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**CIVILIAN STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN: A STA-
TUS REPORT IN ADVANCE OF THE LONDON
CONFERENCE**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

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CONTENTS

	Page
Holbrooke, Hon. Richard, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of State, Washington, DC	31
Prepared statement	36
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators:	
Richard G. Lugar	50
Russell D. Feingold	63
Robert P. Casey, Jr.	65
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement	1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement	3
Miliband, Hon. David, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom	5
Prepared statement	8

**CIVILIAN STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN: A
STATUS REPORT IN ADVANCE OF THE LON-
DON CONFERENCE**

THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 2010

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to the notice, at 3:02 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, and Risch.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS**

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

We are absolutely delighted today to have David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, here with us. He and I have worked closely together on Afghanistan and a variety of other issues, and I am personally grateful for the relationship that we share and grateful for his friendship and that of his wife Louise also, and grateful for their hospitality when we've once or twice, I guess, been able to stop by in London.

Normally, the Foreign Relations Committee has not entertained the testimony of leaders from other countries. But there's no real reason why that has been the case, and I don't think it makes sense, which is why we're delighted to welcome I think the first ever appearance of the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom before this committee, because it is a way of informing us and the public, and in democracies, needless to say, it is vital for us to have that kind of dialogue. So we believe that this is a terrific way of joining with one of the longest and strongest allies that we have in helping to explore difficult policy questions that both of our countries, and therefore our citizens, face.

We hope that today's hearing will be helpful in bringing greater understanding to people of the global views and challenges as they are interpreted by different governments and by us together.

Following the Foreign Secretary, we're going to hear from a very familiar and well-respected presence before this committee, the President's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. He is here to discuss, having just come back literally today, arriving back from a six-nation tour—he

is here to discuss the administration's new Afghanistan-Pakistan regional stabilization strategy.

We're delighted to welcome the Ambassador from the United Kingdom here today with us also.

Today's hearing comes as a leadup to the London international conference next week, which will focus on coordinating and strengthening all of our nonmilitary efforts in Afghanistan. We look forward to hearing from both witnesses about what can be accomplished in London and beyond.

All of us recognize the enormous sacrifices that the United Kingdom has made in Afghanistan. Mr. Secretary, we want to say thank you to you and to your country for your efforts in unison with us and with many other countries. We are especially grateful for the sacrifices made in the turbulent southern part, the heart of the Taliban insurgency. Some 250 British soldiers and civilians have given their lives since 2001. We are enormously grateful for their contribution to our shared security and we are grateful to you and to Prime Minister Brown for your continued commitment to our shared mission.

In December the President explained his decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan and, as I said then and as the President knows well, no purely military strategy in Afghanistan will succeed, and I know you have said that and agree with that, Mr. Secretary. The military is only one component in defeating an insurgency. That is why at every turn we need to empower Afghans to take control of their future.

That is the rationale that guided the conditions that I personally set out with respect to the deployment of new troops and which I believe still holds today: the presence of reliable Afghan partners, both political and military, and the civilian capacity to make our military gains sustainable.

As additional troops arrive and the new strategy is implemented, this committee will be closely monitoring our progress and our plans. Let me be clear. As the United States and our coalition partners increase our troops in Afghanistan, we and our partners are also sending more civilians to translate those efforts into lasting gains for the people of Afghanistan. But this civilian surge will also demand strong, coordinated, and cooperative leadership and participation from all of our allies, and we look forward to exploring that with you today, Mr. Secretary.

Next week's London conference is a real opportunity for the international community to commit itself to a coherent civilian strategy and to unified purposes. Ultimately, nothing will do more to bring success than helping to build effective Afghan institutions and leadership.

At President Karzai's inauguration, he renewed his commitment to strengthening the government's capacity, pushing for lasting reforms and addressing the problems caused by corruption at every level. He made these promises, not just to the United States and other key donors, but more importantly to the Afghan people. The coming weeks will tell us a great deal about the depth of President Karzai's commitment to reform.

His selection of Cabinet officials is cause for both hope and concern. Effective officials were chosen for a number of key seats, but

others did not always appear to be selected on their merits. One positive sign is that the Afghan Parliament, which rejected several Cabinet nominees, is playing its intended role as a check on the executive branch.

We can also expect new political challenges ahead. Parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place this year, but absent real electoral reforms and an improved security climate, we risk repeating the problems that plagued the Presidential contest of last August. So we're eager to hear from our witnesses what efforts are under way to improve that process.

Better governance outside of Kabul is also vital. Real reform means appointing effective leaders at the provincial and district levels. They and the officials carrying out their orders are the only point of contact that most Afghans have with their government. A new survey by the United Nations found that one of every two Afghans paid a bribe to a public official in the last year. Graft has become a part of everyday life, and that must stop.

Alongside better governance, our civilian strategy needs to promote basic sustainable development. Many of us have expressed concerns about undertaking an unrealistic nation-building mission in one of the poorest countries on earth. But if we can provide basic development to meet pressing needs, we will go a long way to winning over the Afghan people and preventing the Taliban from exploiting popular frustrations. That is why we must support projects with a proven track record of success, like the national solidarity program, which has earned praise from Afghans and international observers alike.

Finally, as we continue to improve our civilian partnership we should recognize that we have already accomplished a great deal together. For example, USAID in partnership with the British Department for International Development and the Afghan Government have turned the 2-kilometer gravel Bhost airstrip into a bustling civilian tarmac that will create enormous new economic possibilities for the people of Helmand for years to come.

We are all committed to succeeding in Afghanistan and strengthening partnerships with key allies like the United Kingdom, and that is central to our effort. So we look forward to hearing from you, Mr. Secretary.

I'll just ask Senator Lugar if he has any opening comments, and then we'll look to your testimony.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our distinguished guests to the committee. Foreign Secretary David Miliband will be playing a leading role in the London Afghanistan Conference on January 28. We look forward to learning his views on how this conference can contribute to strengthening and stabilizing Afghanistan. The civilian component of the multinational effort in Afghanistan has been neglected somewhat as discussion of the way forward has centered on military resources. The London Afghanistan Conference is an opportunity to consolidate the civilian response in ways that achieve greater accountability and more demonstrable progress in developing the

country. The proposal for the London conference called on participants to “formulate a joint framework for our transition phase in Afghanistan; i.e., to set our expectations of ownership and the clear view to hand over responsibility step by step to the Afghans, wherever possible.” This goal is reflected in the multilateral civil-military effort in Afghanistan that is employing the new “clear, hold, build, and transfer” strategy. This new paradigm for operations requires leaders and their governments, as well as our Afghan partners, to understand their respective roles and the means by which those goals can be accomplished.

The London conference is a crucial opportunity for President Karzai to improve cooperation with international efforts in his country, while recognizing his own responsibility to enable reform. He must find the means to consolidate disparate influences within his own government in the pursuit of national development. Too often during the last decade, development efforts in Afghanistan have been disconnected and uncoordinated. International donors must agree to consolidate their efforts, narrow their focus, and harmonize their programs in order to achieve a common end with the Afghan people. An inconclusive outcome in London, lacking in specificity and effective guidelines, will diminish the likelihood of success in the coming years.

I look forward to hearing Ambassador Holbrooke’s thoughts on the details of the new Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. Given the cost and security ramifications of our efforts in the region, this strategy must include strong accountability elements. It is important that our collective programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan be effectively monitored and measured against a definable set of metrics. The United States has assigned numerous senior-level officers, ambassadors, and mission directors to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and these individuals have extensive experience in developing and coordinating programs across our agencies. They must also serve as efficient conduits of information and evaluation back to Washington about how programs are working. At the encouragement of Congress, USAID and the State Department have expanded their inspector general presence in these countries, which is certainly a good first step.

A new approach to foreign aid is emerging as a priority within the Obama administration. This approach aims to reduce reliance on foreign contractors and channel more resources through local governments. As development experts have long suggested, the goal of such a strategy is to reduce the overhead costs of our assistance and empower civilian governments with resources flowing through, rather than around, their institutions. It is reasonable to consider this approach in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but we should be mindful that institutions in these nations have very little history of effective oversight and accountability. To the extent that we funnel resources through these governments, we will require creative and robust oversight mechanisms. I hope Ambassador Holbrooke will make clear today, for example, how the expected \$200 million in education programming slated for Pakistan this year will be monitored. Similarly, members would gain confidence if Ambassador Holbrooke could walk us through how the more than \$300

million slated for the agriculture sector in Afghanistan will be overseen as it is dispersed across a volatile country.

While the military reform process has shown considerable progress and NATO/ISAF continues to professionalize the Afghan National Army, there are two crucial civilian sectors that must be thoroughly reformed. The first is agriculture, the mainstay of Afghanistan's legitimate economy, which must be revitalized if Afghans are to create jobs, feed the population, and deliver income for the country. The second is human security and justice, which have long been neglected. The rule of law must be a product of an essential social contract that extends across the traditional landscape and integrates governing institutions such as the police and the courts.

Ambassador Holbrooke has spent much time traveling within the region seeking greater cooperation for stabilizing Afghanistan. I look forward to his testimony on efforts to convince Pakistani leaders of the importance of cooperation and the opportunities that stem from our partnership in routing terror elements in Pakistan. He has also engaged in a broader diplomatic effort to build financial and technical support for Afghanistan. He has spent a great deal of time since his appointment flying from the Gulf States in the Near East to Europe and Russia, as well as Japan and India. We are eager to learn more of the impact of his outreach and hope the London conference will serve as a rallying point for significantly increased participation, especially from the Muslim world.

I thank the chairman again for this hearing and look forward to our discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Mr. Secretary, again thank you for being here. It's a great privilege for us and we look forward to your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE DAVID MILIBAND,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
AFFAIRS, UNITED KINGDOM**

Mr. MILLIBAND. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator Kaufman, Senator Shaheen. It's a great honor for me and for my country to be able to appear here in front of you today. I associate myself very strongly with the sentiments and the substance of both of your remarks. I am conscious of the expertise and the experience that exists in this committee. We followed your hearings and your visits, your analysis and your reports, very closely, and I know that they have helped to shape the debate in this country. I can assure you they have also had an impact outside this country, in Europe and in my country in particular.

In that context, as cochairman of the London conference I'm delighted to be here today so that your input can be added to others in advance of that important occasion next Thursday.

As you know, the United Kingdom is the second largest troop contributor in Afghanistan and the third largest financial contributor. Our armed forces and our civilians have suffered grievous losses, especially over the last year, in both of our countries, and it's right to acknowledge the scale of their bravery and of their sacrifice, and I very much appreciate the words of the chairman in that regard.

That sacrifice shows us the scale of the stakes in Afghanistan at the moment. But of course the stakes are wider for our national security, for the integrity and purpose of the NATO alliance, and for one of the most explosive regions of the world, South Asia, because of course Afghanistan and its neighbors—Afghanistan’s stability matters hugely to its neighbors.

It’s the regional significance of the conflict that explains why I made the sixth of my visits to Pakistan as well as to Afghanistan the weekend before last.

Mr. Chairman, I think that following the inauguration of President Karzai and then the speech of President Obama everybody realizes we’re now in a decisive moment in the Afghan campaign—decisive because the imperative of aligning a successful civilian strategy alongside the military strategy is now very clear to all. It is the decisive nature of the times in which we live that explains Prime Minister Brown’s decision to call the London conference and to give it the very strong focus on the development of a political strategy within which the military and civilian components can sit.

My written testimony goes into some detail about the nature of that political strategy and I just want to highlight three elements for you this afternoon. The first relates to the loyalty and commitment of the Afghan people to their own government. It’s a founding part of any counterinsurgency doctrine that the loyalty of the citizens of the country are the greatest resource of all.

Some of you will have seen the recent poll conducted by the BBC and ABC of Afghan citizens in 34 provinces. It was published last week. It showed overwhelming determination on the part of the Afghan people not to go back to Taliban misrule. But it also showed very high levels of dissatisfaction with corruption in the governance and policing system.

So in seeking to retain the loyalty of their own citizens, it’s important to recognize that the Afghan Government doesn’t just need to avoid being outgunned by the insurgency; it must not be outgoverned by the insurgency either. For us that speaks first to the need to tackle corruption at all levels; second, to achieve much greater focus on district and provincial governance. Afghanistan is a country of 364 districts and 34 provinces. Each and every one needs effective governance to serve its people.

Governance needs to extend beyond the formal sectors of the state to include the informal structures that are so important in a tribal society. That society has been ravaged by 30 years of civil war, but the community structures remain important.

I think it’s worth saying that at the moment there is an attempt to support governance on the cheap. In the last year for which figures are available, some \$33 million was spent by the Institute for Development and Local Governance, the key part of the Afghan governance machinery that supports local governance. That’s less than \$1 million per province, and that explains some of the figures in my statement about the number of district governors who don’t have an office or don’t have proper transportation.

The second part of an effective counterinsurgency strategy on the political side is an effective route to dividing the insurgency. That is important, especially important in the Afghan context, because the insurgency is not a monolith. It’s different insurgent groups

and within insurgent groups differences as well: full-time fighters from outside the tribe, local part-time fighters, narcotraffickers and poppy farmers, as well as people rented for \$10 a day to fight for the insurgency.

The commitment to reintegration, to bringing those fighters back into their communities, is a widely shared aspiration, not just in Afghanistan but in the international community. From our point of view, three things are essential to make it happen: first of all, security pressure, because reintegration is not an alternative to military pressure, it is a complement to it; second, the right offer to the insurgents, the chance to have protection, but also employment and a political say within their own communities; and third, an effective Afghan-led strategic framework within which reintegration can take place.

Mr. Chairman, the third part of an effective political strategy speaks to the role of the neighbors of Afghanistan and above all its eastern neighbor, Pakistan. I know that for you and for Senator Lugar the importance of Pakistan is very, very clear, and I would like to place on record our very strong support for the extraordinary leadership that you've shown and your committee's shown in piloting the Kerry-Lugar bill through the Senate and for putting on the table the offer of a renewed relationship between the United States and Pakistan.

We know that Pakistan matters, not just because it is the location for the Afghan Taliban leadership. It's also important in its own right. It's the base for al-Qaeda. It's a nuclear weapons state with the long-term risk of radicalization, and it has huge demographic and economic challenges.

I believe that the last year has shown a major change in approach from the Afghan civilian and military leadership, recognizing the mortal threat that's posed to the Pakistani state from within its own borders. The strategic reorientation of Pakistan has some way to go, but I believe that the efforts that are being made now in South Waziristan show the level of commitment that the Pakistani authorities are willing to devote to what is a long-term struggle for the survival of that country.

We believe, Mr. Chairman, that there is a real possibility of developing shared interests between the neighbors of Afghanistan and Afghanistan itself, founded on a commitment to respect to sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan. Crime, drugs, and insecurity are no respecters of borders in South Asia and it's very important that we use the London conference to bring the neighbors of Afghanistan with the regional powers together to start a more positive process of dialogue.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with some of the deliverables that we hope to achieve in next week's conference. First of all on security, we believe it's very important to give substance to the idea of the transfer of lead security responsibility in Afghanistan. This is central to the commitment of all of our countries to build up Afghan security forces sufficient to defend their own country.

I also believe that we should use the conference next week to give international support to Afghan-led reintegration efforts, both the program and the structures that I hope President Karzai will announce between now and next Thursday.

On governance and development, President Karzai has said that he wants to end the, "culture of impunity" that has existed in his country with respect to corruption. That needs international support. There also needs to be independent oversight to reinforce accountability in the Afghan system. In addition, I believe that moves on debt relief and development assistance could be a credible part of a positive offer to the Afghan people.

On regional cooperation, as I have just mentioned, a commitment by the countries of the region to take more active steps to promote the political and economic stability of Afghanistan is essential. There is also a challenge for the international community, which needs to up its game both in terms of the coordination of its effort and its effectiveness. It will be very important to take forward new appointments which are pending in the U.N., NATO, and the European Union.

However, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the biggest deliverable of all from next week's conference is an understanding among the 70 or so Foreign Ministers who are attending, and also I hope the wider public, of the coherence and clarity of the plan for the future of Afghanistan. The confidence of the international community and the plans that have been developed, set out by President Obama, needs to be carried forward to maintain confidence in the future.

Mr. Chairman, as you indicated, the alliance between the United States and the United Kingdom is deep and enduring. The sacrifices of the last century are now being matched by new sacrifices in this century. Last weekend in Afghanistan, both in Kabul and in the south, I saw the depth of the Anglo-American relationship at work. I saw it at the military level, but I also saw it at the civilian level.

I'm also delighted to be able to acknowledge the cooperation that exists between London and Washington, not just between myself and Secretary Clinton, who I've just met, but also the outstanding efforts of Ambassador Holbrooke to ensure that the wider world understands the significance of the Afghan campaign, because this is not just a U.S.-U.K. venture. Forty-three nations are contributing on the military side, over 60 on the civilian side. We need to send out a very strong message that all of those countries need to make their full contribution for the success of the effort.

Mr. Chairman, the challenges in Afghanistan are immense. It is a poor, tribal society, very different from our own. But its recent history and its place at the heart of South Asia mean that alternatives to a thorough military-civilian engagement are far, far worse. The plans in place need effective and sustained implementation, and it is to that goal that the London conference has been called and to that goal that the London conference will be judged.

Thank you very much indeed.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miliband follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RT. HON. DAVID MILIBAND, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, UNITED KINGDOM

The London Conference on Afghanistan will bring together over 70 countries and international organizations to discuss the partnership between the international community and the Afghan Government and people. I am immensely grateful to the committee for the opportunity to hear its views on the aims and objectives.

The United Kingdom has been part of the international effort in Afghanistan since the passage of UNSCR 1368 after 9/11. Over 10,000 U.K. troops are deployed predominantly in Helmand province in the South of the country—the second-largest military contribution in Afghanistan. Our aid program for the next 3 years exceeds \$830 million, making us the third-largest contributor financially—after the United States and Japan.

It is right to pay tribute to the skill, dedication and bravery of all armed forces and civilians serving in Afghanistan. We owe them—and their families—a debt of gratitude. I would also like to honor those who have fallen in Afghanistan—from the British, American and other international soldiers, and the civilians that work alongside them, to the members of the Afghan National Army and Afghan civilians caught in the cross-fire.

The war in Afghanistan, and the related challenges in Pakistan, are the No. 1 one foreign policy priority for the British Government. Progress is vital for our national security. The election of a new Afghan Government and the increased U.S. resources in support of a refreshed counterinsurgency strategy, make the next 12–18 months a decisive period. That is why the British Prime Minister has convened the London Conference on Afghanistan on January 28.

As cochair of the Conference, I set out in this note British thinking in three areas. First, the rationale and objectives of the international mission in Afghanistan. Second, how military and civilian resources can support a political strategy in Afghanistan. Third, our vision for the London Conference on Afghanistan and how it will drive forward progress on (a) security, (b) governance and development, and (c) regional cooperation.

RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

With al-Qaeda pushed out into Pakistan's tribal areas, the original rationale for the war in Afghanistan—to ensure the country is not a safe haven again for al-Qaeda and global terrorism—has come under scrutiny.

We do not conflate or confuse al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The Taliban government in Afghanistan in the 1990s provided a supportive environment for the al-Qaeda senior leadership. But the Taliban leadership do not have as their principal aim al-Qaeda's violent global jihadist agenda. The vast majority of its low- and mid-level fighters are certainly not motivated by it. Their aim is the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and the reestablishment of an Islamic Emirate based on shari'a law. But the symbiosis of the Taliban and al-Qaeda senior leadership, and the history of al-Qaeda organization in Afghanistan, explain why we continue to see the war in Afghanistan as critical to the fight against al-Qaeda. The 1,600 mile Afghan border with Pakistan, the presence of al-Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan's border areas, and the links between the two countries, means that their stability needs to be addressed together.

The definition of success is clear: it is not to kill or capture every member of the Taliban. It is to ensure the Government of Afghanistan is able to secure its territory against a weakened insurgency, and deny al-Qaeda the space to operate.

The alternatives to a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy are not attractive. Retreat now would invite danger for the region and for our own countries. But the challenges of counterinsurgency are immense—it requires realistic objectives aligned with substantial international and Afghan resource and effort. It is this alignment which this note addresses.

POLITICAL STRATEGY

The British Government believes that military and civilian resources need to be marshalled behind a clear political strategy: political, because it involves shifting the motivations, relationships and behaviors of critical stakeholders and power-brokers. There are three dimensions to this.

First, the aspirations and loyalties of ordinary Afghans need to be engaged in defence of their country against the Taliban. Second, the insurgency needs to be divided, separating those insurgents motivated by narrow national and local objectives, and whose aims could be accommodated within the Afghan political system, from those unwilling to break with al-Qaeda. Third, with the leaders of the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan, the international community needs to engage with Pakistan and Afghanistan's other neighbors to promote enduring stability.

A political strategy is not separate from a military strategy. Indeed, military and civilian resources are critical contributors to it. Reassuring citizens that the Taliban will not return requires security, but also governance that responds to their most pressing needs. Dividing the insurgency requires military pressure, but also economic and political opportunities. Regional dynamics are affected both by our mili-

tary presence and by diplomatic outreach. A political reconfiguration, however, is the lens through which our military and civilian surge must be seen.

REASSURANCE THROUGH SECURITY

Our greatest resource in Afghanistan is the determination of the Afghan people not to return to Taliban rule. In a recent poll only 6 percent of those asked wanted the Taliban back in power. Despite this, many civilians turn a blind eye when they see IEDs being laid, or refuse to inform on the insurgents in their midst. The reason is simple: they fear Taliban retribution if they are caught.

Building a sense of security and confidence that the Taliban will never again be able to return is therefore critical to mobilizing Afghan citizens to resist them. This also must have three dimensions: the security provided by international troops; the protection offered by the Afghan National Security Forces; and the defense provided at the local level by community security initiatives.

President Obama's counterinsurgency strategy, combined with the increased coalition troop numbers (which means that since the start of 2009 there will be 51,000 more U.S. troops, and 7,800 more from other countries, including the U.K.) is allowing ISAF to reconfigure its laydown and increase the tempo of its operations.

The impact in Helmand—where 8,000 British troops are based—is already being felt. Helmand is the only southern province which provides a potential strategic platform for the Taliban to dominate Kandahar. It has accounted for over a third of all attacks in Afghanistan, yet a year ago there were only 5,000 ISAF troops in Helmand with very few Afghan National Security Forces alongside.

With the deployment of the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Helmand in April 2009 and President Karzai's commitment to increase significantly the Afghan National Army and Police numbers in the province, by next summer these figures will have risen to around 30,000 and 10,000 respectively. This means that ISAF is increasingly able to help the Afghan Government extend its authority into critical population centres in the central Helmand belt—including districts surrounding the provincial capital in Lashkar Gah, such as Babaji and Nad-e-Ali. And it means that international forces can both "clear" an area and train and mentor the Afghan national security forces to "hold" it.

Since 2007, the international community has invested heavily in building up indigenous security forces. The Army now numbers over 100,000 and the police, 96,000. Increasing them to 134,000 and 109,000 by the end of 2010 is necessary. But quality and conduct matter as much as size. That is why the focus on partnering with the Afghan National Army—working side by side on operations—is essential.

However much national security forces are built up, they will not have a monopoly of force in a country like Afghanistan. In such an underdeveloped country, where tribal allegiances are often stronger than national affiliations, local community-based security initiatives are inevitable. In many cases, Afghan tribes have the desire to resist the Taliban. The international community cannot ignore or decry this effort, and in some circumstances will need to consider support for it.

REASSURANCE THROUGH GOVERNANCE

Establishing security is necessary, but not enough if Afghan civilians are to turn their backs on the insurgency. They need to believe that the fragile improvements will endure and strengthen.

In areas recaptured from the insurgents, this must start with immediate post-intervention stabilization. Over the last decade, both our countries have learned important lessons in this area. Together, we have been putting these lessons into practice in Helmand. From the emphasis on local capacity (without which no amount of quick impact projects or infrastructure development can survive), through to community engagement at the grassroots level (with District Governors and District Community Shuras supported by District Stabilization Teams), or integrated civ-mil planning (so that stabilization experts can be on the ground within 24–48 hours of a military campaign), many aspects of our collective approach are now being rolled out elsewhere in Afghanistan.

It is no surprise that in a recent BBC–ABC–ARD poll, Afghans identified security as the biggest problem their country faced. But the economy was not far behind, and corruption and weak governance came third. The Taliban need to be out-governed not just out-gunned.

Forty-two percent of Afghans live on less than a dollar a day. In some parts of the country, there are few credible alternatives to the drugs trade or mercenary activity. Helping the Afghans build schools, provide clean water, electricity and roads is worthwhile in its own right, but will also help to draw people away from the in-

surgency. That is why over the next 4 years the U.K. will spend over \$800 million on development assistance. And it is why the U.K. has pushed so hard for the European Commission and EU Member States to increase their aid—which now stands at over \$1.3 billion a year.

However it is not just about the quantity of assistance, it is also about how it is spent. If such services are to outlast the international presence, they need to be administered by the Afghan Government. Yet in large parts of the country, district governance is almost nonexistent; half of the governors do not have an office, less than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only \$6 a month in expenses. In such circumstances, the Taliban gain traction, with shadow governors allocated to all provinces except Kabul and a substantial district level network in place.

There are already a number of effective schemes to support subnational government under the supervision of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, including the Afghan Social Outreach Programme (delivering District Community Shuras) and the District Delivery Working Group (which supports immediate capacity to deliver basic services in insecure districts). But so far these schemes have been patchy, and inadequately funded.

So, in the coming months and years, a more coherent strategy needs to be developed. The focus should be on selecting and training, empowering and equipping, and mentoring and monitoring the 34 Provincial Governors and the 364 District Governors, just as it is with the Army and the Police. The international community needs to help Afghans create truly representative local shuras, that can help distribute development funds and provide the collective dispute resolution that the Afghans want when they talk about the rule of law. This will require significantly more funding for local government—in 2008 each province had less than \$1m to spend on local administration.

There is a unanimous message from the people of Afghanistan and the international community that the Afghan Government needs to turn its words on tackling corruption into deeds. According to the recent BBC-ABC-ARD poll, 95 percent of Afghans see corruption as a problem in their local area. Such widespread abuse has deep roots and cannot be cured overnight. But it is vital that President Karzai follows through his promise to tackle the culture of impunity with serious steps. The new anticorruption unit needs real powers both to investigate and to prosecute.

REINTEGRATION

Just as the insurgents can be split from the ordinary Afghans who offer them tacit support, so too can the insurgency itself be divided, with foot soldiers, low- and mid-level commanders reintegrated back into society and separated from insurgent leaders.

As President Obama said at the end of March, “in a country with extreme poverty that’s been at war for decades, there will also be no peace without reconciliation among former enemies . . . There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban. They must be met with force, and they must be defeated. But there are also those who’ve taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a price. These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course.”

The prospects for reintegration are significant because the insurgency is not a monolith. It is a broad but shallow coalition, constantly evolving, with shifting relationships, geographical bases, and tactics.

The Afghan Taliban leadership is based primarily in Pakistan. Senior commanders there, under the leadership of Mullah Omar, provide strategic direction to insurgents over the border, if not operational command, directed at retaking territory and power in Afghanistan. The so-called Pakistan Taliban, a loose collection of insurgent leaders mainly in Waziristan, are primarily focused eastward against the authority of the Pakistani state. Al-Qaeda coordinates tactically with both branches of the Taliban, but has a separate mission and religious ideology, focused on mounting terrorist attacks outside the Pashtun tribal belt. The Haqqani network is linked to all the insurgent groups, and is based in Waziristan, but able directly to command and mount attacks in Afghanistan.

Within these insurgent groups, there is also heterogeneity. In the Afghan Taliban, trained full-time fighters, often drawn from several tribes and reinforced by foreign fighters, have more ideological motivations than local part-time fighters, drawn from a particular village or tribe, operating often in pursuit of their own profit or power, or driven by local loyalties and ethnic affiliations. Alongside the fighters, there are shadow governors who provide intelligence, or intimidate those who support the government; warlords and aspirant powerbrokers who believe that the Taliban will win, and so position themselves for their own political advantage; narcotraffickers who rely on the Taliban for protection and the safe passage of drugs; poppy farmers who

ally with the Taliban because they protect them from eradication efforts; and the foot soldiers whom the Taliban pay \$10 a day—more than a local policeman.

Repeated, intelligence-led strikes against particular key positions in the insurgent hierarchy can force low and mid-level commanders to reassess their interests. This requires careful work. For example, Ghulam Yahya, a Taliban commander in Herat leading 600 fighters, was killed last October in an ISAF strike and his deputy was arrested by the Afghan National Police. Leaderless, the structure of the group started to disintegrate, and former fighters returned to their villages, leaving an opportunity for reintegration.

Pressure can be applied by international and Afghan forces, but it can also be applied through local communities resisting the Taliban, thereby creating the conditions for insurgents to switch sides. For example, in Acheen, a small district in Eastern Afghanistan, when the Taliban demanded that a tribal leader's son be handed over for joining the Afghan National Army, the Shinwari tribe drove out the Taliban, and conducted a local peace jirga with the Afridi tribe over the border in Pakistan. The area has now been free from the Taliban for 6 months.

In Acheen, the role of ISAF was minimal, providing boots and warm jackets so that the local people could patrol the outlying areas, and a promise that they would provide backup if the Taliban launched a major offensive. Across Helmand, however, the model has been different, involving much more intensive military engagement. Last summer, the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade was deployed in South Helmand with such force density that it was able to have an immediate impact on security and the calculations of ordinary Afghans and low-level insurgents.

Alongside military force and community mobilization to apply pressure, reintegration requires incentives: the offer of protection from retaliation by former allies and alternative employment. This demands a structured program that targets the right people, and ensures that the support continues over time. In some cases, reintegration may involve relocation and deradicalization programs. The international community can provide valuable support—for example, through the creation of the Afghan Reintegration Fund—but ultimately this must be a process led by the Afghan Government. An immediate priority is therefore to develop a strategic framework with President Karzai for reintegration. This will need to assign clear lead responsibility for reintegration within his government, with a dedicated organization geared to reaching out to insurgents.

Reintegration refers specifically to the co-option of foot soldiers, low- and mid-level commanders. Done successfully and at scale it can weaken the insurgency and lay the ground for more senior members to switch sides. When it comes to higher level commanders, the Afghan Government needs to separate the hard-line ideologues, who are unwilling to break their links with al-Qaeda, and who must be pursued relentlessly, from those who can be drawn into domestic political processes. President Karzai committed himself to this in his inauguration speech, “the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has placed national reconciliation at the top of its peace-building policy. We welcome and will provide necessary help to all disenfranchised compatriots who are willing to return to their homes, live peacefully and accept the Constitution.”

Reconciliation involves difficult decisions about motivation and justice. But the evidence of successful counterinsurgency is that it is necessary for political stabilization. In Afghanistan, it will need to be led by Afghans and supported by the international community.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

The third element in weakening the insurgency is a new relationship between Afghanistan and its neighbors.

The fighters within Afghanistan draw on external funding, support, and shelter. Militants move freely across the border with Pakistan. The insurgencies in the South and East of Afghanistan are directed partly from across the border in Quetta, Peshawar, and Waziristan.

The Pakistani offensives over the last year in Swat, Dir, Buner and more recently in Waziristan are therefore a significant development. For the first time, elements of the insurgency are being squeezed from both sides of the border. With more than 3,000 Pakistanis killed over the last year, the focus of the military operations has been terrorists who attack Pakistan. Over time, however, Pakistan's leaders will need to broaden its fight to address al-Qaeda's leadership and the full range of other militant groups, not just those who pose the most direct threat to Pakistan. And as well as security in the border regions, the international community will need to help Pakistan create the political and economic conditions that will ensure lasting stability.

The U.K. has longstanding links with Pakistan—800,000 Britons are of Pakistani origin. Pakistan will soon receive our second-largest aid program. We have strongly supported the restoration of civilian government in Pakistan.

Britain welcomes developments in U.S. policy toward Pakistan. The U.S. has made clear its intent to build a long-term trust-based partnership with Pakistan—and the Kerry Lugar Act is a major step toward that goal. Last year, we held the first EU-Pakistan summit, which I hope will be the start of a much deeper engagement on security, trade, development and more. And the Friends of Democratic Pakistan group provides us with a wider political forum for aligning international support behind Pakistan.

Perhaps the most significant shift required though is to develop a new consensus within the region that Afghanistan's future lies in being an independent, sovereign state—a client of none and a friend to all. Pakistan, Iran, and others within the region, are affected by the crime, drugs, terrorism, and migration that spills over Afghanistan's borders. A stable Afghanistan that once again becomes the commercial and cultural cross-roads for South West Asia is a shared interest. However, the trust deficit within the region means that neighboring countries fear Afghanistan will one day return to being a chessboard on which the geopolitical struggles of others are played out by proxy. As a result, they continue to hedge their bets, maintaining former relationships and not taking the steps needed to stabilize the country.

Encouraging each of the regional stakeholders, Afghanistan's neighbors and near-neighbors, to accept that the conflict in Afghanistan is a regional problem, and thus a regional responsibility, will require much more focus on the regional dimension than has been given so far. It will demand a new hard-headed attention to what reassurances both Afghanistan and other players in the region need about each other's behavior and intentions. It will also call for consistency and clarity about the presence, activities, and intentions of the international forces in Afghanistan, so that these too are properly understood to be a force for stabilization and not a threat. A sense of regional ownership must be built through a process of systematic and serious regional engagement, in which the regional players, instead of confronting each other face to face, or by proxy, acquire the habit of working side by side to focus on a problem from whose solution all will benefit. Only the countries of the region can decide whether they want to build on the multitude of existing regional bodies, or create something new and Afghanistan-specific.

LONDON CONFERENCE

The aim of the London Conference, which will take place on January 28, is, as Prime Minister Gordon Brown said when he announced it on November 28: "to match the increase in military forces with an increased political momentum, to focus the international community on a clear set of priorities across the 43-nation coalition and marshal the maximum international effort to help the Afghan Government deliver."

London is the venue, but the conference is a joint effort between the British Government, the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations. I will chair it alongside Foreign Minister Spanta and the UNSG's Special Representative Kai Eide.

Together, we have invited the Foreign Ministers of all ISAF partner countries, Afghanistan's immediate neighbors and the key regional players, as well as representatives of NATO, the U.N., the EU and other international organisations such as the World Bank.

Discussions will focus on three areas: security, governance, and development, and regional relations.

With respect to security, the Conference will consider how the respective roles of the international and Afghan forces should evolve over time. Because as the Afghan National Security Forces develop, they will need gradually to assume—district by district and province by province, as the necessary conditions are met—lead responsibility for security. The Conference will also address how to support Afghan-led reintegration efforts.

Although London is not a force generation conference it will be an opportunity to encourage allies to increase their commitments in critical areas, particularly with respect to the training of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. The NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan still has a shortfall of 1,600 trainers, and despite EU promises to increase the size of its Police Mission (EUPOL) to 400 trainers, the total staffing remains at only 267.

With respect to governance and development, the London Conference aims to lead to concrete steps by the Afghan authorities to tackle corruption and improve its

financial management. But it is also the opportunity for the international community to consider how its development assistance is supporting Afghan leadership, and in particular to ensure it is effectively aligned behind the Afghan Government's Economic Plan.

In terms of regional relations, by bringing together Afghanistan's neighbors and the key regional powers, the London Conference aims to promote progress toward more systematic and cooperative engagement by and between all of the regional stakeholders, building on the range of existing structures. I have been in close contact with my Turkish counterpart on this in recent weeks, and am pleased that in the few days before London he will hold a meeting with Afghanistan's neighbors to develop ideas for improving regional cooperation.

CONCLUSION

Amidst the losses of 2009—keenly felt on both sides of the Atlantic—and the drawn-out Afghan Presidential election process, I believe that we have begun to address the issues crucial to any future success. Under U.S. leadership, the International Security Assistance Force has reinvigorated the military strategy and re-doubled its military commitments.

But while necessary, military reinforcements alone will not be enough to achieve success. In 2010, the international community needs to fully align military and civilian resources behind a political strategy that engages the Afghan people in defense of their country, divides the insurgency and builds regional cooperation. This strategy needs to be led by the Afghans, but it requires international support. That is the task ahead of us in London next week. I look forward to discussing it with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. That's helpful, important testimony.

What I wanted to do is ask—Mr. Secretary, we have this little thing that happens around here called voting. Right now we're on the back end of a vote, which is why Senator Shaheen went over. We thought she'd be back here before—here she is, terrific.

Would you wait to begin your round of questioning until we get back, and that way we can run without having to interrupt. So it works out fine, and we'll get back just as fast as we can.

Thanks. You're up.

[Pause.]

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. Thank you very much. I want to begin by echoing what you heard from Senators Kerry and Lugar, our thanks for your being here today and a recognition of the very special relationship that the United States and the United Kingdom have. It remains one of the cornerstones of stability around the world. So I think it's important for all of us to reiterate that. So you can take that back with you.

I also want to recognize the service of the men and women of the British military in Afghanistan. I had the opportunity, like many of us here, to visit Afghanistan last May and we went down to Helmand province, where the PRT is led by the British, and it was very impressive to see what's going on there and to hear the commitment of all of the members who are there from Britain. So thank you very much for that.

One of the things that we've been talking about here is how to measure what's happening in Afghanistan and how do we determine what progress is. I wonder if that's a debate that you all are having and what specific measures you think are important for us to look at for progress in Afghanistan, and specifically with respect to President Karzai, whether there are specific measures of progress that you're looking for.

Mr. MILLIBAND. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you very much for your kind words, and I'm glad that your visit to Helmand province went well.

I think that there are inputs and outputs that help us to measure progress. Inputs I think are best measured on the Afghan side, but I think, for example, the development of the Afghan National Army, which currently is some 96,000 strong, is a significant development in that country and one that speaks to the need to develop Afghan capacity to defend themselves.

I think it's also significant to look at the development of the police force, which has been a much more vexed and difficult project. But I have a lot of confidence in the efforts of Minister Atmar, the Interior Minister for the last 15 or 18 months. He has one of the most difficult jobs in international politics. But I think that the development of Afghan capacity there is very significant.

So I think there are a range of inputs on the Afghan side that are worth documenting. But obviously the most important test is the outputs, what's actually changing in the country. And here there are a number of important proxies for the progress that we are seeking to achieve. One that will be important in the next few years is the transfer of lead security responsibility across the country to Afghans. President Karzai said in his inauguration speech that he wanted half the country to have Afghan security leadership within 3 years, the whole country within 5 years.

I think that it's also significant to look at the figures on poppy production; 20 provinces are now poppy-free. The U.N. reports in last year some 19 percent fall in poppy production, last year 22 percent. Governor Mangal gave me a positive report when I was in Helmand province last weekend about this year's figures.

The third area, which I think General McChrystal would highlight as being of primary importance, concerns the protection of the Afghan people. He's made it the centerpiece of the military campaign to protect the Afghan people. That I think is going to become a very, very important measure in the future.

I think, finally, there are a range of economic and social measures that it's worth reminding oneself of. First of all, some 4 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan. Some 6 million children are now in school in Afghanistan. And the development of the agricultural economy that Senator Lugar referred to I think is also going to be important.

Let me just make one point about that. We do not have military forces in Afghanistan in order to allow children to go to school. We have military forces in Afghanistan because of the security threat to both of our countries. But it's quite a good indication of the change that's going on that those children, especially girls, are able to go to school, because evidently they weren't in the 1990s.

Senator SHAHEEN. I certainly agree with that, and also agree with your assessment of Minister Atmar. We had the opportunity to meet with him and he was very impressive, and we heard that reinforced by some of the trainers that we talked to who are working on developing Afghanistan law enforcement capacity.

One of the things that we've been debating here is the possibility of drawing moderate elements of the Taliban away from the more ideological leaders and reintegrating them into Afghan society. Is

that something that the U.K. also believes is possible, and do you support President Karzai's latest reconciliation plan? Do you think it's feasible?

Mr. MILLIBAND. I think this is a very important aspect of the campaign. I think you were voting when I talked about the second aspect of the political strategy, which is to divide the insurgency and to create space in the Afghan political system, notably at the local level, for those elements of conservative Pashtun communities to find a political voice and to drain their support from the insurgency.

That obviously requires the division between those who are, as you've put it, ideologically motivated, especially those who are linked to al-Qaeda, and those who are pursuing local grievances that would better fit within their own communities. This drive for so-called reintegration seems to me to be one of the most important aspects of the campaign in the future. It's striking that General McChrystal should put this political outreach at the center of his military strategy, not as an alternative to it but as a complement to it.

From the United Kingdom point of view, we very strongly support the emphasis that's being put on this in the new strategy set out by President Obama, but also, as you referred to, President Karzai has talked about this. He's talked about summoning a *loya jirga*, a traditional Afghan form of consultation, for a rather wider project of what you rightly refer to as reconciliation. That involves difficult issues. It involves engaging with mid and high-level commanders, which poses rather different challenges than the attempt to reintegrate farmers and peasants into their communities at local level.

But we think that this drive for reintegration and reconciliation is going to be an important part of the future. The redline is obviously the links with al-Qaeda that provided the danger for the rest of us from Afghanistan's development in the 1990s. But I believe that these political processes are absolutely essential to Afghanistan's future and to our campaign there.

Senator SHAHEEN. Do you have any thoughts about what's a realistic timeframe to think about how we begin those reconciliation efforts? I don't know that Iraq is a fair comparison, but it's the one that we have here. Do we think this is going to be possible within the 18-month timeline that we're talking about before we reassess beginning to drawdown troops?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think it's important to say that reintegration has started. In my written testimony I've given a couple of examples from different parts of the country of where reintegration efforts have already borne fruit, and I think it's important to recognize them. As you indicate, the parallel with Iraq is tempting, but it can also be misleading. Iraq is obviously a very different kind of country from Afghanistan, not least in, first, its wealth. Afghanistan, after all, is the fourth or fifth poorest country in the world. It's very different in its state structure. Iraq has had a history of a centralized state, brutal rule at that, whereas Afghanistan has not.

But I think that some of the lessons that have been learned in Iraq can be used in thinking through the Afghan approach. I think

that for reintegration there's no time like now. The increasing military pressure that is a feature of life in the south and east of Afghanistan is an important spur to reintegration efforts.

In respect to reconciliation, that's a much more difficult thing to talk about in public because the messages can be misunderstood. I think in that context, though, President Karzai has said he wants to summon this loya jirga to kick off the process, and I think that that is something that we should support.

Could I just take the opportunity to pick up your reference to the July 2011 timeline that has been set by President Obama, because it's obviously important. The first thing to say is that some of the misunderstandings that were associated with reporting of this timeline are slowly being corrected, both in Afghanistan and amongst the neighbors. After all, President Obama went out of his way to highlight the fact that this was the moment when U.S. forces would begin a drawdown. I think he subsequently or his staffers subsequently referred to it as a ramp and not a cliff edge, and I think that's an important part of this understanding.

But second, I can report from the region that the sense of urgency that is felt in this country is increasingly concentrating minds, not just in Afghanistan, but amongst some of its neighbors. People are beginning to realize that July 2011 does not mean the end of American or coalition engagement, but it does mean that the commitment of this country and others is to build up Afghan capacity to govern themselves. It's made concrete the commitments that many of us have made over the last few years that our project in Afghanistan is not one of colonization, it is one of defense and empowerment of the Afghan people.

I hope that as this year proceeds, the sense of urgency that has been injected will be properly understood alongside the long-term development commitment that is clearly part of the international engagement in Afghanistan.

Senator SHAHEEN. Given all of our support for recognition of the importance of the civilian effort in Afghanistan, what do you think the prospects are for additional EU support for that civilian effort? And is this something that you expect to see really delineated at the conference next week in London?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think that a number of countries will use the conference next week to announce increased civilian and military contributions. Obviously, since President Obama's speech on the 1st of December a number of countries have committed extra troops. I think that totals about 7,500, 7,800 in the 6 or 7 weeks since December 1. I think on the civilian side you're right to point up the need for the EU, both as individual countries and as a collective, to step up its role. That's part of burden-sharing. I think that's in part with respect to the policing mission, one where the EU has got some specific responsibilities that it needs to fulfill, but also more generally on the development side. The EU is a very large development partner and I think that one of the things that the European Union will have to do is make sure that both in Afghanistan and Pakistan its development effort matches the scale of the need.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in the course of your statement you mentioned a sentiment expressed in a recent public opinion poll. Specifically, I believe you cited the ABC–BBC–ARD poll that indicated a turnaround in popular sentiment over the last 12 months in Afghanistan. Certainly such good news is welcome because the trends in those same polls from 2005 all the way to this point were headed in the other direction.

I am just curious as to why, in the last 6 months, there has been this change in sentiment. I ask this because at the same time we have been debating these issues in this committee, the American people have frequently said there seems to be very little appreciation in Afghanistan for what is occurring. As a matter of fact, data on the polling of the question: “Do you like Americans or not?” shows that sentiment has been decreasing pretty consistently.

Suddenly one poll seems to indicate that we are becoming more liked. Would you be able to provide us with some background as to why this poll may have turned out the way it did? Is this just a blip of optimism or is there something more fundamental going on there that we may not have observed before?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, Senator, to be absolutely honest, I’m quite skeptical of some of the figures, notably the one which I think you’re referring to, which suggests that, instead of 40 percent of Afghans being optimistic about the next year, 70 percent are. That is a—one’s always got to be concerned about one opinion poll.

I would say two things, though. First of all, the poll does have consistent findings with previous polls in this series in respect of the Afghan people’s revulsion at the Taliban and their support for foreign troops. Quite surprisingly, 68 percent in respect to the United States, 62 percent in respect to the U.K., of Afghans say that they want those troops to stay, and that is something which has been borne out in successive polls in this BBC series.

Senator LUGAR. This is really astonishing in comparison to Pakistan, where public opinion of the United States still seems to be on a very steep downward slope.

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think that’s a very important point, and maybe we can come to the issue of the popular mood in Pakistan, because I think it is different.

However, I do think that one factor which could explain why levels of optimism have risen relates to the very significant efforts that General McChrystal has made since last spring to cut the number of civilian casualties. If you think back a year, the level of civilian casualties in Afghanistan—certainly if you think back to the year 2008, the level of civilian casualties, the almost weekly reporting of civilian casualties, was a permanent drain on the sense of confidence of the Afghan people in the mission that was being pursued.

I do think that the commitment to reduce civilian casualties has been a significant factor in helping to change some of the climate in Afghanistan. I also think it’s worth saying that the fact that the election is now behind the people of Afghanistan has helped create a sense that there is someone in charge. I think that’s part of the factor there.

Senator LUGAR. How do you explain the sentiment within the Afghan Legislature regarding the decision on the part of some members to block several of President Karzai's Cabinet appointments? Efforts to this end are continuing into the second round. While apparently some Cabinet officials were acceptable to legislators, a good number of them were not. President Karzai appears to be accepting these rejections and is trying to appoint some more people.

But does this trend have something to do with the figure you cited—that a fairly large percentage of Afghans reported they had bribed someone during the course of the last year? You pointed out this is totally unacceptable, which it is, but some would say, “this is life in Afghanistan,” and “get real; this is what the predicament is.”

What is this sentiment within the Afghan Legislature? Is a change going on there? Is there a check and balance being established that is likely to lead to better governance?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think that the first thing to say is that the Afghan Parliament is flexing its muscles. That's probably not something that's completely alien to this body. That's been known to happen in many of our systems.

Senator LUGAR. But in Afghanistan, wouldn't this be unusual? The executive has been pretty powerful prior to this time.

Mr. MILLIBAND. That's certainly true. But I think it partly reflects the fact that they're in a pre-election year in Afghanistan. That can often be a spur to independence of thought on the part of legislators. Second, the fact that some of the nominees have been given a very thorough going over by the parliamentarians reflects the Afghan constitution and the exercise of rights under it. That's what the chairman referred to.

I think third—and one has to tread delicately here—Afghanistan is a significantly tribal society, and what you are seeing is somewhat of the fissures in that society being reflected in votes in Parliament. And some of the nominees—because you will know that, notably, the Hezaras and Uzbeks have not been ratified when they've been put forward. That reflects some tensions within the Hezara and Uzbek communities. So I think you're seeing some of the tribal divisions being reflected in the votes that are taking place in Parliament.

I'm pleased to say that in some of the absolutely key ministries—Finance, where I met the Finance Minister on Saturday; Interior, ditto; Defense, ditto; Foreign Affairs, ditto; Agriculture—you're seeing people go through and you're seeing people of merit being appointed. One of the absolutely key things for this second term of President Karzai is that his cabinet is empowered to govern. A country as diverse and as complicated as Afghanistan cannot be run by simple fiat from the Presidential palace. It needs functioning ministries, and I think that one of the most important indicators of progress is going to be the ability of those men and women appointed to Cabinet posts to go off and do their work.

Senator LUGAR. In recent debates we've had on how responsibility might be turned over to the Afghans, there have often been estimates made of how many persons will need to be in the Afghan Army, and of how many of these must be well-trained persons who

have some literacy and are able to assume leadership roles. The total numbers mount up; some say 150,000 while others say at least 200,000. Some folks have even formulated rather extravagant estimates and say 300,000 people are required to maintain order as troops from the United Kingdom and the United States are withdrawn.

The dilemma then, pointed out by President Karzai, is that these troops cost money and the total budget of Afghanistan would not be able to support perhaps even 100,000 troops, quite apart from these other rather enlarged numbers. This implies that someone—the United Kingdom, the United States, or others—must be prepared to really support the budget of Afghanistan for some time, even once fewer of our troops are in the country.

Has that debate occurred in Parliament at all? If so, what sort of readings do you get in terms of sustained financial support, leaving aside the military support on the ground?

Mr. MILLIBAND. I think that's a really important question, Senator. I'm grateful to you for raising it. I say in my mission—in my testimony here that the mission in Afghanistan is to ensure that the Government of Afghanistan is able to secure its territory against a weakened insurgency. Hence the importance of the reintegration efforts that Senator Shaheen asked me about while you were away.

As you know, the current plans are for 134,000-strong Afghan National Army by November of this year, as a staging post toward further growth. You're absolutely right that the Afghan state is not going to be able to fund that on its own. So those who talk about continuing commitment to Afghanistan that is nonmilitary are right to do so.

Equally, the scale of the formal institutions of security in Afghanistan is different than in a country like ours, because, as I point out in my written testimony, the state is not going to have a monopoly of force in a country like Afghanistan. The equilibrium that's going to exist in parts of the south and the east is not only going to be between a weakened insurgency and a formal security forces. It's also going to be within communities, with informal mechanisms for justice as well as for security.

I think that the truthful answer is that those things need to be supported, not neglected. We cannot substitute the formal institutions of security of the state in short order. But I do think that the buildup that's being anticipated with the partnering that General McChrystal has proposed suggests that we could see a stronger Afghan National Army if we're willing to pay for it. And paying for it is going to be the price of being able to withdraw our own combat troops.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

Mr. Secretary, as I mentioned earlier—and you referred to it—the British people are sacrificing significantly here, and obviously American families likewise have sacrificed greatly and will continue to. We don't often get a chance to hear this firsthand. I think maybe you can help here today to articulate to Americans why you folks are making these sacrifices.

What is it that you see in Great Britain that brings your government to make this kind of commitment? And help define, perhaps in different words than we might or just from your perspective, why America needs to care about this, why all of us, 43 nations, are committed here? What do you see as at stake?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it's an important question. It's one I'm asked often when I talk to—

The CHAIRMAN. Could you move the mike?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a question I'm asked often in Britain, where people ask why are we there and is it worth it. The reason that we are there is that the primary national security challenge that the British people face is no longer that of invading armies from neighboring countries. The primary security challenge that we face is that of international terrorism.

We know that in terms of our territorial integrity as a country Britain has rarely been safer. Probably you could say that for a thousand years we haven't been safer. But the British people going about their business, whether at home or abroad, are less safe, and they're less safe because they, whatever their race or their religion, can become victims of international terrorism.

We also know, second, that 70 percent of the terrorist plots that are aimed at the United Kingdom can trace their links back to the badlands of the Afghan-Pakistan border. So we have a very clear national security interest there.

Third, we know from the 1990s that Afghanistan is the incubator of choice for global jihad for al-Qaeda. We know that the Taliban government of the 1990s provided, sponsored, provided a supportive environment, it sponsored, al-Qaeda's development within its own borders.

So for those reasons I feel confident in saying to the British people that we would not risk the lives and welfare of our Armed Forces, but also our diplomats and our aid workers, if our national security was not at stake. But we believe it's very important that the insurgency that threatens the country of Afghanistan is not allowed again to provide an umbrella for al-Qaeda.

We know too that al-Qaeda is currently—the al-Qaeda senior leadership is based on the Pakistan side of the border. That does not in my view invalidate the campaign in Afghanistan. What it does is emphasize the interdependence between stability in Afghanistan and stability in Pakistan.

For the first time in a very long time, there is complementary military pressure on both sides of the Durand Line, the 1,600-mile border that exists between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The losses that are being suffered by the Pakistani Army and people on the Pakistani side of the border are testimony to the fact that the insurgency understands the significance of that line and that it understands the significance of the campaign on both sides of the border.

So we have a difficult and complicated argument to put to our people, but it's one that speaks to the nature of national insecurity in the modern world, and that's the basis upon which we try to prosecute our case.

The CHAIRMAN. It's a very articulate and important answer and I appreciate it. I'd like to follow up with a question about the

nature of this threat of the umbrella, which fundamentally comes from the Taliban. In today's New York Times there is an important article, the headline of which is "Taliban Using Lighter Touch to Win Allies." The gist of the story is: "Now, as the Taliban deepen their presence in more of Afghanistan, they are in greater need of popular support and are recasting themselves increasingly as a local liberation movement independent of al-Qaeda, capitalizing on the mounting frustration of Afghans with their own government and the presence of foreign troops. The effect has been to make them a more potent insurgency, some NATO officials say."

A number of us have expressed concern about this potential evolution of the Taliban, what it might mean in the longer term. I wonder if you would address your sense of that and where that concern might fit into the London conference and the strategy that needs to come out of it.

Mr. MILLIBAND. I think that the asymmetric tactics of the insurgency speak first to their use of IEDs, improvised explosive devices, that are so deadly. It is one import from Iraq, which Senator Shaheen was asking about while you were voting.

Second, however, I think we should be clear that for those insurgents who want to pursue local grievances within their political system, that's precisely what the political system is for. And it's important that the political system provides a space for conservative Pashtuns to argue for their kind of social and economic development within their local communities.

So it seems to me that this speaks directly to the issue of reintegration which Senator Shaheen was asking me about. I think General Petraeus has said, perhaps to this committee, that 70 to 80 percent of the insurgency have no business even aligning themselves with a movement that is linked to al-Qaeda and that it should be a primary objective of our civilian-military strategy to bring them back into their local communities.

You'll know from your own detailed work in Afghanistan that concerns about corruption on the part of the Afghan people are real and in many cases well founded. That provides fertile ground for people to argue that they need alternatives to their own government. That needn't mean that they adhere themselves to an alternative that would provide cover for al-Qaeda. It seems to me that we have to be clear enough about the political settlement that we are seeking, especially in the south and east of Afghanistan, that it has space to incorporate concerns about corruption or concerns about social policy.

The CHAIRMAN. So your sense is that if they became a sort of quasi, "legitimate" party or a legitimate force for change and participate in the process, that that can be translated into the reintegration process. What if it's just a cover for their increased spread of violence and support?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think that it will then be rejected by the Afghan people. I think that it's important to say first, I think "party" probably isn't right. It's not really going to be a party system in Afghanistan, certainly not a party system of the kind that we understand. But there will be blocs and movements, and they should represent all shades of political opinion that's willing to live within the Afghan Constitution.

Second, you know from your visits to Pakistan that one of the major changes in the last year has been the fact that the Pakistani people are now backing their own government in taking on the so-called Pakistan Taliban. Why is that? Not just because of our urgings. We don't believe that. The video that was published I think last June of Taliban "justice," so-called, being administered to a 17-year-old girl created a wave of revulsion in Pakistan. And you can be sure that the vast, vast majority of Afghans remember what Taliban rule meant, and the best inoculation against that is those memories.

So of course the Afghan people will be wary of Taliban trying to present themselves as a moderate, reformed political party or political movement. Their good sense is our best defense as well.

The CHAIRMAN. I might mention that the Georgian Ambassador, Batu Kutalaya, is here and we're very happy to welcome you here. The Georgians currently have hundreds of troops being trained by the Marines to take part with ISAF, and we're very appreciative for that support and for your participation.

Senator Risch. You'll yield?

Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony and your presence here. We had the chance in August to visit Afghanistan for 2 days and had a chance to interact with and learn from a number of your troops, especially in Helmand province.

Let me first lay down or set forth a predicate for the question I'm going to ask. It relates to President Karzai. I've had the opportunity to meet him and to talk to him on two occasions, once in 2008 and once in August on that trip I just referred to. Two meetings does not a full understanding make or give you the opportunity to fully assess someone's commitment. But I have to say in the two meetings I had, and especially the one in August, I came away very concerned, for a number of reasons.

One of the questions that I posed to him in that meeting—and you know what they're like when Members of Congress meet. You might have a half an hour or an hour. But one question I asked him was, I said to him that the patience of the American people is not unlimited for our engagement and we need to see progress. And I said to him: Pretend for a moment that you're one of my constituents; tell me what you've done in the last year or so on the basic concerns that we have apart from the basic security question. Tell us what you've done on building a stronger system of justice, rooting out corruption and prosecuting corruption, delivering basic services to your people?

Now, when we were meeting it was about 48 hours after his reelection campaign had concluded. I would have thought—and I look at this as an American politician—that when you're running for reelection you're looking in the rear view mirror and you're also looking ahead. You're telling people this is what I've done and this is what I hope to do if you reelect me. I thought he would have had a reelection message or speech, literally, that would be able to recite chapter and verse on what he had done. His answer was—to say it was inadequate is an understatement.

So that's the predicate. I want you to know the skepticism that I bring to this question. But do you believe there is a way—I'm assuming you'd say this should happen. But do you believe there is a way to impose more accountability in what is a very corrupt system, meaning—is there a way and will President Karzai lead the effort to provide more disclosure of, say, income and assets, the seizing of assets when someone is engaged, who's a public official engaged in corruption, removal from office of those who are engaged in corruption?

I realize that that would be a sea change in that political culture. But tell us what you believe to be not only his commitment, but what is the evidence that that commitment has integrity, just on the political corruption question?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, it's a profoundly important question, Senator. It's not for me to speak for President Karzai, obviously. He speaks for himself. Let me take the two parts of the question.

The first part, can we impose accountability? Well, in some aspects of our work we can. We can say very clearly that we will not spend money through those parts of the Afghan Government where we do not have confidence that the money will reach its intended beneficiaries. We can be very clear about that. We audit the way our money is spent when the Afghans spend it, and we're a country which spends I think the largest proportion of our money through the Afghan system. And we should have very, very tough accountability rules about what the money's for and who it reaches. And if there are ministries who are not spending the money on the things that they're meant to be spending it on, we can do something about that.

The second example: Corruption isn't just national. It can be local. If you want to travel from Lashka Gar to Kandahar and you want to travel along the route between them, the likelihood is that you will be stopped many times on that route, especially if you are trying to take goods to market, or even if you're not. The security between population centers is a very important way of establishing order in a society. At the moment that route between Kandahar and Lashka Gar is not run the way it should be.

So I think, second, we can make a difference with our international forces and we can ensure that the Afghans are supporting it.

The second aspect, though, concerns the role of the Afghan people, because President Karzai doesn't only have a contract with us; he has a contract with his own people. This is where the role of Parliament, the role of the opposition—Dr. Abila, who I met in Kabul on Saturday, as a continuing role as a defeated Presidential candidate—and where the other ministers of the government are important.

Here is an area I think where words matter. To take the corruption example, President Karzai said in his inauguration speech that he wanted to end the culture of impunity that has blighted Afghanistan. Those are very strong words, for which he will now be held to account. The fact that since then he has set up an anticorruption commission and oversight board are good starts. But they then need to be followed through.

I think, as your government said on November 18 after President Karzai's inauguration speech and as we said, words have to be turned into deeds. Some of that work can be done by us. Others has to be done by Afghans because, as the chairman said in his introductory comments, the future of Afghanistan needs to be above all driven by the Afghans themselves.

Senator CASEY. I have a related question, but I may have to ask it in another round or in writing, a related question on just governance and security, or I should say internal security, with regard to the police. I know in your testimony you speak on page 3 of President Karzai's commitment to increase—and I'm summarizing—army and police. You're citing the police as going from 96,000 to 109,000 by the end of 2010.

We can answer this—let me just lay the question down. One is a real doubt about whether—a doubt that I have and I think others have expressed, about whether the 96,000 is a real number; and two about the doubt about the ability to grow that. But we'll try to do it in another round. I know we're out of time.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, Senator Casey, that because of the time—we have Ambassador Holbrooke afterward, and because of the Minister's schedule, we're not going to have a second round. I apologize for that, but I think it's fine if the Secretary would like to just answer the question if he wants to.

Mr. MILLIBAND. I'd be very happy to write you afterward. I think that your degree of concern about the police is very well merited. I said to Senator Shaheen earlier that I thought that Minister Atmar had one of the most difficult jobs in politics as the Interior Minister of Afghanistan.

I think that the fact that NATO has moved into police training in a serious way is a very significant and positive development. I think the European Union needs to do more for officer training on the police side, especially those European nations with a gendarmerie tradition, for obvious reasons. But I think that, on the issue of policing, that the balance between formal and informal institutions of security reaches its heart.

One obvious question for those who are being reintegrated into Afghan society is how they relate to the security forces, and the governance of the security forces goes to the heart of that question.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, first of all I apologize to our witness. I've been on the floor of the Senate involved in debate there.

I know you were asked about where Great Britain is in all of this. Let me expand the question briefly, just one question to you, because I know Richard Holbrooke is here with us. That is, in Europe itself, obviously the commitment of Europe at large to this effort is very, very important. I think most of us feel a level of confidence that our closest ally in the world and friend Great Britain is committed to this. But beyond the confines of Great Britain, to what extent is the rest of Europe committed to this, and how politically viable is that commitment, given some of the expressions of opposition that have emerged, not only there but here as well?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think it's a very important question, Senator. I think that the first thing to say is that I think all European nations recognize the importance of this and all European nations are doing something, most on the military side, but also on the civilian side.

Do we together need to do more to match the moment? The answer is yes, because the fate of Afghanistan is going to be decided in the forthcoming period and the time is now for commitments to be made.

I think it's important to say that some European countries, especially the smaller ones, have made outstanding contributions. Next to us in the south of Afghanistan, the Danes and the Estonians have shown remarkable commitment and remarkable bravery, and that needs to be acknowledged.

But it's also the case that the political temperature in Europe is tough, as it is here. We believe that this is a mission that is essential. It's a necessary mission and it's one that needs to be explained to people. As I was saying just before you came in, the countries of Europe, especially the countries of the European Union, have never been safer in respect to their territorial integrity, but their citizens are less safe because of international terrorism. And we have to explain to people why the armies that we have need to be deployed for different purposes. That's a message that needs to be heard.

I believe this, though. The essence of calling people to rally behind the mission is a coherent and clear plan. I think the coherence and clarity of the plan that now exists, both the priorities that have been set out by the Afghans and, critically, the security strategy that's been set out by President Obama and General McChrystal, gives no one excuses to say that they don't know what the plan is. There are no excuses to say that it's not a plan that genuinely speaks to the needs of Afghanistan. And there's no possibility of saying it isn't integrated with a civilian strategy.

I think that's why I said in my opening statement that the greatest deliverable from the London conference will be clarity, cohesion, and confidence that the politicians take back to their own people?

Senator DODD. Are we doing enough to advance this? What suggestions might you have on how we could better work together, putting aside the differences that may exist both here and there in Europe regarding the policy itself? It seems very important to me, to the extent you want to sustain support that there is clarity—and I think clarity is critically important. To what extent are we able to work better at this than we presently are?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think that it's important, first of all, to say that American leadership is not something that Europeans fear. American leadership is something that is recognized as essential, because this is a more complicated world than during the cold war, but this is a world where America is still the world's superpower. It's still the country that many look to, and it's the country with the resources to be able to take on the great challenges.

But I think that there is an ability to combine our resources better, and the themes of mutual respect and mutual responsibility that the administration and in some ways you yourself, sir, in the way you've asked your question, those themes of mutual respect

and mutual responsibility are the only basis, the right basis, on which to combine our efforts.

I also think that the Afghans need to speak more for themselves. One feature of the London conference is that there will be an opening speech from President Karzai. But when it comes to the discussion of sanction, Defense Minister Wardak and Interior Minister Atmar will also speak. When it comes to discussion of governance, Economics Minister Zakowa and head of the Ideology Popol will speak. When it comes to the regional role, Foreign Minister Rasul will speak.

Those Afghan voices and the voices of Afghan civil society, men and women, who will also be heard at that conference also need to be heard. We have said all along that we are not on a mission of colonization and so Afghan voices are very important support for that.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaufman.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I think civilian strategy here is key with our new COIN strategy, key in how we deal with it.

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for coming, and thank you for your government convening this London conference. It's clearly a positive thing.

There's been a lot of discussion here about the depth of U.S.—U.K. relations. I have my three youngest grandchildren in Hammersmith and they sound a lot more like you than they do like me. So the depth of my commitment is total.

Mr. MILLIBAND. It's the mission of colonization that we're on.

Senator KAUFMAN. Kind of reverse colonization. [Laughter.]

The other thing I want to say, because I've been to Helmand province twice, the intelligence, the professionalism, the courage of the British troops there and the British civilians is clearly incredibly impressive. I mean, talking to your folks about what's going on over there and what we should be doing and how we should be doing it, I feel very, very strongly about the professionalism, intelligence, and courage of our troops, but you are a great ally to have in this difficult venture.

To follow a little bit up on Senator Casey's comment about the police, you know, you don't have to be in Afghanistan for 45 minutes to not realize that the Afghan National Police force is questionable. What went wrong? I mean, we had—obviously, we did a lot of things wrong there. We left early. But we have had NATO involved in training the police for a long time.

First off, what do you think went wrong? And mainly, more important, looking forward, what leads us to believe that this 100,000-some troops, police, we have will actually be a force for positive, as to their present status, which is one of the great forces for negative in the country?

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, Senator, thank you very much for the words about the civilian and military efforts of our people in the south, which I think will mean a lot to people in the U.K. So thank you for saying that.

I think what went wrong—the first answer to that question doesn't lie at our door. What went wrong was an Afghan project for the police that was not carried forward in the right way, and it wasn't carried forward in the right way at ministerial level and it wasn't carried forward in the right way down the line.

I think it's also right to say that the training mission has been underresourced for the police. It's also been poorly conceptualized, because the role of the police in Afghanistan is fundamentally different from the role of the police in our country or in your country or in Europe.

I think that the importance of the local police engagement is something that is right, because this is a tribal society and locality is very important. So that the idea of the Afghan National Police is quite challenging in that society.

Second, the massive educational problems of the Afghan population are mirrored in the police force. This is a society without the sort of schooling system that you might take for granted. So those being recruited into the police, before you can teach them how to be policemen and women they have more fundamental challenges.

Third, it's no secret that drugs are a huge problem within the police force, especially in the south, and that's something that's not going to be cured within the police force on its own.

I think it's important to be very, very sober about how long it will take to turn the police around. The confidence of the Afghan people in their army is much greater than the confidence of the Afghan people in their police force. However, I do think that the way in which over the last 18 months in which NATO has taken seriously the police training mission has given it a whole new dimension, and that is I think one of the few positive aspects that I would point to.

The other positive aspect is that it is being properly led now from the top of the Afghan Interior Ministry. That simply didn't happen until 15 or 18 months ago. There is now a serious plan for the Afghan police. It's one that I have confidence in Minister Atmar as the leader of it. He is gathering around him some very brave people who are trying to prosecute their police reform strategy, and it's something I think we should be proud to back.

Senator KAUFMAN. I agree with something you said earlier when I was not here about how the—which I thought was one of the geniuses of the Obama proposal, is the setting of a deadline of July 2011 for us to leave, for the very reason that I think you said, which is it concentrates the mind. There's nothing like the prospect of a hanging to concentrate the mind, and I think for the Government in Afghanistan that will do it.

How do you feel about—do you get a feeling—I know what the President said, the good things the President said since then. He's still being critical of NATO forces when it suits him. How do you feel that's going? Do you think the deadline—do you still feel the deadline for July 2011 is concentrating their mind and having them move forward?

Mr. MILLIBAND. I was in the south of Afghanistan and in Kabul last weekend and in Pakistan the weekend before. It's important to say, to maybe repeat because I think a lot of you were voting—I think there was a lot of misunderstanding about the original ref-

erence to July 2011 when the President first made it in his speech. It's not a withdrawal date; it is a change in the balance between the American forces or the international forces and the Afghan forces.

Second, it's true that it has made real the commitment of the United States and of the wider international community to empower Afghans to run their own society. But that is a good thing, not a bad thing.

Senator KAUFMAN. Right.

Mr. MILLIBAND. After all, even before the President's speech we were all saying this is not an endless war where we're going to be endlessly committed. So I think he has struck a balance between being clear about our commitment to empower Afghans, while also being responsible in saying that July 2011 is not the day when American responsibility ends; it's the day when the beginning of troop withdrawal can start. That's a very important difference. I think, as I said earlier, it's a ramp, not a cliff edge, and that's an important distinction.

However, I think it has concentrated minds in a way that I think I underestimated when I first heard about this commitment. And it's concentrated minds in Afghanistan and it's also concentrated minds in the wider international community. It's given credence and credibility to the plan that is being developed by General McChrystal. It's also concentrated minds in the region.

While the first response wasn't one that spoke to regional cooperation, I think over the last 3 or 4 weeks you've seen the stirrings of a different attitude. On Tuesday I will be in Turkey, where the Turkish Foreign Minister has summoned a meeting of all the neighbors of Afghanistan and the regional powers. And now the essence of American commitment, both its scale, but also the determination to build up a sustainable capacity within the Afghan state, is something that I think is having a beneficial effect.

Senator KAUFMAN. I want to thank you very much and I want to wish you the best of luck in the London conference.

Mr. MILLIBAND. Thank you, Senator.

Senator KAUFMAN. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks so much, Senator Kaufman. Thank you. Senator Corker.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very brief.

Mr. Secretary, I just came really out of respect for you. I know we've worked on numbers of issues in the past together. We've gone through your testimony and we thank you for what's taking place next week in London. I just came to show support for that—I've got a conflict ongoing in another room—and also for the work that Richard Holbrooke is doing. I thank you both for that and certainly look forward to a very good outcome in London in the next couple weeks.

Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. MILLIBAND. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks a lot, Senator Corker. And we appreciate your coming by to share a moment here.

Mr. Secretary, we could easily go for another round and ask, obviously, a lot more questions. But you've been very generous with your time. We do also have an opportunity to hear from Amba-

sador Holbrooke, obviously, and I know members of the committee want to do that. So we're going to end at this round.

Normally with our witnesses we leave the record open. But I think it's a bad precedent with respect to guests like yourself, representing other countries. We are not going to leave the record open with respect to your testimony. I think people need to be here to ask those questions and we don't want to burden you with additional efforts to answer our questions.

So we're grateful to you, very, very grateful to you, for coming here today. Again let me just say to you quickly, we are working on the U.K.-U.S. defense treaty. I know it is of great concern to you and your country. Senator Lugar and I have held a recent hearing. We have information that was requested at that hearing that we're waiting on from the State Department and Justice Department. We expect it, I think next Monday, at which time Senator Lugar and I will converse and work through what modality might be the most effective to move forward.

We are determined to move forward. We understand your interest in it, our interest in it, and we want to try to get this done.

Our hope also is to have the START Treaty completed at some point in the near term so we can also proceed forward on that. So we have a fairly mutually important agenda ahead of us.

Now, I was going to ask you as a final question whether you prefer questions in Parliament to questions in the Foreign Relations Committee, but I'm not going to put you on the spot and expect an answer to that.

Again, we really do thank you. Thanks for the great work you're doing. Your partnership is essential to our success in Afghanistan and we believe that success in Afghanistan is critical to Pakistan and the region, and we are going to continue to stay focused on this issue.

What I would like to do is as I excuse you ask Ambassador Holbrooke just to come right up and fill in.

Mr. MILLIBAND. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Secretary, you can move through the back here with the Ambassador and others in your entourage.

We'll just literally stand in recess for about a minute while we transition here.

[Brief recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come back to order.

Ambassador Holbrooke has been a terrific friend to this committee, and to me personally, for years, and I appreciate his sharing and choosing this forum to unveil the administration's new Afghanistan and Pakistan regional stabilization strategy. I also want to express my appreciation—he is just back from a long trip. I saw him catch at least one yawn a little while ago, so I know he's struggling with jet lag here.

But I want to express my appreciation for the job he is doing and the work he has undertaken. It is tough, tough work, as complex and as challenging as any foreign policy challenge that we have today, and I think everybody is appreciative of the time that he is taking to commit to it and of the job that he is doing.

The new report that he is setting out today sets out key initiatives, specific milestones, and resource requirements to meet the

goals. These are really things that many in Congress have been waiting for and asking for, a formal plan for the civilian side of our efforts, and I'm very pleased the administration has put such care and attention into shaping this response.

Obviously, success in Afghanistan is going to be profoundly affected by what happens across the border in Pakistan, and I welcome the chance to hear from you today, Mr. Ambassador, your thoughts about the progress toward meeting the economic, security, and governance challenges there.

We also appreciate receiving the first report mandated by the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Pakistan bill, and I think that's a source of greater transparency and accountability for how American money is going to be spent over the next 5 years.

So thank you again, Ambassador, for being here.

Senator Holbrooke—"Senator Holbrooke." Senator Lugar, do you have any additional?

Senator LUGAR. No, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We welcome your testimony. Your full testimony will be placed in the record as usual, as if read in full, and we look forward to your comments.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What a great honor to be back in front of you and your committee again. I am delighted that you suggested that we have this hearing. We have timed the report you just mentioned so that it is released today in conjunction with this hearing in order to emphasize our strong sense of obligation to your committee.

As you said, I have just returned last night from a trip to Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and France, and will be leaving for London again in a few days. I congratulate you on having David Miliband here today. I think it's terrific to hear other voices, responsible voices, with similar but slightly different points of view, and I thought his testimony was extraordinary.

The London conference is important. The last time we had an Afghanistan conference was March 31 in The Hague. Ten months later, following the elections in Afghanistan in which you, Senator Kerry, played such a critical role, and following the President's December 1 announcement of the troops, it was time for the world to get together again.

We're grateful to Gordon Brown, David Miliband, and their government for summoning us to London, and we go with great enthusiasm. Our delegation will be led by Secretary Clinton and I will be honored to be part of it.

I would like to discuss briefly my trip, cover a few other issues. I am accompanied here by certain key members of my staff. As you and I discussed many weeks ago, we both felt that the best way to illustrate the "whole of government" approach that the Obama administration has to this issue is to illustrate it in the most dramatic possible way, and I have brought with me, not all of course,

but some key members of the staff, and I would like, with your permission, to ask them to rise when I finish my brief trip report.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, we welcome that. Let me just say for my part, and I know many of them and I know some of them personally, that you have assembled sort of an A Team of capacity for this endeavor, and that's as it ought to be, and I congratulate you for doing that. We welcome them here.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. In that case, Mr. Chairman, maybe I ought to introduce them right now before we lose the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, go ahead. Do that.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I'm going to do this in the order they claim they're seated in, and I want to just preface this by saying that I brought representatives of all—of 9 of the 10 agencies that work—excuse me, 8 of the 10 agencies that work together. The CIA representatives are not here, for obvious reasons, and our Department of Agriculture representative, Otto Gonzalez, is in Doha today on a very important mission.

But if I've got this right, starting with Paul Jones—I'd ask each of you to stand up as I introduce you. Paul Jones is my senior deputy, a career Foreign Service officer.

Next to him is supposed to be and is Vali Nasser, our senior adviser. I believe he's testified more than once before your committee.

Next to him is Rena Miree, who we managed to steal from George Soros' foundation. She worked for the U.N. She was at the Bonn conference. She is our expert on Afghan internal politics.

Next to her is Barney Reuben, who I think you all know. He's testified before your committee. We're immensely proud that the man that I personally consider America's leading expert on Afghanistan has left the sanctuary of academia and is being introduced to bureaucracy.

Next to him is my senior adviser Ashley Baumer, who is an expert on communications and has worked with me for the last decade.

Next to Ashley is your former staff member, Dan Feldman, my other deputy, who is well known to you and also had a close association with Senator Mark Warner.

In the second row is Derek Hogan. Derek is our expert on the provincial reconstruction teams. He is absolutely instrumental. He's served in the field and claims to speak Dari.

Next to him is our Treasury representative, Romi Shie. We never ever get to the subject, but it is enormously important, our attempts to interdict the flow of funds from the gulf. It's not true that the drug trade is the major source. It's one of three major sources. Another is illicit funds and the third I regret to say is extortion off the international contracts. Romi, who was with me on this trip, has been traveling around the region with his colleagues at Treasury. We're setting up a lot of task forces on this. The Senate majority leader, Senator Reid, has already had a personal briefing on these issues. If you wish additional information beyond the scope of today's hearing, we'd be happy to supply it.

Next to Romi is our Office of Secretary of Defense representative Vikram Singh, also an expert in communications.

Next to Vikram is Sepada Kavanshah from USAID.

Next to Sepada is Tim List from the Department of Homeland Security. He is working full-time now on this hand security measures issue, which I will just say in parentheses—we won't get to it later—has got the Pakistanis extremely upset, these new measures. Tim List from DHS is working on that.

Next to Tim is Maj. Gen. Bert Field, one of our two representatives assigned to us by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

In the third row, from the FBI Chris Ryman.

Next to Chris is Alexander Evans, a loan officer from the British Government and an expert on politics and reintegration, reconciliation.

Next to Alex is Matt Stiglis from the Department of Justice.

Next to Matt is Beth Dunford, our other USAID person.

Now, somebody said earlier they should all be back working and not up here, but I disagree, Mr. Chairman. I wanted you and anyone else who's watching to understand what "whole of government" means in its most visual sense. And everyone here needs to also understand the role of your committee, and I hope you will feel free to call on any and all of their resources during this hearing or at any time. I know you have been down to our office for breakfast. You've spent hours with these people. You know them all already. I know that Senator Casey has been there. We've had some 20 Members of the Senate and many senior Members of the House have breakfast with us. So you know what we're trying to do.

Secretary Clinton and President Obama put together this inter-agency team in order to do what we're doing. With your permission, I would ask that the report that they assembled and which you already mentioned be also entered in the record in addition to my testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. Without objection, it will be.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The report referred to above was too voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be retained in the permanent record of the committee.]

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, I think it's terrific to have the people, the sort of faces, if you will, and more than that, the people affiliated with this effort, and to recognize all of you and for people to see the coordinated effort that is taking place here. I think it's important and helpful. And if you're able to coordinate all of that, Afghanistan ought to be a piece of cake.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It is—and I say this with no discredit to the many other people I've worked with over the last decades in the Department. But this is the best team I've ever been privileged to work with. And Secretary Clinton I think, who knows every one of these people personally, is very pleased with it.

Mr. Chairman, let me start with Afghanistan and let me try not to duplicate what you already heard from David Miliband. But I would like to go back to the question that Senator Casey asked and add my own comments right at the outset. I was there with you in Afghanistan on August 22 and 23 when you saw President Karzai. We talked at the time, and I understand fully why you said what you said.

So let me say something that may surprise you. When I saw Senator—when I saw President Karzai a few days ago, I found cause

for encouragement, and I choose my words very carefully. I think each of you when you go back will see this.

Let me put it in perspective. Today is 1 year since we started work in the Department of State, the day after the inauguration. In that 12-month period, 10 months were dominated by one issue and that was the elections, and you were there during that period, as was Senator Kerry. You came in August. Senator Kerry came at the crunch, deciding point.

That election created so much tension and it so overshadowed everything else we were trying to do. It prevented certain programs from getting off the ground at all. It inhibited others. It raised an enormous challenge to our policy. In the end, we got through, again with tremendous assist from Chairman Kerry.

While the press regarded the election as messy and the President of the United States used that term accurately—it was messy—the fact is that the procedures of the election were fulfilled. The independent election commission, which you visited while you were there, decided no one got 50 percent. Everyone acknowledged massive irregularities. And then, in a very dramatic set of events, President Karzai decided he would go along with the second round, and that of course was where Senator Kerry made what I think was a historically significant intervention in the process, and we—although he was working independently, we were coordinating closely. When President Karzai agreed to that election, his challenger withdrew.

So I need to stress at the outset that President Karzai is the legitimately reelected President of the country. When I got to Kabul a few days ago and saw President Karzai, of all the meetings I've had with him going back over the last 6 years, I felt that this was the one in which he was most focused on the future, looking at the issues, and ready to move forward.

We talked at length about London. We talked about the reintegration program that Foreign Secretary Miliband has discussed and many other issues. I don't want to promise you that corruption will disappear tomorrow. It won't, and President Karzai can't fix that problem on his own. I don't want to promise you that reintegration will suddenly bring thousands and thousands of people off the battlefield. All I can tell you, Senator, and for the rest of the committee, is that I found the situation in Kabul in a better position than it's been at any time in the year since we took office, and we inherited a very difficult situation, to put it bluntly.

So that would be my first comment about Afghanistan, in the form of an answer to your very important question. There are some very good ministers who have been confirmed and some very bad ministers who were rejected. I regret very much that the minister of public health was rejected because she was outstanding. But that as I understand it was internal politics of the sort everyone here is familiar with.

I do not regard to failure to confirm all the members of the Cabinet as a sign of confusion. We're slow in our confirmation processes, too. But I am very pleased with what we've seen, and I'll be happy to answer the question that Senator Lugar put in his introduction in a moment.

Let me turn to Pakistan. Pakistan is an immensely complicated situation, far more complicated than Afghanistan in my mind, and our influence there is necessarily much less. Pakistan's economy is in difficult shape. IMF standby agreements are coming up. We're very concerned about it. We're doing everything we can do to help.

The Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation is enormously important, both symbolically and for its actual value. I found the understanding and appreciation of that significantly up since your trip to Pakistan, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that we will fully fund it in each of its 5 years that's called for. Personally, as I've said many times, I think the international community should do much, much more for Pakistan.

So much for the economy. Now, in terms of what's happening in the west, the Pakistanis have undertaken two major offensives in the last year, one against—one in Swat and one in South Waziristan. These have been successful offensives. If we were sitting here a year ago—and in fact, when I first appeared before this committee early last year this was our major subject of concern. Well, they've begun to move. I know that all of you feel that they ought to do more and I understand that. We all hope that they will be able to find ways to deal with all of the militants in the frontier areas.

But there are two full Pakistani divisions right now just in Swat, and they have pulled over 100,000 troops off their eastern border in order to deal with this. And there are capacity issues here. That's why, in addition to asking for the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, we've asked for increases in FMF and other forms of military assistance. Pakistan is undoubtedly the key to the region because of its location, because of its peculiar history in terms of its interrelationship with Afghanistan.

So while we understand that Pakistan and Afghanistan affect each other and are closely related, we also need to deal with Pakistan in and of itself as a critically important country for all the reasons you know—nuclear weapons, its relations with its giant neighbor to the east, its weak economy which needs tremendous support. And that is, by the way, why we're so, so hopeful that the ROZ legislation will pass the Senate—it passed the House in the last session—because it is both symbolically and substantively important.

Pakistan is a country that deserves our sympathetic support, even though, as no one knows better than your chairman, they sometimes push us to the limits. Their reaction to the Kerry-Lugar legislation, their initial reaction, which I believe was based on a completely—a complete misunderstanding of what was in the legislation, their initial reaction was one that was understandably annoying to people up here. But thanks to Foreign Minister Koreshi's emergency trip here, Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar's intervention on behalf of that process, the explanations, your flying trip out there, I think we turned the corner on that.

Finally on the countries I visited, Mr. Chairman, let me comment on India. India is not formally part of my mandate, but with the support of the Indians I try to go to New Delhi as often as I can to keep them informed and to discuss the situation with them. I don't think it would be valuable to go into details in the public forum, but I do want to stress that the Indians are very, very anx-

ious that we succeed in Afghanistan. They're supporting us. They're giving Afghanistan a lot of aid, particularly in the field of agriculture, which is also our primary nonsecurity priority, agriculture. And I want to be sure that everyone here recognizes how centrally important India will be to this.

Finally, Senator Lugar raised in his initial questions comments about regional strategy and other countries, so let me try very briefly to touch on some of our emerging bilateral relationships. I won't deal with the old relationships with our NATO allies and Japan, which you're familiar with, but the six countries we have developed emerging efforts to work with over the last year, and each one is different, Senator.

The six we are developing strong relationships with and coordination are Egypt, UAE, Turkey, Jordan, China, and Russia. In each case—and there will be more. In each case, we have sent teams out to the area—I've headed some myself, Paul Jones has headed some, your former colleague, Dan Feldman, or your former staff member, Dan Feldman, has headed some—and we're developing bilateral relationships.

You will note that Egypt, UAE, Jordan are all members of the OIC, and we are putting very heavy attention on that. Turkey is a critically important regional player which can help us. We have the same strategic goals. They're concerned about the Turkmen minority in Afghanistan and they have great influence in both countries.

UAE is increasingly supportive. We have had a team in Cairo twice. I led one, Dan Feldman led the other. We're working out joint programs.

Jordan is increasing its military and economic support and is willing to train Afghan police and army.

China we're in preliminary discussions with, but I've been there twice and Dan Feldman led a team there, and President Obama raised the issue with Hu Jin Tao and it is mentioned in the communique.

We have started the dialogue with Russia. Paul Jones and I went there. Paul is going back.

So, Mr. Chairman, that is a very brief introduction to an enormous panoply of issues we're trying to deal with. I'm grateful and I'll be happy to answer any questions you have.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, thank you for your invitation to appear before this committee to discuss our civilian strategy and efforts in Afghanistan. I would like to begin by thanking our friend from the United Kingdom, David Miliband, for the U.K.'s indispensable leadership and commitment to our mission in Afghanistan. American and British soldiers are fighting side by side to achieve peace and security in Afghanistan. And American and British civilians are working side by side to help Afghans develop and govern their country so it will never become an al-Qaeda sanctuary again. The United States and United Kingdom will continue to stand together with the Afghan people to accomplish our shared mission.

We are looking ahead with great enthusiasm to the London Conference on Afghanistan next week. It will be cohosted by U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown and U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and cochaired by the U.K. and Afghan Foreign Ministers, along with the U.N. Secretary of State Clinton will represent the

United States. We will join Afghanistan, the U.N., and over 75 nations and international organizations to renew the international community's partnership with Afghanistan. Our objective for the London Conference is clear: to demonstrate the international community's support for Afghanistan's future, and the agenda outlined by President Karzai in his November 19 inauguration speech. The London Conference will focus on Afghanistan's security, governance and development, and international coordination. We need to maintain momentum so that we continue to deliver progress in Afghanistan and set out the conditions for Afghanistan to take full control of its own security. If conditions are right, we expect that the London Conference will be followed by an international conference in Kabul later this year to present the Afghan Government's commitments to the people of Afghanistan.

President Obama outlined a strategy in March 2009 that includes supporting the Afghan Government's efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies. As he made clear at West Point on December 1, our civilian engagement in Afghanistan will continue long after our combat troops come home. While our military mission in Afghanistan is not open-ended, we are committed to building lasting partnership with Afghanistan. In line with the President's goals, the London conference aims to enhance the international community's partnership with Afghanistan.

Now is a good time for us to take stock of the past year. On January 20, 2009, the situation in Afghanistan was more precarious than many realized. Our basic strategy needed an overhaul. Our Embassy in Kabul lacked personnel, programs, and resources. The international community perceived that Afghanistan was not a top U.S. priority. Key regional actors, such as China and Russia, as well as Muslim partners, were not engaged in Afghanistan's future. In Washington there was no serious effort at coordination for our civilian effort and no agreed civilian strategy.

Our relationship with Afghanistan looks much better than it did at this time last year. We have reclaimed the initiative. We have brought strategic coherence to our nonmilitary efforts; made major changes in our civilian priorities; overcome political crises; greatly increased American civilian resources; and mobilized significant international support for stabilizing Afghanistan.

Before I go into greater detail on the progress we've seen this year and the strategy for the way forward, I want to elaborate on our engagement with international partners to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has been a major focus of Secretary Clinton and my efforts, and just yesterday I returned from a trip that took me to Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia aimed at bolstering the international effort to help Afghanistan. As President Obama said, the future stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan affects "the security of our allies, and the common security of the world." Based on that insight, we have engaged in intensive diplomatic outreach to build a broad international coalition in support of our common objectives in the region.

Of course this includes working with our closest partners, and I am pleased that Foreign Secretary Miliband was able to brief you on the London Conference next week. The European Union has announced an Action Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan that focuses on civilian assistance in vital sectors. Turkey continues to be a vital partner, increasing their military commitment and managing innovative projects in agricultural exports and other fields. Russia is providing overflight rights, and China has engaged in productive consultations over our common objectives. Countries throughout the wider Muslim region are also playing a leading role. The United Arab Emirates announced the appointment of a resident Ambassador in Kabul last week, one day before hosting a meeting of my counterparts from almost 30 countries and international organizations, including some of the most active countries in the region.

Through the international group of my counterparts—the "SRAP" collective—and by strengthening international civilian institutions in Kabul, we are also working to ensure that increased international resources are well-coordinated and well-used. The London Conference should be able to announce important progress in strengthening civilian coordination in Kabul under the leadership of the United Nations but with strong support from ISAF, the EU, and others.

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to summarize a few of the key civilian-led initiatives underway in Afghanistan—which is summarized in the comprehensive civilian strategy that we are releasing today. We are implementing a new civilian-military agriculture redevelopment strategy that will sap the insurgency not only of foot soldiers, but also of income from the narcotics trade. We are expanding subnational capacity-building efforts, focused mainly in key population centers in the East and South, through new civ-mil initiatives, such as the District Development Working Groups and District Support Teams, and supporting programs that give Afghans a greater stake in their own government, such as the National Solidarity Program.

And we are improving coordination of international assistance by consulting with our allies and partners to strengthen the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and enhancing civilian coordination among ISAF partners.

Last week, Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack visited Kabul to highlight the fact that agriculture is our most important nonsecurity program. We are very pleased with the efforts and progress to date we have made with our Afghan partners; 2009 was the best agricultural year Afghanistan has had in the last 30 years—a reflection of good weather, increased security in agriculture areas in the South, and our robust civilian assistance efforts. We have dozens of USDA advisers in the field working closely with Agribusiness Development Teams from National Guard units from such states as Nebraska, Missouri, and Texas. These agriculture experts work closely with their local and provincial Afghan counterparts to revitalize this historically successful economic sector, boost job creation, and encourage the population to stop opium production and wean Afghan youths from joining the Taliban and supporting terrorists. Our military and civilian success in former Taliban-controlled areas will generate word of mouth in Afghanistan and create additional momentum to enable the Afghan Government to more effectively deliver services in these areas and successfully fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

To help implement this strategy, we have bolstered our diplomatic and development presence in the field, and work very closely with Ambassador Eikenberry and his team in Kabul. In Washington, we are also pursuing a whole-of-government approach. I lead a team of experts and senior advisers from 10 U.S. Government departments and agencies, headquartered at the State Department. They represent USAID, Treasury, the Department of Justice, Homeland Security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, FBI, CIA, OSD, and USDA. We work seamlessly with the NSC and CENTCOM, as well as in close coordination with Ambassador Eikenberry and his strong team in Kabul. Together, we are implementing our political, economic, and diplomatic efforts.

We have nearly tripled the number of civilians on the ground since January 2009—but the numbers are not the only measure. We need to do more than just fill personnel slots—we need to be sure that we are putting the right people in the right places. We also have true civ-mil integration and cooperation nationwide—not just in Kabul, but also at RC-East and RC-South. This is possible because of the efforts we have made to recruit and send more qualified civilians into the field. Today key civilian experts are able to deploy with military units in places like Helmand province where insurgents operated uncontested just a few months ago.

A final note on civilian staffing in Afghanistan: unlike their military counterparts, civilians are selected and deploy as individuals, not units. That is what makes this huge increase in civilians to Afghanistan so impressive. The civilian impact is far greater than numbers: the average civilian leverages 10 partners—locally employed staff, Afghan and international experts from U.S.-funded NGOs. There is a different purpose and way of working on the civilian side: we want the civilians supporting and building the capacity of their Afghan counterparts who must be the forward face of these shared programs.

Mr. Chairman, we have no illusions about what faces us in Afghanistan. The challenges there are immense. The Afghan Government is under assault from the Taliban and struggling to provide security, jobs, and basic justice to a society devastated by more than 30 years of war.

One weapon that the Taliban and al-Qaeda use very successfully is information, seeking to dominate the information space through direct communications or intimidation, and by working through religious or nationalist media outlets. They have a well-oiled rapid-reaction propaganda machine that constantly uses graphic images, intimidating telephone calls, and CDs and DVDs distributed in local bazaars, while disavowing responsibility for bombings they conduct which kill large numbers of civilians. Therefore, while our previous strategy focused largely on traditional public diplomacy and communications tools, we are now elevating our communications efforts in importance and innovation. We are helping to build communications infrastructure and capacity; conducting sustained media and outreach strategies in both countries; and fostering a localized grassroots movement on the ground through mobile and radio initiatives—including leveraging new technology to foster socioeconomic benefits through e-banking, learning, and health.

Secretary Clinton has said that while only the Afghan people “can defeat the insurgency once and for all” and “build a successful democracy that lasts,” it remains the responsibility of the United States to partner with the Afghan Government over the long term to achieve these goals. We cannot do so unless we implement an integrated civil-military strategy in Afghanistan.

Achieving progress will require continued sacrifice not only by our military personnel, but also by the more than 1,500 U.S. Government civilians serving in

Afghanistan and Pakistan. But for the first time since the conflict in Afghanistan began 8 years ago, we have an innovative, whole-of-government strategy to protect our vital national security interests in this region—the strategy as articulated by President Obama last year and spelled out in more detail in this document before you today. When combined with U.S. military efforts to build Afghan and Pakistani security capacity, our political, economic, and diplomatic efforts constitute an unprecedented interagency undertaking. And as I saw again during my recent visit to the region, our civilian personnel are working together with our Afghan and international partners as never before. Their efforts are vital to our success in protecting and advancing American interests.

Mr. Chairman, let me close on the most important point: we could not do this without the support of this committee or the Congress. You have been indispensable partners. Over the past several months, many of you have come to the State Department to meet members of my interagency team; you have led numerous delegations to both Afghanistan and Pakistan to better assess the needs on the ground; and worked closely with us on important legislation, like the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. I hope we can continue the open, frank, and regular dialogue we have had over the past year. Secretary Clinton and I are deeply committed to doing more in order to protect and advance American interests side by side with Congress.

I believe the President's strategy—as spelled out in detail in this document—offers our best prospect for stabilizing Afghanistan and the region, and to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies so they are no longer a threat to the United States and our interests. I look forward to continuing to work with you and the Congress to secure the resources we need to achieve our mission and to signal our continued commitment to Afghanistan and our international partners.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Let me begin by asking you for sort of a general assessment of the civilian piece. A lot of us have been saying for a long time, and I think you've been in agreement, that since there is no military solution, the key here is to be able to get the Afghans to start doing things, delivery of services, delivery of governance at the local level.

Give the committee, if you would, your best summary and judgment of what progress we've really made since the inauguration, since this moment of new opportunity for President Karzai to change the dynamics? Give us your assessment of what that state of progress really is on the ground and of where we stand with respect to the civilian capacity to come in under these additional troops and make this transition work?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I want to be clear I understand your question. You're referring not to reintegration, but to—

The CHAIRMAN. I'm not referring to reintegration except to the degree that it's just part of the larger strategy. I'm referring to the civilian capacity to deliver governance, deliver services, do development, come in underneath the clear and hold, so that you're building and transitioning and transferring. I'd like to get your sense of where we are in terms of the personnel and capacity to empower the district and provincial governance that is so critical here.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We're just starting, Senator. That is—we have on paper a plan that takes you from the clear phase, which the U.S. military and its NATO allies do so well, through the hold phase. But when you get to build and transfer, we are just starting, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar.

You take Nawah District in southern Helmand, which has gotten a lot of publicity, "60 Minutes" profiles and so on. The Marines went in with a thousand people, took over the area, which greeted them with great excitement. That was the Little America area that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had done so much in,

and a lot of the people remembered the Americans or had heard about them from their parents.

But there were no Afghans, so to speak, with the American military and civilians when they went in. And when they do go in, they don't have office space, they don't have telephones, they don't have resources. It's a long, long way from Kabul to Lashkahr or Nawah.

The CHAIRMAN. What does that say about our prospects here, then?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, I'm giving you—you wanted a snapshot. The snapshot is a blueprint which has got to be filled in. These things—I hate to say this because time is not always our ally, but these things do take a certain amount of time. Until that election was behind us—and that was only 2 months and 2 days ago from today, November 19—until that election was over, we couldn't get to that issue, Mr. Chairman.

We could do agriculture. Agriculture is the big success story of 2009. It is creating jobs and stopping the poppy eradication was a tremendous achievement. But when you get to governance, then we're talking about a much more difficult issue. Derek Hogan, who I introduced to you a minute ago, his focus is on this issue. We call it subnational governance. What it means is what are we going to do at the district level?

Well, we have got a ton of plans. They're outlined in here, and I would be happy to submit for the record a much more detailed explanation. But I—

The CHAIRMAN. Let's put them into the record and let me sort of extend the question a little bit. As an example of the kind of thing that I think represents the challenge, you're more than familiar with, obviously, the national solidarity program. It's really been in many people's judgment one of the most successful Afghan-run—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The most successful.

The CHAIRMAN. The most successful, and I would agree with that. It's touched the lives of two out of three people in the rural arena. It's the only program I know of that's reached all of the country's 34 provinces, and really that's affected the lives of about 13 million villagers.

I am told that as a result of that program about 28 percent of the population now has drinking water where they didn't, 25 percent have better roads, access to markets, marketplaces, 18 percent have better irrigation systems, 16 percent now have access to power, 11 percent of the children are studying in reconstructed schools.

These are all big deals. That's the up side that you never hear about with respect to Afghanistan. But—and here's the "but," and it goes to this question of President Karzai and the direction we're taking. The ministry of rural rehabilitation and development runs that program, and we've invested hundreds of millions of dollars in it. The new MRRD Minister, Jarullah Mansuri, is essentially a political pick who—I hate to say it, but he simply doesn't have the experience or the level of ability to manage a program like this. And worse, he has made public comments suggesting that he plans

to scale back those programs drastically, which then jeopardizes the one big success story that we have.

So how do we—where are we with respect to that, and how does that fit into this notion that this is sort of the moment of opportunity and truth, where these kinds of setbacks just aren't tolerable?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We agree with you about the NSP. It is the most successful program, and we are expanding it and enlarging it with the enthusiastic support of the Senate, which has repeatedly told us it's your favorite program as well, and we will continue to do so.

The reason it's so successful goes to a central point that goes back to Senator Casey's question. The United States has a tendency to personalize the country's government and put everything on the head of President Karzai, but that isn't consistent with Afghan history, tradition, and no government can ever flow through the top. But this has not been a highly centralized government most of its history, and certainly not after the last 30 years.

So programs that go directly to the district level and below are valuable, and whatever the references you've made, we are going to continue to emphasize this program.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you raised that issue about its leadership with the President?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I've not discussed the minister, Mr. Chairman. I've discussed the program, and President Karzai has reassured us—Ambassador Eikenberry, myself—that this is an issue that he will support, this is a program he'll support.

But, based on what you're saying, we'll go back and batten down the hatches and my crack team behind me will send out a cable tonight asking for more information, and we'll get back to you—

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Because this program should be expanded. In fact, the World Bank did a study in conjunction with Harvard and the ministry recently. They looked at 500 villages in the south, and what they found, and I'll quote. The assessment was that "NSP overwhelmingly demonstrated a positive impact on economic development, local governance, female involvement in local government, girls school attendance, and perceptions of the government from Karzai on down, and security at the village level."

Then they went on in this memo I have. The researchers and the World Bank not only welcome the U.S. commitment to NSP, they were happy to hear about our plan for putting another \$300 million into NSP. Remember, the program phased out, so we inherited a good idea with an empty piggy bank, and we had to come back to you. Another one of these inexplicable inheritances.

But they went on to say that they stressed "The next phase of NSP's development will require nearly a billion dollars." Now, that doesn't need all come from the United States. The World Bank is a big supporter, and other countries. But we are big, big supporters.

The CHAIRMAN. And for good reason.

[The written information from Ambassador Holbrooke to the above question follows:]

The U.S. must be willing and prepared to work closely with duly appointed ministers such as Jarullah Mansoori, who was appointed as the Minister for Rural Rehabilitation and Development by President Karzai, and confirmed in the position by Parliament on January 16, 2010. Prior to his appointment as Minister, Jarullah Mansoori served as an adviser to Minister of Interior Hanif Atmar while the latter was the MRRD Minister. He also worked as an adviser to former Minister of Justice Abdul Rahim Karimi, and as Deputy General of the Afghan National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA).

Ambassador Eikenberry met personally with the newly appointed Minister on January 26 to specifically raise some of the issues and concerns you have highlighted. In addition to his commitment to fighting corruption and restoring the rightful place of women in society, as highlighted in his presentation to Parliament, Minister Mansoori confirmed his strong support for the National Solidarity Program (NSP), among other key initiatives. The NSP forms a critical element of subnational governance programs, and a mechanism that has proved successful—as you have rightly identified—in connecting the Government of Afghanistan to the population. Minister Mansoori has stressed his willingness for national inclusion in MRRD projects, and the need to focus on sustainability and capacity-building of the systems currently in place. We will therefore continue to support MRRD, and Minister Mansoori, in developing these systems (including programs such as NSP) to strengthen the links between central, provincial, district, and community levels to enable GIROA delivery of a package of basic services to the population.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Holbrooke, let me ask a question about relationships between the remarkable staff that you have coordinated, which I understand is comprised of as many as 40 persons in Washington, and the country team in Pakistan. The reason I ask the question is that after returning from staff visits, members of our Foreign Relations Committee staff have indicated that certain arguments and tensions exist between your staff and the country team. I suppose those are unavoidable, but the fact is that this is an unusual situation, in which there is an ambassador and a country team in Pakistan, in addition your very large staff that's also there from time to time.

How are you coordinating the relationships between these groups of people? Who is in charge, and can you describe the process of reconciling these views in a bit of detail?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The easiest way to explain the situation, Senator, is to simply point out what my job is. I'm not a special envoy like George Mitchell or Todd Stern. The title "Special Representative" was designed to indicate that two Embassies, Kabul and Islamabad, were put under our direct supervision, working in close conjunction with, but separate from, the South and Central Asia Bureau, headed by Assistant Secretary Bob Blake. In fact, Paul Jones, my senior deputy, is dual-hatted as a deputy assistant secretary in that Bureau.

Therefore, we have a seamless relationship with the Bureau that's responsible for India and Central Asia. Our job, as stated by the President, is to oversee the embassies in the regular chain of command. In other words, they're instructed ambassadors who report through us to the Secretary of State, just like any other ambassadors in the world.

I've been in and out of the State Department now for over 40 years and almost every embassy and every home office has disagreements. There have been some well publicized disagreements over the size of our aid commitments in both countries. I think that's in the normal course of affairs.

There is no problem between the Embassy in Islamabad and our office, except the routine bureaucratic things that go on day after day, 90 percent of which, Senator Lugar, are in the end results of inadequate communication across 10½ time zones.

I was just in Islamabad and Lahore with Ambassador Patterson and her team for 3 days and there was no problem and no friction. There was one area, however, that Secretary Clinton and I and Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Judith McHale all have been deeply concerned about. That goes back to things you said earlier, both of you: Americans are not well appreciated in Pakistan, despite the fact that we give them a massive amount of assistance. Both Secretary Clinton and Under Secretary McHale and I all felt that our public diplomacy programs were inadequate and we had to revamp them top to bottom. We had to bring in new personnel and we had to change the whole method of operations there.

This is an ongoing effort. I know that Senator Kaufman has been particularly interested in this and I'm very grateful for his constant assistance by nudging us, because it's a very difficult situation when you authorize and appropriate vast amounts of money for a country and it is misrepresented in the press. We had no—there was no plan in place to explain the Kerry-Lugar bill to the Pakistanis the day you passed it. So what happened? All the publicity came in without any warning, misrepresenting it.

Again, I express my appreciation to all of you for what you did to unravel it. But it should never have happened. I speak not only for myself, but for the Secretary, who has said this publicly, that we had to do better.

Two of the people sitting behind you, Vikram Singh and Ashley Baumer, are particularly focused on that. It's part of a larger issue about communications and counterpropaganda.

But that was not a source of friction, Senator Lugar. It was an identified gap. It was a legacy issue, and we have turned to it as one of our highest priorities and will continue to.

Senator LUGAR. Let me mention that Senator Kaufman and I were in the front row to hear Secretary Clinton's speech this morning on the use of the Internet and other communications as a vital part of our new public diplomacy strategy. I thought it was a very important speech and one which hopefully illustrates some of the points you have just made.

Let me just touch—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. May I interject one quick point, Senator. I would add that several of the examples in her speech were either directly from what we're doing in Pakistan and Afghanistan or, in the case of Haiti, 20222 on your dial, we had pioneered that in Swat when the refugees hit. So the technology was in place and we were able to simply transfer it to Haiti, where they've raised \$25 million in just a few days.

Senator LUGAR. That is a very important point, and she did mention Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as Haiti.

Let me follow up on a question I raised in my opening statement. What is the plan for the \$200 million directed this year to education in Pakistan? How do you even begin to approach this issue? What sort of organized effort is there in a country which, as we have often commented in our hearings has virtually no public

school system? It is hard to tell whether there is any organization, quite apart from bureaucracy. How do you disburse and supervise \$200 million?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. In a country of 180 million people, the education system must be reformed by the country itself. No amount of outside money can do it, and yet we have to give them money to support it.

You said \$200 million. Actually, the \$200 million was fiscal year 2009. For this year it's slightly larger. It's gone up to \$265 million under Kerry-Lugar.

With your permission, I'd just like to answer your question as follows. There's basic education and higher education. The basic education is \$265 million in the fiscal year 2010 budget and in accordance with the parameters laid out in your own legislation. This is basic education to support education reform programs to build and rehabilitate schools, provide essential teacher and learning materials, strengthen local school management, improve teacher training. AID's going to support innovative approaches to increase school enrollment through public-private partnerships. In the Federally Administered Tribal programs, we're going to help increase enrollment.

You know, the literacy rates are in the single digits and half of that for women in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. It's a huge problem. The reason it's so important goes back to the communications issue. When you look at what's happening out there, people who are illiterate and do not know what the Koran says are being misled by fiery radicals misrepresenting it. There's a direct correlation.

Three weeks ago a teenager suicide bomber killed over 100 people—a small headline in the press here—in a volleyball area in his home village. What the press didn't emphasize was that that man, that boy, killed two of his brothers and all his friends.

You have to think about that. It's quite different than the Nigerian on the plane to Detroit or the Jordanian who went in and killed our brave CIA colleagues. This is a kid who was completely misled by radio and never went to school, and he killed his own family. That's why this program is so important.

Turning to higher education, we have another \$70 million, so this year it'll be over \$300 million in higher education, to increase enrollment and improve quality through strengthening tertiary institutions, providing scholarships for colleges; \$45 million is going for the Pakistan higher education commission and \$20 million to Fulbrights.

May I add in regard to this money another point. At your direction and the President's direction and Secretary Clinton's direction, we are trying to eliminate the intermediary contracts, which gives us greater flexibility, cuts the overhead. We're throwing away 15 to 25 percent of the money you appropriated for people—it never left the United States or it never left the intermediary NGOs or contractees.

But I don't want to mislead you; 180 million people, \$300 million—this is going to be really tough. The earlier list of countries I referred to—Egypt, Jordan, Turkey—they have a unique oppor-

tunity to also work in the religious educational institutions, which by law we cannot do.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Holbrooke, I just wanted to intervene, because I need to meet with the Foreign Minister for a few minutes privately on a couple of those issues. I would like to be able to get together with you. Are you leaving—when do you leave for London?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Tuesday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. You leave Tuesday morning for London.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Back Friday of next week, and then—

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps it would be possible on Monday we might—let me see what we can arrange—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I'd be delighted here.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. To follow up on some of what we've talked about here.

Again, I want to thank all the members of the team. I know how hard you're all working. There is no issue more important to us than being successful in Pakistan and, obviously, with Afghanistan. So we are grateful to you for that effort.

Senator Casey and then Senator Kaufman, and Senator Lugar is going to chair in that period. I apologize. I need to run to this meeting, but I thank you very, very much.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, sir.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, we're grateful for your testimony here and the great work that you're doing, especially thinking in the larger sense, at a time of real danger around the world and a time of importance to our country you're serving it again. We're grateful for that public service.

You were kind enough to provide a briefing for me with your team. For those who are wondering what those morning meetings are like, it was very businesslike. I think I got a cup of coffee, but that was pretty quick.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator Franken ate every piece of fruit available.

Senator CASEY. I don't remember being offered the fruit. I'll have to try that the next time. [Laughter.]

But you've obviously assembled a great team, and I want to commend their continuing commitment to public service on these important issues.

Let me try to raise at least two issues with you in the time that we have. The first one obviously is very grave and troubling issue for a lot of Americans. When we hear about those who gave, as Lincoln said, the last full measure of devotion, those killed in action, increasingly and disturbingly it's with IEDs.

We know that there's a different treatment really of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer in the two relevant countries. In one place this kind of fertilizer is legal and in the other place it's illegal. In the case of Afghanistan, although it is illegal, and we know, at least I'm told, that the ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer accounts for only 5 percent of the fertilizer in Afghanistan, but it's used in the overwhelming majority of the IED attacks.

What can you tell us—as we talked earlier, I've submitted a letter to Secretary Clinton on this. What can you tell us about efforts made, that you and others have made in the administration to engage the Pakistani Government to help us with this problem where this fertilizer is used to kill or be part of the component parts of the IEDs that kill our soldiers?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Ambassador Patterson and our military people in Islamabad, Admiral LeFevre, have raised this with the Pakistanis on many occasions. I have raised it, too. They claim they're sympathetic, but what can they do; it slips through the borders, of course.

I was very pleased that the ISAF forces in Kandahar discovered that huge cache of ammonium nitrate earlier this year. I read your letter very carefully and we are prepared to come up here and talk at greater detail about it.

Also, Under Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, who has been tasked with the anti-IED mission separate from the ammonium nitrate, is working on various ways to do this.

I'm just given a note here: Karzai just outlawed ammonium nitrate, banning import, production, transportation, sale, use and storage of the fertilizer today. It was my understanding it was already banned, so maybe he reissued it or tightened it. But let me check on what that's about.

If we could reschedule a separate briefing for you and any colleagues who are interested in accordance with your letter to Secretary Clinton, I would be happy to do so. It's a huge issue and I'm very grateful to you for highlighting it.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You know the amount of ammonium nitrate that they captured in that one bust in Kandahar was equal to 1½ years at the current use of IEDs using ammonium nitrate. And they must have had a lot more, because they're still doing it. But that was a big, big haul and it must have set them back. But imagine what that was, and that was a warehouse right in the city of Kandahar. So it was a stunning event.

Senator CASEY. I appreciate the attention to this that you've brought, and I want to commend Secretary Clinton, not only in isolation on this issue, but more generally with the way she's approached committing the resources that you and your team have been able to take advantage of.

I wanted to raise one more question before my time is up, with regard to Pakistan and in particular President Zardari's government. Obviously, even a casual observer in the United States of the challenge that both countries pose for us, both security and governance and otherwise, has to be concerned about the stability of both governments. I wanted to get your sense or your assessment really currently of President Karzai's government in terms of just the day-by-day functioning of that government. The concern that I have and others have is if he is in any way weakened over time, and some of that because of internal politics and rulings by their court system, if he is in any way weakened and therefore the Pakistani People's Party is weakened, that will downgrade or deteriorate their ability to go after the extremists and the terrorists that we're trying to put pressure on ourselves, as well as I know the great ef-

fort that the Pakistani Army, General Kiyani and others, have put forth already.

So I wanted to just get your kind of general assessment of the government and how he's doing, President Zardari, as their President.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We saw President Zardari in Lahore during this trip, and I emphasize that it was in Lahore because he had embarked on a barnstorming tour of the country, which is well described in today's New York Times in an outstanding article by Sabrina Tavernezi. He had gone to Baluchistan, Lahore, Karachi. I think he went to several other places. He was clearly revitalized and reenergized by that experience.

Now, in regard to the larger issue, I got in a little bit of hot water because I started talking about the internal political situation in what I thought were analytical terms in a recent interview, and people immediately dissected it in ways which were not what I intended nor what I said. But then we had to correct. So I want to be very careful, Senator.

We support the civilian democratically elected Government of Pakistan. Internal discussions about how power is distributed and legal—and changes in accordance with the law is something for Pakistan and we do not want to infringe on their sovereignty.

As far as the military goes, they have conducted excellent military operations recently, as I said earlier. They are facing a multitude of problems. Secretary Gates was in Islamabad today talking to them. I do not yet have a report on his meetings.

But I just cannot stress any other point except that the Kerry-Lugar bill was specifically designed to give the civilian government more resources on the civilian side, without in any way reducing the military. I think that that's an important statement of the will of your Chamber and of the executive branch.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Casey.

Senator Kaufman.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke, for your service to the country, and to your team. Every interaction I've had with members of your team has been a positive one. You have assembled a fine group of professionals and I want to thank them for what they do every day.

You talked a little about communications strategy. Is there anything else you want to talk about in terms of what you're doing in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. With Chairman Lugar's permission, could I ask if Vikram Singh and Ashley—I don't know if this is allowed, Senator, but could they respond briefly to the Senator's question?

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you.

Vikram, Ashley, why don't you give a quick response. Just rise.

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Senator Kaufman, Mr. Chairman.

Can you guys hear me without the mike?

In both Afghanistan and in Pakistan, we really found that we had a fairly traditional approach to public relations and communications overall. What we've started to do over the last year is to really revamp that entirely. In both countries we've created strong, unified teams inside the Embassy to look at all related communications issues, not just public relations meeting in one place and exchanges and people-to-people stuff being in another place, but somebody who is pulling everything together and who is focusing on what it takes in those countries to counter the pernicious influence of enemy propaganda, basically the ability of the militants in both countries to directly communicate and very actively communicate to populations who in general are either not reached by much other media or simply don't have a lot to choose from in what they're able to listen to.

So we're working very hard to increase the reach of communications throughout those countries. So that is getting cellphones, radio broadcast, television broadcast out into areas that are really untouched. Both countries have pretty robust media environments, but they don't get out to a lot of the areas that are of most concern to us and where the militancy really has its roots.

We're also working with the Afghans and Pakistanis to support programming and other content that will be relevant to and will actually be meaningful to the people in those areas. So we reach out to them on the airways.

Then we're really leveraging new technologies, so we're looking in both these countries, it's remarkable. Afghanistan had really no telephones in 2002. Over 50 percent of Afghans now have access to cell phones. They use things like SMS. They play games on their cell phones. Even with a low literacy rate, people use their literate cousin or their literate relative to send messages back and forth.

So we're looking at things like Mobile Money—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Could you mention our experiment with payments for the police, because that addresses your concerns on attrition and desertion as well.

Mr. SINGH. We're looking at things like Mobile Money, and the pilot for that is actually a program with the Afghan National Police. One of the key problems for the police is they get their money in cash, which leaves them liable to be robbed or to have money skimmed off the top as it flows down. It also means that to get it to their families they have to get home, and often they'll be gone for a week at a time every month to carry the money home to their families.

Mobile payments actually allow the funds to be on a cellphone. The pilot was very successful and is now being expanded actually, really with the leadership of the Treasury Department and my colleague right next to me is a big part of trying to make this work. It's going to be expanded to additional ministries throughout the course of this year.

When that happens, they get their full pay, and many policemen noted in the studies that were done after the pilot, noted that they didn't know how much they were actually paid. They all thought they were paid about 30 percent less than what they got, because it wasn't all making it to them. And it means they don't have to take off and you don't have the problem of ghost soldiers.

We're also just trying to help foster communities through these new technologies, so that people can share information, be it about criminality, about incidents on the road, about attacks, or just about farming, market prices in areas that farmers take their goods to market. So it's a range of things, Senator, and obviously I can only touch on a few here for you. But there's just really a lot going on and it's a very exciting area.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We have in fiscal year 2010, we have \$50 million for Pakistan and \$90 million for Afghanistan in these programs. But that way understates what we're going to spend because a lot of—there's much more money in the Pentagon budget. We are working very closely with Admiral Smith on this program, and we have just recruited our civilian coordinator for this, who some of you may remember, David Ensor, former ABC–CNN correspondent, who is going to be out there within a few weeks to coordinate this program. I think we might ask him to come up and call on some of you before he goes, if you wish.

Senator KAUFMAN. Are you coordinating this with the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Voice of America, or Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Very much so, very much so. In fact, perhaps not in this session, but there are a couple of items to bring to your attention in that regard, some good news actually, for a change.

Senator KAUFMAN. And while they have a robust media environment in Pakistan, I think historically they've not let international broadcasters on. They've really controlled who gets on the air. I think this is a government-to-government thing. I've often felt that one of the things we should do in Pakistan is allowing the broadcasters to be on the air so that people can hear it.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, Voice of America has been functional in Pakistan.

Senator KAUFMAN. It's functional, but it's not on the proper stations that people listen to. There aren't affiliates in their—the Pakistan National Broadcasting I don't think broadcasts anything from Voice of America. So in these areas distribution is really, really, really key. As I say, it's a robust market, but we've had a real problem over the years getting onto the networks, the radio stations, and the TV stations that people watch.

So to the extent that you can negotiate with the Pakistan Government, I know that would be helpful.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, I totally agree with that. I would, however, say that in the end the fight—the information war is what this fight is all about—when they kill people, suicide bombings and so on, it isn't for the actual event. It's for their view of its value. I think they've misjudged the Pakistani people, incidentally. But that is the problem, and to deal with it you need local voices.

When we were in Swat a few days ago, Senator, and we met with the leaders, every single person said that radio was the vehicle through which Faisullah had terrorized Swat. It was right out of the history books on Rwanda 1994. He would broadcast the names of people he's going to behead, the next day he would terrorize the

population. That it seems to me is exhibit A for the importance of this issue.

But once again, nothing on it was being done on this a year ago. So it's a work in progress. Admiral Mullen and I went out there. He put into place Admiral Smith. We got David Ensor.

But I would just say that I think the backlash against the excesses of a person like Faisullah are going to end up taking them down. It's just going to be a very painful struggle. If we leave the airwaves uncontested—and by “airwaves,” you start with radio in those areas—the price will be enormous.

Senator KAUFMAN. I couldn't agree with you more. The other example is Serbia, where Milosevic did exactly the same thing, and we won the battle of airwaves there. At the end of that, when the people were on the streets, you know how effective Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty was.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We were able to broadcast from the air through Commander Solo and other factors. That technology is not—it's there, but we can't use it as easily in Pakistan. In Afghanistan we don't need it. We can broadcast from other places.

Senator KAUFMAN. In Afghanistan we have great listenerships. I was just saying, in Pakistan we don't need Commander Solo. The problem is because they have a robust media; what we have to do is make sure that our message gets onto the local affiliates that people listen to, radio and television stations that the people use and listen to. And we can do that, and I think it's a government to government. The only reason they're going to let us on there is because you talk to President Zardari and he says OK.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you for your patience in waiting to the end to ask very important questions.

Senator KAUFMAN. It's a thing you learn when you're a junior.

Senator LUGAR. We especially thank Ambassador Holbrooke and Minister Miliband, and we thank the members of his staff for coming today and being a part of this hearing. We appreciate the very large public response. As you have noticed during the last 2½ hours, a great number of persons have come because they feel this is important, just as we do.

So we thank all of you for this investment of time, and we will do our best to use this information.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:29 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

Despite the series of conferences since Bonn in 2001, no clear institutional framework for Afghanistan's nation-building and reconstruction has emerged. Despite international consensus and goodwill the United Nations has yet to play a strategic coordinating role in Afghanistan. UNAMA challenges continue since the election debacle and the extension of parliamentary elections by at least 4 months as well as the near term departure of Kai Eide. Overlapping mandates, competitive relations, and minimal accountability for performance have hampered and diminished positive impact of international partners.

Question. Past conferences have delivered vague and unrealized commitments and merely plans to build frameworks for cooperation. How will the London Conference differ?

Answer. The London Conference on Afghanistan focused on supporting the Government of Afghanistan's leadership in key areas, including development planning. The Government of Afghanistan has developed an interagency process of ministry "clusters" to set priorities and guide donor assistance. The U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is supporting these efforts, including by revitalizing the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) as a venue for coordination between the ministry clusters and donors. Building a cooperative framework with the Government of Afghanistan at its center, supported by UNAMA and others, is more robust and sustainable than previous coordination efforts.

Question. What specific policies or actions has or will the Government of Afghanistan taken that implement President Karzai's rhetoric of reform at his inauguration?

Answer. The Afghan Government's most significant anticorruption achievements in the past 18 months have been the creation of: (1) the Major-Crimes Task Force, a multimilitary initiative responsible for investigating corruption, kidnapping, and organized crime cases and preparing them for prosecution; (2) an Anti-Corruption Unit of prosecutors within the Attorney General's Office; and (3) an Anti-Corruption Tribunal of specially vetted judges to oversee high-profile cases. Additionally, the Afghan Government recently announced that the Cabinet has approved a bill that will enable the prosecution and trial of government ministers and judges. This action will take away a rationale occasionally cited by prosecutors for not pursuing ministerial-level corruption cases. We support all of these initiatives and continue to raise corruption issues in our discussions with Afghan officials.

Question. What specific framework will the international community now use and how does it integrate with the Afghan Government in Kabul and in the provinces?

Answer. The United States has led a concerted effort to strengthen international coordination through existing and new mechanisms. In Washington, the office of the Special Representative chairs monthly meetings of the SRAP Washington Liaison Group of the more than 30 countries who have appointed Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan to share U.S. views on Afghanistan and Pakistan. German Special Representative Steiner has assumed the chair of quarterly international meetings of Special Representatives, in which Ambassador Holbrooke participates.

In Kabul, coordination among leading international representatives—UNSRSG Staffan de Mistura, NATO Senior Civilian Representative Mark Sedwill, and EU Special Representative Vygaudas Usackas—has grown stronger. Donor and political representatives in Kabul meet frequently and informally to share information on projects and programs. Kabul's primary formal coordination mechanism is the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), which is chaired by the Afghan Minister of Finance and the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General. The JCMB is the central platform for strategic coordination, joint policy formulation, problem-solving, and mutual accountability between the Afghan Government and the international community. It also ensures consistency with the Afghan National Development Strategy. The JCMB includes 7 members of the Afghan Government and 21 representatives of the international community. The Afghan Government has used the London conference to lay out its priorities for development assistance and to take responsibility for donor coordination. It is being supported by UNAMA and by other donors, including by our advisers in the ministries.

Question. What sectors will relief efforts focus on?

Answer. Relief efforts will focus on the areas most critical to promoting stability. Achieving this objective will require a multifaceted approach that:

- Establishes human security through credible systems of justice and law enforcement, as well as a path toward reintegration and reconciliation, all the while respecting human rights especially those of women and children;
- Increases licit economic opportunity through agriculture, entrepreneurship, and responsible natural resource extraction;
- Enables economic activity through transportation infrastructure, affordable energy, and progressive trade and commerce regimes;
- Fosters governance and sovereignty through independent revenue generation, a capable civil service, and means to discourage corruption; and
- Improves education and public health.

Question. How will responsibilities/efforts be divided among various donors in critical sectors?

Answer. The Government of Afghanistan is assuming greater responsibility for donor coordination, including by setting priorities and cochairing the JCMB and its standing committees. It is also seeking to improve financial management so that a greater percentage of donor assistance can be channeled through budget mechanisms, such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). Contributions made through budgetary mechanisms allow for clear divisions of international efforts, while leaving responsibility with the Government of Afghanistan.

Question. What benchmarks will be used to measure progress in each sector?

Answer. The Afghanistan Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, issued by Secretary Clinton and endorsed by Secretary Gates, outlines milestones for evaluating the progress of USG programs in each sector. Additionally, the National Security Staff has organized and implemented a comprehensive system of metrics for tracing the results of our implementation efforts.

Question. Who or what entity will lead on general economic reconstruction for Afghanistan and from what organization and location?

Answer. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) is in the lead for general economic reconstruction in Afghanistan, with support from USAID, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and other international partners. The primary planning document for addressing Afghan development needs is the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). In order to focus implementation of the ANDS and improve coherence amongst various line ministries, the GIROA established clusters grouping relevant ministries under a senior ministry. The Ministry of Mines is in charge of the Economic and Infrastructure Development Cluster, which oversees economic reconstruction efforts by the Ministries of Transport and Civil Aviation, Public Works, Energy and Water, Commerce and Industry, Communication and IT, and Urban Development.

At the same time, the clustered ministries will continue to intersect with the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), a multistakeholder, international coordination body officially tasked with overseeing ANDS implementation (the JCMB includes both Afghan Government officials and major international donors). The Office of Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Assistance at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul will remain a central point for harmonizing and prioritizing U.S. development activity.

Question. Will the recent meetings of Friends of Pakistan group recognize and associate progress in the one country as essential to the other? Do the Friends, and Pakistan, concur that progress in one strengthens progress in the other?

Answer. The Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP) was launched in September 2008 to galvanize international support behind the new democratically elected Government of Pakistan. The FODP has since developed into a policy and donor coordination mechanism for countries to work together and with government institutions to address challenges like post-conflict reconstruction in the Malakand division of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa or Pakistans energy crisis. The United Nations has played a key role in organizing FODP activities in Islamabad.

While the FODP itself is focused only on Pakistan, all 26 participants in the Group of Friends also are deeply engaged in Afghanistan and other regional fora, including as coalition partners or as members of the Special Representatives Contact Group. These partners understand that the futures of Afghanistan and Pakistan are interconnected but also recognize that each country faces a unique set of challenges that must be addressed individually. Thus, international coordination efforts in Pakistan reinforce international efforts in Afghanistan while addressing the core needs of the people of Pakistan.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

There are innovative structures for organization of our Embassies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, incorporating former ambassadors and senior diplomats, in order to deliver more comprehensive and responsive foreign assistance to achieve United States goals. These structures are relatively unclear in their organization and purpose.

Question. How have these structures improved the management and delivery of U.S. assistance to date? How are they intended to achieve better results than in the past?

Answer. The new structure, particularly the creation of the Coordinating Directorate for Development and Economic Assistance (CDDEA), has better linked civilian efforts with military efforts to achieve the administration's goals in Afghanistan. The CDDEA, under the direction of Ambassador Eikenberry, has supervisory responsibility to ensure that all interagency and economic development programs are fully integrated and working in sync. The CDDEA oversees the work of 14 sections and agencies at the Embassy. These include the economic and development agencies USAID, USDA, Treasury, FAA, Transportation and the State Department economic section. It also oversees a subgroup of entities consisting of the development and assistance portions of the rule of law section and law enforcement agencies, including Justice, DEA, FBI, Marshals Service, DHS, and INL. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border coordinator and the Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) office also report to CDDEA. CDDEA has succeeded in increasing coordination, reducing stove-piping, and better assuring that development supports U.S. foreign policy and a "whole of government" approach.

Outside of Kabul, the Embassy has created five senior civilian representatives (SCRs), matching the five regional ISAF commands. Below them are civilian representatives at the task force, provincial, and district levels which report up to the SCRs who in turn report to the Embassy. Additionally, the Ambassador, the Deputy Ambassador, the Assistant Chief of Mission, the CDDEA and a new rule of law Ambassador oversee 14 working groups, each focusing on a specific policy goal.

Question. While expanding our military presence in Afghanistan and our training and equipping efforts in Pakistan we are also providing significant additional foreign assistance to improve the civilian partner effort of a civil-military equation. What integrating mechanism exists and what military personnel are incorporated in the civilian planning and implementation of our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Answer. In Afghanistan, the U.S. Embassy and ISAF are implementing a fully integrated civilian-military strategy. The strategy was developed by a joint civ-mil team consisting of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and Embassy Kabul personnel. Lines of effort and operation are coordinated at every level—from the top in Kabul to the regional commands to provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to district support teams (DSTs) on the front lines of the war effort. For instance, our whole of government agriculture program includes USAID-administered programs that are increasingly implemented through the Afghan Government at the subnational level. These programs and capacity-building are facilitated by USAID and USDA advisers deployed to PRTs and DSTs in the field, which include military and civilian personnel. These civilian personnel also work closely with the National Guard's Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs). Similarly, our whole of government counternarcotics strategy brings to bear the expertise of DEA civilian personnel, law enforcement, financial intelligence experts (both civilian and military), and international military forces focused on interdiction of illicit items including heroin and precursor chemicals.

In Pakistan, our overall goal is to build the capacity of the Pakistani civilian government to be able to provide for the needs of the Pakistani people. By building capacity and helping Pakistan address its immediate energy, water, and related economic crises, we will help put Pakistan on a path toward sustainable job creation and economic growth, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani stability. This mission is especially challenging in the conflict-affected areas of Pakistan, where the security situation fluctuates greatly from place to place and day to day, but remains of utmost importance. We realize that humanitarian and stabilization assistance must go hand-in-hand with longer term capacity-building of Pakistani entities, such as the FATA Secretariat; without both we will not be able to hold cleared areas and start the process toward sustainable, civilian-led service delivery.

While we prioritize working through civilian entities where possible, there are also windows of opportunity to provide community stabilization and humanitarian assistance via the U.S. military, who can reach insecure areas where civilians do not have access. Through several programs, we are building the capability of the Pakistani security forces to provide post combat/conflict humanitarian relief. We also frequently discuss with Pakistani security forces the importance of integrating civilian personnel in their counterinsurgency planning, and helping civilian personnel access insecure areas. The Pakistani security forces have demonstrated their understanding of the important role the civilian government plays in long-term development, and have begun to better coordinate with the Political Agent, the FATA Secretariat, USAID, State Department personnel, and Department of Defense personnel to provide security and access to civilian personnel.

More broadly, Ambassador Holbrooke and General Petraeus have cohosted a series of intensive, day-long civ-mil coordination sessions to review all civ-mil plans for Afghanistan and Pakistan. These sessions featured joint presentations by civilian and military officials in charge of implementing programs on the ground in both countries.

Question. To whom does the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan report?

Answer. The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan reports to the President of the United States through the Secretary of State. He is a standing member of all senior-level Afghanistan and Pakistan policy bodies, including the National Security Council, the Principals Committee, and the Deputies Committee.

Question. To whom do the U.S. Ambassador for Pakistan and Ambassador for Afghanistan report?

Answer. The U.S. Ambassadors to Pakistan and Afghanistan report to the President of the United States through the Secretary of State and the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The reporting chain to the President through the Secretary of State is clearly established in Presidential guidance issued to each U.S. Ambassador posted across the globe.

Question. To whom do the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan and the USAID Mission Director for Pakistan report?

Answer. The USAID Mission Directors in both Embassies report to the Chief of Mission, through the respective U.S. Coordinators and Deputy Chiefs of Mission.

Question. To whom do the Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs in Afghanistan and the U.S. Coordinator for Economic and Development Assistance in Pakistan report?

Answer. The Coordinating Directors for Development and Economic Affairs in both countries report to the Chief of Mission, through the respective Deputy Chief of Mission.

Question. What steps have been taken by the State Department to properly organize to meet the criteria for assumption of the Pakistan Counter-Insurgency Capabilities Fund authority (PCCF)?

Answer. We are continuing to develop our oversight and management procedures for PCCF to preserve the flexibility and agility needed to support the requirements in the field. Both State and DOD are committed to the successful implementation of PCCF as a State Department-managed program in FY 2011, with the goal being a seamless transition of the program. A major difference in the management of PCCF will be increased State Department oversight and involvement throughout the execution process, which will ensure that this major assistance program aligns with our broader foreign policy objectives in Pakistan. DOD will continue to be the primary program implementer. We are currently engaged in discussions with DOD over how best to manage PCCF so that it preserves the flexibility and agility needed to support requirements in the field.

Question. When do you expect State to assume responsibilities for administering the PCCF?

Answer. In line with the agreement between Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, conveyed in their May 2009 joint testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, PCF was to be provided to DOD in FY 2009, to State in FY 2010, but with a direct pass through of funds to DOD, and in FY 2011, to be a fully State-managed program.

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (SRAP) AND COUNTRY TEAM COORDINATION

One of the challenges I have long sought to improve in our policy development has been the voice of the Ambassador and Country Team in Washington policy determinations. There is a critical, operational, and local perspective that must inform our policies. I understand you have assembled a fine 40-person team in Washington, in the Office of the Special Representative.

Question. What mechanisms are in place or planned to integrate field perspectives in decisions regarding Afghanistan and regarding Pakistan?

Answer. Both Chiefs of Mission participate via video teleconference in all NSC meetings, Principals Committee meetings, and Deputies Committee meetings on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Special Representative, key members of the Special Representative's office, and the country desks are in frequent communication with

the ambassadors and country teams in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Field views are sought on all key policy issues. Expert teams in Washington and the field collaborate closely on policy development.

Question. It is no surprise that there are tensions between HQ and the field, as they are evident in most situations. How are you dealing with these, apparently strong, concerns from the field in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan?

Answer. Maximizing communications, including through regular face-to-face video teleconferences and visits, helps to manage tensions that arise from the devotion, in the field and in Washington, to the success of the President's strategy and the obvious challenges to our efforts. In addition to frequent informal and formal engagements at lower levels, the weekly Deputies Committee process, which includes Ambassadors in Kabul and Pakistan by secure video teleconference, provide regular, frequent opportunities for frank exchanges of views, complemented by monthly Principals and National Security Council meetings—all of which include participation from ambassadors in the field.

Question. How are you ensuring Washington supports the Country Team and that your hard-working staff is maintaining close and collaborative working relationships with the field?

Answer. As is the case with any Embassy, Washington-based personnel are in frequent and close contact with their field counterparts. They participate in a variety of regular video-teleconferences and teleconferences and exchange daily communications via phone, e-mail, and front channel cables. Washington-based experts also travel frequently to the field to support Country Team implementation efforts.

Question. How does the SRAP office coordinate with the SCA Bureau and U.S. Embassy Country Teams in India and Central Asian countries?

Answer. The Special Representative's senior deputy is dual-hatted as the Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) of State for South-Central Asian Affairs in charge of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this way, the DAS reports both to the Special Representative and the Assistant Secretary of State for South-Central Asian Affairs. The Afghanistan and Pakistan desks located in the SCA Bureau report to the DAS for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Central Asia Desk reports to the DAS for Central Asian Affairs. The SRAP office coordinates with the Country Teams in India and Central Asia like any other office in the State Department—through the country desks, SCA Bureau front office, and through official communications with Chiefs of Missions, as appropriate.

Question. The creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Development (S/CRS), responsible for the organization and deployment of civilian government personnel to conflict areas and as partners for our military is a long developing and encouraging development.

- How has the SRAP office helped to improve the utility of the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction at the State Department?

Answer. The SRAP office's primary mission is to support development and implementation of the administration's Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. In the course of regular business, S/SRAP and S/SCRS have worked closely on several AfPak policy issues. SRAP has encouraged S/CRS contributions to the Afghanistan and Pakistan effort, and been very satisfied with them, in a number of important ways, including: deploying a long-term, senior-led team to Kabul to support the 2009 Presidential elections; deploying civ-mil planners to Kabul to support development of the integrated civ-mil campaign plan; and deploying civilian experts to Kabul to support the Embassy's new civ-mil communications efforts. We will continue to rely on S/CRS and the Civilian Response Corps to support crucial functions in the Afghan mission.

Question. Is SRAP making appropriate use of S/CRS resources and expertise? How will it do so going forward?

Answer. SRAP frequently sought the resources and expertise in S/CRS. A close working relationship to identify how best S/CRS can contribute has resulted in a number of vital S/CRS deployments in Afghanistan, including those listed above. We will continue to rely on S/CRS and the Civilian Response Corps to support crucial functions in the Afghan mission. More broadly, we will remain in close contact with S/CRS to ensure the best appropriate use of its resources, which will contribute to the effort in Afghanistan as well as the further development of S/CRS.

Question. Given the clear necessity in Afghanistan and Pakistan of a civilian response capacity, how has the SRAP office worked to strengthen the nascent S/CRS

component Civilian Response Corps (CRC) which is standing up to build our civilian response capacity?

Answer. SRAP supports S/CRS and the CRC, as demonstrated by the various critical targeted activities that they have undertaken on behalf of the Afghan mission. We will also continue to rely on this important civilian capacity in the future. We are also sharing lessons learned from our oversight of the increase in civilian staffing with S/CRS in an effort to assist them in the standup of the CRC. Individuals who participate in the civilian increase are also made aware of the CRC and given the opportunity to add their name to the standby component roles. In several instances, S/CRS has helped identify personnel to fill positions with specialized skills.

Question. Has the rapid deployment of civilians over the last year, completely depleted the ready pool of potential civilians? What are the most significant obstacles to identifying, preparing, and deploying civilians to Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Answer. The rapid deployment of civilians over the last year has not depleted the pool of potential civilians. The State Department's Bureau of Human Resources closely tracks staffing needs in the Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Its current assessment is that the proposed staffing levels for Afghanistan and Pakistan, both Foreign Service and temporary direct hires, are sustainable. The most significant obstacle to deploying civilians to Pakistan and Afghanistan is matching employee specific skill sets to job requirements. Another significant concern is maintaining continuity and limiting staffing gaps. We are encouraging employees to volunteer for longer than the established 1-year tour, and exploring options to leverage area and job expertise by establishing hybrid tours; e.g., a year on the country desk followed by a year in country, or an 18-month tour in country followed by a 6-month stint as a trainer.

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN REGIONAL STABILIZATION STRATEGY

Question. The strategy that you introduced for rollout at the January 21 SFRC hearing reiterates general plans to expand U.S. diplomatic, economic and political efforts in those two countries. Considerable additional information is necessary to help inform Americans of our efforts to meet President Obama's goals for 2011.

- Provide a recent benchmark for each of the milestones listed in the strategy.

Answer. We measure our progress against the milestones according to the explicitly or implicitly stated benchmark contained in virtually all of the milestones. We will report on progress against the milestones later this year. We provide below a few illustrative examples of milestones and their benchmarks:

- "Nearly 1,000 civilian experts deployed by early 2010" will be measured by counting the number of deployed civilians.
- "Significantly and rapidly expand employment opportunities in the agricultural sector quarter by quarter" is measured by agriculture-related job creation.
- "Afghan Subnational Governance Policy approved and implemented, including provision of additional resources to provincial officials" is measured by the approval of the Afghan policy and provision of resources to support that policy.

Separately, the administration, through the National Security Staff, has organized and implemented a comprehensive system of metrics for tracking the results of our implementation efforts. That effort is designed to be much more detailed. It includes specific measures of progress across all USG efforts, whereas the milestones in the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy focus on higher level measures of progress for the civilian strategy.

Question. How do you ensure inclusive deliberation from our Country Teams in this strategy formulation? How will you ensure the discussion within your SRAP office is informed directly by the voices of the respective Ambassadors, Mission Directors, Working Groups, ISAF, and associated staff in regional command field offices? What mechanisms have you established to ensure that inclusive discussion?

Answer. The Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy was reviewed and approved by the Chiefs of Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was also reviewed and approved by Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, USAID Administrator Shah, National Security Advisor General Jones, CIA Director Panetta, and other senior administration officials. At the experts-level, it was thoroughly reviewed by the 10 civilian departments and agencies involved in implementing our policies on the ground. It is a living document and will be updated to reflect the dynamic nature of events on the ground and major USG programs designed to implement the President's Strategy.

Question. What is the status of the planning and implementation process for the strategy? Has the strategy been circulated and commented upon by our Country Teams and by the military? How does the strategy align with our military strategy? How do other nations efforts align with our strategy?

Answer. The Stabilization Strategy reflects the civ-mil priorities of our civilian and military teams on the ground. Our civilians are implementing the key initiatives outlined in the strategy. As noted in response to a previous question, the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy was reviewed and approved by the Chiefs of Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was further reviewed and approved by Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, USAID Administrator Shah, National Security Advisor General Jones, CIA Director Panetta, and other senior administration officials. At the experts-level, it was thoroughly reviewed by the 10 civilian departments and agencies involved in implementing our policies on the ground.

Question. A long and thorough review of our Afghanistan and Pakistan policy began in the last year of the previous administration. This process continued through President Obama's announcement in December of a new civil-military approach. These deliberative processes often caused delays and indecision.

- During this now post-review operational phase, please indicate what steps you will take to ensure that implementation is not unduly delayed by overly long decision and approval processes.

Answer. The National Security Staff chairs weekly Deputies Committee meetings focused on implementation. The Principals meet at least once a month to discuss implementation, and the President chairs a monthly meeting to assess implementation. Additionally, the Secretary of State provides the President with weekly and monthly reports on implementation. The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan chairs and a representative of the National Security Staff cochairs a weekly meeting with more than 75 essential personnel involved in policy implementation. All of these mechanisms are aimed to ensure timely decisionmaking, coordination, and implementation.

Moreover, the unique structure of the SRAP office, with representatives from all of the major departments and agencies contributing to the civilian effort, facilitates accelerated coordination of policy, decisionmaking, and implementation by eliminating stove-piping of efforts.

Question. Indicate which USG agencies and/or officials will have principal responsibility for implementing each element of the strategy.

Answer. The Secretary of State leads the overall implementation of the civilian effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our new civilian strategy knocks down stove-pipes and encourages integration of efforts between agencies along major lines of effort. This integration and the role of each USG agency is outlined in the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy.

Question. Provide a notional timeline that identifies the intended implementation of programs by sector as well as prospective parallel Afghan deliverables associated with each.

Answer. The Stabilization Strategy identifies the key initiatives intended to be implemented in each sector. The milestones in the Stabilization Strategy provide a measure of anticipated results, usually within a certain timeframe. Since many of these programs are being implemented increasingly through, or in conjunction with, the Afghan Government, the ultimate "Afghan deliverable" will be increased Afghan capacity to assume responsibility for efforts. This will take more time in some areas than others. Our ultimate goal is to empower the Afghan Government at all levels so that it is in the strongest possible position to take advantage of improved security facilitated through the military strategy. (NOTE: We have recently provided to SFRC staff 16 detailed, sector-by-sector briefings covering these issues in greater depth, as well as spend plans.)

Question. What specific next steps will follow from the Stabilization Strategy?

- How does this strategy specifically relate to the deployment of military personnel to RC South and RC East? How does it integrate with efforts in RC North, West and Central? Provide an organizational chart for civilians and military in the RC regions.

Answer. As noted on page iii of the Stabilization Strategy, our civilian personnel "contribute to the mission in the field, especially in the East and South where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and where many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by President Obama on December 1, 2009, will deploy." The strat-

egy reflects the fully integrated civ-mil plan developed in the field and synchronized by Ambassador Holbrooke and General Petraeus.

- What specific correlation and activities does this strategy dictate for our PRT operations and those of our partner nations? What changes will occur?

Answer. As described in the section of the strategy titled “Deploying Additional Civilian Expertise,” a priority of the civilian surge has been to increase civilian expertise in the field, including at Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), District Support Teams (DSTs), and other platforms. The position of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative has been established to ensure improved civilian unity of effort between our ISAF allies and partners. The priorities identified in the Stabilization Strategy reflect broad priorities agreed at the London Conference and will inform donors’ priorities and efforts. Among these, there will be an increased focus on support for improved subnational governance and rebuilding Afghanistan’s agriculture sector, especially in the East and South.

Question. The establishment of U.S. Consulates in Afghanistan and the transition from Provincial Reconstruction Teams provides additional opportunities for the stationing of civilians further afield in order to sustain U.S. efforts in partnership with Afghans. Please provide a description or map of the location and number of USG civilians in Afghanistan.

- Please describe their purpose and their home agency affiliation and identify their Afghan institutional counterpart—i.e., Federal Ministry/Provincial Governor/District Council.

Answer. There are more than 1,050 USG civilian personnel deployed to Afghanistan, with more than 300 deployed alongside our military personnel on the front lines. The specific locations of USG civilian and military personnel on the ground is sensitive for security reasons. The mix of civilian experts in each location varies over time to accommodate changes in the local environment and to address the evolving needs of an area. For example, civilian DEA personnel routinely rotate between the field and Kabul, depending on their mission. Generally, most civ-mil platforms have at least one State officer and one USAID officer, and frequently more than that.

Question. Your testimony and the Stabilization Strategy document describe the intent to channel significantly more USG resources through host government entities in an attempt to improve their functional capacity and to reduce overhead costs lost through other methods. The United States has limited information on the internal operations of government ministries in Pakistan and Afghanistan and what it does have raises real and obvious concerns for oversight.

- Please provide a specific description of how the United States plans to work with Pakistan to channel assistance, as has been described, through government entities. Please use the education sector as an example to describe the planning, distribution, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms that will safeguard U.S. resources.

Answer. We have taken significant steps to encourage long-term Pakistani ownership of development programs through expanded direct financing of the Government of Pakistan’s budgets or internal project planning processes. Doing so ensures that our assistance builds capacity within the Government of Pakistan to continue to provide for the Pakistani people. USAID, leading the implementation of this strategy, is adopting best practices to foster better management and administrative capacity-building of Pakistani institutions, including through counterpart contributions by recipients of USG funding, requirements that recipients budget for future costs (e.g., building maintenance) associated with USG-funded projects, and community participation. In FY 2010 we anticipate providing approximately 50 percent of assistance through federal and provincial agencies.

In education specifically, we are investing in programs that have a track-record of results in Pakistan. In basic education, our programs are increasing enrollment and improving the quality of education by providing stipends to families to encourage school attendance, especially for girls; refurbishing and improving facilities of existing schools; and continuing to improve teacher training programs. This funding will be provided directly to provincial agencies in Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab and KP through fixed amount reimbursable agreements and other direct assistance mechanisms.

We have also teamed up with the United Kingdom-Pakistan Education Task Force to press for structural reforms, tailored by province, that are essential to bring momentum to the basic education sector.

In higher education, the majority of assistance is provided through direct support to the Higher Education Commission (HEC). USAID has audited HEC and certified it for direct funding based on the determination that HEC's procurement operations and financial controls meet our accountability standards. A USAID program officer has been assigned to provide technical oversight and there is routine interaction between USAID and HEC on planning and implementation of our activities. Additional oversight is provided through international technical specialists contracted through the mission for HEC, Pakistani universities and entities that support higher education.

Direct assistance to HEC supports: 800 in-country scholarships, 100 professional exchanges, linkages between 10 Pakistan and U.S. universities, and establishment of Career Development Systems and Centers. Scholarships are 4-year undergraduate and 2-year graduate level awards in the fields of agriculture and business administration at Pakistan universities. Scholarships cover all expenses associated with study, including tuition, fees, books and materials, lodging, and stipends. A monitoring and evaluation process, overseen by the USAID technical officer, is in place to validate these results.

USAID is also supporting HEC policy reform and institutional capacity-building by providing technical assistance in the financial aid and institutional development areas. We are supporting the establishment of viable financial aid development offices at 11 universities to further strengthen the transparency and monitoring of scholarships. These offices assist in managing scholarship funds and in raising funds through providing skills for establishing public-private partnerships toward university development.

Question. Please provide a specific description of how the United States plans to work with Afghanistan to channel assistance, as has been described, through government entities. Please use the health sector as an example to describe the planning, distribution, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms that will safeguard U.S. resources.

Answer. The following describes how we will channel assistance through the Government of Afghanistan in the health sector:

- *Capacity-Building*—Since May 2003, USAID has provided technical assistance to the MOPH through the USAID Afghanistan Rural Expansion of Afghanistan Community Based Health Care (REACH). This longstanding capacity building has strengthened the Ministry's procurement, project management and financial management capabilities.
- *Certification and Assessment*—Before a project may utilize host country contracting, the Mission Director must certify that the procurement operations and financial controls within the relevant Ministry are sufficient to carry out the procurement actions, from solicitation to audit and closeout, in accordance with USAID standards and procedures. Over the past year, the Mission Contracting, Financial and Legal offices have conducted multiple assessments of the procurement and financial procedures, practices, capacities and controls in the MOPH Grants and Contracts Management Unit (GCMU). These assessments resulted in reports concluding that the GCMU is equipped and capable of managing procurements in accordance with USAID requirements. The Mission Director certified that the Ministry has sufficient procurement and financial management capabilities to carry out the procurement actions in accordance with USAID procedures.
- *Approval of Contracting Actions*—All key contracting actions (including the notice to FedBizOpps, solicitation, prequalified offerors (if any), selection method, award decision, administration actions and contract modifications) must be approved by the USAID mission. This enables the mission to observe and mentor the host-country procurement staff while safeguarding the U.S. funds.
- *Advance and Liquidation Mode of Payment*—The payment mechanism will be monthly cash advances and liquidations. Advances shall be limited to the minimum amounts needed to meet current disbursement needs (generally 30 days) and shall be scheduled so that the funds are available to the Ministry as close as is administratively feasible to the actual disbursements for program costs. The Mission Office of Financial Management (OFM) is providing training to the GCMU on the process. Full supporting documentation for the advance and liquidation requests will be required by OFM for the first three months and subsequently if needed. Financial reviews will be conducted by OFM on a periodic basis.
- *Auditing and Reporting*—If total of all funds given to the Afghan Government during its fiscal year exceeds \$300,000, it will be subject to an independent third party financial audit conducted by one of the regional audit firms ap-

proved by the USAID Inspector General. We envision audits for the first several years conducted under an Agency Contracted Audit with significant participation from the Afghan Auditor General and Ministry of Finance. Any sub-contracts with local and/or foreign organizations expending at least \$300,000 in its fiscal year will be audited according to USAID Recipient-Contracted Audit Guidelines. U.S. organizations expending over \$500,000 would be subject to OMB Circular A-133 audit requirements.

- *Technical Monitoring*—USAID has also assigned an officer with relevant technical expertise to monitor the performance of the procurement and projects, and to provide technical direction to the Ministry. The USAID technical officer and the Ministry will work together to implement a performance monitoring and reporting process, to include monthly and 6-month progress reports. The technical officer will work with the Ministry to conduct technical oversight and ensure that the required work is being performed, the results evaluated and objectives achieved.
- *Corrective Actions*—In the event that a problem arises within the GCMU, USAID would work with the host Government to evaluate training needs, policy changes or other steps required to resolve the issue. In the event that performance or cost problems arise with a host-country contract, appropriate action could include noncontractual remedies (such as expediting commodities through customs) or contractual actions (such as change order or modification, disallowance of costs, or termination of the contract). The host-country contract will include standard provisions on procedures for any disputes and appeals arising from the contract. Throughout the process, all mission financial approvals and audits, contracting approvals and technical reports and approvals will be documented.
- *Continued Support*—Additional support continues to be provided to the GCMU through the USAID/MSH project to help it comply with all USAID requirements and ensure that management and oversight functions continue to be strengthened. USAID through MSH will support GCMU by adding three senior Afghan and one International staff members to the current team of 16 Afghan and 1 International staff members. The expected outcome of this additional support will be a GCMU that is fully integrated in terms of the management systems and tools used to supervise grants and contracts, financial management and oversight, and field monitoring and evaluation.
- *Ongoing Training*—The mission through Regional Inspector General (RIG) has provided the Fraud Awareness Training to MOPH/GCMU staff. It has also provided training on Recipient Contracted Audits.

Question. Please describe the challenges that remain and compare the new methods with past delivery practices in those sectors using specific examples.

Answer. Challenges to Direct Assistance:

Security situation: Security concerns will continue to significantly limit the ability of USG personnel to access areas where operations continue. In order to achieve our goals in Afghanistan and the conflict-affected areas of Pakistan, we will continue to rely on flexible and innovative funding and accountability mechanisms that enable U.S. and Pakistani personnel, both civilian and military, to quickly react and provide humanitarian and stabilization assistance to hold cleared areas as the Pakistani military makes progress in their fight against terrorism.

For example, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives continues to help expand the reach of provincial governments in the South and East of Afghanistan and FATA and KPk in Pakistan to provide basic services to the local populations. USAID is also providing assistance directly to the FATA and KPk Secretariats to implement reconstruction projects (e.g., roads, electricity, housing) and build capacity simultaneously. We are also pursuing innovative ways to oversee U.S. assistance in insecure areas, such as monitoring and evaluation by locally employed staff (LES) and independent CPA or engineering firms that can reach areas inaccessible to U.S. personnel.

Institutional capacity: Many of our new implementing partners—particularly local government authorities and indigenous civil society organizations have management capacity issues that will require USAID to provide significant institutional strengthening and collaborative oversight. Potential areas of institutional vulnerability include budget and procurement systems, internal controls, accounting, and institutional policies. Our missions have begun working directly with public and private partners to enhance project management, oversight and evaluation.

These local partnerships are essential in providing proper monitoring and evaluation because they facilitate site visits to insecure areas. In Pakistan, these new partnerships include a range of contracts to strengthen the Auditor General of Pakistan

(the Government of Pakistan's Supreme Audit Institution) and build the audit and financial accounting capacity of local civil society organizations and private sector firms. The OIG has also established a working relationship with the National Accountability Bureau, the Government of Pakistan agency with the legal mandate to address public corruption.

In Afghanistan, specifically in the health sector, a new method of service delivery in Afghanistan is Host Country Contracting (HCC). In July 2009, the U.S. Government and Afghan Government entered into the country's first HCC which directly transfers large amounts of U.S. Government funding into the Ministry of Public Health. Having built the ministry's capacity for several years, the Ministry of Public Health is the only ministry which can now receive large transfers of U.S. funds for implementing critical governmental services—the delivery of basic health care to the citizens of Afghanistan. This contract is valued at \$236m over a 5-year period. This new method affords a shared responsibility with the Ministry of Public Health to award and manage the NGO contracts to deliver health services. USAID has provided capacity building and system strengthening to the Ministry of Public Health since 2002 and is confident in the Ministry's ability to manage the funding and contracts.

Large number of new partnerships: As we shift our funds to increasingly build local capacity, our partnerships will grow, which will require considerable capacity-building in the area of public fiscal management. USAID performs preaward assessments for all new prospective partner organizations to ensure that our new local partners have an appropriate level of accountability and capacity to absorb USG funds.

Question. Describe the status of the traditional justice system in Afghanistan and the status and relation to its formal counterpart.

- What programs are established or planned in the near term, in what provinces, to strengthen traditional justice sector?

Answer. Justice mechanisms in Afghanistan essentially fall into three categories: "formal justice," (i.e., police, prosecutors and courts); "informal" or "traditional justice," by which traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are encouraged to re-emerge at the local level (e.g., through Shuras); and "Taliban justice." A key priority of our new rule of law (ROL) strategy is improving Afghans' access to reliable, efficient, and transparent dispute resolution.

This is especially critical in areas where the Taliban's swift but brutal form of justice has "outperformed" the Afghan Government's more limited formal justice structure. As we evaluate how to best improve Afghan capacity to deliver legitimate and effective formal systems, we are supporting targeted informal justice programs in areas where the Afghan Government lacks a strong presence. Protection of women's rights under the Afghan Constitution and ensuring women's access to justice are also priorities.

In the traditional sector, our "clear-to-hold" approach refers to focusing first on eliminating Taliban influence in the justice sector, improving access to traditional and state justice systems, and reducing official corruption and removing corrupt officials. This sequence also applies to geographic priorities, as determined by prevailing security conditions. In the first year, greater emphasis will be placed on districts in the South and East that were controlled by insurgents or narco-traffickers. In these "priority" districts, the Afghan Government lacks credibility with a population that has lost (or never had) confidence in formal government. Increasing security and providing space for traditional dispute resolution mechanisms to reemerge is the top priority.

This will be done in close consultation with and through Afghan authorities, including district and provincial governors, state justice institutions, the police, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and, in coordination with JTF 435, ISAF, NTM-A, and other military commands, including the Afghan National Security Forces. At the same time, attention will be paid to both traditional and state justice institutions in other parts of the country that have not fallen to insurgents and/or are more stable.

This approach will maximize chances for successful implementation of programs. It recognizes the immediate justice needs of the country are not entirely in insurgent-affected areas. In the East, South, and West, the focus will be on increasing access to, and strengthening the capacity of, existing state justice sector institutions, as well as other executive branch offices involved in settling legal disputes. In these areas, the Afghan Government seeks to establish its authority in previously unstable communities. It is important to have success stories in these areas to foster stability, and for Afghans to publicize these successes.

Question. What programs are established or planned in the near term, in what provinces, to strengthen the formal justice sector?

Answer. The Afghanistan and Pakistan Stabilization strategy outlines an array of efforts to build the capacity of the formal justice sector. These include: professional training of judges and prosecutors; technical and advisory assistance to the Afghan Attorney General's Office; support to the Afghan Anti-Corruption Unit and Major Crimes Task Force; technical assistance and advising for the Ministry of Justice; and corrections sector support. These are nationwide efforts.

In the provinces, our efforts focus on a "hold-to-build" approach where we work to strengthen the entire sector and expand access to it. In the areas of the North, East, and West, where improved security in some areas can enable business development and progress by civil society, access to justice requires building up and expanding "islands of success" in population centers. By expanding these "islands of success" and improving capacity, people seeking justice will be drawn from surrounding areas, particularly for civil disputes (primarily property-related), and serious criminal cases. Further, reducing corruption in the state justice sector will improve its ability to provide fair services and increase the legitimacy of the Afghan Government overall.

Question. What role will the INL office in Afghanistan have in the police sector since the decision was taken last year to remove INL from the NTM/CSTC-A training and oversight? What reduced role will they play? Who will maintain oversight of the international police training effort?

Answer. NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) will continue to supervise the USG and international police training efforts in Afghanistan. As a key stakeholder, the Department of State will continue to play a vital role in Afghan law enforcement training through program policy, oversight, and overall direction for the police program through Ambassador Eikenberry. State remains ready to assist in advanced and/or specialized training.

Question. The strategy makes passing mention to other foreign contributions to several of the sectors in Afghanistan's stabilization and reconstruction, and the administration has continued to seek such contributions especially in light of the limited military role they have chosen to adopt.

- Which partners or potential partners have participated in the creation of this strategy and how have they substantively committed?

Answer. The President's strategy benefited from input from a number of major allies and partners, and we continue to work jointly on the implementation of the strategy through a number of fora. In addition to the North Atlantic Council for ISAF issues, 35 countries and international organizations have appointed SRAP counterparts to Ambassador Holbrooke. The SRAPs meet roughly quarterly, and liaisons from SRAP embassies meet in Washington roughly biweekly. The EU has been an especially important partner in designing our civilian strategy, and their regional action plan, released in fall 2009, closely tracks and complements our Regional Stabilization Strategy.

Question. What progress has been made in the last year in bringing new partners or significant increases in partner contributions of resources and personnel?

Answer. We have seen substantial increases in both troops and financial resources.

Troops: Nearly 10,000 additional troops have been committed since the President announced the U.S.'s own troop increase in December. This increase includes approximately 1,000 from Italy, 900 from Georgia, 600 from Romania, 500 each from the U.K. and Germany, over 500 each from Poland and Spain, and 400 from South Korea. OIC countries including Malaysia, Jordan, and UAE are also committing new or additional military resources.

Finances: Despite the international financial crisis, partners have sustained or increased their development assistance to Afghanistan. Japan made a \$5 billion pledge over 5 years, Germany doubled its annual pledge to €430 million through 2013, and the U.K. has increased its pledge through 2013 by 40 percent, to £710 million. The Afghan National Security Forces also continue to receive international financial support. For example, Japan paid all police salaries for the first 6 months of 2010 and Norway pledged \$110 million to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund and Law and Order Trust Fund.

Question. Illicit Financial Flows have been identified as a center of gravity for the militant forces operating in the Pakistan and Afghanistan region. Though the militants have proven capable of operating on far fewer resources their lifelines are de-

pendent nonetheless on finance that has been identified as from three sources—financiers operating in or from the countries in the Arabian gulf region, proceeds from narcotics trafficking, and proceeds from criminal enterprise including kidnapping, extortion, robbery, and protection rackets.

- How has the State Department been asked to assist other USG entities in bolstering the effort to interdict these financial flows?

Answer. State has been asked to fund a portion of the law enforcement operations and capacity-building to interdict illicit finance flows. Likewise, USAID has been asked to provide and/or fund capacity-building efforts in the financial sector. In addition, much of the USG's counter-illicit-finance activity is coordinated by the State Department, in coordination with the Department of the Treasury, both in Washington and in Afghanistan.

Question. How has State responded or how are they organizing themselves on this issue?

Answer. In addition to providing interagency leadership and coordination as specified in the preceding question, the State Department provides funding to a wide variety of USG agencies to ensure a whole of government approach to counterterrorism finance capacity-building initiatives. We provide funding for FIU development, bulk cash smuggling training, terrorist financing investigative training, financial regulatory training, prosecutorial development and resident law enforcement advisors from the USG in Afghanistan.

Consistent with the shift in strategy to increase the focus on interdiction, alternative development programs and incentivized supply reduction efforts, State/INL provides support for the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and the Good Performers Initiative. INL programs also strengthen drug demand reduction efforts through a nationwide treatment delivery system and increase public information efforts through improved messaging campaigns.

USAID's economic growth strategy also impacts these efforts by building the capacity of the Afghanistan Government to develop a stable, market-based economy. This is achieved primarily through capacity-building assistance directed to the Ministry of Finance and Afghanistan's Central Bank—Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB). At the Ministry of Finance, USAID supports budget and execution reforms, and tax policy and administration. At DAB, USAID supports the Bank's management of monetary policy, statistics, and market operations; financial supervision and risk management; payment systems; and accounting and financial management.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. Given that Pakistan is not moving comprehensively against all Taliban safe havens in that country, is there a danger that our military offensive in the South will have no lasting impact as insurgents take refuge on the other side of the border, beyond our reach? What steps are being taken to mitigate this danger?

Answer. Since August 2009, Pakistan has demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to confronting militant groups using its territory as a base to launch attacks into Afghanistan and elsewhere. Military operations against insurgents in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have yielded steady gains, but Pakistan has also paid a heavy toll—thousands of Pakistani security forces have been killed or wounded in these operations. Pakistan has made these heavy sacrifices on its own behalf because it understands that these militant groups threaten the existence of Pakistan itself. The recent arrests of key Taliban leaders further underscores the seriousness with which Pakistan is tackling this threat. Pakistan has also stepped up its cross-border military cooperation, evidenced by its representation in the two operating Border Coordination Centers. In light of these actions by our Pakistani partners, and our continued engagement with our Pakistani partners, we are confident our military efforts in RC-South will result in sustainable gains.

Question. While we need to maintain a targeted counterterrorism capability in the region, I am not convinced that there is a military solution to the instability in Afghanistan and the region. On the contrary, I think the constant escalation in the use of force over the years has ultimately created more militancy and instability. Meanwhile, it is not clear to me that the Afghan and Pakistani Governments are pursuing the political solutions that are the best way to stabilize the situation. For example, in Afghanistan, the Presidential elections were marred by fraud. In Pakistan, although President Zardari has pushed for reforms in the FATA, they have

fallen far short of what many experts say are needed. Why are we continuing to pursue a military solution when we still haven't been able to secure the political reforms that are key to stabilizing the situation?

Answer. We are pursuing a multifaceted strategy in Afghanistan focused on security, economic development, and good governance. With the support of Congress, we are investing significantly in rehabilitating Afghanistan's infrastructure and strengthening the delivery of health and educational services. We are also working to build the capacity, effectiveness, and transparency of Afghanistan's Government institutions.

We fully agree that there can be no military solution in Afghanistan absent steps to create economic opportunity and improved governance. Nor can there be economic or governance progress without improved security.

Even in those areas hardest hit by the insurgency, our strategy in Afghanistan is a "whole of government" approach which integrates military and civilian components that complement each other. The military component of this strategy is essential, but not sufficient, to our efforts and draws by far the most press coverage. Military action provides security for the population and shapes the environment for our civilian efforts. There are now 900 civilians from across the interagency working in Afghanistan; hundreds of them in the more unstable provinces. This is a notable increase over the number of civilians in Afghanistan only a year ago and is indicative of our commitment to a whole of government approach.

As in Afghanistan, U.S. assistance to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is also one piece of a multidimensional, "whole of government" approach, aimed at building provincial government capacity, pursuing development projects, and creating economic growth opportunities. While our military assistance efforts are necessary to clear and hold the region, our civilian assistance efforts are part of the "build phase," a key part in stabilizing the region by strengthening governance in the FATA to make it less susceptible to hosting terrorist and insurgent groups. We are working to enhance planning coordination between the FATA Secretariat and the Frontier Corps, to better link development efforts to security gains. U.S. counternarcotics and law enforcement activities in FATA have centered on infrastructure development (roads, bridges, etc.), providing training, equipment, and facilities for law enforcement entities, and conducting programs to deter poppy cultivation.

We fully support the political reform efforts endorsed by President Zardari in the FATA and recognize that rule of law and governance reform is necessary for sustainable stability and development in the FATA. We will continue to encourage the GOP to follow through on these and other actions.

Recent Assistance to the FATA includes:

- Humanitarian: Supplies and services for IDPs (\$2 million in South Waziristan);
- Social/Economic Assistance: Over 900 projects since 2008 (\$143 million);
- Infrastructure: Roads, water, and energy (\$96 million committed to FATA Secretariat);
- Law Enforcement: \$4.7 million since Sept 2009 to support FATA Levies (over \$26 million total in past 3 years).

Question. Admiral Mullen has testified that the primary driver of the conflict in Afghanistan is the lack of legitimacy in the government. Yet, President Karzai continues to nominate problematic individuals, including the recently appointed Minister of Counternarcotics, Zabar Ahmed Moqbel, who has reportedly tacitly supported corruption. Do you intend to continue to work with Mr. Moqbel notwithstanding these concerns?

Answer. We will continue working with those ministers who were confirmed. The selection of Cabinet ministers was a very serious Afghan process with important implications for Afghanistan's future and reflects the ongoing development of Afghan Government institutions. Our revised counternarcotics strategy calls for building the capacity of the Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN), the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), and the Ministry of Interior (MOI), among others. To achieve this, we have to work with Minister Zabar and his counterparts in other ministries.

Question. I understand that the State Department may have recently handed over responsibility for training the Afghan police to the Defense Department. The former Minister of the Interior has written that our continued reliance on the police as a paramilitary force has undermined its ability to serve a law enforcement function. General McChrystal has acknowledged that the lack of a functioning criminal justice system has created a vacuum that the Taliban has used to garner support. Am-

bassador Holbrooke, do you have plans to begin transitioning the Afghan police to a law enforcement function that would fill that vacuum?

Answer. The Department of Defense has the lead for Afghan security forces reform, including both the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA), since 2005. DOD is responsible for determining overall program requirements based on policy guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission. Since 2007, DOD has transferred funding for police training to State. At the request of DOD, State uses these funds to deploy civilian police advisors to implement a training and mentoring program that provides basic, advanced, and specialized training to the ANP.

State expects to transfer contract responsibility for police training to DOD's Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in 2010 in order to streamline management of ANP training. With the transfer of contracting responsibility, DOD will establish a contract to directly provide civilian police advisors instead of transferring funds in order for State to do so. This programmatic change is in keeping with General McChrystal's report recommendations to the President last summer.

As acknowledged in the Afghan National Police Strategy, drafted by the Afghan Government and endorsed by the international community at the London Conference, the Afghan police face a challenging environment in which they must not only enforce the laws, but provide local security where Afghan Army and international forces are not present. This need, coupled with the high casualty rates in the police, has led DOD and State to concur on training Afghan police for both law enforcement and the higher threat environment in Afghanistan. State will continue to participate in Afghan law enforcement training through policy oversight and overall direction through the U.S. Ambassador.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.

Question. The New York Times reprinted on January 21 that we are helping the Afghan Government set up a major-crimes task force in the Interior Ministry, which is intended to be the government's main agency to crack down on corruption. How much do we know about Interior Ministry officials working under Minister Atmar, who are charged with leading the anticorruption campaign? How much insight will coalition partners have into the ministry's anticorruption efforts?

Answer. The United States, in conjunction with other international donors, is actively supporting the implementation of a Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF). Initiated in May 2009, the MCTF forms a critical element of the institutional architecture necessary to tackle corruption in Afghanistan, and includes a dedicated Corruption Investigation Unit. As of January 2010, 58 MOI and NDS investigators have been assigned to the MCTF, with ongoing mentoring support from the International Community. All Task Force members are vetted and polygraphed to ensure they do not have ties to the Taliban and have not been involved in corruption. Although initiated in May 2009, the MCTF is still under development—both physically and administratively. The formal process for enabling legislation and drafting a Memorandum of Understanding for staffing are underway. Mentors from the FBI, Department of Justice, U.K. Serious Organised Crime Agency and Australian Federal Police are intrinsically engaged assisting the Afghans with the establishment of the MCTF.

There are ongoing concerns about corruption within the Ministry of Interior, as with other GIRA Ministries; however, we believe that by establishing and supporting a task force that reports directly to Minister Atmar, and ensuring that all of the members of the Task Force and its supporting units are fully vetted and polygraphed, we can help the Afghans establish a successful anticorruption enforcement tool for the Government of Afghanistan.

Question. While Afghanistan's Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) provide a venue for interagency coordination at the brigade level, several coalition military officers have told the press that they vary widely in their levels of effectiveness, cohesion, and coherence. As an example, a senior member of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan told the press in December that he did not believe that he or other NATO military leaders could align the PRTs' efforts with the NATO command's specific lines of operations. Instead, he felt that the PRT members' ultimate loyalties resided with their parent U.S. agencies or their home governments. What is your assessment of the level of coordination between PRTs and what do you think we can do to enhance PRT coordination?

Answer. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have been an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan, strengthening provincial and district-level institutions and empowering local leaders who support the central government. In many locations, PRTs have helped create conditions that make increased political, social, and economic development possible. Throughout Afghanistan, PRTs play a vital role supporting counterinsurgency efforts. Under the President's new strategy, U.S. PRTs are for the most part cocommanded by a senior military officer and a senior civilian representative, and are integrated into military and U.S. Embassy command structures, operating under the joint civilian-military Regional Commands and ultimately under the authority of ISAF Commander General McChrystal and U.S. Ambassador Eikenberry. Other nations organize and resource their PRTs differently, but the United States has attached civilian experts from the State Department, USAID, and /or USDA to all coalition-led PRTs to help ensure a more coherent approach to building local government and economies.

The overall level of coordination between PRTs is strong, and getting stronger over time. All PRTs share a common commitment to development and stabilization that is in line with the NATO/ISAF mission. Of course, some PRTs work more effectively than others and there are still areas where coordination can be improved. But coordination between U.S. military and civilians on PRTs has improved considerably as a result of an MOU between the U.S. Embassy and COMISAF/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. We are establishing similar agreements with our coalition partners.

Question. The State Department anticipates that the reintegration of Taliban insurgents into Afghan society will cost \$100 million a year over several years—and that the funding is likely to come from the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and other countries. How realistic do you think it is that Taliban fighters can be permanently reintegrated into society? Are there any particular keys to ensuring that success?

Answer. Success of Afghan-led reintegration of Taliban fighters, their commanders and shadow government officials depends largely on Afghan political will, the resources backing reintegration efforts, a community-based approach rather than packages for individual fighters, and continued military pressure on the Taliban. Past reintegration efforts have lacked these essential elements. If these are backed by increased economic prosperity and Afghan Government accountability, we believe they can convince Taliban fighters to permanently reintegrate.

President Karzai stated in his November 19 inauguration speech that his government will “welcome and provide necessary help to all disenfranchised compatriots who are willing to return to their homes, live peacefully and accept the Constitution.” We take this as an indication reintegration will be an essential element to President Karzai's second elected term. We are prepared to support him in this effort, and are working with our partners, including the U.K. and Japan, to fund and back this Afghan-led effort. Together with our Afghan and U.K. partners we are also increasing military pressure on the Taliban. Last week, we began Operation Mushtarak, which is the first of our “surge” operations to press the Taliban.

Our ongoing economic development and governance programs are the final piece of this puzzle. We believe increased government accountability and economic opportunity will convince Taliban fighters to permanently disarm and accept the Afghan Constitution.

