pose threats not just to
Afghanistan and the region, but to countries throughout the world.
In response to the threat posed by these extremists, coalition
forces and their Afghan partners are now engaged in a comprehensive
civil-military campaign intended, above all, to prevent reestablishment
of transnational extremist sanctuaries in Afghanistan like the ones al
Qaeda enjoyed there when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan prior to
September 11.
To achieve our objectives, we are working with our ISAF and Afghan
partners to wrest the initiative from the Taliban and other insurgent
elements, to improve security for the Afghan people, to increase the
quantity and quality of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and
to support establishment of Afghan governance that is seen as
legitimate in the eyes of the people.
Over the past year or so, we and our ISAF partners have worked hard
to get the ``inputs'' right in Afghanistan: to build organizations,
command and control structures, and relationships needed to carry out a
comprehensive civil-military campaign. We and our international
partners have put the best possible civilian and military leaders in
charge of those organizations. We have refined and, where necessary,
developed the civil-military plans and concepts needed to guide the
conduct of a comprehensive counterinsurgency effort. We have deployed
the substantial additional resources--military, civilian, funding, and
so on--needed to implement the plans that have been developed. I note
here that the deployment of the 30,000 additional U.S. troopers
announced by President Obama last December and their equipment is
slightly ahead of schedule. By the end of August, all the additional
U.S. forces will be on the ground except for a division headquarters
that is not required until a month or so later. Meanwhile, the efforts
to increase the size and capability of the Afghan National Army and
Police are also on track, though there clearly is considerable work to
be done in that critical area.
Even as we continue the effort to get all the inputs in place, the
actions taken over the last 18 months, which include tripling the U.S.
force contribution and increasing similarly the U.S. civilian
component, have enabled the initiation of comprehensive civil-military
counterinsurgency operations in key districts in Afghanistan.
The initial main operational effort has been in the Central Helmand
River Valley, and progress has been made there, though, predictably,
the enemy has fought back as we have taken away his sanctuaries in
Marjah, Nad-i-Ali, and elsewhere.
The focus is now shifting to Kandahar Province, and the effort
there features an integrated civil-military approach to security,
governance, and development. Over the course of the month ahead, we
will see an additional U.S. brigade--from the great 101st Airborne
Division--deploy into the districts around Kandahar City, together with
an additional Afghan Army brigade. There will also be the introduction
of additional Afghan police and U.S. military police into the city,
together with other U.S. forces and civilians who will work together
with the impressive Canadian PRT that has been working in the city. As
you've heard General McChrystal explain, the concept is to provide the
Kandaharis ``a rising tide of security'' that will expand incrementally
over time and establish the foundation of improved security on which
local Afghan governance can be built, that will enable improvements in
the provision of basic services, and so on. There will be nothing easy
about any of this, to be sure, and as I noted during my annual posture
hearing, the going is likely to get harder before it gets easier. But
it is essential to make progress in the critical southern part of the
country, the part where, in fact, the September 11 attacks were planned
by al Qaeda during the period when the Taliban controlled it and much
of the rest of the country.
Central to achieving progress in Afghanistan--and to setting the
conditions necessary to transition security tasks from the
international community to the Afghan Government--is increasing the
size and capability of ANSF. To that end, with the assistance of the
Afghan Security Forces Fund, the security forces are on track to meet
their targeted end strength objectives by the end of this year. In
January 2009, the ANSF numbered 156,000; today, there are over 231,000
ANSF members. Additionally, General Stan McChrystal has placed a
premium on comprehensive partnering with the ANSF, an emphasis that is
on display daily in operations throughout Afghanistan. Clearly, there
is need for improvement in quality, not just quantity. Considerable
progress has been made in getting the concepts right for developing the
ANSF and also in developing the structures needed to implement the
concepts.
Improving the ANSF is facilitated considerably by the establishment
last November of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), the
organization created to help the ANSF expand and professionalize so
that they can answer their country's security needs. It is worth noting
that the NTM-A Commander, LTG Bill Caldwell, assessed that in NTM-A's
first 6 months, NATO and Afghan security leadership have made
``progress in reversing adverse trends in the growth and
professionalization of the ANSF.'' Nevertheless, as LTG Caldwell has
also observed, there is much work remaining to reduce attrition and to
develop effective leaders through considerably augmented partnering,
training, and recruiting.
In all of our efforts, we continue to emphasize the importance of
inclusivity and transparency on the part of the Afghan Government and
leadership, especially in linking nascent local governing institutions
to the decisionmaking and financial resources in Kabul. Needless to
say, innumerable challenges exist in all areas of governance, and much
more needs to be done to help the Afghan Government assume full
responsibility for addressing the concerns of ordinary Afghan citizens.
The National Consultative Peace Jirga held in Kabul earlier this month
represents a constructive first step in this effort, providing an
opportunity for President Karzai to build consensus, to address some of
the political tensions that fuel the insurgency, and to promote
reconciliation and local reintegration as means that can contribute to
a political resolution of some of the issues that exist.
Another critically important part of our joint civil-military
campaign in Afghanistan is promoting broad-based economic and
infrastructure development. We have seen that improvements in the
Afghan Government's ability to deliver basic services such as
electricity and water have positive effects in other areas, including
public perception, security, and economic well-being. We have worked
closely with the international community and the Afghan Government to
develop robust overarching strategies for water, governance, energy,
and road programs. We are now embarking on a project jointly developed
by the Government of Afghanistan and various U.S. Government agencies
to dramatically increase production of electricity to the Kandahar
area. To complement this effort, we support and promote viable
agricultural and economic alternatives to help Afghans bring licit
products to market, rather than continuing to grow the poppy.
Again, none of this is easy or without considerable challenges.
However, the mission is, as the members of this committee clearly
recognize, hugely important to the security of the region and our
country. We are obviously doing all that we can to achieve progress
toward achieving our important objectives in Afghanistan.
In closing, I thank the members of this committee for your
unwavering support and abiding concern for the more than 215,000 troops
deployed throughout the Central Command area of responsibility--and for
their families, as well. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Petraeus.
I think we'll try a 7-minute first round. General, let me
start with you relative to the issue which I raised about the
ANA not being adequately in the lead down in the south, where
the major fighting is taking place and where it's going to take
place in the months ahead. As I understand it, we have
approximately 94,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. About half of
them are deployed in Helmand and Kandahar, down in the south.
That's the main focus of our counterinsurgency effort.
How many Afghan troops are there currently in Kandahar and
Helmand and about how many Afghan troops do we expect will be
there in September?
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, I'll be happy to get that
for you for the record. If I could just provide the overview of
what it is that we're trying to accomplish in that area, and
you certainly touched on the importance of, obviously, getting
the Afghans in the lead.
[The information referred to follows:]
There are a total of 10,913 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
currently deployed throughout all of Helmand Province--7,280 in the
Afghan Army (ANA), 3,663 in the Afghan National Police (ANP), 2,727 in
the Afghan Uniform Police, 311 in the Afghan Border Police, 625 in the
Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and 28,907 coalition forces (CF).
In Hamkari, the ratio of ANSF to coalition forces operating in
support of Hamkari is approximately 1 to 1 and will remain so
throughout the summer as Afghan and coalition forces continue to flow.
As of 1 July 2010, there were a total of about 10,750 (6,050 in the
ANSF and 4,700 coalition forces) for a ratio of 1.29 to 1.
ANA 3,000 Infantry, 850 Support
ANP 1,500 AUP, 700 ANCOP
CF 2,600 Infantry, 300 Military Police, 1,800 Combat
Enablers
As of 1 August 2010, there were a total of about 14,550 (7,550 in
the ANSF and 7,000 coalition forces) for a ratio 1.08 to 1.
ANA 3,500 Infantry, 850 Support
ANP 1,800 AUP, 1,400 ANCOP
CF 4,200 Infantry, 300 Military Police, 2,500 Combat
Enablers
General Petraeus. We had a video teleconference with
General McChrystal this morning, in fact, the normal weekly one
that the Secretary does. The Chairman, Under Secretary
Flournoy, and I participate in that. In that he described, for
example, how he will use some of the elements of the additional
brigade going into the Kandahar belts, the districts around
Kandahar City, to work with their Afghan partners, so that they
can do what President Karzai also wants them to do, as he
announced in the shura council on Sunday to the 500 or so local
leaders there in discussing what is coming to Kandahar
Province. That is that Afghan forces lead wherever that is
possible.
Chairman Levin. What percentage of the time do you figure
they're going to be in the lead in this Kandahar operation?
Will it be most of the time? Will it be less than half the
time? Roughly how often in these operations that are going to
take place will it be Afghan troops in the lead? Can you give
us some estimate?
General Petraeus. It will depend on which component it is,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Not the special forces. Other than the
special forces.
General Petraeus. With respect to the police, for example,
the police are in the lead in Kandahar.
Chairman Levin. Other than the police. I'm talking about
troops.
General Petraeus. The Afghan National Civil Order Police
will be in the lead. With partners, but not by any means full
numbers, alongside them, they will be conducting the operations
and they will be leading in those.
Chairman Levin. Just for the regular army kandaks, give us
an idea? Do we expect that most of the time that the operations
will be led by Afghan troops or not?
General Petraeus. I would think that the presence patrols,
if you will, will be the ones that are led by the Afghan
forces, and that the more high-end operations that require the
integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) systems, and so forth, that are an important component of
this overall effort, would still be led by U.S. forces.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, the numbers that we have, the
ISAF numbers, are that more than half of those Afghan
battalions are capable of operating either independently or
independently with coalition support. Even if you reduce that
number down to 30 percent, which is what I think ISAF is going
to be doing, there's a lot more kandaks or battalions of the
ANA that are able to operate independently than we are using
down in the south.
Why are we not and why are the Afghans not moving more of
their troops down to the south for this upcoming campaign?
General Petraeus. First of all, they have moved more of
their troops to the south, Mr. Chairman. Second, they are going
to move more of their troops to the south. Third, there are
other missions in Afghanistan that require Afghan troops.
Chairman Levin. Are they capable, General, of leading most
of these operations where you call high end operations? Are
there enough Afghan troops capable of leading those high end
operations?
General Petraeus. The very high end operations, we have
Afghan partners on those and we are developing. Now I'm talking
the very high end operations.
Chairman Levin. I say leading.
General Petraeus. Not the very high end. Again, those are
dependent on U.S. ISR assets that they don't have the ability
to pull down, nor does virtually any other force in the world,
for that matter.
What I think is probably more relevant would be more of the
standard activities. The standard patrols I think they have the
capability to do and are doing. They do secure large numbers of
convoys of various movements, again the presence patrols, the
framework activities, as it's termed. But when you get into the
more challenging scenarios, certainly in the difficult
operations in Marjah, U.S. forces ended up leading the bulk of
those.
Chairman Levin. General, let me ask you whether or not you
continue to support the strategy of the President which has the
additional forces coming in, but, more specifically, do you
continue to support that July 2011 date for the start of
reduction in U.S. forces from Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. I support the policy of the President,
Mr. Chairman. As I have noted on a number of occasions, my
sense of what the President was seeking to convey at West Point
in December were two messages. One is a message of enormous
additional commitment, again culminating in the more than
tripling the number of U.S. forces, triple the number of
civilians, substantial additional funds that you have
authorized for the ANSF, et cetera, and also a message of
urgency. The urgency was the July 2011 piece, noting that what
happens in July 2011 is a beginning of a process for
transition, that it's conditions-based, and the beginning of a
process of responsible drawdown of U.S. forces.
Chairman Levin. When you say that you continue to support
the President's policy both in terms of the additional troops,
but also the setting of that date to begin the reduction for
the reasons that you just gave in terms of laying out the
urgency for the Afghans to take responsibility, does that
represent your best personal professional judgment?
General Petraeus. In a perfect world, Mr. Chairman, we have
to be very careful with timelines. We went through this in
Iraq, as you will recall, and I did set a timeline ultimately
in Iraq. In fact, testifying before this body in September 2007
I said we would start the drawdown of our surge forces in
December, based on a projection of conditions that would be
established.
We are assuming that we will have those kinds of conditions
that will enable that by that time in July 2011. That's the
projection and that is what again we have supported.
Chairman Levin. Do I take that to be a qualified yes, a
qualified no, or just a non-answer?
General Petraeus. A qualified yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Petraeus. Again, I think there was a nuance to what
the President said that was very important, that did not imply
a race for the exits, a search for the light to turn off, or
anything like that. It did imply the need for greater urgency.
That target was--I think a number of targets that was aimed at.
It included the leaders in Afghanistan. It undoubtedly included
some of our partners around the world. It may have included
some of us in uniform.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. General, just to follow up here, there's a
great deal of confusion about this. You just said that
beginning withdrawal, and it would be conditions-based and
contingent upon certain factors. Yet there's a recent book by
Jonathan Alter--and it has quotes:
``Inside the Oval Office, Obama asked Petraeus:
`David, tell me now. I want you to be honest with me.
You can do this in 18 months?'
`Sir, I'm confident we can train and hand over to the
ANA in that timeframe,' Petraeus replied.
`Good, no problem,' the President said. `If you can't
do the things you say in 18 months, then no one is
going to suggest we stay, right?'
`Yes, sir, in agreement.'
`Yes, sir,' Mullen.''
Then Mr. Alter goes on to say:
``Obama was trying to turn the tables on the
military, to box them in after they had spent most of
the year boxing him in. If after 18 months the
situation in Afghanistan had stabilized as he expected,
then troops could begin to come home. If conditions
didn't stabilize enough to begin an orderly withdrawal
of U.S. forces or if they deteriorated further, that
would undermine the Pentagon's belief in the
effectiveness of more troops.''
Then at the end:
``At the conclusion of an interview in his West Wing
office''--referring to the Vice President--``Biden was
adamant: `In July 2011, you're going to see a whole lot
of people moving out. Bet on it.' ''
Now, I don't know if that book is accurate. It has quotes
in it. But honestly, General, there's a disconnect between the
comment that you just made in response to the chairman and what
is being depicted here and the President's repeated statements
that in July 2011 that we will begin withdrawal. This obviously
sends a message to our enemies that we are leaving and our
friends that we are leaving, and then there is accommodation in
the region.
So I guess maybe could you clarify the difference between
what you just said and what is quoted in the book:
``I am confident that we can train and hand over to
the ANA in that timeframe.''
``Good, no problem.''
``If we can't do the things you say you can in 18
months, then no one is going to suggest we stay,
right?''
That's a quote, apparently a direct quote from the
President of the United States.
General Petraeus. Senator, I'm not sure it's productive to
comment on conversations that took place in the Oval Office.
Senator McCain. I understand that.
General Petraeus. What I would come back to is what the
President said at West Point, and that is something that I
support, as I just told the chairman. That is that July 2011 is
not the date where we race for the exits; it is the date where,
having done an assessment, we begin a process of transition of
tasks to Afghan security forces based on conditions and begin a
process of a responsible drawdown of our forces.
Senator McCain. Do you believe that we will begin a
drawdown of forces in July 2011, given the situation as it
exists today?
General Petraeus. It's not given as the situation exists
today. Obviously, it is given as projections are for that time.
I do believe that that will be the case.
Senator McCain. Do you believe we can begin a drawdown in
July 2011 under the projected plans that we have?
General Petraeus. That is the policy and I support it,
Senator.
Senator McCain. I understand you support the policy. Will
conditions on the ground indicate that we will begin a
withdrawal, in the words of the Vice President: ``July 2011,
you're going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on
it.''
Do you agree with the comment of President Karzai's former
intelligence chief that Karzai has lost confidence in the
ability of the United States and NATO to succeed in
Afghanistan, General?
General Petraeus. I do not, Senator. Again, as I mentioned
earlier, in fact we just did a video teleconference, a weekly
video teleconference with General McChrystal. He spent the bulk
of Sunday with President Karzai in the process of conducting
the shura council in Kandahar, going to and from with him as
well, and in that process there was certainly no sense on
General McChrystal's part, nor on those of the others who were
with him, that there was a lack of confidence in the U.S.
commitment to Afghanistan.
As I mentioned earlier, the fact that we will have more
than tripled our forces from January 2009 to the end of August
2010 is of enormous significance. The same with the civilian
force structure, the same with the funding, and the same with
others.
Senator McCain. Let me reiterate my admiration and respect,
General, for you and our military leaders in the task, in the
difficulty of the task before them. I think you are one of
America's great heroes.
But I continue to worry a great deal about the message we
are sending in the region about whether we're actually going to
stay or not and whether we're going to do what's necessary to
succeed, rather than set an arbitrary timeline. The best way
to----[Pause.]
Chairman Levin. We're going to recess. We're going to
recess now for a few moments. We'll recess until the call of
the chair.
[Recess from 10:23 a.m. to 10:33 a.m.]
Chairman Levin. General Petraeus appears to be doing very
well, and we will make a decision as to whether to proceed in,
hopefully, a few minutes. He's eating. He probably didn't have
enough water to drink coming in here this morning. But he
appears to be doing very much better.
Again, we will make a decision hopefully in a few minutes
as to whether we're going to proceed this morning or not.
Until then, we'll stand in recess.
[Recess from 10:34 a.m. to 10:50 a.m.]
[Applause.]
General Petraeus. Senator, my apologies.
Chairman Levin. Are you kidding?
General Petraeus. I got a little bit light-headed there. It
wasn't Senator McCain's questions, I assure you. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I know, it was mine. [Laughter.]
General Petraeus. No, it's just that----
Chairman Levin. Clear me too, would you, with the same
breath, if you would? Just kidding.
General Petraeus. I just got dehydrated, sir.
Chairman Levin. General, you've told us that you're more
than ready to go.
General Petraeus. I am.
Chairman Levin. You always are. You're that kind of an
incredible person.
I have consulted with colleagues and we're going to
overrule you, and we're just not going to continue----
General Petraeus. Civilian control of the military action
here?
Chairman Levin. Yes, proving it again, right----[Laughter.]
We just would feel better about it. We're going to try to
continue tomorrow morning. We think at 9 o'clock is fine. But
you look great, and we just would feel better.
Secretary Flournoy, I don't know if you've checked your
schedule or not, but if you could also do that.
We thank both of you.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, could I just mention, I would
finish the thought that I had when General Petraeus felt a
little ill. You are one of America's greatest heroes and we're
glad you're recovered and we look forward to seeing you again
tomorrow.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We all feel better. I know you feel better, but we all feel
better doing it this way. So we will stand adjourned until
tomorrow morning, tentatively at 9 o'clock. [Applause.]
[Whereupon, at 10:52 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan,
Kaufman, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Graham, Thune, Wicker,
LeMieux, Brown, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Ilona R. Cohen, counsel; Jessica L.
Kingston, research assistant; Jason W. Maroney, counsel;
William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional
staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional
staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member;
David M. Morriss, minority counsel; and Dana W. White,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Christine G.
Lang, and Hannah I. Lloyd.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin and Vance
Serchuk, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Greta Lundeberg,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov,
assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to
Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay
Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Halie Soifer, assistant
to Senator Kaufman; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Andy Olson, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine Wells III, assistant to
Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux;
Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; Kyle Ruckert, assistant
to Senator Vitter; and Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator
Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. We're glad to welcome back our witnesses
this morning, as the committee resumes its hearing on the
progress in Afghanistan. Under Secretary Flournoy and General
Petraeus, let me reiterate this committee's great appreciation
for your service, the sacrifices that you and your families
make along the way. The demands of your positions are great.
You carry out your duties professionally and with excellence,
so thanks to you both.
General Petraeus, you were more than willing and more than
able to proceed yesterday morning. It was my abundance of
caution that led me to adjourn the proceedings until this
morning.
Before I turn to Senator McCain, who still has a bit of his
time remaining, I understand that General Petraeus has a short
statement.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND
General Petraeus. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
members of the committee. Again, thank you for the opportunity
for a redo hearing after I demonstrated yesterday the
importance of following my first platoon sergeant's order 35
years ago, to always stay hydrated. I'll try to remember that
in the future. In fact, my team provided me this nifty
camelback to help me remember it. [Laughter.]
I pointed out that the committee provides water, and I do
thank the committee as well for the chocolate chip cookies that
were in the anteroom before this session.
If I could, Mr. Chairman, before the questioning resumes,
I'd like to ensure that my answers to questions by you and
Senator McCain on the July 2011 date are very clear. As I noted
yesterday, I did support and agree, at the end of the
President's decisionmaking process last fall, with the July
2011 date described by the President as the point at which a
process begins to transition security tasks to Afghan forces at
a rate to be determined by conditions at the time.
I also agreed with July 2011 as the date at which a
responsible drawdown of the surge forces is scheduled to begin
at a rate, again, to be determined by the conditions at the
time.
As I noted yesterday, I did believe there was value in
sending a message of urgency, July 2011, as well as the message
that the President was sending of commitment, the additional
substantial numbers of forces. But it is important that July
2011 be seen for what it is, the date when a process begins,
based on conditions, not the date, when the U.S. heads for the
exits.
Moreover, my agreement with the President's decisions was
based on projections of conditions in July 2011 and, needless
to say, we're doing all that is humanly possible to achieve
those conditions and we appreciate the resources provided by
Congress to enable us to do that.
Of course, we will also conduct rigorous assessments
throughout the year and as we get closer to next summer, as we
do periodically in any event, to determine where adjustments in
our strategy are needed. As July 2011 approaches, I will
provide my best military advice to the Secretary and to the
President on how I believe we should proceed based on the
conditions at that time, and I will then support the
President's decision.
Providing one's forthright advice is a sacred obligation
military leaders have to our men and women in uniform, and I
know that that is what the President expects and wants his
military leaders to provide as well.
Beyond that, Mr. Chairman, in response to some of your
questions yesterday, I want to be very clear as well that I
fully recognize the importance of Afghan security forces
leading in operations. Indeed, the formation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-
Afghanistan (NTM-A), the many initiatives it is pursuing, and
the vastly increased partnering ordered by General McChrystal
are intended to help the Afghan forces achieve the capability
to take the lead in operations.
To that end, I think we should note that Afghan forces are
in the lead in Kabul and in a number of other areas and
missions, and they are very much in the fight throughout the
country, so much so that their losses are typically several
times that of U.S. losses.
In short, our Afghan comrades on the ground are indeed
sacrificing enormously for their country, as are of course our
troopers and those of our International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) partner nations.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General. I am glad to
hear of your support for July 2011 beginning of U.S. troop
reduction decision, since I continue to strongly believe that
it is essential for success in Afghanistan for everyone to
understand the urgency for the Afghans to take responsibility
for their own security.
Now, this morning, after calling upon Senator McCain to
complete his questions, I'm going to be calling on Senators for
questions in the early bird order that was established
yesterday morning, as I believe that we notified all of our
members' offices yesterday afternoon.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We were interrupted probably at the most important point of
my comments yesterday, General Petraeus, when I said I
considered you one of America's greatest heroes. In case you
missed that, I'll repeat it.
Chairman Levin. I don't think you missed that.
General Petraeus. It was overwhelming, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator McCain. I still believe that with all my heart.
I appreciate the statement you just made, General Petraeus,
and I think it's very helpful. I hope that it's heard in the
Oval Office and in the Vice President's office, because your
statement seems to contradict what the President of the United
States continues to say, what his spokesperson said, that July
2011 was ``etched in stone,'' administration officials continue
to say that July 2011 will begin the withdrawal. According to
what is probably trash journalism, Vice President Biden said:
``In July 2011, you're going to see a whole lot of people
moving out. Bet on it.''
So it would be very helpful if your sentiments were shared
by the President, the Vice President, the President's National
Security Advisor, and others. Right now, General, we are
sounding an uncertain trumpet to our friends and our enemies.
They believe that we are leaving as of July 2011. I could
relate to you anecdotes all the way down to the tribal
chieftain level in Afghanistan.
It seems to me that organizations, countries, and leaders
in the region are accommodating to that eventuality, and that
does not bode well for success in Afghanistan. So to elaborate
on the comment I made yesterday, if we sound an uncertain
trumpet, not many will follow, and that's what's being sounded
now. That's one of the reasons why we see some of the events
taking place that are in the region, not just confined to
Afghanistan.
I know that I've used up most of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Maybe General Petraeus would like to respond.
General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, I think July 2011
is etched in stone, but as I tried to explain it, as a date at
which a process begins that is based on conditions, and that I
think was explained clearly at the speech at West Point by the
President, which I was privileged to attend.
Beyond that, as I said yesterday, I don't think it's
productive, obviously, to discuss journalistic accounts of Oval
Office conversations based on second- and third-hand sources,
other than to say that I think it is important that folks
should know that those are not a complete account. I will leave
it right there.
What I have tried to explain today is my understanding of
what July 2011 means and how it is important again that people
do realize, especially our partners and our comrades-in-arms in
Afghanistan and in the region, that that is not the date when
we look for the door and try to turn off the light, but rather
a date at which a process begins.
If I could, I'd like to ask the Under Secretary perhaps if
she wanted to provide some insights, having participated in the
process as well.
Secretary Flournoy. Thank you very much.
I think General Petraeus has characterized the date
accurately. It is an inflection point. It is a point at which
the end of the surge will be marked and a process of transition
that is conditions-based will begin. The President was very
careful not to set a detailed timeline of how many troops will
come out at what point in time, because he believes in a
conditions-based process, and he's said that over and over
again.
On the issue of whether or not Afghans understand our
commitment, I think one of the things that we did in the
strategic dialogue we had recently with President Karzai and 14
members of his cabinet was to focus on the long-term commitment
of this country to the Afghan people and to Afghanistan's
development. We talked about long-term security assistance,
long-term commitment to build capacity, governance,
development.
I think that everyone walked away from that with no
questions in their mind about the depth and enduring nature of
the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan. So I think that that has to
be important context in which this conversation happens.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Madam Secretary. We don't live
in a vacuum here. I've had conversations with him as well. I've
had conversations with leaders throughout Afghanistan and the
region, and that's not what they're telling me.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome back, General. It's great to see you looking good
again. Your recovery time was very impressive yesterday. I
thought it was at World Cup levels, and the coach may want to
add you to the team roster before Slovenia later in the week.
[Laughter.]
I thank you both for your service and your leadership. I
want to say at the outset that, as you both said yesterday in
your opening statements, in previous appearances before our
committee you've made clear that things would get worse before
they got better in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, that's exactly
where we are now.
But to me the important point here--and I want to go back
to that December 1 speech by President Obama at West Point.
We're talking about the deadline parts of it. I want to come
back to that in a minute. But the President made a very strong
case there, expressing his decision that the outcome of the war
in Afghanistan was of vital national security interest to the
United States, and if it went badly the consequences for our
security, American security, were disastrous.
To me that's the most important point. We know from
previous experience that counterinsurgencies take time. I think
the key now is to make sure that we have the right strategy,
that it's sufficiently resourced to execute it with decisive
force, and, as important as anything else, that we give our
warfighters and the Department of State (DOS) personnel on the
ground the time and patience to achieve the strategic national
goal that we have in succeeding in Afghanistan. I say that to
us here in Congress as well as to the American people.
General Petraeus, I think an important part of that is the
clarification you made just now about what the July 2011 date
means. It's not a deadline for withdrawal. It's not a deadline
by which we're going to pick up and go out. It's a goal. I want
to stress, as you did very clearly today, notwithstanding
anything that we may have read and what my dear friend and
colleague from Arizona has described as trash journalism, or it
may be trash journalism, the fact is that what happens on the
ground at that time, will determine whether we withdraw any
troops from Afghanistan in July 2011.
Obviously, we hope we'll be able to. I believe that it's
important for the President to make that clear at some point
soon, because, notwithstanding all the clarifications that
followed from him, Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and the
two of you, in our conversations with people in the region that
date is being read as a date at which the United States is
going to begin to pull out regardless of what's happening on
the ground.
So thank you for your clarification this morning.
Second, I want to ask this question. Some of us on the
committee were talking about it afterward. There's been a run
of bad reporting from Afghanistan over the last couple of
weeks. The marines took Marjah, but the Taliban is fighting
back. There's been beheadings and targeted assassinations of
people who worked with us. General McChrystal announced last
Friday that the offensive in Kandahar is now being delayed.
Yet the reports that you gave in your opening statements
yesterday were quite upbeat about what's happening in
Afghanistan. I fear there's a gap between the tone and the
message that you gave us yesterday and what we are reading in
the media about what's happening. I wanted to ask you to
address yourself to that gap, because that gap can begin to
erode the support that you need from Members of Congress and
the American people in the months ahead.
General Petraeus. Senator, I think you've raised a very
important point, and that is the importance of having measured
expectations. The conduct of a counterinsurgency operation is a
roller-coaster experience. There are setbacks as well as areas
of progress or successes. It is truly an up and down when
you're living it, when you're doing it, even from afar,
frankly.
But the trajectory in my view has generally been upward,
despite the tough losses, despite the setbacks. When I appeared
before you some months ago for the posture hearing, a coalition
soldier could not have set foot in Marjah. I did that just, I
guess it was, a month and a half ago with the district
governor. There wasn't a district governor at that time. There
is gradually the expansion of government activities in the form
of schools, of assistance to revive markets, and of nascent
judicial systems certainly that are tied into local organizing
structures as well, which is very important.
We did the same in Nad-i-Ali, in Kandahar. I bought bread
in the market down there. Yes, I had security around me, but, I
had hundreds of Afghans right around me as well, and bought the
bread directly from them, sat there, chatted with them while we
ate it.
This is an up and down process, and that defines the
experience of counterinsurgency, where there's no hill that you
can take and plant the flag and then go home to a victory
parade. Rather, progress is almost the absence of something. I
remember in Iraq when all of a sudden I realized we were making
progress. We were hearing less about a certain activity, say a
car bomb or a suicide attack, and all of a sudden we had
expanded our forces into an area. The Iraqi forces were
starting to stand up in certain areas, as is the case again in
certain areas of Afghanistan.
So I think it is essential that we realize the challenges
in this kind of endeavor. It is also essential that, as both
the Under Secretary and I noted, that people do realize there
has been progress, but there clearly have also been setbacks.
Beyond that, if I could just underscore what you said about
the designation as a vital national security interest. For one
who taught international relations for a period, that is a code
word. That is a sign of commitment. That's a rhetorical
statement that means an enormous amount, and again I appreciate
your mentioning that because it does highlight what I was
discussing earlier.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General.
Did you want to add something, Madam Secretary?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I would agree with what General
Petraeus said about counterinsurgency campaigns being a roller-
coaster ride. But the overall trajectory is moving in the right
direction. It's going to be hard. There are going to be times
when we take one step back and then we'll take two steps
forward.
The one thing I wanted to give as an example is I do think
that the reporting on the delay in the Kandahar campaign has
been overplayed. We talked a lot yesterday about the importance
of Afghans taking the lead. We owe General McChrystal a great
degree of operational flexibility. What's happening in Kandahar
is he's taking more time to shape the operation. The campaign's
already begun. The shaping is happening now.
The shura that President Karzai conducted on Sunday was
very important for him to step up and take the lead, the
ownership, of what's going to happen in Kandahar. So if that
means delaying some aspects by a little bit of time to make
sure that that Afghan ownership and leadership is in place,
then we should all be supporting that. That is not any sign of
failure at all. It's a sign of good counterinsurgency strategy.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you both.
General Petraeus. If I could, Senator, we probably should
distribute what was published as President Karzai's talking
points for the Kandahar shura, because it really makes a number
of these points. This is a president who is acting as a
commander in chief.
[The information referred to follows:]
President Karzai's Talking Points for Kandahar Shura
future of afghanistan
``Hamkari Baraye Kandahar'' is essential to the expansion of the
exercise of Afghan sovereignty in governance, development and security.
This is the way forward for Afghanistan--increasing our capacity to
guide our own future.
I intend to underscore this growing capacity during the Kabul
Conference--as demonstrated by the performance of government at all
levels in ``Hamkari.'' At both the Kabul Conference and the NATO Summit
in Lisbon, I will encourage the international community to take note of
our growing exercise of sovereignty.
priority of kandahar
Stability in Kandahar is essential for stability and success in
Afghanistan as a whole. Kandahar faces two big challenges: an
insurgency that threatens our peaceful way of life; and our own history
of ineffectiveness in responding to the people's needs for governance
and security. We must resolve both of these challenges.
We will ensure success in Kandahar without losing sight of the
needs of all the Afghan people.
my intent
To provide a firm commitment to the people of Kandahar Province. In
coordination with the Afghan National Security Forces and numerous
Government Officials we have conducted a series of meetings to
synchronize our efforts. As a result, I have directed the following:
(1) Minister Spanta: Provides oversight and direction of
Hamkari through the National Security Council on my behalf.
(2) Director Popal and the IDLG: He will act as the lead
coordinator of all ministries to improve governance and
development in Kandahar. They will ensure that appointments are
expedited and Tashkils are manned not later than the beginning
of Ramadan. Staffs will be provided with appropriate incentives
which encourage them to work in Kandahar Province.
(3) Service and Investments: Ministers will give a high
priority to the delivery of services and investments in
Kandahar Province.
(4) Public Service: An essential aspect of this effort is for
the people of Kandahar Province join the Government of
Afghanistan and become public servants. We encourage families
and members of the community to join the Army, the Police, and
our civil service ranks.
(5) Provincial and District Officials: Ensure councils are
inclusive and representative of all constituencies.
(6) Economic Development--
(a) Electrical power for Kandahar Province is an
extremely high priority and we will work to deliever
this basic service as soon as possible.
(b) A bypass route for Kandahar City will be
constructed this year so that large vehicles do not
need to travel directly thru the center of Kandahar
City.
(7) Private Security Companies and Militias: I have directed
that Private Security Companies and Militias must be registered
and regulated. It is my long term goal that security is only
provided by elements of the Afghanistan Central Government.
(8) Insurgents in the Surrounding Districts: It is
unacceptable for Insurgents to control large swaths of
Arghandab, Zharay, and Panjwa'i. I ask that you, the citizens
of Kandahar Province, confirm your approval of operations to
remove these Insurgents from these districts to protect the
Afghan People.
(9) Peace and Reintegration Program: I have directed Governor
Wesa to develop and execute the Afghan Peace and Reintegration
Program in Kandahar Province. Execution will be at the local
level.
(10) Land Commission: The Kandahar City Mayor will establish
a Land Commission to address important land disputes and
specifically land disputes related to the misappropriation of
properties.
responsibility/ accountability
As your Commander in Chief, I bear the ultimate responsibility for
the success of our effort in Kandahar. Yet all of us are responsible
for continuously and rigorously holding each other accountable.
The principle of mutual accountability extends to our relationships
with the international community, who are supporting us in these
efforts.
We will:
Convene periodically to share updates on progress; to
confirm and update our strategic direction; and to resolve any
issues that require senior leadership attention.
Mobilize the emerging capacity of this government to
prosecute and hold legally accountable officials who have
broken the law.
timeline
Our efforts in Kandahar are already underway, and will continue
aggressively for the rest of the year. We will not see the results all
at once. Our efforts this year will improve security conditions, and
lay a foundation for stronger governance. It will take some time for
better security and governance to earn the trust and confidence of the
people of Kandahar. As trust grows, local communities will increasingly
stand up against insurgent presence and corrupt practices, former
fighters will choose to rejoin peaceful society, violence levels will
go down, and opportunities for more effective governance and
development will continue to grow.
unity of effort and communications
Our success in Kandahar requires, immediately, the closest possible
integration among ourselves. It also requires that we are clear and
unified in articulating our intent and our progress to the people of
Afghanistan, our `upset brothers', and the international community.
focus on serving the afghan people
The Afghan people will hold us responsible for making their present
and future lives better. Success for Afghanistan means that the
government is representative of all the people and is responsive to
their needs. In turn, the people support their government and hold it
accountable. In effect, this is a contract between us and our people,
and the basis for Afghanistan's lasting stability.
Stability in Kandahar will require the people's direct involvement.
The invitation to participate in various councils and shuras is open to
all Kandaharis who want to be part of peaceful Afghan society.
Senator Lieberman. That would be very important.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, just as a suggestion, I share the concern
of both of the previous questioners about the exit strategy, a
certain date. I was relieved when the President made his
speech, when he said: ``Just as we have done in Iraq, we will
execute this transition responsibly, taking into account
conditions on the ground.''
That's the position that I wanted him to take and I was
relieved to hear that. The problem is I've only heard it once.
I asked staff after the meeting yesterday to go back and check
and see if they've seen any emphasis on that by the President.
I would recommend that that be done, that he keep saying that,
and that the administration does it, and certainly General
Petraeus and others, because that clarifies it and makes it
clearer. But without that, only having said it once, I think
there's a little bit of a problem there.
Let me ask you a question, General Petraeus. You've heard
me talk about this before and you know that I have a very
strong feeling about the Commanders' Emergency Response Program
(CERP). You talked about it in your opening comments yesterday.
We had the CERP from the defense budget that came from the
President; it was at $1.3 billion, and this was comprised of
$200 million in Iraq and $1.1 billion in CERP in Afghanistan.
Now, this committee, and I respect them for doing what they
felt was the right thing. I disagreed with it, has lowered CERP
so that it takes the amount to Afghanistan from $1.1 billion
down to $800 million.
Now, I'd like to ask you your feeling about how valuable
the program is and how would you use it? Then the second part
of that question is, you had said this, Madam Secretary, that
General McChrystal needs more operational flexibility. I think
maybe we need that in the CERP, because during talks on my last
trip over there as to what needs are there that could come from
the CERP, something that could be done fast would be power
stations, electric grids, and dam projects. However, the CERP
has restrictions due to the statute so that money can't
necessarily be spent on these types of projects.
So the second part of the question would be, do we need to
change the language, either one of you, particularly you,
General Petraeus, to be able to accomplish these two things
that people in the field told me we should be spending it on?
General Petraeus. Senator, thanks for that. First of all,
the President actually has described what you've quoted him on
in a number of different occasions. I'd come back to the West
Point speech in particular, where the very important words,
``responsible drawdown,'' were used. Just like vital national
interest, that has been a code word for those of us who went
through the Iraq Policy Review, at the end of which the
President announced the responsible drawdown and, as you'll
recall, lengthened the time over that which was expected
earlier. We are in the process of doing that and, touch wood,
we think that it is on track and it will be at the 50,000
number by the end of August, by the way.
With respect to the CERP for Afghanistan, we do need the
full amount, Senator. It is very valuable. You asked about
that. As I mentioned in my opening statement yesterday, we now
have the inputs just about right, certainly another 9,000
troopers to get on the ground and some of our NATO partners as
well.
But as we get everybody in position, as we get them out
performing their tasks and trying to wrest the initiative from
the Taliban, take away their sanctuaries, and then capitalize
on that, CERP is critical to that process.
Now, someone may ask, ``how come the execution rate, the
obligation rate, this year so far is low?'' In part because
we're just building up still. Again, we actually are doing many
more projects that are actually lower cost, is another issue.
But beyond that, we do indeed have projects that are stacked up
right now. We just have submitted them in fact, and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is working on this, and I'll
let the Secretary talk about these projects, for
electrification in particular, in the Kandahar, Greater
Regional Command (RC)-South and RC-East areas.
Secretary Flournoy. Senator, let me just echo. We think
that CERP is an absolutely critical and flexible
counterinsurgency tool. We would urge the committee to consider
restoring the funding that was removed.
In the specific case of the electrical projects in
Kandahar, again it's a very critical element of the fight. We
think it directly impacts the population that we're trying to
protect and win over to support the ISAF and the Afghan
Government. The projects have been developed in close
coordination with U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), with a bridging strategy that would eventually hand
off to longer-term development efforts. U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) has submitted these proposals. They're being reviewed
quickly in OSD and we'll be making a recommendation to the
Secretary very shortly.
We do not judge at this point that the language needs to be
changed. Our reading of the language, and those of our trusty
lawyers, suggests that the flexibility is there to do this kind
of thing.
Senator Inhofe. We're running out of time here, but I would
only suggest this, that this is information I got from the
field, that there are things that we could use that we are
restricted from using. So perhaps for the record you could
elaborate a little bit on that and send us something.
[The information referred to follows:]
In response to Senator Inhofe's questions about: (1) the value of
the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP); (2) how it is used;
and (3) whether it requires less restrictive legislative language:
As stated during the hearing, the CERP is an ``absolutely critical
and flexible counterinsurgency tool'' and ``[we] do not judge at this
point that the language needs to be changed.''
The CERP's overall impact has been immediate and of significant
tactical, operational, and strategic benefit. Commanders use CERP to
provide a rapid response capability that complements civilian
development and reconstruction efforts, particularly in non-permissive
areas. Commanders use CERP to bridge the gap until civilian agencies
and traditional long-term development programs can provide assistance
or the local government can resource requirements. In the dynamic
counterinsurgency environment, flexibility enables commanders to employ
CERP funding in the most effective manner. Effective use requires
different approaches be taken during each distinct stage of the
counterinsurgency campaign, and requires attention to the significant
differences between Afghanistan and Iraq.
Afghanistan requires an array of relief and reconstruction
assistance--small projects and complementary larger-scale projects. The
emphasis is on supporting small-scale projects immediately following
kinetic operations, although CERP funding is also required for larger
projects that can provide a near-term counterinsurgency impact.
In Iraq, the CERP has been and will continue to be a critical
enabler for commanders to carry out the U.S. Government's strategy to
maintain security gains that are not yet enduring. CERP-funded projects
focus on the drivers of instability, and in so doing help sustain
security, and advance Iraqi-led counterinsurgency objectives.
Senator Inhofe. I'm running out of time here. Let me just
mention one of the things that I have a hard time answering.
When I talk to people, they talk about, ``the surge was
successful in Iraq.'' The surge, however, in Iraq, we ended up
with close to 165,000 troops in a period of time of 18 months.
Now we're looking at a surge that might be about 100,000 troops
and talking about 9 months.
Now, considering that Afghanistan is about twice the size
of Iraq, this disparity is--it's hard for me to describe to
people why this number will work in Afghanistan when it took so
much more in Iraq. General Petraeus, do you have any thoughts
that I could share with these people?
General Petraeus. I do, Senator. Thank you. First of all,
with respect on the timing of the actual surge in Iraq, we had
all of the surge forces on the ground by end of June, July-ish,
in there, and we actually began the drawdown of the first
brigade in December. We then did lengthen it out over the
course of the next spring.
But in this case, we will actually have all of our U.S.
surge forces, all of our tactical units certainly, again less
the one headquarters that's not required until a month after
August, but on the ground by the end of August. Again, the July
2011 date is the date at which the process again begins that
would embark on the ``responsible drawdown'' of the surge
forces. So that's a pretty considerable period.
Now, with respect to the density of forces, you have a
situation in Afghanistan where there are a number of places
that really don't require substantial numbers of coalition
forces and areas where in fact the Afghans again are very much
in the lead. So this is about counterinsurgency math. We think
we'll have the density once we get the additional forces on the
ground, our additional U.S. forces, NATO forces, and then as
we're able to ramp up the Afghan forces by about 100,000
between the period of earlier this year and the fall of 2011.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe's comment about the importance of the CERP,
I think, reflects the views of every member of this committee.
The reason why both the House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) reduced the $1.1
billion to $800 million in Afghanistan was because you're on
track in Afghanistan to spend only $200 million for this entire
year of the billion that we appropriated last year.
So, for the record, would you also then explain to us why
the request is for $1.1 billion and why the reduction to $800
million would have a negative impact, given the spending rate
is only $200 million for the entire year? I think I can say
that what Senator Inhofe says is reflective of this committee's
very, very strong support for the CERP and your answer to that
question for the record would be helpful to us as we proceed
during this budget.
[The information referred to follows:]
The requested $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 total Commanders'
Emergency Response Program (CERP) reflects program maturation in
Afghanistan and a continuing full fiscal year requirement in Iraq.
In Afghanistan, CERP will be used in the clear and hold phases by
decentralized local commanders during operations extending into
previously unchallenged areas. Concurrently, the Department of Defense
is working with the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International
Development, and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to
develop larger infrastructure projects in support of the Afghan
National Development Strategy at the national, regional, and local
government levels. These projects will focus on power, water,
transportation, and governance to build Afghan capacity to
provide basic services, demonstrate effective governance, and
promote economic development. As of 21 June, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
(USFOR-A) has obligated $95 million of an $805 million fiscal year 2010
allocation (12 percent). Several factors have influenced a low
execution rate to include clean-up of fiscal year 2009 projects and
lower average cost per project over previous years. Execution rates are
increasing and larger projects are being proposed. USFOR-A expects to
fully obligate the entire $805 million fiscal year 2010 allocation
prior to the end of the fiscal year.
In Iraq, CERP will be used to continue the fiscal year 2010
momentum to strengthen achievements necessary for supporting the new
central government, improving employment and vital services growth, and
complementing the USF-I Responsible Drawdown of Forces. As of 21 June,
USF-I has obligated $159 million of a $245 million fiscal year 2010
allocation (65 percent). USF-I's planned fiscal year 2011 CERP
allocation is $100 million.
Fiscal year 2011 CERP funding could also be affected by the Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC) National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 bill, which would authorize transfer of
CERP funds for both the Reintegration and the National Solidarity
programs. These transfers could total as much as $150 million-$200
million, or 15 percent of the total $1.3 billion CERP budget request.
Transfers of $200 million coupled with the proposed $400 million cut,
which appears in both the House Armed Services Committee and SASC NDAA
bills, would equate to an overall 46 percent reduction of the original
$1.3 billion fiscal year 2011 CERP request.
Chairman Levin. I want to thank you, Senator Inhofe, for
your leadership on that CERP.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for that
clarification about CERP. I think everybody on the committee
does fully support it.
Good morning to both of you. General, we all on the
committee understand this is an important time in Afghanistan.
I think it would be useful to be able to consider President
Karzai a reliable partner. It's sometimes hard to understand
what he says versus what he does, and vice versa. I have a
couple of questions in that regard.
How do you best explain what seemingly is his mercurial
personality? One day he talks about making common cause with
the Taliban and then another day he goes down to Kandahar and
gives an impassioned plea to the residents there to cooperate
in the upcoming fight.
Second, I have had a chance to get to know Minister Atmar
and had great respect for his talent and his vision. What do
you think his departure might mean for the important, maybe
even crucial, police training effort?
General Petraeus. Thanks, Senator. On the first question, I
think there are a number of explanations, if you will. First of
all, perhaps political leaders occasionally differentiate their
message a tiny bit depending on who the audience might be. I
know that would never happen in our own country, but----
Senator Udall. Fair enough.
General Petraeus.--I think over there that occasionally
happens.
The second thing is, this is a tough fight and leaders are
under enormous pressure. I can tell you that, having dealt with
leaders throughout our region and having dealt with leaders in
Iraq at various times who were similarly under enormous,
perhaps even greater, pressure with just staggering levels of
violence in Iraq over the years that we were there prior to the
downturn. Again, this can lead individuals at times to have
outbursts or to express frustrations. I think there's a bit of
that that is understandable.
Now with respect to the president accepting the resignation
of Hanif Atmar, the former minister of interior, someone indeed
that we all really knew quite well, have worked with, not just
as the minister of interior, but in two previous ministry
positions as well, and one who again has impressed all of us. I
think the impact of the departure cannot be determined,
needless to say, until we know who the replacement is.
There are discussions going on. You should know that
coalition leaders are certainly included in those discussions,
which I think is a positive feature of the process. But at the
end of the day, certainly this will be the decision of the
president of a sovereign country. But if the candidates that we
think are under consideration provide the ultimate next
minister, then I think that the ministry will continue forward
on a positive trajectory.
Senator Udall. So I sense you're guardedly optimistic that
there will be a replacement with whom we can work with and who
would bring the same sort of focus and expertise?
General Petraeus. That's correct, Senator. I would not rule
out again seeing Minister Atmar at some point back in another
capacity, either.
Senator Udall. That's heartening to hear.
If I might, let me move to the very fascinating report over
the weekend that Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Paul
Brinkley issued on the mineral and natural resource wealth of
Afghanistan. It's tied to a military task force, the Task Force
for Business and Stability Operations. You may know, the
chairman and I teamed up to offer an amendment in the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that authorizes that task
force's work in Afghanistan.
The amendment also, General, will ask for a report from the
Department of Defense (DOD) and DOS to look at the promising
sectors in Afghanistan's economy, assess the capabilities of
the government to generate additional revenue, to work on
infrastructure needs, and so on. We're hopeful this report will
provide important information that will enable Afghanistan to
attract investment and pursue new economic opportunities.
I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on the task force
work and, more generally, about these economic development
opportunities. Madam Secretary, you may want to respond as
well.
General Petraeus. First of all, if I could just say that
Deputy Under Secretary Paul Brinkley and the Task Force for
Business and Stability Operations did phenomenal work in Iraq.
It was really created initially in fact to our request at that
time that someone try to get some business leaders back into
Iraq. It was a land of extraordinary opportunity, but also at
that time a land of extraordinary violence.
But you had to look out over the horizon. You had to
envision a world where the violence was reduced and business
could begin to flourish again, given the extraordinary
potential that Iraq has in terms of its energy resources,
natural water, agriculture, sulphur, and a variety of other
blessings, including human capital.
He was able to bring in business leaders at a time when no
business leader in his right mind would come in on his own. We
flew them around, secured them, housed them, fed them, and
everything else. Over time this led to some very big deals,
actually, for American business, but also in some cases for
some other businesses as well. We did indeed open it more
widely than that, with some very, very big transactions that
Iraq needed.
In fact, this was at a time when Prime Minister Maliki
specifically was asking me as a military commander if I could
get a certain corporation to reengage after their earlier
disappointing experience there and get another one in. These
are in the electrical sector, the oil sector, gas, and so
forth. Again, Deputy Under Secretary Brinkley did great work
there.
In fact, I encouraged and we have helped to get him into
Afghanistan. We might even look a bit more broadly than that,
but in fact it was during his process of getting acquainted
with the situation on the ground in Afghanistan that these
geological surveys and other documents were all pulled
together, and I think people realized the magnitude of the
mineral resources that exist in Afghanistan, recognizing the
enormous challenges to actually turning those into wealth and
income and so forth for the people, revenue, but nonetheless
recognizing the extraordinary potential that is there.
It has some of the world's last remaining super-deposits,
or some other terms, certainly for iron, lithium, tin, timber,
and gemstones. It has some coal. It has some natural gas and
oil. So again, they're not super-deposits, but it has
extraordinary potential.
Again, helping business find its way to that, in
partnership with the military that is trying to create the
security foundation on which they can build and operate, I
think is a very important initiative, and I appreciate the
committee's support for that particular initiative. That's one
of the areas in which we have learned huge lessons in the
conduct of counterinsurgency operations in the last 5 years or
so.
Secretary Flournoy. Let me just add that I think that what
the picture that's painted from the U.S. Geological Survey that
was done, which is only a partial survey, under Mr. Brinkley's
sponsorship really paints a brighter economic picture for
Afghanistan mid-term and long-term. It creates at least the
prospect of a much more sustainable economy that can actually
support some of the capabilities that we are putting in place
today, like the armed forces and other government and economic
capacity.
It also shines a spotlight on the importance of some of our
capacity-building efforts, particularly with the ministry of
mines, which is under new leadership, that seems very capable
and competent. We are working very closely with them to try to
build their capacity so that this information informs their
planning and they get off on the right foot in terms of
pursuing some of these opportunities, working with businesses
and private sector companies from around the world.
We think this is a bright spot on the horizon. As General
Petraeus said, it's going to take a lot of time and effort to
build the capacity and the legal structures and so forth to
really take full advantage of this. But we're working along
those lines.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that elaboration.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Udall. Thank
you for your leadership on this very, very important part of
the Afghan picture. It's essential that the leadership be there
and we're all grateful to you for it.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, it's good to see you in such chipper shape today.
I think there are a lot of cookies back there, which I hope you
partake in a couple.
When we met in Afghanistan, actually, we were briefed, in
fact, of the mineral, oil, and other deposits. It became
apparent to me that, number one, they have a problem in how to
get everything out of the Earth. Number two, how to secure it
and get it from point A to point B. Number three, then, how to
ensure that the corruption that we've seen in Afghanistan
actually keeps the money in country and has it flow down to the
individual citizens.
So the challenges, Madam Secretary and General, obviously
seem great. Yes, there is a bright spot, but it also appears to
be how do we get from point A to point B. Do you see a role
with the military in anything, aside from security? Or what do
you think, General, in that regard?
General Petraeus. Again, the security foundation is the
essential component to all of this. Without that you can't
build the legal regime that's required, you can't combat the
corruption that creeps into these kinds of activities. So it is
essential in that regard.
We do indeed provide an important supporting role to those,
like the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations,
USAID, some international and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), that are also trying to help Afghanistan. So in that
sense, we are an enabler for them in certain respects as well.
Senator Brown. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple other
hearings, but I'm going to just ask two more questions and then
turn back the remainder of any time I have.
Sir, one of the things we also noted, and I'm the
subcommittee chair on contracting issues with the Afghan
National Police (ANP) and the like, what's your involvement or
the military's involvement in curtailing the level of
corruption of the security forces in Afghanistan? Any news to
report on that?
General Petraeus. There is, Senator, actually. In fact, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have pushed, at
General McChrystal's request, the establishment of a task
force, led by a two-star Navy admiral, who in fact--she was the
Joint Contracting Command-Iraq commander when I was the
commander in Iraq. Now she has one more star. She is going to
head a task force that will go in and augment the contracting
command that helps in Iraq, that oversees this effort in
Afghanistan, and then gets at who are not only the
subcontractors, but the subcontractors to the subcontractors,
literally where is the money going and is it all above board?
That's a hugely important component of dealing with corruption
issues, dealing with warlordism and a variety of other
challenges that cause issues for Afghanistan.
Senator Brown. Because it's $6 billion and counting, with
many more billions forthcoming.
Then on the final note, Mr. Chairman, what type of
cooperation are we getting from Pakistan regarding some of the
terrorist activities, the Taliban and the like, that we're
experiencing on the cross-border situations?
General Petraeus. Pakistan has over the course of the last
year, Senator, conducted impressive counterinsurgency
operations against the Tariq-i-Taliban Pakistani (TTP), the
Pakistani Taliban, and some of its affiliates in the former
Northwest Frontier Province, in eastern South Waziristan,
Baijur, and currently in Orixi.
There is no question that this is an organization that
primarily threatens them, although it is also linked to the
would-be Time Square bomber. So there is an external component
to this that has emerged.
There clearly are other extremist elements that TTP has
symbiotic relationships with, among them certainly al Qaeda,
the Haqqani Network, the Afghan Taliban, and a number of others
that have sanctuaries in various parts of the border region of
Afghanistan. In some cases the Pakistani military has dealt
with them as part of securing lines of communication for us and
for themselves, in their fight against the extremists that are
threatening their writ of governance. In some cases there is
clearly more work that needs to be done.
General McChrystal, Admiral Mullen, and I have met with
General Qiyani. In a recent meeting, we have shared information
with him about links of the leadership of the Haqqani Network,
located in North Waziristan, that clearly commanded and
controlled the operation against Bagram Air Base and the attack
in Kabul, among others.
Again, the challenge for the Pakistani military, because I
think it is important again to note what they have done over
the course of the last year because it is significant, the
challenge is a situation in which they have a lot of short
sticks and a lot of hornet's nests, and they have to figure out
how to consolidate some of those to get through--they've done
good clearance operations. They're in the hold, build, and they
have to get further along in the hold and build phases, and
then into the transition phases as well, so that they can deal
with more and more.
They do realize, I believe, Senator, that you cannot allow
poisonous snakes to build a nest in your back yard with the
understanding that those snakes will only bite the neighbor's
kids, because sooner or later they turn around and bite your
kids. I think that realization has grown during this whole
period of their experience with the TTP and its affiliates, and
as they recognize again what Secretary Gates terms the
symbiotic relationships with the other extremist elements.
They're all related.
Senator Brown. Thank you for that very thorough answer,
General. I appreciate it. I'm glad to see you well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown, and thank you for
raising the issue of the security contractors. The committee is
in the middle of a year-long investigation into these
activities with the private contractors, not only because of
some of the problems that have been created by them, but also
because of the corruption issue which you raised, and we're
grateful for your bringing this to this committee's attention
again, but also because they're a drain on the armed forces and
the police. There's competition for those particular personnel
and it creates a real issue as well.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Flournoy, General Petraeus, it's always weak when
we say we thank you for your service. I just don't know what
else to say, but it's incredible that the two of you do what
you do, and the country is blessed for your doing it.
I've been one of the people that's supported
counterinsurgency. I've spent a lot of time looking into
everything about it and what we're doing here. But I just want
to ask some questions because sometimes time passes and things
change, people's perceptions of things change.
But I think it was pretty clear after our last set of
hearings, and I was on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in addition to the SASC, what everybody agreed to was the deal
back then. I don't think that's important, because what does
cause problems overseas is if it looks like we're changing
where we are. So I'd just like to ask a few questions just to
get clear.
In December we're going to evaluate where we are, isn't
that right? So in December--and no one should be at the point
of prejudging where we are. Now, in December we're going to sit
down and figure out where we are. Then in June 2011, we're
going to begin to draw down troops.
The question on conditions on the ground is just how many
troops we draw down, is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct. Again, that's the point,
actually July 2011, that's the point at which again the term
``responsible drawdown of the surge forces'' begins, at a rate
to be determined by the conditions.
Senator Kaufman. Exactly. So it's not whether we're going
to draw down. It's the rate that is determined by conditions on
the ground?
General Petraeus. That's the policy, that's correct.
Senator Kaufman. There will be no more new introduction of
troops?
General Petraeus. That is not the intention right now.
Senator Kaufman. Right, but I think Chairman Mullen,
Secretary Gates, and Secretary Clinton said in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that this would preclude any
drawdown of troops. Secretary Gates said there may be the 3,000
troops we may need for guards and things like that, but
essentially this is not a situation where we're going to be
increasing the troops in Afghanistan.
General Petraeus. Senator, as a commander, as a military
commander who owes the Commander in Chief and our troops in the
field my best and I owe the President my best professional
military advice, that's something that's a sacred obligation
with our troopers, I would never rule out coming back and
asking for something more. I think that would be irresponsible.
The intention right now is, our consideration right now, our
view is that with the additional forces ordered by the
President with the flex that you mentioned that Secretary
Gates, and General McChrystal has stated this in a letter to
the ranking member of the HASC, that we will have the forces
required to execute the strategy.
Senator Kaufman. I guess I should have directed this to
Secretary Flournoy, because it was the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of State who said we would not introduce new
troops. General, I respect the fact, and it goes without saying
that you would ask for more troops if you think we need more
troops to provide our military objective.
But in terms of the official position of the President of
the United States, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, we've put all the troops
we're going to be putting into Afghanistan; is that fair to
say, Secretary Flournoy?
Secretary Flournoy. I think at this point in time that is
the policy. There is no expectation of introducing any
additional troops. We are all talking about a period of time in
the future, so I don't think anybody would want to tie the
President's hands either way. But as a matter of policy, our
expectation is that in July 2011 the end of the surge will
occur and we will begin a responsible drawdown, the pace and
scope of which will be determined by conditions on the ground.
Senator Kaufman. General, to try to get at where we do have
potential problems, the U.S. troops in Afghanistan are
performing magnificently; is that a fair statement?
General Petraeus. That is correct. In fact, I have said,
Senator, that this is the new greatest generation of Americans,
our young men and women who are performing these tough tasks
under very difficult conditions against a very difficult enemy.
Senator Kaufman. I think they're behavior, I think from top
to bottom when I go over there, I am incredibly impressed with
the fact that you have been able to inculcate in troops from
the bottom to the top that we're in a counterinsurgency
strategy and we move in a counterinsurgency. Just the fact that
you were able to do it in such a short period of time and the
performance of our troops is magnificent at all levels.
So if it was up to our troops, I have no doubt about how
this would turn out, none, zero. I think it's really incredible
when you see our partnering--and it's true in Iraq, too. But
the thing that makes it all work in terms of the partnering is
they want to be on our team. The Afghan National Army (ANA) and
ANP, when they see our troops and they spend time with our
troops, they realize this is it, these are the big guys, these
are the guys that know what they're doing, these are the guys I
want to grow up and be like.
So I don't see anything, anything, in the performance of
our troops, that is anything except on mark, doing great, we're
doing fine.
General Petraeus. Senator, in fact I used to somewhat
jokingly say, except the truth is it was serious, when I would
talk to the transition team members in Iraq before they would
join their Iraqi counterpart units, that our troopers should
know that the Iraqis--and this is true for the Afghans and
really for many other countries' forces as well--they see our
troopers as the Michael Jordans----
Senator Kaufman. Exactly.
General Petraeus.--of military operations. I realized that
that was really the case when I saw them look exactly like our
troopers, even to the point of wearing their kneepads around
their ankles rather than on their knees, as they're designed to
do.
Senator Kaufman. I think the key is seeing. You literally
watch them and see them look at our troopers, and you could
just see it in their eyes. It's like, ``that's what I want to
be when I grow up.''
So really the problem here, to the extent we have a
problem, I think I would say, and we have to evaluate going
forward, and I think most of the people on the committee have
recognized from the beginning, is the fact that
counterinsurgency is not just about our troopers.
General Petraeus. At the end of the day, it has to be a
comprehensive civil-military, really we term it ``whole of
governments'' with an ``s'' on the end, endeavor.
Senator Kaufman. Before I leave the troops, I went to
Dahlgren and saw the non-lethal weapons down there. I
understand you were there, too. When you go over there and see
what the troopers are faced with if there's a bus coming up
behind your convoy at a high rate of speed and doesn't stop and
the only choice you have is to fire into the bus or take the
chance that it's going to blow up the convoy, that's a tough
decision for any trooper to make. Or at a forward operating
base, when you have a car coming for you at a high rate of
speed and you have two choices, you can fire into the car or
let it crash into the barricade.
So I am obsessed with nonlethal weapons in terms of ways to
give our troopers a third choice at all times between deadly
force and no action at all and putting themselves into danger.
Can you talk a little about that?
General Petraeus. I can, Senator. In fact, if I could, I'd
offer even a fourth alternative, I guess. The third alternative
is the various tools that are employed in escalation of force
circumstances. As you note, some of these are nonlethal
weapons. There are a variety of different signaling devices,
disabling devices, and others.
We have to be very careful with this. We have to realize
that there are points, obviously, when that vehicle is really
coming at you, you really have to shoot at it to stop it.
But there is another option as well, and that same group is
examining this also, as are other organizations. That is
equipment to shape the conditions so that you're not in a
position where you have to shoot at the vehicle at all, that if
the vehicle keeps coming forward it runs into a cement block or
something else, there's another alternative altogether.
That's difficult, but we're working hard. That's a
leadership, training, and doctrinal challenge as much as it is
an equipment solution. But the equipment is wrapped into that.
So we're looking at that as well as a way of just avoiding
escalation of force situations altogether and not having to use
either nonlethal or lethal force.
But that's all caught up in this, and we've been working it
really very hard, I think since the very early days of Iraq,
which is where we first had to encounter the suicide bomber
threat in particular, is where you're most concerned.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you very much.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kaufman.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Thank you, General, for being here and for your great work.
I want to call to your attention an article which I'm sure you
read in the June 12 New York Times. The headline is: ``Karzai
is said to doubt West can defeat Taliban.'' This article talks
about the firing of two of President Karzai's top aides, Mr.
Saleh and Mr. Atmar. They were said to have quit because Mr.
Karzai had made it clear he no longer considered them loyal.
The article goes on to say that Mr. Karzai has lost faith
in the Americans and NATO to prevail in Afghanistan. One of the
fired individuals, Mr. Saleh, has spoken at length, saying that
President Karzai has been pressing to strike his own deal with
the Taliban and the country's arch-rival Pakistan, the
Taliban's long-time supporter. ``According to a former senior
Afghan official, Mr. Karzai's maneuverings involve secret
negotiations with the Taliban outside the purview of American
and NATO officials.''
What do you say to that? I know Senator McCain was pressing
on this yesterday. Is this happening at all, in your judgment,
and if it is, is it happening because the Americans are giving
an uncertain sound about being a long-term strategic partner
with Mr. Karzai and his government?
General Petraeus. With respect to the very last point of
that, Senator, having talked with President Karzai about the
meaning of July 2011, just as I started out today's session by
explaining as precisely as I could what that means, that it's a
message of urgency that went along with the huge additional
message of commitment. Senator Lieberman reminded us of the
words ``vital national interest'' used by the President with
respect to Afghanistan, and again July 2011, the point at which
a process begins that is based on conditions, to begin the
responsible drawdown of the surge forces at a rate to be
determined by those conditions at that time, based on advice,
and so forth. It is also a process to begin transitioning some
tasks to Afghan forces and officials.
But I am not sure that I share the characterization of the
headline, at least, about President Karzai's feelings. I base
that on conversations with President Karzai, a number of them
in the past month and a half or so, in Kabul, from Kandahar and
Washington.
Senator Wicker. How often do you speak to him?
General Petraeus. It's probably at least every couple
weeks. Again, it depends on the travel schedule. There was a
period where we saw him several times in a period of just about
2 weeks, and then it may go a couple weeks otherwise. What we
also do, of course, is at the very least weekly
videoteleconferences with the Secretary of Defense, the Under
Secretary, Chairman Mullen, and I with General McChrystal, and
then lots of other conversations with him and exchanges.
He certainly does not share that sense. He just accompanied
President Karzai, for example, all day on Sunday when President
Karzai flew to and from Kandahar and held the shura council
down there. As I mentioned earlier to the committee, I think it
would be important that the committee see the talking points
that he used for that. Because this is a very clear statement
by a president who is the commander in chief of his country,
committing to taking the actions that are necessary and is
rallying the people behind him. Then at the end of this, tells
the ISAF Commander, also U.S. Forces Commander: ``You now have
my full support for the conduct of these operations and the
support of the people in this area.''
Now, with respect to meetings and so forth, President
Karzai of course just hosted the National Consultative Jirga,
Peace Jirga, which indeed addressed reconciliation and
reintegration. I believe that we are aware of the meetings that
he has and that his representatives have. He typically either
includes our elements or at the very least will back-brief us.
I would not characterize these as something that will
culminate in reconciliation coming soon to a theater near us,
reconciliation again being high-level Taliban leaders coming in
to accept the conditions that President Karzai has established,
accepting the constitution, laying down weapons, participating
in the process, and so forth.
On the other hand, there very clearly is scope for
reintegration, and that is the term used for the reintegration
into society of reconcilable members of the Taliban. Now we're
talking low and mid-level Taliban. There are a number of cases
in which that is ongoing. I was just reading in the morning
book this morning the case in Shindand out in the western part
of the country. There's 80 or so Taliban that have come in with
their hands up, put their weapons down, want to be
reintegrated.
It's very important now, in fact, that the interim guidance
that President Karzai has provided then is promulgated as
formal guidance and does move forward to provide what our
troopers need in terms of legal structures, if you will, and
what the Afghan Government elements need to work together to
take advantage of those kinds of opportunities.
Senator Wicker. How likely is it, General, that secret
negotiations could have been held with the Taliban outside the
purview of American and NATO officials?
General Petraeus. I think it's very unlikely, in part
because we are told about what goes on, and we also have good
insights, as they say in the Intelligence Community, into
what's going on on top of that. The insights tend to correlate
with what we are told.
Senator Wicker. Let me touch on one other thing in my
remaining time. That's interpreters. Of course, we need
interpreters. But I'm told that in securing the services of
talented linguists, they're being paid by the coalition
anywhere from $50,000 to $200,000 a year, which is considered
by some a distortion of the Afghan economy.
Are you concerned that we're taking some of the best human
capital that could be used in the Afghan Government, in Afghan
civil society, in Afghan business, and taking them away so that
they can be interpreters for the coalition?
General Petraeus. The short answer is yes, Senator. In
fact, Ambassador Holbrooke and I discussed this with President
Karzai after we completed the 2-day civil-military review of
concept drill in Kabul about 2 months or so ago, and then went
to back-brief President Karzai.
Very clearly there is an issue--by the way, I don't think
the salaries you quoted are correct for Afghans. I think those
may be for U.S. citizens or Afghan-Americans or something. But
again, we might want to verify for you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The average salary for Afghan interpreters if $600/month. Only AFG
local nationals are employed under the interpreter contracts issued by
Central Command (CENTCOM) Contracting Command in AFG. This information
is only for interpreter contracts issued by CENTCOM Contracting
Command. There are other organizations with interpreter contracts in
AFG.
General Petraeus. But the fact is your point, which is more
important, the substance of your point is exactly correct. What
happens in some cases is the Afghan Government, other
countries, contributing nations, help build Afghan human
capital by investing in them with education, to go back and
work in Afghan ministries and so forth, and then in some cases
the NGOs hire them away and we hire them away.
So we're competing with our own efforts, and we have to
figure out how to come to grips with this. This is another of
the tasks that this contracting task force is going to take a
hard look at. In fact, the Afghan Government really needs
either laws or regulations on this. When the U.S. Government
sent me to graduate school, for example, I believe I had to
give back 3 years for each year that I was in graduate school.
They need something like that. President Karzai is actually
keenly aware of it, as are we.
Senator Wicker. Plan to be announced later?
General Petraeus. Correct.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my welcome to Secretary Flournoy and General
Petraeus. I want to thank each of you for your leadership and
also for your distinguished service. I also thank the men and
women that you lead, both of you lead. Their service and
commitment to our country are honored and really appreciated.
General Petraeus, you recently told members of the HASC
that training of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is
being overhauled. I understand that training procedures for ANP
and ANSF were being overhauled to avoid some of the mistakes
made in Iraq. General, can you give us an update on training
efforts in Afghanistan and any lessons learned since
implementing those changes?
General Petraeus. With respect, Senator, training's being
overhauled to avoid mistakes being made in Afghanistan or
shortcomings in Afghanistan. That's not to say that there
weren't plenty of shortcomings in our effort in Iraq. In fact,
we tried to share those with our Afghan counterparts at various
times during my different tours in Iraq.
After the conclusion of one of those tours, after standing
up the train-and-equip mission in Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld
asked me to go to Afghanistan on the way home from Iraq. We
did. We spent time over there, and indeed shared what we had
learned, but also, frankly, identified a number of areas in
which improvements could be made there at that time. Some of
those were made. Some still, frankly, are being addressed now
that General Caldwell is in command.
He's been in command about 6 months now. Literally, the
establishment of the NTM-A itself, which is an input, not an
output, but that is a hugely significant development for all of
this.
But there are a number of initiatives that have been
already started now. Just to give you one example, instead of a
3-year ANP officers training program, they now have an officer
candidate school to complement this, because there's a war
going on out there and we need officers in the interim as well.
It's a 6-month program which we think will be good and will
provide leadership on a more immediate basis, to enable the
kind of progress that we know we need urgently and not just
have this very long process.
There used to be a procedure with the police in a number of
different areas where they were recruited, assigned, and then
trained when they got to it. Now the process is very much to
recruit, train, and then assign. Just the recruiting itself,
there is the creation of a recruiting component, and that has
significantly improved, for the ANA as well, recruiting. Then
there have been measures taken to improve retention, to reduce
attrition, as well various incentive packages, policies, and so
forth. Those, on the basis of 3 months at least, we don't want
to declare that a true trend just yet, but those have enabled
the building of the additional ANA and ANP elements to be on
track for now, after a period in which they were not on track.
So that's just a few of the areas. There are enormous
changes made in the institutional training business. It used to
be there was one trainer for every 80 trainees, obviously
inadequate. Now it's closer to 1 to 29 or 30. I could give you
again chapter and verse across the board on this.
For those who are traveling there, I know that the chairman
and the ranking member both are going to Afghanistan in the
weeks ahead, General Caldwell looks forward to briefing your
groups as you come over and describing to you in some detail
the various programs that have been implemented and others that
are under development.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Flournoy, the ISAF and ANSF are
acting in partnership during operations in Helmand Province. It
is the first large-scale effort to fundamentally change how we
are operating together. Madam Secretary, can you give us
specific examples of how coalition and ANSF have partnered
together during the Helmand Province operations?
Secretary Flournoy. I think the Marjah operation really was
the beginning of a very different way of doing business
together. I would say it was not only about the partnership
between ISAF and ANSF, but between ISAF and the broader
coalition, whole-of-government capabilities, and the Afghan
Government as a whole.
So beginning from the planning stages, you had a combined
Afghan-ISAF team that was planning not only for the military
dimensions of the campaign, but also for elements of different
Afghan ministries to come in and immediately establish a
government presence in Marjah and the surrounding areas. So
that has really created a different way of doing business
together that has now carried into other areas. As the planning
and preparation and the early stages of shaping in Kandahar
unfold, that same kind of in-depth and multifaceted partnership
is happening again.
I would just say that it's not only partnership. It's
really putting Afghans in the lead in helping to design the
operation, in helping to determine the timing of the operation
and setting the conditions for ultimate success in the
operation. So that is a very different way of doing business
than we've done in the past, and I think it's an approach that
General McChrystal has pioneered with his Afghan partners, and
I think it bodes well for the future.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, let me begin by echoing the comments of
my colleagues that we're very relieved to see you looking so
well today. I was quite confident that it wasn't the probing
questions of this committee which caused your problem
yesterday, and today you've shown for certain that that is the
case.
Ultimately, our success in Afghanistan depends on the
ability of the ANSF to take over the fight and to provide
security for the country. You've just had an exchange with my
colleague, Senator Akaka, about the training and you indicated
that we've gone from having trainers in a ratio of 1 to 80 to 1
to 29 or 30. But the 12-31 report indicates that NATO overall
has a requirement for more than 2,300 trainers and that there
is a shortfall of almost a third, of 32 percent.
Similarly, General Casey recently noted that the lack of
trained Afghans was a major concern among U.S. troops in
Afghanistan. There are also stories where our troops have
expressed doubts about the willingness of the Afghans to fully
engage in the fight as long as we're there doing the work.
What are we doing to fix the shortage of trainers
internationally and what is the status of the requirement
versus the actual numbers now? Madam Secretary, if that's a
more appropriate question for you, you can also answer.
General Petraeus. Actually, we can both do that, I think,
Senator.
Secretary Flournoy. Right.
General Petraeus. First, Senator, because I just wanted to
add that the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
literally just sent out a message that I got word on this
morning, asking for additional trainers.
The latest numbers that we have, these do fluctuate as
trainers come and trainers go, pledges are made and filled, and
indeed trainer requirements grow, because as the forces grow as
we try to increase capacity for training, needless to say, the
demand for trainers increases. But the latest that we have is a
450 shortage.
We are trying to bridge the gap in certain areas. Soldiers
and marines are doing some of that. As I mentioned, the Deputy
Commander for the NATO operational element has just asked for
more of them.
Then if I could also add before handing off, as I mentioned
up front, Senator, the Afghan forces are very much in the
fight. They are in the lead, indeed, in some areas, limited
areas, but Kabul is one of them, and other areas and other
mission sets. There are some functional missions, convoy escort
and some other tasks, for which they're in the lead.
But they are very much in the fight throughout the country.
There is no better or perhaps more tragic metric that shows
that than the fact that their losses are typically several
multiples of our U.S. losses on average.
Secretary Flournoy. Senator, we do have an institutional
trainer shortfall of about 450. We continue to press our NATO
allies to step up and fill those gaps. That said, the Secretary
has made clear that he intends to deploy additional U.S.
personnel to bridge the gap as necessary, because this is such
a critical mission. It is a long pole in the tent of what we're
trying to do in Afghanistan.
In addition, there are some continued shortfalls, although
we've made a lot of progress here, in what we call Operational
Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) and Police Operational Mentor
and Liaison Teams (POMLT), the mentoring teams that are
embedded with ANA and ANP units. We started out with a
requirement of about 180 OMLTs. We're now at a shortfall of 14
of those teams. We started out with a requirement of 475
POMLTs. We're now at about 140 shortfall.
In that case, we are taking two kinds of mitigation
measures. One is with this much more intensive partnering
between ISAF and ANSF units in some cases that partnering can
make up for the fact that you don't have an OMLT or a POMLT
with a given unit. In other cases, we've taken a train-the-
trainer approach and there are ANP training teams that are now
prepared to embed to train ANP units.
So there are a number of mitigation measures in place. We
are leaning forward on this very hard because it is such an
important part of the mission.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Counterinsurgency strategy, as we've all learned over the
past few years, depends on a unity of effort by both the
military and the civilian side. In an after-action report in
December of last year, retired General Barry McCaffrey
predicted that: ``The international civilian agency surge will
essentially not happen. Although the DOS officers, USAID,
Central Intelligence Agency, and other American agencies will
make vital contributions, Afghanistan over the next 2 or 3
years will simply be too dangerous for most civilian
agencies.''
Madam Secretary, what is the status of the international
civilian surge? It's so essential that we not just rely on the
military side and that's why General McCaffrey's prediction is
alarming to me.
Secretary Flournoy. I think I would agree with your premise
that the civilian surge is absolutely critical as part of this
broader campaign. On the U.S. side, we have more than tripled
our civilian personnel and that is likely to increase further
as the campaign unfolds. We have developed very cooperative
concepts of operations so our civilians are partnered with and
protected by military forces as well as their own DOS security
forces.
Internationally, as we've gone out to allies we have
pressed them not only to increase their troop contributions,
but also their civilian contributions, and many have stepped
up, whether it's growing the civilian contributions to their
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), which historically
they've been more military, or in cases like countries like
Malaysia where they're actually sending a whole new contingent
of civilian medical personnel and so forth.
So that is part of the effort. I think one of the
challenges here on our side is that we have never resourced our
own--or at least not recently, not since the Vietnam era,
civilian agencies, DOS and USAID, to actually rapidly deploy
civilian expeditionary people and capabilities with any
frequency or with any sustainability.
If we want to be able to do that as a nation, that's
something we need to look at in the future, because we've put
DOS and USAID in the position of having to throw together an ad
hoc solution to a problem. They've done exceedingly well, but
we haven't fully resourced them in the way they need to be
resourced for this mission.
Senator Collins. General?
General Petraeus. Senator, if I could just add to what the
Under Secretary said as well, and that is when I've talked
about the inputs piece, that we're trying to get the right
organizations led by the right people with the right concepts
and the levels of resources necessary to implement those
concepts, among the right people since in fact General
McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry going in have been the
addition of a NATO senior civilian representative, a very
talented United Kingdom (U.K.) Ambassador Mark Sedwill. The
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is now
Stefan de Mastura, whom we will remember from Iraq when he was
the United Nations (U.N.) SRSG there. Then most recently
there's an European Union (EU) representative there as well. In
fact, when I was in the U.K. this past week I talked to the EU
foreign secretary, if you will, and she described her strong
commitment to the mission there as well. All of them were
involved in our civil-military review or concept drill that
Ambassador Holbrooke and I hosted in Kabul now about 2 months
or so ago.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. I'm going to take a minute to clarify some
of the numbers which Senator Collins elicited, because there
has been some confusion about it and it's a very critical
number when it comes to the trainers, the OMLTs, the POMLTs.
This is a critical mission to get them ready to take
responsibility for their own security, and I'm going to take a
minute to go through those numbers with you.
You said there's a shortfall of 450 what you call
institutional, I think, trainers essentially. These are what I
call the basic training. But that's 450 shortfall. There's
also, I believe not included in that number, a pledged number
which has not yet been forthcoming. Is that correct? What is
that number?
Secretary Flournoy. I have there are 574 pledged, 235
pending, meaning they're still getting confirmation in
capitals.
Chairman Levin. Is that on top of the 450?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, that would be in addition to.
Chairman Levin. That's a lot of additional. Go on.
Secretary Flournoy. But I think generally we can count on
those.
Chairman Levin. Maybe you can count on them, but they're
not there yet.
574 plus 234 plus 450, is that correct?
Secretary Flournoy. Correct.
Chairman Levin. Now, on OMLTs and POMLTs, about how many in
each of those units? First on the OMLTs, if we're 14 short--how
many are there? 5, 10, 20?
Secretary Flournoy. OMLTs are between 11 and 28 personnel
per OMLT. It depends on the----
Chairman Levin. That's fine.
Secretary Flournoy. They're tailored to the conditions.
POMLTs, it's between 15 and 20 persons.
Chairman Levin. We can do the multiplication, and that, I
think, is going to get us up to about 2,000 to 2,500 personnel
that are short. That's the number that was given to us.
Does that look right, General?
General Petraeus. It does, Senator. In fact, that is down
considerably since we devoted substantial numbers of marines
and soldiers to these tasks, diverted literally a battalion for
this, and then also have used a brigade combat team from the
82nd Airborne, for example, to help with the partnering effort,
i.e., the OMLTs and POMLTs, in the RC-South area.
Chairman Levin. Right, and I think very appropriately done,
and it's a critical mission, so we're very supportive of it.
Thank you.
Thank you, Senator Collins, very much.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks again to Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus for
being here again today with us. I wanted to talk for a couple
of minutes about President Karzai's reconciliation and
reintegration program. I know it's important that
reconciliation and reintegration efforts operate within the
context of a broader counterinsurgency strategy. It's not
possible for the Afghan Government to reconcile with senior
level Taliban or reintegrate low level Taliban fighters as long
as the Taliban remains militarily strong and convinced that
they are winning the war.
I believe that we need to avoid a situation where warlords
and power brokers retain their militias. It's certainly too
high a price to pay for reconciliation.
Financial incentives alone are not sufficient to reconcile
with low-level Taliban fighters because they will be subject to
brutal retaliation against themselves and their families, and
if the government of Afghanistan cannot protect them from
retribution it would be suicidal for them to shift sides.
However, improved security conditions throughout Afghanistan,
coupled with financial incentives and job opportunities, can
lead to effective reconciliation.
I know that U.S. officials have expressed support for the
inclusion of the Taliban in a future Afghan Government so long
as any former militants joining the government break with al
Qaeda and Taliban, lay down their arms, and accept the Afghan
constitution.
My question is, outside of the jirga on June 4, has
President Karzai started translating his reconciliation and
reintegration initiatives into programs and policies?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, if I could just
say, that's a very accurate and quite a nuanced description of
the situation and of the basic concepts behind all of this.
It's exactly right.
With respect to reintegration, there is interim guidance
that our forces and Afghan officials are using. But as I
mentioned earlier, it's important that President Karzai now
promulgate this formally, and that we believe will happen quite
soon, according to General McChrystal in the
videoteleconference yesterday morning.
With respect to reconciliation, an outcome of the National
Consultative Peace Jirga is indeed direction to develop further
reconciliation programs, while noting that there are criteria
that do exist. It's very clear, and you just stated those as
well, what has to take place for groups, former insurgent
factions, indeed to be eligible for reconciliation.
But again, the promulgating instructions to provide the
real governmental guidance and policies for that are still
under development, noting that again that is quite high level
and, even though there may be talks going on periodically among
emissaries or what have you, I think, as you pointed out, that
it is unlikely to see true reconciliation while the Taliban
still feels that it is in the ascendant or at least can wait us
out.
Senator Hagan. Secretary Flournoy.
Secretary Flournoy. If I could just add, Senator, on
reintegration for low- and mid-level fighters, based on
President Karzai's interim guidance, we have, thanks to this
committee for making this possible, used the authority that you
helped to give us to use up to $100 million of CERP in support
of reintegration efforts. We've actually released those funds
now, so those are now available for commanders working with
their Afghan partners at the district and local level to start
taking advantage of some of these reintegration opportunities.
On the reconciliation side, coming out of the jirga one of
the conclusions was to establish what's called a high peace
council or commission, which will be the Afghan mechanism that
will really begin to try to start thinking through
reconciliation in a programmatic sort of level.
We have also made very clear how we're going to organize
ourselves on the U.S. side so that we are joined at the hip. We
want to make sure that this is obviously an Afghan-led process,
but it is very important that we stay partnered with them as
they consider how to move forward on this and that this is
fully integrated with the broader counterinsurgency campaign.
Senator Hagan. Has the low-level reintegration actually
started and is it successful?
General Petraeus. It has started. It would be premature, I
think, to describe it as successful yet. But it is certainly a
work in progress in several different locations of Afghanistan.
There are as many as in one case 80 fighters/insurgents/
militants that I read about this morning in an intelligence
book, for example, in the RC-West area that came in literally
with their hands up, laid their weapons down, wanted to be
reintegrated.
Their incentives are very much in line with what you laid
out. In that particular area, a combination of Afghan
Government security forces and coalition forces, I think non-
U.S., although I'd have to check that, brought about security
conditions, just put enough pressure on the Taliban that they
decided, this is not what we want to continue doing for the
rest of our lives, and if there is an alternative that allows
us back into society, then the security arrangement does have
some incentives as well, then that's a course that they're
willing to take.
That's basically where they are right now. But the follow-
on piece of that, which is very important, as you'll recall, in
Iraq ultimately we ended up hiring on our payroll, using CERP
or fixed site security contracts, 103,000 Iraqis, largely Iraqi
men. By the way, about 20,000 or more were Shia, just so the
record understands there was a Shia awakening as well as a
Sunni awakening.
We do not envision doing the same thing here, in part
because there's not the prospect, even despite the great
mineral wealth that's found--that is not going to be exploited
in substantial form, we wouldn't think, for some years. So that
we don't want to saddle Afghanistan with a very costly program.
Rather, we want to enable much more local programs, with the
amount of CERP that the Under Secretary talked about being part
of that.
Senator Hagan. You mentioned the new-found wealth of the
minerals. I know that on June 14 the New York Times reported
this discovery of nearly a trillion dollars in untapped mineral
deposits. Does this new mineral wealth have the ability to
fundamentally alter the Afghan economy, but does it also have
the ability to amplify the existing problems of government
corruption, as well as provide greater incentive for the
Taliban to actually fight for control of the government?
I was just wondering, does Afghanistan's new-found wealth
in any way alter the coalition's counterinsurgency approach,
governance support plan, development plan? I know this would be
years in the making, but on the ground now how does this play
into our strategy?
General Petraeus. First, to answer your first question, I
think an all of the above potential is present. Potentially, it
could be an incredible boon to Afghanistan. It could enable
them to pay for their own governmental officials, forces,
programs, and so forth, in a way that I think prior to this
there was not that same expectation, but again being very
careful about how difficult this will be.
Beyond that, we have been engaged--again, this was not a
revelation to a lot of us who have been working this. Again,
there was a keen awareness of the different copper deposits.
China is already in trying to extract that and to build the
infrastructure necessary and to get it out and so forth.
But there is an awareness of these different opportunities
that are out there. Some of them are being exploited in small
ways by either local strongmen--I don't know if I'd quite go to
warlords, but different power brokers and so forth, or
officials. It's very important that there be a legal regime
that governs this as well. This is something that we're quite
keenly aware and the civilian elements have been working. I'll
just give you one example, the timber. There's enormous timber
resources in eastern Afghanistan in particular. There is a law.
They haven't been able to implement it, and that's the effort
that has to go forward if it's to become something that serves
the state, rather than just some interests within it.
Secretary Flournoy. I would just add, when we became aware
when the survey results came in last year, I think what it has
done, even though it's a very long-term project, it has helped
to inform some prioritization, for example putting more
priority on capacity-building in the ministry of mines, the
ministry of finance, putting more emphasis on looking at this
particular area of law and regulation so that we try to--if
you're going to start with a sector, let's start with this
sector.
We're trying now to work with USAID and others to make sure
that the knowledge of some of these deposits and so forth
actually informs some of our near-term projects in communities
where these are located, so you start creating the foundations
that will eventually position those communities to take full
advantage of the wealth that's literally right underneath them.
So I think it has informed some reprioritization of our
efforts on the development side.
I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, General, thank you for your outstanding
service to our country. General, I also want to welcome you
back today. I know we're very pleased to have you back. I'm not
sure I would have been anxious if I were you to come back in
front of this committee. But nevertheless, thank you for your
great service.
General, about a year ago, General McChrystal restricted
close air support (CAS) operations in Afghanistan in an effort
to reduce civilian casualties and damage. I fully understand
the efforts by you and General McChrystal to employ
counterinsurgency tactics and strategy in this war, and that
General McChrystal's CAS directive is an effort to restrain the
use of firepower, which is crucial to fighting an insurgency.
However, it seems to me that the directive can also elevate
the risk to troops who are under fire and require the kind of
assistance that CAS can provide. After a year or so of this
directive being in place, what is your evaluation of the
results of this directive and what kind of effect do you think
that it's had on the war?
General Petraeus. First, Senator, in fact General McKiernan
was the first one to promulgate the so-called tactical
directive, and he did that with the intent of reducing to an
absolute minimum the loss of innocent civilian life in the
conduct of military operations. He did it in the wake of some
instances in which substantial numbers of civilians were killed
in the course of military operations and almost undermined the
entire strategic effort there in Afghanistan. It had a very
serious impact.
General McChrystal did refine the tactical directive, and
issued counterinsurgency guidance as well. Again, same intent.
Let me state up front, though, that we will drop a bomb or use
attack helicopters or any other enabler at any time, at any
place, if our troopers' lives are in jeopardy, if their safety
and wellbeing is in jeopardy. If they're pinned down and can't
get out, we will do what is necessary.
But there are a number of cases in which that is not
necessarily, where you're being engaged from a house--just to
give you one example, and there are many of these--you're being
engaged from a house, let's say. It may not be completely
effective fire. You can break contact. Our predisposition is to
close with and destroy the enemy. That's the motto of the
infantry, to press the fight, to take the fight to the enemy.
But there are cases in which you have to balance that with
the recognition that if you don't know who's in that house and
taking the fight to the enemy ultimately means blowing up the
house, which is sometimes what has to result if you're going to
take out those bad guys that are shooting at you, but in the
course of doing that you kill a substantial number of
civilians, that tactical success then becomes a strategic
setback of considerable proportions.
Now, as we have evaluated this and looked at it, and we
have done after-action reviews throughout the course of the
year, there are clearly cases in which we need to continue to
educate our leaders. Again, we want on the one hand to be
absolutely responsive when that is necessary. As I said, we
will never restrict the use of our firepower or our enablers if
our troopers are in jeopardy on the ground. But also, you need
a sufficient very rapid review process so that folks really do
look at this and examine and make sure that, again, we are not
going to create a strategic setback in the quest for a tactical
victory or advantage.
That's how we have come at that. We have worked very hard
to educate our troopers, to train our troopers in the
predeployment process during the road to war, if you will, the
road to deployment. We've incorporated this in our combat
training center mission rehearsal exercises, in doctrine, in
various tactics, techniques, and procedures. We'll continue to
do that.
We get feedback periodically that troopers feel that they
are being held back. We don't want that to be the case. That is
not the intent. The intent is very clearly just to reduce to an
absolute minimum the loss of innocent civilian life, which in a
counterinsurgency operation in particular can unhinge you.
Senator Thune. Yes?
Chairman Levin. Let me interrupt you, if I could.
A vote has just begun in the Senate. I would suggest the
following: that after Senator Thune's questions that we take a
10-minute recess; that the rest of us that want to and are able
to come back, go vote, come back immediately, so that after
that 10-minute recess we will have some people here to question
you, so there won't be too long a gap. We'd want there to be
about a 10-minute recess.
Thank you very much.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, is there any indication, though, that the Taliban
are engaging in direct or indirect fire attacks more often and
with greater effect, now that they know that there is
potentially a diminished threat from the air? Do you see any
evidence to that effect?
General Petraeus. First of all, insurgents historically
have always tried to use our rules of engagement against us. We
know that. They did that in Iraq periodically. We had people in
Iraq literally pushing through crowds shooting at us. This
happened in a number of other cases in recent decades as well
in these kinds of situations.
But we are about living our values, and every time we have
taken expedient measures not only has it been wrong, we have
also paid a price for it in terms of it biting us in the back
side in the long run. So that's again--we have to be aware that
they will use our reluctance to kill innocent civilians or to
risk the lives of innocent civilians in the course of these
operations.
Having said that, frankly, they generally are not engaging
us directly as much as they are coming at us indirectly. They
realized some years ago, certainly last year, that if they
engage our troopers in a direct fire fight that they will lose.
So they are using improvised explosive devices in much larger
numbers than they have in the past, and that's where we see the
increase in the incidents of violence.
Senator Thune. It's my understanding that B-1 bomber
aircraft are being used quite frequently in intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) roles, rather than in an
on-call fire support role. I don't know if you know the answer
to this or not, but could you provide us with an idea of how
frequently that Afghan and Navy crews are being utilized by
ground troops in Afghanistan in ISR roles?
General Petraeus. We do that all the time, Senator.
Again, a B-1 bomber--we have combat air patrols (CAP), so we
always have CAPs over Afghanistan. While they're waiting to be
called on for a bombing mission, because again that's the only
way we can have responsive bombing. In fact, we want it to be
available within 10 minutes, is the metric. I review these
metrics periodically for responsiveness of CAS and also, by the
way, for responsiveness of medevac, which is the golden hour.
Generally, the average on medevac responsiveness has been to
get from point of injury to the first treatment facility,
lately it's in the range of 45 to 50 minutes, which is where we
want to keep it.
But as they are waiting for missions, we'll use the
lightning pod or the other capabilities that B-1s, F-16s, F/A-
18s, whatever aircraft we have. They're very, very good in this
role. We've all seen the downloads. We've all used this,
frankly, and they are superb in this role.
Now, we'd rather use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or
something like that, which are both more persistent, cheaper,
greater dwell time, and so forth. But we have these platforms
overhead anyway and so we do put them to use while we're
waiting to use them in a CAS role, if they are indeed used in
that role on their mission.
Senator Thune. How many manned aircraft are there typically
in the air above Afghanistan at any moment in time, any point
in time?
General Petraeus. Let me provide that to you for the
record. In fact, we can show you the unmanned as well. But it's
certainly in the dozens at the very least when you start
talking about tankers, command and control aircraft, jammers in
some cases, in addition to those that are providing on-call CAS
in a variety of different locations around the country, you
have to be in the south, in the east, in the center or what
have you and then dozens of UAVs as well.
[The information referred to follows:]
On average, there are approximately 86 aircraft up at any given
time in Afghanistan. For example, a recent snapshot of actual aircraft
airborne in Afghanistan at 0930Z (1400 Afghanistan) on Saturday, 19
June 2010, showed 20 Close Air Support fighters and bombers, 1
electronic warfare aircraft, 4 C2 platforms, 3 reconnaissance aircraft,
25 unmanned aircraft, 7 tankers, 1 airdrop, and approximately 25
helicopters (rotary wing do not appear on the ATO). This is indicative
of an average day's sorties.
Senator Thune. As the number of CAPs increase, my
assumption is that the manned missions over there will be
reduced. Is that a fair statement?
General Petraeus. No, I'm not sure I would--let me lay that
out for you. In fact, we have put more CAPs, tried to put more
CAPs, over Afghanistan as we have spread out our forces. Again,
they're somewhat different missions, needless to say, as well.
Obviously, some of our UAVs are armed, the Predator and the
Reaper, but not the rest.
So a substantial number of those are doing only full-motion
video or various intelligence tasks, not responsive with
weapons. Of course, the weapons on those that are armed are not
as large as those that are carried by, say, a B-1 or some of
the other bombers.
Senator Thune. We do have a vote. My colleague from Florida
may want to say something here. But just a final editorial
comment if I will, because you have answered this question, I
think, many times in response to the questions that have been
posed by other members of the committee. But I share a concern,
too, with respect to the date next summer for withdrawal. There
was a report last week of a wedding party in Argendab District,
which we visited in January, that the Taliban killed at least
39 people. There are reports that the Taliban executed a 7-
year-old child in Helmand Province for cooperating with the
Afghan Government. Notwithstanding the Taliban's so-called code
of conduct, there's still a lot of evidence of brutality.
The question I guess would be a lot of these folks in these
areas, critical areas to us, who are cooperating with and
helping the government, what happens when we leave? Then there
was this report yesterday in the Washington Post, which is
being disputed and denied by the Pakistan Government, but I
want to read you just one paragraph in this news story: ``U.S.
officials say''--and these were releases of Taliban leaders
from Pakistan--``that the releases reflected Pakistan's
strategy of working closely with the United States on key
fronts while also maintaining relationships with militant
groups capable of serving Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan
when U.S. forces are gone.''
I'm concerned that the notion that we're going to be
pulling down here in the not too distant future does shape the
relationships, not only between the people of Afghanistan and
the Taliban and the people of Afghanistan and our U.S. forces
and efforts there, but also the neighbors in the region. So for
what that's worth, I would just add that and echo a concern
that's been raised by other members of the committee
previously.
Thank you, sir. I guess with that we're on break. So thank
you all.
[Recess from 10:53 a.m. to 11:06 a.m.]
Chairman Levin. I believe that Senator--let me check. I
think Senator Ben Nelson is next. That is correct. Senator
Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my appreciation to the two of you and all the
men and women in uniform that are so valiantly protecting our
freedoms. We appreciate your leadership in that effort.
General Petraeus, one of the things that I thought was so
important and I'm pleased that we're seeing that happen now is
the establishment of benchmarks to be able to judge progress.
We achieved that same goal with Iraq and I'm very happy that
we're approaching this same way with benchmarks in Afghanistan.
Two of your major objectives that were submitted in the
benchmark progress reports to the committee in April were to:
one, develop a self-reliant Afghan security force; and two, a
more capable, accountable government in Afghanistan. I
certainly agree with these and that they're critical to our
success.
If you were to use a metric at the present time to measure
our current progress, would you think, with respect to the
self-reliant Afghan security force, that we're 10 percent, 20
percent? Is there some calculation in your mind as to where we
are, what we've achieved, and yet what remains as the goal? The
same thing when it comes to a reliable government? This could
apply to Secretary Flournoy as well.
General Petraeus. With respect to the ANSFs, Senator,
obviously lots of different types of forces, different rates of
progress among them, not only between the different components,
but also throughout the country, to be sure. I think the
important point to make is that we've really made progress in
getting the inputs right in this area as well, in terms of
getting the right organization, the NTM-A and its various
component elements, and then on the Afghan side their various
component elements as well, and in some cases adding, as an
example, a recruiting element, which was not present before on
the police side in particular.
Then getting the right people in charge of them, and
General Caldwell and his team of all-star coalition and U.S.
leaders, I think, is again another important step forward. The
concept's right. I mentioned, for example, with the training of
the police that it used to be recruit, assign, then train when
you get to it.
Senator Ben Nelson. Ready, fire, aim.
General Petraeus. That's about right.
Then have the resources to do it. Of course, you provided,
at the request of the President, the resources to add an
additional 100,000 ANSF by the fall of 2011.
So all of those, again very important, added to the
additional trainers in terms of resources, we've been able to
go from again 1 to 80 ratio of trainer to trainee, to now a 1
to 30 training ratio. The addition of trainers, while still a
significant shortfall exists; additional OMLTs and POMLTs,
although still again more are needed and General McChrystal's
directive to have units partner has made a difference in that
regard.
If you want to characterize all of that and say where are
you and a certain percentage, I don't know that we're quite at
the 50 percentile mark, certainly. I think again there has been
important progress in this regard. I think there are some
foundations now on which we can build much more effectively
than we have been able to in the past.
But we are still at the point of, having gotten the inputs
right now, to see how the outputs come out. Not to say that all
that has been done in the past to build institution,
infrastructure, unit, trainees, and so forth is by any means
without enormous value, because it is. We went through the same
thing like this within Iraq as well, and you're constantly
adjusting, and then you have to adjust to the enemy as well.
Do you want to talk governance?
Secretary Flournoy. On the governance side, again I can't
give you a set percentage, but I can tell you the kinds of
things we're looking at and trying to measure. One is a general
sense of the population as to the responsiveness of government
to their basic needs, and there's everything from polling to
participation in shuras and council meetings and so forth.
At the ministry level, we're very focused on making sure
that ministries can actually receive and disburse monies in an
accountable manner. We're in the process of working with the
various Afghan ministries to actually certify them in terms of
financial management, and I think we've certified three or four
and there are a number, an additional three or four in the
pipeline, and we'll keep working through those, looking at
their capacity to perform core functions.
At the local government level, it really has to do with,
have we actually created a connection with the local people, is
the local government becoming the sort of focal point of
community decisionmaking, do they have the capacity to actually
oversee and execute projects, and so forth.
So there are a number of different metrics that we're
looking at. As General Petraeus has been saying, we're putting
a lot of the right inputs in place, a lot of the right
foundational pieces, and now we're going to start measuring
progress over time. But it will take some time.
Senator Ben Nelson. With respect to the surveys or the
polling----
[Audio system feedback.]
Senator Ben Nelson.--and I don't know why it's doing this.
Chairman Levin. I wonder if somebody could check out the
sound system here, because we have this hum or feedback.
Senator Ben Nelson. In connection with the polling, I know
that the Afghan acceptance of ISAF has not necessarily been
increasing. It's been decreasing. From March 2010, with 29
percent of Afghans having a good or very good opinion of ISAF;
in comparison, 34 percent now have a bad or a very bad opinion
of ISAF, which is the lowest it's been since the surveys were
started in 2008.
Is there comparable polling or are there comparable surveys
on the support or the attitude of the Afghans towards their
government?
Secretary Flournoy. I can cite at least one that I'm
familiar with, sir.
Chairman Levin. You need to talk louder.
Secretary Flournoy. I'm sorry.
Chairman Levin. Is your mike on?
Secretary Flournoy. I don't think it's on.
Chairman Levin. A lot louder.
Secretary Flournoy. There is a recent poll that was done
that shows about 59 percent of the Afghan population believes
that the combination of their government and ISAF is moving the
country in the right direction, sort of a general, are we
heading in the right direction question. That was an
improvement since last fall. But frankly, I think we need to
get better data from the polls. Right now we get somewhat
contradictory information out of the polls.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do you have any polling information on
their local governments versus where the overall direction of
the country is going?
General Petraeus. Interestingly, in the south just recently
a poll indicates greater optimism about the future than it did
just a few months ago.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. The sound I think is now off. I think
they're trying to fix it. So we're all going to have to talk
much louder during this interim period.
Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Good morning. Thank you both.
General Petraeus, what would happen if in the future the
Taliban took over part or all of Afghanistan from our national
security perspective? What would be the consequence?
General Petraeus. I think, Senator, given what's happening
in other areas, with pressure on extremist groups in other
locations, that some of those will make their way back into
Afghanistan and enjoy sanctuary, as they did prior to September
11, recalling that the September 11 attacks were planned in the
Kandahar area and the initial training of the attackers took
place in training camps in Afghanistan.
Senator Graham. On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being not so
significant and 10 being very significant, what would Taliban
control of part or all of Afghanistan mean to us, national
security-wise?
General Petraeus. The President has said that----
Senator Graham. Closer to 10 than 1?
General Petraeus. Yes.
Senator Graham. If we were not there now, what would
happen?
General Petraeus. I think the Taliban certainly would take
control of certain areas of the country. Others might devolve
into warlordism and you might end up with a couple of different
civil wars going on between different ethnic groups, even
sectarian groups, and some warlords overlaid on top of that.
Senator Graham. This is June 2010. Are we winning?
General Petraeus. Winning to a counterinsurgent, Senator,
means making progress. In that regard, I think that we are
winning, but I think that it is a slow process. As I explained,
we have just about got the inputs right in terms of getting the
organizations in place, the right people in charge of them, the
right concepts and the right level of resources to enable
implementation of those concepts under those leaders in charge
of the right organizations.
Senator Graham. What percentage of Afghanistan is under
central government control?
General Petraeus. What's that, sir?
Senator Graham. What percentage of the country,
Afghanistan, is under effective central government control?
General Petraeus. Certainly more, much more than what is
not. Again, we have to talk about how do you want to define
central government control.
Senator Graham. Central government control means being an
effective police force, a responsible army, a functioning, non-
corrupt local and national government.
General Petraeus. We have a ways to go in that regard,
obviously. Again, there are areas of the country that have
those characteristics, but they're certainly in the minority.
Senator Graham. Would you agree with me that in June 2010
most of Afghanistan is not governed in an effective manner,
where you have an honest police force and a non-corrupt,
functioning government, that most of the country doesn't fall
under that model?
General Petraeus. I think that's a fair assessment. Again,
I'd want to sit with you with a map. I'd want to talk a little
bit in a more nuanced fashion.
Senator Graham. I'm just trying to get a baseline of where
we're at in June 2010.
How many al Qaeda members do we think reside in Afghanistan
today?
General Petraeus. Probably a very small number, certainly
perhaps in the double digit numbers, that small, if any. Again,
the nexus of al Qaeda we still believe is very much in the
certain agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of
Pakistan.
Senator Graham. How many are over there?
General Petraeus. Now we're into the hundreds. This is a
question of how do you talk about the symbiotic relationships
between these, because it can very easily extend into the
thousands. There are trainees moving through there. Then there
are relationships. How do you count the support crew, the
family members? As you'll recall, a number of these individuals
literally married into tribes over there, and it becomes a very
difficult accounting drill in a region where people survive by
being chameleons at times.
Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that al Qaeda has moved
next door?
General Petraeus. That is correct.
Senator Graham. What is the number of big ``T'' Taliban
that we're fighting in Afghanistan, give or minus?
General Petraeus. In the thousands, and I can provide you
the whole laydown, because again it depends on how you define
not just--what is the Afghan Taliban? Do you want to include
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan? Do you include the Hakkani
Network? Do you include Commander Nazir? Do you include----
Senator Graham. Let's include them all.
General Petraeus. Then you're well into the thousands, and
then you have to start talking about the tiers of these
different operatives. Again, the leadership, of course, at the
very top, that matters greatly, and then you get all the way
down through the mid-level to the low-level, the $5- or $10-a-
day Taliban, as they say, that clearly can be broken off. You
could argue whether it's not unlike Iraq. You had a hard-core
al Qaeda in Iraq, you had various strands of insurgent
elements.
Senator Graham. So, long story short, into the thousands
probably?
General Petraeus. Certainly.
Senator Graham. Our policy of withdrawing in July 2011, as
I understand it, is that we're going to begin to withdraw in
July 2011. The only thing in question is the pace of
withdrawal. Is that fair?
General Petraeus. Indeed, Senator, as I described--and I
want to get you a copy of the statement that I made this
morning because I tried to provide a very precise description
of that.
Senator Graham. Is generally what I said fair?
General Petraeus. July 2011 is when a process begins that
includes the beginning of a responsible drawdown of the surge
forces and includes the beginning of a process of transition of
some tasks to Afghan officials and forces, based on conditions.
All of this based on conditions.
Senator Graham. I want to make sure I do understand,
because you told Senator Kaufman it's not a matter of if we're
going to leave, it's just how quick we're going to leave. Is
that not true?
General Petraeus. Based on conditions.
Senator Graham. Okay.
General Petraeus. Given current projections as well.
Senator, I'd like you to read the statement that I gave at the
outset.
Senator Graham. I will.
In June 2012, do you anticipate us having more or less than
50,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. Senator, I wouldn't hazard a projection.
I think that would be speculative. Again, we're a year from the
beginning of the process, which is a year from the date that
you just stated. I think that it's just not productive. In
fact, it could be unproductive.
Senator Graham. One last question. How does the Taliban
view this policy? What intelligence do we have? Has this
policy, that we're going to begin to withdraw in July 2011,
given any indication that the enemy is encouraged by that plus
the fact that NATO forces are beginning to withdraw?
General Petraeus. The enemy has a number of different
emotions right now, Senator. One is that the enemy is under
greater pressure than at any time before, and they are feeling
this. We have insights into this, as they say. We have put some
pretty big dents into elements of the Afghan Taliban in
Afghanistan and there have been some pretty big dents in the
extremist ranks, the senior leader ranks, in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas as well.
Having said that, there is an awareness of the July 2011
date and there is some sense among some of them. They are
watching NATO allies as well. They have specifically, with
their information operations campaigns and their tactical
campaigns at times we think, targeted certain elements of the
coalition, certain countries. Their strategy certainly is to do
what they have done in the past, which is outlast whoever it is
that is confronting them.
I tried to be very precise this morning with what July 2011
means. That's why your colleague, Senator Lieberman, I believe,
mentioned the words vital national security interest, which
again say something to all of us, that were featured in the
President's speech at West Point, and why again we should come
back to the fact as well that that was a message of urgency
that complemented the message of enormous commitment.
Let's not forget that by the end of August this year,
Senator, the number of forces on the ground, U.S. forces on the
ground, will be well more than three times, triple, what was on
the ground at the beginning of 2009. That is vastly more than
the surge in Iraq. The number of civilians has tripled as well,
and the authorization that you have provided for the ANSF is a
very substantial one also, 100,000 more ANSF. That is a symbol
and a reflection of commitment as well.
That's what we have tried to convey in the region, by the
way. We have sat down with all the regional leaders to ensure
that there is not--and that's what--in my statement today I
said let's be clear what July 2011 is and what it is not. It is
not when we race for the exits and reach for the light switch.
Senator Graham. I think what they are probably more certain
of is that on the July 2011 date there will be less Americans
to fight and less NATO troops to fight, and that's the policy.
I think it's a huge mistake.
So thank you.
Secretary Flournoy. May I? If I could just add, one of the
reasons we've entered into a very public and high profile
strategic dialogue with our partners in Afghanistan and,
frankly, in Pakistan as well. We are issuing declarations out
of that, that we are trying to both flesh out and communicate
the nature of an enduring commitment to this region and what
that's going to look like, and the fact that we are not leaving
any time soon, even though the nature and complexion of the
commitment may change over time.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Just in time. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Let me first start briefly on some
contracting issues. I know we've had a number of members talk
about the private security contracting and I'd like to touch on
that and the police training. On the private security
contracting, I take it, General Petraeus, that you are
perfectly willing to say on the record that we need to get back
to this being more of an inherently governmental function, as
opposed to something that we're contracting out?
General Petraeus. If I could just talk a little bit about
the private security contractors, because there's obviously a
reason that they're there and that is because they augment what
our troops do, just as they did in Iraq. What we learned in
Iraq we're trying to apply now in Afghanistan and have been for
some time, and that is to make sure that we get them under the
authorities, that they understand the rules, if you will, that
you helped us with the NDAA. We use those in Iraq, as you'll
recall, and at least two cases where we actually brought cases
to court based on those authorities under the military
commander because we had the jurisdiction over them.
We are doing that in Afghanistan as well, and also applying
the efforts to coordinate their activities, to ensure they are
very clear on what their rules of engagement or self-defense
are, and that they are fully integrated into our battlefield
awareness, our situational awareness, and command and control
systems as well.
Now, General McChrystal has also said he would like to get
rid of private security contractors, because in a perfect world
again that would be an inherently governmental function. But
the fact is that to do that requires--there's a reason they are
securing convoys, logistics, and others. I contracted out my
own security in Iraq when I was a three-star general because we
didn't have enough military police in this one-off
organization, the train-and-equip mission, to secure all those
that were lower in rank than I was, and I had enough clout to
be able to contract it out. They couldn't do that for
themselves, so we gave them the military police unit that was
designed for me.
That's the situation that leads to this, and again it's a
reality out there, and of course it's a reality on the DOS
front as well.
Senator McCaskill. I just think it's something that we need
to continue to underline.
General Petraeus. Correct.
Senator McCaskill. If we're going to give our incredibly
strong leaders missions to accomplish on behalf of the United
States of America, we have to continually bang the drum that we
have to have the resources there that are necessary to perform
inherently governmental functions.
I have to tell you, General Petraeus, it doesn't surprise
me that you gave up your military police unit to contract out
your security. But I think a whole lot of Americans wouldn't be
comfortable with that. You're an incredible resource for our
Nation.
General Petraeus. It was when I was a three-star, not a
four-star.
Senator McCaskill. Three-stars--the reason you became a
four-star is because you were an above-average three-star. I
think that it would be important for us to acknowledge that
having--and I do want to get on the record an acknowledgment
that we are pulling people out of the workforce in Afghanistan
that we need in our army and in our local police departments,
at higher pay, and sometimes they're not good guys.
General Petraeus. Right. Not only are we doing that there,
and President Karzai and I had a conversation with Ambassador
Holbrooke as well on the fact that in some cases we are
investing in Afghanistan's human capital, helping train,
educate, provide skills to people, they return to their
inherently governmental function, and then we compete with the
Afghan Government and in some cases take them away and put them
on a contract to us as you name it, a doctor who's now an
interpreter, a great governmental official who now becomes
again, who knows, human terrain team or whatever.
So that is a conflict and it's something that Afghanistan
has to address in terms they need some rules and regulation and
policies, and we have to be sensitive. I don't know if you
heard our mention of the task force that we have formed.
Senator McCaskill. General Caldwell.
General Petraeus. This is one actually with Rear Admiral
Kathleen Dussault, who you will remember as a one-star, Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq commander. She is now a two-star and
is going to go out and lead a task force that will complement
what the contracting command in Afghanistan is doing to really
get into the details of this and to look at some of these
issues that are out there, also to get down to the
subcontractors to the subcontractors, to follow the money, to
find out how is it being doled out, who really is benefiting
from this.
Senator McCaskill. That's great. I know, Secretary
Flournoy, you are aware that we've also asked you to put in the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) contracting plans, that in the
NDAA we're asking that the QDR include contracting. I think if
we've learned anything over the last 5 years, we've learned
that if we are going to be fighting a counterinsurgency far
away, contracting is an essential piece of that mission, and if
we haven't learned that lesson, then we're in real trouble.
Let me briefly talk on the ANP. I would certainly want
there to be an acknowledgment somewhere that we may need to
hold on to training local police as part of our fundamental
core competency in going against a counterinsurgency. This
notion that the DOS had it and then we give it back to DOD and
then the DOS takes it back and now it's back with DOD, and now
we have a problem with the contract and we're struggling with
whether or not we compete it. Here we are in the crucial months
of a strategy that has been adopted by our Commander in Chief
and by the military in Afghanistan and we frankly are
flatfooted as it relates to our ability to contract with the
ANP trainers.
General Petraeus. I could not agree with you more, Senator.
We see this wherever there is what we call an industrial
strength mission. Again, this is to take nothing away from DOS
or international narcotics and law enforcement affairs. There
are fantastic armies of one in those organizations, but they
are not structured, they don't have the deployability, they
don't have the personnel protection, all the rest of these that
in a counterinsurgency situation--they're terrific for the
normal type of mission that has been performed in the past. But
I lived through this in Iraq. I watched us try to do it with
the traditional structures and organizations, and then ended up
being the guy that had to take it over and pull it together. We
just ended up taking more and more and more tasks. Ultimately,
even the overall ministry adviser missions ended up all being
under the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
organization there after we tried to do it the normal way and
it didn't work.
I think it's very important, and there's an issue of
interagency doctrine there that is important, or interagency
roles and missions. Again, I am one who, like Under Secretary
Flournoy and Secretary Gates, has argued for more resources for
DOS and these different elements that are trying to perform
these missions as well.
If I could, there is one we have in fact formed. We formed
it a couple years ago, in fact when I was at Fort Leavenworth.
Another hat was added for the commander at Fort Leavenworth,
the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance.
This is designed for the military to capture what it is we have
learned about the industrial strength efforts here, too,
because again we have learned. Traditionally we did this with
Green Berets, with Special Forces, who would go out and they'd
train a couple battalions, maybe even a brigade or two, in some
country in Africa or Latin America or something like this.
Now we are doing again bulk industrial strength efforts,
and we're having to use conventional forces in very significant
ways. They dwarf the numbers of our Green Berets and have taken
over the bulk of these missions. We have sought to capture the
lessons from that as well, and I think we've done a reasonably
good job in terms of doing that and then developing doctrine,
the preparation of these forces for deployment and the rest of
that as well.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. I'm out of time, but I do
want to let you know, I will submit for the record--I'm very
concerned about the situation in Kyrgyzstan and the stability
of that government, our relationship with that government as it
relates to our airfield there. I know they've arrested the
former president's son in the U.K. and I know there's
allegations of serious skimming in terms of fuel contracts with
that air base. I know we have a backup of trains with fuel.
That northern supply route, we've taken a long time to get
it in place and it looks precarious to me right now, and that
is of great concern. So I will address some questions to the
record and will look forward to learning where you think we are
as it relates to the ethnic strife that we're now seeing in
Central Asia and how that impacts on our mission in
Afghanistan.
General Petraeus. Could I very quickly just reassure that
the northern distribution network, the bulk of which on the
ground, virtually all of it, runs through Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, is functioning very smoothly. There are no issues
with it. In fact, we continue to increase. I think we're almost
at the point of 70 percent now of our supplies, not all of the
other military equipment, run through the northern distribution
network. This has helped enormously to take the pressures off
the routes that come through Karachi, through the Khyber Pass
and the Chaman Gate. Also, the prices went down in Pakistan as
a result of having competition. What a surprise.
Beyond that, the Kyrgyzstan issue, Transit Center at Manas
is quite a distance from Osh. We have had no security issues
whatsoever up there. We are responding to and working hand-in-
glove with the DOS to be prepared if there is a determination
of humanitarian assistance or to help in any other way, as we
did in the wake of the riots that resulted in the displacement
of the government.
There's an OSD team that is working on replacing the
contract. In the mean time, we have been able to keep the fuel,
we have all of our tankers back up there flying again, and
again touch wood that that can just continue as we are sorting
out the way ahead on the contract front.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you both for your service to your
country.
I'd like to go back to the fundamental question that the
American people have at the time of this hearing, is that
they're picking up information that things are not going well
in Afghanistan. They are concerned about it. Members of
Congress are picking that up. We're seeing it in the media,
rightly or wrongly.
I guess first of all, Secretary Flournoy, I understood you
to say that you believe the overall trajectory of our efforts
there is in the right direction since I guess that we are
making progress toward the goal that we'd like to see for
Afghanistan. Is that a fair statement?
Secretary Flournoy. It is, Senator. I think we are moving
in the right direction. The nature of the counterinsurgency
work is, there are going to be setbacks along the way. It's
very difficult. But we are moving in the right direction.
Senator Sessions. The reports from your perspective are
pointing out problems, and some are very real, still don't
dissuade you in that view that overall we're still on the right
trajectory?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, especially because we are still
having the resources that the President ordered coming into
theater, still getting in place, and not fully engaged yet in
the fight. As they come on line, I think that will add to our
ability to create some momentum.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, I remember still so
vividly the decision to execute the surge. The President had to
ask our soldiers who expected to come home to extend for 3
months, one of the most bitter things that I remember having to
go through. It's still emotional to me. I remember asking you,
did you think we can be successful in Iraq. At the time that
was a matter of doubt. I guess we can say that the trajectory
of drawing the troops down so rapidly indicates that you were
at least right, at least at this point in time.
Do you think we can be successful in Afghanistan, given the
current state of affairs there?
General Petraeus. I do. Again, it will not be easy, nor was
it in any way, shape, or form easy in Iraq. It was very, very
hard in Iraq. We took very tough losses in Iraq, as you well
know from visiting many different times. There were significant
ups and downs.
I still remember, for example, way past the September
hearings, well at the end of that year, for example, as various
government leaders came to very senior U.S. officials and
called for a very significant change in governmental leadership
there. This is way beyond the point that anyone was disputing
that there were significant security gains. This is a tough,
tough business and it is, as I described earlier, very much a
roller-coaster ride. Those who are living it have to try to
keep their eye on the horizon to ensure that the trajectory is
generally upward. I agree with the Under Secretary that it is.
Senator Sessions. You talk about DOS and their
contributions, which are very valuable. But you also pointed
out that the NGOs and our other government entities don't carry
security with them and it's difficult for them to fulfill their
responsibilities. In an insurgency situation in which the very
safety of American personnel are still at stake, doesn't it
make sense--or I'll just say it this way and I'll let you
comment. It's my opinion that the people who are in these PRTs,
the people who are out there, are mostly military and we need
to understand that they have the ability and can effectively
dispense aid for local projects and so forth, that can save
lives. I think the military has really such an intensity of
interest in this because their soldiers' lives are at stake.
So would you comment on that fundamental balance between
where the reconstruction monies should be allocated?
General Petraeus. First of all, I think your point is very
well taken. Second, in fact PRTs by and large are significantly
military.
Senator Sessions. These are the PRTs.
General Petraeus. PRTs are a mix of civilian and military.
Typically you'll have civilian leadership and you'll have a
number of very good civilian experts that bring skills that are
hard to find at least within the military, although sometimes
in our Reserve components we even have those skills.
But what we want to do is partner. By the way, we do have
significant skills in uniforms, folks who pack weapons and
everything else and are prepared to go downrange, many of them
again from our Reserve components, who perform civilian
functions when not in uniform that lend themselves very well to
these kinds of tasks.
Then on top of that, of course, we have the National Guard
Agricultural Development Teams that have been superb. These are
individuals who are farming experts. In some cases they're the
leaders in the agriculture departments of their States or
counties, and they have been very valuable over there. They
come as an entire self-contained unit, so you have a unit that
can move itself, feed itself, secure itself, and communicate
and provide the expertise in the agricultural arena on top of
that.
So this is a mix. That's the way it ought to be. We can
dispense some of the money, and indeed the CERP funds are
substantial when you talk about $1.1 billion in CERP or
whatever. That's a significant amount of money to dispense.
Certainly we coordinate then very carefully with USAID and the
other elements that are doing reconstruction and development
work to make sure that we're not double-tapping a particular
target or project.
Senator Sessions. Two things. First, I do believe often 90
percent of the PRTs are military personnel operating them.
Second, I guess the chairman asked you about why we aren't
moving more on utilizing that money that's being asked for.
General Petraeus. In fact, we have a plan, as the Under
Secretary explained, that will actually obligate a very
substantial amount of this on top of what has been obligated
already this year. As our footprint expands, as the inputs are
completed, then the obligation rate will pick up as well.
Senator Sessions. Just briefly, there's been a slowdown in
Kandahar. I saw an Associated Press article; according to
General McChrystal, he was going to slow down a bit. President
Karzai did go there recently, very recently, Sunday, and he
hasn't done that enough in my opinion. But he went, had a
meeting with the Kandahar leaders, as Senator Levin and I did a
couple of years ago, met with serious individuals, respected in
their local areas. He called on them for support and a majority
of the audience stood and raised their hands when he asked for
their support.
I think General McChrystal saw that as a strong clear call
for unity and that Karzai displayed extraordinary ownership of
the operation.
How would you evaluate that, and does that indicate that
we're not doomed in Kandahar, but actually may be laying the
groundwork for a successful operation?
General Petraeus. That was indeed one of the most important
of the political shaping operations. There was also another
shura council that President Karzai held, about probably 2\1/2\
months ago now, even larger. It was from 1,500 to 2,000 local
elders, notables, and leaders. It was so inclusive in fact that
a number of them felt no reluctance in standing up with the TV
cameras rolling and criticizing the Afghan Government, in some
cases President Karzai himself, who turned and pointed the
finger at himself as well.
But this latest one, I've read the statement, the talking
points, if you will, that President Karzai used that were
translated. They're very good, and in fact I told the chairman
I would get copies of them to the committee.
We had a videoteleconference in fact coincidentally with
General McChrystal yesterday morning, the weekly that's done
with the Secretary of Defense and the rest of us. He felt quite
encouraged by it also.
The fact is I always felt that Kandahar was going to take
months and months and months. It's not a revelation to me that
this will go into the winter. That's what I have always
expected it would, having been on the ground in Kandahar and
done it so very recently, I think a month and a half, 2 months
ago most recently, and walked around and talked to the governor
and talked to other leaders there as well.
General McChrystal's changing slightly how he's going to
start by doing more focused training and partnering with some
Afghan forces before they launch their portion of the tactical
operation. That's very sensible to me. Again, I don't see that
as extending the overall timeline necessarily. That's a
component of the plan that I think a tactical commander has
every reason to adjust as he sees fit.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Flournoy, General Petraeus. Thank you
for your service. Good to see you again. About a month ago you
were kind enough to host me and Senator Nelson at CENTCOM and
we talked about a variety of issues. I want to follow on what
my colleague from Alabama was just discussing in talking about
President Karzai.
When we had that meeting, we talked about your confidence
in President Karzai as a partner for our country in this effort
to fight the Taliban and fight al Qaeda. These recent comments
that President Karzai made in Kandahar are welcomed, but they
follow his comments that were reported around the 10th of this
month that he had lost faith in the U.S.'s ability to defeat
the Taliban.
I wanted to get an update from you about your confidence
level in our partnership and in his leadership in fighting this
war.
General Petraeus. Senator, thanks and great to see you
again as well.
If I could just start off by saying that I think that the
statement that President Karzai's lost faith in the United
States is a newspaper account, not certainly a quote directly
from him, and it is more a characterization from some second-
and third-hand sources. It does not square with what my
contacts with him in recent months would have predicted, nor
what General McChrystal reports, nor the others who have very
frequent contact with him in Kabul.
Again, the example of the shura that was held in Kandahar
is very significant. That is, that's the next important
milestone in setting the political conditions for the conduct
of the military operations, recognizing that many of the
security challenges in Kandahar are related to political or
economic disputes, tensions, friction, and so forth. So that's
a very significant step forward.
It doesn't mean the Taliban's all going to turn around and
bow in his direction by any means. They will continue their
campaign of trying to intimidate, in some cases assassinate and
attack our soldiers and our Afghan partners. But this is very
important in getting the people on the side of the government,
knowing what is going to happen, understanding. He also didn't
hold out rosy futures. He said this will be difficult, we're
going to need to fight the Taliban together, et cetera.
At the end of the day, his success is our success. So
working and very clearly following the President's guidance a
couple months ago, that we indeed have to support the leader of
the sovereign country that we're trying to help.
Senator LeMieux. So you're still as confident in the
partnership as you were when we last met?
General Petraeus. Yes, yes. Clearly there is an issue with
the resignation of the minister of interior and their
intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security. We
know those individuals. We've all worked with them. We all
regard them as competent. But I think again before we start
judging what that will do to those ministries, to the overall
effort, we have to see who the replacements are, judge their
competence, their ethnicity, because again President Karzai is
very sensitive that they can't both be Pashtu.
For what it's worth, the discussions that we're aware of,
some of which Americans have participated in, as various
candidates have been considered, indicate that the replacements
will be competent individuals and individuals certainly that we
have confidence in and can work with.
Secretary Flournoy. If I could, Senator, we had President
Karzai and 14 of his cabinet members here in May for a
strategic dialogue. They left with a very clear sense of a
longer-term U.S. commitment. We were talking about activities
that will extend over the next 5 to 10 years in security
assistance, in governance, in education, in economics, and the
full range of a longer-term strategic relationship. They left
with no question, I think, about understanding that we see that
as a vital interest for the United States.
Senator LeMieux. That goes to the question of the timeline.
I know that some of my other colleagues have already questioned
you about that. How many of the troops now are deployed of this
surging effort?
General Petraeus. Of the final 30,000 that will take us up
to that 98,000 figure--and again keeping in mind that we
started in January 2009 with 30,000 to 31,000, so this will be
a more than tripling of the force on the ground. The Secretary
of Defense, as has been discussed in here, has some flex factor
as required for emerging force protection needs and other
critical requirements. We're about almost at the 21,000 of the
additional 30,000 on the ground. This is actually slightly
ahead of schedule in terms of personnel and in terms of
equipment, which is somewhat remarkable given the Icelandic
volcanic eruptions, the Haiti emergency relief operation, and
some other challenges, including the issues with the Transit
Center at Manas with fuel a month or so ago.
Yet it has all stayed on track. What we call Transportation
Nation, the U.S. Transportation Command led by General Duncan
McNabb, the Logistics Nation led by a host of different
individuals, and so forth, they have performed miracles, and in
fact we're issuing equipment early to the brigade that is
moving into the Kandahar area now.
Senator LeMieux. When do you expect the full deployment to
be accomplished?
General Petraeus. All of the 30,000 required by the end of
August will be on the ground by the end of August. There is one
element, a headquarters, that is not required by that time, so
we obviously won't put it in. It goes in about a month later,
although we could get it in there. But it doesn't rotate until
after that, although it is part of the 30,000.
Senator LeMieux. Do you expect that the amount of troops
fully deployed by August will be a sufficient complement to
what you need to accomplish the mission?
General Petraeus. That's correct. In fact, General
McChrystal has in a letter to the ranking member of the HASC
stated that this will enable us to be what's required to carry
out the strategy. Recognizing that, as I said, if there are
emergent needs we will always ask for those. That's our
obligation to our troopers. In fact, Secretary Gates has this
flex factor that could enable him to satisfy some of that at
his level.
Senator LeMieux. I would expect that as we come into the
summer of 2011, if you also felt that you needed to keep that
level of troops on the ground, that you would make that
recommendation to the President?
General Petraeus. In fact, that's correct, Senator. In the
statement that I made upfront, and we'll make sure that you get
a copy of that, I stated that we'll look at the conditions on
the ground at that time, I and I'm sure General McChrystal,
Admiral Mullen, and all the other military leaders involved,
will provide our most forthright and best professional military
advice. Then at the end of the day also support the ultimate
policy decision made by the President.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you. Thank you again for your
service.
My time is up. I wanted to also talk to you about Iran and
what their influence is currently in Afghanistan, so I will
submit some questions for the record to you.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
I'm just going to end with a final comment about a point
which has been, I think, fairly made here by Senator Graham,
that the Taliban knows that we're going to have fewer U.S.
troops in Afghanistan starting in July 2011. Your answer, I
think, is also fair and accurate, that how many fewer and the
speed of the reductions will, as the President has directed, be
based on conditions at that time.
It's also true that the Taliban knows that the ANA, which
is an army that the people support, is going to be far, far
bigger in July 2011 than it is now. I think it's also true that
the Afghan Government understands that those reductions will
begin in 2011. One of the points is that that will give the
Afghan Government a greater sense of urgency about their
responsibility to take their own security on as their
obligation more than it is ours. Is that something you would
agree with, General?
General Petraeus. Absolutely, yes.
Chairman Levin. Madam Secretary?
Secretary Flournoy. They want to fully exercise their
sovereignty, including providing security for their own people.
Chairman Levin. We've done well. If there's a quick comment
by either of my colleagues?
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, if I might, just to follow
up in terms of messages we might send to the Taliban. I don't
expect this to happen, but am I correct that General McChrystal
understands that if for some reason between now and July 2011
he feels he actually needs additional American troops, that he
is free to request that?
General Petraeus. Absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. Then the final question. There has been
some discussion about different ways in which as we head toward
July 2011 we can reassure both the Afghans, their enemies, and
the region of our longer-term commitment. I know that the last
time President Karzai was here some of us talked to him and
there's some interest, it seems to me, I'm sure, in the Afghans
in seeking a longer-term security relationship with us,
including potentially becoming designated as a major non-NATO
ally, and that would go beyond July 2011, might obligate us to
some longer-term funding of the ANSF, for instance.
Secretary Flournoy, is that on the table?
Secretary Flournoy. That is on the table. We are working
together with our Afghan partners on a strategic framework for
the relationship mid- to long-term. As we develop that, we will
certainly be consulting with you here. We would also like to
make that framework a public framework, our intention is very
clear for an enduring and substantial relationship to Afghans
and Taliban and others in the region.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Are you supportive of that, General?
General Petraeus. Yes. In fact, that has been discussed and
really is being worked. I don't want to prejudge the policy,
but certainly discussions have been made.
Senator Lieberman. Sure. That's very encouraging. I think
that's a very constructive way to go. If I might just draw the
parallel, as new countries have come into NATO, the
understanding has been that this is an exchange, that you get
the value of NATO or being a major non-NATO ally, for
instance--and one of the things that you do in response is to
improve your own military and indeed to reform your government.
There might be a very constructive quid pro quo here. But I
thank you for that and I look forward to hearing more about it.
Thanks for an excellent morning of testimony, really very
helpful and ultimately realistically encouraging. I think, as
we said earlier, if you accept the goal and accept the
principle that we have a vital national security interest in
succeeding in Afghanistan, as President Obama has decided, then
we just have to figure out how to achieve that goal.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Let me support something that Senator Lieberman was driving
at. I have put huge emphasis on the importance of getting the
ANA trained, equipped, enlarged, and taking the lead in
operations, including in Kandahar. That's been my focus from
the beginning of this effort in Afghanistan. I have felt that
that decision to set a date for beginning of reductions in July
2011 is essential in order to energize the Afghan Government to
do what only they can do, which is to take responsibility for
their own security.
I believe that deeply. I think that's an inherent part of
counterinsurgency that that happen, and the support of the ANA
by the Afghan people is there and it is going to make a huge
difference in terms of success.
I also very much support a long-term relationship with
Afghanistan, both security relationship and economic and
political relationship. I don't view that as being in any way
inconsistent with my belief that the Afghan Government must get
a message of urgency, of taking responsibility security-wise
and politically for their own country.
I again am very comfortable in supporting both of those
positions. In fact, I think they're not only consistent, but
dependent on each other. I think success in Afghanistan is
going to depend on the willingness of the Afghan Government not
only to take responsibility for their own security, but to take
responsibility for decent governance inside of Afghanistan that
will win the respect of the Afghan people.
I wanted to add that because, with all my emphasis on the
ANA taking the lead and taking responsibility, I do believe at
the same time that they should understand that we have a long-
term commitment and those of us that even want to place greater
responsibility on them share that belief in a long-term
commitment, security-wise, economically, politically, between
us and the Afghans.
We thank you both. It's been a long couple of days and it's
been very, very helpful and constructive. We appreciate it.
Thanks so much.
We stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
united states and kyrgyzstan
1. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus,
central Asia is more unstable than it has been in several years with
the recent overthrow of the Bakiyev government and the ethnic tensions
in Kyrgyzstan. These events are disconcerting because we are so
dependent on these countries for transit of key supplies into
Afghanistan. These countries are also critical to our long-term success
strategy in Afghanistan, especially to building north-south economic
ties and fighting the flow of drugs through the country. Within the
last 2 weeks, there has been violent ethnic unrest in southern
Kyrgyzstan's Ferghana Valley near the city of Osh, which is the second
largest city in the country. According to most sources, hundreds of
people have been confirmed dead, a further 1,500 as injured, and tens
of thousands of ethnic Uzbeks have fled to neighboring Uzbekistan.
Although the Transit Center at Manas has not been directly affected by
the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan so far, the worry persists
about how this instability will affect the Northern Distribution
Network (NDN) in general (air, land, and rail routes), which is so
critical to supplying our plus-up of troops. What is the state of our
relationship with the new provisional government in Kyrgyzstan?
Secretary Flournoy. We have, as part of the U.S. Government's
overall engagement with Kyrgyzstan, worked closely with the provisional
government since early April, and our relationship continues to develop
in a productive, cooperative direction. The Department of Defense
(DOD), the Department of State (DOS), the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and international partners have worked with the
provisional government to provide humanitarian assistance in response
to both the unrest in April and the ethnic conflicts in June. We have
also worked to ensure Kyrgyzstan's continued support for the struggle
against violent extremism, and the provisional government has provided
public and private assurances that it will honor the Manas Transit
Center (MTC) Agreement through the current renewal period, which runs
through July 13, 2011 (the MTC Agreement provides that the U.S.
Government could exercise three additional 1-year renewal options), as
well as the bilateral Agreement for Cooperation, which has no
expiration date. We will continue to engage the provisional government
on these and other issues of interest to DOD.
General Petraeus. Our relationship with the provisional government
has been generally positive. Interim President Roza Otunbayeva and
other government officials have expressed openly they will uphold their
international commitments, including the current MTC agreement. We see
no indication that they will not continue to do so. Our military-to-
military relationship with Kyrgyz Security Forces has also been
positive. Kyrgyz units that have received U.S. assistance have
performed admirably under difficult circumstances. Kyrgyz security
ministries have been cooperative in evacuating American citizens from
areas currently affected by the unrest in the southern part of the
country, in coordination with our team at MTC. There has been no
significant disruption to the NDN.
2. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, can
the new government leadership be counted on to honor our agreement with
respect to Manas?
Secretary Flournoy. The provisional government has provided public
and private assurances that it will honor the MTC Agreement through the
current renewal period, which runs through July 13, 2011 (the MTC
Agreement provides that the U.S. Government could exercise three
additional 1-year renewal options), as well as the bilateral Agreement
for Cooperation, which has no expiration date.
General Petraeus. I believe they can and see no indication to the
contrary. Interim President Roza Otunbayeva and other Government
officials have expressed openly their continued commitment to uphold
the current MTC agreement until it expires in July 2011.
3. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, is
it possible that the latest attacks were coordinated and meant to cause
ethnic clashes, as we are now hearing that United Nations (U.N.) aid
workers are speculating?
Secretary Flournoy. We lack the necessary information to understand
fully the origins of the violence. The provisional government has asked
the international community for assistance with investigating the
violence that occurred in June, and the U.S. Government has provided
the provisional government with recommendations for international
involvement in a Commission of Inquiry. DOD will support U.S. efforts
to support a transparent, objective investigation into these events.
General Petraeus. The current situation in Kyrgyzstan is
characterized by a widespread distrust of the government, security
forces, and fellow citizens. In the wake of this violence, bad actors
such as criminals and extremists may attempt to assert themselves. We
should make every effort to encourage and support the Kyrgyz government
as it works toward national reconciliation.
I recommend we continue to support the Kyrgyz government in its
efforts to investigate the causes of the violence and encourage it to
host an external investigation by an international body, such as the
U.N.
4. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, will
DOD be investigating this possibility?
Secretary Flournoy. DOD does not intend to conduct its own
investigation. The provisional government has asked the international
community for assistance with investigating the unrest that occurred in
June, and the U.S. Government has provided the provisional government
with recommendations for international involvement in a Commission of
Inquiry. DOD will support U.S. efforts to support a transparent,
objective investigation into these events.
General Petraeus. The Kyrgyz Provisional Government's decision to
ask for assistance from the international community in investigating
the recent unrest is the best approach. As Secretary Flournoy stated,
while DOD does not intend to conduct its own investigation, it will
assist, as will U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), with any investigations
as appropriate.
5. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus,
reports suggest that the Uzbek Government estimates that perhaps
hundreds of thousands of people have already crossed into the country
and are living in tent camps. Do you feel the Uzbeks will be able to
handle the crisis from their side and, more long-term, will the Uzbeks
be in a position to honor their transit agreements with us?
Secretary Flournoy. Roughly 100,000 primarily ethnic Uzbek refugees
from Kyrgyzstan crossed the border into Uzbekistan as a result of the
violence in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. The Government of Uzbekistan has
been widely commended by the United States and the international
community for its role in providing shelter for the refugees between
June 11-25, 2010. Virtually all of the Kyrgyz refugees crossed back
into Kyrgyzstan in advance of the June 27 vote on the constitutional
referendum. In the long term, we believe that the Government of
Uzbekistan will honor its transit arrangement with the United States.
General Petraeus. We continue to closely monitor the situation
through our friends in DOS as they update their reporting on this
crisis. The Uzbekistan refugee crisis is mostly resolved due to a mass
return of refugees to Kyrgyzstan on 25 June 2010. Based on reports, the
Uzbek Government acted quickly and effectively to care for the refugees
by providing basic shelter, food, and medical care. The U.S. Embassy in
Tashkent reports there are between 250-400 hospitalized refugees
remaining in Uzbek after the crisis that will be sent to Kyrgyz
hospitals when medical conditions permit.
Due to the limited duration and return of refugees to their
homeland, we believe it will not impact the Government of Uzbekistan's
long-term ability to honor the transit agreements.
6. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, in
your estimation, is the NDN currently stable?
Secretary Flournoy. The NDN is currently exceeding our expectations
in facilitating the transit of sustainment cargo for U.S. and coalition
forces in Afghanistan. Since its inception in April 2009, more than
16,000 containers have been shipped across the NDN in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Countries along the NDN fully support
this network and continue to work with the United States to improve its
performance and increase its capacity.
Virtually no disruptions in transits across the NDN occurred due to
the recent instability in Kyrgyzstan, and we continue to work with all
participating countries to ensure uninterrupted, stable operations.
Publicly supporting the United States through the provision of access
is often politically unpopular and could result in increased security
threats to the country, and so consistent, continual effort to maintain
political support with all participating countries is necessary.
General Petraeus. Yes, the NDN is very stable. Over the course of
its 18 month existence, the NDN has developed into a robust network of
routes which transit the Caucuses, Central Asian States, and Russia.
Pilferage and attack-free, the NDN provides additive capability to the
Pakistan-Afghanistan routes and provides flexibility in how we sustain
operations in Afghanistan.
7. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, can
we expect any adverse effects at the Transit Center at Manas (MTC) in
Uzbekistan, or in Tajikistan as a result of the recent violence in Osh?
Secretary Flournoy. Thus far, we have not seen any adverse effects
to U.S. interests at the MTC, in Uzbekistan, or in Tajikistan as a
result of the violence in southern Kyrgyzstan.
General Petraeus. The greatest danger to the region lies in the
potential demographic stress placed on Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors by
displaced persons. Uzbekistan has taken the brunt of this with no
reports of refugees in Tajikistan. However, the DOS and the USAID have
worked quickly to provide aid to Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors. This
will be key to mitigating this humanitarian disaster.
The current situation in Kyrgyzstan is characterized by a
widespread distrust of the government, security forces, and fellow
citizens. In the wake of this violence, bad actors such as criminals
and extremists may attempt to assert themselves into a vacuum. We
should make every effort to encourage and support the Kyrgyz Government
as it works toward national reconciliation. The potential rise in
extremist activity is also a concern for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; as
bordering countries they likely share a concern that extremist activity
could spill into their territory. The risk is real, but we do not see
indicators of spill-over violence at this time.
8. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, what
is CENTCOM doing to safeguard our interests and supply networks there?
Secretary Flournoy. I defer to the Commander of CENTCOM.
General Petraeus. NDN allows goods to reach Afghanistan through
several central asian states. We are not dependent on Kyrgyzstan for
this support, but value it as a contributor in making the NDN a robust
network with multiple redundancies. Similarly, the MTC serves as a
basing location for refueler aircraft and a passenger transit location
for deploying and redeploying troops. Although we have demonstrated the
ability to relocate our aircraft and passenger transit operation, most
recently due to the disruption caused by volcanic activity in Iceland,
the MTC is very valuable to us and we want to ensure it remains a
location from which we can operate.
Safeguarding our interests and supply networks at key transit
centers remains a top priority. In this effort, we continue to work
with the current provisional Government of Kyrgyzstan and have received
assurances of their support until parliamentary elections are held in
October and the newly-elected government is in place. The military
units in Kyrgyzstan will continue to play an important role interacting
with communities in Kyrgyzstan and providing support and aid when
appropriately authorized.
9. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, if
we lose access to any of the central asian states currently
participating in the NDN, is CENTCOM prepared with alternative routes
capable of picking up that loss?
Secretary Flournoy. The NDN was conceived as part of a flexible,
multi-modal logistics network, with multiple redundancies to offset, at
least in part, a loss of access anywhere in the network. DOD, in
cooperation with DOS, works closely with partner nations participating
in the NDN and in Pakistan to continue to enhance and expand the
capacity of the logistics network so that support for OEF will not be
put at risk by disruptions on any single route.
General Petraeus. Yes, CENTCOM is prepared. The NDN was established
over 18 months ago to provide flexibility to the Pakistan Ground Line
of Communication. Additionally, the NDN consists of a network of routes
which enter the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) from the north,
originating in northern Europe, as well as the south, originating in
either Turkey or Georgia. The routes are purely commercial, with the
carriers utilizing the same established ports of entry for U.S.
Government cargo as they utilize for commercial customers. Due to the
commercial nature of the NDN and the types of cargo, we believe the
routes are less vulnerable. Within the CENTCOM AOR, the NDN routes
transit Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, making it important to maintain
strong host nation support from these two countries.
10. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, do
you see the potential for terrorist groups, such as the Independent
Movement for Uzbekistan, or Islamic extremists that have grown up in
and around the Ferghana Valley to exploit the chaos?
Secretary Flournoy. Ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan has abated, and
the provisional government has reestablished control in Kyrgyzstan. The
constitutional referendum held in June was successful, with a
government-reported 90 percent of voters agreeing to a new
parliamentary form of government in Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzstan is currently stable. Should unrest recur, exploitation
of instability by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or other extremist
groups is one of several scenarios that could result from renewed
violence in the region.
General Petraeus. [Deleted.]
11. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, in
your assessment, is it a fair conclusion to say that many or most
contracts, especially related to fuel, in Central Asia have some kind
of connection to corruption, in some cases the ruling families of the
country, such as the Bakiyevs?
Secretary Flournoy. All DOD contracts in Central Asia are subject
to the same legal and regulatory standards as contracts into which DOD
enters worldwide. DOD takes allegations of corruption seriously and
conducts regular reviews of its contracts to ensure that they are
properly solicited and executed. If DOD finds or receives credible
evidence of corruption, it conducts a full investigation and will, if
appropriate, terminate a contract or take appropriate legal action.
General Petraeus. CENTCOM contracting organizations, such as the
Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, do not contract for bulk
petroleum. In most cases, this is a function of the Defense Logistics
Agency's Defense Energy Support Center. It would be inappropriate for
CENTCOM to comment on contracts outside our purview.
afghanistan national police
12. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, I am interested in the way
that DOS and DOD have been managing the police training mission and
have yet to see a full, one-stop-shop accounting of what CENTCOM is
spending on the police training mission per annum (in Afghanistan and
Iraq). Looking further at the police training missions that you have
been managing in Afghanistan and in Iraq, would you please provide a
breakdown of:
The costs associated with the police training mission
in each country for each of the last 3 years;
The quantity of personnel involved in police training
(DOD civilians, contractors, and military); and
The total support costs to carry out police training
(including security, housing, logistics/life support, et
cetera).
General Petraeus. Under the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, the
Military Services, which support CENTCOM in the Afghanistan and Iraq
theaters, budget and account for their costs and manpower, rather than
the combatant command.
The Army is the resource sponsor for both Afghanistan and Iraq. The
Army's OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom costs are captured in the
Department's monthly Cost of War Report. This report and DOD's official
accounting reports include the direct Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
and Iraq Security Forces Fund amounts that are executed for the DOD
police training mission, as shown in the table below.
[In Millions of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
---------------------------------------------------
2010 (as of 6/ Total
2008 2009 16/10)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraq Security Forces Fund................... 312 527 103 942
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund............ 408 392 413 1,213
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The approximate number of DOD personnel that support the police
training missions (DOD civilians, contractors, and military) in Iraq
and Afghanistan are listed below as reported by U.S. Forces-Iraq and
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Personnel -----------------------------
2008 2009 2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraq:
DOD (Military and Civilian)............. 5,500 5,500 7,000
Contractor.............................. 800 800 400
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghanistan:
DOD (Military and Civilian)............. 0 0 237
Contractor.............................. 721 1,205 1,404
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
u.s. troop drawdown
13. Senator Burris. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, what
concerns do you have with the directed drawdown date of July 2011?
Secretary Flournoy. We have confidence that the progress we are
making jointly with our Afghan partners and other allies will allow us
to initiate transition to Afghan security lead beginning within the
next year. My overall concern is that any drawdown in July 2011 is
consistent with the President's vision of a responsible, conditions-
based reduction.
General Petraeus. In order to ensure that Afghanistan can build the
capacity to take full responsibility for its own security, the pace of
the drawdown of our forces in Afghanistan should, as the President has
stated, be the beginning of a process for transition to the Afghan
Government, and the beginning of a responsible drawdown of U.S forces
based on conditions on the ground in July 2011.
14. Senator Burris. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, are
you concerned that the insurgency is just bidding their time until our
withdrawal?
Secretary Flournoy. We do not assess that the Taliban are ``biding
their time,'' although we do assess that the Taliban may not understand
the U.S. enduring commitment to Afghanistan as a strategic partnership
in the region. The Taliban continue to conduct operations in support of
their strategic goals: the removal of foreign forces from Afghanistan
and the return of Mullah Omar as the leader of Afghanistan. The
increase in our forces and operations in Afghanistan has put pressure
on the Taliban and their pursuit of those goals. This is a resilient
insurgency and a tough fight, but we are making progress on the ground.
General Petraeus. We do not assess the Taliban are ``biding their
time.'' We assess the Taliban consider the announced July 2011 U.S.
withdrawal to be an indication of waning U.S. and international support
for the conflict. However, we assess the Taliban do not intend on
ceding any ground to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) between now and July 2011
pending the announced withdrawal. The Taliban continue to conduct
operations in support of their strategic goals; the removal of foreign
forces from Afghanistan and reinstatement of Mullah Omar as the leader
of Afghanistan. They have increased violence in response to increased
ISAF and ANSF operations, and continue efforts to expand their
influence in key areas of Afghanistan. I feel they will continue
attempting to do so regardless of our withdrawal timeframe or policy.
15. Senator Burris. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, based
on progress in Marja and concerns with Kandahar, is a July 2011
drawdown still realistic?
Secretary Flournoy. A July 2011 conditions-based drawdown is still
realistic. I want to ensure that the meaning of July 2011 is well
understood. As President Obama has previously indicated, July 2011 will
mark the beginning of a transition of our forces out of Afghanistan and
a period in which the Afghan Government will take on more
responsibility. He did not say that after July 2011 there would be no
forces from the United States or allied countries in Afghanistan. He
did not say that we will switch off the lights and close the door
behind us. The pace at which the transition occurs will depend on
conditions on the ground.
General Petraeus. Yes, the July 2011 drawdown is realistic.
However, it is important that July 2011 be seen for what it is; the
date when a process begins. It is a process in which the reduction of
U.S. forces must be based on the conditions at the time, not a date
when the U.S. heads for the exits.
contractors in afghanistan
16. Senator Burris. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, what
steps are being taken to reduce our overreliance on contractors in the
Afghanistan theater?
Secretary Flournoy. We could not support the operations in
Afghanistan without the use of contractors. We do not have the military
force structure to meet the requirements of base operating support and
other services. Contractors are a vital operational enabler, which
allow our military forces to focus on other functions. The use of
contractors provides us an instant, scalable capacity that can expand
and contract with greater agility. Although the costs for contracted
services to DOD are substantial, developing and maintaining a military
structure to perform these same functions would be much more costly.
We are conscious of the number of contractors in Afghanistan and
continue to take measures to minimize the number necessary to
accomplish the mission. One such measure is increasing the use of firm
fixed-price contracts, giving contractors the incentive to accomplish a
task with the least amount of personnel. Also, we are transitioning
from a quarterly contractor census to a monthly census, utilizing data
from the Synchronized Predeployment Operational Tracker (SPOT). This
will provide us greater visibility into contractors and their
activities. Lastly, we conduct routine Joint Logistics Procurement
Support Boards (JLPSB) to synchronize contracting requirements to
maximize efficiency and ensure that existing contracts are being
executed most effectively.
Contracted support plays an important part in our strategy.
Employing local nationals promotes economic vitality and supports the
strategy of ``Winning the Afghan People.'' Currently, 70 percent of the
funds executed within Afghanistan go to companies that consist of local
nationals.
General Petraeus. We could not support the operations in
Afghanistan without the use of contractors. We do not have the military
force structure to meet the requirements of base operating support and
other services. Contractors, especially private security contractors
PSC), are a vital operational enabler, which allow our military forces
to focus on other functions. The use of contractors provides us an
instant, scalable capacity which can expand and contract with greater
agility. Although DOD is paying a substantial price for contracted
services, developing and maintaining a military structure to perform
these same functions would be expensive as well.
Contracted support plays an important part in our strategy.
Employing local Afghan nationals promotes economic vitality and
supports `Winning the Afghan People.' Currently, 70 percent of the
funds executed within Afghanistan go to companies that consist of local
nationals.
We are conscious of the number of contractors in Afghanistan and
continue to take measures to minimize the number necessary to
accomplish the mission. One such measure is increasing the use of firm
fixed-price contracts, giving contractors the incentive to accomplish
the task with the least amount of personnel. We are also transitioning
from a quarterly contractor census to a monthly census utilizing data
from the SPOT which will provide greater visibility of contractors.
Lastly, we conduct routine JLPSBs to synchronize contracting
requirements to ensure that existing contracts are leveraged and
produce efficiencies whenever possible.
17. Senator Burris. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, how is
contractor oversight being improved?
Secretary Flournoy. DOD is working diligently to improve contractor
oversight. The emphasis has been on strengthening the skills of
military and DOD civilian personnel who observe operations and review
contractors' performance. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)
is one of many partner organizations working to provide and improve
contractor oversight in Afghanistan. DCMA provides oversight, as
delegated by the Rock Island Contracting Center, of the Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program IV, Air Force Civil Augmentation Program, and
Theater Wide Contract Administration. DCMA also provides contractor
administration for various other types of contracts, as delegated
through the Theater Business Clearance process.
DCMA has resident personnel (military and civilian) in three
Afghanistan locations for better access to contract activities and
alignment with customers. Additional DCMA personnel are assigned as the
oversight workload grows in Afghanistan.
Improvement has been made to the requirements determination process
and use of Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) and Subject
Matter Experts (SMEs) within the theater through the use of risk
analysis and mitigation. The CORs are critical to adequate surveillance
of contract execution. Their work enables DCMA to perform more in-depth
contract administration and analyze issues from information obtained by
the CORs performing quality assurance oversight functions. Deploying
units are identifying and training CORs prior to deployment. DCMA
provides orientation and training on how to perform the oversight
functions.
Contract oversight improvement actions include:
Increased emphasis on the use of CORs and SMEs.
Unit assignment and training CORs prior to deployment.
Extensive use of risk analysis to ensure best use of
available DCMA and COR resources.
Management Internal Control Reviews are conducted at
DCMA Contract Management Office locations to highlight and
reinforce best practices, while also identifying areas where
oversight efforts can be strengthened.
General Petraeus. We have implemented several changes over the last
few years to improve contractor oversight in the CENTCOM Area of
Operations (AOR). To expand centralized management and oversight of
contracting, the most prominent change is the transition of the Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan to a Joint Theater Support
Contracting Command (JTSCC). The JTSCC is a subordinate functional
command aligned under the command/control of CENTCOM to facilitate a
balanced focus across the AOR. Initially, we have expanded the JTSCC's
responsibility to Kuwait and Pakistan. In the future, we may expand it
further to include other key areas such as the central and south asian
states. The JTSCC is responsible for providing oversight on contracts
written in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kuwait and is also
responsible for coordinating with other DOD organizations that write
contracts executed in the CENTCOM AOR.
Task Force 2010 was recently established under two-star leadership
to track contract funding and identify any malign actors and power
brokers in Afghanistan. This is critical to ensure the billions of
dollars spent to support the counterinsurgency campaign do not have
unintended consequences. Task Force 2010 will increase the transparency
of money flow, ensuring it gets in the right hands and supports our
strategy in Afghanistan.
Task Force Spotlight was implemented under one-star leadership to
enforce PSCs' adherence to established guidance. PSCs must report
detailed census data on all employees in the synchronized pre-
deployment and operational tracker system and the biometric
registration system, comply with requirements for individual arming,
and record serious incidents. Accurate and detailed information of this
nature is paramount for effective oversight.
Contractor Operations Cells and the Armed Contractor Oversight
Division were established to provide visibility of armed contractors'
movements throughout the battle space in order to synchronize efforts
and avoid fratricide.
CORs numbers have increased in Afghanistan to over 90 percent fill
rate. CORs provide the direct interface with contractors and oversee
the services they are providing.
18. Senator Burris. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, could
Reserve and Guard personnel better perform the services assigned to
contractors, specifically with regard to PSCs?
Secretary Flournoy. Reservists and National Guard personnel are
already contributing essential skill sets to the operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Although our Guard and Reserve Forces are exceptionally
well-trained and capable, a contract work force allows us to increase
and decrease capacity in non-warfighting areas very quickly. It takes
years to build military personnel capacity with the requisite
experience level. Contractors bring to the table the required
experience at the required time without the commitment to growing the
end strength of the force.
General Petraeus. While our military forces are exceptionally well-
trained and capable, a contract work force allows us to increase and
decrease capacity very quickly. It takes years to build military
personnel capacity with the requisite experience level. Contractors
bring to the table the required experience at the required time without
the commitment to growing end strength.
afghanistan national security forces
19. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, are you satisfied with the
progress of the ANSF?
General Petraeus. I am satisfied we are taking action to solve the
problem, but I recognize there is much work to be done until there are
sufficient ANSF and that we have many challenges to overcome.
Six months ago we were faced with the following challenges: (1)
recruiting was insufficient to cover attrition and we had at least one
month of negative growth in the ANSF; (2) the number of NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) institutional trainers could not handle the
number of recruits required to meet growth objectives; (3) NTM-A
manning was about 25 percent of requirements; (4) Afghan National
Police (ANP) training focused on reform of the existing police, not
initial training of new police; (5) fewer than 13,000 soldiers and
police were enrolled in voluntary literacy training; and (6) NTM-A
instructor ratios averaged 1:79 with high of 1:466.
Today, there are areas of improvement. NTM-A institutional trainers
and Afghan trainers have doubled from 6 months ago. NTM-A manning has
increased to 58 percent from 25 percent. Our instructor ratio has
increased to 1:29 from 1:79. Although the number of NTM-A institutional
instructors have increased, we still require more NTM-A trainers to
assist in the generation of ANSF that we hope to see grow to 305,000 by
November 2011.
20. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, what are your expectations of
where the ANSF will be over the next year?
General Petraeus. By this time next year, I expect the growth of
the ANSF to remain steady, reaching 305,000 (171,000 Afghan National
Army (ANA) and 134,000 ANP). I also expect that, with the deployment of
our additional maneuver forces as part of the President's force
expansion, more of our forces will partner with the ANSF to conduct
combined operations. Increasingly, the ANSF will take the lead in
combined operations. ANSF lead will be driven by capabilities
development, not by time.
mineral resources in afghanistan
21. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, with the recent announcement
of Afghanistan's potential mineral wealth, what are your concerns about
the impact this could have on violence and security?
General Petraeus. The announcement of the potential mineral wealth
in Afghanistan is sure to generate a sense of hope and prosperity for
the Afghan people. It is also sure to catch the attention of nefarious
groups, including insurgents, who already engage in gem smuggling and
extort ``taxes'' from legal mining companies in return for security. As
legitimate mining increases, so does the potential for increased
criminal and/or insurgent related activity.
To realize the full revenue potential of the country's resources,
the Afghan Government needs to install additional regulatory and
enforcement measures. While this will further strain already overtaxed
governance elements and security forces, the Afghan Government should
encourage continued exploration and discovery of these resources. It
can only do this through a deliberate, controlled process under the
umbrella of an effective government and stable security environment.
22. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, do you foresee a role that
American troops would play with regard to the mineral issue?
General Petraeus. I responded to some questions in an interview on
Saturday that were quoted in the New York Times on Sunday, 13 June, in
a story by James Risen on this subject. I think he covered the issue
and challenges very well. While such wealth is potentially game
changing, it is not an easy feat to explore and mine for these things,
particularly in Afghanistan. One must also be mindful of the paradox
what natural resource wealth can pose to poor countries with weak
governments. And, those interested in extracting the mineral wealth are
not always magnanimous in their methods.
Additionally, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business
Transformation, Paul Brinkley, has taken an interest in this matter,
and in generating economic life in Afghanistan. He did some great work
in Iraq with his Task Force for Business and Stability Operations. This
task force will work along with the USAID, DOS, and the U.S. Geological
Service to build capacity within the Ministry of Minerals and Mines to
enable the Afghan Government to better manage their resource wealth. I
refer you to those organizations for more about this effort.
Nevertheless, as we did in Iraq, we will support his team's efforts as
directed by the Secretary of Defense in developing business and
economic interests in Afghanistan.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
afghanistan interpreters
23. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, we are often at the mercy of
interpreters to provide an accurate description of the conversations
between U.S. forces and local Afghans. However, I am concerned we are
distorting the economy in Afghanistan by paying interpreters so much
money. It is my understanding a low level Category 1 interpreter can
earn between $50,000 and $60,000. Those trusted with classified
information can earn over $200,000. At the same time, I have heard pay
to Afghan officials is just over $500 per month. These individuals
working as translators are likely very intelligent and capable Afghans
who probably possess other skill sets important to the rebuilding of
Afghanistan. Please describe in detail the pay and category level for
local Afghan interpreters.
General Petraeus. CENTCOM interpreter contracts in Afghanistan are
issued by the Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan and awarded
through the Regional Contracting Center (RCC) Kabul, RCC Kandahar, and
RCC Bagram. They employ only local national Afghan interpreters and the
average pay is approximately $600 per month. This information is
CENTCOM specific and does not apply to other agencies or commands that
issue interpreter contracts in Afghanistan.
afghanistan contractor pay rates
24. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, if there are disparities in
the pay between Afghan officials and the Afghans we are contracting,
what are we doing to alleviate this disparity and to encourage the most
capable Afghans to work toward the betterment of their country? If you
have started programs in this area, what are the results thus far?
General Petraeus. I am aware that some disparities in pay exist,
particularly with PSCs, which may be affecting recruitment and
retention within the ANSF and the ANP. ISAF and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are working together to develop
courses of action to reduce the reliance on PSCs. I understand and
support the GIRoA's intent to eventually end the use of PSCs and
transfer that function to the ANP; however the ANP and ANSF are not yet
able to assume this role. ISAF and GIRoA are developing a phased
program to work toward that goal, and will continue efforts that
support the build-up of the ANP and ANSF.
Task Force Spotlight and Task Force 2010 will recommend ways to
mitigate consequences of pay disparity. These task forces facilitate
the capability for greater oversight, regulation, operational
transparency, and visibility of the flow of contracting funds and goods
below the prime contractor level. Their efforts will eventually
minimize malign actor influence, improve PSC accountability, and ensure
an improved distribution of funds to the Afghan people.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator George S. LeMieux
iran
25. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, I am concerned that as Iran
continues to export Islamic extremism and terror throughout the world
they will develop relations that undermine our operations in
Afghanistan. What is your current assessment of Iranian influence or
attempted influence in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. Iran hopes to increase its influence in the
Afghan Government (and with the Afghan populace) and decrease U.S.
presence and influence. Iran supports multiple Afghan political
entities and government officials to create and pass legislation that
will limit or remove U.S./coalition forces presence. Iran continues an
effective ``hearts and minds'' campaign through economic and
educational endeavors that highlight Iran's aid and positively
influence the local populace. Iran also aims to maximize intra-ISAF
fissures via measured support to the Taliban to hasten foreign combat
forces withdrawal. Iran's focus is not to destabilize the Karzai
Government and create a Taliban-led Afghanistan, but rather use the
Taliban as an integral part of a comprehensive plan to expedite the
removal of U.S./Coalition Forces from Afghanistan.
26. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, Iran's nuclear program and
developing ties with other rogue nations like Venezuela is an extremely
destabilizing force. This week the Saudi Government granted permission
for the Israelis to use their airspace in the event they would choose
to conduct an air strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Could you
please comment on the internal situation of the regime and the regional
implications if Israel were forced to respond militarily to Iranian
nuclear program?
General Petraeus. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
cooperation between government agencies
27. Senator Vitter. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, in
Iraq and now in Afghanistan we've seen unprecedented integration of
DOD, DOS, and USAID action. This integration is unquestionably crucial
to success in each theater. Even more crucial is the DOS and USAID
ability to assume agency primacy in these theaters as military and
security roles subside. What do you need to further streamline this
integration and ensure a successful transition between DOD and DOS and
how can Congress assist in this effort?
Secretary Flournoy. Ensuring that the necessary security exists for
development and civilian-led efforts to succeed is a key focus of our
efforts. DOD has an excellent working relationship with DOS.
There is a need for increased spending on the civilian instruments
of national security: diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign
assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.
Civilian efforts are necessary to facilitate successful military
operations to relieve stress on the men and women of the U.S. Armed
Forces and to achieve our strategic objectives in places like
Afghanistan. The availability of more robust civilian capabilities
could also make it less likely that military forces would have to be
used in the first place, as local problems might be dealt with before
crises arise.
Over the past several years, Congress has provided additional
resources for DOS and DOD, but the resources for civilian support have
proven inadequate. It is critically important that the civilian
agencies receive additional resources needed for effective whole-of-
government efforts to address the problems we face.
Regarding Iraq, U.S. departments and agencies are working together
at the senior and working levels--in Iraq and Washington, DC--to ensure
that DOS is appropriately resourced when U.S. forces complete their
drawdown from Iraq. As one would expect with a transition of this scope
and complexity, there are significant challenges. Congress could assist
in this effort by continuing to provide the resources and authorities
necessary to ensure a successful transition in Iraq from military to
civilian lead.
General Petraeus. Congress can assist in this effort to ensure a
successful transition between DOD and DOS by providing a consistent
level of and flexible access to resources to support operations in the
joint operational areas. This is especially critical during the period
of primacy shift from DOD to DOS and USAID in Iraq.
department of state requirements in iraq
28. Senator Vitter. Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, a
recent Associated Press news article has reported that ``The State
Department is quietly forming a small army to protect diplomatic
personnel in Iraq after U.S. military forces leave the country at the
end of 2011.'' It goes on to say that ``Patrick Kennedy, DOD's Under
Secretary for Management, has asked that 50 bomb-resistant vehicles, 24
Black Hawk helicopters, heavy cargo trucks, fuel trailers, and high-
tech surveillance systems be transferred from military stocks to the
State Department.''
Under the assumption that this same capability gap will exist when
a military drawdown in Afghanistan does occur, what are your comments/
views on the transfer of military capability to DOS and does this
development fit with the concept of a responsible drawdown?
Secretary Flournoy. DOD received a letter from Under Secretary of
State for Management Patrick Kennedy requesting military equipment,
continuation of life support services and logistics contracts, and
transportation and logistics support. DOS's request has received high-
level attention in DOD, and DOD is working to provide a response to
DOS. DOD believes our coordination and close working relationship with
DOS in Washington, DC, and Baghdad underscore the U.S. commitment to a
responsible drawdown in Iraq. Efforts continue to ensure that DOS and
DOD are likewise partnered to provide the necessary resources and
security for civilian-led efforts in Afghanistan.
General Petraeus. A list of potential recipients of military
equipment was created during the initial stages of planning for the
responsible drawdown in Iraq to enable a prioritized redistribution of
equipment deemed to be surplus. DOS is on the list as a potential
recipient, but only after other DOD requirements within the AOR are
fulfilled; and that single service readiness requirements are not
jeopardized. DOS has identified that hardened vehicle and helicopter
assets will be required for personnel continuing the U.S. mission in
Iraq post 2011. Although military equipment is not the only way to
achieve this level of self-protection, it is a cost-effective solution
that meets both DOS needs, as well as reducing the cost to DOD to
extract its forces from Iraq. It is conceivable that the same situation
will be faced in Afghanistan when combat forces are redeployed, yet
appropriate self-protection measures are still required to counter
threats to U.S. personnel.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee adjourned.]