    [Senate Hearing 111-821]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 111-821

         THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                    INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                JANUARY 21, 2010

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                                   __________

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
    KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
    EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                   Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                   __________

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

         The Findings and Recommendations of the Department of Defense
                    Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood

                                January 21, 2010

                                                                       Page

    West, Hon. Togo D., Jr., Co-Chair, Department of Defense
      Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood.......................     5
    Clark, ADM Vernon E., USN [Ret.], Co-Chair, Department of Defense
      Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood.......................     8
    [Annex: The Report of the DOD Independent Review ``Protecting the
      Force: Lessons from Fort Hood'' follows:]......................    46

                                     (iii)

         THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
                    INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD

                                  ----------

                           THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to the notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Hagan, Burris, Kirk, McCain, Inhofe,
    Chambliss, Thune, LeMieux, Burr, and Collins.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Gabriella Eisen, counsel;
    Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling,
    counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
    counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Diana G. Tabler,
    professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority
    counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Paul J. Hubbard,
    and Jennifer R. Knowles.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator
    Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick
    Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to
    Senator Ben Nelson; Juliet M. Beyler and Gordon I. Peterson,
    assistants to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to
    Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan;
    Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Begich; Nathan Davern,
    assistant to Senator Burris; Ron Carlton, assistant to Senator
    Kirk; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood
    Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde
    A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake,
    assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to
    Senator Thune; and Molly Wilkinson, assistant to Senator
    Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets this morning to consider the findings and recommendations
    of the independent panel appointed by the Secretary of Defense
    following the tragedy at Fort Hood. The primary objective of
    the panel was to ``determine whether there are programs,
    policies, or procedural weaknesses within the Department of
    Defense (DOD) that create vulnerabilities to the health and
    safety of defense employees and their families.''
        Today's open hearing is on the panel's unrestricted report.
    A restricted annex to their report titled ``Oversight of the
    Alleged Perpetrator,'' focuses on information which in the
    judgment of DOD could prejudice a criminal prosecution if it
    were discussed in public. We'll have a closed session after
    this open hearing has concluded.
        Our witnesses this morning are Togo West, former Secretary
    of the Army, and Admiral Vernon Clark, U.S. Navy-Retired,
    former Chief of Naval Operations, who together co-chaired this
    independent review. We have reviewed their unrestricted report.
    Members have had an opportunity to review the restricted annex.
    We welcome you both. We thank you for returning to government
    service for this very important task. It's a continuation of
    your great patriotism and loyalty.
        On the afternoon of November 5, 2009, an Army field-grade
    officer, Major Nidal Hassan, opened fire on fellow soldiers in
    the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, TX, killing 12
    soldiers, 1 civilian, and wounding or injuring 43 others. There
    is information in the public domain indicating that this tragic
    and violent incident was preceded by a number of indicators
    that would seemingly raise questions about Major Hassan's
    fitness to serve as an officer and Army psychiatrist. Some of
    those indicators were email contact with a radical Muslim
    cleric in Yemen, concerns about his expressed belief that
    sharia religious law took precedence over the U.S.
    Constitution, presentations that he made that for some of the
    witnesses indicated sympathy for violence, and concerns
    expressed by superiors and peers about his duty performance and
    his ratings.
        So there's a connect-the-dots issue here. There are a
    number of other investigations that will examine the failure to
    connect those dots. That is not part of today's open hearing.
    DOD's inquiry is one of several inquiries that are or will be
    examining the incident. The President has directed a review of
    intelligence matters related to the shooting, the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is conducting a review of its
    procedures, and a military justice investigation is ongoing.
        The review that we will consider today was a first
    assessment of the Department's policies and procedures to
    identify gaps that warrant further investigation and action.
    Clearly there is much more that needs to be done. The Secretary
    of Defense has committed to tasking each Service and pertinent
    DOD agencies to conduct an in-depth follow-on review based on
    the findings of this report.
        The Secretary of Defense gave this independent panel less
    than 60 days to conduct a quick-look review ``to identify and
    address possible gaps and/or deficiencies in DOD's programs,
    processes, and procedures related to identifying DOD employees
    who could potentially pose credible threats to themselves or
    others, the sufficiency of DOD's force protection programs, the
    sufficiency of DOD's emergency response to mass casualty
    situations at DOD's facilities, and the response to care for
    victims and families in the aftermath of a mass casualty
    situation, and, finally, the execution and adequacy of Army
    programs, policies, and procedures as applied to the alleged
    perpetrator.''
        The panel completed its work and delivered its report to
    the Secretary of Defense on time, and that is remarkable, given
    the short period of time over the holidays that the panel was
    given for this task. This could only be done under the strong
    leadership of our witnesses, who co-chaired the independent
    panel.
        A copy of the report of the DOD Independent Review titled:
    ``Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood,'' will be
    included in the record of this hearing.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [See Annex.]

        Chairman Levin. The independent panel made a total of 42
    findings with associated recommendations in the basic report,
    with an additional 12 findings in the restricted annex. The
    panel gives Fort Hood high marks for a quick and effective
    response to this incident, while recognizing that DOD can and
    should do more to prepare for multiple simultaneous incidents
    in the future.
        The panel found that some programs, policies, processes,
    and procedures were adequate, but were not complied with, and
    other policies are in need of revision to give commanders the
    tools that they need to counter internal threats as well as new
    threats that may manifest themselves in the future.
        The report produced by this independent panel gives DOD a
    blueprint for additional reviews and resulting policy changes.
    For instance, the Department will need to evaluate and update
    policies and procedures for identification of indicators of
    violence, clarify policy regarding religious accommodation,
    review and improve military personnel records, and refocus
    defense force protection programs on internal threats.
        This committee has a continuing interest in the findings,
    recommendations, and changes made based on these reviews. It
    will continue its oversight of DOD actions, and I assume this
    will be the first of a number of hearings into this incident,
    how it could have been avoided and how we can deter similar
    tragedies in the future.
        Before I close, I want to commend the soldiers, the first
    responders, the law enforcement personnel, and the health care
    providers for their prompt, professional, courageous acts that
    prevented an even greater loss of life as a result of this
    horrendous act.
        I would also like to insert for the record Senator Burris'
    statement.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Burris follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by Senator Roland W. Burris
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome Secretary West and Admiral
    Clark. I am again pleased with both of your taking on this most
    important effort to look at the lessons learned as a result of the
    tragedy at Fort Hood. The Nation, and more importantly, the families,
    are looking to all of us to make sense of this situation and provide
    them with answers and solutions to ensure that this type of incident
    does not occur in the future. The members of our military have
    performed, and will continue to perform, their duties with honor and
    integrity, and it is incumbent upon us to provide them the guidance and
    oversight that they deserve.
        I thank you for your testimony and your service to the Nation.

        Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you
    in welcoming Secretary West and Admiral Clark, and I thank them
    for their continued service to their country, and I thank them
    and their staff for their work in conducting this independent
    examination of the tragic events last year at Fort Hood.
        I agree with the statement in your report that ``the events
    of November 5, 2009, are first and foremost a tragedy for all
    involved; families, colleagues, and the Nation.'' My thoughts
    and prayers continue for the families and friends of the
    victims of this terrible tragedy.
        I appreciate that DOD initiated this review to scrutinize
    itself with regards to organizational shortcomings that led to
    the horrific killings of 12 servicemembers, 1 Army civilian,
    and the wounding of 43 others. However, most of your report is
    devoted to personnel policies and emergency shooting response
    procedures. The report concentrates on actions and effects,
    rather than the motivations. But it was motives that led to the
    Fort Hood killings that should have been examined, whatever the
    political correctness implications. The panel's effort to
    assist DOD and the American people to understand the threat to
    national security and to our military personnel was undermined
    as a result.
        We have a profound responsibility to try to prevent harm to
    all Americans, especially those who volunteer for service in
    the Armed Forces and have, as a result, become high-value
    targets for our enemies. I find insufficient information in
    this report to advance the identification and elimination of
    this threat.
        The omission in your report of adequately recognizing and
    addressing the specific threats posed by violent extremism to
    our military servicemembers is troubling. We owe it to our
    servicemembers and their families to be very candid in
    addressing the threat of violence driven by violent Islamic
    extremism.
        I believe General Jack Keane, the former Vice Chief of
    Staff of the Army, made the point clearly in his testimony on
    November 19, 2009, when he said that: ``We need to provide a
    service to all Muslims serving in the Armed Forces by clearly
    describing the threat, explaining the indicators of potential
    problems, and obliging all military personnel to report
    individuals who display these beliefs and actions.''
        I believe the information you have compiled in the
    restricted annex to this report regarding failures in the
    performance of officers who supervised Major Hassan during his
    medical education will help to ensure accountability and
    corrective measures. Much of this information, not
    surprisingly, has been leaked to the media and it portrays a
    system badly in need of reevaluation and reform.
        I expect the Secretary of the Army to move quickly to
    ensure accountability for the shortcomings you identified and
    to demand more from our officers and organizations. They should
    have the courage and integrity to identify substandard officers
    who represent potential threats to those around them. I hope
    you can comment today on what we can expect in this regard.
        I also believe that your findings and recommendations will
    have value in prodding DOD and the Services to take on the
    challenge of identifying the legal and regulatory barriers to
    information-sharing called for in the report. There is an array
    of concerns that must be addressed in this regard. Concerns
    about individual privacy, threat of litigation, equal
    opportunity violations, First Amendment rights, medical
    privacy, including stigma from seeking treatment, and abuse of
    authority are just a few. They represent a Gordian Knot that
    has to be cut.
        What happened at Fort Hood was something more than an
    isolated incident, more than a random act of violence by an
    alleged perpetrator. It was a terrorist act, struck against us
    as part of the broader war in which we are now engaged. Without
    focusing on the threat posed today by violent Islamic extremism
    to our military and their families, we can't address those
    vulnerabilities and correct them.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Now let me call on you, Secretary West.

     STATEMENT OF HON. TOGO D. WEST, JR., CO-CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF
            DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD

        Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and
    distinguished members of the committee, for the opportunity to
    testify before you on this important matter. I wonder if I
    might do one or two quick housekeeping things. You have from us
    our written opening statement. It is a joint statement by both
    Admiral Clark and by me, and we would ask you to include that
    in the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be.
        Mr. West. With that, we will give a few comments, a bit of
    a roadmap to what's in our report, although we're aware that
    you have had a chance to look through it. I will do the first
    group and then, if you will permit, Admiral Clark will take up
    from there.
        Chairman Levin. That would be fine. Thank you.
        Mr. West. As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, and you also,
    Senator McCain, that day--November 5, 2009--was a day of
    tragedy, and we will all remember it as such. Out of that
    tragedy, there are some instructive lessons for us, and those
    are what we address in our report.
        As you pointed out, Secretary Gates was specific in what he
    asked us to do, contained both in a memorandum to us in his
    terms of reference and in his statement at his press
    conference. That is important to us because it bounds our
    undertaking, as did the time within which we were asked to
    complete our work, and also as did the fact that he had already
    indicated his intention to have a lengthier, more in-depth
    follow-on review of both our report and the issues that we
    raise by the Services. He has already begun the process of
    referring the report out for their follow-on activities.
        As you pointed out, we were asked to look at personnel
    policies, specifically those that pertain to our ability to
    make identifications of those who are a risk, a danger to their
    fellows in the Service, to look at how those policies,
    practices, and procedures allow us to deal with, after we have
    identified those threats, and look at the ways in which there
    are gaps or deficiencies--his language--that we need to improve
    upon going forward.
        He also asked us to look at force protection measures with
    the same idea, not just in the Army, but across the board in
    DOD, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
    procedures and regulations at the level of every Service.
        Third, to look at our preparations and our policies
    concerning preparations for mass casualty events and for
    responding to them.
        Finally in that group of four, to look at how we provide
    for the support of those who provide needed medical care to
    those who serve.
        The fifth assignment that he gave us was a very
    specifically stated one and it's in one of the annexes to our
    report, and that is this: to examine the Army's application of
    its procedures and policies to the alleged perpetrator. I make
    that distinction because he did not ask us to go and explain
    what happened, although it certainly, I think, would appear to
    all of us, you and we as well, that without an understanding of
    what happened we certainly couldn't understand how the Army
    applied its policy. But our purpose, our direction, was to
    understand the Army's application of its policies and
    procedures to the perpetrator. That is what is contained in our
    annex 5.
        I should say to you as part of an understanding of how we
    organized and prepared for this that that was, in our view,
    going to be simply chapter 5 of a report that we would submit
    to you today for review. After review, departmental lawyers
    concluded, and I think they concluded properly, that there was
    a great risk of interfering with the military justice, the
    criminal proceeding, and that is why it is submitted to you as
    a restricted annex.
        With that in mind, we were told not to interfere with the
    intelligence investigation that had proceeded, nor with the
    military justice, nor with the ongoing parallel FBI review, and
    we've made an attempt not to do so. What we did do was to
    organize ourselves into five teams, supported by personnel whom
    we requested and were assigned to us from the military
    departments and from OSD. Each of these teams looked into the
    specific areas that we have described in the report, submitted
    their report of their activities to us, and Admiral Clark and I
    and those who worked directly with us, took responsibility for
    reviewing and stating our conclusions and our views with
    respect to that.
        Our personal views are found throughout the report, but
    they are specifically called out in the executive summary,
    which you note we took the step of signing ourselves so that
    you would know that the words of the executive summary come
    from us, including those five or six recommendations that are
    for specific early action by the Secretary of Defense. Let me
    report that he has already taken some of those actions as we
    speak.
        We also had a board of advisers drawn from the senior ranks
    of the Department, the military ranks, whose purpose was not to
    lead a team, although two of them were team leaders, but merely
    to review as we went and provide an overall perspective of what
    we were looking at and how we were stating it and how it would
    affect real progress for the Department in terms of responding
    to what had happened. Their help to us was invaluable, because
    when you think about it, otherwise the Admiral had himself and
    me to bounce these things bounce and forth, to discuss. The
    board of advisers gave us an additional group with the same
    broad range.
        A word or two at this point from both Admiral Clark and me
    about the actual landscape of the report. What you have before
    you has five chapters with an executive summary at the front
    and with some annexes. The first chapter is a very brief, one-
    page synopsis that we thought we could state in a public
    report, that is much more dealt with in detail in the annex,
    and that is about the alleged perpetrator.
        Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 are the bulk of what the Secretary
    asked us to look at. I call your attention to chapter 2, which
    is about the personnel policies, which is divided into three
    sections, one having to do with how we identify the kinds of
    things that can lead a person to become a danger to his or her
    colleagues. A second part of it has to do with sharing that
    information, getting it to the right place. I point out to you
    that in our finding 2.2 in that report we acknowledge a
    specific difficulty and that is the fact that information that
    is obtained in one place does not always go forward with a
    servicemember to successive assignments, thus making it
    difficult for commanders to know exactly what they're dealing
    with. The third section in chapter 2 has to do with barriers to
    action.
        Three observations before I ask your permission to have
    Admiral Clark take on the description to you of other parts of
    the report. The first is this: There can never be too much
    preparation. In some ways, we could say that no matter how much
    preparation you've done there is more that could be done. At
    Fort Hood, the leaders had anticipated mass casualty events in
    their emergency response plans, and it showed in their
    responses. As you have acknowledged, Mr. Chairman, and as also
    did Senator McCain, the response was prompt. Within 2 minutes
    and 40 seconds of the first 9-1-1 call, first responders were
    on the scene of the shooting, and by first responders I mean
    elements of the Fort Hood security forces. Within a minute and
    a half after that, the assailant had been taken down, and
    within 2 minutes and 50 seconds after that two ambulances and
    an incident command vehicle from the post hospital had arrived
    to begin to dispense needed medical care.
        Lives were saved. Yet, as you have pointed out, 13 people
    died and scores others, 43, were wounded. We must prepare
    better, plan more intensively, and take the hard effort to look
    around the corners of our future to try and anticipate the next
    potential incident.
        Second, we must be attentive to today's hazards. Today the
    requirement that is imposed upon us in DOD is to understand the
    forces that cause an individual to radicalize, to commit
    violent acts, and thereby to make us vulnerable from within.
        Finally, the thread through all of this is violence, how do
    we detect the indicators of violence, how do we share the
    information about those indicators, and then whether we have
    the foresight to act.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with your permission Admiral
    Clark will take it from here.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. West.
        Admiral.

        STATEMENT OF ADM VERNON E. CLARK, USN [RET.], CO-CHAIR,
     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD

        Admiral Clark. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    opportunity to be with you today to talk about the work of
    Secretary West and myself and the group of people who worked
    with us in this effort.
        Let me make a few comments and get right to the questions.
    I know that you have questions for us, so first let me talk
    about force protection for a moment. The principal message of
    our review with regard to force protection is simply this:
    There are lots of policies on force protection inside DOD.
    Since September 11, we have built many barriers. However,
    existing policies simply are not optimized to deal with the
    insider threat, the evolving threat that we see today--and when
    people talk about the new threat, we're talking about the
    insider threat.
        Now, complicating the entire force protection challenge is
    the diverse nature of the way DOD has evolved since September
    11, 2001. So one of our recommendations to the Secretary was
    that you have to look at the organization itself. On page 25 of
    the base report, you find a description of the various Under
    Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense that are
    charged with responsibilities for working the force protection
    challenge. Synchronization is difficult and, simply stated, no
    senior DOD official is assigned overall responsibility for
    synchronizing this policy.
        Notice, I'm not saying that one person should have all that
    responsibility. Neither is Secretary West. We were careful not
    to define the specific organization for the Secretary of
    Defense. Our observation is synchronization is pretty difficult
    the way it's set up, the way it is today, and we recommend that
    it be looked at. The key point, too, is that there has to be a
    mechanism in place to do this integration, and that's our
    recommendation.
        Second, the task of identifying employees who potentially
    could threaten the workforce--and I ask us to remember that the
    Secretary asked us to look at violence. So the question is, how
    do we identify individuals who have the potential for violent
    behavior. Certainly in our research we found that detecting a
    trusted insider's intention to commit a violent act requires
    observation skills that may not be in place. This is the
    evolving threat.
        So there's a requirement to understand behavioral cues and
    anomalies that would alert commanders and supervisors to know
    that such a threat exists. While DOD focuses very effectively
    on many things, there is insufficient knowledge and guidance
    concerning who this insider threat is: Who are these people?
    There is insufficient guidance on workplace violence and, most
    importantly, how to identify the person who has the potential
    to self-radicalize. In our view it is simply insufficient.
        The key word here is ``violence.'' Now, since our report
    has come out some have criticized us for not suggesting and
    talking enough about violent Islamic extremism. When we talk
    about self-radicalization, and the term appears numerous times
    in our report, we're talking about the behaviors that create
    and lead to violence. That's what we're talking about. The lack
    of clarity for comprehensive indicators limits the commanders'
    and supervisors' ability to recognize the potential threats.
    Fixing this issue will be critical to solving this problem in
    the future.
        DOD policy on prohibited activities--and I have the
    instruction here with me that talks specifically about what
    prohibited activities are inside the Department--this
    instruction in our view is too limited and it only addresses
    active and very visible participation in groups that may pose
    threats to good order and discipline inside the ranks.
        So we found that this lack of clarity for comprehensive
    indicators which limit commanders' and supervisors' ability to
    recognize the potential threats--we're talking about people who
    could hurt themselves. The Secretary of Defense cited
    specifically, people could hurt themselves, for example the
    issue of suicide, criminal and gang behavior, people that are
    advocating supremist doctrine, family violence, evolving
    threats like self-radicalization--identifying these key
    indicators is critical to focusing the force on the threat.
        Let's talk about information sharing. Secretary West
    addressed it also and let me just make a couple of points. The
    policies governing information exchange inside the Department
    and in the intergovernment system, in our view the policies are
    deficient. They do not support detection and mitigation of the
    internal threat.
        DOD and Service guidance does not provide for maintaining
    and transferring relevant information from one duty station to
    the other. Now, remember we're doing phase one of this. As you
    talked about, Mr. Chairman, we did this review in a hurry.
    That's what the Secretary of Defense wanted us to do. Thousands
    of pages of review, but put the spotlight on the things that
    the Services can fix in a hurry. It is our view that this
    internal information exchange has to be examined.
        In other words, how can commanders connect the dots if they
    don't have some information that's maintained at a local level
    and hasn't transferred from one command to another. I will tell
    you that automated systems inside the Services do not allow
    them to share information on, for example, registered users and
    persons who routinely come and go from a base and may become a
    threat.
        So the issue of maintaining and transferring all of the
    relevant information, information that could lead to the
    identification of contributing factors, that's the issue.
        Last Friday, the Secretary of Defense, in his press
    conference, stood and addressed his observations about our
    report. One of the things that I was happy to see him address
    was his comment that Secretary West and I are of the view that
    we have to become more adaptable and certainly we have to be
    proactive, but we have to be able to adapt rapidly to this
    changing security environment, bringing a wide and continuously
    evolving range of tools, techniques, and programs into play.
        I just want to emphasize that there's no single-point
    solution for this evolving threat. We have to keep working at
    it. We need architectures and structures in place that will
    make that possible.
        One other point about information sharing. Certainly robust
    information sharing is essential. Hand in glove with that
    information sharing is the required command and control
    apparatus, be it systems, policy, doctrine, tactics,
    techniques, and procedures, to convert this information into
    timely decisions and actions.
        The bottom line, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: We
    have to remove the barriers, all of the barriers. We have to
    equip and enable the commanders, people in decisionmaking
    positions, their ability--Mr. Chairman, you used the phrase--to
    connect the dots. We have to get the information and thus the
    indicators to the appropriate level of people in command.
        Just a couple of comments about emergency response.
    Secretary West addressed this. Mr. Chairman, you also certainly
    did justice to the brilliance of the people at Fort Hood and
    their actions. Lots of good news related to the emergency
    response.
        Mr. Chairman and members, I just wanted to try to put this
    in perspective. I committed my life in service for 37 years. I
    created in those 37 years a number of lessons learned myself,
    and I heard dozens of lessons-learned reports. On the second
    day that our team was in existence, Secretary West and I got on
    a plane with a few members of our team and we went to Fort
    Hood. We walked the ground and they showed us the space where
    all of this happened and looked at the terrain. Then we sat
    down with General Kohn and his command team and they gave us
    this presentation that had been turned in a matter of a few
    days, their lessons learned. I want to tell you that I was
    really impressed.
        So I heard a lot of them in my 37 years and I want you to
    know that I never ever heard a better one than I heard at Fort
    Hood that day. The base personnel were ready to respond. They
    had trained at this, they had worked at it. Secretary West
    talked about the timeline response to the active shooter. It
    was brilliant.
        All of that said, it still could have been better, and in
    our review we found areas where it could be better. In their
    own lessons learned they identified areas where it could be
    better. I spoke in the last subject about the command and
    control system. They need a better system. General Kohn had to
    deal with misinformation, and should anybody be surprised? I
    don't think so. There's never been a crisis ever that there
    wasn't misinformation. Being able to deal with it in a rapid
    way and being able to deal with a potential multiple event, Mr.
    Chairman, as you indicated, is critical.
        Fundamentally we believe that we can improve by providing a
    well-integrated means to gather and evaluate and disseminate
    the wide range of information that will make it possible for
    commanders to perform to the maximum.
        This report is about focusing on better tools for
    commanders. This report is about focusing on violence
    prevention, in whatever form that violence manifests itself.
    This report is about adapting and evolving to rapid change,
    sharing information, connecting the dots, and exercising
    against the most stressing and pressing scenarios that we know
    how to present, so that we satisfy ourselves that we are able
    to perform to the standards that we have identified ourselves.
        I want to close by just acknowledging my alignment with all
    the comments that have been made about the people at Fort Hood,
    the families that have suffered loss, and just say that the
    thrust of our work has been to do everything that we know how
    to do to identify policies, procedures, practices, and programs
    that can be made better, so that the U.S. Armed Forces continue
    to be the outstanding force that it is today.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. West and Admiral Clark
    follows:]
     Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Togo D. West, Jr. and ADM Vernon E.
                               Clark, USN (Ret.)
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
    committee: We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and
    discuss the findings and recommendations of the Department of Defense
    Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood.
        Two months ago, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness
    Center at Fort Hood, TX. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were
    wounded. November 5, 2009 will be remembered as a day of great tragedy.
    We extend our deepest sympathy to the families of the fallen, to the
    wounded, to their families, and indeed all touched by this tragic
    event.
        Following the shooting, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates
    established the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to
    Fort Hood, and asked that Admiral Clark and I lead it. We have done so
    and report on it today. Events such as the Fort Hood shooting raise
    questions about how best to defend against threats posed by external
    influences operating on members of our military community. The
    challenge for the Department of Defense (DOD) is to prepare more
    effectively for a constantly changing security environment. It is with
    that backdrop in mind that Secretary Gates asked us to conduct our
    review.
        Secretary Gates charged us to provide an independent review and
    assess whether there are programs, policies or procedural weaknesses
    within DOD that create vulnerabilities to the health and safety of our
    service men and women, DOD civilians, and their families. Dr. Gates
    asked that we take a careful look at personnel policies, force
    protection measures, emergency response procedures and support to our
    military health care providers. He asked us to evaluate the Army's
    application of its policies, programs, processes, and procedures to the
    alleged perpetrator.
        We established a board of advisors with senior officers from the
    four Services. We constituted five review teams, consisting of a range
    of experts, who investigated the key tasks outlined in our terms of
    reference. The teams had unrestricted access to personnel and
    facilities. The teams traveled to Fort Hood as part of their review.
        Our charter directed us to focus on the noncriminal aspects of the
    shooting. Although Fort Hood was central to our review, our scope
    extended across the entire Department in order to gather the most
    significant and meaningful findings and recommendations. As recognized
    by the Secretary of Defense in stating that he intends to call upon the
    military departments to conduct in-depth follow-on reviews based on our
    results, areas in our report will require further study. By design, we
    limited the depth of our report in areas that will be covered in
    follow-on reviews.
        We recently submitted our report to the Secretary of Defense.
    Before discussing the overall report, we note that we cannot address
    specifics with respect to the alleged perpetrator in open session, in
    order to preserve the integrity of the ongoing military justice
    process. We can tell you, however, that several individuals failed to
    apply professional standards of officership regarding the alleged
    perpetrator. We recommended the Secretary of Defense forward these
    issues of accountability to the Secretary of the Army. The detailed
    results and findings associated with the alleged perpetrator are found
    in a restricted annex that will not be publically released at the
    present time.
        The review was much broader than the assessment of the alleged
    perpetrator. With that in mind, our report includes recommendations to
    strengthen DOD's ability to prepare for and respond to potential
    threats. It is based upon research by our teams of more than 35,000
    pages from over 700 documents related to departmental policies,
    programs, processes, and procedures.
        Before discussing the details of our findings, we would like to
    highlight some observations from the tragic events on November 5.
        First, no amount of preparation is ever too much. Leaders at Fort
    Hood had anticipated mass casualty events in their emergency response
    plans and exercises. The initial response to the incident demonstrated
    this. It was prompt and effective. Two minutes and 40 seconds after the
    initial 9-1-1 call, Fort Hood first responders arrived on the scene.
    One-and-a-half minutes later, the assailant was incapacitated, taken
    into custody, and remained in custody handcuffed to a law enforcement
    representative for the next several chaotic hours. Two ambulances and
    an incident command vehicle from the post hospital arrived on the scene
    2 minutes and 50 seconds later to begin providing lifesaving emergency
    care. Yet 13 people died; scores were wounded. We will prepare harder;
    plan more diligently; seek to envision the next incident.
        Second, we must be attentive to today's hazard. Even as the role of
    our nation's military is to confront the external threat to our
    country, one of the most significant emerging concerns in the
    protection of our force is the internal threat. We need to develop a
    better understanding of the forces that cause a person to become
    radicalized; commit violent acts; and make us vulnerable from within.
        Third, courage and presence of mind in the face of crisis can carry
    the day. It happened at Fort Hood. Courageous acts were the key to
    preventing greater losses that day.
        As our report reveals, however, these attributes alone are not
    enough to protect our force. We must exercise the foresight necessary
    to identify the looming menace--self radicalization and its often
    resultant violence--and act preemptively.
        Our review of DOD policies, procedures, and processes revealed
    shortcomings in the way DOD is prepared to deal with internal threats,
    and in particular, the threat posed by troubled and potentially
    dangerous individuals and groups.
        Commanders are our key assets to identify and monitor internal
    threats. Existing policies, however, are not optimized for countering
    these threats. The policies reflect insufficient knowledge and
    awareness required to help identify and address individuals likely to
    commit violence.
        While the department focuses very effectively on many things,
    guidance concerning workplace violence and the potential for self-
    radicalization is insufficient. DOD policy on prohibited activities is
    limited and only addresses active and visible participation in groups
    that may pose threats to good order and discipline. This lack of
    clarity for comprehensive indicators limits commanders' and
    supervisors' ability to recognize potential threats and detecting a
    trusted insider's intention to commit a violent act requires
    observation of behavioral cues/anomalies.
        Complicating the force protection challenge is the diverse nature
    of responsibilities as they have evolved within DOD since September 11.
    Because no senior DOD official is assigned overall responsibility for
    force protection policy, synchronization is difficult. Moreover, there
    is a lack of DOD policy integration. This has resulted in a lack of a
    well-integrated means to gather, evaluate, and disseminate the wide
    range of behavioral indicators that could signal an insider threat.
    Some policies governing information exchange, both within DOD and
    between outside agencies, are deficient and do not support detection
    and mitigation of internal threats. The time has passed when concerns
    by specific entities over protecting ``their'' information can be
    allowed to prevent relevant threat information and indicators from
    reaching those who need it--the commanders.
        As the Secretary indicated, we see a requirement to create the
    ability to adapt rapidly to the changing security environment, which
    requires anticipating new threats and bringing a wide and continuously
    evolving range of tools, techniques, and programs into play. Robust
    information sharing, therefore, is essential, along with the
    accompanying command and control structure to convert active
    information gathered on potential threats into decisions and actions,
    including dissemination of the analysis and assessments to the
    appropriate levels of command. While leaders at Fort Hood responded
    well under the stress of a rapidly evolving crisis, we are fortunate
    that we faced only one incident at one location. Real-time information
    sharing will be critical should we face a situation of multiple events.
        While all 50 States have complied with the Federal requirements for
    the National Incident Management System, designed for a synchronized
    response in crises, there are no established milestones to define
    initial and full capability within DOD. The timelines should be
    evaluated; doing so could lead to an umbrella plan for emergency
    response and recovery and ensure interoperability with all the States.
    Synchronizing the DOD emergency management program with this national
    guidance will ensure the Department can integrate effectively with all
    partners in response to any and all emergencies. Using common emergency
    management principles, we can prepare our military communities to
    respond to emergency from the smallest incident to the largest
    catastrophe.
        The response by the Fort Hood community in the aftermath of this
    tragedy serves as a reminder of the strength, resiliency and character
    of our people. We were very impressed with them, both military and
    civilian. In a community where we might have expected the fabric of
    trust to fray, it remained intact and grew stronger through mutual
    support. The thrust of our effort has been to do all that we can to
    prevent similar tragedies in the future.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you both very
    much.
        Let's try an 8-minute first round. The panel found that
    ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the
    clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate
    religious practices from those that might indicate a potential
    for violence or self-radicalization.'' I think what you're
    saying is that, obviously, this country believes in tolerance
    of others' religions, but it can never be tolerant of violent
    radical views that are dressed up in religious garb. I think
    that's that point reworded.
        I couldn't agree with you more. Sometimes views that are
    clearly either inherently violent or promote violence are
    dressed up in religious clothing, and that automatically means
    that people who are sensitive to others' religious views then
    are put on the defensive right away, or reluctant right away to
    point out what is underneath the claim of religion.
        So the line has to be there. Obviously, we want to continue
    our tolerance, but we have to be much harder and much more
    intolerant of views that are radical, promote violence, or
    encourage violence.
        So my first question to you is about the policy of the
    Department, which is limited to and addresses only active
    participation in groups that pose threats to good order and
    discipline, is far too narrow a policy because of the self-
    radicalization point--you don't have to participate in a group
    that poses that kind of a threat to be a threat yourself. My
    first question is how would you--and I know you're not here to
    provide remedies and that wasn't your job, but I assume that
    you agree that it's not just that that policy should be
    examined, but that in your judgment at least it's just simply
    too limited a policy. I'm wondering whether or not, for
    instance, you would agree that communication with a radical
    cleric who promotes violence is the kind of conduct that should
    raise real questions. Would you agree with that, even though
    it's not active participation at that point? It's just simply
    communication, asking someone for their recommendations and
    views. Would you agree that that ought to be raising great
    suspicion, without getting into this particular case?
        Mr. West. Mr. Chairman, I would certainly agree. I think we
    both would. I think your larger point that this is an example
    of, we would agree with as well, and that is that, yes, in the
    past perhaps membership alone in a group may have been less
    looked upon than the actual act of doing things, but in this
    environment we have to look at the group. We have to understand
    its purposes.
        It is already considered by some that there is a tool that
    enables a commander to declare certain kinds of action,
    including that, a threat to his immediate area's good order and
    discipline. But we think DOD can just simply strengthen the
    ability of commanders to look at and example exactly what kind
    of activity they are permitting and whether or not we can
    better define it.
        Membership in a group that has a record of active
    advocation of violence, as well as your point, communication,
    especially repeated communication--again, not referring to any
    particular case--with those who advocate violence, those are
    all signals that we need to be able to indicate in our
    publications and in our regulations commanders are authorized
    to look at and react to.
        Chairman Levin. Even if there weren't active participation
    or communication with radical persons who are promoting
    violence, even if there's simply the expression of views which
    promote violence without any information about participation in
    a group or communication with radical extremists--if somebody
    gets up and says, ``I believe that the Constitution comes in
    second and that my religious views come in first,'' would that
    not be that kind of a signal which ought to indicate some real
    genuine concern? Would you agree with that?
        Admiral Clark. I certainly do agree with it. It goes
    without saying that where we draw our red lines is a very, very
    important point. But you know, if you look at our history, we
    as a people as Americans have always been very careful about
    where we draw those lines.
        I so appreciate your introduction to this question by your
    comments about that we are a tolerant people. When I look at
    the DOD instruction here, it talks about what people can do
    when they're at work and things that they can't do at work, but
    they can do on their private time. What we're suggesting is
    that we have to better understand how people go through this
    process from being a non-radicalized person to radicalization
    and what does it mean.
        So I align with your comments completely. I want to make
    one other observation, Mr. Chairman. In our report, we talk
    about Active Duty members of the military, but DOD is much
    broader than just the Active Duty people in uniform. We
    understand that when Americans raise their right hand and take
    a pledge to serve in the Armed Forces that there are some
    freedoms that they set on the shelf. The challenge that we're
    facing here in security applies to everybody in DOD, and that
    includes civilians, contractors, and a whole other body of
    people.
        Then you could look at this and say, ``this is not just
    DOD; this is the whole of our Nation; and the whole of
    government.'' This is a real challenge that we face.
        Sir, you made the comment, when a shipmate hears a comment
    that's being made that is approaching a defined red line or
    crossing a defined red line, that we must make sure our people
    understand where those red lines are. That means we must have a
    very effective education program and outreach program, that
    people understand this is about our own security and the right
    to self-defense is absolutely not in question. We have the
    right to do that.
        Chairman Levin. People should not be afraid of reporting
    information that they believe in their good judgment represents
    a potential threat to good order and discipline and to the
    safety of the country or of their own group out of fear that
    that might be viewed by some as being intolerant of religious
    views. We have to simply allow people the freedom to report
    something which they believe is a threat to their group, their
    country, or to the individual himself or herself, and not be
    dissuaded by the fact that the views are dressed in some
    religious garb.
        Admiral Clark. Good order and discipline is the fabric upon
    which the greatness of the U.S. military is built, and we have
    to ensure that we do everything we know how to do to protect
    it.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary West, did you want to add
    anything to that?
        Mr. West. No. I think the Admiral caught the point I would
    have made, which is that we are sensitive to the fact that we
    are talking about expressions and expressions in many cases
    that pertain to religion--two different hits on the First
    Amendment. But as he pointed out, when a member takes an oath
    of office there are some things as to which he or she agrees to
    be regulated. We believe that where there is a clear connection
    with a potential for violence that would cause damage to one's
    fellows in the Service, this is a basis on which we can
    encourage the Department to act more clearly and more
    aggressively.
        Chairman Levin. My final question is this. You have not
    been given the charge of recommending remedies for where there
    are gaps. That's not part of your charge, although you freely
    responded to my questions this morning and I appreciate that.
    Who is in charge of responding with remedies to your
    recommendations? What is the timetable? Does this go right up
    to the Secretary of Defense and has he assured you that he will
    consider appropriate remedies within a certain timetable, or is
    there somebody else in the Department that's on the remedies
    side of what you've outlined here?
        Mr. West. The answer to your question is twofold. I'll take
    the second first, which is: Yes, in his follow-on review he is
    ordering two sets of things. He's in that process. I think some
    orders have gone out, but not others. One, he is going to ask a
    single member of his staff--we believe, but we don't want to
    commit him--it is his prerogative, not ours--perhaps the
    Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense or Security--I'm not
    authorized to make that statement, don't know, but that's our
    belief--to conduct a follow-on review, but each of the Services
    also.
        Part of their job is to take this report--he will refer it
    to them--and to provide their recommendations as to how to
    implement. That's the answer to your second question.
        The first answer is in some ways you give Admiral Clark and
    me too much of a bye. The fact is his direction to us was to
    come up with action memo recommendations as well.
        Chairman Levin. All right. In that case, I withdraw that
    comment. Are your recommendations then to be acted upon in a
    certain length, period of time?
        Mr. West. I'm not clear.
        Chairman Levin. What I'm referring to is this. You say that
    there's inadequate clarity on the issue we've been discussing.
    The recommendation is a general one: Provide clarity. But it's
    not the specific clarity. It's just: You should provide
    clarity, Mr. Secretary. I couldn't agree with you more, but
    it's not what the new regulation should be. That's going to be
    left up to the Secretary. That's what I meant when I said you
    have not provided the specific new language that should be in
    place replacing the unclear language. That's what I meant by
    that.
        Now, is there a timetable?
        Admiral Clark. Yes, there is. There is a timetable, he
    announced it Friday.
        Chairman Levin. What is it?
        Admiral Clark. He wants first impressions back in March and
    he wants to wrap this up by June.
        If you read the language, we were very careful with our
    recommendations. First of all, you confirm the Secretary of
    Defense and that allows him to be the person who makes policy.
    We were very aware of the fact that at one point in our lives
    we were those people, but we're not those people today.
        So we suggested on numerous occasions he review policy
    because we thought there were holes or weaknesses or gaps.
    There were some places that the language is slightly stronger:
    It's absolutely clear to us that the policy is--and we say
    sometimes it's inadequate. But we teed it up in a way so that
    they could now put that spotlight on it, and he's given them
    the timetable.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm going to pick up on two things you mentioned, and the
    first one I'll be criticized for as not politically correct.
    But I'll make this statement. If you're around Washington and
    you're in these hearings, it's one thing. But when you go back
    to Oklahoma, as I do every week, it's another thing. I'm always
    hit up with this idea, because not only--we're talking about
    the Fort Hood thing now, but I could talk to you about Abdul
    Mutallab, the Christmas bomber. The extremist views were
    evident from the University College through London, and it goes
    on and on. The November 19, 2009, the father reports and we all
    know about that report. Late November, he was added to the U.S.
    550-name Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) and
    all this stuff.
        All this stuff is stuff that we knew. That's not in your
    purview, I understand that. But nonetheless, it's the same. A
    terrorist is a terrorist. That's what they do for a living:
    They kill people.
        I for one--I know it's not politically correct to say--I
    believe in racial and ethnic profiling. I think if you're
    looking at people getting on an airplane and you have X amount
    of resources to get into it, you need to get at the targets,
    not my wife. I just think it's something that should be looked
    into.
        The statement that's been made is probably 90 percent true,
    with some exceptions like the Murrah Federal Office Building in
    my State of Oklahoma. Those people, they were not Muslims, they
    were not Middle Easterners. But when you hear that not all
    Middle Easterners or Muslims between the ages of 20 and 35 are
    terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims or Middle Easterners
    between the ages of 20 and 35, that's by and large true.
        I think that some time we're going to have to really--at
    least I'm going to have to have a better answer than I give the
    people back home, when people board planes or get into
    environments such as the environment that we're dealing with
    with this report.
        I guess nothing more needs to be said from you guys on
    this. Let me first of all say, which I should have said first,
    there are no two people I think are more qualified to do the
    job that you have had to do than the two of you. You've been
    good friends of mine for a long period of time.
        Now, something we can talk about, I think, a little more, a
    little easier. Your purview was really domestic, wasn't it? The
    continental United States (CONUS) was most of what you were
    talking about, was making the recommendations coming from what
    happened in the incident at Fort Hood. Did you look into
    outside the United States (OCONUS)? We have thousands and
    thousands of troops all over the world, and to me the threat is
    probably a little bit greater there than it would be here.
        What thoughts do you have on that, or maybe recommendations
    you could have on that, to expand what you're doing to include
    that?
        Admiral Clark. We certainly did, Senator. The first thing
    that comes to mind is, every base where we exist overseas, we
    have non-Americans working with us on the base. What are the
    processes and the procedures for vetting these people? So we
    challenge it. We have a section in the report that talks about
    security clearances and how people gain access.
        The second thing I talked about--identifying people who
    could become a threat, one of the things we have to look at is
    how we vet people in the OCONUS environment. I would suggest to
    you--and frankly, this would probably be better, the details of
    this we might talk about in closed session. But I would suggest
    to you that it was our conviction, and we would not have put it
    in the report if we didn't think that this was certainly a
    potential weakness.
        Mr. West. Might I add this, Senator. If we take the lesson
    of Fort Hood--and admittedly, we will talk more specifically
    when you have your closed session--we have to be reminded that
    the thesis on which we're dealing here is essentially, for this
    whole report, the threat from within: the member of the
    military family who then turns against his or her fellow
    soldier, airman, sailor, marine, or coastguardsman.
        The difficulty there, whether it is OCONUS or CONUS, is
    that with the universal access card, the ID, they can enter
    what should be the safest place either here or there, the base,
    the post, freely. With our automated systems now, we don't stop
    them for routine checks. So we can't--or we can. Certainly one
    of the lessons learned at Fort Hood was that they have now
    instituted some roving checks even of those who have the
    credentials.
        But the place to stop them, the insider who's the threat,
    is not at the gate. It is to identify him or her before they
    can get onto the post and do that act. That's why all those
    signs that we talk about, all the cues and behavioral
    indications, even the ones that the chairman mentioned, are
    important for us to reemphasize, to expand and to focus on, to
    make sure commanders have that information. That applies both
    here and overseas.
        Senator Inhofe. One of the things that was discussed here
    by the chairman was when can we move this along faster. I think
    you want to do that. We want to do that. We still have some of
    the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that are not fully
    implemented and understood. So I would assume that you share
    those feelings.
        I was down at Fort Hood about 3 weeks before this incident.
    That was when we had two of our Oklahoma units that were
    deploying overseas and I was down there for that event. Then I
    went down afterwards for the event that took place after the
    tragedy.
        You had said--and I asked my staff to hand it to me so I
    could read it again. This is pretty remarkable, Mr. Secretary,
    when you said 2 minutes and 40 seconds after the initial 9-1-1
    call, installation first responders arrived on the scene. One
    and a half minutes later, the assailant was incapacitated. Two
    ambulances and incident command vehicles from the base were
    there 2 minutes and 50 seconds later. I mean, that's really
    moving.
        I would recommend, and maybe you've already done this, that
    you find out--not always looking at what is wrong, but learn
    from what was done right. In this case, I think it would
    probably serve us well to see how they did that remarkable job.
    I wanted to see it in writing after you'd said it, because I
    think that's remarkable. So I'd recommend you do that.
        Mr. West. It was remarkable, and we did think that one of
    our jobs was to find out if that was the result of good
    planning, courageous and fast action, was there an element of
    luck, and, if it was what we believed and what we've said,
    excellent planning and well executed, is there a lesson to pass
    across the force.
        One other thing I would add. I don't want to overdo--let me
    add it anyway. We tried as best we could to figure out what
    that meant, the passage of time from the first shot by the
    assailant to his last. That is, the whole event, because the
    uncertain part was how quickly the 9-1-1 call got in after the
    first shot was fired. The best we can make is that the whole
    shooting incident was ended by security forces between 7 and 8
    minutes after it started.
        Senator Inhofe. Were you surprised at that too, Admiral?
        Admiral Clark. I certainly was. This kind of a panel is
    supposed to find the things that are wrong. That's what we're
    supposed to do. But if you notice, we lead with some very
    strong statements about what we thought was right, because we
    wanted it up front that the people at Fort Hood did a fabulous
    job.
        I testified yesterday and the staff reminded me that I said
    ``fabulous'' or ``excellent'' or ``outstanding'' 19 times
    yesterday. But I want to drive the point home. I said this was
    the best lessons-learned I've ever seen, and the performance of
    the people was brilliant. Were there things that could have
    been better? Yes. One of the reasons that it was brilliant was
    because of the brilliance of our people. They are so good.
        Of course, nobody had the stopwatch going on inside the
    room where he was shooting, so that's why we don't know the
    exact time, as the Secretary indicated, between the first shot
    and the 9-1-1 call. But here's what we do know: There were a
    lot more rounds available, and they took that shooter down and
    the CID agent was handcuffed to him in a matter of moments and
    was with him from that point on.
        Senator Inhofe. Let me commend all of them for the fine
    work they did.
        Admiral Clark. It was incredible.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        I would take 2 seconds just to say that I disagree with
    your comments about Middle Easterners and Muslims and the
    implications of those comments. I wouldn't want to say that
    except while you're here.
        Senator Inhofe. Sure. I understand that. I expected that.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Clark, you mentioned in terms of the threat a
    generic self-radicalization that would lead to violence. There
    are several different, as you suggest, categories of this, not
    simply Islamic radicals, but a host of others. Is there a
    strategy in DOD to identify these potential categories and to
    essentially work explicitly against them or to at least be
    aware of them?
        Admiral Clark. The first point, there are people in the
    public domain that have said we didn't use the magic term,
    ``radical Islamics.'' We didn't do it on purpose. It wasn't
    because we were trying to be politically correct. It was
    because our task was to deal with violence and this was one of
    them. But I don't know how people could read our comments about
    self-radicalization and not understand that this kind of
    radical Islamic behavior is part of that group.
        We said specifically though, the indicators are inadequate.
    Now, having said that, on Friday the Army published the list of
    10, and having something out there is better than nothing. In
    the closed session, I would like to get into this in some
    detail.
        But to say we believe that all of the indicators related to
    violence are not static indicators. We're living in such a
    rapidly changing world, potentially we should be considering
    the establishment of a group that focuses on this full-time. I
    have this whole series of kinds of behaviors that we are
    talking about--criminal, drug, domestic abuse, gang activity,
    supremist ideology, terrorism, school violence, sex crimes,
    sabotage, arson, cyber. We're talking about all of these.
        So I trust that's responsive to your question.
        Senator Reed. It is.
        Mr. Secretary, do you have any comments?
        Mr. West. There is an annex to our report that discusses
    the sources of violence in some detail. It's an example of the
    pieces that our researchers consulted. I think it's very
    informative and I commend it for reading.
        I think that I agree with the Admiral's response. Also, in
    our executive summary, five or six key things that we recommend
    to the Secretary that we pull out from this report is the
    suggestion of a body that will collect the indicators of
    violence, update them in light of current circumstances, events
    in our world, occurrences in our world, and then make them
    available on an updated basis to the commanders and the
    supervisors who need to use them to make their judgments.
        Senator Reed. Let me again turn to the Admiral. Did you
    believe or conclude that there was adequate information coming
    from Walter Reed to Fort Hood with respect to the Major? Was
    there a problem there in terms of letters of reprimand that
    might have been issued or informal reprimands that were never
    fully communicated, so that the commanders at Fort Hood clearly
    weren't able to gauge the seriousness of this individual?
        Mr. West. Senator, I wonder if you would let us discuss
    that with you in the restricted session. It's in the annex.
        Senator Reed. I appreciate that.
        There's another issue and this, I think, can be--I'll let
    you decide--discussed in public, is that, there are many
    indicators about Major Hassan's professional skills, far
    removed from his religious beliefs and his discussions, just
    simple competence, his ability to work with others, those
    things that are fundamental to being an officer in the
    military. Yet he was moved along. I know this question has come
    up. In these critical areas where there are not a surplus of
    individuals, such as mental health professionals,
    psychiatrists, et cetera, is there a double standard in terms
    of, had he been a line officer, an infantry officer, artillery
    officer--forget his radicalization, but just his simple
    performance, would that have gotten him kicked out?
        Mr. West. I think again, Senator, we are prepared to
    discuss that with you, but we would ask you to let us do it in
    the restricted session.
        Senator Reed. I appreciate that.
        Admiral Clark. I would say certainly the heart of what we
    have to say is in the annex. Let me make a comment. We use the
    term ``officership'' in the open report. ``Officership'' was
    intended to mean more than just leadership, and it was our view
    that there were officership deficiencies. In the closed session
    we can talk in great detail about the specifics of that.
        Senator Reed. Just one final question----
        Mr. West. If I might, Senator, I would just add also that
    in our one-page summary discussion, in chapter 1, in the open
    report, we do mention the findings and recommendations, which
    had to do with the Army's application of its policies to the
    perpetrator, but also the fact that there were signs that were
    missed and some that as far as we can tell were ignored. That's
    in the open part of the discussion.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Again, part of this response is going to be training, not
    just commanders, but individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines. We have something like that when it comes to a
    traditional threat, which is subversion and espionage, the old
    posters, World War II, ``Loose Lips Sink Ships.'' That emphasis
    is persistent. Do you envision something like that in terms of
    the training elements going forward?
        Admiral Clark. I mentioned just briefly, but I probably
    didn't emphasize it well enough: There clearly has to be an
    outreach program here. I'm not talking about an outreach
    program outside the Department. I'm talking about inside the
    Department. Notice, the Secretary of Defense said on Friday--
    and we suggested that effective communication is the order of
    the day here. The Secretary started that process on Friday when
    he said to commanders: This isn't just ho-hum--I'm paraphrasing
    now--ho-hum, regular day-to-day stuff. Commanders should have
    to look past the day-to-day.
        There is no doubt that a very effective training and
    outreach program is part of an effective solution.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, you have previously served our country well in
    your respective capacities and we appreciate your coming back
    once again to help us deal with an issue that obviously is
    extremely important, at the same time extremely sensitive. So
    thank you for your continuing service.
        In your report, you suggest that the Pentagon ``coordinate
    with the FBI Behavioral Science Unit and the Military Violence
    Unit to identify the indicators specific to DOD personnel, and
    that DOD should use these indicators to develop an assessment
    tool for commanders, supervisors, and professional support
    service personnel to determine when individuals present risks
    for violent behavior.''
        Now, my question is, don't those tools already exist in the
    form of the Army Form 4856, which is the Army Developmental
    Counseling Form, and the Army Form 67-9, which is the Army
    officer evaluation report (OER)? Assuming these documents are
    used and filled out appropriately, shouldn't we be able to
    identify a soldier who may be becoming self-radicalized as we
    think happened here and appropriately address the threat that
    they represent?
        Mr. West. I'm going to let Admiral Clark have a good long
    swing at that because of his extensive experience with OERs and
    the like. But let me say what we were trying to do here,
    Senator. The fact is that there is a very good argument that
    there are tools out there that commanders can use to make the
    assessments they need to make. The question for us, though is,
    are there ways to strengthen what they can do and have we
    learned anything by the incident we faced and will discuss with
    you in closed session, from this incident, about how we can
    shore that up?
        Frankly, things like OERs, there is a culture in the
    Services, all of them, which I think Admiral Clark can speak to
    better than I can, that doesn't always find and report the
    kinds of things that would be better to report. For one reason,
    it may be because the information of some offense, of previous
    drug usage, but there has been a rehabilitation effort, or of
    some other contacts or signs, may have been left to the
    discretion of the commander as to whether to even keep that in
    the record so that it would be recorded in the OER. It never
    gets to the next commander, the next supervisor, and suddenly
    earlier signs are lost in the midst of the pass as they move
    forward.
        We need to shore that up. We said to the Secretary in our
    executive summary, in our five or six big recommendations: You
    need to say to the officer corps of the Nation and all the
    Services that, what you report on these OERs and on things like
    the Service School Academic Evaluation Report (SAER), which
    takes the place of the OER when they're in Service school, you
    need to say that that matters and that it has to be accurate
    and, most of all, complete, so that we can make the judgments
    we need to make.
        Now, that's the thrust of what we're doing here. So, yes,
    reports exist, but they're not being made use of in a way that
    fits what we need in these new and trying times.
        Senator Chambliss. So do you think it's a matter of further
    education of those supervisors that are asking the questions
    and making that report?
        Mr. West. I have an answer to that. It's a question to me,
    but I want to get Admiral Clark involved. My answer is
    education, yes, but also making sure that the standards--and
    maybe that is education--are applied. But there are also some
    recommendations for some further adjustments.
        Senator Chambliss. Admiral Clark?
        Admiral Clark. I don't know the first form that you
    referenced. I have the second forms here in front of me, so I
    can talk specifically to those.
        Senator Chambliss. The 4856 is the Army Developmental
    Counseling Form, which I understand is completed once a
    quarter. The 67-9 is an annual report for enlisted and officer
    personnel.
        Admiral Clark. I don't have that in front of me. But I
    would say that that form and the tools that go with that would
    be great if the person knows what the indicators are. Our
    review suggests that in the area of self-radicalization that
    can be very fuzzy.
        The reason we suggested the FBI is they've already started
    doing some work here. So we're saying to the Secretary, don't
    start from scratch. But also the recommendation to use every
    expert that we know how to get, because we're looking for
    behavioral cues and their subtleties. Once those are known, I
    have every confidence that our leadership, our supervisors,
    will know how to deal with that.
        But my interpretation of that was, we were talking about an
    education and that's why you have to have an outreach program
    that gets the training to the right people, so they have
    understanding of these issues.
        Senator Chambliss. If I'm hearing you right with regard to
    what both of you've said in your statement and your answers to
    the questions thus far, we did a great job responding at Fort
    Hood. Our men and women were courageous, heroic, and did a good
    job. But with the events leading up to the incident, we have
    some major deficiencies.
        In fact, Admiral, you alluded to this, I think you called
    it ``an evolving threat,'' were your exact words that you said
    earlier. Are there any protections or punitive measures that
    are in place to detect, for example, an individual who is one
    of those folks that I would categorize as an evolving threat,
    who might simply join a branch of the military with the
    intention of duplicating what happened at Fort Hood? What have
    we got in place now or what do we need to do to ensure that we
    don't have somebody who has spent the last 6 months in Yemen or
    4 years ago spent 6 months in Yemen with the idea of ultimately
    coming back and having been trained to go in and duplicate this
    event?
        Mr. West. Or who even spent a bunch of years or a month out
    in the wilds of our country becoming radicalized in a different
    way and under different pressures. The question is the same.
        You're right, Senator, there was no failing by those at
    Fort Hood in their response. If there were gaps, it was in us
    as we tried to prepare ourselves to identify those factors that
    would say this person is going to be a problem, we need to act.
        But I think your question was to the Admiral.
        Admiral Clark. I agree completely with what Secretary West
    has said. The thrust of your question gets us to this issue of
    the identification question that I raised this point to. That
    identification question raises things about the manner in which
    we do checks and what's involved there. I think it would be
    smart not to inform an enemy in a public way about my
    particular impressions, and if it's all right with you that we
    talk about that in a closed session. But affirming your
    comment, this is part of the challenge. By the way, should we
    not expect that they're going to use every technique and scheme
    or maneuver that they can figure out?
        Senator Chambliss. Absolutely. That's why we have to,
    number one, get the information. But further, to your point you
    stated earlier, Admiral, is we have to share that information.
    It has to get in the hands of the people who are filling out
    those forms or who are making recommendations relative to an
    individual.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, can I say, since you made that
    last point, I say one more time: Get rid of the barriers,
    inside and outside of the Department, the barriers to
    information flow. Thank you.
        Mr. West. Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry to keep this going, but
    could I add one more thought to that?
        Chairman Levin. Sure.
        Mr. West. Here's another problem that your questions and
    Admiral Clark's response raise, Senator. That is this. Let's
    take religion. The reason we have numbers and records on the
    representation of people of various religions in our forces is
    because they self-identify. They say: This is my religion, I'm
    an Episcopalian, or what have you. What about those who,
    formulating a reason to hide their purposes, don't disclose
    their religion, don't disclose anything that will cause us to
    try to--this is not your term--to try to profile?
        It's the indicators, the behavioral cues, that we have to
    rely on. They are our only way of getting at this in any
    organized and aggressive and effective way.
        Admiral Clark. One more comment, then. So that you know,
    the alleged perpetrator was initially in the Army as an
    enlisted person and he went off and went to school. When he
    came into the Army the first time, he professed to be a member
    of the Islamic faith. When he came in as an officer, he did not
    declare. So all of the indicators aren't right in front of our
    nose. But I have all the statistics here to talk about every
    brand of religion that we know about.
        The reality is that way over half of our people never ever
    declare what--they choose not to declare. So it's not always
    immediately apparent. That's why this is a challenge. But then
    really focusing on the behaviors, and that's what we wanted to
    put the spotlight on. The Department in its guidance and
    instruction to the commanders and all the people in the field
    are going to go by this document, and this document doesn't
    have sufficient guidance about self-radicalization.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both
    of you for your dedication and time in putting together a very
    well-organized and, I think, insightful report. We appreciate
    it very much.
        So far we haven't really talked about, let's say, patient--
    or the evaluation process. Of course, connecting the dots
    requires that kind of an evaluation capability for it to be
    able to tell us anything. In determining behavior, if you don't
    have all the background perhaps you can't establish that.
        Violence in the workplace is not unique now to the
    military. It's part of everyday life, unfortunately, and that
    kind of violence isn't necessarily the result of self-
    radicalization in the workforce. So I'm wondering, in
    connecting the dots, as you look for not only self-
    radicalization, do you look for other indicators in your
    report? Shouldn't the military look for others, such as marital
    difficulties and other areas that, Admiral Clark, you
    identified in addition? Because self-radicalization is a subset
    of an overall problem when we talk about workforce violence, it
    may be that the military is unique in that respect because it's
    not just about domestic; we also have to face it on our
    military posts around the world.
        So in connecting the dots, I think we understand that not
    all radicals will be engaging in violence and not everyone with
    a different idea will engage in violence. So what are other
    things that can be looked at in performance evaluations that
    would help us detect potential violence coming, not just from
    self-radicalization, but from others as well?
        Admiral Clark. It's a really great question and it drives
    us back to the guidance that's there today. We find that there
    are good indicators in a lot of areas. I mentioned a number of
    these. It includes the two that you talked about, although our
    view is that the whole workplace side is--we tend to focus on
    the kind of violence that takes place away from the workplace,
    not in the workplace, and that's a criticism.
        But let's just talk about the domestic piece, for example.
    Earlier we talked about the requirement for balance. We have
    been dealing with this now for years. So we learned a long time
    ago that if the balance is incorrect we were going to have
    difficulty, because a domestic violence situation always has a
    ``she says, he says'' scenario ongoing. So we know how to do
    these things when we identify the behaviors.
        So you're correct, we have them. We have the tools----
        Senator Ben Nelson. We have the tools, right.
        Admiral Clark. This is why we're suggesting that perhaps we
    want to consider the establishment of an organization, a piece
    of the structure, that does this for a living, because you or I
    cannot define a solution set today and everything be perfect
    for the next 3 years. It's going to change.
        Our suggestion is we need to understand the evolving world
    that we're facing. Let us not get sidetracked on just one
    little piece of this. The Secretary's goal was to make the
    workplace a safe environment. Imagine--and Secretary West
    really alluded to this, when the alleged perpetrator--he was an
    officer in the military, he was a field-grade officer. This
    implies trust. He's a medical doctor, implies more trust. He's
    somebody that a person would confide in. We can't have these
    kinds of people turning from the inside on our people and
    destroying the fabric of the institution and what we're all
    about.
        So we are convinced that this then calls for the kind of
    investment that will ensure that we're staying up with the
    adaption problem. This is a challenge, to be adaptive. I'm so
    pleased that the Secretary of Defense addressed it straight-up
    on Friday and said we have to create a more adaptive force.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary West?
        Mr. West. Just as an add-on, in terms of your question,
    what are some of the things that should be indicators, we have
    a whole list of recommendations. Incidentally, in our appendix
    C for purposes of being helpful to you we list all the
    recommendations, the findings and recommendations, and
    something about them, so that it's easier for you to find them
    without having to go all through.
        At about 2.6 or so and all the way through that to 2.10 or
    so, there's a list of things that addresses what you said. For
    example, you said what about medical? Well, so did we. We know
    that the medical indications and medical records are protected,
    and they should be. But we raise the question of whether we
    shouldn't review whether there are ways to make some of that
    history, especially when it pertains to some things I've said
    before--drug abuse and the like--available on a more regular
    basis to those who need to have these indicators.
        Senator Ben Nelson. If you don't have all the dots, you
    can't connect them.
        Mr. West. Exactly.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do want to
    express my appreciation to you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, for
    all your service to this country, and obviously being called
    back into service for your extraordinary work in regard to this
    tragic incident.
        I also want to take this opportunity to express my
    condolences to those who lost family members and loved ones
    during this terrible event. It was a horrific event in our
    Nation's history and the fact that it happened at Fort Hood, a
    place where more people have deployed to fight against
    terrorism than any other place, is really heartbreaking. Our
    heartfelt appreciation goes to those first responders who, once
    informed of the situation, as you have noted, not only arrived
    quickly, but showed tremendous professionalism and dedication
    to duty and in doing so saved a lot of lives.
        I want to ask you about a couple of findings in your
    report. One is finding 3.8 of your review, which states: ``DOD
    does not have a policy governing privately-owned weapons.''
    Your recommendation states that: ``DOD needs to review the need
    for such a policy.'' I guess my question is, can you explain
    what you mean by a privately owned weapons policy?
        Mr. West. There exists, for example at Fort Hood, which
    among other things is a popular place for hunting, so a lot of
    folks come on to hunt--so the effort to have some sort of
    control over guns has to be carefully balanced, the need to
    come on and use it, but also the security of the post. The way
    that works and often works at a number of installations is
    this. First of all, all weapons issued by the U.S. military to
    its personnel are locked in the armory if you're enlisted or
    officer or what have you. They're secured. So on the day of the
    event, the only armed person on the scene until those who were
    part of the security force arrived was the perpetrator.
        The policy works this way there. If you live in the
    barracks, then your privately owned weapon must of course be
    owned--properly registered in accordance with State and Federal
    law and the like, but also need to be registered with the
    commander so that they know what's there. If you live in the
    barracks, it is also secured in the armory. If you live in
    personal quarters on the base, properly registered with the
    commander, you keep them in your home. If you live off the
    base, the only requirement is that they be registered in
    accordance with State and Federal law, because you don't have
    them on the base. If you bring them onto the base, previously
    there was no way to know when that happened if you were a card-
    carrying member of the Armed Forces, if you had your
    credentials.
        Now there's going to be a requirement, and I guess there
    always was--to the same rules as anyone bringing privately-
    owned weapons onto base: Let us know that you're bringing them
    on, right there at the gate.
        What doesn't exist is any way in which bringing them on and
    concealing them, if you were a credentialed member of the Armed
    Forces, could have been detected. We really don't have the
    answer on how to deal with that, but we do know that it is a
    gap in the protection that was accorded to those that day.
        We know one other thing. The policies vary from post to
    post. So the question we raised is simply this: Give some
    thought, DOD, as to whether you wish to have a DOD-wide policy
    with respect to the bringing and the use of private weapons on
    the post by those who are members of the U.S. military. Fairly
    straightforward.
        Senator Thune. You don't prescribe that. What you've just
    described is the policy at Fort Hood.
        Mr. West. Right. It varies from post to post.
        Senator Thune. It varies from installation to installation,
    and the suggestion is simply that DOD adopt some uniform----
        Mr. West. Consider, consider.
        Senator Thune. Okay. All right, without getting into the
    details of that.
        That brings me to another question, because you have
    described the timing of the incident. News reports have
    indicated that it lasted about 10 minutes. Your report said 2
    minutes and 40 seconds after the initial 9-1-1 call
    installation first responders arrived, 1\1/2\ minutes later the
    assailant was incapacitated, which accounts for about 4 minutes
    and 10 seconds of the timeline, which as you said, is almost
    superhuman in terms of response time. It really is remarkable
    and a great credit to those who responded.
        But could we assume then that there was a time period
    before they got there, if in fact--I think you said 7 or 8
    minutes.
        Mr. West. That was our best estimate, but for the very
    reasons you pointed out, we're not so sure. We just stated the
    best estimate.
        Senator Thune. Okay. Which is still a significant amount of
    time; I guess the question is a follow-up to the previous
    question. But if the soldiers would have been armed at the
    time, in other words allowed to carry small firearms, in your
    opinion could more lives have been saved?
        Mr. West. Might as well give an answer----
        Admiral Clark. Well, they're soldiers. If they had been
    carrying their weapons around on them, it would have been
    different. How different? How can I tell you? What would the
    timeline have been? But of course it would have been different.
        Mr. West. What I was hesitating about is that I thought
    this was a natural lead-in to the active shooter program as
    well, which Admiral Clark spent some time talking about. Maybe
    we didn't go into it in detail, but the answer to your question
    is armed servicemembers could probably have done so. The
    difference, of course, is security personnel trained to take
    down someone in those circumstances differently, and in two
    ways.
        In the past the practice has been clear out all the
    innocents, those who are unarmed, those who are being assailed,
    and then you take down the shooter. That has been the practice
    for law enforcement agencies throughout the United States as
    well. But there has been the advocacy of the response to active
    shooter program, which is more and more becoming the response,
    which is: Train your security people with firearms and then go
    in, and as your first priority, take down the shooter before he
    or she can do more damage to those who are there.
        But the risks are obvious and that's why the emphasis is on
    training. The FBI, who are the experts on this, have cautioned
    that you really need a carefully selected and well-trained
    force to do that. It was done at Fort Hood.
        Senator Thune. They performed extremely well.
        Admiral Clark. May I add one other point? My response was
    brief, almost to the point of being brusque, let me just add.
    It would have made a difference, but if I were a commander
    would that be the first thing that I did, arm all the people on
    the base? That's not what I would do. Would it make a
    difference if some portion of them were armed? Of course it
    would. But the reason I wouldn't just summarily arm everybody
    is because of the fact that it would so change the environment
    that we live in. I don't think that's the immediate solution to
    good order and discipline.
        Senator Thune. I guess in response to that, if, in fact,
    there is going to be some consideration given to a policy, a
    Department-wide policy with regard to firearms, I would hope it
    would not be more restrictive, because I do think these are
    soldiers. These are people who are trained. Clearly, if anybody
    would be prepared, probably not trained exactly in emergency
    response, but people who would be trained and prepared and
    equipped to effectively use a firearm to save other lives, it
    would be someone in the U.S. military. That's my observation.
        So I have some other questions, but I'm out of time. So
    thank you all very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Senator Burris.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, may
    I go on record as also objecting to the comment that was made
    by the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma in reference to
    profiling.
        I also want to commend the two distinguished public
    servants here, one of whom I've known since he was a freshman
    at Howard University, and to see him move through the ranks and
    commit all of this service to America is what I anticipated
    when I saw him as a freshman when I was in law school at
    Howard, and then of course seeing him graduate also from Howard
    Law School. So, Secretary West, you have done a tremendous job
    for the people of America and we are very, very grateful to you
    for that.
        Mr. West. Thank you, Senator. Your own lifelong record of
    public service is quite distinguished and I consider your
    compliment that much more valuable. Thank you.
        Senator Burris. Admiral, I appreciate your service as well.
    I just didn't attend school with you.
        I am really seeking to see how we get at the major problem
    that you were tasked to do. I had other questions, but the
    hearing has just provoked some other thoughts. Mr. Secretary,
    you mentioned the fact that when you take an oath of office in
    the military--and I'm just wondering whether or not there's a
    different standard under the constitutional rights that you
    have after you've taken the oath of office. It's something I
    may have been missing because I've never been in the military,
    and I just want to know whether or not a person who has taken
    an oath, there are different standards that they are held to,
    for example, the free speech article or the right to bear arms
    article, which was brought up by Senator Thune. Could you
    comment on that, please?
        Mr. West. I will, and then I think you'll be interested to
    hear the views of someone who has commanded at every level and
    has had to give these instructions to his officers and those
    serving under him.
        Years ago I was the DOD General Counsel, so we tried to
    remain conversant with this for obvious reasons. I was a Judge
    Advocate General officer as well. The basic rule is stated:
    Servicemembers, whether they are officers or enlisted, who come
    into the Services are still citizens of the United States. They
    do not give up their basic constitutional rights and
    protections. They get to speak, especially when they're on
    their own time and not in uniform, freely. They get to
    associate under the same circumstances. They are entitled, if
    they are accused of criminal activity while on Active Duty, to
    a trial with a number of the constitutional protections, not
    all, because, as I think Admiral Clark observed, they do agree
    when they take the oath of office to put some things, as he
    said, on the shelf. For example, when they're in uniform they
    can't just say anything they darn well please.
        I may have said it too broadly. There are lots of things
    you can add in, qualifications. But it's just a fact of life
    and, frankly, when they're on Active Duty in uniform they can't
    just go anywhere at any time to do whatever they please. They
    are under orders. They are under obligations, either as
    officers or as noncommissioned officers, to respond as they are
    directed, to carry out their orders fully. They represent this
    country as well as serving it.
        Now, I've said that way too broadly, I'm sure. But I think
    it gives an overlay. It says yes, they don't ever stop being
    citizens, they don't lose their constitutional protections, but
    there are some limits that can be imposed on them under lawful
    military authority.
        Admiral Clark. Secretary West said all of that like the
    true veteran that he is. It was absolutely perfect. I would
    just add that, so let's say we're having a time--it's the
    political season and people are running for office. A member of
    the Armed Forces is not allowed to show up there in uniform.
    Now, if they choose to do so--and I'll use my words very
    carefully--they will be counseled, to be sure. I would say
    they'll probably be part of a short but exciting conversation,
    is the way I might put it.
        There are other areas. When we're overseas, the first thing
    we tell our sailors is: Remember, you are ambassadors of the
    United States of America. We put limits on the kind of things
    that we expected them to do and things that we clearly expected
    them not to do. So those are the things that we are speaking
    to, and certainly, as Secretary West said so correctly, basic
    constitutional rights are never in question.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Admiral.
        Another general question that's running through my mind.
    Now, in your work in this short period of time did you seek to
    assess other violent acts that may have taken place on military
    bases, on American soil or military bases, say the incident in
    Iraq where one of the soldiers supposedly snapped and killed
    fellow service persons? Did you look into any of that?
        Admiral Clark. Absolutely. Team one went into great detail
    of policies across the board. They're the group that reviewed
    over 30,000 pages of instructions and policies. It was
    incredible. We called this the omnibus team. It was an
    unbelievable task that they had. They used as a frame of
    reference to look into these special cases and say, now are
    there weaknesses here? Because the Secretary of Defense asked
    us to look for weaknesses in policies, programs, procedures,
    and gaps. So we looked at those, and basically we found that--
    this instruction, by the way, that I hold in front of me has
    extensive detail about the questions you raise about the things
    that you can and cannot do. In other words, the prohibited
    activities are outlined here.
        But our team used those particular cases like you cited as
    a springboard and said, are the policies adequate?
    Fundamentally, what we're reporting is that--and let me inject
    this thought. We know that you can't legislate perfect
    behavior. That's not possible. So the question is, are the
    policies fundamentally sound? The areas that we have put a
    focus on in the report, specifically this internal threat is
    the area where we see the greatest need.
        Senator Burris. I just wonder, gentlemen, whether or not in
    your assessment and in your report we're trying to get at
    something through procedures that is almost impossible to
    prevent. It's similar to a suicide bomber, as I would see it, a
    person who is willing to commit his own death. All the policies
    and procedures that we would put in place, all the
    corrections--for example, Mr. Secretary, if you were to have
    some type of procedure to go on base, whether or not you bring
    your private arms on base or not, what happens if the
    commanding officer was to have a problem? Do you think that the
    military police is going to stop a commanding officer at the
    gate and search him for his own private weapon and determine
    whether or not, if he's bringing that weapon on base, if he is
    determined to make some type of violent act or statement?
        I just bring that up as a result of our attempt to try to
    get procedures that are going to be in the place that would
    seek to prevent someone from doing such a violent act.
        Mr. West. That's a very pertinent observation, Senator
    Burris, and it is exactly on point. It is why we have
    emphasized in our report that we can't rely solely on stopping
    someone at the boundary. We have to have looked for the signs,
    for the 100-yard stare, for the examples of tensions or
    difficulties even in a personal life, and we can do this if
    they use government facilities--for the communications with
    extremist persons or organizations on a repeated basis.
        We can look for all those signs. We can look for the signs
    of drug abuse because--and I mention that so often because
    there is some literature that our team one found, incidentally,
    has its report in chapter 2. We looked for those signs--that
    say that past drug abuse, even when corrected, is often linked
    to later outbreaks of violence. So we have to look for what
    Admiral Clark discussed in his opening statement as the
    behavioral cues and indicators, and we must do that over the
    course, say, of the colonel's service, to find them early
    enough so that it doesn't get to the point that he brings his
    weapon onto their base in some crazed effort.
        Now that is the thrust, frankly, of the entire report, and
    thank you for getting right to the heart of it.
        Senator Burris. Mr. Secretary, the question is, can this
    and will this happen again? God knows we don't want it to. But
    think about it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
        Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary and Admiral, again to add to my colleagues, thank
    you for the work that you've done. Thank you for your past
    service. Thank you for this service.
        I also want to extend my condolences to the families of the
    Fort Hood soldiers who were killed. We're keeping them in our
    thoughts and our prayers.
        I want to, first of all, just state that I think we all
    agree, and your report certainly says, that this was a failure
    on the front end. We commend the first responders for their
    fantastic work, but this was a failure. I don't want to belabor
    that, because I think it's been talked about, Mr. Chairman.
        But there's a Houston Chronicle article of yesterday,
    Richard Lardner and Calvin Woodward, that I'd ask be submitted
    for the record, which I think details a lot of the failures in
    monitoring Major Hassan along the way, and that something
    should have been done to prevent this.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, sir.
        What I want to talk about is three things, and there are
    questions for you. The first one is to follow up on what
    Senator Thune was talking about concerning soldiers on the base
    carrying weapons. This struck me as well because I recently
    this past week went to four military bases in Florida, from
    Naval Air Station Pensacola, to Tindall, to Eglin, to Hurlbert
    Air Force Base. The thing that you notice different than going
    to a military base in a theater of war, like going to Bagram
    Air Force Base, is that the soldiers and the airmen and the
    sailors aren't carrying weapons. But when you're at Bagram you
    see half of the service men and women carrying their weapons.
        I don't think that this would have happened potentially at
    Bagram Air Force Base for two reasons. One is there would have
    been a huge deterrent to Major Hassan if he knew that the other
    soldiers were carrying weapons. The second thing is, if it
    would have happened, to follow up on Senator Thune's point,
    that 4 minutes of time or whatever the period was where there
    was no first responder there, one of our servicemembers I am
    sure would have picked up their weapon and fired back.
        I hope that you will in your continuing work stress this to
    the Secretary of Defense, because, while I understand the
    Admiral's point about order on the base, there is probably a
    sweet spot here where some of the folks on a base, even in the
    United States of America, should be carrying weapons, maybe
    where there's going to be large groups gathered, I guess like
    where this processing center was happening.
        So I don't know if you have any further comments on that.
    You've already answered Senator Thune's question, but I want to
    make that point. Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. West. I have a comment, and that is this. It has
    happened overseas where people have been carrying weapons.
    We've had incidents in which a soldier has gone berserk and
    started shooting and there were weapons around him; it didn't
    stop it.
        Second, let's assume that everyone's able to carry weapons,
    say at Fort Hood. Well then, for a committed person it wouldn't
    have been necessary to smuggle them in to use them.
        Then third, I guess--well, no. I think first and second is
    enough. If the Admiral wants to add a third, I will let him.
        Admiral Clark. I don't argue with your fundamental point. I
    would just say that as a commander I realized that I was
    responsible for the creation of the environment. So the
    deployed environment is always different than the environment
    at home. So I think there are a lot of things that I could
    figure out how to do before I decided to arm every single human
    being on the base.
        I don't discount at all your point about the degree of
    difficulty for a shooter. But I believe Secretary West has
    accurately responded. We have cases, to be sure, and we have
    been very careful not to define specific single-point dot
    solutions for these cases because, for starters, we did this in
    an extraordinarily short period of time. If we were going to
    then look at all the possible courses of alternative solutions
    for every one of the recommendations we made, we would have
    needed at least 6 months and not the short time we had.
        Senator LeMieux. I understand that. I'm just saying that
    there's a general point. I used the term ``sweet spot'' for a
    reason, not that you would put a gun on every service man or
    woman's side, but that there be some thought about this point,
    because I do think that knowing that someone is bearing arms is
    a deterrent. Maybe it hasn't always been a deterrent, but it
    can be a deterrent. It certainly might have saved 13 people. We
    don't know, but it might have saved some of them.
        The second thing is, in terms of--Senator Collins is going
    to speak in a minute and her Homeland Security and Governmental
    Affairs Committee, along with Senator Lieberman, has talked
    about the need for training for all servicemembers in
    identifying signs of Islamic extremism. I wonder if we don't
    only need to encourage our servicemembers to look for these
    signs and report them, but that we need to do more than that
    and require it.
        I think about something that universities do. I didn't
    attend the University of Virginia, but I understand they have a
    very stringent honor code. The honor code can be broken in two
    ways: one, by violating it; and the second is failing to report
    that someone else violated it. I wonder for your consideration,
    whether or not we should make a suggestion like that, that you
    have an obligation as a member of the U.S. military that if you
    see something that is out of line, to report it. There, if I
    feel like in my service record I'm going to be reprimanded for
    not reporting something--none of us like to tell on our
    colleagues. It's human nature. But I also commend that to you
    as something you could consider, and if you want to comment on
    that I'd appreciate that as well.
        Admiral Clark. I think these are the kind of questions, all
    in pursuit of potential solutions, that the Secretary would
    think is going on, without suggesting whether one is the right
    solution or not. Phase two is to do the drill-down, and they
    couldn't do the drill-down on the whole breadth of things that
    we looked at 30,000-plus pages of directions and policies and
    all of that. Our job was to put the spotlight on the key things
    that they could go do in a hurry. It's my understanding that's
    his expectation for phase two.
        Senator LeMieux. The third and final point I have is, we've
    heard this phrase, ``connect-the-dots.'' I heard it yesterday
    when we had a Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
    hearing with Secretary Napolitano and Director Leitner about
    the Christmas Day bombing attempt. That's, obviously, the great
    struggle, is connecting the dots. You mentioned, Admiral,
    perhaps having some other special unit or division of people
    who would try to do that.
        That seems to be smart to me, that you have someone who's
    going to look through all of the information, not be tasked
    with maybe other jobs, but be tasked with trying to--I don't
    know if it's an internal affairs function or if it's just a
    function to make sure that someone is out there looking at
    these reports that are filled out on different service men and
    women. I know there's a lot of people in the U.S. military.
        But we have really good technology in this country,
    technology that's being used by the private sector. I don't
    know if these reports are scanned. I don't know if they're
    entered on a computer. I don't know if someone can use cloud
    computing and some of these new techniques to do searches.
        We've failed again on the almost terrible tragedy on
    Christmas Day because of a misspelling of a name and other
    things that failed in our intelligence and the way that we
    process, gather, and evaluate intelligence. One thing I just
    might commend to you in your further discussions with the
    Secretary is, if you do establish one of these units, talking
    to people in the private sector who develop this wonderful
    technology and see if it might be an aid for helping keep our
    service men and women safe.
        Admiral Clark. May I comment? We say in the report that
    we've been having arguments about who owns what pieces of
    information. We've been having those discussions long enough.
    It's time to move on. So without defining what that solution
    is, I don't know how a commander can possibly connect the dots
    if he doesn't have all the dots in his dot kit. ``Dot kit'' may
    be the right term.
        But also, I bring attention to this point. We told the
    Secretary this isn't just interagency. This is inside the
    Department as well. Challenge the assumptions on who has all of
    the pieces of information. The commanders will be better
    equipped and we know how brilliant they are when they're given
    the tools.
        Mr. West. Actually, I think the organization that you're
    thinking about that we recommended was one that's designed to
    collect all the indicators, keep them catalogued, update them
    regularly, and make them available to commanders and those who
    have to make decisions. Your idea has, I think, to do with
    connecting dots on specific individuals, where those things
    come up. That's an interesting concept and it's not one that we
    necessarily focused on. Thank you for that.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks very much
    to Secretary West and Admiral Clark for the service that you've
    given in doing this report, and of course throughout your
    lives. The attack of November 5, 2009, was a tragedy and we're
    very grateful for the efforts that you've made along with DOD
    personnel working with you in this review to ensure that such a
    tragedy doesn't happen again.
        The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee--
    and Senator Collins and I are here--has been investigating the
    Fort Hood shootings to assess the information the government
    had prior to the shootings and the actions it took in response
    to that information. I can tell you that, even at this early
    stage of our investigation, it's become apparent to us that
    DOD's approach to the threat of servicemembers who adopt a
    violent Islamist extremist ideology needs to be revised.
        Senator Collins and I sent a letter last week along those
    lines to Secretary Gates. I know there's sensitivity on this
    about the other Muslim Americans who are serving honorably in
    our military, but I honestly think that a more focused
    approach, an open approach on Islamist extremism, will protect
    the overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans serving in the
    military, who are serving honorably, and will maintain the
    bonds of trust that are so necessary in a military context
    among servicemembers of all religions.
        It seems to me in the Fort Hood case that there were many
    indicators that Nidal Hassan was motivated to commit these
    murders in furtherance of his own violent Islamist extremist
    ideology. But I must say respectfully that your report only
    tangentially mentions that particular threat. In contrast, your
    review recommends generally that the Department ``identify
    common indicators leading up to a wide range of destructive
    events, regardless of the individual's identity.''
        I understand again DOD's need to be sensitive to the
    religious beliefs of all its servicemembers and employees. But
    I think it's also critically important, and I don't see it in
    your report, as much as I admire so many of the recommendations
    you've made, that we recognize the specific threats posed by
    violent Islamist extremism to our military.
        So I wanted to ask you first, how do you think the
    Department and the Services should address the specific threat
    of violent Islamist extremism and if you want to respond to my
    concern generally about this? I will add that I remember being
    disappointed, troubled, after the Fort Hood murders when
    General Casey's first response described the incident as a
    force protection failure, which I suppose in one sense it was.
    But it was also a terrorist attack in my opinion. To a certain
    extent, the title of your report, ``Protecting the Force,''
    continues that emphasis, as opposed to a focused emphasis on
    the problem we're facing now, just as we focused earlier, after
    Fort Bragg, on the very real problem explicitly of white
    supremist extremism.
        So I welcome your response generally and particularly.
        Mr. West. I was the Secretary of the Army at the time of
    the Fort Bragg, Senator, and because I was given a little more
    leeway I was the one who ordered the review that occurred. We
    operated under the same constraints then that--the folks we
    appointed operated under the same constraints then that we
    operate under now. That is, they had an ongoing military
    justice investigation and in fact, because the victims were
    civilians and the acts occurred off post in Fayetteville, still
    to this day one is struck. I mean, the servicemembers required
    two civilians to kneel and shot them execution-style.
        So there were several, multiple criminal investigations,
    and so that task force that we appointed could not get into
    what might have been criminal aspects or anything that would
    have imperiled the trials. We operated under that same
    constraint.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay, so that's the reason you thought
    you couldn't be more explicit about Islamist extremism?
        Mr. West. What we had to say, a lot of it is in the
    restricted annex. But no, I think to your second point we had
    is, respectfully, yes, it was and yes, it is a force protection
    issue. That is the way in which it was handed to us and that is
    the way in which we had to approach it.
        In that case, it is every kind of extremism, every kind of
    opportunity for violence, that we, if we're going to have this
    one shot, Admiral Clark and I, to make recommendations to DOD,
    have to be sure to cover. So yes, we went for indicators, for
    cues and the like, but we did not exclude any source of
    violence and we specifically did not exclude the source that
    comes from radical Islamic belief associated with the actions
    that go with it.
        Admiral Clark has some thoughts I know he wants to add. We
    talked about it more than once. So I'm going to stop here, but
    that's my brief oversight of how we approached it.
        Senator Lieberman. Let me just, before we go to Admiral
    Clark, just follow up while I'm thinking about it, because
    after those heinous murders at Fort Bragg in 1995 the Army, as
    General Keane testified to us, issued a pamphlet, training
    materials, that are quite directly oriented towards supremist
    activities and other racial extremism, and specifically
    detailed some of the key indicators to look for in white
    supremists, which I thought was exactly the right thing to do,
    of course.
        I guess the question now is do you think the Services
    should issue a similar type of pamphlet with the same kinds of
    recommendations to address the threat of violent Islamist
    extremism, because that is the reality. Of course--do you want
    to respond to that?
        Mr. West. Only that I think you make a good point.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay, thank you.
        Admiral, please.
        Admiral Clark. Good to see you again, Senator.
        Senator Lieberman. You too, Admiral.
        Admiral Clark. In my opening statement I talked about
    violence and I made the point that some have indicated that we
    did not address the kind of violence that you're speaking to,
    radical Islamic fundamentalism and the behavior that goes with
    that. The point that I made is, yes, we did. Because Secretary
    Gates wrote us a set of terms of reference that talked about
    violence in the workplace and the people, including people
    hurting themselves, we decided to go after it in that way.
        But we used the term ``radicalization'' and ``self-
    radicalization'' dozens of times in the report, which we
    intended to make clear we're talking about every kind of
    violent behavior, including this. Then we go on to then specify
    in our recommendations--and I made the point about, here's the
    DOD directive that talks about prohibited activities. Our point
    is this document is inadequate to the task when dealing with
    self-radicalized individuals.
        So that's what we're talking about. I could not agree with
    you more completely that we need the outreach program.
    ``Outreach,'' I mean we have to reach out and let people know
    what the positions are and where the red lines are in
    behaviors, and then with that goes all of the training that you
    talked to. So I made that a matter of my prior testimony and
    I'm in complete alignment with that view.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that clarification. In my
    opinion, because--of course there's a concern about force
    protection generally. But because this is a unique new threat
    we're facing, I think the more explicit we are about it the
    clearer it's going to be and the better off we're going to be,
    because, as somebody said, some of the regulations earlier had
    to do with almost Cold War scenarios, and then the obvious
    response to the white supremist killings. Now, unfortunately,
    we've had now two cases, Akbar in Kuwait and Hassan.
    Unfortunately, the way things are going, we'll probably have
    some more. So for the protection of the force, I think we have
    to be really explicit about what this threat is.
        My time is up. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, it's good to see you both. Thank you for your
    continued public service.
        Senator Lieberman, the chairman of our Homeland Security
    and Governmental Affairs Committee, has asked exactly the
    questions that I planned to ask, which is not a surprise
    because we've been working together on the whole issue of
    homegrown terrorism and the threat of Islamist extremism.
        I do want to follow up a bit on the point that Senator
    Lieberman just made, because I was struck when I read the
    public part of your report by the decision to omit the term
    ``Islamist extremism'' from the public report, and it troubled
    me. It troubled me because it appeared to contrast sharply with
    the approach that DOD has taken in the past. Your report
    recommends that the Army focus on a broad range of motivations
    for violence rather than focusing on specific causes. But
    that's not what the Department and the Army did after the
    racially motivated murders associated with Fort Bragg back in
    1995. The 1995 guidance is striking because it squarely faces
    the problem, and I believe that's why it was so effective. It
    sent a clear message that white supremists had no place among
    our troops.
        I believe we need to send a similarly clear message.
    Indeed, in 1996, in response to the Fort Bragg incident--and
    obviously, Mr. Secretary, you're more familiar with it than I
    since you were involved in correcting the problem at the time--
    but in response, commanders were specifically advised to be
    aware of ``indicators of possible extremist views, behaviors,
    or affiliations.'' They were told to look for specific signs,
    such as reading materials or the use of a personal computer to
    visit extremist sites. These signs were geared toward
    identifying white supremists within the ranks.
        What Senator Lieberman and I have suggested in our letter
    to Secretary Gates is that same kind of focus, squarely
    admitting what the problem is. So my worry is that the
    perception of your report for those who only get to read the
    public part will be that we're not facing the problem squarely
    the way we did in the mid-1990s, and it worked. The guidance
    was excellent. It involved training our commanders or enlisted
    troops, and it appears to have been very successful.
        So, without presuming to speak for my chairman, Senator
    Lieberman, that's what we're suggesting, that we squarely face
    this threat to our troops.
        So I would end what I realize has been more of a comment
    than a question by urging you to more explicitly address this
    specific threat. It doesn't ignore the fact that there are
    other sources of violence. But in fact, family violence,
    suicide prevention, sexual assault, all extremely important
    priorities for us, but they are different in their nature than
    the threat from Islamic extremists.
        So I'd ask you to comment particularly on whether we should
    have specific training to recognize the signs of radicalization
    in this area. Mr. Secretary and then Admiral Clark.
        Mr. West. It's almost impossible to have a comment,
    Senator. That was a very powerful statement, along with Senator
    Lieberman's statement. You of course put me a little bit under
    the gun by pointing out that that's what we did in the Army
    when that occurred.
        I won't even spend time on the distinctions. I think there
    are some clearly. Being a white supremist carries no overtones
    of constitutional protections of any sort, whereas a religion
    is always--I know I'm going to be accused of being politically
    correct here, but so what--is always an area where we have to
    go carefully.
        For example, religious extremism, violent, aggressive
    religious extremism, is a source of threat to our soldiers,
    sailors, marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen, whatever the
    religious source. We need to be careful, and we tried to be
    careful when we did this, to make sure that we turn the
    military's attention inward, since the person that was quoted
    earlier as having talked about the Cold War, that was Secretary
    Gates. What he was pointing out was something we said, which is
    we have been focused on the external threat. Now we have to
    look at the internal threat, from within, from one of our own.
        As I said before, this is our one shot at it, Admiral Clark
    and I, and we want to make sure that we look at the indicators,
    and religious extremism, whatever its source, is an indicator,
    and there are a whole bunch of things to look at. I think that
    description is right. The fact, as you both make it, that it is
    Islamic religious extremism, I think it is a point worth
    making. I think the Secretary and everyone will hear it and
    they will react accordingly. But that becomes part of the
    history of this discussion.
        Senator Collins. Admiral Clark.
        Admiral Clark. It's so nice to see you again, Senator. It's
    been a privilege for me to be engaged working on this task.
    When the Secretary of Defense asked me to do this, I did so
    because I believed it was so important.
        Let me say that within 5 minutes of it going public that I
    was going to co-chair this task force with Secretary West, my
    very good friend General Jack Keane was calling on the phone
    and telling me in great detail--I was driving down the road on
    my cell phone, and he was explaining to me how they did it. He
    happened to have been in command down there at Fort Bragg and I
    was commander of the Second Fleet and we were friends and
    worked together down there then.
        So I've been mindful of his point of view on this since the
    very, very beginning and was in complete alignment with it.
        To build upon my response to Senator Lieberman, I'm just
    going to give you Vern's view here. We talked about this a lot,
    how do we shape this. If we shape this as--if the report was
    full of reference to radical Islamic fundamentalist activity
    and behavior, some people would have read it that it was going
    to be all about that. The Secretary of Defense clearly gave us
    another task. He gave us the task to deal with violence in the
    workplace across the board, and because he did we made the
    decision that we were going to handle it the way we have
    presented it, but when questioned about--we frankly, Senator,
    didn't know how people were going to be able to misread the
    references to self-radicalization. We thought that that was
    going to be pretty clear, but maybe it wasn't clear enough.
        Our focus then, and one of our primary recommendations is
    the guidance on these behaviors is inadequate, and the way you
    make it adequate is you decide what the red lines are going to
    be, you inform your people, you do everything that you know how
    to do--and that's called training--to ensure that our people
    know how to respond. That's what those of us who've had the
    privilege to command are charged to do. We talk about
    officership in the report and so forth. That's what leaders do
    and that is what is required.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
        I was listening to Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins
    with the suggestion that we address a specific threat, since it
    obviously is a specific threat. It is appropriate that our
    leaders be directed as to how to address that threat, just the
    way they were, I guess, in the 1990s with the white
    supremacists, but to make it clear and to make it certain that
    it's not viewed as an anti-Muslim effort, but rather an effort
    to address violent extremism, radical Islamic extremism, it
    would be very essential, it seems to me, wise that people who
    were involved in preparing that kind of instruction include
    Muslims, because obviously that would be important in terms of
    knowledge of the threat, but also important in terms of making
    it clear that is not anti-Muslim. 99 percent of Muslims are not
    people who are engaged in these kind of activities, and to make
    it clear it's not this kind of an effort, which I think is a
    legitimate effort, that Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins
    talk about. That is a legitimate effort to make it clear that
    it is not aimed at Muslims, but aimed at violent Islamic
    radical extremism, and it's important that Muslims be
    significantly involved in that direction.
        I was wondering if Senator Lieberman or Senator Collins
    might want to comment on that suggestion.
        Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, I think that's an
    excellent suggestion. In some ways you've given voice to it.
    But it would be a real omission, as I hear you talk, if it
    wasn't done, in other words if Muslims weren't involved.
        One of the things in this fact situation that troubles me,
    and I suppose why I feel like we have to talk explicitly to one
    another about this threat, including most of all to have in the
    conversation Muslim Americans. Obviously, as Senator Levin
    said, 99 percent plus are not extremists or terrorists.
        I worry as I look at this fact situation in Hassan's case
    that part of the reason that commanders and others who after
    the attacks at Fort Hood were spewing out to the media these
    signs that looked back and said he showed he was really turning
    in a very extremist, anti-American direction, that people
    didn't voice them or record them because of political
    correctness and, even more than political correctness, the
    sensitivity that we all have about religious discussions.
        But the truth is, the best thing that could happen here,
    it's a great place for it to begin, in the military, is to have
    a real open discussion about this. Of course, for it to be a
    real discussion it has to include Muslim Americans. So I think
    your suggestion--in other words, I think that if Muslim
    Americans had been seeing--I don't know what the facts were
    about this--some of the things that Hassan was saying at Walter
    Reed, for instance, I think they would have been alarmed,
    because this doesn't reflect what they think.
        Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I think your suggestion is really
    an excellent one. Thank you.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond as
    well. I too think that your suggestion is an excellent one and
    it's very consistent with the approach that Senator Lieberman
    and I have advocated on the Homeland Security and Governmental
    Affairs Committee. In fact, in our letter to Secretary Gates
    where we suggest more training, we point out that updating the
    approach would help to protect from suspicion the thousands of
    Muslim Americans who are serving honorably in the U.S. military
    and help to maintain the bonds of trust among servicemembers of
    all religions and enhance understanding.
        So the steps that we have recommended would clearly benefit
    from the inclusion and active involvement of Muslim Americans,
    and that's what we intended. But I also think it has benefits
    for Muslim Americans serving, so that other servicemembers have
    a better understanding of Islam. So I'm in complete accord with
    what you suggest. I think that is along the lines of what we
    were proposing as well.
        I would ask that we share with our two distinguished
    witnesses today the recommendations that Senator Lieberman and
    I have made in our January 13 letter to Secretary Gates,
    because as you go forward with your work it may be of value to
    you as well, we hope.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. One other thing that seems to me
    would be appropriate, and I don't know if you've addressed
    this, but it's sort of along this line: that our policies also
    should be very clear about why it is unacceptable, why it's not
    allowed, prohibited, to have taunting or harassment of people
    because of their religious views, as, according to the public
    record, occurred in the Hassan case.
        I don't know if that's true and I can't comment on your
    annex, but it seems to me this is part and parcel. Religious
    tolerance does not mean tolerance for violence and extremism.
    It doesn't mean that, as I pointed out maybe an hour ago.
    That's not what we're tolerant of. But what we are tolerant of,
    and proud of it, is other people's religious views. As part of
    that, it has to be importantly pointed out in the military that
    that means we do not accept taunts, graffiti about ``ragheads''
    or what have you, about anyone's religious views. I don't know
    if that is part of your recommendations here, that that be
    clear as well in terms of guidance, but it seems to me it's an
    important part of it.
        Admiral Clark. Let me address it. It's very well covered in
    the prohibited behaviors and activities.
        Chairman Levin. You mean currently?
        Admiral Clark. Currently. It's very well spelled out. So
    I've spoken only to what's not in this document. What's in this
    document is 100 percent right, and what we have said is this
    document does not have the piece in it regarding self-
    radicalized behavior.
        Mr. Chairman, I so want to appreciate the fact that you
    have collectively recognized the very effective and loyal
    service of thousands of Muslims. Somebody accused me of being
    politically correct. I don't care. The way you said it is
    exactly right and I appreciate it.
        Chairman Levin. One thing to make this even more complex.
    When we talk about connecting the dots, and we have to do a far
    better job of connecting the dots--I believe that's the
    greatest failure in this and the other incidents that we've
    been discussing in various committees--there are counter-
    indicating dots that complicate the work, including with Major
    Hassan. It's not just those dots which in my view would have
    made folks suspicious, had they known about it, of what his
    potential was, but there are some dots that go in the other
    direction in terms of--and these are in the public record--what
    his patients thought of him, which was very high. You have to
    throw those dots into the mix, too, for people who are going to
    be judging him.
        You have a record here of a number of his assessments were
    not just negative--that should have been included in the
    record, by the way; I happen to agree with you totally--but
    there's also some highly positive, not politically correct for
    that reason, but positive, assessments of his capability.
        I just think it's important that, since we're trying to
    take a general view of this, that while it's critically
    important to do a far better job of collecting dots, that we
    also recognize in terms of the task in front of us that there
    are some dots that are going to be in that mix which make it
    very unclear what you do with the dots which seem to point in
    one direction, because there are some dots that point in the
    other direction, even with him. They've not been focused on,
    obviously, but there are some counter-indicators here which are
    fairly clear as well.
        Finally, Admiral, you talk about reducing--``eliminating''
    I think is your word--the barriers, get rid of the barriers to
    information flow. I think generally you're right, and there's
    barriers here which clearly should not be there. So I agree
    with your premise. Are there any barriers that you'd want to
    maintain, either privacy barriers or barriers--for instance,
    you talked about I think prior drug problem or an addiction
    problem which has been overcome. Some of that's not passed
    along now. If it's been overcome, I think there's some instinct
    in commanders that maybe we should just let certain things not
    be passed along which would unfairly perhaps hurt somebody's
    career path if they've overcome a problem.
        Are there any barriers that you might want to keep?
        Admiral Clark. There may be, and if I were responsible for
    the policy review I would then look at all of the potential
    courses of action and make that kind of determination. But let
    me give you an example of the manner in which I might decide to
    handle the case you just suggested, because, as you correctly
    pointed out, by regulation there is some documentation that is
    not allowed to proceed from command to command.
        We could figure out how to compartmentalize information. We
    do it in the intelligence world all the time. The briefer comes
    into the room with the material that's in the pouch, that only
    certain people get to see that information. It would be very
    possible to have information that might be vital to connecting
    the dots that is currently not passed, passed in a way that's
    compartmented so that a select group of people had access to
    the information.
        I believe that that's inherent in achieving the correct
    balance, Secretary West and I would not want anything that was
    said here to imply in any way that the balance between these
    issues isn't--it's very, very important. You have addressed it
    correctly. This is a challenge.
        One of the hallmarks of the U.S. military is we grow and
    develop people. I've had dozens of these interviews with
    people: Okay, you're getting a new job, this is turning over a
    new leaf, this is the time to go get it. We've seen people turn
    their lives around. This is one of the great things about our
    institution.
        So clearly these are issues that the policymakers have to
    come to grips with. Our task was put the spotlight on policies,
    weaknesses, gaps, and that's what we have tried to do. I do
    believe that there may be places where barriers should be
    retained in some way.
        Chairman Levin. Maybe for some purpose.
        Admiral Clark. For some purpose.
        Chairman Levin. Maybe in a promotion.
        Admiral Clark. Exactly.
        Chairman Levin. It's different from whether it's a
    strategic issue.
        Admiral Clark. Exactly. But what I'm suggesting is that
    people who are responsible for these policy decisions know what
    the vital dots look like, know where they come from. As the
    report says and I said in my earlier testimony, the time is
    passed for us to be having these turf wars on who owns the
    information.
        Chairman Levin. I think we couldn't agree with you more,
    and this is a major challenge for all of us in the Senate and
    the House and our committees and, even more importantly
    probably, for the executive branch.
        Senator Lieberman, do you want to add anything?
        Senator Lieberman. No, thanks.
        Chairman Levin. We thank you for all the work you're doing,
    not just here but on the Homeland Security and Governmental
    Affairs Committtee. That committee is doing critically
    important work.
        We're now going to move to a closed session of the
    committee. We'll meet in room 222 in Russell, our committee
    room. In accordance with restrictions placed on access to the
    restricted annex, attendance will be limited to Senators and
    committee professional staff.
        We again thank our witnesses, not just for their work in
    this regard, but for their lifelong work on behalf of our
    Nation.
        The committee will stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                            indicators for violence
        1. Senator Akaka. Mr. West, research into the various predictors
    and causes of violence span many disciplines and offer varying
    perspectives regarding why some people resort to violence. These range
    from biological, to religious, social, and political factors. The four
    recommendations contained in 2.1 ``Protecting the Force: Lessons from
    Fort Hood, Report of the Department of Defense (DOD) Independent
    Review, January 2010'' (Independent Review) coalesce around the
    identification of contributing factors of violent actions and the
    reporting of behavioral indicators of violent actors. How must the DOD
    adequately update and strengthen programs, policies, processes, and
    procedures that address the identification of indicators for violence
    without violating the civil liberties that are enjoyed by the military
    members of the Armed Forces as well as DOD civilians?
        Mr. West. The Department should thoughtfully consider a wide range
    of options and exercise due caution to avoid infringing on civil
    liberties. There are risk-assessment tools available for the
    Department's consideration that would enhance DOD's ability to deal
    with potential internal threats without compromising fundamental civil
    liberties. In particular, DOD should draw on the expertise of the law
    enforcement community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI), which has developed methodologies to help understand the
    motivations and behaviors of violent offenders. My understanding is
    that the FBI has already been assisting DOD in understanding these
    issues.
        We recommend that DOD continue to coordinate with the FBI
    Behavioral Science Unit, under their comprehensive analysis of military
    offenders project to identify behavioral indicators that are specific
    to DOD personnel that would be used to help protect against internal
    threats.
        We also recommend that the Department develop tools and programs
    that would educate DOD personnel about indicators of possible violent
    behavior and help them determine the risk that such behavior might
    occur.

                            religious accommodations
        2. Senator Akaka. Mr. West, recommendation 2.7 of the Independent
    Review states that the DOD should promptly establish standards and
    reporting procedures that clarify guidelines for religious
    accommodations. How must the DOD adequately clarify policy regarding
    religious accommodations to help commanders distinguish appropriate
    religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for
    violence or self-radicalization while balancing the civil liberties
    that are enjoyed by the military members of the Armed Forces as well as
    DOD civilians?
        Mr. West. The Department should issue clear guidance to provide a
    common source for commanders, supervisors, and chaplains to distinguish
    appropriate religious practices. The Department should exercise due
    caution to avoid infringing on civil liberties. Clear standards would
    ensure consistent mechanisms across the military departments, assisting
    commanders and supervisors in assessing behavior and initiating action,
    if appropriate.

                             health care providers
        3. Senator Akaka. Admiral Clark, healthcare providers experience
    traumatic stress and provider burnout and are stigmatized when seeking
    treatment for stress and burnout. Other career fields, such as the
    Chaplaincy and their support personnel, have programs that assess
    stress and burnout. Recommendation 5.3 of the Independent Review states
    that the DOD should review its requirement to de-stigmatize healthcare
    providers who seek treatment. What steps should the DOD undertake to
    ensure the resiliency and recovery of healthcare providers so that they
    can continue to provide members of the Armed Forces and their families
    with the best healthcare?
        Admiral Clark. In order to ensure that healthcare providers can
    continue to provide outstanding care for warriors and their families as
    well as receive outstanding care themselves, DOD can take several steps
    to make certain that a good balance is being struck between health care
    for the warrior and health care for the provider. DOD's current
    deployment model, for example, should be reviewed to assess whether it
    provides sufficient continuity of care for redeploying servicemembers
    while not delaying recovery for health care providers who have been
    assigned to deploying combat units. DOD has a number of policies in
    place designed to guarantee that U.S. military forces receive top
    quality care and we are looking for further ways to integrate these
    policies and properly resource them to positively affect the
    Department's ability to continue delivering the best care available to
    all military members and their families.

                                  officership
        4. Senator Akaka. Admiral Clark, the joint opening statement refers
    to the fact that several individuals failed to apply professional
    standards of officership regarding the alleged perpetrator and that you
    recommended the Secretary of Defense forward these issues of
    accountability to the Secretary of the Army. How should the DOD address
    what the Independent Review characterizes as the failure to apply
    professional standards of officership and to make the reflection of an
    individual's total performance an accepted and standard practice
    throughout the Services?
        Admiral Clark. The conduct of Major Hasan's colleagues and former
    supervisors remains under review, and it would be inappropriate to
    comment at this time. Consistent with the recommendations of the
    Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of Defense referred issues of
    individual accountability to the Secretary of the Army for review and
    action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh assigned senior military
    leaders to investigate further, to assess accountability, and, as
    appropriate, to take final action. This process remains ongoing.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
                       actions not taken by army officers
        5. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, several officers
    failed to comply with existing Army policies when taking actions
    regarding the perpetrator, Major Hassan. There were also significant
    discrepancies between Major Hassan's performance in official records
    and his actual performance during training, residency, and fellowship.
    It seems that medical officers failed to include his overall
    performance as an officer, and instead, focused on his academic
    performance.
        We have to ensure that performance appraisals accurately provide a
    holistic overview of professional, ethical, and personal career
    development of all personnel. Incomplete performance appraisals prevent
    us from recognizing vital warning signs in dealing with internal
    threats. They also prevent leaders from being alert to psychological
    and emotional risk factors of servicemembers and civilians. How should
    Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of the Army McHugh ensure
    accountability for those failures by some medical officers that did not
    apply appropriate judgment?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. Consistent with the recommendations of
    the Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of Defense referred issues
    of individual accountability to the Secretary of the Army for review
    and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh assigned senior military
    leaders to investigate further, to assess accountability, and, as
    appropriate, to take final action. This process remains ongoing.

        6. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, why did Major
    Hassan's colleagues and former supervisors wait until after the Fort
    Hood incident to speak about the content of his extremist religious
    views?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. The conduct of Major Hasan's colleagues
    and former supervisors remains under review, and it would be
    inappropriate to comment at this time. Consistent with the
    recommendations of the Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of
    Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the Secretary
    of the Army for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh
    assigned senior military leaders to investigate further, to assess
    accountability, and, as appropriate, to take final action. This process
    remains ongoing.

        7. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, what did the Army's
    higher authorities do when complaints were sent up the chain?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. The conduct of Major Hasan's colleagues
    and former supervisors remains under review, and it would be
    inappropriate to comment at this time. Consistent with the
    recommendations of the Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of
    Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the Secretary
    of the Army for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh
    assigned senior military leaders to investigate further, to assess
    accountability, and, as appropriate, to take final action. This process
    remains ongoing.

                        interagency information sharing
        8. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, I agree that in order
    to protect the force, our civilian leaders and commanders in the field
    need immediate access to sensitive information regarding
    servicemembers' personal contacts, connections, or relationships with
    organizations promoting radicalization and violence. I encourage the
    Army and the DOD at-large to adopt the recommendation of the
    Independent Review to increase service representation on Joint
    Terrorism Task Forces and coordination with the FBI. What suggestions
    and recommendations can you offer to facilitate enhanced cooperation
    and information sharing between executive department agencies like the
    FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, and the Army Secretariat?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. Liaison and information sharing
    agreements already exist among the executive department agencies you
    mention, but they can be strengthened. Many of these liaison and
    information sharing agreements currently focus on antiterrorism
    cooperation, potentially precluding the agencies from sharing sensitive
    information pertaining to a servicemember's propensity to commit
    violent acts. DOD should review the scope of these agreements to
    determine where they can appropriately be expanded and strengthened to
    enhance a commander's ability to assess his or her personnel.
        We were pleased to learn that Secretary Gates approved our
    recommendation to establish a single organization within DOD to manage
    its participation in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. We also are
    pleased the Secretary approved our recommendation to revise
    significantly DOD's Memorandum of Understanding with the FBI.

        9. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, what challenges do
    you foresee?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. First, revising interagency agreements
    is often a time-consuming process, particularly in the case of
    agreements that involve multiple interagency partners. Second,
    comprehensively accounting for all existing agreements will likely also
    be a time-consuming process. For example, in some cases, each Service
    has a separate agreement with a particular Federal agency on
    information sharing. Determining where these agreements differ, what
    the gaps are between them, and whether it is necessary or desirable to
    bring them under a single umbrella will be time consuming.

        ensuring that force protection policies counter internal threats
        10. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, one of the most
    significant takeaways I got out of the Independent Review was that DOD
    force protection policies are not optimized for countering internal
    threats, and reflect a lack of awareness of the factors and indicators
    we have to be focused on in addressing internal threats.
        I agree that we need to provide commanders with comprehensive
    guidance and a full range of indicators designed to effectively
    identify and address internal threats within the U.S. military
    establishment. Do you anticipate challenges in the military departments
    developing such guidance and indicators?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. We do not doubt that the military
    departments are committed to working to develop such guidance and
    indicators. That said, this is a complex undertaking, and we anticipate
    that it will be difficult to develop comprehensive guidance and a full
    range of indicators to address internal threats. The Department should
    thoughtfully consider a wide range of options and exercise due caution
    to avoid infringing on civil liberties. There are a number of
    recommendations that specifically address internal threats, including
    2.1 (developing a risk assessment tool for commanders, supervisors, and
    professional support service providers to determine whether and when
    DOD personnel present risks for various types of violent behavior),
    2.15 (review prohibited activities and recommend necessary policy
    changes), and 3.2 (commission a multidisciplinary group to examine and
    evaluate predictive indicators relating to pending violence and provide
    commanders with a multidisciplinary capability). It is our
    understanding that the Fort Hood Follow-On Review is addressing these
    recommendations to improve the Department's capacity to protect against
    internal threats.

        11. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, how will those
    indicators be coordinated with combatant commanders?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. Our understanding is that the Follow-On
    Review program includes representatives from all the military
    departments and the Joint Staff, which coordinates input from the
    combatant commands. As such, the combatant commands have a voice in
    determining how potential indicators will be coordinated with them. One
    of our recommendations was that the Department needs to develop
    standardized guidance regarding how military criminal investigative
    organizations and counter-intelligence organizations will inform the
    operational chain of command, e.g. the combatant commander. We
    understand the final report for the Follow-On Review will address this
    specific issue.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
                               potential threats
        12. Senator Burris. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, are there other
    potential internal threats that our current system has failed to
    identify?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. We are not aware of other potential
    internal threats that the current system has failed to identify.
    However, our findings clearly show that DOD and Service programs that
    provide guidance concerning observation of personal behavior do not
    focus on internal threats. As such, one of our recommendations is to
    develop a list of behaviors that may be indicative of an insider threat
    and to integrate the disparate programs designed to defend against
    these threats.

        13. Senator Burris. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, how can we identify
    potential sympathies which are counter to our national interests?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. In the Independent Review report, we
    recommended DOD promptly establish standards and reporting procedures
    that clarify guidelines for religious accommodation. If requests for
    religious accommodation that compete with mission requirements were
    recorded and shared among commanders, supervisors, and chaplains, it
    would help establish a baseline from which to identify deviations
    within the Services and DOD.

                                failures to act
        14. Senator Burris. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, in your
    investigation, were there other examples of a failure to act on
    performance reports and passing on the problem?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. The conduct of Major Hasan's colleagues
    and former supervisors remains under review, and it would be
    inappropriate to comment at this time. Consistent with the
    recommendations of the Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of
    Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the Secretary
    of the Army for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh
    assigned senior military leaders to investigate further, to assess
    accountability, and, as appropriate, to take final action. This process
    remains ongoing.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator David Vitter
                                recommendations
        15. Senator Vitter. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, in Chapter 2 of the
    Independent Review, when reviewing barriers and constraints on taking
    action, you state that the existing authority to address potentially
    violent behaviors ``is likely insufficient if an employee represents an
    imminent threat.'' However, your recommendations do not state specific
    changes to regulations that would enable the DOD and the Services to
    quickly adapt and address potential threats. Certainly identifying
    threats is important and critical to saving lives and preventing
    terrorist acts, but we must also prevent those threats after
    identifying them and cannot let bureaucratic polices stop us from
    averting terrorism. What specific policy changes at the company and
    battalion command level would you recommend to shorten commanders'
    response time in dealing with an immediate threat?
        Mr. West and Admiral Clark. In Chapter 4 of the Independent Review
    report, we identified several ways that the Department can better
    prepare its military communities to respond to emergencies, including
    developing a case study based on the Fort Hood incident to be used in
    installation commander development and on-scene commander response
    programs. But we also cannot discount the importance of responding to a
    potential threat immediately, before it becomes a violent action.
    Recommendation 2.1 specifically addresses updating policies and
    programs that would enable the DOD and Services to assess potentially
    violent behaviors. This includes developing a risk assessment tool for
    commanders, supervisors, and professional support service providers to
    determine whether and when DOD personnel present risks for various
    types of violent behavior. Recommendation 2.15 deals with reviewing
    prohibited activities and recommending necessary policy changes. For
    example, DOD can update DOD Instruction 1325.06, Handling Dissident and
    Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces, by providing
    commanders and supervisors the guidance and authority to act on
    potential threats to good order and discipline. We defer to the
    Department on other policy changes it might identify and implement to
    improve commanders' response times in dealing with an immediate threat.

        [Annex: The Report of the DOD Independent Review
    ``Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood'' follows:]

        [Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee adjourned.]