[Senate Hearing 111-738]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-738
THE NEW START TREATY
(TREATY DOC. 111-5)
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
----------
APRIL 29, MAY 18, 19, 25, JUNE 10, 15, 16, 24, AND JULY 15, 2010
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
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THE NEW START TREATY (TREATY DOC. 111-5)
S. Hrg. 111-738
THE NEW START TREATY
(TREATY DOC. 111-5)
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, MAY 18, 19, 25, JUNE 10, 15, 16, 24, AND JULY 15, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
?
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Thursday, April 29, 2010
THE HISTORICAL AND MODERN CONTEXT FOR
U.S.-RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL
Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Schlesinger, Hon. James R., PH.D., former Secretary of Defense,
former Secretary of Energy, former Director of Central
Intelligence, Chairman of the Board, MITRE Corporation, McLean,
VA............................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Perry, Hon. William J., Former Secretary of Defense, Michael and
Barbara Berberian Professor, Center for International Security
and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA............. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Dr. James Schlesinger to Questions Submitted by
Senator Kerry.................................................. 30
Responses of Dr. James Schlesinger to Questions Submitted by
Senator Risch.................................................. 31
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
THE NEW START TREATY
Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 33
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 35
Clinton, Hon. Hillary, Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington DC.................................................. 37
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Gates, Hon. Robert, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 43
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Mullen, Admiral Michael, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC................................................. 48
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and Secretary
Clinton to Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar................ 77
Response of Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and Secretary
Clinton to Question Submitted by Senator Wicker................ 84
Responses of Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to Questions
Submitted by Senator Lugar..................................... 84
Responses of Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to Questions
Submitted by Senator Barrasso.................................. 88
Responses of Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to Questions
Submitted by Senator Wicker.................................... 90
Responses of Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Barrasso.................................. 96
Responses of Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Wicker.................................... 99
Responses of Secretary Gates to Questions Submitted by Senator
Lugar.......................................................... 99
Responses of Secretary Gates to Questions Submitted by Senator
DeMint......................................................... 105
Responses of Secretary Gates to Questions Submitted by Senator
Barrasso....................................................... 106
Responses of Secretary Gates to Questions Submitted by Senator
Wicker......................................................... 108
Responses of Secretary Gates to Questions Submitted by Senator
Inhofe......................................................... 110
Responses of Admiral Mullen to Questions Submitted by Senator
DeMint......................................................... 112
Responses of Secretary Clinton to Questions Submitted by Senator
Lugar.......................................................... 113
Responses of Secretary Clinton to Questions Submitted by Senator
DeMint......................................................... 121
Responses of Secretary Clinton to Questions Submitted by Senator
Wicker......................................................... 123
Responses of Secretary Clinton to Questions Submitted by Senator
Inhofe......................................................... 128
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
THE HISTORY AND LESSONS OF START
Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 135
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 137
Baker, James A., III, Former Secretary of State, Former Secretary
of the Treasury, senior partner, Baker Botts LLP, Houston, TX.. 138
Prepared statement........................................... 142
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL IN
A POST-COLD-WAR WORLD
Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 163
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 165
Kissinger, Hon. Henry, Former Secretary of State, Kissinger
Associates, New York, NY....................................... 167
Prepared statement........................................... 169
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Russell D. Feingold, U.S. Senator from
Wisconsin...................................................... 187
Responses of Dr. Henry Kissinger to Questions Submitted by
Senator Feingold............................................... 187
Thursday, June 10, 2010
STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 189
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 191
Scowcroft, LTG Brent, USAF (Ret.), President, The Scowcroft
Group, Washington, DC.......................................... 192
Hadley, Hon. Stephen J., Senior Adviser for International
Affairs, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC...... 194
Prepared statement........................................... 196
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
THE NEGOTIATIONS
Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 213
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 215
Gottemoeller, Hon. Rose, Assistant Secretary of State for
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Chief U.S.
Negotiator in Post-START Negotiations, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 217
Prepared statement........................................... 219
Warner, Dr. Edward L., III, Secretary of Defense Representative
to Post-New START Negotiations, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 222
Prepared statement........................................... 225
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Reponses of Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller and Dr. Edward
L. Warner III to Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar.......... 244
Reponses of Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller to Questions
Submitted by Senator Lugar..................................... 244
Reponses of Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller and Dr. Edward
L. Warner III to Questions Submitted by Senator Barrasso....... 258
Reponses of Dr. Edward L. Warner III to Questions Submitted by
Senator Barrasso............................................... 264
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
VIEWS FROM THE PENTAGON
Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 267
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 269
Miller, Dr. James N., Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC.................. 279
Prepared statement........................................... 273
Chilton, GEN Kevin P., USAF, Commander, United States Strategic
Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE............................. 276
Prepared statement........................................... 278
O'Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missle Defense Agency,
Washington, DC................................................. 279
Prepared statement........................................... 280
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Reponses of GEN Kevin P. Chilton to Questions Submitted by
Senator Lugar.................................................. 297
Reponses of Hon. James N. Miller, Jr., to Questions Submitted by
Senator Feingold............................................... 298
Reponses of LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly to Questions Submitted by
Senator Feingold............................................... 299
Reponses of GEN Kevin P. Chilton to Questions Submitted by
Senator Risch.................................................. 299
Reponses of Hon. James N. Miller, Jr., to Questions Submitted by
Senator Risch.................................................. 305
Reponses of LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly to Questions Submitted by
Senator Risch.................................................. 309
Thursday, June 24, 2010
IMPLEMENTATION--INSPECTIONS AND ASSISTANCE
Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 313
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 316
Miller, Dr. James N., Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC.................. 318
Prepared statement........................................... 320
Myers, Kenneth A., III, director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
and director, U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combatting
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Fort Belvoir, VA.................. 322
Prepared statement........................................... 326
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Extract from Politico Submitted by Senator Lugar................. 349
Thursday, June 24, 2010
BENEFITS AND RISKS
Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 351
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 353
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from Oklahoma, opening
statement...................................................... 354
Joseph, Hon. Robert G., senior scholar, National Institute for
Public Policy, Fairfax, VA..................................... 356
Prepared statement........................................... 358
Edelman, Hon. Eric S., distinguished fellow, Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, visiting scholar, Philip Merrill
Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University School
of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC.............. 362
Prepared statement........................................... 365
Halperin, Dr. Morton H., senior advisor, Open Society Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 368
Prepared statement........................................... 372
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Statement from the Partnership for A Secure America.............. 388
Thursday, July 15, 2010
MAINTAINING A SAFE, SECURE, AND EFFECTIVE
NUCLEAR ARSENAL
Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 391
Statement for the record submitted by Ambassador F. Brooks....... 393
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 396
Anastasio, Dr. Michael R., director, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM..................................... 398
Prepared statement........................................... 399
Miller, Dr. George H., director, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Livermore, CA...................................... 406
Prepared statement........................................... 408
Hommert, Dr. Paul J., director, Sandia National Laboratories,
Albuquerque, NM................................................ 416
Prepared statement........................................... 417
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Dr. George Miller to Questions Submitted by Senator
Casey.......................................................... 439
Responses of Dr. Michael Anastasio to Questions Submitted by
Senator Casey.................................................. 440
THE HISTORICAL AND MODERN CONTEXT FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Casey, Shaheen, Lugar,
Isakson, Risch, Barrasso, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order. Thank you
all for coming. This afternoon we begin a series of hearings on
the New START Treaty. In the coming weeks administration
witnesses and outside experts from across the political
spectrum will testify about this historic opportunity to reduce
the threat posed by nuclear weapons. An honest and fair
discussion will be an important part of building the kind of
bipartisan support that the treaty requires and I believe
deserves.
This treaty marks a significant step forward for both
America and Russia, and I think the world, because of the
marker it sets with respect to our efforts to reduce nuclear
weapons globally. It will cut by nearly a third the maximum
number of deployed strategic warheads. It puts in place a
streamlined and effective new verification regime. Overall, it
puts us firmly on the path toward reducing our reliance on
nuclear weapons.
In the weeks and months ahead, we will hear differences of
opinion on some of the specifics of the treaty, including
missile defense, telemetry, and ICBMs. Personally, I welcome a
thorough exploration of each of these issues. But at the outset
I think we have to focus on a single overarching issue: Does
this treaty make us safer? From everything that I have read and
heard so far, the answer to that question is ``Yes.'' This
treaty improves our security because it increases certainty,
stability, and transparency in the two countries that together
hold 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, and it does so
while retaining for America the flexibility to protect
ourselves and our allies in Europe and around the world.
Day by day since the START Treaty and its verification
measures expired last December, we have been increasingly
losing crucial visibility into the Russian nuclear program.
This new treaty will restore that visibility, that capacity,
and in some ways it will enhance it. The sooner we get that
done, the better, because until then we don't have a formalized
agreement with respect to verification.
This treaty also strengthens the global nonproliferation
regime that is under threat today. Every step that America
takes to honor our end of the NPT partnership makes it easy for
others to partner with us, both in pressuring an Iran or North
Korea to honor their own commitments and in preventing nuclear
terrorism.
This treaty's benefits extend far beyond nuclear security.
When Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the accord in Prague
earlier this month, they took a major step toward a better
United States-Russian relationship. In the next few weeks we
expect formal delivery of the treaty and the accompanying
documents, the annexes, from the administration. That will
permit us to get down to the details.
We already know that some are going to contend, as they
always do, that any negotiated reduction in our nuclear arsenal
somehow endangers our national security. As much as I disagree,
Senator Lugar and I share a determination to work together to
conduct a series of hearings that will explore and answer the
full range of concerns from supporters and skeptics alike.
Next month we will hear from Secretary Clinton and
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. We will hear from the team
that spent a year in the ultimately successful negotiations
with the Russians, and we will hear from the intelligence
officials charged with monitoring Russia's strategic forces. We
will also hear from Henry Kissinger, James Baker, Madeleine
Albright, and other officials who, like today's witnesses, can
provide firsthand knowledge and perspective on the history of
arms control.
On a matter that's vital to America's national security,
it's more important than ever that we put aside politics and
judge this treaty on its merits. This should not be a partisan
issue. Some of the most important arms control treaties have
been negotiated by Republican Presidents. Remember, it was
Ronald Reagan who began negotiations on the original START
Treaty, and George H.W. Bush completed them. That treaty was
approved with the overwhelming support of Democrats.
In fact, the New START Treaty reflects concerns raised by
Senators during the process as we have met with negotiators on
a consistent basis, and it reflects concerns raised by Senators
on both sides of the aisle. This treaty emphasizes
verification. It will not inhibit our missile defense. It will
not prevent us from fielding strategic conventional weapons.
The START and SORT agreements with Russia were approved by
large majorities of both parties, and I believe that we can do
it again this year.
Few people know the history of arms control better than our
two witnesses this afternoon. They have offered trusted
strategic advice to Presidents for over 4 decades, and we are
fortunate to have their guidance at this first hearing, at the
outset of this journey. Dr. James Schlesinger has been called
the ``former Secretary of Everything.'' He has served
Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter as Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central
Intelligence, Secretary of Energy. He's been an important voice
of caution regarding the limits of arms control agreements as
tools of U.S. foreign policy, and we are eager to hear his
thoughts today.
Dr. William Perry served as Secretary of Defense during the
Clinton administration. He's also, as we know, a long-time
professor at Stanford University. In 2008 and 2009 Dr. Perry
served as chairman of the Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States, and his vice chairman
was James Schlesinger.
So, gentlemen, welcome back. We've sought your guidance in
the past. We're honored by your presence here today and we look
forward to your insights as we begin our hearings on the New
START Treaty.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. As the chairman pointed out, the committee
begins today to hear testimony regarding the New START Treaty
and the historical context of United States-Russian arms
control. I join the chairman in welcoming two very good friends
to the committee, Jim Schlesinger and Bill Perry. They led the
commission that wrote the ``Report on America's Strategic
Posture'' that was mandated by Congress and released in 2009.
We look forward both to their insights from this report and
their personal observations based on decades of arms control
and defense policy leadership.
Earlier this month, in Prague, the United States and Russia
signed the new START Treaty. Formal transmission of the treaty
to the Senate for advice and consent is expected in early May.
Nevertheless, we are moving forward now to prepare members of
this committee for action on the new accord and to build a
thorough record for the full Senate.
Many Members of the Senate are new to the subject of
strategic arms control. In fact, only 26 Members of today's
Senate were present in 1992 for debate on the START I Treaty.
Only six current members of the Foreign Relations Committee
were Senators when we dealt with the Moscow Treaty in 2003.
Senate consideration of the New START Treaty is an opportunity,
not only to educate the Senators, but also to engage in a
broader public dialogue on the fundamental questions of United
States national security and diplomacy for all of our Members
and for Americans who are witnessing these hearings.
Texts of the treaty and its protocol are available online,
including on my Senate Web site. The treaty annexes, which are
completed, may soon be publicly released. When they are, they
will be placed on my Web site, as well. I look forward to the
administration's provision of other key documents in the coming
weeks, including a modernization plan for our weapons complex,
a National Intelligence Estimate, and a verification
assessment.
I support the New START Treaty, and believe that it will
enhance the United States national security. It would reduce
strategic nuclear launchers and warheads and replace the 1991
START I Treaty that expired last year. Equally important, it
will provide forward momentum to our relationship with Moscow,
which is vital to United States policy goals related to Iran's
nuclear program, nuclear nonproliferation, global energy
security, and stability in Eurasia.
Further, because the verification procedures contained in
START I expired last December 5th, without the New START
Treaty, the United States lacks both the ability to carry out
on-site inspection in Russia and the formal consultation
mechanisms that monitor Russia's strategic nuclear program. It
is essential that a verification system be in place so that we
have a sufficient understanding of Russian nuclear forces and
achieve a level of transparency that prevents miscalculations.
As our hearing today underscores, the task of evaluating a
treaty requires more than a reading of the text. The
administration must explain in detail how the treaty fits into
our defense plans and how it will affect our relationships with
Russia and other nations. Several issues are particularly
important to address.
First, some Members have expressed concern about provisions
in the New START Treaty that deal with missile defense. START I
acknowledged a link between strategic offensive and strategic
defensive systems. The preamble to the New START Treaty
similarly acknowledges this link. But New START also contains
limits on the deployment of U.S. interceptor missiles in
existing strategic missile launchers. The administration must
elaborate on how these provisions constitute no constraint on
our missile defense plans, as it claims.
Second, the administration's Nuclear Posture Review defines
a new, more limited role for nuclear weapons in our military
strategy. It also says that new conventional weapons could
replace nuclear weapons for certain missions. In light of the
limits on conventional capabilities in the New START Treaty,
the administration should explain how, and in what specific
instances, conventional capability can replace nuclear
capability.
Third, any treaty on strategic nuclear forces will be
affected by continued safety, security, and reliability of our
nuclear weapons. The Obama administration should explain how it
plans to ensure that our weapons will perform their missions
over the 10-year life of the treaty. The administration also
must clarify an uncertainty over whether the Nuclear Posture
Review's new, restrictive procedures for maintaining our
industry stockpile will allow experts sufficient flexibility to
keep our weapons safe, secure, and reliable.
Fourth, the administration should articulate clearly how it
wants both American and Russian strategic forces to look at the
end of the new treaty's lifetime. A major goal of the START I
and the START II treaties was to move Soviet and Russian
strategic systems away from destabilizing heavy, fixed ICBMs
with many warheads on them. Today, we have largely achieved
this goal. What are our goals for the future under the New
START Treaty?
These are all important questions for our inquiry, but they
are not partisan ones. Arms control treaties have traditionally
enjoyed bipartisan backing. With 67 votes required for
ratification, the Senate approved the START I Treaty in 1992 by
a vote of 93 to 6, and the 1996 START II Treaty by a vote of 87
to 4. The Moscow Treaty, signed by President Bush and then-
President Putin in 2003, was approved 95 to 0. Since the New
START Treaty combines concepts from START I and the Moscow
Treaty, I believe a thorough and detailed debate can achieve
similar levels of support.
We start on this project today. I appreciate especially the
chairman's scheduling of this hearing and the opportunity to
engage in a dialogue with our esteemed witnesses.
I thank the chair.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Secretary Schlesinger, if you will lead off we would
appreciate it. Your full testimony will be placed in the record
as if read if you would like, and if you want to summarize, or
however you wish to proceed. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, PH.D., FORMER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, FORMER SECRETARY OF ENERGY, FORMER DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, MITRE CORPORATION,
McLEAN, VA
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar,
Senator Casey, Senator Shaheen. I thank the committee for its
invitation to discuss the New START Treaty and its
implications.
At the outset I want to make two general points. First, the
Senate will wish to scrutinize the treaty carefully, as it has
previous arms control agreements. This reflects the many
changes that have occurred between START I and New START.
Second and perhaps even more important, as I shall develop,
it will want to examine the treaty in a wider context of
overall military relationships and our alliance
responsibilities. In a way, this latter aspect is reminiscent
of the clue in Sherlock Holmes' story of the dog that did not
bark. While New START may be acceptable in the narrow context
of strategic weapons, it also needs to be considered in a much
larger context. In particular, as I shall come to later, it
must be viewed in terms of the evolving Russian doctrine
regarding tactical nuclear weapons and their use and on the
balance between Russia's substantial stockpile of tactical
nuclear weapons, which are not included in this treaty, and
strategic weapons.
As to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the
numbers specified are quite adequate at the reduced level, in
my judgment at least. To have gone further at this time, as
some have urged, would not be prudent.
At the time of the committee review of the Moscow Treaty in
2002, criticism was sharp with respect to the failure to deal
with tactical nuclear weapons, the failure further to reduce
MIRVed missiles, and with respect to verification. Those
criticisms--those questions, I should say, are still relevant
today.
On specifics, the committee will wish to review the
question of launchers, why did the United States come down from
its preferred level of 900 to 700, when the Russians were
already at this lower level, and whether or not we got
something for this concession. The main effect of reducing
launchers relative to weapons is to reduce the number of aim
points for an attacker, thus hypothetically increasing
instability.
Second, a heavy bomber constitutes only one count against
the 700-launcher operational limit, even though bombers can
carry many more weapons. A bomber can carry 16 to 20 ALCMs. A
force of 65 to 70 bombers could readily carry upward of 500
additional weapons, beyond the 1,550 limit. The official
Russian press has already bragged that under New START, under
the New START counting rules, Russia can maintain 2,100
strategic weapons rather than the 1,550 specified in the
treaty.
If there is any advantage in this counting rule, it is that
it makes a powerful case for the preservation of the triad and
indeed for starting on the new development, in light of our own
aging bomber fleet, of a follow-on strategic bomber.
Now let me change to what is not included under the
strategic nuclear weapons, to wit, the dog that did not bark,
the frustrating, vexatious, and increasingly worrisome issue of
Russia's tactical weapons. Russian officials have acknowledged
that the number of their nuclear weapons, nonstrategic nuclear
weapons, is some 3,800 and the overall number is believed to be
significantly higher. The United States has over the years
reduced its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by over 95
percent and the percentage reduction is even higher if one
includes the weapons withdrawn from our aircraft carriers in
the early 1990s.
In its hearings on the Moscow Treaty in 2002, this
committee was quite critical on that issue, that that treaty
had done nothing about tactical nuclear weapons. Then-Chairman
Biden asked: ``Why does this treaty not limit tactical nuclear
weapons, which are the most susceptible to theft?''
Secretary Powell had, in his prepared statement, stated:
``As we went about negotiating the Moscow Treaty, one of the
questions foremost in my mind, as a former soldier and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was how will we address tactical
nuclear weapons? We continue to be concerned about the
uncertainties surrounding Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons
and I believe we should discuss inventory levels of NSNW with
the Russians and press Moscow to complete the reductions it
pledged'' in 1991-92.
Later in the hearing, Mr. Powell also stated: ``The
President is still very interested in tactical nuclear weapons,
so this is going to be an area of discussions with the Russian
side.''
That expression of intent to discuss tactical nuclear
weapons with the Russian side was 8 years ago. It seems to go
on interminably and still nothing has happened. While the Obama
administration has repeatedly expressed an intent to deal with
tactical nuclear weapons, up to this point the Russians have
been deaf to our entreaties.
The point to bear in mind is that the ratio between
tactical nuclear weapons and strategic tactical weapons
continues to rise, one of the consequences of reducing the
strategic nuclear weapons. The problem with tactical nuclear
weapons is acknowledged in the preamble of the New START
Treaty, though in relation to the balance between strategic
offense and strategic defense: ``This interrelationship becomes
more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced.''
Similarly, the significance of tactical nuclear weapons rises
steadily as strategic nuclear weapons are reduced.
We must bear in mind that, with respect to tactical nuclear
weapons, there is an inherent asymmetry between the United
States and Russia that goes beyond the questions of mere
numbers. While the United States is far away, Russia is cheek
by jowl with the countries on the Eurasian continent. To a
Poland or a Czech Republic, both of which have been threatened
by the Russians during an earlier period of missile defense
deployment, it is hard to discern the difference between
Russian tactical nuclear weapons--that is, short-range
weapons--and strategic nuclear weapons.
As the plaintive comment of Secretary Powell did reveal,
the Russians have steadfastly resisted any attempt on our part
to deal with the imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons, and
understandably do so. The likelihood of their being willing to
do so in light of New START is sharply diminished, for we have
now forfeited substantial leverage.
The Russians have indicated that they would not even
discuss tactical nuclear weapons until the handful of weapons
we still maintain in Europe are withdrawn. In this connection,
Russian policy, like Soviet policy before it, is quite
consistent. In the 1970s and the 1980s the Russians regularly
demanded either that we should withdraw our forward-based
systems in Europe or, at a minimum, count them against our
total number of strategic weapons. In those days, however, they
remained unsuccessful in achieving that goal.
The United States has made transparency a global
initiative. The Strategic Posture Commission stated that: ``The
United States and Russia have a shared responsibility to
increase nuclear transparency and to set a high standard in
their own postures,'' as you mentioned in your opening
statement, Mr. Chairman. In no nuclear area other than for
proliferators like North Korea and Iran has transparency been
as lacking as it has been with respect to Russian tactical
nuclear weapons.
In the current political context, a premeditated attack on
the United States by a major power like Russia or China has
little credibility. Nevertheless, the role of a lopsided
tactical nuclear posture is potentially important for
intimidating our allies on the Eurasian continent. Extended
deterrence remains central to formulating our own nuclear
posture, offsetting potential tactical nuclear weapons.
Intimidation of our allies remains a critical element in
overall deterrence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. James Schlesinger, Chairman of the Board,
MITRE Corporation, McLean, VA
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I thank the
committee for its invitation to discuss the New START Treaty and its
varied implications. At the outset I should like to make two general
points. First, the Senate will wish to scrutinize the treaty carefully,
as it has previous arms control agreements. This reflects the many
changes as compared to START I. Second, and perhaps even more
important, it will want to examine the treaty in a wider context of
overall military relationships and our alliance responsibilities.
In a way that aspect is reminiscent of the clue in Sherlock Holmes'
story of the dog that did not bark. While New START may be acceptable
in the narrow context of strategic weapons, it also needs to be
considered in a much larger context. In particular, as I shall come to
later, it must be viewed in terms of the evolving Russian doctrine
regarding tactical nuclear weapons use and on the balance between
Russia's substantial stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons--which are
excluded under this treaty--and strategic weapons.
As to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers
specified are adequate, though barely so. To have gone further at this
time, as some had urged, would not, in my judgment, have been prudent.
At the time of this committee's review of the Moscow Treaty in
2002, criticism was sharp with respect to the failure to deal with
tactical nuclear weapons, the failure further to reduce MIRV missiles,
and with respect to verification. Those criticisms are still relevant
today.
On specifics, the committee will wish to review the question of
launchers. First, why did the United States come down from its
preferred number of 900 to 700, when the Russians were already at that
lower level--and whether we got anything for this concession? The main
effect of reducing launchers relative to weapons is to reduce the
number of aim points for an attacker, thus hypothetically increasing
instability.
Second, a heavy bomber constitutes only one count against the 700-
launcher operational limit--even though bombers can carry many more
weapons. Since a bomber can carry 16-20 ALCMs, a force of 65 to 70
bombers could readily carry upward of 500 additional strategic weapons.
The official Russian press has already bragged that under the New START
counting rules, Russia can maintain 2,100 strategic weapons rather than
the 1,550 specified in the treaty. If there is any advantage in this
counting rule, it is that it makes a powerful case for the preservation
of the Triad--and indeed for starting on the development, in light of
our own aging bomber fleet, of a follow-on strategic bomber.
Third, the committee will wish to examine specified limits in the
START I Treaty that have now been removed. In contrast to START I, New
START, for example, does not mention rail-mobile missiles. Does this
mean that such missiles could be deployed and not count against New
START limits? Clearly this implies for us that we must carefully
monitor any activities outside the now reduced specific limits of New
START.
Now let me change to what is not included under strategic nuclear
weapons--i.e., the dog that did not bark--the frustrating, vexatious,
and increasingly worrisome issue of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons.
Russian officials have acknowledged that the number of their tactical
nuclear weapons (nonstrategic nuclear weapons) is some 3,800--and the
overall number is believed to be significantly larger. The United
States has over the years reduced its tactical nuclear weapons in
Europe by over 95 percent--and the percentage reduction is even higher
if one includes the weapons withdrawn from our aircraft carriers in the
early 1990s.
In its hearings on the Moscow Treaty in 2002, this committee was
quite critical on this issue. That treaty had done nothing about
tactical nuclear weapons. Then-chairman Biden asked ``Why does the
treaty not limit tactical nuclear weapons--which are the most
susceptible to theft?'' Secretary Powell had, in his prepared
statement, stated:
As we went about negotiating the Moscow Treaty, one of the
questions foremost in my mind as a former soldier and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was how will we address tactical
nuclear weapons?
We continue to be concerned about the uncertainties
surrounding Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), and I
believe we should discuss inventory levels of NSNW with the
Russians and press Moscow to complete the reductions it pledged
to make in 1991 and 1992.
Later in the hearing Powell also stated ``the President is still
very interested in tactical nuclear weapons. So this is going to be an
area of discussion with the Russian side.'' That expression of intent
to discuss tactical nuclear weapons with ``the Russian side'' was 8
years ago--it seems to go on interminably--and still nothing has been
done. While the Obama administration has repeatedly expressed an intent
to deal with tactical nuclear weapons, up to this point the Russians
have been deaf to our entreaties. The point to bear in mind is that the
ratio between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons
continues to rise.
Indirectly the problem with tactical nuclear weapons is
acknowledged in the preamble of the New START Treaty though in relation
to the balance between strategic offense and strategic defense: ``This
interrelationship becomes more important as strategic nuclear arms are
reduced.''
Similarly, the significance of tactical nuclear weapons rises
steadily as strategic nuclear arms are reduced. We must bear in mind
that with respect to tactical nuclear weapons there is an inherent
asymmetry between the United States and Russia. While the United States
is far away, Russia is cheek by jowl with the countries on the Eurasian
continent. For a Poland, a Czech Republic, or a Lithuania, it is hard
to discern the difference between Russian tactical nuclear and
strategic nuclear. As the plaintive comments of Secretary Powell
reveal, the Russians have steadfastly resisted any attempt on our part
to deal with the imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons--and
understandably so.
The likelihood of their being willing to do so in the wake of New
START, is sharply diminished--for we have now forfeited substantial
leverage. The Russians have indicated that they would not even discuss
tactical nuclear weapons until the handful of weapons we still maintain
in Europe are withdrawn. In this connection Russian policy, like Soviet
policy before it, is quite consistent. In the 1970s and 1980s the
Russians regularly demanded either that we should withdraw our
``forward based systems'' from Europe or, at a minimum, count them
against our total number of strategic weapons. In those days, however,
they remained unsuccessful in achieving that goal.
The United States has made transparency a global initiative. The
Strategic Posture Commission stated that ``the United States and Russia
have a shared responsibility to increase nuclear transparency and to
set a high standard in their own postures.'' In no nuclear area--other
than for proliferators like North Korea and Iran--has transparency been
as lacking as it has been with respect to Russian tactical nuclear
weapons.
In the current political context a premeditated attack on the
United States itself has little credibility. Nevertheless the role of a
lopsided tactical nuclear posture is potentially important in
intimidating our allies on the Eurasian continent. Extended deterrence
remains central to formulating our nuclear posture. Offsetting
potential tactical nuclear weapons intimidation of our allies remains a
critical element in deterrence.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Perry.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, MICHAEL AND BARBARA BERBERIAN PROFESSOR, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
STANFORD, CA
Dr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Pull the mike close.
Dr. Perry. I'm honored to appear before this committee and
its distinguished chairman and ranking member. I believe that
few people in the Senate, or anywhere else for that matter,
have more experience or better judgment on these critical
nuclear issues than do the two of you. I think the Nation is
fortunate to have you as chairman and ranking member for these
deliberations.
I will submit my written statement for the record. I don't
intend to read the statement, but I would like to highlight
some of the points in it.
The Chairman. Absolutely, and the full statement will be
placed in the record.
Dr. Perry. I've organized my comments in two areas: what
the treaty will not do and what the treaty will do. First of
all, what it will not do. It will not make major reductions in
our nuclear forces. Indeed, after all reductions are made the
United States will still have deployed nuclear forces with the
destructive power of more than 10,000--much more than 10,000
Hiroshima bombs.
Second, it will not impose meaningful restraints on our
ability to develop or deploy ballistic missile defenses.
Third, it will not restrict our ability to modernize our
nuclear deterrent force.
And fourth, it does not deal with tactical nuclear warheads
or with the thousands of warheads in reserve, both in the
United States and in Russian forces.
What will the treaty do, then? First of all, it gives a
clear signal to the world that the United States is serious
about carrying out its responsibilities under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. This will be welcomed as a positive
step by all other members of the NPT. So why is that important?
I believe that the greatest threat we face today is the
threat--the greatest nuclear threat we face today is from
nuclear terrorism or proliferation. This is an international
problem and it requires an international solution. None of our
objectives in this field can be achieved without the
cooperation of other nations of the world.
Second, it builds confidence between the United States and
Russia by providing vitally important continuing dialogue on
strategic nuclear issues. My hope is that this greater
confidence will lead to constructive approaches to dealing with
other problems between the United States and Russia, and it
will lead to a follow-on treaty that entails much greater
reductions and also deals with the tactical nuclear weapons and
the reserve nuclear warheads not covered in this treaty.
Third, it does improve strategic stability between the
United States and Russia by requiring both nations to provide
transparency and accountability of their vast nuclear arsenals.
Based on these judgments, I believe that this treaty does
advance American security objectives, particularly with respect
to what I consider to be our greatest nuclear threats, nuclear
proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and I look forward to
seeing this treaty come into force.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. William J. Perry, Michael and Barbara
Berberian Professor, Center for International Security and Cooperation,
Stanford University, Stanford, CA
Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you and other members of this
distinguished committee to discuss ratification for the New START
Treaty.
I would like to start my testimony by offering you five judgments
about the New START Treaty.
1. The reduction of deployed warheads entailed by the treaty is
modest, but the treaty is a clear signal that the United States is
serious about carrying out our responsibilities under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and will be welcomed as a positive step by the
other members of that treaty.
2. The treaty imposes no meaningful restraints on our ability to
develop and deploy ballistic missile defense systems, or our ability to
modernize our nuclear deterrence forces.
3. The treaty does not affect our ability to maintain an effective
nuclear deterrent, as specified by DOD planners in the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review.
4. The treaty is a valuable confidence-building measure in that it
provides for a vitally important continuing dialogue between the United
States and Russia on strategic nuclear weapons.
5. The treaty improves strategic stability between the United
States and Russia by requiring both nations to provide transparency and
accountability in the management of their strategic nuclear forces.
Based on these judgments, I recommend that the Senate consent to
the ratification of this treaty.
I would like to add further comments concerning some details of the
treaty.
The New START treaty limits deployed, strategic systems to an
aggregate of 1,550 warheads. These include warheads on deployed ICBMs
and SLBMs. Heavy bombers count as a single warhead toward these limits.
Further, the treaty creates ceilings on the number of deployed and
nondeployed strategic delivery platforms. Each nation retains the
ability to determine the composition of their forces within these
numbers. While the actual number of nuclear weapons available for
upload on deployed bombers are not counted, this unusual ``counting
rule'' is essentially equivalent between the United States and Russia.
In my opinion, this aspect of the treaty would not put the United
States at any disadvantage.
The focus of this treaty is on deployed warheads and it does not
attempt to count or control nondeployed warheads. This continues in the
tradition of prior arms control treaties. I would hope to see
nondeployed and tactical systems included in future negotiations, but
the absence of these systems should not detract from the merits of this
treaty and the further advances in arms control which it represents.
The transparency and verification regime in this treaty builds upon
the successful procedures and methods from the prior START Treaty.
Declarations of the number and locale of deployed missiles will be made
upon entry into force, and an inspection regime allows short-notice
access to ensure compliance. Technical aspects of the treaty include
establishment of unique identifiers for each missile and heavy bomber
and their locations, an important advance, which further enhances
inspection and verification. Missile tests continue to be monitored,
and the exchange of telemetry data is provided. While telemetry is not
necessary for verification of this treaty or for our security
interests, the continued exchange of telemetry is in our joint interest
as a further confidence-building measure.
Two important questions arise in the evaluation of this treaty.
They are whether the treaty constrains the United States ability to
modernize its nuclear deterrent and infrastructure and whether the
treaty constrains ballistic missile defenses. The treaty directly
addresses this first question. Article V of the treaty states
``modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be
carried out.'' The Congressional Commission on Nuclear Forces noted
that our nuclear weapons complex was in need of improvement. The
President's FY11 budget submission proposes substantial increases to
the nuclear weapons program for just this purpose. The 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review elaborates upon this need in detail. The administration
has been consistent in its statements and proposals on this point, all
of which support upgrade and improvement of the nuclear weapons
complex, including the replacement of key facilities for handling of
nuclear materiels. The New START Treaty does not inhibit any of these
plans or programs.
The development of Ballistic Missile Defense is similarly
unconstrained by this treaty. The preamble notes an interrelation
between strategic offensive and defensive arms and the importance of a
balance between them, but imposes no limits on further development of
missile defenses. Indeed, this treaty modestly enhances the ability to
develop missile defenses, in that retired strategic missiles required
for development of BMD are no longer constrained under the terms of New
START. Further, ballistic missile interceptors are specifically
excluded from the definition of ballistic missiles under this treaty.
The treaty does prohibit the conversion of ICBM launchers for missile
defense purposes. We do not, in fact, plan to do so, so this limitation
will have no practical impact on our BMD systems.
Mr. Chairman, the New START Treaty is a positive step in United
States-Russia arms negotiations. This treaty establishes a ceiling on
strategic arms while allowing the United States to maintain a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. This treaty does not limit
America's ability to structure its offensive arsenal to meet current or
future threats, nor does it prevent the future modernization of the
American nuclear arsenal. Additionally, the treaty puts no meaningful
limits on our Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense program, and in fact it
reduces restrictions that existed under the previous START Treaty. I
recommend ratification.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I welcome your questions regarding the New START Treaty.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Perry and
Secretary Schlesinger.
In your joint effort of the Strategic Posture Commission,
you concluded that the United States and Russia should continue
to pursue a step-by-step approach to arms control, with the
objective being to ``rejuvenate'' or ``achieve a `robust' arms
control process that survives the expiration of the START
agreement.'' I assume you believe, from your comments, that
this particular approach of this agreement, modest as it is
described, does achieve that?
Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Secretary Perry.
Dr. Perry. Yes.
The Chairman. And, that said, you highlighted, Dr.
Schlesinger, in your comments a moment ago, appropriately, the
asymmetry between the United States and Russia with respect to
the tactical nuclear weapons. I agree with you, this committee
did draw focus on that, and it is an ongoing concern and many
of us believe it has to be brought into--there's a point where
we've got to start counting them and putting them into this
equation.
But in the Strategic Posture Commission you explicitly
recommended that there's a first step, and the first step in
reinvigorating the Russian arms control process is ``modest and
straightforward,'' and should not ``strive for a bold new
initiative.'' That is, is it fair to say that you did not
anticipate that this particular step of moving to the next step
of START, that that would in fact bring the tactical at this
stage?
Dr. Schlesinger. No, I did not anticipate that.
The Chairman. But this is a----
Dr. Schlesinger. I think it's most unfortunate.
The Chairman. But this is a precursor, is it not? I mean,
any effort to be able to get to that requires us to ratify this
agreement?
Dr. Schlesinger. Yes. And I fervently hope that it's a
precursor.
The Chairman. So do I. I think we all do.
Secretary Perry, do you want to comment on that?
Dr. Perry. Yes. In my testimony I express the hope that the
confidence-building that would develop from this treaty and the
ongoing dialogues it would have would lead to improvements in
many other areas, not just further nuclear treaties, but in the
other areas of disagreement between the United States and
Russia, but in particular it would lead to a follow-on treaty
dealing with the tactical nukes and also dealing with the
thousands of reserve warheads that we have.
I might mention that the asymmetry in tactical nuclear
weapons is primarily in favor of the Soviet Union, but the
asymmetry in strategic weapons in reserve is primarily in the
favor of the United States and is a very sore issue with the
Russians that I speak to. We have the capability of rapidly
uploading thousands of nuclear weapons onto our strategic
forces if we choose to do so.
The Chairman. That's a point that I wanted to get to and I
appreciate very much your drawing that out. There is an
asymmetry on the tactical, but the decision to begin
withdrawing and continue to withdraw tactical from Europe that
we controlled has been shared by Republican and Democrat
administration alike, correct?
Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, indeed.
The Chairman. Secretary Perry.
Dr. Perry. Yes.
The Chairman. And we have maintained a much more
significant stockpile, that in fact the Russians fear we could
break out at any moment; is that accurate?
Dr. Perry. I believe that is accurate. It's not so much
that we have the stockpile as we have the ability to rapidly
upload it, for example on our Trident submarines.
The Chairman. I'm sorry. Secretary Schlesinger.
Dr. Schlesinger. The Russians have a live production base
for their nuclear weapons. We do not. There is that asymmetry
along with the asymmetry with regard to reserve weapons.
The Chairman. Drawing on your considerable experience in
this field and then sort of making these evaluations about our
national security leads you to make this conclusion that this
step-by-step process is critical because you have to get this
treaty in place and build on it in order to begin to address
this further asymmetry?
Dr. Perry. That is my judgment, yes.
Dr. Schlesinger. I hope that you are right, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. What's the alternative, Secretary
Schlesinger?
Dr. Schlesinger. Oh, there's no alternative. I hope that
you're right that this----
The Chairman. That we will address it?
Dr. Schlesinger [continuing]. That we have a further step.
I don't think that the incentives that the Russians have are
very powerful at the moment.
Dr. Perry. I would add to that. I think the next step will
be very difficult, both for the Russians and for us, because it
not only involves dealing with the tactical nuclear weapons,
which they consider they have threats well beyond the United
States that cause them to have tactical nuclear weapons, but it
will require counting warheads in a verifiable way and that's a
step we have never taken before.
The Chairman. Agreed. And I think we need to, and I
suggested, frankly, at the outset of this effort that we have
to figure out how to get to that counting, because that, in the
end, is really the most salient feature of balance, if you
will.
I wonder if you both would speak to this issue. Tell us, if
you would, what is it about this treaty that leaves you
confident that the numbers, both in launchers and warheads, are
in fact adequate to address the question of this asymmetry as
well as just the broad national security concerns of our
country in the balance of our relationship with Russia and any
threats we might or might not face?
Dr. Perry. Mr. Chairman, it is simply that we have so many
warheads and so many delivery vehicles that we can destroy
Russia many times over with this capability. So we are not
close yet to the point where the number of nuclear weapons we
have is so low that that would become an issue.
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that the overall relationship and
the general military relationships in this era for both Russia
and China are such that there is little temptation on their
part to launch an attack on the United States. I think it's the
overall political relationship, part of which stems from what
Bill has said, that can give us confidence in this area.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Gentlemen, the report of the Strategic
Posture Commission observed: ``The debate over the proposed
Reliable Replacement Warhead revealed a lot of confusion about
what was intended, what is needed, and what constitutes new,
and believes that as the Nation moves forward we must be clear
about what is being initiated and what is not, as well as what
makes a weapon new and what does not.''
My question: What do each of you consider the new
developments the United States should undertake within the next
10 years in our nuclear stockpile? Second, there's considerable
confusion over what ``modernization'' means for the current
nuclear stockpile. Could each of you provide your views as to
what the term means? Do we need new, modern warheads, bombers,
missiles, or all of the above?
Dr. Perry. In our commission report we discussed that issue
in some detail and I still stand by what we said in that
report. We basically have said that maintaining confidence in
the stockpile as we go forward is multidimensional. It
includes, among other things, maintaining a robust, science-
based program, the so-called stockpile stewardship program,
which had been on the decrease as we conducted the report. We
felt it was very important to get that on an increasing level
again. Second, it involved a robust stockpile surveillance
program, which was also, we thought, declining and not adequate
to the job. That had to be increased.
Finally, it involved maintaining a life extension program,
and we offered the view that simply refurbishing existing
warheads might not be sufficient in the future; we had to also
consider replacing components on the missile and, if necessary,
redesigns; and that which of these three approaches were to be
used would be considered on a case-by-case basis.
As I read the Nuclear Posture Review, those judgments are
echoed in the Nuclear Posture Review.
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that Bill has summarized the
situation. We urged a case-by-case study of individual weapons
and that, if necessary, we have replacement. The Nuclear
Posture Review allows for that with the permission of the
President and the Congress. But it is somewhat narrower than
what was recommended by the commission, in that it is beyond
the case-by-case review of the weapons in the stockpile.
May I add that it is essential that we augment the money
that has been allocated for the labs, for the science program,
in particular that the add-on for next year looks to be
significant, but I hope in the out years that it continues to
be appropriate. We don't know yet. Within a few weeks at least,
we should have the 10-year program recommended by the
administration, which will I think influence strongly the
decisions of Senators.
Senator Lugar. It appears that Secretary Gates agrees with
both of you and is apparently asking for approximately $5
billion in additional funds to achieve these ends. I just
wonder whether either of you have been in consultation with
Secretary Gates, if you believe you're on the same wavelength,
and what confidence you have in his leadership in this area?
Dr. Schlesinger. I have great confidence in Secretary
Gates.
Dr. Perry. I do, too.
Senator Lugar. Your commission's report noted that existing
alternatives to stockpile stewardship and life extension
involve varying degrees of reuse and/or redesign. You noted
further that the decision on which approach should be best is
to be made on a type-by-type basis, as you've just said,
Secretary Schlesinger.
The Nuclear Posture Review stated that in its decision to
proceed to engineering development for warhead lifetime
extension the United States will give strong preference to
options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear
components would be undertaken only if the critical stockpile
management program could not otherwise be met and is
specifically authorized by the President and the Congress.
Now, do you both believe that the NPR provides sufficient
flexibility to our weapons designers when it comes to replacing
certain components in our nuclear weapons, and is the NPR's
guidance inconsistent with your commission's broad
recommendations which I cited earlier?
Dr. Schlesinger. It is somewhat inconsistent, but there is
a political reality, which the administration--the Congress has
fought off new weapons, such as the RRW, over the years. What
we have is a step forward, a major step forward, given the
attitudes that have been taken, particularly on the Hill, with
regard to upgrading the nuclear weapons stockpile.
We have made a significant advance. It will depend, of
course, on whether the House is prepared to provide the funds,
due to the peculiar jurisdiction. That remains an open
question.
Dr. Perry. I think the Nuclear Posture Review is a major
step forward in this respect. It explicitly authorizes reuse,
which the laboratories have felt reluctant to use before, and
it gives the condition under which redesign can be achieved. I
think this
is a major step forward from where we are before. But whether
this all plays out appropriately does depend on the level of
the funding given to the laboratories. As I have seen this
year's budget proposal and the 5-year plan, I think these are
moving in the right direction.
The Congress has requested a 10-year plan in this regard. I
support that request and I think--because the issues we're
looking at here really span over more like 10 years than 5
years. So I would encourage you to proceed in that direction.
Dr. Schlesinger. May I mention a worry in that connection.
There is in the plan money for the new facilities at Los Alamos
and at Y-12. The problem is that if we have cost overruns at
those new facilities we do not want to see the consequence of
taking it out of the laboratories' budget.
Dr. Perry. I agree with that.
Senator Lugar. Gentlemen, I have some additional questions.
If I submit these to you, could you reply for the record so
that the record of our hearing and your views will be more
complete?
Dr. Perry. Yes.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
holding the hearing. I intend to carefully review this treaty.
The treaty would reduce the size of our nuclear arsenal without
constraining our ability to defend our Nation, while fostering
the international cooperation needed to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons and materiels. The treaty also works to reduce
and secure Russia's nuclear stockpile, which has noted
vulnerabilities.
At the same time, we must ensure that the treaty is
verifiable and does not compromise our ability to monitor
nuclear weapons and materiels in Russia. As a member of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I intend to carefully
review the inspection regime under this treaty to ensure that
on balance it adds to our understanding of the Russian arsenal.
Meanwhile, I thank our distinguished witnesses for being
here. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the United States, which they chaired, concluded that:
``Terrorist use of a nuclear weapon against the United States
or its friends and allies is more likely than deliberate use by
a state.'' To me this underscores what I have long believed,
that to best secure our Nation we must move beyond a cold-war
mindset and focus on the threat that terrorists could gain
access to nuclear weapons or materiels, and I do think that
this treaty represents a step in that direction.
Secretary Perry, you've recently written that this
administration's plan for modernizing our nuclear complex and
arsenal is consistent with the recommendations of the Strategic
Posture Commission that you two chaired. You've also testified
that this treaty ``imposes no meaningful constraints on our
ability to modernize our nuclear deterrence forces.'' In fact,
is it true that the administration's plans to expand the
infrastructure of our nuclear complex at Los Alamos would
actually increase our capacity to produce plutonium pits beyond
the level that your commission's final report found was
necessary to maintain our nuclear arsenal?
Dr. Perry. The proposed--the administration's plans for
both the plutonium and the uranium facility restoration will in
my judgment provide adequate and maybe even more than adequate
capability for the needs which I can imagine. As it stands
right now, Los Alamos is capable of producing plutonium pits,
but at a rather low level. This will modernize and expand that
capability.
Senator Feingold. Secretary Schlesinger, there has been a
lot of discussion about the ways in which ratifying this treaty
will enhance our national security. Could you say a little bit
about the ways in which failure to ratify this treaty may be
detrimental to our national security, especially in light of
the fact that without the treaty we cannot continue inspections
of the Russian arsenal?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that the principal defect if the
Senate does not ratify lies in the political area, in some of
the points that have already been made by Secretary Perry. To
wit, for the United States at this juncture to fail to ratify
the treaty in the due course of the Senate's deliberation would
have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others
with regard to particularly the nonproliferation issue.
Senator Feingold. Secretary Perry, you wrote in an op-ed
that this treaty is the first tangible product of the
administration's promise to ``press the reset button on the
United States-Russian relations.'' Should we be concerned about
the kind of message we'd send to other nations, for example
Iran, about the United States-Russian ability to work together
on nonproliferation concerns if we failed to ratify a treaty
that brings mutual security benefits?
Dr. Perry. Senator Feingold, I believe that our inability
to control or to limit or restrain nuclear arsenals of either
North Korea or Iran has been largely the result of our
inability to work effectively with the other nations that we
need, whose cooperation we need. That includes not only Russia,
but China as well. Put in a positive way, to adequately deal
with North Korea's and Iran's nuclear aspirations, we need full
cooperation of other nations, particularly Russia and China.
This treaty will not guarantee that, but this treaty is
moving us in that direction of a much better understanding of
the relationship with Russia in these vital matters.
Senator Feingold. Secretary Perry, you stated that it will
be important in future agreements to secure commitments to
dismantle weapons; dismantle weapons and not simply put them in
reserve. I note that the United States already has a backlog of
weapons waiting to be dismantled. In order to secure
commitments on dismantling excess weapons, how important is it
that we reduce our existing backlog?
Dr. Perry. I think we are dismantling weapons at a rate
compatible with our facilities for doing that, and I think that
should be continued. But beyond the weapons that we're planning
to dismantle, we have many weapons in reserve that we don't
plan to dismantle. Both categories, both weapons waiting for
dismantlement and weapons in reserve, both of those categories
have to be considered in future treaties, I think, along with
the consideration of the tactical nuclear weapons that Russia
has.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Secretary.
Dr. Schlesinger. Again, I repeat that the Russians have a
live production base. They turn over their inventory of nuclear
weapons every 10 years. We do not. And therefore the weapons in
reserve are, in effect, a substitute--a partial substitute--for
a live production base.
Senator Feingold. I thank both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you distinguished Americans for being
here today. Both of you expressed a frustration or a concern
with the ability to count nondeployable warheads and tactical
warheads, I think equally so. But both of you said that this
treaty is absolutely essential to get to the point where we can
do that, or at least that's the inference that I received.
You also, I think, both said in one way or another in your
testimony that the Russians' lack of ability to want to be able
to be accountable for tactical weapons is because they are much
more threatened at their border or in proximity than we are. Am
I correct in what I said?
Dr. Perry. Yes.
Dr. Schlesinger. To the Poles, a short-range tactical, so-
called, missile or weapon is hard to distinguish from a
strategic weapon.
Senator Isakson. My question then--and I think--is it ``Dr.
Perry'' and ``Dr. Schlesinger''? Is that--I want to be
respectful.
Dr. Schlesinger. I beg your pardon?
Senator Isakson. You're both doctors, correct? OK, I always
want to be respectful of that.
Dr. Perry, you expressed concern--and I think you did, too,
Dr. Schlesinger--with dirty bombs or the terrorist threat being
the greater threat than a state attack on the United States. It
seems to me like the easiest access for a terrorist to nuclear
materiel would be in a tactical weapon or one of these
nondeployable weapons; is that correct?
Dr. Perry. I'd like to clarify that point. At least from my
point of view, when I was speaking about the terrorist nuclear
threat I was considering the possibility that terrorists would
get a real nuclear bomb, not just a dirty bomb. That's the
major concern I have.
Beyond that, there's a possibility that a terrorist could
make a dirty bomb, but I do not put that in the same ballpark
at all in terms of the catastrophes that it could cause. That
could be done without having access to uranium or plutonium.
That could be done with medical radioactive materiel, for
example.
So that is an issue which I hold separate from the issue.
The dirty bomb issue I'm treating separately from that. My
comments all applied to a terrorist getting a real nuclear
bomb, one that goes off with a nuclear explosion.
Dr. Schlesinger. The greatest threat remains the
possibility, however remote, of a major missile exchange with
the Russians or with China. The most probable threat is, of
course, the use of a weapon by terrorists, but that is a much
lower order of destruction that could be visited on the United
States.
Senator Isakson. Is there anything in this treaty that
helps us with regard to some degree of comfort that a terrorist
is not going to get a weapon? Is there anything in the treaty
that helps us with that?
Dr. Perry. I believe only indirectly, but in an important
way indirectly.
Senator Isakson. Would you elaborate on that?
Dr. Perry. There are two different things we can do, two
fundamentally different things that can be done. One is to keep
nuclear weapons from proliferating. To the extent that North
Korea builds up a nuclear arsenal, to the extent that Iran gets
nuclear weapons, to the extent that other nations follow their
lead, this increases the probability that a terror group could
get a nuclear weapon.
So nuclear proliferation is one danger that could lead to a
terror group getting a nuclear weapon. The other has to do with
better controlling access to fissile materiel, for example in
research reactors. That's what the nuclear summit was all about
last month, trying to get nations to deal with that problem.
In both of those cases, these are international problems
and they require support and cooperation from other
international nations. I think this treaty is one modest step
in the direction of getting that support from other nations.
But it by no means solves the problem.
Dr. Schlesinger. To this point, Senator Isakson, even
though both Russia and China are privileged under the NPT as
nuclear weapons states, they have given us precious little aid
with regard to the proliferation problem, quite notably in
North Korea or in Iran. I hope that they change, but I don't
have a great deal of confidence. Therefore, it's not clear to
me as a practical matter whether or not we are going to be able
to get any more aid from either of them on these issues.
However, while I'm more pessimistic than Secretary Perry, I
think that we ought to make the attempt.
Senator Isakson. So I take that to mean, given your
feelings about China and Russia regarding help on
proliferation, you still believe that this treaty does not
compromise us and gives us a platform to improve that? Is that
what I heard you say?
Dr. Schlesinger. That is indeed correct. It provides us
with a platform. Whether or not that platform turns out to be
particularly useful in the final event is the question.
Dr. Perry. I would put it slightly differently. I would say
this treaty is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
such cooperation.
Senator Isakson. Well, I think from my standpoint and
responsibility as a Senator from the State of Georgia, and
having been here on 9/11 and having seen the change of our
world vis-a-vis the growth of terrorism, the single most
important issue I think to my constituents in Georgia, and to
me personally, is the goal that you both have stated in terms
of removing or reducing the accessibility of fissionable
materiel to terrorists. That's going to be one of the major
things I weigh my decision on in terms of whether or not we
ratify any treaty, because that's got to be our ultimate goal.
I really appreciate both of your attendance today. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Perry, Secretary Schlesinger, we're honored by
your presence and commend you and thank you for your public
service, which I guess you could say was before, during, and
after your service in the U.S. Government.
I wanted to touch on two or three areas, first of all on
missile defense. Secretary Perry, I wanted to refer to your
statement and in particular on page 2 you said that there are
two important questions that arise upon evaluation of the
treaty. The first
was whether the treaty--and I'm quoting from your testimony:
``whether the treaty constrains the United States ability to
modernize its nuclear deterrent and infrastructure.'' At the
end--you did some analysis after that.
At the end of the paragraph you say: ``The New START Treaty
does not inhibit any of these plans or programs.'' Is that
correct?
Dr. Perry. It does not inhibit any plans or programs that
we actually plan to pursue, as General O'Reilly has testified.
It does inhibit our ability to use ICBM launchers for ballistic
missile launchers, but that's something we had not planned to
do anyway.
Senator Casey. The second question you raised on that page
was ``whether the treaty constrains ballistic missile
defenses.'' Then you go through analysis of that, and you say,
and I'm quoting, that it ``imposes no limits on further
development of missile defenses.'' Is that correct?
Dr. Perry. That's correct.
Senator Casey. I wanted to have you elaborate on that, and
invite Secretary Schlesinger as well, because that's become a
point of contention and it's important that we, even prior to
formal debate, that we examine and explore that question. I
think it's pretty clear, but I think it's important that we
highlight it.
I don't know if there's anything you wanted to add to that
or highlight about that question about missile defense?
Dr. Perry. I've read the treaty and its protocols, but I've
not read the annexes yet because they're not available yet. And
I see nothing in the treaty or its protocol that limits our
development or deployment of ballistic missile defenses in any
way that we plan to do.
Dr. Schlesinger. I think, Secretary Casey, that, if I may
say so, there's some overstatement on the part of the
administration in presenting this treaty, in that it says that
it limits missile defense in no way. The answer is we have
limited the capacity to insert missile defenses in Minuteman
silos or in tubes that are empty in our submarine fleet. As
Bill Perry has just indicated, we had no plans to do that. But
it is an overstatement to say that nothing in the treaty
inhibits missile defense. I don't think that it inhibits
missile defense in a serious way, however.
Senator Casey. Well, it's important that we incorporate by
reference that fuller answer to that question. I appreciate
that.
Second, with regard to one of the benefits of this treaty,
we could make a list, but one of them that I think a lot of not
just Members of the U.S. Senate, but I think the American
people, will have, I think, after a debate have more of an
appreciation for is this question of verification. I just want
to see if you could speak to that in terms of the elements of
it, what we gain in terms of verification, especially with
respect to the passage of time and how both the passage of time
as well as new technology, in addition to the provisions in the
treaty, allow us to amplify or enlarge our ability to have
stronger verification.
Dr. Perry. I think the inspection provisions considerably
enhance our ability to verify the treaty. But we should
understand that they are supplementary to our national
technical means, which are quite considerable. The treaty also
provides a noninterference clause, that is a clause that says
both parties agree not to interfere with the national technical
means, which I think is important.
So I would look at the verification both from the point of
view of what it permits us to do and from the point of view of
what it restricts the Russians from doing relative to national
technical means.
Dr. Schlesinger. As compared to START I, our verification
capabilities are restricted. However, as compared to the period
since December of last year when START I lapsed, this is a
resurrection, as it were, of some degree of verification
capacity. Under START I we had total access to telemetry on the
part of Russia, previously the Soviet Union. Now we have
considerably more restricted access. I trust that it will still
be adequate. We have more limited inspection possibilities. We
have been obliged to limit our monitoring at the perimeter of
Votkinsk to know how many missiles come out. That is some
limitation.
I think all in all that the verification possibilities
under this treaty, though much more limited than START I, are
still adequate.
Dr. Perry. I would add to that, Senator Casey, that the
primary restriction relative to START I has to do with
telemetry, but that is because the telemetry was necessary to
monitor START I. START I had technical features in it for which
telemetry was necessary for verification. Those features are
not in the New START Treaty. In fact, I would make a stronger
statement: There is no need for telemetry at all in order to
verify this treaty.
I'm grateful that we have the telemetry because I think
it's a useful confidence-building measure, but it is not needed
to verify the treaty.
Dr. Schlesinger. That is correct, but the reason is that we
have given up on limits on throw weight and on MIRVing of
Russian missiles.
Senator Casey. I'm out of time. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, Senator Casey has already raised what he knows
is an important issue to me and I think probably himself and
other members on the committee, and that is the defensive
posture of the United States with regard to developing various
defensive systems. As we know, different administrations have
had a different view of the appropriateness of doing so. So
I've got a number of questions about that.
I would start with this: What in the world is that doing in
here in the first place? Why--you say, well, we weren't
planning on using the old tubes in either the submarines or
land-based. Why--why is this in the treaty in the first place?
I mean, this is supposed to be, as I understand it, an
offensive weapons treaty. I know the Russians--this has always
bothered them, about us trying to defend ourselves.
To me, the most important function of a government is to
defend itself, and I'm very, very troubled by this. Could I get
your comments?
Dr. Perry. I don't know why this is in the treaty. I'm
confident it in no way--it restricts us in no way from doing
anything that we plan to do. So it does not bother me. I'm not
concerned about it.
Dr. Schlesinger. The question is better addressed to the
negotiators. I think this was regarded as a throwaway on their
part because we were not planning to use the Minuteman silos,
et cetera, for defensive missiles.
Senator Risch. I understand that whoever it is that's
speaking right now for the administration doesn't plan that,
but administrations change and it is entirely possible, I would
think, that in the future these apparatus will be considered to
be used for defensive purposes. So again, I just can't
understand why they would have incorporated that in there.
Dr. Schlesinger. I can understand your expression of
concern, Senator. I think that the reality is that there is
nothing in the treaty that is problematic. I think that the
problem will exist of the continued Russian pressure on us with
regard to missile defense, as reflected in the preamble.
Senator Risch. The issue to me becomes more complex as we
go forward and attempt to guard ourselves from an attack from
Iran or North Korea, which of course is an entirely different
proposition than our relationship with the Russians, which
relies on a mutual destruction sort of philosophy. Not so with
the Iranians and the North Koreans, and they don't think the
same way that the Russians do and so we're going to have to
think about defending ourselves differently.
So you can understand why I'm concerned about that issue
being raised in any way in this treaty. Is that a legitimate
concern?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that it's a legitimate concern. I
do not think that we will be inhibited by this treaty or even
by the Russian pressure with respect to defending ourselves
against North Korea and ultimately against Iran, because those
deployments are much lower. In the case of Iran, we are dealing
primarily with regional missile defenses and they are in no way
inhibited by this treaty.
Senator Risch. However, during the course of this treaty,
if you believe those that are trying to predict forward, they
believe that the Iranians and the North Koreans will develop
sufficient missile technology to reach substantially further
than what they do now. Would that be a fair statement?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think there's no question about that,
that we have evidence of the North Koreans reaching in that
direction. We have flimsier evidence with regard to Iran, but
ultimately they are going to go in that direction. And we will
need to take protection against them as modest nuclear powers,
as opposed to China or Russia, which will be major nuclear
powers.
Senator Risch. Finally--and I'll wrap up, Mr. Chairman. But
finally, I'm assuming that you gentlemen have read the
unilateral statements from each of the parties. In regards to
my concerns about our defensive posture, the unilateral
statement by the Russians is problematic and certainly doesn't
help resolve the questions that I have. In my judgment, it
would seem to me that the Russians need to be straightened out
on this issue, because we obviously view it differently than
they do.
Have you got any suggestions as to how we do this as we go
forward if we are to ratify this treaty?
Dr. Schlesinger. On this particular issue, we've been
trying to straighten out the Russians for many years. We have
been unsuccessful to this point. If you go back and look at the
discussions under the SORT Treaty, for example, and the runup
to the SORT Treaty, you have exactly the same line from the
Russians that you have today. I think that it is likely to
remain a perennial issue for them and that our position will
have to be that we will resist those pressures from Russia.
Dr. Perry. I think the issue, as Dr. Schlesinger says, has
been a disagreement between the two of our countries for a long
time. I think going into the future the best way of dealing
with this issue, of confronting this issue, would be through
the consultative commission which is set up under this treaty.
This at least gives us a forum in which we can meaningfully
discuss these issues. It gives us some better chance at
arriving at a mutual understanding than we now have.
It's not an issue that we will be able to deal with through
trading press releases, but we might be able to get some
progress on it through this consultative forum.
Dr. Schlesinger. For the Russians, it is not only a serious
issue in their minds, but, more than that, it is a political
battering ram that they have been using against us over the
years, and I don't think that we will persuade them to give it
up.
Senator Risch. Gentlemen, my time is up and I thank you for
your candid answers.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar,
for holding the hearing today. Thank you, gentlemen, for being
kind enough to appear. I have limited time because I actually
have to go preside over the Senate and I can't be late for
that.
But I wanted to follow up on a couple of issues that have
been raised by my colleagues. Secretary Perry, you suggested in
your testimony that the new treaty's transparency and
verification regime could be valuable in building confidence
and improving our strategic stability between--with Russia. Can
you talk a little bit more on why you think this is important
as we look at some of the issues that have been raised in the
testimony today about tactical nuclear weapons and about
dealing with Iran and some of the other challenges we face with
respect to nuclear proliferation?
Dr. Perry. I have had a good many discussions with Russian
officials, both in government and also Russian think-tank
people, about these issues, and the level of misunderstanding,
mistrust, between our two countries in this field has been
rather high. So the best thing that has happened in the last--
so far on this treaty, has been the dialogue that's already
taken place in the last year. Just the negotiations of the
treaty have brought our two sides together seriously discussing
these issues of disagreement.
Assuming the treaty is ratified and enters into force, then
the consultative commission set up by that is a vehicle for
continuing that dialogue. This I think gives us the best chance
of dealing with these misunderstandings.
In addition to that, I would hope that after this treaty
goes into force that, even beyond the consultative commission,
we have bilateral talks on how to deal with the Iranian nuclear
threat, first of all how to prevent it from developing, on
which, as Dr. Schlesinger said, the Russians have been very
little help so far, and then, if it does develop, how to
counter it effectively. That can be done much more effectively
as a multilateral effort than a unilateral effort.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger, back in 1991 when the hearings were going
on on the original START Treaty, you testified that: ``Arms
control can't transform a relationship of hostility, but it is
the transformation of the relationship that makes serious arms
control possible.'' Can you talk about how you would apply that
same logic to the treaty before us today?
Dr. Schlesinger. The change that takes place is only in the
area in which both sides agree. In this case the Russians, as I
have indicated, have been quite resistant to any discussion of
the tactical nuclear weapons. This is not a problem of this
administration. It goes on from administration to
administration.
We have common interests in reducing strategic weapons if
they are not reduced to the point that they entice, for
example, the Chinese to get into the competition, and that we
do not reduce strategic weapons to the point that the tactical
nuclear weapons posture of the Russians becomes overwhelming in
numerical terms, which would frighten our allies, although I
don't think we are going to get into a missile exchange with
the Russians.
The upshot is that only in those areas in which there is
some degree of initial agreement can one proceed effectively
with arms control. The irony is that in those areas in which
there is no agreement and might benefit from arms control, such
as tactical nuclear weapons, that we have so far seen such
subjects elude is in the arms control process.
Senator Shaheen. You both testified on START I and the SORT
Treaty acknowledging shortcomings in both of those, I think
just as you have today, acknowledging that there are things
that you might like to see differently, done differently. But
you still recommended ratification of those two treaties. Do
you have a recommendation relative to what we should do with
this treaty?
Dr. Perry. My written statement did recommend ratification,
yes.
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that it is obligatory for the
United States to ratify. And any treaty is going to have
limitations, questionable areas. There are some in this treaty.
We need to watch them for the future, but that does not mean
that the treaty should be rejected.
Senator Shaheen. Do you have thoughts about what
ratification or failure to ratify might--what signals that
might send to the other NPT signatories?
Dr. Perry. Most certainly, if we fail to ratify this treaty
the United States will have forfeited any right to provide any
leadership in this field throughout the world. I mean, that's
pretty clear.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that that's essentially right. I
wouldn't use the word ``forfeit'' myself.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both.
The Chairman. ``Loss,'' is that a good word?
Gentlemen, we are very, very appreciative for your
appearance here today. I have some questions for the record,
and I appreciate your willingness to entertain those.
Let me just say one word with respect to the issue raised
by Senator Risch, which--I don't recall, were you at the
breakfast with Secretary Clinton with us?
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, I raised, as you recall, the
exact same issues with Secretary Clinton and her team. I left
there less than satisfied and I'm continuing to----
The Chairman. Well, it's important to probe it. Obviously,
that's the purpose. I just hadn't recalled whether--I knew that
the question had been raised and I knew it was answered there
very specifically.
But I do think--and just maybe we can wrap up on this area.
What has sustained us throughout the elaborate arms race that
we went through over the course of whatever, 50-plus years, and
saw us rise to a level of some 50,000 warheads, et cetera--and
we're now moving in the opposite direction, gratefully, under
both Republican and Democratic Presidents--has been this
essential need to have a balance of the deterrent, the power
between us, the perception of threat each to each other.
I think it's fair to say that the Russians--and I think
this will come out in the course of the record--consistently
pressed hard at a number of different levels to try to put
missile defense four-square within the framework of this
treaty. It is not. The preamble language, which is the only
real reference--I think Secretary Schlesinger used the term
``throwaway''--is effectively throwaway language that simply
acknowledges what most people believe is a reality, that
offense is affected by defense.
The truth is that if you build a sufficient level of
defense and the other side's just sitting there and it's
unmatched, you can effectively destroy their deterrent, their
capacity to believe they have a sufficient level of offense to
do anything. The result is that you then have the possibility
of setting off another arms race, et cetera, which is why,
while many of us are supporting the research and development of
defense and we have to have the ability to have it, we also
believe it has to be done in a very responsible, perhaps even
shared and multilateral way, so that people don't misinterpret
what you're doing, because if you take it too far you can undo
all of the benefits that you do otherwise.
Is that a fair statement of sort of what's contained within
this simple sentence, Secretaries?
Dr. Schlesinger. If I may go back in history----
The Chairman. Please. We invite you to. That's why we have
you here.
Dr. Schlesinger. Secretary McNamara, when the Russians
deployed the Galosh system around Moscow, said: We are not
going to build a missile defense ourselves. He was opposed to
it. But, he said, we are going to overwhelm the Russians. And
he developed MIRV capabilities in order to fulfill that, what
we called the Moscow package.
When we passed the ABM Treaty in 1972, both sides
recognized the inadequacy at that time of ABM defenses. They
have been improved substantially. The technology has been
improved substantially. But once again, our attitude and their
attitude was, if the ABM defenses begin to threaten our
capability to retaliate, we shall expand our offensive forces.
So in dealing with the major powers, China and Russia, we
must be careful, I think, not to convey to them that we are
threatening their retaliatory capability. At the same time, as
Senator Risch says, we are obliged to have a deployment of
defenses adequate to deal with the newcomers in this business,
Iran, North Korea, and so forth. It's not because we would not
like to have an impenetrable defense, as President Reagan had
hoped for. It's just beyond our capability. They can always
beat us with the offensive capabilities.
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, may I just respond briefly?
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Senator Risch. First of all, I have the highest respect for
your view of that situation, and of course I have the highest
respect for the history. But I think where we are here is
conditions have changed. As the Secretary points out,
conditions are very different today. At that time, we were
focused solely on the Russian threat. Today we have a much,
much broader threat than the Russian threat.
I appreciate the distinction that you made about how much
more serious an exchange of missiles would be with Russia than
if we got into it with either Iran or North Korea. In either
event, the American people would consider it devastating in any
event.
As we move forward and as conditions change, I think we
need to move forward and protect ourselves differently. And my
point is, is I don't want to just do this and go through the
motions of doing this and pretend that conditions are the same
as they were when we started and, if you would, cave to the
Russians in that regard. I would rather they had a very, very
clear understanding that we are going to do what is necessary
to protect the American people, not only from Russians, using
the old theory of ``We're going to overwhelm you with our
offense,'' but also that we are going to do everything we can
to defensively protect ourselves from rogue nations who would
do a demonstration shot or who would do a singular shot.
So that's where I'm coming from on this, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I completely agree and I don't think there's
any disagreement on any side of the aisle here. Three principal
reasons----
Dr. Schlesinger. This issue goes back to the Eisenhower
administration and over the course of the last half century we
have steadily adjusted our position with regard to missile
defenses, and we should, as you say, continue to do so.
The Chairman. I think, Senator, that here is the issue. The
three principal reasons for having a defense, which I support
for those reasons, would be a rogue state shot, a terrorist
event, or an accidental launch. It is critical that, in
whatever we do, the perceptions--all of this is driven by
perceptions, the perception of threat. The other side has a
perception of what we're doing. We have a perception of them.
For years, the perceptions kind of wildly drove it. We've
worked hard to try to control those perceptions. That's the key
here. So if the Russians think, as they did and have--and there
are some old-time players there who still see this very much in
the old way--if they think that our deployment unilaterally is
done in a way that is geared to affect their retaliation, as
the Secretary has said, then you can ignite something.
But if you're proceeding in a thoughtful, multilateral way
where people can share in that protection, which is what we
hope ultimately can happen, then you can do this very
responsibly. I think that this reference that the Russians have
put in this treaty is a real throwaway to say: ``Hey, guys,
don't forget there is this relationship and we have
perceptions; don't lose track of them.'' That's really what
they're saying.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Well, thank you very much.
Following up on the chair's statement about sharing the
development of this defense, you know, President Reagan
famously talked about this in the debate about this when he was
running for President in--I think it was for reelection in
1984. But we've come a long way in this debate since then. As
Secretary Schlesinger says, we've modified the debate as
circumstances changed.
I asked Secretary Gates last year about the concept of
developing a joint missile system with Russia. He said it was a
concept that might be worth pursuing. Other officials from the
Department of Defense confirmed just last week that indeed
conversations are ongoing with Russia to pursue such an
arrangement.
Secretary Perry, you wrote an op-ed on April 11 in the New
York Times saying the United States should pursue such an
arrangement. What are the benefits of a joint United States-
Russia missile defense program and how realistic is that, and
what are the stumbling blocks? And then we'll let Secretary
Schlesinger answer also.
Dr. Perry. About a year ago, I had a track two meeting with
senior Russians, including discussions with some Russian
officials, about that very idea specifically pointed at the
Iran threat. We agreed that the first step ought to be a joint
threat assessment, and that really is moving along very well. I
believe that in fact if Iran does get nuclear missiles they
pose a greater threat to Russia than they do to the United
States. So the joint threat assessment is a very important
first step in this, and that's already well under way in
unofficial circles, track two circles, and some discussion of
it in official circles as well.
The next step would be to find a way of technology-sharing.
That's moderately difficult to do that, but it could be done, I
think.
Then the third step would be a joint system, which has very
difficult problems that are associated with who makes the
decision about when it's fired and under what conditions. I see
those, both the second and the third steps, as being somewhere
between difficult and very difficult, but not beyond reach.
But I also believe that even discussing it seriously is a
good step forward in helping to build confidence between the
two nations. But I do believe it's important to move forward in
those serious discussions and I think both countries are
prepared to do so now.
Senator Wicker. Meanwhile, the Iranians do not tarry on
their side of it, do they? They're not waiting for us.
Dr. Perry. The Iranians are moving full speed ahead, as
nearly as I can determine. And I must say that, aside from
ballistic missile defense against the Iranians, my own view is
that we should be increasing our efforts to try to stop them
from getting the nuclear bomb in the first place.
Senator Wicker. Indeed, indeed.
Do you have any idea on the timetable on that first
component, the assessment, when that assessment might be ready?
Dr. Perry. Well, in the unofficial or track-two level that
has already been done. The group that I described that I was
working on last year completed that about 6 months ago. So
there is an unofficial joint assessment of the joint threat to
Russia and America. The official assessment I think--this has
yet to be agreed to officially, to move forward in this way. I
just express some hope and probably some confidence that it
will be done.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Schlesinger, would you like to comment?
Dr. Schlesinger. The area in which interest might be
expressed is with respect to radar and warning particularly of
what is going on south of the Russian border in Iran. What the
Russians contribute--you ask what benefit this might be. They
have important geography, which we lack. I think that that's
one aspect.
I think that also, that part of this discussion is intended
to reduce Russian--hopefully to reduce Russian concerns about
ballistic missiles which have been ongoing for almost 40 years.
Senator Wicker. Finally, let me ask you, Secretary
Schlesinger. You wrote an op-ed April 13 expressing concern
over the departure from our policy of calculated ambiguity. You
said that by stating that we will only use nuclear weapons
against nuclear-armed states we provide incentives for other
states, such as Syria, to focus on biological weapons as their
WMD of choice.
Can you tell a little more about the importance of that
policy, and did calculated ambiguity play a part during your
tenure? And is the threat posed by biological attack--what is
the level of that?
Dr. Schlesinger. At the time of my tenure we had a
decidedly inferior conventional forces posture and for that
reason calculated ambiguity lay behind our threat of nuclear
retaliation. That no longer drives us. It would seem to me that
you want to be very careful about moving away from calculated
ambiguity because of the incentives and the concerns that it
may develop.
It is ironical perhaps that the new policy seems directed
against states with nuclear weapons, to wit North Korea,
prospectively Iran and Israel. I don't think that the
likelihood of our actually retaliating against Israel is very
high, but they are implicitly specified when we say nuclear-
armed states as our way of attempting to back away from
countries that have aspirations for nuclear weapons.
Senator Wicker. Did I characterize your opinion correctly
as saying that we seem to be providing an unintended incentive
for biological WMD being the weapon of choice?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, of course Secretary Baker, during
the first gulf war, did convey that we would respond to the use
of weapons of mass destruction on the part of Saddam Hussein
with overwhelming force. It was inferred that he was referring
to nuclear weapons. We never stated that. It was calculated
ambiguity.
Similarly, if I may go back, Secretary Perry did hint at
some such development at the time that Qadafi was moving toward
chemical weapons. But I'll let Bill discuss what he said at
that time.
Dr. Perry. What I said was, when I was the Secretary and
Qadafi was moving toward a chemical weapon, I said that if they
went ahead with chemical weapons we would respond with
overwhelming force. And he could have interpreted that in many
different ways. In a later discussion I went on to say that we
would not need nuclear weapons to use overwhelming force
against Libya. We had quite substantial conventional capability
to provide overwhelming force. So whether or not ``overwhelming
force'' means nuclear depends on the context.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. It is, of course, calculated ambiguity.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. We like calculated ambiguity.
Senator Wicker. Yes, we do.
The Chairman. Senator Wicker, thank you very much.
As we wrap up, I want to note the fact, though we will have
expert testimony on this later on from the Defense Department
and elsewhere, that one of the principal reasons that we don't
think about using those ICBM silos for missile defense is very
simply that it would cost, according to every estimate, a lot
more to actually convert them than just to build a new missile
defense structure, which is I believe the accurate reason why
we're not contemplating using them. Is that fair, gentlemen?
Dr. Schlesinger. That is correct.
Dr. Perry. Yes.
The Chairman. Yes, Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Because this point has been raised several
times, some critics of the treaty have said that missile
defense or defensive mechanisms occurs in the preamble and the
preparatory sentence. But in addition, you have these five
silos at Vandenberg, for example. These are platforms for
missile defense and we've pledged not to use the five at
Vandenberg. There may be others, but those come to mind as ones
that are pointed to.
Now, when we've raised this question specifically with
Secretary Clinton and the group that she gathered with the
Foreign Relations Committee, they said this would be an
inferior way to launch missile defense. Not only don't we need
it, but we would not want or use it.
Unless somebody has a vested interest in keeping five silos
at Vandenberg, I'm not able to see the logic of our defending
something that our military people say we do not want and will
not use because we want to have a better missile defense from
platforms that will actually get the job done. Now, they didn't
use those terms, but I'm using them as an inference that we
will be involved in missile defense and we do want the very
best platforms, modern ones that might get the job done.
But I mention this because it keeps weaving through our
conversations, and I just ask for your further comment. Is this
your understanding of the statement we got from the Secretary?
Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, Senator. The advantage of using the
silos at Vandenberg would be a shorter time than construction.
Obviously, new construction would be cheaper.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, I think you know this, but I want
to, as I say ``thank you'' to you, I want to really thank you
on behalf of all the committee and the Senators for your
remarkable careers and the way in which you both give
unbelievable life to the concept of public citizenship, both
your stewardship in official positions and the way you both
continue to contribute to the dialogue of our country. We're
really very, very grateful to you. Thank you for being here
today.
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:17 p., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Dr. James Schlesinger to Questions Submitted
by Senator Kerry
Question. What were the key benefits to the United States from the
years of implementation of the original START Treaty? How did it help
us navigate the post-cold-war relationship with Russia?
Were there mistakes or miscalculations that you think we or
the Russians might have made if we had not had START in place
over those years?
Answer. Even in a time of deep antagonism, such as existed in the
early 1970s, arms control can set useful limits on needless production
or deployment of armaments. In a period like 1991, at the time of the
original START Treaty, when relations are much less antagonistic, arms
control can help to stabilize relationships. The original START Treaty
came at a time of growing rapprochement between the United States and
the Soviet Union. By itself arms control cannot engineer a change in
the overall relationship, but it can underscore a change.
All in all the relationship between the United States and Russia
has been quite stable, so that a turn toward nuclear threats was not
likely. Nonetheless, the improved relationship may have helped at a
time of deep political differences such as over the treatment and
future of Serbia in the mid-1990s when the Russians moved into
Pristina. That was a moment of tension that could have led to something
more.
Question. On April 10, you published a joint op-ed with Dr. Perry
in which you said that the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review ``makes
important strides in charting a sustainable bipartisan path forward for
the United States,'' and that ``healthy disagreements over some NPR
specifics should not obscure the valuable contribution it makes to
advancing U.S. national security interests.'' You added: ``Themes from
our report run through the Nuclear Posture Review and are embodied in
the new START agreement.''
Could you elaborate on those comments?
Answer. We have made a great deal of progress, at least
conceptually, in resolving some of the differences over our nuclear
posture. It is now accepted, I believe, that we should go forward with
refurbishment and life extension measures for weapons in our stockpile.
That ends a long period of domestic disagreement. We should take
advantage of ending that dispute over the future of our nuclear posture
by embracing what we have agreed upon. Disagreements will remain over
some specifics. For example, there is no agreement with regard to the
replacement of weapons in the stockpile. We should not allow such
remaining differences to interfere with what is a major step forward.
I believe that the nuclear posture review very closely, though not
slavishly, followed the recommendations of the Commission. In addition,
the Commission indicated that we could reduce our strategic nuclear
armaments, provided that reductions were parallel to those of Russia.
The Commission's recommendation that the United States not be inferior
in strategic arms to other nations--in light of our responsibilities
under extended deterrence have indeed been carried out.
Question. In your 1992 testimony on the original START Treaty, you
pointed out that any evaluation of a verification regime for a treaty
needs to take account of the political context of the time. So the way
we looked at the verification regime of the START Treaty in 1992--with
the Warsaw Pact already broken up and the Soviet Union itself in the
process of doing so--was different than we might have looked at it
right after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. How should we think
about the role of verification in the current era?
Answer. The verification regime under New START is less demanding
than it was under the original START Treaty. In part, that reflects the
relaxation with respect to rules on throw weights and MIRVs--so that
the needs of verification, given these standards, are reduced. Given
the overall political relationship between the United States and Russia
we believe that verification is adequate at this time. I regret, of
course, along with others, that we no longer have observers at
Voktinsk. That is regrettable. Yet, one must recognize that, since the
United States is not producing new missiles, the Russians regard the
observers at Voktinsk as a one-sided concession on their part.
Question. The Strategic Posture Commission endorsed having the
United States and Russia explore moving the arms control process beyond
a first agreement on modest reductions, but cautioned that there are
numerous challenges that await that effort. Could you describe what you
see as the most important opportunities to move beyond modest
reductions, and the most important challenges?
What does this tell us, more broadly, about what really can
be achieved through arms control?
Answer. The most important challenge, and simultaneously we may
hope the most important opportunity, is to deal with the issue of
tactical nuclear weapons. The Russians still maintain a
disproportionately large inventory of tactical nuclear weapons, while
the United States has radically reduced its own inventory. Not only is
the Russian position numerically lopsided, but because of geography it
is inherently asymmetrical. We have failed to grapple with this issue
since the agreed reductions in the 1990s of tactical nuclear weapons.
Over the last decade we have failed to face up to this issue. In my
judgment, until such time as the Russians are prepared seriously to
negotiate on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, it would be
imprudent to move beyond the reductions of the current agreement.
More broadly, what it tells us is that this era any further actions
with regard to a single category of weapons such as strategic missiles,
cannot be examined in isolation. It must be examined in an overall
context would include, not only tactical nuclear weapons, but overall
conventional capabilities as well. Such further reductions would imply,
however, a greater demand on both verification and compliance.
______
Responses of Dr. James Schlesinger to Questions Submitted
by Senator Risch
Question. In your statement to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, you stated that prior to ratification of new START, the
Senate will wish to carefully scrutinize the treaty in more than the
narrow context of strategic weapons, specifically: (a) The balance
between Russian tactical nuclear weapons and strategic weapons; (b) a
unilateral reduction in the number of launchers (no Russian reductions)
and the effect of reduced launchers on increasing instability due to
reduced targets; (c) the effect of the bomber counting rules on
stability; and (d) the effect of the treaty in terms of extended
deterrence (and Russian tactical superiority). Is it still your
recommendation that the Senate examine the answers to these questions
and on that basis determine whether to ratify this treaty?
Answer. Indeed it remains my strong recommendation that the Senate
examine all these questions, as it deliberates on whether or not to
ratify the New Start Treaty. Additional questions to be pondered, such
as the decision to ban the Navy's nuclear land attack missile (TLAM-N),
would focus particularly on the Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear
weapons. It would seem to me that until we get a grasp on the latter
issue, the administration should not consider any further reductions in
our strategic posture.
Question. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the United States, which you cochaired, concluded that, ``[a]s the
United States proceeds with stockpile refurbishment and modernization,
it must ensure that the design, assessment, and engineering processes
remain sufficiently intellectually competitive to result in a stockpile
of weapons that meet the highest standards of safety, security, and
reliability.'' And you also noted in your recent testimony, ``[a]gain,
I repeat that the Russians have a live production base. They turn over
their inventory of nuclear weapons every 10 years. We do not.'' As you
know, section 1251 of the FY 2010 NDAA requires the President to
provide a 10-year plan for the modernization of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent when the administration submits the START follow-on treaty to
the Senate.
How important do you consider it that the Senate ensures a
robust plan with serious prospects for its support over the
full 10 years, prior to deciding whether or not to consent to
the ratification of the START follow-on treaty?
If the administration's 1251 plan is not robust and is not
accompanied by a clear commitment to fund it over the life of
the treaty, should Senators take that into account when
deciding whether to support the treaty?
I believe that it is immensely important for the Senate to ensure,
what the administration has stated as its intent; i.e., that there be a
robust plan with a continuation of its support over the full 10 years,
before it proceeds to ratify this START follow-on treaty. Included in
this is a clear, continuous, and successful effort to prod the
Appropriations Committee of the House to provide the funding, which it
has been reluctant to do over recent years.
I reiterate that the administration will have made a commitment
with its 1251 plan. It would be obligatory for the administration to
see to it that it is carried out, and it is certainly appropriate for
Senators to take that into account, when deciding whether or not to
support the treaty.
Question. Obviously this is a bilateral treaty between the United
States and Russia, however, the United States has numerous security
commitments with other nations, both bilaterally as well as through the
North Atlantic Treaty and other agreements. In the broader security
context, do you believe this treaty helps or hinders America's ability
to provide deterrence and guarantee the security of our allies?
Answer. The treaty is intended to generate diplomatic support and
to indicate that the United States is fulfilling its obligation to
reduce its nuclear forces under the NPT. It may be successful in terms
of generating such diplomatic support. However, for those countries
which may feel themselves subject to pressures from major powers, the
reduction in U.S. forces under the treaty, to some extent unilateral,
will not help to build confidence in U.S. deterrence. This is
particularly true for our allies in Central Europe who have been
subject to at least hints of military pressure from Russia--as well as
to many observers in Japan.
Question. In your testimony in 1991, you referenced the
``limitations of arms control.'' Can you describe for us what you mean
by limitations? Are we quickly reaching these limitations?
Answer. To some people arms control is a panacea, if not a
religion. Arms control cannot transform relationships of antagonism.
Arms control only can work when both sides recognize that by using
constraints, on either the production or deployment of weapons, they
can enhance strategic stability and their own security. Maintaining
overall strategic stability is always required. Those who think that
arms control should be focused primarily or solely on reducing the
number of weapons can endanger strategic stability. As indicated in
response to a previous question, the U.S. failure over many years to
come to grips with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons (which is
asymmetrically advantageous to the Russians) suggests that we have
reached the limits available at this time.
Question. Drs. Perry and Schlesinger, your Commission stated that
the laboratories and military should be free to look at the full
``spectrum of options'' (i.e., refurbishment, reuse, and replacement)
on a case-by-case basis as it looks to ensure the safety, security, and
reliability of its current stockpile into the future. Specifically,
your report mentioned modernization programs range from simple life
extension through component redesign and replacement up to and
including full redesign, whichever NNSA thinks makes the greatest
technical and strategic sense.'' However, the recently released NPR
states that ``the United States will give strong preference to options
for refurbishment or reuse. Last week, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Chilton,
stated: ``We should not constrain our engineers and scientists in
developing options on what it will take to achieve the objectives of
the Stockpile Management Program, and let them bring forward their best
recommendations as to what is the best way forward.'' Do you agree with
General Chilton? Do you think the NPR should be clarified to ensure, as
General Chilton suggested, ``we should not constrain our engineers and
scientists''?
Answer. I happen to agree with General Chilton that we should not
constrain our engineers and scientists. However, we have happily
reached a national consensus that we should proceed with refurbishment
and life extension programs. The Commission did recommend that weapons
be looked at on a case-by-case basis, including replacement. I would
prefer that that be the national policy. One fears that the bias
against replacement would have a chilling effect on laboratory
scientists and sustaining their intellectual capacity for weapons
development.
However, the NPR is what it is--and is not likely to be modified.
The NPR does reveal the national consensus. We should proceed with
refurbishment; that is a major step forward compared with where we have
been. Also, there is an option in the NPR that if replacement is
necessary it could conceivably proceed with the approval of the
President and the Congress.
THE NEW START TREATY
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 18, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Cardin,
Casey, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar, Corker, Isakson,
Risch, DeMint, Barrasso, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Thank you all
for coming today.
This is a terrific lineup for any hearing, but obviously
particularly for this hearing on the START Treaty--our top
diplomat, our top defense official, and our top military
official. It's a lineup that underscores the Obama
administration's commitment not just to the ratification of New
START, but to having an open and honest, thorough debate that
moves beyond partisanship and sound bites.
The administration's commitment is well placed, because at
stake is the future of over 90 percent of the world's nuclear
weapons and our credibility in the eyes of more than 180 states
that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As the panel knows, I believe--and I think Senator Lugar
shares this--that the New START agreement will make America
safer, because the day that this treaty enters into force, the
United States will strengthen its fight against nuclear
terrorism and nuclear proliferation, gain a fuller
understanding of Russia's nuclear forces, and revitalize our
relations with Moscow.
What's more, I have no doubt that the administration's plan
to maintain and modernize our nuclear weapons infrastructure
demonstrates a firm commitment to keeping our nuclear deterrent
safe and effective for as long as is needed.
This committee will continue to give the New START Treaty
the full and careful consideration that it deserves. We have
already heard from Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger. And in
the coming days, we will hear from Secretaries Baker and
Kissinger, as well. When our review is complete, I'm confident
that we can reach a strong bipartisan consensus on advice and
consent to ratification, just as we did on START I and the
Moscow Treaty.
I believe the case for the treaty is powerful. Most
immediately, New START significantly reduces the number of
warheads, missiles, and launchers that the United States and
Russia can deploy, eliminating surplus cold-war armaments as we
turn to face the threats of the 21st century.
It eliminates those weapons in a transparent manner. The
original START Treaty had verification mechanisms that enabled
us to see what the Russians were doing with their missiles and
bombers. But that treaty expired on December 5 of last year.
Since then, we have, daily, been losing visibility into
Russia's nuclear activities. The New START Treaty restores that
visibility, providing valuable information about Russian
weapons and allowing us to inspect Russian military facilities.
By verifiably reducing the number of United States and
Russian weapons, we're strengthening the stability and
predictability of our nuclear relationship. More than that, we
are strengthening our diplomatic relationship, making it more
likely that we can secure Moscow's cooperation on key
priorities, like stopping Iran's nuclear program.
But, the implications of this treaty extend far beyond
United States-Russian relations. As we hold this hearing,
diplomats from dozens of nations are meeting in New York to
review implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
a crucial barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons to
rogue states and terrorists.
Today, far more than in recent years, those nations are
rallying behind the United States and its efforts to lessen the
nuclear threat. New START has already helped us to isolate Iran
and deflect its efforts to cast the United States as the threat
to the NPT.
For all that it accomplishes, this treaty is only the first
step in a more far-reaching effort. In announcing the
negotiation of New START, Presidents Obama and Medvedev said
that they were trying to move beyond cold war mentalities. By
giving its advice and consent to ratification, the Senate will
speed up that evolution and lay the groundwork for further arms
control efforts.
Likewise, the original START Treaty provided a foundation
for the Nunn-Lugar program, a signature effort led by our
friend Dick Lugar, which has dismantled and secured strategic
nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. New START builds on
that foundation so that we may continue to cooperatively secure
nuclear materiels in Russia and beyond.
If we do not approve New START, there will be serious
consequences for America's vital nonproliferation efforts. As
James Schlesinger testified to this committee, ``For the United
States at this juncture to fail to ratify the treaty in the
course of the Senate's deliberation would have a detrimental
effect on our ability to influence others with regard to,
particularly, the nonproliferation issue.''
We all understand that questions have been raised about New
START. And it is this committee's responsibility to give those
concerns a fair hearing. We will.
Some have alleged that it will constrain our missile
defense plan, which it will not. In fact, it allows us to
proceed with all of our planned testing and deployments.
Some have charged that it will narrow our conventional
strike options, which it will not. We will still be able to
deploy conventional warheads to promptly target enemy sites
around the globe.
Others have argued that we cannot eliminate surplus
weapons, because our nuclear infrastructure is aging. But, the
administration's plan to spend $80 billion to improve that
infrastructure should lay those questions properly to rest.
To explain the contours of this treaty, we are fortunate to
have three very distinguished witnesses with us. As Secretary
of State, Hillary Clinton has worked tirelessly to leverage
America's progress on strategic arms control in our fight
against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates has served Presidents of both parties
with great distinction in a remarkable range of roles. He is
one of our Nation's most respected voices on national security.
ADM Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is
providing farsighted leadership to our military at a time of
great challenge and transition, as we fight two wars and face
the diffused threats of the post-9/11 world.
Both Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates were originally
appointed to their current positions by the last administration
and their support for New START is a sign that the treaty is
consistent with our long tradition of bipartisanship on
strategic arms control.
So, we thank you all for being here today. We look forward
to your testimony and the opportunity to discuss this important
treaty.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates,
and Admiral Mullen to the Foreign Relations Committee once
again.
We are very pleased that our national security leadership
is with us to present the New START Treaty and to answer the
questions of Senators.
Our witnesses have been deeply involved in the negotiation
of the New START Treaty, as well as the formation of the
broader context of nuclear weapons policy. Secretary Clinton
undertook many discussions on the treaty with her counterpart,
Foreign Minister Lavrov. Secretary Gates has a long association
with this treaty, going back to the meetings he attended in
Moscow in 2008 with Secretary of State Rice. Admiral Mullen
undertook several important meetings on the treaty and related
issues with General Makarov, the Russian chief of the general
staff, as well as other Russian officials. Consequently, each
of our leaders today comes to the treaty with unique
experiences that can inform Senate consideration of the pact.
Their personal involvement and commitment to this process
underscores the consensus within the administration and the
military leadership of our country that the New START Treaty
will benefit United States national security.
As the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate begins to
examine the New START Treaty in greater detail, I would urge
the three of you, as our witnesses today, to devote personal
energy to accelerating the timetable for producing the National
Intelligence Estimate and a formal verification assessment
related to the treaty.
The President has declared the New START Treaty to be a top
legislative objective, has called for Senate approval this
year. Failing to deliver these reviews related to the START
Treaty in expedited fashion would diminish perceptions of the
priority of the treaty and complicate the Senate debate
timetable.
On April 29, our committee heard from former Secretaries of
Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger, who voiced their
support for ratifying the treaty.
Secretary Schlesinger stated, ``I think that it is
obligatory for the United States to ratify.'' He continued,
``Any treaty is going to have limitations, questionable areas.
There are some in this treaty. We need to watch them for the
future. But, that does not mean that this it should be
rejected.''
Now, Secretary Perry underscored the importance of treaty
ratification to broader U.S. arms-control objectives,
asserting, ``If we fail to ratify this treaty, the United
States will have forfeited any right to provide leadership in
this field throughout the world.''
Secretary Schlesinger concurred, saying, ``For the United
States at this juncture to fail to ratify the treaty in the due
course of the Senate deliberation would have a detrimental
effect on our ability to influence others with regard to,
particularly, the nonproliferation issues.''
In my view, even as we carefully examine individual
provisions of the treaty, the United States choice to
deliberately forgo a strategic nuclear arms control regime with
Russia would be an extremely precarious strategy. Distancing
ourselves from nuclear engagement with Russia would greatly
reduce our knowledge of
what is happening in Russia, hinder our ability to consult with
Moscow in a timely manner on nuclear and other national
security issues, further strain our own defense resources,
weaken our nonproliferation diplomacy worldwide, and
potentially heighten arms competition.
During the post-cold-war era, the United States security
has been helped immeasurably by the existence of the START
Treaty and related arms control endeavors.
As an author of the Nunn-Lugar program, I've traveled to
the former Soviet Union on numerous occasions to encourage and
to witness the safeguarding and destruction of weapons covered
by START and other initiatives. The destruction of thousands of
weapons is a monumental achievement for our countries. But, the
process surrounding this joint effort is as important as the
numbers of weapons eliminated.
The United States-Russian relationship has been through
numerous highs and lows in the post-cold-war era. Throughout
this period, START inspections and consultations, and the
corresponding threat reduction activities of the Nunn-Lugar
program, have been a constant that have served to reduce
miscalculations and, finally, to build respect.
This has not prevented highly contentious disagreements
with Moscow, but it has meant that we have not had to wonder
about the makeup and the disposition of Russian nuclear forces
during periods of tension.
It's also reduced, though not eliminated, the proliferation
threat posed by the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union.
In my judgment, the question before us is not whether we
should have a strategic nuclear arms agreement with Russia,
but, rather, whether the New START Treaty's provisions meet our
objectives, and how they'll be implemented in the context of
our broader national security strategy.
Arms control is not a static enterprise governed solely by
words on a treaty document. The success or failure of a treaty
also depends on the determination to which it is verified and
enforced. It depends on the rationality of the defense programs
backing up the treaty. And it depends on the international
atmosphere in which it contributes.
For these reasons, Senators are interested in numerous
questions peripheral to the treaty, including our plans for
warhead modernization and missile defense. We are eager to hear
the administration's perspectives on these elements of our
defense policy, as well as the witnesses' views on the New
START Treaty and our relationship with Russia.
I appreciate that our top national security leadership is
personally invested in the Senate ratification process. And I
look forward to working with you and members of this committee
to achieve a timely treaty review that will fully inform Senate
consideration.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Madam Secretary and Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, as I
ask for your testimony, I would like to ask you each--if each
of you wants to, but certainly, at least one of you--to address
a question that is much in the news this morning. The deal
brokered by Brazil and Turkey with Iran is a deal that, at
first blush, one might interpret as a swap of the 3-percent
low-enriched uranium for the 20-percent medical-isotope
uranium. But, as we know, during the course of the months since
that original deal was put on the table, Iran has gone from
about 1,800 kilograms to 2,300 kilograms. And so, it is not the
same deal. And it is our understanding that the potential for a
breakout to one nuclear weapon would exist during the time of
this swap, absent further ingredients of a deal; i.e., the IAEA
oversight, the answering of questions, an agreement not to
enrich to 20 percent, et cetera.
So, we would ask you if you might, at the top of your
testimony, address the question of the administration's
attitude toward this at this point, and whether or not it's
your understanding that it is indeed a swap in exchange for not
going up to 20 percent enrichment, or that would have to be a
demand.
So, Madam Secretary, we recognize you first, and then
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Clinton. Well, Chairman Kerry and Senator Lugar
and members of the committee, thank you for calling several
hearings on the New START Treaty, and for this invitation to
appear before you. We deeply appreciate your commitment to this
critical issue. And I think both the chairman and the ranking
member's opening statements made very clear what is at stake
and how we must proceed in the consideration of this treaty in
expeditious manner.
It's a pleasure to testify along with Secretary Gates and
Admiral Mullen, because we share a strong belief that the New
START Treaty will make our country more secure.
This treaty also reflects our growing cooperation with
Russia on matters of mutual interest, and it will aid us in
advancing our broader nonproliferation agenda. To that end, we
have been working closely with our P5+1 partners for several
weeks on the draft of a new sanctions resolution on Iran. And
today, I am pleased to announce to this committee, we have
reached agreement on a strong draft, with the cooperation of
both Russia and China. We plan to circulate that draft
resolution to the entire Security Council today.
And let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I think this
announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts
undertaken in Tehran, over the last few days, as any we could
provide.
There are a number of unanswered questions regarding the
announcement coming from Tehran. And although we acknowledge
the sincere efforts of both Turkey and Brazil to find a
solution regarding Iran's standoff with the international
community over its nuclear program, the P5+1, which consists,
of course, of Russia, China, the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany, along with the High
Representative of the EU, are proceeding to rally the
international community on behalf of a strong sanctions
resolution that will, in our view, send an unmistakable message
about what is expected from Iran.
We can certainly go into more detail about that during the
Q&A, but let me turn to the matter at hand, because I think, as
convincingly as I can make the case for the many reasons why
this New START Treaty is in the interests of the national
security of the United States of America, the relationship with
Russia is a key part of that kind of security. And as Senator
Lugar said in his opening remarks, during all the ups and
downs, during the heights and the depths of the cold war, one
constant was our continuing efforts to work toward the
elimination of, and the curtailment of, strategic arms in a way
that built confidence and avoided miscalculation.
Now, some may argue that we don't need the New START
Treaty, but the choice before us is between this treaty and no
treaty governing our nuclear security relationship with Russia;
between this treaty and no agreed verification mechanisms on
Russia's strategic nuclear forces; between this treaty and no
legal obligation for Russia to maintain its strategic nuclear
forces below an agreed level.
And as Secretary Gates has pointed out, every previous
President who faced this choice has found that the United
States is better off with a treaty than without one. And the
United States Senate has always agreed. The 2002 Moscow Treaty
was approved by a vote of 95 to nothing. The 1991 START Treaty
was approved by 93 to 6.
More than 2 years ago, President Bush began the process
that has led to the New START Treaty that we are discussing
today. Now, it, too, has already received bipartisan support in
testimony before this committee. And as the chairman and the
ranking member acknowledged, former Secretary James
Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense for Presidents Nixon and
Ford, Secretary of Energy for President Carter, declared that
it is obligatory for the United States to ratify it.
Today I'd like to discuss what the New START Treaty is and
what it isn't. It is a treaty that, if ratified, will provide
stability, transparency, and predictability for the two
countries with more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear
weapons. It is a treaty that will reduce the permissible number
of Russian and United States deployed strategic warheads to
1,550. This is a level we have not reached since the 1950s.
In addition, each country will be limited to 700 deployed
strategic delivery vehicles and 800 deployed and nondeployed
strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers.
These targets will help the United States and Russia bring
our deployed strategic arsenals, which were sized for the cold
war, to levels that are appropriate for today's threats.
This is a treaty that will help us track remaining weapons,
with an extensive verification regime. This regime draws upon
our experience over the last 15 years in implementing the
original START Treaty, which expired in December.
The verification measures reflect today's realities,
including the fewer number of facilities in Russia, compared
with the former Soviet Union. And for the first time ever, we
will be monitoring the actual numbers of warheads on deployed
strategic missiles.
Moreover, by bringing the New START Treaty into force, we
will strengthen our national security more broadly, including
by creating greater leverage to tackle a core national security
challenge: nuclear proliferation.
Now, I am not suggesting that this treaty alone will
convince Iran or North Korea to change their behavior. But, it
does demonstrate our leadership and strengthens our hand as we
seek to hold these and other governments accountable, whether
that means further isolating Iran and enforcing the rules
against violators or convincing other countries to get a better
handle on their own nuclear materiels. And it conveys to other
nations that we are committed to real reductions, and to
holding up our end of the bargain under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
In my discussions with many foreign leaders, including
earlier this month in New York at the beginning of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, I have already seen how
this New START Treaty, and the fact that the United States and
Russia could agree, has made it more difficult for other
countries to shift the conversation back to the United States.
We are seeing an increasing willingness both to be held
accountable and to hold others accountable.
A ratified New START Treaty would also continue our
progress toward broader United States-Russia cooperation. We
believe this is critical to other foreign policy priorities,
including dealing with Iran's nuclear program, cooperating on
Afghanistan, and pursuing trade and investment.
Already, the negotiations over this treaty have advanced
our efforts to reset the United States-Russian relationship.
There is renewed vigor in our discussion, on every level,
including those between our Presidents, our military leaders,
and between me and my counterpart, Foreign Minister Lavrov.
Now, our approach to this relationship is pragmatic and
clear-eyed. And our efforts, including this treaty, are
producing tangible benefits for U.S. national security.
At the same time, we are deepening and broadening our
partnerships with allies. In my recent meetings in Tallinn,
Estonia, with our other NATO allies, they expressed an
overwhelmingly positive and supportive view of the New START
Treaty.
Now, there are also things that this new treaty will not
do. As both Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen will discuss
more fully, the New START Treaty does not compromise the
nuclear force levels we need to protect ourselves and our
allies. The treaty does not infringe upon the flexibility we
need to maintain our forces, including the bombers, submarines,
and missiles, in a way that best serve our national security
interests. The treaty does not constrain our plans for missile
defense efforts.
Those of you who worked with me in the Senate know I take a
backseat to no one in my strong support of missile defense. So,
I want to this point very clearly. Nothing in the New START
Treaty constrains our missile defense efforts.
Russia has issued a unilateral statement on missile
defense, expressing its views. We have not agreed to this view,
and we are not bound by this unilateral statement. In fact,
we've issued our own unilateral statement, making it clear that
the United States intends to continue improving and deploying
our missile defense systems, and nothing in this treaty
prevents us from doing so.
The treaty's preamble does include language acknowledging
the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive
forces. But, this is simply a statement of fact. It does not
constrain our missile defense programs in any way. In fact, a
similar provision was part of the original START Treaty, and
did not prevent us from developing our missile defenses.
The treaty does contain language prohibiting the conversion
or use of offensive missile launchers for missile defense
interceptors, and vice versa. But, we never planned to do that
anyway. As General O'Reilly, our Missile Defense Director has
said, it is actually cheaper to build smaller, tailormade
missile defense silos than to convert offensive launchers. And
the treaty does not restrict us from building new missile
defense launchers, 14 of which we are currently constructing in
Alaska.
This administration has requested $9.9 billion for missile
defense in FY 2011, almost $700 million more than Congress
provided in FY 2010. This request reflects our commitment to
missile defense and our conviction that we have done nothing,
and there is no interpretation to the contrary, that in any way
undermines that commitment.
Finally, the New START Treaty does not restrict our ability
to modernize our nuclear weapons complex to sustain a safe,
secure, and effective deterrent. This administration has called
for a 10-percent increase in the FY 2011 budget for overall
weapons and infrastructure activities, and a 25-percent
increase in direct stockpile work. This was not in previous
budgets. And during the next 10 years, this administration
proposes investing $80 billion into our nuclear weapons
complex.
So, let's take a step back and put the New START Treaty
into a larger context. This treaty is only one part of our
country's broader efforts to reduce the threat posed by the
deadliest weapons the world has ever known. And we owe special
gratitude to Senator Lugar for his leadership and commitment
through all the years on this issue.
This administration is facing, head on, the problems of
nuclear proliferation and terrorism. We have several
coordinated efforts, including the Nuclear Posture Review, the
recently concluded Nuclear Security Summit, and the ongoing
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
While a ratified New START Treaty stands on its own terms,
in the reflection of the benefits of--in national security for
our country, it is also a part of our broader efforts.
So, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of this committee,
thank you for having us here, and for all of your past and
future attention to this New START Treaty. We stand ready to
work with you, as you undertake your constitutional
responsibilities, and to answer all your questions today and in
the coming weeks.
And we are confident that, at the end of this process, you
will come to the conclusion that so many of your predecessors
have shared over so many years, on both sides of the aisle,
that this treaty makes our country more secure and merits the
Senate's advice and consent to ratification.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, thank
you for calling several hearings on the new START treaty and for the
invitation to appear before you. I appreciate your commitment to this
critical issue.
It is a pleasure to testify with Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen. We share a strong belief that the New START Treaty will make
our country more secure. We urge the Senate to approve it.
Some argue that we don't need the New START Treaty. But the choice
before us is between this treaty and no treaty governing our nuclear
security relationship with Russia; between this treaty and no agreed
verification mechanisms on Russia's strategic nuclear forces; between
this treaty and no legal obligation for Russia to maintain its
strategic nuclear forces below an agreed level.
As Secretary Gates has pointed out, every previous President who
faced this choice has found that the United States is better off with a
treaty than without one, and the U.S. Senate has always agreed. The
2002 Moscow Treaty was approved by a vote of 95 to 0. The 1991 START
Treaty--93 to 6.
More than 2 years ago, President Bush began the process that has
led to the New START Treaty we are discussing today. It, too, has
already received bipartisan support. As James Schlesinger, the
Secretary of Defense for Presidents Nixon and Ford and Secretary of
Energy for President Carter, declared before this committee, ``It is
obligatory for the United States to ratify'' it.
Today, I'd like to discuss what the New START Treaty is, and what
it isn't.
It is a treaty that, if ratified, will provide stability,
transparency, and predictability for the two countries with more than
90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons.
It is a treaty that will reduce the permissible number of Russian
and United States deployed strategic warheads to 1,550. This is a level
we have not reached since the 1950s. In addition, each country will be
limited to 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles and 800 deployed
and nondeployed strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers. These
targets will help the United States and Russia bring our deployed
strategic arsenals, which were sized for the cold war, to levels that
are appropriate to today's threats.
It is a treaty that will help us track remaining weapons with an
extensive verification regime. This regime draws upon our experience
over the last 15 years in implementing the original START Treaty, which
expired in December. The verification measures reflect today's
realities, including the fewer number of facilities in Russia compared
with the former Soviet Union. And for the first time, we will be
monitoring the actual numbers of warheads on deployed strategic
missiles.
Moreover, by bringing the New START Treaty into force, we will
strengthen our national security more broadly, including by creating
greater leverage to tackle a core national security challenge: nuclear
proliferation.
I'm not suggesting that this treaty alone will convince Iran or
North Korea to change their behavior. But it demonstrates our
leadership and strengthens our hand as we seek to hold other
governments accountable--whether that means further isolating Iran and
enforcing the rules against violators, or convincing other countries to
get a better handle on their own nuclear materiels. And it conveys to
other nations that we are committed to real reductions, and to holding
up our end of the bargain under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In my
discussions with foreign leaders, including earlier this month in New
York, I have already seen how the New START Treaty makes it difficult
for other countries to shift the conversation to the United States.
A ratified New START Treaty would also continue our progress toward
broader United States-Russian cooperation, which is critical to other
foreign policy priorities, including dealing with Iran's nuclear
program, cooperating on Afghanistan, and pursuing increased trade and
investment. Already, the negotiations over this treaty have advanced
our efforts to reset the United States-Russian relationship. There is
renewed vigor in our discussions on every level, including those
between our Presidents, our military leaders, and with my counterpart,
Foreign Minister Lavrov. Our approach to this relationship is pragmatic
and clear-eyed. And our efforts--including this treaty--are producing
tangible benefits for U.S. national security.
At the same time, we are deepening and broadening our partnerships
with our allies. In my recent meetings with the other NATO members,
they expressed an overwhelmingly positive and supportive view of the
New START Treaty.
There are also things that this treaty will not do.
As Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen will discuss more fully, the
New START Treaty does not compromise the nuclear force levels we need
to protect ourselves and our allies.
The treaty does not infringe upon the flexibility we need to
maintain our forces, including bombers, submarines, and missiles, in
the way that best serves our national security interests.
The treaty does not constrain our missile defense efforts. Those of
you who worked with me in the Senate know I take a back seat to no one
in my strong support of missile defense, so I want to make this point
very clearly. Nothing in the New START Treaty constrains our missile
defense efforts.
Russia has issued a unilateral statement on missile defense
expressing its view. We have not agreed to this view and we are
not bound by it. In fact, we've issued our own statement making
clear that the United States intends to continue improving and
deploying its missile defense systems. Nothing in the treaty
will constrain our missile defense efforts.
The treaty's preamble does include language acknowledging the
relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces.
But this is simply a statement of fact. It does not constrain
our missile defense programs in any way. In fact, a similar
provision was part of the original START Treaty and did not
prevent us from developing our missile defenses.
The treaty does contain language prohibiting the conversion or use
of offensive missile launchers for missile defense interceptors
and vice versa. But as General O'Reilly, our Missile Defense
Director, has said, it is actually cheaper to build smaller,
tailor-made missile defense silos than to convert offensive
launchers. And the treaty does not restrict us from building
new missile defense launchers, 14 of which we're currently
constructing in Alaska.
This administration has requested $9.9 billion for missile defense
in FY 2011, almost $700 million more than Congress provided in FY 2010.
This request reflects our commitment to missile defense.
Finally, the New START Treaty does not restrict our ability to
modernize our nuclear weapons complex to sustain a safe, secure, and
effective deterrent. This administration has called for a 10-percent
increase in FY 2011 for overall weapons and infrastructure activities,
and a 25-percent increase in direct stockpile work. During the next 10
years, this administration proposes investing $80 billion into our
nuclear weapons complex.
Let's take a step back and put the New START Treaty into a larger
context. This treaty is only one part of our country's broader effort
to reduce the threat posed by the deadliest weapons the world has ever
known. And we owe special gratitude to Senator Lugar for his leadership
and commitment on this issue.
This administration is facing head on the problems of nuclear
proliferation and terrorism. We have several coordinated efforts,
including our new Nuclear Posture Review, the recently concluded
Nuclear Security Summit, and the ongoing Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference. While a ratified New START Treaty stands on its own
in terms of national security benefits for our country, it is also part
of our broader efforts.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, thank
you again for having us here today and for all your past and future
attention to the New START Treaty. We stand ready to work with you as
you undertake your constitutional responsibilities, and to answer all
your questions today and in the coming weeks.
We are confident that at the end of this process, you will come to
the same conclusion that we and many others have reached--that the New
START Treaty makes our country more secure and merits the Senate's
advice and consent to ratification.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. We
appreciate it.
May I say, also, that Secretary Gottemoeller and Ellen
Tauscher and the whole team did a terrific job of keeping the
committee appraised and briefed. And we had a number of
sessions and even colleagues who went to Geneva. So, we thank
you for the cooperation. And that is very, very helpful in
getting us here.
Secretary Gates.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today
regarding the agreement between the United States and Russia on
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
This treaty reduces the strategic nuclear forces of our two
nations in a manner that strengthens the strategic stability of
our relationship and protects the security of the American
people and our allies.
America's nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our
national security, deterring potential adversaries and
reassuring allies and partners. As such, the first step of the
year-long Nuclear Posture Review was an extensive analysis
which, among other things, determined how many nuclear delivery
vehicles and deployed warheads were needed. This, in turn,
provided the basis for our negotiations of START.
The results of those studies give me confidence that the
Department of Defense will be able to maintain a strong and
effective nuclear deterrent while modernizing our weapons to
ensure that they are safe, secure, and reliable, all within the
limits of the new treaty.
The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent will continue to be
based on the triad of delivery systems--intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and
nuclear-capable heavy bombers--within the boundaries negotiated
in the New START Treaty. Those are an upper boundary of 1,550
deployed warheads, up to 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs,
and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and up to 800 deployed and
nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments.
Under this treaty, we retain the power to determine the
composition of our force structure, allowing the United States
complete flexibility to deploy, maintain, and modernize our
strategic nuclear forces in a manner that best protects our
national security interests.
The Defense Department has established a baseline force
structure to guide our planning, one that does not require
changes to current or planned basing arrangements. The
Department will retain 240 deployed submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, distributed among 14 submarines, each of
which will have 20 launch tubes. This is the most survivable
leg of the triad, and reducing the number of missiles carried
on each submarine, from 24 to 20, will facilitate Navy planning
for the Ohio-class submarine replacement.
Recognizing the flexibility of the bomber leg of the triad,
we will retain up to 60 deployed heavy bombers, including all
18 operational B-2s. At the same time, we will--we have to
consider the Air Force's planning for a long-range strike
replacement, and plan to convert a number of B-52Hs to a
conventional-only role.
Finally, the United States will retain up to 420 deployed
single warhead Minuteman-3 ICBMs at our current three missile
bases.
Let me also address some of the things that the New START
Treaty will not affect, echoing Secretary Clinton.
First, the treaty will not constrain the United States from
deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor
impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses. And I--
speaking of stories in the news this morning and the last
couple of days, I'll be happy to discuss the article in the New
York Times this morning about the SM-3 missile.
As the administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review
and budget plans make clear, the United States will continue to
improve our capability to defend ourselves, our deployed
forces, and our allies and partners, against ballistic missile
threats. We made this clear to the Russians in a unilateral
statement made in connection with the treaty.
Furthermore, the New START does not restrict our ability to
develop and deploy prompt global strike--prompt conventional
strike capabilities that could attack targets anywhere on the
globe in an hour or less.
The treaty's limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles,
combined with the associated ceiling of 1,550 deployed
warheads, accommodates the limited number of conventional
warheads we may need for this capability. We are also currently
examining potential future long-range weapon systems for prompt
global strike that would not be limited by the treaty.
In my view, a key contribution of this treaty is its
provision for a strong verification regime. While the
intelligence community will provide a detailed classified
assessment, I would like to emphasize some of the key elements
of this regime, which provides a firm basis for monitoring
Russia's compliance with its treaty obligations while also
providing important insights into the size and the composition
of Russian strategic forces.
The treaty allows each party to conduct up to 18 onsite
inspections each year at operating bases for ICBMs, SSBNs, and
nuclear-capable heavy bombers, as well as storage facilities,
test ranges, and conversion and elimination facilities.
The agreement establishes a database, which will be
initially populated 45 days after the treaty enters into force,
and updated every 6 months thereafter, that will help provide
the United States with a rolling overall picture of Russia's
strategic offensive forces. This picture is further
supplemented by the large number of notifications required,
which will track the movement and changes in status of the
strategic offensive arms covered by the treaty.
Unique identifiers, for the first time, will be assigned to
each ICBM, SLBM, and nuclear-capable heavy bomber, allowing us
to track the disposition and patterns of operation of
accountable systems throughout their life cycles.
The treaty provides for noninterference with national
technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance
satellites, ground stations, and ships. This provides us with
an independent method of gathering information that can assist
in validating data declarations.
While telemetry is not needed to verify the provisions of
this treaty, the terms, nonetheless, call for the exchange of
telemetry on up to five launches per year per side.
I am confident that the New START Treaty will in no way
compromise America's nuclear deterrent. In many ways, the
primary threat to the effectiveness and credibility of the
American deterrent is one that we control ourselves, and that
is failing to invest adequately in our Nation's nuclear weapons
infrastructure, a point I have made a number of times in recent
years. Maintaining an adequate stockpile of safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear warheads requires a reinvigoration of our
nuclear weapons complex. That is, our infrastructure and our
science, technology, and engineering base.
To this end, the Department of Defense is transferring $4.6
billion to the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration through fiscal year 2015. This transfer will
assist in funding critical nuclear weapons life-extension
programs and efforts to modernize the nuclear weapons
infrastructure.
The initial applications of this funding, along with an
additional $1.1 billion being transferred for naval nuclear
reactors, are reflected in the Defense and Energy Departments'
FY11 budget request, which I urge the Congress to approve.
These investments in the Nuclear Posture Review strategy
for warhead life extension represent a credible modernization
plan to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our
Nation's deterrent.
I would close with a final observation. I first began
working on strategic arms control with the Russians in 1970, 40
years ago, a United States effort that led to the first
strategic arms limitation agreement with Moscow, 2 years later.
The key question then, and in the decades since, has always
been the same: Is the United States better off with a strategic
arms agreement with the Russians, or without it? The answer,
for successive Presidents of both parties, has always been,
``With an agreement.'' The U.S. Senate has always agreed,
approving each treaty by lopsided bipartisan margins.
The same answer holds true for New START. The United States
is better off with this treaty than without it. And I am
confident that it is the right agreement for today and for the
future. It increases stability and predictability, allows us to
sustain a strong nuclear triad, and preserves our flexibility
to deploy the nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities needed for
effective deterrence and defense.
In light of all these factors, I urge the Senate to give
its advice and consent to ratification on the new treaty.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak today regarding the agreement between the United
States and Russia on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. This
treaty reduces the strategic nuclear forces of our two nations in a
manner that strengthens the strategic stability of our relationship and
protects the security of the American people and our allies.
America's nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our national
security, deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and
partners. As such, the first step of the year-long Nuclear Posture
Review was an extensive analysis which, among other things, determined
how many delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed. This in
turn provided the basis for our negotiations. The results of those
studies give me confidence that the Department of Defense will be able
to maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent while modernizing
our weapons to ensure they are safe, secure, and reliable, all within
the limits of this new treaty.
The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent will continue to be based on
the triad of delivery systems--intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers--within the boundaries negotiated in the New
START Treaty. Those are:
An upper boundary of 1,550 deployed warheads;
Up to 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy
bombers; and
Up to 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers,
and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
Under this treaty, we retain the power to determine the composition
of our force structure, allowing the United States complete flexibility
to deploy, maintain, and modernize our strategic nuclear forces in the
manner that best protects our national security interests. The Defense
Department has established a baseline force structure to guide our
planning, one that does not require changes to current or planned
basing arrangements.
The Department will retain 240 deployed submarine-launched
ballistic missiles distributed among 14 submarines, each of
which will have 20 launch tubes. This is the most survivable
leg of the triad, and reducing the number of missiles carried
on each boomer from 24 to 20 will facilitate Navy planning for
the Ohio-class submarine replacement.
Recognizing the flexibility of the bomber leg of the triad, we will
retain up to 60 deployed heavy bombers, including all 18
operational B-2s. At the same time, we have to consider the Air
Force's planning for a long-range strike replacement and plan
to convert a number of B-52Hs to a conventional-only role.
Finally, the United States will retain up to 420 deployed single-
warhead Minuteman III ICBMs at our current three missile bases.
Let me also address some of the things that New START treaty will
not affect.
First, the treaty will not constrain the United States from
deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose
additional costs or barriers on those defenses. As the administration's
Ballistic Missile Defense Review and budget plans make clear, the
United States will continue to improve our capability to defend
ourselves, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners against
ballistic missile threats. We made this clear to the Russians in a
unilateral statement made in connection with the treaty.
Furthermore, the New START does not restrict our ability to develop
and deploy prompt conventional strike capabilities that could attack
targets anywhere on the globe in an hour or less. The treaty's limit of
700 deployed delivery vehicles combined with the associated ceiling of
1,550 deployed warheads accommodates the limited number of conventional
warheads we may need for this capability. We are also currently
examining potential future long-range weapons systems for prompt global
strike that would not be limited by the treaty.
In my view, a key contribution of this treaty is its provision for
a strong verification regime. While the intelligence community will
provide a detailed classified assessment, I would like to emphasize
some of the key elements of this regime, which provides a firm basis
for monitoring Russia's compliance with its treaty obligations while
also providing important insights into the size and composition of
Russian strategic forces.
The treaty allows each party to conduct up to 18 onsite inspections
each year at operating bases for ICBMs, SSBNs, and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers, as well as storage facilities, test
ranges, and conversion and elimination facilities.
The agreement establishes a database, which will be initially
populated 45 days after the treaty enters into force and
updated every 6 months thereafter, that will help provide the
United States with a ``rolling'' overall picture of Russia's
strategic offensive forces. This picture is further
supplemented by the large number of notifications required,
which will track the movement and changes in status of
strategic offensive arms covered by the treaty.
Unique identifiers assigned to each ICBM, SLBM, and nuclear-capable
heavy bomber will allow us to track the disposition and
patterns of operation of accountable systems throughout their
life cycles.
The treaty provides for noninterference with national technical
means of verification, such as reconnaissance satellites,
ground stations, and ships. This provides us with an
independent method of gathering information that assist in
validating data declarations.
While telemetry is not needed to verify the provisions of this
treaty, the terms nonetheless call for the exchange of
telemetry on up to five launches per year per side.
I am confident that the New START treaty will in no way compromise
America's nuclear deterrent. In many ways, the primary threat to the
effectiveness and credibility of the deterrent is one that we control
ourselves, and that is failing to invest adequately in our Nation's
nuclear weapons infrastructure--a point I have made a number of times
in recent years. Maintaining an adequate stockpile of safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear warheads requires a reinvigoration of our nuclear
weapons complex--that is, our infrastructure and our science,
technology, and engineering base.
To this end, the Department of Defense is transferring $4.6 billion
to the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
through fiscal year 2015. This transfer will assist in funding critical
nuclear weapons life extension programs and efforts to modernize the
nuclear weapons infrastructure. The initial applications of this
funding, along with an additional $1.1 billion being transferred for
naval nuclear reactors, are reflected in the Defense and Energy
Department's FY11 budget requests, which I urge the Congress to
approve. These investments, and the Nuclear Posture Review's strategy
for warhead life extension, represent a credible modernization plan to
sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our Nation's deterrent.
I would close with this. I first began working on strategic arms
control with the Russians in 1970, a U.S. effort that led to the first
Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement with Moscow 2 years later. The key
question then and in the decades since has always been the same: Is the
United States better off with an agreement or without it? The answer
for each successive President has always been: ``with an agreement.''
The U.S. Senate has always agreed, approving each treaty by lopsided,
bipartisan margins.
The same answer holds true for New START: the United States is far
better off with this treaty than without it, and I am confident that it
is the right agreement for today and for the future. It increases
stability and predictability, allows us to sustain a strong nuclear
triad, and preserves our flexibility to deploy the nuclear and
nonnuclear capabilities needed for effective deterrence and defense. In
light of all of these factors, I urge the Senate to give its advice and
consent to ratification of the New START Treaty.
The Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Gates.
Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, WASHINGTON, DC
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished
members of the committee, I am pleased to add my voice in
support for ratification of the New START Treaty, and to do so
as soon as possible, as we are in our 6th month without a
treaty with Russia.
This treaty has the full support of your uniformed
military. Throughout its negotiation, Secretaries Clinton and
Gates ensure that professional military perspectives were
thoroughly considered. During the development of the New START
Treaty, I was personally involved, to include two face-to-face
negotiating session and several telephone conversations with my
counterpart, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General
Makarov, regarding key aspects of the treaty.
The Joint Chiefs and I also had time to review the analytic
work done in the Nuclear Posture Review regarding the shape of
future U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Its recommendations were
transmitted as guidance to the negotiating team in Geneva
regarding the three central limits on strategic systems, and
the warheads associated with them, that are contained in the
treaty.
In short, the conclusion and implementation of the New
START Treaty is the right thing for us to do, and we took the
time to do it right.
The Chiefs and I believe the New START Treaty achieves
important and necessary balance between three critical items--
aims. It allows us to retain a strong and flexible American
nuclear deterrent; it helps strengthen openness and
transparency in our relationship with Russia; it also
demonstrates our national commitment to reducing the worldwide
risk of nuclear incidents resulting from the continuing
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
You should know that I firmly believe that the central
limits established in this treaty, and the provision that
allows each side the freedom to determine its own force mix,
provides us with the necessary flexibility to field the right
force structure to meet the Nation's needs.
We plan to retain our triad of bombers, ballistic-missile
submarines, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
in sufficient diversity and numbers to assure strategic
stability between ourselves and the Russian Federation. We will
also maintain sufficient capability to deter other nuclear
states.
In addition, the agreement provides for an array of
important verification measures that are critical to both sides
in monitoring compliance with the new treaty.
This treaty is also a critical element in the President's
agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United States, our
allies and partners, and the wider international community. Our
recently concluded NPR acknowledges the continuing role for
nuclear weapons in the defense of America while placing
additional emphasis on positive steps to prevent nuclear
terrorism and the risks from nuclear proliferation.
In summary, this New START agreement is important in
itself, and should also be viewed in a wider context. It makes
meaningful reductions in the United States and Russian
strategic nuclear arsenals while strengthening strategic
stability and United States national security.
Coupled with the administration's clear commitment to
prudently invest in our aging nuclear infrastructure and a
nuclear warhead life-extension programs, this treaty is a very
meaningful step forward.
I encourage the Senate to fully study the treaty. I believe
you will see the wisdom of ratifying it. And I sit before you
today recommending that you do so.
Thank you, Sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement of ADM Michael Mullen, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the
committee, I am pleased to add my voice in support for ratification of
the New START Treaty.
This treaty has the full support of your uniformed military.
Throughout its negotiation, Secretaries Clinton and Gates ensured that
professional military perspectives were thoroughly considered. During
the development of the New START Treaty I was personally involved, to
include two face-to-face negotiating sessions and three telephone
conversations with my counterpart, the Chief of the Russian General
Staff, General Makarov, regarding key aspects of the treaty.
The Joint Chiefs and I also had time to review the analytic work
done in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) regarding the shape of future
U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Its recommendations were transmitted as
guidance to the negotiating team in Geneva regarding the three central
limits on strategic systems and the warheads associated with them that
are contained in the treaty. In short, the conclusion and
implementation of the New START Treaty is the right thing for us to
do--and we took the time to do it right.
The Chiefs and I believe the New START Treaty achieves important
and necessary balance between three critical aims. It allows us to
retain a strong and flexible American nuclear deterrent. It helps
strengthen openness and transparency in our relationship with Russia.
It also demonstrates our national commitment to reducing the worldwide
risk of nuclear incident resulting from the continuing proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
You should know that I firmly believe that the central limits
established in this treaty and the provision that allows each side the
freedom to determine its own force mix provides us with the necessary
flexibility to field the right future force to meet the Nation's needs.
We plan to retain our triad of bombers, ballistic missile submarines,
and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in sufficient
diversity and numbers to assure strategic stability between ourselves
and the Russian Federation. We will also maintain sufficient capability
to deter other nuclear states. In addition, the agreement provides for
an array of important verification measures that are critical to both
sides in monitoring compliance with the new treaty.
This treaty is also a critical element in the President's agenda
for reducing nuclear risks to the United States, our allies and
partners, and the wider international community. Our recently concluded
NPR acknowledges the continuing role for nuclear weapons in the defense
of America, while placing additional emphasis on positive steps to
prevent nuclear terrorism and the risks from nuclear proliferation.
In summary, this New START agreement is important in itself, and
should also be viewed in wider context. It makes meaningful reductions
in the United States and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals while
strengthening strategic stability and U.S. national security. Coupled
with the administration's clear commitment to prudently invest in our
aging nuclear infrastructure and in nuclear warhead life-extension
programs, this treaty is a very meaningful step forward. I encourage
the Senate to fully study the treaty. I believe you will see the wisdom
of ratifying it, and I sit before you today recommending that you do
so.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Admiral Mullen.
Secretary Gates, you wrote, last week, about the unanimous
support of the Nation's military for this treaty. And, Admiral
Mullen, you personally engaged with your counterpart, General
Makarov, at a couple of points in the course of these
negotiations. You've just testified, both of you, to a list, of
the things that we gained--and I was quite impressed by the
series of benefits that you articulated. I'd like to ask each
of you if you'd kind of summarize for us, in a layperson's
language for a moment, just why the military has such
confidence that this, in fact, strengthens our national
security and does not present any of the challenges that some
of the critics have raised.
Secretary Gates.
Secretary Gates. Well, I think that, first of all, this
treaty, like its predecessors, brings four benefits that we
would not otherwise have.
The first is transparency. Knowing what the Russians are
doing, being able to track their systems, being able to count
them, being able to observe them--for the first time, actually
look at the warheads themselves, having the unique tagging that
we've talked about--none of this kind of transparency would be
possible without this treaty.
Second, predictability. This has been an important feature
of strategic arms agreements with Russia since the very first
one, in 1972, to have some idea to--for both sides to know the
limits on the other, and therefore, avoiding the need to hedge
against the unknown, and having sufficient verification in
place to be able to have confidence in that judgment.
The third benefit is strategic stability. And the way this
treaty is structured adds to that strategic stability. For
example, as the number of warheads comes--the number of
delivery vehicles comes down, putting just a single one of our
warheads on an ICBM requires the Russians to use a one-for-one
or two-for-one attack mode if they were to come after our
ICBMs, so they would use up a significant portion of their
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles trying to take out our
ICBMS. All of this contributes to strategic stability.
And finally, this treaty, for the first time, gives us
actual access to Russian weapons and Russian facilities. We've
had access to facilities, but not the weapons themselves
before.
So, I think, in each of these four areas, the treaty brings
benefits to the United States and, frankly, enhances our
security in ways that would not happen in the absence of such a
treaty.
The Chairman. Thank you, Secretary.
Admiral.
Admiral Mullen. Chairman, throughout the negotiations--and
the ones I participated in certainly focused from the military
perspective and our ability to maintain a very strong strategic
deterrent. And it's my belief, and the belief of the Chiefs,
including--in addition to the strategic commander, General
Chilton--that, in fact, the treaty does that. Particularly
important was the preservation, at this point in time, of the
triad and the strength of that triad, which has been such a
critical part of our arsenal, historically, and also in my
interaction with our service chiefs, particularly the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the--or the
Chief of Naval Operations, in order to be able to continue to
invest and sustain the infrastructure and the people, the
training, the kinds of things that we need to sustain this over
time. So, the strength of that triad is--which has proven
itself in the past--is still very much there, even though some
of the numbers--the numbers are down.
Second--and, to a limited degree, I can speak to this--but,
what we typically need those weapons for--the ability to
execute military operations, should that, at some point in
time, absolutely have to--you know, have to occur--is that we
are in very good shape with respect to any contingencies which
are out there. And that was a substantial underpinning for this
treaty, from the military perspective: Can we carry out the
mission that the President of the United States has given us?
And I just want to assure you that we can.
In the negotiations with the Russians, specifically, to
look at the wide array of initiatives, including verification,
the size of the arsenal, what we would look to the future--and
to reemphasize what Secretary Clinton said--we've done this in
a way that has put us--or continues to put us in a great
position of strength, while at the same time, in a--from my
perspective, a better position, in terms of cooperation with
Russia--you know, keeping our eyes wide open, but certainly
cooperating with them in ways, which has been a strength of
this treaty, not just this--is a strength of this treaty, but
historically, as well.
The Chairman. Thank you. I thought those were terrific
summaries.
Secretary Clinton, in the context of your efforts, with
respect to a number of the global issues and challenges we
face, and particularly nonproliferation, can you similarly sort
of reduce to the nub what the implications would be of not
ratifying this agreement?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Mr. Chairman, we would obviously
lose all of the benefits that both Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen discussed. And although they are benefits with respect
to this treaty between the United States and the Russia
Federation, they have many ancillary implications for our
larger efforts against nonproliferation.
So, I would basically make five points: First, the intense
efforts that we've engaged in, the last year, to reach this
treaty, has built a level of understanding between the key
decisionmakers in the United States and Russia that has been
very helpful in other arenas, most notably with respect to
Iran. I started my morning talking with Sergei Lavrov about,
you know, finalizing the resolution and the agreement that it
will be discussed later today.
Second, the impact of our resetting of a relationship that
resulted in the treaty has had a very salutary effect on many
of our allies and our adversaries. Our allies, particularly in
NATO, as I said, welcomed this agreement, because they have
been, historically, on the front lines, and even our Central
and Eastern European friends were very pleased to see this
level of cooperation between the United States and Russia. And
that has laid the groundwork for us to work on the strategic
concept that will be introduced with respect to NATO's future,
to reestablish the NATO-Russia Council, and to do some other
confidence-building measures, after the very unfortunate events
concerning Georgia, that build the feeling of alliance among
our NATO members, but, again, with a very clear view that they
expect to--for us to continue to provide their defense.
Third, with respect to adversaries, or potential
adversaries, the fact that the United States and Russia are
working together is not good news. You know, they are not happy
to see this level of cooperation. They're not happy that China
and Russia have signed off on this resolution that we plan to
introduce later. This is a real setback for them. And it has a
very positive effect on our dealings with our international,
you know, friends, about all of these other issues.
Fourth, having gone this far to achieve the benefits that
are in this treaty, to lose them would not only undermine our
strategic stability, the predictability, the transparency, the
other points that both the Secretary and the Admiral made, but
it would severely impact our potential to lead on the important
issue of nonproliferation. Countries would wonder, ``Well, if
we can't get across the finish line on this treaty, can we get
across the finish line on other matters, as well?''
And finally, I can only speak from personal experience, in
the many endless meetings that I go to around the world, that
the fact that we've reached this treaty and have fulfilled our
continuing obligations as an NPT member on the three pillars,
which include disarmament, nonproliferation, peaceful use of
nuclear weapons, gives us so much more credibility on the
nonproliferation agenda.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you
have already zeroed in on specific objections that have been
raised, I want to mention, just again, how important it will be
to answer all of the questions of Senators with regard to
missile defense.
Each one of you have categorically indicated there is no
way--no way in which our missile defense will be inhibited in
any way, at any time. But, that point still doesn't quite get
through. Now, we have people worried about something in this
treaty that's going to inhibit missile defense. So, I ask for
your continued guidance as to how we make that point.
The second point is that, on the stockpile stewardship, or
the making certain that the warheads that we now have work,
that, in the event we were called upon--by ourselves, our
allies, in any way--we have, in fact, the background, in terms
of our laboratories, our continuing research, the personnel--
some of whom have grown old, we need some young ones--all of
these things, so that those things we now have, that are
guaranteed by our treaties, and that we've verified everybody
else in the world, in fact, are there, for their confidence, as
well as our own.
And I mention that because we've written letters, sometimes
bipartisan letters, sometimes all the Republicans, others--
Secretary Gates has been a regular recipient of
correspondence--and yet, at the same time, his response today,
that $4.6 billion has been transferred over to try to meet
this, is a significant commitment.
So, I--but, I mention that once again, and will not belabor
the point.
Then the verification procedure; very important. Even
Senators who are not enthusiastic about arms control treaties
approached, I'm sure, the chairman and me last December the
5th, said, ``What happens now? There are no American boots on
the ground. We're out of there. What about that? We've counted
on this for years, that we had American boots on the ground,
that our verification worked.'' I'll make just one personal
point about this. On the wall of my conference room, we have a
chart in which the Department of Defense has contributed data
each month for the last 15 years. At the start, 13,300 nuclear
warheads on missiles aimed at the United States--13,300. And
a--testimony that any one of those would have obliterated my
entire city of Indianapolis, leveled it, gone, everybody dead.
Now, that's impressive to Hoosiers. I hope it's impressive to
the other 49 States. [Laughter.]
And, by and large, they have supported anything that I
could do to make certain that, one by one, those missiles
left--or, rather, the warheads left the missiles. We've worked
with the Russians to destroy the missiles, destroy the silos in
which the missiles were located, every vestige of this, even
the roots and branches and the finely planted daisies, or
whatever else it is, in many fields in Siberia, or wherever we
had them. It's critically important.
Now, there may be Americans, who have not gone through the
arms control talks, who don't realize what a nuclear--one
nuclear weapon can do. And there were 13,300 of them. Now,
there are still, by some counts, as many as 5,000, not all
deployed, but we have some distance to go.
Now, December 5 comes, no boots on the ground, no treaty,
and some have always said, ``Well, you can't trust the
Russians. You don't want to deal with the Russians.'' We even
have some members who have said, ``We shouldn't knock out the
very first of our weapons, we need every one of them. We ought
to be building more.'' Now, I don't agree with that philosophy,
I understand that's a possible way of going about this world.
But, I would say that--as a counterargument--during one
trip that I was privileged to have with Russians, they became
especially friendly and decided that they would like for me to
go up to a base where they had the so-called ``Typhoon
submarines.'' Now the Typhoons were popularized by Tom Clancy
in ``The Hunt for Red October.'' They were remarkable
submarines that went up and down our eastern coast, whether we
knew about it or not, for the better part of a generation. Each
one of them had, reportedly, 200 nuclear missiles; a chip shot
into New York, Philadelphia, any other place they wanted to
shoot, all that time. We may not have known about it, but we do
now. We did then. I have a picture, in the office, that
Russians took of me standing in front of a Typhoon, which was
the first time our intelligence had seen a Typhoon, at that
stage.
And yet, their agreement was that they wanted us to help
them destroy the Typhoons. Taken 10 years to get through 3 of
the 6. They are very complex situations. But, to leave three of
the six still out there is unthinkable.
So, if I become dogmatic or emotional about it, it's from
some experience of seeing what could hit us, and the need to
have boots on the ground, in terms of verification.
So, we want to make sure we all know what the verification
is and why it's at this particular level. And you've done your
best, thus far.
But--now, without being tedious, I want to submit more
questions that our staff has formulated in detail, so that
there can be as complete a record of every nuance of this, that
we have.
Now, finally, I would just say that our own experience with
these treaties has been that, even after the treaties come, and
we have implementing legislation, whether it be cooperative
threat reduction or something of this variety, there have been
Senators, perennially, who put all sorts of restrictions on all
sorts of reports that were needed before any money could be
spent. You were leveled, in the State Department or the Defense
Department, with obligations to show 15 different things before
a dollar could go. In fact, one year, no money at all was
spent, with regard to disarmament in Russia, because of so many
letters that never got written, and the appropriators took the
money off the table.
So, whether we're doing a treaty or not, we have arguments,
every year, among skeptics who somehow believe that arms
control is not exactly their cup of tea.
I would just add that this is so important that I ask your
indulgence in sending over more and more questions, and then
publishing all of the results of those questions, so that
anyone who is slightly interested in this, academically, will
have every conceivable answer.
And finally, it has to come to a gut reaction. Is this
something that's good for our country? Now, you have all
affirmed that you believe that it is. And we appreciate that
very direct testimony today.
And I thank you for indulging me in an essay rather than a
set of questions, but they will be coming, in large numbers.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator, that's the kind of question, period,
the panel really appreciates. So----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman [continuing]. Let me just say, from our point
of view, we are enormously grateful to have your expertise in
this effort, and I think the questions that you're going to
pose are going to help the committee to put together precisely
the kind of record that's needed here. So, I know the panel, as
well as the committee, appreciates that approach.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And let me thank our witnesses, as well, for your presence
here today.
And let me say that, for the chairman this has been a
longstanding issue, and he's done a remarkable job on it. But,
also a word about Dick Lugar, who I've had the privilege of
serving on this committee with for 30 years. And I have a
feeling, when the last nuclear weapon is gone--and we all hope
that day will come in our world--in the story of how mankind
put its common good above its baser instincts, the names of
Dick Lugar and Sam Nunn will figure prominently in that
history. And having had the privilege of serving with both of
them for many years, I want to thank Dick Lugar personally, but
also Sam Nunn, for their work. And the three of you, as well,
for your tremendous efforts in this regard. This is very
difficult work, and I think you've done a remarkable job
getting it done.
I have two quick questions for you. One, in fact, relates
to the Nunn-Lugar proposals. I wonder if any analysis has been
done to determine whether or not we need to update Nunn-Lugar,
in light of this New START accord? Obviously, that has been a
very valuable tool over the years, as Senator Lugar has just
affirmed. And the question would be, Do we need to do something
else regarding Nunn-Lugar, in light of this treaty?
I don't know--Secretary Clinton or Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Mullen. Actually, Senator, I'm not really sure. I--
it's a great question, and I think it's something we have--from
my perspective, we should look at.
Senator Dodd. Well, I'd ask if that could be done as part
of the questions we have.
Senator Dodd. And then, second--in a sense, you've answered
this, Secretary--Madam Secretary Clinton, but I wonder if you
might just reach a little further.
First of all, congratulations, at least on the news we're
hearing, about the Chinese and the Russians being supportive of
the--of an international sanctions regime regarding Iran.
That's extremely important news. As you know, we're in the
midst, here, of a conference between the House and the Senate,
on the Iran sanctions bill. In my other hat that I wear as
chairman of the Banking Committee, on which Bob Corker serves,
and others, we voted unanimously on an Iran sanctions bill. The
House has done so, as well. And so, we need to proceed with
that issue.
But, we're very interested in seeing what happens,
internationally. Every member of the Conference Committee has
expressed the view that an international sanction makes a lot
more sense than unilateral. And I think we all agree with that,
although we're not going to reduce or retreat from that
unilateral sanctions effort here. But, certainly an effort on
the multilateral front would be a tremendous step forward. And
so, we commend you for that.
But, I wonder if you might comment on the reduction in
counterproliferation efforts, more generally, and the effects
this agreement might have on those efforts. I think,
specifically, of India and Pakistan, for instance. To what
extent might this agreement have the positive impact on causing
other nations to begin to move in this direction?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator Dodd, thank you. And thank
you for all of your work on these and so many other important
issues.
We believe that the treaty history between the United
States and Russia is the bedrock of disarmament. And, as
Senator Lugar just eloquently outlined, it has certainly been
in our interests over all of these years.
We believe that, in the current environment in which we are
putting forth this treaty for your consideration for
ratification, it strengthens our hand in talking with other
countries that have nuclear weapons.
Now, the fact is that if--as far as we know in the world--
and I think we've got a pretty good handle on it--the United
States and Russia have more than 90 percent of all nuclear
weapons in the world. And we want to, as we said in the NPR--
the Nuclear Posture Review--we want to explore beginning
conversations with other nuclear nations, starting with China,
and see what kind of opportunity for discussion could exist.
The United States and Russia have, now, a 30-year history
of these discussions, but we need to begin similar discussions
with others. We go into those with the credibility that this
treaty gives us.
Right now, as both the chairman and the ranking member have
said, there is no treaty. We have no so-called ``boots on the
ground.'' We're not inspecting anything. We're not acquiring
the kind of information that we think is in our national
security interest. So, this treaty is not only, on its own
merits, in our interests, but the fact of it gives us the
credibility to go and talk with other nuclear-armed countries.
It also gives us the credibility to reach agreement, as we now
have, on a resolution in the United Nations, with countries
that are, you know, concerned about the proliferation
represented by Iran.
So, on this broad basis of how we can be more effective in
making our case about what we see as the principal threat to
the United States and the world--the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, their use by rogue regimes or by networks
of terrorists--this treaty gives us a lot of credibility, going
forward.
Senator Dodd. Well, I thank you. Thank you very much for
that.
And let me just add that although we have questions to be
asked, obviously, and answered, I want to express my strong
support for this treaty. And I think we need to move on this.
And my fervent hope is that we'll get this done now, in the
next month or so, clearly before we adjourn. I can't imagine
adjourning from this Congress and not have been completed this
work. So, I appreciate very much your work.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank each of you for your service and what you do on
behalf of our country.
Madam Secretary, what recourse do each of the countries
have against each other if there's violations in the treaty?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, there are several
approaches.
One, there is a bilateral commission, that exists to iron
out differences, solve problems, to which each country may seek
recourse if there is some kind of violation, or perceived
violation.
Senator Corker. What kind of recourse?
Secretary Clinton. Well, you know, we've had this--we have
a long history with these treaties, where presenting
information that we believe might violate the spirit or the
letter of the treaty leads to changes.
I mean, there--this treaty is not a static document. It
goes into effect, like the previous START Treaty and others,
and then it begins to be implemented.
So, if we believe that, under the treaty, we're not getting
access to what we have signed up for under the treaty, we raise
that and we get the access. So, it's a constant effort to make
sure that both sides are complying with their agreements, as
set forth in the treaty.
And I--you know, Senator Lugar is the expert in the room,
probably along with Secretary Gates, but the history of these
treaties has been--I would characterize as positive in the
enforcement and implementation.
The final recourse we have is to withdraw from the treaty.
You know, we----
Senator Corker. Let me----
Secretary Clinton [continuing]. We have the right to
withdraw if we believe that this treaty is no longer in our
security interests.
Senator Corker. So, basically it's an understanding between
two countries, and they act in good faith to live up to those.
Should it, then, trouble us that, before we ever get
started, that each of the countries has a very different
opinion of what we've negotiated, as relates to missile
defense? And should not all--should all of us not want a joint
statement from both countries as to that before we begin?
Because it's sort of troubling that we begin with two divergent
views on what we've agreed to, as relates to missile defense.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, again, there's a history,
here. There were similar divergent views with the first START
Treaty, and it didn't stop us from doing anything we did, and
intended to do, on missile defense.
You know, it's a little bit like a political statement, I
might suggest, that, you know, you can make an agreement and
then you----
Senator Corker. Duplicitous-like. Is that----
Secretary Clinton. Yes, yes.
Senator Corker [continuing]. What you're saying?
Secretary Clinton. Well, no. I think that it is--you make
an agreement. The agreement, on the face of it and in its
terms, set forth the obligations, but, for various reasons,
each side might want to characterize it a little bit
differently. But, if you look at the statement--the unilateral
statements that were made by the Russians, they basically said
they would have a right to withdraw if, you know, we continued
on missile defense. They have a right to withdraw anyway, and
with the original START Treaty, they said similar things about
missile defense; and here we are, billions of dollars later.
And it just is not a--it's not a part of the treaty agreement
itself.
Senator Corker. As it relates to their ability to launch,
it's my understanding they're already below the levels that the
treaty stipulates, and that we're above it, and--so, as it
relates to the ability to deliver, did we really get anything
in this treaty at all?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I--Senator, I think the significant
reduction in overall nuclear weapons was very clearly a
benefit.
Senator Corker. But, aren't they already below the level,
just specifically as it relates to strategic launch ability?
Aren't they--because of the age of their system--aren't they
already below levels that we've agreed to----
Admiral Mullen. In terms of launching----
Senator Corker. That's right.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Launching vehicles----
Senator Corker. That's right.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Themselves, they are, yes.
Senator Corker. OK, so----
Admiral Mullen. But----
Senator Corker [continuing]. So, let me ask you a question.
We--it seems to me their neighbors are pretty concerned about
their tactical abilities. And did we miss an opportunity, since
they're already below on their strategic ability to deliver--
they're already below that; we're the ones that are actually
making cuts, not them--did we miss an opportunity--and I know
we always Monday-morning quarterback, and whenever we negotiate
on behalf of our caucus, other Senators say, ``Well, why didn't
you get this?''--and I know that's what I'm doing now, but I
guess that's the purpose of this hearing--did we miss an
opportunity to get them to do some things, tactically, that
would have made their neighbors feel slightly more safe?
Admiral Mullen. From my perspective, Senator, we seized an
opportunity to come together and get to this treaty. It isn't
everything that everybody could have wanted. Certainly, we're
very aware of the tactical nuclear weapons that Russia has.
That has been discussed with them, in terms of the future.
And, in a broader context, I think the leadership position
that we're both in right now as a result of this, from the
perspective of overall nuclear weapons inventory, it is
certainly something that will be addressed in the future. But,
it just was not a part of this negotiation.
Secretary Gates. I would also add two things, Senator.
First of all, what is important to our allies, and
particularly those on Russia's periphery, is our reaffirmation
of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and the fact that NATO
continues to believe and attest to the fact that it has--must
have a nuclear capability. The F-35s that we are going to
deploy will have a dual capability. So, we have protected our
right, with respect to tactical nuclear weapons.
There's no question that they're concerned in Eastern
Europe, particularly about Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
That was not a part of this negotiation, but we have protected
our own ability to do more.
And, just for the record, I would point out that, while
their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles are under the current
levels of the treaty, the number of warheads is actually above
the level. So, they will be reducing the number of warheads.
Senator Corker. So, I'm going to move on to something that
you can address. I know these other things are lookbacks, and
the treaty is what it is, from you all's standpoint.
I think the modernization issue is the issue that probably
concerns all of us. And I know my time's limited now. But, I
know there's a 23-page report that talks a little bit about,
sort of, where we are. And I know it's a secure document. But,
you know, it focuses mainly on our sub delivery system, and not
the others. Our labs are telling us that, you know, they don't
think there's any way that the amount of dollars that have been
set aside adds up. You all talk about $80 billion in
investment, but many of us look at it, and it looks like it's
double counting. In other words, much of it is money that was
already going to be spent.
And all I would say is, as we move ahead and--I know I'm 13
seconds over now--I think that's an area where we're going to
want a lot of clarification as to what the real commitment is,
modernizationwise. I think that's really important to all of
us. I think all of us know we have a--an aged system, and we
know that for us to really be where we need to be, real
investment in modernization needs to take place.
And I don't know if you want to make a quick closing
comment.
I will say, to all of you, thank you again for your service
and for your willingness to be here to testify.
Secretary Gates. Two quick comments.
First of all, I've been trying for 3\1/2\ years to get
money for modernization of the nuclear infrastructure. This is
the first time I think I have a chance of actually getting
some. And ironically, it's in connection with an arms control
agreement. But, the previous efforts have completely failed.
Second, I would just quote--and we will get you all the
budgetary details and everything with respect to this--but, I
would just quote the Director of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, Tom D'Agostino, who said in testimony that,
``The resources we have in the President's budget are exactly
what we feel is needed in order to satisfy the requirements.''
And he said, separately, ``What is--it is what is required to
get the job done.''
But, we'll give you all the details.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the
hearing.
This treaty stands to reduce the size of our arsenal and
the Russian arsenal, making the world a safer place without
constraining the ability to defend our Nation. Its ratification
would also offer proof to the international community of the
commitment of the United States to fulfilling our obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which will, of course, help
foster the cooperation needed to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons and materiels.
However, this treaty makes significant changes to the
verification and inspection regime that was in place for nearly
two decades under the original START Treaty. We have to ensure
that this treaty is verifiable and guarantees our ability to
adequately monitor Russian nuclear weapons and materiel. So, as
a member of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I'm in
the process of reviewing that.
But, let me go to Secretary Gates and just follow on
Senator Corker's questions that have to do with modernization.
I understand you were talking about funding issues, but let's
get at least one clarification that I think you could provide.
Some of my colleagues in the Senate are concerned that this
treaty would jeopardize our ability to modernize our arsenal.
It's my understanding that nothing in this treaty prohibits us
from building new warheads, if needed. Is that correct,
Secretary?
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Feingold. And then, let's turn to Admiral Mullen on
the issue of verification. This treaty's verification regime
differs in several ways from the one that was in place for
nearly two decades, as I just mentioned. On one hand, we would
no longer maintain an onsite inspection facility at Votkinsk.
On the other hand, due to the change in counting rules, I
understand that the new treaty would permit more vigorous
onsite inspections.
So, Admiral, on balance, would you say that this would
increase or decrease our overall understanding of the Russian
arsenal?
Admiral Mullen. I think, on balance, it would increase it.
And, specifically, with respect to Votkinsk, one of the
provisions of this treaty calls for notification of every
weapon that's--gets made there now--notification to us 48 hours
before it comes out the factory, specifically. I think the
verification procedures in this treaty are easier. Secretary
Gates has spoken, earlier, about the number of inspections,
about the specifics of the inspections, for the first time, to
be able to look into, and see the number of, weapons which are
on top of any particular missile, where we haven't been able to
do that before.
We will be able to count weapons on bombers, which we
haven't been able to do before. We'll be able to, in fact,
confirm facility elimination. There are very robust national
technical means provisions in this treaty, and a specific
provision which does not permit interference with that.
The unique identifier, which will be on every single
weapon, is a brand new provision for verification and was--as
was mentioned earlier, the number of tests--or launches each
year, which will have telemetry--but, the telemetry needs of
this treaty are different from the telemetry needs we had in
the past. And we really don't need telemetry for the kind of
verification that we need for this treaty that we had before,
to include the ability to understand the weight of a missile,
when we didn't know what was actually inside it.
So, I think the verification procedures for this treaty are
very robust and meet the standards that we have, today, in the
21st century, and not the ones that we needed back in previous
treaties.
Senator Feingold. Admiral, I'm concerned that calls for
maintaining a large arsenal are based on a misunderstanding of
the potential impact of any use of nuclear weapons. Independent
studies indicate that even a so-called ``limited nuclear
exchange'' of 100 warheads would have devastating consequences.
Has the U.S. Government evaluated the impact of so-called
``limited exchange''? And is it true that such an exchange
could have a devastating global impact?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I think the--a limited exchange
would have a devastating global impact. Senator Lugar spoke to
that earlier. A single--you know, a single weapon would have a
devastating impact. And yet, we find ourselves, I think, over
time, reducing the size of our arsenal, but also sustaining it
at a size that preserves the deterrence aspect of it. We don't
do this alone, and in a treaty with another country that's got
an enormous number of nuclear weapons, as well.
So, clearly the devastation which would occur with any
release of a nuclear weapon--and we were speaking, earlier,
about--that the--the merging of terrorists with nuclear
weapons, which is another big concern and has been put at the
top of the list in the NPR, here. All those things would be
devastating. And from a--but, from the standpoint of the
overall treaty, it's taken us in the right direction, and I
think it's a very, very positive step, while preserving what we
need, in terms of our overall strength and deterrence
capability in a country.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Admiral.
And, Secretary Gates, I understand that the verification
regime under the treaty will supplement the information we
gather using other intelligence-gathering capabilities, such as
satellites. To the extent that the new treaty scales back
certain inspection activities, are we able to compensate for
that loss of access, through other intelligence activities?
Secretary Gates. That certainly is the judgment of the
intelligence community. Representatives of the DNI and CIA were
involved in these negotiations throughout, and consulted, in
terms of both the terms of the treaty and the verification
terms. And I think what you are likely to hear from them is
that they have high confidence in their ability to monitor this
treaty until toward the end of the 10-year term, when that
confidence level will go to moderate.
I would tell you that's what they do on all long-term
evaluations of their intelligence capability. The further into
the future you go, the confidence level begins to decline.
But, there's no question, in terms of the ability to verify
this treaty. And, in fact, when Senator Lugar was talking about
having his picture taken in front of a Typhoon submarine, and
the fact that that was the first time we had seen one, I would
only qualify that by saying that's the only time we've seen one
from dry land. [Laughter.]
Senator Feingold. Admiral Mullen, the Director of the
Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General O'Reilly, recently
testified that this treaty would actually reduce the
constraints on the development of our missile defense program.
Could you just, finally, say a bit about that?
Admiral Mullen. Well--and the issue of missile defense has
been one that obviously is very much in focus as a result of
this. I mean, throughout the negotiations, there was--while we
talked about it, there really was--it was, by and large,
disconnected. And the purpose of this treaty was to not get at
missile defense.
I see no restrictions in this treaty, in terms of our
development of missile defense, which is a very important
system, as well. And I would actually hope that, in the long
term, given the relationship with Russia, that we would be able
to see our way through to more cooperative efforts with them,
in terms of missile defense, and very well, possibly, in the
future, have the kind of impact that General O'Reilly was
talking about.
Senator Feingold. Thank you all.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
All of you have bragged about the--or, have talked about
the verification improvements, or the ability to verify, in
this. I wanted to ask a couple of questions.
Admiral Mullen, you talk about the identification system on
each weapon. Is that going to be like a transponder from an
airplane? Is it going to be a technological--how are we going
to do that? Or do we know yet?
Admiral Mullen. I think some may know. I don't. It is very
clear that it was going to be visible and verifiable, and every
single weapon would have it. And there were specific criteria
that were laid on for each weapon, because the weapons, in
fact, are different, as well.
Senator Isakson. But, would it be a technological
verification versus a visible one, where they'd have some
ability----
Admiral Mullen. I think--I'd have to get back--I think it
is visible, and--but, it could possibly be technologically
verified, as well.
Senator Isakson. Well, that is--if you would, I'd like to
have that information, because that is impressive.
Admiral Mullen. Sure.
Senator Isakson Secretary Gates, thank you for being here.
You talked about the submarine-launched missiles, and you
talked about the number of inspections we'll now have, which is
18. Is that correct?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. How many inspections do we have under the
current--well, current START's expired by 6 months. How many
did we have under START II?
Secretary Gates. I honestly don't remember.
[Pause.]
Secretary Gates. There was a quota of 28----
Senator Isakson. There were 28 inspections----
Secretary Gates [continuing]. For START II.
Senator Isakson. And now there--have 18?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. Well, that's less.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. So, that's not really an improvement.
Admiral Mullen. I was just informed that, actually, the
UIDs are mechanical, they're not technically detectable.
Senator Isakson. OK, they are----
Admiral Mullen. And, second, I think it's important--under
this treaty, there--under the previous treaty, there are 73
facilities that we inspected. Under this one--Russian
facilities--under this treaty, there are only 27. And, in fact,
based on the number of inspections--18--there are almost twice
as many inspections per facility per year than under the
previous treaty. And that speaks to moving this to where we are
right now, as opposed to where we've been in the past.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, that's a really important
position for us to underscore, because we spent a lot of time
on the inspection issue. And I have to confess, at first I
wasn't quite sure, you know, what the numbers were, because we
go from 28 to 18. But, then one of our very able negotiators
showed me a map of all the sites in the former Soviet Union
that we were inspecting, and then, thanks to Senator Lugar and
other efforts, those sites have been closed, they've been
shrunk, they've been dismantled--because it wasn't just in
Russia, it was in Kazakhstan and Belarus and other places. So,
as Admiral Mullen says, in effect, we actually have twice as
many inspections, because we have so many fewer sites to
inspect.
Senator Isakson. I think it would be great for an eighth-
grade-level memo on how less is more, because somebody'll
take--I mean, that could be taken either way. I think it would
be helpful to all of us.
Secretary Gates. Senator, if I could just elaborate on the
answer that I gave you before on the number of inspections, the
18 versus 28, the 18 are divided into two categories. The first
10 are both at deployed and nondeployed sites; 8 are at
nondeployed sites. But, in that first category of 10, we
actually carry out inspections that were--that required two
inspections under START II. There was a separate inspection
of--on data updates, and a separate inspection on RVs under
START II. Under this treaty, we do both in the same inspection.
So, for all practical purposes, the same--the number of
inspections is about the same as it was under START II.
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
Secretary Clinton, again, thank you for being here.
I seem to remember, from Dr. Schlesinger's testimony in our
previous hearing, that, on this issue of short-range tactical
weapons, they're not included in this START agreement. And it
was an issue for the Russians, because of missile defense,
because their old Eastern-Bloc satellite states are so close to
them. Is that correct?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, they were not willing to
negotiate on tactical nukes. And history of these arms control
agreements were always on strategic weapons. But, we have said
that we want to go back and begin to talk to them about
tactical nukes. We would like to, as soon as we can get this
ratified, with all hope that the Senate will so advise and
consent--we want to do that. And I had a very frank and useful
discussion with our NATO allies--because you may know that
there is a move on--or, there was a move on by a number of
European countries to begin to put pressure on the United
States to withdraw our tactical nukes from Europe. And we have
said very clearly, No. 1, that has to be a NATO decision; it's
not a unilateral decision; and, No. 2, we are not going to
withdraw our tactical nukes unless there is an agreement for
Russia to similarly discuss with us withdrawal of their
tactical nukes.
So, this is an issue that was very well vetted by our NATO
allies, our Central and our Eastern European allies. They know
that, you know, Russia has their tactical nukes, you know,
close to their borders with our NATO allies. It's one of the
reasons--and this is something that either Secretary Gates or
Admiral Mullen can address--it's one of the reasons why we
altered our missile defense approach in Europe to the phase-
adaptive approach, because, you know, very frankly, we were
looking at, you know, what kind of medium-range missiles Iran
had, you know, not the intercontinental. So, this whole
question of shorter range missiles and the tactical nukes is
one that we're going to address.
Senator Isakson. So, we maintain both the leverage of our
existing tactical weapons that are in Europe, as well as
proceeding with missile defense.
Secretary Clinton. Yes, we do.
Senator Isakson. And the--our NATO partners have, I think,
used the word ``welcomed'' this treaty. Is that correct?
Secretary Clinton. Yes, it is.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Isakson.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, thank you for
this hearing, and--appreciate it very much.
I want to express my appreciation to our three witnesses
for their service to this Nation.
And I concur in the comments made by our chairman, by
Senator Dodd, by Senator Lugar, of the importance of moving
forward on our efforts in world leadership on nonproliferation.
And I see this treaty as a critical part in the relationship
between Russia and the United States in providing world
leadership on nuclear safety issues, on nonproliferation
issues, and on responsible reductions of our nuclear
stockpiles.
So, I'm pleased that we're moving forward on this, and I
hope that we will be able to act prior to the end of this
Congress.
Madam Secretary, I want to follow up on a statement you
made earlier. You know, I see that--Russia and the United
States having some common interest here, particularly against
the threat of nuclear arms in other countries. And you
mentioned Iran. Well, put me down in the category as being very
concerned about what happened with Brazil and Turkey with Iran.
I'm certain those two countries--well, these two countries may
have acted in good faith, but Iran is not. We've been down this
road before. We know that Iran can change its mind at any time
in regards to the nuclear materiel. We also know that their--
under this arrangement, they would continue on their refinement
and--capacity to develop a nuclear weapon.
So, I was pleased to hear your status, that we are moving
forward with the Security Council resolutions and that we have
at least some cooperation from Russia and China. That, to me,
is good news. And it seems to me it's one of the by-products on
your negotiations on the START Treaty. So, I think this all
comes together.
I--if there's further--more than you could elaborate on
that now, I would appreciate it. If not, we certainly
understand the timing that you're going through.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, thank you. And I think
there's no doubt that our cooperation and the intensive efforts
that so many of us, along with our Russian counterparts, put
into the START negotiations over the last year--is part of the
reason why we plan to circulate a draft resolution to the
entire Security Council today, that includes Russia and China
and their agreement on the wording of the text.
With respect to the efforts that were undertaken by Turkey
and Brazil, you know, we have acknowledged the sincerity of the
undertakings by both Turkey and Brazil. They have attempted to
find a solution to Iran's standoff with the international
community, and they made an announcement, in Tehran, that
included certain commitments by Iran. But, as we and the
international community have made consistently clear over the
last many months, it is not sufficient for Iran to stand at a
press conference and make a declaration. Iran has to clearly
and authoritatively convey to the International Atomic Energy
Agency what its position is and what it is prepared to do,
before any offer by Iran can be legitimately considered by the
international community. That has not happened.
And, while the removal of a significant portion of low-
enriched uranium from the territory of Iran would be a positive
step, we are seriously concerned by a number of issues that
were missing from the declaration announced. And the chairman
began, today, by listing some of those. Chief among them is
Iran's refusal to suspend its enrichment of uranium to near 20
percent levels. That is in clear violation of its international
obligations. It is continually amassing newly enriched uranium,
regardless of whether it comes to agreement on the Tehran
research reactor concerns. And as President Medvedev said
publicly yesterday, Russia shares our concerns about this
continuing enrichment by Iran.
You know, we had further concerns, which I conveyed to both
my Brazilian and Turkish counterparts, about the amorphous
timeline for the removal of the LEU. The way that it was
presented in this declaration, that could take months of
further negotiation. And that is just not acceptable, to us and
to our partners.
And finally, we're troubled by the continued failure of the
Iranian side in this declaration to commit to engage with the
P5+1 on its nuclear program, despite a request to do so since
last October.
And we don't believe it was any accident that Iran agreed
to this declaration as we were preparing to move forward in New
York. With all due respect to my Turkish and Brazilian friends,
the fact that we had Russia on board, we had China on board,
and that we were moving, early this week--namely, today--to
share the text of that resolution, put pressure on Iran, which
they were trying to somehow dissipate.
So, Senator, given our very serious concerns about Iran's
continued violations concerning its nuclear activities, we
remain committed to moving forward with the process in the
United Nations, and we are very committed to working with our
counterparts at the U.N. and--in order to get as strong a
possible resolution as soon as we can.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you very much for that
response. I share Senator Lugar's concerns that a single
missile could cause havoc with world stability. And I know
that, on the START Treaty, you're trying to get the right
balance between deterrence and nonproliferation. But, it goes
beyond Russia and the United States. And that's why I think
these numbers are significant, and the efforts of Russia and
the United States to work together on these issues are
important for the international community, including what is
happening in Iran or what's happening in North Korea. And, as
pointed out, the India-Pakistan issues are also ones of major
concern to all of us.
So, I think it's extremely important that we keep focused
on the overall objectives as we look at the Senate's
ratification of the START Treaty, because it clearly has
implications beyond just Russia and the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin.
We're going to have a vote, here, in a few minutes. What--I
want to not interrupt the hearing at all, so I would ask
whichever Senator is, sort of, next in line on questioning, if
they would leave--I will also leave immediately, when the vote
goes off, and then turn around and come back so we can continue
the hearing without interruption.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
First of all, let me tell you where I come from on this.
And I suspect everybody's in the same position. And that is,
the first responsibility of a government is the protection of
its citizens and the defense of the American people. Secretary
Gates, I think, probably put this in about as good a--and
simple a--understandable terms as you can, in saying, Are we
better off with this, or are we better off without it? I mean,
that's probably as good a way of looking at this as possible.
Secretary Gates, commenting on your prior testimony, you
know, the modernization that you've been pursuing is absolutely
critical. I mean, it's not only the number of weapons, but it's
the technology, it's everything else. So, keep up the good work
there, and we'll--from this Senator's standpoint, we'll help
you, every way we can. That absolutely needs to be done.
Secretary Clinton, your discussion about pursuing a
discussion or a treaty on tactical weapons--nuclear weapons--is
certainly important, and I do hope, when this is over, that
that will be pursued.
Secretary Gates, you talked about 40 years ago, when you
started this. Certainly, that was an--a marvelous job that was
done 40 years ago. It was a huge step forward for mankind and
getting a START Treaty. But, we've had 40 years of experience
with this now, and I kind of view it as a marriage. Things have
changed dramatically over the last 40 years, and we seem to
have developed irreconcilable differences on the defensive
missile situation. And that's where--and I don't think this is
secret; Secretary Clinton and I have discussed this--I have
real difficulties with this. And I would have hoped that we
would have taken advantage of this opportunity to try to smooth
this over.
You know, 40 years ago, when this started, the--you had the
new treaty. We--the two parties have now dealt with it for 40
years. Both parties have recognized what they have in their
hands and how it would affect the world. This nonsense about a
limited exchange--I mean, all somebody has to do is pull the
trigger once. I mean, it doesn't matter whether it's 100,
whether it's one; it would have profound changes on the culture
of the world.
So--but, in any rate, 40 years ago, we didn't have Iran
pursuing nuclear ambitions, we didn't have North Korea, we
didn't have the Chinese situation, we didn't have India and
Pakistan nuclear armed, and today we do. And, to me, that is
the--is even a more pressing need than this particular treaty.
Now, it's a good thing to have this treaty. And the details
of it, we can all spar about how many inspections there should
be, and that sort of thing. But, to me, we need to be looking,
kind of like a sports analogy, the second shot we're going to
take; and that is, we ought to be looking at, What about these
other situations? And the other situations are such that we
can't sit down at a table with Iran, we can't sit down at a
table with North Korea, and talk to them using common sense and
using reasonableness in reaching a treaty, like we have with
the Russians, that has really been successful over the last 40
years. And they--I don't think anyone can argue that it hasn't
been successful. These others don't fall in the same category.
So, in order to protect the American people, it has--
absolutely critical that we develop, and we develop with the
best technology, the best ability that we have, a defensive
missile system. That's the only way we're going to protect
ourselves from these other countries.
So, that's why I am concerned when, at the end of the day,
after all the discussions, we have irreconcilable differences
with the Russians. We say this doesn't impede our abilities,
the Russians say, ``Yes, it does.'' And I have the greatest
respect for the ranking member, here, who says, ``We need to
say, over and over again, that this doesn't affect our ability
to do that.'' But, yet, when you read the preamble, when you
read some of the language in it, and, most importantly, when
you read the unilateral statements, we have irreconcilable
differences. This treaty means something different to the
Russians than it means to us when it comes to protecting our
people using a defensive missile structure.
So, having said all that, I'm going to give you a couple of
minutes here to again reassure me. I've listened to all of you
reassure me before. And I understand that the bottom-line
answer is, ``Well, if we don't like it, we can always get out
of the treaty.'' Well, that isn't a legitimate answer, because
other--if that's the case, then why have the treaty at all?
So, that's where I come from on this. That's the problem I
have with this. I think that it's a really, really good thing
to have this treaty. But, anything we do to convince the world,
or suggest to the world, that we aren't going to do everything
we possibly can to effect a legitimate defensive position
really, really troubles me.
Secretary Gates. Senator, the Russians have hated missile
defense ever since the strategic arms talks began, in 1969. In
fact, those talks started with the Russians' primary interest
being in negotiating the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. And it
was under the insistence of the United States that we
accompanied with--it with an interim agreement on strategic
offensive weapons.
So, from the very beginning of this process, more than 40
years ago, the Russians have hated missile defense. They hated
it even more in 1983, when Ronald Reagan--when President Reagan
made his speech, saying we were going to do strategic missile
defense. And so, the notion that this treaty has somehow focusd
this antagonism on the part of the Russians, toward missile
defense, all I would say is, it's the latest chapter in a long
line of Russian objections to our proceeding with missile
defense. And, frankly, I think it's because--particularly in
the 1970s and 1980s, and probably equally now, it's because we
can afford it and they can't. And we're going to be able to
build a good one, and are building a good one, and they
probably aren't. And they don't want to devote the resources to
it, so they try and stop us from doing it, through political
means. This treaty doesn't accomplish that for them.
There are no limits on us. We have made these unilateral
statements on other issues relating to virtually every other
strategic arms agreements we've--agreement we've had with the
Russians, on one subject or another. Neither has ever
considered them binding.
And I will tell you, we are putting our money where our
beliefs are. As Secretary Clinton pointed out, our FY11 budget
will add about 700 million more dollars on missile defense. We
are going forward with a second missile field at Fort Greely.
We are--we've put--we're putting more than a billion dollars
into the second--into the two- and three-stage ground-based
interceptor programs. We're buying THAADs, we're buying
Patriot-3s, we're buying SM-3s, we're buying X-band radars. We
are--we have a comprehensive missile defense program, and we
are going forward with all of it. And our plan is to add even
more money to it in FY12. So, you know, the Russians can say
what they want, but, as Secretary Clinton said, these
unilateral statements are totally outside the treaty, they have
no standing, they're not binding, never have been.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time's up.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Let me--as our--as Secretary Clinton knows well, the best-
laid plans of mice and men around here don't always work, and
the Senate has delayed the vote to 12:05. So, we will continue
in normal fashion.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And I want to thank our three witnesses for being here with
us again. I--we recently had a briefing, which was very
helpful, in another setting. And this is a continuation of the
work that's been done by each of you, and those that work with
you.
First of all, I think we--we still have a lot of debating
and discussion about this treaty, and that will continue, and
that's important, to have questions raised over the next
several weeks or months, depending on how quickly we get--this
treaty gets to the floor. But, I think it's apparent, from the
testimony that you've provided, and others, people outside of
government who worked in other administrations of both parties,
all being committed to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal, but also in just--in summary fashion, highlighting
Secretary Gates's four points, on transparency, predictability,
strategic stability, and then access to both Russian facilities
and weapons--all under the umbrella of a safe, secure, and
effective arsenal, but also under, I guess, a broader umbrella
of this treaty enhancing our security. I think it's critically
important to make that point.
And, just by way of review, because in--the three of you
know better than I that, in Washington, we need to review
often, and reemphasize--Secretary Gates, I just wanted to
review some of your testimony, just by way of emphasis and
repetition--but, on page 3 of your testimony, you say the
following, ``First, the treaty will not constrain the United
States from deploying the most effective missile defenses
possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on these
defenses.'' That's one statement.
The next paragraph, ``The New START agreement''--and again,
I'm quoting--``The New START agreement does not restrict our
ability to develop and deploy prompt conventional strike
capabilities that could attack targets anywhere on the globe in
an hour or less.''
Further along in that paragraph, you say, ``We are
currently examining potential future long-range weapon systems
for prompt global strike that would not be limited by the
treaty.''
All three of those statements, I think, meet--or rebut, I
should say--some of the arguments that have been made, over the
last couple of weeks, on missile defense. And I think it's
amplified by what Secretary Clinton said, on page 2, that the
treaty, ``does not compromise the nuclear force levels we need
to protect ourselves and our allies. Second, the treaty does
not infringe on the flexibility we need to maintain our forces,
including bombers, submarines, and missiles, in a way that best
serves our national security interests. And, third and finally,
the treaty does not constrain our missile defense efforts.''
And then, of course, Secretary Clinton adds more to that
assertion.
And, Admiral Mullen, your statements, as well.
So, I think that it's important that we confront that
argument, but I think it's also important that we are very
clear and unambiguous, as I think all three of you have been.
The one issue that was raised, in addition to missile
defense--one of several--and it was raised in the context of a
Foreign Relations Committee hearing that we had, a number of
weeks ago--it's been raised by others, but I know former
Secretary Schlesinger raised it--and it's this question of
tactical weapons. And it keeps arising. And I wanted to have
you speak to that, because one sense that I have is that prior
to and during, but especially prior to, the START Treaty
discussions and negotiations, I think it was very clear that we
entered into negotiations with the Russians with an
understanding that tactical nuclear weapons would not be
discussed, that that would, in fact, take place later, and
that, in particular--I know Secretary Perry made this point--
that, concluding the New START Treaty was a necessary
prerequisite to having discussions about tactical weapons.
I wanted to have each of you, if--in the 2 minutes we
have--I know I haven't left you much time, but--speak to that
question about the tactical and--weapons--and deal with the
argument that's been presented.
Secretary Gates. Well, I think you've put your finger on
it. I mean, there was agreement not to--that these were not a
part of the negotiation and--from the very beginning.
But, in the context of their number of tactical nuclear
weapons, let me just emphasize one other aspect that hasn't
been mentioned, in terms of where I think this treaty is of
benefit to the United States.
I believe the Russians are in the process of changing the--
fundamentally, their approach to their own security. In the
mid-1950s, President Eisenhower decided that, because of the
vast number of Soviet soldiers, that the United States would
not try and match the Russians, tank for tank, and soldier for
soldier, in Europe, but, rather, rely on massive retaliation,
massive nuclear retaliation. And so, we invested very heavily
in our nuclear capability.
In 2010, the Russians, facing both financial constraints,
but especially demographic constraints, are reducing the size
of their conventional forces. And everything we see indicated
they're increasing the importance and the role of their nuclear
weapons in the defense of Russia, and leaving their
conventional force more for handling problems on the borders,
and internal problems.
So, this treaty constrains them in an area where I believe
they are turning their attention as their population prevents
them from having the kind of huge land army that has always
characterized Russia. So, keeping a cap on that, and bringing
those numbers down in the strategic area, and then, perhaps,
hopefully, turning to the tactical nuclear weapons, where
they--their tactical number weapons outnumber ours, thousands
to one, basically, in Eastern Europe--I mean, in the western
United States--in the western Russia--I think gives us a real
advantage.
Senator Casey. Secretary Clinton.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, the Nuclear Posture
Review makes clear--and the President reiterated this
commitment on April 8, at the signing of the treaty with
President Medvedev in Prague--that the United States intends to
pursue, with Russia, additional and broader reductions in our
strategic and tactical weapons, including nondeployed weapons.
Now, we can't get to a discussion about tactical weapons until
we get the New START Treaty ratified, because, obviously, as
Secretary Gates said, that really provides the base from which
we start. And addressing tactical nuclear weapons requires
close coordination with NATO, and we're in the process, as I
said earlier, of working out the NATO alliance approach to
tactical nuclear weapons through the strategic concept. So, all
these things are moving together.
The first of business, of course, is the New START Treaty,
because, you know, that precedes our ability to get into these
additional discussions with the Russians.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
I know we're out of time, but, Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Mullen. Just two brief thoughts.
One is, throughout the negotiations, in the time I spent on
this, it was a known that, one, we weren't dealing with this,
but we needed to. And so, that's not a message that's lost on
them.
And then, second, my experience, both in my last job, with
the head of their Navy, as well as in this job, with, now, two
separate Chiefs of Defense--what Secretary Gates said, their
investment--they are clearly changing, and they are not going
to be able to invest in the kind of ground forces that they've
had in the past. They are investing in strategic--in their
strategic forces, which, to me, just strengthens the importance
of having this kind of treaty with them as we both move
forward.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Senator Lugar.
And I want to thank all three of you for your service to
the country, as well.
We got the copy of the treaty on Friday. I look forward to
getting into a lot of details. But, I'd like to express
concerns, maybe in more of a conceptual way today, just to get
some quick response from you and to make one request.
The details are important, obviously, but it appears, from
what you've said already, that, aside from the treaty with
Russia, that the signal to the rest of the world, our
credibility, the appearances of what it shows, as far as our
good faith, is important. And certainly, making the world
safer, reducing proliferation, is key. And I appreciate that
goal, and I think we all share it.
The concerns I have are that some of the assumptions in the
treaty appear to suggest a different role for America in the
future. And I'll express a few of these concerns.
America does have a different role. As you all know, over
30 countries count on us for their protection. So, as far as
military and defense, we play a much different role than
Russia. Russia's a threat to many, but a protector of none.
America also the largest economic role in the world, as far
as our trade with other countries, and we use it to help other
countries. Russia uses their energy, their oil, as a threat.
And I think we know, as we look at nuclear weapons, that
the Russians don't like missile defense, because they don't see
it as a deterrent. They want to use it as a threat. And I think
that's why this treaty, and what it says about missile defense,
is very important.
But, the first underlying assumption, which I'm afraid is
absurd and dangerous, is that America should seek parity with
Russia when it comes to nuclear weapons. Russia doesn't have 30
countries counting on them for protection. And the reduction of
our ability to--not just to deliver, but to protect from
nuclear weapons, is more likely to result in proliferation than
this arms treaty with Russia.
My biggest concern, though, is related to missile defense,
because it's unrealistic to believe that our treaty with Russia
is going to reduce proliferation with countries like Iran and
Syria and other rogue nations that are intent on developing
nuclear weapons.
The Russians don't appear to misunderstand what's in this
treaty. And I don't have to read the preamble to you. But, it's
very clear that we can develop defensive missile defense, as
long as it does not threaten their offensive capabilities. I
mean, that's exactly what it says here. That's what they've
said in their statement. There is a clear disconnect between
what you are telling us and what it says in this treaty and
what the Russians are saying. We have complete flexibility with
missile defense, until it gets to the point where it threatens
their ability to deliver weapons. And once that happens, not
just for Russia, but all over the world, that we render nuclear
missiles irrelevant if we can shoot them down--and for us to
even include in the treaty that idea that these things are
interrelated is somewhat frightening to me. And I don't
believe, for 1 minute, Iran is going to see this as a good
sign.
What I would like, at this point--and I think other members
of the committee would, too--after the first START Treaty was
presented, members of the committee were given copies of the
full negotiating record so that we can see the understandings
that were discussed during the negotiations and that we can
determine if missile defense is, in fact, interrelated and if
this parity issue is one that we have discussed openly with the
Russians.
And I just want to ask Secretary Clinton, Will you allow
members of the committee to see the full negotiating record?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, Senator, let me say that
the language you're referring to--similar language was included
in the START Treaty. And, you know, I hope we will be able to
persuade you, by the end of this process, and we will certainly
make every effort to do so, that nothing in any previous
treaty, nor any unilateral statement or any preamble to a
treaty, has in any way constrained our development of missile
defense up to this date, and nothing in the current new treaty
does, either.
I think that the facts really refute any concerns that you
and others might have, because we have proceeded apace, over
the last 40 years, with the development of missile defense,
despite, as Secretary Gates said, the 40 years of opposition
from the Russians.
Now, with respect to the information around the treaty, you
know, we are submitting a detailed article-by-article analysis
of the treaty. The analysis is nearly 200 pages long. It
provides information on every provision of the treaty, the
protocol, and the annexes, including how the United States will
interpret the various provisions.
These materials were prepared by the treaty negotiators
and, therefore, are drawn from the negotiating history. They're
intended to provide a comprehensive picture of U.S. obligations
under the treaty. And I do not believe--I will double check
this, Senator--I do not believe that the negotiating record was
provided with the original START Treaty, because negotiating
records, going back to, I think, President Washington, Bob told
me, the other day, have not been provided.
But, we will provide extensive and comprehensive
information, and I hope, in the process, we will be able to
persuade you that, just as in the past, despite the Russian
dislike of our missile defense efforts, we are going forward.
And I voted for missile defense when I was here, when the
START Treaty, that expired in December, was in effect. And I
can assure you that you and other members will be able to
continue to vote for missile defense in the future.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
And I just have to take what's in the treaty and what the
Russians have said. It's clear that, at any point that our
missile defense threatens their ability to deliver offensive
weapons, that they feel completely free to walk away from this
treaty. So--which means we, effectively, have no treaty unless
it is our intent to dabble with missile defense and not create
a global umbrella that could protect us.
But, it seems to make only common sense, at this point, as
we see what's happening in Iran and around the country. Our
ability to stop the development of nuclear weapons is very
limited, but our ability to develop a defense system that could
make those irrelevant would be the best disincentive we could
provide the world, if they can't deliver them anywhere.
So, it's obvious there is a real concern here. The Russians
apparently have gotten--the clear statement from this is that,
at any point, if our missile defense systems threatens their
delivery system, they're going to walk away from this treaty.
And I hope you can convince me by what--the negotiating
records, that that is not what was discussed. But, I do know,
in previous negotiations of treaties, that some members of
committees have had the opportunity to see full negotiating
records. And I hope this is something that you'll consider.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Well thank you, Senator.
Just so the record is as complete as all of us want it to
be, here, let me just state that we did not get the negotiating
record under the START I process. We did get it with the INF
Treaty. But, subsequent to that, the Foreign Relations
Committee decided--and I will read from the report--that,
``With the INF Treaty negotiations having been provided under
these circumstances, both the administration and the Senate now
face the task of ensuring the Senate review of negotiating
records does not become an institutionalized procedure. The
overall effect of fully exposed negotiations, followed by a far
more complicated Senate review, would be to weaken the
treatymaking process and thereby damage American diplomacy. A
systemic expectation of Senate perusal of every key treaty's
negotiating record could be expected to inhibit candor during
future negotiations, and induce posturing on the part of U.S.
negotiators and their counterparts during sensitive
discussions.''
I would suggest to the Senator, I think that we are going
to be given a very frank account when we have a classified
session with the negotiators; you'll be able to ask a lot of
tough questions, and a lot of answers, I think, will be
forthcoming. But, I think--personally, I think that the
rationale that the Senate committee came to previously is a
good rationale, and I think it stands today.
Senator DeMint. Well, Senator, I appreciate that
clarification. And I would be happy, at this point, even if
it's redacted, to have some record of the discussion related to
our missile defense and the linkage that was included in the
preamble so that we can determine what both sides understood.
The Chairman. Let me suggest this, Senator--we all want you
to be satisfied, and we want you to vote for this. But, I think
that the better way to proceed would be--let's meet with the
team, let's meet in classified session, let's see to what
degree those answers can satisfy you.
I'd just share with the Senator, this is a preamble. And
the preamble merely says, ``Recognizing the existence of the
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and
strategic defensive arms''--it's something we all recognize;
there is a relationship ``that this interrelationship will
become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced.''
That stands to reason; if you reduce nuclear arms and you build
up your missile defense, you can, in fact, completely
obliterate one party's sense of deterrence. If their offense is
totally obliterated by your defense, they no longer have an
offense. What happens? They build. That's where we spent 40
years. And we decided, when we had over 30,000 warheads, to
move in the opposite direction.
Senator DeMint. Well, Senator, you're making my point.
Obviously, we're agreeing to keep our missile defense to the
point where it does not render their weapons useless.
The Chairman. No. All that's been said here is, there's a
relationship. There's no agreement not to do anything. And it
simply says that the current level doesn't do that. It's just
recognizing a status quo. It does nothing to prevent us,
unilaterally, from doing whatever we want.
Is that correct, Secretary Gates?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
The Chairman. That is correct.
Senator DeMint. But, you just told me----
The Chairman. It simply acknowledges----
Senator DeMint [continuing]. That if our missile defense
can render theirs useless----
The Chairman. I'm speaking----
Senator DeMint [continuing]. That----
The Chairman [continuing]. About the common sense of the
theory, but I'm not suggesting that this in any way restrains
us. I said, in my opening comments, it does not restrain us.
Senator DeMint. But, is it not desirable for us to have a
missile defense system that renders their threat useless?
The Chairman. I don't, personally, think so, no, because
what'll happen is, if you get near that, they will do exactly
what we both did over the course of 50 years; they will build
to the point that they feel they can overwhelm your defense,
and then you're back right into the entire scenario we had
throughout the cold war, which took us up to 30,000 warheads
each, or more.
Senator DeMint. So, we're still at the point of mutually
assured destruction. I mean, that's the basis of----
The Chairman. Yes. We certainly are. That is accurate.
Senator DeMint. I think that's pretty----
Secretary Gates. And I think it needs--one point needs to
be clarified here. Under the last administration, as well as
under this one, it has been the United States policy not to
build a missile defense that would render useless Russia's
nuclear capabilities. It has been a missile defense intended to
protect against rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran, or
countries that have very limited capabilities. The systems that
we have, the systems that originated and have been funded in
the Bush administration, as well as in this administration, are
not focused on trying to render useless Russia's nuclear
capability. That, in our view, as in theirs, would be
enormously destabilizing, not to mention unbelievably
expensive.
Senator DeMint. So, our ability to protect other countries
is a pipedream, and we don't even intend to do that. Is that
true?
Secretary Gates. Our ability to protect other countries is
going to be focused on countries like Iran and North Korea, the
countries that are rogue states, that are not participants in
the NPT, countries that have shown aggressive intent. And so,
we are able to--we are putting in defenses in Europe that will
be able to defend them. We have defenses in Asia. We're
building defenses in the Middle East. So, we have missile
defense capabilities going up all around the world, but not
intended to eliminate the viability of the Russian nuclear
capability.
The Chairman. Senator, let me do this, because we need to
recognize----
Senator DeMint. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. Senator Shaheen.
It's a good discussion, it's a very important one, and it
needs to be clarified. So, I'm going to leave the record open
for 2 weeks so that we may submit additional questions in
writing. The record from this particular hearing will remain
open. The record for the entire process will still be built.
And, with that, I recognize Senator Shaheen to close out
the hearing.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you----
The Chairman. We have about 5 minutes left on the vote, but
there's a grace period, so you'll----
Senator Shaheen. OK.
The Chairman [continuing]. Get your full questioning
period.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here.
I want to follow up a little bit to make sure I'm clear on
some of what I think I heard in your response to Senator
DeMint. First of all, am I correct that the Russians had a
unilateral statement similar to what is on the current START
Treaty--on the first START Treaty?
Secretary Clinton. There was also perambular language, but
these unilateral statements are very much a pattern. We make
them, they make them, but they are not binding, because they're
not part of the treaty.
Senator Shaheen. And is it correct that, even as we
developed our missile defense plans and pulled out of the ABM
Treaty, that the Russians did not pull out of the START Treaty?
Secretary Clinton. Yes; that is correct.
Senator Shaheen. And would you expect a similar reaction as
we continue to develop missile defense plans with this New
START Treaty, from the Russians?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, we would. And furthermore, we
continue to offer to work with the Russians on missile defense.
We have a standing offer, and we hope that eventually they
will, because we think we now have common enemies.
Senator Shaheen. Well, and just to, one more time, get it
on the record--I think you answered this for Senator Risch--
but, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, are you concerned that
this treaty constricts, in any meaningful way, our ability to
carry out our current missile defense plans?
Secretary Gates. No. I have no concerns whatsoever.
And I would just add that the Russians signed this treaty
knowing full well we intend to proceed with missile defense.
Admiral Mullen. I have no concerns, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Secretary Clinton, you recently spoke at the NPT Review
Conference, and called upon all countries to help strengthen
the NPT, and mentioned that, 40 years ago, after the treaty
came into force, President Kennedy warned that, by the year
1975, we could have up to 20 countries with nuclear weapons.
Fortunately, that hasn't happened. But, can you talk a little
bit about how we ensure that the number of nuclear weapon
states doesn't continue to rise, and how ratification of the
START Treaty can help with that?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I think it begins with
the cooperative relationship between the United States and
Russia, because there are three aspects to the NPT--one is
nonproliferation, one is disarmament, and one is the peaceful
use of nuclear energy--and the nonaligned movement states have,
historically, come to their NPT obligations with some criticism
that the United States is not doing its part on the disarmament
front. There was none of that at this conference in New York,
because of the fact that we had reached this agreement with
Russia. So, it does provide a stronger platform on which we
stand to make the case against proliferation.
The cooperation that we have obtained with Russia, on both
North Korea and Iran in our efforts to constrain and eliminate
their nuclear programs, has been very notable. And I think it
is fair to say that, when this administration started, our
relationship was not very productive. But, through many
efforts, and, most particularly, the intensive efforts around
the New START Treaty, that has changed.
I remember well the quote that you repeated, because the
fears were that, once the genie was out of the bottle, we would
have a multitude of countries with nuclear weapons. That hasn't
happened, we're determined to prevent it from happening, and
we're determined to continue our efforts to prevent Iran from
having nuclear weapon. And, as I said at the beginning of the
hearing, Russia has joined with us and is part of the agreed
statement that is being discussed at the United Nations now.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
And just a final question. I know, in the earlier
questioning, someone brought up the tactical nuclear weapons
question. And I wonder if any of you could speak to what you
think our ability to negotiate an agreement on tactical nuclear
weapons might be if we fail to ratify this treaty.
Secretary Clinton. Well, if we fail to ratify this treaty,
I think it's zero. Once we ratify this treaty, which we are
hopeful the Senate will do, it will still be hard, but it at
least is possible, in the context of our NATO obligations.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Would either of you like to add to that?
Secretary Gates. No. I think that's exactly right.
Senator Shaheen. OK.
Thank you all very much.
The Chairman. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, Admiral
Mullen, thank you very, very much. This has been very helpful.
As I said, the record is open. I know some Senators want to
submit some questions in writing.
We're very grateful to you. Thank you for your work on
this. Thanks for being here today.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and Secretary Clinton to
Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar
missile defense
For many months prior to signature of the New START Treaty,
administration officials indicated the treaty would contain nothing
more than a ``provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive
and strategic defensive arms,'' as the 2009 Joint Understanding between
Presidents Obama and Medvedev stated.\1\
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\1\ At http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/The-Joint-
Understanding-for-The-Start-Follow-On-Treaty/.
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Congress clearly understood this when, last summer, a sense of
Congress was adopted stating that ``the President should maintain the
stated position of the United States that the follow-on treaty to the
START Treaty not include any limitations on the ballistic missile
defense systems[.]'' \2\
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\2\ At section 1251(b)(1) of Title XII of Public Law 111-84, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
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Consequently, some Senators were surprised to read paragraph 3 of
Article V of New START, which is more than a mere statement on the
interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.
In addition, Russian and American unilateral statements on missile
defense as well as language in the preamble and definitions all bear on
missile defense.
Question. Article XIV, paragraph 3 of the treaty provides that
either party may withdraw from the treaty ``if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have
jeopardized its supreme interests.'' Has Russia indicated that it would
regard any current or future part of either our Ballistic Missile
Defense System or the Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defense in
Europe as jeopardizing its supreme interests?
Answer. No. Regarding current capabilities, the treaty's preamble
records the shared view of the United States and Russia that ``current
strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and
effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.'' This
indicates that Russia is not concerned that current U.S. ballistic
missile defense programs jeopardize Russia's supreme interests.
Regarding future capabilities, Russia has expressed concerns about
a potential buildup in the missile defense capabilities of the United
States that would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear forces
potential of the Russian Federation. In an effort to address Russian
concerns we have provided, and will continue to provide, policy and
technical explanations regarding why U.S. ballistic missile defense
(BMD) capabilities such as the European-based Phased Adaptive Approach
and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system will not undermine
Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent.
Question. To what extent has the administration discussed our
regional, and national, missile defense plans with the Russian
Government and the Russian military?
Answer. The Obama administration has provided briefings to, and
discussed U.S. regional and national ballistic missile defense (BMD)
policy, plans, and programs with the Russian Government and the Russian
military. Such briefings and discussions have been held in multiple
channels such as the Arms Control and International Security Working
Group and the Military Cooperation Working Group (consultations between
the Joint Staff and the General Staff) which operate under the auspices
of the United States-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission. Such
briefings and discussions are part of an effort to explain why U.S.
missile defenses do not pose a threat to Russia's strategic deterrent.
We will continue to provide such briefings as appropriate.
reduction levels
Secretary Clinton's Letter of Submittal and the President's Letter
of Transmittal state that the purpose of New START is to require
``mutual'' reductions and limitations on U.S. and Russian strategic
offensive arms. Some estimates indicate the United States may currently
deploy 880 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, while Russia may
currently deploy just above 600. Thus, the central limitation to go to
800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy
bombers under Article II of New START would appear to require the
United States to make reductions, but not Russia. Moreover, the limit
to go to 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers appears to require
the United States to make significant reductions below current levels,
but not Russia.
Admiral Mullen, your written statement indicates that: ``I firmly
believe that the central limits established in this treaty and the
provision that allows each side the freedom to determine its own force
mix provides us with the necessary flexibility to field the right
future force to meet the Nation's needs.''
Question. Why did the United States agree to such low limits? Would
insisting on a limit of 900 delivery vehicles have better served U.S.
interests?
Answer. The United States agreed to the New START Treaty's central
limits of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic
delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM
launchers and nuclear-capable heavy bombers based on strategic force
analyses conducted in support of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and
high-level deliberations within the Department of Defense and the
interagency. The NPR analysis and these deliberations concluded that
the limits contained in the New START Treaty would be sufficient to
support our deterrence requirements, including extended deterrence for
our allies, in the current and projected international security
environment. Operating within the limits and verification regime
established by the New START Treaty, the United States and the Russian
Federation will be able to maintain strategic stability at lower force
levels.
Question. What did the United States get in return from Russia for
agreeing to these limits in view of the fact that all of the reductions
appear to be on the U.S. side?
Answer. Like the START Treaty, the New START Treaty sets equal, but
lower, aggregate limits on the number of deployed strategic delivery
vehicles and associated warheads that each side may have. These
limitations on Russian forces, combined with mechanisms to verify
compliance, constitute the basic bargain of the treaty, and are
consistent with our objective of concluding a treaty that will provide
predictability, transparency, and stability in the United States-
Russian strategic relationship at lower nuclear force levels.
Seven years after entry into force of the New START Treaty, both
Parties will have to ensure their strategic offensive forces are at
levels within the treaty's three limits. The treaty allows the United
States to maintain and modernize our strategic nuclear forces in a way
that best protects our national security interests, within the overall
limits of the treaty.
The administration agreed to the New START central limits on the
basis of recommendations from the Department of Defense based on
analyses conducted by the U.S. Strategic Command in support of the
Nuclear Posture Review. These analyses indicated that the United States
could field a highly capable triad of strategic delivery systems that
would be fully capable of meeting the Nation's deterrence requirements.
The New START Treaty also reinforces America's ability to lead and
revitalize global efforts to prevent proliferation and to strengthen
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by demonstrating that the world's
two largest nuclear powers are taking concrete steps to reduce their
nuclear arms.
significance of noncompliance
A central question for the Senate in examining any arms control
treaty is whether its terms would provide the United States with
sufficient and timely warning to respond to noncompliance so as to deny
a violator benefit of the violation, and well before noncompliance
becomes militarily significant. Military significance has traditionally
been seen in terms of the strengths of U.S. and Russian Forces and the
motivations for Russian cheating.
Question. To what degree would you assess the Russians have any
motivation to cheat under New START?
Answer. This topic is included in a classified National
Intelligence Estimate on the Intelligence Community's ability to
monitor the New START Treaty that was provided to the Senate on June
30, 2010.
Question. How would the types of OSI permitted in the New START
Treaty (a) discover cheating relative to New START's limitations; (b)
raise the cost of such cheating; and (c) deter cheating?
Answer. New START contains three central limits: 1,550 warheads on
deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed
heavy bombers; 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed
nuclear-capable heavy bombers; and 800 total deployed and nondeployed
ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. The
launchers, missiles, and heavy bombers subject to these treaty limits
are required to be based at declared facilities, most of which will be
subject to onsite inspections under the treaty.
As was the case under the START Treaty, onsite inspections will
allow the Parties to confirm the declared numbers of missiles, mobile
launchers, and deployed warheads on a spot-check basis, thereby helping
to detect and deter misrepresentation of such numbers. The assignment
of unique identifiers for each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber, which can
be confirmed during onsite inspections, also will serve as a deterrent
to cheating by making it easier to track each declared strategic
delivery vehicle.
The Intelligence Community's assessment of its ability to monitor
the New START Treaty is conveyed in a classified National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010. This NIE will
help inform the verifiability report that the State Department is
responsible for drafting in accordance with section 306 of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act. The section 306 report will be provided to
the Congress, on a timely basis, and will address the determinations
made by the U.S. Government as to the degree to which the requirements
of the New START Treaty can be verified.
New START verification measures provide the ability to discover
cheating, thus providing a basis for appropriate responses, and thereby
helping to deter it.
Question. What activities involving New START accountable items are
permitted under New START and what activities involving New START
accountable items are prohibited under New START?
Answer. Article IV of the New START Treaty retains a number of the
restrictions and prohibitions on activities relating to strategic
offensive arms that contributed to predictability and stability under
START. These include restrictions on where deployed arms and test items
may be based, restrictions on where nondeployed strategic offensive
arms may be located, a ban on strategic offensive arms at eliminated
facilities with certain exceptions, and a ban on basing strategic
offensive arms outside a Party's national territory.
Within the framework of the specific provisions of the New START
Treaty, the Parties have significant discretion in how their strategic
offensive forces are composed and structured. This principle is
reflected in paragraph 2 of Article II and paragraph 1 of Article V of
the treaty, which states that, subject to the provisions of the treaty,
each Party has the right to determine the composition of its force
structure and is free to carry out modernization and replacement of
strategic offensive arms.
Question. Given that there are relatively few limits on warheads
and delivery vehicles in New START as compared to START I, and the many
administration statements that the United States and Russia are not
likely to engage in a strategic buildup similar to that undertaken
during the cold war, could there still be cheating under New START that
would constitute militarily significant cheating, or would cheating
likely be militarily insignificant and marginal?
Answer. Any act by the Russian Federation to violate its
obligations under the New START Treaty, and/or to deceive the United
States in its effort to verify Russian compliance with the New START
Treaty, would be considered extremely serious. The military
significance of any discovered cheating scenario would have to be
assessed in terms of its potential military and political impact in the
context of the broader international security environment at the time
the cheating was occurring.
Factors that would bear on such an assessment include the
quantitative level of cheating and the overall threat it posed to the
military capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners;
the kind or kinds of weapons involved and their specific capabilities;
our assessment of the state of readiness and training of a clandestine
force; whether the cheating scenario improved Russian strategic
military capability in a manner that destabilized or threatened to
destabilize the United States-Russian military balance and eroded U.S.
deterrence; whether deployed U.S. military forces were sufficient to
pose an effective counter to the Russian capabilities augmented by the
clandestine force; whether the U.S. had sufficient strategic warning to
generate additional capabilities to counter the Russian buildup; and
the overall political and military situation surrounding the discovery
of Russian cheating, whether it was occurring in the context of
relative calm and stability in United States-Russian relations or
during a period of already heightening tension between the United
States and the Russian Federation.
votkinsk
Under the INF Treaty and START I, up to 30 U.S. monitors were
permanently stationed at the portal-and-perimeter continuous monitoring
(PPCM) facility at Votkinsk in Udmurtia to conduct continuous
monitoring of final assembly of Russian ICBM systems using solid rocket
motors, including road-mobile ICBM systems such as the SS-25 Topol, the
SS-27 Topol-M, and now, the RS-24. Monitors observed and measured
containers as they exited the portal perimeter area (a designated space
in which inspection occurred) at the Machine Building Plant. New START
does not contain continuous monitoring, despite the fact that Votkinsk
remains the only location in Russia where this integration is done, and
Russia appears to be deploying more road-mobile ICBMs.
Question. Why did the United States agree to terminate monitoring
at Votkinsk?
Answer. Continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building
Plant began as part of the INF Treaty and was one of the verification
measures used to monitor mobile ICBM production under the START Treaty.
The termination of Votkinsk monitoring coincided with the expiration of
the START Treaty. With the expiration of START on December 5, 2009,
there was no legal basis for maintaining the U.S. portal monitoring
facility at Votkinsk and the United States was required to terminate
its presence at Votkinsk.
Question. At what point during the negotiations did the United
States decide not to seek continued monitoring at Votkinsk as part of
New START?
Answer. During the later part of 2007, the United States and Russia
determined that neither side wanted to extend the START Treaty. While
both sides indicated a willingness to continue some transparency and
verification measures when a follow-on treaty was discussed in 2008,
Votkinsk was not among them. With the anticipated expiration of START,
preparations began in 2008 for ending U.S. portal monitoring at
Votkinsk so that the United States would be able to depart in an
orderly way when START expired on December 5, 2009. The Russian
Government made clear to us that it was not prepared to agree to
continuous monitoring at Votkinsk under a new treaty.
Question. What was the position of the Russian Government on
continuing PPCM-Votkinsk under New START?
Answer. During the later part of 2007, the United States and Russia
determined that neither side wanted to extend the START Treaty. With
the anticipated expiration of START, preparation began in 2008 for
ending U.S. portal monitoring at Votkinsk so that the United States
would be able to depart in an orderly way when START expired on
December 5, 2009. The Russian Government made clear to the United
States that it was not prepared to agree to continuous monitoring at
Votkinsk under a new treaty.
Question. If the previous administration decided to vacate
Votkinsk, when was that decision made and in what context?
Answer. In anticipation of the December 2009 expiration of the
START Treaty, the previous administration began to negotiate an
agreement on arrangements for closing down U.S. continuous monitoring
at Votkinsk. On October 20, 2009, with the expiration of the START
Treaty less than 2 months away, the START Treaty's implementation
commission, the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),
reached an agreement relating to closure of the portal monitoring
activity. This October 2009 agreement is identical to an agreement
negotiated and agreed ad referendum by the Bush administration in
November 2008, with the exception of some minor nonsubstantive edits
made to conform the English and Russian translations.
verification
Secretary Gates, appearing before this committee in 1992 on START
I, as Director of Central Intelligence, you stated, ``the verifiability
of this treaty has always been seen, by supporters and opponents alike,
as the key to the Senate consent process.'' Writing in the Wall Street
Journal last week, Secretary Gates stated that New START ``establishes
an extensive verification regime to ensure that Russia is complying
with its treaty obligations. These include short-notice inspections of
both deployed and nondeployed systems, verification of the numbers of
warheads actually carried on Russian strategic missiles, and unique
identifiers that will help us track--for the very first time--all
accountable strategic nuclear delivery systems.''
If there are no limits in New START on the number of reentry
vehicles (RVs) on any missile, it would appear that better onsite
inspections (OSI), including improved RVOSI, do not verify any limits
but rather confirm that there are warheads on a missile and that a
given missile is where Russia says it is. It is also unclear how
improved RVOSI can significantly contribute to verification of a treaty
not limiting RVs.
In START I, unique identifiers were used to track road-mobile
missiles, and only these missiles. In New START, unique identifiers
would be used for all systems, but it is not clear what verification
value there is in these arrangements.
Question. What are the New START onsite inspections and data
notifications supposed to verify other than the location of a missile
or heavy bomber in Russia?
Answer. The New START Treaty's verification regime, which includes
onsite inspections, a comprehensive database, a wide range of
notifications, and unique identifiers, as discussed below, is designed
to permit verification of each Party's compliance with the treaty's
provisions, including the three central numerical limits contained in
Article II of the treaty, as well as the numbers and status of treaty-
accountable strategic offensive arms.
On-site Inspections.--The treaty provides that each Party can
conduct up to 18 onsite inspections each year at operating bases for
ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and heavy bombers, as well
as storage facilities, test ranges, and conversion and elimination
facilities. These inspection activities contribute to the verification
of compliance with the treaty's central limits by checking on the
accuracy of declared data on the numbers of deployed and nondeployed
ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers and on the warheads
located on or counted for them, as well as conversions and eliminations
of strategic offensive arms.
Comprehensive Database.--A comprehensive database, which will be
initially populated 45 days after the treaty enters into force, will
receive new data constantly as notifications of changes in the force
structures of the two Parties are conveyed in accordance with treaty
provisions. It will also be updated comprehensively every 6 months.
Thus, it will help provide the United States with a ``rolling'' overall
picture of Russia's strategic offensive forces.
Notifications.--The treaty mandates a large number of notifications
which will help to track the movement and changes in status of systems
covered by the treaty.
Unique Identifiers (UID).--Unique alpha-numeric identifiers
assigned to each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber, when combined with
required notifications and the comprehensive database, will contribute
to our ability to track the disposition and patterns of operation of
treaty accountable systems throughout their life cycles.
Question. Since enhanced RVOSI does not serve to verify an RV
limit, how will it help monitor limits in Article II of the New START
Treaty, or constitute an improvement over similar OSI under START I?
Answer. The New START Treaty's procedures for inspections of
reentry vehicles are part of the treaty's more extensive type one
inspections. These inspections confirm the accuracy of declared data on
the numbers of warheads emplaced on designated, deployed ICBMs and
SLBMs. These inspections will help to confirm compliance with the
Article II central limit of 1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed
SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers.
For the first time, inspectors will be tasked to confirm that the
actual number of reentry vehicles emplaced on a designated ICBM or SLBM
is consistent with information provided during the preinspection
briefing.
Under the START Treaty, inspectors could only confirm that no more
reentry vehicles than the number attributed to that type of missile
were emplaced on an ICBM or SLBM designated for a reentry vehicle
inspection.
Question. To which part of each New START accountable system will
each unique identifier be applied?
Answer. The New START Treaty provides each Party with great
flexibility regarding the mode of application and size of the unique
identifiers (UIDs) it is required to affix to all of its ICBMs, SLBMs,
and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Currently, all U.S. strategic
offensive systems have some form of number that will be used as the UID
for treaty purposes.
U.S. ICBM first stages each contain a serial number that is located
on an identification plate on the side of the first-stage rocket motor.
For ICBMs loaded in silo launchers, where the first stage is not
visible during an inspection, the UID will be affixed somewhere on or
near the launcher, either inside the personnel access hatch of the
silo, on the launcher closure door, or on the launch facility fence.
U.S. SLBM first stages each contain a serial number that is located
on a plaque on the front dome of the first stage motor. For SLBM first
stages that are not assembled with a second stage, the serial numbers
can be directly accessed and viewed. For SLBMs that are partially or
fully assembled, so that the serial numbers cannot be directly accessed
and viewed, the UIDs will be affixed somewhere on or near the missile
first stage or written on a placard in the vicinity of the missile. For
assembled SLBMs in loading tubes, the UIDs will be written on the
exterior of the loading tube. For an SLBM loaded in a SSBN launcher,
the UID will be affixed somewhere on the launcher or hatch.
Each heavy bomber carries a unique number that is located on the
tail of the B-52 and B-1B and on the nose gear door of the B-2A.
Part Two of the Annex on Inspection Activities requires that the
unique identifier of a deployed ICBM and deployed SLBM be replicated
directly on the deployed launcher of ICBMs or near it, and directly on
the deployed SLBM launcher, so that inspectors can view and record the
UID in the inspection activity report.
Question. There is less stringent verification in the New START
Treaty. Did the administration agree to this because (a) at lower
numbers of facilities and systems less verification is needed; (b)
because fewer treaty limits require less verification; or (c) because
United States-Russian relations justify fewer formal nuclear
verification and compliance mechanisms?
Answer. The verification measures contained in New START are not
``less stringent'' than those under the START Treaty. New START
verification provisions are tailored to verify the requirements of the
New START Treaty, which are different from START requirements. The New
START Treaty allows the Parties greater operational flexibility to
configure their strategic forces as they see fit within the overall
treaty limits. This is possible and appropriate because of the
knowledge accumulated during 15 years of START Treaty implementation
and the developing relationship between the United States and Russia.
For example, under the expired START Treaty, provisions allowed for
confirmation that a missile of a certain type was not carrying more
than the maximum number of warheads attributed to that type of missile.
In the New START Treaty, there are no restrictions on how many warheads
a certain type of missile may carry. Instead, we will have the
opportunity during inspections to confirm the actual number of warheads
emplaced on a designated missile and declared during the preinspection
briefing. Verification of the actual number of warheads was not
required by the START Treaty.
While it is true that the new treaty provides for fewer inspections
in a given year, 18, rather than the annual quota of 28 permitted under
the START Treaty, the number of inspectable Russian facilities will be
35, substantially lower than the 70 facilities belonging to the four
successor states to the former Soviet Union that were subject to
inspection under the START Treaty. Therefore we have fewer facilities
for inspection, and need fewer inspections to achieve a comparable
level of oversight. In addition, type one inspections combine many of
the aspects associated with two different types of inspections that
were conducted separately under START, thus requiring fewer inspections
annually at the operating bases while achieving many of the results of
the previous START inspection regime with a smaller number of annual
inspections.
cooperative measures
Due to limitations inherent in our NTM, START I contained a variety
of cooperative measures, including a ban on concealment, notifications
of missile movement, equipment exhibitions, design differences to
distinguish variants of systems, public display of certain missiles at
certain times, and a ban on the denial of telemetric data monitoring.
These were used to help target our NTM to monitor declared information
under START I.
Question. In your view, does New START contain sufficient and
similar cooperative measures to assist our NTM? For those cooperative
measures not included in New START (a ban on denial of telemetric data,
for example) why were they determined to be unnecessary? In the absence
of such measures, would our NTM be sufficient to continue to provide
information that, while not necessary to verify the New START Treaty,
nevertheless remains useful for ensuring confidence and stability in
the United States-Russian strategic relationship?
Answer. In July 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev issued a joint
statement that the new treaty would contain ``provisions on
definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections
and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and
transparency measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as
appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty.'' The verification
regime of the New START Treaty is based upon the 15 years of successful
implementation of START and is tailored to the specific obligations of
the new treaty.
The New START Treaty provides for many of the same verification
measures that were in START, such as: extensive notifications,
prohibitions on interference with NTM, unique identifiers, inspections
and exhibitions.
Further discussion about the intelligence community's ability to
monitor the New START Treaty is included in a classified National
Intelligence Estimate which was provided to the Senate on June 30,
2010.
inspections
Under START I, there were 12 different types of OSI. According to
the Department of State, the United States conducted more than 600
START I inspections in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. A 1992
analysis done by the executive branch concluded that to have 95 percent
confidence of detecting just one instance of cheating involving the
number of RVs on 25 of Russia's SS-18 ICBMs, we would need at least 16
inspections per year of such systems under START I. New START would
permit up to 10 similar inspections per year on all deployed New START
accountable systems in Russia.
Question. On what analysis did the administration rely to arrive at
the number of annual inspects permitted under New START--10 per year on
deployed systems and 8 per year on nondeployed systems?
Answer. The interagency assessed the number of type one and type
two inspections needed annually to meet U.S. inspection objectives as
the nature of these inspection types emerged during the New START
negotiations. These assessments ultimately concluded that an annual
quota of 18 such inspections would be adequate to meet U.S. inspection
needs.
The New START Treaty provides for an annual quota of up to 18 short
notice, onsite inspections to aid in verifying Russian compliance with
its treaty obligations. These inspections will provide U.S. inspectors
with periodic access to key strategic weapons facilities to verify the
accuracy of Russian data declarations and deter cheating. Although the
new treaty provides for fewer inspections than the annual quota of 28
permitted under the original START Treaty, the number of inspectable
facilities in Russia under the New START Treaty (35) is also
significantly lower than the declared number of such facilities in
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--the former Soviet Union--when
the START Treaty entered into force (70). Furthermore, some
verification activities covered by two separate inspection types under
the START Treaty have been combined into a single inspection under the
New START Treaty.
The New START Treaty inspection quota includes up to 10 type one
inspections of deployed and nondeployed strategic offensive arms which
will be conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. The quota also
includes up to eight type two inspections focused on nondeployed
strategic systems, which will be conducted at facilities such as
storage sites, test ranges, and conversion or elimination facilities,
as well as formerly declared facilities.
Question. Based on relevant START I data, or any data provided 45
days after the date of signature of New START as specified in Part Two
of its Protocol, how many facilities, by name and location, and
systems, by name, type and total number, in the Russian Federation
would be accountable under New START?
Answer. Please see classified response to be provided separately.
Question. Are you confident that, to the extent they are needed,
enough inspections are permitted? If so, on what basis?
Answer. The New START Treaty provides for an annual quota of up to
18 onsite inspections to aid in verifying Russian compliance with its
treaty obligations. While the new treaty provides for fewer inspections
than the annual quota of 28 permitted under the START Treaty, the 35
inspectable facilities Russia has declared under New START is also
lower than the 70 inspectable facilities in Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Russia, and Ukraine (55 of which were in Russia) at the time of entry
into force of the START Treaty.
Further discussion about the intelligence community's ability to
monitor the New START Treaty is included in a classified National
Intelligence Estimate, which was provided to the Senate on June 30,
2010.
Question. Please provide for the record the analysis, including any
statistical examination, done regarding the number of inspections
required to have high, medium and low confidence of monitoring limits
under New START. This material may be submitted in classified form if
necessary.
Answer. This topic is included in a classified National
Intelligence Estimate on the Intelligence Community's ability to
monitor the New START Treaty that was provided to the Senate on June
30, 2010.
Question. Under START I, up to 10 ``RVOSI-only'' inspections per
year were permitted in addition to other START I OSI. Under New START,
there apparently will be 10 ``RVOSI-plus'' inspections minus some but
not all other START I OSI for all deployed New START accountable
systems. Is it the case that while the frequency of inspection activity
goes down (expressed in numbers of inspections per year), the intensity
of activity during each New START inspection would actually increase
(expressed as combined START I-OSI activities and the length(s) of time
for each such inspection)?
Answer. Type one inspections are to be conducted at the operating
bases for ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers and will
focus on both deployed and nondeployed strategic systems. Type one
inspections under the new treaty combine many of the elements from two
START Treaty inspection types, the data update inspection and the
reentry vehicle onsite inspection (RVOSI), which were conducted
separately at ICBM bases and submarine bases under the START Treaty.
Although there will be a smaller annual quota for onsite inspections
under New START than under START (a total of 18 under New START
compared to 28 under START), the scope of the type one inspections at
the operating bases will be greater than either a data update
inspection or RVOSI under START, thus the time needed to complete the
inspection may be much longer than was the case for either of the
separate inspections conducted under the START Treaty. The period of
time for completing the portion of the type one inspection to confirm
the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on a designated, deployed ICBM
or SLBM will be the time necessary for inspectors to complete the
inspection. Following the reentry vehicle inspection portion of the
type one inspection, inspectors are permitted up to 24 hours to
complete the inspection of nondeployed ICBMs, nondeployed SLBMs, and
nondeployed mobile launchers of ICBMs at the applicable portions of
operational bases. For inspection of heavy bombers at air bases, the
time for conducting a type one inspection is up to 30 hours.
______
response of secretary gates, admiral mullen, and secretary clinton to
question submitted by senator wicker
Question. Has the U.S. ever made side agreements or signed side
letters to arms control treaties in the past? If so, what treaties?
Please share these side agreements, classified or unclassified.
Answer. The United States has on occasion concluded side agreements
to arms control agreements. For example, during the negotiation of the
START Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a number
of side agreements and signed side letters associated with that treaty
but not considered to be integral parts of the treaty. These included
agreements on exhibitions of strategic offensive arms and on exchange
of lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members prior to entry
into force of the treaty, and side letters on the phased reduction of
deployed heavy ICBMs, on the distinguishability of B-1 bombers equipped
for different types of nuclear armaments, and on the provision of
photographs. These agreements and letters were provided to the Senate
for its information as part of the START Treaty transmittal package
(Treaty Doc. 102-20) and are also discussed in the committee's report
on the START Treaty (Exec. Rept. 102-53).
In addition, following signature of the INF Treaty but prior to
ratification, three exchanges of diplomatic notes, and an agreed
minute, were agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union and
were provided to the Senate during its consideration of the treaty.
These are also publicly available (http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/
18432.htm).
No such side agreements or letters were concluded or exchanged with
respect to the New START Treaty.
______
Responses of Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to Questions
Submitted by Senator Lugar
prompt global strike
The New START Treaty will apply to ICBMs or SLBMs that carry
conventional warheads, a so-called Prompt Global Strike (PGS)
capability, because conventional warheads on ballistic missiles would
count against Article II limits in New START. The treaty defines the
term ``ballistic missile'' to mean a missile that is a weapon-delivery
vehicle that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path.
Thus, there is a one-for-one tradeoff within New START's limitations on
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and warheads between each PGS system and each
nuclear missile, warhead, and launcher limited by the New START Treaty.
If the United States were to deploy 28 SLBMs with conventional
warheads, the real limit on deployed strategic offensive nuclear arms
could actually be 672 and the warhead limit would be closer to 1,500-
bringing us closer to what Russia currently deploys in strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles, at 608.
Question. How many PGS weapons will the United States have over the
duration of the New START Treaty, and when and on what delivery
vehicles will they be deployed?
Answer. The New START Treaty protects the U.S. ability to develop
and deploy a conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capability,
should the United States decide to pursue such a capability. A study of
long range strike options, including those that would provide CPGS
capabilities, is currently underway in the Department of Defense, but
no decisions have been made on which, if any, CPGS delivery systems to
acquire or when such systems would be fielded. However, based on
analysis of alternative options, the Department of Defense has
concluded that any deployment of conventional warheads on ICBMs or
SLBMs during the 10-year life of this treaty would be limited, and
could be accommodated within the aggregate limits of the Treaty while
sustaining a robust nuclear triad.
Question. Do the limits in New START constrain either future PGS
capabilities or our deployed strategic nuclear weapons (missiles,
launchers and warheads) in ways that could prove detrimental to our
future strategic capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, and
deterrence missions?
Answer. No, the New START Treaty protects the U.S. ability to
develop and deploy a conventional prompt global strike capability,
should the U.S. decide to pursue such a capability. The treaty does not
prohibit the United States from building or deploying conventionally
armed, treaty-accountable ICBMs or SLBMs. Conventional warheads
deployed on such ICBMs or SLBMs would count toward the New START Treaty
aggregate warhead limit of 1,550, and the deployed ICBMs or SLBMs upon
which they were loaded would count against the limits on deployed
strategic delivery vehicles. However, based on analysis of alternative
options, the Department of Defense has concluded that any deployment of
conventional warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs during the 10-year life of this
treaty would be limited, and could be accommodated within the aggregate
limits of the treaty while sustaining a robust nuclear triad.
the preamble--additional reductions
The Preamble to the New START Treaty acknowledges that the Parties
will seek to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons
and provide new impetus to a step-by-step process of reducing and
limiting nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security of
their nuclear arsenals, and with a view to expanding this process in
the future, including to a multilateral approach.
Question. From a military standpoint, would additional reductions
in U.S. ICBMs, SLBMs and their launchers, warheads, and heavy bombers
and their nuclear armaments below those contained in the New START
Treaty be desirable, and if so, under what conditions?
Answer. The United States will continue to take concrete steps to
reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in its national security
strategy, in accordance with its long-term goal of a world without
nuclear weapons. But this goal will not be reached quickly and its
success will not be achieved by U.S. actions alone.
As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the President has directed
a review of post-New START arms control objectives to consider further
reductions in nuclear weapons.
Specifically, the U.S. goals in post-New START bilateral
negotiations with Russia will likely include reducing nonstrategic/
tactical nuclear weapons and nondeployed nuclear weapons, as well as
deployed strategic nuclear weapons--ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable
heavy bombers. Of course, any specific United States-Russian
discussions on U.S. nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons will take
place in the context of continued close consultation with allies and
partners. The United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal to maintain
strategic stability with other major nuclear powers, deter potential
adversaries, and reassure our allies and partners of our security
commitments to them.
breakout
The administration's Article-by-Article Analysis for New START
states that as negotiations proceeded, the Parties agreed to pursue a
limit for the aggregate number of deployed and nondeployed launchers of
ICBMs and SLBMs and for deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments. This limit (now in clause (c) of paragraph 1 of
Article II) is intended to limit the ability of the Parties to ``break
out'' of treaty limits by constraining the number of nondeployed ICBM
and SLBM launchers and nondeployed heavy bombers available for
deployment. Each Party will have to operate within this aggregate limit
as it considers whether to build and store new systems, and whether to
eliminate, convert or retain older systems.
The 1992 Foreign Relations Committee Report on the START I Treaty
(Executive Report 102-53) stated, with regard to cheating and breakout
scenarios, ``there is always the possibility that the other side could
have extra warheads on undeclared, non-deployed missiles. These
missiles would be cost effective only if they could be launched from
mobile missiles that could be reloaded in a relatively short time.''
START I capped road-mobile systems at 250. It also used Votkinsk
monitoring to obtain a running count on such systems, such as SS-25s,
and applied a unique identifier to each such system.
Question. Under New START, do you assess that (a) Russia could
maintain undetectable, undeclared, road-mobile missiles, and warheads
and launchers that could be mated with them, and (b) whether Russia has
any incentive(s) to do so?
Answer. This topic is addressed in the classified National
Intelligence Estimate on the Intelligence Community's ability to
monitor the New START Treaty that was provided to the Senate on June
30, 2010.
Question. What specific elements in the New START Treaty would
allow us to detect such a covert capability?
Answer. This topic is addressed in the classified National
Intelligence Estimate on the Intelligence Community's ability to
monitor the New START Treaty that was provided to the Senate on June
30, 2010.
Question. What U.S. NTM could detect such a covert capability?
Answer. This topic is addressed in the classified National
Intelligence Estimate on the Intelligence Community's ability to
monitor the New START Treaty that was provided to the Senate on June
30, 2010.
Question. How long would it take for elements of Russia's strategic
forces to reload road-mobile missile launchers, in either a training or
combat scenario?
Does Russia have the infrastructure required to do either in an
undetectable fashion?
Answer. This topic is addressed in the classified National
Intelligence Estimate on the Intelligence Community's ability to
monitor the New START Treaty that was provided to the Senate on June
30, 2010.
Question. Why does New START contain a limitation only on non-
deployed launchers of road-mobile missiles and no limitation on
nondeployed, road-mobile missiles of any kind?
Answer. The central limits on strategic delivery vehicles and their
associated warheads are intended to limit the deployed strategic forces
of each Party. During the negotiations, the Parties also agreed to
pursue a third central limit for the aggregate number of deployed and
nondeployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, including all mobile
launchers of ICBMs, and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments. This third central limit is designed to limit
the ability of the Parties to ``break out'' of the treaty limits by
constraining the number of nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and
nondeployed heavy bombers available for deployment.
Although there is no treaty limit on the number of nondeployed
ICBMs and SLBMs, the ability of a Party to utilize any nondeployed
ICBMs or SLBMs as part of a ``break out'' scenario is constrained by
the overall limit on deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers
and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers.
Question. START I contained a limitation on the types of systems
that could be kept in the nondeployed category. To wit, there was a
limit of 110 total nondeployed launchers, of which no more than 18
could have been rail-mobile launchers. Why doesn't New START provide
comparable specificity with regard to the types of accountable
launchers or missiles that may be kept in a nondeployed mode?
Answer. New START was created with a view to maintain flexibility
for both Parties by allowing each Party to determine for itself how to
structure its strategic nuclear forces within the treaty's limits. New
START has three central limits: the number of warheads on deployed
ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and counted for deployed heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments; the number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers; and the number of deployed and nondeployed ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments.
These three limits, while separate, allow each Party a range of
options with respect to how it will arrange its force structure. Each
Party must make trade-offs regarding its force structure in order to
meet all three limits.
Question. How does the third central limit in New START on deployed
and nondeployed launchers constrain or shape future Russian strategic
forces given that they are already well below New START's limits on
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers?
Answer. This topic is addressed in the classified National
Intelligence Estimate on the Intelligence Community's ability to
monitor the New START Treaty that was provided to the Senate on June
30, 2010.
net assessments
For START I, the United States conducted a net assessment of
possible U.S. force structures in response to future Russian strategic
offensive forces. To date, I am aware of no such assessments for U.S.
and Russian strategic forces over the duration of the New START Treaty.
Question. Can you provide such assessments to this committee?
Answer. Assessments regarding the projected effectiveness of
alternative U.S. nuclear force structures in the context of strategic
exchanges involving potential future Russian Federation nuclear force
structures and target bases were conducted within the context of the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The postulated Russian capabilities used
to conduct these analyses were based on the intelligence community's
assessments of potential future Russian force structures under various
assumptions.
The Nuclear Posture Review analyzed the ability of notional U.S.
force structures to meet posited deterrence and stability requirements
at progressively lower numbers of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to
provide a basis for identifying acceptable strategic force levels that
could be reflected in the interagency approved negotiating instructions
to the U.S. New START delegation. This analysis was conducted by the
U.S. Strategic Command in support of the Nuclear Posture Review at the
Top Secret level.
There was no ``final net assessment'' of the balance of U.S. and
Russian Federation strategic offensive forces under New START limits.
Rather, the acceptability of U.S. strategic forces fielded within
potential treaty limits was assessed in terms of their ability to meet
posited U.S. deterrence and stability requirements.
Question. How will future U.S. strategic forces provide support for
deterrence missions, in particular, extended deterrence missions, under
New START?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense, based on recommendations from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, has established a baseline strategic nuclear
force structure that fully supports U.S. security requirements
including those associated with extended deterrence, and conforms to
the New START Treaty limits. This baseline force structure--which
provides a basis for future planning--provides the flexibility to make
adjustments as appropriate, and as permitted by the treaty:
The United States currently has 450 intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) deployed in silos. The baseline plan for
compliance with the New START Treaty limits will retain up to
420 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, each with a single warhead.
The United States currently has 94 deployable nuclear-capable heavy
bombers. Under the baseline plan, some will be converted to
conventional-only heavy bombers (not accountable under the
treaty), and up to 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers will be
retained.
The United States currently has 14 strategic ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs). Under the baseline plan, all 14 will be
retained. The United States will reduce the accountable number
of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers
(launch tubes) from 24 to 20 per SSBN, and deploy no more than
240 SLBMs at any time.
Over the next decade, the United States will invest well over $100
billion in nuclear delivery systems to sustain existing capabilities
and modernize some strategic systems. U.S. nuclear weapons will undergo
extensive life extension programs in the coming years to ensure their
safety, security, and effectiveness. Maintaining a credible nuclear
deterrent requires that the United States operate a modern physical
infrastructure and sustain a highly capable workforce. The
administration's modernization plan will ensure that our nuclear
complex has the essential capabilities to support a strong nuclear
deterrent--as well as arms control, nonproliferation, and
counterproliferation requirements--over the next decade and beyond. The
President is committed to modernizing the nuclear complex and
maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile
without nuclear testing.
The Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear arsenal to deter attacks on the U.S., our allies, and partners.
This includes extended deterrence. Extended deterrence and assurance
remain strong and the U.S. remains firm in its security commitments to
all of our allies and partners. While the U.S. is retiring the nuclear-
tipped sea-launched cruise missile, the United States retains a variety
of capabilities to forward-deploy nuclear weapons if the situation ever
demands, including dual-capable fighters and heavy bombers.
Question. How do Russia's many tactical nuclear weapons shape
stability calculations relative to future U.S. strategic nuclear
forces?
Answer. Because of their limited range and very different roles
from those played by strategic nuclear forces, the vast majority of
Russian tactical nuclear weapons could not directly influence the
strategic nuclear balance between the United States and Russia. Russian
nuclear-armed sea launched cruise missiles, which could be launched
from attack submarines deployed off U.S. coasts, hold locations in the
United States at risk, but could not threaten deployed submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (which will comprise a significant fraction
of U.S. strategic forces under New START), and would pose a very
limited threat to the hundreds of silo-based ICBMs that the United
States will retain under New START. Because the United States will
retain a robust strategic force structure under New START, Russia's
tactical nuclear weapons will have little or no impact on strategic
stability.
______
Responses of Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to Questions
Submitted by Senator Barrasso
Question. A foreign media source in India recently reported that in
recent years Russia has developed new long-range nuclear missiles armed
with multiple warheads that are said to be capable of ``piercing U.S.
missile defenses.''
The article stated that ``the land-based RS-24 missile is due to be
deployed next year, and the submarine-launched Bulava missile is still
undergoing tests.'' The article also states that by 2016 Russia plans
to build a heavier land-based missile.
I would like to hear your analysis and evaluation of Russia's
modernization of its nuclear arsenals. How concerned are you about
these technological developments?
Answer. The Russian Federation has announced that it is developing
and deploying new ICBMs and SLBMs. These include the MIRVed RS-24 ICBM,
the new RSM-56 SLBM, a modernized SS-N-23 SLBM, and a new class of SSBN
to carry the RSM-56. Russia has also stated that it is developing a new
heavy ICBM and that it has signed a contract for preliminary design
work on a new heavy bomber. Russia has also stated it is developing and
deploying new nuclear warheads for its strategic nuclear force.
These developments are of concern to the Department of Defense. The
Department will take all necessary steps to ensure that U.S. forces,
and particularly our strategic forces, are able to fulfill their
missions regardless of Russian technological or other types of
advances.
Question. The United States and Russia have over 90 percent of the
world's nuclear weapons. However, there are many nations who have
interest in increasing their nuclear weapon supplies and capabilities.
The Nuclear Posture Review mentions concerns from the United States
and other nations about China's military nuclear modernization efforts.
The lack of transparency in China's nuclear programs raises further
questions about China's future strategic intentions.
If we continue to reduce our nuclear force structure, do you
believe this posture will invite other countries like China, who are
ambitiously designing and fielding new weapons systems, to ramp up
their nuclear programs to achieve parity with the United States and
Russia?
Answer. China's military modernization programs, including its
nuclear modernization, are a significant concern which we watch
closely. However, China presently does not appear to be seeking parity
with either the United States or Russia, and its nuclear arsenal
remains much smaller than the U.S. and Russian arsenals. As a declared
nuclear weapon state under the NPT, China's restraint in its nuclear
modernization is important to nuclear disarmament and global non-
proliferation efforts. We look to China to be more transparent about
its strategic programs and to show restraint in them.
As the United States and Russia conduct bilateral negotiations to
reduce nuclear arsenals further, the United States will seek greater
transparency and assurances from China that it does not intend to
increase its stockpile further in an attempt to achieve nuclear parity
with the United States and Russia.
Question. The United States and Russia have over 90 percent of the
world's nuclear weapons. However, there are many nations who have
interest in increasing their nuclear weapon supplies and capabilities.
The Nuclear Posture Review mentions concerns from the United States
and other nations about China's military nuclear modernization efforts.
The lack of transparency in China's nuclear programs raises further
questions about China's future strategic intentions.
As the United States and Russia make reductions to their nuclear
weapons, what level of confidence do you have that other nations and
nonstate actors will halt their pursuit or expansion of nuclear
weapons?
Answer. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the United
States will give top priority to discouraging additional countries from
acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities and stopping terrorist groups
from acquiring the materiels to build nuclear bombs. To that end, the
NPR states that the United States will need to intensify its efforts to
build broad international support for the rigorous measures needed to
prevent those dangers while maintaining stable deterrence and an
effective nuclear arsenal. Reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic
nuclear forces may contribute to these efforts by facilitating
cooperation with Russia, fortifying U.S. credibility in calling on
other nations to reduce or forswear nuclear capabilities, and
reinforcing the global non-proliferation regime.
Although it is difficult to define levels of confidence regarding
changes in other states' and nonstate actors' behavior as the United
States and Russia make reductions in strategic nuclear forces, this
comprises only a part of a broader effort to rebuild and strengthen the
global nonproliferation regime and accelerate efforts to prevent
nuclear terrorism. Other initiatives include aggressively seeking to
secure all nuclear materiels worldwide, continuing cooperative threat
reduction programs, impeding sensitive nuclear trade, and renewing the
U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any supporter or enabler of
WMD terrorism, among others.
Question. While the U.S. and Russia have a rough equivalence in
their strategic nuclear weapons, there is a significant imbalance in
tactical nuclear weapons that favors Russia. The balance of tactical
nuclear weapons is of particular concerns as we decrease the number of
deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
Since the new treaty proposes reduction of deployed strategic
nuclear weapons, what are our options to provide assurances to our
allies in Europe?
Answer. The security architecture in Europe will retain a nuclear
dimension as long as nuclear threats to U.S. allies and partners
remain. A credible U.S. ``nuclear umbrella'' is provided by a
combination of means--the strategic forces of the U.S. triad,
nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed forward in NATO countries, and
U.S.-based nuclear weapons that could be deployed forward quickly to
meet regional contingencies. Any change in the NATO component of these
means will be identified and agreed upon as a collective alliance
decision. The United States will also maintain its extended deterrence
commitments to our allies in Europe through the continued forward
deployment of U.S. forces in the region and strengthening U.S. and
allied nonnuclear capabilities, including regional ballistic missile
defense.
Tactical nuclear weapons are a concern, and, as stated in the
Nuclear Posture Review, should be included in any future reduction
arrangements between the United States and Russia. Ratification and
entry into force of the New START Treaty would facilitate those
discussions, whereas failure to ratify the treaty likely would make
engagement with Russia on nonstrategic nuclear weapons more difficult.
______
Responses of Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to Questions
Submitted by Senator Wicker
missile defense
Question. General O'Reilly, the current head of the Missile Defense
Agency, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that:
``Relative to the recently expired START Treaty, the New START Treaty
actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense
program. Unless they have New START accountable first stages (which we
do not plan to use), our targets will no longer be subject to START
constraints, which limited our use of air-to-surface and waterborne
launches of targets which are essential for the cost-effective testing
of missile defense interceptors against MRBM and IRBM targets in the
Pacific area.
It appears that we will now be able to launch missile defense
targets from airplanes and surface ships. Why is this useful?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency has long used air launched
targets which are not accountable under the START Treaty. Such launches
provide the Missile Defense Agency with greater flexibility to design
tests that are more operationally realistic by enabling them to launch
targets along any azimuth (or angle) in relation to the interceptor
missile. The retired Trident I SLBM remained accountable under the
START Treaty but will no longer be accountable under New START, thus
expanding the availability of target missiles. The use of targets
utilizing missiles not accountable under the New START Treaty, launched
from airplanes and surface ships, which was prohibited by START but is
not prohibited by the New START Treaty, will support more cost-
effective testing of missile defense interceptors against medium- and
intermediate-range ballistic missile threats in the Pacific region.
Question. It appears that the reason we can now launch missile
defense targets in this way is because it is no longer prohibited for
ballistic missiles to be launched from airplanes or surface ships under
the New START treaty. Is this correct?
Answer. Yes. Those prohibitions do not exist under the New START
Treaty. With respect to missile defense target launches, the New START
Treaty actually provides greater flexibility, especially with regard to
air-to-surface and water-borne launches of long-range ballistic
missiles. Under START, air-to-surface ballistic missiles (called ASBMs)
and water-borne launches of ballistic missiles from surface ships using
treaty accountable ICBMs and SLBMs were prohibited.
Question. Is it really a net plus for U.S. security if we can
launch missile defense targets from these platforms but at a cost of
greater freedom for Russia to research and develop and deploy ballistic
missiles with nuclear warheads from these same platforms?
Answer. We have previously been unable to exploit air-launched and
water-borne launches of missile defense targets using the first stage
of ICBMs and SLBMs due to prohibitions under the START Treaty. Under
New START, we now have the flexibility to maximize our ability to test
and develop missile defense targets, which directly enhances our
national security. From a cost-benefit standpoint, we benefit since we
have the opportunity to use various launch configurations to enhance
our national security; both Parties will have equal rights to use air-
launch and water-borne launch to develop offensive capability, should
they so choose.
______
Responses of Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Lugar
Question. For each of the following inspections and exhibitions
provided for under START I, please specify (a) whether New START
provides for such inspections and exhibitions; (b) where in the New
START Treaty, its protocol and annexes such inspections and exhibitions
are provided for; and (c) if such inspection and exhibition is not
permitted under New START, an explanation as to why:
Baseline data inspections/exhibitions;
Data update inspections;
New facility inspections;
Suspect-site inspections;
Reentry vehicles inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs;
Post-exercise and dispersal inspections;
Conversion or elimination inspections;
Close-out inspections;
Formerly declared facility inspections;
Technical characteristics exhibitions/inspections;
Distinguishability exhibitions/inspections for heavy bombers and
long-range ALCMs.
Answer. The New START Treaty significantly simplifies the
inspections framework from the original START Treaty.
Baseline data inspections under the START Treaty were designed to
provide an opportunity during the opening months of START Treaty
implementation to conduct an initial inspection at each inspectable
facility in order to allow each side to familiarize itself with the
accountable items of inspection at each of these facilities subject to
inspection. Given the detailed familiarity of both sides with the
declared facilities likely to be subject to inspection under the New
START Treaty, it was agreed that similar one-time baseline data
inspections would not be needed under the New Treaty. The procedures
for type one and type two inspections are outlined in Sections VI and
VII of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty, and further specified
in Parts Six and Seven of the Annex on Inspection Activities.
The functions of the data update inspections under START are
largely served by type one and type two inspections, during which
inspectors will confirm the accuracy of the declared data regarding
deployed and/or nondeployed items of inspection at facilities subject
to inspection. Procedures for the conduct of these inspections are
outlined in Sections VI and VII of Part Five of the Protocol to the
Treaty and are further specified in Parts Six and Seven of the Annex on
Inspection Activities.
The sides agreed that retaining new facility inspections was not
necessary, because the sides are considered unlikely to open many new
facilities during the life of the New START Treaty. Moreover, the
functions of a new facility inspection can be readily accomplished by
the first type one or type two inspections conducted at a new facility.
The sides agreed that suspect-site inspections would not be
required under the New START Treaty. The purpose of these inspections
under the START Treaty was to confirm that the covert assembly of
mobile ICBMs was not occurring at a few selected ballistic missile
production facilities. Each Party was obligated to declare up to three
facilities as potentially subject to such a suspect-site inspection,
because they produced ballistic missiles as large as, or larger than,
any mobile ICBM possessed by that side. During the development of the
U.S.-proposed verification regime, the relevant departments and
agencies concluded that suspect-site inspections provided minimal value
in assisting the detection of potential covert production of mobile
ICBMs. Ultimately, the United States agreed that verifying Russia's
ballistic missile production would be accomplished through other means,
including the combination of confirming data declarations, the
application of unique identifiers to all strategic ballistic missiles,
advance notification of the exit of solid fuel ICBMs or SLBMs from
their production facilities, and the use of national technical means of
verification.
The functions of reentry vehicle inspections for deployed ICBMs and
SLBMs conducted under START are served by reentry vehicle inspections
conducted as a key component of type one inspections carried out at
ICBM bases and ballistic missile submarine bases. The details of the
procedures for conducting these inspections are set forth in Section VI
of Part Five of the Protocol and Part Six of the Annex on Inspection
Activities. The purpose of such inspections is to confirm the number of
reentry vehicles emplaced on designated, deployed ICBMs and SLBMs.
The sides agreed not to include post-exercise dispersal inspections
under the New START Treaty. These inspections were never used during
the implementation of the START Treaty, simply because the Russian
Federation never declared exercise dispersals for its mobile ICBM
force. The United States could use a type one inspection to conduct an
inspection at a mobile ICBM base whose forces participated in an
exercise dispersal, should the Russians ever conduct an exercise
dispersal.
The functions of the START Treaty conversion or elimination
inspections are served by conversion or elimination inspections
conducted under the New START Treaty, which will count against the
annual quota for type two inspections. The overall procedures for
conducting the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms
subject to the treaty are set forth in Part Three of the Protocol,
while the more detailed procedures for such inspections are contained
in Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol, and further defined in Part
Seven of the Annex on Inspection Activities.
The functions of close-out inspections conducted under the START
Treaty can be served by the conduct of a formerly declared facility
inspection under New START. Eliminated facilities become subject to
formerly declared facility inspections, which could be conducted should
questions arise regarding the activities taking place there. Under the
New START Treaty, formerly declared facility inspections count towards
the type two inspection quota in accordance with Section VII of Part
Five to the Protocol.
Technical characteristics exhibitions and distinguishability
exhibitions conducted under the START Treaty have been condensed in a
single exhibition under the New START Treaty, the conduct of which is
outlined in Section VIII of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty,
with more specific procedures set forth in Part Eight of the Annex on
Inspection Activities. The purposes of these exhibitions conducted
under the new treaty are to demonstrate the distinguishing features and
to confirm the technical characteristics of each new type, variant, or
version of an ICBM, mobile ICBM launcher, SLBM, or heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments. Distinguishability exhibitions for
long-range Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) conducted under START
do not exist under the New START Treaty, because it is no longer
necessary to establish distinguishing features of long-range ALCMs in
order to verify compliance with the treaty.
Question. Please indicate (a) which New START exhibitions will
count against the 18 annual inspections the treaty permits the United
States to conduct in Russia and specify (b) how the treatment provided
each such exhibition in New START differs from that provided in START I
with regard to total annual inspections permitted and the information
or items monitored in such exhibitions.
Answer. Exhibitions will not count against the quota of 18 annual
inspections permitted under the New START Treaty. Similarly,
exhibitions conducted under the START Treaty did not count against the
annual inspection quota for that treaty. Much of the information on
items displayed during an exhibition conducted under the New START
Treaty remains unchanged from that obtained under the START Treaty.
Question. New START's Preamble states that the Parties seek ``to
create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the obligations under
this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and made less costly in comparison
to'' START I. Please specify what adaptations were made to START I's
verification regime that make the New START regime simpler and less
costly.
Answer. A goal of each Party in the negotiations was to make the
New START verification regime simpler and less costly. This was
achieved by consolidating a number of START inspections into each of
the two types of New START inspections, thereby reducing the number of
inspections carried out at inspectable facilities.
Under New START, elements of data update inspections and reentry
vehicle onsite inspections conducted under START were consolidated into
a single type one inspection. Although type one inspections at
operational bases will be longer in duration, there will be fewer
numbers of inspections at these facilities each year. For example,
under START, operational ICBM and ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)
bases were subject to up to four START inspections each year, up to two
each of two types of inspection.
Under New START, the maximum number of inspections at such
facilities is two per year. New START also consolidated START data
update inspections, formerly declared facility inspections, and
conversion or elimination inspections into type two inspections. These
inspections will be conducted at storage, repair, loading, maintenance,
and conversion or elimination facilities, test ranges, eliminated
facilities where nondeployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments were located, or at operational bases to confirm
the elimination of strategic offensive arms.
The New START verification regime is tailored to the limits of the
treaty and will support the standard of effective verification that was
achieved under START inspections. It combines elements of the START
Treaty with new elements designed for the limitations of the New START
Treaty. Type one and type two inspections conducted under New START
were derived from the 12 different types of inspections that were
provided for under START. Through the 15 years of successful
implementation of START inspections, the interagency judged that some
of the START inspections could be combined, consolidated, or eliminated
as a way to make New START inspections simpler and less costly.
Baseline data inspections, new facility inspections, suspect site
inspections, post exercise dispersal inspections, and closeout
inspections were eliminated under New START because they were not
necessary to verify the limits of the New START Treaty.
Costs will also be reduced through the use of the simplified
inspection procedures that were developed to confirm the elimination of
items subject to the treaty. Under START elimination inspections,
inspectors were required to remain at the elimination inspection sites
up to several weeks a year as items were undergoing the entire
elimination process. During a type two elimination inspection under New
START, inspectors now would confirm only the results of the elimination
process once notified by the possessing Party that an item of
inspection has been eliminated.
Question. For the United States, what are annual implementation
costs expected to be over the duration of the New START Treaty?
Answer. The Defense Agencies and Military Departments are presently
engaged in an analysis of annual budget costs and associated funding
requirements. The final costs will be dependent on decisions concerning
the future force structure, conversion and elimination procedures,
facility requirements for supporting inspections, and the development
of additional inspection equipment. While the Nuclear Posture Review
provided certain recommendations concerning the force structure, it did
not specify the New START-compliant structure nor set the schedule for
its implementation. Costs will also be dependent on the types of
elimination and conversion procedures that are selected for the
conversion or elimination of U.S. strategic offensive arms. The treaty
provides the flexibility for the U.S. to decide what conversion or
elimination procedure is most suitable for the task at hand. In
addition, the Services are reviewing potential facility modifications
that may be necessary to support inspection activities. Finally, the
treaty also provides for the possible development of new inspection
equipment to facilitate and enhance inspection activities.
Until the Military Departments have completed their review of these
matters, it would be premature to speculate on the implementation
costs.
Question. Please provide a listing, by calendar year, over the
lifetime of the START I Treaty, of (a) the number of inspections per
year conducted in Russia and (b) the type of each such inspection
(RVOSI, data update, etc.); and (c) the location in Russia where each
such inspection was conducted.
Answer. Please see classified response to be provided separately.
article iii
Under paragraph 6 of Article III, missiles of an existing type
cease to be subject to New START ``if all ICBM or SLBM launchers of a
type intended for such ICBMs or SLBMs have been eliminated or converted
in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.''
Question. Is it possible for Russian missiles of one type to be
launched by a Russian launcher not originally designed or intended for
that missile type?
Answer. Please see classified response to be provided separately.
Question. How observable are preparations to modify a launcher to
carry a missile of a different type, i.e., a type for which it was not
originally designed, intended or used?
Answer. Please see classified response to be provided separately.
Question. How many Russian INF or START accountable mobile
launchers were eliminated from accountability but then subsequently
used for launch of other missiles, either by Russia, or by nations to
which Russia exported such launchers?
Answer. There is no evidence that launchers eliminated from
accountability under the INF or START Treaties have been used by Russia
to launch other missiles, or have been exported to other nations to
launch other missiles.
conversion and elimination
Paragraph 4 of Section I of Part Three of the New START Protocol
appears to state that Parties may continue to apply conversion or
elimination procedures rendering strategic offensive arms
``inoperable,'' (paragraph 2) or conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers
to make them ``incapable'' (paragraph 3) for strategic missions, even
when, per paragraph 4, ``in the opinion of the other Party, the
procedures developed by the Party carrying out the conversion or
elimination are ambiguous or do not achieve the goals set forth in
paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 of this Section,'' subject then only to
demonstrating the ambiguous or deficient procedure to the Bilateral
Consultative Commission. The determinations regarding inoperability and
incapability appear to be made only by the Party applying (even
ambiguous) conversion and elimination procedures.
Question. For the United States, what criteria will be used to
determine whether elimination procedures for strategic offensive arms
subject to the New START Treaty in Russia are, or are not, ambiguous?
Answer. Part Three of the Protocol makes clear that strategic
offensive arms will no longer be subject to the treaty's aggregate
limits when they are rendered inoperable, precluding their use for
their original purpose. Such elimination may be accomplished by
procedures described in Part Three of the Protocol or using a newly
developed procedure. If a new procedure for elimination is developed,
the inspecting Party will consider whether the procedure will clearly
preclude the item's use for its original purpose.
In determining whether newly developed elimination procedures are
sufficient, the United States will not limit itself to a predetermined
set of criteria. Rather, we will assess the procedures used and take
into account the experience and knowledge gained from 15 years of START
Treaty implementation to determine whether the procedure will render
that item inoperable.
In the event questions arise regarding newly developed procedures,
a Party may request that the Party carrying out the elimination
conduct, within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission
(BCC), a demonstration of the procedures. Demonstrations may include
descriptions, diagrams, drawings, and photographs, as needed, or may be
conducted onsite, if so agreed.
Question. For the United States, what criteria will be used to
determine whether conversion procedures for strategic offensive arms
subject to the New START Treaty in Russia are, or are not, ambiguous?
Answer. Part Three of the Protocol makes clear that an ICBM
launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber will no longer be subject to
the treaty's aggregate limits when it is rendered incapable of
employing ICBMs, SLBMs, or nuclear armaments for heavy bombers by
agreed procedures described in the Protocol. If a new procedure for
conversion is developed, the inspecting Party will consider whether the
procedure will clearly result in rendering the item incapable of
employing ICBMs, SLBMs, or nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, as
applicable.
In determining whether newly developed conversion procedures are
sufficient, the United States will not limit itself to a predetermined
set of criteria. The procedures used for conversion must be such that
the other Party can confirm the results of the conversion. If it
appears that a newly developed procedure is not clear enough to confirm
the conversion of an item, a Party may raise the issue in the framework
of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) and require the
inspected Party to conduct a demonstration of the new procedures.
Question. For the United States, what criteria will be used to
determine whether procedures for the conversion or elimination of
strategic offensive arms subject to the New START Treaty in Russia
would, or would not, meet the goals specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Section I of Part Three of the New START Protocol?
Answer. The treaty provides flexibility for various conversion or
elimination procedures, each of which must meet the specified criteria.
These criteria ensure that the converted item must be rendered
incapable of employing ICBMs, SLBMs, or nuclear armaments; and the
eliminated item must be rendered inoperable, precluding its use for its
original purpose.
Specifically, procedures for the elimination of solid-fuel ICBMs
and SLBMs are contained in Section II of Part Three of the Protocol.
Procedures for the conversion or elimination of ICBM launchers are
contained in Section III of Part Three of the Protocol. Procedures for
the conversion or elimination of SLBM launchers are contained in
Section IV of Part Three of the Protocol. Procedures for the conversion
or elimination of heavy bombers are contained in Section V of Part
Three of the Protocol. The Parties have agreed that the specific
procedures contained in these sections meet the standards specified in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I.
Newly developed procedures for conversion or elimination, which are
also permitted, must meet these same standards. In determining whether
newly developed conversion or elimination procedures are sufficient,
the United States will not limit itself to a predetermined set of
criteria.
Question. How will the United States determine whether a strategic
offensive launcher in Russia is (a) ``inoperable''; (b) ``incapable of
employing ICBMs, SLBMs, or nuclear armaments''; and (c) completely
eliminated?
Answer. ICBM and SLBM launchers are rendered ``inoperable'' by
using the procedures provided for in paragraphs 1-4 of Section III and
paragraph 1 of Section IV, respectively, of Part Three of the Protocol
to the New START Treaty. Once these procedures have been completed and
applicable confirmation procedures are complied with, the ICBM or SLBM
launcher is considered to be eliminated.
SLBM launchers and nuclear-capable heavy bombers are considered to
be ``incapable of employing ICBMs, SLBMs, or nuclear armaments'' once
the procedures provided for in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Section IV and
paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section V, respectively, of Part Three of the
Protocol to the New START Treaty are completed. The results of these
procedures are subject to verification through type two inspections.
Once these procedures have been completed and applicable confirmation
procedures are complied with, a launcher or heavy bomber is considered
to be converted and ceases to be subject to Article II limits of the
treaty.
Question. Part Three of the New START Protocol lays out rules for
conversion of strategic offensive arms subject to the treaty, but not
reconversion, i.e., back to a role or with capability to undertake
strategic missions and uses consistent with their original purpose. (a)
What are the benefits of this situation for the United States; and (b)
why is there no reconversion ban in the protocol?
Answer. The United States is currently converting all of its B-1B
heavy bombers such that they will be incapable of employing nuclear
armaments. Once the conversion process is completed, the B-1B will no
longer be subject to the New START Treaty and will not count against
its limits. The United States also plans the similar future conversion
of some, but not all, of its B-52H heavy bombers.
The United States has completed the conversion of all the SLBM
launchers on four Ohio-class submarines into cruise missile launchers
or rendered the launchers incapable of employing SLBMs. As a
consequence, these SLBM launchers will no longer count against the New
START Treaty limits. The United States agreed in the Second Agreed
Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol to conduct one-time exhibitions
of each of the four SSGNs to confirm that the launchers in these
submarines are incapable of launching SLBMs.
The United States also plans to convert individual SLBM launchers
on a number of SSBNs by rendering them incapable of employing SLBMs and
thus reducing the accountable aggregate number of SLBM launchers while
maintaining the existing number of SSBNs.
The Parties also agreed to use exhibitions or inspections as set
forth in the First, Second, Third, and Seventh Agreed Statements to
provide assurance that the converted missile launchers remain incapable
of launching strategic ballistic missiles and the converted heavy
bombers remain incapable of launching nuclear armaments.
In order to provide for future contingencies, the United States did
not support a ban on the reconversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers and
heavy bombers. Changes in future U.S. plans for its strategic forces or
unforeseen events, both technological or policy related, could
potentially require the reconversion of some launchers or heavy bombers
to their original purpose in order to meet such future contingencies.
Reconversion would allow such flexibility.
Question. Why are there no provisions in Part Three of the Protocol
specifically regarding the conversion of ICBMs and SLBMs, only
launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs?
Answer. Part Three of the Treaty's Protocol provides for the
conversion of launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs by rendering them incapable
of employing ICBMs or SLBMs. The other Party must be able to confirm
this. The treaty's conversion procedures cannot be applied to ICBMs and
SLBMs because these missiles cannot be rendered incapable of employing
nuclear weapons while still remaining operable. Therefore, ICBMs and
SLBMs are removed from accountability under the treaty by elimination,
that is, by rendering them inoperable.
Question. Paragraph 3 also notes that a converted strategic
offensive arm that ceases to be subject to the New START Treaty ``may
be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty.'' Could you
provide an illustrative list of such purposes?
Answer. Some examples of ``purposes not inconsistent with the
Treaty'' for which converted strategic offensive arms might be used
are: use of a converted SLBM launcher as a launcher capable only of
launching nonnuclear sea-launched cruise missiles; and use of a
converted heavy bomber as a heavy bomber capable only of carrying
nonnuclear armaments.
ratification and implementation
Question. Does the executive branch believe it has authority under
relevant U.S. law to implement reductions or limitations of United
States strategic nuclear forces at or below limits provided in the New
START Treaty, or other actions relevant to such reductions and
limitations planned and described in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,
before the New START Treaty, its protocol and annexes, enters into
force in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article XIV of the New START
Treaty?
Answer. Part Eight of the Protocol on provisional application makes
it clear that the executive branch is not seeking to implement the New
START Treaty's reductions or limitations prior to entry into force of
the treaty. Any reductions in strategic forces that may occur prior to
entry into force of the treaty would be consistent with the President's
authority as commander in chief and not pursuant to the treaty.
space launch facilities
Part One of the Protocol defines (term no. 73.) a ``space launch
facilit.'' as ``a specified facility from which objects are delivered
into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs.''
Question. How many such facilities are there in the Russian
Federation?
Answer. The initial Russian data declaration will be received no
later than 45 days after entry into force of the treaty. However, the
former Soviet START parties (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine)
had four declared space launch facilities under START: three in the
Russian Federation (Nenoksa, Plesetsk, and Svobodnyy) and one in
Kazakhstan (Leninsk-1).
Question. Does Russia conduct peaceful space launch activities at
any facility where it either stores or tests offensive ballistic
missiles?
Answer. The following facilities have been used in the past for
both peaceful space launches and storage and/or testing of offensive
ballistic missiles:
Dombarovskiy ICBM Base, Russia (declared under START; Russia has
provided site diagrams indicating its intent to declare under
New START);
Kapustin Yar Test Range, Russia (declared under START; Russia has
provided site diagrams indicating its intent to declare under
New START);
Leninsk Test Range and Space Launch Facilities, Kazakhstan
(declared under START); and
Plesetsk Test Range and Space Launch Facilities (declared as a test
range and as a space launch facility under START; Russia has
provided site diagrams indicating its intent to declare under
New START).
Russia's space launch facility declarations under New START will
not be known until the initial data declaration 45 days after EIF.
Question. Is it possible to distinguish the launch of a rocket that
is a strategic offensive weapon from the launch of a peaceful space
launch vehicle?
Answer. Please see classified response to be provided separately.
nunn-lugar/cooperative threat reduction (ctr)
Question. Do you believe that United States CTR assistance to the
Russian Federation will be needed to ensure that the Russian Federation
is able to implement the New START Treaty efficiently and to maintain
security and accurate accounting on Russian nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable components and materiels?
Answer. The Russian Federation will be able to implement the New
START Treaty without U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) reduction
assistance, but we believe it will be able to do so more efficiently
and will be better able to maintain security and accurate accounting
with U.S. CTR assistance. The CTR program has played a major role in
the elimination of strategic offensive arms that were taken out of
service due to implementation of the START Treaty for almost two
decades. The CTR program, in concert with the non-proliferation
programs of the Department of Energy, has also played a very
significant role in securing Russian nuclear weapons and stocks of
fissile materiels.
Clearly, the responsibility for implementing the New START Treaty
will belong to the Government of Russia. The role of the CTR program
will be, as it was throughout the implementation of START, to
incentivize the Russian Government to continue the excellent
cooperation it has had with the Department of Defense in eliminating
Russian strategic delivery systems and in enhancing nuclear weapons
storage and transportation security. It is also important to note that
the elimination procedures that the Russian Government has requested us
to continue to employ in some cases are more robust than those required
under the New START Treaty, and that payment for the work funded by CTR
is not made until the elimination activity has been confirmed as
completed by a U.S. Government CTR official.
______
Responses of Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Barrasso
Question. Recently, former Secretary James R. Schlesinger testified
before this committee that the Russians have consistently resisted
efforts to deal with the imbalance of tactical weapons. He stated that,
``The likelihood of their being willing to do so in light of New START
is sharply diminished, for we have now forfeited substantial
leverage.''
Were tactical weapons addressed during the negotiations with
Russia?
If so, what exactly was discussed during those negotiations?
What was the position of Russia on this issue?
What did the United States propose regarding tactical weapons?
If not, why did the United States not push for tactical weapons to
be a part of the treaty negotiations?
What is the reason for the United States to forfeit substantial
leverage on this issue?
Answer. No. As agreed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, the purpose
of the New START Treaty was to reduce and limit the two nations'
strategic offensive arms; therefore the issue of tactical nuclear
weapons was not raised. A more ambitious treaty that addressed tactical
nuclear weapons would have taken much longer to complete, adding
significantly to the time before a successor agreement, including
verification measures, could enter into force following START's
expiration in December 2009. Because of their limited range and
different roles, tactical nuclear weapons do not directly influence the
strategic balance between the United States and Russia. President
Medvedev has expressed interest in further discussions on measures to
further reduce both nations' nuclear arsenals. We intend to raise
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear
weapons, in those discussions.
Question. Did the United States get any Russian cooperation on Iran
as a result of signing this treaty?
Answer. Our renewed focus on improving our relations with Russia,
including last year's negotiations on the New START Treaty, has led to
a greater understanding and increased cooperation between the United
States and Russia in a number of areas. This renewed relationship is
key to curbing nuclear threats across the globe.
We are working very closely and in cooperation with Russia on our
shared goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons
capability. Russia does not support an Iran with nuclear weapons and--
in addition to other constructive contributions to international
nuclear nonproliferation efforts--has joined the November 2009
International Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolution
condemning Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA, its refusal to
suspend enrichment, and its failure to comply with its Safeguards
Agreement.
Since early 2009, the United States, Russia, and our partners in
the P5+1 have offered to constructively engage Iran--but Iran failed to
take advantage of this opportunity. Since 2006, there have been six
U.N. Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) calling on Iran to suspend
enrichment. Iran has refused to meet with the P5+1 about its nuclear
program despite our efforts and its commitment to do so last October.
Russia supported UNSCR 1929 passage on June 9, the sixth UNSCR of its
kind, imposing additional sanctions on Iran. Russia also continues to
provide key assistance in the ongoing IAEA proposal discussions to
refuel the Tehran Research Reactor.
We continue to discuss with Russia our concerns about advanced
weapons sales to states such as Iran. We appreciate Russia's restraint
in the transfer of the S-300 missile system to Iran.
Question. There has been a variety of views on whether rail-mobile
missile launchers will count under the New START Treaty. Secretary
Schlesinger has indicated that rail-mobile ICMBs may not count under
the new treaty.
Does the New START Treaty address rail-mobile missile launchers?
Answer. Rail-mobile ICBMs are not specifically mentioned in the New
START Treaty because neither Party currently deploys ICBMs in that
mode. Nevertheless, the treaty covers all ICBMs and ICBM launchers, and
would include any rail-mobile system, should either Party decide to
develop and deploy such a system.
Question. Could rail-mobile missile launchers be deployed and not
count against the New START Treaty limits?
Answer. No. The treaty covers all ICBMs and ICBM launchers,
including a rail-mobile system, should either Party decide to develop
and deploy such a system.
The New START Treaty defines an ICBM launcher as a ``device
intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.''
This is a broad definition that covers all ICBM launchers, including
any future rail-mobile launchers.
A rail-mobile launcher containing an ICBM would meet the definition
of a ``deployed launcher of ICBMs,'' which is ``an ICBM launcher that
contains an ICBM'' and, along with any nondeployed rail-mobile
launchers of ICBMs, would fall within the limit of 800 on deployed and
nondeployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed and nondeployed
heavy bombers. The ICBMs contained in rail-mobile launchers would count
as deployed and therefore fall within the 700 ceiling on deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
If a Party chose to develop and deploy rail-mobile ICBMs, such
missiles and their launchers would therefore be subject to the treaty
and its limitations. Specific details about the application of
verification provisions would be worked out in the BCC. Necessary
adjustments to the definition of ``mobile launchers of ICBMs''--to
address the use of the term ``self-propelled chassis on which it is
mounted'' in that definition--would also be worked out in the BCC.
Question. If rail-mobile missile launchers are not provided for
under the treaty, how will the United States be able to track and
monitor the number and movement of these weapons?
Answer. Neither the United States nor Russia currently deploys
rail-mobile launchers. If a Party chose to develop and deploy rail-
mobile ICBMs, such missiles and their launchers would be subject to the
treaty. Appropriate detailed arrangements for incorporating rail-mobile
ICBM launchers and their ICBMs into the treaty's verification and
monitoring regime would be worked out in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.
Question. What type of measures will be used to monitor other
activities outside the New START Treaty?
Answer. Please see the classified National Intelligence Estimate on
the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor the New START Treaty.
Question. What additional information will the United States be
able to obtain under the New START Treaty that we were not able to
obtain under the previous START treaty?
Answer. Each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber will be assigned an
alpha-numeric unique identifier (UID), which will be included in the
applicable notifications, periodic data declarations, and briefings
presented prior to inspections, and may be confirmed during
inspections. Under the previous treaty, only mobile ICBMs had such
UIDs.
Routine data exchanges will contain certain information that was
not provided under START, specifically, the declaration of the total
number of warheads deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs based at each such
facility. Included in the data exchanges will be the UID for each ICBM,
SLBM, or heavy bomber based at the respective facilities. An innovation
in New START is the requirement to notify the change between deployed
and nondeployed status for ICBMs and SLBMs.
As part of an inspection, the inspected Party must declare the
number of reentry vehicles on each deployed ICBM and deployed SLBM
present at the ICBM base or submarine base and subject to inspection,
and the number of nuclear armaments located in or on deployed heavy
bombers present at the heavy bomber base and subject to inspection.
Inspections will be used to confirm the actual number of reentry
vehicles declared for designated, deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs,
and to confirm the number of nuclear armaments onboard or attached to
designated, deployed heavy bombers, although we expect that number to
be zero since neither Party routinely maintains nuclear armaments
loaded on its heavy bombers. In addition, inspectors will be able to
record the UIDs from all items that are inspected.
Question. What information will the United States no longer be able
to obtain under the New START Treaty that we were able to obtain under
the previous START treaty?
Answer. The United States will not obtain recordings of telemetric
information from the Russian Federation for each ICBM or SLBM flight
test, as was the case under the START Treaty. Instead, each side will
provide telemetric information on up to five launches per year on a
parity basis.
Cooperative measures, under which heavy bombers or mobile ICBMs
were, upon request, placed in the open for viewing by national
technical means of verification, are not required by the new treaty.
Although the New START Treaty requires 48 hours advance notice for
solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs exiting Votkinsk, there will no longer be
continuous monitoring of the facility including the presence of
monitors as was the case under the INF and START Treaties.
For more details, please see the classified National Intelligence
Estimate on the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor the New
START Treaty, published on 30 June 2010.
Question. Do you believe that we will see similar problems with
Russia regarding violations of the new verification procedures?
Answer. Although the New START Treaty is less complex than the
START Treaty, different interpretations by the Parties might arise
regarding how to implement the inspection activities and other
verification provisions of the New START Treaty. Should such a
situation arise, the Parties will seek to resolve their differences in
the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
Question. How will the New START Treaty address similar violations
from occurring?
Answer. RVOSI: The New START Treaty establishes the inspected
Party's right to cover reentry vehicles and other equipment with
individual covers, but with the caveat that such covers must not hamper
inspectors in accurately identifying the number of reentry vehicles
emplaced on a front section. This provision is intended to ensure that
covers are not used in such a manner that would obscure the actual
number of reentry vehicles on a front section. It is similar to the
START provision for covers that did not hamper inspectors, but
specifies individual covers and makes the distinction between the New
START verification task of determining the actual number of warheads
versus the START provision of confirming that there were no more than
the attributed number. In addition, as set forth in the Inspection
Activities Annex, reentry vehicle covers are to be viewed, and in some
cases measured, by inspectors prior to their use during the reentry
vehicle inspection portion of a type one inspection.
Telemetry: The obligations in the New START Treaty are different
from those in START. None of the new treaty's specific obligations,
prohibitions, or limitations requires analysis of telemetric
information to verify a Party's compliance. Nevertheless, to promote
openness and transparency, the Parties have agreed to exchange
telemetric information on an agreed equal number (up to five annually)
of launches of the testing party's choice of ICBMs and SLBMs (which
could include launch vehicles that contain the first stage of an ICBM
or SLBM).
______
Responses of Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Wicker
missile defense
Question. In the April 27 issue of Time magazine, Dimitri Simes,
the President of the Nixon Center, wrote, ``In this official's account,
the full spectrum of U.S. officials from the President to working-level
negotiators clearly conveyed that the reason they rejected more
explicit restrictions on missile defense was not because of U.S. plans,
but because of fear that such a deal could not win Senate ratification.
A senior U.S. official intimately familiar with the talks has confirmed
that the Russians were advised not to press further on missile defenses
because the administration had no intention to proceed with anything
that would truly concern Moscow.''
Do you disagree with this characterization?
Answer. Yes, we disagree with this characterization. The April 1,
2009, Joint Statement issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, stated
that ``the subject of the new agreement will be the reduction and
limitation of strategic offensive arms.'' This statement signified that
Russia agreed that the treaty to be negotiated to replace START would
not attempt to reduce or limit defensive arms.
Broadly, the United States is committed to the ballistic missile
defense policies outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. The
United States was not interested, and is not interested, in any
agreements that would prevent the effective implementation of these
policies.
Question. Will you agree to share with the Senate details/cables/
etc of any conversations in any venue with the Russians where missile
defense was discussed?
Answer. We are committed to providing answers in a detailed
briefing, in a classified session if needed.
______
Responses of Secretary Gates to Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar
bomber limits
Under START I, flexible treatment was given to heavy bombers
equipped to carry nuclear, long-range air-launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs). The United States was permitted to count 10 weapons for up to
150 of its heavy bombers and Russia was permitted to count 8 weapons
for up to 180 of its heavy bombers. For both sides, each heavy bomber
over 150 and 180 were counted as a number of weapons equal to the
number of ALCMs with which each such heavy bomber was actually
equipped. This rule gave the United States a considerable warhead-
counting advantage over Russia--an ability to exceed START I's limit of
6,000 warheads by perhaps 2,500 to 3,000 warheads, given our number of
bombers and ALCMs in 1992.
Under New START, there would be more flexible treatment regarding
heavy bombers, as each heavy bomber counts as one warhead. Yet, the Air
Force plans to retire, without a follow-on system, our nuclear-capable
ALCMs. Russia has announced plans for a new heavy bomber and a new
nuclear-capable ALCM, and while the recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review
concluded the United States will maintain a triad of nuclear forces--
including bombers--no modernization plan exists for this leg of the
triad.
Question. If we are to maintain a bomber leg in the triad, why has
the Air Force delayed relevant planning?
Answer. The Air Force and the Department of Defense are committed
to the bomber leg of the triad. With the completion of the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), the Air Force is commencing an analysis of
alternatives on the Long-Range Standoff Cruise Missile while the
Department of Defense completes its study on Long-Range Strike systems
that includes consideration of alternatives for a future bomber.
Additionally, these planning efforts will coincide with legacy
sustainment efforts for the B-2 and B-52 heavy bombers, and associated
Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) and B-61 gravity bombs. The NPR
states that a full scope Life-Extension Program will sustain the B-61
to ensure that production begins in 2017.
Question. Do more flexible rules regarding heavy bombers provide
particular advantages to the United States if we would no longer
maintain significant numbers of such aircraft and nuclear-capable
ALCMs?
Answer. Neither side will secure an advantage over the other under
the New START Treaty--whether with regard to one particular system or
in the aggregate. Instead, the treaty will allow both sides to meet
their legitimate security needs within a set of limits while
acknowledging a mutual desire to reduce further the role and importance
of nuclear weapons in the strategic postures of the Parties. With this
in mind, the United States will retain the capacity within its bomber
force to help meet its overall nuclear deterrence requirements. At the
same time, to meet other warfighting requirements, U.S. bomber
conventional capabilities are unrivaled and continue to advance. In
this context, the New START rules represent the appropriate balance of
transparency, accountability, and flexibility. Transparency rules for
heavy bombers reflect the need to inspect and monitor these strategic
delivery vehicles. The New START attribution rule of one nuclear
warhead for each nuclear-capable heavy bomber strikes a balance between
the fact that bombers are no longer on day-to-day nuclear alert and are
not considered first strike weapon systems, and the fact that these
bombers nonetheless have the capability to deliver nuclear armaments
stored on or near their air bases. In addition, the New START Treaty
conversion and elimination procedures provide greater flexibility, for
instance to convert heavy bombers so that they are not capable of
employing nuclear armaments and will not count against the treaty's
aggregate limits, resulting in reduced costs and burdens for converting
and eliminating such bombers.
Question. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated in
testimony on April 29 that the bomber rules of New START mean ``Russia
can maintain 2,100 strategic weapons rather than the 1,550 specified in
the Treaty.'' At the lower limits on strategic offensive arms specified
in New START, and given our declining edge in these systems, does the
bomber advantage now go to the Russians instead of the United States?
Answer. The U.S. force of nuclear-capable heavy bombers is larger
and more sophisticated than that of the Russian Federation. Under the
New START limits, it will contain up to 60 B-2As, the world's only
stealth bomber, and B-52Hs equipped to deliver long-range, nuclear-
armed air-launched cruise missiles. With these bombers, plus over 60 B-
1Bs that have been converted to carry only nonnuclear armaments, the
U.S. bomber force will remain superior to that of the Russian
Federation for the life of the New START Treaty. Counting one nuclear
warhead for each nuclear-capable heavy bomber applies to both sides and
does not provide Russia an advantage.
Question. What actions will the Department of Defense undertake to
prepare for the conversion and elimination processes envisioned under
New START?
Answer. The New START Treaty gives considerable flexibility beyond
START in the procedures to convert or eliminate strategic offensive
arms to enable both Parties to meet these central limits. The DOD is
exploring various courses of action that utilize this greater
flexibility in reference to ICBM launcher elimination procedures and
heavy bomber conversion and elimination procedures. The DOD is also
researching the cost and operational constraints of the three methods
of conversion of SLBM launchers permitted under the New START Treaty to
determine which method is the most cost-effective. Final
recommendations and actions will be based on fiscally acceptable
solutions that meet the obligations of the treaty.
Question. What planning or other actions have been undertaken by
your Office, the Joint Chiefs and relevant Military Departments to
anticipate New START's entry into force and implementation in the
United States?
Answer. DOD has undertaken efforts to plan for the treaty so that
we can comply with the treaty at entry into force. In February 2010,
the Department of Defense established the New START Treaty
Implementation Working Group (NST-IWG) to oversee and coordinate the
Department's planning for implementation of the New START Treaty. The
NST-IWG includes representatives from OSD, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Military Services, and the Defense Agencies. The
NST-IWG currently meets weekly to review the status of preparations
within each Service and Agency to implement the NST, including the
identification of long lead time items and resolution of issues
identified. The NST-IWG has also coordinated DOD efforts to fully
comply with and successfully implement the New START Treaty
requirements identified in Part Eight of the Protocol for provisional
application prior to entry into force, including the exchange of site
diagrams and provision of certain notifications. DOD Components are
also actively engaged in planning, programming, budgeting, and
allocating resources, including personnel, for implementation of the
New START Treaty at entry into force.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is preparing to perform
its inspection and escort responsibilities should the Senate consent to
ratification of New START. DTRA will train the agency's cadre of
inspectors and escort personnel on the provisions of the new treaty and
how to implement those provisions. Initial certification of DTRA
inspectors and escorts will occur over the May-October 2010 timeframe
and involve formal instruction on treaty provisions, self-study, mock
inspections at U.S. facilities, and team certification standards and
boards. DTRA has also been actively coordinating with the Air Force and
the Navy to prepare facilities subject to inspection under New START,
and is working to update the Web-based Arms Control Enterprise System
to support New START.
Question. How will the Department of Defense undertake to protect
sensitive information under the New START Treaty, and will such
procedures differ in any way from those applied under START I?
Answer. The New START Treaty inspection regime was designed to
minimize security risks while ensuring the U.S. ability to monitor
Russian compliance. The Department of Defense is currently preparing
the plans and procedures necessary to ensure that sensitive information
is protected while complying with the terms of the New START Treaty.
These plans and procedures are based on the extensive experience
gleaned from hosting close to 500 Russian inspection missions of U.S.
facilities during the life of the START Treaty. The Department will
make use of the security countermeasures procedures that were developed
and validated during implementation of the START Treaty and designed to
limit access only to the information that is required to meet treaty
requirements. Although some of the procedures will be modified due to
differences between the New START Treaty and the START Treaty, they
will be very similar to those procedures developed and improved during
the 15 years of implementing the START Treaty.
The Department's preparations for implementation will focus heavily
on ensuring that any security risks at DOD facilities are identified
and addressed well before the first Russian inspection on U.S.
territory is conducted. Over the coming months, the Defense Agencies
and Military Departments will conduct various training events,
including mock inspections at facilities subject to inspection. These
activities are designed to train national and local U.S. in-country
escorts in their duties and responsibilities, refine inspection
procedures, and ensure a wide range of contingencies is identified and
addressed.
delivery systems modernizing
Press reports indicate the administration will invest $100 billion
over the next decade in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. About $30
billion of this total will go toward development and acquisition of a
new strategic submarine, leaving about $70 billion. According to
estimates by U.S. Strategic Command, the cost of maintaining our
current dedicated nuclear force is approximately $5.6 billion per annum
or $56 billion over the next decade. This leaves roughly $14 billion of
the $100 billion the administration intends to invest for other items.
Only $14 billion would remain for development and acquisition of a
next-generation bomber, a follow-on ICBM, a follow-on nuclear-capable
ALCM, and to develop a Prompt Global Strike capability.
Question. In light of these figures, is $100 billion a sufficient
investment in future strategic nuclear delivery vehicles over the next
decade?
Answer. The estimated investment of well over $100 billion for
strategic delivery vehicles over the next decade, provided in the
Section 1251 report, represents a best-estimate of costs associated
with deployed systems and programs underway and planned. This estimate
does not include all of the costs associated with potential future
modernization programs. DOD is currently studying long-range strike
options, including future bomber requirements and prompt global strike
systems, and is also initiating an analysis of alternatives for a
follow-on, nuclear-capable ALCM. Studies regarding a possible follow-on
ICBM will be initiated in 2011-2012. Therefore, costs associated with
any future program decisions on these systems would be additive to the
estimate of well over $100 billion in the Section 1251 report.
warhead lifetime extension policy guidance
Language in the Nuclear Posture Review on life extension programs
for warheads gives a clear preference to refurbishment and reuse-
raising the bar for replacement as an option. Some clarification on
life extension programs is provided in the 1251 report.
Question. What assurance is there that our National Laboratories
can or would pursue objective, technical analyses (to include
replacement) for certain stockpile options given the clear guidance in
the NPR that this administration prefers refurbishment and reuse?
Answer. The National Laboratories have consistently pursued their
stockpile stewardship responsibilities in a professional and thorough
manner, and have provided objective, technical analyses to maintain the
safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
Since the mid-1990s the directors of the National Laboratories have
submitted annual assessments for their respective systems and
components, to include identification of problems and recommendations
for future life extension or replacement action, which are compiled
into the annual Report on Stockpile Assessment which is, in turn,
reviewed and transmitted to the President by the Secretaries of Defense
and Energy. These requirements and expectations of the National
Laboratories will not change. The Nuclear Posture Review clarified that
the National Laboratories will study the full range of approaches to
address requirements for each warhead life extension program. In the
``Report in Response to NDAA FY10 Section 1251; New START Treaty
Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans (U)'' submitted to
Congress, the administration noted the following: ``The Laboratory
Directors will ensure that the full range of LEP approaches, including
refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of nuclear components are studied
for warheads on a case-by-case basis. While the NPR expresses a policy
preference for refurbishment and reuse in decisions to proceed from
study to engineering development, the Laboratory Directors will be
expected to provide findings associated with the full range of LEP
approaches, and to make a set of recommendations based solely on their
best technical assessments of the ability of each LEP approach to meet
critical stockpile management goals (weapon system safety, security,
and effectiveness).'' In accordance with these stated policies, the
National Nuclear Security
Administration and the National Laboratories will work with the
Department of Defense to identify options that meet the requirements
and then develop a preferred life extension approach that is then
presented to the Nuclear Weapons Council for approval, and ultimately
recommended to the administration. The President's budget request, as
implemented by congressional authorization and appropriations
processes, validates that life extension approach before the production
phase of the process begins, irrespective of whether it utilizes
refurbishment, reuse, or replacement of nuclear components.
Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories
released a ``Tri-Lab Directors' Statement on the Nuclear Posture
Review'' on April 9th, 2010. The laboratory directors stated: ``We
believe that the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further
nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of
life extension options (refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of
nuclear components from different warheads and replacement of nuclear
components based on previously tested designs), provides the necessary
technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future
with an acceptable level of risk.''
Question. Has any Laboratory Director or Laboratory study specified
a requirement for replacement?
Answer. We have not yet completed the study phase of a Life
Extension Program (LEP) under the guidance outlined in the NPR.
Consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review, the replacement of nuclear
components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management
Program goals could not otherwise be met and if specifically authorized
by the President and approved by Congress. That determination would be
made prior to the engineering development phase of a LEP.
Question. Does this language in the NPR suggest that the
administration does not plan to pursue replacement?
Answer. No. The Nuclear Posture Review clarifies the
administration's intention to consider all options to achieve the
required life extension improvements to ensure a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear stockpile. All approaches will be considered in the
development of life extension program options, and the National Nuclear
Security Administration and the National Laboratories will work with
the Department of Defense to identify options that meet requirements
and then propose a preferred life extension approach to the Nuclear
Weapons Council.
Question. Former Secretary of Defense and Energy James Schlesinger
concluded on April 29 before the committee that this guidance was
``slightly inconsistent'' with the approach proposed by the 2009
Strategic Posture Commission. Why did the administration deviate from
the Commission's recommendation(s) in this area?
Answer. The Strategic Posture Commission recommended that all LEP)
options be considered on a case-by-case basis, and the NPR is
consistent with the Commission in this regard (and many others). The
NPR additionally expressed a preference for refurbishment and reuse
over replacement of nuclear components. We are committed to ensuring
that the technical community is not constrained in its exploration of
technical options for warhead life extension. Accordingly, the Nuclear
Posture Review and supplemental guidance make clear that the technical
community is to consider all technical options as it studies how best
to extend the life of existing warheads in order to meet stockpile
management goals (i.e., increased safety, security, and reliability)
without providing new military capabilities or conducting underground
nuclear tests. The National Nuclear Security Administration Laboratory
Directors will ensure that the full range of Life Extension Program
(LEP) approaches, including refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of
nuclear components, is studied on a warhead-by-warhead basis. While the
Nuclear Posture Review expresses a policy preference for refurbishment
and reuse when decisions are being made to proceed from study to
engineering development, the Laboratory Directors will be expected to
provide findings associated with the full range of LEP approaches, and
to make a set of recommendations based solely on their best technical
assessment of the ability of each LEP approach to meet stockpile
management goals. The three Laboratory Directors stated that this
approach to life extension ``provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
acceptable level of risk.''
national laboratories funding
In fiscal year 2010, Congress provided roughly $6.4 billion for
atomic energy defense activities of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). If the FY10 budget is taken as a 10-year
baseline, that would be $64 billion of the $80 billion proposed for
nuclear weapons activities at NNSA, assuming no increase for inflation
or increased costs, such as for construction, occurred. Assuming a
standard rate of annual inflation of 3 percent to cover cost-of-living
adjustments in salaries and increased material costs using the FY10
appropriation as the baseline, then to hold that budget constant, a
total of $75.6 billion in 10 years, from fiscal years 2011 to 2020,
would be required.
This leaves $4.4 billion over 10 years for modernization, money
which you would transfer from your budget to the Energy Department.
In your testimony you confirmed that the Department of Defense is
transferring $4.6 billion to the NNSA through FY 2015 to fund
``critical nuclear weapons' life extension programs and efforts to
modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure.'' You state that these
investments ``represent a credible modernization plan.''
Question. What are the modernization options you envision beyond
planned lifetime extensions and planned and projected annual stockpile
work to which you might transfer funds?
Answer. The National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear
Security Enterprise will require sustained vigilance to regain and
retain the critical skills and capabilities needed to assess and
certify the enduring nuclear stockpile. Regular recapitalization of the
infrastructure and continual investments in modern technologies and
approaches are essential to achieve this goal. Regarding the stockpile
itself, the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan documents all
envisioned lifetime extensions and planned and projected annual
stockpile work. History has shown that surveillance can uncover
unexpected developments that can, in turn, lead to new requirements for
future life extension activities.
Question. Would the modernized complex you contemplate support
parallel life extension programs and production?
Answer. Yes. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) accounts for multiple-
phased life extension programs being conducted at the same time. With
congressional support and necessary funding, the phasing will allow
different elements of a modernized NNSA capacity-based enterprise to
work in parallel for greater overall efficiency. For example, NNSA is
presently producing extended life W76-1 reentry body warheads, while at
the same time conducting a series of feasibility studies and a detailed
cost-estimate for refurbishing the B61-3/4/7/10 family of nuclear
bombs. The SSMP commits the Department of Energy to delivering all of
the W76-1 warheads required by the Navy, fully completing the B61 Life
Extension Program (LEP) in support of the Air Force requirements, and
initiating a 2011 LEP study of alternatives for the W78 reentry vehicle
warhead. The phases of these various LEP activities will overlap in
time and will be performed in parallel.
Question. To what degree is it desirable to establish a capability
to execute parallel life-extension programs?
Answer. As stated in the response to the preceding, the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan (SSMP) accounts for multiple-phased life extension
programs being conducted at the same time. With congressional support
and necessary funding, the phasing will allow different elements of a
modernized NNSA capacity-based enterprise to work in parallel for
greater overall efficiency.
Question. If the complex plan does not support parallel life
extension programs, what additional funding would be required in the FY
2011 to FY 2015 timeframe to support such an objective?
Answer. As discussed in the responses to previous questions, the
National Nuclear Security Administration fiscal year 2011 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) does account for multiple phased
life extension programs being conducted simultaneously. We believe this
plan, when implemented, will adequately support the Department of
Defense's evolving military requirements. Sustained support of the
program is essential. Additional capabilities beyond those outlined in
the SSMP are not deemed necessary; therefore, cost estimates for
additional capabilities have not been generated.
Question. What facility improvements would be required in the
weapons complex to undertake parallel life extensions, and could they
be completed before any scheduled LEPs are to be completed?
As discussed in the responses to previous questions, the National
Nuclear Security Administration fiscal year 2011 Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Plan (SSMP) does account for multiple phased life
extension programs being conducted simultaneously. We believe this
plan, which includes facility improvements, will, when implemented,
adequately support the Department of Defense's evolving military
requirements. With Congressional support of current and planned
administration budget requests, the Department of Energy and National
Nuclear Security Administration will be funded through FY 2015 to
achieve the life extension and facility milestones contained in the
SSMP.
1251 report
The recently released 1251 report reaffirms the 2010 NPR policy
that, ``the United States will give strong preference to options for
refurbishment or reuse'' of our nuclear weapons. This position is at
odds with the recommendations of the bipartisan Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.
Question. What are the guarantees that critical skills will not be
lost if our Nation relies solely on refurbishment and reuse of existing
pits in life extension programs?
Answer. We are committed to ensuring that the technical community
is not constrained in its exploration of technical options for warhead
life extension. Accordingly, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) makes it
clear that the technical community is to consider all technical options
as it studies how best to extend the life of existing warheads in order
to meet stockpile management goals (e.g., increased safety, security,
and reliability) without providing new military capabilities and
without underground nuclear tests. The Laboratory Directors will ensure
that the full range of life extension program (LEP) approaches,
including refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of nuclear components,
is studied on a case-by-case basis. Although the NPR expresses a policy
preference for refurbishment and reuse in decisions to proceed from
study to engineering development, the Laboratory Directors will be
expected to provide findings associated with the full range of LEP
approaches, and to make a set of recommendations based on their best
technical assessment of the ability of each LEP approach to meet
stockpile management goals.
Question. How will the capability to design new pits be maintained
in the absence of the actual exercise of those skills--through
replacement or new pit production programs--and what current or planned
stockpile work would maintain these skill sets in the absence of such
weapons activities?
Answer. The response to this question is the same as the response
to the previous question. Additionally, the core National Nuclear
Security Administration program to develop a predictive capability for
anticipating the evolution in performance margin and quantifying the
possibilities of failure modes as nuclear explosives age is a
significant and long-term scientific challenge that exercises key
critical skills. This goal requires a vigorous science, technology, and
engineering base where the skills are developed and honed through
meaningful design and experimental work, and are additionally
challenged through ongoing stockpile surveillance and annual
assessments. These activities produce the necessary learning
environment needed to retain the critical skills for Stockpile
Stewardship and Management.
Question. Do you have any estimate as to the result New START
Treaty implementation in Russia will have on U.S. CTR assistance to the
Russian Federation?
Answer. Preliminary discussions with our Russian CTR partners have
indicated their intent to meet New START Treaty targets in a manner
consistent with CTR nonproliferation and threat reduction objectives.
We therefore have every reason to believe that the excellent
cooperation and close collaboration that has developed between U.S. and
Russian partners over the past several years will continue under the
new treaty.
______
Responses of Secretary Gates to Questions Submitted by Senator DeMint
Question. Why has the U.S. (in the Nuclear Posture Review)
committed to the unilateral retirement of Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles
(SLCM)? Does not Russia retain SLCMs?
Answer. Russia does retain SLCMs. Although the United States will
retain its highly capable force of conventionally armed SLCMs that can
be launched from attack submarines as well as several types of surface
combatants, the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile--Nuclear (TLAM-N) will be
retired as stated in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). TLAM-N has not
been operationally deployed aboard submarines since the 1991
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives were announced and subsequently
implemented. Based on analysis performed as part of the NPR, including
numerous consultations with allies, the administration determined that
TLAM-N was a redundant capability and could be retired. The United
States will maintain its strong commitment to the defense and security
of allies, including our commitment to provide extended deterrence with
dual-capable fighters and heavy bombers if the situation ever demands.
Question. How will nondeployed ICBMs be maintained? Precisely how
long will be necessary to ``deploy'' a formerly nondeployed ICBM?
Answer. Nondeployed ICBMs will be stored in accordance with the
provisions of the New START Treaty either at declared storage
facilities or at ICBM bases. The United States stores the bulk of its
ICBMs in stages and not as fully assembled missiles. The United States
will continue to maintain a small number of nondeployed, fully
assembled missiles at each ICBM base in mission-ready status (i.e.
spares).
The length of time to deploy a former nondeployed ICBM would depend
on a number of factors. A fully assembled, nondeployed ICBM located at
its ICBM base would take a matter of days to deploy, whereas an ICBM
stored in stages at a storage facility located far from an ICBM base
could take weeks to deploy due to the time necessary to transport the
ICBM to the base, assemble, and deploy within a silo. Consequently,
depending on a number of variables, the deployment time for a
nondeployed ICBM to be emplaced in a launch silo could take from days
to weeks.
Question. In your testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, you outlined a plan to reduce the number of missiles on each
submarine by four, to convert some B-52s to a conventional role, and to
remove at least 30 Minuteman III missiles. What is the anticipated cost
of these activities? Were the costs of elimination contained in the
budget projections considered in the formulation of the 1251 report
plan?
Answer. The Section 1251 Report outlines a baseline U.S. force
structure associated with the New START Treaty. Its budget projections
do not include the costs of elimination and conversion. The treaty
provides flexibility for both sides to decide what procedures would be
most suitable to achieve those reductions in ways that would be cheaper
and less burdensome. The Department of Defense is presently conducting
analyses to determine the preferred types of conversion and elimination
procedures as well as the associated financial costs.
Question. Can you precisely define what a Unique Identifier (UID)
is? Where have they been employed in the past?
Answer. There are numerous methods a Party may use to affix a UID
to missiles and heavy bombers; for instance, a UID could be painted,
stenciled, engraved, emplaced on a placard, or etched. All U.S.
strategic offensive systems currently have some form of UID. For
example, U.S. ICBM first stages carry a unique serial number that is
located on an identification plate on the side of the first-stage
rocket motor. Heavy Bombers have a unique number that is located on the
tail of the B-52 and B-1 and on the nose gear door of the B-2.
A Unique Identifier (UID) is a unique, nonrepeating alphanumeric
identifier. Under the START Treaty, UIDs were used to track only mobile
ICBMs and Russia utilized and reported UIDs on its mobile ICBM force.
For the United States, the Peacekeeper system was designated as a
mobile system under the START Treaty, which meant that it also
contained a UID that was utilized and reported. Within the U.S. Armed
Forces, the serial numbers and tail numbers on all other systems were
used for maintenance and tracking purposes, but were not required to be
reported under the START Treaty.
Under the New START Treaty, unique alphanumeric identifiers will be
applied to all ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments. These unique identifiers will be included in the database
and in applicable notifications, so that individual strategic delivery
vehicles may be tracked. During inspections, the Parties will be able
to confirm these unique identifiers, as appropriate, which will provide
additional confidence in the validity of the information in the
database and notifications.
Question. You stated that, ``While telemetry is not needed to
verify the provisions of this treaty, the terms nonetheless call for
the exchange of telemetry on up to five launches per year per side.''
If telemetry exchange is not for verification, what purpose does it
serve to intelligence collection? How will the U.S. benefit from this
provision, if Russia can select their own five flights, effectively
preventing evaluation of new delivery platforms?
Answer. There are no obligations, prohibitions, or limitations in
the New START Treaty that require the analysis of telemetric
information in order to verify a Party's compliance with the treaty.
For instance, the treaty does not limit the development of new types of
missiles so there is no requirement to determine the technical
characteristics of new missiles, such as their launch weight or throw-
weight, in order to distinguish them from existing types. Nevertheless,
the United States and Russia agreed to exchange telemetric information
on an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs each year (up to five
annually), with the testing party deciding the launches for which it
will exchange information, to promote transparency and predictability.
The value of such exchanges will depend on the specific launches for
which telemetric information is exchanged.
For more discussion about the purpose served by telemetry for
intelligence collection, please see the classified National
Intelligence Estimate on the intelligence community's ability to
monitor the New START Treaty.
______
Responses of Secretary Gates to Questions Submitted by Senator Barrasso
Question. The force structure of our nuclear triad is critical to
maintaining an effective deterrent. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review
laid out our force structure in plain view while the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review is silent on force structure.
Your current force structure plan only provides a range of options.
In your May 13, 2010 Wall Street Journal op-ed arguing for the New
START Treaty, you stated: ``Based on recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, we plan to meet the Treaty's limits by retaining a
triad of up to 420 ICBMs, 14 submarines carrying up to 240 SLBMs, and
up to 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers.''
Secretary Gates, how do you expect Members from States like North
Dakota, Montana, Washington, Georgia, Missouri and Wyoming to vote on
this treaty without a detailed force structure?
Answer. The Department of Defense has provided to the Congress a
report in response to Section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2010 providing substantial detail on our
nuclear force structure plans in light of the New START Treaty. As
explained in greater depth in that report, the United States will
sustain and, in appropriate cases, modernize its robust triad of
strategic delivery vehicles.
Because the treaty covers a 10-year period after entry into force,
the Department has outlined a baseline force structure that fully
supports U.S. strategy. This structure is important for planning
purposes and shows our commitment to maintaining the triad, but also
allows us to modify our force structure plans while fielding a force of
700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, as circumstances dictate.
Furthermore, the baseline nuclear force structure fully supports U.S.
security requirements without requiring changes to current or planned
basing arrangements.
Question. When will the detailed force structure plan be submitted
to Congress?
Answer. The Department of Defense has submitted a detailed force
structure plan, along with the New START Treaty, in accordance with
Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
2010. Future force structure decisions will be briefed to Congress
expeditiously.
Question. As you know, Damage Expectancy (DE) is the main criteria
for weapon selection by war planners.
Damage Expectancy = Probability of Arrival x Probability of
Damage
The ICBM and SLBM weapons have a high Probability of Arrival (PA)
on target. The air breathing weapons or bombers (B-52 and B-2) must
have a substantially lower PA because they must potentially fly through
a defensive enemy environment (SAMs, fighters) or a deteriorated air
environment (atmospheric first strike dust, volcanic ash). As we
recently learned, a volcano eruption can ground an entire continent of
aircraft.
Secretary Gates, can you explain the rationale for including so
many aging bombers in the force structure given the lower damage
expectancy for this weapons system?
Answer. The B-52 and B-2 bombers serve two principal purposes as
part of the U.S. strategic triad. First, these heavy bombers could be
placed on quick reaction alert, as an effective hedge, were a technical
problem to emerge with regard to one of the other triad legs, or in
response to a sharp deterioration of the international political
situation. Second, they can be deployed to a threatened region in order
to provide a visible and deployable signal of U.S. commitment and
resolve as we meet our extended deterrence commitments to U.S. allies
and partners during a crisis situation.
In addition, the ability to recall nuclear-equipped heavy bombers,
if launched for survival, provides a critical capability to help manage
the threat of nuclear escalation during a crisis or at the beginning of
an armed conflict.
Question. In 2008, Secretary Gates coauthored a paper titled the
``National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.'' This
paper argued for a strong nuclear deterrent. In the foreword, Secretary
Gates stated: ``We believe the logic presented here provides a sound
basis on which this and future administrations can consider further
adjustments to U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force
structure.''
The white paper recommended a U.S. strategic nuclear force baseline
that includes:
450 Minuteman III ICBMs;
14 Ohio-class submarines; and
76 bombers (20 B-2 and 56 B-52 bombers)
Total of 862.
Question. Secretary Gates, can you please explain how the threat
environment has changed to allow our nuclear deterrent to be reduced to
700 delivery vehicles since your 2008 recommendation to maintain 862
delivery vehicles?
Answer. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) conducted detailed
analysis of current and future threats, as well as potential reductions
in strategic weapons, including delivery vehicles that would allow the
United States to sustain stable deterrence at lower force levels. The
conclusion from the NPR analysis is that stable deterrence could be
maintained at lower strategic delivery vehicle levels, given our
estimates of current and future Russian strategic forces.
It is also worth noting that the NPR and New START plans call for
retaining all 14 SSBNs, but New START counting rules will allow the
United States to count the missiles as deployed only when mated with
launchers. This New START counting rule and the treaty's elimination
and conversion provisions will allow the United States to retain all 14
SSBNs while having them account for only 240 deployed strategic
delivery vehicles--some 96 fewer than assumed in the 2008 paper.
______
Responses of Secretary Gates to Questions Submitted by Senator Wicker
missile defense
Question. The New START Treaty prohibits the U.S. from placing
Missile Defense interceptor missiles on submarines. Why did our
negotiators permit this?
Answer. Article V of the treaty prohibits a Party from converting
or using ICBM or SLBM launchers for the placement of missile defense
interceptors or vice versa. The United States accepted this proposal
because, as LTG Patrick O'Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency
(MDA), explained, the MDA had studied the concept of launching missile
defense interceptors from submarines and determined that such a course
would be operationally impractical and extremely expensive.
Furthermore, submerged submarines are not easily integrated into our
missile defense command and control network.
Question. Secretary Gates, you said of the New START treaty on
March 26 at the White House, ``Nor does this treaty limit plans to
protect the United States and our allies by improving and deploying
missile-defense systems.''
Will you clarify this statement?
Answer. The New START Treaty does not constrain the United States
from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor does
it add any additional cost or inconvenience to our missile defense
plans. As the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our budget submission
and projections, and the U.S. unilateral statement made in connection
with the New START Treaty all make clear, the United States will
continue to improve its missile defenses throughout the next decade.
Question. Is it appropriate to have any restriction at all on our
ability to adapt to future changes in threats to the United States?
Article V of the treaty has now taken at least one option off the
table, has it not?
Answer. Regarding the treaty's ban in Article V, paragraph 3, on
the conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor
launchers and vice versa, this ban does not constrain the Department's
missile defense plans in any way. We currently have a sufficient number
of missile defense silos to accommodate the 30 Ground-Based
Interceptors (GBIs) that we are fielding. Furthermore, should the
decision be made in the future to field additional GBIs, we will
already have eight extra, unoccupied missile defense silos in the
ground at Fort Greely, Alaska.
The new treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM or Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) launchers to missile defense
launchers while ``grandfathering'' the five former ICBM silos at
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) already converted for Ground Based
Interceptors. The Department never had a plan to convert additional
ICBM silos at VAFB. In 2002, we began converting ICBM silos to
operational silos for launching GBIs because we had not developed a
silo specifically for GBIs at that time. Since then, we have developed
a GBI silo that costs $20M less than converting ICBM silos and is
easier to protect and maintain.
Likewise, the conversion of SLBMs into missile defense
interceptors, or the modification of our submarines to carry missile
defense interceptors, would be very expensive and impractical.
Furthermore, submerged submarines are not easily integrated into our
missile defense command and control network.
united states-russia reset
Question. Secretary Gates, on March 26, you stated that ``this
treaty strengthens nuclear stability.'' The U.S. and Russia were well
on their way toward achieving reductions to a range of 2,200-1,700
warheads as called for by the 2002 Moscow Treaty, and it was the
opinion of most informed observers that U.S. and Russian nuclear
weapons did not pose a threat to each other. In fact, it is the
disparity in tactical nuclear weapons--not addressed by this treaty--
that most threatens stability. Former Secretary James Schlesinger told
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May that ``the significance
of tactical nuclear weapons rises steadily as strategic nuclear arms
are reduced.''
What was wrong with nuclear stability before this agreement was
negotiated?
How does it strengthen nuclear stability?
By not eliminating the huge disparity in Russian tactical nuclear
weapons, does this contribute to nuclear instability?
The President announced in his Nuclear Posture Review that he will
move to de-MIRV all our land-based ICBMs. START II eliminated all land-
based MIRVs. I understand that START II never entered into force, but
seeing as how land-based MIRVs have always been considered particularly
de-stabilizing, why shouldn't it be considered a tremendous step
backwards for arms control to complete a treaty where the Russians will
be allowed to deploy large numbers of land-based MIRVs, which they have
announced they plan to do?
Should we be concerned that this treaty does not prevent Russia
from moving to large numbers of land-based MIRVs?
Answer. The immediate impetus behind the negotiation of the New
START Treaty was the expiration of the START agreement, a treaty whose
limitations and verification regime had been an important component of
strategic stability for 15 years. As the Congressional Strategic
Posture Commission recommended, it was important to negotiate a
successor agreement that would preserve the nuclear arms control
architecture between the United States and Russia, including the
extensive verification provisions so essential for transparency and
predictability. Beyond that, the negotiating effort was prompted by the
objective of reinvigorating the arms control process in order to enable
progress on additional issues of importance in the bilateral strategic
relationship, including negotiation of a future nuclear arms reduction
treaty that includes Russian tactical nuclear capabilities.
The New START Treaty strengthens strategic stability. It does so by
imposing lower limits on strategic delivery vehicles and the strategic
warheads they carry and by promoting predictability and transparency in
our relationship with Russia, the world's other principal nuclear
power. At the same time, the New START Treaty enables both the United
States and the Russian Federation to field diverse, survivable,
effective strategic nuclear forces that minimize the incentives for
either side to strike first against the other, even in severe political
crises. The New START Treaty will also enable the United States to
maintain and modernize our robust and redundant triad of strategic
delivery systems, our vital nuclear weapons complex, and our important
ballistic missile defense capabilities. It also accommodates our
possible deployment of conventional prompt global strike capabilities.
Tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear weapons are not limited by New
START although, as the NPR makes clear, the United States intends to
pursue additional and broader reductions with Russia that include all
nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons and nondeployed
nuclear weapons.
Because of their limited range and different roles, tactical
nuclear weapons do not directly influence the strategic nuclear balance
between the United States and Russia. Furthermore, within the regional
context, the United States relies on multiple capabilities to support
extended deterrence and power projection, including: its superior
conventional force capabilities, tactical nuclear capabilities, the
U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent, ballistic missile defenses, and
allied capabilities.
While encouraging Russian de-MIRVing of its silo-based ICBMs was a
longstanding U.S. arms control objective during the cold war, this was
not an objective in either the Moscow Treaty or the New START Treaty.
It is important to note that MIRVed mobile ICBMs differ from fixed,
silo-based MIRVed ICBMs, because the former, when deployed to the
field, are more survivable and thus do not present a stark ``use or
lose'' choice in the fashion that silo-based ICBMs do. Limiting land-
based MIRVed ICBMs was not an objective in the New START Treaty
negotiations, which focused on extending the overarching arms control
and verification architecture and permitting each Party to define its
own strategic nuclear force structure and composition.
The United States will observe closely Russian force developments
as they relate to MIRVing of land-based systems. Of particular interest
will be Russian decisions regarding allocation of multiple warheads to
silo-based ICBMs relative to the allocation of warheads to mobile ICBMs
and SLBMs.
______
Responses of Secretary Gates to Questions Submitted by Senator Inhofe
start (generally)
Question. In your testimony, you argue that the de-MIRVed ICBM
force is stabilizing due to the need for Russia to use one-for-one or
two-for-one attacking.
Was de-MIRVing necessary to achieve this stability?
If not, why were limitations on the number of warheads on ICBMs not
a part of the treaty, and why is the United States taking a unilateral
step?
Answer. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) decision to complete
the de-MIRVing of the silo-based Minuteman III ICBM force was made
because de-MIRVing enhances the strategic stability of the nuclear
balance by reducing the incentives of a would-be attacking side to
strike first. This is the case because de-MIRVing allows for the
retention of a larger number of delivery vehicles and the silos that
house them and thus forces the attacker to expend at least as many
warheads (one attacking RV to destroy one RV of the opponent) and
probably more (two or more attacking RVs to destroy the one RV of the
opponent) to execute a first strike to neutralize the ICBM force. This
means that an exchange would result in a net loss for the attacker in
terms of RVs expended compared to the number of U.S. RVs destroyed. In
addition, the deployment of hundreds of U.S. ICBMs in silos would
compel the attacker to launch many hundreds of RVs, to attempt to
neutralize this highly capable force.
Under the New START Treaty, each side will have the flexibility to
determine the composition of its strategic forces. The U.S. de-MIRVing
of ICBMs is being taken unilaterally because it enhances stability,
irrespective of Russia's strategic force structure.
Question. The Russians have resumed attack submarine patrols off
the East and West coasts of the United States. They have announced that
these submarines could be equipped with cruise missiles carrying
tactical nuclear weapons. How does this treaty, which fails to capture
this important threat, improve our National Security?
Answer. The New START Treaty, in line with predecessor arms control
treaties such as the START Treaty and the Treaty on Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT), covers strategic forces, which do not
include nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles. However, in 1991,
the United States and the Soviet Union, as a political commitment,
voluntarily agreed to cease deploying any nuclear SLCMs on surface
ships or multipurpose submarines. Throughout the period of START
implementation, including as recently as December 2008, Russia has
declared that it planned to deploy zero nuclear SLCMs.
The United States intends to pursue discussions with Russia about
arms control initiatives covering tactical nuclear weapons, including
nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles, in the pursuit of a
stable, long-term strategic relationship during the next round of
United States-Russian nuclear arms reduction negotiations.
The New START Treaty improves our national security by
strengthening strategic stability, providing for key data exchange and
verification measures, preserving the ability of the United States to
sustain and modernize its strategic triad, allowing each side freedom
to choose and alter its mix of strategic forces, and fully protecting
the U.S. flexibility to deploy important nonnuclear capabilities,
including prompt global strike and missile defenses.
Question. You stated that a feature of arms agreements is, ``to
have some idea for both sides to know the limits on the other and
therefore avoiding the need to hedge against the unknown.''
a. Upon ratification of the treaty, and the reduction in deployed
weapons, will there be a reduction in the hedge due to ``having
sufficient verification in place to be able to have confidence in that
judgment''?
b. Is the U.S. hedge size connected to the treaty?
c. Is the U.S. hedge something Russia is interested in limiting due
to perceptions about an advantage it affords the U.S. to upload its
strategic missiles?
Answer a. The United States has benefited during the START Treaty
from reduced uncertainty regarding the size and status of Russian
strategic forces. Those benefits continue today but uncertainty will
rise over time in the absence of a new treaty and its strong
verification regime. The limits and verification provisions of the New
START Treaty, if it is ratified and enters into force, will reduce
uncertainty relative to what it otherwise would have been the case, and
therefore will reduce the requirement for the United States to hedge.
Answer b. The treaty limit of 800 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM
launchers, deployed and nondeployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and
nondeployed heavy bombers sets a practical upper bound on what could be
uploaded onto strategic delivery vehicles from the nondeployed warhead
hedge. This upload capability will be more than sufficient under New
START. The long-term U.S. hedge provided by the responsiveness of the
U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure is not affected by the treaty.
Answer c. Whatever concerns the Russian Federation may have had,
Russia agreed to the treaty, which permits the U.S. to maintain a
significant upload capability that serves as a hedge against technical
and geopolitical uncertainties.
stockpile modernization
Question. The anticipated funding directed to nuclear weapons in
the 1251 Report is $80B for weapons and $100B for delivery vehicles.
a. How much of the $80B over 10 years has been ``donated'' by the
DOD?
b. What specific programs are anticipated for delivery vehicle
modernization, and in what year will these programs commence?
Answer a. The DOD transferred nearly $4.6 billion in top-line over
the period FY 2011-2015 for National Nuclear Security Administration
weapon activities for infrastructure enhancement, Life Extension
Programs, and enhanced stockpile stewardship. This $4.6 billion
includes a $145 million transfer in top-line over the period FY 2012-
2015 for science, technology, and engineering activities in the
Enhanced Stockpile Stewardship Program. In addition, another nearly
$1.1 billion was transferred to Naval Reactors for reactor design and
development during the same period. The specific annual breakdown of
the DOD topline transfer ($M) is:
Annual Breakdown of the DOD Topline Transfer
[Millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 TOTAL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapons........................... 561.0 736.4 858.5 1,148.9 1,292.6 4,597.4
Naval Reactors.................... 80.6 150.9 223.7 278.8 350.9 1,084.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer b. The FY 2011-2020 costs provided in the section 1251
report include funds for sustaining and upgrading existing systems,
including the B-2A and B-52H bombers, Minuteman III ICBMs, and the
Ohio-class SSBN. In addition, the report includes estimated costs for
the Ohio-class SSBN replacement, with the initial funding for this
program having been provided in the FY 2010 DOD budget. These FY 2011-
2020 cost estimates do not provide funds for possible follow-on
systems--the ALCM follow-on and the Minuteman III ICBM follow-on, and a
possible follow-on heavy bomber--as studies are now underway regarding
the analysis of options for these systems. As specific decisions are
made regarding these systems, any necessary funding will be requested
in future DOD budget requests.
______
Response of Admiral Mullen to Question Submitted to by Senator Lugar
Question. From your standpoint, how specifically does the
flexibility provided in New START, both in terms of its central limits
and other provisions bearing on modernization and flexibility regarding
strategic forces, benefit the U.S. military?
Answer. Under New START, each Party retains the right to determine
for itself the structure and composition of its strategic forces within
the treaty's overall limits. This provides the United States with the
flexibility to deploy, maintain, and modernize its strategic nuclear
forces in the manner that best protects U.S. national security
interests. This means that the United States will be able to maintain a
triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers under the New
START Treaty--and the U.S. will retain the ability to ``upload'' a
significant number of nuclear warheads as a hedge against any future
technical problems with U.S. delivery platforms or warheads, a
technical breakthrough by an adversary that threatens to neutralize a
U.S. strategic delivery system, or as a result of a fundamental
deterioration in the international security environment. The United
States also maintains the freedom to take steps necessary to sustain
existing capabilities, including those necessary to ensure the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the treaty does not restrict the U.S. ability to
develop, test, or deploy conventional prompt global strike capabilities
that could enable it to precisely attack targets anywhere on the globe.
Should the United States deploy conventional warheads on treaty-
accountable ICBMs or SLBMs, they would count toward the treaty's
aggregate deployed warhead limit of 1,550, just as conventional
warheads would not have been distinguished from nuclear warheads in
terms of accountability under the START Treaty. However, the treaty's
limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles combined with the associated
ceiling of 1,550 deployed warheads would accommodate any plans the
United States might pursue during the life of this treaty to deploy
conventional warheads on ballistic missiles. Moreover, the treaty does
not prohibit the development, testing, or deployment of potential
future long-range weapons systems for conventional prompt global strike
that are currently under development. We would not consider such
nonnuclear systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of the
New START Treaty to be accountable as ``new kinds of strategic
offensive arms'' for the purposes of the treaty.
______
Responses of Admiral Mullen to Questions Submitted by Senator DeMint
Question. The Nuclear Posture Review is rather unclear regarding
nuclear targeting policy. Under this treaty, will the U.S. maintain a
counterforce targeting capability, one that will hold at risk the
targets that constitute the means of strategic attack on the U.S. in a
timely and effective manner?
Answer. Utilizing existing targeting policies, the NPR conducted
detailed analysis of potential reductions in strategic weapons, and
concluded that stable deterrence could be maintained at lower levels,
assuming parallel reductions by Russia to meet the lower ceiling of the
New START Treaty.
The President, through the National Security Staff (NSS),
establishes the Nation's targeting policies. These targeting policies
are currently under review and, once the review is complete, will
provide the foundation for revisions to appropriate nuclear planning
directives within the Department of Defense.
Question. In your testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, you state that the United States ``will also maintain
sufficient capability to deter other nuclear states.'' Is this
capability separate from, or in addition to, the ability to deter
against Russia, if needed?
Answer. The aggregate U.S. deterrent capability includes
capabilities to deter other nuclear states as well as those
capabilities needed to deter Russia.
Question. During the campaign, President Obama asserted that the
U.S. strategic nuclear force was on ``hair-trigger'' alert. Was that
assessment accurate? Under this treaty, will the alert levels of the
U.S. strategic nuclear forces remain as they were earlier in the
decade?
Answer. As outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the
President concurred that the current alert posture of U.S. strategic
forces--with heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on
alert, and a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time--
should be maintained for the present. The President also agreed that
the United States should continue to posture U.S. forces and enhance
command and control arrangements for strategic nuclear forces to reduce
further the possibility of nuclear launches resulting from accidents,
unauthorized actions, or misperceptions, while maximizing the time
available to the President to consider whether to authorize the use of
nuclear weapons. Looking to the longer term, the Department of Defense
will explore whether new modes of basing may ensure the survivability
of the triad while eliminating or reducing incentives for prompt
launch.
Question. In New START, Votkinsk will not be monitored, but
notification of every launcher made there will be preceded by 48 hour
notification. The fundamental philosophy of START monitoring was to
assume that deception might occur. It appears that the fundamental
philosophy of New START is that deception is unlikely. Would you
characterize this as a weakening of the verification process?
Answer. No. The standard for the New START Treaty verification
regime remains, as under the START Treaty, ``effective verification.''
As explained by Ambassador Paul Nitze in the context of the INF Treaty
ratification deliberations in 1988, effective verification means ``we
want to be sure that, if the other side moves beyond the limits of the
treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect
such violation in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the
other side the benefit of the violation.'' This standard was reaffirmed
in the START Treaty context by Secretary of State James Baker in 1992.
As discussed during the START Treaty advice and consent deliberations,
the required stringency of an effectively verifiable treaty regime is
influenced by political circumstances, military capabilities, economic
constraints, and other such factors. For instance, a major objective of
the United States in negotiating the START Treaty verification regime
was to establish means to verify that treaty in an environment of
strictly limited access due to the closed nature of the Soviet Union.
In this light, the requirements of effective verification have
changed since the negotiation of the START Treaty. Today, the United
States and Russia are not enemies, and each has developed a much more
complete understanding of the strategic nuclear forces of the other
Party in large part due to implementation of the START Treaty,
including its inspection, notification, and telemetry regime. The
United States now has a significantly clearer understanding of Russia's
capabilities than the United States had when negotiating the START
Treaty 20 years ago. The United States, therefore, sought to negotiate
a more tailored verification regime for the New START Treaty that would
involve lower costs and less administrative and operational burdens to
both Parties than under the START Treaty.
Regarding continuous perimeter and portal monitoring at the
Votkinsk Production Facility, this began as part of the INF Treaty and
was one of the verification measures used to monitor mobile ICBM
production under the START Treaty. During the last administration, the
United States and Russia agreed that neither side wanted to extend the
START Treaty. Preparations for ending the monitoring at Votkinsk began
in 2008 so that the United States would be able to depart in an orderly
way when the START Treaty expired on December 5, 2009.
The New START Treaty contains a new, simplified provision to track
and account for new solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs being produced at
Votkinsk. The New START Treaty specifically requires Russia to notify
the United States 48 hours in advance every time a solid-fueled ICBM or
SLBM leaves its production facility. The United States agreed to
provide this same notification regarding the exit of any solid-fueled
ICBM or SLBM from its production facility. The New START Treaty also
continues the requirement from the START Treaty that each side notify
the other of completion of a missile's transit and of its new location.
These provisions will facilitate monitoring through National Technical
Means. In addition, the New START Treaty requires the application of
unique alphanumeric identifiers on all ICBMs and SLBMs as well as heavy
bombers to help track and account for them from the time they are
produced until they are eventually eliminated or converted, or
otherwise removed from accountability.
______
Responses of Secretary Clinton to Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar
Question. Might the Russian Duma and Federation Council specify, as
they did in ratifying START II, conditions under which Russia may
withdraw from New START relative to missile defense?
Answer. We have no information regarding whether the Russian Duma
and Federation Council might specify conditions under which Russia may
withdraw from New START. We will promptly inform the committee if such
information becomes available to us.
Question. Do you have any information regarding what the Kremlin is
likely to suggest in a draft law on ratification for New START relative
to missile defense and the withdrawal clause in New START?
Answer. No. We will promptly inform the committee if such
information becomes available to us.
Question. In your view, would the language on missile defense in
New START impose constraints on our missile defense plans, programs and
policies similar to those contained in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty?
Answer. No. The 1972 ABM Treaty included specific limits on the
number, location, and character of the ABM deployment sites and
components for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The New
START Treaty does not include any such limitations, and will not
constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile
defenses possible, nor will it impose additional costs or barriers on
those defenses. The treaty does not impose legal obligations or
conditions that constrain existing or projected U.S. missile defense
programs. As the administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review and
budget plans make clear, the United States will continue to improve our
capability to defend the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our
allies and partners against the threat of limited ballistic missile
attack and regional missile threats.
Question. Aside from its right to withdraw from New START, has
Russia asserted a separate right to suspend implementation of New
START, as it purported to do with the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty?
Answer. No.
Question. Does this administration intend to negotiate, as a part
of missile defense cooperation with Moscow, agreements similar to those
made in the Standing Consultative Commission in September 1997?
Answer. The Obama administration does not intend to negotiate, as a
part of its missile defense cooperation talks with Russia, agreements
similar to those agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission in
September 1997. Those agreements were signed within the context of the
ABM Treaty and established criteria for differentiating between
strategic and nonstrategic BMD systems. Our view is that the evolution
of BMD technologies, especially since the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty in 2002, has made the distinction between strategic and
nonstrategic BMD systems no longer valid, particularly as regional BMD
systems are capable of enhancing the protection of the U.S. homeland
and could thereby assume a strategic role.
We also believe that attempting to negotiate a distinction between
strategic and nonstrategic missile defense systems, in the manner of
the September 1997 agreements, would wrongly signal a willingness to
negotiate limitations on BMD systems based on such a distinction. The
Obama administration has consistently informed Russia that while we
seek to establish a framework for United States-Russia BMD cooperation,
the United States cannot agree to constrain or limit U.S. BMD
capabilities numerically, qualitatively, operationally, geographically,
or in other ways.
verification process, new verses old
Verification under START I consisted of a three-step process of (a)
notification, (b) monitoring, and (c) verification of compliance.
Eighty types of notification were required and the Parties had to
exchange this data pursuant to the START I MOU. Monitoring included 12
different types of onsite inspection, PPCM, cooperative measures, and
the use of our National Technical Means (NTM). Special access
inspection rights existed, although with a right of refusal given to
the inspected Party. Verification of compliance consisted of taking
into account any uncertainties presented by declared data in
conjunction with START I's terms to make a finding on the likelihood of
a violation or noncompliance by the Parties to START I.
Question. With respect to each of the following START I-accountable
items or actions, please specify (a) whether New START contains
provisions for notification, monitoring, and verification for each such
item; (b) where in the New START Treaty, its protocol and annexes such
notification, monitoring, and verification is specified or permitted;
or (c) if notification, monitoring, and verification of such items is
not included in New START, an explanation as to why it was not
included:
The number, by type, of deployed, fixed land-based ICBMs and SLBMs
and their launchers;
The number, by type, of deployed and non-deployed road-mobile and
rail-mobile ICBMs and their launchers, and the production/final
integration of mobile ICBMs;
The aggregate throw weight of ballistic missiles;
The number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs;
The number of nondeployed mobile missiles;
The aggregate number of deployed missiles;
Technical parameters for new types of both missiles and ALCMs
through technical exhibitions, exchange of telemetric data and
NTM;
The number, by type, of deployed heavy bombers that are equipped
for nuclear-capable ALCMs;
The number, by type, of deployed heavy bombers that are not
equipped for nuclear ALCMs but that carry other nuclear
munitions;
The number, by type, of formerly nuclear-capable heavy bombers,
training aircraft, and heavy bombers equipped for conventional
munitions that no longer carry nuclear munitions;
The elimination of strategic nuclear launchers and delivery
vehicles;
Monitoring production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to
confirm the number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs
produced;
Elimination of declared facilities.
Answer. The number, by type, of deployed, fixed land-based ICBMs
and SLBMs and their launchers;
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI, paragraphs 2 and 3;
Protocol, Part Two, Section I, paragraph 5; Protocol, Part Two,
Sections III and IV; Protocol, Part Four, Sections II and III;
Protocol, Part Five, Section VI.
The number, by type of deployed and non-deployed road-mobile
and rail-mobile ICBMs and their launchers, and the production/
final integration of mobile ICBMs;
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI, paragraphs 2 and 3;
Protocol, Part Two, Section I, paragraph 5; Protocol, Part Two, Section
III; Protocol, Part Four, Sections II and III; Protocol, Part Five,
Sections VI and VII.
The aggregated throw weight of ballistic missiles;
There are no provisions for verifying throw weight in the New START
Treaty because the Treaty does not limit the aggregate throw weight of
ballistic missiles.
Throw weight was used under the START Treaty as an indirect measure
of a missile's capability with respect to the number of warheads it
could carry, and its assessment was part of the calculation of the
number of warheads attributed to a new type of missile under the START
Treaty.
In contrast, the New START Treaty requires a Party to provide
during pre-inspection procedures the actual number of warheads emplaced
on each ICBM or SLBM subject to the inspection, and does not utilize
the warhead attribution method for counting ICBM and SLBM warheads. The
warhead inspection portion of a New START Type One inspection is used
to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the actual number of
warheads emplaced on a designated, deployed ICBM or SLBM.
The number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs;
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI, paragraph 2; Protocol,
Part Two, Section I, paragraph 5; Protocol, Part Two, Sections III and
IV; Protocol, Part Four, Section II; Protocol, Part Five, Section VI.
The number of non-deployed mobile missiles;
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI, paragraphs 2 and 3;
Protocol, Part Two, Section I, paragraph 5; Protocol, Part Two, Section
III; Protocol, Part Four, Sections II and III; Protocol, Part Five,
Sections VI and VII.
The aggregate number of deployed missiles;
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI, paragraph 2; Protocol,
Part Two, Section I, paragraph 5; Protocol, Part Two, Sections III and
IV; Protocol, Part Four, Section II; Protocol, Part Five, Section VI.
The technical parameters for new types of both missiles and
ALCMs through technical exhibitions, exchange of telemetric
data and NTM;
For missiles: Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI,
paragraph 4; Protocol, Part Two, Section VII; Protocol, Part Four,
Section II; Protocol, Part Five, Section VIII.
For ALCMs: The New START Treaty does not specifically limit long-
range nuclear ALCMs, nor are there any Treaty provisions that would
require the exchange or confirmation of technical parameters for ALCMs.
The number, by type, of deployed heavy bombers that are
equipped for nuclear-capable ALCMs;
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI, paragraph 2; Protocol,
Part Two, Section I, paragraph 5; Protocol, Part Two, Section V;
Protocol, Part Four, Sections II and III; Protocol, Part Five, Section
VI.
The number, by type, of deployed heavy bombers that are not
equipped for nuclear ALCMs but that carry other nuclear
munitions;
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI, paragraph 2; Protocol,
Part Two, Section I, paragraph 5; Protocol, Part Two, Sections V;
Protocol, Part Four, Sections II and III; Protocol, Part Five, Section
VI.
The number, by type, of formerly nuclear-capable heavy
bombers, training aircraft, and heavy bombers equipped for
conventional munitions that no longer carry nuclear munitions;
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI, paragraph 2 and 3;
Protocol, Part Two, Section I, paragraph 5; Protocol, Part Two,
Sections V; Protocol, Part Four, Sections II and III; Protocol, Part
Five, Section VI and VII; Protocol, Part Nine, First Agreed Statement.
The elimination of strategic nuclear launchers and delivery
vehicles;
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI, paragraph 3; Protocol,
Part Two, Section I, paragraph 5; Protocol, Part Two, Sections II and
III; Protocol, Part Three, Sections I, II, III, IV, V, and VI;
Protocol, Part Four, Section V; Protocol, Part Five, Section VII.
Monitoring production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs
to confirm the number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs
produced.
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Protocol, Part Two, Section I,
paragraph 5; Protocol, Part Two, Section III; Protocol, Part Four,
Section III; Protocol, Part Five, Sections VI and VII.
Elimination of declared facilities;
Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XI, paragraph 3; Protocol,
Part Two, Section IX, paragraphs 7 and 8; Protocol, Part Three, Section
VII; Protocol, Part Four, Section V; Protocol, Part Five, Section VII,
paragraphs 5 and 6.
Question. Please describe verification tasks that would be carried
out in the 7 years after entry into force of the New START Treaty and
in the period of time thereafter.
Answer. Verification of the New START Treaty will be carried out
throughout the ten-year duration of the New START Treaty using all the
measures and procedures provided for in the Treaty. These include on-
site inspections, national technical means of verification, unique
identifiers, data exchanges, and notifications:
ON-SITE INSPECTIONS.--The Treaty provides that each Party can
conduct up to 18 on-site inspections each year. These
inspections are divided into two groups.
Type One inspections are conducted at the operating bases for
ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers and focus on both deployed and non-
deployed strategic arms. Each Party is allowed to conduct up to
ten Type One inspections annually.
Type Two inspections are focused on non-deployed strategic
arms and conducted at places such as storage sites, test
ranges, and conversion or elimination facilities. Each Party is
allowed to conduct up to eight Type Two inspections annually.
The New START Type One inspections combine many of the
aspects associated with two different types of inspections
conducted separately under the START Treaty, thus requiring
fewer inspections annually at the operating bases while
achieving many of the results of the previous treaty's
inspection regime.
Type One inspections contribute to verification of the
Treaty's central limits by assessing the accuracy of declared
data on the numbers of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs,
and nuclear-capable heavy bombers and on the warheads located
on or counted for them.
Type Two inspections may also be used to confirm the
conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms and to
determine whether eliminated facilities are being used for
purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM).--The Treaty provides for the use of
national technical means of verification (e.g., reconnaissance)
to verify compliance with the provisions of the New START
Treaty.
NTM will provide an independent method of gathering
information that will contribute to the validation of Russian
data declarations.
The Treaty, in Article X, commits both Parties not to
interfere with the NTM of verification of the other Party
operating in accordance with that article.
UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS (UID).--Each Party will assign and provide a
unique alpha-numeric identifier for each of its deployed and
non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers subject to the
Treaty.
These unique identifiers, when combined with required
notifications and inspections, will contribute to the ability
to track the disposition and patterns of operation of such arms
throughout their life cycles, including their production,
movement between facilities, changes in deployment status,
possible storage, and eventual conversion or elimination.
DATA EXCHANGE.--The Parties are required to exchange aggregate data
on their strategic offensive arms and related facilities 45
days after entry into force of the Treaty and semi-annually
thereafter.
The sides will exchange data on the numbers, locations, and
technical characteristics of deployed and non-deployed
strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty, listed by
unique identifier for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, as well
as data on the facilities where these arms are located.
This exchange of data will help provide the United States
with an overall picture of Russia's accountable strategic
offensive arms. Each Party will be able to use on-site
inspections and other means in order to check the validity of
the other Party's data declarations.
NOTIFICATIONS.--The Treaty establishes a comprehensive
notifications regime to track the movement and changes in
status of strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty.
This notifications regime ensures that the database is an
updated, ``living document'' that provides transparency
regarding the disposition of each Party's strategic offensive
arms.
Through such notifications, and through tracking ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers by their UIDs, the United States will
be better able to track the status of Russian strategic
offensive arms throughout their life cycles.
Question. The preamble implies that additional reductions would be
possible only in a multilateral context. What steps are being taken in
this regard with countries other than Russia, and could future U.S.
reductions, below those in New START, occur only if undertaken by other
countries, such as China?
Answer. Preserving continuity in our strategic nuclear relationship
with Russia is important. Thus, our first order of business is to work
with the Senate in support of the ratification and entry into force of
this Treaty. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the President has
directed a review of post-New START arms control objectives to consider
further reductions in nuclear weapons. The President has also expressed
his desire to address non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed
nuclear weapons in future bilateral negotiations with Russia. It is
also our goal to expand this process to a multilateral approach in the
future.When the New START Treaty is ratified and enters into force, we
can begin to move to expand the process of further reducing and
limiting nuclear arms.
unilateral statements
In connection with signing the treaty, both Russia and the United
States made unilateral statements regarding missile defense. The
President's Letter of Transmittal states that they are not legally
binding and are not integral parts of the New START Treaty.
Question. What is the legal status and significance of these
statements?
How do these statements differ from the statements on missile
defense made by the Soviet Union and the United States in connection
with the signing of the START I Treaty in 1991?
Answer. These unilateral statements do not change the legal rights
or obligations of the Parties under the treaty and are not legally
binding. Thus, these unilateral statements have the same legal status
as the unilateral statements made by the Soviet Union and the United
States in connection with the signing of the START Treaty in 1991.
The New START Treaty, like most other arms control treaties,
provides that a Party may withdraw from the treaty if that Party
decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Under this standard,
each Party may decide when extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
The unilateral statement made by the Russian Federation reflects
its current view that such ``extraordinary events'' would include a
build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United
States ``such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic
nuclear forces potential of the Russian Federation.''
President Medvedev explained the Russian view regarding the
significance of the Russian unilateral statement during a television
interview in April 2010 in which he said: ``That does not mean that if
the USA starts developing missile defense the treaty would
automatically be invalidated, but it does create an additional argument
that binds us and that makes it possible for us to raise the question
of whether quantitative change to missile defense systems would affect
the fundamental circumstances underlying the treaty. If we see that
developments do indeed represent a fundamental change in circumstances,
we would have to raise the issue with our American partners. But I
would not want to create the impression that any changes would be
construed as grounds for suspending a treaty that we have only just
signed.''
The 1991 Soviet unilateral statement on ``the interrelationship
between reductions in strategic offensive arms and compliance with the
Treaty between the U.S. and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems'' stated that the START Treaty may be
effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the ABM
Treaty, and further that the extraordinary events referred to in the
relevant provision in the START Treaty also include events related to
withdrawal by one of the Parties from the ABM Treaty or related to its
materiel breach.'' When the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty
in 2002, however, the Russian Federation (as a successor state to the
Soviet Union) did not withdraw from the START Treaty.
In both U.S. unilateral statements--made in connection with the New
START Treaty and with the START Treaty--the United States provided
reasons why its activities related to missile defense should not raise
concerns for Russia (or, in the case of START, the Soviet Union).
initial data notification
Part Two of the New START Protocol specifies that not later than 45
days after the date of signature the Parties will provide certain
categories of data to each other relating to their strategic offensive
arms--(a) site diagrams of facilities and, if applicable, (b)
coastlines and waters diagrams for each facility at which inspection
activities may be conducted; (c) an initial exchange of data according
to the categories of data contained in Part Two; and in accordance with
the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, (d) photographs,
unless such photographs were previously provided in connection with
fulfilling the requirements of the START Treaty. Given that the treaty
was signed on April 8, the 45-day period for submitting this data ended
on May 23.
Question. Has Russia provided this data to the United States and
vice versa?
Answer. The United States and the Russian Federation have conducted
their initial exchange of site diagrams and coastlines and waters
diagrams pursuant to the requirements of Part Two of the Protocol. As
provided in the Protocol, the initial exchange of data and photographs
will not take place until 45 days after entry into force of the treaty.
Question. Will the State Department brief the Committee on Foreign
Relations on the Russian submission when and if this information is
received?
Answer. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VII of the
treaty, which is being provisionally applied, site diagrams and
coastlines and waters diagrams may not be released to the public unless
so agreed within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission. The State Department therefore will provide these diagrams
to the Committee through classified channels.
The administration will be prepared to brief the committee
regularly on treaty implementation, including the data exchanged
between the Parties.
common names
Question. Why does Article III in New START fail to provide the
common American names (``known to the United States of America as'')
for Russian ICBM and SLBM systems, as was the case in Article III of
START I?
Answer. Article III lists the existing types of ICBMs and their
launchers, SLBMs and their launchers, and heavy bombers as of the date
of signature of the treaty. The Parties agreed to use the formal
designations that each Party had established for each ICBM and its
launcher, each SLBM and its launcher, and each heavy bomber rather than
the NATO designation which had been used by the United States under the
START Treaty. By using a single designation to reference a treaty-
accountable item, the possibility for confusion is reduced and the
implementation of treaty provisions is simpler.
provisional application
Part Eight of the Protocol specifies that paragraph 2 of Article V,
will be provisionally applied.
Question. Has Russia developed or deployed any new kinds of
strategic offensive arms other than the existing types listed in
paragraph 8 of Article III since December 4, 2009? If so, what are
they?
Answer. Please see classified response to be provided separately.
Question. Why does the New START Treaty define a ``new type''
(defined term number 46. in Part One of the Protocol) but not a ``new
kind'' of strategic offensive arm?
Answer. Both the START Treaty and the New START Treaty have
definitions for ``new type''; however, neither Treaty contains a
definition of a ``new kind of strategic offensive arm.'' Leaving the
term ``new kind of strategic offensive arm'' undefined allows the
Parties to discuss and reach agreement regarding new arms that do not
fall within any definition established by the treaty.
Question. Why is the notification in the relevant annex concerning
``a new kind of strategic offensive arm'' limited to questions and
clarifications, with no reference to characteristics, capabilities or
distinguishing features for new kinds of strategic offensive arms?
Answer. The notification concerning a ``new kind of strategic
offensive arm'' is structured to provide flexibility in the event that
a Party raises a question about any new kind of strategic offensive
arm. Such questions and clarifications could include, but are not
limited to, references to characteristics, capabilities, or
distinguishing features.
The notification also provides for responding to any such
questions.
Part Eight of the Protocol specifies that paragraph 1 of Article VI
will be provisionally applied.
Question. Since December 4, 2009, has the Russian Federation
carried out any conversion, elimination, or removed by other means from
accountability any strategic offensive arms and facilities?
Answer. Since the end of the START Treaty, the Russians have
continued to eliminate and convert missiles systems and facilities,
similar to how they did under that treaty. For instance, missile and
rocket motor eliminations are under Cooperative Threat Reduction
contracts. Examples of the conversion and elimination activities since
the expiration of START include:
Elimination of SS-25 ICBMs at Votkinsk
SS-25 ICBM launchers have been eliminated at Pibanshur
SS-25 ICBM rocket motors have been burned at Krasnoarmeysk
SS-N-23 SLBMs have been eliminated at Krasnoyarsk.
Question. Which New START verification provisions would apply to
any strategic offensive arms and facilities converted, eliminated, or
removed by other means from accountability during provisional
application of the New START Treaty?
Answer. While there are many verification provisions that will
apply to strategic offensive arms and facilities converted, eliminated,
or removed by other means from accountability once the New START Treaty
enters into force, notification of any launch of an ICBM or SLBM is the
only such provision that will be applied during the provisional
application period. This provision adopts by reference the existing
``Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Notification of Launchers of
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missiles of May 31, 1988.''
Russian strategic offensive arms are being eliminated during this
period of provisional application in cooperation with U.S. personnel
under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, but there are no
provisions for providing notification thereof under the New START
Treaty for this period.
Part Eight of the Protocol specifies that paragraph 2 of Article
VII of the treaty will be provisionally applied by the two sides
pending the treaty's entry into force, but says that such provisional
application shall be ``only to the extent required to provide the
notifications provided for in this Part.''
Paragraph 2 of Article VII of the treaty provides that ``Each Party
shall notify the other Party about changes in data and shall provide
other notifications in a manner provided for in Part Four of the
Protocol to this Treaty.''
Question. Please specify which notifications the Parties have
agreed to provide in the period prior to the treaty's entry into force
by virtue of the provisional application of paragraph 2 of Article VII
of the treaty.
Answer. The Parties agreed to provisionally apply the following
notifications:
1. Paragraph 5, Section III, Part Four of Protocol: the beginning of a
major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers.
2. Paragraph 6, Section III, Part Four of Protocol: the completion of
a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers.
3. Paragraph 1, Section IV, Part Four of Protocol: any launch of an
ICBM or SLBM, in accordance with the Agreement Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Notification of Launches of Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of
May 31, 1988.
4. Paragraph 1, Section VII, Part Four of Protocol: a request to
convene a session of the BCC.
5. Paragraph 2, Section VII, Part Four of Protocol: a response to a
request to convene a session of the BCC.
6. Paragraph 3, Section VII, Part Four of Protocol: other messages
relating to the activities of the BCC.
7. Paragraph 4, Section VII, Part Four of Protocol: a request for
clarification of a notification.
8. Paragraph 5, Section VII, Part Four of Protocol: a clarification,
correction, or modification of a notification.
9. Paragraph 6, Section VII, Part Four of Protocol: additional
messages with respect to the Treaty.
Question. Does this include all notifications provided for in Part
Four of the Protocol to the treaty?
Answer. No. The notifications provisionally applied, prior to entry
into force of the New START Treaty, do not include all notifications
provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty, but only the
nine notifications specified in the response to the previous question.
Question. Is it limited to notifications relating to provisions of
the treaty that are being provisionally applied pursuant to Part Eight
of the Protocol?
Answer. Yes, the Part Four notification provisions that are being
provisionally applied are limited to the nine notifications referred to
in Part Eight of the Protocol.
Part Eight of the Protocol specifies that paragraph 4 of Article
VII will be provisionally applied.
Question. What ``additional notification.'' does Article VII
contemplate?
Answer. Paragraph 4 of Article VII permits the Parties to provide
additional notifications on a voluntary basis beyond those specified in
paragraph 2 of the Article if a Party deems this necessary to ensure
confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under the treaty.
Such notifications would be determined by the transmitting Party.
Question. Would these notifications be of a different type or
provide different data than specified in the other treaty
notifications, or are they merely additional notifications of an
identical type and content?
Answer. The notifications provided for in paragraph 4 of Article
VII could, for example, provide additional information necessary to
ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under the
treaty. However, there are no specific criteria regarding what the
notifications should include, and the content of the notification will
be determined by the transmitting Party.
provisional application of start i and new start
Question. Does the Russian Federation have the necessary domestic
legal authority to permit it to provisionally apply relevant provisions
of the treaty and Protocol in the period prior to their entry into
force as provided for in Part Eight of the Protocol?
Answer. Yes. The Russian negotiators advised that the Russian
Federation does have the necessary domestic authority to permit it to
provisionally apply those provisions listed in Part Eight of the
Protocol.
Question. What was the record regarding provisional application of
the START I Treaty? Did Russia permit or carry out actions under
provisional application or did it wait until START I entered into force
before initiating all activities under START I, its Protocols and the
MOU?
Answer. Under the START Treaty, Russia fulfilled the obligations
the Parties had agreed to provisionally apply, which were primarily
related to the operation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission; the development of telemetry-related procedures; the
exchange of site diagrams and photographs; early exhibitions; and the
exchange of inspector, monitor, and aircrew lists.
Question. Is Russia presently applying all provisions identified in
Part Eight of the New START Protocol on a provisional basis under its
terms?
Answer. Yes. In signing the Treaty, Russia agreed to provisionally
apply the portions of the treaty and its Protocol that are listed in
Part Eight of the Protocol (Provisional Application) during the interim
between signature and entry into force of the Treaty. We have no reason
to conclude that Russia is not fulfilling its obligations under Part
Eight of the Protocol on provisional application.
substantive rights and obligations
Article XV of the treaty provides that the Parties may use the
Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) created by the treaty to make
changes to the treaty's protocol ``that do not affect substantive
rights or obligations unde.'' the treaty. Such changes would be made
without resorting to the regular procedures for amending the treaty.
Question. Does the executive branch intend to submit changes
adopted through this procedure to the Senate for advice and consent as
it would do with formal amendments to the treaty?
Answer. The START Treaty contained similar language in each of its
Protocols, under which the Parties used the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission (JCIC) to make changes in the Protocols that did
``not affect substantive rights or obligations unde.'' that treaty. The
executive branch intends to use the same procedures with respect to
making such changes in the New START Treaty as it did in making them
within the framework of the START Treaty's JCIC. Accordingly, changes
to the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations
under the treaty will not be submitted to the Senate for advice and
consent. Any change that does affect substantive rights or obligations
would be an amendment and would require Senate advice and consent.
Every agreement reached in the BCC will be provided for the Senate to
view. The authority to agree on such changes through the JCIC was an
important tool for the successful implementation of the START Treaty.
Question. What criteria does the executive branch intend to use to
determine whether a particular change to the treaty will ``affect
substantive rights or obligations?''
Answer. The START Treaty provides many helpful precedents for
analyzing the question of whether a particular change in the New START
Protocol will ``affect substantive rights or obligation.'' under the
treaty. In most cases, the nonsubstantive changes made in the JCIC
under the START Treaty were related to verification procedures and
information exchange and were of a technical nature. The executive
branch intends to consult with the Senate in those cases in which there
could be a question as to whether a proposed change in the Protocol
will affect substantive rights or obligations under the treaty.
Question. Please provide examples of the kinds of changes the
executive branch envisions being adopted through this procedure.
Answer. Some provisions of the treaty are highly detailed and may
require adjustment over the life of the treaty. This would include, for
example, provisions regarding the content and timing of notifications
in New START or the detailed procedures related to inspections.
The experience of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission (JCIC) provides some helpful examples of the type
of changes that might be agreed upon within the framework of the New
START Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission. For example, the JCIC
agreed on the releasability of treaty-related data, as is also provided
for under paragraph 5 of Article VII of the New START Treaty, on
specific procedures for use of radiation detection equipment, and on
changes to types of inspection equipment.
Question. Does the executive branch intend to consult with the
Senate in making determinations about whether a particular change
affects substantive rights or obligations under the treaty?
Answer. As with the START Treaty, the executive branch intends to
consult with the Senate in those cases in which there could be a
question whether a proposed change in the Protocol would affect
substantive rights or obligations under the treaty.
______
Responses of Secretary Clinton to Questions Submitted by Senator DeMint
Question. Are you familiar with 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2578, which
requires the Secretary of State to compile and maintain the negotiating
history of all arms control agreements. The text reads:
(a) Preparation of Records.--The Secretary of State shall
establish and maintain records for each arms control,
proliferation, and disarmament agreement to which the United
States is a party and which was under negotiation or in force
on or after January 1, 1990, which shall include classified and
unclassified materials such as instructions and guidance,
position papers, reporting cable and memoranda of conversation,
working papers, draft texts of the agreement, diplomatic notes,
notes verbal, and other internal and external correspondence.
(b) Negotiating and Implementation Records.--In particular,
the Secretary of State shall establish and maintain a
negotiating and implementation record for each such agreement,
which shall be comprehensive and detailed, and shall document
all communications between the parties with respect to such
agreement. Such records shall be maintained both in hard copy
and magnetic media.
Will you agree to share all of these materials with Senators and
their staffs? How soon will you submit this material, unclassified and
classified?
Answer. A detailed article-by-article analysis of the New START
Treaty that is nearly 200 pages long was provided to the Senate in the
transmittal package from the President on May 13, 2010. This analysis
provides information on every provision of the treaty, protocol, and
annexes and was prepared by the treaty negotiators with relevant
information drawn from the negotiating record.
The treaty text and these materials, as well as testimony provided
at hearings on the treaty, and the regular briefings to the committee
by senior officials, including the negotiating team, provide a
comprehensive picture of U.S. obligations under the treaty. However,
should you have any outstanding questions we are committed to providing
answers in detailed briefings, in a classified session, if needed.
Question. During Senate consideration of the START I Treaty and
implementation of the ABM Treaty, members of the Senate were provided
the negotiating records. Indeed, the Senate advice and consent process
for START was led by a Senate Arms Control Observer Group led by
Senators Nunn, Lugar, Byrd, Warner, and the Majority and Minority
Leaders, Mitchell and Dole. Access to the record and the negotiators
were critical to achieving a clear understanding of the treaty's
provisions and thus facilitated the approval process. Please explain
why the administration does not support full transparency in the advice
and consent process and why it does not support providing the U.S.
Senate--charged constitutionally with providing advice and consent to
treaties--full access to the negotiating record?
Answer. The Executive does not traditionally submit to the Senate
the ``negotiating record'' of a treaty for which the Senate's advice
and consent is being sought. For example, the Senate gave advice and
consent to 90 treaties during the 110th Congress. In not one of those
cases did the Executive provide to the Senate ``full access to the
negotiating record.''
So far as we are aware, Senators were not provided ``full access to
the negotiating record'' during Senate consideration of the START
Treaty. Nor was the negotiating record provided to the Senate during
its consideration of the ABM Treaty. Rather, information from the
negotiating record was provided to the Senate in relation to a
controversial interpretation of the ABM Treaty after the Senate had
provided its approval and the treaty had entered into force.
As the committee noted in its report on the treaty between the
United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, ``a systemic expectation of Senate
perusal of every key treaty's `negotiating record' could be expected to
inhibit candor during future negotiations and induce posturing on the
part of U.S. negotiators and their counterparts during sensitive
discussions.'' The committee report further noted that regularly
providing the negotiating record would ultimately ``weaken the treaty-
making process'' and ``damage American diplomacy.''
Of course, Senators being asked to provide advice and consent to
ratification of a treaty should have a full understanding of what
obligations would be undertaken by the United States upon ratification
of that treaty. Thus, when a treaty is submitted by the President it is
accompanied by a detailed article-by-article analysis of the treaty.
The analysis of the New START Treaty transmitted to the Senate by the
President on May 13, 2010, is nearly 200 pages and provides information
on every provision of the treaty, protocol, and annexes. This analysis
was prepared by the treaty negotiators with relevant information drawn
from the negotiating record. The treaty text and these materials
provide a comprehensive picture of U.S. obligations under the treaty.
Should you have any outstanding questions we are committed to providing
answers in detailed briefings, in a classified session, if needed.
Question. You argued that there is no custom of sharing the full
negotiating record with the Senate, stating that administrations going
back to President Washington have chosen not to provide the negotiating
records of treaties to the Senate.
Is it not the case that President Washington submitted the full
negotiating record of Jay's treaty to the Senate?
Can you please explain how not sharing the negotiating record of
this treaty is consistent with President Obama's memo from his first
days in office that said ``Administration is committed to creating an
unprecedented level of openness in Government''?
Answer. As noted in my answer to the previous question, the
Executive does not traditionally submit to the Senate the ``negotiating
record'' of a treaty for which the Senate's advice and consent is being
sought. In the case of the Jay Treaty, President Washington may have
provided aspects of the negotiating record to the Senate, but that is
certainly not standard practice. Instances in which the negotiating
record or portions thereof have been provided to the Senate are
extremely rare exceptions to the rule. For example, it is notable that
although the Senate gave its advice and consent to 90 treaties during
the 110th Congress, in not one of those cases did the Executive provide
to the Senate ``full access to the negotiating record.''
President Obama's Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government
was designed to strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and
effectiveness in Government. The principles articulated in the
President's Memorandum mandate that Senators be provided with a
comprehensive picture of U.S. obligations under the treaty. This is
accomplished in the detailed article-by-article analysis of the treaty
that accompanied the President's transmittal of the New START Treaty on
May 13, 2010. This analysis, which is nearly 200 pages and provides
information on every provision of the treaty, protocol, and annexes,
was prepared by the treaty negotiators with relevant information drawn
from the negotiating record.
Regularly providing full access to the negotiating record of
treaties would not only be unnecessary to a full understanding of the
treaty's provisions, but would also have a negative impact on the
effectiveness of the U.S. Government. As the committee noted in its
report on the treaty between the United States and the USSR on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, ``a
systemic expectation of Senate perusal of every key treaty's
`negotiating record' could be expected to inhibit candor during future
negotiations and induce posturing on the part of U.S. negotiators and
their counterparts during sensitive discussions.'' The Committee Report
further noted that regularly providing the negotiating record would
ultimately ``weaken the treaty-making process'' and ``damage American
diplomacy.''
Question. Secretary Clinton, in your testimony you stated, ``And
we have said very clearly, number one, that it has to be a NATO
decision [to withdraw our tactical nukes from Europe]. It's not a
unilateral decision. And, number two, we are not going to withdraw our
tactical nukes unless there is an agreement for Russia to similarly
discuss with us withdrawal of their tactical nukes.'' Would you be
willing to support a restatement of your second point to read, ``We are
not going to withdraw our tactical nukes unless there is an agreement
for Russia to similarly withdraw their tactical nukes.''?
Answer. As stated in the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, we
will seek to include non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons in
the next round of arms control negotiations with Russia. While we don't
want to prejudge the outcome of future negotiations, we have
consistently stated that NATO's nuclear posture should be discussed and
decided together by Allies. It is the U.S. view that in any future
reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase
transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, relocate these
weapons away from the territory of NATO members, and include non-
strategic nuclear weapons in the next round of U.S.-Russian arms
control discussions alongside strategic and non-deployed nuclear
weapons.
______
Responses of Secretary Clinton to Questions Submitted by Senator Wicker
nie
Question. Secretary Clinton, what is timeline for the completion of
the national intelligence estimate and the formal verification
assessments required to completely evaluate the treaty? What are the
terms of reference of that NIE? Will it be limited to an estimate of
the verifiability of the treaty or will it also evaluate how the treaty
contributes, along with our national technical means, to an
understanding of Russian nuclear forces?
Answer. The National Intelligence Estimate on the Intelligence
Community's ability to monitor the New START Treaty was published on
June 30, 2010, and has been provided to the Senate.
The verifiability assessment of the New START Treaty is conveyed in
the State Department's Section 306 report which addresses the
determinations of the U.S. Government as to the degree to which the
limits of the New START Treaty can be verified. The Section 306 report
was published on July 12, 2010 and has been provided to the Senate.
missile defense
Question. Secretary Clinton, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
Report states, ``The United States will continue to engage [China and
Russia] on this issue to help them better understand the stabilizing
benefits of missile defense . . .'' Regarding Russia, would you detail
how the U.S. side used the New START negotiations to help the Russians
better understand the stabilizing benefits of missile defense?
Answer. The United States did not use the New START Treaty
negotiations as a medium to help the Russians better understand the
stabilizing benefits of missile defense. From the outset, the United
States and Russia agreed that the New START Treaty was intended to
replace the START Treaty, and that it would focus on the reduction and
limitation of strategic offensive arms.
U.S. missile defense discussions with Russia have been conducted in
the Arms Control and International Security Working Group, which is
cochaired by Under Secretary of State Ellen O. Tauscher and Deputy
Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. This working group operates under the
umbrella of the United States-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission
which was established by President Obama and President Medvedev at the
Moscow Summit, July 6-8, 2009.
We have provided, and will continue to provide, policy and
technical explanations to Russia regarding why U.S. ballistic missile
defense (BMD) capabilities such as the European-based Phased Adaptive
Approach will not undermine Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. The
United States has also offered to provide transparency and confidence-
building measures to demonstrate that existing and planned U.S. BMD
programs are not directed against Russia and do not threaten Russia's
strategic deterrent and to develop various forms of missile defense
cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation.
Question. In remarks at the Atlantic Council on April 21, 2010,
Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher said, ``Our Russian friends
needed some assurances as it negotiated deeper reductions in the
absence of an ABM Treaty. The United States made a unilateral statement
to clarify that our missile defense systems are not intended to affect
the strategic balance with Russia.''
Why was it necessary to provide such assurances to Russia?
Answer. A number of public statements made by Russian leaders about
the treaty have shown that they considered such assurances necessary in
the context of reaching agreement on the treaty. Under Secretary
Tauscher's statement to the Atlantic Council was based on standing U.S.
policy as articulated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review that
``while the GMD system would be employed to defend the United States
against limited missile launches from any source, it does not have the
capacity to cope with large scale Russian [or Chinese] missile attacks,
and is not intended to affect the strategic balance with those
countries.''
The United States has made clear that U.S. missile defense efforts
are not directed against Russia. As Secretary Gates stated in his May
18 testimony before the SFRC:
Under the last administration, as well as under this one, it
has been U.S. policy not to build a missile defense that would
render useless Russia's nuclear capabilities. It has been a
missile defense intended to protect against rogue nations such
as North Korea and Iran, or countries that have very limited
capabilities. The systems that we have, the systems that
originated and have funded in the Bush administration, as well
as in this administration, are not focused on trying to render
useless Russia's nuclear capability. That, in our view, as in
theirs, would be enormously destabilizing, not to mention
unbelievably expensive.
Because Russia has expressed concerns that U.S. ballistic missile
defense (BMD) capabilities could eventually be a threat to Russia's
nuclear deterrent, the United States has sought to explain to Russia
our approach to missile defense, consistent with the testimony of
Secretary Gates quoted above. To this end, we have provided, and will
continue to provide, policy and technical explanations regarding why
U.S. BMD capabilities such as the European-based Phased Adaptive
Approach do not and cannot pose a threat to Russian strategic deterrent
forces.
Question. What other ``assurances'' did U.S. negotiators provide
with respect to future U.S. missile defense plans?
Answer. U.S. missile defense was not the subject of New START
negotiations. U.S. negotiators did not provide Russia with
``assurances'' with respect to future U.S. missile defense plans,
openly or otherwise. Nonetheless, we have stated, in various fora, that
U.S. missile defense is not intended to affect the strategic balance
with Russia.
Question. Were the Russians informed that the U.S. intends to
deploy the SM-3 block IIB missile in Europe to defend against the ICBM
threat from the Middle East? What was the Russian response?
Answer. The potential deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB was clearly
explained during the President's September 19, 2009 announcement of the
``Phased Adaptive Approach'' to ballistic missile defense in Europe as
well as in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report to Congress,
which was published on February 1, 2010. Additionally, the Obama
administration has provided briefings on U.S. regional and national
ballistic missile defense (BMD) policy, plans, and programs to
representatives of the Russian Government and the Russian military. The
briefing and discussion conducted in Moscow in October 2009 within the
Arms Control and International Security Working Group of the United
States-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission included a clear
description of all four phases of the U.S Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) to missile defense in Europe, including the possible deployment
of the SM-3 Block IIB under Phase 4 to defend against the ICBM threat
from the Middle East. A second briefing and discussion were held
between representatives of the U.S. Joint Staff and the Russian General
Staff in a meeting of the Military Cooperation Working Group.
Russia has expressed concerns that the ability to defend against
ICBMs launched from the Middle East that is slated to be deployed under
Phase 4 of the PAA in Europe could pose a threat to Russia's strategic
nuclear deterrent. This is not the case. Representatives of the Obama
administration have explained and will continue to explain that U.S.
missile defenses, including those to be deployed during all phases of
the European PAA, do not pose a threat to Russia's strategic deterrent.
Question. Do the Russians view the IIB as a qualitative improvement
to U.S. missile defense systems that would justify withdrawal from the
treaty?
Answer. To date, the Russians have not identified specific missile
defense systems whose deployment would justify Russian withdrawal from
the treaty. At a press conference on April 6, 2010, just prior to the
signing of the treaty, Foreign Minister Lavrov, in speaking about the
prospective deployment of U.S. SM-3 systems in Romania, said that
``[w]ith respect to the practical aspects of the contemplated
unilateral U.S. missile defense systems. We have noted that in the
first stages, the system will not have strategic characteristics. When
and if the strategic features of this system emerge, we will look into
the extent to which they create risks to our strategic nuclear
forces.''
Question. Given the disparity in views between the U.S. and Russia
on missile defense, do you think this treaty is setting the stage for
future confrontation over this issue as the U.S. continues to deploy
missile defense systems, especially in Europe?
Answer. No, I do not believe the treaty is setting the stage for
future confrontation over this issue. The New START Treaty does not
constrain U.S. plans for fielding and continuing to develop missile
defenses. The U.S. unilateral statement in response to Russia's
statement makes it clear that the United States intends to continue to
improve and deploy the most effective missile defense capabilities
possible.
Beyond the context of the New START Treaty, Russia has expressed
concerns that future U.S. BMD capabilities--including the later phases
of the Phased Adaptive Approach--could eventually be a threat to
Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. In an effort to address Russian
concerns, we have provided, and will continue to provide, policy and
technical explanations regarding why U.S. BMD capabilities such as
those associated with the Phased Adaptive Approach will not undermine
Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. The United States has also
offered to provide transparency and confidence-building measures to
demonstrate that existing and planned U.S. BMD programs are not
directed against Russia and do not threaten Russia's strategic
deterrent. These discussions with Russia regarding our missile defense
plans will continue to take place independent from bilateral New START
Treaty discussions.
These efforts seek to minimize future friction with Russia
regarding U.S. missile defense programs. Regardless, the United States
is committed to implementing the BMD policies outlined in the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review Report, including deployment of the Phased
Adaptive Approach in Europe, as needed to respond to long-range missile
threats that emerge in the Middle East.
united states-russia reset
Question. In a GAO report concerning the Russia 123 last June, that
agency stated:
We identified weaknesses in the process State used to ensure
interagency consultation during the development of the
classified NPAS annex that accompanied the United States-Russia
123 agreement, including a lack of formal guidelines, failure
of NRC to analyze the final version of the annex prior to the
Commission's vote on the agreement, and concerns with the
consultative process involving the intelligence community.
As the administration has opted to resubmit the Russia 123
Agreement, can you assure this committee that those issues have all
been addressed?
Answer. In its report on the United States-Russia Nuclear Agreement
(GAO-09-743R, released June 29, 2009), the GAO report outlined three
recommendations for Executive Action.
The first recommendation was that the Secretary of State should
work with the Secretary of Energy (DOE), Chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), as appropriate, to clarify how interagency participants will
implement their statutorily assigned roles and responsibilities in the
review process for agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation entered
into under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
(``123 Agreements'') and associated documents, such as the Nuclear
Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and classified annex that
accompany 123 Agreements. In the course of preparing and clearing the
documents needed for resubmission to Congress in May 2010 of the United
States-Russia 123 Agreement, the Department of State informed all
relevant interagency officials of their roles and responsibilities in
reviewing and clearing the submittal package, and the National Security
Council (NSC) sent all involved agencies a timetable that agencies were
expected to meet in completing those responsibilities. The Department
of State also took steps throughout the clearance process to keep
interagency officials informed of the status of the transmittal
package.
The second recommendation was that the Secretary of State should
work with the Secretary of Energy, NRC Chairman, and the DNI, as
appropriate, to establish written procedures to carry out the process
used to develop, review, and transmit 123 Agreements and associated
documents. While the Department has not yet drafted a formal set of
written procedures for interagency consideration, we were cognizant of
the concerns underlying this recommendation and took steps throughout
the process of reviewing and clearing the United States-Russia 123
Agreement transmittal package to make sure that all relevant
interagency officials understood their responsibilities, and that the
objective of the recommendation was fulfilled within the time available
to complete the relevant documents and forward them to the Congress.
The third recommendation was that the Secretary of State should,
with the Secretary of Energy, NRC Chairman, and DNI, as appropriate,
ensure adequate time for consultation with the NRC and provide for the
NRC to be given the final versions of all necessary documents prior to
any vote on approval for, and submission of its views and
recommendations on, a 123 agreement. In the course of preparing and
clearing the 2010 United States-Russia 123 Agreement transmittal
package, the Department of State kept relevant NRC officials informed
about the status of the various documents in the package and ensured
that the NRC received the last versions of those documents prior to
their submission to the President for his approval of the 123 Agreement
and requisite statutory determination.
Question. As you know, the House version of the Iran Sanctions
legislation now in conference includes a provision that would prevent
the Russia 123, or any other 123 agreement for nuclear cooperation,
from being implemented unless the President determines that the country
in question is not providing Iran with nuclear weapons technology or
ballistic missile or advanced conventional weapon technology.
Do you agree with this provision? If not, why did you cosponsor S.
970 when you were a Senator? As you may recall, that legislation
contained almost the exact same provision?
Do you think the President would be able to issue such a
determination in the case of Russia?
Answer. The administration continues to believe that there are
significant benefits to the United States in concluding an agreement
for peaceful nuclear cooperation with Russia (``123 Agreement''). Once
it enters into force, the 123 Agreement will provide a solid foundation
for long-term civil nuclear cooperation, create commercial
opportunities for U.S. industry, and enhance cooperation on important
global nonproliferation benefits. The Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement (NPAS) submitted as part of the 2010 transmittal package is
based on a current assessment of Russia's nonproliferation behavior and
reaches the conclusion that the 123 Agreement will promote, and will
not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and
security.
We are working very closely and in cooperation with Russia on our
shared goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons
capability. Russia does not support an Iran with nuclear weapons and--
in addition to other constructive contributions to international
nuclear nonproliferation efforts-- joined the November 2009 IAEA Board
of Governors resolution condemning Iran's lack of cooperation with the
IAEA, its refusal to suspend enrichment, and its failure to comply with
its Safeguards Agreement. Russia has supported all six U.N. Security
Council resolutions calling on Iran to suspend enrichment, and also
continues to provide key assistance in the ongoing IAEA proposal
discussions to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor.
Question. The President, in a statement released on May 10 said,
``After review of the situation and of the NPAS and classified annex, I
have concluded: (1) that the situation in Georgia need no longer be
considered an obstacle to proceeding with the proposed Agreement.'' Has
Russia withdrawn from its illegal occupation of South Ossetia and/or
Abkhazia? If not, why is the illegal invasion no longer a concern of
the Department of State?
Answer. Enhancing peace and security in the Caucasus is a priority
for the United States. The decision to move forward with the 123
Agreement was made on its own merits and in order to advance
nonproliferation, a goal which Georgia shares. Advancing civil nuclear
energy cooperation with Russia through this Agreement in no way
diminishes our unwavering support for Georgia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. We still have serious differences with Russia
over its actions and posture in Georgia. We are frank and forthright in
making our views known to Russia, bilaterally as well as through the
Geneva process and in other international fora. We continue to urge
Russia to abide by its August 12, 2008, cease-fire commitments. In
particular, we have expressed concern over the Russian Government's
construction of permanent bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and its
refusal to withdraw to prewar positions, both of which we think are
inconsistent with those commitments.
Question. According to a May 11 Reuters report, a senior Kremlin
official said that, ``Russia wants `the swiftest removal' of U.S.
sanctions against Russian state arms exporter Rosoboronexport and three
other enterprises he indicated were under U.S. restrictions aimed at
preventing weapons proliferation. `We will demand it--seeing as they
are counting on our position in working out (measures) against Iran
with the international community.' ''
Can you assure this committee that any decision to remove sanctions
on entities in any country will be based solely on whether the entity
is proliferating technology in violation of our law and not as a result
of a quid pro quo with Russia where they agree to support sanctions,
especially sanctions they have already watered down?
Answer. There has been no quid pro quo with the Russian Government
on the issue of sanctions. We decided to lift penalties on several
Russian entities because doing so was determined to be in the foreign
policy and national security interests of the United States.
We believe that securing the 1929 UNSC resolution will have a
significant impact on Iran's ability to develop weapons of mass
destruction and acquire conventional weapons. The UNSC resolution will
put international legal constraints on potential exports of concern by
entities in all U.N. Member States, including Russia.
Nonproliferation is a high priority for the United States, and the
Russian Government is a key partner in this effort. We will continue to
work cooperatively with the Russian Government to prevent entities from
contributing to weapons of mass destruction, missile programs, or
conventional weapons programs of concern. At the same time, we will
continue to implement U.S. nonproliferation penalties when appropriate.
We will continue to monitor the activities of Russian entities and will
make determinations consistent with existing legislation and other
legal authorities.
Question. When will you submit the Iran, North Korea, Syria Non
Proliferation Act (INKSNA) reports that are due semiannually, but have
not been submitted since October 2008?
Answer. The Department acknowledges that delivery of the INKSNA
report was delayed considerably. The Department has completed the
determinations mandated by the legislation and provided a classified
report to the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress on July 10,
2010. The Department is prepared to brief on the report's content and
judgments.
Question. Secretary Clinton, in your prepared remarks you asserted
that the completion of New START ``conveys to other nations that we are
committed to real reductions, and to holding up our end of the bargain
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.'' The United States has been
reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile for 40 years, and that fact is
very well-known. It did not take the declassification of our stockpile
numbers at the NPT Review Conference to demonstrate it. In this
respect, what benefits to the nonproliferation regime can we expect to
come from the particular reductions embodied in this treaty that have
not come from the previous 40 years of US nuclear reductions?
Answer. The cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime is the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which contains three pillars--
disarmament, nonproliferation, and access to peaceful uses of nuclear
energy--all of which are interlinked. The treaty obligates nuclear-
weapon states to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to
disarmament, and without measures for this purpose, the willingness of
non-nuclear-weapon state Parties to support a strong nonproliferation
regime would likely diminish. We can expect that the New START Treaty,
combined with further nuclear reductions and nonproliferation efforts
such as holding Iran accountable for Treaty violations, will strengthen
the NPT regime and ensure that it remains the principal legal barrier
to nuclear proliferation.
The United States and Russia are the world's two largest nuclear
powers. Although both nations have made significant cuts to their
stockpiles, both still possess significantly more warheads than any
other nation. For this reason, the world looks to the United States and
Russia to uphold the architecture of arms control and nonproliferation.
______
Responses of Secretary Clinton to Questions Submitted by Senator Inhofe
tactical nuclear weapons
Question. Secretary Clinton, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
concludes that ``large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise
concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not
be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term relationship,
especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced.'' Under this
treaty, the U.S. will reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to
1,550 and the Russians will do the same. At the same time, the Russians
will continue to deploy at least 3,800 tactical nuclear warheads in
addition to their strategic nuclear warheads, compared to only a couple
of hundred deployed U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Not only will the
Russians maintain 10-1 superiority in tactical nuclear weapons, their
tactical nuclear weapons will outnumber our strategic nuclear weapons
by at least 2-1.
What impact will this disparity have on allied views of the U.S.
nuclear umbrella?
What leverage do we have to address this disparity in the future,
and why didn't we make this an objective for this agreement?
Answer. Because of their limited range and different roles,
tactical nuclear weapons do not directly influence the strategic
balance between the United States and Russia. Furthermore, within the
regional context, the United States relies on additional capabilities
to support extended deterrence and power projection, including:
conventional force capabilities, ballistic missile defenses, allied
capabilities, advanced technologies, and modernization and maintenance
of existing forces, to name a few. As President Obama stated in Prague
last year, we are committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee that
defense to our allies. During the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
consultations, our NATO allies were engaged on the issue of extended
deterrence and were assured of our continued commitment to their
defense. Allies have welcomed the outcome of the NPR, as well as the
signing of the New START Treaty.
A more ambitious treaty--one that addressed tactical nuclear
weapons or additional nuclear weapons states--would have taken much
longer to complete, adding significantly to the time before a successor
agreement, including verification measures, could enter into force
following START's expiration in December 2009. We hope the New START
Treaty will set the stage for further negotiations with Russia on
measures to reduce both our strategic and tactical nuclear weapons,
including nondeployed nuclear weapons.
Question. Secretary Clinton, it is common knowledge that Russia was
going down to 600-800 strategic delivery vehicles whether or not there
was a NEW START Treaty. At Russia's request, the administration decided
to forgo the leverage it had to include tactical nuclear weapons in
this treaty--for which the Russians have a 10 to 1 advantage over the
United States.
What was the rationale for forgoing that leverage?
What is the Russian incentive to open new negotiations on tactical
nuclear weapons now that they have NEW START?
Answer. A more ambitious treaty that addressed tactical nuclear
weapons would have taken much longer to complete, adding significantly
to the time before a successor agreement, including verification
measures, could enter into force following START's expiration in
December 2009. Because of their limited range and different roles,
tactical nuclear weapons do not directly influence the strategic
balance between the United States and Russia.
President Medvedev has expressed interest in further discussions on
measures to further reduce both nations' nuclear arsenals. The Russians
are concerned with the totality of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, the
upload capability of our strategic ballistic missiles as well as U.S.
tactical weapons located in Europe. Also, Article VI of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) stipulates that nuclear weapons states
are to work toward achieving nuclear disarmament. The Russians are
sensitive to world opinion and want to be seen as favorably working
towards this goal. As stated in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
and by the President at the signing of the New START Treaty in Prague,
we intend to raise strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including
nondeployed nuclear weapons, in those discussions.
stockpile modernization
Question. Secretary Clinton, you testified that the NNSA budget for
FY11 shows a 10-percent increase in the weapon and infrastructure and a
25 percent increases in direct stockpile work. You stated, ``This was
not in previous budgets.'' Since you are comfortable discussing the
NNSA budget, please answer the following questions:
Isn't it true that the FY07, FY08 and FY09 budgets each showed an
anticipated FY11 budget requirement of about $7 billion, the amount
requested by the Obama administration this year.
Answer. The prior years referenced are correct for the Weapons
Activities account. The President's FY 2011 budget request is
specifically focused on the implementation of administration objectives
as stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.
Question. It is true that the direct stockpile work budget, under
weapon activities, is 25 percent higher than prior budgets. Does the
direct stockpile work increase come at the expense of infrastructure
requirements outlined in the FY07-FY09 budgets (including essential
replacement facilities for plutonium and uranium operations)?
Answer. The President's FY 2011 budget request increases directed
stockpile work by 26 percent compared to FY 2010, and includes
increases in science and selected infrastructure investments to satisfy
Department of Defense requirements. The President's FY 2011 budget
request reflects a balanced approach to satisfy planned directed
stockpile work, science capabilities, infrastructure investment, and
continuity of essential capabilities for plutonium and uranium
operations, consistent with requirements identified in the Nuclear
Posture Review and plans outlined in the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan.
Question. What is the assurance that NNSA will be able to modernize
the complex, with sufficient capacity and with an adequate time-line,
at these lower levels?
Answer. The recently completed NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan provides the comprehensive resource planning document
for modernizing the nuclear security enterprise over the long term to
support the administration's objectives detailed in the Nuclear Posture
Review. The Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense are
confident that we have a credible modernization plan necessary to
sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our nation's deterrent.
Question. Table 3 of the DOD/DOE 1251 report shows the Readiness in
Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) account as essentially flat until
FY16, yet the NNSA is going to be starting work on the CMRR and the UPF
facilities prior to that year. Please explain how the RTBF account will
be sufficient to cover design and construction work on those two
facilities and will cover, with next-to-no increases, current
requirements for RTBF funding for facilities and operations costs
across the NNSA enterprise.
Answer. The current Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP)
RTBF construction budget for fiscal years 2011-2015 has been
prioritized to enable design completion and the start of construction
for the CMRR nuclear facility and the Uranium Processing Facility
(UPF).
Question. Please explain the apparent slip in the date for initial
operations for CMRR from 2020 to 2022. Is this due to insufficient
funding?
Answer. There is no slip in the date for initial operations for the
CMRR nuclear facility. Construction of the CMRR nuclear facility is
scheduled to be completed in 2020, with transition to full operations
to be completed in 2022.
Question. Should the administration have requested more money?
Answer. No, we believe the budget we have set forth meets
requirements and is executable.
Question. Please provide detailed breakdowns on a site-by-site
basis for FY11-16 for RTBF spending.
Answer. Please see the spreadsheets that follow.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. Secretary Clinton, when you were a member of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, that committee and several others, supported
the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. As you know, it was stopped
by one House subcommittee.
Is that your recollection?
Do you still support the RRW, which you consistently supported when
you served on the SASC?
Answer. This administration has made clear that we will maintain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, and our recent budget
request for a 10% increase in NNSA weapons funding is indicative of
this commitment. After months of extensive analysis, our Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), which was led by DOD and included the NNSA and
the State Department, concluded that we can maintain the safety,
security, and reliability of our nuclear arsenal through life extension
programs (LEPs). Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) was a program to
replace all existing nuclear warheads with a common family of new
warhead designs. In contrast to that approach, the NPR adopted a
nuclear warhead LEP under which our experts will study options for
ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a
case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally mandated
Stockpile Management Program. The full range of LEP approaches will be
considered: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear
components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear
components. In any decision to proceed to engineering development for
warhead LEPs, the United States will give strong preference to options
for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components would be
undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could
not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President
and approved by Congress.
Question. Secretary Clinton, I am concerned that the administration
is laboring under the misconception that nuclear disarmament, which
this treaty is designed to advance, must progress simultaneously with
the pursuit of nonproliferation goals. I believe this is a serious
matter of sequencing. The danger is that the administration will be
advancing towards nuclear disarmament goals--which include unilateral
steps like the change declaratory policy, the virtual prohibition on
building new nuclear weapons and disclosing the size of the U.S.
nuclear stockpile--while it is entirely possible that the
nonproliferation regime is running off the rails. Put differently, the
administration appears to be pursuing nuclear disarmament on nothing
more than the hope that the nonproliferation regime will not break
down.
Should not fulfillment of the nonproliferation agenda precede
steps, particularly unilateral and bilateral ones, toward nuclear
disarmament?
Answer. The cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime is the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which contains three pillars--
disarmament, nonproliferation, and access to peaceful uses of nuclear
energy--all of which are interlinked. The treaty obligates nuclear-
weapon states to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to
disarmament, and without measures for this purpose, the willingness of
non-nuclear-weapon state Parties to support a strong nonproliferation
regime would likely diminish. Despite years of calls by many of the
latter states for a sequential or exclusive focus on disarmament, the
United States has promoted strengthening the NPT in a balanced fashion
across all three of its pillars. The success of the 2010 NPT Review
Conference is a testament to the success of this approach. We will
continue to advocate continued progress on all three pillars
simultaneously, not sequentially, and we observe growing international
agreement on the fairness of this approach, as evidenced by the
progress at this year's Review Conference.
U.S. and Russian arms control and reduction efforts play an
important role in nonproliferation. We cannot achieve a world free of
nuclear weapons without the United States and Russian Federation, which
between them hold 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, taking
significant and substantial disarmament steps.
In part due to the substantial efforts of the United States in such
arms reductions, there has been significant progress in furthering the
multilateral nuclear nonproliferation agenda in recent months. In May,
the NPT Review Conference produced a consensus final document that
endorses the Additional Protocol to International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards, supports a strengthened IAEA with sufficient
resources to meet its safeguards responsibilities effectively, and
calls for strengthened export controls, among other important measures
to strengthen nonproliferation. With the NPT Review Conference
producing a substantive final document for the first time in a decade,
the nonproliferation agenda certainly is not ``running off the rails'';
to the contrary, it is currently ``getting back on track.''
THE HISTORY AND LESSONS OF START
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Shaheen, Lugar, Corker, Isakson,
Risch, and DeMint.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Thank you very much for being here. And I'm particularly
grateful to one of our Nation's leading statesmen, whom it is
my pleasure to welcome here today: James Baker. He has been a
top advisor to three Presidents over the course of two decades,
including serving as the 67th Secretary of the Treasury and the
61st Secretary of State.
Most significantly for our purposes today, as President
George H.W. Bush's chief diplomat, he negotiated and concluded
the original START agreement. And some of us have been around
here long enough to remember his visit to this committee to
present the START Treaty in June 1992. All of us are very
fortunate to have Secretary Baker here today to put that treaty
in the context of decades of arms control efforts and to
explain how those efforts advanced American interests and
diplomacy during the cold war and after.
When President Bush and President Gorbachev signed the
original START Treaty in July 1991, it was indeed a remarkable
moment; it was the first time that America and Russia agreed to
reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons that they had
deployed. But, less than 6 months later, before the treaty was
even ratified, the Soviet Union fell apart, ending the cold war
and leaving us in a very transformed world.
Some suggested that START became irrelevant when our enemy
of many decades disappeared, but Secretary Baker argued that
the treaty remained important because it strengthened strategic
stability between nations that still possess thousands of
nuclear weapons and still didn't fully trust each other. As he
testified, that stability rested on ``the predictability that
START mandates through its openness and transparency
provisions.''
The fact is that, because America and Russia were no longer
engaged in an arms race, they were able to begin to work
together. At an uncertain moment, arms control was a familiar
mechanism through which to extend the habits of cooperation as
our two countries wrestled with contentious issues, like the
reunification of Germany, and others. As Secretary Baker
testified, START was a gateway to a new era of cooperation.
As much as times have changed, I think there are parallels
with today. Like its predecessor, New START is going to
significantly reduce the number of nuclear weapons that the
United States and Russia can deploy, and it will revitalize our
relations with Moscow.
When Secretary of Defense Gates testified before this
committee yesterday about the benefits of New START, he cited
many of the same advantages that Secretary Baker had enumerated
two decades earlier, specifically: transparency,
predictability, and strategic stability. Now, as then,
verification remains vital.
Unfortunately, the verification measures that Secretary
Baker negotiated expired on December 5 of last year. Since
then, day by day, we have been losing crucial visibility into
the Russian nuclear program. The New START Treaty will restore
that visibility and, in some ways, enhance it. As Admiral
Mullen said yesterday, the United States should ratify this
agreement as soon as possible, because we are in our sixth
month without a treaty.
But, the confidence this new treaty builds extends beyond
the verification measures that it puts in place. It presents an
opportunity to expand United States-Russian cooperation on a
range of issues, including Iran. In fact, as we learned from
Secretary Clinton yesterday, Russia and the United States have
agreed on a draft U.N. resolution sanctioning Iran for its
nuclear activities.
Further, as Secretary Baker can testify, the original START
Treaty was a powerful demonstration of how bilateral arms
control can strengthen our global effort to halt the spread of
nuclear weapons. Today, New START is winning us new credibility
and leverage at this month's Review Conference on the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Our progress on United States-Russian
arms control has helped ensure that Iran cannot distract the
world with charges of nuclear hypocrisy.
Yesterday, some of my colleagues raised questions about the
New START Treaty. In response, Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen made absolutely clear that there is nothing in this
treaty whatsoever that inhibits our missile defense plans. They
are firm that its verification procedures are excellent, far
better than what we have with no treaty. And they assured us
that the $80 billion the administration has committed to our
nuclear weapons infrastructure will maintain the safety and
effectiveness of our stockpile.
So, today is the third in a series of hearings on the
treaty. We will continue to give it the thorough review that it
warrants. And, as I mentioned yesterday to Senator DeMint, we
will, shortly, have a classified hearing with the negotiators
themselves so that we can probe into the negotiation record
within those confines, and we'll continue, in other ways, to
review this record. I'm confident that at the end of this
process we're going to be able to reach a strong bipartisan
consensus on advice and consent, just as we did on the original
START Treaty, which, I remind people, the Senate approved by a
vote of 93 to 6, and the Moscow Treaty, which was approved, 95
to nothing.
So, Secretary Baker, I thank you for traveling and coming
here and refreshing yourself on all of the START issues in
order to inform the committee. We genuinely value your advice
and insights, and we look forward to hearing from you today.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming
our esteemed witness and our friend, former Secretary of State
James Baker.
Yesterday, the Foreign Relations Committee was briefed on
the New START Treaty by Secretaries Gates and Clinton and
Admiral Mullen. Today, we will benefit again from the
perspective of an architect of the original START agreement.
As President George H.W. Bush's Secretary of State, Jim
Baker testified on the START Treaty before the Foreign
Relations Committee on June 23, 1992. At that time, he was
heavily engaged not only in bringing the treaty to fruition,
but also in transitioning our relationship with Russia from
cold-war antagonism to a more open post-cold-war dynamic.
Much has changed in the intervening 18 years, but most of
the basic strategic concerns that motivated the Reagan and Bush
administrations to pursue nuclear arms control with Moscow in
the 1980s and early 1990s still exist today.
We are seeking mutual reductions in nuclear warheads and
delivery vehicles that contribute to stability and reduce the
costs of maintaining the weapons. We are pursuing transparency
of our nuclear arsenals, backed up by strong verification
measures and formal consultation methods. We are attempting to
maximize the safety of our nuclear arsenals and to encourage
global cooperation toward nonproliferation goals. And we're
hoping to solidify United States-Russian cooperation on nuclear
security matters while sustaining our knowledge of Russia's
nuclear capabilities and intentions.
The Reagan-Bush arms control strategy led to the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the START
Treaties. These agreements shifted the goal of nuclear arms
control from limiting weapons buildups to making substantial
verifiable cuts in existing arsenals. These treaties and their
successors have made us safer. They have greatly reduced the
amount of weaponry threatening the United States, and have
served as a powerful statement of the intent of the United
States to curtail the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
They also helped open the Russian military and defense
establishments, facilitated relationships between American and
Russian officials, and provided mechanisms promoting
predictability, and regularized consultations. This remains a
fundamental tenet of the New START Treaty, which contains
nearly all of the confidence-building measures first initiated
in treaties negotiated and signed by Presidents Reagan and
Bush.
We know, however, that bilateral treaties are not neat
instruments, because they involve merging the will of two
nations with distinct, and often conflicting, interests.
Treaties come with inherent imperfections and questions. As
Secretary Gates testified yesterday, even successful agreements
routinely are accompanied by differences of opinion by the
parties. The ratification process, therefore, is intended to
consider whether limits on strategic forces and verification
procedures are fully consistent with U.S. national security.
Having served as White House Chief of Staff, Secretary of
the Treasury, and Secretary of State during the Reagan and Bush
years, our witness is in a unique position to offer insights
about the historical legacy of START as it pertains to the
context of a New START Treaty.
I also look forward to his perspective on our relationship
with Moscow and the broader geopolitical impact of the START
agreements. How important is the New START Treaty to our long-
term relationship with Moscow? And does it advance strategic
goals beyond Russia?
I thank the Chair again for holding this hearing, and look
forward to our discussions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Mr. Secretary, thank you. You can choose to use your text
or summarize, as you wish, and I'll put the full text in the
record; however you want to proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. BAKER III, FORMER SECRETARY OF
STATE, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, SENIOR PARTNER, BAKER
BOTTS LLP, HOUSTON, TX
Secretary Baker. What I'd like to do----
The Chairman. If you push the button on the--there's a
button there--yes.
Secretary Baker. Yes. What I would like to do is to go
ahead and give you my statement, because I've tried to make it
complete, both with respect to my view of the treaty itself and
my view of some other peripheral questions that you might want
to----
The Chairman. Absolutely, please.
Secretary Baker [continuing]. To address.
The Chairman. Proceed.
Secretary Baker. And I thank you for the opportunity to
appear again before the Foreign Relations Committee. I think
the staff told me, when I walked in this afternoon, this was
the 20th time that I've been up here. And I'm delighted to be
back. But, I do come here today, not as an expert on the
particulars of this New START Treaty, but, rather, really, as
you pointed out, as the Secretary of State who negotiated much
of START I, all of the Lisbon Protocol, and much of START II.
So, I want to begin by speaking about the role that arms
control has played in enhancing American security over the
decades, because I happen to be one who strongly believes that
it is important for our country, and for Russia, to maintain a
vigorous commitment to arms control as a part of our efforts to
create and maintain an effective nonproliferation regime.
When they're carefully enacted, arms control treaties can
reduce the threat of global nuclear devastation while also
preserving our Nation's nuclear arsenal as a critical component
of our security and the security of our allies. As a result,
it's my view that any treaty the Senate ratifies has to
maintain our decades-long combination of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and
heavy bombers, as well as retain our ability to change our
force mix, as needed.
Negotiations on the original START Treaty began, as you
indicated, Mr. Chairman, in the early 1980s, during some of the
most contentious years in the United States-Soviet rivalry,
when the United States and Soviet Union were running the arms
race at a really fast clip. Many feared that the cold war would
turn hot, and START was about stopping that race. It was about
beginning to shrink the enormous nuclear arsenals that each
side had built, and it was about stabilizing the nuclear
relationship between the two countries so that our diplomatic
relationship could evolve without the fear that either side was
going to seek an atomic advantage.
By dramatically reducing each side's nuclear forces, START
took a relationship that was filled with uncertainty and made
it far more predictable. The original treaty provided a
foundation for Washington and Moscow to reduce their arsenals
and to improve diplomatic ties and overall cooperation; and
that's just what we did in those years.
START made the United States-Soviet nuclear balance more
predictable, and not simply by putting numbers on a piece of
paper; it made the balance more predictable by imposing
stringent verification provisions, including onsite
inspections.
President Ronald Reagan was famously focused on the
importance of verification. ``Trust, but verify'' was a maxim
that he quoted to the Soviets many, many times. And President
George H.W. Bush shared that insistence.
START provided an unprecedented transparency. It gave us a
window into what had been the world's most secretive and most
threatening military establishment.
The secrecy that had been a hallmark of the cold war, and
one of its most destabilizing characteristics, was replaced by
an openness that was an invaluable asset to our national
security. Of course, when I was Secretary of State and
testified before this committee about START I, in June 1992,
conditions had changed dramatically from when the negotiations
had first started, in the early 1980s. The Soviet Union had
dissolved, leaving Boris Yeltsin in charge of Russia. The
decades-long United States-Soviet conflict was coming to an
end.
But, as I said then, if START was a product of the cold
war, it was not a relic of the cold war. The breakup of the
Soviet Union produced a time of great potential, but it also
produced a time of great uncertainty. Amid that uncertainty,
START was an anchor of stability, promising that our nuclear
security would remain assured as relations between the two
countries evolved.
I think that promise was fulfilled. Despite ups and downs
in relations between Washington and Moscow over the last 18
years, START ensured strategic stability between the United
States and Russia. It reduced nuclear arsenals by 30 percent to
40 percent, and it did so in a verifiable way.
Later, START II, which, of course, was ratified by the
United States Senate, but not by the Russian Duma, pushed for
the elimination of multiple nuclear warheads on
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Even after the Moscow Treaty, signed by Presidents George
W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in 2002, had further lowered the
ceilings for the United States and Russian arsenals, START
remained essential and important. It provided the verification
mechanisms for the Moscow Treaty, which had none, propping open
that key window into Russian nuclear forces, a window that only
becomes more important as our arsenals shrink further.
But, the legacy of START extends well beyond the provisions
of the treaty. START really initiated an era of broader nuclear
cooperation with Russia. Two months after he signed START, on
July 31, 1991, President George H.W. Bush announced his
intention to unilaterally withdraw most tactical nuclear
weapons that the United States deployed abroad. That was a
decisive step that was quickly reciprocated by Mikhail
Gorbachev.
START also enabled our diplomatic, scientific, and military
establishments to form deeper levels of trust and
collaboration. And as the ranking member knows very well, a
direct result of that was the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, which immeasurably improved our security by
helping keep nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists.
I really don't think Nunn-Lugar would have been nearly as
successful as it was if the Russians had lacked the legally
binding assurance of parallel United States reductions through
the START Treaty.
START I also served as a sign of the United States and
Russian commitment to nonproliferation, generally, during the
period when George H.W. Bush was President and I served as
Secretary of State.
As I also testified before this committee in 1992, the
reductions under START I constituted a major step by the United
States and Russia toward fulfilling their obligations under
Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nonnuclear
states have long regarded these reductions as keys to the
success of that treaty, and really to their cooperation with
it.
Most concretely, through the Lisbon Protocol, START
actually removed nuclear weapons from three former Soviet
states--Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--ensuring, thereby,
that the breakup of the Soviet Union did not lead to a
breakdown of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
START, therefore, was a turning point, I think, in United
States-Russian relations. And today, the threat of nuclear war
really is only a shadow of what it once was. But, that does not
mean that arms control is no longer important. It is precisely
at times when relations are warming that we can accomplish the
most by reducing nuclear dangers and reinforcing our ability to
cooperate. That enhanced cooperation, in turn, enables us to
further reduce nuclear dangers, establishing a virtuous circle
that strengthens American security.
Although I'm not an expert on the nuances of the proposed
New Treaty, Mr. Chairman, it appears to take our country in a
direction that can enhance our national security while at the
same time reducing the number of nuclear warheads on the
planet. It can also improve Washington's relationship with
Moscow regarding nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, a
relationship that is going to be vital if the two countries are
going to cooperate in order to stem nuclear proliferation in
countries such as Iran and North Korea.
I agree with Secretary of Defense Bob Gates when he wrote,
last week in the Wall Street Journal, that the new treaty
provides verification that has been needed since START I
expired in December. An effective verification regime is a
critical component of arms control, and I believe that the
world is safer when the United States and Russia are abiding by
one.
So, in my view, Mr. Chairman, the New START Treaty is a
modest and appropriate continuation of the START I Treaty that
expired this past December, subject, however, to there being
satisfactory answers to a few questions that have been raised.
And so, I would like to mention a couple of those questions for
your consideration as the committee moves forward. Although
this may not be a complete list, it includes questions that I
personally believe should be answered before a ratification
vote is taken.
And let me begin with missile defense. Any arms treaty that
goes into effect should focus on nuclear weapons reduction, and
not on missile defense limitations. In the New START Treaty,
however, there is at least one clear limitation on U.S. missile
defense systems. Specifically, Article 5 limits the conversion
of ICBM and SLBM launchers into launchers from missile defense
interceptors. Now, I understand that the current administration
has no plans for transforming strategic weapons launchers into
missile defense launchers. The administration believes that it
is less expensive to build new systems rather than to convert
existing ones. But, I'm not so sure how wise it is to restrict
future administrations.
Another question concerns the verification program, because
it does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that
verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and
prohibitions under START I. This complex part of the treaty is
even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are
allowed than were allowed in the past. As a result, I think the
proposed verification regime deserves thorough scrutiny.
It is also important that we maintain a nuclear stockpile
that would allow the United States to adequately cover the 30-
or-so countries allied with us around the world that are
currently under our nuclear umbrella. And we should make sure
that we have enough nuclear capacity, in case we decide to
expand that nuclear umbrella, to include perhaps another 9 to
10 countries, should Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, while not a part of the New
START Treaty, I would like to call the committee's attention to
two other issues that I think are related to it.
First, there is a section in the administration's Nuclear
Posture Review that appears on page 8 of the executive summary
and that says, ``The United States will not use, or threaten to
use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons states
that are a party to the NPT and in compliance with their
nuclear nonproliferation obligations.'' Presumably, that would
apply even if a country were to use chemical or biological
weapons against us. And I question the wisdom of that position.
And, frankly, Mr. Chairman, my apprehension in this regard
comes from my own real-world experience. On January 9, 1991, as
the George H.W. Bush administration was in the final stages of
the buildup to remove Saddam Hussein's troops from Kuwait, I
had a 7-hour meeting in Geneva with Tariq Aziz, Iraq's Foreign
Minister. At the end of our discussion, when it was quite clear
that war was inevitable, I warned him against using weapons of
mass destruction against our troops. ``If conflict ensues,'' I
told Aziz, ``and you use chemical or biological weapons against
U.S. forces, the American people will demand vengeance, and we
have the means to exact it.'' And I further said, ``Mr.
Minister, this is not a threat, it is a promise.''
It is entirely possible, and even likely, in my opinion,
that Iraq did not use its chemical weapons against our forces
because of that warning. Of course, that warning was broad
enough to include the use of all types of weapons that America
possessed.
Years later, when Saddam Hussein was captured, debriefed,
and asked why he had not used his chemical weapons, he recalled
the substance of my statement to Aziz in Geneva.
So, I think, Mr. Chairman, that the Nuclear Posture Review
should not limit our flexibility, not just our military
flexibility, but also our diplomatic flexibility, in responding
either to the threat of a biological or chemical attack upon us
or to an actual attack.
Second, let me say that I think it's critical that we beef
up the reliability of our nuclear stockpile. Because our
security is based upon the safety and reliability of our
nuclear weapons, it is important that our Government budget
enough money to guarantee that those weapons can carry out
their mission. As we reduce warheads and launchers, it is more
and more imperative that those we have left be safe and be
reliable.
Members of the committee, as you continue your
consideration of this treaty, I know that you will thoroughly
examine these questions, and others that some may have, about
New START. It is important that nuclear weapons treaties have
the broadest bipartisan support possible so that leaders in
Moscow and other international capitals understand that our
country wholeheartedly supports the treaty. Bipartisan support
was important, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, when the
Senate ratified START I in 1992 by a vote of 93 to 6, and START
II in 1996 by a vote of 87 to 4. And bipartisan support will be
equally important with the New START Treaty,
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I would be happy to try and respond to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Baker follows:]
Prepared Statement of James A. Baker III, Senior Partner, Baker Botts
L.L.P., Houston, TX
Thank you, Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar. It is a
pleasure to appear again before the Foreign Relations Committee.
I come here today not as an expert on the particulars of the New
START Treaty. But rather, as the Secretary of State who negotiated much
of START I, all of the Lisbon Protocol, and much of START II.
I want to begin by speaking about the role that arms control has
played in enhancing American security over the decades. I strongly
believe that it is important for our country and Russia to maintain a
vigorous commitment to arms control as part of our effort to create and
maintain an effective nonproliferation regime. When carefully enacted,
arms control treaties can reduce the threat of global nuclear
devastation while also preserving our Nation's nuclear arsenal as a
critical component of our security and the security of our allies. As a
result, any treaty the Senate ratifies must maintain our decades-long
combination of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missiles, and heavy bombers as well as retain our ability to
change our force mix as needed.
Negotiations on the original START Treaty began in the early 1980s,
during some of the most contentious years in the United States-Soviet
rivalry, when the United States and the Soviet Union were running the
arms race at a fast clip. Many feared that the cold war would turn hot.
START was about stopping that race. It was about beginning to
shrink the enormous nuclear arsenals that each side had built, and
about stabilizing the nuclear relationship between the two countries so
that our diplomatic relationship could evolve without the fear that
either side was seeking an atomic advantage. By dramatically reducing
each side's nuclear forces, START took a relationship filled with
uncertainty and made it far more predictable. The original treaty
provided a foundation for Washington and Moscow to reduce their
arsenals and improve diplomatic ties and cooperation--and we did.
START made the United States-Soviet nuclear balance more
predictable, and not simply by putting numbers on a piece of paper. It
made the balance more predictable by imposing stringent verification
provisions, including onsite inspections. President Ronald Reagan was
famously focused on the importance of verification. ``Trust but
verify'' was a maxim that he quoted to the Soviets many times--and
President George H.W. Bush shared that insistence. START provided
unprecedented transparency. It gave us a window into what had been the
world's most secretive and most threatening military establishment. The
secrecy that had been a hallmark of the cold war--and one of its most
destabilizing characteristics--was replaced by an openness that was an
invaluable asset to our national security.
Of course, when I was Secretary of State and testified before this
committee about the START I Treaty in June 1992, conditions had changed
dramatically from when negotiations began in the early 1980s. The
Soviet Union had dissolved, leaving Boris Yeltsin in charge of Russia.
The decades-long United States-Soviet conflict was coming to an end.
But, as I said then, if START was a product of the cold war, it was
not a relic of the cold war. The breakup of the Soviet Union produced a
time of great potential but also tremendous uncertainty. Amid that
uncertainty, START was an anchor of stability, promising that our
nuclear security would remain assured as relations between the two
countries evolved.
That promise was fulfilled. Despite ups and downs in relations
between Washington and Moscow over the last 18 years, START ensured
strategic stability between the United States and Russia; it reduced
nuclear arsenals by 30 percent to 40 percent; and it did so verifiably.
Later, START II, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate but not the
Russian Duma, pushed for the elimination of multiple nuclear warheads
on ICBMs. Even after the Moscow Treaty signed by Presidents George W.
Bush and Vladimir Putin in 2002 further lowered the ceilings for the
United States and Russian arsenals, START remained essential. It
provided the verification mechanisms for the Moscow Treaty, which had
none, propping open that key window into Russian nuclear forces--a
window that only becomes more important as our arsenals shrink further.
But the legacy of START extends well beyond the provisions of the
treaty. START initiated an era of broader nuclear cooperation with
Russia. Two months after he signed START on July 31, 1991, President
George H.W. Bush announced his intention to unilaterally withdraw most
tactical nuclear weapons that the United States deployed abroad--a
decisive step that was quickly reciprocated by Mikhail Gorbachev. START
also enabled our diplomatic, scientific, and military establishments to
form deeper levels of trust and collaboration. A direct result of that
was the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program, which
immeasurably improved our security by helping keep nuclear material out
of the hands of terrorists. I do not believe Nunn-Lugar would have been
nearly as successful as it was, if the Russians had lacked the legally
binding assurance of parallel U.S. reductions through START.
The START I Treaty also served as a sign of the United States and
Russian commitment to nonproliferation during the period when George
H.W. Bush was President and I served as his Secretary of State. As I
also testified before this committee in 1992, the reductions under
START I constituted a major step by the United States and Russia toward
fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Non-nuclear states have long regarded such
reductions as key to the success of that treaty--and to their
cooperation with it. Most concretely, through the Lisbon Protocol,
START actually removed nuclear weapons from three former Soviet
states--Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--ensuring that the breakup of
the Soviet Union did not lead to a breakdown of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
START, therefore, was a turning point in United States-Russian
relations, and today, the threat of nuclear war is only a shadow of
what it once was. But that does not mean that arms control is no longer
important. It is precisely at times when relations are warming that we
can accomplish the most by reducing nuclear dangers and reinforcing our
ability to cooperate. That enhanced cooperation in turn enables us to
further reduce nuclear dangers, establishing a virtuous circle that
strengthens American security.
Although I am not an expert on the nuances of the proposed New
START treaty, it appears to take our country in a direction that can
enhance our national security while at the same time reducing the
number of nuclear warheads on the planet. It can also improve
Washington's relationship with Moscow regarding nuclear weapons and
delivery vehicles, a relationship that will be vital if the two
countries are to cooperate in order to stem nuclear proliferation in
countries such as Iran and North Korea.
I agree with Secretary of Defense Bob Gates when he wrote last week
in the Wall Street Journal that the new treaty provides verification
that has been needed since START I expired in December. An effective
verification regime is a critical component of arms control and I
believe that the world is safer when the United States and Russia are
abiding by one.
In my view, the New START treaty is a modest and appropriate
continuation of the START I treaty that expired this past December,
subject, however, to there being satisfactory answers to a few
questions that have been raised. And so, I would like to mention a few
of those questions for your consideration as the committee moves
forward. Although this may not be a complete list, it includes
questions that I believe should be answered before a ratification vote
is taken.
Let me begin with missile defense. Any arms treaty that goes into
effect should focus on nuclear weapons reductions and not missile
defense limitations. In the New START treaty, however, there is at
least one clear limitation on U.S. missile defense systems.
Specifically, Article V limits the conversion of ICBM and SLBM
launchers into launchers for missile defense interceptors. Now, I
understand that the current administration has no plans for
transforming strategic weapons launchers into missile defense
launchers. The administration believes that it is less expensive to
build new systems rather than convert existing ones. But I am not sure
it is wise to restrict future administrations.
Another question concerns the verification program because it does
not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the
numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions under START I.
This complex part of the treaty is even more crucial when fewer
deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than were allowed in the past. As
a result, the proposed verification regime deserves thorough scrutiny.
It is also important that we maintain a nuclear stockpile that will
allow the United States to adequately cover the 30 or so countries
allied with us around the world that are currently under our nuclear
umbrella. And we should make sure that we have enough nuclear capacity
in case we decide to expand that nuclear umbrella to include perhaps
another 9-10 countries should Iran acquire a nuclear weapons
capability.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, while not a part of the New START treaty, I
want to call the committee's attention to two other issues that I
believe are related to it.
First, a section in the administration's Nuclear Posture Review
that appears on page 8 of the Executive Summary says that ``the United
States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
nonnuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance
with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.'' Presumably that
would apply even if a country were to use chemical or biological
weapons against us. I question the wisdom of that position. And my
apprehension comes from my own real-world experience.
On January 9, 1991, as the George H.W. Bush administration was in
the final stages of the buildup to remove Saddam Hussein's troops from
Kuwait, I had a
7-hour meeting in Geneva with Tariq Aziz, Iraq's Foreign Minister. At
the end of our discussion, when it was clear that war was inevitable, I
warned against using weapons of mass destruction against our troops.
``If conflict ensues,'' I told Aziz, ``and you use chemical or
biological weapons against U.S. forces, the American people will demand
vengeance. And we have the means to exact it. this is not a threat, it
is a promise.''
It is entirely possible, and even likely in my opinion, that Iraq
did not use its chemical weapons against our forces because of that
warning. Of course, the warning was broad enough to include the use of
all types of weapons that America possessed. Years later, when Saddam
Hussein was captured, debriefed and asked why he had not used his
chemical weapons, he recalled the substance of my statement to Aziz in
Geneva.
The Nuclear Posture Review should not limit our flexibility--not
just military, but also diplomatic flexibility--in responding either to
the threat of a biological or chemical attack upon us, or to an actual
attack.
Second, let me say that it is critical that we beef up the
reliability of our nuclear stockpile. Because our security is based
upon the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons, it is important
that our government budget enough money to guarantee that they can
carry out their mission. As we reduce warheads and launchers it is more
and more imperative that those we have left are safe and reliable.
Members of the committee, as you continue your consideration of
this treaty, I know that you will thoroughly examine these questions
and others that some may have about New START. It is important that
nuclear weapons treaties have the broadest bipartisan support possible
so that leaders in Moscow and other international capitals understand
that our country whole-heartedly supports the treaty.
Bipartisan support was important when the Senate ratified START I
in 1992 by a vote of 93-6 and START II in 1996 by a vote of 87-4. And
bipartisan support will be equally important with New START.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
That's a very helpful and comprehensive view. And I appreciate
the questions that you've raised. They are questions that the
committee is going to have to analyze, and we're already
starting to; I think they were raised yesterday. And I look
forward to furthering that discussion a little bit with you
now, perhaps.
With respect to the missile defense question, you noted the
point about the conversion of the silo, and you wouldn't want
to tie somebody's hands in the future. Would it be relevant to
you, would it affect your judgment about that, at all, if the
Missile Defense Agency, themselves, said to you, ``Mr.
Secretary, that's a particularly time-consuming as well as
expensive proposition, and we see no benefit from putting the
missile defense interceptor in the Midwest in our country,
because we want to continue to build the silos in what we
consider to be better locations, such as Alaska''? If they said
that to you, would that have an impact on you?
Secretary Baker. They have said that to me, Senator,
because I was given a brief by the administration, and I was
grateful for that, so I know that that's their position, and I
understand that position. I'm simply saying that I think that
the Senate, in discharging its duty to advise and consent, will
want to satisfy itself that, indeed, that it makes good sense,
not only to agree to it now, but to agree to it with respect to
future administrations, because it is treaty language. But, I
understand that the administration position is, it's cheaper to
build new ones, and we have no plans to use current launch
platforms for missile defense interceptors.
The Chairman. Let me ask you a question with respect to
barring the threat of nuclear retaliation, in the negative
security assurance, as we refer to it with respect to countries
that don't possess, and aren't seeking, nuclear weapons. I
remember very starkly, as a matter of fact, that 7-hour
meeting, and we were all glued to the television when you came
out of it. And I remember the very stark assessment that you
made about that meeting.
Secretary Baker. Yes.
The Chairman. So, I think we all recall that very, very
pointedly. And I think your diplomacy in those days, let me
also comment, was quite extraordinary. I think you were--if I
recall, you made about your 15th trip to Syria, 16th--15 or 16
trips--when you finally secured the support of Hafez al-Assad
and----
Secretary Baker. I think it was 15 trips to the Middle
East, but maybe only 9 to Syria.
The Chairman. Well, 9 to Syria. I'm trying to help--you
know, I'm telling a Texas tale, here. [Laughter.]
But, at any rate, Mr. Secretary, let me express my
admiration for what you did put together there. It was a
genuine coalition, it was a superb piece of diplomacy, and I
think we all respected it enormously then, and do----
Secretary Baker. Thank you.
The Chairman [continuing]. Today.
In that context, I have no doubt that the veiled threat of
nuclear retaliation, I would assume, must have helped.
Certainly I'm sure that Tariq Aziz understood it, and I would
hope that Saddam Hussein did. And the way things played out,
one has to assume that, of course, he did.
Now, that was a country that was trying to build a nuclear
weapon, so it would not be one of the cases that would fall
under this current concept.
Secretary Baker. Well, they were not in compliance with
their NPT obligations, is the point I think you're making,
Senator.
The Chairman. Agreed.
Secretary Baker. Yes. So, they really were not--they were
not a country that--with respect to which there would be any
prohibition----
The Chairman. Right.
Secretary Baker [continuing]. Under the current policy--the
new policy.
The Chairman. What I'm trying to get at is that--correct, I
agree with that. That's the point I'm making. But, it's really
a dilemma, and I'm trying to figure out how we deal with this.
We had been making a negative security assurance for over a
decade, I think, when you became Secretary of State. And we
never mentioned chemical or biological threat. And I suspect
that you didn't--I think, in your account now you didn't
specifically mention nuclear retaliation to Tariq Aziz. I think
you were veiled in the comment. There was a constructive
ambiguity. Is that correct?
Secretary Baker. I said, ``If you use weapons of mass
destruction against our forces, the American people will demand
vengeance, and we have the means to exact it.'' That's all I
said.
The Chairman. Perfect. That's exactly what I'm trying to
underscore here.
Now, in 2001, the policy that you, in fact, carried out
with Tariq Aziz changed, and it went from constructive
ambiguity to an outright threat, openly, of nuclear
retaliation. And that change had an impact in a lot of
different places; some would say, negatively in many places.
And the current administration has been trying to sort of work
back, if it can, to this place where you get the genie back in
the bottle, but it's hard to get back to ambiguity after
someone else has sort of thrown it out.
So, this is where we are today. And my question to you
really is--we have only a partial ambiguity with respect to
biological weapons--Do you see any way out of this? Is there
any construct that you think gets us back into the, perhaps,
virtues of a constructive ambiguous statement?
Secretary Baker. Well, there's some specific language that
I don't have, right now, in my head, in the new Nuclear Posture
Review, with respect to biological weapons, I think, that would
give us--there's wiggle room in the new Nuclear Posture Review
with respect to biological. There's none--there is none with
respect to chemical.
And I guess what I'm saying is, I don't see the harm or
lack of benefit, if you want to put it that way, in our being
able to tell a country that threatens the use of chemical
weapons against our forces, or that uses chemical weapons
against our forces, that is nevertheless in compliance with its
NPT obligation--I don't see the harm in our being able to tell
them, ``Hey, you do this at your peril. We're warning you,''
and not go any further than that. I mean, you could certainly
write it that way, I think. I don't understand why we want to
have--I understand, now, that there's only, if I'm not
mistaken--and you may want to delve into this in a closed
session, not--so, I won't name it, but I understand there's
really only--right now, only one country that would qualify for
the--that would be a problem under the current Nuclear Posture
Review. There's one country that has chemical weapons, that
would--that might be dissuaded from using them against our
forces if we were able to make such a threat.
The Chairman. We're going to take up that in classified
session. I think it's appropriate. I think it's a good
question----
Secretary Baker. And those are chemical, they're not
biological.
The Chairman. Yes, I understand.
Secretary Baker. Because there is--there's wiggle room on
the biological.
The Chairman. Would you reject a strategic arms control
agreement unless the administration went back on its Nuclear
Posture Review position?
Secretary Baker. Would I reject this particular----
The Chairman. Would you see that as a----
Secretary Baker [continuing]. Treaty?
The Chairman. Right.
Secretary Baker. No. What I said in my statement was, I
think this is related. I think it's something that, given the
fact that this committee is considering ratifying a far-
reaching treaty, you know, it's a treaty that is expected to
last for some time--it might not be a bad time to look at that
related question. That's all I'm saying.
The Chairman. Fair enough. It's a good point, and we will
do that. That's a good point.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Baker, in your statement, you noted that START
also enabled our diplomatic, scientific, and military
establishments to form deeper levels of trust and
collaboration. And you've also generously mentioned that the
Nunn-Lugar Act was a result of that kind of openness that
happened through diplomacy. And I would just say that one of
the effects of this, which you guided, was that--we talked a
little bit about chemical and biological--the START Treaty
dealt with nuclear weapons and counts and so forth, but, as a
part of your statement, you point out how the relationship
deepened, and, as a result, we began to talk about chemical
weapons and biological weapons. Now, this led to a very long
debate in this country over the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Secretary Baker. Yes.
Senator Lugar. And, as you recall, ratification of that was
not an easy task.
Secretary Baker. No.
Senator Lugar. And the Russians felt that we would never
ratify it. But, once we did, they were on the spot. And so,
they had to come along with it.
Now, this all came to mind last year at Sucha, which is now
a very large facility brought together by Russians and
Americans to destroy what may be as many as 100,000, and some
would estimate 200,000, missiles that contain nerve gas. And
the process is literally draining the nerve gas out of every
one of these, bituminizing it, as they say, and burying it in
the ground. And these are very mobile situations. You can put
one in the proverbial suitcase.
Secretary Baker. Yes.
Senator Lugar. Now, this was not contemplated by the START
Treaties, but nevertheless a very important product, because it
led to Americans and Russians coming together to understand
that they had a problem with the Caucasus, they had a problem
with terrorists, as well as we did. They even had problems with
their old nuclear warheads buried in vaults. I remember being
invited in to see some of these, which I--they were in a
morgue, bodies there in the tomb, with records of what sort of
servicing they'd had and how long they had been there, and some
hopes by the Russians, we would take out the oldest ones first
so there might not be an accident in Russia. Well, none of this
is contemplated by the treaty, but it comes about in sort of
the ambience that you describe as Americans actually get boots
on the ground in Russia and begin to take this seriously.
Now, at Sucha, I would just add, there was a press
conference with the Russians. I was fortunate to have at least
somebody who knew much more about our own chemical weapons
situation than I did, because the Russians assured the world
they were going to meet the deadline of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. There's no conceivable possibility.
Secretary Baker. No.
Senator Lugar. And the very plant we were dedicating
indicated there's at least a 7-year period of time, which all
the rest of the world saw at the same time. But, we had three
instances, in our country, in which we're not going to meet it,
either. And the point that I'm making is that sometimes there
is ambiguity in these situations, but if we're all standing on
the same platform, all talking to the same world press, there's
a degree of openness there that clearly was not true before you
and the Presidents that you served opened up the process. And
this is, I think, critically important for us to understand,
because, since December the 5th, we still are--have been
allowed into Russia. It's not a closed society. But, there
isn't any obligation on the part of the Russians to open up
anything.
Now, I appreciate--you know, we're getting arguments that,
``Why should we, in fact, destroy anything more?'' And so, I
want to ask this question of you today. Scorecards that we have
in our office indicate that there may be ``X'' number of
nuclear weapons deployed by both countries, a good many more
involves nondeployed, sort of, not destroyed, either. But, what
assurance can we give to those who would ask, ``Do we have
enough weapons to protect 30 countries, or more? Do--should we
be destroying anything or does this, in fact, inhibit our
security?'' In other words, some would say, ``Why in the world
are we even discussing an arms control agreement? We may need
every one of those bombs, and prepared to shoot them all off in
every direction necessary, at least to give the impression that
we're likely to do so.''
Give us some idea of the perspective you have of how many
weapons, for instance, we really need to fulfill these
obligations, quite apart from the condition they need to be in.
Secretary Baker. Well, Senator Lugar, I'm not someone who
would have expertise on that, particularly now, although I
think you have to rely on the judgment of your military
leadership. If the military leadership tells you that 1,550
nuclear warheads is sufficient to carry out our nuclear
umbrella responsibilities, I think you're not going to get any
better judgment than what they give you; or that 700 deployed
launchers is enough, 800 in total. So, if you're going to go
1,550 and 700-800, and the military says, ``This is all we
need''--and it's my understanding that's what they say; at
least that's what they told me when I asked them for a
briefing--that's--I don't know where else you go to get a
judgment on that.
You know, when I was negotiating START I, we were in excess
of--we were north of 6,000 warheads. I mean, and I think 1,550
warheads is a heck of a lot of warheads, seems to me, just as a
layman. But, I'm a layman on this, and I think if the military
leadership, the Joint Chiefs, and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and the national nuclear agency said, ``This is
what we need,'' I don't know where you'd get better judgment
than that.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for the great context that
you provide us, and background. And, you know, we advise and
consent; we don't really have an opportunity to change much.
What we can do is focus on modernization, which is not a part
of this, and ensure that what we do have is reliable. And
certainly if we knew that, we might even reduce more than we
have. So, that's something that's very, very important to us.
The missile defense piece is kind of interesting. I mean,
we started out in Russia's--has sent out a unilateral statement
that's very different than ours as it relates to missile
defense. And then you bring up the issue of if, in fact, we're
saying that there's no way this limits our missile defense, why
in the world would we say that we're going to do away with our
offensive launchers' ability to be converted. And I'm just
wondering if you might help us think through what somebody
might have been thinking, in basically restricting our ability
to do that, when, in essence, missile defense in no way was to
be impeded.
Secretary Baker. Well, the preambular language in the
treaty that's a little bit opaque and ambiguous, if you will,
is not something that I see as particularly unusual, given the
position the Russians--the Soviets, first, and then the
Russians, have had for many, many years, going way, way back.
And I think that Secretary Gates may have testified about this
yesterday. But, they've always had a fear of our ability with
respect to missile defense, our ability to construct a missile
defense system, because they can't afford it, and we can.
It was--it goes all the way back to Star Wars, certainly,
and maybe a little back before that. When Ronald Reagan
announced that he was going to do this, they went into
paroxysms of fear over there. And it was one of the things, I
think, that helped bring about the changes that Gorbachev
instituted in the Soviet Union. I think they concluded, at some
point, they weren't going to compete with the United States,
primarily economically, but also militarily, particularly with
respect to missile defense.
So, I think, if you'll look at the negotiating record of
this treaty--and I don't know this for a fact, but I've heard,
that the Russians wanted a limitation from the United States on
our ability to construct missile defense systems. And we said,
``No, we're not going to give you that.''
They made noises about missile defense even when I was
negotiating Start I and II with them. And even--but, back in
those days, we have the ABM Treaty, and it was in force. But,
they were still nervous about it.
So, it's--I think it just reflects what has been a
pervasive and is a systemic nervousness on their part that
somehow we're going to build a missile defense system that will
totally negate their offensive nuclear capabilities and will
lead to a destabilizing situation, because they'll be worried
about first strike, and so forth. That's why, I think, it's in
there. I think it was a matter of giving--tipping the hat, if
you will, to their concern, without really giving them
anything; although, as I pointed out in my statement, I do
think the one thing we did give them, in my view, is that we
agreed we will not use our current launchers, we will not put
our missile defense interceptors in those current launchers.
Senator Corker. And I know you've questioned that, whether
we should have done that, or not.
So, let me ask you this. So, we--we, I think, have all--
we're all focused, in a proactive way, in ensuring that the
administration invests properly in modernization.
Secretary Baker. Right.
Senator Corker. And we're--we have concerns about the
numbers and some double counting and all of that, that may be
taking place. We'll find out, certainly, soon.
But, as it relates to our relationships with Russia and,
just, others, what should our posture be, as far as our
aggressiveness, on spending money on missile defense right now?
I mean, if they have tremendous concerns about it, we obviously
have done something to--maybe it was a chit that we weren't
going to use anyway--but, what should our--in the Senate, in
the House, what should our posture be toward our country in
building up our missile defense program even more?
Secretary Baker. Well, I think that the posture should be
that we're going to pursue the recommendations of our military
leadership and the people who are versed in this field with
respect to what we need, because we have--as I understand it,
we have refused, in this treaty, to agree with the Russians
that we're going to put limitations on it, save that one I
mentioned.
Senator Corker. You know, everybody kind of Monday-morning-
quarterbacks around here. Do you see any missed opportunities
in this treaty? I know that many of the neighbors and--of
Russia are concerned about their tactical abilities. Were
there--are there things that you see that we might have
pursued, that we didn't?
Secretary Baker. In this treaty?
Senator Corker. Yes, sir.
Secretary Baker. I can't think of any, Senator. But, I did
characterize this as a modest and appropriate continuation of
what we've been--what we were doing, back during START I and
START II.
Senator Corker. So, we refer to NATO--and I know there have
been some discussions about our ability, with the number of
warheads we have, to protect the 30 countries. Just, while
you're here, and you're a person of--that we all respect
greatly, on both sides of the aisle--we've had discussions
about NATO here, and it seems to me that what's happened with
NATO is, we've sort of been--become the protector of all. The
budgets that the countries were supposed to maintain as it
relates to defense have not been there. And obviously, with
what's happening, that's going to diminish even more.
Would you give us any editorial comment, since you're
someone, again, that we all listen to, regarding what our
posture ought to be, as far as expansion of NATO, and just what
our relationship ought to be to NATO, in general?
Secretary Baker. Well, I've always seen NATO as a very
successful military alliance. It was an extraordinarily
successful military alliance as long as it was a defensive
alliance. Once it became a little bit of an offensive alliance,
it became less successful. And we're experiencing difficulties
with our NATO partners coming forward with their commitments,
particularly in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, we have had a nuclear umbrella extended to
many, many of those--of our nuclear partners for many, many
years. I'm not sure that they--that they're all beneficiaries
of it. Maybe some of the newer members may not be; I'm not
positive about that. But, it goes back to the 40 years of the
cold war, Senator. And we've had that nuclear--we've had that
commitment out there for a long time. I don't think we ought to
walk away from that. But, we ought to take a position with our
partners that, ``If you want to--if you want the benefits of
this alliance, then you have to bear your share of the
burdens.''
Senator Corker. My time is up. Thank you for your service,
and thanks for being here.
Secretary Baker. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Corker.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's very nice to have a chance to hear from you, Secretary
Baker.
Secretary Baker. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. In your testimony, you talked about the
importance of an effective verification regime as being a
critical component to arms control, and the importance of
having that kind of regime with Russia and--I assume, so that
we can have a sense of what Russia is doing. Are you worried--
or, can you talk about the benefit of the verification measures
that are in this new version of START?
Secretary Baker. In this treaty?
Senator Shaheen. Yes.
Secretary Baker. No. What I said in my prepared remarks,
Senator, was that this is one of the issues I think the
committee ought to take a close look at. And you really--I
don't think you can satisfy yourself just on a casual
examination of the literal language of the treaty. It's
important, I think, to talk to the people in our--again, in our
military who are going to be involved with the actual onsite
verifications and that kind of thing.
We have things today that--I pointed out that this
verification regime is nowhere near as intrusive and extensive
as what we negotiated in START I. But, today we have national
tactical means that we didn't, maybe, have then. There are
provisions in this treaty that say you can't interfere with
national technical means that commit the parties not to do
that. It's my understanding that we only have 27 Russian
nuclear facilities that we have to inspect under this treaty;
whereas, under START I, we had 73. So, you have all those
differences. But, I don't think anybody can tell you that the
verification regime is sufficient until you actually get down
there in the weeds--it's very, very complicated--and study the
details of it. The administration's point people will tell you,
as they've told me, that they're quite comfortable with the
verification provisions that are in there, and their ability to
verify Russia's obligations under this treaty. That doesn't
mean it--it might not--it wouldn't hurt to delve deeply into
it. All I'm saying is, it's a far different verification regime
than we had in START I, and therefore, it's worth a look.
That's what I'm saying.
Senator Shaheen. But, I'm correct that, right now, given
that START has expired, we don't have any verification----
Secretary Baker. We have nothing.
Senator Shaheen [continuing]. In place.
Secretary Baker. No. That's correct.
Senator Shaheen. And your point is that it's important to
have verification measures----
Secretary Baker. It's really important that we be in there.
It's been quite some--I think START expired December the 5th.
It's been a number of months now since we've been able to
really go in there and verify anything. And it's important that
we have that right. And not just so much because we might think
the Russians are cheating, which I personally wouldn't suspect
right now--first place, I think it would be, economically, very
difficult for them--but because it gives us a sense of
assurance, and them as well, when they're over here--it
promotes stability. It promotes atomic and nuclear stability.
And it's very good. And it leads to the kind of things that we
discussed in my colloquy with the chairman. If you can do
things diplomatically that would be impossible, in my view, if
you're on a razor's edge with another country, with respect to
whether you're going to have a nuclear conflagration with that
country.
Senator Shaheen. In your testimony, you also make a link
between arms control and an effective nonproliferation regime.
Do you think the START Treaty will be a signal to the
international community that the United States is serious about
carrying out its responsibilities under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty?
Secretary Baker. I think it will, Senator. And I think it
was. I think START I was, and I think START II was, frankly,
even though it was deMIRVing, which, of course, never got
ratified by the Russian Duma. But, yes, I think it's a signal
that the United States is honoring--or, United States and
Russia are taking steps to meet their obligations under--I
think it's Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
That may not be the right article; I'm not sure.
Senator Shaheen. And what do you think it would signal to
the rest of the world if we fail to ratify this START Treaty?
Are you concerned about what the interpretation from the rest
of the world might be to that?
Secretary Baker. I don't think that the rest of the world
would see it as the end of the world, but they would say,
``Wait a minute, now. You're sitting there with all those
nuclear weapons, and you negotiate a treaty, and then you don't
ratify it. What's your--where are you going? What is your
objective? What's your goal?'' But, having said that, you don't
want to ratify it unless you satisfy yourself with respect to
these questions that have been raised. And I'm sure you will.
We had these--we had questions like this, let me assure
you, with respect to START I and, to a lesser extent, with
START II. By the time of START II, the relationship between the
Soviet Union and Russia--and Russia and the United States had
totally changed. I mean, things were moving in the direction
that we--both countries wanted to see them go. And--but, I
think if you ratify, this treaty will help promote, in the
future, that kind of cooperation rather than confrontation.
Senator Shaheen. So, you're affirming what we heard
yesterday from the Secretaries Clinton and Gates, that there
are additional benefits, other than----
Secretary Baker. There are no--there were, with START I,
Senator; there were clearly a lot of additional benefits.
Senator Lugar has talked about one of them, the Nunn-Lugar
Initiative, and the Chemical Weapons Treaty--no, sorry--
Chemical Weapons Convention flowed from START I. The Lisbon
Protocol, where we were able to take--where we were able to
denuclearize three countries--Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine--all flowed from the START Treaty.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Baker, thank you for what you did, on behalf of
America, on behalf of the world, the original work you did on
the START Treaty. I think, when you talk about 6,000 warheads,
and now we're down to--I--you know, I thought--I think 1,500 is
a considerable amount. When you think of 6,000--I mean, you
only need one or two, really, if--to bring a country to its
knees. But, in any event, thank you for that.
Secretary Baker. Thank you.
Senator Risch. Thank you for the conversation you had with
Mr. Aziz. I can think of a couple of countries right now in the
world that it would be nice to have you go and have a sitdown
with them and tell them what's going to happen if they do
certain things, and have them believe you. It might make the
world a safer place.
You bring a lot of wisdom to this, which we really
appreciate. And you're focused on something that I've had a
concern about since the onset of this, and that is the advice
you gave, of not ensnaring the issue of missile defense in a
arms treaty that's not a defensive treaty, but, rather, an
offensive treaty. I think that's wise counsel. And it has
troubled me that it is in here. It's in the preamble. It's in
the--as you pointed out, it's in the body of the treaty itself.
But, one of the things that's most disconcerting to me is
the unilateral statements. And I've heard Secretary Clinton and
others who have come in here and said, ``Oh, don't worry about
that. Those are just unilateral statements. They're just
postures.''
You know, I come from a part of the country that you either
have an agreement or you don't have an agreement. And when I
read those unilateral agreements, we don't have an agreement.
In fact, indeed, we have irreconcilable differences when it
comes to missile defense. And it seems to me, if we're going to
have an agreement, we ought to have an agreement. And so,
again, I'm troubled by that. And I think your wisdom about not
ensnaring the two issues together, I think, is important. And I
think that's particularly true in light of the fact of where we
find the world today.
When you originally started this, we had the United States
and we had Russia that had nuclear weapons. And we were doing
the things that we did, and rightfully so, and it was important
that we had the treaty. But, you know, today it is really
important--the--our job, as a Congress, our job, as a
government, our first job, is to defend the American people.
And it seems to me, where we now have other countries--Iran,
North Korea, Pakistan, India--and the other issues out there--
it seems to me that a missile defense is more important now
than it's ever been. And I am particularly concerned about the
irreconcilable differences that we have, and how far apart we
are on the missile defense issue.
Secretary Baker. Well, I raised that question, Senator,
because I think it's something the committee should look at
before it takes its ratification vote. And I know it will. I,
frankly, would not share that much concern about it, for this
reason. The Russians are saying, ``We're now entitled to
claim--if America increases its missile defense, we're entitled
to claim that that's inimical to our strategic offensive
capability and withdraw from the treaty.'' Well, fine. They can
withdraw from the treaty anyway. And so can we. So, I don't
know how we are prejudiced by that, if the end result is, we're
going to--parties are just going to withdraw from the treaty.
There is, in fact, no restriction on the United States of
America's ability to move forward on missile defense, in
whatever way it wants, except one. That is, we cannot use our
current platforms--offensive weapons platforms for missile
defense interceptors. That's the only restriction.
Senator Risch. And I agree with that. I only wish that it
said that right in the preamble, and say, ``Look, this thing
has got nothing to do with missile defense, and the parties are
going to go their own ways on it.'' I wish it was in there.
Let me--I've only got a little time left--first of all, I--
you know, to me, nobody can argue that we really need a treaty
in order to have an inspection regime. And the inspection
regime, to me, is the most important part of this, because, as
you pointed out, I mean, either party can withdraw, for any
reason, or no reason at all, from the treaty, as it exists. So,
an inspection regime is important.
I shared your concerns, that you raised in your testimony,
about why the inspection regime was ratcheted back, here, when
it is the most important part of the treaty. Did you get a
satisfactory answer from the administration when you talked to
them about that?
Secretary Baker. I got a pretty complete answer, Senator,
because I asked them that question. And part of the answer was
what I've already said. There are fewer installations that need
to be inspected now, and there are unique identifiers that we
are now putting on every Russian nuclear weapon, that we didn't
used to be able to put on, as a part of our verification
process.
And the military, for what it's worth, are very comfortable
with the inspection regime that we now have. It is intrusive.
It is onsite. I raised a question about the counting rules in
this treaty, because in the treaty I negotiated, if a bomber
could carry 20 warheads, we counted it as 20. Today, you count
it as one. If you could--if you could put five nuclear warheads
on top of a missile--in my treaty, we counted it as five; in
this treaty, you count it as one. I said, ``Well, how--why
would you--how can you do that? How do you feel comfortable?''
They said, ``Well, we can climb up there and we can look at
those warheads on the top of that missile, and we can verify
whether they're there.'' And I agree with that. They're right
about that. I said, ``Well, what about the bombers?'' Well, a
bomber is a second-strike weapon, and it's not a first-strike
weapon, and it's not something that we're worried about not
being able to determine whether there's one or 14 warheads on a
heavy bomber.
But, the counting rules, Senator, apply, as well, for us. I
mean, whatever latitude there is, by virtue of a lack of
attribution of warheads, we get the benefit of that, just like
the Russians do.
So, all I'm saying about verification is, you ought to just
make sure that you look carefully, have your experts get in
there, and have detailed briefings to satisfy yourselves that
you've got enough verification capability. The military will
tell you that you do. And, you know, prima facie, you--I think
you have to take their word for it. But, you can go in there
and dig deeper and see if you have any reason to doubt it.
Senator Risch. Again, Secretary Baker, thank you for great
service to America.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Mr. Secretary, honored to be with you today. And they've
called a vote, so I'm just going to have to have one focused
question here.
I know you know better than anyone, when Ronald Reagan
first envisioned a strategic missile defense----
Secretary Baker. Right.
Senator DeMint [continuing]. System, that he had hoped, at
some point in the future, that that technology could render
nuclear missiles obsolete. And obviously, at the time, Russia
had the nuclear weapons, that defense system was focused at
them.
Yesterday, it became, in the hearing here, that--of why
there is an apparent discrepancy between what we say about the
treaty's effect on missile defense and what the Russians say.
And Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates made it clear that
their vision of missile defense has nothing to do with
defending against Russian missiles, that our current-day vision
in this administration is that missile defense is aimed at
North Korea or Iran or some rogue nation that could fire a
missile or two at us. But, the--but, this whole START Treaty is
based on the assumption that we will not develop a missile
defense system that in any way threatens Russia's offensive
capacity. That's what Secretary Clinton told me yesterday,
Senator Kerry agreed to. And for me, given the fact that Russia
is, in some ways, a defunct socialist Third World country at
this point, and we're agreeing to nuclear parity with them, the
idea that we are agreeing to a treaty that binds us to not
defend ourselves against nuclear missiles takes us back 30
years to a mutually assured destruction strategy----
Secretary Baker. Yes.
Senator DeMint [continuing]. Which seems to be a huge step
backward.
Secretary Baker. Well, Senator, I understand that. I think
the only answer to the question you pose is that mutually
assured destruction worked for 40 years, and it can work for a
few more years with respect to one country. If we have a
certain number of missiles, and they know, if they launch on
us, they're wiped off the face of the Earth, it's likely to
work. I think that's what they were--what the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense were probably saying
yesterday.
And therefore, the focus of this administration, at least--
maybe future administrations will have a different focus--is to
build missile defenses against the other threats that you
pointed out----
Senator DeMint. Right.
Secretary Baker [continuing]. The threats of Iran and North
Korea and maybe some other countries.
Senator DeMint. Right.
Secretary Baker. And we're quite free to build as--whatever
we want, with respect to those threats.
Senator DeMint. Thank you. That makes----
Secretary Baker. Yes.
Senator DeMint [continuing]. Clear. Thank you, sir.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Secretary Shaheen, do you have--Senator
Shaheen, any more questions?
I know Senator Kerry is hurrying to get back to the hearing
to keep it open. And--however, I think Senators, for the
moment, will have to vote, there being 6 more minutes----
Secretary Baker. It's all right.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Left to get there.
So, I will, on behalf of the chairman, recess the hearing,
because the chairman may, in fact, have an additional question
or two, or comment. I just want to express my own appreciation
again to you, Secretary Baker, for the constancy of your
observation about all these issues over the years, just as
fresh as 22 years ago, or whenever----
Secretary Baker. Yes, thank you, Senator.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. We commenced the first START
Treaty.
Secretary Baker. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lugar. We are recessed for a few minutes until the
chairman arrives.
[Recess.]
The Chairman [presiding]. We'll come back to order.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I apologize for the interruption.
I gather Senator DeMint did get to question.
Secretary Baker. Yes, he did.
The Chairman. So, I think we're through almost all the
questions, unless Senator Kaufman is going to come over, which
I don't know.
If I could just ask your indulgence for a few minutes
longer and ask you a couple of things.
You noted in your testimony that the verification program
is less extensive than the START I Treaty. When you say that,
are you referring strictly to the numbers of inspections, but
not necessarily to the quality or rigor of them?
Secretary Baker. Yes, Senator, I am. But, as I mentioned,
when I think--when you were out of the room, the military and
the people who are going to be in charge of running the
inspections tell me they've got all the ability and rights and
capabilities they need in order to assure--to verify compliance
with this treaty, and they're very comfortable about that. And
I mentioned, I think, as well when you were out of the room,
that there's far more latitude to use unique identifiers, and
that every Soviet missile, as I understand it, is going to have
its own unique identifier number. We didn't have that back in
the days of START I. We may have had it with respect to mobile
missiles, but not with respect to anything else. I think that's
right.
And there's going to be much more use of national technical
means and their provisions that say you can't interfere with
national technical means.
So, they're comfortable with it. All I'm saying is, I think
it's an area where--since it's so critical to the treaty,
that--where the committee will want to do its own due diligence
and dig in to make certain that it shares that comfort.
The Chairman. Indeed, we have that obligation, and we're--
--
Secretary Baker. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. Going to do that, for certain. I
would note that, in addition, I think, yesterday, Secretary
Gates advised the committee, or reminded the committee, that,
in this particular instance, a single inspection is going to be
able to be used in order to confirm data on launchers and
missiles, and then to count the reentry vehicles at the same
time, so they're combining two into one, so you get a twofer,
in a sense, which may account for some of the----
Secretary Baker. And there are fewer installations to
inspect, which I mentioned.
The Chairman. And there are only 27.
Secretary Baker. And you have telemetry exchange rights and
so forth.
The Chairman. Correct. Yes.
If I can ask you, generically, sort of looking at the
nuclear landscape today, I'd like to take advantage of your
presence here to share with the committee what levers you think
may or may not exist, or if there are any that haven't been
used by us, with respect to strengthening the NPT regime as a
whole, sort of the challenge that we face--in India, Pakistan,
North Korea, and Iran now. While you succeeded in reducing the
nuclearization of a number of states, and while some other
states have chosen to give it up since then, we still have this
very significant moment, at this point, with respect to Iran,
and what the implications would be for the gulf and a number of
Arab States. I just wonder if you'd sort of share your sense of
how you see that now, from afar, not dealing with it on a day-
to-day basis, but I know you follow it.
Secretary Baker. Well, I think that the NPT Review is an
extraordinarily important thing to see successfully
accomplished. But I, frankly, Senator, I'm--Mr. Chairman, I'm
not sure what you do when you have as many new nuclear powers
as we see today. I was not a big fan, for what it's worth, of
fudging a little bit with respect to nuclear cooperation with
some countries that developed nuclear weapons outside of the
NPT. I mean, I think--but, I can't--I don't know that there's
anything more we can do, other than to concentrate on the NPT,
try to strengthen it, consistently have a strong review, and do
the best we can to fight proliferation.
I do believe this, that--and I said this in my testimony--
if we have a good arms control agreement with Russia, that is
being observed by both countries, that will help us, in my
opinion, in the U.N. Security Council, deal with the problem of
Iran. And that is extraordinarily important. I mean, Pakistan
and India and North Korea and Israel, now, all have the bomb,
and some of them have it in violation of the NPT that they
signed, and some of them have it because they were never NPT
countries to begin with.
The Chairman. What, if any, observations would you make,
generically, about the Russian state, at this point, with
respect to how it might view its own need for these weapons? I
mean, we obviously lived--you lived, we lived--in a very
different world 20 years ago. You, yourself, said, a moment
ago, that you thought the chances of this kind of confrontation
are significantly reduced. Does that, do you think, lay the
foundation, potentially, for even further reductions?
Secretary Baker. You mean further reductions after this
treaty?
The Chairman. Yes.
Secretary Baker. Well, I think the logical path would be to
continue to try and reduce the number of warheads in the world
and the number of launch vehicles. You're not going to be able
to do any good, with respect to the problem you've just asked
me about, and that is the countries that have proliferated,
unless you are seen to be willing to reduce along with them.
Now, you know, some very prominent and distinguished voices
in American foreign policy--among them, Henry Kissinger and
George Shultz and Sam Nunn and Will Perry--have called for the
goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Well, the first person
that I ever heard call for that was my boss, Ronald Reagan.
And, of course, I don't think you can just dismiss that as
being an airy-fairy notion, but, at the same time, you've got
to realize how extraordinarily difficult that will be. I, for
one, would welcome an effort to see that happen--I really
would--without saying, for 1 minute, that we would get rid of
our nuclear capability or our nuclear deterrent.
And I would put at least three conditions on any such
effort.
Condition No. 1: Everybody would have to be at the table--
nuclear-capable nations and threshold states, as well--states
that might become nuclear.
And, second, everybody would have to take reductions
proportionately. None of this stuff about, ``You powers--the
United States and Russia--you've got to get rid of yours before
we're going to talk about--or, you've got to get yours down to
the level we are.'' No, sir. Everybody reduces proportionately.
If you do those two things--and that is, everybody at the
table and it--and stated as simply an aspiration or a goal, and
make it clear that America's not going to get rid of her
nuclear deterrent until such an agreement is negotiated.
And the third condition is the one we've been talking about
a lot here with this treaty verification: unlimited
verification, onsite, anywhere, anytime, anyplace.
You do those three things. Everybody's at the table,
including nuclear threshold states and nuclear-capable states,
proportionate reductions, and intrusive verification. That's
the only way you'll ever get something like that negotiated.
When you think about it, when you think about the countries
that will have to sign on to that, including the ones that
we've just mentioned--Pakistan, India, North Korea, Israel, and
all the other nuclear states, and some nuclear threshold
states, like Iran.
The Chairman. Well, I think those are very good criteria to
try to satisfy. I had the privilege of speaking at Wehrkunde
this year on this subject, and I don't disagree with you, it is
a noble and worthy goal; it is very complicated, obviously. And
a lot of aspects of conflict resolution between states would
have to be changed, attitudinally. But, in addition to that, I
wonder if it wouldn't also require, as a prerequisite, some
kind of restraints on conventional weapons, because if all you
do is shift it over to another place, the balance of power can
be played out in its own, you know, dangerous ways.
Secretary Baker. I think--I understand what you're saying,
but I think that would really complicate it.
The Chairman. Yes.
Secretary Baker. I really do. And what we're really talking
about is a nuclear cataclysm. I mean, conventional weapons
don't have that----
The Chairman. No, they don't. But, with respect to----
Secretary Baker [continuing]. Destructive capacity.
The Chairman [continuing]. War, if you go back and read the
history--I mean, this is all a sidebar--but, if you go--and you
know the history--when you're dealing with conventional
weapons--and somehow people think there's an exhaustion factor
or a supremacy factor that you wear out the other side, one way
or the other--it can be costly. And as we recall in the battles
of World War I, when they just threw people at it, with
expendability, generations were lost in a lot of countries.
I've sometimes wondered whether--I just wonder aloud--whether
that deterrent--I mean, there were thoughts, as we all recall,
with Lyndon Johnson, in Vietnam, about whether or not we
shouldn't invade the North. And most people would make the
judgment that one of the reasons we didn't was the presence of
two nuclear powers on the other side--Russia and China.
Secretary Baker. Yes.
The Chairman. So, you know, these are long-term goals.
Secretary Baker. Absolutely. And nobody ought to
underestimate the excruciating difficulty of ever getting to a
world without nuclear weapons.
The Chairman. But, you will agree with me, I know, that
every step one takes moving in that direction makes the world a
safer place, if you can do it in company with----
Secretary Baker. As long as it's done in balance, yes.
The Chairman. Right.
Secretary Baker. As long as it's not done unilaterally or--
--
The Chairman. Exactly.
Secretary Baker [continuing]. Or in a way that would be
destabilizing.
The Chairman. Agreed.
Secretary Baker. But, again, Mr. Chairman, I know you're
not advocating that we should go for a world without nuclear
weapons in which we reduce first and then everybody comes
along. I mean, that's a nonstarter.
The Chairman. Absolutely a nonstarter. By no means. I'm
also not willing to do it without the kinds of terms that you
described. I mean, if you don't have unlimited verification,
and you don't have everybody at the table, it would be
impossible.
Secretary Baker. You don't have everybody at the table,
unlimited verification, and proportionate reductions only. So,
if we've got a lot more than a small proliferator out there,
they nevertheless--if we take a 10-percent cut, they've got to
take a 10-percent cut. It's the only way you're ever going to
get the countries--in my opinion, you'll ever be able to
negotiate it diplomatically with the countries.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, as always, thank you for
being here to help us think through this treaty. I think your
comments today are important and well taken, and I think they
will help a number of folks here to sort of sift through the
pros and cons of this agreement, and to focus on the questions
that you've put to us, which are already, I think, surfacing as
the principal areas of concern that we have to flesh out. And
we'll be doing that over the next weeks.
Next Tuesday, we'll have Secretary Kissinger here, and then
we'll be moving in to get the negotiating team and have some
classified sessions and, hopefully, be able to move to the
resolution and ratification relatively quickly.
Thank you.
Secretary Baker. Well, thank you for having me, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. We're honored. Thank you, sir, very much.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL IN A POST-COLD-WAR WORLD
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 25, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Cardin, Casey, Kaufman, Lugar,
Corker, Risch, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Good morning, everybody. This morning we are enormously
privileged to welcome one of America's most distinguished
statesmen, perhaps the dean of diplomacy in the United States,
Dr. Henry Kissinger, who served as National Security Advisor
and Secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and Ford.
This is our fourth hearing on the New START Treaty. And by
our count, this is Dr. Kissinger's 66th appearance before this
committee. We are particularly fortunate to have him--that's
more than some Senators on the committee, I think--we are
particularly fortunate to have him back to testify, because of
his deep expertise on great power relations and nuclear
strategy.
It was 1957 when Dr. Kissinger helped define the study of
nuclear deterrents by publishing one of the classic books on
the subject: ``Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.'' And while
serving President Nixon, he successfully negotiated the SALT I
accord, the first agreement to limit United States and Soviet
nuclear weapons.
In 2007, precisely 50 years after publishing his book, Dr.
Kissinger once again shaped public debate on nuclear security
when he joined with George Shultz, William Perry, and our
former colleague, Sam Nunn, to endorse the goal of a world free
of nuclear weapons. That suggestion surprised many people. But
Dr. Kissinger and his coauthors wrote that the spread of
nuclear weapons to rogue states and possibly even terrorists
means that the world is now on the precipice of a new,
dangerous nuclear era. That, they argued, demanded a new way of
thinking.
Now, as you know, Dr. Kissinger does not just throw out
empty strategy pronouncements. And that's precisely why his
article laid out a list of concrete steps that would enhance
our security in the immediate future. One of the steps
Secretary Kissinger recommended is that we continue reducing
the size of United States and Russian nuclear arsenals. New
START, which lowers the legal limit on deployed warheads by up
to 30 percent, is a responsible move in that direction. Four
decades of bilateral arms control treaties with Moscow have
decreased fears of nuclear aggression and helped the United
States and Russia to work together. The New START Treaty
continues and advances the tradition of reductions that was
forged in the original START agreement and the Moscow Treaty.
Secretary Kissinger and his coauthors have also argued that
strategic arms control can help us to fight nuclear
proliferation. The United States and Russia, together, hold
more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. That is
why they wrote that we have a special responsibility--we and
Russia--a special responsibility, an obligation, and the
experience to demonstrate leadership. They said bilateral
nuclear reductions are key to our global effort to reduce the
spread of nuclear weapons.
This is a crucial point in time. Some have said that other
countries don't care how many nuclear weapons the United States
and Russia have. But, in fact, we've already seen that New
START can help us fight nuclear proliferation, and therefore,
nuclear terrorism.
Last week, Secretary Clinton testified to this committee
that New START had renewed American credibility at this month's
conference in New York to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. That means we've already been better able to isolate
Iran and prevent it from diverting attention from its own
troubling behavior. And the New START Treaty has reenergized
our relationship with Russia, helping us to persuade Moscow to
support a new round of U.N. sanctions against Iran.
Since 2007, Dr. Kissinger and his coauthors have elaborated
on their groundbreaking work. They have emphasized, among other
things, the importance of the original START Treaty's
verification mechanisms, which expired on December 5 of last
year. Skeptics have argued that the New START Treaty's
verification provisions are not as effective, because they
provide for fewer inspections. But that argument overlooks
three crucial details. First, there are many fewer facilities
to inspect today than when START was first signed. Second, for
the first time ever, Russian missiles will be given a unique
identification number that allows us to track that specific
missile. And third, United States inspectors will be able, for
the first time, to determine how many reentry vehicles are on a
Russian missile. Our military, at every level, as testified to
by Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
is confident that New START's verification provisions get the
job done. And the New START Treaty safeguards are better than
what we have right now. The fact is that until we ratify a
treaty, we have none. So, that's the choice.
Secretary Kissinger has also argued that we must reduce
tensions with Russia on missile defense so that we can
cooperate more effectively.
The preamble to the New START Treaty acknowledges the
relationship between offensive forces and missile defenses. It
does nothing more than acknowledge the relationship. As
Secretary Jim Baker testified last week, we're tipping our hat
to Russia's concerns without giving anything away.
Some people have insisted that the preamble constrains our
ability to deploy missile defenses against rogue states. So,
let me be clear on this point. This accord imposes no
restriction--zero--none--no restriction on our ability to
defend ourselves. In fact, the administration has been clear
that we will not be limited in any way in plans to continue to
build missile defenses to protect America from Iran or North
Korea or any other individual nuclear threat.
Dr. Kissinger knows how important bipartisanship is in our
consideration of arms control agreements. The Senate approved
SALT I by a vote of 88 to 2 during his tenure as National
Security Advisor. Many years later, the Senate endorsed the
original START Treaty, 93 to 6. The Moscow Treaty was approved
with 95 Senators voting in favor and none voting against. I am
confident that once this committee concludes its deliberations,
we will find overwhelming support for the New START Treaty, as
well.
And part of that deliberation takes place today, as it has
in our prior hearings, by inviting distinguished statespeople
from our country to share their thoughts with us. Today, as
I've said previously, we are pleased to have one of our most
distinguished statesmen of all, Dr. Henry Kissinger.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our
friend and distinguished witness, former Secretary of State and
National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger.
Last week, the Foreign Relations Committee received
testimony, as you pointed out, on the New START Treaty from
Secretaries Gates and Clinton and Admiral Mullen, and former
Secretary of State James Baker. In April, we heard from former
Defense Secretaries Jim Schlesinger and William Perry.
Our witnesses have expressed the common view that while
there are questions to be answered about the treaty and our
broader nuclear posture, a decision not to ratify the treaty
would forgo an opportunity and exacerbate the broader
challenges to U.S. foreign policy.
Our hearings on the New START Treaty come at a time when we
are witnessing fundamental changes in United States strategic
planning.
In addition to consideration of the treaty, this committee
is studying the full meaning of the new Nuclear Posture Review.
Moreover, the treaty has coincided with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty review conference underway in New York;
Iran's continued pursuit of nuclear programs; the development
of a new Strategic Concept for NATO; and discussions related to
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
The New START Treaty has been, both directly and
indirectly, linked to each of these issues, and Senate's
decision on START will reverberate throughout our strategic
relationships worldwide.
The New START Treaty follows a period when we have had
severe disagreements with Russia. Russian actions related to
Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea, for example, often have
exhibited a reflexive resistance to United States positions
even when we have substantial commonality of interest. Russia's
repeated use of energy exports as a political weapon and its
treatment of Ukraine and Georgia demonstrate a hard-line on
regional issues. In this context, we should avoid ratcheting
between excessive expectations and severe disappointment in our
attitude toward Russia.
We also should avoid the idea that the New START Treaty can
reset our relationship with Russia on its own.
But recent difficulties in the United States-Russian
relationship make the New START Treaty more important, not
less. Distancing ourselves from nuclear engagement with Russia
would greatly reduce our knowledge of what is happening in
Russia, hinder our ability to consult with Moscow in a timely
manner on nuclear and national security issues, further strain
our own defense resources, weaken our nonproliferation
diplomacy worldwide, and potentially, heighten arms
competition.
As Secretary Baker said last week, ``Despite ups and downs
in relations between Washington and Moscow over the last 18
years, START ensured strategic stability between the United
States and Russia.'' Dr. Kissinger, I hope that you will
elaborate on what role such treaties play in our relationship
with Moscow, as well as in sustaining United States influence
worldwide.
Beyond Russia, we must think strategically about how we
hope to shape the world in an era when developed nations are
contending with an explosion of debt that limits the resources
they are willing to apply to international problems, even as
opponents practice asymmetrical warfare that is expensive to
combat and terrorist cells seek weapons of mass destruction.
Meanwhile, the systemic risks to the global economic system
have increased sharply in recent years due to the debt
situation and the growing fragility of energy, food, and water
supplies, which are likely to be the subject of increasing
international conflict. In such an environment, few security
problems will be solved by increasing U.S. defense
expenditures.
Our margins for error in preventing nuclear proliferation
in the coming decades will be especially narrow. Reaching
common ground on START provides some foundation for continuing
United States-Russian cooperation on reducing the nuclear,
chemical, and biological dangers facing our world.
The NPT is under stress from the actions of Iran and North
Korea and the concerns of neighboring countries. The treaty is
also contending with the complications that arise out of an
expansion of global interest in nuclear power. The national
security of both Russia and the United States will suffer if
the world experiences a breakdown of the nonproliferation
regime. Unless the United States and Russia provide strong
leadership in this area, the coming surge in demand for nuclear
power will lead more and more nations to seek their own
enrichment facilities. If non-nuclear-weapons states opt for
major nuclear power programs and their own fuelmaking
capabilities, they could produce enough nuclear materiel for
thousands of nuclear bombs. This could generate a raft of new
nuclear weapons states, exponentially increase the threat of
nuclear terrorism, and provoke highly destabilizing arms races.
The New START Treaty, by itself, cannot address these
threats. But without a strategic nuclear treaty with Russia and
all the consultations and transparency measures that come with
it, we will have very little hope of tackling the more acute
security problems that confront both of our nations.
We are very fortunate to have Dr. Kissinger with us today
to examine the New START Treaty, our relationship with Russia,
and the broader strategic environment that we are attempting to
shape. And I look forward to his insights and our discussion,
as always.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Dr. Kissinger, we welcome your testimony.
As I said, your full testimony will be placed in the record
as if read in full. And if you choose to summarize or read part
of it, or all of it, the choice is yours.
Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE,
KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman. Can you push the--I think there's a button on
there. And if you pull it down a little closer, it'd be great.
Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, it's a
great privilege to be able to testify before this committee,
after a fairly long interval, actually.
I have submitted a statement. And I think it might be most
efficient if I summarize my views and gave the Senators an
opportunity to question me about them.
And I broke my statement, in effect, into two parts. One,
an assessment of the agreement. And second, the strategic and
geopolitical issues we need to deal with as a country,
independent of the treaty, as a result of a new, evolving
situation.
The subject of nuclear arms control grew out of the effort
of those who had created the largest and most destructive
weapons that had ever existed to resolve by negotiations some
of the ultimate consequences of the decisions that had been
made over a period of years.
A number of objectives have characterized these
negotiations: to reduce or eliminate the danger of war by
miscalculation, which requires transparency and verification;
to bring about the maximum stability in the balance of forces
to reduce incentives for nuclear war by design, especially by
reducing incentives for surprise attack; and to overcome the
danger of accidents fostered by the automaticity of the new
technology. All of these measures, combined, might merge into
an international system that would reduce or limit--and, in the
end, hopefully, eliminate--the use of these weapons as a
conscious choice.
And in the last decade, there have emerged two vast
additional dangers that profoundly affect the way we think of
weapons of mass destruction: the proliferation of these weapons
and the consequent danger that nonstate groups might acquire
some of these weapons.
As the chairman and ranking member have pointed out, the
treaty before you is an evolution of agreements that go back to
the 1970s, and particularly of the series of START agreements
that were started in the Reagan administration and then
continued, in some form, in every subsequent administration.
In my view, the agreement is a modest step forward,
stabilizing American and Russian arsenals at a somewhat reduced
level. It provides transparency. It reintroduces many of the
verification measures that lapsed with the expiration of the
last START agreement. It encourages what the Obama
administration has described as ``the reset of political
relations with Russia,'' and it may provide potential benefits
in dealing with the issues of proliferation.
I want to emphasize the point that both the chairman and
the ranking member have made, the importance of a continuing
dialogue with a country that, together with us, possesses 95
percent of the world's nuclear weapons, on the measures to deal
with these weapons. Without such a dialogue, the world would be
rudderless in front of its greatest dangers.
I have not had an opportunity to study the full text of the
treaties, including the associated protocols. And I'm aware
that, at the end of any negotiation, controversies arise
because the treaty merges the views of the parties with
different requirements and sometimes adversarial purposes. I
would have preferred some of the provisions to be somewhat
different. But, I do not believe they affect the central
purpose of the treaty. And having negotiated arms control
agreements myself, I recognize the difficulty of achieving
every objective.
In deciding on ratification, the concerns need to be
measured against the consequences of nonratification,
particularly interrupting a process that has been going on for
decades, the relationship to the NPT, and to the attempt to
achieve a strategic coherence.
So, for all these reasons, I recommend ratification of this
treaty, unless the deliberations of this committee reveal
material that is not before me and that I do not anticipate
encountering.
Having said this, let me raise a number of concerns that
affect, not the text of the treaty, but the nature of the
international situation within which this treaty takes place
and to which the deliberations of this committee could play an
important role.
The first is that, when SALT agreements were negotiated in
the 1970s, the Soviet Union was a global adversary. And the
danger of strategic war with the Soviet Union was a major
factor in all our deliberations. Today, a strategic war with
Russia is a relatively negligible danger. We have an obligation
and should attempt to control the nuclear armaments. But, the
relationship with Russia now has to be defined, importantly, in
political and not only in strategic terms.
Second, when arms control started, the world was
essentially bipolar. As weapons are reduced and as other
arsenals proliferate, we can envision a world of multilateral
nuclear establishments. And in the interval before--where we
are and where, perhaps, we may wind up after a period that
President Obama described could--would not be reached in his
lifetime. When all--when nuclear weapons are hugely reduced, we
have to, as a country, ask ourselves a series of questions of
how one defines a multilateral strategic balance, how one
defines the number of delivery vehicles, what happens when
nuclear countries make an alliance with each other, confronting
a third state, and what will be the impact on the international
situation when we achieve our objective and deterrence has to
be achieved primarily by conventional weapons.
I repeat, I'm not raising these concerns as an objection to
the treaty, but as a guide to issues that need to be discussed
as our debate continues.
Two considerations follow from this. The first is that, at
some early point, the negotiations that are now bilateral have
to merge into multilateral discussions. We will reach a point
where further reductions of American and Russian weapons, by
themselves, will have to take into account the growing relative
importance of the arsenals of other countries that are being
augmented.
The second point is that, as we go through these
reductions, tactical nuclear weapons will have to be included
in any further deliberations. The imbalance in tactical nuclear
weapons between Russia and the states around it cannot be made
up under reduced nuclear strategic weapons on our side or
decreasingly made up by our own strategic forces.
So, those two considerations should guide future
approaches.
And finally, I would like to say two things. Concerns have
been raised with respect to missile defense and with respect to
modernization. I agree with the chairman. I do not believe this
treaty is an obstacle to a missile defense program or
modernization. Those are decisions that the United States can
and should take as part of its own strategic design. And I
share the view that a robust program of modernization must be
an integral part of the ratification of this treaty and be
discussed between the administration and the Senate as the
treaty deliberations go forward.
In short, this committee's decision will affect the
prospect for peace for a decade or more. It is, by definition,
not a bipartisan, but a nonpartisan, challenge.
I thank you for the opportunity of appearing before you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Former Secretary of
State, Kissinger Associates, New York, NY
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Lugar. It is a pleasure
to meet again with this committee, whose membership has substantially
turned over since I last testified before it.
Let me begin by placing the treaty into the context of arms control
issues as they have evolved in the half-century that I have dealt with
them. I consulted in the Kennedy administration during discussions on
Berlin and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in the 1960s. As National
Security Advisor and Secretary of State, I participated in the
negotiations of several arms control agreements in the 1970s. In
various advisory capacities and as a concerned citizen ever since, I
have advocated both arms control measures as well as a strong national
defense.
The subject of nuclear arms control grew out of the seemingly
paradoxical effort of those who had created the largest and most
destructive arsenals to avoid by negotiation the ultimate consequences
of their own decisions. The advent of nuclear weapons and other
instruments of mass destruction causes strategy to be conducted at the
edge of an abyss from which, should we fall into it, there may be no
return. An increasing familiarity with the implications of modern
weapons technology has generated a growing desire to mitigate its
consequences to the greatest extent compatible with our security.
A number of objectives characterize these negotiations: to reduce
or eliminate the danger of war by miscalculation, which requires
transparency of design and deployment; to bring about the maximum
stability in the balance of forces to reduce incentives for nuclear war
by design, especially by reducing incentives for surprise attack; to
overcome the danger of accidents fostered by the automaticity of the
new technology. All these measures combined might, if successful, merge
into a strategy that would reduce or limit--and, in the end, perhaps
eliminate--the use of these weapons as a conscious choice.
In the last decade, there have emerged two vast additional dangers
that profoundly affect the way we think of weapons of mass destruction
and arms control: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the consequent danger that nonstate groups might acquire some of these
weapons.
The treaty before this committee is the latest of a series of
measures seeking to control strategic arms going back to the 1970s when
the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons were limited in the so-called
SALT agreements. The treaty before this committee is an evolution of
the START treaties begun in the Reagan administration and elaborated by
its successors of both parties. It is, as I shall argue, probably the
last agreement on strategic arms that can be made without taking
tactical nuclear weapons into account. It is also approaching the end
of what can be achieved by bilateral negotiations on the subject
between the United States and Russia. Growing existing arsenals and
proliferation will soon impose a multilateral context.
The current agreement is a modest step forward stabilizing American
and Russian arsenals at a slightly reduced level. It provides a measure
of transparency; it reintroduces many verification measures that lapsed
with the expiration of the last START agreement; it encourages what the
Obama administration has described as the reset of political relations
with Russia; it may provide potential benefits in dealing with the
issue of proliferation.
I have not had an opportunity to study the full text of the treaty
including its associated protocols. I understand that the Senate has
not yet received the obligatory National Intelligence Estimate required
for ratification procedures nor the State Department judgments on
compliance performance. Before making its final decision, this
committee will no doubt carefully review those documents. The committee
has also available to it the concerns of previous witnesses,
particularly those of Secretaries Baker and Schlesinger. The committee
could make a significant contribution by clarifying some of the
treaty's ambiguities.
At the end of any negotiation, controversies arise because a treaty
merges the views of parties with different requirements and sometimes
adversarial purposes. I personally would have preferred to avoid
establishing a separate category for deployable but not deployed
missiles or a different counting rule for airplanes. I would also have
preferred to avoid prohibiting the use of missile launching sites for
strategic defense as unnecessarily limiting strategic options of a
future President. But having negotiated arms control agreements myself,
I recognize the difficulty of achieving every objective. In deciding on
ratification, these concerns need to be measured against the
consequences of nonratification, which would profoundly affect global
confidence in American purposes.
Based on the evidence currently available, I would submit these key
judgments:
The treaty, if observed, would maintain strategic stability
with Russia over the next decade at somewhat lower force levels
than currently existing.
The treaty allows for the necessary modernization of our
forces. The obstacles to the necessary modernization are not
provisions in the treaty but strategic decisions within our
unilateral capacity to make.
The treaty does not unduly restrict our ability to build and
deploy an effective missile defense system--again, a decision
that will be shaped by strategic choices in our power to make.
The treaty, with its inspection and verification regime, is
a significant confidence-building measure that may help lay the
foundation for more constructive United States-Russian
relations.
Verification must be adequate to detect any attempt to break
out in sufficient time to devise an appropriate response. The
committee will want to pay special attention to the protocols
dealing with these subjects and to expert testimony on that
subject.
long-term issues
Having said this, allow me to use this opportunity to raise
additional concerns not as obstacles to ratification but to shape
further negotiations we might pursue on the subject of arms control.
The committee might use the ratification process to help shape a
bipartisan consensus with respect to them.
We need to adapt our policies to the changed political context.
While negotiating traditional arms control, we must recognize that the
danger of a strategic nuclear conflict with Russia is negligible. The
United States-Russian relationship can no longer be defined in purely
strategic terms. Nor should arms control bear the entire weight of this
relationship. The contribution of the Russian-American relationship to
world peace must be judged importantly in political terms--on the
global issues like nuclear proliferation, environment, and energy.
When strategic arms control with the Soviets began 40-plus years
ago, the strategic world was bipolar. Other nuclear arsenals were not
of sufficient dimension to affect the overall balance because the
numbers of strategic warheads and delivery systems were so vast.
Three key elements have changed in the intervening years:
First, the number of nuclear weapons states has grown, as
have the arsenals of some smaller nuclear weapons states.
Second, the numbers of American and Russian strategic
warheads and deliveries systems have been radically reduced and
are approaching levels where the arsenals of other countries
will bear on the strategic balance, as will tactical nuclear
weapons, particularly given the great asymmetry in their
numbers in Russia's favor.
Third, nonproliferation policies have failed to arrest the
spread of nuclear weapons--including in the immediate issues of
North Korea and Iran.
A multilateral strategic context is inherently more complex than a
bilateral one. It obliges us to think through questions as these:
How is a multilateral strategic balance to be defined?
How many warheads and delivery vehicles of which kind are
needed to deal with other contingencies, including those
arising from proliferation and terrorism, and still have a
sufficient residue to maintain a credible deterrent posture
vis-a-vis Russia?
How would we deal with a potential hostile alliance of
nuclear-armed states? And, further, how does the prospect of
nuclear alliances affect the strategic equation?
What are the requirements of a credible war-fighting
strategy in this context?
As nuclear arsenals are reduced and conventional defenses
grow in relative significance or as deliberate substitute, what
is the relevance of the lessons of history that deterrence is
difficult to calculate with conventional weapons, hence the
frequency of wars throughout history?
As we move toward lower numbers, extended deterrence guaranteeing
allies and partners needs to be dealt with. For as strategic arsenals
are reduced, the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear
weapons is bound to erode. The large Russian stockpile of tactical
nuclear weapons, unmatched by a comparable American deployment, could
threaten the ability to undertake extended deterrence. This challenge
is particularly urgent given the possible extension of guarantees in
response to Iran's nuclear weapons program and other programs that may
flow from it. For all these reasons, as the Nuclear Posture Review
suggests, we are approaching with this treaty the limit beyond which
further reductions are inadvisable unless they include Russia's
tactical systems.
This committee is not in a position to settle all of these issues
in the context of one ratification debate. But it can start--and indeed
already has--the discussion, raise public awareness and convey a sense
of the Senate with respect to them to guide future national decisions.
modernization
The United States is the only nuclear weapons state not currently
modernizing its nuclear capabilities and supporting infrastructure. The
pool of scientists, engineers, designers, and technicians that has
underpinned our nuclear forces is shrinking as we continue to rely on
designs 20 years old.
As part of a number of recommendations, my colleagues, Bill Perry,
George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and I have called for significant investments
in a repaired and modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and added
resources for the three national laboratories. We expressed this view
in a statement of January 20, 2010, as follows: ``Maintaining high
confidence in our nuclear arsenal is critical as the number of these
weapons goes down. It is also consistent with and necessary for U.S.
leadership in nonproliferation, risk reduction, and arms reduction
goals . . . Departures from our existing stewardship strategies should
be taken when they are essential to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective deterrent.'' In determining what is essential, I believe that
great weight should be given to the findings of the bipartisan
Schlesinger-Perry Commission: ``So long as modernization proceeds
within the framework of existing U.S. policy, it should encounter
minimum political difficulty.''
Bill Perry has summed up the challenge before our country: We must
``move in two parallel paths--one path which reduces nuclear dangers by
maintaining our deterrence, and the other which reduces nuclear dangers
through arms control and international programs to prevent
proliferation. Given today's threats of nuclear proliferation and
nuclear terrorism, these are not mutually exclusive imperatives. To
protect our Nation's security, we must succeed in both.''
This committee's decision will affect the prospects for peace for a
decade or more. It is, by definition, not a bipartisan but a
nonpartisan challenge. Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to
your deliberations.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Secretary
Kissinger. We appreciate the testimony.
I was particularly struck when I read your testimony. I'm
particularly struck by the strategic overlay that you set out,
in the back part of your testimony that you've just referred
to. You raise an intriguing and important set of questions.
I do think--I'd like to come to that, but I first want to
try to bear in on the treaty itself, for a moment, if I can.
But, I think those questions that you have posed with respect
to the geopolitical, slash, long-term nuclear challenge are
very, very important ones. And they're, in some ways, more
interesting and challenging.
With respect to the tactical nuclear weapons, there is, I
think, a complete agreement in this committee and in the
administration that that is the next step, that we cannot
proceed further, in a sense. It was never assumed that that
would, in fact, be part of this discussion. It was sort of the
next discussion. I think you would agree that, notwithstanding
the imbalance on the tactical weapons, that the levels that
we've arrived at, the 1,550 warheads and the 700 delivery
vehicles, leave you confident that this arrangement that comes
out of this treaty will, in fact, leave the United States in
the position of strength and the position of deterrence that it
needs. Is that correct?
Dr. Kissinger. Yes. Yes, it does. The--any employment--any
use of nuclear weapons will produce hugely catastrophic
consequences. So, one should not visualize an unlimited use of
tactical nuclear weapons that one would not respond to. I think
the present numbers will enable us to maintain deterrence.
The Chairman. And in your prepared testimony, you said that
a failure by the United States to ratify this treaty would
profoundly affect global confidence in American purposes. I
think that's an important warning, and I wonder if you would
elaborate a little bit.
Dr. Kissinger. Well, I would argue, on two levels. One,
under the NPT, the United States obligated itself to negotiate
about the reduction, and indeed eventual elimination, of its
nuclear weapons. Second, the expectation, globally, that a
serious effort is being undertaken to limit the prospects of
nuclear war, has become an almost permanent feature of the
international negotiating scene and a major commitment,
especially of this administration.
This START Treaty is an evolution of treaties that have
been negotiated in previous administrations, of both parties.
And its principal provisions are an elaboration or continuation
of existing agreements. Therefore, a rejection of them would
indicate that a new period of American policy has started that
might rely largely on the unilateral reliance of its nuclear
weapons and would, therefore, create an element of uncertainty
in the calculations of both adversaries and allies. And
therefore, I think it would have an unsettling impact on the
international environment.
The Chairman. And also in your opening, you said that, with
the inspection and verification regime that's in this treaty,
you deem it to be, ``a significant confidence-building measure
that may help lay the foundation for more constructive United
States-Russian relations.'' Could you also elaborate, perhaps,
on what you could envision coming out of this, on the plus
side, as a result of that confidence-building?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, we will need, as I indicated in the
second part of my statement, a reevaluation of global strategy,
in the light of the emerging pattern. One could imagine an
ultimate goal in which the incentive to initiate nuclear war is
removed, to the greatest extent possible. And this, of course,
would have to be coupled with a redesign of our own military
forces so that they can fill whatever gaps occur as a result of
that decision. So, as negotiations proceed, verification of the
strategic forces of an increasing number of countries should be
included in the negotiation process to bring about these
objectives.
The Chairman. Fair enough.
With respect to the modernization issue of our forces, you
have deemed that this treaty allows for sufficient
modernization to take place to maintain the security of our
deterrent. Is that accurate?
Dr. Kissinger. I'm not aware of any provisions in the
treaty that prevents the modernization of our forces. The
modernization of our forces depends largely on unilateral
decisions we make--and should make--as part of our own
strategic design.
The Chairman. And you say that; that is, in fact, what you
said in the testimony. I just wanted to make that a more
visible part of this colloquy, if you will, that there's
nothing in the treaty that restrains that modernization. That
is really a decision that is made by the executive department
and the Congress. Correct?
Dr. Kissinger. The--modernization, in my view, depends on
decisions made by the executive branch of the government and
approved by the Congress.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Secretary Kissinger, I wanted to ask you,
again, the broad question which faces this committee. The
committee has been discussing a good number of aspects of our
strategic posture and future defense plans, which constitute a
great deal of importance to us. But, the immediate question, it
seems to me, is, What would be the consequences of failure to
ratify the New START Treaty with regard to United States-Russia
relations or our broader nonproliferation agenda?
Dr. Kissinger. Since Russia and we possess 95 percent of
the world's nuclear weapons, an understanding between the
United States and Russia about the consequences of their use,
and restraining their use, where that is possible, and
restraining their numbers, is very important. For a long time,
the dialogue with respect to nuclear weapons has been sometimes
the principal feature of our relationship.
During the period of bipolarity, this was understandable.
But, now we are moving into a period where, actually, strategic
conflict between the United States and Russia is extremely
unlikely. So, what we negotiate with each other should become a
pattern that ought to spread to the rest of the world. But, it
also ought to be considered, by both sides, as a means to
restrain the pressures they put on each other in the political
field. So, it is not really compatible with the spirit of this
treaty, or with the purpose of this treaty, if, on the one
hand, there is restraint in the deployment and building of
nuclear weapons while, on the other side, issues like
proliferation are not dealt with in a compatible fashion.
So, the long-term impact of the treaty will have to be
judged, importantly, by the degree to which Russia is willing
join in a regime, not only of the relations of Russia to the
United States, but of the spread of nuclear weapons to other
countries; at the moment, specifically, Iran.
Senator Lugar. Well, that's a very important consideration.
I know, from your experience, as you've proceeded through
treaty-building on several occasions, the conversation may have
started out with regard to nuclear weapons, but very frequently
the relationship involved other weapons of mass destruction--
chemical weapons, even allegations of biological weapons. And
one reason for the treaties, both on the Russian side and ours,
was the degree of transparency illustrated by the transport of
American service personnel and contractors to Russia, which was
of value to the Russians themselves. This was the case simply
because the Russians were fearful, with the breakup of the
Soviet Union, that elements in the Caucasus, or various other
people that were fairly close by, might gain access to fissile
materiel, or, in smaller situations, chemical weapons in the
form of shells.
Now, I mention this because the relationship that has been
denoted by these treaties has brought this degree of
transparency, in terms of counting and vision, but, likewise,
with the sheer numbers of Americans with boots on the ground in
Russia who were very helpful and were perceived that way by the
Russians.
Now, what I perceive, as we proceed in this particular
situation, is that the appreciation of how important that has
been is sort of being lost in translation. This is of concern
to me. The transparency aspect of this is critically important.
Now, I'm convinced the treaty does not restrain, as you pointed
out, any developments of our own weapon systems, nor our
missile defense. But, I am concerned the verification aspects,
the relationship, the status of American personnel implementing
agreements in Russia, and so forth could be vastly inhibited if
we do not have accord with this treaty. Do you share that
feeling?
Dr. Kissinger. I agree that the verification provisions of
this treaty, even if they are somewhat modified from the
previous one, are extremely important for this relationship.
I would also like to supplement an answer I gave to the
chairman when he asked what other steps might occur. I believe
that the control of fissible materiel around the world will
have to be a crucial aspect of a continuation of this process,
and that, again, requires that some of the key verification
provisions of this agreement should be put into force.
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank you for that statement. With
regard to developments in related areas, for instance, chemical
weapons, the plant at Shchuchye providing for the destruction
of nearly 2 million chemical weapons shells and nerve agent was
established last year. It appears that both Russia and the
United States, although we are parties to the Chemical Weapons
Convention, will not be able to meet the April 2012 deadline
for possessor states.
One of the values of having this close relationship with
the Russians regarding the destruction of our chemical weapons
stockpiles is that we both know what the other has at this
point, and so does the rest of the world.
So, I get back to the point that transparency is
tremendously important, in terms of our relations with every
other country, as well as our joint work with the Russians in
trying to stop proliferation efforts by other actors around the
world. This is going to be difficult for both of us, even if we
currently possess 90 to 95 percent of the weapons.
But, I thank you again for your testimony today.
The Chairman. Thank you Senator Lugar.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kissinger, thank you for your testimony and the help
you're providing this committee as we consider the ratification
question.
I wanted to highlight a couple of bullet points in your
testimony. Page 3--and I'm reading in pertinent part, I won't
read every bullet point--but, you say, on page 3 of your
prepared testimony, that, ``Based upon the evidence currently
available, I'd submit these key judgments.'' The first one is
the following: ``The treaty, if observed, would maintain
strategic stability with Russia, over the next decade, at
somewhat lower force levels than currently existing.'' The
second bullet point--I'm just reading the first sentence of
that, ``The treaty allows for the necessary modernization of
our forces.'' And then the third bullet point has this full
sentence, ``The treaty does not unduly restrict our ability to
build and deploy an effective missile defense system--again, a
decision that will be shaped by strategic choices in our power
to make.''
All three are--including the other statements you make in
that section--key considerations for us as we deliberate.
And I guess the one that has had a lot of attention paid to
it is missile defense. And I just wanted to comment further, if
you have any further comments, about the question of missile
defense and the ratification impact in that question.
Dr. Kissinger. Well, first, with the relationship of the
treaty to missile defense. There are two aspects in which the
treaty talks about missile defense. One is in the preamble, and
the other is in the prohibition against using missile-launching
silos--offensive missile-launching silos for missile defense.
The first of these provisions is not prescriptive. It
states that the strategic equation will be affected by changes
in missile defense status. In an abstract world, and if I could
have written the treaty without a Russian counterpart, I might
not have put that in. But, it's a statement of--it's a truism.
It is not an obligation. It's something to which countries can
react unilaterally.
The second one, about prohibiting the use of existing
offensive silos, my understanding is--and reinforced by
conversations with Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright--we
have no plan to do this. So that the only argument one could
raise with respect to it is to say, ``Why constrict the
flexibility of a future President with respect to deployments
that he might make, even though no current plan exists for
making them?'' I have sympathy for that argument, but I don't
think it is central, because it does not inhibit anything that
the military chiefs have asked for or that has ever been in our
plans.
Now, on the second question: the degree of missile defense.
I don't think any country, any President, or any administration
can adopt a strategy that leaves the country totally vulnerable
to any kind of attack. So, it seems to me there is a fair
degree of consensus that one should have missile defense
against accidental launches, terrorist attacks, and the kind of
attacks that the emerging proliferating regimes develop. So,
the area of controversy would be to what degree one should also
protect against less-than-all-out attacks from major countries,
since there also seems to me a consensus that a total defense
against an all-out attack is, at present, not possible. So,
it's in this range of the degree of protection against less-
than-all-out attacks, we should move toward missile defense,
and the degree to which this might primarily serve to trigger
another offensive buildup by a major opponent. That is the
range within which the debate will be taking place. But, I
don't think the treaty is relevant to that debate.
Senator Casey. I wanted to ask you a question that's not
central to the ratification issue, but is a point that you've
raised. And that's the connection between the very real concern
that we have about nuclear terrorism and this particular
treaty.
I was very fortunate to see the film, ``The Nuclear Tipping
Point,'' where you were--you and others were raising real
concerns about where we are in the world, in terms of the
threat posed by nuclear terrorism. And I was struck by one of
your statements, where you said, ``With the classical notion of
deterrence, there are consequences before which an aggressor
would recoil. In the world of suicide bombers, that calculation
does not compute in any comparable way.'' Your statement. And
then later, you said, ``Once nuclear weapons are used, we will
be driven to take global measures to prevent it from happening
again.'' So, some of us have said, ``Let's ask ourselves, `If
we have to do it afterward, why don't we do it now?' ''
If you could elaborate on those statements, and especially
in the connection between the very real threat of nuclear
terrorism and this process of ratification.
Dr. Kissinger. Let me describe the problem of deterrence as
I have experienced it in my own life.
I started writing about this when I was a young professor
at Harvard, almost by accident, because I commented on a
personal letter that a friend had received regarding the then
new doctrine of massive retaliation. I have always been in
favor of a strong national defense. But, I must also tell you
that the most searing issue I faced, in my own mind, when I was
Security Advisor or Secretary of State, is what I would do if
the President asked me that--he had exhausted all his
diplomatic options and the time had come to move to the--to
nuclear war. Because the consequences of nuclear war go beyond
anything that any leader has ever had to face previously.
And so we've, for all this period, been caught in the
dilemma that we need a strong defense and we need to find some
way to limit its consequences. And that's what these
discussions are about.
How one strikes this balance has to be rediscovered every
decade or so. And I don't know--I may have forgotten what the
precise point of your question was.
Senator Casey. Oh, about the nuclear terrorism itself, and
how that affects our debates about the----
Dr. Kissinger. Well, it's----
Senator Casey [continuing]. START Treaty----
Dr. Kissinger [continuing]. The point I made, ``What
happens if nuclear weapons are used?'' If we woke up one
morning and found that 500,000 people had been killed somewhere
in which, I think, there would be perhaps overwhelming
pressures for two things: One, to avoid it happening in this
country, if it hasn't happened in this country; and second, to
prevent it from ever happening again. I don't think one will be
able to live with the consciousness that this could happen as a
regular feature of international diplomacy. So, I raise this
question: ``Why don't we ask ourselves the question now of what
we would do then, before it has happened?''
Senator Casey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Kissinger, it's a sobering thought. An important
one.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony
and your service. I've certainly respected your career.
I found your opening comments semirevealing. I mean, in
essence, you haven't spent a lot of time on the treaty itself,
and haven't seen the protocols, and do not anticipate, though,
that anything is going to be in the written document that is
problematic, but believe that we should ratify it. And the
reason I find that revealing is, it seems to me that what
you're saying is, the treaty itself is not particularly
important, that what is important is the dialogue that we have
with Russia, and that we need to continue that dialogue, and,
regardless of what the document says, that that dialogue is
more important than the document.
Dr. Kissinger. Senator, I have not addressed the protocols
because they are not yet available. But, in order to prepare
myself for the testimony, I have consulted the following
officials: Admiral Mullen, Secretary Gates--regarding
modernization--interdepartmental briefing team including
General Cartwright and headed by Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher
and another briefing team from the National Security Council
headed by Gary Samore. As for the treaty itself, I called it a
``modest step and--of somewhat reduced numbers.'' Then I listed
a number of things which I would have--about which I have some
questions, some of which I have mentioned here. But, then that
raises the issue, is that a reason not to ratify it? Well, some
of them can be fixed by dialogue between the committee and the
administration. But, the fact that I might have avoided this
distinction between nondeployable--nondeployed deployable
weapons, and that I might have put this 100 into this limit,
rather than make one limit of 700 and another limit of 100
which might have been more designed to permit a claim of
substantial reductions than of the architecture of the treaty,
all that, in my view, is no reason not to ratify the treaty.
But it should be clearly understood that the missile defense
issue and the modernization issue are not affected by the
treaty, that the treaty supplies a modest progress toward
reduction and perhaps a possibility to build Russia into the
nonproliferation process.
Senator Corker. So, it seems to me that, though, in many
ways, you look at this, just--if I look at the--everything that
you've said, that this is sort of form over substance, that us
continuing to negotiate with Russia helps us, as it relates to
other nonproliferation efforts. And even thought the treaty is
modest and we don't really know, necessarily, everything that
the outcome is going to be, but we should continue to support
these negotiations.
Let me ask you this question. It seems to me that we put a
lot of weight on the negotiations with Russia as it relates to
nonproliferation. I wondered, in your previous life, if the
conditionality of our relationship with countries is of greater
problem, as it relates to nonproliferation. In other words, our
friends, we know, have nuclear weapons, and we wink and nod at
that, or create unusual relationships, as we have with India.
Has that--is that more of a problem, as it relates to dealing
with nonproliferation with other countries, than the positive,
if you--which is the greater issue, us dealing with Russia, or
that other issue?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, the history of our relationship with
Russia has been that of a strategically adversarial
relationship. And throughout the cold war, all policymakers had
to consider the possibility that a conflict with Russia might
occur, or at least would affect the calculations of key
countries. So, there is that history.
On the other hand, there is--this adversarial relationship
need not be frozen and, therefore, one could hope, or expect,
that Russia would build itself into an international system.
I'm disappointed at the conduct of Russia with respect to
the Iranian issue. And I'm disappointed that they have
specifically excluded the air defense system that they have
agreed to sell to Iran from the sanctions that they have
joined.
So, improvement is still very important in our relationship
with Russia. I'm saying that this treaty should contribute to
inducing Russia to conduct itself in a more restrained fashion
internationally. It can contribute to such a dialogue but, in
the end, Russia will have to be judged, like other nations, on
the degree to which it builds itself into a peaceful
international system.
Now, of course, countries with a different history, like
France--we treat their nuclear establishments in a different
way. But, I would argue that the further spread of nuclear
weapons, regardless of the domestic structure of the regime,
will create instabilities which will make the danger of nuclear
war greater and, in time, intolerable. In the cold-war period,
there was only one deterrent balance one had to worry about. In
a multipolar nuclear world--in a world with multiple deterrent
forces, countries have to calculate so many deterrent balances
simultaneously, and they may not have the technical means of
controlling their weapons, and they may have value systems that
are less stringent with respect to the loss of life than ours--
that some accident or miscalculation becomes more probable.
Therefore, we must oppose the spread of nuclear weapons,
regardless of the domestic structure of the countries that are
acquiring them.
Senator Corker. But, we really--but, we don't. And we
continue to sort of go down a path of everybody knowing things,
but not acknowledging things. And I just wonder how that
affects our nonproliferation efforts.
And I know my time is up.
I've noticed, in the past, that you have--or, in recent
times, you've said that you have a vision of a--you believe
that we should have a nuclear-free world. And as I look at the
tremendous weight that you placed on that answer to your friend
and--about the--you know, if you were faced with--or, I guess,
later in life, faced with going to the nuclear board, and what
your answer would be. I mean, I'd love to hear, at some point--
and I realize, today, my time is up and we'll move on to
another topic--but, it seems to me that there's a--having
nuclear weapons, on one hand, keeps countries from engaging
with each other militarily, and, on the other hand, as you
mentioned, people, domestically--not having the ability to keep
them from being used inappropriately, creates other issues. And
it seems to me there's a tension there that's interesting, that
I know we won't get to today.
But, I find your remarks interesting, and would love to
talk with you more, offline.
Dr. Kissinger. Let me make a comment on that point,
Senator. The--if you read the statements that the so-called
``Gang of 4'' have made, they've usually described the nuclear-
free world as a vision that might happen at the end of a
process. But, while this process is going on, we are still
living in a nuclear world in which the issues of deterrence and
security will have to be respected and taken seriously.
And we have also said--and it has been particularly well
expressed by Senator Nunn--that vision is like climbing a
mountain which is covered in clouds, and you don't really know
what the summit looks like and what obstacles you'll find, but
that doesn't mean you can't establish a way station along the
way, in the territories that you can see, and discover what you
might see later on.
So, the vision, it's what might be the end process, but the
policy choices are the choices that are before your committee.
And let the various administrations that have dealt with them,
and this administration that is dealing with them, has to
consider in a concrete, and not in a visionary, way.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kissinger, we thank you very much for your
extraordinary service to our country. And it's a real pleasure
to have you before our committee.
I want to get the benefit of your thoughts as to this
treaty and its way that it's being judged as toward the
relationship of Russia and the United States. I'd be interested
in your assessment as to why Russia believes that ratification
of this treaty, from its point of view, benefits its country.
Some could argue that Russia is interested in getting a
strategic advantage over the United States on nuclear weapons,
and whether this treaty has that impact, or whether Russia
wants to improve its relationship with the United States or
improve its international leadership on these types of issues.
And I would welcome your thoughts as to why you believe Russia
was interested in extending the START Treaty, and the specifics
as to what it sees as its advantage.
Dr. Kissinger. Of course, one should not look at this
treaty in isolation. This treaty is an evolution of treaties,
that have been made by a series of American and Russian
administrations, which suggests that an unconstrained nuclear
arms race has appeared too dangerous to leaders of both
American political parties and almost every incarnation of
Russian leaders over the last 30 years.
Russia now, in it since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
has faced a problem of identity. Through much of Russian
history, the Russian state has been identified with its foreign
expansion and with what the outside world certainly considers a
kind of imperial expansion. This collapsed in the 1990s. And,
since then, Russia has attempted to redefine a new role.
Undoubtedly, there are some elements of imperial nostalgia.
Equally, there are elements of recognition that, with frontiers
of thousands of miles of demographic imbalance with China, of
ideological challenge from Islam, and new frontiers in Europe,
that the era of the Russian global expansion is coming to an
end.
So, how can Russia define itself in these circumstances?
For them, being taken seriously by the United States is an
important element. At the same time, there is probably also--
temptation of creating a situation that enables Russia to
assert its power around its periphery. And this undoubtedly
contributes to their reluctance--and, in fact, so far,
refusal--to discuss tactical nuclear weapons, at all.
So, one should not look at this treaty as a means by which
Russia seeks to achieve a great advantage over the United
States. The most they can achieve is to mitigate the decline of
its global role by a measure of parity with the United States.
It is certainly true that they have limited themselves to
what the economy undoubtedly imposes on them, anyway. But, I
don't know what we would gain by the slightly higher ceilings
of less than 100 missiles that have been talked about.
Senator Cardin. Thank you for that response.
As we look forward to our relationship with Russia,
confronting other nuclear threats around the world, you
commented briefly about Iran and your disappointment about
certain provisions not being included in the sanction
legislation. Do you believe that Russia will be a reliable
partner with the United States in dealing with the threat of
Iran becoming a nuclear state? Or, for that matter, we could
expand that to North Korea or problems develop in Pakistan or
India. Is Russia focused with us, or not?
Dr. Kissinger. In the mid-term future, a nuclear Iran is a
greater danger to Russia than it is to the United States,
because it is contiguous. And the border populations of Russia,
which are mostly Islamic, are also adjoining Iran. And, based
on my own conversations with Russian leaders, I'm convinced
that they are very concerned about Iran.
On the other hand, they are reluctant to be drawn into a
conflict in which they might bear the brunt while we begin to
ease out of it. And, second, their economy creates temptations
to benefit from sales to Iran, even while they recognize the
long-term dangers.
But, if present trends continue, and if Iran continues to
build its nuclear establishment, I don't see how Russia can
avoid facing some of the consequences.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Secretary Kissinger. Appreciate
it.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kissinger, thank you for your many years of
service to the United States.
I noted, in your opening statement, you observed that, ``We
must recognize that the danger of a strategic nuclear conflict
with Russia is negligible.''
And I think that that fact is virtually universally
recognized or accepted on our side. And the result of that, I
think, is that there are a lot of people in the same place you
are, that they haven't really looked at the treaty that
closely, because they're more interested in the form than they
are the substance, because, obviously, that form has served us
very well over the last four decades.
The question I have for you is this. Obviously, we are
where we are today, and it's very different than where we were
40 years ago, as far as our relationship with Russia is
concerned. Do you anticipate, or do you foresee, any
circumstances in the future where that might change and we'd go
back to a much more hostile relationship than what we have
today? What are your thoughts on that?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, if Russia were to try to rebuild its
empire in Central and Eastern Europe, it would undoubtedly be
opposed by the United States. That would produce the conflicts
that occurred during the cold war. And I can imagine other
circumstances of Soviet expansion which we would surely resist.
But, in the cold war, the adversarial relationship was almost
congenital, in the sense that Russia attempted to intervene in
every part of the globe. There was a period, in the 1970s,
where Cuban troops were sent around to Africa, Russian troops
marched into Afghanistan, and pressure was exerted on China. I
don't think Russia has the capability for that kind of foreign
policy today.
But, the reason to approve this treaty is not to placate
Russia. We conducted negotiations with Russia on these weapons
at the height of the adversarial relationship, because we
thought that it was essential to have a dialogue with Russia,
with a country that had this huge capability, if only to avoid
war by accident. Also, the nature of these weapons was so
unique that they could not be dealt with in the manner of
foreign policy before World War I.
I can imagine that we will have disagreements with Russia
in the decades ahead, but I do not believe that they will reach
the intensity of the cold-war period. I consider it possible
that Russia and we will develop congruent views of what a
peaceful international order should look like. But, under no
conditions should a treaty be made as a favor to another
country, or to make another country feel better. It has to be
perceived to be in the American national interest.
Senator Risch. Thank you for those observations, Mr.
Secretary.
The other point, in your opening statement, that caught my
eye was your comments about modernization. Your observation
that the United States is the only nuclear power that is not
going through modernization, I think, is an important
observation. And I appreciate that, and there are a lot of us
in this body that are very concerned about that, particularly
in light of the fact that we are going to further reduce our
numbers. Modernization is absolutely critical.
So, I appreciate your thoughts on that, and I hope you'll
continue to keep----
Dr. Kissinger. Well, I strongly support a robust
modernization program. And I put several criteria into my
statement that apply to that.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Secretary Kissinger.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this
hearing.
And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for testifying, and for your
long service.
Can you talk, a few minutes, about what the implications
would be of failure to ratify this treaty by the U.S. Senate?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, it would signal a reversal of an
American policy that has been carried on for several decades,
and it would be particularly upsetting, in the light of the
rhetoric of the incumbent administration, if it were disavowed
by the Senate in its first major initiative on this subject. It
would impose on us the necessity of taking some concrete steps
to indicate that we are now conducting a different policy, to
define its character, and seek public acceptance for it. The
likelihood of the rejection would be that both sides would
carry out the provisions anyway, without a formal treaty, as
happened with respect to SALT II. But, then there would be no
verification in Russia, and we would be much less certain about
the framework of the strategic balance.
Senator Kaufman. Well, what do you think it would affect,
in terms of United States-Russian relations?
Dr. Kissinger. In?
Senator Kaufman. United States-Russian relations. How do
you think that would be affected if we----
Dr. Kissinger. It would certainly lead to some less
cooperation in the proliferation field. The likelihood is that,
after some years, things would get back to about the point
where we are now, and some other agreement would emerge. When
negotiations have gone on for 50 years, in one way or another,
and when they have been carried out by every American
administration, in some manner, and by every Russian
administration, in some manner, you would not simply move into
an uncontrolled environment.
But, I want to make absolutely clear that I am not here
because of whatever benefit Russia gets out of it. The reason
for ratifying the treaty is the benefit to America's national
interest and global peace.
Senator Kaufman. How about what the impact would be if we
fail to ratify on nonproliferation efforts, do you think?
Dr. Kissinger. Ratifying the nonproliferation?
Senator Kaufman. No, not ratifying this treaty would have
no efforts to----
Dr. Kissinger. That would----
Senator Kaufman [continuing]. Get nonproliferation----
Dr. Kissinger. Nonproliferation has to be a central
American objective, for the reasons that I gave. And the
ability to achieve these objectives depends on the credibility
of your government. It would be more difficult for us to
achieve the objective that, again, has been proclaimed on a
bipartisan basis for many decades if we abandoned a treaty
negotiated by this administration and that formalizes numbers
substantially agreed to by the Bush administration before it.
Senator Kaufman. Can you talk about why it's so difficult
to get a technical--I mean, a tactical nuclear weapons
agreement with Russia?
Dr. Kissinger. Russia--part of the reason is that the
strategic perspectives of the two sides are different. Russia
has major countries on its borders whose populations outnumber
Russia's. It substitutes tactical nuclear weapons for manpower.
Second, Russia has had a long history of invasion from foreign
countries. Third, undoubtedly there are vestiges of the
imperial and Communist tradition in their system. So,
negotiations with Russia are always difficult.
As I pointed out in my formal statement, we cannot go
further toward strategic reductions without including tactical
nuclear weapons. But this statement applies to follow-on
agreements. With respect to the current agreement, the argument
always has to be, does the overall direction that this treaty
represents justify proceeding, particularly when weighed
against the consequences of nonratification? And second, will
we carry out those things, like modernization and in the
missile defense area, that we can do on our own, and that are
not constrained by the treaty, and where we should not use the
treaty as a means of--by inventing arguments that they are
constrained?
Senator Kaufman. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman.
Dr. Kissinger, just a few questions to wrap up here and
perhaps take advantage of you, if we can, for a moment, on some
broader issues.
You recently wrote, regarding the Nuclear Posture Review,
that you agree with the basic thrust of trying to reduce our
reliance on nuclear weapons, ``where we can safely do so,'' I
think is the language it uses. And, of course, that makes
sense, and that's what we've been trying to do. But, you took
issue with the statement that the United States would not
respond to chemical or biological attacks with nuclear weapons,
and you said that should be left ambiguous.
I agree with you. I think the constructive ambiguity has
been, in fact, a fairly effective way to deal with this through
the years. But, it was the last administration, the previous
administration, that actually gave up on ambiguity, in 2001, in
that Nuclear Posture Review, when it dropped the negative
security assurances that had existed under President Carter,
President Clinton, and President Bush--George H.W. Bush--and it
then proposed using nuclear weapons to take out the chemical or
biological capacities of an enemy.
The question is, sort of, twofold. I think the current
Nuclear Posture attempts to restore some of that old ambiguity,
but the question is, Can you restore the ambiguity after you've
gotten rid of that? Can you put the genie back in the bottle,
or not? Or maybe you can, just by the statement. Maybe the mere
statement of a new administration, in fact, recreates the
ambiguity.
I'm wondering if you might comment on that. Can you get it
back? Is it better to live with it than without it?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, I thought that the statement in the
NPR was unnecessary. What it said, if I remember it correctly,
was that we would not retaliate against non-nuclear-weapon
states, that use biological or chemical weapons, with nuclear
weapons. I thought that this could be read to say to non-
nuclear-weapon states, ``You don't need nuclear weapons,
because you can use biological and chemical weapons.'' So, I
thought that interpretation was--could be dangerous.
And, second, I thought it was a mistake that one provide a
roadmap for our use of nuclear weapons in such extreme
circumstances.
Now, can this be retrieved? There will, of course, always
be an element of uncertainty, having made the original
statement, even if it is revoked. But, the President can
undoubtedly find authoritative ways of saying it, and people
tempted to use chemical and biological weapons will not be
sitting there parsing it so finely, because the consequences of
our retaliating would be very severe.
What I think would be important is that a clear tone be
established about firm resistance--one, to proliferation, and
second, to weapons of mass destruction--that do not leave any
impression that, within the administration, there is a big
contest going on that has an unresolved outcome. This is within
the power of the President to accomplish.
The Chairman. With respect to this treaty that you've
testified on today, last month you were quoted, in the
Christian Science Monitor, as saying that, ``It's a useful step
that deserves ratification.'' Is it fair to say that--I think,
listening to your testimony today, that that is still your
bottom line with respect to this treaty?
Dr. Kissinger. Yes, that's the essence. That's the essence
of my position. And it is based on the belief that it is in the
interest of the United States and it's not done to placate some
other group of powers.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I do want to take advantage of
your being here, for a moment--I think we'd be remiss if we
didn't--in looking at the back part of your testimony, which
is, I think, important. And you say there, that, ``The
contribution of the Russian-American relationship to world
peace must be judged, importantly, in political terms, on the
global issues, like nuclear proliferation, environment, and
energy.''
I wonder if you'd just share with the committee, for a
moment, based on your long experience of dealing with these
issues, and your observations now, sort of, Where do you think
we are in our foreign policy? Is there a missing ingredient?
What could we do better? Should there be a focus that we're not
paying enough attention to? And to what degree is the global
economic situation going to have an impact on the
implementation of our foreign policy goals?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, I mean, I'm doing this off the top of
my----
The Chairman. You're very good at that, Mr. Secretary.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Kissinger. As a general proposition, I would be happier
if the administration didn't find it necessary, in every
statement it makes on foreign policy, to attack the previous
administration. I think this has--this is--whatever the
differences were, I think it should stand on its own direction
and try to build as broad a basis of foreign policy as they
can. It also weakens necessary continuity because it raises the
question whether successors to this administration will disavow
it as it so frequently does its predecessor.
Then, on the general view of foreign policy, I probably
would look at foreign policy more from a point of view of
balancing incentives and penalties based on the national
interest than on the belief that one can build a consensual
basis of foreign policy largely on the emotional rapport with
the American leadership. The world contains countries with
vastly different cultures and vastly different stages of
development. So, it would be very difficult to believe that
stability can be brought about entirely by a single formula.
But, this is my basic approach to foreign policy. But, I have
also made every effort to be nonpartisan about the
administration, and I think what we need is the broadest
possible basis of bipartisan foreign policy.
On issues like Iran, I believe that the consequences of
failure of negotiation need to be brought home more
emphatically than they have been. But, I would also point out,
I'm not volunteering this, I'm doing this in response to the
chairman's question. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. I thank you.
It's a subject that I'd enjoy--I'm sure we all would--sort
of, following up with you sometime, perhaps privately. I don't
want to abuse the privilege that brought you here today.
We're very grateful to you for coming in to help build the
record.
Senator Lugar, do you have any additional comments?
Questions?
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, let me just take advantage of
the opportunity to mention, as you note, Dr. Kissinger, that a
123 Agreement with Russia has been proposed by the
administration. It sort of backs up some of the dialogue we've
had today in this hearing about working with the Russians,
potentially, to provide fissile materiel to other countries for
peaceful use in their power industries, and therefore trying to
retain some control over the use of fissile materiel worldwide.
Given the fact that Russia and the United States possess so
much of the world's supply of fissile materiel, we have some
mutual interest in working constructively together to try to
control the use of it.
But, do you have any views on the 123 Agreement that you
would share with us?
Dr. Kissinger. Let me first make a general comment about
Russia. In the decades ahead, I think a cooperative
relationship with Russia seems to me in the benefit--to the
benefit of both countries. The historic Russia that existed has
no scope anymore for its traditional expansionist policy, and
it has to fit itself into some kind of cooperative
international system. With the changing situation in Europe and
in Asia, new possibilities for partnership with Russia exist.
But it will be a difficult process with many ups and downs.
On fissile materiel, it seems to me crucial that the
fissile materiel that has been and is being produced will be
brought under some kind of international regimen. Otherwise,
the spread of peaceful uses of nuclear technology is going to
create incentives to divert into nuclear weaponry. On this, we
and Russia have a particular opportunity--and indeed, over
time, necessity. So, I would be sympathetic, without having
studied that agreement in detail.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, sir.
And let me just comment, finally, Mr. Chairman, that I
think our conversation with the Secretary today has been
important with regard to many issues, but it particularly
illustrates that the New START Treaty has brought to the fore
the possibilities for discussion of half a dozen foreign policy
issues which relate to Russia, but go beyond the treaty. As
you've perhaps observed, Dr. Kissinger, it's been a long time
since this committee or the Senate actually held a process in
which debate and deliberations took place on a new arms control
treaty. People have been making reports as to how many Senators
were around the last time such a thing occurred. And what has
struck me is that--and I appreciate the point that you've made
with regard to bipartisanship in foreign policy--these hearings
and the discussion of the START Treaty have sometimes offered a
platform for discussion of half a dozen different
administration foreign policy initiatives, some of which have
greater accord between the two parties than others.
What I've feared a bit is that we sometimes fail to get
back to the deliberations as to whether this treaty should be
ratified, as opposed to ``this treaty should or should not be
ratified, if, in fact, five or six other things occur.'' That
is problematic. So, I appreciate your comments specifically
about the importance of ratifying this treaty and the basis
that we have, therefore, for carefully considering, with or
without Russia, nonproliferation efforts or our own buildup, as
we see fit. I think it's going to be important, at least for a
moment, to isolate some of our attention on the treaty,
notwithstanding all these other arguments that we may be
having.
And we thank you for coming, with your broad experience,
having dealt in a bipartisan way, really, for decades, as you
had to, both inside and outside administrations because that's
an important ongoing part of our history.
Dr. Kissinger. Well, thank you both for the manner in which
this hearing has been conducted.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar, thanks for focusing in on the
task at hand. We appreciate it.
And, Secretary Kissinger, we're enormously grateful.
Again, let me just comment that I know the Secretary is
going to celebrate his 87th birthday this Thursday, so we join
in wishing you well. Happy birthday. Many happy returns. And
thank you for coming here today.
We stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Russell D. Feingold,
U.S. Senator From Wisconsin
Secretary Kissinger, thank you for being here today. There has been
confusion during the previous hearings on this treaty about the
relative importance of reducing the Russian and United States strategic
arsenals, particularly compared with the importance of pursuing missile
defenses and reducing tactical nuclear weapons. I would like to use
this hearing to get some clarity on what is really needed for us to
maintain a credible deterrent, what we can realistically expect from
missile defenses, and the risks associated with maintaining an arsenal
larger than what we need for sufficient deterrence.
You have written that we are in a new era, where the threat of
proliferation and the danger that terrorists would gain access to
nuclear materiels requires us to prioritize bilateral efforts to reduce
the size of our arsenals. Some of my colleagues on this committee who
oppose this treaty do not seem to have taken this call for action to
heart.
______
Responses of Dr. Henry Kissinger to Questions Submitted
by Senator Feingold
Question. Please describe the danger of terrorists accessing
nuclear weapons and materiels and why this threat requires us to work
to reduce the size of our arsenals so that they are no larger than is
needed to maintain a deterrent.
Answer. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have made it
clear that they seek to acquire nuclear weapons. We should have no
doubt that, should they obtain one, they will be inclined to use it: A
nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist is the ultimate weapon of
terror. The simple credible threat to use a nuclear weapon would give
terrorists considerable leverage to blackmail states and advance their
goals. We do not know how to deter a terrorist use of a nuclear weapon.
The condition that undergirds deterrence against states--namely, the
possibility of putting another society at existential risk--does not
obtain with regard to terrorists.
As a result, it is imperative to secure nuclear weapons and their
components, including fissile materiel, against efforts by terrorist
organizations to acquire them. One key element of such an effort is
reducing the size of nuclear arsenals to the minimal level consistent
with strategic deterrence and strategic stability because that reduces
to the greatest extent possible the number of targets that need to be
secured against terrorists. Where that level is, is a matter of debate,
but it lies without doubt well below the current levels of the American
and Russian arsenals and below the levels stipulated in the new START
agreement before the Senate.
Question. Some of my colleagues on this committee have argued that
we gave up something for nothing with this new treaty, particularly
with regard to the limitations on nuclear delivery vehicles. My own
assessment differs significantly from that view. For example, we have
agreed to go from 880 to 800 launchers under this treaty. This leaves
us with a clear advantage over the Russians, who--according to the
Congressional Research Service--are estimated to have 620 launchers and
limits on their ability to produce a higher number. Meanwhile,
according to independent reports, we have the capacity to upload far
more warheads onto our launchers than the Russians.
a. Given this calculus, would you agree with the assessment
that this treaty actually preserves our own strategic
advantage?
Answer. The issue is not whether this new treaty preserves our own
strategic advantage; it is whether this treaty preserves strategic
stability. In my judgment, the numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery
vehicles stipulated in the treaty and the verification and monitoring
regimes provided for by it reduce to an acceptable level the risk that
Russia could break out of this treaty and undermine strategic stability
to our disadvantage.
b. Would you also agree that the reduction in launchers we
have agreed to in the treaty still leaves us with more than
enough to provide a credible deterrent, including a deterrent
to Russia's tactical nuclear weapons?
Answer. The number of launchers agreed to in the treaty is, in my
judgment, sufficient to provide a credible deterrent against Russia's
use of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. But, as I noted in my
testimony, I do not believe we could go to lower numbers without making
Russia's tactical nuclear weapons an element in the overall limits. We
have reached levels, from which further reductions in strategic
weapons, absent reductions in Russia's tactical arsenal, would raise
questions about the credibility of our guarantees of extended
deterrence among our allies in Europe and Asia.
c. On balance, would it be fair to say that the very modest
concessions we made in this treaty are far outweighed by the
need to retain the ability to do inspections and to maintain
strategic stability through having a treaty?
Answer. As I said in my testimony, in deciding on ratification, the
concerns have to be measured against the consequences of
nonratification. This treaty is an evolution of treaties that have been
negotiated in previous administrations of both parties. Its principal
provisions are an elaboration or a continuation of existing agreements.
Therefore, a rejection of this treaty would indicate that a new period
of American policy had started that might be founded largely on
unconstrained reliance on our nuclear weapons. That would create an
element of uncertainty in the calculations of both adversaries and
allies, it would erode strategic stability, and it would have an
unsettling impact on the international environment. In my judgment,
whatever concessions we might have made in negotiating this treaty are
outweighed by the imperative to maintain and enhance strategic
stability, as this treaty does.
d. Could we go further in reducing our launchers, consistent
with Russian levels, and still have a credible deterrent?
Answer. As I noted in my testimony, how much further we can go in
reducing our launchers and still retain a credible deterrent and
maintain strategic stability is a matter that requires further study.
Reductions below the ones stipulated in the new treaty would require us
to take into account Russia's tactical nuclear weapons and, depending
on the size of the reductions contemplated, might also require us to
take into account the arsenals of other nuclear weapons states, notably
China, and the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional
states. We have reached, or will soon reach, the point where strategic
stability--and credible deterrence--is not a bilateral equation, as it
has been since the beginning of the cold war, but a more complicated,
multilateral one.
Question. Some of my colleagues on this committee have stated that
we need to make sure that we do not constrain our ability to deploy
missile defenses to deal with the emerging threats, for example, Iran.
I agree. However, there seems to be a misunderstanding about whether
this treaty has any bearing on our ability to develop this system. In
your view, is Russia likely to withdraw from the treaty if we develop a
limited missile defense system clearly designed to address the threat
posed by a particular rogue nation with a small number of nuclear
weapons?
Answer. Russia has reserved the right to withdraw from this treaty
if it concludes that the United States is developing and deploying a
missile defense system that threatens its strategic arsenal. Russia
will seek to use that threat in ways that ensure that any American
missile defense system remains limited both in scope and capabilities.
That said, financial constraints have led Russia to reduce its
strategic arsenal over the past two decades and will probably continue
to do so during the 10-year term of this treaty. A Russian decision to
withdraw from the treaty for any reason would risk putting Russia at a
strategic disadvantage--both in terms of numbers and capabilities and
of its ability to monitor our nuclear arsenal. As a result, I believe
the risks of a Russian withdrawal to be quite low.
STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, Corker,
and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
This morning we are very, very privileged to welcome two
men who have served at the highest levels in the White House
and over a long period of time. Gen. Brent Scowcroft is one of
the country's leading strategic thinkers. After a storied,
three-decade career in the Air Force, he served as National
Security Adviser to Presidents Ford and George H.W. Bush. And
Stephen Hadley was National Security Adviser during the last
administration and has been a dedicated and involved public
servant during one of the most challenging periods in our
recent history.
Both General Scowcroft and Mr. Hadley have long experience
with strategic arms control. They both worked on the START I
and START II accords and they have both testified many times
before this committee on strategic issues during the 1980s and
1990s. Mr. Hadley also served as Deputy National Security
Adviser during the negotiation and ratification of the Moscow
Treaty.
This is our sixth hearing on the New START Treaty and the
degree of bipartisan support from the witnesses who have
testified so far has been significant. Henry Kissinger
recommended ratification because he said it is in America's
national interest. James Baker testified that the treaty
appears to take our country in a direction that can enhance our
national security while reducing the number of nuclear warheads
on the planet. William Perry said the treaty advances American
security objectives, and James Schlesinger called ratification
``obligatory.''
The reasons for supporting this treaty are, in my judgment,
powerful. Together the United States and Russia have more than
90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. By making the size
and structure of their nuclear arsenals transparent and
predictable, the New START Treaty will stabilize the strategic
relationship between Washington and Moscow. And by
strengthening the relationship, the treaty can open the door to
cooperation on other issues of mutual concern.
The most important of those issues is stopping the spread
of nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorists. James Baker,
who spent many years negotiating with the Soviets and the
Russians, told this committee last month that the New START
Treaty can improve the United States-Russian relationship and
help stem nuclear proliferation in countries like Iran and
North Korea.
Already New START has yielded benefits. Yesterday Russia
reversed its prior position and voted to impose further U.N.
sanctions on Iran for its nuclear activities. I am 100 percent
convinced that it is no stretch at all to say that our
negotiations on the New START Treaty helped to make yesterday's
outcome possible.
New START is already encouraging greater cooperation from
other states. Last month at the conference reviewing the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States was able to
isolate Iran and prevent it from diverting attention from its
own troubling behavior. At the end of the conference, we
secured unanimous support for a document that strengthened the
treaty. We were able to do this because by reducing the role
that nuclear weapons play in our own security policy, we have
increased our credibility with the more than 180 states that do
not have nuclear weapons. Today, far more than in recent years,
those nations are rallying behind the United States in its
efforts to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of rogue
states, entities, or terrorists. This is an obviously positive
development, but if we reject this treaty, that will be quickly
reversed. As Henry Kissinger testified 2 weeks ago, rejection
of the treaty would suggest we were emphasizing a new
unilateral reliance on nuclear weapons. It would risk injecting
a new element of uncertainty into the calculations of our
adversaries and allies.
This committee has been working to answer all the questions
that members have about the treaty. Some members have raised
concerns about the treaty's impact on missile defense, but all
of the witnesses that have testified before this committee so
far--witnesses from both sides of the aisle with decades and
decades of collective national security experience--have
testified that this treaty does not limit America's ability to
defend itself from rogue state missile attack.
In addition, they have testified, as I am confident they
will next week when the negotiators testify before the
committee, that there are no side agreements, no back door
agreements, no unwritten agreements, none whatsoever. This
treaty is what it is on its face.
The committee has been assured repeatedly by our top
defense officials that the treaty does not limit our ability to
develop and deploy new missile defense systems, and next week
we are going to have the opportunity to hear directly from the
head of the Missile Defense Agency.
So we will take the time needed to review and debate this
treaty. That is appropriate. And all of our colleagues on this
committee have the right to ask all the questions that they
want and need to have confidence in their vote.
We have an aggressive schedule of hearings planned over the
next several months, but we also recognize this: Each day
without a treaty in force, we lose the concrete benefits that
the treaty provides for American security. Why? Because the
verification mechanisms depend on the ratification of the
treaty. The arrangements that we had in place to monitor
Russia's strategic nuclear forces lapsed in December when the
original START Treaty expired. And with every day that has
passed since then, our ability to see what Russian forces are
doing is diminished. This treaty will restore the information
exchanges, label each missile and bomber with a unique
identifying number that allows us to better track it, and
permit onsite inspections with a very rigorous, tight surprise-
announcement schedule. These are obviously critical measures,
and the desire to put them in place as soon as possible is one
reason why we plan to hold a full committee vote on the treaty
before the August congressional recess.
When Dr. Kissinger was here, he said that consideration of
the treaty had not been bipartisan, but nonpartisan. And I take
that as a compliment to the work of Senator Lugar, our
colleagues on the committee and the way we ought to approach
this. It is in that spirit that we have invited our two
distinguished witnesses today and we look forward to hearing
their views.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to join you
in welcoming our distinguished witnesses, former National
Security Advisers, Brent Scowcroft and Stephen Hadley. Having
served for 29 years in the U.S. Air Force and in the White
House under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and George H.W. Bush,
General Scowcroft was at the forefront of United States
strategic policy during many critical periods. Steve Hadley was
a leader in shaping U.S. arms control policy and managing our
relationship with Russia while in the White House and as
Assistant Secretary of Defense.
In recent weeks, the Foreign Relations Committee has heard,
as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, testimony on the New START
Treaty from former Secretaries of State, Henry Kissinger and
James Baker, and former Secretaries of Defense, James
Schlesinger and William Perry, as well as from the Obama
administration's national security team. The committee has also
met in closed session with the New START Treaty's negotiators
and will continue to hold hearings throughout this month.
Following commitments made at the 2001 Crawford summit,
Presidents Bush and Putin signed the Moscow Treaty in 2002.
This strategic arms control treaty built upon the reductions
codified in START I by committing both parties to reduce
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between
1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012.
At the first strategic arms control treaty negotiated after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Moscow Treaty advanced an
agenda with Russia based on mutual interests and ensured that
the United States and Russian arms control cooperation did not
stagnate.
The Moscow Treaty relied entirely upon the verification and
transparency measures established by START I, which expired on
December 5, 2009. In President Bush's letter of transmittal to
the Senate accompanying the Moscow Treaty, he noted that START
I would remain the foundation for confidence, transparency, and
predictability in further strategic offensive reductions.
Thus, while reductions of deployed strategic warheads have
continued apace for both parties since December, our confidence
regarding Russian nuclear strategic offensive forces has been
narrowed. Without a binding treaty, there will be no basis for
onsite verification of the reductions and limitations from
previous arms control treaties or the broader status of
Russia's nuclear posture.
As I have stated before, verification is a key to Senate
consideration of arms control treaties. The Bush administration
recognized the perils posed to our national security absent
verification measures. Near the end of his term, President Bush
concluded a strategic framework declaration with Russia which
stated--and I quote--``we will continue development of a
legally binding post-START arrangement.''
Most of the basic strategic concerns that have motivated
Republican and Democratic administrations to pursue nuclear
arms control with Moscow during the last several decades still
exist today. We are seeking mutual reductions in nuclear
warheads and delivery vehicles that contribute to stability and
reduce the costs of maintaining the weapons. We are pursuing
transparency of our nuclear arsenals backed up by strong
verification measures and formal consultation methods. We are
attempting to maximize the safety of our nuclear arsenals and
encourage a global cooperation toward nonproliferation goals.
And we are hoping to solidify United States-Russian cooperation
on nuclear security matters while sustaining our knowledge of
Russian nuclear capabilities and intentions.
The committee is pleased to have both of you as
distinguished witnesses once again to examine the New START
Treaty in relation to these objectives, and I look forward to
our discussion and your testimony.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
General Scowcroft, if you would lead off and then, Mr.
Hadley, if you would follow. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF (RET.), PRESIDENT,
THE SCOWCROFT GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Scowcroft. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Lugar, members of the committee. I greatly appreciate the
opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss
ratification of the New START Treaty.
I do not consider myself an expert on arms control, but I
have been, as the chairman remarked, involved in some degree in
every strategic nuclear weapons agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union and Russia since SALT I in 1972 and
through START II which did not come into force.
Based on that, let me say just a word about what I think
has been our philosophy in strategic arms control from the
beginning, and that is it has really had three phases. The
first SALT Treaty was designed to stop the increase in weapons.
It did almost nothing else but just put a stop to the growth in
weapons which really had been the impetus for the treaty.
SALT II was designed to then try to equilibrate, if that is
a good word, the forces of the two sides so that they could be
comparable in terms of what to do about them because our force
structures were very different and how do you equate the two
structures together. SALT II did not make it through the
ratification process. That was picked up at Vladivostok with
President Ford, and there was a general understanding about the
equivalency measures to use. That effort was brought down by
the Backfire bomber and nuclear armed cruise missiles. But then
it was restored in START I which did do that measure.
Now, part three was after you decide how to compare these
two sides, then you can make reductions which both sides think
are comparable, maybe not one for one, but comparable in
capability. And that is really what we are about to do.
Now, START II tried that because it was not only to reduce
the numbers, but also to increase the stability of the forces.
And one of the measures in START II, which was not agreed upon,
was to eliminate MIRVed ICBMs as being an incentive for a first
strike in a crisis.
So that has generally been the pattern of all these: SALT
I, SALT II, START I, and START II.
I do not have extensive comments to make. I largely agree
with the opening statements of a number of your witnesses such
as Henry Kissinger and Bill Perry. I believe this treaty will
achieve the purposes for which it is intended, and I support
its ratification.
As I understand it and based on the comments of the
chairman and Senator Lugar, this treaty was not designed to
move strategic arms control in a great leap forward. Instead,
it was designed to preserve or renew the myriad verification
rules, counting rules, definitions, and other measures to give
both sides the confidence in the process to move ahead, and
that I think this treaty has done.
A number of assertions have been raised about technical
difficulties of the treaty, such as rail-mobile ICBM. I have
not read the vast detail or material accompanying the treaty,
but I have seen nothing which on the surface seems to me
alarming.
I do recommend, however, that the committee satisfy itself
on ambiguities and loopholes that might exist through a
discussion with the administration negotiators. There will also
be an NIE on verification shortly forthcoming from the
intelligence community, as well as the required State
Department verification documents, and I recommend they be
studied carefully by the committee.
This treaty makes no provision, of course, for the
maintenance of our deterrent capability. I believe it is
essential that our strategic nuclear capability be safe,
reliable, and capable, including assuring a continued
outstanding capability of the entire nuclear complex. I urge
the early appropriation of the administration requests in this
regard.
Several of the criticisms of the treaty deal with what it
does not do, and as I said, this treaty was not designed to
move the process forward but to preserve the confidence-
building measures that the two sides over a half a century have
built to assure themselves that they could have confidence as
they move ahead that they were not going to be cheated in some
way.
However, one of the additional measures for which this
treaty has been criticized would certainly, I think, be a
candidate for follow-on negotiations and that is dealing with
short-range nuclear weapons. They have not been included in the
strategic nuclear arms negotiations in the past, in part
because the strategic issues were pressing in and of themselves
and were complicated enough by themselves that the addition of
tactical weapons were likely to overburden the process. But
those shorter range systems now have relatively greater impact,
and the numbers are so imbalanced that the next negotiations
must almost certainly take them into consideration.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, I support ratification of the
treaty, examination by the committee of administration
negotiators of all the alleged loopholes and ambiguities,
review of administration verifiability documents when they are
submitted, and funding of all necessary measures to keep our
nuclear weapons safe, reliable, and capable and our nuclear
complex modern and effective.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Hadley.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. HADLEY, SENIOR ADVISER FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hadley. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
committee to discuss the New START Treaty.
I have a five-page statement. If I might, I would like to
submit that for the record and just summarize some of the key
points here if I may.
The Chairman. Without objection, the full statement will be
put in the record, and we look forward to your summary.
Mr. Hadley. The statement tries to talk a little bit about
the historical context and make the point that the New START
Treaty is the latest step in a two-decade United States-Russian
effort since the end of the cold war to reduce the nuclear
arsenals of the two nations. And General Scowcroft has outlined
that clearly. The one I was most recently associated with was
the 2002 Moscow Treaty which required a further reduction of
almost 40 percent, down to between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed
weapons. The expectation at the time was that the United States
would deploy about 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons, while the
Russians would probably deploy about 1,700.
The point I would make is that the result of these treaties
and this two-decades-long effort is a cumulative reduction in
the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by each
country by over 80 percent from the end of the cold war. That
is a remarkable achievement for which I think our two nations
do not get enough credit.
The New START Treaty stands on the shoulders of these past
efforts. Its principal contribution is really not in making
further reductions. While it reduces the limit on deployed
strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550, this is a modest, but only
modest, reduction, about 10 percent, from the 1,700 that Russia
was expected to deploy under the Moscow Treaty.
Now, a number of people have said that because of the
counting rules, the number of strategic nuclear weapons
deployed under the New START Treaty could theoretically be
higher than the number deployed under the Moscow Treaty. I do
not think the committee should be too much concerned by this
fact. In fact, the bomber counting rules of the New START
Treaty do not, to me, appear to convey any intrinsic advantage
to either country, and I suspect that the actual levels of
strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the two sides will have
as much, if not more, to do with budget levels and
modernization programs as it will with the counting rules.
I think the best case for the New START Treaty is that it
replaces the set of counting rules, definitions, and
verification measures that were provided by the START I Treaty
until it expired in December 2009. Both Democrats and
Republicans have accepted the need for such provisions in order
to build confidence and allay suspicion.
As it reviews the New START Treaty, I would hope the
committee would give priority to four issues. General Scowcroft
talked about a couple of them.
First, of course, is whether the definitions, counting
rules, and verification measures are adequate to ensure not
only compliance with the terms of the treaty, but also to rule
out strategic surprise, what might undermine the stability of
the relationship. And the answer to this question, of course,
is going to have to await the monitoring and verification
reviews now being conducted by the intelligence community and
the State Department.
Second, does the treaty permit the United States to
maintain the forces it needs to safeguard its security? The
Moscow Treaty limited only deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
The New START Treaty also limits the ballistic missiles and
bombers that deliver those weapons. Will the ceilings on
delivery vehicles allow the United States to deploy a robust
triad of strategic nuclear forces adequate to meet our security
needs? The committee is going to hear witnesses on this. My own
guess is that the answer will probably be, yes, that it is
adequate.
The New START Treaty requires that conventional warheads
placed on ICBMs or SLBMs be counted as strategic nuclear
warheads under the New START weapons ceiling, and that will
effectively force a tradeoff between nuclear and nonnuclear
warheads. The question for the committee will be, despite these
limitations, Will the United States be able to deploy the long-
range conventional strike capability it needs? And you will, of
course, hear from administration witnesses on that.
Are there any gaps and loopholes in the treaty that put the
United States at a strategic disadvantage? General Scowcroft
and critics have talked about the rail-mobile ICBM issue. I
think my own view is that this and other similar ambiguities
need to be addressed if necessary by conditions or reservations
to the treaty, and they can be addressed in that way.
Third, to enhance deterrence, the New START Treaty needs to
be accompanied by a joint commitment by the Congress and the
administration to a specific 10-year program that will
recapitalize our nuclear infrastructure, modernize our
strategic nuclear delivery systems, and ensure safe, secure,
and reliable nuclear weapons to include building replacement
weapons if that is the best way to achieve the latter
objective. I believe these concerns can be addressed by
legislation developed and enacted by the Congress in parallel
with the treaty ratification process.
Finally, as part of the ratification process, the Congress
and the administration must make absolutely clear that the
treaty will not be permitted to prohibit or limit in any way
what the United States might want to do on missile defense.
Cold war thinking took as an article of faith that the United
States and Russia could not both build ballistic missile
defenses and reduce their strategic nuclear forces at the same
time. Yet, just 5 months after the United States announced its
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 2001, Russia and the
United States concluded the Moscow Treaty. The message of these
two initiatives was the same. Since Russia and the United
States no longer presented an existential threat to each other,
they now had a common interest in cooperating to make their
nuclear deployments smaller, safer, and more secure and to work
together on developing ballistic missile defenses against
common threats.
Regrettably, the language of the New START Treaty and
accompanying administration and Russian statements reflect
somewhat of a regression from this position by suggesting that
some level of United States missile defenses, perhaps anything
beyond the current levels even, could justify withdrawal from
the treaty. The Senate in its ratification process needs to
make clear that it will accept no limits whatsoever on U.S.
ballistic missile defenses. Ballistic missile defense should
instead become an area of strategic cooperation between Russia
and the United States to counter ballistic missiles that
threaten both countries.
In summary, by leading the way in addressing these and
other concerns--and I believe these concerns should be
addressed and can be addressed in the ratification process, the
committee can ensure that the New START Treaty makes its modest
but nonetheless useful contribution to the national security of
the United States and to international stability.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hadley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen J. Hadley, Senior Adviser for
International Affairs, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the
New START Treaty.
I would like to begin with a little historical context.
The New START Treaty is the latest step in a two-decade United
States/Russian effort since the end of the cold war to reduce the
nuclear arsenals of the two nations.
The 1992 START I Treaty permitted each country to deploy 6,000
accountable strategic nuclear weapons. Because of START I counting
rules for bomber weapons, this meant that each side could have about
8,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons--about a 30-percent reduction
from the roughly 10,000 to 12,000 such weapons deployed by each side
when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. As importantly, the START I Treaty
established a comprehensive set of definitions, counting rules, and
verification measures to increase the transparency and reduce the
uncertainty associated with the nuclear activities of the two nations.
The 1993 START II Treaty effectively limited each country to
between 3,000 and 3,500 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. This
required a cut of roughly 60 percent from actual START I levels.
Although the START II Treaty never entered into force, both countries
nonetheless reduced their forces so that by 2001 each country was
roughly at or approaching START II levels.
The 2002 Moscow Treaty required a further reduction of almost 40
percent down to between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed weapons. The treaty
specified a range to reflect differences in the strategic nuclear
forces of the two nations. The expectation at the time was that the
United States would deploy about 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons while
Russia would deploy about 1,700.
The result of these three treaties was a cumulative reduction in
the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by each country of
over 80 percent from the end of the cold war. That is a remarkable
record, and the two nations have not received the credit they deserve
in the context of meeting their obligations as nuclear weapon states
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The New START Treaty stands on the shoulders of these past efforts.
Its principal contribution is not in making further reductions. While
it reduces the limit on deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550,
this is only a modest reduction--about 10 percent--from the 1,700 that
Russia was expected to deploy under the Moscow Treaty. Because the
counting rules under the New START Treaty attribute only 1 weapon per
heavy bomber, the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed under
the New START Treaty could theoretically be higher than the number
deployed under the Moscow Treaty which counted the number of weapons
operationally deployed on each bomber (up to 16 or 20 per bomber for
the United States and up to 6 or 16 for Russia). This fact does not in
itself appear to convey an intrinsic advantage to either country.
Moreover, actual deployment levels may be more driven by budget levels
and modernization efforts than by counting rules.
The best case for the New START Treaty is that it replaces the set
of counting rules, definitions, and verification measures that were
provided by the START I Treaty until it expired at the end of 2009.
Both Democrats and Republicans accepted the need for such provisions in
order to build mutual confidence and allay suspicion. For this reason,
in 2008 the Bush administration tabled a legally binding treaty text
that retained appropriate verification and other measures from START I
but simplified to reflect post-cold-war realities and to reduce burden
and cost.
As it reviews the New START Treaty, the committee should give
priority to four key issues.
First, are the definitions, counting rules, and verification
measures adequate to ensure compliance with the terms of the treaty and
to rule out strategic surprise? An answer to this question must await
the monitoring and verifications reviews now being conducted by the
Intelligence Community and the State Department.
Second, does the treaty permit the United States to maintain the
forces it needs to safeguard its security?
--The Moscow Treaty limited only deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
The New START Treaty also limits the ballistic missiles and bombers
that deliver those weapons. Will the ceilings on delivery vehicles
allow the United States to deploy a robust triad of strategic
nuclear forces adequate to meet our security needs?
--The New START Treaty does not prohibit long-range conventional
strike, but it does limit such systems. Conventional warheads
placed on ICBMs or SLBMs will be counted as strategic nuclear
warheads under the New START weapons ceiling, thus forcing a
tradeoff between nuclear and nonnuclear warheads. Despite these
limitations, will the United States be able to deploy the long-
range conventional strike capability it needs?
--Are there any gaps or loopholes in the treaty that put the United
States at a significant disadvantage? The one most mentioned by
critics involves rail-mobile ICBMs. While such systems are not
prohibited under the treaty, and neither country currently deploys
them, the Russians have done so in the past. Should the Russians do
so again, critics allege that such systems would not be captured by
the language of the treaty. This and other similar ambiguities need
to be addressed, if necessary by a condition or reservation to the
treaty.
Third, to enhance deterrence, the New START Treaty needs to be
accompanied by a joint commitment by the Congress and the
administration to a specific 10-year program that will recapitalize our
nuclear infrastructure, modernize our strategic nuclear delivery
systems, and ensure safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons--to
include building replacement weapons if that is the best way to achieve
this latter objective. At a time when other nuclear weapon states are
modernizing their nuclear forces--and Iran and North Korea are actively
pursuing nuclear weapons--a failure by the United States to
recapitalize and modernize is not leading by example to a nonnuclear
world but gambling with our national security. I believe these concerns
can be addressed by legislation developed and enacted by the Congress
in parallel with the treaty ratification process.
Finally, as part of the ratification process, the Congress and the
administration must make absolutely clear that the treaty will not be
permitted to prohibit or limit in any way what the United States might
want to do on missile defense. Cold-war thinking took as an article of
faith that the United States and Russia could not both build ballistic
missile defenses and reduce their strategic nuclear forces at the same
time. Yet just 5 months after the United States announced its
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 2001, Russia and the United
States concluded the Moscow Treaty. The message of these two
initiatives was the same: Since Russia and the United States no longer
presented an existential threat to each other, they now had a common
interest in cooperating to make their nuclear deployments smaller,
safer, and more secure--and to work together on developing ballistic
missile defenses against common threats.
Regrettably, the language of the New START Treaty and accompanying
administration and Russia statements reflects a clear regression from
this position by suggesting that some level of United States missile
defenses--perhaps anything beyond even current levels--could justify
Russian withdrawal from the treaty. Even more troubling, the Bilateral
Consultative Commission seems to have been given authority to adopt
without Senate review measures to improve the viability and
effectiveness of the treaty which could include restrictions on missile
defenses. The Senate in its ratification process needs explicitly to
proscribe the Commission from doing so. More fundamentally, however,
the Senate needs to make clear that it will not accept a return to the
false offense/defense linkage of the cold war--and that it will accept
no limits whatsoever on U.S. ballistic missile defenses. Ballistic
missile defense should instead become an area of strategic cooperation
between Russia and the United States to counter ballistic missiles that
threaten both countries.
In summary, by leading the way in addressing these and other
concerns, this committee can ensure that the New START Treaty makes its
modest but nonetheless useful contribution to the national security of
the United States and to international stability.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Hadley.
Let me begin by following up on a number of points you
made, but first on the question of ambiguity. You point out in
your prepared testimony that some critics have alleged that if
Russia were to again build the rail-mobile missiles, which no
one expects them to do, but somehow if they did, those missiles
might not count under New START's limits. Now, it is true some
critics have alleged this, but I am curious as to why those
claims impress you at all given, No. 1, that article 2,
paragraph 1(a) of the treaty sets a limit of 700 ``deployed
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.'' Paragraph
12 of part 1 of the Protocol defines a deployed ICBM as an ICBM
that is contained in or on a deployed launcher of ICBMs, and
paragraph 13 of part 1 of the Protocol defines deployed
launcher of ICBMs as ``an ICBM launcher that contains an ICBM
and is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, or
an ICBM launcher located in a space launch facility.''
So it seems to me, analyzing those very specific
definitions, that a rail-mobile ICBM, if either side decided to
deploy one, very clearly fits under the 700 limit and a
nondeployed launcher of a rail-mobile ICBM similarly fits under
the 800 limit. Am I wrong?
Mr. Hadley. You are not wrong. I think as I have read the
critics, it comes to the fact that all the provisions of the
START I Treaty that dealt with rail-mobiles have been
eliminated, and what remains are the provisions dealing with
mobiles that seem tailored to land-mobile systems. They talk
about the definition of a launcher on a self-propelled vehicle
which is a very good description of a land-mobile, but not a
particularly good description of a rail-mobile. I think it is--
--
The Chairman. Let me interrupt for a minute. Rail-mobile or
land-mobile or whatever mobile, the limit is 700 deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. So you have got a limit of
deployed missiles in one of the three potential categories.
Mr. Hadley. Right.
The Chairman. Then there is a definition of what
``deployed'' means, that it is contained in or deployed on a
launcher--rail launcher, submarine launcher, whatever. And then
it says if it contains that ICBM and it is not a test launcher,
et cetera, you know, if it is meant to be part of that
strategic effort, which we get to see because we inspect and
because all of these are numbered and targeted, I do not see
any ambiguity there, nor do the negotiators incidentally, nor
do the Russians.
Mr. Hadley. I think that is all positive, and I think in
some sense, Mr. Chairman, you have shown the way out of this
which is to emphasize the breadth of that language that would
seem to catch any launcher even if it was on a rail platform,
but then deal with the fact that there are not provisions in
the treaty about notifications, inspections, and all the other
procedures about how to handle rail-mobiles by making clear
that should either side deploy such a system, the sides would
then need to sit down and develop the applicable regimes for
including them operationally in the inspections and all those
other things that are called for in the treaty. I think again,
I called it an ambiguity, not a flaw, and I think there is a
way in which--you have suggested a way in which it can be
addressed in the ratification process.
The Chairman. I think that we will have the verification
folks here for a hearing shortly, and we will pursue this with
them. But under the verification/notification process, there is
a 4-hour--you notify where you want to go and that can be to a
rail facility. It can be any facility. So, I think we are going
to find the answer to that. It is an appropriate question to
raise, but I think we will find that that is going to be
satisfied.
Now, also you asked the question, will the ceilings on
delivery vehicles allow the United States to deploy a robust
triad of strategic nuclear forces. Bob Gates was here a few
weeks ago, together with Admiral Mullen, and both of them--you
have served with both of them, and I know you have great
respect for both of them--both of them said that this does
allow us to deploy a robust triad. That is their testimony. Do
you have any reason to doubt their testimony?
Mr. Hadley. No. When I was briefed, what I was told was
that despite some of the discussion in the press, the number
that they thought they needed for the triad was in the 650 to
700 range. I think, as they will tell you, if you go much below
those numbers, I think they start having concerns and problems.
But I think when you hear further from them, that is what they
will tell you. And as I said in my opening statement, I think
it is probably going to turn out that the committee will judge
that the numbers are adequate.
The Chairman. What do you judge?
Mr. Hadley. Without going through all the analysis that you
really need your military and Defense Department people to do--
and I am not in that business anymore. But as I look at it, I
think when they come to you--and I think they will say to you
it is adequate. I do not have any grounds at this point to say
it is not.
The Chairman. And in your statement you also said that New
START reduces the limit on deployed warheads by only about 10
percent from the 1,700 that Russia was expected to deploy under
the Moscow Treaty.
Mr. Hadley. Right.
The Chairman. But the Moscow Treaty does not actually
require any reduction of Russia's warheads below 2,200. Does
it? There is a range.
Mr. Hadley. That is correct.
The Chairman. So if you compare limits to limits--the limit
is 2,200 on the up side--there actually is a 30-percent
reduction here in terms of the limit. Correct?
Mr. Hadley. That is correct. What I said in my statement
was the reason we did a range in the Moscow Treaty was to
accommodate the expectation that the Russians could not get
much above 1,700 and we did not want to get below 2,200, but we
did not want to make it look like a one-sided treaty. So we
basically had the range. And all I was saying, Senator, was the
expectation is that we would be on one end, and the Russians
would be at the other.
The Chairman. Fair enough.
But I agree with your judgment, and I do not think the
administration is claiming otherwise--and I think General
Scowcroft has appropriately characterized this as a step
forward. It is a limited one. It is a modest advance, but it is
not breaking some enormous new ground with the exception that
some of the inspection pieces are more rigorous and the
counting of the warheads is more rigorous, and I think we got
some advantage out of that.
Senator Lugar, I have to apologize. I just need to step
downstairs and meet with Secretary Geithner for a few minutes,
but I will be back. Thank you.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to pick up a thought that came in your
testimony, and that is that despite the fact we are talking
about limits--and I think General Scowcroft talked about the
very beginning of this process in which both the United States
and the former Soviet Union had very large numbers of missiles
and warheads and other strategic weapons. And perhaps there was
a feeling on either side at that point that for various reasons
we wanted to produce more. At least reason prevailed at this
point, and that was the gist of, I guess, the conversations
that we had enough, and the question then was how do you scale
down appropriately so there is not a disadvantage for either
party. The rest of the world looked at all of this with awe
because these were huge amounts of destructive potential and no
sign necessarily that we were at least foreswearing ever using
them.
Now, year by year and treaty by treaty, some ratified and
some not, and so forth, we have scaled down now to the Moscow
Treaty.
But I just note as a practical matter--and I want your
comments--that in Russia, at least, there have been real
stresses with regard to their defense budget. This is obvious
in the so-called conventional forces, the number of people
under arms and so forth. We have not witnessed the same type of
debate. By and large, our defense appropriation debates are
ones in which we want to make sure that the troops are fully
supported, that American defense is never in question. Yet, at
the same time in recent weeks and months, Secretary Gates has
indicated there probably are limits to what our defense budget
can be, given the huge deficit that our country is running. It
is a curious fact that when we have Senate debates on the floor
and most of us decry the fact that we are running abnormal
deficits and a $13 trillion national debt, that this does not
come under consideration.
But I sort of pose the question to both of you as statesmen
who have seen a long stretch of this and simply the practice of
this, that we are in the process, I think advisedly so, of
making certain that even though this is not covered by the
START Treaty, it is not prohibited, that we make certain that
our warheads would work, the delivery vehicles and our
laboratories that have not been run down, but nevertheless, we
are losing scientists. We are losing potential--that this is
refurbished. So this is going to be expensive, and it is an
expense outside of the treaty but one that we feel that we need
to have.
Inside the treaty, it may be that we will want to maintain
all of the 1,700 or whatever we are entitled to, as well as
every single delivery vehicle. But is it possible that given
the way the world works presently, even our own budget, that we
will find it possible to get along even with smaller limits if,
in fact, we have relationship with the Russians and, in fact,
some look-see, some verification that gives confidence? As I
shared with you before we came into the hearing, I have a
scoreboard in my office--and I appreciate the Defense
Department monthly, now for two decades, sending over reports.
This month we took six warheads off of missiles. We destroyed
two missiles. We got rid of another submarine and so forth.
Interestingly enough, those reports have continued since
December 5.
Now, this is a surprise to many that something is still
going on with Americans and Russians working together without
the verification measures and without the treaty, but it is in
our practical interest to do so and has been for a long time.
Many of the reductions have come not because of the treaties,
because really very practical statesmen in the military and
civilian components in both governments have said we really do
not need all of this and we are going to get rid of it, treaty
or no treaty. The treaty does not prohibit downsizing, but a
lot of this has occurred. It is a very practical measure.
Can you give some insight as to what is likely to be the
evolution of affairs? How many weapons--1,700, 2,200, however
you count them--are really required for us to have the
strategic defenses that we believe that we need in this
respect, plus the options of going into other types of things
that are not prohibited by the treaty?
Mr. Hadley. I think that we are at an interesting point in
this 20-year history, and it is why I think you will hear from
administration witnesses that they are OK with the current
level, but if the level goes down, then it raises difficult
questions. And it does. One is, can you continue economically
and practically to maintain a triad of land-based, sea-based,
air-based systems? What are the implications if we were to go
to a dyad? That is a big idea. It needs some thinking. For
those countries that depend on our nuclear deterrence, to
provide extended deterrence to protect them, how will they see
something very visible in our coming down further and maybe
going to a dyad?
A question that you and others have raised: What do you do
about continuing to go down on so-called strategic nuclear
weapons when there are all these tactical nuclear weapons out
there, anywhere from 2,200 to 3,800? And if you are living in
Eastern or Central Europe, a so-called tactical nuclear weapon,
if you are within range, looks pretty strategic to you. So what
are we going to do about those?
What are we going to do about the fact that there are other
countries with strategic nuclear deterrents? Some of them are
bringing them down, but some of them, like China, are
increasing. And then, of course, there is the problem of the
nuclear wannabees, Iran and North Korea.
So I think we are at the point where people will, I think,
feel comfortable as to where we are, but if you are going to go
dramatically further down, it is going to raise a lot of
questions that it is not beyond the mind of man to work them
through, but they need to be worked through. It is not just a
ratchet that you can keep bringing down 40 percent every 5 to
10 years. We are at a point where a lot of difficult questions
need to be addressed.
Mr. Scowcroft. I would only add, Senator Lugar, that the
number required depends significantly on the targeting
philosophy. How many are needed for these various roles? Now,
that is something we cannot talk about in this venue, but it is
a very important issue and it is something I know personally
that Presidents have wrestled with over and over again. What do
we need to do in the event we have to use these very difficult
weapons?
The other aspect of it is that in an atmosphere of
reductions, you mentioned the Russians now. Now, they find
themselves embarrassed with their conventional forces and they
seemingly are placing increasing reliance on their nuclear
forces. We, I think, have found in the past that they are not
substitutable, and in the world we have today, we need
competent conventional forces for the tasks we have before us,
and you cannot simply say, no, we will rely on nuclear forces.
This is something I think we all need to look at very seriously
as the world changes and what this balance needs to be, and
there is no absolute.
Senator Lugar. Well, my time is up. I would just say that
to the extent that we have an opportunity to talk about the
tactical weapons with the Russians, this is going to require
another set of negotiations. The importance of ratifying this
treaty is so that we might get on with that. I am not saying
things we are discussing now are unimportant, but we have a
whole agenda still ahead of us and the need, it seems to me, to
have partners who are willing to negotiate in our defense and
theirs.
Let me now recognize Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning. Thank you both for being here.
General Scowcroft, I am not sure that I accurately wrote
down what I thought you said this morning, so let me try and
paraphrase if I can. I think you said something like this
treaty is designed to give both sides confidence again in the
process of arms control. And then you pointed out that it does
not address tactical weapons and how important that is.
Can you relate this treaty to the potential for us to
address tactical weapons? What happens if we do not ratify this
treaty and what would that do to our ability to address the
tactical weapons piece that you are suggesting should come
next?
Mr. Scowcroft. Senator, I think the principal result of
nonratification would be to throw the whole nuclear negotiating
situation into a state of chaos. The reason this treaty is
important is over the decades we have built up all these
counting rules, all these verification procedures, and so on so
that each side feels, yes, we can take these steps. If you wipe
those out, you are back to zero again. And they have taken
since the late 1960s to put together. So that is the real part
of it.
Tactical weapons are going to have to, in part, stand on
their own. I might say I heard a Russian recently berating us
for still having tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.
Now, the ratio is mind-boggling. So it is a complicated issue,
but it needs to be addressed because many of the missions now
that used to be covered by strategic weapons can now be covered
by these shorter range weapons. So it has to be brought in in
the future, not right now, but as we move forward.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I see you are nodding, Mr. Hadley. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Hadley. I do but I think it is going to be a challenge
to deal with tactical nuclear weapons in a negotiation
precisely because it is kind of a 10 to 1 advantage for the
Russians. And the risk is that they will want compensation for
an asymmetric reduction and want to take it by limiting
defenses or limiting our conventional strike.
And I hope the administration would consider looking at
what President George H.W. Bush did--and Brent was at the
center of that in 1991--about proposing that the two sides
reciprocally, without formal negotiation, just bring their
levels down. And we did that and that is what got the tactical
nuclear weapons out of our ground forces and off our deployed
naval surface forces.
And we did that because in the wake of the breakup of the
cold war, both the Russians and we were worried about Russian
tactical nuclear weapons in countries that were now no longer
part of the former Soviet Union, and the two countries had an
interest that it was in their interest, and the interest of
stability, and because verification of tactical nuclear
warheads is a very difficult proposition, that it was in their
mutual interest of stabilizing the situation just to bring them
down. And we did. And it may be that that is a model that at
least I hope the administration would look at to do it in a
little different way to take into account the real asymmetries
there are in the deployments of the two sides.
Senator Shaheen. But you are not suggesting that we can get
to that without ratifying this New START Treaty, are you?
Mr. Hadley. No. As I say, I think the case for this New
START Treaty is in the counting rules, definitions,
verification measures, and as I tried to indicate in my
testimony, I think the questions that have been raised can be
addressed by the committee in the ratification process and
should be.
Senator Shaheen. You both talked about the importance of
that verification and the fact that we lost the ability to do
the inspections and the verification when the old START expired
in December. Can you talk a little bit more about the value of
this New START's verification regime and why it is so important
for us to be able to do the inspections and see what is going
on with the Russians?
Mr. Scowcroft. This treaty changes a number of the
verification measures. It makes some of them tougher, makes
some of them--removes some of them. And I think that is based
on the character of our own national means of verification and
the character of weapons themselves. But if we agree on numbers
and types and so on and there is no way to check on the other
as to whether or not those agreements are being carried out, we
do not have a level of confidence with the Russians now that
would allow either side to go forward. So that is what is
needed.
You know, besides just these rules, it restores the sense
that the United States and Russia have a community of interest
here as the possessors of 95 percent of all the world's nuclear
weapons to deal responsibly with them, and I think that is part
of what this treaty is about.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hadley, do you want to add anything
relative to verification----
Mr. Hadley. I do not think there is any disagreement on
that. We in the Bush administration in 2008, I think as Senator
Lugar mentioned, tabled a legally binding treaty of counting
rules, definitions, and verification measures that took the
START I provisions, adapted them to reflect that we were in a
post-cold-war world and, quite frankly, to ease some of the
cost and operational burden where we thought we could and still
do two things, which is, one, make sure that the parties are
each in compliance with the treaty, and then generally to
contribute to stability by making sure there is not going to be
some kind of strategic surprise in the process.
Senator Shaheen. So just to finalize that point, so
ratification of this treaty is going to be important if we are
going to get back to that kind of a verification and inspection
regime.
Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
No problem.
I want to thank you both for your service and for being
here today and being coherent in your presentations. Thank you
very much.
If I understand and paraphrase I guess what has been said
today, as it relates to arms reduction, I mean, this really is
not much of a treaty. It is more about continuing the process
and understanding how we verify and do those types of things.
This really is not much of a step toward reductions. It is more
just keeping the process going and may lead to other things. Is
that, generally speaking, what both of you have said?
Mr. Scowcroft. Yes, I think that is very much the case,
Senator. What it does is clear the way for whatever the two
sides want to do now in proceeding with this overall plan to
now reduce the numbers and reduce them in a way that improves
the stability of the balance between us. Without this treaty,
you cannot move forward to that other step.
Senator Corker. There are some people that--I mean, I think
it is recognized by all that the limitations on the Russian
side were limitations that were going to be met by them anyway
because of just their decreasing abilities within their country
budgetarily and other reasons, that the only real restrictions
are coming on our side where we are actually reducing our
capabilities per the treaty. But it seems to me that both of
you all are all OK with that. Is that correct?
Mr. Hadley. Yes. I think you do need to see this treaty in
context of really a 20-year effort spanning Republican and
Democratic administrations. Even if budgetary and modernization
considerations push the forces down, this does provide some
transparency, some predictability in the relationship. Quite
frankly it is an indication of one more thing where Russia and
the United States have found it in their common interest to
work together cooperatively, and that is an important
contribution to the overall environment of Russian and United
States relations.
So in this context, it is a logical next step, and again, I
would urge the committee to deal with some of the questions
that have arisen. I think they can be addressed, and when they
are, I think the treaty should be ratified and it will make a
modest but useful contribution in this overall process.
Senator Corker. And for people like you that obviously care
deeply about national security, as I think everybody up here
does too, the fact that the only real reductions that are
taking place are on our side--and that may be a good thing for
us. The offsetting effort that I think you are both saying we
should all vigorously pursue is making sure that the arsenal we
have left is modernized. The real opportunity for us in this
country today with this treaty, because we are not really
getting any reductions from Russia, is to use the event of this
treaty to modernize what we have in this country and ensure
that that takes place. Is that correct?
Mr. Scowcroft. Yes, I think so, Senator. You know, the
reductions we have to take are pretty minimal. We may, for
example, convert a few bombers from the nuclear to the
conventional role, and we will probably have to leave around
100 silos or submarine missile launchers empty. We do not have
to retire them, but they will not be deployed. So it is fairly
minimal. And as Mr. Hadley said, we have been at the high end
of the balance going down. The Russians have been at the low
end. So I do not think this is a significant issue.
Mr. Hadley. Brent is right. We are not--except for maybe a
couple dozen Minuteman IIIs, I think when the administration
testifies, you will find we are not carving up delivery
platforms. We are able to reach those levels by doing the kinds
of adjustments that Brent talked about, taking bombers, putting
them in the conventional force, reducing the number of missiles
on some of our submarines. So I think it is a pretty modest
reduction, but I would underscore very strongly the importance
of a firm commitment by the Congress and the United States to a
modernization effort of our infrastructure, our delivery
platforms, and our weapons so that it is clear to everybody
that we have the capacity to stay in this business because that
is part of deterrence to show that our commitment is and can be
enduring. It is terribly important.
Senator Corker. Well, thank you for underlining that, and I
hope that all of us will pursue modernization. It is something
that is very important.
On missile defense, you know, there have been these
conflicting statements. I mean, basically a treaty is only as
good as the two people who agree to it, and either one of them
can step aside. It is not like a law that is created. And so
when you have these statements right after the treaty is agreed
to that seem to be in opposite directions, it is concerning.
We had a hearing the other day in a secure setting, and I
appreciate so much the chairman continuing to have so many
hearings. I finally think I have figured out what that
disconnect is. We, per the Russians--and this is not
classified, so I am not breaking any rules. These, per the
Russians--I think the Russians agree that we can continue to
have missile defense systems against a few rogue countries, and
that is kind of what we are doing right now. We are pursuing
missile defense systems against those rogue countries we are
concerned about. And today we are not concerned about Russia. I
think what they are saying is, though, if we develop any
capabilities--any capabilities--as it relates to defense
against Russia, they can get out of this treaty. So that is
what they are saying on their side. I finally realized what it
is--whether it is back room or conversations that always take
place, I think there is an understanding that Russia can get
out of this treaty if we develop any missile defense
capabilities against them. So we are in a situation where we
are saying we can continue to develop missile defense, but we
know the obvious outcome of what would be if it is against
Russia; they will get out.
Does any of that in any way trouble you? Are we OK with
being in that scenario?
Mr. Hadley. I think you have characterized it rightly. The
problem in a way is the worst casers on both sides. In
connection with the deployments in Poland and the Czech
Republic, we spent several years trying to demonstrate to the
Russians that those deployments were directed at ballistic
missiles coming out of Iran that could threaten Russia, Europe,
or the United States. And we tabled document after document and
offered various kinds of inspections to give them confidence
that it was not directed against them.
But if you are a worst caser, you can find in almost any
deployment something that leads you to say ``aha,'' see it
threatens us. And the problem is we are getting back into that
mindset of suspicion and uncertainty of the cold war, and I
think the record is a little bit untidy and the way forward is
for this committee in the ratification process with the
administration to make clear that we accept no limits on our
missile defense capabilities and that rather than being
directed at Russia, in fact, this is an opportunity for Russia
and the United States to work together on ballistic missile
defense to design a system in Europe that can protect all
three. And I think if we can generate that kind of cooperation,
we can build some confidence so that you do not have this sort
of worst-case analysis all the time.
But as Senator Lugar once told me a couple decades ago in
an arms control treaty hearing that was up for ratification,
the record is a little muddy if you take the preamble language,
the Russians' statement and our statement. We need to be very
clear that we do not accept any implicit limits on our ability
to go forward with missile defense and at the same time offer
to the Russians the opportunity to work with us to build
defenses against ballistic missiles that threaten each and both
of us.
Senator Corker. Thank you both for your testimony and for
your public service. I look forward to seeing you many times, I
hope, in the future.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. I too--we all say it, but we really mean
it--thank you for your service. The two of you are a great
asset for the country and thank you for coming up and helping
to keep us straight on this very, very important treaty.
START I we had--the Russians and the United States could
unilaterally get out of. Right? I mean, the United States could
unilaterally--just as we said in this treaty that we can
unilaterally get out of the treaty, we could.
Mr. Scowcroft. Oh, yes. Either side can. They can use
ballistic missile defense or anything else.
Senator Kaufman. Why would you think it is suspicious and
why do we need a long explanation of the fact that the Russians
are just saying that they can get out of this treaty? I hear
this but it was in START I. It is kind of a standard thing. You
talk about suspicion. You know, the suspicion is out there. I
do not think we have suspicions of the cold war. I just think
we have some folks who want to look at this treaty and say this
is really suspicious behavior when, in fact, it has been in
every one of the treaties we have done.
Mr. Hadley.
Mr. Hadley. You are right. This has the same kind of
language that is in all the arms control agreements that says
that if--and I cannot quote you the language, but if there are
developments that arise, a party may withdraw on the basis of
its supreme national interest.
The problem is that in terms of the preamble and in terms
of some Russian statements, there is the suggestion that while
the current level of United States defense effort is
appropriate, if we should change it qualitatively or
quantitatively, they want to put a marker down right now that
they have the right and will get out. What people worry about
is that there is an effort to put pressure on us not to go
forward with missile defense. And so we need to take that gloss
off the language.
Senator Kaufman. The simplest explanation is the best. I
think it is pretty clear they are doing this for domestic
political consumption. That is the reason they are doing it.
And as you said so eloquently about Senator Lugar, who we have
all learned a lot from, the preamble and these unilateral
statements, if you take them into account, do not mean a whole
lot in terms of international treaties. Is that fair to say?
Mr. Hadley. It is true. I think they are doing it for
domestic political purposes. I think they are doing it to put
some pressure on us, and I think, quite frankly, they still
believe, I think wrongly, that there is active opposition to
ballistic missile defense in the United States and they want to
give those folks another debating point.
Senator Kaufman. It is a lot of stuff to do in a preamble
and unilateral statements.
General Scowcroft.
Mr. Scowcroft. I think also, Senator, there is a lot of
confusion in our discussion between ballistic missile defense
against rogue states and ballistic missile defense between
Russia and the United States. And we use those terms
interchangeably. There is ambiguity in the systems themselves.
But if you make those clear and if each side agrees that they
are clear, that would simplify the thing a lot because, as
Steve says, there is a lot of room for cooperation on defenses
against rogue nations.
Senator Kaufman. Right. But I want to make sure that
everyone is clear because you raised some things here, that the
main thing the U.S. Government wants to do is maintain our
ability to do a missile defense. And I, frankly, have a hard
time kind of looking through the ashes of this or even looking
at the preamble and unilateral. I mean, critics and
everything--I have been around this town for a long time. There
is a really slender thread on which to base a suspicion that
there is really something going on here that we have got to
watch out for.
Mr. Hadley. Though a lot of us have earned bruises and
scars around the issue of ballistic missile defense over the
last couple decades. So maybe a little paranoia is not
unreasonable given the history.
Senator Kaufman. And that brings me to the other point
because I have sat in these hearings and the chairman has had
some extensive hearings on this from the very beginning. And I
do not know what else this administration can do outside of
running a billboard in downtown Washington to say that missile
defense is not included in this treaty. I mean, they have said
it over and over in hearing after hearing and everyone we have
had up here to testify wherever they are in the administration,
whether it is the military or Ambassador Gottemoeller or
whoever else it is, they start out discussions with, ``let us
make it perfectly clear,'' because they realize that this is an
issue that is very sensitive. So I do not know what else they
can do to kind of convince folks that this is not part of the
deal.
Either one of you, do you think there is some kind of
secret deal that is going on, which is what is also implied by
many of the critics?
Mr. Scowcroft. No. I would say that on both sides, this is
an issue of domestic politics. The treaty is amply clear. It
does not restrict us. Would the Russians like it to restrict
us? Yes, of course. I do not think there is substance to this
argument.
Senator Kaufman. Mr. Hadley.
Mr. Hadley. I do not think there are secret understandings.
I think it is a muddy record. I think the administration has
and will make it clear that they do not accept any limitations.
I think the trick is that it is not just the program they want
to pursue that is OK. I think it needs to go further and say no
limitations whatsoever on either their program or the program
of some other administration. And I think the way to do it is
to have the administration on the record and then for the
Senate of the United States as part of the ratification to be
on the record that they do not accept any limitations on our
ability to pursue ballistic missile defense either.
Senator Kaufman. I think maybe the Senate part of it, but I
do not see how this administration can do anything more to
communicate the fact. I mean, it is really better I think--this
is just a matter of personal opinion on how to deal with this
problem--to do what they have done, which is to say it is not
in this treaty. It was not part of negotiations. It was never
part of negotiations as opposed to start picking it out and
saying, well, we need a special counterforce or something in
here to do. And I think that calls attention to--but that is
just a matter of strategy.
Mr. Hadley, I would like to also address the 10-year plan.
I think everyone here is for nuclear modernization. I mean,
sometimes I hear my colleagues talk about nuclear
modernization, that there is a group of people up here that do
not want to modernize our nuclear weapons. I sit here in the
hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee. I just do not see
anybody that does not want to modernize nuclear weapons.
As usual, I think Senator Lugar raises an excellent point
and that is we are in a tough economic situation. To put
together a 10-year plan on just about anything right now is
going to lock us into spending money, and especially in an area
where if we ever have to change it, we are sending a message
that our economic issues are overcoming our strategic concerns.
Can you just comment on that a little bit?
The other thing, by the way, to finish up on that--and then
that will be the end of my questions--is then put it to the
House to have to pass on. If you would just comment on--you
would not have these two linked or locked so that we could not
go ahead with the treaty until we got the House and the Senate
and the President to sign the modernization. It would just be a
parallel thing. Is that correct?
Mr. Hadley. I think the dilemma, as you describe it, is
that we are in a time of great budgetary pressure, yet I do
think it is important for deterrence to show our commitment to
stay in this nuclear game since our security and the security
of a lot of others depends on it. So I think it would be
important to try to get agreement on a 10-year plan
legislatively to raise its priority, show our commitment, and
make it hard to take the money out of that program. I think it
is an issue of prioritization.
And then second, it starts by finding a way to get year-one
money actually out the door so we can start this process.
I think we ought to try to do those two things, but I
recognize it is very difficult in the times we are in.
Senator Kaufman. And thank you both again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaufman. You always ask a
good set of questions. We appreciate it.
Just two quick wrap-ups, if I can, General Scowcroft and
Mr. Hadley, coming back to the missile defense thing for a
minute. I just want to make sure the record is crystal clear
from your own testimonies. And, General Scowcroft, you just
made a very important comment about it with respect to the
domestic politics.
Bob Gates at our hearing last month said the following:
``We are putting our money where our beliefs are.'' As
Secretary Clinton pointed out, our fiscal year 2011 budget will
add about $700 million more on missile defense. We have a
comprehensive missile defense program and we are going forward
with all of it.
Does that satisfy you, Mr. Hadley, that the administration
has spoken on that issue?
Mr. Hadley. Yes, with one caveat. I think you are going to
find and probably have already found, Mr. Chairman, that people
will ask you, well, does it just mean that they have cleared
the administration's missile defense program with the Russians
and they are OK, or are we really saying that there are no
restrictions whatsoever on missile defense so that if events
occur and this administration changes its ballistic missile
defense program or another administration comes in and has a
different one, that they will not be faced with argumentation
that says, oh, no, this program was OK under the treaty but
yours is not? So I think, Mr. Chairman, it really needs to be
``no limitation whatsoever.''
The Chairman. But both Secretaries and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff further testified--I just read you one
paragraph--to the effect that there are no limitations
whatsoever on what the United States can deploy, that we are
pursuing the program we need to now according to the national
security community's judgments about what is necessary to
protect America and that they are free to change that at any
point in time.
Mr. Hadley. And I have been told that by administration
officials as well, and I think that is a good----
The Chairman. Have you been told that by the
administration?
Mr. Hadley. Right. And I think the next step is, as part of
the ratification effort, for the Senate of the United States to
say that you see it the same way.
The Chairman. Well, I think if we ratify the treaty, we
will be saying that we see it the same way. I mean, that is
what advice and consent to ratification are. But I am not sure
anything is necessary beyond the full hearing record and all of
the questions that have been asked and the answers that have
been given by the administration with respect to those things.
I mean, they make it pretty clear. I think you spent--how long
did you spend trying to convince the Russians that the program
was not directed at them?
Mr. Hadley. A long time, Mr. Chairman. A lot of effort.
The Chairman. So I am not sure that we are going to
necessarily convince them of that. I think they have put us on
notice that if they finally make a determination that it is a
threat to their deterrent, what they may do to protect their
interests, but that has been true of the arms race since it
began in the 1940s.
Mr. Hadley. Mr. Chairman, not to prolong it, I think given
the history and the debates we have had in this country over
30-40 years on missile defense, if there is a way in the
ratification process for the Senate of the United States,
Republicans and Democrats with a, hopefully, overwhelming vote
for the treaty that says we agree, no limitations means no
limitations, I think that would help put these debates of the
past to rest.
The Chairman. Well, I am confident that there are ways to
do that without necessarily changing the treaty.
Mr. Hadley. I am not suggesting that.
The Chairman. There are ways to do that. I am glad you are
not suggesting that and that is important in this process.
And finally, just on the 10-year plan again, the President
has requested $7 billion for fiscal year 2011 for stockpile
sustainment and infrastructure investments. That is a 10-
percent increase over last year and they have laid out the path
for their $80 billion of investment. I have talked with Senator
Kyl. We are working with Senator Inouye and others to guarantee
that money will be available. I assume if it is, you are
satisfied that we are serious about moving forward with the
modernization program. General Scowcroft, are you comfortable
on the modernization?
Mr. Scowcroft. Yes, I am. I am comfortable. I did not use
the term ``modernization'' in my comments. I said safe,
reliable, assurance. Modernization for the sake of
modernization, in light of the comments that Senator Lugar has
made about the overall defense budget, is a separate question.
Some things need to be modernized in order to be safe, secure,
and reliable. Other things do not need to be. And I would not
put modernization itself as a key to what we need to do. We
need to be assured that the system will work the way we want it
to work.
The Chairman. That is a very important distinction, and I
really appreciate your drawing that because I think it is vital
to the debate.
Senator Lugar, do you have any additional comments or
questions?
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no
additional questions. I just simply want to thank the witnesses
and likewise our colleagues for raising questions and providing
answers today to some issues that have clearly been disturbing
in other hearings. This, it seems to me, was a hearing in which
we made progress. I am hopeful that the public record will
indicate the questions and answers. I think it will be helpful
to our colleagues as they come to a decision.
Thank you again, both of you, for your thoughtful
testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar. That is important
and I agree with you. I think it has contributed. Thank you
very, very much. It was helpful today. We appreciate it.
And the record will remain open for the rest of the week in
the event there are any additional questions, but I think you
have probably escaped that burden.
Thanks very much for being here. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
THE NEGOTIATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Edward E.
Kaufman, presiding.
Present: Senators Kaufman, Lugar, and DeMint.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD E. KAUFMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Kaufman. This afternoon the Foreign Relations
Committee meets to consider the New Strategic Arms Reduction,
or START, Treaty. This the eighth time--the eighth time--the
committee has met to discuss this topic since the treaty's
signing, including classified meetings. We have heard from the
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have also heard from former
Secretaries of State and Defense in both Republican and
Democratic administrations, former National Security Advisors,
and others, all of whom have voiced their support for the
ratification of the treaty.
This is a good treaty. From the historical perspective, it
is another step contributing to our decades-long process of
responsible, safe, and secure nuclear arms reduction.
First, it gives our military enough warheads and means to
deliver them to meet our current and future defense
requirements.
Second, it in no way limits U.S. missile defense strategy.
We intend to deploy a missile defense system that will protect
the United States, Europe, and Russia from attacks from rogue
states, and our strategic relationship with Russia will
continue to rely on the deterrence theory that has kept us safe
for half a century.
I want to repeat missile defense is not part of the New
START because President Medvedev and President Obama agreed in
April 2009 that missile defense would not be part of the START
follow-on treaty. This was reiterated in the July 2009 United
States-Russian Joint Statement and by every witness who has
come before the committee. As the lead negotiators of the
treaty, I look forward to hearing our witnesses' perspective on
this issue and others.
Third, the treaty contains an important clause that will
allow us to withdraw at any time in accordance with changing
calculations pertaining to national and global security. Such
language is boilerplate in international arms reduction
treaties and was included in START I and START II and the
Moscow Treaty. This is nothing new about this. This is a
standard provision that has been in the START I, START II, and
Moscow Treaty. It allows us to put the interest of the American
people first and it is a military priority.
Finally, the treaty provides long-needed verification
standards which represent significant improvement over the old
START Treaty. This is possibly the most important portion of
the treaty because the required notifications and inspections,
combined with the work of our intelligence community, give us
the confidence to reduce the number of deployed warheads. The
new verification system allows for more detailed inspections
for the first time allowing United States inspectors to open a
Russian missile and view nuclear warheads. When the Senate
first began considering nuclear arms reduction between the
United States and the Soviet Union, I could never have imagined
the time when Americans and Russians would have agreed to such
access and transparency.
Another element of the treaty which strengthens our
verification abilities are the unique identifiers on every
missile from its moment of creation to its moment of
destruction. Combined with notifications and national technical
means, this gives us an unprecedented ability to understand the
Russian strategic force. Additionally, it enhances our ability
to identify any possible cheating.
These verification measures are of particular importance
and of urgency. The original START verification provision
expired with that treaty 7 months ago, leaving us with the bare
minimum of notifications for New START to which both sides
provisionally agreed. If the treaty should be rejected by the
Senate, however, these provisional notifications will become
null and void. As we speak, the United States military and
strategic decisionmakers know less about the Russian strategic
force than they did in December because of the expiration of
the first START Treaty. It is in our, the United States, short-
term and long-term strategic interest to restore inspections
and notifications and strengthen our verification regime.
In closing, I welcome--truly welcome--our distinguished
witnesses, Rose Gottemoeller, who is Assistant Secretary of
State for Verification and Compliance and the chief negotiator
of the treaty; Ted Warner, who is a former Assistant Secretary
of Defense and was representative of the Department of Defense
to negotiations. Together they are uniquely qualified to answer
questions about what was included in negotiations and what was
not, which will constitute an important part of our record here
today. This is the second time they have testified before the
committee since the treaty was ratified, the first being a
classified hearing last week. It is a testament to the
importance of their perspectives that we have brought them back
to continue conversations for the record today.
There is an old expression that when a shark stops
swimming, it drowns, and I think that perfectly summarizes
where we stand with regard to arms control and why we have to
keep swimming.
Some witnesses have testified who have wholeheartedly
supported the treaty, and some have voiced specific areas of
concern, but each has insisted that nonratification would be a
setback for global security. In the words of Lt. Gen. Brent
Scowcroft, ``The principal result of nonratification would be
to throw the whole nuclear negotiating situation into a state
of chaos.''
The decades of cooperative limits and reductions provided
by SALT and subsequently by the robust verification systems in
the first START Treaty provided the United States and Russia
with the confidence needed to reduce nuclear weapons because
both sides knew it was in their national interest. Failure to
ratify this essential follow-on treaty would represent an
unraveling of past cooperation between the United States and
Russia on arms reduction and pose a significant setback for
nuclear security.
Thank you again.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
join you in welcoming our good friends, Assistant Secretary of
State Rose Gottemoeller and chief negotiator for the START
Treaty and Dr. Edward Warner, the Secretary of Defense's
representative for negotiations on the treaty. We appreciate
again the closed session, and we look forward to raising
questions in the public session that will be helpful to our
members and to the broader group of Americans who are watching
carefully this ratification procedure.
Today we will explore technical issues related to the
treaty's negotiations. Tomorrow we look forward to examining
with Defense Department witnesses its deeper military
implications, including modernization and missile defense
issues.
Last week, the committee heard in the closed-door testimony
from both of you, and that session was extremely valuable in
advancing our understanding of missile defense considerations
in the treaty. We gained a much better picture of the intent of
our negotiators, and I hope that we will continue to make
progress on that issue today. What were the understandings of
the negotiators relative to missile defense and the meaning and
effect of these provisions, especially concerning the grounds
for withdrawal from the New START Treaty? Did the Russians say,
as has often been asserted, that these provisions were merely
for their domestic political consumption, or do they view them
as a binding obligation on the United States that will inhibit
future missile defense development and deployment on our part?
Tomorrow we will be able to ask Defense Department
witnesses, Dr. James Miller and General O'Reilly of the Missile
Defense Agency, about their conversations with the Russians on
missile defense. But today we will hear from the negotiators
about what their goals were in agreeing to the missile defense
language in the treaty.
We also have heard testimony about tactical nuclear
weapons, in particular, from former Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger and former National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft. What consideration was given to tactical nuclear
weapons during negotiations on the New START Treaty, and how
would the treaty contribute to achieving binding limits on
tactical weapons in the future? It will be important for Dr.
Warner to share with us the views of the Defense Department and
how these were reflected in the final treaty. Does the New
START Treaty provide the flexibility sufficient to deal with
strategic changes and to meet our deterrence missions?
Bomber counting rules under New START have been criticized,
but in this area the treaty appears to continue guidance first
set down by President Reagan. The START I Treaty counted 10
warheads for 150 U.S. bombers and 8 warheads for up to 180
Russian bombers. Bombers in excess of these limits counted for
the number of warheads deployed on each. New START counts just
one weapon for every bomber.
Now, President Reagan's position was to minimize the
counting of bombers reflecting their stabilizing nature.
Counting bomber warheads at all in START I was a concession.
Testifying before this committee on START I in 1992, Ambassador
Ronald Lehman stated ``even as we establish lower ceilings on
the most destabilizing ballistic missile system, we sought
flexible treatment of bombers and cruise missiles, and we've
succeeded in achieving our objective.''
In counting one weapon per bomber, the New START Treaty
advances the legacy of bomber stability and flexibility
initiated by President Reagan. Verification of compliance and
our ability to monitor the limits of this treaty remain central
to the Senate's evaluation. Secretary Gottemoeller has stated
that she believes that the New START Treaty fixes a number of
the compliance issues we faced under START. Our witnesses
should discuss at length how the verification regime has been
modified under New START and why these changes will fulfill our
current verification requirements.
As I noted during our May 18 hearing with Secretaries
Clinton and Gates and Admiral Mullen, the administration must
make a special effort to produce the National Intelligence
Estimate and formal verification assessment related to the
treaty. The verification assessment is the direct
responsibility of the State Department, and I asked the
Secretaries that day to devote their personal energies to
accelerating the delivery of these reports to the Senate.
Today I would ask Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner to
do the same. The President has declared the New START Treaty to
be a top legislative objective and has called for Senate
approval this year. Failing to deliver these reviews related to
START in an expedited fashion would diminish the perceptions of
the priority of the treaty and complicate Senate debate.
The task facing members of this committee is to continue to
clarify areas of ambiguity so that we can craft a responsible
and transparent resolution of ratification. I believe that such
a resolution can command strong support in the Senate and that
we can act on this treaty with confidence this year.
I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for chairing our hearing.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Senator.
Now we will hear from our witnesses. I understand
Ambassador Gottemoeller is going to go--I think if you limit
your remarks to no more than 10 minutes, the full written
statement can be inserted in the record.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR VERIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION, CHIEF
U.S. NEGOTIATOR IN POST-START NEGOTIATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for your very extensive remarks to introduce the
session. Senator Lugar, thank you also for your extensive
remarks. I think it launches us well on our discussions today.
I did want to underscore, Mr. Chairman, that I am not
actually appointed to the post of Ambassador for this position.
I am the Assistant Secretary and also the chief negotiator of
this treaty. But thank you for the title.
Thank you again, sir, and I am very happy to have this
opportunity today to provide my perspective as the chief
negotiator of the treaty between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on measures for the further
reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, known as
the New START Treaty, and to respond to your questions.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to give an
abbreviated version of my remarks today and submit the rest of
them for the record.
Senator Kaufman. Without objection.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, sir.
I believe that there is every reason for the Senate to
provide its advice and consent to ratification of the New START
Treaty. The treaty is a continuation of the international arms
control and nonproliferation framework that the United States
has worked hard to foster and strengthen for the past 50 years.
It will provide ongoing transparency and predictability
regarding the world's two largest deployed nuclear arsenals
while preserving our ability to maintain the strong nuclear
deterrent that remains an essential element of U.S. national
security and the security of our friends and allies.
Our negotiations benefited from our long experience with
implementing the INF Treaty, the START Treaty, and the Moscow
Treaty. We began with a far better understanding of each
other's strategic forces than we had when we were negotiating
the original START agreement in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Several members of both delegations had extensive experience
implementing the START Treaty, including inspections of
strategic facilities. The U.S. negotiating team was especially
rich in experienced inspectors, as Dr. Warner can attest.
Indeed, my colleague, Ted Warner, and I are two
representatives of a strong interagency negotiating team that
cooperated very effectively in agreeing through a thorough
interagency process on the concept and substance of this
treaty. The strength of the treaty rests on the fact that we
took into account the broad perspectives of the State
Department, the Defense Department, the uniform military, the
Energy Department, and other agencies at the outset and at
every step throughout the negotiating process.
As I often noted during the negotiations, the New START
Treaty is a hybrid of START and the Moscow Treaty. New START
has its conceptual roots in both treaties. It contains a
comprehensive verification regime, as does START, to provide
for predictability, but it also recognizes that at the current
time we are no longer in a cold-war relationship with the
Russian Federation. Thus, it allows each party to determine for
itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive
arms and to decide how reductions will be made. This
flexibility is the great contribution of the Moscow Treaty and
it will be important to our national security as we move
forward to further reductions.
The warhead counting rules in this treaty are a significant
innovation. The parties will receive realistic accounting of
the number of reentry vehicles actually emplaced on each
party's deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and the opportunity to monitor
the declared numbers through onsite inspections. Mr. Chairman,
you already made reference to this in your remarks.
While neither party carries any nuclear armaments on its
bombers on a day-to-day basis, the parties agreed to an
attribution rule of one warhead per nuclear-capable heavy
bomber rather than count them as zero. And Senator Lugar, thank
you for your comments with regard to the bomber counting rules.
As you said, this attribution rule strikes a balance between
the fact that neither side loads nuclear armaments on its
bombers on a day-to-day basis and the fact that these bombers
have a nuclear mission. Furthermore, heavy bombers have long
been considered to be more stabilizing than ICBMs or SLBMs
because, as slow-flying weapons systems, compared to ballistic
missiles, they are not well-suited to first-strike missions.
The treaty's verification regime will give us an important
window into the Russian strategic arsenal, and I will turn to
Dr. Warner for a more extensive discussion of the verification
regime, but I would like only to note that the verification
regime will provide each party confidence that the other is
upholding its obligations while also being simpler and less
costly to implement than START.
The treaty protects our ability to develop and deploy a
conventional prompt global strike capability, should we decide
to pursue such a capability. We were firm during the
negotiations that the treaty must allow for strategic missiles
and conventional configuration and also that future nonnuclear
systems of strategic range that do not otherwise meet the
definitions of the treaty should not be considered new kinds of
strategic offensive arms for the purposes of this treaty.
The administration shares the Congress' concern that there
should not be any constraints on U.S. efforts to defend
ourselves or our allies from missile attacks launched by third
parties. The treaty does not constrain our current or planned
missile defenses and in fact contains no meaningful
restrictions on missile defenses of any kind. The preamble's
acknowledgment of the interrelationship between offensive and
defensive arms is not new. It has been acknowledged for decades
in prior strategic arms control treaties.
Moreover, for decades it has not been the policy of the
United States of America to undermine the Soviet or Russian
strategic offensive forces with ballistic missile defenses.
Ronald Reagan, at the time he announced the Strategic Defense
Initiative in 1983, said, ``We seek neither military
superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose, one all
people share, is to search for ways to reduce the danger of
nuclear war.'' Beginning with George H.W. Bush, our missile
defense policy has focused on defending the United States, our
troops, our friends and allies from limited ballistic missile
threats.
Regarding the unilateral statements on missile defense
associated with the treaty, the United States has made clear
our intention to continue improving and deploying our missile
defense systems in order to defend ourselves and our allies
against limited attacks. We did not agree with the Russian
Federation's unilateral statement, and the Russian statement in
no way changes the legal rights or obligations of the parties
under this treaty. The fact that Russia felt compelled to make
its unilateral statement is, in fact, a striking piece of
evidence that they were unable to restrict our missile defenses
in the agreement itself.
To those who may have concerns regarding alleged backroom
deals during the treaty negotiations, let me state
unequivocally today on the record before this committee that
there were no--I repeat no--backroom deals made in connection
with the New START Treaty, not on missile defense nor on any
other issue. Everything we agreed to is in the treaty documents
transmitted to the Senate on May 13 of this year.
The New START Treaty represents a significant step forward
in building a stable, cooperative relationship with Russia, but
this treaty is not about Washington and Moscow alone. It
advances the security of the entire world by giving added
stability and transparency to the relationship between the
world's two largest nuclear powers, and by demonstrating that
we are living up to our obligations under Article 6 of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, we enhance our credibility to convince
other governments to help strengthen the international
nonproliferation regime and confront proliferation.
Mr. Chairman, in sum, I believe that the New START Treaty
is in the interest of the United States and is the right treaty
for today.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of
State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Department of
State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and members of the Foreign Relations
Committee, I am very happy to have this opportunity today to provide my
perspective as chief negotiator of the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the ``New START''
Treaty, and to respond to your questions.
I believe there is every reason for the Senate to provide its
advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty. The treaty
is a continuation of the international arms control and
nonproliferation framework that the United States has worked hard to
foster and strengthen for the last 50 years. It will provide ongoing
transparency and predictability regarding the world's two largest
deployed nuclear arsenals, while preserving our ability to maintain the
strong nuclear deterrent that remains an essential element of U.S.
national security and the security of our allies and friends.
Presidents Obama and Medvedev described it best when, upon signing
the treaty on April 8 in Prague, President Obama called it ``an
important milestone for nuclear security and nonproliferation, and for
United States-Russia relations'' and President Medvedev declared it a
``win-win situation.''
A little over a year ago, the administration set out to negotiate
the New START Treaty with the goal of replacing the expiring START
Treaty with a new agreement mandating lower levels of strategic
offensive arms. We were also determined to move beyond cold-war
mentalities and chart a fresh start in our relations with Russia. The
2010 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that U.S. national security would
not be negatively affected by a reduction in our nuclear arsenal,
especially considering that the most immediate threats we face today
are nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The United States could
sustain a stable deterrence with significantly fewer deployed warheads
and strategic delivery vehicles than permitted under earlier arms
control agreements. It further recognized that we need to cooperate
with Russia as our partner to meet these threats and other global
challenges.
The negotiations benefited from our long experience with
implementing the INF Treaty, the START Treaty, and the Moscow Treaty.
We began with a far better understanding of each other's strategic
forces than we had when we were negotiating the original START
agreement. Several members of both delegations had extensive experience
implementing the START Treaty, including inspections of strategic
facilities. The United States negotiating team was especially rich in
experienced inspectors, as Dr. Warner can attest.
Indeed, my colleague, Ted Warner, and I are two representatives of
a strong interagency negotiating team that cooperated very effectively
in agreeing, through a thorough interagency process, on the concept and
substance of the treaty. The strength of this new treaty rests on the
fact that we took into account the broad perspectives of the State
Department, the Defense Department, the uniformed military, the Energy
Department, and others at the outset and at every step throughout the
negotiation process.
As I often noted during the negotiations, the New START Treaty is a
hybrid of START and the Moscow Treaty--New START has its conceptual
roots in both treaties. It contains a comprehensive verification regime
as does START, to provide for predictability, but it recognizes that we
are no longer in a cold-war relationship. Thus, it allows each Party to
determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic
offensive arms and how reductions will be made. This flexibility is the
great contribution of the Moscow Treaty, and it will be important to
our national security as we move forward to further reductions.
The three central numerical limits in the New START Treaty will
affect the Parties in different ways because our strategic forces are
structured differently. Each Party must make decisions regarding its
force structure with respect to all three limits. For example, Russia
currently has fewer operational launchers than the United States, but
it has a number of inactive submarines and ICBM launchers that it will
have to eliminate in order to meet the aggregate limit of 800 deployed
and nondeployed launchers and nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
The warhead counting rules in this treaty are a significant
innovation. The Parties will receive a realistic accounting of the
number of reentry vehicles actually emplaced on each Party's deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs, and the opportunity to monitor the declared numbers
through onsite inspections. While neither Party carries any nuclear
armaments on its bombers on a day-to-day basis, the Parties agreed to
an attribution rule of one warhead per nuclear-capable heavy bomber
rather than count them at zero. This attribution rule strikes a balance
between the fact that neither side loads nuclear armaments on its
bombers on a day-to-day basis and the fact that these bombers have a
nuclear mission. Furthermore, heavy bombers have long been considered
to be more stabilizing than ICBMs or SLBMs because, as ``slow-flyers''
compared to ballistic missiles, they are not well suited to be used as
first-strike weapons.
The treaty's verification regime will give us an important window
into the Russian strategic arsenal. The regime includes extensive
provisions that contribute to verification of the Parties' compliance,
including notifications, data exchanges, agreed conversion and
elimination procedures, inspections, demonstrations, and exhibitions.
It also includes some significant innovations over the START
verification regime, such as the provision of unique identifiers for
all ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and reentry vehicle onsite
inspections that are designed to monitor the exact number of reentry
vehicles emplaced on individual missiles.
The verification regime will provide each Party confidence that the
other is upholding its obligations, while also being simpler and less
costly to implement than START. The regime reflects the improved United
States-Russian relationship since the end of the cold war and reduces
the disruptions to operations at strategic nuclear forces facilities
imposed by START.
The treaty protects our ability to develop and deploy a
conventional prompt global strike capability, should we pursue such a
capability. As eminent Russian foreign policy expert Dr. Sergei
Karaganov has noted, it was not possible for Russia to secure a ban on
United States development and deployment of high-precision nonnuclear
strategic systems.\1\ We were firm during the negotiations that the
treaty must allow for strategic missiles in conventional configuration,
and also that future nonnuclear systems of strategic range that do not
otherwise meet the definitions of the treaty should not be considered
``new kinds of strategic offensive arms'' for purposes of the treaty.
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\1\ http://karaganov.ru/en/publications/preview/206.
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The administration shares the Congress' concern that there should
not be constraints on U.S. efforts to defend ourselves and our allies
from missile attacks launched by third parties. The treaty does not
constrain our current or planned missile defenses, and in fact contains
no meaningful restrictions on missile defenses of any kind. The
preamble's acknowledgement of the interrelationship between offensive
and defensive arms is not new; it has been acknowledged for decades in
prior strategic arms control treaties.
Moreover, for decades it has not been the policy of the United
States to undermine the Soviet or Russian strategic offensive forces
with ballistic missile defenses. Ronald Reagan, at the time he
announced the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, said, ``We seek
neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only
purpose--one all people share--is to search for ways to reduce the
danger of nuclear war.'' Beginning with George H.W. Bush, our missile
defense policy has focused on defending the United States, our troops,
our friends and allies, from limited ballistic missile threats.
Regarding the unilateral statements on missile defense associated
with the treaty, the United States has made clear our intention to
continue improving and deploying our missile defense systems, in order
to defend ourselves and our allies against limited attacks. We did not
agree to Russia's unilateral statement, and the Russian statement in no
way changes the legal rights or obligations of the Parties under the
treaty. The fact that Russia felt compelled to make its unilateral
statement is, in fact, a striking piece of evidence that they were
unable to restrict our missile defenses in any meaningful way in the
agreement itself. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov said in an
interview published in the newspaper Russia Today on April 19, ``We
have never ever believed that it would be possible through this treaty,
the scope of which covers exclusively strategic offensive arms, to be
able to limit capabilities of another Party in the area of strategic
defence.'' \2\
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\2\ http://rt.com/Top_News/2010-04-19/ryabkov-nuclear-programme-
iran.html.
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In addition, Russian President Medvedev said in an interview with
ABC News on April 9, ``I would not want to create the impression that
any change would be construed as grounds for suspending a treaty that
we have only just signed. Moreover, we agreed--I discussed this with
President Obama, and our respective administrations discussed it--that
we should cooperate on building a global missile defence system. But if
events develop in such a way as to ultimately change the fundamental
situation Russia would be able to raise this issue with the USA.'' \3\
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\3\ http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/l.
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To those who may have concerns regarding alleged back-room deals
during the treaty negotiations, let me state unequivocally today on the
record before this committee that there were no/no secret deals made in
connection with the New START Treaty; not on missile defense or any
other issue. Everything we agreed to is in the treaty documents
transmitted to the Senate on May 13. I also want to make clear that
Article XV of the treaty authorizes the Bilateral Consultative
Commission to make changes in the protocol without resorting to the
treaty amendment procedures only where such changes do not affect
substantive rights or obligations under the treaty. This provision is
similar to the provisions contained in, and successfully implemented
under, the START Treaty.
The New START Treaty represents a significant step forward in
building a stable, cooperative relationship with Russia. But this
Treaty is not just about Washington and Moscow. It advances the
security of the entire world. By giving added stability and
transparency to the relationship between the world's two largest
nuclear powers and by demonstrating that we are living up to our
obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), we enhance our credibility to convince other governments to help
strengthen the international nonproliferation regime and confront
proliferators.
Mr. Chairman, in sum, I believe that the New START Treaty is in the
interests of the United States and is the right treaty for today. It
will restore the transparency and predictability that START provided,
preserve the flexibility enshrined in the Moscow Treaty, contribute to
our efforts to reinvigorate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
take us another step toward achieving the ultimate goal of a nuclear
weapons-free world.
Senator Kaufman. Dr. Warner.
STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD L. WARNER III, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
REPRESENTATIVE TO POST-NEW START NEGOTIATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar. It is a
privilege to appear before this committee once again to discuss
the New START Treaty.
I served as the representative of the Secretary of Defense
on the New START negotiating team and was involved in the
effort from its very beginning in April 2009 through the
signing of the treaty almost a year later. The Department of
Defense stands firmly behind this treaty. It strengthens
strategic stability, enables the United States to modernize its
triad of strategic delivery systems and protects our
flexibility to deploy important nuclear and nonnuclear
capabilities. Because of this, the treaty has the full support
of the U.S. defense leadership. This includes the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service
chiefs, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, the
command responsible for sustaining our strategic nuclear
deterrent. In light of my role in the negotiation of the New
START Treaty, I would like to focus my remarks today on the
defense-related aspects of the agreement and on the inspections
framework of the treaty which I was responsible for negotiating
on the U.S. side. In my role, I had particular responsibility
to ensure that the national defense interests of the United
States were properly incorporated into our negotiating
positions and in any provisions of the treaty that were agreed.
I am confident that we did so.
Throughout the negotiations, my colleague representing the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Mike Elliott, and I were in close
contact with the Defense Department leadership. We did not
agree to the inclusion of any provisions without securing their
approval. Indeed, the final treaty, protocol, and supporting
annexes very much reflect the input of the senior Department of
Defense leaders to an effective governmentwide process. This
included the personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense
and of Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who participated directly at key junctures in the
negotiation of the treaty itself.
Let me address some of the key national defense issues that
are contained within this treaty.
First, the United States sought to conclude a treaty that
would significantly limit and reduce United States and Russian
strategic offensive arms while preserving strategic stability
in a manner that provides predictability and is supported by an
effective, extensive verification system. While pursuing
stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive forces, the U.S.
negotiators sought to protect our ability to field a flexible,
effective, strategic triad of nuclear delivery systems and to
enable the modernization of these delivery systems and the
nuclear weapons that they carry. The United States negotiators
also sought agreement on ceilings on strategic warheads and
strategic delivery vehicles that were lower than those in the
Moscow Treaty but sufficient to meet the needs of the Nation as
established and assessed within the recently completed nuclear
posture review.
We did achieve these objectives. The agreement of the
Department of Defense leadership to the limits was based on the
force analyses that were conducted during the nuclear posture
review by the U.S. Strategic Command and reviewed throughout
the Pentagon by the services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
It was also conditional upon Russian agreement to allow
removal of converted B-1B bombers, cruise missile submarines,
so-called SSGNs, and eventually a number of conventionally
armed B-52H bombers from accountability under the treaty. This
is one of the examples of the flexibility in the treaty where
it does allow conversion of systems from nuclear to nonnuclear
roles and specifies particular procedures, including inspection
activities associated with such conversions.
Second, the treaty affords us the freedom to deploy,
maintain, and modernize our forces as we deem appropriate. As
outlined in the section 1251 report to the Congress, the
administration plans to maintain and modernize all three legs
of the triad. By the time the treaty reductions go into effect
7 years after the treaty enters into force, the Department
intends to field strategic nuclear forces within the central
limits of the treaty that include up to 420 deployed Minuteman
III ICBMs, 240 deployed Trident II D5 submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, or SLBMs, and up to 60 B-2A and B-52H
nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Over the next decade, DOD plans
to invest over $100 billion in sustaining and modernizing our
strategic nuclear delivery systems, and the Department of
Energy plans to invest over $80 billion in sustaining and
modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear
weapons complex that supports that stockpile.
Third, protecting our ability to develop and deploy the
most effective missile defenses possible was one of the most
important U.S. objectives during the treaty negotiations, and
we clearly did so. Under the treaty, the United States is free
to pursue its current and planned ballistic missile defense
programs, as well as any other courses of action we might
choose to pursue. The one exception, as has been previously
pointed out, is the ban on the conversion of ICBM or SLBM
launchers for use as missile defense interceptor launchers and
vice versa. As previously explained and as will be, I am sure,
discussed by General O'Reilly in his appearance here tomorrow,
such a course of action would be costly and impractical.
Nothing in this treaty or in the Russian unilateral statement
concerning missile defenses, which is not legally binding, will
constrain us from developing and deploying the most effective
missile defenses possible to protect the United States homeland
from limited missile attack and to protect U.S. forces deployed
abroad and partners and allies from growing regional ballistic
missile threats. Nor will the treaty impose additional costs or
burdens on these missile defense efforts.
And fourth, the administration was also intent on
protecting the U.S. ability to develop and deploy conventional,
prompt global strike systems. We, therefore, agreed to a
permit-and-count regime whereby conventionally armed ICBMs or
SLBMs would be permitted but counted under the strategic
delivery vehicle and strategic warhead ceilings. In addition,
the United States stated during the negotiations it would not
consider future strategic range nonnuclear systems that do not
otherwise meet the definitions of this treaty to be new kinds
of strategic offensive arms for purposes of this treaty and
thus captured by its provisions. We are confident that this
arrangement accommodates our defense requirements regarding the
possible development and deployment of conventional prompt
global strike capabilities for the 10-year lifetime of the
treaty.
Achieving an effective verification framework was another
key U.S. and Department of Defense objective in the
negotiations. Let me, therefore, turn very briefly now to my
role as the U.S. chairman of the Inspections Working Group
during the negotiation of the treaty.
During the course of the negotiations, we met more than 90
times with our Russian counterparts to hammer out an effective
tailored inspections framework for the treaty. In this effort,
I was aided, as Rose noted, by a cadre of veteran inspectors
who brought many years of combined experience, both carrying
out inspections in Russia and hosting such inspections here in
the United States. We brought that experience to the
negotiating table.
Our objectives were to craft an inspection framework that
continues the appropriate verification and transparency
functions provided for under START while streamlining the
overall process and reducing unnecessary burdens in line with
the July 2009 joint understanding signed by Presidents Obama
and Medvedev. We achieved these objectives.
The treaty provides that each party may conduct up to 18
short-notice, onsite inspections each year. These inspections
are divided into two groups. Type one inspections will be
conducted at the operating bases for ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers and will include inspection of both
deployed and nondeployed systems. Type two inspections are
focused on nondeployed strategic systems, as well as formerly
declared facilities, and confirming the results of the
elimination or conversion of strategic offensive systems. These
inspections will be conducted at places such as storage sites,
test ranges, formerly declared facilities, and conversion or
elimination facilities. Each side is allowed to conduct up to
10 type one inspections and up to 8 type two inspections
annually. Type one inspections combine many of the aspects
associated with two different types of inspections that were
conducted separately under START, thus requiring fewer
inspections annually at the operating bases while achieving
many of the results of the previous START inspection regime
with a smaller number of annual inspections.
The inspection activities contribute to the verification of
the treaty's central limits by confirming the accuracy of
declared data. Inspections may also be used to confirm weapon
system conversions and eliminations and to confirm that
formerly declared facilities are not being used for purposes
inconsistent with the treaty, that is, they are not being used
to support strategic offensive arms anymore.
The use of unique identification or identifier numbers,
notifications, and the regularly updated comprehensive database
on all strategic offensive arms and the use of national
technical means of verification will complement onsite
inspections in providing for a robust treaty verification
regime.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, for the opportunity
to discuss this very important treaty.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Edward L. Warner III, Secretary of Defense
Representative to the New START Negotiations, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today regarding the
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. I served as the Representative of
the Secretary of Defense on the New START Treaty negotiating team and
was involved in the effort from the beginning of our discussions with
the Russians in late April 2009 through to the signing of the treaty
almost a year later.
The Department of Defense stands firmly behind this treaty. The
agreement strengthens strategic stability, enables the United States to
modernize its triad of strategic delivery systems, and protects our
flexibility to develop and deploy important nuclear and nonnuclear
capabilities needed for effective deterrence and defense. Because of
this, the treaty has the support of the U.S. defense leadership--
including the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command, the command responsible for the U.S. strategic nuclear
deterrent.
In light of my role in the negotiation of New START Treaty, I would
like to focus my remarks today on the national defense-related aspects
of the agreement and on the inspections framework for the treaty, which
I was responsible for negotiating on the U.S. side.
As the Representative of the Secretary of Defense for the talks, I
had a particular responsibility to ensure that the national defense
interests of the United States, as viewed by the leadership in the
Department of Defense, were properly incorporated into our negotiating
positions and in any provisions that were agreed for inclusion in the
treaty and its supporting documents. I am confident that we did so.
Throughout the negotiations, my colleague representing the Joint Staff
and I were in close contact with Defense Department leadership, and we
did not agree to the inclusion of any provisions without securing their
approval. Indeed, the final treaty, protocol, and supporting annexes
very much reflect the input of senior DOD leaders to an effective
governmentwide process, including the personal involvement of the
Secretary of Defense and Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, at key junctures in the negotiation of the treaty.
Let me address some of the key national defense-related issues in
the treaty and how the U.S. side handled them.
First, the United States sought to conclude a treaty that would
significantly limit and reduce United States and Russian strategic
offensive arms while preserving strategic stability in a manner that
provides predictability and is supported by an effective verification
system.
While pursuing stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive
forces, the U.S. negotiators sought to protect our ability to field a
flexible, effective strategic triad composed of ICBMs, SLBMs, and
nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and to enable modernization of our
strategic delivery systems and the nuclear weapons they carry. The
United States negotiators also sought agreement on ceilings on
strategic warheads and strategic delivery vehicles that were lower than
those in the Moscow Treaty, but sufficient to meet the needs of the
Nation as established by the Nuclear Posture Review.
We achieved these objectives. The New START Treaty will entail
stabilizing limits on deployed strategic nuclear forces and nondeployed
ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, as well as
associated verification measures. We agreed to these limits based on
analysis conducted in the Nuclear Posture Review prior to and during
the course of the negotiations, which determined that the ceilings
would be sufficient to allow us to meet U.S. strategic deterrence
requirements and to maintain the triad of delivery systems. The
agreement of the Defense Department leadership to the limits was also
conditional upon Russian agreement to allow removal of converted B-1s,
cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), and, eventually, a number of
conventionally armed B-52Hs from accountability under the New START
Treaty.
We achieved agreement on these points as well.
The treaty affords us the freedom to deploy, maintain, and
modernize our forces as we determine appropriate in a manner consistent
with the central limits of the treaty. As outlined in the report to
Congress issued in compliance with section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act, 2010, the administration plans to maintain and
modernize all three legs of the triad. By the time that the treaty
reductions go into effect, 7 years after entry into force, the
Department intends to field strategic nuclear forces within the central
limits of the treaty that include: up to 420 deployed Minuteman III
ICBMs; 240 deployed Trident II D5 SLBMs; and up to 60 deployed B-2A and
B-52H heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Over the next
decade, DOD plans to invest over $100 billion in sustaining and
modernizing our strategic nuclear delivery systems, and the Department
of Energy plans to invest over $80 billion in sustaining and
modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear weapons
complex.
Protecting our ability to develop and deploy the most effective
missile defenses possible was one of the most important U.S. objectives
during the treaty negotiations, and we clearly did so. Under the
treaty, the United States is free to pursue its current and planned
ballistic missile defense programs, as well as any other courses of
action we might choose to pursue. The one exception, as has been
previously pointed out, is the conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers for
use as missile defense interceptor launchers, or vice versa. As
previously explained, such a course of action would be costly, and is
not part of our plans for future missile defense programs.
Nothing in this treaty or in the Russian unilateral statement
concerning United States missile defenses, which is not legally
binding, will constrain us from developing and deploying the most
effective missile defenses possible, nor will the treaty impose
additional costs or burdens on these efforts.
The administration was also intent on protecting the U.S. ability
to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike systems. We
therefore agreed to a ``permit and count'' regime whereby
conventionally armed ICBMs or SLBMs would be permitted but counted
against the strategic delivery vehicle and strategic warhead ceilings.
In addition, the United States stated during the negotiations that it
would not consider future, strategic range nonnuclear systems that do
not otherwise meet the definitions of this treaty to be ``new kinds of
strategic offensive arms'' for purposes of the treaty. We are confident
that this arrangement accommodates our defense requirements regarding
the possible development and deployment of conventional prompt global
strike capabilities for the lifetime of the treaty.
Overall, the New START Treaty will strengthen stability and
predictability. It will allow us to sustain a strong nuclear triad, to
deploy ballistic missile defenses to meet growing regional missile
threats, to defend the U.S. homeland against the threat of limited
ballistic missile attack, and to maintain the flexibility to deploy the
nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities needed for effective deterrence.
Achieving an effective verification framework was another key U.S.
and Department of Defense objective in the negotiations. Let me
therefore turn now to my role as the U.S. Chairman of the Inspections
Working Group during the negotiation of the treaty. In this capacity, I
led the U.S. side in negotiating the inspections framework that will
form a central pillar of the treaty's verification regime. During the
course of the negotiations, we met more than 90 times with our Russian
counterparts to hammer out an effective, tailored inspections framework
for the treaty. In this effort, I was aided by a cadre of veteran
inspectors who brought many years of combined experience in
implementing inspections under the START and INF Treaties to the
development of our negotiating positions and to the negotiating table.
The inspections framework that we negotiated with Russia is an
essential part of the treaty's overall verification regime. Our
objectives were to craft an inspection framework that continues the
appropriate verification and transparency functions provided for under
START, while streamlining the overall process and reducing unnecessary
burdens, in line with the July 2009 Joint Understanding signed by
Presidents Obama and Medvedev. We achieved these objectives.
The treaty provides that each Party may conduct up to 18 short-
notice, onsite inspections each year. These inspections are divided
into two groups. Type one inspections will be conducted at the
operating bases for ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers and
will include inspections of both deployed and nondeployed systems. Type
two inspections are focused on nondeployed strategic systems, as well
as formerly declared facilities, and confirming the results of the
elimination or conversion of strategic offensive systems. These
inspections will be conducted at places such as storage sites, test
ranges, formerly declared facilities, and conversion or elimination
facilities. Each side is allowed to conduct up to 10 type one
inspections and up to 8 type two inspections annually. Type one
inspections combine many of the aspects associated with two different
types of inspections that were conducted separately under START, thus
requiring fewer inspections annually at the operating bases while
achieving many of the results of the previous START inspection regime
with a smaller number of annual inspections.
These inspection activities contribute to the verification of the
treaty's central limits by confirming the accuracy of declared data on
the numbers of deployed and nondeployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers and of the warheads located on or counted for
them. Inspections may also be used to confirm weapon system conversions
and eliminations and to confirm that formerly declared facilities are
not being used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty.
Unique identifiers, notifications, the regularly updated
comprehensive database, and the use of national technical means will
complement inspections in providing for a robust treaty verification
regime.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on New START. I would be
happy to answer any questions.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
We will begin the question period. Each Senator will have 7
minutes and if there is time, we will do a second round.
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller, in practical terms, how
will the New START Treaty limit Russia's forces and options in
terms of things that they can do because they signed the
treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you for the question, sir.
In fact, the Russian forces are spread across three
categories in the central limits: warheads, delivery vehicles,
and launch systems. The Russians, of course, have been
experiencing over time some degradation in their strategic
forces, and so they have already been, in fact, taking some
reductions in their strategic delivery vehicles due to the fact
that some systems are reaching obsolescence.
I do want to emphasize, however, that for the Russians they
have, as we do, a fairly significant number of launchers such
as submarines and ICBMs and their launch silos that will be
reduced and eliminated under this treaty. So it will cause some
significant restructuring and reductions in the Russian
launchers, in addition to which the treaty will require them
overall to submit to a verification regime, as it will cause us
to submit to a verification regime, which will give both sides
a significant view into the strategic nuclear forces of both
parties. So that, I think, is significant in that it helps to
guide decisionmaking in both governments. It helps to prevent
worst-case decisionmaking and the kind of financial decisions,
resource decisions that might go with that, but furthermore
gives both sides a very, I think, clear notion of what kinds of
threats we are facing, and as systems are eliminated over time,
it gives us a sense that that threat is beginning and steadily
declining. So for both sides, it is a net increase to a sense
of strategic security, and in fact, of course, that is why both
sides enter into such strategic reduction negotiations and
eventual achievement of such agreements in order to essentially
achieve an enhancement in national security.
So I would underscore, I think, those two things, that it
does help us to understand the structuring of the Russian
strategic forces and will cause some elimination over time in
their launchers, and furthermore, it will also enhance
predictability by giving us a clear view into their strategic
forces and vice versa.
Senator Kaufman. And as a negotiator, what makes you
confident the new verification process will be effective?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think, sir, more than anything it is
our 15-year history of implementing the START Treaty and,
behind that, our experience in implementing the INF Treaty
since 1988. Those were the first treaties that brought us into
an onsite inspection regime, got us our boots on the ground, as
Senator Lugar likes to say, gives us the opportunity to
actually get inside the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian
Federation, the bomber forces, the submarines, and the ICBM
forces, and really helps us to understand what is going on
there.
It is the very experience of implementing those treaties
and understanding how both sides implement. Have there been
compliance concerns over time? Yes. START was a very complex
treaty, over 500 pages. From time to time, both parties had
difficulties with complying with some of the constraints and
obligations of the treaty. We have been trying to do everything
we can to ensure that such questions are not coming forward
into this new treaty. But as a matter of fact, in general terms
both sides implemented the START Treaty well, and it is that
history that gives us a good sense going forward that this
treaty is well worthwhile in its implementation particularly of
the verification regime.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
Dr. Warner, you are quoted as saying that in the new
regime, the notification unique identifiers will enable us to
follow a missile from the cradle to the grave. How precisely
will that contribute to verification?
Dr. Warner. Well, there is a combination of three elements,
Senator, that come together here. One is the massive database,
the comprehensive database. There is a requirement of both
sides to really register the data about all strategic offensive
arms that, in fact, fall within the provisions of the treaty.
Within 45 days after entry into force, both sides will exchange
data on these systems, where they are located, and so forth.
In combination with this is this idea of unique
identifiers, an alphanumeric designator assigned uniquely to
each ICBM, each SLBM, and each nuclear-capable heavy bomber,
just each heavy bomber as a matter of fact. These numbers, if a
system is newly created, will be present from birth all through
their operational lifetime in storage facilities and test
ranges, at operational bases, and we will also be tracking them
down to conversion or elimination at the end of their lifetime.
And that is what we mean.
The third part of the combination here, a troika of
reinforcing verification provisions, was database, the unique
identifiers, and then the necessity for notifications. Every
time that a system changes status from deployed to nondeployed
or is moved between facilities from a production plant to a
test range to a storage facility to an operating base and so
forth, notifications must be provided to the other side within
5 days of the completion of that activity. The notification
again will include the unique identifier.
So it is this combination of identifiers, notifications,
and comprehensive database that give us this ability to track,
and it is on that basis that we launch our inspections.
Inspectors go to a facility knowing in their case in advance
where they want to go, doing their homework, preparing, knowing
the information. Then they are able to verify the accuracy of
that information through the inspection itself.
Senator Kaufman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. I would like to ask either one of you to
give an answer to this question. The United States maintained a
permanent, continuous, boots-on-the-ground inspection capacity
in START I to monitor Russian missile production. Why was this
not continued under the New START?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Perhaps I'll begin, Senator Lugar, and
then perhaps Dr. Warner would like to continue with some
comments.
You are referring to the site that was located at the
Votkinsk production facility in the Russian Federation. It was
first established again under the intermediate range nuclear
forces treaty and continued under the START Treaty.
As START was nearing the end of its implementation in 2007-
08, the United States and the Russian Federation began to
confer about what would be the transition from New START,
whether there would be a new legally binding treaty, what
negotiations would ensue, and furthermore began to prepare for
an orderly transition from the START Treaty to whatever would
follow. In the course of those discussions, in 2008 it was
discussed what continuing obligations would both sides like to
see with regard to the verification regime, and during that
period, the continuing permanent presence, continuous
monitoring site at Votkinsk did not come into those
discussions. And so there was a preparation that began to
essentially bring about an orderly shutdown of the facility at
Votkinsk and to move to the next stage, whatever that would be.
So in essence, as the United States and the Russian
Federation in 2007 and 2008 were considering the future and
what they would like to do, one key decision that was made was
both parties decided they did not want to extend the START
Treaty per se for an additional 5-year period, which would have
been one way to go about extending the Votkinsk facility, but
in addition to which they simply decided to enter into an
agreement on the orderly shutdown of that facility. So that
process was unfolding at the time that we began our new
negotiations.
I would just like to comment, sir, that indeed we did work
very hard to try to continue some permanent presence during the
early course of the negotiations, but we also looked very hard
at what was actually required to verify the obligations, the
central limits of this treaty, and took a very good look at the
combination of notifications associated with the production and
being able to track missiles coming out of the Votkinsk plant
through their unique identifiers. That was an absolute
requirement for us to be able to track from the time that the
systems left the production plant until they arrived at their
either deployment site, storage site, or the test range. And so
there was very thorough consideration given to what would be
satisfactory in terms of following and tracking systems as they
left Votkinsk.
In fact, we did achieve that under the treaty. We have 48
hours advance notification of the departure of solid rocket
missiles from the production facility. This essentially allows
our national technical means to be cued and to be watching as
systems leave the production facilities. So we do feel that
there is a very thorough way to continue to track missiles
under this treaty.
Senator Lugar. I thank you for that response. I would
mention, without getting into criticism of either
administration, that in fact a comment was made with regard to
the last administration that time is running out. We are coming
down the trail toward December the 5th. There did not appear to
be accurate negotiations going on with the Russians at that
period of time. And so that on December 5 when the last
observers left Votkinsk, there was at least some anxiety on the
part of some of us as to what follows because a transition was
inevitable and before you and this administration could
negotiate a new treaty. But it appears to me that you have
taken into consideration the lay of the land at that point and
at least picked up the particulars of this treaty in terms of
what needs verification and the means of doing it.
My second question really comes down then to these new
means. For either one of you, please outline for us the
difference between START I and New START on the provision of
telemetric data. Why is New START different from START I? Will
the United States ever need to return to the kind of telemetric
data exchange with Russia contained in START I? And why do you
believe your negotiations concluded with a successful outcome
on telemetry?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Again, sir, I will start on this question
and my colleague may wish to add something.
Telemetry or the exchange of telemetric information is not
required to verify the central limits of this treaty. The START
Treaty was formulated somewhat differently. There were some
particular provisions of the treaty that required telemetric
data in order to be able to verify them. Particularly, I will
just give one example. That is the attribution rule. START used
an attribution rule, that is, if a system was tested with 10
warheads, it was always counted with 10 warheads. And in order
to determine that attribution for a particular missile,
telemetric information was required. In this new treaty, we use
a completely different kind of counting rule. I noted it is an
innovative and different kind of approach, but it does not
require telemetric information to confirm.
So telemetry under this treaty is a useful transparency
measure. Both Presidents, after some very serious discussion of
the matter, came to agree that it was a good transparency
measure under this treaty and will continue to unfold with the
exchange of up to five missile flight tests per year, that is,
telemetric information on up to five missile flight tests. We
believe--and because there is an annual review possible in the
bilateral consultative commission for the telemetry regime
under this treaty, we believe that over time it will prove its
utility because both sides will have an opportunity to make
adjustments in the telemetric data exchange throughout the life
of the treaty. Sir, I am confident that it will prove its
utility in this treaty, but as a transparency measure rather
than a verification measure.
Senator Lugar. Dr. Warner, do you have any further comment?
Dr. Warner. The only point that I might add is--Rose got to
it at the latter part--for the audience telemetric information
is really information monitoring the performance of missiles
during flight tests. And the issue here is when you are flight
testing an ICBM or SLBM, both sides use telemetry in order to
monitor and understand how the missile performed in flight.
One of the other issues--Rose's answer was exactly correct.
The point is it is not needed for verification of this treaty.
The other primary area was in the START Treaty, there were
limits on throw weight, the aggregate, really size and lifting
capacity of ballistic missiles. There is no such--and that
could only be monitored as an effective manner to see what was
the size of the missiles being tested. Again, there is no limit
on throw weight. Because of that idea of flexibility, sides
should be able to determine the composition of its forces as it
sees fit. Without that needed, there was no need to have to
exchange telemetric information of that nature.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Kaufman. Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller, how did
you craft the New START Treaty to avoid future compliance
disputes?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Mr. Chairman, this was actually a process
that was begun in the latter years of implementation of the
START Treaty. There is and was a Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission that worked very hard throughout the life
of the treaty on implementing the treaty and ensuring that
issues of difference between the two sides on compliance with
the treaty were resolved over time. It is one of the core
functions of that particular body. And by the way, in the new
treaty, we have a bilateral consultative commission that will
have, as one of its core functions, that very same type of
work.
But what we did with the JCIC in the latter stages of the
START Treaty was begin to resolve some longstanding questions
between the two sides. For example, there were questions
related on the U.S. side to the reentry vehicle onsite
inspection of the Minuteman III. The Russians addressed those
questions to us. We addressed questions to the Russians with
regard to the reentry vehicle onsite inspection of the SS-27.
And in the course of work in the JCIC and some demonstrations
and exhibitions, both sides were able to reassure the other
regarding these reentry vehicle onsite inspections, so that by
the time START was going out of force, we had achieved what are
called clean RVOSI inspections on both sides. That is, the
inspectors had no comments for each other. And so that was a
real accomplishment.
And we took that spirit into the negotiations because we
wanted to ensure that the new treaty had a real problem-solving
attitude from the very outset. So we transferred the attitude
of problemsolving and trying to work through questions in the
JCIC to the negotiating table in Geneva and really tried to
take some of the solutions that they were coming up with. The
SS-27 RVOSI is a very good example because it looked at some of
the covers that had been used during previous inspections that
had been problematic that the Russians had put into use, and we
really worked with them and they worked with us to come up with
a cover that would be acceptable for a reentry vehicle onsite
inspection of the SS-27 and then could be brought forward again
into the new treaty as a cover that will be used in the new
treaty.
So that is the way we, I guess I would say, tried to bring
a new attitude to this effort, and I do believe that we have
succeeded.
Dr. Warner. In my inspections working group, we had to do
the negotiation of these things in detail, and I would just
note very briefly this is where we got an invaluable
contribution of these former inspectors. These were people--
some of them had also participated in the JCIC deliberations on
these matters. They had attended the demonstration that
resolved these matters. They had been there, if I get the
chronology right, in the first place when the problems had
arisen.
So we were very careful. And if you look into the protocol
and then the annexes, especially in the annexes, which are at a
level of detail that most people do not want to wander into,
those annexes are basically a handbook for the conduct of
inspections, the ones that affect the inspection activities. We
got right down to the specifics of the character of the covers
for reentry vehicles, how they could be displayed, displayed
ahead of time, then used, make sure they did not hamper the
ability to count accurately the number of reentry vehicles
there.
So again, very much in the spirit of what Secretary
Gottemoeller spoke of, we brought that to specific
manifestation in literally the individual provisions. These
were often hammered out with considerable intensity, but in the
end, we did, in fact, achieve--and I think both sides came to
understand that they had a better--I do not know--``guarantee''
may be too strong, but better assurances that we were setting
in motion a set of provisions that could, in fact, be
implemented very effectively.
Senator Kaufman. Dr. Warner, as we talked about earlier,
START I expired in December. From a military perspective, how
important is it to get back in the verification business?
Dr. Warner. I think it is very, very important. I had the
opportunity to speak with General Chilton, Commander of
Strategic Command, within the last couple of days. He certainly
shares that assessment. I think we all do.
It has now been 6 months more since the expiration. In
truth, we did not fall off a cliff. We had lots of accumulated
information, but with each passing month, that information gets
more dated. In the Russian case, for instance, a new, very
important system has been introduced since the end of that, the
long-awaited mobile MIRVed ICBM called the RS-24. We will have
an opportunity, once START begins to have an exhibition of that
system to understand it in great detail, and we will have an
opportunity to track it and others through onsite inspections.
So the insights that are available to us cannot be
overestimated. I have spent much of my professional life as a
student of first Soviet and then Russian military affairs,
including strategic nuclear affairs. And I remember very well
the ``Through a Glass Darkly'' kind of assessments that we had
to make in the 1970s, in the 1980s about these systems. The
appearance of onsite inspections and the opportunity to get
this firsthand exposure to these systems--by the way, the
cooperative threat reduction program that is named for Senator
Lugar and his former colleague, Senator Nunn, was also crucial
in this regard because it came into being here in the early
1990s and it too brought this kind of direct exposure. In this
case, it was often exposure to systems leaving the inventory,
but nevertheless, this is a qualitatively different basis for
being able to understand Russian strategic nuclear forces. We
need to get back into the position where we will have those
insights available to us.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask either one of you for a response
to this question. The key to our consideration to the New START
Treaty will be a discussion of various cheating scenarios which
the intelligence community will discuss with us next month.
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, how do you design the
verification regime under this treaty to deter and detect
cheating, and are the most useful elements of START I that
enabled detection of cheating retained in New START?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Senator Lugar, again I will let Mr.
Warner deal with most of that question as it relates to the
verification regime.
But I did want to say one thing to begin with, and that is
I wanted to reiterate the point that I made at the outset, that
this was a very thorough interagency effort. We worked very
hard to ensure that we were airing all concerns across the
interagency and thinking through very carefully what the
various effects could be on our national security in terms of
threats to the United States from Russian strategic forces and
in terms of potential threats from cheating scenarios. So we
did do a very thorough job in my view on an interagency basis
of getting everybody to our table in-house, so to speak, and
making sure that such concerns were aired. So I do feel like we
did our due diligence and more in the preparation of the
verification regime of this treaty.
So now let me hand over to Dr. Warner for his comments.
Dr. Warner. I have not participated with the intelligence
community on whatever analyses they are doing on cheating
scenarios and the like, so I certainly cannot speak to what the
specifics of what they are examining.
But as a general proposition, I think the overall
comprehensiveness of the verification regime, that
comprehensive database, the unique identifiers, notifications,
and then the ability to do the sampling with onsite
inspections--it is the combination of all of that that gives
you the confidence that were a side try to cheat, it would run
significant risks of having it detected.
I should make mention, of course, which I have not noted,
the role of national technical means, the euphemism we use for
our overhead satellite reconnaissance of various types for the
use of other sort of standoff systems. We still monitor Russian
strategic nuclear force activity very intensively with our own
intelligence collection systems. So the combination of the
intelligence collection systems and this extensive verification
regime, in combination--and then the inspections where you do,
in fact, verify the accuracy of the declared data, meaning that
entire database as a whole--when you got those opportunities,
it just raises the strong possibility that were either side to
cheat, it would be detected, and were it to be detected, the
political ramifications would be very considerable.
Now, in this question of verification, they often argue
what you want to be able to ensure you can do is to detect any
militarily significant change in a way where you would have
time to react. That is kind of the standard that I think the
intelligence community will apply to itself, and they will give
their evaluation.
But I think that we have in combination between our
national technical means, our independent sources of
information, and those that are boned up with the treaty,
between the two, either side, were it to try to cheat--and they
think of it from their point of view. I am simply giving it
equal time, if you will. But certainly if the Russians were
going to cheat on this in any substantial way, they would have
a very strong possibility of having that detected and would be
very harmful I think for their political interests.
Senator Lugar. Let me thank you for your generous comment
about the cooperative threat reduction, the so-called Nunn-
Lugar program.
I would just mention that on the verification side, one of
the things that I am certain Senator Nunn and I visited with
over the years was the fact that the Russians frequently were
very forthcoming with thoughts of their own which were not
required. By that I mean, for example, an invitation to Sevmash
was totally unexpected. No American had ever seen the typhoons
up there. I was asked to go up there. The Russians took a
picture of me standing in front of one, which is more than our
intelligence had ever seen. This was not covered by START, but
it was a part of the relationship.
And the importance of having a treaty is to have a
relationship which in fact Americans and Russians are very
likely to come and say, as they did with the typhoons, we do
not have the money to dismantle these. We do not have the
technical skills in terms of the size of the force that we
need. But it is an important thing for both of us to take 200
missiles that could be nuclear-armed off of submarines that
have run up and down your coast for 20 years. This was not a
part of the treaty, but it is a part of the whole consideration
here.
And I mention this because occasionally people say, well,
why do we need a treaty at all? What is the point of all of
this? I have seen vividly the point of this. In terms of our
national security, a lot of things would never have happened
without there being this relationship. It is a very personal
one that came about because of that format.
So I appreciate your mention of that as an auxiliary part
of verification because I perceive that it is an important one.
Likewise, being invited down into the tombs where all the
warheads were situated, almost like corpses in a morgue, but
with a small tablet at the top telling them when the warhead
was created, what the servicing had been of it, what the
dangers might be of something happening to that without proper
servicing and hope that we would help eliminate the oldest ones
first so something would not happen in Russia unexpectedly,
quite apart of the purpose of the warhead to begin with, these
are also realities of our discussion now which I was tempted by
your comment to launch into.
Let me cease-fire for the moment because another Senator
has joined us, and we appreciate that. I yield, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaufman. Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Lugar.
Thank you both for your service.
I would like to hone in for just a few moments on the
missile defense aspect of the negotiations. It appeared that
there was a disagreement between what the Russians were saying
about the linkage between missile defense and the reduction of
offensive weapons. We had a good hearing with Secretary Clinton
and Secretary Gates. It became apparent to me--and I would just
like to confirm with you--that the reason for the disagreement
is when the Russians speak of missile defense, they feel the
START Treaty is a clear limitation of the United States ability
to develop any strategic defense system against multiple
missiles such as those that could be fired by the Soviet Union.
When we speak of having flexibility with missile defense, we
mean it is a nominal defense system that could shoot down an
isolated missile by a rogue nation or one that was fired
accidentally by a superpower.
I just want to clarify with you, being involved with the
negotiation, is it your understanding that the START Treaty is
an agreement that the United States will not attempt to develop
a missile defense system capable of shooting down multiple
missiles fired by the Soviet Union. Is that your understanding?
I will just allow either witness here to answer that.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your
very thoughtful questions, as always.
I wanted to underscore a remark that I made in my testimony
that I thought would just bear repeating at this moment, and
that is, that for decades it has not been the policy of the
United States to undermine Soviet or Russian strategic
offensive forces with ballistic missile defenses. Ronald
Reagan, at the time he announced the Strategic Defense
Initiative in 1983, said, ``We seek neither military
superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose, one all
people share, is to search for ways to reduce the danger of
nuclear war.'' Beginning with George H.W. Bush, our missile
defense policy has focused on defending the United States, our
troops, our friends and allies from limited ballistic missile
threats.
One other point I would like to just stress at this
juncture, if I may, sir, is that regarding the unilateral
statements, the United States made clear in our unilateral
statement our intention to continue improving and deploying our
missile defense systems in order to defend ourselves and our
allies against limited attacks. We did not agree with Russia's
unilateral statement, and I can tell you that, sir, as our
negotiator.
Senator DeMint. I just want to make sure we are clear, and
I appreciate what you said. I know Reagan's vision was to use
missile defense to render nuclear missiles obsolete, that we
would not be in danger of them.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir, and he made reference to
speaking to arms control----
Senator DeMint. In the Bush administration, they realized
our technology was not there and we were not capable of moving,
at least at that point, to a system that could deal with
multiple missiles, but it was never George W. Bush's policy, as
I understand from his people, that we would not have that as an
ultimate goal. So I do not accept the premise that going into
the future that the United States should accept a mutual
assured destruction policy, which I am assuming that is what
you are telling me. That is what Secretary Clinton, Secretary
Gates--the START Treaty is a continuation of the mutually
assured destruction pact with Russia. Is that your
understanding?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Perhaps, sir, with your permission I will
allow my Defense Department colleague to provide----
Senator DeMint. And I do not have much time. So I really
would like some direct answers. Is the START Treaty a
continuation of mutually assured destruction?
Dr. Warner. The START Treaty's concept of strategic
stability includes the idea of having a secure second strike,
the ability for both sides to be able to retaliate
substantially or devastatingly against one another. That has
been characterized as mutual assured destruction.
Senator DeMint. And it is your understanding that it is the
American policy that we will not attempt to develop a missile
defense system that could shoot down multiple missiles. Is that
your understanding?
Dr. Warner. Well, that of course is the choice of each new
administration. That is not embodied in the New START Treaty.
Senator DeMint. But that is clearly the understanding of
the Russians, that we will not develop any defense system that
threatens their offensive capability.
Dr. Warner. They made clear that should we develop a system
that would threaten their ability to have deterrence, to have
strategic retaliatory deterrence, that they would consider
leaving the treaty. That was their unilateral statement, sir.
Senator DeMint. Right. Well, it is a very important issue
to us because I think if we told the American people that we
are going to continue with the cold-war strategy with Russia of
mutually assured destruction, that if they shoot at us, we will
destroy them, they will destroy us, and that we will not
attempt to use our technology to develop a system that could
not only protect us against the Soviet Union but multiple
missiles from China or some other nation that was capable of
developing multiple systems, I do not think that is something
that the American people would like. I know it is something I
do not like. But implicitly, if not explicitly, that is
apparently the terms of the agreement with the START Treaty.
Dr. Warner. First of all, I do not think there is even in
our missile defense policy--the treaty set aside. We are
committed to being able to protect the homeland against limited
missile attack. Limited missile attack has not been
specifically defined. So it certainly could include multiple
missiles. It does not say only one missile, but it does, as
Secretary Gates spoke in his colloquy with you on this matter--
it is not the search for a comprehensive shield, but it is
against limited missile attack. So I agree with that.
Senator DeMint. The disagreement here really compels me to
ask for the negotiating record so that I can understand more
clearly what has been discussed. In the meeting that you
referenced, Secretary Clinton said going back to George
Washington, that negotiating records were not shared. In fact,
George Washington shared the negotiation records of the Jay
Treaty. The Senate committees were availed the negotiating
records of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the 1987
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, and we have the Senate Arms
Control Observer Group who tells us that we actually got the
negotiating records from the first START Treaty. Now, we can
quibble about that. I asked for these and I was told that is
unprecedented. It is not unprecedented.
Is there any reason that the Senate committee cannot review
the negotiating records?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, first of all, I did want to
underscore that we, in preparing our package for ratification,
worked very hard to ensure that our article-by-article
analysis, 200-plus pages, really gives you a full viewing of
the obligations that the United States would be assuming under
this treaty. Certainly we have done everything we can to ensure
that we are providing you the information that you will need,
including extensive briefings and continuing to provide
information both in closed and open sessions. So I do want to
underscore for you our commitment to continuing to provide all
the information you need to make your decisions about this
treaty and also to answer any questions that you have.
My understanding of the precedents are different from
yours, I will say. It is my understanding that the negotiating
record was not, in fact, provided for the START Treaty, the
START II Treaty, or the SORT Treaty, known as the Moscow
Treaty. As a matter of usual practice, negotiating records are
not provided. For example, looking into it, we understand that
in the 110th Congress, there were 90 treaties ratified by the
Senate, and in none of those cases were the negotiating records
provided. So it is my understanding, as a normal practice, that
they have not been provided.
Senator DeMint. Well, we can discuss and debate that. The
issue here is: There is a serious disagreement between what the
Russians say and what we say that this treaty entails, and it
is about one of the most important aspects of the defense of
our country, which is a missile defense system. We are saying
we have complete flexibility to develop a nominal system. The
Russians say there is clear linkage and we cannot develop
anything that threatens their ability to destroy us. That is
not an acceptable scenario, and I will continue to ask for the
full negotiating records so that I can determine, as well as my
colleagues on the committee, what has this country agreed to
when it comes to missile defense.
And there are clearly definitional differences here. When
we speak of missile defense, it is very different from what the
Russians consider missile defense.
So again, I have gone way over time. I thank you for your
indulgence, Chairman, and I again thank the witnesses for their
hard work.
Senator Kaufman. Never an indulgence, Senator. Never an
indulgence.
It is true, though, that the basic decision that was
announced in April 2009 that President Medvedev and President
Obama said that missile defense was not part of this treaty.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Correct, sir.
Senator Kaufman. And it is also correct that in terms of
START treaties--the INF Treaty we did have access, but START I
we did not, although this is new to me, but I will look into
this that they did. But clearly under START II and the Moscow
Treaty, on both those treaties, we did not have access to
negotiating records.
Ms. Gottemoeller. That is correct, sir.
Senator Kaufman. And it is also true that after the INF
Treaty in the record of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
it reads, when the INF treaty negotiating record, having been
provided under these circumstances, both the administration and
the Senate now face the task of ensuring that Senate review of
negotiating records does not become an institutionalized
procedure. First, a systematic expectation of Senate perusal of
every key treaty's negotiating record could be expected to
inhibit candor during future negotiations and induce posturing
on the part of the U.S. negotiators and their counterparts
during sensitive sessions. The overall effect of fully exposed
negotiations, followed by a far more compelling Senate review,
would be to weaken the treatymaking process and thereby damage
the American diplomacy.
That is not me speaking. That was in the record after the
implementation of the INF Treaty.
Senator DeMint. Mr. Chairman, I will summarize the
information I have and forward it to you, as well as Senator
Lugar. But certainly having our public hearings here inhibit
some of the things that we might say----
Senator Kaufman. Sure.
Senator DeMint [continuing]. But it certainly enhances the
democratic process. So I thank you very much.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you for your participation, Senator.
I just have one final question and that is we spent a lot
of time talking about the benefits of the treaty and, as I
said, every single person that has come to testify has said
they are in favor of ratifying the treaty. But I do think it is
important to put into perspective--I have asked this from a
number of witnesses, and Senator Lugar has asked about the ones
that I have not asked just so people can put it in perspective.
What would be the implications of failure to ratify this
treaty? Let me start with you, Secretary Gottemoeller and then
Dr. Warner.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I really think that there are three
major implications. I will start with the most fine-grained one
and move to the highest level.
In my view, the immediate fine-grained is with regard to
the phrase we have used several times in this hearing, that is,
with regard to boots on the ground, with regard to our ability
to get inside the Russian strategic nuclear forces and
understand what is going on in those forces. We would not have
available to us the verification and inspection regime of this
treaty, including onsite inspection.
Would we be completely bereft of knowledge? No. Dr. Warner
mentioned our national technical means which would continue to
operate, but it is the interplay between national technical
means and the important verification regime of this treaty that
I think really gives us a thorough understanding of what is
going on in the Russian strategic forces.
The second point has to do with the predictability with
regard to what is going on in the Russian strategic forces and
our understanding of where they are going in the future, what
their numbers will look like. This, in turn, is our planning
and helps us to understand what scarce resources we need to
spend on our nuclear forces and what we can continue to spend
in other areas of the defense establishment. As we have very
important continuing requirements for our soldiers in Iraq and
Afghanistan and so forth, it is an important, I think,
mechanism for us to be able to decide what our priorities are
with regard to our defense budget.
The third is this more top-level issue and that is the role
of the United States on the international stage. I made
reference in my opening comments to our ability to lead in the
implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. I can
only say to you, sir, this effect is not a direct, easily
linked effect, but I have seen it myself operate both at the
NPT review conference, in the unfolding of the U.N. Security
Council resolution over Iran in the past 10 days, and
furthermore in the little known regime in Vienna, the Open
Skies regime, which is an important part of our European arms
control regimes. In fact, we were able to achieve significant
successes in recent weeks. Because, I think, of the strong
leadership that the United States showed with the Russian
Federation in concluding the START Treaty, it enables us to get
things done in the international arena. And so I would say that
it would also have an effect on our international leadership
role.
The final point. I was asked in recent hearings and
Secretary Clinton was asked as well about the future. What
about getting at nonstrategic nuclear weapons, so-called
tactical nuclear weapons? Sir, I believe our chances of
proceeding to reductions on tac nukes would be zero if we do
not ratify and put this treaty into force.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
Dr. Warner.
Dr. Warner. Ms. Gottemoeller has covered most of the issues
here. The one broad one that I would go back to is basically
just Russian-American cooperation on broader measures, even
beyond arms control. I mean, this has been a signal event in
the relationship between our two countries since the Obama
administration has come into office. The failure to ratify and
move ahead with this will certainly set back the prospects for
United States-Russian cooperation. Again, is this a
catastrophe? Of course, not. But it would sacrifice
opportunities to have the Russians work with us on a variety of
issues, whether it is countering terrorism, countering
proliferation, U.N. Security Council resolutions, the role of
the Russians in the six-party talks on North Korea. I mean, all
these areas of cooperation.
We have built a very tangible partnership within the scope
of the national interests of these two great powers, but very
effective working relationships have been developed from the
Presidential level, at the Secretary of State level, Foreign
Minister level. All of that will be more difficult if, in fact,
we do not follow through and implement this important treaty.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Now, let me follow along questions raised by the Senator
from South Carolina which he raised at an earlier hearing and
referenced responses by Secretary Gates.
As I understand your responses and as I remember
historically, at least at the time that the START Treaty
proposition began, a scoreboard we have in my office shows
there were 13,300 nuclear warheads aimed at the United States.
There may have been more or less, but that was the best
verification we had at that moment. We have eliminated almost
6,000 of those, but that is still leaves 6,000-plus to go.
I cannot recall at any point during this period of time
that either Russia or the United States seriously discussed
creating a sufficient missile defense that would stop several
thousand missiles, all aimed with additional warheads on them,
at the United States. In other words, neither side was able
really to do very well with missile defense at all. The numbers
of starts and flourishes and finishes of that are legend,
although we keep trying. We keep trying now to maybe make
certain a single warhead that was aimed at the United States
might be stopped if, for instance, the North Koreans got a
long-range missile, for example.
But this is a new concept altogether that is coming in on a
debate on a fairly limited treaty. Granted, it is an important
one.
Now, perhaps we should have a national debate on this
subject. Perhaps, as the Senator has said, mutually assured
destruction is unacceptable. It is a horrible thought. It is
still possible. This is one reason this is serious business.
But I do not know any serious thinker with regard to defense
matters or technical matters who has envisioned the thought of
a comprehensive missile defense system that would stop multiple
warheads coming into the United States.
Now, I say this having gone down into a silo in Siberia one
time and visiting with the Russian who was monitoring this. It
was a chilling experience because on the wall there were
pictures of American cities, 10 of them, as I recall. There
were 10 warheads on this one missile. They were all going to go
different directions to hit the 10 cities in America. This was
one single missile with those warheads. Our ability to develop
a means of stopping even that 10-warhead situation seemed to me
to be not in the cards then. Now, maybe there has been such an
evolution of thought, unknown to most of us, that we ought to
be thinking about this now.
But I mention this because I think that proponents of the
treaty are going to have to face this particular issue, if in
fact this is being raised. If this treaty somehow inhibits in
any way the defense of our country and accepts or ensures
mutually assured destruction, why, that becomes a rather
volatile message that somehow or other we were derelict in our
duties, myopic with regard to the world in which we are.
So I raise this question really quite openly to the two of
you. In your knowledge at any time, in any Presidency, any
administration, has there been serious thought given to the
thought we would develop a comprehensive missile defense system
for our country, not just protecting our NATO allies from the
Iranian missile or various topical things we have, but our
country? And furthermore, if we thought about such a thing, was
there also thought on the part of our military leaders that the
Russians might be unlikely to let us have a decade or 2 to get
it all set up, in other words, that they would remain passive
in the midst of all of this? That might have been one thing
that deterred us from undertaking such a system to begin with,
given the huge number of warheads both sides had at the end of
the cold war.
Do either of you have any comments on this discussion?
Dr. Warner. Certainly my recollection is that was the
vision of Ronald Reagan for a time under the Strategic Defense
Initiative which was popularly known as Star Wars because it
had both space and ground-based components. There was an
aspiration--an aspiration to explore many ways simultaneously
to try to have multilayered defense through all phases of a
ballistic missile's travel from the boost phase to the
midcourse phase to the terminal phase.
The fact of the matter was that despite all the research
and money put against it, it was, I think, the conclusion of
virtually all that we were nowhere near being able to
accomplish that objective against a substantial inventory of
adversary missiles, particularly given the fact that the
adversary would employ countermeasures of one sort or another,
decoys, chaff, a variety of measures, faster-burning rocket
motors to prevent boost-phase intercept and so forth.
In the Bush 1 administration, near the end of that
administration, they backed off. They continued to be loyal in
the SDI effort, to continue to try to find that magic shield,
if you will, or that comprehensive shield.
In the latter years of the Bush administration, they went
to a process called GPALS, the Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes. They began to say, look, we cannot do the
comprehensive job. Let us shift toward limited. Their version
of limited was still very ambitious. It included some space-
based interceptors, what they called Brilliant Pebbles. It did
include what has become the root of the systems we are pursuing
today, the ground-based interceptor for midcourse intercept to
go against a few.
By the time it came to the Clinton administration, it began
to focus--and by the way, it was in the Bush administration
they began to be worried about third countries. This was not so
much about Russia or China. It was more about the proliferation
of missiles falling into hands of hostile regimes like North
Korea, like what has become the Iranian effort. So that
transition occurred. In the Clinton administration, it went
very much to a limited homeland missile defense.
Now, were we there by choice or by necessity? At a minimum,
we were there by necessity. We cannot effectively defend
against a very substantial volley of attack by a sophisticated
adversary. So given that fact, we are de facto in a situation
of mutual deterrence. Now, that can be characterized as mutual
assured destruction. Well, in the presence of nuclear weapons,
that is certainly what it in fact means. If mutual deterrence
means both can retaliate, even after being exposed to a first
strike, they retaliate effectively in a very devastating
manner. We are not there because we like it. We are there
because it is just the way it is. That situation does prevail.
So the missile defense, followed by the most recent Bush
administration and by this administration has two components.
It defends the homeland. It defends the homeland against
limited attacks, but it could try to defend against an
accidental or unauthorized launch that came out of Russia or
China. It would depend on how sophisticated the missiles that
had accidentally been launched would be whether it would be
effective. We would certainly try to use them. We would not sit
idly by. But it is designed for limited defense against these
kind of first generation capabilities of these emerging
adversarial nations.
The second phase, of course, is theater missile defense,
and that has been present across many administrations. We do
seek to protect our troops, protect our friends and allies on a
regional basis against shorter range missiles. We used those
defenses in their first manifestation in the gulf war. We had
them available but did not have to use them in the war with
Iraq that occurred just a few years ago, and we are certainly
strengthening that capability.
But it is just a reality that you cannot have this
comprehensive defense. We have been able to ratchet those
offensive forces down very dramatically, but it is a legitimate
issue to say as they come down, what is the offense/defense
situation. And that will remain a concern or consideration as
we look into the future.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. I would just add that parallel
with this is, of course, an intense look at our strategic
posture review and whether our warheads work, whether our
missiles--in other words, the credibility of our retaliation
comes down to the fact that we have all of these weapons. And
now we want to make certain that they work. So as I understand
the Defense Department is asking for several billion dollars
more over the course of the next few years to either upgrade or
make certain or to relook at all of this so that there is
credibility on our part, and a major reason why we do not
anticipate another nation is going to strike is because we do
have a plethora of these weapons with which to retaliate.
Dr. Warner. It is that combination of delivery systems, of
modern, effective retaliatory delivery systems, and the weapons
themselves. And an important issue that has been raised by the
Members of the Senate is this question of the reliability, the
safety, effectiveness, and reliability of our nuclear weapons
stockpile. And I made reference to it. It will be discussed
tomorrow. There is a major investment being made into life
extension programs for the weapons that go into--for missiles
and for the bombs that can be delivered by, for instance, the
B-2 bomber. And there is a major investment to be made in the
physical infrastructure and the human capital infrastructure of
the system that maintains our nuclear stockpile of reliable,
effective weapons.
Senator Lugar. Secretary Gottemoeller, do you have a
comment?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Senator Lugar, I would just like to
underscore one point that we have not yet addressed this
afternoon, and that is that the United States has been talking
very extensively to Russia about missile defense cooperation.
And indeed, although we emphasized throughout these
negotiations in Geneva on the New START Treaty that this treaty
was only about strategic offensive armaments, not about
strategic defenses, nevertheless my Under Secretary, Ellen
Tauscher, has been working very extensively with the Russians
to develop missile defense cooperation, and that was a theme
that in another venue we would be very keen to work with them
on developing missile defense cooperation because we do take
note in the preamble to the treaty that as the numbers of
strategic offensive forces are reduced, the interrelationship
between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms
will become more important and that, therefore, we will have to
take account of these trend lines and so will the Russian
Federation. But the view is that a considerable cooperative
program could be developed in the course of the coming years
that would lead both sides to be able to work together to
tackle missile problems both on a regional basis and perhaps on
a national basis as well.
Senator Lugar. Well, that would be an ideal outcome and a
way of ratification that we began to work with Russia seriously
on missile defense in which both of us undertook steps and
cooperation as opposed to there being an adversarial
relationship taken for granted that was a great peril to both
of our nations. It could be the peoples of both countries would
appreciate that new turn of events in much the same way that
you hope--and I do too--that a new treaty negotiation would get
into the tactical nuclear weapons in a serious way because this
is a question raised by some who are not certain about
ratification of this treaty. That is, the Russians are left
with a 10-to-1 ratio, or however they characterize it in terms
of tactical nuclear weapons, and nothing really is resolved in
this treaty. This is still down the trail.
One response has been, well, it will not be resolved until
we really get back to the table again, and to set the table,
the ratification of this treaty is required as an interim step
in all of this as I understand it.
I mention once again, as I did at the outset, in part as
conclusion, that some Members of the Senate who are undecided
about ratification on the treaty are still focused on what is
in the report we are going to have from the intelligence
agencies, quite apart from the additional report from the State
Department.
Now, it could very well be that officials in both of these
instances feel that there has never been that much urgency in
the past, that when they got around to it, they would forward
the reports. I would just say that given the timetables of the
Senate schedule and our requests of Senator Reid, the majority
leader, for a time to consider this treaty during this calendar
year, quite apart from the stretch of time after the Fourth of
July recess or the stretch of time between Labor Day and
dismissal for the elections, with or without a lame duck
session, we are really coming down to a point of urgency that
all the cards on the table and all the information is
available.
Now, in terms of history, whenever it comes forward, it
will be interesting to somebody. But in terms of ratification
of this treaty now, this is why I keep droning on and on about
the need to get on with it. I am hopeful this has not caused
great bureaucratic distress, but if so, I am prepared to try to
create some of that just to make sure that we are serious about
something that is going to be required.
It may be, as you pointed out, that the diplomatic record
as a matter of precedent is not available so there is not
posturing during the negotiations and so forth. But at the same
time, the intelligence record is usually available, and we are
going to have probably more closed hearings to try to discuss
that, in addition to open hearings that will give citizens an
opportunity to form an opinion.
Well, we thank both of you very much for your preparation
for both hearings, the closed hearing and this very important
open hearing and likewise for your continued counsel of the
committee. Thank you for your leadership in formulating this
treaty.
Having said that, on behalf of the chairman, I will state
that we will keep the record open for questions and statements
for 1 week from today.
That then would conclude our committee record of this
particular session. And having said that, the committee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller and Dr. Edward L.
Warner III to Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar
the preamble
The article-by-article analysis states that, with regard to the
seventh preambular paragraph, ``In the U.S. view, follow-on
negotiations with Russia should address nonstrategic nuclear weapon and
nondeployed nuclear weapon stockpiles.''
Question. What is the view of the Russian Federation with regard to
future negotiations regarding nonstrategic, that is, tactical nuclear
weapons?
Answer. As agreed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009,
the New START Treaty was negotiated in order to reduce and limit the
two nations' strategic offensive arms; therefore the issue of tactical
nuclear weapons was not part of the negotiations. President Medvedev
has expressed interest in further discussions on measures to further
reduce both nations' nuclear arsenals. As President Obama commented in
Prague when he signed the New START Treaty, we intend to pursue further
reductions in strategic and nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons,
including nondeployed weapons, in future discussions with Russia. Such
discussions will follow appropriate consultations with our allies.
Question. In connection with the New START Treaty, during its
negotiation, did the United States raise the issue of Russia's tactical
nuclear weapons?
Answer. No. From the outset, the New START Treaty negotiations were
to be about strategic offensive arms. This direction from President
Obama and President Medvedev was contained in their Joint Statement
issued in London on April 1, 2009, as the negotiations were about to
begin.
Question. What is the position of the Russian Federation regarding
limitation or reduction of ``nondeployed nuclear weapon stockpiles''?
Answer. To date, there have been no treaties with Russia that
include limitations on or reductions of nondeployed nuclear weapons
stockpiles. We intend to explore limitations on and reductions in
strategic and nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons, including
nondeployed weapons, in future discussions with Russia.
Question. Does Russia maintain a significant number of nondeployed
nuclear weapons or stockpiles of such?
Answer. A classified response to be provided separately.
Question. How do you define a ``nondeployed nuclear weapon
stockpile.''
Answer. The term ``nondeployed nuclear weapon stockpile'' is not
used in the New START Treaty. Generally speaking, the term
``nondeployed nuclear weapon stockpile'' refers to all nuclear warheads
and armaments that are not physically emplaced or located on a deployed
delivery vehicle.
Question. The preamble notes that the Parties are ``endeavoring to
reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons.'' For the
United States, what steps have been taken consistent with this
statement, and what steps has Russia taken, in the opinion of the
administration, that are consistent with this statement?
Answer. The U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report outlines
concrete steps for reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons in
U.S. security strategy. Given changes in the security environment and
the strong and improving U.S. conventional military capabilities, the
United States can deter adversaries and assure allies of our continuing
commitment with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and at the lower
nuclear force levels represented by the New START Treaty.
As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United States
would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances
to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and
partners. The United States will continue to strengthen missile
defenses, counter-WMD capabilities, and other conventional
capabilities, and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring
nonnuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear
attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose
of U.S. nuclear weapons. The United States will not develop new nuclear
warheads.
By signing the New START Treaty, Russia has joined us in
endeavoring to reduce the role and importance of nuclear weapons.
Russia's implementation of the New START Treaty will result in the
lowest levels of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery
vehicles since the early days of the cold war.
Question. Paragraph 10 of the preamble states the Parties are
``Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on
strategic stability.''
For the United States, what would be the impact on strategic
stability of such systems?
What numbers and kinds of such systems (ICBMs or SLBMs) have
the greatest impact on strategic stability?
For the Russian Federation, what is the impact on its
strategic stability of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs?
Answer. In our efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and to
develop the capability to precisely strike time-sensitive, high value
targets, the United States is considering the development of prompt
conventional global strike capabilities. The number of such systems, if
the United States elects to deploy them, will be small and they will
not threaten strategic stability. The deployment of a nonnuclear prompt
global strike system would provide the United States with a capability
that we currently lack: the ability to hit precisely a target anywhere
on the earth in less than 1 hour using a nonnuclear warhead. At the
same time, depending on technical and operational details, such systems
could raise a number of challenges, including potential overflight of
other countries, and the ability to distinguish between the launch of
nonnuclear-armed as opposed to nuclear-armed systems.
While our analysis of potential U.S. nonnuclear prompt global
strike systems is still underway, DOD has concluded that any deployment
of conventionally armed ICBMs or SLBMs, which would count under the
treaty's limits, should be limited to a niche capability. DOD is also
exploring the potential of conventionally armed, long-range systems not
associated with an ICBM or SLBM that fly a nonballistic trajectory
(e.g., boost-glide systems). Such systems would have the advantage that
they could ``steer around'' other countries to avoid overflight and
have flight trajectories distinguishable from an ICBM or SLBM.
If the United States chooses to acquire conventional prompt global
strike systems, such systems would not be acquired for use against
Russia. Moreover, because any U.S. plans for acquiring conventional
prompt global strike systems would be limited to small number of such
systems, Russia could be assured that they would not pose a threat to
the survivability of the Russian nuclear deterrent.
It appears that Russia believes the deployment of conventionally
armed ICBMs and SLBMs would have an impact on strategic stability, if
they were accurate and numerous enough to hold at risk a significant
portion of Russia's deployed strategic deterrent systems. Russian
commentators have raised the concern that the threshold for launching
conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs might be lower than that for
launching a nuclear-armed missile, and that this would be
destabilizing. Finally, Russian observers have also expressed concerns
about the possibility that one would not be able to determine whether a
conventionally armed ICBM or SLBM in flight was, in fact,
conventionally armed, and whether it was being targeted on a third
country or on Russia.
Question. The preambular paragraphs note the Parties' deep
appreciation for the contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
as nonnuclear weapon states to strengthening the NPT regime. What role
did Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance play in ensuring
that these three states became nonnuclear weapon states?
Answer. The Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program
was instrumental in ensuring that these three states became nonnuclear
weapon states. The program provided these states with essential
confidence that they would not be saddled with the entire bill for the
denuclearization process. Some key examples: The program funded the
shipment of 1,900 warheads from Ukraine to Russia for eventual
dismantlement. This was an important precedent, which led to the longer
term Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS) program with
Russia. To date, NWTS has completed 477 rail shipments of nuclear
weapons from operational sites to dismantlement facilities or from less
secure to more secure central storage sites.
Additional projects under the CTR program included the development
of Government-to-Government Communications Links (GGCL), defense
conversion projects, and security enhancements (e.g., Kevlar blankets
to protect nuclear weapons in transit and refurbished railcars with
security sensors) for the shipment of the nuclear warheads from
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine back to Russia.
start i and new start terms and definitions
Question. Under New START, the term ``air base'' means ``a
facility, other than a production facility for heavy bombers, a heavy
bomber flight test center, or a training facility for heavy bombers, at
which heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based and their
operation is supported.'' Under START I, this definition included
``other than a production facility for heavy bombers, a heavy bomber
flight test center, or a training facility for heavy bombers'' but that
language is omitted from the definition of ``air base'' in New START.
What is the significance of this omission? Why does New START appear to
narrow the definition?
Answer. Under New START, the term ``air base'' means a facility at
which ``deployed'' heavy bombers are based and their operation is
supported. The term does not include any reference to production
facilities for heavy bombers, repair facilities for heavy bombers, or
heavy bomber flight test centers because a heavy bomber based at such a
facility would not be considered to be a ``deployed heavy bomber,'' as
that term is defined in the New START Treaty (definition #12); i.e.,
``a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, other than a test
heavy bomber or a heavy bomber located at a repair facility or at a
production facility.'' In START, the term ``air base'' also included
bases for ``former'' heavy bombers; i.e., those not equipped for
nuclear armaments, and this category was not carried over into New
START.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 3, why is the
reference to the provisions of the Inspection Protocol not included in
the definition of ``aircrew member''?
Answer. The reference to the Inspection Protocol was deemed useful
in the START Treaty because definitions in START were contained in an
Annex to the treaty and not located within the same instrument as the
inspection procedures. In New START, both the definitions and the
inspection-related provisions are contained in the same instrument, the
Protocol, with little likelihood of ambiguity. Therefore, this
definition was simplified, with no change in the meaning of the
underlying provisions.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 9, the definition
of the term ``conversion or elimination facility'' does not include
language in START I describing launch canisters ``that remain after
flight tests of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or ICBMs for
mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs that remain
after static testing.'' Why was this language excluded?
Answer. It is important to recognize that conversion or elimination
may be carried out at any declared facility, not just at the facilities
declared to be ``conversion or elimination facilities.'' That being
said, under the New START Treaty, conversion or elimination facilities
may be used to eliminate all types of launch canisters, and not only
those that remain after flight tests. Therefore, the New START
Definition 9 states simply that, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a conversion or
elimination facility is ``a specified facility for the elimination of
ICBMs, SLBMs, and launch canisters.'' In addition, under New START,
static testing is another means of eliminating an ICBM or SLBM. It can
be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, or at a
specified location where static testing is conducted. There is also no
requirement to transport to a conversion or elimination facility any
launch canister that remained after a flight test from a test range,
for instance; such a launch canister could be eliminated in situ, that
is, at the test range.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 12, why was the
phrase ``other than a test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber located at a
repair facility or at a production facility'' included in the
definition of a ``deployed heavy bomber''? It was not in START I. Why
were ``training heavy bombers'' excluded?
Answer. The reason for the inclusion of this phrase was based on
the definition of the term ``air base'' in New START; i.e., a facility
at which ``deployed'' heavy bombers are based and their operation is
supported. Because that term does not include an exemption for
production facilities for heavy bombers, repair facilities for heavy
bombers, or heavy bomber flight test centers, as was done in the
corresponding definition in START (definition #1), it was necessary to
include those exemptions in the definition of ``deployed heavy
bomber.'' Training heavy bombers were not included in New START because
neither Party has them.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 13, what is the
significance of defining a ``deployed ICBM'' as ``in or on a deployed
launcher of ICBMs''? Why does the definition of a ``deployed ICBM'' no
longer include ICBMs that are ``considered to be contained'' in a
deployed launcher of ICBMs, as was the case under START I?
Answer. Deployed ICBMs for silo launchers are contained ``in''
their launchers, while deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers are
contained ``on'' their launchers.
The definitions for when ICBMs are deployed and nondeployed are
different in New START from the START Treaty. In New START, a deployed
ICBM or deployed SLBM is an ICBM or SLBM that is contained in or on a
deployed launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs. When ICBMs or SLBMs are removed
from their launchers for any reason--for example, for maintenance--both
the missile and launcher become nondeployed for purposes of the treaty,
and a notification of this change in status is provided within 5 days,
leading to a corresponding adjustment in the New START Treaty's
database. Under START, each deployed launcher of ICBMs was considered
to contain one deployed ICBM, whether or not it actually contained an
ICBM. The concept of ``considered to contain'' is not used in New
START.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 14, a ``deployed
launcher of ICBMs'' is defined as an ``ICBM launcher that contains an
ICBM and is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, or an
ICBM launcher located at a space launch facility.'' Why are silo
launchers or deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs no longer referenced in
this definition, as they were in START I?
Answer. The term ``ICBM launcher'' (definition #28) means a device
intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM,
and thus includes both silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of
ICBMs. Upon review of the corresponding START Treaty definitions, it
was determined that there was no treaty-based need to distinguish
between silo and mobile launchers when using the defined term ``ICBM
launcher'' in this context.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 15, why does the
definition of ``deployed launcher of SLBMs'' now include the phrase
``that contains an SLBM, and is not intended for testing or training''?
Answer. The definitions for when SLBMs are deployed and nondeployed
are different in New START from the START Treaty. Under New START, only
launchers that contain missiles are considered to be deployed. When
SLBMs are removed from their launchers for any reason--for example, for
maintenance--both the missile and launcher become nondeployed for
purposes of the treaty, and a notification of this change in status is
provided within 5 days, leading to a corresponding adjustment in the
New START Treaty's database. Under START, each deployed launcher of
SLBMs was considered to contain a deployed SLBM, whether or not it
actually contained an SLBM.
The phrase ``not intended for testing or training'' reflects the
definition of the term ``nondeployed launcher of SLBMs'' (definition
#50); i.e., an SLBM launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, that is
intended for testing or training, or an SLBM launcher that does not
contain a deployed SLBM. Thus, the phrase is used as a way to
distinguish between deployed and nondeployed launchers of SLBMs, and,
to be consistent with the two defined terms, the phrase must be stated
in the negative and affirmative, respectively.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 16, why does the
definition of ``deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs'' no longer include
mobile launchers of ICBMs that are ``considered to contain'' ICBMs, as
was the case in START I?
Answer. The definitions for when ICBMs are deployed and nondeployed
are different in New START from the START Treaty. Under New START, a
deployed ICBM is an ICBM that is contained in or on a deployed launcher
of such missiles. When ICBMs are removed from their launchers for any
reason--for example, for maintenance--both the missile and launcher
become nondeployed for purposes of the treaty, and a notification of
this change in status is provided within 5 days, leading to a
corresponding adjustment in the New START Treaty's database. Under
START, each deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs was considered to contain
a deployed ICBM, whether or not it actually contained an ICBM.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 17, why does the
term ``deployed SLBM'' no longer refer to SLBMs that are ``considered
to be contained'' in a deployed launcher of SLBMs, as was the case in
START I?
Answer. The definitions for when SLBMs are deployed and nondeployed
are different in New START from the START Treaty. Under New START, only
launchers that contain missiles are considered to be deployed. When
SLBMs are removed from their launchers for any reason--for example, for
maintenance--both the missile and launcher become nondeployed for
purposes of the treaty, and a notification of this change in status is
provided within 5 days, leading to a corresponding adjustment in the
New START Treaty's database. Under START, each deployed launcher of
SLBMs was considered to contain a deployed SLBM, whether or not it
actually contained an SLBM.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 20, why does the
definition of ``facility'' include basing areas? Why does this
definition eliminate references to rail garrisons, restricted areas,
parking sites, and static display sites that were included in START I?
Answer. Unless a Party declares a base or other area to be a
``facility,'' treaty-limited items are not permitted to be located at
that location. A basing area had to be considered a ``facility'' under
New START because it is a place where deployed mobile launchers of
ICBMs are based and at which fixed structures for mobile launchers of
ICBMs are located.
The terms ``rail garrison,'' ``restricted area,'' ``parking site,''
and ``static display'' site are not used in New START and thus are not
included in the definition of ``facility.''
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 21, what is the
significance of defining a ``fixed structure for mobile launchers of
ICBMs'' as a ``unique structure, within a basing area, designed to
contain mobile launchers of ICBMs'' instead of a fixed structure for
both road-mobile launchers and rail mobile launchers of ICBMs as was
the case in START I?
Answer. Neither side has rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, so a
reference to them was deemed unnecessary. The START term ``fixed
structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs'' (definition #31) was
defined as a ``unique structure, within a `restricted area', that can
contain road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.'' Because the concept of
``restricted area'' is not used in New START, the corresponding concept
of ``basing area'' was substituted for ``restricted area'' in New
START, and the editing of the phrase, ``can contain,'' to ``designed to
contain'' was intended to clarify, rather than change, the intent of
that phrase as it is used in New START.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 24, why does the
definition of ``heavy bomber equipped for nonnuclear armaments'' omit
references to ``nonmodern heavy bombers'' and the conversion
requirements of the New START Conversion and Elimination Protocol? Why
does it define nonnuclear armaments as any armaments other than ``long-
range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear
bombs''?
Answer. In START, only nonmodern heavy bombers could be converted
to heavy bombers equipped for nonnuclear armaments, which limited such
conversions to heavy bombers of a type, any one of which was initially
based at an air base more than 10 years prior to the time at which the
determination of ``modern'' versus ``nonmodern'' status is being made.
At the time of signature of the START Treaty, no such bombers existed
for either side. The New START Treaty no longer has this limitation.
New START Treaty Terms and Definitions (definition #53) define
nuclear armaments as ``long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface
missiles, or nuclear bombs.'' To ensure that there was no ambiguity,
the words ``nonnuclear armaments'' that appear in the phrase,
``equipped for nonnuclear armaments'' are clarified to mean exactly the
obverse of what ``nuclear armaments'' means.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 27, why are rail-
mobile launchers and road-mobile launchers not specifically mentioned
in the definition of an ICBM base? Why do ``basing areas'' replace
START I's ``restricted areas'' in this definition?
Answer. Neither side has rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, so a
distinction between rail-mobile launchers and road-mobile launchers was
unnecessary.
The term ``restricted area'' is not used in New START. The
corresponding concept of ``basing area'' was substituted for
``restricted area.'' Under START, deployed road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs and their associated missiles could be based only in restricted
areas, the number and type of such launchers and missiles was limited
within a restricted area, the size of the restricted area was limited
to no more than 5 square kilometers, and restricted areas could not
overlap. There are no equivalent restrictions in the New START Treaty
related to basing areas.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 30, what is the
significance of omitting references to monitors and the Inspection
Protocol in the definition of an ``in-country escort''?
Answer. In START, a monitor was defined as ``an individual
specified by one of the Parties to conduct continuous monitoring
activities'' (definition #66). Under New START, there are two types of
inspection activities as well as exhibitions, but there are no
continuous monitoring activities as were carried out under START. With
respect to the omission of the reference to the Inspection Protocol,
the reference to the Inspection Protocol was deemed useful in the START
Treaty because definitions in START were contained in an Annex to the
treaty and not located within the same instrument as the inspection
procedures. In New START, both the definitions and the inspection-
related provisions are contained in the same instrument, the Protocol,
with little likelihood of ambiguity. Therefore, this definition was
simplified, with no change in the meaning of the underlying provisions.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 34, what is the
significance of excluding a ``facility'' in the definition of an
``inspection site''?
Answer. The inclusion of words, ``facility'' and ``location,'' in
the corresponding definition in START (definition #51), was due to a
linguistic issue raised by the Russian side during the negotiation of
that treaty. Based on Russian usage, in certain contexts the word
``facility'' in English was translated by a Russian word that in other
contexts would mean ``location,'' and in other contexts by the Russian
word that meant ``facility.'' Thus, to ensure that there was no
ambiguity, both words, ``facility and location,'' were used in START.
During the negotiation of the New START Treaty, however, the Russian
side agreed that it was not necessary to make this distinction and
agreed to use the word with the widest application; i.e., ``location.''
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 39, why does the
definition of a ``launch canister'' capture SLBMs?
Answer. When the START Treaty was agreed, Russia did not have any
SLBMs that employed launch canisters. However, Russia's new Bulava SLBM
is maintained, stored, and transported in a launch canister.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 45, the term
``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' is defined as an ``erector-launcher
mechanism for launching ICBMs and the self-propelled device on which it
is mounted.'' Why does this definition exclude the terms road-mobile
launcher and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs as was the case in START I?
Answer. Neither side has rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, so a
distinction between rail-mobile launchers and road-mobile launchers was
unnecessary.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 46, what is the
significance of the decreased percentages associated with the length of
the assembled missiles without front sections, the length of first
stages, and the diameter of accountable first stages?
Answer. Under the START Treaty there were a number of restrictions
that applied to new types of ICBMs or SLBMs that do not apply under the
New START Treaty. These restrictions were driven by START's
attribution-based approach for warhead counting. For example, under the
START Treaty, a Party could not attribute a new type of ICBM or SLBM
with a number of warheads greater than the lowest number of warheads
attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM, respectively, for which the
attribution had been reduced. It was agreed in START that only
significant changes to ICBMs or SLBMs should trigger these new type
restrictions.
The New START Treaty contains no such attribution rules. Therefore,
the Parties agreed that the percentage changes previously associated
with a new variant under START (see START's 25th Agreed Statement)
would be the criteria for declaring a new type under New START.
The New START Treaty requires exhibitions of each new type of ICBM
or SLBM. The reduced amount of change necessary to meet the new type
criteria reflects a tighter standard for requiring the conduct of new
type exhibitions after changes are made from existing types of ICBMs
and SLBMs.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 48, what is the
significance of adding ``on a deployed launcher of ICBMs'' to the
definition of ``nondeployed ICBMs''? What is the significance of
excluding ICBMs ``not considered to be contained'' in a deployed
launcher of ICBMs from the definition?
Answer. Deployed ICBMs for silo launchers are contained ``in''
their launchers, while deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers are
contained ``on'' their launchers.
A deployed ICBM or SLBM is an ICBM or SLBM that is contained in or
on a deployed launcher of such missiles. When ICBMs or SLBMs are
removed from their launchers for any reason--for example, for
maintenance--both the missile and launcher become nondeployed for
purposes of the treaty, and a notification of this change in status is
provided within 5 days, leading to a corresponding adjustment in the
New START Treaty's database. Under START, each deployed launcher of
ICBMs was considered to contain one deployed ICBM, whether or not it
actually contained an ICBM.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 51, why does the
definition of ``nondeployed mobile launcher of ICBMs'' include the
phrase ``unless otherwise agreed by the Parties'' which was not
included in START I's definition? Why are mobile launchers ``not
considered to contain'' ICBMs excluded from this definition?
Answer. A classified response will be provided separately.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 52, why does the
definition of the term ``nondeployed SLBM'' exclude SLBMs ``not
considered to be contained'' in a deployed launcher of SLBMs?
Answer. There is no concept of ``considered to contain'' or ``not
considered to contain'' a missile in New START. A deployed SLBM is an
SLBM that is contained in a deployed launcher of such missiles. When
SLBMs are removed from their launchers for any reason--for example, for
maintenance--both the missile and launcher become nondeployed for
purposes of the treaty, and a notification of this change in status is
provided within 5 days, leading to a corresponding adjustment in the
New START Treaty's database. Under START, each deployed launcher of
SLBMs was considered to contain one deployed SLBM, whether or not it
actually contained an SLBM.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 57 part A.i, why
are SLBMs included in the New START definition of a ``production
facility''? In part C, why is the phrase ``self-propelled chassis,
trailer chassis, railcar, or flatcar'' omitted from this definition?
Answer. SLBMs are included in the New START definition of a
``production facility'' because Russia's new Bulava SLBM is maintained,
stored, and transported in a launch canister. When the START Treaty was
agreed, Russia did not have any SLBMs that employed launch canisters.
Neither side has rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, so the references
to trailer chassis, railcars, or flatcars were not included in New
START. The phrase, ``self-propelled device,'' was deemed to be more
inclusive than ``self-propelled chassis'' that was used in START and
was therefore substituted. This is also the phrase used in the
definition of ``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' (definition #45).
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 58, why are
missiles referred to as ``launched'' instead of ``flight-tested'' in
this definition?
Answer. The START Treaty definition of ``flight test'' (definition
#32) was ``the launch and subsequent flight of a missile;'' there was
no definition of ``launch'' in START. Under the New START Treaty, the
term ``launch'' (definition #38) means the initial motion and
subsequent flight of an ICBM or SLBM. The term ``launch'' as used in
this treaty has the same meaning that the term ``flight test'' had in
START. Despite the change in terminology, the Parties' understanding of
their treaty obligations with regard to such limitations under New
START will remain the same as they were in START. The term ``launch''
does not require flight for a minimum distance or period of time.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 65, why is the
``silo launcher of ICBMs'' no longer defined as a ``fixed'' site?
Answer. The word ``fixed'' was considered to be redundant within
the context of the remainder of the definition: an ICBM launcher ``in a
silo structure located in the ground'' (emphasis added). There is no
change in the intent of the sides as to what is a silo launcher of
ICBMs.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 74, why is the
phrase ``that can provide its payload with an additional velocity of
more than 1,000 meters per second'' omitted? Why does a ``self-
contained dispensing mechanism'' qualify as an exception in New START?
Answer. The velocity criterion was used in START (definition #105)
to distinguish a stage from other propulsive devices, such as self-
contained dispensing mechanisms. By specifying in the New START
definition that the ``self-contained dispensing mechanism'' was not a
stage, there was no need to include this criterion, but the result is
identical under START and New START as to what is considered to be a
stage.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 76, why is a
provision added that addresses ``submarines that had been previously
equipped with SLBM launchers but after conversion are incapable of
launching SLBMs''?
Answer. This acknowledges the existence of submarines that have
been converted from ballistic missile submarines to submarines equipped
with launchers of cruise missiles, which are known as SSGNs by the
United States and are further described in the Second Agreed Statement
in Part Nine of the Protocol. Such submarines may be located at
submarine bases where SSBNs are based, but the converted, former SLBM
launchers in them are not accountable as launchers of SLBMs under New
START.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 78, what is the
significance of defining ``telemetric information'' in terms of
``initial motion and subsequent flight that is broadcast'' instead of
all information broadcasted and recorded during flight tests?
Answer. The START Treaty definition of ``flight test'' (definition
#32) was ``the launch and subsequent flight of a missile.'' As noted in
the answer to question #32, there was no definition of ``launch'' in
the START Treaty. ``Launch'' is defined (definition #38) in the New
START Treaty as ``the initial motion and subsequent flight of an ICBM
or SLBM.'' Despite the change in terminology, the Parties'
understanding of their treaty obligations under New START will remain
the same as those in START. The change in terminology from ``flight
test'' in the START Treaty to ``launch'' in the New START Treaty makes
the New START Treaty consistent with the terminology used in the
Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement of 1988. The term
``launch'' as used in the New START Treaty has the same meaning that
the term ``flight test'' had in START.
The START Treaty definition of ``telemetric information''
(definition #111) was ``information that originates on board a missile
during its flight test that is broadcast or recorded for subsequent
recovery.'' The New START Treaty definition of ``telemetric
information'' (definition #78) is ``information that originates on
board a missile during its initial motion and subsequent flight that is
broadcast.'' This should be read to mean that the only substantive
change from the START Treaty definition to the New START Treaty
definition of ``telemetric information,'' which substitutes the meaning
of the term ``launch'' for the term ``flight test,'' is the deletion of
the phrase ``or recorded for subsequent recovery.'' This means that
encapsulated information recorded during the test launch of an ICBM or
SLBM is not considered to be telemetric information for purposes of the
New START Treaty, while it was considered to be telemetric information
for the purposes of the START Treaty.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 80, why is the
phrase ``unless otherwise provided for in the treaty'' eliminated from
the definition of a ``test launcher''?
Answer. Under the START Treaty, the reason for that phrase was so
that rail-mobile test launchers could conduct limited movements for the
purpose of testing outside a test range. Since neither side has rail-
mobile launchers, and there is no equivalent provision concerning
movement of a test launcher outside of a test range, this phrase was
not carried forward into New START.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 82, why is the
reference to heavy bombers made in START I eliminated from the
definition of a ``training facility''?
Answer. Since neither Party has training heavy bombers, the Parties
agreed that there was no need for the category of ``training facilities
for heavy bombers.''
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 85, why does the
definition of ``transit'' omit references to ICBMs and SLBMs of a
retired or former type? Why does this definition omit provision C (from
START I, term 119) addressing a ``launch canister that remains after
the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs''?
Answer. The New START Treaty did not retain the START concepts, or
the terms associated with those concepts, of ICBMs and SLBMs of a
retired type or a former type, so the definition of transit does not
include references to such types of ICBMs or SLBMs.
The New START Treaty does not require the movement to an
elimination facility of launch canisters that remain after the flight
test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, so there is no
requirement for a notification of their transit from one facility to
another. However, paragraph 4 of Section II of Part Three of the
Protocol provides for the elimination of such launch canisters when
their associated missiles are eliminated. Launch canisters that remain
after the flight test of an ICBM can be eliminated in situ, that is at
the test range,
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 87, why is
provision B (from START I, term 121) regarding long-range nuclear ALCMs
omitted from the New START definition of ``variant''? Why are ICBMs and
SLBMs distinguished as ``ICBMs of one type or SLBMs of one type''
instead of ``ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type''?
Answer. There is no requirement in New START that technical data
for long-range nuclear ALCMs be provided, so there is no need to
distinguish between ALCMs that have different characteristics within
the same type.
The change in wording with respect to ICBMs and SLBMs was for
textual clarification only and does not change the intent of the sides
on what constitutes a variant of an ICBM or SLBM.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 88, why are ``fixed
structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs and support equipment'' not
included in the definition of ``version''? What is the significance of
adding the words ``functional differences'' to this definition?
Answer. The START Treaty definition of ``version'' (definition
#122) included the categories of ``fixed structures for mobile
launchers of ICBMs'' and ``support equipment'' that could be further
classified, upon declaration by the inspected Party, into different
versions of that category based on external differences from other such
items for a particular type of ICBM or SLBM. Such ``versions'' would be
considered to be equally authoritative models of a given category.
Because no versions of either fixed structures or support equipment
were declared during the 15 years of implementing the START Treaty and
were not envisioned during New START, these categories were not carried
into the new treaty.
Under New START, the term ``version'' refers only to mobile
launchers of ICBMs, and, because versions can be declared at the option
of the inspected Party, that Party was given the choice of establishing
differences based on either external differences or functional
differences, which would then be subject to inspection. The Russian
delegation during the negotiations made clear that all such versions of
mobile launchers would have visible distinguishing features.
Question. Under New START Terms and Definitions 90, why was the
word ``launched'' added to the description of a ``weapon-delivery
vehicle''?
Answer. The START Treaty definition (definition #124) of ``weapon-
delivery vehicle'' used the defined term ``flight test'' to cover both
the flight test and launch of a missile. The START Treaty definition of
``flight test'' (definition #32) was ``the launch and subsequent flight
of a missile;'' there was no definition of ``launch'' in START. Under
the New START Treaty, the term ``launch'' means the initial motion and
subsequent flight of an ICBM or SLBM. The term ``launch'' as used in
the New START Treaty has the same meaning that the term ``flight test''
had in START. Despite the change in terminology, the Parties'
understanding of their treaty obligations will remain the same as in
START. The term ``launch'' does not require flight for a minimum
distance or period of time.
article i
Question. The article-by-article analysis notes that the term
``strategic offensive arm'' is not defined in the New START Treaty. It
was not defined in START I, either, and yet both treaties reduce and
limit such arms. Why have the Parties consistently determined not to
define this term, instead opting for references to existing types of
weapons the Parties determine to be strategic offensive arms?
Answer. The term ``strategic offensive arms'' is well understood by
the Parties to mean strategic delivery vehicles and their launchers.
``Strategic'' indicates that, in general, the forces covered are those
of intercontinental range, in contrast to intermediate-range weapons,
ground-launched variants of which are covered by the treaty between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles
(INF Treaty), and shorter range weapons. ``Offensive'' is in contrast
to defensive strategic arms, such as ballistic missile defense systems.
The term ``strategic offensive arms'' was also used, but not
defined, in the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms'' (SALT I) of May
26, 1972, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (SALT II) of June 18, 1979, the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) of January 3, 1993,
and the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty) of May 24,
2002.
As a practical matter, the ``strategic offensive arms'' constrained
by the New START Treaty are existing delivery systems of strategic
range--ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments, each of which is defined in the New
START Treaty. The New START Treaty does not include a general
definition for strategic offensive arms because it might inadvertently
fail to address all the theoretical, or as yet undeveloped, systems
that could or should be considered as strategic offensive arms subject
to this treaty, or may inadvertently include a system that was not
intended to be covered by the New START Treaty.
To overcome the need for such a definition, for the purposes of the
reductions and limitations provided for in this agreement, the United
States and Russia have simply listed the specific types of systems to
be limited and defined those systems so as to capture their modernized
replacements.
The New START Treaty also provides that, if a Party believes a new
kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, it can raise the issue
within the Bilateral Consultative Commission for consideration as to
whether the new arm is a new kind of strategic offensive arm that
should be subject to the treaty. There is no requirement in the treaty
for the deploying Party to delay deployment of the new system pending
such resolution.
article ii
Question. The article-by-article analysis states that: ``A deployed
ICBM or SLBM is an ICBM or SLBM that is contained in or on a deployed
launcher of such missiles. Similarly, a deployed launcher of ICBMs is a
launcher that contains an ICBM and is not an ICBM test launcher, an
ICBM training launcher, or an ICBM launcher located at a space launch
facility. A deployed launcher of SLBMs is an SLBM launcher installed on
a submarine that has been launched, that contains an SLBM, and is not
intended for testing or training.''
For each existing type of both Russian and U.S. ICBM, SLBM,
heavy bomber, ICBM and SLBM launcher listed in paragraph 8 of
Article III, describe how each system will be counted as
deployed and nondeployed under the criteria described above.
Answer. For the Russian Federation, existing types of ICBMs are the
RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24, and existing types of SLBMs
are the RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56. When a missile is installed
in or on a launcher, that missile will be deployed, as will its
launcher. When the missile is removed from its launcher, that missile
and its launcher will both be nondeployed.
For the United States, existing types of ICBMs are the Minuteman
II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper, and the existing type of SLBM is
the Trident II. When a missile is installed in or on a launcher, that
missile will be deployed, as will its
launcher. When the missile is removed from its launcher, that missile
and its launcher will both be nondeployed.
For the Russian Federation, existing types of heavy bombers are the
Tu-95MS and Tu-160. For the United States, existing types of heavy
bombers are the B-52G, B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A. All heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments are counted as deployed heavy bombers
unless they are test heavy bombers, or they are heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments that are located at a repair facility or at a
production facility. This provision recognizes the reality that heavy
bombers located at a repair or production facility are not available
for operational deployment and thus are placed in a nondeployed status.
Clause (b) of paragraph (1) of Article II requires, within 7
years from the date of entry into force, that the Parties
deploy no more than 1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and
deployed heavy bombers. How will this limit be verified using
NTM and measures contained in the treaty to verify that this is
the total number of warheads deployed by Russia?
Answer. The aggregate number of warheads emplaced on deployed ICBMs
and SLBMs is declared for each ICBM and submarine base as part of the
regular data exchange required by the treaty. Type One inspections are
conducted at ICBM and submarine bases for the purpose of spot checking
the declarations regarding the number of warheads emplaced on deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs by counting reentry vehicles. During Type One
inspections, inspectors will be informed of the number of warheads
emplaced on each individual ICBM or SLBM located at the ICBM or
submarine base, respectively, at the time of the inspection and will
have the right to select one deployed ICBM in or on its launcher or one
SLBM in its SLBM launcher for inspection for the purpose of confirming
the number of warheads declared to be emplaced on that missile, and to
confirm the Unique Identifier for that missile.
The numbers of deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments are limited in that they are included within the
aggregate limits on deployed strategic delivery vehicles and deployed
and nondeployed ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers. Each
deployed heavy bomber is attributed with one warhead.
The combination of notifications, UIDs, inspections, NTM, and
independent intelligence will greatly facilitate the ability of the
United States to maintain an accurate accounting of all declared ICBMs,
SLBMs, their warheads, and heavy bombers.
For more information on the use of NTM and treaty verification
measures, please see the classified National Intelligence Estimate on
the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor the New START Treaty.
In particular, please explain how the criteria noted in (a)
would apply to mobile launchers of ICBMs.
Answer. When a missile is installed on a mobile launcher of ICBMs,
that missile will be deployed, as will the launcher. When the missile
is removed from its launcher, that missile and its launcher will be
nondeployed.
Language in the article-by-article analysis regarding the
preamble notes that a future treaty may govern ``nondeployed
nuclear weapon stockpiles.'' Does this administration
contemplate that warheads the United States does not deploy
(those not emplaced on a delivery system) would be the subject
of any negotiations with Russia concerning its tactical nuclear
weapons?
Answer. Just over a year ago in Prague, President Obama stated his
commitment to take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear
weapons. The New START Treaty is an important first step which will set
the stage for further cuts. But it is just one step. As the Nuclear
Posture Review Report makes clear, and as the President reiterated in
Prague on April 8 of this year, the United States intends to pursue
with Russia additional and broader reductions in our strategic and
nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed weapons.
Question. The article-by-article analysis states that: ``Previous
practice under START was to use attribution rules to determine the
number of warheads counted for each type of ICBM and SLBM. Under this
practice, each deployed missile of a given type was counted as if it
carried a particular number of warheads, even if the individual missile
carried fewer reentry vehicles than its attributed number of warheads.
Under the Moscow Treaty, each Party used its own methodology for
counting which of its warheads it considered to be ``deployed'' and
thus subject to the treaty's limits. Under the New START Treaty, one
set of warhead counting rules will be used by both Parties and the
warhead count will reflect the number of reentry vehicles actually
emplaced on each ICBM and SLBM.''
Did attribution rules applied in START I correspond with
missile throw-weight?
What is the maximum number of warheads each existing type of
Russian ICBM or SLBM listed in paragraph 8 of Article III could
carry, based on information provided under START I, or other
information?
If you do not obtain telemetric information on developmental
Russian ICBM or SLBM systems that have not been previously
attributed any number of warheads, and there is no obligation
to attribute warheads nor an RV limit per Russian ICBM or SLBM,
how will you know that the number of warheads you find on any
such system is the accurate and only number of warheads that
are deployed on all missiles of that type?
How would you determine margins of warhead uncertainty for
new kinds and types of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs if there is a
doubt as to its warhead capacity?
Answer. Classified responses to be provided separately.
Question. The article-by-article analysis states that: ``In
accordance with the Eighth Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the
Protocol, the Parties have agreed that nonnuclear objects on the front
sections of ICBMs or SLBMs declared to carry at least one nuclear-armed
reentry vehicle will not be counted as warheads. This statement is
premised on the shared assumption that there is no military utility in
carrying nuclear-armed and conventionally armed reentry vehicles on the
same ICBM or SLBM. In practice, this means that objects such as
penetration aids and inert ballast objects that may be carried on an
ICBM or SLBM will not count toward the treaty's warhead limits.
Inspectors will have the opportunity to confirm that these objects are
not nuclear through the use of radiation detection equipment during the
reentry vehicle portion of Type One inspections.''
What is the likelihood that U.S. inspection teams would
actually be permitted access to a Russian ICBM or SLBM that
carried penetration aids?
Which Russian New-START-accountable missiles are known to
contain penetration aids and inert ballast objects?
Answer. Classified responses to be provided separately.
strategic stability
The administration has said New START reduces and limits strategic
offensive arms ``in a manner that enhances strategic stability.''
Question. Is the use of multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle (MIRV) systems by either the United States or Russia
destabilizing?
Answer. De-MIRVing silo-based ICBMs enhances the stability of the
nuclear balance by reducing the incentives of either side to strike
first against these high-value, fixed targets. For this reason, the
United States will continue to de-MIRV its Minuteman III ICBMs. The
United States will also seek to encourage Russia to de-MIRV its silo-
based ICBMs.
However, the use of MIRVed ICBMs or SLBMs on mobile launchers of
these missiles is considered to be comparatively stabilizing because
mobile launchers deployed at sea or in the field are difficult to find
and strike and are thus more survivable. Consequently, these MIRVed
missiles on mobile launchers assist the Parties in fielding
sufficiently capable, survivable, second-strike capabilities which are
critical for maintaining the mutual deterrence that is a critical
component of strategic stability.
Question. The Nuclear Posture Review states that ``All U.S. ICBMs
will be de-MIRVed to a single warhead each to increase stability,'' yet
Russia is permitted to MIRV its New-START accountable ballistic
missiles, and has announced plans to field a number of road-mobile,
MIRVed systems during the duration of the New START Treaty. Given this
situation, is the New START Treaty more or less stabilizing a treaty
than were its predecessors, which attempted to move Russia away from
more destabilizing, MIRVed systems?
Answer. The New START Treaty reflects the strategic balance that
exists today and is projected to exist over the lifetime of the treaty.
The Soviet Union's aggressive deployment of highly MIRVed, hard target-
kill capable silo-based ICBMs during the 1970s and 1980s prompted the
United States to seek to shift the Soviet Union away from such systems
during the START negotiations of the 1980s. In large part due to the
U.S. achievement of this objective in START, during the course of START
implementation Russia dismantled and plans to continue dismantling much
of its highly MIRVed, hard target-kill capable silo-based ICBM force.
While Russia continues to possess such MIRVed, silo-based ICBMs,
the force's age and smaller size meant that the United States
determined it was less important to prioritize discouraging the
deployment of such systems. Instead, the treaty prioritizes the ability
of the Parties to determine the composition of their own forces,
reflecting the assessment that both sides will continue to emphasize
survivable systems--including but not limited to MIRVed strategic
missiles located in SSBNs on the U.S. side and on both SSBNs and road-
mobile ICBMs on the Russian side--which, when deployed at sea or in the
field, do not pose the destabilizing ``use or lose'' concerns posed by
MIRVed silo-based ICBMs.
unique identifiers (uid)
During the committee's May 18 hearing, Secretary Gates stated
``Unique identifiers, for the first time, will be assigned to each
ICBM, SLBM, and nuclear-capable heavy bomber, allowing us to track the
disposition and patterns of operation of accountable systems throughout
their lifecycles.'' Admiral Mullen stated that ``[Unique identifiers]
are going to be visible and verifiable and every single weapon would
have it.'' Later, Admiral Mullen stated ``actually, UIDs are
mechanical, they're not technically detectable.''
Question. The New START Inspection Annex notes that UIDs ``shall be
applied by the inspected Party, using its own technology . . . Such a
unique identifier shall not be changed. Each Party shall determine for
itself the size of the unique identifier,'' and inspectors are supposed
to be able to verify them.
Will such UIDs be visible from national technical means
(NTM)?
How will you confirm that there are no duplicate UIDs
applied to New-START-accountable Russian systems?
Answer. Unique identifiers (UIDs) will not be visible from NTM.
UIDs will be read by inspectors during Type One and Type Two
inspections to confirm the accuracy of the declared data. In the New
START Treaty, unique alphanumeric identifiers will be applied to all
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. These unique identifiers will be
included in the database and in applicable notifications, so that
individual strategic delivery vehicles may be tracked. During
inspections, the Parties will be able to confirm these unique
identifiers, which will provide additional confidence over time
regarding the validity of the information in the database and
notifications, thus reducing the likelihood that duplicate UIDs will be
applied to strategic systems.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller to Questions
Submitted by Senator Lugar
new start reentry vehicle onsite inspection (rvosi)
Question. You have claimed that RVOSI under New START is improved
over START I, and indeed that it may remedy compliance issues
encountered in START I RVOSI.
Did START I permit the use of shrouds, hard and soft covers
for missile front sections?
Answer. The START Treaty permitted the inspected Party to cover
reentry vehicles (RVs) and other equipment, including the mounting
platform, with covers in such a manner that these covers did not hamper
inspectors from ascertaining that the front section of a particular
missile contained no more RVs than the number of RVs attributed to a
missile of that type under the treaty. Both hard and soft covers were
permitted, with inspectors having the right to only view soft covers
and to view and measure hard covers.
Does New START permit the Parties to use shrouds, hard and
soft covers for existing types of weapons listed in paragraph 8
of Article III. If so, please explain how Russia will likely
employ such covers and on which systems.
Answer. Like START, the New START Treaty establishes the inspected
Party's right to cover RVs and other equipment, including the mounting
platform, with individual covers in such a manner that such covers must
not hamper inspectors in accurately identifying the number of RVs
emplaced on the front section of a missile. In addition, as set forth
in the Inspection Activities Annex, soft reentry vehicle covers are to
be viewed, hard covers are to be viewed and measured, and combined
covers (a cover made of both hard and soft components that when fully
assembled has a fixed shape) are to be viewed and measurements of the
fully assembled cover are to be permitted for the base diameter and
height of the fully assembled combined covers prior to their use during
the inspection.
Until the treaty enters into force and the first reentry vehicle
inspection is conducted as part of the Type One inspection in Russia,
we cannot be certain how Russia intends to cover its reentry vehicles
on each of its systems under the New START Treaty. However, the New
START Treaty has a provision that requires that before a hard or
combined RV cover is used for the first time during a reentry vehicle
inspection, the fully assembled cover must first be demonstrated,
including the right to measure the cover. This approach is intended to
help address issues early on if Russia elects to use reentry vehicle
covers that hampered the ability of U.S. inspectors to accurately count
the number of RVs emplaced on an ICBM or SLBM during the implementation
of START.
Is it true that there were substantial compliance issues
involving Russian shrouds, hard and soft covers under START I
that effectively prevented verification of RVs emplaced under
such covers?
Answer. During the life of the START Treaty, Russian RV covers and
their method of emplacement did, in some cases, hamper U.S. inspectors
from ascertaining that the front section of the missiles contained no
more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to a missile of that
type under the treaty. Russian cooperation in the use of RDE and other
measures has been helpful in addressing most, but not all, of the
difficulties encountered by U.S. inspectors. Further discussion of
issues related to Russia's compliance with reentry vehicle onsite
inspections are addressed in the July 2010 Compliance Report and the
June 2010 National Intelligence Estimate on the Intelligence
Community's ability to monitor the New START Treaty.
How does use of radiation detection equipment, which is not
unique under New START (it was permitted by JCIC decision under
START I) enable you to deal with potentially problematic
shrouds, hard and soft covers that Russia may employ?
Answer. Under New START, radiation detection equipment (RDE) may be
used at the discretion of the inspected Party to demonstrate that
additional objects declared by the inspected Party as nonnuclear, which
could also be located on the front sections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs
equipped with no less than one nuclear-armed RV, are in fact,
nonnuclear. If these nonnuclear objects can be confirmed by inspectors
to be nonnuclear, such additional objects will not count against the
aggregate warhead limit in accordance with the Eighth Agreed Statement
of Part Nine of the Protocol. Such objects may be covered or uncovered.
No radiation measurements of actual reentry vehicles were conducted
under the START Treaty and none will be conducted under the New START
Treaty.
new kinds of strategic offensive arms
Question.The article-by-article analysis of paragraph 2 of Article
V states: ``The Parties understand that they may use the BCC to discuss
whether new kinds of arms are subject to the treaty. The United States
stated during the negotiations its view that not all new kinds of
weapon systems of strategic range would be ``new kinds of strategic
offensive arms'' subject to the New START Treaty. Specifically, the
United States stated that it would not consider future, strategic range
nonnuclear systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of this
treaty to be ``new kinds of strategic offensive arms'' for purposes of
the treaty. The Parties understand that, if one Party deploys a new
kind of strategic range arm for delivering nonnuclear weapons that it
asserts is not a ``new kind of strategic offensive arm'' subject to the
treaty, and the other Party challenges that assertion, the deploying
Party would be obligated to attempt to resolve the issue within the
framework of the BCC. There is no requirement in the treaty for the
deploying Party to delay deployment of the new system pending such
resolution.''
a. Did the Russian Federation indicate agreement with the
U.S. approach to ``strategic range nonnuclear systems that do
not otherwise meet the definitions of this treaty?''
Answer. The Russian Federation did not make a definitive statement
regarding this matter. The provision on new kinds of strategic
offensive arms in the New START Treaty recognizes that, during the life
of the treaty, the Parties could develop new kinds of strategic-range
systems not currently in existence and provides a mechanism for the
Parties to discuss such systems should they emerge. If such a system
does not meet the definitions in the treaty, a Party could raise the
issue of whether the new system should nonetheless be made subject to
the treaty. The United States stated its view (similar to the U.S. view
stated during the START negotiations) that it would not consider
future, strategic-range nonnuclear systems that do not otherwise meet
the definitions of this treaty to be ``new kinds of strategic offensive
arms'' for purposes of the treaty.
b. If the answer to (a) is yes, is this agreement contained
in any of the documents submitted to the Senate with the New
START Treaty?
Answer. Not applicable.
c. If the answer to (a) is yes, but the answer to (b) is no,
please provide a detailed explanation of how Russian agreement
on this issue was communicated.
Answer. Not applicable.
d. What other issues, if any, prompted U.S. interpretive
statements in the negotiations that were not contained in any
of the treaty documents before the Senate?
Answer. None.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller and Dr. Edward L.
Warner III to Questions Submitted by Senator Barrasso
missile defense
Question. In the New START Treaty, the preamble states that
``Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic
offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this
interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms
are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine
the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the
Parties.''
Did the administration oppose the provision during
negotiations?
Why was this language included in the preamble?
What did the United States get in exchange for the inclusion
of this provision?
Answer. The preamble language referred to is simply a statement of
fact acknowledging the interrelationship of strategic offensive and
defensive arms. It also affirms that currently deployed strategic
defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of
either Party's strategic offensive arms. This preambular statement was
negotiated and agreed between the Parties in accordance with the Joint
Understanding signed by President Obama and President Medvedev on July
6, 2009. As stated in the Article-by-Article Analysis of the treaty,
this statement is part of the shared view of the Parties of the
importance of predictability and strategic stability.
This statement in the preamble creates no constraints regarding
future U.S. strategic defense programs, including those for any form of
missile defense. Neither the preamble nor Russia's unilateral statement
will constrain our efforts to develop and deploy the most effective
missile defenses possible.
Question. There seems to be some disagreements between the United
States and Russia on the interpretation of the missile defense language
in the treaty.
Why is there this misunderstanding?
Did these different views come up during the negotiations?
Did you reach an agreement during the negotiations on these
differences?
Answer. There is no difference of opinion between the United States
and Russia with respect to the meaning of the treaty's provisions as
they relate to missile defense. Both Parties understand that the New
START Treaty does not constrain U.S. plans for fielding and continuing
to develop missile defenses. Both the United States and the Russian
Federation also understand that the only constraint on missile defense
in the New START Treaty is the provision in paragraph 3 of Article V,
prohibiting the placement of missile defense interceptors in ICBM or
SLBM launchers and the conversion of missile defense interceptor
launchers to launch ICBMs or SLBMs.
The Russian unilateral statement in no way changes the legal rights
or obligations of the Parties under the treaty, and our unilateral
statement in response makes it clear that the United States intends to
continue to improve and deploy the most effective missile defense
capabilities possible, in order to defend the U.S. homeland from
limited ballistic missile attacks and to defend U.S. deployed forces
and our allies from growing regional ballistic missile threats.
While, as Secretary Gates acknowledged during the SASC hearing on
June 17, ``there is no meeting of the minds [between the United States
and the Russian Federation] on missile defense,'' the United States did
not use the New START Treaty negotiations to discuss missile defense
with the Russians. From the outset, the United States and Russia agreed
that the New START Treaty would focus on the reduction and limitation
of strategic offensive arms. Thus, missile defense discussions fell
outside the scope of the New START Treaty negotiations.
Question. Article V prohibits the conversion of launchers for ICBMs
and SLBMs into launchers for missile defense interceptors.
Did the administration oppose the provision during
negotiations?
Why was this language included in the treaty?
Which country proposed the language of Article V?
What did the United States get in exchange for the inclusion
on this provision?
What is the reason and policy consideration for including
any type of limit on U.S. strategic missile defense in the
treaty?
Answer. Paragraph 3 of Article V of the treaty prohibits the
conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense
interceptors and the conversion of missile defense interceptor
launchers to launch ICBMs or SLBMs. The paragraph also ``grandfathers''
the five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base that were
converted to house Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) several years ago.
The U.S. side agreed to this Russian-proposed provision in the
treaty for several reasons. It resolves a longstanding ambiguity that
arose during implementation of the START Treaty. Specifically, it
ensures that our five previously converted ICBM silo launchers at
Vandenberg that now are used for missile defense interceptors will not
be a continuing subject of dispute with Russia and will not count
against the New START Treaty's limits on nondeployed ICBM launchers.
This provision will have no operational impact on U.S. missile
defense efforts. As Lieutenant General O'Reilly, Director of the
Missile Defense Agency, has testified, the United States has never had
any plans to convert additional ICBM silos to missile defense
interceptor launchers. Doing so would be much more expensive than
building smaller, tailor-made GBI silos from scratch. Moreover, as
Lieutenant General O'Reilly has also stated, newly built GBI silos are
easier both to protect and maintain.
With regard to the conversion of SLBM launchers into missile
defense interceptor launchers, as Lieutenant General O'Reilly stated in
his testimony, the Missile Defense Agency had examined earlier the
concept of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines and
found it operationally an unattractive and extremely expensive option.
He added that the United States already has a very good and
significantly growing capability for sea-based missile defense on
Aegis-capable surface ships, which are not constrained by the New START
Treaty.
For these reasons we were comfortable including this militarily
insignificant provision within the New START Treaty, and have been
unequivocal in stating that the treaty does not constrain the United
States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor
does it add any additional cost or inconvenience. Rather, the treaty
enables this President and his successors to develop the missile
defenses needed to defend our Nation, our deployed forces abroad, and
our allies.
Lieutenant General O'Reilly also noted that the New START Treaty
offers certain advantages for development of the U.S. ballistic missile
defense system: ``Relative to the recently expired START Treaty, the
New START Treaty actually reduces constraints on the development of the
missile defense program. Unless they have New START accountable first
stages (which we do not plan to use), our target [offensive missiles
used as targets during tests of our missile defense interceptors] will
no longer be subject to START constraints, which limited our use of
air-to-surface and waterborne launches of targets which are essential
for the cost-effective testing of missile defense interceptors against
MRBM and IRBM targets in the Pacific area. In addition, under New
START, we will no longer be limited to five space launch facilities for
target launches.''
Question. Under Article V of the New START Treaty, the five U.S.
ICBM silo launchers at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California are
excluded.
Why were the five U.S. ICBM silo launchers at the Vandenberg
Air Force Base in California specifically excluded from the
provision?
Was any consideration made to excluding other U.S. ICBM
silos?
Answer. Paragraph 3 of Article V of the treaty prohibits the
conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to serve as launchers for missile
defense interceptors and the conversion of missile defense interceptor
launchers to launch ICBMs or SLBMs. The paragraph also ``grandfathers''
the five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, that were
converted to house and launch the Ground Based Interceptors (GBI)
several years ago.
As stated in the article-by-article analysis of the treaty, this
statement has the effect of ensuring that the paragraph's prohibition
does not apply to the five converted former ICBM launchers at
Vandenberg. It also resolves a longstanding ambiguity that arose during
implementation of the START Treaty. Specifically, it ensures that these
five previously converted ICBM silo launchers at Vandenberg Air Force
Base that now are used for missile defense interceptors will not be a
continuing subject of dispute with Russia and will not count against
the New START Treaty's limit on nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
There are no other missile defense interceptor silos that have been
converted from ICBM silo launchers. And as Lieutenant General O'Reilly,
Director of the Missile Defense Agency, has testified, the United
States has never had any plans to convert additional ICBM silos to
missile defense interceptor launchers.
general issues
Question. What were the priorities for the administration regarding
the New START Treaty? Which of the priorities were accomplished?
Answer. The administration's top priorities going into these
negotiations were to reach agreement on a new bilateral treaty between
the United States and Russia to replace the expiring START Treaty that
would reduce and limit strategic nuclear forces, promote strategic
stability by ensuring transparency and predictability regarding U.S and
Russian strategic nuclear forces over the life of the treaty, ensure
effective verification of the treaty's provisions, advance our nuclear
nonproliferation agenda, and set the stage for further nuclear arms
limitations and reduction agreements. In addition, we sought to ensure
the continuing sufficiency of our nuclear deterrent for ourselves and
our allies at lower levels, and to ensure we would have flexibility
regarding how we would structure our strategic forces within the
treaty's overall limits and to maintain the capability to deploy
conventional prompt global strike capability, including on our ICBMs
and SLBMs, should we elect to do so.
We believe that when the New START Treaty enters into force, each
of these goals will have been achieved.
Question. Which of the treaty provisions did the administration
receive the most resistance on from the Russians? Why?
Answer. A classified response to be provided separately.
Question. How has the New START Treaty improved relations with
Russia?
Answer. Concluding the New START Treaty was one of the most
immediate tasks in putting the United States-Russia relationship back
on a track of stability and cooperation. The completion of the New
START Treaty shows that the United States and Russia can work together
on many issues of mutual interest, including top priorities like
nuclear security and nonproliferation. The treaty gives the United
States and Russia a better opportunity to work together and to gain
mutually assured stability. That our two countries were able to
conclude this mutually beneficial agreement is both a reflection of
improved relations, as well as a foundation for further cooperation and
dialogue across a broad range of issues. The process of negotiating the
New START Treaty involved a year-long, focused, professional
interaction, which sometimes occurred at the very highest levels of our
governments and demonstrated our ability to successfully work together
in a mutually respectful way toward a common goal. Such interactions
have contributed significantly to the ``reset'' of our relationship
with Russia.
Conclusion of the New START Treaty has improved bilateral relations
and thus facilitated cooperation on other top priorities, including
collective international efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapons capability, as demonstrated by our combined support for
the passage of UNSC Resolution 1929, which imposes new sanctions on
Iran.
Implementation of the treaty will result in continued close,
professional contact between our governments both at the Bilateral
Consultative Commission in Geneva and on the ground in Russia and the
United States during inspections and exhibitions. The openness and
transparency fostered by these interactions will continue to foster
improved U.S. relations with Russia.
Question. Did the United States get any Russian cooperation on Iran
as a result of signing this treaty?
Answer. Our renewed focus on improving our relations with Russia,
including last year's negotiations on the New START Treaty, has led to
a greater understanding and increased cooperation between the United
States and Russia in a number of areas. This renewed relationship is
key to curbing nuclear threats across the globe.
We are working very closely and in cooperation with Russia on our
shared goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons
capability. Russia does not support an Iran with nuclear weapons and--
in addition to other constructive contributions to international
nuclear nonproliferation efforts--has joined the November 2009
International Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolution
condemning Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA, its refusal to
suspend enrichment, and its failure to comply with its Safeguards
Agreement.
Since early 2009, the United States, Russia, and our partners in
the P5+1 have offered to constructively engage Iran--but Iran failed to
take advantage of this opportunity. Since 2006, there have been six
U.N. Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) calling on Iran to suspend
enrichment. Iran has refused to meet with the P5+1 about its nuclear
program despite our efforts and its commitment to do so last October.
Russia supported UNSCR 1929 passage on June 9, the sixth UNSCR of its
kind, imposing additional sanctions on Iran. Russia also continues to
provide key assistance in the ongoing IAEA proposal discussions to
refuel the Tehran Research Reactor.
We continue to discuss with Russia our concerns about advanced
weapons sales to states such as Iran. We appreciate Russia's restraint
in the transfer of the
S-300 missile system to Iran.
Question. Please indicate and explain which provisions in the New
START Treaty are most beneficial to the United States.
Answer. The New START Treaty as a whole provides predictability and
transparency regarding the strategic nuclear relationship between the
United States and Russia. One of the most important concrete benefits
the United States derives from the treaty is the transparency regarding
Russian strategic forces. The New START Treaty's verification regime
and transparency measures allow each side to gain important insights
into the other side's strategic forces. Without this window, our
knowledge of Russia's strategic forces will decline over time. Treaty
information will reduce uncertainty about the future direction of
Russian strategic forces and assist in improved planning for our future
defense needs. But the benefits are not all one-way: Shared knowledge
of U.S. and Russian strategic forces is crucial for maintaining
strategic stability between the two major nuclear powers.
The United States also benefits from the requirement that Russia
maintain lower force levels or reduce its forces to meet the treaty's
central limits. In the absence of a treaty, Russia could, if it so
desired, field greater numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and
strategic nuclear warheads than are permitted under the New START
Treaty. While the New START Treaty should be evaluated in terms of the
entirety of the treaty regime rather than with regard to its individual
provisions, there are numerous examples of provisions that are
particularly beneficial to the United States, including:
(1) The provision in paragraph 2 of Article II of the New START
Treaty, which gives us the right to determine for ourselves the
composition and structure of our strategic offensive arms, was also
very important to the United States.
(2) The flexibility in the conversion or elimination regime
allowing the United States to decide what procedures would be most
suitable to achieve required reductions in ways that would be cheaper
and less burdensome. In the case of SLBM launchers, the United States
will have the flexibility to convert individual launchers such that
they are no longer capable of launching SLBMs. This allows the United
States to reduce the number of deployed and nondeployed SLBM launchers
under the treaty's limits without having to eliminate an entire SSBN.
(3) The counting rules for deployed warheads associated with ICBMs
and SLBMs are also very useful for the United States. Under these
rules, the actual number of reentry vehicles emplaced on the missiles
is counted toward the treaty's aggregate limit on warheads. U.S. ICBMs
and SLBMs will routinely be deployed with a lesser number of reentry
vehicles emplaced on them than the number of warheads that was
attributed to them under START, so this more accurate way of counting
warheads associated with ICBMs and SLBMs will benefit the United
States.
Question. What did the United States get from the negotiations on
the New START Treaty?
Answer. The United States concluded a treaty with the Russian
Federation that will provide verifiable limitations and reductions in
the strategic offensive arms of the United States and the Russian
Federation as well as ongoing transparency and predictability regarding
the world's two largest nuclear arsenals, while preserving the ability
of the United States to maintain the strong nuclear deterrent that
remains an essential element of U.S. national security and the security
of our allies and friends. We got a treaty that includes an effective
verification regime to assess Russian compliance with the treaty's
limits and other constraints while also allowing us the flexibility to
determine for ourselves the composition and structure of our strategic
offensive arms and how we will make our reductions to meet the treaty's
limits. Finally, we also got a treaty that will help provide a safer,
more secure, and more stable strategic nuclear environment for our
citizens.
Question. How many United States negotiators participated in the
negotiations of the New START Treaty?
Answer. The U.S. delegation to the negotiations with the Russian
Federation on the New START Treaty was led by Assistant Secretary of
State Rose Gottemoeller. Her team included two Deputy Negotiators, and
three additional senior representatives from agencies of the
interagency policy community. The negotiating team also consisted of
agency advisors, administrative staff, and linguists. The peak number
of delegation personnel in Geneva at one time during the New START
negotiations was approximately 50 but this was not a static number and
varied over time.
In addition, President Obama, Secretary Hillary Clinton, and Under
Secretary Ellen Tauscher of the Department of State, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen, National Security Advisor Gen.
James Jones, and other senior officials in the administration
participated in negotiations with their counterparts as needed.
verification
The original START Treaty had an extensive verification regime
which included onsite inspections, methods for providing telemetry, and
transparency measures. Reports indicate that Russia continued to
violate verification provisions on the counting of ballistic missile
warheads, monitoring of mobile ballistic missiles and telemetry. The
new treaty will be making numerous changes to the verification and
inspection procedures.
Question. Do you believe that we will see similar problems with
Russia regarding violations of verification procedures?
Answer. Although the New START Treaty is less complex than the
START Treaty, different interpretations by the Parties might arise
regarding how to implement the inspection activities and other
verification provisions of the New START Treaty. Should such a
situation arise, the Parties will seek to resolve their differences in
the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
Question. What were the most common violations by Russia with
regards to the verification and inspection provisions under the START
Treaty?
Answer. The most common Russian violations encountered during START
involved problems regarding reentry vehicle onsite inspections (RVOSI)
and with regard to the exchange of telemetric information.
RVOSI: In some cases, Russian reentry vehicle covers and their
method of emplacement hampered U.S. inspectors from ascertaining that
the front section of the ICBMs and SLBMs being inspected contained no
more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to a
missile of that type under the START Treaty. Russian cooperation in the
use of radiation detection equipment and other measures were helpful in
addressing some, but not all, of the difficulties encountered by U.S.
inspectors.
Telemetry: Russia in some instances failed to comply with START
Treaty requirements regarding the provision of telemetric information
on missile flight testing.
Additional details on compliance issues may be found in the 2010
Compliance Report, which was submitted to Congress on July 1, 2010. The
portions of the report related to START Treaty implementation issues
were updated through the expiration of the START Treaty on December 5,
2009.
Question. What is the total number of Russian violations of the
verification and inspection procedures under the START Treaty?
Answer. Issues related to Russia's compliance with verification and
inspection procedures under the New START Treaty are addressed in the
Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (the
Compliance Report) that was provided to the Senate on July 1, 2010.
Question. What verification and inspection measures were put in
place to ensure that these or similar violations do not occur in the
future?
Answer. With regard to RVOSI: The New START Treaty establishes the
inspected Party's right to cover reentry vehicles and other equipment
with individual covers, but with the caveat that such covers must not
hamper inspectors in accurately identifying the number of reentry
vehicles emplaced on a front section. This provision is intended to
ensure that covers are not used in such a manner that would obscure the
actual number of reentry vehicles on a front section. It is similar to
the START provision for covers that did not hamper inspectors, but
specifies individual covers and makes the distinction between the New
START verification task of determining the actual number of warheads
versus the START provision of confirming that there were no more than
the attributed number. In addition, as set forth in the Inspection
Activities Annex, reentry vehicle covers are to be viewed, and in some
cases measured, by inspectors prior to their use during the reentry
vehicle inspection portion of a Type One inspection.
With regard to telemetry: The obligations in the New START Treaty
are different from those in START. None of the new treaty's specific
obligations, prohibitions, or limitations requires analysis of
telemetric information to verify a Party's compliance. Nevertheless, to
promote openness and transparency, the Parties have agreed to exchange
telemetric information on an agreed equal number (up to five annually)
of launches of the testing party's choice of ICBMs and SLBMs (which
could include launch vehicles that contain the first stage of an ICBM
or SLBM).
Question. What information will the United States no longer be able
to obtain under the New START Treaty that we were able to obtain under
the previous START Treaty?
Answer. The United States will not obtain recordings of telemetric
information from the Russian Federation for each ICBM or SLBM flight
test, as was the case under the START Treaty.
Cooperative measures, under which heavy bombers or mobile ICBMs
were, upon request, placed in the open for viewing by national
technical means of verification, are not required by the new treaty.
Although the New START Treaty requires 48 hours advance notice for
solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs exiting the Votkinsk Production Facility,
there will no longer be continuous monitoring of the facility,
including the presence of monitors, as was the case under the INF and
START Treaties.
For more details, please see the classified National Intelligence
Estimate on ``Monitoring the New START Treaty,'' published on 30 June
2010.
rail mobile missile launchers
There has been a variety of views on whether rail-mobile missile
launchers will count under the New START Treaty. Secretary Schlesinger
has indicated that rail-mobile ICMBs may not count under the new
treaty.
Question. Does the New START Treaty specifically address rail-
mobile missile launchers?
Answer. Rail-mobile ICBMs are not specifically mentioned in the New
START Treaty because neither Party currently deploys ICBMs in that
mode. Nevertheless, the treaty covers all ICBMs and ICBM launchers, and
would include any rail-mobile system, should either Party decide to
develop and deploy such a system.
Question. Were rail-mobile missile launchers specifically mentioned
and discussed during the New START Treaty negotiations?
Answer. During the New START negotiations, the Parties discussed
the fact that neither side currently deploys rail-mobile ICBMs and,
therefore, agreed that there was no need to reference such systems in
the new treaty.
Question. Could rail-mobile missile launchers be deployed in Russia
and not count against the New START Treaty limits?
Answer. No. The treaty covers all ICBMs and ICBM launchers,
including a rail-mobile system, should either Party decide to develop
and deploy such a system.
The New START Treaty defines an ICBM launcher as a ``device
intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.''
This is a broad definition intended to cover all ICBM launchers,
including rail-mobile launchers.
A rail-mobile launcher containing an ICBM would meet the definition
of a ``deployed launcher of ICBMs,'' which is ``an ICBM launcher that
contains an ICBM'' and, along with any nondeployed rail-mobile
launchers of ICBMs, would fall within the limit of 800 on deployed and
nondeployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed and nondeployed
heavy bombers. The ICBMs contained in rail-mobile launchers would count
as deployed and therefore fall within the 700 ceiling on deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
If a Party chose to develop and deploy rail-mobile ICBMs, such
missiles and their launchers would therefore be subject to the treaty
and its limitations. Specific details about the application of
verification provisions would be worked out in the BCC. Necessary
adjustments to the definition of ``mobile launchers of ICBMs''--to
address the use of the term ``self-propelled chassis on which it is
mounted'' in that definition--would also be worked out in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.
Question. If rail-mobile missile launchers are not provided for
under the treaty, how will the United States be able to track and
monitor the number and movement of these weapons?
Answer. Neither the United States nor Russia currently deploys
rail-mobile launchers. If a Party chose to develop and deploy rail-
mobile ICBMs, such missiles and their launchers would be subject to the
treaty. Appropriate detailed arrangements for incorporating rail-mobile
ICBM launchers and their ICBMs into the treaty's verification and
monitoring regime could be worked out in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.
Question. Under the New START Treaty, are there verification and
inspection provisions to gather the information needed to track and
monitor possible rail-mobile missile launchers?
Answer. If a Party chose to develop and deploy rail-mobile ICBMs,
such missiles, their warheads, and their launchers would be subject to
the treaty, including its notification, verification, and inspection
provisions. Necessary adjustments to the definition of ``mobile
launchers of ICBMs''--to address the use of the word ``self-propelled''
in that definition--would be addressed in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC). Similarly, application of the treaty's verification
and inspection provisions to rail-mobile launchers would be addressed
in the BCC.
Question. What type of measures will be used to monitor other
activities outside the New START Treaty?
Answer. Please see the classified National Intelligence Estimate on
``Monitoring the New START Treaty,'' published on 30 June 2010.
______
Responses of Dr. Edward L. Warner III to Questions Submitted
by Senator Barrasso
force structure
Question. The force structure of our nuclear triad is critical to
maintaining an effective deterrent. In 2008, Secretary Gates issued a
white paper recommending a U.S. strategic nuclear force structure
baseline of around 862.
Who provided you with the guidance to reduce our strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles down to 700?
Answer. All New START Treaty guidance reflects administration-
approved, interagency-developed guidance.
This guidance was developed based on input from the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), which made it an early task to develop U.S. positions for
the New START Treaty negotiations. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and U.S. Strategic
Command conducted analyses during the NPR to inform the relevant U.S.
Government Departments and Agencies and the New START Treaty
negotiation team.
What was the rationale and policy consideration for reducing
our strategic nuclear delivery vehicles down to 700?
Answer. The United States agreed to the New START Treaty's central
limits based on strategic force analyses conducted in support of the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and high-level deliberations within the
Department of Defense and the relevant U.S. Government Departments and
Agencies. The NPR strategic force analysis performed by the U.S.
Strategic Command staff and these deliberations concluded that U.S.
strategic forces fielded within the limits contained in the New START
Treaty would be sufficient to support U.S. deterrence requirements,
including extended deterrence for our allies, in the current and
projected international security environment.
Specifically, the NPR determined that the United States should
retain a nuclear triad and determined the appropriate number of
strategic delivery vehicles based on four requirements: supporting
strategic stability through maintenance of an assured second-strike
capability that is able to meet the national nuclear deterrence
guidance; retaining sufficient force structure in each leg to allow the
ability to hedge effectively by shifting weapons capabilities from one
triad leg to another, if necessary, due to unexpected technological
problems or operational vulnerabilities; retaining a delivery
capability margin above the minimum-required nuclear force structure
for the possible addition of nonnuclear, prompt-global strike
capabilities that would be accountable within the treaty limits; and
providing the basis for maintaining the needed strategic offensive
capabilities over the next several decades or more, including retaining
a sufficient cadre of trained military and civilian personnel and
adequate infrastructure to support the strategic nuclear deterrence
mission. Based on this analysis, the inclusion in the treaty of
provisions for excluding conventional-only B-1B bombers and U.S. SSGN
submarines from accountability under the New START Treaty, the New
START definitions of ``deployed'' and ``nondeployed'' ICBMs and SLBMs,
and the potential conversion of a subset of the
B-52H fleet to a conventional-only capability, the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command supported reductions to the central ceilings of 700 deployed
strategic delivery vehicles and 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
In your opinion, how has the threat environment changed to
allow the United States to negotiate down to 700 delivery
vehicles?
Answer. Fundamental changes in the international security
environment in recent years--including the growth of unrivaled U.S.
conventional military capabilities, major improvements in U.S. missile
defenses, and the easing of cold war rivalries--enable us to deter
potential adversaries and reassure allies and partners at lower nuclear
force levels. The decision to agree to the limits of 700 deployed
strategic delivery vehicles and 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers was also
based on the assumption that the Russian Federation would reduce its
strategic nuclear forces to comply with the New START Treaty limits.
U.S. strategic forces fielded within these limits were assessed to be
sufficient to support an assured second strike capability that will
meet the national nuclear deterrence guidance, provide a hedge
capability in the event of unexpected technological problems,
operational vulnerabilities, or a significant deterioration in the
international security environment, retain a margin for possible
fielding of conventionally armed prompt-global strike capabilities
accountable within these limits under the New START Treaty, and
maintain the necessary capabilities in personnel and infrastructure to
support the New START-compliant U.S. strategic nuclear force.
Therefore, we were able to agree to the treaty's ceilings, assured
that a U.S. strategic nuclear force fielded within these limits will be
fully capable of sustaining stable deterrence and meeting our
traditional deterrence and reassurance goals.
Question. How many strategic nuclear delivery vehicles will Russia
need to destroy from its arsenal in order for Russia to meet the New
START Treaty limit of 700 nuclear deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons?
Answer. A classified response to be provided separately.
Question. The New START Treaty contains a combined limit of 800
deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy
bombers. In addition, the New START Treaty provides a separate limit of
700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.
What was the purpose and reasoning for creating a separate
category for deployable but not deployed missiles?
What is the benefit and disadvantage of creating the
separate category?
Answer. There is no separate category in the treaty for
``deployable but not deployed missiles.'' While there is no limit on
nondeployed ICBMs or SLBMs, there is an aggregate limit of 800 deployed
and nondeployed ICBM launchers, deployed and nondeployed SLBM
launchers, and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments, which is intended to limit the ability of the
Parties to ``break out'' of the treaty limits by constraining the
number of nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and nondeployed heavy
bombers available for deployment. Each Party must operate within this
aggregate limit as it considers whether to build and store new
launchers and heavy bombers, and whether to eliminate, convert, or
retain older launchers and heavy bombers. Limiting ``break out''
capability is a measure that helps to ensure neither Party upsets the
strategic stability between the United States and Russia that the
treaty is intended to preserve.
Question. The New START Treaty contains a combined limit of 800
deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy
bombers. In addition, the New START Treaty provides a separate limit of
700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.
Why is there a different counting rule for bombers?
Answer. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit of
700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments, the counting rule is the same--each
deployed ICBM, each deployed SLBM, and each deployed heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments is counted as one. Similarly, for the
purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit of 800 for deployed and
nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments, the counting rule is the same--each deployed or
nondeployed ICBM launcher, each deployed or nondeployed SLBM launcher,
and each deployed or nondeployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear
armaments is counted as one.
For the purposes of counting toward the 1,550 aggregate limit for
warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads
counted for deployed heavy bombers, one nuclear warhead is counted for
each deployed heavy bomber. This attribution rule was adopted because
on a day-to-day basis neither the United States nor the Russian
Federation maintains any nuclear armaments loaded on its deployed heavy
bombers. If the counting approach adopted for deployed ballistic
missiles had been applied to deployed heavy bombers, each deployed
heavy bomber would have been counted with zero nuclear warheads. The
New START Treaty approach strikes a balance between the fact that
neither side loads nuclear armaments on its bombers on a day-to-day
basis and the fact that these bombers, nonetheless, have the capability
to deliver nuclear armaments stored in nuclear weapons storage bunkers
on or near their air bases.
Additionally, as was the case under START, the New START Treaty
``discounts'' bomber weapons because heavy bombers are considered to be
more stabilizing than ICBMs or SLBMs because, as ``slow-flyers''
compared to ballistic missiles, they are not well suited to be used as
first-strike weapons. Consequently, the number of weapons counted for
bombers in arms control agreements has traditionally been much less
than the bombers are capable of carrying, i.e., bomber weapons are
``discounted'' by the treaties.
Question. During Dr. Henry Kissinger's testimony before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, he emphasized the importance of
understanding the needs for warheads and delivery vehicles in order to
handle third party contingencies that may arise while still maintaining
a credible deterrent position with Russia.
What is the number of warheads needed to handle third party
or country contingencies involving proliferation and terrorism
while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with Russia? How
many delivery vehicles are needed?
Answer. The Nuclear Posture Review analyses and deliberations
concluded that the force levels permitted by the New START Treaty, as
well as the maintenance of a stockpile of nondeployed nuclear warheads,
would be sufficient to support U.S. deterrence requirements, including
extended deterrence for our allies, against a range of potential
adversaries in the current and projected international security
environment.
Was this information considered during the negotiations with
Russia?
Answer. Yes.
tactical weapons
Question. Recently, Former Secretary James R. Schlesinger testified
before this committee that the Russians have consistently resisted
efforts to deal with the imbalance of tactical weapons. He stated that,
``The likelihood of their being willing to do so in light of New START
is sharply diminished, for we have now forfeited substantial
leverage.''
Were tactical weapons addressed during the negotiations with
Russia?
If so, what exactly was discussed during those negotiations?
What did the United States propose regarding tactical
weapons?
If not, why did the United States not push for tactical
weapons to be a part of the treaty negotiations?
Did the United States get a commitment from Russia to reduce
tactical weapons?
Did the United States get a commitment from Russia on
initiating negotiations on tactical weapons?
What would be the rationale for the United States to forfeit
substantial leverage on this issue?
Answer. No. As agreed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, the purpose
of the New START Treaty was to reduce and limit the two nations'
strategic offensive arms; therefore the issue of tactical nuclear
weapons was not raised. A more ambitious treaty that addressed tactical
nuclear weapons would have taken much longer to complete, adding
significantly to the time before a successor agreement, including
verification measures, could enter into force following START's
expiration in December 2009. Because of their limited range and
different roles, tactical nuclear weapons do not directly influence the
strategic balance between the United States and Russia. Though
numerical asymmetry in tactical nuclear weapons exists, this asymmetry
must be considered within the context of our total nuclear and
nonnuclear capabilities, including the strategic force levels as
structured to conform to New START. President Medvedev has expressed
interest in further discussions on measures to further reduce both
nations' nuclear arsenals. We intend to raise strategic and
nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear
weapons, in those discussions.
VIEWS FROM THE PENTAGON
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Casey, Shaheen, Kaufman,
Lugar, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. Good morning. The hearing will come to order.
And thank you all for coming.
Today, we're pleased to welcome three individuals with long
and distinguished careers in defense of American security. And
they're here to testify about the United States nuclear
posture, modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and our
missile defense plans.
Dr. James Miller is the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, advising Secretary Gates on a wide range of
vital strategic issues. He has extensive experience, both
inside and outside of government, on WMD security. Gen. Kevin
Chilton is an accomplished Air Force officer, a pilot, and the
rare witness who has flown on the space shuttle. He is now the
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command in charge of America's
nuclear deterrent. And Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly is the
Director of the Missile Defense Agency, which gives him
responsibility for the systems that we're developing and
deploying to protect America and our forces, and indeed even
some other countries, from missile attack. He has also served
as a physics professor, I might add, at West Point.
This is our eighth hearing on the New START Treaty. And
members of the Obama administration, the treaty's negotiators,
and many former officials, Republicans and Democrats, have
urged us to ratify the New START agreement.
James Baker and William Perry said that ratifying the New
START Treaty is crucial if few want to keep nuclear weapons out
of the hands of rogue states and terrorists. Henry Kissinger
and Stephen Hadley explained that New START is fundamental to
the United States-Russian relationship. James Schlesinger
called ratification ``obligatory.'' And Brent Scowcroft warned
that if we don't ratify the treaty, we'd throw all of our
diplomatic efforts to control nuclear weapons into ``a state of
chaos.''
Each of our witnesses has emphasized the importance of
reinstituting the monitoring and verification measures that
lapsed when the original START Treaty expired last December. I
believe that all of the arguments that our witnesses have made
are powerful arguments, and important with respect to the
ratification process.
But, today's hearing is particularly important because we
have the opportunity to talk with the people who are tasked
with the operational details of both the offensive and
defensive side of our nuclear strategy.
The New START Treaty limits offensive forces, but some of
our colleagues have raised the question, with respect to the
treaty, as to whether or not it might affect our missile
defense plans.
From everything that I have heard--and I believe Senator
Lugar would agree with me, that everything that we have heard
from all of our witnesses--this treaty does not undercut our
ability to protect our country from missile attack. It doesn't
undercut us in any way whatsoever.
Numerous witnesses, including the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have testified that
the treaty will not affect America's ability to defend itself
from an Iranian or North Korean missile, now or in the future.
But, today we have an even better opportunity to ascertain
opinion and judgment with respect to those issues, because we
will hear from the head of the Missile Defense Agency. And we
can pose the question, yet again, with respect to the potential
of the treaty to pose any impediment to our missile defense
plans.
Some members have also expressed concern about this issue
because, in the preamble, the New START Treaty acknowledges the
relationship between offensive forces and strategic defensive
forces. I happen to believe that that's the most obvious sort
of acknowledgment of an existing relationship that you could
make without effect--and I mean without effect--despite the
fact that the Russians have issued a unilateral statement
saying that if our missile defenses ever threaten their
deterrent, they could withdraw from the treaty. Well, they can.
And so can we. And so could either party, historically, with
the other treaties that we've been party to.
But, those aren't reasons to oppose the treaty and the
verification measures and gains that we get with respect to our
deterrence. Obviously, the preamble is not legally binding. And
that should have some impact, I would think.
Finally, Secretary Gates testified before the committee:
``Neither the last administration nor this one have any plans
to build a missile defense that would undermine Russia's
nuclear deterrent.''
The New START Treaty is intended to strengthen strategic
stability. It reduces the number of nuclear weapons that the
United States and Russia deploy, while increasing the
transparency and the predictability of strategic forces. Of
course, as we reduce the number of nuclear weapons that we
deploy, yes, it becomes even more crucial that we have the
ability to maintain the safety and the reliability of our
nuclear deterrent. That is why the Obama administration has
submitted an $80-billion plan to maintain the effectiveness of
our nuclear weapons and to revitalize our Nation's nuclear
weapons infrastructure over the next decade.
What's more, the administration plans to invest $100
billion over the next 10 years to maintain and modernize our
nuclear delivery systems. By any measure, that's a significant
investment. And I'm particularly glad we have General Chilton
here today to address the plans for our nuclear forces.
So, together, our witnesses today can explain the difficult
work of maintaining America's strategic offenses and defenses,
and state unequivocally why the New START Treaty improves
America's security. This is an open hearing, but I would say,
to any of the witnesses, if at some point that you need to
reference sensitive material, we could move to a classified
setting at the appropriate time, or at the end of the hearing
even, in order to establish that record.
So, we thank you all for being here today. And we very much
look forward to your testimony.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Today, as you've mentioned, the committee holds its eighth
open hearing--or rather, seventh open hearing, eighth hearing
overall--on the New START Treaty, and we're fortunate to have
before us three distinguished Defense Department witnesses who
will discuss strategic modernization and missile defense: Dr.
James Miller, Gen. Kevin Chilton, and Gen. Patrick O'Reilly.
The New START Treaty comes to the Senate at a time when
Senators also are considering a new Nuclear Posture Review, a
Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and the implications of the
Obama administration's phased adaptive approach to missile
defense in Europe.
Article V of the New START Treaty explicitly provides that,
``Modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may
be carried out.'' The treaty is an opportunity for the Senate
and the administration to engage in a serious debate about
future plans for our nuclear warheads and their delivery
vehicles.
In September 2008, General Chilton and Admiral Mullen
wrote, ``The United States is the only nuclear-weapons state
not currently modernizing its nuclear capabilities and
supporting infrastructure.'' The United States has not produced
a new Minuteman ICBM since 1975. And the last new B-52 bomber
was produced in 1964. Indeed, under the current plan, the B-52
will have been flying for 80 years when it's finally retired.
The United States has not tested a nuclear weapon since 1992,
and, unlike Russia and China, extends the lifetimes of its
warheads through selective replacement, refurbishment, and
recertification.
With the New START Treaty, the administration submitted a
10-year modernization plan as it was required to do under
section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010. The plan notes that, over the next decade,
$80 billion will be invested in sustainment and modernization
of a nuclear weapons complex, and $100 billion in nuclear
weapons delivery systems. Most funding on the 1251 report would
go to sustaining existing warheads and delivery vehicles, not
building new ones.
The Nuclear Posture Review states that this administration
will ``give strong preference to options for refurbishment or
reuse.'' Replacement of nuclear warhead components would be
``undertaken only if critical. The stockpile management program
goals could not otherwise be met, and it is specifically
authorized by the President and approved by the Congress.''
Greater discussion is warranted, in Congress and the
executive branch, about modernization of nuclear delivery
systems beyond the 10 years covered in the 1251 report. We have
some time to consider options now, but we should be planning
how to respond to the decline of multiple systems. For example,
there is no clear plan for the maintenance of a nuclear-capable
air-launched cruise missile for our heavy bombers. With each
bomber accounting for just one warhead under the New START,
bombers would play an especially important and stabilizing role
in our nuclear triad of air-, land-, and sea-based nuclear
forces.
We also have a chance today to explore the military
considerations related to missile defense. Last September,
President Obama announced that plans to build a so-called
``third site,'' for ground-based midcourse interceptor missiles
in Poland and a supporting radar installation in the Czech
Republic were to be scrapped. Instead, the United States will
focus on a phased adaptive approach that would provide,
according to the administration, more capability in a shorter
period of time against more mature Iranian short- and medium-
range ballistic missile threats.
Yesterday, our treaty negotiators told us that missile
defense language, including the unilateral Russian and American
statements accompanying the New START Treaty, in no way
inhibits future missile defense deployments, and that there are
no secret deals with Moscow on missile defense. General
O'Reilly and Dr. Miller both have spoken to Russian officials
about our missile defense plans and programs. I'm hopeful they
will establish a clear outline of discussions in this area.
Again, I thank our witnesses for testifying today. And I
look forward to their insights.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Secretary Miller, if you would lead off, General Chilton,
and then General O'Reilly. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES N. MILLER, JR., DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank you for the
opportunity to testify.
It is a pleasure to join General Chilton----
The Chairman. Pull the mic up a little closer to you.
Thanks.
Dr. Miller. OK.
The Chairman. Just pull it up--if you bend it there.
Dr. Miller. Is this better, sir?
The Chairman. Bend the mic up. Yes, there you go. Good.
Dr. Miller. OK.
The Chairman. Thanks.
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank you for the
opportunity to testify. It is a pleasure to join General
O'Reilly and General Chilton here today.
The committee asked for a Department of Defense perspective
on the New START Treaty, so let me provide that up front.
DOD's view of the treaty is that it will allow us to
sustain effective deterrence and strengthen strategic stability
with Russia at reduced force levels. It will improve
transparency and mutual confidence with key data exchange and
verification provisions. It will enable the United States to
retain and modernize a robust triad of strategic delivery
systems. It will allow us the freedom to mix our strategic
forces over time. And it will protect our ability to deploy
nonnuclear capabilities, including prompt global strike and
ballistic missile defenses. In short, the New START Treaty will
make the United States and our allies and partners more secure.
I'd like to briefly summarize some highlights of my
prepared statement and then ask that the full statement be
entered into the record.
The Chairman. The full statement of each witness will be
placed in the record as if read in full. And we'll appreciate
your summary comments.
Dr. Miller. Thank you.
An early priority of the year-long Nuclear Posture Review,
which concluded in April, was to develop U.S. positions for the
New START Treaty negotiations. The Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Chilton were all deeply involved
in the NPR and all deeply involved in decisions on New START
Treaty limits.
The NPR's early, extensive, and continued attention to New
START produced guidance to negotiators that ensured the treaty
would meet key strategic objectives for the United States. In
particular, I'd like to note several.
First, the treaty's limits of 1,550 accountable warheads
will allow the United States to sustain effective nuclear
deterrence, including sufficient survivable nuclear forces for
an assured devastating second-strike capability.
Second, the treaty's limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers will support strategic stability by allowing
the United States to retain a robust triad.
The treaty's limit of 800 deployed and nondeployed
launchers of ICBMs, launchers of SLBMs, and nuclear-capable
heavy bombers, combined with additional New START provisions--
for example, allowing conversions of bombers to a conventional-
only role--will allow the United States to minimize
irreversible changes to our strategic force structure.
Fourth, by providing the freedom to mix U.S. strategic
forces, the treaty will allow us to rebalance, as necessary
over the timeline of the treaty, to adapt to any future
technical or geopolitical changes that could affect a given leg
of the triad.
Fifth, the treaty allows us to maintain our stockpile of
nondeployed warheads in an upload capacity with our strategic
delivery systems, which provide a hedge against adverse
technical developments or a serious deterioration in the
international security environment.
The treaty's data exchange and verification provisions will
increase transparency and confidence in the numbers and status
of Russia's nuclear forces without imposing significant burdens
on our ability to operate United States nuclear forces. And, as
noted before, the treaty does not constrain our ability to
develop and deploy nonnuclear prompt global strike
capabilities, nor does the treaty constrain our ability to
develop and deploy effective missile defenses.
The Department has developed a baseline force plan for New
START that fully supports U.S. security requirements without
requiring any changes to current or planned basing
arrangements. I'd like to say, very briefly, what this baseline
force involves. It includes retaining all 14 current Ohio-class
strategic submarines, and deploying no more than 240 Trident II
D5 SLBMs. It also includes retaining up to 420 deployed
Minuteman II--Minuteman III, excuse me--ICBMs, all with a
single warhead. And finally, the baseline force includes up to
60 nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 heavy bombers, while converting
remaining B-1B and some B-52H heavy bombers to a conventional-
only capability, under which they won't be accountable under
the treaty's central limits.
And, as was noted by Senator Lugar, over the next decade
DOD plans to invest well over $100 billion to sustain exiting
strategic delivery systems and capabilities, and to modernize
these systems, and, as the chairman noted, over $80 billion to
sustain our nuclear infrastructure and our nuclear stockpile.
DOD is currently studying the appropriate mix of long-range
strike capabilities, including heavy bombers, as well as
nonnuclear prompt global strike systems, in follow-on analysis
to the Quadrennial Defense Review and to the NPR. The results
of this ongoing work will be reflected in the Department's FY12
budget submission.
While our analysis of nonnuclear prompt global strike is
still underway, DOD has concluded that any deployment of
conventionally armed ICBMs or SLBMs with a traditional
trajectory, which would count under the treaty limits, should
be limited to a niche capability. That's based on military
considerations. The required number could easily be accounted
for under the treaty's limits while still retaining a robust
nuclear triad.
DOD is also exploring the potential of conventionally armed
long-range systems that fly a nonballistic trajectory; for
example, boost-glide systems. We are confident that such
nonnuclear systems, which do not otherwise meet the definitions
for the New START Treaty, would not be accountable as ``new
kinds of strategic offensive arms'' for the purposes of the
treaty.
Maintaining an adequate stockpile of safe, secure, and
effective nuclear warheads is a core U.S. objective identified
in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and requires a
reinvigoration of our nuclear security enterprise. The New
START Treaty does not in any way constrain our ability to
pursue the additional investments needed, and the
administration is committed to doing so.
Now on ballistic missile defenses, where General O'Reilly
will add some additional information. The New START Treaty does
not constrain the United States from deploying the most
effective missile defenses possible, nor does it add any
additional cost or inconvenience. It enables this President and
his successors to develop the missile defenses needed to defend
the Nation, our deployed forces abroad, and our allies and
partners, from the threat of ballistic missile attack.
The New START Treaty's preamble states that there is an
interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic
defensive arms, and that strategic defensive forces do not
threaten to undermine the effectiveness of either party's
strategic offensive arms. Given that the United States has only
30 ground-based interceptors--and with the past administration,
it was 44--the same statement would be true--and that Russia
will likely field well over 1,000 ICBM and SLBM warheads under
the treaty, missile defenses of the United States can increase
very significantly, and the same would be true: no effect on
stability.
It's also important to note that the preamble does not
require the United States to anything, nor does it prohibit
anything.
Article V of the treaty prohibits any future conversion of
ICBM silos or SLBM launchers to house and launch BMD
interceptors, or vice versa. As LTG O'Reilly will explain
further, such conversion would be neither cost-effective nor
necessary. Consequently, the Article V limitation on launcher
conversion does not constrain the realistic options available
to this or any future President.
As was noted, Russia made a unilateral statement about
missile defense, in connection with this treaty. It's not--this
statement is not part of the treaty and not legally binding.
The United States also made a unilateral statement
associated with New START which makes clear that our missile
defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic
balance with Russia, and that we will continue to improve our
missile defense capabilities to provide for effective missile
defenses against limited attacks.
As the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our budgetary
plans, the U.S. unilateral statement, extensive testimony by
administration officials, and other public statements make
clear, the United States can and will continue to expand and
improve missile defenses, as necessary.
One final issue I'd like to raise. Some have asked whether
if Russia were to again deploy a rail-based ICBM, such as its
former rail-based SS-24, if that system would be accountable
under New START. The answer is ``Yes.'' The treaty's central
terms and definitions cover all ICBMs and all ICBM launchers,
which would, therefore, include any rail-mobile systems. In the
event that Russia deploys rail-mobile ICBMs in the future, the
launchers and the ICBMs they carry would be--and the warheads,
as well--would be accountable under the New START Treaty.
In conclusion, the New START Treaty is strongly in the
national security interests of the United States. The
Department of Defense fully supports the treaty.
Thank you. And I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. James N. Miller, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a
pleasure to join Gen. Kevin Chilton, commander of U.S. Strategic
Command, and Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense
Agency, in discussing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
and key military capabilities, including our strategic nuclear force
structure, nonnuclear prompt global strike, and ballistic missile
defenses.
The New START Treaty will strengthen strategic stability with
Russia at reduced nuclear force levels, improve transparency with key
data exchange and verification provisions, enable the United States to
retain and modernize a robust triad of strategic delivery systems,
allow the freedom to alter our mix of strategic forces over time, and
protect our ability to develop and deploy non-nuclear prompt global
strike and missile defenses. In short, the New START Treaty will make
the United States, and our allies and partners, more secure.
nuclear posture review and new start
An early priority of the year-long 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) was to develop U.S. positions for the New START negotiations,
including how many strategic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads
were needed to field an effective, credible, and flexible nuclear
deterrent for the duration of the treaty. The Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Chilton were all deeply involved in
the NPR, and in decisions on New START Treaty limits.
The NPR's early, extensive, and continued attention to New START
resulted in guidance to negotiators that ensured the treaty would meet
key strategic objectives for the United States. In particular:
The treaty's limit of 1,550 accountable warheads will allow the
United States to sustain effective nuclear deterrence,
including sufficient survivable nuclear forces for an assured
devastating second-strike capability.
The treaty's limits of 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will support
strategic stability by allowing the United States to retain a
robust triad of strategic delivery systems--while downloading
all Minuteman III ICBMs to a single warhead.
The treaty's limit of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers of
ICBMs, launchers of SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers
will allow the retention of up to 100 ICBM and SLBM launchers,
and nuclear-capable bombers, in a nondeployed status. When
combined with the New START counting rule that a launcher is
deployed only when mated with a missile, and the treaty's
provisions on conversion of heavy bombers to a conventional-
only configuration, this will allow the United States to
minimize irreversible changes to nuclear force structure.
By providing the freedom to mix U.S. strategic nuclear forces as we
see fit, the treaty will allow the United States to rebalance
its strategic forces as necessary to adapt to any future
technical and geopolitical challenges that could affect a given
leg of the triad.
The treaty allows us to maintain our stockpile of nondeployed
warheads and an ``upload'' capacity for strategic delivery
systems, which provide a hedge against adverse technical
developments or a serious deterioration in the international
security environment. More broadly, the treaty does not in any
way constrain the ability of the United States to sustain our
nuclear weapons stockpile, and rebuild the nuclear security
enterprise that supports it.
The treaty's data exchange and verification provisions will
increase transparency and confidence in the numbers and status
of Russia's nuclear forces, without imposing significant
burdens on our ability to operate U.S. nuclear forces.
As I will discuss in more detail, the treaty does not constrain our
ability to develop and deploy non-nuclear prompt global strike
capabilities.
As I will also discuss in more detail, the treaty does not
constrain the ability of the United States to develop and
deploy effective ballistic missile defenses, including the
ability to improve these defenses both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
u.s. nuclear force structure under new start
The Department of Defense has developed a baseline nuclear force
structure that fully supports U.S. security requirements without
requiring changes to current or planned basing arrangements.
Specifically, under baseline plans, the administration plans to field a
force that meets New START limits by:
Retaining 14 Ohio class SSBNs and deploying no more than 240
Trident II D5 SLBMs at any time.
Retaining up to 420 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, all with a single
warhead.
Retaining up to 60 nuclear-capable B-2A and B-52H heavy bombers,
while converting remaining nuclear-capable B-1B and some B-52H
heavy bombers to conventional-only capability.
This force structure--which provides a basis for future planning--
affords the flexibility to make appropriate adjustments as necessary.
The Department of Defense plans to sustain and modernize U.S.
strategic delivery capabilities, as outlined in detail in the
classified report submitted to Congress in response to section 1251 of
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010. To this end, over the
next decade, the United States will invest well over $100 billion to
sustain existing strategic delivery systems capabilities and modernize
some strategic systems.
nonnuclear prompt global strike
DOD is currently studying the appropriate long-term mix of long-
range strike capabilities, including heavy bombers as well as
nonnuclear prompt global strike systems, in follow-on analysis to the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the NPR. The results of this
ongoing work will be reflected in the Department's fiscal year 2012
budget submission.
The deployment of a nonnuclear prompt global strike system would
provide the United States with a capability that we currently lack: the
ability to hit a target anywhere on the earth in less than 1 hour using
a nonnuclear warhead. At the same time, depending on technical and
operational details, such systems could raise a number of challenges,
including potential overflight of other countries, and the ability to
distinguish the launch of nonnuclear as opposed to nuclear-armed
systems.
While our analysis of nonnuclear prompt global strike is still
underway, DOD has concluded that any deployment of conventionally armed
ICBMs or SLBMs, which would count under the treaty's limits, should be
limited to a niche capability. For example, if the Conventional Trident
Modification program were deployed, it would involve two missiles for
each of 12 to 14 submarines, or 24-28 strategic delivery vehicles
total. This number of SDVs could easily be accounted for under the
limit of 700 deployed SDVs under the treaty, while still retaining a
robust nuclear triad.
DOD is also exploring the potential of conventionally armed, long-
range systems not associated with an ICBM or SLBM that fly a
nonballistic trajectory (e.g., boost-glide systems). Such systems would
have the advantage that they could ``steer around'' other countries to
avoid overflight and have flight trajectories distinguishable from an
ICBM or SLBM. We would not consider such nonnuclear systems that do not
otherwise meet the definitions of the New START Treaty to be
accountable as ``new kinds of strategic offense arms'' for the purposes
of the treaty.
sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure
In addition to sustaining U.S. delivery systems, maintaining an
adequate stockpile of safe, secure, and reliable nuclear warheads is a
core U.S. objective identified in the 2010 NPR, and requires a
reinvigoration of our nuclear security enterprise. To this end, the
Department of Defense transferred $4.6 billion of its top-line to the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
through fiscal year 2015. This transfer will assist in funding critical
nuclear weapons life extension programs and efforts to modernize the
nuclear weapons infrastructure. The initial applications of this
funding, along with an additional $1.1 billion being transferred for
naval nuclear reactors, are reflected in the Defense and Energy
Departments' FY 2011 budget requests. The NNSA budget request for
weapons activities for FY 2011 represents a 10-percent increase over FY
2010, and increased funding levels are planned for the future, as
reflected in the administration's recent section 1251 report.
ballistic missile defenses
As made clear in the report of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, the ballistic missile threat to our deployed military forces
and to our allies and partners is growing rapidly, with significant
implications for our ability to project power abroad, to prevent and
deter future conflicts, and to prevail should deterrence fail. One of
the most significant threats to the U.S. homeland is the continued
efforts of Iran and North Korea to develop weapons of mass destruction
and long-range ballistic missiles to deliver them. The protection of
the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners
from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national
priority.
A core U.S. aim during the New START negotiations was to protect
the U.S. ability to deploy the most effective missile defenses
possible. U.S. negotiators achieved this objective. The New START
Treaty does not constrain the United States from deploying the most
effective missile defenses possible, nor does it add any additional
cost or inconvenience. Rather, the treaty enables this President and
his successors to develop the missile defenses needed to defend the
Nation, our deployed forces abroad, and our allies and partners from
the threat of ballistic missile attack.
The New START Treaty addresses missile defenses in two places: the
Preamble and Article V. First, the Preamble of the Treaty states that
there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic
defensive arms, and that current strategic defensive forces do not
threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the Parties' strategic
offensive arms. Given that the United States has only 30 Ground Based
Interceptors and Russia will likely field well over 1,000 ICBM and SLBM
warheads under the treaty, U.S. missile defenses can increase very
significantly and the same would remain true. It is also important to
note that the treaty's Preamble statement does not require or prohibit
either side from doing anything.
Second, Article V of the treaty prohibits any future conversion of
ICBM silos or SLBM launchers to house and launch BMD interceptors--or
vice versa. As Lieutenant General O'Reilly will explain further, such
conversion would be neither cost-effective nor necessary. For example,
converting 10 ICBM silos to house GBIs would cost about $550 million,
compared to $360 million for building 10 new silos. The placement of
midcourse missile defense interceptors in converted SLBM launchers
would be operationally impractical and very expensive. Consequently,
the Article V limitation on launcher conversion does not constrain U.S.
plans or programs.
In addition, Russia made a unilateral statement about missile
defense in connection with the treaty. This statement is not part of
the treaty and is not legally binding.
The United States also made a unilateral statement associated with
the New START Treaty, which makes clear that our missile defense
systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia,
and that we will continue to improve our missile defense capabilities
to provide for effective defense of our homeland against limited
missile attacks and of our deployed forces, allies, and partners
against growing regional threats. We have also explained that the
missile defense capabilities associated with the European Phased
Adaptive Approach will not affect the United States-Russian strategic
balance.
As the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our budgetary plans,
and the U.S. unilateral statement made in connection with New START all
make clear, the United States will continue to expand and improve
missile defenses as necessary.
accountability of rail mobile icbms and their launchers
Before concluding, I would like to address an additional issue that
has arisen recently regarding the treaty. Some have asked whether a
Russian rail-mobile ICBM system, should Russia again deploy a system
such as its former rail-based SS-24, would be accountable under New
START. The answer is yes. Such systems were not specifically addressed
in the treaty because, unlike the situation when the previous START
Treaty was being negotiated, neither party currently deploys rail-
mobile ICBMs. Nevertheless, the treaty's terms and definitions cover
all ICBMs and ICBM launchers, including railmobile systems. Therefore,
in the event that Russia deploys rail-mobile ICBMs in the future, the
launchers and the ICBMs they carry would be accountable under the New
START Treaty.
conclusion
The New START Treaty promotes stability and transparency in our
strategic relationship with the Russian Federation. It allows us to
maintain and modernize a robust triad of strategic delivery systems,
and if desired, deploy nonnuclear prompt global strike capabilities.
The New START Treaty does not affect our ability to revitalize our
nuclear security enterprise or improve our ballistic missile defense
capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively. For these reasons,
the Department of Defense fully supports this agreement.
The Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Miller.
General Chilton.
STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND, OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NE
General Chilton. Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, it's truly
a pleasure to appear before your committee and testify here
today. It's also a great pleasure to testify again with Dr.
Miller, whom I've testified with before--and also with
Lieutenant General O'Reilly. These two great gentlemen have
worked very important national security issues for our country,
and I'm always pleased to be in their presence.
Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by assuring you that I was
fully consulted during the treaty negotiation process, and I
support ratification of New START.
Today, I would like to briefly discuss three reasons why
our Nation will be safer and more secure with this treaty than
without it, and to highlight current challenges that must be
addressed to ensure the long-term safety, security, and
effectiveness of the U.S. strategic deterrent.
Mr. Chairman, throughout the Nuclear Posture Review process
and New START negotiations, U.S. Strategic Command's team
played important analytic and advisory roles. As the combatant
command responsible for strategic deterrence planning,
advocating for related capabilities, and executing operations
at the President's direction, no military organization has a
greater interest in the treaty's specifics than we do. The
breadth and depth of our involvement gives me great confidence
that both the NPR and START bodies of work enhance America's
ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, assure our
allies, and sustain strategic stability.
I believe that there are three reasons why the New START
agreement represents a positive step forward.
First, New START limits the number of Russian ballistic
missile warheads and strategic delivery vehicles that can
target the United States.
Second, New START retains sufficient flexibility in
managing our deterrent forces to hedge against technical or
geopolitical surprise.
And third, New START will reestablish the strategic nuclear
arms control verification regime that provides access to
Russian nuclear forces and a measure of predictability in
Russian force deployments over the life of the treaty.
It is equally important, I believe, to remember what New
START will not do. Secretary Gates noted here last month that
the treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying
the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose
additional cost or barriers on those defenses.
As the combatant command also responsible for synchronizing
global missile defense plans, operations, and advocacy, I note
that this treaty does not constrain any current missile defense
plans.
In closing, let me say a word about the need to sustain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. As Secretary
Gates also noted in his statement before you last month,
America's nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our
national security, deterring potential adversaries and
reassuring allies and partners. Today the deterrent is indeed
safe, secure, and effective. But, it is also in need.
The Nuclear Posture Review and administration plans
recognize needs in infrastructure, human capital, life
extensions, and delivery platform developments, and they
include support for improving our nuclear enterprise,
sustaining today's nuclear triad of delivery platforms, and
exploring future triad platforms.
In order to sustain the deterrent and implement the NPR, we
must commit to long-term investment--investments that begin
with several increases outlined in the President's fiscal year
2011 budget--most notably, a 13-percent increase in NNSA
funding, full-rate production of the W76-1 warhead for our
submarine leg of the triangle, full-scope nuclear and
nonnuclear life extensions of the
B-61 bomb to sustain its strategic deterrent and extended
deterrent roles, and initiating studies to develop life-
extension options for the W-78 ICBM warhead. These investments
are not only important, they are essential, in my view.
Chairman, thank you, again, for the opportunity to be here
with you today. And I look forward to your questions during
this session.
[The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:]
Prepared Statement of GEN Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, Commander, United
States Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE
introduction
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to meet with you today. United States Strategic
Command was closely consulted before and during negotiations on the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and I look forward to
discussing the treaty with you today. I would like to note at the
outset how proud I am of the extraordinary work the command performed
in support of these negotiations. We have an amazing team, and their
diligence, expertise, and tireless work continue to ensure our ability
to deliver global security for America.
new start
New START will enhance the security of the United States of
America, and I support its ratification. Our Nation will be safer and
more secure with this treaty than without it. Let me briefly explain
why, from the perspective of the combatant commander responsible for
planning and executing strategic deterrence and nuclear operations.
First, New START limits the number of Russian ballistic missile
warheads that can target the United States, missiles that pose the most
prompt threat to our forces and our nation. Regardless of whether
Russia would have kept its missile force levels within those limits
without a New START treaty, upon ratification they would now be
required to do so. The New START bomber counting rules are unlikely to
result in a reduction in Russian nuclear bomber forces, but these
platforms have much less potential to be destabilizing, and we will
retain the option to sustain equivalent capabilities.
Second, New START retains sufficient flexibility in managing our
deterrent forces to hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.
To support the New START negotiation effort, U.S. Strategic Command
analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle force
structure and posture to meet current guidance. The options we provided
in this process focused on ensuring America's ability to continue to
deter potential adversaries, assure our allies, and sustain strategic
stability for as long as nuclear weapons exist. This rigorous approach,
rooted in deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary
capabilities, supports both the agreed upon limits in New START and
recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). We will retain a
triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems, and if we have a technical
failure in one of our nuclear systems, we can rearrange our deployed
force posture and structure within the treaty limits to compensate.
Third, New START will reestablish a strategic nuclear arms control
verification regime that provides intrusive access to Russian nuclear
forces and a measure of predictability in Russian force deployments
over the life of the treaty. Such access and predictability contribute
to our ability to plan confidently our own force modernization efforts
and our hedging strategy. Without New START, we would rapidly lose
insight into Russian strategic nuclear force developments and
activities, and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy
would be more complex and more costly. Without such a regime, we would
unfortunately be left to use worst-case analyses regarding our own
force requirements. Further, we would be required increasingly to focus
low density/high demand intelligence collection and analysis assets on
Russian nuclear forces.
deterrence capabilities
The nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable
future, the foundation of U.S. deterrence strategy and defense posture.
The NPR recognizes this and makes a series of recommendations that I
strongly urge the Congress to fully support. Specifically, the NPR
recommends moving forward with a number of nuclear enterprise
sustainment projects, including strengthening our nuclear command and
control structure; continuing development and deployment of our triad
of delivery systems; maintaining a safe, secure, and effective
stockpile; and revitalizing the National Nuclear Security
Administration's aging infrastructure. America's triad of diverse and
complementary delivery systems provides unique synergies that make our
deterrent highly credible and resilient in the face of a variety of
potential technological and geopolitical developments. The NPR endorses
DOD efforts to explore future triad systems, specifically to extend the
Minuteman III ICBM through 2030 and conduct studies now to inform
decisions on a follow-on ICBM; to replace the Ohio class SSBN at end of
life for existing ships; and to study future long-range bomber
capabilities. It also supports moving forward with full rate production
for the W76-1 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad; full-scope
life extension of the B61 bomb (including enhancing safety, security,
and use control) to sustain its strategic deterrence and extended
deterrence roles; and initiating studies to develop life extension
options for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of also
adapting the resulting warhead for sea launched ballistic missiles and
thereby reducing the number of warhead types.
Additionally, the NPR and the President's budget recognize the need
to improve, sustain, and ensure all necessary elements of a safe,
secure, and effective deterrence enterprise, including weapons,
delivery systems, warning and communications capabilities, and their
supporting human capital and technological infrastructures, and to make
sustained investments to adequately preserve these capabilities for the
foreseeable future. These investments are required in order to
confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while sustaining the
credibility of our nuclear stockpile, which is fundamental to effective
deterrence. Investments that revitalize NNSA's aging infrastructure and
intellectual capital strengthen our security with the facilities and
people needed to address technological surprises, geopolitical change,
and a range of cutting-edge national security challenges. In order to
sustain the deterrent and implement the NPR, we must commit to long-
term investments that begin with several increases outlined in the
President's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget, most notably a 13-percent increase
in NNSA funding. These investments are not only important--they are
essential.
closing
Every day, U.S. Strategic Command remains focused on providing the
President and future Presidents with the options and flexibility needed
for deterrence. Today, our deterrent is safe, secure, and effective;
our forces are trained and ready; and the Command is faithfully and
fully carrying out its mission each and every day. I am confident that
the combination of New START ratification, implementation of the NPR's
recommendations, and funding of associated investments will enable the
men and women of U.S. Strategic Command to continue delivering global
security for America today and in the future. Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify before this committee.
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
General O'Reilly.
STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC
General O'Reilly. Good morning, Chairman Kerry and Senator
Lugar.
It is an honor to testify before you today on the impact of
New START on the U.S. missile defense program.
The Department of Defense's recent Ballistic Missile
Defense Review set our objectives for developing and fielding
increasingly more capable sensors, ground-based midcourse
defense, terminal high-altitude area defense, Aegis ballistic
missile defense, and international missile defenses, to counter
the growing global proliferation of ballistic missiles.
The U.S. missile defense program includes developing new
space-based sensors, expanding our command-and-control
networks, improving our ground-based interceptor reliability
and testing, and giving the Aegis system a capability against
future intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from
today's regional threats, to increase the robustness of our
homeland defense.
Throughout the treaty negotiations, I frequently consulted
with the New START team on all potential impacts to missile
defense. The New START does not constrain our plans to execute
the U.S. missile defense program. Although Article V of the New
START prohibits the conversion of ICBM or submarine-launched
ballistic missiles--launchers--to missile defense launchers,
while grandfathering five former ICBM silos already converted
for launching ground-based interceptors, MDA has never had a
plan to convert additional ICBM silos.
In 2002, we first began converting ICBM silos to
operational silos for launching ground-based interceptors
because we had not yet developed a silo specific for GBI
launches. Since then, we have developed a GBI silo that costs
$20 million less than converting ICBM silos, and is easier to
protect and maintain. Likewise, the conversion of submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs, into missile-defense
interceptors, or the modification of submarines to carry
missile defense interceptors, would be very expensive and
impractical. Furthermore, submerged submarines are not easily
integrated into our missile defense command-and-control
network.
The New START Treaty actually reduces previous START
Treaty's constraints on developing a missile defense program,
in several areas. For example, MDS's intermediate-range target
booster system, used in key tests to demonstrate homeland
defense capabilities, and components of the new European phased
adaptive approach, are accountable under the previous START
Treaty because it employed the first stage of the now-retired
Trident I SLBM. Under New START, the Trident I missile is not
accountable, so we will have greater flexibility in using it as
a missile defense test target with regards to launcher
locations, telemetry collection, and data processing; thus,
allowing more efficient test architectures and operationally
realistic intercept geometries.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to answering
the committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of General O'Reilly follows:]
Prepared Statement of LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA, Director, Missile
Defense Agency, Washington, DC
Good morning, Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, other distinguished
members of the committee. It is an honor to testify before you today on
the impact of the New START Treaty on the U.S. missile defense program.
The Department of Defense's recent Ballistic Missile Defense Review
set our objectives for developing and fielding increasingly more
capable sensors, Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, and international
missile defenses to counter the growing global proliferation of
ballistic missiles. The program includes developing new space-based
sensors, expanding our command and control networks, improving Ground-
Based Interceptor (or GBI) reliability and testing, and giving the
Aegis system a capability against future ICBMs launched from today's
regional threats, to increase the robustness of our homeland defense.
Throughout the treaty negotiations, I frequently consulted the New
START team on all potential impacts to missile defense. The New START
Treaty does not constrain our plans to execute the U.S. Missile Defense
program. Although the new treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM or
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) launchers to missile
defense launchers while ``grandfathering'' the five former ICBM silos
at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) already converted for Ground-Based
Interceptors, MDA never had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos at
VAFB. In 2002, we began converting ICBM silos to operational silos for
launching GBIs because we had not developed a silo specifically for
GBIs at that time. Since then, we have developed a GBI silo that costs
$20M less than converting ICBM silos and is easier to protect and
maintain.
Likewise, the conversion of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
into missile defense interceptors, or the modification of our
submarines to carry missile defense interceptors, would be very
expensive and impractical. Furthermore, submerged submarines are not
easily integrated into our missile defense command and control network.
The New START Treaty reduces constraints on the development of the
missile defense program in several areas. For example, MDA's
intermediate-range LV-2 target booster system, used in key tests to
demonstrate homeland defense capabilities and components of the new
European Phased Adaptive Approach, was accountable under the previous
START Treaty because it employed the first stage of the now-retired
Trident I SLBM. Under New START, this missile is not accountable, thus
we will have greater flexibility in conducting testing with regard to
launch locations, telemetry collection, and processing, thus allowing
more efficient test architectures and operationally realistic intercept
geometries.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, all of you, for your
testimony, which is helpful.
Let me just try to just bear in on a few points
particularly relevant to the ratification process.
I'd like to ask both the Generals, in their role as active
commanders of relevant commands, to address this issue: General
Chilton and General O'Reilly, as this negotiation began, as we
reentered the discussions with the Russians about New START,
did each of you have a specific set of concerns which you
articulated to the negotiators? And, if so, were those concerns
met in the course of the negotiations?
General Chilton.
General Chilton. Chairman, I guess I would say that I
didn't have any particular concerns that I transmitted. Our job
was to support the negotiations. And I guess I would say my
concerns were more internal to DOD as we started to think about
where we wanted to go, both with NPR and START. And if you
recall, maybe 2 years ago, there were initial ideas of just
putting numbers on the table, so let's reduce the total force
to 1,000. And my position was, don't give me a number, give me
a strategy and a policy that you want me to execute. Let us do
the analysis, and we'll come back and tell you what it will
take to do that. And that, at the end of the day, was the
approach that we took, that the Department took.
And so, that allowed us to do the military analysis to
support the civilian leadership guidance and present that
forward so that as the negotiators went into negotiation, they
had solid underpinnings for the positions that were being
presented forward.
And so, a little bit of a different answer to your
question, but I didn't go to the negotiators and demand, you
know, ``You need to hold the line here.''
The Chairman. No. I----
General Chilton. Except----
The Chairman [continuing]. Understand that.
General Chilton. Yes.
The Chairman. But, as they came to you and sought your
counsel and advice and input----
General Chilton. Right.
The Chairman [continuing]. What, if any, strategic concerns
did you express? Any?
General Chilton. Well----
The Chairman. Or did you simply take their concept and then
you ran the numbers and evaluated their concept?
General Chilton. No. We actually began, before the
negotiations, looking at--because we did the NPR in concert----
The Chairman. Right.
General Chilton [continuing]. With START. And so, as we
looked at the Nuclear Posture Review we began with--the first
criteria that was established was, ``Look, STRATCOM, go off
with current guidance, current strategy, and tell us what it
will take to support that today.''
And then we had to make two assumptions, at that point. One
was that as the treaty was negotiated and lower positions were
taken on both sides--is that, one, an assumption was made that
the Russians would not cheat, that they would abide by that. I
mean, I think you have to make that assumption as you do your
work in support of it. And the second one was that the follow-
on work in NPR would not demand an increase in total U.S.
strategic forces.
And then, based on those assumptions and the direction to
follow current guidance, we were able to provide the support
that they needed.
The Chairman. The verification procedure, which we both
want, is to guarantee that neither side cheats, correct?
General Chilton. Senator, what we want is transparency and
insight so that we can understand that each side is complying
with the treaty, that's correct.
The Chairman. And in your judgment, from the strategic
interests of the country, is there an adequate capacity in this
treaty to do that?
General Chilton. Senator, I guess I would defer to the NIE
that's going to come out from the intelligence community, since
that is their job, to assess that strictly. And from a broader
context, though, what I would worry about would be any ability
for Russia to make a strategically significant change or
breakout from the treaty without us being able to detect it.
And I would just define ``strategically significant'' as
one that would surprise us to the point that we couldn't react
to it.
What gives me some confidence, just looking at it from the
DOD perspective, is that we have preserved a hedge capability,
both for technical failure and for geopolitical surprise, that
I think makes me comfortable with where we are at this time.
But, as to the specifics of verification, I would defer to
the intelligence community, Senator.
The Chairman. Fair enough. And we will be hearing from them
also.
General O'Reilly.
General O'Reilly. Sir, I did not have concerns, going into
this, as much as objectives, which I expressed to the parties
that were negotiating on our part.
And that was primarily--a major part of the missile defense
development is the actual testing of our missile defense
systems. It is not a minor fact that we are emulating and
duplicating long-range ballistic missiles, which are very
difficult to develop. And we wanted to ensure that our
resources were more effectively focused on developing our
missile defense capabilities, not on the targets.
So, I was asking if there was an ability to have greater
capability to use retired missile--or offensive missiles in a
role that we could use them as targets. Because we were so
involved in the previous treaty, with our targets, the
negotiating team was very familiar with what those limitations
were, and they knew which systems that we could employ most
cost-effectively in our flight testing. And that was a
significant objective of mine. And we were, as General Chilton
said, very closely coupled to the negotiating team on all
issues that would affect our use of particular targets and
flight testing.
And then second of all was the general ability to develop
the most capable, cost-effective missile defense, and ensuring
there was not limitations on it which would affect our plans,
especially as we just finished last year's Comprehensive
Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which set forth what those
objectives were.
The Chairman. So, in your judgment, will this treaty
prevent the Missile Defense Agency from pursuing any aspect of
the phased adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe that
the administration has outlined?
General O'Reilly. No, sir, it will not prevent or affect in
any way our plans.
The Chairman. And is there, to your knowledge, any kind of
side deal or unspoken agreement with respect to missile defense
in this, that you're aware of?
General O'Reilly. No, sir. I have no knowledge of that.
The Chairman. And General Chilton?
General Chilton. No, sir. No knowledge.
The Chairman. In the view of the Strategic Command, is the
New START counting rule better than the rule that was obtained
under the START Treaty originally?
General Chilton. Senator, I think it is, for the time we're
in right now. The flexibility that we have, with regard to the
numbers of 700 deployed and a total of 800 deployed and
nondeployed, gives us operational flexibility, with regard to
our force. So, when we do maintenance on a missile or we have a
submarine come into port, we can use that nondeployed category
as a way of balancing our force and ensuring we have the
deterrent available that's required at any given time.
Additionally, the counting of the warheads also adds to
operational flexibility for us, as opposed to attribution of a
number of warheads to a particular delivery-system type.
So, these two points that add flexibility to us, I think,
are an improvement over the START--the original START Treaty
for us.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have three very technical questions, which I raise
specifically to make a record with your testimony.
And the first involves this. Some suggest New START
constitutes a political limit on future defensive deployments,
given that a Russian withdrawal from the New START is tied to
missile defense.
Well, I'd like to ask Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly this.
If ratified this year by both sides, New START would expire
sometime in 2020. Based on announced plans, am I correct that
the third phase of the phased adaptive approach could provide
protection against intermediate-range ballistic missiles and
will be deployed in 2018, and the fourth phase, which could
provide protection against ICBMs using the Standard Missile 3
Block 11B interceptor missile, will be deployed in 2020? Could
we field defensive capabilities during the treaty's duration,
particularly in 2018 to 2020, to which the Russians might
object?
Dr. Miller. Senator Lugar, both General O'Reilly and I,
along with others, have briefed the Russians, at various times
and in various fora, on the phased adaptive approach for
Europe. My first one was with Ambassador Kislyak the day of the
announcement, in September, of the phased adaptive approach.
We've gone through each of the phases, including, in detail,
phases three and four.
And your description is correct. As we move to the later
phases, it will be the Standard Missile 3 2A, and then 2B for
phases three and four.
We have no plans, within this timeframe, that would take
our ballistic missile defenses to a place that would threaten
strategic stability with Russia. We have made that clear, as a
matter of policy, in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, that
we don't intend to do so. But, the reality is that we don't
have the technical ability to deploy the sophisticated defenses
that would be necessary to really make a dent or to try to
negate the extensive Russian nuclear strategic arsenal.
Senator Lugar. General O'Reilly.
General O'Reilly. Sir, I, also, have briefed Russian
officials in Moscow on the capabilities and limitations of our
missile defense plans throughout all four phases of the phased
adaptive approach. And based on fundamental physics and first-
principle engineering, it is well understood of where we have
capability and where
we don't have capability, especially in regards to their
strategic arsenals.
And, throughout those conversations, it was very clear to
me, through their questions and responses, that they fully
understood my presentation.
Senator Lugar. Let me follow on with this question. In
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee last April,
the administration was asked if the United States had provided
an assurance to Russia that the fourth phase of the plan--or,
of the phased adaptive approach would not threaten Russian
strategic nuclear forces, to which the witness replied, ``To my
knowledge, no.''
Now, I ask, once again, Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly,
when did either of you discuss missile defense, either the
phased adaptive approach or as specific elements, with the
Russians? In particular, did either of you discuss the fourth
phase of the adaptive approach? And did any Russians state that
capabilities you discussed constitute a threat to the strategic
nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation?
Dr. Miller. Senator Lugar, as I noted before, my first
briefing of any Russian on the phased adaptive approach was in
September 2009, just--as part of the rollout, just after the
announcement.
I did--I've briefed Russians, a number of times since, on
all of the phases, and at no time did any Russian with whom I
was meeting state that phase three or four was perceived to be
a threat to undermine their strategic deterrent.
They have asked for a lot of information about these
systems. We have provided it. General O'Reilly has provided
extensive technical analysis of the capabilities of the system,
in layperson's terms. With those systems deployed in Europe,
the Standard Missile 3 would be in a tail-chase if it were to
go after a Russian ICBM. It wouldn't have the range or the
velocity to get there. There are other reasons, as well, that
it would be unable to do so.
But, I'd like to state, sir, that the purpose of the
missile defense deployment in Europe with the phased adaptive
approach is to provide effective missile defense in the early
phases of Europe, including of our deployed forces there. And
in the--in phase four, defense against an ICBM that could come
from Iran or somewhere else in--potentially, in the region.
We built the system to provide effective missile defenses
against the threats that we perceive as--today and potentially
emerging in the future. And, as it turned out, those missile
defenses did not--do not pose a threat to their--to the
Russians. But it's important to understand which was the
objective. The objective was effective missile defense against
the threats that we see today, and that we believe may emerge,
from Iran and others in the region.
Senator Lugar. General O'Reilly.
General O'Reilly. Sir, I also have briefed Russian
officials in Moscow, a rather large group of them in October
2009. I went through the details of the--all four phases of the
phased adaptive approach, especially phase four. And while the
missiles that we have selected as interceptors in phase four,
as Dr. Miller says, provide a very effective defense for a
regional-type threat, they are not of the size that have a long
range to be able to reach their strategic missile fields. And
it's a very verifiable property of these missiles, given their
size and the Russian expertise in understanding what the
missiles' capabilities will be, given the size of the missiles
that we're planning to deploy and develop. It was not a very
controversial topic of the fact that a missile, given this size
of a payload, could not reach their strategic fields.
And, as Dr. Miller said, even if they flew a missile within
range of our phase-four interceptors, given the time we would
see the missiles and the velocity of their much larger
strategic missiles and our smaller ones, we would not be able
to catch up with those missiles in order to have an intercept.
And they seemed to be very knowledgeable of this, and
acknowledged my points that I made.
Senator Lugar. Now, I'd like to raise my final question.
Some suggest we should place interceptor technology into
existing silos and perhaps even on existing strategic
submarines, which New START would not permit.
General Chilton and General O'Reilly, in the absence of New
START, we could take Minuteman ICBMs and Trident SLBMs out of
their launchers and replace them with interceptor missiles. If
we did, wouldn't we reduce our missiles, launchers, and
deployed nuclear warheads further below even New START limits
on strategic offensive arms? And what are the dangers of
placing interceptor missiles in ICBM fields or commingling them
with our strategic offensive forces, generally?
General Chilton and then General O'Reilly.
General Chilton. Sir, I would not support going down in
those--in either of those directions, for a couple of reasons.
One, the missile tubes that we have are valuable, in the
sense that they provide the strategic deterrent. And I think
the value of the nuclear deterrent far--per missile--far
outweighs the value of a single missile defense interceptor.
So, I would not want to trade Trident D5, and how powerful it
is and its ability to deter, for a single missile defense
interceptor.
From an ICBM-field perspective--and General O'Reilly, I
know, can address the cost and technical piece of this--but,
there would be some issues that would be raised if you were to
launch a missile defense asset from an ICBM field, with regard
to the opposite side seeing a missile come off and wondering,
``Well, was that a missile defense--was that a defensive
missile or is that an offensive missile?'' So, just in my
opinion, I don't see that either of those two options would be
particularly beneficial as you laid them out.
Senator Lugar. General O'Reilly.
General O'Reilly. Sir, from a technical basis and being
responsible for the development of our missile defenses, I
would say that either one of those approaches, of replacing
ICBMs with ground-based interceptors or adapting the submarine-
launched ballistic missiles to be an interceptor, would be--
would actually be a setback--a major setback to the development
of our missile defenses; one, because of the extensive amount
of funding required, and resources, to redesign both the fire-
control system, the communications system, but especially the
interceptors. They're of completely different size and
completely different functionality, different fuels, so they
are incompatible, our interceptors are, with submarines. And
also, the submarine-launched ballistic missiles have a launch
environment which is significantly different than what our
interceptors have today. And the front end, the most critical
part of our interceptors, would have to be completely
redesigned in order to withstand the shocks and the other
launch environments.
So, in both cases, there would have to be an extensive
redesign of our systems, and some of the basic, fundamental
engineering that we've been doing over the past decade would
have to be redone in order to adapt them for either one of
those applications.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miller. Senator Lugar, could I just add, very briefly,
a couple of quick points?
The first is that the possibility of deploying an
interceptor in a submarine, or the possibility of alternative
deployments of interceptors on land, were both looked at
extensively prior to us agreeing to this position in the New
START Treaty, including studies going back several years, in
terms of operational effectiveness and cost. And the
conclusions that were reached then informed the negotiations
and our willingness to accept this provision.
And second is that the senior leadership of DOD was well
apprised of these, and comfortable with these, with Article V,
section 3.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Let me just give everybody a heads-up. We have a vote or
two, I think, at 10:40. We may have time, here, to get through
the next two rounds, if that's all that appears.
So, Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.
And I'd like to also welcome the witnesses.
There's been some confusion, during the previous hearings
on this treaty, about the relative importance of reducing the
Russian and United States strategic arsenals, particularly
compared with the importance of pursuing missile defenses and
reducing tactical nuclear weapons. And I'd like to take this
opportunity to get a little clarity on what is really needed
for us to maintain a credible deterrent, and the risks
associated with maintaining an arsenal larger than what we
actually need for sufficient deterrence.
This treaty makes significant changes to the verification
regime that was in place for nearly two decades under the
original START Treaty, and I intend to review this issue
carefully. I'm looking forward to receiving the National
Intelligence Estimate in order to better understand the
implications of the new verification regime.
But, General Chilton, some of my colleagues on this
committee have argued that we gave up something for nothing
with this new treaty, particularly with regard to the
limitation on nuclear delivery vehicles. Now, my own assessment
so far differs significantly from that view. For example, we've
agreed to go from 880 to 800 launchers under this treaty. This
leaves us with a clear advantage over the Russians, who,
according to the CRS, are estimated to have 620 launchers, and
limits on their ability to produce a higher number than that.
Meanwhile, according to independent reports, we have the
capacity to upload far more warheads onto our launchers than
the Russians.
So, General, given this calculus, would you agree with the
assessment that this treaty actually preserves our own
strategic advantage?
General Chilton. Senator, I wouldn't go as far as to say
that a strategic advantage existed before or after the treaty,
but a strategic balance continues to exist between both sides.
I don't think we would come to a resolution in the negotiations
if both sides didn't feel that way. And I certainly feel that
we have adequate forces, adequate ready forces, to----
Senator Feingold. So, it--so, to use your language, it
preserves the balance that we had before.
General Chilton. I believe so. And I believe we can
adequately use Strategic Command to fulfill our mission to
provide strategic deterrence adequate to defend this Nation.
Senator Feingold. OK. On balance, would it be fair to say
that the very modest concessions we made in the treaty are far
outweighed by the need to retain the ability to do inspections
and to maintain strategic stability through having a treaty?
General Chilton. Senator, I would say that the importance
of the treaty is threefold. One, it allowed us to preserve our
ability to provide a strategic deterrent. Two, it also put
limits on the Russians that would not have been there had this
treaty not been negotiated. START I had expired. And so, there
were no limits on where the Russians might go. And, third, the
treaty provides us with insight into the Russian program that
we would not have had without this new treaty. All three of
these things, I think, are the big advantages of this new
treaty, which I support.
Senator Feingold. General, as I mentioned before, the
reductions mandated by this treaty are really quite modest.
There's no limit on the number of warheads we can keep in
reserve. And some have argued that we're maintaining far more
launchers that needed to maintain a credible deterrent. Indeed,
some experts argue that, with just over 300 strategic nuclear
weapons, we would have 10 times the amount of explosive power
that Secretary McNamara thought we needed to incapacitate the
Soviet Union. Do you agree that this treaty allows us to
maintain a nuclear arsenal that is more than is needed--that is
more than is needed to guarantee an adequate deterrent?
General Chilton. Sir, I do not agree that it is more than
is needed. I think the arsenal that we have is exactly what is
needed today to provide the deterrent.
And I say this in light of--when we talk about the
nondeployed portion of the arsenal, it is sized to be able to
allow us to hedge against both technical failures in the
current deployed arsenal and any geopolitical concerns or
changes in the geopolitical environment that might cause us to
need more weapons deployed.
The reason we have to maintain this large inventory is
because we no longer have the ability to produce nuclear
weapons in this country. The infrastructure has been allowed to
decay and get to a point where we cannot do that. The Russians,
on the other hand, have an ability to produce nuclear weapons.
That is how they hedge. And so, this is why I think the NPR
findings and the investments in the nuclear infrastructure, in
the personnel and expertise that is required to sustain the
stockpile, are so important, so that, by the time we get to the
next decade, we'll be in a position to look at our nondeployed
arsenal and consider future reductions to that. But, today I
think we have what we need to support the deterrent.
Senator Feingold. General, you talked a little bit about
verification already. There's some concern that we'll not be
able to make up for a lack of onsite inspections at the missile
assembly facility in Votkinsk through other intelligence
sources, and this may somehow enable Russia to develop a
breakout capability. Reports indicate that Russia has not been
producing large numbers of missiles for some time, and may
actually have some struggle maintaining the number of missiles
even permitted under the treaty.
How accurate is that? And, if so, is it fair to say that it
would be very difficult for Russia to increase its missile
production without our detecting it?
General Chilton. Sir, I'd have to defer to the intelligence
community estimates on that, because they are the ones who will
be asked to show that they can verify that these types of
things couldn't happen.
I would point out, though, there are three parts of the
treaty that attempt to address this area. One is the
requirement for a declaration of current status and data
exchanges. Two is the requirement for notification of any
change to that status. And three is the application of specific
identification numbers to delivery platforms. And these help
mitigate the closing of the Votkinsk observation area. But,
again, I'd defer to the NIE final report on their comfort with
verification in this area.
Senator Feingold. And I look forward to reviewing that.
General O'Reilly, Secretary Gates testified that it is not
our policy to develop missile defenses to counter Russia's
deterrence--deterrent, because this would be cost-prohibitive
and deeply destabilizing. Could you just lay out for us what it
might cost to develop a missile defense system capable of
rendering Russia's arsenal useless, and how Russia would
respond to such an initiative that we took forward?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the precise answer on that would
depend on the firing doctrine which the combatant commanders--
specifically, NORTHCOM, in this case--would use. But, if they
used--for example, as a minimum, we usually set aside at least
two interceptors for every missile in the air--threat missile--
that we're concerned about. And therefore--and in some cases,
some doctrines have four missiles--interceptors--dedicated
toward one intercept. So, you would need at least two to four
times the number of interceptors than you would the launch
platforms. And that means maintaining missile fields--well over
1,000. And currently, our plans are to have a capability to
counter and protect the United States against any regional
threat that could develop the ICBM capability. So, right now,
our plans are to have 30 deployed missiles.
So, this tremendously larger inventory of interceptors
would be needed, and the command-and-control, the sensor-and-
fire control, would be tremendously more complex than what
we're developing today.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thanks, Senator Feingold.
Dr. Miller. Senator, if I--Mr. Chairman, if I could just
add, very briefly--General O'Reilly answered exactly right what
it might take to begin to try to render the Russian arsenal, as
President Reagan has said, ``impotent and obsolete.'' If we
think about it, we need to understand that we're talking about
thousands of reentry vehicles, we're talking about
sophisticated countermeasures. The Russians would have the
option for alternative delivery systems, including today's
systems of bombers and cruise missiles and so on. And they'd
have the ability to grow those over time, so that the--there
would be--you would expect an offense-defense interaction, as
well, so that the--at this time, it is--we don't see a
possibility that, with any investment of resources over the
duration of the treaty--barring a fundamental breakthrough that
we don't, at this point, see in technology--we don't see the
possibility of rendering their nuclear arsenal useless. Our
missile defense research continues. If--obviously, if something
were to someday arise that would allow that, it would be--it
would be an important change, but we don't see it on the
horizon.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
General O'Reilly, I assume you've read the third-party
statements, or the--what are they called? The statements that
each part--the unilateral statements that each party makes--I
assume you've read those.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Senator Risch. You would agree with me that we have deep
differences with the Russians on what this treaty actually
means when it comes to defending ourselves. Would you agree
with that?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I don't have the insight to think
how they interpret that, but the relationship between offense
and defensive capabilities is understood, and the impact on--as
Dr. Miller just said, the impact on the ability to affect that
strategic balance was understood.
Senator Risch. But, would you agree with me that they said,
in their unilateral statements, that they believe the treaty is
such that we cannot defend ourselves using missile defense
systems? Would you agree with me that that's what their
unilateral statement says?
General O'Reilly. Sir, my understanding of the statement
is, is that we would not develop ballistic missile defense
systems to counter their strategic balance of forces with us.
Senator Risch. And you understand our position is that
that's not what the treaty says. Are you in agreement with
that?
General O'Reilly. My understanding is, sir, that the treaty
does not limit my ability to develop the most cost-effective
missile defenses possible.
Senator Risch. And we have so stated. Is that correct?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, within the policies that the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review has outlined.
Senator Risch. And, as a result of that, would you now
agree with me that we have a difference, as far as the Russians
are concerned, as to what this treaty actually says when it
comes to our ability to defend ourselves?
General O'Reilly. Sir, my--actually looking at the treaty
itself, the legally binding aspects of the treaty, I do not see
any limitation on my ability to develop missile defenses.
Senator Risch. Well, that's not absolutely true, though, is
it? Can you use the silos that we have right now to defend
ourselves?
General O'Reilly. Sir, given our plans, I would not use a
silo that is less hardened, more--it would not be--I don't
think it affects our ability to defend and develop the
capability against missile defenses, sir. I think the options
that are prohibited would be ones that we would not choose--I
wouldn't choose, and any other director of Missile Defense--
because it is--it gives us less capability than what we are
currently pursuing now.
Senator Risch. But, your statement that the treaty does not
limit you in that regard isn't true, is it? I mean, there are
limitations in the treaty, as far as our ability to defend
ourselves using, for instance, those silos.
General O'Reilly. Sir, there are no limitations in the
treaty that affect our plans for developing missile defense.
There are limitations, as I've stated before, in Article V,
that state the ability to limit--for us not to convert an ICBM
silo, which I would never recommend, for many different
reasons; and the same for SLBMs. So, yes, there are constraints
against aspects of developing missile defense that I do not
believe are prudent or operationally effective.
Senator Risch. So, is it your position, then, that we do
not have a disagreement with the Russians, as far as what this
treaty says regarding our ability to defend ourselves from a
missile attack?
General O'Reilly. In the treaty itself, sir, I see no
limitations to us for the plan that we are pursuing.
Senator Risch. I understand that. You've read the
unilateral statements. Do you agree with me that the two
parties, in their unilateral statements, disagree with what the
treaty says regarding that point?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I don't have the ability to
understand how they interpret it, but I have briefed the
Russians, personally in Moscow, on every aspect of our missile
defense development. I believe they understand what that is.
And that those plans for development are not limited by this
treaty.
Dr. Miller. Senator, might I--sir, might I----
Senator Risch. On that--on----
Dr. Miller [continuing]. Comment----
Senator Risch. No.
Dr. Miller [continuing]. Briefly?
Senator Risch. Just a minute, please.
General, if they understand, why are they making unilateral
statements that say they've won and that they have bested us in
our ability to defend ourselves from a missile attack? Why are
they saying that in a unilateral statement?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I don't interpret their unilateral
statements in saying that they've ``bested us'' or they have
some advantage over us. I do believe what it says is, is that
if there is an imbalance in our strategic forces, then they
would reconsider staying with this treaty. However, the treaty
itself does not constrain any of our plans.
Senator Risch. Well, General, I can tell you, you're the
first witness to come before this committee that has
interpreted their unilateral statement, written in the clearest
of language, that they believe that they have an advantage over
us when it comes to the--our ability to defend ourselves from a
missile attack.
Thank you.
Sir, did you want to comment?
Dr. Miller. Thank you, Senator, yes, very briefly.
I just--I'd say there is no question that the Russians have
made statements, not just with respect to this treaty, but over
the last years and decades, that indicate that they would like
to constrain our missile defenses. I think the Secretary of
Defense noted that in his testimony. Their unilateral statement
makes a connection between missile defenses and offense, in the
context of strategic stability, that, on its face, one could
accept it, because it says that they would be concerned if it
gave rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential
of the Russian Federation. We don't have the capacity to build
defenses that will do that in--over this timeframe.
At the same time, we have made clear, in multiple face-to-
face meetings with the Russians, at all levels, we have made
clear, as a statement of policy, on the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review, it's backed up by our budget--$9.9 billion this
year--and in multiple statements, that we will continue to
improve and expand our missile defenses, as necessary, to
provide missile--to provide defense of this country, and to
provide defense of our deployed forces overseas, and to support
that of our allies and friends. We do not have the capacity to
provide an umbrella over the United States entirely against a
large, sophisticated Russian threat, and we see no way of
getting there within the--certainly within the timeline of this
treaty.
Senator Risch. Do you agree with me that they interpret the
treaty different than we do in that regard?
Dr. Miller. Sir, I would put it differently. I think that
there are at least some on the Russian side that would like to
use the discussion of the treaty to attempt to constrain our
options on missile defense. We have made it absolutely clear--
as I said, in multiple venues, not just on unilateral
statements--that we will not go there.
Senator Risch. So, as far as you'll go is, you will at
least admit that there are some on the other side who interpret
this differently than we do. Would you go that far?
Dr. Miller. Senator Risch, I don't believe that there's a
different interpretation of the treaty. I think that there are
some Russians who would like to use the process of
ratification, on their side and in our discussion, to try to
constrain what we do, not through the treaty, but through some
other mechanism, to have us make statements that would suggest
that would be the case. We have made very clear statements to
the contrary, repeatedly.
Senator Risch. I understand what we have said. My problem
is what they're saying.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We want to thank our witnesses for being here. I know we
have a vote coming up, so I might be less than my allotted
time.
I wanted to first start with Dr. Miller. You know we've had
a number of witnesses here, in addition to the three of you--
many distinguished witnesses. One of them was Dr. Kissinger.
When he testified, he talked about, among other things, three
objectives. One was to reduce or eliminate the dangers of war
by miscalculation, which requires transparency. Two, he said,
bringing about the maximum stability in the balance of forces.
Three, he said, to overcome the danger of accidents fostered by
the automaticity of the new technology.
I'd ask, you, first, Dr. Miller, in your--based upon your
experience and based upon your knowledge of the treaty and our
current security posture as it will be impacted by the treaty,
do you believe this treaty in any way hinders the United States
from responding to any and all threats against it?
Dr. Miller. Senator Casey, no, I do not believe it hinders
us in any way. And, in fact, the provisions of the treaty,
including those for verification and transparency,
significantly aid our ability to identify potential challenges
and to be prepared to respond to them.
Senator Casey. And I wanted to also follow up with General
O'Reilly on some questions that we've all asked about--over
time, about missile defense. I know that when you were in front
of the House, the House Armed Services Committee, you said a
number of things that spoke to this question of missile
defense. You said ``Relative to the recently expired START
Treaty, the New START Treaty actually reduces constraints on
the development of the missile defense program. And under the
New START Treaty our targets will no longer be subject to START
constraints.''
In a similar vein, in the question I asked Dr. Miller, Does
the START Treaty in any way hinder our ability to carry out
these objectives that you set forth in the House--in your House
testimony?
General O'Reilly. No, sir, it does not.
Senator Casey. And, in addition to asserting that, why do
you say that? What are your----
General O'Reilly. Well, sir, for----
Senator Casey [continuing]. What do you point to as
evidence?
General O'Reilly [continuing]. For one thing, the treaty
actually, in Article III, excludes interceptor development,
which is what is the mainstay of our missile defense. So, it
explicitly addresses the fact that the development of our
interceptors is not under this--covered under this treaty.
Second of all, I have talked about the use of targets,
which are a challenge for us, to come up with longer range
targets as we mature the missile defense system. But, there are
other aspects, too, such as--the previous treaty limited our
ability to encrypt our information from our targets in flight
testing. And what we do not want to do is share, in broad, open
forum, our data, as it's coming off our flight tests. And so,
there are various other aspects, besides the discussion we have
had before about limiting our launchers. The areas which they
limited--converting silos or putting them on submarines--are
not part of our plan, for operational, for technical, and for
resource reasons.
Senator Casey. Thank you. And I'll make this my last so we
have time--a little extra time.
The verification measures in--that would be in place, upon
ratification of the treaty, can any one of you--any one of you
want to speak to that, the benefits of those verification
provisions?
Dr. Miller. Senator Casey, I'll just start with the three
that General Chilton mentioned earlier.
The first is a database of deployed and nondeployed systems
and facilities that is--will be put in place, I believe, 45
days after the entry into force of the treaty.
Linked to that is a requirement for notification of any
change in the status of forces under the treaty.
Third is the unique identifiers. And under START, there
were unique identifiers associated with mobile missiles only.
This treaty has them associated with all delivery systems. And
so, it will improve our ability to track the--what--the status
and--of their systems over time.
So, the database, the notifications, and the unique
identifiers, together, really provide a very strong basis. Add
on top of that the inspections under the treaty--18 inspections
of--overall, of deployed and nondeployed systems, and of
facilities.
Just note that 18 inspections for 35 sites under New
START--compare that to 28 inspections under START for 70
facilities. In fact, the ratio is improved under the New START
Treaty, relative to the START Treaty.
All of that backed up by national technical means that we
can collect by ourselves and provide an independent means of
validating the data that we collect across these multiple
different pathways. Very, very solid verification regime.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Casey.
And, Senator Kaufman, have you voted?
Senator Kaufman. No.
The Chairman. OK. Well--how long do you think you're going
to be, Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Probably 5 minutes.
The Chairman. Why don't you stay, then, and try to wrap up?
My suggestion would be that, Senator Shaheen, you proceed;
Senator Kaufman, you wrap up; and I'll go over and--we're
trying to hold the vote.
I'll thank you, ahead of time, very, very much for being
here today.
We're going to leave the record open for--I guess, until
the end of the week, in case there are any questions that want
to be submitted.
Thank you very much.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
And thank you all for being here.
I missed the beginning of the interchange with Senator
Risch, but I just wanted to follow up and make sure I
understand what your bottom line is on that, General O'Reilly.
Do you believe that the Russian unilateral statement is a
reason for concern, from a military perspective?
General O'Reilly. No, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
And, General Chilton, in your testimony you suggested that
the verification regime would be very important so that we
could continue to know what was going on in Russia, basically.
Can you be more specific about what you think the impact of
failure to ratify this treaty would have on our military
planning and our knowledge of what's happening in Russia?
General Chilton. Senator, we would have no verification
regime, because there is none under the Moscow Treaty, and, of
course, START I has expired. And so, I think that's a
significant point, that we would lose any transparency or right
to inspect the Russian force structure. And I think that's
important, that we have that visibility into their forces.
Senator Shaheen. And what happens if we don't get that
visibility?
General Chilton. Well, if we don't get the treaty: a,
they're not constrained in their development of force
structure, and b, we have no insight into what they're doing.
So, it's the worst of both possible worlds. And so, what that
means to us is that we have to guess or, through other national
technical means, estimate what their force structure and what
the capability of their weapons are, which then leads us to do
analysis on what we need. And the less precise that is, the
more the probability that we either under- or overdevelop the
force structure we require. And neither is a good result.
``Under,'' it would be a security issue; ``over'' would be a
cost issue. We could end up developing capabilities that we
really didn't require.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
You also pointed out in your testimony that--you talked
about the modernization plan for the administration. Can you
talk about why you feel like what's being proposed is
sufficient, or not, to address modernization?
General Chilton. Senator, this is the first substantial
increase in the funding toward addressing the stockpile issues
that we have, to address the infrastructure issues that we have
in the Department of Energy, in the NNSA. This is something I
have personally been advocating for, for the last 2\1/2\ years,
and so, I'm greatly encouraged by this Presidential budget that
has come forward, and I strongly support--completely support
the FY11 budget, as well as the request for FY10 reprogramming
to address the issues with the B-61 bomb.
We're at a very, very important point in history, in the
decision making progress to ensure we can sustain our nuclear
stockpile for the future. The stockpile is safe, secure, and
reliable today, but the decisions we make will impact the
stockpile in 2020, in 2030, and it's important that we make
those decisions, support these funds, so that we can move
forward to assure future generations will have the security
provided that we benefit from today.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
And thank you all very much for being here.
Senator Kaufman [presiding]. Thank you for your service. As
usually happens, when you get to me, most of the questions have
been asked and answered, and answered very well.
And I just--the point to make here is that we've had--I
think this is our ninth hearing, and all the witnesses have
said this is a treaty and it's good for us, and we should be
ratifying.
And you talked about some of the problems if we do not
ratify the treaty. What are some limitations on the Russians
that are incorporated in this treaty? If you were in the
Russian Defense Department, what are some of the things you
will not be able to do, that you might like to do, once this
treaty is ratified?
Dr. Miller. Senator Kaufman, I would start with the overall
limits of the treaty. And should there be a future Russian
decision to try to deploy larger numbers of ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy
bombers, and associated warheads, the treaty's limits will be
in place. As was noted earlier, we expect them to be below the
treaty's limit of 700 deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers--I'm
sorry--deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers. But, the
treaty makes clear that that--in fact, that they will be, and
therefore, will help us on the planning side, as well.
From a verification perspective--without the treaty,
obviously the Russians would not be required to open up their
facilities and to open up the--for inspection--the deployed
forces, as well. And I would hope that they would see that as
something that would be not a positive. In other words, I would
hope that they would see the transparency in the same positive
way that we do. But, in any event, it would be something that,
without the treaty, Russia would not be obliged to provide.
Senator Kaufman. Great.
General O'Reilly, you said the New START Treaty reduces--
this is a quote--``The New START Treaty reduces constraints on
the development of the missile defense programs in several
areas.'' Can you just expand on that a little bit?
General O'Reilly. Sir, as I've said, the area--the targets
which we use--as the missile defense program is maturing, we
are testing against longer and longer range targets. And the
targets themselves become a challenge for us. Being able to use
previously retired strategic systems greatly enhances our
ability to conduct a target--or, a flight-test program. Plus,
the way the data is processed. And previously, when we had
accountable targets, where part of the targets were accountable
under the previous treaty, we were limited from where we could
launch. And that also is an issue. So, in those regards, sir,
this is a--it gives us much greater flexibility into developing
a cost-effective and very insightful flight-test program.
Senator Kaufman. And finally, we talked about--you talked
about some of the problems if we do not ratify the treaty. Why
is there a sense of urgency to get the treaty ratified?
Dr. Miller. Senator Kaufman, today, as you know, we have no
verification procedures in place for for Russian forces. We--
without the treaty, we wouldn't have the database, we would not
have notifications, we would not have the unique identifiers,
nor the inspections to provide us a good understanding of the
status of--and size of--Russian forces. So, the--in terms of
the desire to get this--have the treaty ratified and enter into
force relatively soon, the longer that we wait before those are
in place, the greater the uncertainty associated with our
understanding of their strategic systems.
Senator Kaufman. Great, thank you. So, we have a very--we
have a very good treaty here. We've had a number of--9, 10
hearings. Everyone agrees the treaty should ratify, and there's
a real sense to have--it's a real sense to have it done, and
done as quickly as possible.
I want to thank you for your testimony, and I want to thank
you especially for your service. The American people are well
helped by the service that you've created over the years. And
I--when I look and listen to what your testimony, it makes me
more and more proud that we have the very best people working
on these issues. And the American people should feel safe that
we're going to have a new treaty, and it's been well worked
out, and it's been checked out by people in all parts of the
government.
So, I want to thank you for your service.
And I adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of GEN Kevin P. Chilton to Questions Submitted
by Senator Lugar
modernization of the u.s. nuclear weapons enterprise
Question. General Chilton, how important is the modernization of
the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, including the nuclear weapons
stockpile, the delivery systems, and the supporting infrastructure?
Answer. Modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise is
critical to meeting the President's commitment to sustain credible,
reliable, and effective nuclear deterrence capabilities as long as
nuclear weapons exist. The Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the value
of the triad and the need to recapitalize our nuclear forces. The DOD
1251 Report and the DOE 1331 Report provide summaries of plans and
requirements needed for the sustainment and recapitalization of a safe,
secure, and effective strategic deterrent.
b-61 warhead life extension
Question. General Chilton, how vital and urgent is the pending
reprogramming request for the B-61 warhead Life Extension?
Answer. The National Nuclear Security Administration reprogramming
request for the full scope (nuclear and nonnuclear) B-61 Life Extension
Program (LEP) is extremely vital and urgent to sustaining our theater
and strategic nuclear air-delivered capabilities. Delaying action on
the pending B-61 reprogramming request will delay completion of the LEP
study that determines the technical approach by the end of FY11 and
jeopardizes availability of the first production unit required in FY17.
In addition, timely approval of the reprogramming request is needed to
mature technologies, including critical safety and security features,
for incorporation in the LEP. In short, further delays will impact the
operational availability and reliability of the B-61, limit the ability
to incorporate vitally needed safety and security features, increase
costs, and introduce risks to future stockpile management efforts.
atomic energy defense activities of the nnsa
Question. General Chilton, how is the uniformed military leadership
supporting appropriation of the FY11 budget submission with regard for
atomic energy defense activities of the National Nuclear Security
Administration? How important is it to your mission that this request
by fully funded?
Answer. The President's FY 2011 budget request for NNSA resulted
from close coordination between DOD, DOE and the National Security
Council on required funding for atomic energy defense activities of the
National Nuclear Security Administration and represents a very
important first step in recapitalizing our infrastructure to more
effectively sustain our stockpile and manage risk.
It is imperative that we get a solid start on the critical
recapitalization and sustainment efforts necessary to sustain our
nuclear deterrence capabilities. Fully funding the President's FY 2011
budget request and the future program years is needed to begin to meet
sustainment requirements in several already compressed program
schedules. This recapitalization will take many years and require
continued bipartisan support and funding.
executive-legislative cooperation in fy11
Question. General Chilton, how can we work together to ensure that
the Congress and administration continue to build on the increases
provided in FY11 over the coming decade?
Answer. An administration and congressional commitment to a clear,
long-term plan for managing delivery systems, the nuclear stockpile and
supporting infrastructures will support sustained funding for U.S.
strategic deterrence capabilities. We must build partnerships and
continue our dialogue to refine a shared vision and understanding of
the nuclear weapons policies and posture articulated in the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR). DoD's recent 1251 Report is a first step that
builds on the NPR and describes plans for maintaining delivery
platforms for nuclear weapons; sustaining a safe, secure, and reliable
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; and modernizing the nuclear weapons
complex while neither supporting new military missions nor providing
new military capabilities.
1251 report
Question. General Chilton, how useful was the 1251 report to
planning for the future nuclear weapons enterprise? Should Congress and
the administration regularly reasses the plan to ensure it provides for
a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent for the United States?
Answer. The 1251 report was very useful in providing an outline of
force structure and NNSA plans. We worked very closely with OSD, Joint
staff, and the National Security Council staff. It allowed for
increased visibility of important issues by both Congress and the
administration. Sufficient and sustained funding will be critical to
the sustainment and recapitalization of force structure, stockpile, and
nuclear enterprise infrastructure. We will continue to work to ensure
the required recapitalization of our delivery vehicles to provide for a
safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.
involvement of national laboratories in nuclear weapons safety
Question. General Chilton, do you believe it is important for the
National Laboratories to explore the full range of options to ensure
that U.S. nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and reliable into the
future, including, when and where appropriate, replacement options?
Answer. Yes, I agree it is important that our scientists and
engineers explore all options to ensure the safety, security, and
reliability of our nuclear weapons and bring their recommendation to
the Nuclear Weapons Council for assessment of the path forward. The
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) codified the full range of LEP approaches
will be considered on a case-by-case basis to sustain current stockpile
capabilities: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear
components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear
components. This is consistent with the congressionally directed
Stockpile Management Program objectives. I do not view the NPR language
as a ``restriction,'' but an important part of the administration's
internal review before it submits a budget request for stockpile
sustainment activities executed by the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
triad
Question. General Chilton, do current plans enable us to maintain a
triad of
air-, land-, and sea-based strategic offensive forces and how are you
working to ensure that planning is brought forward to present a
credible, stabilizing family of delivery vehicles well into the next
decade, and beyond?
Answer. Yes, current plans support the triad as clearly articulated
in the NPR, however, there are acquisition decisions that will be
needed to support the sustainment and recapitalization of the triad
over the long term. USSTRATCOM, with the assigned mission of strategic
deterrence, participated in the process of identifying requirements and
advocating for funding for the modernization and sustainment of triad
forces and nuclear stockpile. We are working very hard in conjunction
with our Service Components to carefully study the requirements and
tradespace necessary to make the most cost-effective investments, while
looking for leveraging opportunities and innovative ways to meet our
national security commitments. We will need to work together to
continue to address sustainment and recapitalization requirements to
provide a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent.
______
Response of Hon. James N. Miller, Jr., to Question Submitted
by Senator Feingold
prompt global strike
Question. Dr. Miller, You testified with regards to a prompt global
strike capability that, DOD is also: . . . exploring the potential of
conventionally armed, long-range systems not associated with an ICBM or
SLBM that fly a nonballistic trajectory (e.g., boost-glide systems).
Such systems would have the advantage that they could ``steer around''
other countries to avoid overflight and have flight trajectories
distinguishable from an ICBM or SLBM. We would not consider such
nonnuclear systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of the
New START Treaty to be accountable as ``new kinds of strategic offense
arms'' for the purposes of the treaty. Is there a possibility that
other countries would not be certain that such a ``system'' was armed
with a conventional warhead, notwithstanding the nonballistic
trajectory, and that any launch of such a ``system'' would
inadvertently provoke a nuclear confrontation?
Answer. The Department of Defense is currently evaluating the
potential costs, risks, and benefits of nonnuclear prompt global strike
capabilities, as well as alternative deployment options and scenarios
for their possible employment. A range of measures could help to
distinguish nonnuclear from nuclear systems and reduce the risks of
misinterpretation, including deploying nonnuclear and nuclear systems
at different locations, having different flight trajectories (e.g.,
hypersonic glide only for nonnuclear weapons), limiting the number of
nonnuclear systems deployed and/or employed at any one time so that it
was clear that a first-strike was not possible/underway, and providing
launch notifications and implementing other transparency measures.
______
Response of LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly to Question Submitted
by Senator Feingold
missile defense system
Question. During the hearing you testified that the development of
a missile defense system that might be able to overcome Russian nuclear
forces, at least temporarily, would be significantly more expensive
than the current, planned system. Dr. Miller indicated that even if we
developed such a system, it would not alone be sufficient as the
Russians would likely develop additional means to overcome any such
system, effectively renewing the arms race. Putting aside the wisdom of
such a course of action, can you give a rough estimate of the cost of
developing such a system? Specifically, I would appreciate it if you
would provide the following information:
The per unit cost of developing, deploying and maintaining
an interceptor missile, all related equipment and property.
The cost of developing, deploying, and maintaining two
interceptor missiles, all related equipment and property, per
Russian missile permitted under the New START Treaty.
The cost of developing, deploying, and maintaining two
interceptor missiles, all related equipment and property, per
50,000 Russian missiles.
Answer. U.S. missile defense capabilities are intended to counter
regional threats and provide a viable homeland defense against a
limited ballistic missile attack. MDA has not been directed to attempt
to develop a system to defend the high volume and complexity of
Russia's ICBM arsenal and thus cannot estimate a cost for such an
effort. The Ground Based Interceptors deployed today--not intended to
cope with high-volume complex attacks--cost on average $70 million to
produce (procurement costs only), and each new silo is estimated to
cost approximately $36 million.
______
Responses of GEN Kevin P. Chilton to Questions Submitted
by Senator Risch
funding increases
Question. In your testimony you stated ``you are confident that the
combination of NEW START ratification, implementation of the NPR's
recommendations, and funding of associated investments will continue to
provide global security.'' If the necessary increases in funding do not
materialize, would you still maintain your same level of confidence?
Answer. No, sustained funding will be required to ensure our
continued confidence in our strategic deterrent. If increases contained
in the FY11 budget submission do not materialize, we will experience
delays in addressing aging concerns with our systems. Reduced funding
will also delay the incorporation of important safety and security
improvements; reduce our ability to sustain weapons, platforms, and
human capital; and impact necessary platform modernization efforts.
Over time, these combined impacts will erode the effectiveness of the
stockpile and the credibility of the deterrent. Funding requested is
both prudent and necessary.
Question. During testimony in 2009, General Cartwright expressed
the view that he ``would be very concerned if we got below 800 deployed
delivery vehicles.'' The New Start Treaty establishes a level of 700
deployed strategic delivery vehicles. Are you concerned that this
number is 100 below General Cartwright's comfort level?
2009 SASC Testimony:
Senator Thune. Do you agree with the commitment to reduce our
strategic delivery vehicles as somewhere in the range of 500 to
1,100 systems? And in your view, at what point in this range
between that 500 and 1,100 would the delivery vehicle
reductions necessitate making our nuclear triad into a dyad?
General Cartwright. When we get into that range--and that's
what drove the--the range, is that from--from about 1,100 down
to about 500, 500 being principally where the Russians would
like to be, 1,100 being principally where we would like to be,
now the negotiation starts. I would be very concerned if we got
down below those levels about midpoint.
Answer. No, I'm not concerned. Under the 700 limit on deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and 800 limit on
deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers, the United States will maintain a sufficiently
robust and flexible deterrent force.
The Nuclear Posture Review conducted detailed analysis of potential
reductions in strategic weapons, including delivery vehicles, which
would allow the United States to sustain stable deterrence at lower
force levels. This analysis assumed negotiated limits with Russia. The
conclusion from the NPR analyses that stable deterrence could be
maintained at lower strategic delivery vehicle levels, which took
advantage of New START counting and conversion rules, formed the basis
for U.S. negotiations with Russia.
nuclear force structure
Question. The administration's one-page fact sheet on the 1251
report shows that the U.S. nuclear force structure under this treaty
could comprise up to 420 ICBMs, 240 SLBMs, and 60 bombers.
Additionally, the use of the ambiguous ``up to'' means anything up to
that level, meaning it could be much less than that number. This adds
up to 720, which is 20 over the 700 limitation on strategic delivery
systems, which suggests additional decisions need to be made with
respect to U.S. force structure under New Start.
Where will you find the additional 20 delivery systems to
eliminate?
With the added complexity of the counting rules for Prompt
Global Strike systems, as we add PGS systems where would you
cut delivery vehicles to make way for these systems?
Answer. Yes, additional decisions are required to meet the 700
deployed strategic delivery vehicle limit of New START. We must be
within the treaty limit of 700 deployed strategic delivery systems
before the end of the 7-year treaty implementation period. In
anticipation of determining this force size, U.S. Strategic Command
will continue to work with the Services as they develop post-Nuclear
Posture Review modernization and sustainment plans for our nuclear
forces. We will continue to assess the force size required for an
effective deterrent and provide a recommendation to the Secretary of
Defense well in advance of the treaty requirement.
Whether or not deployment of PGS requires additional adjustment in
the strategic launchers will be a function of the type PGS system
deployed. Given this uncertainty, it is premature to speculate on where
possible reductions may or may not come from.
Question. What kind of input did you provide to the SecDef
regarding the numbers of ICBMS, SLBMs, and bombers should be deployed
under New Start? Will you share that input?
What is your estimate of how the Russians will configure their
strategic forces under New Start? What new strategic systems will the
Russians deploy within the timeframe of this treaty? Have the Russians
deployed their new road-mobile ICBM with multiple warheads? Are we able
to track this missile?
Have you conducted a net assessment to determine whether the United
States can carry out its deterrence missions in the face of likely
Russian strategic and tactical nuclear weapons force structure? Please
provide details.
What if the United States decides to deploy 20 conventionally armed
ballistic missiles for prompt global strike--which of the three legs of
the nuclear triad will be further reduced to accommodate this
deployment?
With the failure of the recent boost glide prompt global strike
test, will the United States look more seriously at more traditional
ballistic prompt global strike? What is the timeline for those
decisions to be made?
Answer. [Deleted.]
need for a nuclear force net assessment
Question. Assume there are some 425 critical targets for the
Russians to strike--420 ICBMs, 2 submarine bases, and 3 bomber bases--
and the Russians have at least 1,550 nuclear warheads as allowed under
New Start (they could have more since bombers count only as 1 despite
the number of nuclear bombs they actually carry).
Walk us through your understanding of how this contributes
to strategic stability? Why aren't U.S. forces vulnerable to a
Russian first strike?
Please explain why Russian tactical nuclear weapons (which
could number approximately 3,800 according to the Strategic
Posture Commission) don't upset strategic stability?
Did U.S. Strategic Command, perform a net assessment of the
ability of U.S. nuclear forces to survive a Russian first
strike and carry out their respective missions in support of
U.S. deterrence objectives, including U.S. security guarantees
to allies? Can you provide the Senate a classified briefing and
the written analysis on this?
Answer. Our nuclear forces are postured today to deter other
nuclear capable nations from attacking the United States and to also
assure allies to whom the United States has extended an umbrella of
strategic deterrence. The mix of ICBMs on alert, SSBNs at sea and
unlocated by potential adversaries, and bombers that could be generated
to alert in a timely fashion in addition to serving as an effective
deterrent also provide a high degree of strategic stability. These
forces, combined with our missile warning systems and redundant and
highly survivable nuclear command and control systems provide the
response options for the President to consider should the United States
be attacked. Finally, the focused collection of intelligence supporting
strategic deterrence is intended to allow sufficiently timely
generation of additional forces above our day-to-day posture if
required in a developing crisis. The combination of day-to-day force
posture, ability to generation additional forces in a timely manner,
and focused intelligence and warning provides a highly survivable
deterrent force.
Under the assumptions of limited range and different roles, Russian
tactical nuclear weapons do not directly influence the strategic
balance between the United States and Russia. Though numerical
asymmetry exists in the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons the United
States has and we estimate Russia possesses, when considered within the
context of our total capability and given force levels as structured in
New START, this asymmetry is not assessed to substantially affect the
strategic stability between the United States and Russia.
Furthermore, within the regional context, the United States relies
on additional capabilities to support extended deterrence and power
projection, including: conventional force capabilities, ballistic
missile defenses, allied capabilities, advanced technologies, and
modernization and maintenance of existing forces, to name a few. As
President Obama stated in Prague last year, we are committed to
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter any
adversary and guarantee that defense to our allies. During the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) consultations, our NATO allies were engaged on the
issue of extended deterrence and were assured of our continued
commitment to their defense. Allies have welcomed the outcome of the
NPR, as well as the signing of New START.
New START's lower strategic force levels are based on force
analyses conducted during the Nuclear Posture Review. We concluded that
the lower New START limits will allow for an effective nuclear
deterrent, and that any plans envisioned for deploying limited numbers
of conventional warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs could be accommodated within
those limits. In reaching these conclusions, the analyses conducted
during the Nuclear Posture Review took into account the nuclear
arsenals of other declared nuclear weapon states, as well as the
nuclear programs of proliferant states.
Please refer further details of the analysis and requests for
briefings to OSD.
nuclear triad
Question. The administration has made a commitment to maintaining
the nuclear triad.
Does this commitment extend only through the life of the
treaty or beyond?
Do you believe it is important the United States maintain
all three legs of the nuclear triad? Why, please explain?
Given the advances in potential enemy air defenses, the
ability of our strategic bombers to penetrate to their targets
is becoming increasingly more difficult. Can we maintain the
viability of the bomber leg of the triad without developing a
new nuclear air-launched cruise missile?
Answer. I believe it is important to retain the triad. Each leg
provides distinct attributes contributing to the strategic deterrence
mission. As you note, this position was validated during the Nuclear
Posture Review.
Service plans reflected in the FY11 Presidential Budget Request
take a long view toward sustainment and modernization. The U.S. Navy
has embarked on developing an Ohio-class SSBN Replacement Program,
beginning R&D to support construction of the first submarine in 2019.
Delivery of the first new SSBN is tentatively scheduled for 2027, with
an expected lifespan through 2080. Navy's Trident D5 missile system has
ongoing life extension programs to ensure its viability through 2042.
The Air Force has plans in place for the sustainment of ICBMs (through
2030), B2s and B52s (to 2040) and ALCM (to 2030).
The growth of adversary defensive capabilities is a concern for the
bomber force. In order to support the range of potential missions of
all Combatant Commands, the future air leg needs both standoff and
penetrating capabilities. The Air Force plans on sustaining ALCM to
2030 and included funding in the FY11 budget for an Analysis of
Alternatives for a future cruise missile that may satisfy both the
nuclear and conventional missions.
aging of u.s. nuclear weapons
Question. Are you concerned about the aging of our nuclear weapons?
You wrote a letter with Admiral Mullen in September 2008 stating
``while today's nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable, the
stockpile sustainment issues expressed by the directors of the nuclear
weapons laboratories raise significant concerns.'' ``[S]ignificant
concerns,'' General Chilton? Please elaborate on those concerns.
There are those in the Senate who have stated that because the lab
directors continue to certify the stockpile each year, all is well.
Would you agree with those Senators?
Answer. I am concerned about the long-term confidence in the
stockpile. Each year it is increasingly challenging to certify the
legacy stockpile due to aging concerns. Through the success of the
stockpile stewardship program the stockpile today remains as safe,
secure, and effective as our cold-war-era designs allow. Our stockpile
stewardship program has provided evidence that our warheads are aging
and doing so in ways that can be difficult to predict. Today, we know
that selected components on some warheads require refurbishment as part
of ongoing, funded efforts. The administration has also requested
funding for additional studies to identify necessary life extension
requirements for other weapons. As weapons require life extension
activities, we will also have opportunities to improve their safety and
security features, as well as to maintain long-term confidence in
effectiveness. Robust assessment and surveillance programs within the
nuclear weapons enterprise are needed to continue to certify the
stockpile without underground nuclear testing. Additionally, we must
make the necessary investments to recapitalize the NNSA infrastructure
outlined in the 3113 Report, FY 2011 Stockpile and Stewardship
Management Plan.
1251 plan
Question. How important is it that the Congress take a fresh look
at the 1251 plan each year? Would you be concerned if the FY11 budget
turned out to be a
1-year blip and the nuclear weapons enterprise budget returned to the
FY05-10 era of dangerous underfunding?
Answer. I believe the annual oversight of budgets for strategic
weapons and platforms is important to sustain the Nation's focus on
this key element of our security. I also believe that we need to have a
broader, longer term view of the stockpile in view of the time needed
to identify problems, study and determine corrective measures, and then
implement appropriate program changes.
We carefully review Service budget activities related to strategic
systems on an annual basis. The administration has requested a
multiyear commitment in the FYDP to the nuclear enterprise budgets. I
would be concerned if we do not sustain funding within these budgets
beyond FY11.
modernization of nuclear weapons
Question. You wrote a letter in September 2008 with Admiral Mullen
that ``the United States is the only nuclear weapons state not
currently modernizing its nuclear capabilities and supporting
infrastructure.'' Is that a prudent course for the United States? Can
that be fixed in only 1 year?
Answer. Your question reflects an accurate assessment of my
previous and current position. We cannot address our aging capabilities
and supporting infrastructures in 1 year. However, as articulated in
the Nuclear Posture Review and the President's FY 2011 Budget Request,
the administration has requested significant long-term investments
essential for sustaining a safe, secure, and effective strategic
deterrent capability. Continued commitment from the administration and
Congress will be required over a number of years to sustain and
modernize our strategic deterrence capabilities.
tactical nuclear weapons
Question. The Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission report
estimates that Russia holds 3,800 tactical nuclear warheads and notes
that, ``The combination of new warhead designs, the estimated
production capability for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery
systems and open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten
to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.'' Likewise,
Under Secretary of Defense Flournoy has observed that the Russians are
``actually increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons and the role of
nuclear weapons in their strategy.''
Isn't it the case that as the numbers of strategic nuclear
weapons go down in our respective arsenals, the disparity in
tactical nuclear weapons becomes more significant?
Under this treaty, the United States will reduce strategic nuclear
warheads to 1,550, while the Russians will continue to deploy at least
3,800 tactical nuclear warheads in addition to their strategic nuclear
warheads. Not only will the Russians maintain a 10-1 superiority in
tactical nuclear weapons, their tactical nuclear weapons will outnumber
our strategic nuclear weapons by at least 2-1.
How does this contribute to nuclear stability?
What impact will this disparity have on allied views of the
U.S. nuclear umbrella?
What leverage do we have to address this disparity in the
future?
Why didn't we make this an objective for this agreement?
Especially since we agreed to a more vague connection between
strategic offensive and defensive arms.
Answer a & d. Certainly, Russia's total nuclear force size will
remain a significant factor in determining how much and how fast we are
prepared to reduce U.S. forces in the future. The size and pace of U.S.
nuclear force reductions will be implemented in ways that maintain
effective deterrence and sustain the credibility of our security
assurances to our allies and partners.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and statements by senior U.S.
officials have made clear that the United States intends to pursue
broader reductions with Russia, including tactical nuclear weapons,
following the entry into force of the New START Treaty. The number and
role of tactical nuclear weapons in the Russian arsenal warrants
addressing in future nuclear reduction discussions between the United
States and Russia. Meanwhile, United States nuclear forces will
continue to underwrite deterrence for the United States, its allies,
and its partners.
Answer b & c. Tactical nuclear weapons do not substantively
influence the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and
Russia because of their limited range and different roles. Even so,
under the New START limits the United States retains the capacity and
capability to upload our strategic nuclear delivery systems in response
to any attempt by Russia to leverage its tactical nuclear weapons to
gain advantage. Furthermore, within the regional context, the United
States relies on multiple capabilities, including its superior
conventional force capabilities, tactical nuclear capabilities, U.S.
strategic nuclear capabilities, ballistic missile defenses, and allied
capabilities, to support extended deterrence and power projection.
Answer e. Refer to OSD.
future reductions
Question. From your perspective, would additional reductions in
U.S. ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, and their associated warheads/
bombs, below those contained in the New START treaty be possible and
would you advise we pursue them?
I understand DOD is currently conducting an analysis of future
force reductions, but help us understand how you are thinking about
these issues:
What are the key considerations to take into account when
contemplating lower U.S. nuclear forces?
Are you concerned that at lower levels the military will not
be able to carry out its deterrence missions?
Are you concerned about the survivability of U.S. forces at
lower levels?
Do you believe that at lower force levels the implications of
cheating become more profound?
Does detecting cheating, become more important at the lower
levels imposed by New START?
To have greater confidence in detecting cheating, doesn't it
require a larger dependence on National Technical Means?
Are you concerned that other countries may view lower U.S.
force levels as an opportunity to gain parity with the United
States in nuclear capability?
Are you concerned that at lower levels of U.S. forces, our
allies may come to doubt the credibility of U.S. nuclear
security guarantees--especially if the Russians maintain large
numbers of tactical nuclear weapons?
Answer. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the President has
directed a review of post-New START arms control objectives to consider
further reductions in nuclear weapons.
Specifically, the U.S. goals in post-New START bilateral
negotiations with Russia could include reducing nonstrategic/tactical
nuclear weapons and nondeployed nuclear weapons, as well as deployed
strategic nuclear weapons--ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy
bombers. Of course, any specific United States-Russian discussions on
U.S. nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons will take place in the
context of continued close consultation with allies and partners. The
United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal to maintain strategic
stability with other major nuclear powers, deter potential adversaries,
and reassure our allies and partners of our security commitments to
them.
A number of factors were considered in STRATCOM's analysis for New
START and the NPR, including but not limited to: employment guidance,
deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance of friends and allies,
ability to hedge against technical and geopolitical developments based
on the nuclear infrastructure, and the potential for further
reductions. These factors will certainly play a critical, but not all
inclusive role, in the analysis to support further reductions.
technological parity with the russian federation
Question. According to the Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States (page 12): ``Russia is at work
on a new intercontinental ballistic missile (initially deployed with a
new single warhead but capable of carrying multiple warheads), a new
ballistic missile submarine and the associated new missile and warhead,
a new short-range ballistic missile, and low-yield tactical nuclear
weapons including an earth penetrator. It is also engaged in continued
research and development on a hypersonic intercontinental glide
missile.''
With the Russians currently developing these new systems. What new
platforms is the United States planning to deploy during the life of
this treaty in order to ensure technological parity with the Russians?
Do you believe the United States should continue to deploy an ALCM?
Answer. The United States will likely not deploy new delivery
platforms during the life of the treaty. The Department is committed to
the ongoing life extension and sustainment programs to ensure our
platforms and weapons provide a robust and assured strategic and
extended deterrent capability.
The Department has also embarked on efforts for our ``next-
generation'' platforms--Navy has started R&D activities to support the
Ohio-class Replacement program while the Air Force is conducting
recapitalization studies for ICBMs, penetrating and standoff bomber and
future cruise missile.
Yes, the ALCM remains a critical component of the strategic
deterrent force. ALCM provides flexible and responsive capabilities
that ensure our bomber forces remain an essential element of our
deterrent. It also serves an integral role in our hedge strategy by
providing the most responsive capability to mitigate technical problems
in other legs of the triad.
b61 life extension
Question. Please describe why the B61 life extension is important.
Answer. The full scope B61 life extension is important because the
B61 is a cornerstone of our air-delivered strategic and extended
deterrent. The full scope life extension will refurbish an aging
system; improve 30-year-old safety and security features; take
advantage of a limited infrastructure window within the nuclear
enterprise; and reduce future stockpile size by consolidating four B61
variants into one. Finally, conducting this life extension as planned
will eliminate the need for another life extension in the 2020s, thus
saving taxpayer dollars by handling the weapon only once.
delivery system modernization
Question. The administration will invest $100 billion over the next
decade in nuclear delivery systems. About $30 billion of this total
will go toward development and acquisition of a new strategic
submarine, leaving about $70 billion. According to estimates by U.S.
Strategic Command, the cost of maintaining our current dedicated
nuclear forces is approximately $5.6 billion per year or $56 billion
over the decade. This leaves roughly $14 billion of the $100 billion
the administration intends to invest--even less if you factor in
inflation.
General Chilton, the 1251 plan reveals that the bulk of the
funding planned is to sustain current systems. There is no
funding in the plan to build a new bomber, ICBM, or Air
Launched Cruise missile. How can this plan be sufficient if
there is no money in it for any follow-on system other than the
nuclear submarine?
Is this $14 billion sufficient to develop and acquire:
1. A next generation bomber;
2. A follow-on ICBM;
3. A follow-on nuclear air launched cruise missile; and
4. Develop a conventional prompt global strike capability.
In light of these figures, and the fact that you have yet to
make additional modernization decisions, please explain why you
believe $100 billion is sufficient investment in our delivery
systems over the next decade.
1. How confident are you that the administration will pursue
these other programs? Please explain?
2. Why didn't you make a decision to pursue these in the 1251
report?
3. What is the likelihood you would decide against a new
bomber, air-launched cruise missile, or follow-on ICBM?
4. Do you believe the Senate should ratify this treaty before
the administration has committed to modernization beyond a new
ballistic missile submarine?
Answer. The estimated investment of over $100 billion for strategic
delivery vehicles over the next decade, provided in the section 1251
report, represents a best-estimate of costs associated with deployed
systems and programs underway and planned. This estimate does not
include all of the costs associated with potential future modernization
programs. The FY 2011-2020 costs provided in the sec. 1251 report
include funds for sustaining and upgrading existing systems, including
the B-2A and B-52H bombers, Minuteman III ICBMs, and the Ohio-class
SSBN. In addition, the report includes estimated costs for the Ohio-
class SSBN replacement, with the initial funding for this program
having been provided in the FY 2010 DOD budget. These FY 2011-2020 cost
estimates do not provide funds for other possible follow-on systems--
the ALCM follow-on and the Minuteman III ICBM follow-on, and a possible
follow-on heavy bomber--studies are now underway regarding options for
these systems. As specific decisions are made regarding future systems,
necessary funding will be requested in future DOD budget requests.
Given this level of commitment the ability of the present force to be
adequately sustained through the New START Treaty and the time
available to consider the nature of future deterrent forces beyond the
new SSBN, I believe the Senate should provide their consent for
ratification of New START.
______
Responses of James N. Miller, Jr., to Questions Submitted by Senator
Risch
tactical nuclear weapons
Question. . The Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission
report estimates that Russia holds 3,800 tactical nuclear warheads and
notes that, ``The combination of new warhead designs, the estimated
production capability for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery
systems and open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten
to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.'' Likewise,
Under Secretary of Defense Flournoy has observed that the Russians are
``actually increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons and the role of
nuclear weapons in their strategy.''
Isn't it the case that as the numbers of strategic nuclear
weapons go down in our respective arsenals, the disparity in
tactical nuclear weapons becomes more significant?
Under this treaty, the United States will reduce strategic nuclear
warheads to 1,550, while the Russians will continue to deploy at least
3,800 tactical nuclear warheads in addition to their strategic nuclear
warheads. Not only will the Russians maintain a 10-1 superiority in
tactical nuclear weapons, their tactical nuclear weapons will outnumber
our strategic nuclear weapons by at least 2-1.
How does this contribute to nuclear stability?
What impact will this disparity have on allied views of the
U.S. nuclear umbrella?
What leverage do we have to address this disparity in the
future?
Why didn't we make this an objective for this agreement?
Especially since we agreed to a more vague connection between
strategic offensive and defensive arms.
Answer. a. Russia's nuclear force remains a significant factor in
determining how much and how fast the United States should reduce U.S.
nuclear forces. While large disparities in overall levels of nuclear
capabilities could raise concerns on both sides, it is important to
note that the United States will retain many more than 1,550 nuclear
weapons if the New START Treaty is ratified and enters into force. For
example, as of September 30, 2009, the United States had 5,113 nuclear
in the stockpile (several thousand more than the upper limit for
deployed strategic systems under the SORT Treaty), with an additional
several thousand awaiting dismantlement. Because the New START Treaty
does not limit tactical and nondeployed nuclear weapons, the United
States may retain whatever numbers of these systems desired.
b. Tactical nuclear weapons do not directly influence the stability
of the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and Russia
because of their limited range and the different roles these weapons
play. More broadly, the United States will be able to retain
approximate overall parity in nuclear weapons if the New START Treaty
is ratified and enters into force.
c. In the course of consultations with allies during the
development and following the release of the NPR and the signing of the
New START Treaty, many allied governments have told us they are
comfortable with our planned nuclear force posture, which is consistent
with the NPR recommendations and the New START Treaty. Representatives
of these governments have also noted that future United States-Russian
nuclear arms reduction negotiations should seek to reduce Russian
tactical nuclear weapons.
d. As the 2010 NPR makes clear, and as the President reiterated in
Prague on April 8, 2010, at the signing of the New START Treaty, the
United States intends to pursue additional and broader reductions with
Russia that would include reductions in strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons and also nondeployed weapons. We believe that such reductions
will be in the interests of both sides in order to further enhance
stability, reduce costs, and meet obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
e. The United States did not make reductions in the Russian
tactical nuclear forces an objective for this treaty, because from the
outset, the New START Treaty was intended to replace the START Treaty
expiring in December 2009, which was focused solely on strategic
offensive forces. Deferring negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons
until after a START successor agreement had been concluded was also the
unanimous recommendation of the Perry-Schlesinger Congressional
Strategic Posture Commission in the spring of 2009.
missile defense preamble language
Question. The New START Preamble states: ``Recognizing the
existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and
strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more
important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current
strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and
effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.''
How does the U.S. side interpret the phrase ``current
strategic defensive arms''? Does it include the deployment of 5
SM-3 block IIB missiles in Europe by 2020? How about 10 IIB
missiles? How about 100?
How do the Russians interpret the ``current'' level of
strategic defensive arms? At what point in our deployment plans
will they suggest we've moved beyond ``current'' capabilities?
In your testimony you said that you have briefed the
Russians on President Obama's Phased Adaptive Approach. What
was their reaction to each phase? What concerns did they raise?
What objections did they raise? Please provide a copy of all
the briefing slides used for that presentation.
Answer. I would like to address the policy issues which LTG
O'Reilly deferred:
``Strategic defensive arms'' consist of missile defenses
that are capable against intercontinental ballistic missiles as
well as air defenses that provide protection against heavy
bombers and cruise missiles. ``Current'' strategic defensive
arms include those capabilities deployed at the time of the
signing of the New START Treaty in April 2010.
The United States has repeatedly made clear that we intend
to move beyond ``current'' missile defense capabilities by
improving our Ground-Based Midcourse Defenses (GMD), as well as
moving forward with the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in
Europe and in other regions. There is therefore no doubt that
the Russians understand that the United States plans to move
beyond ``current'' missile defense capabilities both
qualitatively and quantitatively. In our assessment, none of
the capabilities planned for the PAA in Europe will undermine
the viability and effectiveness of Russia's strategic offensive
arms. This is a point we have made repeatedly to Russia in
explaining the results of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, and in policy and technical explanations about the
European-based Phased Adaptive Approach and the GMD system.
russian unilateral statement
Question. ``The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the
United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, can operate and be
viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing
its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.
Consequently, the exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 14
of the treaty include increasing the capabilities of the United States
of America's missile defence system in such a way that threatens the
potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.''
What would the Russians consider a quantitative or
qualitative development in U.S. missile defense capabilities?
Additional ground-based interceptors in Alaska? Additional SM-3
block IIA missiles on U.S. ships or deployed in Poland in 2018,
as planned? The development and deployment of SM-3 block IIB
missiles in Europe by 2020, as planned?
How did you discuss this matter with the Russians? Can you
provide the Senate documentation, briefings, memos of such
discussions?
Have the Russians explained what type and numbers of U.S.
missile defenses could ``threaten the potential of the
strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation''?
Answer. a. The Russian Federation has not defined what it would
consider a quantitative or qualitative development in U.S. missile
defenses. Russia's main concern--as specifically stated in the last
sentence of its unilateral statement cited in this question--appears to
be that improved and expanded U.S. missile defense capabilities might
be able to undermine the credibility of Russia's strategic deterrent.
Various U.S. officials have informed their Russian counterparts that
U.S. missile defense capabilities associated with deployment of the
Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in Europe will not pose a threat to
Russia's strategic deterrent because the capabilities to be deployed
during each phase (including Phase 4, which is planned to include
deployment of SM-3 Block IIB missiles in Europe) will not be able to
engage Russian strategic missile forces, that is, ICBMs, based in
Russia and SLBMs deployed on strategic submarines at sea or in port.
The various versions of the Stand Missile-3 (SM-3) missile defense
interceptors we are planning to deploy in Europe as part of the
European PAA (including the SM-3 Block IIBs to be deployed during Phase
4) will not have the speed necessary to intercept Russian ICBMs or
SLBMs heading to the United States. Moreover, the 30 ground-based
interceptors (GBIs) deployed at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air
Force Base, CA--which are designed to defeat very small attacks by
first generation North Korean and Iranian ICBMs--will not have
significant capability against a large-scale Russian strategic missile
attack that would likely include hundreds of advanced reentry vehicles
combined with various types of penetration aids; indeed the number of
GBIs could increase substantially and the same would be true.
For these reasons, we do not believe that Russia will have a
legitimate missile defense-related reason, as defined by their own
unilateral statement, to withdraw from the New START Treaty during its
10-year duration, or for that matter if the treaty were extended for an
additional 5 years, as allowed by mutual consent.
b. U.S. missile defense plans were set forth publicly during the
President's September 17, 2009, announcement of the ``Phased Adaptive
Approach'' to ballistic missile defense in Europe as well as in the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report mandated by Congress, which was
published on February 1, 2010.
Additionally, the Obama administration has provided briefings on
U.S. regional and national ballistic missile defense (BMD) policy,
plans, and programs to representatives of the Russian Government and
the Russian military on several occasions over the past several years.
The briefing and discussions conducted in Moscow in October 2009 within
the Arms Control and International Security Working Group of the United
States-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission included a clear
description of all four phases of the U.S Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) to missile defense in Europe. A second briefing and discussion
were held between representatives of the U.S. Joint Staff and the
Russian General Staff in a meeting of the Military Cooperation Working
Group. There have been numerous other high-level engagements between
representatives of the United States and Russia in which we have
repeatedly explained that we do not see Russia as a threat, nor do we
or will we have the capabilities to negate the Russian strategic
deterrent during the 10-year duration of the New START Treaty, or for
that matter if it were extended for an additional 5 years by mutual
consent.
We can provide the Senate briefings and related materials. In
addition, we can assure the Senate that we have made no ``secret
deals'' or agreements with the Russians that would constrain the U.S.
ability to develop and deploy missile defenses to defend the homeland
from limited missile attacks and to defend our deployed forces, allies,
and partners from growing regional missile threats.
c. The Russians have not identified specific U.S. missile defense
systems whose deployment would justify Russian withdrawal from the
treaty.
u.s. unilateral statement
Question. U.S. statement says; ``The United States of America takes
note of the Statement on Missile Defense by the Russian Federation. The
United States missile defense systems are not intended to affect the
strategic balance with Russia. The United States missile defense
systems would be employed to defend the United States against limited
missile launches, and to defend its deployed forces, allies, and
partners against regional threats. The United States intends to
continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order
to defend itself against limited attack and as part of our
collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions.''
Are the U.S. and Russian definitions of ``limited'' the
same?
What the United States considers to be limited could be
construed by the Russians as having an impact on their
strategic forces--did you discuss this with the Russians?
The Russians claimed 10 ground-based interceptors to be
deployed in Poland were a threat to them and President Obama
unilaterally backed away from the missiles' emplacement. Why
won't the Russians also claim that the SM-3 block IIB is a
threat to Russian strategic forces? And if the Russians do
claim it is a threat, will the administration back away and
revise the Phased-Adaptive Approach to comply with Russian
objections?
Answer. a. We have not made an attempt to arrive at an agreed
definition of ``limited'' in terms of missile defense with the
Russians. This language is used to describe the goal of our missile
defense efforts. As the United States has stated in the past, our
homeland missile defense capabilities are focused on regional actors
such as Iran and North Korea. While the GMD system would be employed to
defend the United States against limited missile launches from any
source, it does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian
missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic balance
with Russia.
b. We have discussed with Russia why we believe that our missile
defense efforts, including the GMD system deployed in the United States
for defense of the U.S. homeland and our planned regional missile
defense capabilities, including the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe,
are not a threat to Russia's strategic deterrent.
c. As the U.S. unilateral statement regarding missile defense, the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and our budgetary plans all make
clear, the United States is committed to the Phased Adaptive Approach
in Europe and will continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed,
to defend the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and
partners. The United States has made it clear to the Russian Federation
that the U.S. missile defenses, including the GMD system deployed in
the United States for defense of the U.S. homeland and our planned
regional missile defense capabilities, including the Phased Adaptive
Approach in Europe, are not intended to affect the strategic balance
with Russia.
deployment of sm-3 block iia and iib
Question. What is the current estimate for when the SM-3 block IIA
and block IIB would be ready for deployment? Is the administration
committed to fully fund the development and deployment of phase 3 and 4
of the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe?
Answer. Deployment of the SM-3 Block IIA is planned for the 2018
timeframe and the SM-3 Block IIB is planned for the 2020 timeframe. The
administration is fully committed to funding the development and
deployment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to counter the
threat posed by regional actors such as Iran to our deployed forces,
allies and partners in Europe.
______
Responses of LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly to Questions Submitted
by Senator Risch
missile defense preamble language
Question. The New START Preamble states: ``Recognizing the
existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and
strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more
important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current
strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and
effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.''
How does the U.S. side interpret the phrase ``current
strategic defensive arms''? Does it include the deployment of 5
SM-3 block IIB missiles in Europe by 2020? How about 10 IIB
missiles? How about 100?
How do the Russians interpret the ``current'' level of
strategic defensive arms? At what point in our deployment plans
will they suggest we've moved beyond ``current'' capabilities?
In your testimony you said that you have briefed the
Russians on President Obama's Phased Adaptive Approach. What
was their reaction to each phase? What concerns did they raise?
What objections did they raise? Please provide a copy of all
the briefing slides used for that presentation.
Answer. As head of the Missile Defense Agency, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I defer to my
colleagues in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the
Department of State to respond to questions that have policy or
diplomatic implications.
I briefed Russian officials on the capabilities and limitations of
our missile defense plans throughout all four phases of the phased
adaptive approach. Based on fundamental physics and first principle
engineering, it is well understood where we have capability and where
we don't have capability, especially in regards to their strategic
arsenals. It was very clear to me through their questions and responses
that they fully understood my presentation.
I went through the details of all four phases of the Phased
Adaptive Approach, especially Phase IV. And while the missiles that we
have selected as interceptors in Phase IV are expected to provide a
very effective defense for a regional type threat, they are not of the
size to have sufficient range to reach Russian strategic missile
fields. Given Russian expertise in missiles and the size of these
interceptors it is an easily verifiable property of these missiles.
Even if Russia flew a missile within range of our Phase IV
interceptors, we would not be able to intercept those missiles given
the time we would see the missiles and the velocity of their much
larger strategic missiles and our smaller interceptors. The Russians
seemed to be very knowledgeable of this and acknowledged my points.
DOD will provide the briefing slides used for this presentation
under separate cover.
russian unilateral statement
Question. ``The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the
United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, can operate and be
viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing
its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.
Consequently, the exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 14
of the treaty include increasing the capabilities of the United States
of America's missile defence system in such a way that threatens the
potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.''
What would the Russians consider a quantitative or
qualitative development in U.S. missile defense capabilities?
Additional ground-based interceptors in Alaska? Additional SM-3
block IIA missiles on U.S. ships or deployed in Poland in 2018,
as planned? The development and deployment of SM-3 block IIB
missiles in Europe by 2020, as planned?
How did you discuss this matter with the Russians? Can you
provide the Senate documentation, briefings, memos of such
discussions?
Have the Russians explained what type and numbers of U.S.
missile defenses could ``threaten the potential of the
strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation''?
Answer. Our plans for the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
defense in Europe do not require the development of large interceptors
capable of countering the Russian ICBM arsenal. The deployment of
hundreds of Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) would be required over a
5-year construction period before the quantity of GBIs would be
sufficient to degrade Russia's strategic capabilities. We have no plans
or budget requested for such qualitative or quantitative improvements
that would effectively degrade Russian strategic forces.
u.s. unilateral statement
Question. The U.S. statement says; ``The United States of America
takes note of the Statement on Missile Defense by the Russian
Federation. The United States missile defense systems are not intended
to affect the strategic balance with Russia. The United States missile
defense systems would be employed to defend the United States against
limited missile launches, and to defend its deployed forces, allies and
partners against regional threats. The United States intends to
continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order
to defend itself against limited attack and as part of our
collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions.''
Are the U.S. and Russian definitions of ``limited'' the
same?
What the United States considers to be limited could be
construed by the Russians as having an impact on their
strategic forces--did you discuss this with the Russians?
The Russians claimed 10 ground-based interceptors to be
deployed in Poland were a threat to them and President Obama
unilaterally backed away from the missiles' emplacement. Why
won't the Russians also claim that the SM-3 block IIB is a
threat to Russian strategic forces? And if the Russians do
claim it is a threat, will the administration back away and
revise the Phased-Adaptive Approach to comply with Russian
objections?
Answer. The size of the propulsion systems of the interceptors
under development to support the Phased Adaptive Approach are too small
to effectively reach Russian strategic missiles heading toward the U.S.
from their missile fields. I have made the Russians aware of our
smaller interceptors and they understand the interceptors' limited
capability against the Russian ICBMs. The 10 Ground-Based Interceptors
(GBIs) previously proposed for deployment in Poland are 12 times larger
than our new interceptors and the Russians were concerned about the
larger GBIs.
deployment of standard missile-3 (sm-3) blocks iia and iib
Question. What are the current estimates for when the SM-3 Blocks
IIA and IIB would be ready for deployment? Is the administration
committed to fully fund the development and deployment of phase 3 and 4
of the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe?
Answer. The current deployment estimate for the SM-3 Blocks IIA and
Blocks IIB are:
Flight testing for the SM-3 Block IIA missile is scheduled
for 2014. Production would follow with the SM-3 Block IIA ready
for deployment as part of Phased Adaptive Approach Phase III in
FY18.
The initial flight testing for the prototype SM-3 IIB
missile is scheduled to begin in FY 2015. Production would
follow with the SM-3 Block IIB ready for deployment as part of
the Phased Adaptive Approach Phase IV in 2020.
As head of the Missile Defense Agency, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. MDA's budget
requests fully support the development scope and deployment timeframes
described above.
IMPLEMENTATION--INSPECTIONS AND ASSISTANCE
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P.
Casey, Jr., presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Cardin, Lugar, Isakson, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. The hearing will come to order.
Thank you very much for taking the time to be with us this
morning.
This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
meets today to review the role of inspections in the
verification regime of the New START Treaty.
First, we need to ask a threshold question with regard to
this treaty. How does this treaty contribute to the United
States national security? First, the treaty itself provides for
predictability, transparency, and stability in the United
States-Russian nuclear relationship. Former National Security--
or, I should say, former National Nuclear Security
Administration--Administrator, Ambassador Linton Brooks, put it
best when he said, ``Transparency leads to predictability and
predictability leads to stability.'' The opportunity to examine
Russian nuclear forces will help limit the surprises, mistrust,
and miscalculation that could result from a lack of
information.
To underscore this point, I'd like to draw attention to an
ad that was released today by the Partnership for a Secure
America that appeared in today's--probably among other places--
today's Politico. I think you've seen--it's on page 31. This ad
is signed by a bipartisan list of distinguished Americans,
including George Shultz, Lee Hamilton, Colin Powell, Madeleine
Albright, just to name a few. This group clearly declares that
the New START Treaty does not limit missile defense, nor does
it inhibit our ability to maintain an effective and reliable
arsenal. Moreover, the group states that the verification and
inspection measures are essential to United States national
security and nuclear threat reduction as it relates to Russian
strategic nuclear weapons.
We thank them for their continued service, those who were
listed in the ad, and their contribution to this important
debate.
The existence of the START Treaty--and, in particular, the
framework for an inspection regime--has proven remarkably
durable, even during difficult times in the Russian-United
States relationship. For example, despite tensions over policy
in the Balkans and the NATO campaign in Kosovo, our respective
commitments to START have never been in question. In an
environment of instability today in Afghanistan and across the
Middle East, stability in our relationship with Russia becomes
even more important.
In addition to the benefits of decreasing the number of
nuclear weapons, the signing of this treaty has resulted in
concrete benefits. First, in deepening our relationship with
the Russian Federation, we're able to secure support for
sanctions on the Iranian regime at the United Nations. Russia
has also decided not to provide S-300 missiles to Iran, even
though the sale of this weapon is not banned by U.N. sanctions.
Moreover, our current relations with Russia are stable, but
if that were to change, the New START Treaty would provide a
ceiling of 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons in the Russian
nuclear arsenal in case it were to decide to chart a new
strategic course.
This treaty will also have strategic benefits apart from
arms control. But, at a more fundamental level, we meet here
today to concretely discuss how this treaty will provide a
valuable window into Russian nuclear forces.
Today, we look forward to hearing from our witnesses on
whether they believe that the verification regime crafted under
the New START Treaty fulfills the two main purposes of arms-
control verification regimes: First, to provide a mechanism to
increase confidence that all parties are abiding by the treaty;
and second, to provide early warning of any violation that can
jeopardize our national security.
Over the past two decades, both the American and Russian
inspection teams have implemented the original START Treaty.
The New START Treaty was negotiated with this experience as a
foundation, and builds on its best practices.
Some have asked whether we have lost any valuable elements
of the original START agreement's inspection regime. Critics
point out that, under the original START Treaty, the United
States was permitted 25 data update, reentry vehicle, and
facility inspections a year, while under the New START Treaty,
the United States can only inspect 18 facilities annually.
However, in a previous hearing on the START Treaty, Admiral
Mullen noted that, when START entered into force, there were 55
Russian facilities subject to inspection, but now there will
only be 35 Russian facilities subject to inspection. Because
the Russian strategic nuclear forces have contracted so much
over the past 15 years, we have certainly not lost anything in
the number of inspections we carry out per facility. This does
not take into account that some of the inspections under the
New START Treaty allow us to do two inspections at once, unlike
under the original START verification regime.
I would also assert that the inspections regime has also
changed to reflect the current security environment and
enhanced relationship with the Russian Federation, and because
of more than a decade of experience in conducting inspections.
The inspection regime is simpler and cheaper than it was--than
what was conducted under the first START Treaty. We conduct
fewer inspections under this treaty, because there are fewer
sites to inspect. We know what works and we know what doesn't
work.
As I mentioned earlier, we have built upon a substantial
track record of experience in conducting inspections and
hosting Russian inspectors. The Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, known by the acronym DTRA, trains, equips, organizes,
deploys, and exercises operational control over inspection,
monitoring, and escort teams. In addition to preparing for
conducting onsite inspections of Russian facilities, the United
States must be prepared to host onsite inspections under the
New START Treaty without revealing--without revealing--
sensitive military information.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
how the New START Treaty will affect their hosting of Russian
inspections at United States facilities.
We must ask ourselves what we would lose under the New
START Treaty agreement, were it not verified--or, ratified, I
should say. As General Chilton, Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command, testified last week, ``The New START Treaty will
reestablish a strategic nuclear arms control verification
regime that provides intrusive access to Russian nuclear forces
and a measure of predictability in Russian force deployments
over the life of the treaty. Such access and predictability
contribute to our ability to plan, confidently, our own force
modernization efforts and our hedging strategy.'' So said
General Chilton.
The General also noted that while--that without this
verification regime in place, the ability to plan our own force
structure would be far more difficult and costly, and would
drive our strategists to always default to the worst-case
scenario. He said, ``Without such a regime, we would be,
unfortunately, left to use worst-case analyses regarding our
own force requirements.''
While Chairman Kerry and Senator Lugar have led an effort
to thoroughly review the treaty, there remains key questions
with regard to the inspections regime. I hope that, through the
course of this hearing, we'll gain better perspective on at
least two particular issues: No. 1, an instructive
understanding of the actual inspections process; and second,
the mechanisms in place to address and resolve disputes or
perceived inconsistencies with the agreement.
Thanks to the leadership of this committee's ranking
member, Senator Lugar, the United States has worked with Russia
for almost 20 years to eliminate weapons of mass destruction
and their associated delivery systems through the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. This historic effort has
bolstered U.S. nonproliferation efforts, and with the original
START Treaty as a foundation, was successful in the elimination
of ICBMs and SLBMs, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface missiles.
I look forward to hearing how the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program would complement the New START Treaty agreement.
Today we welcome back the Honorable James N. Miller, Jr.,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who was before
this committee last week. And we give a warm welcome back to
Kenneth A. Myers III, a former professional staff member on the
committee, and now the director of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency and U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons
of Mass Destruction.
In his role as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
of Policy, Dr. Miller provides advice and assistance on matters
concerning the formulation of national security and defense
policy and the integration of the oversight of Department of
Defense policy. Dr. Miller provided the committee with valuable
insight last week, and we look forward to the same today.
Kenneth Myers is in charge of--or, is charged with
integrating and synchronizing the Pentagon's defensewide
efforts in support of combating the weapons of mass destruction
threat. In this role, we look to Mr. Myers to provide us,
today, with a thorough examination of the connection between
the New START Treaty and DTRA's activities.
I'd ask our witnesses to speak for about 7 minutes each.
We'll try to keep to that as best we can. Please note that if
you'd like to summarize your statement, of course, your full
statement will be made part of the official hearing record.
And at this time, I'd like to turn to our distinguished
ranking member, Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Today, the Foreign Relations Committee will meet twice as
part of our ongoing examination of the New START Treaty. And
this morning, we will hear, as you pointed out, testimony
regarding treaty inspections and implementation. This
afternoon, we will examine benefits and risks of the new
treaty.
I join you in welcoming back Dr. James Miller, Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, who appeared before us last
week and offers his valuable testimony. And we are especially
pleased to welcome back to the committee, Kenneth A. Myers III,
the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which
played such an important role in this committee's deliberations
on previous arms control treaties, as well as his work in the
field as a part of Cooperative Threat Reduction.
Having served for many years as a senior member of the
Foreign Relations Committee professional staff, we are
especially pleased that he is here today and can help
recapitulate the history of some of our previous deliberations.
During discussion of the New START Treaty, many Senators
and commentators have underscored the importance of
verification and inspections. It is a widely accepted principle
of strategic arms control that agreements must be verifiable.
Yet, few Senators know how we carry out inspections or
implement treaty provisions. Who performs the inspections for
our government? How do inspectors enter Russia, and under what
conditions? What are they allowed to see? How do we choose what
to inspect? How do we accommodate Russian inspection teams that
come to the United States?
Successful arms control sometimes depends on seemingly
mundane matters, such as delineating the privileges and
responsibilities of verification teams operating in each
others' countries, as well as the procedures for conducting
inspections. Today's hearing is an opportunity to develop a
detailed understanding of the verification process that will be
applied to the New START Treaty.
The START I Treaty expired last December. The White House
agreed with Moscow to continue to act in its spirit while
negotiations continued on the treaty that is now before us. And
yet, today we have no binding verifications regime in place
with Russia as we have this meeting this morning. The only way
forward to binding verification is through the New START
Treaty.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or DTRA, was the
executive agency for onsite inspection under the START I
Treaty. The painstaking inspection process in the New START
Treaty will also fall under DTRA's purview. Beyond treaty
inspections, DTRA has numerous missions, including
implementation of the Nunn-Lugar Act, which is devoted to
safely converting and destroying vast stockpiles of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union.
As of today, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 7,545
strategic nuclear warheads, as well as corresponding strategic
launchers and nuclear infrastructure. The number of nuclear
warheads deactivated in the former Soviet Union under the Nunn-
Lugar program is almost five times greater than the number of
deployed strategic warheads that Russia would be allowed under
the New START I--rather, under the New START Treaty we're
discussing today.
Nunn-Lugar has also upgraded security at 24 weapons storage
sites, built and equipped 20 biological monitoring stations,
and neutralized 1,395 metric tons of Russian and Albanian
chemical weapons agent.
Now, in addition to verification issues, we have the
opportunity today to examine the New START Treaty's
implications for the Nunn-Lugar program activities in Russia.
What missiles or supporting infrastructure are likely to be
eliminated under the treaty? How would the treaty's revised
elimination regime change the locations at which Nunn-Lugar
would work?
I've traveled to the former Soviet Union on numerous
occasions to encourage and witness the safeguarding and
destruction of weapons covered by START and other initiatives.
The destruction of thousands of weapons is a monumental
achievement for our countries. But, the process surrounding
this joint effort is as important as the number of weapons
eliminated.
The United States-Russian relationship has been through
numerous highs and lows in the post-cold-war era. Throughout
this period, START inspections and consultations and the
corresponding threat reduction activities of the Nunn-Lugar
program have been a constant that have served to reduce
miscalculation and to build respect. This has not prevented
highly contentious disagreements with Moscow, but it has meant
we have not had to wonder about the makeup and the disposition
of Russian nuclear forces during periods of tension. It's also
reduced, though not eliminated, the proliferation threat posed
by the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union.
This process must continue if we are to answer the
existential threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. Every missile destroyed, every warhead
deactivated, and every inspection implemented makes us safer.
Russia and the United States have the choice whether or not to
continue this effort, and that choice is embodied in the New
START Treaty.
I thank the witnesses for joining us today. We look forward
to their insights.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Lugar. And I'm--again,
want to thank you for your leadership over so many years on
these issues, and we're grateful that you're with us today
again to provide that leadership.
Dr. Miller, do you want to start?
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, JR., DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Miller. Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished
members of the committee, it is a pleasure to join Ken Myers,
our very capable and accomplished director of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, to testify here today on the New START
Treaty.
The committee asked us to address four issues: the treaty's
inspection regime, its elimination provisions, the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program and it's relation to the inspections,
and our continuing efforts to address biological threats.
I would like to briefly summarize highlights of my written
statement, and, as Senator Casey offered, ask that the full
statement be entered into the record.
And I know that Mr. Myers will go into more detail on the--
on how we conduct inspections in CTR. I will focus on policy-
related issues.
So, first, on New START inspections. Onsite inspections are
a lynchpin of the New START Treaty's verification framework.
The treaty allows each party to conduct up to 18 short-notice
onsite inspections each year, with up to 10 type one
inspections at operating bases for ICBMs, strategic nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines, and nuclear-capable heavy
bombers, and up to 8 type two inspections conducted at places
such as storage sites, test ranges, and conversion or
elimination facilities.
Onsite inspections work synergistically with other elements
of the treaty on its provisions on verifications, including
extensive data exchanges on the characteristics and locations
of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, unique
identifiers associated with each ballistic missile and heavy
bomber, and a requirement to report any changes in the status
of strategic systems through timely notifications.
By enabling the United States to directly observe Russia's
strategic nuclear forces and related facilities, inspections
will help the United States verify that Russia is complying
with the provisions of the New START Treaty.
Inspections under New START will also provide a deterrent
to cheating, because the treaty provides for up to 18
inspections per year at sites selected by the inspecting party.
Each side knows that the other will have a significant
capability to uncover any discrepancies between what is
reported and what is actually happening. If the United States
has concerns or sees ambiguities in reported data, we will be
able to raise those issues with the Russians in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission established under the treaty, and
pursue them at higher levels, if necessary.
The conversion and elimination provisions of the New START
Treaty are designed to allow both the United States and Russia
to convert or eliminate strategic offensive arms in a
transparent, simplified, and less costly manner than was the
case under START. Under these simplified procedures, the United
States will be able to remove from accountability over 300 ICBM
and SLBM launchers and heavy-bomber systems that would have
been accountable under the old START.
And I want to particularly highlight that the treaty will
allow us to take our four conventional SSGNs, which now carry
cruise--conventional cruise missiles, as well as
conventionally--conventional-only B-1B and B-52 bombers off the
books. This feature of the treaty will allow us to meet the
treaty's limits while preserving force structure for
conventional missions and more headroom under the treaty's
limits for nuclear systems.
Now, regarding the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
For almost 20 years the Nunn-Lugar CTR program has worked with
Russia, other states of the former Soviet Union, and,
increasingly, new partners, to advance U.S. nonproliferation
objectives by supporting the elimination of weapons of mass
destruction and associated delivery vehicles. As was noted, the
CTR program has played a critical role in the elimination of
the strategic systems of the former Soviet Union. This includes
672 ICBM launchers and 783 ICBMs, 476 SLBM launchers, and 651
SLBMs, and 155 heavy bombers, and 906 air-to-surface missiles.
This program has also supported the deactivation of 7,545
nuclear warheads. Those figures are accurate as of June 21,
when we submitted the testimony.
CTR will complement New START while continuing to operate
under its own authorities. Consistent with longstanding
practice, the United States will continue to make payment for
the work funded by Nunn-Lugar CTR only after it is confirmed as
completed by a U.S. Government CTR official or U.S. Government-
authorized CTR contractor personnel. Such practices will
provide additional transparency into the elimination of Russian
Strategic systems, building off the verification provisions of
the New START Treaty.
The Nunn-Lugar CTR program has made a tremendous
contribution to U.S. national security, in great part because
of the single-minded commitment of its two founders. Senator
Lugar, I understand, has visited a CTR project virtually every
year since the program has existed, sometimes with Senator Nunn
along, now in his role as a private-citizen advocate.
Senator Lugar has always been available, as well, to help
administrations of both parties when quiet high-level
intervention was required with a foreign government on a CTR
issue. And his leadership has also been key to ensure that CTR
has received strong congressional support over the years.
This program--his program--has succeeded because of his
role. And, Senator, I want to say that we're all truly
grateful.
Finally, the committee asked that we address the
administration's efforts to prevent and, if necessary, respond
to biological threats, a top priority for the administration.
As you know, to guide the U.S. approach, last fall the
President signed a national strategy for countering biological
threats which seeks to reduce the risks presented by the
deliberate or accidental release of a biological agent.
DOD is working with our interagency partners to implement
the national strategy. For DOD, a large support of this plan
comes from the CTR program. In fact, biological threat
reduction activities now reflect almost 40 percent of the CTR
budget. And the Biological Threat Reduction Program is
currently assisting eight countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Building on these and other successes of the CTR program, we
are working to expand the scope of our threat reduction efforts
to new regions in a response to new challenges and
opportunities.
In conclusion, the New START Treaty is strongly in the
national security interest of the United States, and the
Department of Defense fully supports it. The Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program will complement New START and make additional
key contributions to U.S. national security in its own right.
CTR is also key to our broader efforts to prevent and counter
biological threats.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. James N. Miller, Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a
pleasure to join Kenneth Myers, Director of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), to discuss inspections associated with the New
START Treaty, and the continuing work of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) program. My remarks will provide a policy
perspective, and Mr. Myers will address implementation, for which DTRA
plays a leading role.
new start inspections
Onsite inspections are a linchpin of the New START Treaty's
verification framework. The treaty allows each Party to conduct up to
18 short-notice onsite inspections each year, with up to 10 type one
inspections conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, strategic nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable heavy
bombers, and up to 8 type two inspections conducted at places such as
storage sites, test ranges, formerly declared facilities, and
conversion or elimination facilities.
Onsite inspections work synergistically with other elements of the
treaty, including extensive data exchanges on the technical
characteristics, locations, and dispositions of ICBMs, SLBMs, and
nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and unique identifiers associated with
each ballistic missile and heavy bomber. Any changes in the status of
strategic systems must be reported through timely notifications and,
twice annually, the sides must provide a comprehensive snapshot of
their strategic offensive forces. By enabling the United States to
directly observe Russia's strategic nuclear forces and related
facilities, inspections help confirm the accuracy of declared data on
deployed and nondeployed strategic offensive arms, and the conversion
or elimination of these systems. Inspections also can confirm that
facilities which previously supported strategic offensive arms are not
being used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty. In short,
inspections will help the United States verify that Russia is reporting
the status of its strategic forces accurately and complying with the
provisions of the New START Treaty.
Inspections will not be shots in the dark. Using information
provided by required data exchanges, notifications, past inspections,
and national technical means (NTM), we can choose to inspect those
facilities of greatest interest to us. Then, through short-notice
onsite inspections, our inspectors can verify that what the Russians
are reporting accurately reflects reality.
Inspections under New START will provide a deterrent to cheating.
Because the treaty provides for an annual quota of up to 18 inspections
at sites selected by the inspecting party, each side knows that the
other will have a significant capability to uncover any discrepancies
between what is reported and what is actually happening. If the United
States has concerns or sees ambiguities in reported data, we will be
able to raise them with the Russians in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission and pursue them further at higher levels, if necessary.
In addition to helping to monitor compliance and deter cheating,
onsite inspections, coupled with compulsory exhibitions of any new
types of strategic systems, will help the United States better
understand the disposition, operating and support patterns, and
characteristics of Russia's strategic offensive forces. This level of
detailed information on Russian strategic forces could simply not be
accumulated in the absence of a treaty verification regime. By allowing
both sides to base assessments on the direct monitoring of each other's
strategic offensive forces, New START will, if ratified, promote
transparency and help avoid worst-case assumptions and planning.
conversion and elimination
The conversion and elimination provisions of the New START Treaty
are designed to allow both the United States and Russia to convert or
eliminate strategic offensive arms in a transparent, simplified, and
less costly manner than was the case under START. These processes will
ensure that the systems are rendered incapable of performing their
original purposes. Under New START, the United States will be able to
remove from accountability 96 former SLBM launchers on 4 Ohio-class
SSBNs converted to SSGNs, and over 60 B-1B bombers converted to a
conventional-only role. We will also be able to convert additional B-
52H bombers to a conventional-only role and employ simplified
procedures to eliminate 100 currently empty ICBM silos and more than 70
B-52 and B-1B heavy bombers.
nunn-lugar cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
For almost 20 years, the Nunn-Lugar CTR program has worked with
Russia, other states of the former Soviet Union, and increasingly, new
partners around the world to advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives
by providing support for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction
and associated delivery systems. As part of this mission, the program
has played a critical role in the elimination of the strategic systems
of the former Soviet Union. As of June 21, 2010, the CTR program has
supported the elimination of 672 ICBM launchers and 783 ICBMs, 476 SLBM
launchers and 651 SLBMs, and 155 heavy bombers and 906 air-to-surface
missiles. It has also supported the deactivation of 7,545 nuclear
warheads.
CTR assistance has incentivized Russia to drawdown its Soviet-
legacy nuclear forces, and reduced opportunities for their
proliferation or use. Past eliminations have been completed in
accordance with applicable START provisions, including the START
Conversion or Elimination Protocol. CTR will complement New START,
while continuing to operate under its own authorities. Consistent with
longstanding practice, the United States will continue to make payment
for the work funded by Nunn-Lugar CTR only after it is confirmed as
completed by a U.S. Government CTR official or U.S. Government-
authorized CTR contractor personnel. Such practices will provide
additional transparency into the elimination of Russian strategic
systems that builds on the verification provisions of the New START
Treaty.
I would also like to highlight that other Nunn-Lugar CTR projects
in Russia complement New START Treaty objectives. DOD, in cooperation
with the Department of Energy, has upgraded and modernized the security
systems of sites in the Russian Federation where strategic and
nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons are stored. This has included
instituting an enhanced personnel reliability system and provision of
an automated inventory control system to allow the Russian Ministry of
Defense to keep better track of the location and status of its nuclear
warheads destined for dismantlement. We are sustaining enhanced
security systems at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites in Russia
previously upgraded by DOD. Further, CTR's nuclear weapons
transportation security program is enhancing the security, safety, and
control of nuclear weapons during shipment between operational sites,
secure storage sites, and dismantlement facilities. Such nuclear
weapons shipments average four per month and will continue through
2012. These programs play an important proliferation prevention role
and support the President's initiative to lockdown all vulnerable
nuclear sites around the world.
In sum, the CTR program has made a tremendous contribution to U.S.
national security and will continue to do so under the New START
Treaty.
continuing biological threat
The committee asked that Mr. Myers and I address the
administration's efforts to prevent and respond to biological threats,
which is a top priority for the Obama administration. To guide the U.S.
Government approach to this problem, in November 2009, the President
signed a National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats which
seeks to reduce the risks presented by the deliberate or accidental
release of a biological agent.
DOD, along with its interagency partners, is developing a
comprehensive plan to implement the national strategy and ensure that
all U.S. Government efforts in this critical area are aligned with the
strategy. For the Department of Defense, a large portion of the overall
support to this plan comes directly from the CTR program. In fact,
biological threat reduction activities are an increasingly important
aspect of the overall CTR program and now reflect almost 40 percent of
the CTR budget. Today, the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP)
is assisting eight countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, with plans to
expand further into Afghanistan and several other regions.
Building on these and other successes of the Nunn-Lugar CTR
program, we are working to expand the scope of our threat reduction
efforts to new regions and in response to new challenges and
opportunities. Four key principles--integration, responsiveness,
stewardship, and cooperation--will guide the Nunn-Lugar CTR program as
we undertake these new missions around the world. We are grateful for
the continued support of Congress, including this committee. This
support has enabled the Nunn-Lugar CTR program to address emerging WMD
threats and to achieve longstanding nonproliferation goals more
effectively and comprehensively.
conclusion
The New START Treaty's provisions for onsite inspections provide
the cornerstone of the treaty's verification regime. Onsite inspections
and exhibitions will provide us with the ability to put our trained
inspectors in some of Russia's most sensitive facilities to confirm
that the data they declare about their strategic offensive arms is
valid. This, in turn, will establish a strong disincentive to Russian
cheating. More broadly, these inspections and exhibitions will give us
a detailed picture of Russia's strategic nuclear forces that we simply
could not obtain otherwise. The Nunn-Lugar CTR program plays a critical
role in encouraging further eliminations of Russia's strategic delivery
systems and associated infrastructure. Together, these activities form
a central part of our effort to reduce nuclear dangers in a verifiable
and stabilizing manner. The expansion of the CTR program's biological
threat reduction program will further reduce risks to the United
States.
Senator Casey. Mr. Myers.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY AND DIRECTOR, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER
FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, FORT BELVOIR, VA
Mr. Myers. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, committees--
members of the committee, it is an honor to return to the
committee to address the roles of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency in executing the inspection provisions of the New START
Treaty.
I will summarize my remarks and ask that my complete
statement be made part of the record.
The mission of the nearly 2,000 civilian and military
personnel of DTRA is to safeguard the United States and its
allies from weapons of mass destruction by providing
capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter such threats,
and mitigate their effects. The proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related
knowledge materiels pose a grave and current threat that is
growing and evolving.
One of the most effective tools our Nation has for
addressing WMD threats is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program. This highly innovative and effective program
has assisted Russia in meeting its START obligations by
dismantling 783 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 651
submarine-launched ballistic missiles and associated
infrastructure.
DTRA implemented these Nunn-Lugar activities in accordance
with the START Treaty and will continue these activities,
consistent with new START provisions, should the Senate consent
to ratification.
DTRA is also the DOD focal point for the implementation of
inspection and escort provisions of arms control treaties. The
Agency conducts onsite inspections and escorts foreign
inspectors at U.S. facilities. In addition, DTRA provides
technical expertise to arms control treaty delegations, the
compliance forums of treaties, and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and other DOD components.
DTRA supported the New START Treaty negotiations by
providing arms control implementation expertise and negotiating
experience, linguistic ability, and administrative support to
the lead negotiators. Of the 56 members of the Geneva
negotiating team, 18 were DTRA personnel.
DTRA played a critical role in the development of the
inspections framework and the conversion and elimination
portion of the new treaty.
DTRA will have the same responsibilities to support New
START that we had in place for START. As it did in the 649
onsite inspections under START, DTRA will staff, train, equip,
and lead United States onsite inspection teams in Russia, and
escort Russian inspectors at United States facilities. DTRA
inspectors and escorts are responsible for observing,
documenting, and reporting the factual findings of their
inspections activities to the interagency community responsible
for making verification and compliance judgments. Onsite
inspection serves as a tool designed to promote fulfillment of
treaty obligations under New START. The short-notice nature of
these inspections is designed to ensure treaty compliance.
In addition, New START imposes restrictions that prevent
the removal of strategic systems from an inspection site before
inspectors arrive. Once on the ground, DTRA inspectors are able
to put eyes on these systems and confirm that what has been
reported in the data exchange is actually what exists on that
site.
DTRA will also oversee the conduct of all New START escort
operations of Russian inspectors at United States facilities.
We've successfully fulfilled this mission 470 times under
START. Escort teams will consist of DTRA core members,
augmented by local personnel from the facility being inspected.
DTRA teams will serve as the onsite representatives during the
escort activities, and ensure that short-note inspections
comply with the treaty.
DTRA will train the Agency's cadre of inspectors and escort
personnel on the specific provisions of the new treaty, and how
to implement those provisions. We are crafting a specific
training program, prepare our personnel for New START.
Earlier this month, DTRA conducted a START to New START
Transition Workshop and will soon begin conducting our first
New START training course. This course concentrates on the
operating principles and inspection procedures for New START.
The core audience is interagency personnel, service
representatives, and treaty compliance officers from U.S.
facilities, as well as our own inspectors and escorts. The
curriculum is modeled after the highly successful semiannual
treaty course DTRA conducted for the original START Treaty.
DTRA continues to work closely with the DOD Office of Treaty
Compliance and the military services to prepare U.S. facilities
for the new treaty. We are actively coordinating with the Air
Force and the Navy in preparing facilities subject to
inspection under New START. This involves working through the
inspection procedures for each site, conducting site-assistance
visits, as needed, and conducting mock inspections.
Full mock inspections utilize base personnel, a DTRA escort
team, and the DTRA team playing the role of Russian inspectors.
These events provide opportunities for DTRA to simulate an
actual inspection and refine training for inspection and base
personnel.
I would like to take this opportunity to walk you through
the inspection and escort process that would be used, should
the Senate consent to ratification of the New START Treaty. In
front of each of you is an overview detailing the inspection
and escort procedures that would be conducted by DTRA teams.
The New START Treaty retains the START construct of two
points of entry for each country through which teams will
transit to conduct inspections. The points of entry for U.S.
inspectors in Russia are Moscow in the west, and Ulan Ude for
inspection sites in the east. The points of entry for Russian
inspectors are Washington, DC, and San Francisco.
All United States missions to Russia will originate at the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency at Fort Belvoir, VA, where
inspection teams will assemble, draw necessary equipment, and
conduct initial mission briefings.
As was the case under START, teams are limited to a total
of 10 inspectors. Each DTRA-led team will consist of a team
chief, deputy team chief, weapons specialist, linguists, and
selected experts. The team chief is the official United States
representative for the team.
Teams conducting missions in western Russia will proceed to
the DTRA gateway in Darmstadt, Germany, near Frankfurt, an
agency facility, where they will conduct detailed mission
planning and preparation. Inspectors will conduct a thorough
study of the inspection facility and its systems, previous
inspection history for the site, and the data declared by
Russia for that facility.
Nearly all of the facilities under the New START Treaty
were also inspectible under START, and we have substantial
START inspection history to draw upon as teams prepare for
missions. They will review the treaty provisions applicable to
the inspection site, assign individual roles and
responsibilities for each team member, and plan the conduct of
the inspection.
Teams conducting missions in eastern Russia will conduct
similar preparations at the DTRA facility at Yokota Air Base in
Japan.
A type one inspection consists of two major components: a
warhead inspection of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers,
and an inspection of any nondeployed strategic offensive arms
that might be present at the facility--spare missiles in the
ICBM maintenance facility, or within bunkers at a submarine
base, for example.
The overall objective of the inspection is to confirm the
exchange data for the facility being inspected. No later than
32 hours prior to the team's arrival in Russia, the Russian
Government will be notified of our intent to conduct an
inspection. The team will be met by a Russian escort team at
Moscow or Ulan Ude, and conduct arrival procedures.
Within 4 hours of arrival at the point of entry, the U.S.
team chief will designate the site to be inspected, after which
the escort team has 24 hours to transport inspectors to the
site.
Upon arrival at the base, the team will be told how many
reentry vehicles are loaded on each deployed ICBM, SLBM, or how
many nuclear armaments are loaded on heavy bombers, and the
number of deployed and nondeployed items located at the base.
Inspectors will also be provided a site diagram annotated to
show the location of declared items on the base. The team will
select a single ICBM or SLBM or three heavy bombers for
inspection. The base will prepare the missile or heavy bombers
for inspection by partially dismantling the front section and
covering the reentry vehicles with other soft or hard covers,
for ICBMs and SLBMs, or covering nuclear armaments, if they are
loaded onto a bomber. The team will then observe the covered
objects and confirm the declared number.
In the case where objects declared to be nonnuclear are
present--for example, penetration aids on missiles or
conventional weapons on bombers--those objects may be subject
to radiation-detection measurements to confirm that they are
nonnuclear.
Due to safety and handling considerations at ICBM and
submarine bases, there is no time limit on the conduct of the
warhead inspection. Afterward, the team has 24 hours to inspect
the rest of the site, to include structures and vehicles, to
confirm the number of nondeployed items declared for that
facility.
For heavy bombers, the inspection is limited to 30 hours.
Inspectors will then complete the official inspection report,
which will be signed by both the United States and Russian
Federation team chiefs. After completion of inspection
activities, teams return to the respective gateway, via the
point of entry, for post-mission activities and reporting.
Russian inspections in the United States will follow the
same procedures and timelines described above. DTRA will
oversee the conduct of all New START escort operations at
United States facilities, and will maintain an escort team on
standby at each point of entry.
After receiving the notification of Russia's intent to
conduct an inspection, the DTRA Operations Center will notify
all U.S. facilities subject to inspection associated with a
particular point of entry, and DTRA will prepare to receive the
inbound team. Russian----
Senator Casey. Mr. Myers, I just want to make sure you can
wrap up soon, because----
Mr. Myers. Yes, I will. Yes, sir.
Russian inspectors arriving at the Washington point of
entry will be escorted by personnel from DTRA headquarters. Our
detachment at Travis Air Force Base will escort Russian
inspectors arriving at the San Francisco point of entry.
After the Russian team designates the inspection site, the
DTRA escort will notify the selected facility, gather necessary
information, and coordinate with the Air Force's Air Mobility
Command to transport the team to the facility. Escorts will
work closely with site personnel to facilitate the inspection,
with the DTRA team chief being the senior U.S. representative.
Upon completion of the inspection, the escort team will
coordinate the return of the Russian inspection team to the
point of entry and facilitate its departure from the United
States. From the time of their entry into the United States
until their departure, Russian inspectors will be escorted by
DTRA personnel.
DTRA's preparations for executing its responsibilities
under New START have been thorough and built upon our
experiences with START and INF. Implementing the new inspection
regime will not be unfamiliar to the agency, and we will be
prepared to carry out all of its inspection and escort
provisions with the utmost accuracy and efficiency. We are
proud of our record of success in treaty implementation, and
look forward to the challenges ahead.
I thank you for this opportunity, and welcome your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth A. Myers III, Director, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and Director, U.S. Strategic Command Center for
Combating WMD, Fort Belvoir, VA
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator Lugar, and members of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it is an honor and a pleasure to
appear before you today to testify on the roles of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) in shaping the inspection and escort provisions
of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NST) and implementing those
provisions, should the Senate consent to ratification of the treaty.
After an overview of the DTRA mission, I will focus my remarks on
agency roles and responsibilities regarding the NST; inspection and
escort provisions of NST; inspection and escort team organization; and
preparations for implementing those responsibilities under NST
including training, site assistance visits and mock inspections, and
inspection notifications and data management.
agency mission
The mission of the nearly 2,000 civilian and military personnel of
DTRA is to safeguard the United States and its allies from Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD)--Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Weapons, as well as high yield explosives capable of destroying
buildings and critical infrastructure, by providing capabilities to
reduce, eliminate and counter such threats, and mitigate their effects.
The proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and related
knowledge and materiels pose a grave and current threat that is growing
and evolving. The need to develop and field improved Countering-WMD (C-
WMD) capabilities is more important than ever and DTRA is in the
forefront of the national effort to deliver such capabilities.
In addition to serving as the Director of DTRA, I am also the
Director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-
WMD). Colocated with DTRA and fully integrated within the daily
activities of the agency, the SCC-WMD assists the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command with the synchronization of Countering-WMD planning
and coordination of related DOD activities across the Combatant
Commands and with our interagency partners; identification of C-WMD
capability needs; and advocacy for C-WMD capabilities.
DTRA provides C-WMD expertise and support at strategic (global and
national), operational (regional and theater), and tactical
(battlefield) levels. The agency initiates, stimulates, and
participates in interagency, bilateral, and multilateral partnerships,
often providing the essential expertise and leadership to get programs
established and projects moving. However, the primary role of DTRA in
the global CWMD effort is that of an executing agency. Our programs
span nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence
management, combining technology with operational considerations, and
providing Combatant Commanders systems approaches to meeting their WMD
challenges. In partnership with others across the U.S. Government
(USG), the private sector, and our overseas allies and friends, DTRA
integrates a wide range of C-WMD technical, operational, and
intelligence subject matter expertise to provide integrated, readily
applicable solutions to
C-WMD challenges.
One of the most effective tools our Nation has for countering WMD
threats is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.
This highly innovative and effective program dismantles and eliminates
strategic WMD delivery systems and associated infrastructure;
consolidates and secures WMD related technology and materiels;
increases transparency; and builds foreign partnerships and
collaboration. Nunn-Lugar conducts these activities consistent with the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and will continue these
activities consistent with the applicable NST provisions. DTRA is the
Department of Defense (DOD) organization responsible for implementing
this program.
To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has dismantled strategic delivery
systems--fixed and mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
and their launchers; Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs),
their launch tubes, and strategic missile submarines (SSBNs); strategic
bombers and associated air-to-surface missiles--once capable of
carrying over 7,500 nuclear warheads. The Nunn-Lugar program also has
sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels and holes; improved nuclear weapon
transportation and storage security against potential terrorist threats
in Russia; destroyed over 1,300 metric tons of Russian and Albanian
chemical weapons agents; built and equipped 20 biological monitoring
stations; and assisted our partners in improving their capabilities to
interdict illicit movements of WMD and related materiels.
As these important efforts with our partners in the former Soviet
Union continue, we also are taking the knowledge and capabilities
acquired through Nunn-Lugar program implementation to new partners
across the globe. For example, the Nunn-Lugar program will provide the
DOD means for implementing the President's initiative to secure all
vulnerable fissile materiels worldwide by the end of 2012 and will
expand its Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) efforts through new
partnerships around the globe to provide for more rapid, coordinated,
and effective U.S. and international responses to future disease
outbreaks or biological attacks.
These new nuclear and biological threat reduction efforts exemplify
DTRA's new strategy of global engagement, called ``Nunn-Lugar Global
Cooperation'' (NLGC). Under this strategy, DTRA is adapting and
applying the lessons learned from the execution of the Nunn-Lugar
Program to the new partnerships across the globe. We are shaping our
programs and activities so that they are more agile and flexible,
anticipatory of and responsive to emerging threats and fleeting
opportunities, and tailored to the individual needs and potential
contributions of new international partners. In addition, the NLGC
strategy will harness the full range of DTRA and SCC-WMD CWMD expertise
and capabilities, integrating Nunn-Lugar capabilities, arms control,
bilateral and multilateral threat response activities, global
situational awareness, partnership capacity building, and increased
support to the Combatant Commanders' theater security engagement
efforts.
the dtra arms control mission
DTRA's charter, DOD Directive 5105.62, designates the agency as the
DOD focal point for implementation of inspection, escort, and
monitoring provisions of arms control treaties. The agency provides,
conducts, and manages training for onsite inspections, as well as
performs activities associated with the conduct of onsite inspections
by foreign inspectors at U.S. facilities. In addition, DTRA provides
technical expertise to U.S. arms control treaty delegations, the
compliance forums of the various treaties, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) and other DOD Components, and provides staff support
to the OSD Treaty Managers.
Prior to the establishment of DTRA on 1 October 1998, these
activities were performed by the onsite Inspection Agency (OSIA) in
support of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Vienna
Document, Open Skies Treaty, and START. OSIA brought its unique
expertise to DTRA, which continues to perform the inspection mission
for those treaties still in effect, as well as escort-only operations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
negotiations
DTRA supported the NST negotiations by providing analytical,
technical, and staff support to the lead negotiators and to DOD and USG
interagency working groups. Of the 56 members of the Geneva negotiating
team, 18 were DTRA personnel. The DTRA team provided years of arms
control implementation expertise and negotiating experience, linguistic
ability, and administrative support to the Delegation as a whole and to
the chief negotiator, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller.
DTRA personnel fulfilled key roles in the negotiating working groups on
Inspection Activities, Conversion and Elimination, Treaty Articles and
Definitions, and Notifications, and played a critical part in the
development of those portions of the new treaty. DTRA military
linguists augmented the language support staff at the U.S. Mission,
providing much-needed help in translating the large number of
negotiating documents. Our linguists were frequently called on to
interpret for high profile or technically oriented meetings due to
their exceptional language abilities and precise knowledge of arms
control terms.
inspections under new start
Building on the success of the INF Treaty, START had a verification
regime in which onsite inspections played a major role. These
inspections ensured that declared systems were accurately accounted for
and helped to verify compliance with treaty provisions. The NST
inspection regime builds on the experience gained from 15 years of
START implementation, in which over 1,100 onsite inspections were
conducted.
START had nine different types of onsite inspections. Under the
NST, that number has been reduced to two: type one inspections, which
focus on sites with deployed and nondeployed strategic systems, for
instance operational ICBM, submarine, and bomber bases; and type two
inspections, which focus on sites with nondeployed strategic systems
such as storage and training facilities and can also be used to confirm
conversions or eliminations of items subject to the treaty. After entry
into force, each side will have the right to conduct 10 type one
inspections and 8 type two inspections per year. NST does not provide
for a baseline inspection of every facility as had been conducted under
START.
Building on the past 15 years of START experience, the sides agreed
that it would not be necessary to conduct baseline inspections at
facilities that had been subject to inspection under START. They also
agreed that it was unnecessary to conduct technical exhibitions for
arms that had been previously exhibited under START. Exhibitions will
be required only for those current and future types of strategic
offensive arms that had not been exhibited under START--such as the RS-
24 mobile ICBM for Russia and the B-2 heavy bomber for the United
States. In addition to exhibitions for these new types, New START
provides for exhibitions related to conversion or elimination of items
that are subject to the treaty, in order to demonstrate the procedures
used to render such items incapable of employing nuclear weapons.
inspection and escort operations under new start
DTRA will staff, train, equip, and lead where inspection teams in
Russia and escort Russian inspectors at United States facilities, and
will maintain the same basic organization to support NST that it had
established for START, with detachments in Yokota Air Base (AB), Japan
and Travis AFB, California, as well as the DTRA European Operations
Division in Darmstadt, Germany. There are 35 facilities in Russia that
will be subject to inspections and 17 facilities in the United States
that will be subject to inspections.
As it had under START, DTRA will prepare for and conduct inspection
activities at facilities in Russia, to collect data that will assist
the USG in determining treaty compliance. However, the agency does not
make verification or compliance judgments. DTRA inspectors and escorts
are responsible for observing, documenting, and reporting the factual
findings of their inspection activities to the interagency policy
community responsible for making requisite judgments concerning
verification and compliance.
The NST retains the START construct of two points of entry for each
country, through which inspection teams will transit to conduct
inspections. The points of entry for United States inspectors in Russia
are Moscow in western Russia and Ulan-Ude for inspection sites in
eastern Russia. The points of entry for Russian inspectors are
Washington, DC, and San Francisco, CA. All United States inspection
missions to Russia will originate at the Defense Threat Reduction
Center at Fort Belvoir, Va, where inspection teams will assemble, draw
necessary equipment, and conduct initial mission briefings.
Teams conducting missions in western Russia will proceed to the
DTRA gateway in Darmstadt, Germany, where they will conduct detailed
mission planning and preparation. Inspectors will conduct a thorough
study of the inspection facility and its systems, previous inspection
history for the site, and the data declared by Russia for that
facility. Nearly all of the facilities under the NST were also
inspectable under START, and we have substantial START inspection
history to draw upon as teams prepare for missions. They will review
the treaty provisions applicable to the inspection site, assign
individual roles and responsibilities for each team member, and plan
the conduct of the inspection. Teams conducting missions in eastern
Russia will conduct similar preparation at the DTRA facility at Yokota
AB, Japan.
A type one inspection consists of two major components, a warhead
inspection of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers, and an
inspection of any nondeployed strategic offensive arms that might be
present at the facility (spare missiles in the ICBM maintenance
facility or within bunkers at a submarine bases, for example). The
overall objective of this inspection is to confirm the exchanged data
for the facility being inspected.
No later than 32 hours prior to the inspection team's arrival in
Russia and during normal working hours, the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction
Center will notify the Russian Government of our intent to conduct an
inspection. The team will be met by a Russian escort team at Moscow or
Ulan Ude and conduct arrival procedures. Within 4 hours of arrival at
the point of entry, the U.S. team chief will designate the site to be
inspected in writing, after which the escort team has 24 hours to
transport inspectors to the site.
Upon arrival at the base, the inspection team will be told how many
reentry vehicles are loaded on each deployed ICBM or SLBM, or how many
nuclear armaments are loaded on heavy bombers and, the number of
deployed and nondeployed items located at the base. Inspectors will
also be provided a site diagram annotated to show the location of
declared items on the base. The inspection team will select a single
ICBM or SLBM or three heavy bombers for inspection. The base will
prepare the missile or heavy bombers for inspection by partially
dismantling the front section and covering the RVs with either soft or
hard covers for ICBMs and SLBMs or covering nuclear armaments if any
are loaded onto a bomber. The inspection team will then observe the
covered objects and confirm the declared number. In the case where
objects declared to be nonnuclear are present (penetration aids on
missiles or conventional weapons on bombers), those objects may be
subject to Radiation Detection Equipment measurements to confirm that
they are nonnuclear.
Upon completion of the reentry vehicle inspection, the inspection
team will inspect the rest of the facility, to include structures and
vehicles within the inspectable boundaries, to confirm the number of
nondeployed items declared for that facility. For Heavy Bomber bases,
the inspection is limited to 30 hours. Due to safety and handling
considerations at ICBM and submarine bases, there is no time limit on
the conduct of the warhead inspection. Upon completion of the warhead
inspection, inspectors have 24 hours to inspect the rest of the ICBM or
SLBM base for nondeployed items. Inspectors will then complete the
official inspection report, which will be signed by both the inspection
and escort team chiefs. After completion of inspection activities,
teams return to the respective gateway via the point of entry for post-
mission activities and reporting.
For onsite inspections of United States facilities, Russian
inspectors arriving at the Washington point of entry will be escorted
by personnel from DTRA headquarters. Our detachment at Travis AFB will
escort Russian inspectors arriving at the San Francisco point of entry.
DTRA will oversee the conduct of all NST escort operations at U.S.
facilities. DTRA will maintain an escort team on standby at each POE
upon the treaty's entry into force.
Under NST, the inspecting party must notify the inspected party of
the arrival of an inspection team during normal working hours and no
later than 32 hours before the team's scheduled arrival time. After
receiving the notification of Russia's intent to conduct an inspection
via the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, the DTRA Operations Center
will notify all U.S. facilities subject to inspection associated with a
particular point of entry and DTRA will prepare to receive the inbound
inspection team. No more than 4 hours after the team arrives at the
point of entry, the Russian team chief will declare in writing the site
to be inspected. After site designation, the DTRA escort team will
immediately notify the selected facility and will coordinate with that
facility to gather the necessary information, determine preferred
arrival time and prepare for the inspection. DTRA escorts will
coordinate with the Air Force's Air Mobility Command to transport the
team to the site within 24 hours of the time of site declaration. Site
personnel will make the necessary preparations for the arrival of the
inspectors and their escorts. Such preparations include complying with
preinspection restrictions, readying the site for inspection, and
making logistical arrangements to feed, billet, and transport the
inspectors and escorts while they are at the facility.
Upon completion of the inspection, the escort team will coordinate
the return of the Russian inspection team to the point of entry and
facilitate its departure from the United States. From the time of their
entry into the United States until their departure, the activities of
Russian inspectors will be supervised by a DTRA escort team.
inspection and escort team organization
Inspection teams consist of technical experts in the areas of ICBM,
SLBM, and heavy bomber inspections. As was the case under START,
inspection teams are limited to a total of 10 inspectors. Each team is
led by a DTRA core element consisting of team chief, deputy team chief,
weapons specialist, and two linguists. The remainder of each 10-person
team will consist of selected experts from DTRA and other USG agencies.
The inspection team chief is the official USG representative.
The escort teams consist of the same core group, but are augmented
by local personnel from the facility being inspected. Escort teams will
support inspections throughout the United States and also serve as the
onsite USG representatives during the escort activities. In addition to
facilitating the inspection process, escorts are responsible for
coordinating transportation, billeting, meals, interpreting, emergency
support, and security.
Based on the projected workload and the number of inspections that
can be conducted under the new treaty, the personnel requirements for
NST are less than they were for START. Under START, DTRA was prepared
to escort multiple visiting inspection teams simultaneously, as well as
conduct both short notice and elimination inspection missions. It was
possible to have four United States inspection teams in Russia (two
short notice and two elimination inspections) while at the same time
receiving a Russian inspection team at each United States point of
entry. New START allows for only one inspection team in country at any
given time. Coupled with the reduction in number of inspections, these
changes will allow DTRA to reduce from 10 teams under START to 5
inspection teams under NST.
Although there will be fewer inspections under NST, the type one
inspections will be more demanding on both DTRA and site personnel, as
it combines the main parts of what were formerly two separate
inspections under START into a single, more lengthy inspection.
new start treaty preparations
DTRA is preparing and planning to perform its inspection and escort
responsibilities should the Senate consent to ratification.
Inspector and Escort Training
To prepare for implementation of the treaty, DTRA will train the
agency's cadre of inspectors and escort personnel on the provisions of
the new treaty and how to implement those provisions. The agency has
rigorous team training programs to support inspections and escorting
for all treaties, including a specific training program to prepare our
personnel for NST. DTRA will ensure that the techniques and lessons
learned under START are carried forward. Initial certification of DTRA
inspectors and escorts will occur over the May-October 2010 timeframe
and involve formal instruction on treaty provisions, self-study, mock
inspections at U.S. facilities, and team certification standards and
boards.
The agency recently conducted a START to New START Transition
Workshop, and will be conducting our first NST training course this
October. This course provides the core training for interagency
personnel, service representatives, and Treaty Compliance Officers from
U.S. facilities, as well as our own inspectors and escorts, on the
operating principles and inspection procedures for NST. This course is
modeled on the highly successful semiannual treaty course DTRA has
conducted for START.
Site Assistance Visits and Mock Inspections
DTRA works closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Office of Treaty
Compliance and the services to prepare U.S. facilities for the new
treaty by providing training, assisting in the development of
inspection plans, conducting site assistance visits, and providing full
``red-on-blue'' mock inspections. Since NST was signed this April, DTRA
has been actively coordinating with the Air Force and the Navy to
prepare facilities subject to inspection under New START. This has and
will involve working through the inspection procedures for each site,
and conducting site assistance visits and mock inspections as needed.
Full mock inspections will utilize base personnel, a DTRA escort team,
and a DTRA team playing the role of Russian inspectors. These events
provide opportunities for DTRA to simulate an actual inspection and
refine training for inspection and base personnel.
Arms Control Enterprise System
DTRA uses the web-based Arms Control Enterprise System (ACES) to
support data reporting requirements and notifications for all treaty
limited equipment and accountable items. This system includes data
handling capabilities and reporting procedures for compliance tracking
of weapons systems subject to treaty restrictions. The ACES module that
previously supported START and INF requires upgrading for NST's
provisions for the use of unique identifiers and counting of warheads,
as well as the change in structure of the semiannual database report
and updated notification formats. DTRA is in the process of upgrading
ACES to meet NST requirements, and will ensure that the necessary
interim data management and reporting measures are in place during the
transition to the new module.
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
DTRA implements the Nunn-Lugar program which promotes the
elimination of systems to achieve force reductions required by treaty
obligations and provides transparency. Nunn-Lugar is currently engaged
in decommissioning, disassembly, dismantlement, and elimination
activities for a variety of systems, including: SS-25 ICBMs, mobile
launchers, and regimental base infrastructure; SS-N-20 SLBMs and
components; SS-N-18 SLBMs and components; SS-18 ICBMs and silos; SS-19
ICBMs and silos; and SLBM launchers and reactor units from Typhoon- and
Delta III-class submarines. All Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination
activities have been conducted consistent with START and all future
activities will be conducted consistent with NST. These activities have
continued without disruption through the expiration of START and
following the signature of the NST.
We have reviewed the elimination procedures for each of these
systems and are working closely with the Executive Agent for the
Russian Government, the Federal Space Agency (FSA), to consider
adjustments to ongoing elimination activities to take advantage of
efficiencies resulting from NST provisions while maintaining our mutual
nonproliferation and threat reduction goals within the NST Treaty
environment.
Further, in cooperation with the FSA and Rosatom, the Nunn-Lugar
program will continue to identify potential cost-sharing opportunities
for each system that will enable the Russian Government to assume
increased responsibilities for strategic system eliminations.
We will continue to monitor the elimination work in accordance with
Federal Acquisition Regulations governing payments for completed work.
Technical site visits will continue as they have in the past under the
same procedures agreed to under the CTR Umbrella Agreement which was
signed by the United States and Russian Federation Presidents.
conclusion
DTRA's preparations for executing its responsibilities under NST
have been thorough and build upon our experience with START and INF.
Implementing the new inspection regime will not be unfamiliar to the
agency and we will be prepared to carry out all of its inspection and
escort provisions with the utmost accuracy and efficiency. We are proud
of our record of success in arms control implementation and look
forward to the challenges ahead. I thank you for this opportunity, and
welcome your questions.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Myers. I appreciate both your
testimony and that of Dr. Miller, as well.
I'm--because of the substantial contribution that the
ranking member, Senator Lugar, has made to this issue and to
our national security over many years, I'm tempted, at this
moment, to yield my time, but I'm not allowed to, by the
committee rules; I have to ask some questions first. But, we'll
make sure he gets even more time than we would normally allot
to anyone.
But, grateful for that testimony.
I wanted to step back and--Mr. Myers, much of what you
walked through--I'm glad you did that, because we were going to
get to the mechanics, and I think that's important, for people
to get an understanding, both Senators' as well as the American
people. I wanted to step back and take a broader--take on a
broader question first, and that's the question, really, in a
word, ``experience,'' that, as the years marched on, under the
original START Treaty, obviously both sides gained a lot of
experience from that. And there's no question that that
experience has informed our judgments, has informed the--and
did inform--the negotiations leading up to the development of
the New START Treaty.
I'm just wondering if either of you can highlight or
specify some examples of experience developed and learned over
those years that helped in the negotiations, but also will help
effectuate the elements of these--this treaty, upon
ratification--methods or strategies or procedures that might
work better, just based upon that experience, but also from the
vantage point of how our experience over those years actually
helped in the negotiations themselves.
Dr. Miller. If I could----
Senator Casey. Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller [continuing]. Senator, take a first answer, then
I know that Ken will want to--will add more on the question of
experience on the ground, as well.
The START Treaty had an integrated approach to
verification. Onsite inspections were a key part, but, in
addition to that, we have a comprehensive updated database,
notifications with respect to movements between facilities and
changes in the status of strategic offensive arms, the use of
unique identifiers. One lesson learned was that we should
broaden that from just mobile missiles to all systems, which we
did under New START, and also provisions against interference
with national technical means and the establishment of the
JCIC, the Joint Consultative--I've forgotten the--is it----
Voice. Compliance and----
Dr. Miller [continuing]. Compliance and Inspection
Committee--Commission--and the new name for that in New START
is the Bilateral Consultative Commission--as a forum to take
these issues, so the--from a treaty perspective, a structural
perspective, a lot of lessons from New START, in terms of how
to structure a comprehensive and integrated verification
regime, and the--as Mr. Myers noted, the deep involvement of
the DTRA personnel and the negotiating team helped to bring
those issues in--the more detailed procedures, as well--into
the treaty and prepare us for inspections and other----
Senator Casey. I'm just going to interject for one second.
When--just for people listening, just some--a little more
definition on terminology. ``National technical means'' and
``unique identifiers,'' could you just walk--just briefly
define them?
Dr. Miller. Sure. National technical means include the use
of, for example, satellites or aircraft to collect data that
are--and these systems are under United States control, and we
are able to use them to try to understand the status of Russian
strategic forces; indeed, to try to understand the status of
other systems worldwide. Both the START Treaty and New START
have a provision calling for noninterference with national
technical means, which allows us to use those most effectively.
And in any instances when we felt that there was interference,
we would then have the right to take that issue into the
Bilateral Consultative Commission.
And, I'm sorry, the----
Voice. Unique identifiers.
Dr. Miller [continuing]. The unique identifiers--under the
START Treaty, there was an identifier affixed to each mobile
missile. And what's been done under the New START is to have a
similar approach, not just for mobile missiles, but for all
missiles. And the details of where that is located will be
determined by a combination of--on each side--of what's
feasible. So, for silo-based ICBMs, it may make sense to do it
at a location that's viewable by the side when it does its
inspections, and so forth. So, those unique identifiers will
then allow us--as we establish a comprehensive database of
Russian strategic systems, it will actually allow us to track
their status, and, if they are moved, their movement over time
throughout the treaty, with 6-month updates and with required
notifications, anytime that there's a change.
Senator Casey. Mr. Myers, I'll just--I have about 2 minutes
left on my questions--but, just a slight reformulation of the
question on the experience gained. With your expertise in
this--in the area of--the process itself, how you go about the
inspections--anything learned in those years that will help--
that has helped in the negotiations, and will help in the
implementation, of the treaty as it relates to the process, the
experience gained by learning more--or going through that
process?
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir. DTRA and its predecessors started
doing arms-control inspections in 1988. We--through the INF
Treaty--we do inspections under a number of different treaties
today, whether it be CFE, whether it be the Dayton Accords,
Vienna document, Open Skies, a number of different treaty
obligations that DTRA carries out.
WE also have the experience of the START Treaty. So, when
we're talking about the New START Treaty, the inspections--the
inspectors are not starting from scratch. We are starting with
a wealth of knowledge that will allow us to pick up where we
left off in December. And that's our plan.
With regard to a specific example, I think that the unique
identifiers that Mr. Miller mentioned are critical, but I would
point out, on the inspection regimes, with regard to the
experience of our inspectors, we're learning lessons and
applying to them daily. When a team goes to Russia, they
encounter a situation, whether it be a new technique, whether
it be a unique situation that has not been seen before, we take
that lesson learned, go ahead and apply it, begin applying it
to our training regime, our preparation regime, before the next
team heads out on the next inspection. So, I think I would
amplify on unique identifiers, and I would point in, in terms
of lessons learned, it's happening on a daily/weekly basis.
It's being applied the very next time a DTRA team goes out the
door.
Senator Casey. I don't want to simplify this, and I want to
turn to Senator Lugar, but ``unique identifiers,'' just for
people listening, to put it into more common language, what's
the best way to express that? Serial numbers, plus--I just want
to give a sense, for people listening.
Mr. Myers. Here in the United States, we will probably go
ahead and use the serial numbers of the missile, if you will;
and that will allow the United States to track Russian
components, and the Russians to track United States components,
from their birth, if you will, all the way through their
deployments, different bases, different locations, and will
allow us to track it all the way through its elimination, all
the way through its death. So, it really allows us to chart and
track a system's life cycle and the transparency that that
provides, and the ``asurety'' that that provides, ensures, as
Senator Lugar said earlier on, no misunderstandings.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miller, some commentators have expressed the view that
the New START Treaty may not limit Russian missiles launched
from railcars. Now, under New START, the term ``mobile launcher
of ICBMs'' is defined as the mechanism for launching the
missile and the self-propelled device on which it is mounted.
These commentators suggest that the term ``self-propelled''
excludes towed railcars. Now, regardless of the definition of a
``mobile launcher,'' isn't it true that any Russian ICBM, and
any Russian launcher of an ICBM, would count toward limits in
the New START Treaty? And perhaps even more important, isn't it
true, just as a matter of historical fact, that the Nunn-Lugar
program participated in the dismantlement of the last SS-24
rail mobile Russian missile, and that Russia no longer has any
rail mobile systems?
Mr. Myers. Senator, that's exactly correct, that rail
mobile ICBMs are not specifically mentioned in the New START
Treaty because neither party currently deploys rail mobile
ICBMs. They would be counted under the treaty's limits on--for
ICBMs and for launchers. If, in the future, the--Russia were to
go forward and develop and deploy rail mobile ICBMs, first they
would be counted, and then we would need to take to the
Bilateral Consultative Commission discussion of what should be
the specific verification provisions associated with them.
Negotiators made a decision not to negotiate for hypotheticals
with respect to this or other systems.
And, in fact, with respect to CTR, 56 SS-24 ICBMs were
eliminated in Russia. That was completed in 2008. And 39 SS-24
launchers were eliminated, with completion in 2007.
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank you for that response. I
mention it, not out of a source of irritation, but simply--
critics of the New START Treaty preying upon something such as
the fact that these railcars are no longer mentioned betray,
perhaps, a thought that they really don't know what has been
destroyed in Russia. And this is why it--I appreciate very much
your going through, today, what already has been achieved. We
are not beginning from scratch, we're coming in with a New
START Treaty with, as we pointed out, every single one of the
rail mobile Russian missiles and railcars destroyed, gone,
under programs we have had. So, that's sort of important, to
establish these facts so that we delimit, at least, the amount
of our purview.
Now, both of you have done a great job of walking us
through the inspection process. I appreciate especially the
handout and the detail with which Mr. Myers proceeded with
this. But, just the sake of underlining a couple of thoughts
that you have done here, what role did the record of
inspections under START I play in formulating the new
inspections mandated under the New START? And please explain
for us how these new inspections compare with the 12 different
kinds of inspections permitted under START I.
Mr. Myers. Thank you, Senator. The inspection provisions of
the New START Treaty are grounded in the experience of the 15
years that we had under the START Treaty. Key elements of the
inspection regime were retained, while those with minimal
utility are no longer--with no utility--were streamlined or not
brought forward.
There were nine types of onsite inspections and two types
of exhibitions under the START Treaty. Those have been
streamlined into three components under the New START Treaty.
Type one inspections, type two inspections, and exhibitions.
Type one inspections combine elements of START reentry
vehicle inspections and data update inspections, and are
focused on both deployed and nondeployed systems.
Type two inspections are geared more toward nondeployed
systems and include elements of START data update inspections
and formally declared facilities inspections and elimination
inspections.
The remaining types of START inspections were not carried
forward.
START's technical characteristics exhibitions and
distinguishability exhibitions have been condensed into a
single exhibition under New START. And obviously the primary
difference between START and New START is, under New START, we
are confirming the actual number of reentry vehicles that each
delivery vehicle is carrying, as opposed to, under START, where
we were ensuring that ``not more than'' an assigned number was
being carried by that delivery vehicle.
Senator Lugar. Now, you've already indicated, Mr. Myers,
that DTRA had 18 persons in the negotiating team.
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir.
Senator Lugar. And that is important to establish as we
take a look at who was around the table. The expertise that you
have demonstrated this morning, and this detail was obviously
around the table with those who were negotiating the treaty in
our behalf.
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir.
Senator Lugar. Let me just ask, now--Under Article VI of
the New START Treaty, there is provision for conversion or
elimination of weapons and launchers. Conversions or
elimination may be carried out at any declared facility. Nunn-
Lugar supported destruction of strategic weapons under START I
at declared facilities for storage and elimination. And I
recall visiting with you at the Surovatikha facility to witness
the SS-18 being eliminated.
What results will implementation of the New START Treaty
have on the Nunn-Lugar strategic offensive elimination
activities in Russia? And do you anticipate that elimination
could become cheaper, given the flexibility provided under the
New START Treaty for such provisions? And where would all this
work be carried out, at existing Nunn-Lugar sites or at other
places in Russia that--where we did not previously have work?
Dr. Miller. Senator, let me take a first cut at the answer,
and I think Mr. Myers will want to add something.
As noted before, we expect CTR to complement New START,
just as it did START, but continue to operate under its own
authorities as it seeks its--the nonproliferation benefits, as
well.
CTR elimination procedures will be consistent with the New
START Treaty. They are designed to be simplified and less
costly than those under START, but also designed to be
effective in rendering strategic systems inoperable.
So, at this point, as we look to go forward, we have a lot
of experience with the New START--I'm sorry, with--we have a
lot of experience with the procedures under START and applying
them with the CTR program. And as the negotiations were
underway, we began to look at what the implications would be
for elimination and conversion under the New START Treaty, as
well.
And I believe that those are still under review at DTRA,
but I'll let Mr. Myers speak to that. There certainly is the
possibility of cost savings. Because one of the key goals of
CTR is to ensure our nonproliferation goals, as well, we'll
look closely at any changes, to make sure that we meet the full
range of objectives of New START and of CTR.
And if I could just add one last note, with respect to
conversion or elimination. The conversion of our systems, from
nuclear-capable to--or dual-capable bombers, for examples--to
conventional-only is really a key provision of the treaty that,
as I said, allows us to retain, indeed strengthen, our
conventional capabilities while leaving more headroom for
nuclear systems under the treaty.
Mr. Myers. Senator, I'd add two points.
No. 1, as Mr. Miller pointed out, it--the elimination
procedures under New START are much simpler. So, indeed, there
could be savings in elimination processes, in terms of overall
costs. And that's primarily because fewer components will need
to be displayed for arms control inspectors, as opposed to, for
example, 14 cuts that you might have observed in your visit to
Surovatikha, or in another installation in Russia. Fewer
requirements for elimination exist under the New START Treaty.
And the second point is, in our conversations with the
Russians to date, we understand that the eliminations required
to meet Russian obligations under the New START Treaty will
take place at the same locations that we are operating and
doing elimination work today. So, we do not envision new
facilities. Now, obviously, things may change. They are fluid,
at this moment. But, right now we are not planning on doing
work at any new locations than we are, already, today.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And let me thank both of our witnesses for their service on
this issue to our country. These are extremely important
issues.
This is one of a series of hearings that the committee has
held on the START--the confirmation process. And at each time,
there have been the advantages of this treaty for the United
States. And today, we're talking about--as it relates to
inspections, we've gone over several other aspects of it. And
in each case, we go over how important it would be for the
United States, that type of access--for example, inspection, to
see what's going on in the Soviet--in Russia. We've also gone
over how important this treaty is for the United States-Russian
relations and for the United States leadership, on nuclear
safety issues and on dealing with nonproliferation and
reduction of nuclear warheads. And, of course, as has been
pointed out many times, there is the ability to withdraw from
the treaty. So, if it be--there's a national security interest
for the United States, we always have that safety valve to deal
with.
My question is--we're talking about inspection, and you
went through what our obligations are in regards to the
Russians' inspections here within the United States. Can you
just outline for us where we should have at least knowledge of
issues that our obligations are, in regards to inspection, that
may be of concern for the security of our country?
Mr. Myers. Senator, the way we go about training for the
conduct of and the hosting of the inspections, the way we work
closely with the military services, with the Air Force and the
Navy, the way we, not only train our inspectors, but train the
personnel at the bases, the way we do mock inspections, the way
we practice, the--we believe that we have a system in place
that ensures that U.S. national security is not jeopardized in
any of those types of situations.
The personnel that carry out and who escort these
inspections know the treaties, backward and forward, left and
right, and have the relationship and the experience with their
Russian partners to ensure that the treaties are lived up to
the exact word of the document. So, in terms of overall
concerns with regard to inspections and the like, that is
minimal.
I don't know if Dr. Miller----
Dr. Miller. Sir, I would just add that, just as there were
a good number of DTRA personnel involved in the negotiations,
the services and U.S. Strategy Command were also very much
involved. And as the that alternative approaches to inspections
were considered, any potential impact on operations was taken
into account, and these--the result was a set of inspection
activities planned under New START--or allowed for under New
START--that we believe will be effective in verification, but
will not have any notable impact on the United States ability
to operate our strategic forces effectively.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate that answer. We've been
operating under these inspection requirements under the current
START obligations. Is there anything new in this START Treaty
that would raise any concern in regards to inspections here in
the United States or U.S. facilities?
Mr. Myers. Not in my opinion, Senator, and not in the way
we're going about preparing this and training for these
inspections, both conducting them and hosting them. And, in
fact, I think your question outlined the critical point. This--
we're not starting from scratch. We have 15 years of experience
of hosting and conducting these inspections. And the
inspections--and with regard type one inspections, we have
several inspections that have been combined, that were separate
under the original START Treaty. But, this is not new
territory. Our inspectors and our escorts and our hosts are
confident that they can carry out the provisions of this
treaty.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. I agree. We are confident we can carry out the
provisions of the treaty with no impact on our ability to
operate our forces.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Again, I thank you both for your extraordinary service. I
know these are not easy issues when you're trying to balance a
lot of different agencies and their concerns with an overall
objective. And congratulations for a job well done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Dr. Miller, I want to associate myself
with the kind words you said about Dick Lugar--Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn have done the country a great
service. Sam Nunn was a great Senator from Georgia, and still a
good friend of mine today.
And I think it's important to note that the Cooperative
Threat Reduction of 7,545 warheads, since it started, that's
five times the number of warheads this agreement would allow
the Russians to have. So, it's a significant contribution. And,
I think, in a time in which terrorism raised its ugly head in
the world, in 2001, and continues to be a threat, the most
important thing we can do is make sure those spent warheads
that are laying around are captured, deactivated, and we don't
have the danger of a possible dirty bomb somewhere in the
world.
So, I want to add my congratulations to what Dr. Miller
said about the work of Dick Lugar and Sam Nunn on that.
Mr. Myers, the staff briefing memo tells me--I want to
qualify this, I'm telling you who told me this----
[Laughter.]
Senator Isakson [continuing]. That the Permanent Portal
Monitoring Facility that each country was allowed under the
first START Treaty is not included in this START Treaty, and
that it's because--and the statement says we discontinued
production of new ICBMs in Utah, so the Russians took away
their permanent facility. But, we had one, up until December of
last year, in Votkinsk--or I guess that's Votkinsk--Russia.
Does it bother you that, with the new treaty, we wouldn't have
that in Russia anymore?
Dr. Miller. Senator, the provisions that have been included
in the New START Treaty, including the 48-hour notice prior to
the exit of a missile from the--not only the Votkinsk facility,
but others, and the notification process of where those
missiles would be moved to, where they might be deployed, and
the like, provides us with tremendous amount of transparency
and the ability to provide verification of where those missiles
and where those items are in the absence of the Votkinsk
Portable--Portal Monitoring Facility.
Senator Isakson. Good. Of the 18 inspections that the New
START Treaty will allow, 10 tier one and 8 tier two, how long
does the normal tier one inspection take? And how long would a
normal tier two inspection take?
Mr. Myers. The norm--if you give me one moment, I will give
you the exact numbers--the--from the time the inspection team
arrives in-country they will be at the site within 24 hours.
So, depending on how you define the start of the inspection--
they will arrive. The inspection site is, in fact, frozen with
one--within 1 hour of our inspectors identifying which site we
want to inspect. The inspected country is obligated by the
treaty to transport inspectors to the designated launcher
within 12 hours for silos, 3 hours for SLBMs and bombers, and 5
hours for mobile ICBM launchers. For safety reasons, there is
no limit on the time to prepare a missile for inspection. And
then, prior--excuse me--after that process, each of the
inspectors on the inspection team is provided 15 minutes to
directly observe the article. There is a 30-hour time limit for
bomber inspections.
So, in other words, with 10 inspectors, theoretically they
could stretch that out to 150 minutes of viewing of whatever it
is they want to take a look at. More often than not, they go up
in groups or in small groups, or not everyone takes that time.
But, following that, 24 hours on the site for a type one
inspection, and then normally they would be leaving the base
and returning back.
Senator Isakson. Now, under a tier one inspection we have
to give 32 hours' notice, is that right?
Mr. Myers. Under any inspection, Senator.
Senator Isakson. On any tier----
Mr. Myers [continuing]. Thirty-----
Senator Isakson [continuing]. One or----
Mr. Myers. Thirty-two----
Senator Isakson [continuing]. Two.
Mr. Myers [continuing]. Hours.
Senator Isakson. Well, under tier one, there's a
prohibition against moving anything at the facility once the
notice has been given, is that correct?
Mr. Myers. After 1 hour.
Senator Isakson. After 1 hour.
Mr. Myers. One hour. So, when our--if our folks, for
example, are--have arrived in Moscow, they have presented the
Russian escorts with a designation of which site we want to go
to, the clock starts.
Senator Isakson. OK.
Mr. Myers. And with--after 1 hour, nothing can move. And
obviously, we will be taking--we'll bring a number of different
skill sets and tools to that table to ensure that the Russians
are complying with that, in terms of national technical means
and the like.
Senator Isakson. Well that's my followup question. I guess
you're talking about, in terms of technical means, satellite
observation and things like that?
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. Is that the primary way you would do it?
Mr. Myers. I would say so. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. OK. I remember--and we've had so many
hearings, and I've attended so many of them, I've got a lot of
things running around in my head that may not be correct--being
that Kings Bay is located on the coast of the State of Georgia
and is our east coast Trident submarine base, wasn't there a
provision, in terms of the number of launchers within the
Tridents, we're going to reduce it from 24 to 20, is that
correct?
Mr. Myers. Senator, that is our plan, under the New START
Treaty, so we'll have a plan to have no more than a--or, in
fact, plan to have 240 SLBM launchers, at any point in time,
that are deployed. Under the provisions of the treaty, we're
allowed to have up to 100 additional nondeployed launchers.
Senator Isakson. That does--I don't know whether you're
familiar with our converted Tridents, the Georgia and the
Florida, I think. The--does--I'm trying to remember. Well, I
can't talk about that, that's right. I better not ask that
question.
That completes my questions. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
I wanted to direct my first question, on this round, to Mr.
Myers about the handout you gave, that Senator Lugar referred
to. We're grateful for that kind of a handout, because it saves
many of us on the committee, if not members who will be voting
on ratification but are not members of the committee--saves
them and us a lot of time. We'd probably have to ask our staffs
to create this if it didn't exist, so it's very helpful. In 14
pages, you've given a very specific guidebook for us.
I wanted to focus on the--well, first, just by way of
explanation for folks who are hearing, I know, lots of
different terminologies. When you get to the part of the
handout that is referred to as ``Mission Execution''--and you
did a wonderful job of outlining what takes place up until the
point of execution--but, you divide execution into both
inspection and escort. And I guess most people can really
understand the--what ``inspection'' means, but can you
differentiate between ``inspection'' and ``escort,'' just so we
have a sense of the difference?
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir. When we're talking about
``inspection,'' we're talking about the United States team that
will be inspecting a Russian facility.
Senator Casey. Right.
Mr. Myers. A 10-man or -person team that would inspect a
Russian facility.
When we--when we're referring to ``escorts,'' we're
referring to the Russian escorts who would meet our inspection
team, either in Moscow or Ulan Ude. And we're also referring to
the DTRA team of escorts that would meet a Russian inspection
team, either in Washington or in San Francisco.
Senator Casey. OK. And, in terms of the inspection process,
in your handout you've got, I guess, two pages dedicated to
that. And some of the detail, you've just highlighted. I guess
I wanted to have you, to the extent that you can--and I know
there are different roles that an--various inspectors would
play, depending on what type of inspection and when. But, if
you can just kind of give us a sense of what that individual
does, once they're on the ground, so to speak. You've walked
through some of the detail, but just kind of take us to that
site, for a moment, and walk through what a typical inspector--
an individual person would be doing once they--once they're,
kind of, in-country. Can you do that in a summary fashion? I
think it just helps to be able to visualize that.
Mr. Myers. Certainly, Senator. Let me start with the
inspection team having arrived at the site to be inspected.
There is a time limit for them to actually get out to see,
let's say, for example, the silo. When they arrive at the silo,
the door of the silo is to have been--remained closed. They
will open the door of the silo. And there are a number of
different ways that they will exhibit what is inside. Sometimes
the inspectors will actually go over to it and look down the
silo; sometimes the payload or the nosecone is removed, taken
to another facility. But, from the moment that the silo door
comes open, our inspectors never take their eyes off the
missile, to ensure that what we inspect is actually what is
inside that silo.
So, part of the team--and when they're at DTRA, to begin
with, or what--they're at one of the gateways, either in
Darmstadt, Germany, or in Yokota, in Japan--part of the
responsibilities, part of the things that are going on, is the
handing out of duties. Whose responsibility will be to take on
this role and this role and this role? And, obviously, one of
the responsibilities is to keep eyes on that, the entire time.
When the missile is prepared for viewing, each of the
entity--each of the team members will have another specific
role while they go up and they inspect. I mean, obviously
they're taking in the general view, but they also have specific
responsibilities.
Senator Casey. Let me just stop you there for 1 second.
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir.
Senator Casey. The--when the inspector--an individual
inspector, in that scenario that you just outlined, is keeping
his or her eye on the missile, what--and they obviously have
trained eyes, they've been through lots and lots of training--
what are they looking for? I mean, is there a checklist that
they're trying to walk through? Or are they just----
Mr. Myers. They're just making sure it doesn't move.
Senator Casey. Yes.
Mr. Myers. They're making sure what's in there doesn't come
out of there until the inspection team has an opportunity to
verify that what's supposed to be in there is actually in
there.
Senator Casey. And I was told recently that if there are
photographs taken, that's--how does that process work?
Mr. Myers. If the inspectors and the escorts find what I
would call an ``ambiguous situation'' in which something does
not appear to be in full compliance, or there is a concern, or
something is being utilized that is--that may not be
appropriate, the inspecting team can request that the escort
team take a picture of it, a digital photograph. That
photograph is then appended to the inspection report, which is
signed by both the U.S. lead inspector as well as the lead
escort. And that becomes the official record, for the United
States and Russia. And the United States inspection team, as
they come out of Russia, through Frankfurt--excuse me--
Darmstadt, Germany, and back to Washington, that is the
official record. That is the record that they will give to the
interagency compliance process, the group of U.S. Government
agencies and departments whose job it is to make judgments on
the compliance. Our--the DTRA inspectors are supplying the
facts--and, in this case, the photograph--and the judgment is
being made, at the policy level.
Senator Casey. Now, go back in time--and I just have
another minute in this round, but--go back in time, to the
preparation. I noted, on page 2 of your handout, in terms of
the training--I'm just going to do a quick highlight, here. You
say the core team inspectors undergo 4 to 6 months of intensive
training, in three phases. You have a heading that outlines
team certification boards and then recurring monthly training.
What can you tell us about that process of training, in terms
of the intensity of it? And then, I guess, the--intensity and
duration, I guess.
Mr. Myers. We have 500 people focused on this mission. And
their No. 1 goal is to ensure that our teams, who are going out
to do the inspections, and our teams that are taking on the
escort responsibilities, are most up to date with any
eventuality, any change, any development that occurs.
So, when we're talking about the recurring monthly
training, we were talking about the lessons learned, the new
situations that an inspection team might encounter, or unique
situations that--at certain facilities, that were not known
before or what have you. All of that information, all of that
data, is brought forward and provided across the board, in
terms of training, to ensure that all of our--the entire
organization is on the same page with the lessons learned, with
the new conditions, and ensure that we are all prepared to deal
with it accurately and adequately.
Senator Casey. Thank you. I'll come back to some others.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, earlier in the hearing you
mentioned a page in Politico, today's edition, June 24, 2010,
on page 31, which is entitled, ``Russia Transparency Equals
Security.'' And you cited, at that time, very distinguished
Americans who have endorsed a series of statements on that
page, that included Secretaries Albright and Shultz and Perry,
and John Whitehead, and a great number of people. I would
mention, just for the sake of the record, that those also
affirming these statements were some distinguished former
colleagues who have taken part in our debates, including Bill
Cohen, who also served as Secretary of Defense, John Danforth,
Chuck Hagel, Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, Warren Rudman, Alan
Simpson, Tim Worth, and, of course, my partner, Sam Nunn, who
Senator Isakson mentioned, quite correctly, a moment ago.
I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, that unanimous consent
be given for this to be a part of the record of the hearing.
Senator Casey. Without objection.
[The page from Politico referred to above can be found in
the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section of
this hearing.]
Senator Lugar. Now, let me just state what each of these
distinguished Americans--and they're on a long list of equally
distinguished persons joining them--have stated, which is,
``Now, is the time for a thorough and balanced national
discussion about nuclear arms control and nuclear
nonproliferation. We must remember that a world without a
binding United States-Russian nuclear weapons agreement is a
much more dangerous world. We, the undersigned, Republican and
Democrats, support the New START Treaty because we believe that
it, first, enhances stability, transparency, and predictability
between the world's two largest nuclear powers, which together
possess about 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons; two,
contains verification and inspection measures essential to
United States national security and national threat reduction
as it relates to Russia's strategic nuclear weapons; third,
addresses our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT,
obligations, and therefore assists in gaining cooperation from
other countries on key nonproliferation priorities; four, helps
strengthen broader United States-Russia cooperation, which is
important in responding to proliferation challenges from Iran
and North Korea; five, does not inhibit our ability to maintain
an effective and reliable nuclear arsenal; and, sixth, does not
constrain our ability to develop and deploy missile defense
systems.''
Now, I cite these because these are all issues that have
arisen in our hearing in various forms and the fact that this
long list of distinguished American public servants,
Republicans and Democrats over at least two decades, all come
to the same conclusions. Does not mean that every Senator would
come to the same conclusions, but I think it's a strong
argument, which buttresses the testimony you're giving in
detail today. And I appreciate the initiative taken by these
Americans in speaking out, at this point.
And on a different subject, I would like to ask either one
of you about the biological strategy you've touched upon. In
November 2009, the Obama administration released the National
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. And the national
strategy stated, ``By assisting with efforts to redirect former
weapons scientists, repurpose our--or decommission facilities
and equipment, develop and implement practices that permit safe
and secure work with high-risk pathogens and toxins, build
scientific ties, and improve mutual understanding, our security
engagement programs have developed a strong track record of
effective risk management.'' This is from the Obama
administration's National Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats.
Now, last week, DTRA announced the opening of the Interim
Central Reference Laboratory in Odessa, Ukraine. The level-
three biosafety laboratory is the first built under the
expanded authority of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program. The White House has placed strong emphasis on its
announced policy of securing all nuclear weapons in 4 years,
but has made limited progress on implementation of a bipartisan
biological strategy. Therefore, I would like to ask both of
you, What efforts are being made or undertaken on the policy
front to ensure effective implementation of our biological
threat strategy? And how will DTRA implement key elements of
that biological strategy?
Dr. Miller. Senator Lugar, as you know, as I stated
earlier, we have shifted, such that some 40 percent of the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is now focused on
biological threat reduction. We're currently working with eight
countries, looking to expand that to additional countries. And
so, very much understand the--both the opportunities and the
dangers associates with the advancement of biotechnology, and
that this needs to be a key focus for our national security
strategy.
I would just highlight three themes that were in the
National Strategy to Counter Biological Threats that provide a
reference point for us and suggest areas where we're really
focusing.
The first is to improve global access to the life sciences,
to combat infectious disease, regardless of its cause. And
that's, in part, because, while there are some viruses and
bacteria that are known to have, historically, been possible
agents for weapons, there are the potential for others to
emerge in the future, and we also want to be concerned about
naturally occurring diseases as well.
Second, is establishing and reinforcing norms against the
misuse of the life sciences. As we see this expertise in
technology advance, that's especially important.
And the third--it relates to the BTRP, the Biological
Threat Reduction Program--is to institute a set of really
coordinated activities that together will help influence,
identify, inhibit, and/or interdict those who seek to misuse
the life sciences.
That's the framework we've been operating under. We have a
very active interagency process. DOD is contributing, through
DTRA, through investments and in potential multivalent vaccines
and in other areas, and it--let me just assure you that it's an
area where we understand there is a significant threat, and
where we have significant progress ahead of us that we need to
make.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Myers.
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir. I would add a couple of points. One, I
appreciate your recognizing the important work that was done in
Odessa, Ukraine. Your visit to Odessa, several years ago with
Senator Nunn, really allowed us to set the foundation for the
laboratory we were able to open up. That'll be an interim
laboratory, until we're able to identify the location of a
permanent one.
Two months prior to that, we broke ground on setting up a
permanent central reference laboratory in Kazakhstan. In both
situations, we have good working relationship with the Kazakhs
and the Ukrainians; and perhaps even more importantly, we have
an outstanding relationship with our colleagues at the
Department of State. Both of those laboratories, the
groundbreaking and the opening of the laboratory in Ukraine,
would not have been possible without the support of Ambassador
Hoagland, in Kazakhstan, Ambassador Tefft, in Ukraine. They are
outstanding supporters, and we work very, very well together.
I think Mr. Miller laid out for you the areas that we're
looking to expand. We're looking to take the lessons learned
from our work in the former Soviet Union, and apply them and
take them outside, take them to new regions of the world. We
basically have three pillars that we seek to arrange our
cooperation or our work around.
No. 1 is, helping enhance the bio--excuse me--the disease
biosurveillance capabilities of these countries. Identifying
the outbreak of a disease sooner--as soon as possible--is
critical in terms of stopping it before it could spread, before
it could reach, potentially, U.S. shores or our men and women
serving overseas.
No. 2, supporting collaborative research. Working with
these countries where these diseases are--where they live,
where they were born, is critical in terms of finding
collective solutions to them.
And also, improving the overall biosafety and security, and
that includes increase in the security surrounding these
disease pathogens. Countries and laboratories and hospitals
have good reasons to keep these dangerous pathogens, so they
can work on solutions, work on antidotes, but that makes them
very, very dangerous, as well. So, one of the things that we
work on very carefully, in a daily basis, is increasing the
security around them so that that research can go on, but can
go on in a safe and secure location.
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank you very much for that
testimony.
I mention all of this, Mr. Chairman, because during one
visit to Russia, I saw production lines where pathogens were
being replicated. Ostensibly, this was to treat livestock.
Others would have charged that it might have eliminated the
livestock of a country that, in fact, was victim of this
situation.
Now, in fairness to Russians who were involved in that
production line, which had been shut down, in Saint Petersburg,
we observed pathogens, now under control, being utilized for
the benefit of the hospital system of the country, in the
treatment of disease. Now, both are a part of the picture.
And even as we have centered, correctly I think, on nuclear
weapons that might be fired at us or others, the fact is that
weapons of mass destruction have included biological and
chemical components, and no amount of missile defense is really
going to be particularly effective in this area. And this is
why I want to spread the discussion a little further, because
this relationship with Russia is absolutely critical, in terms
of the areas that we're talking about today and which we'll not
be able to explore in more detail.
But, I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Lugar. I know we might--I
have a few more questions--we might be joined by another
member; and I'll yield, if we are joined by another member.
I did want to ask a question that I meant to ask earlier,
in terms of the inspection regime itself. And, of course, for
those listening, whenever we say the word ``regime,'' it's not
a government, it's a process and a structure. But, in terms of
the treaty's inspection regime that the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency would have liked to have seen, but didn't get,
is there any--can you point to any improvements to the process,
the structure, the regime itself, that either of you or like-
minded individuals were advocating for, that you didn't get in
the end, in the course of the negotiations?
Mr. Myers. No, sir. The DTRA representatives at the
negotiations were part of the team from the beginning, from the
formulation of the negotiating positions all the way through.
They were onboard the entire time.
Senator Casey. Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. Senator Casey, I agree, we are absolutely
confident that this inspection regime that--and the broader
verification regime of the treaty--is adequate for the--for
verifying the provisions of the treaty.
I'll just add briefly that, as an example where we
achieved, in a sense, more than was absolutely necessary for
verification, the provisions of this treaty are not dependent
on telemetry for their verification, unlike some of the
provisions of the START Treaty. And yet, we have a provision to
exchange in--telemetric information in up to five missile
launches per year.
Senator Casey. And I wanted to, again, get to--when we use
the word ``telemetry,'' the definition that--it's the
transmission--it's transmission--just so we're clear about
that.
Dr. Miller. It--telemetry is the--in this instance, is the
information associated with the launches of missiles. It's
transmitted--well, either transmitted or sometimes captured in
data storage devices.
Senator Casey. Broadcasted, yes.
Dr. Miller. Or both--broadcast, exactly right. And it was
useful in the START Treaty for verification, because START
Treaty limited throw weight, and so, the--as the missile was
launched, it would help to assess the missile's throw-weight.
And because there was a limitation--I'm sorry--the START Treaty
had an attribution rule for warheads. And so, if, let's say,
the SS-18 had an attribution rule of 10, if we saw a launch
that had 11 warheads, that would have been a treaty violation.
So, this information that is associated with the missile
launches and either broadcast and/or captured by device is--was
important for START, not important for New START, but in--
notwithstanding that, we still have--will have some exchange of
this data.
Senator Casey. Just about two more questions.
There was one area, that I didn't pursue, about the--kind
of, the undergirding, or the foundation, of any kind of
verification structure. The goal--or one of the main goals is
to increase confidence that both parties are complying with the
treaty.
I guess the--one thing--but, one thing we didn't get to was
the Bilateral Consultation Committee's process, how that works,
in the context of the treaty. Either or both of you want to
walk through that a little bit?
Mr. Myers. I can give a basic broad overview.
The purpose of the Commission is to provide a forum for the
sides to come together to discuss, and with the goal of,
settling on a solution to some of the ambiguous situations that
I described earlier. I think a number of issues have come up
during the implementation of the treaty, and--in which the two
sides saw a provision of the treaty, thinking that, you know,
it had maybe been one way or another, and the two sides had a
different interpretation. And the consultative commissions are
very helpful, in terms of providing a forum for those
discussions to take place, to find a solution. They--a number
of solutions have been found, and there are other issues that
continue to be discussed, and will be needed for the New START
Treaty.
Senator Casey. Is it too simplistic to analogize it to a
dispute resolution body or is it--is it akin to that, or is
it----
Mr. Myers. Well, I guess my only hesitation would be--is
that no answer is imposed. It has to be agreed to by both
parties. I think that's the key difference I would put there,
is--this is a forum to find solutions. And very often solutions
are found, and--but, if they are not, that commission remains
for continuing to seek them.
Senator Casey. Doctor.
Dr. Miller. Senator, I would just add that it--that the
BCC, the Bilateral Consultative Commission, builds directly
from the experience and lessons learned from the START Treaty's
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, the JCIC. And there
were, throughout the course of the treaty, a number of issues
raised, by both sides, about a range of issues, often with
respect to detailed questions of how inspections would be
conducted in--for example, whether--what kind of covers could
be placed over reentry vehicles as those were inspected. And
the experience was that, following the discussion and
implementation of new procedures coming out of the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission, or, looking forward, the
BCC, that the majority of these issues were resolved and
allowed moving forward with the inspections.
Senator Casey. I wanted to conclude with just one question.
It relates to a Congressional Research Service report entitled
``Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control,'' April 21 of
this year, written by Amy E. Woolf. Senator Lugar is in some of
the footnotes--he's referred to in several of the footnotes. I
won't read the whole report, obviously, but I did want to ask
for your reaction to a statement made at the end of this report
which is consistent with much of what we discussed today and
what Senator Lugar was referring to earlier, about the
importance of this treaty, beyond just the mechanics of arms
control, but also in terms of the relationship. She writes, in
pertinent part--this is on page 23, the last full paragraph,
and I'm reading--it's, in pertinent part--it's not the whole
paragraph--she says, the--and I quote, ``The United States
would have far less access to and knowledge about Russian
forces without any treaty mandated monitoring provisions in
place. The New START Treaty will contain an extensive database,
listing the number and location of every deployed and
nondeployed delivery vehicle, and every deployed and
nondeployed missile in the Russian arsenal. The database will
also list the precise number of warheads deployed on each
missile.'' And it goes on from there.
I just wanted to have you react to that, if--and I know
it's not a comprehensive statement of the reasons why I believe
we should ratify--but, talk for a moment about--as we
conclude--about that statement, which is very much consistent
with, I think, your own statements here today.
Dr. Miller. Senator Casey, I agree 100 percent with the
portion of the statement that you--of the report--that you read
out loud. The New START Treaty will provide the ability for
United States inspectors to be onsite at a range of Russian
deployment locations and other locations where they--with--for
nondeployed items--that we would otherwise not have access to,
and will provide us, through its--the database, the unique
identifiers that we discussed earlier, the requirements for
notification when anything moves, a very strong baseline of
understanding that will then inform those onsite inspections
when they take place. Cooperative Threat Reduction will build
off of that and provide us tremendous insights that, as I think
you had noted, General Chilton had--in testimony, earlier--
testified last week that this will help us avoid worst-case
planning and help us build confidence and help us move forward,
we hope, with further arms reductions, beyond New START, and,
more broadly, with continuing to strengthen the United States-
Russian relationship.
Senator Casey. Mr. Myers, anything to add to that?
Mr. Myers. Without the New START Treaty, we won't have
inspectors on the ground in Russia. Without the New START
Treaty, we will not have the data declarations, we will not
have the notifications of where things are located, we will not
have the unique identifiers to be able to track missiles and
components through their life.
The quote that was given earlier, that was attributed to
Linton Brooks, we won't have transparency, we won't have
predictability, and that won't provide as much stability as we
will have under the New START Treaty.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar, anything?
Senator Lugar. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Our hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Extract From Politico Submitted by Senator Richard Lugar
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
BENEFITS AND RISKS
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne
Shaheen presiding.
Present: Senators Shaheen, Lugar, Risch, DeMint, Barrasso,
and Inhofe.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Shaheen. Good afternoon, thank you all for coming.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets today in our tenth
hearing--so if the room is not full for our panelists, please
know that it's not because of you, it's because of--we have
been on this topic for awhile.
We are here to discuss what the treaty will mean for
American national security, for our deterrent capabilities, the
global nonproliferation regime, and our relationship with
Russia.
We have three excellent witnesses today, and we look
forward to your testimony.
Over the past 2 months, we have heard from more than a
dozen witnesses, including the treaty's chief negotiators, the
Secretaries of both State and Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command,
and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. We've heard
from many former officials, both Democrat and Republican, some
of our country's most esteemed voices on national security.
And their testimony has made one thing abundantly clear.
They have all agreed that the United States will be more secure
if we ratify this treaty.
The New START Treaty reduces the number of nuclear weapons
that Russia and the United States can deploy. As former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said last month, we must
recognize, ``the importance of a continuing dialogue with a
country that together with us possesses 95 percent of the
world's nuclear weapons. Without such a dialogue, the world
would be rudderless in front of its greatest dangers.'' We have
heard from former Secretary of Defense and Energy James
Schlesinger, who said ratification of this treaty is
``obligatory'' and who noted that failure to ratify New START
would be, ``detrimental to U.S. influence over other countries'
nonproliferation policies.''
We have also heard from administration officials who have
tried to allay some of the concerns raised by skeptics. Critics
have expressed concern that the reductions under the treaty
will prevent the United States from fielding an effective
nuclear deterrent. However, last week, General Kevin Chilton,
the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told us that the
treaty allows us to keep ``exactly what is needed'' to maintain
an effective nuclear deterrent. In fact, he said the treaty
gives us flexibility to hedge against any potential technical
failure in our weapons or change in the geopolitical situation.
Other critics have been concerned that the treaty will
somehow impede our missile defense efforts. But on this point
all of our witnesses from the Department of Defense--both
civilian and uniformed military--have been unanimous. In the
words of General Chilton, ``This treaty does not constrain any
current missile defense plans.'' In addition, LTG Patrick
O'Reilly, Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, noted
that New START actually reduces the previous START Treaty's
constraints on developing missile defense programs.
We must remember that currently, the United States and
Russia are working without a much-needed verification regime.
New START establishes verification and monitoring mechanisms so
that the United States can better understand how Russia is
developing and deploying its strategic nuclear forces. As our
expert witnesses have testified, every day that we are without
an effective verification regime represents another day that we
do not have knowledge of the Russian arsenal.
The New START Treaty also opens the door to further
cooperation with Russia on other issues of mutual concern, most
importantly nuclear proliferation.
As Stephen Hadley testified last week, the New START Treaty
is ``an indication of one more thing where Russia and the
United States have found it in their common interest to work
together cooperatively.'' Two weeks ago, Russia voted in favor
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposes new
sanctions on Iran. In addition, Moscow has cancelled its sale
of S-300 antiaircraft missiles to Tehran.
Finally, New START Treaty is a critical part of our
commitment to fight nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism. By demonstrating that the United States is serious
about adhering to its commitments under the Nonproliferation
Treaty, the New START Treaty will help us convince other
nations to fight the spread of nuclear weapons.
Today, we are here to discuss both the benefits of the New
START Treaty and the concerns that critics have expressed. We
will hear three different viewpoints from three people with
long careers in public service.
Ambassador Robert Joseph is a senior scholar at the
National Institute for Public Policy, and he served as Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
during the George W. Bush administration.
Ambassador Eric Edelman is a distinguished fellow at the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and he served
as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the Bush
administration.
Dr. Morton Halperin is a senior adviser to the Open Society
Institute. He has also held many positions in government,
including director of the State Department's policy planning
staff during the Clinton administration.
Gentlemen, thank you all for coming here today. We look
forward to your testimony.
And I will ask both Senators Lugar and Inhofe if they would
make opening statements next.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Chairman Shaheen.
This morning, as you know, our committee met with Dr. James
Miller, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and
Kenneth A. Myers, III, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, to better understand how the New START Treaty would be
implemented. We examined, in particular, how inspections will
be carried out and how the Nunn-Lugar Program will intersect
with the New START Treaty.
This afternoon, we continue our discussion with an
examination of the potential risks and benefits of the treaty.
And we welcome a very distinguished panel. As you pointed out,
Dr. Bob Joseph, who was Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security during the second Bush
administration; Eric Edelman, who has served several
administrations in different capacities, including the Bush
administration as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and
Morton Halperin, currently of the Open Society Institute, also
was a member of the 2009 Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States.
Most of the basic strategic concerns that motivated
Republican and Democratic administrations to pursue nuclear
arms control with Moscow during the last several decades still
exist today. We are seeking mutual reductions in nuclear
warheads and delivery vehicles that contribute to stability and
reduce the costs of maintaining the weapons. We are pursuing
transparency of our nuclear arsenals, backed up by strong
verification measures and formal consultation methods. We are
attempting to maximize the safety of our nuclear arsenals and
encourage global cooperation toward nonproliferation goals. And
we are hoping to solidify United States-Russian cooperation on
nuclear security matters, while sustaining our knowledge of
Russian nuclear capabilities and intentions.
We know, however, that bilateral treaties are not neat
instruments, because they involve merging the will of two
nations with distinct, and often conflicting, interests.
Treaties come with inherent imperfections and questions. As
Secretary Gates testified in May, even successful agreements
routinely are accompanied by differences of opinion of the
parties. And the ratification process, therefore, is intended
to consider whether limits on strategic forces and verification
procedures are fully consistent with United States national
security.
This process also is intended to prepare the committee to
draft a resolution of ratification for consideration by the
whole Senate. The resolution should clarify the meaning and
effect of treaty provisions for the United States and resolve
areas of concern or ambiguity.
We appreciate very much the presence and the assistance of
our witnesses today in this continuing process and look forward
to their testimony.
I thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I, first of all, I agree with you, this is the 10th hearing
that you've had. I would suggest that you haven't had any
hearings where the witnesses are opposed to the treaty. That's
kind of interesting, because I'm on the Armed Services
Committee, I'm the second-ranking member on the Armed Services
Committee, and we had a hearing. The first hearing that we had,
Madam Chairman, we had four witnesses--we had Secretary Chu,
Secretary Clinton, Mullen and Gates--all of whom were for the
treaty.
Now, we've gone through this before, I can remember, back
when--and I was not on the Foreign Relations Committee several
years ago, Senator Lugar, when the Law of the Sea Treaty was
passed out by a vote of 16-0 and it was going to just run--rush
right through the Senate until, at that time, Republicans were
a majority and I was on the--our Environment and Public Works
Committee, as well as the Armed Services Committee. And I
insisted that we have hearings and have people who are both for
and against that treaty at that time, which is the Law of the
Sea Treaty. Well, we ended up defeating it. But I can assure
you, if we had not had any hearings, Madam Chairman, where
there is someone who is opposed to it, that it wouldn't have
been defeated. I mean, you--that's what hearings are supposed
to be all about.
Now, we've had these hearings, some nine--17 witnesses, so
far, no witnesses in opposition to it. I don't know who thinks
that can be reasonable, because it's not. Now, I don't mind
being criticized--normally, as Senator Lugar knows,
historically I've been the skunk at the picnic many times. But,
in this case, as I study this treaty and I go through on the
floor--I won't go through this now because I've given three
speeches on the floor where I do get down to some of the--into
the weeds on this thing, such as the modernization, force
structure, missile defense and the verification. And,
obviously, I'm not going to go through that now, but since you
brought up a couple of these things, let me just mention.
If you look at force structure, this force structure
reduces--and we're talking about here, delivery systems, the
ICBMs for 420, the nuclear-capable--we only two vehicles that
can handle this from there, that's the B-52 and the B-2--we
would have 60 of them, and then as far as the SLBMs, the
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, we would be reducing
down to 240.
Well, right now we have 720. If you add that up, that's
700. And I asked Secretary Gates, I've asked everyone, can you
tell me where the other 20 are going to come from? And people
don't have the answer.
I've been very much much concerned on--as I hope others
are--on the technical disparity--the technical weapon disparity
between the United States and Russia. And, anyway, they have 10
to 1, their ratio over ours.
And as far as, Madam Chairman, you made the statement that
this does not affect the missile defense system. I would only
suggest that, as Sergei Lavrov stated--he's a Russian Foreign
Minister, ``We have not yet agreed on this missile defense
issue, and we are trying to clarify how the agreements reached
by the two Presidents correlate with the actions taken
unilaterally by Washington,'' and added that, ``Obama
administration had not coordinated its missile defense plans.''
Now, listen to this, Madam Chairman, in a unilateral
statement by the Russian side--and this is back on the day of--
shortly after this was signed, this was in Prague, April 8th,
``The treaty can operate and be viable only if the United
States of America refrains from developing its missile defense
capabilities quantitatively and qualitatively.''
Now, I could go on, but I'm sure that you've heard this
before. You've heard that there is objection to this, and
you've also seen something that was an advertisement in
today's--what was this? In Political Today, Madam Chairman,
where it's an advertisement for a Partnership for a Secure
America, a group that is criticizing me because I have not
attended these. And I made the statement that, until we have a
hearing where there is at least one witness in opposition to
it, I'm not going to. I made this statement after I attended
the first one with those four witnesses.
So, what I'm going to do is, hopefully some of the
witnesses, and I think that, perhaps Mr. Joseph might be the
one who would be most knowledgeable in these areas--might want
to address some of the things that I have said, both on the
floor and now.
So, I would only say on this nasty blog that came out on
me, it doesn't matter, it doesn't bother me because it happens
every day, that was from the people who paid for and ran this
ad, talking about the fact that I was absent from these
hearings, I want to make sure that everybody knows that I have
been absent for that reason. Because I will continue to be
absent until I see, Madam Chairman, that there is a committee
with some witness on the committee, who is opposed to it.
I think that we're going to see--you'll see me insisting on
some hearings, some more hearings in the Armed Services
Committee, but hopefully this committee could do the same
thing.
Now, I'm going to be here for awhile, I have to excuse
myself between 3:00 and 3:15 for a media call, but I'd like to
hear some of the witnesses, perhaps, address some of the things
that I've been saying.
And I thank you very much.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
I would just like to point out for the record that in my
statement, I wasn't the one talking about the impact of the
treaty on our missile defense efforts, but I was quoting from
witnesses who appeared before this committee.
Senator Inhofe. Sure.
Senator Shaheen. Who testified to that. So, I think you--I
just wanted to make sure that nobody was confused about that
point.
So, Ambassador Joseph, would you like to begin?
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT G. JOSEPH, SENIOR SCHOLAR, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, FAIRFAX, VA
Ambassador Joseph. Madam Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator
Inhofe, thank you for the invitation to appear before the
committee. It's a real pleasure and honor to return and testify
on New START.
I do have a prepared statement that I would--with your
approval--submit for the record.
Senator Shaheen. We will include the statement as you have
submitted it, thank you.
Ambassador Joseph. Thank you, Senator.
Let me preface my opening remarks by noting that my
experience with arms control is grounded within the executive
branch, but I am keenly aware of the vital role that the Senate
plays in the treaty ratification process. Our Nation's security
has benefited from the close scrutiny given to past treaties,
especially by this committee, but also others by asking hard
questions and fixing flaws that have been uncovered in the
process.
In summarizing my statement, I would like to raise three
questions. The first is whether New START meets the long-held
standards we have thought necessary to protect U.S. security?
Does it limit what we assume to be limited or are there gaps?
Equally important, can it be verified?
A number of experts have concluded that rail-mobile ICBMs
would not be counted under the treaty. Others disagree. The
position of the administration is clear: rail-mobile launchers,
missiles, and warheads are accountable.
I don't know what the Russian position is. But I do know
that New START is silent on rail-mobiles. All previous START
provisions that captured rail-mobile ICBMs were either deleted
or were changed to exclude them. To me, it is inconceivable
that, should Russia again deploy rail-mobile ICBMs, they would
not be counted. That said, based solely on the treaty text, its
protocols and annexes, one can come to a different conclusion
than that of the administration--one that excludes rail-mobiles
from accountability.
On this point, I believe the Senate can play a very
constructive role by ensuring that there is no ambiguity, that
the obligation is clear and precise and agreed by both parties,
as it is with silo-based and road-mobile missiles.
When faced with an analogous situation in the INF
ratification debate, the Senate directed the Reagan
administration to seek clarification on several aspects of the
verification regime. As it was then, leaving any potential
loophole would not be in our security interest or in the
interest of improved United States-Russian relations.
Another longstanding theme in Senate oversight has been the
requirement for effective verification. We know that New START
includes data exchanges and inspections that could provide
valuable information that we may not have absent the treaty
being ratified.
But the question is not whether or not we're better off
with the monitoring provisions of New START than without them.
The question is whether the treaty is verifiable. Whether New
START meets this standard is an open question, the intelligence
community has yet to provide its assessment. We do know that
New START leaves significant gaps in our ability to monitor new
developments in Russia's strategic posture. The end of U.S. on-
the-ground presence at Votkinsk, and the provisions governing
telemetry mean we will have less confidence than under START I
in our ability to determine what Russia may be doing in its
ongoing modernization. While New START is being advertised as
strengthening predictability, these changes could well have the
opposite effect.
A final point on the terms of New START relates to the size
of the reductions and whether the treaty will provide for equal
force reductions. While technically accurate, saying that there
will be a one-third reduction of deployed strategic warheads
ignores two factors.
First, both sides are already below the 2,200 level of the
Moscow Treaty. Second, actual reductions of warheads may be
substantially less than expected given the bomber counting
rule. Because bombers, no matter what they are loaded with, are
counted as ``one,'' both parties could increase deployed
warheads beyond 2,200.
While the United States will almost certainly seek to go
below the 1,550-warhead level for actual deployed warheads, the
same may not be true for Russia. And Moscow will not be legally
obligated to do so.
As for who reduces more, here again the answer is clear. As
stated by Secretary Gates, Russia is currently below the top
levels of delivery vehicles permitted under New START. For the
United States, the reductions are real and deep and, in the
case of launchers, well below what U.S. military officials had
earlier said was the minimum U.S. requirement.
My second question relates to the treaty's impact on two
vital capabilities for the future: missile defenses and prompt
global strike capabilities--the very capabilities that,
according to the Nuclear Posture Review, make possible
reductions in nuclear weapons. I know my colleague, Ambassador
Edelman, will talk about conventional prompt global strike, so
I will limit my remarks to missile defenses.
Initially, the administration gave numerous assurances that
there would be no limitations on missile defenses. After the
text of the treaty became public, the line changed to ``no
constraints on current and planned'' programs.
We know there are restrictions in the treaty, both direct
and possibly--and I would underline possibly--indirect. Article
V prohibits the conversion and use of ICBM and SLBM launchers
for placement of missile defense interceptors. While the Obama
administration has stated it has no intention to undertake any
further conversions, future administrations, as Dr. Kissinger
pointed out, might find the option attractive.
Last week Under Secretaries Flournoy and Carter, two widely
respected professionals, wrote that New START ``does not
constrain the U.S. from testing, developing and deploying
missile defenses.'' I believe the Senate can, and should, make
this assurance formal. Perhaps the best means would be an
explicit statement that no further limitations on defenses will
be acceptable.
My third question is how does the United States benefit
from New START? The administration has stressed the importance
of New START to ``re-set'' the United States-Russian
relationship. For some in Russia, including some in high
government positions,
``re-set'' may mean something entirely different from our
understanding. For them, the United States is described,
openly, as the adversary. For them, New START serves a number
of purposes. It constrains United States forces while not
encumbering Russian forces; it enhances the status of Russia
and restores in part the lost prestige from superpower days;
and it once again treats nuclear weapons--the one category of
arms in which Russia can compete with the United States--as the
principal currency in our relationship.
I believe that if we want a normal relationship with
Russia, we need to move beyond cold war approaches. We need to
build on common interests and joint efforts to deal with
today's challenges, such as combating nuclear terrorism and
managing the expansion of nuclear energy in a manner that
reduces the risks of nuclear proliferation.
The administration has also made the case that New START is
important because it demonstrates a commitment to disarmament,
and thereby will lead to greater support for U.S.
nonproliferation goals. The first half of that is sound--
through New START and other means, the administration has
established impeccable disarmament credentials. However, this
has not led, in my view, to greater pressure on Iran, or to
greater cooperation in strengthening the NPT regime. The most
recent U.N. Security Council resolution on Iran, Resolution No.
4, falls far short of what the administration sought, as did
the outcome of the NPT review conference.
In closing, I would join with others, including in the
Senate and in the administration, to stress the need for
ensuring an effective, reliable, and safe nuclear deterrent for
the future. New START must be assessed in the context of a
robust commitment to maintain the necessary nuclear offensive
capabilities required to meet today's threats and those that
may emerge. This is a long-term commitment, not a 1-year budget
bump-up. It includes the maintenance of the triad and of a
modern nuclear weapons infrastructure. These are the
capabilities that will provide strategic stability, deterrence,
and credible assurances to our friends and allies.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Joseph follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert G. Joseph, Senior Scholar, National
Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, VA
Chairman Shaheen, Senator Lugar, distinguished members, thank you
for the invitation to appear before this committee to discuss the New
START Treaty. Having retired from the career civil service in 2007
after serving at the Department of Defense, on the National Security
Council staff, and at the Department of State, I am here today in a
personal capacity.
While my direct experience with arms control is grounded within the
executive branch, I am well aware of the vital role the Senate has
played in all of the treaties that I have been associated with--
including the INF Treaty and the START I Treaty to reduce nuclear arms
and provide strategic stability. In particular, this committee has
consistently provided close scrutiny of all arms control agreements
submitted for consent to ratification. Our Nation's security has
benefited from this due diligence--from asking hard questions and from
fixing flaws that have been uncovered in the process.
I would like to raise three questions for your consideration based
on concerns that I have in my reading of the New START Treaty.
The first is whether New START--especially the provisions on
limitations and monitoring--meet the long-held standards we have
thought necessary to protect U.S. security? Do the terms of the treaty
limit what we assume to be limited or are there gaps that must be
addressed? And, equally important, do the terms provide for effective
verification?
A number of arms control experts have concluded that, based on
their examination of the treaty, rail-mobile ICBMs would not be counted
under the treaty limits. Other experts disagree. The position of the
Obama administration is clear and now part of the treaty record. In
testimony to this committee, Dr. Jim Miller, Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, has stated unequivocally that rail-
mobile ICBM launchers, missiles and warheads are accountable.
I do not know the Russian position. But I do know that the New
START Treaty is totally silent on rail-mobiles and that all previous
START provisions that captured rail-mobile ICBMs were either deleted or
changed to exclude them. To me, it is inconceivable that, should Russia
again deploy rail-mobile ICBMs, they would not be counted under the
treaty's launcher and warhead limits. That said, based solely on the
treaty text, its protocols and annexes, one can come to a different
conclusion than that of the administration--one that excludes rail-
mobiles from accountability.
On this point, I believe Senate can play a very constructive role
by ensuring that there is no room for ambiguity, through amendment or
other means, such as a formal exchange of notes. The language should
not allow for competing interpretations. It should be clear and
precise--as it is with silo-based and road-mobile missiles.
When faced with an analogous situation in the INF ratification
debate, on important points on which the terms of the INF Treaty were
not clear, the Senate directed the Reagan administration to seek
clarification with the then Soviet Union on several aspects of the
verification regime and on the meaning of a ``weapons delivery
vehicle.'' As it was then, leaving any potential loophole would not be
in our security interest or in the interest of improved United States-
Russian relations. Ambiguities involving treaty obligations do not lead
to greater confidence. Rather, they undermine mutual trust.
Another principal, longstanding theme in Senate oversight has been
the requirement for effective verification. ``Trust but verify ``has
been the standard for more than 20 years. Whether the New START Treaty
meets this standard is a major issue.
The Intelligence Community (IC) has yet to provide its assessment.
How that assessment will be stated and conditioned will be a key factor
in evaluating the treaty. Experience suggests that there will
substantial conditionality in the IC's judgments. The level of
confidence in the assessments will differ depending on the assumptions.
As just one example, if Russia does what the IC expects in terms of
road-mobile ICBM deployments, the confidence level will be higher than
the level if Russia practices denial and deception techniques that are
not prohibited by the treaty. As with previous assessments from the IC
and State, the devil will be in the details.
We do know that the verification regime for New START includes data
exchanges and onsite inspections that could provide valuable
information that we may not have absent the treaty being ratified. But
we also know that the treaty leaves potentially significant gaps in our
ability to monitor developments in Russia's strategic posture. For
example, the end of the United States on-the-ground presence at
Votkinsk means we will have less confidence than under START I in our
ability to determine what is exiting this Russian missile manufacturing
facility.
Moreover, given the telemetry exchange provisions, whereby each
side determines the information to be shared, we may have additional
gaps in understanding ongoing and future Russian strategic force
improvements. The Obama administration argues that this change in
monitoring posture will not affect the ability to verify New START
limits because these limits are different than under START I. While
perhaps technically true, New START is being advertized as a means of
strengthening predictability. Yet, because of changes in the telemetry
regime, we will have less transparency into Russia's modernization.
This is likely to undermine confidence and predictability.
The question before the Senate is not whether we are better off
with the monitoring provisions of New START Treaty than without them.
The question is whether the treaty is verifiable. The answer is unclear
at this time. Before rendering judgment on the treaty, we must await
assurances of the ability to verify its provisions.
A final point on the terms of New START relates to the size of the
reductions and whether the treaty will provide for equal force
reductions. While technically accurate, saying that the treaty will
result in a one-third reduction of deployed strategic warheads (from
2,200 to 1,550) ignores two factors.
First, both sides are already well below the 2,200 level of the
Moscow Treaty. Russian military journalist Alexander Golts has written
that Russia is now about 100-150 warheads above the 1,550 level and
that, with the expected near term retirement of legacy systems, Russia
will soon be under the limit--with or without New START. For our part,
under guidance set by President Bush, the United States has been in the
process of going significantly lower than the 2,200 warhead limit. In
fact, I understand we are now below 2,000 deployed warheads.
Second, actual reductions of warheads may be substantially less
than advertised given the change in the bomber counting rule.
Technically, because strategic bombers, no matter what their actual
load out, are counted as carrying one warhead, it is possible that any
actual reductions in deployed warheads would be much less than
anticipated. In fact, it is possible under the treaty for either or
both parties to increase the level of deployed warheads beyond the
2,200 level set by the Treaty of Moscow.
While the bomber counting rule may be a positive for the United
States if we modernize this leg of the triad, it is essential to
understand how the treaty works and the implications. In doing so, we
must recognize that, while the United States will almost certainly seek
to go below the 1,550 level of actual deployed warheads, the same may
not be true for Russia. And Moscow is not legally obligated to do so.
As for who reduces more, the answer is clear. As stated by
Secretary Gates, Russia is currently below the top levels permitted
under New START with regard to delivery vehicles. Consequently, Moscow
is not likely to have to eliminate a single launcher from where it was
headed without New START. The expectation is that Russia will cut some
deployed warheads but significantly less than suggested by the
administration. For the United States, the reductions are much deeper
and, in the case of launchers, well below what U.S. military officials
had earlier stated to be the U.S. requirement.
My second question relates to the treaty's impact on two vital
capabilities for the future: missile defenses and conventional prompt
global strike capabilities--the very capabilities that, according to
the recently released Nuclear Posture Review, make possible the
reductions in nuclear forces envisioned in New START. What will be the
impact of New START on our ability and willingness to develop and
deploy future capabilities in both of these areas to meet future
threats?
I know my esteemed colleague, Ambassador Edelman, will go into some
detail on conventional prompt global strike, so I will limit my remarks
to missile defenses. Initially, the Obama administration gave numerous
assurances that there would be no limitations on missile defenses in
the treaty--``no way, no how.'' Later, once the treaty text was made
public, the line changed to ``no meaningful'' limitations and ``no
constraints on current and planned'' programs.
We know there are restrictions on missile defenses in the treaty,
both direct and possibly indirect. Article V prohibits the future
conversion and use of ICBM and SLBM launchers for placement of missile
defense interceptors. While the Obama administration has stated it has
no intention to convert such launchers for missile defense, the
previous administration did undertake such conversions. And future
administrations might also find the conversion option attractive. As
Dr. Kissinger testified before this committee: ``I would also have
preferred to avoid prohibiting the use of missile launching sites for
strategic defense as unnecessarily limiting strategic options of a
future President."
As for implicit constraints on missile defenses, Russian officials
have stressed what they call the ``legally binding ``protocol language
which notes the ``interrelationship between strategic offensive arms
and strategic defensive arms. ``Foreign Minister Lavrov has repeatedly
stated that Russia will be entitled to withdraw from the treaty if
there is a change from existing levels in the ``quantitative and
qualitative ``capacities of U.S. strategic defenses. By doing so,
Moscow may desire to gain leverage over the future direction of U.S.
missile defense programs--development and deployments of future systems
that are necessary to defend the United States and our friends and
allies.
Last week Under Secretaries of Defense Michele Flournoy and Ashton
Carter, two widely respected professionals, wrote in the Wall Street
Journal that New START ``does not constrain the U.S. from testing,
developing and deploying missile defenses.'' They emphasized that these
``capabilities are critical to protecting U.S. citizens, our forces
abroad, and our allies from real and growing threats.'' In the
ratification process, the Senate can build on, and make formal, this
assurance. It can also make evident that the United States will not
accept limits on current and future missile defense programs and
capabilities. Perhaps the best means of doing so would be an explicit
statement that no further limitations or prohibitions on missile
defenses, such as those that could potentially be agreed in the
treaty's consultative body, will be acceptable.
My third question is how does the United States benefit from New
START?
The Obama administration has stressed the importance of New START
to ``re-set'' the United States-Russian relationship. To the extent
that the treaty improves mutual confidence in our bilateral relations,
it may make a modest, near term contribution. To the extent the treaty
contributes to the reestablishment of the cold-war relationship we had
with the Soviet Union, it will carry a long-term cost.
For some in Russia, including in high government positions, the
United States is seen and described openly as the adversary. For them,
New START serves a number of purposes: it constrains U.S. forces while
not encumbering Russian forces; it perpetuates deterrence through the
balance of terror and mutual assured destruction; it enhances the
status of Russia and restores in part the lost prestige from superpower
days; and it once again treats nuclear weapons--the one category of
arms on which Russia can compete with the United States--as the
principal currency of the relationship.
If we do believe the cold war is over, and if we want a normal
relationship with Russia, we need to move beyond cold-war approaches.
We need to base our relations on common interests and joint efforts to
deal with today's security challenges, such as countering nuclear
terrorism and managing the expansion of nuclear energy in a manner that
reduces the risks of nuclear weapon proliferation.
Predictability and stability are important elements of our
relationship with Russia. Reductions of nuclear weapons to the lowest
level possible consistent with our security requirements, including for
extended deterrence for our friends and allies, are important to our
nonproliferation goals. But these objectives are not well-served by
traditional arms control of the type practiced in the cold war when we
and the Soviet Union were enemies in a divided world with thousands of
nuclear weapons pointed at each other.
The Obama administration has also made the case that New START is
important because it demonstrates the U.S. commitment to disarmament,
and thereby will lead to greater support for U.S. nonproliferation
goals. The first half of the administration's case is sound--through
New START and other means, it has established impeccable credentials on
disarmament. However, it is far from clear that this has or will lead
to greater international pressure on states like Iran or to greater
cooperation in strengthening the NPT regime. The most recent U.N.
Security Council resolution on Iran falls far short of what the
administration sought, as did the outcome of the NPT review conference.
In closing, I would join with many others, including in the Senate
and in the administration, to stress the need for ensuring an
effective, reliable, and safe nuclear deterrent force for the future.
New START must be assessed in the context of a robust commitment to
maintain the necessary nuclear offensive capabilities required to meet
today's threats and those that may emerge. This is a long-term
commitment, not a 1-year budget bump-up. It includes the maintenance of
the TRIAD and of a modern nuclear weapons infrastructure. These are the
capabilities that will provide strategic stability, deterrence, and
credible assurances to our friends and allies.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Ambassador Edelman.
Senator Lugar. Madam Chairman, could I just ask that we
recess, and I ask this because I want to make certain all of us
hear each of the three witnesses.
Senator Shaheen. Sure. What----
Senator Lugar. And if we leave and relieve each other, we
are going to miss some of the testimony.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, Madam Chair, they may not be aware
that a vote started 6 minutes ago.
I meant to mention, Ambassador Edelman, I have fond
memories of our relationship in Turkey when you had that job
there, and I thank you for your public service, and I've
enjoyed that relationship.
Senator Shaheen. I think recessing while we all go vote is
a good idea, so we'll recess for 5 minutes, and we will return.
[Recess.]
Senator Shaheen. This hearing will come to order again, we
didn't quite make it back in 5 minutes, but pretty close.
So, because I know a number of the members have a
scheduling issue and we promised to let our panelists out, we
will go ahead and begin and hope that the other Senators join
us shortly.
Ambassador Edelman.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC S. EDELMAN, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS, VISITING SCHOLAR,
PHILIP MERRILL CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Edleman. Thank you Senator Shaheen, and Senator
Lugar and to the other members of the committee who hopefully
will arrive. I very much appreciate the opportunity to be here
today and speak to the committee.
I think the committee's hearings, as many of them as there
have been, and as many more as there will be, provide a very
good opportunity to increase our understanding of how this
treaty fits into the broader set of national security issues
that are facing the Nation in a period when, as the Nuclear
Posture Review notes, ``the threat of global nuclear war has
become remote, but the threat of nuclear attack has
increased.''
And I think it's particularly the case that the Senate can
be deliberate about this, because earlier arms reduction and
limitation agreements were reached in a context of what was
widely perceived as an out-of-control arms race. But today,
both sides are clearly lowering their number of deployed
warheads, and I think the Senate therefore can and ought to
take the time necessary to make sure that all of this is done
right, rather than done fast.
I, as Senator Lugar noted, have served several
administrations as a career diplomat, working on United States-
Russia relations. And I served three consecutive Presidential
administrations, all of which operated from the assumption that
the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of an
ideologically driven strategic antagonism between the United
States and Russia. All three administrations based their
policies on the hope and expectation that a democratizing
Russia would become a normal country, an active proponent of a
new and stable world order, a partner with the United States in
NATO in seeking peace and stability, and a Europe whole and
free, and also in resolving conflicts and dangers in Southwest
Asia, Northeast Asia, and elsewhere.
And in that sense, I do see that the recurrence of a form
of arms control that posits an adversarial relationship between
the United States and Russia as an unfortunate retreat from
those earlier aspirations. We don't, for example, have arms
control treaties with ``normal'' countries with nuclear weapons
like France and the United Kingdom. And I suppose that Russia's
increasing turn toward authoritarianism and the tensions and
conflicts along Russia's periphery that have developed over the
past half-decade may have made the return to a START-like
treaty structure an inevitable. But, I think we also need to
bear in mind that in the current environment, a START-like
treaty that ignores North Korea and Iran could represent more
of a step backward than a step forward.
In my view, the treaty needs to be evaluated both against
the standards of predictability, strategic stability, and
verifiability that we employed for the earlier START treaties
if we are going to use that traditional treaty structure.
In addition, however, I think it needs to be evaluated in
another way, because we are entering a second nuclear era with
emergent nuclear powers in North Korea, most likely Iran, and
now perhaps Burma. And I think the Senate must review this
measure against a standard that incorporates the kinds of
capabilities, particularly robust missile defenses and
conventional prompt global strike that I think are likely be
necessary for the United States to deal with these emerging
challenges.
My colleague, Ambassador Joseph has talked about some of
the ambiguities in the treaty language, some of the issues of
verifiability, and the limits on missile defense so I will
focus my remarks on the launcher limits set in the New START
Treaty which is a concern, I think, of Senator Inhofe's, and
their impact on the Prompt Global Strike capabilities.
Beginning in the 1990s a number of scholars began to write
about the emergence of a second Nuclear Age. It's an era
characterized by a continuing need to maintain deterrence among
great powers but also to manage a more complicated
multinational nuclear competition resulting from the
progressive nuclearization of Asia with Iran and Burma, as I
said, possibly soon joining India, Pakistan, China, and North
Korea as nuclear weapons states.
Others may follow in a cascade of proliferation which was a
concern highlighted by the report of the Perry-Schlesinger
Nuclear Posture Commission on which Mort Halperin served, as
well as the Graham-Talent Commission on Prevention of Weapons
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.
So, how well does the New START Treaty position the United
States for the task of both maintaining deterrence and dealing
with emergent regional powers?
I do hope that the Senate will look carefully at the
launcher limit of 700 and I noted your comments, Madam
Chairman, about the testimony you've heard from General
Chilton, Secretary Gates, and others. All I can tell you is
that in September 2008, Secretary Gates and then-Energy
Secretary Bodman produced a joint DOE-DOD White Paper on
``National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century''
which suggested a larger force was necessary. And as recently
as a year ago--less than a year ago, actually, General
Cartwright, in an exchange with Senator Thune on the Senate
Armed Services Committee said he ``would be very concerned'' if
the launcher limit dropped below 800. So, you know, what has
changed? It's easy to understand why this lower limit was
appealing to Russian officials since their launcher numbers
appear to be dropping below 700 as a consequence of the aging
of their systems and problems with their foundering
modernization plans. But a treaty that requires no elimination
of nuclear force structure by Russia while forcing the United
States to reduce launchers is perhaps not in the United States
national interest, given the global United States
responsibilities for providing extended deterrence to allies--a
set of responsibilities that Russia does not face.
Secretary Clinton, among others, has suggested that the
United States may have to take on even new extended deterrence
requirements in the Middle East if Iran emerges as a nuclear
power.
And one has to ask the question, can the United States credibly
take on increased commitments to provide assured deterrence to
our allies and extended deterrence with a shrinking arsenal of
launchers?
In both the 2001 and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews, the
point was made that advancing U.S. conventional capabilities,
and in particular long-range precision strike weapons, make it
possible to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in our
Nation's military force posture. But while long-range
conventional strike weapons can achieve some of the discrete
target effects that were previously reserved for nuclear
weapons, they cannot produce the mass effects or credibility
that are uniquely resident in the nuclear weapons inventory as
General Chilton testified before the Armed Services committee
on April 22.
The use of prompt conventional strike for the purposes of
destroying a fleeting, emergent target, such as terrorist
leader or a suspected transfer of WMD would require small
numbers of PGS vehicles, which might easily be accommodated
under the 700 launcher limit which is what, I think, Secretary
Miller has testified to. However, I think we increasingly need
to think about prompt global strike as the leading edge of
combat operations in environments where anti-access/area-denial
capabilities will preclude the traditional use of U.S. airpower
or where the President, current or future, will want nonnuclear
options for dealing with a spreading number of nations with
small nuclear inventories.
One recent study has suggested the need for at least 50
such systems, but the number could easily be larger. Fifty
would already pinch the nuclear forces needed to maintain the
nuclear triad under the New START negotiated launcher limit,
and I think that goes to one of the points that Mr. Inhofe made
at the beginning, but the problem could become even more acute
if lower limits are negotiated in subsequent agreements. And I
think the problem here is that the treaty's preamble
establishes a link--suggests a link--between deployment of
prompt global strike and ``strategic stability,'' thereby
establishing a precedent for counting these weapons as part of
nuclear arms control agreements.
The truth is, for the 10-year life of this agreement the
cheapest and quickest route to prompt global strike capability
would be a conventionally armed Trident or Minuteman missile,
whose numbers are limited by the treaty.
Let me conclude by agreeing with Secretary and Ambassador
Joseph that in the current context, the requirement for nuclear
deterrence is going to remain a concern for all policymakers
and a modernized nuclear force is going to be essential to
that. As Secretary Gates suggested in October 2008, it's a sine
qua non for maintaining nuclear deterrence. He pointed out then
that, ``at a certain point, it will become impossible to keep
extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our
testing moratorium. It also makes it harder to reduce existing
stockpiles, because eventually we won't have as much confidence
in the efficacy of the weapons we do have. Currently, the
United States is the only declared nuclear power that is
neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability
to produce a new nuclear warhead. The United Kingdom and France
have programs to maintain their deterrent capabilities. China
and Russia have embarked on ambitious paths to design and field
new weapons. To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can
maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons
in our stockpile without either resorting to testing or
pursuing a modernization program.''
Much of the danger and the difficulty the Nation will face
in the future presents itself in the form of regional, nuclear
armed powers. The Nuclear Posture Review rightly points out the
Nation can reduce the role of nuclear weapons, even in the face
of these difficulties, because we have improved missile defense
and prompt global strike capabilities, among others, but this
is true only if we continue to field these capabilities in
sufficient numbers, and with plausible operational concepts
that enable us to preserve our security interest.
New START, unfortunately, introduces limits and obstacles
to further development of precisely these means of defending
the country. I think as part of the ratification I would hope
the Senate will express its sense that no further limitations
on either missile defense or prompt global strike should be
considered as a part of future nuclear arms reduction
agreements. Any such constraints could potentially prove to be
a major error in long-term strategy because they would trade
away areas of United States comparative advantage for
reductions in Russian strategic forces that would be likely to
happen even in the absence of a treaty.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Edelman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eric S. Edelman, Distinguished Fellow, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Visiting Scholar, Philip Merrill
Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC
Chairman Shaheen, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank
you for providing me with the opportunity to share some thoughts with
you today on the New START Treaty. A year ago I retired from the United
States Foreign Service after almost 30 years and I bring to the subject
at hand some perspectives from my years of work at the State
Department, White House, and Department of Defense, but today, however,
I am not representing any institution, organization, or party. I am
speaking solely for myself.
I would like to begin by saluting you Mr. Chairman, and your
colleagues on the committee, as well as the Armed Services and
Intelligence Committees, for approaching the subject with the
thoroughness and careful deliberation it deserves. As the
constitutional scholar George Anastaplo has observed, ``the
arrangements in Section 2 with respect to treaties and appointments
take it for granted that the Senate can be depended upon to be as well
equipped as the President to know, or at least to be told, what is
needed by the country from time to time. The Senate shares the
Executive power here, however convenient it may be to vest in a single
man the negotiation of treaties. The President is not assumed to know
things the Senate does not know or that the Senate cannot be told in
appropriate circumstances.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ George Anastaplo, ``The Consitution of 1787: A Commentary''
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 112.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Senate's scrutiny and skepticism has played a valuable role in
the history of arms limitation and reduction agreements and, in at
least one case, SALT II, this body did not ratify an agreement reached
by the executive branch.
I believe the systematic airing currently being provided by the
committee can contribute to increased understanding of how this treaty
fits into the broader set of national security issues facing the Nation
when, as the Nuclear Posture Review notes, ``the threat of global
nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has
increased.'' \2\ This is particularly the case because the earlier arms
limitation and reduction agreements were reached in a context of what
was widely perceived as an out of control arms race. Today both sides
are already lowering their number of deployed nuclear warheads, and
contrary to some assertions, despite the expiration of the START Treaty
in December 2009, the number of deployed warheads remains governed by
the Moscow Treaty until 2012. The Senate therefore can and should take
the time to make sure that we get things done right rather than done
fast.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Department of Defense, ``Nuclear Posture Review Report,'' April
2010, p. iv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I spent a good deal of my career as a diplomat working on U.S.-
Soviet and, after 1992, U.S.-Russian relations. I served three
consecutive Presidential administrations, all of which operated from
the assumption that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of
an ideologically driven, strategic antagonism between the United States
and Russia. All three administrations based their policies on the hope
and expectation that a democratizing Russia would become a ``normal''
country, an active proponent of a new and stable world order, a partner
with the U.S. and NATO in seeking peace and stability in a Europe whole
and free and also in resolving conflicts and dangers in Southwest Asia,
Northeast Asia, and elsewhere. In that sense the recurrence to a format
that posits an adversarial relationship between the United States and
Russia, defined by a need to control their respective nuclear arsenals,
seems to mark an unfortunate retreat from those earlier aspirations. We
don't, for example, have arms control treaties with ``normal''
countries that have nuclear weapons like the U.K. and France. Russia's
increasing turn toward authoritarianism and the tensions and conflicts
along the country's periphery that have developed over the past half-
decade may have made the return to a START-like treaty structure an
inevitable, if lamentable, development. But a START-like treaty that
ignores North Korea and Iran may be a step backward rather than
forward.
Given these circumstances the New START Treaty, in my view, needs
to be evaluated both against the standards used for predictability,
strategic stability, and verifiability that were employed for earlier
treaties of this type. If we are going to use the traditional arms
control treaty structure we need to approach treaty questions with the
same care and attention to detail that we did in earlier Senate
reviews. In addition, however, because we are entering a Second Nuclear
Era with emergent nuclear powers in North Korea, most likely Iran, and
perhaps in Burma as well, the Senate's review must also be measured
against a standard that incorporates the kinds of capabilities,
particularly robust missile defenses and conventional prompt global
strike, that will likely be required to cope successfully with new
challenges.
In his statement, my colleague Robert Joseph deals with issues
regarding ambiguities in the treaty language, verifiability, and limits
on missile defenses. I will not belabor those issues, although I very
much share his concerns. Rather I will focus my attention on some
characteristics of the Second Nuclear Era and pose some questions, in
that regard, about the launcher limits set in the New START Treaty and
their impact on the development of Prompt Global Strike (PGS)
capabilities.
Since the middle of the 1990s a number of scholars, including Fred
Ikle, Keith Payne, Paul Bracken, Colin Gray, and Andrew Krepinevich
have written about the emergence of a Second Nuclear Age.\3\ This era
is characterized by the continuing need to maintain deterrence among
the great powers and to manage a more complicated multinational nuclear
competition resulting from the progressive nuclearization of Asia with
Iran and Burma possibly soon joining India, Pakistan, China, and North
Korea as nuclear weapons states. Others may perhaps follow in a cascade
of proliferation that has been highlighted in the reports of both the
Perry-Schlesinger Nuclear Posture Commission and the Graham-Talent
Commission on Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation
and Terrorism. The growing number of nuclear weapons states with
relatively small nuclear inventories imposes on the United States a
requirement to put more emphasis on both missile defenses and long-
range precision conventional strike weapons. This requirement has been
recognized by the Nuclear Posture Review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See for example, Fred Charles Ikle, ``The Second Coming of the
Nuclear Age,'' Foreign Affairs, January/February 1996; Keith Payne,
``Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age'' (Lexington, KY: University
Press of Kentucky, 1996); Colin Gray, ``The Second Nuclear Age''
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); Paul Bracken, ``The
Second Nuclear Age,'' Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000; and
Andrew F. Krepinevich, ``U.S. Nuclear Forces: Meeting the Challenge of
a Proliferated World'' (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How well does the New START Treaty position the United States for
the task of both maintaining deterrence among the existing nuclear
powers and dealing with emergent regional nuclear powers?
With regard to the overall question of deterrence I hope the Senate
will carefully examine the launcher limit of 700 deployed (with an
additional 100 nondeployed launchers) to determine for itself if this
limit meets the requirements of deterrence. In September 2008,
Secretary Gates and then Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman produced a
joint DOE-DOD White Paper ``National Security and Nuclear Weapons in
the 21st Century'' that suggested a force of roughly 900 launchers was
needed for purposes of deterrence. As recently as last fall the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, during
an exchange with Senator Thune in the SASC, said he ``would be very
concerned'' if the launcher limit dropped below 800. What has changed?
Why are 700 deployed launchers now sufficient? How will the U.S.
maintain a resilient triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned bombers in the
medium term? It is easy to understand why this lower limit was
appealing to Russian officials since their launcher numbers appear to
be dropping below 700 as a consequence of the aging of their systems
and problems with their foundering modernization plans. But is a treaty
that requires no elimination of nuclear force structure by Russia while
forcing the U.S. to reduce launchers in the U.S. national interest,
particularly given U.S. global responsibilities for providing extended
deterrence to its allies a requirement which Russia does not face.
Secretary Clinton and others have suggested that the possible emergence
of a nuclear Iran may lead the U.S. to take on even more commitments to
provide extended deterrence in the Middle East. Can the U.S. credibly
take on such commitments with a shrinking arsenal of launchers?
The launcher limit has implications for our Prompt Global Strike
capabilities. Both the 2001 and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews make the
point that advancing U.S. conventional capabilities, and in particular
long-range precision conventional strike weapons, make it possible to
decrease the role of nuclear weapons in the Nation's military force
posture. It is important to note, however, that while long-range
conventional strike weapons can achieve some of the discrete target
effects that were previously reserved for nuclear weapons they cannot
produce the mass effects or credibility that are uniquely resident in
our nuclear weapons inventory. As General Chilton told the Senate Armed
Services committee on April 22, ``I consider prompt global strike
capability as a niche capability, another quiver, if you will, of the
United States to address warfighting concerns. I do not see it as a
replacement for the nuclear deterrent in that role, specifically.you
don't replace the nuclear deterrent with that, one-for-one, not even
ten-for-one.'' Today, as we move into the Second Nuclear Era the
question of a Prompt Global Strike capability is taking on greater
urgency. But the use of either ICBMs or SLBMs for the PGS mission will
henceforth be constrained by the Treaty which counts them as Strategic
Delivery Vehicles accountable under the 700 launcher limit. The
difficulty here is that we do not yet know what the requirement for PGS
will be, and thus run a substantial risk of putting the arms control
cart ahead of the capability requirements horse.
The use of prompt conventional strikes for the purpose of
destroying a fleeting, emergent target, such as a terrorist leader or a
suspected transfer of WMD, would require small numbers of PGS vehicles
which might be easily accommodated under the 700 launcher limit.
However, PGS increasingly needs to be seen as necessary for the leading
edge of combat operations in an environment where anti-access/area
denial capabilities will preclude traditional uses of U.S. airpower or
where the President (current or future) will want nonnuclear options
for dealing with a spreading number of nations with small nuclear
inventories. One recent study has suggested the need for 50 such
systems, but the number could easily be larger.\4\ This number could
already pinch the nuclear forces needed to maintain the nuclear triad
under the New START negotiated launcher limit. The problem could become
even more acute if lower limits are negotiated in subsequent
agreements. A major problem here is that the treaty's preamble suggests
a link between the deployment of PGS and ``strategic stability,''
thereby establishing a precedent for counting these weapons as part of
nuclear arms control agreements. Although the article-by-article
analysis of the treaty submitted to the Senate suggests that the United
States has registered with Russia its view that ``not all new kinds of
systems of strategic range would be 'new kinds of strategic offensive
arms' subject to the New START Treaty'' (a statement that would seem to
protect a hypersonic glide vehicle from being subject to the treaty),
the fact remains that for the 10-year life of this agreement the
cheapest and quickest route to a PGS capability would be a
conventionally armed Trident or Minuteman missile, whose numbers are
limited by the treaty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Bruce Sugden, ``Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of
Conventional Ballistic Missiles,'' International Security, 34:1, Summer
2009, 113-146, estimate of a minimum force of 50 for counternuclear
missions is on page 119. See also Thomas Scheber, ``Conventionally-
Armed ICBMs: Time for Another Look,'' Comparative Strategy, 27:4, 336-
344.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Let me conclude by noting that the United States has probably never
faced a more complex or daunting set of challenges to the Nation's
security as we will in the years ahead. In that context, the
requirement for nuclear deterrence will remain a concern for
policymakers. As Secretary Gates suggested in October 2008 a sine qua
non for maintaining our nuclear deterrent is a modernized nuclear
force. He rightly pointed out that ``at a certain point, it will become
impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal--especially in
light of our testing moratorium. It also makes it harder to reduce
existing stockpiles, because eventually we won't have as much
confidence in the efficacy of the weapons we do have. Currently, the
United States is the only declared nuclear power that is neither
modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new
nuclear warhead. The United Kingdom and France have programs to
maintain their deterrent capabilities. China and Russia have embarked
on ambitious paths to design and field new weapons. To be blunt, there
is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce
the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to
testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.''
That said much of the danger and difficulty the Nation faces will
present itself in the form of regional, nuclear armed powers. The
Nuclear Posture Review rightly points out that the Nation can reduce
the role of nuclear weapons, even in the face of these difficulties,
because we have improved Missile Defense and PGS capabilities, but this
is true only if we continue to field these capabilities in sufficient
numbers, and with plausible operational concepts that enable us to
preserve our security interest. New START, unfortunately introduces
limits and obstacles to further development of precisely these means of
defending the country. As part of the ratification process I would hope
that, at a minimum, the Senate will express its sense that no further
limitations on either Missile Defense or Prompt Global Strike should be
considered as a part of future nuclear arms reduction agreements.
Allowing any further such constraints could well prove a major error in
long-term strategy because they would trade away areas of U.S.
comparative advantage for reductions in Russian strategic forces that
would be likely to happen even in the absence of a treaty.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Ambassador Edelman.
Dr. Halperin.
STATEMENT OF DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN, SENIOR ADVISOR, OPEN
SOCIETY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Halperin. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, Senator
Lugar. It's a great pleasure to testify again before this
distinguished committee and to make clear I appear in support
of the Senate consenting to ratification of the New START
Treaty. I have no doubt the ratification of the treaty is in
the national interest of the United States, that it will
strengthen strategic stability between the United States and
Russia and help the United States to secure the international
cooperation it needs to deal with the dangers of nuclear
proliferation and the danger of terrorists gaining control of a
nuclear weapon.
As Senator Lugar noted, I was a member of the Perry-
Schlesinger Commission, and I will rely on the conclusions of
that Commission in my testimony.
The Commission, as the committee knows, was composed of
individuals with, to say the least, very diverging views on a
wide range of nuclear issues, but with one exception, we
managed to reach a consensus on every issue that we considered.
And that consensus included very clear and precise
recommendations on what we thought--all of us thought--the next
strategic arms control treaty should look like. The Obama
administration took these recommendations very seriously and
the treaty that's now before you conforms, in every material
way, with the recommendations of the Commission. I thus support
ratification for the same reasons that led me to join the
consensus on the Commission.
In short, I believe that the limitations placed on Russian
and American forces will contribute to strategic stability and
reduce the risk of unintended and/or accidental use of nuclear
weapons by either nation. At the same time, it will clearly
permit the United States to maintain sufficient forces to deter
deliberate attack on the United States or its allies or
partners, by Russia or any other state possessing nuclear
weapons.
It will also enable the United States to provide credible
and effective nuclear guarantees to our allies and partners and
will provide a framework in which we can get the greater
cooperation that we need from other states to advance our
nonproliferation objectives.
The Commission report makes clear that another purpose of a
new START treaty is to improve the overall political relation
between the United States and Russia. I think the treaty will,
in fact, accomplish that purpose when it is ratified by both
countries.
The Commission was mindful, as the administration was, of
how difficult it will be to reach agreement with the Russians
on very large reductions in the arsenals of both sides and it,
therefore, expressed its support for the framework that had
been agreed, as we were finishing our work, between the two
governments and suggested that the treaty focus, as its first
step, on modest and straightforward reductions which would
reinvigorate the strategic arms control process rather than
striving for bold new initiatives. It suggested that a mutual
reduction of strategic forces would be achievable and would be
a first, but important, modest step forward. As I say, the
administration followed this advice and the treaty before you
achieves modest but important objectives.
The treaty, reflecting, as it does, the recommendation of a
bipartisan Commission, should provide momentum to reestablish
the badly needed bipartisanship that we've had in the past on
arms control policy and on arms control treaties.
In that connection, I am pleased to see that today the
Partnership for A Secure America, Senator Inhofe mentioned,
released a statement which was a bipartisan statement in
support of ratification of the treaty which was signed by 30
former high-ranking officials equally divided between
Republicans and Democrats. I should note that I am on the board
of the Partnership for a Secure America, but I would ask that
that statement be made part of the record, and I'd like to
submit it to the committee for that purpose.
Senator Shaheen. Without objection, the statement will be
included in the record.
Dr. Halperin. Now, the numerical limitations in the treaty
will permit the United States to gradually reduce the number of
deployed warheads and number of launchers in its strategic
arsenal over a 7-year period, and in a manner that will allow
the United States to maintain the triad of delivery systems
with each leg contributing to stability and deterrence. The
administration has ample time to make careful choices about
which systems to reduce, and how to reach the posture that, in
my view, will clearly be more than sufficient for both
deterrence and assurance.
Moreover, the administration is committed to the
modernization of its arsenal. We've been told that the
modernization of the arsenal is a necessary component of moving
ahead with this treaty. I believe that it is in our interest to
do so whether or not we have a treaty, that the administration
is committed to do so, and I hope that the Congress will follow
the budget proposals of the administration and move forward
with the modernization of both the delivery systems, when that
is required, and also with the steps necessary to maintain a
modern, safe and effective nuclear weapons arsenal.
Now, you've also asked me to evaluate the concerns that
have been raised about the treaty. As I understand those
concerns, in addition to the question of whether Congress will
actually approve the proposed improvements in our nuclear
infrastructure, they relate to verification, to ballistic
missile defense, and to one or two other issues. I will leave
it to other witnesses to discuss the technical aspects of
verification. Let me simply say that I have no doubt that
Russian efforts at evasion of this treaty have no chance of
success at any level which would provide a meaningful advantage
to them in the nuclear competition between the United States
and Russia, and I think that is the standard that the Senate
has used to evaluate every other treaty, and I think it is the
only appropriate standard for assessing the adequacy of
verification.
Now, the ballistic missile defense issue seems to have
generated the greatest level of concern. I find this
surprising, and frankly, disappointing. The New START Treaty
simply does not limit the number of launches the United States
can deploy or otherwise constrain the ability of the United
States to deploy effective ballistic missile defense, period,
full stop. That should be the end of the debate. But it has not
been.
The concerns expressed are that the preamble acknowledges a
link between offense and defense, that the treaty bans placing
ballistic missile defense launchers in strategic missile silos
and that the Russians have asserted a right to withdraw from
the treaty if they determine that American missile defenses
threaten their deterrent. The statement in the preamble, in my
view, is nothing more than a statement of the obvious and
indeed, a truth which the United States long urged on the
Soviet Union before they came to accept it.
The Russian unilateral assertion is nothing more than a
restatement of what is in the treaty and what is obvious. No
one could doubt, for example, that a Russian decision to deploy
a very large ballistic missile defense force aimed at shooting
down all American missiles that survived a Russian first strike
on the United States would lead the United States to carefully
evaluate the adequacy of our offensive forces and to withdraw
from the treaty if we determined that our supreme national
interests required such action. We should not be surprised if
the Russians have the same view.
The only thing that I would add to the very clear statement
to this committee by General O'Reilly on the silo issue is that
I think it is in the interest of the United States to draw a
bright line between those systems which are under the treaty
and those systems which are not. So that I think the limit on
both placing offensive missiles in defensive silos and the
reverse is, in fact, in the interest of the United States.
I noted that the continuing controversy over ballistic
missile defense was disappointing. This is so because the
Commission, which included many long time opponents of
ballistic missile defense as well as many passionate advocates,
reached a full consensus on that issue, one that is fully
consistent with the treaty as well as the actions of the Obama
administration and the recommendations it has made to the
Congress. And I would ask that my written statement and
attachment quoting from the committee--the Commission statement
also be included in the record.
Senator Shaheen. Without objection.
Dr. Halperin. The committee not only strongly supported
limited defenses, it clearly opposed defenses aimed at the
Russian or Chinese missile force. And not only that, it warned
against deployments that did lead Russia or China to believe
that we were trying to affect their offensive military
capability because it said that such actions would lead Russia
or China to take actions, increase the size of their own
strategic forces, that would increase the threat to the United
States and its allies.
So this statement, this policy proposal from the
Commission, says deploy active defenses against Iran, against
North Korea, but make sure you do it in a way that doesn't
trigger Russian increases in their own offensive missile forces
because that will reduce our security, whether it's in the
treaty or not. And all the Russians have done is to say what
the Commission said, which is if we deploy forces that, in
fact, threaten their deterrent, they will respond by building
larger offensive forces. That is not in our interest that they
do that. And therefore, as the Commission recommended, we
should very carefully design our ballistic missile defenses so
that they don't seem to pose, or actually pose, that threat to
Moscow. And I think the Russian unilateral statement and,
therefore, what our own policy should be are very much the
same.
Now, let me say a final word, if I can, about two other
issues that have been raised in the other testimony. First is
the question of rail mobile missiles. As I read the treaty, it
is not at all silent on that subject. It has a definition of
both strategic offensive missiles and strategic offensive
launchers, which clearly includes rail mobile systems. So they
are covered by the treaty. They are prohibited by the treaty. I
think no Russian could possibly believe that this treaty was
written to put limits on offensive missiles but then say but if
you put them on rails, they don't count. I don't believe there
is anything in the legislative history to suggest that that is
the case. And I think that the Senate can ratify the treaty in
full confidence that rail mobile missiles are covered.
Now, on the question of conventional prompt global strike,
I think, as Secretary Edelman has conceded, that if we stay
with numbers like 10 or 12 of these, which is what most people
think is sufficient for the purposes that have been discussed,
we can easily accommodate it within these numbers. If we go to
much larger numbers of them, then we will need to design and
build a new system. And my own view is that it is imperative
that we build a system that isn't covered by the terms of this
treaty, that isn't a strategic missile.
And the administration is working on such a system because
you do not want to fire, in my view, 50 missiles from the ICBM
field in the direction that will--the Russians will not be able
to tell is not an attack on them. That seems to me
extraordinarily dangerous. There would be a very strong
argument against doing that in a crisis. And we do not want to
build a prompt conventional system that we then find that we
can't use because it seems too risky. And the operational use
of them on submarines, which are often out of communication
range, also seems to me not the most effective system. So if
the United States decided that it did need 50 or more of these
systems, I believe it would build a new system which would not
be covered by the strategic treaty.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify. And, of
course, I would be delighted to answer questions. Thank you
very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Halperin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Morton H. Halperin, Senior Advisor, Open Society
Institute, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, It is a great honor and privilege to be invited to
testify again before this distinguished committee. I appear in support
of the Senate consenting to ratification of the New START Treaty. I
have no doubt that ratification is in the national interest and that
the treaty will strengthen strategic stability between the United
States and Russia and help the United States to secure the
international cooperation it needs to deal with nuclear proliferation
and the threat of terrorists gaining control of a nuclear weapon.
My official involvement with these issues began in 1967 when, as a
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, I helped to develop the initial
American positions for what became known as the SALT process. I also
worked on strategic arms control matters in the Nixon and Clinton
administrations. I am now the cochair of the advisory board of the New
America Foundation Nuclear Strategy and Non-Proliferation Initiative.
Perhaps most directly relevant to the evaluation of the New START
Treaty, I served on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States.
As the committee knows, the Commission, composed of individuals
with, to say the least, very divergent views on nuclear issues reached
consensus on every issue but the CTBT. That consensus included very
clear and precise recommendations on what we thought the next strategic
arms control treaty should look like. The Obama administration clearly
took those recommendations very seriously. The treaty now before the
Senate conforms in every material way with the recommendations of the
Commission. I thus support ratification for the same reasons that led
me to join the consensus on the Commission.
In short, I believe that the limitations placed on Russian and
American forces will contribute to strategic stability and reduce the
risk of unintended or accidental use of nuclear weapons by either
nation. At the same time it will permit the United States to maintain a
strategic arsenal which is more than sufficient to deter a deliberate
attack on the United States or its allies and partners by Russia or any
other state possessing nuclear weapons. It will also enable the United
States to provide credible and effective nuclear guarantees to our
allies and partners and will provide a framework in which we are much
more likely to get the cooperation we need from other states to advance
our nonproliferation objectives. As I will explain in a minute, I am
confident that the provisions of the treaty can be verified.
The Commission's final report placed the value of a new START
treaty in the context of the importance of the overall political
relation between the United States and Russia and explained the
potential value of an arms control regime as follows:
It may provide assurances to each side about the intentions
driving modernization programs. It may lend predictability to
the future of the bilateral relationship, a benefit of value to
the United States but also its allies and friends. U.S.-Russian
arms control can also reinforce the NPT.
Moreover, at a time when the United States is considering how
to reduce nuclear dangers globally, it is essential that it
pursue cooperative, binding measures with others.
The Commission was mindful, as was the administration, of how
difficult it would be to reach agreement with the Russians on very
large reductions in the nuclear arsenal of both sides. It, therefore,
expressed its support for the framework agreed in early April 2009
between Presidents Obama and Medvedev and offered this specific advice:
In the effort to renew the U.S.-Russian arms control process,
the first step should be modest and straightforward. It is more
important to reinvigorate the strategic arms control process
than to strive for bold new initiatives. A mutual reduction of
operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons in some
increment should be achievable. This first reduction could be a
modest one, but the objective should be to do what can be done
in the short term to rejuvenate the process and ensure that
strategic arms control survives the end of START I at the end
of 2009.
Recalling that reductions in nuclear forces should proceed
only through bilateral agreements, the United States and Russia
should address limits on both launchers and warheads and
discuss how to adopt the comprehensive START verification
measures to any new commitments. Success in taking this first
step will help create the political will to proceed to follow-
on steps on the basis of effective verification.
The Obama administration followed this advice and the treaty
achieves the modest but important objectives that the Commission
envisioned. I urge the committee to report the treaty favorably. This
treaty, reflecting as it does the recommendations of a bipartisan
commission, should provide momentum to reestablish bipartisanship on
strategic arms control treaties and policy.
Although the treaty is limited in its scope, the administration has
achieved the modest but important objectives identified by the
Commission.
The numerical limitations contained in the treaty will permit the
United States to gradually reduce the number of deployed warheads and
the number of launchers in its strategic arsenal over 7 years and in a
manner that will allow the United States to maintain the triad of
delivery systems with each leg contributing to stability and
deterrence. The administration has ample time to make careful choices
about which systems to reduce and to reach a posture that is more than
sufficient for deterrence and assurance.
Moreover, the administration's proposals to the Congress to
modernize the nuclear infrastructure and to substantially increase
spending to assure that the nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure, and
reliable, also follows the recommendations of the Commission. If
approved by the Congress, which I would also strongly urge you to do,
the administration's proposed effort would assure that the nuclear
forces of the United States remain equal to the tasks of deterrence and
assurance.
The committee has asked me evaluate the concerns that have been
raised about the treaty. As I understand them, these concerns, in
addition to doubts about whether Congress will fund the proposed
improvements in the nuclear infrastructure, relate to verification and
to ballistic missile defense.
I will leave it to other witnesses to discuss the technical aspects
of verification. Let me simply say that I have no doubt that Russian
efforts at evasion have no chance of success at the level which could
provide any advantage. With thousands of warheads and hundreds of
delivery vehicles permitted under the treaty, the scale of any possible
undetected cheating would have no impact on our security nor that of
our allies and partners. The question of whether any arms control
treaty is in the American security interest does not turn on whether
there is a 100 percent assurance that the first violation can be
detected on the first day. There can never be such an assurance. Rather
one must ask, in light of the value to the United States of the
limitations and monitoring in the treaty and the range of uncertainty
about possible violations, whether the treaty is in the overall
interest of the United States. That is the standard which informed the
evaluation of the INF Treaty, START I, and START II, and the Moscow
Treaty--all of which were overwhelmingly approved by the Senate--and it
should be the standard for this very modest step.
The BMD issue seems to have generated the greatest level of
concern. I find this surprising and frankly somewhat disappointing. The
New START Treaty simply does not limit the number of launchers the
United States can deploy or otherwise constrain the ability of the
United States to deploy ballistic missile defenses. Period. That should
be the end of the discussion. The concerns expressed are that the
preamble acknowledges the link between offense and defense, that the
treaty bans placing BMD launchers in strategic missile silos, and that
the Russians have asserted a right to withdraw from the treaty if they
determine that American missile defense deployments threaten their
deterrent.
The statement in the preamble is nothing more than a statement of
the obvious and a truth which the United States long urged on the
Russians before they accepted it. The Russian unilateral assertion is
nothing more than a restatement of what is in the treaty and what is
obvious. No one could doubt that a Russian decision to deploy a very
large ballistic missile defense force aimed at shooting down all of the
American missiles that survived a Russian surprise first strike would
lead the United States to carefully evaluate the adequacy of our
offensive forces and to withdraw from the treaty if we determine that
our supreme national interest requires such action. We should not be
surprised if the Russians have the same view.
As the committee well knows, the military and civilian leadership
of the Department of Defense have assured the Senate that the Pentagon
has concluded that placing defensive missiles in existing offensive
silos is not cost-effective. The existing silos that were converted at
Vandenberg, despite some early claims to the contrary by treaty
opponents, have been grandfathered in under the treaty. In any event,
there is nothing in the treaty to prevent the United States from
building new missile defense launchers. So this constraint is of no
significance.
Moreover, it is in the interest of the United States to draw a
bright line between those systems that are limited under the treaty,
strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, and those that are
not, i.e., missile defenses. Rather than seeing this demarcation as a
constraint, a clear line between offenses and defenses ensures an
unconstrained space outside the treaty for a robust missile defense
effort.
I noted that the continuing controversy over BMD was disappointing.
That is so because the Commission, which included many long time
opponents of ballistic missile defense as well as many passionate
advocates, reached a full consensus on this issue, one that is fully
consistent with the treaty as well as with the actions that the Obama
administration has taken and recommended to the Congress. I have
attached the short chapter on this subject from the Commission report
to my statement and ask that it be made part of the record along with
my prepared statement.
The Commission strongly supported technically capable missile
defenses against limited threats such as those that might come from
Iran or North Korea, but it argued against any effort to deploy
defenses directed at Russia or China, warning that ``the United States
should ensure that its actions do not lead Russia or China to take
actions that increase the threat to the United States and its allies
and friends.'' It also urged renewed efforts to insure cooperation with
Russia. It noted that:
For more than a decade the development of U.S. ballistic
missile defenses has been guided by the principles of (1)
protecting against limited strikes while (2) taking into
account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about
strategic stability. These remain sound guiding principles.
Defenses sufficient to sow doubts in Moscow or Beijing about
the viability of their deterrents could lead them to take
actions that increase the threat to the United States and its
allies and friends.
The START Treaty and the policies of the Obama administration are,
down to the last detail, fully consistent with that advice. The
assertion that the treaty should be rejected because of a concern about
BMD amounts to an unfounded assertion that this administration or a
future one would fail to request funding for a ballistic missile
program against a real threat from a third power because of a fear that
Russia would use it as an excuse to withdraw from the treaty. This
administration made clear where it stands when it resisted efforts to
write additional limits on defense into the treaty and was prepared to
walk away from the negotiations if necessary. I have no doubt that
future administrations will act with similar regard to the nation's
security.
Attachment.
America's Strategic Posture--The Final Report of the Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States--Chapter 3
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ambassador Edleman. Madam Chairman, I think I neglected to
ask for your permission to have the text of the formal
statement I----
Senator Shaheen. They will all be included in the record.
Thank you very much.
Ambassador Joseph, you made the point in your testimony
that the United States and Russia should move beyond a cold war
framework for arms control and that during the Bush
administration there was a suggestion that we have less
stringent counting rules and no need for clear verification as
in the Moscow Treaty. But did I misunderstand that you--it
sounded to me like you also were criticizing New START for
having counting rules that are not stringent enough. So I
wondered if you could just--did I misunderstand you, or can you
clarify the difference in the two points that you were making?
Ambassador Joseph. My comments on the counting rules
weren't meant to be a criticism. They were just meant to draw
out the implications of what is in the treaty and what is not
in the treaty.
Senator Shaheen. But I--I guess I am trying to--so are
the--are you comfortable that the counting rules that are in
New START will be an improvement over not having any in the
Moscow Treaty? Or do you think that--that we should go back to
not having any?
Ambassador Joseph. Well, no, I think that the Moscow
Treaty has basically the same counting rules as the New START
Treaty. We are counting operationally deployed warheads. Now,
there is one change. And that is in the bomber counting rule.
And I did not mean to criticize that. It may be something that
is positive for the United States, to have that flexibility
because it is important, I believe, to have the bombers as a
leg of the triad.
But it is only going to provide the flexibility and the
advantage to us if we modernize our bomber force. And right now
that is very much in question. I don't know that we will
modernize and we will go forward with a follow-on to ALCM. If
we don't, we lose the B-52Hs as delivery platforms. I don't
know that in the longer term we are going to modernize by
having a new strategic bomber. These are questions, I think,
that need to be dealt with because the answers affect how, I
believe, the New START agreement needs to be assessed.
Senator Shaheen. OK. Thank you. That is helpful. You also
highlighted what you called gaps in the verification regime in
the treaty. And do you believe that the verification procedures
in the treaty, including resuming onsite inspections and
providing unique identifiers for each weapon--are they more
useful than the complete absence of these that we now have? Or
do you think--not see them as comparable?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator? I am sorry for interrupting.
Senator Shaheen. No, that is OK.
Ambassador Joseph. I think that the data exchanges and the
onsite inspections are likely to provide useful information.
And so, if the question is are we better off with those
provisions than without those provisions, I think the answer is
yes. But that has never been the standard for determining
whether a treaty is verifiable. That is only one factor. We
don't have the intelligence community's assessment yet as to
whether the treaty is verifiable or not.
And in terms of the gaps, I was pointing out gaps in the
ability to monitor future developments in Russian strategic
forces. Without an on-the-ground presence at Votkinsk and
without the type of telemetry that we received under START I,
we are less able to understand what the Russians are doing and
will be doing in the future in terms of modernization. Now,
that may or may not be a factor in the verifiability of the
specific limits of the treaty. But it does undermine this
notion of predictability and mutual confidence-building because
we will know less about their modernization program.
Senator Shaheen. Ambassador Edelman, you pointed out that
there is no way to maintain a credible deterrent and reduce our
stockpile without either testing our stockpile or modernizing
it. Do you believe that the treaty has specific constraints on
doing either of these?
Ambassador Edleman. No, ma'am, I was saying that the
treaty needs to be considered in the broader context of the
circumstance of our nuclear enterprise and our nuclear force.
And I was--most of my remarks, actually, were a long quotation
from Secretary Gates' speech to the Carnegie Endowment in
October 2008. So I was really reflecting Secretary Gates' view.
Senator Shaheen. And do you--are you concerned that the--
the modernization--the dollars that this administration is
putting toward modernization are going to be inadequate? Is
that what you are suggesting?
Ambassador Edleman. I do have a concern about that, which
I hope this committee and the Armed Services Committee would be
looking into carefully. I have seen the one-page White House
press statement about the 1251 report which is a classified
document. I think you all have it. I have not seen that, so I
can't comment really in any granularity about the--the longer
term program. But it--it does strike me that it seems to be a
minimal add-on to the amount of money that Secretary Gates has
offered from the Defense Department budget. And that, I don't
think, is going to be sufficient for the real modernization of
the complex.
Senator Shaheen. And how does it compare to the dollars
that were allotted under the previous administration? Can you
tell us that?
Ambassador Edleman. Well, I mean, the--the previous
administration had a different approach, which was not to
pursue life extensions, but to pursue the RRW. And we were not
successful in getting the funding from the Congress.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Halperin, you pointed out in your testimony that the
treaty could help with the future of the United States-Russian
relationship. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about
what you think the benefits of that would be.
Dr. Halperin. Well, I think that the treaty--sorry. The
treaty reestablishes a legally binding relationship between the
two countries in terms of their nuclear arsenals and in terms
of a set of verification procedures and commitments, for
example, not to interfere with unilateral verification
procedures that I think is important to have. It is, as has
been said, something the Russians wanted. And I think it sets
the framework which enables us to move ahead with other issues.
We can have a debate about whether the Iranian resolution would
have been even worse if we hadn't reached that agreement. It is
clearly not everything we wanted. But I think it provides an
important platform under which we can then engage the Russians
on other issues that are important to our security and to
theirs.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Chairman.
Now, let me just note that many of us on this committee
have cosigned a number of letters with regard to the adequacy
of our deterrent. Secretary Gates has welcomed--back in
September and October of last year subsequently, and I
appreciate that that $5 billion more is being added,
apparently. And Senator Inhofe will be able to help out on that
on defense side, maybe add more. But there is a desire to make
sure we have an adequate arsenal. And those reports are taken
seriously.
Now, I would just indicate that the treaty, as I think you
have suggested, Dr. Joseph, does not get into the railway
situation with regard to the SS-24. I would--would indicate, as
I mentioned this morning, there are no more SS-24 rail mobile
Russian missiles. And one reason is in the Nunn-Lugar program
we got rid of all of them. They are gone. I think the statement
is adequate, it covers historically where we stand. But
nevertheless, I would just indicate that as we try to talk
about this morning with verification and the particulars of
that that one of the reasons why we have made considerable
headway is that under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
which went on for several administrations, we were talking
about maybe 1,500 warheads being left in the Russian situation.
It was mentioned widely this morning that about 5,500 have been
destroyed. And that is a good many more than most of us would
have contemplated at the beginning of the Nunn-Lugar business.
I would just say that one reason so many were destroyed is
that when we had boots on the ground, we had DTRA people there,
the Russians, as a matter of fact, did want to get rid of more
and more materiel because it is expensive. And the problems of
maintaining it or the risks of having it around were very
considerable. My impression is they still do. One reason they
have so little is because it costs a lot, and their budget has
never been quite adequate for all of this.
So I appreciate the need for trying to determine who is
winning or losing in this proposition, but I would be very
skeptical of suggesting that somehow whether this treaty may
lead to a more adversarial relationship. I would--I would just
say anecdotally that after I complete my question at about 10
minutes to 4, I am committed to go to a meeting that Senator
Reid has called and a few folks to talk to President Medvedev
of Russia, who happens to be here in the building. My guess is
that it will not be an adversarial meeting. He will probably
ask when are you going to ratify the treaty. And we will raise
the same with him. As a matter of fact, this is as basic for
getting on with our relationships and getting to serious arms
control talks with regard to the tactical missiles or various
other aspects of this, which in my judgment are not going to
occur without there being at least some structure for this to
happen.
I would just--I would just mention finally that this
morning in our briefing in detail about the verification
procedures there is no absolute way of knowing everything we
need to know about Russia. But much of what we know about
Russia, as you as veterans of the treaty all know, has come
about sometimes inadvertently like some folks wandering around
out there every year visiting with Russians as they opened up
more and more situations.
I can recall vividly, for example, being invited to
Sermash, the submarine base. No American to my knowledge had
been there before. And the only reason I was going is because I
was in Russia and at the time they wanted somebody to talk
seriously about how they were going to get rid of the Typhoon
submarines, which had become very expensive for them and which
they were six. And Tom Clancy's Red October stories of those
submarines going up and down our coasts, the 200 nuclear armed
missiles ship-shot from Philadelphia and New York all this
time--whether we knew about it or not makes no difference. I
went up there, and they would not allow me to take a picture
standing in front of the Typhoon. But they took one and
inadvertently sent it over to us. And it was the first time our
intelligence people had seen something of that size. Right
there.
I would just say simply this was not covered by arms
control. There was no arm twisting. And that has been the
nature of the picture in a pragmatic way. So, you know, I
appreciate the testimony of all three of you. And I am--I am
sorry to get into philosophizing and anecdotes and the past.
But it just seems to me that the bulk of what we were hearing
from many persons is as a practical matter we had better get on
with the job of serious negotiations with the Russians and see
whether we can enlist them for the serious problems you have
illustrated with North Korea, with Iran, with some other
situations which really are very important and for the moment
are not begging us for arms control talks.
This is going to require considerable pressure by the two
countries that have still 95 percent of the stuff left and
therefore, whatever may be the intimidating factors to that.
And so, I am hopeful that as we proceed through this, we retain
really as practical a point of view. And I appreciate the
calmness with which you have approached this and your--and I
appreciate working with you over the years in terms of so many
ways in which we have all tried jointly on behalf of the
country.
And finally, I would just say that I believe that
eventually we will come to some conclusion on this treaty. I am
not certain what the alternative is. Some have suggested, even
in one of our hearings, that what we really ought to develop is
a comprehensive missile defense system in which we shoot down
everything that comes. That is an interesting Star Wars view
and I think just as wild as it can be and not really a part, as
I can see it, of any serious talk about arms control. But I
take seriously anybody in these hearings who comes forward with
any idea. I would hope, however, we would come to find our
agreement--that there is no constraint, no constraint against
our developing missile defense, despite the preamble statement
and ramblings by Russians from time to time. The fact is if the
Russians decide they don't want the treaty, they can walk away
from it. And so can we. My view is that we both want the
treaty. And the problem is sort of getting on with it so we
have a better basis.
Having exhausted all of my time, I will rest and not ask to
get into an argument with any of you. But I appreciate your
coming. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. So you are leaving the argument to me. Is
that it?
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. Let me first of all say that I understand--
I am sorry, Ambassador Edelman, I wasn't here during your
testimony. I had to do a radio call before coming back from the
vote.
But I understand that, Dr. Halperin, you made a comment
about this. I hope you don't think from any comments I made in
my opening statement that I object to this. I have no objection
to this. The fact, though, is that all of the--the--the blogs
that were so critical of me came from John Isaacs, who
contributed to this and is not--this is not--this is not his
organization. I have no problem with this at all.
And also, I am not saying that I owe either Ambassador
Joseph or Ambassador Edelman an apology for my opening
statements. But the fact is that the 17 witnesses prior to this
meeting were all very pro-New START. And all four of the
witnesses that we had in the Senate Armed Services Committee
were also. My point is a hearing is not a hearing in something
as significant as this until you have people that are very much
opposed to it. And I believe that is healthy. I reference the
Law of the Sea Treaty that was--we ended up with very healthy
debating, confrontational hearings because it is--was a very
significant one. And we, as you know, did not end up ratifying
that.
So--so I--I from some of the comments that you made,
Ambassador Joseph, I agree with you some of the things. I think
in terms of our--our delivery systems or, as I referred to it
in my statements on the Senate floor, are force structures. We
do have a problem. And we--we do--you commented about the B-52
and the
B-2. The fact that we did have and authorized in our committee
the next generation bomber, which was taken out 18 months ago
in President Obama's first budget is something I think that one
of the things that I had a problem with. I had other problems.
The main problem I had was what they did with the ground-based
site in Poland.
Well, let me ask the two of you, if I could, the--you heard
me in my opening statement refer to the numbers in the nuclear
force structure, section 1251, retains--and we talked about the
3 delivery ICBM, SLBM and then, of course, the aircraft. Four
hundred and twenty of the ICBMs, sixty of the bombers. Now, we
actually have more than that, but those that have--can be used
for this purpose and then retaining the 240 SLBMs. Now, that
adds up to 720. We are to get--bring that down to 700. Would
either one of you have a specific answer as to how we get
there? You probably don't. This is getting into the weeds, I
know.
Ambassador Edleman. I think the most likely answer would
be from the bomber wing of the triad. But I'd--I'd go back to
what Ambassador Joseph said. One of the concerns I have is I
think the 1251 statement says up to 60 bombers. I think there
are 18 operational B-2s, which means about 42, by my count, B-
52Hs. But--but that 42 B-52H number of delivery platforms is,
as--as Ambassador Joseph said, totally dependent on a follow-on
to ALCM. And we could very easily find ourselves some time in
the next couple of years with a bomber leg of the TRIAD that is
only 18 B-2s. That would be a matter of some concern to me
because, as the Schlesinger Commission reported--not the one
that Ambassador Mort Halperin was on, but the one that
Secretary Schlesinger did for Secretary Gates about the Minot
episode--very strongly suggested that the bomber wing of the
triad remains extremely important. It is--it is the one tool
the President in the crisis has to signal. And it is the one
set of nuclear weapons he has which are recallable. And so, I
would be very worried that some of this comes out--to get down
to the 700--out of the bomber leg.
Senator Inhofe. OK. And I appreciate that. Ambassador
Edelman, you also--in my absence my staff tells me that you
said you did agree with Senator Inhofe on one point. But you
didn't say what that point was.
Ambassador Edleman. I am not--I think it might have been
on the--first of all, I don't mean to suggest that it is the
only point on which I agree with you. But I think it was on the
question of whether the launcher limits worked a hardship on--
on U.S. ability to provide the deterrent. I think that is what
it was.
Senator Inhofe. OK. That is--that is fine. One of the
problems I have had, of course, is in the tactical area where
we are out-manned about 10 to 1. And I have found a statement
that was made--if I can find it here. Here it is--by Senator
Biden at that time, 2003. That was Senator Biden. He said,
``After entry into force of the Moscow Treaty, getting a handle
on the Russian tactical nuclear weapons must be a top arms
control and nonproliferation objective of the United States
Government.'' Do the two of you agree with his statement at
that time?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I have for a long time thought
it was necessary to get a handle on the great disparity in so-
called nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Every time I hear the term
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, I recall that no nuclear weapon
is nonstrategic.
Senator Inhofe. OK.
Ambassador Joseph. This notion of a nonstrategic nuclear
weapon is one that is derived from the old arms control
dialogue. It is a total artificiality. It relates to the
inability to count these weapons in the past and to verify
them. And when we had thousands and thousands of strategic
weapons, it was kind of OK to put them off to one side as a
convenience. But I have never thought of them as nonstrategic.
I imagine a short-range nuclear weapon going off anywhere, and
the consequences would be fundamentally strategic.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir.
Ambassador Joseph. We have not been able to get a handle
on those. In 2002, the Bush administration was criticized for
the Treaty of Moscow by a number of Members of the Senate for
not getting a handle on those. This treaty does not get a
handle on these so-called tactical nonstrategic theater--call
them what you will--just don't call them strategic. I think we
very much need to because the importance of this category of
weapons has gone up as the number of strategic weapons has gone
down. In 2002, we were talking about 6,000 weapons under START
I. Now we are below 2,200. The great disparity in this category
of weapons, which gives the Russians an 8 to 1 or 10 to 1
advantage--I am not entirely sure what the numbers are--is
clearly important. And to me it raises the possibility for the
first time--for the first time since the Kennedy
administration--we are at risk of sacrificing or changing a
fundamental policy which was a set--a nuclear posture second to
none. I think we are approaching a nuclear posture second to
one.
Senator Inhofe. To none. All right, that is very good. I
know my time is expired. But if it is--if it is----
Senator Shaheen. Actually, I would prefer if we could go
on. I also have to leave, and we have two more people to ask
questions. So thank you.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First of all, let me say that I have the highest regard for
our ranking member's view of all of these things. And he
mentioned the fact that there has been discussion about the--
there has been a lot of discussion about our ability and our
fortitude to defend ourselves from incoming missiles. And
certainly, I think the consensus is that--that it would be
really impossible to develop a full umbrella where you could
stop everything coming in everywhere. But on the other hand, I
think if we ignored our own peril, having some type of a
missile defense system, not as much as from Russia as from the
other rogue nations who threaten us, we do so really at our own
peril. And while we are about it, it seems to me that even
though you could not put a full umbrella up, as technology
develops, we could strategically protect military
installations, the seat of government, the largest populations
in our country. And we have a real disagreement with the
Russians on that. And I--one of the things I am troubled with--
with all this is that we do not have an agreement. We have a
disagreement. And so, I mean, how do you vote for an agreement
when it is, in fact, a disagreement?
So I have--I have maintained reservations about the treaty
in that regard. And I continue to--to do so. But--but we have
moved on, it seems like, to some other subjects. And so, I
would like to get--this is only my second year on the
committee. And I find it stunning, absolutely stunning that we
have not had a compliance report since 2005. I mean, I do not
get it. Now, the law of the United States, as I understand it,
is this committee is supposed to be provided with a compliance
report annually. And we have not had one since 2005. Yet I am
being asked to exercise the constitutional requirement that I
have to say ``yea'' or ``nay'' to this treaty. And I do not
know how much cheating has gone on for the last 5 years. So I
would kind of like to get each of your views briefly because I
think we are going to have a vote here pretty quick. But I
would like to get each of your views briefly as to why or what
you make of the fact that we have not had a compliance report
and we are operating here in the dark.
Ambassador Edleman. Senator, I was in the Department of
Defense from 2005 to 2008, so--and those reports are normally
prepared in the Department of State. So I--to be quite honest
with you, I do not have an answer for you on why they have not
been done.
Senator Risch. Well, do you share my concern about this?
Ambassador Edleman. Yes.
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I was in the Department of
State. And--from 2005 to 2007. And I did periodically ask why
the compliance reports--because I think they are--we are
obligated to provide those on an annual basis--why we were
having so much difficulty getting those reports to the Senate.
And the answer kept coming back each time--it was--it was the
interagency. Not a very good answer, but I think it probably is
the correct answer. The process just could not deliver what was
required under the report.
Senator Risch. Well, it is only the law.
Ambassador Joseph. I agree, Senator.
Senator Risch. Ambassador Halperin.
Dr. Halperin. I have no insight on that, Senator.
Senator Risch. Madam Chairman, that is all I have. Thank
you.
Senator Shaheen. Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank
the witnesses today. But, frankly, I am--I am almost stunned
that anyone in this Senate would accept as an impossibility
that America with our technology and what we have seen change
in technology over the last several decades--would accept that
we could never develop a missile defense system that could
shoot down multiple missiles. With what is happening in laser
technology, with electromagnetic fields, with--it is just hard
for me to believe that we would accept indefinitely this idea
that we have to be vulnerable to missile attacks. So that part
of the whole equation of this is--is still unacceptable to me.
But I would like to ask Ambassadors--Mr. Joseph and Edelman
about negotiating records. And I think you have been--you have
received negotiating records for--for antiballistic missiles,
the ABM Treaty, Intermediate Range Treaty. I would just like to
get a little bit of details on that because, as my colleagues
says here, this is more of a disagreement than an agreement as
far as what is being said about the treaty right now. And if it
is just something where if they do not like it, they get out
and we do not like it, we get out, that does not sound like a
whole lot to me. That does not sound really worth our time.
But since there have been conflicting reports about what
has been promised, it would appear to be helpful in our
decisionmaking to see what was said at the negotiating table.
Is this unprecedented for us to ask for the negotiating
records?
I will start with you, Mr. Edelman.
Ambassador Edleman. No, it is certainly not unprecedented
to my knowledge. I was not involved in some of the earlier
negotiations. Ambassador Joseph may be more expert on this. But
I would think in particular on some of these disputed issues it
would be helpful for the Senate to have the negotiating record
in--in understanding what actually occurred.
For instance, on the issue of--of rail-mobile, which
Senator Lugar addressed and my colleague addressed in some
detail in his statement and Mort Halperin addressed, I think
the view that Mort expressed in his testimony is undoubtedly
the administration view, as Secretary Miller testified to and
the view that the United States would put forward. We do know
from statements that have been made by senior Russians,
including General Gagarin, the deputy of the strategic rocket
forces, the commander, that the Russians have an interest,
again, in rail-mobile. They have taken down all the SS-24s that
Senator Lugar said. But they are interested in pursuing this in
the future.
There is at least an interpretation of--of the treaty that
it--that they do not ever enter into accountability because at
Russian request the definitions for rail-mobile were deleted
from the treaty. So I think it would be illuminating in the
first instance for the members to get the negotiating record,
find out what exactly happened, what were the discussions, why
was it not included, why weren't the definitions carried over
from--from START I, as just one example.
I would give another example--the limits on missile defense
in article 5, section 3. Mr. Halperin said that, as
administration witnesses have said, that those are not
important limits or not very significant limits. But they are
still limits. And it accedes to the principle that in these
negotiations, missile defense can be limited, where we can put
them, how we do it. I would like to see, if I were in your
shoes, the negotiating record on that, in part because Alexi
Arbatov, a very senior Russian expert on arms control, has said
that this limit was specifically put into the treaty at Russian
request. Well, if the United States in the course of these
negotiations made that concession to Russia, I think the
members of the Senate ought to know what we got for it.
Senator DeMint. Ambassador Joseph, do you agree with that
assessment?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I do. I think it is
appropriate. And I think it is necessary in some cases for the
Senate to have access to the record in order to have a full
understanding of what the provisions are and what the
implications are. And as my colleague said, you know, what did
we get for the types of concessions that we made, other than
the treaty? I mean, maybe that is the answer. We got a treaty.
But I think exploring the negotiating record is something that
would be very useful.
Senator Inhofe. Could I mention something? We made that
request already. But the Armed Services----
Senator Shaheen. Senator, would you like to yield some of
your time to Senator Inhofe?
I am sorry. We are on a tight schedule. And I apologize for
that.
Senator DeMint. I appreciate the Senator's comments there.
He can add any he would like. So--but let me, since I am
running out of time, just one other issue. I think implicitly
the treaty accepts the idea that these are two--the United
States and Russia are two superpowers agreeing to parity as far
as nuclear missiles. As I look at the size of our economies,
our role in the world, again, it is another assumption that is
very difficult for me to accept. The United States is a
protector of many and a threat to none. Russia is a protector
of none and a threat to many. Over 30 countries count on us.
Yet we are bringing our--offensive capabilities down to the
Russian level and in the process agreeing not to develop a
missile defense system that is capable of threatening that
offensive capability. The only flexibility we have with missile
defense is to develop a system that does not threaten Russia. I
mean, that is clear from the hearings with Secretary Clinton
and Gates. It is clear from the treaty. But this concept of--of
parity with a third world economy that is--is using its energy
to extort power from other countries--again, something that
seems absurd to me at this time for the United States to accept
a parity role with Russia.
Am I way off base? Does it make sense for us to agree to
this? To me that seems like a destabilizing concept. It seems
like it is going to send a number of our allies that depend on
our umbrella of protection into the mode of developing their
own nuclear weapons. And again, Ambassador, one of you?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, my skepticism is that we
continue to apply cold-war approaches in our relationship with
Russia. And to me that plays to the worst instincts of Russia
because they see parity as sort of restoring their superpower
status. But they see it in the context of the United States
being the adversary. I think that a better way to improve our
relations with Russia--and I am an advocate of that--is to
focus on those areas where we have common interests, such as
stopping a terrorist acquiring a nuclear weapon, such as
working together as nuclear energy expands, but to do that
together in a way that limits access to reprocessing technology
or enrichment technology.
I think working together in other areas will build
confidence and will build trust in our relationship. There are
always going to be difficulties in the United States-Russian
relationship, at least in the near and mid-term. I mean,
Georgia is--is a clear indication of that. But we can establish
a non-cold-war-type relationship. But when we continue the
practice of cold-war arms control, I think we move in the wrong
direction.
And--and when we talk about the terms of the treaty--the
rail-mobile issue has been raised a couple of times. I raised
it in my prepared statement. The problem with the treaty is
that it is ambiguous. And these ambiguities will play out in
different forms in the bilateral consultative commission in
this case, and will continue to undermine confidence. It will
continue to create problems.
I think this is a--a terrific opportunity for the Senate to
clarify this issue, to take away the ambiguity--because the
ambiguity exists. And we can have our interpretation, and they
can have a different interpretation. That is not the sort of
treaty that you want to sign, it seems to me. We need to have
precise and clear obligations. And both parties need to agree
to that.
Senator DeMint. Thank you for your indulgence, Madam Chair.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator. Again, I apologize
because I have to leave. So we are going to have to close this
hearing. But we will----
Senator Inhofe. May I ask a question of the Chair?
Senator Shaheen. Let me just finish my point. We will leave
the record open for questions until Monday. And hopefully that
will allow any further questions to be done. Did you have a
final point, Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. No, that would be--that was my request.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Thank you to the witnesses.
Senator Shaheen. Again, thank you very much to all of our
witnesses.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement From the Partnership for A Secure America
Nuclear arms control is a critical pillar of America's national
security. Negotiated agreements to reduce the threat posed by the Cold
War nuclear arms race have always enjoyed strong bipartisan support in
the U.S.
In 1982, President Reagan proposed that the U.S. and the Soviet
Union reduce their nuclear arsenals by thousands of warheads each. This
proposal became the basis for the 1991 START I treaty. Since that time,
every U.S. President, in concert with Russia, has advanced President
Reagan's legacy through steady and prudent reductions of the world's
two largest nuclear arsenals, including the 2002 Treaty of Moscow,
signed by Presidents Bush and Putin.
On April 8, 2010, Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the new
START treaty, agreeing to further reduce both sides' arsenals and bring
into force a new regime for inspections and verification. This was a
necessary and appropriate step toward safeguarding our national
security. Without the new START, the U.S. has no legally binding
ability to conduct inspections of Russia's nuclear arsenal, and would
be a in a far weaker position to lead the world in stopping nuclear
proliferation.
Now is the time for a thorough and balanced national discussion
about nuclear arms control and proliferation. But we must remember that
a world without a binding U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons agreement is a
much more dangerous world.
We, the undersigned Republicans and Democrats, support the new
START treaty because we believe that it:
Enhances stability, transparency, and predictability between the
world's two largest nuclear powers, which together possess
about 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons;
Contains verification and inspection measures essential to U.S.
national security and nuclear threat reduction as it relates to
Russia's strategic nuclear weapons;
Addresses our Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations and
therefore assists in gaining cooperation from other countries
on key nonproliferation priorities;
Helps strengthen broader U.S.-Russia cooperation, which is
important in responding to proliferation challenges from Iran
and North Korea;
Does not inhibit our ability to maintain an effective and reliable
nuclear arsenal; and
Does not constrain our ability to develop and deploy missile
defense systems.
Madeline Albright, Secretary of State 1997-2001
Howard Baker, U.S. Senator (R-TN) 1967-85
Samuel Berger, National Security Advisor 1997-2001
Linton Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
2002-2007
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense 1977-81
Frank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense 1987-89
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State 1993-97
William Cohen, Secretary of Defense 1997-2001
John C. Danforth, U.S. Senator (R-MO) 1977-95
Kenneth M. Duberstein, White House Chief of Staff 1988-89
Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator (R-NE) 1997-2009
Lee Hamilton, U.S. Congressman (D-IN) 1965-99, Co-Chair, PSA Advisory
Board
Gary Hart, U.S. Senator (D-CO) 1975-87
Rita E. Hauser, Chair, International Peace Institute
Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative 1989-93
Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, U.S. Senator (R-KS) 1978-97
Thomas Kean, Governor (R-NJ) 1982-90, 9/11 Commission Chair
Richard Leone, President, The Century Foundation
Donald McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the UN 1979-81
Sam Nunn, U.S. Senator (D-GA) 1972-96
William Perry, Secretary of Defense 1994-97
Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State 1997-2000
Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State 2001-05
Warren Rudman, U.S. Senator (R-NH) 1080-92, Co-Chair, PSA Advisory
Board
Alan Simpson, U.S. Senator (R-WY) 1979-97
George Shultz, Secretary of State 1982-89
Theodore Sorensen, White House Special Counsel, 1961-63
John Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State 1985-88
Timothy E. Wirth, U.S. Senator (D-CO) 1987-93
Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of State 1992-93
MAINTAINING A SAFE, SECURE, AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR ARSENAL
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 15, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:55 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Casey, Kaufman, Lugar, Corker,
Isakson, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Thank you all
for being so orderly already. And we welcome you to this, which
will be the last public hearing on the subject of the New START
Treaty.
I'm very pleased to welcome the directors of our Nation's
three nuclear weapons laboratories. Together, our three
witnesses today are responsible for maintaining the safety and
reliability of our deterrent forces. That's a task that
requires not only a significant commitment to our Nation's
defense, but also the highest degree of scientific knowledge
and technical skill.
We're very fortunate that this responsibility has fallen to
the three dedicated professionals who are here this afternoon,
and we thank you for your commitment and careers.
I said this is the last. I might just comment this is the
12th hearing that we've held on the New START Treaty. We've
scrutinized the text of the treaty. We've scrutinized the
protocol, the three technical annexes. We've reviewed the
National Intelligence Estimate on the agreement, a State
Department report on verifiability, and an analysis of Russian
compliance with past arms control agreements. We've heard from
20 witnesses from across the ideological spectrum, some more
than once. As Henry Kissinger said, ``The hearing process has
been not just bipartisan, it has been nonpartisan.''
Throughout the process, one thing has become clear: The New
START Treaty will make a vital contribution to American
security. It will limit the number of nuclear weapons deployed
by the United States and Russia. It will give us flexibility
about how we meet those limits. Its verification provisions
will deepen our understanding of Russia's nuclear forces, and
perhaps most important, it will strengthen our efforts to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states and
terrorists.
Support for the New START Treaty has, frankly, been
overwhelming, from both Republicans and Democrats. In our first
hearing, James Schlesinger called ratification, ``obligatory.''
James Baker said that New START is an important part of our
efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. And Stephen
Hadley, George W. Bush's national security advisor, said that
we need to see this treaty in the context of a 20-year effort
spanning administrations of both parties.
Those same points were made again, 2 weeks ago, when 30
high-ranking former officials released a letter calling for
ratification. That prestigious group included four former
Secretaries of State, four former Secretaries of Defense, and
the chair and vice chair of the 9/11 Commission. Many of the
signatories, like George Shultz, served in the Reagan
administration. Their participation reminded us that the
process of strategic reductions supported by intrusive
verification is one of President Reagan's greatest legacies.
That legacy has always garnered strong bipartisan support in
the U.S. Senate. The INF Treaty, the original START Treaty, the
Moscow Treaty were all approved by overwhelming majorities.
But, this committee, I'm pleased to say, and appropriately,
has not offered its support automatically. We've asked tough
questions. We've perused the record and demanded accountability
from the negotiators, and I think we've gotten answers to the
questions that we've asked.
Now, at first, some members, and some others, expressed
concern that the treaty's verification provisions were not as
stringent as those in the original START Treaty. But, we have,
in fact, learned that this treaty includes new tools, like
unique identifying numbers for all delivery vehicles. Its
inspections will allow for new information, such as the number
of warheads on each missile, which will be subject to
inspection. And, of course, the treaty's verification
provisions are, in fact, far more than what we have now, today,
as we sit here, which is nothing, because the original START
Treaty has expired.
There's also been concern that the treaty limits our
missile defense options. This has been a frequently raised
issue. I think we've pressed our Nation's top military
officials on this issue, and I know that their response has
been unanimous. This treaty does not, and will not, constrain
missile defense in any meaningful way. The United States will
continue to develop and deploy defenses, as we choose to,
against possible attack from states like North Korea and Iran,
and, were we to choose to, even against the potential of an
attack from Russia or some other country.
Anyone who opposes this treaty because of alleged
restrictions on missile defense needs to explain why their
particular military judgment is better than that of the general
in charge of the Strategic Command, better than the general
directing the Missile Defense Agency, better than the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, better than the Secretary of
Defense--who was, after all, appointed to that position by
George W. Bush originally.
Today, we're going to discuss a final issue that has been
raised. How do you ensure that the weapons that we retain under
the treaty are adequately maintained so as to maintain
America's deterrence? As our colleague Senator Kyl wrote in the
Wall Street Journal last week, the New START Treaty should be
considered within the context of our overall nuclear weapons
policy, including funding for the nuclear infrastructure. I
agree with that. But, as these issues are interrelated, you
have to move forward on both of them together.
The President has requested $80 billion over the next 10
years to maintain our nuclear weapons and modernize the nuclear
complex so that we preserve our nuclear deterrent for as long
as we need it. Eighty billion dollars is a significant
investment, folks, representing a 15-percent increase over
baseline spending even after accounting for inflation. That's
an additional $1 billion per year to guarantee the
modernization program.
Linton Brooks, who served President George W. Bush as head
of the National Nuclear Security Administration, has said that
he would have killed for a budget like this.
I'd like to assure our witnesses that killing will not be
necessary. [Laughter.]
But, now we need to move ahead on the New START. If we
don't, we will set back the cause of American nuclear security
and, frankly, harm our own efforts, with respect to
proliferation, that are very real now, in terms of Iran, Iran
sanctions, and where we will be, come September, at the United
Nations meetings at that time.
This treaty, in my judgment, marks an important step
forward toward safety in a world that is threatened by rogue
states and terrorists with nuclear ambitions. As Dr. Kissinger
said, ``This committee's decision will affect the prospects for
peace for a decade or more.''
Our witnesses today are responsible for maintaining the
health of our nuclear arsenal. Dr. Michael Anastasio is the
director of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. George Miller
is the director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. And
Dr. Paul Hommert is the director of Sandia National
Laboratories.
Gentlemen, it's an honor to have all of you here today, and
we look forward to your testimony.
I might add that we will enter into the record the
testimony of Linton Brooks, whose appearance before the
committee was canceled at the time that the Senate marked the
death of Senator Robert Byrd earlier this month.
[The statement referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
on the New START Treaty
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this committee with my
views on the New START Treaty. Although those views are informed by my
government service, especially as negotiator of the START I treaty, I
am appearing as a private citizen and my views do not necessarily
represent the views of any organization with which I am affiliated.
I first testified before this committee in support of an arms
control agreement almost 20 years ago. Then as now, the country
benefited greatly from the committee's careful scrutiny of both the
benefits and drawbacks of each agreement. As you carry out your
consideration of New START, I want to encourage you not to evaluate it
by cold-war standards. During the cold war, we wanted to constrain the
arms race--thereby saving money--and to improve stability in a crisis
by encouraging a shift away from ICBMs with multiple warheads.
Neither of these objectives is appropriate today. There is no arms
race to cap and thus no savings to be had. Improving stability in a
crisis is still an important goal and I would prefer that this treaty
encourage such stability. Conditions in Russia, however, preclude
massive restructuring of their strategic forces no matter what arms
control says. Thus, the two sides agreed at the onset of the New START
negotiations that each would be free to structure its forces as it sees
fit. This is consistent with the views of the last administration as
well.
Instead of using a traditional cold-war standard, I believe the
Senate should evaluate the degree to which New START fulfills the
following four objectives:
First, reduce suspicion and avoid misunderstanding through
increased transparency and predictability. Transparency leads
to predictability and predictability leads to stability. Here I
believe New START breaks new ground. In cold-war treaties, we
limited verification provisions to those necessary to verify
formal treaty limits. New START provides some exchanges purely
for transparency. For example, it assigns a unique identifier
to each nondeployed system and provides for an exchange of data
on the movements and locations of those systems, even though
there are no numerical limits on nondeployed missiles. The most
important example, however, is the agreement to exchange
telemetry data on up to five ballistic missile launches a year,
even though such data is not needed to verify any treaty
limits. The treaty states that this exchange ``is designed to
help forge a new strategic relationship of the Parties.''
Second, improve the overall political relationship with the Russian
Federation. The ability to work together on a complex issue
helps advance the administration's aim to ``reset'' relations
with Russia. It will be some time before we know the degree to
which relations have improved and we may never know how much
credit for any improvement goes to New START. I suspect that
the record of cooperation will be mixed. For example, some will
see the recent Russian support for a United Nations Security
Council resolution imposing additional sanctions on Iran as an
example of improved cooperation, while others perceive the
sanctions as of limited effect and a sign that true Russian
cooperation has not yet arrived. But it seems clear, as former
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger told this committee, that
failure of the United States to ratify New START would deal a
serious blow to United States--Russian relations and thus to
our ability to work together on important international
security issues.
Third, increase international support for nuclear nonproliferation
and for measures to counter nuclear terrorism by demonstrating
a renewed emphasis on arms control and disarmament. No one
believes that states like Iran or North Korea will change their
behavior because of New START ratification, but the
administration hopes other nonnuclear states will be willing to
take stronger actions to counter proliferation and to thwart
nuclear terrorism now that the United States has reburnished
its disarmament credentials. While I hope that the
administration is right, and while their arguments are
plausible, evidence that this will actually happen is lacking.
It is certainly true that some states tell us they are
unwilling to adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol or to convert
research reactors from use of highly enriched uranium because
we are not meeting our disarmament obligations under Article VI
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It is unclear if these
are reasons or excuses. Ratification of New START will let us
call their bluff and take away excuses for inaction.
Finally, take tangible steps toward the elimination of nuclear
weapons. While I am a skeptic about both the feasibility and
the desirability of nuclear abolition, it is a stated U.S.
policy. The first step is obviously reductions in the arsenals
of the two largest nuclear powers. Because abolition cannot
happen for decades (if ever), I do not believe that it is
necessary to support abolition in order to favor New START.
The only treaties in which the United States gets absolutely
everything it wants are the kind signed on the deck of the Missouri to
end a war. The committee and the Senate will need to consider possible
shortcomings as well as possible advantages of New START. In doing so,
it will wish to consider several concerns raised by thoughtful
observers. I believe the following are the most significant:
A concern that the verification procedures and the transparency
they provide are less than those available under the now
expired START I Treaty. It is important to distinguish between
provisions needed to verify adherence to the limits of the
treaty and those designed to enhance transparency. Because the
Soviet Union appeared bent on a major buildup, START I had a
number of subsidiary limits designed to prevent circumvention.
Verifying those limits provided a good deal of useful
transparency. But in an era of reductions, these limits are no
longer required. Thus, New START has only three numerical
limits, on launchers, missiles and warheads. While the Senate
will need to study the recently submitted monitoring NIE and,
once it has been submitted, the verification assessment, I
believe it is virtually certain it will find the treaty
effectively verifiable. With respect to transparency, some of
what was possible under the original START Treaty (monitoring
production of mobile missiles, for example) is not provided for
in New START. But I believe the correct comparison is not with
what was available under START I but with what is available
today with no treaty regime, no data exchange and no
inspections.
Another concern, that New START may limit U.S. ballistic missile
defenses. The only explicit provision in this area is a ban on
converting ICBM or SLBM launchers to launchers for ballistic
missile defense. It is unfortunate that the administration
allowed the perception that there would be no provisions
outside the preamble, but such conversions would be a bad idea
and banning them has no impact on our ability to field
effective ballistic missile defenses. When New START was
signed, the Russians made a unilateral statement that
significant improvements in U.S. defenses would justify their
withdrawal under the supreme national interest clause. This has
no legal effect and is an obvious effort to pressure the United
States. The Soviets made a similar statement to me about START
I in June 1991. We ignored it in 1991 and should ignore it now.
The Senate might consider language in the resolution of
ratification making it clear it rejects such an attempt to
pressure the United States.
A third concern, that the treaty doesn't cover so-called Russian
tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons are of particular
concern to some of our NATO allies. The Administration plans to
include all nuclear weapons, including Russian tactical
weapons, in future negotiations, although that may be
difficult. While I think it is unwise and inappropriate to
dictate details of U.S. negotiating strategy in advance, the
Senate may wish to use the resolution of ratification to make
explicit its expectation that such weapons will be dealt with
in any future treaty.
Finally, many in the Senate are concerned about funding for the
nuclear weapons enterprise. I share that concern. The FY 2011
President's budget, if enacted, will provide a dramatic
improvement, provided the increased funding is sustained in the
future. I understand the administration has been forceful in
supporting the weapons budget. The Senate should be equally
forceful in working with House appropriators to ensure adequate
funding for the nuclear weapons enterprise. Further, the
Congress should be prepared to accept additional increases in
the future if required. An important component of the
President's budget is funding for two major new nuclear
faculties: a Uranium Processing Facility in Tennessee and a
plutonium laboratory in New Mexico. Large, complex, one-of-a-
kind nuclear facilities often experience cost growth. While the
Congress should insist on sound construction management, if
cost growth occurs, Congress should work with the
administration to provide additional
funds so that necessary weapons science and stockpile
stewardship are not threatened.
Each Senator must decide whether the benefits of New START overcome
any concerns. In my view, the benefits--especially transparency and the
improved political relationship with Russia--are significant, while the
concerns are of limited importance. Thus, my professional judgment is
that U.S. security would be best served by the Senate providing its
advice and consent to ratification.
The Chairman. And I'd also like, if there is no objection,
to enter into the record a letter I received yesterday from
Secretary Shultz and from our former colleague Senator Sam Nunn
in which they both strongly endorsed the New START Treaty and
called for its swift ratification.
[The letter referred to follows:]
Nuclear Security Project,
Washington, DC, July 14, 2010.
Hon. John F. Kerry,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Kerry: The potential use of nuclear weapons is one of
the gravest dangers the world faces. Working with former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger and former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, we
have called for U.S. leadership to help build a solid consensus for
reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution
to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and
ultimately ending them as a threat to the world. One important step
involves the renewal of nuclear arms talks between the United States
and Russia and the conclusion of the New START Treaty, signed by
President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev on April 8, 2010,
in Prague.
We commend you for your leadership in scheduling hearings over the
past two months in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a
distinguished group of administration officials, former officials, and
experts, and for your thorough and expeditious review of the New START
agreement. Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Perry have both testified
before the Senate in support of the New START agreement. In his
testimony, Secretary Perry concluded that the New START Treaty ``is a
clear signal that the United States is serious about carrying out our
responsibilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' and
``improves strategic stability between the United States and Russia.''
Secretary Kissinger stated, ``The treaty, with its inspection and
verification regime, is a significant confidence-building measure that
may help lay the foundation for more constructive U.S.-Russia
relations.'' In other expert testimony, former Director of Central
Intelligence, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy James
Schlesinger stated, ``It is obligatory for the United States to
ratify'' New START.
The two of us also want to make clear our support for New START and
express our hope that the Committee can now move expeditiously with
their report and a vote recommending New START for consideration by the
full Senate. We recognize the importance of the Senate giving full
consideration to the related hearings held by the Senate Armed Services
Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
We strongly endorse the goals of this Treaty--to achieve a near-
term reduction of nuclear weapons with mutually agreed verification
procedures. We believe the threat of nuclear terrorism remains urgent,
fueled by the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technology
around the world. While this is a global issue, there are two
countries--the United States and Russia--whose cooperation is
absolutely essential in order to successfully deal with current nuclear
threats. With New START, our odds of establishing a more cooperative
relationship with Russia improverecognizing this will be a process of
engagement broader than anyone treaty.
Noting the full support of the Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and following our
own review of the Treaty, we urge the Senate to give its advice and
consent to ratification of New START as early as is feasible. We also
urge the two governments to begin planning now for even more
substantial reductions in the future involving all nuclear weapons,
strategic and tactical, deployed and non-deployed. An identical letter
has been provided to Senator Lugar.
Sincerely,
Hon. George P. Shultz,
Hoover Institution,
Stanford, CA.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Nuclear Threat Initiative,
Washington, DC.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As you pointed out today, the committee holds another very
important hearing on the New START Treaty, and I join you in
welcoming this distinguished panel of weapons experts.
As I mentioned last January in a speech to the Conference
on Strategic Weapons in the 21st century, the work of our
National Laboratories in science and stockpile stewardship is
indispensable for our national security. In addition to
ensuring that our nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and
reliable, our laboratories also serve as engines of innovation
that we hope will provide new technologies to tackle the vast
array of energy, environmental, and medical challenges facing
our Nation and the world.
This hearing is unique because, as our witnesses will make
clear, the New START Treaty will not affect the mission of our
laboratories. The treaty explicitly states that,
``modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may
be carried out.'' The management of both deployed and
nondeployed warheads will not be fundamentally altered by entry
into force of the New START Treaty. Yet, our consideration of
New START has intensified a debate on modernization and
stockpile stewardship programs in which our National
Laboratories play a central role.
The three National Laboratories represented here today form
the core of the United States nuclear weapons complex.
Collectively, they must certify annually, to the President and
to the Congress, that our nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and
reliable.
Near the end of the last administration, a consensus
developed that more needed to be done to ensure the vitality of
our nuclear weapons complex, even as a framework for a
successor to START I was sought. As Secretary Gates stated in
his 2008 speech at the Carnegie Endowment, and I quote from the
Secretary, ``We will lead the way in reducing our arsenal, but
we must always hedge against the dangerous and unpredictable
world.''
The Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review appears
to set a high bar for replacement of our nuclear weapons. The
NPR states that, in considering any decision on engineering
development for our weapons, the administration will give,
``strong preference,'' to options for refurbishment or reuse,
and that replacement would occur only if, ``critical stockpile
management program goals could not otherwise be met and if
specifically authorized by the President and Congress.''
Now, reinvestment in our nuclear stockpile will require
substantial planning and funding. The administration's fiscal
year 2011 budget--that request includes $624 million, an
increase, for atomic energy defense activities. This is a
welcome start to a longer process of budgeting and
reinvestment. These plans were laid out in broad terms in the
report submitted to Congress under section 1251 of last year's
Defense Authorization Act.
This is a good plan, that should be executed. I look
forward to engaging with our three laboratory directors today,
and I hope to hear from them how the plans and budgets reported
to the Senate are sufficient to maintain confidence in our
nuclear weapons stockpile and the infrastructure that supports
them.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Dr. Anastasio, I think you're going to start, and we're
just going to run right down the table. Thank you very much.
Dr. Anastasio. Well, thank you very much----
The Chairman. I might add, if you want to summarize, that
would be certainly advantageous to the committee, in terms of
time for questions, and your full texts will be placed in the
record in full as if read. But----
Dr. Anastasio. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. But, do what you need to do.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL R. ANASTASIO, DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS
NATIONAL LABORATORY, LOS ALAMOS, NM
Dr. Anastasio. Well, Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar,
and members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
I'm Dr. Michael Anastasio, the director of the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and it's a real honor for me to be here
with you.
I've devoted the bulk of my career to the nuclear weapons
enterprise; since 2006 as the director of Los Alamos, but
originally as a weapons designer at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory before becoming director there in 2002.
In the President's April 2009 Prague speech, and in the
recently released Nuclear Posture Review, this administration
has directly linked reductions in nuclear weapons to the
maintenance of the nuclear arsenal, both in support of the
overall goal to reduce nuclear danger.
Secretary of Energy Steven Chu testified recently that as
the stockpile size decreases in size, the role of science,
technology, and engineering in deterrence will increase in
importance.
The reductions proposed in New START highlight the
importance of the laboratories' mission and the need for a
healthy and vibrant science, technology, and engineering base.
And so, I would like to bring forward three main points today
to emphasize with you.
The first point is that the Stockpile Stewardship Program
that was created by Congress in the mid-1990s has had many
successes that were--by the way--no means assured at the outset
of the program. We've maintained a safe, secure, and effective
stockpile for the Nation without having to resort to nuclear
testing. And, so far, we have retained the knowledge and
skilled workforce of outstanding scientists and engineers.
We've built many of the tools required for the task, in the
form of the world's fastest computers and new experimental
capabilities, such as the DARHT, the NIF, and MESA.
But, we're not finished. Because of the science we've
developed, we now know more about nuclear weapons than we ever
have. In particular, we've learned that our systems are aging,
and that almost every one of them will require some form of
life-extension activity in the next 25 years. The available
mitigation actions are reaching their limits, and we have not
challenged the full skill set of our workforce. Therefore, we
must go beyond the refurbishments that have been considered to
date as we look to the future.
My second point is that the Obama administration has put in
place a new nuclear policy in its Nuclear Posture Review and in
the FY11 budget submission. It calls for a significant increase
in Weapons Activities. The NPR calls for a case-by-case
analysis of the full range of life-extension approaches:
refurbishment, reuse, and replacement. It also expresses, as
we've heard, a strong preference for refurbishment or reuse in
a decision to proceed to engineering development.
I understand the sensitivity of this issue, but personally
I do not feel overly constrained by the language in the NPR.
Rather, I believe it provides the necessary flexibility to
manage the stockpile with acceptable levels of risk. It's
always my obligation to ensure that the best technical
recommendations to meet requirements are brought forward for
consideration.
The FY 2011 budget request, which calls for a $624 million
increase, is essential. This is a positive step, and I urge
Congress to approve that budget. And it's a real show of
commitment on the part of the administration that helps
stabilize the weapons program for the future. It also puts
necessary new funds toward starting some of the needed hands-on
stockpile work and repairing of the decaying infrastructure
throughout the complex.
So, my third and final point is that, even with these
positive actions, I do have concerns. This effort will require
sustained focus for multiple administrations and multiple
Congresses over several decades. I fear that program
expectations may already be out of line with the fiscal
realities faced by the country. The nuclear infrastructure
needs and the stockpile needs have the potential to unbalance
the rest of the program, squeezing out the science that is
really the fundamental basis of Stockpile Stewardship.
In addition, we must balance the need to hire the future
national security workforce with the looming pension shortfalls
of nearly $200 million in FY12 at Los Alamos.
So, in conclusion, I'm cautiously optimistic about the
future of the nuclear weapons program, that we can carry out
our responsibilities under New START with adequate levels of
risk. But, we need help. So, I urge Congress to work with the
administration to form a national consensus on nuclear policy
and to support the FY11 budget request as a necessary first
step forward, and I would welcome a dialogue on how best to
sustain focus on these issues over the extended period into the
future.
So, thank you, and I'll be happy to take questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Anastasio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Michael R. Anastasio, Director, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar and members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to respond to
the committee's questions on the New START Treaty and the ability of
the National Laboratories to maintain the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the stockpile into the future. I am Dr. Michael R.
Anastasio, the Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
and it is an honor to appear before you today to present my views.
In President Obama's April 2009 Prague speech and in the recently
released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), this administration has
articulated its goal to reduce the global nuclear danger. In both the
speech and the policy document, the administration has directly linked
reductions in nuclear weapons to the maintenance of the nuclear
arsenal. This then is a propitious time to discuss what is necessary to
maintain the stockpile into the future as the Senate considers
ratification of the New START Treaty.
From a Laboratory standpoint, it is important to understand that
New START will reduce the number of delivery vehicles and warheads, but
it will not alter the Nuclear Triad. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2010,
that ``As the stockpile decreases in size, the role of science,
technology and engineering in deterrence will increase in importance.''
This means that the United States will have to devote appropriate
attention and resources to protecting the physical and intellectual
science, technology and engineering (ST&E) infrastructure that
underpins the stockpile.
Los Alamos and the other National Security Laboratories also have
historically played an important role in arms control, providing
technical support to negotiators, to those who implement treaties, and
to those who monitor the treaties and assess compliance. While I will
not discuss this further, we continue to bring the innovative technical
capabilities of the Laboratory to these challenges.
I do not see New START fundamentally changing the role of the
Laboratory. What New START does do, however, is emphasize the
importance of the Laboratories' mission and the need for a healthy and
vibrant ST&E base to be able to continue to assure the stockpile into
the future. These issues will be the focus of my remarks.
stockpile stewardship
Stockpile Stewardship Successes
The United States and its allies continue to depend on a nuclear
deterrent as part of the overall security posture. The manner in which
the Nation executes this mission has changed dramatically over the last
several decades. In 1989 the United States ended the production of new
nuclear weapons; 3 years later the United States adopted a moratorium
on nuclear weapons testing that remains in effect to this day. In
response to these new circumstances, the FY 1994 National Defense
Authorization Act charged the Secretary of Energy to establish a
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) ``to ensure the preservation of the
core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in
nuclear weapons.'' To meet this challenge the nation has invested
significant resources in the advanced scientific, experimental,
engineering and computational capabilities of the National
Laboratories. These capabilities are the basis for the Laboratories to
assess the overall safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile
as well as to execute the Stockpile Life Extension (LEP) Program, which
I will describe in more detail below.
It is primarily through the SSP that the Laboratory provides
technical support for U.S. nuclear forces, posture and policy. Our
approach involves the continual assessment of the stockpile through
surveillance enabled by a more fundamental scientific understanding.
This has required us to build upon past nuclear test experience with
the development of more advanced experimental and simulation tools and
the expertise of the scientists, engineers, and technicians at our
laboratories and production plants.
Our surveillance results show ever-increasing effects from aging.
These results are assessed with an extensive range of nonnuclear
testing and vastly improved simulation capability. Ultimately, expert
judgment and rigorous interlaboratory peer review assure that critical
conclusions are drawn from the best available data, appropriate high-
resolution simulations and a suite of evolving experimental
capabilities. Sound science is the core of our confidence.
The SSP at the Laboratories has had many successes to date; these
successes were by no means assured when the Program began in 1995 as an
ambitious effort to sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile while
minimizing the need for nuclear testing. Examples of these successes
include:
Annual Assessment: I am responsible for an assessment, based on a
rigorous technical process, of all weapons in the stockpile for which
the Laboratory is responsible. This ``annual assessment'' letter is
provided to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, as well as the Chair
of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and then is forwarded to the President.
I have personally signed eight assessment letters during my tenure at
both Lawrence Livermore and now at Los Alamos and have had direct
involvement in all 15 cycles since the inception of the program in
1996. In many regards, this letter and its detailed set of backup
documents is the annual summation of all that we do in Stockpile
Stewardship.
Pit Manufacturing: In 1989, the United States halted plutonium pit
manufacturing at the Rocky Flats plant in Colorado, leaving the United
States as the only nuclear weapons state without the ability to
manufacture the core component of nuclear weapons. Using our science
and technology to qualify the new build processes, Los Alamos restored
this essential capability in 2007 and has nearly completed the build of
pits required for the W-88, a central component of the sea-based
deterrent.
DARHT: The Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT)
facility is now fully functional and allows our experimental teams to
obtain three-dimensional, high-resolution, time-sequenced images taken
within billionths of a second at specifically selected times within an
implosion of a mock nuclear weapons assembly. Last December, the first
dual-axis experiment was successfully carried out at DARHT. Data from
the experiment will allow Los Alamos to close a Significant Finding
Investigation (SFI) on a stockpile system. DARHT data is also critical
to the W76 LEP effort.
Supercomputing: In partnership with IBM, Los Alamos built and
deployed the world's first petascale (million-billion calculations per
second) supercomputer--Road Runner. After an initial series of
unclassified science runs to assure machine performance, Road Runner is
now dedicated to classified weapons work. Later this summer, Los Alamos
in partnership with Sandia, will take delivery of out next
supercomputer--Cielo--another petascale machine. The breadth and
quality of experimental data being obtained has allowed Los Alamos to
validate the significant progress on integrated three dimensional
software tools within the Advanced Simulation and Computing campaign.
LANSCE: The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) facility,
an 800 MeV proton accelerator, makes a number of important
contributions to our understanding of weapons performance. Proton
radiography (pRad) at LANSCE allows us to make time-resolved
measurements of dynamic events of weapon components, such as high-
explosive detonation and burn. Data from pRad informs the W-76 LEP and
B61 work. The LANSCE protons are also used to create spallation
neutrons that allow the imaging of weapons components and are used to
understand the basic nuclear physics. The Weapons Neutron Research
station at LANSCE provides invaluable new radiochemical data used to
refine the nuclear yield determinations, thereby allowing LANL staff to
glean additional information from archived nuclear test data. LANSCE is
the only facility in the country where these types of classified
experiments that involve special nuclear material can currently be
conducted.
Plutonium Aging Physics: LANL conducted years of detailed
experiments that examined the physics of how plutonium ages. This
assessment, paired with work conducted at Lawrence Livermore, enabled
the NNSA to better understand the lifetime of plutonium components and
its impacts upon nuclear weapons performance. This work allowed for
better estimates of the sizing of production capabilities and of needed
resources.
Maintaining the Stockpile Through Life-Extension Programs
As we learn about our strategic systems through Stockpile
Stewardship, we then work with DOD and DOE/NNSA to determine
appropriate steps for extending the lives of these systems for an
additional 20 to 30 years beyond their original lifetimes through LEPs.
To date, the LEP focus has been to effectively refurbish them so they
are ``just like'' they were originally designed, to meet the
requirements of the cold war (high yield to weight ratios). LEP
activities include: research, development, and production work required
to ensure that weapon systems continue to meet national security
requirements.
The nation has successfully completed LEPs for the W87 ICBM warhead
and the B61-7/11 gravity bomb. The W76 LEP is well underway and is
contributing significantly to the long-term viability of the nation's
sea-based deterrent force. Major components refurbished as part of the
LEP include: the nuclear explosive package; the arming, firing and
fuzing system; and the gas transfer system. This LEP is expected to
extend the life of the W76 for an additional 30 years without reliance
on underground nuclear testing. LANL played a major role in this
effort, which required reconstitution of specialized material
production after several decades. The First Production Unit (FPU) for
the W76 LEP was completed in FY 2008.
With the bulk of the Laboratory's efforts on the W76 LEP complete,
Los Alamos will shift its focus to the the B61 LEP, consistent with the
NPR. Major components that will be refurbished as part of the LEP
include: new detonator cable assembly, main charge, foams and polymers,
and a new gas transfer system. This LEP also provides the opportunity
to install enhanced, intrinsic safety and security features by
modifying components in existing designs to meet today's dynamic
security environment. Los Alamos expects to support an FPU in 2017
assuming timely Congressional approval of the funding needed to carry
out the program.
LEP requirements derive from the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC). Each nuclear weapon system they identify and Congress
funds is studied to develop options that meet the requirements
established by the NWC. Per the guidance in the NPR and in the
administration's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Report, it is my
obligation to ensure that the teams at Los Alamos examine all the
relevant technical options for an LEP, including refurbishment, reuse
and replacement, and bring them forward to the NWC for a decision.
These efforts will include modifying cold-war-era weapons for
enhanced margin against failure, increased safety, and improved
security and use control. For example, introducing insensitive high
explosives into systems that currently use conventional high explosives
can improve safety. Future LEP studies will consider the possibility of
adapting the resulting warhead to multiple platforms in order to reduce
the number of warhead types. In all LEP studies, the Laboratories will
rely on fundamental and applied ST&E to improve its understanding of
nuclear weapon behavior and to assure the safety, security, and
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent supported by a reduced and more
sustainable, efficient and appropriately sized nuclear security
infrastructure.
Leveraging our Science for National Security
The issues that have arisen in the last 18 years of assuring the
reliability of nuclear weapons without conducting a nuclear test are
complex science and engineering problems. Some of these problems were
anticipated--like the aging of certain components in a warhead--and
others were totally unexpected. The success of the Stewardship program
has been the ability to draw on a deep and rich science base at the
Laboratories. This science base is enriched by engaging on a broad
range of scientific problems, many of which have a direct relevance to
broader national security interests. A vibrant science, technology and
engineering enterprise is essential to supporting the stewardship
program, and at the same time it provides a powerful resource for
issues such as nonproliferation, counterproliferation, counterterrorism
and intelligence assessment.
There is a tendency when people hear about the role the NNSA
Laboratories play in solving other national problems that these are
simply nice ``spinoffs.'' These provide more than just positive
benefits for the nation; rather, this work outside of the weapons
program is essential to the conduct of the core nuclear weapons
mission. We have a vibrant scientific workforce at Los Alamos,
including around 2,500 Ph.D.s that are the core of our science base.
The weapons program benefits directly when these scientists have the
opportunity to extend their skills by working on challenging technical
problems, like climate modeling, which then can validate and improve
the methods in our 3-D weapons codes and solve challenges in the
stockpile.
The following are a handful of recent Laboratory scientific
successes that leverage our weapons science capabilities for broader
national security interests, and also feed directly back into the
nuclear weapons program:
Intelligence: Our weapons program capabilities give us the ability
to assess foreign weapons programs and to assist the intelligence
community. There is much truth to the statement that ``it takes a
nuclear weapons lab to find a nuclear weapons lab.''
Nuclear Forensics and Attribution: Los Alamos delivered a suite of
models and databases for National Technical Nuclear Forensics
applications, such as modeling debris signatures and other nuclear
security applications. LANL's capabilities in this area are a direct
outgrowth of the former nuclear weapons testing program where
scientists had to study the detailed chemistry of soil samples to
determine various characteristics of a detonation. Our experts in this
area can not only help with current nuclear forensics, but they also
support the weapons program by helping to reinterpret data from
previous underground tests. This information is then used to validate
our weapons codes.
Plutonium Center of Excellence: LANL's efforts in nonweapons
plutonium work help ensure the country maintains a core human capital
ability to work with this material. The same researchers and
technicians who work on plutonium 238 for use in deep-space missions
for NASA also support the manufacture of plutonium pits for the
stockpile.
Detection Technology: Much of the work at Los Alamos in the basic
sciences arena has had a significant impact on detecting threats from
emerging phenomena. For example, building x-ray and gamma ray detectors
on satellites has promoted the discovery of fundamental cosmological
phenomena like the collapse of black holes. In turn, these detectors
have been refined and are part of our front line defense in monitoring
other nations' weapons programs.
Advanced Simulation and Energy/Climate Research: The ability to
simulate complex systems--like a nuclear explosion with thousands of
parts exploding in a fraction of a second--is something that has also
driven national security science forward. LANL has developed two of the
four modules (sea ice and oceans) used in international climate models.
Many of the lessons learned from observing a complex climate system can
be applied to our weapons models. In particular, we have discovered
heretofore unknown phenomena--in terms of regional climate impacts and
within weapons systems--as we have gone to finer and finer levels of
resolution in our simulations. On the energy front, LANL is also a
partner in the recently announced DOE Office of Nuclear Energy Hub
focused on nuclear power. LANL will play a key role in helping to build
a ``virtual reactor.''
Gulf Oil Spill: Scientists from Los Alamos and other laboratories
have played a significant role in the federal government's efforts to
assess and stem the oil leaking in the Gulf of Mexico. Several efforts
are continuing as the crisis continues. One particular area of emphasis
is in diagnostics of the well system. LANL designed and developed the
first ever two-dimensional radiography system deployed in deep water
(below a few hundred feet). The radiography leveraged numerous
capabilities including machining, advanced image analysis, and modeling
techniques.
Next Chapter of Stockpile Stewardship
For the future, we need to build on the core scientific successes
achieved through Stockpile Stewardship that have maintained the safety
security and effectiveness of the stockpile for 18 years without
nuclear testing. However, we are now at a crossroads as a nation. The
next few years will determine our approach to the stockpile for decades
to come. There is an opportunity right now for a national consensus to
develop around nuclear policy that has been needed since the end of the
cold war. As I will discuss further below, I am encouraged by the
significant strides this administration has made in issuing a new
policy, in the form of the NPR, as well as by its FY11 budget request
for the Department of Energy, which I believe is an important first
step. With this as a basis, I hope that Congress and the administration
can reach a bipartisan national consensus.
Even with such a consensus, my concern is that with all there is to
be done, the level of interest and budget support that we have seen
this year will need to be sustained by future administrations and
future Congresses. As I have seen over my nearly 30-year career at the
Laboratories, solutions and fixes in this arena cannot be accomplished
quickly. This will require a sustained effort on the part of the Nation
for decades to come.
new policy for nuclear weapons
The administration's NPR, issued in April of this year, ``provides
the roadmap for implementing President Obama's agenda for reducing
nuclear risks .'' It focuses on five key objectives of nuclear weapons
policies and posture, one of which is ``Sustaining a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal.''
The Directors of Livermore and Sandia joined me in issuing a tri-
lab statement about the NPR in April. We felt it was important to first
outline the roles and responsibilities of the national laboratories in
terms of providing the technical underpinnings to ensure the safety,
security and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. With regard to the
NPR's overall framework, I repeat here what we said:
We believe that the approach outlined in the NPR, which
excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration
of the full range of life extension options (refurbishment of
existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different
warheads and replacement of nuclear components based on
previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future
with an acceptable level of risk.
We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is the
recognition of the importance of supporting a modern physical
infrastructure--comprised of the national security laboratories
and a complex of supporting facilities--and a highly capable
workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the
nuclear deterrent.
While the joint statement reflects the Laboratory Directors'
collective views, I will elaborate on my own thinking on the NPR. It
clearly emphasizes the three key elements of Stockpile Stewardship--
hands-on work on the stockpile; the science, technology and engineering
base; and the infrastructure at the laboratories and plants. I agree
with the NPR's view that these are the three critical elements of the
nuclear weapons enterprise. It is essential that all of these elements
be in balance and adequately funded to maintain a safe, secure and
effective stockpile. I will focus my remarks on each of these elements
in turn.
Stockpile Work
The NPR is explicit about the weapons that need life-extension over
the next 10 years: completion of the W76, proceeding on the full scope
life extension of the B61, and study of the W78. I strongly agree with
the NPR assertion of the need to increase the safety and security of
our systems. The LEP process provides opportunities to do so, for
example by switching all conventional high explosive (CHE) primaries
with insensitive high explosive (IHE) primaries to increase safety
margins and deploying certain intrinsic surety systems in the stockpile
to better meet today's security challenges.
The NPR's statements on needed LEPs align well with the assessments
that the Laboratories have made in recent years. We have seen that in
many cases, the uncertainties associated with the current issues
identified through surveillance threaten to overwhelm the small
performance margins that characterize many of the weapons in the
current stockpile. Essentially, this uncertainty dictates that almost
every weapon system in the current stockpile will require completion of
some type of life extension activity in the next 25 years.
The available mitigation actions for the results observed in
surveillance, such as changes external to the nuclear package or
relaxation of certain military requirements are reaching their limits.
Consequently, as the Perry Commission observed, ``The Stockpile
Stewardship Program and the Life Extension Program have been remarkably
successful in refurbishing and modernizing the stockpile . . . but
cannot be counted on for the indefinite future.'' We will need to take
advantage of the flexibility articulated in the NPR to go beyond just
refurbishment that has been considered to date and evaluate the full
range of options (refurbishment, reuse, and replacement) to increase
nuclear performance margins to mitigate the need for nuclear testing.
The NPR states that in ``any decision to proceed to engineering
development for warhead LEPs, the United States will give strong
preference to options for refurbishment or reuse.'' The NPR also
strongly endorses, and the NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan reinforces, the importance that on a case-by-case basis, the full
range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment, reuse, and
replacement. I recognize the sensitivity of this topic but am convinced
that allowing the laboratories the flexibility to present policymakers
with our best technical recommendations to meet requirements is
critical to our role in the stockpile management process. This approach
greatly reduces the possibility of having to conduct nuclear testing,
while at the same time exercising our nuclear designers and engineers.
I do not feel overly constrained by the language in the NPR; rather, I
believe it provides the necessary flexibility to manage the stockpile
with acceptable levels of risk.
The starting point for all of this hands-on work, of course, is the
stockpile surveillance program that pulls actual units from service and
puts them through rigorous destructive and nondestructive testing.
Through these efforts we are able to anticipate issues as well as learn
when issues may require action, but I have been concerned for some time
that we are not doing as much surveillance as we should be doing. The
NPR states that investments are required in ``Strengthening the
science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) base needed for conducting
weapon system LEPs, maturing advanced technologies to increase weapons
surety, qualification of weapon components and certifying weapons
without nuclear testing, and providing annual stockpile assessments
through weapons surveillance [emphasis added].'' I agree with this
assessment. Since our knowledge base begins with surveillance, it is
essential that we sustain support in this area.
Science, Technology, and Engineering
I strongly endorse the view of the NPR on strengthening the ST&E
base; it is this base that provides the underpinning of confidence in
the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. This expertise can
only be maintained by continued scientific advances; it cannot be
static. However, it has been allowed to erode in recent years, putting
at risk our ability to make the necessary future advances in our
capabilities. It is important to note that often years of technical
work, for example in actinide sciences, are required ahead of time to
enable the successful completion of today's requirements. Without
investment today future confidence is at risk.
In addition, it is essential that we acquire experimental data from
nonnuclear experiments to provide the ``ground truth'' about stockpile
issues. Today, we are beginning to see many of the investments of
Stockpile Stewardship come to fruition--notably the DARHT at Los
Alamos, the NIF at Livermore, and the MESA facility at Sandia--yet, we
have inadequate resources to carry out the all key experiments at these
facilities. Just as the Nation is positioned to reap the benefits of
these investments, funding declines make it extremely difficult to
maintain, use or enhance these facility capabilities that are necessary
to preserve our deterrent and to further other national security goals.
Similar to the world of experiments, today we are faced with an
equal computational challenge and opportunity. To maintain the
scientific vitality, international competitiveness, and leadership
needed to support the administration's nuclear posture, continued
advancement to exascale class computation is necessary. Such a
capability will position us to provide better support for the
stockpile, particularly in the form of surety options, and to provide
reliable support for intelligence analysis including emerging foreign
threats in the broad area of nuclear security.
Compounding that challenge of a healthy, vibrant ST&E base is the
aging workforce at Los Alamos and elsewhere in the complex. At Los
Alamos, the average age of career employees is now over 48, and 32
percent of all career employees are expected to retire within the next
5 years. Without an infusion of younger talent who can become
recipients and beneficiaries in the transfer of knowledge from those
with decades of experience, we will be at risk for loss of that
knowledge.
Aging Infrastructure
Much of the nuclear infrastructure needed by the United States
resides in facilities that date back to the 1950s. While we take great
efforts to ensure our employees are safe in these aging facilities and
that the public is not put at risk, the challenges and costs to
maintain their active status is mounting rapidly.
The NPR and administration's FY11 budget support the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) in Tennessee and the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement (CMRR) Nuclear Facility in New Mexico. They
represent the critical next step in shrinking the Nation's nuclear
infrastructure footprint while allowing these vital operations to
continue in the most safe and secure environments possible. I strongly
endorse investments in these two facilities and believe without them
the costs associated with maintaining the existing facilities will
eventually overwhelm the weapons program budgets.
The CMRR project at Los Alamos will replace the existing Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility, completed in 1952, that is at
the end of its useful life. This facility houses the analytical
chemistry, materials characterization, and actinide research and
development activities that are required to support a wide spectrum of
work at Los Alamos. The work in CMRR is critical to sustaining the
Nation's nuclear deterrent, but it also is critical to nonproliferation
efforts, development of power sources for U.S. space missions, training
of IAEA inspectors and the work of nuclear forensics. We have been
working closely with our industry partners to bring strong project
management to this effort and to deliver this important project on cost
and schedule. I am proud to report that on the first phase of this
project, construction of the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office
Building (RLUOB), we did just that: it was completed on time and budget
last year. We are in the process of outfitting that facility and expect
to occupy RLUOB in 2012. We continue to work closely with NNSA on the
design of the next and final stage of the project, the Nuclear
Facility. To successfully deliver this project, it will be important to
have certainty in funding and consistency of requirements throughout
the project.
At the same time, there are many other essential facilities across
the complex and at Los Alamos that cannot be neglected because of our
necessary focus on the major nuclear facilities. Infrastructure
considerations must include operation of current facilities and the
consolidation of old, inefficient ones. For example, we are working to
identify adequate funding to maintain and operate the LANSCE facility
for material properties, carry out planned actinide research and renew
an aging infrastructure where over fifty percent of the buildings are
more than 40 years old.
To reduce costs we have already eliminated a million square feet of
antiquated laboratory and office space. Using funds from the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act we are in the process of decontaminating
and demolishing the earliest plutonium and uranium facilities at the
Laboratory.
fy11 budget proposal
In addition to the NPR, the administration has developed an FY11
budget that moves us in the right direction. I view the NNSA's FY11
budget request as a positive first step and I urge its approval by
Congress. The $624 million increase to Weapons activities is primarily
focused on addressing the crumbling infrastructure of the Complex--most
notably the plutonium infrastructure at LANL and the uranium
infrastructure at Y-12, as well as beginning to attend to the needs of
an aging stockpile with increased funds for Life Extension Programs.
These are welcome increases and will begin to address some of the
concerns that the Strategic Posture Commission and the Laboratory
Directors have raised in recent years.
Restoring the scientific and physical infrastructure--all while
managing pension and other challenges--will take time and sustained
support by the Congress. Sustaining strong science funding in the form
of Science Campaigns and advanced computing, as well as the
infrastructure account, known as Readiness in Technical Base and
Facilities (RTBF) that underlies all of the work we do, is essential.
This funding enables us to carry out the fullest of scientific research
and development efforts necessary to meet our nuclear weapon mission
and broader national security needs and to attract and retain the best
and brightest scientists.
challenges
The NPR provides the necessary policy framework, which I hope leads
to a national consensus, and the FY11 budget request provides the first
step in the fiscal implementation of the roadmap to sustain the long-
term safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile. It is
important to recognize that to fully implement this roadmap requires
investments that carry across multiple administrations and multiple
Congresses. Today, I fear that there is already a gap emerging between
expectations and fiscal realities. I fear that some may perceive that
the FY11 budget request meets all of the necessary budget commitments
for the program; however, there are still significant financial
uncertainties, for example, the design of the UPF and CMRR are not
complete and the final costs remain uncertain.
As I look to the future, I remain concerned that science will be
squeezed when trying to compete with capital infrastructure investments
and life extension program funding priorities. Having experienced three
decades of federal budgets and their impacts on the weapons program, it
will be challenging to sustain the increases the administration has
called for. Just as I am encouraged by the significant increase we see
in FY11, I am concerned that in the administration's section 1251
report, much of the planned funding increase for Weapons Activities do
not come to fruition until the second half of the 10-year period.
Another example of the fiscal challenges that I see on the horizon
is related to pensions. Like many other organizations across the
country, we at Los Alamos are facing a pension shortfall during the
current fiscal year and it is expected to grow over the next 2 years.
In FY10, the Laboratory has worked closely with the NNSA to resolve
a pension shortfall of $76 million. Part of the solution has been to
require employees to make contributions; the Laboratory is increasing
its fringe rates to cover costs and NNSA has provided assistance on the
order of $46 million. Next year, the pension shortfall is expected to
be $77 million, and in FY12, the shortfall is expected to grow to about
$200 million. NNSA is aware of this issue and we are working closely on
possible options to address it. My chief concern is that if the
Laboratory must shoulder the bulk of this increase, this will
dramatically reduce the funds available for programmatic deliverables
and cause significant disruption of the Laboratory workforce.
As I noted earlier, it will be important that as a nation we can
align expectations with the fiscal realities that we see. At the same
time, it is essential that we balance investment across all three major
elements of the program--hands-on stockpile activities, ST&E, and
infrastructure. For example, without investment in ST&E today we put at
risk timely execution of the program beyond the very near term. On the
other hand, focus on near term stockpile LEPs without infrastructure
investment limits the near term program scope and efficiency and puts
at risk longer term timely execution. Stability of funding plans is
also important so that the balance that is struck can actually be
executed. One approach to maintain focus on these issues across
multiple administrations and Congresses could be a set of
``safeguards,'' that have been used in past arms control treaties.
conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you to testify
on this important subject. As I stated, I am very encouraged by the
progress this administration has made both on the policy and the budget
fronts. The NPR provides the policy framework with the technical
flexibility to manage the stockpile with an acceptable level of risk
and the FY11 budget request is a positive step forward.
I am cautiously optimistic that with Congress' support we--as a
nation--can recapture the bipartisan consensus that once existed about
the Nation's strategic deterrent and the overall nuclear weapons
complex. At the same time, I have concerns about sustaining the focus
and an appropriate budget over the several decades for which it will be
required. As a Laboratory, we are dedicated to ensuring the innovative
science and engineering necessary to sustain our strategic deterrent
and that can be applied to the many challenges the Nation now faces.
Maintaining the necessary focus and resources of the administration and
Congress is critical in order to achieve these national goals.
I look forward to engaging further with the committee on this
important topic and I welcome your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Dr. Miller.
STATEMENT DR. GEORGE H. MILLER, DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE
NATIONAL LABORATORY, LIVERMORE, CA
Dr. Miller. Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry, Ranking
Member Lugar, and thank you very much for your continued
interest in the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
As director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, we
are one of the laboratories responsible for sustaining
stockpile safety, security, and effectiveness. I've devoted,
essentially, my whole career to providing science and
technology for the Nation's national security interests,
including having personally designed several of the warheads
that are in the stockpile today.
There are three points that I'd like to emphasize.
Technically, we have an approach that can maintain safety,
security, and effectiveness of the stockpile without nuclear
testing and without introducing new military capabilities.
Successfully meeting these mission requirements and carrying
out the program of work will require sustaining the nuclear
security enterprise for decades, with balanced investments
across the full spectrum of activities that are required to
support this activity.
Finally, and importantly, we all have a responsibility to
nurture and sustain the outstanding stewards at our
laboratories and our production plants.
From a scientific and technical point of view, I'm
confident that we can maintain the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the stockpile, because of the successes of the
program to date. We've greatly improved our simulation and
experimental capabilities, and used these unique national
assets to understand and learn details about weapons'
performance that went undiscovered in the era of nuclear
testing. We've found and corrected issues in the stockpile, and
we are continually improving our ability to assess weapon
performance. We've successfully extended the life of some of
the systems in the stockpile without resorting to nuclear
testing. And we're providing the hands-on experience that's
necessary to train the next generation of stockpile stewards.
The President's 2011 budget request seeks increased funding
to reverse the recent declining budget trends and create a
sustainable U.S. nuclear security enterprise. Our Nation's
deterrent requires a Stockpile Stewardship Program that is
adequately supported by successive administrations and
Congresses to provide sufficient funding.
Today, additional investments are needed in all three of
the areas of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, in science and
technology and engineering that provides the basic underpinning
of all of the decisions and all the confidence that we have, in
extending the life of the systems that are currently in the
stockpile, and in modernizing the facilities and
infrastructure. I strongly urge Congress to support this vital
first step toward increased investment in this national
security mission.
Science, technology, and engineering underpin our
confidence in the stockpile, and it's of vital importance that
we enhance the level of surveillance that goes on in the
stockpile. This is a program by which we look each year at
what's going on in the stockpile, and we learn what issues we
must address. We need to take full advantage of the two-
laboratory system to provide independent advice and counsel to
the administration and to Congress about what steps to take. In
my view, this is much like something that's very familiar to
all of us: When we have a serious medical problem, we
frequently consult more than one doctor. We need to pursue and
continue to advance the remarkable improvements that we have
seen in high-performance computing. And finally, we need to
utilize these unique tools in order to improve our
understanding.
The stockpile itself needs attention. We need to undertake
extensive programs over the next two decades to extend the life
of our stockpile.
We will examine a series of options that are based on
previously tested nuclear designs that will range from
refurbishment to reuse to replacement, carefully considering
the desirability of improving the safety, security, the
manufacturability, the maintainability of a much smaller
stockpile. Preferred alternatives will consider the cost and
the risks associated with each of the different options.
We also have an opportunity in these life-extension
programs to provide more resiliency to the stockpile as it is
reduced in size by providing warheads that are adaptable from
one system to another.
And finally, we need to modernize cold-war era facilities,
particularly those for processing uranium and plutonium. This
will require funding increases.
Above all, we need to nurture and sustain our outstanding
stewards at the laboratories and production facilities, and
mentor them, and create our future. Long-term success depends
upon these people.
While the President's 2011 budget for NNSA is a very good
start, the 10-year plan calls for significant budget increases
in the out years. This is the program of work that is required
to sustain this effort over the long period of time.
Our success depends upon your support, and the support of
successive administrations, in creating and sustaining a
program that is balanced across all of these efforts, and a
program that is adequately funded.
Thank you very much, again, for your continued interest in,
and support of, this important national effort.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. George H. Miller, Director, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA
opening remarks
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to provide a statement on the status and future prospects
of the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's
(NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program to sustain the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear stockpile. My name is George
Miller and I am the Director of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL).
LLNL is one of NNSA's two nuclear design laboratories and a
principal participant in the Stockpile Stewardship Program. National
security depends greatly on the success of our stockpile stewardship
efforts. I want to thank the committee for your interest in and
continued support for these activities.
In addition to stockpile stewardship, our Laboratory's nuclear
security responsibilities include engaging in vital national programs
to reduce the threats posed by nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The
Laboratory also applies its multidisciplinary science and technology to
provide solutions to a broader range of pressing national and global
security challenges.
introduction
From a scientific and technical viewpoint, I am confident that we
can maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent through a
science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program that is balanced,
integrated, and sustained over time; this will require the support of
successive administrations and Congress and sufficient funding to meet
mission requirements. Stockpile stewardship is a cornerstone of the
Nation's strategic deterrent for the future. As demonstrated by the
program's achievements to date, I believe that the highly capable
scientists and engineers at the NNSA national laboratories and
production facilities will be able to address issues that arise in an
aging, smaller nuclear stockpile by utilizing and further advancing our
exceptional computational and experimental tools and employing the full
range of life-extension program (LEP) options.
My optimism is tempered by recent funding trends in--what to date--
has been a very successful Stockpile Stewardship Program. Continuing
success in the program's scientific and technically challenging
activities will require additional new investments in major facilities
and particular attention to sustaining the skills of our workforce.
Budget constraints to date have resulted in deferral of life-extension
programs (LEPs) and slower warhead surveillance rates than is
technically desired. These constraints have also delayed production
schedules; postponed important deliverables in science, technology, and
engineering; delayed resolution of identified stockpile issues; and
hindered efforts to develop modern and efficient manufacturing
processes. In addition, there are fewer highly skilled stockpile
stewards supporting the program than were present as recently as 5
years ago. Our Laboratory now has 2,608 scientists and engineers--609
fewer than in May 2005. Concurrently, stewardship is becoming
technically more challenging as weapons continue to age beyond their
intended lifetimes. In my 2009 Annual Stockpile Assessment letter to
the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the Chairman of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, I expressed concerns about the impact that these
trends will have on sustaining confidence in the stockpile.
The FY 2011 budget request seeks to reverse recent funding trends
and reflects the need for increased investment to maintain sufficient
capability to ensure the viability of the U.S. stockpile. The Nation's
nuclear strategy--with or without the planned stockpile reductions--
requires a Stockpile Stewardship Program that is balanced, integrated,
and sustained over time. NNSA has provided to Congress its Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan, which is funded in the FY 2011 Budget
Request with a 9.8-percent increase ($624 million) compared to FY 2010.
This is a good start, but only a start. The increased level of
investment must not only be sustained but grow over time to provide for
construction of new facilities and support increased LEP activities.
My testimony emphasizes several key points about a balanced,
integrated, and sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program:
Accomplishments.--Stockpile stewards have achieved many outstanding
successes since the program began. These accomplishments give
me confidence that the ``science based'' approach being pursued
is a workable path forward for sustaining the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the nation's nuclear deterrent.
A Sustainable Program.--Stockpile stewardship is scientifically and
technically very demanding. It is a very active, integrated
program and to sustain it, its interdependent facets must be
adequately funded to progress in a balanced manner.
The Budget.--With the President's FY 2011 budget, we can begin to
reinvigorate the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The requested
additional funds will enable greater progress on many fronts--
from stockpile life-extension activities, to recapitalizing the
infrastructure, improving assessment capabilities, and building
the knowledge base required to answer increasingly difficult
questions about weapon performance over its full life cycle.
Life-Extension Programs.--Options for life-extension programs
(LEPs) will be based on previously tested nuclear designs. We
will consider, on a case-by-case basis, the full range of LEP
options (refurbishment, reuse, and replacement) to provide
findings and technical recommendations for engineering
development decisions.
The Workforce.--The Stockpile Stewardship Program's most valuable
and irreplaceable assets are the unique individuals who sustain
it. Confidence in the stockpile ultimately depends on
confidence in the stockpile stewards at the NNSA laboratories
and production facilities. We must attract top talent to the
program and sustain over time specialized technical skills and
expertise, which provide the basis for judgments about the
stockpile and stewardship actions taken, through mentoring and
hands-on experience.
science-based stockpile stewardship accomplishments
The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program was launched on the
premise that by developing a much more thorough understanding of the
underlying science and technology that governs nuclear weapons
performance, the country could maintain confidence in the stockpile
without requiring nuclear testing. The knowledge gained must be
sufficiently detailed to assess with confidence the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the stockpile. We must have the ability to deal
with whatever issues arise using existing nuclear test data together
with advanced computational and experimental tools. Very ambitious
goals were set to expeditiously develop increasingly sophisticated
tools and apply them to arising issues in an aging stockpile.
We have made significant progress since the Stockpile Stewardship
Program began. Use of the many tools and capabilities developed since
the end of nuclear testing has greatly increased our understanding and
knowledge of the stockpile. These tools and capabilities, together with
the existing nuclear test database, have enabled the NNSA laboratories
to annually assess and, as required, extend the life of the warheads in
the U.S. stockpile. Some highlights--featuring work at LLNL--include:
High-Performance Computing.--At its onset, the Stockpile
Stewardship Program set the extremely challenging goal--many
thought unachievable--of improving scientific computing
performance by a factor of a million over a decade. That goal
was achieved with the delivery of the 100-trillion-operations-
per-second ASC Purple supercomputer to LLNL in 2005. The
machine has served as a workhorse for all three NNSA
laboratories, performing very demanding 3-D weapons
simulations. This highly successful partnership between NNSA
and the high-performance computing industry continues with the
20,000-trillion-operations-per-second Sequoia machine, which is
on track to become operational at LLNL in 2012.
High-Fidelity Weapons Physics Simulations.--Laboratory physicists
and computer scientists stepped up to the challenge of
developing weapons simulation codes that model the physics with
far greater fidelity and run efficiently on computers with
thousands of processors working in parallel. In 2002, LLNL
scientists performed the first-ever complete 3-D simulation of
a nuclear weapon explosion--with a level of spatial resolution
and degree of physics realism previously unobtainable.
Supercomputers have also been used to gain valuable insights
into the properties of materials at extreme conditions and
details about the formation and growth of hydrodynamic
instabilities. These improved capabilities have made possible
expeditious development of LEP design options and their
certification.
Vastly Improved Experimental Capabilities.--Thoroughly diagnosed
nonnuclear tests are used to gather input data for weapons
physics simulation models and validate their performance.
Experiments at LLNL's Contained Firing Facility and the Dual-
Axis Radiographic Hydrodyanamic Test (DARHT) Facility at Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) have provided key
hydrodynamic performance information for applications ranging
from LEPs to weapon safety studies. Data from the Joint
Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) gas-gun
experiments were instrumental in the very successful plutonium
aging study, and tests conducted at LLNL's High Explosives
Applications Facility (HEAF) enable improved modeling of aging
high explosives. With commissioning of the National Ignition
Facility (NIF) in 2009, stockpile stewards now have an
experimental facility capable of creating the temperatures and
pressures necessary to study the physics of the nuclear phase
of weapons performance.
Improved Understanding of Materials Aging and Weapons
Performance.--A long-term study by LLNL and LANL concluded that
the performance of plutonium pits in stockpiled weapons will
not sharply decline due to aging effects--a result with
important implications in planning the future of the production
complex. Through simulations and experiments, we have a much
deeper understanding of the behavior and aging properties of
weapons materials ranging from plutonium and high explosives to
crystalline metals and polymers. Recently an LLNL scientist
received an E.O. Lawrence Award for breakthrough work to
resolve a previously unexplained 40-year-old anomaly that was
one of the factors that drove the need for continued nuclear
testing. Now, in simulation codes, a physics-based model can
replace the use of an ad hoc calibration factor that had to be
adjusted depending on weapon design specifics and nuclear test
data. The effort involved combining high-fidelity nonnuclear
experiments, the latest simulation tools, and reexamination of
archival nuclear test data. Experiments at NIF are serving to
confirm the model.
Successful Life-Extension Program.--In 2004, NNSA successfully
completed its first program to extend the lifetime of a
stockpiled weapon without resorting to nuclear testing.
Refurbishment of the W87 ICBM warhead--the design in the
stockpile with the most modern safety features--extends the
weapon's life by 30 years. LLNL (with Sandia National
Laboratories) developed and certified the engineering design
and worked closely with the production facilities to ensure the
product quality. The program has served as a model of the
processes to be followed by subsequent and future LEPs. Today,
the NNSA, its laboratories, and production facilities have
continued this success with a major program to extend the life
of the very important W76 Trident II SLBM warhead.
The successes to date have also given us insight into the better
tools that are needed and science and technology areas that require
continued work. These improvements will put our annual assessment of
the stockpile on the firmest footing and provide us the insight and
tools to make wise decisions and ensure the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the stockpile as we move forward. For instance, from
simulations performed to date, we have learned that we will need at
least exascale--1,000,0000 trillion operations per second--to fully
resolve the phenomena we have discovered.
a balanced, integrated, and sustained stockpile stewardship program
Stockpile Stewardship Program accomplishments to date give us
confidence that the ``science based'' approach being pursued is a
workable path forward to sustaining the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. Stockpile stewardship
is scientifically and technically very demanding, yet the high-caliber
experts at the national laboratories have proven themselves worthy of
this major challenge time and time again.
Since 2005, the buying power of NNSA's Defense Programs has
declined approximately $1B. Yet, the program will grow even more
demanding as nuclear weapons continue to age far beyond their intended
lifetime. As the stockpile continues to be downsized, even more
pressure will arise to understand the state of each individual weapon.
More difficult manufacturing issues are arising in life-extension
programs (LEPs) and we have largely exhausted available options to
improve performance margins through changes external to the warhead
package.
There is growing widespread recognition that the Stockpile
Stewardship Program--its workforce and facilities--must be
reinvigorated to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal
over the long run. Reports commissioned by Congress (e.g., America's
Strategic Posture and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
prepared by NNSA) and reviews pursued by the executive branch (e.g.,
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)) have concluded that
significantly increased investments are needed to support (in the words
of the NPR) ``a modern physical infrastructure--comprised of the
national security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities--
and a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to
sustain the nuclear deterrent.''
A balanced and sustainable Stockpile Stewardship Program integrates
stockpile support activities--which include weapons surveillance,
assessments, and as necessary, life-extension programs--with
investments to modernize facilities and efforts to greatly improve
scientific understanding of the details of nuclear weapons components
and their performance. The many facets of the program are tightly
interconnected. Even with stable overall funding at an adequate level
of support, long-term success requires judicious balancing of evolving
priorities and appropriate levels of effort.
Weapons Surveillance (to predict and detect the effects of aging
and other stockpile issues).--We need to step up the rate of stockpile
surveillance and continue to become more proficient at detecting and
predicting potential problems early. The use of embedded sensors, which
we are developing, would enable persistent surveillance and improve our
knowledge of the specific state of each stockpiled weapon. Data would
be indicative, for example, of aging and degradation, mechanical
integrity, and exposure to harsh environments. In addition, we are
developing ever more sophisticated tools to study how aging alters the
physical characteristics of weapon materials and how these changes
affect weapon effectiveness and safety.
Assessments (to analyze and evaluate effects of changes on weapon
safety and performance). The Stockpile Stewardship Program includes a
comprehensive set of activities to annually assess each weapons system
and to address issues that arise. It is particularly important, in my
view, for processes to actively engage both centers of nuclear design
expertise--LLNL and LANL--to provide independent assessments. This is
much like having a serious illness: advice from more than one
independent source is crucial to the decisionmaking process. As we move
further and further from a workforce that has actually tested a nuclear
device, the independence of the two design centers is increasingly
important. Our assessments are also benefiting from the development of
Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties, a methodology that is
increasing the rigor of weapon certification and the quality of annual
assessments. To the extent possible, our assessments require rigorous
scientific and engineering demonstration and evaluation. As described
below, we have been acquiring increasingly powerful tools to do so.
Life-Extension Programs (to sustain the stockpile through
refurbishment, reuse, and/or replacement).--The laboratories must work
closely with production facilities to integrate the production of parts
with the development of new materials and manufacturing processes.
Manufacturing is a particularly demanding challenge because the plants
have to overcome extensive infrastructure and operational challenges
and production technologies need modernization. Options for LEPs must
be thoroughly analyzed to present decision makers with low risk, cost
efficient alternatives to consider.
Science and Technology Foundations (to provide stockpile support
through a thorough understanding of nuclear weapon performance and
sustain the necessary base of specialized skills).--In ``keystone
question'' areas such as boost physics and energy balance, Predictive
Capability Framework campaigns utilize our advanced stockpile
stewardship tools to fill gaps in knowledge about nuclear weapon
performance relevant to existing or expected issues about stockpiled
weapons. These activities integrate the use of state-of-the-art high-
performance computers, high-fidelity simulation models, and data
gathered from exceptional experimental facilities. This cutting-edge
research both provides data for stockpile stewardship and enables the
retention of nuclear weapons expertise in a staff that increasingly
will have no nuclear test experience. We must nurture and exercise the
scientific judgment of stockpile stewards.
Modernized Facilities and Infrastructure (to replace major
facilities for processing plutonium and uranium and upgrade the
physical infrastructure of the weapons complex).--NNSA's plans are to
pursue the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear
Facility (CMRR-NF) project at LANL and build a new Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Currently,
these more-than-50-year-old facilities for processing plutonium and
uranium are oversized, increasingly obsolete, and costly to maintain.
They are also safety, security, and environmental concerns. These two
are high priority and the most costly of numerous infrastructure
modernization projects throughout the complex. Because of these
projects, substantial increases above the FY 2011 budget will be
required to sustain a balanced, integrated overall program. As the cost
baselines are better defined, the changes that occur must be
accommodated without upsetting overall program balance--the balance
among science, technology, and engineering; life extensions of the
stockpile; and recapitalization of the infrastructure.
implications of the president's fy 2011 budget proposal
NNSA has provided to Congress its 10-year Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan, developed as a complement to the NPR and New START.
The plan is funded in the FY 2011 Budget Request with a 9.8-percent
increase ($624 million) compared to FY 2010. This is a good start and
will address a number of immediate needs for FY 2011. It is noteworthy
that the plan calls for significant increases in the out years, as
increasing levels of funding will be required for the LEPs and
construction of major facilities. The FY 2011 budget request will serve
to meet most needs in the three overarching areas:
Science, Technology, and Engineering (for technical assessments and
certification of the stockpile).--Assessments of the condition of
weapons and certification of the engineering design of implemented LEPs
depend on the critical judgments of stockpile stewards and their
nuclear weapons expertise. Both are developed by hands-on experience
working challenging nuclear weapons science, technology, and
engineering issues. In addition to supporting stockpile needs and
building expertise, this work also advances ourfundamental
understanding of nuclear weapons performance so that future stockpile
stewards will be able to tackle even more difficult issues as they
arise. The increased funding from FY 2010 levels will provide a
critically needed boost to activities:
Stockpile Assessments.--The funding increase in FY 2011 will
support implementation at the NNSA laboratories of a new dual
validation process that was established in the FY 2010 National
Defense Authorization Act. The Independent Nuclear Weapon
Assessment Process (INWAP) will strengthen annual assessments.
Two sets of challenge teams (one from LLNL and SNL and the
other from LANL and SNL) are being formed. Both the challenge
team and the ``home team'' will have access to all relevant
data and analysis about a weapon system-to be applied to annual
assessments and peer reviews of significant finding closures
and LEP certifications.
Keystone Science Issues.--Science campaigns in the Stockpile
Stewardship Program aim at filling major gaps in our knowledge
about nuclear weapon performance--for example, in the areas of
energy balance and boost physics. The goal is to remove
``adjustable parameters'' in our simulations and replace them
with first-principles physics models. Such improvements are
critically important to providing high confidence in the
difficult decisions that might arise in sustaining an aging
stockpile.
This extremely challenging research calls for a concerted effort
that combines continuing advances in high-performance computing
with well-diagnosed experiments at the laboratories' unique
experimental facilities. We have a golden opportunity to
dramatically advance our knowledge base. Progress, in
particular, depends on effective use of NIF (allowing stockpile
stewards to experimentally explore the physics of nuclear
phases of nuclear weapons performance), DARHT, JASPER, and our
other smaller scale experimental facilities. Importantly,
efforts to support these keystone science issues are increased
in the FY 2011 budget request.
Research and Development on Technology Advances for Stockpile
Support.--An important responsibility of the NNSA laboratories
is to explore what is technically possible in nuclear design.
Exploratory studies hone the skills of stockpile stewards and
help us to avoid technical surprise from other nations' nuclear
weapons activities. In addition, we develop advanced
technologies that could be applied to the U.S. stockpile,
consistent with the goal of no new weapons or improvements in
militarycapabilities. These include means for substantially
improving weapon safety and security that could be implemented
as part of an LEP. The proposed budget increases will help
accelerate progress in this area to ensure availability of
these technologies as LEPs are proposed and carried out over
the coming decade.
Advances in High-Performance Computing.--We have made remarkable
advances in high-performance computing and simulations, yet it
is imperative that we continue to make rapid progress. Early
success in the Stockpile Stewardship Program brought us
``terascale'' computing (trillions of operations per second);
we now reached ``petascale'' (thousands of trillions); and we
need ``exascale'' (millions of trillions) for two reasons.
Petascale makes 3-D high-fidelity simulations of weapons
performance practical. However, better models of boost physics
and thermonuclear burn processes still need to be developed (in
concert with experiments). That will require much greater
computing horsepower. Secondly, as mentioned above, the
underpinning of our assessment and certification is uncertainty
quantification. Rigorous implementation of the methodology for
each weapon system requires the running of many thousands of
high fidelity 3-D simulations to map out the impact of
uncertainties on weapon performance; hence, the need for much
greater computing power.
The proposed FY 2011 budget adequately supports computer center
operations at LLNL and acquisition of the 20-petaflop Sequoia
machine, which will become operational in 2012. More than a
factor of ten faster than the current best, it is the next
major advance in high-performance computing. Now is the time to
start planning and preparing for the next step toward exascale,
which is a grand challenge requiring additional resources.
An Active LEP Effort Together With Aggressive Surveillance.--As
mentioned below, a number of stockpile systems require LEPs in the next
one-to-two decades. Over the past two decades, two LEPs have been
completed. Over the next 10 years, plans call for the the completion of
one in progress, start of two full-scope LEPs, and preparation
activities for additional LEPs the following decade. In addition to LEP
support, funding needs to be increased from FY 2010 levels to address
current surveillance shortfalls and mature safety and security
technologies for production readiness for future LEPs. We look forward
to participating in a study to identify and evaluate LEP options for
the W78 Minuteman III ICBM warhead, which is planned to begin in FY
2011. NNSA has announced its intention to assign the W78 LEP to LLNL.
The FY 2011 budget request provides adequate support for our B61 LEP
peer review responsibilities as well as our responsibilities to support
existing LLNL-designed stockpile systems.
Recapitalization of Plant and Laboratory Infrastructure.--
Recapitalization is necessary to build a responsive infrastructure able
to meet program and production needs. This includes fulfilling science,
technology, and engineering program objectives and production
requirements. Such an infrastructure is essential to the complex's
ability to respond in a timely manner to technical issues and/or
emerging threats. In addition to planning for and construction of new
facilities (including the very major investments in CMRR-NF and UPF),
adequate investments are needed for Readiness in Technical Base and
Facilities (RTBF) for operations in and maintenance of existing
facilities. My direct concern at LLNL is obtaining sufficient funding
in FY 2011 to support operations at HEAF, which is a one-of-a-kind
facility for research and development in high explosives and energetic
materials, and to support Site 300, the Laboratory's remote
experimental site which is home to the Contained Firing Facility.
life-extension programs
Warhead life-extension programs are undertaken to address issues
discovered through surveillance and review processes supporting annual
assessments. The role of the LEP is to fix issues that impact overall
system effectiveness and extend stockpile life.
Effectiveness is influenced by many factors. Nuclear weapons are
not static devices; their chemical and physical properties or
characteristics change over time. While plutonium pits have been
determined to have a very long service life, aging affects the
performance of a number of important components including metals other
than plutonium, polymers, neutron generators, and gas transfer systems.
In addition, there are many other potential causes of decreased
confidence in effectiveness--ranging from design flaws to material
compatibility issues. Experience has shown that at least one major new
and unanticipated issue is discovered approximately every 5 years.
Thus far, we have been able to retain confidence in warhead safety
and effectiveness by offsetting identified increased uncertainties with
corresponding increases in performance margins. They have been obtained
by changes external to the nuclear explosives package or by relaxing or
eliminating military requirements (in coordination with the Department
of Defense). Options to further improve these margins have largely been
exhausted.
Several LEPs activities are in progress and/or recommended by the
NPR, and they are supportable with the proposed FY 2011 budget. The W76
Trident II SLBM warhead LEP is well underway. The initial design
activities began in FY 2000 and the final refurbished weapon is
expected to be delivered in FY 2017. In FY 2011, concept development is
scheduled for completion in preparation for a full-scope LEP for the
family of B61 nuclear bombs. The first production unit is planned for
FY 2017. In addition, a study to identify and evaluate LEP options for
the W78 Minuteman III ICBM warhead will begin in FY 2011. The NPR
proposes that this study consider the possibility of having the
resulting warhead be adaptable to multiple platforms in order to
provide a cost effective hedge against future problems in the deployed
stockpile. The first production unit is projected in FY 2021.
These plans for future LEPs are based on consideration of weapon
system age and early indicators of impending issues that will need to
be addressed. LEP activities formally start with a Phase 6.1 (or Phase
6.2) study conducted jointly with the DOD, which follows processes and
procedures that were established for developing weapons during the cold
war and have been adapted for LEPs. These joint concept development
efforts consider military requirements and explore LEP options to meet
the requirements. They involve extensive supercomputer simulation
efforts and supportive experimental activities, thorough interactions
with the NNSA production facilities and DOD contractors, and extensive
peer review.
Within the Laboratory, we consider the full range of technical
options to address military requirements that need to be balanced--for
example, form fitting and functioning with an existing delivery system
while providing enhanced safety (e.g., insensitive high explosive). In
doing so, we consider tradeoffs that emphasize one requirement over
another. The output of these evaluations is a set of recommended
options for the U.S. Government to consider in deciding on the specific
LEP option to proceed to engineering development (Phase 6.3). After a
decision to proceed to full-scale development is made, we follow a very
disciplined engineering process that involves the design agencies,
production agencies, and the responsible military service.
LEPs provide the opportunity to consider adding new safety and
security features without degrading overall effectiveness or
introducing new military capabilities. Some of these safety and
security improvements are ready for deployment now and would make a
significant improvement; other even more effective approaches require
further research. Considered features would be based on previous
nuclear tests. Intrinsic surety, which incorporates the safety and
security features inside the nuclear explosives package, provides the
highest level of safety and protection against terrorist threats.
Examples range from enhanced fire safety to technologies that make
acquisition of special nuclear materials from U.S. nuclear weapons of
little to no value to a terrorist.
The decision to add surety features is up to the U.S. Government,
and the technical feasibility of specific safety and security features
depends on the weapon and approach taken to extend its life. The
current LEP approach (refurbishment only) limits the range of safety
and security features that can be incorporated into certain weapons
systems.
The options studied for LEPs will be based on previously tested
nuclear designs. To best manage risk, we will consider, on a case-by-
case basis, the full range of LEP approaches characterized by the three
discrete options along the spectrum of possibilities:
Warhead Refurbishment.--Nuclear explosive package (NEP) composed of
existing or newly manufactured components originally designed
for that warhead.
Warhead Component Reuse.--NEP composed of components previously
manufactured for the stockpile (includes new production of
previously manufactured components).
Warhead Replacement.--NEP component not previously produced for the
stockpile (based on tested designs).
All potential approaches--or, more likely, combinations of
approaches--need to be examined because the areas of most significant
risks vary, and often times, have to do with costs, manufacturing
issues, the importance of improvements in margins, safety and security,
and long-term maintenance and surveillance. These factors differ from
system to system, and the various LEP approaches differ in the degree
to which they provide flexibility to manage identified risks. They also
differ in the degree to which they exercise the skills and capabilities
of our people, which is an important consideration in sustaining an
experienced workforce. Assessment and certification challenges depend
primarily on design details and associated margins and uncertainties
rather than the type of LEP approach considered.
Consideration of the full range of LEP options provides the
necessary technical flexibility to manage the stockpile with an
acceptable level of risk. Our findings and recommendations in studies
of options will be based solely on our best technical assessments of
cost, risk, and ability to meet stockpile management goals. In
decisions to proceed to engineering development, the U.S. Government
can consider a number of factors for particular LEP approaches.
the importance of people
Long-term success in stockpile stewardship fundamentally depends on
the quality of people in the program. If the nation is not confident in
the expertise and technical judgments of the stewards, the nation will
not have confidence in the safety, security, and effectiveness of our
nuclear deterrent. Over the years, exceptional scientists and engineers
have been attracted to LLNL by the opportunity to have access to the
world-class facilities, to pursue technically challenging careers, and
to work on projects of national importance. A Stockpile Stewardship
Program that is stable, technically challenging, and of recognized
importance to the nation is critical to the future success of the
program--and to the Laboratory in carrying out its national security
responsibilities.
The specialized technical skills and expertise required for
stockpile stewardship, which come through mentoring and hands-on
experience, take a long time to develop. Program stability is
critically important, and it requires a balanced, integrated Stockpile
Stewardship Program that has sustained bipartisan support and is
sufficiently funded over the long term. We welcome a strong affirmation
by the administration and Congress of the importance of the NNSA
laboratories' work in maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent through
stockpile stewardship.
An important benefit of a strong Stockpile Stewardship Program is
that this foundational program helps the NNSA laboratories in meeting
broader national security objectives. Clearly, nuclear weapons
expertise is directly applicable to the nuclear security challenges of
proliferation and terrorism. Other areas of national defense, domestic
and international security, and energy and environment security also
benefit from LLNL's broad scientific and technical base and
international leadership in areas such as high-performance computing.
These activities further strengthen our science and technology
workforce, add vitality to the Laboratory, spin new ideas and
additional capabilities into the weapons program, and serve as a
pipeline to bring top talent to LLNL so that we continue to provide the
nation outstanding stockpile stewards. A broader base of national
security programs at the NNSA laboratories is not a substitute for a
strong Stockpile Stewardship Program; neither is it a distraction from
our defining mission and responsibilities to sustain the nation's
nuclear deterrent.
closing remarks
My testimony describing the successes and future challenges in
stockpile stewardship supports and amplifies a joint statement my
fellow NNSA laboratory directors and I issued when the Nuclear Posture
Review was released. We made two key points.
First, that a Stockpile Stewardship Program which ``includes the
consideration of the full range of life extension options
(refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from
different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components based on
previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
acceptable level of risk.''
Second, that ``We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is
the recognition of the importance of supporting a modern physical
infrastructure--comprised of the national security laboratories and a
complex of supporting facilities--and a highly capable workforce with
the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent.''
Finally, I would like to again thank the committee for your
interest in and continued support for stockpile stewardship.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
Dr. Hommert.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. HOMMERT, DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL
LABORATORIES, ALBUQUERQUE, NM
Dr. Hommert. Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and
distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
I'm Paul Hommert, director of Sandia National Laboratories,
a multiprogram national security laboratory. I'm honored to be
here today with my colleagues from Los Alamos and Livermore to
testify on sustaining nuclear weapons under New START.
Within the policy outlined in the NPR, the collective DOD
and NNSA guidance documents, the FY11 budget request, and the
force-structure terms of New START, I am confident that Sandia
can provide the required support for the Nation's nuclear
deterrent. This confidence comes from our assessment of
stockpile management requirements against our mission, product
space, and capabilities.
Within the nuclear weapons complex, Sandia is responsible
for the design and qualification of nonnuclear components that
ensure the weapons perform as intended when authorized, and
remain safe and secure otherwise. We are responsible for
hundreds of highly specialized components with extremely high
reliability specifications and unique, often very harsh
environmental requirements.
Today, we are facing new challenges. The weapons in the
stockpile are aging and were designed when long life was not a
high priority. The radar for the first B61 bomb, for example,
was designed for a 5-year lifetime. There are B61s in the
stockpile today with components that date back to the 1960s. It
is a credit to the Stewardship Program that we have the
economical knowledge to support continued confidence in these
weapons system as they age.
What are the keys to managing the stockpile into the
future?
First, a strong and modernized surveillance program
tailored to the needs of an aging smaller stockpile to underpin
our annual assessment findings and recommendations. While this
is essential for the future, it is not sufficient. Through
surveillance activities to date, we have already established a
number of stockpile concerns that we must address.
Thus, the second element is the life-extension programs,
foremost for us being the B61. This is an immediate challenge
for Sandia, with a demanding schedule and a technical scope
more than twice that of the W76 life-extension program. I
support the full-scope approach called for by the NPR, and
would be very concerned if we only replaced nonnuclear
components with the most immediate aging issues with those--and
chose to reuse other nonnuclear components, some of which are,
even now, over 40 years old.
In addition to the surveillance program and the life-
extension programs, we must give strong attention to sustaining
capabilities for the future. This--the highest priority is the
vitality of our design competencies. In recent years,
uncertainties surrounding requirements for the stockpile
resulted in programmatic instability noted by the JASON panel
as a threat to the stewardship program. Today, nearly half of
the Sandia staff with experience in major weapons system
efforts are over the age of 55. Their remaining careers will
not span the upcoming life-extension program. This puts a
premium, going forward, on stable, multiyear program direction
and resources to provide opportunities for new technical staff
to work with experienced designers.
Also key to sustainment is keeping pace with modern-day
technologies. As an example, consider microelectronics, where,
since we began our most recent full-system-development effort,
the W88 in 1983, there has been a quantum leap in
miniaturization and microelectronics functionality that offer
real potential for enhancement to stockpile safety and
security, which we will realize in the B61.
Infrastructure sustainment is also critical. We have world-
class facilities, where we perform a range of scientific
research and product qualification, but we also have outdated
facilities that were commissioned in the 1950s and 1960s. We
are working with NNSA to complete revitalization of our
environmental test capabilities required to support the design
of the B61 and subsequent LEPs, and to recapitalize the tooling
in our trusted microelectronics foundry.
At Sandia, our broad national security work is critical to
sustainment. We are well poised to support the New START regime
and to continue our contributions to the nuclear security,
nonproliferation, and counterterrorism objectives of the
Nation.
This work exercises and strengthens many of our nuclear weapons
capabilities.
New START would not constrain the upcoming life-extension
imperatives. However, it does reinforce the importance of a
modern stockpile and a responsive infrastructure as we move
forward toward a smaller arsenal.
Let me close by summarizing the keys to success, going
forward: a robust surveillance program, stable life-extension
programs, and unyielding attention to sustaining the key
aspects of our capabilities for the future--people,
technologies, infrastructure, and our broader national security
programs.
Thank you, and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hommert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Paul J. Hommert, Director, Sandia National
Laboratories, albuquerque, NM
introduction
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity
to testify. I am Paul Hommert, President and Director of Sandia
National Laboratories. Sandia is a multiprogram national security
laboratory owned by the United States Government and operated by Sandia
Corporation \1\ for the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA).
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\1\ Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin
Corporation under Department of Energy prime contract no. DE-AC04-
94AL85000.
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Sandia is one of the three NNSA laboratories with responsibility
for stockpile stewardship and annual assessment of the Nation's nuclear
weapons. Within the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, Sandia is responsible
for the design, development, and qualification of nonnuclear components
of nuclear weapons. It is also responsible for the systems engineering
and integration of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile. While nuclear
weapons remain Sandia's core mission, the science, technology, and
engineering capabilities required to support this mission position us
to support other aspects of national security as well. As a
multiprogram national security laboratory, Sandia also conducts
research and development in nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear
counterterrorism, energy security, defense, and homeland security.
The policy framework outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) Report, the high-level implementation plan established by the FY
2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan and the Report in
Response to NDAA FY 2010 Section 1251, New START Treaty and Nuclear
Force Restructure Plans (to be referred to as Section 1251 Report), and
the funding profile described in the Department of Energy FY 2011
Congressional Budget Request weave the fabric of a compelling strategic
future for U.S. nuclear weapons policy. In this context and in view of
the New START Treaty, my statement today will address five closely
related issues: (1) the U.S. nuclear stockpile today and in the future;
(2) stockpile surveillance; (3) the life extension programs; (4) a
retrospective of stockpile stewardship; and (5) verification
technologies.
the u.s. nuclear stockpile today and in the future
As noted in the Nuclear Posture Review Report, ``The fundamental
role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear
weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our
allies, and our partners'' (p. vii). Since the end of the cold war, the
stockpile has become smaller in total numbers and comprises fewer
weapon types, and its size will continue to decrease. It is natural
that nuclear weapons policy in the post-cold-war era should be
reevaluated in light of 21st century threats. The administration's
joint objectives of maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal and, at the same time, strengthening the global
nonproliferation regime and preventing nuclear terrorism provide a
challenging, significant role for Sandia and, indeed, for all those
involved in the nuclear weapons program.
Within the context of the nuclear weapons policy outlined in the
Nuclear Posture Review Report and the collective guidance for
implementation provided in the FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan, the Section 1251 Report, and the Department of Energy
FY 2011 Congressional Budget Request, and under the New START Treaty
terms, I am confident that Sandia can fulfill its responsibilities in
support of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. That confidence comes from
our assessment of the stockpile management requirements against our
mission and product space and our capabilities. In their totality, the
documents describing the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent represent
a well-founded, achievable path forward, which I understand and
support. However, as we stand on the threshold of the next era of
stockpile stewardship and management, we must recognize the challenges
inherent in this framework. A significant body of work is required to
sustain the deterrent into the next two decades, and we must ensure
that the resources are commensurate with the requirements and
expectations. Specifically, I can be confident that the totality of the
stockpile management and deterrent policy can be supported only if the
FY 2011 budget is authorized and appropriated at the level of the
administration's request and the national significance of our mission
is sustained.
Mission and Product Space
Sandia is responsible for the systems engineering and integration
of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile. As systems integrator, we
are responsible for numerous unique and challenging assignments,
including the engineered interfaces from the warheads to the delivery
platforms and surveillance management at the weapon system level for
the nuclear weapons complex-both flight testing and system-level ground
testing.
Sandia is the nonnuclear component design agency for NNSA. The
components that we design ensure that the weapons will perform as
intended when authorized through the U.S. command and control
structure, and that they remain safe and secure otherwise. These
critical functions are provided through our core products of arming,
fuzing, and firing systems (AF&Fs), neutron generators, gas transfer
systems, and surety systems. We are responsible for literally hundreds
of major components in the stockpile. Our products are highly
specialized electrical, microelectronic, electromechanical, chemical,
and explosive components with extremely high reliability specifications
and unique, very harsh environmental requirements. For example, an
``intent stronglink'' is a component that prevents a nuclear weapon
from being armed until a unique string of code is entered indicating
human intent. Even in the most recent designs, there are more than 200
parts in a component the size of a cell phone. We are also responsible
for ``weaklink'' components, which are designed to fail in a manner
that precludes inadvertent nuclear detonation in accident scenarios
such as those involving fire or lightning. These safety components must
meet stringent requirements.
Sandia designs, engineers, and integrates these specialized
products into the Nation's nuclear arsenal through the efforts of a
world-class workforce and highly specialized tools, facilities, and
equipment. However, to fulfill our responsibilities for the deterrent
into the future, we are facing new challenges.
Consider first that most of the weapons in the current stockpile
were designed at a time when long design life was not typically a high-
priority design requirement. The radar for the first B61 bomb, for
example, was originally designed for a 5-year lifetime; today there are
B61s in the stockpile with components manufactured in the late 1960s.
It is a credit to our Stockpile Stewardship Program that we have the
technical knowledge base to support continued confidence in these
weapon systems as they age. Indeed, it is also a credit to those who
designed the current stockpile that it has lasted well beyond original
design lifetimes. Now we are working to provide solutions that will
extend the lifetime of our nuclear arsenal for another 30 years.
The state of the stockpile is reported to the President through the
annual assessment process. Through this process, we have been, and
remain, able to assess the Nation's stockpile as safe, secure, and
reliable. That said, as we move forward with the challenging business
of extending the lifetimes of U.S. nuclear weapon systems, we must
address stockpile aging and degradation, as well as technology
obsolescence. In addition, long weapon lifetimes will become a specific
design objective.
While the options to refurbish, reuse, and replace are applicable
to the nuclear explosive package, almost all of Sandia's life extension
work will involve replacements with modern technologies. Nonnuclear
components, by their very nature, are subject to a whole range of
potential aging and failure modes. Although we may be able to reuse
some of the original components, doing so uniformly would be a
fundamentally unwise option when their service life must be extended by
another 30 years. In addition, only modern technology will enable
introduction into the stockpile of the safety and security required by
the Nuclear Posture Review Report.
Stockpile Surveillance
Stockpile surveillance and assessment play a crucial role in
assuring the nuclear deterrent. Through these activities, we develop
knowledge about the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile.
This knowledge provides the technical basis for our annual assessment
findings and recommendations regarding the state of the stockpile. It
also informs decisions made about the stockpile: from deployment and
targeting to safe handling operations (routine or otherwise) and from
there to development of new component and system design options. In
their 2009 annual assessment letters, all three NNSA laboratory
directors highlighted concerns about inadequate progress toward
surveillance transformation. Former Sandia Laboratories Director Tom
Hunter said, ``I believe that the level of commitment to a tailored and
balanced stockpile evaluation program for our aging, smaller stockpile
is inadequate.'' Indeed, the JASON panel reached the same conclusion in
their 2009 life extension study.
The Department of Energy FY 2011 Congressional Budget Request
places high priority on stockpile surveillance, and we understand and
agree to strengthen our knowledge and confidence in the current
stockpile. The Surveillance Transformation Plan was established to
better align our surveillance program with the challenges of an aging
and smaller stockpile. The plan aims to shift the surveillance
program's focus from finding defects to acquiring deeper scientific
understanding of stockpile performance margins, distributions, and
trends by creating higher fidelity diagnostics and physical and
computational simulation capabilities. In this new framework, we will
be better able to anticipate stockpile performance degradation and to
schedule required actions. Yet, although essential, a strong
surveillance program is only one component of stockpile management into
the future. The life extension programs are another component.
the life-extension programs
The B61 Life-Extension Program
The Nuclear Posture Review Report concluded that the United States
will ``proceed with full scope life extension for the B61 bomb
including enhancing safety, security, and use control'' (p. xiii). This
is the most immediate stockpile challenge for Sandia. For this life
extension, we are deliberately building multidisciplinary teams of both
highly experienced staff and new talent, sustaining the necessary
knowledge in the management team, providing an optimal teaming
environment, ensuring that facilities are ready for the work, and
piloting new processes that will benefit our life-extension work.
Nevertheless, we find ourselves in a state of urgency, with a
demanding schedule and expansive product requirements. The primary
driver for the schedule of the B61 LEP is the fact that critical
nonnuclear components are exhibiting age-related performance
degradation. For example, the radar in the B61, which includes the now
infamous vacuum tubes, must be replaced. In addition, both the neutron
generator and a battery component are fast approaching obsolescence and
must be replaced. A secondary driver for the schedule is the deployment
of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter, which requires a new digital interface
for the B61. Replacing the three aging components and adding the new
digital interface represent the absolute minimum approach to this LEP.
However, it is my judgment that we need to approach this LEP with a
resolute commitment to replace old nonnuclear components and field a
nuclear weapon system that employs modern technologies to improve
safety and security and to extend service life.
The weapon systems addressed through the LEPs of the coming two
decades will be in our stockpile well into the second half of this
century. The ``full'' scope for the B61 LEP called for in the Nuclear
Posture Review Report is a prudent approach to this life extension that
addresses aging concerns, obsolete technologies, and enhancements in
safety, security, and use control. Notably, the scale of this LEP will
be much larger than that of the W76 Trident II SLBM warhead LEP, which
is now in production. Whereas the W76 LEP involved redesign and
replacement of 18 major Sandia components, the B61 LEP involves 46 such
components.
To extend the lifetime of the B61, the requested FY 2011 funding is
critical. We must complete the design definition in FY 2011 to create a
firm understanding of system requirements and thus fully establish
future-year budget needs. Total cost estimates for the B61 LEP are
subject to change until the design definition and requirements are
finalized.
We also have considerable technology maturation work to perform in
FY 2011. Technology maturation is a rigorous approach we apply to
developing new technologies, from the earliest conceptual designs
through full-scale product realization and ultimately insertion into
the stockpile. We use a construct of technology readiness levels, first
implemented at the Department of Defense and then NASA, and implement a
series of technical and programmatic reviews to ensure that new
technologies reach the appropriate maturity level before they are used
in a life extension baseline design. For the B61 LEP, we have 13 major
categories of technology maturation work underway. Our cost estimates
for FY 2011 in this area depend heavily on the progress we are trying
to make in FY 2010. I am therefore concerned that, if the requested FY
2010 reprogramming is not implemented, significant additional risk will
be introduced into our FY 2011 efforts on the B61 LEP. For example, we
began FY 2010 by staffing up our B61 LEP team to position ourselves for
strong performance in FY 2011. Specifically, we started FY 2010 with
139 full-time equivalent employees for the B61 LEP, and that number
peaked in April at 192. Now the numbers are declining in the absence of
FY 2010 reprogrammed dollars and concern over FY 2011 continuing
resolution. Unless this situation changes, we will enter FY 2011 with
roughly 50 percent of the staffing level that was originally intended
for this critical program.
The possibility of a prolonged continuing resolution for FY 2011 is
a real concern. The funding growth required for the B61 LEP from FY
2010 to FY 2011 is so essential that a continuing resolution funding
level referenced back to FY 2010 will almost surely require removing
staff from the program, a slip in the FY 2017 target for first
production unit, or even a down-scoping of the program. The LEP
schedule and scope are also, of course, heavily dependent on the
appropriated funding in FY 2012 and beyond. FY 2011 funding is needed
to get this program off to a good start, but enduring multiyear
sustained funding is required to bring this program to successful
completion. The success of the B61 LEP also requires a fully supported
production complex with particular importance placed on the Kansas City
and Pantex Plants.
Other Life-Extension Programs
The B61 bomb is our current focus, but certain reentry systems in
our stockpile also require near-term life extension activities. The
Nuclear Posture Review Report recommended ``initiating a study of LEP
options for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using
the resulting warhead also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead
types'' (p. xiv). The Department of Energy FY 2011 Congressional Budget
Request includes funding for a W78 LEP. Based on the guidance in the
Nuclear Posture Review Report, the planning for this LEP will also
examine the opportunities and risks associated with the resulting
warhead referenced above.
At the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we
completed a feasibility study for a common integrated arming, fuzing,
and firing (AF&F) system. Using an envelope of the requirements for the
W78 and the W88, and even the W87 and the U.K. system, our study
concluded that this approach was technically feasible, including
improvements in safety and security enabled by miniaturization of
electronics. Savings in weight and volume, at a premium in reentry
systems, can be used for those additional safety and security features.
The study results have been briefed to the Nuclear Weapons Council and
are being used to inform decisions regarding the scope, schedule, and
interplay between the W78 and W88 life extensions.
a retrospective of stockpile stewardship
My confidence in our ability to successfully execute the life-
extension programs is based on the suite of tools and capabilities that
have resulted from the investments made in stockpile stewardship. For
the first 15 years of the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program,
creating the scientific tools and knowledge required in the absence of
underground nuclear testing was a compelling grand challenge for the
U.S. nuclear weapons program. While the moratorium on underground
nuclear testing had a more direct impact on Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories than on Sandia National Laboratories,
hundreds of experiments have been run on Sandia's Z accelerator,
providing critical experimental data that are tied directly to the
milestones of NNSA's Predictive Capability Framework roadmap. Advances
in our pulsed power capabilities are supporting the Advanced
Certification, Dynamic Materials Properties, and Primary and Secondary
Assessment Technologies programs.
At Sandia, the primary impact of the moratorium on underground
nuclear testing was the need to create tools and acquire the knowledge
necessary to sustain confidence in the radiation hardness of our
designs. We created advanced stockpile stewardship tools and
effectively applied them to our annual assessment of the stockpile and
to the qualification of the W76-1 life-extension program. Those tools
gave us the understanding and knowledge to assess with confidence the
state of the stockpile. Advances in our computational tools and
improved experimental capabilities, coupled with high-fidelity
diagnostics for model validation and improved characterization of test
results, provided this new understanding.
Looking back at the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, it
is clear that we collectively understood the magnitude of the change
that needed to occur in the nuclear weapons program to address the
moratorium on underground nuclear testing. What we, at Sandia, perhaps
did not fully appreciate at the time was the impact that the end of the
cold war would bring to the vitality of our system and component design
community. During the cold war, we were pursuing simultaneously as many
as 14 full-scale weapon development programs. Since 1992, we have had a
total of only two programs of similar scale: the W76-1 and the W80-3
LEPs. The latter was cancelled in 2005. Thus, as we began to implement
stockpile stewardship in the early 1990s, our weapon systems
development workload dropped dramatically, and that meant less work for
systems engineers and component designers. At the same time,
technological advances were happening that would bear directly on the
products within Sandia's responsibility.
As stated earlier, the products Sandia designs and engineers are
highly specialized for the unique demands of nuclear weapons; however,
they are related to commercial products because of similarities in
underlying technologies. To express this idea differently, our
components have a point of reference in commercial technology. This
reality bears directly and significantly on Sandia's responsibilities
as we embark on the next era of stewardship.
The pace of technological advances in recent decades has been
staggering. Let me give just one example. In 1983, we were embarking on
the full-scale design and development for the W88 Trident II submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead, which is the last newly
designed warhead to have entered the stockpile, and it took advantage
of the microelectronics available at the time. That year, the cell
phone industry, also relying on microelectronics, was proud of the
first network in the United States: 7,000 phones, each weighing about 2
pounds. In the time that has passed since, miniaturization and
functional density of microelectronics have taken a quantum leap. Today
there are about 285 million cell phones, each weighing about 3 ounces.
Such technological advances mean simply that some of the technologies
on which Sandia products are based have become radically more advanced
than they were the last time we built a large number of nonnuclear
components for weapons.
The strong tie between the products developed by Sandia and those
developed by the private sector is both a challenge and an
opportunity--a challenge, because we must have the right set of people,
skills, production equipment, and an up-to-date technology base at a
time when budgets are not predictable; yet an opportunity, because it
keeps us agile, adaptable, in tune with the needs of the Nation and
because modern technologies provide opportunities for improvements in
stockpile safety and security. This strong tie manifests itself in
several ways. To reduce cost and whenever the required functionality is
available from a trusted supplier in the commercial sector, we
incorporate commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) parts into our products.
Furthermore, for the parts we must manufacture (for example,
specialized microelectronics), only modern production tooling and
equipment can be readily maintained. Perhaps most important is the fact
that we can attract the best and brightest new graduates when we can
offer them challenging innovative projects that use the latest
technologies, which they understand and on which they have been
trained.
Cyber risk is another aspect of technological advances that we must
consider. Since the 1980s Sandia has pioneered the use of vulnerability
assessments to determine systematic cyber weaknesses in command and
control and surety systems. We believe it is vital to the next
generation of life extension programs that cyber risk be assessed and
capabilities developed to mitigate the dangers.
Workforce
The demographics within Sandia's nuclear weapons program clearly
reflect both the strengths of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the
challenges of a period with few full-scale weapon design programs. We
have attracted the very best scientists, engineers, and technologists
to the laboratories with large-scale science-based engineering programs
that bring together computational with experimental test capabilities.
However, retaining talent in our weapon and component design community
has been challenging. The uncertainty surrounding the requirements for
the future stockpile resulted in programmatic instability and lack of
full-scale engineering development programs. In their recent life
extension study, the JASON panel noted that a ``lack of program
stability'' threatened the continued strength of the stewardship
program.
While we must rise to meet near-term challenges of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, we also must establish the basis for long-term
stability. For Sandia, stability should be viewed in the context of
three pillars: people, infrastructure, and broad national security
work. The Nuclear Posture Review Report highlighted the importance of
the first two of these: ``In order to remain safe, secure, and
effective, the U.S. nuclear stockpile must be supported by a modern
physical infrastructure, and a highly capable workforce'' (p. xiv).
Today, 37 percent of the experienced technical staff in Sandia's
weapon system and component design organizations are over the age of
55. Their remaining careers will not span the upcoming life extension
programs. This reality puts a huge premium going forward on stable,
multiyear, large-scale LEPs that provide opportunities for our new
technical staff to work closely with our experienced designers on a
full range of activities-from advanced concept development to component
design and qualification, and ultimately to the production and fielding
of nuclear weapon systems. The team we are assembling for the B61 LEP
is representative of the new multidisciplinary approach we will take to
ensure that (1) the powerful stewardship tools developed through our
Nation's investment and applied effectively to stockpile assessment are
adapted going forward to meet the needs of the design of weapon system
architectures and components and (2) the latest technologies and
innovative designs are coupled with rigor that comes from experience.
To give only one example, recently validated thermal models developed
by the Stockpile Stewardship Program were applied to the design of
thermal batteries for the B61 LEP. These models allowed us to identify
a nearly twofold increase in battery run time that could be achieved
with a simple material substitution.
New tools and modern technologies, coupled with our management
vision for the engineeringenvironment required for success, will foster
innovation; lead to safety and security for the upcoming LEPs; and
provide foundational technical and scientific strength to support the
stockpile over the long term.
Essential Capabilities and Infrastructure
Sandia's capabilities are essential to its full life cycle
responsibilities for the stockpile: from exploratory concept definition
to design and qualification, and ultimately through ongoing stockpile
surveillance and assessment. Let me point out a few examples.
The NNSA complex transformation plan designated Sandia as the Major
Environmental Test Center of Excellence for the entire nuclear weapons
program. The facilities and equipment we have in this area are
extensive: (1) twenty test facilities at Sandia-New Mexico; (2) the
Tonopah flight test range in Nevada; (3) the Weapon Evaluation Test
Laboratory in Amarillo, Texas; and (4) the Kauai test facility. We use
environmental test capabilities to simulate the full range of
mechanical, thermal, electrical, explosive, and radiation environments
that nuclear weapons must withstand, including those associated with
postulated accident scenarios.
Significantly, capabilities originally developed in Sandia's
nuclear weapons program also support other national needs. For example,
the Thermal Test Complex, one of our major environmental test
capabilities, is a $38M world-class suite of facilities supporting a
full spectrum of technical research: from the basic studies of fire
chemistry and model validation, to full-scale highly instrumented
simulations of weapon system safety performance in fuel fire accident
scenarios. The Thermal Test Complex was funded by Test Capabilities
Revitalization (TCR) Phase 1, came online in 2006, and immediately
provided necessary capabilities for the W76-1 LEP. Interestingly,
expertise in flow visualization, plume evaluation, thermal sciences,
and fire sciences developed at the Thermal Test Complex was recently
also used in an area unrelated to nuclear weapons: the BP oil disaster.
Today, TCR Phase 2 funding is needed to renovate our suite of
mechanical environment test facilities, many of which were commissioned
in the 1950s and 1960s. These facilities will support the design and
qualification of the B61 life extension and subsequent LEPs.
Another unique capability that Sandia stewards for the nuclear
weapons program and also for DOE's nonproliferation payloads is the
microelectronics research and fabrication facility, where we design and
fabricate an array of unique microelectronics, as well as specialty
optical components and microelectromechanical system, or MEMS, devices.
This capability includes a national ``trusted foundry'' for radiation-
hardened microelectronics. We have been providing microelectronic
components to the nuclear stockpile at the highest level of trust since
1978 and to DOE's nonproliferation payloads since 1982. In 2009, Sandia
received Class 1A Trusted Accreditation (the highest level of
accreditation) from the Department of Defense for Trusted Design and
Foundry Services and is the only government entity with this
accreditation for both design and foundry operations. We must
recapitalize the tooling and equipment in our silicon fabrication
facility, much of which dates back about 15 years in an industry where
technology changes almost every 2 years. Recapitalization will ensure
production of the radiation-hardened components required by the
upcoming reentry system life-extension work.
Expertise in materials science is required to engineer new
materials for future stockpile applications, create the physics-based
understanding of material aging in the current stockpile, and project
potential performance impacts. Our materials science capabilities are
essential to our national security mission. And yet, past funding
constraints in Sandia's nuclear weapons program led to significant
erosion in materials science. That erosion might have been even more
serious had Sandia not successfully leveraged materials science
research in support of its broader national security role. We are
currently working with NNSA on centralizing our nonnuclear materials
science funding and thereby enabling a more integrated capability.
We also have a critical but eroding capability in radiation effects
sciences. It is my belief that the U.S. strategic arsenal should
continue to maintain its requirements for radiation hardness. By its
very nature, U.S. nuclear deterrence requires a nuclear arsenal that
cannot be held at risk or denied by any adversary. Relaxation in the
strategic hardness of our designs could be interpreted as a weakening
of our deterrent posture.
Nuclear survivability is best addressed through intrinsic design
properties and cannot be added through modifications to the stockpile
once a threat changes. During the era of underground nuclear testing,
we exposed Sandia components to nuclear environments as part of the
qualification process. Today, in order to create a fundamental
understanding of the phenomena and failure mechanisms of concern, we
simulate nuclear environments in aboveground test facilities, create
computational models of the experiments, and then validate the
computational models with experimental results. However, experimental
and modeling and simulation capabilities that allow us to assess with
confidence must be sustained. In the recent past, funding in this area
has been erratic, resulting in difficulties managing the program and
sustaining the critical skills of our staff in the important area of
nuclear effects simulation.
Broad National Security Work
Today, national security challenges are more diverse than they were
during the cold war. The NNSA laboratories are uniquely positioned to
contribute solutions to these complex national security challenges. In
the new environment, synergistic work supporting other national
security missions is crucial. Indeed, as mentioned in the FY 2011
Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan Summary, ``while NNSA nuclear
weapons activities are clearly focused on the strategic deterrence
aspects of the NNSA mission, they also inform and support with critical
capabilities other aspects of national security.''
I will refer to only one of many success stories at Sandia (others
come from materials science, microelectronics, and computer science),
showing how capabilities for the nuclear weapons program benefit from
synergy with other national security programs. It is the story of our
work in radars.
Competency in specialized radar applications is a required
capability for the nuclear weapons program. As a result of initial
investments in radar fuze capability for nuclear weapons, in 1983 we
began working on miniature radars based on synthetic aperture concepts
for nuclear weapons and broader national security activities. In 1985
we became involved in a program for the Department of Defense to
develop a high-resolution, real-time synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
suitable for use in unmanned aircraft. Sandia flew the first such SAR
prototype in 1990. Follow-on work sponsored by the Department of
Defense reduced the size and cost of SAR systems, improved resolution,
and significantly expanded the applications and military benefits of
radar. Partnerships with industry have transitioned each generation of
the technology into field-deployable systems. Sandia-designed airborne
SAR systems are now widely used for real-time surveillance by the U.S.
military.
In this example, the original radar competency of the nuclear
weapons program was improved by this work for the Department of
Defense. The resulting advanced radar competency made it possible to
apply new technology to the updated fuzing system for the W76-1 life
extension. This updated fuzing system would not have been possible
without the competency that was maintained and advanced by work for the
Department of Defense.
verification and monitoring
Sandia has had a long tradition of ingenuity and engineering
excellence in developing technologies for verification and monitoring
to support efforts in nonproliferation and nuclear security as
demonstrated, for example, by our successful record of involvement with
international treaties: from the VELA Satellite Programs (1960s) to the
Intermediate-Range Forces Treaty (INF, 1987) and from there to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START, 1994). The New START Treaty
signed in Prague in April 2010 aims to enhance predictability and
stability and thus security, and verification activities will monitor
compliance with limits and other obligations set forth in the treaty.
While details of Sandia's activities in verification can best be
presented in a classified environment, I will state here that we have
carefully reviewed the New START Treaty and understand the limits and
obligations as well as the changes to the inspection protocols. Sandia
will continue to support the government by providing the best technical
solutions and expertise required. The current language of the New START
Treaty mentions the radiation detection equipment, which was developed
and manufactured at Sandia and used in the previous START, as a key
piece of equipment for verification purposes under the terms of the new
treaty. In addition, between September 2009 and April 2010, two Sandia
experts served as technical advisors on the delegation that negotiated
the New START Treaty.
conclusions
As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, ``as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal'' (p. iii). The upcoming decade will be
demanding as we conduct a number of life extension programs under
compressed schedules, modernize our aging facilities, and invest in
human capital.
Within the context of the nuclear weapons policy presented in the
Nuclear Posture Review Report and the collective guidance for
implementation provided in the FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan, Section 1251 Report, and the Department of Energy FY
2011 Congressional Budget Request, and under the New START Treaty
terms, I am confident that Sandia can provide the required support for
the nation's nuclear deterrent. That confidence is based on our
assessment of the stockpile management requirements against our mission
and product space and our capabilities.
The New START Treaty, if ratified and entered into force, would not
constrain or interfere with the upcoming stockpile life-extension
imperatives. It would not change our planned approach or the tools we
will apply. It would not limit the required introduction of modern
technologies into existing warhead designs and the realization of the
attendant benefits. However, it would reinforce the imperative to
ensure a modern stockpile and a strong, responsive infrastructure as we
move toward a smaller nuclear arsenal.
As a whole package, the documents describing the future of U.S.
nuclear policy represent a well-founded, achievable path forward, which
I understand and support. However, as we stand on the threshold of the
new era of stockpile stewardship and management, we must recognize the
challenges inherent in this framework. A significant body of work will
be required to sustain the deterrent into the next two decades, and we
must ensure that resources are commensurate with the requirements and
expectations. The administration's FY 2011 budget request reflects a
strong alignment among the White House, the Department of Defense, and
the NNSA, and it recognizes the magnitude of our future work scope. And
the fact that the three national security laboratory directors were
invited to speak before you today is a clear indication of the
leadership role of Congress in authorizing a path forward for U.S.
nuclear deterrence. Our success in sustaining the stockpile rests on
program stability, multiyear sustained funding, a clear national
commitment to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and the opportunity to
perform innovative technical work in the service of the Nation.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, all three of you. And,
again, may I say, for all of us, how much we appreciate your
leadership in this critical area.
Let me begin. Each of you has raised the issue of
resources, obviously, and appropriately. This week, Senator
Lugar and I were invited to the White House and met with the
President and Vice President on this subject, and I'm pleased--
we're pleased--to be able to report that the President made it
crystal clear that he is completely committed to the full
funding of this modernization program for as long as his
administration is in power, and he is going to make that clear
to the leadership of the Senate, and particularly to Senator
Kyl and others who have raised that concern, appropriately.
I want to make it clear, all of us are concerned about the
viability of our deterrent. It would be absurd not to be. We
rely on it. It's been a critical component of our country's
defense and security for as long as it's existed, and we've
always taken the measures necessary to maintain the
technological confidence, and even edge, superiority, to know
that we're in the position that we want to be. We are all
committed to staying there.
There was a healthy debate at one period of time, based on
the Perry-Schlesinger report and other things, that raised the
question of building a new warhead design, other things, and it
was rejected by the House. But, I think the current language is
such that proceeding on an item-by-item basis and keeping our
minds open to what is the best way to maintain the viability of
those warheads, that we can proceed.
Am I correct, gentlemen, in reading your testimony and
taking away from each of you the conclusion that--as former
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry told this committee with
respect to the Nuclear Posture Review, ``The Nuclear Posture
Review explicitly authorizes reuse, which the laboratories have
felt reluctant to use before, and it gives the condition under
which redesign can be achieved.'' He says, ``I think this is a
major step forward from where we are before.''
Judging by your written statements, it seems to me you
would endorse Secretary Perry's comments, but I would like to
emphasize this for the record. Is that accurate? Do you feel
confident that the NPR allows you the flexibility needed to be
able to guarantee the viability of the structure?
Dr. Anastasio.
Dr. Anastasio. Sir, I believe, with the flexibility offered
to explore the full range of options, that we do have the
ability to sustain the stockpile with acceptable levels of
risk. It's not the perfect approach, but we believe--or, I
believe--that this is an approach that we can make work--again,
if we have a program that's well planned and adequately funded.
The Chairman. Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. Yes. Senator Kerry, I would say that the
outline that is included in the NPR not only gives us the
flexibility, it gives us the responsibility; it specifically
says we are to examine the full range of options. It's
certainly something that I feel, personally, is my
responsibility to the country, to bring forth the full spectrum
of options and which ones work the best.
In addition, we have certainly been encouraged by members
of this administration, that that is their intent; they want us
to examine the full range of options and to be sure that the
full range of technical options are available to the
decisionmakers.
The Chairman. Dr. Hommert.
Dr. Hommert. Yes. Mr. Chairman, in the Sandia mission
space, which is nonnuclear components, largely as we go forward
we will engage in replacement to adapt to modern technologies.
But, overall, I would say I agree with my colleagues here, that
what faces us in managing this stockpile forward, that this is
not a limitation directly, and one that we can address in
recommendations, we come forward, in the best way to manage the
stockpile.
The Chairman. And the $624 million that, I think, is in the
budget for next year, while it's not the $900 million that I
think some requested, still amounts to a significant increase.
Does that give you the capacity to be able to do what you need
to do?
Dr. Anastasio. Well, sir, I think, first, that budget
request--we sure hope that Congress will act on it, as well,
but if that----
The Chairman. Assuming we act on it----
Dr. Anastasio. Yes. If that comes to pass----
The Chairman [continuing]. You get to 624----
Dr. Anastasio [continuing]. To me, it's a very strong
commitment, on the part of the administration, to this program,
and to what we need to do. Of course, that's the near term. As
a good program manager, you need to worry about funding across
the full life of the program, and that's an issue, as well.
But----
The Chairman. But, no administration and no Congress can
commit that to you. We can commit now and next year.
Dr. Anastasio. I understand. And I--and, as I say, that's
an excellent start and a very strong, positive message.
The Chairman. And you don't have to kill for it.
Dr. Anastasio. Pardon?
The Chairman. You don't have to kill for it.
Dr. Anastasio. No, no. [Laughter.]
No, sir.
The Chairman. Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. Yes, it is. The FY 2011 budget is a very
positive step. Given the recent trends, you know, I can't say
strongly enough how positive a step it is. It sets the
direction correctly, sets the stage for the continued
investment in this area, as Dr. Anastasio has said. You know,
my concern is whether or not the country will be able to
sustain that, because that is what is required in order to move
this program and accomplish what has been set forward as a set
of program goals for us.
The Chairman. Dr. Hommert.
Dr. Hommert. Yes. The FY11 budget, for us, is dominated by
initiating the B61 life-extension program. And it's imperative
that we begin that in 2011. And also in 2011 it allows us to
accomplish establishing the baseline and requirements and cost
for the full life-extension--full engineering development on
the 61. So, it's a critical year, and it is supported in the
budget.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that, from all of you.
I'm going to recognize Senator Lugar.
I, incidentally, noticed, Dr. Miller, that you pronounced
his name ``Loogarr.'' And yesterday Senator Corker made a major
issue out of clarifying for the world how it is correctly
pronounced. It's like the gun, ``Looger.'' So----
[Laughter.]
Senator Corker. We did do that in a secret meeting. I
didn't want anybody to know that his name is actually
``Looger.'' But----
The Chairman. It was a secret----
Senator Corker [continuing]. It's good----
The Chairman. It was a secret meeting in front of cameras,
press, all kinds of people. [Laughter.]
Dr. Miller. I do apologize for my Southern heritage.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. That's something you should never apologize
for, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Lugar is going to also chair, because I have to go
introduce a new U.S. attorney to the Judiciary Committee, so I
hope you'll forgive me for that. But, I'll stay until I do have
to run for that.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Well, thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. I appreciate your introduction on the basis of my
name identification, appropriate that it be equated to a gun
during an arms control hearing, but----
[Laughter.]
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Not to worry.
Let me just suggest, Dr. Anastasio, you note that one
approach in--to maintaining a focus on our nuclear stockpile
across multiple administrations and Congresses could be a set
of safeguards that have been used in approving past arms
control treaties. Now, I ask, Do you mean that certain measures
could be required in a resolution approving the New START
Treaty that would speak to these issues? And I raise this and
would note that the Senate spoke to the safety, reliability,
and performance of our nuclear forces when it approved the
START II Treaty. I would mention, just for the sake of clarity,
that the START II Treaty did not come into force, due,
ultimately, to Russian objections, but it did pass this
committee, it did pass the Senate, and it had at least these
elements that have been suggested.
Now, would you agree with me, sir, that a good way to
maintain the focus that you desire, and that we desire, would
be to approve the New START Treaty with similar provisions?
Dr. Anastasio. Senator, my concern is the sustainability
over the long term. Certainly, using safeguards could be one
approach that the Congress could use to keep attention and
focus. There are other approaches that potentially could serve,
with annual written reports like the annual assessment letters
that we write every year, which happen to be classified; we
could do something unclassified. There could be regular
hearings, annually, or some such thing, but something in that
spectrum of ideas. Perhaps there's something that will work for
the Congress and the administration that will allow us to keep
this focus and to assure ourselves that we're still on track
and on path to take care of these important issues.
Senator Lugar. Well, I appreciate your comment, and maybe
you could be of further counsel. I raise it because I suspect
that, given what I mentioned, the potential multiple
administrations, a stretch here, that perhaps our resolution of
ratification ought to include language or other steps that
might be useful in simply tightening our own focus on this
issue of this hearing today and of the debate.
Let me ask for comments of all three of you. And, if you
can, try to jot down in your memories these four items so that
you might respond to them effectively together.
First of all, are U.S. nuclear weapons safe, secure, and
effective?
Second, is Russia modernizing its stockpile of nuclear
weapons?
And third, without the data provided by the New START
Treaty, will there be more uncertainties with respect to the
nuclear weapons Russia deploys as a part of its modernization?
And finally, would more uncertainty with regard to Russian
weapons complicate current stockpile challenges--in particular,
if our military decided that we would need to respond to those
uncertainties through stockpile adjustments?
As you can tell, essentially I want to know your evaluation
of how safe, secure, and reliable our stockpile is; what the
Russians are doing; if we don't ratify START; and the
uncertainties then increase, or maybe you will testify they
wouldn't increase, but if they would; and then, under those
circumstances, how we then begin to adjust what we're going to
do, given a world of uncertainty in this area.
Would you commence with that, Dr. Anastasio?
Dr. Anastasio. Sure. So, the U.S. weapons in the stockpile
today are safe, secure, and reliable. And I'm confident of
that. I do worry about the long-term viability. And that's, of
course, the basis for all the discussion----
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Dr. Anastasio [continuing]. We're having today.
As far as ``Is Russia modernizing their stockpile?''--to
the best of the information I've seen from our intelligence
community and our contact directly with the Russians over the
years, I certainly believe that that's what they're doing.
Without data from New START, would that create more
uncertainty for us about Russia? Well, certainly the country
would not get as much information that the monitoring program
would provide through New START.
Would that impact and complicate our job? I think, perhaps,
that's best to ask the commander at STRATCOM or someone in the
military, but my personal sense is that, based on what we know
about the Russians, I think the path forward for our program is
that it incorporates that knowledge that we have about where
the Russians are going. So, I'm not sure that it would
complicate, but, if we do get new requirements from the
Department of Defense, then that certainly would have to be
folded into the plans on how we could go forward, and we'd have
to adjust the program to respond.
Senator Lugar. Dr. Miller, do you have a comment on these
questions?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. Again, today I think the U.S.
stockpile is safe and secure and effective. The principal issue
is that in order to keep it that way requires us to do work on
the stockpile, and, in many cases, there are opportunities to
improve the safety
and security of our stockpile in ways that are potentially very
beneficial.
The Russians, I believe, are modernizing. We have an
intelligence division at Livermore that spends a lot of time
understanding what's going on in foreign countries. Again, it
is my understanding that they are actively modernizing their
stockpile.
I think that it is certainly true that the START Treaty
that is under your consideration does offer the ability to
understand, provide more data on what's going on in Russia with
their systems. As a technical person, data is always valuable.
And so, it will certainly reduce our uncertainties.
With respect to how the United States responds to those
uncertainties, I would first say that the treaty itself does
not impact, in a direct way, our job on the warhead side. It,
of course, does impact the Department of Defense, in terms of
the delivery systems. But, in terms of the treaty, the warhead
proceeds, independent of any particular limitations in the
treaty itself.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Dr. Hommert.
Dr. Hommert. Yes, sir. I'm not going to--I think I agree
with the comments of my colleagues.
Just on the first point, certainly the U.S. stockpile
remains safe, secure, and effective. But, I would say that
perhaps, as we look to an unprecedented age of our overall
stockpile, the imperative for us to take some action on that
stockpile is increasing. And, in this forum, we'll just leave
it at that.
And then, as to the other topics, I would echo the comments
of my colleagues.
Senator Lugar. I thank all three of you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and
the ranking member for having this hearing.
To me, the issue that we're focused on today is the most
crucial issue that we need to be focusing on. And I thank each
of you for your leadership. I know I plan to visit your
facilities--two of the three facilities--at the end of the
month, and get some firsthand input.
We have had others, who know each of you well and are
former directors and have other relationships with you, who've
talked a great deal about the fact that, if you look at this
10-year plan, that, in essence, we're still, even with the
first-year input that we have, which I think we all welcome,
that there's still about a $10 billion shortfall to do the
things that need to be done over this next 10 years to really
modernize and do the things that we need to do.
Over the course of time, I know we're going to talk more
fully about that, but I wondered if you all might want to talk
today about that, and give any editorial comments.
Also, I might add, in the 1251 report, it seems that we've
pushed a great deal of the funding into the out years. And it
seems to me it's pretty difficult--obviously, we do that a lot
around here. And what I mean by that is, we leave the tough
decisions to other people, and sometimes they never get made. I
wondered if you two--if all three of you might comment on what
I just said.
Dr. Anastasio. Well, certainly, Senator, the former lab
directors are all colleagues of ours, and we do hear from them
rather regularly.
As far as the funding issue, as I said, I think the 2011
budget submission shows strong commitment on the part of the
administration. However, I do have concerns, as I've tried to
express, that, in the out years, we need to find ways to
sustain our focus and commitment to that.
A program that's back-end funded is always a difficult one
to manage, when you're never sure, when you're funded on a
year-by-year basis, exactly what's going to happen then. So, I
think that is an important issue.
The other important part of that is that, for many of the
major activities, like the life-extension programs or the
nuclear facilities at Y-12 or at Los Alamos that need to be
refurbished, we still don't have full estimates of what those
costs are. What are the baseline costs for the LEPs and those
facilities? Those are not fully established yet. So, there's
still uncertainty in what the costs are going to be for this
program over its 10-year life or 20-year life.
And so, I think, with all those reasons, we need to
continue to have our focus and pay attention and adjust the
program as we learn more. And hence, my suggestion and the
dialogue with Senator Lugar about potential mechanisms to keep
that focus.
Dr. Miller. Yes, Senator, I also believe that the major
risks associated with this program are in the out years. The
2011 budget is a very good first step that we strongly welcome.
And, you know, as an individual familiar with managing very
large programs in the budget environment that this country
chooses to live in, it is very important to readjust the
expectations every year, because we learn something every year.
As Dr. Anastasio said, most of the major programs, such as the
B61 life-extention program and the required facility upgrades
do not yet have firm baselines. They will be established over
the next year. Once we get that information, we will have to
adjust the out-year budgets.
We also learn things every year about the nature of the
stockpile itself. Is it aging as rapidly as we currently
expect? Is it aging more rapidly or less rapidly? So, all of
these things have to be taken into account. And it's really the
flexibility to manage the out-year budgets while keeping our
eye on the fact that, ultimately, we have to maintain the core
intellectual capability that provides the overriding
confidence, because there's a huge tendency, when facility
costs go up, to rob the scientific capability in order to fund
those very large facilities.
Dr. Hommert. Yes, sir, I would say, echoing that--and I
have a very strong sense of the immediacy of the B61 situation,
in that--very important, in 2011, that we establish that
baseline--that when we establish that baseline, we then place
the resources consistent with the requirements to execute the
right scope required for that life-extension program, because
it's immediate. It is right here in front of us.
And then, I think, once we establish these and other
baselines for the program, inevitably there'll be reshaping and
reprioritization that will have to occur in the budget as we go
forward.
But, again, I'm very encouraged by at least now seeing, in
2011, that we can establish that very first and most immediate
program baseline, and then gives us the momentum to carry that
forward through the decade.
Senator Corker. When you mentioned, Dr. Anastasio, the
fact--and I know this is not a current statement--but, the
fundamental premise of stockpile stewardship was at risk in
2008, what, in essence, were your referring to at that time?
Dr. Anastasio. Thank you, Senator. The thought I had in my
mind is the same one I have today, which is, the path that we
were on in 2008. I was very concerned about the decline in
budget. And, as George Miller said, I like to think of it as
the imperatives of the near term challenge us, sometimes we put
the longer term at risk. And that's generated a squeeze on
science, the fact that the other imperatives in the program
have just reduced our focus on the science. And when you think
about the premise of stockpile stewardship--my point--the whole
notion, in a world without nuclear testing, which is one that
we understand we're in, getting a more deep understanding of
the science and the engineering is the basis for our
confidence. By having that knowledge, and then continuing to
extend that knowledge, that's the basis for our understanding
and, hence, our confidence. And when you're squeezing that
activity, you're starting to sacrifice it for the other
elements of the program, and that will lead to a situation
where we could easily lose our confidence.
Dr. Miller. Senator, if I could just add a point. You know,
in 2008, both Dr. Anastasio and I, as directors of these two
laboratories, had to reduce our workforce by 2,000 people. For
us, that's more than 25 percent, a substantial number of
scientists and engineers. I mean, it wasn't just administrative
people, it was a substantial number of scientists and
engineers--left the program. That is a huge concern, because,
again, as one of the architects of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program, when it was formed, in the early 1990s--you know, the
fundamental premise which we based the recommendation that we
could, in fact, maintain the stockpile without nuclear testing,
was keeping the strong science and technology base with people
engaged in understanding what was going on, and responding
appropriately. So, that's really the concern. That is the long-
term concern.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, I know you're getting ready
to leave. And I really appreciate your having his hearing and
certainly these distinguished and really important people to
our country being here--I look--again, I know we're going to
spend a lot of time, at the end of the month, at your
facilities. What I would say--I know that you all are looking
for 67 votes. I mean, around here, it's a counting game--that's
kind of what we do. I just want to say to you that this, to me,
is the important issue--the most important. And I know that we
have some issues of verification and missile defense. And my
guess is, we can address some of those questions actually in
the resolution that we'll draft in this committee. And I know
that we cannot bind future Congresses. Thankfully, those before
us didn't do that. But, you know, the fact is that--I think--I
very much appreciate the comment you made about the President's
commitment. I know a letter's coming. I think a very strong 10-
year plan--and really, the--even though this is good start--and
this is kind of an opportunity, let's face it, for those of us
who care about modernization, this moment in time is an
opportunity. And I appreciate that very much.
I do think there are some discrepancies that we can work
out in the scope of things, as it relates to our national
security. They're not that big a dollars, in the scope of what
we do with defense and other kinds of things.
But, just the buildings, alone, the--just the facilities
that it takes to do the things we need to do are probably a $10
billion expenditure. So, there's obviously a gap. And I hope
that there's some way that intelligent people, that really want
to see something good happen, will figure out a way to work
together to really solve this problem.
So, I'm heartened by the comments of both of you. I look
forward to learning more from each of you later this month.
But, I do think--and I've shared that with Secretary Clinton--
that the real key issue is figuring out some way of giving
assurance to those of us who care about our stockpile, that
we're going to do those things over a period of time with a
real concrete plan to achieve modernization.
And I thank you for this hearing.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Corker. And, look,
we appreciate your concern. I've had a number of meetings with
Senator Kyl, who, I think, is an acknowledged leader with
respect to these issues. And he shares that concern, as do
other Members. We all do.
And, as I said at the outset, the President--and all of us
legitimately share this. None of us can afford to allow our
deterrent shield to deteriorate, and to have a lack of
confidence about it. That changes the bets. You know, the
balance of power is maintained by the threat perception and the
capacity to counter it. And whenever anybody makes a move--
that's why I always argue so forcefully on this committee that
if you unilaterally deploy defense to such a degree that you've
altered somebody else's perception of their offense, you've
done the same thing as you might do by changing your own
offensive force; you've altered the perceptions. And people
make their choices based on those perceptions. So, we are 100
percent committed to that.
What I can guarantee you is that, for the next 2 years,
through the 2012 election, this President is going to make it
absolutely clear this will be full-funded to the degree that
he's promised. And that is a very significant plus-up. The most
significant thing that the laboratories can do is take that
money and execute all of these components as effectively as
possible, so the Congress, and everybody else, has confidence
in the dollar well spent and in a program well implemented. And
if we do that, it's going to make it a lot easier to come back
and do the other parts of this.
But, I am confident that the 10-year plan is going to be
well laid out, well defined, on the table. And it's going to be
up to us to guarantee--those of us who are here, you know, over
the course of these next years, to guarantee that we fill our
part of the bargain. And we'll do it.
Senator Isakson.
I need to leave, at this point, to go introduce this
nominee. So, Senator Lugar, I appreciate your chairing. Thanks.
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming, very, very much. We
appreciate it.
Dr. Anastasio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Hommert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Anastasio, following up on the comments of the
chairman, and particularly the questions of Senator Corker, on
page 10 of your printed testimony, you made a rather
substantial paragraph talking about, ``As I look to the future,
I remain concerned that science will be squeezed when trying to
compete with capital infrastructure investments and life-
extension program funding priorities.'' And then, I'll skip a
couple sentences down to the bottom, where it says, ``Just as
I'm encouraged by a significant increase in FY11, I am
concerned the administration's section 1251 report, much of the
planned funding increases for weapons activities do not come to
fruition until the second half of the 10-year period.'' Now,
that's already been mentioned by Senator Corker.
And I read, in Dr. Hommert's testimony, regarding the B61
and the radar system and the famous vacuum tubes, that you have
an absolute necessity to modernize that now. Am I--is that
correct?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Isakson. All right. So, I have this--I'm going to
get to you in a minute, Dr. Miller, so just hang on, but I----
[Laughter.]
Senator Isakson [continuing]. I have this question. And I
don't want to put you on the spot, but it would be helpful if
we have--and I'm sure there are many more pressing depreciation
or age-related deterioration issues in a weapons system--there
have to be--are the funds in the 1251, understanding they're
only gross numbers--I don't think they're broken down; at
least, I don't have them--are they going to be enough to do
what you know we have to do with what you know now?
I'll start with you, Dr. Hommert.
Dr. Hommert. Yes, Senator. Let me start first with 2011,
because there's two phases here that are very important. First,
in 2011, we establish what--using our vernacular, 62(a) phase,
which is the--is--firms the requirement base and the funding
base to then do the second phase, which is full-scale
engineering development. The first--the 2011 budget is adequate
for us to complete that first phase. The out-year budgets, 2012
through 2017, are, at this point, to the best of our knowledge,
commensurate with that full-scale engineering development. But,
we can't be certain of that until we finalize the requirements
in costing base. So, that's a very important step.
The other thing I will mention, relative to the science
issue, is that, in our mission space there is a very strong
linkage with delivering technologies to--like an updated radar,
et cetera--to our science and technology base. They are very
strongly linked in executing, going forward. So, a piece of
this budget is our technology maturation, our pull on our
science and engineering into the stockpile.
So, two--touched two issues there, but--certainly, the 2011
does position us to get that first phase completed.
Senator Isakson. Dr. Anastasio.
Dr. Anastasio. Well, sir, I think, as Paul Hommert said, I
would agree that there are two phases. The first is, How do we
get started? And that's the FY 2011 budget. And, as I said,
that's an excellent start, and shows a strong commitment on the
part of the administration.
As you properly noted in my testimony, I am concerned--and
it's a real concern--about the out-year funding. And the
concern is that there are very legitimate demands in the
program for our nuclear facility refurbishment, for our needs
to address the stockpile issues. And it's not just the B61,
it's the fact that most of the weapons need attention over the
next decade or two.
But, we also can't sacrifice our science and technology and
engineering base to do those more immediate needs. So, the
question is, How do you have an adequately funded program that
is balanced so that all three legs of the stool are in a place
where you don't kind of slide off because one leg's too short?
That's going to put the overall program at risk.
So, we need to have a balanced program that can be
sustained throughout the life of the activity we have to do.
And I think there are good steps to take, for Congress to go
ahead and appropriate the funds that the President's requested.
I would also say, another good way to stabilize the program
is for this national consensus to be formed around the
appropriate direction to go forward with the nuclear weapons
program. This is a consensus that we've been lacking for 15 or
20 years. And I think it's important for that, as well.
Senator Isakson. I commend you for that statement, because
what I've heard both of you say--and tell me if I'm wrong; I
don't want to put anything on the record that isn't right--but,
I heard both of you say, in the immediate term, the funding is
adequate to do what you're going to do. But, given the
knowledge you have of science and the unknown in the years out,
there may be need for more funds. Is that a fair statement?
Dr. Anastasio. Well, even more so, that the work we're
doing today is because of the investments we made in science--
--
Senator Isakson. Right.
Dr. Anastasio [continuing]. And engineering 10 years ago.
So, the work we have to do 10 years from now is going to derive
from the investments we make in science and engineering today.
And if we're not making those investments, that puts at risk
our ability to take on those unknowns that we are confident
will arise, because they always have.
Senator Isakson. And heightened pressure--you said--the
others didn't, but I would assume they agree--that we do
believe that the Russians are reinvigorating their nuclear
stockpile and their weapons system, and modernizing, as well.
Dr. Hommert. Yes, I concur with that.
Senator Isakson. OK.
Dr. Miller, this is not about nuclear power or science or
engineering, it's about budgets. You said you had laid off
2,000 people, between you and Dr. Anastasio.
Dr. Miller. Two thousand at each laboratory.
Senator Isakson. Two thousand each. Would you tell me, did
you do that at the direction of someone above?
Dr. Miller. Let's see. Yes, it was certainly with the
concurrence of the Department of Energy and the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). It was a budget
necessity. In terms of the funding that I had available, it
would not support the larger workforce.
Senator Isakson. Well, the only reason I make that point is
because we have added Federal employees throughout the system
over the last 2 years by about 146,000. And if you are having
to reduce yours by 2,000 each, some of whom are highly
educated, very critical scientific people, I don't know how
good a modernization system you can do if you're being forced
to lay off your brightest and your best. I just make that as--
you don't have to--I said that, you didn't say it. But, I just
wanted to get that on the record.
And last, Dr. Anastasio, this is also not a nuclear
question, by any stretch. In your statement, you say, next year
you're going to have to put in $77 million for a pension
shortfall, and, estimated, it will be $200 million in 2013, is
that right?
Dr. Anastasio. In 2012.
Senator Isakson. 2012?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. Are you in a separate pension fund from
the employee retirement system of the Federal Government?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, sir. Our employees are not employees of
the Federal Government; none of our employees are Federal
employees. We're all in a private pension plan. And we have a
plan that is--I'll try to make it simple--we have a legacy with
the University of California, so we have a set of people who
are currently in that legacy plan, but now managed by us. New
employees are in a 401(k)-like plan. But, the legacy employees
are not part of that. And it's that defined benefit plan that,
just like all the other pension plans in the country, has
stress on it. And so, the NNSA, our sponsor, is well aware of
these issues, and we're trying to work closely with them to
find the right path forward.
Senator Isakson. Well, the reason I ask the question is
because we just passed, 2 weeks ago in the Congress, two
choices that pension funds have to smooth and amortize that
immediate obligation.
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. And I hope you'll take advantage of it,
because this number probably didn't calculate--did----
Dr. Anastasio. Actually, it does.
Senator Isakson. It does?
Dr. Anastasio. We've been following your actions very
closely, and it includes that smoothing.
Senator Isakson. OK.
Dr. Anastasio. Without going into the details, we're more
dominated by the discount rate, because our plan doesn't have
new people entering, because new employees go in the 401(k)
plan.
Senator Isakson. Right.
Dr. Anastasio. The crux of the way the plan works, is that
it's our liabilities that are the more sensitive issue. And so,
it's the discount rate, for which we have no control,
obviously, and the state of the economy--that's the thing that
really drives our cost. And so, that has been a good step
forward for us. There are other things Congress could do to
help relieve the situation, if that were possible.
Senator Isakson. Well, I'm the only Isakson in the Senate
phonebook, so give me a call. [Laughter.]
Dr. Anastasio. Yes sir. I would be happy to do that.
Dr. Hommert. Senator, I'd just add, we have a similar
problem, and we do appreciate the legislative relief. It was a
help. But, our--we still have a remaining issue to face over
the next 5 years in this area.
Senator Isakson. We probably should have a meeting, because
it'd be very--I thought, when I asked the question, you were
independent of the Federal retiree system, and----
Dr. Anastasio. We do. We are. And since now we're not under
University of California, which was a nonprofit, of course,
we're in a for-profit situation, so we fall under the Pension
Protection Act. And again, your legislative relief in that
regard did help. But, there's more. There are still challenges
before us.
Senator Isakson. Well, I will tell my staff to look for a
call. And maybe we can have a----
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson [continuing]. Meeting convenient to both of
you. And we'll try and help all we can.
Dr. Anastasio. We greatly appreciate that, Senator.
Dr. Miller. We welcome that, Senator.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
Please remember Senator Isakson's name so that you can have
the proper communication. [Laughter.]
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me say for the record, I want to respond
to something Senator Kerry said. I wish he hadn't left,
although I'm sure he'll hear this. And we're going to have
plenty of time for debate on this, on the floor. But, if I
heard him right, I thought I heard, he said that we don't want
to go too far with our defensive missile system because it
might aggravate other countries to do other things. And I
respectfully disagree. And I know we're going to have plenty of
time for debate on this on the floor. I'm not as worried about
the country that we're dealing with here--Russia--although I
think we should have a missile defense system in place, even as
far as they're concerned. But, I'm truly concerned about the
rogue countries and our defensive posture, when it comes to
incoming from rogue countries, such as North Korea or Iran. And
I don't--I think that treaties aren't going to be the answer
there. It's only going to be a defensive system.
But, today we're talking about modernization, and I have
some questions for you. And if I get--I understand we're in an
unclassified setting here--if I get too close, let me know, and
we'll take it up at--in a classified setting.
First of all, as to the START Treaty that--or, the treaty
that expired on December 8, did you get information from the
inspectors regarding the type, size, the mechanical aspects of
the Russian warheads, based upon their inspections, from that
treaty?
Dr. Hommert. That's probably better left----
Dr. Anastasio. Yes.
Dr. Hommert [continuing]. To a different conversation,
Senator.
Senator Risch. OK, thank you.
Dr. Anastasio. It would be better in a different setting.
Senator Risch. Let me move on.
The--as far as the--again, tell me if you can't answer
this--I've been told about a comparison of the size of our
warheads compared to the size of their warheads. In fact, I
made--asked the specific question, in another setting, and they
said I should ask the directors of the labs about that. So,
here I am. Can you tell me about that? Or, again, are we--do we
have to go to a classified setting for that?
Dr. Miller. I think the specifics are better handled in a
classified situation.
I would say that while the Russians have to abide by the
same laws of physics that we do, the particular technology
paths that they have chosen appear to be different than the
ones that we have chosen.
Senator Risch. Can you--we've been told--again, I think
this in a--in the public domain--we've been told that they
are--the Russians are involved in a modernization program, and
that they're further along than we are. I'll say that
carefully. Can you compare that for me? Or, again, do we need
to move a classified setting?
Dr. Anastasio. I think we certainly can concur that our
best understanding is that they are in a modernization program,
and that it has been a very active program for a number of
years. As far as the details of exactly what they're doing,
that's probably best left for another----
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Dr. Anastasio [continuing]. Session.
Dr. Miller. But----
Senator Risch. And I appreciate that. I----
Dr. Miller. I think one of the things that we can say in
this setting, is that the state of their production complex is
very different than the state of ours. And that, again, causes
significant differences between the two countries.
Dr. Hommert. Senator, I--it's my understanding you may be
visiting us with Senator Kyl----
Senator Risch. I will be.
Dr. Hommert [continuing]. And Senator Corker.
Senator Risch. I am.
Dr. Hommert. These are topics that we can go into at----
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Dr. Hommert [continuing]. That time.
Senator Risch. I'll look forward to that.
Thank you very much. Appreciate your responses.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Senator Risch.
I'm advised--and this may or may not fit your convenience--
but I have been advised that Senate security is prepared to
host a classified session for you, after this session, with the
witnesses, in the event you want to do that.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Let me thank each of you for very informed
testimony. Obviously, you can tell the importance of this issue
to the Senators who are here, as well as their representation
of many other Senators--have been raising these questions. And
likewise, the specific activity that our chairman, Senator
Kerry, advised you--and this was the first, I think, public
statement he had made about our visit with President Obama and
Vice President Biden, and their assurances. We count this as a
very important factor. We look forward to those communications
from the Chief Executive, and I'm certain you will, too.
But, we look forward, if you will, to following up with
you, as there may be more questions of members who were not
able to be with us, because I am certain this will be an issue
as we try to formulate our resolution of ratification, debate
that in the committee, and then on the floor of the Senate.
So, thank you, again, in behalf of the chairman and all of
our committee members.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Dr. George Miller to Questions Submitted by Senator Casey
nuclear complex personnel
Question. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the United States stated that the ``continued success [of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program and the Life Extension Program] is endangered by
recent personnel and funding cuts.''
Can you please expand upon this statement and describe what type of
personnel cuts you have experienced and how these cuts have directly
affected the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Life Extension
Program?
Answer. Declining budgets and increased costs over the past 5 years
created funding pressures that forced workforce reductions at LLNL.
Between 2006 and 2009, LLNL's workforce was reduced by 25 percent.
Available funding was insufficient to compensate for the increased
costs and maintain the 2005 workforce levels. The number of personnel
at LLNL directly supported by the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)
and Life Extension Programs (LEPs) decreased by 22 percent between 2006
and 2009.
The Laboratory implemented a strategic workforce reduction plan to
minimize the risks to meeting our national security mission
requirements. While we have been successful in supporting the needs of
the current stockpile, numerous critical skill areas have been reduced
to only a handful of individuals, as evidenced in the following
examples:
LLNL's hydrotest execution capability was reduced from two fully
capable teams to one small team, and experimental throughput
has declined.
LLNL's technical support team in Nevada, which provides mission-
specific expertise to maintain and conduct critical experiments
at SSP facilities at the Nevada Test Site, has declined by more
than 60 percent in the past 4 years, LLNL's reduced ability to
support these mission-critical experimental facilities,
combined with complex-wide financial challenges, have resulted
in delays in the experiments schedule.
One of the major science initiatives, known as the Boost
Initiative, has been delayed 3 years to date and extended
beyond its original planned completion date due to lack of
funding and available skilled staff to support this initiative.
Additionally, warhead surveillance rates are lower, there are
numerous examples of underutilization of SSP facilities that have
caused delays in key scientific deliverables for assessing the
stockpile, and LEPs have been deferred.
The Laboratory is continuing to work very closely with NNSA to
manage available resources in a prioritized structure to ensure our
national security mission requirements are met. The President's FY 2011
budget request seeks increased funding to reverse the declining budget
trends and provide stable and reliable funding levels to maintain
sufficient capability to ensure the viability of the U.S. nuclear
stockpile and the critically skilled workforce that underpins it.
Question. What do you believe is needed to ensure that we maintain
a proper level of trained scientists and engineers to ensure the safety
of our stockpile?
Answer. Maintaining a quality workforce with the specialized
scientific and technical talent to execute the Stockpile Stewardship
Program (SSP) requires a well-defined national security mission that is
consistently supported by successive administrations and Congresses.
Stable and reliable funding is critical to attracting and retaining a
skilled and knowledgeable workforce. Opportunities must be made
available for stimulating research in support of program goals.
A vigorous SSP includes a robust science, technology, and
engineering (ST&E) effort to ensure a pipeline of trained personnel. In
addition to a strong ST&E effort, the program must include adequate
opportunities to exercise skills in the complete design-through-
production cycle, which is essential in the training of laboratory and
production plant personnel.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) welcomes the National
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) intent to assign
responsibility for the W78 Life Extension Program (LEP) to LLNL. For
the W78 LEP, LLNL's design and engineering cadre will work the entire
design/engineering/manufacturing process for an integrated weapon
system, which serves to maintain key competencies and capabilities at
the Laboratory.
It is also vitally important to provide the flexibility to retain
access to retired weapons experts and ensure their availability to
train and mentor the next generation of stockpile stewards.
Question. The Commission also stated that the national nuclear
laboratories should have an expanded national security role, which
includes fundamental research, energy technologies and intelligence
support. Do you believe that these are roles that the laboratories
should or can take on? Why or why not?
Answer. The National Nuclear Security Administration laboratories
are truly national laboratories with unique materials science, physics,
chemistry, and engineering capabilities that are applicable to a broad
range of national priorities. The laboratories currently have active
programs in nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, intelligence,
energy and environmental security, and fundamental research. For
example, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has actively
applied its nuclear weapons expertise and technical capabilities to
provide uniquely valuable intelligence analysis of foreign nuclear
weapons systems and to monitor proliferation risks.
The nation has benefitted greatly from applying the expertise
derived from the nuclear weapons activities of the laboratories it
mission areas beyond the U.S. stockpile maintenance efforts.. For
example, this year LLNL's research garnered six R&D 100 Awards.
Sponsored by R&D Magazine, R&D 100 Awards are a mark of excellence
widely known to industry, government and academia. They are often
dubbed the ``Oscars of Invention'' because they honor the most
innovative ideas of the year. One of this year's awards recognized
LLNL's pioneering efforts to develop a new material (strontium-iodide
doped with europium) to significantly improve radiation detectors to
identify nuclear materials. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) is supporting the development of this material for use in devices
to counter nuclear smuggling. Since 1978, the Laboratory has earned 135
total R&D 100 Awards.
Research opportunities beyond the core nuclear weapons program
provide challenging opportunities to exercise and improve critical
skills that are essential to the success of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program. Active programs in energy, intelligence, nonproliferation,
nuclear counterterrorism, intelligence, energy and environmental
security, and fundamental science enhance the Laboratory's ability to
recruit and retain highly skilled scientists and engineers.
__________
Responses of Dr. Michael Anastasio to Questions Submitted
by Senator Casey
nuclear complex personnel
The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States stated that the ``continued success [of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program and the Life Extension Program] is endangered by
recent personnel and funding cuts.''
Question. Can you please expand upon this statement and describe
what type of personnel cuts you have experienced and how these cuts
have directly affected the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Life
Extension Program?
Answer. From the time of contract transition in June 2006 to
present, staffing at Los Alamos National Laboratory has decreased by
2,175 people. The breakdown of this number is as follows:
548 were scientists;
57 were engineers;
67 were technicians; and
1,503 were ``other,'' which includes non-technical staff and
support staff.
These reductions were the result of a voluntary separation program,
reductions in our flexible workforce, natural attrition and significant
oversight by lab management on new hires. These actions were taken
reluctantly but in recognition of declining budgets and a need to avoid
a demoralizing involuntary separation.
The funding reductions in the stockpile stewardship program over
the last several years have impacted a number of life extension
programs including the W76 LEP and B61 Alt 357. These decisions
accepted elevated technical risk, often against design agency
recommendations, to save funds and meet accelerated schedules. In the
W76 program, the decision to temporarily suspend production of a
critical material for several years resulted in a 1-year delay in
meeting the Navy's delivery schedule while the design agency (Los
Alamos) and the production agency (Y-12) worked to resolve material
quality issues. On the B61 Alt 357, the Process Prove-In (PPI) phase at
the production agency was reduced by over 60 percent to save money. The
planned assessment of the units manufactured for assessment was never
conducted and the units were transferred to active status to meet
accelerated schedules. All units were later removed for technical
issues.
At Los Alamos, the average age of career employees is now over 48
and 32 percent of all career employees are eligible to retire within
the next 5 years. Without an infusion of younger talent who can become
recipients and beneficiaries in the transfer of knowledge from those
with decades of experience we will be at risk for loss of that
knowledge. The laboratories rely on expert judgment supported by a
strong experimental and computational capabilities and extensive peer
review for our critical assessments. As we approach 18 years since our
last nuclear test and over 20 years since our last weapon system
development, I am concerned about our ability to transfer expertise
from generation to generation. I am also concerned with attracting the
scientists for the future. Critical to attracting the best scientists
and engineers is having cutting-edge scientific tools and capabilities.
If science is allowed to atrophy further, the ``brain drain'' will
accelerate
Question. What do you believe is needed to ensure that we maintain
a proper level of trained scientists and engineers to ensure the safety
of our stockpile?
Answer. First, the Nation must reach a national consensus on a
nuclear deterrence policy that can be supported by future Congresses
and administrations. The report of the Congressional Bipartisan
Commission and the Nuclear Posture Review are the foundational
documents for this national consensus. Second, stable and sustained
funding as outlined in the President's FY 2011 budget begins the
investments needed to correct for decades of neglect in infrastructure.
Third, as the NPR highlights the Nation must continue to invest and
strengthen the ST&E base at the laboratories. It is the ST&E base that
underpins our understanding and confidence in the deterrent in the
absence of testing and prepares use for future challenges. Finally,
congressional visits provide a visible and potent symbol to the staff
that this Nation's policy leaders value the work conducted by
Laboratory staff.
Hiring the ``best and the brightest'' is a challenge for the labs,
and will continue to be so for the future. LANL has been successful in
recruiting because of our strong postdoctoral fellowship programs
(e.g., Oppenheimer, Rheines, and director-funded fellowships) and
internal graduate and undergraduate student programs. Our student
programs at the Laboratory continue to bring excellent students into
the laboratory and provide a strong recruiting mechanism. The
Laboratory currently has over 400 post-doctoral fellows and over 1,200
students at work this summer. Additionally, the national laboratories
take advantage of DOE and NNSA funded programs like the Stockpile
Stewardship Graduate Fellowship Program and the Computational Science
Graduate Fellowship Programs to find and recruit the next generation.
To be able to do strategic hiring requires that the laboratories
have the outstanding scientific and computing capabilities and
experimental facilities, such as the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center
(LANSCE) linear accelerator, that enable cutting-edge research. Without
the capabilities and facilities, the students will simply go elsewhere.
The best students have the most options--the challenge is to make the
national laboratories the best option for their career.
Question. The Commission also stated that the national nuclear
laboratories should have an expanded national security role, which
includes fundamental research, energy technologies and intelligence
support. Do you believe that these are roles that the laboratories
should or can take on? Why or why not?
Answer. The three NNSA laboratories are unique scientific and
engineering resources that can and are being applied to a range of
national security challenges that confront the Nation. There is a
tendency when people hear about the role the NNSA laboratories play in
solving other national problems that these are simply nice
``spinoffs.'' These provide more than just positive benefits for the
Nation; rather, this work outside of the weapons program is essential
to the conduct of the core nuclear weapons mission. We have a vibrant
scientific workforce at Los Alamos, including around 2,500 Ph.D.s that
are the core of our science base. The weapons program benefits directly
when these scientists have the opportunity to extend their skills by
working on challenging technical problems, like climate modeling, which
then can validate and improve the methods in our 3-D weapons codes and
solve challenges in the stockpile.
The issues that have arisen in the last 18 years of assuring the
reliability of nuclear weapons without conducting a nuclear test are
complex science and engineering problems. Some of these problems were
anticipated--like the aging of certain components in a warhead--and
others were totally unexpected. The success of the Stewardship program
has been the ability to draw on a deep and rich science base at the
laboratories. This science base is enriched by engaging on a broad
range of scientific problems, many of which have a direct relevance to
broader national security interests. A vibrant science, technology and
engineering enterprise is essential to supporting the stewardship
program, and at the same time it provides a powerful resource for
issues such as nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence assessments.