THE FUTURE OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

HEARING
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
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CONTENTS

Glassman, Hon. James K., former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, executive director, George W. Bush Institute, Dallas, TX .......................... 17
Prepared statement ........................................................................................................ 20
Hughes, Hon. Karen P., former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, worldwide vice chair, Burson-Marsteller, Austin, TX ............................ 11
Prepared statement ........................................................................................................ 15
Kaufman, Hon. Edward E., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 1
Lieberman, Hon. Evelyn S., former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, director of communications and public affairs, The Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC ....................................................................................... 5
Prepared statement ........................................................................................................ 8
McHale, Hon. Judith A., Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 39
Prepared statement ........................................................................................................ 41
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators:
   John F. Kerry ............................................................................................................ 51
   Richard G. Lugar ..................................................................................................... 53
   Russell D. Feingold ................................................................................................. 63
Wicker, Hon. Roger F., U.S. Senator from Mississippi, opening statement .......... 3

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

List of Alumni of ECA Programs Who Are Current Chiefs of State or Heads of Government ........................................................................................................ 59
THE FUTURE OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010

U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Human Rights, Democracy, and Global Women’s Issues, Committee on Foreign Relations,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:02 p.m., in room SD-430, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Edward E. Kaufman presiding.

Present: Senators Kaufman, Barrasso, and Wicker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD E. KAUFMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator KAUFMAN. I assume Senator Wicker is on his way. I think we will go ahead and start. I’ll be making an opening statement. Thank you, Senator Barrasso, for being here.

This is a day I’ve been looking forward to for a long time. Today we meet to examine the future of U.S. public diplomacy, one of the most important facets of foreign policy. As Secretary Clinton has said, we must use all the tools in our toolbox—diplomacy, development, and defense—to promote the U.S. interests globally, and soft power is an absolutely critical element of that strategy.

Public diplomacy often takes the form of broadcasting, exchanges, and outreach with foreign populations, all of which help to promote greater understanding between the United States and the international community. By creating direct channels of communication between America and the world, U.S. public diplomacy contributes to global security and stability.

Tools of public diplomacy can be grouped under three large umbrellas: education and cultural exchanges that promote cross-cultural dialogue and understanding; informational programming that explains U.S. policy; and international broadcasting that provides accurate, informative news and information, often to societies that do not have unfettered access to a free press.

Those efforts, our broadcasting efforts serve two purposes: one, providing news to both open and closed society; and two, serving as a model for increasing the flow of news and information globally.

Just like government-to-government diplomacy, public diplomacy efforts are only as effective as the quality of the leadership and personnel that shapes and implements them. This is why we will hear from three extraordinarily gifted and qualified individuals who have led these efforts in the State Department and learn from them about the lessons learned from their wide experience, and to
hear the current Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy about today's strategy and policy and priorities.

The goal of this hearing is to assess public diplomacy strategy of the past, the present, and with an eye toward the future. There is no question that many achievements have been made since the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy was established in 1999 and it is important the State Department incorporate past successes into the future planning. This is why we must consider which tools have proven most effective and which have proven the most challenging. I love that word, “challenging.”

I know our first panel of witnesses can shed light on valuable lessons learned based on their firsthand experience shaping public diplomacy strategy. The broader question to be explored today is how do we communicate our global message most effectively and how can achievements of the past be used as models for future public diplomacy activities? In addition, we must closely consider each tool of public diplomacy, including educational exchanges, American Centers, and international broadcasting efforts under the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

The witnesses and many who have known me throughout my career know that I'm an unequivocal supporter of complete separation between programming in international broadcasting and the rest of the government. The firewall that exists between the BBG programming and the rest of the government is essential, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their experiences, positive and negative, with this difficult issue, especially in wartime.

Finally, we should consider how new technology changes our strategy and future vision for public diplomacy. I'm interested in hearing about the opportunities new technology creates and the way it forces us to reevaluate our old way of doing business. For example, how did mobile phone technology change our approach in regions such as Afghanistan and Pakistan? And what's the future of the Smith-Mundt Act, part of which prohibits domestic dissemination of information produced for foreign audiences, when a quick search of the Internet will turn up all the information anyway.

To answer these and other questions, we have two very distinguished panels. First we hear from three former Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy, for whom I have great respect and admiration for their honorable service to this country. The first is Evelyn Lieberman, appointed by President Clinton as the first Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy. As a trailblazer who set the path for successes, Evelyn oversaw the difficult transition of shifting our public diplomacy structure to the State Department from the U.S. Information Agency. Evelyn was well equipped for this enormous challenge, having come from the Clinton White House, where she served as Assistant to the First Lady, Hillary Clinton, Deputy White House Press Secretary, and Deputy White House Chief of Staff; and later was Director of Voice of America, where she acquired valuable experience in international broadcasting.

Since 2002, Evelyn has continued her career in the Federal Government, serving as the Director of Communications and Public Affairs for the Smithsonian.
Next we have former Under Secretary Karen Hughes, appointed by President Bush to this position after serving as counsel in the White House from 2000 to 2002. When she was appointed in 2005, Karen was given the rank of ambassador to underscore the importance of public diplomacy. While at State, Karen implemented important changes, including expanding English language training exchange programs, developing a strategic plan for public diplomacy, and creating a rapid response unit to respond to inaccurate press reports.

Upon leaving State in 2007, Karen told the BBC that her greatest achievement was “transforming public diplomacy and making a national security priority central to everything we do in our government,” which is the goal I believe continues to this day.

Since returning to Texas, Karen has been serving as the global vice chair of public relations firm Burson-Marsteller.

Finally, we have former Under Secretary Jim Glassman, also appointed in the Bush administration. Jim brought with him to this position his previous experience as chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. I worked frequently with Jim in that capacity and saw firsthand his commitment to promoting and developing a robust international broadcasting and public diplomacy strategy.

While serving as Under Secretary, Jim focused on developing a strong interagency structure that allowed visibility into the strategic communications work being done in other parts of the government, especially the Department of Defense. He also created the Global Strategic Engagement Center with staff from State and the intelligence community to promote great coordination day to day.

Since leaving office, Jim has been working in the nonprofit sector and was recently selected to lead the Public Policy Institute at the George W. Bush Presidential Library.

We are also joined today by current Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Judith McHale, a veteran of private sector media who will testify on our second panel. Most recently, Under Secretary McHale served as the president and CEO of Discovery Communications, parent company of Discovery Channel, TSL, Animal Planet, and a host of other networks. In her 11 years at Discovery, she oversaw worldwide expansion to 1.4 billion subscribers in 107 territories in countries.

Since leaving Discovery for the State Department last year, she's applied her wide experience in business to revamping our public diplomacy strategy. I look forward to her testimony and hearing about future plans and current policy.

Finally, I thank Senator Wicker for his interest and commitment, and I want to thank Chair Boxer for generously allowing us to hold this subcommittee meeting. I'd also like to thank the HELP Committee for hosting us to this committee.

Senator Wicker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Kaufman, for convening this hearing to evaluate the future of U.S. public diplomacy. This should be a very good hearing. It's my hope that this hearing will allow us to identify some of the challenges faced by previous under
secretaries, as well as understand the current direction of the administration and the direction they would like to take regarding these efforts.

I would note that this is the second hearing Senator Kaufman has chaired and I appreciate you, Ted, for devoting your time and helping us examine in depth these important issues that impact U.S. foreign policy.

Public diplomacy represents an indispensable component of any viable foreign policy. It is distinguished from the exclusive contact with foreign governments that has characterized traditional diplomacy. The importance of effective public diplomacy ought to be and has been embraced by both sides of the aisle. Believing is simple. Translating it into action is a bit more difficult. According to a May 2009 GAO report, the U.S. Government has spent more than $10 billion on international communication efforts since September 11, 2001. Yet international public opinion polls highlight negative attitudes toward the United States.

It is my hope that this hearing will shed light on this truth and identify steps that might reverse this trend.

It is unquestionable that policy shapes public opinion. One need only look to the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, which provided aid to Pakistan, to see how damaging the lack of understanding of United States policy can be to foreign audiences. We worked here in Congress to pass a bill increasing aid to Pakistan by $7.5 billion over the next 5 years, focusing on addressing issues such as poverty, illiteracy, joblessness, and education. However, many Pakistanis viewed these efforts with suspicion and raised questions about United States interference into Pakistani sovereignty, forcing the authors of the bill to release an explanatory statement clarifying the legislation.

I hope that during this hearing we can explore ways that these examples could be avoided through increased engagement and explanation in advance.

It remains true that oftentimes because of U.S. national interests we have to adopt positions overseas that might become unpopular. We have seen this most recently in our increased focus on counter-insurgency. The leadership roles we often play come with the added consequence of international unpopularity. But this does not erase the need for an effective public diplomacy strategy. In fact, it reinforces that need.

It is also true that the responsibility of public diplomacy does not lie with one department or agency. The State Department, the Defense Department, and USAID each have their own substantial public diplomacy responsibilities. We have witnessed the overlap of these responsibilities most recently in Haiti, where United States public diplomacy efforts will likely be needed for years to come. In the areas where our military is currently engaged, the need for coordinated public diplomacy efforts is immeasurable. As we continue to surge troops into Afghanistan, our ability to cohesively fight the battle of ideas is important there.

As we hear from witnesses today, it is my hope that their experiences of the past will help shed light on how we approach our future outreach. As we use this time to focus on U.S. public diplomacy efforts, we should be mindful that other countries are also
working to define and improve their public image internationally. China and Russia continue to show increasing influence around the world. I would be interested to hear from our witnesses how they view this influence and how the United States can work to ensure we keep pace with other countries as we all strive to engage, inform, and influence key international audiences.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. I welcome both panels of witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Roger.

Let's now hear from the witnesses, starting with Evelyn Lieberman.

STATEMENT OF HON. EVELYN S. LIEBERMAN, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting me here today to discuss the future of American public diplomacy. Before I begin, however, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words on the floor of the Senate today about me. I could have done without the enormous blowup of a picture of me taken on a bad hair day, but that's a discussion between my hairdresser and me.

Today I'd like to look back briefly at the creation of the State Department Office of Public Diplomacy and what that experience might tell us as we work to support and better equip the foreign service professionals who represent our government, our culture, and our people to the world. I had the honor of serving as the first Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs during the final year of the Clinton administration. My tenure in that job was fairly brief and I have since observed the Department and public diplomacy from the outside vantage point as a private citizen. I do know that Secretary of State Clinton has a deep long-standing commitment to strengthening our public diplomacy and she has developed—she has assembled a superb public diplomacy team. My hope in appearing before you is that some of the things I learned as Under Secretary remain relevant today.

Prior to becoming Under Secretary, as you said, Mr. Chairman, I had worked as Deputy White House Chief of Staff and had served as Director of the Voice of America. At VOA I learned firsthand the wisdom and power of diplomatic speech that is honest and respectful of its audience. Good news or bad news, VOA broadcasts the truth and because of that countless Americans listen, countless millions listen, and they listen with trust.

So when Secretary Albright asked me to head the State Department's new Public Diplomacy Office, she described its mission in words that hit home. "We are trying," she said, "to build a diplomacy that listens more."

This was only a decade ago, but it was before 9/11 and it was medieval times in terms of where we are today with the Internet and global communications. Yet, although there was no Twitter or iPhones or YouTube, it was a pivotal time in American democracy. New forces of global communication, the Internet, cell phones, 24-hour cable news were pulling our Nation and the world together.
Our planet was shrinking fast as we crossed borders online and watched the world on TV and computer screens. It became tempting then to think that the unifying wonders of technology would give us a global village, a uniformity that might sweep away old divisions rooted in national, ethnic, and cultural identities. It was indeed a new world, but Secretary Albright cautioned us. “Globalization,” she said, “has blurred many national and cultural traditions, but it has by no means erased them.” That was true then and it is true today.

We needed and still need to reshape our traditional diplomacy, to take it beyond the formal channels and often elite settings in which it has operated for so long. To strengthen our diplomacy in the new information age, President Clinton and Congress agreed to restructure the Foreign Service by merging the U.S. Information Agency and State Department Office of Public Affairs, creating the office that I served in. The reorganization aimed to give Foreign Service officers at USIA, the principal practitioners of public diplomacy, more equal status in the Department when it came to formulating and executing foreign policy.

The Office of Public Diplomacy is still the only branch in the State Department that partners with independent nongovernmental organizations and programs, and its commitment to open debate and cross-cultural understanding is essential to advancing our diplomatic mission.

As first Under Secretary, I did not myself get to practice much public diplomacy. My job was to rewire the structural circuitry, meld press operations with cultural outreach, and institute an organizational framework where public diplomacy could thrive. We were combining two distinct institutional cultures that had functioned separately in Washington and at our embassies for generations, one group of traditional diplomats, used to working in classified settings behind closed doors, the other, the cultural and public affairs people who engaged foreign publics, presenting American culture abroad and nurturing dialogue, largely through education and cultural programs and exchanges. This second group brought America to other countries and other cultures home to us. And, as with most big ideas, implementation meant organizational sausage-making in the Department at all levels.

To do this, I met with hundreds of staff and employees on both sides of the merger, visited embassies to learn how they operated and observe the cultural, educational, and exchange programs that were run now by the office I led. This process led me to believe even more in the goal of the merger, to infuse cultural and public diplomacy into the everyday conduct of foreign affairs. It meant including public diplomacy specialists in strategic planning. It meant adding a public diplomacy voice to internal policy debates, no matter what the issue, the myriad daunting issues that the State Department tackles every day.

In launching this public diplomacy effort, we did not aim to end or alter too suddenly the practices and tenets of traditional diplomacy. We wanted to encourage and enable diplomats to work in a field where foreign relations were increasingly conducted in public, instantaneously through mass media, or, just as often, through local media or targeted Internet communications. People no longer
waited to hear what diplomats had hammered out in closed rooms. They could watch leaders shape public policy—shape policy live and in real time, witness the decision process, and by reacting help drive it.

Indeed, the rise of interactive Internet-based communications has changed the interests and expectations of our global audience. People no longer only wanted to hear arguments. They wanted to argue back. Audiences still would listen, but they expected to be heard. Our mission as diplomatic communicators was not simply to make presentations, but to engage foreign publics in conversations, and conversations have to be two-way. Simply airing pro-American ads on Al Jazeera will not work because they are all push and no pull. They encourage attitudes toward our country that they seek to reverse.

Simply put, we need communications strategies that listen more. We must stand firm against and defeat terrorism, true. But it is wrong and can be dangerously wrong to believe that simply listening shows weakness or that respect for other cultures naively invites exploitation.

Seeing the results and impact of these public diplomacy programs in education and culture made it clear to me that, as one report stated, “Personal, active, direct engagement by diplomats is one of the best foreign policy tools we have.” At one point we polled our ambassadors, who unanimously attested to the value and import of education and cultural programs and charged us to do more to strengthen them.

When I became Under Secretary, I was astonished to discover the extent to which these programs had to struggle for resources to survive, let alone grow. I know that my successors as Under Secretary continue to advocate as great as I do to strengthen these programs that have worked so powerfully for our country.

When I was Under Secretary, the Fulbright Senior Scholars Program sent a thousand Americans to lecture and conduct research in 140 countries and the Fulbright Student Program supported 800 Americans studying abroad and 3,000 foreign students studying here. These were respectable numbers and they have increased since, but Fulbright participants were chosen from among many thousands of gifted applicants who would have benefited the program immensely had we had the means to accept them.

These programs should be viewed as smart investments in American security and international peace, not simply as a budget expense. As of today, more than 330 alumni of our education and cultural programs have gone on to become heads of state or government and more than 40 are Nobel laureates. These are leaders who know America, who have friends here, leaders to whom this country is a human place, not an abstraction or a piece of propaganda. We should be investing heavily in these programs.

As I said, conducting effective public diplomacy is much more difficult now than it was prior to 9/11 when we launched the program. Of course we must ensure the safety and security of Foreign Service officers and we know that in some countries it takes exceptional fortitude and courage for a diplomat to work beyond embassy walls. Under Secretary Powell an ambitious program was begun to construct and modernize embassies that are safe, functional, and able
to advance our diplomatic mission. In some cases, however, these new embassies have been relocated outside major cities, where access to them and our programs is limited. Security and cost concerns require limitations, but we must do everything we can to see that our embassies are as open to the public as they can be and not remote from urban centers.

I see that my time is about to expire. I just want to say that many of these programs—and I know, Senator, you talked, Mr. Chairman, you talked about American Corners and American Presence Posts, and I would say that these are effective tools to expand the reach of our public diplomacy even further, and I hope we can replicate them and other existing programs as much as possible.

We need to invest in these proven programs on a major scale and the American people need to understand the importance of strengthening our investment in public diplomacy.

Thank you, and I'm happy to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lieberman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EVELYN S. LIEBERMAN, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here to discuss the future of American public diplomacy. Today, I would like to look back briefly at the creation of the State Department office of public diplomacy and what that experience might tell us as we work to support and better equip the Foreign Service professionals who represent our government, our culture, and our people to the world.

I had the honor of serving as the first Under Secretary of State for public diplomacy and public affairs during the final year of the Clinton administration. My tenure in that job was fairly brief and I have since observed the State Department and public diplomacy from the outside vantage point of a private citizen. I do know that Secretary of State Clinton has a deep, longstanding commitment to strengthening our public diplomacy and she has assembled a superb public diplomacy team. My hope, in appearing before you, is that some of the things I learned as Under Secretary remain relevant today.

Prior to becoming Under Secretary, I had worked as deputy White House chief of staff and had served as director of the Voice of America. At VOA I learned first-hand the wisdom and power of diplomatic speech that is honest and respectful of its audience. Good news or bad news, VOA broadcasts the truth, and because of that countless millions listen, and they listen with trust. Over the years, VOA's Office of Development and Training has conducted workshops for more than 5,000 foreign journalists in 140 countries.

So when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asked me to head the State Department's new public diplomacy office, she described its mission in words that hit home. “We are trying,” she said, “to build a new diplomacy that listens more.”

This was only a decade ago, but it was before 9/11, and it was medieval times in terms of where we are today with Internet and global communications. Yet although there was no Twitter, no iPhones or YouTube, it was a pivotal time in American diplomacy. New forces of global communication—the Internet, cell phones, 24-hour cable news—were pulling our Nation and the world together. Our planet was shrinking fast, as we crossed borders online and watched the world on TV and computer screens. It became tempting to think that the unifying wonders of technology would give us a global village—a uniformity that might sweep away old divisions rooted in national, ethnic, and cultural identities. It was indeed a new world, but Secretary Albright cautioned us: “Globalization,” she said, “has blurred many national and cultural traditions, but it has by no means erased them.” That was true then and it is true today.

We needed and still need to reshape our traditional diplomacy—to take it beyond the formal channels and often elite settings in which it has operated for so long. To strengthen our diplomacy in the new information age, President Clinton and Congress agreed to restructure the Foreign Service by merging the U.S. Information Agency and the State Department Office of Public Affairs, creating the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The reorganization aimed to give Foreign Serv-
ice officers in USIA—the principle practitioners of public diplomacy—more equal status in the Department when it came to formulating and executing foreign policy. The Office of Public Diplomacy is the only branch of the State Department that partners with independent, nongovernmental organizations and programs, and its commitment to open debate and cross-cultural understanding is essential to advancing our diplomatic mission.

As the first Under Secretary, I did not myself get to practice much public diplomacy, but I had to rewrite the structural circuitry, meld press operations with cultural outreach, and institute an organizational framework where public diplomacy could thrive. We were combining two distinct, institutional cultures that had functioned separately in Washington and at our embassies for generations—traditional diplomats, used to working in classified settings behind closed doors and the cultural and public affairs people who engaged foreign publics, presenting American culture abroad and nurturing dialogue, largely through educational and cultural programs and exchanges. This second group brought America to other countries and other cultures home to us. As with most big ideas, implementation meant organizational sausagemaking at all levels of the Department—combining payroll functions, reconfiguring office space, safeguarding the rights and aspirations of our Foreign Service professionals as we reorganized, and deciding what to cut and what to keep.

To do this job, I met with hundreds of staff and employees on both sides of the merger, visited embassies to learn how they operated and observed the cultural, educational and exchange programs that now were run by the office I led. This process led me to believe even more in the goal of the merger—to infuse cultural and public diplomacy into the every day conduct of foreign affairs. It meant including public diplomacy specialists in strategic planning. It meant adding a public diplomacy voice to internal policy debates, no matter what the issue—combating terrorists, promoting the rule of law, stopping the trafficking in human beings, fighting disease, strengthening civil institutions, addressing weapons proliferation—the myriad, daunting issues that the State Department tackles every day.

In launching Public Diplomacy at the Department, we did not aim to end—or to alter too suddenly—the practices and tenets of traditional diplomacy. We wanted to encourage and enable diplomats to work in a world where foreign relations were increasingly conducted in public, instantaneously, through mass media or, just as often, through local media or targeted Internet communications. We realized that in the new world of global information, millions of people could access and observe policymaking and instantly register their opinions, ideas and objections. People no longer waited to hear what diplomats had hammered out in closed rooms; they could watch leaders shape policy live and in real time, witness the decision process and, by reacting, help drive it.

Indeed, the rise of interactive, Internet-based communications had changed the interests and expectations of our global audience. People no longer only wanted to hear arguments—they wanted to argue back. Audiences still would listen but they also expected to be heard. Our mission as diplomatic communicators was not simply to make presentations but to engage foreign publics in conversations, and conversations have to be two-way. Simply airing pro-American ads on Al Jazeera will not work because they are all push and no pull—they encourage attitudes toward our country that they seek to reverse. Simply put, we need communication strategies that “listen more.” We must stand firm against and defeat terrorists, but it is wrong—and can be dangerously wrong—to believe that simply listening shows weakness, or that respect for other cultures naively invites exploitation.

A 2007 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, entitled, “The Embassy of the Future,” put matters succinctly. “America’s diplomats,” it said, “are struggling to break free from the bureaucratic practices that keep them inside U.S. embassy buildings and that emphasize the processing of information over the personal, active, direct engagement that wins friends and supporters for America—the kind of diplomacy that inspired Foreign Service officers to serve their country in the first place.”

Seeing the results and impact of public diplomacy programs in education and culture made it clear to me that “personal, active, direct engagement” by diplomats is one of the best foreign policy tools that we have. At one point we polled our ambassadors, who unanimously attested to the value and import of educational and cultural programs and charged us to do more to strengthen them.

When I became Under Secretary I was astonished to discover the extent to which these programs had to struggle for resources to survive, let alone grow. We all know that throwing money at issues does not necessarily improve things, but these programs work so powerfully for our country that I continue to advocate a great surge in their growth whenever I get the chance, just as I did as Under Secretary and
as—I am sure—my successors have done. And with, I would bet, unfortunately consistent results.

When I was Under Secretary, the Fulbright Senior Scholars program sent 1,000 Americans to lecture and conduct research in 140 countries, and the Fulbright Student Program supported 800 Americans studying abroad and 3,000 foreign students studying here. These were respectable numbers, I suppose, but Fulbright participants were chosen from among many thousands more gifted applicants who would have benefited the program immensely had we had the means to accept them.

Fulbright students and scholars should be viewed as a smart investment in American security and international peace, not simply as a budget expense. Similarly, the Citizens Exchange Program in fiscal year 2000 engaged 1,000 Americans and 3,000 foreign citizens in professional and cultural exchanges, and our International Visitors Program enabled about 5,000 emerging foreign leaders to visit the United States. At the time, alumni of the Visitors program included more than 200 current or former heads of state of foreign governments—leaders who knew America, who had friends here—leaders to whom this country was a human place, not an abstraction or a piece of propaganda. As of today, more than 330 alumni of our educational and cultural programs have gone on to become heads of state or government and more than 40 are Nobel laureates. We should be investing heavily in these programs.

A singular project that we undertook in November 2000 was the White House Conference on Culture and Diplomacy, a colloquy hosted by President and Mrs. Clinton and Secretary Albright that assembled 200 cultural leaders, artists, and diplomatic leaders from around the world, as well as congressional leaders. Organized in partnership with the Office of the First Lady, the National Security Council and the White House Millennium Council, the conference focused attention on the role of culture in U.S. foreign policy and produced recommendations for future development of American cultural diplomacy.

The event was high profile, involving a major Islamic leader, an African Nobel Laureate in Literature, two former American Poets Laureate, and some of the world’s most recognized actors, artists, and musicians, not to mention the President, First Lady, Secretary of State, ministers of culture from around the world and leaders of private foundations, NGO’s, and multinational companies. The conference received global media coverage, and large numbers of Americans heard about the connections between culture and public policy around the world—about the powerful force that public diplomacy can be in a dangerous and threatening world. Opening the conference in the East Room of The White House, Mrs. Clinton said, “It is the arts and humanities that give us roots, that foster our civil society and democracy and create a universal language so that we can understand each other better as nations and human beings.”

In her remarks, Secretary Albright declared that we were assembled “for the first—but I hope not the last” such conference. As it turns out, it was the first and last, and I would hope that similar, cultural diplomacy summits be held at the highest level—events involving international leaders in culture, government and the arts that can reach millions through global media and the World Wide Web. Too few Americans know about the importance of public diplomacy; we need to tell its story.

Conducting effective public diplomacy is more difficult today than it was prior to 9/11, when we launched the State Department program. We must, of course, ensure the safety and security of Foreign Service officers. In some countries, it takes exceptional fortitude and courage for a diplomat to work beyond embassy walls. An ambitious program to construct and modernize embassies, begun, I believe, under Secretary of State Powell, aims to build embassies that are safe, functional, and able to advance our diplomatic mission. In some cases, however, new embassies have been relocated outside major cities, where access to them is limited. Security and cost concerns require limitations, but we must do everything we can to see that our embassies are as open to the public as they can be, and not remote from urban centers.

In some countries, our diplomatic missions have set up small, unclassified posts that consist of a single Foreign Service officer, who wears many hats, assisted by one or two host national staff. These American Presence Posts, or APPs, operate in cities distant from the embassy and engage in a full range of person-to-person diplomacy—public relations, trade and commercial affairs, liaisons with local government, and so on. Security is always an issue; APPs cannot operate everywhere. But they are a strong public diplomacy asset. Similarly, some embassies are establishing “American Corners,” spaces that offer the public access to American books, DVDs, CDs, informational materials and the Internet. Operating in institutions such libraries or universities and staffed by a person from the host institution, American Corners are another good way to engage and serve foreign publics. Virtual Presence
Posts, which offer Internet connectivity to the public, also are being used increasingly as a diplomatic tool.

These programs and others like them should be replicated as much as possible, just as the cultural, educational and exchange programs sponsored by the Office of Public Diplomacy should be allowed to grow significantly. Our country needs to invest in these proven, public diplomacy programs on a major scale, and our government and its leaders should do a better job of informing the American people about the need to strengthen public diplomacy and its role in our foreign affairs.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Hughes.

STATEMENT OF HON. KAREN P. HUGHES, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, WORLDWIDE VICE CHAIR, BURSON-MARSTELLER, AUSTIN, TX

Ms. HUGHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also for honoring us on the floor also. Thank you for your many, many years of service and passionate advocacy for public diplomacy and especially our international broadcasting. You’ve been a real champion for our efforts.

Thank you.

Let me start by saying that the 2½ years that I spent as Under Secretary were among the most challenging and difficult, yet in the end among the most rewarding, of my entire career. Working with an outstanding team of foreign and civil service officers and public diplomats across the world, we were able to make a number of significant changes and put in place new programs, most of which are being carried on by the current administration. Much more needs to be done and I thank you for the opportunity to share some thoughts about that today.

People often talk about public diplomacy in the context of opinion polls and, while we all want to be liked, I believe to view public diplomacy only in the context of an international popularity contest is a fundamental misunderstanding. America’s engagement with foreign publics is actually a vital foreign policy and national security priority that seeks to promote our national ideals and interests, to undermine those of our enemies, and to foster understanding by engaging in dialogue and listening with respect to the views and opinions of others.

When I took office, a strategic plan for U.S. public diplomacy did not exist. We worked through an interagency process to develop one and put in place three strategic imperatives which I believe remain vital today: First, that America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity rooted in our most basic values, which are not merely American, but are universal human rights—liberty, justice, the rule of law, rights for women and other minorities, a fundamental belief in the dignity and worth of every person.

Second, public diplomacy should work to isolate and discredit al-Qaeda and other violent extremists and undermine their attempt to appropriate religion to their cause.

And third, to nurture—public diplomacy should work to nurture common interests between Americans and people of different cultures and countries across the world.

I believe you can put most U.S. public diplomacy activities into four broad categories: our communications efforts; our education and exchange programs, which are the heart of public diplomacy;
what I call the deeds of diplomacy, and these are the concrete things that our country does in the areas of education and health and economic development to improve people’s lives; and finally, our international broadcasting, which now reaches 171 million people across the world with accurate and objective news and information.

I’ll talk a little about each of those areas. In the area of communications, with the explosion of media channels across the world today’s ambassadors and diplomats must be trained and empowered to speak on behalf of our country and represent us on those foreign media channels. I found the bilateral setup of the State Department was often counterproductive to our communications efforts, particularly when dealing with regional networks like Al Jazeera that reach broad audiences across an entire region.

I remember meeting with an ambassador. He told me Al Jazeera was by far the No. 1 source of news and information influencing people in his country, yet they weren’t headquartered there, so he had no personnel or strategy to deal with them, really no capability to push back. We set up regional media hubs as a result and put language-qualified communicators in them whose daily job it was to go out and communicate and advocate for our U.S. Government policies. I believe we need more of this as we now have more and more journalists who increasingly are viewing us on a regional basis, our policies toward a certain region of the world, rather than individual countries.

We also need better language training. Most of State’s training teaches officers to be able to engage in conversation in a foreign language, but to be able to conduct an interview on television under often hostile questioning you need far greater language skills, and we need many more effective spokespeople to be able to communicate on television.

I believe the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy also has to be more involved in the assignment of State Department personnel. I needed Arabic speakers and I found that Arabic speakers were often in non-Arabic speaking countries and I had no ability to move them to the locations where I needed them. The Under Secretary also needs flexibility to move people in order to respond to urgent world events, such as what happened in the aftermath of 9/11.

Our communications also have to be two-way. We need to do more listening, and to help us do that I started a new broadcast center to monitor the international media and produce a daily summary of what they were saying about our policies, to inform our policymakers, and then also provide our U.S. Government position in response, to help our ambassadors and military commanders and others around the world know what our country’s position was on those issues that were driving news.

We engaged on the Internet in a preliminary fashion. We assigned several officers to start blogging and get on the blogs and begin to correct misunderstandings and misrepresentations and accurately present our policies. We made a concerted effort to communicate that al-Qaeda’s attacks most often killed fellow Muslims. It’s vitally important, I think, that our communications strategies counter the extensive communications being carried out by extremists, largely on the Internet.
On education and exchange programs, during my tenure I dramatically expanded English language training. I found it was a skill that young people across the world want because it improves their opportunities in life, plus it allows us to reach a much younger demographic of 8-to-14-year-olds. We started programs teaching English language. It also exposes them to a wider body of knowledge and of course put them in contact face to face with Americans. Many of them had never met a real-life American before, and I found that the reaction was almost universally positive.

We almost doubled participation in our education and exchange programs and worked to make them more strategic, focused on those who have a wide circle of influence, such as clerics and journalists and others who are influential in shaping the opinions of a wider audience.

A survey of our ambassadors rated the international visitor program No. 1 among all public diplomacy programs because of its ability to influence the future leaders of the world. Bringing them here, letting them see America for themselves, is enormous intellectual capital for our country.

We also worked with university leaders to reverse the trend of decline in student visas that had occurred after 9/11 and the number of students after we reversed that decline has now been growing and setting records, I believe, for the last several years.

We began using technology to expand the impact of our exchanges, encouraging participants to blog about their experiences, giving them a camera to make YouTube videos. I believe much more needs to be done in this area to maximize the impact of our exchanges, perhaps through documentaries, other ways of broadcasting them to a wider universe.

I also worked to each out through areas of mutual interest such as sports and music that transcend any political or policy differences.

Now, most of these programs build relationships in understanding over the long term, so I understand, with a lot of competing interests, it's often difficult to fund them. But I also believe they're vital and they must be expanded in a world that is increasingly global and interconnected.

Collaborative programs such as the breast cancer initiative that we started with women in the Middle East I believe have a lot of potential, because they do more than just share expertise on a health issue. They also teach women to network, to begin to stand up for themselves, to more fully participate in their societies. I think we should actively seek ways to partner with people in other countries on areas of mutual interest that both improve people's lives and show the great compassion of America. Teacher training, hospital ships, the AIDS initiative in Africa, these are not just development programs; they are also powerful public diplomacy tools that communicate who we are, and we must view them that way.

In international broadcasting, we worked to improve our television offerings. As you know, Voice of America and many of our other broadcasts started as radio programs. Yet now most of the world gets its news on television. Members of the BBG, including you, Senator Kaufman, had the foresight to start a new Arabic television and radio station before I arrived. I worked with you to get
additional funding for a new midday show for women's programs. Those two channels, Alhurra and Sawa, now have a weekly combined audience of 35 million people—a channel where we had none before.

I just returned from Dubai, where I announced the results of the most comprehensive survey ever done of Arab youth—2,000 in-person interviews conducted by my company and its partner polling firm. It highlighted the crucial importance of television. I know the Internet—a lot is happening on the Internet, but television is also a dramatic and powerful tool. Seventy-eight percent of the Arab youth we surveyed said they get their news and information from television, and overwhelmingly they listed it as their No. 1 leisure pastime. Sixty-six percent said television was their first choice for leisure activities.

Let me tell you why I worry about that for our national interest. If you see something on television, you tend to give it more credibility. You've seen it with your own eyes. Yet the view is often quite misleading. I heard people around the world talk about the sex and violence that they saw on American movies and the soap operas and shows.

I'll close with a story from a young man I met in China who had just returned from his first trip to America. I asked him what surprised him. He said he was surprised by how friendly Americans were, by how much they cared about their families, and by how many of them went to church or synagogue or mosque. I told him: I don't get that, because if you take a survey of my fellow Americans most of them, not all of them but most of them, will say their family and their faith are what's most important to them. So what's the disconnect?

His reply has haunted me ever since. He said: America is not the way it looks on television. A lot of people are getting their views of our country—one of the biggest changes in communications in the world is that mass audiences are now seeing television in ways they never did before, and the view is often not a pretty picture.

I believe it calls for continued investment in international broadcasting, a lot more private sector partnerships to produce documentaries, perhaps reality shows, something to offer a more accurate picture of what our country is truly like.

Let me just quickly state—I see I'm out of time—a few recommendations. We do need more accessible spaces with diplomats occupying them. We cannot conduct public diplomacy while walled off in embassy fortresses. We have to encourage more conversations and recognize that's going to mean less control. When you have a call-in show or an Internet chat, you may not like everything that's being said, but we have to support the conversation.

I urge you to confirm board members of the BBG so that they can continue to improve our international broadcasting.

Finally, public diplomacy needs an advocate at the White House. I regularly met with President Bush. I sat in on all the Secretary of State's policy meetings. It was important, but it wasn't enough. It's very hard from someplace besides the White House to get the resources, the personnel, the authority that you need. I believe there has to be someone there who comes to work thinking about foreign audiences and coordinating with the Under Secretary,
because we have to do a lot more thinking and planning about our conversations around the world.

So thank you so much for your time.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hughes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KAREN HUGHES, WORLDWIDE VICE CHAIR, BURSON-MARSTELLER, AUSTIN, TX

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Senator Kaufman—with whom I had the great pleasure of working on the Broadcasting Board of Governors and who is a great champion of public diplomacy and particularly international broadcasting—thank you for inviting me here today.

Let me start by saying the 2½ years I spent as Under Secretary were among the most challenging and difficult, yet in the end some of the most rewarding, of my entire career.

Working with an outstanding team of career foreign and civil service officers and public diplomats around the world, we were able to make a number of significant changes. Much more needs to be done and I want to outline some thoughts about that today.

People often talk about public diplomacy in the context of the most recent opinion poll but to view public diplomacy as an international popularity contest is a fundamental misunderstanding.

America’s engagement with foreign publics is actually a vital foreign policy and national security priority that seeks to promote our national ideals and interests and to undermine our enemies.

When I took office, a strategic plan for U.S. public diplomacy did not exist. We worked in an interagency process to develop one and put in place three strategic imperative, which I believe remain vital today.

First, that America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity rooted in our most basic values, values which are not merely American, but universal human rights—liberty, justice, the rule of law, rights for women and other minorities, a fundamental belief in the dignity of every individual.

Second, to isolate and discredit al-Qaeda, and other violent extremists, and undermine their attempt to appropriate religion to their cause.

Third, to nurture common interests between Americans and people of different countries across the world.

You can put most U.S. public diplomacy activities into four broad categories:

1. Communications;
2. Education and exchange programs (the heart of public diplomacy);
3. The Deeds of Diplomacy (concrete things we do in areas such as education, health and economic development that make such an impact on people’s lives); and
4. International broadcasting (which now reaches 171 million people across the world).

COMMUNICATIONS

With the explosion of media channels across the world, today’s ambassadors and public diplomats have to be trained and effective communicators and empowered to speak on behalf of our country.

I found the bilateral setup of the State Department is often counterproductive, particularly when dealing with regional networks like Al Jazeera that reach broad audiences across an entire region. I remember meeting with an ambassador; Al Jazeera was by far the No. 1 source of news and information in his country yet they weren’t headquartered in his country so he had no strategy or personnel to deal with them. We set up hubs and put language qualified communicators there. The daily job of those communicators was to get out and explain and advocate our policies.

We need better language training of our personnel. Most of State’s training teaches officers to be able to engage in conversations, but not television interviews. We need effective spokespeople who are able to communicate on television in key languages.

Public diplomacy has to be more involved in assigning State Department personnel and have the flexibility to move people to respond to urgent needs or world events.

Communications have to be two-way. It’s imperative to put in place a unit to monitor international media, listen to what they are saying about U.S. policies, provide
U.S. Government’s position in response, etc. Secretary Clinton’s team has kept up with that practice and I believe it’s vitally important.

And I’d like to mention two other areas. One, we were more engaged on Internet and put in place a program blogging in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu to correct misrepresentations and undermine the work of extremists. Two, there was a concerted effort to communicate that al-Qaeda’s attacks often killed fellow Muslims. These are vitally important communications strategies that undermine extensive communications of extremists.

**EDUCATION AND EXCHANGE**

Education and exchange programs are the heart of public diplomacy. During my tenure we dramatically expanded English language training; it’s a skill young people across the world want because it gives them opportunities, and also gives them access to a wider body of knowledge and brings them in contact with an American. We are also allowed to reach much younger demographics (8–4 year olds) with in-country programs to learn English.

Doubled participation in exchange programs worked to make more strategic and focused on those who have a wide circle of audience and influence such as clerics and journalists, and also women who have a rippling impact on societies.

We worked with university leaders and reversed the trend of decline in student visas, that had occurred after 9/11, and the number of students has been growing and setting new records ever since.

We began using technology to expand the impact of exchanges, encouraging them to blog about their experience, giving them a camera and asking to make YouTube videos. However, much more needs to be done in this area to maximize the impact of exchanges.

Also, the act of citizen dialogue: We sent Muslim Americans overseas to engage with Muslim communities through sports diplomacy, music, and culture. These are spaces where Americans can come in contact with foreign publics.

Most of these programs that build relationships and understanding over the long term are hard to fund, but they are vital and must be expanded in a world that is increasingly interconnected.

**DEEDS OF DIPLOMACY**

Collaborative programs such as a breast cancer initiative with women in Middle East does more than share expertise in a way that improves women’s health—it also teaches them to learn to network, to stand up for themselves, to more fully participate in their societies.

I believe there are many such ways to partner on issues of mutual interest in ways that improves people’s lives and shows the heart and compassion of our country.

The USNS Comfort and the AIDS initiative in Africa are examples of things that are not just development, they are also public diplomacy that communicate who we are and we must view them that way.

**INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING**

Improved television offerings: Members of the Broadcasting Board of Governors had had the foresight to start new Arabic television and radio stations before I arrived. We worked to get additional funding and provide relevant programming such as a new midday show, women’s programs and others that build value. They now have a weekly audience of 35 million.

I just returned from Dubai where I announced the results of the most comprehensive survey every done with Arab youth. The survey compiled 2,000 in person interviews and was conducted by my company Burson-Marsteller. Findings from the survey showed Arab youth are increasingly connected: Three out of four have mobile phones, three in five use the Internet at least once a day. The survey also highlighted the crucial importance of television in the lives of Arab youth.

Seventy-eight percent said they get their news and information from television. Overwhelmingly 66 percent said their favorite leisure pastime is watching television.

Let me tell you why I worry about that for our national interests; if you see something on television, you tend to give it more credibility because you’ve seen it with your own eyes. Yet the view is often quite misleading. I’ll close with a story from a young man I met in China, who had just returned from his first trip to America. I asked him what surprised him. He said he was surprised by how friendly Americans were, how much they cared about their families and how many of them went to church or synagogue or mosque.
I told him that if you take a survey of Americans and ask what's most important to them, not all of them, but most will say family and faith—yet he just told me that surprised him, so I asked: What's the disconnect. His reply has haunted me ever since; America, he said, is NOT the way it looks on television.

There should be calls for continued investment in international broadcasting, and additionally a lot more private sector partnerships (documentaries, etc.)

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

We need changes in personnel training and deployment at State, more in-depth language training of spokesmen in key languages and maybe we need to keep those people in one region of the world, rather than transferring them around. This will strengthen public diplomacy within the regional bureaus, which is the power structure at State, and give the Under Secretary greater authority to assign personnel and allocate resources.

We need more accessible spaces and expanded American corners. We need Americans staffing them; we cannot conduct public diplomacy while walled off in embassies.

We have to encourage more conversations and recognize that's going to mean less control. Internet chat means someone may not like what is said, a call-in show means someone may not agree with all the opinions expressed. Al-Qaeda is a one-way communicator, we have to be a two-way facilitator.

We need to confirm board members at the Broadcasting Board of Governors and continue to improve international broadcasting.

Public diplomacy needs an advocate at the White House. I regularly met with, and saw, President Bush and he put me in the lead of interagency. I was in all of Secretary Rice's highest level policy meetings and all that was important but it was still very hard to get it done. We need someone at White House who cares and comes to work every day thinking about this and coordinating with the Under Secretary and that's hard because the White House tends to focus on the domestic audience—after all, that's who elects the President. But for our national interests we have to do a lot more thinking and planning about our conversations and interactions with publics across the world.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. I'd just like to say, because it's interesting in terms of the complexity of this problem, and that is I was in Guinea right before I left the Broadcasting Board of Governors 3 years ago. The No. 1 syndicated TV show in Guinea was Baywatch, the No. 2 show was Jerry Seinfeld—not Jerry Seinfeld; Jerry Springer.

Jim.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES K. GLASSMAN, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, GEORGE W. BUSH INSTITUTE, DALLAS, TX

Mr. GLASSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

Senator Kaufman, you and Vice President Biden, more than any other individuals in recent years, have advanced the cause of public diplomacy as champions of international broadcasting. Thank you for your long service to your country.

Thank you also for your kind words on the floor about the three of us. I benefited enormously from the work of the four women who preceded me, and especially my immediate predecessor, Ambassador Hughes. You can tell from her remarks she accomplished a great deal in 2 ½ years.

The hearing asks us to address the future of public diplomacy. That future in my view is in doubt. Why? Because public diplomacy today is not being taken seriously enough as a tool of national security. Public diplomacy needs to focus on key foreign policy problems, not merely on more vague improvements in the far-off future. It needs to be primarily an activity of national security, not of pub-
lic relations. It needs to be mobilized and sent into battle to win the ideological conflicts of our time.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has said: “Over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Nonmilitary efforts, tools of persuasion and inspiration were indispensable to the outcomes of the defining struggle of the 20th century. They are just as indispensable in the 21st century and perhaps even more so.”

The Secretary is right, and one would expect his words to be heeded at a time when so many have lauded soft or smart power. But in fact, tools of persuasion and inspiration are not being considered indispensable. Far from it.

Here then are some recommendations for a more effective public diplomacy. First, make public diplomacy a top priority. The entire government should know that the President views public diplomacy as a critical part of America’s overall national security strategy.

Second, make a distinction between what I call strategic public diplomacy, that is public diplomacy with clear objectives that can be achieved in a definable period, such as goals in a war of ideas against violent extremists like al-Qaeda, and long-term ongoing public diplomacy, which may be shaped strategically, with emphasis on exchanges with Muslim-majority nations, for example, but which is more general in its effects.

Third, public diplomacy needs to be more about the rest of the world and less about us. As President Obama has said several times, we should stress mutual interests and mutual understanding. We should find mutual interests even among those who don’t like us at present. The default position in U.S. public diplomacy, getting people to like us better, has irresistible inertia. Certainly some public diplomacy activities can over the long run improve foreigners’ understanding of the United States, our people, our values, and our policies, and we should vigorously pursue those activities, such as exchanges. But in addition to such activities, the tools of strategic public diplomacy must be applied toward urgent goals for which likability means very little.

For example, in Pakistan United States favorability has dropped in the past year and is in the teens. But according to Pew, by a margin of 47 percent to 24 percent Pakistanis support United States missile strikes against leaders of extremist groups. What can public diplomacy do in Pakistan? Working quietly, it can help the Pakistani Government reinforce the notion that the violent extremist threat is real and that this is Pakistan’s war.

Fourth, institute a strong interagency structure and process led by an official with a close connection to the President. During the Bush administration that official was the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. But other structures are possible.

Fifth, launch an interagency program quickly to show that public diplomacy can achieve national security goals. Iran should be the immediate focus. Here we are squandering a great opportunity. Our objective is an Iran free of nuclear weapons. Two routes to achieving that objective appear in my view unlikely: armed conflict or successful official diplomacy. But public diplomacy can work, mainly because of the brave opposition movement that developed after the June elections.
We could help by providing substantial moral, intellectual, and material support for the Green Movement. The great fear of the Iranian regime is that a nonviolent civil resistance in the form of a color movement, like those in the states of the former Soviet Union, will gain authority and legitimacy and ultimately power through democratic means. The regime is right to be afraid, but we are wrong to ignore this opportunity.

Sixth, promote the successes and enhance the understanding of the function and purpose of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the entities it oversees, such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, and Alhurra. Between 2001 and 2009 the weekly audience of the BBG increased by approximately three-fourths. Nearly the entire increase occurred in languages of strategic importance, such as Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu. Particularly remarkable is the Arabic Service. Before its launch just 7 years ago, the Arabic audience for the BBG through Voice of America radio was only 2 or 3 million. Today the total audience, that is listeners and viewers who tune in at least once a week on radio or TV, is 35 million. Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa have a weekly audience of 71 percent of Iraqis and 61 percent of Syrians. VOA and Radio Farda are reaching more than one-fourth of Iranians each week, and BBG networks have large audiences in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Senator Kaufman, in reference to your question earlier about the firewall, my experience has been that the firewall between State and other government agencies on the one hand and the journalists of the BBG on the other has worked very well. You have been the great guardian of that firewall.

Seventh, expand what I call Public Diplomacy 2.0, using technology to facilitate and convene a broad and deep global conversation in which we can more effectively influence and inform. At the same time, put teeth into Secretary Clinton’s affirmation that the United States supports open global communications. One step would be to challenge outrageous Iranian jamming of satellite broadcasts by VOA and BBC. As the head of BBC’s Farsi Service put it, “This is a rogue government jamming international signals. How will the West stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons if we can’t deal with this?” And we are not dealing with it right now.

Eighth, create a new narrative to counter the pervasive one that holds that the United States is out to destroy Islam and replace it with Christianity. The counternarrative would accurately portray conflicts within Muslim societies that are working toward resolution: the attempt of a radical, violent group to hijack a religion, the struggle for democracy and the rights of women, the conflict between the Iranian regime and Arab societies. These are real conflicts. They are intra-Muslim conflicts, and I think that the right side is going to win and it will be a glorious victory. But we need to recognize that that is the most important narrative that faces Muslim societies today.

Ninth, establish a pervasive culture of measurable results. All public diplomacy programs must be assessed and evaluated to see how well they move the needle. Measuring can be difficult and expensive, but without it we can’t tell whether work is succeeding or failing.
Finally, although it occurred in June 2007, almost 3 years ago, my own confirmation was the last one voted by the Senate for a BBG governor. Natural attrition has left the BBG with only four governors plus the Secretary of State, a total of five, which is the minimum for a quorum. The BBG is no ordinary board, as you know, Senator Kaufman.

Its governors serve as a collective chief executive office for this critical organization. The lack of action over the past few years on confirmations of governors is a sad manifestation of the overall standing of public diplomacy among too many policymakers. We can't wait.

I ended my testimony before this committee in January 2008 with the following sentence, which I believe bears repeating: "The task ahead is to tell the world the story of a good and compassionate nation and at the same time to engage in the most important ideological contest of our time, a contest that we will win."

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Glassman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES K. GLASSMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, GEORGE W. BUSH INSTITUTE, DALLAS, TX

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Senator Kaufmann, you and Vice President Biden, more than any other individuals in recent years, have advanced the cause of public diplomacy as champions of international broadcasting. Thank you for your long service to your country.

I had the unique honor myself of serving, far more briefly, in two public diplomacy positions: First, as chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, where I was a colleague of the future Senator Kaufmann. The BBG oversees all nonmilitary taxpayer-funded U.S. international broadcasting, including radio, television, and Internet in 60 languages across more than 100 countries. Then, as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, in charge of engagement with foreign publics.

This hearing asks four of us who have served or are serving in the latter post to address the future of public diplomacy. That future, in my view, is in doubt.

While the men and women who practice public diplomacy are working diligently and courageously, they lack what the Djerejian Group, a 2003 commission, called the proper "strategic direction"\(^1\) to contribute effectively toward the achievement of the American interest.

In short, here is the problem with public diplomacy: It is not today being taken seriously as a tool of national security by policymakers. Will it be in the future? Perhaps only in a desperate response to a terrible crisis. Such delay is unacceptable.

In my testimony today, I will describe what a serious public diplomacy—what I call "Strategic Public Diplomacy"—looks like. In the second half of the last administration, President Bush and the leadership of the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the BBG, and the intelligence community—with support from a handful of Members of Congress and staffers—were succeeding in developing this new vision of public diplomacy and putting it into practice, especially to counter violent extremism.

Today, that effort needs to be sustained, renewed, and invigorated. There are areas in the world where Strategic Public Diplomacy is not merely one tool, but, in fact, the best tool, for achieving America's interests. One of those areas is Iran, which I will address today.

Public diplomacy needs to be sharp, not flaccid. It needs to focus on key foreign policy problems, not merely on vague, feel-good improvements in the far-off future. It needs to be primarily an activity of national security, not of public relations. It needs to be mobilized and sent into battle to win the ideological conflicts of our time.

During the cold war, with institutions like Radio Free Europe, the Congress of Cultural Freedom, the publication Problems of Communism, educational and cultural exchanges, and the U.S. Information Agency, the United States became very

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effective at public diplomacy. Public diplomacy played an essential role in defeating communism.2 But after the Berlin Wall came down, our arsenal of persuasion was dismantled.

"At a critical time in our Nation's history," said the report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, "the apparatus of public diplomacy has proven inadequate . . . First and foremost, public diplomacy requires a new strategic direction, informed by a seriousness and commitment that matches the gravity of our approach to national defense and traditional state-to-state diplomacy."3 True in 2003; still true today.

"WE CANNOT KILL OR CAPTURE OUR WAY TO VICTORY"

Here is the best definition of public diplomacy: understanding, engaging, informing and influencing foreign publics with the goal of achieving the national interest of the United States of America. Of the four activities, the most important is "influencing." Public diplomacy is a means, not an end. It is a particular set of tools and approaches that help us influence foreigners in order to achieve goals that the United States desires.

During the Bush administration, the relevant ends were keeping the United States safe and promoting freedom—ends that are linked.

Today, the greatest threats to safety and freedom come from violent extremists and their supporters, mainly using terrorism to try to achieve their aims.

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, "Over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Nonmilitary efforts—tools of persuasion and inspiration—were indispensable to the outcome of the defining struggle of the 20th century. They are just as indispensable in the 21st century—and perhaps even more so."4

In keeping with that belief, President Bush in 2006 designated the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy as the lead official across government in strategic communications—which is a rubric that includes public diplomacy as well as other activities, including covert and kinetic ones, that attempt to communicate a specific, intentional message to the rest of the world. The Secretary of State and I believed that, given my own background and the nature of the threats, this role should be my primary one. Our focus was countering violent extremism by engaging in a "war of ideas," or what we also termed "global strategic engagement."

Drawing on the work of my predecessor, Karen Hughes, I built an interagency structure that allowed visibility into the strategic communications work being done in other parts of government, including the military, the intelligence community, the foreign assistance apparatus, Treasury, and elsewhere.

Beyond visibility, we were able, working with the National Security Council, to assign specific agencies to perform specific duties in pursuit of clear strategic goals. I also created a small interagency group called the Global Strategic Engagement Center, or GSEC, with a State Department director and members from the Department of State and the intelligence community, to handle day-to-day operations.

By the time I left government, this structure was working well, with State at the top of it, as it should be. We received superb cooperation, both from the military and from the intelligence community. Yes, the Department of Defense had more resources for strategic communications activities, but DOD worked in concert with us and looked to us for leadership.

We tried to achieve our war-of-ideas goals in two ways: First, by pushing back and undermining the ideology behind the violent extremism while at the same time explaining and advocating free alternatives and, second, by diverting young people from following a path that leads to violent extremism. What all terrorist groups have in common, in fact, is the exploitation of vulnerable young people, who are isolated and indoctrinated and become the shock troops.

In both of these endeavors—undermining and diverting—Americans themselves are rarely the most credible actors and voices. Much of what we did was encourage others. For example, we supported a global organization of female family members of victims of violent extremism and supported another network, based in Europe, of Muslim entrepreneurs.

In Afghanistan, with the most meager resources, we helped stand up an Afghan-led media center in Kabul. In October 2008, the Taliban stopped a bus at Maiwand,

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2 See many examples, including this speech last year by Yale Richmond, a retired Foreign Service officer: http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2009/12/cultural-exchange-and-the-cold-war-how-the-west-won.html.


pulled off 50 passengers and beheaded 30 of them.\(^5\) The media center’s leaders immediately brought together 300 Afghan religious leaders who issued a statement condemning the action and calling it anti-Islamic. The effort led to widespread anti-Taliban protests.\(^6\)

(I am happy to note that the new Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy calls for an expansion of the Afghan Government Media and Information Center and the establishment of 16 provincial satellite offices.\(^7\))

We often worked in partnership with private-sector organizations, deploying small amounts of money, in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars. A good example was providing funds to the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, a group that has been working for years to enhance education (to include academic subjects, plus the teaching of universal values such as tolerance and critical thinking) in Pakistan’s madrassas, often breeding grounds of terrorists.\(^8\) The ICRD has so far trained over 2,000 madrassa leaders.

We also funded “Life After Death,” a documentary by Layalina Productions, a U.S.-based nonprofit, on the journey of families of 9/11 victims as they commiserate with families of terrorism victims in Spain, Jordan, and Egypt.\(^9\) The documentary was first aired last fall on Al Arabiya News Channel throughout Arab-speaking nations.

All of these efforts were aimed at specific goals. We wanted, for example, to show the widespread and senseless suffering caused by violent extremists, especially in their attacks against fellow Muslims. We also wanted to find ways—such as through encouraging entrepreneurship, improving madrassas, or expanding an excellent English-teaching program that teaches values as well—to divert young people from a path to terrorism.

“MUTUAL INTEREST AND MUTUAL RESPECT”

We took our direction from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 2006, which stated: “In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas.”\(^10\) So our mission then and, it is my hope, today is to use the tools of ideological engagement—words, deeds, and images—to create an environment hostile to violent extremism.

What do these efforts in strategic public diplomacy have to do with improving America’s image abroad? Very little, in an immediate sense. The United States itself is not at the center of the war of ideas. Rather, as I will explain a bit later, the United States is being affected by conflicts within Muslim societies, which themselves are ground zero for this enormous struggle, which involves both ideology and violence.

In his inaugural address, President Obama stated, “To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.”\(^11\) He repeated this powerful phrase in speeches in Istanbul and Cairo last year. We do indeed have mutual interest, even with people who may disagree with us on such policy matters as Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

On the threat of violent extremism, we are absolutely on the same page as Muslim societies. As a result, even in countries where vast majorities say, even today, that they view the United States unfavorably—Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, to name a few—our mutual interest in defeating the terrorist threat (and, I should add, in constraining the Iranian threat)—the United States can work cooperatively, using public diplomacy methods, to reach mutual strategic goals.

Americans, for example, have a clear mutual interest with the Pakistanis, who, according to recent Pew Research surveys, view us more unfavorably than practically any other people (in fact, favorability dropped, to just 16 percent, between 2008 and 2009).\(^12\) We both want to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda for the sake of a stable, free Pakistan and a safer America. That interest can be achieved even if Pakistanis harbor animus toward Americans.

The latest Pew data reinforce this notion. By a margin of 63 percent to 12 percent, Pakistanis support America’s “providing intelligence and logistical support to Paki-
stani troops fighting extremist groups. By 47 percent to 24 percent, Pakistanis even support U.S. “missile strikes against leaders of extremist groups.” What can public diplomacy do in Pakistan? Working quietly, it can help the Pakistani Government reinforce the notion that the violent extremist threat is real and that “this is Pakistan's war.”

Still, the default position in U.S. public diplomacy—getting people to like us better—has irresistible inertia. When in doubt, policymakers and practitioners turn to brand-burnishing. But the unresolved question is whether a better-liked America is one that can more easily achieve its national security goals. Certainly, some public diplomacy activities can, over the long run, improve foreigners’ understanding of the United States, our people, our values, and our policies—and we should vigorously pursue those activities. But, in addition to such activities, the tools of Strategic Public Diplomacy must be applied toward urgent goals for which likeability means little. Much of the public diplomacy effort in the past has focused on our own image, on how we are seen by others. But today, in the war of ideas, our core task is not how to fix foreigners' perceptions of the United States but how to isolate and reduce the threat of violent extremism. In other words, it’s not about us.

“AN OBSERVABLE BUT INTANGIBLE ATTRACTION”

In all aspects of public diplomacy—both traditional and strategic—we require a new approach to communications, to the engaging and informing that lead to the influencing. We began to develop such an approach during my brief tenure, calling it Public Diplomacy 2.0. It is an approach that Secretary Clinton has embraced.

The approach begins with research on America’s image. We found three reasons for low favorability—differences with our policies, a lack of understanding of those policies and beliefs, and a perception that the United States does not respect the views of others, does not listen to them, or take them seriously. These last two subjects—lack of understanding by foreigners and lack of respect by us—cannot be addressed by preaching or by telling the world how wonderful we are. In fact, the technique of standing in one place and spraying a message widely to others is not very effective in today’s world.

A better way to communicate is through the generation of a wide and deep conversation. Our role in that conversation is as facilitator and convener. We generate this conversation in the belief that our views will be heard—even if U.S. Government actors are not always the authors of those views.

This new approach takes advantage of new social networking technologies like Facebook and YouTube and Second Life, whose essence is multiple, simultaneous conversations, in words and pictures. And, in fact, the method of communication is itself a reflection of American values. The medium, as Marshall McLuhan said, is the message. We, as Americans, do not dictate. Rather, we believe that, in a free and open discussion, the best ideas will prevail, and we want to encourage the free expression of views, rather than drowning out words that disturb us.

Joseph Nye, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, has written: “If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place—in short, if my behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction—soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation—an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.”

Public Diplomacy 2.0, endorsed at the highest levels of government during my tenure at the State Department, embodies Nye’s description of soft power. Specifically, in 2008, our Education and Cultural Affairs Bureau, under the direction of Goli Ameri, an Iranian-American with experience as a technology executive, launched the first U.S. Government social-networking Web site. The site, ExchangesConnect, on the Ning platform, provides a forum around the topic of international exchanges.

The U.S. Government cannot control everything that goes on within this forum (indeed, during the fighting in Gaza, much of the comment on the site was in oppo-

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13 President Zardari of Pakistan has made this statement many times, for example: http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2892.htm.
14 Secretary Clinton immediately supported the Alliance of Youth Movements and in January gave a speech on Internet freedom and met with high-tech executives on improving the use of social media in public diplomacy: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/01/sec__clinton_dines_high-tech_ti.html?wprss=posttech.
16 http://connect.state.gov/.
sition to U.S. policy), and the lack of control naturally produces some anxiety. But we live in a world in which we have two choices: preach and be ignored, or convene a conversation and be heard—and, if our views are persuasive, have influence. ExchangesConnect is now running its second annual video contest, this one with the theme, "Change Your Climate, Change Our World." Among the top 40 entries are videos from Egypt, Turmenistan, Cuba, and Vietnam.\(^\text{17}\)

In 2008, the Bureau of International Information Programs—with such private sector partners as YouTube, the Tisch School at New York University, and NBC Universal—initiated a video contest called the Democracy Video Challenge, with the theme "Democracy Is . . ." We wanted contestents, most of them young Internet users, to define democracy for themselves in 3-minute films. There were 900 entries from around the world, with the winner chosen by a vote on the Web—which, again, we did not control.

Perhaps the best example of PD 2.0 in action is the Alliance of Youth Movements. In the fall of 2008, a young State Department official named Jared Cohen suggested that I travel to Colombia to see what that government, with U.S. help, had done to encourage young fighters to leave the FARC, the terrorist group (which started in the 1960s as the military wing of Colombia’s Communist Party) that had been killing and kidnapping innocents. Were there lessons here for the demobilization and reintegation of violent extremists in the Middle East?

Also at Cohen’s suggestion, I met with the leaders of a spontaneous civilian movement that used Facebook to bring 12 million people into the streets of cities around the world in early 2008 to oppose the FARC. That movement, One Million Voices Against the FARC, had real-life effects, demoralizing FARC fighters and causing them to demobilize. As a result of this and other efforts, the size of the FARC was cut in half and its effectiveness significantly reduced.

The dynamic young founder of the anti-FARC group, Oscar Morales,\(^\text{18}\) worked without the support—or, even, at first, the knowledge—of the Colombian Government. Morales, a young computer technician, was simply a citizen, angry at what terrorists were doing in his country. This was a model we wanted to replicate. So we decided to bring Morales together with young representatives of similar antiviolence and pro-social-change organizations using the Internet from countries like Egypt, Mexico, and the U.K., as well as officials of technology companies such as Facebook, Google, Howcast, and AT&T.

The State Department provided only a small amount of seed money. We were conveners and facilitators. At a New York conference in late 2008, the young people decided to create their own network—which is now called the Alliance of Youth Movements (AYM), with a social networking site, including how-to hub, and a professional executive director.\(^\text{19}\) With backing from Secretary Clinton, the group held a conference in Mexico in October, in part with the purpose of pushing back against narcoterrorism, and will hold another meeting next month in London.

Unfortunately, not all PD 2.0 ideas have become reality. We were on the brink of launching the contemporary analogue of “Problems of Communism,” the USIA journal that confronted the Soviet ideology for 40 years during the cold war. Our version, tentatively called “Problems of Extremism” (POE), was planned as a journal, a Web site, and a platform for conferences. We wanted it to become the locus of liberal thought, promoting freedom, tolerance, and women’s rights, with emphasis on the conflicts (which I will explain below) that are occurring in Muslim societies. The POE venture, like AYM, would be a nonprofit foundation, with a small amount of seed money provided by the U.S. Government and other funding from foreign governemnts and private institutions.

Finally, a good example of PD 2.0 even before such a rubric existed is the Digital Outreach Team, begun under Ambassador Hughes. Team members go into chat rooms and on interactive Web sites, in Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu (and, we had planned, Russian), to explain U.S. policy and refute lies and distortions. They identify themselves as working for the U.S. Government and provide links to easily accessible facts on the Internet.

Public Diplomacy 2.0 would be an unfulfilled idea if it were not for Web 2.0, the interactive tools now available on the Internet. Yes, al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations have exploited the Internet to their advantage, but that edge has diminished—and not just because the jihadist message has worn thin with al-Qaeda’s penchant for slaughtering fellow Muslims.

\(^{17}\)http://connectcontest.state.gov/contests/change-your-climate-change-our-world/entries/top

\(^{18}\)Oscar Morales in February became a Visiting Fellow of the George W. Bush Institute in Dallas.

\(^{19}\)http://youthmovements.howcast.com/.
Why? One reason, says analyst Daniel Kimmage in the New York Times, is that "the Qaeda media nexus . . . is old hat. If Web 1.0 was about creating the snazziest official Web resources and Web 2.0 is about letting users run wild with self-created content and interactivity, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are stuck in 1.0."20

The Internet world of al-Qaeda is one of direction: believe this, do that. The Internet world of today is one of interactivity and conversation: I think this, your ideas are unconvincing, I need more information to make up my mind, let's meet at 3 p.m. Thursday for a peaceful protest. In fact, the Internet itself is becoming the locus of Civil Society 2.0.

This new virtual world is democratic. It is not a place for a death cult that counts on keeping its ideology sealed off from criticism. The new world is a marketplace of ideas, and it is no coincidence that al-Qaeda blows up marketplaces.

U.S. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

While taxpayer-funded, nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting is almost 70 years old, the fundamental principle that underlies it is the same as that of Public Diplomacy 2.0: rather than preaching, the BBG’s entities seek to inform and to generate a conversation, also with the ultimate objective of securing American interests. The BBG’s broadcasters embody President Obama’s notion of mutual interest and mutual respect.

Along with the Fulbright educational exchanges, U.S. international broadcasting is almost certainly the most successful public diplomacy program. It is also the largest. The BBG budget rose from $440 million in 2001 to $758 million in fiscal 2010. The BBG’s success may be attributed in part to its clear mandate. It does one thing and does it well: as a reliable source of news, it presents an accurate, objective and comprehensive view of America and its policies and, through surrogate broadcasters like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the BBG serves as a free, mature communications medium in nations lacking in such institutions.

Between 2001 and 2009, the weekly audience of the BBG increased by approximately three-fourths, to 171 million, and nearly the entire increase occurred in languages of strategic importance, such as Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu. Particularly remarkable is the Arabic service, Middle East Broadcasting Network.

Before MBN’s launch, just 7 years ago, the Arabic audience for BBG—through Voice of America (VOA) radio, was only 2 to 3 million. Today, the total audience—that is, listeners and viewers who tune in at least once a week on radio or TV—is 35 million. In the 14 countries where the BBG has done research (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and UAE), 92 million adults have access to satellite TV. Alhurra’s weekly audience in these 14 countries, as measured consistent with international broadcasting standard, is 27.5 million—almost a third of the potential audience.21

While Alhurra’s weekly audience is less than the weekly audiences for Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, it is greater than all other non-Arab broadcasters combined (including BBC Arabic). Alhurra and the BBG’s Arabic radio network, Radio Sawa, have a weekly audience of 71 percent of Iraqis and 61 percent of Syrians. Together, Sawa and Alhurra reach an unduplicated audience of more than 35 million. In each of the 14 researched markets, Alhurra figures among the top 20 TV channels of all kinds (entertainment as well as news), except in Saudi Arabia, where it is 21st. Surveys find that Alhurra is considered “trustworthy” by at least 90 percent of its viewers in such countries as Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait. In the past few weeks, Alhurra, with a larger audience in Iraq than Al Jazeera, has provided vigorous, objective coverage of that country’s elections.

Meanwhile, two other BBG entities, RFE/RL and VOA are together broadcasting a stream in Pashto and Dari 24/7 into Afghanistan, where RFE/RL is the No. 1 news station in the country. Separately, last December, RFE/RL began broadcasting in local Pashto dialects to Pakistan and the border regions with Afghanistan over a new station called Radio Mashaal, offering an alternative to extremist stations in the region. Radio Deewa, a product of VOA, is now broadcasting 9 hours a day in Pashto to federally administered tribal areas of Pakistan, reaching 14 percent of Pashtuns in this critical area.

VOA has the largest combined radio and television audience in Iran of all international broadcasters, with one in four adult Iranians tuning in to a VOA program


21 The source of these data is the ‘BBG itself, which contracts with a firm which independently engages such respected survey organizations. Most of the Middle East research was done by ACNielsen. The BBG uses the standard audience measurement for international broadcasters, asking whether the respondent watched or listened in the past week.
once a week. PNN broadcasts 7 hours of television daily, repeated in a 24-hour format, and 5 hours of radio. Programming is also available around the clock on the Internet.

At the end of December, VOA launched a new Web application that allows users in Iran to download and send content to VOA’s Persian News Network with their iPhones. The application enables users of Apple iPhones and Android phones to get the latest news from PNN and, with a single click, to send links to VOA stories via Facebook and Twitter pages and e-mail accounts. The application will be available shortly in Apple’s online store, PNN’s Web site (http://www1.voanews.com/persian/news/) and on PNN’s Facebook and Twitter accounts.

The application also gives Iran’s “citizen journalists” the opportunity to use their iPhones and Android phones to send video and still pictures taken on their devices to a secure Web site where VOA’s PNN editors can download the images and review them for possible broadcast use and Web posting.

RFE/RL’s Radio Farda continues to provide hard-hitting news and information in a 24/7 format that gets stories to the Iranian people that their government denies them on domestic media outlets. Radio Farda has reported the harsh crackdown in the aftermath of the flawed June election.

The BBG is focused not only on areas of conflict. It has a major presence in Africa, where it has gained a reputation for broadcasting useful information about health; in Cuba, Russia, and in parts of Asia where freedom of the press is constrained, such as China and Burma. BBG budgets rose significantly in the 7 years following the 9/11 attacks.

Because of evolving audience tastes, as well as legal, political, and technical obstacles to radio and TV in countries such as Russia, the BBG has moved more and more toward reaching audiences through the Internet.

But all is not well. The BBG’s purpose and achievements need to gain greater understanding and support among policymakers.

The BBG is an independent agency of the Federal Government, with eight governors, four from each party, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, plus the Secretary of State, who typically appoints as representative the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Unfortunately, in recent years, the confirmation process has become fraught with difficulty. As a result, although it occurred in June 2007—more than 2 1⁄2 years ago—my confirmation was the last voted by the Senate for a BBG governor. Natural attrition has left the BBG with only four governors plus the Secretary of State—a total of five, which is the minimum for a quorum.

The BBG is no ordinary board; its governors serve as a collective chief executive officer for this critical organization. Imagine a CEO who serves with barely half of his or her intellectual and physical strength, and you’ll get an idea of the status of the BBG today. I urge the Senate to confirm a full slate of governors immediately. The lack of action over the past few years on confirmations of governors is a sad manifestation of the overall standing of public diplomacy among too many policymakers. We can’t wait.

TRADITIONAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

My predecessor, Ambassador Hughes, gave me two excellent pieces of advice, and I passed them on to my successor: First, the best thing we can do for the long run in traditional public diplomacy is put Americans face to face with foreigners, and, second, we can’t do enough English teaching.

We put people face to face mainly through exchanges. Ambassador Hughes’ great accomplishment was expanding these programs that had been languishing. The United States now brings about 50,000 people from other countries to the United States on programs like Fulbright and YES (for high school students, mainly from Muslim-majority nations) and International Visitor Programs, whose graduates have included such figures as Hamid Karzai and Margaret Thatcher, when they were rising stars.

Education is America’s greatest brand, and we have bounced back dramatically from 9/11. Today, despite tougher visa requirements, more than 600,000 foreign students are matriculating in the United States—an all-time record.

Fulbright is the largest single public diplomacy program of the State Department, with federal support that has been increasing consistently for the past 6 years,22 thanks to the efforts of President Bush and the U.S. Congress. In fiscal 2004,

federal spending on Fulbright was $150 million; in 2010, it will be $254 million. Fulbright too has become more strategic. Exchanges for university students and scholars in both directions have increased substantially in Muslim-majority countries, including Afghanistan, Indonesia, Turkey, and Iraq. The Fulbright program in Pakistan is the largest in the world. Globally, applications are at their highest level in history.

While the U.S. Government is the top funder of Fulbright scholarships, there are substantial contributions coming now from 100 countries, including major investments from India, China, Turkey, Chile, and Indonesia. And as an example of the public-private partnerships that are so critical to the success of public diplomacy, U.S. universities contribute $30 million a year in cost-sharing.

The problem with exchanges, however, is that they are expensive. To succeed in the future, public diplomacy will need to find ways to use technology to reach a wider audience with each individual exchange—through video, for example, or sophisticated use of social networking media—and to find ways to engage more private-sector partners.

As for English, the United States teaches it because the world wants to learn it—because governments and people in practically every country in the world see English as a way to move up economically. Everywhere, including difficult neighborhoods like Yemen, the West Bank and Gaza. In teaching English, we teach a language and tell America’s story. Spending on English-teaching programs by the State Department has risen from $6.8 million in fiscal 2004 to $46.6 million this year.

Educational and cultural (including sports) exchanges, plus the outsourcivities (such as sending speakers aboard and operating America.gov Web sites in seven different languages) of the Bureau of International Information Programs, comprise what I term “traditional public diplomacy.” These programs are important. They work, as recent assessments and evaluations have shown. The challenge is to improve efficiency and flexibility.

TWO URGENT TASKS

But, to return to Strategic Public Diplomacy and the war of ideas: What are the urgent tasks today? Here are two.

A New Narrative: The most pernicious idea in Muslim societies is that the United States wants to destroy Islam and replace it with Christianity. Vast majorities in many countries believe this narrative, and it is the prism through which they view almost all U.S. activities.23

But to try to refute this narrative head on is not easy. A better approach is to promote a different narrative—one that reflects the truth. The State Department’s new strategic plan for public diplomacy lists “Shape the narrative” as one of five strategic objectives. That’s encouraging, but the narrative that the plan has in mind appears, from the document, to be U.S.-centric and difficult to convey and sustain. The objective appears to be to explain American policies better and to “counter misinformation and disinformation.”24 Certainly, those activities must be part of any public diplomacy strategy, but the more valuable narrative to spread is not about the United States at all.

The indispensable narrative is the real story of what is happening in Muslim societies. It is a narrative of three conflicts that are within Muslim societies. Yes, the United States is deeply affected by them, but they are intra-Muslim conflicts and need to be understood that way. They are:

- Religion and terror. A small group of violent reactionaries—led by al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and allied groups—is trying, through horrifying brutality, to bring more than 1 billion Muslims into line with a sweeping totalitarian doctrine, inconsistent with the tenets of Islam.

Growing numbers of Muslims are waking up to threat and are opposing and ostracizing the violent extremists in their midst—even in Pakistan, where a terrible threat had been widely ignored. Even as U.S. favorability has slipped,
support for al-Qaeda and the Taliban has plummeted. In spring 2008, some 25 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of al-Qaeda, with 34 percent unfavorable—a disturbingly close split. Today, just 9 percent have a favorable opinion, with 61 percent unfavorable. So, too, with the Taliban: The ratings shifted from 27 percent favorable and 33 percent unfavorable in 2008 to 10 percent favorable and 70 percent unfavorable today.\(^{25}\) Our job in public diplomacy should be to help spread information about these reactionary groups trying to destroy Islam.

- Iran and proxies. Along with its proxies Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas, Iran is confronting the vast majority of Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. This Iran vs. Arab conflict is also part of the Sunni-Shia conflict that is playing out elsewhere, including Iraq, but Iran’s threat transcends religion. Regardless of sectarian bent, Muslim communities are rising to oppose the attempts by Iran and its intelligence services—in particular the Quds Force—to extend Shia extremism and influence throughout the world. Here, public diplomacy can support those who are struggling to change the policies of the Iranian regime.

- Democracy and human rights, especially the rights of women. Many Arab governments have denied their citizens what Egyptian activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim has called “the infrastructure of democracy”: rule of law, independent judiciary, free media, gender equality, and autonomous civil society. These necessities of liberty are more important than ballots dropped in a box, as we have seen by the actions of the terrorist Hamas regime in Gaza.

A widespread criticism among Muslims is that the United States has not pressed authoritarian allies to democratize. For both moral and strategic reasons, we have a stake in supporting free societies with accountable governments. The reality of democracies thriving in Muslim societies—like Turkey and Indonesia—is a powerful counterweight to the canard that Islam and political freedom can’t coexist. Here, public diplomacy can remind those advancing freedom and democracy that they aren’t alone and that history, including our own, is replete with examples of brave advocates.

For the immediate future, our job in public diplomacy is to promote this accurate narrative in everything we do. We can do it while at the same time emphasizing America’s values—concepts of pluralism, freedom, and opportunity that run counter to the extremists’ ideology. We should emphasize that the United States won’t be a passive bystander in these struggles. We will advance our own ideals and interests—which include promoting a comprehensive two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians.

But it is challenging and empowering Muslim communities to take on the three great struggles themselves, with the United States as a constructive partner, that is an approach that will overturn the extremists’ narrative and help shape a new, honest, and positive storyline—in which Muslims see themselves not as victims but as central protagonists in global struggles for justice.\(^{26}\)

Strategic Public Diplomacy in Iran: The second example is one I laid out in a recent article with Mike Doran, a former colleague who now teaches at NYU. It concerns Iran. Here we are squandering a great opportunity. Our objective is an Iran free of nuclear weapons. Two routes to achieving the objective appear highly unlikely: armed conflict or successful official diplomacy. But public diplomacy can work—mainly because of the brave opposition movement that developed after the June elections. What are we doing to help? It’s hard to see. Doran and I urge:

- Providing moral and educational support for the Green Movement in Iran by publicizing what worked in Ukraine or Georgia, dubbing into Farsi documentaries on the fall of Ceausescu, Milosevic, and Pinochet; the transitions in South Africa and Poland; and the achievements of the U.S. civil-rights movement. The great fear of the Iranian regime is that a nonviolent civil resistance in the form of a color movement, like those in states of the former Soviet Union, will gain authority and legitimacy and, ultimately, power through democratic means. The regime is right to be afraid.

- Tightening sanctions on the Iranian economy and publicizing the connection between regime belligerence and economic malaise. The slogans of the protesters


demonstrate that they are connecting the dots between the regime’s foreign policy and economic privation.

- Doing all we can to increase communications within Iran, as well as between Iran and the outside world, including boosting broadcasting by Radio Farda and Voice of America satellite TV and spreading tools to facilitate mobile-phone messaging and social networking—and helping Iranians get the technology to overcome regime attempts to block and censor. In testimony in February in the House, Mehdi Khalaji and J. Scott Carpenter urged this approach as well. They state that Ayatollah “Khamenei often expresses his belief that he is in a soft war with the West. For him, all new telecommunication, Internet, and satellite technology are Western tools to defeat him in this war.”

- Finally, aggressively refuting, in campaign style, the key propositions of Iranian propaganda, such as that the Green Movement is marginal and lacks support and that the West wants Iran to be a technological backwater. A serious strategic communications program for Iran could have dozens, even hundreds, of programs. They might range from a campaign, including posters and TV commercials featuring Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, to encourage Iranians to come to California to be trained as high-tech experts; to an aggressive effort to expose the Iranian agents who beat and seize demonstrators; to support for an interactive satellite TV station that appeals to young people and urges them to express free choice in cultural and social, as well as political matters; to financial aid to the families of victims of the crackdown on demonstrators.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Here, then are seven recommendations for a more effective public diplomacy:

1. Make public diplomacy a top priority. The entire government should know that the President sees public diplomacy as a critical part of America’s overall national security strategy.

2. Make a distinction between what I call Strategic Public Diplomacy—that is, PD with clear objectives that can be achieved in a definable period, such as war-of-ideas goals—and long-term ongoing public diplomacy, which may be shaped strategically (with emphasis on exchanges with Muslim-majority nations, for example) but which is more general in its effects.

3. Institute a strong interagency structure and process led by an official with a close connection to the President. During the Bush administration, that official was the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, but other structures are possible.

4. Launch an interagency program quickly to show that public diplomacy can achieve national security goals. Iran should be the immediate focus.

5. Promote the successes and enhance the understanding of the function and purpose of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Confirm the new slate of governors. The BBG is a precious asset that must not be ignored or denigrated.

6. Expand Public Diplomacy 2.0, using technology to facilitate and convene a broad and deep global conversation in which we can more effectively influence and inform. At the same time, put teeth into Secretary Clinton’s affirmation that the United States supports open global communications. One step would be to challenge Iranian jamming of satellite broadcasts.

7. Establish a culture of measurable results. All public diplomacy programs must be assessed and evaluated to see how well they “move the needle.” Measuring can be difficult and expensive, but, without it, we can’t tell whether work is succeeding or failing.

Finally, remember that public diplomacy performs its mission of achieving the national interest in a particular way: by understanding, informing, engaging, and influencing foreign publics. While the “influencing” part may be the most important,
the “understanding” part comes first. You can’t persuade if you don’t truly understand the people you are trying to persuade.

Senator J. William Fulbright, who created the Fulbright exchanges in 1946, put it well: The “essence of intercultural education,” he said, referring to what would become one of our most effective public diplomacy programs, is “empathy, the ability to see the world as others see it, and to allow for the possibility that others may see something we have failed to see.”

Another key word in public diplomacy is compassion. At the Bush Institute, we base our programs on four key principles of the former President: freedom, responsibility, opportunity, and compassion. Americans are compassionate people, and that trait needs to be reflected in all that we do in public diplomacy. It is the foundation of Public Diplomacy 2.0, and, in the goals we seek, it is the driving force behind Strategic Public Diplomacy.

I ended my testimony before this committee in January 2008 with the following sentence, which I believe bears repeating: The task ahead is to tell the world the story of a good and compassionate nation and, at the same time, to engage in the most important ideological contest of our time—a contest that we will win.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much. Thanks for all three.

I’d like to start with Jim and then go down the panel on this one question. That is, we get so tied up in the budgets and where we are and the rest of it. I think the point that Jim made about this has got to be taken seriously. If you came back 10 years from now, what were the things that, if we’d done them, they would have been the most effective? Not thinking about present budgets or what’s happening right away, but trying to view it from a longer range, what are the things that would have been the most effective if we had done them now so that 10 years from now we’d take seriously a strategic—public diplomacy was taken seriously? Start with Jim.

Mr. GLASSMAN. Senator, first let me just comment on budgets. I really did not in my way too extensive written testimony say that we ought to expand budgets. I understand what’s going on.

Senator KAUFMAN. Oh, no, I——

Mr. GLASSMAN. I know you agree with that. So I don’t think that’s the solution, to increase resources. Increasing resources would be fine, but we have to be realistic.

I think there’s a lot that can be done. First of all, I completely agree with Ambassador Hughes that increasing exchanges is enormously important. There’s nothing more important. Karen told me the two most important things that we do are putting foreigners face to face with Americans and teaching English. That’s what she told me when I took the job. She was absolutely right.

But I do believe that there are certain things we can do in this more strategic realm of public diplomacy, and it begins with the President taking seriously, and other policymakers, public diplomacy as a tool of national security. That’s what it is. I think what I would feel very good about 10 years from now is that there is a structure in place led by the Under Secretary or possibly by somebody else, that brings the interagency together, and that actually sends people out to do specific tasks.

Now, we were doing that at the end of the last administration. I’m not clear about how that’s being done now. I’m not going to criticize what’s being done now. But I think that’s the most important thing. If you ask me one specific thing, it would be this: I believe we are on the brink of a foreign policy success in Iran if
we would use public diplomacy the way it should be used. That would be a great thing to look back on 10 years from now.

Senator KAUFMAN. Now, you know we passed the Voice Act, which was a bipartisan bill passed the Senate, that shows that this is a bipartisan issue in terms of the Congress, in terms of the Senate, that we really want to do this thing and what we have to do on Internet freedom. It has funds in there for Internet freedom and the rest of it.

So Iran is very much on people’s minds and public diplomacy’s role is key. Obviously, we have a good broadcasting effort in that area.

Karen.

Ms. HUGHES. Same question?

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, same question.

Ms. HUGHES. Let me share with you what I saw being done in one country that I thought was extremely effective, and it touches on what Ambassador Glassman just said. That is that all the tools were brought together and applied to a problem in a coordinated way. So for example, the Ambassador in the Philippines at the time, Kristie Kenney, took me to Holo Island, where I, as the U.S. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, opened a road that we had opened to help the villagers bring their products to market.

It was very much a battle for hearts and minds, where they were competing with a very violent strain of extremism that was connected with al-Qaeda. The war of ideas was going on on that little island, where they were trying to—the terrorists were attacking the local population, were trying to intimidate and terrorize the local population. We were trying to win them over.

The Defense Department was providing strategic help to the Philippines Armed Forces. The USAID was working with State to help provide the funds to help the villagers bring their goods to market.

That’s the type of thing that I think needs to happen more broadly in key countries where we’re facing this ideological struggle. We had identified, as Jim said, key countries. The list was classified, but we were working on very country-specific plans to bring all the resources of the U.S. Government together and try to coordinate better to make a difference in those countries. So I think that’s probably the single thing.

I do think we need more resources devoted to public diplomacy. I don’t think that means an expansion of spending overall. I think there are resources that are misallocated. For example, Defense has—and Secretary Gates has said this himself, that they have a lot of funds for public diplomacy that probably should more normally be used by the State Department in conducting public diplomacy.

One of the problems that I found was not much flexibility. Most of my funding was tied up in salaries around the world with Foreign Service nationals, career Foreign Service officers. There was no pot of money to apply to a problem. So if I had found the magic bullet program, it would have been very hard to find the money to fund it.

I did get funding, thanks to the Congress, through the supplemental on the war on terror, that allowed us to start this new
English language teaching program for 8-to-14-year-olds in about 30 different countries. I think that was very important. But that illustrated that those types of funds are not available.

The first week that I was at the State Department, the Defense Department signed a contract with a public relations agency, the Lincoln Group, for almost as much as my overall budget. So I think that sort of illustrated very clearly that there may be some misallocation of existing resources and we need better coordination among the agencies.

Senator KAUFMAN. Of course, Secretary Gates is a big supporter of that.

Ms. HUGHES. He is.

Senator KAUFMAN. He always points out that there are more people in the Army bands than there are in the entire Foreign Service. Ms. HUGHES. Exactly.

Senator KAUFMAN. Evelyn.

Ms. LIEBERMAN. I agree with my colleagues. Mine is a little bit more of a—my first is a little bit more of a parochial request, and that is I still do not believe that the public diplomacy practitioners in the State Department are considered equal to the people who are the Foreign Service officers. I think that has not happened yet. I think it's been a merger, successful in some places. I think the fact that some ambassadors have been former public affairs officers or cultural officers, have been very few and far between, but that symbolically makes a difference as well. So I don't think the merger has worked as well in terms of the personnel.

The second, I agree that exchanges, exchanges, exchanges, let Americans see people from other places. Let people from other places see and interact with Americans. I think the radios should be strengthened. I think they're very often underestimated, underrated, the radios and TV. I think that's worked very well. I'd like to see that work even better. I was reading some statistics from one of my former colleagues at VOA. He told me that VOA has trained 5,000 journalists in 140 countries.

I also find that Voice of America's special English program with a vocabulary of 1,500 words has taught thousands. Thousands of people, who we've all met, I'm sure, have said that that's how they learned to speak English and have learned to like this country, love this country.

I agree about interagency, but I would also like to see—there was a point I was just going to make. I would also like to see more interagency activity. I think the point about the Defense Department being very rich and in many cases they just don't know how to practice public diplomacy. They try to be more generous with some funds, but it's usually for programs that they themselves want to encourage, not necessarily programs that the State Department wants to encourage.

I also think that we have got to get rid of having editorials in our radio broadcasts. The BBC and Deutsche Welle and Radio France International and one other that I'm missing used to meet quarterly, all the international broadcasters. And I would say why do people look at the BBC or Deutsche Welle with more seriousness in some cases than they look at us? And they said: Because you have these required editorials. People do not make a distinction
between what is an editorial, considered American propaganda, and what is real news; and because the broadcasts on—because I was at Voice of America, I use that as an example, of course. Because “The news shall be good, the news shall be bad, we’ll tell you the truth,” and the broadcasts themselves are so excellent, but they lose—they lose their power when they are juxtaposed with American policy editorials.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you.

Senator Wicker.

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much, and thanks to all three of our witnesses. They certainly have been there and we can benefit from their testimony.

Ambassador Hughes, let me begin with you. In the House and Senate I’ve tried to be a strong advocate of languages at the university level, strengthening language training in ROTC with our military. But you said something that caught my attention. You said we not only need people who are conversational, but we need to go beyond that to people who can be actually articulate in an interview, even with a hostile questioner. You know, that’s hard for a lot of American politicians, so it’s a tall order. [Laughter.]

And it got me thinking. I was in Afghanistan at the police academy in Kabul and the general who was talking to us had a translator who it turns out was an Afghan-American who had gone to the United States, had married an American citizen, and who was persuaded to join the military to serve his new country. Well, I’ll tell you what. I don’t speak the language that he was speaking, but he certainly appeared to be very comfortable in the native language, obviously.

How are we going to find these people that can go beyond conversational, which is really an achievement for an American citizen? How do we do that?

Ms. HUGHES. That’s a great question.

Senator WICKER. Have I stumbled upon something that we need to be looking at.

Ms. HUGHES. I think we need to be more focused on it. President Bush started a national security language initiative to encourage scholarships for young Americans in key languages vital to our national security, such as Arabic, Chinese, Russian. There’s a list of six or seven as I recall. I do think we need to reach out.

The State Department trains—reach out to people, maybe, as you say, Afghan-Americans, people from—maybe native speakers, and recruit them. There are problems, however. One of the things I’m concerned about is the State Department personnel system makes it difficult, even if you can find those people, to get them on board and deployed quickly.

Right now you have to take the Foreign Service exam. That’s a lengthy process. Once you go to work at the State Department, you have to do a tour on consular duty. All required—new officers have to do that. It’s several years, I believe. Two years, is that right, Jim?

Mr. GLASSMAN. Frequently it’s 5.

Ms. HUGHES. Frequently it’s longer. So from start to finish, if you had a young American who was a great speaker that you wanted to send to Afghanistan to speak on, do television interviews on
behalf of the Foreign Service, it would probably take you at least 5 to 6, 7 years to get them there, because of the current system. The State Department has language training that is very good. They rate it on different categories and I think there’s a 3–3 that is trained to be able to be very conversational, to be able to engage with foreign publics and work. The 4–4 is what is required to be able to conduct an interview, and we don’t train very many people to that 4–4 level.

There’s another concern that I have. We’ve gone away from a system of encouraging people to specialize in certain regions or language. There was apparently some concern, described as “going native,” that they worried that people were going native because they served in certain regions so long that they started to have the perspective of that region rather than the perspective of America. The problem is—and so now the State Department rewards people for serving in different geographical regions rather than staying on one throughout their career. The problem with that again is it becomes very hard to train enough spokespersons who are able to communicate and understand the nuances of language and culture that make them really effective communicators.

So I do think for the type of people that we’re expecting to communicate in foreign languages on behalf of our country, we might need to look at their career path a little differently.

Senator Wicker. Ambassador Glassman, you may want to comment about that. But let me shift and first ask you about Iran. I think the information that we have is that the government there doesn’t like America very much, but the Iranian people really do. The population of Iran, I guess approximately half of it is below the age of 25, 26, something like that. What accounts for that?

And then—I’ll pile my questions up and let you answer as you choose. You stated we need to provide moral support for the protesters. Could you be specific about how we might do that without raising expectations? I don’t want the protesters to think that it’s all likely that the American military is going to come in and intervene on their behalf. In previous decades—Hungary comes to mind. I think the freedom fighters thought that America would show up. We didn’t. We shouldn’t have given them reason to believe we would.

So how do you balance that out? And then if you want to comment on languages I’d be happy for you to.

Mr. Glassman. Senator, on the question of why the Iranian people like us, but the regime doesn’t, you’re absolutely right. The Iranian people have a long and rich history, deep. It’s a great civilization and it is a freedom-loving people, and I don’t think it should be unusual, we should be surprised, that the Iranian people have a good deal of admiration for the United States.

Senator Wicker. Where does that young person that’s 25 years of age or under, where do they get their information?

Mr. Glassman. Well, I think that—

Senator Wicker. Is this a success of public diplomacy or is it just—

Mr. Glassman. Let me say, and I have talked to many Iranians in this country, Iranian-Americans, and the role that’s played by the VOA and Radio Farda should not be underestimated. It’s really
important. It is really important. That's why I did mention the jamming by the Iranians of international satellite broadcasts, which is absolutely outrageous.

But the answer to your question is that the Iranians are very much, especially the young people, are very much exposed to what's going on in the rest of the world through the Internet and through other means. There is travel outside of Iran. And they feel an affinity with Americans. There are a lot of Iranian-Americans that talk to people in Iran as well.

So it's a great relationship, and Iran is a rich, a rich civilization that is now under the thumb of a despotic regime that more and more Iranians feel that something can be done about. And I'm not talking about the United States giving material support to overthrow the Iranian Government. I'm not saying that. What I'm saying is that there is, first of all, moral support. I don't think moral support—to give moral support to Iranians in the Green Movement is not to say that we're sending in the tanks. It is to say that what you're doing is brave, it is admirable, and it is in keeping with the values of this country and I think the values of freedom-loving people everywhere. I think that's something we need to say, and we can reinforce it. There are many ways to reinforce it.

One very simple way to reinforce it is to remind Iranians of the people who've gone before them, both those in the Orange Movement in Ukraine, people in the civil rights movement in the United States. There is a rich history of dissidents and freedom and advancing freedom around the world. The idea is they're part of it.

Now, there are other things that can be done in a material sense and certainly in an educational sense. But there's lots and lots that can be done. I mentioned in an op-ed that I wrote with Mike Doran, former Defense Department official, that there are—literally we could be doing hundreds of programs aimed at Iran today, and we're lucky that events have transpired in the way that they have in a country in which, as you say, the population is predisposed to like us. There couldn't be a more fertile field for the use of public diplomacy to achieve national security ends than Iran.

Senator Wicker. OK. And then finally, you've mentioned measuring results. You also mentioned strategic goals versus long-term and ongoing goals. I guess it's hard to measure success in the long term ongoing. But to the extent that you have a strategic goal that doesn't last for decades, could you elaborate on how best to measure our success?

Mr. Glassman. Well, let me just say, Senator, that it is not easy to do this.

Senator Wicker. No, it sure isn't.

Mr. Glassman. Right. When I was on the Djerejian group in 2003 looking at public diplomacy in Arab and Muslim societies, that was one of our major recommendations. I have to say that Ambassador Hughes and others of my predecessors really stepped up to the plate and put into effect in the Under Secretary's Office some very good tools for measuring, for example, how well we're doing with exchanges, how well we're doing with Access Micro-scholarships, the English teaching programs she's talking about.

It is much harder to do, and I'm not the expert on exactly how you do it. All I can say is it has to be part of everything that you
do in public diplomacy. Is this working or not? It requires people who are experts sitting down, trying to figure out what the metrics should be, and then trying to take out the other elements that may be influencing final outcomes.

As I say, it's not easy. We devoted a fair amount of resources during my time to trying to do this, and I know that the current Under Secretary is doing the same thing. I think it just needs to continue. It's too easy to say, as I heard many people say in 2003, gee, we can't do this, it's way too hard. You've got to know whether it's working or not.

Senator WICKER. Well, I'm way over on this segment. If you could supplement your answer with thinking back during your term to specific ways that you measured.

Mr. GLASSMAN. I'd be happy to.

Senator WICKER. Now, Mr. Chairman, it's your turn. I have a question——

Senator KAUFMAN. Go ahead.

Senator WICKER. OK. Secretary Lieberman, I want to ask you about American Centers, which we now call Information Resource Centers. You mentioned, you and Ambassador Hughes both mentioned, not being walled in within the security of our compounds. After the bombing of our Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, we pulled back on what some people consider a very valuable diplomacy platform, the American Centers. They housed libraries, reading rooms, taught English, conducted countless outreach programs, book groups, film series, and on and on.

The decision was made around 1998, 1999, to move those within the Embassy and, as you might expect, the attendance at these centers dropped considerably. Our ranking member on the full committee, Senator Lugar, has championed reversing this retrenchment of the American Centers. S. Res. 49 has passed the full Senate and Senator Kaufman and I were cosponsors. It urges the Secretary of State to review the status of American Centers globally and, to the extent that security considerations allow, increase access to them.

Did we make a mistake by changing the focus and accessibility of American Centers and what is the future there?

Ms. LIEBERMAN. The answer is we made a mistake, but in some places it was a matter of necessity. When I first became Under Secretary, as I had traveled around many of the libraries were beginning to close, and it was as these libraries that were staffed by the former USIA public affairs officers began to close down, I think not so much because of safety reasons at that time, but because everything was becoming more electronic and they were trying to get more efficient.

I think after 9/11—and the complaint about the closure was that this was the one place, this was the one place in the Embassy that people were allowed to come in, find information, read books, find out about the United States, a chance for us to meet people face to face, and that was considered a hardship when they closed because people didn't have any contact with the Embassy, with the Embassy informally, let's put it that way.

I remember Ambassador Rohatyn around the time of 1999 or 2000 began to talk about these American Presence posts, where
people—one officer would go to, not a remote area, but away from the Embassy, to a city or a smaller area, and he and a couple of foreign host national staff would have a mini-embassy where they would deal with local governments, do trade, do commerce. So they would function as mini-embassies, and at least there were places where people could interact with local people.

I think the safety and security became an issue. In some places, as I said before, you’re very brave to go out of the embassy in some countries, as you know, and deal with the people on the street, but where American Centers spaces that offer public access to information about us—books, CDs, DVDs, Internet use—have been tremendously popular and tremendously successful, and it’s the one place where informally there can be interaction with people in a particular country and our public affairs officers.

Senator KAUFMAN. I’d just make one comment. The importance of these things—I was really struck. I was in Johannesburg when they closed down the library there in the Embassy. That’s where Mandela and Slovo and Mbeke came together to figure out what they were going to do, and that’s what happened all over the world.

The second thing was, I was in Jerusalem in April. There’s an American Center right in downtown Jerusalem in a mall. So I think we really have to—and I know Senator Wicker agrees with me—we really have to take a hard look at the security, because clearly this is what the terrorists want us to do. I mean, the whole objective, if you listen to what they’re saying, is they want us to retreat.

Jim, could you just talk me a little bit more? I thought your example on measurement on Pakistan was extremely good in terms of laying out the complexity of the problem. How would you do something like that kind of a complex problem, where you’re not trying to change public opinion, but where you’re trying to change opinions in the country? And I’d like everybody’s comment.

Mr. GLASSMAN. Well, it’s not public opinion about the United States necessarily.

Senator KAUFMAN. Right.

Mr. GLASSMAN. I think we’re way too fixated on that. For example, if your objective in Pakistan would be to convince more Pakistanis that this is our war—that, by the way, is a phrase that comes from President Zardari, and I think that as a mission for American public diplomacy it’s a good one. That’s actually quite easy to measure. Maybe our own participation in changing attitudes in Pakistan so that more people would agree with the statement, that may be kind of difficult to separate out from what others are doing.

And then there’s the question of what we would do. Some of what we would do might be covert and classified, but a lot of it might be simply giving help to the Pakistanis, helping to build capacity, for example, for their own effort to change public opinion. I think that would do a world of good.

Now, public opinion in Pakistan is changing and it’s mainly—it may be changing partly because of what we’re doing, but it may be mainly changing because of what they’re doing, what the terrorists are doing. But I think that’s something we could measure.

Senator KAUFMAN. Good. Karen, Evelyn?

Ms. Hughes. Well, I do think there are a lot of things we could do to help. We can provide forums where Pakistanis have a chance to talk about these issues, to debate. We can help with communications tools and tactics. I found that often very good things would happen, someone would speak out and condemn violence and terrorism in the name of Islam, for example, but it wouldn't be publicized, it wouldn't be picked up by the media. So we can help them with communications tactics to make sure that it's publicized and that they're booked on radio and television and have an opportunity to share those views.

So I think there are a lot of opportunities to do things like that. And I very much agree with Jim that we need to look at it, not as if—we need to look at our strategic priority in the country. Obviously, we have a shared priority with Pakistan in defeating extremism there, and look at with Pakistani partners how can we best help you to do that, because it's in our interest and in your interests.

Ms. Lieberman. It's very difficult to measure, obviously, as my colleagues have said. But one vastly underutilized resource is the thousands of alumni who have participated in our programs, then have gone back to their own countries. There is no system for reaching these people with regular communications, and I think that that is a vast untapped resource that we can use.

Ms. Hughes. I agree with that, and we worked—Senator, if I may address that, we did work to begin to establish an alumni database. We also put in place some programs to begin to evaluate. We do a good job of evaluating our exchange programs. We often weren't doing a good job on our other public diplomacy programs. So we put in place something called the Mission Activity Tracker, where we now have a survey: What was the result? Did this speaker help shape your views or increase your understanding of America? Did we achieve the goal in this program? How would you evaluate the impact of this program?

So we are trying to get that culture. I actually cancelled the publication of a magazine, Hi Magazine, which had been created to try to reach out to Arab young people, but we found after we did a survey of our embassies it wasn't successful. People weren't looking at it. It wasn't being used. It was expensive and not achieving the goal. So we suspended publication of it.

So I think we are doing a better job and our public diplomats are committed to doing that. The thing that's harder to measure is what is the impact of having an American who speaks good Arabic going on Al Jazeera? Well, at least you're taking time that somebody else might be spending to criticize you, so at least you're getting—and you're getting your views out there. It's hard to measure what impact does that have, but over time—take the analogy here. It's as if someone in a campaign for Senate decided not to go on television. Well, you would never do that because your opponent would get all the air time.

So we need to be out there advocating. It is difficult to measure the impact of that.

Senator Kaufman. Great. I want to thank you very much. We could stay. I've got another 20 questions. But we have a very im-
important second panel and the Ambassador is here. So I want to thank you very much, and if Ambassador McHale will come up here we'll get started with the second panel.

Ms. Hughes. Thank you for the opportunity for inviting us. Thank you.

Senator Kaufman. Thank you very much.

Pause.

Senator Kaufman. Under Secretary McHale, thank you very much for coming here today. I think we can move right into your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. JUDITH A. McHALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. McHale. Thank you. Thank you very much. It's a bit lonely by myself. Can I invite them back?

Chairman Kaufman, Senator Wicker, thank you for your invitation to appear before you this afternoon. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the state of America's public diplomacy, the framework that we are developing to more closely align our activities with the Nation's foreign policy objectives, and the challenges we continue to face.

Before I begin, I want to acknowledge the legacies of my predecessors who just testified. In a span of just a few years, they put our Nation's public diplomacy on a trajectory that laid the foundation for a new approach to public diplomacy for the 21st century.

As I noticed when I listened to them—in fact, I was saying to them, you guys have stolen all my lines—my predecessors and I agree on many issues, including the central importance of public diplomacy to our Nation's foreign policy and our obligation to ensure public diplomacy is strategic and coordinated at the interagency level. We also agree in many ways on how we should approach public diplomacy, including by assertively shaping the public narrative, expanding our engagement beyond elite audiences, and getting more innovative in our programming while not walking away from programs that work.

Throughout the past year we have witnessed the strong, energetic, and consistent commitment of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to public diplomacy. Both understand that engagement with global publics must be an essential part of our foreign policy apparatus. The communications revolution that has rocketed around the world has had an impact on the attitudes, behaviors, and aspirations of people everywhere. Public opinion is influencing foreign governments and shaping world affairs to an unprecedented degree.

In this environment, our efforts to engage foreign publics through public diplomacy are more important than ever. We must act boldly and decisively to develop a clear, consistent, and comprehensive approach. Over the past months 8 months we have undertaken a focused and disciplined review of the current state of public diplomacy and public affairs at the Department of State. This process showed that in significant ways our public diplomacy was working well to advance America's interests, but it also re-
revealed a great deal of consensus about what needs to be changed to align it to current priorities and guide our efforts going forward.

Last month we began rolling out the results of our review, a new global strategic framework that I believe will give us the focus and capabilities we need in the complex environment of the 21st century. The new framework rests on the core mission of public diplomacy to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.

As part of our review, we identified five strategic imperatives. First, in this information-saturated age we must do a better job of framing global narratives in order to reinforce our foreign policy goals. We must become more proactive and less reactive. We are bolstering our communications outreach locally, nationally, regionally, and globally to inform, inspire, and persuade our target audiences and to counter misinformation.

In support of these efforts, among other things, we are creating the new position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Media Support within State's Bureau of Public Affairs, to facilitate coordinated and high-level attention to foreign media.

Second, we are expanding and strengthening people-to-people relationships, relationships based on mutual trust and respect, through our public diplomacy programs and platforms. In addition to growing our highly successful exchange programs, we are broadening the demographic base of those with whom we engage beyond traditional elites, and we will continue to support programs that simultaneously advance U.S. national interests and offer desired skills to targeted audiences, including expanded language training and teacher training, collaboration in skill-building in science, technology, and entrepreneurship, and programs designed to provide women with the skills they need to advance within their societies.

We are evaluating the opportunities to revitalize and establish American Centers and Corners as spaces for public engagement and we are working with organizations across the country to expand our cultural programs to showcase the breadth and depth of America's cultural heritage.

Third, we are expanding our efforts to respond rapidly to terrorist and violent extremist messages and proactively counter the narrative that has allowed them to disseminate misinformation and recruit new followers. In Washington and at our embassies and consulates overseas, we will aggressively harness new and traditional media to counter misinformation and disinformation. In doing so, we will not simply communicate U.S. perspectives. We will also empower local, credible voices and build host government capacity to counter the extremist narratives.

Fourth, we are taking steps to ensure that our policies and programs are informed up front by a clear understanding of attitudes and opinions of foreign publics. We are establishing the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy in each of our regional bureaus. These officers will be responsible for ensuring that a public diplomacy perspective is incorporated as part
of senior policy formulations and for coordinating all our public diplomacy initiatives throughout the respective regions.

Finally, we are taking steps to ensure a strategic allocation of resources in support of today’s foreign policy priorities. We are strengthening the policy, planning, and resource function within my office and we are reestablishing multiyear public diplomacy plans for all posts. These plans will set forth our public diplomacy mission in host countries, analyze target audiences, inventory continuing and innovative tactics to achieve our goals, identify the resources necessary for success, and integrate realistic measurements of effectiveness.

As we implement the new global strategic framework for public diplomacy, we have placed renewed emphasis on coordination both in Washington and overseas to ensure that our efforts complement and, where possible, reinforce the activities of other departments and agencies. We participate in the weekly NSC-led interagency policy coordination process and take part in a variety of other staff-level coordination bodies, including the biweekly small table group at the National Counterterrorism Center. We also enjoy a close and productive working relationship with our partners at the Department of Defense. I talk and meet regularly with my counterparts there on both specific programs and on broader strategic issues, such as potential rebalancing of the respective roles, responsibilities, and resources of State and Defense in the public diplomacy and strategic communications arenas.

Mr. Chairman, let me say in closing that I believe this is a moment of great opportunity to redefine our relationship with people around the world and to build bridges of knowledge and understanding with people everywhere. In doing so, I believe we will improve lives and support our national interests, and I look forward to working with you as we seek to achieve these goals.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McHale follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JUDITH MCHALE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Kaufman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to appear before you this morning.

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the state of America’s public diplomacy, the framework that we are developing to more closely align our activities with the Nation’s foreign policy objectives, and the challenges we continue to face.

Before I begin, I want to acknowledge the legacies of my predecessors, several of whom testified before you this morning. In a span of just a few years, they put our Nation’s public diplomacy on a trajectory that laid the foundation for a new approach to public diplomacy for the 21st century.

Throughout the past year we have witnessed the strong, energetic, and consistent commitment of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to public diplomacy. From the President’s speeches in Cairo and Accra, to the many events that the Secretary has held directly with international audiences around the world, they have made public diplomacy an integral part of their approach to foreign policy. Both understand that engagement with global publics must be an essential part of our foreign policy apparatus as we pursue our policy objectives, seek to advance our national interests, and strive to ensure our national security.

THE WORLD WE FACE

The communications revolution that has rocketed around the world has had an impact on the attitudes, behaviors, and aspirations of people everywhere. Public opinion is influencing foreign governments and shaping world affairs to an unprece-
dent degree. In the past 25 years 40 new electoral democracies have emerged. This is a great triumph for our belief in the democratic form of government. As citizens in these countries exercise their rights, their decisions affect not only the future of their own countries but also the future of the United States and that of the rest of the world. In this context, our efforts to engage foreign publics through public diplomacy are more important than ever before.

Today, 45 percent of the world’s population is under the age of 25. These young people—many of whom face enormous social and economic challenges—have come of age during a period of limited direct engagement with the United States. They communicate in new ways and with tools which are constantly evolving. As we reach out to this new generation we must develop strategies to engage and inspire them. Increasingly our opponents and adversaries are developing sophisticated media strategies to spread disinformation and rumors which ignite hatred and spur acts of terror and destruction. We must be ever vigilant and respond rapidly to their attacks against us.

Women account for over 50 percent of the world’s population and yet in too many parts of the world they lack access to education and fundamental rights. Countless reports and studies demonstrate that increased participation by women in the social, economic, and political lives of their countries results in more stable productive societies. We must continue to develop and deploy new programs to support and empower women as they seek to improve their lives and communities.

The global challenges we face today require a complex, multidimensional approach to public diplomacy. Our Government must develop new ways to communicate and engage with foreign publics at all levels of society. In doing so, we must do a better job of listening; learn how people in other countries and cultures listen to us; understand their desires and aspirations; and provide them with information and services of value to them. In essence, we must develop ways to become woven into the fabric of the daily lives of people around the world as we seek to create strong and lasting relationships with them.

**A STRATEGIC APPROACH FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**

We must act boldly and decisively to develop a clear, consistent, and comprehensive approach to public diplomacy. Over the past 8 months we have undertaken a focused and disciplined review of the current state of public diplomacy and public affairs at the Department of State. As part of that review, we have consulted with individuals involved in public diplomacy here on Capitol Hill, at the National Security Council and the Department of Defense, and at all levels within the Department of State. We have also met with representatives of academia, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector. I have traveled to embassies and consulates in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. And in October we hosted a global conference attended by all our Public Affairs Officers to ensure that we understood the needs of our posts around the world.

This process showed that in significant ways our public diplomacy was working well to advance America’s interests. But it also revealed a great degree of consensus about what needs to be changed to align it to current priorities and guide our efforts going forward. Last month, we began rolling out the results of our review: a new global strategic framework for public diplomacy that I believe will give us the focus and capabilities we need in the complex environment of the 21st century.

The new framework rests on the core mission of public diplomacy to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.

As part of our review we identified five strategic imperatives: to proactively shape global narratives; expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships; counter violent extremism; better inform policymaking; and, redeploy resources in strategic alignment with shifting priorities. Moving forward, we are taking steps to ensure that all our activities support these requirements.

First, in this information saturated age we must do a better job of framing our national narrative. We must become more proactive and less reactive. We are bolstering our communications outreach—locally, nationally, regionally, and globally—to inform, inspire, and persuade our target audiences and to counter misinformation. We are working with our posts around the world to develop and implement targeted media engagement plans to both push positive stories and to respond rapidly to negative attacks against us. We will expand the role of our regional Media Hubs, and enhance their capabilities as digital engagement centers to ensure that
we are fully represented in dialogues in both traditional and new venues for information and debate.

In December, I sent a cable to our Public Affairs Officers worldwide directing them to be more aggressive and strategic in their communications efforts. As an example of our new forward-leaning stance across the range of issues, our embassies successfully changed the global narrative about our rescue and relief efforts following the tragic earthquake in Haiti. In support of these efforts, we are creating the new position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Media Support within State’s Bureau of Public Affairs to facilitate coordinated and high-level attention to foreign media.

Second, we are expanding and strengthening people-to-people relationships—relationships based on mutual trust and respect—through our public diplomacy programs and platforms. In addition to growing our highly successful exchange programs, we are broadening the demographic base of those with whom we engage beyond traditional elites. We are using social networking and connective technologies such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter to expand our reach and ensure that we are represented in new media and conversation spaces. Last year, in connection with the President’s speech in Ghana, we used a combination of traditional and new media to actively engage with millions of individuals across Africa. And in January, I participated in a Skype-enabled video conference which allowed high school students in Boston to talk to their peers in Jalalabad.

We will continue to support programs that simultaneously advance U.S. national interests and offer desired skills to targeted audiences. These programs include expanded English language teaching and teacher training, collaboration and skill-building in science, technology, and entrepreneurship, programs designed to provide women with the skills they need to advance within their societies, and, educational advising that promotes the broad array of education opportunities offered by U.S. academic institutions.

We are evaluating opportunities to revitalize and establish American Centers and Corners as spaces for public engagement. And we are working with organizations across the country to expand our cultural programs to showcase the breadth and depth of America’s cultural heritage. Recognizing that participants in our programs are among our best ambassadors, we are investing new resources both to enable us to remain better connected to alumni of our exchange programs and to enable them to better connect with each other so that they can build upon their shared experiences.

Third, we are expanding our efforts to respond rapidly to terrorist and violent extremist messages and proactively counter the narrative that has allowed them to disseminate misinformation and recruit new followers. In Washington and at our embassies and consulates overseas, we will aggressively harness new and traditional media to communicate U.S. perspectives and counter misinformation and disinformation. We will redouble our efforts to empower credible voices within societies. To do so, we will continue to provide tools and platforms for independent voices to expand their reach, and leverage partnerships to train religious and secular leaders with local influence in issues of development, health, and education.

Fourth, we are taking steps to ensure that our policies and programs are informed upfront by a clear understanding of attitudes and opinions of foreign publics. We are establishing the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy in each of the regional bureaus. These officers will be responsible for ensuring that a public diplomacy perspective is incorporated as part of senior policy deliberations and for coordinating all our public diplomacy initiatives throughout their respective regions. We are also strengthening our research and planning capacity. In doing so we will draw on the resources of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, media reporting from the Open Source Center, and others to provide us with the information and data we need for this critical task.

Finally, we are taking steps to ensure a strategic allocation of resources in support of foreign policy priorities. We are strengthening the Policy, Planning and Resource function within my office and we are reestablishing multiyear public diplomacy plans for all posts. These plans will set forth our public diplomacy mission in the host country, analyze target audiences, inventory continuing and innovative tactics to achieve our goals, identify the resources necessary for success, and integrate realistic measurements of effectiveness. In Washington we will examine each plan to ensure congruence with our global objectives and allocation of public diplomacy resources in line with current priorities.
COORDINATION AT ALL LEVELS

As we implement the new global strategic framework for public diplomacy, we have placed renewed emphasis on coordination both in Washington and overseas to ensure that our efforts complement and, where possible, reinforce the activities of other departments and agencies.

We participate in the National Security Council (NSC)-led Interagency Policy Coordination (IPC) process. The NSC brings together senior working-level stakeholders from across the interagency for a Strategic Communications IPC meeting on a weekly basis. These meetings address a wide range of issues including global, regional, and country-specific matters. They are designed to coordinate, develop, and deconflict communications programs and activities across U.S. Government agencies. My staff also takes part in a variety of other staff-level coordination bodies, including the biweekly Small Table Group at the National Counterterrorism Center.

The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC), which is part of my office, is specifically chartered to support the NSC’s Global Engagement Directorate. We are expanding and upgrading GSEC to strengthen its ability to contribute across a broad range of U.S. Government strategic communications and global engagement activities. To head the new GSEC, I have recruited Ambassador Richard LeBaron, formerly our Ambassador to Kuwait and one of our senior-most Foreign Service officers. He will arrive on the job this summer.

We also enjoy a close and productive working relationship with our partners at the Department of Defense. I talk and meet regularly with my counterparts there on both specific programs and on broader strategic issues, such as potential rebalancing of the respective roles, responsibilities, and resources of State and Defense in the public diplomacy and strategic communications arenas. I recently visited General Petraeus in Tampa to discuss challenges and opportunities in his region of responsibility and how we can work more effectively with CENTCOM. I have also met several times with Admiral Olson of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to put our heads together on ways to improve current cooperation between State and SOCOM.

THE NEW APPROACH: A CASE STUDY—PAKISTAN

Last summer, my office worked closely with our Embassy in Islamabad, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, USAID, and DOD to draft the Pakistan Communications Plan, a copy of which has been provided to the committee.

The Pakistan Plan has four broad goals: expand media outreach, counter extremist propaganda, build communications capacity, and strengthen people-to-people ties. Our plan links elements of traditional public diplomacy with innovative new tools. For instance, recognizing that extremist voices dominate in some of Pakistan’s media markets, we instituted a rapid response unit and a 24-hour multilingual hotline for the Embassy to respond to attacks, threats, and propaganda from the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and their sympathizers. This approach reversed a previous approach of not actively countering such propaganda. It has been an uphill battle but, as our voice gets more frequent play, the impact on the discourse in Pakistan’s media has been noticeable.

As we strengthen our people-to-people ties with Pakistanis, our aim has been to increase positive American presence on the ground in Pakistan. To do this we are focusing on more exchanges, more presence, more Lincoln Centers, more face-to-face meetings with engaged citizens in Pakistan, and more nonofficial contacts between Pakistanis and Americans in Pakistan.

Secretary Clinton’s October 2009 visit to Pakistan was planned and executed in coordination with the themes of our strategic plan. Her focus on issues of education, jobs, and reliable electric power responded to what we had identified as central concerns of Pakistanis. Her extensive series of public engagement activities carried out the plan’s emphasis on rejuvenating our personal, face-to-face diplomacy. Her visits to historical and cultural venues underscored American respect for and desire for partnership with the people of Pakistan. Perhaps the most telling moment came during a press conference during which Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi stated that the Secretary’s visit had been a success precisely because it had manifested a “policy shift” toward a focus on “people centric” relations. This was and is precisely our message.

While very few countries will require plans on the order of Pakistan, henceforth we will ensure that our public diplomacy strategic plans for each mission incorporate rigorous strategic analysis to drive focus and coordination at the post level.

Mr. Chairman, let me say in closing that I believe this is a moment of great opportunity to redefine our relationship with people around the world and to build
bridges of knowledge and understanding with people everywhere. In doing so, I believe we will improve lives and support our national interests. I look forward to working with you as we seek to achieve these goals.

The Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much.
I was really pleased to see that the fiscal year 2011 State Department’s budget’s gone from—you requested $568 million, which is almost a $48 million increase. Why don’t you spend a couple minutes and tell us what that $48 million is going to go for?

Ms. McHALE. First, I think it is one of the sort of good news stories of public diplomacy. If you look at 2009, 2010, 2011, there has been a robust increase in the resources allocated to it. I think that’s a reflection across the government of an understanding of the importance of its critical nature.

I don’t have the exact specifics as to where it is, but some of the things that we’re looking at are American Centers. We believe that this is a critical area, that we actually have to find ways of going back and connecting with people and being where they are. So a certain amount of that, of those funds, will be going there. We’re also looking to expand some of our very successful exchange programs as well.
Again, my predecessors, we all agree that—if I could sort of wave my magic wand and bring everyone here and send everyone there, we would be able to do it. We can’t do that. But we want to do it, because we see and understand the importance and the power of those programs.
[Additional written information supplied by Ms. McHale follows:]
The requested FY 2011 increase of approximately $48 million is composed of the following:
• $14.5 million for statutory pay raises and inflation to maintain the current FY 2010 level of personnel activity.
• $14.4 million for the establishment of new American Centers as pilot projects around the world varying in size and function reflecting different local conditions and priorities. Funding requested would cover make-ready, staffing, equipment and maintenance of the new Centers as well as training and development of IIP’s Information Resource Officer Corps.
• $7.4 million for the establishment of 28 new American Officer positions (8 domestic and 20 overseas) in accordance with the Secretary’s Diplomacy 3.0 initiative.
• $11.5 million for the extension and expansion of public diplomacy programs in Pakistan above the $30.9 million originally funded by the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009. The goals of this program are to reduce support for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups and ideologies; build confidence in the capabilities of the Pakistan Government to serve its people; improve and expand the professionalism of Pakistani media; and strengthen the U.S. relationship with Pakistani people at all levels of society.

Senator KAUFMAN. Can you talk a little bit about what Evelyn Lieberman talked about in terms of making sure that the public diplomacy people throughout the embassies and in the State Department are on equal footing with the Foreign Service officers?
Ms. McHALE. I think I agree, and I’ve spoken to Ambassador Lieberman about this issue before coming in, and obviously I had read about it. I think, first off, that there’s a growing recognition within the Department itself of the importance of public diplomacy. Part of our establishment of a new role of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in each of the regional bureaus is one way of doing that. It provides a career path. I was recently in India and I was
talking to our PAO there and when he heard that he basically said: You know, that's something for me to shoot for.

Evelyn again mentioned the fact that there had not been a lot of PAOs who have progressed up through the structure to become ambassador, and we are looking to address that. So I think part of it is to look how to provide career paths for people; to provide them the opportunities. We have increased the number of PAO positions around the world, so we're actually creating more positions.

I don't have the exact statistic, but I think the initial recruits into the PD Cone are actually either the top or the second, that's where people go, but when they get in there haven't been sufficient posts for them to advance their careers. So we're addressing it at multiple levels and we've made this a top priority to see how we can continue to do it.

But I do believe that there's sort of throughout the building an acknowledgment and an understanding that we have simply got to do some different things here.

Senator KAUFMAN. Senator Wicker.

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much, Secretary McHale. When a representative of the State Department appears on Al Jazeera, can that representative speak Arabic to the extent that he or she can handle a sometimes hostile interview?

Ms. MCHALE. Well, in Dubai we have a media hub. And we have specifically staffed it with Arabic speakers who are at the 4–4 level because we knew that it was absolutely critical for them to be able to do that. So we have that. We have a number of our senior officers who can respond in Arabic, because I absolutely agree that the more that we can do that the better off we are going to be.

So we specifically recruit officers who can do that. Do we have enough people who can speak Arabic to do that? Probably not.

Senator WICKER. What strategy would we have to find some more?

Ms. MCHALE. You know, it's one of the things which is quite difficult to do, to get to that level where you're confident enough to take those kinds of interviews and handle that in a very rapid-fire environment. I think we have a renewed focus and emphasis on training people. Unfortunately, you can't train someone in it overnight. But we're trying to encourage people to do it as best we can.

Senator WICKER. Some of my colleagues have been interviewed on Al Jazeera. When they submit to an interview in English, what sort of penetration do we get? How many listeners are able to understand that interview in English?

Ms. MCHALE. Well, we encourage people to go on Al Jazeera when we can, because if you look at the reach that that network actually has throughout the Arab world, it has an audience of about 250 million people. So we encourage people, under the appropriate circumstances, to go on there because it is a great opportunity to connect with them.

In terms of how many of those 250 million would understand the English, I can get back to you on that. I can't give you a specific answer on it. I would expect that the majority of the 250 million probably cannot understand it in English and you would be relying on the translation.
[Additional written information supplied by Ms. McHale follows:]

Al Jazeera Arabic estimates that it has an average weekly audience of 50–60 million viewers. They routinely interview English speakers, including U.S. officials, via interpreters in order to ensure that all their viewers are able to understand the answers clearly. We have consistently found their interpreters to be of high quality.

Al Jazeera English, on the other hand, conducts interviews in English for their English-speaking audiences in Africa, South Asia, North America, and elsewhere. As of now, we have seen no complete data on audience penetration rates for Al Jazeera English.

Senator WICKER. What did you think about the question about measuring results? Let me preface it by saying this. I understand what Senator Kaufman and you are saying about expanding the budget. I also worry about the national debt and I think Americans are worried about $12 trillion. If we're going to view this as an essential part of national security, therefore justifying an exception to the President's freeze, which is apparently his view, then we need to be able to get back to the American people at a point and say we got this, this, and this for your dollars.

Ms. MCHALE. I couldn't agree more, and I have made this a big area of focus. I obviously come from the private sector, where everything I did was measured, literally. So I'm very familiar with that.

One of the things that we have done now as sort of a new approach to this is we will not undertake a program unless we build it up front some performance metrics against which we can measure. It is, as Ambassador Glassman said, it is very difficult to do that. How do you measure? When you put someone through—you have a Fulbright scholar who comes here; 30 years later they may end up being the President of their country. I know now that that's a great investment. We have 40 heads of state or senior government ministers who have been there. However, the fact that it's not impossible; that it's very difficult—we still have to do it.

And frankly, whether there was a budget challenge or not, I would think that we should do that. I think that that's a prudent way of knowing what you're doing.

So what are some of the things that we're actually doing? As Ambassador Hughes said, we pretty successfully measure our exchanges. It's relatively easy to do that. You invite people, they're here, you survey them, and you send them back. Some of our other programs are more difficult. We have a new office of—we've expanded the Office of Measurement and Evaluation. I'd be happy to have them come up and give you a full briefing on it. But to give you some sense of what we're doing, we do some post-program experience. We go back to a sort of sound research basis; we follow participants in those programs over a defined period of time—2 to 3 years—so that we can see what was the benefit of it, measuring it. So that's one way that we're doing it. We know from our initial reports of that, which just came out earlier this year, that they have a positive impact on people's perception of the United States.

I think we are also trying to establish a process of trend analysis, so that we can see over time and filter out some of the sort of intervening effects, and you should be able to over a period of time discern some trends. You have to have a relatively short period of time. You don't want to be 5 years into a program and go, well, that doesn't work. So there are a variety of different mechanisms
and levers that we’re pulling. But I’d be happy to have the head of the evaluation team come up and brief your staff if you’d like to hear more details.

But to me it’s absolutely essential. One of the things we do is, as we’re rolling out new programs, we build in some measures of effectiveness, so that we’re trying to embed in the culture the sense that you have to do this on a going forward basis.

Senator WICKER. Who is that Fulbright scholar that’s now President of his country?

Ms. MCHALE. I knew you were probably going to ask that. I’ll get back to you with a full list.

[The written information submitted by Ms. McHale follows:]

There are three Fulbright Alumni who are current Heads of State:
- John Mills, President of Ghana (2009-present);
- Sebastian Pinera, President of Chile (2010-present); and
- Colvert Young, Governor General of Belize (1993-Present).

Fulbright Alumni who are former Heads of State (with their terms in office) include:
- Giuliano Amato, Prime Minister of Italy (1992–1993, 2000–2001);
- Marek Belka, Prime Minister of Poland (2004–2005);
- Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil (1995–2003);
- Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister of Sweden (1986–1991, 1994–1996);
- Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Prime Minister of Poland (1996–1997);
- Lamberto Dini, Prime Minister of Italy (1995–1996);
- Ivor Dumont, Governor General of the Bahamas (2001–2005);
- Zlatko Lagumdžija, Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001–2002);
- Hyun Jae Lee, Prime Minister of South Korea (1988);
- Jamil Mahuad, President of Ecuador (1998–2000);
- Beatriz Merino, Prime Minister of Peru (2003);
- Moeen Qureshi, Prime Minister of Pakistan (1993);
- Wallace Rowling, Prime Minister of New Zealand (1974–1975);

Attached please find a list of the 55 alumni of all ECA programs who are current Chiefs of State of Heads of Government.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The above attached list can be found on page 59 in “Additional Material Submitted for the Record.”]

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KAUFMAN. I’d just like to make—and Senator Wicker and I are in exactly the same place in terms of the deficit and the rest of it. But I must tell you, every time——

Senator WICKER. Not exactly.

Senator KAUFMAN. Well, no, I think we are, in terms of being concerned about them and making sure that whatever money we spend—we may be a little different about how to get there.

But it does offend me every time people start talking about us on Al Jazeera and us having gone on Al Jazeera and Al Jazeera having this and Al Jazeera having that. We’re the most powerful military, economic, and strategic political organization, diplomatic organization, in the world, in the history of mankind, and the idea that we spend $100 million on our TV station and we allow a small Arab country to spend $400 million on their TV station and therefore one of the reasons why we have 35 million combined and they have the big numbers they have is the fact that we don’t spend money.

In terms of long-term effectiveness, I don’t think anybody would argue that if we could do something, especially now that we have
a counterinsurgency strategy, if we could do something to change
the hearts and minds of people around the world—let me tell you, Al Jazeera is doing a hell of a job. I don’t have to measure it. I
know. They’re out there in the street constantly stirring things up, constantly presenting things.
So I think that I’m concerned about the deficits, but I’m also con-
cerned that we don’t get outdone by a third-rate country.

Ms. McHale. I think that we live in an age, again, of the 24-
hour news cycle. We all know that. You know that. We have to do
that. It is very, very difficult to do that. We have to get better at
responding across the board. We have to get better at telling sort
of our side of the story and being very proactive.

I’ll give you a quick example recently as a result of the Haiti cri-
sis, for example, where, frankly, I thought our response was Amer-
ica at its best. Our military went in; they reestablished the airport.
Americans opened their hearts and their pocketbooks to the Hai-
tian people. And the headlines and the stories around the world,
including, may I say, Al Jazeera, were horrifying. It was “the
American invasion.”

So what we did was very proactive. We responded to that. We
very specifically had our chiefs of mission around the world re-
pond to that. I personally called Al Jazeera and said: What you’re
doing is not only inaccurate, it’s unprofessional; how can you do
that? And frankly, I got a letter of apology from them in terms of
their coverage because it was inaccurate.

But more importantly, around the world our ambassadors were
able to change that story. So you literally could see it. I think it
demonstrated the importance of our responding very quickly and
not allowing things like that to develop.

Senator Kaufman. Can you talk a little bit about—everybody
talked about the importance of TV and I think that’s absolutely
essential. The advantage we have in the Arabic world is we have
satellite TV, so we can actually broadcast into countries. Can you
talk about how you get into countries or how we should be dealing
with countries that clearly won’t let us do anything on TV, will
fight everything we do on the radio, countries like China and Rus-
sia, the Stans primarily, nations in Africa?

And I’m not just talking about broadcasting. I’m talking about
the whole public diplomacy effort. How do we make that more
effective?

Ms. McHale. Well, obviously it’s a very challenging environment
in countries like that. But we can’t allow the challenges to deter
us. I think what we’re doing is trying to understand, how can we
get our message in. Clearly, the Internet is one way to do it, and
I think the Secretary has been very strong on her position and her
support for freedom of the Internet. We see that that is a way of
going in.

Frankly, I believe that the regimes that try to sort of keep out
information are fighting a losing game. They cannot continue to do
that. I think what we try to do is look at all the tools that are
available to us and try to find the best way to get in, because
frankly at the end of the day they can’t win—this is a zero sum
game for them and they will lose it. You can’t suppress informa-
tion. I think you see that all over the world. Even in countries
which 5 or 10 years ago did not have access to information, like many parts of Africa, they’re using mobile phones which have become a very effective communication tool. We are adapting our programs and strategies to be able to reach people wherever they are, even in very difficult circumstances.

A lot of it will be Internet-based. BBG’s going to continue to do the great work that they do, which is essential for everything that we’re trying to achieve. But at the end of the day I do believe we will prevail in this environment. There is simply no way for them to keep the information out, and we see so many examples of that.

Senator KAUFMAN. Can you talk a little bit—I didn’t realize this. There are 14 Cabinet-level departments and 48 independent agencies in the government participating in at least one or another form of official public diplomacy. Can you talk about—the former Under Secretaries talked about how challenging it is to coordinate everything that’s going on throughout the government. Can you talk about where we are and the state of play on that?

Ms. MCHALE. Yes, I think it is complicated. Yet I think it’s critically important for any number of reasons. I think it’s important for us to be consistent in how we communicate, but I also think—I think Evelyn used the word—let’s leverage all the resources we have. So we participate in the IPC process—the NSC takes the lead in this and brings in agencies and departments to work together.

I have been struck by, to be honest, the degree of collaboration that I’ve actually encountered. So I work very closely—the agencies that I work most closely with would be Department of Defense and USAID. Those three agencies together really have a lot in common. So we’re trying to figure out what’s the best way of leveraging it.

But there is a change in the IPCs that are there. What we are all trying to do is, because I think everyone here understands the importance of collaboration, is to work ahead of the game and figure out ways that we can do it.

Senator KAUFMAN. Without getting into anything classified, can you give me an example off the top of your head of a program you’re doing with the Department of Defense that you really think is working well?

Ms. MCHALE. I would probably rather talk to you about that separately.

Senator KAUFMAN. OK. Can you talk a little bit about surge? What happens with these—so many times, all of a sudden we have a problem. There isn’t much ability from a budget standpoint to put things on the shelf to bring out. But can you talk a little bit about—Haiti is a very good example, but also what we’re doing in Afghanistan? In other words, here we are faced with an extraordinary situation, it’s not business as usual. Many of those things are incredibly important. Just give me some feel for how you——

Ms. MCHALE. Sure. I’ll approach it two ways. First, Afghanistan and Pakistan. I’ll start with the easy one. Basically, frankly, what we’ve done in Pakistan and Afghanistan, we have supplemental budgets focused on communications; strategic communications. I’ve worked very closely with Ambassador Holbrooke and his team to put together a comprehensive strategic communications plan for Pakistan and for Afghanistan. I think I provided copies to the committee of that plan.
Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, you did.

Ms. McHale. There you actually see the sort of interagency cooperation and collaboration and how we've done it. In cases like Haiti, what we try to do, because you have to anticipate that there will be crises like this—one of the things that we're trying to do with our new focus on the budgets and how they're actually being administered is to be sure that we have sufficient unallocated funds that would enable us to deal with crises like that.

The other thing that happens is that at the moment of a crisis you look to what you have in your existing budgets that you could repurpose. Obviously, circumstances changed pretty dramatically in Haiti. There were existing funds there that we looked at to repurpose, and then we supplemented those with additional funds that I have within my office.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much.

I just want to recognize Tom Dine here. Talk about public diplomacy, someone who has been a leader in public diplomacy as the president of Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty.

I want to thank everybody for coming today. This is an important issue and I really think we've had a lot of light on it.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY JUDITH McHALE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. The President's FY 2011 State Department budget request shows an increase of $47.7 million above the FY 2010 appropriated level for public diplomacy. What percentage of these funds will go into expanding educational and professional exchange programs that target Muslim-majority and developing countries?

Answer. The increase of $47.7 million illustrated in the FY 2011 President's budget request supports public diplomacy programs funded within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) appropriation and excludes funding to expand educational and professional exchanges. Educational and professional exchanges are funded through the Educational and Cultural Exchanges (ECE) appropriation which includes within the request approximately $83.2 million that will support programs in Muslim-majority countries.

Question. The domestic dissemination restrictions of the Smith-Mundt Act have been criticized as anachronistic given the global reach of the Internet, and as unduly limiting the ability of the State Department to conduct public diplomacy in a timely and effective fashion. Do you support amendment to or repeal of the act's domestic dissemination restrictions?

Answer. The Smith-Mundt and Zorinsky restrictions were enacted years ago and designed to ensure that public diplomacy funds and materials not be used to propogandize the American people or influence U.S. public opinion. With the consolidation of the United States Information Agency and the State Department and the widespread use of the Internet, these restrictions pose challenges to advancing the core public diplomacy mission of informing and influencing foreign audiences. These restrictions also place limitations on our ability to inform the American people about our efforts overseas and, on occasion, engender duplication of effort.

In light of this and changes in technology in recent years, it would make sense to review the law to ensure that it still expresses the will of Congress, and allows us to accomplish our multiple missions as efficiently and effectively as possible. I am not in a position to prejudge the results of such a review.

Question. The independent U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy can review U.S. public diplomacy activities and report on its findings. Do you support increasing the Commission's role in assessing U.S. public diplomacy efforts, and could
the Commission serve in the place of a proposed independent support organization for public diplomacy?

Answer. I welcome support for U.S. public diplomacy from a variety of sources, not only from within the government but also from the private sector. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy has for years supported the public diplomacy function by offering independent assessments of U.S. Government activities intended to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics. However, I believe public diplomacy is best served by dialogue with a variety of organizations outside of the Department of State which are interested in international outreach and engagement and not one single independent organization.

I have read the many reports on public diplomacy, some of which call for a separate independent organization. I do not believe that such an organization is needed at this time. As I lay out in the public diplomacy framework, what public diplomacy needs is a more strategic focus, structural changes, improved processes which help ensure the link between policy and public diplomacy, and adequate resources. The priorities, is to ensure that public diplomacy has a seat at the policy decision-making table and that resources are deployed in accordance with policy priorities. Toward this end, for example, we are moving ahead to create public diplomacy deputy assistant secretary (PD DAS) positions in each regional bureau.

Question. You stated that interagency coordination has not been problematic, and that you are part of ongoing interagency discussions on public diplomacy and strategic communications. Given your seat at the table, how should the Congress approach the disparity of resources between DOD and the State Department for strategic communication and other kinds of public diplomacy? Should we accept the status quo, or should funding levels be modified?

Answer. The State Department is developing well-reasoned and strategically justified requests for appropriate levels of funding for public diplomacy (PD) and strategic communication (SC) to present to Congress, through the annual State Department appropriations process.

PD coordination across the U.S. Government is improving but still needs to get better. As part of the effort to improve coordination, I and members of my office regularly participate in the Interagency Policy Coordination (IPC) meetings led by the National Security Council (NSC) staff. This enables us to address a wide range of issues, including global, regional, and country-specific matters; and it enables us to coordinate, develop, and de-conflict communications programs and activities across U.S. Government agencies. My staff also take part in a variety of other interagency coordination bodies.

The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC), which is part of my office, is specifically chartered to support the NSC’s Global Engagement Directorate; and we are expanding and upgrading GSEC to strengthen its ability to support the interagency coordination of a broad range of U.S. Government SC and global engagement activities.

I am also focused on institutionalizing the already close and enthusiastic dialogue and coordination between DOD and State about SC and PD. We have launched a joint DOD-State working group to review existing DOD programs in order to recommend an appropriate rebalancing of SC programs, authorities, and resources. This effort, under the purview of the National Security Council, will focus on current DOD strategic communication with civilian populations outside zones of active combat.

As we implement the new Global Strategic Framework for public diplomacy about which I spoke at the subcommittee hearing, we will place renewed emphasis on PD coordination not only in Washington but also overseas to ensure that our efforts complement and, where possible, reinforce the activities of other departments and agencies.

There is no question that American PD is suffering today the effects of years of underfunding. PD is more important than ever to accomplishing our foreign policy priorities, and we passed the point long ago where we could reasonably be expected to do more with less. But before we seek increased resources, I am committed to ensuring that we wisely spend every penny of what we already have. With the new framework for PD in place, we will be able to ensure a strategic allocation of resources in support of current foreign policy priorities.

Among other steps, we are reestablishing multiyear PD plans for all posts that will specify our PD mission in each host country, analyze target audiences, inventory continuing programs and propose innovative tactics to achieve our goals, integrate realistic measurements of effectiveness, and identify the necessary resources. As we enumerate through those multiyear PD plans the resources necessary for success, and as we take into account the recommendations that will emerge from the
RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY JUDITH MCHALE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In your discussion with the committee today, you mentioned it was vital to have language-qualified Public Diplomacy officers capable of speaking with the press in the local language. With that in mind, please provide for the committee the designated language requirement level for the PD positions in the Near East Asia Bureau. Please indicate the language proficiency of the incumbent and of the officer slated to replace him/her with a pending arrival date and the departure of the incumbent, if known.

Answer. The NEA Bureau has 70 language-designated public diplomacy positions, of which 34 are specifically designated to work with the media. Of the NEA language-designated public diplomacy positions, 46 require a General Professional Proficiency (3/3) in Arabic, and 18 require a Limited Working Proficiency (2/2) or lower in Arabic. There is also one regional media position that requires Advanced Professional Proficiency (4/4). In addition, there are also 5 Hebrew-designated positions (General Professional Proficiency or lower) and 1 position requires a General Professional Proficiency in French.

Of the incumbents in these 70 language-designated positions, 58 meet or exceed the language requirement.

During the upcoming summer transfer season, 24 Public Diplomacy language-designated positions will rotate. Eighteen of the incoming Public Diplomacy officers meet or exceed the language requirements of the positions they will fill. In an effort to increase the number of language-qualified Public Diplomacy officers, the NEA Bureau often fills its language-designated public diplomacy positions far enough in advance to allow time for language training. Depending on the language and the level required, language training can sometimes take 1 to 2 years. The challenge so far has been having enough officers to fill existing positions as well as having officers in this “language float.”

Question. As per H.R. 489, and the policy of the Bush administration to convert the head of the International Information Programs Bureau from a Coordinator to an Assistant Secretary in order to highlight the importance of IIP activities, is there an available Assistant Secretary slot unencumbered to use for this position (given that the number of such positions is capped by statute)? If such a slot is available, will it be used for IIP? If not, what are the perceived advantages of keeping the position as a Coordinator?

Answer. There is an available Assistant Secretary slot unencumbered which could be used for the head of IIP. Deliberations are ongoing among the Department’s senior leaders as to whether the IIP Coordinator should be designated an Assistant Secretary, or whether that slot should be used elsewhere.

Question. The recent OIG inspection of the Public Affairs Bureau noted that four of the eight offices in the Bureau’s USAID Press Office are vacant. OIG recommends filling the vacant Director of that office with someone selected by USAID. Please provide a staffing pattern for the Office showing grade levels and brief job descriptions. Please note which positions are currently vacant and for how long they have been so. Additionally, the OIG has called the arrangement of this office “institutionally awkward.” Please provide an organizational chart showing the location of the Office within the PA structure and provide other possible alternative arrangements.

Answer. The duties of the Public Relations Officers in USAID are basically similar and the duties follow:

Public Affairs Specialists/Press Relations Officer

Serves as senior advisor to assigned USAID senior staff on all press matters. Meets regularly with assigned senior staff to formulate press guidance and official response to media inquiries. Reviews media requests and determines appropriate responses to queries. Arranges and conducts media interviews in response to requests and proactively generates media interest on USAID issues. Provides confidential briefings to USAID senior staff regarding on-going programs and developments. Briefs USAID senior staff on possible interview questions and provides guidance on appropriate responses. Prepares briefings materials and talking points for senior USAID officials in preparation for news media events. Prepares press releases, fact sheets, and other background materials for use with the news media. Prepares, reviews, and edits speeches, testimony, talking points and other written materials for
USAID officials attending public events. Arranges and coordinates major public events, which involve heads of state and other high-level visits with USAID Administrator and other senior officials. Arranges for media coverage and works with White House and other government agencies. Provides press materials and serves as officer-in-charge of events. Covers congressional hearings affecting USAID to assist with background information for media. Travels to assigned countries to provide assistance with media events, media training, and other media-related events at the USAID missions.

Attached is an organizational chart for the USAID Press Office as well as the updated organizational chart for the entire Bureau of Public Affairs. Some structural changes have been made to both the press office and the Bureau to address the shortcomings identified by the office of the Inspector General, including moving the USAID press office to report directly to the Spokesman.

While staffing shortages have plagued this office for far too long, we are optimistic that they will soon be addressed. We have identified candidates for the Director position and now titled Deputy Director position, both traditionally filled by Schedule C appointees, which have been vacant since January 20, 2008. Both individuals are scheduled to begin work in early April. The Public Affairs Assistant position that has been vacant since March 24, 2008, and has not been filled due to a variety of reasons. The long vacancy in this position will be one of the first issues we will ask the new Director of the office to tackle.
**Question.** The committee was recently briefed by S/PRAP officials on a $50 million dollar congressional notification for PD activities to Build Afghan Communication Capacity and Counter Extremist Voices in Afghanistan. Please provide a breakdown of the personnel currently at post and in Washington who will implement these activities (by grade, position, cone and office)—particularly in light of the OIG's recent inspection of Embassy Kabul which found that "most of the Public Affairs Section had only limited PD experience." The OIG report also notes that the Embassy requested some 27 new FS and LE PD positions—what is the status of those requested positions?

**Answer.** Kabul Public Affairs Section (PAS) staff members are fully engaged on a range of public outreach programs, including building communications capacity, countering extremist voices, strengthening people-to-people ties and expanding media engagement. PAS is currently staffed with 22 American and 18 Locally Em-
ployed Staff (LES). Twenty additional American positions and 20 additional LES positions were requested and approved, and are in the process of being filled.

PAS Kabul is comprised of a Director of Communications and Public Diplomacy, who is a 3161 limited appointment, a Public Affairs officer (a Senior Foreign Service Public Diplomacy officer), two deputy Public Affairs officers (Foreign Service (FS) grade 01 PD officer and Civil Service (GS) grade 15 PAO), three Information officers (an FS grade 02 Management officer, and FS grades 03 and 04 PD officers), four Cultural Affairs officers (one FS 02, three FS 03), and seven 3161 PD-experienced employees equivalent to mid-level FS officers. New positions will build on existing staffing of information officers, cultural affairs officers, and also include the addition of grants management and contracting officers to help develop and track grants and contracts. Some of these new positions have been filled temporarily during the summer months in the buildup to the end of fiscal year. There are also seven Department of Defense personnel and USAID communications specialists working on these issues within PAS and who report to the Director of Communications and Public Diplomacy.

Five Public Diplomacy Officers presently operate in the field outside of Kabul. The PAOs for consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif are in place in Kabul until the consulates open. Two immediately available positions are open for Public Diplomacy officers in Helmand and Kandahar and are in the process of being filled. Eventually, the Department intends to place Public Diplomacy officers on at least 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The current field positions are occupied by two FS grade 02 officers and three 3161s at the equivalent level.

In Washington, the public affairs arm of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs has the following employees supporting Strategic Communication activities: Director (GS15); Deputy Director (FS02 PD Cone); Program Coordinator (WAE), Public Diplomacy Desk officer (FS03 PD cone), Social Media officer (FS04 PD cone); Grants Program Specialist (3161); Program Specialist (contractor).

**Question.** The Bureau’s Strategic Approach for the 21st century calls for clear dissemination and coordinated guidance to posts for the use of digital tools such as Facebook and YouTube and to “address confusion and inconsistency” in their utilization. Given the prominence new media is playing in current PD strategies, what have been the Department’s attempts to address such problems and what more needs to be done?

**Answer.** The Department’s Internet Steering Committee, chaired by the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), has for 10 years developed policies guiding the Department’s presence on the Internet. Over the past year, this committee coordinated a Department-wide effort with key experts from the Office of Privacy, Records Management, the Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) to create clear policy specifically addressing the Department’s use of social media. Publication in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) is expected within a month. That policy will formalize guidance that has been in place as social media tools became rapidly employed for Department use within the last 2 years. Approximately a year ago, IRM issued a worldwide notice on the subject of social media usage as a precursor to the formal and more detailed FAM Chapter.

IIP coordinates the development of social media products and services with all relevant stakeholders. The Bureau’s pilot initiative on innovative engagement is the Department’s central resource for tool-specific social media guides; e.g., how to establish a Facebook presence, or how to incorporate video and Twitter into targeted information campaigns for use abroad. This pilot initiative publishes guides on its Social Media Hub, available worldwide on the Department’s Intranet, and to the wider interagency community via Intelink.

IIP support is designed to empower American embassy officers and locally employed staff to use social media for engaging foreign publics. Guidance includes:

- Social Media Field Guides provide policy-based step-by-step instruction for most commonly used tools and platforms;
- Discussion forums for specific and current social media topics;
- Best Practices showcase innovation in social media throughout the Department;
- Research assists Posts with analysis and engagement opportunities;
- “Ask the Expert” is a new webinar series with outside experts;
- Community Managers Group is a virtual location for department online managers to meet;
- Training enables participants to engage in hands-on discussions at the Foreign Service Institute with both public affairs professionals and embassy information technology managers.
Guidance and resources related to digital tools are also available on INFOCENTRAL, a USG-only internal Web site that provides guidance and instruction for public diplomacy and strategic communication practitioners, includes comprehensive material on the use of USG new media tools such as government Facebook pages, YouTube videos, Twitter feeds, blogs, Web chats, and Flickr photos, so that officers in the field can quickly and easily access them to engage foreign audiences.

IIP continually adapts its policies, tools, and resources to meet the challenges of a constantly changing communication landscape and audience. More needs to be done to increase both formal and informal training for overseas posts so resources are available to develop and teach the most productive uses of social media. IIP critically needs around the clock expert support so overseas posts can avail them of these services in real time. Limited resources need to be targeted better through more in-depth audience analysis and market focused testing. The Department needs more band-width, and storage, to support the burgeoning use of video and related social media. This requires extensive investment in global communication infrastructure.

Question. The Bureau's Strategic Approach for the 21st century calls for greater outreach to alumni of USG exchanges. What have been the current budgets for such programs and what increases have been proposed to keep alumni engaged in USG programming?

Answer. For both FY 2010 and FY 2011, funding for alumni outreach is $4,135,000 per year. This amount reflects a substantial increase over the $1,000,000 budgets of the past several years for alumni activities. Expanding opportunities for the USG to stay connected with exchange program alumni and for them to better connect with each other is a top priority under the Public Diplomacy Strategic Framework.

Question. By when do you hope the PD regional bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary positions will be created and filled? Since each regional bureau already has an Office of Public Diplomacy, staffed by an Office Director, what other issues will the DAS cover or offices supervise, to prevent him/her from becoming what is, in essence, a glorified office director?

Answer. We hope that the new Public Diplomacy Deputy Assistant Secretary positions will be established and filled by this summer.

By establishing a PD DAS position in each regional bureau, we hope to institutionalize PD's role in ensuring that Bureau policy discussions are informed upfront by a research-based understanding of foreign opinions and attitudes. While we recognize that Public Diplomacy Office Directors are generally included in bureau policy and resource discussions, this has not been the case universally.

As DASes, these individuals will be the regional Assistant Secretary's primary adviser on all Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs matters. The PD DAS will also be responsible for seeing that Public Diplomacy operations and resources in the region are tied to policy objectives and align with the Department's priorities and standards. The PD DAS will be expected to nurture strong working relationships with the leaders of all three R bureaus (i.e., ECA, IIP, and PA) to enlist their consistent support for regional information and outreach requirements. They will oversee Public Diplomacy assignments process for the bureau, recruiting and mentoring officers for regional positions, and participating with other leaders in the decisionmaking process to ensure the most qualified officers are assigned appropriately. The PD DAS will serve as the rating officer for the bureau Public Diplomacy Office Director and the reviewing officer for any deputy(-ies) in that office; some bureaus may elect to have the PD DAS also have some role in reviewing the performance of PAOs in the field. Finally, the PD DAS may also represent the Assistant Secretary or the Principal DAS when necessary.
# List of Alumni of ECA Programs Who Are Current Chiefs of State or Heads of Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Alumni Details</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
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| Côte d'Ivoire: | President Laurent Gbagbo (2000 - Present)  
International Visitor Leadership Program (1993)  
International Visitor Leadership Program (1980) |
| Ghana: | President John Evans Atta Mills (2009 - Present)  
Fulbright Foreign Student Program (1970) |
| Kenya: | President Mwai Kibaki (2002 - Present)  
Voluntary Visitors Program (1999)  
International Visitor Leadership Program (1961) |
| Mauritius: | President Anerood Jugnauth (2003 - Present)  
International Visitor Leadership Program (1981) |
| Mauritius: | Prime Minister Navin Chandras Ramgoolam (2005 - Present)  
International Visitor Leadership Program (1996) |
| Mozambique: | President Armando Emilio Guebuza (2005 - Present)  
International Visitor Leadership Program (1987) |
| Namibia: | Prime Minister Nahas Gideon Angula (2005 - Present)  
Group International Visitor Grant Programs (1996) |
| Togo: | President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbe (2005 - Present)  
International Visitor Leadership Program (2001) |
| Uganda: | Prime Minister Apolo R. Nsibambi (1999 - Present)  
International Visitor Leadership Program (1984) |
| Zimbabwe: | Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (2009 - Present)  
International Visitor Leadership Program (1989) |
| **East Asia and Pacific** | |
| Australia: | Governor General Quentin Alice Bryce (2008 - Present)  
International Visitor Leadership Program (1978) |
Japan: Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (2009 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1988)

Papua New Guinea: Prime Minister Michael Somare (2002 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1970)

Philippines: President Maria Gloria Macaraeg Macapagal-Arroyo (2001 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1964)

Taiwan: President Ma Ying-Jeou (2008 - Present)
Voluntary Visitors Program (2003)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1971)

Europe

Austria: President Heinz Fischer (2004 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1964)

Belgium: Prime Minister Yves Leterme (2009 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (2002)

Croatia: President Ivo Josipovic (2010 - Present)
Group International Visitor Grant Programs (2002)

Denmark: Prime Minister Lars L Rasmussen (2009 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1989)

Finland: Prime Minister Matti T Vanhanen (2003 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1993)

Finland: President Tarja Kaarina Halonen (2000 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1983)

France: Prime Minister Francois Fillon (2007 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1984)

France: President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1985)

Georgia: President Mikheil Saakashvili (2008 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1999)
Voluntary Visitors Program (1997)
Citizen Exchanges (other) (1996)
Muskie, Edmund S. Graduate Fellowship Program (1993)
Kosovo: President Fatmir Sejdiu (2006 - Present)
Educational Partnerships Program (2003)

Lithuania: President Dalia Grybauskaite (2009 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1994)

Lithuania: Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius (2008 - Present)
Citizen Exchanges (other) (1994)

Macedonia: Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski (2006 - Present)
Voluntary Visitors Program (2000)

Malta: Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi (2004 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1990)

Netherlands: Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende (2002 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1985)

Norway: Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg (2005 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1988)

Poland: Acting President Bronislaw Komorowski (2010 - Present)
Voluntary Visitors Program (2006)

Poland: Prime Minister Donald Franciszek Tusk (2007 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1993)

Portugal: President Anibal Cavaco Silva (2006 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1978)

Slovak Republic: Prime Minister Robert Fico (2006 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1990)

Sweden: Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt (2006 - Present)
Voluntary Visitors Program (2002)

Turkey: President Abdullah Gul (2007 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1995)

United Kingdom: Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2007 - Present)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1992)
International Visitor Leadership Program (1984)
Near East

**Egypt:**  Prime Minister Ahmed M. Nazif (2004 - Present)
  International Visitor Leadership Program (1990)

South and Central Asia

**Afghanistan:**  President Hamid Karzai (2004 - Present)
  International Visitor Leadership Program (1987)

**Bhutan:**  Prime Minister Lyonpo Jigme Yoson Thinley (2008 - Present)
  International Visitor Leadership Program (1987)

**India:**  President Pratibha Devi Singh Patil (2007 - Present)
  International Visitor Leadership Program (1987)

**India:**  Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2004 - Present)
  International Visitor Leadership Program (1981)

**Sri Lanka:**  President Mahinda Rajapakse (2005 - Present)
  International Visitor Leadership Program (1989)

Western Hemisphere

**Belize:**  Governor General Colville Norbert Young (1993 - Present)
  Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program (1992)
  Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program (1991)

**Chile:**  President Sebastian Echenique Piñera (2010 - Present)
  Fulbright Foreign Student Program (1974)
  Fulbright Foreign Student Program (1973)

**Colombia:**  President Alvaro Uribe Velez (2002 - Present)
  Voluntary Visitors Program (1999)

**Costa Rica:**  President Oscar Arias Sanchez (2006 - Present)
  International Visitor Leadership Program (1972)

**Dominica:**  President Nicholas Joseph Orville Liverpool (2003 - Present)
  International Visitor Leadership Program (1985)

**Mexico:**  President Felipe De Jesus Calderon Hinojosa (2006 - Present)
  International Visitor Leadership Program (1992)
RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY JUDITH MCHALE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. Former Under Secretary Glassman testified that international broadcasting is currently one of the most successful public diplomacy programs run by the U.S. Government, and that the BBG’s success in building “mutual interest and mutual respect” comes from providing an “accurate, objective, and comprehensive view of America and its policies.” However, a 2009 GAO report cited questionable journalistic standards and biased editorialization at the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and at a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee hearing in June 2009, an expert witness testified that Cubans “are going to look for more credible sources of information and entertainment [than Marti].” Do you agree that if broadcasts are perceived as unreliable, inaccurate, or biased, they may actually be counterproductive and undermine both the stated goals of the BBG and the broader public diplomacy goals of the U.S. Government?

Answer. The United States is a strong supporter of freedom of expression and high journalistic standards around the world. We agree that unbiased and objective reporting should be the cornerstone of all broadcasting supported by the United States Government.

The State Department appreciates the collaborative partnership that we have with the BBG, as well as the role that the Department’s seat on the BBG Board of Governors serves in advising the Board on U.S. foreign policy goals.

For additional information on how the BBG ensures high journalistic standards for its broadcasting, including its office of Cuba Broadcasting, we suggest you reach out to the BBG directly.

Question. Mr. Glassman testified that we need to focus on “Strategic Public Diplomacy” geared to addressing our national security priorities, and in your testimony you identified strategic imperatives that included countering violent extremism and “redeploying resources in strategic alignment with shifting priorities.” Please describe the unique strategic importance of Cuba Broadcasting as part of our public diplomacy and national security strategies. Despite extensive and expensive efforts by the OCB, numerous reports have found that very few Cubans are interested in tuning in to Radio or TV Marti or able to do so, and I remain concerned that we will spend over $30 million in FY10 ineffectively promoting human rights through jammed radio and TV broadcasts to Cuba.

Answer. An important component of the administration’s policy toward Cuba includes promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms. President Obama has made promoting freedom of expression and the free flow of information to, from, and within the island one of the cornerstones of this policy.

Some examples of steps that we have taken to support this policy include the President’s April 2009 announcements easing restrictions on family travel and regulatory and policy changes permitting increased telecommunication between the United States and Cuba which enable Cubans access to additional sources of information. Most recently, the administration established a general license category for
personal Internet communications services to reinstate services that were temporarily cut off by companies that feared that they were in violation of U.S. sanctions. Live Messenger, Facebook, and Twitter, among others, are free personal Internet communication tools that can be accessed by people all around the world.

We believe that Radio Marti continues to serve a critical function in providing uncensored news and information to the people of Cuba. We agree that its programming should be of the highest caliber. It is very difficult to accurately account for the percentage of people in Cuba who listen to Radio Marti, for a variety of reasons related to the closed nature of the state and the challenges involved with conducting survey research on the island. We defer to the Broadcasting Board of Governors for more detailed information about their audience reach and their approaches to assessment of impact. Limited survey research indicates, however, that Cubans do listen to and appreciate having access to Radio Marti.

**Question.** In your testimony, you said that the U.S. Government must “develop new ways to communicate and engage with foreign publics,” and highlighted the use of new technologies and new media to expand our global reach. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Congress requested a report on the efficacy of Cuba Broadcasting and on possible alternative means of reaching a larger audience in Cuba. In light of the aforementioned problems that plague Radio and TV Marti, would you consider advocating for the suspension of continued operation of the OCB and Radio/TV Marti broadcasting in favor of such new media alternatives?

**Answer.** We do not support suspending broadcasting to Cuba because it provides the Cuban people with uncensored news and information. Nor do we think this is the only appropriate media with which to interact with the Cuban people. Throughout the world, and certainly including Cuba, we must make sure that we are communicating with the public in innovative ways that allow different audiences to access information through their preferred media outlet. For example, the Web site of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana already includes a Facebook link in Spanish. We will continue to reach out to the island through new, as well as traditional, media in a multifaceted campaign; the continued emphasis on traditional media is particularly important in a country where Internet access remains largely out of reach for the majority of Cubans.

We also note that new technologies and the country’s important youth demographic are natural allies in the pursuit of greater freedom of expression and the free flow of information. Emerging online tools have the potential to allow young activists to collaborate virtually and physically with counterparts throughout the country and around the world to empower citizens and advance democratic processes.