    [Senate Hearing 111-701, Part 1]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 111-701, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 3454

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
        PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 1

    MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE ``DON'T ASK,
                              DON'T TELL'' POLICY
                             DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                             DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
                          DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
       U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT FORCES
                                    COMMAND
                U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
            U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
      U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
                BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
                        LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION

                                   ----------

    FEBRUARY 2, 23, 25; MARCH 4, 9, 11, 16, 26; APRIL 20; DECEMBER 14, 2010

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                  2011--Part 1

    MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE ``DON'T ASK,
    DON'T TELL'' POLICY  b   DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  b   DEPARTMENT OF THE
    NAVY  b   DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  b   U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S.
       AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND  b   U.S. NORTHERN
    COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND  b   U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
      AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  b   U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC
    COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA  b   BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES
               AND PROGRAMS  b   LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION

    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
    http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

    62-155 PDF

                                     ______

    2011

                                                     S. Hrg. 111-701, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 3454

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
        PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 1

    MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE ``DON'T ASK,
                              DON'T TELL'' POLICY
                             DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                             DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
                          DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
       U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT FORCES
                                    COMMAND
                U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
            U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
      U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
                BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
                        LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION

                                   __________

    FEBRUARY 2, 23, 25; MARCH 4, 9, 11, 16, 26; APRIL 20; DECEMBER 14, 2010

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
    ?

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                             (Before July 22, 2010)

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
    KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
    EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware

                                     ______

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                             (After July 22, 2010)

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
    KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois           SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
    EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
    CARTE P. GOODWIN, West Virginia

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                   Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
    Military Posture and to Receive Testimony Relating to the ``Don't Ask,
                              Don't Tell'' Policy
                                february 2, 2010

                                                                       Page

    Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense......................    11
    Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.....    21

                             Department of the Army
                               february 23, 2010

    McHugh, John M., Secretary of the Army...........................   180
    Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army.......   228

                             Department of the Navy
                               february 25, 2010

    Mabus, Hon. Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy...............   316
    Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations...............   324
    Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps......   342

                          Department of the Air Force
                                 march 4, 2010

    Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force..............   453
    Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force..   464

       U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Joint Forces
                                    Command
                                 march 9, 2010

    Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command...   538
    Ward, GEN William E., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command........   576
    Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command   595

                U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command
                                 march 11, 2010

    Renuart, Gen. Victor E., Jr., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern
      Command, and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
      Command........................................................   655
    Fraser, Gen. Douglas M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command..   672

            U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Command
                                 march 16, 2010

    Olson, ADM T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command...   735
    Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command.....   742

      U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Forces Korea
                                 march 26, 2010

    Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command..   839
    Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.....   851
    Sharp, GEN Walter L., USA, Commander, United Nations Command,
      Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces-Korea.....................   867

                Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs
                                 april 20, 2010

    Miller, Hon. James N., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
      Defense for Policy.............................................   919
    Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and
      Evaluation, Department of Defense..............................   929
    O'Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency..   933
    Macy, RADM Archer M., Jr., USN, Director, Joint Integrated Air
      and Missile Defense Organization, and Deputy Director for Force
      Protection, J-8, The Joint Staff...............................   942

                        Littoral Combat Ship Acquisition
                               december 14, 2010

    Mabus, Hon. Raymond E. Jr., Secretary of the Navy................  1018
    Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations...............  1020
    Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
      Research, Development, and Acquisition.........................  1021
    Pandolfe, RADM Frank C., USN, Director, Surface Warfare Division
      OPNAV N86......................................................  1023
    Labs, Eric J., Ph.D., Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and
      Weapons, Congressional Budget Office...........................  1023
    O'Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional
      Research Service...............................................  1032
    Francis, Paul L., Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
      Management, Government Accountability Office...................  1042

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

    MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE ``DON'T ASK,
                              DON'T TELL'' POLICY

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman), presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill,
    Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
    Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, and Collins.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Richard
    W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
    professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research
    assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerard
    J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W.
    Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J.
    Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips,
    professional staff member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff
    member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
    Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Pablo E.
    Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; Paul C. Hutton IV,
    professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional
    staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member;
    David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
    professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional
    staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member;
    Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jennifer R.
    Knowles, Christine G. Lang, and Breon N. Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator
    Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher
    Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant
    to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator
    Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa
    Steffen Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer
    Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
    assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to
    Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
    Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator
    Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
    Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek,
    assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to
    Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; and
    Chip Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning everybody. The committee this
    morning welcomes Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Admiral Michael Mullen for
    our hearing on the Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year 2011
    budget request and the associated Future Years Defense Program
    (FYDP), the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the 2010
    Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR).
        Gentlemen, as always we are thankful to you and to your
    families for your dedicated service to our Nation, to the
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at home, and in harm's
    way around the globe, and to their families. Your commitment to
    the welfare of our troops and their families shines through all
    that you do. The American people are grateful for that and we
    are grateful and eager to help whenever we can.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $549 billion
    for the base budget and $159 billion for the ongoing wars in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. On top of this $708 billion request for
    2011, the administration has included a 2010 supplemental
    request of $33 billion to fund the additional 30,000 troops to
    support the President's Afghanistan policy announced last
    December.
        The budget request continues the defense reforms begun last
    year to rebalance the force toward the military capabilities
    necessary to prevail in today's conflicts, to buy weapons that
    are relevant and affordable, and to assure that tax dollars are
    used wisely.
        The long-anticipated 2009 QDR report was also submitted on
    Monday with the Department's 2011 budget. This is, and the
    report is explicit, a wartime QDR. The Department's analysis
    and decisions place the focus and priority on policies,
    programs, and initiatives that support the current fight in
    Afghanistan and Iraq and against al Qaeda. The QDR makes and
    justifies tough choices and indicates that more tradeoffs will
    be necessary in the future.
        I'll note that along with the budget request the
    administration submitted the BMDR. This review was required by
    the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
    2009. This is the first comprehensive policy and strategy
    framework for missile defense and it is long overdue.
        Secretary Gates' cover memo to the report notes that ``I
    have made defending against near-term regional threats a top
    priority of our missile defense plans, programs, and
    capabilities,'' and that statement is consistent with what
    Congress has been urging for many years.
        The report also says that before new missile defense
    programs will be deployed, they must first be tested
    realistically to demonstrate that they are effective and
    reliable. It also states that our missile defense programs must
    be fiscally sustainable over the long term, and emphasizes
    international cooperation with our allies and partners, and
    expresses an interest in cooperation with Russia. Those are all
    important elements of a sound missile defense policy.
        Consistent with the reform goals set out by Secretary Gates
    and the results of the QDR, a top priority for DOD must be the
    critical requirements for the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan
    and Iraq. This committee has sought to ensure that our
    combatant commanders have what they need to succeed in those
    conflicts, including technologies to counter improvised
    explosive devices (IEDs); mine resistant ambush protected
    (MRAP) all-terrain vehicles (ATVs); intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and additional helicopters.
    This committee will continue to support the needs of our men
    and women who are in those conflicts.
        I have long argued that the principal mission in
    Afghanistan should be training the Afghan security forces so
    that they can take responsibility for the security of their
    country. What we heard during our recent visit to Afghanistan
    was that President Obama's speech at West Point in December had
    a tangible, positive effect on the recruitment of Afghan
    security forces. Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, the head of
    NATO training mission in Afghanistan, told us that President
    Obama's setting of the July 2011 date for the beginning of U.S.
    troop reductions in Afghanistan energized Afghanistan's
    leadership, made clear to them that President Obama means
    business when he says our commitment is not open-ended, and got
    them to focus on planning for the shift in responsibility for
    Afghan security that is highlighted by that 2011 July date.
        Even more than a pay raise, General Caldwell told us, the
    July 2011 date increased recruiting of Afghan soldiers because
    Afghan leaders called for and reached out to local leaders to
    produce new recruits across the country. The number of Afghan
    recruits in training has jumped from 3,000 in November to over
    11,000 as of last month.
        Key to the success of the mission of strengthening the
    Afghan Army will be the partnering of coalition and Afghan
    units together on a one-to-one unit basis and for Afghans to
    take the lead in operations. The budget the President sent over
    yesterday includes significant resources for the training and
    partnering mission, including increased funding for the Afghan
    Security Forces Fund in both the 2010 supplemental and the 2011
    request. The fully-integrated partnering of coalition and
    Afghan units, living together and integrating their lives
    daily, is at the heart of our troops' mission.
        Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, the Commander of the
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command in
    Afghanistan, has promised to get us data, indicated on a chart
    that I have up behind me and a handout which is circulated, on
    the number of Afghan units fully-integrated with coalition
    forces and how many of those Afghan units are in the lead-in
    operations. This effort is key to the transition to an Afghan
    lead-in providing for the Nation's security and we will track
    this data very closely.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Chairman Levin. While I'm pleased with the increased
    partnering in the field, we were disappointed with the
    shortfall in trainers for the initial training needed for the
    Afghan Army and police. General Caldwell told us that he had
    only 37 percent of the required U.S. and NATO trainers on hand
    and NATO countries were about 90 percent short of meeting their
    commitment to provide about 2,000 non-U.S. trainers. That's
    simply inexcusable and our NATO allies must do more to close
    the gap in trainers.
        In the area of personnel, I am pleased that this budget
    request provides increased funding for military personnel and
    for the defense health program. The budget request includes
    funding to support the care and treatment of wounded warriors,
    including $1.1 billion for the treatment, care, and research of
    traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) and psychological health. The
    budget would also increase funding for family support programs
    by $500 million over last year's levels and include the funding
    necessary to support the temporary increase to the Army's
    active duty end strength to 569,400, which will help improve
    dwell time and reduce stress on the force.
        The catastrophic January 12 earthquake that struck Haiti
    reminded all of us just how indiscriminate natural disasters
    can be and renewed America's commitment to Haiti. DOD has
    mobilized resources and manpower to aid in the relief effort in
    support of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID).
        Just last week, the committee approved a $400 million
    reprogramming to ensure that DOD was adequately resourced for
    that important support mission. We are prepared to continue to
    work with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to ensure DOD is
    able to continue providing support to this critical
    humanitarian disaster response effort in the weeks and months
    ahead, and we all greatly appreciate the skill shown by U.S.
    Service personnel in response to the Haiti disaster.
        Now, following this hearing, as previously announced, at
    around noon we're going to turn to the issue of Don't Ask,
    Don't Tell (DADT). I would appreciate questions on that subject
    being asked after Secretary Gates' statement on the subject at
    that time.
        Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, we look forward to your
    testimony, and now I turn to Senator McCain for any opening
    remarks that he may have.
        [The prepared statement by Senator Levin follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
        This morning, the committee welcomes Secretary of Defense Robert
    Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael
    Mullen, for our hearing on the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal
    year 2011 budget request and the associated Future Years Defense
    Program, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the 2010
    Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
        Gentlemen, as always we are thankful to you and your families for
    your dedicated service to the Nation and to the soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines at home and in harm's way around the globe and to
    their families. Your personal commitment to the welfare of our troops
    and their families shines through all that you do. The American people
    are grateful for that and we are grateful and eager to help wherever we
    can.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Department of Defense
    includes $549 billion for the base budget and $159 billion for the
    ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On top of the $708 billion
    request for 2011 the administration has included a 2010 supplemental
    request of $33 billion to fund the additional 30,000 troops to support
    the President's Afghanistan policy announced last December. The budget
    request continues the defense reforms begun last year to rebalance the
    force toward the military capabilities necessary to prevail in today's
    conflicts, to buy weapons that are relevant and affordable, and ensure
    that tax dollars are used wisely.
        The long anticipated 2009 QDR Report was also submitted on Monday
    with the Department's fiscal year 2011 budget submission. This is, and
    the report is explicit, a wartime QDR. The Department's analysis and
    decisions places the focus and priority on policies, programs, and
    initiatives that support the current fight in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
    against al Qaeda. The QDR makes and justifies tough choices--and
    indicates that more tradeoffs will be necessary in the future.
        It is also worth noting that this QDR's force sizing framework is
    no longer based on a combination of simultaneous or sequential major
    regional conflicts, as it has in the past, such as the ability to fight
    and prevail in two major wars. Instead, the analysis used a series of
    wargames through a range of plausible strategic scenarios to inform
    decisions on force structure and capability or capacity adjustments.
    The QDR assumes that our security challenges and the operational
    environment will be as taxing into the future as it is today.
    Therefore, the emphasis remains on appropriately sufficient force
    capability and capacity to support current operations and ensuring the
    sustainability of the All-Volunteer Force through the rotational
    demands that appear likely over the next several years. As we all hope,
    over time, forces no longer needed to support operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, will shift their focus to preparing for and deterring
    future adversaries--in other words, rebuilding our military strategic
    depth, which is critically important for long-term security of our
    Nation.
        I would note that, along with the budget request, the
    administration submitted the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR).
    This review was required by the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2009. This is the first comprehensive policy and strategy
    framework for missile defense, and it is long overdue. Secretary Gates'
    cover memo to the report notes, ``I have made defending against near-
    term regional threats a top priority of our missile defense plans,
    programs, and capabilities.'' This is consistent with what Congress has
    been urging for several years.
        In addition to outlining our national priorities for defending the
    homeland against missile threats from nations like North Korea and
    Iran, and for flexible and adaptable regional missile defense, the
    review describes several important policies. For example, it says that
    before new missile defense systems will be deployed, they must first be
    tested realistically and demonstrate that they are effective and
    reliable. It also states that our missile defense programs must be
    fiscally sustainable over the long term. It emphasizes international
    cooperation with our allies and partners, and expresses an interest in
    cooperation with Russia. I believe these are all important elements of
    a sound missile defense policy.
        Consistent with the reform goals set out by Secretary Gates and the
    results of the Quadrennial Defense Review, a top priority for the
    Department must be the critical requirements for the ongoing conflicts
    in Afghanistan and Iraq. This committee has sought to ensure that our
    combatant commanders have what they need to succeed in those conflicts,
    including technologies to counter improvised explosive devices; MRAP-
    All Terrain Vehicles; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
    assets; and additional helicopters. I am confident that this committee
    will continue to support the needs of our men and women who are in
    these conflicts.
        The next 12-18 months will be critical in Afghanistan. Based on
    what I saw and heard during my visit to Afghanistan in January, I am
    somewhat more optimistic than I was after my last visit in September
    that the fully-resourced, counterinsurgency strategy announced by
    President Obama is the right strategy and is starting to take hold.
    This strategy focuses on the security of the Afghan people. Our troops
    understand and embrace this people-centered approach.
        I have long argued that our principal mission in Afghanistan should
    be training the Afghan security forces so they can take responsibility
    for the security of their country. What we heard during our visit to
    Afghanistan was that President Obama's speech at West Point in December
    had a tangible, positive impact on the recruitment of the Afghan
    security forces. Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, the head of the NATO
    Training Mission in Afghanistan, told us that President Obama's setting
    of the July 2011 date for the beginning of U.S. troop reductions in
    Afghanistan energized Afghanistan's leadership, made clear to them that
    President Obama means business when he says our commitment is not open-
    ended, and got them to focus on planning for the shift in
    responsibility for Afghanistan's security that is highlighted by that
    July 2011 date. Even more than the pay raise, General Caldwell told us
    the July 2011 date has increased recruiting because Afghan leaders
    called for and reached out to local leaders to produce new recruits
    across the country. As a result, the number of Afghan recruits in
    training jumped from 3,000 in November to over 11,000 as of last month.
        Key to the success of the mission of strengthening the Afghan Army
    will be the partnering of coalition and Afghan units together, on a one
    unit-to-one unit basis, and for Afghans to take the lead in operations.
    The budget the President sent over yesterday includes significant
    resources for the training and partnering missions, including increased
    funding for the Afghan Security Forces Fund in both the fiscal year
    2010 Supplemental and the fiscal year 2011 request.
        The fully integrated partnering of coalition and Afghan units--
    living together and integrating their lives daily--is at the heart of
    our troop's mission. Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, the commander
    of the ISAF Joint Command in Afghanistan, has promised to get me data,
    indicated on the chart behind me and the handout that was circulated,
    on the number of Afghan units fully integrated with coalition forces
    and how many of those Afghan units are in the lead in operations. This
    effort is key to the transition to an Afghan lead in providing for
    their nation's security. Accordingly, I intend to track the data on
    this chart very closely.
        While I am pleased with the increased partnering in the field, I am
    disappointed with the shortfall in trainers for initial training needed
    for the Afghan Army and police. Lieutenant General Caldwell told us he
    had only 37 percent of the required U.S. and NATO trainers on hand, and
    NATO countries were about 90 percent short of meeting NATO's commitment
    to provide about 2,000 non-U.S. trainers. This is simply inexcusable,
    and our NATO allies must do more to close the gap in trainers.
        Other areas where progress appears to be happening are in equipping
    the Afghan security forces, including with equipment coming out of Iraq
    as U.S. forces draw down there, and in putting in place a plan for
    reintegrating lower-level Taliban fighters willing to lay down their
    arms and abide by the Afghan Constitution. In both of these areas, U.S.
    efforts in Afghanistan have been aided by authorities provided by
    Congress in last year's National Defense Authorization Act.
        Also challenging over the coming months will be maintaining
    security and stability in Iraq. Following Iraq's national elections,
    the posture and mission of U.S. forces in Iraq will change
    significantly, as they draw down from over 100,000 to under 50,000
    soldiers, and the U.S. combat mission comes to an end in August of this
    year, as called for by President Obama. The U.S.-Iraq status of forces
    agreement sets a December 2011 deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S.
    forces from Iraq.
        Even as operations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, we also must
    continue to bring the fight to al Qaeda and its affiliates as they look
    for new operational hubs. We have already seen al Qaeda's interest in
    places like Yemen and Somalia, but we must attempt to ensure we are a
    step ahead of al Qaeda in places like West Africa and the South
    Pacific. Assisting our allies and partners in these regions is critical
    and DOD's focus on building the capacity of our allies and partners is
    welcome.
        Turning to the readiness of our Armed Forces, the fiscal year 2011
    budget request provides adequate levels of funding including support
    for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The war funding request
    includes $21.3 billion for repairing and replacing equipment and $2.8
    billion in the base budget to reset and reconstitute equipment. This
    committee has long advocated for the Department to shift funding for
    reset and reconstitution from the war budget into the base budget and
    it appears they have finally begun to do so in this year's budget
    request. We must recognize however that the $2.8 billion is a modest
    down payment against our long term reset and reconstitution
    requirements and this level of funding will need to be sustained
    several years after forces have withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Readiness funding in this year's budget request increases by 8.5
    percent to account for additional costs associated with depot
    maintenance, flying hours, steaming days, training, force growth, and
    other increases in operational tempo. It is imperative these vital
    readiness accounts are protected and fully funded. However, while our
    deployed forces remain ready as they go into combat, until there is a
    decrease in operational tempo, force readiness for non-deployed units
    will continue to suffer historical lows, which poses significant risk
    and adverse impacts to our National Military Strategy.
        In the area of personnel, I am pleased that this budget request
    provides increased funding for military personnel and the Defense
    Health Program. The budget request includes funding to support the care
    and treatment of Wounded Warriors, including $1.1 billion for the
    treatment, care, and research of traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and
    psychological health. The budget would also increase funding for family
    support programs by $500 million over last year's levels and include
    the funding necessary to support the temporary increase of the Army's
    active-duty end strength to 569,400, which will help improve dwell time
    and reduce stress on the force.
        I am disappointed, Secretary Gates, that you have announced that
    you will recommend a veto if the Defense bills include funding for the
    F136 alternate engine. Apart from the attributes afforded by
    competition in improving technology and ensuring better contractor
    performance, I believe that the business case today may be different
    than the one the Department faced 4 years ago when the Department made
    the original termination decision. Based on the information that I have
    been provided, it would appear to me that the additional investment
    that Congress has made in the program since that original decision
    would change the business case for going forward with this program. At
    the time of the original decision, the Institute for Defense Analyses
    (IDA) assessed that the F136 alternate engine would have to achieve
    savings of roughly 18 percent to make economic sense, a figure in
    excess of the historical averages achieved in previous procurement
    programs, which IDA assessed as being 14.6 percent. With the additional
    investment that we have made since that time, it would appear that the
    required savings threshold would now be closer to 13 percent, or a
    figure below the average that procurement competitions have yielded in
    the past.
        The catastrophic January 12 earthquake that struck Haiti reminded
    all of us just how indiscriminate natural disasters can be and renewed
    America's commitment to Haiti. DOD has mobilized resources and manpower
    to aid in the relief effort in support of the Department of State and
    U.S. Agency for International Development. Just last week, the
    committee approved a $400 million reprogramming to ensure DOD was
    adequately resourced for this important support mission, and we are
    prepared to continue to work with the Secretary and Admiral Mullen to
    ensure DOD is able to continue to provide support to this critical
    humanitarian disaster response effort in the weeks and months ahead. We
    appreciate the skill shown by U.S. Service personnel in response to the
    Haiti disaster.
        Following this hearing, as previously announced, at around noon, we
    will turn to the issue of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'' I would appreciate
    questions on that subject being asked after Secretary Gates' statement
    on the subject.
        Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, we look forward to your testimony.
    Now I will turn to Senator McCain for any opening remarks he may have.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
    join you in welcoming the witnesses to discuss the President's
    budget request for fiscal year 2011 and the 2010 QDR and its
    impact on the FYDP for DOD.
        Secretary Gates, I greatly appreciate that you continue to
    place the highest priority of the Department on supporting the
    men and women of the Armed Forces. I am consistently amazed and
    heartened by the courage, commitment, and dedication of the
    brave men and women who choose to answer the call to defend the
    Nation. We all know they endure long, hard work under very
    demanding conditions and in some cases making the ultimate
    sacrifice. They in turn ask their families to endure unwelcome
    separations and the burden of managing the homefront. Your
    country's volunteer force and their families are a national
    asset and they deserve our steadfast and united support.
        Informed by the 2010 QDR, your 2011 base budget request of
    $549 billion builds upon the substantial changes you outlined
    in last year's budget by establishing strategic priorities and
    identifying where DOD needs to spend scarce resources.
    Secretary Gates, last year I supported your view that winning
    the wars of today, while deterring and preparing for the
    conflicts of tomorrow required a balancing of risks. I look
    forward to your assessment of why this year's budget and the
    QDR that it's based on entail an acceptable amount of risk
    between our present and future priorities.
        The 2011 overseas contingency operations (OCO) request of
    $159 billion and 2010 supplemental request of $33 billion
    support our men and women in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I fully
    support your efforts to use OCO and supplemental funding to
    address many operational shortfalls in Afghanistan through
    increased funding for ISR assets, electronic warfare
    capabilities, and increasing the end strength of our Special
    Operations Forces (SOF).
        Your request includes significant funding for building the
    Afghan security forces. I remain very concerned that we're not
    on pace to achieve the end strength of 400,000 by 2013 as
    recommended by General McChrystal. I'm eager to hear whether
    you think your funding request will enable us to achieve that
    goal.
        On the issue of a 2011 withdrawal, from speaking with the
    President of Pakistan to the tribal leader in Kandahar who
    fought against the Russians, there's great uncertainty out
    there because of the President's statement. There's great
    uncertainty whether we're going to stay, and it was raised to
    me by every leader that I met with, including the tribal chief
    who had fought against the Russians, who looked at me and said:
    ``Are you going to stay or are you going to leave like you did
    last time?''
        Our allies and friends in the region need to be reassured
    that 2011 is not the date for withdrawal and, although your
    words and that of the Secretary of State have been excellent,
    the President has not made that statement in a way that would
    be reassuring to our allies as well as to our enemies.
        Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their
    families to sacrifice so much, both Congress and the
    administration must be ready to make some tough funding
    decisions, something we've failed miserably at in previous
    years. Despite numerous calls last year for earmark reform, the
    fiscal year 2010 defense appropriations bill signed into law a
    bill that contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 billion
    in unrequested and unwanted funding for C-17s and the
    alternative engine for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). That's
    $7 billion that the Department had to eat in programs that it
    didn't request or need.
        This business as usual spending that we've come to accept
    is unnecessary, wasteful, and it diverts precious funding from
    other, more pressing military priorities.
        Secretary Gates, I was encouraged in your rollout of the
    budget yesterday that you laid an early marker with Congress by
    indicating that if we added funds to continue the C-17 and
    alternate engine for the JSF in 2011 you would recommend that
    the President veto the bill. I strongly support such a
    recommendation, but feel it may fall on deaf ears up here
    unless that veto threat comes early, consistently, and directly
    from the President.
        We cannot continue to condone spending billions of dollars
    on programs that the Department doesn't want or need. If the
    President is really serious, if he's really serious about not
    wasting billions of dollars more of the taxpayers' money, he
    should also say that he will veto any appropriations bill that
    comes across his desk with earmarks and pork barrel spending on
    it. It has to stop.
        On the F-35 JSF program, I appreciate the management
    decisions you announced yesterday to replace the program
    executive officer and withhold more than $600 million where
    accountability required that those changes be made. As you
    appropriately stated yesterday during your press conference:
    ``When things go wrong, people will be held accountable.'' I'd
    like to see that happen in some other areas of government.
        I am nonetheless concerned about your comment during the
    press conference that it was clear there were more problems
    with the F-35 than you were aware of when you visited the Fort
    Worth plant last August. With your recently announced
    management decisions, I hope the process by which you get
    reliable, up to date information about important aspects of the
    program when you need it has improved.
        However, I am still concerned about whether the Services
    will get sufficiently capable JSFs when they need them. Just a
    few weeks ago, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
    found that continued production concurrent with the slow
    increase in flight testing over the next 2 years will commit
    DOD and the Services to test, training, and deploy plans with
    substantial risk. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) recently
    determined that the Marine Corps and the Navy's version of the
    JSF may end up being too expensive to operate, with each flight
    hour flown costing about $31,000 compared with around $19,000
    per flight hour for the Services' current F/A-18 Hornets and
    AV-8B Harriers. I'd appreciate if you could comment on these
    and potentially other issues you see facing this program.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Mr. Chairman, thank you. I join you in welcoming Secretary Gates
    and Chairman Mullen today to discuss the President's budget request for
    fiscal year 2011, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and its
    impact on Future Years Defense Programs for the Department of Defense.
        Secretary Gates, I greatly appreciate that you continue to place
    the highest priority of the Department on supporting the men and women
    of the U.S. Armed Forces. I am consistently amazed and heartened by the
    courage, commitment, and dedication of the brave men and women who
    choose to answer the call to defend our Nation. They endure long hard
    work under very demanding conditions, and in some cases making the
    ultimate sacrifice. They, in turn ask their families to endure
    unwelcome separations and the burden of managing the homefront. Our
    country's volunteer force and their families are a national asset. They
    deserve our steadfast and united support.
        Informed by the 2010 QDR, your 2011 base budget request of $549
    billion builds upon the substantial changes you outlined in last year's
    budget by establishing strategic priorities and identifying where the
    Department needs to spend scarce resources. Secretary Gates, last year
    I supported your view that winning the wars of today while deterring
    and preparing for the conflicts of tomorrow required a balancing of
    risk. I look forward to your assessment of why this year's budget, and
    the QDR that it is based on, entail an acceptable amount of risk
    between our present and future priorities.
        Your 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request of $159
    billion and 2010 supplemental request of $33 billion supports our men
    and women in Iraq and Afghanistan. I fully support your efforts to use
    OCO and supplemental funding to address many operational shortfalls in
    Afghanistan through increased funding for intelligence, surveillance
    and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities
    and increasing the end strength of our Special Operations Forces. Your
    request includes significant funding for building the Afghan security
    forces. I remain concerned that we are not on pace to achieve the end
    strength of 400,000 by 2013, as recommended by General McChrystal. I am
    eager to hear whether you think your funding request will enable us to
    achieve that goal.
        Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their families to
    sacrifice so much, both Congress and the administration must be ready
    to make some tough funding decisions--something that we have failed
    miserably at in previous years. Despite numerous calls last year for
    earmark reform, the fiscal year 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill signed
    into law contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 billion in
    unrequested and unwanted funding for C-17s and the alternative engine
    for the Joint Strike Fighter. That's $7 billion that the Department had
    to eat in programs that it didn't request or need. This business-as-
    usual spending that we have come to accept is unnecessary, wasteful and
    it diverts precious funding from other more pressing military
    priorities. Secretary Gates, I was encouraged in your rollout of the
    budget yesterday that you laid an early marker with Congress by
    indicating that if we added funds to continue the C-17 and alternate
    engine for the Joint Strike Fighter in 2011, you would recommend that
    the President veto the bill. I strongly support such a recommendation,
    but feel it may fall on deaf ears up here unless that veto threat comes
    early, consistently and directly from the President. We cannot continue
    to condone spending billions of dollars on programs that the Department
    doesn't want or need. If the President is serious about not wasting
    billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money, then he should use every
    opportunity this year to vow to veto any appropriations bill that that
    is laden with pork barrel spending.
        Mr. Secretary, on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, I
    appreciate the management decisions you announced yesterday--to replace
    the program executive officer and withhold more than $600 million--
    where accountability required that those changes be made. As you
    appropriately stated yesterday during your press conference, `When
    things go wrong, people will be held accountable.' I am, nonetheless,
    concerned about your comment during the press conference that it was
    clear there were more problems with the F-35 than you were aware of
    when you visited the Fort Worth plant last August. With your recently
    announced management decisions, I hope the process by which you get
    reliable, up-to-date information about important aspects of the Program
    when you need it, has improved.
        However, I am still concerned about whether the Services will get
    sufficiently capable Joint Strike Fighters when they need them. Just a
    few weeks ago, the Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation found
    that continued production concurrent with the slow increase in flight
    testing over the next 2 years will commit the Department and Services
    to test, training, and deployment plans with substantial risk. NAVAIR
    recently determined that the Marine Corps and the Navy's version of the
    Joint Strike Fighter may end up being too expensive to operate, with
    each flight hour flown costing about $31,000, compared with around
    $19,000 per flight hour for the Services' current F/A-18 Hornets and
    AV-8B Harriers. I would appreciate it if you could comment on these and
    potentially other issues you see facing this program.
        Thank you Chairman Levin.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        I will put the balance of my statement in the record and if
    there's part of your statement that you didn't give, of course,
    that will be made part of the record, too, if you wish.
        Secretary Gates, we welcome you, Admiral Mullen, and Mr.
    Hale. Please proceed.

        STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
    the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011.
        I first want to thank you for your support of the men and
    women of the United States military these many years. These
    troops are part of an extraordinary generation of young
    Americans who have answered their country's call. They have
    fought our wars, protected our interests and allies around the
    globe, and, as we have seen recently in Haiti, they have also
    demonstrated compassion and decency in the face of
    incomprehensible loss.
        I have a brief opening statement to provide an overview of
    the budget request. My submitted statement includes many more
    details that I know are of interest to the committee.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, I'm going to interrupt you
    at this time and do something which I know you would love us to
    do, which is to approve a number of nominations. We have a
    quorum present and we should take advantage of that. Forgive
    the interruption. I will ask the committee now to consider 5
    civilian nominations and 1,802 pending military nominations.
        First, the civilian nominations of Douglas Wilson to be
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; Malcolm Ross
    O'Neil to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
    Logistics, and Technology; Mary Sally Matiella to be Assistant
    Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller;
    Paul Luis Oostburg Sanz to be General Counsel of the Department
    of the Navy; and Jacqueline Pfannenstiel to be Assistant
    Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment.
        Is there a motion to report these nominations?
        Senator McCain. So moved.
        Chairman Levin. Second?
        Senator Inhofe. Second.
        Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye. [Chorus of ayes.]
        That is approved.
        Finally, I'll ask the committee to consider the 1,802
    pending military nominations. They've been before the committee
    the required length of time. Is there a motion?
        Senator McCain. So moved.
        Chairman Levin. Second?
        Senator Inhofe. Second.
        Chairman Levin. Second. All in favor say aye. [Chorus of
    ayes.]
        Opposed, nay. [No response.]
        The motion carries. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Gates. A most worthwhile interruption.
        The budget requests being presented today include $549
    billion for a base budget, a 3.4 percent increase over last
    year, or 1.8 percent real increase after adjusting for
    inflation, reflecting the administration's commitment to
    modest, steady, and sustainable real growth in defense
    spending. We're also requesting $159 billion in fiscal year
    2011 to support OCOs, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, plus
    $33 billion for the remainder of this fiscal year to support
    the added financial costs of the President's new approach in
    Afghanistan.
        The base budget request reflects these major institutional
    priorities: first, reaffirming and strengthening the Nation's
    commitment to care for the All-Volunteer Force, our greatest
    strategic asset; second, rebalancing America's defense posture
    by emphasizing capabilities needed to prevail in current
    conflicts while enhancing capabilities that may be needed in
    the future; and third, continuing the Department's commitment
    to reform how DOD does business, especially in the area of
    acquisitions. Finally, the commitments made and the programs
    funded in the OCO and supplemental requests demonstrate the
    administration's determination to support our troops and
    commanders in combat so they can accomplish their critical
    missions and come home safely.
        The budget continues the Department's policy of shifting
    money to the base budget for enduring programs that directly
    support warfighters and their families, whether on the
    battlefield, recovering from wounds, or on the homefront, to
    ensure that they have steady, long-term funding and
    institutional support.
        The base budget request was accompanied and informed by the
    2010 QDR, which establishes strategic priorities and identifies
    key areas for needed investment. The 2010 QDR and fiscal year
    2011 budget build upon the substantial changes that the
    President made in the fiscal year 2010 budget request to
    allocate defense dollars more wisely and reform the
    Department's processes.
        The fiscal year 2010 budget proposals cut, curtailed, or
    ended a number of programs that were either performing poorly
    or in excess of real world needs. Conversely, future-oriented
    programs where the United States was relatively underinvested
    were accelerated or received more funding.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget submissions and QDR are
    suffused with two major themes. The first is continued reform,
    fundamentally changing the way this Department does business,
    the priorities we set, the programs we fund, the weapons we
    buy, and how we buy them. Building on the reforms of last
    year's budget, the fiscal year 2011 request two additional
    steps aimed at programs that were excess or performing poorly.
    They include terminating the Navy EPX intelligence aircraft,
    ending the Third Generation Infrastructure Surveillance
    Program, cancelling the Next Generation CGX Cruiser,
    terminating the Net-Enabled Command and Control Program, ending
    the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS)
    due to cost overruns and performance concerns, completing the
    C-17 program and closing the production line, as multiple
    studies in recent years show that the Air Force already has
    more of these aircraft than it needs, and ending the alternate
    engine for the F-35 JSF, as whatever benefits might accrue are
    more than offset by excess costs, complexity, and associated
    risks.
        I am fully aware of the political pressure to continue
    building the C-17 and proceed with an alternate engine for the
    F-35. So let me be very clear: I will strongly recommend that
    the President veto any legislation that sustains the
    unnecessary continuation of these two programs.
        The budget and reviews are also shaped by a bracing dose of
    realism, with regard to risk, and with regard to resources. We
    have in a sober and clear-eyed way assessed risks, set
    priorities, made tradeoffs, and identified requirements based
    on plausible real-world threats, scenarios, and potential
    adversaries.
        Just one example. For years, U.S. defense planning and
    requirements were based on preparing to fight two major
    conventional wars at the same time, a force-sizing construct
    that persisted long after it was overtaken by events. The
    Department's leadership now recognizes that we must prepare for
    a much broader range of security challenges on the horizon.
    They range from the use of sophisticated new technologies to
    deny our forces access to the global commons of sea, air,
    space, and cyberspace to the threat posed by non-state groups
    delivering more cunning and destructive means to attack and
    terrorize, scenarios that transcend the familiar contingencies
    that dominated U.S. planning after the Cold War.
        We have learned through painful experience that the wars we
    fight are seldom the wars that we planned. As a result, the
    United States needs a broad portfolio of military capabilities
    with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of
    conflict. This strategic reality shaped the QDR's analysis and
    subsequent conclusions, which directly informed the program
    decisions contained in the budget.
        Before closing, I would like to offer two thoughts to
    consider when assessing the U.S. investment in national
    defense. First, the requests submitted this week total more
    than $700 billion, a massive number to be sure. But at 4.7
    percent of gross national product, it represents a
    significantly smaller portion of national wealth going to
    defense than was spent during most of America's previous major
    wars, and the base budget represents 3.5 percent of GDP.
        Second, the President recently exempted the defense budget
    from spending freezes being applied to other parts of the
    government. It is important to remember, however, that, as I
    mentioned earlier, this Department undertook a painstaking
    review of our priorities last year and as a result cut or
    curtailed a number of major programs. These programs had they
    been pursued to completion would have cost the American
    taxpayer about $330 billion.
        In closing, Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you and members of
    this committee again for all you have done to support our
    troops and their families in light of the unprecedented demands
    that have been placed upon them. I believe the choices made and
    the priorities set in these budget requests reflect America's
    commitment to see that our forces have the tools they need to
    prevail in the wars we are in, while making the investments
    necessary to prepare for threats on or beyond the horizon.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the
    President's budget requests for fiscal year 2011. I first want to thank
    you for your support of the men and women of the U.S. military these
    many years. I know they will be uppermost in your thoughts as you
    deliberate on these budget requests. Our troops are part of an
    extraordinary generation of young Americans who have answered their
    country's call. They have fought this country's wars, protected our
    interests and allies around the globe, and, as we've seen recently in
    Haiti, they have also demonstrated compassion and decency in the face
    of incomprehensible loss.
        The budget requests being presented today include $549 billion for
    the base budget--a 3.4 percent increase over last year, or 1.8 percent
    real growth after adjusting for inflation, reflecting this
    administration's commitment to modest, steady, and sustainable real
    growth in defense spending. We are also requesting $159 billion in
    fiscal year 2011 to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),
    primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, plus $33 billion for the remainder
    of this fiscal year to support the added financial costs of the
    President's new approach in Afghanistan.
        The base budget request was accompanied and informed by the 2010
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which establishes strategic
    priorities and identifies key areas for needed investment. The 2010 QDR
    and fiscal year 2011 budget build upon the substantial changes that the
    President made in the fiscal year 2010 budget request to allocate
    defense dollars more wisely and reform the department's processes.
        The base budget request reflects these major institutional
    priorities:

             First, reaffirming and strengthening the Nation's
            commitment to care for the All-Volunteer Force, our greatest
            strategic asset;
             Second, rebalancing America's defense posture by
            emphasizing capabilities needed to prevail in current
            conflicts, while enhancing capabilities that may be needed in
            the future; and
             Third, continuing the department's commitment to
            reform how the Department of Defense (DOD) does business,
            especially in the area of acquisitions.

        Finally, the commitments made and programs funded in the OCO and
    supplemental requests demonstrate this administration's determination
    to support our troops and commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq so they
    can accomplish their critical missions and return home safely.
        At this point, I would like to offer two thoughts to consider when
    assessing the U.S. investment in national defense:
        First, the requests submitted this week total more than $700
    billion--a massive number, to be sure. But, at 4.7 percent of gross
    national product, it represents a significantly smaller portion of
    national wealth going to defense than was spent during America's
    previous major wars.
        Second, the President recently exempted the defense budget from
    spending freezes being applied to other parts of the government. It is
    important to remember, however, that this department already undertook
    a painstaking review of our programs and priorities last year, and
    proposed to cut, curtail, or end a number of programs. These programs,
    had they been pursued to completion, would have cost the American
    taxpayer about $330 billion.
                        care for our all-volunteer force
        The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $138.5 billion for
    military pay and allowances, an increase of $3.6 billion--or 2.6
    percent--over last year. This includes an increase of 1.4 percent for
    military basic pay, which will keep military pay increases in line with
    those in the private sector. This amount funds bonuses and other
    incentives to meet recruiting and retention quality and quantity
    goals--especially for our most critical skills and experience levels.
    The military deserves generous pay because of the stress and danger
    these jobs entail. In recent years, Congress has added 0.5 percent to
    the administration's requested military pay raise--an action that adds
    about $500 million a year to our budget now and in future years, and
    reduces the funds available for training and equipping the force. In
    this time of strong recruiting and retention, I urge Congress to
    approve the full requested amount for the fiscal year 2011 military pay
    raise but not to add to the request.
    Wounded, Ill, and Injured
        This budget supports the department's intense focus on care for our
    wounded, ill, and injured military members. As I've said before, aside
    from winning the wars themselves, this is my highest priority. Key
    initiatives include:

             Achieving a seamless transition to veteran status for
            members leaving the military and increased cooperation between
            the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs;
             Ensuring a high standard at facilities caring for
            wounded warriors, including first-rate hospitals and the Army's
            Warrior Transition Units;
             Enhancing case management of individuals transitioning
            to civilian life--especially those needing long-term care;
             Establishing a better Disability Evaluation System--to
            create a simpler, faster, more consistent process for
            determining which members may continue their military service
            and helping them become as independent and self-supporting as
            possible; and
             Working with the VA to create Virtual Lifetime
            Electronic Records to improve veteran care and services by
            improving the availability of administrative and health
            information.

        The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $2.2 billion for
    enduring programs for our wounded, ill, and injured. It also includes
    $300 million to complete the Army's Warrior Transition complexes and
    new medical facilities in the Washington, DC, capital region. The $2.2
    billion for these programs is $100 million more than the fiscal year
    2010 enacted amount and is more than double the fiscal year 2008 level
    of $1 billion.
    Military Health System
        The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $50.7 billion for the Unified
    Medical Budget to support the Military Health System that serves 9.5
    million eligible beneficiaries. Over the past decade, U.S. health-care
    costs have grown substantially, and defense health costs have been no
    exception, more than doubling between fiscal year 2001 ($19 billion)
    and fiscal year 2010 ($49 billion). These costs are expected to grow
    from 6 percent of the department's total budget in fiscal year 2001 to
    more than 10 percent in fiscal year 2015.
    Military Family Support Programs
        The department remains fully committed to providing assistance to
    our troops and their families in light of the unprecedented demands
    that have been placed on them. As the President stated in the State of
    the Union Address last week, our men and women in uniform and their
    families have our respect, our gratitude, and our full support. The
    budget reflects the department's policy of shifting money to the base
    budget for enduring programs so that they will not disappear as war
    funding declines. The fiscal year 2011 base budget includes $8.1
    billion for a variety of family-support programs vital to the morale
    and well-being of our military members and their families--an increase
    of $450 million over last year. The OCO request includes $700 million
    for family support--bringing the total to $8.8 billion.
    Build and Sustain Facilities
        The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $18.7 billion to fund critical
    military-construction and family-housing requirements, including
    substantial funding to recapitalize many department schools for
    children of servicemembers.
        The fiscal year 2011 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) investment
    funding of $2.4 billion is less than prior years because most of the
    funding needed to implement the 2005 round of BRAC decisions has
    already been appropriated for 24 major realignments, 24 base closures,
    and 765 lesser actions--all of which must be completed by September 15,
    2011, in accordance with statute.
        We have requested $14.2 billion to modernize the department's
    facilities; to support the recently completed growth in the Army and
    Marine Corps; to support the relocation of 8,000 marines from Okinawa
    to Guam; and to recapitalize medical facilities and schools for
    servicemembers' children.
                   rebalancing the force--the wars we are in
        Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the
    top of the institutional military's budgeting, policy, and program
    priorities. We now recognize that America's ability to deal with
    threats for years to come will largely depend on our performance in the
    current conflicts. The fiscal year 2011 budget request took a number of
    additional steps aimed at filling persistent shortfalls that have
    plagued recent military efforts, especially in Afghanistan.
    Rotary-Wing Aircraft
        To increase these capabilities, this request includes more than
    $9.6 billion for the acquisition of a variety of modern rotary-wing
    aircraft, including the creation of two Army combat aviation brigades
    by fiscal year 2014. The goal is to train 1,500 new Army helicopter
    pilots per year by 2012.
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
        The fiscal year 2011 budget request continues efforts to increase
    ISR support for our fighting forces. The ISR Task Force was formed in
    April 2008 to generate critical operational ISR capacity--primarily in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then, the department has worked to secure
    substantial funding to field and sustain ISR capabilities. In the
    fiscal year 2011 budget, that includes:

             $2.2 billion for procurement of Predator-class
            aircraft to increase the Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) available to
            deployed forces from 37 to 65 by 2013; and
             Doubling procurement of the MQ-9 Reaper over the next
            few years.
    Electronic Warfare (EW)
        The fiscal year 2011 budget request supports the QDR's call for
    better EW capabilities for today's warfighters. The Navy procurement
    budget includes $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2011 and $2.3 billion in
    fiscal year 2012 for the addition of 36 EA-18G aircraft, with 12
    procured in fiscal year 2011 and 24 in fiscal year 2012. These
    resources and capabilities will help fill an imminent EW shortfall that
    has been consistently highlighted by the combatant commanders as one of
    their highest priorities.
    Special Operations Forces (SOF)
        The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $6.3 billion for USSOCOM--
    nearly 6 percent higher than in fiscal year 2010. The department plans
    to call for SOF funding to increase sharply over the next several
    years, including an increase of about 2,800 personnel in fiscal year
    2011.
                rebalancing the force--preparing for the future
        The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $189 billion for total
    procurement, research, and development. This investment reflects the
    fact that the United States needs a broad portfolio of military
    capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible
    spectrum of conflict, including conventional conflict with the
    technologically advanced military forces of other countries. To meet
    the potential threats to our military's ability to project power, deter
    aggression, and come to the aid of allies and partners in environments
    where access to our forces may be denied, this budget request includes
    substantial funds for conventional and strategic modernization.
    Tactical Aircraft
        The fiscal year 2011 budget funds programs to develop and buy
    superior aircraft to guarantee continued air dominance over current and
    future battlefields, most importantly the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
    (JSF). The fiscal year 2011 base budget includes $10.7 billion for
    continued development of the F-35, and for procurement of 42 aircraft.
    An additional JSF is purchased in the OCO budget. This budget reflects
    a restructuring of the JSF program to stabilize its schedule and cost.
    The department has also adjusted F-35 procurement quantities based on
    new data on likely orders from our foreign partners and realigned
    development and test schedules.
    Mobility and Tanker Aircraft
        The fiscal year 2011 budget continues to support development of a
    new aerial refueling tanker. The KC-X, the first phase of KC-135
    recapitalization, will procure 179 commercial derivative tanker
    aircraft to replace roughly one-third of the current aerial refueling
    tanker fleet at an estimated cost of $35 billion. Contract award is
    expected in the summer of 2010 and procurement should begin in fiscal
    year 2013. To support this long-range effort, $864 million has been
    requested for research into the next-generation tanker.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget ends production of the C-17, supports
    shutdown activities for production of new aircraft, and continues the
    modification of existing C-17s. With the completion of the program, the
    United States will have 223 of these aircraft, more than enough to meet
    current and projected requirements.
    Shipbuilding
        The fiscal year 2011 budget reflects the department's formulation
    of a realistic, executable shipbuilding plan through the Future Years
    Defense Program. Overall, the fiscal year 2011 budget includes $25.1
    billion for fiscal year 2011 procurement of new ships, equipment and
    research and development into future construction--including $15.7
    billion for Navy shipbuilding and conversion activities. It reinforces
    the ongoing transition to a naval force that can meet the needs of
    today's warfighters and reduce reliance on very costly and increasingly
    vulnerable large surface combatants in the future. The fiscal year 2011
    request and planned out-year funding would allow the department to:

             Build a new aircraft carrier every 5 years;
             Shift large-deck amphibious ship production to a 5-
            year build cycle to maintain a long-term force structure of
            nine large-deck aviation ships to support amphibious
            operations;
             Stabilize near-term production quantities for the
            Littoral Combat Ship and the Joint High Speed Vessel to support
            irregular warfare operations;
             Produce two attack submarines per year beginning in
            fiscal year 2011 and continue development of a new strategic
            deterrent submarine; and
             Build three Mobile Landing Platform ships--one ship
            per year in fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2013, and fiscal year
            2015.
    Ground Forces Modernization
        The fiscal year 2011 budget advances restructuring of the Army's
    Future Combat Systems, principally through Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
    modernization. The fiscal year 2011 request for BCTs is $3.2 billion,
    mostly for research and development.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget also supports the development of a new
    ground-vehicle program to replace aging systems. The new program will
    take into account the hard battlefield lessons of recent years,
    especially with respect to threats posed by improvised explosive
    devices (IEDs), and will include a role for the MRAP and M-ATV vehicles
    that have been so important in Afghanistan and Iraq.
    Space and Cyber Capabilities
        Just about all of our military forces--land, sea, and air--now
    depend on digital communications and the satellites and data networks
    that support them. The role of space and satellites has never been more
    crucial to military operations--from GPS-guided munitions and
    navigation to missile defense and communications. The fiscal year 2011
    budget continues to strengthen U.S. capabilities in space, with $599
    million allocated to procure Advanced Extremely High Frequency
    satellites instead of the Transformational Satellite, which was
    cancelled in the fiscal year 2010 budget.
        With cheap technology and minimal investment, adversaries operating
    in cyberspace can potentially inflict serious damage on our command and
    control, ISR, and precision strike capabilities. The fiscal year 2011
    budget continues to fund the recruiting and training of new experts in
    cyber warfare begun in fiscal year 2010, and supports the stand up of a
    new U.S. Cyber Command.
    Ballistic Missile Defense
        DOD continues to pursue missile-defense systems that can provide
    real capability as soon as possible while taking maximum advantage of
    new technologies. In accordance with the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
    Review, our goal is a missile-defense program that balances
    capabilities and risks in order to deter aggression; project power and
    protect U.S. and allied interests; and respond to warfighter
    requirements.
        This year's base budget request includes $9.9 billion total for
    missile defense--almost $700 million more than last year, mostly for
    the Missile Defense Agency.
        This includes funding for:

             Enhanced missile defenses for deployed forces, allies,
            and partners to defend against regional threats--including
            THAAD battery ground components and interceptors, as well as
            the conversion of additional Aegis ships.
             The ``Phased Adaptive Approach'' for missile defense:
            a flexible, scalable system to respond to developing threats.
            This has particular applicability to Europe, where the new
            approach allows us to adapt our systems more rapidly as new
            threats develop and old ones recede. In the short-term, we will
            be able to provide immediate coverage and protection by
            deploying current and proven systems such as the Aegis and SM-
            3.
             A viable homeland defense against rogue threats--
            including ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, AK, and
            Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.
             Expansion of the flight-test program to test
            capabilities against medium-, intermediate-, and long-range
            threats.
             Investments in break-through technologies to improve
            our ability to counter threats during the boost phase while
            focusing on the most promising new technologies.
    Nuclear Weapons
        The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) being released in March will
    outline the policy framework for achieving the President's objectives
    to reduce nuclear weapons with a long-term goal of elimination; and
    maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal as long as these weapons
    exist. It will also provide steps to strengthen deterrence while
    reducing the role of nuclear weapons. While the NPR conclusions are
    still being developed, the President's budget requests for the Defense
    and Energy departments reflect several priorities already established
    in our review:

             Funding to sustain a nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs,
            and heavy bombers under the New START Treaty; and
             Increased National Nuclear Security Administration
            funding for infrastructure, warhead life extension, and science
            and technology.

        Details of these and other elements of our nuclear posture will be
    presented in the final NPR report in March.
    Building Partner Capacity
        In a world where arguably the most likely and lethal threats will
    emanate from failed and fractured states, building the security
    capacity of partners has emerged as a key capability--one that reduces
    the need for direct U.S. military intervention, with all of its
    attendant political, financial, and human costs. To provide more
    resources, predictability, and agility to this important mission, the
    department will seek an increase in Global Train and Equip authority in
    the fiscal year 2011 budget to $500 million--authority that includes
    coalition activities to support current operations.
             reforming how the department of defense does business
        President Obama is committed to ending unneeded and troubled
    programs and achieving a better balance between capabilities needed to
    succeed in current conflicts and capabilities needed to prepare for the
    conflicts we are most likely to see in the future.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget request builds on the reforms of last
    year by ending a number of unneeded or troubled programs:

             Next Generation Cruiser CG(X): Cancelled due to
            concerns about costs and utility in future combat scenarios.
            Any resulting capability gap will be filled by an enhanced Navy
            destroyer program.
             Navy Intelligence Aircraft EP(X): This Navy-planned
            EP-3 replacement was cancelled because of cost and its
            redundancy with other technologies and systems.
             Third Generation Infrared Surveillance: This sensor
            system was cancelled because there are better alternatives.
             The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System
            (DIMHRS): DIMHRS has been in development for over 10 years and
            cost $500 million--with little to show and limited prospects.
             Net Enabled Command and Control: This joint program
            has had cost overruns and performance shortfalls.
    JSF Alternate Engine
        One of the tougher decisions we faced during this budget process
    was whether or not to formally add the alternate engine to the Joint
    Strike Fighter program. It has been the position of this department
    since 2007 that adding a second JSF engine was unnecessary and too
    costly.
        Over the past year, as part of our thorough review of the overall
    JSF program, we took a fresh look to determine whether the second
    engine option had reached a point in funding and development that
    supported a different conclusion. We considered all aspects of this
    question and, in the end, concluded that the facts and analysis simply
    do not support the case for adding an alternate engine program. There
    are several rationales for this conclusion:
        First, even after factoring in Congress' additional funding, the
    engine would still require a further investment of $2.5 billion over
    the next 5 years.
        Second, the additional costs are not offset by potential savings
    generated through competition. Even optimistic analytical models
    produce essentially a break-even scenario.
        Third, the solution to understandable concern over the performance
    of the Pratt & Whitney program is not to spend yet more money to add a
    second engine. The answer is to get the first engine on track. Further,
    the alternate engine program is 3 to 4 years behind in development
    compared to the current program, and there is no guarantee that a
    second program would not face the same challenges as the current
    effort.
        Fourth, split or shared buys of items, particularly from only two
    sources, do not historically produce competitive behavior since both
    vendors are assured some share of the purchase. Another reality is that
    the JSF is designed to support a wide diversity of military customers,
    including the Navy, Marine Corps, and overseas buyers, many of whom are
    unable or unwilling to purchase from two engine manufacturers.
        For all these reasons, we are firm in our view that the interests
    of the taxpayers, our military, our partner nations, and the integrity
    of the JSF program are best served by not pursuing a second engine.
        I believe most proponents of this program are motivated by the
    genuine belief that a second engine is the right thing to do. I look
    forward to engaging Congress in this discussion and sharing with them
    our facts and analysis. However, we have reached a critical point in
    this debate where spending more money on a second engine for the JSF is
    unnecessary, wasteful, and simply diverts precious modernization funds
    from other more pressing priorities. Accordingly, should Congress add
    more funds to continue this unneeded program, I will strongly recommend
    that the President veto such legislation.
    C-17
        The fiscal year 2011 request completes the C-17 program and begins
    shutting down the production line. At present, we have 194 C-17s (plus
    111 C-5s) in our strategic airlift fleet. By the end of this fiscal
    year, the department will have procured 223.
        Three department studies completed over the past 5 years have
    concluded that the U.S. military has more than enough strategic airlift
    capacity, and that additional C-17s are not required. Some factors to
    consider:

             In 2004, the Air Force Fleet Viability board
            determined that the fleet of C-5As--the oldest variant--will
            remain viable until at least 2025. The Air Force and the
            manufacturer believe that the C-5 fleet will remain viable
            until 2040. Ongoing modernization and refurbishment efforts are
            intended to increase the reliability, availability, and
            maintainability of the C-5 fleet;
             Despite the demands of the current military campaigns,
            the existing C-17 fleet is not being ``burned up.'' With the
            exception of 2003--when there were only 111 aircraft in the
            fleet that were being surged to begin the Iraq war--the annual
            use of the C-17 inventory has been within program limits; and
             While it is true that the C-17 can land places where
            the C-5 cannot, of the 200,000 landings made by C-17s since
            1997, less than 4 percent were in places that were not
            accessible to the C-5. In summary, for these and other reasons,
            the department has concluded that the current C-17 is more than
            sufficient to meet the military's airlift needs. Should
            Congress add funds to continue this program, I will strongly
            recommend a presidential veto.
    Acquisitions
        The department is implementing initiatives that will increase the
    numbers and capabilities of the acquisition workforce, improve funding
    stability, enhance the source-selection process, and improve contract
    execution. Our intent is to provide the warfighter with world-class
    capability while being good stewards of taxpayer dollars.
        To operate effectively, the acquisition system must be supported by
    an appropriately-sized cadre of acquisition professionals with the
    right skills and training to perform their jobs. To address these
    personnel deficiencies, DOD will increase the number of acquisition
    personnel by 20,000 positions--from about 127,000 in fiscal year 2010
    to about 147,000 by fiscal year 2015. We will be making significant
    increases in training and retention programs in order to bolster the
    capability and size of the acquisition workforce.
    Civilian Workforce
        The fiscal year 2011 budget funds a pay raise of 1.4 percent for
    DOD civilians--the same as the military pay raise. The request includes
    funding to transition out of the National Security Personnel System
    (NSPS)--as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2010.
        About 225,000 DOD employees are covered by NSPS. These employees
    must convert to a successor statutory personnel system. The fiscal year
    2011 budget includes $23 million to implement NSPS transition and $239
    million for estimated higher civilian pay for employees transitioning
    out of NSPS.
        The request supports the DOD plan, announced last year, to grow its
    civilian workforce by in-sourcing--replacing contractors with DOD
    civilian employees. DOD is on track to reduce the number of support
    service contractors from the current 39 percent of our workforce to the
    pre-2001 level of 26 percent, and replace them with full-time
    government employees. DOD will hire as many as 13,400 new civil
    servants in fiscal year 2010, and another 6,000 in fiscal year 2011, to
    replace contractors and up to 33,400 new civil servants in place of
    contractors over the next 5 years. This includes 2,500 acquisition
    personnel in fiscal year 2010 and 10,000 through fiscal year 2014.
                     fiscal year 2010 supplemental request
        As the President stated, the goal of the United States in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda
    and to prevent its resurgence in both countries. The international
    military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this
    overarching goal. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if
    not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda and its affiliates
    operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I believe the strategy
    announced by the President represents our best opportunity to achieve
    our objectives in a part of the world so critical to America's
    security.
        The fiscal year 2010 supplemental requests $33.0 billion to support
    the President's buildup of U.S. troops in Afghanistan for the rest of
    this fiscal year and fund other related requirements, including $1
    billion for Iraqi security forces. DOD urges Congress to approve this
    supplemental by the spring to prevent disruption of funding for our
    troops in the field.
        The fiscal year 2010 supplemental includes $19.0 billion to support
    an average troop level in Afghanistan of 84,000 U.S. troops--16,000
    higher than the 68,000 assumed in the enacted fiscal year 2010 budget.
    Troop levels are expected to reach 98,000 by September 30, 2010. The
    additional troops will consist of:

             Two Army counterinsurgency BCTs;
             An Army Training BCT;
             A USMC Regimental Combat Team; and
             Enablers such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams.

        The supplemental also includes $1.1 billion--on top of the $11.3
    billion already enacted--to field and sustain critically important
    lifesaving MRAPs and M-ATVs for troops already there and for the
    additional forces being deployed this fiscal year.
                fiscal year 2011 overseas contingency operations
        To fund military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in fiscal year
    2011, we are requesting $159.3 billion, comprised of these major
    categories:

             Operations ($89.4 billion): Incremental pay for
            deployed troops, subsistence, cost of mobilizing Reserve
            Component personnel, and temporary wartime end-strength
            allowances.
             Force Protection ($12.0 billion): Body armor,
            protection equipment, and armored vehicles to protect forces--
            including the rapid deployment and sustainment of MRAPs and M-
            ATVs.
             IED Defeat ($3.3 billion): To develop, procure, and
            field measures to defeat improvised explosive devices
            threatening U.S. and coalition forces.
             Military Intelligence ($7.0 billion): To enhance U.S.
            intelligence capabilities and operations including ISR.
             Afghan Security Forces ($11.6 billion): To build and
            support military and police forces capable of conducting
            independent operations and providing for Afghanistan's long-
            term security.
             Iraqi Security Forces ($2.0 billion): To continue
            building and sustaining Iraq's efforts to defend its people and
            protect its institutions as the United States removes troops by
            the end of 2011.
             Coalition Support ($2.0 billion): Reimbursements and
            logistical sustainment for key cooperating nations supporting
            U.S. military operations.
             Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) ($1.3
            billion): To provide flexible funds for commanders in the field
            to finance urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs.
             Reconstitution/Reset ($21.3 billion): To fund the
            replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment and
            munitions that have been consumed, destroyed, or damaged due to
            ongoing combat operations. This request includes funding to
            procure one Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to replace the combat
            loss of an F-15.
             Military Construction ($1.2 billion): To expand the
            logistical backbone and operational foundation for our fighting
            forces.
             Temporary Military End Strength ($2.6 billion): To
            support temporary end-strength increases in the Army and Navy
            for ongoing military operations.
             Non-DOD Classified Programs ($5.6 billion): To fund
            non-DOD classified activities that support ongoing military
            operations--the President's counterterrorism strategy in
            Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the drawdown of U.S. forces in
            Iraq.
    Iraq Force Levels
        This request supports the President's goal of a responsible
    drawdown of U.S. forces and transfer to full Iraqi responsibility and
    control. Troop levels in Iraq are projected to decrease to 50,000 by
    August 31, 2010. Further reductions will occur in accordance with the
    U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The projected forces levels would be:

             Six Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs) by August
            31, 2010.
             Six AABs for the first part of fiscal year 2011,
            decreasing to approximately four AABs (approximately 35,000
            personnel) in Iraq by the end of fiscal year 2011.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you and members of this committee for
    all that you have done to support our troops and their families. I
    believe the choices made and priorities set in these budget requests
    reflect America's commitment to see that our forces have the tools they
    need to prevail in the wars we are in while making the investments
    necessary to prepare for threats on or beyond the horizon.
        Thank you.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Admiral Mullen.

    STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
                                OF STAFF

        Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished
    members of this committee: Thank you for the chance to appear
    before you and discuss the state of our military as well as the
    President's fiscal year 2011 defense budget submission. I also
    thank you all for the extraordinary support you provide each
    and every day to our men and women in uniform as well as their
    families. That they are well equipped, well trained, well paid,
    and enjoy the finest medical care anywhere in the world is
    testament in no small part to your dedication and stewardship.
        I've seen many of you in the war zone, in hospitals, and at
    bases all over this country. So have our troops. They know you
    care. Just as critically, they know their fellow citizens care.
    All they want right now is guidance on the mission before them
    and the tools to accomplish it. That's why I'm here today to
    speak on their behalf about the guidance they are getting from
    this Department and to secure your continued support for the
    tools we want to give them.
        Secretary Gates has already walked you through the major
    components of the QDR and the President's fiscal year 2011
    defense budget submission, both of which, when combined with
    the new BMDR and our OCOs fund request, build upon the reform
    effort of last year and represent as comprehensive a look at
    the state of our military as I have seen in my experience.
        I will not endeavor to repeat his excellent summation and I
    would ask you to accept without further comment my endorsement
    of the findings contained in each of these documents. Let me
    leave you rather with three overarching things to consider as
    you prepare to discuss these issues today and as you prepare to
    debate this budget request in the future.
        First, there is a real sense of urgency here. We have well
    over 200,000 troops deployed in harm's way right now and that
    number includes only those in Operations Iraqi Freedom and
    Enduring Freedom. Tens of thousands more are meeting our
    security commitments elsewhere around the globe and many of
    those missions are no less dangerous, certainly no less
    significant.
        I am sure you have stayed abreast of our relief efforts in
    Haiti, where more than 20,000 of your soldiers, sailors,
    marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen are pitching in feverishly
    to help alleviate the suffering of the Haitian people. It is
    truly an interagency and international mission and these troops
    are blending in beautifully, doing what is required, where and
    when it is required, to support the Government of Haiti, USAID,
    and the U.N. mission there.
        We also continue to do what is required to win the wars we
    fight, and the one that needs fighting the most right now is in
    Afghanistan. You've seen the reports and you know the
    situation. The Taliban have a growing influence in most of
    Afghanistan's provinces and the border area between that
    country and Pakistan remains the epicenter of global terrorism.
    You no doubt followed with great interest the development of
    the President's strategy to deal with this threat, a strategy
    that in my view rightly makes the Afghan people the center of
    gravity and the defeat of al Qaeda the primary goal.
        We have already moved over 4,500 troops to Afghanistan and
    expect that about 18,000 of the President's December 1st
    commitment will be there by late spring. The remainder of the
    30,000 will arrive as rapidly as possible over the summer and
    early fall, making a major contribution to reversing the
    Taliban momentum in 2010. Indeed, by the middle of this year
    Afghanistan will surpass Iraq for the first time since 2003 as
    the location with the most deployed American forces.
        Right now, the Taliban believe they're willing. Eighteen
    months from now, if we've executed our strategy, we'll know
    they aren't, and they'll know that they can't.
        Getting there will demand discipline and hard work. It will
    require ever more cooperation with Pakistan, and it will most
    assuredly demand more sacrifice and more bloodshed. But the
    stakes are far too high for failure. That's why we're asking
    you to fully fund our fiscal year 2010 supplemental and the
    fiscal year 2011 OCOs request. It's why we want a 6 percent
    increase for Special Operations Command. It's why we need your
    support to develop and field a Next Generation Ground Combat
    Vehicle, to allow us to grow two more Army combat aviation
    brigades, and to continue rotary wing production, including
    nearly $3 billion for the V-22 Osprey program.
        In keeping with the Secretary's strong emphasis on ISR, an
    emphasis more than justified by our long experience in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, we are asking for more capability in unmanned
    aircraft and ground-based collection systems, including nearly
    $3 billion to double the procurement rate of the MQ-9 Reaper by
    fiscal year 2012.
        Our future security is greatly imperiled if we do not win
    the wars we are in. As the QDR makes clear, the outcome of
    today's conflicts will shape the global security environment
    for decades to come. I'm very comfortable that we can and will
    finish well in Iraq, remaining on pace, despite a spate of
    recent violence to draw down American forces to roughly 50,000,
    ending our combat mission there, and transitioning to an advise
    and assist role.
        But without your continued support, we will not be able to
    show the meaningful progress in Afghanistan that the Commander
    in Chief has ordered, the American people expect, and the
    Afghan people so desperately need. This is no mission of mercy.
    This is the place from which we were attacked in 2001, the
    place from which all--from which al Qaeda still plots and
    plans. The security of a great nation, ours and theirs, rests
    not on sentiment or good intentions, but on what ought to be a
    cold and unfeeling appraisal of self-interest and an equally
    cold and unfeeling pursuit of the tools to protect that
    interest, ours and theirs.
        That leads me to the second thing I'd like to consider:
    proper balance. Winning our current wars means investment in
    our hard-won irregular warfare expertise, a core competency
    that should be institutionalized and supported in the coming
    years, and we are certainly moving in that direction. But we
    must also maintain conventional advantages. We still face
    traditional threats from regional powers who possess robust
    regular and in some cases nuclear capabilities. These cannot be
    ignored. The freedom to conduct operations in support of joint,
    allied, and coalition efforts, assuring access and projecting
    combat power, can only be preserved through enduring
    warfighting competencies.
        In the air, this means sufficient strike aircraft and
    munitions capable of assuring air superiority. At sea, it means
    having enough ships and enough sailors to stay engaged globally
    and keep the sea lanes open. On the ground, it means
    accelerating the modernization of our combat brigades and
    regiments. On the whole, it means never having to fight a fair
    fight.
        Thus, the President's budget request will buy us another 42
    F-35s. It will maintain a healthy bomber industrial base and it
    will fund development of a prompt global strike system, as well
    as efforts to upgrade our B-2s and B-52s.
        For ship construction, the spending plan totals some $18
    billion, procuring 10 new ships in 2011, including 2 Arleigh
    Burke destroyers, 2 Virginia-class submarines, 2 Littoral
    Combat Ships (LCSs), and a brand-new Amphibious Assault Ship.
    It puts the Navy on track to maintain aircraft carrier
    production on a 5-year build cycle, resulting in a long-term
    force structure of 10 carriers by 2040.
        Our budget request also seeks $10 billion for ballistic
    missile defense programs, including $8.4 billion for the
    Missile Defense Agency, and it develops ample resources to
    improving our cyber defense capabilities. Again, it's about
    balance, it's about deterring and winning the big and the small
    wars, the conventional and the unconventional--two challenges,
    one military.
        But where balance is probably most needed is in the
    programs and policies concerning our most important resource,
    our people. That's my final point. This QDR and this budget
    builds upon superb support you and DOD have provided our troops
    and their families for much of the last 8 years. Stretched and
    strained by nearly constant combat, many of them on their
    fifth, sixth, and seventh deployments, our men and women are
    without question, and almost inexplicably, the most resilient
    and battle-ready in our history.
        On the one hand, we keep turning away potential recruits,
    so good is our retention and so attractive our career
    opportunities. On the other hand, we keep seeing an alarming
    rise in suicides, mental problems, prescription drug
    addictions, and mental health problems. Deborah and I meet
    regularly with young troops and their spouses and, though proud
    of the difference they know they are making, they are tired.
    Quite frankly, many of them are worried about their futures,
    their children.
        So you will see in this budget nearly $9 billion for family
    support and advocacy programs. You will see child care and
    youth programs increased by $87 million over last year, and you
    will see a boost in warfighter and family services, to include
    counseling, to the tune of $37 million. Military spouse
    employment will get a $2 million plus-up and we will increase
    the budget to $2.2 billion for wounded, ill, and injured
    members. In fact, the health care funding level for fiscal year
    2011 is projected to provide high-quality care for 9.5 million
    eligible beneficiaries.
        Lastly, we are pushing to dramatically increase the number
    of mental health professionals on staff and advance our
    research in TBIs and post-traumatic stress. We know the strain
    of frequent deployments causes many problems, but we won't yet
    fully understand how--we don't yet fully understand how or to
    what extent.
        So even as we work hard to increase dwell time, aided in
    part by the additional temporary end strength you approved last
    year for the Army, we will work equally hard to decrease the
    stress of modern military service. Indeed, I believe over time
    when these wars are behind us we will need to look closely at
    the competing fiscal pressures that will dominate discussions
    of proper end strength and weapons systems. A force well suited
    for long-term challenges and not necessarily married to any
    current force planning construct will be vital to our national
    security.
        Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, thank you again
    for your time and for the longstanding support of this
    committee to the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces. They
    and their families are the best I have ever seen. On their
    behalf, I stand ready to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
                Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
    committee; it is my privilege to report on the posture of the U.S.
    Armed Forces.
        I begin by thanking you for your support of our service men and
    women, their families, and the communities that do so much to help
    them. We can never repay them for their sacrifices, but we can support
    their efforts. As leaders, we necessarily debate the best course of
    action to secure our Nation in a dangerous world. But our service men
    and women do not hesitate. When the decision is made, they go where
    they are needed most, where dangers must be confronted and adversaries
    defeated. I'm humbled as I visit them around the world, defending our
    Nation in very trying conditions. They care deeply for this country,
    and they care most that they have the Nation's clear backing. The
    support of Congress and the American people remain essential to their
    strength and resolve. I am grateful for your unwavering recognition of
    the service of our forces and their families.
        Today's Armed Forces are battle-hardened, capable, and ready to
    accomplish the Nation's missions. They are the most combat experienced
    yet most compassionate force we have ever fielded, and continue to
    learn and adapt in ways that are truly remarkable. They are the best I
    have ever seen. I thank the committee for taking the time to understand
    the stresses, strains and concerns of our servicemembers. Your
    continuing legislative support of our Armed Forces makes all the
    difference.
                                key developments
        Over this past year, our wartime focus has shifted to Afghanistan
    and Pakistan. As I have testified before Congress on many occasions,
    the threats to our national security from al Qaeda and affiliated
    movements based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remain real and
    persistent. We require a stable and reasonably secure Afghanistan and
    Pakistan--inhospitable to al Qaeda's senior leadership, capable of self
    defense against internal extremist threats, and contributors to
    regional stability.
        Our increasing focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan confirmed the
    border region to be al Qaeda's center of gravity. It also showed the
    situation to be more dire than previously understood. The Afghan-
    Taliban's post-2005 resurgence produced a widespread paramilitary,
    shadow government and extra-judicial presence in a majority of
    Afghanistan's 34 provinces. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (the Pakistan
    Taliban) showed itself to be a bold and audacious enemy of the
    Pakistani people, ruthlessly seizing control of Swat in late spring.
    Nine Pakistani military operations against the Taliban that began last
    March have reversed their territorial gains. Throughout this year, we
    have constantly and carefully reviewed our objectives for the region. I
    concur completely with the President's strategy, and believe we have
    now matched the right strategy with the required resources. The
    decision to authorize an additional 21,500 American forces into
    Afghanistan in early 2009, followed by the President's commitment of
    additional forces in December set conditions to reverse Afghan-Taliban
    gains. It will also enable the Government of Afghanistan to build the
    security and governance necessary to eliminate the insurgency as a
    threat. Setbacks marked much of 2009, but with a new leadership team,
    appropriate resources, improved organization, and a better strategy, we
    are confident of success against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Success will
    not come easily or swiftly, but we will succeed. The hardest work to
    achieve our regional aims remains ahead of us, especially in 2010-2011.
        Al Qaeda's central leadership has suffered significant losses over
    the past several years. Though its operational capacity has declined,
    al Qaeda's senior leaders remain committed to catastrophic terrorist
    attacks against the United States and our allies. Actions in the
    Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, in Iraq, and elsewhere have met with
    marked success. That said, al Qaeda successfully sought new approaches
    to plot attacks. The disrupted terrorist plot against New York City was
    planned in al Qaeda's Pakistani safe haven and intercepted in Denver.
    The failed Christmas Day bombing attempt over Detroit was crafted by
    and ordered from those in Yemen's growing safe havens. Both incidents
    demonstrate the resolve of al Qaeda and its ever-evolving strategy.
    While the danger remains real, like-minded governments and people
    around the world--especially those in the Muslim community--
    increasingly reject al Qaeda, its affiliates and what they stand for.
    Most want a brighter future for their children and grandchildren, not
    al Qaeda's endless war and intolerance. They see daily evidence that al
    Qaeda and its affiliates deliberately target and kill thousands of
    innocent Muslims in cold blood. They know al Qaeda continues a ruthless
    and deadly campaign against the people of Islam in Iraq, Pakistan,
    Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Indonesia, Turkey, and elsewhere.
    Continued progress against violent extremism will require enhanced, but
    prudent, partnerships with key governments and movements, including
    consistent efforts to counter al Qaeda's bankrupt message.
        The behavior of the Iranian Government is of grave and growing
    concern. Tehran's leadership remains on a trajectory to acquire a
    nuclear capability, in defiance of international demands and despite
    widespread condemnation. Iran's government continues to support
    international terrorist organizations, and pursues a coercive and
    confrontational foreign policy. These efforts exist alongside some of
    the greatest internal unrest Iran has faced since the Islamic
    Revolution in 1979. These events and conditions risk further
    destabilizing an already unstable region.
        The unpredictable has also galvanized our military, requiring a
    significant force commitment in Haiti, making it one of our most
    significant humanitarian missions in history. As of January 31, nearly
    20,000 American troops are in direct support of the Government of
    Haiti, the United Nations, USAID and supporting American and
    international aid agencies. From port openings, to security and
    distribution of supplies, U.S. Southern Command's military Joint Task
    Force has delivered over 1.6 million bottles of water, 67,000 meals and
    56,000 pieces of medical supplies to Haiti's earthquake survivors.
    Military medical teams also supplement the U.S. Health and Human
    Services, and have already have seen over 2,800 patients and performed
    nearly 100 surgeries. We are committed to this assistance until the
    situation on the ground stabilizes.
        Several policy initiatives over the past year have provided the
    military with new direction. President Obama's June speech in Cairo set
    the stage for a new relationship between the United States and more
    than a billion people across the Muslim world. Throughout 2009, this
    Congress supported the rapid and necessary deployment of more forces to
    Afghanistan. We also began negotiations with Russia for a Strategic
    Arms Reduction Treaty follow-on treaty, which will reduce nuclear
    weapons stockpiles while maintaining U.S. deterrence. As mandated by
    Congress, we have reviewed current and future threats and developed
    appropriate strategies in the Quadrennial Defense Review. We look
    forward to working with Congress to forge a common understanding of the
    threats our Nation faces, and how best to counter them.
        Key alliances continue to matter greatly in our global security
    efforts. Our North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and other
    non-NATO partners expanded support in Afghanistan over the past year.
    We now work there with 43 countries and nearly 40,000 international
    troops. Although the world avoided a widespread economic depression in
    2009, many of our partners were financially challenged and may spend
    less on combined security and stabilization efforts. Other critical
    allies faced internal considerations that could adversely affect U.S.
    and regional security interests if not managed closely. Our close
    alliance with Japan, in particular, suffered strain around basing
    rights in Okinawa. I am confident we will work through these and other
    issues, but it is a reminder that even our strongest allies cannot be
    taken for granted.
        Against this backdrop, the strategic priorities for the military
    remain unchanged from my last annual testimony before Congress:
    defending our interests in the broader Middle East and South/Central
    Asia; ensuring the health of the Force, and balancing global strategic
    risk. With your ongoing help and support, we continue to address each
    of these priorities.
     defend our interests in the broader middle east and south/central asia
        The Broader Middle East and South/Central Asia, remains the most
    dangerous region of the world.
        Our main effort within the region has changed. The Government of
    Iraq is taking firm control of its own security. We have shifted our
    priority to Afghanistan and Pakistan, long under-resourced in many
    ways. That shift in focus will take the movement of some quarter of a
    million troops and their equipment in and out of the Central Command
    theater over the next several months. This is a herculean logistics
    effort. By the middle of 2010, Afghanistan will surpass Iraq for the
    first time since 2003 as our location with the most deployed American
    forces.
        Despite this surge, the security situation in both Afghanistan and
    Pakistan remains serious. The Afghan-Taliban have established shadow
    governments--featuring parallel judicial, taxation and local security/
    intimidation systems--in a clear majority of Afghanistan's 34
    provinces. Attacks by the Taliban have become far more numerous and
    more sophisticated. We are now establishing conditions--with military
    forces and expanded civilian agency presence--to reverse the Taliban's
    momentum. Yet we face both a resilient Taliban insurgency and an Afghan
    public skeptical of their government's good will, capacity, and
    capability.
        As of late January 2010, we have already moved nearly 4,500 troops,
    and expect that 18,000 of the President's December 1st commitment will
    be in country by late spring. The remainder of the 30,000 will arrive
    as rapidly as possible over the summer and early fall, making a major
    contribution to reversing Taliban momentum in 2010.
        These forces are joining some 68,000 U.S. forces and more than
    30,000 coalition forces already in Afghanistan--all of which have
    undertaken a fundamental shift in how they are being employed across
    the country. Our troops are now focused on protecting key population
    centers--separating them from the intimidation and influence of the
    Taliban. Simultaneously, they are training and partnering with Afghan
    security forces to enable Afghans to assume lead security for their own
    country as soon as possible. The next 12-18 months must be the time to
    reverse insurgent momentum and assess partnership progress.
        The brave men and women we charge to implement this fundamental
    shift in Afghanistan security strategy need the strong support of this
    Congress. We need your assistance in key areas like funding for Afghan
    National Security Forces, who will ultimately bring about success and
    security. In the short term, the Commander's Emergency Response Program
    is needed to adequately protect the population, and enhanced special
    construction authorities and equipment procurement accounts will be
    critical to putting enough force on the ground to make a difference.
        The border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the epicenter
    of global terrorism. This is where al Qaeda plans terrorist attacks
    against the United States and our partners--and from where the Taliban
    leadership targets coalition troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan's ongoing
    military operations against extremists in these areas are critical to
    preventing al Qaeda and associated groups from gaining ground.
        In Pakistan, the extremist threat, a fractious political system,
    economic weakness and longstanding tensions with India continue to
    threaten stability. We are working to rebuild our relationship with
    Pakistan and re-establish trust lost between our two countries. We aim
    to demonstrate to Pakistan--in both our words and our actions--that we
    desire a long-term relationship. Our recent concerns with Pakistan's
    approach to U.S. visa requests is further testimony to the challenges
    of the relationship; and, it will affect increased capacity for
    counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, to include support for
    development projects. Nevertheless, the Pakistani Counterinsurgency
    Fund and the Coalition Support Funds earmarked for Pakistan remain
    essential components of our support to this critical ally. I urge you
    to continue them. Enhanced contact and engagement between Pakistan and
    the United States is a critical component of a maturing, long-term
    partnership. Thus, we are focusing on expanded military education
    exchange programs, joint training opportunities and especially Foreign
    Military Sales and Financing. The budget before you requests additional
    funds for these critical partnership endeavors.
        South Asian security tensions and political dynamics significantly
    impact our objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The longstanding
    animosity and mistrust between Pakistan and India complicates regional
    efforts. Yet India and Pakistan must both be our partners for the long
    term. Bilateral military relationships are an essential component in a
    wide array of cooperative activities. We must recognize this and
    address it as part of our policy. While we acknowledge the sovereign
    right of India and Pakistan to pursue their own foreign policies, we
    must demonstrate our desire for continued and long-term partnership
    with each, and offer our help to improve confidence and understanding
    between them in a manner that builds long-term stability across the
    wider region of South Asia. As part of our long-term regional approach,
    we should welcome all steps these important nations take to regenerate
    their `back channel' process on Kashmir.
        While Afghanistan and Pakistan remain the critical terrain, we must
    remain vigilant in denying al Qaeda unfettered physical safe havens
    elsewhere across the Broader Middle East and South Asia, including
    Northern and Eastern Africa. These efforts will not require tens of
    thousands of American troops. Instead, we can work quietly and
    persistently with regional allies and Coalition partners to deny al
    Qaeda territory from which to plot, train, and project global terror
    operations. Similarly, we continue to undertake collaborative,
    supporting efforts with like-minded governments across the broader
    Middle East. We now work to help the Yemeni government build the
    information base and the military capacity necessary to combat the al
    Qaeda threat within its borders. We applaud Yemeni efforts to confront
    al Qaeda operatives, and continue to offer Sana'a the support necessary
    to achieve this aim. We have worked with the concerned neighbors of
    Somalia to contain the worst aims and objectives of the Islamic Courts
    Union and al Shabaab. This must continue. In these areas--as well as
    others including Indonesia and the Philippines--our military engages
    with willing partners in a manner detrimental to al Qaeda's
    aspirations. We undertake these partnerships in conjunction with those
    from American intelligence, diplomatic and economic organizations. I
    must stress that in today's environment, training and equipping partner
    security forces to defend and protect their own territory and coastal
    waters is a core military mission. We appreciate Congress' continuing
    support for these important undertakings.
        The Iranian Government continues to be a destabilizing force in the
    region. The government's strategic intent appears unchanged--its
    leaders continue on a course to eventually develop and deploy nuclear
    weapons. This outcome could spark a regional arms race or worse. It
    will be profoundly destabilizing to the region, with far-ranging
    consequences that we cannot fully predict. Tehran also continues to
    provide a range of support to militant proxy organizations, including
    Hamas and Hezbollah, fomenting instability outside its borders. Its
    increasingly reckless nuclear and foreign policy agenda is now playing
    out against the backdrop of a shrinking economy and a growing rift
    between the Iranian Government and its people. I remain convinced that
    exhaustive--and if necessary coercive--diplomacy with Iran remains the
    preferred path to prevent these grave outcomes. To this extent, the
    Joint Chiefs, combatant commanders, and I support all efforts to steer
    the Government of Iran off of its hazardous course. However, as with
    any potential threats to our national security, we will have military
    options ready for the President, should he call for them.
        Iraq continues to progress, although more is needed. U.S.
    partnership with Iraqi security forces has been fundamental to this
    progress since 2005. Last year's level of violence was the lowest since
    2003, testifying to the success of our approach. Al Qaeda is still
    present and has carried out a few large-scale attacks. But, Iraqi
    Security Forces and government leaders responded to them in a
    restrained, professional, and relatively apolitical manner. Upcoming
    elections will not be free from tension. However, I believe Iraqis are
    now more concerned about economic growth than domestic security
    threats. Credible elections are important. Foreign direct investment
    and expanded political engagement by other regional powers are also
    important as more diplomatic and economic progress will spotlight
    Iraq's return to the world stage as a sovereign nation.
        U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) remains on track to draw down American
    forces to roughly 50,000 and end our combat mission by August 31, 2010.
    Our security partnership will then shift to training, advising, and
    supporting Iraqi security forces. More broadly, the U.S. military will
    transition from a supported to a supporting effort in Iraq as we
    normalize relations. The State Department will increasingly be the face
    of U.S. efforts in Iraq. The U.S. military will strongly support their
    leadership. We request continuing congressional support for the Iraqi
    Forces Fund and for the Equipment Transfer Provision of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. These transfers are a
    critical component America's transition to a limited, but reliable
    partner in Iraq's assumption of a responsible and Baghdad-led security
    future.
                              health of the force
        Our Nation's security is founded upon a well-trained, well-equipped
    All-Volunteer Force. We must care for our people and their families,
    reset and reconstitute our weapon systems, and take on new initiatives
    that increase wartime effectiveness. Care for our People
        Our service men and women, their families, and their communities
    are the bedrock of our Armed Forces. Their health, resilience, and
    well-being are at the heart of every decision I make. Frankly,
    investing in our people remains the single greatest guarantee of a
    strong military. Competitive pay, selective bonuses, expanded access to
    mental health care, continued health benefits for tens of thousands of
    our Wounded Warriors--those with seen and unseen wounds--and their
    families are critical to this investment.
        Our military families and communities continue to play a unique and
    growing role in our national security fabric, one not seen in more than
    a generation. They support us and sustain us in ways we do not yet
    fully understand. They deserve the admiration and support of a grateful
    nation. I applaud the efforts of this body's Military Family Caucus,
    and encourage significant attention and funding for their programs of
    greatest concern. My conversations with spouses and children around the
    world tell me these concerns center on caring for those affected by
    these wars, child care, education, health and deployment issues.
        We remain competitive in attracting the country's best talent. For
    the first time in the history of the All-Volunteer Force, the Active
    Duty, Guard, and Reserve components all exceeded annual recruiting
    goals for 2009. This success was reflected in the quality of our
    recruits as well as their numbers. Ninety-six percent of our accessions
    earned a high school diploma or better. Each Service also met or
    exceeded its 2009 retention goals. Our ability to recruit and retain
    underscores the fact that this is the best military I have seen in my
    42-year career. While competitive pay is a critical factor in this
    success, it does not stand alone. Other critical `people' programs
    supported by Congress--like the new GI Bill, adequate housing, access
    to quality schooling for military children, and attractive family
    support centers--come together to make the harsh burdens of military
    life acceptable.
        We must not forget the challenges that this excellent All-Volunteer
    Force faces every day. More than 8 years of wartime operations have
    come at a cost. Most Army brigade combat teams are preparing for their
    fourth major deployment since September 11, with some of them preparing
    for their fifth--unprecedented in our history. The Marines Corps is in
    the same boat--their deployments are shorter but more frequent, and
    their pace is grueling. Our people spend less time at home, and this
    shorter dwell time between deployments does not allow for respite or
    for training along the entire spectrum of military operations. Our
    irregular warfare expertise--hard won over the last 8 years--has come
    at a price. Conventional warfighting skills have atrophied and will
    require attention. Yet this overdue attention will have to wait. The
    gains we anticipate from the coming draw-down in Iraq will be absorbed
    by our necessary efforts in Afghanistan for at least 2 more years.
    Resetting the force requires significant effort and sustained
    commitment now and post-conflict. We will continue to rely heavily on
    our Navy and our Air Force.
        Dwell time--the ratio of time deployed to time home--remains a
    concern, and one we must manage closely this year and into 2011. Dwell
    time for the Army is at 1:1.2 and the Marine Corps is slightly better
    at 1:1.5. We will not see significant dwell time improvements across
    all Services until 2012. Deployment rates for Special Operations Forces
    (SOF) and other low-density, high-demand specialties also remain very
    high. While our force is strong and resilient, these trends cannot
    continue indefinitely.
        The challenges remain significant, but are manageable thanks to the
    support of Congress for increased end-strengths in the Army and Marine
    Corps. We are only now starting to feel the positive impact from these
    2007-authorized increases in the baseline force--stabilizing deployment
    rates and dwell times. Coupled with the additional temporary increase
    of 22,000 troops within the Army, Congressional support for our wartime
    military manning needs has been critical.
        The stresses of protracted war extend beyond the deployments
    themselves. Our number of dead and wounded continues to rise, as does
    the strain on their families and their communities. Other social costs
    of war--divorce, domestic violence, depression, and post-traumatic
    stress syndrome--are unacceptably high and continue to increase. We
    have much more to do.
        Suicide deserves special attention. Despite our best efforts, 2009
    witnessed a record level of suicides, with increases in both the Active
    and Reserve components. We have not begun to study suicides among
    family members and dependents. While there is not one cause for
    increased servicemember suicides, we know enough to be certain that
    better prevention training programs for leadership, for at-risk
    servicemembers, and robust funding and attention toward sober study of
    the problem are absolutely necessary.
        We should provide a lifetime of support to our veterans. I urge you
    to continue funding the programs supporting those that have sacrificed
    so much, including those aimed to reduce veteran homelessness and that
    focus on rural health care options. The demands on our active and
    veterans care services will continue to grow, and require the attention
    found in this budget. Yet we must conceive of Wounded Warrior Support
    in a manner that goes beyond the traditional institutions. Public,
    private, and individual sources of help represent a ``sea of goodwill''
    towards our veterans. Our focus must be more on commitment than
    compensation; and more attuned to transition and ability than upon
    disability. Our veterans want the opportunity to continue to serve, and
    we should enable that opportunity.
    Reset and Reconstitute
        My concerns about the health of our force go beyond our people. Our
    systems and capabilities are under extraordinary stress as well. The
    high pace of operations is consuming our capital equipment much faster
    than programmed. The Air Force and Navy have been essentially
    performing non-stop, global operations for 19 years, since Operation
    Desert Storm. The Army and Marine Corps have had the majority of their
    combat forces and equipment in the combat theater of operations for
    nearly 6 years. The unforgiving terrain of Afghanistan and Iraq causes
    extensive wear and tear, especially on our ground vehicles,
    helicopters, and supporting gear.
        The demands of the current fight mean we must increase capacity in
    several areas, including rotary wing, ISR, electronic warfare and SOF.
    We sustain necessary rotary wing capacity through the addition of two
    active Army Combat Aviation Brigades, continued production of the tilt-
    rotor V-22, as well as our helicopter force, and a seventh SOF
    helicopter company. I support this budget's rebalancing in favor of
    more commercial airborne ISR capabilities for combatant commanders.
    This budget continues increasing the number of unmanned combat air
    patrols, coupled with the ability to fully exploit the intelligence
    coming from these platforms. We should expand current technologies to
    fill electronic warfare shortfalls and develop next-generation
    technologies for manned and unmanned aircraft.
    New initiatives
        Too many of our processes and programs remain geared to a peacetime
    clock, but several new initiatives focused on supporting our war
    efforts show promise. I strongly support the Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands
    program and ongoing initiatives that increase the number and skill of
    our civil affairs and psychological operations personnel. I also
    strongly back the USAF's initiative to use light aircraft for enhanced
    capacity building of key allies and partners for light mobility and
    attack.
        Our current acquisition process remains too unwieldy and
    unresponsive. Adding 20,000 more acquisition experts by 2015 will help,
    as will increasing the rigor and efficiency of our internal processes.
    Stability in our programs, comprehensive design reviews, better cost
    estimates, more mature technology and increased competition will make
    the process more responsive. Once fielded, our systems are the finest
    in the world, because of the experienced and capable program managers
    and engineers building them. We need more of managers and engineers,
    and they need better support and leadership.
        Finally, I am growing concerned about our defense industrial base,
    particularly in ship building and space. As fiscal pressures increase,
    our ability to build future weapon systems will be impacted by
    decreasing modernization budgets as well as mergers and acquisitions.
    We properly focus now on near-term reset requirements. However, we may
    face an eroding ability to produce and support advanced technology
    systems. Left unchecked, this trend would impact war fighting
    readiness. The Department, our industry leaders, and Congress need to
    begin considering how to equip and sustain the military we require
    after our contemporary wars come to an end.
                        balancing global strategic risk
        Balancing global risk requires sustained attention to resetting the
    force. It also means making prudent investments to meet the challenges
    of an increasingly complex and challenging worldwide security
    environment. As the President recently noted, it is the United States
    that has helped underwrite global security with the blood of our
    citizens and the strength of our military. America's interests are
    global, and our military must secure these interests. Where possible,
    we will act first to prevent or deter conflict. When necessary, we will
    defeat our enemies. Whenever able, we will work in concert with our
    many allies and partners.
        For many decades, but especially since 1989, U.S. conventional
    overmatch has guaranteed our security and prosperity, as well as that
    of our many allies and partners. We have helped protect expanding
    global commons, including into space and cyberspace. We have seen the
    likelihood of conventional war between states drop. We have used the
    tools designed for war not against human adversaries, but instead to
    support humanitarian operations. Most recently in Haiti, but elsewhere
    over the past 60 years, the military's unmatched capacity to transport
    goods and services have provided relief in the face of tragic natural
    disasters. In short, many nations have benefited from an
    extraordinarily capable and ready U.S. military, even as we have
    defended our own interests.
        That capability must continue to span the full range of military
    operations. But in this post-Cold War era--one without a military near-
    peer competitor--we should not be surprised that adversaries will
    choose asymmetric means to confront us. They will seek to use both old
    and new technology in innovative ways to defeat our advantages.
    Terrorism will remain the primary tactic of choice for actors to
    conduct warfare ``on the cheap''. Both state and non-state actors will
    seek weapons of mass destruction through proliferation. Increasingly,
    states will attempt to deny our ability to operate in key regions,
    through the development and proliferation of ballistic missile systems,
    or by exploiting space and cyberspace. Taken together, these are
    diverse threats that require a broad set of means.
        Winning our current wars means investment in our hard won irregular
    warfare expertise. That core competency must be institutionalized and
    supported in the coming years. However, we must also stay balanced and
    maintain our advantage in the conventional arena. In the air, this
    advantage requires sufficient strike aircraft and munitions capable of
    assuring air superiority and holding difficult targets at risk. At sea,
    we require sustained presence and capacity supported by a robust ship-
    building program. On the ground, we must accelerate the modernization
    of our combat brigades and regiments. Without question, these are
    expensive undertakings. But our present security challenges demand
    them.
        Countering weapons of mass destruction means investing in new
    research, securing nuclear materials, and preparing a layered defense.
    Improving our ability to neutralize and render safe critical targets is
    vital. We maintain the ability to respond to their use against our
    citizens. But while improving responsiveness to the use of such weapons
    is critical, more important is to counter their proliferation and deter
    their use. I advocate diverse investments in nuclear forensics and
    expanding our biological threat program, in addition to continuing
    investment in the highly effective counterproliferation programs that
    are central to our success in this critical endeavor. These relatively
    small funds will have a disproportionately positive impact on our
    security.
        The ability of potential adversaries to challenge our freedom of
    movement and the peaceful use of the global commons--sea, air, space,
    and cyberspace--has grown in recent years. Anti access-technologies and
    capabilities are proliferating, which could prevent us from deterring
    conflict in some regions. We must preserve our ability to gain access
    even when political, geographical or operational factors try to deny us
    the same. This requires funding for improvements to our missile defense
    capabilities, expanded long range and prompt global strike systems, and
    hardened forward bases. Threats in cyberspace are increasing faster
    than our ability to adequately defend against them. Cyber attacks can
    cripple critical infrastructure, impose significant costs, and
    undermine operational capabilities. Meanwhile, space-based systems
    critical to our global awareness and connectivity are aging and have
    proven vulnerable. A determined enemy could degrade existing space
    systems, significantly impacting our strategic intelligence and warning
    capabilities, as well as global positioning and communication. I ask
    Congress to support the stand-up of U.S. Cyber-Command and provide
    funding for cyber and space initiatives to redress these growing and
    worrisome vulnerabilities.
        Rising states may present a strategic challenge, but also offer
    opportunities. China's economic strength, military capability, and
    global influence continue to grow. While our military relations remain
    generally constructive, we seek much more openness and transparency
    from China regarding the growth of its conventional and nuclear defense
    forces. We also believe that China can--and should--accept greater
    responsibility for and partner more willingly to safeguard the global
    trade and investment infrastructure. This requires Beijing to work more
    collaboratively when determining fair access to transportation
    corridors and natural resources. China also should demonstrate greater
    clarity in its military investments. Absent a more forthcoming China in
    these critical areas, we must prudently consider known Chinese
    capabilities, in addition to stated intentions. As we seek to establish
    a continuous military-to-military dialogue to reconcile uncertainties
    and gain trust, we will pursue common interests in agreed upon areas
    such as counter-piracy, counter-proliferation, search and rescue,
    humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. As a Pacific Rim nation
    with longstanding interests throughout Asia, we will continue to play a
    vigorous regional role.
        Our present dialogue with Russia is multi-faceted. It acknowledges
    points of contention as well as opportunities to ``reset'' our
    relationship on a positive trajectory. We seek Moscow's cooperation in
    reducing the number and role of strategic nuclear weapons. These
    discussions have been constructive, and negotiations are near fruition.
    I believe the resulting treaty will benefit the United States, Russia,
    and the world. Moscow has also helped us establish a supplemental
    logistics distribution line into Afghanistan. Russia also helped our
    diplomats pressure Iran, and we look toward Moscow to do even more in
    this process. On the other hand, Russia continues to reassert a special
    sphere of influence with its neighbors. The Russian military is
    simultaneously modernizing its strategic forces and many conventional
    forces. Our obligations under Article V of NATO remain clear and we
    remain poised to fulfill them.
        North Korea's autocratic government makes it a persistent wild card
    in Asia. Today, Pyongyang continues to pursue intercontinental
    ballistic missile technologies, develop nuclear weapons, and export
    weapons in contravention to international law and treaties. It also
    maintains an unfortunate and threatening posture toward our ally South
    Korea, and an unhelpful disposition toward our ally Japan.
        Of course, we can best defend our interests and maintain global
    order when we partner with like-minded nations. By forging close
    military-to-military relations with an expanding number of nations--
    providing training, equipment, advice, and education--we increase the
    number of states that are interested and capable of partnering with us.
    While tending to long-term allies, we should also cultivate our
    relationships with other liked-minded powers around the world. Making a
    small investment now will pay dividends in reducing our security burden
    and global risk.
        We need full funding of Defense Theater Security Cooperation
    programs, International Military Education and Training activities, and
    the many security assistance programs managed by the Department of
    State. Preventative strategies require providing foreign partners with
    the capacity to promote stability and counterterrorism. With your help,
    we have made considerable strides in adapting our tools for security
    force assistance, but more is needed. I urge your complete support of
    the Global Train and Equip initiatives (under section 1206
    authorities), the future evolution of the Global Stability fund (under
    section 1207 authorities), as well as funding for special operations to
    combat terrorism (under section 1208 authorities).
        The majority of threats facing the United States require integrated
    interagency and international initiatives. Supporting interagency
    cooperation programs, to include expanding the number of exchanges
    between the Department of Defense and other Executive Agencies, will
    improve interagency capacity to meet future security threats as well.
    Please urge your colleagues who oversee the Department of State to
    fully fund Secretary Clinton's requests. I ask Congress to promote
    legislation that increases the expeditionary capacity of non-military
    Executive Agencies. Our future security concerns require a whole-of-
    government effort, not just a military one.
                                   conclusion
        This past year witnessed significant achievements by America's men
    and women in uniform. Their efforts and sacrifices--as part of a
    learning and adapting organization--have sustained us through more than
    8 years of continuous war. Thanks to them we are in position to finish
    well in Iraq. Thanks to them, we can begin to turn the corner in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. In conjunction with our many partner nations,
    they've provided humanitarian relief assistance to millions, helped
    contain a threatening H1N1 pandemic, expanded support to national law
    enforcement for enhanced border security, and disrupted terrorist
    sanctuaries world-wide. Thanks to them, we have a global presence
    protecting our national security and prosperity.
        The demands of the present remain high, and our military role in
    national security remains substantial. This will continue for the
    foreseeable future. Yet as I have testified before this body in past
    appearances, the military serves America best when we support, rather
    than lead U.S. foreign policy.
        On behalf of all men and women under arms, I wish to thank Congress
    for your unwavering support for our troops in the field, their families
    at home, and our efforts to rebalance and reform the force to assure
    that we win the wars we are in and are poised to win those we are most
    likely to face in the future.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
        We'll try a 5-minute first round here. Mr. Secretary, the
    change in our Afghanistan policy is what drove the requirement,
    apparently, for a supplemental funding request this year. Is it
    your goal to avoid a supplemental funding request for fiscal
    year 2011?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, it is. Our hope would be that
    the OCO's approach is a preferred way to do this. As we saw
    this time unforeseen circumstances brought us up here to defend
    another supplemental. I think I'm on the record last year as
    expressing the hope we wouldn't be doing another one of those,
    but here I am. But it is our intent that for fiscal year 2011
    the OCO fund would be sufficient.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, the President, you, the
    Admiral, and others have all pointed out that a principal
    mission for our forces in Afghanistan is the training up of the
    Afghan security forces to take over responsibility for the
    security of their country. Yet our NATO allies are 90 percent
    short of meeting their commitment for trainers for the Afghan
    troops. These are the ones who are in that early 8-week basic
    training period, not out in the field, where I think we're
    doing very well and we are meeting what the goals are in terms
    of kind of on-the-job training, partnering unit with unit.
        But back to that basic training, the NATO non-U.S.
    countries committed 2,000 trainers. They've produced 200. Now,
    what are we going to do to get General Caldwell those
    additional trainers which are so essential?
        Secretary Gates. My understanding is that General
    Caldwell's short about 1700 trainers. Our hope is that with the
    additional commitments of somewhere between 7 and 10,000
    additional forces by our NATO and other partners, that out of
    that number we can more than fill the requirement for trainers.
    Certainly Admiral Stavridis, General Petraeus, and General
    McChrystal have been talking to them about this. But I might
    add, Admiral Mullen just met with the heads of the European
    militaries last week. I might ask him for a comment.
        Chairman Levin. If you could just briefly say, are you
    confident that the need is going to be filled, because it's
    just totally unacceptable that the commitment is made and then
    not kept?
        Admiral Mullen. We all agree it's unacceptable. It's the
    top priority there and it's a top priority from this meeting
    with some 28-plus CHODs to go back to their capitals and meet.
    There's a conference later this month to focus specifically on
    that.
        Chairman Levin. The ``CHOD,'' what does that mean?
        Admiral Mullen. Sorry. My counterparts, the chiefs of
    defense for these countries in NATO.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Secretary Gates, the BMDR report says that, in contrast to
    the practice over the last decade of fielding missile defense
    capabilities that were still being developed, that the
    administration ``will take a different approach, best described
    as fly before you buy, which will result in a posture based on
    proven technology in order to improve reliability, confidence,
    and cost control.'' That's a welcome change.
        My question: Will we be deploying ground-based interceptors
    (GBIs) that have not been tested and demonstrated?
        Secretary Gates. We have deployed GBIs at Fort Greely. We
    have a very aggressive test program that has been successful.
    We believe that those interceptors give us the capability to
    deal with launches from either Iran or North Korea, a small-
    scale threat.
        The fact is we are continuing--in addition to robustly
    funding increases in theater level missile defense, we will
    also continue to spend. We have in this budget $1.35 billion to
    continue the development and test program for the GBIs, both
    the three-stage that are now deployed and the two-stage that we
    were going to deploy in Poland.
        So I think we, both for homeland security and for our
    allies and our troops in the field, have very strong programs
    going forward.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe that the
    Christmas bomber should be tried in civilian court or by
    military commission?
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I would defer to the Attorney
    General and the proper jurisdiction for such people.
        Senator McCain. When you fill out your form when we confirm
    you for the U.S. Senate, you sign that you would give your
    honest and candid opinion in response to questions. Do you want
    to give me an opinion?
        Secretary Gates. My honest opinion is that I think that the
    Attorney General is in the best position to judge where these
    people get tried. After all, we have----
        Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
        It was reported in the media that ``When President Obama
    convened his national security team on January 5 to discuss the
    Christmas incident, the decision to charge the suspect in
    Federal court was specifically discussed and again nobody
    present raised any objection to it. In fact, Secretary of
    Defense Robert Gates made the point that even if Abdulmutallab
    had been transferred to military custody, it is unlikely that
    any more information could have been gleaned from him since
    enhanced interrogation techniques have been banned by the
    administration.''
        Is that a true depiction of your view?
        Secretary Gates. What I actually said was that I believed
    that a team of highly experienced Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI) and other interrogators could be as
    effective in interrogating the prisoner as anyone operating
    under the Military Field Manual.
        Senator McCain. So that's a direct contradiction to the
    Michael Isikoff piece in Newsweek magazine. So you agree with
    Director of National Intelligence Blair when he said ``We did
    not invoke the HIG''--that's the trained interrogators--``in
    this case. We would have.'' Do you agree with Admiral Blair?
        Secretary Gates. I think we did not have the high-level
    interrogators there that we now have protocols in place to
    ensure would be present in such a situation.
        Senator McCain. Do you agree that they should have been
    there?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. Do you believe it was possible in 50
    minutes to exhaust the possibilities for getting all of the
    information that was needed from the Christmas bomber?
        Secretary Gates. I'm just not in a position to know the
    answer to that, Senator.
        Senator McCain. I see. Again, media reports state that you
    thought so.
        Is it your view that, absent enhanced interrogation
    techniques, that the Intelligence Community provides no value
    in the interrogation of a terrorist?
        Secretary Gates. No, I don't believe that.
        Senator McCain. Well, I thank you.
        On the issue of the F-35, to what do you attribute the fact
    that you were not appraised of all the major problems
    associated with the program last summer, when it seems to me
    you needed to be?
        Secretary Gates. We had not yet undertaken at that time,
    Senator McCain, an independent cost analysis that is now one of
    the requirements under the Acquisition Reform Act that you
    passed last year. Our Under Secretary for Acquisition launched
    such an exercise. He himself spent about 2 weeks full-time
    looking into the F-35 program, and as a result of the
    independent cost estimate and his own investigation came to the
    conclusions that the program required restructuring.
        Senator McCain. Can you give us, either verbally or in
    writing, the delays and cost overruns that we now expect?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I would say that, in terms of
    delivery, even with the restructured program, we still expect
    the training squadron to be at Eglin in 2011. We expect initial
    operational capability (IOC) for the Marine Corps in 2012, for
    the Air Force in 2013, and the Navy in 2014, the fourth quarter
    of 2014.
        There will be fewer delivered aircrafts at IOC. That's the
    result of reducing the production ramp, as has been recommended
    to deal with some of the issues associated with that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        At the time of this hearing, the Department knew that the Joint
    Strike Fighter Program would need additional funding of approximately
    $3 billion to complete the System Development and Demonstration (SDD)
    phase. Additionally, SDD would require an additional 13 months to
    complete. Procurement costs were also estimated to be higher. The
    Department reduced the procurement ramp to align with recommendations
    from an Independent Manufacturing Review Team, to pay for the increased
    development costs and to reduce concurrency.
        Since the hearing, the Department has benefited, and will continue
    to benefit, from insight gained during the Nunn McCurdy review, and the
    subsequent bottoms up Technical Baseline Review of the development and
    test program. The Department is utilizing all of the independent
    reviews, analysis, and actual program performance from the past year to
    develop the fiscal year 2012 budget, and document the cost and schedule
    for the program going forward. That work is still ongoing.

        Senator McCain. Well, in conclusion, given your
    responsibilities to the men and women who are serving in the
    military in the defense of this Nation, I hope you will come to
    a conclusion as to how enemy combatants should be treated as
    far as their trials are concerned and our ability to assure the
    American people that they will not be returning to the
    battlefield, and whether they should be tried and incarcerated
    in the United States rather than Guantanamo. I look forward to
    your views on that because I view that clearly in your area of
    responsibility, not the Attorney General, who has obviously
    botched this one very, very badly.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to add my welcome to Secretary Gates and Admiral
    Mullen for being here to discuss the 2011 defense budget, and
    to thank you for your service and the service of all the men
    and women in our Armed Forces, and I also welcome Mr. Hale.
        Secretary Gates, you have mentioned that beyond winning the
    wars themselves, the treatment of our wounded and ill is your
    highest priority. As a result of today's continuing conflicts,
    the psychological effects of those conflicts within the ranks
    of the U.S. military have never been more profound. Secretary
    Gates, what do we need to improve our treatment of mental
    illness and how does this budget address that?
        Secretary Gates. Well, as Admiral Mullen mentioned in his
    opening statement, there is over $1 billion in this budget for
    the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and TBI.
    All of the Services have very extensive programs for dealing
    with psychological problems. All of the leadership, I think,
    have weighed in on this very heavily.
        I would say that there are two problems that we still are
    wrestling with. One is the shortage of mental health care
    providers. We are--and frankly, we've discovered it's a
    national shortage; it's not just a shortage in the military,
    because we're all over the country trying to hire these people.
    We've hired a lot, I think something on the order of 1,000 or
    1,400 over the last 18 months or so. But we still need more.
        The second is still overcoming the stigma of seeking help,
    of getting not only our soldiers, but also their families, to
    get the psychological help that is available to them.
        But let me ask Admiral Mullen if he'd like to add a word or
    two.
        Admiral Mullen. I think the Secretary has captured the two
    big issues. We dramatically increased the number of mental
    health providers in recent years, but we're still short. We're
    just beginning to understand the real impacts of TBI.
        Then the other piece I would ask for your help on is, how
    do we work with other committees here? Secretary Gates and
    Secretary Shinseki have certainly set the standard shoulder-to-
    shoulder that both DOD and VA need to work this together,
    because many of these young people transition certainly from
    DOD to VA. I really believe it has to be a three-part team that
    includes communities throughout the country.
        So how do we ensure that those who sacrifice so much
    receive the care across this entire continuum, and we
    understand their needs, which change over time. It's those who
    suffer greatly in uniform, but it's also families who have been
    under great stress. So that would be the third piece that I
    would add to the Secretary's answer.
        Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, IEDs remain the number one
    cause of casualties in Afghanistan. The administration recently
    announced the deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. troops to
    Afghanistan. As a result, more of our men and women will be
    exposed and vulnerable to this deadly form of attack. The Joint
    IED Defeat Organization was created to lead and coordinate all
    DOD actions in support of combatant commanders' efforts to
    defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. Mr. Secretary,
    what is your assessment of DOD's efforts in protecting our
    troops against IEDs, and if improvement is needed what can be
    done to improve those results?
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I think that we have a number of
    very forward-leaning efforts to try and deal with the challenge
    of IEDs. My concern a few months ago was that these efforts
    were not adequately integrated and put together in a way that
    we derive maximum benefit from the efforts that we had under
    way.
        I asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics, as well as General Jay Paxton, to
    co-chair an effort, a short-term effort, to see what more we
    could do, both in terms of better structure for how we deal
    with this problem, but also if there were some specific areas
    where additional attention was needed. They've brought to me
    some recommendations in terms of significant enhancements for
    long-term full-motion video so we can watch roads, we can watch
    the areas around our encampments, aerostats, a variety of other
    technical solutions.
        The commanders have increased the requirement for the MRAP
    vehicles, particularly the ATVs, so there is an additional
    requirement that actually is already funded or is taken care of
    in this budget for about 10,000 more MRAPs. 6,600 of those will
    be the all-terrain version that are designed especially for
    Afghanistan to protect our troops.
        So we have a number of efforts. There were identified
    problems, such as the labs we had--we had a lot of labs working
    the IED problem in Iraq. We hadn't put as many labs into
    Afghanistan yet. So this is a dynamic process and I would say
    to you we have a number of initiatives under way to improve the
    strong work that was already being done, because this is
    absolutely the worst killer and maimer of our troops and we
    are, with your support, sparing no expense and no effort to try
    and reduce those casualties.
        The MRAPs have made a huge difference, but the enemy is a
    thinking enemy and they change their tactics and their
    structures.
        Another thing we're doing is, a very high percentage in
    Afghanistan of these IEDs are made from the fertilizer
    component ammonium nitrate, which is illegal in Afghanistan. So
    now we're establishing an effort to try and hit the smuggling
    networks that bring this ammonium nitrate in to be used for
    these IEDs.
        But we have a lot of different efforts going on, and if the
    committee is interested I'd be happy to have Secretary Carter
    and General Paxton come up and brief on their endeavors.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me start off by saying I disagree with Senator McCain
    on his statements on the C-17 and I disagree with him on the
    statements, his past statements on the F-22. It concerns me
    that we keep hearing, well, this is something that the military
    doesn't want, they didn't ask for, and all that. Then I go over
    there and that's not their attitude at all. They have needs
    over there. Our lift capacity is in dire straits. We're still
    using those old, beat-up C-130E models that we keep losing
    engines on. We actually lost two engines on one not too long
    ago when I was over there.
        The state of the art is still there in the C-17s and I
    think that we are going to have to do some surgery on that and
    some of the other things on this budget when the Senate Armed
    Services Committee gets together.
        Now, on the F-22, just yesterday we read about the T-50
    that they're coming out with, a fifth generation that the
    Russians have. I'm not at all as confident as everyone else is
    that our F-35s are going to be on line when we say; as Senator
    McCain just said, that we have cost overruns, we have problems
    that just recently have surfaced. I'm concerned about this.
        I guess if we're down to 187 F-22s, and I think out of that
    what, only 120 are actually combat-ready and used for combat.
    Yet, as I read this article on the T-50, they're starting to
    crank these things out and India, is talking about buying 200
    of them. Who knows who else is going to be buying them?
        So I am concerned about it. I guess it goes beyond just
    that. I look at the Senate Armed Services Committee. On these
    two vehicles I mentioned, the F-22 and the C-17--in Oklahoma I
    don't have a dog in that fight. We don't have any parochial
    interest there. But it's the capability that we're going to
    need.
        I look and I see and remember so well testimony that our
    defense for 100 years averaged 5.7 percent of gross domestic
    products (GDP). It's now down to 3.7 and, as you project it by
    the figures that I'm getting, it will go down to 3 percent by
    2019. This is what really concerns me, is we're just not doing
    the job that we need to be doing to defend America, if you
    consider that the number one function of government, which I
    happen to.
        I do agree with Senator McCain on his concern over pulling
    the rug out from under Eastern Europe on the third site. I read
    something yesterday that Russia doesn't want us to have any
    ground-based capability. I don't know.
        I guess the first thing I would ask you, Mr. Secretary--and
    I should know this, but I don't: If we're talking about having
    the capability of the SM-3 and getting that working, where
    would it be used? Is this Aegis or where would we have this
    capability?
        Secretary Gates. In the initial phase it would be based on
    ships, but we have money in the budget for a land-based
    Standard missile. So it would be deployed in Europe and perhaps
    elsewhere, depending on the agreements that we reached with
    other countries.
        Senator Inhofe. You don't think you'll have a little bit of
    a problem, in that we negotiated, and we went over there, with
    the Czech Republic for its radar and then Poland for the site
    of the GBI, and then changed our minds? Isn't that going to
    create a little bit of a problem, or have you already initiated
    any kind of a discussion with any of the European countries to
    have that capability there?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, and in fact we've reached agreement
    with the Poles already to move advanced Patriots into Poland.
    So I think, frankly, we----
        Senator Inhofe. That's a different capability than getting
    up, what we were talking about before.
        Secretary Gates. As I say, I don't think we'll have a
    problem.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. All right.
        Well, Army modernization, I've been concerned about that.
    :ook at our capability on the Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) cannon.
    First we were going to have a Crusader and then that was axed
    by the Republicans, by President Bush, right when we were in
    negotiations, I might add, in the Senate Armed Services
    Committee on putting together a program. So I'm concerned about
    that.
        Now we do have the Paladin Integrated Management program
    and that's good on the Paladin. But I have to tell you, that's
    the same technology they had when I was in the U.S. Army, so I
    am concerned about that.
        I'm concerned that General Casey and General Chiarelli both
    have stated many times that we're burning up equipment as soon
    as they can be procured. Yet the Army procurement funding
    decreased in this budget by $31 billion from fiscal year 2008
    to fiscal year 2010. Is that a good idea?
        Secretary Gates. I think a good part of that was for the
    Army's Future Combat Vehicle and we're restructuring that
    program, and I think that you'll see a significant increase
    when the Army moves into production of that vehicle.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, I hope that's the case and I hope
    that we're here to be able to see that as a reality.
        My time has expired, but just one last question if I could,
    Mr. Chairman. On the section 1206, 1207, 1208, and so forth,
    the 1206 is fine. I appreciate the fact that we have enhanced
    that program and some of the others. The 1207, that's the
    civilian-to-civilian. That now is going to go back to the State
    Department, and one of the original reasons we wanted to have
    this in the DOD was the timing, so that when a decision is made
    we'll be able to get it done. Do you think that's a good move
    or do you think we should try to reverse that in terms of the
    1207 in the train and equip program to bring it back the way it
    is today?
        Secretary Gates. First of all, Senator, I want to thank you
    for your support and your help on section 1206, 1207, and 1208.
    But I think when I testified here last year the plan was to
    begin transferring the 1207 money to the State Department. I
    think the plan you have in front of you essentially simply
    accelerates that process.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me add my appreciation to you and your families for
    your distinguished service.
        I've long been an advocate for benchmarks or measures of
    progress and I think we need to continue to do so objectively
    so we can gauge our efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. I
    know this administration, as well as our NATO allies, are
    committed to objective benchmarks for measurement and we've
    done so with past strategies, and we've all talked about this
    so many times, most recently in December, about both
    Afghanistan and Pakistan.
        During that hearing in December, it was noted that measures
    of progress were being used and evaluated. I thought at that
    time those benchmarks would be forthcoming to our committee,
    but at least I have yet to see them. It seems to me that one of
    the most important times to inform the process is at the very
    onset of any change, and as this mission changes course, the
    way in which we measure efforts will change as well.
        Have comprehensive and final benchmarks or measures of
    progress been developed to reflect this new strategy, and if so
    when will these be made to the committee? Secretary Gates?
        Secretary Gates. I think they have and I frankly thought
    that they had already been provided to the committee, and I'll
    check on it after the hearing.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In accordance with section 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations
    Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), the President submitted to Congress on
    September 24, 2009, a statement of the objectives of U.S. policy with
    respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the metrics to be utilized to
    assess progress toward achieving such objectives. Section 1117 also
    includes a reporting requirement to provide Congress an assessment of
    the progress of U.S. Government efforts in achieving the objectives of
    U.S. policy by March 30, 2010, and every 180 days thereafter using the
    metrics submitted in September 2009. The President will submit the
    first report in Mach 2010 and semi-annually thereafter.

        Senator Ben Nelson. Okay, thank you.
        Could you talk a little bit about some of the areas of
    measurement that would be in these measures of progress?
        Secretary Gates. I think a couple that are pretty obvious
    are are the Afghans meeting their recruitment goals for the
    Afghan national security forces, are they meeting their goals
    in terms of limiting attrition, how many--are they meeting the
    number of units being fielded that are in the plan, are they--
    there are benchmarks associated with their training. So I think
    those are the kinds of things, at least with respect to the
    security forces, that we're talking about.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Do we have anything that we might
    relate to our measures of progress with respect to our
    particular efforts?
        Secretary Gates. I think in some respects the President has
    made his expectations pretty clear. He has some clear
    expectations and is benchmarking us on how fast we can get
    30,000 troops into Afghanistan and watching that carefully. I
    think he has clearly set a marker in terms of beginning to
    transfer security authority to the Afghans beginning in July
    2011, so that's a clear benchmark that must be met. So I think
    we do have some.
        Another for us is the number of civilians we're getting
    into Afghanistan from the State Department, USAID, and other
    agencies.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Are you working with the State
    Department jointly in that effort? Because I know they've set
    some measures of progress of their own.
        Secretary Gates. Absolutely. This is as integrated an
    effort as I've ever seen the U.S. Government undertake.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        I'd like to talk to you just a second about our contractor
    conversion efforts. You announced in the spring of 2009 that
    DOD would scale back the role of contractors in support
    services. Quite honestly, my sense is that for too many years
    we were outsourcing too much with perhaps too little emphasis
    on why and whether it was justified.
        But regardless of the makeup, outsourcing or insourcing has
    to make sense and be oriented towards the best utilization of
    resources, both money and people. Is there in place a strategic
    plan for the right mix of contractor, government, civilian, and
    military personnel, and what are we doing to execute such a
    plan?
        Secretary Gates. First of all, our goal is to take the
    number of contractors in DOD as a percentage of the workforce
    back to where it was prior to September 11, which would mean
    taking it from 39 percent to 26 percent. The plan--first of
    all, I think one of the effects of what we have seen in Iraq in
    particular has been the revival of acquisition in a couple of
    the Services where that as a career field had withered. I think
    this is particularly true in the Army, where a number of
    measures, including the allocation of general officer positions
    and so on, to revive that career field as an attractive career
    field. Some other Services have done better.
        I think that Under Secretary Carter has a clear idea of the
    right mix between contractors and civilians. But I think that
    the first place we need to look is that we probably shouldn't
    have contractors evaluating contractors. So I think that's the
    first area as we make these conversions, which I might add are
    on track 1 year in.
        Senator Ben Nelson. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Just to implement the point Senator Nelson
    made, I believe in this year's budget proposal you are
    proposing maybe 10,000 contractor jobs be eliminated and
    changed over to employees of DOD. I don't know the exact
    number, but is that not true? It's in the budget?
        Secretary Gates. Our goal is 20,000, to increase the number
    of acquisition professionals from 127,000 to 147,000. 10,000 of
    those will be the conversion of contractor jobs to civil
    service jobs. Another 10,000 will be new hires.
        Chairman Levin. That's in this year's budget, is that
    correct?
        Secretary Gates. That's correct.
        Chairman Levin. I just wanted to clarify that point.
        Admiral Mullen. 20,000 total is over 2010 to 2014, Senator
    Levin.
        Chairman Levin. Over 4 years.
        Admiral Mullen. Right.
        Chairman Levin. How many in this year's budget?
        Admiral Mullen. The total is about 6,000. That would
    include acquisition and everything else. I'll have to get you
    the number specifically for acquisition.
        Chairman Levin. To clarify the benchmarks point made by
    Senator Nelson, which he's been very persistent on, to the
    benefit of everybody in the Nation, the only thing that we've
    received from DOD is a draft set of benchmarks and they were
    classified. So he is right, we have not received benchmarks,
    although we were promised them. We need both the benchmarks,
    but also in an unclassified way.
        Secretary Gates. The benchmarks that I was talking about
    were interagency benchmarks that had been agreed, and those
    were the ones that I thought had been delivered and I'll pursue
    after the hearing.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In accordance with section 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations
    Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), the President submitted to Congress on
    September 24, 2009, a statement of the objectives of U.S. policy with
    respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the metrics to be utilized to
    assess progress toward achieving such objectives. Section 1117 also
    includes a reporting requirement to provide Congress an assessment of
    the progress of U.S. Government efforts in achieving the objectives of
    U.S. policy by March 30, 2010, and every 180 days thereafter using the
    metrics submitted in September 2009. The President will submit the
    first report in march 2010 and semi-annually thereafter.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your good
    leadership. You're an excellent chairman. We do have a lot on
    the agenda today: talking about the defense budget, the QDR,
    two wars, the BMDR, DADT, terrorist trials. I guess I would
    just say, I don't think we can do it all justice today. I hope
    we'll have more hearings as we go forward. Some of them, we
    need the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs.
        Just briefly, Mr. Secretary, on the Christmas Day bomber. I
    saw your former colleague, Attorney General Mukasey, this
    morning on the television pointing out that, yes, they tried
    Moussaui in Federal court, he tried the case as a Federal judge
    at the time, but he pled guilty and the sentencing phase took a
    year. He said it was made into a circus. He pointed out that
    Guantanamo was created for the purpose of these kind of trials.
        When a person like the Christmas Day bomber leaves Yemen
    armed with a bomb from al Qaeda, on directions of al Qaeda, and
    flies into the United States, I suggest he's an unlawful enemy
    combatant and perfectly suited for detention and trial, if need
    be a trial, in military custody. I think DOD needs to know
    about those things because the intelligence that could be
    gathered from a prolonged interrogation by people knowledgeable
    in Yemen could have added greatly to this.
        Now he's been advised he has a right to a lawyer. He's no
    longer going to cooperate or talk. He's going to be entitled to
    a speedy trial. There are a lot of problems with that.
        So I just hope you will be alert to that as it goes by. I
    think the military has a real responsibility.
        I just would briefly say that I've come to understand and
    feel more strongly about the concern Senator McCain has about
    setting an absolute date for beginning to leave in 2011. We'll
    hardly have our troops in place by then, the surge in place by
    then. We see things like President Karzai beginning to talk to
    the Taliban. It makes you wonder if he's looking beyond our
    departure date. I worry about that.
        Mr. Secretary, you talked about the supplemental. I've been
    baffled a bit by that. It seems to me that when you're in a
    war, a supplemental is an appropriate way to handle funding for
    that. To try to force into the baseline budget funding
    specifically for these two operations, with a couple hundred
    thousand troops deployed, is not a good policy. Why do you feel
    like we should do this only within the baseline budget?
        Secretary Gates. I absolutely do not believe we should do
    it within the baseline budget. I think that the purpose of
    providing the OCOs funding budget is I think that it's actually
    in response to considerable pressure from Congress for
    greater----
        Senator Sessions. I know you have gotten pressure from
    Congress on that.
        Secretary Gates.--greater predictability----
        Senator Sessions. But not out of me.
        Secretary Gates.--greater predictability about how much is
    going to be spent in these wars, and so that those budgets can
    be considered within the framework of the normal consideration
    of the budget. So I think that it's certainly not a part of the
    base budget, but it is provided in advance in a way that gives
    Congress the opportunity to review it in the same way it
    reviews the rest of the budget.
        Senator Sessions. I'm not sure. It seems we should be able
    to review the supplemental as well. But I guess in a way you're
    creating a discrete funding program that we could review, and
    maybe that would be acceptable.
        Admiral Mullen, with regard to our procurement of major
    weapons systems, I know that DOD has focused on life cycle
    costs, and I guess you would agree that things such as fuel and
    maintenance are important factors to evaluate if you're going
    to evaluate the cost of a weapons system over a period of
    years?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. I know we did that on the tanker
    aircraft. In fact, fuel and that sort of things are counted as
    evaluating that aircraft. Should that be applied to a
    procurement program like the LCS; the cost of fuel over its
    lifetime, should that be accounted for?
        Admiral Mullen. I've long been concerned about life cycle
    costs. Senator Sessions, I think you know that long before now.
    The Secretary pointed out, and I think very importantly, in his
    opening statement that the programs that he cut last year
    actually had some life cycle value focused on about $330
    billion. As far as what's in a request for proposal (RFP) and
    what it's going to be focused on, that's something that I
    really can't comment on----
        Senator Sessions. I don't know. We have an RFP in the LCS
    that I'm told does not have any factor for fuel costs.
        Admiral Mullen. You know more about it than I do. I haven't
    seen it.
        Senator Sessions. If that's so, would you be willing to
    look at it and ask questions if that's a wise decision?
        Admiral Mullen. Again, as I said, for a long time I've been
    concerned about life cycle costs. Actually, I think one of the
    weaknesses of the acquisition system is typically that the line
    is not involved in it. The uniformed side is not involved in
    that. So I'm not involved from that point of view and would
    under actually no circumstances see an RFP or look at its
    evaluation criteria in what I'm doing right now.
        Senator Sessions. I would think it would be your ultimate
    responsibility as part of the procurement of the Department to
    see that at least basic requirements are being met. I think I
    hear you say that life cycle costs, which certainly would
    include fuel, should be a factor in evaluation of the bids or
    the proposals. Wouldn't it?
        Admiral Mullen. I've said life cycle costs are an important
    factor and have been for a long time.
        Senator Sessions. We'll have to follow up on that.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Thank you very much.
        Senator Udall is next.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here with us
    today.
        Secretary Gates, we have a proposal from the President
    which I fully support, to freeze nondiscretionary spending for
    nondefense programs in fiscal year 2011. I think we're going to
    face tighter budgets in future years and we may have the
    potential need to trip Pentagon budgets as well. Could you talk
    about how you're posturing DOD to be able to react to that
    potential?
        Secretary Gates. First of all, I think that the situation
    out there in the world doesn't change, and the world is
    becoming more complex and I would say more dangerous, rather
    than less so. I think that as people think about where we are,
    there are many reasons for the deficit and DOD certainly spends
    a lot of money. But if you look at where DOD is today, it's
    very much within historical norms in terms of both GDP and a
    percentage of the budget in terms of what we're spending.
        That said, I would tell you that if DOD received
    significant reductions in its budget, that we would have to
    sacrifice force structure. We cannot do it any other way. So
    the result of that would be a reduction in military capability
    and a reduction in our flexibility.
        Senator Udall. If I might, let me thank you for your focus
    on acquisition reform. I want to associate myself with Senator
    McCain's remarks and I hope that this committee will continue
    to support you as you make some tough decisions, so that we
    extract every penny of value from every dollar that we spend. I
    just want to acknowledge the important work you've done there.
        Let me turn to Afghanistan. Senator Sessions expressed some
    concern, but I would like to comment that you make peace with
    your enemies, not with your friends. I've been interested,
    Admiral Mullen, in the re-integration of the low-level Taliban
    proposals that have been forthcoming. There was a recent
    conference I believe in the United Kingdom some significant
    monies pledged.
        Could you comment on those plans to the extent that you're
    comfortable?
        Admiral Mullen. The reintegration piece is clearly an
    important piece of this, and every commander feels that way.
    Very specifically, the reintegration is really bringing those
    who are literally the fighters who are against us right now,
    bringing them into the fold. In fact, General McChrystal is
    very focused on that. We are in the execution of this strategy
    which includes that, so getting everybody on the same page for
    exactly what it means and how rapidly it happens or doesn't
    happen is where we are very much at the beginning. But we think
    it is an important part. There is no view at this point that is
    a panacea, because we just don't see that many at this point.
        The other term that is used that I think it's very
    important to understand is the reconciliation piece, which is a
    term that is focused on I would call the senior leadership of
    the Taliban or the senior leadership of the enemy--much more
    complex, and President Karzai has made it clear that he wants
    to get on this path. But again, it's at the beginning. We're at
    the beginning of that process.
        I think we have to be clear about the terms and what they
    mean, and also look at a realistic pace in terms of both
    expectations and actually what's happening. In that regard,
    we're just at the beginning.
        Senator Udall. Let me turn to Iraq. We have elections
    looming. There is some increased violence. Do you still believe
    we're on schedule to redeploy, as General Odierno has put in
    place?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I do. We were very focused on the
    elections in early March. It's the elections after which we
    start coming down fairly dramatically, 104,000 today is what we
    have on the ground. We will come down to approximately 50,000
    by August. In that timeframe, another big issue is they will be
    standing up a government and it will take them several months
    to do that, sort of the summertime, to stand up this newly-
    elected government.
        So it's a great time of transition. General Odierno, and
    Ambassador Hill on the civilian side, are very focused on all
    aspects of that. But right now, overall the indicators are
    positive.
        Senator Udall. I see that my time's expired. I want to
    thank you again for your leadership and for this comprehensive
    set of statements today and for a budget, Secretary Gates, that
    I think clearly leads us in the right direction.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for your outstanding
    service and for appearing today and responding to some of our
    questions.
        Secretary Gates, I wanted to take up with you the
    recommendations in the budget and the QDR. Going back to the
    2006 QDR, there was a recommendation in there to develop a
    follow-on bomber. You've made it clear that you support the
    development of a new bomber. Last April you opted not to pursue
    a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until
    you had a better understanding of the need, the requirement,
    and the technology.
        As part of the effort to better understand the requirement
    for a new bomber, I also understand that you stood up a Tiger
    Team to do an in-depth study of long-range strike in the new
    QDR. In reading the new QDR on page 33, it looks, however, like
    you have still not made a decision to move forward with the new
    bomber program, but instead have commissioned yet another
    study.
        My question is, what conclusions were drawn by the Tiger
    Team regarding the development of a new bomber and are those
    conclusions available to us, at least in writing for the
    record?
        Secretary Gates. I will get you an answer for the record on
    that, Senator. But there is, I think, $1.7 billion in the
    budget for next generation bomber and long-range strike. I
    think one of the issues that we're still wrestling with is what
    kind of a bomber would we be looking for. Do we want a stand-
    off bomber? Do we want an attack bomber? Do we want a manned
    bomber or an unmanned bomber? Or do we want variations, where
    you could have a platform that could serve both purposes?
        I think we still have a lot of life left in the B-52s, as
    old as they are, and there is modernization money for both them
    and the B-2s in the budget. We're talking about a bomber that
    would probably not appear into the force until the late 1920s.
    So we're just trying to figure out, looking ahead a generation,
    what the right configuration for that would be.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Tiger Team to which you refer was formed to study the need,
    requirement, and technology for a follow-on Air Force long-range strike
    aircraft. That team completed its work last November. The team was
    supportive of pursuing a new long-range strike aircraft, but recognized
    that additional analysis was needed to explore options for reducing
    overall program costs and determining fielding timelines. Another
    conclusion of the Tiger Team's study was that the Department should
    sustain the industrial base for early-stage design work and
    technologies for a new long-range strike aircraft while the Department
    continues to study all options. Through the Quadrennial Defense Review,
    the Department provided industrial base funding for fiscal year 2011
    and fiscal year 2012 to prepare for the potential start of a new long-
    range strike program. I decided that a more in-depth analysis was
    required in order to evaluate and compare the capabilities of new long-
    range strike aircraft designs in the context of the full range of
    supporting capabilities that would be relevant to the operation of such
    aircraft in future combat scenarios.
        The Department is now undertaking a follow-on effort to examine the
    appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities; upgrades to legacy
    bombers; manned and unmanned options; stand-off and penetrating
    requirements; new and improved cruise missiles; electronic warfare
    improvements; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance demands;
    and conventional prompt global strike options. The goal of this ongoing
    assessment is to ensure that the Department fully understands how all
    potential long-range strike options and supporting capabilities could
    contribute to U.S. security goals before committing to one or more
    major development programs. I anticipate that our analysis will inform
    decisions shaping the Department's fiscal year 2012 budget submission.

        Senator Thune. The 2006 QDR had suggested, I think,
    fielding a new bomber by 2018. I understand the concerns that
    you raised about what type of bomber that might be. But I
    guess--and by the way, I think the $1.7 billion is a multi-year
    number. Isn't that like a 4-year number?
        Secretary Gates. Yes.
        Senator Thune. But why is it necessary to have another
    study? I mean, the thing has been studied and studied and
    studied and studied, on whether or not we want to move forward
    on developing a follow-on bomber. When would you expect that
    study to be completed?
        Secretary Gates. I'll have to get an answer for the record.
    I think what the studies up to now have been is whether, and
    now the study is what.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Tiger Team that was initially formed to study the need,
    requirements, and technology for a follow-on Air Force bomber completed
    its work last November. The team's conclusions were supportive of
    pursuing a new bomber, but the team recognized that additional analysis
    was needed to explore options for reducing overall program costs and
    determining fielding timelines. Additionally, I decided that a more in-
    depth analysis of how a new bomber might compare with other long-range
    strike options was required. Consequently, the Department chartered
    another study to look at a broader array of long-range strike options
    to include upgrades to legacy bombers; manned and unmanned options for
    future bombers; stand-off and penetrating options for future bombers;
    new and improved cruise missiles; and conventional prompt global strike
    options, such as land-based and sea-based conventional ballistic
    missiles. The new study will also examine the support requirements for
    various long-range strike options, such as electronic warfare,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and secure, high-data-
    rate communications.
        The rationale for this new study is to ensure the Department fully
    understands how all potential long-range strike options could
    contribute to U.S. goals before we spend billions of dollars. I
    anticipate that results from the new study will be available in time to
    support the formation of the fiscal year 2012 budget.
        Another of the initial Tiger Team's conclusions was that the
    Department should sustain the industrial base for early-stage design
    work and technologies for a new bomber while the Department continues
    to study long-range strike options. Consequently, the Department
    provided industrial base funding for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year
    2012 to prepare for a potential start for a new bomber program.

        Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, with regard to the FYDP
    force structure that's set out in the new QDR for the Air
    Force, the QDR proposes five long-range strike wings with up to
    96 primary mission aircraft. According to the latest Air Force
    Almanac, the Air Force has 153 bomber aircraft and I understand
    some of these aircraft are dedicated to testing, but over 50
    aircraft for testing seems like a lot. Do you plan on retiring
    any bomber aircraft in the near future? I guess a follow-on
    question would be, what are the assumptions underlying what
    appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator, I'm not aware that we are,
    although I certainly would want to check for the record to make
    sure that I have that right. But there certainly hasn't been
    any big discussion about the retirement of bombers.
        If I could speak just briefly to the other issue you raise,
    one of the things that's happened in the last two budgets in my
    view is it's put us on a pace and with a view that evolves.
    Some of the previous laydowns, the 2006 QDR, were from my
    perspective incredibly aggressive. So part of my answer to the
    question of why we're still doing this is because this is a
    very difficult problem. We want to get it right, and it has a
    huge impact, quite frankly, on the future of the Air Force
    because of the capability requirement.
        I think what you're seeing is a process that is led by
    Secretary Gates to move us through a deliberative process that
    really focuses on getting it right for the future. As he
    indicated, the previous study was as to whether or not, and now
    we look to the future as what it should be. I'm supportive of
    that. These are tough decisions we absolutely want to get
    right.
        Senator Thune. Could you for the record get to that
    question, though, of the number? Of the 96 bombers that are
    assumed in the five wings, with 153 Air Force bombers, a
    certain number of them allocated to testing, but that does seem
    like a significant number, whether or not there is any plan to
    retire and any assumptions underlying that, what would appear
    to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers.
        Admiral Mullen. We'll supply it for the record, but I think
    a lot of them may be for training. I think you're talking about
    primary aircraft, coded aircraft. There are a number designated
    for training and testing, as you say. But we'll supply the
    details for the record.
        Senator Thune. That would be great.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I'd like to get
    for the record a response to a question dealing with the START
    Treaty in sort of the same vein. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Chairman Levin. We will expect that answer for the record
    relative to Senator Thune's question on START.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, for
    your testimony today and for your dedication to our men and
    women in the military.
        Secretary Gates, I applaud you for the tremendous job DOD
    has done in carrying out and supporting the relief efforts that
    have been under way in Haiti. The ability of our maritime
    forces to operate from a sea base while rapidly transitioning
    personnel and equipment ashore is something that I believe is
    an excellent demonstration of what our military is capable of
    doing and especially useful in a situation in Haiti where
    there's limited capacity for air transport.
        I believe it's important that we maintain our advantage in
    projecting sea power across the range of military operations
    from humanitarian relief to combat. My question, Secretary
    Gates and Admiral Mullen, is do the military departments and
    combatant commanders have sufficient amphibious operational
    capabilities to address the full spectrum of requirements, both
    military and humanitarian, anticipated within the QDR?
        Admiral Mullen. Ma'am, as I go back over the last 10 to 15
    years and then look at the future, my overall answer to that
    would be yes. We certainly have this within DOD over the years,
    debated this and there's been tension. I think it's good
    tension to get this right, and it focuses very specifically on
    the amount of amphibious lift capability that we have.
        Actually, one of my concerns specifically--so right now,
    yes. One of my concerns about the future--and I'm certain that
    the Commandant of the Marine Corps shares this--how is the
    Marine Corps has become very heavy. Obviously, it's now in the
    sixth or seventh year of fighting a land war, which is not what
    it wants to do. So there are an awful lot of adjustments that
    have to be made for the future. The Marine Corps is going to
    have to get lighter than it's been in the past.
        So I think this discussion will continue. But as far as my
    view of the future, I think we have it about right as we sit.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        I know that we've already discussed some of the IEDs, but I
    know that in Afghanistan the mountainous terrain and the
    limited communication infrastructures certainly pose a
    distinctly different IED threat as opposed to what we have seen
    in Iraq. We need additional personnel at the battalion and
    company levels with the appropriate expertise and technical
    equipment to detect the IEDs in areas such as Afghanistan,
    where the insurgents utilize the primitive forms of IEDs with
    very little metallic content that is buried into the ground.
        What type of feedback are you receiving from CENTCOM and
    the component commanders in theater with respect to their
    personnel requirements encountering the IEDs, and what do you
    expect to do to address any shortages that exist?
        Secretary Gates. A substantial number of the 30,000 troops
    that will be going are in the category of what we call
    enablers. That includes engineers, route clearance specialists,
    counter-IED specialists, all of whom are--and people associated
    with ISR--all of which are part of the counter-IED effort.
        One of the initiatives that this temporary task force that
    I've set up under General Paxton and Dr. Carter is looking at
    is establishing, at the battalion level, what we would call a
    warehouse approach for counter-IEDs, which would basically,
    instead of giving every battalion the same set of equipment,
    rather have an array of equipment that is available to that
    battalion, so that each of the teams going out can select the
    equipment that seems most appropriate to that mission that day.
        We have a wide range of these detectors and intelligence
    capabilities and so on, and the idea is some of these units are
    better, frankly, with certain kinds of equipment than others.
    There's more than a little art in this. So what we're trying to
    do is figure out how, at the battalion level, we in essence
    could have an array of equipment that a team going out could
    take advantage of.
        So I think that there is an understanding on the part of
    General McChrystal and General Petraeus that we are pouring
    every bit of counter-IED capability into Afghanistan that we
    can.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you. My time is up.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen. We do have a lot to
    talk about, and I share Senator Sessions' view that it would be
    nice to have you back. I hope the chairman will be able to
    arrange that.
        My first question is about the 313-ship Navy, Admiral
    Mullen. The Congressional Budget Office recently testified that
    the current shipbuilding budgets are not enough to fund the
    Navy's plan to increase the fleet to 313, and I think we all
    know that. I assume you agree with that. At 283, the Service
    has the smallest fleet since 1916. That's pre-World War I. We
    need to build more than 12 ships per year for the next 18 years
    to arrive at 313.
        Is 313 still the requirement, Admiral Mullen? How does this
    budget, how does this QDR, support the goal of a 313-ship Navy?
        Admiral Mullen. It is still the goal. It was when I led
    that analysis and generated that requirement as Chief of Naval
    Operations. It remains the floor. It was a number that was
    achieved with an understanding of what the risk would be. We,
    the total ``we''--that's the Services, the Department, those
    that build ships, certainly congressional support--have been
    working for years to get more money into the shipbuilding
    account. I think, as we laid out, there's some $15 billion this
    year. It's 10 ships, 1 of which is an Army ship.
        One of the things that we're not going to be able to do is
    build to that number if ships keep costing a whole lot more
    than we expect they will. The acquisition reform is really a
    critical part of that. I'll use the littoral combat ships as an
    example. That has cost--while I had expectations the costs
    would go up, certainly not to the degree that it has.
        So that has to be contained. We don't need the perfect ship
    or the perfect airplane as we look to the future. So I argued
    for years there has to be a strategic partnership across all
    three of those entities in order to get shipbuilding and major
    procurement right. I think this budget takes some steps in that
    direction. But you can just do the math and see that we're not
    going to get to 313, and I would not want to be satisfied with
    283, which is sort of what the projection is right now, given
    the demands that we have for our military and our Navy.
        Senator Wicker. So it's going to take acquisition reform to
    get us to that floor number of 313. When do you think we might
    be able to actually make some progress in that regard?
        Admiral Mullen. I think the Secretary and many others,
    myself included, have taken steps to really put our--get our
    arms around requirements growth, having expertise there,
    holding people accountable. Those are some of the things that
    are certainly in great focus right now, and there's more to do.
        But it's going to take a few years, I think, before that
    really takes a grip and starts to have the kind of impact to be
    able to generate the kind of capability you need within cost.
    I'm encouraged by this shipbuilding program. It has two
    submarines in it. This is the first year it has. I can tell you
    it took almost 10 years to make that happen. So we will
    continue to--I think it continues to need to be an area of
    focus. It's a vital capability for our country and, as you
    indicated, it's the smallest Navy we've had for many, many
    decades. For a country that has big bodies of water on both
    coasts, that's a maritime country, that's a great concern.
        Senator Wicker. Would it be fair to say we are
    shortchanging part of the mission? Could you enlighten us as to
    what aspects of our mission are we shortchanging because of the
    lack of these 313 ships?
        Admiral Mullen. The Navy is very pressed right now,
    operating at a very high tempo. I think Admiral Roughead, who
    will certainly have an opportunity to speak for himself, would
    say that he is sort of at the edge of being able to meet the
    commitments in terms of global commitments. He and our Navy is
    heavily focused in the Gulf as well. The sea base that was just
    created very quickly in Haiti is certainly well within what we
    expect and can do. But given the operational tempo (OPTEMPO)
    that our Navy and our Air Force, quite frankly, is under, which
    sometimes gets lost in the focus on our ground forces--their
    OPTEMPO has increased as well, and so Admiral Roughead's
    concern is that we are wearing capability out and we're not
    replacing it at a rate that gets to that kind of number that
    you're talking about.
        Senator Wicker. I see.
        Let me move back to a point that Senator McCain was making.
    I just returned also from Afghanistan and Pakistan. I agree
    with Senator McCain that this July 2011 date is mentioned when
    you talk to leaders over there. There was a term that we came
    back with from our Congressional Delegation with Leader
    McConnell, and that was a ``deficit of trust.'' It's not just
    the date for the beginning of the drawdown, but also
    specifically with regard to Pakistan it's the decade of really
    very ill will between the United States and the Government of
    Pakistan.
        Do you agree, Secretary Gates, that there is a deficit of
    trust about the United States' intention to be a long-term
    strategic partner with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and what are
    we doing to address that deficit of trust?
        Secretary Gates. I think there definitely is such a deficit
    of trust with Pakistan, and I think it's historical. The
    Pakistanis will speak of three or four American betrayals, only
    the most recent of which are turning our backs on Afghanistan
    and them after the Soviets withdrew, and the other the
    implementation of the Pressler amendment and cutoff of military
    to military relationships.
        I think, frankly, the way that trust is rebuilt is with
    time, effort, and actions. I think Admiral Mullen at this point
    has in his 2\1/2\ years as Chairman been to Pakistan probably
    15 or 16 times. He has an extraordinary relationship with
    General Kayani. I think there is a good personal trust there.
        But I think for Pakistanis as a whole, it is our sticking
    with them. It is our attention to their problems, including
    their economic problems. So we commend the Kerry-Lugar-Berman
    bill, which is very important. But I think being steadfast is
    important.
        I was in Pakistan just a couple of weeks ago and spoke
    directly to this, and I would say that in some areas it's more
    than a deficit of trust. There are conspiracy theories over
    there about our wanting to take their nuclear weapons, about
    our wanting to divide them up, all kinds of things. I spoke to
    that directly. So I think honesty in dealing with them, but a
    long-term effort, is what's going to be required.
        In Afghanistan, my personal sense is that we have--in the
    various visits that I have made and Admiral Mullen and others,
    they understand that July 2011 is the beginning of a process
    and that there is no deadline on that process. But there also
    is an acknowledgment by some of the Afghans that in effect they
    needed that kind of wakeup call in order to begin to realize
    they were going to have to take responsibility themselves for
    defeating the Taliban, that this wasn't something that
    everybody else could do for them.
        So I think that what we need to continue to communicate to
    the Afghans is that even as our security forces draw down over
    the next several years, that our presence there, our
    willingness to partner with them, our willingness to be a part
    of their economic and political life going forward, is a long-
    term, decades-long commitment by the United States to that
    country, not to having huge military forces there, but helping
    them get control of their security situation and then them
    being in charge of their country.
        But I think the July 2011 timeline is controversial. My own
    view is that it provided exactly the right incentive for them
    to begin to accept responsibility, but by having no terminal
    date on it, it allows us to do a conditions-based withdrawal
    that I think makes sense.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, we have the recommendations of the QDR. We have
    your budget proposal. This is not the moment to comment from
    our side of the table on the details in there.
        I would like to thank Senator Wicker for his comments about
    the size of the Navy and the challenges in the Navy. Obviously,
    I do not think it is an appropriate budget item for the Navy to
    think that they can spend a billion dollars in upgrading a
    nice-to-have facility in Mayport at the same time when we're
    looking to try to build a fleet up to 313 ships. Admiral
    Mullen, you'll recall when you and I were commissioned in 1968
    we had 930 ships in the United States Navy. We went down to
    479. When I was Secretary of the Navy it went up to 568.
        But I want to set that aside. I want to make sure you know
    we're still going to continue that discussion. I want to set
    that aside because I only have 5 minutes and I want to talk
    about something else. That is that I don't believe, quite
    frankly, that the DOD budget should be sacrosanct when it comes
    to looking at the constraints and the examinations that we
    ought to be putting on different programs.
        Secretary Gates, I take your point about not wanting to go
    into force structure reductions. But at the same time, I
    believe you can meet the challenges and adapt for the future
    and still clean up a lot of unnecessary programs that exist in
    the Pentagon by taking a hard look at programs that don't
    produce a clear bottom line and are not simply hardware systems
    or force structure issues.
        I very much appreciate the efforts that you've made in
    terms of program reductions, which you mentioned in your
    opening statements. But I think there comes a time every now
    and then to sort of shake things down. I remember when I was
    Secretary of the Navy the Gramm-Rudman Act was passed over
    here, 1987. We had to implement it in 1988. It mandated a 10
    percent across-the-board reduction in defense programs, because
    it was a 5 percent government-wide mandate and half of the
    programs at that time were fenced.
        They went too far. They clearly went too far. I resigned as
    Secretary of the Navy because they cut into force structure too
    far. But it doesn't hurt to really get into efficiencies in an
    area where we're not getting an appropriate bottom line.
        Let me give you three data points and I would ask today for
    you to make a commitment to really examine these types of
    programs. You and I are familiar with the Blackwater program
    that I wrote you about in 2007, and we came to some resolution
    on it, where out in San Diego they were going to spend more
    than $60 million for a private contractor to train sailors how
    to do their job, basically how to defend themselves on-board a
    ship.
        The first question I had on that was the fact that this is
    something that active duty people should have been doing, not a
    contractor. But the major concern I had was that this program
    came from operations and maintenance block funding. It had
    never been authorized. It had never been specifically
    appropriated as a program. It was just approved by a lower
    level official in the Department of the Navy based on the needs
    of the fleet. As we examined it, we found out that the
    Secretary of the Navy didn't even have to review that program
    unless it was a $78 million program.
        There's a program existing right now, and I don't know the
    extent of it, where we're basically sending military officers
    over to staff and fund think tanks. Your own Under Secretary of
    Defense was part of creating a think tank, CNAF. My
    understanding of these programs is they get military fellows.
    These are active duty people. They go over, they get their full
    pay and allowances. But not only that, they get tuition. The
    numbers that I saw were $17,000 a ``semester,'' whatever a
    semester is while you're over there, to pay the rent, the
    computers and all the rest of that.
        Essentially what that means is the American taxpayer is
    funding think tanks, basically to keep them in business. They
    don't produce any really added value to DOD in my view in terms
    of a direct contribution.
        Another example that just came up over the past couple of
    months is this mentors program, where, according to news
    reports, you can have retired high-ranking general officers and
    admirals making well in excess of $100,000 a year in their
    retirement, 80 percent of these people working with defense
    contractors, and then going in and making up to $2,600 a day to
    give their advice. In other words, a retired admiral or general
    can make more in a day than a corporal in Afghanistan will make
    in a month, basically to do what he's supposed to do anyway,
    and that is fulfill his stewardship from having spent a career
    in the military.
        I don't know the full cost of that, but according to USA
    Today these people are being paid between $200 and $340 an hour
    plus expenses. They are hired as independent contractors, so
    they're not subject to government ethics rules. They operate
    outside public scrutiny, and many of them work for weapons
    makers and in effect are able to either gain information for
    companies or exchange data.
        That's not the military I grew up in. That's not the
    military you and I served in, Admiral. That's not the Pentagon
    that I served in in the 1980s.
        So these are the kinds of things, Mr. Secretary, I think we
    can do and not affect force structure.
        Secretary Gates. We certainly will continue to look at
    these things. I will tell you on the mentoring program, the
    Deputy Secretary has been reviewing this and I think you will
    see some--we think there is great value in the program, but you
    will see some fairly dramatic changes in the way it's
    administered.
        Senator Webb. I would certainly hope so.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and
    for being here today to answer our questions.
        Secretary Gates, when we capture an enemy combatant in
    Afghanistan or Iraq, do we read them their Miranda rights?
        Secretary Gates. No.
        Senator LeMieux. So why should we do so if we capture one
    in this country?
        Secretary Gates. That's a question better addressed to the
    Attorney General, Senator.
        Senator LeMieux. You were the Director of the Central
    Intelligence Agency before you were the Secretary of Defense?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Senator LeMieux. So I assume you have an opinion on this.
        Secretary Gates. My view is that the issue of whether
    someone is put into the American judicial system or into the
    military commissions is a judgment best made by the chief law
    enforcement officer of the United States.
        Senator LeMieux. Before they get into either commission,
    there's a question of being able to ask questions, and
    certainly we know there's a chilling effect when we give
    someone their Miranda rights. So if we're not doing it
    overseas, I'm not sure why it makes sense that we would be
    doing it in this country.
        Secretary Gates. We have in place protocols now that--and
    there is authority under the law--that if a person is deemed to
    be a threat to the national security as a self-confessed
    terrorist would be, that there can be delays in Mirandizing to
    allow time for questioning. So we have the authority to do that
    even in the Article III system.
        Senator LeMieux. My colleague from Virginia was just
    talking about Mayport and that he has a different view than you
    expect that I would. You put in the QDR that, to mitigate the
    risk of a terrorist attack, accident or natural disaster, the
    Navy will homeport an east coast carrier in Mayport. I know you
    support that and I appreciate that.
        But there is no money in the budget, as I understand it,
    for the nuclearization projects or other projects that need to
    be completed.
        Admiral Mullen. There's $239 million in the FYDP for
    military construction for Mayport.
        Senator LeMieux. Okay, thank you.
        Admiral Mullen, will you officially designate a ship to
    Mayport in the coming months?
        Admiral Mullen. Actually, it's not mine. I think that in
    the end that would be a decision that the Navy would recommend
    and it would come up to the Secretary.
        Senator LeMieux. Are you planning on making a
    recommendation soon?
        Admiral Mullen. As soon as the Navy brings one up, and I
    just don't know where they are in that process.
        Senator LeMieux. Maybe we can follow up on that later.
        I want to speak a little bit about acquisition reform. A
    number of my colleagues have mentioned this. Specifically, Mr.
    Secretary, about the JSF, we recently were given some
    information about the fact that it's 35 percent over budget,
    which I think is about $18 billion if my numbers are correct.
    This program started in the mid-1990s. It occurs to me I think
    we went to the moon quicker than we've produced this plane.
        So I appreciate your efforts to try to get this under
    control, and I saw that there was a suspension in the
    performance bonuses. My question to you is, in terms of
    acquisition reform, it seems to me that there needs to be
    reform across DOD, probably across the government, and not just
    performance bonuses being withheld, but performance penalties
    under the contracts that we have with vendors.
        Is there a person that you charged as responsible solely to
    lead the effort on acquisition reform, and are you looking at
    these contracts to make sure that the vendor would bear the
    cost if programs were delayed?
        Secretary Gates. Under Secretary Carter is responsible for
    that and he is taking a very close look at a large number of
    contracts.
        Senator LeMieux. I had an opportunity to be at CENTCOM
    yesterday and I spoke with General Petraeus. In the follow-up
    to my trip to Afghanistan at the end of October, which I went
    on with Senator Burr and Senator Whitehouse, one thing that we
    noted is that our information work there in terms of trying to
    get the message out to the Afghan people may be not doing as
    good of a job as it could be.
        General Petraeus talked about the fact that we were
    successful in the surge in Iraq because of the power of ideas,
    not just the power of our forces. I'm wondering if this is on
    your radar screen, the need to commit more focused energy and
    potentially more funds to providing information to the Afghan
    people to counteract what the Taliban does. The Taliban will go
    in and say, oh, we just killed a bunch of children. It's
    misinformation.
        There are some good efforts that are being done. I met with
    a Colonel Kraft who was doing some very good work with trying
    to get radios out there to folks, working with territorial
    governors to get information out quickly so that we could
    counteract propaganda from the Taliban.
        Is that something that's risen to your level and do you
    understand the need to maybe improve our efforts?
        Secretary Gates. Absolutely, and in fact we have spent a
    good bit of time on this in the situation room with our
    interagency.
        Senator LeMieux. I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to
    ask just one more question for the Admiral.
        On the 313-ship Navy, the plan I guess is currently to have
    10 carriers. Is that sufficient? We're refitting the
    Enterprise. Do we need to keep the Enterprise in operation
    until the Ford comes on line? What's your thoughts?
        Admiral Mullen. I think that the current requirement is for
    11 and I support that. The 10-carrier issue is to be decided
    literally decades down the road. Obviously, how we build them
    generates how many of them there are and when we retire them.
        I don't think we should keep the Enterprise. I think the
    Enterprise is unique, incredibly costly, and the decision to
    decommission it after its next deployment and take the risk in
    that gap I think--it is a decision that I support, recognizing
    there is some risk associated with that.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator LeMieux.
        Senator Burris.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'd like to add my thanks, gentlemen, for the wonderful
    service that you do for our country. For those of our military
    personnel in Haiti, I just want to extend my thanks to them,
    and also remind our government that we're there to assist and
    not to take over or occupy a country, as some people are
    concerned about. So make sure that we keep that message going
    forward.
        Mr. Secretary, the DIMHRS, the largest enterprise resource
    planning program ever implemented for the human resource
    system, would replace over some 90 legacy systems. It's
    intended to bring all payroll and personnel functions of the
    military into one integrated, web-based system.
        In August 1996, a DOD task force concluded that the
    multiple service-unique military personnel and pay systems
    causes significant functional shortcomings, particularly in the
    joint arena, and excessive development and maintenance costs.
    Their central recommendation was that DOD should move to a
    single all-Service, all-component, fully-integrated personnel
    and pay system with common core software.
        This is a program that DOD said at one time was necessary.
    Why is it considered a poorly performing program today, Mr.
    Secretary, and why is it not necessary and what has changed?
        Secretary Gates. Well, this is one where I think both
    Admiral Mullen and I have something to say. First of all, after
    10 years of effort, poor performance and difficulties with that
    program, I would say that what we've gotten for half a billion
    dollars is an unpronounceable acronym. Many of the programs
    that I have made decisions to cut have been controversial
    within DOD. I will tell you this one was not.
        Admiral Mullen. Both in my prior life as head of the Navy
    and actually even before that as a budget officer and certainly
    through this, this program has been a disaster. The
    characteristics you describe, Senator, are good characteristics
    to have. I talked earlier about making a program too perfect
    and you just can't get there, too complex. It was proven that
    DIMHRS couldn't get there time and time again.
        So I applaud the termination of the program. That doesn't
    mean we shouldn't try to create the kind of enterprise effort
    that you just described, but we have to do it in a way where
    we're not spending the kind of money that we were spending
    going nowhere in DIMHRS.
        Senator Burris. Gentlemen, is that where we run into a
    military bureaucracy, that people don't want to give up
    something? I think it's more of that. If we can pay under the
    Office of Personnel Management all civilian employees under one
    payment system, why can't the military also exercise one
    payment system? It would be my assessment that you would run
    into turf problems that the military is not willing to say that
    a person at a grade 6 in the Navy should be paid as a person
    who's a grade 6 in the Army, with the same system. So you cut a
    paycheck and you don't have all these--what have you got, five
    or six different payroll systems in the military? We can save
    millions and millions of taxpayers' dollars by combining those
    systems.
        Admiral Mullen. I don't disagree that theoretically we
    could get there and we should have that. However, it was
    costing us a tremendous amount of money to go nowhere in this--
    --
        Senator Burris. Then why----
        Admiral Mullen. Senator, even in the private sector, when
    you talk to individuals who have tried to combine, who have
    combined various multi systems, it is always a challenge. So
    the challenge is there. I think the goal is one that's a good
    goal. We just were not getting there with DIMHRS. We were
    wasting our money.
        Senator Burris. Are you going to take it up in the future?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I'm sure we will. It sounds like
    we will.
        Senator Burris. Let me shift gears for a minute. Why is the
    funding for Iraq security forces nearly doubling from the
    fiscal year 2010 budget to the fiscal year 2011 budget? When I
    was in Iraq it was my understanding we were standing down and
    that we wouldn't need to be spending extra money for training
    for the security forces. Is there an explanation why the budget
    is increasing?
        Secretary Gates. Sir, $300 million in the 2011 OCO is to
    set the conditions for the transfer to the State Department for
    responsibility for training the police.
        Chairman Levin. Repeat what ``OCO'' means?
        Secretary Gates. The overseas contingency operations bill.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Secretary Gates. The new supplemental.
        So there are a number of categories like that. A lot of
    it--there's only $158 million--of the billion dollars for 2010,
    for example, only $150 million of that is for equipment. The
    rest of it is all connected with our transfer of
    responsibilities from--costs associated with transfer of
    responsibilities either from ourselves to the Iraqis or from
    DOD to the Department of State after our troops come out. So
    most of those costs are associated in that area, along with
    sustainment of and training for the Iraqis who are going to be
    taking our places.
        Senator Burris. My time has expired. But gentlemen, I hope
    that we will revisit this personnel system. If the civilians
    can do it, you get one paycheck and one pay scale system, the
    civilians, the military can do it without five or six different
    systems existing.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
        A couple quick items. Feel free to submit that
    unpronounceable acronym for the record.
        Secretary Gates. DIMHRS.
        Chairman Levin. You made reference in an earlier answer to
    the Article III system, and you were referring to the civilian
    court system.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Now, one housekeeping announcement before I
    call on Senator Collins. When we begin our hearing on DADT,
    which it looks like we're on schedule to begin maybe even
    before noon, we're going to follow the same early bird order as
    we have for this hearing, so that everybody can be put on
    notice. We're going to recognize Senators in the same order as
    they appeared for the current hearing when we reach the DADT
    hearing.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. So the last will be first for
    that next hearing?
        Chairman Levin. I didn't say reverse order. I said the same
    order. [Laughter.]
        I wish I could say otherwise. We're struggling here with
    what is the best way to do it and we decided the best way to do
    it is to put everyone on notice.
        Senator Collins. Just don't tell them that we're starting
    early, then.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, you have a deal. [Laughter.]
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gates, according to the QDR, on any given day
    there are more than 7 million DOD computers that are being used
    to support our warfighters and for other DOD operations. We
    also know that every single day there are attempts to hack into
    those computers. Some of these attacks are from nation-states
    like China.
        What is your assessment of the effectiveness of DOD's
    current cyber security efforts?
        Secretary Gates. I think that we actually are, particularly
    with our classified systems, in good shape. Most of the attacks
    that we encounter, too, are to unclassified systems. But
    frankly, we're not happy with where we are, and particularly as
    we look ahead. That's why we have an initiative to create Cyber
    Command and also have money in the budget and have made a
    priority in the QDR and in the budget for cyber in terms of
    training significant additional individuals who are expert in
    this area. We've made it a top priority for the Services to
    fill all the slots in the education programs for cyber.
        So I would say I think we're in good shape now, but we look
    with concern to the future and we think a lot more needs to be
    done.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Admiral Mullen, last year the President announced a major
    policy change on how our country would extend protection
    against ballistic missiles to our NATO allies. I joined Senator
    Levin on a trip to talk to the Czech Republic, Poland, and
    Russia about this very issue last March. I support the change
    in direction.
        Part of the change in direction is that sea-based Aegis
    surface combatants would become a primary means of
    accomplishing that important mission. Now, ships dedicated to
    perform this mission will likely be tied to specific areas of
    operation. That means that they're not going to be fully
    available to perform many of the other more traditional
    missions that we've typically assigned our major surface
    combatants. A number of analysts have suggested that that means
    we will need a larger number of major surface combatants if all
    of these missions and roles are to be executed successfully.
        How does the decision to assign major surface combatants to
    this new dedicated missile defense mission affect your
    assessment of the size of the overall fleet?
        Admiral Mullen. It starts with an earlier discussion we had
    on the need to get to that floor of 313 ships, which we're
    below target right now. One of the things that I've worried
    about for years is that we would have enough in particular
    surface combatants to be able to meet the needs that are out
    there, although I do not subscribe to the theory that these
    ships would become ships like our strategic ballistic missile
    submarines, in other words it's the only thing that they do.
    We've invested too much in the broad capability of our surface
    ships, wide-ranging capability of our surface ships, to
    dedicate them to one mission.
        I think as this program has been adjusted, it focuses on
    regional, theater, evolving threats and I think that's the
    right answer. So we would have certainly some indications and
    warning. We have enough ships to flood, if you will, to a
    certain area, understanding what the threat is.
        So I think we need to look carefully at how many we need. I
    also think we need to upgrade the ones that we have. While we
    are upgrading some, I think that we need to look pretty
    seriously in modernization at do we have enough upgrades for
    the ships that we've already built to meet this threat in the
    longer term, as well as looking to see if we need more. I'm
    more focused on the upgrade right now than I am additional
    Aegis ships per se.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, I want to compliment you on
    the relief efforts in Haiti.
        The American military leads. You are the point of the
    spear. You make it happen. Please consider that for the future,
    for the long term, we're going to have to do something
    different. I was just told a very troubling story of a relief
    effort by a group of Floridians, doctors, prominent people,
    that took a private planeload of medical supplies down to a
    number of our doctors who have been on the ground just doing
    heroic stuff. Just before they got there, the customs had been
    turned back over to the Haitian Government, and as they're
    unloading the plane of all the medical supplies to get it to in
    this case to University of Miami doctors, who were there the
    day after the earthquake, the customs officials wanted bribes
    to release the medical supplies.
        We just can't allow this kind of thing. So you have done
    tremendous things in getting us to where we are, the
    humanitarian mission. But for the long term, we're going to
    have to have some kind of international trusteeship that's
    going to be led by the international community, that will take
    this kind of nonsense away from the people who have done this
    for 200 years in Haiti.
        I'm not expecting a response. I just want to compliment you
    for what you've done.
        Now, I have the privilege of chairing the Emerging Threats
    and Capabilities Subcommittee and as we withdraw our
    conventional forces in Iraq, the requirement for the SOF is
    projected to remain. But they, the SOF, rely on the
    conventional counterparts for many of the support functions. So
    what do we do to ensure that our SOFs are being adequately
    supported as we withdraw the conventional forces from Iraq?
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I think there's a two-part
    answer. I'll take the equipment part and ask Admiral Mullen to
    take the people part.
        One of the things that we are doing is moving the base--
    moving the funding of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
    from the supplementals into the base budget. We believe SOCOM
    is going to have the capability that this country is going to
    need far into the future, and so in terms of their equipment,
    we're plussing up the equipment that they are supplied with,
    much of which is unique to them. We are increasing the number
    of slots that they have by this budget for fiscal year 2011,
    increases the SOCOM personnel by 2,800 people.
        So I think that in terms of equipment and so on, we are
    putting ourselves on a long-term footing to sustain that
    capability.
        Admiral Mullen. Part of--and this is in the QDR and in the
    budget--part of moving to the future is investing in the wars
    that we're in, and there's no more critical capability to my
    view that we are investing in in these wars than the Special
    Forces capability. That will serve us well for the future.
        I don't know if I'll get these numbers exactly right, but I
    think we started these wars at about 38,000. We're at some
    56,000 Special Force operators or Special Force military
    members now, and these, as the Secretary said, are growing by
    2,800. This is, at least from my interaction with Admiral
    Olson, this is about as fast as we can grow, as fast as we can
    find the people to do this.
        A document which has struck both the Secretary and myself
    has been Admiral Olson's guidance for this year in 2010. I have
    said for years I believe our whole military has to be looking
    at the kinds of characteristics--swift, agile, lethal,
    engaging, all those kinds of things that is a part of our
    Special Forces, as we look to the future for our conventional
    forces.
        The tension that you describe--and I think it's a healthy
    tension--between the Special Forces and the Services that
    provide the people, provide a lot of the early training, go out
    and recruit them, is a good tension and we'll have to continue
    to deal with that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Just a quick comment, if you would,
    Admiral, about the role of Joint Surveillance Target Attack
    Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft in Afghanistan? You have
    provided adequately in the budget for keeping JSTARS as a
    viable option by re-engining these old platforms. What's the
    role in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. It is principally tracking targets on the
    ground more than anything else. But as you ask that question,
    Senator Nelson, I think of JSTARS being the revolutionary
    aircraft that it was for Operation Desert Storm--actually, I'm
    sorry, even in the mid-1990s, early to mid-1990s in the
    Balkans, where we deployed them prior to the time that we
    actually finished successfully testing them, and they have
    provided an extraordinary capability. Yet, the adaptation in
    these wars to the persistence requirement which we've achieved
    much more readily with our unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) than
    we've been able to do with any manned aircraft per se.
        But they're incredibly valuable, particularly in tracking
    targets on the ground, which is one of the reasons this
    investment is so important.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, sir.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. First I want to thank you, Secretary
    Gates, and I hope that your office will continue to cooperate
    with information we've requested on a number of different
    topics for the subcommittee that I chair in Homeland Security
    on contracting.
        One of the things we're trying to get to the bottom of is
    whether or not some of the contracts on the earmarks have been
    competitive. There is--it is said that--I think the chairman
    accidentally called on me before Senator Bayh and I want to
    make sure--I'm happy to----
        Chairman Levin. Just let me thank Senator Bayh. There's a
    mistake I made here and I appreciate your courtesy in dealing
    with it. Thank you.
        Senator McCaskill. I want to thank you for the cooperation
    in trying to get to the bottom, because I think that there is
    in some instances a fiction that some of these earmarks are
    being competitively given out, when in reality the Senators'
    requests are being honored, maybe informally. But we're trying
    to get to the bottom of it and make sure we have as much
    transparency as possible.
        I've read everything I can get my hands on on the JSF, and
    when we're going to actually use these fighters. I'm confused
    about the date. Depending on whether you're talking about the
    analysis team that went out from DOD or whether--I see quotes
    from General Schwartz or whoever--let's get that on the record,
    Secretary Gates. When do you think the JSF is going to be
    operational for our military?
        Secretary Gates. Even with the restructuring of the
    program, the training squadron is still scheduled to deploy to
    Eglin Air Force Base in 2011. The Marine Corps will have their
    IOC in 2012; the Air Force in the second quarter of 2013; and
    the Navy the fourth quarter of 2014. Those are the latest
    estimates that I've been given.
        Senator McCaskill. Okay. I heard you say those earlier. I
    just wanted to make sure that it was clarified.
        I want to tell you how much I respect the fact that you
    fired somebody. You've done this several times. I've watched
    you do this, and it is unusual. I don't think anybody around
    here realizes how unusual it is for a Secretary of Defense to
    fire people when these things happen. Traditionally, there have
    not been people that have been fired. I just want you to know I
    noticed and I think it's hard to do, but I think it's very
    important that you send that signal of accountability.
        Let me ask you about the modernization of the C-5s. I'm
    going to try to go at the C-17 a little bit differently. I
    would like to ask this question: If your hands were not tied by
    Congress in terms of the modernization of the C-5s, would you
    continue to modernize or would you retire?
        Secretary Gates. We would continue to modernize a good
    portion of the C-5s. But there would be some of the older C-5As
    that we would retire.
        Senator McCaskill. Are you advocating that we repeal the
    statutory tying of your hands while you're advocating for the
    closing of the line on the C-17s? Are you also advocating that
    Congress quit tying your hands as it relates to retiring the C-
    5s?
        Secretary Gates. Any greater flexibility I can have to
    manage the program, I would welcome.
        Senator McCaskill. I want to make sure that I get your
    endorsement for us retiring our hand-tying of you, obviously,
    the modernization of the C-5s has had huge problems. It turned
    out to be much more expensive than it was ever intended to be.
    I know that it's my understanding we're not using C-5s in
    Haiti, correct?
        Secretary Gates. I don't think so.
        Senator McCaskill. In fact, we're using, as we always do,
    the reliable, easy to land on short runways, load them up, get
    them out, cheaper to fly, C-17 in Haiti; isn't that correct,
    Admiral Mullen?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator McCaskill. I just wanted to make sure.
        Secretary Gates. Although I would just say for the record,
    200 and some, 204,000 landings for strategic lift since 1997, 4
    percent have been at airfields that a C-5 could not access, and
    half of those were in Iraq.
        Senator McCaskill. I understand that and I know that. But
    it's important to remember that the Iraq capability was pretty
    darn important over the past 6 to 8 years in terms of military
    operations. I think we're going to have the same situation in
    Afghanistan. Aren't there air strips in Afghanistan that are
    certainly more friendly to a C-17 than a C-5?
        Secretary Gates. Sure.
        Senator McCaskill. I would like to briefly get into
    prescription drugs and our military. I think we are all
    painfully aware of the suicide problem that we have. I think we
    are also aware that there has been a ``modernization,'' of
    prescription drug availability in the military as it relates to
    PTSD and other mental health issues. I know that we have a task
    force looking at prescription drug use.
        I wanted to also bring to the attention of the committee,
    and to you, I think as this task force is looking at
    prescription drug use, not only should we be looking at the
    anti-depressants that I think have become ubiquitous in some
    instances as it relates to treating our deployed forces when
    they're having stress issues, but also the prescription drug
    for pain. I particularly have mentioned to General Casey
    Oxycontin, and the highly addictive nature of Oxycontin and the
    widespread availability of Oxycontin within the military, and
    the fact that we now know that in some parts of our country
    Oxycontin has a higher street value than heroin because of the
    highly addictive nature of the drug.
        I wanted to ask your cooperation, Secretary Gates--and I
    will be sending you a letter--that the prescription drug task
    force also take a look at how widely available Oxycontin is in
    the military and whether or not its overall effect has been
    harmful or positive.
        I wanted to ditto Senator Webb on the mentoring program.
    Pretty ugly. We have to get that under control and make sure
    it's transparent. The revolving door at the Pentagon deserves
    as much attention as the revolving door in Congress.
        Thank you, Secretary Gates.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator Bayh, again with our thanks.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First let me compliment Senator McCaskill for her line of
    questioning. Claire, Harry Truman would be proud. You're
    focused on saving the taxpayers' money. It reminds me in a
    previous incarnation when I was our State's governor during
    difficult financial times. I used to scrub the budget so
    carefully I had a nickname in some quarters as ``Evaneezer.''
    So I really do appreciate your efforts.
        Mr. Secretary, I'd like to begin by complimenting you and
    associating myself with what Senator McCaskill was saying. It
    was a breath of fresh air that you're bringing increased
    accountability to some of these programs. Some of the practices
    that have been allowed to exist for too long in DOD contracting
    of weapons systems would never survive in the private sector.
    So the fact that people are being held accountable and the
    contractors themselves are being asked to share some of the
    burden for the delays and the cost overruns I think is
    absolutely the right thing to do. I want to commend you for
    that and I hope we'll see more of the same.
        We are gathered here at a time of great financial and
    economic distress for the American people and for our
    government. People are being asked to make sacrifices. The
    President has called for a freeze and nonsecurity discretionary
    spending, and yet we are being asked to appropriate, I think
    you indicated, a 3.4 percent increase in Defense spending. Is
    that correct?
        Secretary Gates. 1 percent, 1.8 percent in real growth.
        Senator Bayh. In real growth. My point is I support that
    because of the challenges that we face. I just wanted to put it
    in the context of people are being asked to make real
    sacrifices. It makes even more important your efforts to try
    and save tax dollars wherever possible.
        It seems to me that, looking at the big items, the prospect
    for any real meaningful savings in the future have to do with
    our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan and perhaps the
    prospect that they will head in a better direction, allowing us
    to perhaps save some money there. So I'd like to ask you about
    both of those conflicts.
        I know you've given us your best--or your most likely case
    estimate about what it will take in both of those conflicts. If
    you had to say that it was going to be something other than the
    most likely case--let's start with Iraq. The way things are
    trending there, would it be more or less likely that we would
    be able to withdraw more aggressively there than you're
    currently planning on, and in so doing save some of the money
    that we're being asked to commit to to Iraq?
        Secretary Gates. I think that General Odierno's view would
    be that it would be very risky to try and accelerate the
    withdrawals beyond the timetable that he already has.
        Senator Bayh. So no real prospect for savings beyond what
    has been estimated there?
        Secretary Gates. I think not.
        Senator Bayh. In Afghanistan, my own view is that skeptics
    who look at that conflict and say, we're going to do our part,
    we're making a major commitment to stabilizing that country, to
    keeping the Taliban and the al Qaeda from having a platform to
    attack us--there's no doubt in my mind we'll do what is
    necessary. The question is whether the Afghans are capable and
    willing to do their part. You look at the history of that
    country, the complexity of that country, I think skeptics kind
    of wonder whether even with our best efforts we'll be able to
    get the job done.
        Would it be your assessment that there probably is not much
    prospect for--well, if events are going to deviate from the
    most likely scenario, it's more likely to be on the down side
    than the up side in Afghanistan, no real prospect for
    additional savings there?
        Secretary Gates. I suspect not. But I would tell you,
    Senator, that, as the President announced, there will be a
    review of our strategy in Afghanistan at the end of this year,
    and I think both Admiral Mullen and I are committed that if we
    determine that our strategy is not working that we will not
    recommend just plunging ahead blindly without a change of
    course.
        Admiral Mullen. If I could just quickly, I think a healthy
    skepticism is good. I think a terminal skepticism at this point
    is--it's far too soon. In fact, we see signs in many places now
    of uplifted spirits on the part of the Afghan people where
    security has turned around. I'm not underestimating the
    significance of the challenge, but from a strategy standpoint,
    a resourcing standpoint, a leadership standpoint, and a
    commitment on the part of the Afghans that we can see as a
    result of what the President announced, it's better than it's
    ever been and we're just a few months into it.
        Senator Bayh. We're all hopeful, but I think we all realize
    we have to be realistic as well. Mr. Secretary, I think that's
    what you've outlined here: a review in progress, assessing our
    partners both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and then making the
    hard decisions at the appropriate time.
        Let me ask a couple of other questions. Have you requested
    all the Predators and Reapers you can use and you need?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. We have pretty much maxed out
    the lines. I would just say that those capabilities in some
    instances, in more than a few instances, the challenge is not
    just the airframe or the platform; it's the ground station,
    it's the crews, it's the linguists that enable us to use the
    information. So it's the whole package that we have to put
    together.
        Senator Bayh. For a long time there was a shortage of
    pilots as I recall. But we've----
        Secretary Gates. It was both airframes and platforms. But I
    would say over the last year to 15 months the Air Force has
    really leaned into this problem, and General Schwartz has told
    me that they are now training more UAV pilots than they are
    fighter-bomber pilots.
        Senator Bayh. That's quite a change. But it's one of those
    systems that's really been delivering for us here. So I'm
    delighted at your request.
        Finally--and my time has expired--along with five of my
    colleagues, I was in Kabul and at the Bagram Air Base earlier
    this month, or last month now that it's February, and I just
    want to--please convey, we have met with many of the members of
    the Armed Forces, and particularly the Special Operations folks
    down there at Bagram, they're doing an outstanding job and I
    want you to, if you can, please relay our appreciation for the
    service they're rendering our country.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. Some points have
    been raised with respect to the trial of Abdulmutallab and I
    think, Mr. Secretary, you sort of indicated that that decision
    was the province of the Attorney General. But just as a matter
    of fact, had he been turned over to military custody he would
    have been provided a lawyer, I presume; isn't that correct?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Given the fact that we've harmonized the
    rules of interrogation between the FBI and other agencies of
    the government, including the military, that the tools
    available for an interrogation would have been very much the
    same?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. I think something else, too. Again, this is
    not a question of venue; this is a question more of how we
    combat these terrorists. A lot of them describe themselves as
    holy warriors, and if we reinforce their self-described holy
    warrior description, trying them essentially in a military
    trial and not a civilian trial, doesn't that reinforce what
    they think they are, which is basically that they're not
    terrorist criminals, they are some type of holy warrior?
        Secretary Gates. Well, I suppose that that's the case. I
    just think that we're in a good place when you have the ability
    to use both the civilian court system and the military
    commissions and to be able to make decisions on how to
    prosecute an individual based on a case by case basis depending
    on those specific circumstances. The Attorney General consulted
    with me in terms of the decision on the Christmas Day bomber
    and I told him that I would defer to him on that. I think we
    need to use both of those venues, but I think it will depend on
    the circumstances in each case.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Admiral Mullen, in Afghanistan there has been I believe an
    increase in recruits to the Afghani forces, which are
    absolutely essential to our long-term strategy. I know there's
    been a pay increase that has helped. But what other factors
    have helped?
        Admiral Mullen. I think an intangible that I would put out
    there is the fact that the commitment on the part of the United
    States and NATO nations specifically to this fight and to the
    totality of it, not just the military side. I think the
    leadership in Afghanistan visibly more committed, General
    McChrystal out in battlefield circulation with the President,
    who has connected with his people in ways that have been very
    important as well, along with--and I think it's a combination
    of standing up for their country, which I am told routinely and
    which their leaders feel strongly about, in addition to the
    incentivized pay increases specifically.
        What we're struggling with is, while the recruiting was at
    116 percent over the last couple of months, having the
    institutional capacity both from a training infrastructure
    standpoint as well as trainers to absorb that many. That's
    just, quite frankly, an area that we haven't focused on enough
    in the past and we're trying to get right right now.
        Secretary Gates. I should correct the record. The Attorney
    General consulted with me on the five September 11 terrorists,
    not the Christmas Day bomber.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, because it's important to have the
    record accurate.
        Mr. Secretary, you have I think once again proposed robust
    funding for basic science in DOD in this budget. I think that's
    critical. Could you give an idea of where you're proposing to
    spend this money?
        Secretary Gates. Let me do that for the record if I might.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The $200 million increase relative to the Fiscal Year 2010
    Department of Defense request will be directed to basic research in
    high-priority areas that are promising for transformational defense
    capabilities. These include nano-manufacturing science, synthetic
    biology, advanced energy science, materials modeling for force
    protection, computational neuroscience and quantum information science,
    among other highly promising areas. We have increased the investment in
    the Army by $29 million, Navy by $25 million, Air Force by $34 million,
    the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency by $102 million and with
    smaller changes in other Defense Agencies. The research will be
    conducted at universities and other nonprofit institutions, industries,
    and Government laboratories, in distribution similar to the base budget
    for basic research. The increased funds will support individual
    investigators and research teams, including students.

        Senator Reed. You're quite welcome to do that for the
    record.
        Admiral Mullen, in the QDR there is a discussion of dealing
    with anti-access environments and utilizing the advantages of
    sub-surface operations, which I presume is not just submarines,
    but also unmanned undersea vehicles. Can you amplify what your
    plans are?
        Admiral Mullen. Broadly, I think the presumption is exactly
    right. We've focused on investments there for some years. I'd
    have to get back to you with what the specifics of that would
    be. I would only say, from actually every capability area that
    we have, that the ability to create and sustain access
    globally, oftentimes is very important. Oftentimes this is very
    focused on the Western Pacific, but, quite frankly, it's much
    broader than that and those capabilities are vital for our
    future.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here, and I am the last one
    standing I think on this round of activity. So let me try to be
    very quick. I have some very Alaskan issues, but first a little
    more global.
        Again, thank you for all the work you're doing in Haiti and
    the impact that we have down there. Can you tell me, just so I
    have the number correct, what's our total capacity down there
    right now in regards to troops that we have there?
        Admiral Mullen. We actually had over 20,000. With the
    release of the aircraft carrier Vinson, who actually left her
    helicopter capability ashore in Haiti, but with the release of
    her we're down to just under 17,000 today.
        Senator Begich. Do we have an idea of what the resource
    cost has been so far to DOD?
        Secretary Gates. It's about $150 million so far.
        Senator Begich. Do you have an estimation of what you think
    in this budget process that you're planning to expend for the
    next year?
        Mr. Hale. Well, I am not sure of the duration and length of
    this. We estimated $300 to $400 million during the first 30
    days, and I think we'll have to revise that depending on how
    long we're there and the degree of our commitment.
        Senator Begich. Do you have within the budget that the
    President has presented the resources to meet that goal?
        Secretary Gates. No.
        Senator Begich. Okay, that's good. That's what we need to
    know.
        Secretary Gates. We can cash flow it, but we need to be
    repaid.
        Senator Begich. Understood.
        Mr. Hale. We do have the money right now, thanks to the
    committee and Congress, to cash flow it.
        Senator Begich. Okay. Do you think and believe you have a
    clear mission of what you should be doing Secretary Gates?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, I think we do.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. It's very clear and it's in
    support of, obviously, first of all the Haitian people, the
    Haitian government, the UN mission. We're in support of USAID,
    who has also been magnificent in this effort. So it is a
    supporting effort specifically.
        Senator Begich. Very good. If I can go very quickly on
    another subject that Senator McCaskill brought up, on
    Oxycontin. The other piece I would like, maybe at another time
    for the record, not only what the drug activity in the sense of
    distribution, but the efforts for individuals who are trying to
    get off of it. I have talked to several soldiers who have had
    Oxycontin as their pain management and other things, but now
    they're trying to get off it and we have limited resources. So
    if you could, maybe for the record, just give me kind of how
    that works and what you do for those soldiers that are trying
    to now get themselves out of that situation, if you could do
    that for the record, Admiral.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        We have come a long way in identifying and treating substance abuse
    in recent years, but our work is not done. The Department continues to
    work diligently to assure the appropriate use of pain medications and
    prevent their misuse.
        Foremost, alternative non-opioid pain treatments are being
    developed and used when possible. Physical modalities, non-opioid
    adjuvant medications, integrative modalities, and injection and
    interventional modalities all provide treatment for pain in some cases
    and thus militate against some opioid use.
        An excellent example is the Defense and Veterans Pain Management
    Initiative (DVPMI). The DVPMI seeks to improve the management of pain
    in military and civilian medicine. Through clinical research efforts,
    it has become a model for effective integration of acute and chronic
    pain medicine. Through the efforts of the DVPMI, peripheral nerve
    infusion pumps and patient-controlled analgesia pumps have been
    approved for battlefield use and for flights on military aircraft.
        The 2010 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary
    of Defense to develop and implement a comprehensive policy concerning
    pain management. The Task Force Report contained numerous
    recommendations, and is currently being operationalized into a six
    phase Comprehensive Pain Management Campaign Plan that will standardize
    and optimize pain management.
        Additionally, alternative pain management methods are being
    considered which will allow a portion of servicemembers to avoid the
    possibility of addiction in many cases where opioid pain medications
    would otherwise have been used.
        When opioids are the proper choice for patient care, programs and
    standards of care are being improved to more effectively manage those
    patients. Closely managing patients reduces the likelihood that the use
    of opioids will lead to addiction. Efforts to improve the patient
    management process include embedding pain physicians in the wounded
    warrior clinics. We anticipate that improvements in Health Information
    Technology will also reduce duplicative prescribing and dispensing of
    medication. This includes tracking beneficiary data for prescription
    information and working with civilian organizations on the Prescription
    Drug Monitoring Program.
        In some cases, a servicemember requires opioids and their use can
    lead to addiction. In these cases, there are a variety of treatment
    options available. A primary care provider is the first step in a whole
    continuum of treatment levels. Patients move through the continuum of
    care as more resource intensive treatments may become necessary.
        In addition, Military OneSource allows soldiers to receive mental
    health counseling. The program leverages civilian resources to prevent
    those with addiction issues from failing to seek help.

        Senator Begich. Then give me the Iraq status again. We had
    how many troops there about a year ago?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In February 2009, we had roughly 146,400 military in Iraq: 108,100
    Army; 11,100 Air Force; 6,200 Navy; and 21,000 Marines.

        Admiral Mullen. Sorry?
        Senator Begich. How many troops did we have in Iraq about a
    year ago? What was our peak level, do you think? 140?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, I would say 140, 150. We're at 104,000
    today.
        Senator Begich. 104,000 today?
        Admiral Mullen. Right, and the marines are out.
        Senator Begich. Then by the end of August, you think we'll
    be down to?
        Admiral Mullen. About 50.
        Senator Begich. 50,000 remaining?
        Admiral Mullen. Right.
        Senator Begich. Then the other date of next August, where
    will we be?
        Admiral Mullen. The following year, actually end of 2011,
    we'll be out.
        Senator Begich. Again to echo what I think you said to
    Senator Udall, we're on track?
        Admiral Mullen. We are.
        Senator Begich. Very good. I'm trying to rapid-fire these,
    knowing my time is limited.
        In your DOD presentation of the budget, do you still have a
    very robust--another issue, separate--alternative, renewable
    energy program? I know that's been a big plus, to be very frank
    with you, with the military. You have been leaders in this
    area. Are you still fairly, in your mind, aggressive in this
    arena?
        Secretary Gates. Yes.
        Senator Begich. Let me now be parochial, as you probably
    had anticipated. But first with regards to the GMD, I
    appreciate the missile ground defense system and the work
    you've been doing in Alaska and the efforts you've done over
    the years in kind of transition of what's been going on with
    overall missile defense.
        The way I understand this is you'll finish off field 2. Do
    you have the resources in this budget or do you allocate
    utilizing other resources to get to that final completion of
    the 12 and then the decommissioning of the 6?
        Secretary Gates. That's budgeted for.
        Senator Begich. In this cycle?
        Secretary Gates. Yes.
        Senator Begich. Is there anything beyond even the six
    decommissioned? Do you have to budget for that or do you think
    you have that also in this cycle?
        Secretary Gates. I think it's all in the budget.
        Senator Begich. If there is a difference, you'll let us
    know?
        Climate change, Arctic policy. I know you mentioned it and
    you started talking about it within this process, and I think
    it's important. There is an issue, and maybe again at a later
    time--we have three, the European Command, the Northern
    Command, and the Pacific Command that kind of manages it all
    together. Is there a process you're going through now to try to
    bring some unified command, be it a joint command. How do we
    deal with that, because I know that's an issue that keeps
    popping up. Are you going through the process now, Admiral?
        Admiral Mullen. I think, Senator, we would use the normal
    process, which would bring all of that back here certainly from
    the combatant commander's standpoint. We do that routinely
    across a host of issues. There's no view that I've heard of or
    certainly I don't see it from an intention standpoint to create
    another command to handle this. But we are looking at the
    policy. We actually want to give Thad Allen and the Coast Guard
    a lot of credit here because they've actually done great work
    and brought it to our attention in the last couple years. We've
    moved ahead. We still have a long way to go there.
        Senator Begich. My time is up, but that is exactly--you
    stated that the Coast Guard's really been hollering out there
    at all of us. As you move forward on that, I would love to be
    engaged in that. As you're well aware, a huge opportunity, also
    potential huge conflicts. So your work there would be greatly
    appreciated.
        My time is up. I tried to give you a variety pack and you
    did a great job.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
        Senator Chambliss is on his way. He has not had a first
    round yet. I think maybe we'll just see if anyone has one
    question for a second round. I have one, and then I'll see if
    others do. Okay, I'll call on you too, Senator Burris.
        My question is the following. There was a study that the
    Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) did on that alternate
    engine for the F-136. My question is: It's now about 3 years
    old. They looked at how much was invested, how much would need
    to be invested to develop it, what would be the possible
    benefits, what would be the costs for that alternate engine. My
    question is, will you ask the IDA to update that study, since
    we've had a couple of years now of additional investment? Can
    you do that, Secretary Gates?
        Secretary Gates. Let me take a look at it, Senator, Mr.
    Chairman. I don't know why not, but let me get back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department does not intend to contract with the Institute for
    Defense Analyses (IDA) to update their 2007 study. The Fiscal Year 2007
    National Defense Authorization Act directed the Department to sponsor a
    Federally Funded Research Center (FFRDC) to conduct one of the three
    independent studies on the Joint Strike Fighter propulsion system. The
    Department selected IDA. The Department's Cost Analysis Improvement
    Group (CAIG) was also directed to complete one of the studies. The
    Department's Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office,
    formerly the CAIG, recently updated their 2007 study to account for
    investment in the alternate engine since that time, as well JSF
    programmatic changes. The Department is satisfied with the CAPE's
    analysis and believes that contracting with an FFRDC to do the same
    analysis would not be a prudent use of Department resources.
        The Deputy Secretary provided the CAPE's updated analysis to
    Senator Levin via separate correspondence.

        Chairman Levin. All right. Is there anyone--let's just try
    one question for everybody. Senator Burris--well, wait a
    minute. Let me see. Senator Collins would be next if you had a
    question.
        Senator Collins. No.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, Senator Burris.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        My question, gentlemen, goes to the ability of small
    contractors to have the opportunity to do business with DOD,
    where they may need some type of assistance with their
    development project, which I understand that there are millions
    of dollars sometimes spent to get a piece of equipment that the
    military may need. I have a specific company in mind where it's
    been cleared through generals and been authorized, but you
    can't get the decision to be made, because we're talking about
    saving--this is technical equipment for our space stations and
    our drones and other military aircraft. It seems like the
    bureaucracy with the bigger companies just seem to charge much
    more money and they sometimes try to subcontract or either sub-
    contract with these contracts, but this could be sold directly
    to the military, but there just seems to be a bureaucracy that
    these small companies run into.
        Gentlemen, is there some system or device that a small
    business can really get an opportunity to sell their product to
    DOD, which is a better product and a cheaper product, which
    will save taxpayers' dollars?
        Secretary Gates. Let me give you an answer for the record
    on how we deal with small business, Senator. If you will
    provide us with the specifics of the case you have in mind,
    we'll look into it.
        Senator Burris. Mr. Secretary, I certainly will do that.
        Admiral?
        Admiral Mullen. If I just could respond briefly, my
    experience in this is exactly what you've said, Senator. I
    think it's very difficult to get small, innovative, creative
    companies into the business. My experience is too often
    competing against the bureaucracy, they just can't afford it.
    They can't afford the overhead. They don't have the people. It
    puts them out of business. So they go too often in the private
    sector. There are some great ideas out there. I've seen small
    companies go other places, put out of business, or be consumed
    by the larger defense contractors.
        My engagement with larger defense contractors over the
    years has been to try to get them to support these smaller
    companies. Some of them have. But it's a real challenge, and I
    think it's a shortfall in what we do overall, in our overall
    contracting business, if you will, as we try to look to the
    future.
        Senator Burris. Mr. Secretary, we will get this information
    on this small company, because we're talking about saving, if
    the numbers are correct, hundreds of millions of dollars.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        If you can just have one question, because we need to take
    a 5-minute break here for everybody's sake.
        Senator Begich. Mine's very quick. Secretary and Admiral
    Mullen, I just want to follow from the comment you made earlier
    in regards to I think it was the life cycle of equipment and so
    forth and how the procurement process works and how sometimes
    the line folks are not engaged in that. I guess the question
    is, are you making efforts to change that, because I agree with
    you 100 percent, if the line people are not involved you end up
    with a product--and a good example might have been the payroll
    issue, but I won't go into that. As a former mayor, I dealt
    with payroll transformation. It's a nightmare. Is there
    something you're working on to make that transition?
        Admiral Mullen. I think in the area of acquisition reform,
    this is an area of focus. But we have a system right now that
    would only allow me to pull something in. It does not come to
    me naturally or, quite frankly and more importantly, to the
    Service Chiefs naturally, particularly on the acquisition side.
        Senator Begich. Are you working to change that?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, I am. But I don't see--I don't see
    healthy change coming in that regard in the near future,
    because that fundamental principle that was laid out in 1986 in
    Goldwater-Nichols that separates us is still there.
        Senator Begich. Let us know how we can help. I agree with
    you on what you're trying to do.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        We're going to call just now on Senator Chambliss, Senator
    Lieberman. We're going to really break no later than noon here.
    We all need a 5-minute break. Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I was not going to get into a discussion on
    F-22 particularly. We've been down that road. But when you
    responded to Senator McCain's question about why you didn't
    discuss the problems with the F-35 when we were having the
    debate last summer, your response was that you didn't have the
    independent cost analysis that you have now. I thought it was
    pretty ironic that the report from the independent commission
    came out about 2 days after the vote in the Senate, where the
    F-22 in effect was killed. I couldn't understand why you didn't
    know about that, didn't know that report was coming.
        But really, the 2009 report was simply a validation of
    exactly what that same commission reported in 2008. Now, I
    assume you knew about the 2008 report and for whatever reason
    you didn't give much credence to it. Am I incorrect in that
    assumption? Did you not know about the 2008 report from that
    independent commission, or did you just seek to ignore it?
        Secretary Gates. I honestly don't remember, Senator. The
    restructuring of this program has been due not just to the
    report of the JET from last fall, but to the time that the
    Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    spent on this issue just in the last few weeks, and that's the
    reason that the restructuring has only been announced in the
    last few days. It's because he completed his investigation, of
    which the JET was one part, just within the last couple weeks
    or so.
        Senator Chambliss. Well, I heard your comment yesterday
    about your not intending to in any ways revisit the F-22 issue.
    Is that a correct statement?
        Secretary Gates. Correct.
        Senator Chambliss. That's even in spite of the fact that we
    now know that the assumptions that you based your decision on
    last year were wrong, that the F-35 is going to slip, and that
    your department has no idea of what the cost of an F-35 is
    going to be, as we've been told in a hearing by Dr. Carter. Now
    it's gotten to the point where I understand you've even
    relieved your program manager of his duties as of yesterday on
    the F-35.
        So you're not going to in any ways revisit that, even
    though we're struggling with the issues that we talked about
    might come about with regard to the F-35?
        Secretary Gates. No, sir, because the IOCs, based on
    information that I was given in preparation for this hearing,
    the IOCs for the Services, for the arrival of the training
    squadron at Eglin, all remain pretty much on track. The
    difference will be somewhat fewer aircraft delivered.
        Senator Chambliss. Do you intend to allow the expiration of
    foreign military sales (FMS) of the F-22?
        Secretary Gates. My impression is that that's prohibited by
    law.
        Senator Chambliss. Well, you've been instructed in the
    authorization bill last year that you will do a review of FMS
    and the prospect of those sales. There's another independent
    commission outside DOD that's also tasked with that. So is that
    review not under consideration at this point?
        Secretary Gates. I'll have to check, Senator.
        Senator Chambliss. Could you get me an answer on that,
    please, sir.
        Secretary Gates. Sure, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The report required by section 1250(a)(b) of the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 directed the Secretary of
    Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, and in
    consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force, to submit a report on
    potential Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of the F-22A fighter aircraft.
    The report was completed and transmitted to the Defense Committees, the
    Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the House Committee on
    Foreign Affairs on August 26, 2010. Section 1250(c) of the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2010 directed the Secretary to contract with a Federally
    Funded Research and Development Center to submit an additional report
    on the impact of F-22A FMS on the U.S. aerospace and aviation industry.
    The Department contracted RAND to complete the report. RAND expects to
    complete the report in early 2011.

        Senator Chambliss. Let me just ask you a quick question on
    the budget. I want to go back to the MRAP that's specifically
    designed for Afghanistan. Tell me again about that vehicle?
    What's the difference in that and what we're using in Iraq, and
    what's the budget difference there?
        Secretary Gates. The cost per vehicle is roughly the same
    for the ATV and the R-31 MRAP. The MRAP being designed for
    Afghanistan is designed to operate off-road, where the MRAPs in
    Iraq, designed for Iraq, were designed to operate on the road.
    So there's quite a difference in the engineering as well as in
    the power train and so on.
        Senator Chambliss. Any of those vehicles in Afghanistan
    today?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. We probably have somewhere
    between 500 and 700 of them now. We're ramping up the
    production right now and our expectation is that we'll be
    sending in between 500 and 1,000 a month pretty quickly here.
        Senator Chambliss. Do you have any idea when that will
    begin? Will it begin before the weather warms up?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. Again, we're probably either
    this month or next going to be at 500 a month going into the
    country.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to the witnesses for your service. It strikes me
    after 3 hours that we're coming close here to violating your
    rights under the Geneva Convention. But I thank you for your
    strength as shown here today.
        Frankly, seriously, I don't think we've had a better team
    than you at DOD in a long time, and I thank you for your
    service in every way. I think this is a very good budget.
    Obviously, we'll go over it in a series of subject matter
    hearings, but I think it meets the needs of our military within
    the resources that we have.
        I want to ask a question I think hasn't been addressed.
    Both of you talked about, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen,
    about the proper balance between allocating funds to meet the
    unconventional threats we're facing in the war against Islamist
    extremism, terrorism, and then being set to meet threats later
    on from large potentially peer competitors. Somewhere in the
    mix with both of those is Iran, now still the major state
    sponsor of terrorism in the world, according to the State
    Department.
        It seems to me that it is also the most significant threat
    multiplier out there if it goes nuclear. We all want to find a
    diplomatic way to get the Iranians not to go nuclear. The
    Senate passed a very strong sanctions bill last Thursday
    unanimously, which goes to conference now and hopefully it will
    come back soon.
        But I wanted to ask you the extent to which the budget that
    you present to us will enable us to deal with this threat. If
    Iran goes nuclear, it greatly strengthens their terrorist
    proxies, including some that have killed a lot of Americans in
    Iraq and are causing some trouble in Afghanistan. It probably
    ends the nonproliferation, nuclear nonproliferation regime.
        Admiral Mullen, at one point I saw you quoted somewhere a
    while ago that said just in the normal dispatch of your
    responsibility it's your responsibility to prepare plans for
    potential use of military force against Iran regarding nuclear
    weapons. Then General Petraeus said something similar recently.
    I wanted to ask you if that's the case and how you would
    describe that, in what context you would put that preparation?
        Admiral Mullen. I put it in the context I think, Senator,
    that you laid it out. I think the potential for instability is
    still there, that I'm, as many are, hopeful that the engagement
    dialogue has legs and actually can produce something. I would
    agree with your assessment that them achieving that capability,
    it becomes a whole new ballgame in terms of what the down side
    potential is. I don't see much upside potential. We certainly
    over a long period of time have recognized that and focused on
    that. We work contingencies all the time, and it was really in
    that context that I was speaking of that.
        The President has said, Secretary Gates has said, I've
    said, all options remain on the table and certainly the
    military is one of them.
        Senator Lieberman. Secretary Gates, let me ask you a
    different side to this. In recent trips over the last year or
    so that I've taken to the Middle East, both to the Arab
    countries and to Israel, it seems to me that there is a kind of
    increasing military connection in a very positive sense between
    ourselves and our allies there. I wonder if you'd comment on
    that, and to what extent you see it in relationship to the
    current or future Iranian threat?
        Secretary Gates. We have made considerable progress over
    the past 2 years or so in developing a regional maritime
    surveillance, air and missile defense cooperation in the Gulf
    region. It is a step at a time. It is in my view clearly
    motivated--they are motivated--because of their concerns with
    Iran's armaments programs and, leave aside nuclear weapons, the
    number of missiles they're building and so on. So we have made
    considerable progress in those relationships.
        Senator Lieberman. I thank you. My time's up. I know we
    want to give you a minute or 2 off. Thank you again.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
        That concludes this hearing. The chart I referred to, which
    I prepared relative to the Afghan Army, will be made part of
    the record. Secretary Gates, we would ask you and Chairman
    Mullen to present this chart to your folks, make sure that it's
    accurate. If there's any errors in it, please let us know
    immediately, and ask General Rodriguez please to provide us the
    information that he has committed to provide.
        Admiral Mullen, you have your hand up.
        Admiral Mullen. Just one for the record, and it's brief. On
    Senator Thune's question, he was asking about decommissioning
    bombers and in fact what I didn't say was there is
    consideration for a reduction in the number of bombers in the
    overall START negotiations, which are ongoing and which have
    not come to conclusion yet.
        Chairman Levin. We will ask his staff to give him that
    information.
        We're going to recess now for 5 minutes. When we come back,
    after opening statements we are going to call on Senators in
    the same order that we called on them for the first hearing.
    We'll stand adjourned for 5 minutes.
        [Recess from 12:03 p.m. to 12:08 p.m.]
        Chairman Levin. The committee is now going to receive
    testimony from our senior leadership of DOD as we begin the
    task of addressing the DADT policy on gays in the military. I
    believe that ending the policy would improve our military's
    capability and reflect our commitment to equal opportunity. I
    do not find the arguments used to justify DADT convincing when
    it took effect in 1993 and they are less so now.
        I agree with what President Obama said in his State of the
    Union address, that we should repeal this discriminatory
    policy. In the latest Gallup poll, the American public
    overwhelmingly supports allowing gays and lesbians to serve
    openly in the military. Sixty nine percent of Americans are
    recorded as supporting their right to serve and many in fact
    are serving.
        As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John
    Shalikashvili said--and he supports ending the policy--``A
    majority of troops already believe that they serve alongside
    gay or lesbian colleagues.'' One recent study estimated that
    66,000 gays and lesbians are serving today, at constant risk of
    losing their chance to serve.
        Other nations have allowed gay and lesbian servicemembers
    to serve in their militaries without discrimination and without
    impact on unit cohesion or morale. A comprehensive study on
    this was conducted by Rand in 1993. Rand researchers reported
    on the positive experiences of Canada, France, Germany, Israel,
    and The Netherlands and Norway, all of which allowed known
    homosexuals to serve in their Armed Forces. Senator McCain and
    I have asked DOD to update the 1993 report.
        Ending this discriminatory policy will contribute to our
    military's effectiveness. To take just one example, dozens of
    Arabic and Farsi linguists have been forced out of the military
    under DADT at a time when our need to understand those
    languages has never been greater. Thousands of troops, 13,000
    by one estimate, have been forced to leave the military under
    the current policy. That number includes many who could help
    the military complete some particularly difficult and dangerous
    missions.
        I have long admired the merit-based system of advancement
    employed by the U.S. military that allows service men and women
    of varied backgrounds to advance to positions of high
    leadership. An Army is not a democracy. It is a meritocracy,
    where success depends not on who you are, but on how well you
    do your job. Despite its necessarily undemocratic nature, our
    military has helped lead the way in areas of fairness and anti-
    discrimination. It has served as a flagship for American values
    and aspirations, both inside the United States and around the
    world.
        We will hold additional hearings to hear from various
    points of view and approaches on this matter. This committee
    will hold a hearing on February 11, when we will hear from an
    independent panel. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs
    will all be testifying before this committee during the month
    of February on their various budgets, and they, of course, will
    be open to questions on this subject as well during their
    testimony.
        My goal will be to move quickly, but deliberatively, to
    maximize the opportunity for all Americans to serve their
    country, while addressing any concerns that may be raised. We
    should end DADT and we can and should do it in a way that
    honors our Nation's values while making us more secure.
        My entire statement will be made part of the record. A
    statement of Senator Gillibrand will also be inserted in the
    record following the statement of Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
        The committee continues our hearing this afternoon to receive
    testimony from the senior leadership of the Department of Defense as we
    begin the task of addressing the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy on
    gays in the military. I believe ending the policy would improve our
    military's capability and reflect our commitment to equal opportunity.
        I did not find the arguments used to justify ``Don't Ask, Don't
    Tell'' convincing when it took effect in 1993, and they are less so
    now. I agree with what President Obama said in his State of the Union
    address, that we should repeal this discriminatory policy.
        In the latest Gallup poll, the American public overwhelmingly
    supports allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military.
    Sixty-nine percent of Americans are recorded as supporting their right
    to serve--and many are in fact serving. As former Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs General John Shalikashvili, who supports ending the policy has
    pointed out, a majority of troops already believe they serve alongside
    gay or lesbian colleagues. It's hard to know for sure, but one recent
    study estimated that 66,000 gays and lesbians are serving today, forced
    to hide their orientation and at constant risk of losing the chance to
    serve.
        Supporters of this policy argue that allowing gays and lesbians to
    serve openly would damage unit cohesion and morale, crucial factors in
    building combat effectiveness. But there is no evidence that the
    presence of gay and lesbian colleagues would damage our military's
    ability to fight. Other nations have allowed gay and lesbian
    servicemembers to serve in their militaries without discrimination and
    without impact on unit cohesion or morale. The most comprehensive study
    on this was conducted by Rand in 1993. Rand researchers reported on the
    positive experiences of Canada, France, Germany, Israel, the
    Netherlands and Norway, all of which allowed known homosexuals to serve
    in their Armed Forces. Senator McCain and I have asked the Department
    to update this 1993 report.
        We should end this discriminatory policy because ending it will
    contribute to our military's effectiveness. To take just one example:
    dozens of Arabic and Farsi linguists have been forced out of the
    military under ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' at a time when our need to
    understand those languages has never been greater. Thousands of
    troops--13,500 by one estimate--have been forced to leave the military
    under the current policy. Certainly that number includes many who could
    help the military complete its difficult and dangerous missions.
        Supporters of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' accuse those who would
    change it of trying to impose a social agenda on the military. But at
    this point in our history, when gays and lesbians openly work and
    succeed in every aspect of our national life, it is the ``Don't Ask,
    Don't Tell'' policy that reflects a social agenda out of step with the
    everyday experience of most Americans.
        I have long admired the merit-based system of advancement employed
    by the U.S. military that allows service men and women of varied
    backgrounds to advance to positions of high leadership. An Army is not
    a democracy. It is a meritocracy where success depends not on who you
    are, but on how well you do your job. Despite its necessarily
    undemocratic nature, our military has helped lead the way in areas of
    fairness and anti-discrimination, as it did in ending racial
    segregation in America. It has served as a flagship for American values
    and aspirations both inside the United States and around the world.
        We will hold additional hearings to hear from various points of
    view and approaches on this matter. This committee will hold a hearing
    on February 11 when we will hear from an independent panel. The Service
    Secretaries and Service Chiefs will all be testifying before this
    committee during the month of February and they will be open to
    questions on this subject during their testimony.
        Change is always hard, especially when it involves social issues or
    personal beliefs. We will proceed fairly, trying to hear varying
    opinions. I hope those who favor change will not mistake open and fair
    process for undue delay.
        My goal will be to move quickly but deliberately to maximize the
    opportunity for all Americans to serve their country while addressing
    any concerns that may be raised. We should end ``Don't Ask, Don't
    Tell,'' and we can and should do it in a way that honors our Nation's
    values while making it more secure.

        Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
    to thank you Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen for what's
    turning into a very long morning for them. We appreciate your
    patience and your input on this very, very important issue.
        We meet to consider the DADT policy, a policy that the
    President has made clear, most recently last week in his State
    of the Union Address, that he wants Congress to repeal. This
    would be a substantial and controversial change to a policy
    that has been successful for 2 decades. It would also present
    yet another challenge to our military at a time of already
    tremendous stress and strain.
        Our men and women in uniform are fighting two wars,
    guarding the front lines against a global terrorist enemy,
    serving and sacrificing on battlefields far from home, and
    working to rebuild and reform the force after more than 8 years
    of conflict. At this moment of immense hardship for our armed
    services, we should not be seeking to overturn the DADT policy.
        I want to make one thing perfectly clear upfront. I'm
    enormously proud of and thankful for every American who chooses
    to put on the uniform of our Nation and serve at this time of
    war. I want to encourage more of our fellow citizens to serve
    and to open up opportunities to do so. Many gay and lesbian
    Americans are serving admirably in our Armed Forces, even
    giving their lives so that we and others can know the blessings
    of peace. I honor their sacrifice and I honor them.
        Our challenge is how to continue welcoming this service
    amid the vast complexities of the largest, most expensive, most
    well-regarded, and most critical institution in our Nation, our
    Armed Forces. This is an extremely difficult issue and the
    Senate vigorously debated it in 1993. We heard from the senior
    uniformed and civilian leaders of our military on eight
    occasions before this committee alone. When Congress ultimately
    wrote the law, we included important findings that did justice
    to the seriousness of the subject.
        I would ask, without objection, Mr. Chairman, that a copy
    of the statute, including those findings, be included in the
    record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator McCain. I won't quote all those findings, but three
    points must be made. First, Congress found in the law that the
    military's mission to prepare for and conduct combat operations
    requires service men and women to accept living and working
    conditions that are often spartan and characterized by forced
    intimacy with little or no privacy.
        Second, the law finds that civilian life is fundamentally
    different from military life, which is characterized by its own
    laws, rules, customs, and traditions, including many
    restrictions on personal conduct that would not be tolerated in
    civil society.
        Finally, the law finds that the essence of military
    capability is good order and unit cohesion and that any
    practice which puts those goals at unacceptable risk can be
    restricted.
        These findings were the foundation of DADT, and I'm eager
    to hear from our distinguished witnesses what has changed since
    these findings were written such that the law they supported
    can now be repealed.
        Has this policy been ideal? No, it has not, but it has been
    effective. It has helped to balance the potentially disruptive
    tension between the desires of a minority and the broader
    interests of our All-Volunteer Force. It is well understood and
    predominantly supported by our fighting men and women. It
    reflects, as I understand them, the preferences of our
    uniformed services. It has sustained unit cohesion and unit
    morale while still allowing gay and lesbian Americans to serve
    their country in uniform. It has done all of this for nearly 2
    decades.
        Mr. Chairman, this is a letter signed by over 1,000 former
    general and flag officers who have weighed in on this issue. I
    think that we all in Congress should pay attention and benefit
    from the experience and knowledge of over a thousand former
    general officers and flag officers, where they say: ``We firmly
    believe that this law which Congress passed to protect good
    order, discipline and morale in the unique environment of the
    Armed Forces deserves continued support.'' So I think we should
    also pay attention to those who have served, who can speak more
    frankly on many occasions than those who are presently serving.
        I know that any decision Congress makes about the future of
    this law will inevitably leave a lot of people angry and
    unfulfilled. There are patriotic and well-meaning Americans on
    each side of this debate, and I have heard their many
    passionate concerns. Ultimately, though, numerous military
    leaders tell me that DADT is working and that we should not
    change it now. I agree.
        I would welcome a report done by the JCS based solely on
    military readiness, effectiveness, and needs, and not on
    politics, that would study the DADT, that would consider the
    impact of its repeal on our armed services, and that would
    offer their best military advice on the right course of action.
        We have an All-Volunteer Force. It is better trained, more
    effective, and more professional than any military in our
    history, and today that force is shouldering a greater global
    burden than at any time in decades. We owe our lives to our
    fighting men and women and we should be exceedingly cautious,
    humble, and sympathetic when attempting to regulate their
    affairs.
        DADT has been an imperfect but effective policy, and at
    this moment, when we're asking more of our military than at any
    time in recent memory, we should not repeal this law.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Gillibrand follows:]
                Prepared Statement by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
    committee, I appreciate your leadership in hosting this important
    hearing today.
        James Madison once said, ``Equal laws protecting equal rights . . .
    the best guarantee of loyalty and love of country.''
        Lesbian and gay service men and women have been serving in our
    Armed Forces bravely while being denied the full equality they deserve.
    Since 1993, more than 13,500 American troops have been discharged from
    the military under ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' (DADT), at an estimated
    cost of over $400 million. Those discharges include more than 800
    specialists with skills deemed mission critical by the U.S. military,
    including at least 323 linguists, approximately 10 percent of foreign
    language speakers, 59 of which specialized in Arabic, and at least 9 of
    which specialized in Farsi, the official language of Iran. Among these
    specialists were pilots, engineers, doctors, nurses, and combat medics,
    all of which the military has faced shortfalls of in recent years.
        These brave Americans were not discharged because of poor
    performance, but rather because of their sexual orientation.
        According to a recent study by the Williams Institute, an estimated
    66,000 lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are serving in the U.S.
    military. According to data provided by the Department of Defense,
    discharges under DADT in the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps
    declined to 428 in 2009 from 619 the previous year. This represents a
    65 percent drop since 2001, the highest number on record.
        In a time of war, discharges have decreased, even as anecdotal
    evidence strongly suggests larger numbers of lesbian and gay
    servicemembers are serving openly. Despite the current law, individual
    commanders are deciding to retain otherwise qualified personnel.
        Why is this the case? Because the Armed Forces is experiencing
    shortfalls in several types of mission-critical personnel, especially
    in the midst of fighting ongoing wars, and is losing additional trained
    and highly qualified personnel under DADT. It has been estimated that
    the U.S. military loses more than 4,000 gay and lesbian military
    personnel each year, which it would have otherwise retained, had the
    servicemembers been able to be open about their sexual orientation, and
    that more than 40,000 recruits might join if the ban is lifted.
    Commanders on the ground believe what many of us strongly believe--it's
    time to repeal DADT.
        In a January 2007 op-ed article published in The New York Times,
    General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    when the policy was enacted, stated that his opinion was that DADT
    should be repealed. He argued that due to the U.S. military being
    stretched thin by its current deployments in the Middle East, the Armed
    Forces need to accept every American who is willing and able to serve.
    Last week I was proud to share another statement from General
    Shalikashvili, 1 of only 17 people in the country's history to serve as
    chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calling for an end to this
    failed policy. In his statement he said:

              ``When I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my
            support of the current policy was based on my belief that
            implementing a change in the rules would have been too
            burdensome for our troops and commanders at the time.
              ``The concern among many at that time, was that letting
            people who were openly gay serve would lower morale, harm
            recruitment and undermine unit cohesion. ``DADT'' was seen as a
            useful measure that allowed time to pass while our culture
            continued to evolve. The question before us now is whether
            enough time has gone by to give this policy serious
            reconsideration. I believe that it has.''

        Twenty-five foreign militaries now let gays serve openly, including
    our closest ally, Britain. I sit on the Foreign Relations Committee and
    I am acutely aware that most of our allies--Israel, Britain, France, 22
    of 26 NATO nations in all--allow gay and lesbian soldiers to serve
    openly and I believe the American military should follow suit. At a
    time when our Nation is fighting two wars, and with increased national
    security threats, we can ill afford this loss of personnel and talent
    in our national defense. Our military is the best in the world. Once
    gay and lesbian servicemembers are allowed to serve openly, our
    military will still be the best in the world.
        As we look at the path that has brought us to this hearing today,
    regarding how best to repeal the DADT policy, I am reminded of several
    leaders in the fight to allow openly gay servicemembers into the Armed
    Forces.
        One is then West Point Cadet, Lt. Alexander Raggio. In his 2006
    award winning thesis he stated:

              ``The military should abandon the false acceptance of DADT
            and allow the open service of homosexuals immediately.'' He
            added, ``Current policy cannot be rationally explained except
            as a reflection of the personal prejudices of those who create
            and enforce it and, rationalized by faulty logic and double
            standards.''

        These steps towards equality are our duty. I strongly believe that
    equality is an inalienable American right--and should not be ascribed
    based on gender or race, religion or sexual orientation or gender
    identity. America must lead by example when it comes to equality and
    justice. Freedom from discrimination is a basic right that all
    Americans should enjoy. Lifting the ban on DADT is not only necessary
    for realizing equality, but it's necessary for ensuring that our Armed
    Forces remain the best in the world.
        Pepe Johnson, a former Sergeant, U.S. Army sums up the moral
    imperative on why we have to change this policy. Every day this policy
    remains we ask these soldiers to lie about who they are, Pepe said
    ``Honesty and integrity are everything in the army. I felt if I was
    lying, I didn't have it. I wasn't serving with integrity. I felt
    trapped. Lying is not the way of the Army--I felt I was violating
    regulation.
        ``During the 3 years I served I only wanted to be all I could be--
    to borrow the old recruiting slogan--but DADT forced me to be something
    other than what I was. That's not consistent with the Army's Values:
    'Leaders are honest to others by not presenting themselves or their
    actions as anything other than what they are, remaining committed to
    the truth.' (FM 6-22, Army Leadership) As long as DADT exists, there is
    a hole in the integrity of the entire military.''
        We must recognize that human dignity and respect are part and
    parcel of who we were as Americans--male or female, African American or
    Caucasian, gay or straight, bisexual or transgender.
        We must ensure that our Armed Forces are fully prepared with the
    best resources we can muster. DADT is a threat to our men and women in
    uniform and our national security. We cannot afford to handicap our
    efforts because of ignorance or hatred.
        This policy is wrong for our national security and inconsistent
    with the moral foundation upon which our country was founded. It is
    critically important for this Congress to take up President Obama's
    call to permanently end the ban on LGBT Americans serving in our armed
    services. We will strengthen America--both militarily and morally--by
    repealing this discriminatory policy.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Secretary Gates.
        Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, last week during the State
    of the Union Address the President announced he will work with
    Congress this year to repeal the DADT law. He subsequently
    directed DOD to begin the preparations necessary for a repeal
    of the current law and policy.
        I fully support the President's decision. The question
    before us is not whether the military prepares to make this
    change, but how we best prepare for it. We received our orders
    from the Commander in Chief and we are moving out accordingly.
    However, we can also take this process only so far, as the
    ultimate decision rests with you, Congress.
        I am mindful of the fact, as are you, that unlike the last
    time this issue was considered by Congress more than 15 years
    ago, our military is engaged in two wars that have put troops
    and their families under considerable stress and strain. I am
    mindful as well that attitudes towards homosexuality may have
    changed considerably, both in society generally and in the
    military, over the intervening years.
        To ensure that DOD is prepared should the law be changed,
    and working in close consultation with Admiral Mullen, I have
    appointed a high-level working group within DOD that will
    immediately begin a review of the issues associated with
    properly implementing a repeal of the DADT. The mandate of this
    working group is to thoroughly, objectively, and methodically
    examine all aspects of this question and produce its finding
    and recommendations in the form of an implementation plan by
    the end of this calendar year.
        A guiding principle of our efforts will be to minimize
    disruption and polarization within the ranks, with special
    attention paid to those serving on the front lines. I am
    confident this can be achieved.
        The working group will examine a change of lines of study,
    all of which will proceed simultaneously. First, the working
    group will reach out to the force, to authoritatively
    understand their views and attitudes about the impact of
    repeal. I expect that the same sharp divisions that
    characterize the debate over these issues outside of the
    military will quickly seek to find their way into this process,
    particularly as it pertains to what are the true views and
    attitudes of our troops and their families.
        I am determined to carry out this process in a way that
    establishes objective and reliable information on this
    question, with minimal influence by the policy or political
    debate. It is essential that we accomplish this in order to
    have the best possible analysis and information to guide the
    policy choices before the Department and Congress.
        Second, the working group will undertake a thorough
    examination of all the changes to the Department's regulations
    and policies that may have to be made. These include potential
    revisions to policies on benefits, base housing, fraternization
    and misconduct, separations and discharges, and many others. We
    will enter this examination with no preconceived views, but a
    recognition that this will represent a fundamental change in
    personnel policy, one that will require that we provide our
    commanders with the guidance and tools necessary to accomplish
    this transition successfully and with minimum disruption to the
    Department's critical missions.
        Third, the working group will examine the potential impacts
    of a change in the law on military effectiveness, including how
    a change might affect unit cohesion, recruiting and retention,
    and other issues crucial to the performance of the force. The
    working group will develop ways to mitigate and manage any
    negative impacts.
        These are, generally speaking, the broad areas we have
    identified for study under this review. We will of course
    continue to refine and expand these as we get into this process
    or engage in discussion with Congress and other sources. In
    this regard, we expect that the working group will reach out to
    outside experts with a wide variety of perspectives and
    experience. To that end, the Department will, as requested by
    this committee, ask the Rand Corporation to update their study
    from 1993 on the impact of allowing homosexuals to serve openly
    in the military.
        We also have received some helpful suggestions on how this
    outside review might be expanded to cover a wide swath of
    issues. This will be a process that will be open to views and
    recommendations from a wide variety of sources, including of
    course members of Congress.
        Mr. Chairman, I expect that our approach may cause some to
    wonder why it will take the better part of a year to accomplish
    the task. We have looked at a variety of options, but when you
    take into account the overriding imperative to get this right
    and minimize disruption to a force that is actively fighting
    two wars and working through the stress of almost a decade of
    combat, then it is clear to us we must proceed in a manner that
    allows for the thorough examination of all issues.
        An important part of this process is to engage our men and
    women in uniform and their families over this period, since,
    after all, they will ultimately determine whether or not we
    make this transition successfully.
        To ensure that this process is able to accomplish its
    important mission, Chairman Mullen and I have determined that
    we need to appoint the highest level officials to carry it out.
    Accordingly, I am naming DOD General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, and
    General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Army-Europe, to serve as
    the co-chairs for this effort.
        Simultaneous with launching this process, I have also
    directed DOD to quickly review the regulations used to
    implement the current DADT law and within 45 days present to me
    recommended changes to those regulations that within existing
    law will enforce this policy in a fairer manner. You may recall
    that I asked DOD's General Counsel to conduct a preliminary
    review of this matter last year. Based on that preliminary
    review, we believe that we have a degree of latitude within the
    existing law to change our internal procedures in a manner that
    is more appropriate and fair to our men and women in uniform.
    We will now conduct a final detailed assessment of this
    proposal before proceeding.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee: DOD
    understands that this is a very difficult and in the minds of
    some controversial policy question. I am determined that we in
    DOD carry out this process professionally, thoroughly,
    dispassionately, and in a manner that is responsive to the
    direction of the President and to the needs of Congress as you
    debate and consider this matter.
        However, on behalf of the men and women in uniform and
    their families, I also ask you to work with us to insofar as
    possible keep them out of the political dimension of this
    issue. I am not asking for you not to do your jobs fully and
    with vigor, but rather that as this debate unfolds you keep the
    impact it will have on our forces firmly in mind.
        Thank you for this opportunity to lay out our thinking on
    this important policy question. We look forward to working with
    Congress and hearing your ideas on the best way ahead.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
        Last week, during the State of the Union address, the President
    announced that he will work with Congress this year to repeal the law
    known as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'' He subsequently directed the
    Department of Defense to begin the preparations necessary for a repeal
    of the current law and policy.
        I fully support the President's decision. The question before us is
    not whether the military prepares to make this change, but how we best
    prepare for it. We have received our orders from the Commander in Chief
    and we are moving out accordingly. However, we also can only take this
    process so far as the ultimate decision rests with you, Congress.
        I am mindful of the fact, as are you, that unlike the last time
    this issue was considered by Congress more than 15 years ago, our
    military is engaged in two wars that have put troops and their families
    under considerable stress and strain. I am mindful, as well, that
    attitudes towards homosexuality may have changed considerably--both in
    society generally and in the military--over the intervening years.
        To ensure that the department is prepared should the law be
    changed, and working in close consultation with Admiral Mullen, I have
    appointed a high-level working group within the department that will
    immediately begin a review of the issues associated with properly
    implementing a repeal of the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy. The
    mandate of this working group is to thoroughly, objectively and
    methodically examine all aspects of this question and produce its
    finding and recommendations in the form of an implementation plan by
    the end of this calendar year. A guiding principle of our efforts will
    be to minimize disruption and polarization within the ranks, with
    special attention paid to those serving on the front lines. I am
    confident that this can be achieved.
        The working group will examine a number of lines of study, all of
    which will proceed simultaneously.
        First, the working group will reach out to the force to
    authoritatively understand their views and attitudes about the impacts
    of repeal. I expect that the same sharp divisions that characterize the
    debate over these issues outside of the military will quickly seek to
    find their way into this process, particularly as it pertains to what
    are the true views and attitudes of our troops and their families. I am
    determined to carry out this process in a way that establishes
    objective and reliable information on this question with minimal
    influence by the policy or political debate. It is essential that we
    accomplish this in order to have the best possible analysis and
    information to guide the policy choices before the Department and
    Congress.
        Second, the working group will undertake a thorough examination of
    all the changes to the department's regulations and policies that may
    have to be made. These include potential revisions to policies on
    benefits, base housing, fraternization and misconduct, separations and
    discharges, and many others. We will enter this examination with no
    preconceived views, but a recognition that this will represent a
    fundamental change in personnel policy--one that will require we
    provide our commanders with the guidance and tools necessary to
    accomplish this transition successfully and with minimal disruption to
    the Department's critical missions.
        Third, the working group will examine the potential impacts of a
    change in the law on military effectiveness, including how a change
    might affect unit cohesion, recruiting and retention, and other issues
    crucial to the performance of the force. The working group will develop
    ways to mitigate and manage any negative impacts.
        These are, generally speaking, the broad areas we have identified
    for study under this review. We will, of course, continue to refine and
    expand these as we get into this process or engage in discussion with
    Congress or other sources.
        In this regard, we expect that the working group will reach out to
    outside experts with a wide variety of perspectives and experience. To
    that end, the Department will, as requested by this committee, ask the
    RAND Corporation to update their study from 1993 on the impacts of
    allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the military. We have also
    received some helpful suggestions on how this outside review might be
    expanded to cover a wide swath of issues. This will be a process that
    will be open to views and recommendations from a wide variety of
    sources, including, of course, Members of Congress.
        Mr. Chairman, I expect that our approach may cause some to wonder
    why it will take the better part of the year to accomplish this task.
    We looked at a variety of options, but when you take into account the
    overriding imperative--to get this right and minimize disruption to a
    force that is actively fighting two wars and working through the stress
    of almost a decade of combat--then it is clear to us that we must
    proceed in manner that allows for the thorough examination of all
    issues. An important part of this process is to engage our men and
    women in uniform and their families over this period since, after all,
    they will ultimately determine whether we make this transition
    successfully or not.
        To ensure this process is able to accomplish its important mission,
    Chairman Mullen and I have determined that we need to appoint the
    highest level officials to carry it out. Accordingly, I am naming the
    Department of Defense General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, and General Carter
    Ham, Commander of U.S. Army Europe, to serve as the co-chairs to for
    this effort.
        Simultaneous with launching this process, I have also directed the
    Department to quickly review the regulations used to implement the
    current Don't Ask, Don't Tell law and, within 45 days, present to me
    recommended changes to those regulations that, within existing law,
    will enforce this policy in a more humane and fair manner. You may
    recall that I asked the Department's General Counsel to conduct a
    preliminary review of this matter last year. Based on that preliminary
    review, we believe that we have a degree of latitude within the
    existing law to change our internal procedures in a manner that is more
    appropriate and fair to our men and women in uniform. We will now
    conduct a final detailed assessment of this proposal before proceeding.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of this committee, the
    Department of Defense understands that this is a very difficult and, in
    the minds of some, controversial policy question. I am determined that
    we in the Department carry out this process professionally, thoroughly,
    dispassionately, and in a manner that is responsive to the direction of
    the President and to the needs of Congress as you debate and consider
    this matter. However, on behalf of the men and women in uniform and
    their families, I also ask that you work with us to, insofar as
    possible, to keep them out of the political dimension of this issue. I
    am not asking for you not to do your jobs fully and with vigor, but
    rather that as this debate unfolds, you keep the impact it will have on
    our forces firmly in mind.
        Thank you for this opportunity to lay out our thinking on this
    important policy question. We look forward to working with Congress and
    hearing your ideas on the best way ahead.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Mullen.
        Admiral Mullen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
    and thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss with you
    this very important matter.
        The Chiefs and I are in complete support of the approach
    that Secretary Gates has outlined. We believe that any
    implementation plan for a policy permitting gays and lesbians
    to serve openly in the Armed Forces must be carefully derived,
    sufficiently thorough, and thoughtfully executed. Over these
    last 2 months, we have reviewed the fundamental premises behind
    DADT as well as its application in practice over the last 16
    years. We understand perfectly the President's desire to see
    the law repealed and we owe him our best military advice about
    the impact of such a repeal and the manner in which we would
    implement a change in policy.
        The Chiefs and I have not yet developed that advice and
    would like to have the time to do so in the same thoughtful,
    deliberate fashion with which the President has made it clear
    he wants to proceed. The review group Secretary Gates has
    ordered will no doubt give us that time and an even deeper
    level of understanding. We look forward to cooperating with and
    participating in this review to the maximum extent possible,
    and we applaud the selection of Mr. Johnson and General Ham to
    lead it. Both are men of great integrity, great experience, and
    have our complete trust and confidence.
        Mr. Chairman, speaking for myself and myself only, it is my
    personal belief that allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly
    would be the right thing to do. No matter how I look at this
    issue, I cannot escape being troubled by the fact that we have
    in place a policy which forces young men and women to lie about
    who they are in order to defend their fellow citizens. For me
    personally, it comes down to integrity, theirs as individuals
    and ours as an institution.
        I also believe that the great young men and women of our
    military can and would accommodate such a change. I never
    underestimate their ability to adapt.
        But I do not know this for a fact. Nor do I know for a fact
    how we would best make such a major policy change in a time of
    two wars. That there will be some disruption in the force I
    cannot deny. That there will be legal, social, and perhaps even
    infrastructure changes to be made certainly seem plausible. We
    would all like to have a better handle on these types of
    concerns and this is what our review will offer.
        We would also do well to remember that this is not an issue
    for the military leadership to decide. The American people have
    spoken on this subject through you, their elected officials,
    and the result is the law and the policy that we currently
    have. We will continue to obey that law and we will obey
    whatever legislative and executive decisions come out of this
    debate.
        The American people may yet have a different view. You may
    have a different view. I think that's important and it's
    important to have that discussion. Frankly, there are those on
    both sides of this debate who speak as if there is no debate,
    as if there is nothing to be learned or reflected upon. I hope
    we can be more thoughtful than that. I expect that we will be
    more thoughtful than that.
        The Chiefs and I also recognize the stress our troops and
    families are under, and I have said many times before, should
    the law change we need to move forward in a manner that does
    not add to that stress. We have two wars going on, a new
    strategy in Afghanistan, and remaining security challenges in
    Iraq. We're about to move forward under a new QDR. We still
    have budget concerns and a struggling economy, and we have a
    host of other significant security commitments around the
    globe. Our plate is very full, and while I believe this is an
    important issue, I also believe we need to be mindful as we
    move forward of other pressing needs in our military.
        What our young men and women and their families want, what
    they deserve, is that we listen to them and act in their best
    interests. What the citizens we defend want to know, what they
    deserve to know, is that their uniformed leadership will act in
    a way that absolutely does not place in peril the readiness and
    effectiveness of their military. I can tell you that I am 100
    percent committed to that.
        Balance, Mr. Chairman, balance and thoughtfulness, is what
    we need most right now. It's what the President has promised us
    and it's what we ask of you and this body.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        So that everyone has a chance within a reasonable period of
    time, we're just going to have a 3-minute first round.
        Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, we need more than 3 minutes.
    We need more than 3 minutes.
        Chairman Levin. We can have a second round then. We have to
    also have a schedule here. So we'll go to a second round if we
    can fit that into Secretary Gates' schedule. If not, we'll pick
    this up at a later time.
        Well now, this schedule was shared with everybody here, I
    know.
        Senator McCain. Not with me.
        Chairman Levin. It was indeed shared.
        Senator McCain. You're the chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, the Washington Post I think
    this morning reported that the Military Services will not
    pursue any longer disciplinary action against gays and lesbian
    servicemembers whose orientation is revealed by third parties.
    Is that one of the degrees of latitude within existing law that
    you're looking at?
        Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, a preliminary assessment,
    which fits within the 45-day review that I mentioned in my
    prepared statement, is that we can do the following within the
    confines of the existing law. We can raise the level of the
    officer who is authorized to initiate an inquiry. We can raise
    the level of the officer who conducts the inquiry. We can raise
    the bar on what constitutes credible information to initiate an
    inquiry. We can raise the bar on what constitutes a reliable
    person on whose word an inquiry can be initiated. Overall, we
    can reduce the instances in which a servicemember who is trying
    to serve the country honorably is outed by a third person with
    a motive to harm the servicemember. We also have to devise new
    rules and procedures in light of the appeals court decision in
    Witt versus the Department of the Air Force for the areas of
    the country covered by the appellate court.
        So I would say all of these matters are those that will be
    reviewed within this 45-day period. So it's a little more
    complicated than the Washington Post conveyed.
        Chairman Levin. But all of those are possibilities?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Now, would you--assuming that even if it
    requires legislation, would you support a moratorium on
    discharges under DADT during the course of this up to year-long
    assessment that DOD is going to be making?
        Secretary Gates. I would have to look into that, because
    the problem that we have is that all of the issues that both
    Admiral Mullen and I described in terms of what we have to look
    into in terms of the effect on the force, in terms of
    everything else, is what we need to examine before I could
    answer that question.
        Chairman Levin. While you're going to be examining the
    other points that you're looking at, the other flexibilities,
    would you add this to the questions you're going to look at and
    let us know promptly----
        Secretary Gates. Sure.
        Chairman Levin.--as to whether you would support a
    moratorium pending this period on discharges? That doesn't mean
    you couldn't discharge at the end of the period, but there'd be
    a moratorium.
        Secretary Gates. We will look at it, Mr. Chairman. I would
    tell you that the advice that I have been given is that the
    current law would not permit that, but--
        Chairman Levin. I'm saying would you support a change in
    the current law if necessary in order to permit that. That's
    what we need to hear from you on.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. I'm deeply disappointed in your statement,
    Secretary Gates. I was around here in 1993 and was engaged in
    the debates, and what we did in 1993 is we looked at the issue
    and we looked at the effect on the military and then we reached
    a conclusion and then we enacted it into law. Your statement is
    the question before us is not whether the military prepares to
    make this change, but how we best prepare for it.
        It would be far more appropriate, I say with great respect,
    to determine whether repeal of this law is appropriate and what
    effects it would have on the readiness and effectiveness of the
    military, before deciding on whether we should repeal the law
    or not. Fortunately, it is an act of Congress and it requires
    the agreement of Congress in order to repeal it. So your
    statement obviously is one which is clearly biased, without the
    view of Congress being taken into consideration.
        Admiral Mullen, you're the principal military adviser to
    the President and you have to consult with and seek the advice
    of the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders.
    What in your view are the opinions of the other members of the
    Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders about changing this
    policy?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator McCain, as the chairman indicated
    earlier, they'll obviously be out in their posture hearings in
    the near future, and I would certainly defer to them in terms
    of exactly----
        Senator McCain. Well, in the near future I'd like you to
    ask them and we could have it on the record what their position
    is, in the near future.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Each of the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders has appeared
    before the committee, where they had the opportunity to express their
    views. I can tell you that all the Chiefs are concerned with current
    combat operations and the associated stress on the force. Given what is
    currently being asked of our force and their families, the Chiefs would
    all like to better understand the exact nature of the impact of any
    repeal of the law. This is why all of us support a comprehensive review
    of the issue in order to better advise the Secretary of Defense and the
    President.

        Senator McCain. I would like it as soon as possible.
        Admiral Mullen. Actually, I've worked very closely with
    them over the last months in terms of understanding what their
    concerns and what our overall concerns are, and I would
    summarize them by saying it's really important for us to
    understand that if this policy changes, if the law changes,
    what's the impact and how we would implement it. Secretary
    Gates' point about the study is to really understand
    objectively the impact on our troops and on our forces, and
    that is their biggest concern.
        Secretary Gates. I would say, Senator McCain, I absolutely
    agree that how Congress acts on this is dispositive.
        Senator McCain. Well, I hope you will pay attention to the
    views of over a thousand retired flag and general officers.
        Mr. Secretary, what kinds of partnerships or unions would
    the military be prepared to recognize by law in the event that
    this DADT is repealed?
        Secretary Gates. That's one of the many issues that I think
    we have to look at, Senator.
        Senator McCain. So again, you are embarking on saying it's
    not whether the military prepares to make the change, but how
    we best prepare for it, without ever hearing from members of
    Congress, without hearing from the members of the Joint Chiefs,
    and of course without taking into consideration all the
    ramifications of this law. Well, I'm happy to say that we still
    have a Congress of the United States that would have to pass
    the law to repeal DADT despite your efforts to repeal it in
    many respects by fiat.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    holding this very important hearing.
        I want to acknowledge, Secretary Gates, the work you've
    done to put a plan in place. Admiral Mullen, I think the
    centerpiece of your statement will be long remembered for the
    courage and integrity with which you outlined your own personal
    beliefs and how we can proceed.
        I'm proud to hail from a region of the country, the Rocky
    Mountain West, where we have a live and let live attitude. Some
    people would call it small ``l'' libertarianism. People's
    personal lives, the choices that people make, are not the
    government's business. I can't help but think about a great
    Arizonan--I grew up in Arizona. My father was an Arizonan, my
    mother was a Coloradan, and I have the great honor to represent
    Colorado now. Barry Goldwater once said: ``You don't have to be
    straight to shoot straight.'' That's the opportunity that we
    have here today as Congress and the Pentagon moves forward.
        I have a few concerns I'd like to share in the couple of
    minutes that I have, and I'll pepper my comments with questions
    and hopefully there'll be time for you to respond. There have
    been a lot of studies done, Mr. Secretary, Rand, and there's a
    recent study in the Joint Force Quarterly. It's not clear to me
    that the study group needs a full year to study the
    implementation and transition. I want to just put that out
    there.
        I want to ensure that the focus of the group is on how to
    implement repeal of the policy, not whether, and I want to ask
    you to assure me that the end point of the study would be a
    road map to implementing repeal, and that Congress would then
    be in a position to take legislative action that the Pentagon
    as a whole could support.
        Before you answer, I'd like your reaction to a legislative
    proposal that you may have seen. It would be to write into
    repeal legislation the period of time you suggest you need, say
    1 year, while legislating that at the end of that time we would
    have finality, in other words a complete end to DADT. During
    that year-long transition, the DOD would have full authority
    and discretion with respect to DADT investigations and
    discharges.
        Language like this would certainly make me much more
    comfortable since I want, and so many others, a clear path to
    full repeal, and I'm not sure I see finality in the study.
        Again, thank you, gentlemen, and hopefully there's a little
    bit of time left for you to answer.
        Secretary Gates. I think the purpose of the examination
    that we're undertaking frankly is to inform the decisionmaking
    of Congress and the nature of whatever legislation takes place.
    It's also, frankly, to be prepared to begin to implement any
    change in the law. We obviously recognize that this is up to
    Congress and my view is, frankly, that it's critical that this
    matter be settled by a vote of Congress.
        The study is intended to prepare us along those lines so
    that we understand all of the implications involved. Frankly,
    there have been a lot of studies done, but there has not been a
    study done by the military of this, and this is the kind of
    thing that Admiral Mullen was talking about.
        I would just say with respect to your second point that I
    think we would regard--if legislation is passed repealing DADT,
    we would feel it very important that we be given some period of
    time for that implementation, at least a year.
        Admiral Mullen. Senator, if I may, the only thing I would
    comment about all the studies and all the polls, I would just
    urge everybody that's going to be involved in this, look at
    those studies and polls deliberately and what they actually
    looked at specifically, and to just reemphasize what the
    Secretary said: There really hasn't been any significant
    statistically significant and objective survey of our people
    and their families. That gets to the Chiefs' concern and mine
    as well, which really is engaging them in a way that we really
    understand their views on this. That just hasn't been done and,
    as urgently as some would like this to happen, it's just going
    to take some time to do that.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know this is
    an important issue. We need to think it through, and every
    American is entitled to fairness and justice as we deliberate
    these issues. I do think we should do it at a high level.
        I would note, however, a bit of a concern that arises from
    something Senator McCain suggested. That is that the President
    as the Commander in Chief has announced a decision, and the
    Secretary of Defense apparently supports that decision. Admiral
    Mullen now has declared that he personally believes in this
    decision. So then presumably someone below you will do some
    work on the policy, whether this is a good policy or not. So I
    guess if it was a trial we would perhaps raise the undue
    command influence defense.
        I think we need an open and objective and fair evaluation
    of this. A lot of things that have been said I would note that
    are not accurate, at least in my view, at least misrepresent
    certain things. One of them is 10,000 people have been
    dismissed from the military or voluntarily left the military
    under this provision. But that's over 10 years. It would be 1
    percent maybe, if it was 1 year less than that, maybe if it was
    1 year less than that, maybe .75 of 1 percent. But over a
    decade, it would be one-tenth of 1 percent or less.
        Also, there will be costs. I noticed--and I give the
    military credit. A lot of people don't know this, Admiral
    Mullen, how open the debate and discussion you are. There's an
    article in the Joint Forces Quarterly that basically supports
    this change. It was an award-winning article, and they raised a
    lot of different issues both for and against, and the military
    welcomed that. I salute that. I think that's healthy.
        But one of the points it made is that Charles Moskos, one
    of the original authors of the DADT points out that the number
    of discharges for voluntary statements by servicemembers--
    presumably, they come forward and say that they are
    homosexual--accounts for 80 percent of the total, and the
    number of discharges for homosexual acts have declined over the
    years. Do you think that's approximately correct?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator Sessions, I think it is
    approximately correct. But it does go to again sort of a
    fundamental principle with me, which is everybody counts. Part
    of the struggle, back to the institutional integrity aspect of
    this----
        Senator Sessions. Well, I know. I appreciate your view.
        Admiral Mullen.--and putting individuals in a position that
    every single day they wonder whether today's going to be the
    day and devaluing them in that regard just is inconsistent with
    us as an institution. I have served with homosexuals since
    1968. Senator McCain spoke to that in his statement. Everybody
    in the military has, and we understand that. So it is a number
    of things which cumulatively for me personally get me to this
    position.
        But I also want to reemphasize what I said, is I am not
    all-knowing in terms of the impact of what the change would
    have, and that's what I want to understand, and any impact and
    understanding readiness and effectiveness is absolutely
    critical.
        Senator Sessions. Well, it's pretty clear what your view is
    and it would be clear on all your subordinates, every single
    servicemember in uniform. I don't think that they are required
    to lie about who they are. I think that's an overstatement,
    although I think the rule of DADT has seemed to work pretty
    well.
        I would note from the Christian Science Monitor here that
    the Chiefs of the Services met with the Chairman, Mike Mullen--
    I'm quoting from the article--``and the consensus seemed to be
    that, the military fighting two wars and now responding to a
    new mission in Haiti, now is not the time to make such a big
    change to military policy.'' That's my understanding of the
    status of things.
        I just hope that as we discuss it you'll recognize first
    that Congress has made the decision, it's not yours to make,
    and we'll have to change it if we do change it; and second, you
    shouldn't use your power to in any way influence the discussion
    or evaluation of the issue.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I would just say that we can't
    possibly evaluate the impact on unit cohesion, on morale, on
    retention, on recruitment and so on, unless we encourage people
    to tell us exactly what they think and exactly what their views
    are honestly and as forthrightly as possible. Otherwise there's
    no use in doing this at all.
        Again, I just can't emphasize enough, we understand from
    the beginning of this that this must be an act of Congress.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Mullen. Senator Sessions, for me this is about--
    this is not about command influence. This is about leadership,
    and I take that very seriously.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gates, I want to say that I applaud your efforts
    in commissioning a thorough evaluation of DADT and how to
    implement a repeal of the policy in order to minimize
    disruption in military readiness. I was just wondering, within
    this study how will you study--how will the study take into
    account the views of the combatant commanders in theater in
    order to minimize any disruption in the military readiness?
        Secretary Gates. The combatant commanders and the Service
    Chiefs will all have a part in this. The one thing that I have
    asked is that as we go through this process we try to--try not
    to disrupt or impact the deployed forces, and particularly
    those in Afghanistan and Iraq. They have enough on their minds
    and it seems to me we can get the answers that we need to the
    questions that need to be asked by not adding to their burden.
    So the one limitation I've put on this, which obviously does
    not apply to the combatant commanders, is that we try and have
    as little impact on the deployed force as possible.
        Senator Hagan. Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, as we move
    to end discriminatory practices within our Armed Forces, is
    there any reason to believe that the dedication and
    professionalism of our leaders in uniform is based in any way
    upon your sexual orientation, and that the moral fitness of our
    men and women should be based upon their sexual orientation? If
    not, then on what grounds do you believe that there remains a
    need to discriminate based on a servicemember's sexual
    orientation?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator Hagan, I personally don't think
    sexual orientation, again, has a place for these kinds of
    decisions. I actually, I think there's a gap between that which
    we value as a military, specifically the value of integrity,
    and what our policy is. But again, that's personally where I
    am. I think it's really in the review that would take place
    over the course of the next--by the end of this year, that I
    would look to certainly understand it much more fully,
    understand the impact if and when the policy changes, the
    impact on our people.
        That's really--rather than at the end of this, we're to
    some degree at the beginning of really trying to understand
    that. That's in light of many other opinions on this, including
    the opinions of those who've retired, all those things. But it
    really is--what I need to understand is to get it from our
    people and their families, and incorporating that in addition
    to all the other requirements that are here will be the goal of
    the review over the next better part of this year.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I, too, am disappointed with this decision by the
    administration. But I'll say this for our two witnesses. They
    understand the chain of command. I think we understand that
    elections have consequences, and these two gentlemen see their
    charge as moving forward with the directives of their
    commander. I think Secretary Gates said it explicitly in his
    statement: ``We have received our orders from the Commander in
    Chief and we are moving out accordingly.''
        So we'll have a debate about this and we will appreciate
    the information that the Department gathers for us.
        Senator McCain referenced in his statement more than 1,000
    retired flag and general officers. Actually, I think it's
    upwards of 1,160 retired flag and general officers from all the
    armed services who have come out against a change in this
    policy. For my colleagues, their statement urging continued
    support for the 1993 law is contained at
    www.flagandgeneralofficersforthemilitary.com.
        I would commend to the members of this committee an op-ed
    written by Carl E. Mundy, Jr., a retired four-star general and
    former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, who points out--who
    mentions the strong support for the current policy by this
    overwhelming number of retired flag and general officers, and
    points out that certain findings were made by Congress in
    support of the 1993 law to ensure clarity concerning the
    rationale behind the current statute. Key findings included
    that the primary purpose of the Armed Forces is to prepare and
    to prevail in combat, not to promote civil rights or social
    justice or compassion or individual fairness, but to prepare
    for and prevail in combat.
        Further findings include that success in combat requires
    military units that are characterized by high morale, good
    order and discipline, and unit cohesion; and further, that one
    of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit
    cohesion, that is the bonds of trust among individuals
    servicemembers.
        I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that this op-ed dated January
    12, 2010, by General Mundy be included in the record at this
    point.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Wicker. So I appreciate the situation that our two
    witnesses find themselves in and I look forward to the debate
    and hope that the policy remains.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, let me see if we can review the facts here. This
    is obviously quite an emotional issue, but it's also a
    legislative issue. My understanding from hearing both of your
    statements is this year period that you're going to take in
    order to examine the issues will be followed then by clearer
    observations about the implications of changing the law. Would
    that be a correct way to state it? So you're not coming in here
    saying, we're going to change the law and this is the year that
    we're going to put into figuring out how to implement the
    change?
        Secretary Gates. Our hope would be that the information we
    would develop during the course of this review would help
    inform the legislative process.
        Senator Webb. Right. I salute both of you for very careful
    statements. Admiral Mullen, I salute you for the courage, for
    what you said, but I want to also emphasize that you balanced
    that in your statement saying you don't know what's going to
    come out of this. We don't know.
        What we're looking for here is an examination of the
    present law, what is the most damaging aspect of the present
    policy? I think, Admiral Mullen, you made a very powerful
    statement in terms of the integrity of the individual as your
    deciding factor on your personal view.
        What is, on the other hand, what's the great value of this
    law if we were to do away with it and move into something else?
    Again, what are the perils of undoing the law? Where are we
    going? Would we know we are going in the proper direction? We
    don't. We can't really say that today.
        I think that when you say that this is something that will
    ultimately be decided by Congress, I'd also like to emphasize
    my own agreement with what you have been saying about how
    important it is to hear from people who are serving, because
    whether the ultimate decision might be here with Congress, that
    decision can't be made in a proper way without a full and open
    input from all of those who are serving, not just combatant
    commanders--family members, people who are in the operating
    units.
        The way that I am hearing this, which I would agree with,
    is that we have a duty here in a very proper way to understand
    the impact of this on operating units, to raise the level of
    understanding of the complexity of this issue among the
    American people and up here, as well as attempting to deal
    fairly with this issue.
        So again, I salute you both for a very responsible and
    careful approach to how we examine this.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just as was stated by my friend Senator Udall, I think that
    a live and let live policy is not a bad policy to adhere to,
    and that's what we have in place in the military with DADT
    right now.
        To you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, you're in a
    tough spot and we understand that. This is an extremely
    sensitive issue. Everybody on this committee, I'm satisfied, is
    very sensitive to the issue, both inside and outside the
    military. In the military, it presents entirely different
    problems than it does in civilian life, because there is no
    constitutional right to serve in our Armed Forces. Today we
    know we have gay and lesbians soldiers serving. They've served
    in the past. They're going to serve in the future and they're
    going to serve in a very valiant way.
        But the primary purpose of the Armed Forces is to prepare
    for and to prevail in combat should the need arise. Military
    life is fundamentally different from civilian life in that
    military society is characterized by its own laws, rules,
    customs, and traditions, including restrictions on personal
    behavior that would not be acceptable in civilian society.
    Examples include alcohol use, adultery, fraternization, and
    body art. If we change this rule of DADT what are we going to
    do with these other issues?
        The Armed Forces must maintain personnel policies that
    exclude persons whose presence in the Armed Forces would create
    an unacceptable risk to the Armed Forces' high standards of
    morale, good order, and discipline, and unit cohesion. In my
    opinion, the presence in the Armed Forces of persons who
    demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
    would very likely create an unacceptable risk to those high
    standards of morale, good order and discipline, and effective
    unit cohesion and effectiveness.
        I'm opposed to this change and I look forward to a very
    spirited debate on this issue, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        I believe Senator Burris is next. Senator Burris.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'd like to extend my deep admiration for our two
    distinguished leaders and their position. Not only are you
    following the direction of the Commander in Chief, but, Admiral
    Mullen, you expressed your personal view, which is to be
    commended.
        What we need is a policy that allows any individual who has
    the integrity and the commitment to serve this country, to
    serve this country. We can go back to President Truman, who
    took the audacity to integrate the Services. At one time my
    uncles and members of my race couldn't even serve in the
    military. We moved to this point where they're some of the best
    and brightest that we've had, generals and even now the
    Commander in Chief is of African American heritage.
        So what we are doing here now is not looking at the
    integrity and the commitment that individuals can make, not
    based on their sexual orientation, but in defense of this
    country. I say the policy needs to be changed, the policy must
    be changed, and we must have everyone who is capable, willing,
    and able to volunteer to defend this country, defend this great
    American tradition of ours, to have the opportunity to serve
    regardless of their sexual orientation. So based on that, we
    must continue to have the American spirit and have individuals
    who are willing to serve.
        I don't have a question, Mr. Chairman. I just have this
    statement. I hope that we will look at legislation. By the way,
    the House has drawn up a bill. There are 185 members on this
    House bill. It's House Bill 1283 and I'm hoping and praying
    that we will get it and move on this issue and not be wasting
    the taxpayers' time and all of the energy on something that is
    so basic in human rights and opportunities for individuals in
    this country.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Burris.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
    unlike my colleagues, I do have some questions rather than just
    a statement to ask.
        Admiral Mullen, we know that many of our NATO allies allow
    gays and lesbians to serve openly and many of these countries
    have deployed troops who are serving with us in Afghanistan.
    Are you aware of any impact on combat effectiveness by the
    decision of our NATO allies to allow gays and lesbians to serve
    openly?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator Collins, I've talked to several of
    my counterparts in countries whose militaries allow gays and
    lesbians to serve openly and there has been, as they have told
    me, no impact on military effectiveness.
        Senator Collins. We've heard today the concern that if DADT
    is repealed that it would affect unit cohesiveness or morale.
    Are you aware of any studies, any evidence, that suggests that
    repealing DADT would undermine unit cohesion?
        Admiral Mullen. I'm not. In fact, the 1993 RAND study
    focused heavily on unit cohesion and that became the principal
    point put forward by the military leadership at the time, and I
    understand that. I understand what it is, I understand what
    goes into it, and that there are--there's been no thorough or
    comprehensive work done with respect to that aspect since 1993.
    That's part of what needs to be addressed as we move forward
    over this year.
        Secretary Gates. I would just underscore that. Part of what
    we need to do is address a number of assertions that have been
    made for which we have no basis in fact.
        Senator Collins. Exactly.
        Secretary Gates. We need--the purpose of the review that we
    are undertaking is to find out what the force, what the men and
    women in our Armed Forces, and, as Senator Webb said, and their
    families really think about this. The fact is at this point we
    don't really know.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
        Senator Lieberman is next and then, assuming nobody else
    comes in, then Senator McCaskill would be next, and then
    Senator Reed. Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I opposed the DADT policy when it was created by this
    committee in 1993 and I remain opposed to it today. Therefore I
    support repealing it as soon as possible. My feeling, stated
    simply, then was that what mattered most was not how a member
    of the military lived his or her private sexual life, but that
    they were prepared to risk their lives in defense of our
    country; and that my judgment was that in a combat situation a
    member of the military in a tank or an MRAP today is going to
    care a lot more about the capability and courage of the soldier
    next to them than they are about the sexual orientation of that
    soldier, just as over the years, as Senator Burris referred to,
    they came to care a lot less about the race of the soldier next
    to them than about his or her courage or capability.
        Therefore, I'm grateful that the President has said he
    supports the repeal of DADT. I thank you, Secretary and
    Chairman, for saying that the question now is not whether, but
    how, and I think for us really when, we will repeal DADT. Am I
    right that what you're telling us today is that what you're
    going to do as soon as possible, at least after 45 days, is to
    determine how you can reduce the impact of the DADT within the
    current state of the law? Is that correct?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. The numbers actually have gone
    down fairly substantially. They were about 600 and some in
    2008, 428 in 2009. We don't know--I mean, we can't quantify
    what the possible changes that I have talked about here, what
    impact they would have on that. But at least it would--if we
    are able to do something like that, would make these folks less
    vulnerable to somebody seeking revenge or whatever their
    motives in terms of trying to wreck somebody's career.
        Senator Lieberman. Am I correct, just to ask the question
    and get it on the record, that your judgment as advised by
    counsel is that it requires an act of Congress repealing DADT
    for the actual policy itself to be ended in the military? You
    can't do it by executive action.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, that is correct.
        Senator Lieberman. I wanted to ask you if--I'm sure one of
    the reactions to what you announced today will be that this is
    a delay. I want to ask you to consider not only the 45-day
    limit, but whether you would think about providing regular
    reports to Congress, and therefore the public, on the progress
    of the study that you're doing during this next year?
        Secretary Gates. I don't see any reason why we can't do
    that.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that.
        Then the final obviously is that it's up to us in Congress
    and in the Senate. We have to get 60 votes to repeal DADT or
    else it will remain in effect.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Unless there's a provision inside the
    defense authorization bill that goes to the floor, which would
    then require an amendment to strike it from the bill, in which
    case the 60-vote rule would be turning the other way.
        Senator Lieberman. It's good. It is with great appreciation
    that I accept the higher wisdom of the chairman of the
    committee. I think that's a great way to go.
        Chairman Levin. That's on the record, everybody.
    [Laughter.]
        Thank you, Joe.
        Senator McCaskill is next.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to make sure that we're crystal clear about a
    couple of things here. First, are gay and lesbian Americans
    currently serving in our military?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes.
        Senator McCaskill. In fact isn't the foundation of the
    current policy that we welcome their service?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes.
        Senator McCaskill. Are you aware of any morale issues or
    disciplinary problems surrounding the current service of gay
    and lesbian Americans as members of our military?
        Admiral Mullen. Certainly not broadly.
        Senator McCaskill. Now, I think what you're embarking upon
    is important. I think it is welcome. But here's my problem. We
    now have established that we have gay and lesbian Americans
    serving in the military, that they are not broadly causing any
    kind of disciplinary or morale problems, that we welcome their
    service.
        So the issue isn't whether or not gay and lesbian Americans
    are serving in the military. It's whether or not we talk about
    it. So how are you going to get their input in this survey?
        Admiral Mullen. Actually, my take on that is--well, hang on
    a second. [Pause.]
        I think that we would have to look very carefully at how we
    would do that.
        Senator McCaskill. That's the point I would like to leave
    you with today, is that unfortunately because of this policy we
    welcomed their service. They're serving bravely and well. We
    don't have any kind of issues with morale and cohesiveness
    surrounding their service. But yet when it comes time to
    evaluate their service, they're not allowed to talk about it.
    So you have a real challenge in getting perhaps maybe some of
    the most important input you may need as you consider this
    policy. I'll be anxiously awaiting how you figure that one out.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
        Secretary Gates. One approach, Senator, is to talk to those
    who have been separated.
        Senator McCaskill. I think that's terrific. I think the
    ones who have been separated would be a great place that you
    can get good information. But I don't know that you're going to
    be able to get at those that are currently serving, because
    obviously they're not going to e able to step forward and talk
    bout it. But I agree, Secretary Gates, that's a great place
    because so many of them voluntarily separated because of issues
    of integrity.
        Thank you
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to follow up the point that Senator
    Collins made. It was my understanding that both Canada and the
    United Kingdom have allowed gays and lesbians to serve openly,
    in the case of Canada since the early 90s and Great Britain
    since at least early 2000. They are fighting side by side with
    us today in Afghanistan, and in fact I would think that we
    would like to see more of their regiments and brigades there.
        Does that I think suggest, as Admiral mentioned to me
    before, that their combat effectiveness has not been impaired
    and we've had the opportunity to work with them in joint
    operations. Does that add credibility, evidence, or weight to
    the discussions that you're undertaking?
        Secretary Gates. I think that it is clearly something we
    need to address. We need to talk to those countries' militaries
    in a more informal and in-depth way about their experience. I
    think that their experience is a factor, but I also would say
    that each country has its own culture and its own society and
    it has to be evaluated in those terms as well.
        Senator Reed. I think one of the aspects you referred to in
    your prepared remarks is the at least presumptive difference in
    terms of the attitudes at different ranks within the military.
    Is that something you can comment upon now? Have you done any
    research or, Admiral Mullen, can comment about the attitudes
    based on age or based on other factors?
        Secretary Gates. I think that really goes to the point of
    what we need to do in the months ahead. I think Admiral Mullen
    would agree that we don't know. We don't have information based
    on rank or anything like that.
        Admiral Mullen. Anecdotally, it would be my only comment:
    There really hasn't been any objective review of this. So I
    think it would be too soon to comment, because actually
    anecdotally, there are young poeople, noncommissioned officers,
    senior officers, on both sides this issue. It gets to this
    strongly held views driving this, as opposed to really
    understanding objectively what this policy change would mean.
        Senator Lieberman. Let me ask a final question, which I
    think is implicit in your overall testimony. That is--and this
    is rather simplistic, but there will be a decision and then
    there will be the implementation of that decision. I would
    assume that, at least in part, those have to be coordinated or
    referenced, so that part of this discussion and analysis going
    forward is not only a decision, but it's also about how this
    policy would be implemented in a very detailed fashion. That
    would be something that would be available to Congress before
    they made the decision, or can you comment at all about that
    aspect?
        Secretary Gates. Let me just start by saying, sure, because
    one of the things that we will look at is, if there is a
    problem with unit cohesion, how would you mitigate it? How
    through training or regulations or other measures do you--if
    Congress were to repeal the law, then how would we implement
    it, just as you say. Part of our review process is, as we look
    at the different aspects of it, what are the problem areas that
    we're going to see and how do we address those?
        As I said in my statement, it's everything from base
    housing to various policies and regulations and so on. All of
    those have to be addressed.
        Admiral Mullen. For me, Senator, it's understanding the
    impact. It is then in that understanding that speaks in great
    part to potential implementation, and that then really goes to
    the core of where I am on this, which is leadership. So I mean,
    understanding that and they are integral to each other, impact
    and implementation, then says to me, Mullen, here's how you
    lead this, this is what you need to do to move through it if
    the law changes.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Just briefly following up Senator Reed and Senator Collins'
    point about other militaries, and Senator Reed's point that our
    military is fighting side-by-side and with militaries who do
    not have a discriminatory policy against open service by guys,
    have you noticed any impact on our troops who serve with
    Canadians or with Brits because of a British or Canadian policy
    that allows gays to openly serve? Admiral?
        Admiral Mullen. Since these wars started in 2003, it has
    not been brought to my attention that there's been any
    significant impact of the policies in those countries on either
    their military effectiveness or our ability to work with them.
        Chairman Levin. I have to make one comment on a suggestion
    that somehow or other, Admiral, you were simply following
    orders here of your Commander in Chief, who's made a decision,
    in your testimony this morning. I think your testimony was not
    only eloquent, but it was personal. You made it very clear that
    you were reflecting your personal view, which you are obligated
    under the oath you take to give to us. We thank you for that,
    and I thank you not just because it happens that I agree with
    what you said, but more importantly because you are required to
    give us a personal view, and it was clear to me and I think
    clear to most of us that this was a view that you hold in your
    conscience and not giving to us because you were directed to by
    anybody, including the Commander in Chief.
        This statement of yours in my judgment was a profile in
    leadership this morning. It's going to take a great deal of
    leadership to have this change made. I hope it is--the sooner
    the better, as far as I'm concerned. But with the kind of
    leadership you've shown this morning, I think it's very doable,
    hopefully in a short period of time.
        One other comment and that has to do with what can be done
    in the interim--you're going to be looking at that--without
    legislative change. Secretary, it's my understanding that when
    servicemembers are discharged under DADT with an honorable
    discharge, that DOD policy now is that they only receive half
    of their separation pay which is authorized by statute. You're
    authorized to either get half or full pay. Would you take a
    look at that as something we can do in the interim here to
    indicate a greater sense of fairness about this issue.
        You're sitting there quietly, Senator Udall. I should have
    asked, do you have a final question?
        Senator Udall. No, thank you.
        Chairman Levin. I thank you both. It's been a long hearing
    this morning and we very much appreciate you, the men and women
    that serve with you and your families. We will stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
                tactical signals intelligence/electronic warfare
        1. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, it has been brought to my
    attention that during operations in Afghanistan, U.S. forces enter
    areas believed to be infiltrated by the Taliban and, because of the
    widespread availability of cell phone and satellite phone technology,
    their efforts to capture the enemy are thwarted when lookouts provide
    early warning of their approach. What efforts can be undertaken to
    provide readily available, comprehensive, and continuous support to
    defeat this enemy capability? Please provide a detailed response (in
    classified form, if necessary).
        Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]

        2. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, it has also been brought to my
    attention that during operations in Afghanistan, U.S. forces have had
    to rely on physical searches of caves and other dangerous areas to
    locate Taliban propaganda radio stations. What capabilities exist to
    locate and defeat these facilities, and are they sufficiently deployed
    to prevent these facilities from operating? Please provide a detailed
    response (in classified form, if necessary).
        Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]

            intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs
        3. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the current ability of the Air
    National Guard (ANG) to perform its Incident Awareness and Assessment
    (IAA)/Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission to
    support law enforcement, counter-narcotics, weapons of mass destruction
    response, search and rescue, border and maritime security, and National
    Security Special Events requirements within the United States has been
    degraded due to the transfer of 6 of the 11 ANG RC-26 aircraft to
    support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as an enduring U.S.
    Central Command (CENTCOM) requirement. These transfers, combined with
    maintenance and upgrade requirements, have reduced the number of
    available aircraft in the Continental United States to as few as one
    operational aircraft at times. What efforts are underway to
    reconstitute this domestic capability?
        Secretary Gates. No timeline has been established for the return of
    the six RC-26 aircraft supporting OCO in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility. Although I do not expect the RC-26 to be permanently
    deployed, I anticipate the aircraft will maintain a prolonged presence
    in theater to help offset the current airborne full motion video
    shortfall.
        The ANG is nearing completion of a capabilities based analysis that
    will identify domestic requirements for a fixed-wing aircraft with
    capabilities similar to those on the RC-26 (results expected in May
    2010). This analysis will provide a basis for which the U.S. Air Force
    and ANG can better identify and fill domestic incident awareness and
    assessment requirements.

        4. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, are sufficient ISR assets
    currently dedicated to U.S. Africa Command? Please explain (in
    classified form, if necessary).
        Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]

                               medical evacuation
        5. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the progress being made in
    Afghanistan by the United States in connection with minimizing the time
    between battlefield injury and arrival at a facility with surgical
    capabilities is admirable, and the performance of our medical
    evacuation and combat search and rescue crews can only be described as
    heroic. Are you committed to maintaining the current standard in
    Afghanistan as additional forces are deployed and operations spread
    over a larger geographic area?
        Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]

        6. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, several of our North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO) allies also provide medivac support in areas
    occupied by U.S. forces. What efforts are underway to shorten the NATO
    90-minute standard for medical evacuation from the battlefield?
        Secretary Gates. Less than a year ago (June 18, 2009),
    International Security Assistance Force Command (COMISAF) issued
    Fragmentary Order 318-2009 (Reassessment of Medical Evacuation
    (MEDEVAC) timelines) reducing the NATO standard for MEDEVAC timelines
    from 120 minutes to 90 minutes. COMISAF also directed that the regional
    commands conduct assessments to determine whether service personnel are
    receiving appropriate and expedient medical care. General McChrystal's
    goal is for medical treatment to be made available to all assigned
    forces of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/U.S. Forces-
    Afghanistan (USFOR-A) within 60 minutes of receipt of the medical
    request. The current COMISAF MEDEVAC plan is based on the 60-minute
    standard, and includes aircraft necessary to meet this timeline.
        Additionally, the Departments of Defense and State continue to
    encourage our Allies and partners to invest in additional helicopters
    and the associated technology required for MEDEVAC in adverse
    conditions, as well as to drop those caveats that preclude currently
    deployed airframes and aircrew from responding in a timely manner.

        7. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, I have been informed that certain
    NATO allies have caveats on their medical evacuation aircraft that
    limit their support during certain times of the day and under certain
    battlefield conditions. When U.S. combat forces operate in these areas,
    they are often required to provide their own medical evacuation
    capabilities because of the NATO 90-minute standard and the caveats on
    their operations. What is being done to remedy this issue?
        Secretary Gates. Seven nations currently have caveats on MEDEVAC
    missions that include minimum night vision goggle illumination
    requirements, dust limitations, constraints on flying in mountainous
    terrain, requirements for landing zones to be secured, or have higher
    headquarters approval processes. Although the Departments of Defense
    and State consistently appeal to ISAF nations to remove operationally
    restrictive caveats, we are realistic that limitations in training,
    budgets, and political desire will preclude all caveats being dropped.
    Therefore, as part of the President's increase in forces to
    Afghanistan, a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) is being deployed in RC-
    North to provide, among other missions, timely MEDEVAC coverage.
    Additionally, General McChrystal has directed regional commanders to
    ensure that all Allied service personnel receive appropriate and
    expedient medical care, ideally within 60 minutes of receipt of a
    MEDEVAC request.
        To support achievement of the goal of 60 minutes for our service
    men and women, in June 2009 I issued a memorandum to Commander, U.S.
    CENTCOM directing him to achieve medical evacuation parity between
    Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, with the
    standard for both theaters at 60-minute mission completion time. I
    further instructed General Petraeus to improve MEDEVAC response times
    in Afghanistan by:

        (1)  establishing procedures to expedite MEDEVAC mission launches
    without having to wait for approval;
        (2)  creating a process to identify, analyze, and report all
    MEDEVAC missions that take longer than 60 minutes;
        (3)  reviewing existing MEDEVAC approval and launch procedures
    across Afghanistan;
        (4)  directing USFOR-A to review ISAF/NATO procedures and Standard
    Operating Procedures, and making recommendations to ISAF for
    streamlining current requirements; and
        (5)  requiring all U.S. forces in the USCENTCOM to review and
    understand existing MEDEVAC procedures.

        8. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2011 budget
    request supports creation of two CABs. What is the timetable for
    standing up these units?
        Secretary Gates. The 12th Active Component CAB, currently
    designated the 16th CAB, is planned to be fully operational by 2012.
    The majority of the personnel requirement for this CAB already exists,
    as this formation was consolidated utilizing existing aviation force
    structure. Some personnel growth is required to grow the headquarters
    for an assault battalion, an aviation support battalion, and the
    brigade headquarters; the spaces required for these formations were
    resourced in Total Army Analysis 12-17 (TAA 12-17).
        The Army Staff will present a recommendation for stationing
    location and timelines for the 13th Active component CAB to the
    Secretary of the Army (SecArmy) and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) in late
    May 2010. There are multiple courses of action affecting the
    recommendation for the final stationing timeline which are dependent on
    available military construction, equipping and production line
    capabilities. Once the SecArmy and CSA have made their final stationing
    timeline decision we will be able to provide Congress with an expected
    timeline and final stationing locations for these units.

        9. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, will priority be given to the
    standup of the associated medivac companies to support combat medical
    evacuation in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]

        10. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, what procurement is planned for
    fiscal year 2011 to ensure that these units are able to be fielded as
    rapidly as possible?
        Secretary Gates. One of the two CABs is being reorganized from
    existing aviation force structure and will not require additional
    procurements. The second CAB is being built incrementally as manning
    and equipment become available. Fiscal year 2011 procurement includes 4
    CH-47F helicopters, 16 UH-60M, and 2 HH-60M MEDEVAC helicopters.

        11. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, of the UH-60M aircraft proposed
    for procurement in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011, how many will
    be allocated to replace the aging fleet of UH-60A aircraft currently
    being used for medical evacuation?
        Secretary Gates. Due to a growth in medical evacuation requirements
    across the Army, the Army projects that it will not start replacing UH-
    60A aircraft with HH-60M aircraft until fiscal year 2015. Prior to
    fiscal year 2015, the HH-60Ms that the Army procures will fill the new
    requirement for additional MEDEVAC aircraft.

        12. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the Afghanistan mission of the
    aging fleet of combat search and rescue aircraft has been expanded to
    include medical evacuation. This means that the direct combat support
    role of these HH-60 aircraft and the associated wear and tear on these
    aircraft has been dramatically increased. How many additional HH-60
    aircraft will be procured in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 to
    replace existing combat search and rescue aircraft?
        Secretary Gates. The Air Force is purchasing four HH-60 aircraft in
    fiscal year 2010 and the fiscal year 2011 budget requests the purchase
    of three additional HH-60 aircraft during fiscal year 2011. There are
    an additional three aircraft identified in the fiscal year 2011 OCO
    request.

        13. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
    have placed a dramatic strain on the UH-60 aircraft. What is the
    principal factor limiting the acquisition of new aircraft to support
    the UH-60 mission: production capacity, cost, lack of available or
    appropriate alternative aircraft, or some other reason?
        Secretary Gates. The Army is committed to procure UH-60M aircraft
    as part of the Army's overall plan to modernize the UH-60 Blackhawk
    Fleet. The UH-60 fleet is the largest helicopter fleet in the U.S.
    Army. The Army manages its UH-60 fleet modernization using Army force
    generation requirements to meet operational demands. There are no
    constraints to acquire the full number of aircraft required within
    budgeted resources. The maximum UH-60 production capacity has not been
    exceeded and the Army is procuring over 70 UH-60M aircraft each year
    through fiscal year 2015 for a total of 451 aircraft.

                       improvised explosive device defeat
        14. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, in Afghanistan, the largest
    percentage of U.S casualties is being suffered directly from the
    employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by enemy forces. What
    is the status of your review regarding IED defeat in Afghanistan and
    when can forces on the ground expect to see additional support?
        Secretary Gates. We have a number of very forward-leaning efforts
    underway to try and deal with the challenge of IEDs. Last November, I
    asked the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and
    Logistics (AT&L) and the Joint Staff, Director of Operations (J-3), to
    co-chair an effort focused on integrating Counter-IED programs across
    the Department of Defense (DOD). They made a number of recommendations,
    most recently to significantly enhance long-term full motion video
    platforms like aerostat blimps. In addition to this larger integration
    effort the theater commanders increased their requirement for Mine-
    Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles, particularly the MRAP all-
    terrain vehicles. There is an additional requirement that is funded, or
    reflected in the OCO request, for approximately 10,000 more MRAPs--
    6,600 of those will be the all-terrain version that is designed
    specifically for Afghanistan. Another important step has been to work
    collaboratively with the Government of Afghanistan to ban ammonium
    nitrate, the ingredient in the most prevalent IEDs in Afghanistan.
    Afghan National Security Forces and the coalition are aggressively
    pursuing smuggling networks that bring ammonium nitrate into the
    country to be used for making IEDs.

                  rapid prototyping and acquisition capability
        15. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, as you know, when a requirement
    is received from the battlefield, it is almost always a current
    requirement. However, the defense acquisition process is not set up in
    such a way to facilitate immediate or near-term fulfillment of these
    requirements. In many cases, these requirements can be met immediately.
    In other cases, minor modifications to existing technologies can be
    made. In past wars, when the United States was less dependent on
    contractor support, these modifications could be made on the fly, often
    in the theater of operations. Similar requirements are being developed
    today. However, because of the current force structure and requirements
    process, these modifications or off-the-shelf requirements languish
    while our forces remain at risk. What efforts are currently underway to
    develop rapid prototyping and rapid acquisition capabilities and
    centers to address these requirements as quickly as possible?
        Secretary Gates. Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom
    clearly demonstrated the importance of developing a Departmental
    structure capable of rapidly responding to urgent warfighting needs. To
    respond to these urgent requirements, the Department has created
    several organizations that work with the Services to provide rapid
    prototyping and rapid acquisition. The Joint IED Defeat Organization
    (JIEDDO) and the Rapid Fielding Directorate (RFD) within the Director
    of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) are indicative of flexible
    organizations focused on expeditiously addressing the Joint urgent
    operational needs of our warfighters. When necessary, I have also
    formed task forces to quickly respond to emerging threats, such as the
    MRAP and the ISR Task Forces. Additionally, each of the Services and
    the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have developed rapid
    acquisition processes to respond to Service-specific urgent needs.
        Rapid prototyping and rapid acquisition have enabled the Department
    to develop and field the all-terrain version of the highly successful,
    MRAP vehicle. The MRAP program made excellent use of rapid prototyping
    and rapid acquisition to accelerate schedules and deliveries of this
    lifesaving, highly effective vehicle. Additionally, within the last 6
    months, the Department has used the Joint Capability Technology
    Demonstration (JCTD) Program to rapidly develop and demonstrate
    persistent ground surveillance technologies that will directly benefit
    U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. The success of this recently accelerated
    JCTD (Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS)) will deliver
    increased force protection and persistent surveillance sensors and
    command and control. The rapidly developed and procured Distributed
    Tactical Communication System now permits remote forces to stay in
    contact with friendly forces. The Transnational Information Sharing
    Cooperation (TISC) JCTD's ``All Partners Access Network'' is enabling
    U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to coordinate with non-governmental
    organizations, coalition and interagency partners in support of Haitian
    disaster relief. Each of these systems was rapidly developed to respond
    to Warfighter and humanitarian assistance needs in less time than
    conventional defense systems.
        As I have previously stated, stability and counter-insurgency
    missions require 75 percent solutions over a period of months. The
    Department is infusing innovative thinking and flexibility into its
    sometimes rigid procurement processes and adapting our policies and
    organizations to rapidly meet today's threats to servicemembers and
    missions.

                               special operations
        16. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, it has come to my attention from
    a variety of sources that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in
    Afghanistan do not have sufficient medivac, manned ISR platforms, and
    dedicated air assets. As a result, forces are at increased risk. What
    is being done to remedy this situation?
        Secretary Gates. Deployed SOF in Afghanistan currently have
    sufficient medevac resources to support current operational
    requirements.
        Personnel training is the biggest factor limiting how fast DOD can
    deliver more manned ISR platforms to Afghanistan. Training pipelines
    for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are operating at maximum
    throughput to operate and employ newly acquired hardware, and DOD
    continues to ensure proper numbers and placement of analysts to
    effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence data.
        To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one
    additional MH-47 will be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two
    additional Chinooks will arrive in December 10 and June 11,
    respectively. Additionally, five CV-22s deployed in April to support
    SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. DOD
    is also accelerating delivery of CV-22s to better support the forces
    requiring them, and the Department anticipates adding five more CV-22s
    to the fleet in the coming year. Additionally, Program Objectives
    Memorandum (POM) initiatives will grow SOCOM's helicopter fleet by
    eight MH-47 Chinooks by fiscal year 2015, and SOCOM's CV-22 Osprey
    fleet will grow from the current 12, to 50 by 2016.

        17. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, when can these units expect to
    receive additional support? Please provide a detailed response (in
    classified form, if necessary).
        Secretary Gates. Deployed SOF in Afghanistan currently have
    sufficient medevac resources to support current operational
    requirements.
        Personnel training is the biggest factor limiting how fast DOD can
    deliver more manned ISR platforms to Afghanistan. Training pipelines
    for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are operating at maximum
    throughput to operate and employ newly acquired hardware, and DOD
    continues to ensure proper numbers and placement of analysts to
    effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence data.
        To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one
    additional MH-47 will be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two
    additional Chinooks will arrive in December 10 and June 11,
    respectively. Additionally, five CV-22s deployed in April to support
    SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. DOD
    is also accelerating delivery of CV-22s to better support the forces
    requiring them, and the Department anticipates adding five more CV-22s
    to the fleet in the coming year. Additionally, POM initiatives will
    grow SOCOM's helicopter fleet by 8 MH-47 Chinooks by fiscal year 2015,
    and SOCOM's CV-22 Osprey fleet will grow from the current 12, to 50 by
    2016.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                  foreign language development strategic plan
        18. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, the Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) recently reported that while DOD is developing a foreign
    language development strategic plan, DOD doesn't know when it will be
    finished. In the absence of an approved plan, it will be difficult for
    DOD to guide the Services as it develops its approach to foreign
    language and regional proficiency transformation. Furthermore, it will
    be difficult for DOD and Congress to assess progress toward a
    successful transformation. Do you have an estimate as to when DOD will
    issue a strategic plan?
        Secretary Gates. The Department is nearing completion of its
    strategic plan for language skills, regional expertise, and cultural
    capabilities. We anticipate its release by late summer of 2010.

        19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, how will this plan address the
    development of foreign language skills for all servicemembers to better
    perform warfighting and non-warfighting activities?
        Secretary Gates. The strategic plan, built on the foundation laid
    in numerous strategic documents, will address the development of
    foreign language skills by focusing on identifying needed capabilities
    and requirements of the combatant commands and Defense Agencies. The
    plan will also outline specific steps how to build these capabilities
    into the Department.
        The strategic plan is designed to provide a comprehensive,
    systematic, and actionable way ahead. The plan's vision statement,
    goals, objectives, and tasks will focus on building and enhancing
    language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities as vital
    enablers for the Department to shape and respond to national security
    issues. The desired result will be the institutionalization of language
    skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities across the
    Department and the generation of a globalized force, with the right
    combination of skills and in the right numbers, equipped with the
    capabilities needed to meet the diverse operational needs of the 21st
    century.

                         asia-pacific region readiness
        20. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, it is impossible to overstate
    the importance of our military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
    It's obvious that there are many challenges in this area, given the
    administration's emphasis on this vital region. If one looks at
    continuing developments in the Pacific, our conventional adversaries
    are getting better and it is critical we maintain our superiority in
    the region. Given the many demands on the defense budget and the unique
    mission and environment we have in the region, how does DOD's fiscal
    year 2011 budget impact our military readiness in the Pacific region?
        Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2011 budget request supports the
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which identifies the unique mission
    and environment of the Pacific Region. The United States has been a
    Pacific power for more than a century. The vast distances of the
    Pacific and the low density of U.S. basing and infrastructure there
    place a premium on forward stationed and forward-deployed U.S. forces.
    We seek to sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific alliances and
    partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure
    sustainable peace and security in the region, while also promoting
    contributions by our allies and partners to global security. Toward
    this end, the fiscal year 2011 budget request supports augmenting and
    adapting our forward presence, which reassures allies of the U.S.
    commitment to their security. At the same time, we will encourage our
    allies and partners to enhance their roles in security and in regular
    multilateral security cooperation within the region to build trust,
    increase transparency, and reduce the risks of crisis or conflict.

                       u.s.-pakistan military engagement
        21. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, you were recently quoted in a
    speech at the Pakistan National Defense University that rebuilding
    relationships with this generation of Pakistani officers--who have had
    little or no interactions with the American military--cannot be done in
    just a few months. Rather, it will take years--requiring openness,
    transparency, and, above all, continuous engagement on both sides. What
    is U.S. and Pakistan progress in this area and how we can improve?
        Secretary Gates. Critical relationships are built through many
    aspects of DOD's engagement program. For example, under the
    International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the
    Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), DOD brings Pakistani
    officers into U.S. Professional Military Education (PME) programs,
    where they and their families can gain an appreciation for the United
    States and its citizens that pays dividends long after the officers
    return to Pakistan. Within Pakistan, the best examples are the training
    and equipping activities that U.S. forces carry out every day in
    various locations throughout the country-coaching, teaching, mentoring,
    and enabling soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers.
        These opportunities, and the progress achieved through them, are
    difficult to quantify because they are based on the complexity of
    personal contacts and commitment; nonetheless, the progress is quite
    real. As an example, from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2010,
    Pakistan IMET funding rose from $2.3 to $5.0 million, which supported
    132 Pakistani students in fiscal year 2009 and is forecasted to support
    197 students in fiscal year 2010. We continue to seek to expand
    opportunities for such interchanges through IMET and other avenues.
    Where DOD has built such relationships, the PAKMIL leaders with whom
    DOD interacts have allowed us to expand our training and assistance,
    teach PAKMIL forces far more sophisticated tactics, and the
    fundamentals of Military Intelligence. Conversely, in those places and
    with those PAKMIL units where we are still struggling to build such
    relationships, there has been far less progress.
        The primary organization that engages the Pakistani Military
    (PAKMIL) on a continuous basis is the Office of Defense Representative
    Pakistan (ODRP) in Islamabad, Pakistan. This joint military
    organization, led by the three-star flag officer who also commanded our
    Humanitarian Relief efforts after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan,
    provides the direct, military-to-military engagement for U.S. CENTCOM
    and DOD.
        ODRP's ongoing efforts to strengthen and enable the PAKMIL's
    ongoing combat operations against violent extremist organizations are
    fundamentally based on the establishment and nurturing of personal
    relationships with a broad range of PAKMIL officers and servicemembers.
    The ``trust gap'' that divides our countries and our militaries is
    quite real, and will take years to overcome. By focusing on personal
    relationships, DOD has learned that it can still create opportunities
    for real progress in achieving DOD's goals to improve the PAKMIL's
    skills in conducting counterinsurgency operations and strengthening its
    defense capabilities.
        We also utilize the DOD's Near East South Asia (NESA) Center's
    initiatives, which host Pakistani military officers and familiarize
    them with U.S. political values, governmental structures, policymaking
    processes, and policies related to South Asia and other regions of
    special interest to Pakistan. These initiatives are another essential
    piece in building the U.S.-Pakistan military relationship.

                        electronic health record systems
        22. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 required DOD and the
    Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to accelerate their exchange of
    health information and to develop capabilities that allow for
    interoperability (generally, the ability of systems to exchange data)
    by September 30, 2009. It also required compliance with Federal
    standards and the establishment of a joint interagency program office
    to function as a single point of accountability for the effort. In a
    January 2010 report, the GAO noted that the DOD-VA interagency program
    office is not yet positioned to function as a single point of
    accountability for the implementation of interoperable electronic
    health record systems or capabilities. In addition, GAO also stated
    that if the program office does not fulfill key management
    responsibilities as GAO previously recommended, it may not be
    positioned to function as a single point of accountability for the
    delivery of future interoperable capabilities, including the
    development of the virtual lifetime electronic record. What is the
    status of the virtual lifetime electronic record?
        Secretary Gates. Following the President's announcement of April 9,
    2009, DOD and VA accelerated efforts already underway to develop an
    approach to achieve the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER). On
    August 21, 2009, the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs
    endorsed a development approach for VLER's health component, leveraging
    the Federal Health Architecture's Nationwide Health Information Network
    (NHIN) concept and standards. The VLER approach is multi-phased. The
    initial two phases will aid in defining additional pilots and the VLER
    implementation timeline, which is anticipated to occur in six month
    increments.
        A VLER Pilot in San Diego was implemented on January 30, 2010. The
    San Diego Pilot participants were DOD's Naval Medical Center San Diego,
    VA's San Diego Medical Center, and Kaiser-Permanente. They demonstrated
    the use of the NHIN to exchange a selected set of data elements of a
    ``Continuity of Care'' document. Kaiser Permanente is a contract
    provider for VA, but not for DOD in the San Diego area, so DOD had no
    shared patients with Kaiser Permanente. Lessons learned from the San
    Diego Pilot are being incorporated into the next Pilot in Tidewater,
    Virginia.
        Subsequent phases of VLER will include additional VA and DOD sites,
    live patient information, expanded data domains, different document
    types, and the ability for additional civilian sector partners to
    participate. VLER will build on the San Diego Pilot data set and expand
    it initially to Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, the VA Medical Center
    Hampton, and private sector partners in the Tidewater/Hampton Roads
    area in Virginia. The target date for activation of Phase 1b is July
    31, 2010. The hospitals at Fort Eustis and Langley Air Force Base will
    be incorporated into the pilot after the initial activation. The
    Departments anticipate selecting additional sites for implementation by
    January 31, 2011.

        23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, what is your assessment of the
    progress being made and what are your thoughts on how the DOD and VA
    should proceed?
        Secretary Gates. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans
    Affairs (VA) are making substantial progress with electronic health
    record (EHR) systems. Historically, their respective systems existed in
    mutually exclusive lifecycles, with DOD serving beneficiaries from
    accession until retirement or separation and VA providing services from
    that point forward. Each Department's EHR capability evolved to meet
    functional requirements, mission-specific and shared. Each Department
    also developed a system to obtain clinical information from private
    providers of purchased care.
        The historical EHR model is evolving as the Departments collaborate
    on and deliver health information technology solutions that improve the
    secure sharing of electronic benefits, personnel, and health
    information. Today, DOD and VA share more health information for
    clinical use than any other two health organizations in the Nation.
    Each Department has real-time access to the other's health data on more
    than 3.5 million shared patients, including over 173,300 patients who
    are in theater. Further, since 2001, DOD has securely shared 1.6
    terabytes of data on over 5.0 million patients using the Federal Health
    Information Exchange initiative. Shared data includes patient
    demographic data, medication and allergy data, laboratory results,
    radiology reports, discharge summaries, consult reports, and health
    assessments.
        Today, each Department is modernizing its EHR capability and
    migrating from outdated legacy technologies to enable more rapid,
    flexible, and scalable responses to evolving national health care and
    computer industry standards. Common requirements will be treated as
    opportunities to consider common capabilities. A disciplined process
    for reviewing and identifying potential opportunities for shared
    acquisition or development is in place to ensure that shared efforts
    support the effective execution of each Department's medical mission.
    The end-to-end lifecycle of health care will become a seamless process.
        The Departments' efforts coincide with the movement to national
    standards led by the Department of Health and Human Services. As the
    Nation develops an increased capability for health information exchange
    using the Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN) portfolio of
    services, DOD and VA are developing a Virtual Lifetime Electronic
    Record (VLER) that will employ NHIN services. Over time, VLER will
    become the primary method for DOD and VA to exchange clinical
    information with each other and with purchased care providers in the
    private sector. Until then, legacy system interoperability will be
    maintained.

                                futenma airbase
        24. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, there has been growing concern
    over a possible delay of the implementation of the move of the Futenma
    Airbase on Okinawa's remote east coast. Japan has said that it needs
    more time to consider the base's future following recent elections.
    What is your assessment of the situation and how does DOD plan to
    proceed?
        Secretary Gates. I recognize that implementing the Futenma
    realignment agreement has been a challenge. The process has spanned
    three U.S. administrations and multiple Japanese cabinets.
        Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated that he intends to resolve the
    issue by May. I look forward to resuming work with the Government of
    Japan to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our
    force posture in Japan to ensure that the Alliance's operational
    capabilities remain sustainable politically and operationally.

                             don't ask, don't tell
        25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, in the President's State of the
    Union speech, he said he will work with Congress and the military to
    repeal Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT). DOD has a lot on its plate, from
    fighting two wars, supporting contingency operations in Haiti, to
    trying to build and maintain the best military force in the world in a
    fiscally constrained environment. What are the men and women in uniform
    telling you regarding this issue?
        Secretary Gates. As I announced in my statement previously before
    this committee, I have appointed a high-level Working Group within the
    Department to review the issues associated with properly implementing a
    repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. Over the course of the next
    8 months members of the Working Group will meet with a wide array of
    individuals of all Services, ranks, ages and assignments, officers and
    enlisted, to seek their advice, opinions, and concerns regarding a
    repeal and how it should be implemented.

        26. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, a repeal of DADT will have an
    effect on many levels of the military. As a former commander, you have
    had to deal with how changes in policy have affected those under your
    command. It has been argued that a repeal could present some very
    complicated issues in the daily lives of our military. It has also been
    said that these resulting changes could affect morale and discipline in
    the ranks. Have you had the opportunity to talk to military leaders of
    our allies who allow individuals to serve in their militaries
    regardless of sexual orientation? Please provide comments on anything
    that you have learned from them.
        Admiral Mullen. I am familiar with the militaries of a number of
    countries, typically western-style democracies, that have lifted the
    ban on homosexual conduct. I have spoken with the chiefs of many of
    these militaries. Their experiences are informative, but as the
    Congressional Research Service notes, we must be careful in making
    comparisons to other militaries. Our military is uniquely American,
    shaped by our unique national experience. I want to understand the
    range of issues repeal presents within our forces, and how those issues
    might be managed.
        That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of the issue
    to better understand the dynamics of any repeal.

                      suicide prevention conference report
        27. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, suicide prevention is difficult
    and challenging. There have been a lot of people in the Services and
    the VA who have worked diligently on this issue. The Services have
    experienced a rise in the number of suicides since the wars in
    Afghanistan and Iraq started. There is a need to understand suicide,
    look at the causes, and get to a point where we can prevent it. I would
    like to request a report on the results of the recent DOD/VA 2010
    Suicide Prevention Conference. In particular, what follow-up actions
    are to be required from the two departments, as well as what is the
    timeframe which specifies the goals and actions that are to be
    achieved?
        Admiral Mullen. The 2010 DOD/VA Suicide Prevention Conference,
    Building Strong and Resilient Communities, was attended by
    approximately 980 people from DOD, VA, the Services, and other Federal
    and civilian agencies. The conference was hosted by the Suicide
    Prevention and Risk Reduction Committee (SPARRC), which is chaired by
    the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and
    Traumatic Brain Injury and VA and also includes representatives from
    DOD, the Services, and other Federal agencies. The conference
    demonstrated the progress DOD and VA have made in suicide prevention
    efforts, but also identified six key areas that need additional
    attention, including families; dissemination of resources; postvention
    activities; reducing stigma; building resilience; and additional
    research. Postvention refers to all activities after a suicide event.
    The SPARRC members and its partners will continue to collaborate this
    year to address some of the most pressing suicide prevention issues as
    highlighted during the conference.
        The conference identified the need for additional outreach,
    training, and education for families. Families should be viewed as the
    first line of defense in recognizing the signs and symptoms associated
    with suicide risk. SPARRC has formed a family subcommittee, which
    includes representatives from the Services, National Guard, and
    Reserves to focus on the needs of families, such as outreach,
    education, and training. During the course of calendar year 2010, the
    subcommittee will identify the most pressing needs of family members
    and provide recommendations on how SPARRC can best address those gaps.
    The subcommittee held its first meeting in March 2010 and will provide
    recommendations to the SPARRC in December 2010.
        The dissemination of resources and tools to servicemembers,
    veterans, and families is another area that requires additional focus.
    Many innovative resources and tools currently exist, but
    servicemembers, veterans, families, and clinicians need to be aware of
    and have access to them. Populations in rural areas, particularly as it
    pertains to the National Guard, Reserves, and veterans are especially
    difficult to reach. One of the top priorities this year is to launch
    the SPARRC website. This website will serve as a ``clearinghouse'' for
    suicide prevention resources and practical tools for servicemembers,
    veterans, families, and clinicians. It will also create a collaborative
    space and allow for further improvement of dissemination and sharing of
    resources. An easily accessible web-based location for resources will
    ensure servicemembers, veterans, families, and clinicians know where to
    go for help and have access to critical resources no matter where they
    are located.
        The conference emphasized the need for consistent postvention
    activities within DOD. To address this issue, SPARRC has formed a
    working group to draft a DOD policy memo on postvention activities.
    Members of the working group will include representatives from the
    Services, National Guard, Reserves, VA, other Federal partners, as well
    as civilian organizations. The group will leverage existing postvention
    initiatives and best practices to develop a policy applicable to DOD.
    The working group expects to have a draft completed by September 2010.
        First hand testimonies from the conference emphasized the
    importance of seeking help, support and treatment. Stigma remains a
    toxic threat to access to care and needs to be eliminated. SPARRC and
    its partners will continue working to proactively transform culture
    through public education campaigns such as Real Warriors
    (www.realwarriors.net), the Marine Corps ``Cover Me'' video, and
    numerous other efforts to reduce stigma and encourage help-seeking
    behaviors to prevent suicide. Reducing stigma is an ongoing effort that
    DOD and VA will engage in throughout year.
        The conference also demonstrated the importance of engaging leaders
    at all levels to proactively mitigate risk through building resilience.
    The second highest priority highlighted by the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff's strategic guidance for 2009-2010 states, ``we will
    focus on Health-of-the-Force by considering holistically how to better
    prepare our force and care for our people.'' Development of a Chairman
    of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) is currently underway to
    address Total Force Fitness based on the CJCS's guidance. The estimated
    completion date for the CJCSI is fiscal year 2011.
        Finally, the conference highlighted the need for additional
    research and evidence-based models. The RAND Corporation conducted a
    study to identify state of the art suicide prevention practices. This
    effort was discussed at the conference and the results will be
    disseminated by May 2010. The Department will continue to engage in
    other research efforts to inform suicide prevention efforts throughout
    the DOD.
        SPARRC and its partners will work aggressively this year to
    accomplish these initiatives, but also recognize that suicide
    prevention is an ongoing effort. Continued collaboration between SPARRC
    members will ensure completion in a timely manner. Further, the SPARRC
    will facilitate communication and dissemination of emerging knowledge
    and tools through sustained outreach to military line leaders, health
    care professionals, family members, and communities.

        28. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, DOD has made significant
    progress caring for our military heroes with mental health issues. But,
    before we can care for them, we must first identify them. One of the
    biggest issues we must address is reducing the stigma related to
    seeking counseling. You recently stated at the DOD/VA Suicide
    Prevention Conference last month that the stigma still exists among
    servicemembers. It is imperative to get the message to our warriors
    that it would be courageous to reach out for help. How would you assess
    DOD's continuing efforts to tear down the stigma that still deters many
    from seeking treatment for problems such as Traumatic Brain Injury and
    Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and what do we need to do as we move
    forward?
        Admiral Mullen. Current DOD-wide resilience and anti-stigma
    initiatives are focused on research and evaluation of the range and
    effectiveness of military resilience programs, to include, the Real
    Warriors Campaign to combat stigma, to increase servicemembers
    awareness of and encourage use of resources, utilization of the Warrior
    Resilience Conference to enhance and integrate core principles, DOD/
    Federal programs development and utilization, promoting leadership in
    health and well-being, and providing practical tools for units and
    colleagues.
        Information on DOD Wide Real Warriors Campaign program is provided
    in attachment one. Although the Services do not have individual anti-
    stigma campaigns, anti-stigma efforts are reflected at all levels of
    their programs (see attachment two) including imbedded psychological
    health providers in personnel communities and primary care clinics (to
    avoid concern about seeking behavioral health services from the medical
    community), removal of personal information in psychological heath
    utilization reports to leadership, confidential counseling services,
    lower stigma options for seeking care for issues such as sleep
    difficulties rather than mental health, and many other new initiatives
    delivered within the units, aleviating stigma concerns.
        Finally, and most importantly, a robust series of evaluation
    initiatives are underway to provide objective measurement of the range
    and effectiveness of resilience programs in the military. These
    evaluation efforts are outlined in detail in the third attachment.

                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
                           readiness funding concerns
        29. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the fiscal
    year 2011 budget materials request an 8.5 percent increase in Operation
    and Maintenance (O&M) funding from last fiscal year's budget. The
    budget materials claim to rebalance the force. Yet without a decrease
    in operational tempo, force readiness continues to be consumed as
    quickly as it is created. How does this request rebalance the force if
    the lack of readiness in our nondeployed forces continue to cause
    significant risk to our National Military Strategy?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. In the absence of force cuts,
    DOD needs real growth to sustain its operations because some major
    programs grow faster than inflation--for example military health and
    readiness requirements.

             Sustains air, ship, and land forces operations
             Increased fuel costs
             Interoperable communications
             Intelligence and security activities
             Information, surveillance, and reconnaissance
            activities

        The DOD also made significant progress to shift the financing of
    enduring programs from the OCO budget to the base budget. Adds were
    made to the base program for flying hours, servicemember and family
    support, intelligence, and special operations previously funded through
    OCO.
        Also DOD faces higher operating costs for more sophisticated
    weapons--e.g., stealth materials and technologies require more
    expensive maintenance.

             Depot maintenance for land forces equipment, ships,
            and aircraft
             Related contract logistics support

        Training costs associated with more sophisticated weapons are
    higher.

             Advanced skills training such as flight training

        30. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, is the reset
    funding request for fiscal year 2011 sufficient and when will we begin
    to see a return on its investment in reset in terms of improved
    readiness?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Department's reset funding
    request of $21.3 billion is sufficient, based on an examination of
    individual military Service requests, reconciled with the
    administration's ground rules for items acceptable for inclusion in
    reset funding. This amount will cover requirements for replenishing
    ammunition and missile stocks expended in operations and training,
    replacement of equipment lost in battle or worn beyond economic repair,
    and maintenance activities based on scheduled need. If funding is
    provided as requested, the Department will maintain the highest level
    of readiness that is achievable, but readiness levels are dependent on
    other Overseas Contingencies Operations funding as well, such as
    Military Personnel, O&M to maintain operating tempo levels, and Force
    Protection funding, to mention a few.

        31. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, would
    additional reset funding restore readiness levels sooner and what are
    the anticipated reset costs for the out-years?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Department's reset funding
    request of $21.3 billion is sufficient for fiscal year 2011, based on
    an examination of individual military Service requests, reconciled with
    the administration's ground rules for items acceptable for inclusion in
    reset funding. It is anticipated that reset funding will be needed for
    at least 2 years after the contingencies end. The Department will
    assess the need for future reset funding based on force levels in the
    theater of operations, as well as specific equipment battle losses and
    damage as those are incurred. Outyear funding requirements are not
    precisely known at this time, as they are dependent on those
    circumstances, as well as the timing of eventual force drawdown.

        32. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, to what
    extent has DOD evaluated the impact of sending additional forces to
    Afghanistan on overall force readiness?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Through our quarterly Global
    Force Management Board (GFMB) process, the Department routinely
    evaluates the impact and risk associated with force sourcing before the
    decision to allocate additional forces is approved. Furthermore, as a
    major component of the Chairman's Readiness System (CRS), the Joint
    Combat Capabilities Assessment (JCCA) process evaluates our ability to
    execute plans based on our current force posture and readiness. In
    turn, the Joint Staff examines and evaluates the results of the JCCA
    process and reviews force readiness on a quarterly basis through the
    Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR).

        33. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how confident
    are you that the supplemental request will or will not be sufficient to
    cover all costs, considering the disaster assistance currently being
    provided to Haiti by our military forces?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Based on the current force
    assumption, the fiscal year 2010 OCO supplemental request will be
    sufficient assuming congressional support for a Haiti supplemental. The
    Department is requesting a supplemental of $655 million to support
    operations in Haiti. The Haiti supplemental includes $400 million to
    reimburse the Component's for Haiti operations and $255 million for the
    Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civilian Assistance
    (OHDACA).

        34. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is the
    plan to recoup those costs which are currently being taken out of O&M?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Department is requesting a
    supplemental of $655 million to support operations in Haiti. The Haiti
    supplemental includes $400 million to reimburse the Services for funds
    that were transferred from the O&M appropriation to the OHDACA
    appropriation for the Haiti operations. It also includes $255 million
    for the OHDACA to cover the costs for DOD's humanitarian support to
    Haiti and other contingencies that are affected by natural disasters.

               reset/reconstitution and readiness in afghanistan
        35. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, as DOD begins
    to increase troop levels in Afghanistan, the Army and Marine Corps have
    been adjusting their plans to redeploy equipment from Iraq. Some of
    this redeploying equipment, which was scheduled to return to the United
    States, is now being redirected to units headed to Afghanistan. In
    addition, we understand that some forces will move directly from Iraq
    to Afghanistan. How is DOD handling the reset of this equipment to
    original capability before it goes into Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The equipment directly
    transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan is combat-ready and is being
    transferred without going through a reset event. The transferred
    equipment is primarily Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) that units
    deploying to Afghanistan will fall in on. Use of TPE reduces
    transportation requirements, a particularly important consideration for
    supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. In rare cases based on
    operational need, some units were transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan
    with serviceable, combat-ready organizational equipment and TPE. Some
    equipment items, such as MRAPs, are being reconfigured to meet
    operational requirements and repaired as required en route to
    Afghanistan at an in-theater facility; however, this is not a reset
    event. As most TPE has been in theater for more than 6 years, the
    Services anticipate higher than normal wash-out rates as well as
    increased repair costs in future years. The organizational equipment
    assigned to units redeploying from Iraq to home station will be reset
    as appropriate after return.

        36. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what are the
    cost implications for reset/reconstitution given increases in troop
    levels and new platforms such as MRAP vehicles and Multipurpose All-
    Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs)?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Department will assess the
    need for future reset funding based on force levels in the theater of
    operations each year, as well as specific equipment battle losses and
    damage as those are incurred. Equipment Reset costs will be more
    dependent on equipment already in theater that will be scheduled for
    maintenance cycles and possible replacement, than the presence of new
    platforms such as MRAPs and M-ATVs. Outyear funding requirements are
    not precisely known at this time, as they are dependent on those
    circumstances, as well as the timing of eventual force drawdown and
    equipment return to the continental United States (CONUS).

        37. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
    additional training is being provided to those forces that will move
    directly into Afghanistan from Iraq?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The combatant commander and
    joint service provider of forces transitioning from Iraq to Afghanistan
    is responsible for ensuring those forces receive any required
    Afghanistan specific training prior to assignment to that area. Core
    competency training associated with the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility
    (AOR) and the Request For Forces (RFF) requested capability(ies) has
    previously been completed by those forces already deployed to Iraq.
    Afghanistan specific training will be provided based on RFF
    requirements and can include but not be limited to Rules of Engagement
    (ROE), cultural training, enemy threat briefs, detention procedures,
    medical and casualty evacuation (MEDEVAC/CASEVAC) procedures, and other
    force protection measures. Additional training and briefings on various
    Afghanistan command directives such as the July 2009 ISAF headquarters
    (HQ ISAF) tactical directive will also be incorporated into individual
    and unit training requirements as required.

        38. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, is there
    sufficient basing in Afghanistan to handle the additional troops, and
    given the logistical challenges in Afghanistan, has DOD synchronized
    the arrival of troops with their equipment, and if not, what is the
    operational impact?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. A. The basing in Afghanistan
    will have to expand in order to handle the additional troops the
    President ordered, but U.S. CENTCOM and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-
    A) have structured a plan to send Engineers in early to build
    additional Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and expand existing FOBs to
    accommodate the additional forces prior to their arrival. As for
    synchronization, CENTCOM and U.S. Transportation Command conducted
    planning conferences in December and again in late January. These
    planning conferences refined requirements for personnel and associated
    equipment and developed a phased transportation plan to ensure
    synchronized force build up. The Global Force Management process is now
    closely managing the deployment of those forces to arrive in country at
    virtually the same time as their equipment, so the troops are not
    waiting without their equipment.
        B. I agree with what Secretary Gates said. I think it is important
    to realize, the basing standard we are building to is the Initial
    Standard, which is expeditionary, with our troops living in austere
    conditions utilizing unit organic tentage, with force protection and
    basic life support services provided but not much more. Our intent is
    to improve the facility infrastructure over time to a Temporary
    Standard. In order to improve the sustainable living environment of our
    forces, we have asked for some Military Construction (MILCON) funds to
    facilitate these improvements and appreciate your continued support in
    these efforts. To the question of phasing, the forces are arriving in
    three phases and the engineers are timed to arrive in time to prepare
    FOBs for the troops arriving for the next phase. The FOB construction
    and expansion plans are on track and the additional 30,000 troops the
    President ordered will be closed by the end of August this year as
    planned. Finally, I would just note that the Department continues to
    improve synchronized force flow through prudent planning and expanded
    air, road and rail routes across Europe and Central Asia, routes also
    known as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The NDN augments
    other well-established routes running through Pakistan and is an
    important part of our capacity and synchronization solutions.

                                    earmarks
        39. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, every year our committee
    receives letters from Senators requesting earmarks. While we have taken
    significant steps to increase earmark transparency to the general
    public, the process for evaluating and which to support has essentially
    remained the same over the years. As a result, in order to support a
    few earmarks we must make funding cuts in other areas to meet budget
    resolution top line requirements and the President's budget request.
    Unfortunately, cuts sometimes take additional risk in DOD's O&M
    accounts. How can you help us better determine what earmark requests
    are in line with real military value or requirements and what are
    simply wasteful spending?
        Secretary Gates. What you are asking essentially is for assistance
    in cutting the President's defense budget request in order to fund
    earmarks that we did not request. Your question acknowledges that
    earmarks cause additional risk in DOD's O&M accounts, and that is what
    I would underscore. If certain earmarks have some military value, that
    does not alter the fact that those earmarks would displace genuine,
    higher priority requirements in our request. When our DOD leaders
    formulate each year's budget request, we always have to omit certain
    requirements because they cannot be accommodated in a constrained
    topline. Each year's budget request includes our most pressing military
    needs, and cuts to the request increase the risks for our current and
    future warfighters.

        40. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, in your opinion, what would
    constitute a valid member request?
        Secretary Gates. In my opinion, the program needs to have military
    value to the Department and be a priority of the administration. The
    budget request that the President submitted for fiscal year 2011
    reflects the most pressing needs of our military warfighters that could
    be accommodated within the constrained Defense topline. Any action by
    Congress to reduce the budget request for Defense to fund programs not
    requested by the adminsitration increases the risk for current and
    future warfighters.

        41. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, from your experience, how would
    you characterize the additional risks are we accepting to military
    readiness by making cuts in O&M accounts?
        Secretary Gates. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request
    balances our needs, including O&M accounts, to secure and advance U.S.
    security interests around the world. Reduction to any appropriation
    account increases the risks of not being able to meet our mission
    requirements. The fiscal year 2011 budget supports our force structure
    requirements and will sustain our readiness levels. Should significant
    cuts be made to operating budgets, readiness goals will be put at risk.

                             full disclosure budget
        42. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, in last week's issue of Defense
    Daily, retired Pentagon senior budget analyst, John King, proposed a
    ``full-disclosure budget, where all parties can see the real military
    requirement backed by quantifiable rationale, the budget plan, and any
    gap created by affordability or other development or acquisition delays
    . . . To re-channel all the misspent pork war energy, DOD can set up a
    show-and-tell office, where companies, research institutes, and
    universities can bring their ideas and proposals. DOD conducts a hard-
    nosed evaluation of how the proposal adds military value and fits into
    the budget plan.'' This process would be open to the public as well.
    What is your take on this idea and how feasible is it?
        Secretary Gates. A full disclosure budget is feasible, and that is
    exactly what DOD uses. So this proposed process is essentially already
    used and is not a new idea. Every DOD budget request is backed by
    quantifiable rationale to justify the military requirements being
    funded. Our budget plans or presentations discuss development or
    acquisition delays, or affordability issues. And companies, research
    institutes, and universities have full access to bring their ideas and
    proposals in response to DOD requests for proposals (RFPs).
                                     ______

                   Questions Submtited by Senator Mark Begich
                                energy security
        43. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, over the
    course of the past several years, DOD has engaged in a number of
    initiatives to increase its energy security. Energy security is
    critical to national security. How important do you believe it is for
    DOD to achieve energy security and what specific steps is DOD taking to
    get there?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. It is critical that the
    Department achieve energy security. The U.S. military's reliance on oil
    and other fossil fuels poses four broad security challenges. The first
    is the growing risk to operating forces. Attacks on our supply lines in
    Afghanistan and Iraq are increasingly sophisticated and effective,
    resulting in a growing number of casualties. The ability of potential
    adversaries to attack our fixed energy supplies and delivery forces
    will continue to improve. In short, our fuel inefficiency endangers our
    troops and threatens our missions.
        A second challenge is the insecurity of the global commons. Most
    petroleum products are transported by sea, and much of this trade
    passes through vulnerable chokepoints such as the Straits of Hormuz and
    the Straits of Malacca. The free flow of energy through these vital
    channels may be threatened by piracy, political instability, or
    military action. Thus, fuel inefficiency is a strategic as well as a
    tactical threat.
        A third challenge has to do with oil supply, demand, and price
    volatility. Tightening global oil supplies and political instability
    within some oil-producing nations created significant price volatility
    in recent years, raising our costs and making budget and acquisition
    decisions more difficult. The challenge will increase as the growing
    demand for energy--particularly in Asia--outstrips projected oil
    production and refining capacity.
        A final challenge is grid vulnerability. The Department's reliance
    on a fragile commercial grid to deliver electricity to its 500-plus
    installations places the continuity of critical missions at risk. Most
    installations lack the ability to manage their demand for and supply of
    electrical power and are thus vulnerable to intermittent and/or
    prolonged power disruption due to natural disasters, cyber attacks, and
    sheer overload of the grid. Because of U.S. combat forces' increasing
    reliance on ``reachback'' support from installations in the United
    States, power failures at those installations could adversely affect
    our power projection and homeland defense mission capability. For
    example, the Department operates Predator drones in Afghanistan from a
    facility in Nevada and analyzes battlefield intelligence at data
    centers here at home. This means that an energy threat to bases at home
    can be a threat to operations abroad.
        The Department has made meaningful progress in addressing energy
    security, though we have much more to do. In keeping with the
    requirements of the 2009 NDAA, I have created the Office of Director
    for Operational Energy Plans and Programs. The President has nominated
    Sharon Burke to head this new Directorate, and I hope the Senate will
    confirm her very soon. The Military Departments are standing up their
    energy offices as well and they are developing detailed strategic
    plans. The Service Secretaries have also made energy a high priority.
    For example, in October, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus announced a set of
    ambitious new goals to boost the energy efficiency of the Navy and the
    Marine Corps. His plans include fielding a completely sustainable
    carrier strike group (nuclear vessels and ships powered by biofuel),
    dubbed ``the Great Green Fleet,'' by 2016, and producing half of the
    Navy's installation energy requirements from renewable sources by 2020.
    Secretary Mabus also stated recently that energy-related costs will
    become a greater consideration in Navy acquisition decisions. We have
    seen how the vulnerability of logistics forces, coupled with a huge
    demand for fuel, creates an operational risk that must be reduced. As
    Congress has directed, I will develop and implement the Energy Key
    Performance Parameter in the requirement development process and the
    Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel in the acquisition process to help drive
    down this risk to forces and the cost of assuring operational energy
    security.
        With respect to fixed installations, under my direction the
    Department has pursued a two-part investment strategy that is designed
    to: (1) reduce the demand for traditional energy while (2) increasing
    the supply of renewable energy sources. In addition to the Department's
    military construction budget, financing for these investments has come
    from our Energy Conservation Investment Program, Energy Savings
    Performance Contracts and mechanisms such as Enhanced Use Leases, and
    Power Purchase Agreements.
        Efforts to curb demand--through conservation measures and improved
    energy efficiency--are by far the most cost-effective way to improve an
    installation's energy profile. A large fraction of energy efficiency
    investments go to retrofit existing buildings; typical retrofit
    projects install high-efficiency heating, ventilation, and cooling
    (HVAC) systems, energy management control systems, new roofs, and
    improved lighting. The Department is also taking advantage of new
    construction to incorporate more energy efficient designs, material and
    equipment, using LEED Silver standards as a guide. From 2005 to 2008,
    DOD reduced the energy intensity of facilities by 11 percent through
    conservation and investment in energy efficiency.
        On the supply side, military installations--which are large and
    disproportionately located in the southwest and on our coasts--are
    well-situated to support solar, wind, geothermal and other forms of
    renewable energy. For example, Nellis Air Force Base in southern Nevada
    built a 14-megawatt (MW) photovoltaic solar array using a public-
    private partnership. The military's interest in renewable energy is
    nothing new. Naval Air Weapons Center China Lake in California has been
    operating a 270-MW geothermal plant since 1987. The Department
    renewable energy goal is to produce or procure 25 percent of energy
    from renewable sources by fiscal year 2025.
        The assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
    Americas' Security Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
    Installations and Environment, and the Office of the Director for
    Operational Energy Plans and Programs are also leading an effort on
    grid-related energy security relative to DOD operations. The purpose is
    to ensure DOD's critical missions continue unimpeded during
    interruptions in grid power and to inform the interagency and industry
    on DOD's needs related to grid-supplied power.

        44. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how does
    the budget and the QDR budget reflect a move towards energy security?
    Please describe in detail.
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The recently released QDR makes
    clear that crafting a strategic approach to energy and climate change
    is a high priority for DOD.
        To achieve operational energy reductions, the Department tripled
    investment in energy security technology over the last 4 years, from
    $400 million to $1.2 billion. DOD is investing to improve the
    efficiency of aircraft engines, which account for a large fraction of
    all operational energy consumption. One promising project is the Highly
    Efficient Embedded Turbine Engine, based on a high-pressure ratio,
    high-temperature core turbine technology that should reduce fuel
    consumption by 25 percent and also be applicable to commercial
    aircraft. The Army is developing technology to reduce the fuel
    consumption of tactical ground vehicles such as the High Mobility
    Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) by 30 to 40 percent in the future.
        The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is spending
    $100 million on an 18-month project to develop affordable algae-based
    synthetic fuels. DOD is testing a more advanced approach within the
    Net-Zero Joint Concept Technology Demonstration program that would
    allow a FOB to create all the power it needs within its own perimeter
    fence--largely through renewable energy. The demonstration is hosted at
    the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. Generators used to
    provide HVAC at FOBs are another major consumer of operational energy.
    In 2008, DOD began spraying insulating foam on tents, trailers and
    other temporary structures in Iraq, and later Afghanistan, with
    significant results. Estimates of the fuel saved for heating and
    cooling in these structures are approximately 50 percent. In one
    demonstration, DOD insulated 9 million square feet of temporary
    structures and reduced daily fuel demand by an estimated 77,000
    gallons, which can translate to 13 fewer trucks convoying fuel each
    day. Once confirmed, the Director for Operational Energy Plans and
    Programs will lead the creation of a DOD-wide Operational Energy
    Strategy setting priorities and informing how the Department addresses
    energy in its core planning, requirements, acquisition, and budgeting
    processes.
        With respect to fixed installations, the Department is pursuing a
    two-part investment strategy that is designed to: (1) reduce the demand
    for traditional energy; and (2) increase the supply of renewable energy
    sources. In addition to the Department's military construction budget,
    financing for these investments has come from its Energy Conservation
    Investment Program, Energy Savings Performance Contracts, and
    mechanisms such as Enhanced Use Leases and Power Purchase Agreements.

                           ballistic missile defense
        45. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, last year,
    the administration made significant changes to the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The
    decision was made to decrease deployment of interceptors in the United
    States from 44 to 30. Additionally, deployment of a European GMD
    capability was cancelled in favor of a phased-adaptive approach to
    address a range of threats in the area. The new approach is intended to
    augment the existing GMD long-range capabilities in the United States.
    As a result of the decision to cancel deployment of GMD Europe, Alaska
    and California are the Nation's only line of defense against a long-
    range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). How does the fiscal
    year 2011 budget and the BMD review reflect a robust strategy and
    investment in the GMD program to provide defense of the Nation with 30
    operational interceptors?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The fiscal year 2011
    President's budget request lays out a funded plan to expand the
    integration of the GMD capabilities into the larger Ballistic Missile
    Defense System (BMDS). This will include deploying 30 operational
    ground-based interceptors (GBIs), as well as delivery of 4 additional
    interceptors as operational spares (based on reliability estimations)
    and 18 additional interceptors to support the flight test program. The
    GMD element will maintain operational effectiveness and reliability
    through a number of initiatives designed to: thoroughly test the
    performance of the system; achieve a high state of readiness; monitor
    the health of the deployed interceptors; and modernize the system with
    technology improvements to the interceptor and supporting ground
    systems.
        The Department plans to complete the construction of Missile Field
    2 in Fort Greely, AK, by emplacing the full 14 GBI silos and making
    those silos operationally ready. This will both replace older,
    inadequate silos from Missile Field 1 and provide a reserve capability
    to deploy up to 8 additional GBIs rapidly from the pool of interceptors
    currently designated for testing. Although the Department does not
    currently foresee a need for more than 30 deployed GBIs, these extra
    operational silos will provide an additional hedge against future
    threat uncertainty. The Department does not require the procurement of
    additional GBIs for this purpose. The Department will also complete a
    second GMD Fire Control node at Fort Greely, AK, by the end of calendar
    year 2011.

                           interceptor infrastructure
        46. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
    decisions have been made with respect to infrastructure required to
    deploy interceptors, specifically at Fort Greely, Alaska?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. There are currently two
    completed missile fields at Fort Greely, AK--Missile Field 1 and
    Missile Field 3 with 6 and 20 silos, respectively. The fiscal year 2011
    President's budget request reflected the funding needed to continue the
    operations, sustainment, and maintenance of Missile Field 1 and to
    complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration.
        This effort also requires continued use of fiscal year 2009 funds
    previously appropriated for work on Missile Field 2 and fiscal year
    2010 funds previously appropriated to suspend work on Missile Field 2.
    MDA submitted a reprogramming request to the Department's Comptroller
    for the realignment of $72.8 million of fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funds
    and $16 million of fiscal year 2010 RDT&E funds within the BMDS
    Midcourse Defense program element for the continuation of Missile Field
    2. This configuration's additional silos will enable future flexibility
    to increase GBI inventory in response to emerging threats.
        Upon completion of Missile Field 2, Missile Field 1 will be
    decommissioned. Missile Field 1 was originally designed as a test bed,
    so it lacks required hardening and redundant power, and has significant
    infrastructure reliability issues. The Missile Field 2 design includes
    shielding and addresses the reliability concerns of Missile Field 1.
    Missile Field 1 will not be decommissioned until Missile Field 2 is
    fully available for emplacing GBIs. In the meantime, Missile Field 1
    will be closely monitored and maintained in a high state of readiness
    through intensive maintenance procedures.

        47. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, has DOD
    taken any measures to preserve deployment capacity as a hedge against
    the increasing threat in the event more than 30 operational
    interceptors are required?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Yes, The Department plans to
    buy 52 GBIs, 30 of which will be operationally deployed, 4 of which
    will be held as operational spares, and the rest of which will be test
    articles. DOD expects this level to provide sufficient protection of
    the homeland, while allowing the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to pursue
    a robust test program and enabling operational flexibility should a new
    threat emerge. DOD will maintain readiness and continue to develop
    existing operational capabilities at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg
    Air Force Base, CA.
        DOD will hedge against an increased threat in numerous ways,
    including:

             Complete the second field of 14 silos at Fort Greely
            to hedge against the possibility that additional deployments
            become necessary.
             Continue development and assessment of a two-stage
            GBI.
             Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve cueing for
            missiles launched at the United States by Iran or other
            potential adversaries in the Middle East.
             Invest in further development of the Standard Missile-
            3 (SM-3) for future land-based deployment as the ICBM threat
            matures.
             Pursue a number of new GMD system enhancements, and
            develop next generation missile defense capabilities.

        48. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how is the
    deployment capacity in Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely funded, and is
    this all in fiscal year 2011 or a reprogramming?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The fiscal year 2011
    President's budget request contains funding needed to complete Missile
    Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration. The request reflects funds required
    in addition to fiscal year 2009 funds previously appropriated for work
    on Missile Field 2 and fiscal year 2010 funds previously appropriated
    to suspend work on Missile Field 2.
        The MDA submitted a reprogramming request to the Department's
    Comptroller for the realignment of $72.8 million of fiscal year 2009
    RDT&E funds and $16 million of fiscal year 2010 RDT&E funds within the
    BMDS Midcourse Defense program element for the continuation of Missile
    Field 2.

        49. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
    deficiencies and readiness are achieved by continuing completion of
    Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo starting capacity?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Completing Missile Field 2 in a
    14-silo configuration allows for the decommissioning of Missile Field 1
    and provides future flexibility to increase the number of interceptors,
    if the threat evolves. When Missile Field 2 is completed and fully
    available for emplacing GBIs, the MDA plans to transfer six GBIs
    currently deployed in Missile Field 1 to Missile Field 2.
        Once Missile Field 2 is fully operational, Missile Field 1 will be
    decommissioned since it was designed as a test bed only and is not
    hardened or sufficiently reliable for a long-term operational
    deployment. Specifically, Missile Field 1 lacks backup power and has
    significant infrastructure reliability issues. These reliability issues
    include extensive mold contamination in the Missile Field 1 utilidor,
    requiring personnel to suit up for a hazardous environment; inadequate
    valve connections in the chilled water system, resulting in leaks of
    glycol; and dust intrusion at Mechanical Electrical Building-1. The
    Missile Field 2 design includes shielding and addresses the reliability
    concerns of Missile Field 1.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
                       modernization and recapitalization
        50. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
    particular programs address the Services' modernization and
    recapitalization?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.
    Guardian Armored Security Vehicle (ASV):
             Modernization:

                     Product Director (PD), ASV, is addressing
                    limited modernization (Engineering Change Proposals
                    (ECPs)) through existing modification and services line
                    or by modernization through spares.

             Reset (Operations and Maintenance, Army-funded):

                     Planning is underway to reset approximately
                    1,500 ASVs during fiscal year 2011-2017.
                     While the average age of ASVs is 3 years, some
                    ASVs in theater accumulated 20,000-plus miles per year
                    (peacetime OPTEMPO is estimated at 2,729 miles per year
                    for a useful life of 20 years).
                     Reset will bring ASVs to fully mission capable
                    condition, to include replacing basic issue items such
                    as shovels and tire jacks.

             Recapitalization (RECAP--Other Procurement, Army
            (OPA), funding is required):

                     The Army has not programmed RECAP funding in
                    POM fiscal year 2012-2017.

                             OPA funding currently ends in fiscal
                            year 2011, with production ending in fiscal
                            year 2012.

                     However, in accordance with a recent
                    Acquisition Decision Memorandum, the ASV Product Office
                    will continue to collaborate with the Combat Developer
                    on desired upgrades. Potential outcome of this
                    collaboration could result in an ASV RECAP requirement.
    Stryker:
             Modernization:

                     Evolutionary acquisition approach to achieve
                    the full Stryker Capability Development Document
                     Planned as separate and distinct program from
                    base Stryker
                     Provides suspension, structure and power
                    growth capability to support planned upgrades
                     Includes modified lower hull for under belly
                    IED protection as well as upgraded suspension to
                    support up to a 60,000-pound GVW
                     Key Upgrades include Lethality, Survivability,
                    360 degrees Situational Awareness, Sniper Detection
                     Assumes JTRS & Battle Command Upgrades
                     30-ton Capacity Configuration

             Reset:

                     Army selected Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, as
                    centralized Reset facility for the Stryker Family of
                    Vehicles.
                     Stryker vehicle resets for OCONUS based
                    Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (2nd Brigade, 25th
                    Infantry Division--Schofield Barracks, HI, and 2nd
                    Cavalry Regiment--Vilseck, Germany), as well as the 1st
                    Brigade, 25th Infantry Division SBCT (Fort Wainright,
                    AK) may still be conducted at home station.
                     Stryker Reset provides annual scheduled
                    service level plus maintenance action, does not return
                    vehicles to zero hours/zero miles standard.

             Recapitalization:

                     Stryker does not perform RECAP efforts.

                    defense support to civilian authorities
        51. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, please
    explain how the mission to provide defense support to civil authorities
    is addressed.
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. During the 2010 QDR, I directed
    a significant emphasis to domestic military operations, including
    Defense Support of Civil Authorities. After considerable analysis in
    the QDR, the Department will make a number of changes in its approach
    to support civil authorities responding to Chemical, Biological,
    Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents in
    the United States.
        First, the Department will re-structure CBRNE Consequence
    Management Response Force 1 (CCMRF-1) to be larger and faster than it
    is today, with more life saving capabilities. CCMRFs 2 and 3 will be
    significantly downsized to become command and control (C2) elements,
    each able to handle up to 45,000 Title 10 general purpose and
    specialized forces in the event of multiple, simultaneous incidents.
        Most significantly, rather than building three large Federal-level
    response forces to be employed by U.S. Northern Command, the Department
    will start placing a National Guard-based Homeland Response Force (HRF)
    in each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions
    beginning at the end of fiscal year 2011. Each HRF, routinely operating
    in State status (State Active Duty or in duty under Title 32, U.S.
    Code) at the direction of a governor, will consist of approximately 560
    personnel. The HRFs will include CBRNE capabilities similar to the
    existing National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages
    (CERFPs), as well as additional robust C2 and security capabilities. I
    anticipate that the HRFs will serve as a catalyst for promoting greater
    regional integration within the FEMA regions and promoting closer
    working relationships with the FEMA Regional Administrator offices,
    Defense Coordination Officers, and individual States.

                        overseas contingency operations
        52. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what role
    will the ongoing contingency operations play in future force-sizing?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. All of our servicemembers
    (Active and Reserve) continue to perform extraordinarily in light of
    the demands we have placed upon them. We cannot fail to have the right
    numbers and kinds of uniformed personnel to win our wars and deter
    potential adversaries. Additionally, our force, Active and Reserve,
    must be large enough to not only satisfy deployed demands, but also
    have a base that recognizes the personal needs of our volunteers and
    their families. We believe we are currently at an appropriate force
    level. As our future challenges evolve and requirements change, we will
    work closely with Congress to determine if adjustments are necessary.

                         guantanamo detainee operations
        53. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how does
    the budget support the President's decision on Guantanamo (GTMO)
    detainee operations?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The President's fiscal year
    2011 OCO budget request includes $350 million to finance all detainee
    operations at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility or another site.

                             don't ask, don't tell
        54. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, taking a
    look at discharge statistics provided by DOD, it appears that the
    number of individuals discharged during years of conflict drop off
    drastically. Can you explain these numbers--noting that reports of
    homosexual conduct are not covered under the military's stop-loss
    policies?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. I cannot speculate as to why
    separations under the homosexual conduct policy have declined in recent
    years. However, the Department has not changed how it applies 10 U.S.C.
    Sec. 654 in ``years of conflict.''

        55. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, once this
    change is enacted, how will you address the cases involving pending and
    previously discharged servicemembers?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. If the law is repealed, any
    pending homosexual conduct discharge cases would be ceased. Those
    servicemembers previously separated would remain separated. As part of
    their assessment, the working group will examine re-accession policies
    for such servicemembers if the law is repealed.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
              program management of the f-35 lightning acquisition
        56. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, I am gratified by the
    management decisions you announced yesterday to instill accountability
    in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program by replacing the program
    executive officer and withholding more than $600 million. Does the
    withhold reflect the outcome of pending discussions between your office
    and the prime contractor, following the instructions you issued in
    December 2009 to restructure the program, to have the contractor fund
    part of the proposed extension in development?
        Secretary Gates. A more accurate way to portray the handling of the
    $614 million withhold is that the Department is changing the paradigm
    under which the contractor can earn that fee. I decided that the
    current award fee structure would not properly incentivize the
    contractor. Therefore, the Department took the future fee that the
    contractor could have earned and redistributed it in a fashion that
    better reflects the behavior I expect. The criteria are objective, date
    certain, and designed to accomplish major events in the program with
    the appropriate level of detail to ensure the event is successful
    instead of just complete. In addition, the fee is back-loaded, with a
    major portion applied to the ability of the contractor to meet the
    estimate at completion. Failure to do so results in the complete loss
    of that fee.

        57. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, under what circumstances, if
    any, could the prime contractor recoup that withholding?
        Secretary Gates. The remaining fee for the contractor's development
    effort is $614 million. We are restructuring that $614 million and
    revising the SDD contract structure to reward measurable progress
    against significant schedule events and ensure event-based fees, to
    include completion at or under the estimate at completion. The
    contractor can recoup the withheld fees only if these events are
    successfully completed according to the schedule and the estimate at
    completion is achieved.

                      f-35 testing and engineering issues
        58. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, as you of course know, I am
    concerned about the F-35 Lightning acquisition program, even with the
    restructuring you announced in December 2009. A few weeks ago, the
    Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) found that
    ``[c]ontinued production concurrent with the slow increase in flight
    testing over the next 2 years will commit the Department and Services
    to test, training, and deployment plans with substantial risk.'' Will
    extending development of the JSF, as is being proposed under the budget
    request, be supported with additional flight test aircraft, the
    delivery of software, and an adequate pace of testing, so that
    operational testing of fully integrated and capable aircraft will occur
    on time in 2016?
        Secretary Gates. The program office is currently working with all
    the test stakeholders, including the Operational Test (OT) community,
    to finalize the test schedule outlining both the timing and the
    appropriate allocation of resources for a successful completion of
    System Development and Demonstration as well as successful transition
    to OT. The restructured program will mitigate cost and schedule
    challenges. The restructured program funds the F-35 program to an
    Independent Cost Estimate, adds additional schedule to development
    test, moves the full rate production decision to April 2016, adds
    additional test assets to flight test to build on the successful
    ongoing ground test, and expands the software integration capacity.
    These actions are in-line with multiple independent assessments
    performed in 2009 covering cost, schedule and capacity.

        59. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain how your budget
    request will ensure that program management emphasizes maintaining
    robust engineering and test forces; early completion of detailed test
    plans; fully resourcing those plans; and rigorous accreditation of
    models and labs.
        Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2011 budget request for the JSF
    program is the result of rigorous analysis by a Joint Estimating Team
    (JET), led by the Office of the Director, Cost Analysis and Program
    Evaluation. The JET's analysis informed a senior leadership JSF Task
    Force that led to a restructure of the JSF development and test
    program. The program office is currently working with all the test
    stakeholders, including the OT community, to finalize the test schedule
    outlining both the timing and the appropriate allocation of resources
    for a successful completion of System Development and Demonstration and
    transition to OT. The Department will conduct an even more in-depth
    review of the JSF program as part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification
    process. All aspects of the program, to include engineering manning,
    test plan scheduling, resourcing, and lab and modeling accreditation
    will be reviewed.

        60. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, to what extent will your
    budget proposal ensure that the delivery of assets for OT&E and initial
    training will be managed consistent with plans approved for OT&E?
        Secretary Gates. The Department has fully funded F-35 System
    Development and Demonstration (SDD) to the Joint Estimating Team (JET)
    II estimate, which includes adequate funds for both developmental and
    operational testing. The funds are adequate to purchase and deliver
    aircraft and all the necessary support equipment to the OT community.
    In addition, the Department has fully resourced, across the Future
    Years Defense Program (FYDP), for adequate organic and contractor
    support of developmental and operational testing. The program office is
    currently working with all the test stakeholders, including the OT
    community, to finalize the test schedule outlining both the timing and
    the appropriate allocation of resources for a successful completion of
    SDD.

        61. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you expect that the
    delivery of those test and training assets will deviate from those
    plans? If so, please explain.
        Secretary Gates. I expect delivery of test and training assets to
    happen on a timeline commensurate with the restructured program. The
    program office is currently working with all the test stakeholders,
    including the OT community, to finalize the test schedule outlining
    both the timing and the appropriate allocation of resources (including
    training) for a successful completion of System Development and
    Demonstration as well as successful transition to OT.

        62. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, during the hearing, you
    explained that, at this moment, the program is holding schedule in
    terms of the expected initial operating capability (IOC) dates for all
    the variant aircraft except that fewer quantities may be delivered.
    Please explain.
        Secretary Gates. At the date of the hearing, the Services were
    still evaluating how the restructured program would impact IOC dates.
    The Services have completed their review, and the Marine Corps IOC is
    still projected for December 2012 with Block 2 capability, while the
    Air Force and Navy IOCs are now projected for 2016 with Block 3
    capability.

        63. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the concurrency structured
    into the JSF program's test, production, and training plans has
    obscured the mission capability of low-rate initial production (LRIP)
    aircraft and support systems. How will DOD, under its proposed budget,
    improve the process by which the mission capability of LRIP systems
    will be accurately and credibly predicted well before delivery?
        Secretary Gates. Concurrency was a choice made at the outset of the
    program, which was a sound strategy for the Department. It is designed
    to replace legacy aircraft and provide the Warfighter a 5th generation
    strike fighter as quickly as possible, allowing the Department to reach
    a more economic order quantity while still thoroughly testing the
    aircraft. To that end, DOD intends to produce aircraft at a rate
    consistent with the Independent Manufacturing Review Team
    recommendations to the maximum extent possible. To mitigate concurrency
    risks, a great deal of upfront investment was made in design tools
    giving us a greater level of confidence in the design of the aircraft
    than we would have for legacy systems such as the F-16 or F-15. Early
    ground and flight test data closely match model predictions for flying
    qualities, performance, and structures, justifying our upfront
    investment. The maturity of the physical aircraft and the restructured
    program give us confidence that our predictions will remain sound
    concerning the capabilities of the F-35.

        64. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, I understand that the JSF
    program office is executing a comprehensive, robust, and fully funded
    live fire test plan. However, the program recently removed shutoff
    fuses for engine fuel hydraulics lines. Coupled with the prior removal
    of dry bay fire extinguishers, this may increase the likelihood of
    aircraft combat losses from ballistic threat induced fires. At present,
    only the Integrated Power Plant (IPP) bay has a fire suppression
    system. Though the JSF Executive Steering Board (JESB) has approved the
    Joint Program Office's (JPO) request to remove these safety systems as
    an acceptable system trade to balance weight, cost, and risk, DOT&E
    remains concerned regarding the aircraft's vulnerability to threat-
    induced fires. Why is DOT&E's concern here not valid?
        Secretary Gates. The Department is committed to delivering the most
    affordable, supportable, lethal and survivable F-35 aircraft that meets
    the needs of the warfighter. The overall survivability posture of the
    F-35 is without equal due to advanced avionics and sensor suite, 5th
    generation stealth performance, advanced countermeasures and robust,
    balanced vulnerability reduction design. The warfighting effectiveness
    of each design feature is carefully balanced against the overall system
    impact to cost, weight and supportability. According to the JPO, the
    removal of PAO (polyalphaolefin) coolant shut-off valves and fuses for
    engine fuel-draulic lines resulted in a minimal (.05 Pk) impact on the
    vulnerability assessment, no impact on the safety assessment, avoids
    11 lbs. per aircraft in weight, avoids $40,000 (CTOL and CV)--$50,000
    (STOVL) per aircraft in procurement cost, and avoids $1.4 million in
    development cost. The JESB decision included a requirement to update
    the vulnerability assessment after conclusion of the live-fire testing
    in calendar year 2011. All F-35 aircraft vulnerability data will then
    be re-assessed.

        65. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, looking ahead to 2010, exactly
    what milestones does the Director, Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation (DCAPE) believe the JPO and prime contractor must complete
    on time and on budget to achieve stated IOC dates?
        Secretary Gates. DCAPE has identified five performance metric areas
    for tracking in fiscal year 2010 that CAPE will monitor closely to
    assess whether the JPO and prime contractor are making reasonable
    progress against what the Joint Estimating Team (JET) schedule forecast
    and cost estimate prepared in fall 2009 (also known as the ``JET II
    estimate''). These areas are: 1) Progress in software for Block 0.5 and
    1.0 releases; 2) the status of Mission System Hardware qualification
    activities; 3) the level of engineering change traffic resulting from
    ongoing flight test and early production activities; 4) the
    availability of flight test aircraft at test sites; and 5) the status
    of sortie generation rates, flight test hours completion, and test
    point verification completion.

        66. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, to what extent will the
    verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of labs and models
    as test venues be event-driven, subject to disciplined oversight by the
    government and independent review?
        Secretary Gates. The JSF Program Office employs a specific process
    for verification, validation and accreditation of each model, lab, and
    simulation intended as a test venue. A joint government/contractor team
    reviews the validation evidence and accreditation support packages. The
    team makes a recommendation to accredit the venue to the government
    accreditation authority in the program office, which is either the
    chief engineer or the program executive officer. Independent review of
    the validation and accreditation process or content is not currently
    included in the process but would be useful in helping to ensure
    adequate F-35 test data are used in the validation phase and that
    models are not used before accreditation is complete.

        67. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, to what extent will these labs
    and models not be used to close verification success criteria unless
    formally approved for that use?
        Secretary Gates. I expect the JSF program office leadership to
    follow the process and assure any verification success criteria
    dependent on model accreditation are not considered closed unless the
    model successfully completed an adequate validation and accreditation
    process.

                  impact of iraqi elections on drawdown plans
        68. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the budget request is based on
    assumptions that include the ability to withdraw all combat forces from
    Iraq by the end of fiscal year 2011, leaving a non-combat U.S. military
    training and assistance force of about 50,000. The ability to make
    substantial reductions in combat forces hinges on the timing of the
    next round of Iraqi parliamentary elections that were first scheduled
    for January and which have now slipped to March. Domestic political and
    security considerations in Iraq may lead to further delays. The bombing
    in Baghdad on February 1, 2010, was the fifth suicide attack in Baghdad
    in a week. While it's not totally unexpected given the national
    elections in March, a sudden deterioration in security could have
    considerable implications for the withdrawal of most U.S. troops later
    this year. Do you anticipate General Odierno will recommend that the
    estimated 65,000 U.S. combat troops return this August?
        Secretary Gates. DOD is on schedule to draw down to 50,000 U.S.
    forces in Iraq and to end the combat mission by August 31, 2010. The
    remaining U.S. forces will be engaged in training, equipping, and
    advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); targeted counterterrorism
    operations; and protection of U.S. military and civilian efforts. U.S.
    forces will continue to draw down responsibly in compliance with the
    Security Agreement.
        DOD's ability to continue the drawdown of U.S. forces is a
    testament to the increasing capability of the ISF, as evidenced by
    their performance during the elections. Since U.S. forces repositioned
    from the cities in June 2009, the ISF have had the lead for operations
    in Iraq, with U.S. forces playing a supporting role through partnering
    with and enabling the ISF.

        69. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what will be the budget impact
    if forces in Iraq cannot be withdrawn according to the current plan?
        Secretary Gates. The budget impact would be proportional to the
    size of the force that is not withdrawn. The budget impact could be
    substantial because it is very expensive to sustain deploy forces, even
    if the operating tempo is moderate compared to active combat. Still, I
    remain confident that U.S. forces can be withdrawn according to our
    current plan.

        70. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how will that impact the
    ability to source the increase of troops in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. The responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq
    continues forward as planned and will be executed concurrently with the
    increase of forces in Afghanistan. The Iraqi national elections and the
    plan to drawdown U.S. military forces in Iraq do not adversely affect
    the ability to source the force increase in Afghanistan. The Iraqi
    national elections were successfully conducted on March 2010. The
    security environment established by the ISF prevented any large scale
    effective attacks by insurgents or extremist elements seeking to derail
    the conduct or outcome of the elections and demonstrated the increasing
    capability of the Iraqis to provide security for themselves. As our
    requirements in Iraq continue to decrease, units that redeploy from or
    are no longer required to deploy to Iraq will return to the pool of
    forces available to deploy in support of the mission in Afghanistan or
    other global requirements.

        71. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, I remain concerned that Iraq
    will not have the training and equipment that it will need to maintain
    a credible defense after most of our forces leave later this year. What
    are we doing to ensure that Iraq receives the equipment and training
    necessary to ensure we can responsibly withdrawal as scheduled?
        Admiral Mullen. In spite of Iraq's recent budgetary challenges that
    impact both manning and equipping the ISF, we remain confident that
    with continued and focused U.S. support, specifically the $3 billion in
    requested Iraqi Security Forces Funds, the ISF will be capable of
    providing internal security and foundational external defense by the
    time U.S. forces withdraw at the end of December 2011.
        As of February 2010, the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program
    had executed 144 cases valued at $5 billion. Between now and the end of
    2011, USF-I will continue to support the training and equipping of the
    ISF. We are currently working with Iraq on 96 additional FMS cases
    valued at over $4 billion. In addition, thanks to critical authorities
    provided by Congress in the 2010 NDAA, the United States will transfer
    equipment to the ISF to further assist Iraq in meeting critical
    equipping requirements.

                               military pay raise
        72. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, for the last 3 years, Congress
    has increased the administration's proposed increase in pay by half a
    percentage point. What is the impact on the DOD budget by such a
    directed increase in fiscal year 2011 and beyond?
        Admiral Mullen. The cost of an additional half percent pay raise
    increase to the fiscal year 2011 budget is $339 million in fiscal year
    2011 and $2.2 billion across the FYDP. Increases in pay beyond DOD
    requests contribute to a reduction of funding for our readiness
    accounts which will jeopardize our ability to meet defense objectives
    to prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to
    defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and
    preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.

                              u.s. forces in korea
        73. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what will be the total costs in
    terms of infrastructure, family support programs, and other operating
    costs to achieve DOD's long-term goal to phase out all unaccompanied
    tours in Korea?
        Admiral Mullen. The fiscal year 2011 FYDP includes $536 million to
    increase the total number of families in Korea to 4,900. Additional
    increases in the number of families in Korea, as part of the
    Department's long-term goal to phase out unaccompanied tours, will be
    addressed in future budget requests.

        74. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are these costs reflected in
    the budget request for fiscal year 2011 and the FYDP?
        Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2011 FYDP includes $536 million to
    increase the total number of families in Korea to 4,900. Any further
    increases in the number of families in Korea, as part of the
    Department's long-term goal to phase out all unaccompanied tours, would
    be addressed in future budget requests.

                         force structure in afghanistan
        75. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, GAO recently reviewed military
    readiness issues and raised concerns that the flow of forces into
    Afghanistan, including critical enabling forces, is being impeded by a
    force cap placed on the total number of troops equal to 68,000 plus the
    President's announced increase of 30,000, with a 10 percent buffer of
    3,000 additional troops. This 10 percent buffer, which could
    temporarily raise troop levels above the maximum of 98,000, can only be
    authorized on a case-by-case basis by you. Is there a hard cap on the
    number of troops in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. In December 2009, President Obama committed an
    additional 30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18
    months. Since taking office, the President has committed 52,000
    additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of 92,000.
        The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended
    surge will be largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard
    cap on the number of forces in Afghanistan. DOD's commitment of
    significant military resources to support this effort is consistent
    with the President's strategy set forth in March 2009, and is directly
    linked to the progress of General McChrystal's civil-military plan to
    reverse the Taliban's momentum and create time and space to develop
    Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force
    level through July 2011. During this time, we will regularly measure
    our progress and, beginning in July 2011, transfer lead security
    responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces
    for redeployment.

        76. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, is this cap driven by
    operational factors, budget concerns, or other policy considerations?
        Secretary Gates. In December 2009, President Obama committed an
    additional 30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18
    months. Since taking office, the President has committed 52,000
    additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of 92,000.
        The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended
    surge will be largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard
    cap on the number of forces in Afghanistan. DOD's commitment of
    significant military resources to support this effort is consistent
    with the President's strategy set forth in March 2009, and is directly
    linked to the progress of General McChrystal's civil-military plan to
    reverse the Taliban's momentum and create time and space to develop
    Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force
    level through July 2011. During this time, we will regularly measure
    our progress and, beginning in July 2011, transfer lead security
    responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces
    for redeployment.

        77. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, should there be any arbitrary
    cap on the total number of forces that may be temporarily in
    Afghanistan if such forces are necessary to establish the capability to
    succeed in the mission?
        Secretary Gates. In December 2009, President Obama committed an
    additional 30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18
    months. Since taking office, the President has committed 52,000
    additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of 92,000.
        The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended
    surge will be largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard
    cap on the number of forces in Afghanistan. DOD commitment of
    significant military resources to support this effort is consistent
    with the President's strategy set forth in March 2009, and is directly
    linked to the progress of General McChrystal's civil-military plan to
    reverse the Taliban's momentum and create time and space to develop
    Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force
    level through July 2011. During this time, we will regularly measure
    our progress and, beginning in July 2011, transfer lead security
    responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces
    for redeployment.

        78. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are there indications from
    CENTCOM that the build-up of forces in Afghanistan is being impeded by
    the cap on forces?
        Secretary Gates. No, the U.S. CENTCOM has indicated the build-up/
    increase of U.S. forces approved by POTUS in December 2009 is not being
    impacted by the total authorized force. U.S. CENTCOM has worked a very
    detailed transportation plan to ensure a majority of these forces
    arrive in-country by late summer and this plan still remains feasible.

        79. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if the President's priority is
    to rapidly increase U.S. force levels in Afghanistan to turn the tide
    in the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda so the U.S. can begin to
    withdraw forces by July 2011, is managing the flow of forces to stay
    below an arbitrary cap consistent with that priority?
        Secretary Gates. In December 2009, President Obama committed an
    additional 30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18
    months. Since taking office, the President has committed 52,000
    additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of 92,000.
        The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended
    surge will be largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard
    cap on the number of forces in Afghanistan. DOD's commitment of
    significant military resources to support this effort is consistent
    with the President's strategy set forth in March 2009, and is directly
    linked to the progress of General McChrystal's civil-military plan to
    reverse the Taliban's momentum and create time and space to develop
    Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force
    level through July 2011. During this time, we will regularly measure
    our progress and, beginning in July 2011, transfer lead security
    responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces
    for redeployment.

        80. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will a delay in the supply of
    trainers for Afghan security forces, or a decision by NATO allies not
    to provide trainers, affect the need for U.S. forces above the 30,000
    approved by the President?
        Secretary Gates. Ensuring that the NATO Training Mission-
    Afghanistan (NTM-A) has sufficient institutional and operational
    trainers remains a top priority. DOD is currently working with NATO to
    resource NTM-A. A series of SHAPE-led force generation efforts have
    resulted in a significant number of international commitments to help
    meet the institutional and operational trainer shortfall. The U.S.
    Government continues to be engaged in very active diplomatic efforts to
    urge our coalition partners to provide additional trainers and
    mentoring teams for the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). We are
    also examining DOD's own contributions to ensure we are doing
    everything we can to fill the requirement.

                 overseas contingency operations budget request
        81. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, among the items in the fiscal
    year 2011 OCO supplemental budget request is a request for one F-35 JSF
    aircraft. I understand that this aircraft is intended to replace an F-
    15E fighter plane from the 336th Fighter Squadron, Seymour Johnson Air
    Force Base, North Carolina that crashed while conducting combat
    operations in eastern Afghanistan, near the Ghazni province on July 18,
    2009. I also understand that the existing ground rules for determining
    what projects can be funded with the supplemental budget allow for the
    replacement of combat equipment as a result of loss during combat
    operations.
        I have been told that because the Air Force can no longer procure
    F-15E aircraft from the prime contractor, you elected to procure a
    fighter aircraft currently in production. I am troubled by this
    request. The JSF aircraft you are proposing to buy here will cost $205
    million, as opposed to the F-15E unit cost of around $65 million. More
    importantly, the very earliest that the Air Force can accept delivery
    of its first operationally capable aircraft will be 2013, and
    development of the JSF will not be completed until a few years later.
    Would you please provide a major cost breakout and explain why you are
    asking $205 million for this one JSF aircraft?
        Secretary Gates. In early summer 2009 the Air Force provided an
    estimate for a fiscal year 2011 OCO F-35 aircraft. At that time, the
    estimate was $204.9 million. This cost control was subsequently used to
    develop the detailed cost breakout that appeared in DOD's fiscal year
    2011 President's budget (PB) Justification. If Congress approves the
    additional OCO aircraft, the unit cost for 23 aircraft (fiscal year
    2011 22 aircraft plus 1 OCO aircraft) would be approximately $182.5
    million. OCO funds appropriated above this amount will be used for
    initial spares associated with the OCO F-35. The table below reflects
    the numbers which were submitted in the fiscal year 2011 PB
    documentation for the base and OCO request, and what the OCO numbers
    should have been in the documentation for the same weapon system unit
    cost ($182.5 million).

        82. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, as a cost effective
    alternative to buying a JSF aircraft here and to ensure timely fielding
    of needed strike fighter capability in theater, to what extent have you
    explored the possibility of refixing a legacy F-15E intended for
    retirement, or one that has actually been retired, pursuant to the Air
    Force's Combat Air Forces (CAF) Restructure Plan?
        Secretary Gates. The F-15E Strike Eagle is a two-seat all-weather
    ground attack aircraft designed for high-speed interdiction and is a
    derivative of the F-15C Eagle that is used for air superiority. The F-
    15Es are some of the newest fighters in the Air Force (AF) active
    inventory, and as of today, none of them have been retired or are
    planned to be retired.

                           bmd-capable ships and sm-3
        83. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, with the growing threat from
    China, North Korea, and the Middle East, does DOD have enough BMD/SM-3
    resources/assets to defend the United States, its allies, and forward
    deployed forces in the region? In answering this question, please break
    out your responses by BMD-capable ships and SM-3 missiles.
        Secretary Gates. The Department will have 20 Aegis BMD ships and 81
    SM-3 interceptors available for worldwide deployment by the end of
    fiscal year 2010. The Aegis BMD ships and SM-3 interceptors deployed to
    the East Asia, Middle East, and Europe are sufficient to carry out
    assigned missions in those regions.
        The Department also plans to have 23 Aegis BMD ships operationally
    available in fiscal year 2011, along with a total of 110 SM-3
    interceptors. By Phase 2 of the EPAA in the 2015 timeframe, the
    Department plans to have 37 Aegis BMD-capable ships along with 112 SM-3
    Block IA and 180 Block IB interceptors available.
        The Department understands that demand for regional BMD
    capabilities will outstrip supply for quite some time. Given this
    reality, DOD is pursuing a collaborative approach with Allies and
    partners to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. It is
    important to note that as we manage U.S. resources, our objective is to
    provide a steady-state capability that can be augmented for added
    defensive capability for a limited duration in times of increased
    threat. This is the essence of the phased adaptive approach to regional
    architectures.

        84. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, does the Navy have enough
    Aegis Class Destroyers to support both MDA and Navy requirements?
        Secretary Gates. The Navy currently has sufficient large surface
    combatants to meet the demand for Aegis destroyers. The Navy does not
    have the capacity to meet the entire BMD requirement. In the near term,
    DOD will employ a comprehensive Global Force Management (GFM) process
    to most effectively allocate available surface combatants with Aegis
    BMD capability. A modernization program is in place to increase BMD
    capacity to meet the additional Combatant Commander's forward presence
    requirements for BMD capable ships. The restart of the Aegis
    shipbuilding program is aligned with providing the required Aegis BMD
    capacity.
        By spring 2010, Navy will have 21 BMD capable ships, and by 2015,
    new construction and modernization will bring the total of BMD capable
    ships to 27. The Navy will continue to work with the MDA to support
    global BMD demands. It is important to recognize that Navy force
    structure is not sized to utilize multi-mission Aegis ships for an
    exclusive use mission on an enduring basis. Such single mission use
    invariably results in shortages in other mission areas and a loss of
    operational flexibility for the Joint Force Commander. Navy's long-term
    plan is to make all Aegis destroyers and up to 15 Aegis cruisers BMD
    capable to provide BMD forward presence ``in stride'' while also
    performing its other missions.

                          contract oversight personnel
        85. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, last May, the Special
    Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) found that
    Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the lead
    element for training Afghan security forces, did not have ``the
    mechanisms necessary to ensure that U.S. funds are managed effectively
    and spent wisely.'' In particular, the SIGAR noted a lack of qualified
    contracting personnel in the command. Have you increased the number of
    personnel overseeing these training contracts, and if so, by how much?
        Secretary Gates. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and Combined
    Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) takes
    contracting oversight seriously. Every resource that is misallocated
    due to inefficiency, miscommunications, and undue delay cannot
    contribute to improving the operational capabilities of the Afghan
    National Security Forces. Concerning contracting oversight, we have
    taken the following specific actions in the areas of oversight, quality
    assurance, contract management, and senior leadership review:

             Oversight: For our large Continental United States
            (CONUS) based contracts that require a substantial degree of
            effort to implement adequate contract oversight, we have
            coordinated to have the contracting command provide a full-time
            'in-country' Contract Officer Representative (COR) located with
            CSTC-A.
            For contracts that are awarded in Afghanistan and for small
            CONUS based contracts CORs have been appointed from either
            CSTC-A or other USFOR-A personnel. Additionally, for certain
            contracts that require technical competence (such as vehicle
            and weapons maintenance) we are arranging for U.S. Government
            civilians from Army Depots (e.g. Red River Army Depot) to
            deploy and provide us with oversight assistance.
             Quality Assurance: We are enforcing the requirement
            for Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP) for CSTC-A
            contracts and have in place a tracking system to ensure
            designated CORs are verifying compliance with the QASP. During
            the contract planning phase, requirement generators develop a
            detailed written QASP and the associated COR coverage
            requirements identifying the quantity, locations, and required
            qualifications & skills for required CORs to provide adequate
            oversight coverage to reasonably ensure compliance with the
            QASP.
             Contract Management: We established a six-person CSTC-
            A Contract Management team that has developed improved
            processes and they also monitor CSTC-A contracts to validate
            contract oversight and share best practices across the command.
            We are in the process of implementing a systemic approach to
            review the contract oversight and standards for every contract.
            Additionally, each month we identify COR requirements for every
            location where contracted services are provided and update the
            description of the oversight responsibilities that need to
            performed.

        86. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in this audit, the SIGAR
    described a particular $404 million training contract where the
    government contracting personnel were located in Maryland and
    Pennsylvania--nine time zones away from where the work was actually
    being performed. Is DOD planning to deploy more DOD contract oversight
    personnel out to the field in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. Yes. Overall the DOD has increased the numbers of
    Contracting Officer Representative (CORs) and Contracting Officer
    Technical Representatives (COTRs), and placed military commanders at
    each training site associated with this contract. In addition, DOD has
    taken the following steps to increase oversight:

             Established a contract management cell within Combined
            Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.
             Added greater flexibility in assignment of contract
            advisors with the ability to more geographically and among the
            levels of Advisor/Trainer (Ministerial Systems, Institutional
            Training, Field level).
             Issued orders in theater on how to select, train and
            place CORs for the upcoming Research and Development and
            Engineering Command Contract.
             Developed a contract statement of work to reduce the
            number of contract advisors and identify other efficiencies and
            increased contractor oversight in so doing.

        The Department takes its contingency contracting oversight
    functions extremely seriously and will continue to keep Congress
    informed of how the Department performs this important function.

                                naval readiness
        87. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, as you recall, the only
    priority that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) identified as
    unfunded in your last budget submission was ship depot maintenance.
    Over the last few months, a number of press accounts have come out
    describing problems directly related to how ineffectively the shipyards
    are maintaining the readiness of the Navy's oldest surface combatants.
    I understand that this year's proposed budget increases total funding
    for ship depot maintenance by almost $800 million over last year. To
    what extent does that proposed amount fully fund the Navy's current
    requirement for ship depot maintenance and capture depot maintenance
    volume that has accumulated from chronic underfunding over time?
        Admiral Mullen. The fiscal year 2011 budget request in the O&M
    baseline and Other Contingency Operations accounts is $6.1 billion and
    funds 99 percent of the total projected ship maintenance requirement.
    This request, and the percent of requirement funded, clearly reflects
    the Navy's commitment to ensure that ships are properly maintained to
    support current operations, and reach their expected service lives.
        The request also funds the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management
    (SSLCM) activity. Established in May 2009, SSLCM mission is to provide
    centralized SSLCM. In conjunction with Naval Sea Systems Command and
    Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF), the SSLCM activity conducted a
    detailed review of fiscal year 2011 surface ship maintenance
    requirements. The fiscal year 2011 budget request incorporates the
    results of this review. The SSLCM activity is assessing maintenance
    requirements for each ship class based on engineered technical
    requirements necessary to reach expected service life, and any
    additional requirements that are identified will be included in future
    budget requests.

                           c-17 acquisition programs
        88. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, over the last 4 years, the
    Senate Appropriations Committee added 44 C-17s that we neither needed
    nor could afford, at a total cost of over $14 billion above DOD's
    requests--in the form of earmarks. As DOD had done in the preceding few
    years, you proposed last year to cancel the C-17 Globemaster program
    and argued against a congressional earmark that intended to buy 10 more
    of those aircraft for $2.5 billion. You stated that the cost of buying
    and operating those additional aircraft would ``invariably result in a
    reduction in critical warfighting capability somewhere else in the
    defense program.'' Is this view shared by the Service Chiefs and
    unified and combatant commanders?
        Secretary Gates. The current C-17 fleet is in excess of our
    strategic airlift needs, resulting in increased operating costs at the
    expense of other priorities. This position, supported by the Services
    and Combatant Commanders, is based on the findings of several recent
    mobility studies to include the Mobility Capabilities Requirements
    Study 2016 (MCRS-16). The objectives of MCRS-16 were to determine the
    mobility capabilities and requirements needed in support of the
    National Military Strategy in the 2016 timeframe, to determine
    capability gaps/overlaps associated with the programmed mobility force
    structure, and to support the QDR and decisions regarding mobility
    programs. The study found that the planned capacity of the programmed
    strategic airlift fleet, consisting of 223 C-17s and 111 C-5s, exceeds
    the most demanding projected requirements. In addition, the report
    noted that C-17s could be used to support intra-theater missions
    without adding to the peak demand for C-17s. Both of these insights are
    consistent with findings from previous mobility studies.
        Based upon this information no additional C-17s should be procured,
    and I request your support in granting me the authority to allow for
    the proper management of the strategic fleet by providing the
    Department greater flexibility in retiring C-5 aircraft and eliminating
    the current statutory requirement to maintain a minimum fleet of 316
    strategic airlift aircraft.

        89. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what affect would the purchase
    of yet more C-17s, as some Members might insist on again this year,
    have on our ability to field critical warfighting capabilities?
        Secretary Gates. Unnecessary acquisition programs deplete funding
    for our readiness accounts which jeopardize our ability to meet defense
    objectives to prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict,
    prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of
    contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.
        I am fully aware of the political pressure to continue building the
    C-17, but I will strongly recommend that the President veto any
    legislation that sustains the unnecessary continuation of this program.

        90. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, while I appreciate your
    commitment in your opening statement to recommend a veto for further C-
    17 funding in the current budget request, will you request that that
    the President directly signal his intent to veto this bill if it
    authorizes any expenditure for more C-17s, as was done with F-22
    funding last year?
        Secretary Gates. I will continue to strongly recommend to the
    President that he veto any legislation that sustains the unnecessary
    continuation of the C-17 program for the reasons stated in my
    testimony.

                                missile defense
        91. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the supply of missile defense
    assets, whether it be Aegis cruisers, SM-3 missiles, THAAD units, etc.,
    pales in comparison to the worldwide demand of our combatant
    commanders. How does DOD and this budget seek to satisfy the stressing
    needs of the new European phased adaptive approach while also
    continuing to meet those needs of our ongoing efforts in the Pacific,
    the Middle East, and the Homeland?
        Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request
    affirms and continues the decisions made in the fiscal year 2010 PBR to
    realign BMD programs and plans to focus on regional missile defenses.
    Toward this end, investments in regional missile defenses amount to
    about $3.8 billion in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget request,
    or almost half of the MDA budget request. Significant investments will
    continue over the FYDP, enabling the Department to make progress in
    closing the gap between demand and supply. By 2015 DOD plans to have 6
    THAAD batteries with 281 interceptors, along with 292 SM-3 interceptors
    and 37 Aegis BMD-capable ships.
        As the Department makes progress on fielding additional regional
    missile defenses, I will also work to build on a strong foundation of
    cooperative relationships and utilize appropriate contributions from
    Allies. It is important to note that as we manage U.S. resources, my
    objective is to provide a steady-state capability that can be augmented
    for added defensive capability for a limited duration in times of
    increased threat. This is the essence of the phased adaptive approach
    to regional architectures.

        92. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, does modernization and
    sustainment of our GBIs and the development and testing of a two-stage
    GBI remain a priority for DOD?
        Secretary Gates. Yes. I believe that defending the homeland against
    the threat of limited missile attack is a high priority for the
    Department. Therefore, the DOD is committed to continue modernizing and
    sustaining the GMD system.
        The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request lays out a funded
    plan that includes fielding 30 operational GBIs, as well as delivery of
    4 additional interceptors as operational spares (based on reliability
    estimations), and 18 additional interceptors to support the flight test
    program. The GMD sustainment program will maintain and support an
    effective defensive system, meeting Warfighter requirements over the
    expected 20-year life cycle.
        As part of a hedging strategy for homeland defense against long-
    range ballistic missile attacks, the Department is continuing the
    development and assessment of the two-stage GBI. The planned two-stage
    flight testing also supports three-stage data collection requirements
    and adds to our confidence in and sustainment of the GBIs.

        93. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are you committed to the
    modernization and sustainment of our GBIs and the procurement of
    additional GBIs if it were determined that technological advancements
    with the SM-3 do not come to fruition in the planned timeframe?
        Secretary Gates. I am committed to modernizing and sustaining the
    GMD system as the Department defends the United States against
    ballistic missiles.
        The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request lays out a funded
    plan that includes completing the fielding of 30 operational GBIs;
    delivering 22 additional GBIs for testing, stockpile reliability, and
    operational spare requirements; and refurbishing 16 of the original 52
    GBIs for both operational and flight test rotation during the FYDP. The
    budget request also provides for continued Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
    (EKV) software upgrades for the GBIs with focus on improved probability
    of kill while leveraging improved sensor data. Additionally, we will be
    completing the establishment of a second command and control node at
    Fort Greely, AK.
        The GMD sustainment program maintains and supports an effective
    defensive system, meeting Warfighter requirements over the expected 20-
    year life cycle. This program is planned within established Army and
    Navy standards for missile field and depot-level support, including the
    surveillance and testing of GBIs over their lifetime. A service-life
    extension decision is anticipated in the 2027 timeframe.
        Development and testing of the two-stage GBI will continue as a
    hedge alternative should the SM-3 Block II A/B not emerge as
    anticipated. The first two-stage GBI test will occur this summer.

                            nuclear weapons complex
        94. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in the past you have been
    quite vocal on the need for modernization of the nuclear weapons
    complex. The fiscal year 2010 budget lacked adequate funding to address
    the dire infrastructure needs. More than a year has passed since you
    stated that ``there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible
    deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without
    either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization
    program.'' Do you believe the President's fiscal year 2011 budget
    addresses the critical needs for modernizing our nuclear weapons
    complex?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, I believe that the fiscal year 2011 budget
    provides a credible modernization program to meet the national security
    needs of the United States. The fiscal year 2011 budget for the
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) reverses a decade's
    long decline in the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise in terms of both
    stockpile management and the recapitalization of aging and
    unsustainable nuclear facilities that do not meet modern safety
    standards.
        Specifically, the fiscal year 2011 NNSA budget requests funds to:

             Revitalize warhead surveillance efforts, and the
            science and technology that supports stockpile assessment and
            certification in the absence of nuclear testing.
             Protect human capital--including the expertise to
            design, develop, and field warheads-through a stockpile
            management program that fully exercises these capabilities.
             Design and build a modern facility at Los Alamos--the
            Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear
            Facility--for plutonium R&D and pit production support.
             Design and build a modern facility at Y-12--the
            Uranium Processing Facility--to support Highly Enriched Uranium
            (HEU) and related operations.

                         funds for the closure of gtmo
        95. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the OCO portion of the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2011 includes $350 million
    in a transfer fund for the detention facilities at GTMO, provides
    funding to make improvements at the Illinois State Prison at Thomson,
    IL, in the amount of $150 million, and includes another $158 million
    for information technology improvements at the Rock Island Arsenal, IL,
    to support DOD detainee operations at Thomson. These funds are in
    addition to another $150 million in the Department of Justice (DOJ)
    budget request to purchase the Thomson facility from the State of
    Illinois. Current law prohibits bringing detainees from GTMO for any
    reason except for detention during trial or for other legal
    proceedings.
        Why are the amounts requested for purchase and improvement of
    Thomson and information technology support, a total of nearly $458
    million, so high considering that the existing prison and courtroom
    facilities at GTMO were built for about $240 million?
        Secretary Gates. The $350 million request is for detainee
    operations in general and not just for Thomson. Of the $350 million,
    approximately $100 million is for improvements at Thomson Correctional
    Center, approximately $50 million is for improvements at Rock Island
    Arsenal, approximately $35 million is for procuring capital equipment
    for the facility, and approximately $60 million is for capital
    equipment and supplies for detention operations. The remaining $105
    million is for operations at GTMO and Thomson.
        The $458 million request includes DOJ purchase, DOJ operations, DOD
    renovations, and DOD operations. When operations costs are excluded,
    the relevant comparison for ``GTMO'' facility investment at Thomson is
    approximately $200 million (DOJ's purchase price of DOD's portion of
    the prison plus DOD's renovation costs).

        96. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are these amounts in addition
    to the more than $200 million per year that it is estimated to cost to
    try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his four September 11 cohorts in New
    York?
        Secretary Gates. The $200 million per year was estimated by New
    York City officials as their cost to conduct the trials. The amounts
    requested in the President's budget are separate from this estimate.

        97. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is the estimated amount
    of funding necessary to carry out all September 11 terrorist trials in
    GTMO?
        Secretary Gates. I cannot estimate a number at this time. The cost
    per trial varies depending on the number of pre-trial motions,
    witnesses, and other variables which are difficult to predict.

        98. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is the estimated amount
    to try all the detainee cases the DOJ believes can be tried, which I
    understand is about 35 total cases, in GTMO?
        Secretary Gates. I cannot estimate a number at this time. The cost
    per trial varies depending on the number of pre-trial motions,
    witnesses, and other variables which are difficult to predict.

        99. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, why is $158 million needed for
    information technology improvements at Rock Island to support detention
    facilities at Thomson?
        Secretary Gates. Of the $350 million request, only approximately
    $35 million is for procuring capital equipment, which includes
    information technology hardware at both Thomson and Rock Island.

        100. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, does this request include
    funding for military housing and other base support facilities at
    Thomson and Rock Island for the military personnel that will be
    stationed to support the new facility?
        Secretary Gates. No, it does not. There are no plans to build
    military housing because the Department's initial preliminary
    environmental assessment shows that the local economy can support the
    estimated number of personnel that will work at Thomson and Rock
    Island.

        101. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how many military personnel
    will be assigned to Thomson and where will they be housed?
        Secretary Gates. I estimate that approximately 800 military
    personnel will be assigned to Thomson in a temporary duty status at
    initial operational capability. The exact number of military personnel
    assigned to Thomson will be determined by the Commander, U.S. Northern
    Command (NORTHCOM). These personnel will leverage the local economy for
    housing, and initial environmental planning documents affirm that the
    local economy can support them.

        102. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how many additional military
    personnel will be assigned to Rock Island to support detention
    operations at Thomson and where will they be housed?
        Secretary Gates. Pending completion of NORTHCOM's planning efforts,
    I estimate that up to 500 personnel supporting the detainee operations
    will be assigned to Rock Island at initial operational capability. The
    exact number of personnel assigned to Rock Island will be determined by
    the Commander, NORTHCOM. These personnel will leverage the local
    economy for housing, and initial environmental planning documents
    affirm that the local economy can support them.

        103. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if Congress approves a change
    in the law to allow long-term detention without trial in the United
    States, and also approves the funding requested to purchase and improve
    detention facilities at Thomson, what is the timeline to begin
    detention operations at Thomson?
        Secretary Gates. From the date the restriction on long-term
    detention without trial in the United States ceases to have effect, and
    the funding requested to purchase and improve detention facilities at
    Thomson becomes available. I would not give any estimate because there
    are too many variables to work through.

        104. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when do you estimate the
    Bureau of Prisons would purchase the Thomson facility from the State of
    Illinois?
        Secretary Gates. The Bureau of Prisons cannot begin negotiating a
    purchase price until enactment of the portion of the President's fiscal
    year 2011 budget that contains the DOJ appropriations and provides
    funding for planning and assessment to continue at Thomson.

        105. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when would the extensive
    improvements at Thomson and Rock Island begin?
        Secretary Gates. Improvements could not begin until the
    environmental assessment is completed, the Bureau of Prisons purchases
    the facility, and DOD receives authorization and funding from Congress.

        106. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when would the IOC for
    detention operations at Thomson be achieved?
        Secretary Gates. I estimate that initial operational capability
    would be achieved 10-13 months after DOD receives authorization and
    funding from Congress.

        107. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when is the earliest date
    that military commission trials be held at Thomson under this plan?
        Secretary Gates. Military commission trials could be held when
    initial operating capability is achieved.

        108. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when would the Final
    Operational Capability (FOC) for detention operations at Thomson be
    achieved?
        Secretary Gates. Full operational capability would be achieved in
    13-18 months after DOD receives authorization and funding from
    Congress.

        109. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is the difference in
    terms of the number of detainees that could be held or the nature of
    detention operations between IOC and FOC?
        Secretary Gates. There is no difference in either the number of
    detainees that could be held at IOC and FOC or the nature of detention
    operations at IOC and FOC.

        110. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on what date would detention
    operations at GTMO actually end?
        Secretary Gates. Detention operations at GTMO could end shortly
    after Thomson is operational.

                         disposition of gtmo detainees
        111. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the President established a
    Joint Task Force (JTF) shortly after taking office last January to
    review all the available information on the detainees at GTMO and to
    make recommendations on whether they should be tried, released, or held
    long-term without trial. These recommendations were to extend to
    whether trials should be by military commission or by Federal courts,
    and the location of such trials. After extending the deadline for their
    work by 6 months, the media now reports that the report has been
    completed and recommendations on all the detainees have been made. When
    will the JTF report be made available to Congress, since the details it
    contains will influence our consideration of funding for alternatives
    to GTMO?
        Secretary Gates. The report was completed on January 22, 2010, and
    subsequently sent to the White House. It is not my decision to release
    the report.

        112. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will the administration come
    forward with a legislative proposal to repeal the current restrictions
    on bringing detainees from GTMO to the United States in time for
    comprehensive review before Congress receives the JTF report or takes
    action on the funding request for the closure of GTMO?
        Secretary Gates. The administration is reviewing a number of
    possibilities relating to this issue, and it will not move any
    detainees to the United States unless it is in full compliance with
    U.S. law.

        113. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if an administration's
    legislative proposal is forthcoming, will it address other aspects of
    detention policy such as:

             a prohibition on release of detainees into the United
            States;
             denial of any immigration status to detainees,
            including refugee and asylum status, if detainees are ordered
            released by a Federal court as a result of habeas corpus
            challenges to their detention;
             authorization for long-term detention without trial
            within the United States; and
             uniform rules for Federal courts to apply in
            conducting habeas corpus proceedings reviewing the detention of
            terrorists captured during our ongoing armed conflict with al
            Qaeda and the Taliban, and associated forces, which are
            responsible for the attacks of September 11?

        Secretary Gates. The President said that we will not release any
    detainee into the United States who will endanger American lives, and
    that we will use all lawful and appropriate means to protect the
    American people. The authority to detain individuals under the
    immigration laws pending their removal from the United States,
    particularly where they pose a threat to national security, is but one
    mechanism that may be relied upon, if necessary, to ensure that
    detainees will not endanger our citizens.
        Furthermore, denial of any immigration status to detainees has
    already been constituted. Section 552(f) of the fiscal year 2010
    Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, which was signed
    into law by the President on October 28, 2009, specifically bars
    immigration benefits for detainees including ``classification as a
    refugee or applicant for asylum.''

                             law of the sea treaty
        114. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the U.S. has not ratified the
    Law of the Sea Treaty while China has continued efforts to assert
    sovereignty over contested areas in the South China Sea and in other
    areas where such claims support China's national security interests.
    Beijing has now suspended military-to-military exchanges as a result of
    the recent U.S. announcement to continue defensive arms sales to
    Taiwan. How are we managing our relationship with China in disputed
    areas such as its maritime claims?
        Secretary Gates. Despite China's recently announced suspension of
    military-to-military relations, I remain highly committed to
    strengthening the mechanisms that the Department has in place to engage
    China on this and other security issues, including the U.S.-China
    Defense Consultative Talks, the U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination
    Talks, and the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
    process. These mechanisms provide for open and sustained channels of
    communication to build greater confidence and mutual understanding,
    discuss candidly our differences, and improve understanding and
    application of safety standards and rules of the road for operations
    that improve the safety of sailors and airmen of all countries in the
    region.
        I regard any suspension of discussions on operational safety as
    potentially dangerous, and I regard the suspension of these discussions
    on political grounds as particularly unfortunate. PLA General Xu Caihou
    and I both reaffirmed our commitment to maintaining open dialogue on
    security and safety issues during his visit in October. The United
    States remains committed to all of our dialogue mechanisms with the
    PLA.
        Regarding China's maritime claims and the competing claims by other
    states around the South China Sea, U.S. policy continues to be that we
    do not take sides on the competing legal claims over territorial
    sovereignty, including those in the South China Sea and East China Sea.
    Furthermore, the United States does not propose to arbitrate or mediate
    the underlying conflicts between the competing claims. However, it is
    my view that our strong and continued presence in the region does
    provide a sense of stability and a modicum of breathing room for the
    claimants to pursue political means to resolve these issues. In short,
    the U.S. presence is a stabilizing influence for all claimants in the
    region.

        115. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how do you think the
    relationship with China will develop as we continue to share the global
    commons--sea, air, space and cyberspace--as our interests clash or
    diverge?
        Secretary Gates. As U.S.-PRC interactions at sea, in the air, in
    space, and in cyberspace become more frequent, it will become
    increasingly important that the United States and China have effective
    mechanisms for communication to avoid miscalculation or
    misunderstanding. I believe that the United States and China should
    seek to recognize and expand shared interests in upholding the
    stability of, and access to, the global commons, and work together
    cooperatively in support of those interests. Where our interests
    diverge, we must ensure that each has a clear understanding of the
    other's intentions, and that open channels of communication exist to
    avoid escalatory reactions or perceptions that could breed mistrust or
    inadvertently destabilize the overall bilateral relationship. Whether
    addressing shared or divergent interests with China, I have been
    diligent to ensure DOD's positions are advanced in accordance with
    customary international law.
        DOD has several existing mechanisms to facilitate discussion with
    China on the topics you mentioned, and the Department is examining ways
    to expand their scope and effectiveness. In 1998, then-Secretary Cohen
    signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) with China's
    Minister of Defense, and under its auspices the U.S. and China have
    held discussions on maritime operational safety, at sea and in the air.
    In 2005, DOD established what became the Defense Policy Coordination
    Talks as a forum for discussing, among other things, issues of maritime
    security. In 2008, DOD also began a Dialogue on Nuclear Policy and
    Strategy, and, in October 2009, General Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of
    China's Central Military Commission, visited U.S. Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM) and engaged in discussions with General Chilton and his
    staff on the issues under STRATCOM's purview.
        The American and Chinese Governments have not yet reached the point
    where these interactions are sufficiently consistent or substantive to
    constitute the solid foundation needed for a stable and productive
    relationship--one that can withstand the stresses that inevitably
    emerge between two countries with interests as diverse as those of the
    United States and China. Going forward, I believe that a whole-of-
    government approach on both sides of the table provides the best
    formula for building the necessary foundation.

                          okinawa to guam realignment
        116. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on February 17, 2009, the
    U.S. Government reaffirmed its support of an agreement with the
    Government of Japan (GOJ) concerning the implementation of the
    relocation of 8,000 marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam by
    2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Since then, Japan
    elected a new Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, who has asked the U.S.
    Government to consider new options for the Futenma Replacement Facility
    (FRF), which is part of the larger agreement for Guam. I note that the
    agreement stipulates that the Japanese Government must demonstrate
    tangible progress regarding the FRF, which has been defined to include
    a signature by the Governor of Okinawa on a landfill permit required to
    commence construction. This action was currently planned to take place
    in mid to late 2010. In a press conference yesterday, you suggested
    that we should demonstrate patience in the negotiations with the
    Japanese Government on the future of the agreement. With that said, the
    fiscal year 2011 budget request contains $387 million in military
    construction funds for infrastructure on Guam to support the relocation
    of marines from Okinawa. This is in addition to $160 million authorized
    for construction in the 2010 defense bill. If the Japanese position
    does not change regarding Futenma, will DOD still proceed with the
    award of construction contracts on Guam to support the relocation of
    the marines?
        Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2011 budget request is $452
    million in military construction funds for infrastructure on Guam to
    support the relocation of marines from Okinawa. The NDAA for Fiscal
    Year 2010 approved $514 million to support the relocation effort.
        The framework for U.S.-Japan force posture realignment is the U.S.-
    Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, issued following the May
    1, 2006, meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-Japan Security Consultative
    Committee. This framework confirms that the Okinawa-related realignment
    initiatives are interconnected and, specifically, that the III Marine
    Expeditionary Force (III MEF) relocation from Okinawa to Guam is
    dependent on, among other things, tangible progress toward completion
    of the FRF.
        The relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue.
    I have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in
    support of the combatant commander and to meet our commitments to
    Allies and partners in the region, including under the U.S.-Japan
    Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
        The Department is currently waiting for the GOJ to complete its
    review of the FRF. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that he intends to
    resolve the issue by May, and I look forward to resuming work with the
    GOJ to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our
    force posture in Japan to ensure that the Alliance's operational
    capabilities remain politically and operationally sustainable.

        117. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what other options are
    acceptable to DOD for the relocation of Marine Corps aviation units
    from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma?
        Secretary Gates. The FRF, included in the May 2006 U.S.-Japan
    Realignment Roadmap, resulted from several years of bilateral
    coordination that took into account the political, operational, safety,
    noise, environmental, and infrastructure requirements associated with
    the Marine Corps forces in Okinawa. These forces, which consist of air,
    ground, logistics, and command elements, remain dependent upon the
    interaction of those elements in regular training, exercises, and
    operations.
        I am not aware of any other options that meet these criteria. DOD
    is prepared to review what the GOJ comes up with to determine its
    feasibility, including operational, safety, noise, environmental, and
    infrastructure aspects, as well as to discuss its political
    sustainability given local conditions. DOD remains committed to the
    FRF--as reflected in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap--as the best way
    to move forward with the strategic transformation of U.S. presence in
    Okinawa.

        118. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when do you expect to see a
    resolution on the status the FRF?
        Secretary Gates. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that he intends to
    resolve the issue by May. The GOJ is conducting a review of options and
    has asked the U.S. Government to be patient as they prepare to present
    an official alternative. I look forward to resuming work with the GOJ
    to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our force
    posture in Okinawa to be more politically and operationally
    sustainable.

        119. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would you recommend to the
    President the continuation of the movement of marines to Guam absent an
    acceptable solution for the FRF?
        Secretary Gates. The current framework for U.S.-Japan force posture
    realignment is the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,
    issued following the May 1, 2006, meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-
    Japan Security Consultative Committee. This framework confirms that the
    Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected and,
    specifically, that the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF)
    relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on, among other things,
    tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility
    (FRF).
        A suitable FRF is considered the ``lynchpin'' for III MEF
    relocation to Guam. The relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not
    a basing issue. I have a responsibility to provide operationally ready
    forces in support of the combatant commander and to meet our
    commitments to allies and partners in the region, including under the
    U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
        The Department is currently waiting for the GOJ to complete its
    review of the FRF. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that he intends to
    resolve the issue by May, and I look forward to resuming work with the
    GOJ to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our
    force posture in Japan to ensure that the Alliance's operational
    capabilities remain politically and operationally sustainable.

        120. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if the GOJ fails to approve
    the current roadmap regarding Futenma, is the United States prepared to
    nullify the current framework and remain in Futenma?
        Secretary Gates. The current framework for U.S.-Japan force posture
    realignment is the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,
    issued following the May 1, 2006, meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-
    Japan Security Consultative Committee. While a suitable FRF is
    considered essential for an enduring presence on Okinawa, the
    Department is prepared to stay at Futenma if no replacement facility is
    approved by the GOJ.
        The GOJ is reviewing the FRF; Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated
    that he intends to resolve the issue by May. We look forward to
    resuming work with the GOJ to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective
    of realigning our force posture in Japan to ensure that the Alliance's
    operational capabilities remain sustainable, politically and
    operationally. We have a responsibility to provide operationally ready
    forces in support of the combatant commander and to meet our
    commitments to allies and partners in the region, including under the
    U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

                          international pilot training
        121. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, many of our allies choose to
    conduct fighter pilot training here in the United States for various
    reasons ranging from the availability of adequate ranges to cost and
    the quality of training. This obviously affords the U.S. Air Force an
    outstanding opportunity to partner and train with NATO and other allied
    pilots. From what I have been told, the Secretary of the Air Force's
    International Affairs office manages the program. Does DOD normally
    guide or influence a partner nation's selection of the best location
    among candidate bases already conducting similar missions in the United
    States to conduct training to maximize efficiency for cost, quality of
    training, and access to ranges?
        Secretary Gates. There is no initiative in the U.S. Air Force
    concerning a decision to influence or guide international partner pilot
    training to a particular location. The Air Force provides tuition-based
    pilot training at 14 locations. Each location, with the exception of
    undergraduate pilot training, is the sole provider of tuition-based
    training for a particular model of aircraft. For example, all F-16
    tuition-based training is done at Tucson Air National Guard Base
    (ANGB), AZ, through the 162d Fighter Wing and their assigned F-16
    aircraft and instructor pilots.
        When a partner nation desires to bed down its own aircraft at a
    continental United States (CONUS) air force base, the Secretary of the
    Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) provides options based on
    the country's requested training needs and budgetary requirements. When
    presented with available locations, training capabilities, and pricing
    information, the partner nation selects the training venue that best
    meets their needs. The U.S. Air Force is committed to providing the
    most effective training venue available for our international partners
    consistent with their training needs and budget by dispassionately
    providing the facts and costs for the available training.

        122. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would the office of the
    Secretary of Defense have any reason to provide guidance to Secretary
    of the Air Force's International Affairs office to encourage an allied
    nation to remain at a certain location, regardless of the cost or
    quality of training? If so, what would be those reasons and why?
        Secretary Gates. There are occasions when discussions take place
    between the appropriate DOD offices and a partner nation concerning
    their choice of a bed down training location, usually when information
    is requested by the partner nation. Cost and quality of training are
    always considered in these discussions and are provided on all
    available training locations. Once the data are provided, we expect the
    partner nation to make the decision that best meets their training
    needs and budgetary requirements.
        When a partner nation requests tuition-based training for a
    specific aircraft, there are no alternatives and the requesting nation
    is limited to the stated location and standard student cost.

             contractor performance for the missile defense agency
        123. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in the fiscal year 2011
    budget press conference for the MDA, David Altwegg, Executive Director,
    was asked about the quality of work being conducted by contractors on
    MDA acquisition programs. Altwegg responded stating:

              ``I'm not going to name names today, but I'm going to tell
            you we continue to be disappointed in the quality that we are
            receiving from our prime contractors and their subs--very, very
            disappointed; quality-design issues, but more in quality of
            products delivered, which then results in rework and which
            reserved--because most of these contracts are cost contracts,
            it costs the taxpayer more.''

        Given the cost-plus nature of many of these contracts and the
    allegation that reckless failures by contractors are resulting in
    unnecessary cost increases, how do you intend to address these
    concerns, both within MDA and across DOD?
        Secretary Gates. MDA has consistently expressed concern over the
    magnitude and frequency of quality problems encountered in the
    development and manufacture of the various elements that make up the
    Missile Defense System.
        MDA made significant changes in its acquisition processes over the
    past several years that both Lieutenant General O'Reilly, the MDA
    Director, and I believe will improve the quality in the manufacture of
    our weapons systems. Specifically:

             MDA established a robust quality organization within
            the Agency, which focuses on tackling problems identified
            during development and testing. One of the first steps of this
            organization was the development of a MDA Assurance Plan, and a
            MDA Parts, Materials and Process Plan. These plans require
            major contractors to adopt disciplined processes and procedures
            that lead to enhanced quality, a reduction in rework, lower
            costs, and preventing ``parts'' quality issues from progressing
            to the finished components. Second, MDA Quality Safety and
            Mission Assurance now conducts periodic mission assurance
            audits at contractors' facilities to monitor compliance and
            ensure the contractors are following their approved policies
            and procedures for the manufacture of systems. Following the
            audit, any deficiencies identified are tracked and reported to
            the MDA Director until they are successfully closed out.
             MDA made significant changes to the award fee process
            and quality control has received increased emphasis over the
            past year. Prior to the beginning of each award fee period, the
            contractor is provided with an expectations letter clearly
            articulating the areas that the fee determining official
            considers to require emphasis during the period. The award fee
            expectations letters outline to contractors that poor quality
            will not be tolerated and will reduce award fee earned when
            appropriate.
             MDA also moved away from cost plus award fee contracts
            to cost plus incentive fee contracts, an approach that measures
            contractor performance more precisely. Cost overruns result in
            lower fees, while the contractor has also the opportunity to
            earn more based on demonstrated positive performance against
            objective criteria.
             MDA performs an annual assessment of its contractor's
            performance that is recorded in a database called Past
            Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) where these
            assessments are retrieved and used as part of past performance
            evaluations supporting future source selections throughout DOD.
            Negative reports, such as poor quality control, can lead to a
            contractor not being selected for a competitive contract award.
             MDA embarked on efforts to re-compete many of its
            major contracts. The Agency's expectation is that the
            competitive process will result in lower cost, better
            performance, and higher quality.
             MDA clearly articulated to companies that it will not
            authorize future contract scope when a clear trend of poor
            quality assurance is not addressed by senior personnel and they
            do not initiate changes to cause enduring improvement in the
            quality and reliability of products.

        124. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what steps can be taken to
    ensure that contractors are held responsible to provide quality
    products without unnecessary increases in cost?
        Secretary Gates. I believe that the greater use of incentive-type
    contracts with cost incentives and objective criteria, rather than
    award fee contracts with more subjective criteria, should improve
    contractor performance. In addition, greater emphasis on past
    performance as a discriminator during contract competitions will
    incentivize sources to achieve quality performance.

        125. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain to what extent
    the fee structure of those contracts covered by Executive Director
    Altwegg's comment can be better designed to incentivize optimal
    performance. What specific remedial efforts do you intend to employ to
    achieve that result?
        Secretary Gates. The contract fee structure is just one element in
    how we motivate or incentivize better contract performance. We will
    monitor contractor performance under the revised incentive structure
    over time and propose new steps when appropriate. The steps taken by
    MDA will accomplish our mutual goal of achieving optimal contract
    performance. Specifically:

             MDA established a robust quality organization within
            the Agency, which focuses on tackling problems identified
            during development and testing. One of the first steps of this
            organization was the development of a MDA Assurance Plan, and a
            MDA Parts, Materials and Process Plan. These plans require
            major contractors to adopt disciplined processes and procedures
            that lead to enhanced quality, a reduction in rework, lower
            costs, and preventing ``parts'' quality issues from progressing
            to the finished components. Second, MDA Quality Safety and
            Mission Assurance now conducts periodic mission assurance
            audits at contractors' facilities to monitor compliance and
            ensure the contractors are following their approved policies
            and procedures for the manufacture of systems. Following the
            audit, any deficiencies identified are tracked and reported to
            the MDA Director until they are successfully closed out.
             MDA made significant changes to the award fee process
            and quality control has received increased emphasis over the
            past year. Prior to the beginning of each award fee period, the
            contractor is provided with an expectations letter clearly
            articulating the areas that the fee determining official
            considers to require emphasis during the period. The award fee
            expectations letters outline to contractors that poor quality
            will not be tolerated and will reduce award fee earned when
            appropriate.
             MDA also moved away from cost plus award fee contracts
            to cost plus incentive fee contracts, an approach that measures
            contractor performance more precisely. Cost overruns result in
            lower fees, while the contractor has also the opportunity to
            earn more based on demonstrated positive performance against
            objective criteria.
             MDA performs an annual assessment of its contractor's
            performance that is recorded in a database called PPIRS where
            these assessments are retrieved and used as part of past
            performance evaluations supporting future source selections
            throughout DOD. Negative reports, such as poor quality control,
            can lead to a contractor not being selected for a competitive
            contract award.
             MDA embarked on efforts to recompete many of its major
            contracts. The Agency's expectation is that the competitive
            process will result in lower cost, better performance, and
            higher quality.
             MDA clearly articulated to companies that it will not
            authorize future contract scope when a clear trend of poor
            quality assurance is not addressed by senior personnel and they
            do not initiate changes to cause enduring improvement in the
            quality and reliability of products.

                                  tricare fees
        126. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in your recent press comments
    on the fiscal year 2011 budget request, you stated that reasonable
    tradeoffs had to be made to control cost growth in the TRICARE program.
    What is the administration's rationale for charging military families
    or retirees higher out of pocket fees for health care they earned in
    return for their military service?
        Secretary Gates. There are no proposals in the fiscal year 2011
    budget request that will raise discretionary fees for military families
    or retirees. However, fees for the TRICARE program have remained static
    since its inception in 1995, while health care costs have soared. For
    example, the Prime enrollment fee has remained $460 a year for a
    retiree family since 1995. As a result, many beneficiaries are
    returning to the Military Health System (MHS), opting to use their more
    generous TRICARE benefits versus other health plans.
        MHS costs have more than doubled between fiscal year 2001 ($19
    billion) and fiscal year 2010 ($49 billion). At this growth rate, MHS
    costs are projected to approach $64 billion by fiscal year 2015, more
    than 10 percent of the Department's top line budget. While the
    Department continually looks for opportunities for savings and
    efficiencies within the MHS, these efforts are unlikely to solve the
    long-term sustainability issues of the TRICARE benefit without changes
    to the beneficiary cost-sharing structure

                      extending benefits to new categories
        127. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the Senate Committee on
    Veterans Affairs has recently adopted legislation that would extend
    TRICARE benefits to certain current and former members of the Armed
    Forces and their family members for health problems occurring as a
    result of exposure to environmental hazards at Camp LeJeune and the
    Atsugi Naval Air Facility if so determined by an advisory board on
    military exposures. What is your position on expansion of eligibility
    for TRICARE to cover such individuals, including those who may be
    otherwise ineligible for DOD health care benefits?
        Secretary Gates. Before we would extend health benefits, we would
    need evidence of causality between consumption of contaminated water
    and any adverse health conditions. The Agency for Toxic Substances and
    Disease Registry of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has
    not yet established linkage between the consumption of contaminated
    water at Camp Lejeune and health conditions in the population who
    consumed the contaminated water.
        Health benefits coverage should be limited only to those conditions
    where there is sound scientific evidence of a causal relationship
    between exposure, including the amount of exposure dose, and specific
    disease outcomes. Absent information on exposure dose and in accordance
    with proposed Senate legislation, this determination would be made by
    an Advisory Committee and a Scientific Review Committee. In addition to
    consideration of causally-related associations with the particular
    contaminants identified, consideration must be given to the severity of
    exposures (dosages) that individuals may have encountered while
    residing at Camp Lejeune or the Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Japan. The
    doses of contaminates are critical in determining risk, as many low
    dose exposures do not create significant health risks. The Agency for
    Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is embarking on a series of
    studies to better identify the exposed personnel and then to study
    disease outcome in those individuals in order to identify any positive
    associations.
        It should also be noted, in accordance with the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Marine Corps contracted
    with the National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council (NRC))
    to review the evidence regarding potential associations between
    exposure to contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune and adverse
    health effects in prenatal children, children, and adults. The NRC
    review report concluded that while former Camp Lejeune residents and
    workers were exposed to unregulated solvents, there are no conclusive
    associations between adverse health effects and exposure to the
    contaminated water at the base. The report noted that for the chemicals
    of greatest concern, tetrachloroethene and trichloroethene, the highest
    levels measured in the mixed-water samples at Camp Lejeune were much
    lower than the lowest dose that caused adverse effects in the most
    sensitive strains of species of laboratory animals. The review
    concluded, however, that even though adverse effects were unlikely,
    they could not be ruled out completely and that the Department of the
    Navy (and other policy makers) should move forward with responses they
    deem appropriate based on available information.
        In regard to the personnel who were assigned at Naval Air Facility
    Atsugi, Japan while the Japanese Shinkampo incinerator was operational,
    a number of comprehensive health studies were accomplished by the U.S.
    Navy Environmental Health Center. As a result of these assessments, it
    would be difficult to attribute any particular cancer occurring in this
    population that is related to the incinerator emissions.

        128. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if enacted, how would the
    TRICARE program implement health benefits coverage limited to
    conditions related to exposure to environmental hazards?
        Secretary Gates. The Department provides or arranges for medically
    necessary health care for those entitled to the MHS benefit. In the
    broad sense, we do not deny care to those entitled to care based on the
    cause of their medical condition. If the statute is changed and the
    Department is directed to provide care for a new category of
    beneficiary, we would use existing regulatory procedures to define
    eligibility and health care coverage.

                         payments to civilian hospitals
        129. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what amount of savings is
    assumed in this request as a result of payment reform for civilian
    hospitals, such as application of Medicare outpatient prospective
    payments, and payments to sole community providers?
        Secretary Gates. TRICARE implemented its Outpatient Prospective
    Payment System (OPPS) on May 1, 2009 to bring its reimbursement rates
    for hospital outpatient services into alignment with Medicare rates.
    All public comments were taken into account before the final rule was
    published on December 10, 2008. The rule provided a phase in period of
    four years for network hospitals and three years for non-network
    hospitals to buffer the effect of the decline in payments. Prior to
    this rule, TRICARE paid billed charges for emergency room visits and a
    CHAMPUS Maximum Allowable Charge for outpatient radiology, pathology,
    and ambulatory surgery. In total, the payments reflected approximately
    45 percent of overall billed charges.
        The fiscal year 2011 President's budget for the Defense Health
    Program assumes $366 million in savings associated with this change.
    The calculation included the phase in schedule as well as the
    assumption that some hospitals would qualify for Military Contingency
    Payment Adjustments which offset the effect on facilities serving a
    significant number of active duty servicemembers and their families.
    These adjustments may be applied if certain volume or TRICARE revenue
    thresholds are met by the hospital. This provision was designed to
    ensure continued access to care in military communities. Sole community
    hospitals are among those affected by the OPPS regulation.
        Based on the first 3 months of fiscal year 2010, we are on track to
    realize these projected savings. TRICARE Regional Offices are assisting
    hospitals with documentation of their claims history to qualify for the
    Military Contingency Payment Adjustment.

        130. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do civilian hospitals lose
    money every time they care for a TRICARE patient? If so, why? If not,
    please explain, based on data available to DOD.
        Secretary Gates. We have no evidence that civilian hospitals lose
    money. Statute (10 U.S.C. 1079(j)(2)) requires TRICARE to pay
    institutional providers according to the rules which apply to Medicare
    reimbursement to the extent practicable. In comparing OPPS
    reimbursement to the prior formula, our analysis of a nationwide sample
    of 73 hospitals indicated reimbursement would drop from approximately
    45 percent of overall billed charges to 30-40 percent. This amount
    exceeds publicly available cost to charge ratios in all but four States
    (Wyoming, Utah, Nebraska, and Alaska), thus covering hospitals' costs
    for the care.
        While TRICARE's OPPS represents a significant change for hospitals,
    it aligns our program with Medicare, covers hospital costs, and
    includes considerations for hospitals seeing a large volume of TRICARE
    patients.

               medical facilities in the national capital region
        131. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, nearly all of our Nation's
    seriously wounded and ill warriors return to medical facilities in the
    National Capital Region (NCR) even if they do not become inpatients
    here. It is imperative that the quality of care at Walter Reed and Fort
    Belvoir retain the high degree of excellence provided today as well as
    achieve additional attributes of world-class care in the new joint
    facility.
        In its independent review of DOD's plans for the new Walter Reed
    National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC), an advisory committee of the
    Defense Health Board (DHB) found that there is an ``urgent need to
    clarify the vision, goals, and expectations'' for the new facility and
    to ``consolidate organizational and budgetary authority in a single
    entity.'' The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD to delineate
    budget and operational authority to provide and operate world class
    military medical facilities in the NCR as part of a plan that must be
    submitted to Congress by March 31, 2010. Are funds included in DOD's
    FYDP to invest in the existing facilities at Bethesda to raise them to
    world-class standards?
        Secretary Gates. The Department has developed a Comprehensive
    Master Plan for the NCR, which provides a roadmap to continue improving
    the finest healthcare facilities possible for our military families.
    Military medicine in the NCR incorporates many of the world-class
    attributes and capabilities as defined in the DHB panel's recently
    established standard. Since our 2009 review of the DHB report, the
    Department has institutionalized even greater requirements than the
    report outlined and has undertaken a Master Facilities Planning process
    to define and execute the requirements as part of our Comprehensive
    Master Plan. This plan will inform the DOD's FYDP starting fiscal year
    2012.

        132. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are the plans for DOD
    and the JTF, NCR Medical, to address the issues of command and control,
    resources and staffing, both military and civilian, of the integrated
    care system for the NCR?
        Secretary Gates.
    Command, Control, and Resources:
        The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendation that
    realigned operations from Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) to a
    new WRNMMC, Bethesda and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital (FBCH), was
    the Department's first step in a larger effort to transform, realign,
    and significantly enhance the way it delivers healthcare in the NCR.
    Taking into account the recommendations of the DOD's 2007 Independent
    Review Group and the President's Commission on Care for America's
    Returning Wounded Warriors (Dole-Shalala), the DOD Senior Oversight
    Council recommended, and the Department established, the Joint Task
    Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CAPMED) as a standing JTF to
    oversee these efforts.
        The NCR BRAC Health Systems Advisory Subcommittee of the DHB's
    independent review of DOD's plans for the new WRNMMC, Bethesda, and
    FBCH identified authority issues in the NCR as ``foundational'' and
    recommended empowering a single official with complete organizational
    and budgetary authority in the NCR.
        The Department is developing and implementing a comprehensive
    master plan for the NCR Medical as required under section 2714 of the
    NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 that will address this.
    Manpower Document:
        The Department has determined an Active-Duty Force mix distribution
    for the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH and the Services have identified
    the resources to meet the defined manning requirements. At WRNMMC,
    Bethesda the Active-Duty Force mix will be approximately 41 percent
    Army, 54 percent Navy, and 5 percent Air Force. At FBCH, it will be
    approximately 62 percent Army, 36 percent Navy, and 2 percent Air
    Force. The distribution of forces is necessary to understand where the
    future requirements for the civilian workforce will be located.
        An Intermediate Manpower Document (IMD) is being developed and will
    be used to facilitate the development of the ultimate Joint Table of
    Distribution (JTD). The IMD is an authoritative database that supports
    the underlying manning documents for each Service. It will allow the
    compilation of all personnel requirements for the eventual JTD while
    maintaining more flexibility for changes during the transition and as
    experience is gained operating the new hospitals. The IMD will look
    exactly like a JTD in all aspects, which will facilitate its eventual
    migration to the JTD. The final iteration of the Department's draft JTD
    version 3.0 was renamed the IMD. Following the completion of the IMD,
    JTF CAPMED and the Services will develop a Memorandum of Agreement
    (MOA) to commit resources in support of the IMD. Until the Department
    makes its final determination on the ultimate governance alignment of
    JTF CAPMED, the IMD can remain a local database, with necessary MOAs,
    allowing flexibility for position changes and realignments.
    Civilian Personnel:
        Retaining the skilled workforce in the NCR is imperative to
    operating the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. A Joint manning solution
    coupled with a comprehensive human capital strategy will allow the
    Department to incorporate the rich legacies of both WRAMC and NNMC as
    national icons in establishing the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. While
    attrition levels of government civilians at WRAMC remain normal,
    individuals at WRAMC and NNMC remain concerned about their jobs and
    location in the end state. The Department is engaged in comprehensive
    communication efforts with the current workforce to ensure transparency
    and maintain trust.
        The Department has established a Civilian Human Resources (CHR)
    Council to oversee the transition of civilian employees in the NCR. In
    February 2010, the CHR began matching current permanent WRAMC civilians
    to work locations at either WRNMMC, Bethesda or FBCH. Utilizing a
    workforce mapping model to execute a Guaranteed Placement Program
    (GPP), the Department will be able to identify placement options for
    the vast majority of WRAMC government civilians at their desired work
    location performing their preferred work assignment. Placement options
    will also include reassignment opportunities and career progression
    opportunities that do not exist today. By July 1, 2010 notifications
    will be made to civilian employees of their future work assignments and
    locations at WRNMMC, Bethesda, FBCH or other opportunities within the
    GPP. Government civilians will not incur any loss in pay as a result of
    the transition.
        The Department is taking significant actions to accommodate work
    location preferences for as many civilians as possible. Approximately
    1,500 of the WRAMC civilian personnel will be placed at WRNMMC,
    Bethesda. Surveys indicate that approximately 405 current civilian
    employees prefer to work at FBCH, which includes 355 civilian employees
    assigned to WRAMC and 50 civilian personnel assigned to NNMC. DOD may
    be able to expand WRAMC placement opportunities for civilian personnel
    at WRNMMC Bethesda through workforce mix analysis, insourcing and/or
    other initiatives. All new permanent civilian hires at WRAMC and NNMC
    are being advised that their work and position may move to FBCH in
    2011. This change was effective as of February 2010. In addition, DOD
    will leverage attrition over the next year and a half to create
    additional positions at WRNMMC, Bethesda in order to place current
    permanent WRAMC civilians. DOD is committed to maintaining a highly-
    skilled workforce in the NCR able to meet the unique healthcare needs
    of the Nation's servicemembers, retirees, and their families.

        133. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what steps has DOD taken and
    what additional steps are necessary to apprise civilian health care
    employees at Walter Reed and Bethesda of their future status within the
    new facility in order to retain the highest quality staff now serving?
        Secretary Gates. Retaining the skilled workforce in the NCR is
    imperative to operating the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. A Joint
    manning solution coupled with a comprehensive human capital strategy
    will allow the Department to incorporate the rich legacies of both
    WRAMC and NNMC as national icons in establishing the new WRNMMC,
    Bethesda and FBCH. While attrition levels of government civilians at
    WRAMC remain normal, individuals at WRAMC and NNMC remain concerned
    about their jobs and location in the end state. The Department is
    engaged in comprehensive communication efforts with the current
    workforce to ensure transparency and maintain trust.
        The Department has established a CHR Council to oversee the
    transition of civilians in the NCR. In February 2010 it began matching
    current permanent WRAMC civilians to their work locations at either
    WRNMMC, Bethesda or FBCH in the end state. Utilizing a workforce
    mapping model to execute the Guaranteed Placement Program (GPP), the
    Department will be able to place the vast majority of WRAMC government
    civilians at their desired work locations doing the work they want to
    do and will provide reassignment opportunities and career progression
    opportunities that do not exist today. Notifications will be made to
    Federal Government civilians, who will be transitioned to a single DOD
    civilian manning model, of their future work locations at WRNMMC,
    Bethesda, FBCH, or other opportunities within the GPP by July 1, 2010.
    Government civilians will not incur any loss in pay as a result of the
    transition.
        The Department has taken significant actions to meet work location
    preferences for as many civilians as possible. The Active-Duty Force
    mix across these hospitals will facilitate the placement of
    approximately 1,500 of the WRAMC civilian personnel to be placed at the
    WRNMMC, Bethesda. Surveys indicate that more than 355 Federal
    Government civilians at WRAMC and 50 at NNMC desire to go to FBCH.
    There are approximately 230 contract billets planned for FBCH and 475
    for WRNMMC, Bethesda and depending on the skills needed, DOD may be
    able to use some of those contractor billets to expand WRAMC personnel
    placements at Bethesda. In addition, effective February 2010, all new
    permanent hires at WRAMC and NNMC are being advised that their work may
    move to FBCH in 2011. DOD will also be leveraging attrition over the
    next year and a half to create additional ``spaces'' at Bethesda to
    place current permanent WRAMC civilians. DOD is committed to
    maintaining a highly-skilled workforce in the NCR able to meet the
    unique healthcare needs of the Nation's servicemembers, retirees, and
    their families.

                support for military families with special needs
        134. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010
    required DOD to establish an Office of Community Support for Families
    with Special Needs, and to significantly improve programs both in the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and throughout the military
    departments to assist military families with special educational and
    medical needs. What are DOD's plans to implement this program in fiscal
    year 2010?
        Secretary Gates. We have established the Office of Community
    Support for Military Families with Special Needs within the office of
    the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family
    Policy. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the office to develop
    and implement a comprehensive policy on support for military families
    with special needs.
        An Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Services working group
    has been meeting since April 2009, on how to better support military
    families with special needs, for both Active Duty and the Reserve
    component. The working group has begun developing the policy and will
    develop standards and metrics by which to measure the effectiveness of
    the support provided.
        We met with military families with special needs to better
    understand their needs and will continue to involve them. We will also
    consult with military and civilian specialists supporting families with
    special needs to help us develop the family support program.
        In November 2009, the Department sponsored joint service training
    for over 300 military personnel who serve military families with
    special needs.
        The Department has established a repository of information for
    military families with special needs at Military OneSource
    (www.militaryonesource.com/specialneeds). The launch page provides a
    central location for families to learn about services and support
    available from the military as well as from the communities outside the
    gate.

        135. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, why does the request for
    fiscal year 2011 omit any request for funding this mandate?
        Secretary Gates. Although the Department did not request funds in
    the fiscal year 2011 budget, we understand the importance of this
    program. We are reviewing our funding options for fiscal year 2011 and
    will work with Congress to resolve any concerns.

        136. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is DOD's estimate of the
    funds required to meet this mandate in fiscal year 2011 and how will it
    be achieved?
        Secretary Gates. The Military Community and Family Programs office
    under the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)
    continues to refine the implementation plan, including the requirements
    of the program management office. Once the implementation plan is
    complete, funds will be realigned within available resources, or
    reprogrammed during the Omnibus reprogramming action to meet the
    initial fiscal year 2010 funding requirements of the Office of
    Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs. The
    implementation plan will also lay out the fiscal year 2011 funding
    requirements and strategies. As necessary, the Department will submit a
    reprogramming action to meet fiscal year 2011 requirements.

                       rotary wing support in afghanistan
        137. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, on September 28, 2009,
    Newsweek released an article titled ``Not So Special Forces''
    describing a shortage of aviation assets, particularly rotary lift, to
    support SOF in Afghanistan, including a claim that nearly 80 percent of
    aviation requests made by SOF in Afghanistan were rejected. Aware of
    the vital role SOF play in our efforts against terrorism, the 2010 QDR
    calls for a substantial increase in SOF personnel and a correlating
    increase in key enabling assets for SOF, including rotary lift. While
    this increase is necessary to support the growing end strength of SOF,
    it will not provide near-term relief to already strained resources in-
    country. What is your current assessment of the availability of
    enabling forces, including rotary lift, for SOF in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. We continue to have shortfalls in ISR and rotary
    wing support to SOF in Afghanistan. Personnel training is the biggest
    factor limiting how fast we can deliver more ISR to Afghanistan.
    Training pipelines for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are
    operating at maximum throughput to operate and employ newly acquired
    hardware, and we continue to ensure proper numbers and placement of
    analysts to effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence
    data.
        To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one
    additional MH-47 will be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two
    additional Chinooks will arrive in December 2010 and June 2011,
    respectively. Additionally, five CV-22s deployed in April to support
    SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. We
    are also accelerating delivery of CV-22s to better support the forces
    requiring them, and we anticipate adding five more CV-22s to the fleet
    in the coming year. Currently at initial operational capability, CV-22
    units cannot currently sustain a permanent presence in Afghanistan and
    they are limited to 4-6 month deployments to accommodate training new
    crews. However, their presence will become more enduring as the fleet
    grows and the CV-22 reaches full operational capability in fiscal year
    2011.

        138. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what steps, if any, have been
    taken to alleviate the shortage of key enabling forces, including
    rotary lift, in Afghanistan for SOF?
        Admiral Mullen. We continue to have shortfalls in ISR and rotary
    wing support to SOF in Afghanistan. Personnel training is the biggest
    factor limiting how fast we can deliver more ISR to Afghanistan.
    Training pipelines for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are
    operating at maximum throughput to operate and employ newly acquired
    hardware, and we continue to ensure proper numbers and placement of
    analysts to effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence
    data.
        To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one
    additional MH-47 will be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two
    additional Chinooks will arrive in December 2010 and June 2011,
    respectively. Additionally, five CV-22s deployed in April to support
    SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. We
    are also accelerating delivery of CV-22s to better support the forces
    requiring them, and we anticipate adding five more CV-22s to the fleet
    in the coming year. Currently at initial operational capability, CV-22
    units cannot currently sustain a permanent presence in Afghanistan and
    they are limited to 4-6 month deployments to accommodate training new
    crews. However, their presence will become more enduring as the fleet
    grows and the CV-22 reaches full operational capability in fiscal year
    2011.

        139. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, do you believe that U.S.
    forces will have adequate rotary medical evacuation lift in Afghanistan
    once the surge of 30,000 forces is in place?
        Admiral Mullen. The Joint Staff stood-up an operational planning
    team to examine the current and future requirements for rotary medical
    evacuation, or MEDIVAC, platforms in Afghanistan given the increase in
    number of deployed forces. I expect to be briefed on the team's
    assessment by 10 May and I will subsequently provide the results to the
    committee. That said, we will do all we need to do to ensure there is
    adequate rotary medical evacuation lift in Afghanistan once the surge
    of 30,000 forces are in place.
        The Joint Staff is working closely with U.S. CENTCOM and U.S. Joint
    Forces Command (JFCOM) to accurately define the CENTCOM Commander's
    requirements and sourcing solutions. Additionally, in order to be
    adequately prepared to source solutions once the Commander's
    requirements are finalized, U.S. Joint Forces Command is working
    closely with the Services, Reserves, and National Guard Bureau to
    determine readiness and availability of forces.

                  impact to readiness from off-shore drilling
        140. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the President stated his
    support for new off-shore drilling initiatives during his State of the
    Union Address. As you may know, the issue of drilling in the Eastern
    Gulf of Mexico has raised concerned within DOD over potential impacts
    to the test and training air ranges in that area. Some of this concern
    has been addressed with recent negotiations with the Department of the
    Interior about acceptable methods of drilling. What is the current
    position of DOD concerning the issuance of additional leases in the
    Eastern Gulf of Mexico to support off-shore drilling operations and the
    current concerns about the impact to military readiness?
        Secretary Gates. On April 2, 2010, the DOD transmitted a report to
    the Department of Interior (DOI) on the compatibility of DOD activities
    with oil and gas resource development on the outer continental shelf.
    Transmittal of the report occurred after months of discussions with the
    DOI and was in response to the Mineral Management Service's ``Draft
    2010-2015 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Lease Sale Plan.''
        The report applied greater analytic rigor than past reports, going
    beyond the former binary analysis where areas were either compatible or
    incompatible with development, to include areas of conditional
    compatibility (drilling with stipulations such as periodic evacuation
    or no permanent surface structures). While only a small portion of the
    Eastern Gulf was found to be compatible without restrictions, larger
    areas were found to be conditionally compatible. The report only
    examined military mission and did not address environmental issues.

                          don't ask, don't tell policy
        141. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, in your testimony on February
    2, you were clear that the Joint Chiefs have not yet developed their
    best military advice about the impact of a repeal of the DADT policy
    and the manner in which you would implement a change in policy. You
    stated that you would like to have the time to do so. However, many in
    Congress intend to move quickly through legislation to repeal 10 U.S.C.
    Sec. 654 as quickly as possible.
        In view of the time needed to perform the high level review, do you
    support legislative change to the current homosexual conduct policy
    before the Chiefs have formulated their advice?
        Admiral Mullen. I agree with the approach that the Secretary of
    Defense has proposed, which calls for a careful review of this policy.
    Given all we are currently asking of our force and their families, I
    think we owe it to them to understand the exact nature of the impact of
    any repeal of the law. I also believe this review will be useful to
    Congress in your deliberations. This is why we are undertaking a
    comprehensive review of the issue, and I support taking the time to do
    so. I do not support legislative change to current homosexual conduct
    policy before the Chiefs have formulated their advice, tied to the
    results of the ongoing comprehensive review.

        142. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you testified that a high-
    level working group within DOD will review the issues associated with
    properly implementing a repeal of the DADT policy. Part of this review,
    you testified, will be to reach out to authoritatively understand the
    views and attitudes of the force. Please explain in detail what steps
    DOD will take to implement the President's direction to begin the
    preparations necessary for repeal of the current law and policy.
        Secretary Gates. As I have directed, the Working Group will solicit
    the views of a wide array of individuals including military families.
    Over the course of the next 8 months members of the Working Group will
    meet with a wide array of individuals of all Services, ranks, ages and
    assignments, officers and enlisted, to seek their advice, opinions, and
    concerns regarding a repeal and how it should be implemented. The
    Working Group will thoroughly, objectively, and methodically examine
    all aspects of this question, and produce its finding and
    recommendations in the form of an implementation plan by the end of
    this calendar year.

        143. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are the actions you are
    directing intended to strengthen the argument for repeal of existing
    law?
        Secretary Gates. The Comprehensive Review Working Group is
    conducting a comprehensive review of the issues associated with a
    repeal of the law. I have directed this effort be carried out
    professionally, thoroughly, dispassionately, and in a manner responsive
    to the direction of the President and to the needs of Congress this
    matter is debated and considered.

        144. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what difference will it make,
    if any, in DOD planning if a significant proportion--say 50 percent--of
    servicemembers and their families register objection to a change in the
    policy?
        Secretary Gates. I am not in a position to speculate as to what the
    Working Group may find and conclude in the course of its review. I do
    know that the Working Group will undertake its review in an objective
    and thorough manner, and I expect that the Working Group co-chairs will
    provide me with their best assessment of the impact of repeal,
    regardless of what that may be, to permit me to determine, as I said in
    my testimony, how best to prepare for implementation of a congressional
    repeal.

        145. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain in detail how
    you intend to authoritatively understand the views and attitudes of
    Active and Reserve servicemembers.
        Secretary Gates. Over the course of the next 8 months members of
    the Working Group will meet with a wide array of individuals of all
    Services, ranks, ages, and assignments, officers and enlisted, to seek
    their advice, opinions, and concerns regarding a repeal and how it
    should be implemented. The Working Group is in the process of
    developing appropriate means by which to accomplish this.

        146. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, as part of your review, do
    you intend to seek the views of veterans or retired members of the
    Armed Forces? If no, why not?
        Secretary Gates. The Working Group will seek to hear from the many
    responsible voices of those individuals and groups with diverse views
    on this important matter, including veterans and retired members of the
    Armed Forces.

        147. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain in detail how
    the working group will attempt to gauge the impacts of a change in the
    law on military effectiveness, including how a change might affect unit
    cohesion, recruiting, and retention.
        Secretary Gates. As stated in my testimony, the Working Group will
    examine the potential impacts of a change in the law on military
    effectiveness, including how a change might affect unit cohesion,
    recruiting and retention, and other issues crucial to the performance
    of the force. To accomplish this task, I have directed the Working
    Group to systematically engage the force and in an appropriately
    balanced manner engage Members of Congress, key influences of potential
    servicemembers, and other stakeholder groups who have expressed a view
    on the current and prospective policy.

        148. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you have outlined plans for a
    study about changing, or more likely, repealing the current law
    regarding military service by homosexuals. Please describe the
    regulatory or legislative changes you will seek or direct this year
    with respect to DOD's DADT policy and title 10, U.S.C., Sec. 654.
        Secretary Gates. The Working Group will produce its findings and
    recommendations in the form of an implementation plan by the end of
    this calendar year. I anticipate recommended regulatory and legislative
    changes will be included in this report. Additionally, as announced in
    my testimony, I have directed the Department to quickly review the
    regulations used to implement the current Don't Ask, Don't Tell law,
    and within 45 days present recommended changes to regulations that will
    enforce this policy in a fairer manner within existing law.

        149. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, you are the principal military
    adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, but under law,
    you must consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. What are the views
    of the other Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders about
    changing the existing homosexual conduct policy?
        Admiral Mullen. Each of the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders
    has appeared before the committee, where they had the opportunity to
    express their views. I can tell you that all the Chiefs are concerned
    with current combat operations and the associated stress on the force.
    Given what is currently being asked of our force and their families,
    the Chiefs would all like to better understand the exact nature of the
    impact of any repeal of the law. This is why all of us support a
    comprehensive review of the issue in order to better advise the
    Secretary of Defense and the President.

        150. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen,
    subparagraph (a) of section 654 of title 10, U.S.C., sets forth 15
    findings of fact concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces. Do you
    disagree with any of the findings? If so, how?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. I fully support the President's
    decision. The President announced a plan to work with Congress this
    year to repeal 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654. He subsequently directed DOD to
    begin the preparations necessary for repeal of the current law and
    policy. I have directed this effort be carried out professionally,
    thoroughly, dispassionately, and in a manner responsive to the
    direction of the President and to the needs of Congress this matter is
    debated and considered. The Comprehensive Review Working Group will
    solicit the views of a wide array of individuals from the different
    Services on this subject. This working group is conducting a
    comprehensive review of the issues associated with a repeal of the law.
    With the preparation and conclusions of the working group completed,
    the next stage will be Congressional deliberation and decision, as only
    Congress can repeal 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654.

        151. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, would you
    please explain your views about what conditions are now present in the
    Armed Forces that justify repealing the current homosexual conduct
    policy now.
        Secretary Gates I support the President's decision to work with
    Congress this year to repeal 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654 and to direct DOD to
    begin the preparations necessary for a repeal of the current law and
    policy. The Comprehensive Review Working Group I have established will,
    among other things, solicit the views of a wide array of individuals
    from the different Services on this subject, and I look forward to the
    continued progress of the working group as they undertake their
    important task in the months ahead.
        Admiral Mullen. Given all we are currently asking of our force and
    their families, I think we owe it to them to understand the exact
    nature of the impact of any repeal of the law. I support the approach
    that the Secretary of Defense has proposed, which calls for a careful
    review of issues and impact related to this policy and its potential
    repeal. This review will help us better understand the conditions in
    today's Armed Forces related to this law and policy.
        My personal view, as I have expressed, is that current law and
    policy conflict with our core value of integrity--as individuals and as
    an institution. But I need to understand the full impacts of any change
    to the law, and how to best ensure the wellbeing of the force should
    the law change.
        It is premature for me to speculate now regarding what the review
    will find. I look forward to working with leaders within DOD to conduct
    this review in a manner that preserves the high state of readiness of
    the U.S. military.

        152. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, you have extensive operational
    and command experience, including command of three ships. Even on
    today's most modern ships and submarines, living conditions are
    spartan. The same is certainly true for deployed ground forces in Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and around the globe. What is your message to military
    personnel of any rank who object to being required to live and work
    under such conditions with an openly gay individual?
        Admiral Mullen. We ask much of our servicemembers, and we put them
    into situations where they are living and working, day in and day out,
    under tough conditions. At all times, we must be attentive to good
    order and discipline and morale, and maintaining military
    effectiveness. We will always take the steps necessary to preserve
    effectiveness and readiness, consistent with our core values and
    military ethos, and our mission.

        153. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, we should anticipate that many
    military leaders, officer and enlisted, will object to changes in the
    current DOD homosexual conduct policy. Yet you have testified about
    your personal view that good leadership requires military leaders to
    support changes to the policy. Please expand on your views about
    military leadership and the burden of implementing the homosexual
    conduct policy.
        Admiral Mullen. For the record, I testified that understanding the
    impact of any change to the law gets to the core of where I am at on
    this issue, which is leadership. We must be prepared to lead if the law
    changes.
        I do not expect to try to change someone's views about
    homosexuality. I do believe that we can have clear standards of conduct
    and behavior, and hold people accountable to those standards. To ensure
    we can lead effectively, we are undertaking a comprehensive review of
    the issue to better understand the dynamics of any repeal. Leadership
    requires preparation, and it is my responsibility to ensure our leaders
    are ready for any decision Congress should make.

        154. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what is your message to
    officer and enlisted leaders who oppose change but whom you consider
    key to making changes to the policy work successfully.
        Admiral Mullen. I do not expect to try to change someone's views
    about homosexuality. I do believe that we can have clear standards of
    conduct and behavior, and hold people accountable to those standards.
    To ensure we do this effectively, we are undertaking a comprehensive
    review of the issue to better understand the dynamics of any repeal.
        I have great confidence in the quality of our officer and enlisted
    leadership and know that with sound preparation they can lead the force
    successfully, should the law and policy change.

        155. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, in your view, to what degree
    and how would repeal of the current law and DOD homosexual conduct
    policy improve military readiness?
        Admiral Mullen. I cannot say what all the impacts of repeal of the
    law would be. That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of
    the issue to better understand the impacts of any potential change. A
    balanced, reasoned assessment will best serve us as we consider this
    matter.

        156. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what effect would repeal of
    the current law and policy have on recruiting and retention?
        Admiral Mullen. I cannot say for certain how repeal might affect
    these areas. That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of
    the issue to better understand the impacts of any potential change. It
    is important for us to understand these dymanics in order to lead the
    force, should the law change

        157. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, has
    the current law and DOD DADT policy hindered the military's ability in
    a measurable way to recruit and retain qualified personnel to meet
    service manpower requirements?
        Admiral Mullen. I know that some schools have expressed concern
    over the presence of recruiters due to the existence of this law. Our
    recruiters currently are able to accomplish their mission, and we will
    continue to work through issues directly with those schools that
    express concerns.
        However, I cannot say for certain how the current law affects
    recruiting and retention overall, or its how its potential repeal might
    affect recruiting and retention. That is why we are undertaking a
    comprehensive review of the issue to better understand the impacts of
    any potential change of current law and policy.

        158. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, has
    the current law hindered the ability of the Army and Marine Corps to
    expand in recent years?
        Admiral Mullen. The Marine Corps has already completed its growth
    to new active duty end strength levels of 202,100. The Army is on track
    to grow to 547,400, and I am confident that the Army will be successful
    in getting to that level. I cannot say how current law has helped or
    hindered this process. Recruiting and retention are impacted by many
    factors, and it is important that we understand these as best we can.

        159. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, has
    the requirement to separate homosexual personnel under section 654
    created a measurable impact on readiness of the force?
        Admiral Mullen. The number of annual separations is small (less
    than four-tenths of 1 percent of all separations). No one likes to see
    talent leave the Service, but it is our job to follow the law. I
    support Congress' examination of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, and should the
    law change we will work within any new guidance. Related to your
    deliberation, I support the approach the Secretary of Defense has
    proposed, which calls for a careful review of this policy.

        160. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, do you
    think the repeal of the current law and DOD homosexual conduct policy
    would affect military readiness, cohesion, morale, good order, and
    discipline?
        Admiral Mullen. We have fair and responsive disciplinary and
    administrative processes by which we promptly investigate and
    adjudicate instances of inappropriate conduct. Our standards and
    processes apply to conduct, regardless of orientation, rank, or gender.
    However, I cannot say exactly what all the impacts of repeal of the law
    would be. That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review to
    better understand the issues associated with any potential change. A
    balanced and thorough review will support effective leadership within
    the force, should the law change.

        161. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what effect would a repeal of
    current law have on the propensity of prospective recruits to enlist
    and on the propensity of influencers (parents, coaches, teachers, and
    religious leaders, for example) to recommend military service?
        Admiral Mullen. I cannot say for certain how repeal might affect
    recruiting and retention. I would expect a range of views among
    influencers, who guide our young Americans towards public service as
    policemen, firemen and first responders, as well as towards the armed
    forces. Through our comprehensive review of the issue we aim to better
    understand the impacts of any potential change from current law and
    policy.

        162. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, according to data provided by
    the Services and DOD, the number of discharges for homosexual conduct
    consistently has been significantly less than 1 percent, compared to
    discharges for other reasons. The Congressional Research Service
    concluded that most discharges occur among younger, less experienced
    personnel. Do you consider the numbers of discharges under the existing
    DOD policy to adversely affect the readiness of the Armed Forces?
        Secretary Gates. The Comprehensive Review Working Group will
    examine impacts--both positive and negative--of repeal of the law. This
    will include the impact of no longer discharging servicemembers for
    homosexual conduct, as is currently required by law.

        163. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what percentage of
    separations on the basis of the policy can be attributed to statements
    only, i.e., individuals who identify themselves as homosexual or
    bisexual?
        Secretary Gates. In fiscal year 2009, there were 428 homosexual
    conduct separations. Of these, 341, or approximately 80 percent, were
    based on the member making a statement that he or she was homosexual,
    bisexual, or words to that effect.

        164. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what percentage of total
    discharges has been based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., third-party
    reports?
        Secretary Gates. The Department does not currently track homosexual
    conduct discharges this way. All discharges are due to a military
    member engaging in one of the forms of conduct set forth 10 U.S.C.
    Sec. 654: (a) engaging in, attempting to engage in, or soliciting
    another to engage in a homosexual act, (b) stating that he or she is a
    homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, or (c) marrying or
    attempting to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex. Of
    the 428 separations in fiscal year 2009, 341 were statements cases, 80
    were acts cases, and 7 were marriage cases.

        165. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the 2008 Military Times poll
    of active duty subscriber/respondents found that 10 percent said they
    would decline reenlistment if the law is repealed, and another 14
    percent would consider ending their careers. Even a smaller proportion
    of losses among mid-career people would cause many difficulties in
    short-handed units. What weight do you give to this 2008 Military Times
    poll regarding the views of currently serving individuals?
        Secretary Gates. These sentiments, as well as many others held by
    servicemembers, will be one of many data points the Working Group will
    consider in its review.

        166. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you think that
    servicemembers with more than 10 years of military service should be
    given a temporary retirement option or some other separation payment if
    they express objection to serving on Active Duty with openly gay
    servicemembers?
        Secretary Gates. No, I do not believe a temporary retirement option
    nor other separation pay should be given in these circumstances.

        167. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if the effective date of the
    law were postponed, how could current law be enforced pending that
    date?
        Secretary Gates. I do not have a position on the implications of
    such an arrangement. However, I do not support a moratorium on
    homosexual conduct discharges while the Working Group is undertaking
    its review.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                          air force tanker competition
        168. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, I understand that many
    factors in the previous RFP that favored a larger, more capable
    aircraft have been removed from the RFP and many factors that favor a
    smaller, less capable aircraft are now mandatory. If the pending tanker
    RFP fails to result in a real competition, meaning at least two teams
    decide to bid, then we really do not have a competition. What steps are
    you taking to ensure that both sides stay at the table and bid on the
    pending draft RFP?
        Secretary Gates. I pledged to Members of Congress a fair, open, and
    transparent process. DOD and the Air Force favor a competition but will
    let the RFP process run its course. The RFP is structured to be fair to
    all sides and, above all, to the taxpayer and warfighter. The process
    of procuring a new Air Force tanker needs to recommence without delay.
    Numerous meetings with potential offerors were held as part of the
    draft RFP process. Careful consideration is being given to all requests
    and comments, and all questions are being answered to ensure that the
    Department is crystal clear on how the winning offeror will be
    selected. The approach will be crafted to favor no one except the
    Warfighter and taxpayer. The Department has steered straight down the
    middle.

        169. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, what steps do you plan to
    take if one of the sides does not bid and we do not have a real
    competition?
        Secretary Gates. As I stated at the House Armed Services Committee
    hearing on February 3, 2010, ``We would like to have a competition . .
    . and we hope that both companies will agree to participate. But we
    will move forward. We have to have new tankers. We hope very much that
    there will be a real competition. We hope very much that both
    competitors stay in the competition. But should that not prove to be
    the case, we will--we have to move forward. It's been delayed too long.
    We need to get this thing started.''

                            national missile defense
        170. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, last year the President's
    budget request, as it pertained to NMD, called for cutting back the
    deployment of GBIs from 44 to 30 while curtailing further
    modernization. Thanks to your efforts, this year's budget request seems
    to indicate a commitment to continue to improve the GMD system, while
    also purchasing additional missiles for testing and stockpile
    reliability. Can we continue to count on your support for a robust GMD
    modernization program that will ensure the system keeps pace with the
    threat?
        Secretary Gates. Given the uncertainties of future ICBM threats, I
    will preserve a position of advantage by maintaining and enhancing the
    current midcourse defense capability. The fiscal year 2011 President's
    budget request provides a substantial investment in the GMD element to
    ensure it remains effective and viable over the long-term. This is
    accomplished by funding element and system improvements, including:

             Refurbishment or delivery of 22 GBIs for testing and
            operational spare requirements;
             New software upgrades to expand GMD integration with
            the BMDS and improve interceptor discrimination capability;
             Interceptor obsolescence mitigation and avionics
            upgrades;
             The completion of Missile Field 2 with 14 silos at
            Fort Greely, AK, by fiscal year 2012, increasing the number of
            silos available for operational use if needed to address the
            threat;
             The completion of the Future Power Plant at Fort
            Greely, Alaska to address survivability and reliability
            concerns; and
             Implementation of a GMD reliability, availability, and
            maintainability program;

        Fiscal year 2011 funding will complete the establishment of a
    second GMD Command and Control node at Fort Greely, AK. The fiscal year
    2011 budget also requests funds to continue executing operationally
    realistic ground and flight testing of the GMD element of the BMDS, and
    to validate BMDS system performance through robust models and
    simulation anchored by flight test data.

        171. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, can you assure us there
    will not be a break in production for the GBI until DOD determines how
    many GBIs are needed for testing and stockpile reliability over the
    life of the system, as per section 233 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
    2002?
        Secretary Gates. The MDA's most recent purchase of GBIs occurred in
    December 2006. As a result, lower-tier GBI suppliers began completing
    delivery, i.e., began a ``production break,'' in 2007 for sub-
    assemblies to support the manufacture and delivery of the remaining
    GBIs on contract. All remaining third- and fourth-tier GBI suppliers
    are expected to complete their deliveries in fiscal year 2010 with the
    exception of Aerojet and Rockwell Collins.
        The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request (fiscal year 2011
    PBR) lays out a funded plan that includes completing the fielding of 30
    operational GBIs; delivering 22 additional GBIs for testing, stockpile
    reliability and operational spare requirements; and refurbishing 16 of
    the original 52 GBIs for both operational and flight test rotation
    during the FYDP.
        The three requirements set forth in section 233 of the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2010 have either been met or will be met shortly. First, I
    delivered the BMDR to Congress on February 1, 2010. Second, in the
    fiscal year 2011 PBR, MDA states plans to acquire five additional GBIs,
    beginning in fiscal year 2011, to satisfy Integrated Master Test Plan
    (IMTP) and stockpile reliability testing requirements to support the
    service life of the GMD element of the BMDS.
        With respect to the third requirement, within the next several
    weeks, a report on the GBI production line will be submitted to the
    congressional defense committees. The report will detail the
    Department's plans to utilize the additional $50 million fiscal year
    2010 appropriation to keep the manufacturing lines for critical
    suppliers warm through fiscal year 2010, with most of the component
    suppliers completing deliveries in fiscal year 2011. This investment
    along with the planned five additional GBIs, plus additional hardware
    components to support GBI scheduled maintenance and refurbishment
    activities, will sustain third and fourth tier GBI suppliers until
    fiscal year 2013.
        GBI purchases after fiscal year 2013 will likely include
    manufacturing line restart costs for third- and fourth-tier GBI
    suppliers. Also, any additional GBI purchases beyond the planned 2011
    purchases will likely include redesign/development costs due to parts
    obsolescence. With ongoing refurbishments for operational and flight
    test GBIs, the first- and second-tier GBI manufacturing lines will
    remain warm beyond 2016.

                            european missile defense
        172. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, the Phased Adaptive
    Approach to missile defense in Europe calls for fielding land-based SM-
    3 Block IB missiles in Europe starting in 2015. Is the IB missile on
    schedule, and have you identified the two countries that will host its
    deployment in 2015?
        Secretary Gates. Yes. The SM-3 Block IB missile is on schedule for
    flight testing in fiscal year 2011, deployment on Aegis ships in 2013
    and fielding on land in 2015.
        In February 2010, Romania agreed to host the land-based SM-3
    Southern Europe site planned for deployment in Phase 2 (2015
    timeframe). In the coming months, the U.S. and Romanian Governments
    will work together and begin discussions on the system, including the
    steps necessary to establish a missile defense facility in Romania.
        In October 2009, Poland agreed to host a similar Northern Europe
    site in Phase 3 (2018 timeframe). I expect that by the planned time of
    this deployment, the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA will be available.
    The Department has concluded a supplemental Status of Forces Agreement
    (SOFA) with Poland and the Polish Government recently agreed to an
    updated BMD basing agreement that will enable us to move forward with
    the land-based SM-3 site in Poland. The supplemental SOFA has been
    ratified by the Polish Parliament and entered into force. The BMD
    Agreement was signed but has not yet been ratified by the Polish
    Parliament.

        173. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, last year you testified
    that the two-stage GBI will continue development as a hedge against
    technical difficulties with the SM-3 Block IIA and IIB missiles. Is
    this still the plan?
        Secretary Gates. Yes. As part of a hedging strategy for defense of
    the homeland against long-range ballistic missile attacks, the
    Department is continuing the development and assessment of the two-
    stage GBI. My overall testing strategy for the two-stage GBI, which
    includes flight testing, supports three-stage data collection
    requirements as well.

        174. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, how and when would we know
    that it is necessary to substitute the two-stage GBI for the SM-3 Block
    II missile?
        Secretary Gates. There are two planned versions of the SM-3 Block
    II, the SM-3 Block IIA and the SM-3 Block IIB. The SM-3 Block IIA is
    planned for use aboard ships first, and then for use ashore until the
    Block IIB is developed and available. The Aegis BMD ship-based SM-3
    Block IIA will remain an operational need independent of decisions
    related to developing and producing two-stage GBIs or Block IIBs.
        MDA will know if it is necessary to substitute the two-stage GBI
    for the Block IIB after the Block IIB flight testing, which is
    currently planned for fiscal year 2016. The MDA is engineering the
    systems and maturing the technologies for the SM-3 Block IIB. The
    technical maturity will be determined through a series of knowledge
    points that tie achievement of critical information to reducing
    developmental risk and increasing confidence in capabilities. These
    knowledge points will measure confidence in the SM-3 Block IIB through
    the end of fiscal year 2016, providing data that will be used to
    determine whether development should continue or whether alternative
    designs should be considered.

        175. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, what has been Russia's
    reaction to the new missile defense plans for Europe?
        Secretary Gates. Russia's initial reaction to the new system was
    positive. Although the Department is transparent with Russia about the
    Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), Russia recently expressed concern that
    the adaptive nature of the system makes is appear to be open-ended, and
    in later phases could undermine Russia's strategic deterrent. The new
    system poses no threat to Russia, and I believe Russia has an interest
    in working with the United States and Europe to defend against the
    growing missile and nuclear threat from Iran and other states. I will
    continue to be transparent with Russia about our plans for the PAA to
    try to allay its concerns, and I will seek avenues for cooperation in
    this area.

        176. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, I've seen press reports
    that Russia may now be concerned that the SM-3 Block II missile may be
    a threat to their strategic forces and that Russia will seek to limit
    its deployment in the ongoing Strategice Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
    follow-on negotiations. What can you tell me about this?
        Secretary Gates. Russia expressed concerns that the SM-3 Block IIB
    interceptors that we would deploy in Phase 4 of the Phased, Adaptive
    Approach (PAA), in the event that the threat environment evolves to
    require the deployment, could be capable of engaging their ICBMs. The
    Department is in discussions with Russia on the nature of the threat
    presented by various ballistic missile programs and the potential for
    missile defense cooperation. During our consultations with Russia, DOD
    stressed that the PAA is not directed at Russia. I believe that Russia
    may be unnecessarily concerned simply because the SM-3 Block IIB is
    still in development and thus Russia could be suspicious about the
    final capabilities of the interceptor. I will continue to be
    transparent with Russia on DOD's BMD capabilities, including the SM-3
    Block IIB interceptor, to allay their concerns and build trust.
    Regarding New START Treaty, I have been clear with Russia that U.S.
    missile defense systems are not directed against Russia and that the
    new treaty is about strategic offensive arms.

        177. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, the administration's new
    approach to missile defense in Europe hopes to solicit allied
    participation. We are hearing, however, that NATO is facing a funding
    crisis due to the operational demands related to Afghanistan. How
    likely is it that we can expect European contributions to the defense
    of their territory against medium- and long-range ballistic missiles?
        Secretary Gates. I believe that, as an alliance, NATO can best
    contribute to European territorial missile defense in two areas--
    political commitment and command and control (C2) infrastructure.
        In terms of political commitment, I am seeking a decision by NATO
    to take on territorial missile defense as a mission for the alliance.
    If NATO adopts such a mission, there will be a NATO-wide BMD effort to
    which the United States can contribute through the European Phased,
    Adaptive Approach (PAA). Furthermore, Allies will be able to contribute
    their current and future missile defense capabilities to this effort,
    augmenting the overall defense and the PAA.
        Regarding C2 infrastructure, NATO is developing a C2 network that
    will allow Allies to link their missile defense assets together, called
    the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program.
    By linking Allied assets, including those of the U.S. PAA, NATO and the
    United States can create a more efficient and cost-effective
    architecture.
        Currently, NATO is funding the component of ALTBMD that will
    provide C2 for defense of deployed forces only, rather than territorial
    missile defense. I strongly support continued funding for ALTBMD, as
    well as the ongoing study to determine the implications of expanding
    ALTBMD to include C2 for territorial missile defense. To date, NATO
    spent =159 million of the total =451 million cost for the current
    ALTBMD program.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
                     funding for contsrtuction/restoration
        178. Senator Graham. Secretary Gates, some military agencies do not
    appear to be spending funds appropriated by Congress for construction,
    cleanup and restoration activities. The Air Force Center for
    Engineering and the Environment and Naval Facilities Engineering
    Command has yet to obligate hundreds of millions of dollars
    appropriated. The United States Army Corps of Engineers continues to
    fall further behind in awards for the New Orleans Hurricane Risk
    Reduction Program and for the Everglades restoration. The funds for
    these projects represent a large number of jobs which could be filled
    by capable DOD contractors. What is the root cause of the delay and
    what is being done to remedy this situation?
        Secretary Gates. I fully support the President's budget and will
    continue to fully execute the construction, cleanup and restoration
    projects for which funds are authorized and appropriated. The root of
    the ``problem'' is the global economic downturn. As a result of that
    downturn, during fiscal year 2009, the Department was able to award
    many projects below initial government estimates, producing bid
    savings. DOD is making every effort to quickly apply those bid savings
    to offset a variety of requirements such as increases in costs on other
    projects and reductions to programs levied by Congress in fiscal year
    2010. In those rare circumstances when the Department cancels a
    project, we notify Congress as required by statute.
        Regarding the New Orleans Hurricane Risk Reduction Program, the
    Army Corps of Engineers is awarding construction contracts at a rapid
    pace, and construction work is progressing throughout the New Orleans
    area. As of mid-April 2010, the Army Corps awarded 251 of 361 planned
    construction contracts and obligated $8 billion of the $14.5 billion
    appropriated for the program.
        The Everglades restoration projects experienced contract award
    delays stemming from complications in establishing required cost share
    agreements with non-Federal sponsors. The Corps has made significant
    progress in completing agreement negotiations with the South Florida
    Water Management District (SFWMD), the primary non-Federal sponsor for
    Everglades restoration projects, by executing a Comprehensive
    Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) Master Agreement in August 2009.
    This agreement provides the foundation for all future Project
    Partnership Agreements by establishing basic terms of cooperation for
    CERP projects including cost sharing, construction, operations and
    maintenance, replacement, rehabilitation, and oversight by agency
    technical staff. The Corps is awarding contracts more rapidly since
    putting this agreement into effect. Additionally, to accelerate
    contract awards, the Corps is improving coordination with SFWMD during
    respective agency review and approval of draft agreements and allowing
    construction contract advertisements to be made prior to execution of
    partnership agreements, thus permitting earlier contract award
    following execution of those agreements.

                          air force tanker competition
        179. Senator Graham. Secretary Gates, regarding the competition for
    the new Air Force tanker competition, some have advocated a dual buy of
    tankers, wherein DOD would buy aircraft from the two major competitors
    who have previously proposed aircraft as the new aerial tanker. What is
    your position on this proposal?
        Secretary Gates. I am not planning for a dual award at this time.
    The Air Force considered all options per congressional direction, but
    ruled out split buy and dual award approaches based on budget
    affordability and fleet concerns including increased training,
    operations, maintenance, and support costs. I am committed to a single-
    award, competitive strategy for a commercial derivative tanker as it
    provides the best value for the Warfighter and taxpayer.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
                                  start treaty
        180. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, a January 25, 2010, article in
    RIA-Novosti, a Russian press outlet, stated that the United States and
    Russia have coordinated a number of disputed issues in relation to the
    START follow-on treaty. Specifically, the article said an agreement has
    been reached to reduce the number of nuclear delivery vehicles, meaning
    bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles, of 700 to 750 systems.
    Today, the United States deploys about 883 delivery vehicles, when
    ghost or phantom systems are taken off the books. Testimony before the
    House in July indicated that the Russians at best can deploy 500
    delivery vehicles through the course of the START follow-on treaty. At
    the delivery vehicle levels of 700 to 750 reported in the Russian
    press, where will these significant cuts come out of our triad?
        Secretary Gates. I believe that the New START Treaty allows the
    United States to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. Under the
    draft New START Treaty, both the United States and Russia have seven
    years after entry into force of the treaty to meet the treaty limits.
    The Department will have sufficient time to align our forces and to
    effect the necessary eliminations to fulfill our obligations under the
    New START Treaty with regard to our strategic delivery vehicles and
    their associated warheads. The specific mix of systems to be maintained
    was closely examined during the Nuclear Posture Review, with a final
    decision deferred pending signing of the Treaty.

        181. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, at the delivery vehicle levels
    of 700 to 750 reported in the Russian press, is Russia actually giving
    up any delivery vehicles?
        Secretary Gates. As of October 1, 2009, Russia declared 809
    deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and their
    associated launchers, deployed Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
    (SLBMs) and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers
    under START counting rules. Some of these systems may not be
    accountable under the New START Treaty, but others may still represent
    delivery vehicles that will be eliminated during the treaty's seven-
    year elimination period following entry into force.

                             next generation bomber
        182. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, the 2006 QDR made the decision
    to develop a follow-on bomber, and you have made clear that you support
    the development of a new bomber. However, last April you opted not to
    pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until you
    had a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the
    technology. As part of this effort to better understand the
    requirements for a new bomber, I understand that you stood up a Tiger
    Team to do an in-depth study of long-range strike in the new QDR.
    However, on reading the new QDR, on page 33, it looks like you have
    still not made a decision to move forward with a new bomber program,
    but instead have commissioned yet another study. What conclusions were
    drawn by the Tiger Team regarding the development of a new bomber?
        Secretary Gates. The Tiger Team to which you refer was formed to
    study the need, value, and technology for a follow-on Air Force long-
    range strike aircraft; that team completed its work last November. The
    team was supportive of pursuing a new long-range strike aircraft, but
    recognized that additional analysis was needed to explore options for
    reducing overall program costs and determining fielding timelines. The
    Department decided that a more in-depth analysis was required in order
    to determine how a new long-range strike aircraft might compare with
    other options. An assessment of the various support functions for long-
    range strike assets was also needed. Consequently, the Department
    chartered another study to look at a broader array of options to
    include the appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities; upgrades
    to legacy bombers; manned and unmanned options; stand-off and
    penetrating requirements; new and improved cruise missiles; electronic
    warfare improvements; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    demands; and conventional prompt global strike options.
        The goal of this new study is to ensure that we fully understand
    how all potential long-range strike options could contribute to U.S.
    security goals before spending billions of dollars. We anticipate that
    the new study will be completed in time to inform decisions shaping the
    Department's fiscal year 2012 budget.
        The final conclusion of the Tiger Team's study was that the
    Department should sustain the industrial base for early-stage design
    work and technologies for a new long-range strike aircraft while the
    Department continues to study all options. The Department provided
    industrial base funding for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 to
    prepare for the potential start of a new long-range strike program.

                             bomber force structure
        183. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, with regard to the FYDP force
    structure set out in the new QDR for the Air Force, the QDR proposes
    five long-range strike wings with up to 96 primary mission aircraft.
    According to the latest Air Force Almanac, the Air Force has 153 bomber
    aircraft. I understand some of these aircraft are dedicated to testing,
    but over 50 aircraft for testing seems like a lot. Do you plan on
    retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future?
        Secretary Gates. The total number of bombers in the Air Force
    inventory is 162 (66 B-1, 20 B-2, and 76 B-52 aircraft). 96 represents
    the total number of combat coded aircraft with the difference being
    made up from training, backup, attrition Reserve, and test airframes.
    The table below shows the breakdown by aircraft type and coding. The
    attached slides show the geographic location, coding, and correct
    number for each bomber in the Air Force inventory. At this time, the
    Air Force has no plans to retire any of the 162 bombers currently in
    the inventory. I believe that the 2011 President's budget provides for
    aggressive modernization for all three types of bombers, to keep them
    relevant far into the future.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Combat Coded    Training                    Attrition
              Airframe                Total         (CC)          (TF)      Backup (BAI)  Reserve (AR)    Test (CB)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    B-1.........................           66            36            16             9             1             4
    B-2.........................           20            16             0             4             0             0
    B-52........................           76            44            16            11             2            3
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Atch: Bomber inventory slides

        184. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, what are the assumptions
    underlying what appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of
    bombers?
        Secretary Gates. At this time, there are no plans to retire any of
    the bombers currently in the inventory. The fiscal year 2011 budget
    provides for aggressive modernization for all three types of bombers,
    to keep them relevant far into the future.

                                  qdr red team
        185. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, I understand you appointed a
    so-called ``Red Team'' of retired senior officers and outside defense
    experts to give you an outside assessment of the QDR. I understand that
    the Red Team reviewed the QDR's assessments and conclusions through the
    summer of 2009, and submitted a memo to you in the fall of 2009. As you
    know, you are required by the QDR statute in Title 10 to appoint an
    independent panel to assess the QDR. However, that panel will not be
    able to provide a report to us until July of this year, meaning that we
    may very well have completed work on the National Defense Authorization
    Bill for Fiscal Year 2011 before we see an independent assessment of
    the QDR. Since we won't be able to read an independent assessment of
    the QDR in a timely way, please provide us with a copy of the Red
    Team's memo to you, with the names of the Red Team members redacted to
    protect any confidentiality agreements.
        Secretary Gates. When I appointed the QDR Red Team, I assured the
    members that their insights would help inform my decisionmaking and
    would not be subject to outside review. I did this to foster frank and
    forthright advice for use by the Department in its internal
    deliberations. However, the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command,
    General James Mattis, and Director of Net Assessment, Mr. Andrew
    Marshall, served as co-chairs of the QDR Red Team. They would be happy
    to provide Members their perspectives on the QDR.
        The QDR Independent Panel has begun its work and has indicated it
    will publicly deliver interim findings before the release of its final
    report in July 2010.

        186. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, are any members of the Red
    Team that assessed the QDR also now members of the independent panel
    assessing the QDR?
        Secretary Gates. Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of the Office of Net
    Assessment, and General James Mattis, Commander U.S. Joint Forces
    Command, served as the co-chairs of the 2010 Red Team. The identities
    of other members of the QDR Red Team remain confidential. I believe
    that it is critical that I maintain the ability to have candid
    discussions with senior defense thinkers outside of government on a
    non-attribution basis.
        I selected members for the QDR Independent Panel based on their
    ability to offer an objective, independent, and non-partisan
    perspective.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                          army aircraft modernization
        187. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, I am glad to know that the
    QDR places success in today's wars as its first priority. It is our
    foremost responsibility to provide for our national defense. Just as
    the tactics and strategies have adjusted to that of our enemy, so must
    our approach to investing the necessary resources to rapidly equip the
    warfighter for success.
        I also appreciate your stating that this budget is shaped by
    embracing a dose of realism. One dose of realism that we can't avoid is
    the long-term impacts that the current deficit forecast is going to
    have on all sectors of the government, to include DOD. Given that
    realism, it is increasingly important that we do our best to get the
    best long-term benefit out of the investments we make to fulfill our
    immediate needs.
        One major focus area of this budget is to increase the availability
    of helicopters by procuring more aircraft and improving aircraft
    capabilities. Due to the cancelation of the armed Scout helicopter
    program, DOD is planning to invest well over a billion dollars in the
    aging Kiowa Warrior. That investment has transformed from performing
    safety enhancements to a long-term modernization program. I now hear
    discussions ranging from engine upgrades to reconstituting a production
    line.
        While many of these improvements are necessary to maintain
    operational capability, none will result in the performance
    capabilities that are desired. Yet, I don't know of any investments
    being planned on other fleet assets that would reduce your risk of
    providing more capable Scout capabilities and could realistically
    achieve the 80 percent of optimal solution that you have mentioned in
    the past.
        Are there any newer aircraft in the Army's fleet that could be
    enhanced, which would significantly exceed the capability of the legacy
    Scout helicopter, and could also provide returns on that investment
    much further into the future?
        Secretary Gates. The Army is exploring all options to leverage
    existing and potential developmental solutions to replace the legacy
    scout helicopter. Investment in the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior (KW) as a
    bridging strategy is critical in fulfilling the Army's immediate
    reconnaissance needs in support of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
    requirements. This investment will address immediate obsolescence,
    safety, and weight reduction issues and will enable the aircraft to
    perform better in the current combat environment until a viable
    replacement is procured. The Army is conducting an Analysis of
    Alternatives (AoA) to address Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) capabilities and
    determine a replacement for the KW. The study will be completed in
    April 2011 at which time the existing KW path ahead will be re-
    evaluated along with the future AAS recommendations for a leadership
    decision.

        188. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, would you be supportive of
    the Army exploring all options to leverage existing assets to provide
    the highest level of Scout capability until the Army acquires and
    fields its future Armed Aerial Scout aircraft?
        Secretary Gates. The Army is exploring all options to leverage
    existing and potential developmental solutions. In July 2009, the
    Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) directed the Army to conduct an AoA
    to meet Armed Aerial Scout capabilities and determine a replacement for
    the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. This AoA will determine the appropriate
    materiel solution(s) to address any capability gaps and meet Army
    requirements. The AoA will be conducted in two non-sequential phases
    with the preliminary results completed in December 2010 and final
    results published in April 2011.
        On April 14, 2009, the Secretary of the Army approved a strategy to
    reinvests in the Kiowa Warrior helicopter to address obsolescence and
    sustainment until a viable replacement is procured. The strategy
    includes a funded ACAT II program called the Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade
    Program (CASUP). The CASUP addresses obsolescence, safety, and weight
    reduction to perform better in the current combat environment. The Army
    expects to sustain the Kiowa Warrior until 2025.

                    mine resistant ambush protected vehicles
        189. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, you mentioned the funding
    requested in the budget for an additional 10,000 MRAPs, of which 6,600
    are the new M-ATV. What type of MRAP vehicle makes up the remaining
    3,400?
        Secretary Gates. The most recent purchase of MRAP family of
    vehicles includes 1,460 more Oshkosh M-ATVs, 1,050 Navistar MaxxPro
    Dashs, 250 GDLS RG-31s and 58 BAE RG-33s. The remaining 582 vehicles to
    fulfill the estimated requirement for Afghanistan have not yet been
    defined.

        190. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, will these platforms be sent
    to Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. All of the vehicles most recently purchased are
    being sent to Afghanistan.

        191. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, how will they compliment the
    M-ATVs?
        Secretary Gates. MRAP vehicles are designed to meet mission
    requirements. The M-ATV was uniquely designed for missions requiring
    off-road mobility. The earlier variants in the MRAP family of vehicles
    were designed for other missions ranging from urban area patrolling,
    route clearance and Special Forces missions. The Department continues
    to make available all vehicles under the MRAP family of vehicles to
    Warfighters upon Combatant Command requirements. Our most recent
    purchase of MaxxPro Dashs, RG-31s and RG-33s will include improved
    suspension systems that are more suitable to the rough terrain in
    Afghanistan. I believe that these vehicles will complement the M-ATVs
    by supporting other, but closely related missions.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator George S. LeMieux
                             information operations
        192. Senator LeMieux. Secretary Gates, in October, I traveled to
    Afghanistan with Senators Burr and Whitehouse. While there we learned
    of the good work being done by our SOFs in the area of strategic
    communications--particularly in countering the enemy's false messages.
    However, I am concerned that too often we are not getting our message
    out to counter the enemy's. Some of the soldiers in Afghanistan are
    using what is called radio-in-a-box technologies to try and counter
    enemy propaganda. I think this approach should be more prevalent in the
    military. What is in this budget to help our soldiers get the best
    message out to local Afghans?
        Secretary Gates. During fiscal year 2011, I will ensure that DOD
    will allocate funds specifically for the dissemination of messages to
    the Afghan people down to the local level. DOD collaborates with the
    ISAF and the Department of State (DOS) to commit significant resources
    to ensuring the U.S. Government is getting our message out, and when
    necessary countering the enemy's propaganda. DOD and ISAF fund programs
    in Afghanistan that capitalize on radio and television programming, as
    well as a variety of printed products to disseminate messages that
    support U.S. and coalition objectives. The messages are directed at key
    audiences at multiple levels from national to local and are focused on
    objectives such as increasing support for Afghan National Security
    Forces, reducing support for insurgents, and increasing reporting of
    illicit activities. The majority of DOD and ISAF efforts are
    concentrated on content development and dissemination, and DOS has made
    a significant commitment to building the communications infrastructure
    in Afghanistan. The radio-in-a-box provides tactical military
    commanders a very capable temporary solution to short-range radio
    broadcasts in areas not covered by permanent stations. The funds
    provided to U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan allow commanders
    the flexibility to purchase more of these systems should they determine
    it is necessary to bridge the gap until DOS or another organization's
    efforts provide a permanent solution.

        193. Senator LeMieux. Secretary Gates, do you believe our forces
    are well-trained and doing enough to project good news in the warzone?
        Secretary Gates. I believe that U.S. forces are the best trained
    military in the world to fight and win America's wars. DOD committed
    significant resources to increase cultural awareness among U.S. forces
    and improve the understanding of the environment in which U.S. forces
    operate. DOD made significant progress in information operations,
    working closely with the ISAF, DOS, other U.S. Government agencies, and
    nongovernmental organizations to ensure the Afghanistan people and the
    international community understand the coalition's commitment to the
    future of Afghanistan. U.S. and ISAF forces conduct face-to-face
    engagement with leaders at all levels, develop and disseminate messages
    through radio, television, and printed products, and participate with
    our Afghan partners in civil-military activities. As technology
    advances, and the infrastructure develops in Afghanistan, DOD will
    continue to develop new methods of getting the message to the audience.

        194. Senator LeMieux. Secretary Gates, what is the training
    pipeline for soldiers who conduct information operations?
        Secretary Gates. Both the service components and the Joint
    community have specific training requirements for personnel who conduct
    Information Operations (IO). Specific service requirements are varied
    and driven by their unique operational and doctrinal requirements. I
    expect all servicemembers assigned to a combatant command to have had
    appropriate exposure to joint operational concepts and procedures;
    particularly within the area of IO and so will focus my comments on the
    Joint IO community.
        Within the Joint IO community, training requirements and the
    training pipeline are clearly described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 1630.01, Joint Information Operations Force.
    Based on the policy established in CJCSM 1630.01, members of the Joint
    IO Force are drawn from commissioned officers in grades O-4 through O-9
    and non-commissioned officers in grades E-6 through E-9. The manual
    further stipulates that these individuals must have completed either a
    U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) certified Joint IO Planning Course or
    a JFCOM-certified Joint IO Core Capabilities Specialist Course and
    occupy a billet requiring Joint IO education and/or training. At
    present there are 159 joint billets requiring JFCOM-certified IO
    planners and 153 Joint billets requiring JFCOM-certified IO Core
    Capability Specialists.
        Commissioned and non-commissioned officers, in the grades I
    previously mentioned, enter the Joint IO training pipeline upon
    assignment to a JFCOM-certified IO Planning or IO Core Capability
    Specialist Course. The Joint Forces Staff College's Joint IO Planners
    Course constitutes the only JFCOM-certified Joint IO Planning Course at
    present. JFCOM-certified Joint IO Core Capability Specialist Courses
    include the Joint Military Deception Training Course, the Joint Theater
    Electronic Warfare Operations Course and the Joint Network Attack
    Course. Besides these courses, Joint Operations Security and
    Psychological Operations courses are currently under development.
        Upon designation by the appropriate service component, an officer
    or noncommissioned officer, who has already completed service component
    IO training, will attend one of the JFCOM-certified IO training
    courses. After graduation, these personnel should be assigned to an
    OSD-level, Joint Staff, combatant command staff or JTF. In the case of
    an OSD-level, Joint Staff or combatant command assignment, this tour of
    duty will normally be 36 months. For a JTF, the tour duration could
    range from 60 days to more than a year.

        195. Senator LeMieux. Secretary Gates, how is the private sector
    being utilized to help the military adopt best practices for
    information operations?
        Secretary Gates. DOD seeks partnership with the private sector to
    understand the information environment and improve DOD information-
    related capabilities. DOD has developed and continues to identify
    relationships with communication companies, media companies, software
    developers and producers, academia, and defense contractors to remain
    abreast of technological advances, media resources, and access to
    information not readily available to the military. These relationships
    are very important to DOD capability providers and help DOD adopt best
    practices. For example, one of the five core capabilities of
    information operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), utilizes the
    private sector to produce high-quality products targeted at specific
    foreign population segments. Public Affairs use the private sector to
    assist in monitoring the enormous number of global media sources and
    outlets, to gain cultural understanding, and for translation support.
    Information operations planners integrate applicable information
    capabilities consistent with U.S. Government guidance and policies to
    support the Commander's information goals and objectives. The
    Department recently forwarded an extensive report to Congress outlining
    our efforts to align information operations with other U.S. Government
    activities via the strategic communication process.

        196. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Mullen, do you believe we need to put
    more resources toward information operations?
        Admiral Mullen. The information environment plays an increasing
    role in all the Department's activities and we're looking at
    Information Operations (IO) across the board to determine future
    requirements. Although IO is a relatively small part of the defense
    budget, several combatant commands have highlighted its importance in
    their Integrated Priority Listings; specifically in support of the
    VOICE programs and for cyber activities.
        Currently, there are numerous IO-related studies in various stages
    of completion looking specifically at what we will need in the future.
    The Joint Force Information Operations Study is evaluating joint IO
    organizations, roles and missions, training and education, and measures
    of effectiveness. The Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document
    and the PSYOP Capabilities Based Assessment are reviewing those
    capabilities at the Service level. The PSYOP Capabilities Based
    Assessment will validate whether or not there is a need for growth in
    the active and Reserve components to support both special and
    conventional forces. These are detailed studies and their
    recommendations are expected later this year. The results of these
    studies will influence SOCOM's and JFCOM's requests for additional
    future resources. It is my opinion that we wait to allow those studies
    to inform future IO funding recommendations.

        197. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Mullen, how are we empowering the
    Afghans to spread news more rapidly to local populations?
        Admiral Mullen. HQ ISAF, alongside the U.S. Embassy and the U.K.
    Embassy, are working with the Government of the Islamic Republic of
    Afghanistan (GIRoA) to bolster their Government Media Information
    Center (GMIC). The central GMIC in Kabul provides GIRoA the ability to
    rapidly disseminate news to all critical outlets. Additionally, the
    Kandahar GMIC, located on the Governor's Compound, is expected to be
    operational in April and will provide similar capacity and capability
    for the southern region. ISAF has embedded planners and liaison
    personnel in both of these facilties. To assist the security
    ministries, ISAF has partnered with the MoD and MoI to establish the
    Security News Coordination Center (SNCC). The SNCC is already
    operational and ensures shared situation awareness among MoI, MoD, and
    ISAF strategic communication teams. MoI, MoD, and ISAF personnel man
    the SNCC together, and will ultimately provide 24/7 media response
    capability. Regular meetings between President Karzai's spokesman, Mr.
    Wahid Omar, and the ISAF's Communications Directorate Staff ensure key
    issues are clarified and resolved, delivering one common voice to the
    Afghan people.
        Most of the direct production and distribution of information is
    supported by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
    initiatives in Afghanistan; programs like journalist training and media
    programming/content management training are successful examples. That
    said, the IJC-in heavy consultation with Afghans-produces a wide array
    of media for public consumption. Radio programming provides the
    greatest outreach across Afghanistan. Recently, the IJC produced a
    ``radio drama'' portraying key security issues (reintegration, for
    example) in a culturally appropriate way. Television, newspapers and
    pamphlets also cover areas where literacy and access to electricity are
    greatest.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
                            optempo and dwell times
        198. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, a
    previously identified and ongoing problem our military faces is an
    incredible operational tempo with inadequate dwell times between
    deployments. Today you stated that ``we will not see significant dwell
    time improvements across all Services until 2012.'' Unforeseen events
    such as the Haiti relief effort will only serve to further exacerbate
    this problem. Have you accounted for contingency troop deployments,
    such as Haiti, in your calculations?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Barring a major contingency
    operation that requires a substantial ground campaign, Army and Marine
    Corps forces will begin to approach a 1:2 BOG to Dwell ratio in fiscal
    year 2012. U.S. forces can absorb some small scale operations such as
    Haiti relief, but multiple occurrences may impact forces in Dwell.
    Overall, we anticipate 24-36 months following redeployment from Iraq
    and Afghanistan to reset and train the force for full spectrum
    readiness.

        199. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, when do
    you expect to achieve the goal of 2 years at home for every 1 year
    deployed?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The pace of operations in
    support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom has
    not yet allowed our ground forces to achieve the dwell goal of 2 years
    at home for every 1 year deployed. Although we have seen some small
    dwell improvements over the past year, the Department does not
    anticipate achieving this goal until late in calendar year 2011.

        200. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, should
    more be done now to increase dwell times for an already stressed
    military? If so, what are your recommendations?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The temporary increase in Army
    end strength has been helpful, particularly in regard to ensuring that
    units have sufficient personnel to address those individuals who cannot
    deploy. This increase does not affect the unit's dwell time, but does
    provided for needed personnel replacements and ensures a more ready and
    deployable unit. Although we have seen some small dwell improvements
    over the past year, with the surge in Afghanistan, we do not anticipate
    achieving the goal of a 1:2 dwell ratio until late in calendar year
    2011 for ground forces. We do not anticipate any unit will spend less
    than a year at home before being deployed again. We, as a Department,
    are managing dwell times closely, and based on projected demand for
    ground forces, we anticipate some very real and significant
    improvements in dwell in the next 2 years.

                            civil executive agencies
        201. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, you have asked Congress to
    ``promote legislation that increases the expeditionary capacity of non-
    military executive agencies'' stating that ``our future security
    concerns require a whole-of-government effort.'' According to National
    Security Presidential Directive 44, DOS is now the lead for stability
    operations. Should your request be interpreted to mean that DOS and
    other non-military executive agencies are currently failing in the
    execution of their overseas roles in parallel to DOD efforts?
        Admiral Mullen. State continues to develop and strengthen its
    capacity to execute its overseas roles. National Security Presidential
    Directive 44, has been further enhanced by the Reconstruction and
    Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (Title XVI, P.L. 110-
    417), which codifies State's role as the lead for reconstruction and
    stabilization by establishing the Office of the Coordinator for
    Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) under the Office of the
    Secretary of State. S/CRS is leading the establishment of a whole-of-
    government civilian response capability, the Civilian Response Corps,
    which responds to failed and failing states either in conjunction with
    the military or in the absence of military forces. The Civilian
    Response Corps is comprised of active and standby members from eight
    participating civilian agencies and, when fully implemented, will serve
    as the main non-military expeditionary force of the U.S. Government.
        The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $184
    million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which funds the
    stand-up of the Civilian Response Corps, and supports S/CRS's efforts
    to manage and deploy this civilian force. I urge Congress to fully fund
    and support this request.

        202. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, in your opinion, is DOS
    adequately prepared to assume agency primacy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    future conflict areas as hostilities transition to stabilization and
    reconstruction activities?
        Admiral Mullen. I simply don't have the visibility inside State to
    tell you whether they are prepared for that role today. I do know that
    the State Department is working hard to build that capacity. The
    Secretary of State, through the Office of the Coordinator for
    Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), has been developing a whole-
    of-government civilian response capability that can deploy to both
    conflict and post-conflict situations. The Civilian Response Corp, or
    CRC, is gaining strength to meet this mission. Furthermore, the
    President's fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $184 million for
    the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which funds the stand-up of the
    CRC, and supports S/CRS's efforts to manage and deploy this civilian
    force.
        As is now happening in Haiti, I envision a gradual transfer of
    responsibility based on the situation on the ground. In that sense, DOD
    and DoS, through the leadership of General Odierno and Ambassador Hill,
    will gradually shift ``primacy'' from a military to a civilian led
    force. I expect this same gradual transition in Afghanistan when
    appropriate.
        On a parallel note, Defense has supported S/CRS by transferring
    over $350 million under the Section 1207 authority to State for
    conflict prevention, stabilization and security projects and by urging
    congressional support for S/CRS's budget request and for soft power
    overall.

        203. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, what specific legislated
    increases in expeditionary capacity of non-military executive agencies
    do you recommend?
        Admiral Mullen. I recommend that Congress fully fund the Civilian
    Stabilization Initiative, which will allow the Office of the
    Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to continue to build
    and deploy a whole-of-government civilian expeditionary response
    capability to failed and failing states.
        I also recommend that Congress fully fund the Complex Crisis Fund
    in State, which is intended to replace the Section 1207 transfer
    authority.
        Finally, I recommend that Congress authorize flexible hiring
    authorities, already granted by Congress to State for hiring civilian
    to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, to S/CRS to more rapidly stand-up
    the Civilian Response Corps, as well as any other personnel authorities
    necessary for the CRC to reach its full potential as quickly as
    possible.
        I would also recommend a pooled fund, as proposed by Secretary
    Gates, continue to be considered for security capacity building,
    stabilization, and conflict prevention. State, USAID, and Defense would
    contribute to these funds and no project could move forward without the
    approval of all agencies. Although there are obstacles to this concept,
    it is worth continued consideration as it could further support the
    activities of the Civilian Response Corps under future reconstruction
    and stabilization crises. We need agility, flexibility, effective
    oversight mechanisms, and tools that foster cooperation across the
    executive branch which could also enhance cooperation across
    jurisdictional boundaries among congressional committees--thereby
    actually strengthening congressional oversight in the national security
    arena. We believe this pooled fund is the first step.

                                  f136 engine
        204. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, Congress has been very clear
    in its support of the F136 competitive engine for the JSF for about 15
    years. Why does it not make sense to make the investment needed to
    complete program and capitalize on the benefits of competition in
    production just like the Air Force did on the F-16 in the mid-1980s,
    particularly since we're talking about a production of over 4,000
    engines during the procurement of the JSF?
        Secretary Gates. Maintaining two engine suppliers would result in
    increased development, production, and support costs. Recent experience
    with engine development for the F-22 and F/A-18E/F indicates that sole
    source risks are modest and acceptable, and the Pratt & Whitney F135
    engine continues to meet or exceed our stringent performance
    requirements. The risks involved with a single engine supplier are
    acceptable, and savings associated with competition, which may be
    realized in the future, will not sufficiently offset the upfront
    development costs when competing against existing Department
    priorities.

        205. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, history has shown that it's
    very difficult to control costs on a sole source program. If you
    terminate the F136 engine, you will have a $100 billion sole source
    program on the engines for the JSF. What would be the incentive for the
    sole source supplier to control costs when they would know that DOD
    would have no alternative to their engine?
        Secretary Gates. In my view, maintaining two engine suppliers would
    result in increased development, production, and support costs. Recent
    experience with engine development for the F-22 and F/A-18E/F indicates
    that sole source risks are modest and acceptable, and the Pratt &
    Whitney F135 engine continues to meet or exceed the Department's
    stringent performance requirements. The risks involved with a single
    engine supplier are acceptable, and savings associated with
    competition, which may be realized in the future, will not sufficiently
    offset the upfront development costs when competing against existing
    Department priorities.

        206. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, how does DOD intend to ensure
    cost control under a sole source circumstance?
        Secretary Gates. Pratt & Whitney leadership committed to assist the
    Department in correcting the cost growth concerns on the F135 engine.
    In addition, company leaders agreed, from corporate funds, to fund a
    number of affordability initiatives that require investment in order to
    further reduce the cost of the F135 engine. The Joint Assessment Team
    proposed that, with commitment and funding, the cost growth trends can
    be reversed and I have every expectation that the Department will
    accomplish that. DOD will continue to work with Pratt & Whitney, with
    affordability as a major concern, to take actions that will continue to
    lower the price of the F135 for the future. The company's incentive is
    to please one of its primary customers, as there will likely be an
    opportunity for Pratt & Whitney to pursue future DOD and partner-nation
    work, and a failure on its part to achieve affordability could likely
    be a deciding factor in the future.

                           c-17 acquisition programs
        207. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, over the last 4 years, the
    Senate Appropriations Committee added 44 C-17s that we neither needed
    nor could afford, at a total cost of over $14 billion above DOD's
    requests--in the form of earmarks. As DOD had done in the preceding few
    years, you proposed last year to cancel the C-17 Globemaster program
    and argued against a congressional earmark that intended to buy 10 more
    of those aircraft for $2.5 billion. You stated that the cost of buying
    and operating those additional aircraft would ``invariably result in a
    reduction in critical warfighting capability somewhere else in the
    defense program.'' Is this view shared by the service chiefs and
    unified and combatant commanders?
        Secretary Gates. I believe that the current C-17 fleet is in excess
    of our strategic airlift needs, resulting in increased operating costs
    at the expense of other priorities. This position, supported by the
    Services and combatant commanders, is based on the findings of several
    recent mobility studies to include the MCRS-16. The objectives of MCRS-
    16 were to determine the mobility capabilities and requirements needed
    in support of the National Military Strategy in the 2016 timeframe, to
    determine capability gaps/overlaps associated with the programmed
    mobility force structure, and to support the QDR and decisions
    regarding mobility programs. The study found that the planned capacity
    of the programmed strategic airlift fleet, consisting of 223 C-17s and
    89 C-5s, exceeds the most demanding projected requirements. In
    addition, the report noted that C-17s could be used to support intra-
    theater missions without adding to the peak demand for C-17s. Both of
    these insights are consistent with findings from previous mobility
    studies.
        Based upon this information, it is my position that no additional
    C-17s should be procured, and I request your support in granting me the
    authority to allow for the proper management of the strategic fleet by
    providing the Department greater flexibility in retiring C-5 aircraft
    and eliminating the current statutory requirement to maintain a minimum
    fleet of 316 strategic airlift aircraft.

        [Whereupon, at 1:23 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                             DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris,
    McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, Burr,
    Vitter, and Collins.
        Committee staff member present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff
    member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
    counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
    professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff
    member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; and William
    K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Paul
    C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw,
    professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
    member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Diana G.
    Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
    minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Jennifer R.
    Knowles, and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator
    Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Caroline Tess,
    assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to
    Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh;
    Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Roger Pena,
    assistant to Senator Hagan; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to
    Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
    Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde
    A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek,
    assistant to Senator Thune; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator
    LeMieux; Kyle Ruckert, assistant to Senator Vitter; and Chip
    Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        Today, Secretary McHugh and General Casey will testify
    before our committee on the plans and programs of the U.S. Army
    as part of our review of the fiscal year 2011 Annual Budget and
    Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request.
        Gentlemen, we are thankful to you for your dedicated
    service to our country, and to your families for their support
    of your service.
        As the committee meets again this year to review the Army's
    posture, we find ourselves, as always, inspired by, and proud
    of, what our soldiers have accomplished and what they continue
    to do.
        General Casey, I understand that you will be introducing
    some special guests later on this morning. We look forward to
    meeting them, to hearing their stories from you, and thanking
    them in person for their service and their sacrifice.
        America's Army today is as great as any other in the Army's
    nearly 235 years of service to the Nation. Great service,
    however, always comes with great sacrifice. Our Army remains
    globally committed and overstretched by nearly 8 years of
    continuous combat. Thankfully, the drawdown of U.S. forces in
    Iraq has begun, but over 96,000 American soldiers remain
    engaged in operations there, contributing to the continued
    strain on our forces. I'm hoping that, at a minimum, we will
    achieve the planned withdrawal of additional units from Iraq,
    set to reach 50,000 by the end of this August.
        Much depends on the ability and willingness of the Iraqis
    themselves to preserve hard-fought gains; and, in turn, that
    will depend in large measure on whether the political steps
    Iraqi leaders have consistently promised to take will be
    completed.
        At the same time we see the drawdown of forces in Iraq, the
    administration has shifted its strategic emphasis and resources
    to the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and support to
    help Pakistan confront the al Qaeda and Taliban threats.
        An additional 30,000 troops--many Army--will be committed
    to support operations in Afghanistan to implement a people-
    centered counterinsurgency strategy to help defeat al Qaeda and
    the Taliban and more quickly build up the capabilities of
    Afghanistan security forces.
        Last week, coalition forces, including large numbers of
    Afghan Army units, started a major offensive operation in
    Helmand Province to take control of key populations away from
    the Taliban and build support for the Afghan Government by
    leaving security and services in the wake of removal of the
    Taliban to them. Hard fighting continues, and some of our best
    and bravest have been lost and wounded.
        I've long argued that the principal mission in Afghanistan
    should be training the Afghan military and police so that they
    can take responsibility for the security of their country. It
    is essential to the success of our objectives in Afghanistan
    that we strengthen the Afghan army, deepen the partnership of
    coalition and Afghan units, operating together on a one-unit to
    one-unit basis, and for Afghans to take the lead in achieving
    security. In this respect, operations in Helmand could be a
    turning point for the Afghan people and their government, their
    security forces, and the people of this critically important
    region. But, we are still short thousands of trainers in
    Afghanistan for the initial 8 weeks of training. That is
    totally unacceptable. Our North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO) allies have provided only 10 percent of the trainers
    that they committed.
        Although the Army continues to meet the demands of
    counterinsurgency and support operations in Afghanistan and
    Iraq and around the world, the Army--soldiers and their
    families--are stressed in many ways. In order to gain and
    sustain necessary higher readiness levels in our deployed
    forces, the readiness of our nondeployed forces has been at
    historic lows. Most of our nondeployed Army units are not ready
    to quickly respond to an unforeseen contingency. Consequently,
    getting those units reconstituted and ready for their next
    rotation to Iraq or Afghanistan is that much more difficult and
    risky. This Nation faces substantially increased risk, should
    we need the Army to respond to another contingency, despite the
    amazing resilience of our troops and their families.
        In light of this challenge, the Department of the Army,
    over the last 3 years, has set a goal to reestablish a balance
    within the force by 2011. By balance, we understand that
    soldiers and units would have twice as much time at home as
    they would deployed. Nondeployed units would achieve required
    levels of personnel, equipment, and training readiness
    necessary to meet other strategic contingencies; budget
    pressures to support current operations would ease, allowing
    greater investment in modernization; and Army families would
    enjoy greater stability and less stress. The committee is
    interested to learn more about how the Army's fiscal year 2011
    budget request will achieve balance in 2011, even assuming that
    declining operational demands on the force keep pace with
    current strategic plans.
        An issue of concern to the committee, and related to the
    strain on the force, is the size of the Army. In order to deal
    with getting units ready for the rotational requirements of
    Afghanistan and Iraq, the Secretary of Defense has permitted
    the Army to retain 22,000 soldiers, temporarily, above its
    authorized end strength of 547,000. Additional troops, plus
    limiting the growth of Active component Army combat brigades to
    45, are intended to address the Army's soldier shortages in
    units getting ready to deploy. However, questions of additional
    permanent Army end strength, as well as unit structure, need to
    be carefully considered, in light of the inevitable and heavy
    near- and long-term budgetary pressures that such increases
    will put on the Army's investment and modernization accounts.
        We'd like the witnesses to address the Army's analysis of
    its current and future end strength and unit structure
    requirements, and their ideas on how to manage the growth of
    personnel costs.
        Nothing in our defense establishment is as important or as
    expensive as our people. In fact, the 2009 Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR) makes preservation of the All-Volunteer Force an
    overarching national defense strategy objective. The Army's
    2011 budget request supports this objective and makes a strong
    commitment to ensure that we are taking care of our
    servicemembers and their family.
        Much of the defense budget's growth can be attributed to
    significant and necessary increases in pay and benefit
    accounts. For example, the fiscal year 2011 budget request
    continues the Army's major commitment to expand and improve
    programs for wounded soldiers and their families, as well as
    for the prevention, identification, and care of soldiers and
    their families suffering from the stress of ongoing operations.
        I commend the Army for your commitment. I look forward to
    the witnesses' discussion of these programs today.
        The long anticipated 2009 QDR, submitted with the fiscal
    year 2011 budget, places the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    focus and priorities squarely on policies, programs, and
    initiatives that support the current fight in Afghanistan and
    Iraq and against al Qaeda around the world.
        The QDR recognizes the tremendous contributions that the
    Army has been providing in this fight over the last several
    years, and emphasizes that these types of contingencies are
    more likely the wave of the future. Accordingly, the 2009 QDR's
    recommendations support much of what the Army has already been
    doing, but it includes new direction for building or realigning
    capabilities and force structure that will make it more
    structurally relevant to the requirements of irregular or
    unconventional warfare.
        We look forward to the witnesses' assessments on the 2009
    QDR, what it means for the Army today and into the future, and
    how their 2011 budget request supports the changes that are
    directed.
        As challenging as meeting the demands of current operations
    is today, the Army must also ensure that it remains
    technologically dominant across the range of potential
    contingencies and assure our future security. Army
    modernization, however, has proven difficult to manage and
    achieve. Army technical modernization, as part of a broad
    transformational effort, appears to have been consistently
    falling short of plans and promises. Secretary Gates' decision
    last year to restructure the Future Combat Systems (FCS)
    program, including cancellation of the previously planned
    manned combat vehicle systems, require the Army to
    fundamentally change its approach to modernization.
        The 2011 budget request carries the Army deeper into yet
    another modernization strategy that attempts to rationalize the
    demands for new, immediately ready technologies needed to
    quickly support the current fight with the opportunities that
    other less mature technologies may offer for the force in the
    next 5, 10, or 15 years, such as the Army's commitment to a new
    ground combat vehicle.
        The Army must also manage its modernization investment
    risks carefully and consistently with our recently enacted
    Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act. It also needs to guard
    against allowing its enthusiasm for modernization and the near-
    term availability of resources to lead to a high-risk schedule-
    driven program, where the necessary technologies are not mature
    and the operational requirements are not urgent.
        We look forward to the witnesses' report on their efforts
    to establish an Army modernization program that meets the many
    challenging goals of simultaneously being comprehensive,
    relevant, technologically achievable, manageable, affordable,
    and enduring.
        So, Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Nation could
    not be more proud of the Army, its soldiers, and their
    families, and we are grateful for your leadership of our Army
    and our Army family.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I join you in welcoming Secretary McHugh and General Casey
    here today.
        Gentlemen, I thank you for your leadership in these
    challenging times.
        I've also had the opportunity of saying hello to our
    wounded warriors and spouses and brave Americans, and I look
    forward to your introduction of them to the committee. I thank
    them for their service and sacrifice.
        We all know the Army has been operating at a high
    operational tempo for the past 8 years, while meeting wartime
    requirements a half a world away, so we should consider the
    implications of the President's 2011 budget request in the
    context of our most pressing challenges, which are, of course,
    success in Afghanistan and Iraq.
        I applaud Secretary Gates' recent statement that,
    ``Achieving our objective in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to
    the top of our institutional military's budgeting policy and
    program priorities.'' I look forward to your explanation of how
    the budget priorities of the institutional Army directly
    support ongoing operations in Afghanistan and continuing
    efforts to succeed in Iraq.
        General Casey, you have expressed concern, and very
    legitimate concern, about the effect of continued deployments
    on our All-Volunteer Army. While stretching our forces does
    create risk, we have demonstrated that the best way to reduce
    that risk is by succeeding in theater. The Iraq troop surge
    offers an important lesson in that regard.
        Now we have the right mission and the right leadership in
    place in Afghanistan. The additional 30,000 troops ordered by
    the President are beginning to arrive, and the burden on the
    institutional Army is high. It's incumbent on you to field the
    best-trained and -equipped force in the world, and it is
    incumbent on us, in Congress, to approve resources sufficient
    to do so. We are committed to the long-term success of
    Afghanistan and Iraq as stable states that can govern and
    secure themselves and will not become bases of attacks on the
    United States, on our allies.
        I would also point out, incredibly, that retention and
    recruitment is at an all-time high in the history of the All-
    Volunteer Force. Many are surprised by that; in fact, I am
    pleasantly surprised. But, the fact is, it's a testimony to the
    patriotism and willingness to serve of young Americans all over
    this country.
        The competition for resources frequently pits development
    of future capabilities against the cost of sustaining current
    operations, and this gets to the heart of the Army's
    modernization efforts. Last year, we supported Secretary Gates'
    decision to restructure the Army's FCS program with spinouts of
    mature technologies to the current force.
        The Army has done much over the past year to develop a new
    acquisition strategy based on an incremental Brigade Combat
    Team (BCT) modernization plan. This new acquisition plan, like
    the previous FCS program, will be a multiyear, multibillion-
    dollar program that is the centerpiece of the Army's
    transformation efforts. I'm interested in hearing from our
    witnesses how the Army plans to transition from the FCS program
    to the BCT modernization program. Specifically, what is the
    Army's BCT modernization strategy and spinout plan, and what is
    the impact of an incremental modernization strategy on the
    Army's budget for 2011 and beyond?
        Since taking office, Secretary Gates has taken decisive
    action to increase capabilities available to our deployed
    forces, especially those forces in combat in Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
        As we all know, improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
    continue to be the greatest killer of American troops in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, and I applaud the Army and DOD for fielding
    technologies to protect our men and women on the battlefield.
    Congress authorized and appropriated billions for mine-
    resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, and their increased
    use has reduced the Army's reliance on other lightly-armored
    vehicles.
        Enhancing capabilities of our fighting forces is critical
    to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. I support the Army's
    budget request to field more helicopters and aircrews, create
    two combat aviation brigades, and fund new unmanned aircraft.
        Recently, Mr. Secretary, I was down at the Yuma Proving
    Ground. I was very impressed by the coordination and
    communication between field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan
    and the Yuma Proving Ground, as we face these ever-evolving new
    technologies that the enemy is using in developing new and more
    lethal IEDs. From the battlefield to testing and response, I
    was extremely impressed.
        Finally, I'm interested, of course, in the views of General
    Casey and Secretary McHugh on the Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT)
    policy. We will continue to listen to our military leaders. As
    I pointed out before, recruitment and retention is at an all-
    time high in the history of the All-Volunteer Force, and
    obviously changes in a policy that, I think, is working would
    have to be carefully considered.
        I want to make perfectly clear that I am enormously proud
    of every American who puts on an Army uniform to serve in a
    time of war, and we want to encourage more of our fellow
    American citizens to serve and to open up opportunities to do
    so.
        So, with that, I would like to thank you, Mr. Secretary. I
    think this is your first inquisition here, and we certainly
    welcome you on the other side. We want to thank you, again, for
    your outstanding service for many years as a member of the
    House Armed Services Committee, and the work we did together.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Secretary McHugh
    and General Casey here today. Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership
    in these challenging times. I would also like to welcome the soldiers
    and spouses who are seated behind you and take this opportunity to
    thank them for their service and sacrifice. The Army has been operating
    at a high operational tempo for the past 8 years while meeting wartime
    requirements half a world away. So we should consider the implications
    of the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request in the context of
    our most pressing challenges, success in Afghanistan and Iraq.
        I applaud Secretary Gates' recent statement that ``achieving our
    objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of the
    institutional military's budgeting, policy, and program priorities.'' I
    look forward to your explanation of how the budget priorities of the
    institutional Army directly support ongoing operations in Afghanistan
    and continued efforts to succeed in Iraq.
        General Casey, you have expressed very legitimate concern about the
    effect of continued deployments on our all-volunteer Army. While
    stretching our forces does create risk, we have demonstrated that the
    best way to reduce that risk is by succeeding in theater. The Iraq
    troop surge offers an important lesson in that regard. Now we have the
    right mission and the right leadership in place in Afghanistan. The
    additional 30,000 troops ordered by the President are beginning to
    arrive and the burden on the institutional Army is high. It is
    incumbent on you to field the best-trained and -equipped force in the
    world and it is incumbent on Congress to approve resources sufficient
    to do so. We are committed to the long-term success of Afghanistan and
    Iraq as stable states that can govern and secure themselves and that
    will not become bases for attacks on the United States or our allies.
        I would also point out that retention and recruitment is at an all
    time high in the history of the All-Volunteer Force. Many are surprised
    by that, but I believe it is testimony to the patriotism and
    willingness to serve of young Americans.
        The competition for resources frequently pits development of future
    capabilities against the cost of sustaining current operations. This
    gets to the heart of the Army's modernization efforts. Last year we
    supported Secretary Gates' decision to restructure the Army's Future
    Combat Systems (FCS) program with spin-outs of mature technologies to
    the current force. The Army has done much over the past year to develop
    a new acquisition strategy based on an incremental Brigade Combat Team
    (BCT) Modernization plan. This new acquisition plan, like the previous
    FCS program, will be a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program that is
    the center piece of the Army's transformation efforts. I am interested
    in hearing from our witnesses how the Army plans to transition from the
    FCS program to the BCT Modernization Program. Specifically, what is the
    Army's BCT modernization strategy and spin-out plan and what is the
    impact of an incremental modernization strategy on the Army's budgets
    for fiscal year 2011 and beyond?
        Since taking office, Secretary Gates has taken decisive action to
    increase capabilities available to our deployed forces--especially
    those forces in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improvised explosive
    devices (IEDs) continue to be the greatest killer of American troops in
    Iraq and Afghanistan and I applaud the Army and the Department of
    Defense for fielding technologies to protect our men and women on the
    battlefield. Congress authorized and appropriated billions for mine-
    resistant vehicles and their increased use has reduced the Army's
    reliance on other lightly armored vehicles. Enhancing capabilities for
    our fighting forces is critical to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
    and I support the Army's budget request to field more helicopters and
    air crews, create two Combat Aviation Brigades, and fund new unmanned
    aircraft.
        I would note here that I was at Yuma Proving Ground last week and
    was very impressed by the coordination and communication taking place
    between field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Proving Ground
    as we face ever evolving IED technologies used by the enemy. The short
    response time between testing of new technologies and their application
    on the battlefield was extremely impressive.
        Finally, I'm interested in the views of General Casey and Secretary
    McHugh on the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy. We will continue to
    listen to our military leaders, and as I have pointed out, recruitment
    and retention is at an all-time high in the history of the All-
    Volunteer Force. I think that the current policy is working and changes
    to it would have to be carefully considered.
        I want to make perfectly clear that I'm enormously proud of every
    American who puts on an Army uniform to serve at a time of war. I want
    to encourage more of our fellow citizens to serve and to open up
    opportunities to do so.
        I look forward to our witnesses' testimony. Thank you Chairman
    Levin.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        A special welcome to you, Secretary McHugh. You're battle-
    tested over in the House, so you come with a great background.
        Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary McHugh. It does look a little different from down
    here than it does from up there, I'll just say. [Laughter.]

        STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

        Secretary McHugh. I should say, I've never missed being in
    Congress so much as I do right now. [Laughter.]
        But, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I certainly want
    to thank you, sir, and you as well, Ranking Member McCain, for
    your very kind and very gracious comments, not just in support
    of me, but in support of this absolutely incredible Army.
        It is a privilege, although somewhat intimidating, to be
    before you here today, but I do it with great pride, because we
    are here, along with the Chief of Staff, in support of
    America's Army.
        As was noted, it was just a few short months ago that I sat
    before you as President Obama's nominee for our Nation's 21st
    Secretary of the Army, and at that time, I recall very clearly,
    I promised you, and assured you, of my dedication and
    commitment to support our men and women in uniform, Army
    civilians, and the great families, who, I know all you
    understand so very well, stand with them. I pledged to work
    with you, as well, in support of that great institution.
        It's some 5 months later, and I want to tell you, I come
    before you again reaffirming that commitment; but, doing so
    having been in the Pentagon, having worked with these great men
    and women for that time, it brings an even greater appreciation
    of those wonderful Americans who serve within the Army ranks,
    and the vital role they play in defense of our great Nation.
        One-point-1 million soldiers, some 279,000 civilians, and,
    as I noted, their families, proudly serving in some 80
    countries around the world, and they continue to be at the
    forefront in ongoing counterinsurgency operations against our
    enemies, assisting other nations to build their own security
    capacity, supporting homeland defense, deterring and defeating
    hybrid threats and hostile state actors, and, as we've
    witnessed, I think, so proudly, in recent days in Haiti,
    providing life-saving humanitarian assistance in response to
    natural disasters.
        At the risk of stating the obvious, every member of this
    committee, and every member of the House and the Senate at
    large, are critical to the success of these vital missions, in
    your capacity as our congressional overseers. As was mentioned,
    I know full well, from my nearly 17 years of service on the
    House Armed Services Committee, that a strategic partnership
    between Congress and the Army is critical to the Army's
    success. I think I can speak from experience, as well; without
    exception each and every one of you has partnered with us to
    ensure that our soldiers, civilians, and family members receive
    the very best in training, equipment, healthcare, and vital
    family programs. I want to say, on behalf of a grateful Army,
    thank you for your leadership and for your unwavering support.
        This morning, if I may, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and
    other distinguished members, I'd like to share, just briefly, a
    few of my priorities and some of the perspectives I've gained
    over the past several months on where the Army is now, and
    where it's heading in fiscal year 2011.
        Admittedly, over the last several months, I've been on kind
    of a crash course. I learned I was not quite as smart as I
    routinely said every 2 years in my campaign for reelection.
    But, through the process of studying our programs, visiting
    installations in the United States and overseas, examining
    units in all stages of what we call R4 Gen, and most
    importantly, talking with our soldiers, civilians, and their
    family members throughout the force, how well and yet the
    challenges that lie before us.
        I have been, in this time, both impressed and challenged
    personally by what I've observed and what I've discovered.
    Frankly, I've found an Army that is clearly fatigued by nearly
    9 years of combat, but through it all is today a resilient,
    determined, and extraordinarily effective. Our soldiers today,
    through nearly 9 years of war, have more expertise, more
    education, more training, and more lethal capabilities than
    ever before, and due to the advancement, equipment, training
    and doctrine, are more likely than ever before to return safely
    to their loved ones and to a grateful Nation.
        But, in spite of those significant gains, the stress on our
    personnel and their families remains all too real. For all our
    efforts, as has been referenced, and as the Chief of Staff has
    said repeatedly, we remain out of balance. As I know all of you
    clearly understand, the All-Volunteer Force is a national
    treasure, as Senator McCain mentioned. If we wish to sustain
    it, supporting our critical family and quality-of-life programs
    for our soldiers and their families must be a top priority. If
    I say nothing else here today, I want to assure you, for those
    of us in the Army family, it is the top priority. The 2011
    proposed budget rightly focuses on those initiatives that
    support our soldiers, families, and civilians. The submission
    requests $1.7 billion in 2011 to standardize and fund those
    vital family programs and all those that they serve.
        We're attempting to aggressively address the cause of
    stress on individuals resulting from the effects of multiple
    deployments, including the essential effort to increase dwell
    time. As all of you know, and has been referenced here already
    this morning, with continuing deployments in multiple theaters,
    this has been no easy task. But, I want to assure you in the
    strongest terms, the Army is committed to our wounded warriors
    and those critical programs that support them, and to building
    dwell ratios, bringing back a sense of stability in terms of
    their redeployments.
        We fully believe it is our solemn obligation to provide
    world-class care and transition services to our wounded, ill,
    and injured through properly led and properly resourced Warrior
    Transition Units. Your Army is committed to ensuring that the
    quality of life for those who serve, or who have served, is
    commensurate with the quality of their service.
        On the subject of family programs, I've heard from many of
    the good Senators on this panel about reductions in base
    operation support (BOS) budgets in installations across the
    country. Earlier this month, General Casey and I announced the
    Army's plan to increase BOS funding by $500 million in fiscal
    year 2010.
        The Army Installation Management Command continues to work
    with each installation to guarantee that essential BOS needs
    are met.
        We also will conduct a comprehensive mid-year review of all
    BOS accounts to ensure that adequate funding is maintained to
    meet Army priorities through the remainder of the fiscal year.
        I want to make it clear that as our installations look for
    ways to operate more efficiently, as they should, family
    programs will be sacrosanct; they will not be touched. That
    isn't to say we won't ask, ``Is this program working? Is the
    money well spent? Are there better ways to provide necessary
    care?'' Where change is required, we'll change things, but
    where money is best directed, we'll so direct it. But, through
    all of that, Army families will not be left behind.
        Second, I found an Army with equipment systems and networks
    in need of reset while simultaneously requiring significant
    modernization to ensure our soldiers maintain a decisive edge
    on the battlefield of today, as well as superiority over
    threats of tomorrow. Nowhere is this challenge more evident
    than in the need to repair, replace, and recapitalize equipment
    affected by the harsh realities and environment of war. As the
    responsible drawdown in Iraq continues and the flow of forces
    and equipment to Afghanistan grows, we'll confront this reality
    anew.
        Additionally, we have to strive to modernize efficiently in
    an era of growing fiscal challenges. As such, with this year's
    budget, the Army is embracing what I believe is an affordable
    yet effective modernization strategy designed to revamp our
    vehicle, network, aviation, and logistical systems. We've
    requested $31.7 billion for research, development, and
    acquisition which includes $3.2 billion for the BCT
    modernization, $1.29 billion to fund tactical vehicle
    modernization, $2.74 billion to fund Army network systems, and
    $6.41 billion to fund aviation modernization. Fully funding
    these programs is vital to our soldiers' welfare this year and
    beyond.
        Third, I found an Army acquisitions system that, while
    improving, still lacks the workforce and flexibility needed to
    efficiently and affordably purchase the right weapons,
    services, and equipment to our soldiers. Here, too, the
    proposed budget will help us better meet our continued
    commitment to growing the Army's acquisition workforce by
    thousands of positions over the next few years, thereby
    ensuring that we have the best available equipment for our
    soldiers, while being responsible stewards of the taxpayers'
    dollars.
        But, I would tell you, workforce improvements are not
    enough to fix the procurement system, and I know you on this
    committee, particularly the chairman and the ranking member,
    who worked so hard on the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act
    (WSARA) of last year, know that full well. The entire process
    must be retooled, and in that way, more fully adopt an agile
    system that rapidly develops, purchases, and fields innovative
    solutions. This approach will require more streamlined
    procedures and flexible rules, and for that, we need your help.
        As I mentioned, in 2009 Congress significantly reformed how
    DOD purchases major weapons systems. Thank you to this
    committee and its leadership in that regard. But, as the
    chairman and the ranking member so correctly noted, both at
    that time and since, it's only a start. Now it's time to
    address how we purchase services, and on that front, we look
    forward to partnering with you to develop better ways and
    better systems that achieve that critical objective.
        In the end, I would tell you we have an Army that is strong
    in spirit, strong in ability, and strong in results. We need to
    recognize, too, this is an Army that, after 8 years of
    uninterrupted war, is tired, stressed and too often burdened by
    the inefficiencies of bureaucracy. This must change, and with
    your help, we'll make those changes.
        Let me close by highlighting, again, my deep appreciation
    for the men and women in uniform, the civilians and the
    families who support them, and by so doing, support this
    Nation. Every day, I'm humbled by their dedication. I'm so
    blessed to have the chance to walk into a building every
    morning to go to work where the word hero really means
    something. All of you on this great committee are part of that
    magnificent formula for freedom. Thank you, again, for all you
    do in support of our men and women in uniform, our Army
    civilians, and their families.
        I deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear here before
    you, and I look forward to your questions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and
    General Casey follows:]
       Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. John M. McHugh and GEN George W.
                                Casey, Jr., USA
                                  introduction
        America's Army continues to answer the Nation's call, as it has
    since it was established nearly 235 years ago. Today our Army is
    fighting two wars, assisting other nations as they build their own
    security capacity, supporting civil authorities at home, helping the
    people of Haiti rebuild after a devastating earthquake, and preparing
    to deter and defeat new threats. The Army's soldiers, civilians, and
    families faithfully shoulder the load that our Nation asks of them.
    With the support of Congress, we are on track with our 4-year plan to
    put the Army back in balance.
        Though their sacrifices can never be fully repaid, the Nation
    continues to recognize and honor our soldiers and their families by
    supporting them before, during, and following deployments. Our soldiers
    rely upon the best training and equipment that our Nation can provide
    to accomplish their mission. Yet even with this continued support, the
    demands of 8 years of war weigh heavily on our Army. The strain of
    multiple deployments is evident on soldiers and their families.
    Equipment is used at a pace that seriously challenges our maintenance
    and replacement capabilities and resources. The stress is present in
    our institutions as we change 20th-century systems and processes to
    meet the demands of the 21st century.
        Our Nation faces the difficult challenge of balancing when, where,
    and how to engage in a dynamic and uncertain world while meeting
    important priorities at home. However, when the security of our
    citizens or allies is threatened, the Nation can depend on America's
    Army--the Strength of the Nation.
                               strategic context
        The United States faces a complex strategic landscape with an array
    of diverse security challenges. We are fighting wars in Iraq and
    Afghanistan while preparing for future challenges to our national
    security. For the foreseeable future, violent extremist movements such
    as al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations comprise the most
    immediate threats. Current global economic conditions, changes in
    demographics, cultural pressures associated with globalization, and
    competition for scarce resources exacerbate the uncertainty and
    volatility of the strategic environment. Within this setting, the
    American soldier stands as our Nation's most visible and enduring
    symbol of commitment in an era of persistent conflict.
                              persistent conflict
        For the near future, persistent conflict--protracted confrontation
    among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly
    willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological
    ends--will characterize the global security environment. Security
    crises will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and last
    for uncertain durations. These challenges will take place in all
    domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Natural disasters and
    humanitarian emergencies will continue to be frequent and unpredictable
    missions, requiring the commitment of soldiers and resources. In this
    dynamic environment, the Army will conduct operations that span the
    spectrum of conflict from humanitarian and civil support to
    counterinsurgency to general war, often simultaneously.
                                 global trends
        Several global trends will continue to shape the international
    security environment and the conflicts confronting our Nation.
    Globalization may increase prosperity, but it can also spread
    destabilizing influences. The unequal distribution of benefits creates
    societies with divisions between ``haves'' and ``have nots''--divisions
    that can be exploited by extremist ideologies and lead to conflict.
    Fault lines reflecting protracted competition and friction can erupt
    unpredictably as societies struggle to adjust to the move toward
    modernity and greater interdependence. Meanwhile, increasingly
    available and affordable technology provides our adversaries
    sophisticated tools to enable a networked approach to recruiting the
    disenfranchised and exporting terror.
        Shifting demographics and rapid population growth that is
    increasingly urbanized can continue to break down traditional,
    localized norms of governance, behavior, and identity, and further
    strain already stressed governments. This is especially true where a
    lack of economic opportunity increases the potential for instability
    and extremism. Those who are disaffected may rebel against perceived
    western interference, challenges to traditional values, and ineffective
    governments. Increased resource demand, in particular energy, water,
    and food, is a consequence of growing prosperity and populations. The
    growing global competition for resources will continue to produce
    friction and increase opportunities for conflict. In this environment,
    climate change and natural disasters will compound already difficult
    conditions in developing countries by igniting humanitarian crises,
    causing destabilizing population migrations, and raising the potential
    for epidemic diseases.
        The two trends of greatest concern are the proliferation of weapons
    of mass destruction (WMD) and failed or failing states. A catastrophic
    attack utilizing WMD has the potential to be globally destabilizing.
    Failed or failing states, lacking the will or capacity to maintain
    effective territorial control, contribute to regional instability and
    provide ideal environments for terrorist groups to plan and export
    operations. The merging of these two trends constitutes a significant
    and compelling threat. Together, these trends make conflict in the
    decades ahead more likely.
                   character of conflict in the 21st century
        Global trends and recent conflicts--such as those in Lebanon and
    Georgia--and our own recent combat experience indicate the evolving
    character of conflict in the 21st century.
        Conflicts will be waged among diverse actors--state and non-state--
    with the latter employing capabilities that, during the last century,
    remained largely the purview of nation-states. Motives, objectives, and
    often the identities of these actors will be difficult to discern, and
    are likely to shift as some act covertly and others use proxies. The
    battle to gain influence over, and support from, populations will be
    central to our success. Therefore, conflict will be unavoidably waged
    among the people.
        The initiation, location, duration, and intensity of conflicts are
    increasingly unpredictable. In an interdependent world, conflicts are
    more susceptible to the potential for spillover, creating regionally,
    and potentially globally, destabilizing effects. All of this will occur
    under the unblinking scrutiny of the 24-hour global media cycle and the
    internet. Details of conflict as well as misinformation will flow
    equally across social, communications, and cyber networks. Our
    adversaries will exploit these media and communication sources locally
    and globally.
        We are more likely to face hybrid threats-diverse and dynamic
    combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal
    capabilities employed asymmetrically to counter our advantages. Hybrid
    threats require hybrid solutions-adaptive military forces that can
    function in a variety of situations with a diverse set of national,
    allied, and indigenous partners. Given the strategic environment,
    enduring global trends, and the character of 21st-century conflict, the
    Army will operate as part of a Joint, interagency, inter-governmental,
    and multi-national team to fulfill its global commitments.
                              roles of land forces
        More than 1 million of our men and women have served in the ongoing
    campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 3,900 American soldiers have
    given their lives, and more than 25,000 others have been wounded during
    this longest period of sustained conflict ever fought by an All-
    Volunteer Force. Today, America's Army has over 255,000 soldiers and
    more than 18,500 Army civilians serving in nearly 80 countries around
    the world--with the remainder stationed within the United States
    supporting domestic missions, resetting from recent deployments, or
    preparing for an upcoming deployment.
        Our soldiers are performing magnificently around the world every
    day, and the roles for land forces in this environment are becoming
    increasingly clear.
        First, the Army must prevail in protracted counterinsurgency (COIN)
    operations. Not only must we prevail in our current missions in Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and the Philippines, we must be prepared to prevail in any
    future COIN operation.
        Second, the Army must engage to help other nations build capacity
    and to assure our friends and allies. Through security force
    assistance, we can increase the capacity of other nations' military and
    police to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order, and deny
    sanctuary to terrorists--thereby helping avoid future conflicts that
    might otherwise develop. American soldiers are currently deployed to
    Central America and the Balkans, building the capacity of indigenous
    security forces. Additionally, the Army has established an Army Service
    Component Command for U.S. Africa Command to assist partner nations and
    humanitarian organizations in Africa.
        A third role that the Army fulfills is to provide support to civil
    authorities at home and abroad. In the past year alone, American
    soldiers have fought fires in the west, conducted search and rescue
    operations in the Rockies and Alaska, and assisted with tsunami relief
    in American Samoa, in support of civil authorities. The Army has also
    provided a sizeable force to support the relief efforts in Haiti
    following the catastrophic earthquake that destroyed its capital. Army
    units from both the active and Reserve components remain prepared to
    react to a variety of crises as consequence management and response
    forces. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a lead organization in
    providing DOD support to civil authorities for disaster relief at home
    and engineering support to the U.S. Agency for International
    Development overseas. Abroad, the Army has also supported civil
    authorities in many ways, such as sending Agribusiness Development
    Teams from the Army National Guard to Afghanistan.
        Finally, the Army must deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile
    state actors. As an Army, we recognize that we must remain prepared to
    meet and defeat hostile state actors that threaten our national
    security. But we recognize that the probability of facing a nation that
    will challenge America's military head-on is lower than it was during
    the Cold War and other periods in our history. Our readiness and
    capability to confront near-peer competitors also deters war by raising
    the stakes for nation-state and hybrid actors who would threaten our
    security interests.
        To meet these threats, Army units continue to participate in joint
    and international training exercises around the world, ensuring that
    military skills and cooperative partnerships remain strong. The Army
    continues to position forces in Korea and at various missile defense
    sites in order to discourage actors who seek to disrupt regional
    stability and security.
                            two critical challenges
        The Army has operated at a demanding pace for the last 8 years, and
    while it has met each challenge, the strain has placed the Army out of
    balance. Demand for Army forces continues to exceed the sustainable
    supply. Against that backdrop, the Army continues to meet the wartime
    requirements of our Nation while it addresses the two major challenges
    facing our force--restoring balance and setting conditions for the
    future. In 2007, we established a 4-year plan to restore balance to an
    Army that had experienced the cumulative effects of years of conflict.
    The fiscal year 2011 budget supports the final year in that plan. As we
    continue to restore balance to the force, we are also setting the
    conditions for the Army of the 21st century--an Army that fulfills our
    strategic role as an integral part of our Joint Force.
                 restoring balance: the army's four imperatives
        With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress over
    the past 3 years in our plan to restore balance--a plan founded on four
    imperatives. Yet today the Army remains out of balance. We've improved
    our ability to sustain the Army's soldiers, families, and civilians;
    prepare forces for success in the current conflict; reset returning
    units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare
    for future deployments and contingencies; and transform to meet the
    demands of the 21st century. As a result of this progress we now are in
    a better position to achieve balance than we were 2 years ago. Critical
    to this was the growth in the size of the Army.
        The security agreement with Iraq that transferred security in urban
    areas to Iraqis was a momentous and welcomed accomplishment. The hard
    work and sacrifice of our soldiers with the support of Congress helped
    make this achievement possible and set the conditions for our
    responsible drawdown of combat forces in Iraq this year. Coupled with
    our growth, the drawdown in Iraq allowed for our increased commitment
    of forces to Afghanistan to stem the rising violence, and disrupt,
    dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda while reversing the momentum of the
    Taliban insurgency. However, the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan
    continue to create demands that have our Army operating beyond
    sustainable capacity. In fact, in 2009 more soldiers were deployed in
    Iraq and Afghanistan combined than during the height of the Iraq surge.
        Presently, and for the short term, we lack sufficient strategic
    flexibility, and we continue to accumulate risk. We continue to stress
    our soldiers, families, civilians, equipment, and institutional
    systems, so our efforts to restore balance must not waiver.
    Sustain
        Sustaining our All-Volunteer Force is our first imperative. Nowhere
    is the stress on our force more profound than in the toll it takes on
    our people, as is tragically evident in the rising number of suicides
    and increasing need for counseling among our soldiers and families. We
    are aggressively addressing the causes of stress on individuals
    resulting from the cumulative effects of multiple deployments, and
    seeking to build resilience in soldiers, families, and civilians. The
    Army is committed to ensuring that the quality of life of those who
    serve the Nation is commensurate with the quality of their service.
        Goals
        To sustain the force, the Army continues to pursue four major
    goals. Our first goal is to recruit and retain quality soldiers and
    civilians dedicated to service to the Nation. Next, we are committed to
    furnishing the best care, support, and services for soldiers, families,
    and civilians by improving quality of life through meaningful
    initiatives such as the Army Family Action Plan, the Army Family
    Covenant, Army Community Covenants, and the Comprehensive Soldier
    Fitness Program. It is our solemn obligation to provide world-class
    warrior care and transition to our wounded, ill, and injured warriors
    through properly led and resourced Warrior Transition Units. Finally,
    by supporting the families of our fallen comrades we honor their
    service and sacrifice.
        Progress and Accomplishments
             The Army met 104 percent of its recruiting goals for
            2009, and achieved both numeric goals and quality benchmarks
            for new recruits.
             All components exceeded 105 percent of their
            reenlistment goals.
             We reduced off-duty fatalities by 20 percent, to
            include a 15 percent reduction in overall privately-owned-
            vehicle fatalities and 37 percent reduction in motorcycle
            fatalities.
             In collaboration with the National Institute of Mental
            Health, the Army began a seminal study into suicide prevention
            that will inform the Army Suicide Prevention Program and
            society's approach to suicide.
             We began instituting Comprehensive Soldier Fitness--an
            all-inclusive approach to emotional, social, spiritual, family,
            and physical fitness--as the foundation to building resiliency
            within the Army.
             We initiated an unprecedented series of construction
            projects at five major hospitals as part of our commitment to
            modernize our healthcare system.
             The Army established the Warrior Transition Command
            and reorganized Warrior Transition Brigades to provide
            centralized support, rehabilitation, and individualized
            transition planning to our recovering warriors.
             We expanded Survivor Outreach Services to over 26,000
            family members, providing unified support and advocacy, and
            enhancing survivor benefits for the families of our soldiers
            who have made the ultimate sacrifice.
             We implemented the post-September 11 GI Bill,
            significantly increasing educational benefits for Active Duty
            soldiers, veterans, and family members.
             The Army Reserve established Army Strong Community
            Centers to support geographically-dispersed soldiers and
            families. Together with Army National Guard Family Assistance
            Centers and Soldier and Family Assistance Centers on active
            duty installations, these centers provide help to soldiers'
            families near their hometowns.
        Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
             Provides $1.7 billion to standardize and fund vital
            family programs and services to include welfare and recreation;
            youth services and child care; Survivor Outreach Services; and
            expanded education and employment opportunities for family
            members.
             Provides a 1.4 percent military basic pay raise and
            civilian pay raise, a 3.9 percent basic allowance for housing
            increase, and a 3.4 percent basic allowance for subsistence
            increase.
             Warrior Transition Units for our wounded soldiers will
            continue to receive strong support in fiscal year 2011 with $18
            million in military construction funds allocated to resource
            construction of barracks spaces.
             Supports Residential Communities Initiatives program,
            which provides quality, sustainable residential communities for
            soldiers and their families living on-post, and continues to
            offset out-of-pocket housing expenses for those residing off-
            post.
    Prepare
        Our soldiers face determined enemies--so preparing the force for
    our current conflict is complex and time-consuming, but essential for
    success. Our units must have the people, training, and equipment they
    need to prevail. Meanwhile, our institutions and systems must adapt to
    provide those critical capabilities in a timely manner and in
    sufficient quantities.
        Goals
        To prepare the force, we have four key goals. First, we accelerated
    the pace at which we needed to Grow the Army to our end strength and to
    grow our modular brigades to 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and nearly
    230 Support Brigades. Second, the Army is committed to improving
    individual and collective Training to better prepare soldiers and
    leaders for a complex and challenging operational environment. Next, we
    continuously work to provide our formations with effective equipment in
    a timely manner that maintains our technological edge and protects our
    most critical resource--the soldier. Finally, we must transform the
    Army to a rotational model--Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)--the core
    process for generating trained, ready, and cohesive units on a
    sustained and rotational basis--to meet current and future strategic
    demands.
        Progress and Accomplishments
             We began the phase-out of stop-loss, starting with the
            Reserve Component in August 2009 and the Army National Guard in
            September 2009, and followed by the Active Army in January
            2010. Today, no mobilizing or deploying units have stop-loss
            soldiers in their ranks.
             The force achieved its ``Grow the Army'' end strength
            goal of 1.1 million in 2009. The Active component continues to
            grow toward its additional authorized temporary end strength in
            order to improve unit manning within the already existing Army
            structure as we eliminate stop-loss.
             Fifteen-month tours effectively ended in November
            2009, when the last soldiers on those extended deployments
            returned.
             We completed fielding nearly 12,000 Mine Resistant
            Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan and
            delivered the first MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs) to
            Afghanistan--just 15 months after identifying the need for that
            capability. As of the beginning of February, we have provided
            nearly 800 M-ATVs to Afghanistan.
             This year, we successfully manned, trained, equipped,
            and deployed 67 brigade equivalents.
             The Army exceeded fleet readiness of 90 percent for
            ground equipment, to include MRAPs, and 75 percent for
            aviation.
             We established Army Training Network (ATN)--a 21st
            Century Approach to Army Training. This revolution in training
            knowledge access is now providing a one-stop portal to share
            training best practices, solutions, and products across the
            Army.
             The Army increased its employment of biometric
            technologies enabling the Army to better identify the enemy
            among the populace.
        Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
             Funds permanent, Active component end strength at
            547,400; Army Reserve at 205,000; and National Guard at 358,200
            in the base budget and supports a 22,000 temporary increase in
            the Active component through the Overseas Contingency
            Operations (OCO) request.
             Procures and upgrades the Army's UH-60 Black Hawk, CH-
            47 Chinook, and AH-64 Apache helicopters, which are vital to
            operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
             Provides over $1 billion for flight crew training in
            all components to fund flying hours, maintenance, fuel,
            airfield operations, and specialized skill training.
    Reset
        With the pace of continuous combat operations in two wars for the
    past 8 years, we are consuming our readiness as fast as we can build
    it. Reset restores returning units--their soldiers, families, and
    equipment--to a level of readiness necessary for future missions.
        Goals
        Our Reset plans include four goals. Our efforts to revitalize
    soldiers and families seek to reestablish and strengthen relationships
    following deployments. The Army's comprehensive efforts to repair,
    replace, and recapitalize equipment affected by the harsh environments
    of the war are essential to resetting units. In particular, achieving
    responsible drawdown in Iraq while increasing our commitment of forces
    and equipment to Afghanistan will require an unprecedented reset
    effort. The Army must retrain soldiers, leaders, and units to build
    critical skills necessary to operate across the spectrum of conflict in
    the current security environment. Lastly, we are identifying and
    applying the lessons learned from the Reset Pilot Program that was
    designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Reset
    process. Army Reset is a necessary process that must continue not only
    as long as we have forces deployed, but an additional 2 to 3 years
    after major deployments end.
        Progress and Accomplishments
             The Army completed the reset of 29 brigades' worth of
            equipment in fiscal year 2009 and continued the reset of 13
            more. In total, we have reset more than 98,000 pieces of
            equipment as depot production has doubled since September 11,
            2001.
             We began executing a responsible drawdown in Iraq
            which will redistribute, transfer, or dispose of 3.4 million
            pieces of equipment; redeploy 143,000 military and civilian
            personnel, and 147,000 contractors; close 22 supply support
            activities; and consume or dispose of over 21,000 short tons of
            supplies.
             In 2009, more than 160,000 soldiers and family members
            participated in over 2,600 strong bonds events designed to
            strengthen Army families.
             The Army continues to revise its approach to training
            by emphasizing doing fewer tasks better, making judicious use
            of field time, and maximizing the use of mobile training teams
            and distributed learning.
             We completed our Reset Pilot Program and will begin
            instituting the full Reset model across the Army in 2010.
             The Army fostered partnerships by executing more than
            $24 billion in new foreign military sales.
        Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
             Provides $10.8 billion to reset Army equipment through
            the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request.
             Supports training and sustainment of Army forces to
            include individual skills and leader training; combined arms
            training toward full spectrum operations; and adaptable, phased
            training based on the ARFORGEN process.
    Transform
        Since 2004, the Army has been transforming our force to provide the
    combatant commanders tailored, strategically responsive forces that can
    dominate across the spectrum of conflict. Transformation is a
    continuous process that sets the conditions for success against both
    near-term and future enemies.
        Goals
        Our goals for transformation include continued modular
    reorganization to standardize our formations to create a more
    deployable, adaptable, and versatile force. We will accelerate fielding
    of advanced technologies to ensure our soldiers retain their
    technological edge. The Army will operationalize the Reserve components
    by systematically building and sustaining readiness while increasing
    predictability for these soldiers, families, employers, and
    communities.
        Completing the requirements of the Base Realignment and Closure
    (BRAC) statutes is central to restationing forces. soldier and leader
    development will ensure that we produce the next generation of agile
    and adaptive military and civilian leaders who are supremely competent
    in their core proficiencies and sufficiently broad enough to operate
    effectively in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-
    national environments.
        Progress and Accomplishments
             The Army is 88 percent complete on the modular
            conversion of its brigades. The fiscal year 2011 budget will
            support the near completion of this process.
             The Army consolidated existing aviation force
            structure to create a 12th Active component combat aviation
            brigade (CAB) forming an additional deployable CAB without
            adding force structure.
             The Army activated the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort
            Polk, LA, providing a dedicated and enduring capability to
            prepare combat advisors to train and build capacity in foreign
            security forces. Trainers from the brigade are now deployed to
            Afghanistan to assist with the training and development of the
            Afghan security forces.
             The Army developed a new incremental capability
            package approach to modernization which will allow
            technologically mature, soldier-tested, proven technologies to
            be prioritized, bundled in time, and fielded to the force more
            quickly than ever before.
             We provided combatant commanders with dedicated,
            regionally based network operations support, and integrated
            cyber security capability in the form of Theater Network
            Operations and Security Centers, unique within the Department
            of Defense.
             This past year, the Army closed three active
            installations and five U.S. Army Reserve Centers and is on
            course to complete BRAC in fiscal year 2011. To date, we have
            awarded 265 major military construction projects, of which 59
            are complete.
             The Army built a Leader Development Strategy that
            balances experience, greater opportunities for professional
            education, and training in full spectrum operations.
        Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
             Invests nearly $3.2 billion in BCT modernization
            programs that include procurement of the first incremental
            changes packages for Infantry BCTs and additional research,
            development, testing, and evaluation funding for subsequent
            change packages as well as initial development of the Ground
            Combat Vehicle (GCV).
             Provides funds to begin equipping a 13th CAB.
             Supports the increase in intelligence, surveillance,
            and reconnaisance (ISR) platforms to include the Extended
            Range/Multi-Purpose, Raven, Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles
            (UAVs) and the Extended Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and
            Surveillance System.
                       setting conditions for the future
    21st Century Army
        The second critical challenge facing the Army is setting the
    conditions for the future through a continuous process of
    transformation. We must ensure that our Nation has the capability and
    range of military options to meet the evolving challenges we face in
    the 21st century. We need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable
    and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to
    provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum
    operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies--at a tempo
    that is predictable and sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force.
        Versatility is the central organizing principle of a balanced Army.
    It enables our forces and institutions to effectively execute
    operations across the spectrum of conflict. Our modular heavy, Stryker,
    and light brigades provide a versatile mix of forces that can be
    combined to provide multi-purpose capabilities, and sufficient capacity
    to accomplish a broad range of tasks from peacetime engagement to major
    combat operations.
        Our modular units are designed to be tailorable. Brigades now have
    capabilities previously found at division level and higher. These
    brigades can be tailored for specific missions and combined with
    support units and key enablers such as ISR, communications, civil
    affairs, psychological operations, public affairs capabilities, and
    expanded logistics support, to accomplish a wide variety of missions
    and increase the land options available to combatant commanders.
        The network is essential to a 21st-century Army. Networked
    organizations improve the situational awareness and understanding
    leaders need to act decisively at all points along the spectrum of
    conflict, while providing connectivity down to the individual soldier.
    The network allows dispersed Army organizations to plan and operate
    together, and provides connectivity to joint, combined, and interagency
    assets. To support this objective, the Army will use the Global Network
    Enterprise Construct (GNEC) as our strategy to transform LandWarNet to
    a centralized, more secure, operationalized, and sustainable network
    capable of supporting an expeditionary Army.
        To provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces at a tempo
    sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force, we will put the whole Army
    under a rotational model-ARFORGEN.
        The ARFORGEN process includes three force pools--Reset, Train-
    Ready, and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a
    versatile force package, available at varying time intervals based on
    its readiness level. Each force pool consists of an operational
    headquarters (a corps), 5 division headquarters (of which 1 or 2 are
    National Guard), 20 BCTs (3 or 4 are National Guard), and 90,000
    enablers (about half of those are Guard and Reserve). Each will be
    capable of full spectrum operations once we reach a steady-state, ratio
    of time deployed (known as ``boots on the ground'' or BOG) to time at
    home (dwell) of 1:2 (BOG:dwell) for Active component forces and 1:4 for
    Reserve component forces. This versatile mix of land forces could
    sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At lower demand levels, a
    sustainable BOG:dwell ratio of 1:3 for Active component forces and 1:5
    for Reserve component forces provides ready, global reaction forces and
    regionally-oriented forces for engagement in support of Theater
    Security Cooperation Programs. This process also allows strategic
    flexibility to surge in response to unexpected contingencies across the
    spectrum of conflict, and provides operational depth with more forces
    available for longer commitment times.
        The increased demands of our combatant commanders, coupled with the
    size of our Active component (AC) force, require that we continue to
    integrate Reserve component (RC) forces as part of our operational
    force. Continued and routine access to our RC forces is essential to
    sustaining current operations, and is improving the overall operational
    experience and quality of our RC forces. Additionally, sufficient Army
    National Guard (ARNG) forces must be ready and immediately available to
    their state and territorial authorities to respond to domestic crises.
    We are building an integrated Army in which our RC forces are included
    in the rotational cycle, but at a deployment rate of about half that of
    their AC counterparts.
        The ARFORGEN process increases predictability for soldiers,
    Families, employers, and communities, and enables our RC to remain an
    integral element of the operational force while providing the Nation
    with the strategic depth (i.e. those nondeployed units which are 2 to 3
    years from commitment) and operational flexibility to meet unexpected
    contingencies.
        The Army has undergone significant changes in recent years, and we
    must continue to change in order to keep pace with an environment of
    uncertainty and complexity in this era of persistent conflict. The same
    requirements that drive the imperative to change also drive our
    modernization efforts and need for institutional adaptation.
    Realizing Change
        To become the Army the Nation needs in the second decade of the
    21st century, we are transforming the Army and prioritizing programs
    and efforts that show the most promise for today and tomorrow.
    Similarly, we are transforming business processes across the Army,
    including how we identify requirements, acquire, and provide materiel
    capabilities to our soldiers, and how we adapt our institutions to
    align with the ARFORGEN process.
        On April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates announced his adjustments to the
    defense program as part of the President's budget proposal for fiscal
    year 2010. The Secretary's decisions had an immediate and major impact
    on our FCS-centric Army modernization effort. He terminated the MGV
    portion of FCS, directing that we ``reevaluate the requirements,
    technology, and approach--and then re-launch the Army's vehicle
    modernization program . . . .'' He further directed the Army to
    ``accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out
    technology enhancements to all combat brigades,'' and retain and
    deliver software and network development program in increments, and
    incorporate MRAP into our force structure. Secretary Gates' intent for
    these bold adjustments was clear--to better reflect the lessons that we
    were learning from ongoing operations and better posture Army forces
    for a broader range of future challenges.
        To fully implement the Secretary of Defense's direction, the Army
    has developed a comprehensive plan. We refer to this new program as the
    Army's ``BCT Modernization Plan,'' which is a subset of our overall
    Army Modernization Strategy.
        BCT Modernization Plan
        We will leverage the lessons learned from the last 8 years to
    provide effective and affordable equipment now, while reducing the time
    it takes to develop and field new and updated materiel solutions. BCT
    Modernization includes four elements: modernizing the network over time
    to take advantage of technology upgrades, while simultaneously
    expanding it to cover ever increasing portions of the force;
    incorporating MRAPs into our force; rapidly developing and fielding a
    new GCV that meets the requirements of the 21st-century Army; and
    incrementally fielding capability packages that best meet the needs of
    soldiers and units as they train and then deploy.
                                  army network
        Central to the Army's modernization efforts is an enhanced and
    interoperable communication network that gives the Army a decisive
    advantage across the spectrum of conflict. The network supports leaders
    in making timely, informed decisions, and supports organizational
    agility, lethality, and sustainability. It allows our soldiers to know
    where the enemy is, where other friendly forces and civilian
    populations are, and what weapon systems are available for them at any
    given time. The network links soldiers on the battlefield with space-
    based and aerial sensors, robots, and command posts--providing
    unprecedented situational awareness and control and enabling the
    application of precise lethal fires on the modern battlefield.
        Maintaining our technological advantage is a constant challenge.
    The Army's battle command network must be continuously upgraded to
    ensure security and provide improved capability, capacity, connectivity
    and operational effectiveness. The Warfighter Information Network
    (Tactical) (WIN-T) is designed to extend the network ultimately to the
    company level for BCTs and provide real-time information, such as high
    definition imagery, from surveillance sources. The Joint Tactical Radio
    System (JTRS) was born joint with the specific requirement to resolve
    radio interoperability among the services. It will provide soldiers at
    the tactical level with connectivity at extended ranges, including
    voice, data, and video, enabling them to move information from platoon
    to higher-level command posts in complex terrain (including urban and
    mountainous areas).
                                 mrap strategy
        In response to deadly IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Nation made
    a tremendous investment in fielding MRAPs that have saved lives by
    providing significantly improved protection for our soldiers. The Army
    is incorporating these vehicles throughout its unit formations.
    Additionally, we used the basic design of the MRAP as the foundation
    for the M-ATV, modifying it for the mountainous terrain in Afghanistan
    and in other regions around the world. The MRAP family of vehicles
    provides the versatility our forces need to rapidly move around the
    battlefield, particularly in an IED environment, with the best
    protection we can provide.
                             ground combat vehicle
        Combining the lessons learned from the survivability of the MRAP,
    the tactical mobility of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the
    operational mobility of the Stryker, the Army is developing a GCV that
    possesses all of these qualities. Providing soldiers protected mobility
    is our top design criteria. The first combat vehicle designed from the
    ground up to operate in an IED environment, the GCV will have enhanced
    mobility that will allow it to operate effectively in both urban and
    off-road environments. It will be designed to host the Army's network.
    Perhaps most importantly, it will have the capacity available to accept
    future upgrades incrementally as technologies mature and threats
    change.
        The GCV will be versatile enough to support our expeditionary
    requirements and be capable of carrying an infantry squad. It will
    combine sustainability features that match the availability rates of
    the Stryker while consuming less fuel than current vehicles of similar
    weight and power. The pace of change and the operational environment
    demand an expedited acquisition timeline, so the Army is pursuing a GCV
    program timeline that provides the first production vehicles in 7
    years.
                              capability packages
        Capability packages provide the Army a regular, timely process to
    enable our deployable units with the latest materiel and non-materiel
    solutions based on the evolving challenges of the operating
    environment. The best available capabilities will go to the soldiers
    who need them most, based on the threats they are likely to face. These
    bundles of capabilities will include materiel, doctrine, organization,
    and training to fill the highest priority requirements and mitigate
    risk for soldiers. This incremental packaging approach will enable
    leaders to make timely, resource-informed decisions, and will help
    ensure that we provide the best available technologies to fulfill
    urgent needs to soldiers in the fight--all driven by the cyclic
    readiness produced by ARFORGEN. These capability packages will upgrade
    our units as they prepare to deploy by providing them improved
    capabilities such as precision fires and advanced Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).
    The Army Modernization Strategy
        The Army's BCT Modernization Plan is a key element of our overall
    Army Modernization Strategy. The Army Modernization Strategy reflects
    our overarching vision of how we will achieve our ends, which is to:
        Develop and field an affordable and interoperable mix of the best
    equipment available to allow soldiers and units to succeed in both
    today's and tomorrow's full spectrum military operations.
        The Army Modernization Strategy relies on three interrelated lines
    of effort:

        (1)  Develop and field new capabilities to meet identified
    capability ``gaps'' through traditional or rapid acquisition processes.
    In support of this Line of Effort in fiscal year 2011 we have requested
    $934 million to develop the Army's new GCV, which will overcome
    critical capability gaps in both current and future operations. It is
    envisioned to have the tactical mobility of a Bradley, the operational
    mobility of a Stryker, and the protection of an MRAP. We are also
    requesting $459 million to procure the Extended Range Multi-Purpose
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. This extraordinarily capable platform, which
    is already making a difference in Operation Enduring Freedom, gives
    commanders longer dwell ISR capabilities across a joint area of
    operations.
        (2)  Continuously modernize equipment to meet current and future
    capability needs through upgrade, replacement, recapitalization,
    refurbishment, and technology insertions. Army efforts in this line of
    effort include our request for $887 million for the procurement of 16
    Block III AH-64 Apache Helicopters, as well as the upgrade of 13 AH-64
    Helicopters to Block II. Block III Apache is part of a long-term effort
    to improve situational awareness, performance, reliability, and
    sustainment of the Apache. Block II upgrades continue our commitment to
    modernize the Army National Guard Aviation Fleet. Additionally, in this
    line of effort, we have requested $505 million to upgrade Shadow RQ-7
    UAVs. This key upgrade will increase the payload capacity and enhance
    the performance of this key ISR asset for our BCT Commanders.
        (3)  Meet continuously evolving force requirements in the current
    operational environment by fielding and distributing capabilities in
    accordance with the Army Resource Priorities List and ARFORGEN Model.
    Meeting the constantly evolving needs of theater commanders and the
    demands of persistent conflict will require unprecedented agility in
    our equipping and modernization programs. One example of this agility
    can be found in our Kiowa Warrior fleet. We are currently maneuvering
    our fleet of OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Light Helicopters to meet Army and
    combatant command requirements based on the ARFORGEN model. As Air
    Cavalry Squadrons return from conflict, their OH-58D helicopters are
    placed into Reset. Units in Reset have very few aircraft, if any.
    Because the Kiowa Warrior fleet is short 35 aircraft overall, when the
    squadrons transition into the Train/Ready Phase of ARFORGEN, they are
    provided a number of helicopters sufficient to conduct training (25),
    but less than what they are fully authorized (30). When the units move
    into the available phase, they are provided their full complement of
    aircraft. It is this agility that has allowed Army forces to meet the
    needs of theater commanders for over 8 years of sustained combat.

        What do we need? Congress has been very supportive of Army
    Modernization needs in the past. Their tremendous support has ensured
    that the Army soldier is the best equipped and most respected combatant
    in the world. In order to execute Army Modernization and ensure the
    continued success of soldiers and units, we depend on a variety of
    resources, not the least of which is predictable funding. For fiscal
    year 2011, we have requested $31.7 billion for procurement and
    Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts.
    Adapting the Institution and Transforming Business Practices
        In addition to modernizing our operating force, we are transforming
    our institutional Army. As required by section 904 of the 2008 National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the appointment of the Under
    Secretary of the Army as the Army's Chief Management Officer (CMO) has
    allowed the Army to develop a series of initiatives to adapt the
    institutional Army and transform our business practices. In accordance
    with section 908 of the 2009 NDAA, these efforts will result in the
    development and implementation of a comprehensive program that
    establishes a series of measurable performance goals and objectives.
    Specifically, the comprehensive program will address the following:

             Developing and implementing a business transformation
            plan focused on running the Army as effectively and efficiently
            as possible.
             Continuing the Army's business process reengineering
            activities, led by OSD's Business Transformation Agency.
             Developing an integrated business systems architecture
            that emphasizes transparency and seamless access to data, and
            provides timely and accurate information to decisionmakers.
             Preparing Army leaders to take a greater role in
            inculcating the Army with a cost-conscious culture.

        While the Army transformed its operating force--building versatile,
    agile units capable of adapting to changing environments--the
    institutional Army continued to use processes and procedures that were
    designed to support a pre-September 11 Army based on tiered levels of
    readiness. To support this new operating force, the Army must have an
    updated institutional Army--our generating force.
        Once the mission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly and
    continuously adapt--tailoring force packages and quickly adjusting
    training, manning, and equipping--to ensure units have all of the
    physical and mental tools necessary to succeed.
        Institutional agility allows us to adapt to the realities that
    present themselves. To that end, the CMO and Office of Business
    Transformation will build upon progress that has already been made
    toward the Army's institutional adaptation, specifically:

             Improvement of the ARFORGEN process-aligning the
            generating force and its processes to better support soldiers,
            families, and units within the operating force.
             Adoption of an Enterprise Approach-developing civilian
            and military leaders who take a collaborative, holistic view of
            Army objectives and resources to make better decisions for the
            Army.
             Reformation of the requirements and resource
            processes--delivering timely and necessary capabilities at best
            value.

        This transformational approach will overlay everything that the
    institutional Army does, with the unwavering goal of effectively and
    efficiently providing trained and ready forces to meet combatant
    commander requirements.
                           stewardship and innovation
        The Army remains devoted to the best possible stewardship of the
    resources it is provided by the American people through Congress. The
    establishment of the CMO and initiatives related to the transformation
    of Army business practices represent the Army's effort to act as a
    responsible steward. Several other initiatives serve to conserve
    resources and to reduce waste and inefficiencies wherever possible.
        The Army achieved full operating capability of the new Army
    Contracting Command, Expeditionary Contracting Command, and Mission and
    Installation Contracting Command in 2009. These organizations are
    dedicated to ensuring professional, ethical, efficient, and responsive
    contracting.
        Civilians are assuming increased responsibilities within the Army.
    The Army is recouping intellectual capital by in-sourcing former
    contracted positions that were associated with inherently governmental
    functions. In fiscal year 2009, the Army saved significant resources by
    in-sourcing more than 900 core governmental functions to Army
    civilians. We plan to in-source 7,162 positions in fiscal year 2010,
    and are programmed to in-source 11,084 positions during fiscal year
    2011-2015, of which 3,988 are acquisition positions. These positions
    were identified in the Army's ongoing contractor inventory review
    process.
        In the Employer Partnership program, the Army Reserve works with
    public agencies and private employers to leverage their shared
    interests in recruiting, training, and credentialing highly skilled
    citizen-soldiers. The Army Reserve has signed more than 800 partnership
    agreements with corporations, state agencies, and local police
    departments.
        Energy security is a key component of Army installations, weapons
    systems, and operations. The Army has developed a comprehensive energy
    security strategy, and is acting now to implement initiatives to make
    us less dependent on foreign sources of fuel and better stewards of our
    Nation's energy resources. In support of these goals, we fielded the
    largest hybrid vehicle fleet within the Department of Defense. Energy
    will continue to be a key consideration in all Army activities in order
    to reduce demand, increase efficiency, seek alternative sources, and
    create a culture of energy accountability, while sustaining or
    enhancing operational capabilities.
        The Army is committed to environmental stewardship. Through
    cooperative partner agreements and the Army Compatible Use Buffer
    Program, the Army protected more than 28,000 acres of land at 14
    locations in fiscal year 2009. Through creative solutions, the Army
    continues to conduct realistic training on its installations while
    protecting threatened and endangered species on Army lands.
                   america's army--the strength of the nation
        The professionalism, dedicated service, and sacrifice of our All-
    Volunteer Force are hallmarks of the Army--the Strength of our Nation.
        Our soldiers and their families quietly bear the burdens of a
    Nation at war. Our civilians stand with them, dedicated to the Nation
    and the Army that serves it. Despite the toll that 8 years of combat
    has taken, these great Americans continue to step forward to answer our
    Nation's call. In an environment in which we must make hard choices,
    they deserve the very best we can offer, commensurate with their
    dedication and sacrifice.
        To continue to fulfill our vital role for the Nation, the Army must
    sustain its efforts to restore balance and set conditions for the
    future. We have made significant progress this year, but challenges
    remain. The continued support of Congress will ensure that the Army
    remains manned, trained, and equipped to protect our national security
    interests at home and abroad, now and in the future. America's Army--
    the Strength of the Nation.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        General Casey.

     STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
                                THE ARMY

        General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
    members of the committee.
        As the chairman said, I would like just to begin by
    introducing four representative members of this great Army that
    we have.
        First, I'd introduce Mrs. Donna Engeman. Donna's husband,
    John, was killed in Iraq 4 years ago, and she currently runs
    our Survivor Outreach Services Programs. It's a program we put
    in place, about 2 years ago, to increase what we were doing for
    surviving family members. Her son, Patrick, is on his second
    tour in Iraq.
        Next to her is Staff Sergeant Christian Hughes. He was
    wounded in Afghanistan in October. He's recovering from his
    wounds in Walter Reed, and he looks forward to rejoining his
    unit as soon as he can.
        Next is Sergeant First Class Shana Tinsley. Her husband,
    Arthur, is a Master Sergeant. He leaves for Afghanistan
    Thursday, I think, and she will be here with her children,
    working here with us in the Pentagon.
        Lastly, Sergeant First Class Jeff Lawson. He has recently
    completed a program at the University of Pennsylvania that
    qualifies him to be a master resilience trainer, and this is an
    important part of our Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program
    that I will talk about a bit later. He has three tours in Iraq,
    himself.
        So, thank you all, very much, for coming out. [Applause.]
        Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much for bringing
    these special guests to us. I just want to give them a special
    thanks for their service, their families' service, their
    dedication and commitment to this country. We stand in awe of
    you. Thank you.
        General Casey. Thank you.
        Now, if I could, Mr. Chairman. As you noted, I've been
    saying for the past 3 years that the Army is out of balance,
    that we're so weighed down by our current commitments that we
    can't do the things we know we need to do to sustain this All-
    Volunteer Force and to prepare to do other things. I can tell
    you that, with the help of the committee, we've made progress
    over the last year to get back in balance, but we're not quite
    out of the woods yet.
        That said, fiscal year 2011 budget completes the
    procurement funding to finish our conversion to modular
    organizations that we began in 2004 and the growth that we
    began in 2007. It also contains the military construction
    funding to complete the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
    moves of 2005. So, your continued support will allow us to meet
    the goals we set 6 years ago to build an Army that was both
    relevant to 21st century challenges and back in balance.
        Now, this plan that we put in place to get ourselves back
    in balance was centered on four imperatives. We had to sustain
    our soldiers and families; they're the heart and soul of the
    force. We had to continue to prepare our soldiers for success
    in the current conflict. We had to reset them effectively when
    they return. Then we had to continue to transform for an
    uncertain future.
        Let me just give you a short progress report on where we
    are.
        Our first objective was to finish our growth. You'll
    recall, the administration, in January 2007, directed that we
    increase the size of the Army by 74,000. Originally, we were
    going to do that by 2012. With Secretary Gates' and your
    support, we completed it last spring. When that did not prove
    to be sufficient, we were granted a temporary increase of
    22,000 soldiers, and we will evaluate, later this year, that
    entire amount. This growth, coupled with the drawdown in Iraq,
    has allowed us to meet the need for additional forces in
    Afghanistan without returning to 15-month deployments and
    without going back on stop-loss.
        Our second key objective was to increase the time our
    soldiers spend at home. I will tell you, after almost 3 years
    in the job, I'm more convinced than ever that this is the most
    important element of putting ourselves back in balance, and for
    several reasons. One, our soldiers need time to recover from
    repeated combat deployments. What we continue to see across the
    force are the cumulative effects of these deployments. We
    recently completed a study that demonstrates what we
    intuitively knew, that it takes 2 to 3 years to recover from a
    1-year combat deployment. That's why it's so important for us
    to meet our near-term objective of 2 years at home between
    deployments for our Active Force and 4 years at home between
    deployments for our Reserve components. As demand decreases, we
    plan to move to more sustainable goals of 3 and 5 years,
    respectively, between deployments.
        More time at home also gives us more stable preparation
    time for the next mission and more time to prepare to do other
    things. When you're only home for a year, you barely have time
    to finish your leave before you have to begin preparing to go
    back. I've recently visited units that had 18 months home. The
    difference between 18 months at home and 12 months at home, and
    the pace of the tempo that they're home, is significant.
        Additionally, as time at home increases, we'll be able to
    see more units training for the full spectrum of operations,
    and we will gradually rekindle some of the skills that have
    atrophied over the past several years.
        Our third objective was to move away from our Cold War
    formations to organizations that are more relevant for the
    challenges we'll face in the 21st century. In 2004, we set out
    to convert all 300-plus brigades in our Army to modular
    organizations. Today, we're almost 90-percent complete, and
    these formations are demonstrating their versatility and their
    value in Iraq and Afghanistan every day.
        We also set out to rebalance the skills resident in these
    formations. This involved converting, retraining, and equipping
    around 150,000 soldiers from all components to new jobs. By way
    of example, in the last 6 years we have stood down around 200
    tank companies, artillery batteries, and air-defense batteries,
    and we've stood up a corresponding number of military police,
    engineers, civil affairs, and Special Forces companies. This
    has paid tremendous benefits in the current operations.
        So, together, the rebalancing and the modular conversions
    represent the largest organizational transformation of the Army
    since World War II, and we will have done this while fighting
    two wars.
        Fourth, we are moving to put the whole Army on a rotational
    readiness model, much like the Navy and Marine Corps have been
    on for many years. This model will allow us to more efficiently
    and effectively provide a sustained flow of land forces that
    are trained for the full spectrum of operations to our
    combatant commanders. It will also allow us to have forces
    available to hedge against the unexpected contingencies that
    you spoke of. It will also allow us to do this in a way that's
    predictable and sustainable for this All-Volunteer Force.
        Our fifth objective was to complete our restationing, and
    we're just over half way through these efforts. We're on track
    to complete the 2005 BRAC by the end of 2011. This will affect
    over 380,000 soldiers, family members, and civilians. While
    it's a lot of turbulence, the construction on these new
    installations will significantly improve the quality of life
    for our soldiers and families.
        So, the bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is we've made progress,
    but we still face challenges as we work to restore balance and
    set the conditions for the future.
        I'd like to conclude my remarks with comments on three
    areas that are very important to us and, I would hope, also
    important for this committee.
        First of all, sustaining our people. This budget contains
    money for housing, barracks, childcare, youth centers, Warrior
    Transition Units, and surviving spouse programs--all critically
    important to sustaining our soldiers, civilians, and families
    through a period in which our country is asking so much of
    them. In general, we're strengthening our programs to build
    resiliency into the force, to help them deal, not only with the
    challenges of the past, but with the challenges of the future.
        We've all seen the manifestations of the stresses of 8\1/2\
    years at war--elevated suicide rates, increased demand for
    behavioral health counseling and drug and alcohol counseling,
    increased divorce rates, increased numbers of soldiers
    temporarily nondeployable from nagging injuries from previous
    deployments--and we've been moving aggressively to give our
    soldiers and families the skills they need to deal with these
    challenges.
        In October, we began a program that we had been working on
    for more than 18 months with some of the best experts in the
    country. The program is called Comprehensive Soldier Fitness.
    I've spoken about it here before. It's designed to give mental
    fitness the same level of effort that we give to physical
    fitness. We intended to provide our force the resiliency skills
    that they need to succeed in an era of persistent conflict.
    This program consists of four components: an online self-
    assessment to identify resiliency strengths, this assessment
    has already been taken by over 250,000 soldiers; next, online
    self-help modules; third, master resilience trainers, like
    Sergeant Lawson. These are designed to conduct resiliency
    training down to the unit level. We've trained over 600
    Sergeant Lawsons at the University of Pennsylvania already.
    Finally, there will be resiliency training at every Army Leader
    Development School. This program shows great promise, and I'd
    be happy to discuss it further in the questions and answers.
        Second, the reset of our equipment will be increasingly
    important as we complete the drawdown in Iraq over the next 2
    years, and for 2 to 3 years after the conclusion of combat
    operations. It's important to note that our reset efforts have
    been a key factor in maintaining the high operational readiness
    rates for ground and air systems in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
    budget provides almost $11 billion to reset our equipment, and
    sustained funding for reset will be essential to the long-term
    health of the force.
        Finally, this budget, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
    contains a significant adjustment to our modernization
    strategy. I believe that we are in a period of continuous and
    fundamental change, and that we must continually adapt to deal
    with evolving threats. So, in conjunction with the Secretary of
    Defense, we've transitioned away from the FCS program to what
    we believe is an achievable, affordable modernization program
    for our BCTs. This program leverages the lessons that we've
    learned at war and the lessons that we learned from the FCS
    program itself. It contains four elements. First of all,
    incrementally modernizing our networks over time to take
    advantage of rapid advances in technology. Second,
    incrementally fielding capability packages to put the best
    equipment into the hands of our soldiers as rapidly as it is
    available. Third, incorporating MRAP vehicles into our force.
    Lastly, rapidly developing and fielding a new ground combat
    vehicle that meets the requirements of a 21st century Army.
        We intend to make this program a model for the Weapon
    Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA), and we look forward to
    working with the committee on it.
        In closing, I'd like to reiterate how proud I am of what
    the men and women of this great Army continue to accomplish at
    home and around the world. We've made progress in restoring
    balance, but we still face a tough road ahead, and we could not
    have done it without the committee's support.
        Thank you very much. The Secretary and I look forward to
    your questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General. We appreciate
    that testimony.
        Let's try a 7-minute first round.
        This goes, first, to you Mr. Secretary; the fiscal year
    2011 budget request for DOD includes $549 billion for the base
    budget and $159 billion for the ongoing wars in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Now, on top of the $708 billion request for 2011,
    the administration has included a 2010 supplemental request of
    $33 billion to fund the additional 30,000 troops to support the
    President's policy announced last December, and much of that
    additional funding is required to support the Army's operating
    costs. What is your estimate, Mr. Secretary, of how far into
    the current fiscal year the Army can cover its war costs before
    you're going to need that appropriation of additional funds?
        Secretary McHugh. I appreciate you asking this, Senator,
    because obviously it is something we spend a lot of time
    talking about on the Army side. I recognize full well that the
    process of introducing, and ultimately passing and having
    signed, a supplemental, under any conditions, is not always
    subject to a calendar, but there are realities, as you just
    mentioned.
        Our budget people tell us, including DOD Comptroller Hale,
    that the last possible moment in which we can comfortably fund
    this would be at the end of June, beginning of July.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        The WSARA was designed to address the problems that we've
    had with weapons systems that take too long and cost too much,
    by getting the programs off on a sounder footing, with better
    systems engineering, better cost estimates, more mature
    technologies, and better developmental testing. Is the Army on
    track to rebuild its systems engineering, cost estimating, and
    developmental testing capabilities, as required by that Act?
        Secretary McHugh. We believe we are. I've jokingly said,
    over the last several months, as a prime cosponsor of that bill
    in the House, that had I known I was going to be Secretary of
    the Army, I probably would have read it more carefully. But,
    having the chance now to work with it, we're working very hard,
    particularly in programs like the ground combat vehicle, to
    meet the kinds of standards and the kinds of milestone
    judgments and prototype competitions that is envisioned in this
    act.
        I would tell you, we have a challenge on insourcing and
    growing that workforce. If you look at the statistics over the
    last 10 years, there's been a 15 percent cut in the acquisition
    workforce in the Army. At the same time, we've been called upon
    to execute approximately a 500 percent increase in contracted
    dollars. I think the workforce, as strained as they have been,
    have done a good job in that regard. Over 2008 and 2009, we had
    about 1,000 protests to the contract lettings through our
    systems, and yet, of those 1,000, approximately only 8 were
    sustained.
        Nevertheless, the long pole in the tent, it seems to me, is
    bringing in more contract expertise. We had a good start. We've
    insourced about 900 core functions. We've saved about $41
    million. We have, though 2015, a plan to insource nearly 4,000
    new positions. Targets sometimes are hard to achieve. But, I
    think we've done, thus far, a pretty good job in respecting
    both the intent and the letter of that law.
        Chairman Levin. In general, you feel you're on track.
        Secretary McHugh. I do, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Now, on the Wounded Warrior Transition Command, you've both
    made references to our responsibility to our wounded warriors.
    The Army has set up a Warrior Transition Command to oversee the
    care and support of wounded or ill or injured soldiers. In your
    judgement, is that new command now in operation, and is it
    effective?
        General Casey. It has been fully operational, Mr. Chairman,
    and it has been increasingly effective. We've continued to
    improve our facilities, the staffing, and actually how we
    process soldiers through the Warrior Transition Unit system. We
    are trying to shift our focus away from just disability, over
    to rehabilitation. We focus them on goal-settings, to move them
    more rapidly through the process.
        The other bit is, we've added an automation component to
    this, and we're automating the evaluation board process, and I
    think that's going to help us streamline this, as well. Short
    answer, it has improved the way we handle our warriors.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Relative to the DADT law and policy, Secretary Gates
    testified that he's appointed a high-level working group to
    review the issues that are associated with implementing a
    repeal of the DADT law and policy. Admiral Mullen has testified
    that he and the Service Chiefs are in support of that approach.
        Let me ask both of you; would you object to a moratorium on
    discharges for homosexuality until completion of that review?
        Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary McHugh. Mr. Chairman, I hate to parse words, but
    it depends what you mean by support.
        Chairman Levin. Well, I said, would you object to a
    moratorium?
        Secretary McHugh. We don't feel we have the legal authority
    to impose that, from the Department side. But, quite honestly,
    if it were the will of Congress and the President to institute
    that moratorium, I can't see that we would object to that, per
    se.
        Chairman Levin. Okay.
        General, if Congress adopted a moratorium, would you object
    to that? Would you recommend against it? What would be your
    position?
        General Casey. Senator, I would recommend against it. Aside
    from the legal issues that the Secretary mentioned, it would
    complicate the whole process that Secretary Gates had laid out.
    We would be put in a position of actually implementing it while
    we were studying implementation, and I don't think that would
    be prudent.
        Chairman Levin. If the moratorium were simply a moratorium?
    In other words, you're not implementing anything, you're just
    withholding discharges until that study is completed.
        General Casey. Mr. Chairman, this process is going to be
    difficult and complicated enough. Anything that complicates it
    more, I think I would be opposed to.
        Chairman Levin. Well, if we do that, we'll try and make it
    simple and straightforward.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank the witnesses.
        General Casey, you've put forward the goal of increasing
    dwell time for soldiers, so they can spend 2 years at home for
    every year deployed. I think it's a laudable goal. Obviously,
    there's two ways of reaching it: reduce our commitment overseas
    or increase end strength. What would be the effect of making
    the temporary end-strength increase of 22,000 soldiers
    permanent? Would that be helpful?
        General Casey. Senator, it would have a slight impact on
    dwell across the Army. I can tell you that, with the drawdown
    in Iraq and the plus-up in Afghanistan, we actually get 70
    percent of the Active Force to our goal of 1 year out, 2 years
    back, in 2011, and 80 percent of the Guard and Reserve meet
    their goal. So, we are well on the way to getting that, because
    of our growth and because of the drawdown in Iraq.
        Senator McCain. Do you still think we can get close to your
    objectives by 2011?
        General Casey. I do, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh, how much of the Army's
    OCO request could be placed in the base budget?
        Secretary McHugh. About $8 billion, sir.
        Senator McCain. Out of $100 billion.
        Secretary McHugh. A hundred-plus, yes.
        Senator McCain. So, we will probably see supplemental
    requests for a long period of time.
        Secretary McHugh. Well, I can't speak to that. There is
    certainly an expectation--a hope, if you will--amongst the Army
    leadership and, I expect, most of the Services, as we are
    engaged in named overseas operations, that we would have
    supplemental support.
        Senator McCain. In other words, you think we need
    supplementals?
        Secretary McHugh. If we're going to operate in these types
    of theaters, yes, we absolutely do.
        Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary and General Casey, as we
    know, they are going to stop making the Humvee. The 2011
    request ends production in the Humvee line of vehicles. Maybe
    you could provide, for the record, the long-term plan for a
    wheeled-vehicle fleet. I understand the President's budget
    request. I hope that we have some plans on a replacement for
    that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The long-term plan for the Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) fleet is to
    support the development and procurement of the Joint Light Tactical
    Vehicle (JLTV) and to modernize the existing High Mobility Multi-
    purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet through recapitalization.
        The Army is currently reviewing the LTV requirement, which
    currently stands at approximately 150,000 vehicles. As JLTV is
    projected to start procurement in fiscal year 2013, the HMMWV
    requirement will decrease proportionately. The Army will divest based
    on criteria in favor of the most modern, capable versions of armored
    and unarmored HMMWVs.
        The Army recognizes there will continue to be a requirement for
    both armored and unarmored HMMWVs in the fleet. As JLTV is fielded and
    its capabilities evaluated, the role of both armored and unarmored
    HMMWVs will be reassessed, and the fleet will be adjusted accordingly.

         Senator McCain. General Casey, do you feel that the
    operational commanders also ought to have input into this issue
    of how to address the DADT issue?
        General Casey. Their input is certainly welcome, but we're
    the ones responsible for organizing and preparing the forces
    that they employ. So, I believe that we, the Service Chiefs,
    have a greater stake in it. But, their reasoned opinions are
    always welcomed.
        Senator McCain. Of course, since they have to implement
    your personnel policies, and are given that responsibility, it
    seems to me they should be consulted, as well.
        I think it's pretty obvious what the next step is in this
    effort to repeal DADT. Senator Levin just said, now instead of
    going through the study that the Secretary of Defense has
    called for, the forces now will want a moratorium before any
    decision is made. Not unexpected, but certainly it flies in the
    face of what the Secretary of Defense committed to, and that
    is, before a decision is made to change a policy that, in my
    view at least, is working, we would then impose a moratorium.
        What are the plans for this long-range study that the
    Secretary of Defense is going to implement? Do you know,
    Secretary McHugh?
        Secretary McHugh. In general terms, Senator, it's still
    being set up; and, in fact, some of the basic construct of the
    seniors group was worked out this weekend.
        If I may, before I go to that, just to return to the
    chairman's question. My answer about a moratorium was
    predicated upon the assumption that if Congress were to pass
    it, we would respect and obey that.
        Senator McCain. But, that was not the chairman's question.
        Secretary McHugh. Well, that's how I took it. I want to be
    clear. If you're asking for my personal opinion as to the
    effects of a moratorium, we have any number of cases underway,
    pursuant to the current law, that would be greatly complicated
    were there a moratorium; but if it were passed, obviously, and
    the intent of my answer was to say, we would follow through
    with that.
        Chairman Levin. What are those cases, if I could just
    interrupt?
        Secretary McHugh. Well, we have Lieutenant Choi, a member
    of the New York Reserve, for example, who's in a process now,
    whose Federal recognition has been withdrawn, who's not had
    final action.
        Chairman Levin. Who is being discharged?
        Secretary McHugh. We've not yet seen the recommendations
    and paperwork out of the State, but certainly with the process
    of withdrawing his Federal recognition, that would certainly
    lend to that decision and others. I'm not trying to prejudge
    the appropriateness of that discharge or any other discharge,
    I'm just saying it would bring a legal complication to the
    circumstances.
        But, if Congress were to pass it, and the President were to
    sign that, we would step forward and respect it and implement
    it.
        Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, but that's not the question.
    The question is, would you support a moratorium before the
    review, as conducted by the Secretary of Defense, is completed?
        Secretary McHugh. If the question is my personal opinion,
    if asked, the preference would be, we would not enact a
    moratorium.
        Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
        Unfortunately, last year we put hate crimes on the defense
    authorization. For the first time in history, we put a
    legislation that didn't have anything to do with defense
    authorization on the authorization bill, and I'm greatly
    concerned about what would be put on this authorization bill
    since the precedent was shattered last year by the majority by
    putting on legislation that had nothing to do with the Nation's
    defense.
        I thank you for your candid answers, and I thank all of you
    for your service to the country.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Just while we're on DADT, am I correct in concluding, based
    on your testimony, two things; one, if Congress adopted a
    moratorium on enforcement of DADT or adopted repeal and the
    President signed it, that you would carry out those those laws?
    Is that correct?
        Secretary McHugh. Absolutely.
        General Casey. Absolutely.
        Senator Lieberman. The second question is, on the question
    of repeal of DADT, what I'm hearing both of you say--maybe you
    want to fill it in--is that, this morning, you are neither
    supporting nor opposing repeal. Is that correct?
        Secretary McHugh. I have a somewhat different position on
    this matter, under the constructs of my responsibilities as
    Secretary. I work for the President of the United States and
    the Secretary of Defense. I entered this job with a full
    understanding, and the President has been consistently clear,
    that he supports repeal of this policy. Recent developments, of
    course, are the first steps by the administration to take steps
    to work in a way in which he believes can bring about an end to
    that. My job is to try to provide, as the Secretary of Defense
    is doing at this moment, the best possible information and
    views, from the Army's side, so that they can formulate
    whatever decision forward and way forward they may choose, and
    thereafter, to best explain and represent the policies that the
    Commander in Chief has put forward.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.
        I know, when we talked about this a while back, General
    Casey, I thought I understood you to say that you had some
    questions about a repeal, but that you were not taking a hard
    position either for or against, at this point.
        General Casey. Senator, I think that's fair. As I mentioned
    to you, I do have serious concerns about the impact of the
    repeal of the law on a force that's fully engaged in two wars
    and has been at war for 8\1/2\ years.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Casey. We just don't know the impacts on readiness
    and military effectiveness.
        Secretary McHugh. Exactly.
        General Casey. That's why I fully support what Secretary
    Gates has laid out. I'll fully participate in that. I feel I
    can provide my informed military judgments to the Secretary of
    Defense, the President, and Congress.
        Senator Lieberman. Good enough.
        Let me go on to the end strength question that Senator
    McCain took up for a moment in his questioning. We worked very
    hard to give you the increase in temporary end strength of
    22,000 soldiers. Based on the dwell time, the time back at
    base, that our troops have and the stress that they're under,
    and also, of course, based on the unpredictability of the two
    hot wars we're involved in, in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is
    to say, what demands there'd be on manpower we never can
    foresee--I notice there's a story in the paper this morning
    suggesting that, because of uncertainties surrounding the
    election in Iraq and the post-election negotiating to form a
    new government, that it may be necessary to keep more of our
    soldiers in Iraq longer than we had originally hoped. It's not
    clear yet, but while we're surging in Afghanistan. So, I want
    to get clear, just for the record, General Casey. Have you
    filled that 22,000 increase in end strength now?
        General Casey. We have not. We will fill up to 15,000 this
    year.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Casey. Then we'll make a decision, later this year,
    whether of not we want to complete the last 7,000. It's tied,
    as you would suggest, to the demand on our forces--and the
    drawdown in Iraq. I will tell you, because of what was already
    spoken of here--the military personnel costs--we will work to
    find the right balance between an Army that we can afford and
    an Army that is able to meet the Nation's demands at
    sustainable deployment rates for its soldiers.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate it. We had a hearing
    yesterday with Secretary Flournoy and General Paxton about a
    status report on where we are in the operations in Afghanistan
    and Marja, and based on statements that General McChrystal and
    General Petraeus have made, this is the beginning of a turn-
    the-momentum-against-the-Taliban operation that will presumably
    go from Marja in Helmand Province into Kandahar. These are all
    very troop intensive operations, and we know that, in this kind
    of conflict, numbers matter. So, I just want to express my
    hope--first a concern, if I can--that in the budget that you're
    receiving, this end strength increase temporarily goes to 2012.
    My concern is that you're going to get squeezed budgetarily to
    make a decision against the troop increase that we may need in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, because the truth is that personnel
    really do cost a lot of money. The net effect of that, I fear,
    will be that we will increase the stress on our forces and not
    do so well in combat. In a sense, the Secretary of Defense's
    decision--which I support with the fiscal year 2011 budget--to
    add two additional combat aviation brigades--which I supported,
    because it provides much needed aviation assets for the Army--
    also creates additional manpower and budgetary demands on our
    overtaxed force.
        So, you get my point. I'm concerned that the Army's going
    to be pressured, for reasons of money, not effectiveness in the
    field or your goal, which I totally support, of increasing
    dwell time, to not have the personnel we need to achieve those
    ends. How would you respond?
        General Casey. Senator, I share your concerns, and I assure
    you that we won't get pressed by that to do something that will
    impact a force that's already stretched by 8\1/2\ years of war.
    As I talked to you in your office, the Secretary and I will let
    you know, here, as we get closer to this, about how we're
    thinking on it and where we're going.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. I'll keep asking the
    question.
        Mr. Secretary, do you want to add anything?
        Secretary McHugh. Well, I would simply say, Senator, as
    both the Chief and I have discussed, we deeply appreciate that
    plus-up; and it was through yours and other great members of
    this committee that that came about. We feel that if our plans
    for drawdowns in Iraq and the continued plus-up goes according
    to the outlines, that we can meet our dwell objectives without
    that end strength. But, obviously, as General Odierno's
    comments in the media this morning suggest, this is a situation
    that could change, and we need to make that judgment at the
    appropriate time.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. Thank you.
        You have a lot of allies here in that cause, so thank you
    very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, again, thanks for your service.
        Mr. Secretary, you and I have been good friends for a long
    time, and I'm very proud of your service and your continuing
    commitment to our military Services, particularly the U.S.
    Army.
        My State continues to be at the forefront of both the war
    in Afghanistan and the conflict in Iraq. The 48th Brigade of
    the Georgia National Guard is in the process of returning home
    right now, after another very successful engagement, this time
    in Afghanistan. Of course, the 3rd Infantry Division is on
    their fourth tour in Iraq now and, again, just doing a terrific
    job. We're very proud of those folks.
        General Casey, you referenced in your statement that this
    budget includes all the remaining funding to complete the round
    of BRAC. While the Taliban can't stop the U.S. Army in
    Afghanistan, it appears that the red cockaded woodpecker in
    Georgia has at least slowed down the transfer of the Armor
    School. Can you give us an update on that, and does your budget
    reflect the fact that we're going to complete that in the short
    term?
        General Casey. The budget reflects the fact that we're
    going to complete the construction. Frankly, I am not up to
    speed on where we are with the red cockaded woodpecker.
        Mr. Secretary, I don't know if you have the data either.
        I'll find out, and let you know.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The move of the Armor School and stand up of the Maneuver Center of
    Excellence (MCOE) at Fort Benning is on track to meet the September 15,
    2011, BRAC 2005 deadline. The Sierra Club and the Southern
    Environmental Law Center have expressed concerns and discussed possible
    litigation regarding the adverse impact the military construction and
    subsequent training at the MCOE will have on the red cockaded-
    woodpecker (RCW), a federally listed endangered species. Thus far,
    several of the concerns expressed by the Sierra Club and the Southern
    Environmental Law Center have been satisfactorily addressed. Remaining
    issues of concern are expected to be resolved in late March 2010 when
    the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service issues a supplement to the existing
    Biological Opinion that will provide greater clarity and specificity on
    the requisite procedures to ensure proper management of the RCW.

        General Casey. I was down at Benning probably 2 months ago,
    and they told me that they were on track. They mentioned some
    problems, but they didn't think those were going to keep us
    from meeting that September 2011 date to have Armor Center down
    there.
        Senator Chambliss. Okay. Well, if you could just give us a
    followup on that in writing, or have your staff give me a call,
    that would be fine.
        Mr. Secretary, we previously discussed the issue of Fort
    Stewart and the Army's decision not to grow the additional
    three BCTs, as previously stated. With that in mind, the QDR
    mentions two pending reviews of our four European-based BCTs.
    As you well know, we eagerly await the outcome of those reviews
    and hope that the Army will give a hard look at where those
    BCTs should be based, and keep in mind both your commitments to
    NATO allies, as well as the need to have troops based in the
    continental United States.
        Now, in that regard, the fiscal year 2010 defense
    appropriation bill called for a review to be completed within
    60 days of enactment of the Department's efforts to mitigate
    the impact of the brigade basing decisions that I mentioned
    above on local communities. Can you give us the status of that,
    since we are at the 60-day mark?
        Secretary McHugh. The one thing I've learned, Senator,
    since my 5 months in the Pentagon, is that 60 days usually
    means 75. I've not yet seen that report. I promise you we will
    attempt to find out where it is for you and provide that
    information for you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Per the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Legislative
    Affairs congressional report tracking system, OSD (Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics) is writing this report and is expected to
    have it completed in the near future.

        Secretary McHugh. As to the rebasing, we expect the NATO
    review and the attendant U.S. posture reviews, as to the four
    brigade teams' end in the European theater, to be concluded,
    and, hopefully, a decision can be made whether they'll be
    retained in Europe or, perhaps, one or both be brought back
    home by the fall of this year.
        Senator Chambliss. Okay.
        With respect to the reset and replacement of the equipment
    that we are using, or have used, in Iraq over the last several
    years, it's pretty obvious, when you're on the ground over
    there, that a lot of this equipment is just simply worn out. If
    we're truly going to leave the Iraqis in a position to be able
    to maintain security, both internally and also threats from
    external sources, we're probably going to have to leave some
    equipment with them. What's the plan of the Army now with
    respect to how much of this equipment is truly going to be
    brought back to the United States to be reset, how much is
    going to be left there for the Iraqis, and how much is simply
    too worn out to do either of the above?
        General Casey. Senator, that is a great question. In fact,
    we have been working on the drawdown in Iraq for over 18
    months, and putting in place the stewardship boards to ensure
    that we have a good handle on this. As you suggest, just to
    give you an idea of the scope of this, this is about 3 million
    pieces of equipment in Iraq, and as you say, in various states
    of repair. About 70 percent of that equipment belongs to Army
    units. That will come back to the United States, get reset, and
    get put back into units. The remaining 30 percent is
    nonstandard equipment. About 95 percent of that will be
    retained for our future use. It's things like X-ray machines
    that we use at entry sites. About 5 percent will be made
    available to State agencies for emergency use.
        Right now, it looks like we will leave about half a billion
    dollars worth of excess equipment to the Iraqis, and that
    includes trucks, Humvees, rifles, generators, and those kinds
    of things. Part of that has been provided by the authorities
    that came from this committee. But, of all the billions of
    dollars, only about half a billion dollars will be left there
    for the Iraqis.
        Senator Chambliss. Okay. I think Senator McCain touched on
    the issue of the 22,000 personnel that we've plussed-up and
    whether or not we ought to make those permanent. But, without
    repeating the specific question that he asked--I hope I'm not--
    General Casey, what are your thoughts on making the current
    temporary increase of end strength at 22,000?
        General Casey. Senator, because of the costs of personnel
    and the impact of that on the rest of the programs within the
    budget, I want to look at it very closely. As I mentioned to
    Senator Lieberman, if we meet the drawdown in Iraq targets
    about as they've been laid out, we may not need the entire
    22,000, and we may not need to keep it. But, it's something
    we'll look very, very closely at here, probably over the next 6
    months.
        Senator Chambliss. I would fully expect this committee is
    going to support your decision, whatever it may be, but the one
    issue that I keep hearing, back home as I visit the Army posts,
    is the operational tempo issue, and it primarily comes from
    spouses, the same as what you already know, I'm sure. Trying to
    deal with that issue is not easy, but one way to do it is to
    make these 22,000 troops permanent.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
        General Casey, the Marines deployed, initially, MRAP
    vehicles that had specialized suspension for Afghanistan. Where
    is the Army in that process? Is that something you intend to
    do?
        General Casey. I was up at Aberdeen, and I looked at one of
    those systems up there, and we have a plant in Kuwait that is
    actively transitioning some of the MRAP vehicles that we have
    in theater to the new suspension system. So, we're actively
    working on that.
        Senator Reed. Is it your goal to fully equip all our Army
    forces in Afghanistan with those vehicles, or what is the plan?
        General Casey. My recollection, Senator, is that we're
    converting a certain type of MRAP vehicle. All MRAP vehicles
    don't necessarily need that kit, and so we'll continue to
    outfit those.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Both for the Secretary and for the Chief of Staff; as we go
    forward, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, hopefully the need for
    combat brigades will decrease, and the need for trainers will
    increase. How are you trying to accommodate that shift in the
    future?
        General Casey. We have been creating, probably for the last
    6 months or so, Senator, advise-and-assist brigades for Iraq
    and modular brigades that are augmented with additional
    trainers for Afghanistan. There's a two-phase training process:
    one, that when they go to their mission rehearsal exercise at
    one of our training centers, they get some training there; and
    then, last year, we stood up a new brigade whose sole mission
    is to conduct security force assistance trainings for general-
    purpose units. So, the leadership of those units also receives
    additional training in the skills required to work with
    indigenous forces, much like our Special Forces do. We're
    having great success with the combination of those.
        The other thing, Senator, I was down visiting a brigade
    from the 82nd at one of their exercises, and I said, ``What's
    the story, guys, can we really do this? Can conventional units
    do this training?'' There was silence, and then one of the
    battalion commanders said, ``Sir, it's what we've been doing
    for the last 4 years.'' Since 2005, our conventional forces
    have been actively working with the indigenous forces in Iraq
    and also in Afghanistan. So, we're getting much better at it.
        Senator Reed. This proposal you're talking about is the
    embedded trainers or units working with American brigades?
        General Casey. We put additional field-grade officers into
    existing brigades so that they can partner with divisions and
    border brigades, things like that.
        Senator Reed. But, at some point, the presence of
    brigades--in Iraq first, and then Afghanistan--will be minimal,
    and what about individual trainers or training structures that
    don't depend upon the brigades?
        General Casey. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have structures to
    stand up the institutional side of their armies. It's called
    MNSTC-I, in Iraq, and it's called CSTC-A, in Afghanistan.
    Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, USA, has been working in
    Afghanistan to stand it up. Frankly, it was under-resourced. In
    fact, we've just sent about 50 senior leaders from that
    training brigade to Bill Caldwell to augment his staff and
    continue to get things going there. That is where, currently in
    Afghanistan, he is having problems with the trainers, the
    institutional trainers that I think the Chairman mentioned in
    his opening statement.
        Senator Reed. Going forward, General and Mr. Secretary, are
    you consciously planning to resource this effort with qualified
    noncommissioned officers on an extended basis? Is that built
    into your plan?
        General Casey. Absolutely. In fact, we have begun selecting
    lieutenant colonel and colonel commanders, off of a command
    select list to command in those organizations.
        Senator Reed. Another aspect to this training issue is
    interagency training, prior to deployment. Is that going on,
    and how effective is that?
        General Casey. It is, but it's tough, Senator. What we wind
    up doing is contracting retired interagency folks to come out
    and give us that expertise as we're going through the training.
    The other agencies just aren't big enough to provide the folks
    that are actually going to be out there in time. So, that
    continues to be difficult.
        Senator Reed. So, there's no sort of training as you do
    before deploying military units to bring all of the relevant
    parts together, train for a period of time, and then deploy.
    You have surrogates, and then when they get in the field, they
    get together with the actual agency partners.
        General Casey. Right. If we're getting the actual partners
    there, it's by exception and not the rule.
        Senator Reed. There's been a lot of discussion about the
    DADT policy. Have you heard anything from commanders in the
    field in Afghanistan or Iraq about the readiness of British
    forces or Canadian forces, which do allow gay servicemembers to
    serve openly? Is there any reluctance, by American units, to
    cooperate? Any feedback from individual soldiers about their
    policies?
        General Casey. I have heard nothing from anyone about any
    conflicts with British or Canadian soldiers, or any other
    country's soldiers, that have already implemented that policy.
        Senator Reed. Have you had anybody suggest that their
    battle readiness was impaired by that policy?
        General Casey. I have not, Senator.
        Senator Reed. As you go forward, you're reorganizing the
    military--as you point out, the most significant reorganization
    in decades--is there any thought about changing the construct
    of the Reserve Forces, of putting more or less combat service
    support elements there? If there is, can you comment?
        General Casey. We're always trying the get the mix of
    Active component and Reserve component forces right. We made a
    conscious decision in 2004 to get through this, to complete
    this reorganization that we've done. Now we're reassessing and
    we're taking a hard look at ourselves to see if we have the mix
    right. That will take place over the next 6 months, and I'd be
    happy to keep you abreast of it as we go forward.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
        I just want to recognize and commend you Mr. Secretary for
    your leadership. We were all very gratified when the President
    nominated you, and your performance since then, Mr. Secretary,
    has been very exceptional, and I thank you for that service.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me echo my appreciation to both witnesses for their
    service. To reiterate what I said when Congressman McHugh was
    nominated by the President, I think the President chose well,
    and we're proud of the Secretary.
        Just to follow up on Senator Reed's question, General. Have
    you had conversations with British or Canadian generals of like
    rank about the transition and their observation with regard to
    DADT?
        General Casey. I have not, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. But, don't you think that might be a
    good idea, something you might pursue?
        General Casey. We will do that as part of this process.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Thank you.
        There's been a lot of discussion about MRAP vehicles today.
    In your prepared testimony, gentlemen, you say the Army is
    incorporating these vehicles throughout its unit formations. I
    understand that Secretary Gates mentioned sharing MRAP vehicles
    with our allies. To either one of you, are we going to do that,
    or is that just a notional concept? Would we be giving them to
    other countries? Would we be selling them under a foreign
    military sales-type program? Specifically, how many MRAP
    vehicles do we have in Iraq today? I have information that it's
    about 23,000. Would that be a fair number?
        General Casey. No, Senator. We have probably about 9,300
    MRAP vehicles or so in Iraq.
        Senator Wicker. Ninety-three hundred?
        General Casey. That's the total for the Army now.
        Senator Wicker. The Army.
        General Casey. We have almost 12,000 total deployed and
    about 600 of these MRAP all-terrain vehicles (MATVs) out there.
        Senator Wicker. Okay.
        General Casey. That number of 23,000 sounds high, but it
    may be all of the other Services thrown in there.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Is this part of the equipment that
    Senator Chambliss was talking about? Will some of these be left
    in control of the Iraqis? Are we going to bring them all back?
        Secretary McHugh. We're not through that process, as yet,
    Senator. I will tell you that, with respect to discussions to
    provide MRAP vehicles or any other piece of hardware to our
    allies, obviously we want them to be equipped as they help us
    on this or any other battlefield, they have adequate
    protection. But, the last I knew, the Secretary of Defense's
    position was that we must meet U.S. solders' requirements first
    and foremost.
        As to the means of disposal of those, either through some
    sort of in-kind donation or should they pay up front, it will
    be on a case-by-case basis, should we get to that point.
        Senator Wicker. Okay, now this refurbishing that Senator
    Reed asked about is taking place in Kuwait. Is that to make
    them ready for the different terrain in Afghanistan?
        General Casey. It's to put a more agile suspension system
    on them, yes.
        Senator Wicker. Will all of them have to go through this
    refurbishing before they're sent to Afghanistan?
        General Casey. Senator, I don't believe so, but I don't
    know exactly. So, I will provide that to you for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Yes. All mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles that are
    being redistributed from Iraq to Afghanistan are routed thru the Army's
    MRAP Sustainment Facility in Kuwait. This ensures all required
    maintenance actions are performed before these vehicles are shipped to
    our forces in Afghanistan.

        Senator Wicker. Okay.
        General Casey. It will apply to some models for sure. I
    don't know that it applies to all the models, but I'll get you
    that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Based on past experience, virtually all vehicles require some level
    of maintenance work after being redeployed to Kuwait. Current
    priorities at the mine-resistant ambush-protected Sustainment Facility
    are the Maxx Pro (manufactured by International Military Group of
    NAVISTAR), CAIMAN (manufactured by BAE, Inc.) and Force Protection
    variants.
        In the case of the Cougar, the Joint Program Office (JPO) is
    planning to install an independent suspension system on 515 Cougar
    vehicles on loan to the U.S. Army from the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S.
    Navy. This system will better enable the Cougar to operate within the
    challenging terrain of Afghanistan. The JPO has modified approximately
    600 U.S. Marine Corp and U.S. Navy Cougars. These vehicles were
    modified in Kuwait and are now operating in Afghanistan.

        Senator Wicker. I understand we're transitioning from the
    MRAP vehicle to the MATV. Are we going to be building any more
    MRAP vehicles or are we going to start making MATVs
    exclusively, at this point?
        Secretary McHugh. My understanding is that the various
    platforms of MRAP vehicles will continue. The theater demand is
    for the MATV, but that doesn't suggest that some of the other
    variants don't have suitability and applicability in other
    uses, and that will be examined on a case-by-case basis. But,
    clearly, from the battlefield, the MATV, particularly in
    Afghanistan, is the high-demand platform.
        We're getting the impression you're interested in MRAP
    vehicles.
        Senator Wicker. Indeed, and other members of the panel have
    been interested in MRAP vehicles.
        One other line of questioning, and that's with regard to
    the Fire Scout vehicles. They've been made by Northrop Grumman,
    in my State of Mississippi. I was disappointed when Secretary
    Gates canceled the program.
        We have eight Fire Scout vehicles manufactured, sitting in
    storage in the manufacturing plant in Mississippi. The
    President's budget indicates that the Army is working to
    transfer existing assets to the Navy or Special Forces. But, my
    question is, it would seem to me that the Army would need a
    vertical takeoff-and-landing capability in Afghanistan, much as
    the Fire Scout can provide. So, can either one of you tell me
    why the Army decided to cancel the Fire Scout program? When
    will the Army present Congress with its plan on moving forward
    with existing assets that have been manufactured and are
    sitting unused? Is the Army currently conducting any studies to
    determine the need for a vertical takeoff-and-landing unmanned
    air system capability in its future force?
        General Casey. Senator, if I could, I'd answer those in
    reverse. Right now, we don't have any studies ongoing for a
    vertical takeoff and landing system. We will get you the plan
    for how we intend to deal with the existing systems here within
    the next 60 days.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        With the termination of the Class IV Unmanned Aerial System, the
    U.S. Army considered several options for disposition of the eight U.S.
    Army Fire Scouts that are currently at Moss Point, MS. While a final
    decision has not yet been made, the Army anticipates transferring the
    Fire Scouts to the U.S. Navy as soon as possible to facilitate their
    continued development of the Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial System.

        General Casey. Now to the question of why did we go down
    this road to begin with? The bottom line is, Senator, that we
    developed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strategy that gave
    us more capability at less cost. We studied this over the last
    year, and we looked at the payload, the cost, and the force
    structure that was attendant to operating the different
    systems. When we compared it to an improved Shadow, which is a
    system that's already in the force, the Shadow gave us more
    value for the money, and more capability for the money, as
    well. While a vertical takeoff-and-landing capability is
    convenient, it just didn't put it over the top, in terms of the
    capabilities that the improved Shadow gave us for the cost.
        Senator Wicker. The Shadow doesn't have that vertical
    capability. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to add my welcome to Secretary McHugh and General
    Casey, and I want to thank you for your distinguished service
    to our country.
        I also want to thank the men and women of our Army, both
    uniformed and civilian, who serve our country proudly. Also, I
    want to thank Army families, who make many sacrifices while
    their loved ones serve our country.
        Mr. Secretary, the number of servicemembers returning from
    deployment who have mental health issues is a great concern.
    Many servicemembers are reluctant to volunteer information that
    could reflect negatively on the state of their mental health.
    Secretary McHugh, considering servicemembers' reservations to
    volunteer such information, can you update us on the Army's
    efforts to proactively identify and assist soldiers in dealing
    with mental health issues? Also, for those transitioning from
    the Active component, how is the Army helping them to find
    mental healthcare, either from the VA or from the civilian
    sector?
        Secretary McHugh. You raise a very important point,
    Senator. There has long been the attitude, amongst men and
    women in uniform across the Services, that somehow mental
    health is a shortcoming, a handicap, a weakness. From the Army
    side--and, I think it's fair to say, from all of the Services--
    we're working very hard to try do change the opinions of those
    who we hope will find themselves in a position to reach out for
    help. Earlier, the Chief mentioned Comprehensive Soldier
    Fitness, and this change of attitude has to begin at the very
    basic level, and that is to have Army doctrine treat physical
    fitness and mental fitness along the same par. That is the
    attempt of this initiative. I think it's fair to say that,
    combined with the online mental health assessments that are
    available through that program, and coupled with the resilience
    trainers that are increasingly going out into the units and
    helping soldiers become more resilient, that they're beginning
    to understand it's okay to seek out help.
        We have the same challenge, quite frankly, that we see in
    the civilian community, and that is a difficulty in bringing on
    necessary behavioral health specialists. In fact, we're at
    about 86 percent of our stated requirements for those
    behavioral health providers, and we're working, each and every
    day, to try build on that. But, we've had success, I would
    argue, particularly in moving our concern about behavioral
    health, and our focus on it, away from just the predeployment.
    We're reaching out into the battlefields. We have the mental
    health advisory teams that come back and provide advice to us
    as to what we can do to extend that service. Now in the
    battlefields, both Iraq and Afghanistan, we have mental health
    specialists dealing with the troops, dealing with them on
    patient-to-provider ratios that, frankly, are better than our
    stated requirement. We have a requirement in theater of about 1
    of these behavioral health providers for every 700 soldiers, in
    both Iraq and Afghanistan. We're just about or just above the
    1-to-600.
        So, the way you get people to understand it's okay is to
    act as if it's okay and by providing that kind of care and
    destigmatizing it. That's key to our success in the future, and
    it's certainly key to our activity, thus far.
        Senator Akaka. The other part of that question was on
    whether there are any efforts being made to help them plan for
    their healthcare from either the VA or the private sector.
        Secretary McHugh. We don't just turn people loose, Senator.
    When soldiers redeploy, thanks to the work of both Houses of
    Congress, and certainly this and the House Armed Services
    Committee, we're now providing not one but two post-deployment
    reassessments. We're trying to create a continuum where we can,
    more early on, identify folks who are either likely or who are
    encountering problems; and when those people are identified, we
    try to provide for them in house.
        Where distance becomes a challenge, as it often does with
    respect to the Reserve component, we're working through the
    Reserves, through the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, and
    others to make sure that we can do everything we can to connect
    people who are in need, based on their service challenges, to
    those who can provide them help.
        I don't want to suggest that we have this perfect. We
    don't. But, it is, nevertheless, something we focus on every
    day, and we're improving every day. But, we still have a ways
    to go.
        Senator Akaka. I'm very interested, Secretary McHugh, in
    collaboration between the Services and the VA. Of note, the
    Army has worked with the VA on a Physical Disability Evaluation
    System pilot program, and a Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record
    systems. Mr. Secretary, can you give me an update on the pilot
    program and how you are addressing the challenges of creating a
    Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record system?
        Secretary McHugh. I can provide you an overview, and I
    think the Chief could give you more detail, because he's been
    focused on this. I spent a lot of time in Congress, on the
    House Armed Services Committee, frankly, frustrated at the
    disconnect between the various evaluation systems maintained in
    the military versus those in the VA, and we're working very
    hard, particularly post what we found out at the Walter Reed
    Army Medical Center. One of the great frustrators of soldiers,
    in our Warrior Transition Units who were doing the
    transitioning from the military to the VA disability system,
    was that disconnect and the frustration of repetitive dealings.
        The last report I got is that the model study is going
    fairly well and they hope to have it completed and results in
    the relatively near future. But, I'd defer to the Chief for any
    fill-in-the-blanks he might have.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        Chief?
        General Casey. The pilot is currently working at 10 places,
    and we're going to increase it by another 5 in March. That,
    frankly, is not as fast as I'd like to see it go, because
    intuitively, we all believe it's the way that we should go.
        The general feedback we get from the soldiers is, they see
    the one physical given in the pilot is more fair, because it
    allows them to start getting their benefits sooner.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, both of you, for your service, and I look
    forward to continuing to work with you to support the finest
    Army this Nation, I think, has ever fielded. They've been under
    great stress, and have exceeded all our expectations. I'm so
    proud of the men and women that serve.
        Just a few issues that I'd like to raise. General Casey, we
    have a continual discussion about unmanned aerial systems, and
    there was some confusion, for a period of time, about who was
    going to be responsible for that. I think that matter has been
    settled with clarity.
        First, is that so? Second, we've seen how effective they
    can be, is there any need to expand the number of military
    units and reduce the size of the units that have access to this
    kind of capability?
        General Casey. To answer your first question, we have
    worked very closely with the Air Force over the last 18 months
    to resolve who's in charge, and at what level. I feel very
    comfortable that we have resolved those differences.
        Senator Sessions. Was that different from Secretary
    England's decision? Have you made any changes from what I
    understood his decision was?
        General Casey. What I was speaking of, Senator, was the
    employment aspect of it, not the procurement side of it.
        The other thing I would say is I think you know that, in
    this budget, we have been given some additional assets to
    procure some additional UAVs. In fact, several companies of our
    top-line UAV. I think we all feel that these systems give our
    soldiers, not only a great capability to operate in irregular
    warfare operations, but they are relevant across the spectrum
    of conflict.
        Senator Sessions. Well, like I said, we have MRAP vehicles
    and we spend a lot of money on those protective vehicles. But,
    there was an article in the paper, in the last few days, about
    a young officer using an unmanned aerial system to identify a
    group of people planting an IED in the road. So, it could save
    lives in a lot of different ways. I just hope that you will not
    hesitate to ask for what you need.
        Second, with regard to the Commanders' Emergency Response
    Program (CERP) funds and the funds, General Casey, that
    soldiers have to deal with local civilians. Let's say, in the
    Afghan theater, there's a village, remote from the central
    government, that has always sort of taken care of its own
    matters. What I think we learned in Iraq--and you were there
    when it really happened--was that if you work with some of the
    local leaders, and can help them have the resources to hire and
    train local people who are going to defend the local community,
    sometimes you get a lot better result than if you take those
    young people and send them off to some distant part of the
    country, where they have no family and not the same loyalty.
        As I understand it, the commanders have certain abilities
    to utilize funds through CERP to work with local leaders, but
    the substantial majority of the money may be going through the
    State Department, and often they're not in these more remote
    villages. My question is: are you satisfied that you have
    enough funds, based on the amount that's out there, to actually
    work with local leaders, shake hands with them, make some
    commitments, and be able to deliver on those commitments in a
    way that can transform a whole village, region, or valley in a
    more positive way?
        General Casey. Senator, there's $1.3 billion in the fiscal
    year 2011 budget for CERP funds. The bulk of that, $1.1
    billion, is going to Afghanistan. That seems to me to be an
    appropriate amount for what their needs are there, at the low
    level.
        Senator Sessions. Can that be used at the local level,
    let's say, to help a local leader hire a police force, and pay
    those people?
        General Casey. Yes. I'm a little rusty on the exact
    restrictions they have. Hiring people sometimes is outside of
    the realm of CERP.
        Senator Sessions. Well, there we go.
        General Casey. But, certainly it can be used----
        Senator Sessions. See that's the problem. It was in the
    Washington Post; they had an interesting article about it.
    Ambassador Eikenberry and Ambassador Holbrooke were quoted
    about it, and they have concerns. Kabul has concerns. They like
    everybody to answer only to them, of course. But, didn't we
    have success in Iraq, when you were there, in creating loyalty
    with the local leaders by the military people being able to
    deliver, and help them provide jobs and security forces for
    their people?
        General Casey. Yes, Senator. I was just there before
    Christmas and I'm not getting any feedback that that's not
    happening in Afghanistan.
        Senator Sessions. There's still some uncertainty about it.
    I just hope, Mr. Secretary, sometimes DOD has to defend its
    legitimate interest in the internal bureaucracies that are out
    there. I don't know precisely where the line ought to be drawn,
    but I know, in certain areas of Afghanistan, there really is no
    State Department presence. The only presence there is a
    trained, skilled military officer, who meets with a tribal
    leader, and he needs to be able to offer that leader something,
    and make decisions that could neutralize hostilities and save
    lives. Is that something you've thought about?
        Secretary McHugh. I have, and it's something that I agree
    with you about. The workings between State and DOD on this
    program took some time. My understanding is that now it's
    working relatively well, that commanders on the ground do have
    access to those funds that provide, as you correctly noted,
    Senator, a great opportunity and a great option to create local
    jobs through various construction projects, be it a repair of a
    road, or be it construction----
        Senator Sessions. What about security forces?
        Secretary McHugh. I have to demur, as I think I heard the
    Chief do.
        Senator Sessions. Well, it's a pretty big issue, would you
    agree that that's a big issue? Will you look at it? That's all
    I'm asking.
        Secretary McHugh. I'm not disagreeing. What I'm saying is,
    I'm not certain, under the current construct, if direct hiring
    is allowable under CERP. I just don't know of it is or it
    isn't. Generally, a CERP is a construction program that
    provides jobs and, obviously, economic security in that way. If
    there's an opportunity for hiring of direct forces, we're
    generally inclined to do that through other means. But we can
    certainly check and get back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Direct hiring of local security personnel is not allowed under the
    Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP may be used for
    short-term security contracts that hire security personnel on a
    temporary basis to guard critical infrastructure.

        Senator Sessions. General Casey, just briefly, you did that
    in Iraq. The forces were able to partner with local people, put
    their local young men on the payroll as security forces, and
    they ran al Qaeda out of their villages, time and time again,
    didn't they?
        General Casey. I think that happened afterwards. I don't
    recall hiring security forces with CERP.
        Senator Sessions. I don't know where they got their money
    but I'm just telling you, that's a big deal. They don't have
    time to send them off a year to Kabul to be trained and get
    sent some other place in Afghanistan. I mean, the reality is
    now; you've cleared a village or whatever, and you have some
    support and I just think we need to cut through this and be
    able to recognize, in some areas of the country, that the
    military are the only real people there that make a good
    decision, and they should have access to some of those funds,
    if need be, to do that.
        General Casey. I'll check on that and get back with you.
        Secretary McHugh. I'll double check on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Military commanders in Afghanistan do have access to the
    Commanders' Emergency Response Program funds and may use those funds to
    contract for temporary security guards to protect critical
    infrastructure, including neighborhoods and other public areas in a
    village. The contracts must be short-term, usually for the life of the
    project involved, but not to exceed 365 days.

        Senator Sessions. I have some other questions I'll submit
    to you in writing.
        I, again, thank you for your service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        I do believe that Senator Sessions is correct. I think the
    CERP funding has been authorized at least for the reintegration
    piece; it's not just for construction. I think it's been
    specifically authorized for reintegration, which would include
    payroll.
        Secretary McHugh. We will certainly check and see how
    that's being applied.
        Chairman Levin. I think it is not only authorized, I think
    it's been used for that purpose, at least to reintegrate some
    of the lower-level Taliban with some pay for them.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for your service.
        I thank the members of the Army for your service, as well
    as the families who support our men and women in uniform.
        I'd like to turn to military construction (MILCON), just
    for a moment, Secretary McHugh and General Casey. General
    Casey, you and I have talked about reset and recapitalization,
    so what I'm really addressing is, the budget request includes
    significant funding increases to replace aging facilities for
    the National Guard and the Reserves. Obviously, the investment
    is critical, considering the Guard and Reserve personnel
    comprise some 51 percent of your end strength. But, your
    request for Guard and Reserve MILCON, while $1.2 billion, is
    less than 1 percent of your total base budget, and only a fifth
    of your total MILCON request. Some of Nebraska's Guard units,
    for example, are lacking, currently, adequate space to store
    and reset new equipment. For example, Nebraska units lack 33
    acres for improved and unimproved parking to store new trucks,
    tractors, and trailers, as well as 8,000 square feet of heated
    storage and 3,500 square feet of security vault storage.
        We'll take this for the record, but what is the current
    state of our Guard and Reserve infrastructure at the present
    time? Perhaps you could make some general comments. We'd like
    to have something more for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The current state of Army Reserve infrastructure is adequate to
    support its current missions but inadequate to support all its
    missions. Competing requirements from mission areas such as Grow the
    Army, Army Modular Force, Army Force Generation, provide facility lease
    options to address Army requirements to support unit stationing plans
    and others will always be a constraint to a modernized infrastructure.
    The average age of Army Reserve facilities is over 42 years old, the
    majority of facilities are under-sized for today's mission
    requirements, encroached upon by local community activities and are
    Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection non compliant. Base Realignment and
    Closure Act of 2005 (BRAC 2005) funding helped tremendously in
    providing over 120 new Air Force Reserve Commands that meet today's
    operational and training needs; however, BRAC 2005 funding modernized
    only 11 percent of the Army Reserve Center facility inventory. The Army
    National Guard has stated that they could use $1.5 billion per year for
    20 years to address revitalizing their facilities.

        Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary McHugh?
        Secretary McHugh. Senator, as we have begun to
    operationalize the Guard and Reserve, there have been
    significant challenges. The first wave of those challenges were
    based largely on the equipment side. If you look at the state
    of both the personnel, as well as the equipment readiness for
    Guard and Reserve, although still a work in progress, we've
    made some successful steps. The personnel readiness ratings
    have improved about 4 percent this year over last. The
    equipment, right now, is at about 79 percent readiness. If you
    count substitute equipment, that raises to about 89 percent.
    But what that tells us is, we have a long way to go.
        As to the distribution of MILCON, certainly, if I were in a
    Guard or Reserve unit, I'd feel as though I wasn't getting what
    I needed, and we have to admit that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, that's why, in taking them to an
    operational Reserve, it has to be thorough with respect to not
    only equipment, but to their facilities, so that the facilities
    management is capable of taking care of the equipment and
    keeping them an Operational Ready Reserve. So, that's my
    concern, and obviously it's your concern, as well. But, I hope
    that you can address that in more detail for us and for the
    record.
        Secretary McHugh. We will do that, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Army fully supports the fiscal year 2011 President's budget
    request. The fiscal year 2011 request completes the U.S. Army Reserve's
    Grow the Army effort to provide new facilities for those additional
    soldiers. However, funding is currently not sufficient to address all
    of the Army Reserve's requirements to include modernizing our legacy
    facilities, provide new/upgraded maintenance facilities, provide
    leasing funded options to address Army requirements to field units
    faster and upgrade our facilities to meet current mission standards and
    anti-terrorism/force protection set back requirements. Long-term
    solutions for all of the remaining requirements (such as recapitalizing
    existing facilities for existing missions) necessitates a long-term
    funding strategy beyond the Future Years Defense Program. Obsolete
    legacy facilities adversely affect readiness, organizations, missions
    and installations across the Army. This issue affects all Army commands
    and components and adversely impacts the mission and organizations.

        Secretary McHugh. As I said, we're making progress, but
    it's incremental, at best, I would agree with you.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, if we don't continue to make
    progress, what we'll see happen is what would be fairly
    obvious, that would be a sliding back of the capabilities of
    the Guard and Reserve to be that Operational Reserve, and
    readiness will suffer, I think, as we all understand.
        On human capital, one of the biggest challenges will be
    managing and expanding the new missions while maintaining the
    fixed end strength. A significant number of questions have been
    asked about that. What I'd like to do is focus on the
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission seeing a
    great deal of growth all across the services, due in part
    because of this expansion of the UAVs. How will the Army be
    able to staff the growing needs of these missions, both as to
    the increased number of units and increased number of these
    UAVs? What are we doing to be able to keep pace with the
    growing nature of the use of such?
        General?
        General Casey. That's a great question, Senator, we have
    learned a lot over the course of the last 8\1/2\ years about
    intelligence, particularly in how to apply intelligence in this
    environment. We are in the process of going through another
    significant reevaluation of our whole intelligence structure.
    As we look at this, we do very good analysis of where our gaps
    and shortfalls are. But, what we don't do well, and what we are
    working on, is redundancies, and how to get at redundancies. To
    get at high-payoff forces, like the intelligence forces, we
    have to continue to be able to free up redundant forces from
    other areas, to put them in these high-payoff areas. That
    process is hard, but it's ongoing right now.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Do you think that we're maintaining an
    adequate pace? Is it something we need to step up in order to
    have our readiness there be as sufficient as we would like it?
        General Casey. I think you always like to go faster. We are
    keenly aware of the fact that we're at war and we have soldiers
    deployed, and I think we're moving on this about as fast as is
    reasonably possible, Senator.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I've also noticed that the fiscal year
    2011 request includes $507 million to buy 29 MQ-1 drones, and a
    plan to spend $2.9 billion on 158 of these aircraft by 2015.
    The Air Force's request, $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2011, to
    purchase 48 MQ-9 drones, and they'll spend $7.3 billion on 341
    MQ-9s over the same period.
        Is there intercooperation between the Air Force and the
    Army sufficiently on this so that there's no overlap or
    underlap, in that we don't have a stovepipe situation
    developing where we have ours, they have theirs? Obviously,
    coordination of these efforts would strengthen our overall
    military.
        General Casey. You're exactly right. I've been working
    directly with the Air Force Chief for almost 2 years on UAV
    issues. I can't look you in the eye and tell you we've
    eliminated all the redundancies, Senator, but we will continue
    to work closely with the Air Force to avoid that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. These are not only essential military
    requirements we need to meet to have the sufficient number of
    UAVs for certain, but we don't want to underlap the situation
    in any significant way, because, obviously, the information can
    be exchanged readily if there's a willingness to do it. I
    appreciate the fact that you're suggesting to us that you're
    working with your counterpart in the Air Force. I hope that
    will continue. Obviously, I'm going to ask the Air Force the
    same question. So, if I can smooth the process for you, I'll be
    happy to.
        General Casey. Use my name, yes.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I'll use your name. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Casey, 6 years ago this week, at a hearing before
    the Personnel Subcommittee, you and I had a discussion about
    the problem of sexual assaults in the military. At that time,
    you stated that the Army had a zero-tolerance policy, and you
    pledged your commitment to trying to deal with this growing
    problem.
        Last fiscal year, however, there were 2900 reports of
    sexual assaults among servicemembers; and obviously, since the
    Army's the biggest, on a percentage basis, the majority of
    those assaults occurred among our soldiers. This reflected an
    increase of 8 percent over the previous fiscal year.
        Now, I understand that the Army is contending that this is
    a result of better reporting and that our female soldiers, in
    particular, feel more comfortable now coming forward to report
    assaults, but it is still extremely troubling that we're seeing
    those kinds of numbers. Why haven't we made more progress in
    the past 6 years in this troubling area?
        General Casey. Senator, that's a fair question, and I can
    tell you, I still remember that hearing. As the Vice Chief, I
    went back and we worked very hard to put together a prevention
    and response program because we, frankly, didn't have one that
    was effective. We worked very hard on it.
        When I came back to this job--it was probably about 18
    months ago, now--I was sitting down and getting a report on
    where we'd come, and I was shown the data for the last year, I
    think it was the year before, and we were clearly the highest
    of the Services. I was told the same thing that you were,
    ``Well, we just report better.'' I said, ``Baloney.'' As I
    bored into it, it was clear to me that we had a program that
    was almost entirely focused on response, on helping the victim
    after it happened, and not on the prevention. Secretary Geren
    and I sat down and used Secretary Geren's experience when he
    was working with the Air Force on this, to put together a
    program to change our culture so that we could prevent the
    assaults before they happened. We kicked that off in the end of
    2008, and we put $28 million in his budget to bring that
    program to fruition. We recognized--and we started it in 2008--
    that it was a culture change and that it was going to take some
    time. But, we're absolutely committed to staying on this until
    we fix it. I still feel that we're zero-tolerance, and we have
    to be.
        Senator Collins. Secretary McHugh, would you like to add
    anything?
        Secretary McHugh. I would, Senator. As you and I have
    talked before, there's very few, if any, other single issues
    that are more contrary to the Army values than sexually
    assaulting or harassing another member in uniform, or anyone,
    for that matter. I made the pledge to you and to others in the
    House--Congresswoman Harman, for example--and any number of
    others who have, thankfully, focused on this issue so
    carefully.
        The Chief, I think, has highlighted what the Army needs to
    do, and that is to change the culture. I can't tell you how it
    came to the level it did. I don't want to say it was ever
    acceptable, because it wasn't, but clearly, there was some kind
    of disconnect amongst our young soldiers that didn't help them
    understand more clearly, this is not just wrong, it's
    unacceptable. The I. A.M. Strong program, under the SHARP
    program, as you're aware, is the major means by which we convey
    that new attitude of values. It's something we're working very
    hard. The Chief correctly mentioned the $28-million
    appropriation in the President's proposed budget for this.
        But I think we need to, as well, while changing the
    culture, help those victims understand that, if they do come
    forward, they're going to be helped. That critically means that
    we're going to pursue, legally, those that have committed these
    acts. I think there was an attitude amongst many, largely
    female, victims that if they reported, they'd become a victim
    again by a system that just didn't follow through and somehow
    didn't care.
        We have worked hard to start, in our Judge Advocate General
    schools, to put courses in for prosecutors to pursue these.
    We've hired highly qualified experts and forensic scientists
    who are skilled in pursuing crime scenes, and brought in new
    prosecutors, as well, so that those soldiers who are the victim
    of this horrendous, unacceptable crime, when they are brave
    enough to come forward, see that it means something and we
    follow through.
        So, the Chief correctly said, it's frustrating, in that it
    doesn't happen overnight, but we are fully committed to that.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        I know, from our discussions, that you also share my
    concern about the enormous increase in suicides in the Army.
    You've had a previous discussion with members of this panel
    about the need for more mental health services. Secretary
    McHugh, I just want to commend you for your emphasis in talking
    about not just physical fitness, but mental and emotional
    fitness. I think that's absolutely critical.
        It's troubling that the Army had its worst year on record
    last year, as far as the number of suicides. But, it's even
    more troubling that we don't know why, that there doesn't seem
    to be a correlation--at least that's what I'm told--between the
    number of deployments or whether the person is in the Reserve
    or on Active Duty. Are we any closer to understanding why there
    is this troubling spike in suicides?
        Secretary McHugh. Sadly, the answer is not much closer. We
    have instituted--and I appreciate your kind comments--the
    Comprehensive Social Fitness program, that I think is so
    critical, and we're transitioning that now to families, as
    well, to help people become more mentally resilient. That was a
    lot of great work by the Chief and by my predecessor. Those
    kinds of things need to continue to help people better cope.
        But, as to why people take this step, particularly as to
    why men and women in uniform do, we're still, in many ways,
    befuddled. The best hope I see, in terms of understanding it
    truly, is the 5-year longitudinal study that the Vice Chief of
    Staff of the Army has headed up for us, with the Institute of
    Mental Health, that will take a cold, hard look, over a
    necessary period of time, to try to better understand that.
    Frankly, we don't have much better answers in the civilian
    community either.
        But, as you noted, 160 suicides last year in the Army, the
    highest number ever, tells us that we have to focus in on this
    even more strongly, and we're doing that.
        The one thing I would say about this 5-year study--it seems
    like a long time, and it is--is that there is a process for
    quarterly reports, so that, as things hopefully come to light
    as we begin to understand things we might do in the interim,
    the data will be provided, and the guidance provided, for us to
    step forward and to try to put into place some measures that
    will hopefully provide some solutions.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey, thank you very much for
    being here today, for your service and your testimony.
        General Casey, thank you for bringing the individuals you
    introduced.
        I want to thank each and every one of you for your service
    to our military.
        I do want to say that we all know that we have the best
    army in the world and that Fort Bragg's 82nd Airborne Division
    is leading the effort in the Regional Command East in
    Afghanistan, and there are also elements of the 82nd throughout
    Afghanistan and Iraq, advising, assisting, and partnering with
    the Afghan National Security Forces, as well as the Iraqi
    Security Forces.
        I also want to point out the exceptional contributions to
    the Army Special Forces in theater, as well as the 30th BCT
    from the North Carolina National Guard. I can't tell you how
    proud we are of the incredibly important job that they are
    doing.
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey, in your opening
    statements, both of you talked about the commitment that you
    have for the families. Secretary McHugh, you said that the
    number one concern to you is the care for families and the
    programs for them. General Casey, when you were talking about
    getting the Army back in balance, you stated that dwell time
    was the most important issue in order to get back in balance.
    Then you gave details about that.
        Obviously, ensuring family readiness plays a big role in
    Army retention. Improving the quality of life of our Army
    families allows our soldiers to operate in theater more
    effectively. I'd like to have you comment on some of the
    enhanced family programs that you have mentioned and which are
    included in this budget.
        Secretary McHugh. I appreciate, first of all, the great
    service of all those great North Carolinians you mentioned, not
    just in Fort Bragg, but your Reserve component soldiers. I was
    over there; I had a chance to visit with some of them, and they
    should make you proud. They make all of us proud.
        If you can't tell, I will state it for the record, I'm a
    big admirer of Secretary Pete Geren, my predecessor, and one of
    many great things he did is work with the Chief of Staff and
    really make a commitment to our Army families that we're going
    to do everything we can to return the sacrifice that, as you so
    correctly noted, Senator, they make, each and every day on our
    behalf. The main conveyance of that was the Army Family
    Covenant. It was one of the first acts I did when I came to the
    Pentagon was to resign that in a ceremony that reaffirmed our
    commitment to those families and the various programs that
    we've instituted to try to attend to their needs.
        We have done a good job on funding. In fact, over the last
    several years, the appropriations for Army family programs has
    doubled. It was about $750,000 when we started, now just 2
    short years later, it's up to $1.5 billion. The President's
    budget would increase it to $1.7 billion, and by the end of
    2015 it would be up to $1.9 billion according to the planned
    way forward.
        It does a whole host of things. It provides respite care
    for the caregivers and families whose soldier is deployed; it
    provides respite care to those soldiers and their families who
    have children with special needs; there's the Spousal
    Employment that works with Fortune 100 and 500 companies to
    provide employment opportunities for spouses. In fact, we've
    had the great success through those terrific companies of
    filling jobs for more than 35,000 Army spouses, and just on and
    on and on.
        It's just something we have to do. You noted, we sign up
    the soldier, we re-sign the family. It's something that we
    believe in very, very devoutly. We have a plan for creation of
    50-some new child development centers, 7 new youth centers,
    just trying to take the whole range of family needs and show
    them that the family cares.
        General Casey. The only thing I really can add is, as you
    point out, keeping the families understanding that we really
    are committed to them over the long haul is an essential part
    of holding this force together over the next couple of years.
        Senator Hagan. Well, I appreciate your signing of the Army
    Family Covenant. I do think that's extremely important. I think
    these programs, and the enhancement of the programs, are
    certainly playing a big role in the families and the retention.
    So, I thank you for that.
        I know we've had a lot of discussion today about the MRAP
    vehicles. I wanted to say that I'm supportive of the Joint
    Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program; however, I want to learn
    more about how that program fits within the Army's long-term
    ground vehicle strategy. When the JLTV program first began in
    2006, the MRAP vehicle requirement did not exist, and the
    unforecasted procurement of significant numbers of the MRAP
    vehicles has impacted the overall JLTV program. The Army has
    stated that the MRAP vehicles fill a short-term urgent joint
    service requirement in order, obviously, to protect our
    soldiers, while the JLTVs are the long-term solution.
        Can you describe how it is in the best interests of the
    Army to maintain the JLTV and the MRAP vehicle, given their
    overlapping missions and requirements, and how does the JLTV
    service the long-term solution in order to better protect our
    soldiers?
        Secretary McHugh. Let me take the first swat at that,
    Senator. It really all starts with Humvees. The Army did an
    assessment this year as to the requirements for the current
    light tactical vehicle in the Army fleet, the Humvee. What we
    discovered is, we had totally met our stated requirements for
    that platform. As such, there are no funds included in this
    budget for any more procurement, beyond the stated contract,
    for Humvees.
        The question we have to ask ourselves is: how do we provide
    for a light tactical vehicle until the JLTV, the joint program
    with the Marine Corps, is up and running? The answer to that is
    really two-fold. One, we've experienced far fewer battle
    losses, and far fewer breakdowns on the Humvee platforms than
    originally expected. So we feel that we can meet a large part
    of that through recapitalization and reset of the platforms we
    have available. As you said, about 3,000 or so of the Humvee
    requirements can be met by our MRAP vehicle stocks. So until
    the JLTV comes onto line, we feel very comfortable that we have
    a light tactical vehicle that will serve and keep safe our men
    and women in uniform.
        One of the concerns of the Humvee, of course, is that
    commanders are telling us that it does not provide, in its
    manufactured state, the level of protection that is necessary.
    We hope the JLTV will meet that need.
        General Casey. The other thing I'd add to that is in
    response to another question over here about; what's our
    wheeled vehicle strategy?
        Senator Hagan. Right.
        General Casey. We are in the throes of completing that.
    But, DOD has had a significant investment in the MRAP vehicle,
    and we have to figure out how to incorporate that into our
    force, and into our overall wheeled vehicle strategy.
        Senator Hagan. I have another host of questions concerning
    this, but I believe my time has run out, so I'd put those on
    the record.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service.
        When it comes to mental health professionals, I know
    they're in short supply nationwide, but approximately many more
    mental health professionals do we need to address some of the
    problems related to suicide and just general mental health
    problems? What's the strategy to find these people?
        Secretary McHugh. The requirement of behavioral health
    providers in the Army is 4,304 as I mentioned earlier, we are
    at 86 percent of that, which, if my math is correct, is 3,714.
        So, we are roughly about 600 short. The strategy is to try
    to use the flexibilities that this Congress has provided us in
    creating incentive programs and outreach programs to try to
    convince those folks, who obviously are in great demand in the
    private sector, to come and to serve their Nation in the Army.
        Senator Graham. Do you have the tools you need to be
    competitive with the private sector?
        Secretary McHugh. We're making progress. I guess that would
    suggest that we have sufficient tools. Certainly, as we go
    forward, if more flexibility and more initiatives are needed,
    we won't hesitate to ask.
        Senator Graham. That's my invitation. Let us know. Is it
    harder to recruit a mental health professional than it is just
    a traditional doctor?
        Secretary McHugh. Generally, recruiting of specialties and
    subspecialties is more challenging, simply because you don't
    have the density of personnel available.
        Senator Graham. Is there a cross-training effort within the
    military to get people who enjoy the military and are willing
    to go into a new career?
        Secretary McHugh. Well, we do have education opportunities,
    through the university hospital system and scholarships and
    such, that can be provided to candidates who meet the
    qualifications.
        Senator Graham. Okay, great.
        When it comes to the Guard and Reserve, I think TRICARE has
    been very helpful, making that available to Guard and Reserve
    families, because a lot of them didn't have healthcare, it just
    gave them an opportunity to purchase TRICARE for their Guard
    and Reserve time, which I think is a pretty good deal for the
    force.
        The other issue I hear from the Guard and Reserve
    everywhere I go is about lowering the retirement age. I know
    there's several ideas floating around about how you can earn an
    early retirement by doing more Active Duty tours and getting
    credit for that. I do understand the need for the military to
    sort of self-select, but I'm looking from the 20- to the 30-
    year point. It used to be that most Guard and Reserve members
    stayed in 30 years. A lot of them are getting out, now, at 20,
    for a variety of reasons; multiple deployments being one
    reason. Is there a strategy to deal with allowing people to
    retire early, but incentivizing them to stay from 20 to 30,
    based on the needs of the military?
        Secretary McHugh. That's part of the process that we have
    to do in deciding what kind of structure has to be put into
    place to operationalize the Guard and Reserve.
        Senator Graham. Right.
        Secretary McHugh. The challenge I think we ultimately have
    to face is: how do we sufficiently incentivize those good folks
    to come from our communities, to periodically leave their jobs
    and their families, to act as an operationalized Guard and
    Reserve, but, at the same time, recognizing we have to keep
    certain distance, in benefits and such, with the Active.
        Senator Graham. You don't want to cross-purpose here.
        Secretary McHugh. True.
        Senator Graham. You don't want to get people out of the
    Active Duty.
        Secretary McHugh. Exactly.
        Senator Graham. But, I don't really think it's that much of
    a problem right now, with the benefit packages, from the 20- to
    30-year period, a lot of people are leaving earlier, some of
    our best and brightest, if they could earn their way to early
    retirement, they might stay past 20.
        Secretary McHugh. I think it's correct to say we're willing
    to consider any kind of initiative.
        Senator Graham. Yes.
        Secretary McHugh. I know that there are many champions in
    Congress of a variety of approaches.
        Senator Graham. Yes.
        Secretary McHugh. My good friend, who is now retired, Jim
    Saxton on the House side, was very active in this regard.
        Any ideas would be happily accepted.
        Senator Graham. I'll give you some input, and I appreciate
    your willingness to receive it.
        General, moving on to Guantanamo Bay. General Petraeus said
    Sunday that he believed it was in our national security
    interest to try to close Guantanamo Bay. Do you share that
    view?
        General Casey. Senator, that's a policy issue that is
    outside the purview of my job here, as the Chief of Staff of
    the Army.
        Senator Graham. Fair enough. Just from your travels, do you
    think Guantanamo Bay is used by our enemies, still, against us,
    the images of the past?
        General Casey. I have read intelligence where I have seen
    how the enemy has used that against us.
        Senator Graham. That's fair enough.
        We're looking at the DADT policy. I think you all have
    given good answers about how we'll study it. Any movement to
    change the role of women in combat? Has that time come?
        Secretary McHugh. From the Army perspective, Senator, we
    conduct, periodically, an assessment of all the MOSs and who is
    eligible to serve in them. That's ongoing right now. It is not
    directed specifically at women in combat, but, obviously, the
    billets that are either open or closed to women would be part
    of that review.
        Senator Graham. So, General, what's your view about
    expanding the ability of women to serve in combat roles?
        General Casey. Senator, I believe that it's time that we
    take a look at what women are actually doing in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, and look at our policy. We've discussed this,
    between ourselves here. We don't have an active effort going
    on, but I think it's time.
        Senator Graham. I agree with you, because, as I understand
    it, women, on the aviation side, fly combat missions. Probably
    the time has come to look at that, and if you could give us
    some input, we'd appreciate it.
        Thank you both for your service. I know these have been
    stressful times for our men and women in uniform, and they've
    delivered. I just want to make sure that we're here to deliver
    for them, and that's why your testimony is so helpful.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, Secretary McHugh, great to see you here.
    Thank you for taking the time to come out to Colorado and visit
    Fort Carson. I know you could spend every day of the rest of
    your tenure visiting the facilities around the country, but
    when you come back out, maybe we can join together and be
    inspired by the men and women there at Fort Carson.
        General Casey, thank you for your service. You and I have
    had some conversations about the transition opportunity for
    soldiers with Outward Bound. It's an organization I worked with
    for 20 years, and it's a wonderful way to provide those
    soldiers with the opportunity to get in touch with that
    excitement, the adrenaline, the meaning that comes when you
    serve in combat, but also how you make that transition with
    those needs back to civilian life.
        A couple of shout-outs. I wanted to acknowledge Master
    Sergeant Rubio, who's here. She served as a fellow in my office
    for a year. It's a wonderful program. General, you need to know
    that, whether she's in uniform or in civvies, she brings a
    complete game. I miss her. I know she's back with her first
    love, but I wanted to acknowledge the great work she did for
    me.
        Then, Sergeant First Class Larson, thank you for what
    you're doing as a master resilience trainer. I liked what
    General Casey said about mental fitness. This thing up here is
    the biggest, baddest piece of equipment we have but it needs to
    be maintained and upgraded, it needs a little tender love and
    care, sometimes the sights have to be recalibrated. But, thank
    you for what you're doing in that regard. You're a brain
    mechanic, it sounds like, and we have a lot more to learn. So,
    thank you for pushing the envelope there.
        I'd like to turn to two areas. One, I want to talk about
    Combat Aviation Brigades, and then conclude with a couple of
    comments on DADT.
        We've seen, in these last few decades, just how important
    aviation is. It's a combat multiplier. Everything from airborne
    attacks to aeromedical evacuations. It appears in the fiscal
    year 2011 budget that we're going to increase aviation assets,
    it supports the development of a twelfth combat aviation
    brigade, and then begins to acquire, it looks like, equipment
    for a planned thirteenth aviation brigade.
        When will you make stationing decisions for those brigades,
    General and Mr. Secretary? Can you share some criteria that the
    Army would use to make those decisions?
        Secretary McHugh. Those are ongoing right now. Obviously,
    there have been no final determinations made. As I think both
    you and your colleague on your right from Alaska are aware, the
    Army is looking very carefully at all the permutations of that
    stationing, from environmental to training capacity, et cetera,
    et cetera. So, I would expect, in the very reasonably near
    future, those decisions will be finalized.
        Senator Udall. I look forward to working with you in that
    way. We have, certainly, mountainous terrain that rivals and
    matches that in some of the theaters in which we're undertaking
    operations today. We have, in Colorado, of course, a history of
    training combat aviators up in the Eagle County region, at the
    High-Altitude Army Aviation Training facility that the National
    Guard runs so effectively. So, thank you for that outline.
        Let me turn to DADT. What I heard both of you say is, when
    the repeal occurs, you'll follow the leadership and the
    dictates of the Commander in Chief and the Joint Chiefs
    themselves. I appreciate that clarity.
        If I might, I'd like to make a couple of comments on how I
    see this. We did talk about the moratorium and how that might
    work or be implemented. It was mentioned that a moratorium
    would introduce legal complications; for example, in the case
    of Lieutenant Dan Choi. It seems to me that that complication
    would simply be that the Army would not, for the duration of
    the moratorium, discharge an Arabic-speaking combat veteran
    who's now participating in drills with his Guard unit, at the
    request of his superior officers.
        My belief is, the moratorium could be put in place as we
    put this implementation plan together. I say that because the
    testimony of Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates was that the
    review is not about whether, but it's about how we'll implement
    the repeal. So, it seems that the eventuality of the repeal
    isn't in question.
        In that spirit, this Senator thinks that we ought to put a
    moratorium in place during this implementation period. In other
    words, the moratorium would be in effect until we begin to
    implement this plan to repeal the DADT measure.
        The Army and the military does human resources as well as
    any corporation, as well as any organization I've ever seen. I
    know that this is one of the challenges, and one of the reasons
    we, maybe, need some time to study how you implement. How do
    you deal with those servicemembers who are in the pipeline
    right now, if you will, because of DADT, because they've been
    identified as being gay servicemembers? I just think that we
    should do everything possible, given that we're going to, based
    on what the President, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen have
    said, implement a repeal, that we should do everything possible
    to ensure that as few servicemembers are discharged between now
    and then.
        Who's going to be the last gay servicemember to be
    discharged under DADT? That would be a tragedy, in my mind,
    because they're clearly patriots, they clearly want to serve
    their country. Admiral Mullen made it very clear that they
    shouldn't have to lead a lie to serve their country and defend
    their country.
        I'll end on this note, I mentioned Senator Goldwater in the
    previous hearing. He was an Arizonan. I had the great privilege
    to know him as a boy. He and my father, who served in
    Congress--one a Democrat, one a Republican--loved Arizona, they
    loved the libertarian spirit of the west, where it's live and
    let live. Senator Goldwater famously said, ``You don't have to
    be straight to shoot straight.'' I think that's what we've come
    to be aware of, and that's why I so strongly support repealing
    this policy, so that every single American can serve who would
    like to.
        You don't need to respond. I just wanted to, for my own
    heartfelt reasons, make that statement to the committee.
        Thank you again for your leadership. I'm just so proud to
    know both of you and to be able to serve with you in my
    capacity as you defend our Nation.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        I'm going to have a question on that issue, the DADT answer
    of yours, on a second round, which will be brief, I think. But,
    I will have another question or two on that same subject.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Thank you both for being here. I know you've been here for
    several hours, so I'll try to give you a random selection,
    because you've come through the snowstorm to my office, and I
    appreciate that. We had a good time there, having a good
    discussion about many issues. I have a couple of broad
    questions, then I'm going to kind of bring it down a little
    parochial.
        First, if I can follow up on the dwell-time issue. Based on
    the rebalancing that's occurring, for soldiers that are
    listening, and for families that are listening, give me a sense
    of the difference that it will be for a family, today or next
    year versus 2, 3 years ago, in the amount of dwell time or time
    home they might have. Can you put that in kind of a term that
    people can see it and hear it?
        General Casey. I can try, Senator, but for the last 5
    years, a good portion of the force was deploying on 1 year out,
    1 year back. We were, frankly, meeting ourselves coming and
    going.
        Senator Begich. Right.
        General Casey. They'd come home, take their leave, come
    back, and immediately start training to go back. So, the time
    they were home, they weren't home.
        Senator Begich. Right.
        General Casey. I went down and visited a unit that was home
    for 18 months. The difference in pace between 18 months at home
    and 12 months at home was striking. The difference in pace
    between 24 months at home and 12 months at home is going to be
    even more striking. As I mentioned earlier, we expect to get 70
    percent of the Active Force to 2 years at home by 2011, and 80
    percent of the Guard and Reserve at 4 years at home by 2011.
        Senator Begich. When you say 2011, do you mean calendar
    year or fiscal year?
        General Casey. By the end of the calendar year.
        Senator Begich. End of calendar year 2011.
        Very good. Thank you. I know you had mentioned it earlier,
    and I just wanted to kind of reemphasize, because I agree with
    you, and we've talked a little bit about this, in regards to
    the amount of dwell time is critical for the long-term health
    of the military. It doesn't matter if it's the Army or the Air
    Force, but Army, specifically, because the amount of time that
    you're out is going to be critical for the long-term health.
    So, I want to say thank you for moving down that path.
        Mr. Secretary, did you have something that you wanted to
    add to that?
        Secretary McHugh. I was just going to say there's another
    component to it, as well, that, if families are listening, the
    Chief and I certainly fully endorse the commitment that we're
    not going to revert to 15-month deployments, and we'll be
    sending folks out without the threat of stop loss.
        Senator Begich. Excellent.
        Secretary McHugh. That doesn't directly play into the dwell
    time, although, in a very real way, it does, because it
    requires more troops. But, families care very much about that,
    and I think they would want to be assured of that, as well.
        Senator Begich. That's great. That's a good point. It's a
    combo package.
        Let me ask a couple more general questions and then I'm
    going to be on a couple of quick Alaska issues.
        I want to follow up with Senator Graham on mental health
    services and making sure you hire the right professionals. I
    heard the pay differential between the private-sector mental
    health providers and what we're able to pay, there's a gap
    there. Is that one of the challenges you have? Because if
    that's the case, I think this committee, or members, would be
    very interested in trying to help solve that to make sure we're
    competitive in the marketplace, especially as this economy is
    now turning around. Healthcare providers in the private sector
    will be one of the biggest fast-growth areas in the new
    economy, and we're going to be competing with that. When I say
    we, the military. I want to make sure we are not at an economic
    disadvantage.
        Is that something you could get to me and indicate, at some
    point, if there is a gap? If so, what strategies do you have?
    Because as this economy picks up, the fastest-growing industry
    will be healthcare, and we will have a problem competing
    against that. Is that a fair request?
        General Casey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. Excellent.
        When people do retire, do you do exit interviews with those
    folks that are retiring, to determine why they're leaving
    early? Is there an actual datapoint study that you guys
    utilize?
        General Casey. I don't know that we do retirees so much as
    we do soldiers or officers who leave before retirement.
        Senator Begich. Before retirement.
        General Casey. I know we do very good sitdowns just to find
    out what's on their mind and what's motivating them to leave. I
    don't know that we do that with retirees.
        Senator Begich. Actually, I misstated. The way you stated
    it was correct.
        General Casey. Yes.
        Senator Begich. The early retirees, basically, people
    getting out before their 20 or 30 years. Do you put that in any
    kind of analysis that can be shared with this committee or with
    members? I'd be curious, what are those two or three top things
    that people say, ``This is why I'm leaving,'' based on data?
        General Casey. Right. We do have that data available. In
    fact, we recently completed a survey--it was finished up in the
    end of the summer last year--and it's a general survey of the
    force. As part of that survey, it was repeated deployments that
    still remains the number one reason for soldiers leaving the
    Army.
        We also utilize our various intellectual centers, such as
    we maintain at West Point. I'm thinking specifically of our
    midgrade officers who were leaving the force in greater numbers
    than we'd like, and in greater numbers, I think, than we would
    expect. They've done some analysis to see what it was that they
    felt they weren't getting as part of their Army service. In
    large measure, it was educational and the rotations and to go
    to the various schools and such that we're trying to respond
    to. So, it's not something we look at holistically, but through
    bits and pieces, particularly where we're finding challenges.
    We try to get whatever answers we can.
        Senator Begich. Very good. That helps.
        Let me get to, very quickly, a couple of quick Alaskan
    ones. This is one that you could respond to later, because it's
    very, very specific. In Fairbanks, in the basic allowance for
    housing, there was a study done. When they did the study, it
    reduced the rates of what the soldiers would get for their
    housing in Fairbanks. I can tell you, from my experience of
    almost 25 years in the landlord business, that they did it at a
    time when the utility rates were lower and vacancy rates were
    higher, which is summer. It creates a problem, because then the
    analysis sets the rate, which then they will have to pay for or
    deal with as they go into the winter months, which was lower
    vacancy rates and the higher utility costs. The end result is,
    the soldiers--we've gotten calls on this--end up paying out of
    their pocket to make sure they can compensate for the housing
    allowance.
        Would you take a look at that? We will send you something a
    little more detailed. But, just in my 25-plus-years experience
    in the real estate business, the timing of the survey was
    probably not the most appropriate time, or they could have
    extended it over the winter-fall to get a better picture.
    Because you can go $2 or $3 a gallon heating-fuel differential
    between those months, as an example, and the rates can
    dramatically be different, based on winter and accessibility of
    the fuel and other things, especially in Fairbanks, which is a
    significant problem with heating issues. If you wouldn't mind,
    just note that.
        The last thing I'll say--only because Senator Udall isn't
    here now, I can say it--that, of course, we have the best
    training grounds. We don't have hills, we have mountains, and
    all three of us have talked about that in the past. But, as you
    progress on utilization of training facilities, the one, as I
    mentioned to you, is the unmanned aircraft. I think we have
    some superb locations that, as you consider all the deployments
    and reassignments of equipment, obviously we want to be engaged
    in that discussion. You know it better than I do by your ground
    troops up there, but what we have up there is exceptional. I'll
    tell Senator Udall later that I credited his and I didn't say
    anything about mine.
        Thank you very much for your testimony.
        Chairman Levin. You create a real problem for me, Senator
    Begich, because I'm tempted to talk about our training areas in
    Michigan, and I'm going to resist that temptation, only because
    of time limitations.
        I have a couple of questions. One has to do with equipment
    that we have authorized to go from Iraq--or, more technically,
    perhaps, Kuwait--to the Afghan Army. We are short on training
    that army, not just in the shortage of trainers I pointed out,
    but we also have not done what we need to do in terms of
    equipment. So, we authorized, in the last authorization bill,
    not just equipment that could go to the Iraqi army, even though
    it was not excess equipment. The same thing is true with the
    Afghan army.
        We talked to one of our trainers over there, when we were
    there a few months ago, and he indicated, as a matter of fact,
    some of that equipment was beginning to arrive from Iraq-Kuwait
    into Afghanistan for the Afghan army, not just for our guys.
        In going through the numbers there, General, you indicated
    that half a billion dollars of excess equipment, I believe, was
    left for the Iraqis. Perhaps it was non-excess. I'm not sure.
    But, in any event, we have authorized, not just excess
    equipment, but non-excess equipment, understanding we're going
    to have to replace that, but also understanding that it's
    essential that we get equipment to the Afghan army if we're
    serious about turning over responsibility for the security of
    Afghanistan to that army.
        Do you have any numbers at all on how much either excess or
    non-excess equipment has gone from the Iraq theater to the
    Afghan army or police?
        General Casey. I know we've processed the Afghans'
    uparmored Humvees, machine guns, and some ammunition and repair
    parts, but I don't have any specific numbers.
        Chairman Levin. If you could get us that for the record,
    I'd appreciate it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of the Army is using multiple means and authorities
    to transfer or sell equipment located in the Iraq Theater and other
    locations to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Current
    efforts to facilitate equipping the ANSF include: Foreign Military
    Sales of 1,626 Non-Excess Up Armored HMMWVs (1,317 are for the Afghan
    National Police and 309 for the Afghan National Army); excess defense
    articles transfer of over 211,000 pieces of organizational clothing and
    individual equipment; 1,260 machine guns; approximately 6.5 million
    rounds of ammunition; and 2,500 life support items such as tents, light
    sets and folding cots. Additionally, the Department is processing a
    request for transferring over 5,000 pieces of excess, nonstandard
    equipment located in Iraq (commercial nontactical vehicles,
    communications, and maintenance-related equipment).

        Chairman Levin. Now, on this question of DADT, what you've
    indicated, appropriately, is that a moratorium could create
    complications for pending legal cases. But, the decision of the
    Commander in Chief to end the policy--the only issue being, in
    his mind, how and when, and not whether--has also got to create
    some complications for existing cases. If you were representing
    somebody, in an existing case, who was being discharged or
    threatened with discharge, I assume you'd ask for a stay until
    there's a resolution of the matter.
        So, what I will need from you is your lawyers' assessment
    as to whether or not there are complications, currently, with
    the decision of the Commander in Chief to end the policy, and
    just to have a study as to how it's done, and to compare that
    to any complications which might occur from having a suspension
    of the discharges, pending a decision on whether to repeal.
        Remember, a moratorium or a suspension is not a repeal.
    That would mean that, if for some reason it were not repealed
    down the road, then the current discharge policy would stay in
    place.
        So, my request of you is that you get an assessment from
    your lawyers to this committee as to whether there are
    complications from the decision that's been given by the
    Commander in Chief, relative to repeal down the road, and
    whether there are complications from a moratorium, which
    obviously there could be, as well as from a down-the-road
    repeal announcement, and to compare for us whether or not, one
    way or the other, there are more or less complications.
        That's not a question, other than to ask you whether or not
    you will ask your lawyers if they could prepare that assessment
    for us.
        Secretary McHugh. Absolutely.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The analysis you requested is currently under review and
    consideration as part of the Secretary of Defense's study of the
    potential repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) law. The Army is
    working closely with Department of Defense officials to assess the
    personnel, readiness, legal, and operational issues and impacts
    associated with action to suspend, modify or repeal DADT. Upon
    completion, it is expected the analysis will include the information
    outlined in the chairman's request, which will be shared with the
    committee when available. While the Secretary's comprehensive study is
    ongoing, the Army is committed to providing the committee with
    information on the Army's implementation of current DADT law.

        Chairman Levin. We thank you both. We thank the men and
    women you lead. We particularly, again, want to acknowledge the
    presence of your special guests here today. We thank them for
    their service, for your son's service, Mrs. Engeman. We are
    grateful for it. It's a grateful Nation that is united behind
    our troops and our veterans, no longer facing the kind of
    divisions we had in previous engagements, such as Vietnam, but,
    regardless of policy differences, totally behind our forces,
    our men and women who put on the uniform of this country.
        Thank you all.
        We will stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
         adaptability of higher-end combat units to lower-end missions
        1. Senator Levin. General Casey, the notion of a full spectrum
    force has been a central and enduring organizing, equipping, and
    training concept for the Army. Today's range of potential security
    threats, and the likelihood that the Army will be called upon to meet
    simultaneous conventional and irregular challenges, calls for a much
    more adaptable, if still full-spectrum force.
        Over the years, the Army has argued that, as a rule, most
    capabilities required for higher-end combat operations can be adapted
    for application to lower-end missions. The Army's modular brigade
    combat teams (BCTs)--whether infantry, heavy, or Stryker--can be task
    organized, or if necessary augmented, for lower-end missions such as
    stability operations and security force assistance missions, while
    remaining capable of full-spectrum operations.
        On the other hand, since the start of counterinsurgency operations
    in Afghanistan and Iraq several senior Army leaders have acknowledged
    that the notion of lesser and included tasks at the lower end of the
    spectrum were not in fact easily adapted in units trained and ready for
    high-end conflict.
        The 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recognizes this challenge
    and directs specific structural changes in the Army including the
    conversion of at one heavy brigade to a medium Stryker brigade, the
    potential conversion of heavy to lighter brigades in the future, and
    increasing the number of combat aviation brigades to 13.
        What are the Army's assumptions and observations today about the
    adaptability of higher-end combat units, equipment, and training for
    application in lower-end stability or counterinsurgency missions?
        General Casey. We continue to rebalance the force to achieve the
    right mix of capabilities to meet current demands while preparing for
    future challenges. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that
    the right mix of BCT-types, properly tailored for the mission, possess
    full spectrum utility to protect our own forces as well as the local
    population and successfully train and partner with indigenous security
    forces. During the QDR we examined how to further institutionalize
    lessons learned in current operations as well as next steps to posture
    the Army to execute Full Spectrum Operations as part of the Joint Force
    in the mid- to far-term. Full Spectrum Operations recognizes the
    unpredictability of the environment and hybrid nature of kinetic and
    non-kinetic threats. The key to meeting this guidance and maintaining
    the balance outlined by the Secretary of Defense is the modularization
    and rapid mission tailoring of the BCT through the Army Force General
    (ARFORGEN) Cycle. This is the base general purpose force organizational
    construct designed to balance the offense, defense, stability, and
    civil support operations as part of the Joint Force.
        The QDR outlines the importance of providing a highly adaptable,
    versatile Security Force Assistance (SFA) capability for all combatant
    commanders in the future. The BCT contains a range of experience in
    combat arms, combat support and combat service support. This
    composition serves as a firm base of trainers and advisors, together
    with the integral supporting staff. It has the ability to task-organize
    constituent elements to provide teams of the required size and skill
    set for each mission, providing simultaneous sustained SFA across
    multiple locations using organic command and staff capabilities.
        The Army has developed numerous initiatives to improve and
    complement the adaptability of BCTs for stability and counter-
    insurgency missions. The Army's Institutional or Generating Force can
    augment the operating force to conduct SFA. Training and Doctrine
    Command (TRADOC) is one example of this capability with 32 schools and
    centers at 16 Army installations--all of which can provide ``Train the
    trainer'' experts. The Army has developed a new SFA doctrine,
    established a permanent SFA training formation and associated planning
    teams in Geographic Combatant Commands. It has enhanced SFA-related
    education, training and gaming; increased foreign language and cultural
    training; and increased study and publication of SFA lessons learned.

        2. Senator Levin. General Casey, what risks might additional
    emphasis on non-conventional missions, in doctrine and training, pose
    for the Army's ability to conduct traditional high-end combat missions?
        General Casey. The nature of conflict today requires a flexible
    approach for anticipating force requirements. Accordingly, the Army's
    greatest emphasis must be on creating a versatile force. We must
    prepare soldiers, units and their equipment for future missions, both
    conventional and non-conventional, by providing adequate time to train
    for full-spectrum operations and to reduce uncertainty and stress for
    soldiers and their families. We continue to assess and transform the
    force to meet combatant commanders' requirements by revising our
    modernization strategy, completing transformation from Cold War legacy
    formations to modular formations and improving business processes in
    order to apply resources efficiently.
        Although we are focused on prevailing in current counterinsurgency
    operations, improving the Army's deployment to dwell time ratios will
    increase training opportunities across the full-spectrum of operations
    necessary to meet future requirements. Rebalancing the force remains an
    essential part of mitigating risk from unforeseen contingencies for our
    Army. Restoring readiness will enable the Army to prepare for and
    accomplish all assigned missions as a member of the Joint Force.
    Mitigating these risks will sustain our Army, which is the most
    experienced combat force in the world.
                                     ______

               Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
                                   m4 carbine
        3. Senator Lieberman. General Casey, I understand that although the
    M4 Carbine performed to Army specifications during the battle of Wanat,
    you are now reviewing options to improve that weapon's performance
    during sustained firefights, namely by requiring a thicker barrel. I am
    glad that the Army is making these improvements, and the only concern
    that I have is that the process for approving them may take too long.
    What steps are you taking to expedite the speed with which these
    improvements for the M4 reach our troops in the field?
        General Casey. The Army had previously approved the heavier barrel,
    as well as a full auto trigger mechanism. These improvements are
    already in use by our Special Operations units, who use the M4A1. We
    are also incorporating an ambidextrous fire control selector into the
    M4 series. The heavy barrel and ambidextrous selector will begin to
    reach our conventional forces in the fourth quarter of fiscal year
    2010. The full auto trigger will be available in the second quarter of
    fiscal year 2011. The next series of improvements include an improved
    rail system and weapon bolt and carrier. These will be available in the
    second and fourth quarter fiscal year 2012, respectively.
        The Army is continually testing and upgrading the carbine. For
    example, since 1991 more than 8 million rounds have been fired in
    product improvement testing. As a result of this testing, over 62
    performance enhancing improvements have been incorporated into the
    carbine design to include the trigger assembly, extractor spring,
    recoil buffer, barrel, chamber and bolt. These improvements have made a
    significant difference to the mean time between stoppages (MRBF) for
    the weapon. The requirement for the M4 is 600 MRBF, but with these
    improvements applied testing has demonstrated the reliability is over
    3,600 MRBF.

                              army force structure
        4. Senator Lieberman. Secretary McHugh, the report accompanying the
    Senate Armed Services Committee's mark of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included a special interest item
    requiring a report providing an analysis comparison, and projected
    impacts of limiting the Army's Active component to 45 rather than 48
    BCTs through 2012. I note that the deadline for that report is March 1,
    2010--can you reconfirm that you will submit this report by that
    deadline?
        Secretary McHugh. The Army anticipates providing the committee with
    an interim report no later than 4 March and a final response by 30
    April 2010. We are reviewing the recent troop increase in Afghanistan
    and the Iraq drawdown plan to better assess the effects of maintaining
    the Army at 45 versus 48 Active BCTs.

                              land warrior program
        5. Senator Lieberman. Secretary McHugh, the Land Warrior system has
    received positive reviews from the soldiers who have used it in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, and it is my understanding that there are currently
    units with operational needs statements that have not received Land
    Warrior equipment due to funding constraints and production lead times.
    In light of these recent requests for Land Warrior systems, is it fair
    to conclude that the Army prematurely terminated this program?
        Secretary McHugh. No. The Army learned valuable lessons from the
    Land Warrior system but it did not represent the complete capability we
    desired. The Ground Soldier System is expected to cost less, weigh
    less, and provide greater operational mission duration using more
    advanced technologies than were resident in the original Land Warrior
    system. Fielding of the Ground Soldier System is expected to begin in
    fiscal year 2012.

        6. Senator Lieberman. Secretary McHugh, now that Ground Soldier
    System is going into production, what lessons have been learned by the
    Army from the Land Warrior fielding that would assist them in providing
    this capability to dismounted troops in a timely manner?
        Secretary McHugh. The Army learned a great deal from the Land
    Warrior program, and we are applying these lessons to our Ground
    Soldier System in order to get the best capability to our dismounted
    soldiers in the most efficient manner possible. For example, the Army
    learned that soldier acceptance of the system and its capabilities is
    critical to achieving operational success; and effective training at
    the individual and collective unit levels plays a vital role in that
    acceptance. Soldier and unit leader input has resulted in
    recommendations to improve form, fit, and function.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                     army test range unfunded requirements
        7. Senator Bill Nelson. General Casey, on February 22, the Senate
    Armed Services Committee received a copy of a letter you wrote on
    February 19 to Representative Buck McKeon, the ranking member of the
    House Armed Services Committee, in which you provided a list of what
    are called unfunded requirements. On that list were two items that
    relate to the Army's test infrastructure: $18 million for Test and
    Evaluation Instrumentation, and $23 million for Army Test Range
    Infrastructure.
        As the chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee, I am glad to see the Army indicating that additional
    funding for these items would, as you say in your letter, ``provide
    added value to commanders in the field.'' This committee has been
    concerned for many years about the need to improve our military test
    and evaluation infrastructure.
        Can you tell me how these additional funds would improve the Army's
    ability to conduct test and evaluation of our ever more complex weapon
    systems?
        General Casey. The additional funds would be used for the
    replacement and restoration of critical infrastructure and
    instrumentation, such as radars, optics, telemetry and digital systems.
    This new equipment/infrastructure will better align our testing with
    changing requirements and will allow us to monitor/analyze more complex
    technologies during evaluations and experiments. The funds would also
    provide for modeling and simulation to address survivability,
    reliability, maintainability and the increased complexity of
    ballistics, which affects every major Army acquisition program.

            national guard and reserve component operational tempos
        8. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the
    wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have transformed our Guard and Reserve
    Forces from Strategic Reserves to an operational force. The increased
    demand placed on these servicemembers has naturally led to increased
    requirements for more training, equipment, and facilities. What are the
    biggest challenges you face with the high operational tempo for the
    Guard and Reserve Forces?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Even as the men and women of
    the Army National Guard (ARNG) continue to demonstrate their dedication
    to the Nation, the reality is that there are significant challenges for
    Guard and Reserve Forces. While we continue with the transformation of
    the ARNG into an Operational Force, the Army is using the ARFORGEN
    model to try to make deployments predictable and to provide stability
    for soldiers, families, and their employers. The ARNG also has Homeland
    Defense and Civil Support missions, which place additional demands and
    requirements on the soldiers and their equipment.
        The men and women of the ARNG can meet the demands of the
    operational tempo, provided that they are properly prepared physically
    and have the resources available to complete their Federal and State
    missions. The citizen-soldier must have access to proper medical and
    dental care, before, during, and after mobilization because when
    soldiers are not available for medical reasons, it has a ripple effect
    as soldiers are pulled from other units to plug holes. Providing care
    also promotes stability for families by reducing the financial and
    personal impacts of serving as a member of the ARNG.
        Equipment has also been strained by the operational tempo over the
    past 8 years. The dual-use equipment within the ARNG is vital to both
    the Federal and State missions. As conditions have changed outside the
    borders of the United States, so too have conditions within the
    borders. These changing requirements must be constantly evaluated to
    ensure that the ARNG is equipped to meet the challenges of today and
    tomorrow with equipment that is available, well-maintained, and
    relevant.
        The ARNG also faces a difficult challenge with regard to individual
    soldier training. Soldiers awaiting training occupy a position within a
    unit in the ARNG, even though they are nondeployable. This impacts
    overall readiness and forces the ARNG to cross-level soldiers from
    other units. As with the medically nondeployable, this has a ripple
    effect over time that creates stress on soldiers, families, and
    employers.

        9. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what
    risk does your budget take with equipping and training the Guard and
    Reserves?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The ARNG and Army Reserve are
    being equipped based on a deliberate investment plan which is
    commensurate with their mission and commitments. Over the last 4 years,
    the ARNG and Army Reserve have been equipped and modernized at a pace
    exceeding that of the Active component. Shortages do remain, but
    working with the Reserve components we are ensuring they have the
    necessary equipment to execute their State and Federal commitments.
        From the Individual Training perspective, the ARNG accepts risk in
    certain functional training courses in order to maintain the necessary
    Duty Military Occupational Skills Qualification rate for deploying
    units. This ensures that soldiers are qualified to perform their
    primary duties when deployed. Functional courses teach soldiers
    secondary skills such as advanced gunnery and maintenance courses, and
    airborne or air assault training. The Army Reserve has adapted a
    similar program. Soldiers from the ARNG and the Army Reserve also go
    through Mobilization Training prior to deploying.

        10. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, please
    describe the Grow the Force initiatives that will increase the Army
    Reserve Forces in Florida and other States.
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Pursuant to the Grow the Army
    Initiative, the Army Reserve was granted an increase in Force Structure
    Allowance from 205,000 to 206,000. Additionally, the Army Reserve
    restructured 16,000 unstructured Trainees, Transients, Holdees and
    Students spaces into structured forces to help meet the Army's
    increased operational requirements. Due to resourcing constraints, the
    Army Reserve has programmed the activation of these new units over a 5
    year period (fiscal year 2009-fiscal year 2014) with the majority of
    actions occurring in fiscal year 2010-2011. In some cases, previously
    scheduled inactivating units are retained in the force, resulting in no
    local community disruption. Given that programming the force is a
    continuous process, the original Grow the Army list has changed. Today,
    there are 144 Army Reserve units programmed in 32 States and Puerto
    Rico. Florida has 11 units in 6 communities in the Grow the Army
    program. The ARNG has no ``Grow-the-Force Initiatives'' that will
    increase forces.

        11. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what
    additional military construction (MILCON) funding is needed to
    rehabilitate and construct Reserve centers and National Guard
    facilities for training and duty?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The funds requested in
    President's fiscal year 2011 budget will be used complete the USAR's
    Grow the Army efforts in order to provide new facilities for additional
    soldiers. ``Military Construction Army Reserve'' funding, however, is
    not sufficient to address all of the USAR's requirements, which include
    modernizing our legacy facilities and upgrading our facilities to meet
    current mission standards and Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP)
    set back requirements. The Army Reserve would need $180 million in
    additional MILCON funding to rehabilitate and construct these Reserve
    centers for training and duty. These specific construction projects are
    as follows:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Installation            Location     Project Title      Cost
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fort Collins.................            CO Army Reserve         $11,200
                                                 Center.
    Homewood.....................          IL   Army Reserve          12,800
                                                 Center.
    Rockford.....................          IL   Army Reserve          10,800
                                                 Center/Land.
    Fort Benjamin Harrison.......          IN   Army Reserve          50,000
                                                 Center.
    Kansas City..................          KS   Army Reserve          16,000
                                                 Center/Land.
    St. Joseph...................          MN   Army Reserve           9,000
                                                 Center.
    St. Charles..................          MO   Army Reserve          26,000
                                                 Center.
    Greensboro...................           NC  Army Reserve          16,500
                                                 Center/Land.
    Schenectady..................          NY   Army Reserve          16,000
                                                 Center.
    Orangeburg...................           SC  Army Reserve          11,400
                                                 Center/Land.
                                                                 -----------
      Total                                                         $179,700
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The ARNG requires $1.5 billion a year for 20 years to revitalize
    its facilities.

            mobilization for training for reserve component soldiers
        12. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the
    Army recently withdrew the mobilization for training option for Reserve
    component soldiers. This concept relieved pressure on the State
    National Guard training budgets, and it lengthened the dwell time for
    soldiers in some cases. What prompted this change in policy, your
    assessment of the change, and whether or not it is something that
    should be revisited?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Mobilization for Training is a
    cumbersome system that was not being effectively used by the state
    Adjutants General. In most cases, the Mobilization for Training program
    was used to ensure that soldiers received their requisite military
    education. With the current ARFORGEN cycle, however, soldiers are being
    afforded time to get needed training. Funding the Army School Systems
    budget will help to ensure that the Mobilization for Training program
    is no longer necessary.

                            7th special forces group
        13. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the
    Army's 7th Special Forces Group is in the process of moving from Fort
    Bragg, NC, to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, to increase joint training
    opportunities between the Army and Air Force Special Forces. What is
    the status of the move?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The move of the 7th Special
    Forces Group (SFG) to Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) in accordance with
    Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is proceeding as planned.
    Construction is on or ahead of schedule and is to be completed no later
    than 1 August 2011. The unit move is slated for August and September
    2011. The 7th SFG has advanced party elements in place at Eglin AFB to
    coordinate and facilitate the logistics, and the operations associated
    with the arrival of the 7th SFG.

        14. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is the
    move on time?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The BRAC move of the 7th SFG is
    currently on schedule, and is to be completed by 15 September 2011.

        15. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what
    issues remain?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. There are no BRAC related
    issues at this time.
                                     ______

               Questions Submitted b. Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
                    guard and reserve military construction
        16. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, your
    budget requests include significant funding increases to replace aging
    facilities for the National Guard and the Reserves. This investment is
    critical considering the Guard and Reserve personnel comprise some 51
    percent of your end-strength. However, your request for Guard and
    Reserve MILCON is $1.2 billion, which is less than 1 percent of your
    total base budget and only a fifth of your total MILCON request. Some
    of Nebraska's Guard units are lacking adequate space to store reset and
    new equipment. For example, Nebraska units lack 33 acres for improved
    and unimproved parking to store new trucks, tractors, and trailers, as
    well as 8,000 square feet of heated storage and 3,500 square feet of
    security vault storage. What is the current state of our Guard and
    Reserve infrastructure, both nationally and within Nebraska?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Army Reserve Nationally: The
    average age of Army Reserve facilities is over 42 years old. The
    majority of facilities are under-sized for today's mission
    requirements, encroached upon by local community activities and not
    compliant with Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) standards. BRAC
    Act funding helped to provide over 120 new AFRCs that meet today's
    operational and training needs, as well as to modernize 11 percent of
    the Army Reserve Center facility inventory.
        Army Reserve Nebraska: The Army Reserve will construct and
    modernize 7 of 13 facilities within the next 7 years. The remaining 6
    facilities are inadequate and are not AT/FP compliant. The facility in
    Fremont will be rehabilitated in fiscal year 2015 and the remaining
    five facilities are not currently programmed.
        ARNG Nationally: The Army is proposing in the fiscal year 2011
    budget submission Army National Guard MILCON funding of $874 million,
    more than in any previous budget submission. In the fiscal year 2011
    budget, the ARNG has 20 projects where it is proposing to either build
    new or revitalize existing Readiness Centers to address space or
    condition shortfalls or to support new missions.
        The ARNG infrastructure has about 80 percent of the required square
    footage, and the average facility requires about 20 percent of its
    original value in repairs. Critical shortfalls include Readiness
    Centers, Training Facilities, and Maintenance Facilities. Replacing
    aging and inadequate facilities with modern facilities that allow
    efficient training to support the ARFORGEN cycle is a high priority for
    the Army and the National Guard.
        ARNG Nebraska: Nebraska's ARNG infrastructure also has about 80
    percent of required building square footage, and the average facility
    requires about 20 percent of its original value in repairs. There are
    two MILCON Projects proposed for Nebraska in the fiscal year 2011
    budget: a Readiness Center in Mead and a Readiness Center addition or
    alteration in Lincoln.

        17. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, you
    noted that there is a concern that the investment in infrastructure
    isn't enough and that equipment may not be properly stored and
    maintained. I am concerned that this will undermine the readiness. What
    is being done to address what are known facility gaps?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The ARNG is pursuing a number
    of options to address well-known facility gaps related to equipment
    storage and maintenance. Storage issues alone total about $2.2 billion.
    This number reflects the upfront costs related to the requirements of
    an Operational Force. Projects include constructing secured parking
    areas and storage buildings, acquiring land and modifying facilities
    (especially arms vaults to meet code requirements and increase
    capacity). Most states have taken a hard look at this shortfall and
    have plans to execute the funds quickly to resolve increasing storage
    requirements. Short-term solutions include installing portable vaults
    and erecting unheated storage buildings, which will allow rapid
    installation and construction. Many states have looked at longer-term
    solutions, such as acquiring additional land. Nearly all states have
    itemized their shortfalls and stand ready to remedy these and other
    well-known facility gaps.

        18. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, barring constraints from
    other mission areas, what level of funding do you need to address all
    your MILCON requirements?
        General Casey. Competing requirements from other mission areas will
    always be a constraint. MILCON funding is currently not sufficient to
    address all of the Army's MILCON requirements. The Army has prioritized
    its existing resources to support the Army Modular Force, Grow the
    Army, completing BRAC, completing Global Defense Posture Realignment,
    and completing the barracks modernization. Long term solutions for all
    of the remaining requirements (such as recapitalizing existing
    facilities for existing missions) necessitates a long-term funding
    strategy beyond the fiscal year 2012-2017 POM. Obsolete legacy
    facilities adversely affect readiness, organizations, missions and
    installations across the Army. The level of funding that the ARNG
    requires for the facility revitalization is $1.5 billion a year for 20
    years. At this level of funding the ARNG will meet its readiness
    requirements.

                           ballistic missile defense
        19. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, in your letter of February
    19 to the House Armed Services Committee, you indicated that one of the
    so-called unfunded requirements of the Army is the Patriot missile
    defense system. Your letter indicated that an additional $134 million
    of funding for Patriot would be valuable to our combatant commanders.
    The Patriot system is our only combat-proven missile defense system,
    and is a critical element of our ability to defend our forward deployed
    forces and allies against existing short- and medium-range ballistic
    missiles. Can you tell me how these additional funds would be used to
    improve the Army's Patriot capability?
        General Casey. The Patriot Advanced Capability-Phase 3 (PAC-3)
    missile is a hit to kill surface-to-air interceptor. It provides the
    most robust protection for troops and critical infrastructure against
    Tactical Ballistic Missiles and Air Breathing threats. Funds are
    necessary to repair and recertify PAC-3 missiles and return them to the
    operational force. The Enhanced Launcher Electronic System (ELES) is
    the upgrade kit applied to aging PAC-2 launching stations, to upgrade
    them to fire the PAC-3 missile. The proposed funding would procure 24
    additional ELES upgrade kits in fiscal year 2011, upgrading 24
    additional PAC-2 launchers to the PAC-3 capability.

        20. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, do you believe additional
    Patriot capabilities would help meet the requirements of our combatant
    commanders to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
    from countries like North Korea and Iran?
        General Casey. Given the rapid proliferation of short- and medium-
    range ballistic missiles, it is critical that we continue to modernize
    and grow our regional ballistic missile defense capabilities. We are
    already increasing our Patriot capacity by growing our PAC-3 battalions
    from 13 to 15 over the next 2 years. Within the broader ballistic
    missile defense strategy, as articulated in the January 2010 Ballistic
    Missile Review Report, 15 Patriot battalions is sufficient capacity to
    address those threats that the Patriot can defend against. Our
    modernization strategy will also focus on complementary ballistic
    missile defense capabilities, including the Terminal High-Altitude Area
    Defense system currently being fielded, the AN/TYP-2 radar, and
    overarching command and control battle management architecture.
    Additionally, it is important that we continue to procure PAC-3
    missiles and Patriot launcher upgrades to enhance the capability of our
    Patriot Battalions.

                                 human capital
        21. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, from a human capital
    perspective, one of the biggest challenges facing the Services will be
    managing expanding and new missions while maintaining a fixed end-
    strength. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
    mission is an area that is seeing a great deal of growth across all of
    the Services due in large part to the significant expansion of unmanned
    aerial vehicles (UAVs) or remotely piloted aircraft. What is the
    current state of your training pipeline for operators and analysts, and
    how are you expanding it to meet demand?
        General Casey. The Army approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
    training is a systematic, module-based training program, which produces
    highly trained, professional and Federal Aviation Administration tested
    Enlisted UAS operators. We have Common Soldier UAS Operator training
    for Shadow, Hunter, Warrior-Alpha, and the Extended Range/Multi-purpose
    (ERMP) UAS.
        Through 2004, we trained less than 1,000 operators and maintainers
    per year on a single shift, Monday through Friday. In 2005, we expanded
    to two shifts to meet the increasing demand. In 2008 and 2009, we hired
    and trained 253 additional instructors and support personnel, and
    currently train in three shifts at multiple locations to accommodate
    the 2,000+ operators and maintainers programmed for 2010. Current
    training throughput requires Libby Army Airfield (LAAF) operations 6
    days per week, 16 hours per day. The Army is in the process of
    validating the requirement to increase airfield operations at LAAF to 6
    days per week, 24 hours per day in order to meet the future UAS
    training requirements.
        To meet growing requirements for analysts, the Army's Intelligence
    Center of Excellence has doubled the annual number of Imagery Analysts
    graduates over the past 5 years. Since 2005, over 1,500 Imagery
    Analysts have been trained at Fort Huachuca. This has resulted in a
    current on hand strength of 110 percent for Active Army Imagery
    Analysts (MOS 35G) throughout the force.
        Full Motion Video (FMV) training is an integral part of the 105-day
    Imagery Analyst course where students are exposed to current tactics,
    techniques and procedures (TTPs) used in overseas contingency
    operations (OCOs). Students utilize the Distributed Common Ground
    System--Army approved software for exploitation of all Full Motion
    Video (FMV). Soldiers in training also receive further scenario-based
    FMV training as they conduct convoy live-fire exercises with a UAS
    flying in support of the mission. Additional exposure to FMV
    exploitation in support of intelligence, surveillance and exploitation
    comes during a 10-day capstone exercise during which students plan,
    execute and exploit simulated UAS missions in support of BCT
    requirements/operations.

        22. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, what kind of retention rates
    are you seeing in UAV pilot and sensor operators and intelligence
    analyst specialties?
        General Casey. The Army is retaining nearly 100 percent of its
    warrant officer Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 150U, (Tactical
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) Operations Technicians), who have
    trained and deployed in this specialty over the past 5 years.
        Although the Army transferred this specialty from Military
    Intelligence to the Aviation in September 2008, it was originally
    established under MOS 350U, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations
    Technician. Since its transfer, the MOS has been restructured to be
    managed with the Army's other Aviation skills. It is currently in the
    fourth year of a 5-year growth and integration plan within the Aviation
    Branch and is at 89 percent of assigned strength.
        This specialty's unusually high retention rate is to be expected
    during its initial development. Personnel are selected for their
    longevity and interest, and, therefore, are very likely to continue
    service. As the specialty matures beyond the initial growth phase,
    however, the Army expects to see an increase in losses that more
    closely resemble other Aviation Warrant Officer specialties. Regarding
    enlisted personnel, the 15W Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operators specialty
    is retaining just under 95 percent of first-term inventory
    (approximately 500 soldiers), as compared to the average first-term
    retention across all enlisted specialties of just over 87 percent.

                               unmanned aircraft
        23. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, with regard to mission
    effectiveness, how are you coordinating efforts with the Air Force to
    integrate your growing fleet of drones with their unmanned and manned
    aircraft into concept of operations that will ensure safe and effective
    mission execution?
        General Casey. Each of the Services have missions that require
    specific capabilities, which are often unique to that Service. For
    example, the Navy has a requirement to support maritime operations
    using shipborne systems. The need to share information across all
    Services, however, is not unique. To that end, the Department of
    Defense (DOD) has stressed interoperability between the Services as the
    cornerstone of all manned and unmanned Intelligence, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance system acquisitions and employments.
        Today, for example, a ground maneuver commander can expect full
    motion video transmitted from any manned or unmanned aircraft overhead
    will be received and displayed by another Service's remote video
    receiver. This has been made possible through the Services working
    closely together to develop interoperable data link protocols for
    control, video and encryption. To ensure safe and effective mission
    execution, we use joint processes, which apply to both manned and
    unmanned systems, to ``de-conflict'' airspace and layer assets to
    provide the best mission profiles.

        24. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary McHugh, what process does DOD
    have to produce a comprehensive plan to integrate policy and
    requirements across the Services for unmanned aircraft programs?
        Secretary McHugh. In 2007, due to the diversity of the Services'
    unmanned aircraft programs, DOD created the UASs Task Force to
    coordinate policies and acquisitions across DOD. Although the Services
    retain their individual Title 10 authorities and responsibilities, this
    organization, led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics, is the central clearinghouse for
    interoperability protocols, national airspace access initiatives and
    the development of common procurements where applicable. An example of
    this close cooperation between the Services can be seen in real time
    transmission of Full Motion Video (FMV).
        By adhering to a set of uniform standards for interoperability, the
    Army One System Remote Video Terminal, and similar systems in other
    Services, receive real time FMV from all transmitting manned and
    unmanned aircraft overhead. This interoperability enables joint support
    of combat operations regardless of the Services involved. Additionally,
    policy is being developed and published by the Joint Staff, which will
    guide standards of training for UAS operators across the Services.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb
                    transfer of ownership of fort monroe, va
        25. Senator Webb. Secretary McHugh, it has come to my attention
    that three critical health and safety projects at Fort Monroe, VA,
    remain unfunded, in spite of the Army's plan to transfer ownership of
    that installation's property to the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2011. I
    realize BRAC law does not provide for new MILCON, however,
    infrastructure remediation, modernization, and maintenance that will
    affect the health and safety of the installation's current staff and
    personnel or its future owner should be completed prior to the transfer
    of this property. These critical projects are:

        1.  $10.1 million to upgrade the water supply system to provide
    adequate supply for the fire-suppression system;
        2.  $15.0 million to bring sanitary sewer infrastructure up to
    Virginia Department of Environmental Quality standards; and
        3. $20 million to complete flood-protection projects.

        What are the Army's plans to address these health and safety
    requirements before Fort Monroe is transferred to Virginia at the end
    of fiscal year 2011?
        Secretary McHugh. The current conditions of these systems meets
    current Federal health and safety standards and are operating properly
    to ensure the safety of our soldiers, our civilians and their families.
    We have invested funds to ensure that the fire suppression system meets
    all operational requirements with no shortfalls in safety standards.
    The sanitary sewer infrastructure meets Federal safety standards, and
    in 2003 the Army initiated and completed a $26 million flood control
    construction project.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
        recapitalization of high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles
        26. Senator Hagan. General Casey, I understand the Army is in the
    process of recapitalizing its Humvees to increase survivability and
    mobility. What is the status of the Army's Humvee recapitalization
    program?
        General Casey. The Army is developing a program to continue the
    recapitalization of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
    (HMWWVs) currently underway at Red River and Letterkenny Army Depots.
    We have requested $983 million in fiscal year 2011 for this effort, and
    may request permission to reprogram some amount of fiscal year 2010
    funding to support this program.

        27. Senator Hagan. General Casey, what are the requirements?
        General Casey. The Army will recapitalize approximately 8,390
    legacy High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to reduce
    the fleet age as HMMWVs will remain in the Army's fleet through at
    least 2025. We will also have the requirement to recapitalize over
    7,000 Up Armored HMMWVs returning from theater as we responsibility
    draw down from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

                       joint light tactical vehicle cost
        28. Senator Hagan. General Casey, I understand it is difficult to
    generate an accurate cost estimate of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
    (JLTV) program because it is still in development. However, defense
    analysts suggest the JLTV program may cost as much as $30 to $70
    billion, depending upon the final unit cost of the vehicle and the
    number procured. What is the Army's JLTV procurement requirement, and
    what is the current estimated per vehicle cost?
        General Casey. The current Army JLTV procurement requirement is
    54,883 vehicles. However, the Army is in the process of developing and
    refining our tactical wheeled vehicle strategy; therefore, a final
    planned JLTV quantity has not been determined. The Army is creating a
    flexible vehicle strategy emphasizing a mixed fleet approach that spans
    performance, protection and payload. Planning figures are subject to
    change as the Army's tactical wheeled vehicles strategy evolves, the
    availability of base funding changes, and service requirements develop.
    The average base vehicle cost is between $370,000-$400,000, including
    general and administrative fees and profit. This base vehicle cost
    includes hull/structure, suspension, power pack/drive train, auxiliary
    automotive, ring mount, Gunners Protection Kit and Government Furnished
    Equipment A-Kit (all in-dash wiring and items integral to the vehicle).

        29. Senator Hagan. General Casey, will the Army have to reduce
    total JLTV acquisition quantities or scale back JLTV capabilities in
    order to deal with rising costs?
        General Casey. The Army is actively pursuing this vehicle. Although
    the final planned quantity has not been determined, the current
    procurement requirement remains 54,883 vehicles. The program is in the
    Technology Development (TD) Phase. The requirements and cost data
    developed during the TD phase are being evaluated to provide an
    affordable system that is balanced between payload, performance and
    protection. Based on current estimates of quantity, schedule, and
    technical capability, there has been no cost growth and no reduction in
    acquisition quantities.

                         next generation ground vehicle
        30. Senator Hagan. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, Secretary
    Gates emphasized the importance of having the Army adequately develop a
    next generation ground vehicle capability that takes into account and
    adapts to the lessons learned in theater. Can you discuss the status of
    the Army's assessment with the Marine Corps on joint capability gaps
    for ground vehicles?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Future Combat Systems
    Acquisition Decision Memorandum, dated 23 June 2009, directed the Army,
    in conjunction with the Marine Corps, to ``initiate actions to assess
    joint capability gaps for manned ground vehicles.'' The Army
    Capabilities Integration Center and the Marine Corps Combat Development
    Command implemented a consolidated assessment process from June to
    August 2009. Much like the Army's and Marine Corps' earlier assessments
    for the JLTV, this review included comprehensive lessons learned,
    current operational data for specific types of platforms and seminar
    wargames with both Generating Force and Operating Force members.
        In August 2009, the Army-Marine Corps Board approved the joint
    capability gap assessment for manned ground vehicles, which addresses
    protection, network, mobility and lethality shortfalls. This was
    included in the Army's submission to the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council (JROC) as part of the approval process for the Ground Combat
    Vehicle (GCV) Initial Capabilities Document in November 2009. The next
    formal step in the requirements process is submission of a Capabilities
    Development Document to the JROC.

        31. Senator Hagan. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, can you also
    discuss how the assessment is providing new requirements for Army GCV
    modernization?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The joint capability gaps
    assessment for manned ground vehicles provided key insights into
    prioritizing modernization efforts for all combat vehicles. We apply
    these lessons learned in our analysis of vehicle upgrades, divestments
    and new procurements. For example, the capability gaps in protection
    underpin our efforts to improve Stryker protection.
        The assessment also weighed heavily in drafting the operational
    requirements for the GCV (e.g., new kinds of weapon systems and/or
    equipment needed by the warfighter in current operations). For example,
    the capability gaps identified regarding protected mobility and non-
    lethal assets for manned ground vehicles led to specific operational
    requirements in the draft GCV Capabilities Development Document.

        32. Senator Hagan. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what effect
    will the vehicle modernization program have on the Army's force
    structure, operational capabilities, procurement, and budget
    requirements?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army's combat vehicle
    modernization is a combination of the new GCV program with divestiture
    and recapitalization (RECAP) of other existing combat vehicles, to
    include rebuilds and upgrades. RECAP will continue for the Abrams,
    Paladin, and Stryker and RESET will continue for Bradley as interim
    solutions until GCV is available. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
    (MRAP) vehicle variants will also provide protected mobility.
        The GCV effort is part of a holistic Army plan to modernize its
    combat vehicle fleet within the existing force structure. The GCV
    platform will be highly survivable, mobile and versatile. The GCV is
    the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate
    in an improvised explosive device (IED) environment. It is envisioned
    to have greater lethality and ballistic protection than a Bradley,
    greater IED and mine protection than an MRAP, and the cross country
    mobility of an Abrams tank.
        Our intent for the first installment of GCV procurement is conduct
    a one for one replacement of Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicles in
    Heavy BCTs with the first brigade being equipped in fiscal year 2019.
    In conjunction with developing our program for fiscal year 2012-2017,
    we will develop a balanced modernization effort across our platforms
    based on capability needs and the resources available.

                           alternative fuel and power
        33. Senator Hagan. Secretary McHugh and General Casey,
    Afghanistan's mountainous terrain poses significant logistical
    challenges, which drives up the cost of our operations in theater. I
    believe we need to engage in significant research and development
    initiatives involving alternative fuel and power sources, as well as
    fuel efficient engines for the Army's tactical wheeled vehicles. What
    are the Army Research Office and Program Executive Office doing to
    increase the fuel efficiency of tactical wheeled vehicles?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Fuel efficiency is a Key System
    Attribute (KSA) in the JLTV Capability Development Document. The JLTV
    effort is the future of the light tactical vehicle fleet. The fuel
    efficiency KSA states that the JLTV shall achieve 60 (Threshold) 65
    (Objective) ton-miles per gallon as measured at gross vehicle weight
    (including armor) using Test Operating Procedure 2.2.603 over the
    Munson Standard Fuel Course. The Tank and Automotive Research,
    Development and Engineering Center's analysis of the three technology
    development contractor vehicles states that the JLTV is currently at 76
    ton-miles per gallon. Clearly, this highlights the Army's commitment to
    incorporating more fuel efficient vehicles into our Tactical Wheeled
    Vehicle fleet.
        The Army is also pursuing research and development initiatives in a
    number of technological areas, which enable increased fuel efficiency
    in the ground tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. Ongoing efforts include
    development of the following: light-weight structural materials (armors
    and composites, which can reduce the overall vehicle weight resulting
    in more fuel efficient vehicles) and technologies to enable high
    efficiency energy storage, efficient motors, exportable power and
    thermal/power management for application on a hybrid electric vehicle.
    In addition, the Army is evaluating a number of currently fielded
    engines for their ability to perform in an operational environment
    using alternative fuels. Although these fuels alone are not expected to
    increase the vehicles' fuel efficiency, their widespread use could
    reduce the Army's overall dependence on petroleum.
        Finally, the Army Research Office is investing in promising
    research in a number of fundamental technological areas, such as the
    conversion of cellulosic materials into hydrocarbons, understanding the
    chemical kinetics of hydrocarbon combustion, spray and combustion
    diagnostics and new hydrocarbon spray methodologies. These basic
    research investments have the potential to further enable the use of
    alternative fuels and ultimately improve gas mileage.

                         army irregular warfare center
        34. Senator Hagan. General Casey, I am pleased the Army is looking
    into establishing an Irregular Warfare Center in order to streamline
    irregular warfare doctrinal development. Has the Army made a decision
    on the location of the Irregular Warfare Center?
        General Casey. I have tasked TRADOC to assess and then recommend to
    me whether we should establish an Irregular Warfare Center. Our
    Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth currently has proponency for
    all warfighting doctrine across the full spectrum of conflict including
    operations against traditional threats, counterinsurgency, and
    stability operations. In the execution of this responsibility, they
    will closely coordinate with the JFK Special Warfare Center at Fort
    Bragg, NC. I expect TRADOC's recommendation within the next 90 days.

        35. Senator Hagan. General Casey, what is the TRADOC's position?
        General Casey. The U.S. Army TRADOC and the Headquarters,
    Department of the Army are examining the benefits of creating a center
    for Irregular Warfare (IW). If created, the IW center would leverage
    expertise, experience and core capabilities, from sources both internal
    and external to the Army, as well as harness the intellectual capital
    of the growing IW community. The center would focus on collecting
    lessons learned, identifying best practices and informing concept
    development. This would more effectively enable the integration of
    doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
    personnel and facilities across TRADOC and the Army.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
                              supplemental request
        36. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, there is a
    $20 billion supplemental request for fiscal year 2010 in addition to a
    $102.2 billion OCOs request for 2011. If the supplemental is being
    replaced by the OCO request, then why is there such a big disparity?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The $20 billion supplemental is
    a requested increase to the $78 billion provided by the fiscal year
    2010 OCO, which was enacted in December 2009. This is additional
    funding required this fiscal year to support the increasing force
    levels in Afghanistan. The fiscal year 2011 OCO request of $102 billion
    is to provide fiscal year 2011 funding for all operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq.

                              balancing the force
        37. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, it is my
    understanding that in a speech to the Association of the U.S. Army and
    other forums last fiscal year, that you expected the Army will achieve
    operational balance in the force by 2011. Do you still believe that the
    Army will reach that goal, specifically, with achieving the dwell time
    ratios?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Although the recent troop
    increase in Afghanistan delays the Army's long-term goal of a 1:3/1:5
    ratio of time deployed versus time spent at home station (i.e.,
    ``BOG:Dwell''), the Army's current growth continues to mitigate this
    new Operation Enduring Freedom force demand.
        Because of the growth of the Army over the past 5 years (more than
    70,000 troops since 2004; 40,000 of them in the last 2 years) and the
    drawdown in Iraq, the Army can execute this increase without going to
    15-month deployments, without going to less than 12 months at home
    between deployments and without continued implementation of stop loss.
    Assuming the drawdown in Iraq continues on schedule, the Army will
    achieve our BOG:Dwell goals. The Army estimates that approximately 70
    percent of the Active component and 80 percent of the Reserve component
    will achieve BOG:Dwell goals of 1:2 Active component and 1:4 Reserve
    component by 2011. The remainder of the force will continue to see an
    increase in its dwell rate and will meet these goals by 2012.

        38. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, will you
    meet the Grow the Army objectives that are part of achieving
    operational balance?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army will meet the Grow the
    Army objectives of building or converting 301 brigades across all
    components by the end of fiscal year 2014. The support from your
    committee continues to ensure the Army will be capable of achieving
    operational balance and conducting full spectrum operations.

                                force protection
        39. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, you
    testified in the past that force protection is a major imperative with
    current and future OCO. Why did you not request mine-resistant ambush
    protected (MRAP) vehicles and other force protection vehicles as part
    of your 2011 budget, OCO, or fiscal year 2010 supplemental requests?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. To date, the MRAP initiative
    remains a joint program and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD) submits requests for programmatic funding. All funding received
    is managed and controlled by OSD and the Joint Program Office--MRAP.
        In fiscal year 2010, OCO funds were requested to procure MRAP-All
    Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs) for the Army and other Services. There is no
    MRAP procurement anticipated in fiscal year 2011, because the Army's
    known needs will have been met.
        The M-ATVs were requested for the Army as part of overall OSD
    fiscal year 2010 OCO budget submission. Additionally, OSD recently
    directed the procurement of an additional 1,300 MRAPs and 1,460 M-ATVs
    for the Army in fiscal year 2010.
        OSD anticipates that the MRAP initiative/program will transition to
    individual Service management in fiscal year 2012. At that time, the
    Army will assume budgetary control for our fleet of MRAP vehicles. The
    Army is committed to incorporating the MRAP Family of Vehicles into the
    future force structure.

        40. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, how does
    your UAV budget request compare with the other Services' requests?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army's UAV budget request
    is comparable to that of the other services. The total DOD budget
    request for procurement and development of UAVs was approximately $5.1
    billion. Of that amount, the Army requested $1.45 billion to procure,
    retrofit and develop the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose UAS, to retrofit
    the RQ-7B Shadow with Tactical Common Data Link, longer wings and laser
    designators and to procure new the RQ-11B Raven Small UAS and retrofit
    it with digital data link kits. For their UAV programs, the Air Force
    requested $1.1 billion; the Navy and Marine Corps requested $.7
    billion; and the Special Operations Command requested $1.8 billion.

        41. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is separate
    research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement
    necessary?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Separate RDT&E and procurement
    budget lines are necessary, because each Service has different
    requirements for its Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The Army UASs are
    tactical platforms under the direct control of the Combatant Commander
    used to provide immediate, responsive, real-time Reconnaissance,
    Surveillance, Target Acquisition and, if deemed appropriate, attack
    support to influence the current fight. The Air Force uses its UASs to
    provide Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance information for
    analysis at a strategic level in order to influence future battles.
    Finally, the Navy has its own unique requirements, such as overwater
    operations, and therefore, designs its UASs to operate in a salt water
    environment. Although each Service may manage and develop UASs to meet
    its individual requirements, where appropriate, the Army leverages the
    technologies being developed by the other Services.

                        army national guard and reserves
        42. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, I applaud
    the level of integration of the ARNG and the Army Reserves into the
    total Army. The Army has carried the lion's share of the OCO missions
    and should be commended. How would you characterize the success of
    their integration and support to the world-wide missions of the Army?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. During the last 8 years of war,
    our Reserve component (RC), the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S.
    Army Reserve (USAR), has consistently demonstrated its readiness and
    ability to make sustained contributions to ongoing operations. The
    challenges facing the United States today and in the future require the
    employment of the RC as part of a global operational force. To that
    end, we have institutionalized the transformation of the RC from a Cold
    War Era strategic Reserve to an operational Reserve.
        The Army's procurement strategy for the ARNG/USAR is focused on
    modernization on par with the Active component (AC) and in accordance
    with the ARFORGEN model. Over the last 5 years (fiscal years 2006-2010)
    the Army has invested a total of $28.4 billion in ARNG equipping.
    Additionally, over the same 5 years, Congress appropriated an
    additional $4.4 billion for the ARNG in the National Guard and Reserve
    Equipment Appropriation. Much of the equipment from the fiscal year
    2008 and fiscal year 2009 procurements are now emerging from production
    and are being fielded. This filled shortages and modernized equipment
    on hand (EOH)--giving units increased capability, (although readiness
    calculations may not appear to show significant improvement due to a
    concurrent growth in requirements).
        The overall EOH summary by Components at the end of March 2009 was:
    AC 80 percent; ARNG 77 percent; USAR 80 percent. The Army has
    programmed approximately $102.4 billion over the next 5 years to
    address shortfalls and modernize equipment. Based on current
    operational requirements, the Army anticipates bringing the AC to 86
    percent, the ARNG to 83 percent, and the USAR to 81 percent EOH by
    2017. Transforming RC to an Operational Reserve will require the Army
    to develop new policies and make targeted investments in support of
    desired outcomes: efficient delivery of medically ready and trained
    soldiers to RC units; incentives programs to sustain family and
    employer support for the Guard and Reserve; policies for utilization
    and integration of the total force; and investments in RC unit
    management programs and collective training.

        43. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, do you see
    a need to ask for more funding to cover the costs of full-time manning
    for the National Guard and the Army Reserves?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. No. Our Reserve components are
    able to leverage OCOs funding to mitigate war-related demands for
    additional manning.

        44. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, it appears
    that the majority of the ARNG's portion of the budget request is in the
    OCO and supplemental. Will the baseline request adjust when these two
    budgets are no longer needed?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Yes. The baseline will be
    adjusted when the OCOs and supplemental budgets are not longer needed.

                                   recruiting
        45. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the fiscal
    year 2011 baseline $43.9 billion Operation and Maintenance request
    funds the recruiting and training the All-Volunteer Force program. Is
    there a study examining the possibility of having one recruiting
    command that serves the needs of the total force vice having three
    separate agencies?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army combined the Army
    Reserve and Regular Army recruiting programs in the 1990s, but has not
    taken action to add ARNG recruiting. This is primarily due to the
    authority that the 54 States and territories exercise in determining
    whether an individual will be enlisted in the Guard. There are no
    formal studies examining the possibility of having one recruiting
    command that serves the needs of the total force--Regular Army, Army
    Reserve, and ARNG.

               post-deployment and mobilization respite allowance
        46. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army
    issued an information paper on February 17, 2010 titled, ``Post
    Deployment & Mobilization Respite Allowance.'' It is my understanding
    that there are over an estimated 20,000 National Guard and Reserve
    soldiers who exceeded their original deployment schedule that are
    eligible to receive post deployment and mobilization respite allowance.
    It is my understanding this process has taken over 3 years, and to
    date, many have not been paid. Can you explain to me how this situation
    occurred and what is the timeline to expeditiously resolve this very
    unfortunate issue?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 604 (Public Law 111-
    84), authorized the Service Secretaries to retroactively compensate
    former servicemembers for Post-Deployment Mobilization Respite Absence
    (PDMRA) days earned from January 19, 2007, through the date the
    Military Department implemented the PDMRA program. Under the statutory
    authority, however, the Service Secretaries may provide such benefits
    only in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
    Defense. The DOD implementation policy was approved on February 1,
    2010, and the Army began payments on March 1, 2010. We will continue to
    process and pay these claims until all eligible individuals are
    appropriately compensated.

                                   diversity
        47. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army
    has worked hard to advocate a robust diversity program that provides
    opportunities for minorities and women to reach the highest ranks.
    After reviewing your equal opportunity Army strength data, I see that
    the overall number of minorities and women in the ARNG are very scarce
    given that the Army National Guard makes up approximately 35 percent of
    the total force. Is there not enough qualified minorities and females
    officers available in the Army National Guard?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. At the national level, four of
    the nine senior positions in the Army National Guard are occupied or
    filled by a female or a minority officer. The percentage of female
    officers in the Army National Guard has continued to increase over
    time. In 1992, 7.8 percent of the Army National Guard officer corps was
    made up of females compared to 12.2 percent at the end of fiscal year
    2009.
        Regarding African Americans, as of fiscal year 2009, 10.2 percent
    of officers in the Active Army were African American, while in the ARNG
    it was 7.9 percent. Although the disparity between the two is not that
    great, there is obvious room for improvement. The ARNG has programs to
    encourage African Americans, as well as other minorities to join the
    Army. These programs apply to officer and enlisted personnel and are
    integral to supporting the overall recruiting mission of the U.S. Army
    Accessions Command.

        48. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is there a
    plan to address this disparity?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Although the overall disparity
    is not that great, whatever differences there are may stem from the
    fact that each state looks at its program individually, as does the
    ARNG. Diversity programs vary from State to State based on their
    individual requirements and demographics. The ARNG is considering one
    standardized framework for continuity and measurement purposes.
    Although one blanket set of standards may not work for all states,
    recruiting goals and objectives could be tailored to address these
    areas.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                 army to revise requirements generation process
        49. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, Lieutenant
    General Reno (retired) recently completed an internal study of the
    Army's requirement's generation process, which has not been shared with
    Congress. We understand General Reno's report emphasizes the need to
    make Army requirements realistically reflect resource constraints. This
    would prevent the creation of future requirements which are neither
    technologically nor financially obtainable. Do you agree with General
    Reno's recommendation? Please explain how you plan to make the Army
    requirements process better informed by resource constraints.
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. In June 2009, Lieutenant
    General (R) William Reno completed the Reforming the Requirements and
    Resourcing Processes in Support of Army Institutional Adaptation study
    known as The Reno Study. The purpose was to recommend methods by which
    the requirements system could be reformed and better aligned with the
    resourcing systems of the Army. The Army intends to deliver The Reno
    Study to the committee in early March.
        I wholeheartedly support LTG Reno's recommendations to improve our
    requirements determination processes. We must continuously improve our
    acquisition model to ensure the Army identifies capabilities that
    provide the best operational capability at the best cost. The Reno
    Study provides several recommendations to incorporate cost-based
    analysis earlier in the Army requirements generation process, which
    will improve decisions on required capabilities informed by life-cycle
    costs and operational risk. The earlier use of analytics to determine
    best value (best capability for best cost) will identify feasible
    alternatives with associated costs across the doctrine, organization,
    training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities
    (DOTMLPF) domains.
        To implement these recommendations, we are updating our
    requirements determination and programming policies, training analysts
    to conduct cost-benefit analyses and placing them in our Capabilities
    Development and Integration Directorates within the TRADOC, and
    requiring cost-based analysis across the DOTMLPF domains for all new
    requirements submitted to the Department. The culmination of these
    efforts will enable our senior leaders across governance forums to
    weigh choices based on best value and make better-informed decisions.

        50. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, when will
    this report be provided to the committee?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. In June 2009, Lieutenant
    General (R) William Reno completed the Reforming the Requirements and
    Resourcing Processes in Support of Army Institutional Adaption study,
    also known as ``The Reno Study.'' The Army intends to deliver the study
    to the committee in early March. The Army has conducted a detailed
    analysis of the study, and has developed implementation proposals for
    each of its 98 recommendations. The Under Secretary of the Army and the
    Vice Chief of Staff Army are conducting final reviews of these
    proposals.

                     end strength and deployment cycle time
        51. Senator McCain. General Casey, you have put forward the goal of
    increasing dwell time for soldiers so that they spend 2 years at home
    for every 1 year deployed. There are two ways to achieve that goal: to
    reduce our commitments overseas or to increase end-strength. What are
    the budgetary and dwell-time implications of making the temporary end-
    strength increase of 22,000 soldiers permanent?
        General Casey. Budget: A sustained 22,000 increase would cost
    $11.15 billion across the Future Years Defense Program (fiscal year
    2012-fiscal year 2017) above the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
    This cost estimate includes $4.71 billion Operations and Maintenance
    (O&M), $5.67 billion Military Personnel Appropriation Army (MPA) and
    $0.77 billion Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund, assuming such
    an increase would remain predominantly in grades E1 through E4.
        Dwell: A sustained 22,000 increase above documented authorizations
    would not add any rotational units to the force pool and therefore
    would not have any impact on unit BOG: Dwell ratios. A sustained 22,000
    increase would certainly relieve stress and strain on the force by
    filling our deploying units appropriately, compensate for nondeployable
    soldiers in deploying units, and improve readiness of units throughout
    the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.

        52. Senator McCain. General Casey, in review of the 2009 QDR, I
    noted that one of the objectives was ``to further rebalance the
    capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and institutionalize successful
    wartime innovations to better enable success in today's wars while
    ensuring that our forces are prepared for a complex future.'' The QDR
    went on to assert priorities for the sizing and shaping of the force
    which assumed a range of conflicts and contingencies similar to what
    our Armed Forces are presently facing. Yet the QDR proposed a force
    structure for the Army that is essentially what you currently have,
    without the 22,000 soldiers. In your testimony today, you state that
    ``the Army has operated at a demanding pace for the last 8 years and .
    . . the strain has placed the Army out of balance.'' You go on to say
    that ``the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to create demands
    that have our Army operating beyond sustainable capacity.'' I see a
    disconnect between your testimony and the results of the QDR. Does the
    QDR's recommendation regarding Army force structure allow the Army to
    meet its goals regarding dwell time given the QDR's defense objectives
    regarding prevailing in today's wars, preparing to defeat adversaries,
    and preserving the force?
        General Casey. The temporary manpower increase of up to 22,000 was
    authorized by the Secretary of Defense to assist with near term manning
    challenges and ensure units are appropriately manned prior to
    deployment. The temporary manpower increase does not include force
    structure and is intended to mitigate the increase in the soldier
    nondeployable rate associated with the current high demand for forces.
    With the upcoming responsible OIF drawdown and the subsequent projected
    demand reduction on the force, the Army views the manning challenge as
    temporary. Therefore, the projected decrease in demand on the
    programmed Army force structure will allow the Army to achieve balance
    by the end of 2011 and meet the rotation dwell time goals given the
    QDR's defense objectives.

        53. Senator McCain. General Casey, have you determined how many
    deployed forces your current force structure levels can sustain to meet
    your goals for dwell time? If so, what is that number?
        General Casey. Our interim goal, only sustainable in the near-term,
    is 2 years at home for every 1-year deployed for the Active Force and 4
    years at home for every 1-year mobilization for the Reserve component.
    At these dwell ratios, the Army can produce a continuous supply of 1
    corps headquarters, 5 division headquarters, 20 BCTs, and about 90,000
    troops worth of enablers.
        Our long-term dwell goal, which we believe is necessary to maintain
    the All-Volunteer Force, is a ratio of three periods at home for each
    period deployed for the Active component, and 5 years for every 1 year
    mobilized for the Reserve component. Our target for achieving this
    long-term goal is 2015. At this dwell ratio, the Army can produce a
    continuous supply of 1 corps, 4 divisions, 16 BCTs, and about 72,000
    troops worth of enablers.

                       readiness of nondeployed readiness
        54. Senator McCain. General Casey, in review of your February 23
    testimony, I note your continued concern that ``presently, and for the
    short term, we lack sufficient strategic flexibility, and we continue
    to accumulate risk.'' This risk is reflected in the quarterly readiness
    reports received by this committee that continue to show severely
    degraded readiness for nondeployed units. I also note that the QDR does
    not propose any initiatives or plans to specifically address the issues
    of the reset or readiness of nondeployed forces in the Army and the
    Marine Corps. In your opinion, why did the QDR not address the issue of
    the readiness status of nondeployed units in the Army?
        General Casey. We will continue to accumulate risk in the near-term
    as we meet requirements for the current campaigns, and we anticipate a
    tough few years ahead in providing sufficient strategic flexibility to
    meet future contingencies. Eight and a half years at war builds latent
    risks; risks that inherently impact soldiers and their families, and
    their equipment.
        The QDR addresses the primary readiness concerns to the Joint
    Force. First, and most importantly, the QDR recognizes the need to
    preserve the All-Volunteer Force and to sustain the health of our
    soldiers, civilians, and their families. Next, the findings clearly
    articulate the importance of managing deployment tempos and associated
    challenges with resetting and reconstituting equipment. These two
    issues directly impact readiness for the Joint Force, and particularly,
    the Army.
        Under the ARFORGEN's cycle, we do not apply a single, standardized
    test of readiness to all units. Instead, different units in different
    phases of ARFORGEN are expected to be at different levels of readiness.
    As an example, ARFORGEN Reset phase is specifically designed without
    any readiness expectations for unit personnel and equipment. Typically,
    it is a 6-month process that systematically restores units--whether re-
    deployed or nondeployed--to a level of personnel and equipment
    readiness that permits resumption of training for future missions.
        Reset encompasses those tasks necessary to reintegrate soldiers and
    families, and tasks required to organize, man, equip, and train a unit.
    As units progress from Reset to Train/Ready status, they possess the
    soldiers and equipment required to train to a level of readiness that
    will enable the Army to provide a surge capacity for contingencies. We
    are not able to provide this now, but in the near- to mid-term we
    expect to achieve this capacity and restore our strategic flexibility.
    In the available cycle of ARFORGEN, soldiers and units are at a level
    of readiness to execute assigned full spectrum operations.
        Meeting the requirements of the last 8 years at war, the Army has
    not achieved targeted deployment to dwell ratios creating heightened
    stress to soldiers and their Families. By managing deployment tempos,
    specifically deployment to dwell at home station time ratios, we build
    readiness with predictability and sufficient physical and mental
    recovery time for soldiers and their families. As dwell times at home
    station stabilize and increase in time, individual soldier and unit
    readiness will increase as they train and prepare for the full spectrum
    of military operations.
        As cited in the QDR, DOD is developing policies and initiatives to
    assess the effects of stress to the force, the impact of low dwell
    rates and measures to mitigate the same. Similarly, the Army has
    implemented numerous initiatives to mitigate stressors to soldiers,
    their families, and units. These initiatives, among many others,
    include: the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the Army Suicide
    Prevention Program, Army Family Action Plan and Warrior Care and
    Transition.
        Reset is essential in maintaining our equipment and Army Pre-
    positioned Stocks (APS) readiness. During Reset, we repair or replace
    destroyed, degraded and lost equipment. Although current support
    provides for the full restoration and replacement of all equipment in
    support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, success in restoring
    readiness following responsible draw downs in both campaigns will
    depend on reliable, timely and consistent funding to reset the force.
    Of particular importance will be support to our soldier, families, and
    veterans, and restoring the readiness of our equipment and pre-
    positioned stocks. The combination of these actions will improve
    readiness in the near- to mid-term.

        55. Senator McCain. General Casey, what do you consider to be an
    acceptable degree of risk for the readiness of nondeployed forces?
        General Casey. The Army mitigates risk to the readiness of
    nondeployed forces by progressively increasing unit readiness as they
    cycle through the ARFORGEN force pools from RESET through Train/Ready
    to the Available force pool.
        The RESET force pool provides a unit time to reintegrate soldiers
    with their Families, receive new personnel, field new equipment,
    conduct individual training, attend institutional training and initiate
    collective training. The Train/Ready force pool progressively increases
    a unit's readiness by completing the fill of personnel shortages,
    fielding equipment, conducting collective training and conducting
    mission readiness exercises to validate unit readiness in meeting
    Combatant Commanders' and Service requirements. Risk decreases as a
    unit progresses from the RESET force pool, without any readiness
    expectations, to the Available force pool.
        Additionally, the Army is establishing ARFORGEN Aim Points to track
    a unit's progression and focus resources to ensure its readiness
    increase. The first Aim Point is when a unit emerges from the RESET
    force pool. The second Aim Point is approximately 45 days before a
    unit's mission readiness exercise. ARFORGEN will generate enough forces
    to meet Combatant Commander and Global Force Management sustained
    demands and to have depth to respond to contingencies.

        56. Senator McCain. General Casey, what are your plans over the
    next 2 years to mitigate this risk?
        General Casey. The Army's plan to reduce risk to the force in the
    near-term is contingent upon achieving sustainable deploy-to-dwell
    ratios, adequately providing for soldiers, civilians, and families,
    resetting our Soldiers and their equipment, and securing reliable,
    timely and consistent funding.
        With your support and no change to known troop requirements the
    Army will reach a deploy-to-dwell ratio of 1 year deployed to 2 years
    at home station for the Active component and one year deployed to 4
    years at home station for the Reserve component in fiscal year 2012, as
    well as begin to move towards our long-term deploy-to-dwell ratios.
    Improving dwell times is critical to preserving the All-Volunteer Force
    as we implement Army initiatives to improve and sustain the health of
    our soldiers and their families, and provide them with a quality of
    life that is commensurate with their service to the Nation.
        We are developing a revised Modernization Strategy to build the
    necessary capabilities required to meet future contingencies while
    balancing capabilities between the Active and Reserve components.
    Continued additional funding above the base budget is critical to
    mitigating risk in the near to mid-term to allow us to reset equipment
    and Army Prepositioned Stocks. This additional funding will be needed
    for several years after completion of operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan.

        57. Senator McCain. General Casey, based on your plan, when is this
    committee going to see an overall improvement in the readiness of
    nondeployed units as reflected in quarterly reports?
        General Casey. The Army plans to improve readiness by increasing
    dwell times for Army units, reconstituting its Army Prepositioned
    Stocks, and operationalizing the Reserve Component.
        The recent approval of the Army's accelerated Grow the Army plan
    was intended to rapidly improve the unit'' time deployed to time at
    home'' ratio. As dwell time increases, we expect to see sustained
    improvement in the readiness of nondeployed units. The Army is
    continuing to transition the Reserve component to an accessible partner
    of the total operational force and is integrating the ARNG and the U.S.
    Army Reserve (USAR) into the Sustained Sourcing Approach. The Army has
    programmed approximately $102.4 billion over the next 5 years to
    procure shortfalls and modernize equipment, which is anticipated to
    bring the ARNG and USAR to 83 percent and 81 percent Equipment On Hand
    respectively by 2017 based on current operational requirements.
        The current Army procurement strategy for ARNG/USAR is focused on
    modernization and is on par with the active Component in accordance
    with the ARFORGEN model. Integration of the Reserve Component into the
    ARFORGEN cycle better enables Reserve Component employment as part of
    the Joint Force while preserving some ability to expand the scope by
    accelerating availability. With timely and predictable funding, we will
    be able to provide units more of their required equipment earlier in
    the process, not just-in-time for their deployment. This will also help
    us restore the Army's strategic depth and increase our flexibility to
    defend the Nation.

        58. Senator McCain. General Casey, do you believe the funding
    proposed for reset, manning, and training in the fiscal year 2011
    budget and the Future Years Defense Plan will allow you to restore
    readiness of nondeployed units to an acceptable level?
        General Casey. The readiness of nondeployed formations continues to
    be the biggest concern for the Army--it is the foremost concern driving
    the Army's risk assessment for the Chairman. The Army has been at war
    since September 11, and seen sustained growth annually in overseas
    contingencies operations since the end of the Cold War. The fiscal year
    2011 budget will help arrest the continued decline in the readiness of
    nondeployed forces--but will not in and of itself reverse the decline
    in nondeployed readiness. ARFORGEN accepts the proposition that some
    forces are less ready due to their proximity in the deployment cycle.
    Right now, too many nondeployed forces are at degraded readiness
    levels. The readiness of nondeployed forces will not improve to an
    acceptable level (based on ARFORGEN goals) until demand is reduced.

         establishment of an army unit at thomson correctional facility
        59. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the OCO
    portion of the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011 includes
    $350 million in a transfer fund for the detention facilities at
    Guantanamo Bay, provides funding to make improvements at the Illinois
    State Prison at Thomson, Illinois, in the amount of $150 million, and
    includes another $158 million for information technology improvements
    at the Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, to support DOD detainee
    operations at Thomson. The current plan calls for approximately 600-
    1,000 permanently-stationed Army personnel to perform duties at Thomson
    with base support provided by Rock Island Arsenal, which is about 60
    miles from the Thomson facility. Do you support the use of Army
    personnel and facilities for this initiative?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army is the Executive Agent
    for detainee operations policy, and we are coordinating closely with
    DOD regarding the potential use of the Thomson facility. If DOD assigns
    this task to the Army, we will develop the appropriate personnel
    structure to accomplish this mission to the best of our ability.

        60. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, does the
    Army have the available manpower authorizations to support this new
    mission?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. If OSD assigns the Army this
    task, we will thoroughly review the manpower requirements needed to
    accomplish the mission.

        61. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, do you
    support the proposal to require Army personnel to commute 60 miles each
    way to work at the Thomson facility?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. If the Army was directed to
    perform this mission, the senior commander within the local area has
    the flexibility to establish and define the local commuting area. A
    distance of 50 miles, one way, is normally considered to be within
    reasonable commuting distance of a station, but the 50-mile rule is not
    inflexible.

        62. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, do you have
    any proposals or plans to mitigate the effects of this dislocation for
    soldiers and their families?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. In addition to the senior
    commander's authority to establish and define the local commuting area,
    the Army could accommodate short distance moves within proximity of the
    facility if the Army is directed to perform this mission.

               military construction requirements for afghanistan
        63. Senator McCain. General Casey, the budget request for fiscal
    year 2011 OCO contains $761 million for facilities and infrastructure
    to be constructed in Afghanistan, plus an additional $90 million for
    future planning and design of facilities in Afghanistan. In the
    justification documents provided with the budget request, most of these
    projects are not proposed to be completed until mid-2012, almost a full
    year after the President's announced goal for start of the withdrawal
    of forces. In other words, we may be faced with a scenario where we are
    still constructing facilities at the same time we are withdrawing
    forces. I ask you only because the amounts are requested by the Army.
    Does this make sense to you?
        General Casey. Yes, the Army continues to plan for all scenarios
    and will adjust plans and operations as the situation develops. The
    Afghanistan projects requested in the fiscal year 2011 MILCON base
    program were identified to support CENTCOM's Global Defense Posture
    plan. These projects serve a dual purpose by supporting CENTCOM's
    enduring mission post conflict and contingency operations prior to unit
    drawdown and mission accomplishment. fiscal year 2011 OCO projects
    support current contingency operations. All projects were coordinated
    with CENTCOM and ARCENT with the current timeline taken into
    consideration. Projects will be cancelled or scaled down as needed.

        64. Senator McCain. General Casey, are the proposed dates for
    completion of construction consistent with the President's policies and
    goals?
        General Casey. Yes, we are planning for operational requirements,
    consistent with the administration's policies and goals, beyond 2012.
        In addition, based on the Global Defense Posture Plan, the Army
    will have an enduring presence in Afghanistan and other countries in
    Southwest Asia. Projects in the base budget are required to support the
    enduring force.

        65. Senator McCain. General Casey, should I read in these documents
    the military's plan to maintain forces in Afghanistan long after June
    2011?
        General Casey. Based on the Global Defense Posture Plan, the Army
    will have an enduring presence in Afghanistan and other countries in
    Southwest Asia. Our plans support operational requirements, consistent
    with the administration's policies and goals, beyond 2012.

                        implications of iraqi elections
        66. Senator McCain. General Casey, the U.S. presence in Iraq is
    currently about 96,000 uniformed personnel. General Odierno said
    yesterday that the planned withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces by the
    end of August 2010 could be delayed if conditions worsen in the coming
    months as Iraqis choose a new government. Should the Iraqi elections
    scheduled for March 7 be postponed, will the Army be capable of
    sustaining the necessary forces in Iraq while fulfilling the
    requirements of the troop increase in Afghanistan?
        General Casey. All indications are the elections are going to take
    place as planned.

                            equipment and readiness
        67. Senator McCain. General Casey, with regard to excess military
    equipment, specifically Class II, VII, and IX, currently located in the
    Southwest Asia theater, what specific steps is the Army taking to
    return excess equipment to nondeployed Army units?
        General Casey. This question requires a two part answer:
        First, with regard to excess Class II (general supplies) and IX
    (repair parts), we will retrograde our serviceable stocks, and
    redistribute them throughout the Total Army (to include Army
    Prepositioned Stocks (APS)). The items may be redistributed to
    Afghanistan, APS and other War Reserve requirements, as well as used to
    offset the routine resupply of Army units worldwide.
        Second, regarding excess Class VII (end items), our first priority
    for materiel, which is not needed, is redistribution to satisfy
    requirements in Afghanistan. If not needed there, it will redeploy to
    the Continental United States, be Reset, and redistributed to
    nondeployed units. The Army will use its Army's Resourcing Priorities
    List to determine the distribution of this equipment. If not needed
    within the Army anywhere, these items will be offered to Foreign
    Military Sales customers as Excess Defense Articles, or will be
    disposed of by the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service. Excess
    non-standard gear no longer needed by the Army will be offered to U.S.
    State and local governments, subject to their willingness to pay
    transportation costs to return the items to the United States.

        68. Senator McCain. General Casey, how is equipment that was rushed
    to Iraq, like MRAP vehicles, being incorporated into the Army's vehicle
    fleet?
        General Casey. The Army has developed a predecisional allocation
    plan for MRAPs as they return from theater. This plan was briefed to
    Army senior leaders and is undergoing revision based on guidance to
    conduct a detailed cost benefit analysis. The results will be presented
    to Army senior leaders the end of March 2010. Other pieces of non-
    standard equipment that have been acquired to meet operational
    requirements are being reviewed through the Non-Standard Equipment
    (NSE) disposition process. As a part of the NSE disposition process,
    selected NSE items that have potential to become enduring capabilities
    will be sent through the Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition
    (CDRT) process for additional detailed analysis. These processes use
    wartime lessons learned and other inputs to determine if equipment
    procured through non-traditional means should be incorporated into the
    Army's long term force structure. If it is determined a piece of
    equipment should be retained, a capabilities document is developed to
    assist in the documentation of the structure, manning, training and
    sustainment (including base budget) as the first step in the formal
    process of becoming an acquisition program or being incorporated into
    an existing acquisition program.

        69. Senator McCain. General Casey, have these vehicles been placed
    on units' property books?
        General Casey. Yes, as the Joint Program Office issued MRAP
    vehicles to units in theater, they were placed on unit property books.
    Moreover, last year U.S. Army Central directed units in theater to
    conduct 100 percent inventories to ensure all equipment (including MRAP
    vehicles) appeared in our automated property book system, which
    provides both accountability and visibility. We will continue to focus
    on property accountability at every level during the drawdown in Iraq.

        70. Senator McCain. General Casey, the President's 2011 budget
    request ends production of the Humvee line of vehicles. In many
    instances Humvees are no longer the preferred transport in theater,
    having been supplanted by more heavily protected vehicles, like MRAPs.
    When does the Army intend to finalize a tactical wheeled vehicle
    strategy?
        General Casey. The Army originally developed an overarching
    tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) strategy in 2009. This strategy takes
    maximum advantage of existing platforms; plans for the integration of
    MRAP into the fleet; emphasizes a mixed fleet approach that spans the
    ``Iron Triangle'' of protection, payload and performance; and moves the
    Army to a fleet of scalable protection. Additionally, we published a
    TWV investment strategy on 30 October 2009.
        We are currently working the latest updates to the strategy as part
    of our POM 12-17 submission. This work includes the ongoing TRADOC MRAP
    and TWV studies to determine the feasibility of adjusting the fleet
    mix. This will inform long-term life cycle management decisions and
    future investment strategies.

                don't ask, don't tell homosexual conduct policy
        71. Senator McCain. General Casey, in recent testimony before this
    committee the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen,
    stated his personal view that the current Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT)
    policy on homosexual conduct should be repealed. You testified on
    February 23, 2010, to the effect that you are not ready to endorse
    elimination of the DADT policy and that you want to first see the
    results of the high level review that Secretary Gates has ordered
    before you provide advice on this. Do you agree with the proposition
    that some have advanced that the decision to repeal the DADT policy has
    already been made by the President as Commander in Chief and that the
    only reason for the review and delay is to formulate a plan for
    implementation?
        General Casey. In his State of The Union Address on 27 January
    2010, President Obama indicated an intention to ``work with Congress
    and our military to finally repeal [10 U.S.C. Sec. 654]. . . . ``
    Secretary Gates stated, ``[t]o ensure that the department is prepared
    should the law be changed, and working in close consultation with
    Admiral Mullen, I have appointed a high-level working group within the
    department that will immediately begin a review of the issues
    associated with properly implementing a repeal of the ``Don't Ask,
    Don't Tell' policy.'' Therefore the reason for the review is to
    identify issues associated with the proper implementation of a repeal
    of DADT, should Congress act to change the law.

        72. Senator McCain. General Casey, what do you view as the purpose
    and utility of the high level review?
        General Casey. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the
    Army is participating in an OSD Task force to determine the potential
    impact of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654 to military readiness,
    military effectiveness and unit cohesion and how to best manage any
    noted impact during implementation if the law is ultimately changed.
    The review will assess servicemember views and attitudes concerning
    Don't Ask Don't Tell and will determine what changes to Service
    regulations and policies may be necessary in the event that the current
    law is repealed.

        73. Senator McCain. General Casey, do you personally hold open the
    possibility that you will review the outcome of the high level review
    and determine that the DADT policy should remain in effect and not be
    changed?
        General Casey. The finding of the high-level review will certainly
    inform my opinion as to whether and how the DADT policy should be
    changed. However, the ultimate decision remains with Congress.

        74. Senator McCain. General Casey, is it your understanding that
    the DADT policy lawfully cannot be repealed or ignored, despite the
    President's preferences, and that openly gay soldiers must continue to
    be processed for separation until Congress repeals or modifies section
    654 of title 10, U.S.C.?
        General Casey. The Army's policy on homosexual conduct implements
    DOD policy and Federal Law. DOD policy implements 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654
    and applies to all branches of the Armed Forces. Due to current law and
    governing policy, when a soldier has violated the homosexual conduct
    policy, the commander must initiate separation procedures.

        75. Senator McCain. General Casey, in your view, has the DADT
    policy since 1993 affected the Army's military readiness negatively or
    positively?
        General Casey. Under the current homosexual conduct policy, the
    Army continues to accomplish the mission of providing trained and ready
    forces in support of the combatant commanders.

        76. Senator McCain. General Casey, how would repeal of the current
    law, in your judgment, affect recruiting and retention in the Army?
        General Casey. The OSD Task Force study will help determine the
    impact of repealing the current law on recruiting and retention. If any
    impacts are identified and Congress changes the law, the Army will take
    appropriate actions to address any effects on our recruiting and
    retention programs.

        77. Senator McCain. General Casey, has the current law and DADT
    policy hindered the ability of the Army to increase its end strength in
    recent years?
        General Casey. The current law and ``Don't Ask Don't Tell'' policy
    has not negatively impacted the Army's ability to increase end
    strength. The Army has enjoyed tremendous success in meeting the end
    strength goals and is ahead of schedule (resulting in end strength of
    543,645 for fiscal year 2008). The Army met the fiscal year 2010 end
    strength goal of 547,400 in January 2009. As a result of meeting the
    end strength growth early, the Army currently has enough enlisted
    soldiers to fill all the current authorizations, which helps to
    mitigate the stress of the high operational pace. The current fiscal
    year 2010 end strength projection is 563,543 compared to our targeted
    end strength of 562,400, which includes a 15,000 temporary end strength
    increase. This success is based on both our recruiting and retention
    programs.

        78. Senator McCain. General Casey, in his testimony on February 2,
    Admiral Mullen was clear that the Joint Chiefs have not yet developed
    their best military advice about the impact of a repeal of the DADT
    policy or the manner in which a change would be implemented. However,
    many in Congress intend to move quickly through legislation to repeal
    the law as quickly as possible, including imposition of a moratorium on
    administrative separations while the high level review proceeds. Do you
    support legislative change to the current policy before the Chiefs have
    formulated their advice?
        General Casey. The military must look hard at how a new policy
    would be implemented and address any issues in the Armed Services that
    may result from a repeal of the current law. It is important to have
    accurate data on how soldiers and their families feel about
    implementing a new policy. Because a moratorium would complicate the
    process laid out by Secretary Gates, I would object to a moratorium
    until the Services have a clearer picture.

        79. Senator McCain. General Casey, what is the basis for your
    objection to a congressionally-mandated moratorium on separations of
    openly gay servicemembers under the DADT policy?
        General Casey. It would complicate, and in some respects, undermine
    the whole process that Secretary Gates had laid out. The practical
    impact of a moratorium would be the same as the repeal of the current
    law. We would be put in a position of actually implementing a
    ``repeal'' while we were studying the potential impacts of implementing
    a repeal.

                       role of the joint chiefs of staff
        80. Senator McCain. General Casey, Admiral Mullen is the principal
    military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, but
    under law, he must consult and seek advice from the other members of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. Have you been
    given adequate opportunity to state your views to date?
        General Casey. Yes. The Chairman, Vice Chairman and Service Chiefs
    meet regularly to discuss issues and collectively make decisions.

                   high level review of don't ask, don't tell
        81. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, on February
    2, Secretary Gates testified that a high-level working group within DOD
    will review the issues associated with properly implementing a repeal
    of the DADT policy. Part of this review, he testified, will be to reach
    out to authoritatively understand the views and attitudes of the force.
    Please explain what steps the Army has been asked to take in order to
    implement the President's direction to ``begin the preparations
    necessary for repeal of the current law and policy.''
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army fully supports the
    working group established by Secretary Gates. General Carter Ham,
    Commander, U.S. Army Europe, was selected as the co-chair of the
    working group. It is my understanding that the group will seek input
    from across the Army regarding the views and attitudes of the force
    concerning changing the law and the current DADT policy. The group is
    also expected to review the regulations used to implement the current
    policy to determine if there are different ways to enforce existing
    polices. Finally, the Army has ensured full participation in the
    working group by assigning officers and enlisted personnel in the
    specialties requested.

        82. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is it
    correct that the actions the Secretary of Defense has directed are
    intended to strengthen the argument for repeal of existing law?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The actions directed by the
    Secretary of Defense are intended to ``objectively and methodically
    examine all aspects of this question, and produce its findings and
    recommendations'' by the end of this calendar year.

        83. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what
    difference will it make, if any, in DOD planning if a significant
    proportion--say 50 percent--of servicemembers and their family members
    register objection to a change in the policy?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The views of soldiers and Army
    families will be relevant to our assessment of the potential impact
    that a repeal of the current law may have on military readiness,
    military effectiveness and unit cohesion. DOD policy implements 10
    U.S.C. Sec. 654, which applies to all branches of the Armed Forces. If
    the existing law is changed, the Army will comply with the new law and
    resulting DOD policy. We will deal with this issue with the same
    professionalism that has marked our conduct during this war and that
    has been a hallmark of this institution for 234 years.

        84. Senator McCain. General Casey, according to data provided by
    the Services and DOD, the number of discharges for homosexual conduct
    has consistently been far less than 1 percent, compared to discharges
    for other reasons. The Congressional Research Service concluded that
    most discharges occur among younger, less experienced personnel. How
    many soldiers have been discharged since September 11, 2001, for
    violating DADT?
        General Casey. The total number of Army Homosexual Conduct
    discharges from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2009 (9 years) is
    3,211.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Fiscal Year
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2001..........................................                      627
    2002..........................................                      433
    2003..........................................                      378
    2004..........................................                      325
    2005..........................................                      386
    2006..........................................                      280
    2007..........................................                      303
    2008..........................................                      284
    2009..........................................                      195
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        85. Senator McCain. General Casey, does that number adversely
    affect the readiness of the Army?
        General Casey. As Chief of Staff of the Army, I am focused on my
    Title 10 responsibilities of preparing and sustaining an Army at war.
    That number of soldiers separated for violating the homosexual conduct
    policy since September 11, 2001, has not affected the readiness of the
    Army as we have accomplished the mission of fighting and winning this
    nation's wars.

                       medium extended air defense system
        86. Senator McCain. General Casey, the Medium Extended Air Defense
    System (MEADS) is the Army's follow-on program to the Patriot missile
    system. It is being co-developed by the United States (funding 58
    percent), Germany (25 percent), and Italy (17 percent). MEADS is
    designed to provide 360-degree coverage and protect against short-range
    ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, and aircraft. In their most
    recent assessment of MEADS, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
    determined that many critical technologies have not matured since
    development started in 2004 and will not be fully mature until the
    production decision in 2012. During the program's preliminary design
    review (PDR) in 2008, it was determined that this program carried
    excessive risk and that at least an additional $1 billion and more time
    would be needed prior to Critical Design Review, which is now scheduled
    for August this year. What steps are being taken to ensure that the
    program stays within budget and schedule?
        General Casey. As an international cooperative program, the
    overarching decision body for MEADS is the National Armaments
    Directorate. The representatives or National Armaments Directors are
    senior defense officials of partner nations. The U.S. National
    Armaments Director is the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). Program
    direction and oversight is being migrated from a Joint Steering
    Committee to a more senior tri-national Board of Directors (BOD). The
    senior U.S. member of the BOD is OSD for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics (OSD-AT&L), The Office of Portfolio Systems Acquisition (PSA)
    and is supported by the Army Acquisition Executive.
        In an effort to contain costs and reduce program risks, the
    National Armaments Directors agreed to pursue a rebaseline of the
    original 110 month program. This would extend the Design and
    Development program by up to 24 months. The nations are awaiting the
    response to the proposal for the rebaselined program. Based on the
    direction of the BOD, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization MEADS
    Management Agency General Manager is conducting cost reviews and the
    OSD-Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation is conducting an
    independent cost estimate of the rebaselined program. Preliminary
    projections indicate the extended program will add at least $700
    million in cost to the U.S. over the remainder of the Design and
    Development (D&D) program. Several changes are being sought to adjust
    the program. We acknowledge the schedule and cost growth and are
    discussing additional steps with the international partners to address
    the cost and schedule changes in the upcoming years. The OSD-AT&L is
    the lead for these international negotiations for the Department, so I
    will defer to OSD-AT&L for a current status of those negotiations.

        87. Senator McCain. General Casey, given the international
    collaboration associated with MEADS, is it true that this program is
    exempt from traditional DOD acquisition regulations? If so, was or is
    MEADS in risk of breaching Nunn-McCurdy?
        General Casey. The International (North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO)) MEADS Program is exempt from DOD 5000 Regulations.
    It is governed by the negotiated tri-national Memorandum of
    Understanding (MOU). The International MEADS program is executed by a
    NATO agent, NATO MEADS Management Agency, which complies with the MOU
    and NATO rules and regulations.
        As part of the normal stewardship of our funds, we assess the
    program against typical program metrics, such as procurement and total
    program unit costs as used in Nunn-McCurdy evaluations, as well as
    requiring program documentation similar to those required by DOD 5000
    (e.g. test plans, cost documents, etc.). Based on available estimates,
    the U.S. MEADS current program assessments are within Nunn-McCurdy
    thresholds. The department will have a more precise assessment at the
    conclusion of the OSD Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation's Cost
    Assessment.

        88. Senator McCain. General Casey, is the Army looking at any
    alternatives to a follow-on system for Patriot?
        General Casey. The Army is continuing to program and plan for the
    MEADS as a replacement for Patriot.

                             humanitarian missions
        89. Senator McCain. General Casey, what effect will continuing
    humanitarian operations in Haiti have on the Army's continuing missions
    in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the ability to respond to contingencies
    around the world?
        General Casey. Assuming force requirements do not increase,
    continuing humanitarian operations in Haiti should have little or no
    effect on the Army's continuing missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, or
    the ability to respond to contingencies around the world. It is
    anticipated units supporting Haiti operations will be redeployed with
    sufficient time for reset and train-up for scheduled future
    deployments.

        90. Senator McCain. General Casey, what is the Army's understanding
    of the duration, personnel, and equipping requirements in response to
    the continued humanitarian mission to Haiti?
        General Casey. Duration - Our understanding of the duration of the
    humanitarian mission is that units will remain in place until relieved.
    The mission will not impact operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.
        Personnel - Units are currently transitioning based on U.S.
    Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) timeline.

             U.S. Army South (USARSO) is assuming command and
            control of Joint Task Force (JTF) Haiti, from 18 Airborne
            Command Post (ACP), not later than 15 Mar 2010. 18 ABC ACP is
            redeploying and will return to home station.
             2/82 Airborne (ABN) is redeploying and will return to
            home station by end of Mar 2010. There is no requested backfill
            for 2/82 ABN. FORSCOM projects 2/82 ABN will assume GRF mission
            on or around 01 Apr 2010.
             377 Theater Support Command (TSC) replaced the 3rd
            Expeditionary Support Command (ESC) Headquarters on 06 Mar
            2010.

        Equipping - Units deployed to Haiti with organic equipment.
    Equipment will not be left behind unless directed by Command Authority.

        91. Senator McCain. General Casey, how is the Army preparing to
    deal with future disaster relief missions, to include assisting
    partners to better prepare for these regional and global responses?
        General Casey. The Civil-Military Emergency Preparedness program,
    which was created at the inception of the Partnership for Peace program
    in 1994, is the Army's primary means to assist partner nations in
    enhancing their disaster preparedness and response capacities.
    Annually, this program conducts bilateral and regional events that
    support DOD and Army security cooperation objectives by enhancing
    civil-military cooperation and building our partners' capacity to
    respond to both natural and manmade disasters.
        In fiscal year 2009, the program, which is funded by DOD and
    managed by Headquarters, Department of the Army, conducted 23 events
    with 14 countries using a budget of $1.4 million. In fiscal year 2010,
    the Army plans to conduct 32 events in 16 countries including support
    to U.S. Africa Command's emergency response events using a $1.8 million
    budget. Recently, the program developed a new global assessment tool
    called Providing International Disaster Emergency Support, or ProvIDES,
    which quantitatively assesses a nation's capabilities and capacity to
    establish requirements for enhancing effectiveness across all phases of
    preparedness and response.
        Additionally, the Army assists partners with disaster preparedness
    through security cooperation activities executed by the Army Service
    Component Commands as well as through programs at the Army Medical
    Command and the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
    (WHINSEC). Of note, since 2007 a total of 13 students from Chile have
    participated in disaster preparedness training at WHINSEC.

                          mid-level officer shortfalls
        92. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the
    committee heard outside testimony last year that the Army is projected
    to experience a shortfall of approximately 3,000 captains and majors
    until at least 2013. Please describe the current status of this
    shortfall, its impact, and the Army's mitigation efforts.
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army's current officer
    shortages stem from force structure growth designed to support the
    development of additional capabilities needed to meet emerging threats
    in our OCOs. Based on this growth, we project the Army will be short
    over 4300 captains and majors (across all officer competitive
    categories) through fiscal year 2010, with the shortage dropping to
    about 2900 in fiscal year 2011. We project the Army will be
    specifically short approximately 3800 Army Competitive Category (ACC)
    captains and majors through fiscal year 2010, with the shortage
    dropping to about 2700 in fiscal year 2011. The Army expects to be
    above full strength for captains in aggregate for fiscal year 2013 and
    beyond.
        A shortage of 1,000-1,300 (10 percent-12 percent) ACC majors will
    continue from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2013, and we will
    remain short 1,900-2,200 (10 percent-12 percent) majors across all
    competitive categories during the same time period. The Army will not
    be able to eliminate the major shortage in the foreseeable future, but
    can ease its effects by using captains to fill certain major vacancies
    after fiscal year 2012.
        Examples of measures taken to mitigate captain and major shortages
    include the following: increasing Regular Army accessions to 5500 by
    the end of fiscal year 2010; Reserve Component calls to active duty
    (over 1500 to date); and the use of ``Blue-to-Green'' inter-Service
    transfers (over 500 to date). The Army is also implementing high
    promotion rates to both captain and major (including 2 years below-the-
    zone eligibility for selection to major). We will work to lower these
    rates gradually to allow additional opportunities to differentiate
    exceptional performers. We are also slowly increasing promotion ``pin-
    on'' points for lieutenants and captains as our personnel inventories
    become more healthy.
        The Army is also using incentives to help mitigate our shortages of
    captains and majors. We offered the Captains' Retention Menu of
    Incentives in September 2007 through March 2009 with a goal of
    retaining and managing critical skills in officers to complete the
    Army's modularity conversion. As a result of this program, the Army
    increased captain retention through fiscal year 2011 for over 16,000 of
    the 23,000 captains, who were eligible to participate. We have also
    continued to use the pre-commissioning Officer Career Incentive
    Program, first implemented in fiscal year 2006. By adding 3 guaranteed
    years of active service to the initial obligations of officers
    commissioned through USMA and ROTC programs, this program has increased
    retention at the 8th year of service from a historical 47 percent to
    between 62 percent and 69 percent.

                   brigade combat team modernization program
        93. Senator McCain. General Casey, this year's budget request
    continues work begun under Future Combat Systems (FCS) with a multi-
    billion dollar request for the Army's BCT Modernization program, which
    includes the Early Infantry BCT (E-IBCT) component. The Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) reported in February 2010 that
    ``all E-IBCT systems require further development before fielding,''
    that E-IBCT systems ``demonstrated reliability well below user
    requirements,'' and that the ``systems [tested] were not in the same
    configuration as the systems intended for purchase.'' Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD (AT&L)]
    Carter recently approved the Army's request to move E-IBCT into Low
    Rate Initial Production (LRIP), but said that ``testing has identified
    large reliability shortfalls'' and that the Army lacks ``a clear
    operational perspective of the value'' of these systems in their
    current form. Why is the Army moving ahead with LRIP of the E-IBCT set
    of systems, when they have not met important reliability goals?
        General Casey. The Army has just entered year 3 of a 4-year test
    cycle for Increment 1 capabilities. The Army will not field any new
    equipment until system performance is sufficient to satisfy the
    capability requirements of the warfighter. Given our desire to get E-
    IBCT capabilities into the hands of soldiers as soon as possible,
    Increment 1 employs an extensive developmental and operational test
    program. This will culminate with one brigade set of low rate initial
    production equipment being tested as part of initial operational test
    and evaluation in 2011. The ``test-fix-test'' strategy we are utilizing
    has allowed the program to continuously mature hardware models and
    software as it progresses through the development process. One key
    element of this strategy has been the use of the Army Evaluation Task
    Force. Comprised of combat veterans, these soldiers evaluate all of the
    E-IBCT equipment and provide invaluable feedback to the program which
    permits continual improvement to these systems.
        In 2009, the second year of warfighter tests, results indicated
    that Reliability, Availability and Maintainability scores fell short of
    their requirements. The Army has implemented an aggressive reliability
    growth plan that has identified 100 percent of the root causes. To
    date, 98 percent of the known failures have been corrected and are
    implemented for Limited User Test 10.
        As directed in the December 2010 Acquisition Decision Memorandum,
    the Program Office will report to the OSD the results of these tests,
    which will factor into approval to proceed with production and fielding
    plans.

        94. Senator McCain. General Casey, how does the Army intend to
    mitigate E-IBCT developmental delays?
        General Casey. Increment 1 equipment and software has undergone
    robust testing and evaluation. All programmatic milestones including
    Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR) have
    been met and approved through a series of Defense Acquisition Board
    reviews and decisions ultimately leading to a Low Rate Initial
    Production (LRIP) decision in December 2009.
        Soldiers are part of a 4-year test and evaluation process. Early in
    development the Army made the decision to deliver pre-production
    equipment and network components to the Army Evaluation Task Force to
    allow soldiers to test and evaluate the systems. Resultant soldier
    feedback has played a key role in optimizing design throughout the
    development phase leading to better product design. Increment 1
    capabilities are only now in their third year of the pre-planned 4-year
    test cycle.
        OSD has asked the Army to report on the progress at the end of the
    second year as these capabilities move through the 2010 test cycle. The
    Army is required to report test and evaluation plans, risk mitigation
    strategies and test and evaluation results at two Defense Acquisition
    Board meetings in April 2010 and December 2010. These reviews will
    shape the path ahead for the LRIP of the Early Infantry BCT (E-IBCT)
    equipment sets 2 and 3.
        The Increment 1 LRIP decision was based on sound acquisition
    processes and multiple reviews/tests/evaluations of hardware and
    software. Production will be intensely managed and will allow for
    adjustments to be made in the LRIP stage as additional test results are
    finalized. Such an incremental process will allow for technological
    upgrades and refinements even during the fielding process.
        The Government's interests are protected through a series of
    established decision points.

        1.  Milestone C for Increment 1 in December 2009 authorized
    acquisition of the first E-IBCT set of equipment. This decision was
    supported by results from 2009 test cycle (year 2 of 4) and DODI 5000.2
    Statutory and Regulatory requirements.
        2.  Limited User Test 2010 (year 3 of 4) assessment and breakout
    decision review is scheduled for December 2010. This review evaluates
    year 3 of 4 test and evaluation results plus risk mitigation plans
    prior to authorization for the final two LRIP E-IBCT sets of equipment.
    Finalization of the Full Rate Production (FRP) plan will also occur.
        3.  A FRP decision for the additional six E-IBCT sets of equipment
    will occur in December 2011using all 4 years of test results. This
    decision will be supported by the fiscal year 2011 (year 4 of 4)
    testing including the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
    demonstrating that Increment 1 production units are operationally safe,
    effective, suitable, and survivable.

        95. Senator McCain. General Casey, what are the advantages of
    developing and procuring E-IBCT spin-out increments together under one
    contract?
        General Casey. The development effort and the procurement effort
    are being acquired as two separate contracts. For clarification
    purposes, there is only one planned spin out of the Early-Infantry
    Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) capability. The Army, as directed by the
    Milestone Decision Authority, is planning on two spin out programs
    called increments. The Increment 1 E-IBCT program will field capability
    to nine E-IBCTs and the Increment 2 program will field additional
    capability to thirty-one IBCTs. The Increment 1 capability is
    completing development under a cost-reimbursable development contract
    (restructured from the former Future Combat Team Program). The
    Increment 1 capability (systems) is being procured as an integrated set
    for fielding to the E-IBCT under a separate fixed-price low-rate
    initial production contract.

        96. Senator McCain. General Casey, what would be the advantages or
    disadvantages of incrementally upgrading E-IBCTs using multiple,
    smaller contracts?
        General Casey. For clarification purposes, there is only one
    planned spin out of the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)
    capability. A follow-on incremental capability is under development for
    the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).
        For purposes of responding to this question it is assumed that
    ``multiple, smaller contracts'' as used in this question refers to
    platform level versus integrated system of systems performance
    contracts.
        Upgrading E-IBCTs using multiple, smaller contracts shifts overall
    IBCT performance and schedule risk to the Government, which may or may
    not be acceptable depending on the lifecycle phase. Breaking out
    performance accountability across multiple contracts makes the
    Government responsible for integrated performance versus the
    contractor. Prior to completion of integrated operational test and
    evaluation, this risk was determined unacceptable for E-IBCT given the
    magnitude of cost and schedule impacts associated with managing and
    fixing component (platform) deficiencies to meet the integrated
    specification. Under a single contractor, that contractor is
    responsible for meeting the integrated performance and, therefore,
    responsible for any deficiency. Furthermore, if each platform is being
    developed or enhanced under separate contracts, the Government becomes
    responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of each platform.
    Should effort under one platform fall behind schedule then it could
    become grounds for Government caused delay and equitable adjustment
    entitlement claims by contractors performing on the other contracts.
        Post fielding, the advantage to using multiple contracts for
    upgrade efforts is greater flexibility and insight in making platform
    specific changes. The disadvantages of using multiple contracts are
    contracting and administrative staffing needs substantially increase to
    accommodate the award and monitoring of multiple contracts.
    Additionally, contracts for associated E-IBCT systems may be impacted
    by each platform change which would have to be contractually addressed.

             internal threats to army personnel and their families
        97. Senator McCain. General Casey, in January 2010, an independent
    panel appointed by Secretary Gates to identify gaps or deficiencies in
    DOD force protection policies following the horrific killing of 12
    servicemembers, 1 Army civilian, and the wounding of 43 others at Fort
    Hood, TX, on November 5, 2009, concluded that DOD was inadequately
    prepared to address internal threats. Do you agree with that finding?
        General Casey. The independent review chaired by Former Army
    Secretary Togo West and retired Navy Adm. Vernon Clark identified
    shortfalls in DOD's procedures for identifying and responding to
    potentially dangerous internal threats.
        I agree with their assessment and concur with Secretary Gates' view
    that, as a result of the shortcomings revealed by the Fort Hood
    tragedy, DOD must do more to adapt to the evolving domestic internal
    security threat to American troops and military facilities that has
    emerged over the past decade.

        98. Senator McCain. General Casey, what actions have you taken
    since the killings at Fort Hood to assess the specific threats posed by
    violent extremism to U.S. Army personnel and their families?
        General Casey. On 23 November 2009, the Army issued an All Army
    Action message on Force Protection (DTG 231751ZNov 09). The message
    directed the immediate review of force protection measures to identify
    potential insider threats and to prevent or mitigate acts of violence
    directed against the Army.
        The message tasked Army leaders to become familiar with the ten key
    indicators of terrorist activities and to use them in conjunction with
    Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) training. It
    also directed leaders to engage their soldiers and know their behavior
    on and off duty, to train leaders in identifying indicators of
    potential violence and terrorist behavior and to identify and report
    soldiers exhibiting indicators of potential violence. The message
    tasked senior leaders to ensure compliance with existing privately
    owned weapons registration policies, ensure leaders emphasize SAEDA
    training and ensure soldiers know how to report those suspected of
    subversion and espionage. Leaders are to take appropriate actions
    wherever soldiers exhibit behaviors that adversely affect good order
    and discipline in the Army.
        In addition, the message tasked mission commanders and installation
    commanders to perform risk assessments of their installations and to
    consider detailing, on a routine but random basis, law enforcement
    officials to observe behavior at primary gathering places like
    commissaries, schools and hospitals. It directed them to increase
    community oriented policing programs, review and adjust Random
    Antiterrorism Programs, and revitalize Neighborhood Watch Programs. The
    message also tasked installation commanders to coordinate information
    sharing between local civilian and installation law enforcement
    officials so commanders receive feedback on off base activities.
        My office is reviewing the findings and recommendations of the DOD
    Independent Review of the Fort Hood Shootings, and, where appropriate,
    is in the process of implementing many of the recommendations, in
    accordance with Army policies and processes.

        99. Senator McCain. General Casey, what actions have you taken to
    reduce the risk that internal threats driven by violent extremism will
    result in harm to U.S. Army personnel and their families, such as
    improved awareness and reporting programs?
        General Casey. On 23 November 2009, the Army issued an All Army
    Action message on Force Protection (DTG 231751ZNov 09). The message
    directed the immediate review of force protection measures to identify
    potential insider threats and to prevent or mitigate acts of violence
    directed against the Army.
        The message tasked Army leaders to become familiar with the ten key
    indicators of terrorist activities and to use them in conjunction with
    Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) training. It
    also directed leaders to engage their soldiers and know their behavior
    on and off duty, to train leaders in identifying indicators of
    potential violence and terrorist behavior and to identify and report
    soldiers exhibiting indicators of potential violence. The message
    tasked senior leaders to ensure compliance with existing privately-
    owned weapons registration policies, ensure leaders emphasize SAEDA
    training and ensure soldiers know how to report those suspected of
    subversion and espionage. Leaders are to take appropriate actions
    wherever soldiers exhibit behaviors that adversely affect good order
    and discipline in the Army.
        In addition, the message tasked mission commanders and installation
    commanders to perform risk assessments of their installations and to
    consider detailing, on a routine but random basis, law enforcement
    officials to observe behavior at primary gathering places like
    commissaries, schools and hospitals. It directed them to increase
    community oriented policing programs, review and adjust Random
    Antiterrorism Programs, and revitalize Neighborhood Watch Programs. The
    message also tasked installation commanders to coordinate information
    sharing between local civilian and installation law enforcement
    officials so commanders receive feedback on off base activities.
        My office is reviewing the findings and recommendations of the DOD
    Independent Review of the Fort Hood Shootings, and, where appropriate,
    is in the process of implementing many of the recommendations, in
    accordance with Army policies and processes.

        100. Senator McCain. General Casey, what actions have been taken to
    improve the application of military personnel evaluation policies with
    respect to medical personnel, and to hold accountable supervisors who
    fail to report substandard performance?
        General Casey. We are currently in the process of reviewing our
    evaluation reporting systems including leader counseling and
    development, roles and responsibilities of rating officials, and the
    synchronization of evaluation report assessments with the
    identification and selection of qualified leaders. Insights from
    investigations into the Fort Hood tragedy are being carefully
    considered in our review.

                               army suicide study
        101. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh, in July 2009, the Department
    of the Army launched a $50 million study by the National Institute of
    Mental Health on Army suicides. The study is reportedly designed to be
    able to identify quickly potential risk factors that can inform
    existing prevention strategies. What is the status of the research
    project and how much DOD money has been expended to date?
        Secretary McHugh. The Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in
    Servicemembers (Army STARRS) is a 5-year study being conducted through
    a cooperative agreement grant award from the National Institute of
    Mental Health (NIMH). In July 2009, NIMH awarded the grant to a
    consortium consisting of the Uniformed Services University of the
    Health Sciences, Columbia University, the University of Michigan, and
    Harvard University. The research is being conducted by the grantees, as
    well as NIMH scientists. Army scientists are also participating in
    scientific coordination and review.
        Army STARRS began receiving historical data from internal Army
    sources in January 2010. This followed a detailed review to identify
    relevant data sources, the establishment of a Data Use Agreement, and
    demonstrating compliance with the Army's Information Assurance
    protocol. Parallel Data Use Agreements with applicable DOD data sources
    are being processed. The Study is scheduled to begin new data
    collection from current soldiers and new recruits over the next 6
    months.
        The Army transferred $10 million to NIMH in June 2009 to cover the
    fiscal year 2009 expenditures. An additional $10 million is programmed
    for fiscal year 2010.

        102. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh, what specific findings, if
    any, have been helpful in improving prevention strategies?
        Secretary McHugh. From a scientific perspective, it is too early in
    the study to have substantive findings. In the interim and at our
    request, National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) has provided a
    report on civilian ``best practices'' regarding suicide prevention and
    behavioral health care. NIMH and the Army are working together to
    identify where relevant interventions could be implemented.

        103. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh, what are future deliverables
    and when are they expected?
        Secretary McHugh. The STARRS will report its progress and findings
    on a quarterly basis, as well as on an ad hoc basis as it makes new
    findings.
        In the coming year, Army STARRS is scheduled to deliver initial
    findings on risks and protective factors for suicide and related
    outcomes. This will be based on analyses of historical data, as well as
    detailed new information on the characteristics, exposures and
    experiences of current soldiers and new recruits, with a particular
    focus on known risk factors for suicide, such as mental health
    problems.
        In subsequent years, the study will follow soldiers over time,
    identify those who have particular negative (or positive) outcomes and
    deliver practical, actionable information on specific risks and
    protective factors for suicide. This is designed to assist the Army
    preventing suicide and improving soldiers' overall psychological
    health.

           traumatic brain injury and post traumatic stress disorder
        104. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, please
    provide a comprehensive list and description of policy and program
    actions which are underway in the Army to identify and treat traumatic
    brain injury (TBI), including mild TBI, and post-traumatic stress
    disorder (PTSD).
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army TBI program is a
    standardized, comprehensive program that provides a continuum of
    integrated care and services for soldiers and patients from point-of-
    injury to return to duty, or transition from active duty and/or return
    to highest functional level.
        The policy documents supporting the program include the following:
    the TBI Task Force report, the TBI Action Plan, four All Army Activity
    messages, and the TBI Operations Order. The Army is also initiating an
    ``Educate, Train, Treat & Track'' campaign plan to facilitate leader
    and medical collaboration to improve acute concussion identification
    and management. The plan's goal is a cultural change in warfighter
    management after concussive events to include identification and
    treatment close to point of injury, documentation of the incident and
    expectation of recovery with early treatment.
        Key actions that facilitate identification and treatment of TBI
    include: educating the Force on TBI; funding over 350 staff to provide
    TBI care; implementing TBI screening for all medically evacuated
    patients and all soldiers during post-deployment; implementing the
    Military Acute Concussion Evaluation for initial concussion assessment;
    and developing and implementing Clinical Practice Guidelines for the
    management of soldiers with concussion in both the deployed and
    nondeployed settings.
        To help those dealing with PTSD and other psychological effects of
    war, Army leadership is taking aggressive, far-reaching steps to ensure
    the availability of an array of behavioral health services for soldiers
    and their families. Key actions that have facilitate identification and
    treatment of PTSD include: improving the distribution of behavioral
    health providers in theater and increasing access to care; implementing
    the Respect-Mil program to integrate behavioral healthcare into the
    primary care setting; incorporating Battlemind training in the
    Deployment Cycle Support program; producing two DVD/CDs that deal with
    family deployment issues; screening soldiers using the Post-Deployment
    Health Assessment and Reassessment; revising the questionnaire for
    national security positions regarding mental and emotional health;
    instituting post traumatic stress training for our health care
    providers; and hiring approximately 350 additional behavioral
    healthcare providers and 44 marriage and family therapists across the
    Army Medical Command.
        Additionally, on 1 Oct 2008 the Army established the Comprehensive
    Soldier Fitness Program. The mission of this program is to develop and
    institute a holistic, resilience building fitness program for soldiers,
    families, and Army civilians. The program focuses on optimizing five
    dimensions of strength: Physical, Emotional, Social, Spiritual, and
    Family. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness expects this to enhance the
    performance (capability) and build the resilience (capacity) of the
    Force in this era of persistent conflict and high operational tempo.
        Finally, the Army supports and conducts innovative TBI and PTSD
    research. The Army Medical Research and Materiel Command manages the
    Congressional Special Interest medical research program and serves as
    the Executive Agent of the DOD Blast Injury research program. In
    partnership with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Defense Center
    of Excellence, civilian hospitals and research institutes, as well as
    other organizations such as the National Football League, the Army is
    working aggressively to improve our understanding of TBI and
    psychological health conditions.

        105. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, how much
    is provided for these programs in the fiscal year 2011 request?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The President's proposed budget
    for the fiscal year 2011 Defense Health Program (DHP) provides the Army
    $285 million for TBI and psychological health, focused on initiatives
    related to access, surveillance, quality, resilience and transition.
    The DHP also enhanced funding for medical research, which will include
    funds directed toward research on TBI and psychological health.

        106. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, are there
    any unfunded requirements for personnel, programs, treatment or
    research with respect to TBI and PTSD? If so, please identify each such
    requirement.
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The President's proposed budget
    for the fiscal year 2011 DHP fully funds the Army's identified
    requirements for personnel, programs and treatment with respect to TBI
    and PTSD. Similarly, the combined Research, Development, Test, and
    Evaluation investment of Army and the DHP adequately addresses the key
    gaps in our knowledge of TBI and PTSD, as well as the technological
    development required to field improvements in medical treatment and
    prevention.

                                nursing shortage
        107. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh, what is the current state of
    the nursing shortage within the U.S. Army and what actions are underway
    to increase the supply of nurses available to the Army, both in uniform
    and civilian nurses?
        Secretary McHugh. The Army Nurse Corps has been successful in
    meeting its recruiting goals for Active Duty nurses. In the aggregate,
    the Army Nurse Corps is over 100 percent of required end strength. As
    such, the recruiting focus has shifted from building capacity to
    building capability.
        The Army Nurse Corps will continue its current accession
    strategies, but enhance them through precision recruiting initiatives.
    We have realigned recruiting incentives to make Army Nursing
    competitive with incentives offered nationally. Our focus is recruiting
    experienced nurses in specialties such as trauma/critical care,
    emergency nursing and all behavioral health disciplines to ensure
    position fill in low density, high complexity areas of concentration.
    Incentive Specialty Pay for nurses, who achieve and maintain
    certification in these areas of concentration, has been an effective
    retention incentive that assists the Army Nurse Corps to maintain
    capability in critical fill areas to support operations at home and
    abroad.
        Through effective recruitment, we have successfully increased the
    number of civilian registered nurses (RNs) throughout the Army Medical
    Command, even as the mission requirements of a protracted conflict have
    generated an increased demand for healthcare providers. The staffing
    strength has steadily increased to over 5,300 civilian RNs in 2009,
    representing a 45 percent increase over the 2007 end strength.
        The Civilian Nurse Loan Repayment Program (CNLRP) and the
    Recruitment, Relocation and Retention Initiatives Program (3Rs) are two
    successful civilian nurse incentive programs. The 3Rs support our newly
    appointed and current employees by offering incentives commensurate
    with service agreements. Since its inception, the CNLRP has supported
    tuition loan repayment for over 283 RNs and 32 licensed practical
    nurses. Central funding of the CNLRP at $1.5 million annually began in
    2006. The use of 3Rs for Army Medical Command civilian nurses increased
    from $4.8 million in 2007 to $8.2 million in 2009. Although the
    recruitment and retention incentives for RNs have been successful, Army
    Medical Command still had over 650 open hiring actions for RNs at the
    end of 2009. These open actions represent about 12 percent of our
    civilian RN workforce and are typical of the number of vacancies we
    manage as part of routine turnover.
        The Army Medical Command's success in attracting experienced nurses
    into the military healthcare system may be partially due to the
    downturn in the economy and private sector salaries. We must maintain
    aggressive recruitment efforts and incentives for nurses, regardless of
    the Economic environment, to ensure future success.

                     mental health resources in afghanistan
        108. Senator McCain. General Casey, the Army's most recent Mental
    Health Advisory Team study identified a shortage of mental health
    providers for Army personnel serving in Afghanistan. What actions have
    you taken to address that gap in staffing?
        General Casey. There is currently no staffing gap in Afghanistan.
    Based on the Mental Health Advisory Team's (MHAT) findings and
    recommendations, the Army pushed additional behavioral health providers
    into Afghanistan to close the staffing gap. There are approximately 104
    behavioral health providers serving in Afghanistan providing clinical
    services to the supported force. The ratio in Afghanistan of 1
    behavioral health provider for every 663 servicemembers improves upon
    the MHAT's recommended ratio of 1:700.

                       medical evacuation in afghanistan
        109. Senator McCain. General Casey, in March 2009 Secretary Gates
    directed that medical care and evacuation capabilities in Afghanistan
    achieve parity with the Iraq theater. Have we achieved that goal?
        General Casey. Critically wounded personnel in both theaters are
    being delivered to surgical facilities consistently in less than 1
    hour. The Army recognizes the strategic value of this mission, and have
    reprioritized our resources, changed our structure and invested in
    improvements to take care of the wounded in Afghanistan. The Army
    implemented several initiatives to achieve this standard. The greatest
    being the increase in assets deployed to the Theater.
        In March 2009, there were 15 HH-60 medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)
    helicopters and 3 Forward Surgical Teams (FST) deployed. Today, the
    Army has deployed 39 HH-60 MEDEVAC helicopters and an additional 6
    FSTs. Additionally, the Army's increased assets include Level III
    surgical augmentation and a medical brigade command and control
    headquarters. Other initiatives include changing doctrine for
    aeromedical evacuation to 1 hour for urgent and urgent surgical
    missions, increasing force structure, increasing additional assets,
    fielding improved aircraft capabilities, streamlining procedures,
    establishing new data collection/reporting requirements and releasing a
    VCSA SENDS Aeromedical Evacuation Message. The Army's force structure
    changes include aggressively growing 9 additional MEDEVAC companies in
    the Reserve component (two of which will be deployed this year) and a
    force design structure change in each of the 37 MEDEVAC companies
    increasing from 12 aircraft/12 crews to 15 aircraft and 20 crews. The
    first of these newly designed companies will be deployed this year.
        The Army also continues to modernize MEDEVAC aircraft with improved
    engines, satellite communication capability and forward looking
    infrared technology. We are committed to aggressively pursuing
    initiatives that further improve medical care and evacuation
    capabilities for our fighting forces.

        110. Senator McCain. General Casey, are sufficient MEDEVAC
    helicopters, crews, and forward surgical teams available in Afghanistan
    to ensure rapid evacuation and care for the wounded?
        General Casey. Currently we have sufficient evacuation capability
    to ensure rapid evacuation of the wounded. The challenge is the surge.
    Although we all know that requirements will go down in Iraq, the
    reality is that future demand will have a short term net increase that
    may exceed our available supply. In order to mitigate this challenge,
    the Army has changed its sourcing strategy. The Army is beginning to
    source the requirement with the new 15 aircraft/20 crew MEDEVAC
    companies instead of replacing units in the fight with the older
    construct of 12 aircraft/12 crew MEDEVAC companies. This strategy will
    increase capacity and capability and mitigate surge requirements. These
    efforts are part of a larger joint effort to ensure sufficient MEDEVAC
    capability is sustained in Afghanistan.

        111. Senator McCain. General Casey, what is the ratio of U.S.
    personnel who are injured to those who die, and how does that compare
    with experience in the Iraq theater?
        General Casey. The ratio of U.S. personnel injured in Operation
    Enduring Freedom to those who die is 1 Soldier Killed in Action for
    every 7 Soldiers Wounded in Action (based on reports from theater since
    October 7, 2001). For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the ratio of U.S.
    personnel injured to those who die is one soldier killed in action for
    every nine soldiers wounded in action (based on reports from theater
    since March 19, 2003). This information, from the Defense Manpower Data
    Center Contingency Tracking System, is current as of February 6, 2010.

                             support for survivors
        112. Senator McCain. General Casey, please provide information
    describing the Army's Survivor Outreach Services (SOS) program.
        General Casey. In fiscal year 2008, the Army began a holistic
    review of programs, services, and policies for survivors of the fallen
    to ensure we serve them in a manner commensurate with their level of
    service and sacrifice to the Nation. The Army created the SOS program
    to standardize services and ensure we meet our commitment to these
    family members.
        The SOS program has been operational for 1 year and provides a
    holistic and multi-agency service delivery model to our survivors. The
    SOS program supports all survivors--including Reserve component
    survivors--who have lost loved ones while on active duty, regardless of
    whether the loss was a result of combat, accident, illness or suicide.
    The SOS Program services remain available until the survivors no longer
    desire them; however, some services, such as medical care requires the
    recipient be a DOD ID card holder. The SOS helps Survivors understand
    their benefits and make timely and more accurate decisions that impact
    positively on them and their families.
        The range of services covers the entire spectrum of care, from life
    skill education to treatment. Services are tailored to the needs of the
    survivors and may include support groups, educational seminars,
    financial counseling, advocacy, information, referral, and behavioral
    health treatment.
        The Army increased SOS Program staffing levels by adding support
    coordinators and financial counselors at garrisons and communities
    closest to where the families live. Support coordinators serve as the
    long-term support agent and links survivors to programs and services.
    Additional staff was placed at the Casualty Assistance Centers to
    include benefit coordinators and trainers who are subject matter
    experts on benefits and entitlements, and provide standardized training
    for Casualty Assistance and Notification Officers.

        113. Senator McCain. General Casey, what are the goals of the
    program?
        General Casey. Our Fallen Warriors have paid the ultimate
    sacrifice, and the Army is committed to serving their families--both
    Active and Reserve component survivors--for as long as they desire. The
    goal of the SOS program is to deliver on this promise by expanding and
    standardizing services, as well as building a comprehensive program
    that embraces and reassures survivors that they are continually linked
    to the Army for as long as they desire.

        114. Senator McCain. General Casey, are sufficient resources
    available to achieve those goals?
        General Casey. The current fiscal year funding of $53.8 million has
    been adequate to establish the program. To ensure we reach out and
    fully support every survivor, as well as improve our case management
    systems, the Army plans to increase our garrison and headquarters
    capabilities by adding a full-time SOS Support Coordinator at every
    garrison and increasing staffing at the Department of the Army level.

        115. Senator McCain. General Casey, what additional resources or
    legislative authority, if any, are needed?
        General Casey. At this time, no changes to legislation are required
    to support the SOS program. As we refine and develop the program, we
    will request additional funding in future budget requests as necessary.

                          support for military spouses
        116. Senator McCain. General Casey, please provide a comprehensive
    description of training and support programs provided to military
    spouses at all points in the career of Army personnel.
        General Casey. Families are important to the Army, a priority to
    soldiers, and a vital factor in the Army's overall readiness. A
    prepared Family is better able to manage deployment, long-term
    separations, and Army life in general. The Army has a myriad of
    training and support programs that are geared towards our spouses, both
    Active and Reserve Component.
        To help new spouses adapt to the Army, we have developed the New
    Spouse Orientation Seminar, which this available online.
        The Building Strong and Ready Families is a commander-directed
    program that is primarily for first-time soldiers and spouses as they
    adapt to Army life.
        Army Family Team Building classes provide junior spouses and those
    new to the military with the skills and tools to successfully maneuver
    through the Army system.
        Senior Spouse Leadership Seminars are offered annually to spouses
    whose soldiers are attending training at the Army War College and the
    Sergeants Major Academy. These courses are designed to assist senior
    spouses in enhancing their roles as mentors and advisors.
        The Enlisted Spouse Outreach and Training Plan prepares enlisted
    spouses for requirements of key assignments through drill sergeant,
    recruiter, and first sergeant spouse seminars.
        The Joint Senior Spouse Course is the only senior spouse course
    regarding leadership. It is jointly conducted and is the 5-day course
    for spouses of newly promoted general officers. This course complements
    the CAPSTONE course for general officers conducted by the National
    Defense University.
        In addition to these training programs, there is a multitude of
    programs and services, which offer support to spouses. Let me take a
    few moments to highlight some of these programs.
        Services for Multi-Cultural Families target support for Families
    with foreign-born spouses.
        Liaison for Citizen Immigration Services is available to Families
    seeking guidance for the citizenship and residency application process.
        Hearts Apart offers support to all waiting Family members--Active
    Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard spouses and children.
        The Operation Resources for Educating About Deployment and You
    (Operation READY) training program assists commanders in meeting family
    readiness objectives. Operation READY includes training modules and
    resources designed to help soldiers and their families cope with
    personal, Family, and financial demands of deployment.
        Military Family Life Consultants (MFLCs) provide non-medical,
    short-term, problem-solving counseling services which help soldiers and
    families cope with the reactions to stressful or adverse situations
    created by deployments and reintegration. The MFLC works directly with
    Army Community Service, ARNG Headquarters and Army Reserve Regional
    Commands to provide deployment and reintegration support to soldiers
    and their families. Consultants with specialized skills (e.g.,
    financial, child, and youth needs) may be requested to respond to
    installation and Reserve Component needs. The goal is to prevent Family
    distress by providing education and information on Family dynamics,
    parent education, support services, and the effects of stress and
    positive coping mechanisms. In April 2009, MFLCs increased the number
    of nonmedical Behavioral Health counseling sessions offered for
    servicemembers and their Families from 6 to 12 sessions per person/per
    issue.
        Family Readiness Group (FRG)/Rear Detachment Training is available
    to FRG leaders and rear detachment commanders. Virtual FRGs (vFRG)
    provide all the functionality of an FRG via a secure, online setting to
    meet the needs of geographically dispersed units and families.
        The Employment Readiness Program provides assistance to family
    members in acquiring skills, networks, and resources that will allow
    them to participate in the work force and to develop a career plan.
    Employment services are available to all Army components regardless of
    location. Services include: career counseling and coaching; employment
    training classes; job fairs; Army Spouse Career Assessment Tool; job
    listings; and information and assistance on the Military Spouse Career
    Advancement Account.
        The Army Spouse Employment Partnership (ASEP) is an expanding
    partnership that is mutually beneficial to the Army and corporate
    America. ASEP consists of a small group of committed partners from the
    private sector, military, and Federal Government who have pledged their
    best efforts to increase employment and career opportunities for
    military spouses. The partnership provides Army spouses the opportunity
    to attain financial security and achieve employment goals through
    career mobility and enhanced employment options. Additional training
    and support opportunities includes Battlemind Training for spouses,
    which assists in understanding PTSD and TBI.
        The Dependents' Educational Assistance (DEA) Program provides
    education and training opportunities to eligible dependents of certain
    veterans. DEA reduces tuition by offering up to 45 months of education
    benefits.
        The Stateside Spouse Education Assistance Program (SSEAP) is a
    need-based education assistance program designed to provide spouses of
    active duty and retired Army soldiers, and widows(ers) of Army soldiers
    who died either on active duty or in a retired status, and residing in
    the United States, with financial assistance in pursuing educational
    goals. The program assists spouses/widows(ers) in gaining the education
    required to allow them to qualify for increased occupational
    opportunities. SEAP provides for up to $2,500 maximum per academic year
    for fees, supplies, or books.
        The Army has a website (Army OneSource) which provides detailed
    information for all of these programs.

        117. Senator McCain. General Casey, what resources are available to
    support these programs in the fiscal year 2011 request?
        General Casey. The resources requested for training and support
    programs for military spouses has more than doubled from the fiscal
    year 2008 budget of $116.9 million to the fiscal year 2011 budget
    request of $321.1 million.

        118. Senator McCain. General Casey, are there any unfunded
    requirements with respect to programs to support military spouses? If
    so, please identify each such requirement.
        General Casey. All programs provided by Army Community Services
    that support military spouses are fully funded.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                                 army structure
        119. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the 2010
    QDR states, ``In the mid- to long-term, U.S. military forces must plan
    and prepare to prevail in a broad range of operations that may occur in
    multiple theaters in overlapping time frames. This includes maintaining
    the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state aggressors.'' I
    am concerned that DOD is being short sighted in our QDR and budgeting
    process; that the cost of Iraq and Afghanistan is coming at the expense
    to maintaining our long-term military capability. The Army's fiscal
    year 2011 budget request appears focused more on maintaining the force
    in the current fight and less on developing a force capable of winning
    across the spectrum of future threats. Is the Army postured and
    structured properly to counter the full spectrum of threats, low and
    high end, in the near- and far-term?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army has outlined two major
    priorities: Restoring Balance and Setting Conditions for the Future. To
    restore balance, we are targeting the four imperatives of Sustain,
    Prepare, Reset and Transform. First, we must sustain the All-Volunteer
    Force by ensuring a quality of life for our soldiers, families, and
    Army civilians that is commensurate with their quality of service.
    Second, we must prepare soldiers, units, and their equipment for future
    deployments by providing adequate time to train for full-spectrum
    operations and to reduce uncertainty and stress for soldiers and their
    families. Third, we must reset the force as it returns from extended
    deployments, to a level of personnel and equipment readiness that
    permits the resumption of training for future missions across the full
    range of potential military operations. Finally, we must continuously
    assess and transform the force to meet combatant commander requirements
    by revising our modernization strategy, completing transformation from
    Cold War legacy formations to modular formations, and improving
    business processes.
        Our fiscal year 2011 budget reflects how we have transformed the
    Army and prioritized programs and efforts that show promise for today
    and tomorrow. The Army incorporated a BCT modernization plan that
    continuously modernizes equipment to meet current and future capability
    needs through upgrade, replacement, recapitalization, refurbishment,
    and technology insertions. Army efforts in this line of effort include
    our request for $887 million for the procurement of 16 Block III AH-64
    Apache Helicopters, as well as the upgrade of 13 AH-64 Helicopters to
    Block II. Block III Apache is part of a long-term effort to improve
    situational awareness, performance, reliability, and sustainment of the
    Apache. Block II upgrades continue our commitment to modernize the ARNG
    Aviation Fleet. Additionally, in this line of effort, we have requested
    $505 million dollars to upgrade Shadow RQ-7 UAVs. This key upgrade will
    increase the payload capacity and enhance the performance of this key
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset for our BCT
    commanders.
        We are confident the current program provides the resources and
    structure to meet the imperatives defined above while also setting
    conditions for the future. The Army continues to serve the needs of the
    Nation in an increasingly unpredictable global security environment.
    While me must maintain access to consistent, timely and reliable
    funding, we believe the fiscal year 2011 base budget and OCOs requests
    provide the resources necessary to sustain the force, ensure deployment
    readiness, reset the force, and to transform the Army to ensure an
    adaptive, capable and dominant force in support of combatant commanders
    and the Nation. The Army takes seriously its obligation to maintain
    responsible stewardship of the resources appropriated to it by the
    American public. Current enterprise initiatives are studying how to
    continually improve Army business practices and policies to better
    enable this stewardship.
        As we responsibly draw down our forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan
    and train for Full Spectrum Operations, we must sustain reliable,
    timely, and consistent funding. A force capable of deterring or
    defeating emerging adversaries is supported by funding that restores
    balance and readiness for our soldiers, families, and veterans, and
    allows us to reset our equipment and Army Prepositioned Stocks.

        120. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, does the
    Army have the right equipment currently in inventory or being developed
    to address these contingency requirements?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Yes. The current and future
    strategic environments of persistent conflict require the Army to
    modernize our capabilities continuously and aggressively to stay ahead
    of our adversaries. The objective of the Army's modernization effort is
    to develop and field a versatile and affordable mix of the best
    equipment available to allow soldiers and units to succeed in full
    spectrum operations both today and tomorrow.
        The Army will accomplish our modernization goals by focusing our
    efforts on three major lines of effort: develop and field new
    capabilities to meet identified gaps through traditional and rapid
    acquisition processes; continuously modernize equipment to meet current
    and future needs through the procurement of upgrades, recapitalization
    and divestment; and meet continuously evolving force requirements in
    the current operational environment by fielding and distributing
    capabilities in accordance with Army priorities. Examples include the
    ongoing Apache Block III and Paladin Improvement Programs, new GCV and
    Joint Light Tactical Truck Programs.

                        combat vehicles and helicopters
        121. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army's
    current fleets of combat vehicles and helicopters were developed and
    procured over 30 to 60 years ago and are aging at an increasingly rapid
    rate. The M1 Abrams tank was developed in the 1970s and fielded in the
    1980s, the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle was developed over 25 years ago,
    and the M109A6 Paladin howitzer is on its sixth version. The Army's
    helicopter fleet continues to get older and suffer the effects of
    continuous combat operations, with ages ranging from 15 to 40-plus
    years, with the CH-47 dating back to 1962 and on its seventh version
    (CH-47F). How does the Army achieve a balanced and full spectrum
    strategy when its fleet of combat vehicles and helicopters range from
    30 to 50 years old?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army reduced the Fleet Age
    of M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles by conducting a
    national level reset of its vehicles returning from deployments. This
    combat vehicle reset restored capability or ``life'' lost during combat
    operations. Additionally, the Army recapitalized these vehicles by
    installing equipment upgrades to incrementally modernize the vehicle
    fleet resetting a vehicles' age to zero hours/miles. These actions
    reduced the fleet age in aggregate, while allowing the Army to
    integrate lessons learned from OEF/OIF to enhance survivability and
    battle command.
        We are making a similar investment in the M109A6 Paladin 155mm,
    Self-propelled howitzers and Field Artillery Ammunition Vehicles
    (FAASV) with the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program. The PIM
    program will produce a new chassis with Bradley common engine,
    transmission and suspension systems. The new PIM chassis combined with
    the current cannon turret will provide the needed power to maneuver the
    howitzer and FAASV with the Abrams and Bradley fleets. In addition,
    with Bradley common components, the PIM program will reduce the
    logistic footprint of the Heavy BCT, while restoring the fleet age and
    minimizing the overall maintenance costs.
        The Army will also continue to modernize its aviation fleet through
    procurement, recapitalization and reset. A total of 464 CH-47F model
    aircraft are planned for delivery to the Army over the next 12 years.
    Of these, 220 will be new builds and the remaining 244
    ``remanufactured'' aircraft utilize dynamic components from the
    divested CH-47D. Unlike the CH-47D which was created on the same aging
    frame of the CH-47A fleet, the CH-47F will include a new airframe,
    wiring harness and hydraulic system. The current average age of the CH-
    47D fleet is 20 years and the current age of the CH-47F fleet is 2
    years. Other Army airframes are receiving similar attention like the
    UH-60A to A to L RECAP Program, which recapitalizes 228 UH-60A ARNG and
    USAR legacy fleet Black Hawk helicopters in fiscal year 2010 thru
    fiscal year 2015.

        122. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what is
    the plan for Army helicopter modernization for fiscal year 2011 and
    beyond?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Army Aviation continues to
    transform and modernize to meet current and future full-spectrum
    aviation requirements. The Aviation Transformation Plan, which guides
    fleet modernization strategy and aviation formation transformation, is
    based on a full, in-depth analysis that integrates lessons learned from
    recent operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
    Freedom. The Plan restructures Army Aviation warfighting units into 21
    Combat Aviation Brigades (13 Active, 8 Reserve components).
        Additionally, we have significant MEDEVAC and cargo/utility modular
    capabilities above division level to support the combatant commander
    requirements ensuring the aviation units are modular, capable, lethal,
    tailorable and sustainable. To maintain our current capability, and
    meet future requirements, we are executing a combination of aircraft
    recapitalizations and remanufactures, in addition to replacing wartime
    losses with brand new aircraft.
        The future vision for Army Aviation is being assessed and developed
    throughout the aviation community of operators and materiel
    development. The challenge is to chart a future for Army Aviation while
    maintaining and fighting the world's best rotary wing and unmanned
    system fleets. To do this, we must continue the cooperation with
    industry and academia to ensure we provide the incentive to make the
    next leap in technology that will bring us the development of future
    propulsion systems and revolutionary aircraft designs that will meet
    our future requirements for faster, more capable, more efficient and
    more easily sustained aircraft systems.
        As part of the process, the Army is participating in several
    studies looking at future Rotorcraft capabilities. These include the
    DOD's Future Vertical Lift Study, the Joint Future Theater Lift effort,
    and our own Joint Multi-Role Helicopter Study. These capabilities-based
    assessments will lay out a strategic plan for the Department's vertical
    lift that will take us to the next fleet of rotorcraft and vertical
    lift aircraft in the 2025 timeframe.
        The Army will also continue to modernize its aviation fleet through
    procurement, recapitalization and reset. A total of 464 CH-47F model
    aircraft are planned for delivery to the Army over the next 12 years.
    Of these, 220 will be new builds and the remaining 244
    ``remanufactured'' aircraft utilize dynamic components from the
    divested CH-47D. Unlike the CH-47D which was created on the same aging
    frame of the CH-47A fleet, the CH-47F will include a new airframe,
    wiring harness and hydraulic system. The current average age of the CH-
    47D fleet is 20 years and the current age of the CH-47F fleet is 2
    years. Other Army airframes are receiving similar attention like the
    UH-60A to A to L RECAP Program, which recapitalizes 228 UH-60A ARNG and
    USAR legacy fleet Black Hawk helicopters in fiscal year 2010 thru
    fiscal year 2015.

                         ground combat vehicle program
        123. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the
    cancellation of the Armored Gun System, Comanche, Crusader, and the FCS
    Manned Ground Vehicle program, along with recent reports on the
    uncertainty of the GCV as part of the BCT Modernization program, gives
    me cause for concern over the Army's capabilities in the coming years.
    Since the Manned Ground Vehicle portion of FCS was terminated last
    year, you have made it a priority to field the new GCV within the next
    7 years. The press has been reporting that there is disagreement
    between DOD and the Army about the Army's GCV program--``U.S. Army,
    Pentagon at odds over new vehicle''--Reuters, February 17, 2010. Is
    there disagreement and if so, what is it based on?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army and OSD agree on the
    need to develop the new GCV in response to current and emerging threats
    and the limitations of the existing combat vehicle fleet. In response
    to the Secretary of Defense's direction, the Army has reviewed
    requirements and developed an acquisition plan for GCV that is
    consistent with DOD policy and law. As part of the Materiel Development
    Decision approval process, the Army provided OSD with several briefings
    to ensure that all questions and concerns were addressed. The shared
    goal is to see the GCV program proceed in a way that will ensure its
    success. As a result of Army's last meeting with OSD, the GCV Request
    for Proposal was released. In accordance with DOD policy and law, OSD
    will continue to be involved in the planning for the GCV program as it
    moves toward a Milestone A decision.

        124. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what are
    you doing differently to ensure that the GCV doesn't suffer the same
    fate as other failed programs?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The GCV program plan has
    incorporated several mitigation strategies into the program plan. First
    of all, we will have contractors deliver subsystem level competitive
    prototypes early in the development. This will give the program manager
    an undeniable indication of the contractor's progress. Second, we will
    retain competition throughout the Technology Development (TD) and
    Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phases. This will keep
    the competing contractors responsive and innovative; they will not have
    any assurance that they are the sole source for GCV production. This
    strategy required the contractors to maintain schedule and reduce costs
    as they progress through the TD and EMD phases. Third, we will stay
    focused on maintaining the program schedule during execution, even if
    that results in slightly less capability. A 7-year schedule is the
    constant even if that schedule results in an 80-85 percent solution.
    Finally, the modular design approach with growth margin to support
    system updates will support performance improvements over time and will
    provide flexibility for emerging/changing requirements.

        125. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, if the GCV
    is fielded in accordance with your schedule, how long will the current
    fleet of vehicles such as the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles remain
    in the force?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The current fleet of combat
    vehicles including the Bradley will remain in use through 2030. The GCV
    will replace the Bradley in its Infantry Fighting Mission Role starting
    in 2017 with replacement of the Bradley's other mission roles to
    follow.

        126. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what are
    your plans to upgrade the other vehicles such as the engineer, field
    artillery, ambulance, and command vehicles?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army continues to explore
    an incremental approach to conduct modernization for its combat vehicle
    fleet. This effort is tied to how the Army conducts its current fight
    and adjusts its force structure and mix analyses. The Army has a
    significant number of M113 variants which are serving in command and
    control, engineer, field artillery and ambulance roles. There are about
    5,200 of these variants required. As the Army builds its Program
    Objective Memorandum (POM) 12-17 investment program, we will be
    exploring options for the replacement of these vehicles. Those options
    include using Strykers, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and MRAP vehicles to
    fill some or all of these roles.

                         health and quality of the army
        127. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army's
    strength is in its soldiers, their families, and the Army civilians who
    support them. Even after 8-plus years of combat operations, the Army
    remains resilient and capable, a fact that never ceases to leave me in
    awe. I applaud you, General Casey, for the emphasis you have placed on
    the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the Army Risk Reduction
    Program, and the Health Promotion Program as part of your stated
    objective to ``sustain soldiers, civilians, and families.'' I also
    applaud the Army in taking an aggressive approach last year to address
    the soldier suicide issue and continue to pursue the right solutions
    for the growing trend of suicides among family members. What is your
    assessment of the health and quality of the Army?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Our soldiers, families, and
    civilians are clearly stressed and fatigued by nearly 9 years of
    combat. The Army is out of balance, and that balance needs to be
    restored to sustain this All-Volunteer Force for the long haul. Yet
    through it all, our Army remains amazingly resilient, determined, and
    extraordinarily effective. Today, our soldiers have more expertise,
    education, training and capabilities than ever before, and in fiscal
    year 2009 our incoming Active component soldiers had the highest high
    school diploma rates since fiscal year 2003.

        128. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, where is
    the Army in terms of the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the
    Army Risk Reduction Program, and the Health Promotion Program?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness
    (CSF) is a rapidly maturing program designed to develop psychological
    and physiological resilience across the entire Army community,
    including soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army
    civilians. To date, over 395,000 soldiers have taken the Global
    Assessment Tool, which is a web-based strengths assessment. Eight web-
    based training modules that target resilience skills are currently
    available to soldiers once they complete the Global Assessment Tool,
    and 20 modules will be available by the end of fiscal year 2010.
    Additionally, CSF has trained 829 Master Resilience Trainers at the
    University of Pennsylvania and satellite locations, with a goal of
    training at least 1,800 trainers by the end of fiscal year 2010. These
    Master Resilience Trainers lead resilience development training in
    their units and local communities. CSF is currently budgeted for $42
    million annually over the next 5 years.
        The Army considers reduction of soldier high-risk behaviors as an
    ultimate goal. These behaviors, whether they be substance abuse,
    domestic violence, financial problems, self-medication or others are
    viewed by the Army as possible precursors to suicide, as well as
    serious issues that must be dealt with individually. In essence, many
    of our human services fall under the general rubric of risk reduction.
    The Army also has a specific Risk Reduction Program that aids
    commanders and human service providers in tracking 15 high-risk soldier
    behaviors in units and addressing areas of high risk. This program is
    now being expanded to deployed units and to the Reserve and National
    Guard as a result of initiatives from the Army Suicide Prevention Task
    Force.
        The goal of the Army Health Promotion Program is to maximize
    readiness, warfighting ability and work performance. Objectives include
    enhancing the well-being of all soldiers, Army civilians, family
    members, and retirees; and encouraging lifestyles that improve and
    protect physical, behavioral and spiritual health. The Army Health
    Promotion Program encompasses a variety of activities designed to
    facilitate behavioral and environmental alterations to improve or
    protect health and well-being. This includes a combination of health
    education and related policies, organizational, social, behavioral,
    spiritual and health care activities and initiatives. These are
    integrated to produce a single comprehensive program evaluating
    population needs, assessing existing programs and coordinating targeted
    interventions.

        129. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, how have
    the measures taken in 2009 helped to reduce the suicide rates in the
    Army?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army had a record number of
    suicide deaths in January and February 2009. If the trend had
    continued, the Army was on track to exceed 200 Active Component suicide
    deaths for 2009. The Army's senior leadership engaged this problem
    head-on.
        The Army conducted a ``suicide stand-down'' in March 2009, released
    an interactive suicide training video and implemented several
    initiatives to reduce the ``stigma'' associated with seeking behavioral
    health services. The Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot
    program in Schofield Barracks, HI; Fort Richardson, AK; and Fort Lewis,
    WA allows self-referral into treatment programs without command
    notification. Several ``tele-behavioral'' health pilot programs are
    underway, which require all redeploying soldiers, from the senior
    commander to the most junior soldier, to receive behavioral health
    screening.
        In 2010, we have continued this effort by expanding the training
    for ``peer support'' using the Ask - Care - Escort model, developing
    new interactive training videos, and increasing access to behavioral
    health care thru telemedicine initiatives. Finally, the Army fully
    supports the requirement set forth in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 for ``person to person''
    behavioral health assessments for every servicemember upon their
    redeployment from an overseas operation.

        130. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what is
    the Army doing to address suicides among family members?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. : The Army Suicide Prevention
    Task Force and the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk
    Reduction and Suicide Prevention have addressed family member and Army
    civilian suicide prevention efforts.
        Many of our outreach efforts have a specific family member focus.
    For example, this year's interactive training video ``Home Front'' will
    have specific scenarios for family member's--both spouses and children.
    The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research developed Family Battlemind
    training for use in both pre- and post-deployment settings. Key
    components include teaching families the following:

             Independence: the capability of having a fulfilling
            and meaningful life as part of an Army-centric Family
             Resiliency: The ability to overcome setbacks and
            obstacles and to maintain positive thoughts during times of
            adversity

        The Army Medical Department has expanded access to behavioral
    health within Military Treatment Facilities and through TRICARE. The
    Army helped initiate the TRICARE Assistance Program and Tele-Behavioral
    Health program for geographically dispersed Family Members. This
    demonstration project will expand access to existing behavioral health
    services by using audiovisual telecommunication systems, such as video
    chat and instant messaging to access existing behavioral health
    centers. It also expands access to the behavioral health call centers
    and counseling services for eligible beneficiaries, which assists
    Reserve component and Active component families, who do not live near
    an Army post.

                                equipment reset
        131. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, since
    2003, Army units have left behind a significant amount of their
    organizational equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan as with some given to
    Iraqi or Afghan forces, some abandoned and some left in place to
    provide future capability in theatre. In some instances, leaving this
    equipment has created home-station training challenges for units going
    through reset in preparation for another deployment. In the fiscal year
    2011 OCO request, $10.8 billion is highlighted for reset of Army
    equipment. As well, it was noted that ``the Army has reset 29 brigades
    worth of equipment in fiscal year 2009 and continued the reset of 13
    more, with a grand total of some 98,000 pieces since September 11,
    2001.'' As I understand reset, it is a continuous requirement,
    occurring as brigades return from combat operations and prepare for the
    next, and will have to continue well after operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan have ceased. Is the Army experiencing any equipment
    shortages due to reset or recap funding?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. No. The Army does have some
    equipment shortages, but they are not due to inadequate reset or
    recapitalization funding. The Army greatly appreciates all of the
    support Congress has provided for Army equipment reset, which has
    enabled the Army to meet all such requirements for redeployed units.
        You are correct regarding continuous reset. As our Army
    organizations return from operational missions, they immediately move
    to reset to prepare for the next mission. When equipment shortfalls are
    identified, the Army uses our ARFORGEN model as a mitigation strategy
    to support training and homeland defense missions for nondeployed
    forces. Many of our current equipment shortages can be traced to the
    extraordinary demands imposed by fighting two wars simultaneously.

                               water purification
        132. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the task
    of supplying U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan is a daunting
    task, a task that was challenging even without the deployment of
    additional U.S. and coalition forces and the increase in ground
    operations. Supply lines to Afghanistan are long and difficult, with
    many of our operating bases in austere locations. One piece in a
    February 14 New York Times article about the movements of a Marine
    company in Helmand Province caught my eye--some of the Marines were
    carrying 5-gallon jugs of water which increased the weight they were
    carrying to 100 pounds or more. I have received reports from Army,
    Marine, and Special Operations units regarding the need for man-
    portable water filtration units. What is the current state of supply
    operations to your soldiers in Afghanistan?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. U.S. Forces Afghanistan has the
    capacity to produce and distribute both bulk and bottled water for
    current forces, as well as for the future force structure.
        Current bulk water requirements are 1.5M gallons per day and
    147,000 cases of bottled water per day. With the surge, projected bulk
    requirements will rise to 2.5 million gallons per day and projected
    bottled water requirements to 220,000 cases per day. Today, the current
    maximum bulk capacity for water production supporting Afghanistan is
    3.4 million gallons per day and a bottled water capacity of 544,000
    cases per day. This capacity is based on the forward positioning of
    five commercial water bottling plants: two in Kabul, and one each in
    Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and United Arab Emirates.
        We fully recognize that the major challenge in tactical water
    operations in Afghanistan, as with any supply commodity in that
    theater, is distribution, not necessarily capacity or wholesale
    production. To address this distribution challenge, the Army has
    deployed its full array of tactical water purification systems, as well
    as water storage and distribution assets as far forward as possible.
    These tactical systems range from larger capacity production units,
    such as the 3,000 gal per hour Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit,
    to lighter weight purification systems that are designed to support
    smaller unit configurations, such as Teams, Platoons, and Company-sized
    elements. These lighter systems are capable of being delivered by air
    along with a robust storage capability to support them.
        Moreover, there are currently seven Expeditionary Water Packaging
    Systems (EWPS) being deployed to various operating bases in
    Afghanistan, placing water production and distribution closer to the
    forces. The EWPS are government owned, contractor operated water
    bottling systems using tactical production equipment. Each is capable
    of producing a minimum of 5,000 one-liter bottles per day.
        Finally, we recently deployed six well drilling rigs, currently in
    Afghanistan, to drill new wells closer to the point of consumption.
    This will shorten the distribution leg. The CENTCOM water strategy
    continues to be the development of water resources and the production
    of water at the forward operating bases (FOBs); thus reducing
    transportation requirements.
        Currently, there are no Operational Needs Statement or Joint Unit
    Operational Needs Statement or Rapid Equipping Force 10 Liner
    requirements for a manportable water filtration unit.

        133. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, can you
    check on our ability to purify water in austere locations, ensuring a
    safe supply of drinking water for our soldiers in theater?
        Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army has sufficient water
    purification, storage and distribution systems available for employment
    in a tactical environment. Each of these systems is approved for use by
    the U.S. Army Health Command; thereby ensuring that the water is safe
    for soldier consumption. These systems have been successfully
    supporting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Our forces
    continue to receive potable and palatable water on-time and in
    sufficient quantities to meet all water requirements for consumption
    and personal hygiene.
        To ensure that water production capability is closer to the point
    of consumption in austere areas, we have deployed six well drilling
    rigs in Afghanistan, to expand water resources and production of water
    at our FOBs.
        Currently, we also have the following tactical systems, designed
    for austere deployment, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom:
    Water Purification Units:
             The 600 Gallon per hour (GPH), trailer mounted,
            Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) is capable of
            purifying 600 gallons of seawater and 900 gallons fresh water
            per hour. Eighteen (18) of these systems are in deployed status
            providing a total capability of 10,800 GPH.
             The 3000 GPH, trailer mounted, ROWPU is capable of
            purifying 2,000 gallons of seawater and 3,000 gallon of fresh
            water. Twenty-four of these systems are in a deployed status
            providing a total capability production of 72,000 GPH.
             The 1500 GPH, Tactical Water Purification System is
            capable of purifying 1,200 GPH seawater and 3000 GPH fresh
            water. Nine systems are in a deployed status providing at total
            production capability of 13,500 GPH.
             The Light Weight Purifier (LWP), which is the Army's
            most expeditious reverse osmosis purification unit, is capable
            of producing 125 GPH from a fresh water source and 75 GPH from
            a salt water source. Both air transportable and air droppable,
            26 systems are in a deployed status providing a total
            capability production of 3,250 GPH.
    Storage and Distribution:
             Water Tank Rack (HIPPO) consists of a 2,000 gallon
            potable hard wall water tank in an ISO frame with an integrated
            pump, hose and fill stand.
             Water Storage and Distribution Systems, which consists
            of 800,000 and 40,000 gallon system, are collapsible tanks and
            support equipment and that provide large volumes of bulk
            potable water storage and distribution (two 800,000 and three
            40,000 systems are in a deployed status providing a storage and
            distribution of 1.7 million gallons of water).
             The Expeditionary Water Packaging System, which is a
            newly developed tactical water purification system capable of
            bottling water, is being deployed to Afghanistan (7 systems
            total). These systems are designed to operate at austere FOBs,
            placing water packaging and distribution closer to U.S. forces.
            Each system is capable of bottling 5,000 one liter bottles per
            day.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                                 army aviation
        134. Senator Sessions. General Casey, I am very happy about the QDR
    plus-up of two Combat Aviation Brigades for the Army. With this plus-up
    of aviation assets must come a plus-up in resources. Do you believe
    adequate resources are available to support the growth in Army
    aviation?
        General Casey. Yes, I think we have what we need. The first of
    these combat aviation brigades (CAB) was organized by consolidating
    existing aviation force structure within the Army. With the exception
    of adding some required headquarters personnel and common equipment
    such as trucks and generators, the resources required were minimal. All
    aircraft and crews required were already in the existing force
    structure. As for the second CAB, the majority of the funding required
    ($5.5 billion) was provided. While we have determined that it is
    feasible to activate this CAB, there is an unfunded requirement
    remaining ($1.2 billion) to cover operations, training and some
    personnel costs, which we will have to make adjustments for in our
    budget process.

        135. Senator Sessions. General Casey, are you planning to increase
    resources for the Aviation Training Center at Fort Rucker?
        General Casey. Yes. We have already begun increasing resources for
    training at Fort Rucker. Funding there increased from $775 million
    (fiscal year 2009) to $995 million (fiscal year 2010) to $1.067 billion
    (fiscal year 2011) annually to cover increases in undergraduate and
    graduate flight training. Fort Rucker has already hired 40 new contract
    instructor pilots to train AH-64, CH-47, and UH-60 flight training with
    plans to increase the total to 52 new instructors. The Aviation Center
    has received an additional 21 AH-64Ds and 20 UH-60s to meet the
    increased training requirements. New hangar ($36 million) and
    maintenance facilities ($29 million) are being constructed in fiscal
    year 2011 to support training increases. Additionally, $34 million in
    improvements will be made this year to existing structures and ranges
    to support increased training.

        136. Senator Sessions. General Casey, will this plus-up of Army
    aviation include manned and unmanned teaming increases?
        General Casey. The Army has achieved great success by combining the
    capabilities of manned and unmanned systems in combat operations, and
    will maximize this new aviation organizational force design construct.
    Additional Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) and their manned helicopter
    assets will be paired with existing unmanned systems, to provide
    greater manned-unmanned operations capability. In addition to teaming
    with UAS resident within BCTs, the Extended Range Multi-Purpose UAS
    will be assigned to CABs. We are also developing concepts combining
    Shadow UAS with manned scout helicopters in an Armed Reconnaissance
    Squadron. These efforts will greatly expand the Army's manned-unmanned
    capabilities.

        137. Senator Sessions. General Casey, will the Center of Excellence
    for unmanned aerial systems at Fort Rucker receive additional resources
    to continue doctrine development, integration, and execution planning
    for the manned and unmanned team initiative?
        General Casey. The Army Unmanned Aircraft System Center of
    Excellence (UAS CoE) is a critical organization that provides a
    professional and focused team to ensure the Army maintains our
    leadership role in the UAS community across all Army warfighting
    functions. This includes our groundbreaking efforts to develop and
    improve manned-unmanned operations.
        The UAS CoE is currently a provisional organization and is
    resourced through May 2010. Fort Rucker has forwarded a Concept Plan to
    Headquarters, TRADOC to ensure that the UAS CoE remains as an enduring
    organization with 6 military and 11 civilian personnel authorized on an
    approved Table of Distribution and Allowances. As the Army reviews our
    Generating Force personnel numbers (including TRADOC), our unmanned
    systems mission growth is a key area upon which we will focus.

                              anniston army depot
        138. Senator Sessions. Secretary McHugh, I just visited Anniston
    Army Depot last week while working in Alabama. I understand that the
    Army is considering placing the installation under the command of the
    Army's Installation Management Command. The community is up in arms
    over this decision. Do you believe Anniston Army Depot will increase
    its productivity and lower its Army Capital Working Fund rates because
    of this realignment of command?
        Secretary McHugh. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) and Installation
    Management Command (IMCOM) are in the process of conducting a transfer
    of responsibility for base operation functions in a pilot at ANAD.
    IMCOM will assume responsibilities for non-Army Working Capital Fund
    (AWCF) base operation support functions.
        Under the pilot concept, ANAD with the support of AMC and IMCOM
    regional office, will create a virtual structure to determine if the
    proposed transfer of non-AWCF base operating functions and costs to
    IMCOM can be done with no impacts to the ANAD production mission and no
    additional cost to Army as a whole. If the pilot is successful and
    implementation is approved there will be a reduction in base operating
    costs (overhead costs) that have to be allocated to stabilized
    workload; however, due to the complex nature of rates this would only
    be a good measure if all extraneous variables were held constant (i.e.
    direct labor hours available to allocate overhead costs, direct labor
    and material costs, Accumulative Operating Results adjustments, etc).

        139. Senator Sessions. Secretary McHugh, if productivity does not
    increase and Army Capital Working Funds rates are not reduced, will you
    carry on with the reassignment?
        Secretary McHugh. The Army will consider all factors prior to
    moving forward with the reassignment. We have established three guiding
    principles for assessing the results of the pilot: (1) maintaining or
    reducing costs; (2) maintaining or improving mission effectiveness; and
    (3) preserving the mission commander's flexibility to direct resources.
    As we conduct the pilot program, we will adjust the parameters as
    required to address any issues encountered.

                                  afghanistan
        140. Senator Sessions. General Casey, I think we would all agree
    that the Anbar Awakening during the Iraq war was a great success and
    signaled the beginning of stabilization in that troubled theater. A
    recent Washington Post article that appeared on January 22 highlights
    U.S. Central Command's use of local defense initiatives to similarly
    train local militias as security forces to bridge the gap until more
    Afghan army and police forces can be trained. Recent estimates imply
    that 32,000 soldiers need to be added over the next 10 months in order
    to meet the stated goal of 134,000 troops by the end of the year. While
    not all lessons from the Iraq war can be applied to Afghanistan, former
    Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf recently wrote, ``Afghanistan for
    centuries has been governed loosely through a social covenant between
    all the ethnic groups, under a sovereign king. This structure is needed
    again to bring peace and harmony.'' Would you agree that this program
    will spread coalition influence into remote regions and bridge the gap
    until we can recruit and train adequate Afghan army and police forces?
        General Casey. Central Command (CENTCOM) is working on several
    initiatives to achieve local security by incorporating more community
    involvement. It's my understanding that these initiatives are Afghan
    led and supported by the CENTCOM.

        141. Senator Sessions. General Casey, do you think the Afghani
    government can be persuaded to support this program or is this
    something that will have to be implemented independently?
        General Casey. I believe the Afghan government will proceed with
    caution as the initiatives are more fully developed and implemented,
    but I defer to CENTCOM for their assessment.

        142. Senator Sessions. General Casey, what is your opinion on our
    ability to adequately screen militia candidates for this program to
    ensure that we are not training the wrong folks?
        General Casey. I defer to CENTCOM to respond since they are on the
    ground and better able to assess the situation.

        143. Senator Sessions. General Casey, the Post article addressed
    differences between DOD and the Department of State (DOS) concerning
    implementation of a timeline. General McChrystal has already
    implemented this program on a small scale using existing funding. In
    order to fully implement, though, Ambassador Eikenberry must release
    additional funds. How are existing Commander's Emergency Response
    Program funds being used to support this program and are these funds
    adequate to fully implement local defense initiatives?
        General Casey. Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
    funding is used for short-term, private sector contracts for temporary
    guards of critical infrastructure, not to train local militias as
    security forces. The CERP program supports local defense initiatives by
    funding development projects in targeted areas. As noted in the same
    Washington Post article, ``In Afghanistan, compensation will be in the
    form of money for development projects in areas where the groups
    operate.'' Current CERP funding is adequate to accomplish these
    development efforts.

        144. Senator Sessions. General Casey, what support is needed from
    DOS and what is DOD doing to resolve these differences in a timely
    manner?
        General Casey. I believe there is a lot of cooperative activity
    taking place between DOD and Department of State. We have ongoing
    partnerships with the Iraqi Security Forces and the Afghan National
    Security Forces with a number of counter-terrorism initiatives ongoing.
    As for the specific details regarding support that DOD needs from the
    Department of State, I have to defer to DOD to respond.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
                       medium extended air defense system
        145. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, GAO and OSD have confirmed
    that MEADS will cost billions more than expected. What amount of
    additional funding will be necessary that exceeds the existing budget
    baseline?
        Secretary McHugh. The cost growth for the International Program is
    estimated to be over $1.2 billion to be shared by the three Nations.
    The U.S. share of this is estimated to be in the range of $700 million
    (preliminary estimates). The OSD for Cost Assessments and Program
    Evaluation assessment is ongoing and will be used to refine these
    estimates further.

        146. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, why has the MEADS program
    not been scrutinized under Nunn-McCurdy?
        Secretary McHugh. We evaluate and assess the program against the
    Nunn-McCurdy criteria as part of our normal program management. The
    program has been reporting program unit costs against Nunn-McCurdy
    criteria since September 2004, and current estimates are within the
    thresholds. We continue to monitor the matter closely, and OSD directed
    the Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation office to develop an
    independent estimate.

        147. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, MEADS was designed to
    upgrade the capabilities of the U.S., German, and Italian Air and
    Missile Defense (AMD) systems. However, the MEADS program is 9 years
    behind to deliver the capability to our troops and our allies. What is
    the reason and justification for this delay and how will we defend
    ourselves from current threats while we continue to wait for MEADS?
        Secretary McHugh. The MEADS Design and Development program of
    record began in July 2004. Issues emerged during the program's
    Preliminary Design Review, necessitating an Army and OSD independent
    review. The independent review assessed the program to be approximately
    18 months behind schedule, with a high degree of concurrency and risk
    leading into Critical Design Review and testing. The independent review
    team recommended a rebaseline of the program, adding approximately 18-
    24 months (at additional cost), to reduce engineering and test
    concurrency and reduce overall risks. The MEADS initiative has
    experienced a series of starts and stops since the concept inception in
    the early 1990s. Since the Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board in
    2004, the program has been fully funded but will require approximately
    $700 million between fiscal year 2012-17 to support the rebaselined
    schedule and effort.
        The United States utilizes a combination of Air and Missile Defense
    systems to provide required capability to the force today. Most
    notably, the Patriot Missile System is forward deployed in multiple
    Areas of Responsibility. These systems undergo periodic upgrades to
    increase capability against an evolving threat, mitigate obsolescence,
    and minimize sustainment costs. Patriot is the only combat-proven
    Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense in the force. Patriot continues to
    match the threat and provide our troops with excellent Air Defense
    coverage.

        148. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, in addition to years of
    program delays, cost overruns, and technological challenges for the
    MEADS program, I understand there may be changes to the key performance
    parameters (KPPs) for MEADS. What changes have been made to the KPPs?
        Secretary McHugh. Currently, no changes to the KPPs are being made;
    however the U.S. Army TRADOC has been tasked to review MEADS
    requirements

        149. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, is it possible that an AMD
    system could be centered around the upgraded Patriot AMD system, which
    I understand would be a more cost-effective alternative to MEADS?
        Secretary McHugh. While it is possible, even an upgraded Patriot
    Air and Missile Defense system would not meet the MEADS requirements
    for a 360-degree surveillance and fire control capability.

        [Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                             DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
    SDG-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, Webb, Hagan, Begich, Burris, Inhofe,
    Sessions, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, and Collins.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
    professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research
    assistant; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
    counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; John H. Quirk V,
    professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member;
    Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J.
    Paul, professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G.
    Lang, and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka;
    Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Juliet
    Beyler and Gordon Peterson, assistants to Senator Webb; Julie
    Holzhueter, assistant to Senator Hagan; David Ramseur,
    assistant to Senator Begich; Brady King, assistant to Senator
    Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
    Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
    assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to
    Senator Thune; Erskine Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker;
    Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; and Chip Kennett,
    assistant to Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. We welcome
    Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway to our
    committee this morning to testify on the plans and programs of
    the Department of the Navy in our review of the fiscal year
    2011 annual budget and overseas contingency operations (OCO)
    request. This committee is grateful to each one of you for your
    service to our Nation and for the valorous and truly
    professional service of the men and women under your command,
    and we are also grateful to their families.
        Since our last meeting, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
    completed the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). We look
    forward to the witnesses' assessments of the 2009 QDR, what it
    means for the Department of the Navy today and into the future,
    and how their fiscal year 2011 budget request supports the
    changes which were directed.
        Our witnesses this morning are faced with a number of
    critical issues that confront the Department of the Navy in the
    budget, such as balancing modernization needs against the costs
    of supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
    President's strategic review, concluded in December, called for
    a surge in additional U.S. Marine Corps forces to Afghanistan,
    including an increase to 18,500 marines in Afghanistan by March
    2010, with that number rising to 19,400 by mid-April.
        The recent launch of major operations in southern
    Afghanistan represents a critical test of the President's
    counterinsurgency strategy and the campaign plan developed by
    the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander,
    General McChrystal, to implement that strategy. U.S. and ISAF
    personnel, with the U.S. Marines playing a central role, are
    partnering side by side with Afghan forces in support of
    extending the authority of the Government of Afghanistan to the
    Central Helmand River Valley, including the former Taliban
    stronghold of Marjah.
        The ratio of Afghan to U.S. troops in Marjah is almost one
    to two, one Afghan soldier to two coalition troops, a
    considerable improvement, as I've mentioned before, over the
    one to five ratio which was the case when a number of us
    visited the marines in Helmand Province last September. General
    Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), has
    called this operation the initial salvo of a 12- to 18-month
    military campaign. The extraordinary bravery of our soldiers
    and marines, as well as our allies, reminds us once again how
    truly heroic our men and women in uniform are.
        I've argued for a long time that our principal focus in
    Afghanistan should be the building of the capacity of the
    Afghan army and police so they can take the lead in providing
    for their country's security. In this respect, it is difficult
    to understand why there has been a persistent shortfall in the
    number of trainers available to provide the 8-week basic
    training to Afghan security forces. That is a totally
    unacceptable situation.
        As we discussed in my office, General Conway, you and the
    Marines are looking for ways to help out General Bill Caldwell,
    the head of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    Training Command in Afghanistan, to help him to fill the gap by
    deploying Marines on shorter rotation to Afghanistan to serve
    as trainers for the Afghan army, and we're going to be
    interested in getting your update on the progress in supplying
    those marines as trainers.
        We have proceeded with the drawdown of Marine Corps forces
    in Iraq. Where these forces once averaged roughly 25,000
    marines, as of last Friday there were only about 150 marines in
    Iraq. By spring, the marines will have completed their
    redeployment.
        The Navy has also been contributing directly to the war
    effort in CENTCOM as well. In addition to normal deployments of
    ships and aircraft in support of these operations, the Navy
    currently has deployed almost 12,000 individual augmentees
    (IAs) to support these missions on the ground in Afghanistan
    and Iraq. In total, the Navy provides approximately 15,600
    sailors in the form of IAs, including 3,800 personnel in the
    training pipeline to fulfill mission requirements of the
    combatant commanders.
        So we express the thanks of this committee for how well and
    ably the men and women of the Department of the Navy and their
    families are responding to these challenges.
        Many of the challenges facing the Department of the Navy
    center on acquisition programs. We have great concerns about
    cost problems in the shipbuilding arena, the most notable
    example being the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Since
    last year the Navy has decided on a winner-take-all acquisition
    strategy for the contract for the two LCS vessels approved in
    the fiscal year 2010 budget.
        We also look forward to receiving all of the analytical
    efforts that were required by our National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 regarding future surface
    combatant production and the truncation of the DDG-1000
    production line. We understand that the Navy decided to make
    this change for a number of reasons, including mission
    requirements and affordability. However, we want to ensure that
    whatever program we pursue has a sound basis in reasoning
    behind it before we launch on another vector.
        If the Department of the Navy is unable to get control of
    its acquisition programs and cost growth, there is no way that
    the Navy is going to be able to afford the fleet of 313 ships
    that Admiral Roughead says that he needs, and it is obvious
    that other capabilities would suffer as well. I cannot
    overstress the importance that the whole Navy Department
    shoulders its responsibility to correct mistakes in acquisition
    programs because the future strength of our Navy depends on it.
        General Conway, lest you feel left out of the acquisition
    discussion, you're pursuing the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
    (EFV) program. In your prepared statement you emphasize the
    importance of the EFV to the Marine Corps' amphibious assault
    mission and of the continuing relevance of that mission and
    capability to our Nation's defense. The Marine Corps'
    amphibious assault concept rests on launching an assault from a
    safe distance from shore, beyond where our ships can be easily
    observed and attacked. This concept depends on an ability to
    swim ashore from 20 to 30 miles out to sea with armored
    vehicles, which is the purpose of the EFV.
        The QDR heavily emphasized the need to overcome the so-
    called anti-access capabilities and strategies that might be
    employed by potential adversaries and approved continuing the
    EFV program despite previous cost, schedule, and performance
    issues with the program. So we need to understand how the
    Marine Corps' amphibious assault mission relates to the anti-
    access concerns and initiatives discussed in the QDR and what
    are you doing in the EFV program to correct the previous
    problems with the program.
        The President last year signed the Weapons Systems
    Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA). While I'm certain that this
    legislation is going to help correct past problems, we also
    know that we will succeed only through concerted efforts within
    the executive branch to implement the spirit of that
    legislation and improve past behavior within the Department. We
    in Congress cannot legislate a culture change. So we look
    forward to hearing how the Department of the Navy is proceeding
    to implement the provisions of this act.
        Another concern surrounds future ship and aircraft force
    levels. We are facing the prospect that the current Navy
    program will lead to potentially large gaps between the forces
    that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has said that he needs
    and the forces that will be available to his successors. For
    instance, the Navy is facing a shortfall of as many as 250
    tactical fighters needed to outfit our 10 aircraft carrier air
    wings and 3 Marine Corps air wings in the middle of this
    decade. With shortfalls that large, we could be faced with
    drastically reducing the number of aircraft available on short
    notice to the combatant commanders, either because we have
    deployed under strength air wings or because we did not deploy
    the carrier at all because of these aircraft shortages.
        Since the last time we saw a Future Years Defense Program
    (FYDP), we've actually had a slight net loss of production of
    new strike fighter aircraft over comparable years in the FYDP,
    a result that cannot help this situation.
        Turning to naval readiness, currently the Navy is operating
    with a 1-year backlog in aircraft and ship depot maintenance.
    When asked for your unfunded priorities in the fiscal 2010
    budget request, Admiral Roughead, you only had two unfunded
    items on your list, aircraft and ship depot maintenance in the
    amount of $395 million. Both sides of the aisle on this
    committee, as well as our House counterparts, authorized that
    critical funding, but, unfortunately, that addition was not
    supported by the appropriators. As a result, over $188 million
    in deferred maintenance was not executed last year.
        In the fiscal year 2011 presidential budget request, again
    we have a very short list from the Navy of unfunded
    requirements, including aircraft and ship depot maintenance and
    aircraft spares to meet the Navy's maintenance requirements.
    While we encourage the Navy's commitment to these vital
    readiness accounts, we're very interested in hearing from the
    witnesses today specifically why this funding is critical to
    the Navy's mission, what were the effects of not receiving last
    year's maintenance funding, and what are the potential
    ramifications of not receiving additional fiscal year 2011
    funds to support these needs.
        Readiness rates need to be restored rather than delayed.
    Additionally, I believe it is essential that the Navy not rely
    on OCO funding to make up for maintenance shortfalls. Such an
    approach does not contribute to long-term sustainment and risks
    degrading the expected service life of the fleet.
        We look forward to hearing your testimony. Again, we are
    grateful to you and your families for supporting your service
    and, of course, the men and women that you command.
        Senator McCain is not here. Senator Inhofe is the acting
    ranking member this morning.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to go ahead and
    submit Senator McCain's statement for an opening statement. But
    I'd like to make an observation. When we have these Navy
    posture hearings, I look around and I see a very heavy
    representation from coastal States, and I'm not sure why. I'd
    like to remind my colleagues up here of something that may
    surprise them a little bit: We in my State of Oklahoma are in
    fact navigable. We have a navigation way that we put in many
    years ago.
        In fact, when I was in the State senate many years ago, the
    head of the World War II submarine veterans came to me and he
    told me the story of the submarine veterans, about how half of
    them died in World War II and the other half took care of the
    families of those others. He said, ``I'd like to do a memorial;
    I'd like to bring a World War II submarine all the way up to
    Oklahoma.''
        We studied it and it could be done. So we went down to
    Orange, TX, and got the USS Batfish and we took all 300 feet of
    this thing all the way up the channel. It had to go down under
    some of the bridges and have flotation and all that. All my
    adversaries were saying, ``We're going to sink Inhofe with his
    submarine.'' But we made it, so we have a submarine in my State
    of Oklahoma.
        We also have quite a presence, which surprises people, of
    Navy and Marines, with TACAMO Operations for E-6s at Tinker Air
    Force Base. There is a very large presence of Navy there. At
    Vance Air Force Base we're doing primary training of not just
    Air Force, but also Navy and the Marines. Then down at Fort
    Sill we do most of the artillery training, General Conway, for
    marines there at Fort Sill in my State of Oklahoma. So we have
    a great personal interest in this hearing today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today to
    discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011 for the
    Department of the Navy. I'm sure I speak for all members of our
    committee when I say that our thoughts and prayers are with all the
    deployed sailors and marines, with their families, and with particular
    concern for those marines who are currently engaged in the combat
    operations. I also want to commend the thousands of men and women of
    the Navy and Marine Corps who deployed to Haiti within just a few hours
    of the earthquake to support humanitarian efforts there. Their hard
    work and dedication reflects the very finest traditions of the
    Department of the Navy.
        While supportive of your fiscal year 2011 budget submission, I do
    have concerns about the Navy's future force that I would like to have
    you specifically address.
        For example, last year, the Navy estimated that its shortfall of
    carrier-based strike-fighter aircraft was growing larger than previous
    estimates--243 aircraft short by 2018. That number is now 100. I'd like
    to know what the Navy's current appraisal of that ``strike-fighter
    gap'' is and what steps it is taking under its budget proposal to
    manage that issue. While this is undoubtedly an important issue,
    protecting taxpayers' interests requires that any proposal to buy more
    F/A-18s under a multi-year contract fully complies with applicable law.
        On the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, with a newly
    announced slip in development of 13 months, that program appears to be
    headed into another breach of Nunn-McCurdy's cost growth limits. Among
    my concerns here is whether the Navy and Marine Corps will be equipped
    with the F-35 in time to have the capability they need, when they need
    it. With the Marine Corps expected to take delivery of a squadron of
    these fighters first among all the Services in 2012 and its acute
    reliance on this Program to provide much-needed capability, my concerns
    about this Program apply with the most force to them.
        On ship depot maintenance, I am encouraged that this year the Navy
    has added about $1.2 billion over last year's request to overhaul ships
    and, in particular, restore those systems that affect safety and
    current combat capability to established performance levels. But, that
    amount does not cover the ship maintenance periods that were not funded
    in last year's budget--because the appropriators saw it fit to strip
    that money away to fund earmarks. Still, that leaves nine additional
    ships that will not undergo repair work next year. From the witnesses,
    I would like to hear their concerns about underfunding ship overhauls
    and whether our surface fleet may be returning to the days of a hollow
    force.
        On the Littoral Combat Ships Program, the Navy will down-select to
    a single sea frame and split its production between two competing
    shipyards--reflecting a new acquisition strategy designed to reduce the
    ship's overall cost. I would like to know whether the costs of that
    troubled program will be below the congressional cost cap and whether
    the Program will finally deliver the capability that it was designed to
    provide at its inception.
        Next, the LPD-17 amphibious ship program has too seen more
    challenges than we had hoped. From the witnesses, I would like to know
    if we are seeing a systemic problem with the readiness of the Navy's
    amphibious ships and how the budget request addresses that issue.
        Finally, the Navy's 30-year Shipbuilding Plan calls for the
    replacement of 14 Ohio-class submarines and the multi-year procurement
    of 2 Virginia-class attack submarines per year to replace Los Angeles-
    class submarines. But, those ballistic missile submarines run about
    $6.5 billion each and the Virginia-class submarines cost about $2
    billion each. That alone consumes over 75 percent of the current
    shipbuilding budget. Particularly in the context of our current
    economic challenges, we have to be careful that our commitment to
    recapitalizing the submarine fleet does not impinge on our commitment
    to the surface fleet. I hope the witnesses can give us their views on
    the impact of the Plan on our force projection capability in the future
    and the shipbuilding industrial base.
        I would like to take a moment to convey my support the Department's
    decisions to terminate or cut back on those Navy and Marine Corps
    programs that have benefited from a reassessment of our requirements or
    suffered from a chronic inability to manage development and production
    risk. Those programs include canceling plans to build two new joint
    command ships; delaying the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Program; and
    terminating the EP-X manned intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance aircraft program, as well as the JSF Alternate Engine
    program and the Next Generation Cruiser (CG(X)). According to the
    Office of Management and Budget, those program cuts will save taxpayers
    as much as $573 million over last year's budget, freeing up resources
    much needed by our combatant commanders to fight the fights we are in
    and defense against threats likely to arise in the future.
        I look forward to hearing from these witnesses on these, and other,
    tough but important issues, which go squarely to how we arm and equip
    those men and women who serve their Nation so selflessly at home and
    abroad.
        Thank you, Chairman Levin.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Secretary Mabus.

     STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

        Mr. Mabus. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished
    members of this committee, it's a real pleasure to be here
    today with you. The CNO, the Commandant, and I are grateful for
    the commitment that the members of this committee have shown to
    the men and women in uniform in the Navy and Marine Corps. We
    are exceptionally proud to be here today representing our
    sailors, marines, civilians, and their families.
        The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable
    expeditionary fighting force in the world, capable of
    operations across the entire spectrum of warfare. Today 40
    percent of our forces are deployed and over half our fleet is
    at sea. In Helmand Province, Afghanistan, more than 15,000
    marines are engaged in major combat, counterinsurgency, and
    engagement operations, including, as the chairman pointed out,
    the effort to clear the Taliban from their stronghold in
    Marjah. They're supported by naval aircraft flying close air
    support from the Eisenhower and our forward-deployed
    expeditionary aviation assets.
        A total of 12,000 sailors are on the ground in Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and across the broader Middle East and another
    9,000 sailors and marines are embarked on our ships at sea. Off
    the coast of Africa, ships are protecting international
    commerce off Somalia, and ships are operating as partnership
    stations with our regional allies. Off the coast of South
    America, more ships are stemming the flow of illegal drugs into
    the United States.
        Our ballistic missile defense forces are ready to defend
    against any threat to international peace in Europe, the Middle
    East, and the Pacific Rim, where our forward-deployed forces
    continue their role as a strategic buffer and deterrent against
    rogue states and potential competitors alike. Today in Haiti, 9
    ships and 1,900 marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
    (MEU) continue to provide humanitarian aid, medical assistance,
    and disaster relief.
        The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive, and
    everywhere our Nation's interests are at stake. Our global
    presence reduces instability, deters aggression, and allows us
    to respond rapidly to any crisis.
        I believe that the President's fiscal year 2011 budget for
    the Department of the Navy is a very carefully considered
    request that gives us the resources we need to conduct
    effective operations and meet all the missions we have been
    assigned. Our shipbuilding and aviation requests concur with
    the findings of the QDR and its objectives of prevailing in
    today's wars, preventing conflict, preparing for future wars,
    and preserving the force.
        With this budget, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue
    to maintain the maritime superiority of our forces, sustain a
    strong American shipbuilding base, and ensure our capacity for
    rapid global response.
        Across the FYDP, we have requested the funds to build an
    average of 10 ships a year, including 1 carrier, 1 big-deck
    amphibious ship, 10 Virginia-class submarines, and 17 LCSs.
    We'll leverage the technologies captured from the canceled
    Future Cruiser Program and truncated DDG-1000 program into what
    will become our Flight 3 Burke-class guided missile destroyers.
    These technologies include the SPY-3 and air and missile
    defense radar.
        Through the submitted shipbuilding plan, we will increase
    the size of our fleet to approximately 320 ships by 2024. In
    our shipbuilding program, I believe we have made the most cost
    effective decisions to achieve the most capable force, one that
    achieves equal flexibility to confront missions across the
    spectrum of conflict from the technically complex, like
    ballistic missile defense and integrated air defense, to low
    intensity, humanitarian response, and regional engagement.
        In aircraft procurement, we have requested just over 1,000
    aircraft across the FYDP, including both fixed and rotary wing.
    Over the next year, the Navy and the Marine Corps will continue
    to move ahead with changes to our acquisitions process. In
    compliance with the WSARA, we are aggressively developing our
    acquisition strategies to ensure that on-time and on-budget
    becomes the standard for the Navy and Marine Corps.
        I'm grateful for the support of this committee for the
    decision to recompete the LCS program when it failed to meet
    program standards, and I can assure you that we will not
    hesitate to recompete or cancel other programs whenever
    substandard performance demands such a change.
        Change is also required to address the way in which the
    Navy and Marine Corps use and produce energy. Energy reform is
    an issue of national security and it's essential to maintaining
    our strategic advantage, warfighting readiness, and tactical
    edge. By 2020, I've committed the Navy to generate half of all
    the energy we use from alternative sources.
        Forty years ago, I stood watch on the deck of the USS
    Little Rock as a young junior officer. Today I have the great
    and solemn privilege of standing watch on behalf of our Navy
    and Marine Corps in a time of war and national challenge. I'm
    honored by the trust that the President and Congress have
    placed in me and fully recognize the solemn obligation I have
    to those who defend us.
        I, along with the CNO and the Commandant, look forward to
    hearing your thoughts, answering your questions about our
    budget request, our specific programs, and our policies. I also
    look forward to working closely with you as we move forward to
    sustain the Navy and Marine Corps as the most formidable
    expeditionary fighting force in the world.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Mabus follows:]
                Prepared Statement by Hon. Raymond E. Mabus, Jr.
        Chairman Levin and Senator McCain, it is a pleasure to be here
    today with the Senate Armed Services Committee as the representative of
    the nearly 900,000 sailors, marines, and civilians that make up the
    Department of the Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant
    of the Marine Corps and I are privileged to lead some of the best men
    and women in the country, who are selflessly serving the United States
    all around the world in support of our safety, our security, and our
    national interests.
        The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable expeditionary
    fighting force in the world. We are America's Away Team. The mission
    and experience of our team is well matched to the multiple and varied
    challenges that threaten our Nation's security and global stability.
        Today the Navy and Marine Corps are conducting operations across
    the spectrum of military operations, from major combat and ballistic
    missile defense to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
        Fifteen thousand marines are at the forefront of our Nation's
    defense, serving in and around Helmand Province, Afghanistan. By spring
    this number will grow to almost 20,000. It is a testament to the
    responsiveness and combat capability of the Marine Corps that the first
    troops to depart for Afghanistan in the wake of the President's
    December 1 announcement were 1500 marines from Camp Lejuene, NC. The
    new arrivals, who deployed before the end of last year, joined the
    Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade already in place. Together they are
    taking the fight to the Taliban and al Qaeda in their sector and
    assisting the Afghan Provincial Government in reestablishing control.
    General Conway describes their capability as a two-fisted fighter,
    capable of simultaneously combating an adaptive and insidious
    insurgency among the Afghan civilians while maintaining the skill set
    to conduct major combat operations.
        The Navy in Afghanistan is contributing Special Operations Forces,
    Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, Seabee civil engineering assets, all
    of the airborne expeditionary tactical Electronic Warfare capability,
    medical and intelligence professionals, and logistical support. From
    our carriers operating in the Indian Ocean, we are launching a
    significant percentage of the close air support that watches over our
    marines and soldiers on the ground. The Navy has over 12,000 sailors on
    the ground in Central Command supporting joint and coalition efforts in
    both Iraq and Afghanistan and another 9,000 sailors at sea supporting
    combat operations.
        The Navy and Marine Corps today are globally engaged in a host of
    other security and stability operations. In our cruisers and
    destroyers, the Navy has built a strong ballistic missile defense
    force. These multi-mission ships routinely deploy to the Mediterranean,
    the Arabian Gulf, and the Western Pacific and extend an umbrella of
    deterrence. Across the Future Years' Defense Program we will expand
    this mission and operationally implement the President's decision in
    September 2009 to focus on sea-based ballistic missile defense.
        That capability is complemented by the continued preeminence of the
    ballistic missile submarines in our strategic deterrent force, who
    operate quietly and stealthily on station every day of the year.
        In the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean, Combined Task Force
    151 is leading the international effort to combat piracy in the Gulf of
    Aden. They are coordinating their operations with forces from the
    European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and a total of 24
    Nations contributing ships, aircraft, and staff personnel as well as
    operational and intelligence support.
        Our ships and maritime patrol aircraft in the Caribbean and off
    South America are working with the Coast Guard-led Joint Interagency
    Task Force-South, which ties together information and forces from 13
    nations to stem the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States.
    In 2009 alone they contributed to the seizure or disruption of almost
    220,000 kilograms of cocaine with a street value of over $4 billion.
        Both the Navy and Marine Corps routinely conduct training exercises
    and multi-lateral operations with nations all around the world to
    solidify our relationships with traditional allies and forge
    partnerships with new friends. Global Partnership Stations in Africa,
    South America, and the Pacific are training hundreds of sailors,
    marines, and coastguardsmen from dozens of nations and are supporting
    regional diplomatic and humanitarian engagement efforts, like those of
    the hospital ship USNS Comfort and the Fleet Auxiliary USNS Richard E.
    Byrd in the summer of 2009. The two ships together treated over 110,000
    patients in the Caribbean, South America, and Oceania, and the USNS
    Comfort furthered an existing partnership with numerous civilian aid
    organizations.
        The Navy-Marine Corps team remains on the frontline of response to
    natural disasters. In 2009 we provided humanitarian assistance to
    Indonesia, the Philippines, and American Samoa, and delivered thousands
    of tons of food, water, and medical supplies to those affected by
    devastation. After the January 12 earthquake in Haiti, the Navy and
    Marine Corps responded immediately. Within a week of the earthquake, 11
    Navy ships, including the carrier USS Carl Vinson, the big-deck
    amphibious ship USS Bataan, and the hospital ship USNS Comfort were on
    station off the coast of Haiti. These ships embarked 41 Navy and Marine
    Corps helicopters and approximately 2,000 marines of the 22nd Marine
    Expeditionary Unit. On station, our units treated patients, provided
    helicopter lift capability, and delivered hundreds of tons of relief
    aid. Additional personnel and capabilities continued to flow in over
    the next weeks. Our mission there will continue as long as required.
        The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive, and everywhere
    that our Nation's interests are at stake. The Navy and Marine Corps'
    global presence reduces instability, deters aggression, and allows for
    rapid response to a wide range of contingencies.
        In order to ensure our continued global mobility, the Department of
    the Navy strongly supports accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
    The United States must continue to take maximum advantage of the
    navigational rights contained in the Convention. Ratification would
    enhance stability for international maritime rules and ensure our
    access to critical air and sea lines of communication.
        I have now been the Secretary of the Navy for 9 months, and in that
    short period of time I have met thousands of our sailors and marines
    serving on the frontlines at sea and ashore. I have been constantly
    inspired by the high morale, courage, and commitment to serving our
    country displayed by every one of them as they conduct our missions. In
    return, I have continually expressed to them the appreciation of the
    American people for the sacrifices they and their families are making
    every day.
        I have met our operational commanders and seen first-hand the
    warfighting readiness of our Fleet and our Marine Forces. I have
    inspected the facilities of our industry partners who are building the
    Navy and Marine Corps of tomorrow. With the advice and support of my
    leadership team, I have made some initial decisions to better prepare
    the Navy and Marine Corps for the challenges of the future. These
    observations and our initial actions have given me a good picture of
    the Navy and Marine Corps, and from this vantage I can report to
    Congress and the President the current state of the Services, the
    budgetary requirements we need to successfully perform our mission, and
    the future direction I believe we must take.
        The Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2011 budget request
    reflects the President's priorities, Secretary Gates' strategic and
    fiscal guidance, and fundamentally aligns with the 2010 Quadrennial
    Defense Review (QDR) priorities:

              (1) Prevailing in today's wars
              (2) Preventing and deterring conflict
              (3) Preparing for a wide range of future contingencies
              (4) Preserving and enhancing the All-Volunteer Force

        This budget request of $160.7 billion will maintain across the
    Future Years' Defense Program our commitment to a strong industrial
    base. The fiscal year 2011 request of $18.5 billion for contingency
    operations includes incremental costs to sustain operations, manpower,
    equipment and infrastructure repair as well as equipment replacement to
    support our focus on increasing threats in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
        In the fiscal year 2011 budget request, we have included funds for
    nine ships, including two additional Virginia-class submarines, two
    destroyers in the restarted Arleigh Burke line, a lower-cost commercial
    variant of the Mobile Landing Platform, the multi-role Landing
    Helicopter Assault Replacement, a Joint High Speed Vessel, and two
    Littoral Combat Ships, which will be constructed under the terms of the
    down-select we will conduct this fiscal year. In aviation, we have
    requested 206 aircraft in fiscal year 2011, including 20 F-35 Joint
    Strike Fighters for both the Navy and Marine Corps, 24 MH-60R and 7 P-
    8As to begin replacing our aging anit-submarine warfare (ASW) and
    maritime patrol squadrons, 18 MH-60S for logistics support, 28 H-1
    variant helicopters, and 30 MV-22 for the Marine Corps, 22 F/A-18E/F
    and 12 EA-18G to continue replacing the EA-6B. For Marine Corps ground
    operations, we have requested funding for an additional 564 Logistics
    Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) and High Mobility Multipurpose
    Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) tactical vehicles. The fiscal year 2011 budget
    request also contains development funding for the Navy Unmanned Combat
    Aerial System and continues development of the Broad Area Maritime
    Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). We have continued our
    support of the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, including funding
    for a fourth Riverine Squadron.
        The Department's long-range shipbuilding and aviation intentions
    are designed to sustain our naval superiority and they achieve a
    balance of capability and affordability that both wins today's wars
    even while preparing for the challenges of the future.
        There are four strategic, tactical, and personnel management
    imperatives I believe the Department of the Navy must also address to
    maintain preeminence as a fighting force and successfully address
    whatever comes in the future. These four areas reinforce the strategic
    framework of the QDR and address the areas of risk it identifies. They
    are:

              (1) Taking care of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their
            families
              (2) Treating energy in the Department of the Navy as an issue
            of national security
              (3) Creating acquisitions excellence
              (4) Optimizing unmanned systems

        They underpin the development of our fiscal year 2011 budget
    request, execute Presidential policy, and comply with and respond to
    congressional direction.
         taking care of sailors, marines, civilians, and their families
        Sailors and marines are the fundamental source of our success. They
    are our most important asset, and they must always come first in our
    minds and in our actions. One of my most important responsibilities as
    Secretary is to ensure adequate compensation, medical care, and family
    support services are provided to our sailors, marines, civilians, and
    their families.
        The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to recruit and retain the
    same high quality individuals we brought into and kept in the service
    in 2009. We remain committed to providing a competitive pay and
    benefits package to aid recruiting. The package includes not only basic
    pay and housing allowances, but also provides incentives for critical
    specialties in health care, explosive ordnance disposal, and nuclear
    propulsion.
        Beyond compensation, we recognize that quality of life programs are
    crucial to retention and the military mission. We are providing
    expanded career opportunities, opportunities for life-long learning,
    and a continuum of care and family support. The Department continues to
    support a wide array of readiness programs, including deployment
    support services, morale and welfare services, and child and teen
    programs. Our innovative personnel management and human resource
    programs were in fact recognized by civilian experts as among the best
    in the country when, in October 2009, the Navy was named by Workforce
    Management Magazine as the winner of the Optimas Award for General
    Excellence.
        Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, over 10,000 marines and
    sailors have been wounded in action. Their service has been exemplary
    and unselfish, and in their sacrifice they have given so much of
    themselves for our country. The Department of the Navy, through the
    Wounded Warrior Regiment and the Navy Safe Harbor Program, provides
    support and assistance to our wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers
    and their families throughout recovery, rehabilitation, and
    reintegration. We continue to provide encouragement and support for
    wounded sailors and marines, in partnership with the Department of
    Veterans Affairs, long after they have left the Service.
        Our medical community has continued to strive for excellence in the
    care of our sailors and marines. Navy Medicine has reached out to its
    civilian colleagues, and we have established partnerships with civilian
    hospitals to improve our understanding and care for those affected by
    traumatic brain injuries, mental health issues, amputation, and
    disfiguring injuries. I had the opportunity last fall to see this
    first-hand, when I witnessed groundbreaking pro-bono work in
    reconstructive surgery on behalf of Wounded Warriors at the UCLA
    Medical Center.
        We will continue to aggressively address the issues of sexual
    assault prevention and response. Sexual assault is a criminal act that
    is corrosive to the readiness and morale of a professional military
    organization. In the fiscal year 2011 budget request, we have requested
    funds to support a reinvigorated program under the supervision of a new
    Office of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, which I created
    within the Secretariat to focus attention on the issue, develop
    effective training, and coordinate prevention and response programs
    across the Navy and Marine Corps.
        In 2010, the Department will move forward on expanding the
    opportunities for women in the Navy. We will establish a process to
    integrate women into the submarine force, beginning with nuclear-
    trained and Supply Corps officers on our ballistic and guided missile
    submarines.
        After 8 years of continuous combat operations, the Navy and Marine
    Corps' people remain strong, and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
    Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), and I are very focused on
    maintaining the overall health of the force. The fiscal year 2011
    budget request reinforces these goals and is designed to provide the
    fiscal support necessary to sustain the force. The visible support of
    Congress to our personnel programs is deeply appreciated and has been
    vital in maintaining overall readiness.
                                 energy reform
        The way in which we use and produce energy is an issue of national
    security and is essential to maintaining our warfighting capabilities.
    At present, we simply rely too much on fossil fuels, which are
    susceptible to both price and supply shocks caused by events in
    volatile areas of the world largely outside the scope of our control.
    Those potential shocks have, in turn, strategic, operational, and
    tactical effects upon our forces. In addition, fossil fuel emissions
    are the root cause of many of the impending security challenges of
    tomorrow, and the QDR has correctly identified that climate change and
    its effects: rising sea levels, pressure on natural resources, and
    changes to the polar regions, will increasingly affect our force
    structure and the global security environment as the 21st century
    progresses. In order to improve our long-term strategic and fiscal
    position, I have set the Navy and Marine Corps on a path to change the
    way in which we use and produce energy.
        In October 2009, I issued five energy targets. They are ambitious
    in their scope, but I firmly believe that little will be accomplished
    without bold, innovative, and timely action. The most important of the
    targets commits the Navy and Marine Corps to generating half of all the
    energy we use, including that used by the operational fleet, from
    alternative sources by 2020. I have also committed the Navy and Marine
    Corps to consider energy as a mandatory evaluation factor in
    contracting, and to consider as an additional factor in our business
    dealings, the energy footprint of the companies that sell to the Navy
    and Marine Corps.
        America is a world leader precisely because of our willingness to
    not just embrace change, but to create it. The U.S. Navy has always
    been a technological leader. We moved from wind to coal in the 19th
    century, coal to oil early in the 20th century, and to nuclear power in
    mid-century. In every transition there were opponents to change, but in
    every case the strategic and tactical position of naval forces
    improved. In this century, I have asked the Navy to lead again by
    pioneering technological change through use of alternative energy. But
    I want to reiterate that every action and program we undertake must and
    will have as an effect improved warfighting capability. We will strive
    in every case to improve energy efficiency and reach cost-neutrality
    over the life of the program.
        Many of our initiatives are already doing this. We conducted a
    ground test of an F/A-18 Hornet jet engine this fall running on a
    biofuel blend and we intend to conduct an airborne test of the ``Green
    Hornet'' later this year. In late 2010, the Navy will also conduct
    tests of a more efficient F/A-18 engine, which will increase the
    aircraft's range. Afloat, the USS Makin Island, the first ship
    constructed with a hybrid-electric drive that dramatically lowers fuel
    consumption at lower speeds, saved approximately $2 million in a single
    transit to her new homeport in San Diego. Over the life of the ship, we
    estimate the savings will be up to $250 million using today's fuel
    prices. Writ large across the Navy, as we begin to retrofit our DDG
    fleet with similar propulsion systems, the potential fuel savings will
    only grow.
        In addition to these tactical applications, we have implemented a
    number of energy projects at our facilities ashore, and numerous other
    efficiency initiatives throughout the Fleet. As the President clearly
    stated in Copenhagen, changing the way we use and produce energy is a
    national security imperative.
                             acquisition excellence
        The ships and aircraft of the Navy and Marine Corps are unmatched
    at sea and over land. Our precision munitions, networked targeting
    systems, armored vehicles, stealth technology, and unmanned vehicles
    are advanced systems that define the leading edge of warfare in all
    domains.
        These truths have been brought home to me during my visits with the
    defense industry. I have had the opportunity to visit shipyards,
    aircraft manufacturers, factories, and depots; and I applaud the hard
    work and dedication of this country's skilled workforce--Americans who
    take as much pride in their patriotism as they do in their
    craftsmanship.
        The issue before us all, however, is affordability. Acquisition
    costs are rising faster than our budget's top-line, and without
    deliberate, sustained action to reverse this trend, we put the size and
    capability of the future force at risk. In accordance with the Weapons
    System Acquisition Reform Act passed by Congress in 2009, the Navy and
    Marine Corps will aggressively pursue additional ways to make the
    acquisitions process more rigorous; we will prudently safeguard the
    resources entrusted to us by the American taxpayer, and we will fully
    meet the obligation we hold to our Sailors and Marines.
        This requires close examination of the way we do business in our
    policies, practices, priorities, and organization, with a clear focus
    on controlling cost. The Navy and Marine Corps will continue
    initiatives to raise standards, to improve processes, to instill
    discipline in procurement, and to strengthen the professional corps
    that manages our major defense acquisition programs.
        We are pressing forward with key initiatives that promise to
    improve our ability to affordably deliver combat capability to the
    fleet.
        We are improving the quality of our cost estimates, which underpin
    our investment decisions. We are strengthening our cost estimating
    group, requiring independent cost estimates, and incorporating
    Departmental best practices in the formulation of our Service Cost
    Position for all major programs. We are using these realistic cost and
    schedule estimates to drive difficult decisions at the front end of the
    requirements process.
        We are developing our acquisition strategies with the intent of
    expanding the use of fixed price contracts, leveraging competition, and
    tightening up on the use of incentive and award fees to ensure quality
    systems are delivered consistently on budget and on time to our sailors
    and marines. When we could not achieve these objectives this past year
    on the Littoral Combat Ship program, we rewrote the program's
    acquisition strategy to improve performance through competition. I
    thank the committee for its strong support of this revised strategy,
    and I assure you that I will not hesitate to recompete or cancel
    programs when substandard performance demands change.
        We are demanding strict discipline in the execution of our
    contracts. Before commencing production on new start ship programs, I
    have reported to you the results of reviews conducted to ensure that
    designs are mature. We are specifically clamping down on contract
    changes, the most-often cited reason for cost growth, through improved
    policies and increased oversight.
        Our goals for modernizing today's force and recapitalizing the
    fleet affordably cannot be accomplished without a healthy industrial
    base and strong performance by our industry partners. We have worked
    hard to procure our ships, aircraft, and weapon systems at a rate
    intended to bring stability to the industrial base and enable efficient
    production. The Navy's long-range shipbuilding plan was developed with
    particular regard for maintaining the unique characteristics and
    strength of the base and our efforts support the QDR's emphasis on
    maintaining the defense industrial base with appropriate levels of
    competition, innovation, and capacity. The Future Years' Defense
    Program outlines construction of a balanced force of 50 ships, an
    average of 10 ships per year, which requires the full breadth of
    capabilities and services provided by our major shipbuilders and
    vendors.
        In the end, industry must perform. We will work with our shipyards,
    aircraft manufacturers, and weapon systems providers to benchmark
    performance, to identify where improvements are necessary, to provide
    the proper incentives for capital investments where warranted, and to
    reward strong performance with terms and conditions that reflect our
    desire for a strong government-industry partnership.
        To meet our objectives, we must be smart buyers. The acquisition
    workforce has been downsized over the past 15 years and in truth our
    professional acquisition corps has been stretched too thin.
    Accordingly, and with your strong support, we are rebuilding the
    acquisition workforce through a number of parallel efforts. We must
    both increase the number of acquisition workers and restore to the
    government the core competencies inherent to their profession. The
    Department has added 800 acquisition professionals in the last year
    towards the goal of increasing the community by 5,000 over the Future
    Years' Defense Program. This represents a 12 percent growth in our
    workforce.
                                unmanned systems
        The complex nature of today's security environment, as well as
    current and future anti-access threats faced by the United States
    require that the Navy and Marine Corps investigate the contributions
    unmanned systems can make to warfighting capability. Unmanned systems
    are unobtrusive, versatile, persistent, and they reduce the exposure of
    our sailors and marines to unnecessary threats. They perform a vast
    array of tasks such as intelligence collection, precision target
    designation, oceanographic reconnaissance, and mine detection, and that
    array will grow exponentially year to year.
        Navy and Marine Corps unmanned systems have already made key
    contributions to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the counter-
    piracy effort off the coast of Africa. Unmanned aircraft systems have
    flown thousands of flight hours in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
    and Operation Enduring Freedom. Unmanned ground vehicles employed by
    the Marine Corps have conducted thousands of missions detecting and/or
    neutralizing improvised explosive devices. Unmanned maritime systems
    have provided improved port security.
        We continue to support research and development activities to
    improve these capabilities and increase the level of autonomy in
    unmanned systems. Over the Future Years' Defense Program we will
    continue to focus on transitioning from research and development and
    limited deployments, through test and evaluation, to full fleet
    integration and operations. In order to best direct our research and
    harness the capabilities of unmanned systems, I am tasking the
    Department to develop a comprehensive roadmap for unmanned system
    development, to include a coordinated strategy for air, ground,
    surface, and subsurface systems focused on integration and
    interoperability with our existing platforms and capabilities.
        The initiatives and investments contained in the fiscal year 2011
    budget request will move us onto this path. I look forward to reporting
    continued progress throughout the year.
                                    closing
        In this statement, I have discussed the strategic and tactical
    imperatives that guide the Department and influence the future
    decisions we will make. Specific programmatic requests are reflected in
    the fiscal year 2011 budget request, which I believe incorporates the
    difficult trade-offs and disciplined decision making that you and the
    American taxpayer expect of us. We have carefully weighed risks and
    made proposals to you that will ensure we retain a ready and agile
    force capable of conducting the full range of military operations. We
    will continue to work hard to be effective stewards of the resources
    you allocate to us.
        Forty years ago I stood watch on the deck of the USS Little Rock as
    a young junior officer. Today I have the solemn privilege of standing
    watch on behalf of our Navy and Marine Corps in a time of war and
    national challenge. I am honored by the trust the President and
    Congress have placed in me and I fully recognize the solemn obligation
    I have to those who defend us.
        That obligation fueled my desire to observe our people up close in
    their varied and often dangerous jobs. I've seen first hand the courage
    of our young marines in Helmand, the determination of a wounded SEAL to
    walk despite losing two legs, the pride of a young sailor in a hot
    engine room, the selfless dedication of corpsmen, nurses, and doctors
    caring for the fallen.
        Sacrifice and service created and preserve the freedom and
    opportunity that we enjoy as Americans. Although we aspire to create a
    world in which violence and aggression have been eliminated, we
    understand that peace and stability are often secured only when strong
    nations and good people are willing and prepared to use decisive force
    against those who threaten it. The Navy and Marine Corps stand ready to
    do so.
        Your commitment to the service of our country and your recognition
    of the sacrifice of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families
    has been steadfast and is fully reflected in the support of this
    committee for our key programs and our people.
        I, along with my partners, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
    Roughead, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Conway, look
    forward to hearing your thoughts and answering any questions you may
    have about our budget request or specific programs of interest. I also
    look forward to working closely with Congress as we move forward to
    sustain the Navy and Marine Corps as the most formidable expeditionary
    fighting force in the world.
        Thank you and Godspeed.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Admiral Roughead.

     STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

        Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator
    Inhofe, members of the committee, it is my honor to appear
    before you again representing more than 600,000 sailors and
    Navy civilians. Sixty-five thousand of them are deployed,
    12,000 on land in the CENTCOM area of operations, and 56
    percent of our fleet is underway carrying out our maritime
    strategy, a prescient precursor to the 2010 QDR.
        They are projecting power into Afghanistan, building
    partnerships in Africa, delivering relief in Haiti, silently
    patrolling under the sea in every ocean, and providing
    ballistic missile defense in the Arabian Gulf, the Western
    Pacific, and the Eastern Mediterranean with pride and
    determination.
        They are even deployed on the first LCS, 2 years ahead of
    schedule, and I think it's noteworthy that in the first week of
    that ship's deployment it seized over a quarter of a ton of
    cocaine.
        It is our sailors and Navy civilians who make all things
    possible, and thanks to your support we made important progress
    in building tomorrow's Navy, remaining ready to fight today,
    and supporting our sailors, Navy civilians, and families last
    year. This year's budget submission will take us even further.
        As the high demand for our Navy continues apace, we have
    stabilized end strength and the tone of the force remains
    positive. We will continue to aggressively improve wellness
    programs and medical and social services for our wounded
    warriors, indeed for all who serve. For our fleet as a
    continuously deployed force, we must continue to reset in
    stride. Conducting regular maintenance and training so that our
    ships and aircraft reach their expected service lives is
    extremely important.
        This year's budget aligns our baseline budget for operation
    and maintenance (O&M) accordingly and reflects a significant
    shift away from supplemental funding. I strongly request your
    support for this important change.
        While we reset, we must also procure ships and aircraft to
    reach our requirement of more than 313 ships. Last year we
    commissioned 9 ships and over the next decade our plan procures
    an average of 10 ships per year, significant growth for the
    near term.
        For aviation, we remain committed to bringing new
    capabilities on line, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and
    unmanned aircraft, and to maintaining the readiness of our
    current naval air force, all of which give our Nation
    flexibility in response unencumbered by overseas basing.
        Affordability for all our plans will remain fundamental to
    our decisions. The effectiveness of our unmanned systems,
    ships, and aircraft is a feature of the systems which connect
    them. Last year, I brought information capabilities and
    resources under a single Information Dominance Directorate
    within the Navy staff and commissioned Fleet Cyber Command 10th
    Fleet. I see benefits of that already.
        I am proud of our Navy's accomplishments last year and I am
    confident we can achieve more with this year's budget
    submission. Our risk continues to trend towards significant and
    achieving the right balance within and across my priorities
    remains critical to mitigating it. But I remain optimistic
    because of our outstanding sailors and Navy civilians and the
    spirit of our Nation. We have seen more challenging times and
    emerged prosperous, secure, and free.
        I ask you to support our 2011 budget request and thank you
    for all you do to make the U.S. Navy a global force for good
    today and into the future. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by ADM Gary Roughead, USN
                    navy fiscal year 2011 posture statement
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, it is
    my honor and pleasure to appear before you, once again, representing
    the more than 600,000 sailors and civilians of the U.S. Navy. Every
    day, our dedicated Navy men and women are forward deployed protecting
    the global commons in every domain: sea, land, air, space, and
    cyberspace. I appreciate your continued support for them as our Navy
    protects our Nation and our national interests.
        When I signed our Maritime Strategy with General Conway and Admiral
    Allen more than 2 years ago, I was confident that the strategy would
    prepare us well for the current and future security environments. Since
    then, it has guided our operations and investments, and I am further
    convinced of its relevance to our operations today and of its enduring
    attributes. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) validated the
    underlying principle articulated in the Maritime Strategy that
    preventing wars is as important as winning wars. The QDR also declared
    that U.S. security and prosperity are connected to that of the
    international system, that deterrence is a fundamental military
    function, and that partnerships are key to U.S. strategy and essential
    to the stability of global systems. These themes reinforce the tenets
    of our Maritime Strategy and the six core capabilities it identified
    for our maritime Services: forward presence, deterrence, sea control,
    power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and
    disaster response (HA/DR).
        My priorities for the Navy remain unchanged: to build tomorrow's
    Navy, to remain ready to fight today, and to develop and support our
    sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. We are making progress in
    these areas thanks to your continued support. Some highlights follow.
        We added nine new ships to our fleet in 2009, including USS Freedom
    (LCS-1), currently on its first deployment, and USS Independence (LCS-
    2), our second Littoral Combat Ship. We delivered three DDG-51
    destroyers and restarted the DDG-51 line to increase surface combatant
    capacity for maritime security, deterrence, and anti-submarine warfare.
    We are adapting our force to meet the President's demand for sea-based
    ballistic missile defense (BMD) of Europe while sustaining our current
    BMD missions in the Arabian Gulf and Western Pacific. Our Virginia-
    class submarine program continues to excel with the delivery of USS New
    Mexico (SSN-779) 4 months ahead of schedule. We rolled out our first
    carrier variant of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (F-35C) aircraft, the
    timely delivery of which remains essential to fulfilling our strike
    fighter requirements. We are conducting the first deployment of our
    Vertical Take-Off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) and we
    expect the first test flight of our Navy Unmanned Combat Aerial System
    demonstrator this year.
        In the information and cyberspace domain, I established Fleet Cyber
    Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet as the global operator of Navy's cyber,
    networks, cryptology/signals intelligence, information, electronic
    warfare, and space operations. I restructured the Navy staff to bring
    all Navy information capabilities and resources under our new
    Information Dominance Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and created the
    Navy Information Dominance Corps, integrating more than 45,000 sailors
    and civilians from our existing intelligence, information professional,
    information warfare, meteorology/oceanography, and space communities.
    About 1,400 of these sailors are deployed globally as individual
    augmentees (IAs) today, most supporting operations in the Central
    Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.
        More than 40 percent of our fleet is underway daily, globally
    present and persistently engaged. Our forward presence enabled the
    rapid response of our aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and numerous
    other surface and USNS ships, helicopters, and personnel to Haiti to
    provide humanitarian aid after the devastating earthquake in January.
    We remain engaged in operations in Afghanistan and in the drawdown of
    U.S. forces in Iraq. Navy has more than 21,000 Active and Reserve
    sailors on the ground and at sea in CENTCOM. This includes a doubling
    of our construction battalion (SEABEE) presence in Afghanistan and
    ongoing IA support to both operations. I recently issued our Navy
    Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges to shape how our Navy will
    plan for, resource, and deliver a wide range of capabilities to
    confront irregular challenges associated with regional instability,
    insurgency, crime, and violent extremism at sea, in the littorals, and
    on shore.
        Our Navy continues to support our people and their families. We are
    in the process of expanding opportunities for service at sea to women
    in the Navy by opening to them assignments on submarines for the first
    time in history. Our Navy has received 19 national awards in the past
    18 months for its workforce planning, life-work integration, diversity,
    and training initiatives. Most notably, Workforce Management magazine
    awarded Navy the 2009 Optimas Award for General Excellence, which
    recognized the U.S. Navy as an employer of choice among the ranks of
    previous distinguished recipients such as Google, Intel, and Hewlett-
    Packard. We have met or exceeded overall officer and enlisted (Active
    and Reserve) recruiting goals for 2009 and we are on track to achieve
    similar success in 2010. I appreciate the support of Congress for our
    fleet and its dedicated sailors, Navy civilians, and their families
    that serve our Nation every day.
        I continue to focus on ensuring our Navy is properly balanced to
    answer the call now and in the decades to come. Last year, I stated our
    risk was moderate trending toward significant because of the challenges
    associated with Fleet capacity, increasing operational requirements,
    and growing manpower, maintenance, and infrastructure costs. This risk
    has increased over the last year as trends in each of these areas have
    continued. We are able to meet the most critical combatant commander
    demands today, but I am increasingly concerned about our ability to
    meet any additional demands while sustaining the health of the force,
    conducting essential maintenance and modernization to ensure units
    reach full service life, and procuring our future Navy so we are
    prepared to meet the challenges of tomorrow.
        The costs to own and operate our fleet continue to rise due to
    increasing operational demands, higher maintenance requirements, and
    growing manpower costs. Over the last decade, the overall size of our
    active fleet decreased by more than 30 ships, about 10 percent, and our
    active duty end strength decreased by about 13 percent, while
    operational demands globally have grown. Our Navy's high tempo of
    operations has placed additional stress on our smaller fleet of
    sailors, ships, and aircraft and we are consuming the service life of
    our fleet at a higher than expected rate. We are implementing force
    management measures in the near term to stretch the capacity of our
    285-ship force to meet increasing global requirements. Through our
    Fleet Response Plan, we are tailoring our training and maintenance
    cycles to generate ready forces, allowing us to meet the most critical
    combatant commander requirements today. The impact of these measures on
    our fleet has been felt in longer deployments and shorter dwell times,
    which increase stress on our sailors and drive up maintenance
    requirements and costs for our ships and aircraft. Regular maintenance
    of our ships and aircraft, and training and certification of our crews
    between deployments, is essential to our ability to sustain our force.
    It is how we reset. This ``reset in stride'' is different from other
    Services. It ensures our ships and aircraft maintain the required
    continuous forward presence whether supporting coalition troops in
    Afghanistan, deterring North Korea and Iran, or providing humanitarian
    aid in Haiti. For our Navy, continuous reset translates into decades of
    service for each ship and aircraft, a significant return on investment.
        Our reset and readiness are tied directly to our operation and
    maintenance (O&M) funding. Over the last decade, we have relied upon a
    combination of base budget and overseas contingency operations (OCO)
    funding to operate and maintain our Navy. Our fiscal year 2011 OCO
    request for O&M is tightly focused on supporting our ongoing and
    increased operations in CENTCOM. Our fiscal year 2011 base budget
    request for O&M is focused on properly sustaining our ships and
    aircraft so they reach their expected service life; funding enduring
    readiness requirements, particularly in aviation; and funding price
    increases, most notably in fuel, to support our enduring operations.
    Together, our OCO and base budget O&M requests reflect our commitment
    to resource current operations while preserving our fleet for future
    operations. I ask for your full support of this year's O&M request.
        Our fiscal year 2011 budget request achieves the optimal balance
    among my priorities to build tomorrow's Navy, to remain ready to fight
    today, and to develop and support our sailors, Navy civilians, and
    their families. It supports our Maritime Strategy and the 2010 QDR and
    continues us on the path we started in fiscal year 2010 to support our
    forces forward, take care of our people, continue rebalancing our force
    to meet current and future challenges, and reform how and what we buy.
    Highlights follow.
                             build tomorrow's navy
        Since the release of our Maritime Strategy, I have stated that our
    Navy requires a minimum of 313 ships to meet operational requirements
    globally. This minimum, a product of our 2005 force structure analysis,
    remains valid. We are adjusting our requirement to address increased
    operational demands and expanding requirements, as outlined in the QDR,
    for BMD, intra-theater lift, and forces capable of confronting
    irregular challenges. Our shipbuilding plan addresses these operational
    needs by growing our fleet to 315 ships in 2020 and peaking at 320
    ships in 2024. Per the President's direction, we will improve our
    capacity to conduct sea-based BMD of Europe by increasing our inventory
    of Aegis-capable ships through our restarted DDG-51 production line and
    modernization of our existing cruisers and destroyers. The funding for
    these upgrades will deliver the capability and capacity of ships
    required to perform this mission while maintaining sustainable
    deployment ratios for our sailors. To fulfill combatant commander
    requirements for intra-theater lift, we will increase the number of
    Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) in our Fleet; the large payload bays,
    speed, and shallow draft of these versatile ships make them capable of
    supporting a wide range of naval missions, including security
    cooperation, security force assistance, and logistics support. To
    provide forces capable of confronting irregular challenges, we will
    continue to pursue the planned number of Littoral Combat Ships,
    providing a flexible and modular ship optimized for operations close to
    shore. We are moving from developing a Maritime Prepositioning Force
    (Future) squadron optimized for high-end, forcible entry operations to
    augmenting our three existing Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS)
    with enhanced sea basing capabilities that are useful across a wide
    range of military operations. The augmented MPS will support our
    amphibious warfare force, which we will build to a minimum of 33 ships
    to increase our capacity to conduct theater security cooperation,
    sustain combat and assistance operations from the sea, and hedge
    against future conflict.
        We have improved the balance among capability, capacity,
    affordability, and executabilty in our procurement plans by developing
    a shipbuilding plan that procures our most needed capabilities,
    increases Fleet capacity in the near-to-mid-term, and is fiscally
    executable within the FYDP. It carefully manages increasing levels of
    operational and institutional risk, recognizing that, for as much as
    our Navy does to protect our national security and prosperity, the
    overall economy of our Nation undoubtedly does more. I am confident our
    near-term plan provides the capability and capacity we need to conduct
    contingency operations and build partner capacity while retaining our
    ability to deter aggressors, assure allies, and defeat adversaries.
    Beyond 2024, I am concerned about the decrease in Fleet capacity that
    will occur as our legacy cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and
    amphibious ships reach the end of their service lives. Many of these
    ships were brought into service during the 1980s, when we procured some
    ship classes at a rate of four to five ships per year. While economic
    and security conditions are sure to change between now and then, it
    takes 10 to 15 years to design and build our ships, which then remain
    in service for 20 to 50 years. A long view is necessary to ensure our
    Navy has sufficient capacity to protect America's global national
    interests in the future.
        As directed by the QDR, we are working with the Air Force and
    Marine Corps on an Air Sea Battle concept that will identify the
    doctrine, procedures, training, organization, and equipment needed for
    our Navy to counter growing military threats to our freedom of action.
    This joint effort will help us inform investments and identify future
    opportunities to better integrate naval and air forces across the
    entire range of operations. We are already moving forward with the Air
    Force to streamline capabilities, manpower, and resources related to
    our unmanned aviation systems. We continue to pursue our unique
    maritime aviation capabilities in carrier-based strike, anti-submarine
    warfare, and naval special warfare missions.
        Underpinning the capacity and capability of our fleet is a highly
    technical and specialized industrial base. A strategic national asset,
    our shipbuilding and aviation industrial base is essential to
    sustaining our global fleet and remains a significant contributor to
    our Nation's economic prosperity. Our shipbuilding industrial base
    directly supports more than 97,000 uniquely-skilled American jobs and
    indirectly supports thousands more through second and third tier
    suppliers. The highly specialized skills in our shipbuilding base take
    years to develop and, if lost, cannot be easily or quickly replaced.
    Level loading and predictable ship procurement allow industry to
    stabilize its workforce and retain the critical skills essential to our
    national security.
        I am committed to reducing the total ownership cost of our fleet so
    that what we buy today does not pressurize our ability to operate
    tomorrow. Significant cost drivers for our Fleet include increasing
    technical and design complexity, changes in requirements, reductions in
    the number of ships procured, and higher labor costs. To reduce these
    costs, we are pursuing common hull forms and components, open
    architecture for hardware and software, and increased modularity.
    Moreover, we are considering total ownership costs in procurement
    decisions. We are exploring new ways to design our ships with greater
    affordability throughout their lives, including reducing costs of fuel
    consumption, maintenance, and manpower and by increasing the efficiency
    of our maintenance and support processes and organizations. We are
    leveraging open production lines to deliver proven and required
    capabilities, such as in our DDG-51 and EA-18G programs. We are
    promoting longer production runs with our Virginia class SSNs, EA-18G
    and F/A-18E/F, P-8A, BAMS, and DDG-51 programs. We are capitalizing on
    repeat builds to control requirements creep and increase predictability
    with our aircraft carrier, destroyer, and submarine programs. Finally,
    we are pursuing evolutionary instead of revolutionary designs to
    deliver required future capabilities. Our future missile defense
    capable ship, for example, will be developed by spiraling capability
    into our DDG-51-class ships, instead of designing and building a new
    cruiser from the keel up.
        I remain committed to delivering a balanced and capable fleet that
    will meet our national security requirements. I seek your support for
    the following initiatives and programs:
                               aviation programs
    Aircraft Carrier Force Structure
        The Navy remains firmly committed to maintaining a force of 11
    carriers for the next 3 decades. With the commissioning of USS George
    H.W. Bush (CVN-77) and inactivation of the 48-year-old USS Kitty Hawk
    (CV-63), our last conventionally powered aircraft carrier, we now have
    an all nuclear-powered carrier force. Our carriers enable our Nation to
    respond rapidly, decisively, and globally to project power, as we have
    done in Iraq and Afghanistan, or to deliver humanitarian assistance, as
    we have done in Haiti, while operating from a small, yet persistent,
    footprint that does not impose unnecessary political or logistic
    burdens on other nations. Our carriers remain a great investment for
    our Nation.
        Our 11-carrier force structure is based on worldwide presence and
    surge requirements, while also taking into account training and
    maintenance needs. I thank Congress for granting us a waiver to
    temporarily reduce our force to 10 carriers for the period between the
    inactivation of USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and the delivery of Gerald R.
    Ford (CVN-78). We will continue to meet operational commitments during
    this 33-month period by managing carefully carrier deployment and
    maintenance cycles. After the delivery of CVN-78, we will maintain an
    11-carrier force through the continued refueling program for Nimitz-
    class ships and the delivery of our Ford-class carriers at 5-year
    intervals starting in 2020.
        CVN-78 is the lead ship of our first new class of aircraft carriers
    in nearly 40 years. Ford-class carriers will be our Nation's premier
    forward-deployed asset capable of responding to crises or delivering
    early decisive striking power in a major combat operation. These new
    carriers incorporate an innovative new flight deck design that provides
    greater operational flexibility, reduced manning requirements, and the
    ability to operate current and future naval aircraft from its deck.
    Among the new technologies being integrated in these ships is the
    Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), which will enable the
    carrier's increased sortie generation rate and lower total ownership
    costs. EMALS is on track for an aircraft demonstration later this year
    and is on schedule to support delivery of CVN-78 in September 2015.
    Strike Fighter Capacity: Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18 E/F
        Our Navy remains committed to the JSF program. The timely delivery
    of the F-35C carrier variant remains critical to our future carrier
    airwing strike fighter capacity. Our Navy has the necessary tactical
    aircraft capacity in the near term to support our Nation's strategic
    demands; however, a January 2010 assessment forecasts a decrease in our
    carrier-based strike fighter capacity that peaks in 2014 and remains
    through 2019. We have a plan to address this capacity decrease that
    involves several management and investment measures.
        Our force management measures are targeted at preserving the
    service life of our existing legacy strike fighter aircraft (F/A-18 A-
    D). We will reduce the number of aircraft available in our squadrons
    during non-deployed phases to the minimum required. We will reduce our
    Unit Deployed squadrons (UDP) from 12 aircraft to 10 aircraft per
    squadron to match the corresponding decrease in Marine Corps
    expeditionary squadrons. We are accelerating the transition of five
    legacy F/A-18C squadrons to F/A-18E/F Super Hornets using available F/
    A-18E/F aircraft and will transition two additional legacy squadrons
    using Super Hornet attrition reserve aircraft. These measures make our
    legacy strike fighter aircraft available for High Flight Hour (HFH)
    inspections and our Service Life Extension Program, which together will
    extend their service life and manage to some extent the decrease in our
    carrier-based strike fighter capacity through 2018. These measures
    expend the service life of our Super Hornets earlier than programmed,
    so we are refining our depot level production processes to maximize
    throughput and return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the fleet
    expeditiously. Our fiscal year 2011 budget procures 22 additional F/A-
    18E/F aircraft.
        Our investment measures are targeted at extending the service life
    of our F/A-18 A-D aircraft and procuring JSF. HFH inspections, which
    have been in place for 2 years, provide the ability to extend the
    service life of our legacy F/A-18 A-D aircraft to 8,600 flight hours,
    while engineering analysis is underway to determine the SLEP
    requirements necessary to reach the service life extension goal of
    10,000 flight hours. The HFH and SLEP programs increase our
    institutional risk by diverting investment and maintenance funds from
    other accounts, but they are necessary measures to address our strike
    fighter decrease while preserving our investment in JSF.
        I remain committed to the JSF program because of the advanced
    sensor, precision strike, firepower, and stealth capabilities JSF will
    bring to our Fleet. While the overall schedule for JSF has slipped,
    causing us to reduce the overall rate of procurement, initial operating
    capability is still planned for 2014 and we have not reduced the total
    number of airframes we plan to buy. We are monitoring the JSF program
    closely and managing our existing strike fighter capacity to meet power
    projection demands until JSF is delivered. Procurement of an alternate
    engine for JSF increases our risk in this program. The Navy does not
    have a requirement for an alternate engine, and its additional costs
    threaten our ability to fund currently planned aircraft procurement
    quantities, which would exacerbate our anticipated decrease in strike
    fighter capacity. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request procures seven F-
    35C aircraft.
    EA-18G Growler
        The proliferation of technology has allowed state and non-state
    actors to use the electromagnetic spectrum with increasing
    sophistication. Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) provides one of the
    most flexible offensive capabilities available to the joint warfighter
    and it remains in high demand in traditional, irregular, and hybrid
    conflicts. The Navy continues to provide extensive AEA support from our
    carriers afloat and from our expeditionary EA-6B Prowler squadrons
    deployed currently to Iraq and Afghanistan.
        We are leveraging the mature and proven F/A-18E/F airframe
    production line to recapitalize our aging EA-6B aircraft with the EA-
    18G Growler. As directed in the QDR, we are planning to procure an
    additional 26 EA-18G Growler aircraft across the FYDP to increase joint
    force capacity to conduct expeditionary electronic attack. Our program
    of record will buy 114 total EA-18G aircraft, recapitalizing 10 Fleet
    EA-6B squadrons and four expeditionary squadrons. The program continues
    to deliver as scheduled. In September, our first EA-18G transition
    squadron, based at NAS Whidbey Island, reached Initial Operational
    Capability and it will deploy as an expeditionary squadron later this
    year. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding for 12 EA-18Gs.
    P-3 Orion and P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft
        Your continued support of the P-3 and P-8A force remains essential
    and is appreciated greatly. Our P-3 Orion roadmap focuses on
    sustainment and selected modernization until it is replaced by the P-8A
    Poseidon. These aircraft provide capabilities ideally suited for
    regional and littoral crises and conflict, and are our pre-eminent
    airborne capability against submarine threats. Our P-3s are in high
    demand today for the time-critical intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance they provide to the joint force on the ground in CENTCOM
    and for their direct contributions to our maritime domain awareness in
    key regions across the globe.
        P-3 Zone 5 wing fatigue has resulted in the unplanned grounding of
    49 aircraft between 2007 and 2009, with more expected. Mitigation
    measures include a combination of targeted Zone 5 modifications and
    outer wing replacements. As of December, we have returned 12 aircraft
    to service after completing Zone 5 modification and 32 aircraft are
    currently being repaired. As part of our sustainment program, we have
    included $39.6 million in our fiscal year 2011 budget request to
    conduct outer wing installations on nine of our P-3 aircraft. P-3
    sustainment and modernization programs are critical to ensuring
    successful transition to the P-8A, while preserving essential maritime
    and overland battle space awareness.
        The P-8A completed it's first Navy test flight this past October
    and will resume integrated flight testing in March of this year. The P-
    8A will achieve initial operating capability and begin replacing our
    aging P-3 aircraft in 2013. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request
    procures seven P-8A aircraft.
    MH-60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter
        The MH-60R and MH-60S successfully completed their first deployment
    together this past summer with the USS John C. Stennis carrier strike
    group. The MH-60R multi-mission helicopter replaces the surface
    combatant-based SH-60B and carrier-based SH-60F with a newly
    manufactured airframe and enhanced mission systems. With these systems,
    the MH-60R provides focused surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare
    capabilities for our strike groups and individual ships. Our fiscal
    year 2011 budget request procures 24 MH-60R helicopters. The MH-60S
    supports surface warfare, combat logistics, vertical replenishment,
    search and rescue, air ambulance, airborne mine counter-measures, and
    naval special warfare mission areas. Our fiscal year 2011 budget
    request procures 18 MH-60S helicopters.
                             surface ship programs
    Littoral Combat Ship
        Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a fast, agile, networked surface
    combatant that is optimized to support naval and joint force operations
    in the littorals and capable of supporting open-ocean operations. It
    will operate with tailored-mission packages to counter quiet diesel
    submarines, mines, and fast surface craft. The modular and open
    architecture design of the seaframe and mission modules provides the
    inherent flexibility to adapt or add capabilities beyond the current
    Anti-Submarine, Mine Countermeasures, and Surface Warfare missions.
    These ships will employ a combination of manned helicopters and
    unmanned aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles.
        USS Freedom (LCS-1) has completed her post-delivery testing, trial,
    and shakedown periods and commenced her maiden deployment in February
    to Southern Command and Pacific Command. Her deployment 2 years ahead
    of schedule will allow us to incorporate operational lessons more
    quickly and effectively as we integrate these ships into our Fleet. USS
    Independence (LCS-2) completed builder's trials in October 2009 and
    acceptance trials in November 2009. We accepted delivery of
    Independence on 18 December 2009, and commissioned her 16 January 2010.
    In March 2009, fixed price contracts were awarded for USS Fort Worth
    (LCS-3) and USS Coronado (LCS-4) which are now under construction by
    Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics respectively.
        I am impressed and satisfied with the capabilities of both LCS
    designs and am committed to procuring 55 of these ships. Affordability
    remains the key factor in acquiring LCS in the quantities we require.
    After careful review of the fiscal year 2010 industry proposals,
    consideration of total program costs, and ongoing discussions with
    Congress, we made the decision to cancel for affordability reasons the
    Phase II requests for proposals for three fiscal year 2010 LCS ships
    and adjust our acquisition strategy. In fiscal year 2010, we will
    conduct a competition among the existing LCS industry participants to
    down-select to a single LCS design. The winner of the down-select will
    be awarded a block buy contract for up to 10 ships, to be procured from
    fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014 at a rate of two ships per
    year, built in one shipyard. To sustain competition and increase
    capacity, the winner of the down-select will be required to deliver a
    Technical Data Package to the Navy to support competition for a second
    contract source. We plan to award up to five ships to a second source
    beginning in fiscal year 2012 with one ship and continuing with an
    additional two ships per year through fiscal year 2014. The winner of
    the down-select will provide combat systems equipment, up to 15 ship
    sets, for the ships built by the two contract sources: 10 sets for the
    10 ships under contract with the winner of the down-select and up to 5
    additional sets for the 5 ships being procured by the second contract
    source. The five additional sets will later be provided as government-
    furnished equipment to support the second source LCS contract. We
    intend to procure all future LCS ships within the national Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 revised cost cap. Our
    down-select strategy leverages competition to the maximum extent
    practical, provides for economic procurement quantities, improves
    learning curve and commonality opportunities, and ultimately provides
    for program stability. We recently issued the requests for proposals
    for this contract and expect industry bids in March of this year.
        Consistent with our new strategy, our fiscal year 2011 budget
    requests two LCS seaframes and an additional $278 million to secure an
    LCS block buy, which is essential to lowering unit costs. I request
    your support as we acquire LCS in the most cost-effective manner and
    deliver its innovative capability in sufficient capacity to our Fleet.
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense
        Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) incorporates all aspects
    of air defense against ballistic, anti-ship, and overland cruise
    missiles. IAMD is vital to the protection of our force, and it is an
    integral part of our core capability to deter aggression through
    conventional means. The demand for sea-based BMD is increasing
    significantly. The Navy's mature and successfully demonstrated maritime
    BMD capability will play a primary role in the first phase of our
    Nation's plan to provide for the missile defense of Europe. Aegis BMD
    counters short, medium, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles
    through active defense and is able to pass target information to other
    BMD systems, thereby expanding the BMD battlespace and support of
    homeland defense. Currently, 20 ships (4 cruisers and 16 destroyers)
    have this capability and are being used to perform maritime BMD. All of
    the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and nine of the Ticonderoga-class
    cruisers are planned to receive BMD capability through our
    modernization program.
    DDG-51 Restart and Future Surface Combatant
        To address the rapid proliferation of ballistic and anti-ship
    missiles and deep-water submarine threats, as well as increase the
    capacity of our multipurpose surface ships, we restarted production of
    our DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (Flight IIA series). These
    ships will be the first constructed with IAMD, providing much-needed
    BMD capacity to the Fleet, and they will incorporate the hull,
    mechanical, and electrical alterations associated with our mature DDG
    modernization program. We will spiral DDG-51 production to incorporate
    future integrated air and missile defense capabilities.
        We are well underway with restarting DDG-51 production. We awarded
    advance procurement (AP) contracts for DDG-113 and -114, and expect to
    award an AP contract for DDG-115 in the coming months, to support the
    long lead items necessary for production of these ships. I thank
    Congress for supporting our fiscal year 2010 budget, which funded
    construction of DDG-113. We anticipate a contract award for DDG-113
    production this spring. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding
    for the construction of DDG-114 and DDG-115 as part of our plan to
    build a total of eight DDG-51 ships through the FYDP.
        The Navy, in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, conducted a Radar/Hull Study for future surface combatants
    that analyzed the total ship system solution necessary to meet our IAMD
    requirements while balancing affordability and capacity in our surface
    Fleet. The study concluded that Navy should integrate the Air and
    Missile Defense Radar program S Band radar (AMDR-S), SPY-3 (X Band
    radar), and Aegis Advanced Capability Build (ACB) combat system into a
    DDG-51 hull. While our Radar/Hull Study indicated that both DDG-51 and
    DDG-1000 were able to support our preferred radar systems, leveraging
    the DDG-51 hull was the most affordable option. Accordingly, our fiscal
    year 2011 budget cancels the next generation cruiser program due to
    projected high cost and risk in technology and design of this ship. I
    request your support as we invest in spiraling the capabilities of our
    DDG-51 class from our Flight IIA Arleigh Burke ships to Flight III
    ships, which will be our future IAMD-capable surface combatant. We will
    procure the first Flight III ship in fiscal year 2016.
    Modernization
        As threats evolve, we must modernize our existing ships with
    updated capabilities that sustain our combat effectiveness and enable
    our ships to reach their expected service life, which in the case of
    our destroyers and cruisers, is more than three decades. Our destroyer
    and cruiser modernization program includes advances in standard
    missiles, integrated air and missile defense, open architecture, and
    essential hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) upgrades. Maintaining
    the stability of the cruiser and destroyer modernization program is
    critical to achieving relevant future Navy capability and capacity.
        Our Navy plans to conduct DDG modernization in two 6-month
    availabilities. The first availability is focused on HM&E
    modifications, while the second availability, conducted 2 years later,
    is focused on combat systems modernization. The program will commence
    in fiscal year 2010 and focuses on the Flight I and II DDG-51 ships
    (hulls 51-78). All ships of the class will be modernized at midlife.
    Key tenets of the DDG modernization program include: an upgrade of the
    Aegis Weapons System to include an Open Architecture (OA) computing
    environment, an upgrade of the SPY radar signal processor, the addition
    of BMD capability, installation of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
    (ESSM), an upgraded SQQ-89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare system,
    integration with the SM-6 Missile, and improved air dominance with
    processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air
    capability.
        The Cruiser Modernization Program will modernize all remaining
    cruisers (Baseline 2, 3, and 4). The first fully modernized cruiser,
    USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), was completed in June 2009. The key aspects of
    the CG modernization program include: an upgrade to the Aegis weapons
    system to include an OA computing environment, installation of an SPQ-
    9B radar, addition of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), an
    upgrade to Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) Block 1B, an upgraded SQQ-
    89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare system, and improved air dominance with
    processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air
    capability. Six Baseline 4 cruisers will receive the BMD upgrade.
        Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding for the modernization
    of three cruisers and three destroyers.
    DDG-1000
        The DDG-1000 Zumwalt guided missile destroyer will be an optimally
    crewed, multi-mission surface combatant designed to fulfill long-range
    precision land attack requirements. In addition to providing offensive,
    distributed and precision fires in support of forces ashore, these
    ships will serve as test-beds for advanced technology, such as
    integrated power systems, dual band radars, and advanced survivability
    features, which can be incorporated into our other ship classes. The
    first DDG-1000 is under construction and approximately 20 percent
    complete. We recently notified Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy breach in
    this program as a result of our decision to reduce the number of DDG-
    1000s in the original program. DDG-1000 will be a three-ship class. It
    is scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 2013 with an initial operating
    capability in fiscal year 2015.
    Joint High Speed Vessel
        Intra-theater lift is key to enabling the United States to rapidly
    project, maneuver, and sustain military forces in distant, overseas
    operations. The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program is an Army and
    Navy joint program that will deliver a high-speed, shallow draft
    surface ship capable of rapid transport of medium payloads of cargo and
    personnel within a theater to austere ports without reliance on port
    infrastructure for load/offload. In addition, the Navy JHSV will be
    capable of supporting extensive Security Force Assistance and Theater
    Security Cooperation operations, including the hosting of small craft
    for training. A JHSV Production Readiness Review was completed in
    October 2009 and the first vessel construction began this past December
    with an anticipated delivery to the Army in fiscal year 2012. The
    second ship, a Navy vessel, is scheduled to be delivered in 2013. Our
    fiscal year 2011 budget includes funds for the construction of Navy's
    third JHSV. Navy continues oversight of JHSV procurement for the five
    Army-funded vessels in this program. The Army assumes full
    responsibility for these five vessels following acquisition.
                               submarine programs
    Virginia-Class SSN
        The Virginia-class submarine is a multi-mission submarine that
    dominates in the littorals and open oceans. Now in its 13th year of
    construction, the Virginia program is demonstrating that this critical
    undersea capability can be delivered affordably and on time. Thanks to
    Congress, these ships will begin construction at a rate of two a year
    in 2011, with two ship deliveries per year beginning in 2017. The Navy
    continues to realize a return from investments in the Virginia cost
    reduction program and construction process improvements through
    enhanced shipbuilder performance on each successive ship. These
    submarines are under budget and ahead of schedule, and their
    performance continues to exceed expectations with every ship delivered.
    Three of the five commissioned ships completed initial deployments
    prior to their Post Shakedown Availabilities, a first for the Navy. I
    am pleased with the accomplishments of the combined Navy-Industry team
    and look forward to even greater success as we ramp up production to
    two submarines next year.
    SSGN
        Our Navy has four guided missile submarines that provide high-
    volume strike and irregular warfare capabilities in support of
    operations and missions across the broad spectrum of conflict. SSGNs
    are performing well on deployment, and we are learning valuable lessons
    from each mission. Combatant commanders value the long-range strike
    capability they provide and we are investigating options to sustain
    this capability in the most operationally and cost effective manner, to
    include options for expanding the long-range strike capacity of the
    submarine fleet.
    SSBN and Ohio Replacement
        Our Navy supports the Nation's nuclear deterrence capability with a
    credible and survivable fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile
    submarines (SSBN). Originally designed for a 30-year service life, this
    class will start retiring in 2027 after more than 42 years of service.
        The United States needs a reliable and survivable sea-based
    strategic deterrent for the foreseeable future. To ensure there is no
    gap in this critical capability, our fiscal year 2011 budget requests
    research and development funds for the Ohio replacement to support the
    start of construction of the first ship in fiscal year 2019. The Ohio
    replacement will be a strategic, national asset with the endurance and
    stealth to enable our Navy to provide continuous, survivable strategic
    deterrence into the 2080s. Appropriate R&D investment is essential to
    design a reliable, survivable, and adaptable submarine capable of
    deterring all potential adversaries. We completed our Analysis of
    Alternatives study in 2009, and Milestone A is planned for April 2010.
    The Ohio Replacement program will leverage the many successes of the
    Virginia SSN program to achieve acquisition and total ownership cost
    goals. The United States will realize significant program benefits as a
    result of our close partnership with the United Kingdom's Vanguard SSBN
    replacement program, particularly in the design and construction of a
    common missile compartment. Our cooperation with the UK mitigates
    technical risk and shares design costs.
                            amphibious warfare ships
        Our amphibious warfare ships provide essential capabilities for the
    full range of military operations, including theater security
    cooperation, humanitarian assistance, conventional deterrence, and
    forcible entry as part of major combat operations. With the unique
    capability to move hundreds of personnel and substantial material
    through complementary surface and air capabilities, these ships are key
    to our ability to overcome geographic, political, and infrastructure
    impediments to access. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and I have
    determined that a minimum of 33 amphibious assault ships represents the
    limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship requirement for
    supporting a forcible entry operation conducted by an assault echelon
    of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB). Our 33-ship force would be
    comprised of 11 LHA/D amphibious assault ships and a mix of 11 LPD-17
    amphibious transport dock ships and 11 LSD dock landing ships. At this
    capacity, we are accepting risk in the speed of arrival of the combat
    support elements of the MEB. The QDR and our 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
    account for 29-31 amphibious warfare ships within the FYDP. We plan to
    procure the 11th LPD-17 in 2012, which will allow us to realize a 33-
    ship minimum amphibious force in about fiscal year 2016. We continue to
    review options to achieve and sustain the minimum 33 amphibious ship
    assault echelon force.
    LPD-17 Class Amphibious Warfare Ship
        The LPD-17 class amphibious warfare ships represent the Navy and
    Marine Corps commitment to an expeditionary fleet capable of power
    projection, security force assistance, and theater security cooperation
    in diverse operating environments. These ships have a 40-year expected
    service life and will replace four classes of older ships: the LKA,
    LST, LSD-36, and the LPD-4. Two LPD-17 class ships have completed their
    initial deployments, and USS New York (LPD-21), forged with steel from
    the World Trade Center, delivered in November 2009. We continue to
    apply the lessons learned during construction and initial operation of
    the early ships to those under construction. Quality is improving with
    each ship delivered as we continue to work closely with the shipbuilder
    to address cost, schedule, and performance concerns.
    LHA Replacement (LHA(R))
        LHA(R) is the replacement for our aging Tarawa class ships, which
    will reach the end of their already extended service life between 2011-
    2015. LHA(R) will provide us flexible, multi-mission amphibious
    capabilities by leveraging the LHD-8 design and increasing aviation
    capacity to better accommodate the JSF, MV-22, and other aircraft that
    comprise the future Marine Corps Air Combat Element. We laid the keel
    of the lead ship, USS America (LHA-6), in April 2009 and our fiscal
    year 2011 budget includes one LHA(R) which is split-funded in fiscal
    year 2011 and fiscal year 2012.
    Mobile Landing Platform and Future Maritime Preposition Force
        The Future Maritime Preposition Force (MPF(F)) program was
    envisioned as a forward-deployed squadron of ships capable of at-sea
    assembly and rapid employment of forces in an area of interest during a
    crisis. Our requirement for amphibious and joint forcible entry
    operations was reevaluated during the QDR and, as a result, we have
    adjusted our approach to augment our three existing Maritime
    Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) instead of developing an MPF(F)
    squadron. MPF(F) was optimized for high-end, forcible entry operations,
    while the augmented MPS will provide enhanced sea basing capabilities
    across a wide range of contingency operations. Each existing MPS will
    be augmented by one Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) cargo
    ship (transferred from the Army), a T-AKE combat logistics ship, and a
    new Mobile Landing Platform (MLP). The MLP will be based on existing
    designs for commercial ocean-going tankers and will meet most of the
    mission requirements envisioned for the original MLP design. The three
    augmented MPS reflect the QDR's emphasis on day-to-day deterrence and
    partner capacity building, while continuing to meet forcible entry
    needs. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request procures one MLP.
                         information dominance programs
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
        We are investing in unmanned aircraft to meet an increasing
    warfighter demand for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
    (ISR), and we are making technology investments to expand UAS
    operations to other mission areas. The Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
    (BAMS) UAS will enhance our situational awareness and shorten the
    sensor-to-shooter kill chain by providing persistent, multiple-sensor
    capabilities to Fleet and Joint Commanders. The VTUAV Fire Scout is on
    its first deployment aboard the USS McInerney (FFG-8). We are
    developing a medium endurance maritime-based UAS and a Small Tactical
    Unmanned Aerial System (STUAS) that will support a variety of ships,
    Naval Special Warfare and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command units, and
    Marine Corps elements.
        The Navy Unmanned Combat Aircraft System demonstration (UCAS-D) is
    designed to prove carrier suitability of an autonomous, unmanned, low
    observable, carrier-based aircraft. This effort includes maturing
    technologies for aircraft carrier catapult launches and arrested
    landings, as well integration into carrier-controlled airspace. Initial
    flight tests to demonstrate carrier suitability are scheduled to start
    later this year and autonomous aerial refueling demonstrations are
    planned for 2013. We will leverage the lessons learned from operating
    the demonstrator in developing a low-observable unmanned carrier-
    launched airborne strike and surveillance system.
    Mobile User Objective System
        Our Maritime Strategy demands a flexible, interoperable, and secure
    global communications capability that can support the command and
    control requirements of highly mobile and distributed U.S. and
    coalition forces. Satellite communications give deployed forces a
    decisive military advantage and often offer the only communication
    means to support on-going operations. Rapidly expanding joint demand
    for more access at ever-higher data rates requires moving beyond our
    current legacy Ultra High Frequency (UHF) satellite capabilities. The
    Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) will satisfy those demands when
    initial operational capability is reached in fiscal year 2012. I
    request your continued support of MUOS and the critical UHF satellite
    communication capability it will provide to the joint warfighter as the
    aging UHF Follow-On constellation degrades.
    Next Generation Enterprise Network
        The Navy is continuing its transition from disparate independent
    computer networks to a single secure network environment. We are
    currently evolving our ashore network from the Navy Marine Corps
    Intranet (NMCI), the largest intranet in the world, to the Next
    Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN). NGEN Increment 1 is the follow-on
    to the existing NMCI contract, which expires at the end of fiscal year
    2010. NGEN will sustain the services currently provided by NMCI, while
    increasing government command and control of our network and enabling
    secure, reliable, and adaptable global information exchange. Future
    NGEN increments will expand on services currently provided by NMCI and
    support seamless transition between afloat and ashore environments. A
    continuity of services contract is expected to be awarded this spring
    and NGEN Initial Operating Capability is scheduled for the summer of
    2012.
    E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
        The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft, which replaces the E-2C, will
    improve nearly every facet of tactical air operations and add overland
    and littoral surveillance to support theater Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense against air threats in high clutter, complex electro-magnetic
    and jamming environments. The airborne radar on the E-2D, with its
    improved surveillance capability, is a key pillar of the Navy
    Integrated Fire Control concept. The E-2D is scheduled to begin
    operational test and evaluation in 2012. The first Fleet squadron
    transition is planned for 2013, with deployment planned for October
    2014. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests four E-2D Hawkeye aircraft.
                          remain ready to fight today
        Our Navy continues to operate at a high tempo. We are filling new
    combatant commander requirements for BMD, electronic attack,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), combat support,
    combat service support, and maritime security force assistance, in
    addition to conducting ongoing deployments in support of our maritime
    and national strategies.
        In CENTCOM alone, we have more than 9,000 sailors at sea, including
    a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier and air wing dedicated to providing 24/7
    air support to U.S. and coalition forces on the ground. Navy Riverine
    forces are on their sixth deployment to Iraq, conducting interdiction
    patrols and training their Iraqi counterparts. Our surface ships in the
    region are providing BMD and conducting counterterrorism,
    counterpiracy, maritime security, theater security cooperation, and
    security force assistance operations. On the ground in CENTCOM, we have
    more than 12,000 Active and Reserve sailors supporting Navy, joint
    force, and coalition operations. Navy Commanders lead 6 of the 12 U.S.-
    led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. We have doubled our
    construction battalions (SEABEEs) in Afghanistan, increasing our
    capacity to build forward bases for U.S. forces and improve critical
    infrastructure in that country. Our Naval Special Warfare Teams
    continue to be engaged heavily in direct combat operations and our
    Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams continue to conduct lifesaving
    counter-Improvised Explosive Device operations on a daily basis. As we
    shift our effort from Iraq to Afghanistan, demand for Navy individual
    augmentees (IAs) has grown. We are providing IAs to support the
    increase of U.S. forces in Afghanistan while our IAs in Iraq remain at
    current levels to support the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops,
    maintain detention facilities and critical infrastructure, and assist
    coalition efforts until they can be turned over to Iraqi forces. During
    my recent trip to CENTCOM, I met with many of our dedicated Navy men
    and women supporting these efforts and I could not be more proud of
    their contributions. Their expert skill, ingenuity, competence, and
    drive are impressive and unmatched.
        Our high tempo will likely continue as combat forces draw down in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. Navy enabling forces will remain in CENTCOM to
    provide protection, ISR, and logistics support to our troops and
    partner forces in the region, while we will continue to maintain a
    forward-deployed presence of about 100 ships around the world to
    prevent conflict, increase interoperability with our allies, enhance
    the maritime security and capacity of our traditional and emerging
    partners, and respond to crises. Global demand for Navy forces remains
    high and continues to rise because of the unequalled and unique ability
    of our naval forces to overcome diplomatic, geographic, and military
    impediments to access while bringing the persistence, flexibility, and
    agility to conduct operations from the sea.
        Reset in stride is how our Navy prepares our Fleet to deploy again.
    Lifecycle maintenance and training between deployments is essential to
    our reset and to the ability of our ships and aircraft to reach their
    expected service lives. Although we are on pace to grow our fleet for
    the next 10 years, our fleet reduced in size over the past decade. As a
    result, while we continue to maintain the same number of ships at sea
    assigned to combatant commanders, we have a historically low number of
    ships available for at-sea training, exercises, and surge operations.
    Our fiscal year 2011 budget request balances the need to meet
    increasing operational requirements, sustain our sailors' proficiency,
    and conduct the maintenance required to ensure our ships and aircraft
    reach their full service lives. Highlights follow of initiatives that
    ensure our Navy remains ready to fight today.
    Depot Level Maintenance
        Our ships and aircraft are capital assets that operate in
    challenging physical and security environments. Keeping these assets in
    acceptable operating condition is vital to their ability to accomplish
    assigned missions and to reach their expected service lives. Timely
    depot level maintenance, performed in a cycle determined by an
    engineered assessment of expected material durability and scoped by
    actual physical condition, will preserve our existing force structure
    and ensure it can meet assigned tasking. Continued investment in depot
    level maintenance is essential to our efforts to achieve and sustain
    the force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy.
        Last year, I established the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management
    (SSLCM) Activity to address deficiencies in our ship class maintenance
    plans that could prevent our ships from reaching their full service
    life. SSLCM has established an engineered approach to surface ship
    maintenance that optimizes existing maintenance availability work
    packages and better tracks ship material condition through robust
    inspections and corrosion control tasks. We accelerated our review of
    the requirements for certain ship classes, significantly improving the
    accuracy of our surface ship maintenance requirements in fiscal year
    2011 over prior years. We are committed to a full review of all surface
    ship class maintenance plans, which will take several years. The value
    of investing in an engineered approach to maintenance is evident in our
    submarine force, where we have successfully extended the time between
    scheduled availabilities based on demonstrated material conditions and
    verification of engineering analysis. Because we have invested in this
    engineering and planning effort, we have been able to safely recover
    additional operational availability and reduce the overall depot level
    maintenance requirement for our submarines. This significant step has
    provided some of the resources needed to make additional investments in
    surface ship maintenance.
        Our combined fiscal year 2011 budget funds 99 percent of the
    projected depot ship maintenance requirements necessary to sustain our
    Navy's global presence. Our budget funds aviation depot maintenance to
    provide 100 percent of the airframes for deployed squadrons and 96
    percent of the nondeployed airframes. I request that you fully support
    our baseline and contingency funding requests for O&M to ensure the
    effectiveness of our force, safety of our sailors, and longevity of our
    ships and aircraft.
    Shore Readiness
        Our shore infrastructure is a fundamental enabler of our
    operational and combat readiness and is essential to the quality of
    life and quality of work for our sailors, Navy civilians, and their
    families. As I described last year, rising manpower costs and growing
    operational demands on our aging fleet have led our Navy to take risk
    in shore readiness. This risk increases our maintenance, sustainment,
    restoration, and modernization requirements and continues our reliance
    on old and less efficient energy systems. These factors increase the
    cost of ownership of our shore infrastructure and outpace our efforts
    to reduce costs through facilities improvements and energy upgrades. At
    our current investment levels, our future shore readiness, particularly
    the recapitalization of our facilities infrastructure, is at risk.
        To manage our risk in shore infrastructure, our fiscal year 2011
    budget request prioritizes funding for our most critical needs,
    including Navy and Joint mission readiness, nuclear weapons security
    and safety, and improving our bachelor quarters through sustained
    funding for our Homeport Ashore initiative. To guide investment in
    other areas ashore, we continue to pursue our capabilities-based Shore
    Investment Strategy, which targets our investment in shore
    infrastructure to where it will produce the highest return on
    investment and have the greatest impact on achieving our strategic and
    operational objectives, such as in areas that enable critical
    warfighting capabilities, improve quality of life, and fulfill Joint
    requirements.
        We have made essential progress and improvements in nuclear weapons
    security, child care facilities, and bachelor's quarters. Thank you for
    funding all our requested military construction projects in 2010, as
    well as 19 additional projects and our Reserve program. Your support
    allowed us to address ship, aircraft, systems, infrastructure, and
    training requirements, while enhancing the quality of life and quality
    of service for our sailors and their families. Your similar support and
    assistance through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
    was also very helpful. As you requested, we identified Military
    Construction projects for Child Development Centers and barracks and
    prioritized them according to operational need and the ability to
    obligate funds quickly. We selected infrastructure and energy projects
    based on mission requirements, quality of life impact, environmental
    planning status, and our ability to execute quickly. Our aggressive
    execution schedule is on track; we have awarded all but 1 of our 85
    initial projects and construction outlays are ramping up swiftly.
    Training Readiness
        Our Fleet Synthetic Training (FST) program provides realistic
    operational training with seamless integration of geographically
    dispersed Navy, Joint, Interagency and Coalition forces. Using virtual
    and constructive training environments has allowed us to reduce our
    energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions while providing the
    level of sophistication necessary to prepare our sailors for
    operational and tactical mission proficiency. We continue to evolve FST
    to provide our sailors with exposure to a multitude of warfare areas.
    Last year, we conducted our first BMD Fleet Synthetic Training event,
    proving the viability and effectiveness of integrated Navy, Joint, and
    partner-nation BMD training.
        The proliferation of advanced, stealthy, nuclear, and non-nuclear
    submarines continues to challenge our Navy's ability to guarantee the
    access and safety of joint forces. Effective Anti-Submarine Warfare
    (ASW) training with active sonar systems is vital to meeting potential
    threats. The Navy remains a world leader in marine mammal research and
    we will continue our robust investment in this research in fiscal year
    2011 and beyond. Through such efforts, and in full consultation and
    cooperation with other Federal agencies, Navy has developed effective
    measures that protect marine mammals and the ocean environment from
    adverse impacts of mid-frequency active sonar while not impeding vital
    Navy training. We continue to work closely with our interagency
    partners to further refine our protective measures as scientific
    knowledge evolves. It is vitally important that any such measures
    ensure the continued flexibility necessary to respond to future,
    potentially unforeseen national security requirements.
        Over the last year, we completed environmental planning for seven
    existing and proposed at-sea training and combat certification areas.
    We expect to complete planning for another six areas by the end of 2010
    as we continue to balance our responsibility to prepare naval forces
    for deployment and combat operations with our responsibility to be good
    stewards of the marine environment.
        Conducting night and day field carrier landing practice (FCLP)
    prior to at-sea carrier qualifications is a critical training
    requirement for our fixed-wing carrier-based pilots, who must develop
    and maintain proficiency in the fundamentals necessary to conduct safe
    carrier-based flight operations. We continue to seek additional
    airfield capacity in the form of an outlying landing field (OLF) that
    will enhance our ability to support FCLP training for fixed-wing,
    carrier pilots operating from Naval Air Station Oceana and Naval
    Station Norfolk. The additional OLF will allow Navy to meet training
    requirements and overcome challenges related to capacity limits, urban
    encroachment, and impacts from adverse weather conditions at existing
    East Coast facilities. In August 2009, the Navy announced that the
    release of the draft environmental impact statement (EIS) for
    construction and operation of an OLF would be delayed. This delay was
    necessary to ensure JSF noise analysis is included in the OLF draft
    EIS. The Navy is committed to developing, with local, State, and
    Federal leaders, a plan to ensure the OLF provides positive benefits to
    local communities while addressing Navy training shortfalls.
    Energy and Climate
        Energy reform is a strategic imperative. The Secretary of the Navy
    and I are committed to changing the way we do business to realize an
    energy-secure future. In alignment with the Secretary of the Navy's
    five goals, our priorities are to advance energy security by improving
    combat capability, assuring mobility, ``lightening the load'', and
    greening our footprint. We will achieve these goals through energy
    efficiency improvements, consumption reduction initiatives, and
    adoption of alternative energy and fuels. Reducing our reliance on
    fossil fuels will improve our combat capability by increasing time on
    station, reducing time spent alongside replenishment ships, and
    producing more effective and powerful future weapons. Most of our
    projects remain in the demonstration phase; however, we are making good
    progress in the form of hybrid-electric drive, delivered last year on
    the USS Makin Island (LHD-8), bio-fuel engines, advanced hull and
    propeller coatings, solid state lighting, and policies that encourage
    sailors to reduce their consumption through simple changes in behavior.
        Thanks to your support, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act
    funded Navy energy conservation and renewable energy investment in 11
    tactical and 42 shore-based projects totaling $455 million. Tactical
    projects included alternative fuel, drive, and power systems, while
    ashore projects included alternative energy (wind, solar and
    geothermal) investments in 10 States and the installation of advance
    metering infrastructure in three regions. Our fiscal year 2011 budget
    continues to invest in tactical and ashore energy initiatives,
    requesting $128 million for these efforts.
        In our Maritime Strategy we addressed maritime operations in an era
    of climate change, especially in the ice diminished Arctic. In May
    2009, I established the Navy's Task Force on Climate Change to develop
    policy, investment, and force-structure recommendations regarding
    climate change in the Arctic and globally over the long-term. Our focus
    will be to ensure Navy readiness and capability in a changing global
    environment.
    Second East Coast Carrier-Capable Port
        Hampton Roads is the only nuclear carrier capable port on the East
    Coast. A catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area affecting port
    facilities, shipping channels, supporting maintenance or training
    infrastructure, or the surrounding community has the potential to
    severely limit East Coast Carrier operations, even if the ships
    themselves are not affected. Consistent with today's dispersal of West
    Coast aircraft carriers between California and Washington State, the
    QDR direction to make Naval Station Mayport a nuclear carrier-capable
    homeport addresses the Navy's requirement for a capable facility to
    maintain aircraft carriers in the event that a natural or manmade
    disaster makes the Hampton Roads area inaccessible. While there is an
    upfront cost to upgrade Naval Station Mayport to support our nuclear
    aircraft carriers, Mayport has been a carrier homeport since 1952 and
    is the most cost-effective means to achieve strategic dispersal on the
    east coast. The national security benefits of this additional homeport
    far outweigh those costs.
    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
        The Law of the Sea Convention codifies navigation and overflight
    rights and high seas freedoms that are essential for the global
    mobility of our Armed Forces. It directly supports our national
    security interests. Not being a party to this Convention constrains
    efforts to develop enduring maritime partnerships, inhibits efforts to
    expand the Proliferation Security Initiative, and elevates the level of
    risk for our sailors as they undertake operations to preserve
    navigation rights and freedoms, particularly in areas such as the
    Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Gulf, and the East and South China Seas.
    By becoming a party to the Convention, the United States will be able
    to expand its sovereign rights to the increasingly accessible outer
    continental shelf areas of the resource rich environment of the Arctic,
    as well as in other locations where technological advances are opening
    up previously unobtainable resources. Accession to the Law of the Sea
    Convention remains a priority for our Navy.
       develop and support our sailors, navy civilians and their families
        Our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families underpin our
    Maritime Strategy and are the foundation of our Nation's global force
    for good. We have great ships, aircraft, weapons, and systems, but it
    is our skilled and innovative sailors who turn these ships, aircraft,
    and technologies into capabilities that can prevent conflict and win
    wars. In January 2010, we released the Navy Total Force Vision for the
    21st century to guide our efforts to attract, recruit, develop, assign,
    and retain a highly-skilled workforce and reaffirm our commitment to
    supporting our uniformed and civilian people wherever they serve and
    live.
        We have transitioned from reducing end strength to stabilizing our
    force through a series of performance-based measures. Our stabilization
    efforts remain focused on maintaining a balanced force in terms of
    seniority, experience, and skills while supporting growth in high-
    demand areas such as cyber and special operations. We recognize the
    importance of retaining the talent and experience of our sailors after
    they complete their active duty obligation so we are actively removing
    barriers associated with the transition between Active and Reserve
    careers to allow for a continuum of service over a lifetime. Our fiscal
    year 2011 budget requests authorization and funding for 328,700 Active
    end strength and 65,500 Reserve end strength. We continue to request
    OCO funding for our individual augmentees that are performing non-core
    Navy missions in support of contingency operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. OCO funding remains critical to our ability to meet these
    missions without adversely impacting fleet readiness or sailor dwell
    time.
        We continue to provide support to our sailors and their families,
    including those who are wounded, ill, and injured, through expanded
    Fleet and Family Support services, Navy Safe Harbor, and our
    Operational Stress Control (OSC) program. We are addressing
    aggressively the recent rise in suicide rates by implementing new
    training and outreach programs for fleet commanders, sailors, and Navy
    families to increase suicide awareness and prevention. We are focused
    on reducing sexual assaults in our Navy through our new Sexual Assault
    Prevention and Response (SAPR) Office and initiatives that emphasize
    our intolerance for sexual assault and related behavior in our Navy. We
    remain committed to helping our sailors balance work and family
    commitments through initiatives such as 12-month operational deferments
    for new mothers (the most comprehensive policy of all military
    services), 21 days of administrative leave for adoptive parents, 10
    days of paternity leave, a Career Intermission pilot program, and
    flexible work options. I continue to emphasize diversity outreach and
    mentorship to ensure we attract, leverage, and retain the diverse
    talent of our Nation. Diversity among U.S. Naval Academy and Navy
    Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) applicants and graduates
    continues to grow each year. Through our Naval War College and Naval
    Postgraduate School, we are providing Joint Professional Military
    Education (JPME) and world-class higher education and training to our
    sailors. We continue to build our Foreign Area Officer program to
    strengthen existing and emerging international partnerships.
        Our fiscal year 2011 budget request represents a balanced approach
    to supporting our sailors and their families, sustaining the high tempo
    of current operations, and preserving fleet and family readiness. I
    request the continued support of Congress for our fiscal year 2011
    manpower and personnel initiatives.
    Recruiting and Retention
        Our Navy has attracted, recruited and retained a highly-skilled
    workforce over the past several years, and we expect this success to
    continue into fiscal year 2011. Fiscal year 2009 marked the second
    consecutive year Navy achieved its aggregate officer and enlisted
    recruiting goals in both the Active and Reserve components. At the
    forefront of this effort is our highly trained and professional
    recruiting force, which has postured us to respond to changing trends.
    We continue to attract the highest quality enlisted recruits in our
    history. We are exceeding DOD and Navy standards for the percentage of
    non-prior service enlisted recruits who have earned a high school
    diploma and whose test scores are in the upper mental group category.
    We met the Navy standard of 95 percent of recruits with a high school
    diploma in fiscal year 2009 and are currently at 96 percent this fiscal
    year. We exceeded the Navy standard of 70 percent of recruits in the
    upper mental group category in fiscal year 2009 (77 percent tested into
    this group) and we are currently at 78 percent this fiscal year.
        Navy will remain competitive in the employment market through the
    disciplined use of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Using a
    targeted approach, we will continue our recruiting and retention
    initiatives to attract and retain our best sailors, especially those
    within high-demand, critical skill areas that remain insulated from
    economic conditions. Judicious use of special and incentive pays
    remains essential to recruiting and retaining these professionals in
    the current economic environment, and will increase in importance as
    the economic recovery continues. Our goal remains to maintain a
    balanced force, in which seniority, experience, and skills are matched
    to requirements.
    Diversity
        Our Navy draws its strength and innovation from the diversity of
    our Nation. We continue to aggressively expand our diversity. We are
    committed to implementing policies and programs that foster a Navy
    Total Force composition that reflects America's diversity. We have
    increased diverse accessions through targeted recruiting in diverse
    markets, developed relationships with key influencers in the top
    diverse metropolitan markets, and are aligning all Navy assets and
    related organizations to maximize our connection with educators,
    business leaders and government officials to increase our influencer
    base. Recruiting and retaining a diverse workforce, reflective of the
    Nation's demographics at all levels of the chain of command, is a
    strategic imperative, critical to mission accomplishment, and remains
    focus area for leaders throughout our Navy.
        We continue to expand our relationships with key influencers and
    science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)-based affinity
    groups to inform our Nation's youth about the unique opportunities
    available in our Navy. To increase our accessibility to diverse
    markets, we established NROTC units at Arizona State University and
    Tuskegee University. Tuskegee University accepted students in the fall
    of 2009, and ASU will accept students in the fall of 2010. Our
    diversity outreach efforts have contributed to our 2013 U.S. Naval
    Academy and NROTC classes being the most diverse student bodies in our
    history. In the years ahead, we will continue to focus our efforts on
    retaining this talent by building and sustaining a continuum of
    mentorship approach that reaches out and engages sailors throughout
    their career. This approaches includes social networking, strong
    relationships with affinity groups, and various programs offered by our
    sailors' immediate commands and associated leadership in addition to
    their respective enterprises and communities.
    Women on Submarines
        The Secretary of the Navy and I are in the process of changing the
    Navy policy that restricts women from serving aboard our submarines.
    This move will enable our Navy and, specifically, our submarine force
    to leverage the tremendous talent and potential of our female officers
    and enlisted personnel. Initial integration will include female
    officers assigned to ballistic missile (SSBN) and guided missile (SSGN)
    submarines, since officer accommodations on these submarines have more
    available space and appear to require less modification. The plan also
    integrates female supply corps officers onto SSBNs and SSGNs at the
    department head level. We are planning the first female submarine
    officer candidate accessions into the standard nuclear training and
    submarine training pipelines this year, making it possible to assign
    the first women to submarines as early as fiscal year 2012. Integration
    of enlisted females on SSBNs and SSGNs and integration of officer and
    enlisted female personnel on attack submarines (SSNs) will occur later,
    once the extent of necessary modifications is determined. This
    initiative has my personal attention and I will continue to keep you
    informed as we integrate these highly motivated and capable officers
    into our submarine force.
    Sailor and Family Continuum of Care
        We remain committed to providing our sailors and their families a
    comprehensive continuum of care that addresses all aspects of medical,
    physical, psychological, and family readiness. Our fiscal year 2011
    budget request expands this network of services and caregivers to
    ensure that all sailors and their families receive the highest quality
    healthcare available. Navy Safe Harbor, Navy's OSC Program, Reserve
    Psychological Health Outreach Program, Warrior Transition Program
    (WTP), and Returning Warrior Workshop (RWW) are critical elements of
    this continuum.
        Navy Safe Harbor continues to provide non-medical support for all
    seriously wounded, ill, and injured sailors, coastguardsmen, and their
    families through a network of Recovery Care Coordinators and nonmedical
    Care Managers at 16 locations across the country. Over the past year,
    Safe Harbor's enrollment has grown from 387 to 542. Over 84,000 sailors
    have participated in OSC training, which is providing a comprehensive
    approach designed to actively promote the psychological health of
    sailors and their families throughout their careers while reducing the
    traditional stigma associated with seeking help. The WTP and RWWs are
    essential to post-deployment reintegration efforts. WTP, established in
    Kuwait and expanded via Mobile Care Teams to Iraq and Afghanistan,
    provides a place and time for individual augmentees to decompress and
    transition from life in a war zone to resumption of life at home. The
    RWW identifies problems, encourages sailors to share their experiences,
    refers family members to essential resources, and facilitates the
    demobilization process.
    Stress on the Force
        As we continue to operate at a high operational tempo to meet our
    Nation's demands in the Middle East and around the world, the tone of
    the force remains positive. We continue to monitor the health of the
    force by tracking statistics on personal and family-related indicators
    such as stress, financial well-being, and command climate, as well as
    sailor and family satisfaction with the Navy. Recent results indicate
    that sailors and their families remain satisfied with command morale,
    the quality of leadership, education benefits, health care, and
    compensation.
        Suicide affects individuals, commands and families. We continue
    efforts at suicide prevention through a multi-faceted approach of
    communication, training, and command support designed to foster
    resilience and promote psychological health among sailors. Navy's
    calendar year 2009 suicide rate of 13.8 per 100,000 sailors represents
    an increase from the previous year rate of 11.6 per 100,000 sailors.
    Although this is below the national rate of 19.0 per 100,000
    individuals for the same age and gender demographic, any loss of life
    as a result of suicide is unacceptable. We remain committed to creating
    an environment in which stress and other suicide-related factors are
    more openly recognized, discussed, and addressed. We continue to
    develop and enhance programs designed to mitigate suicide risk factors
    and improve the resilience of the force. These programs focus on
    substance abuse prevention, financial management, positive family
    relationships, physical readiness, and family support, with the goal of
    reducing individual stress. We continue to work towards a greater
    understanding of the issues surrounding suicide to ensure that our
    policies, training, interventions, and communication efforts are
    meeting their intended objectives.
        Sexual assault is incompatible with our Navy core values, high
    standards of professionalism, and personal discipline. We have
    reorganized our efforts in this critical area under the Navy SAPR
    program, which takes a multi-faceted approach to raise awareness of
    effective prevention methods, victim response and offender
    accountability. Recent program reviews undertaken by the Government
    Accountability Office, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the
    Military Services, and the Navy Inspector General will help us to
    identify program gaps and refine our program so we can continue to
    promote a culture that is intolerant of sexual assault.
    Learning and Development
        Education and training are strategic investments that give us an
    asymmetric advantage over our adversaries. To develop the highly-
    skilled, combat-ready force necessary to meet the demands of the
    Maritime Strategy and the Joint Force, we have 15 learning centers
    around the country providing top-notch training to our sailors and Navy
    civilians. We continue to leverage civilian credentialing programs to
    bolster the professional qualifications of sailors in all ratings and
    increase sailor equity in their own professional advancement. We are
    balancing existing education and training requirements with growth in
    important mission areas such as cyber warfare, missile defense, and
    anti-submarine warfare. Cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise
    remain essential to the Navy's global mission, and our budget request
    supports expansion of the Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture
    program for NROTC midshipmen, as well as implementation of the AF-PAK
    Hands Program. We recognize the importance of providing our people
    meaningful and relevant education, particularly JPME, which develops
    leaders who are strategically-minded, capable of critical thinking, and
    adept in naval and joint warfare. Our resident courses at Naval War
    College, nonresident courses at Naval Postgraduate School and Fleet
    Seminar program, and distance offerings provide ample opportunity for
    achievement of this vital education. I appreciate the support of
    Congress in the recent post-September 11 GI Bill. We have led DOD in
    implementing this vital education benefit and continue to carefully
    balance our voluntary education investments to further develop our
    force.
                                   conclusion
        Our sailors are performing brilliantly, providing incredible
    service in the maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace domains
    around the world today. I am optimistic about our future and the global
    leadership opportunities that our Navy provides for our Nation. Our
    fiscal year 2011 budget request continues the progress we started in
    fiscal year 2010 to increase fleet capacity, maintain our warfighting
    readiness, and develop and enhance the Navy Total Force. I ask for your
    strong support of our fiscal year 2011 budget request and my identified
    priorities. Thank you for your unwavering commitment to our sailors,
    Navy civilians, and their families, and for all you do to make our U.S.
    Navy an effective and enduring global force for good.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral Roughead.
        General Conway.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
                              MARINE CORPS

        General Conway. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to report to you on the posture of your Marine
    Corps. My pledge, as it has been over the years, is to provide
    you with a candid and honest assessment.
        Having recently returned from a trip to theater, I'm
    pleased to report to you on the magnificent performance of your
    marines and sailors in combat. If you count a 4-year enlistment
    as a generation of marines, we are now experiencing our third
    generation of great young patriots since our Nation was
    provoked on September 11. The first generation broke trail,
    leading strikes into Afghanistan and Iraq. The second
    generation quelled a once-violent province of Anbar. Today
    there are less than 150 marines in Iraq. But our third
    generation has more than 15,000 serving in Afghanistan.
        Your marines are fighting a skilled and determined enemy,
    but, with the Afghan Security Forces, they are once again
    proving they are the strongest tribe in the Taliban stronghold
    of Helmand. Let me assure you from what the Sergeant Major and
    I witnessed first-hand, the highest morale in the Corps resides
    in those units that are posted to Afghanistan.
        My written statement to the committee provides a snapshot
    of the Corps and describes our near-term focus, long-term
    priorities, and our vision of the future. That vision matches
    closely the results of the QDR. The Secretary of Defense seeks
    to create a U.S. military more closely focused on hybrid
    threats, yet capable of responding to a major-level
    contingency. That combination essentially describes the Marine
    Corps that we have built today, a Corps that we call a two-
    fisted fighter, able to perform equally well in a
    counterinsurgency or in a high-intensity combined arms fight.
        Our resource expenditures, moreover, reflect our dual, or
    swing, capacity. That is to say that 100 percent of Marine
    Corps equipment can be used in a hybrid conflict or in a major
    fight. Equipment procurement is indeed our primary concern as
    we look at the fiscal year 2011 budget and beyond. Our
    requirements for equipment density in Afghanistan and our
    resolve to reestablish our maritime prepositioned squadrons
    have driven equipment stocks to an all-time low in our
    operating forces at home station. The ability to perform and
    train for deployment and certainly the ability to respond to an
    unexpected contingency is at significant risk based on this
    increasing shortfall.
        Congress has promised us resources for reset and
    reconstitution, but increasingly we cannot wait for the guns to
    fall silent in Afghanistan for such an effort to begin. We ask
    for your help in this critical area.
        Our military construction (MILCON) accounts in the fiscal
    year 2011 budget and the FYDP are sufficient to help maintain
    the promise we made to our marines that they'll have quality
    living spaces while they're home between deployments. One need
    only visit some of our major bases and stations to realize that
    we waited too long to begin the effort.
        Similarly, we believe that even in wartime we must continue
    a heavy emphasis on education of our officers and senior staff
    NCOs. A strong reservoir of strategic and operational thinkers
    is a must on a sophisticated joint and combined battlefield.
    Therefore, a quality Marine Corps University with facilities to
    match our already world class student body, faculty, and
    curriculum is a major priority. We trust we will receive your
    fully support on our MILCON investments that will pay huge
    investments in the years to come.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I must admit my own
    surprise that our Marine Corps and their families have remained
    so resilient over these 9 years of conflict. They have been
    incredibly determined, loyal, and courageous in an effort to
    see these two wars to a successful close. Much of the credit
    goes to you in Congress for providing them with the finest in
    terms of equipment, warrior care, quality of life for families,
    and compensation.
        The number one question in the minds of our troops is
    always: Is the country behind us? The Members of Congress have
    answered that question in spades, both by your apportionment of
    the Nation's precious resources and also through personal
    efforts to visit both the troops in theater and our wounded at
    Bethesda and Walter Reed.
        As a result of the above and the natural tendency of
    marines to stick around for a fight, our recruitment and
    retention are at all-time highs. I predict that for the second
    year in a row we will close out reenlistment opportunities for
    first-term and career force halfway through the fiscal year.
    Clearly, such a phenomenon would not be possible if marines and
    their families were not happy in the service of their country.
        One day this long war with terrorists and Islamic
    extremists will be over. Your Marine Corps will cease being a
    second land army and will gladly rejoin our Navy brothers
    aboard amphibious ships in order to project American global
    presence, demonstrate American good will, and if need be
    protect America's vital interests. Until that day comes,
    however, your Corps will continue, as we say, to do windows.
    That is, we'll continue to take aboard the indomitable youth of
    America and make them marines, with the absolute conviction
    that as a result they will one day be better citizens. We will
    be trained and as equally prepared to route Taliban fighters in
    Marjah as we are to feed beleaguered Haitians outside Port au
    Prince.
        With your continued support and that of our loyal
    countrymen, we will do whatever the Nation asks us to do and do
    it exceedingly well.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Conway follows:]
                Prepared Statement by Gen. James T. Conway, USMC
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you
    for the opportunity to provide a written report for the record on the
    current posture of the Marine Corps. My pledge, as always, is to
    provide you with a candid and honest assessment. On behalf of all
    marines, their families, and our civilian employees, I want to thank
    you for your concern and continued support.
        This brief statement contains a summary of our near-term focus and
    enduring priorities, an update on your Marine Corps today, a discussion
    of the challenges we see ahead, and our vision of the future. In
    addition to any testimony you wish to receive from me, I have directed
    the Deputy Commandants of the Marine Corps to meet with you as
    individuals and members of your respective subcommittees, and to
    provide you any other information you require. Our liaison officers
    will also deliver copies of 2010 U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and
    Programs to the offices of each member of the committee. This almanac
    and reference book contains detailed descriptions of all our major
    programs and initiatives. We hope you will find it useful.
                              i. your marine corps
        We believe that Americans expect their marines to be ready to
    respond when our country is threatened; to arrive on the scene on short
    notice anywhere in the world via the amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy,
    as was necessary when a disastrous earthquake recently struck Haiti;
    and to fight and win our Nation's battles. The public invests greatly
    in the Marine Corps. In turn, our commitment is to uphold their special
    trust and confidence and provide them the best return on their
    investment.
    Characteristics
        Your Marine Corps is a young force that provides great value to the
    Nation.

             The average age of a marine is 25 years old.
             Almost half of the enlisted force--84,830 marines--is
            between the ranks of private and lance corporal (pay grades E1-
            E3).\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ As of 23 December 2009.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Almost 70 percent of your marines are on their first
            enlistment, and some 30,000 have been in uniform for less than
            a year.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ As of 1 December 2009, the percentage of marines on their first
    enlistment was 68.6 percent, and the number of marines with less than 1
    year on active duty is 29,032.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             The ratio of officers to enlisted marines is 1:9--the
            lowest of all the Services.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Authorized end strength of 202,000 = 21,000 officers + 181,000
    enlisted marines = 1:9.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             More than 136,000 marines (67 percent) are in
            deploying units--what we call the Operating Forces. Nearly
            30,000 marines are forward deployed, forward based, or on
            training exercises around the world.
             For 6.5 percent \4\ of the baseline 2010 Defense
            budget, the Marine Corps provides:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ 6.5 percent of DOD budget represents fiscal year 2010 USMC
    Green dollars and Direct Blue (Navy) dollars.

                     17 percent of the Nation's active ground
                    combat maneuver units
                     12 percent of the Nation's fixed wing tactical
                    aircraft
                     19 percent of the Nation's attack helicopters

    Expeditionary
        The Marine Corps is the Nation's naval expeditionary, combined-arms
    force-in-readiness. To marines, expeditionary connotes fast, austere,
    and lethal.

             Expeditionary means rapid deployment by air or sea to
            respond to crises of temporary duration. For example, within 24
            hours of the speech by the President of the United States in
            December announcing the current strategy in Afghanistan, the
            lead elements of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines from Camp Lejeune,
            NC, were en route to Afghanistan.
             Expeditionary means being efficient and effective
            while operating in an austere environment--a task-organized
            force that is manned and equipped no larger or heavier than
            necessary to accomplish the mission.
             Expeditionary means being prepared for decisive
            action--to be lethal, if necessary--but also possessing the
            lesser-included capabilities for security cooperation,
            humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief.
             In summary, the term expeditionary to marines goes to
            the very heart of our service culture, core values, and warrior
            ethos. Service as part of an expeditionary force means
            embracing a Spartan way of life and regular deployments on
            foreign soil in furtherance of our Nation's interests.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ This is consistent with the official Defense Department
    definition of an expeditionary force: ``An armed force organized to
    accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.'' Joint Pub 1-02
    Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
    (Washington, DC: 2001, as amended through 31 August 2005), p. 193.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Organization
        The Marine Corps is the only general-purpose force in the
    Department of Defense (DOD) that is trained and equipped as the
    Nation's first responders.

             We organize in Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs).
            Under a single command element, the MAGTF integrates three
            major subordinate elements: (1) Ground Combat Element, (2)
            Aviation Combat Element, (3) Logistics Combat Element. Each
            element of the MAGTF is complementary, and Marine Corps forces
            are most effective and best employed as MAGTFs within the joint
            or multinational command structure.
             MAGTFs are adaptive, general-purpose rapid response
            forces. They are multi-capable, transitioning seamlessly from
            fighting conventional and hybrid threats to promoting stability
            and mitigating conditions that lead to conflict. For example,
            in 2003, after completing a conventional, 350-mile attack over
            land from Kuwait to Baghdad, I Marine Expeditionary Force--a
            60,000-marine-plus MAGTF--was able to transition quickly to
            security and stability operations.

    Near-Term Focus
        We understand the economic challenges facing our country and the
    hard decisions Congress must make. We thank you for your unwavering
    support. This report discusses the near-term focus of the Marine Corps:

             The current fight in Afghanistan and the responsible
            drawdown in Iraq
             Readiness and reset of equipment
             Modernization of the MAGTF
             Preparing for the next contingency and the
            uncertainties of the future
    Enduring Priorities
        Through the Future Years Defense Program and beyond, we are focused
    on:

             Providing the Nation a naval expeditionary force fully
            prepared for employment as a MAGTF across the spectrum of
            operations
             Remaining the most ready when our Nation is least
            ready
             Providing for our marines and their families
                            ii. iraq and afghanistan
    Operation Iraqi Freedom
        Since testimony before your committee last year, the Marine Corps
    has transferred authority for Anbar Province to the U.S. Army and is
    near completion of a responsible drawdown from Iraq.

             From 2003-2009, our force levels in Iraq averaged
            25,000 marines.
             As of February 19, 2010, there were 159 marines in
            Iraq. By spring of this year, our mission in Iraq will be
            complete and your marines will redeploy.
    Operation Enduring Freedom
        In Afghanistan, the mission has expanded.

             As of September 23, 2009, there were more marines in
            Afghanistan than in Iraq.
             By March 2010, there will be more than 18,500 marines
            in Afghanistan, and by mid-April, that number will grow to a
            robust MAGTF of 19,400 personnel with equipment, and will be
            commanded by a Marine two-star general.
             Your marines have already had success and have made a
            difference in some of the toughest regions of Afghanistan,
            primarily Helmand Province in the south--formerly a Taliban
            stronghold, and the source of the highest volume of opium
            production in the world. However, more work remains to be done.
    Summary
             Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the
            Marine Corps to fight as a second land army. Although we have
            been successful in our assigned missions in Iraq and
            Afghanistan, that success has come at the price of degraded
            readiness for our designed missions. The Marine Corps will
            always do whatever the Nation requires. But, as Congress has
            authorized and resourced, the Marine Corps is trained,
            organized, and equipped for our primary mission as a force in
            readiness.
             The harsh environments and tempo of operations in Iraq
            and Afghanistan through 8 years of combat have accelerated wear
            and tear on our equipment. The enemy's weapon of choice--the
            improvised explosive device (IED)--has forced us to increase
            the weight of our personal protective equipment and the armor
            on our vehicles.
             The distributed nature of operations has shown us that
            our legacy tables of equipment were inadequate. The required
            type and number of ground vehicles, radios, and other major end
            items of equipment have significantly increased. In our
            infantry battalions, for example, the number of tactical
            vehicles has almost doubled while the number of radio sets has
            grown sevenfold. Our preliminary estimates indicate that the
            cost of restructuring the Marine Corps' tables of equipment
            would be $5 billion over fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year
            2015.
             The amount of equipment that has been damaged,
            destroyed, or has reached the end of service life from
            accelerated use has increased, and the cost associated with
            fixing or replacing this equipment has increased significantly.
             Based upon the Marine Corps current analysis, our
            estimated reset cost is $8 billion. The $8 billion consists of
            $3 billion requested in the fiscal year 2011 OCO and an
            additional long-term reset liability of $5 billion upon
            termination of the conflict.
             Equipment on hand at home station to support training
            has been serious degraded. Particularly worrisome is our
            capacity to respond to other contingencies.
             We are institutionalizing the lessons learned in Iraq
            and Afghanistan in training, education, organization, doctrine,
            and capability development. One of the ways we are doing this
            is through the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned.
             The current operating environment in Iraq and
            Afghanistan has led to an exponentially increased need for
            intelligence collection assets down to lower levels of command.
            The Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
            Enterprise provides support to the MAGTF in this operating
            environment by organizing all of the intelligence disciplines,
            sensors, and equipment and communication architecture into a
            single capability that is integrated and networked across all
            echelons.
                                 iii. readiness
    1. Personnel Readiness
        Our people--the brave men and women who wear our uniform and the
    spouses, children, and the parents who support them--are our most
    valuable resource. In 2009, your Corps lost 65 marines to enemy action
    in combat. We also lost 52 marines who died by suicide--this serious
    issue, which will be discussed later in this report, has my personal
    attention.
        End Strength
        Current authorized end strength is 202,100 marines in the Active
    component and 39,600 marines in the Selected Reserve.

             During fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps requested
            and received authorization to grow 27,000 additional personnel
            by the end of fiscal year 2011.
             We completed our growth during fiscal year 2009--2
            years ahead of schedule. We attribute this to four factors:
            quality recruiting, exceptional retention, reduced personnel
            attrition, and a great young generation of Americans who want
            to serve their country during wartime.
             With this personnel increase, we will improve
            training, upgrade readiness, and enhance the quality of life
            for all personnel and their families. The goal is to build the
            equivalent capacity of three Marine Expeditionary Forces--the
            largest MAGTF and principal Marine Corps warfighting
            organization.
             We are continuing to shape the Marine Corps with the
            right mix of units, grades, and occupational specialties.
        Quality
             Recruiting. In fiscal year 2009, we exceeded goals in
            numbers and standards for the Active component and the Selected
            Reserve. The Active component accessed 31,413 personnel, and
            the Selected Reserve accessed 9,627 personnel. In fiscal year
            2010, our goal is to access 27,500 enlisted personnel in the
            Active component and commission 1,800 new officers.
             Enlistment Standards. One of the DOD standards for new
            recruits is that at least 90 percent will possess a high school
            diploma. The Marine Corps has chosen to maintain a higher
            standard; our goal is a high school graduation rate of 95
            percent. In fiscal year 2009, for our combined active and
            Reserve components, the high school graduation rate of our
            recruits exceeded 98 percent.
             First-Term Reenlistments. In fiscal year 2009, 8,011
            first-term marines reenlisted, meeting 109.2 percent of our
            goal. This represented a retention rate of 33.7 percent,
            exceeding our traditional retention rate of 24 percent. In the
            first quarter of fiscal year 2010, 5,194 first-term marines
            have already reenlisted--77 percent of the goal for the entire
            year.
             Subsequent Term Reenlistments. In fiscal year 2009,
            7,985 marines who had completed at least two enlistment
            contracts chose to reenlist again. This number represented 107
            percent of our goal and a 78.6 retention rate--the highest in
            history. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, 5,685
            marines who had completed at least two enlistment contracts
            chose to reenlist again--82 percent of the goal for the entire
            year.
             Officers. The quality of officers accessed and
            retained remains high. In one example, the share of Marine-
            option U.S. Naval Academy candidates in the top third of their
            graduating class greatly exceeded representative levels in
            2008. The number of Naval Academy graduates who chose to become
            Marine Corps officers last year was 270--the highest number in
            history for the second year in a row.
             In fiscal year 2009, our officer retention rate was 93
            percent and during fiscal year 2010, we expect officer
            retention to remain stable.
        Reservists
        The Marine Corps Reserve is a full partner in the total force. As
    of January 2010, there were 39,164 marines in the Selected Reserve and
    another 55,233 in the Inactive Ready Reserve. Marine Forces Reserve
    includes 183 training centers in 48 States, the District of Columbia,
    and Puerto Rico.

             The extensive contributions of the Reserve have
            reduced deployment requirements for the Active component,
            thereby improving the health of the total force. More than
            54,000 marines from the Selected Reserve and the Inactive Ready
            Reserve have mobilized and deployed in support of Operations
            Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, or other operational
            commitments around the globe.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ As of 3 January 2010.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``Every Marine into the Fight''
        The majority of your marines joined the Corps after our Nation was
    already at war. They expect to train, deploy, and fight because that is
    what they believe marines are supposed to do. As such, the 2007 ``Every
    Marine into the Fight'' initiative adjusted personnel assignment
    policies so marines serving in nondeploying units or the supporting
    establishment would have the opportunity to deploy. At the same time,
    we monitor carefully the frequency and duration that units and
    individual personnel spend deployed.

             To date, 73 percent of the available marines have
            deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
            Freedom, or other operational commitments around the globe.
             Individual Deployment Tempo. We measure individual
            deployment tempo on a 2-year sliding scale--the number of days
            deployed out of the previous 730 days. In the last 7 years, we
            have seen a 20-fold increase in the individual deployment tempo
            of marines in the Active component. In October 2002, the number
            of marines who deployed for at least 120 consecutive days in a
            2-year period was 4,845. As of January 2010, 100,760 marines
            had deployed for at least 120 consecutive days.
             Unit Operational Tempo. The metric we use to measure
            unit operational tempo is the ratio of ``deployment to
            dwell''--months deployed to months at home station. We limit
            the duration of deployments for units and individual marines to
            no more than 7 months for battalions and squadrons. Higher
            headquarters units deploy for 1 year.
             Our goal is to achieve a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio
            in the Active component and a 1:5 ratio in the Reserve
            component. Our Reserve units are currently operating at a ratio
            that more closely approximates a ratio of 1:4, while many of
            our Active component units, on average, are nearing the goal of
            1:2 (see Table 1).

               Table 1. MAGTF Unit Deployment to Dwell Ratios \7\
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Average Ratio (Months
                   MAGTF Element                   Deployed : Months Home
                                                          Station)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Command Element...........................  1:1.43
    Ground Combat Element.....................  1:2.08
    Aviation Combat Element...................  1:2.11
    Logistics Combat Element..................  1:1.79
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ As of 18 November 2009.

             The subordinate units most frequently deployed are
            Intelligence Battalions, 1:1.01 (Command Element); Infantry
            Battalions, 1:1.78 (Ground Combat Element); VMU Squadrons,
            1:1.10, and Attack Helicopter Squadrons, 1:1.28 (Aviation
            Combat Element); and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Companies
            1:1.30 (Logistics Combat Element).
        Suicide Prevention
        The number of marines who have died by suicide in recent years is
    shocking and unacceptable. This issue has my personal attention, and we
    have multiple programs at work to reverse this trend.

             Causes. Our studies have shown that regardless of duty
            station, deployment, or duty status, the primary stressors
            associated with marine suicides are problems in romantic
            relationships, physical health, work-related issues, such as
            poor performance and job dissatisfaction, and pending legal or
            administrative action. Multiple stressors are typically present
            in a suicide. This is consistent with the findings of the other
            services and civilian agencies.
             Deployments. We analyze suicides monthly and annually
            for combat-related trends such as the number of deployments and
            dwell time. Although it is reasonable to assume that one or
            more deployments may cause an increase in suicides, to date, we
            have been unable to establish a direct correlation between
            deployments and suicides.
        Civilian Employees
        Civilian employees are a vital part of the Marine Corps. In fiscal
    year 2010, civilian Federal employees will number more than 25,000.
    Through initiatives in management and career development, the Marine
    Corps is dedicated to maintaining a civilian workforce with the
    leadership skills and technical competencies necessary to meet the
    challenges of today as well as those of the future.

             Traditionally, civilian employees have served
            primarily in the supporting establishment. Now, more than ever
            before, they are deploying with the operating forces and
            serving in positions traditionally occupied by Active Duty
            marines. For example, we are in the process of hiring more than
            260 tactical safety specialists, who will each rotate on
            deployments with the operating forces. We are also
            participating in DOD's program to build a deployable Civilian
            Expeditionary Workforce.
        Families
        While we recruit marines, we retain families. More than 45 percent
    of your marines are married, and we believe that investing in military
    families is critical to the long-term health of the institution. When
    marines know that their loved ones at home station have access to
    quality housing, healthcare, child development services, and education,
    they are better prepared to face the rigors of deployment and more
    inclined to stay in uniform when they return home.

             Family Readiness Programs. Our baseline budget in
            fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for family programs is $399 million
            per year. We have reformed our family readiness programs at
            every level of command at all of our installations. As an
            example, we have created more than 400 full-time positions for
            family readiness officers down to the battalion and squadron
            level.
             Child Care. Today, we are currently meeting 64 percent
            of potential need for child care spaces. To meet the DOD
            standard of 80 percent of potential need based on the current
            population, we would require approximately 3,000 additional
            spaces. With your support, we have programmed an additional
            2,615 spaces that will open over the next 18-24 months.
             Families with Special Needs. With an increase of $11
            million for the Exceptional Family Member Program in this
            year's baseline budget, we have made great strides improving
            the programs that support special needs family members.
            Enrollment is now mandatory and more than 8,900 exceptional
            family members are in the program. The Marine Corps assigns a
            caseworker to each family, who assists during relocation,
            deployment, and life events. In addition, the Marine Corps now
            underwrites the cost of up to 40 hours of respite care per
            month for families in the program. To date, the Marine Corps
            has provided more than 250,000 hours of respite care.
        Wounded Warriors
        About 9,000 marines have been injured or fallen seriously ill while
    serving in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom. We
    are deeply committed to their care as well as the welfare of their
    families. Since activation in April 2007, the Wounded Warrior Regiment
    has provided a wide range of nonmedical care for the injured and ill.
    The Marine Corps now also has wounded warrior battalions at Camp
    Pendleton and Camp Lejeune.

             Infrastructure. The Marine Corps is investing $50
            million from the 2009 Overseas Contingency Operations
            supplemental for the construction of resource and recovery
            centers at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune. These recovery
            centers will provide spaces for counseling, physical therapy,
            employment support, financial management, and other training
            and outreach programs in support of our wounded.
             Outreach. With a 24-hour call center for wounded
            marines and their families, the Wounded Warrior Regiment has
            contacted 99.4 percent of all marines (7,654 out of 7,703) who
            were wounded since the beginning of Operations Iraqi Freedom
            and Enduring Freedom, in order to determine their health
            status. We also maintain a toll-free number to the medical
            center in Landstuhl, Germany, for families to contact their
            loved ones who have been wounded.
             Recovery Care. The Marine Corps has 42 recovery care
            coordinators, who coordinate non-medical services for marines
            and their families during recovery, rehabilitation, and
            transition.
             Mental Health

                      Traumatic Brain Injury. Naval medicine
                    remains at the forefront of researching and
                    implementing pioneering techniques to treat traumatic
                    brain injury. One technique, Hyperbaric Oxygen
                    Treatment, is showing great promise. We anticipate a
                    study to begin this spring that tests the efficacy of
                    this revolutionary treatment. The Marine Corps has a
                    formal screening protocol for marines who suffer
                    concussions or who are exposed to blast events in
                    theater.
                      Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. We are
                    attentive to the mental health of our warriors and we
                    are dedicated to ensuring that all marines and family
                    members who bear the invisible wounds caused by stress
                    receive the best help possible. We developed the Combat
                    Operational Stress Control program to prevent,
                    identify, and holistically treat mental injuries caused
                    by combat or other operations.

             With the increased workload, we do have concerns about
            the capacity of mental health care in military medicine.
            Operational support and current treatment facility demands
            continue to stretch our mental health professional communities,
            even though DOD has taken many steps to increase mental health
            services. Our shortages of mental health professionals are a
            reflection of Nation-wide shortages of this specialty. We are
            actively engaged in discussions about possible solutions.
    2. Equipment Readiness
        We have sourced equipment globally, taking from non-deployed units
    and strategic programs to support our forces in theater. As a result,
    the amount of equipment remaining for non-deployed units to use for
    training and other potential contingencies is seriously deficient.

             For example, while the overall supply rating of Marine
            Corps units in Afghanistan is near 100 percent, the supply
            rating of units at home station is less than 60 percent.
             Additional equipment is being procured with
            supplemental funds, but the production rates are too slow to
            meet our requirements for new equipment orders.
        Equipment Reset
        As mentioned previously, the distributed and decentralized nature
    of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown us that our legacy,
    20th century tables of equipment are significantly inadequate.
    Moreover, the tempo of operations has accelerated the wear and tear on
    equipment. Also, the diversion of equipment in theater from Iraq to
    Afghanistan has delayed reset actions at our logistics depots in the
    United States.

             Our preliminary estimates indicate that the cost of
            restructuring the Marine Corps' tables of equipment would be $5
            billion over fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2015.
             In light of the continued high tempo of operations in
            Afghanistan, and the delay in reset actions due to the
            diversion of equipment in theater, we estimate the cost of
            reset for the Marine Corps to be $8 billion ($3 billion
            requested in the fiscal year 2011 OCO and an additional $5
            billion reset liability upon termination of the conflict).
        Aviation Readiness
        All Marine Corps aircraft in support of overseas contingency
    operations are exceeding programmed rates, and are thus consuming
    service life at a rate sometimes three times higher than that scheduled
    for the lifetime of the aircraft. (See Table 2.) This will eventually
    result in compressed timelines between rework and, ultimately, earlier
    retirement of the aircraft than originally programmed.

             It is critical that our aviation modernization
            programs, discussed in the next section of this report,
            continue to receive the support of Congress.
             The majority of our legacy platforms are at the end of
            their service life and most of the production lines are closed.

                                Table 2. Fiscal Year 2009 USMC Aircraft Utilization Rates
                                             Overseas Contingency Operations
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Programmed
                      Aircraft                      Average Age     Rates  (Hours/     OCO Rates      OCO Life Usage
                                                      (Years)           Month)       (Hours/Month)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AH-1W.......................................              19             19.5             32.7             1.7x
    UH-1N.......................................              35             21.7             30.0             1.4x
    CH-46E......................................              41             13.6             31.1             2.3x
    CH-53D......................................              40             23.8             50.3             2.1x
    CH-53E......................................              21             19.2             33.6             1.8x
    MV-22B......................................               3             20.9             29.4             1.4x
    AV-8B.......................................              13             20.9             24.1             1.2x
    F/A-18A.....................................              23             25.5             72.5             2.9x
    F/A-18C.....................................              16             23.9             65.5             2.7x
    EA-6B.......................................              27             26.4             66.0            2.5x
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note: Programmed rates are defined in the Weapon System Planning Document and are based on the projected dates
      an aircraft will be replaced by a new platform or reworked to extend its service life. Programmed rates
      include monthly flight hours and the associated logistical support required for each aircraft.

        Strategic Prepositioning Programs
             Marine Corps prepositioning programs trace their
            origins back 30 years, when the Iranian revolution, the Soviet
            invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraqi attack on Iran, and the
            deepening civil war in Lebanon collectively brought to the
            forefront the limitations of strategic airlift to respond to
            no-notice contingencies. The solution--the Secretary of Defense
            testified in 1980, and Congress agreed--was prepositioned
            combat equipment, ammunition, and supplies afloat on commercial
            vessels underway or docked in strategic locations. The Marine
            Corps developed three squadrons of maritime prepositioned ships
            and, in 1982, began prepositioning equipment and ammunition
            underground in Norway.
             The first real test for these programs was in 1991,
            during Operation Desert Shield. In 2003, in Kuwait, the Marine
            Corps downloaded 11 vessels from all 3 prepositioned squadrons
            and moved 648 principal end items from Norway in preparation
            for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Without this capacity, the Marine
            Corps would not have been able to move half of the entire
            operating forces--more than 60,000 fully equipped marines--
            halfway around the world for a 350-mile attack on Baghdad.
             When completely loaded, Marine Corps prepositioning
            vessels today carry more than 26,000 pieces of major equipment
            including tanks, wheeled tactical vehicles, and howitzers, as
            well as the necessary supplies to support the force.
             When measured against authorized allowances, the
            percentage of major item equipment (Class VII) currently
            present in the prepositioned fleet is 94 percent; the
            percentage of supplies currently present is in excess of 99
            percent.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Data as of 18 February 2010. To clarify any misperceptions,
    these are not the formal readiness percentages the Marine Corps uses in
    separate reports to Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, and Congress. The readiness percentages in those reports
    are a measurement against MARES reportable items, a more select range
    of equipment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             In Norway, the current percentage of on-hand major end
            item equipment (Class VII) measured against authorized
            allowances is 47 percent; the percentage of on-hand supplies is
            78 percent.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ Data as of 18 February 2010.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             It is important to note that these programs are not
            just a strategic war Reserve. Marine Corps prepositioning
            programs support forward-deployed training exercises and, along
            with the amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy, the steady state
            requirements of the combatant commanders. For example, using
            the equipment positioned in Norway, the Marine Corps provides
            security force assistance to partner nations in U.S. European
            Command and U.S. Africa Command.
             In summary, Marine Corps prepositioning programs are
            vital to the Nation and they require the continued funding and
            support of Congress.
    3. Infrastructure
        Bachelor Housing
        Our number one priority in military construction is barracks. In
    years past, due to fiscal constraints, we had focused on operational
    concerns. We now have a program under way that will provide adequate
    bachelor housing for our entire force by 2014. Table 3 depicts Marine
    Corps fiscal year 2011 investment in new barracks.

              Table 3. USMC Fiscal Year 2011 Barracks Construction
                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Fiscal Year
                    Location                       2011        New Barracks
                                                Investment        Spaces
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Twentynine Palms, CA....................           $53.2             384
    Camp Lejeune, NC........................           326.6           2,794
    Cherry Point, NC........................            42.5             464
    Camp Pendleton, CA......................            79.9             860
    MCB Hawaii, HI..........................            90.5             214
    MCB Quantico, VA........................            37.8             300
                                             -------------------------------
      Total.................................          $630.5           5,016
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

             The Marine Corps is committed to funding the
            replacement of barracks furnishings on a 7-year cycle and to
            funding the repair and maintenance of existing barracks to
            improve the quality of life of marines.
        Summary
             Our equipment shortfalls are serious and the impacts
            on readiness have been significant. Our nondeployed units do
            not have the required amount of equipment they need to train or
            support other contingencies. Moreover, the harsh environments
            of Iraq and Afghanistan, the tempo of operations, and our
            employment as a second land army since 2004 has accelerated
            wear and tear on our equipment and delayed the reset activities
            necessary to prepare for the next contingency.
             We estimate that the cost of restructuring the Marine
            Corps' tables of equipment from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal
            year 2015 would be $5 billion and the cost to reset for the
            Marine Corps will be $8 billion ($3 billion requested in fiscal
            year 2011 OCO and an additional $5 billion reset liability upon
            termination of the conflict).
             Iraq and Afghanistan have not adversely affected
            personnel readiness or the resiliency of the force. The Marine
            Corps continues to recruit and retain the highest quality
            people. Your marines want to make a difference; they understand
            being a marine means deploying and fighting our Nation's
            battles. Indeed, the marines with the highest morale are those
            currently in Afghanistan.
             The Marine Corps has achieved its goal of 202,000
            active duty personnel and has done so with no compromise in
            quality. However, the Marine Corps has not achieved the correct
            mix of skills and paygrades. Continued funding will be needed
            to balance the force correctly.
             Our personnel growth has outpaced our growth in
            infrastructure, and your continued support is needed to provide
            the additional barracks, messing, and office spaces required.
                         iv. modernization of the magtf
        Our modernization effort is not merely a collection of programs but
    a means of aligning the core capabilities of the MAGTF across the
    spectrum of present and future security challenges. All of our
    procurement programs are designed to support the full range of military
    operations.
    The Individual Marine
        Marines are the heart and soul of your Corps. The trained,
    educated, and physically fit marine enables the Corps to operate in
    urban areas, mountains, deserts, or jungles. However, we are concerned
    about weight. Depending on the enemy situation, and including helmet,
    body armor, individual weapon, water, ammunition, and batteries, the
    weight of gear for a marine on foot-patrol in Afghanistan can average
    90 pounds. There is a delicate balance between weight and protection,
    and we continue to pursue the latest in technology to provide marines
    with scalable protection based on the mission and threat.
    Tactical Vehicles
        The Marine Corps currently has a total ground tactical vehicle
    quantity of nearly 47,500. Over the next 10 years, we plan to replace
    about 50 percent of that total.

             We are planning, programming, and budgeting toward a
            balanced fleet of vehicles. Our chief considerations are
            mobility, survivability, payload, transportability, and
            sustainability. Our goal is a portfolio of vehicles that is
            able to support amphibious operations, irregular warfare, and
            operations ashore across the range of military operations. We
            envision a blend of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles, Marine
            Personnel Carriers, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles,
            and replacements for our High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
            Vehicles.
             The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is the number
            one modernization program in the ground combat element of the
            MAGTF. The requirements of the current and future security
            environment have driven the research and development of the
            critical capabilities associated with the EFV. The Marine Corps
            has not taken a myopic view of the EFV; we are well aware of
            the fiscal realities and developmental challenges associated
            with such a revolutionary vehicle. We are, however, convinced
            that national security demands the capabilities of the EFV and
            justifies the costs. This vehicle will save lives and enable
            mission success across an extremely wide, and highly probable,
            range of operational scenarios.
    Fire Support
        We are modernizing Marine Corps land-based fire support through a
    triad of weapons systems--a new and more capable 155mm howitzer, a
    system of land-based rockets, and a helicopter-transportable 120mm
    mortar. Each of these is extremely accurate. This accuracy is critical
    in counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare because accuracy
    reduces the instances of civilian casualties and collateral damage to
    local infrastructure.

             The Lightweight 155mm Towed Howitzer (M777) weighs
            about half of the cannon it is replacing and fires projectiles
            to a range of 15-19 miles. Our Marine Expeditionary Brigade in
            Afghanistan has 15 of these howitzers at 3 different locations,
            which have collectively fired more than 600 rounds since April
            2009.
             The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (M142
            HIMARS) provides high-value rocket and missile fire in support
            of ground forces. Each system carries six rockets or one
            missile. Like our new lightweight howitzer, HIMARS has proven
            itself over the past year in Afghanistan, delivering long-range
            precision fires.
             The Expeditionary Fire Support System is a rifled
            120mm mortar, internally transportable 110 nautical miles by
            both the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53E helicopter. This will be
            the primary indirect fire-support system for helicopter-
            transported elements of the ground combat element. A platoon
            equipped with these new mortars recently deployed with the 24th
            Marine Expeditionary Unit.
    Marine Aviation
        Marine pilots are naval aviators; they are trained to fly from the
    ships of the U.S. Navy or from expeditionary airfields ashore in
    support of marines on the ground. We are in the midst of an
    unprecedented modernization effort. By 2020, we will have:

             Transitioned more than 50 percent of our aviation
            squadrons to new aircraft
             Added 5 more operational squadrons and almost 100 more
            aircraft to our inventory
             Completed fielding of the tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey and
            the upgraded Huey (UH-1Y) utility helicopter
             Updated our entire fleet of aerial refuelers to the
            KC-130J model
             Fielded the upgraded Cobra (AH-1Z) attack helicopter
            and the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35B)
             Fielded an entirely new family of Unmanned Aircraft
            Systems
             Introduced a new model of the heavy-lift CH-53 cargo
            helicopter
    The Joint Strike Fighter
        The Marine Corps is on track to activate DOD's first operational
    Joint Strike Fighter squadron in 2012. Although our investment in this
    program may seem high, it is important to note that the Marine Corps
    has not bought a fixed-wing tactical aircraft in 11 years, and that the
    Joint Strike Fighter will ultimately replace three different types of
    aircraft currently in our inventory.

             The short-takeoff and vertical landing variant (F-35B)
            of the Joint Strike Fighter will be transportable aboard the
            amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy; it will be able to operate
            under the same austere conditions as does the AV-8 Harrier; it
            will be able to carry more bombs and loiter overhead longer
            than does the F/A-18 Hornet; and it will be a better electronic
            warfare platform than our legacy EA-6 Prowler.
    The Osprey
        We are very pleased with the performance of the tilt-rotor MV-22
    Osprey. The Osprey provides greater speed, more range, and enhanced
    survivability compared to other rotary wing platforms. It flies more
    than twice as fast and carries three times the payload at more than six
    times the range of the medium-lift helicopter it is replacing.

             Osprey squadrons have completed three successful
            deployments to Iraq and one aboard ship. One squadron is
            currently in Afghanistan. We are nearing delivery of our 100th
            operational aircraft, and at a current build of 30 Ospreys per
            year, we are replacing our CH-46E medium-lift helicopter
            squadrons at a rate of two squadrons per year.
    Logistics Command and Control
        Global Combat Service Support System--Marine Corps is the
    cornerstone of our logistics modernization strategy.

             The program is a portfolio of information technology
            systems that will support logistics command and control, joint
            logistics interoperability, secure access to information, and
            overall visibility of logistics data. It will align Marine
            Corps logistics with real-world challenges, where speed and
            information have replaced mass and footprint as the foremost
            attributes of combat operations; it will replace 30-year old
            legacy supply and maintenance information technology systems;
            and it will provide the backbone for all logistics information
            for the MAGTF.
                                   v. vision
        The current transnational struggle against violent extremism will
    not end anytime soon. Other threats--conventional and irregular--will
    continue to emerge and the complexity of the future operating
    environment will only increase. As we look to the future, we believe we
    must refocus on our core competencies, especially combined-arms
    training and operations at sea with the U.S. Navy.
    2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
        We believe the report from the Quadrennial Defense Review offers an
    accurate and informed analysis of the challenges in the future security
    environment, particularly with respect to growing complexity of hybrid
    threats and the spread of advanced anti-access capabilities.

             We concur with the overarching need for a
            comprehensive and balanced approach to national security--a
            whole of government approach.
             We agree with the need for a U.S. military that is
            balanced in capabilities for irregular warfare and conventional
            conflict. For the Marine Corps, we have always believed in such
            a balance. Our equipment and major programs, and our means of
            employment as an integrated MAGTF, reflect our commitment to be
            flexible in the face of uncertainty. One hundred percent of our
            procurement can be employed either in a hybrid conflict or in
            conventional combat.
             Finally, while our current focus is rightly on today's
            fights, we believe it is critical that we do not underestimate
            the need to maintain the ability to gain access in any
            contested region of the world.
    Seabasing and the Navy-Marine Corps Team
        With oceans comprising about 70 percent of the Earth's surface and
    the world's populations located primarily on the coasts, seabasing
    allows our Nation to conduct crucial joint operations from the sea.

             Seabasing is a capability and a concept. It is the
            establishment of a mobile port, airfield, and replenishment
            capability at sea that supports operations ashore. In effect,
            seabasing moves traditional land-based logistics functions
            offshore.
             From the sea, U.S. forces will be able to conduct the
            full range of military operations, from disaster relief and
            humanitarian assistance to irregular warfare and major combat
            operations. Sea-based logistics, sea-based fire support, and
            the use of the ocean as a medium for tactical and operational
            maneuver permit U.S. forces to move directly from sea to
            objectives ashore.
             There are misperceptions that the United States has
            not conducted an amphibious operation since Inchon during the
            Korean War in 1950. Since 1982, our Nation has conducted more
            than 100 amphibious operations. For example, the Navy-Marine
            Corps Team has been on the scene in Bangladesh (1991), the
            Philippines (1991), Liberia (1996), and East Timor (1999).

                     After September 11, U.S. amphibious forces,
                    from a seabase, led the first conventional strikes
                    against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
                     In 2004, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
                    was on station in Southeast Asia to support the relief
                    efforts after the Tsunami.
                     In 2005, from a seabase in the Gulf of Mexico,
                    the Navy and Marine Corps supported recovery efforts
                    after Hurricane Katrina.
                     In 2009, off the coast of Somalia, when
                    pirates boarded the Maersk Alabama, the 13th Marine
                    Expeditionary Unit and the USS Boxer were on station to
                    support the counterpiracy operations.

             Last month, with Haiti's airfield overwhelmed and
            their seaport disabled by wreckage following the earthquake,
            the USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and the 22nd Marine
            Expeditionary Unit provided a significant and sustainable
            delivery of food, water, and other supplies without the
            logistical burden ashore.
             Seabasing--Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
            Enhancements

                     Critical to seabasing are the logistics
                    vessels of the Maritime Prepositioning Force. As
                    discussed in the Long-Range Plan for Naval Vessels, we
                    have restructured our Maritime Prepositioned Force
                    (Future) program and will enhance the current
                    capabilities of each of our three existing Maritime
                    Preposition Force Squadrons.
                     One mobile landing platform (MLP), one Large
                    Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship, and one
                    Lewis and Clark-class (T-AKE) cargo ship will be added
                    to each squadron of the MPF.
                     The MLP will interface with the LMSRs, which
                    are being added to each MPF squadron from fiscal year
                    2009-2011, thus providing the capability to transfer
                    cargo while at sea and making each MPF squadron highly
                    responsive to demands across the full-spectrum of
                    operations.
                     In summary, as the security environment grows
                    more complex, so does the value of amphibious forces.
    Expeditionary Operations in the Littoral Domain
        The littoral domain is where the land and sea meet. This is where
    seaborne commerce originates and where most of the world lives.
    Littorals include straits--strategic chokepoints that offer potential
    control of the world's sea lanes of communication. The Navy-Marine
    Corps team and the vitality of the amphibious fleet is critical to
    overcoming anti-access challenges in locations along the coastlines of
    the world where there are no American military forces or basing
    agreements.

             The QDR emphasized the need for U.S. naval forces to
            be capable of robust forward presence and power projection
            operations, while adding capability and capacity for working
            with a wide range of partner navies. Amphibious forces are
            perfectly suited for engagement and security force assistance
            missions, as well as humanitarian missions such as are ongoing
            in Haiti. In short, the strategic rebalancing directed in the
            QDR places high demands on our amphibious forces.
             Given the fiscal constraints facing the Department of
            the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
            and I agreed that 33 amphibious ships represents the limit of
            acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship requirement we
            established in a letter to the committee on 7 January 2009.
             We currently have a 31-ship force in the U.S.
            amphibious fleet. The Long-Range Plan for Naval Vessels
            projects a 33 ship amphibious inventory in the near-term.
             With a robust inventory of amphibious ships the Navy-
            Marine Corps team will be able to:

                     Better address the growing steady state
                    combatant commander requirement for theater security
                    cooperation, forward presence, and crisis response.
                     Strengthen our Nation's relations with allied
                    and partner countries through peacetime engagement and
                    training exercises.
                     Better ensure our Nation is ready to respond
                    with humanitarian assistance when disaster strikes
                    anywhere around the globe.
                     In the event of major conflict, improve our
                    response time to gain theater access with combat forces
                    without having to rely on basing agreements with
                    foreign governments.

             Finally, to clarify any misperceptions about the
            numbers of amphibious ships cited in the 2010 QDR Report, those
            numbers of ships are neither shipbuilding requirements nor
            targets; they are simply statements of the amphibious ship
            numbers across the fiscal year 2011-2015 Future Years Defense
            Program.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR Report)
    (Washington, DC: Feb 2010), p. xvi, 46.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Training, Education, and Professional Development
             ``Two-Fisted Fighters.'' The QDR Report calls for
            increased counterinsurgency capacity in the general purpose
            forces of the United States.\11\ The Marine Corps has long
            recognized the special skills required to operate with host
            nation forces and among local populations. Evidence of this
            dates back to the Marine Corps publications of Small Wars
            Operations (1935) and the Small Wars Manual (1940), both
            comprehensive texts on counterinsurgency operations and
            irregular warfare. Today, through standing Marine Corps
            organizations such as the Center for Advanced Operational
            Culture Learning and the Center for Irregular Warfare, and
            programs such as the International Affairs Officers Program, we
            continue to build capacity in foreign language, and regional
            and cultural skills.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR Report)
    (Washington, DC: Feb 2010), pp. 20-26.
        \12\ Each year, the Marine Corps selects officers for the
    International Affairs Officer Program, which consists of two
    professional tracks: Foreign Area Officer (FAO), and Regional Area
    Officer (RAO). The International Affairs Officer Program provides
    graduate-level study and language training for nine geographic areas.
    There are 329 international affairs officers on active duty (262 FAOs,
    67 RAOs). The officers in this program possess advanced knowledge and
    expertise in the language, culture, and political-military affairs of a
    given region. Since 2008, the Marine Corps has doubled the number of
    accessions in the FAO program, and accessions will continue to increase
    through 2015. Moreover, the Marine Corps provides mid-grade officers
    (major-lieutenant colonel) for the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands
    Program. Our current requirement is to provide 63 officers--3 cohorts
    of 21 officers each.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Leadership Development. We recognize the need for a
            diversity of skills and specialties, and our standing guidance
            to promotion, command, and special selection boards is to give
            due consideration to personnel with special skills and
            nontraditional career patterns.
             Marine Corps University. Annually, a percentage of
            Marine Corps officers from the rank of captain through colonel
            attend year-long resident courses in professional military
            education at Marine Corps University in Quantico. The Marine
            Corps University is regionally accredited to award postgraduate
            degrees and, in 2009 alone, University schools awarded 200
            master's degrees.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ The Marine Corps also has a separate, voluntary graduate
    education program, through which officers attend Naval Postgraduate
    School and other secondary institutions to obtain advanced degrees.
    There are 300 officer billets in the Marine Corps that require master's
    degrees. The Marine Corps also maintains an active fellowship program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Facilities are an integral part of supporting
            professional military education. To that end, the Marine Corps
            fiscal year 2011 military construction budget request includes
            funding for additions in Quantico to the General Alfred M. Gray
            Research Center and the Staff NCO Academy. These projects will
            support our plan to upgrade the infrastructure of the Marine
            Corps University.
             Acquisition Professionals. The Marine Corps has an
            active acquisition professional program in place to meet the
            need identified in the QDR ``for technically trained
            personnel--cost estimators, systems engineers, and acquisition
            managers--to conduct effective oversight.'' \14\ There are
            about 520 acquisition billets in the Marine Corps--400 are
            entry and mid-level positions filled by enlisted marines and
            officers, and 120 are senior-level acquisition professional
            positions filled by field grade officers who oversee our major
            ground and aviation programs. Our acquisition professional
            officers are members of the Defense Acquisition Community; they
            possess Level II certification, 4 years of acquisition
            experience, at least 24 undergraduate credit hours in business.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ DOD, QDR, p. 76.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Future Realignment of Marine Forces in the Pacific
        The Governments of the United States and Japan have agreed to
    invest in a realignment of forces that will result in Marine Corps
    forces postured in the Pacific for a long-term presence on Japan, Guam,
    and Hawaii. Critical requisites to the implementation of this
    realignment are:

             Japanese construction of a replacement for Marine
            Corps Air Station Futenma that meets both operational and
            safety requirements.
             An appropriate force laydown that supports the
            operational requirements of the Commander, U.S. Pacific
            Command.
             Adequate available airlift and sealift within theater
            to transport marines to training areas and partner countries.
             Adequate training areas and ranges in Guam and the
            Northern Mariana Islands that can maintain readiness as well as
            support security cooperation with our regional partners.
             An enduring, sustainable ``live where you work,'' base
            on Guam that maximizes operational effectiveness, minimizes
            encroachment, accommodates future development, and provides a
            quality of life on Guam commensurate with any other U.S. base.
             Continued political and financial support by the
            Governments of the United States and Japan.

        Refined planning and staff interaction processes within DOD have
    made significant contributions to our efforts to align these
    requirements. Planned and executed properly, this realignment effort
    will result in an enduring solution that provides forward deployed
    combat ready Marine forces to uphold our Nation's commitment to the
    security and stability of the Pacific region.
    Energy and Water Initiatives
        We believe energy and water are two of our Nation's most valuable
    resources. We are focused on improving our stewardship at our
    installations and on the battlefield.

             Our Installations. We have already gained efficiencies
            and achieved savings at all our major installations. We have
            three major goals:

                    1.  From 2003-2015, reduce energy consumption by 30
                    percent
                    2.  Through 2020, reduce water consumption by 2 percent
                    per year
                    3.  By 2020, increase the use of alternative energy at
                    our installations to 50 percent of the total energy
                    consumed

             On the Battlefield. Operations in Afghanistan have
            forced us to reevaluate energy and water distribution and usage
            in expeditionary environments. We believe the future security
            environment will again require the Marine Corps to operate over
            long distances in austere environments, and we are actively
            pursuing a wide range of solutions to:

                     Lighten the combat load of our marines and
                    sailors
                     Reduce our overall footprint in current and
                    future expeditionary operations
                     Lessen energy consumption and dependence on
                    fossil fuels
                     Achieve resource self-sufficiency in
                    expeditionary environments
                                   conclusion
        As a naval expeditionary force in the form of an elite air-ground
    team, the Marine Corps is ready and willing to go into harm's way on
    short notice and do what is necessary to make our country safe. America
    expects this of her marines. In the complex and dangerous security
    environment of the future, the Marine Corps stands ready for the
    challenges ahead. We appreciate the continued support of Congress.
    Thank you again for this opportunity to report on the posture of your
    Marine Corps.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General. We can't thank
    you and your marines enough for what they are doing in
    Afghanistan and other places around the world. It was an
    eloquent statement. We're appreciative.
        I want to talk to you, not just about our marines, but also
    about the Afghan forces that they're fighting with and how well
    that's working out. We heard from ISAF the other day that there
    are five brigades of Afghan Security Forces that are part of
    Operation Moshtarak, and we want to know from you if you can
    tell us, based on what you understand, just what your
    assessment is as to whether or not the Afghan army particularly
    is in the fight.
        We heard from Marine General Nicholson that the Afghan
    forces are not cosmetic, but what is your assessment?
        General Conway. Sir, first of all, it's in their blood to
    fight. They have a warrior culture and so that gives you good
    raw material to draw from. There are issues with regard to
    educated young men in Afghanistan to lead. But our experience
    is, at least at this point, at the lower levels when you join
    an Afghan infantry unit you have fighters at your flank.
        That has been our experience now in the early days of the
    assault onto Marjah. Not as many as we would like, but more
    than perhaps we saw when Marine forces were first introduced,
    before the President's decision on the 30,000.
        I am concerned, as you noted in your opening statement,
    sir, about the number of trainers and the ability to raise the
    Afghan forces that will be needed to one day turn the country
    over to them and walk away. But I'm also optimistic that as we
    help to bridge that effort and as the Army trainers and perhaps
    NATO trainers become more available to us that that will be
    something that we will be able to accomplish.
        Chairman Levin. I forgot to announce that we'll have an 8-
    minute first round.
        Are the Afghan forces and the Marine Corps jointly
    coordinating planning and conducting the operations?
        General Conway. We are, sir. There's an Afghan brigadier
    general who's quite a charismatic character, who has brought
    his officers into the planning sessions, and we've been very
    satisfied with their tactical acumen and their ability to lead
    their forces.
        Actually, we have taken partnering to a new level, to the
    degree that we have actually integrated Afghan units into our
    company and platoon formations. As the Sergeant Major and I
    arrived at Dwyer, we witnessed some of the rehearsal activity
    that was taking place with both Afghan and U.S. units for the
    helicopter-borne assaults that kicked off the first day of
    Marjah, and they were knitted closely together.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary and Admiral, I want to hear a little bit more
    detail about the readiness and maintenance concerns. We added
    some funding last year. It was not appropriated, and so I want
    to ask you about the impact of not receiving last year's
    unfunded maintenance requirements. What would be the effects on
    naval readiness if you do not receive support for the unfunded
    aircraft and ship depot maintenance requirements that you've
    identified in the fiscal year 2011 budget?
        Mr. Mabus. As the CNO pointed out in his opening statement,
    the Navy resets in stride. Our O&M budget is essentially our
    reset budget and it allows the Navy to make sure that our ships
    reach the end of their operational life, that they are ready
    for any eventuality that comes along.
        We have requested a fairly substantial increase in
    operational maintenance funds for this year and we think that
    they are crucial to keeping Navy readiness at the place it
    should be. If we receive the funds that we have requested, we
    will have 99 percent of our depot maintenance for ships, 100
    percent for deployed aircraft, and 96 percent for nondeployed
    aircraft.
        The unfunded requirements that you talk about, we would be
    unable to do nine ship depot availabilities totaling about $35
    million. For the aircraft, we'd be unable to do about 21
    aircraft and 240 engines, the overhaul and upgrade. So that
    would be the result of not receiving that
        Chairman Levin. Admiral?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. To follow on with the
    Secretary, it is ensuring the current readiness of today, that
    the systems are up, that the necessary repairs have been done,
    so that we can stay in the deployment cycles that are part of
    what we do as a Navy. It's also about getting those ships to
    the end of their service lives so that we can realize the force
    structure that we need. If we're not doing the maintenance on
    them today, they're not going to live as long as they normally
    would.
        It also gets to the ability to train in the way that we've
    planned to train. If the ships aren't ready to go, we can't get
    out and do the training. Similarly with the aircraft. So that
    it begins to have an effect on the competencies of our people.
    So it all adds together, and that's why we made the move to
    increase the percentage as we did this year.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        We're going to be facing the issue of the Don't Ask, Don't
    Tell (DADT) law and what actions, if any, should be taken in
    this year's authorization bill or otherwise. Secretary Gates
    testified earlier this month along with Admiral Mullen.
    Secretary Gates said that he'd appointed a high-level working
    group to review the issues associated with properly
    implementing a repeal of DADT law and policy, and Admiral
    Mullen testified that he's in complete support of Secretary
    Gates's position, both professionally as our top military
    officer, but also personally.
        Secretary Mabus, let me first ask you and then I'll ask
    your colleagues, what are your views on DADT? Should we repeal
    it and, if so, what process should we follow in any event?
        Mr. Mabus. Since DADT is the law, whatever happens resides
    in Congress. I support the repeal of DADT. I do think the
    President has come up with a very practical and workable way to
    do that, to work through the working group that the Secretary
    of Defense has set up to make sure that we implement any change
    in the law that Congress makes in a very professional and very
    smooth manner and without any negative impacts on the force.
        Chairman Levin. Has that working group been appointed?
        Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. It's headed by Jeh Johnson, the
    General Counsel for DOD, and General Ham, the head of U.S. Army
    Europe.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral Roughead?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The DADT is the law and that
    will be a matter for Congress to change or not change, and
    clearly we will abide by that law.
        I think the path that has been laid out is extremely
    important to be able to perform the assessment that the
    Secretary has called for, because there are comparisons made to
    other navies, there are comparisons made to other forces, there
    is a lot of anecdotal information, none of which really
    addresses the current force that we serve in today. I believe
    it is important to assess that force, the opinions of that
    force, and also the families, because we as a Navy, as a
    military, have made our families part of who we are in ways
    that other services have not, other countries have not. The
    assessment is extremely important and we are fully supportive
    of that, and we have our very best people assigned to that
    group that is being led by General Ham and Jeh Johnson.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General Conway?
        General Conway. Sir, my professional perspective, first of
    all, is that our Commander in Chief has spoken and the
    Secretary of Defense has a way to examine, based on data and
    gathering of perspectives from the force, just how we should
    proceed. My personal opinion is that, unless we can strip away
    the emotion, the agendas, and the politics and ask, at least in
    my case, do we somehow enhance the war-fighting capabilities of
    the United States Marine Corps by allowing homosexuals to
    openly serve, then we haven't addressed it from the correct
    perspective. At this point, I think that the current policy
    works. At this point, notwithstanding the results that the
    study will bring forward, my best military advice to this
    committee, to the Secretary, to the President, would be to keep
    the law such as it is.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I appreciate that answer very much.
        In your opening statement--and this goes both for the Navy
    and the Marine Corps--right now you have some 30,000 marines
    deployed, less than 20,000 in the theater of Iraq and
    Afghanistan. At a time when the Navy and the Marine Corps are
    being called on to project presence in more parts of the world
    than ever before, I see an unacceptable growth in the risk of
    the force.
        When you take into consideration what's happening right
    now--and I could read the whole list of the strike fighter
    shortfall that's going to reach a peak of 263 aircraft by 2017.
    We're looking at a lot of the resources dropping down. Would
    you want to talk about a risk assessment? I would say both to
    Admiral Roughead and General Conway, what would the risk
    assessment be right now in light of the operational tempo and
    the lack of resources that are out there?
        Admiral Roughead. With regard to our risk, as I said in our
    opening statement, Senator, we are trending towards
    significant. It's not that the total force is at risk, but that
    we have some pockets where it would be a challenge for us to
    swing those capabilities. For example, our SEABEES are heavily
    engaged, our explosive ordinance disposal is heavily engaged,
    our SEALs are heavily engaged.
        We have taken our maritime patrol aircraft that normally
    are optimized for anti-submarine warfare, but because of the
    systems that we have on them they are extremely effective in
    the over-land fight and the intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance mission, and so we essentially have that fleet
    committed to the fight, appropriately so.
        So there is risk should there become a maritime campaign of
    being able to swing those types of assets. But, the fleet
    response plan that we have in place makes us more flexible than
    we ever have been. Still there are some pockets where we do
    have some risk.
        Senator Inhofe. The reason I bring this up, General
    Conway--I've talked to you about this before. One of the
    problems I have in these posture hearings when they come to
    Washington, you hear a lot rosier of a scenario than you do
    when you go out in the field and you talk to people in the
    field. I guess a lot of that's because--and I'm talking about
    everyone up here--when we go out to Iraq, Afghanistan, or
    Djibouti or any of the other areas, you hear more about the
    problems than how good things are.
        So I always appreciate it if you can be as open as
    possible. That's why I think using the term, what would the
    risk assessment be, high, low, and so forth, that's a good way
    to approach it during these hearings. Any thoughts on that,
    General Conway, as far as your feelings?
        General Conway. Sir, as I tried to provide in my opening
    statement, we do have serious concerns actually. Our priority,
    the Secretary of the Navy's priority, is that marines at the
    front of the spear increasingly in Afghanistan will have
    everything they need in order to be able to win that fight. But
    in the process, we're taking away from our capabilities
    elsewhere.
        At this point, we're at about a 60 percent readiness factor
    with regard to equipment in our home station forces. Should
    there be a requirement for marines to flow elsewhere, we could
    be in some serious straits. We would hold what we have in
    Afghanistan, perhaps call on our Reserves, use our Maritime
    Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) equipment, and all those things.
    So we could get the job done, but it would not be nearly as
    elegant.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. Aren't you using a lot of your
    resources, though, over there that otherwise you'd use in
    training?
        General Conway. Absolutely, 100 percent of what is required
    in theater, 60 percent of what's available in home station.
    That's an imbalance I'm uncomfortable with.
        Senator Inhofe. I think that's significant. The Marine
    Corps are famous for not complaining about anything. They're
    the only Service that has retreads. Is that still true now?
        General Conway. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. You're not complaining, right?
        Let me just ask on another line. I've been active in Africa
    for many years in things not even related to defense. But, when
    we made a decision to go and become active in Africa right
    after September 11, I think that was the right thing to do.
    We're working on brigades there to help train or have the
    Africans train the Africans and we're assisting, so that as the
    squeeze takes place in terrorism and some of this terrorist
    activity goes down through the Horn of Africa and Djibouti that
    they'll be ready to do a lot of things.
        I was also one that was very active in pursuing the idea of
    taking the continent of Africa, that was in three commands, and
    putting it in one command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). I
    think that was good. I only wish that we were actually down in
    Ethiopia or someplace instead of up in Germany for the
    headquarters, but that's a political problem in Africa and I
    understand that.
        Admiral, because of the piracy and all these problems that
    are going on, not just in the area in East Africa, but what's
    happening in the Gulf of Guinea and around there, what is your
    activity and what contribution are you making to some of those
    coastal African nations?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Thank you, and Africa has been
    an area of focus for us. We are the only Service that has a
    four-star component commander that addresses Africa.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. I was over there and I visited with
    them just recently.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, and I think that has paid great
    dividends.
        Clearly, we're working with several other navies on the
    counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast
    of Somalia, and that has had some additional benefits of
    bringing many people together that otherwise normally wouldn't
    be--Russia, China, us, the European Union, and NATO. But we've
    also very aggressively taken on this idea of Africa partnership
    stations. Initially we began in the Gulf of Guinea and on the
    west coast of Africa, but we now are operating an Africa
    partnership station on the east coast of Africa.
        Most recently, the Gunston Hall, the ship that was on its
    way over to be the West Africa partnership station, we sent to
    Haiti. The staff was already embarked, African officers who
    participated directly, actively, and effectively in that Haiti
    relief operation. So that actually enhances how they're able to
    come along.
        We've also reached out to South Africa. I'm the first CNO
    to have visited there. We have had an aircraft carrier visit
    there for the first time and also one of our nuclear submarines
    was welcomed there.
        So we're looking at the west coast. We're working with the
    navies there, maritime strategic, humanitarian assistance, but
    also just bringing the navies of Africa together in a
    constructive and a very focused way so that we can get to some
    of the issues that are going to be important for their
    development.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, because I know that on the west side
    around the Sea of Guinea some of the finds and the oil activity
    and all of that, that's increased your activity and I know it's
    draining a lot of resources.
        General Conway, I visited your marines in Djibouti and
    other areas down there. What's your activity down there?
        General Conway. Sir, we think that Africa is going to be
    tremendously important to our country in the long term, and so
    at this point I think it's fair to say we're doing what we can.
    My agreement with General Ward, the Commander of AFRICOM, is
    that we substantially are going to take a rain check at this
    point. We will work with our brothers in the Navy and we'll go
    inside the continent where we need to to try to accomplish some
    of his smaller-scaled engagement opportunities.
        I would, at this point, like to tout our Reserves because
    they are carrying the preponderance of that load. They are
    stepping up and volunteering, coming on duty to do some of
    these things at a time when our Active Forces are simply
    engaged in the transition to go back now to Afghanistan.
        So I would say at this point, sir, we appreciate the
    importance. We want to be players in the long term and we're
    doing what we can.
        Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. It's kind of the
    forgotten continent. People talk about other areas and they
    don't talk about Africa as much. But you guys are doing a great
    job there.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you very much for
    your extraordinary service to our country.
        I don't have any questions about DADT, but I do really want
    to respond to the answers that you gave Senator Levin, which I
    appreciate, I think were thoughtful and honest. I want to make
    two comments about them. General Conway, I agree with you that
    ultimately the question of what we do about DADT has to be held
    to the standard of military readiness. I'm supportive of
    repealing DADT. I believe it's the fair and right thing to do.
    But in the end, because we are fulfilling our constitutional
    responsibility to provide for the common defense, as you are
    and those who serve with you are, this has to pass the test of
    military readiness.
        I believe it will, based on my knowledge of what's happened
    in other militaries, including those like the Brits and the
    Canadians that we serve alongside today in Afghanistan and
    Iraq. I visited Afghanistan in January. There is a British
    general, General Carter, who our forces serve under the
    direction of, and it seems to work very well.
        But I want to say that I agree with that and I think it's
    important that all of us go forward in that way. This has to
    pass the test of military readiness. In fact, I hope that
    repealing DADT will enhance military readiness, but that's yet
    to be determined as the study goes on.
        The second thing that gives me confidence about this, and
    it's a factor that's hard to weigh prospectively, but we can
    acknowledge it retrospectively, which is exactly the sense of
    duty and honor that characterized your answers. This is the
    law. If the law changes, the military will follow it. If the
    Commander in Chief takes a position, the military will make it
    work.
        That's been the history of the military, taking us through
    some transitions within the military that seemed very hard when
    they were first mentioned. That too, which I wanted to express
    my appreciation for, is what gives me confidence that on the
    day this happens and the repeal occurs that there's an
    intangible factor here that will make it work, which is that
    the leadership will say that, these are our orders now from
    Congress, from the Commander in Chief, and now we have to make
    it work and make it work for the benefit of our military, our
    country, and every individual who serves in our military.
        So I thank you for what you said. I look forward to working
    with you on that.
        I want to go back now to the Navy, Mr. Secretary and
    Admiral, and to say that I'm glad to see that this year's
    budget and the 30-year shipbuilding plan includes an SSBN-X,
    the new generation of strategic deterrence submarine. This is
    the program that will provide a replacement for the Ohio-class
    submarines that have so ably defended our Nation since 1981.
        Admiral, I note that the 30-year shipbuilding plan states
    that the requirement for SSBNs will be reassessed in the
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). I understand that the
    requirements-building process for our strategic deterrence
    submarines is classified, but I think it is also important, to
    the extent that we can in an open setting, that we explain to
    the public that they're not made of whole cloth. In that sense,
    I want to ask you the specific question: Could you describe, to
    the degree you can in public session, the significance of
    having a fully operational SSBN force and what risks could
    result from a reduction in that force?
        Admiral Roughead. Thank you very much, Senator. For fear of
    being a little parochial on that line, there's no question that
    as we look at our strategic triad, all important to be sure,
    but that the true stealth of our SSBN force in my opinion makes
    it the most survivable leg of the triad. It is also a leg that
    we can move, that we can protect through its stealth and
    through its movement in ways that the other legs don't enjoy.
        The SSBN-X that we are in the process of designing, its
    last patrol will be in 2080.
        So the importance of getting the design done properly and
    thoroughly and thoughtfully is absolutely key to ensuring that
    that very survivable leg of the triad remains almost to the end
    of the century. If that capability were not to exist, it would
    not be in the best security interest of the Nation.
        Senator Lieberman. Is it fair to say, Admiral, that
    assuming we make progress in some of the nuclear reduction
    negotiations we're in with the Russians and perhaps more
    broadly and the number of our nuclear warheads goes down, that
    the importance of the strategic nuclear fleet goes up because
    of its survivability?
        Admiral Roughead. I do believe that the importance does
    increase. I also think it is important to understand that the
    number of submarines that we need are not strictly based on the
    number of warheads, but rather where you want the submarines to
    be to provide that continuous coverage, and that also is a
    driver of the number. It's where you put them and the rotation
    that they're on. So those two things come into play and it's
    not simply about the number of weapons.
        Senator Lieberman. Well said.
        Secretary, do you want to add anything to that?
        Mr. Mabus. Just that in order for us to field the SSBN-X on
    schedule to replace the Ohio-class that now is when we have to
    do the design work, the engineering work, and we have to begin
    building the first of those boats in 2019. We tried this year
    in the 30-year shipbuilding plan to be very realistic in terms
    of costs of each ship and in terms of historically what
    Congress has appropriated for our total shipbuilding budget and
    putting the SSBN-X in our core budget was part of that realism.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you for that answer.
        Admiral Roughead, we have a perennial favorite here that
    seems to blossom for our committee every year and that's the
    question about the alternate engine for the JSF. When you were
    asked about an earmark to develop an alternate engine for the
    JSF last July, you said that space on an aircraft carrier is at
    a premium.
        I note that in your prepared statement which you gave to
    the committee for this hearing you say that continued
    development of an alternate engine would ``increase our risk in
    the underlying JSF program.''
        Could you draw out those two statements and tell us what
    your feeling is today as we go forward with this battle again?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. My position on the alternate
    engine is based on the operational needs that we have in the
    Navy and the constraints that we face, not just on our aircraft
    carriers, but JSF will also be in our large-deck amphibious
    ships and they are even more challenged space-wise than our
    carriers are.
        One can look at a carrier and see a very large ship, but
    when that ship is deployed we have things packed in almost
    every nook and cranny in order to provide that reliability and
    responsiveness. So having to stock two different types of
    engines is just not practical for us.
        The costs associated with the alternate engine in my
    opinion would simply continue to pressurize a program that is
    already being pressurized for a variety of reasons. So from the
    perspective of the Navy and the support that I render to the
    Marine Corps and their JSF, the best course of action for us
    and my recommendation has been and will continue to be one
    engine, because that's what serves us the best.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate it. Thank you.
        My time is up. I just want to say finally, General, that
    when I went to Afghanistan in January and was able to spend
    some time with General Larry Nicholson and the marines--and I
    just want to validate what you said. The morale is very high.
    The interactions with the Afghan forces are exemplary. It's
    really inspiring to see, and I thank them and thank you.
        General Conway. Thank you, sir. I'll pass your comments
    along.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank each of you for your service.
        I'm disappointed to have to raise the subject I'm going to
    raise with you, Mr. Secretary, but I just feel no alternative
    to it. Some might say you're worrying about a parochial
    interest, but the LCS is a part of our Navy's future, as
    Admiral Roughead and his predecessors have all committed to.
    Fifty-five of those ships are expected to be built and we're
    getting close to having a bid on it.
        You would agree, I assume, that when you draft a request
    for proposal (RFP) it should be fair, give each party a fair
    opportunity to succeed, and properly set standards that serve
    the interest of the Navy and the warfighter. I guess you do. So
    I would take that as a yes.
        I'm concerned about it. In October 2009, you made a speech
    at a Naval Energy Forum in which you said, ``We have to change
    the way we award contracts. The lifetime energy costs of a
    building or a system and the fully-burdened costs of fuel in
    powering those will be a mandatory evaluation factor when
    awarding contracts.'' That makes sense to me.
        Then later, at the Press Club in September 2009, you say,
    ``We no longer have the luxury to say this is a good deal
    today, let's buy it. We have to get our arms around the life
    cycle.''
        In your testimony today you talk about having half the
    Navy's fuel from alternative sources by 2020. I will just say,
    that's a costly decision. I don't know that that's necessary as
    a policy decision for the Navy. It's just going to deny other
    money for other areas. But I would note that you're correct to
    focus on energy costs, and one way to save energy is not use so
    much, to use less.
        So you said in your remarks today, ``I have also committed
    the Navy and Marine Corps to consider energy as a mandatory
    evaluation factor in contracting and to consider as an
    additional factor in our business dealings the energy footprint
    of the companies that sells to the Navy and Marine Corps.''
        As you and I have discussed, I have to ask you publicly:
    How is it that in this combat ship, this new transformational
    littoral ship, that we have a factor capping the life cycle
    costs, apparently all life cycle costs, not just fuel use, at 3
    percent? Isn't that too small? Could it be a mistake and will
    you reevaluate it?
        Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. As we discussed, the whole
    idea behind the LCS was a total ownership cost for the lifetime
    of the ship--the crew size, the type of weapons, and the
    maintenance costs that would be involved. All these things for
    both variants are an important determinant for deciding to
    build the LCS in the first place.
        We believe that the way the RFP is written is an absolutely
    level playing field, and is an absolutely fair way to pick the
    down-select.
        Senator Sessions. Does it meet your standard that you
    announced last October that the lifetime energy cost will be a
    mandatory factor? You have to fully and fairly evaluate the
    lifetime energy costs, do you not?
        Mr. Mabus. Sir, we believe that the way the RFP is written,
    the lifetime energy cost will be fully and fairly----
        Senator Sessions. All right. What if it becomes clear that
    the 3 percent factor for total lifetime cost that you've
    apparently capped in this RFP is not a fair evaluation of the
    lifetime energy cost? Would you be willing to reevaluate it?
        Mr. Mabus. I believe, based on everything we know today,
    that the way the RFP is written and the only reason we down-
    selected or made the decision to down-select the one variant
    was because the bids came in at an unsustainable level for each
    variant prior, that we are considering everything that involves
    total ownership costs for each of those variants.
        Senator Sessions. I know the cost was high, and I think
    you've gotten all the bidders' attention. If they can't submit
    a competitive bid, then they don't need to be selected. But
    when you set up the criteria for the bid, don't you think it
    should adequately reflect the lifetime fuel consumption costs
    of the vessels involved?
        Mr. Mabus. I believe that the RFP that we did does do that,
    yes.
        Senator Sessions. So the answer is yes. Would you not agree
    that cost should not be the only factor, that value for the
    warfighter, capability, should be also adequately considered in
    the bid process?
        Mr. Mabus. Our major concern is for capability and value to
    the warfighter. However, we have determined through the first
    two ships of each of these variants that either will give us
    the capability that we need and will give us high value for the
    warfighter.
        Senator Sessions. That worries me, because you say these
    are the only things we care about. For example, the ship that
    would be built in Alabama can accommodate two helicopters, they
    can land without a tether. The other ship can only account for
    one and that has to be tethered to bring the helicopter down.
    It has substantially more cargo space. It uses less fuel. It
    cruises, I think we'll establish, with greater stability.
        So if the prices came in exactly the same and one ship had
    greater potential or even if one was slightly more expensive
    than the other one, should you not be sure to give some credit
    for that, rather than just say both meet minimum requirements?
        Mr. Mabus. I think both meet far more than minimum
    requirements. They meet all our requirements, each one of the
    variants do.
        Senator Sessions. Are you saying that you should or should
    not give credit for what might be a substantial additional
    capability?
        Mr. Mabus. I think that both variants have shown that they
    meet not only minimum requirements, but all the requirements
    that the Navy has established for these ships. Both are
    excellent competitors. As you pointed out, we have not received
    any bids yet.
        Senator Sessions. You can have two good automobiles, but if
    you want to carry some cargo and one has a larger luggage
    compartment and it costs $50 more and it has other capabilities
    that you need like cruise control or some things, I think you
    should give credit for that.
        But regardless of that, I want to ask you again: Are you
    saying that even if there is shown to be a RFP that fails to
    meet your stated goal and the logical goal--this is a good
    goal; you're correct to say this--that the lifetime energy cost
    must be a mandatory evaluation factor, and if this RFP fails to
    adequately do that would you consider changing it?
        Mr. Mabus. Well, I do believe that the RFP does do it.
        Senator Sessions. I know you said that, but if there's some
    rare possibility that there was an incorrect accounting and
    maybe a slip of the typewriter and it wasn't written quite
    right, would you be willing to change that?
        Mr. Mabus. At this point in the RFP process, Senator, we're
    expecting bids in. Based on our view or the analysis that we
    have done previously on the two ships that we have, and on the
    projected use of those ships, frankly, it's unclear if either
    has an advantage on energy consumption over the lifetime.
        Senator Sessions. I think you should fairly evaluate it. I
    certainly agree with that, and you should rigorously analyze
    and compare the fuel savings that each claim to have.
        I would just note that the Air Force tanker aircraft in
    their second RFP changed the lifetime fuel costs, which they
    calculated rigorously, from 25 years to 40 years, raising it
    even to a greater level. You count the entire lifetime cost of
    this ship at 3 percent and I think that's so far beyond the
    actual relevant factors that it really needs to be evaluated.
    I'm disappointed to have to spend this time raising that, but
    you want the best ship for the Navy and we don't want to have
    an RFP that does not get you that, along with a competitive
    price.
        Thank all of you. General Conway, we appreciate your
    marines. They're doing such a fabulous job. Admiral Roughead, I
    appreciate your service. You know this Navy so well and I
    appreciate that. I thank you, Secretary Mabus.
        Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
        Mr. Secretary and Admiral Roughead, the Secretary of
    Defense announced that women will be allowed to serve on
    submarines. Can you give us an idea of when that will happen?
    How long will it take to do the preparation, and what
    significant steps do you feel we have to make to accommodate
    that decision, Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Mabus. The preliminary timeline that we have set forth
    shows that if we get women into the pipeline to serve on two of
    our classes of submarines, SSBNs and SSGNs, coming out of this
    year's class, and we take them through the normal nuclear power
    training and normal submarine training, the first women will be
    on submarines late in fiscal year 2011.
        We think that we've learned a lot from integrating women
    into our surface ships almost 20 years ago and that those
    lessons are very applicable today. Some of those lessons are
    that you need a critical mass of women on a crew, and for that
    reason we want to put enough women on each submarine. It also
    is important to have more senior women or a more senior woman
    officer on each submarine to act as mentors for the new people
    coming in, and so we're looking at bringing supply corps
    officers as department heads on these first tours. Once these
    first tours are completed, the women that came into the
    submarine force as ensigns will have the experience to be those
    department heads.
        Finally, the reason for choosing the SSGNs and SSBNs to be
    the lead ships that we integrate women into is that neither
    would require any structural modification to allow those women
    officers to be integrated into the force.
        Finally, one of the lessons that we learned and one of the
    things that we are going to do in this integration is to make
    sure that any questions are answered by the force, any
    questions are answered by the families, and that we are very
    open and transparent about exactly how we're doing this.
        But we think this is a great idea and that it will be done
    very smoothly and very professionally and that it will enhance
    our warfighting capabilities.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Roughead, any comments?
        Admiral Roughead. We have a very good plan. We have great
    interest. We're ready to go. The first young women will come
    aboard at the end of 2011.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Conway, let me also join my colleagues in
    commending your marines who are fighting so aggressively and
    effectively today and doing a remarkable job, as they always
    do. Let me look at another issue, though. In the fiscal year
    budget you're restructuring the Maritime Prepositioned Force
    for the future. In that restructuring, will that still allow
    you to move to an offshore location and conduct operations
    without any intermediate land base or adjacent land base?
        General Conway. Yes, sir, it will. We still have as the
    core element of the Maritime Prepositioned Force three brigades
    of equipment that are embarked aboard the collective of ships.
    The Maritime Prepositioned Force Future, which will allow us to
    do sea basing in the aggregate, is still under development and
    that will take some years to bring to pass.
        But in the meantime, we have a steady and resilient
    capability at about 44 percent these days of supply
    availability, and we consider that in some ways very much a
    national Reserve.
        Senator Reed. Going forward, are your plans taking into
    consideration what has become typically the more heavy and
    larger vehicles that the Marine Corps is using, because of the
    limitations on some of the ships?
        General Conway. Yes, sir, we are. Frankly, some of those
    vehicles won't fit aboard our ships, and so it is a cause for
    concern. We don't want the Marine Corps of the future to be the
    Marine Corps that we have today, for instance in Afghanistan or
    that we saw in Iraq. We need to cut it back. We need to shed
    weight. We need modular kinds of concepts so that if we do go
    static we can add armor protection for our troops or those
    types of things that a requirement might cite.
        But in the meantime, our definition of expeditionary is
    fast and austere, and those things call for us to be much
    lighter than we are today.
        Senator Reed. Is there a parallel discussion of different
    types of equipment in the future that would make you lighter?
        General Conway. Yes, sir. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
    is a classic example of that. We emphasize the light. Our
    partner in it is the Army. They're not quite as concerned about
    it as we are. We are concerned about the additional weight of
    the helicopters that we're going to see and what it does to
    center of gravity on our L-class ships, those manner of things.
        So it's something that we keep a constant eye on, sir, and
    try to keep curtailed to the degree that industry can support
    us.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Admiral Roughead, I want to associate myself with the
    comments of Senator Lieberman about the wisdom of including the
    SSBN development. But also in that area of undersea warfare,
    there is a renewed emphasis on unmanned sub-surface vehicles
    and sub-surface operations. Can you give us an idea of the
    development of some of those systems, where you stand and where
    you're going?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I mentioned in my opening
    remarks that we've done a reorganization within my headquarters
    that has given us a much better focus and effort into
    unmanneds. Unlike the other Services, we in the Navy are the
    only ones that will be exploring the underwater effort. We have
    some very interesting concepts. We've made a prototype
    deployment of some of those systems. It's clear to me that the
    area that we have to spend most of our effort in is in power. A
    lot of folks will want to hang a new sensor of some kind on
    these vehicles, but we have to get to the power issue. That's
    where we are focusing ourselves. That's where we are
    encouraging our labs to look, to get into that. We have run
    some experiments out in the Pacific with some unmanned concepts
    that I find not only very exciting, but I'm very optimistic as
    to where we can take those. It has my full attention.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        The QDR called for a new air-sea operational concept for
    the Pacific theater of operations, beginning with the review
    obviously. Can you give us some indication of how you propose
    to conduct that review and who will the participants be, and in
    general terms how do you go forward?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. That review is already under
    way. We began bringing the group together from the Air Force
    and the Navy, and the Marine Corps is also included because of
    the air power that they also generate. The groups have been
    formed and we are working our way through the various
    scenarios.
        I'll be getting an update here from them very shortly. I
    think it's a great opportunity for us to look, not only at the
    airborne systems, but the networks that are involved, and we
    are well underway. We started before the QDR was published.
        Senator Reed. So we can assume there's a cyber dimension in
    this review of significance?
        Admiral Roughead. My direction to my team was if you're not
    talking about networks it's not going to pass the test.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        I appreciate the testimony of all three witnesses.
    Secretary Mabus, I think you will agree with the members of
    this committee that you are well served by the two gentlemen on
    your right and left.
        Mr. Mabus. It gives me an incredible feeling of comfort and
    security to be surrounded by the CNO and the Commandant.
        Senator Wicker. Right, and the committee and country are
    well served by them also.
        Let me just follow up on the DADT questions. Secretary
    Mabus, I understand your position. It's very straightforward.
    Yesterday with Secretary McHugh, Senator McCain asked a
    question about whether there was any discussion pending the
    survey of attitudes that's being done of a moratorium on the
    current DADT enforcement. Have you been a part of any
    discussion that enforcement actions might be suspended pending
    a final decision?
        Mr. Mabus. No.
        Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, in the Navy are there some
    discharges and actions pending at this time?
        Mr. Mabus. Senator, I don't know how many are pending.
    There's usually a small number each year. I don't know what's
    pending today.
        Senator Wicker. But from the information that you have, the
    law, as it currently is, is going to be enforced until such
    time as the survey is completed and the law is changed; is that
    your understanding?
        Mr. Mabus. Until such time that the law is changed, we will
    follow the law.
        Senator Wicker. All right. Then let me ask you, Admiral
    Roughead. You said something about comparisons to other navies
    and anecdotal information. I wonder if you could just briefly
    explain what you were getting to there?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The surveying and the attitudes
    of the U.S. Navy have never been formally sensed or assessed.
    There is often discussion about how other services and other
    countries have implemented homosexual service into their navy,
    army, air force, or whatever it may be. But while I have high
    regard for those other Services, they are not us. They do not
    come from our culture. They do not come from the beliefs that
    the young men and women bring into the service. We have to be
    able to assess our force and judge what our force believes and
    what the attitudes within our force are. That's why this
    assessment is so important, and not use surveys from other
    militaries and other countries.
        Senator Wicker. I thank you for clarifying that statement.
        I want to ask about the cost as it relates to changing
    requirements. I'll ask that question with regard to our
    amphibious ships. I think I've had the conversation with both
    the General and the Admiral about the well deck aspect. For
    those within the sound of my voice who don't know, a well deck
    is a hangar-like deck located on the waterline on the back of
    some amphibious assault ships, and by taking on water the ship
    can lower its stern, flooding the well deck and allowing boats
    and amphibious landing craft to dock with ships.
        We just completed at Northrop Grumman the LHD-8. That ship
    has a well deck. Now, the next two ships will not have a well
    deck, the LHA-6 and, as I learned at last year's hearing, most
    emphatically the LHA-7 will not have a well deck. I think it's
    fair to say that General Conway wishes that those did have a
    well deck. Then the follow-on ship, the LHA, will indeed have a
    well deck again.
        Now, we're told that on the two ships where it was
    eliminated, that the decision was made to enlarge the hangar
    space to accommodate the F-35 and the V-22 Osprey, so the well
    deck was eliminated.
        If the design continues to change, gentlemen, isn't it fair
    to say that this is a significant cost driver? We're interested
    in commonality and the use of common hulls, and I would simply
    submit that this is going to be a cost driver and it's
    regrettable. Would either one of you like to comment on this?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. In fact, the Marine Corps and
    the Navy have periodic warfighter talks. This was one of the
    topics that we discussed just last week. There were decisions
    made in years past about the configuration of the big-deck
    amphibs and, as was pointed out, the weight, the volume of the
    equipment has changed, and the interest in going back to the
    well deck design is something that was a topic.
        In order to get into looking in that redesign, there is a
    cost associated with it, and then the cost of redesign.
    Depending on when we do it, that cost can change, and I have
    committed to the Commandant that we're going to take a very
    hard look at this as we go into our 2012 budget to see how that
    can best be done to support the needs of the Marine Corps.
        General Conway. I would only complement the CNO's answer,
    sir, to say that we're operating at risk with the numbers of
    amphibs that we have. It's our view that those that are at sea
    ought to have the maximum flexibility possible for whatever the
    mission might require. Ergo, our desire to have well decks on
    ships after the two that you referenced.
        We also would like to have that ship in the 2016 budget
    because we will need it for purposes of putting MEUs to sea and
    that type of thing. So as the CNO said, we're going to look at
    it from a business case perspective, analyze the costs against
    the timeline, and hopefully make a very good decision.
        Senator Wicker. Let me ask you about the requirement for 38
    amphibious ships, as opposed to the QDR recommendation for an
    amphibious fleet of 29 to 33. It is the testimony of both the
    CNO and the Commandant that a 33-ship amphibious fleet
    represents the limit of acceptable risk. So let me ask you
    this: What is the risk of going below 33 and are you willing to
    take issue publicly with the possibility in the QDR of 29, 30,
    31, or 32? What are your major concerns about going below 33
    amphibious ships?
        General Conway. Sir, I think what the QDR reflects is the
    5-year program on out, and the numbers are below 33 at that
    point. There is then obviously additional risk. I think, to
    give it perspective, though, you did acknowledge the agreement
    that we have with the CNO on what we actually see as the
    requirement, what that risk number is in and around 33.
        If you look at the 30-year shipbuilding plan, it sort of
    runs a sine wave. At one point we build to as many as 36. So I
    think you have to look at it perhaps from a larger perspective,
    realize that we also want a strong and balanced fleet out there
    supporting our amphibs and that there are cost drivers.
        So would we like more? Of course. Are we fiscally realistic
    at this point? I'd like to think we're also that.
        Senator Wicker. Admiral, is the 31 an acceptable risk? What
    is the risk?
        Admiral Roughead. I think the Commandant and I are in
    agreement--that 33 is a risk that we believe is acceptable now,
    because if you don't have that number then the speed and the
    amount which you can flow becomes questionable. So, as the
    Commandant mentioned, it is a question of balancing the many
    shipbuilding demands that we have and building the fleet that
    is balanced and gives us the broadest capability, and 33 is
    acceptable.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to say aloha to our esteemed panel of leaders here
    today. First, I would like to thank each of you for your
    dedicated service to our country. I also want to commend the
    military and civilian men and women of the Navy and Marine
    Corps for their outstanding service and thank their families
    for the support of their loved ones.
        The proposed fiscal year 2011 budget highlights the
    Department's priorities of prevailing in today's war, preparing
    for a wide range of contingencies, and managing its most
    precious resource, its people.
        I was pleased to hear the Department of the Navy has agreed
    to fund a study that will address the health concerns from
    drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune. I look forward to
    the results. I see this as a positive step to help determine
    the true scope of the problem and the number of people
    affected. I will include questions for the record on this
    matter.
        Secretary Mabus, I'm very interested in collaboration
    between the Services and the Department of Veterans Affairs
    (VA). Of note, the Department has worked with the VA on the
    physical disability evaluation system pilot program and the
    virtual lifetime electronic records system. Mr. Secretary, how
    are you addressing the challenges of creating a virtual
    lifetime electronic record system?
        Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. I think it goes without
    saying, but I want to repeat, that our care for our veterans,
    and particularly our wounded warriors, is the most important
    thing that we do. We have an obligation to those who have borne
    the battle and who have come back to us wounded, to do
    everything that we can to make whatever transition they have to
    make whatever transition they have to make as smooth as
    possible.
        The things that we are doing on the subject that you talked
    about, in Chicago, for example, we're putting together VA and
    Navy medicine in one place, so that there's one stop for
    everyone to go to, Navy, Marine Corps, and veterans.
        You talked about the single physical and mental evaluation.
    That pilot program is ongoing at our six largest personnel
    installations. We are ready to extend that and make it
    permanent, and we're working very closely with the VA to do
    that.
        Similarly, on the lifetime electronic records we're moving
    forward to make sure that every servicemember and everyone who
    has served will have that, so that there will be a seamless
    transition between service and back to the community or service
    and back to the unit.
        I've been with the Commandant to Bethesda, and the
    Commandant makes one statement and that is, to every marine: If
    you want to stay a marine, regardless of your wounds, we'll
    find a place for you in the Marine Corps. While there are a lot
    of different decisions made by our wounded warriors as they
    progress through rehabilitation as to whether to continue in
    the Marines or the Navy or to go back to their community, the
    idea that they are welcome as a marine has a very powerful
    impact, I think, on those young men and women who have been
    wounded.
        Finally, in terms of employment, one of the things that we
    are working very hard on and that we're proud of is we just had
    an employer conference for our wounded warriors to allow those
    who have decided to rejoin their communities, go back to the
    civilian world, that they'll have a job when they get there. We
    should be able to help them make sure that they have a good job
    waiting for them when they finish their rehabilitation process.
        I will end as I began, which is there is no more important
    thing that we do than to care for our veterans, and
    particularly our wounded warriors.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you for your response.
        Admiral Roughead, to ensure mission success the Navy must
    have shipyards that are modern, flexible, and safe. The Navy's
    public shipyards play a vital role in keeping the fleet
    operating to meet the significant challenges posed all over the
    world. In June 2009, the Navy reported a shortfall of $1.3
    billion in sustainment, restoration, and modernization projects
    at its four public shipyards.
        Admiral, how is this shortfall affecting current and future
    Navy readiness and how is the Navy addressing this situation?
        Admiral Roughead. Sir, when we look at our accounts for our
    public shipyards, which are extraordinarily important to us as
    a Navy, but also for all of our shore infrastructure, and we
    set what the shortfalls are, that is a figure that we use to
    take us to the very highest level of everything that is there.
    Obviously, as we work our way through the budgets and deal with
    the many issues that we have there will be a difference between
    absolute perfection and that which we bring our facilities to.
    But I can assure you that the mission capability and the
    safety, especially the safety aspects of our shipyards and our
    facilities, are provided for, and we value that capability and
    we ensure that we have funded to deliver on that safety and
    mission capability.
        Senator Akaka. Admiral, I'm glad to hear that the Naval
    Academy's current freshman class is the most diverse in the
    history of the great institution. I believe that diversity is a
    real strength. Organizations that are diverse are able to use
    to their advantage many different views and perspectives. I
    understand that diversity is a very important issue for you.
        Can you share with us your views in this area and how
    you're approaching diversity in the senior levels of the
    officer, enlisted, and civilian ranks?
        Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator. I would also add that
    not only did we achieve the most diverse class at the Naval
    Academy, but our Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) class
    was also the most diverse, simply because we have had a much
    more aggressive outreach program and have really attracted
    many, many bright young men and women to the Navy, and I'm very
    proud of what we've done.
        But it's more than just those who are coming in, it's
    looking at the leadership that we have currently. What I do
    periodically with the leaders of the various specialty areas
    within the Navy is to sit down with them individually leader to
    leader, not a staff function, and go through where their
    underrepresented minorities are serving, the types of jobs that
    they have, the types of educational and experiential
    opportunities that we're providing them, because we know that
    in order to be selected for promotion there are certain
    experiences that are valued.
        This is not a quota system. This is not a goal, but rather
    we ask if we are bringing the bright young leaders of the
    future along and putting them in positions and giving them the
    experiences that they need. We do that routinely. As I
    mentioned, we've just recently created an Information Dominance
    Corps. Last week I did my first review of that group, and it
    allows us to look at how we're developing that leadership.
    You're right, sir; it's a very high priority for me.
        Senator Akaka. Let me ask General Conway for any further
    comments on this.
        General Conway. Sir, my answers again are significantly the
    same. It starts with a strong young cadre of diverse officers
    that can go through the traditional assignments that will allow
    them to prosper and grow, and we're seeing that. We have two
    battalions attacking in Marjah. One of them is commanded, for
    instance, by a very capable young black officer who just is
    representative of what we're seeing increasingly in our Corps
    all the way through the general officer ranks. So the process
    works.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to each of you for your service. I was pleased that
    my friend and colleague Jack Reed raised the issue of women
    serving on submarines. Actually, I wasn't pleased, because I
    wanted to be the first to raise that issue. But it was good to
    hear your testimony that you do not see significant costs in
    reconfiguring submarines to allow women to serve. I view this
    as creating more opportunity for women in the Navy to go
    through the ranks. I just want to start by commending you for
    that decision.
        Admiral Roughead, in your testimony you indicated that the
    DDG-1000 program has recently triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach.
    For the record, I just want to clarify my understanding that
    this breach is solely due to the decrease in quantity from 10
    to 3 DDG-1000s, as opposed to any dissatisfaction with the
    performance of Bath Iron Works, which is slated to build all 3
    of the DDG-1000s. Is that correct?
        Admiral Roughead. That's correct, Senator. It's pure
    mathematics. Fewer ships and the math triggers the breach.
    We're in the process of complying with the requirement to make
    the certifications that are necessary. But it's a mathematical
    issue and, as I've been able to say on many occasions over the
    last couple of years, the program is extremely well run by
    very, very fine people. Of course, we know the great work that
    comes out of Bath and look forward to that.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Secretary Mabus, that's your assessment as well?
        Mr. Mabus. Yes, it is.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Secretary Mabus, Congress has previously strongly supported
    the Navy's two previous uses of multi-year procurements for the
    DDG-51 shipbuilding program. What we found is that multi-year
    procurements have tended to reduce acquisition costs, they have
    led to more stability in the workforce among our dual-source
    shipbuilding industrial base, and that too has contributed to
    reduced acquisition costs.
        The Navy is proposing in its FYDP to procure a total of six
    DDG-51 destroyers over 4 years between fiscal year 2012 and
    fiscal year 2015 at alternating procurement rates of one or two
    ships per year. Now, prior to the restart last year of the DDG-
    51 program the Navy had procured the most recent DDG-51s in two
    successive 4-year multi-year procurements, and I would note
    that previous studies have found that the most efficient
    procurement level necessary to meet force structure
    requirements and maintain production efficiency is to do three
    DDG-51s a year.
        Has the Navy decided on an acquisition plan for procuring
    these ships? Are you looking at doing multi-year procurements,
    which could help you reduce the costs?
        Mr. Mabus. In any procurement program that we do, we look
    at all the alternatives, including multi-years. There are, as
    you are well aware, certain thresholds that a multi-year has to
    reach and, because the DDG-51 line, as you pointed out, was
    restarted last year, we have not had sufficient ship numbers to
    make a decision and to do the certifications necessary of
    whether a multi-year will save us the requisite amount of money
    or not.
        Senator Collins. I would encourage you to take a close look
    at that approach, which has been used successfully in the past.
        Mr. Mabus. Thank you.
        Senator Collins. Admiral Roughead, you have said strongly
    and repeatedly that you view 313 ships as the minimum for our
    fleet, and indeed there was a draft version of the QDR which
    suggested that the Navy might request a minimum level of 324
    ships. In any event, 313 is the number that you've consistently
    testified is necessary.
        Recently the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) gave
    testimony before the House subcommittee in which it cast doubt
    on whether the funding in the FYDP is adequate to meet that
    minimum level. Indeed, the CBO has warned that its estimate
    shows that the battleforce fleet could fall to only 270 ships
    by 2025 with a $15 billion annual budget and estimated that if
    there were a bit higher budget it might be 240 ships. But
    still, in both cases the projections by CBO do not show us
    meeting that 313-ship level.
        Could you comment on the CBO analysis, please?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, ma'am. The budget that we have
    proposed and that is before you puts us on a trajectory and we
    believe that we have adequately priced the ships that will take
    us beyond the 313 minimum. As we get out into what I would call
    the mid-years and the requirements that we have for building
    the fleet, recapitalization of ships that we're building in
    large numbers every year, as they fall off the scope as we
    recapitalize the strategic deterrent, the funding does become
    quite challenging in that mid-year period.
        But the budget that we have before you and the plan that we
    have laid out puts us on that trajectory to take us over 313
    ships.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Finally, Mr. Secretary, I know you've been to my State and
    I very much enjoyed your visits, both to Bath Iron Works and
    the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, ME. I want to
    associate myself with the comments made by the Senator from
    Hawaii about the importance of our public shipyards, which are
    making such a contribution, particularly in the area of
    submarine overhaul and maintenance. I believe that Senator
    Akaka has made very good points about the backlog in
    maintenance projects. The chairman also has referred to that. I
    just want to pledge to work with you to make sure that you have
    the funding needed.
        Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Hagan arrived in the nick of time to be recognized.
    Your timing is exquisite. I hope it was intentional so I don't
    catch you by surprise.
        Senator Hagan. Oh, no, that's fine. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. I just wanted to once again thank you for
    being here and your testimony and especially your service, each
    and every one of you. You're doing a great job.
        I wanted to say that my office has received a signed
    agreement in principle concerning the Camp Lejeune water
    contamination study, and the signed agreement between the
    Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Environment and the acting
    Director for the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
    Registry (ATSDR), and I certainly appreciate the Department's
    deciding to fully fund this Camp Lejeune water mortality study
    in the ATSDR and Annual Plan of Work.
        But I wanted to know when we can expect for this agreement
    in principle to be solidified and when will the money be
    transferred to ATSDR for the actual study?
        Mr. Mabus. The money will be transferred as soon as we get
    the voucher and it will take 3 or 4 days. But we are ready to
    fund this. The agreement in principle is pretty much the
    agreement. We're ready to move forward on this with all six
    studies, four of which previously have been agreed to, with the
    mortality study and with the health survey. We have committed
    to fully fund whatever science comes out of the health survey
    in terms of doing a fuller health study.
        Senator Hagan. Great. I think the fact that we have so many
    families that have had questions for so many years, that it is
    time to begin this study so that we can get answers to the
    family members who have served at Camp Lejeune over so many
    years. So thank you on that one.
        I also wanted to talk about that in Afghanistan, with the
    challenging terrain and extremely limited infrastructure, it
    serves as a formidable logistical challenge for our military.
    Recent reports have indicated that DOD pays an average cost of
    $400 per gallon for fuel that's delivered to and consumed in
    Afghanistan's remote locations, where the Marines often
    operate.
        The extent of our current dependence on fossil fuels is a
    strategic vulnerability that has the potential to influence
    foreign policy and national security objectives. What does the
    Marine Corps intend to do in order to lighten our energy
    footprint, reduce energy inefficiencies in expeditionary
    environments, and reduce energy dependencies? Are our Marine
    Corps bases and stations vulnerable to the energy grid?
        General Conway. Ma'am, let me correct something first of
    all that was cited. A Defense Science Board study did determine
    as much as $400 is sometimes spent on fuel, but for the most
    part that's fuel that's flown up to Army forces in RC-East in
    some very rigorous terrain. Our costs on average are more than
    what you pay at the service station here, but not nearly
    approximating those costs.
        That said, frankly, I was stunned when I looked at what I
    consider to be waste in terms of how we are going about the
    fight. There's a lot of what I would call low-hanging fruit in
    terms of how we can become more efficient in terms of our fuel,
    in terms of the structures that we build and their ability to
    retain cold or heat, in terms of water, and any number of
    things that we consume on a daily basis that simply can be made
    better.
        So we have put in place an Expeditionary Energy Office, a
    colonel with about 10 people both military and civilian that
    will work for him. We're not going to burden the field
    commander with this responsibility. That would be unfair. I've
    been in his shoes and he simply needs to know what he needs and
    how soon it's going to get there. But we think that we owe it
    to the Nation to be better stewards of the resources available,
    to cut back on our needs where we can, to keep young marines
    and sailors off those convoys to the extent that we have
    reduced demand, and we're very serious about going about that.
        In terms of bases and stations, we think we're doing pretty
    well. We have the mandate that's been placed on us. It is one
    of the Secretary's four priorities, to cut back our energy
    consumption about 30 percent by 2015, petroleum consumption by
    20 percent at the same time, and we're working hard to be able
    to do that.
        We've had more success I would say at this point in our
    western bases and stations because of solar energy and wind.
    But across the Corps we're working hard to try to be more
    efficient and again better stewards of our resources.
        Senator Hagan. Do you have plans and procedures in place to
    monitor how you're achieving these goals?
        General Conway. Yes, ma'am, absolutely, only through
    metrics and determining just what we can do. There have been
    some things done already. For whatever combination of reasons,
    the Army did not have need for eight solar water generation
    kinds of capabilities. We took those happily and they're
    already in Afghanistan.
        But we have a series of metrics that the office of this
    colonel is maintaining to give us a grade and see where we need
    to go.
        Senator Hagan. Great.
        I have a question concerning the mental health care for our
    returning servicemembers. As our service men and women continue
    to rotate home from Iraq and Afghanistan, there are those among
    them that are obviously returning with significant mental
    health issues. Early intervention services for these men and
    women may reduce the demands placed upon the VA once these
    servicemembers are discharged.
        What programs or initiatives are being put into place to
    address the mental health concerns of our returning
    servicemembers?
        Mr. Mabus. Senator, as I said in answer to a previous
    question, there's nothing more important that we do than to
    care for the people who have borne the battle. That is equally
    true of mental health as it is in physical health. The Navy and
    Marine Corps are both doing a lot of work in both post-
    traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injuries
    (TBIs). For TBIs, one key is very early diagnosis and care near
    the battlefield. The Marine Corps in particular, supported by
    Navy medicine, has been working to make sure that the symptoms
    are recognized by both medical and non-medical personnel in the
    field.
        We do a mental evaluation before people go on deployment in
    the Navy or in the theater as marines. We do a second one when
    they come out to see if there has been any impact, and then
    another evaluation some time after they return home.
        For Navy IAs, as we bring them out of theater we have a
    stop-over in Kuwait to allow them to decompress from what they
    have been doing before they return home and be evaluated in
    terms of physical and mental health. I know that the Commandant
    and the CNO can give you other details, because we are working
    very hard on these things.
        One of our primary focuses is to make sure that there is no
    stigma attached to asking for help for mental health issues.
    One of the things we look at is to make sure that as people ask
    for help that those people who ask are promoted at exactly the
    same rate as the ones who do not need that assistance. So I
    think that in our senior enlisted ranks and our officer ranks
    that the understanding that we need to make sure that there is
    no stigma attached to asking for mental health services, and in
    fact that there's an imperative that if you need any help or if
    people around you recognize the symptoms that they encourage
    you to get help.
        We're working as hard as we are on anything to make sure
    that our returning warriors' mental health needs are absolutely
    met.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you. I do want to thank you again for
    having the agreement in principle completed on the Camp Lejeune
    water mortality study, and that obviously begins as soon as
    possible. So thank you for that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank you all, Admiral, General, Secretary, very
    much for your service to our country, and I appreciate your
    responses to the committee and the questions that you're being
    posed today.
        I would echo what the Senator from North Carolina has said
    on the issue of energy. That's something I have a great
    interest in. The Air Force has taken quite a fairly aggressive
    goal out there in terms of trying to acquire 50 percent of
    their domestic aviation fuel via alternative fuel blends in
    which the alternative component is derived from domestic
    sources. I think this issue of dependence, this dangerous
    dependence that we have on foreign sources of energy, is a very
    real issue, and of course the military is the biggest user.
        I hope that the Navy and the Marine Corps can move in that
    direction as well, because I do think it's not only a national
    security issue, but it's also something that I think in terms
    of the economic security of the country is really critical. I'm
    hoping that you can pursue that path as well.
        Admiral Roughead, I wanted to raise a question with you.
    I'm very concerned about the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
    (START) follow-on treaty negotiations that we're currently
    having with the Russians, and particularly worried about the
    steep cuts that are being made to the number of delivery
    vehicles and that it might necessitate making our nuclear triad
    a diad. President Obama agreed in a joint understanding with
    President Medvedev last July to reduce the nuclear delivery
    vehicles somewhere in the range of 500 to 1,100 systems. Then a
    few days later General Cartwright, who is the current Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and former head of Strategic
    Command, testified before this committee that he would be very
    concerned about the ability to maintain the nuclear triad if
    the number of delivery vehicles would go below about midpoint
    between 1,100 and 500 or, in other words, if the number went to
    somewhere in the 800 delivery vehicle range.
        So the question I have, Admiral, is do you share General
    Cartwright's concern about the ability to maintain the nuclear
    triad if the final START number agreed on for delivery vehicles
    is below that 800 delivery vehicle number?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The negotiations are still
    ongoing. But I think as you get into the lower numbers that
    General Cartwright cited, it does become problematic. We have
    been working with the Joint Staff and all the Services, and
    clearly the value of the triad is well acknowledged.
        Senator Thune. Do you see a scenario in which the triad
    might be in jeopardy if they agreed to a number, though, that's
    below 800, if you get down to 700, 750? There has been some
    reporting in the Russian press that that's the range that
    they're looking at.
        Admiral Roughead. In the discussions that I've had,
    Senator, I'm not concerned about that--nor have we had
    discussions about any elimination of a leg of the triad.
        Senator Thune. Good.
        Admiral, the new QDR rightly dedicates a lot of ink to
    deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environments,
    and it directs the Navy and the Air Force to develop a new
    joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries with
    sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities, which
    in turn will help guide the development of future capabilities
    needed for effective power projection operations.
        I strongly support expanding and improving our Nation's
    long-range strike and power projection capabilities and I was
    pleased to see you mention in your prepared testimony that the
    Navy, as directed by the QDR, is working with the Air Force to
    develop this new joint air-sea battle concept, and I understand
    that was discussed a little bit earlier this morning.
        I understand that you and the Air Force Chief of Staff
    signed a memorandum to begin developing this new operational
    concept last September. In your view, how will long-range
    strike capabilities fit into this new air-sea battle concept?
        Admiral Roughead. I think that they will fit into the air-
    sea battle concept, as will many other facets of that type of
    operation. We've also included the Marine Corps in air-sea
    battle. But I believe there's long-range strike that needs to
    be considered. Even the ability for us to be able to engage in
    an air-sea battle from under the sea becomes extremely
    important, and also the importance of networks in how we knit
    all this together is a key element, and I've made that point to
    my people, that in addition to all of the kinetic
    considerations that we also have to be thinking in terms of
    networks, because any adversary is going to be looking at that
    same thing as well.
        Senator Thune. Last September the Manchester Guardian
    reported that the President has rejected the Pentagon's first
    draft of the NPR as being too timid and has called for a range
    of more far-reaching options consistent with his goal of
    eventually abolishing nuclear weapons altogether, according to
    European officials, and that's a quote from that newspaper. Is
    that an accurate report?
        Admiral Roughead. I haven't read the Manchester Guardian,
    Senator. But I've been involved in the NPR and I believe that
    the process we've had, the considerations we've had, has placed
    great value on our nuclear deterrent force, all legs of that
    triad, and the considerations of being able to field the
    strategic needs of the Nation. I haven't read the article, but
    I'm very comfortable with the discussions we've had, the
    involvement that we've had, and how we're looking at things.
        Senator Thune. With respect to the delay on that, why is it
    continually getting pushed back? We're now looking at April as
    the latest date that we've heard in terms of that being
    completed.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We continue to work with the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense on this, and I'll get back
    to you on the particulars of the delay.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The delay reflects the fact that the current Nuclear Posture Review
    (NPR) is fundamentally different from the prior NPRs conducted in 1994
    and 2001. The differences are of scope, process, and context.
        On scope: The 1994 NPR was focused almost exclusively on force
    structure and numbers. The 2001 review also addressed forces, but had
    more to say about strategy than in 1994. In contrast, the 2010 NPR is
    broadly reviewing capability, strategy, and policy. This comprehensive
    approach reflects requirements applicable to the 2010 NPR that are in
    section 1070 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
    Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181.
        On process: The two prior NPRs were both conducted by the
    Department of Defense with some coordination with the White House. As
    stated in section 1070 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, the Secretary
    of Defense shall conduct this NPR in consultation with the Secretary of
    Energy and the Secretary of State, so this review is interagency in
    character. From the review's start last April, the Departments of State
    and Energy have been key partners in the process and have added
    significant value to the comprehensive approach. Moreover, the review
    undertook to provide results in the form of options, across all areas
    of review, for discussion by senior leaders. This has facilitated a
    broad, high-level discussion of nuclear posture and policy of a kind
    not conducted in decades.
        On context: The rising risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear
    terrorism since the 2001 NPR have underscored the need for a fresh
    approach to strategy and policy. In Prague in April 2009, the President
    articulated a vision for reducing 21st century nuclear dangers that
    highlighted the commitment to the ultimate elimination of such weapons
    globally. He then asked for a work plan of concrete steps that would
    move demonstrably toward that goal, while also meeting continuing
    requirements of deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability.
    Determining how best to accomplish these objectives has required broad
    and deep analysis.

        Senator Thune. That comes from a European newspaper. But
    we've been led to believe that the analysis guiding the START
    negotiations in the QDR was completed at the front end of that
    NPR process, and that the first draft was reportedly scrapped
    on a concern that it was too timid in terms of reducing the
    number of nuclear weapons.
        Maybe you don't want to comment.
        Admiral Roughead. The too timid phrase is one that I had
    not heard before. I think as we have worked our way through
    what's a very complex process, I've been very comfortable with
    the discussions that we've been having, sir.
        Senator Thune. All right, good.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Senator Burris is next.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'd like to add my thanks to these three excellent
    Americans for their dedication and commitment to the service of
    our country. I would just like to let them know where I spent
    last week--at the Marine Corps recruiting depot in San Diego
    and the Marine Air Station in Miramar, where I experienced and
    flew the Osprey simulator and crashed it about 20 times. Also,
    Mr. Secretary, I visited the naval medical center in San Diego.
    I must say, Commandant, I thought I was a pretty rough kid
    coming up until I saw the basic training that those marines
    were going through in preparing them to be warriors and to
    defend this country. The leadership that I met was terrific,
    from the officers on down to the enlisted personnel. I want to
    compliment you for what you're doing in preparing those young
    men.
        General Conway. Thank you, sir. I'll pass that to the
    troops.
        Senator Burris. Also, on the question of DADT, gentlemen, I
    hear the various positions and I know that you may have some
    input into that major question that we will be confronting.
    Keep in mind that at one time blacks could not serve with any
    dignity in our military. We just heard the comment on where we
    are now with this diversity issue and the top ranks. Not only
    that, but we've had an African American who served as the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, and of course we have currently an African
    American who's the Commander in Chief. Also, at one time we
    didn't allow women in our services, and now we're talking about
    even having women on submarines.
        So please keep that in mind in terms of what it is and how
    we judge individuals by their orientation or by their sex or by
    their race, so just by way of comment.
        Mr. Secretary and General Conway, the JSF program has been
    plagued with numerous delays and setbacks. If the program
    continues to be beset with difficulties, at what point will
    your readiness posture be significantly affected in terms of
    that aircraft?
        General Conway. Sir, we have seen setbacks in the program.
    We, as a product of this 5-year defense plan, have seen a
    reduction of 28 Marine Corps JSFs and that's a serious impact
    on our readiness, because for about 11 or 12 years now we have
    not bought an attack aircraft. We did not buy the E&F when the
    Navy did and so we've been relying upon our F-18s A through D
    types and on our venerable Harriers.
        So we're really anxious to have the JSF come on line when
    it's supposed to, with the capacities that we believe it has.
    We're nevertheless encouraged that the supplier is going to
    make his timeline that he's promised us, which is initial
    operating capacity in 2012.
        Senator Burris. Commandant, pardon me. That's not what my
    information is. My information is that they're behind schedule,
    that they're trying to test various components of it because of
    the complications of it replacing three or four of those other
    planes. If we have any information to the contrary, please----
        General Conway. We'll have to compare notes, sir. December
    2012 is what we have been tracking now for quite some time. We
    have three aircraft at Pax River at our test facilities. We
    will see vertical flight we think this quarter and delivery of
    other airplanes before the end of the year.
        It is the answer to your question, though, because 2012 is
    really important to us in that we have gone for so long without
    this capacity.
        Senator Burris. Absolutely.
        General Conway. If we don't make those kinds of timelines
    it will almost immediately have an impact on our ability to
    provide the strike fighter capacity that both the Navy and the
    Air Force depend on.
        Senator Burris. General, I applaud the level of integration
    of the Navy and the Marine Corps Reserves into the total force
    structure by the Navy and the Marine Corps. How would you
    characterize the success of their integration into the overall
    mission of the Department of the Navy?
        Mr. Mabus. I think the integration of the Reserves of the
    Marine Corps and the Navy has been an absolute success. We
    simply wouldn't be able to do some of the missions that we do
    without the Reserves. They perform an incredibly wide variety
    of missions. Their training and readiness is exemplary, and
    when they are called to active duty they are integrated
    seamlessly and well. As I said, we owe our Reserves not only
    the training and readiness, but also the things that I answered
    previously about health care, mental health care, and when they
    return from active duty.
        Senator Burris. Mr. Secretary, do you see the need for more
    funding to cover the costs of fulfilling the manning of the
    reservists?
        Mr. Mabus. Senator, I think that the budget that we
    submitted will allow us to meet every mission, both Active Duty
    and Reserve.
        Senator Burris. Admiral, did you want to comment on that,
    sir?
        Admiral Roughead. I was just going to say that integration
    is absolutely extraordinary. But even with that, we're not
    satisfied. In the Navy we're continuing to look at ways with
    which our Active and Reserve components can flow between the
    two more seamlessly. A few months ago, by the time you got all
    of the paperwork and admin done, it was about a 4-month
    process. We now have that down to 8 days and my personnel chief
    and my Chief of Naval Reserve know they have to get it to 72
    hours.
        We can do that because of the terrific professionalism and
    the fact that we truly are one Navy. It doesn't make any
    difference if we're Active or Reserve. We are one Navy.
        General Conway. Senator, I would only comment on the
    mentality of the Reserves. It's absolutely incredible to me,
    but our Secretary of Defense has set aside guidelines and terms
    of their usage and how frequently we can make use of our
    Reserve formations. These people want to come on board active
    duty and they want to come on board in most instances even more
    frequently than what the policies will now allow for.
        There are just tremendous people out there who really do
    want to be a part of what's taking place in the world today.
        Senator Burris. Commandant, you're making that comment and
    I see this myself. Even those wounded warriors, the ones that
    come back from combat injuries, or amputees--I saw some of them
    out in San Diego Hospital or saw them over at Walter Reed. I'm
    amazed at the commitment that they have.
        I asked this young infantryman from the Army at Walter Reed
    when I was out there a question. He was an amputee just below
    the knee and he was being discharged that day. I asked him:
    Okay, young man, what do you want to do? He said, ``Sir, what I
    really want to do is to go back and join my unit.''
        General, I couldn't hold it. I just cried right before him.
    I mean, it's amazing to me. We have to give thanks to those
    type of individuals, committed to give us protection and that
    cause and help us to be the America that we are. We couldn't do
    it without them.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris. Senator Burris
    speaks for this entire committee with those eloquent comments.
        Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, General Conway, Admiral Roughead, thank you
    for your service to the country. Thank you for the men and
    women who serve in the Navy and the Marines.
        As we had a chance to talk about last night, Florida loves
    having the Navy and the Marines, not as many marines as we
    would like, General, but we'll work on that. But from Naval Air
    Station (NAS) Jacksonville and NAS Pensacola down to Key West
    to Blount Island to Mayport, we're just very privileged and
    proud to have you in Florida in the numbers that you're in.
        I want to first commend you for the work that you have done
    and are doing in Haiti. I had a chance to go on a Congressional
    delegation trip 2 weeks ago and to visit the young men and
    women who are down there who are helping in that rescue and the
    humanitarian effort. It is as difficult a situation as one
    could find in the world. They're doing great work, and I
    appreciate the work that they continue to do.
        The next thing I'd like to talk to you about is a topic
    that we've discussed before. It will not come as a surprise to
    you, and that is Mayport and the decision that the Secretary of
    the Navy signed, the record decision to make Mayport a nuclear-
    ready facility in order to have a nuclear-powered submarine.
        Now, it's my understanding that we have enjoyed having an
    aircraft carrier in Mayport since 1952 and it's been maybe not
    continuously that way, but it was that way up and through 2006,
    when the USS Kennedy was decommissioned.
        Admiral Roughead, I know that there has been some
    discussion about homeporting a carrier at Mayport. But it's my
    understanding that the Navy has had a long policy of strategic
    dispersal, that is dispersing your assets in numerous places in
    order to best protect them, and that you do this, for example,
    on the west coast of the United States. So is it true that the
    Navy has historically had aircraft carriers homeported in
    multiple ports on each coast, and that Mayport has been home to
    several aircraft carriers in the past?
        Admiral Roughead. That's correct, sir.
        Senator LeMieux. Also, is it true that the Navy maintains
    more than one nuclear-capable port on the west coast and that
    making Mayport nuclear-capable only makes a sensible strategy
    just like the Navy employs on the west coast of the United
    States?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, that's correct.
        Senator LeMieux. I've heard discussion that this is going
    to be an extremely expensive proposition, talks about $1
    billion to $2 billion, and that it's not going to be an
    effective or efficient decision for the Navy. Can you comment
    on that for me, Admiral?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We estimate the cost to be just
    past $500 million. Some of those costs have already been
    incurred because we are involved with dredging the basin there.
    But the costs are also spread out over a period of years. It's
    not one lump sum in any given year, it's spread out, and will
    give us the opportunity to have an alternate carrier port on
    the east coast, which would then make it possible for every
    ship class that we have to have alternatives as far as where
    they could go to be maintained or where they could go to put in
    if they had emergency work to be done.
        Senator LeMieux. I guess, Admiral, that part of the concern
    is that if there is only one East Coast port for a nuclear
    carrier and there were some kind of natural disaster or other
    manmade disaster, that that would significantly limit our
    strategic abilities.
        Admiral Roughead. Particularly as it would apply to our
    carrier fleet, yes it would, sir.
        Senator LeMieux. In terms of the future of the Navy and the
    ships that the Navy will have, it's my understanding that more
    and more ships may be nuclear-powered, not just subs, not just
    aircraft carriers, and that that's going to require proper
    shore facilities to maintain those nuclear propulsion plants.
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, as we look to the future,
    nuclear power clearly is something that we will be looking at
    as a propulsion source. There are many factors that come into
    play--construction, maintenance, the manning, and the training.
    But as we look to the future, fuel considerations, energy
    considerations, and then the power that some of the newer
    weapons systems are going to require, you're automatically
    drawn to nuclear power as a source, and we're going to be
    looking at that.
        Senator LeMieux. So having those capabilities in multiple
    locations to be able to service those ships is important?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, it is.
        Senator LeMieux. Last on the Mayport issue: I've heard some
    talk about concerns about hurricanes and weather. In Florida
    we've unfortunately, like other States, had hurricanes hit us
    in the past. Has there been an evaluation as to whether or not
    Jacksonville is as susceptible as the rest of Florida is to
    hurricanes?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. That was one of the factors
    that we looked at, because I think that one can easily conjure
    up an image that anything in Florida is susceptible to multiple
    hurricanes. But when you look at the historic nature of the
    storm tracks, that area in the Jacksonville area is not prone
    to what many perceive to be a high incidence of hurricanes.
        The patterns either take them south or the patterns take
    them up toward the Carolinas, and the area in Jacksonville
    seems to be in a very fortunate pocket.
        Senator LeMieux. It does. I'm not aware of a hurricane ever
    hitting Jacksonville. Perhaps it has. It hasn't in the last 4
    years that I'm aware of, and I don't think we've had one prior
    to that. Maybe a long time ago, but it has been a long time.
    That area does seem to be a pocket.
        I want to next talk a little, if I may, Mr. Secretary and
    Admiral, about the good work that the Navy is doing in relation
    to Colombia. I had an opportunity to visit Colombia last week
    on a delegation trip and meet with President Uribe as well as
    Minister of Defense Silva and talk about the good work that
    we've been doing for the past 8 years--longer than that, but
    specifically in the past 8 years--to help the Colombian
    military with fighting narcotrafficking and all of the
    challenges that Colombia has had with the Revolutionary Armed
    Forces of Colombia.
        It recently was mentioned to me by the Admiral that the
    Fourth Fleet was able to achieve a major success with a drug
    seizure on February 22 and disrupting a go-fast vessel and
    recovering more than a quarter ton of cocaine.
        I want to emphasize to you how important I think this work
    is. The drug terrorists, these folks what are working from
    Colombia all the way up through Central America into Mexico,
    are very dangerous people. They are not just drug gangs. They
    are terrorists. We recently saw this incident in Mexico where a
    young soldier who had been killed in a firefight with one of
    the drug cartels and then given a State funeral, that his
    entire family was killed afterwards by the drug cartel in order
    to make a point.
        That is extremely worrisome to me. It's also extremely
    worrisome to me, not to get into information that we can't
    speak about openly, but we know that Iran is projecting its
    image into Latin America. We know that Ahmadinejad has visited
    Venezuela on several occasions. We know that there are concerns
    about Hamas and Hezbollah in Latin and South America.
        So I want to commend you on the work that you're doing with
    the Colombians and with our other partners in Central and South
    America. I had an opportunity to visit our friends in Honduras
    as well and our good work that we're doing there in partnership
    with them under the new government.
        I want to make the point of how important I think it is
    that you continue to do the work that you're doing with Joint
    Interagency Task Force-South and with the Coast Guard and the
    combined efforts with the Colombian military, because I find
    that to be an emerging threat to our country and to our
    national security. While we are focused, properly, on
    Afghanistan and Iraq and other places in the world, we cannot
    fail to look south. We cannot fail to make sure that we do not
    have terrorist threats within this hemisphere.
        So thank you for that good work and thank you for your
    service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just to follow on a bit, as you might expect, from the
    comments of my good friend from Florida and my other good
    friend from Florida arriving to make comments after I speak,
    I'd like to emphasize that I do have a good deal of empathy for
    that area of Florida for the fact that they have lost ships due
    to retirement, and that there are ways to address that
    situation.
        But I would also like to emphasize that this discussion is
    clearly not over, and that there are strong statements that
    could be made contrary to what was just said. This isn't the
    place. I have a very limited amount of time here and I want to
    get into some detail with the situation in Okinawa and Guam,
    General Conway.
        But we are in a situation where we are going to have to
    find ways to make better use of limited funds and we are going
    to be wanting to put them in places that enhance our overall
    ability to perform our national objectives, and that very
    strongly includes making sure that we hit the mark on our
    shipbuilding goals, Admiral, as you and I discussed when you
    visited. There's a great deal of concern about this.
        I just listened to Senator Collins mention a CBO study that
    indicated that if certain trends were followed the size of the
    Navy could be at 270 ships by 2025. I know that the bow wave
    always looks good in the Pentagon. I spent 5 years over there.
    Your testimony is that you can hit your 313 minimum in a
    certain period of time.
        But these are just as compelling strategic concerns as
    dispersal. I've been through three different renditions of
    strategic dispersal debates in my adult lifetime, one of them,
    as you'll remember, during the Reagan administration, when we
    were going to put a strategic homeport in Corpus Christi. I
    went down there and made the speech when I was Secretary of the
    Navy to open that one. They were talking about a strategic
    homeport in Alaska.
        You're familiar with the service of Admiral Joe Prueher, I
    assume, former Vice CNO, commander of Sixth Fleet, former
    Commander in Chief, Pacific, and former Ambassador to China,
    who is not being paid by anyone as a lobbyist to express a
    point of view, who stated his strong agreement that this amount
    of money would be much better spent in shipbuilding than in
    creating a redundant facility.
        So I want to make that point, just because I'm sandwiched
    here between two opposing points of view, but this discussion
    is not over.
        I just returned from a visit to Tokyo, Okinawa, Guam,
    Tinian, and Saipan. The purpose of this trip was to first meet
    with the new leadership of the Japanese Government, but then
    also to listen to the viewpoints on Okinawa and in these other
    areas in terms of this military base realignment. General, as
    you recall, I spent a good bit of time out there in 1973 and
    1974, walked and drove every square inch of the military lands
    on Guam, Tinian, Saipan, went up to Okinawa, and looked at our
    training areas.
        Without going through the whole drill, there are two
    questions that I am very concerned about right now. One is for
    you, General, and the other is for you, Mr. Secretary. We have
    gotten ourself into a box with respect to a 2014 timeline, not
    only in the situation at Okinawa, which has been delayed
    because of the Futenma relocation controversy, and we're
    waiting for the Japanese Government to come forward with a
    decision, but also in terms of the way we are dealing with the
    situation on Guam.
        This realignment of marines and these new bases were
    arguably supposed to be completed by 2014. I think what is
    happening out there is that the civilian populace in both
    places are getting very nervous about the prospect of these
    timelines, in Okinawa, one, because people see that it's not
    really doable practically; and on Guam, because of the civilian
    infrastructure itself that would be needed, you can't hit that
    mark.
        I would like to get your thoughts on that timeline,
    General, and what our position might be on it.
        General Conway. Sir, I share your concern. Of course, we
    will await the Japanese decision, hopefully by May. But any
    delay at this point I think is going to be reflected downrange
    attempting to meet our timelines. Going all the way back to the
    1970s probably, but certainly today, there's only a certain
    workforce capacity on Guam to get things done. There is a lot
    that needs to be done.
        So our concern is that for every month we delay a decision
    and action really on the part of both governments in cohort
    with each other, it's going to have impact on our ability to
    make the timelines.
        Senator Webb. I think we're going to have to start talking
    more realistically about what those timelines are and calm
    people down. I would also strongly encourage looking at more
    training areas and firing ranges on Tinian rather than Guam.
    Guam is 208 square miles. They now say 210; somewhere they've
    gotten 2 more square miles since I was working out there. But
    one-third of that island is already military retention areas.
    It's very difficult to put firing ranges and that sort of thing
    on there.
        Tinian is wide open. I went up and looked at it again. The
    difficulty is it's not part of the specific plan that's being
    discussed. But the utility long-term is very strong.
        Mr. Secretary, I hope you will be able to raise the
    importance of getting funding for the civilian side on this
    Guam project if we're serious about doing this. We cannot
    remain as a viable balancing force in the Pacific without these
    bases. At the same time, the numbers I got from last year, just
    to give you an idea of the disconnect here, were that, in terms
    of MILCON projects for this buildup, there was $700 million in
    the DOD budget inside the wire and only $51 million outside the
    wire, and $50 million of that was DOD money for roads in Guam.
        As the General mentioned, they're going to have to increase
    workforce out there. They have school difficulties, hospital
    difficulties. When I was there, there was a $50 million grant
    that was supposed to come their way through the stimulus
    package for the port authority that somehow did not happen.
    This is American soil. This isn't like being off in Kuwait
    somewhere. These are American citizens and the people who have
    supported this have now started to wonder whether we are really
    serious about doing it in a responsible way. That can only
    happen, I think, through interagency coordination and strong
    discussions with the White House.
        Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir, I agree. On the grant for the Apra
    Harbor, I was a very strong advocate for that grant and met
    with the Secretary of Transportation on two different occasions
    to urge him to do that grant, for the exact reasons that you
    just stated.
        Senator Webb. I contacted the White House when I was on
    Guam, trying to make the point that this isn't simply a
    transportation issue; it's a national security issue. I think
    that $50 million when they have $150 billion in unexpended
    money from the stimulus package would go a long way towards
    calming people down out there, but also getting this done.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, before my dear friend
    Senator Webb departs, we have certainly had a different
    position with regard to our parochial interests on the
    homeporting of a carrier. Florida has always been a second port
    and the Atlantic fleet of carriers has always been dispersed.
    It was up until 1987 that there was----
        Senator Webb. Excuse me. We've had this discussion before.
    I have a meeting I have to go to.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Well, as you are departing, I
    just wanted to point out that you are a distinguished former
    Secretary of the Navy, and in your confirmation hearing in
    1987--well, the former Secretary and now Senator from Virginia
    has just departed; I'll just finish the sentence. I went back
    and checked the record, and indeed he supported strategic
    dispersal of carriers in his confirmation hearing for Secretary
    of the Navy.
        Of course, it's the logical position, and that was 1987 and
    the Atlantic fleet, just like the Pacific fleet, had always
    been dispersed so that you don't put all your eggs in one
    basket. There are three homeports for the Pacific fleet. There
    have always been two homeports for the Atlantic fleet, and that
    was the case up until 2\1/2\ years ago when the conventional
    carrier John F. Kennedy was mothballed, and that left no
    carriers in Mayport.
        Since then a new carrier has come on line, a nuclear
    carrier since we now have all nuclear carriers, but the Navy
    has made its decision. This goes back. The record is replete.
    In February 2005 the CNO, Admiral Clark, stated that the Navy
    should have two Atlantic carrier ports.
        In March 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and former
    Secretary of the Navy Gordon England stated: A nuclear carrier
    should be in Florida to achieve dispersion.
        In March 2006, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
    Admiral Giambastiani, shared his judgment before this committee
    that we should disperse our carriers.
        These are all parts of the record of this committee, Mr.
    Chairman.
        In July 2007, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral
    Mullen, stated, ``I am on the record more than once for this,
    very supportive of strategic dispersal of our carriers.''
        In December 2008, the Secretary of Defense wrote, ``Having
    a single CVN homeport has not been considered acceptable on the
    West Coast and should not be considered acceptable on the East
    Coast.''
        In January 2009, the Navy issued a record of decision to
    establish Naval Station Mayport as a CVN homeport. Then we went
    through all last year, the QDR, at the insistence of the
    Senator from Virginia. When the QDR was complete, DOD validated
    the Navy's position, stating in the QDR, ``To mitigate the risk
    of terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster, the U.S.
    Navy will homeport an east coast carrier in Mayport, FL.''
        I didn't intend to come here and speak on this. If I'd have
    known that my colleague from Florida was going to speak on it,
    I would have encouraged him not to. But it seems like that we
    have to continue, and therefore I will continue. Just so the
    record is understood, Admiral, you earlier testified that the
    total cost of making Mayport nuclear-capable for a homeport of
    a nuclear carrier would be somewhere around $500 million.
        Admiral Roughead. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You also stated, if I recall, because
    I heard you on the television, that that included the amount
    that was being spent now for the dredging as well as the
    repairs to the wharf. Is that correct?
        Admiral Roughead. That's correct, sir. It's to make that
    port nuclear carrier-capable, which I include to be a
    maintenance capability.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Therefore, I would like the record to
    reflect that that was a matter that we took care of in the
    defense appropriations bill for this current fiscal year. That
    is law, and that money is appropriated and it's being spent,
    and it is a total amount of some $70 million for the dredging
    out to a mile and a half, and that's dredging down to 55 feet
    to accommodate a nuclear carrier, as well as to the repairs to
    the wharf, which are the two long-lead items that need to be
    done.
        So if my math is correct, $70 million already appropriated
    from what the Admiral said, approximately $500 million. We're
    talking about somewhere in the range of about $430 million left
    over a several-year period to be appropriated to have a second
    homeport for a nuclear carrier; is that right?
        Admiral Roughead. That's correct, sir, give or take some
    adjustments in there. But we've begun the process. The money is
    spread over the FYDP, and this year what we need is to be able
    to continue this plan. It's the money that allows us to do the
    appropriate planning that allows us to most efficiently lay in
    that improvement.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I certainly don't want
    to continue to take the committee's time on this. The decision
    has been made. A good slug of the appropriations are already
    underway. The military has made its decision all the way up to
    the Secretary of Defense with the QDR, and I'd like to move on.
        But as long as this keeps being raised as an issue, I'm
    going to have to have a fight in the Budget Committee over this
    very same issue.
        If that is the case, so be it. It seems to me that at some
    point we ought to understand that the decision has been made
    and it's been made for the purposes of securing the national
    defense. If we disperse carriers in three homeports with
    another two ports available in the Pacific, for a total of
    five, we sure better not put all five Atlantic fleet carriers
    in one port up river, which the commercial channel runs right
    by the docks.
        So I will stop right there. I want to thank you, Mr.
    Chairman, for your patience.
        I want to thank the CNO, the Secretary of the Navy, and the
    indulgence of the General. I want to thank you all for your
    public service. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
        I have just a few additional questions. I don't know if any
    other colleagues do, but if they do I'm sure they'll come back.
        First, Secretary, on the WSARA of 2009, it was designed to
    address some of the problems that we've had with weapons
    systems that take too long and cost too much. An effort is
    there in law, but it's going to require in the culture to
    insist on early tradeoffs between cost, schedule, and
    performance, better systems engineering, better cost estimates,
    more mature technologies at the beginning, and better
    developmental testing.
        Is the Navy on track to rebuild its systems engineering,
    cost estimating, and developmental testing capabilities as
    required by our law?
        Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir, we are. We are aggressively moving to
    hire the acquisition professionals back into the Navy to get
    those requirements on line.
        Chairman Levin. The committee added nine F/A-18 E and Fs to
    the budget request last year, in part to help with a real
    shortfall in strike fighters. We understand the Department was
    glad to get those additional aircraft. We've seen a
    restructuring this year of the JSF program, with a resultant
    slowdown, we believe, in the production of F-35s, with a slight
    increase in the number of F-18s, but that increase does not
    match the slowdown in the F-35 aircraft production.
        What is the current assessment of the Navy of the maximum
    size of the fighter shortfall, Admiral?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We have worked this management
    of our tactical aviation very hard for the last couple of
    years, and I believe we have done some very good work in using
    attrition aircraft and transitioning squadrons a little ahead
    of schedule. So right now as we sit and we look at what we're
    going to have in the future, it's about 100 aircraft. In POM
    2012 we're going to have to look at the life extension on some
    of our earlier 18 A through Ds, and that's where our focus will
    be.
        Chairman Levin. Why not request the increase in the F/A-18
    E and Fs procurement to compensate for that reduction in JSF?
        Admiral Roughead. What we are looking at, Senator, is the
    cost of the life extension on the A and Ds is not unattractive.
    We have to look at that and that's where our focus is right
    now. Getting the JSF on track and delivered is of paramount
    importance, but we're going to look at the life extension
    program on the earlier Hornets.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, your prepared statement says that,
    ``Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention remains a priority
    for the Navy.'' Is that your personal and professional view
    regarding accession to that convention?
        Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, and it's even more important
    than just the Navy, Senator. I believe that as we deal with
    resource issues in the coming years and decades being party to
    that treaty will be in the best interests of the Nation.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary, your prepared statement said
    that you support ratification of that convention, saying that,
    ``Ratification would enhance stability for international
    maritime rules and ensure our access to critical air and sea
    lines of communication.'' Secretary, what effects would you
    foresee if we do not ratify that convention?
        Mr. Mabus. Senator, I think that ratifying the convention
    will give us much more ability to make those things happen in
    terms of free access to sea lanes, and in terms of our ability
    to use the sea as a maritime commons. I think that if we do not
    ratify that convention we take some risk in being able to do
    some of the things that we need to do.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary and Admiral, let me join in my
    commendation for the Navy for reassessing a prohibition which
    it had on the assignment of women for service on our
    submarines. I think you're doing the right thing and I commend
    you for that leadership.
        On the question of DADT, Mr. Secretary, you indicated that
    you favor repeal of that program. I guess my question is would
    you favor repeal the way you do, if you felt that it would lead
    to a negative impact on readiness?
        Mr. Mabus. No, sir, I do not.
        Chairman Levin. So in favoring the repeal, then, is it fair
    to assume or to believe that you believe it will not have a
    negative effect on readiness?
        Mr. Mabus. That's my personal belief, Senator. But I do
    believe that the President has set forth a good plan in terms
    of how to implement and I think that we should follow that
    implementation plan.
        Chairman Levin. The President has also indicated, or I
    guess Secretary Gates has indicated, that there is going to be
    an effort to see if there can be some modifications in the way
    in which the rules are applied without a change in the law. Are
    you familiar with that directive?
        Mr. Mabus. I'm familiar that Secretary Gates has said that,
    yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Do you know what he is referring to?
        Mr. Mabus. No, sir, I do not.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I just wanted to mention a couple
    things. It's pretty exciting, Admiral, as we're now looking
    down the road, what does the new nuclear submarine look like.
    Part of that is going to be designing the launch system of the
    future. Would you share with the committee what we had talked
    about before, the role that the Naval Ordnance Test Unit at
    Cape Canaveral that has been so integral to the design of the
    existing SSBNs, what that role might be in the future?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. As we begin to design the new
    submarine that will serve our country for decades to come, one
    of the components of it will be missile compartment and launch
    systems. Clearly, the relationship that we've had with the
    center down in Cape Canaveral is one that will continue. As we
    look to the future, there will be opportunities for not just
    that site, but also for employment as we begin to spin up and
    get into various stages of development and test.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I'd just like the record to reflect,
    Mr. Chairman, that unfortunately, due to some misplaced
    priorities in the development of the new rocket to follow on
    the Space Shuttle, that rocket is not developed and as a result
    there are going to be layoffs of some exceptionally talented
    and trained and educated people at the Kennedy Space Center,
    which will be a talent pool that is needed as the Navy gets
    into this design work with regard to the future launcher of a
    nuclear submarine. So I want the record to reflect that.
        Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I might ask General Conway. We
    have the Lightweight Mine Roller System. It's listed as one of
    your unfunded programs. It's my understanding--and I'd love to
    hear your ideas--that it has been very effective in countering
    the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan. Can you
    describe that system and the Marines' attitude about funding
    for that system?
        General Conway. Yes, sir, I can. It has been effective,
    sir. It's valuable to us because it's a steerable system that
    fits on the front of virtually all of our mine-resistant
    ambush-protected vehicles. There's no doubt that it has saved
    lives.
        They for the most part are blown away when the larger IEDs
    go off. But in instances where they're not, it's easily
    repairable and put back into operation, and that's what makes
    it different from some of the others.
        Sir, it's on the unfunded priority list because actually
    we've done some discovery learning on the value of the system
    since we worked our budget. Normally, unfunded priority list
    types of things would not take precedence over our budget
    items. That's by conscious choice. But in this case there are
    probably two or three instances out of that $231 million that
    we have found very valuable just in recent weeks or months in
    Afghanistan that we wanted to put on that list.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, we want to keep talking to you
    about that. Since this seems to be such an effective device, if
    it's ready to be funded we want to try to provide that for you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Thank you for
    pointing out that priority. It's a major priority. It has been
    for this committee for as long as I can remember that these
    IEDs be addressed in any way we possibly can, and we have never
    that I can remember, ever not come forth with whatever funding
    could be usefully spent to address that threat.
        Gentlemen, we thank you and we will stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                               suicide prevention
        1. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, the Navy and Marine Corps still
    face the tough challenge of preventing suicides. The wars in
    Afghanistan and Iraq have placed additional mental burdens on our men
    and women in uniform. I applaud the Navy and Marine Corps for their
    campaign to increase the involvement of their leaders at all ranks in
    suicide prevention efforts. Can you please update me on the Navy and
    Marine Corps' efforts to prevent suicides, including adding more mental
    health providers and substance abuse counselors?
        Secretary Mabus. Sailors and marines are the Department of the
    Navy's (DON) most important asset. The DON continues to develop and
    deploy training that builds resiliency for the individual servicemember
    while educating the force on the warning signs of a troubled sailor and
    marine. No longer is training focused solely on the active duty member.
    Training now includes DON civilian employees and is available to family
    members. Service-specific efforts include:

             Navy has developed the Operational Stress Control
            (OSC) program to address the psychological health needs of
            sailors and their families. To date more than 99,000 sailors
            have received the initial OSC familiarization brief. Formal
            training curriculum for key points throughout a sailor's career
            is now in various stages of development and fleet introduction.
             Navy recently updated its suicide prevention policy
            guidance requiring commands to maintain written crisis response
            plans and updating reporting requirements. Additionally, Navy
            has initiated an overarching policy review to identify
            potential barriers to seeking appropriate care or to the
            successful reintegration of a sailor to a viable career path
            following treatment.
             Marine Corps (USMC) is implementing its Operational
            Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) program. This program
            assists leaders in prevention, early identification, and
            treatment of combat and operational stress problems, using
            medical, religious and peer support assets. OSCAR reduces
            stigma associated with mental health issues and enhances other
            behavioral health programs like suicide prevention, family
            advocacy, and substance abuse by addressing all sources of
            operational stress. All Marine Divisions will receive OSCAR
            training by May 2010, with implementation to other commands
            soon thereafter.
             Marine Corps has updated its suicide prevention
            training at Recruit Training, Drill Instructor School and the
            Basic School. Furthermore, Marine Corps is now providing new
            evocative suicide prevention training to junior enlisted, staff
            noncommissioned officers (NCO) and spouses. The training is
            peer taught, interactive, and personal. Nearly 100 percent of
            all NCOs and Hospital Corpsmen have received the training. A
            longitudinal study will be used to assess the training's
            effectiveness.
             Marine Corps will be participating in a National
            Institute of Mental Health study to better understand unique
            Marine Corps risk and protective factors, and to better inform
            prevention programs.
             The number of mental health provider authorizations
            adjusts to meet the demand for medical services. The
            combination of military, Federal civilian service and
            contractor professionals provides flexibility and timeliness to
            meet the operational and beneficiary care and missions. To that
            end, between fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2012 DON will
            increase the number of military mental health authorizations by
            137.

                               cultural awareness
        2. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, there has been a continuing
    emphasis within the Department of Defense (DOD) to increase cultural
    awareness of our personnel so that they may better perform counter-
    insurgency and stability operations. What is your opinion regarding the
    Navy and Marine Corps' efforts at developing foreign language skills to
    better perform warfighting and non-warfighting activities?
        Secretary Mabus. Over the past years, Navy and Marine Corps have
    made significant progress in language familiarization and cross
    cultural competency training for in support the full spectrum of its
    core capabilities missions.
        Specifically, Navy has:

             Established its Center for Language, Regional
            Expertise, and Culture (CLREC), which leverages existing
            foreign language, culture and area studies instruction, as well
            as training tools, technologies and methodologies, to
            facilitate professional development of Foreign Area Officers,
            Intelligence, Information Warfare, and Cryptologic personnel.
            Additionally, CLREC has developed practical, Navy-wide, cross-
            cultural skills training needed to enhance relationships with
            emerging partners.
             Navy directs CLREC coordinated training and education
            to operational forces through classroom instruction provided
            during pre-deployment work-ups, or as mission-tailored Mobile
            Training Teams (MTT) to units already deployed. In 2002, in
            response to the attack on USS Cole, Navy established its
            Regional Security Education Program, coordinated by the Naval
            Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA. NPS faculty and
            regional experts embark with Navy Strike and Amphibious Groups
            to deliver underway instruction in regional history, current
            affairs, threats and general cultural/religious awareness.
             Navy is increasing regional and cultural content
            through Navy Professional Military Education (NPME) developed
            by the Naval War College (NWC), providing non-resident language
            instruction to sailors and delivering in-residence training to
            more officers. NWC offers a set of five Regional Concentration
            Areas in its Elective Program within its resident intermediate
            and senior PME programs.
             For officer accessions, Naval Reserve Officers
            Training Corps (NROTC) midshipmen now take a semester course in
            regional studies, world culture and/or world religions, with
            emphasis on Third World, Far East, and SW Asia. This
            requirement uses existing university-taught courses. The U.S.
            Naval Academy has established an International Programs Office
            and a Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies. Starting with
            the 2009-2010 academic year, Navy implemented an LREC Majors
            program for NROTC. This program provides NROTC scholarships to
            20-30 midshipmen per year who will major in select critical
            languages, with a minor in associated regional studies, or
            major in regional studies, with a minor in an associated
            language. The goal, when fully implemented across 4 years, is
            to have up to 120 total NROTC Midshipmen enrolled in the
            program.
             In July 2007, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Commander,
            U.S. Pacific Fleet developed Navy Tactical Task 4.8.5
            ``Maintain Cultural Awareness,'' committing the fleet to a
            gradual, but important enhancement of the Navy's awareness of
            overseas cultures. CLREC is tasked to define the cultural
            awareness training needed to meet the Mission Essential Task
            (MET) and to prioritize and tailor development of country and
            regional studies.
             Navy's interest in, and support for, cultural issues
            led it to volunteer to conduct a DOD-sponsored, Joint Staff-
            led, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Capabilities
            Based Assessment (REC-CBA) to develop a validated methodology
            to identify combatant commander REC requirements. Army led an
            associated Language CBA. The assessments have been completed,
            and the resultant methodology has been submitted for
            implementation pending review by the Joint Staff, combatant
            commands, and Services.

        The Marine Corps separates the needs of its Marines into three
    broad categories, each with distinct cultural and language training
    requirements. These three categories are:

        (1)  Professional Linguists (Intelligence Crypto-linguists and
    Signals Intelligence, and Foreign Area Officers (FAO))
        (2)  Special Forces (those marines assigned to Marine Special
    Operations Command)
        (3)  General Purpose Forces (GPF)

        There are numerous organizations involved in the Marine Corps
    efforts to improve the culture and language skills of our entire
    uniformed force. In May 2005 the Marine Corps opened its Center for
    Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) under Training &
    Education Command as the central Marine Corps agency for operational
    culture training and education. CAOCL's mission is to provide regional,
    operational culture and operational language knowledge through
    training, education, research and mentorship so that Marines and Marine
    units can plan and operate effectively in the joint expeditionary
    environment, anywhere in the world.
        While CAOCL is primarily focused on the GPF, there are other Marine
    Corps organizations and institutions that provide culture and language
    training and education for Marines. Intelligence Department manages the
    professional linguist community within the intelligence MOSs and those
    Marines selected for attache duty. The Deputy Commandant for Plans,
    Policies and Operations (PP&O) manages the International Affairs
    Officer Program, which includes our FAOs and Regional Affairs Officers
    (RAO). The Marine Special Operations Command manages the training of
    its Marines with specific language and culture requirements and
    receives support from CAOCL and the Defense Language Institute (DLI).
        The goal of Marine Corps culture and language training and
    education programs is to develop a force of marines that have the
    operational culture and language skills needed to quickly and
    accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively operate, in
    any complex environment to achieve the desired outcomes. CAOCL, through
    its direct programs and in concert with other Marine Corps and joint
    institutions, ensures that our marines have the right culture and
    language skills to perform both warfighting and non-warfighting
    functions anywhere in the world.
        The Marine Corps is:

             Enhancing USMC capacity to meet the culture, regional
            studies, and language needs of the GPF across the career
            continuum, from accession until retirement, and in all
            operating environments across the range of military operations
            by working across the Marine Corps training and education
            establishment. Our enduring effort to train and educate our
            marines is encapsulated in the Marine Corps Regional, Culture,
            and Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program. Throughout the
            program all career marines will study a specific strategic
            region and corresponding language, while deepening their
            ability to operate across all cultures. Providing operational
            culture and language familiarization training to units
            throughout the predeployment training program (PTP).
    Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
             Over the last 3 years, over 68,000 deploying marines
            received training in the country-specific operational culture
            of Iraq or Afghanistan.
             Over the same 3 year period, over 16,000 deploying
            marines were trained in the tactical use of either Iraqi,
            Pashto or Dari languages.
             Building Partner Capacity & Security Force
            Assistance--Providing country-specific cultural training and
            robust, mission focused language training to support the
            deployment of Marines to carry out Security Force Assistance,
            Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, Civil Affairs, Civil
            Military Operations, Transition and Advisor team missions.
             Coordinating and synchronizing efforts within DOD and
            the Interagency to leverage culture and language resources and
            minimize duplication of effort.
             Expanding USMC research capacity and outreach to the
            broader U.S. Government, academic, nongovernmental, and
            international communities to increase our training and
            education capabilities.
             Formalizing and institutionalizing culture and
            language training standards in a Training & Readiness Manual,
            eventually being a readiness reportable item for commanders.
             Creating a cultural mentorship program to provide high
            quality heritage subject matter experts (SMEs) as operational
            support to senior level MAGTF Commanders, both at home station
            prior to deployment, and then while forward deployed. This
            capability embeds cultural SMEs within the headquarters
            elements to assist commanders and senior staff with mature
            counsel when facing operational decisions that are effected by
            culture considerations.
             Fielding Language Learning Resource Centers at major
            Marine Corps bases and stations that facilitate focused
            language instruction in support of PTP and the RCLF Program.
             Providing a number of computer-based language training
            programs such as Defense Language Institute's (DLI) Head Start,
            Rosetta Stone and Transparent Languages' CL-150. These and
            other government procured software available to Marines for
            self-paced study. Over 31 languages are currently offered.
             Responsive to General McChrystal's desire to improve
            the language skills of senior commanders to enhance Key Leader
            Engagements (KLEs), the Marine Corps created an Incidental
            Language Training Program for commanders. This program better
            prepares commanders to conduct key leader engagements while
            deployed in support of OEF.
             In close coordination and partnership with the Navy
            Staff, the Marine Corps actively participated in the DOD-
            sponsored, Joint Staff-led, REC-CBA to develop a validated
            methodology to identify combatant commander REC requirements.
             The Marine Corps is creating an interdisciplinary
            research capacity for USMC to enhance it's understanding of
            culture and strategic regions and augment existing USMC culture
            and regional studies training and education efforts in order to
            ensure operational effectiveness. This capacity is blended with
            seasoned operational experience to create academically sound
            and operationally relevant publications and curricula.

              educating sailors and marines in financial literacy
        3. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, it is vitally important that our
    citizens, both in and out of uniform, understand the importance of
    saving, debt reduction, planning for retirement, and understanding
    investments. It is also important that our troops be protected from
    predatory practices of some companies that specifically target them.
    Can you tell me what the Navy and Marine Corps are doing to educate
    their members on the importance of financial literacy?
        Secretary Mabus. The Navy and Marine Corps offer personal financial
    management services to sailors and marines and their families to ensure
    they have the knowledge, skills, and tools necessary to successfully
    manage their personal finances. These services are provided by
    certified financial counselors at Navy and Marine Corps installations
    worldwide and include the following:

             Individual assistance to help foster financial
            responsibility and accountability with primary emphasis on
            financial independence, sound money management, debt avoidance,
            and long-term financial stability to increase personal, family
            and operational readiness.
             Education forums specifically designed to stimulate
            changes in personal financial behavior at key career intervals,
            including recruit training, initial skills training, Petty
            Officer indoctrination, first-term and mid-career career
            exploration workshops, Transition Assistance Program, and pre-
            retirement seminars, with appropriate financial topics at each
            lifestyle milestone.
             The Navy launched ``Million Dollar Sailor,'' a
            standardized wealth-building program, in February 2009 as a
            means of teaching sailors how to develop positive financial
            habits, how to be savvy consumers, and how to save and invest
            to become future million dollar sailors. Navy Fleet and Family
            Support Centers offer the program fleetwide.
             Navy and Marine Corps Personal Financial Management
            Program specialists work collaboratively with installation
            Command Financial Specialists, on-installation banks and credit
            unions, and DOD financial readiness partners to provide
            information on financial planning and budgeting, credit and
            debt management, military retirement plans, Thrift Savings
            Plans, home and car purchases, insurance, investment
            strategies, deployment cycle financial impacts, predatory
            lending, and personal banking.
             Both the Navy and Marine Corps participate in the
            ``Military Saves'' campaign, a DOD programs designed to
            encourage military families to improve personal financial
            savings.

                          jinkanpo atsugi incinerator
        4. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, the Jinkanpo Atsugi Incinerator
    was a waste incinerator located near Naval Air Facility (NAF) Atsugi, a
    base manned partly by several thousand U.S. Navy members and their
    families. The incinerator, which closed in 2001, emitted harmful toxins
    into the air that spread to surrounding areas. NAF Atsugi's proximity
    to the incinerator potentially exposed its residents to these harmful
    toxins. Can you please explain what the Department of the Navy has done
    to identify and notify persons who have potentially been exposed?
        Secretary Mabus. In April 1998, at the direction of Assistant
    Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN(M&RA)),
    Navy Environmental Health Center developed a comprehensive risk
    communication and health consultation program. This was coordinated
    with the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, NAF Atsugi, Branch Medical
    Clinic Atsugi, Commander Naval Forces Japan, Bureau of Naval Personnel
    and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The plan established
    procedures for providing formal risk communication to personnel aboard
    NAF Atsugi or who subsequently received orders to Atsugi.
        One-on-one health consultations were conducted for all adults who
    remained on station for more than 6 years, all adults who had children
    under the age of six, those with chronic respiratory conditions and
    pregnant or nursing women. Six years was chosen because the cancer risk
    for adults residing at NAF Atsugi for 6 years was at a level of 1 in
    10,000 above the current rate of cancer in the U.S. population. This
    risk level falls at the upper end of the Environmental Protection
    Agencies' acceptable cancer risk range. A standard entry was made in
    medical records that described potential exposure conditions at NAF
    Atsugi.
        The program required that orders assigning personnel to Atsugi
    include a statement regarding the air quality issue and referring
    members to medical and base points of contact for further information.
    Overseas medical screeners were required to discuss the health risks
    and provide a focused health consultation for individuals with orders
    to NAF Atsugi, and to provide a fact sheet addressing potential risks
    of living and working at NAF Atsugi. A phased approach was established
    to inform individuals of potential risks to adults and children living
    or working at NAF Atsugi.
        A Health and Environmental Risk Communication Plan addressed the
    means for providing information to the community (e.g., base newspaper
    articles, public availability sessions, fact sheets, web sites, library
    repositories).
        Several different medical record forms were used at NAF Atsugi to
    respond to concerns from NAF Atsugi military personnel and their
    families about medical documentation and full disclosure of their
    potential exposure and possible health effects. All forms were placed
    in personnel and family permanent health records. Branch Medical Clinic
    Atsugi, with Bureau of Medicine and Surgery's approval, developed a
    medical record form that listed the maximum sampling concentrations
    measured in 1994 for 12 chemicals exceeding U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA) or New York State ambient air quality standards
    during the air quality study. These chemicals included: sulfur dioxide,
    nitrogen dioxide, hydrochloric acid, carbon tetrachloride, benzene,
    dioxins, cadmium, mercury, nickel, chromium, arsenic and respirable
    particulates. (http://www-nmcphc.med.navy.mil/downloads/ep/Atsugi/
    Appendix--A--appendices.pdf). Cancer risks were also provided on this
    form. Beginning March 1, 1996, this form was inserted into the medical
    records of all individuals who requested the documentation.
        During health risk communication and consultation at NAF Atsugi,
    which began in June 1998, a revised form was completed for every
    individual at NAF Atsugi and those with orders to NAF Atsugi. This new
    form documented full disclosure of potential exposures and possible
    health effects, related to environmental conditions, for each military
    member and family member based upon their medical history. The new form
    was signed by each adult family member (18 years and older) to
    acknowledge receipt of risk communication. The sponsor or spouse signed
    the new form for children under the age of 18. Additionally, all
    servicemembers and family members over the age of 17 indicated that
    they received a risk communication briefing by signing an
    ``Administrative Remarks NAVPERS 1070/613 (Rev. 10-81),'' commonly
    referred to as a ``Page 13'' entry, to be retained in the member's
    military record. Prior to detachment from NAF Atsugi, another medical
    form was completed to document arrival and departure dates, locations
    of residence, schools attended and employment, while assigned to NAF
    Atsugi.

        5. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, is there a current registry of
    those exposed to environmental toxins at NAF Atsugi? If not, why?
        Secretary Mabus. The Navy has assembled a comprehensive database of
    personnel and their families stationed at NAF Atsugi during the
    timeframe the Shinkampo Incinerator Complex was in operation. The Navy
    Marine Corps Public Health Center in Norfolk, VA, maintains the
    database.

           number of navy personnel on ships off the coast of vietnam
        6. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, a frequently cited estimate is
    that around 800,000 personnel served on ships located off the coast of
    Vietnam during the Vietnam war. Is this an accurate number? If not,
    what is the Navy's accurate estimate of the number of Navy personnel
    who served on ships located off the coast of Vietnam during the Vietnam
    war?
        Secretary Mabus. The Navy does not hold records that would readily
    allow for an assessment of the accuracy of the estimate that 800,000
    sailors served in ships located off the waters adjacent to Vietnam or
    provide the basis for an official Navy estimate. A rough estimate could
    be based upon the standard complement of crew for those ships that
    sailed within a particular proximity to the Vietnamese coast. The
    creation of such a list of Navy ships would require a compilation of
    those ships that earned the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for
    Vietnam or the Vietnam Service Medal followed by research into their
    deck logs to determine whether those vessels sailed within a defined
    area off the coast of Vietnam. A more precise figure would entail
    extremely detailed and extensive research into Navy personnel records.

                             ships' past locations
        7. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, keeping track of a ship's
    locations during its lifetime is an important operational and historic
    function. Does the Navy keep track of where its current and past ships
    have sailed?
        Secretary Mabus. The deck logs submitted by Navy ships allow for a
    detailed accounting of an individual vessel's movements. However, no
    comprehensive resource or record exists that provides a list of all
    Navy ships that sailed within a defined area during a particular time
    period.

        8. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, is such information readily
    available? If not, how long would it take to compile such information?
        Secretary Mabus. A single listing of all Navy ship locations is not
    readily available. A list of ships that sailed within a particular
    proximity to the Vietnamese coast could be compiled by creating a list
    of Navy ships that earned the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for
    Vietnam or the Vietnam Service Medal followed by researching those
    ship's deck logs to determine whether they sailed within a defined area
    off the coast of Vietnam. It is difficult to accurately estimate the
    time necessary to complete such a list; however, it would require an
    exceptional level of detailed and extensive research.

        9. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, can you provide the names of
    ships that were located off the coast of Vietnam during the Vietnam
    war?
        Secretary Mabus. The Navy does not hold readily available records
    that would provide that information. A list of ships that sailed within
    a particular proximity to the Vietnamese coast could be compiled by
    creating a list of Navy ships that earned the Armed Forces
    Expeditionary Medal for Vietnam or the Vietnam Service Medal followed
    by researching those ship's deck logs to determine whether they sailed
    within a defined area off the coast of Vietnam. It is difficult to
    accurately estimate the time necessary to complete such a list;
    however, it would require an exceptional level of detailed and
    extensive research.

                  contaminated drinking water at camp lejeune
        10. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, many military personnel and
    their family members who were stationed at Camp Lejeune from the late
    1950s through the late 1980s may have been exposed to contaminated
    drinking water. The chemicals contained in the contaminated drinking
    water are known toxins that have adverse health effects on humans.
    Military personnel and their family members who may have been exposed
    to the contaminated drinking water may have lost confidence in DOD's
    and the Department of the Navy's ability to provide adequate,
    appropriate, and needed health care that will result from exposure to
    contaminated water at Camp Lejeune. What are DOD and the Department of
    the Navy doing to identify personnel and family members who may have
    been exposed to contaminated drinking water?
        Secretary Mabus. The Department of Navy continues to reach out to
    our marines, sailors, and civilians who worked or lived aboard Camp
    Lejeune regarding potential exposure to drinking water contamination
    prior to 1987. In September 2007, we launched a Notification Registry
    which can be accessed via the internet or a toll-free phone line. The
    registry was created so that former Camp Lejeune residents, workers, as
    well as other interested parties can input their contact information so
    that we may notify them and send them up-to-date information regarding
    this important issue. We have used information from our personnel
    records as well as print and radio advertising to solicit individuals
    to register. To date, we have sent out over 200,000 direct
    notifications and registered more than 155,000 individuals. The
    registry can be accessed on the Camp Lejeune Water Study Website at
    http://www.marines.mil/clwater or via the toll-free hotline at (877)
    261-9782.
        In addition to individual notifications, the Marine Corps continues
    to use general notification tools (print and other media as well as
    targeted outreach to VA centers and retirees) to reach former base
    residents and workers to encourage them to register. General
    notification will also be used to announce the completion of the
    ongoing health study initiatives. The Marine Corps will keep
    Congressional Members updated on our notification progress.
        The Department of the Navy relies on science organizations like the
    Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and the
    National Academy of Sciences to inform us on scientific matters through
    their research initiatives. Currently, no association between adverse
    health outcomes and exposure to impacted water at Camp Lejeune has been
    demonstrated.

        11. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, what is the estimated number of
    personnel and family members who may have been exposed to contaminated
    drinking water?
        Secretary Mabus. Detailed data for servicemembers and family
    members who lived or worked on Camp Lejeune between 1957 and 1987 do
    not exist. The Marine Corps can only make estimations using assumptions
    that will likely produce conservatively high estimations. We estimate
    that stationed at Camp Lejeune between 1957 and 1987 there were:

          As many as 630,000 servicemembers.
          As many as 60,000 spouses.
          As many as 60,000 dependent children.
          As many as 30,000 births.
          Total population estimate = 500,000-800,000

        Note: Data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, Camp Lejeune
    housing, Camp Lejeune schools, and ATSDR studies were used to produce
    these estimates. These estimates do not include Marine Corps Air
    Station New River.
        Patient care and Federal benefits for veterans and their dependents
    are primarily a function of the Department of Veterans Affairs and not
    a function of DOD or the Department of the Navy. Questions about
    provision of patient care or Federal benefits as a result of or related
    to exposure to impacted water should be directed to the Department of
    Veterans Affairs.

        12. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, what are DOD and the Department
    of the Navy doing to address the valid and pointed concerns of
    veterans, military personnel, and their family members?
        Secretary Mabus. The Department of the Navy cares deeply about
    current and former marines, sailors, civilian workers, and their
    families. We believe the best way to assist them is to continue our
    support of the research initiatives underway. This includes studies and
    surveys being undertaken by the ATSDR. Additionally, a scientific/
    medical literature review was conducted by the National Academies'
    National Research Council and was released on 13 June 2009. Our hope is
    that these efforts will help answer the many questions we all have
    regarding exposure to the impacted water at Camp Lejeune, NC.
        Furthermore, the Department of Navy and the Marine Corp is
    proactively engaged in outreach to marines, sailors, and civilians who
    worked or lived aboard Camp Lejeune prior to 1987. In September 2007,
    we launched a Notification Registry that can be accessed via the
    internet or a toll-free phone line to collect contact information of
    former Camp Lejeune residents, workers, and other interested parties
    who wish to receive information updates on this important issue. To
    date, we have sent out over 200,000 direct notifications and registered
    more than 155,000 individuals. The registry can be accessed on the Camp
    Lejeune Water Study Website at http://www.marines.mil/clwater or via
    the toll-free hotline at (877) 261-9782.
        The Marine Corps also continues to use general notification tools
    such as print and other media as well as targeted outreach to VA
    centers and retirees to reach former base residents and workers to
    encourage them to register. General notification will also be used to
    announce the completion of the ongoing health study initiatives.

                            chinese naval activities
        13. Senator Akaka. Admiral Roughead, China's economic growth has
    led it to import large amounts of raw materials, much of which comes by
    sea. There is speculation that China is considering establishing
    overseas naval bases to protect these supply lines. The idea of Chinese
    bases abroad, particularly in the Indian Ocean, immediately raises
    concerns that China is growing more active and assertive in its naval
    activities. What are your thoughts on whether or not the Navy has the
    capacity and capabilities to address this developing scenario?
        Admiral Roughead. Our Navy today has the capacity and capabilities
    to protect U.S. national interests in the Western Pacific and Indian
    Ocean. I am committed to maintaining the necessary forward presence of
    ships and aircraft in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, with
    credible combat power, to assure our allies and friends, deter
    aggression, and build partnerships with nations that share our common
    interests.
        As I have stated before, we require a minimum of 313 ships to meet
    and sustain combatant commanders' warfighting and forward presence
    demands globally, while providing reasonable operational tempo for our
    sailors and their families and conducting the maintenance necessary to
    reach the expected service life of our fleet. Our 30-Year Shipbuilding
    Plan grows our fleet capacity in the near term, which will enable our
    continued, relevant presence in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean
    region to support our national interests and counter both current and
    future naval threats.

                        care for wounded servicemembers
        14. Senator Akaka. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, I'm
    encouraged with the additional funding in the defense budget for
    wounded warrior care. The Navy Safe Harbor Program and the Marine Corps
    Wounded Warrior Regiment show the continued commitment to our
    servicemembers that we will take care of them and their families. How
    would you each assess the approach within your respective Services to
    care for our wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their
    families?
        Admiral Roughead. I am confident that we are extending the highest
    quality care to our wounded, ill and injured sailors, coast guardsmen,
    and their families. Our Navy provides a continuum of care to sailors
    and their families that addresses all aspects of medical, physical, and
    psychological care. Through our Navy Safe Harbor program, recovery care
    coordinators provide oversight of, and assistance with, delivery of
    care to recovering servicemembers and families who move between DOD,
    Veterans Affairs, and civilian facilities. Direct family member
    feedback and survey results indicate high enrollee satisfaction with
    the program.
        General Conway. The Marine Corps' approach to caring for its
    wounded, ill, and injured Marines and their families is solid and
    robust. The foundation of its approach is compassionate and concerned
    leadership that focuses its marines on their abilities and stresses
    that they are still in the fight as they continue to contribute to the
    mission of defending our Nation. With this foundation and
    encouragement, the Marine Corps' Wounded Warrior Regiment provides a
    wide range of nonmedical care ranging from family support and mental
    health treatment coordination to financial security counseling and
    employment transition assistance. The intent of our efforts is to
    support a Marine's return to a full duty status or provide them with
    the support resources they need to successfully reintegrate to their
    communities. The Wounded Warrior Regiment continually assesses its
    approach through personal feedback from Marines and their families
    during command visits (including General Officer visits with our
    wounded, ill, and injured marines and families), town hall meetings and
    surveys. The Regiment reaches out to active duty, Reserve and veteran
    marines and their families through the Sergeant Merlin German Call
    Center, a recognized DOD ``Best Practice'' model. The call center,
    named for a Marine who died from injuries suffered in Iraq, receives
    requests for assistance and places outgoing calls to wounded, ill and
    injured Marines to touch base with them and offer help. The call center
    adds depth to our approach and reminds our Marines and their families
    that they will always have a place to go for help.

                                 cyber threats
        15. Senator Akaka. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, our
    National security is tightly linked to cyberspace, where conflict is
    not limited by geography or time. The expanding use of cyberspace
    places our Nation's interests at greater risk from cyber threats and
    vulnerabilities. How are the Navy and Marine Corps responding to cyber
    threats so that it can carry out its mission?
        Admiral Roughead. I have elevated the role of information, cyber,
    and networks in our Navy. I established Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth
    Fleet as the global operator of Navy's cyber, networks, cryptology/
    signals intelligence, information, electronic warfare, and space
    operations. I restructured the Navy staff to bring all Navy information
    capabilities and resources under our new Information Dominance Deputy
    Chief of Naval Operations and I created the Navy Information Dominance
    Corps, integrating more than 45,000 sailors and civilians from our
    existing intelligence, information professional, information warfare,
    meteorology/oceanography, and space communities. These actions have
    improved Navy's ability to ensure the availability, integrity,
    confidentiality, and security of our information and warfighting
    systems.
        Additionally, the Navy has developed the Prometheus system, a
    unique network defense capability that receives, processes, aggregates,
    correlates, and fuses real-time and near real-time information from
    multiple network sources to provide Network Domain Awareness (NDA).
    This capability, supported by SIGINT and a Dynamic Network Defense
    operational construct, provides the Navy with an exceptional ability to
    develop a deep understanding of the network environment, to rapidly
    characterize network activity and enable a preemptive response to
    global threats in support of our warfighting missions.
        General Conway. [Deleted.]

                           shipyard budget shortfall
        16. Senator Akaka. Admiral Roughead, to ensure mission success, the
    Navy must have shipyards that are modern, flexible, and safe. The
    Navy's public shipyards play a vital role in keeping the fleet
    operating to meet the significant challenges posed all around the
    world. In June 2009, the Navy reported a shortfall of $1.3 billion in
    sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) projects at its four
    public shipyards. How is this shortfall affecting current and future
    Navy readiness, and how is the Navy addressing this situation??
        Admiral Roughead. Our public shipyards are fully functional and
    safely meeting their Fleet mission requirements. Our $3 billion naval
    shipyard restoration and modernization (RM) backlog represents the
    investment required to meet the very highest level of shipyard RM
    needs. Our Navy has steadily increased its investment in naval shipyard
    recapitalization over the past several years through Operation and
    Maintenance, Navy and Military Construction (MILCON) projects, and we
    are developing future investment plans to reduce the RM backlog and
    ensure that our public shipyards continue to meet their mission
    requirements.

                               mental health care
        17. Senator Akaka. General Conway, the Marine Corps has made
    significant progress in caring for our military heroes with mental
    health issues. But, before we can care for them, we must first identify
    them. One of the biggest issues we must address is reducing the stigma
    related to seeking counseling. Last summer, DOD launched the Real
    Warriors campaign, a public education effort designed to reduce stigma.
    It is imperative to get the message to our warriors that it would be
    courageous to reach out for help. How would you assess the Marine
    Corps' continuing efforts to tear down the stigma that still deters
    many from seeking treatment for problems such as traumatic brain injury
    (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and what more do we
    need to do as we move forward?
        General Conway. First of all I would like to state that the U.S.
    culture in general faces issues of stigma surrounding mental health
    problems and care. The Marine Corps is no different in this regard, but
    as an institution we understand that we have responsibilities and
    options in tackling stigma reduction that are not present in the
    civilian world.
        The Marine Corps' approach to ensuring that all marines who need
    help with Traumatic Brain Injury and Operational Stress issues is
    focused in three major areas: strategic communications, engaged
    leadership and ``meeting the Marine where he/she is.''
        I expect all of my leaders, officer and enlisted, to treat a marine
    with a TBI or TSI (Traumatic Stress Injury) in the same way they
    approach other injuries with the provision of command support during
    the treatment process with an expectation of improvement/resolution and
    a return to full duty. I broadcast this message whenever I meet with
    groups of Marines, which I do quite frequently. In addition, I have
    filmed a specific message on this subject in which I directly address
    the need for Marines to stay mentally as well as physically fit and
    that getting the help they need is part of being a marine. This video
    has been distributed throughout the Marine Corps and the informal
    feedback I have received has been very positive.
        The key weapon in the Marine Corps in addressing a wide range of
    issues related to earlier detection of Marines having difficulties is
    Engaged Leadership. No one is better positioned to notice a Marine
    ``not being quite right'' for any reason than the Marines that he or
    she serves with everyday. I rely on my leaders at all levels to know
    their Marines and intervene early when things seem to be veering off
    course. Our Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC) model as well as
    our ethos as warriors makes leadership the front line in noticing
    marines having a problem. That having been said, we also have a variety
    of formal tools and processes that aid us in detecting TBI and TSI
    problems. The Post-Deployment Health Assessment and Post-Deployment
    Health Reassessment are requirements for all marines to complete and
    represent real opportunities for these conditions to be detected.
    Similarly, the Pre-Deployment process that involves a structured review
    of a Marine's health status prior to deployment provides another
    opportunity to discover a previously unknown medical issue.
    Additionally, we are working with the other Services and the Office of
    the Secretary on the implementation of the ``person to person'' post
    deployment mental health evaluations that are now required as a result
    of the NDAA 2010. We expect that there will be some questions related
    to TBI as well as Traumatic Stress incorporated into these evaluations.
    All of these efforts serve to ``normalize'' having a discussion about
    psychological health and TBI and this normalization is a key element in
    our drive to reduce the stigma sometimes associated with these issues.
        Finally, while I would like all Marines to feel comfortable coming
    forward to discuss their concerns about a TBI or TSI, for some this is
    still difficult to do. As such, the Marine Corps has developed ways
    that make it easier for marines to at least start these conversations.
    Working with Navy Medicine we have assigned additional psychological
    health professionals to operational units via the OSCAR initiative.
    With OSCAR these professionals are part of a Marine unit. They train
    with them before a deployment, return home with them and importantly
    remain with the unit after returning. While I wish there were enough
    psychological health personnel to put one of these teams with every
    battalion that is just not the reality of the situation. To meet the
    psychological health needs of all marines we have also instituted the
    OSCAR extender training program that provides a comprehensive
    curriculum to organic battalion level providers, typically general
    medical officers and general duty corpsmen, as well as leaders
    throughout the unit. With these initiatives, Marines have a very high
    likelihood of having a known and trusted agent with additional
    psychological health training working close by and thus reducing a
    potential barrier to that critical first discussion.
        The Marine Corps is not in this alone of course. We publicize and
    support DOD efforts to provide other avenues for warriors, and their
    families, to access assistance without necessarily involving the chain
    of command. One prime example of this would be the ``Military
    OneSource'' hotline. While I know that my leaders, officer and
    enlisted, would prefer to be viewed by their Marines as accessible and
    the ``go to person'' for a Marine having any difficulty, having some of
    these other tools available that are outside the traditional chain of
    command will continue to be valuable for the foreseeable future.
        In summary, the Marine Corps recognizes that stigma is one of
    several potential barriers to marines seeking the care they need and
    deserve. We are addressing these barriers in a proactive way and the
    message I am receiving is that these efforts are making a difference. I
    sense this difference whenever I gather with a group of marines. We
    still have more to do in this area, but I am optimistic that we are on
    the right path on these issues and I will continue to pursue them with
    vigor for the remainder of my time as Commandant.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Kay Hagan
                       joint lightweight tactical vehicle
        18. Senator Hagan. General Conway, reportedly, the Marine Corps is
    considering removing itself from the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle
    (JLTV) program because the vehicle's weight does not lend itself to
    Marine Corps expeditionary operations. JLTV prototypes do not seem to
    meet the Marine Corps' requirements in terms of improvised explosive
    device resistance, weight, survivability, and mobility. The Marine
    Corps is also concerned that the JLTV prototypes are too heavy to be
    transported by helicopter and ships. Please describe additional
    concerns the Marine Corps has with the JLTV program.
        General Conway. Our team updating the ground vehicle strategy has
    taken a hard look at capabilities and capacities needed by the MAGTF.
    That work has underlined the critical need for about 5,000 light combat
    support vehicles that provide the payload and mobility of the original
    HMMWV, with all the protection we can get in an expeditionary (aka
    fully transportable and maneuverable) vehicle. We are working hard to
    ensure that those 5,000 vehicles that replace the current ECV and M-ATV
    are substantially lighter than the M-ATV, and substantially more
    protected than the ECV, but at a reasonable cost.
        We are finding it challenging to develop a vehicle with
    expeditionary qualities in an ACAT I program with all services. Over
    the past 15 years we've worked successfully with the Army in building
    smaller quantities of vehicles that are fully suitable to our
    expeditionary needs. The Medium Tactical Truck Replacement is an
    excellent example--probably the best medium tactical truck in the
    world, built in relatively small quantities for the Marine Corps,
    supported by TARDEC as appropriate.

        19. Senator Hagan. General Conway, can you also describe some of
    the interim solutions the Marine Corps has looked at?
        General Conway. The Small Combat Tactical Vehicle Capsule (SCTVC)
    is a lightweight highly protected system currently under development as
    a part of experimentation activities at the Marine Corps Warfighting
    Laboratory (MCWL). This vehicle would replace existing 2- and 4-door
    vehicle cabins of the HMMWV Expanded Capacity Vehicle (ECV) fleet with
    a protected capsule, incorporating best practices survivability design
    concepts such as v-shaped blast-deflecting hull forms. If SCTVC
    experimentation activities continue to produce positive results, an
    SCTVC-like capsule recapitalization, along with other needed upgrades,
    could be used by the Marine Corps as a low-cost recapitalization
    ``bridge'' to JLTV-level capabilities.

        recapitalization of high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles
        20. Senator Hagan. General Conway, reportedly, the Marine Corps is
    in the process of determining whether to recapitalize and reset its
    existing Humvees, or design an interim vehicle with a v-shaped hull
    outside the auspices of the JLTV program. I understand the Marine Corps
    is testing a blast capsule that goes over a Humvee chassis as a
    probable solution to meet the Marine Corps' requirements to
    recapitalize Humvees. Please provide an update on this initiative.
        General Conway. The SCTVC is a lightweight highly protected system
    currently under development as a part of experimentation activities at
    the MCWL. It is built by Granite Tactical Vehicles Inc. SCTVC replaces
    the existing 2- and 4-door vehicle cabins of the existing HMMWV ECV
    fleet with a protected capsule, incorporating MRAP/JLTV survivability
    design concepts such as v-shaped blast-deflecting hull forms and a lift
    to increase standoff.
    Key Points
             HMMWVs will be in the Marine Corps' inventory through
            2020. The existing HMMWV ECV is constructed from aluminum and
            then outfitted with a series of often heavy fragmentation kits.
            These kits add significant weight, stressing the payload and
            mobility capabilities of the vehicle.
             The SCTVC capsule increases protection levels while
            not increasing the overall weight of the vehicle. Outside of
            the capsule, SCTVC retains the characteristics and components
            of the existing HMMWV. Other recapitalization improvements,
            such as engine, suspension, and chassis upgrades, could also be
            implemented if SCTVC experimentation continues to demonstrate
            an effective capability.
             MCCDC and MCWL are closely monitoring SCTVC
            performance. SCTVC is being considered in the Joint Light
            Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Analysis of Alternatives as a ``product
            improvement'' option for cost benefit comparisons.
             If SCTVC experimentation activities continue to
            produce positive results, an SCTVC-like capsule
            recapitalization, along with other needed upgrades, could be
            used by the Marine Corps as a low-cost recapitalization
            ``bridge'' to JLTV-level capabilities. SCTVC is not a
            replacement to MRAP or MATV.
             We have conducted blast and ballistic testing at
            Aberdeen Proving Grounds with successful results. We are
            currently building three more test articles to evaluate basic
            safety and drivability, to include driveline overheating from
            the enclosed drivetrain.
    Plan Of Action and Milestones
             Oct-Nov 2009: Blast and Ballistic testing conducted at
            Aberdeen Proving Grounds
             Jan-Mar 2010: Building of three additional test
            articles for safety and drivability assessment.
             April 2010: Safety and drivability assessment at
            Aberdeen Proving Grounds
             May 2010: Report submitted to MCCDC and MCSC on the
            overall effectiveness of the SCTVC concept demonstrator

           acquisition of combat vehicles and recapitalization needs
        21. Senator Hagan. General Conway, within your prepared testimony
    you commented on the fact that the distributed nature of today's
    conflicts have revealed that the Marine Corps' legacy table of
    equipment was significantly inadequate. You have also addressed the
    requirement to replace aging equipment due to the fact that the wear
    and tear generated by the extreme conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan
    has reduced the service life of major end items. Understanding that the
    Marine Corps' ground vehicle equipment set has grown heavier based upon
    the demands of the current conflicts, does the Marine Corps believe
    that the mix of combat vehicle programs that are currently in the
    acquisition pipeline will sufficiently address its recapitalization
    needs, and if not, what specific requirements does the Marine Corps
    still need to address in order to meet its operational requirements?
        General Conway. As we update our vehicle strategy to meet current
    and future operating environments, we're finding the needed vehicle
    capabilities are already documented in the three major programs being
    pursued by the Marine Corps, EFV, MPC and JLTV. While the requirements
    are sound, we're finding it takes longer than we'd like to get those
    capabilities, with expeditionary qualities, built and fielded. Two of
    our newer legacy systems, the LVSR, MTVR are superb vehicles, but they
    are in fact being aged at an accelerated rate, along with the venerable
    LAVs, and a host of legacy support vehicles. Our vehicle assessment
    included a look at readiness risk in the next 5-10 years, cuing us of
    the need to focus additional R&D on maintenance, reliability and fuel
    efficiency to arrest some of the O&M cost growth we are seeing as the
    average weight of our vehicle fleet grows. We are seeing a direct
    relationship between vehicle weight and vehicle procurement cost, and a
    comparable direct relationship between vehicle procurement cost and
    annual O&M cost. So, for the Marine Corps, efforts to reduce vehicle
    weight have a double return in that they ensure our vehicles have
    expeditionary qualities, and contribute to O&M cost containment. So in
    summary, the Marine Corps will continue our efforts to replace aged
    equipment with new in the near term, and invest in weight and cost
    reduction technologies for the vehicle fleet in the long term

                      realignment of forces in the pacific
        22. Senator Hagan. General Conway, although the United States and
    Japan have agreed to invest in the future realignment of forces in the
    Pacific, there are a number of very real quality of life, capacity,
    encroachment, training access, and operational effectiveness concerns
    that still seem to be unresolved. What impact on training and readiness
    are anticipated based upon your assessment of where we are right now in
    planning for the future realignment of Marine Forces in the Pacific?
        General Conway. If done correctly, the realignment of forces in the
    Pacific could result in improved training and readiness for Marine
    forces at the individual, unit, joint, and coalition level.
        Key to this will be a robust training capability to support marines
    distributed on Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii. While the ongoing Guam
    relocation Environmental Impact Statement does not address all Marine
    Corps training requirements, those requirements will be addressed by a
    separate Environmental Impact Statement to be initiated by U.S. Pacific
    Command. This second Environmental Impact Statement will address
    longstanding shortfalls in the Pacific to conduct combined-arms, live-
    fire, and maneuver training.
        One of the biggest training and readiness advantages that this
    future realignment offers is the basing of Marines on Guam where we can
    conduct training with our allies and partners in the region. This
    allows us to host training without the restrictions often associated
    with deploying to foreign countries, reciprocate training that have
    been hosted by our allies and partners, and build strong and meaningful
    partnerships that improve our ability to respond to contingencies in
    the region.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
                          joint strike fighter program
        23. Senator Burris. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the Joint
    Strike Fighter (JSF) program has been plagued with numerous delays and
    setbacks. If the program continues to be beset with difficulties, at
    what point will your readiness posture be significantly affected?
        Secretary Mabus. As we develop POM-12, any additional delays in the
    JSF program will impact future readiness. While it is difficult to
    define a tipping point per se, we will actively manage our transition
    plan based on the JSF production challenges, growth in capabilities,
    and remaining life on our legacy platforms. The PB11 tactical aviation
    resource submission includes the management initiatives necessary to
    retain our readiness posture while we conduct the transition to the
    JSF. We will consider initiating an F/A-18 SLEP program, and further
    optimize our tactical aircraft depot efficiencies in POM12.
        General Conway. Readiness posture is a factor of many complex
    variables and is monitored closely for the Department. Among those
    variables are aircraft operational use; accidents; resources for depot
    repair; the type of repair required (that cannot always be determined
    until airframes are inspected); the outcome of service life extension
    programs (SLEP); the availability of spare/repair parts; resources
    provided to the Services; etc. As such, a precise date is difficult to
    state or predict at this time. The PB11 tactical aviation resource
    requirements include the management initiatives necessary to retain our
    readiness posture while transitioning to the JSF by increasing the F/A-
    18 SLEP program and further optimizing our tactical aircraft depot
    efficiencies. In fiscal year 2010 we will continue to explore other
    mitigation alternatives and refine our management actions to ensure
    readiness as the transition matures.

                  integration of reserves into the total force
        24. Senator Burris. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, I applaud the level of integration of the Navy and Marine Corps
    Reserves into the total force structure of the Navy and Marine Corps.
    How would you characterize the success of their integration into the
    overall missions of the Department of the Navy?
        Secretary Mabus. The integration of the Navy and Marine Corps
    Reserve Components (RC) into the Total Force is an absolute success.
    The RC performs missions throughout the full spectrum of operations.
    Their contributions are vital in achieving overall mission success.
    Their training and readiness are exemplary, and when they are called to
    active duty, they are integrated seamlessly and well. They stand
    shoulder to shoulder with our Active component men and women overseas
    at this very moment, and no distinction is made between Active or
    Reserve. They truly are part of one Navy and Marine Corps team.
        Admiral Roughead. We have had extraordinary success integrating our
    Navy reservists into our Total Force. Navy reservists provide half of
    the Navy's shore-based support to Overseas Contingency Operations in
    Central Command and African Command, they participated in recent
    Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations in Haiti, and they
    are called upon regularly to support short-term, emergent needs via
    voluntary Active Duty for Special Work and Definite Recall assignments.
    Navy Reserve personnel continually demonstrate their readiness to
    respond to emergent missions across a broad spectrum of military
    operations as an integral part of the Navy Total Force.
        We have improved our processes to better facilitate movement
    between our Active and Reserve Forces. Over the last year, we reduced
    the average time it takes to transition from the Active to Reserve
    component from 30 days to approximately 8 days and we are aggressively
    working to reduce that further, to less than 72 hours. Additionally,
    the efforts of our new Career Transition Office (CTO) have increased
    the number of Active component officers who choose to affiliate with
    the Reserves after they separate from 28 percent to 54 percent. The
    Naval Personnel Command is in the process of expanding CTO operations
    to also encompass transitions for enlisted sailors. We continuously
    review and adjust our policies and practices to allow our Active and
    Reserve sailors seamless transitions between the two components.
        General Conway. The Marine Corps Reserve is a full partner in the
    total force and provides operational capabilities to meet requirements
    across the range of military operations. The extensive contributions of
    the Marine Corps Reserve have reduced deployment requirements for the
    active component, thereby improving the health of the total force. More
    than 54,000 marines from the Selected Reserve and the Inactive Ready
    Reserve have mobilized and deployed in support of Operations Enduring
    Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, or other operational commitments around the
    globe.

        25. Senator Burris. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, do you see a need to ask for more funding to cover the costs of
    full-time manning for the reservists?
        Secretary Mabus. The budget that the Department of the Navy
    submitted will allow us to meet every mission.
        Admiral Roughead. No, the budget as submitted meets our mission
    requirements.
        General Conway. No, we do not see a need to request additional
    funding.

                           wear and tear on the force
        26. Senator Burris. General Conway, for the better part of a
    decade, the Marine Corps has been engaged in sustained ground combat. I
    am concerned about the wear and tear on the equipment your marines need
    to be successful. What potential problems do you see with regard to
    equipment shortfalls and equipment replacement due to sustained
    operations?
        General Conway. To support the requirements in OIF and OEF, the
    Marine Corps has been forced to deplete strategic in-stores equipment
    and redirect equipment, originally slated to return to CONUS as part of
    our reset, from Iraq and send it to Afghanistan. The result is that 65
    percent of our non-deployed units are now in a degraded state of
    readiness, with equipment being the largest contributing factor.
    Equipment shortages negatively impact training and perhaps more
    importantly, the Marine Corps' ability respond to another major global
    contingency. Congress' continued support and investment is needed to
    reset our ground and aviation assets to not only prevail in the current
    fight, but also to ensure we are prepared to overcome future challenges
    to U.S. interests and security.

        27. Senator Burris. General Conway, how has equipment modernization
    been affected due to the sustained operations?
        General Conway. Our modernization effort is not merely a collection
    of programs but a means of aligning the core capabilities of the MAGTF
    across the spectrum of present and future security challenges. All of
    our procurement programs are designed to support the full range of
    military operations. Due to the sustained effort of operations in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, and our focus on the forward deployed warfighter, some
    of our equipment modernization efforts have been delayed, but we
    continuously reevaluate every program to ensure we remain on track to
    meet the future security challenges.

        28. Senator Burris. General Conway, has the Force reached its
    breaking point in terms of stress on your personnel?
        General Conway. Despite the increase in unit deployments and the
    corresponding increase in the deployment tempo of our individual
    marines, the Marine Corps has not observed any indicators of adverse
    impacts, i.e., too much stress, to date. While continued high
    deployment tempo could result in increased attrition, decreased
    retention rates and decreased accessions, the Marine Corps has not
    observed any indicators of these adverse impact to date.
        Although not considered a ``breaking point'', we are also
    monitoring indicators on suicides, sexual assaults, divorce rates, et
    cetera, for signs of increased stress on the force and families. We are
    taking deliberate action in prevention programming, training, and
    leadership engagement. Examples include:

             Expanding our program of embedding mental health
            professionals in operational units--the OSCAR program.
             Enhancing suicide prevention capabilities by reducing
            stigma through senior/peer leadership and effective evocative
            peer-led training for NCOs.
             Redesigning family readiness training with LifeSkills
            courses that specifically address the challenges of military
            life in order to increase the resiliency of our marines and
            their families.

        29. Senator Burris. General Conway, what programs do you have in
    place to address immediate and latent combat stress and mental health
    issues?
        General Conway. Addressing immediate and latent combat stress and
    mental health issues in our marines is a paramount priority and a
    leadership responsibility. The Marine Corps Combat and OSC program has
    two goals: 1. Force preservation and readiness and 2. Long-term health
    and well-being. Currently, Headquarters Marine Corps is implementing
    the OSCAR program. OSCAR extends leadership capabilities and helps
    build strength, resilience, and readiness in Marines. To further assist
    leaders with prevention, rapid identification, and early treatment of
    combat operational stress, we are expanding our program of embedding
    mental health professionals in operational units--the OSCAR program--to
    directly support all Active and Reserve ground combat elements. This
    will be achieved over the next 3 years through realignment of existing
    Navy structure supporting the operating forces, and increases in the
    Navy mental health provider inventory. Currently there are six
    authorized permanent billets, two at each active division. In fiscal
    year 2011, 23 additional permanent billets will be authorized in the
    Active and Reserve divisions. Ultimately, each Active division will
    have three mental health providers, and each regiment will have two. In
    the Reserves, the division will have four providers. OSCAR capability
    is also being extended to all deploying units, but is specifically
    focused and prioritized to support infantry battalions by providing
    additional training to OSCAR Extenders (existing medical providers,
    corpsmen, chaplains, and religious program specialists) to make OSCAR
    expertise immediately available to more marines.

                    mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles
        30. Senator Burris. General Conway, I know that force protection is
    a high priority for our troops deployed in support of operations in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. Have you and General Casey conferred on the
    number of mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles that are
    required for our overseas operations?
        General Conway. Along with the Joint Staff, the Army and Marine
    Corps have been working very closely together to ensure both Services
    have the right mix of vehicles for overseas operations. The Marine
    Corps has loaned the Army 399 Category I Cougars and reallocated 400
    MaxxPro Dashes for their use in Afghanistan. The Army has reallocated
    25 MaxxPro ambulances and 34 M-ATVs to meet Marine requirements.
    Currently we are completing the coordination to reallocate additional
    vehicles to meet service-specific needs.

        31. Senator Burris. General Conway, which Department has budgeted
    for the MRAP vehicles?
        General Conway. All MRAP funding to date has been received via the
    MRAP Joint Program Office OCO funding requests. It is anticipated that
    OCO funding will decrease with the completion of combat operations,
    thus transitioning sustainment funding responsibilities to the
    individual Services. Although, the Marine Corps has yet to be given an
    official date when the MRAP sustainment costs would transfer we
    anticipate that the Services will be directed to budget for the
    sustainment of MRAPs as Programs of Record in the near future,
    potentially as soon as POM-12.

        32. Senator Burris. General Conway, will MRAP vehicles play a role
    in the modernization of the Marine Corps?
        General Conway. Our plans for use of MRAP vehicles place them in
    our engineer and EOD units, supporting the Route Reconnaissance and
    Clearance, EOD and other engineer support missions. We have added these
    vehicles to our unit equipment lists to ensure adequate planning for
    sustainment of MRAPs, and are currently integrating MRAPs into our MPF
    planning cycles.
        MRAP vehicles and the new MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) will be
    included in the Marine Corps Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle (GCTV)
    Strategy. M-ATVs have the potential to fill the armament carrier
    mission role for the light vehicle fleet.
        The approved course of action proposed that all MRAPs presently
    allocated to the Marine Corps and determined to be in an appropriate
    operational condition will be retained and designated for one of three
    locations. (It is assumed for planning purposes that all 2502 MRAPs
    will remain in serviceable condition upon the completion of
    hostilities. 1218 MRAP/1284 M-ATVs)
        Because none of the MRAP vehicles have the expeditionary qualities,
    mobility or modularity needed by the MAGTF, we continue to be
    aggressive in developing our Program Objective Memorandum to support
    our long-term commitment to balancing our ground vehicles in both
    traditional and irregular warfare, while accepting the MRAP investment
    as a near-term bridge for protected mobility.

                                amphibious fleet
        33. Senator Burris. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the Navy's
    budget overview states that the 2011 budget provides for a deployable
    force of 284 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers and 29 amphibious
    ships. The Navy has stated that while 38 ships are needed in the
    amphibious fleet to fully meet amphibious lift requirements, 33 ships
    will meet minimal requirements at an acceptable level of risk. If a 33-
    ship fleet already presents additional risk, how much extra risk is
    present with the 29-ship fleet supported by the budget?
        Secretary Mabus. The Navy has looked more closely at where it would
    be willing to assume risk for the future and procure only those ships
    which are absolutely necessary in executing the missions for which the
    Navy is solely responsible. In completing this review, the Navy has
    balanced the anticipated risk in the period with the uncertainties of
    the future to achieve the best balance of missions, resources and
    requirements possible. The shipbuilding plan provides a projected
    battle force that balances the level of risk across the fleet; while
    the long-term risk has increased above past assessments, it is
    acceptable for the force.
        The 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift, which drives the
    33 ship assault echelon requirement, is an amphibious ship combatant
    inventory demand necessary to support forcible entry operations in
    Major Combat Operations (MCO). In any area of operations below that of
    major warfare, augmented Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Squadrons
    will enhance the afloat prepositioning capacity and will continue to
    support the USMC 2.0 MEB lift requirement by enabling a reinforcing MEB
    to ``marry up'' ashore with its equipment from one of the three MPS
    squadrons.
        The augmented MPS will enable limited seabasing operations by
    introducing three core capabilities: transfer of vehicles and equipment
    between ships at sea, delivery of equipment from over the horizon, and
    sea based sustainment of forces ashore. This will facilitate the
    routine employment of prepositioned equipment in a variety of
    activities across the range of military operations (ROMO) and mitigate
    the impact of lower than desired amphibious ship inventory levels.
        General Conway. The Navy has looked more closely at where it would
    be willing to assume risk for the future and not procure those ships
    which are not absolutely necessary in executing the missions for which
    the Navy is solely responsible. In completing this review, the Navy has
    balanced the anticipated risk in the period with the uncertainties of
    the future to achieve the best balance of missions, resources and
    requirements possible. The shipbuilding plan provides a projected
    battle force that balances the level of risk across the fleet; while
    the long-term risk has increased above past assessments, it is
    acceptable for the force.
        Any additional risk in the amphibious force may be mitigated by the
    Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP). The ALEP is a program of
    record developed to mitigate the operational risk of the amphibious
    lift requirement, specifically, the vehicle square footage shortfall.
    ALEP is designed to provide augmentation to forcible entry lift
    capability in response to national emergency.
        The 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift is an amphibious
    combatant inventory requirement in support of Major Combat Operations
    (MCO). The augmented Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Squadrons will
    enhance the operational capabilities of afloat prepositioning and will
    continue to support the USMC 2.0 MEB lift requirement by enabling a
    reinforcing MEB to ``marry up'' ashore with its equipment from one of
    the three MPS squadrons.
        The augmented MPS will enable limited seabasing operations by
    introducing three core capabilities: transfer of vehicles and equipment
    between ships at sea, delivery of equipment from over the horizon, and
    sea based sustainment of forces ashore. The augmented MPS will
    facilitate the routine employment of prepositioned equipment in a
    variety of activities across the range of military operations (ROMO).
        Given fiscal constraints, DoN will sustain a minimum of 33 total
    amphibious ships in the Assault Echelon, accepting risk in the arrival
    of combat support and sustainment elements of the MEB. The plan
    maintains an adaptable amphibious landing force of approximately 33
    ships.

        34. Senator Burris. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, what is the
    long-term plan to get to a 33-ship force?
        Secretary Mabus and General Conway. It is anticipated that the
    total number of amphibious ships will be at 33 in fiscal year 2016
    (LHA-7 and LPD-27 are expected to deliver in fiscal year 2016,
    resulting in a force of 8 LHDs and 2 LHAs, 11 LPDs and 12 LSDs).
        Within fiscal constraints, the Department is committed to meeting
    the Marine Corps lift requirements throughout the period of the 30-Year
    Shipbuilding Plan. In fact, the Navy begins procurement of the LSD-41
    class replacement, LSD(X), in fiscal year 2017--roughly 3 years earlier
    than necessary to ameliorate the drop-off in amphibious ship inventory
    that results from the block retirement of the LSD-41 class. By building
    the LSD(X) at a 2-year interval, the Navy will have a total of 11
    LSD(X) in the inventory by about 2043. The objective force will be
    comprised of 11 LPD-17 class ships, 11 LSD(X), and 11 large-deck
    amphibious ships.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                         dod homosexual conduct policy
        35. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, what are
    your views about the current Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) policy?
        Admiral Roughead. My views are shaped by what is in the best
    interest of the U.S. Navy. At present, we have no empirical data upon
    which to base an assessment of the impact that DADT has had or will
    likely have on military readiness, recruiting, retention, end strength
    or attrition. The comprehensive review directed by Secretary Gates will
    allow us to assess the dynamics and impacts of the current law, as well
    as identify issues and potential impacts of repeal of that law.
        General Conway. I believe that the current policy has worked well
    to carry out the requirements directed upon us by Congress via 10
    U.S.C. Sec. 654.

        36. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, do you
    support retaining the current policy, or do you believe that the law
    requiring this policy be repealed and a new policy permitting openly
    gay servicemembers to serve in the military be put into effect?
        Admiral Roughead. I believe it is essential to first complete the
    comprehensive review directed by Secretary Gates to fully understand
    all the potential issues and impacts associated with changing this law.
    Since enactment of the law that governs the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''
    policy, we have been able to field ready forces, meet recruiting and
    retention goals, dramatically reduce attrition, and meet our end
    strength objectives. The thorough and objective review ordered by the
    Secretary of Defense will allow us to assess the dynamics and impacts
    of the current law as well as the possible impacts that may be
    associated with repeal or amendment.
        General Conway. The President and Secretary of Defense have given
    us a way forward. We will participate in the year-long assessment that
    the Secretary has directed. Once this study has been completed, we will
    examine the issue based on the information gathered from all sources,
    including marines and their families.
        My primary interest will be on the effect of any change to
    readiness and military combat effectiveness.
        When I am asked for my advice on this matter, I will support the
    way forward that, at a minimum, maintains the current exceptional
    warfighting capabilities of the Marine Corps.

        37. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, in his
    testimony before this committee a week ago, Admiral Mullen, the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that he had worked
    closely with you and the other Chiefs in understanding what your
    concerns are about changing the policy. Do you think that your concerns
    have been heard and listened to?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes. The Chairman has always been receptive to
    hearing my views on this and other matters affecting the U.S. Navy.
        General Conway. The Chairman has always been open and receptive to
    my input on this and other matters impacting the Marine Corps.
        I expect that we will continue to discuss and consult on the study
    and development on the Department's position on any future change to
    the law.

        38. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, what do
    you view as the purpose of the year-long review that Secretary Gates
    testified about?
        Admiral Roughead. DOD and the Joint Chiefs owe the President and
    Congress an informed assessment of the implications of a repeal of the
    ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' law. As Secretary Gates has stated, we must
    understand all issues and potential impacts associated with repeal of
    the law and how we would manage implementation of any repeal in such a
    way that minimizes disruption to a force engaged in combat operations
    and other demanding military activities around the globe. The
    comprehensive review will objectively and methodically examine all
    aspects of this issue; specific lines of study will address personnel
    policies, including benefits, base housing, and discipline, as well as
    separation and discharge issues. This study will inform us all on this
    important issue.
        General Conway. As stated in the Terms of Reference, the
    Secretary's review will examine the issues associated with the repeal
    of the law, should it occur, and will include an implementation plan
    that addresses the impact, if any, on the Department.

        39. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, is the
    year-long review to determine whether the current policy should change,
    or has the decision already been made to repeal the policy in your
    understanding?
        Admiral Roughead. The memorandum from Secretary Gates, accompanying
    the Terms of Reference for the comprehensive review, provides that
    ``The Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I owe the President an
    assessment of the implications of such a repeal, should it occur.''
        General Conway. As stated in the Terms of Reference, the
    Secretary's review will examine the issues associated with the repeal
    of the law, should it occur, and will include an implementation plan
    that addresses the impact, if any, on the Department.

                   high level review of don't ask, don't tell
        40. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, on February 2, Secretary Gates testified that a high-level
    working group within DOD will review the issues associated with
    properly implementing a repeal of the DADT policy. Part of this review,
    he testified, will be to reach out to authoritatively understand the
    views and attitudes of the force. Please explain what steps the Navy
    and Marine Corps have been asked to take in order to implement the
    President's direction to ``begin the preparations necessary for repeal
    of the current law and policy.''
        Secretary Mabus. The Department of the Navy is participating in the
    comprehensive review ordered by Secretary Gates. The review is designed
    to assess the implications of a repeal and determine how to implement
    any potential change Congress might make to the law. The Department is
    providing participants to the Comprehensive Review Working Group and
    the Executive Committee, comprised of senior service reps--civilian and
    military, as well as administrative staff in support of this review. We
    will continue to support the review which is due to report its findings
    to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010.
        Admiral Roughead. Navy is fully participating in the comprehensive
    review, and is providing working group participants and administrative
    staff in support of the effort. We will continue to support the review
    which is due to report its findings by December 1, 2010.
        General Conway. The Marine Corps is participating in the DOD
    Working Group to assess the implications of a repeal of 10 U.S.C.
    Sec. 654, should that occur, and develop an implementation plan for any
    new statutory mandate.
        The Marine Corps is providing representation to the Comprehensive
    Review Working Group that will identify the impacts to the force of a
    repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654 in areas that include military readiness,
    military effectiveness, unit cohesion, recruiting/retention, and family
    readiness, and recommend actions that should be taken in light of such
    impacts.

        41. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, what difference will it make, if any, in DOD planning if a
    significant proportion--say 50 percent--of servicemembers and their
    family members register objection to a change in the policy?
        Secretary Mabus. Our servicemembers are professional and dedicated,
    and they will execute the direction provided by the chain of command. I
    am confident we will continue to meet mission requirements. We owe our
    servic members informed and thoughtful decisionmaking. That is why
    Secretary Gates has asked all of the Services to participate in a
    comprehensive review, not of whether the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' law
    should change, but what the impact would be should Congress change the
    law and develop an implementation plan for any statutory change. Our
    department is providing participants to the Comprehensive Review
    Working Group and the Executive Committee, comprised of senior service
    reps--civilian and military, as well as administrative staff in support
    of this review. We will continue to support the review which is due to
    report its findings to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010. Our
    servicemembers have every right to expect us to proceed with careful
    deliberation and to reach decisions that will enhance readiness and
    advance mission accomplishment. But no matter what decision Congress
    makes, I am confident our sailors and marines will execute their
    mission fully and successful, just as they have always done.
        Admiral Roughead. I cannot speculate on what impact opposition to a
    change would have on DOD planning, but we owe our servicemembers
    informed and thoughtful decisionmaking. The comprehensive review will
    allow us to assess and better understand the impacts of the Don't Ask,
    Don't Tell law. Our servicemembers and their families have every right
    to expect us to proceed with careful deliberation and to reach
    decisions that will enhance readiness and advance mission
    accomplishment.
        General Conway. It is not clear to me that this decision will be
    made using strictly democratic principles. For me, given my title 10
    responsibilities, the issue is the impact of any change to the current
    law and policy on readiness and combat effectiveness, not on how many
    people support that change.
        As instructed, the Department is conducting a review and study of
    the force to gauge the impact of a change to the current law and
    policy. Our understanding is that this study will include input from
    servicemembers and their families on the potential impact of a repeal
    of the current law on readiness, military effectiveness and unit
    cohesion, recruiting and retention, and family readiness.
        Once the Department concludes this effort, the Service Chiefs will
    provide review and comment. The Department and Chiefs will then have
    the opportunity to deliver their best advice to the President, and then
    to Congress. Armed with these recommendations, Congress will be able
    determine the way forward and we will follow this direction.

                  cost growth in joint strike fighter aircraft
        42. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, do you
    expect that additional cost growth in the JSF program arising from
    Secretary Gates' decision to restructure the program in December 2009
    will trigger a Nunn-McCurdy breach? Please explain your answer.
        Admiral Roughead. DOD reported a Nunn-McCurdy breach in the JSF
    program in its December 2009 F-35 Selected Acquisition Report, which
    was delivered to Congress on 2 April. The report was based on the
    independent Joint Estimating Team (JET II) assessment, led by the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation. The JET II determined that F-35 program cost increases were
    a result of: higher than planned development costs due to weight-driven
    performance issues identified in 2003, and the related schedule
    extension to address them; an increase in labor and overhead rates;
    degradation of airframe commonality; reduction in Department of Navy
    planned procurement quantities, from 1,089 to 680 aircraft; increases
    in commodity prices (particularly titanium); and major subcontractor
    cost growth.
        General Conway. Defer to OSD.

        43. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, in the
    context of a projected shortfall in the Navy's tactical strike-fighter
    capability over the intermediate- to long-term, what would that mean
    for the Navy?
        Admiral Roughead. The Department of the Navy (DoN) has the
    necessary tactical aircraft capacity in the near term to support our
    Nation's strategic demands; however, ongoing assessments forecast a
    potential decrease in our strike fighter inventory that will peak at
    the end of this decade. We plan on addressing this inventory decrease
    through aggressive and precise management strategies that include
    service-life extension programs to prolong the use of existing F/A-18
    A-D aircraft, reducing the number of aircraft available in our non-
    deployed squadrons to the minimum required, accelerating the transition
    of seven legacy squadrons to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets (using F/A-18E/F
    attrition aircraft in two cases), and maximizing depot level throughput
    to return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the Fleet more quickly.
    Collectively, these measures will extend the service life of our legacy
    aircraft and make the projected inventory decrease manageable.
        While the F/A-18 fleet continues to meet operational needs in the
    current conflicts, the timely delivery of the JSF remains critical to
    our future strike fighter capacity. I remain committed to the JSF
    program and am watching it closely as the program restructures and a
    new program manager takes office.
        General Conway. The USMC will preserve our legacy fleets of
    Harriers and Hornets with sufficient funding while awaiting the fifth
    generation STOVL JSF. This is the best option to balance the
    requirement to fulfill operational commitments with legacy aircraft,
    while funding the development and procurement of the JSF. We are taking
    proactive steps today to preserve the legacy fleets, maintain their
    operational relevance, and continuing these efforts until the
    production of STOVL is sufficient to fully transition our Harriers,
    Hornets, and Prowlers to the STOVL variant.

        44. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, the F-35
    JSF program, already facing a 1-year delay, could be heading toward a
    breach of Nunn-McCurdy cost growth limits. Will the Navy and Marine
    Corps be equipped with the F-35 in time to have the required
    capabilities they need, when they need it?
        Admiral Roughead. The Navy remains on schedule to deploy its F-35C
    carrier variant strike fighter with the required Block III capability
    as planned in 2016.
        While the JSF program restructuring directed by the Secretary of
    Defense pushed back F-35C Initial Operating Capability (IOC) to 2016,
    this IOC reflects our requirement for a squadron of 10 Block III
    aircraft that have completed Initial Operating Test & Evaluation and
    are ready to deploy. We will begin to receive JSF aircraft into our
    squadrons in 2014 and anticipate their deployment in 2016.
        General Conway. We are confident the action taken by the Secretary
    of Defense to address the testing and production problems in PB-11
    establish a viable program that continues to support a Marine Corps
    December 2012 IOC.

        45. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, I'm
    concerned about the Naval Air Systems Command's (NAVAIR) recent finding
    that the Navy's version of the F-35 JSF may be considerably more
    expensive to operate than the legacy aircraft that it was intended to
    replace. Is NAVAIR's analysis reflected in the Navy's budget proposal
    this year?
        Admiral Roughead. I have directed my leaders to study and
    understand the total ownership costs (TOCs) of new and existing
    systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost per flight hour is consistent
    with that direction. It is not prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF
    based on the NAVAIR study alone. Navy has not yet completed operational
    testing of the carrier variant and flight hour costs are only one
    aspect of JSF TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority
    for the U.S. Navy, and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our
    long-term operations and support costs for all our ships and aircraft.
        General Conway. No, the assessment you are referring to is not an
    official estimate, or considered a finished product, nor has it been
    refined or corrected to accurately compare operation and support (O&S)
    costs between a legacy supportability construct and the JSF
    evolutionary international collaborative approach to sustainment.
        We are realizing today the Congressional Budget Office analysis
    from 2001, age does cause higher O&S cost increases ranging from 1
    percent to 3 percent for every additional year of age. The average age
    today of our F/A-18s is 19 years and will reach 32 years by retirement
    in 2023, increasing O&S costs by over 50 percent. The cost of
    recapitalization and modernization of our legacy aircraft will soon
    exceed the cost of procuring and sustaining an aircraft with more
    relevant capabilities and technology that will substantially increase
    survivability, reliability and maintainability.
        Managing the future O&S costs of the JSF is a joint DOD and
    international endeavor that requires deliberate action and finite
    analysis now in the early acquisition phase of the program to ensure
    affordability as the JSF ages through the next 30 plus years of service
    life. The JSF program is just now maturing to the point where we can
    move from modeling cost to assessing the actual cost of operating the
    aircraft with our first deliveries in 2010.

       f-35 joint strike fighter lightning testing and engineering issues
        46. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, I continue to be concerned about the F-35 Lightning II
    acquisition program, even with Secretary Gates' decision to restructure
    the program in December 2009. Basically, at this point, I am concerned
    about whether the program will make the deadlines by which it is
    supposed to deliver aircraft with initial operating capability (IOC) to
    each of the Services, the program's ability to manage software risk,
    the testing program's ability to detect and anticipate problems, and
    the capability of those aircraft that will be delivered under low-rate
    initial production (LRIP). A few weeks ago, the Director, Operational
    Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) found that ``[c]ontinued production
    concurrent with the slow increase in flight testing over the next 2
    years will commit DOD and the Services to test, training, and
    deployment plans with substantial risk.'' Do you share that concern,
    particularly as it relates to the Navy's version of the fighter?
        Secretary Mabus. The F-35 program was structured with known
    concurrency that will remain, though reduced, with the SECDEF directed
    F-35 program restructure. The DOD decision to restructure the F-35
    Program was in response to multiple Department studies and reports
    including DOT&E's most recent Operational Test report. The F-35 program
    restructure mitigates many of the risks highlighted by DOT&E and the
    GAO, though the Department acknowledges that F-35 program risks will
    continue, as would any major defense acquisition program. Software risk
    will be mitigated by the addition of another software integration line
    to preclude mission systems software from becoming a limiting factor
    during SDD. The F-35 test program risks will be mitigated by the
    continuation of a test program assessment in conjunction with the
    support and advice of DOT&E. An Integrated Test Review Team composed of
    experts in developmental test and operational test continues to mature
    test program plans to ensure program technical maturity is aligned with
    Initial Operating Capability (IOC) dates; operational assessments are
    optimized; new opportunities for integrated test are matured; test
    schedule margins are realistic; and the proposed flow of technical data
    enables the planned operational test periods. To help mitigate aircraft
    assets required during testing, the program is adding one carrier
    variant (CV) aircraft to the SDD program in order to expand
    developmental testing capacity and will utilize three low-rate initial
    production (LRIP) aircraft in support of development testing. USMC IOC
    requirements encompass capabilities, equipment, training, and support
    metrics that will measure the progress of the program office to meet
    our goals and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all the tenets for
    operational use of the F-35B are ready. The Navy IOC date is based on
    sufficient aircraft quantities; desired capability to conduct all ORD
    missions, to include, but not limited to, AI, OCA, DCA, CAS, SEAD/DEAD
    and CSAR in a denied, near-peer environment better than legacy
    aircraft; and completion of operational test of that capability. Based
    upon the SECDEF directed F-35 program restructure and Navy/Marine Corps
    IOC requirements, the Marine Corps F-35B IOC in 2012 and the Navy F-35C
    IOC in 2016.
        Admiral Roughead. I continue to watch the JSF program carefully.
    The F-35 program restructure directed by the Secretary of Defense
    mitigates many of the risks highlighted by the most recent DOT&E
    Operational Test report; however, the Department acknowledges that risk
    in the F-35 program will continue. To mitigate this risk, we will add
    one F-35C carrier variant aircraft to the System Development and
    Demonstration (SDD) program in order to expand developmental testing
    capacity; we will utilize three LRIP aircraft in support of development
    testing; and we will add another software integration line to preclude
    mission systems software from becoming a limiting factor during SDD.
    These three steps, taken together, establish a viable program and
    continue to support the Navy's 2016 IOC and the Marine Corps' 2012 IOC.
        General Conway. With the recent program restructuring approved by
    USD(AT&L), the F-35B IOC is projected to be 2012 and the F-35C IOC is
    projected to be 2016. The action taken by the SECDEF to address the
    testing and production problems in PB-11 establish a viable program
    that continues to support a Marine Corps December 2012 IOC. USMC IOC
    requirements encompass capabilities, equipment, training, and support
    metrics that will measure the progress of the program office to meet
    our goals and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all the tenets for
    operational use of the F-35B are ready.
        Navy IOC is contingent on the requirement to deploy an ORD
    compliant, Block 3 aircraft with IOT&E complete.

        47. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, with the Navy to accept delivery of its first squadrons with
    IOC in 2012 (for the Marine Corps) and 2014 (for the Navy), where do
    you see the most significant risk with respect to the Navy's versions
    of the fighter?
        Secretary Mabus. Based upon the SECDEF F-35 Program Restructure,
    the Marine Corps F-35B IOC will remain in 2012 and the Navy F-35C IOC
    will be in 2016.
        The earlier Navy IOC of 2014 was based on three items: sufficient
    aircraft quantities; capability; and completion test. Based on the
    program and test schedule restructure and delivery of fiscal year 2011
    procured aircraft, the Navy IOC has been revised to be in 2016. The
    most stressing Navy IOC capability requirement is Destruction of Enemy
    Air Defenses which requires a highly integrated mission systems suite
    and stand-off weapons. Further delays in delivery of capabilities are
    the most significant risk to the Navy IOC--with any further delays
    exacerbating the overall strike fighter shortfall. Moreover, the Navy
    requires a sufficient ramp to stand-up a training squadron and a fleet
    squadron prior to declaring IOC. The Navy's intent is to stand up
    squadrons as aircraft become available and declare IOC when sufficient
    capability is tested and delivered. And as with any complex weapon
    system development program, unforeseen discovery during F-35B/F-35C
    test will remain a risk until completion of IOT&E.
        Admiral Roughead. The most significant risk to Navy's version of
    the F-35 JSF is further delay in the delivery of capabilities required
    to achieve carrier variant IOC, which is currently scheduled for 2016.
    IOC will occur once the capabilities identified in our Operational
    Requirements Document for JSF are attained. Navy F-35C IOC is defined
    as outfitting a squadron with 10 Operational Requirement Document (ORD)
    compliant, Block III aircraft ready to deploy with Initial Operational
    Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) complete.
        General Conway. The most significant risk to IOC is the late
    delivery of aircraft to flight test and delays in mission system and
    ALIS software build/test. Both have been addressed by the Secretary of
    Defense in his restructure of the program in PB-11.

        48. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, as you know, NAVAIR effectively determined a few weeks ago that
    the Marine Corps and the Navy's version of the JSF may end up being too
    expensive to operate, with each flight hour ultimately costing about
    $31,000 compared with about $19,000 per flight hour for current F/A-18
    Hornets and AV-8B Harriers--considerably higher than the costs to
    operate than the legacy aircraft they were intended to replace. Have
    you reviewed NAVAIR's analysis and, if so, do you agree with its
    finding on expected operating costs of JSF?
        Secretary Mabus. I have directed my leaders to study and understand
    the TOCs of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost
    per flight hour is consistent with that direction. However, it is not
    prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone.
    The Department of the Navy has not yet completed operational testing of
    its two JSF variants and flight hour costs are only one aspect of JSF
    TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority for the
    Department, and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term
    operations and support costs for all our ships and aircraft.
        Admiral Roughead. I have directed my leaders to study and
    understand the TOCs of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of
    JSF cost per flight hour is consistent with that direction. It is not
    prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone.
    Navy has not yet completed operational testing of the carrier variant
    and flight hour costs are only one aspect of JSF TOCs. Understanding
    and controlling TOCs is a priority for the U.S. Navy, and we will
    continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term operations and support
    costs for all our ships and aircraft.
        General Conway. The department is on the front end of reviewing JSF
    TOCs and assumptions. The brief is a working document and has yet to be
    coordinated across the program office, the services and senior
    leadership.
        The NAVAIR cost team brief on TOCs is a pre-decisional brief. These
    types of briefs are developed to inform leadership of ongoing technical
    analyses and provide options and consequences as we work to deliver
    affordable programs. In a program such as the JSF, these analyses are
    constantly evolving. The brief is an internal working document and
    provides points for discussion in support of achieving successful and
    affordable fielding of all variants of the JSF.
        The operating and support (O&S) costs in the working document are
    not definitive and are subject to variance based on potential courses
    of action. The Navy Department is fully coordinated with OSD, the Air
    Force and the Joint Program Office in executing this critical program.

        49. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, if you do, what does that mean for the Navy's JSF program and
    what kind of mix should we achieve in terms of the Navy's future
    strike-fighter force?
        Secretary Mabus. The Department's commitment to tactical aviation
    integration is enduring. We view the integration of our forces as the
    best means for the Department to balance operational and programmatic
    risk. We are committed to making a mix decision at the earliest
    opportunity based upon F-35 program maturity as defined by discreet and
    successful program events and accomplishments. Among those key events
    is F-35B test burn down; F-35B/L-class Sea Trials; F-35C test burn
    down; F-35C/CVN sea-trials; and assessment of F-35B/CVN
    interoperability. Upon completion of these, and other key program
    milestones, the Department will make a determination on the proper mix
    between F-35B and F-35C variants. We anticipate this decision could be
    made after the completion of the JSF program SDD in accordance with the
    F-35 program restructure.
        Admiral Roughead. The Navy is committed to the JSF program and has
    not changed the total number of JSF aircraft it intends to buy. Our
    carrier air wings will continue to have a mix of Super Hornet and JSF
    into the 2030s that will bring great capability across a wide range of
    operations. Those capabilities include stealthy, deep penetrating
    strike, netted far-reaching sensors, and lethal close air support to
    troops in contact with enemy forces.
        General Conway. The Department's commitment to tactical aviation
    integration is enduring. We view the integration of our forces as the
    best means for the Department to balance operational and programmatic
    risk. We are committed to making a mix decision at the earliest
    opportunity based upon F-35 program maturity as defined by discreet and
    successful program events and accomplishments. Among those key events
    is F-35B test burn down; F-35B/L-class Sea Trials; F-35C test burn
    down; F-35C/CVN sea-trials; and assessment of F-35B/CVN
    interoperability. Upon completion of these, and other key program
    milestones, the Department will make a determination on the proper mix
    between F-35B and F-35C variants. We anticipate this decision could be
    made after the completion of the JSF program SDD in accordance with the
    F-35 program restructure.

        50. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, how is NAVAIR's assessment reflected in your current budget
    proposal?
        Secretary Mabus. I have directed my leaders to study and understand
    the TOCs of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost
    per flight hour is consistent with that direction. However, it is not
    prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone.
    The Department of the Navy has not yet completed operational testing of
    its two JSF variants and flight hour costs are only one aspect of JSF
    TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority for the
    Department, and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term
    operations and support costs for all our ships and aircraft.
        Admiral Roughead. I have directed my leaders to study and
    understand the TOCs of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of
    JSF cost per flight hour is consistent with that direction. It is not
    prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone.
    Navy has not yet completed operational testing of the carrier variant
    and flight hour costs are only one aspect of JSF TOCs. Understanding
    and controlling TOCs is a priority for the U.S. Navy, and we will
    continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term operations and support
    costs for all our ships and aircraft.
        General Conway. The assessment you are referring to is not an
    official estimate, or considered a finished product, nor has it been
    refined or corrected to accurately compare O&S costs between a legacy
    supportability construct and the JSF evolutionary international
    collaborative approach to sustainment.

           f-35 joint strike fighter and initial operating capability
        51. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, when Secretary Gates testified here on DOD's budget request a
    few weeks ago, he explained that, while the JSF program is holding
    schedule in terms of when the Services can expect to take delivery of
    fighters with IOC, he expects that fewer quantities may be delivered. I
    understand that the JSF program's IOC date for the Marine Corps is 2012
    and for the Navy is 2014. What is your understanding of how many
    fighters with IOC will be delivered to the Navy and Marine Corps by
    that time? Please explain.
        Secretary Mabus. The current program plan stands up the first two
    training squadrons (USAF and USMC) at Eglin in 2010 and delivers
    production aircraft to the Marine Corps in 2012, Air Force in 2013, and
    Navy in 2014. Each service has differing requirements for Initial
    Operational Capability (IOC) depending upon what capabilities each
    Service requires at IOC encompassing aircraft performance, equipment,
    training, testing, and support. Based upon the F-35 program restructure
    schedule, the Marine Corps will have an IOC in 2012 and the Navy will
    IOC in 2016. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with 10 BLK 2 F-35Bs and the
    Navy plans to IOC with 10 ORD compliant BLK 3 F-35Cs.
        Admiral Roughead. The current JSF program plan begins to deliver
    production aircraft to the Marine Corps in 2012 and the Navy in 2014.
    Navy will begin to accept JSF aircraft into its squadrons in 2014, and
    we expect Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the F-35C to occur in
    2016 with 10, Operational Requirements Document (ORD)-compliant, Block
    III aircraft that are ready to deploy. The Marine Corps expects to
    achieve IOC of the F-35B in 2012 with 10, Operational Requirements
    Document (ORD)-compliant, Block IIB aircraft.
        General Conway. The current program plan stands up the first two
    training squadrons (USAF and USMC) at Eglin in 2010 and delivers
    production aircraft to the Marine Corps in 2012, Air Force in 2013, and
    Navy in 2014. Each service has differing requirements for Initial
    Operational Capability (IOC) depending upon what `capabilities' each
    Service requires at IOC encompassing aircraft performance, equipment,
    training, testing, and support. Based upon the revised JET II schedule,
    the Marine Corps will have an IOC in 2012 and the Navy intends to IOC
    in 2016. The Marine Corps plan to IOC with 10 BLK 2 F-35Bs and the Navy
    plans to IOC with 10 BLK 3 F-35Cs.

        52. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, looking ahead to 2010, in your view what milestones do you
    believe the Joint Program Office (JPO) and prime contractor must
    complete on time and on budget to achieve the Navy's IOC dates?
        Secretary Mabus. Key 2010 planned events include the following:
    complete the first F-35B Vertical Landing [accomplished March 19,
    2010]; complete the first F-35C flight; deliver Block 1.0 software to
    flight test; deliver at least three aircraft to Eglin AFB; commence
    flight training operations at Eglin AFB; deliver 11 test aircraft to
    Naval Air Station Patuxent River and Edwards AFB; and complete 400
    flight tests.
        Admiral Roughead. The Joint Program Office (JPO) and prime
    contractor should accomplish the following milestones planned for 2010:
    completing the first F-35B Vertical Landing (accomplished on 19 March
    2010); completing the first F-35C flight; delivering Block 1.0 software
    to flight test; delivering at least three aircraft and commencing
    flight training operations at Eglin AFB; delivering the required test
    aircraft to Naval Air Station Patuxent River and Edwards AFB to
    complete test programs supporting IOT&E completion in 2016.
        General Conway. In 2010 we concur with the Joint Program Office's
    objectives are the requisite milestones needed to keep on track to IOC.
    These include; ALIS operational at the Eglin Integrated Training
    Center, award of the LRIP 4 contract, delivery of Block 1.0 Software to
    Flight Test, commence flight training at Eglin, complete training for
    125 maintenance personnel, deliver at least 3 aircraft to Eglin,
    deliver 11 test aircraft to Pax and Edwards, demonstrate flight test
    rate of 12 Fts/Acft/Mo, and complete 400 test flights. For the Marine
    Corps key milestones are the standup of the first training squadron at
    Eglin, the completion of the West and East Coast Environmental Studies,
    and starting flight training of the first STOVL pilots.

        53. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, I know that the dates by which all the Services intend to take
    delivery of JSFs with IOC are being maintained. While, for the Navy,
    IOC means ``full warfighting capability and mission functionality'',
    for the Marine Corps it means ``interim warfighting capabilities, basic
    weapons and moderate mission system capabilities''. However,
    development on the JSF is not expected to be completed (per Deputy
    Secretary's statement a few days ago) before November 2015 or, more
    likely (per the Joint Estimating Teams' original assessment), by April
    2017. That is well after the IOC squadrons are supposed to be delivered
    to the Navy in 2012 and 2015.
        Therefore, it seems to me that the only way the Navy will be able
    to take delivery of its IOC squadrons on time is by accepting less
    initial capability and defer some requirements to a future upgrade
    program. Given the likelihood that, in others words, the definition of
    IOC for your JSF squadrons will have to change, what is that new
    definition?
        Secretary Mabus. With the recent program restructuring approved by
    the Secretary of Defense, the IOC for the F-35B is 2012 and 2016 for
    the F-35C. The actions taken by the Secretary of Defense include
    procuring an additional F-35C aircraft to be used for flight testing,
    loaning three early production aircraft to developmental test and
    directing the addition of another software integration line to the
    program. These three steps, taken together, establish a viable program
    and continue to support the DoN IOC dates.
        Each service has a somewhat different definition of IOC depending
    on what capabilities they intend to have at IOC, their operational and
    testing requirements, and the number of aircraft they require for IOC.
    For the Marine Corps, IOC is defined as a squadron of 10 F-35B Block 2
    aircraft able to execute the full range of TACAIR directed mission sets
    and deploy on F-35B compatible ships and austere expeditionary sites.
    For the Navy F-35C, IOC date is based on three items: sufficient
    aircraft quantities, desired capability to conduct all ORD missions, to
    include, but not limited to, AI, OCA, DCA, CAS, SEAD/DEAD and CSAR in a
    denied, near-peer environment better than legacy aircraft; and
    completion of operational test of that capability test.
        Admiral Roughead. The Navy is retaining its definition of IOC as
    Operational Requirements Document (ORD)-compliant, Block III aircraft
    that have completed Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E). As a
    result of the recent program restructuring approved by the Secretary of
    Defense, the IOC for Navy's F-35C is currently in 2016.
        General Conway. The F-35B Block 2B is a far superior aircraft than
    any aircraft in the DoN inventory. With VLO survivability, a powerful
    integrated sensor suite, fused information displays, interoperable
    joint connectivity, a precision weapon capability, and self protect
    anti-air weapons it is a total package of capabilities that will
    revolutionize our expeditionary Marine Air-Ground combat power in all
    threat environments while reducing the reliance on supporting aircraft,
    tankers and jammers, and enabling joint interoperability with newer
    systems.
        The aircraft and equipment required to meet IOC were procured in
    fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. The training facilities for our
    aircrew and maintenance personnel are on track at the Joint Integrated
    Training Center at Eglin AFB.
        The remaining infrastructure that enables IOC to include
    environmental studies, and facilities ashore and afloat is on schedule.
        Our IOC requirements and associated metrics that encompass
    capabilities, equipment, training, and support will measure the
    progress of the program office to meet our goals between now and
    December 2012 and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all the elements
    required for operational use of the F-35B are ready.

                   joint strike fighter--marine corps variant
        54. Senator McCain. General Conway, the draft Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) report released for DOD comment on February
    12, 2010, lists a large number of critical issues facing JSF. In
    particular, the Marine Corps IOC date of 2012 does not appear to be
    achievable unless the Marine Corps accepts aircraft that are far below
    full combat capability which will have to be upgraded later at
    significant expense for retrofitting. The system development and
    demonstration (SDD) phase for the F-35 extends until April 2017 under
    the most recent December 2009 estimate cited by GAO based on multiple
    sources including NAVAIR and DOT&E, and GAO predicts that technical,
    manufacturing, and testing delays will further delay completion of the
    SDD wring out of potential problems. Why would the Marine Corps accept
    an IOC date that is 5 years or more before SDD shake out of the program
    is complete?
        General Conway. For the Marine Corps F-35B, IOC is defined as a
    squadron of 10 aircraft able to execute the full range of TACAIR
    directed mission sets and to deploy on F-35B-compatible ships and to
    austere expeditionary sites. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with a
    multi-mission support capable Block 2B aircraft, primarily close air
    support and enhanced air interdiction.
        With the recent program restructuring, IOC is projected to be 2012
    for the F-35B which is based on operational requirements and the
    associated metrics that encompass capabilities, equipment, training,
    and support that will measure the progress of the program to meet the
    USMC requirements between now and December 2012 and enable the Marine
    Corps to ensure all the elements required for operational use of the F-
    35B are ready. An IOC declaration will be dependent upon meeting these
    requirements.

        55. Senator McCain. General Conway, key milestones for the program
    have shifted 2 to 3 years to the right since the Program of Record was
    established in December 2008, yet the Marine Corps IOC has remained
    unchanged as 2012. Does this indicate that an IOC of 2012 cannot be met
    with an acceptable level or risk given the current delays in
    development, production, and testing?
        General Conway. We are confident the action taken by the Secretary
    of Defense to address the testing and production problems in PB-11
    establish a viable program that continues to support a Marine Corps
    December 2012 IOC.

                      concerns about joint strike fighter
        56. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, the concurrency structured
    into the JSF program's test, production and training plans has obscured
    the mission capability of LRIP aircraft and support systems. How will
    DOD, under its proposed budget, improve the process by which the
    mission capability of LRIP systems will be accurately and credibly
    predicted well before delivery?
        Secretary Mabus. The F-35 program was structured with known
    concurrency that will remain, though reduced, with the SECDEF directed
    F-35 program restructure. The DOD decision to restructure the F-35
    Program was in response to multiple Department studies and assessments.
    The Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) examined the
    transition from development to production. The IMRT recommended the
    program adopt a somewhat flatter and smoother ramp. The Joint
    Estimating Team (JET II) accepted this revised ramp and moved it later
    in time with the delayed progress of the development program. By doing
    so, the risk of concurrency is lowered.
        As part of the program restructure, several steps have been taken
    to partially restore SDD schedule. To help mitigate aircraft assets
    required during testing, Secretary Gates directed the procurement of
    one carrier variant (CV) aircraft to the SDD program in order to expand
    developmental testing capacity, and will utilize some LRIP aircraft in
    support of development testing. Secretary Gates also directed the
    addition of another software integration line to the program, to
    prevent the building of mission systems software from becoming a
    limiting factor on the development schedule. Finally, contract
    negotiations are currently underway to ensure the contractor is held
    accountable in meeting or exceeding a defined set of milestones
    connected to fee on the development contract.
        The scrutiny of the review teams has informed the actions taken by
    the Department to ensure the program is executable. It's also important
    to note that during the extensive reviews that led to the program
    restructure, no fundamental technology or manufacturing problems were
    discovered, nor were there any changes to F-35 performance
    requirements. All F-35 variants are projected to meet their respective
    Key Performance Parameters.

        57. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, I understand that the JPO is
    executing a comprehensive, robust, and fully funded live fire test
    plan. However, the program recently removed shutoff fuses for engine
    fueldraulics lines. Coupled with the prior removal of dry bay fire
    extinguishers, this may increase the likelihood of aircraft combat
    losses from ballistic threat-induced fires. At present, only the
    Integrated Power Plant (IPP) bay has a fire suppression system. Though
    the JSF Executive Steering Board (JESB) has approved the JPO's request
    to remove these safety systems as an acceptable system trade to balance
    weight, cost, and risk, DOT&E remains concerned regarding the
    aircraft's vulnerability to threat-induced fires. What is your
    appraisal of DOT&E's concern here?
        Secretary Mabus. The Department is committed to delivering the most
    affordable, supportable, lethal and survivable F-35 aircraft that meets
    the needs of the warfighter. The overall survivability posture of the
    F-35 is without equal due to advanced avionics and sensor suite, fifth
    generation stealth performance, advanced countermeasures and robust,
    balanced vulnerability reduction design. The warfighting effectiveness
    of each design feature is carefully balanced against the overall system
    impact to cost, weight, and supportability. The removal of PAO shut-off
    valves and fuses for engine fueldraulic lines resulted in a minimal
    (.05 PK) impact on the vulnerability assessment, no impact on the
    safety assessment, avoids 11 lbs. per aircraft in weight, avoids
    $40,000 (CTOL and CV)--$50,000 (STOVL) per aircraft in procurement
    costs, and avoids $1.4 million in development costs. The JESB decision
    included a requirement to update the vulnerability assessment after
    conclusion of the Live Fire Testing in calendar year 2011. All F-35
    aircraft vulnerability data will then be re-assessed.

                         expeditionary fighting vehicle
        58. Senator McCain. General Conway, the fiscal year 2011 budget
    calls for $243 million in research and development (R&D) for
    production, testing, and evaluation of seven SDD2 vehicles. That is
    $34.7 million per vehicle in fiscal year 2011 alone. At what point and
    based on what criteria will the Marine Corps determine whether it is
    cost effective to continue the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program?
        General Conway. The success criteria for the Expeditionary Fighting
    Vehicle were stated in previous testimony, the Program must pass five
    key decision points that will evaluate the planned operational
    assessments, ability to meet KPPs, as well as the program cost and
    schedule metrics.

                        mv-22 osprey tilt-rotor aircraft
        59. Senator McCain. General Conway, readiness rates of the MV-22 in
    Afghanistan have been reported as in the mid-60s, trending towards the
    70s. On the other hand, the Army's new CH-47F is experiencing readiness
    rates in Afghanistan in the 80s and 90s, consistent with refinement of
    a platform that has been in use for decades. The CH-47F can reach
    speeds greater than 175 mph and transport more than 21,000 pounds, and
    with Aviation Extended Range Fuel System, has a mission radius of more
    than 400 nautical miles. The CH-47F can carry 66 combat-loaded soldiers
    or marines. Should the Marine Corps consider the CH-47F as an
    alternative to the MV-22?
        General Conway. No. The MV-22B is the premier medium lift assault
    support platform in the inventory, and has performed all combat tasking
    in Iraq and Afghanistan without any combat losses. The MV-22B has
    several characteristics that make it superior to the CH-47D and F for
    Marine Aviation purposes.

             The MV-22B's ability to leverage its speed to rapidly
            build combat power in an objective through shorter sortie cycle
            times surpasses that of the CH-47. This was most recently
            demonstrated in the assault on Now Zad in Afghanistan, when the
            MV-22Bs were inbound with their second wave of troops as the
            helicopters were landing with their first.
             By virtue of its design, the MV-22B transits the
            battlespace at 270kts ground speed in altitude sanctuary
            compared to 160kts in the heart of the threat as is typical for
            high-end traditional rotorcraft.
             The MV-22B is built for survivability, including
            excellent ballistic tolerance, low IR signature, low aural
            signature, and widely dispersed and redundant systems.
             The MV-22B combat radius with 24 combat troops is
            325nm or better with internal fuel. No extended range fuel
            tanks are required.
             Much like the CH-53E that can carry 55 combat troops
            with center-line seating installed yet carries 24 troops by
            operational procedure, the CH-47 does not routinely leverage
            its maximum seating capacity by convention in combat.
             MV-22B fulfills the medium lift requirement for the
            Marine Corps. The CH-47 would be a redundant heavy lift
            platform.
             BDM Federal noted in the 1994 Medium Lift Replacement
            COEA Phase II:

        ``These studies generally showed that the productivity benefits
    resulting from carrying larger loads are negated when aircraft
    survivability is taken into account. That is, loading more troops onto
    each aircraft meant that more assets would be lost when an aircraft was
    downed as large capacity aircraft were also the least survivable.
    Studies have verified a medium lift requirement when force
    effectiveness is balanced against attrition.''

             The MV-22B has specific design features to make it
            suitable for shipboard operations, including folding blades and
            wing, electromagnetic hardening, and powered steering for self-
            taxi on the flight deck. To operate aboard ship, the CH-47
            would have to add blade fold capacity and make landing gear
            modifications.
             The CH-47F operating cost of $6,899 per hour does not
            include Depot Level Repair charges. The current Fleet MV-22B
            operating cost of $11,488 includes Depot charges, which account
            for roughly 50 percent of its parts costs.
             At the completion of the current multi-year
            procurement agreement, we will have procured 243 of our 360
            program of record. Adding a second Type/Model/Series to conduct
            the medium-lift mission would significantly increase the
            program, training, and support costs.

                         procurement of h-1 helicopter
        60. Senator McCain. General Conway, last year, the House of
    Representatives cut H-1 funding by over $300 million as a funding
    source for the F-35 alternate engine based on concern about Bell's
    ability to meet the production ramp. Can Bell meet the ramp for 31 H-1s
    requested in fiscal year 2011?
        General Conway. Yes. Manufacturing planning, processes and tooling
    are in place to support 31 aircraft production a year. Bell has
    consistently delivered both the UH-1Y and AH-1Z production aircraft 30
    days or more ahead of contract requirements. This performance has been
    demonstrated and maintained even after a 6 week labor strike
    experienced in July/August 2009.

        61. Senator McCain. General Conway, how important are these H-1
    assets for the fight in Afghanistan, given their increased capability?
        General Conway. These aircraft are vital to fight supporting our
    marines on the ground. Last November, Marine Light Attack Helicopter
    Squadron (HMLA)-367 deployed to Afghanistan with a full complement of
    nine UH-1Y aircraft. In their first three months HMLA-367 posted
    mission capable rates in excess of 77 percent while flying an average
    of 40 flight hours per aircraft per month--over two times the planned
    utilization rate of 18.9--while also playing a critical role in
    successes achieved in the Now Zad Valley of Helmand Province. The UH-1Y
    has not missed an assigned launch to date and has flown a multitude of
    missions in theater including troop and cargo transport, command and
    control, aerial and armed reconnaissance, armed escort, and close air
    support. The UH-1Y's increased payload, range and endurance has
    resulted in the ability to carry more marines, more payload and more
    ordnance while increasing time on station throughout the entire
    spectrum of utility missions. The legacy UH-1N Huey forced aircrews to
    sacrifice either payload, time on station, or both, whereas UH-1Y
    aircrews no longer have to make those sacrifices. Additionally, the UH-
    1Y's increased engine power and performance have been particularly
    important during missions flown at higher altitudes and in hotter
    temperatures.

                              energy alternatives
        62. Senator McCain. General Conway, please describe the alternative
    you are pursuing to reduce our reliance on fuel on the battlefield.
        General Conway. Recently, our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
    establish an Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) in Quantico,
    VA. The ExFOB was supported by many organization inside and outside the
    Marine Corps to include all of our fellow services energy experts and
    OSD's Power Surety Task Force. Prior to our recent ExFOB evaluations we
    reviewed approximately 200 commercial off-the-shelve (COTS)
    technologies, in the end, we invited 29 vendors to ExFOB, 27 arrived at
    Quantico for evaluation by our experts. For this phase of ExFOB we
    focused on Energy, Water, and Shelter technologies that were COTS ready
    and could be deployed to Afghanistan right away to reduce our reliance
    on fuel. Of the 27 systems evaluated, 2xwater purification systems,
    3xphotovotaie (PV) solar-based energy systems, 1x PV solar lighting
    system, and 1xLED lighting system were selected for further evaluation
    and deployment to Afghanistan.

        63. Senator McCain. General Conway, which of those initiatives do
    you think holds the most promise?
        General Conway. The water purification systems that can be powered
    by solar systems show the most promise at the tactical edge. As we have
    discovered at the tactical edge, for every fuel truck on the roads of
    Afghanistan, we have 6-7 water trucks. Getting small, lightweight,
    alternative powered water purification systems to the battlefield is a
    high priority. In addition, we are encouraged by replacing our
    incandescent lights with LED lighting and PV solar-powered area lights
    too.

                              iraq and afghanistan
        64. Senator McCain. General Conway, I know you are proud of the
    performance of our marines in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and I share
    that pride. I also noticed that this year's budget request includes
    $4.1 billion in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) for fiscal
    year 2011 for Marine Corps operation and maintenance (O&M). The fiscal
    year 2010 OCO amount was $3.4 billion, although the supplemental for
    fiscal year 2010 raised that amount by about $1.1 billion to a total of
    $4.5 billion for all of fiscal year 2010. What are driving your O&M
    costs for fiscal year 2011?
        General Conway. The primary driver of our fiscal year 2011 O&M
    costs is related to Optempo ($850 million). Other significant drivers
    include depot maintenance ($525 million), transportation associated
    with the OIF draw down ($420 million), body armor and personal
    protective equipment ($365), and deployment specific training ($350
    million).

        65. Senator McCain. General Conway, does the fiscal year 2011
    request include everything you need to support the surge in
    Afghanistan?
        General Conway. Yes, the current fiscal year 2011 request will
    support Marine Corps forces and operational requirements to support the
    surge in Afghanistan.

        66. Senator McCain. General Conway, do you have a good feel for
    what the cost of resetting the force will be?
        General Conway. In light of the continued high tempo of operations
    in Afghanistan, and the delay in reset actions due to the diversion of
    equipment in theater, we estimate the cost of reset for the Marine
    Corps to be $8 billion ($3 billion requested in the fiscal year 2011
    OCO and an additional $5 billion reset liability upon termination of
    the conflict). However, this estimate will change the longer we
    continue to remain in theater.

        67. Senator McCain. General Conway, how many years after the final
    draw downs from Iraq and Afghanistan will it take to reset the force
    and what will it cost?
        General Conway. We believe that after the final draw downs from
    Iraq and Afghanistan, with appropriate funding, we will be able to
    reset the force in 2 to 3 years.

                               laser-guided zuni
        68. Senator McCain. General Conway, I am aware that the Marine
    Corps has placed the Laser-Guided Zuni rocket on its most current
    Marine Aviation Plan and on its Air-to-Ground Weapons roadmap. The
    Marine Corps has also validated the Urgent Universal Need Statement
    that requests 5-inch Laser-Guided Zuni rockets for use in combat
    operations and is pursuing the smaller 2.75-inch Advanced Precision
    Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets for helicopters. I have been briefed
    that there is no money in the budget for the 5-inch Laser-Guided Zunis
    for jet aircraft; however Marine Corps requirements documents call for
    its development. In fact, the Navy's China Lake Weapons division has
    partnered with industry to build and successfully test fire Laser-
    Guided Zunis against fixed and moving targets. Can you tell me why the
    Marine Corps has decided not to fund in the fiscal year 2011 proposed
    budget the development of these precision rockets for its combat
    forces?
        General Conway. Senator, several years ago the Marine Corps
    recognized the need for low collateral damage during combat operations
    and set out to reduce collateral damage by developing an all-precision-
    guided weapon inventory. In the fiscal year 2007 Air-to-Ground Weapons
    Roadmap and Marine Aviation Plan we established a goal to create a
    precision-guided capability for all air-to-ground weapons by 2015.
    These documents included a precision-guided 5-inch Zuni rocket (I do
    not use the term Laser-Guided Zuni (LGZ) as those terms have been trade
    marked for a weapon that is not in the Marine Corps inventory). The
    Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake has been operating with industry
    since 2005 within a Cooperative Research and Development Activity
    (CRADA) to fire a guided 5-inch Zuni rocket and prove the concept for a
    precision-guided 5-inch Zuni rocket. This program, with MBDA Missile
    Systems, is designed to upgrade our extensive existing 5-inch Zuni
    rocket motors and warhead inventories by adding a Semi-Active Laser
    (SAL) capability. Two successful ground-launched guided shots against
    stationary and moving targets were completed in May and August 2009. A
    precision-guided 5-inch Zuni will provide a high probability kill, low
    cost weapon against tactical vehicles and other soft targets and the
    Marine Corps needs it to fill the ``clear air'' forward firing missile
    niche for legacy Marine Corps aircraft as they will not carry the
    Joint-Air-to-Ground-Missile (JAGM). In fiscal year 2007 the Marine
    Corps attempted a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD), but
    failed to gain the required joint support. The Air Force does not use a
    5-inch rocket and the Navy is focusing resources on JAGM for F/A-18E/F.
    A sole source Rapid Deployment Capability is now our preferred route to
    funding and fielding a guided 5-inch Zuni rocket, but is unlikely due
    to industry competition. The interest shown by many industry
    representatives in the 2.75-inch fixed wing APKWS JCTD, a spinoff of
    the successful rotary wing APKWS program, indicates that pursuing a
    sole source acquisition strategy for the MDBA LGZ may be challenged by
    formal industry protest. Several vendors have offered solutions that
    provide a precision-guidance capability for the Zuni and a full and
    open competition seems likely to be required. NAVAIR's Legal and
    Contracts personnel are assessing the options. The precision-guided 5-
    inch Zuni rocket will follow the APKWS II JCTD and will provide a low
    collateral damage precision munition for Marine legacy fixed wing
    aircraft. Adding precision guidance to the Zuni presents challenging
    technical issues because of its mach speed release from the aircraft
    and higher operation altitudes than the APKWS. Although APKWS and JAGM
    are our precision-guided munition solutions for the near term and
    require the scarce resources we have available for funding weapons, a
    precision-guided 5-inch Zuni rocket remains a valid weapon requirement
    for Marine Corps aviation. It is a capability being aggressively
    pursued by us as we support the precision-guided Zuni CRADA effort at
    China Lake.

        69. Senator McCain. General Conway, are Laser-Guided Zunis included
    in your Unfunded Priority List?
        General Conway. Senator, developing a precision 5-inch rocket with
    laser guidance remains a Marine Corps goal. Currently the JAGM and the
    APKWS are the major Navy and Marine Corps weapons programs and have
    high priorities for rotary wing aircraft. The Small Diameter Bomb is a
    high priority program for our fixed wing F-35B aircraft. The precision-
    guided 5-inch Zuni will fill gaps between the JAGM and APKWS and SDB
    II, but it competes for scarce funds and is not yet on our Unfunded
    Priority List

                        requirement for a 313-ship navy
        70. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, for the past few years the
    Navy has justified to Congress a need for 313 ships. Does this budget
    support that requirement?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request grows
    the capacity of our Fleet to 313 ships by 2020 and 320 ships by 2024.

        71. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, I'm concerned that cost
    overruns in shipbuilding programs will undermine future plans. What
    specific actions is the Navy taking to mitigate cost overruns in
    shipbuilding programs?
        Admiral Roughead. To better control shipbuilding costs, the Navy is
    reducing the types of our ships, maximizing the reuse of ship designs
    and components, and pursuing open architecture and mission systems
    modularity. These efforts permit longer production runs and cost
    reductions associated with production improvements and economies of
    scale. We continue to focus on program affordability by ensuring
    designs are mature and requirements are well understood prior to the
    start of construction, and by emphasizing design and affordability
    concepts in initial design and follow-on procurements. We have also
    improved acquisition governance and cost control mechanisms through the
    following initiatives:

             Executing an acquisition governance process where
            leadership assesses technical maturity and programmatic changes
            that typically drive cost growth
             Using cost risk analysis in budget development, which
            enables understanding of cost risk and uncertainty inherent in
            the budget
             Improving our ability to provide comprehensive cost
            and earned value management analysis support
             Rebuilding our core knowledge, skills and processes to
            improve cost estimating
             Implementing the requirement to submit a certified
            cost position and ensure the program is fully funded at each
            milestone

                           30-year shipbuilding plan
        72. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, the Navy's 30-Year
    Shipbuilding Plan calls for the replacement of 14 Ohio-class submarines
    and the multi-year procurement of 2 Virginia-class attack submarines
    per year to replace Los Angeles-class submarines. Because the ballistic
    missile submarines run about $6.5 million each and the Virginia-class
    submarines cost about $2 billion each, those expenditures alone consume
    over 75 percent of the current shipbuilding budget. Will the Navy be
    successful in increasing its shipbuilding budget during that period of
    robust submarine procurement so that overall surface ship production
    will not decrease to just two surface ships per year?
        Admiral Roughead. Building the required force structure will
    largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat
    systems) within an affordable range. We are committed to maintaining
    stability in requirements, funding, and profiles to control costs. This
    requires the combined efforts of the Navy, the shipbuilding industry,
    and the combat systems industry. Working in conjunction with Congress,
    the Navy will procure and sustain the force structure necessary to
    deliver the naval capabilities needed to support our National
    interests.

        73. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, what will be the impact on
    most importantly our force projection capability and second the
    shipbuilding industrial base?
        Admiral Roughead. The battle force inventory presented in our 30-
    year shipbuilding plan provides the global reach, persistent presence,
    and strategic, operational, and tactical effects required of our naval
    forces within reasonable levels of funding. On balance, the force
    structure represented by our 30-year shipbuilding plan maintains our
    ability to project power across the spectrum of challenges we are
    likely to face throughout the time period of the report, albeit with
    prudent risk where appropriate. One of the plan's three basic precepts
    is the importance of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding
    design and industrial base necessary to build and sustain tomorrow's
    Navy. The shipbuilding plan aims to maintain that base.
        The SSBN(X) procurement will begin to constrain our shipbuilding
    plan in the latter part of this decade because recapitalization of our
    SSBNs will occur at the same time our SSN-688 submarines, CG-47 class
    guided missile cruisers, DDG-51 class guided missile destroyers, and
    LSD-41/49 class dock landing ships reach end-of-service-life. During
    the years in which the new submarine is being procured, the procurement
    of other ship types will be reduced, resulting in force level and
    industrial base impacts. Even under these constraints, our shipbuilding
    plan still achieves a peak battle force inventory of 320 ships in
    fiscal year 2024 and averages about 303 ships between fiscal year 2020
    and fiscal year 2040.

        74. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, the recently released 30-year
    shipbuilding plan uses the 313-ship battle force inventory as its
    baseline. However, building the required force structure will largely
    depend on controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat systems)
    within an affordable range. Will the Navy be able to maintain stability
    in requirements, funding, and profiles in an effort to control costs?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes. New construction will be funded consistent
    with balanced investment profiles and expected future budgets. The Navy
    will continue to focus on program affordability by ensuring designs are
    mature, that affordability is a factor in design and procurement
    concepts, and that requirements are well specified prior to the start
    of construction.
        The Navy is taking positive action to control costs and prevent
    requirement creep, and to have a long view regarding reduced types and
    models of ships, maximizing reuse of ship designs and components, and
    using open architecture and mission systems modularity. Navy leadership
    is engaged in managing cost and controlling requirements growth in our
    shipbuilding programs. We have instituted an acquisition governance
    process that causes leadership to assess technical maturity and
    programmatic changes. NAVSEA is improving its ability to provide
    comprehensive cost and earned value management analysis support and is
    rebuilding core knowledge, skills and processes to improve cost
    estimating.
        Navy is committed to developing a stable long-term shipbuilding
    plan to reduce industrial base volatility, which is a primary reason
    for cost growth. Great care has been taken to describe a plan that is
    fiscally sustainable over the 30-year planning horizon. The plan also
    takes into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national
    shipbuilding design and industrial base.

        75. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, controlling shipbuilding
    costs will require the combined efforts of the Navy, the shipbuilding
    industry, and the combat systems industry. What is the Navy doing to
    encourage fixed-price contracts and ensuring that requirements are
    approved by the leadership and will not change? Please give some
    discrete examples by program type.
        Admiral Roughead. To encourage the use of fixed-price contracts,
    the Navy has developed an acquisition policy defining certain
    limitations and controls for use of cost-reimbursement type contracts
    and emphasizing use of fixed-priced contracts, as appropriate, to
    support the Department's mission.
        For shipbuilding programs, the Navy has successfully used fixed-
    price contracts where the design is very mature at the start and is
    derived from existing ship designs and technical risk is low. In cases
    where the initial ships of a class include complex technologies, the
    Navy contracts for these initial ships under cost-type contracts;
    however, as the respective class matures and we move into serial
    production, the contracts typically used are fixed-priced. A specific
    example is DDG-1000, which is a cost contract due to the innovative
    design and high degree of technology insertion. Follow-on ships (DDG-
    1001 and -1002) will be fixed-price contracts. An example of where
    fixed-price contracts were used initially is JHSV. That design was
    mature and derived from a well understood parent design. The lead JHSV
    and all follow ships are contracted under a fixed-price contract.
        Additionally, these recent solicitations for shipbuilding new
    construction contracts have been fixed-price: The LCS (fiscal year 2009
    and fiscal year 2010-2014 competitive solicitation); LPD-26/27; DDG-
    113/114, DDG-115, and DDG-1001/1002. The fiscal year 2009-2013
    Virginia-class multi-year contract was awarded on a fixed-price basis.
    The upcoming solicitation for LHA-7 construction will be issued as
    fixed-price.
        To ensure that requirements are approved by leadership and changes
    are closely controlled, the Navy has several acquisition oversight
    processes that provide leadership visibility and vigorous control of
    acquisition requirements. The Navy implemented a Peer Review Program in
    fiscal year 2009 which applies to contracts for supplies, systems and
    services and includes tiered review and approval levels. The CNO's
    Resources and Requirements Review Board and Naval Capabilities Board
    (NCB) are the Navy's 3- and 2-star forums for reviewing and making
    decisions on requirements and resourcing issues. SECNAV's requirements-
    acquisition governance (Gate Review) and Configuration Steering Board
    (CSB) processes provide Service-level approval of capabilities
    requirements. The annual Gate Six sufficiency reviews serve as the
    forum for the CSB as part of the oversight process to stabilize
    requirements and review any descoping-cost saving strategies. CVN-78,
    LCS, DDG-51 and Virginia-class have planned Gate Six reviews this year.
    The Navy is introducing rigor into the contract change management
    process by limiting the amount of funding program managers may spend
    without a Gate Six sufficiency review to not more than 40 percent of
    the program funds budgeted for engineering changes. Release of
    remaining funds to program managers will be based on the outcome of
    CSBs that are held in conjunction with Gate Six reviews.

            ddg-1000 destroyer program-critical nunn-mccurdy breach
        76. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, on February 4, 2010, Secretary
    Gates said the DDG-1000 destroyer program will breach Nunn-McCurdy's
    cost thresholds. By operation of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform
    Act of 2009, it should be canceled or restructured and recertified.
    Based on a critical Nunn-McCurdy cost threshold breach, should the Navy
    go forward with buying the third DDG-1000 in light of the Nunn-McCurdy
    cost breach and the growing requirement for more ballistic missile
    defense (BMD) ships in the Pacific, Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf?
        Secretary Mabus. Pursuant to the Weapons System Acquisition Reform
    Act of 2009 and Section 2433 of Title 10, U.S.C. (``Nunn-McCurdy''
    statute), the Secretary of Defense will terminate, or provide
    certification of the program to Congress. Navy is supporting the
    ongoing OSD-led certification process. A termination or certification
    decision is due to Congress by late spring 2010.

                  amphibious fleet affordability and readiness
        77. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the Navy's
    plan for a 33-ship amphibious fleet, according to the Navy's budget
    proposal, represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the
    requirement to deliver two Marine expeditionary brigades in a forcible-
    entry operation. Is the Marine Corps' desire for 38 ships affordable
    and are there ways to mitigate that risk when considering the entire
    shipbuilding plan?
        Secretary Mabus. The 38 ship force identified by the Marine Corps
    represents the lift capacity necessary to support 2.0 MEB operations
    including all of their combat support and combat service support needs
    across their full range of expected missions. This risk/force level is
    inconsistent with the risk levels accepted by the remaining Naval
    Forces. Therefore, the Commandant and CNO reached an agreement to
    benchmark the Amphibious Force at 33 ships and accept a modicum of risk
    in the extent of combat support equipment available within the Assault
    Echelon (AE) forces and to move that equipment in conjunction with
    follow-on force equipment. Specific decisions made in support of this
    agreement are:

             The Navy plans to procure an LHA-6 class ship in
            fiscal year 2011 and its 11th LPD-17 class amphibious transport
            dock in fiscal year 2012. LSD(X), replacement for the existing
            LSD-41 class, will begin in fiscal year 2017.

                     The Navy determined the LHA-6 class amphibious
                    assault ships previously designated for the Maritime
                    Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) would serve more
                    effectively in the AE force where they could be
                    employed in Marine forcible-entry operations. Within
                    the context of the 30-year Shipbuilding Plan, these AE
                    amphibious ships will be procured in fiscal year 2011,
                    fiscal year 2016, and fiscal year 2021.
                     The Navy begins procurement of LSD-41 class
                    replacement, LSD(X), in fiscal year 2017, on a 2-year
                    build cycle.

             The Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP)
            provides additional lift capacity, but does not factor in
            meeting the Marine Corps' 2.0 MEB AE requirement.

                     ALEP is designed to fill the gap in vehicle
                    square feet stowage.

             The Navy plans to procure three Mobile Landing
            Platforms (MLP) as well as the three previously appropriated T-
            AKEs. These augmented Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)
            squadrons enhance the afloat prepositioning capacity and will
            support the USMC 2.0 MEB lift requirement by enabling a
            reinforcing MEB to ``marry up'' ashore with its equipment from
            one of the three MPS squadrons. The augmented MPS facilitate
            the routine employment of prepositioned equipment in a variety
            of activities across the range of military operations (ROMO)
            and mitigate the risk of lower than desired amphibious ship
            inventory levels.

        General Conway. Without a top line increase and/or a
    reprioritization of missions and capabilities that form the basis of
    the Navy's shipbuilding plan, the requirement for 38 amphibious assault
    ships outlined in our 7 January 2009 report to Congress is
    unaffordable. We have examined ways to mitigate risk within the context
    of the entire shipbuilding plan and determined that sustaining a
    minimum of 33 amphibious ships is adequate within today's fiscal
    limitations.

        78. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, are the
    requirements for more amphibious ships greater because at least 15 to
    20 percent of the amphibious fleet is not deployable because they are
    in shipyards undergoing maintenance and repair?
        Secretary Mabus. No. Under normal circumstances, no more than about
    10 percent of the amphibious fleet is undergoing significant
    maintenance and repair that would preclude operational availability in
    the event of a national crisis. While there may be instances when
    greater than 10 percent of the force is undergoing maintenance, we are
    confident this assumption is consistent with the long term availability
    of amphibious ships for contingency operations.
        The requirement for amphibious ships outlined in the January 7,
    2009, Report to Congress on Naval Amphibious Force Structure and the
    Annual Report to Congress on the Long Range Plan for Construction of
    Naval Vessels for fiscal year 2011, calls for a force of 33 total ships
    (11 LHA/LHD, 11 LPD, and 11 LSD). Under normal circumstances, 29-30 are
    available for tasking, enough to support MEBs while accepting risk in
    the arrival of combat support and combat service support elements of
    the MEB.
        Without accepting this risk, the full requirement would be 38
    ships. However SECNAV, CNO, and CMC agree that the 33-ship force
    equates to an acceptable level of risk, as stated in the January 7,
    2009, Report to Congress on Naval Amphibious Force Structure.
        General Conway. The 38- and 33-ship numbers were based on the
    mutually agreed-to assumption that amphibious ships were operationally
    available 90 percent of the time based on OPNAVNOTE 4700 scheduled
    maintenance availabilities.
        The requirement for amphibious ships outlined in our 7 January 2009
    report to Congress assumes that amphibious ships are not operationally
    available-class due to maintenance approximately 10 percent of the
    time. Due to the current maintenance challenges faced by the San
    Antonio-class, amphibious shipping is trending near 75 percent
    availability vice the 90 percent planned. We would work to improve
    operational availability to close to the 90 percent level instead of
    increasing our force structure requirement to offset a significantly
    lower operational availability. This will require increased resources,
    specifically maintenance funding for the upkeep of amphibious ships.

        79. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the serious
    engineering problems on LPD-17 class ships gives rise for a concern
    about a broader readiness problem. The recent commissioning of the USS
    New York in New York City harbor was a marvelous site, but now the ship
    cannot get underway because of mechanical failures in the main
    propulsion engines, generators, and failing piping welds that make the
    ship unsafe to operate. The LPD-17 amphibious ship program has more
    challenges than we had hoped. Are we seeing a systemic problem with the
    readiness of the Navy's amphibious ships?
        Secretary Mabus. No. While we have seen some recurring material
    issues in LPD-17 class ships, the problems associated with a new
    construction ship are not indicative of a systemic problem with the
    amphibious ship readiness of the existing Fleet.
        General Conway. The Navy and Marine Corps are committed to ensuring
    we are ready to meet our amphibious mission requirements. While we have
    seen some recurring material issues in LPD-17 class ships, we are
    working with the shipbuilder to address these issues head on. An LPD-17
    Class Strike Team was established in December 2008 to methodically
    resolve recurring/systemic class issues. Top three issues in progress
    are main propulsion diesel engine (MPDE) bearing damage, Geislinger
    coupling (connects MPDE to main reduction gear (MRG)) leaks, and faulty
    piping welds. In each case the Navy is working with the shipbuilder or
    vendor to identify the root cause and resolve associated material,
    workmanship, or inspection issues.

                              littoral combat ship
        80. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, later this year the Navy will
    down-select to a single sea frame for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
    program and split its production between two competing shipyards--this
    new acquisition strategy is designed to reduce the ship's overall cost.
    Will the costs of this troubled program be below the congressional cost
    cap?
        Secretary Mabus. Although achieving the cost cap will be
    challenging, the Navy is working to ensure the program costs are within
    the parameters of the cost cap established in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The Navy will continue to apply
    lessons learned to the LCS program and across the ship acquisition
    enterprise. The Navy's acquisition strategy to competitively downselect
    to a single LCS seaframe will further contribute to cost control on
    this program. Navy remains committed to effective cost control, and
    believes that the acquisition strategy for the fiscal year 2010 and
    later ships and management practices provide the strongest possible
    foundation for program stability and delivery of this urgently-needed
    capability at the best value.

        81. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, will the winning vessel be the
    least expensive to operate as is required under the acquisition reform
    law we enacted last year, which highlighted the total operating costs
    of weapons programs?
        Secretary Mabus. The acquisition strategy for the LCS program for
    fiscal year 2010 and later vessels includes key tenets for competition
    identified by the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, such
    as competitive prototyping, dual sourcing, unbundling of contracts, use
    of modular, open architectures to enable competition for upgrades, and
    use of build-to-print technical data packages to enable production by a
    second source. The goal of the Government is to arrive at a best-value
    determination. The Government will however, consider life cycle cost
    reduction initiatives as part of its evaluation under the technical/
    management category. Offeror-proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle
    costs will be evaluated, assigned an adjective rating, and factored
    into the overall best value determination.
        Throughout the LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both
    acquisition cost and life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this
    regard, life cycle cost considerations are emphasized in both designs
    through the Navy's requirements for reduced manning, open architecture
    and mission package modularity that have been key design parameters
    since the inception of the program.

                       electronic aircraft launch system
        82. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, I am concerned that problems
    with developing the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS)
    could delay the USS Gerald Ford's (CVN-78) entry into service. That
    could increase the period of time during which the Navy has 11
    operational carriers from 33 months to some longer period. What is the
    status of that troubled program?
        Secretary Mabus. EMALS is currently undergoing System Design and
    Development (SDD) testing at Lakehurst, NJ, and is on track to conduct
    manned aircraft launch later this year. Manufacturing of EMALS
    production components is ongoing and is on schedule to support CVN-78
    delivery dates. Motor generator components have the least schedule
    float and are being closely monitored by the Navy.

        83. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, do we expect that problems
    associated with the EMALS will cause any delays to the delivery of the
    CVN-78 it was designed to support?
        Secretary Mabus. Current EMALS production schedules support on-time
    delivery of CVN-78 in September 2015. Motor generators have the least
    schedule float and are being carefully managed by the Navy to ensure
    that required in yard dates are met.

        84. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, should we be looking at a
    conventional steam catapult solution if the contractor cannot resolve
    its engineering issues?
        Secretary Mabus. In 2009, Senior Navy leadership decided EMALS
    would remain the CVN-78 class aircraft launching system following a
    detailed assessment of the viability of both EMALS and steam catapults
    on the CVN-78 class. While steam catapults were deemed at the
    conclusion of the assessment to be a technically viable alternative to
    EMALS, reverting to steam would have incurred a 12-18 month delay in
    CVN-78 ship delivery, along with associated costs for redesign and
    delay. The current EMALS System Development and Demonstration (SDD)
    phase and production schedules continue to support the CVN-78
    construction schedule. While the overlap of system-level testing and
    shipset production hardware procurement decision induces some cost and
    schedule risk, the management focus, review processes, and oversight
    the Navy has employed continue to mitigate these risks. The Navy is
    committed to EMALS as the launching system for CVN-78 class aircraft
    carriers.

        85. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, how confident are you that the
    EMALS will come on line on time so as not to delay the delivery of the
    CVN-78?
        Secretary Mabus. The Navy is committed to EMALS as the launching
    system for CVN-78 class aircraft carriers. EMALS technology was
    fundamentally proven by the Navy during the Program Definition and Risk
    Reduction phase using a full-scale, half-length prototype. Component-
    level testing of production representative hardware is currently
    verifying design predictions and system performance. A full-scale EMALS
    catapult test site is operational at Lakehurst, with launching of
    manned aircraft projected to begin later this year.
        Implementation of the EMALS system for the Gerald R. Ford-class is
    required to meet the fixed wing launch goals of the Navy, as well as
    provide flexibility for future operations. All manufacturing components
    are on schedule to support required in-yard dates for delivery of CVN-
    78 in September 2015. The Navy is closely monitoring the production of
    motor generators, the component with the least schedule float, to
    ensure delivery remains on schedule.

                             ship depot maintenance
        86. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, as you recall, the only
    priority that you identified as unfunded in your last budget submission
    was ship depot maintenance. Over the last few months, a number of press
    accounts have come out describing problems directly related to how
    ineffectively the shipyards are maintaining the readiness of the Navy's
    oldest surface combatants. I understand that this year's proposed
    budget increases total funding for ship depot maintenance by almost
    $1.2 billion over last year. To what extent does that proposed amount
    fully fund the Navy's current requirement for ship depot maintenance
    and capture depot maintenance volume that has accumulated from chronic
    underfunding over time?
        Admiral Roughead. Our fiscal year 2011 baseline and Overseas
    Contingency Operations (OCO) budget requests $6.1 billion for ship
    maintenance. This funds 99 percent of our total projected ship
    maintenance requirement, including depot maintenance.

                            navy strike fighter gap
        87. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, the Navy testified last year
    that the so-called fighter gap or shortfall of strike-fighter aircraft
    on aircraft carriers was growing larger than previous estimates--243
    aircraft short by 2018. Is the Navy taking appropriate action to
    mitigate the gap and the operational implications of that gap?
        Admiral Roughead. The Department of the Navy (DoN) anticipates a
    decrease in our strike fighter inventory of about 100 aircraft that
    will peak at the end of this decade. We are addressing this inventory
    decrease through aggressive and precise management strategies that
    include service-life extension programs to prolong the use of existing
    F/A-18 A-D aircraft, reducing the number of aircraft available in our
    non-deployed squadrons to the minimum required, accelerating the
    transition of seven legacy squadrons to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets (using
    F/A-18E/F attrition aircraft in two cases), and maximizing depot level
    throughput to return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the Fleet more
    quickly. Collectively, these measures will extend the service life of
    our legacy aircraft and make the projected inventory decrease
    manageable.

        88. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, does the Navy have the
    adequate carrier air wings to satisfy the needs of 11 aircraft
    carriers?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes.
        Our carrier air wing (CVW) Fleet Readiness and Training Plan (FRTP)
    is tailored to compliment the training and maintenance requirements for
    our 11 CVNs. We will manage our tactical aviation inventory to ensure
    we have the number of aircraft required to support our deployable CVWs.

        89. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, how does this committee
    reconcile different estimates of what this gap is likely to be in 2018
    which Secretary Gates has offered is 100 aircraft?
        Admiral Roughead. The Navy continues to evaluate and manage its
    strike fighter inventory. We have updated our inventory estimates as we
    have adjusted the assumptions in our models to reflect what we are
    learning about the ability to extend the service life of our legacy
    aircraft, and to adjust to procurement rates for JSF and the addition
    by Congress of nine Super Hornets into our budget last year. Based on
    current data and the application of specific management measures, the
    Navy anticipates a shortfall in our strike fighter inventory of about
    100 aircraft that will peak in 2018.

    missile defense, ballistic missile defense-capable ships, and standard
                                   missile-3
        90. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, as you are well aware, the
    supply of missile defense assets, whether it be Aegis cruisers,
    Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) missiles, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
    (THAAD) units, etc., pales in comparison to the worldwide demand of our
    combatant commanders. How does the Navy's budget request seek to
    satisfy the stressing needs of the new European-phased adaptive
    approach while also continuing to meet those needs of ongoing efforts
    in the Pacific, the Middle East, and the Homeland?
        Admiral Roughead. To meet increasing global demands for BMD, our
    fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding to increase and accelerate BMD
    capability and capacity in our Fleet.
        Specifically, the DOD budget request funds six BMD installations
    and one upgrade, in addition to Aegis modernization installs/upgrades
    that were included in PB 10 for our existing surface combatants.
    Additionally the budget request funds the construction of DDG-114 and
    DDG-115, the second and third ship in our DDG-51 restart program.
    Across the FYDP, our budget request increases our total number of Aegis
    BMD-capable ships from 21 to 38, of which 27 will be deployable in
    fiscal year 2015 to meet global requirements for BMD.
        The Aegis BMD budget contains funding to increase the number of SM-
    3 missiles in our inventory. Currently, we have 59 SM-3 missiles. The
    projected inventory will be 61 by the end of fiscal year 2010 and 262
    by end of fiscal year 2015.

        91. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, with the growing threat from
    China, North Korea, and the Middle East, do your forces have enough
    BMD/SM-3 resources/assets to defend the United States, its allies, and
    forward-deployed forces in the region? In answering this question,
    please break out your responses by BMD capable ships and SM-3 missiles.
        Admiral Roughead. We are meeting existing requirements for BMD
    forces today. The implementation of the phased adaptive approach to
    missile defense of Europe requires an increase in our capacity of BMD-
    capable ships and missiles to continue to meet global requirements.
        We are increasing the number of our BMD ships by accelerating the
    installation of Aegis BMD on our existing cruisers and destroyers and
    by restarting the DDG-51 shipbuilding program. By 2015, new
    construction and modernization will bring the total number of BMD
    capable ships in our Fleet to 27, up from 21 today. Our long-term plan
    is to modernize all 62 Aegis destroyers and up to 15 Aegis cruisers
    with BMD capability while building new, BMD-capable DDG-51 ships.
        We are also increasing the number of SM-3 missiles in our
    inventory. Currently, we have 59 SM-3 missiles. The projected inventory
    will be 61 by the end of fiscal year 2010 and 262 by end of fiscal year
    2015.

        92. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, is BMD training for the crews
    of these Aegis-BMD ships sufficient to ameliorate stresses on the force
    that are being called on to satisfy other non-BMD mission requirements?
        Admiral Roughead. In February, we completed a thorough analysis of
    the Aegis modernization training program, including BMD and non-BMD
    mission training requirements. The analysis informed curricula
    improvements now underway in the technical training associated with new
    BMD baselines and open architecture systems, enlisted specialized
    skills training, advanced warfare team training, and command, control,
    communications, and intelligence interoperability training.
    Implementation of these curricula improvements will complete in fiscal
    year 2013 and will enhance BMD and non-BMD mission proficiency among
    our crews. As we increase the number of BMD-capable ships in the Fleet
    to support the President's phased adaptive approach for missile defense
    of Europe, we will further enhance our training programs to accommodate
    increased student throughput at Aegis training commands.

        93. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, to what extent does your
    budget request address that issue?
        Admiral Roughead. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding to
    expand our training throughput from 20 to 23 BMD-capable ships by the
    end of fiscal year 2011. The expanded training will provide specialized
    skills for additional individual operator training, instructor
    capacity, team training, and technical training aids that will be
    necessary as we grow our BMD capability.

                             law of the sea treaty
        94. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, the
    United States has not ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty while China
    has continued efforts to assert sovereignty over contested areas in the
    South China Sea and in other areas where such claims support China's
    national security interests. Beijing has now suspended military-to-
    military exchanges as a result of the recent U.S. announcement to
    continue defensive arms sales to Taiwan. How are we managing our
    relationship with China in disputed areas such as its maritime claims?
        Secretary Mabus. The U.S. Navy (USN) manages its relationship with
    China in disputed areas such as its maritime claims as part of the
    Joint Force, in coordination with the interagency, and in accordance
    with the appropriate DOD policies. In support of the larger U.S.
    Government effort, the USN uses consistency in both policy statements
    and operations. Examples include:

             Navy leadership regularly reiterates the U.S. position
            with senior leaders from other maritime powers, such as on 08
            February with the Chief of Defense Forces, Singapore Armed
            Forces.
             USN representatives engaging with Chinese officials
            promote U.S. Government interpretations of UNCLOS and
            international maritime law at the appropriate policy venues
            (ex: Defense Policy Consultative Talks).
             Naval forces in the PACOM AOR conduct missions such as
            hydrographic and military surveys in accordance with customary
            international law as codified in UNCLOS.
             USN educational institutions engage in academic
            discussions with Chinese counterparts.
             Naval forces leverage cooperative opportunities such
            as the HOA counter-piracy operation to develop military-to-
            military understanding that can mitigate future tensions.

        Additionally, the Navy maintains that U.S. ratification of UNCLOS
    directly supports our National security interests.
        Admiral Roughead. We are managing our relationship with China, and
    all other nations, in the maritime domain in accordance with customary
    international law. We continue to conduct missions that are consistent
    with customary international law, including our hydrographic and
    military surveys in the Pacific Command area of responsibility. We are
    also leveraging cooperative opportunities, such as in counter-piracy
    operations, to develop military-to-military understanding that can
    mitigate future tensions. Navy is committed to maintaining our forward
    deployed naval forces and rotational forward presence in the Asia-
    Pacific region.
        With regard to the Law of the Sea Treaty, customary international
    law is not universally accepted and may be changed by States over time.
    Customary law does not offer the future stability that comes with being
    a party to the Law of the Sea Treaty. Ratification of the Law of the
    Sea Treaty would codify our essential navigational rights and freedoms
    in disputed areas, and grant the United States a seat at the table when
    critical navigational, economic, and other rights are being applied,
    interpreted, and developed by other nations. I continue to support
    ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty as vital to our National
    security interests and helpful in managing our relations with foreign
    nations, including China.

        95. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, how do
    you think the relationship with China will develop as we continue to
    share the global commons--sea, air, space, and cyberspace--as our
    interests clash or diverge?
        Secretary Mabus. The U.S. Navy is working to support the U.S.
    policy of building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive
    relationship with the People's Republic of China. China's re-emergence
    as an actor of consequence on the international stage is increasing the
    quantity of interactions between our two militaries in the global
    commons. As a consequence, and in support of U.S. policy, the U.S. Navy
    is working hard to ensure the quality of these interactions both
    supports the growth of a positive military relationship and encourages
    China to channel their growing naval capabilities towards providing for
    the security of the maritime commons.
        Maritime security is a key element of our Cooperative Strategy for
    21st Century Seapower. It is also an area of mutual interest we share
    with the PLA(N) as China has become more dependent on the stability and
    security of the maritime domain. Both the U.S. Navy and the PLA(N) are
    showing an increasing willingness to maintain a positive momentum in
    the development of our relationship, and Navy is optimistic that both
    sides will continue to seek to cooperate where our interests converge
    and to work out differences in a constructive and effective manner
    through open and frank discussions.
        The U.S. Navy seek to ensure interactions at sea between naval
    vessels of the two countries are conducted in a safe and professional
    manner through venues such as the Military Maritime Cooperative
    Agreement.
        Admiral Roughead. The U.S. Navy is working to support the U.S.
    policy of building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive
    relationship with the People's Republic of China. China's re-emergence
    as an actor of consequence on the international stage is increasing the
    quantity of interactions between our two militaries in the global
    commons. As a consequence, and in support of U.S. policy, the U.S. Navy
    is working hard to ensure the quality of these interactions both
    supports the growth of a positive military relationship and encourages
    China to channel their growing naval capabilities towards providing for
    the security of the maritime commons.
        Maritime security is a key element of our Cooperative Strategy for
    21st Century Seapower. It is also an area of mutual interest we share
    with the PLA(N) as China has become more dependent on the stability and
    security of the maritime domain. Both the U.S. Navy and the PLA(N) are
    showing an increasing willingness to maintain a positive momentum in
    the development of our relationship, and Navy is optimistic that both
    sides will continue to seek to cooperate where our interests converge
    and to work out differences in a constructive and effective manner
    through open and frank discussions.
        The U.S. Navy seek to ensure interactions at sea between naval
    vessels of the two countries are conducted in a safe and professional
    manner through venues such as the Military Maritime Cooperative
    Agreement.

                    u.s. marines-okinawa to guam realignment
        96. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, on February
    17, 2009, the U.S. Government reaffirmed its support of an agreement
    with the Government of Japan concerning the implementation of the
    relocation of 8,000 marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam by
    2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Since then, the
    Japanese elected a new Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, who has asked
    the U.S. Government to consider new options for the Futenma Replacement
    Facility, which is part of the larger agreement for Guam. I note that
    the agreement stipulates that the Japanese Government must demonstrate
    tangible progress regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility, which has
    been defined to include a signature by the Governor of Okinawa on a
    landfill permit required to commence construction. This action was
    currently planned to take place in mid- to late-2010.
        Recently, the Secretary of Defense suggested that we should
    demonstrate patience in the negotiations with the Japanese Government
    on the future of the agreement. With that said, the fiscal year 2011
    budget request contains $452 million in MILCON funds for infrastructure
    on Guam to support the relocation of marines from Okinawa. This is in
    addition to $160 million authorized for construction in the fiscal year
    2010 defense bill. Also, the Japanese Government transferred $336
    million to DOD in July 2009 for projects on Guam. Does DOD plan to
    award construction projects on Guam with U.S. funds or funds provided
    by the Government of Japan prior to resolution of the future of Marine
    Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma?
        Secretary Mabus. The fiscal year 2011 budget request is $452
    million in MILCON funds for infrastructure on Guam to support the
    relocation of marines from Okinawa. The National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2010 provided $514 million in authorization for
    construction to support the Marine relocation.
        The framework for U.S.-Japan force posture realignment is the
    United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, issued
    following the May 1, 2006, meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-Japan
    Security Consultative Committee. This framework confirms that the
    Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected and,
    specifically, that the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF)
    relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on, among other things,
    tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility
    (FRF).
        Our relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue.
    We have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in
    support of the combatant commander and to meet our commitments to
    Allies and partners in the region, including under the U.S.-Japan
    Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
        We are currently waiting for the Government of Japan to complete
    its review of the FRF. Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated that he
    intends to resolve the issue by May, and we look forward to resuming
    work with the Government of Japan to fulfill our longstanding mutual
    objective of realigning our force posture in Japan to ensure that the
    Alliance's operational capabilities remain sustainable politically and
    operationally.
        General Conway. No DPRI projects have been awarded. They will be
    awarded after the Record of Decision (ROD) is signed. The ROD is
    anticipated in August 2010. GoJ has stated they will provide resolution
    on the future of the FRF in May 2010.
        Fiscal year 2010 MILCON projects were designed to have broad impact
    and enduring value to DOD stationed on Guam. For example Apra Harbor
    Warf improvements and defense access roads will benefit DOD independent
    of any Marine relocation. We have time with MILCON planning to receive
    and analyze GoJ FRF proposals.
        The construction plan is designed purposely to phase in
    capabilities and design requirements. This allows flexibility during
    the initial construction phase and ultimately allows the force laydown
    to drive final facility requirements.
        Initially, infrastructure and enabling facilities, such as at Apra
    Harbor to improve throughput, will be constructed. These initial
    construction projects have an enduring value no matter what the final
    laydown may be. This will be followed by construction of support
    facilities, such as the fire station and medical clinic, and housing.
    General purpose operational facilities, such as warehouses and
    headquarters buildings, will then be constructed. The final
    construction projects will be unit specific buildings that would be
    particular to the force laydown on Guam.

        97. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, what other
    options are acceptable to the Marine Corps for the relocation of Marine
    aviation units from MCAS Futenma?
        Secretary Mabus. The current Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)
    plan is a result of several years of bilateral planning culminating in
    what was agreed to be the best answer for both parties. The Government
    of Japan (GoJ) has not made any formal proposals for alternate options,
    nor have they formally identified what is wrong with the current agreed
    to plan. We continue to honor the Agreed Implementation Plans (AIPs)
    and will respect the GoJ's processes of policy review. However, it is
    the USMC position that any FRF option the GoJ may present must provide
    the same or better capability of the current FRF plan.
        General Conway. The current FRF plan is a result of several years
    of bilateral planning culminating in what was agreed to be the best
    answer for both parties. The GoJ has not made any formal proposals for
    alternate options, nor have they formally identified what is wrong with
    the current agreed to plan. We continue to honor the AIPs and will
    respect the GoJ's processes of policy review. However, it is the USMC
    position that any FRF option the GoJ may present must provide the same
    or better capability of the current FRF plan.

        98. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, would it be
    in the best interests of the Marine Corps to move marines to Guam
    absent an acceptable solution for the Futenma Replacement Facility?
        Secretary Mabus. The U.S.-Japan negotiated agreements were a
    comprehensive set of realignment initiatives to meet the strategic
    needs for both allies. Although the Government of Japan is taking a
    hard look at Futenma Replacement Facility options, we remain confident
    they realize the strategic value of having marines on Okinawa for their
    own defense and for security in the Asia-Pacific region.
        The Marine Corps requires that an aviation capability must remain
    on Okinawa to support the rest of the Marine Air Ground Task Force
    stationed there. We currently have that capability with Marine Aircraft
    Group 36 at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
        Our relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue,
    and we have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in
    support of the combatant commander. We need to look at force laydown in
    the Pacific in total, which includes aviation capabilities on Okinawa.
    A suitable Futenma Replacement Facility is considered the ``lynchpin''
    for USMC force relocation to Guam. Therefore, it is not the USMC desire
    or intent to alter the force laydown, to include moving any forces to
    Guam, until the Futenma issue is adequately resolved.
        General Conway. The U.S.-Japan negotiated agreements were a
    comprehensive set of realignment initiatives to meet the strategic
    needs for both allies. Although the Government of Japan is taking a
    hard look at Futenma Replacement Facility options, we remain confident
    they realize the strategic value of having marines on Okinawa for their
    own defense and for security in the Asia-Pacific region.
        The Marine Corps requires that an aviation capability must remain
    on Okinawa to support the rest of the Marine Air Ground Task Force
    stationed there. We currently have that capability with Marine Aircraft
    Group 36 at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. If a suitable replacement
    facility proves to be untenable, for whatever reason, we plan to
    continue operating out of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma
    indefinitely.
        Our relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue,
    and we have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in
    support of the combatant commander. We need to look at force laydown in
    the Pacific in total, which includes aviation capabilities on Okinawa.
    A suitable Futenma Replacement Facility is considered the ``lynchpin''
    for USMC force relocation to Guam. Therefore, it is not the USMC desire
    or intent to alter the force laydown, to include moving any forces to
    Guam, until the Futenma issue is adequately resolved.

        99. Senator McCain. General Conway, on a related issue, the plan
    for the stationing of marines on Guam calls for the acquisition of land
    not currently under the control of DOD in order to provide adequate
    live fire training ranges for the marines stationed on Guam. Initial
    assessments during the environmental review of the plan suggest that
    these land acquisitions may be problematic and marines may need to use
    ranges on other islands such as Tinian and Saipan to conduct training.
    In your view, how will the potential lack of adequate ranges on Guam
    affect Marine Corps training and readiness?
        General Conway. A lack of adequate ranges and training capability
    that would adversely affect readiness is a show stopper. Before moving
    marines to Guam, we must ensure that adequate training capability is
    available.
        The Marine Corps has always maintained that adequate training
    capability must be available in the area commensurate with relocation
    of our marines. Marine forces on Guam must have the ability to sustain
    core competencies in order to meet the operational requirements of the
    combatant commander.

        100. Senator McCain. General Conway, is this development
    significant, or are there acceptable alternatives for the training of
    marines stationed on Guam?
        General Conway. While training ranges currently planned for Guam
    and Tinian provide limited individual-skills training capabilities,
    these ranges do not provide for all requisite collective, combined
    arms, live and maneuver training the Marine Corps forces must meet to
    sustain core competencies. Those Marine Corps forces relocating from
    Okinawa to Guam will have to travel off-island to maintain requisite
    core competency.
        As part of continuing efforts by DOD to address these existing and
    ongoing training issues, as well as the training needs of other
    services in the Western Pacific, the OSD has directed U.S. Pacific
    Command to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for joint
    training requirements in the Western Pacific. This EIS will include an
    evaluation for additional training facilities in the Commonwealth of
    the Northern Mariana Islands and other locations in the Western Pacific
    to address collective, combined arms, live fire and maneuver training
    requirements for Marine Corps and joint forces in the area.

        101. Senator McCain. General Conway, is the development of a
    training range on Tinian Island feasible?
        General Conway. Currently, the plan to develop four expeditionary
    training ranges to augment individual skills training on Guam is
    feasible. Development of ranges that could potentially support ranges
    to meet individual, unit level, and integrated combined arms training
    requirements for training of Marine, joint, and multilateral forces on
    Tinian are unknown and will be addressed in a separate Environmental
    Impact Statement to be conducted by U.S. Pacific Command.

        102. Senator McCain. General Conway, does a potential exist that
    the Marine Corps will be forced to accept and adapt to a plan that does
    not provide for adequate live fire training ranges on Guam as
    originally envisioned?
        General Conway. The Marine Corps has always maintained that
    adequate training capability must be available in the area commensurate
    with relocation of our marines. A lack of adequate ranges and training
    capability that would adversely affect readiness is a show stopper.
    Before moving marines to Guam, we must ensure that adequate training
    capability is available and we are moving in the right direction
    towards that capability.

        103. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, on February 17, 2010, the
    U.S. EPA rated the Navy's Draft EIS as Environmentally Unsatisfactory:
    Inadequate Information. This rating was based on two aspects: first, by
    not providing a specific plan to address wastewater treatment and water
    supply needs of the increase in Guam's population due to the influx of
    construction workers related to facilities improvements on Guam which
    may result in significant adverse public health impacts; and second,
    because aspects of the project will result in what EPA views as
    unacceptable impacts to the coral reef ecosystem in Apra Harbor. EPA
    states that the impacts are of sufficient magnitude that EPA believes
    that the proposed improvements to facilities in Guam should not proceed
    as proposed and that improved analyses are required to ensure the final
    EIS is adequate. Given this very negative position by EPA on the
    current environmental analysis supporting the improvements of
    facilities on Guam, and the aggressive 2014 deadline for facilities to
    be ready to support the relocation of 8,000 marines and 9,000 family
    members from Okinawa to Guam, what is the Navy going to do to correct
    these apparent deficiencies?
        Secretary Mabus. The Guam military build-up EIS is one of the most
    complex EISs ever undertaken by DOD. We have worked closely with EPA
    and other Federal and local agencies during the development of the
    Draft EIS, and expected that formal agency comments would point out
    deficiencies and areas requiring revision. We are currently analyzing
    all comments received on the Draft EIS and are determining how best to
    address these issues in the Final EIS. The White House Council on
    Environmental Quality is also involved and is leading interagency
    efforts to help determine how best to assess and address the indirect
    impacts of the military buildup. DOD is committed to executing the
    program on Guam in such a way that will not pose significant public
    health impacts, so we are currently evaluating the major potential
    causes of those impacts and developing mitigation solutions. We also
    continue to work with other Federal agencies to find ``whole-of-
    government funding'' solutions to address Guam's existing conditions
    and potential impacts associated with the general population growth of
    Guam.

        104. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, can the Navy proceed with any
    of the MILCON projects requested in the fiscal year 2011 budget
    request, or projects to be funded by the Government of Japan, given the
    need to carry out further environmental analyses to support the build
    up on Guam?
        Secretary Mabus. We are currently reviewing public comments
    received on the DEIS, developing strategies for how best to address
    them in the Final EIS, and determining whether any of the issues raised
    by public comments received require further environmental analysis. As
    of this time we have not identified any specific issues or items that
    require additional environmental analysis such that we would not be
    able to carry out projects funded by the Government of Japan in
    Japanese fiscal year 2009 and 2010, and U.S. MILCON in fiscal year 2010
    and 2011.
        We must complete the Final EIS and sign the ROD before starting any
    of the construction projects, regardless of funding source. Our
    acquisition strategy allows for award of contracts for all projects for
    which we have received GOJ or US funding immediately following the
    signing of the ROD.

        105. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, what projects are likely to
    be delayed due to the need to address the issues raised by EPA?
        Secretary Mabus. The Navy is currently reviewing the comments
    submitted by EPA on the Draft EIS. While EPA has raised many serious
    concerns, we are optimistic that we can respond to the issues raised
    and make necessary changes to the Final EIS to address EPA's concerns
    and thus avoid any delay in the program.
        The following Government of Japan funded Japanese fiscal year 2009
    and 2010 projects, as well as the U.S. MILCON fiscal year 2010 and 2011
    projects, are scheduled to be awarded shortly after a ROD is issued
    later this fiscal year.

              JFY 2009 ACE Gate, U&SI Ph I, AAFB
              JFY 2009 Apra Harbor, U&SI Ph 1
              JFY 2009 Finegayan, U&SI Ph I
              FY 2010 P-1003 Military Working Dogs
              FY 2010 P-204 Apra Wharf Ph I (U/T) Increment I
              FY 2010 P-100 North Ramp Utilities Ph I, AAFB
              FY 2010 P-101 North Ramp Parking Ph I, AAFB
              JFY 2010 J007 Waterfront Ops
              JFY 2010 J008 Fire Station, Finegayan
              JFY 2010 J006 Apra Harbor Clinic
              JFY 2010 J017 U&SI Ph II, Finegayan
              JFY 2010 J-010 BEQ, Finegayan
              FY 2011 P-110 U&SI, Finegayan Ph I
              FY 2011 P-202 North Ramp Utilities Ph II, AAFB
              FY 2011 P-203 North Ramp Parking Ph II, AAFB
              FY 2011 P-204 Apra Wharf Ph I (U/T) Increment II
              JFY 2011 J-011 Base Admin Bldg
              JFY 2011 J-012 MLG Admin Bldg
              JFY 2011 J-015 Enlisted Dining Facility
              JFY 2011 J-016 BEQ Site Adapt, 2 BEQs, Finegayan

        106. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, how will this delay impact
    the deadline to be ready for the marines to move to Guam by 2014?
        Secretary Mabus. We are committed to the 2014 date agreed to in the
    Realignment Roadmap between the United States and Japan. We are
    currently reviewing public comments received on the DEIS and developing
    strategies for how best to address them in the Final EIS and sign a ROD
    in time to begin construction in fiscal year 2010.

                                     china
        107. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, are you comfortable with the
    current number of U.S. submarines, especially at the rate that China is
    building and deploying its submarine fleet?
        Admiral Roughead. Our existing submarine fleet of 53 attack
    submarines (SSNs) is meeting all critical combatant commander SSN
    requirements, including any potential threat posed by the existing
    Chinese submarine fleet.
        Beyond the FYDP, our SSN force structure will dip below combatant
    commanders' minimum force level requirement of 48 SSNs in 2024, as we
    decommission Los Angeles-class SSNs at a rate of 3 to 4 per year. Our
    ability to effectively counter submarine threats posed in this
    timeframe hinges on our reaching and maintaining an increased
    construction rate of two Virginia-class SSNs per year starting in 2011.
    Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding for this construction.

        108. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, how is the Navy planning
    long-term to maintain its strategic and tactical dominance in Asia-
    Pacific?
        Admiral Roughead. The Navy will continue to maintain its strategic
    and tactical dominance in the Asia-Pacific region through sustained
    engagement with allies and partners and the persistent forward presence
    of our combat-capable ships and aircraft in the region. Specifically,
    we will continue to forward deploy naval forces and exercise the
    freedom of maneuver necessary to deter aggression, assure our allies,
    and enable our quick response to regional contingencies. We will employ
    superior and resilient warfare systems, including sea-based BMD and
    conduct exercises to improve interoperability with our joint service
    and international partners. We will conduct regional maritime security
    operations and partnership building activities to protect maritime
    resources, support free and open seaborne commerce, and counter
    conventional and irregular challenges, including maritime-related
    terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy,
    environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. Navy
    remains committed to sustained and active engagement in the Asia-
    Pacific region over the long-term to protect our vital national
    interests.

                     proposal for moratorium on discharges
        109. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, in his testimony on February 2, Admiral Mullen was clear that
    the Joint Chiefs have not yet developed their best military advice
    about the impact of a repeal of the DADT policy or the manner in which
    a change would be implemented. However, many in Congress intend to move
    quickly through legislation to repeal the law as quickly as possible,
    including imposition of a moratorium on administrative separations
    while the high level review proceeds. Do you support a moratorium on
    discharges of openly gay servicemembers while the high level review is
    conducted?
        Secretary Mabus. I do not recommend enactment of a moratorium
    because I believe that it would complicate the ongoing review directed
    by Secretary Gates to assess the potential impact of a repeal of 10
    U.S.C. Sec. 654. The Department of the Navy is participating in the DOD
    Comprehensive Review Working Group to assess the implications of a
    repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654 and, should that occur, to develop an
    implementation plan for any statutory change. That review is due to
    report its findings to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010. I strongly
    believe we owe our servicemembers informed and thoughtful
    decisionmaking.
        Admiral Roughead. I do not recommend enactment of a moratorium
    because I believe that it would be extremely confusing to the force at
    a time when they are engaged in two combat operations and other
    demanding military activities around the globe. Moreover, a moratorium
    could complicate the ongoing review directed by Secretary Gates.
        General Conway. No.

        110. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, what is the basis for your objection to a congressionally-
    mandated moratorium on separations of openly gay servicemembers under
    the DADT policy?
        Secretary Mabus. I do not recommend enactment of a moratorium
    because I believe that it would complicate the ongoing review directed
    by Secretary Gates to assess the potential impacts of a repeal of 10
    U.S.C. Sec. 654. The Department of the Navy is participating in the DOD
    Comprehensive Review Working Group to assess the implications of a
    repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654, should that occur, and develop an
    implementation plan for any new statutory mandate. That review is due
    to report its findings to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010. I
    strongly believe we owe our servicemembers informed and thoughtful
    decisionmaking.
        Admiral Roughead. I believe a moratorium would be extremely
    confusing to the force at a time when they are engaged in two combat
    operations and other demanding military activities around the globe,
    and that a moratorium could complicate the ongoing comprehensive review
    directed by Secretary Gates.
        General Conway. Until such time as the law is changed, the Marine
    Corps will follow the law.
        Commanders in the field are executing the current law and policy to
    the absolute best of their abilities.
        During this time of war, Congress should either change the law or
    not. Half measures, while the public debate and in-depth study are
    ongoing, will only create confusion for commanders and marines and add
    an additional level of friction to an already complex battlefield.

                       role of the joint chiefs of staff
        111. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, Admiral
    Mullen is the principal military adviser to the President and the
    Secretary of Defense, but under law, he must consult and seek advice
    from the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant
    commanders. Have you been given adequate opportunity to state your
    views to date?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes. The Chairman has always been receptive to
    hearing my views on matters affecting the U.S. Navy.
        General Conway. Senator McCain, I believe that Admiral Mullen has
    sought out, and provided me adequate opportunity to state my views. If
    disagreement exists, the Chairman routinely shares the Service Chiefs'
    views with the President and the Secretary of Defense. If the Service
    Chiefs think we need a stronger reply, we are not hesitant to write and
    sign a 16-star letter and send it forward.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                     life cycle fuel consumption and costs
        112. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, on December 3, 2009, I sent
    you a letter and expressed concern that ``TOC, including fuel
    efficiency, should be a critical factor of competitive cost
    evaluation'' in the LCS request for proposal (RFP). On January 14,
    2010, you responded in a letter and stated, ``reduced TOC has been
    central to the LCS concept and requirements.'' Additionally, you stated
    at the Naval Energy Forum in October 2009 that, ``the lifetime energy
    cost of a building or a system, and the fully burdened cost of fuel in
    powering those, will be a mandatory evaluation factor used when
    awarding contracts.'' Where, specifically, in the final RFP do you
    evaluate the lifecycle fuel costs in dollars for the LCS?
        Secretary Mabus. The LCS fiscal years 2010-2014 block buy
    solicitation does not specifically address life cycle fuel costs in
    dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one of six technical/management
    evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose specific life
    cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs--
    training, maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration
    management, operations (including fuel usage), environmental impact and
    disposal. These are common TOC categories in the Operating and Support
    Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (October
    2007).
        The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its
    evaluation under the price/cost category. Since the inception of the
    LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and
    life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this regard, life cycle cost
    considerations are emphasized in both designs through the Navy's
    requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package
    modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of
    the program.
        The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of
    each ship design. Total ownership considers research and development
    costs, investment costs, disposal costs, and O&S costs including
    maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and infrastructure support. The
    Navy's analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements.
        In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the
    estimated life cycle cost for each ship design, but are also highly
    dependent on the speed-time profile assumed for the LCS mission.
    Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary significantly
    based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time
    profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications
    was based upon an assumption that the ship would perform a single
    wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other
    significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare or
    anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned from
    actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include
    a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a
    variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold
    value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities Development
    Document as ``Ownership Cost'' and approved by the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council.
        With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship
    of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they
    are today because of the inherent design features that have been
    required from the beginning of the program and the continued focus on
    reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to include O&S costs in the
    price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the Offerors would
    have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective
    designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed
    changes to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition
    process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing
    acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to the program.
        The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/
    management category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-
    proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated,
    assigned an adjectival rating, and factored into the overall best value
    determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will
    therefore be a consideration in the Navy's best value determination for
    this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the
    proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the
    contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable
    long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design.

        113. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, how did you determine the
    factors to address those lifecycle fuel costs in dollars and where was
    the data generated to determine the lifecycle fuel consumption?
        Secretary Mabus. The LCS fiscal years 2010-2014 block buy
    solicitation does not specifically address life cycle fuel costs in
    dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one of six technical/management
    evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose specific life
    cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs--
    training, maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration
    management, operations (including fuel usage), environmental impact and
    disposal. These are common TOC categories in the Operating and Support
    Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (October
    2007).
        The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its
    evaluation under the price/cost category. Since the inception of the
    LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and
    life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this regard, life cycle cost
    considerations are emphasized in both designs through the Navy's
    requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package
    modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of
    the program.
        The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of
    each ship design. Total Ownership considers research and development
    costs, investment costs, disposal costs, and O&S costs including
    maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and infrastructure support. The
    Navy's analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements.
        In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the
    estimated life cycle cost for each ship design, but are also highly
    dependent on the speed-time profile assumed for the LCS mission.
    Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary significantly
    based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time
    profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications
    was based upon an assumption that the ship would perform a single
    wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other
    significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare or
    anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned from
    actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include
    a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a
    variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold
    value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities Development
    Document as ``Ownership Cost'' and approved by the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council.
        With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship
    of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they
    are today because of the inherent design features that have been
    required from the beginning of the program and the continued focus on
    reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to include O&S costs in the
    price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the Offerors would
    have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective
    designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed
    changes to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition
    process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing
    acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to the program.
        The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/
    management category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-
    proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated,
    assigned an adjectival rating, and factored into the overall best value
    determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will
    therefore be a consideration in the Navy's best value determination for
    this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the
    proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the
    contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable
    long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design.

        114. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, why was the determination
    of fuel consumption and lifecycle costs done in terms of percentages
    vice real dollars?
        Secretary Mabus. The LCS fiscal years 2010-2014 block buy
    solicitation does not specifically address life cycle fuel costs in
    dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one of six technical/management
    evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose specific life
    cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs--
    training, maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration
    management, operations (including fuel usage), environmental impact and
    disposal. These are common TOC categories in the Operating and Support
    Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (October
    2007).
        The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its
    evaluation under the price/cost category. Since the inception of the
    LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and
    life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this regard, life cycle cost
    considerations are emphasized in both designs through the Navy's
    requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package
    modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of
    the program.
        The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of
    each ship design. Total ownership considers research and development
    costs, investment costs, disposal costs, and O&S costs including
    maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and infrastructure support. The
    Navy's analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements.
        In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the
    estimated life cycle cost for each ship design, but are also highly
    dependent on the speed-time profile assumed for the LCS mission.
    Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary significantly
    based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time
    profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications
    was based upon an assumption that the ship would perform a single
    wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other
    significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare or
    anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned from
    actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include
    a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a
    variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold
    value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities Development
    Document as ``Ownership Cost'' and approved by the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council.
        With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship
    of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they
    are today because of the inherent design features that have been
    required from the beginning of the program and the continued focus on
    reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to include O&S costs in the
    price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the Offerors would
    have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective
    designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed
    changes to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition
    process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing
    acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to the program.
        The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/
    management category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-
    proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated,
    assigned an adjectival rating, and factored into the overall best value
    determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will
    therefore be a consideration in the Navy's best value determination for
    this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the
    proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the
    contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable
    long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design.

        115. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, is the use of percentages a
    common practice for evaluating these important criteria? If you think
    it does or does not, please explain your rationale.
        Secretary Mabus. The LCS fiscal years 2010-2014 block buy
    solicitation does not specifically address life cycle fuel costs in
    dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one of six technical/management
    evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose specific life
    cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs--
    training, maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration
    management, operations (including fuel usage), environmental impact and
    disposal. These are common TOC categories in the Operating and Support
    Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (October
    2007).
        The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its
    evaluation under the price/cost category. Since the inception of the
    LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and
    life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this regard, life cycle cost
    considerations are emphasized in both designs through the Navy's
    requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package
    modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of
    the program.
        The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of
    each ship design. Total ownership considers research and development
    costs, investment costs, disposal costs, and O&S costs including
    maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and infrastructure support. The
    Navy's analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements.
        In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the
    estimated life cycle cost for each ship design, but are also highly
    dependent on the speed-time profile assumed for the LCS mission.
    Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary significantly
    based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time
    profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications
    was based upon an assumption that the ship would perform a single
    wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other
    significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare or
    anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned from
    actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include
    a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a
    variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold
    value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities Development
    Document as ``Ownership Cost'' and approved by the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council.
        With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship
    of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they
    are today because of the inherent design features that have been
    required from the beginning of the program and the continued focus on
    reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to include O&S costs in the
    price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the Offerors would
    have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective
    designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed
    changes to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition
    process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing
    acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to the program.
        The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/
    management category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-
    proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated,
    assigned an adjectival rating, and factored into the overall best value
    determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will
    therefore be a consideration in the Navy's best value determination for
    this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the
    proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the
    contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable
    long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design.

        116. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, in your letter to me dated
    January 14, 2010, you stated, ``prior to the fiscal year 2010 contract
    award, the LCS program will be presented to the Under Secretary of
    Defense of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as the Milestone
    Decision Authority for a Milestone B decision. Here, the Navy's Life
    Cycle Cost Estimate will be scrutinized against an independently
    derived estimate for the Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and
    Program Evaluation (CAPE).'' It is my understanding that the milestone
    decision will occur after the source selection. Why would you wait
    until after a source selection is made to evaluate the second most
    important program cost criteria for the life cycle cost of the LCS?
        Secretary Mabus. The contract award of the LCS fiscal year 2010-
    2014 block buy solicitation will not occur until after the Milestone B
    has been conducted. Rather, the Navy will prepare for and participate
    in the Milestone B decision process concurrently with its evaluation of
    competing proposals under this solicitation.
        This approach has been used on other shipbuilding programs and was
    most recently used on the competitive contract award of the Joint High
    Speed Vessel (JHSV) in November 2008.
        This approach is consistent with both the January 14, 2010 letter
    and in my public statements before the Naval Energy Forum in October
    2009.

        117. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, has this approach ever been
    used before, or is it common practice to consider life cycle fuel
    consumption after the source selection is made? If so, please provide
    the program name and dates where this approach was executed.
        Secretary Mabus. The contract award of the LCS fiscal year 2010-
    2014 block buy solicitation will not occur until after the Milestone B
    has been conducted. Rather, the Navy will prepare for and participate
    in the Milestone B decision process concurrently with its evaluation of
    competing proposals under this solicitation.
        This approach has been used on other shipbuilding programs and was
    most recently used on the competitive contract award of the JHSV in
    November 2008.
        This approach is consistent with both the January 14, 2010 letter
    and in my public statements before the Naval Energy Forum in October
    2009.

        118. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, do you feel that this
    approach is consistent with your statements of January 14, 2010, in the
    letter to me and your public statement before the Naval Energy Forum in
    October 2009?
        Secretary Mabus. Yes. From the inception of the LCS Program, TOC
    has been addressed through the utilization of open architecture,
    reduced manning, and reduced maintenance. Although fuel (energy) costs
    are not a specific evaluation factor in the cost section of the LCS
    Request For Proposal (RFP), the RFP strikes an appropriate balance
    between the acquisition costs and O&S costs that make up the overall
    TOCs.
        The technical/management section of the RFP specifically focuses on
    the drivers of TOC in an effort to further reduce O&S costs,
    particularly in the area of energy usage or fuel costs. From the
    beginning of the LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both
    acquisition cost and life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this
    regard, life cycle cost considerations are emphasized in both LCS
    designs, through the Navy's requirements for reduced manning, mission
    package modularity and open architecture that have been key design
    parameters since the inception of the program.
        The fiscal year 2010 LCS RFP addresses TOC as one of six technical
    factors. This factor specifically focuses on future efforts to reduce
    ownership cost in the areas of training, maintenance, supply support,
    configuration management, operations costs (which include fuel),
    environmental impact and disposal, all of which affect TOC. The RFP
    includes an evaluation factor under the technical/management category
    for life cycle cost reduction initiatives. Offeror-proposed initiatives
    to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated, assigned an adjective
    rating, and factored into the overall best value determination.
        Fuel costs are highly dependent on the speed-time profile assumed
    for the LCS mission. Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would
    vary significantly based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover,
    the speed-time profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build
    Specifications was based upon an assumption that the ship would perform
    a single wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect
    other significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare
    or anti-surface warfare, did not reflect any lessons learned from
    actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include
    a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for
    representative operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the
    threshold value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities
    Development Document as ``Ownership Cost'' and approved by the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council.

                  draft request for proposal sections l and m
        119. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, why
    was the decision made to not provide Sections L and M to the bidders
    during the draft RFP comment period?
        Secretary Mabus. The decision not to release a draft of Sections L
    and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
    mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
    protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
    provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
    the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to
    provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
    of the statement of work. Draft RFP Sections A-J were released to
    industry prior to the OSD Peer Review.
        DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
    acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
    implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
    contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
    lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
    industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
    joint decision by Naval Sea Systems Command Contracts Directorate
    (NAVSEA 02) and Program Executive Office for Ships (PEO SHIPS).
        The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
    the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
    Sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
    draft RFP without Sections L and M was issued for the competitive
    procurement for Integrated Submarine Imaging Systems (ISIS) in support
    of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program Office (PMS 435). Contract
    award was made and this procurement was not protested. For the DDG-51
    program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the draft specifications were
    issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was successfully awarded without
    protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.
        Admiral Roughead. The decision to not release a draft of Sections L
    and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
    mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
    protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
    provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
    the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them to
    provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
    of the statement of work.
        DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
    acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
    implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
    contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
    lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
    industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
    joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
        The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
    the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
    sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
    draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
    procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this procurement was
    not protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only
    the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
    successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.

        120. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, do you
    feel this is a mishandling of the draft RFP and could serve as a
    potential area of protest?
        Secretary Mabus. The decision not to release a draft of Sections L
    and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
    mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
    protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (Sections A-J) were
    provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
    the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to
    provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
    of the statement of work. Draft RFP Sections A-J were released to
    industry prior to the OSD Peer Review.
        DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
    acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
    implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
    contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
    lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
    industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
    joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
        The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
    the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
    sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
    draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
    procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program
    Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not
    protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the
    draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
    successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.
        Admiral Roughead. The decision to not release a draft of sections L
    and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
    mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
    protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
    provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
    the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them to
    provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
    of the statement of work.
        DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
    acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
    implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
    contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
    lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
    industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
    joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
        The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
    the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
    sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
    draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
    procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this procurement was
    not protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only
    the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
    successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.

        121. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, who
    made this decision?
        Secretary Mabus. The decision not to release a draft of Sections L
    and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
    mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
    protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
    provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
    the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to
    provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
    of the statement of work. Draft RFP sections A-J were released to
    industry prior to the OSD Peer Review.
        DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
    acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
    implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
    contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
    lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
    industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
    joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
        The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
    the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
    Sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
    draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
    procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program
    Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not
    protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the
    draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
    successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.
        Admiral Roughead. The decision to not release a draft of Sections L
    and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
    mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
    protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
    provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
    the scope, structure, and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them to
    provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
    of the statement of work.
        DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
    acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
    implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
    contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
    lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
    industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
    joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
        The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
    the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
    sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
    draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
    procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this procurement was
    not protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only
    the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
    successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.

        122. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, on
    what other occasions has the Navy not provided these sections during
    the draft RFP comment period?
        Secretary Mabus. The decision not to release a draft of sections L
    and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
    mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
    protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
    provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
    the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to
    provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
    of the statement of work. Draft RFP Sections A-J were released to
    industry prior to the OSD Peer Review.
        DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
    acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
    implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
    contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
    lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
    industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
    joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
        The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
    the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
    sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
    draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
    procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program
    Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not
    protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the
    draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
    successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.
        Admiral Roughead. The decision to not release a draft of sections L
    and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
    mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
    protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
    provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
    the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them to
    provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
    of the statement of work.
        DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
    acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
    implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
    contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
    lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
    industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
    joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
        The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
    the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
    sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
    draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
    procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this procurement was
    not protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only
    the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
    successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.

        123. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, what
    was the outcome of those acquisition programs?
        Secretary Mabus. The decision not to release a draft of sections L
    and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
    mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
    protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
    provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
    the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to
    provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
    of the statement of work. Draft RFP sections A-J were released to
    industry prior to the OSD Peer Review.
        DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
    acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
    implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
    contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
    lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
    industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
    joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
        The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
    the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
    sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
    draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
    procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program
    Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not
    protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the
    draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
    successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.
        Admiral Roughead. The decision to not release a draft of sections L
    and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
    mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
    protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
    provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
    the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them to
    provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
    of the statement of work.
        DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
    acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
    implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
    contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
    lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
    industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
    joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
        The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
    the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
    sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
    draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
    procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this procurement was
    not protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only
    the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
    successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.

                              best value approach
        124. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, you stated before this
    committee on February 25, 2010, that, ``both ships meet the
    requirements for the Navy.'' I understand that LCS-1 has made
    engineering modifications after delivery to place stern extensions to
    the hull to address performance issues. If that information is
    accurate, how can you state that both ships met the requirements on
    delivery?
        Secretary Mabus. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are
    required to meet stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the
    ship's length is flooded. The Build Specification for LCS invokes this
    requirement. LCS-1 meets these requirements with the addition of the
    external tanks. The LCS-3 had already incorporated this change into the
    fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline
    for the fiscal year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the
    LCS-4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel
    and transom redesign, which is the performance baseline for the fiscal
    years 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal
    years 2010-2014 block buy solicitation meet the Navy's standards.

        125. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, additionally, the final RFP
    allows for changes and modifications to the hull to address weight,
    trim, and stability. Are these changes to LCS-1 being allowed to
    compensate for a design shortfall in the hull's performance even after
    she was delivered to the Navy?
        Secretary Mabus. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are
    required to meet stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the
    ship's length is flooded. The Build Specification for LCS invokes this
    requirement. LCS-1 meets these requirements with the addition of the
    external tanks. The LCS-3 had already incorporated this change into the
    fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline
    for the fiscal year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the
    LCS-4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel
    and transom redesign, which is the performance baseline for the fiscal
    years 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal
    years 2010-2014 block buy solicitation meet the Navy's standards.

        126. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, does this then mean that
    LCS-1 meets the performance requirements as outlined by the Navy?
        Secretary Mabus. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are
    required to meet stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the
    ship's length is flooded. The Build Specification for LCS invokes this
    requirement. LCS-1 meets these requirements with the addition of the
    external tanks. The LCS-3 had already incorporated this change into the
    fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline
    for the fiscal year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the
    LCS-4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel
    and transom redesign, which is the performance baseline for the fiscal
    year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal
    year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation meet the Navy's standards.

        127. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, if a provision can be made
    to enhance the performance of one ship in these areas, why did you
    determine that changes could not be made to descope the ships where
    they over perform to allow for cost competitiveness?
        Secretary Mabus. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are
    required to meet stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the
    ship's length is flooded. The Build Specification for LCS invokes this
    requirement. LCS-1 meets these requirements with the addition of the
    external tanks. The LCS-3 had already incorporated this change into the
    fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline
    for the fiscal year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the
    LCS-4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel
    and transom redesign, which is the performance baseline for the fiscal
    year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal
    year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation meet the Navy's standards.

                         u.s. marine corps requirements
        128. Senator Sessions. General Conway, it is my understanding that
    you toured the USS Independence (LCS-2) last year. Is a larger mission
    bay more advantageous to Marine Corps operations when comparing LCS-2
    to LCS-1?
        General Conway. A larger mission bay would be advantageous,
    however, the LCS has a limited interface capability and does not have
    the capability for at-sea offload. The Marine Corps continues to
    explore LCS options with the Navy.

        129. Senator Sessions. General Conway, is a larger flight deck more
    advantageous to Marine Corps operations when comparing LCS-2 to LCS-1?
        General Conway. A comparison of LCS-1 versus LCS-2 shows that LCS-
    2's larger flight deck would be preferable. It is large enough to
    support landing up to a single CH-53E or a single MV-22 at a time and
    possibly supporting dual operations of H-1 aircraft whereas the smaller
    LCS-1 flight deck would only support landing a single H-1 at a time.
    However, the LCS class of ships was not structurally designed to
    support landing aircraft heavier than Navy MH-60 variants. This results
    in neither ship being capable of supporting landing operations of the
    USMC's primary assault support helicopters (MV-22/CH-53E). The Marine
    Corps is currently working with the Navy in exploring current LCS
    capabilities, determining the costs associated with possible flight
    deck modifications, and how future LCS operations could incorporate
    Marine Forces. Actions such as increasing the deck and point loading
    strength of the LCS-2 or modifying the design of the LCS-1 flight deck
    to support larger helicopters would enable safe and sustained landing
    operations of all Marine Corps rotary-wing platforms. This ability
    would enhance and provide flexibility to stated LCS mission sets such
    as SOF support, NEO, HA/DR, and theater security cooperation/maritime
    influence. This would in turn provide maritime component planners
    greater flexibility in course of action development. We understand that
    ultimately the Navy must find solutions that best support the LCS
    mission.

        130. Senator Sessions. General Conway, were Marine Corps
    operational requirements taken into consideration during the
    development of the draft RFP or final RFP for the LCS program? If so,
    what were those requirements and if not, why not?
        General Conway. Marine Corps operational requirements were not
    taken into consideration. LCS was primarily designed to support three
    Navy missions in the littorals: mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare,
    and surface warfare.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
                              contract for lpd-26
        131. Senator Vitter. Secretary Mabus, I understand that a RFP has
    been released for the LPD-26 and a proposal has been submitted.
    Congress has appropriated significant funding for the LPD-26, and the
    longer there is no contract, the more jobs that are at risk. Please
    provide me with a status update on the contract.
        Secretary Mabus. The Navy is committed to a stable shipbuilding
    plan and is actively engaged with industry to expedite shipbuilding
    contract awards. A Request for Proposal for LPD-26 with an option for
    LPD-27 was sent to Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB) on May 4, 2009.
    The shipbuilder provided their LPD-26 proposal to the Navy on January
    26, 2010. The Navy immediately began fact finding on the proposal. The
    review and audit of this proposal is ongoing, with negotiations
    expected to start shortly. However, the speed of the resolution and the
    final award will depend on the ability of both NGSB and the Navy to
    reach an agreement that is fair and reasonable.
        In June 2009, Navy awarded $213 million of LPD-26 long lead time
    material (LLTM). An additional $200 million is in process in order to
    maintain the contractor proposed production schedule.

        132. Senator Vitter. Secretary Mabus, how quickly will the Navy
    take to approve a bid to move forward on the LPD-26?
        Secretary Mabus. The Navy is committed to a stable shipbuilding
    plan and is actively engaged with industry to expedite shipbuilding
    contract awards. A Request for Proposal for LPD-26 with an option for
    LPD-27 was sent to NGSB on May 4, 2009. The shipbuilder provided their
    LPD-26 proposal to the Navy on January 26, 2010. The Navy immediately
    began fact finding on the proposal. As a result of discussions between
    the Navy and NGSB, the proposal is ongoing, with negotiations expected
    to start shortly. However, the speed of the resolution and the final
    award will depend on the ability of both NGSB and the Navy to reach an
    agreement that is fair and reasonable.
        In June 2009, Navy awarded $213 million of LPD-26 LLTM. An
    additional $200 million is in process in order to maintain the
    contractor's proposed production schedule.

        133. Senator Vitter. Secretary Mabus, can you give a definitive
    deadline on when this will be approved?
        Secretary Mabus. The Navy is committed to a stable shipbuilding
    plan and is actively engaged with industry to expedite shipbuilding
    contract awards. For the LPD-17 program, the Navy awarded $213 million
    of LLTM to NGSB for LPD-26 on June 23, 2009. The Navy's Request for
    Proposal (RFP), issued on May 4, 2009 for construction of LPD-26,
    included options for LPD-27 LLTM and for LPD-27 construction. The Navy
    received a proposal from NGSB for construction of LPD-26 and some LLTM
    for LPD-27 on January 26, 2010, and is actively in discussions with
    NGSB to reach an agreement.

                        information technology contracts
        134. Senator Vitter. Secretary Mabus, the Department of the Navy
    was visionary in their pursuit and implementation of the Navy Marine
    Corps Intranet (NMCI), the single largest information technology (IT)
    network in the world short of the Internet itself. NMCI has been in
    place since 2000 and has proven to be invaluable to the Department of
    the Navy as the world's preeminent command and control network and
    placing the Department of the Navy ahead of both the Army and the Air
    Force in IT capability.
        We are now coming to the conclusion of this contract which will
    expire in October of this year. It is my understanding the Department
    of the Navy has decided to continue operations using a Continuations of
    Services Contract (COSC) until the Department finalizes the RFP
    necessary to procure for the Next Generation Enterprise Contract which
    will be the program of record building on NMCI.
        My question for you is in these challenging economic times wouldn't
    it be best for the taxpayers and the Department of the Navy to contract
    those services via a multi-year contract for the required duration of
    the COSC, instead of a series of single-year contracts? We know these
    multi-year contracts reduce program costs because they enable the
    ability to plan and make the necessary arrangements well into the
    future rather than negotiating program specifics on an annual basis
    regarding workforce retention, supplier pricing, and asset cost
    recovery.
        Secretary Mabus. As a multi-year contract the Department of the
    Navy would be locked into an extended non-competitive relationship with
    predetermined minimums that would compromise the competitive
    environment we seek to create for NGEN. The DoN goal is to transition
    as quickly as possible from COSC to competitive contracts.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
                                public shipyards
        135. Senator Collins. Secretary Mabus, last year I raised the issue
    of maintaining the infrastructure in our four public shipyards. You
    indicated that the Navy is trying to incorporate more mission critical
    infrastructure improvement projects into the base budget rather than
    relying on congressional earmarks for funding. Although the President's
    fiscal year 2011 budget includes slight increases in MILCON and SRM
    funding, I remain concerned about the material condition of Navy
    shipyards. According to the Navy the current SRM backlog, as of last
    December, was $3 billion. Can you please detail how the Navy plans on
    addressing this backlog and upgrading our public shipyards?
        Secretary Mabus. Shipyards are fully functional and safely meeting
    their fleet mission requirements. The Navy has steadily increased its
    investment in Naval shipyard recapitalization over the past several
    years through Operation and Maintenance, Navy and MILCON projects.
        In 2009, Navy completed a comprehensive condition assessment of the
    Naval shipyards to assess restoration requirements. A configuration
    analysis was also recently completed for modernization requirements.
        We are developing future investment plans to properly address the
    backlog to ensure that the public shipyards continue to meet future
    mission requirements.

        [Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                          DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich,
    Burris, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, and Thune.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional
    staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald
    J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W.
    Maroney, counsel; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member;
    and John H. Quirk V, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative
    counsel; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L.
    Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul,
    professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
    member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Paul J. Hubbard,
    and Jennifer R. Knowles.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Patrick Hayes, assistant to
    Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
    Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena,
    assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to
    Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator
    Burris; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A.
    Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek,
    assistant to Senator Thune; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant
    to Senator Wicker.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. We will start with
    a warm welcome to our witnesses. Secretary Donley, General
    Schwartz, we welcome you back to the committee to testify on
    the plans and the programs of the U.S. Air Force as we review
    the fiscal year 2011 annual budget and overseas contingency
    operations (OCO) request of the administration.
        Gentlemen, please extend on behalf of our committee our
    gratitude to the men and women of the Air Force and to their
    families, for the many sacrifices that they have made on behalf
    of our Nation; thanks to both of you for your long careers of
    leadership and service.
        The budget request continues the defense reforms begun last
    year to rebalance the force towards the military capabilities
    necessary to prevail in today's wars, to buy weapons that are
    relevant and affordable, and to ensure that tax dollars are
    used wisely. Consistent with those reform goals set out by
    Secretary Gates and the results of the Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR), a top priority for the Department of Defense
    (DOD) must be the critical requirements for the ongoing
    conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our committee has sought to
    ensure that our combatant commanders have what they need to
    succeed in those conflicts, including technologies to counter
    improvised explosive devices (IED) and intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
        We're confident that this committee will continue to
    support the needs of our warfighters in those conflicts. I
    would note in particular that the new budget is going to
    support expanding the number of Predator Unmanned Aerial
    Vehicles (UAV) in theater from approximately 150 to 200. This
    committee has been pressing for more UAVs I think every single
    year for at least the last 15 years.
        A number of critical issues confront the Air Force. We know
    that the Air Force is providing forces to the U.S. Central
    Command (CENTCOM) war efforts in a number of traditional roles,
    but is also providing airmen in support of land component
    tasks. We look forward to hearing this morning about how the
    Air Force is responding to the shift of emphasis from Iraq to
    Afghanistan and how the Air Force is supporting these current
    operations while preparing its forces to deal with future
    demands.
        The catastrophic January 12, 2010, earthquake that struck
    the nation of Haiti reminded all of us just how indiscriminate
    national disasters can be and renewed America's commitments to
    the Nation of Haiti. DOD has mobilized resources and manpower
    to aid in the relief effort in support of the Department of
    State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
        We know that the Air Force has played a critical role in
    supporting those relief efforts in Haiti, and we applaud those
    efforts and stand ready to continue to work with the Air Force
    to ensure that DOD is able to continue to provide support to
    this critical humanitarian disaster response effort in the
    weeks and months ahead.
        We await receipt of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). We
    also expect that the Senate will be presented with a new treaty
    to succeed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
    Significant reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile, both
    deployed warheads and those in reserve, while maintaining the
    remaining stockpile in a safe, secure, and reliable
    configuration, should strengthen our security. We will be
    having much more discussion on these topics in the coming
    weeks.
        The NPR, as well as the START follow-on treaty, could have
    a significant impact on the Air Force. The budget request for
    fiscal year 2011 includes funds to begin the next phase of the
    life extension study for the B-61 nuclear bomb. This nuclear
    gravity bomb is the only nuclear weapon carried by fighter
    aircraft and is the only nuclear weapon carried by North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft.
        The Air Force is looking at bomber force reductions, a new
    bomber aircraft, and the possibility of some changes in the
    Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force,
    either in the number of deployed systems or the number of
    nuclear warheads loaded on missiles. After the significant
    failures in the management of the nuclear force structure, the
    Air Force has taken significant steps to refocus on the nuclear
    enterprise, including the recent standup of the Global Strike
    Command. But there is much more that needs to be done. More
    rigorous nuclear inspections have uncovered deep systemic
    problems. There's been progress and a lot of hard work on the
    part of many dedicated professionals, but the recovery is by no
    means complete.
        The most pressing space issue for the Air Force, together
    with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), is to
    address the management of space programs. Currently management
    of space programs is very fragmented. One of the reasons for
    this predicament is that the Air Force has been without an
    Under Secretary since well before the end of the Bush
    administration.
        That extended vacancy in the Under Secretary's position
    raises a more fundamental problem that the Air Force is facing
    now. The President has nominated and the committee has
    considered, and indeed unanimously endorsed, a number of well-
    qualified people to fill vacancies in DOD. I intend to seek
    again unanimous consent to move those nominations through the
    Senate. They've been stalled far too long. It is unconscionable
    what these holds are doing to nominees that are nominated to
    fill essential positions.
        I would hope that all of my colleagues, all of us on this
    committee, will join in this effort to get these nominees
    confirmed. They were unanimously approved by this committee,
    and these vacancies matter and it makes it much more difficult
    for the agencies, in this case the Air Force, to carry out
    essential functions.
        Another acquisition challenge facing the Air Force is the
    closure of several production lines and the stretching out of
    others. Once again, the Air Force has chosen not to request
    funds for the C-17 aircraft program and the overall F-35 Joint
    Strike Fighter (JSF) program has been stretched out. I know
    that the JSF program is being managed by a joint program office
    with representatives from the Air Force and the Department of
    the Navy. Also, at the current time, an Air Force official
    serves as the senior acquisition executive overseeing the JSF
    joint program office.
        Given the recent revelations of troubles with the system
    design and demonstration phase of the JSF program and the
    relief of the program manager, as well as Secretary Donley's
    indications this week that the initial operating capability
    (IOC) date for the Air Force has slipped and the restructured
    program may incur a Nunn-McCurdy breach, the committee will be
    holding a hearing next week on the JSF program. I specifically
    want to thank again Senator McCain for his bird-dogging of this
    and so many programs. I just want to again let all the members
    of the committee know that the hearing, which Senator McCain
    has requested very appropriately, should be scheduled by the
    end of next week, and we thank him for his focus on this matter
    on behalf of all of us.
        One program that appears to be moving forward as planned at
    this time last year is the Strategic Tanker Modernization
    program. The Department of the Air Force issued a new request
    for proposals (RFP) late last month. We look forward to the Air
    Force's proceeding on that program.
        Underlying all these major acquisition concerns is an
    acquisition management issue. Secretary Donley, both you and
    your predecessor have made it a major goal to improve the Air
    Force acquisition corps. I believe that we all realize that the
    Air Force needed to take significant steps to build up the
    acquisition workforce and restore confidence in the Air Force
    acquisition program after the abuses and poor decisions that
    were previously documented on the tanker lease program.
        In addition, the President last year signed the Weapons
    Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009, which this
    committee led in getting passed. While this legislation will
    help correct past problems, I also know that we will succeed
    only through concerted efforts within the executive branch to
    implement the spirit of that legislation and to improve past
    behavior within DOD. We cannot legislate a culture change. We
    can do everything we can legislatively, and we have. We can
    perform oversight, which we have a responsibility to do. But
    the culture change, which is essential, can only come
    internally.
        We look forward to hearing from you this morning about what
    progress you're making on this issue, expanding the acquisition
    workforce, and dealing with the other issues that face the Air
    Force.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join
    you in welcoming Secretary Donley and General Schwartz here
    today to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year
    2011 for the Department of the Air Force. Informed by the 2010
    QDR and the aircraft investment plan for fiscal years 2011
    through 2040, the Air Force's fiscal year 2011 base budget
    request of $150 billion builds on the substantial changes that
    both of you outlined in last year's budget. I want to
    emphasize, I understand the Air Force is going through a period
    of significant transition where winning the wars of today while
    preparing for the conflicts of tomorrow requires balancing of
    risks.
        I look forward to your assessment as to how this budget
    proposal achieves a desirable balance between our present and
    future priorities. I want to again state, I greatly appreciate
    your continuing to place the highest priority on supporting our
    men and women who wear the blue uniform and their families.
    There can be no doubt that, like our soldiers, sailors, and
    marines, they deserve the most steadfast and united support we
    can offer.
        As the chairman mentioned, JSF is one of the Air Force's
    top acquisition priorities, and I'm very concerned about the
    stability of that program. Despite Secretary Gates' decision to
    restructure the program, I remain concerned about the ability
    of the test program to detect and anticipate problems, how
    effectively software risk will be managed going forward,
    whether deficiencies in the program's manufacturing processes
    will be resolved so that flight testing and production hold
    schedule, and the capability of those aircraft that will be
    delivered under low-rate initial production.
        As to the Air Force decision this week to extend the
    deadline by which it is supposed to accept delivery of JSF
    aircraft with IOC, I ask that the witnesses explain why the Air
    Force decided to extend the IOC date, exactly what kind of
    capability will those aircraft have, what effect that decision
    will have on the cost of buying that aircraft, the Air Force's
    anticipated fighter shortfall, and the basing plans for the
    aircraft.
        I want to thank the chairman for scheduling a hearing on
    this very important issue. There are a lot of questions that
    need to be answered. Given Secretary Gates' testimony before
    the committee just early last month that the Services' IOC
    dates would not change, it appears that just over the last few
    weeks the Secretary and the Services have increased their
    appreciation of the development and production risks associated
    with the program.
        In my view, that piecemeal process by which DOD has been
    assessing risk and only in some cases notifying the committee
    in a timely and appropriate manner of required changes to the
    program frustrates the ability of this committee to subject
    this program to proper congressional oversight.
        Against that backdrop, I want to again thank Chairman Levin
    for agreeing to hold hearings, and probably more than one, on
    this very important weapons system.
        I have serious concerns about the Air Force's commitment to
    managing military space programs, for which $10.9 billion is
    requested in the 2011 budget. I applaud the decision to move
    away from some of the high-risk programs of the past, but I'm
    concerned that the Air Force continues to make significant
    investments without a designated executive agent for space or a
    space posture review and strategy, which I now hear could be
    delayed by as much as a year.
        I look forward to hearing how committed the Air Force
    remains to its space acquisition mission and, if so, exactly
    how it intends to reverse the troubling trend of chronic
    schedule delays, Nunn-McCurdy breaches, and the widening gaps
    in capability.
        Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their
    families to sacrifice so much, both Congress and the
    administration must be ready to make some tough funding
    decisions, something we have failed miserably at in previous
    years. Despite numerous calls last year for earmark reform, the
    Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill signed into law
    contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 billion in
    unrequested and unwanted funding for C-17s and the alternative
    engine for the Air Force's version of the JSF. That's $7
    billion that DOD had to eat in programs that it didn't request
    or need, at the expense of more pressing military priorities.
        I was encouraged by Secretary Gates laying an early marker
    last month by indicating that if we added funds to continue the
    C-17 and the alternate engine for the JSF in 2011, he would
    strongly recommend that the President veto the bill. I look
    forward to seeing the President himself issue that veto threat.
    Now, I'd like to know whether our witnesses support Secretary
    Gates' positions on both programs.
        Finally, I'm interested in the views of General Schwartz
    and Secretary Donley on the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy.
    We will continue to listen to our military leaders. As I know,
    recruitment and retention is at an all-time high in the history
    of the All-Volunteer Force. I think that the current policy is
    working and changes to it would have to be carefully
    considered.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank the witnesses.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        I join you in welcoming Secretary Donley and General Schwartz here
    today to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011
    for the Department of the Air Force.
        Informed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Aircraft
    Investment Plan for fiscal years 2011 through 2040, the Air Force's
    fiscal year 2011 base budget request of $150 billion builds on the
    substantial changes that the both of you outlined in last year's
    budget. Where winning the wars of today while preparing for the
    conflicts of tomorrow require a balancing of risk, I look forward to
    your assessment as to how this budget proposal achieves a desirable
    balance between our present and future priorities.
        I greatly appreciate your continuing to place the highest priority
    on supporting our men and women who wear the blue uniform and their
    families. There can be no doubt that like our soldiers, sailors and
    marines, they deserve the most steadfast and united support we can
    offer.
        The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is one of the Air Force's top
    acquisition priorities and I am very concerned about the stability of
    that program. Despite Secretary Gates' decision to restructure the
    program, I remain concerned about the ability of the test program to
    detect and anticipate problems; how effectively software risk will be
    managed going forward; whether deficiencies in the program's
    manufacturing processes will be resolved so that flight testing and
    production hold schedule; and the capability of those aircraft that
    will be delivered under ``low-rate initial production''. As to the Air
    Force's decision this week to extend the deadline by which it is
    supposed to accept delivery of JSF aircraft with ``initial operating
    capability'' (IOC), I ask that the witnesses explain why the Air Force
    decided to extend that IOC date; exactly what kind of capability will
    those aircraft have; what effect that decision will have on the cost of
    buying that plane, the Air Force's anticipated fighter shortfall, and
    the basing plans for the aircraft.
        Given Secretary Gates' testimony before the committee early last
    month that the Services' IOC dates would not change, it appears that
    just over the last few weeks the Secretary and the Services have
    increased their appreciation of the development and production risks
    associated with the program. In my view, that piecemeal process (by
    which the Department has been assessing risk and, only in some cases,
    notifying the committee timely and appropriately of required changes to
    the program) frustrates the ability of this committee to subject this
    program to proper congressional oversight. Against that backdrop,
    Chairman Levin has agreed to hold hearings as early as next week on the
    status of the F-35 program, which I wholeheartedly support.
        I also have serious concerns about the Department's commitment to
    managing military space programs, for which $10.9 billion is requested
    in the 2011 budget. While I applaud the decision to move away from some
    of the high-risk programs of the past, I am concerned that the Air
    Force continues to make significant investments without a designated
    executive agent for space or a space posture review and strategy, which
    I now hear could be delayed by as much as a year. I look forward to
    hearing how committed the Air Force remains to its space acquisition
    mission and, if so, exactly how it intends to reverse the troubling
    trend of chronic schedule delays, Nunn-McCurdy breaches, and widening
    gaps in capability.
        Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their families to
    sacrifice so much, both Congress and the administration must be ready
    to make some tough funding decisions--something that we have failed
    miserably at in previous years. Despite numerous calls last year for
    earmark reform, the fiscal year 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill signed
    into law contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 billion in
    unrequested and unwanted funding for C-17s and the alternative engine
    for the Air Force's version of the JSF. That's $7 billion that the
    Department had to eat in programs that it didn't request or need--at
    the expense of more pressing military priorities.
        I was encouraged by Secretary Gates' laying an early marker last
    month with the Congress by indicating that if we added funds to
    continue the C-17 and alternate engine for the JSF in 2011, he would
    strongly recommend that the President veto the bill. I look forward to
    seeing the President himself issue that veto threat. For now, I would
    like to know whether our witnesses support Secretary Gates' positions
    on both programs.
        Finally, I'm interested in the views of General Schwartz and
    Secretary Donley on the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy. We will
    continue to listen to our military leaders, and as I note, recruitment
    and retention is at an all-time high in the history of the All-
    Volunteer Force. I think that the current policy is working and changes
    to it would have to be carefully considered.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Secretary Donley.

    STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

        Mr. Donley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    committee. It is a pleasure to be here today representing
    almost 680,000 Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve airmen and Air
    Force civilians. I'm also honored to be here with my partner in
    this work, General Schwartz, with whom I came into this
    position. He's been a phenomenal partner, and he is a tireless
    public servant.
        Today, I'm pleased to report that America's Air Force
    continues to make progress in strengthening both our
    contributions as part of the joint team and the excellence that
    is the hallmark of our service. We're requesting $150 billion
    in our baseline budget and almost $21 billion in the OCO
    appropriation to support this work.
        In the past year and in planning for the future, we've
    focused on balancing our resources and risks among the four
    priority objectives outlined by Secretary Gates in the
    recently-released QDR. First, we must prevail in today's wars.
    Your Air Force understands the gravity of the situation in
    Afghanistan, and as we continue to responsibly draw down forces
    in Iraq, we are committed to rapidly fielding needed
    capabilities for the joint team, such as surging ISR assets
    into theater and maximizing air mobility, to accelerate the
    flow of forces into Afghanistan.
        Second, we must prevent and deter conflict across the
    spectrum of warfare. As we await the results of the NPR and the
    New START, we continue concentrating on the safety, security,
    and sustainment of two legs of the Nation's nuclear arsenal.
    Last year, we stood up Air Force Global Strike Command and we
    have now realigned our ICBM and bomber wings under the control
    of a single commander. We also stood up the Air Force Nuclear
    Weapons Center to consolidate the management of all our nuclear
    weapons sustainment activities. To increase our engagement
    across the world, we're building partner capacity in
    Afghanistan and Iraq and developing a training framework
    emphasizing light attack and mobility that can benefit other
    nations.
        Third, we must be prepared to defeat adversaries and to
    succeed in a wide range of conflicts. We need to ensure that
    we're providing the right capabilities with our strategic
    airlift and ISR platforms and ensure our space-based assets
    continue to deliver needed capabilities for the future.
        In addition, the last two decades of sustained operations
    have strained our weapons systems. We continue to determine
    which aircraft we will modernize and sustain and which we
    should retire and recapitalize. One of our primary efforts
    includes retiring and recapitalizing many of our legacy
    fighters and tankers and replacing them with JSFs and KC-X
    aerial refueling tanker aircraft. These decisions require tough
    choices as well as the ability to quickly field systems that
    meet warfighter needs at an affordable price.
        Because acquisition underpins this effort, we're continuing
    our work to recapture excellence in this area. In the past
    year, we've made great strides in reforming our internal
    processes; we've added more program executive officers, and we
    are growing our acquisition workforce by several thousand
    professionals over the next 5 years.
        Finally, we must preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer
    Force. Airmen are our most valuable resource, and they have
    performed superbly in every mission and deployment they've
    undertaken. With the understanding that their families serve
    alongside them, in July of last year, the Chief and I began a
    year-long focus on our men and women and their families. This
    Year of the Air Force Family recognizes their sacrifices and
    looks to determine how we can better support, develop, house,
    and educate them. We're determining which programs are
    performing well and where we can do better.
        Your Air Force is performing exceptionally well in
    supporting the current fights, responding to growing demands
    and shifting personnel priorities. But we're increasingly
    stressed in the continental United States (CONUS). Rebuilding
    the nuclear expertise that we need for the future will require
    continued determination and patience. We're taking more risk in
    non-deployed force readiness and facing significant challenges
    in modernization and infrastructure.
        At the same time, however, we are developing and fielding
    new technologies and capabilities that bode well for our
    future. I can tell you after a recent trip to the CENTCOM area
    of responsibility (AOR), Mr. Chairman, that we are recruiting
    and training some incredible airmen.
        We're very grateful for your continued support, and we look
    forward to discussing our proposed budget. One more point, Mr.
    Chairman. Thank you for your opening comments concerning the
    two Air Force nominations still pending confirmation, Erin
    Conaton, the nominee for Under Secretary of the Air Force, and
    Terry Yonkers, the nominee for Assistant Secretary for
    Installations and Environment. Both of these individuals are
    highly qualified, and we're aware of no issues concerning their
    background, their capabilities, or their credentials.
        More to the point of some concern to others, neither have
    been involved in the Air Force KC-X tanker acquisition and,
    looking ahead, should they be confirmed, neither would have
    responsibility for source selection.
        Both nominations were cleared by this committee on December
    2, 2009. The Under Secretary position has been vacant for over
    2\1/2\ years; the Assistant Secretary position has been vacant
    for over a year and a half.
        Similarly, the nominee for Dr. Carter's Principal Deputy in
    the Under Secretary's Office for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics, Frank Kendall, falls into the same general category.
    That position has been vacant for over a year, and his
    nomination has been pending action by the full Senate since
    October 29.
        I thank the committee, Mr. Chairman and Mr. McCain, other
    members, for your favorable reporting of these nominees, and I
    ask that each member now support their speedy confirmation by
    the full Senate. Their confirmation is important. The
    individuals whose livelihoods and careers are being held in an
    uncertain limbo deserve a vote, and we need to proceed with the
    important work of the Air Force and DOD.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Donley and General
    Schwartz follows:]
     Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael B. Donley and Gen. Norton A.
                                 Schwartz, USAF
        The 2010 Air Force Posture Statement presents our vision of Global
    Vigilance, Reach and Power as a vital component of the joint team,
    defending our national interests, and guided by our core values of
    Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do.
                                  introduction
        Today, the United States confronts a dynamic international
    environment marked by security challenges of unprecedented diversity.
    Along with our joint partners, the Air Force will defend and advance
    the interests of the United States by providing unique capabilities to
    succeed in current conflicts while preparing to counter future threats
    to our national security. Over the last year, the Air Force made great
    strides in strengthening the precision and reliability that is our
    hallmark.
                                strategic focus
        This year offers an opportunity to fully integrate our Service
    posture with a new National Security Strategy, the Department of
    Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and strategic reviews of the
    Nation's space, nuclear, and ballistic missile defense postures.
    Balance is the defining principle linking this budget request to our
    strategic guidance.
        In the 2010 QDR, the Secretary of Defense established four U.S.
    defense objectives to guide our current actions as well as to plan for
    the future: prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict,
    prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of
    contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. In
    accordance with this guidance, the Air Force developed the 2011 budget
    request to enhance our capabilities to meet these objectives, while
    balancing risk appropriately. As the future security environment will
    require a range of agile and flexible capabilities, investments for
    today's conflict will also support our efforts to prepare, prevent, and
    prevail, and preserve well into the future.
    Prevail in Today's Wars
        Our investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
    as well as airlift, command and control, and building partner capacity
    (BPC) reinforce the prominence of this priority in our budget request.
    In addition, nearly 30,000 deployed airmen daily provide key
    capabilities in direct support of combat operations.
    Prevent and Deter Conflict
        The Air Force made significant resource and cultural investments in
    reinvigorating our portion of the Nation's nuclear deterrence over the
    past 18 months. We are now institutionalizing these successes to ensure
    the highest standards across the nuclear enterprise. Our initial
    investments in a family of long-range strike capabilities mark our
    commitment to sustaining power projection capabilities for the next
    several decades.
    Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and Succeed in a Wide Range of
            Contingencies
        This priority directly reflects the Air Force emphasis on balancing
    our commitments to today's conflicts against preparing for mid- and
    long-term risks. Awarding a contract this year to recapitalize our
    aging tanker force is our top acquisition priority. Similarly, tile F-
    35 will be the workhorse of the fighter force for decades to come. Our
    investment in this program is timed with other modernization
    initiatives and divestment plans to ensure sufficient capabilities are
    available to deter and defeat potential enemies.
    Preserve and Enhance the All-Volunteer Force
        Preserving and enhancing our All-Volunteer Force provides the
    foundation required for our flexible and agile posture. This budget
    reflects a commitment to enhancing our force through education and
    training, while also bolstering the overall quality of life of airmen
    and their families.
                             strategy to resources
        As we prepared the budget request described by this Posture
    Statement, we structured our resource choices by balancing the twelve
    Air Force Core Functions across the near- and long-term. When
    considered together, the Core Functions encompass the full range of Air
    Force capabilities, and serve as the framework for this Posture
    Statement. While this document describes the core functions
    individually, we recognize their inherent interdependence within not
    just the Air Force, but also within the joint force and the whole of
    government.

                            AIR FORCE CORE FUNCTIONS
    Nuclear Deterrence Operations.............  Special Operations
    Air Superiority...........................  Global Integrated ISR
    Space Superiority.........................  Command and Control
    Cyberspace Superiority....................  Personnel Recovery
    Global Precision Attack...................  Building Partnerships
    Rapid Global Mobility.....................  Agile Combat Support

        Nuclear Deterrence Operations
        Since its inception, the Air Force has sewed as a proud and
    disciplined steward of a large portion of the Nation's nuclear arsenal.
    We steadfastly maintain and secure nuclear weapons to deter potential
    adversaries, and to assure our partners that we are a reliable force
    providing global stability.
        The first Air Force priority during the last 2 years has been to
    reinvigorate the stewardship, accountability, compliance, and precision
    within the nuclear enterprise. This mission demands perfection. Last
    year we reorganized our nuclear forces, consolidating responsibility
    into a clear chain of command. All nuclear operations are under the
    command of the Air Force Global Strike Command and all sustainment
    activities are controlled by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. We
    also added a fourth B-52 squadron to enhance nuclear surety through
    greater mission focus. We continued these advancements in fiscal year
    2010 by reassigning Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and
    nuclear bomber forces to Air Force Global Strike Command as it proceeds
    toward full operational capability.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget request continues to invest in
    sustaining the Air Force's ICBM and bomber fleets. We will invest $295
    million across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to replace
    fuzing mechanisms, and to sustain test equipment and environmental
    control systems for the aging, but capable, Minuteman III ICBM weapon
    system.
        As we begin work to develop a future Long Range Strike capability,
    we recognize the need to continue investing in our legacy bomber
    fleels, including nearly $800 million for modernization. This budget
    request provides the B-52, initially designed in the early 1950s, with
    an internal precision-guided weapons capability, a new radar, and a
    modern and effective anti-skid system. This request funds modernization
    of B-2 analog defensive systems to ensure continued survivability
    against increasingly capable air defense systems. Additionally, the UH-
    IN replacement program supporting missile launch complexes is on track
    and we anticipate IOC by fiscal year 2015.
        Air superiority
        Air superiority is a necessary precondition for most U.S. military
    operations. American ground forces have operated without fear of enemy
    aircraft since 1953. Although we operate in uncontested airspace in
    current conflicts, we cannot assume this will be the case in the
    future. The emergence of modern air defenses challenges the ability of
    the Air Force to achieve air superiority. Potential adversaries are
    leveraging readily accessible technologies by modifying existing
    airframes with improved radars, sensors, jammers, and weapons. In
    addition, several nations are pursuing fifth-generation aircraft
    capable of all-aspect, low-observable signatures, and fully integrated
    avionics and sensors. Adversary nations are also turning to advanced
    surface-to-air missiles to augment or even substitute for aircraft
    modernization efforts. The proliferation of these sophisticated and
    increasingly affordable weapons presents an area denial capability that
    challenges our legacy fleet. As the range of potential threats evolves,
    the Air Force will rely on the F-22 Raptor as the workhorse of the air
    superiority fighter force for the foreseeable future. Complementing our
    187 modernized F-22s, we will continue to rely on F-15C/D aircraft to
    provide an important component of our air superiority capability.
        Our fiscal year 2010 budget included plans to accelerate the
    retirement of some legacy fighter aircraft to pave the way for a
    smaller but more capable fighter force. As we work with Congress to
    execute this important plan, we continue to aggressively modernize our
    air superiority fleet, including upgrading fielded F-22s to ensure
    fleet commonality with current deliveries. Additionally, we began
    modernizing 176 F-15Cs with the new APG-63(v)3 Active Electronically
    Scanned Array (AESA) radar. Along with these modifications, we are
    continuing the development and procurement of the AIM-9X and AIM-120D
    air-to-air missiles.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $12.5 billion in the FYDP to
    sustain America's air superiority advantage. To continue F-22
    modifications, this request includes $1.34 billion to continue fleet
    commonality upgrades, improving reliability and maintainability, and
    adding training enhancements for the fleet. Building on the multi-role
    nature of our most advanced aircraft, this request also includes $1.19
    billion to add precision attack capabilities such as the Small Diameter
    Bomb. The Air Force will also continue the development and procurement
    of air-to-air munitions and defenses for the F-22 such as the AIM-9X,
    AIM-120D, and electronic warfare capabilities. To sustain our legacy
    aircraft viability, we included $92 million to continue the upgrades
    and modifications to the new F-15 AESA radar. Recognizing that
    Electronic Warfare remains an integral part of air superiority, we
    request $251 million in fiscal year 2011 for upgrades to the EC-130H
    Compass Call fleet. This request includes the conversion of an
    additional EC-130H, as well as a combined flight deck and mission crew
    simulator to increase training capacity.
        Space superiority
        America's ability to operate across the spectrum of conflict relies
    heavily on space capabilities developed and operated by the Air Force.
    We support the Joint force by developing, integrating, and operating in
    six key mission areas: missile warning; space situational awareness
    (SSA); military satellite communications; positioning, navigation and
    timing; space access; and weather.
        To enhance space support to the joint force, we are increasing
    communications capability in fiscal year 2010 through two satellite
    communications programs, the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) program to
    replace the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and
    Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system for protected
    communications. We launched the second and third WGS satellites in
    fiscal year 2010; each WGS satellite provides the equivalent capacity
    of the entire legacy DSCS constellation. Additionally, the second on-
    orbit Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Highly Elliptical Orbit
    payload was fully certified by U.S. Strategic Command to perform
    strategic missile warning. Finally, spacelift remains the backbone for
    national security space with a record 64 consecutive successful
    missions.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget request for $10.9 billion will improve
    our stewardship of space with investment in space and space-related
    support systems. With these resources, we will field several first-of-
    their-kind systems--Global Positioning System (GPS) Block IIF, SBIRS,
    and AEHF satellite communications system. This request proposes $1.2
    billion for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, $1.8 billion
    for the Space Based Infrared System, and $1.3 billion for GPS. We also
    included $135 million for Joint Space Operation Center Mission System
    to improve SSA capabilities, and $94 million for the Operationally
    Responsive Space program to pursue innovative capabilities that can be
    rapidly developed and fielded in months rather than years. We request
    $577 million to fully fund WGS to meet combatant commander bandwidth
    requirements. Moreover, we will continue to maintain SSA ground-based
    systems and explore space-based capabilities to ensure our continued
    freedom to operate in this domain.
        Cyberspace Superiority
        Cyber threats ranging from individual hackers to criminal
    organizations to state-sponsored cyber intrusions can challenge access
    to, and use of, this domain. Although the freedom to operate in the
    cyber domain is a precondition for our increasingly networked force,
    many of our potential adversaries are similarly adopting information-
    enabled technology, rendering them vulnerable to cyber attack as well.
    Threats to freedom of access to the cyber domain present both
    challenges and opportunities.
        In fiscal year 2010, we continued the development and
    institutionalization of cyberspace capabilities and integration into
    the joint cyberspace structure. The newly activated 24th Air Force, the
    first Numbered Air Force dedicated to cyberspace operations, recently
    achieved initial operational capability and has been designated the Air
    Force component for the sub-unified U.S. Cyber Command. We are also
    focusing on cyber personnel by normalizing the cyber career path and
    adding technical education courses.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects a continued commitment
    to cyber superiority. We request $31 million for expanded rapid cyber
    acquisition capabilities to keep pace with dynamic adversaries and
    fast-paced advances in technology. In support of the national cyber
    effort, this budget request dedicates $104 million to support
    operations and leased space for headquarters staff at the sub-unified
    U.S. Cyber Command. Additionally, we propose adding $15 million and
    additional manpower over the next 5 years to increase the investigative
    and law enforcement aspects of cyberspace defense.
        Global Precision Attack
        Global Precision Attack is the ability to hold any target at risk,
    across the air, land, and sea domains. Many of our global precision
    attack forces are meeting the current requirements of ongoing
    contingency operations by performing precision strike and intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support roles. In the longer
    term, however, the proliferation of area denial and anti-access
    capabilities will challenge the ability of current fourth-generation
    fighters and legacy bombers to penetrate contested airspace.
        The Air Force budget request in fiscal year 2010 recognized these
    developments and continued improvements to aircraft and weapons
    capabilities. This year, we will take delivery of 10 F-35s for
    developmental testing and to train test pilots. We are also modernizing
    legacy fighter aircraft to maintain sufficient capability and capacity
    until the F-35 fleet is fully operational, and are continuing to
    develop programs for preferred air-to-ground weapons. Upon completion
    of the required reports to Congress later this year, we will implement
    the planned reduction of 257 legacy fighters. We have had mixed results
    in test drops of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator; however, we are
    closely monitoring the progress of this important capability, and
    future successes likely will result in a reprogramming request to
    accelerate its development in fiscal year 2010. Finally, continued
    development of the second increment of the Small Diameter Bomb will
    give the Air Force even greater capability and flexibility.
        Our $14.4 billion Global Precision Attack request for fiscal year
    2011 reflects a balanced approach across the portfolio, prioritizing
    investment in fifth-generation aircraft while sustaining legacy
    platforms as a bridge to the F-35.
    F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
        The multi-role F-35 is a critical element of the Air Force's future
    precision attack capability. In addition to complementing the F-22's
    world class air superiority capabilities, the F-35 is designed to
    penetrate air defenses and deliver a wide range of precision munitions.
    This modern, fifth-generation aircraft brings the added benefit of
    increased allied interoperability and cost-sharing across services and
    partner nations.
        Working in close collaboration with DOD, the F-35 program team
    realized a number of accomplishments over the last year, to include the
    first flight of the first optimized conventional take-off and landing
    (CTOL) Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) variant-aircraft AF-I.
        Despite these important accomplishments, the program is
    experiencing program challenges as it transitions from development to
    production. Last year, DOD conducted multiple, independent reviews to
    assess the impact of these challenges on the program's cost, schedule,
    and technical performance. The results were consistent with a previous
    fiscal year 2008 DOD independent assessment that projected a cost
    increase and schedule slip.
        The challenges being experienced are not unusual for this phase of
    a major program. However, we are disappointed by the contractor's
    failure to deliver flight test aircraft as scheduled during the past
    year. The result of the late deliveries will be a delay in the flight
    test program.
        Although there appear to be recent improvements, the contractor
    also has been experiencing assembly inefficiencies that must be
    corrected to support higher production rates.
        In response to the challenges still facing the program and the
    findings of the independent reviews, we have taken numerous management
    actions to reduce risk. Most significantly we have determined that it
    is prudent to adjust the schedule and funding to levels consistent with
    the most recent independent estimates. These cost and schedule
    adjustments require that we initiate the process to confirm the program
    is in breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act criteria, and details will be
    reported later this spring.
        The F-35 is our largest and most important program and we are
    dedicated to successfully delivering these aircraft to both the United
    States and to our international partners in this effort. The Air Force
    fiscal year 2011 budget includes $5.6 billion for continued development
    and procurement of 22 CTOL production aircraft.
    Long-range Strike
        Investments in our B-52 and B-2 fleets sustain nuclear deterrence
    operations as well as conventional global precision attack capabilities
    in the near-term, but we are adding R&D funds to accelerate development
    of enhanced long-range strike capabilities. Building upon insights
    developed during the QDR, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a
    follow-on study to determine what combination of Joint persistent
    surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack capabilities
    will be best suited to support U.S. power projection operations over
    the next two to three decades. The study will examine both penetrating
    platforms and stand-off weapon options. As part of this assessment, the
    Air Force is reviewing options for fielding survivable, long-range
    surveillance and strike aircraft as part of a comprehensive, phased
    plan to modernize the bomber force. Additionally, the Navy and the Air
    Force are cooperatively assessing alternatives for a new joint cruise
    missile. Finally, the Department of Defense also plans to analyze
    conventional prompt global strike prototypes and will assess the
    effects that these systems, if deployed, might have on strategic
    stability.
        Rapid Global Mobility
        The Air Force is committed to providing unmatched airlift and air
    refueling capability to the nation. Air Force mobility forces provide
    an essential deployment and sustainment capability for the Joint force,
    delivering personnel, equipment, and supplies necessary for missions
    ranging from conflict to humanitarian relief.
        We are releasing the Request for Proposal for a KC-X replacement
    tanker in early 2010, and will aggressively work toward awarding a
    contract later this year. Additionally, we completed the successful
    operational testing of the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engine
    Program (RERP) and will induct two more C-5Bs into low-rate initial
    production. For tactical airlift, we recently concluded a test of our
    Direct Support airlift concept and continue to work with the Army to
    rapidly and smartly transfer the C-27J program to the Air Force.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget reflects a balanced approach across the
    tanker and airlift portfolios, which prioritizes recapitalization of
    the oldest aircraft while ensuring the continued viability of the
    legacy fleet. Investments in tanker capability are heavily weighted
    towards the KC-X program--our top acquisition priority--and represent
    $11.7 billion in the FYDP. However, while moving aggressively to
    recapitalize the tanker fleet, we must also ensure the continued health
    of legacy aircraft. This budget request includes $680 million in the
    FYDP for airspace access modifications and sustainment of the KC-10 and
    KC-1 35 fleets.
        The Air Force Airlift budget request is focused on meeting mobility
    requirements in the most cost efficient way possible, recapitalizing
    only the oldest airlift aircraft. To ensure continued access to all
    airspace, this budget continues to modernize and modify C-5s and C-
    130Hs through Avionics Modernization Programs, and upgrades C-5B/Cs
    with RERP. To complete the recapitalization of C-130Es, we request $1.8
    billion over the next 5 years to procure 24 C-130Js. Additionally, in
    accordance with the preliminary results of the Mobility Capabilities
    and Requirements Study 2016, and subject to authorization by Congress,
    we intend to retire some of the oldest, least capable C-5As and C-
    130H1s. We have also requested $38.9 million in fiscal year 2011 to
    transition from C-17 procurement to sustainment.
        Special Operations
        Air Force special operations capabilities play a vital role in
    supporting U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and geographic
    combatant commanders. As the Department of Defense increasingly
    develops irregular warfare capabilities, the Air Force is investing in
    special operations airlift, close air support, foreign internal
    defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    capabilities.
        In fiscal year 2010 we focused on growing and recapitalizing the
    special operations aircraft inventory. By the end of the fiscal year,
    three MC-130W Combat Spear aircraft will be modified with the Precision
    Strike Package to provide additional armed overwatch capability for SOF
    forces. Additionally, we will deliver the 16th of 50 CV-22s.
        This fiscal year 2011 budget proposal includes $6.7 billion through
    the FYDP to continue growing and recapitalizing the Air Force Special
    Operations Command (AFSOC). In fiscal year 2011 we will procure five
    additional CV-22s and five MC-130Js for $1.1 billion. This request also
    includes $1.6 billion in the FYDP to start recapitalizing our AC-130H
    aircraft. We will rapidly recapitalize these aging aircraft through the
    procurement of 16 additional MC-130Js, modified with the proven
    Precision Strike Package. In fiscal year 2011 we will also increase
    AFSOC's manpower by 258 personnel by fiscal year 2015 to support the
    addition of 16 fixed-wing mobility and 2 rotary-wing aircraft.
        Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
        The Air Force continues to rapidly increase its ISR capability and
    capacity to support combat operations. Air Force ISR provides timely,
    fused, and actionable intelligence to the Joint Force, from forward
    deployed locations and globally distributed centers around the globe.
    The exceptional operational value of Air Force ISR assets has led Joint
    Force Commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa to
    continually increase their requests for these forces. To help meet this
    demand, the Air Force currently has more than 90 percent of all
    available ISR assets deployed.
        In fiscal year 2010, we are quantitatively and qualitatively
    increasing aircraft, sensors, data links, ground stations, and
    personnel to address emergent requirements. Over the last 2 years, the
    Air Force increased the number of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)
    fielded by 330 percent. We invested in a Wide Area Airborne
    Surveillance (WAAS) system for new and existing MQ-9s to provide up to
    50 video streams per sensor within a few years. By the summer of fiscal
    year 2010, a quick reaction capability version of WAAS known as Gorgon
    Stare will provide 10 video streams per MQ-9. Any ROVER-equipped ground
    force will be able to receive any of these feeds. We also added four
    RQ-4s, and graduated our first class of RPA-only pilots. Early in
    fiscal year 2010, we proposed a shift in the nomenclature from
    ``unmanned aircraft systems'' (or UAS) to ``remotely piloted aircraft''
    as part of normalizing this capability within the Air Force manpower
    structure and culture. We will also maintain our current Joint
    Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)-based Ground
    Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) capability as we begin an Analysis of
    Alternatives to determine the future of GMTI.
        To complement remotely piloted capabilities, we are deploying MC-
    12W Project Liberty aircraft to the theater as fast as they can be
    delivered from the factory. This program progressed from ``concept to
    combat'' in a record 9 months, and has a deployed maintenance
    availability rate well above 90 percent.
        Because analysis transforms data into actionable intelligence, we
    are shifting approximately 3,600 of the 4,100 manpower billets
    recaptured from the early retirement of legacy fighters to support RPA
    operations, and the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of
    intelligence collected by manned and remotely piloted aircraft. We also
    doubled the number of ISR liaison officers assigned to deployed ground
    forces to ensure the seamless integration of ISR collection and
    exploitation assets.
        Our fiscal year 2011 budget proposal reflects the Joint Force
    emphasis on ISR capacity, and builds on progress made in fiscal year
    2010. The Air Force will reach 50 RPA continuous, combat air patrols
    (CAPs) in theater by the end of fiscal year 2011. The budget request
    increases MC-12W funding to normalize training and basing posture, adds
    Wide Area Airborne Surveillance capability, and increases the total
    number of our RPA platforms to enable fielding up to 65 CAPs by the end
    of fiscal year 2013. As we request additional RQ-4 Global Hawks for
    high altitude ISR, we also intend to continue operating the U-2 at
    least throughout fiscal year 2013 as a risk mitigation effort. We will
    sustain our ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination in the
    Distributed Common Ground System, providing critical distributed
    analysis without having to forward deploy more forces.
        Command and Control
        Theater-wide command and control (C2) enables efficient and
    effective exploitation of the air, space, and cyber domain. The Air
    Force maintains significant C2 capabilities at the theater level.
    However, the highly decentralized nature of irregular warfare also
    places increased demands on lower echelons of command. Matching the
    range and flexibility of air, space, and cyberspace power to
    effectively meet tactical requirements requires a linked C2 structure
    at all echelons.
        This year, we are expanding our efforts to provide C2 at the
    tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In fiscal year 2011, the
    Air Force is requesting $30 million across the FYDP to fund equipment
    and assured communications for U.S. Strategic Command's Distributed
    Command and Control Node (DC2N), U.S. Northern Command's National
    Capital Region-Integrated Air Defense (NCR-IADS), and U.S. Africa
    Command's expanding air operations center. Tactically, we are
    increasing training pipelines for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers
    (JTACs), establishing an Air Liaison Officer career field, fielding
    advanced video downlink capabilities, and adding airborne radio and
    datalink gateways to improve the connectivity of air support operations
    centers and JTACS.
        In fiscal year 2011, the Air Force request also includes
    modernization and sustainment of both airborne and ground-based C2
    systems. For Air Force airborne C2, we request $275 million for the E-3
    Block 40/45 upgrade program. This upgrade modernizes a 1970s-era
    computer network, eliminates many components that are no longer
    manufactured, and adds avionics to comply with Global Air Traffic
    Management standards. To improve ground-based tactical air control
    operations, we are increasing manpower in the control and reporting
    centers and investing $51.5 million with the U.S. Marine Corps for a
    follow-on ground-based radar capability supporting air and missile
    defense. This Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar will be
    the future long-range, ground-based sensor for detecting, identifying,
    tracking, and reporting aircraft and missiles.
        Personnel Recovery
        Personnel recovery (PR) remains an important commitment the Air
    Force makes to the Joint Force. The increased utilization of military
    and civilian personnel in support of Overseas Contingency Operations
    (OCO) has dramatically increased the number of individuals who may find
    themselves isolated. This has in-turn created an increasing demand for
    Air Force rescue forces beyond the combat search and rescue mission.
    Air Force PR forces are fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
    Horn of Africa, accomplishing crucial medical and casualty evacuation
    missions for U.S. and coalition military and civilian personnel.
        This year, we will continue to surge critical personnel recovery
    capability to the field, and will start replacing the aging fleet. To
    bring the fleet back to its original size of 112 HH-60Gs, we will put
    the first 4 operational loss replacement aircraft on contract.
    Additionally, we will deliver the first two HC-1305 tanker aircraft,
    starting the replacement of the 1960s-era HC-130P fleet.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget request continues the replacement of
    operational losses and modernization of aging equipment. This request
    funds the last eight HH-60G operational loss replacement aircraft by
    the end of fiscal year 2012. Additionally, we begin the process of
    recapitalizing the remaining fleet with the inclusion of $1.5 billion
    to procure 36 HH-60G replacement aircraft in the FYDP. We also continue
    our recapitalization of the HC-130P/N fleet with HC-130J aircraft.
    Finally, we request $553 million in funding throughout the FYDP for the
    Guardian Angel program, which will standardize and modernize mission
    essential equipment for our pararescuemen.
        Building Parnterships
        The Air Force continues to seek opportunities to develop
    partnerships around the world, and to enhance long-term capabilities
    through security cooperation. In the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
    area of responsibility (AOR), deployed airmen are working with our
    Afghan and Iraqi partners to build a new Afghan National Army Air Corps
    and Iraqi Air Force to strengthen the ability of these nations to
    uphold the rule of law and defend their territories against violent,
    non-state actors. We are also working to further partnerships with more
    established allies with programs like the Joint Strike Fighter.
    Similarly, the third and final C-17 procured under the 12-nation
    Strategic Airlift Capability program was delivered in October 2009,
    helping to address a chronic shortage of strategic airlift among our
    European allies.
        In fiscal year 2011, we will expand our capabilities to conduct
    building partnership capacity (BPC) operations with partner air forces.
    Past experience has shown us that we are more effective trainers when
    we operate the same platforms as our partners. To increase our
    interoperability, the Air Force requests resources to prepare to field
    the Light Mobility Aircraft in fiscal year 2012 and the Light Attack/
    Armed Reconnaissance aircraft in fiscal year 2013. These aircraft will
    provide effective and affordable capabilities in the two most critical
    mission areas for partner air forces: lower-cost airlift and light
    strike/reconnaissance training. Additionally, we will continue to
    foster BPC capability in our Contingency Response Groups. This request
    also includes $51 million to continue investing in the Strategic
    Airlift Capability program. Finally, we programmed $6.4 million
    annually across the FYDP for Pacific Angel humanitarian assistance
    missions in support of U.S Pacific Command theater objectives.
        Agile Combat Support
        Agile combat support underpins the entire Air Force, from the
    development and training of airmen to revitalizing processes in the
    acquisition enterprise. In terms of core functions, agile combat
    support reflects the largest portion of the Air Force budget proposal,
    totaling approximately $42 billion for personnel and training,
    installation support, logistics, and acquisition.
    Airmen and Families
        Over the last year, we stabilized end strength. Retention rates
    have exceeded expectations, but we continue to progress toward our end
    strength goal of 332,200 active duty airmen. In addition to stabilizing
    our end strength, we are also modernizing our training programs and
    aircraft. To better partner with the joint and coalition team, we will
    provide our airmen with cultural and regional expertise and appropriate
    levels of foreign language training. We are also expanding foreign
    language instruction for officer commissioning programs at the Air
    Force Academy and in ROTC, encouraging cadets to take foreign language
    coursework and participate in language immersion and study programs
    abroad. This expanded training includes enhanced expeditionary skills
    training to prepare airmen for deployment. Finally, as part of our
    effort to modernize training systems, we have established a program
    office to start the process of replacing the T-38 trainer with an
    advanced trainer capable of teaching pilots to fly the world's most
    advanced fighter aircraft.
        Recognizing that family support programs must keep pace with the
    needs of airmen and their families, we initiated the Year of the Air
    Force Family in July 2009. We plan to add enough capacity to our child
    development centers to eliminate the child care space deficit by the
    end of fiscal year 2012, provide better support to exceptional family
    member programs, and add 54 school liaison officers to Airmen and
    Family Readiness Centers to highlight and secure Air Force family needs
    with local school administrators.
        The Air Force continues to expand its efforts to improve the
    resiliency of airmen and their families before and after deployments.
    This year we expanded deployment-related family education, coupling it
    with psychological screening and post-deployment health assessments.
    Additionally, we offer access to chaplains who provide pastoral care,
    and counselors and mental health providers trained in post-traumatic
    stress treatment at every base. We plan to further enhance support in
    2010 by promoting and encouraging mental health assistance, and by
    providing at-risk deployers with tailored and targeted resiliency
    programs. To support this increased effort, we will enhance mental
    health career field recruiting and retention through special pays and
    targeted selection bonuses.
    Acquisition Excellence
        The Air Force continues to make progress within the Acquisition
    Improvement Plan. In 2009, we hired over 2,000 personnel into the
    acquisition workforce and continued contractor-to-civilian conversions.
    The Air Force institutionalized early collaboration with acquisition
    system stakeholders, senior acquisition leadership certification of
    requirements, cost estimation improvements, and an improved budgeting
    process to enhance the probability of program successes. The multi-
    functional independent review teams conducted over 113 reviews,
    ensuring acquisition selections are correct and defendable. As part of
    our recent acquisition reorganization, we created 11 new program
    executive officer positions to reduce the span of control and increase
    their focus on program execution. These enhancements demonstrate our
    commitment to restoring the public's trust in the Air Force's ability
    to acquire the most technologically advanced weapon systems at a
    competitive cost. In the near-term, this more rigorous approach to
    acquisition is likely to identify problems and programmatic
    disconnects. In the medium- and long-term, it should yield significant
    improvements in Air Force stewardship of taxpayer resources.
    Energy
        As part of our institutional effort to consider energy management
    in all that we do, the Air Force requests $250 million for energy and
    water conservation projects in fiscal year 2011. This investment will
    ensure we meet the President's efficiency goals by 2015. In fiscal year
    2010, the Air Force finalized an energy plan that directs the
    development and use of reliable alternative energy resources, and
    reduces the life-cycle costs of acquisition programs. Additionally, the
    plan recognizes that aviation operations account for over 80 percent of
    the energy used by the Air Force each year, and directs airmen and
    mission planners to continue managing aviation fuel as an increasingly
    scarce resource.
    Military Construction
        The Air Force $1.3 billion MILCON request is austere, but provides
    funding for new construction aligned with weapon system deliveries.
    Additionally, the budget request sustains our effort to provide quality
    housing for airmen and their families. Finally, the Air Force remains
    focused on completing its Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005
    program and continuing the legacy BRAC programs as well as the
    environmental clean-up at legacy BRAC locations.
    Strategic Basing
        In 2009, the Air Force implemented a Strategic Basing Process to
    ensure basing decisions are made in a manner that supports new weapon
    system acquisition and delivery schedules as well as organization
    activation milestones. The newly established Strategic Basing Executive
    Steering Group directs these actions to ensure a standard, repeatable,
    and transparent process in the evaluation of Air Force basing
    opportunities. We are currently using this process to conduct an
    enterprise-wide look at F-35 basing options.
    Logistics
        Air Force requirements for weapon system sustainment funding
    continue to grow as aircraft age. In the long term, the increasing
    requirements for sustaining an aging aircraft fleet pose budget
    challenges and force trade-offs. We protected direct warfighter
    support, irregular warfare capabilities, and the nuclear enterprise.
    Since this year's budget includes a simultaneous OCO submission along
    with a base budget, the Air Force optimized its flying hour program
    funding to support only the peacetime flying hours we can fly, given
    the number of deployed airmen and aircraft supporting these operations.
    Due to the volatile nature of fuel prices, reprogramming may be
    necessary to cover increased fuel costs. Over the longer term,
    enactment of the Department of Defense's legislative proposal for the
    Refined Petroleum Products Marginal Expense Transfer Account would
    reduce disruptions to operations and investment programs by providing
    the Department of Defense flexibility to deal with fuel price
    fluctuations in the changing economy. The Air Force maintained its
    commitment to transforming logistics business practices, including
    total asset visibility and associated information technology, by
    protecting funds associated with fielding the first increment of the
    Expeditionary Combat Support System.
                            readiness and resourcing
        Our efforts over the last year continued to stress both people and
    platforms. Nearly 40,000 of America's airmen are deployed to 263
    locations across the globe, including 63 locations in the Middle East.
    In addition to deployed airmen, nearly 130,000 airmen support combatant
    commander requirements from their home station daily. These airmen
    operate the Nation's space and missile forces, process and exploit
    remotely collected ISR, provide national intelligence support, execute
    air sovereignty alert missions, and contribute in many other ways. To
    date, the Air Force has flown over 50,000 sorties supporting Operation
    Iraqi Freedom and almost 66,000 sorties supporting Operation Enduring
    Freedom. During this time the Air Force delivered over 1.73 million
    passengers and 606,000 tons of cargo, employed almost 1,980 tons of
    munitions, and transported nearly 70,000 total patients and 13,000
    casualties from the CENTCOM AOR. In doing so, airmen averaged nearly
    330 sorties per day.
        To support the efforts of airmen and to recruit and retain the
    highest quality Air Force members, this fiscal year 2011 budget request
    includes $29.3 billion in military personnel funding, to include a 1.4
    percent pay increase. Our Active component end strength will grow to
    332,200 Airmen as the Reserve component end strength increases to
    71,200, and the Air National Guard end strength remains 106,700 in
    fiscal year 2011. Our recruiting and retention is strong, but we
    request $645 million for recruiting and retention bonuses targeted at
    critical wartime skills, including command and control, public affairs,
    contracting, pararescue, security forces, civil engineering, explosive
    ordnance disposal, medical, and special investigations.
                                    summary
        The Air Force's proposed fiscal year 2011 budget of $119.6 billion
    achieves the right balance between providing capabilities for today's
    commitments and posturing for future challenges. The Air Force built
    this budget to best achieve the four strategic priorities outlined in
    the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: (1) prevail in today's wars; (2)
    prevent and deter conflict; (3) prepare to defeat adversaries and
    succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and (4) preserve and enhance
    the All-Volunteer Force.
        Balancing requirements for today and tomorrow determined our
    recapitalization strategy. We chose to improve our existing
    capabilities whenever possible, and to pursue new systems when
    required. This recapitalization approach attempts to keep pace with
    threat developments and required capabilities, while ensuring
    stewardship of national resources. In developing this budget request,
    we also carefully preserved and enhanced our comprehensive approach to
    taking care of airmen and Air Force families.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        General Schwartz.

     STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
                             THE AIR FORCE

        General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members
    of the committee: I'm proud to be here representing your Air
    Force with Secretary Donley.
        Let me begin by reaffirming that the Air Force is fully
    committed to effective stewardship of the resources that you
    and the Nation have placed in our trust. Guided by integrity,
    service, and excellence, our core values, American airmen are
    serving courageously every day, with precision and reliability,
    on behalf of the American people.
        The budget request supports these airmen and our continuing
    efforts to rebalance the force, to make difficult decisions on
    how and what we buy, and to sustain our needed contributions to
    the joint team.
        Secretary Donley and I established five priorities shortly
    after taking office to ensure that our entire force was focused
    on the right objectives. Most of the initial efforts centered
    on reaffirming our long-established standards of excellence and
    recommitting ourselves in areas where our focus had waned. I am
    pleased to report to you today that our dedicated and talented
    airmen broadly understood our intent and delivered in
    meaningful fashion.
        Although these priorities were not designed to change from
    year to year, our progress with the nuclear enterprise is such
    that we can now shift our efforts to sustaining the progress
    that we've made. Thus, our first priority is to continue to
    strengthen excellence in the nuclear enterprise. The rigor of
    our nuclear surety inspections demonstrates a renewed
    commitment to the highest level of performance. But we must and
    we will do more to ensure 100 percent precision and reliability
    in our nuclear operations and logistics as close to 100 percent
    of the time as such a human endeavor will allow.
        For our second priority, and that is partnering with the
    joint and coalition team in today's fight, Secretary Donley
    mentioned several ways that our airmen are providing critical
    air and space power for the joint and coalition team. Your
    airmen are also performing admirably wherever and whenever our
    joint teammates require, including providing battlefield
    medical support and evacuation, ordnance disposal, convoy
    security, and much more.
        Our third priority remains to develop and care for our
    airmen and their families. We initiated the Year of the Air
    Force Family shortly after our testimony last year in
    recognition of the vital role that our families fulfil in
    mission accomplishment and their contributions. Their sacrifice
    is perhaps less conspicuous, but their efforts are no less
    noble and certainly their contributions no less substantial.
        Modernizing our inventories, organizations, and training,
    our fourth priority, is among the most difficult tasks that our
    service has undertaken in the last 18 months. In order to
    achieve the balance that Secretary Gates has envisioned for our
    force, we are compelled to decisions and to action. The budget
    represents a continuation of that effort. We set forth on a
    plan last year to accelerate retirement of some of the older
    fighter aircraft. This year we will not be retiring additional
    fighters, but we are transitioning from some of our oldest and
    least capable C-130s and C-5s. We will modernize where we can,
    but where modernization no longer is cost effective, we will
    pursue recapitalization.
        KC-X is one example. With the delivery of the RFP last
    week, our top acquisition effort to procure the next generation
    refueling aircraft passed another significant milestone.
        A similar imperative is the JSF. I want to underscore
    Secretary Donley's comment by noting that this weapons system
    will be the work horse driving much of our Air Force and the
    joint force forward.
        Long-range strike is the last program I number among our
    top priorities. The Air Force fully supports the development of
    the family of systems providing both penetrating and standoff
    capabilities for the next 2 or 3 decades, as described in the
    QDR.
        Finally, recapturing acquisition excellence, our fifth
    priority, is now beginning to pay dividends with our
    acquisition improvement plan at the heart of our reform
    efforts. While promising, the initial successes must continue
    for a number of years before we can declare victory on this
    front. But we are fully aware that we must wring every bit of
    capability and value that we can from the systems that we
    procure. So this effort will require sustained focus on
    acquisition excellence.
        Mr. Chairman, the Air Force will continue to provide our
    best military advice and stewardship, delivering global reach,
    vigilance, and power for America. Thank you for your continued
    support of the United States Air Force and particularly our
    airmen and their families.
        As the uniformed member at the table, sir, may I reinforce
    the comments concerning Erin Conaton. Secretary Donley and I
    came into these jobs about 18 months ago. I think we both work
    pretty hard. But I have had the benefit of a four-star deputy
    throughout, General Fraser, now General Howey Chandler. The
    Secretary has been without a deputy and that does need to be
    remedied.
        Finally, sir, on behalf of the Secretary, myself, and the
    entire Air Force, we'd like to offer our sincere condolences to
    the family of Terry Laughlin, with whom we have worked for many
    years and for whom we have the greatest respect.
        Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much, and thank you
    for your reference to our professional staff member and friend
    on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Terry Laughlin for your
    condolences, and in joining us in those feelings. We and his
    family certainly appreciate it.
        Let's try a 7-minute first round here.
        First as to the nomination, I just want to make it clear
    for the record, in addition to the Air Force nominees on which
    there have been holds placed since December, the two that you
    mentioned, Mr. Secretary, we also have Principal Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Frank Kendall, who has
    been held up since last December. We have an Assistant
    Secretary of the Army, an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and
    General Counsel for the Navy, who have been held up now for
    over a month. We're going to do our very best to bring those
    holds to an end. They are unconscionable. They are not
    supported by any substantive opposition to these nominees. They
    fly in the face of the unanimous vote of this committee. We're
    going to press this issue very, very hard on the floor, and we
    again would urge all the members of this committee to join in
    that effort for the reasons that are obvious to us who spend so
    much time on these issues, as well as the reasons that were
    given by our Secretary here this morning and by General
    Schwartz.
        First, let me ask you about the issue of the C-5A aircraft.
    Is it the intent of the Air Force, maybe I can start with you,
    Mr. Secretary, and then ask General Schwartz, to retire C-5A
    aircraft in fiscal year 2011?
        Mr. Donley. It is, sir. I believe the proposed number to
    retire is 17. To do that, we owe you a couple of reports.
        Chairman Levin. Under WSARA, we require, if we're going to
    succeed, better systems engineering, better cost estimates,
    more mature technologies, and better developmental testing. Is
    the Air Force on track, Secretary Donley, to rebuild the
    systems engineering, cost estimating, and developmental testing
    capabilities as required by WSARA?
        Mr. Donley. Sir, we're making good progress on that, I
    believe. As I mentioned in my statement, we have several
    thousand additions planned over the next 5 years in our
    acquisition workforce. We added over 700 personnel last year,
    and we're on track to continue to grow that in the future in
    the areas that you mentioned: cost estimating and systems
    engineering. We've added nine program executive officers to our
    acquisition structure, which will reduce the span of control
    and give the senior officers more time to spend on fewer
    numbers of programs, and this will align us much more with how
    the Army and Navy have been doing business recently.
        Chairman Levin. The Air Force is requesting an Active Duty
    end strength of 500 more personnel than last year and a Reserve
    end strength of 1,700 more personnel than last year. Why does
    the Air Force need additional Active and Reserve end strength,
    and what are the specific purposes that it would be used for?
    Let me start with you, Secretary, and then go to General
    Schwartz.
        Mr. Donley. Let me give you a broad overview, Mr. Chairman,
    and then provide some more specifics for the record. In
    general, the Air Force is attempting to hold its Active Duty
    end strength relatively constant. We do not plan to grow the
    Air Force in any significant numbers going forward.
        But while we have an essentially fixed top line for Active
    Duty end strength, we do face demands for growth. We've needed
    to put additional personnel on the nuclear enterprise. We have
    needed to bring in and restructure the force to support the ISR
    buildup that we have underway with the new Reaper and Predator
    UAVs coming on board. That means crews, that means providing
    operations and maintenance for their support, and it means
    providing additional intelligence personnel to do the analysis
    from all the data pulled down by the sensors from those
    capabilities.
        We have growth in several areas. Cyber is another area
    where we're anticipating growth.
        Chairman Levin. If you want to supplement that for the
    record, we'd appreciate it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The difference between the 331,700 Active Duty (AD) end strength
    authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
    Year 2010 and the 332,200 AD end strength the Air Force requested in
    the fiscal year 2011 President's budget is 500 AD. The 500 AD will
    support the Defense Health Program (DHP) specifically due to the NDAA
    for fiscal year 2008 reversal of planned military-to-civilian
    conversions for DHP.
        The Air Force Reserve military manpower increase of 1,700 personnel
    between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 is a result of the fiscal
    year 2010 President's Decision Memorandum III Reserve end strength
    increase, which increases Air Force Reserve Command manpower in
    association with AD end strength growth. Specifically, the manpower
    increases were utilized in the following areas: nuclear operations
    (70), Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (930), modernizing
    organizations to include Total Force Integration initiatives (400),
    and stressed career fields (300).

        Chairman Levin. General, anything you want to add to that?
        General Schwartz. Sir, again I would just say that there
    are two countervailing pressures here. One is that we do have
    additional demand in certain mission areas. Certainly ISR is
    one. At the same time, we recognize that personnel costs are a
    very substantial part of our budget, and if we're not careful
    as we grow, we will force out other essential content in the
    portfolio.
        This is the tension we face. As the Secretary suggested, I
    personally do not favor growing the force except marginally, if
    at all, and that we will have to adjust internally and find
    ways to reallocate our manpower to the most pressing missions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Relative to ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' Admiral Mullen
    testified that he and the service chiefs are in support of
    Secretary Gates in repealing this program and expressed his
    personal and professional belief, in the case of Admiral
    Mullen, that allowing homosexuals to serve openly would be the
    right thing to do.
        First, Secretary Donley, do you support Secretary Gates in
    this decision?
        Mr. Donley. I do, Mr. Chairman. I support the President's
    efforts to change the policy and change the law in this area.
    There is an additional point I'd like to make on this. As it
    happens, I was actually in this seat in 1993. I know many
    members were also around when this change was made. I think
    Secretary Gates' approach this year has put us in a much better
    situation than we were in 1993. I think a full review of all
    the potential implications of this change, done by the
    community that is most affected by these changes, puts us in a
    stronger position to reach sound judgments and develop sound
    advice going forward on how to do this.
        Chairman Levin. Subject to that qualification, you support
    repeal?
        Mr. Donley. I do.
        Chairman Levin. General, do you support repeal of the
    policy?
        General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, the President has clearly
    articulated his intent and, should the law change, your Air
    Force will implement the new statute and policy faithfully. I
    do have concern, however, with respect to what I consider
    inadequate current scholarship on this issue and certainly
    insufficient current survey data on our airmen and their
    families.
        Secretary Gates' effort to carefully evaluate and study
    this issue I think is obviously essential to our getting to the
    right spot on this, and that it's important that we carefully
    investigate the facts, circumstances, potential implications,
    the possible complications, and potential mitigations.
        I do have two firm convictions on two matters. One is that
    this is not the time to perturb a force that is stretched by
    combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and important missions
    elsewhere, without due deliberation. Second, that Air Force
    standards, should the law change, will continue to apply to all
    airmen. That is, standards of conduct will continue to apply to
    all airmen, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I didn't intend to begin my questioning with ``Don't Ask,
    Don't Tell,'' but I will follow up. In other words, General
    Schwartz, as you said, this is not the time to disturb the
    force, when we are in two wars. Contrary, in all due respect,
    to what the chairman just said, Admiral Mullen did not testify
    that the Joint Chiefs supported, the chiefs of services
    supported, repeal. In fact, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    has just come out in opposition to repeal. You have just stated
    your concerns about disturbing the force.q
        Should this survey, study, and in-depth evaluation be about
    how to repeal ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' or should it be about
    the effect of the repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''? General
    Schwartz, what is your view on that?
        General Schwartz. Senator McCain, it is important to
    understand what the consequences of the change would be. There
    are things that have not been thoroughly thought through in my
    view in terms of benefits, in terms of cohabitation, in terms
    of discipline and such.
        Senator McCain. So a moratorium would be foolish?
        General Schwartz. I think, sir, that any interim change
    would not be wise.
        Senator McCain. Thank you. Again, I want to point out that
    you reflect basically the views of General Casey, General
    Conway, yourself, and we have yet to hear thoroughly from
    Admiral Roughead. So this idea out there that's being pushed
    that the service chiefs somehow support a campaign promise made
    by the President of the United States is obviously untrue. We
    need to look at this very, very carefully, and we do not want
    to disturb the force, particularly since we are in two wars at
    this time.
        Also, General, I would like to congratulate you and the
    other service chiefs, who have basically stood up under intense
    pressure, including coming from your right. I'm very proud of
    the uniformed service chiefs in the way that they have said
    that an in-depth review is an absolute necessity before we
    change the policy. Clearly, a moratorium would be a change in
    the policy, just a back door way of doing it.
        I'd like to return a second to the JSF. First of all, do
    you support the Secretary of Defense's call for cancellation of
    the C-17 aircraft, Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Donley. I do.
        Senator McCain. General Schwartz?
        General Schwartz. Yes, sir, I do.
        Senator McCain. All right. Maybe you could give us a
    statement for the record as to why that is necessary.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The recent release of the Mobility Capability Requirements Study
    validated that our current strategic airlift program of record exceeds
    the most demanding scenarios modeled. Continuing to grow a fleet that
    is already postured to meet national defense strategies diverts
    resources from other critical programs needed to enhance the security
    of the Nation. For this reason, the Air Force believes it is prudent to
    close the C-17 line and end production at the currently planned 223
    aircraft.

        Senator McCain. I want to get, in the few minutes I have
    remaining, to the JSF. As a strong supporter of the JSF, as a
    person who supported the termination of the F-22 because of the
    viability and necessity of the JSF as a partial replacement,
    I'm very disturbed at what has been the process here. We have
    not, I believe, members of the Armed Services Committee or
    Congress, been adequately informed of the full extent of the
    difficulties with this program.
        Now, according to published reports, there's going to be at
    least a 2-year delay in the production of the JSF. Is that
    true, Secretary Donley?
        Mr. Donley. Sir, I think what has been established in the
    acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) that Dr. Carter, Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics, issued is that the delay in development is going to
    be about 13 months.
        Senator McCain. What impact does that have on fulfilling
    the mission requirements of our fighter aircraft?
        Mr. Donley. We're working on that. As part of the
    restructuring that the Secretary announced earlier in the year,
    we added dollars to extend development. We moved, I think, four
    aircraft from initial production back into the test program to
    see if we could accelerate the flight test program, which is
    behind, and to see if we could recapture time there. We have
    lowered the production ramp. That doesn't mean we have stopped
    production. We have, I think, 22 production aircraft in the
    budget for this year. But, we have lowered the rate of growth
    in that production ramp over the next several years.
        DOD took out about 122 jets from its previous estimate of
    last year and about half of those are Air Force jets. We're
    working through the implications of that going forward for
    completion of the test program and also the IOC date that is
    out in front of us. It's up to General Fraser at Air Combat
    Command to work through the IOC date with the program office to
    determine the content that he needs in those production jets.
        If I can make one other point here, in restructuring the
    program, we're also restructuring the contract and putting, I
    think, additional pressure and incentives on the contractor to
    buy back some of the schedule slips that have been forecast by
    the independent estimates.
        Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. The chairman
    has graciously, and I think very appropriately, agreed that we
    need to have a hearing or hearings on this issue, so I'll
    pursue further questioning on it at that time.
        I just want to say that it's disappointing to all of us, in
    these very difficult economic times, when we see these kinds of
    delays and cost overruns. Hopefully, the legislation we passed
    will help remedy some of these problems. But maybe, Mr.
    Chairman, in 6 months, a year, or so we ought to look at the
    effect of the legislation that we passed, because there are
    still significant problems with the consolidation of the
    defense industry, which has led to lack of competition and lack
    of real brakes on cost overruns in acquisition of our weapons
    systems large and small.
        I'd love to see a success story some time, and maybe you
    know one and would bring it to the committee's attention. Go
    ahead, General.
        General Schwartz. It's a modest one, but there is one, and
    it's the MC-12 ISR aircraft. It does both full-motion video and
    signals intelligence. From a cold start to first delivery was 8
    months. There are things out there that are, I think,
    representative of the kind of execution you expect.
        Senator McCain. Good. Maybe you could provide us with some
    of the detail on how that program succeeded. We'd be very
    interested in that. I know we focus on the failures rather than
    the successes, and we'd like to give the successes a little
    more visibility.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The MC-12W Liberty Project Aircraft program has proven that rapid
    acquisition tools can deliver a product effectively, efficiently, and
    at an affordable price, and still meet the warfighter's immediate
    requirements. This effort was an immediate response to the Secretary of
    Defense's demand for the Services to provide additional intelligence,
    reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) capability to combat forces. The
    Air Force, working through its specialized, rapid reaction, acquisition
    program management team, and the ISR Task Force, developed the MC--12W
    Liberty concept to deliver an ``80 percent solution'' quickly, and
    continue to improve the system with feedback from operators in the
    fight. These operator inputs are rapidly rolled into both hardware/
    software and training in real time. The ISR Task Force provided
    oversight to set and hold requirements, and provide immediate funding.
    The MC-12W Liberty concept leveraged commercial off-the-shelf systems
    integrated on a readily available and highly reliable manned airframe,
    by a responsive and cooperative prime contractor with proven past
    performance. Acquisition professionals and operators, working hand-in-
    hand from the beginning, enabled the deployment of a full combat
    squadron directly into the war zone in less than 10 months after
    receipt of requirement. MC-12W aircraft have flown over 11,000 combat
    sorties since June 2009. Of the 37 M-12W aircraft, 30 are deployed in
    the overseas congtingency operations fight while the other 7 are
    dedicated trainers--an unheard of ratio for a traditional aircraft
    program of record. The MC-12W Liberty is a benchmark for Air Force
    rapid acquisition.

        Senator McCain. I thank you both. General Schwartz, again I
    want to thank you and the other uniformed chiefs for standing
    up for the men and women in the military and acknowledging that
    ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' is an issue that has to be examined
    very carefully, with an eye to our battle effectiveness and
    effect on the performance of the men and women in our military.
    I want to thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, thanks, Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz for your
    great leadership. It's hard to resist not asking a question or
    two about ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' because it is before us
    now. I want to do it quickly and then move on to the
    acquisition programs.
        General Schwartz, you said something that I think is very
    important as part of this discussion of repealing ``Don't Ask,
    Don't Tell,'' which is that there must be an understanding
    that--I believe you used the term ``standards of conduct''--the
    standards of conduct for Air Force members and, for that
    matter, members of the other three Services cannot be altered
    in any way if ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' is repealed. We'd be
    eliminating one policy, but then everybody in the military has
    to live by those standards of conduct.
        I just wanted to say to you as an advocate of repeal that I
    totally agree with that. I think that the ultimate question I
    want to just ask you both and, I understand what you've said,
    that the repeal effort raises is whether one believes that men
    and women in uniform who are otherwise capable and living by
    the standards of conduct of the military should be discharged
    from the military solely because of their sexual orientation.
    Secretary Donley, do you believe that men and women in uniform
    should be discharged solely because of their sexual
    orientation?
        Mr. Donley. My personal view is no, they should not. I'd
    like to come back to the issue that the Chief raised just
    briefly on conduct.
        Senator Lieberman. Go ahead.
        Mr. Donley. The Chief and I at our level have the
    opportunity and the duty to review dismissal cases from the Air
    Force, the highest level of review in the Air Force before
    officers are dismissed from service. My experience in this is
    that these cases do not depend on gender or orientation, but
    rather the issue of good order, discipline, unit cohesion; it
    depends on conduct. That's my experience in this job.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        General Schwartz, it's a direct question, but I think it is
    ultimately the question: Do you believe men and women in
    uniform should be discharged solely based on their sexual
    orientation?
        General Schwartz. Sir, I have to tell you that the answer
    to that question is more complex than a yes or no. It is
    dependent on the consequences, given a change in the policy. I
    would reiterate that it is very important for us to understand
    what's in each of the four corners of this issue. I would
    submit to you, sir, respectfully, that I'm not sure that is the
    case at the moment.
        For example, have we had an opportunity to understand what
    the thinking of our airmen and their families is? I have not
    done that. I cannot give you a sense of what their current
    views are. We need to know, and we need to understand what the
    puts and takes are.
        I take a pragmatic view of this, sir, not the philosophical
    view perhaps that you've explored here. We need to be
    pragmatic.
        Senator Lieberman. Do you have a personal feeling on the
    underlying question? I understand what you've said about the
    potential impact of it.
        General Schwartz. Senator, my personal feeling is acting
    now is premature.
        Senator Lieberman. Good enough for now, and we'll continue
    the discussion as we go.
        Mr. Donley. I would like to reinforce what has been said. I
    think the Secretary of Defense has put us in a good place by
    calling for this review. This is an important change to our
    military, and we need to have the time and the space to work
    through the implications of this in ways that have not, to be
    honest, sir, fully been worked through in other parts of our
    society in many dimensions. It would have particular impacts on
    our military.
        Senator Lieberman. Understood. My own reading and hearing
    of what Secretary Gates said when he testified before the
    committee, and of course Admiral Mullen backed it up in very
    strong testimony, was that, based on the decision of the
    Commander in Chief, the President, in favor of repeal, that the
    question in Secretary Gates' mind is not whether to repeal, but
    essentially when and how.
        The bill that we put forward yesterday contemplates the
    time going by with the study. It states a principle or goal,
    which is repeal, but it contemplates the time passing. In fact,
    it embraces a delayed time schedule to see that it's
    implemented correctly.
        I'm going to stop this one here for now. I think I
    appreciate the sincerity of the answers. Let me go in the time
    remaining to other issues. I'm really interested in what you
    said about cyber, but I want to just briefly talk to you about
    Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).
    I've had a long-term interest in the JSTARS program and the
    unique capability that the program has as a ground moving
    target indicator.
        This is all about the re-engining of the program. I was
    very pleased when last September, Under Secretary Carter issued
    an Acquisition Decision Memorandum designating JSTARS as a
    special interest program and directing the Air Force to proceed
    immediately with re-engining. The final fiscal year 2010
    Defense Appropriations Act provided $185 million for JSTARS,
    including $62 million to procure one engine set. This fiscal
    year 2011 budget request provides $168 million in research,
    development, test, and evaluation funding and $176 million on
    procurement. That's $344 million total.
        In the Air Force posture statement, General Schwartz, you
    note that the Service will begin an analysis of alternatives
    (AOA) to determine the future of ground moving target indicator
    capability this year, although the Air Force previously
    indicated that that would begin by April of last year. I want
    to ask you this question. My time is running out. I was
    surprised to see in the justification materials supplied in
    support of the budget for the Air Force for fiscal year 2011
    that although there are a total of 18 aircraft to be modified
    with procurement funds, the Service has only funded 4 of those
    18 aircraft through the Future Years Defense Program and only 2
    aircraft are funded this year, preventing the program from
    attaining economies of scale that would be achieved at the 4
    ship sets per year.
        I want to confirm that the re-engining program for the
    JSTARS fleet remains, as the Air Force justification book for
    procurement indicates, in your opinion a valid requirement.
        General Schwartz. We received guidance from Secretary
    Carter to execute--both to complete the development that
    included two ship sets--and to acquire two production ship
    sets, for a total of four, as you indicated. The backdrop on
    this, Senator, is that you have a couple of issues, one related
    to the JSTARS airframes that were used.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Schwartz. The pedigree on those airframes is not as
    solid as we'd like it to be. Just a case in point. One of the
    birds we had deployed forward had a cracked upper rear spar
    recently, tail number 122 I believe it was, and we had to bring
    it back for repair. There are issues with respect to the
    longevity of these airframes that raise questions in our mind.
        Second, the question about the AN/APY-7 sensor for JSTARS.
    Is that the sensor to go forward with or is there a better
    package to do both the mechanized movements on the ground as
    well as movements of humans on the ground? They are different
    requirements.
        Third, the issue has to do with the fundamental question on
    where should we invest for the future. That's where the AOA is
    supposed to help us. Should it be an unmanned system, for
    example, or should it be manned as currently?
        The bottom line is, I think the wise thing to do here is to
    proceed cautiously, to re-engine the four airplanes that we've
    been directed to re-engine, and get the AOA and decide what the
    best way forward is for us.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay. My time is up, and we'll continue
    the discussion. Obviously, I hope the AOA can go forward as
    quickly as possible and that the four engine sets can go
    forward as quickly as possible as well.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Schwartz, let me echo the comments of Senator
    McCain with respect to the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' repeal. I
    know there's tremendous pressure on you from the administration
    and other arenas to promote this change, and we look forward to
    continuing this debate and to the study. I'm very pleased to
    hear you say that you're going to go down to the very lowest
    levels of the enlisted personnel in the Air Force because, at
    the end of the day, we need to hear from everybody on this. I
    thank you for your courage there.
        Mr. Secretary, in your response to Senator McCain, I want
    to make sure I'm clear on this. The IOC date on the F-35 has
    slipped 2 years, is that correct?
        Mr. Donley. Sir, the IOC decision is up to General Fraser,
    who is the commander of Air Combat Command. We think meeting
    the fiscal year 2013 date that had been on the books for a
    couple of years is going to be very difficult, and our guidance
    to General Fraser and Under Secretary Carter's guidance to us
    at this point is to have the operating community, represented
    by General Fraser, working with the acquisition community and
    with the program office, to work through the implications of
    the restructure for IOC.
        Senator Chambliss. The restructure plan anticipates a 2-
    year slippage, correct?
        Mr. Donley. The restructure plan did not address that
    specifically. It just told us to go work the IOC issues.
        Senator Chambliss. So what do you think the slippage is?
        Mr. Donley. I have indicated that it's going to be very
    hard to meet 2013.
        Senator Chambliss. Just answer my question, Mr. Secretary.
    What's going to be the slippage in your opinion?
        Mr. Donley. As I have indicated, certainly beyond 2013.
    General Fraser's task is to establish the definition of what
    IOC is and to work with the program office to determine the
    content of the program going forward.
        Senator Chambliss. Are we going to reach a Nunn-McCurdy
    breach this year with the F-35?
        Mr. Donley. I believe we will. I have indicated that in my
    testimony. The content of that, again, we have not worked
    through completely. But since the restructuring decision was
    made earlier in the winter, we have been undertaking, and the
    program office, under Under Secretary Carter's direction, has
    been undertaking, all the actions as if the program were in a
    Nunn-McCurdy breach. We're working through all the mitigation
    steps necessary.
        Senator Chambliss. The Joint Estimating Team (JET) prepared
    a report on the F-35 in the fall of 2008 that indicated that
    the F-35 would be significantly over cost and behind schedule
    relative to the joint program office's prediction. Are you
    aware of that report?
        Mr. Donley. I am.
        Senator Chambliss. About a week after the vote in the
    Senate last year to terminate the F-22, the JET prepared
    another report that said exactly the same thing. Were you aware
    of that report?
        Mr. Donley. Yes.
        Senator Chambliss. Were you aware of both those reports
    when you came to this committee and testified that there would
    not be a slippage in the IOC date on the F-35, and that it
    would meet test and production requirements?
        Mr. Donley. Yes. This is where we were last year.
        Senator Chambliss. Why didn't you tell us that the JET was
    going to come out with a report that disagreed with the IOC
    date being met?
        Mr. Donley. This concentrated review of the program has
    been a 2-year process. We received the JET report in 2008
    indicating there was a difference between the program office,
    as you have described, and the independent estimate. DOD
    reviewed that and ended up adding dollars to the fiscal year
    2010 budget for more system development and demonstration. It
    did not recognize all the changes in the independent estimate
    at that time, but it set in motion another review, which
    delivered at the end of last year.
        So we've had a close 2-year review of this program. I would
    say that the restructure represents, in part, the work of this
    committee and the House on the weapons system's evaluation
    process and how to better accommodate independent cost
    estimates, more realistic cost estimates in our program.
        Senator Chambliss. Why didn't you tell this to the
    committee?
        Mr. Donley. DOD's judgment at the end of the year was that
    we need to recognize this disconnect and fund closer to the
    independent cost estimate, and that judgment was reached at the
    end of the review.
        Senator Chambliss. Why didn't you tell this committee last
    year when we had testimony on the termination of the F-22
    program that the JET was going to come back with a report a
    week after the vote last year on the floor of the Senate that
    confirmed their conclusions in the fall of 2008 that there was
    going to be a 2-year slippage in this program? Why didn't you
    tell us that?
        Mr. Donley. Sir, I cannot speak to the specific dates
    you're referencing. I don't recall the precise sequence of when
    reports came in or when testimony was taken.
        Senator Chambliss. General Schwartz, were you aware of
    those two reports last year when you came before this
    committee?
        General Schwartz. I was aware of the substance of the
    reports, yes, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. Was there any reason you didn't disclose
    that to this committee when we were discussing the termination
    of the F-22 program?
        General Schwartz. Those, the independent estimates, at that
    time had not received a level of validation that I felt was
    compelling.
        Senator Chambliss. This week, the Air Force awarded a $223
    million contract for the first two re-engining ship sets for
    the JSTARS re-engining effort. I would certainly hope that it's
    the Air Force's intent to procure these engines and install
    them on JSTARS aircraft. Is that the Air Force's intention?
        General Schwartz. It is for the four ship sets, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. The fiscal year 2011 Air Force budget
    includes funds for two additional JSTARS re-engining ship sets.
    Since this is in the President's budget request, I assume that
    you both support that; is that correct?
        Mr. Donley. I do.
        General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. Are you fully committed to obligating
    and executing these funds as soon as you're able to, assuming
    they are authorized and appropriated?
        General Schwartz. We are, sir. I would only indicate that
    there is a need for a bit of reprogramming in order to execute
    the fiscal year 2011 program, about $20 million.
        Senator Chambliss. But you intend to make that request?
        General Schwartz. We intend to request that approval, yes,
    sir.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I want to begin by
    thanking you for your leadership and your distinguished service
    to our country. I want to recognize and thank our airmen and
    civilians serving around the world and their families that
    support them.
        Secretary Donley, it is impossible to overstate the
    importance of our military engagement in the Asia Pacific
    region. We know that there are six of the world's largest
    militaries that operate in this region. Our conventional
    adversaries are getting stronger, and it is critical that we
    maintain our superiority in this region.
        Mr. Secretary, given the many demands on the Air Force
    budget and the unique mission in the region, the question is
    how does the Air Force and the Air Force's budget impact our
    military readiness in the Pacific?
        Mr. Donley. Certainly, Senator, we recognize the importance
    of this region and, while we have been focused understandably
    on the current work in the CENTCOM AOR, we've been very busy in
    the Pacific working with Admiral Willard on his vision for that
    region. Many of the systems that we are procuring and have
    deployed are part of his plans for this region, both in terms
    of peacetime engagement and in terms of wartime planning as
    well, such as our long-range strike platforms, our mobility
    platforms, our tanker assets, the future fighter attack
    capability when we eventually field and deploy in the F-35, for
    example. We also have our space assets and our ISR assets.
        There are a broad range of Air Force capabilities that are
    important to this region and that are getting support in the
    program that we've tabled this year.
        Senator Akaka. I'm glad to know that the F-22s are being
    sent to Hickam Air Force Base and the Pacific area, as well as
    Alaska.
        General Schwartz, the Air Force is increasing its use of
    UAVs. You mentioned in a speech recently that the Air Force
    wants to acquire an additional 320 units over the next 5 years
    and deploy most of them on combat air patrols. The men and
    women who operate the UAVs face unique mental health challenges
    as they experience the realities of combat remotely.
        General, how does the Air Force plan to help UAV operators
    deal with these unique mental health challenges, and any other
    remarks on that?
        General Schwartz. Sir, I would say that I would take the
    question a bit more broadly. Certainly those remotely piloted
    aircraft operators have a special challenge in that they, for
    some part of their day, are in the midst of combat and, in some
    parts of their day, they are much removed from that, in a more
    domestic setting.
        But more broadly, the question is how do we sustain the
    resilience of our airmen? That is, how do we prepare them both
    physically and mentally to withstand the rigors of today's
    demanding missions, whether they're forward deployed or whether
    they're in the rear? We have several programs underway to
    reinforce our efforts to make sure that our airmen have the
    psychic support, the medical attention, to ensure that there is
    a chaplaincy which is readily available and accessible, as well
    as commanders who care, so that we can assure the resilience of
    this talented and precious pool of airmen.
        We are concerned, for example, about suicide rates, which
    were higher last year than they were the year before, and we're
    running ahead again this year, both with our civilian and
    military personnel. This is another application of our efforts
    to improve resilience among our Air Force members, both
    civilian and military members.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, I'm happy to hear about the progress you
    have made in enhancing the acquisition workforce. Can you
    discuss any improvements within the Air Force acquisition
    system to help prevent a requirements creep and obtain the best
    possible estimates?
        Mr. Donley. Senator, I think there are several efforts
    underway here. But I think the one that I would mention front
    and center is KC-X. As the Air Force went back to define the
    requirement, the mandatory requirement set for KC-X, we were
    very careful to include those things that we needed to go to
    war on day 1. There is a bit of acquisition reform in this as
    well in the manner in which we have done this. We would expect
    to get that capability right off the production line and not to
    have to send an aircraft back for modifications any time soon.
    We would not expect to have to negotiate additional
    capabilities with who ever is selected for that airframe. But
    we have designed the requirements to be what we need on day 1
    and to limit that defining very precisely.
        Senator Akaka. General Schwartz, President Obama has called
    on Americans to lower our reliance on fossil fuels and change
    the way we produce energy. The Air Force's energy strategy is
    to reduce demand, increase supply, and change its culture.
    General, please tell us about the status of efforts to meet the
    Air Force's strategic energy goals by reducing fuel demand,
    increasing energy supplies, and changing Air Force culture?
        General Schwartz. Sir, there are a couple of parts to this.
    We, as you well know, are the largest consumer of hydrocarbons
    in DOD. There are things that we can do as a matter of course
    that reduce our demand for those hydrocarbons. In fact, over
    the last several years we've reduced our demand in the double
    digits through process, through procedures, through careful
    mission planning, and so on.
        That is part of the deal here, which is reminding our
    people that hydrocarbons are a precious resource, they are a
    cost driver in our cost of operations, and they must use these
    petroleum products judiciously. That's one part.
        The other thing we've done, as you probably know, is we
    have qualified a number of our aircraft--the KC-135, the C-17,
    the B-52; the F-22 is pending--on mixes of fuel, hydrocarbon
    and synthetic derivatives, for which we think there is a market
    for that fuel. We don't want to be the producer, but we can be
    the consumer of those blended fuels, which we know will work in
    our airplanes and certainly will enhance availability.
        The third part of this is the fundamental question of
    whether we can get beyond hydrocarbons. Our research laboratory
    is working that aspect as well. Hydrogen is one example, and
    there are a number of other promising technologies.
        I would conclude by saying that this is not just about
    airplanes. Our installations are large consumers of electricity
    and so on. An example of one initiative is the solar farm at
    Nellis Air Force Base, where over 50 percent of the electricity
    consumed at Nellis now is produced via solar. That's again
    representative of our efforts across the board, sir.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I remain deeply, deeply troubled by the process that
    resulted in this dramatic alteration of the RFP for the KC-X
    tanker aircraft. It's such a dramatic change that it has, I
    think, stunned the entire contracting world. I believe that the
    Air Force correctly chose the preferred airplane the last time.
    There were technical problems with the way that RFP went
    forward, and it was legitimate to come back and look at it
    again. But to have 11 significant changes and 9 of those favor
    one aircraft, to change the RFP to a degree that when you have
    two aircraft, each offering different values, and to craft the
    RFP so it directly favors only one aircraft is a stunning
    development. I think is going to have ramifications throughout
    the defense community.
        I believe no matter if the Northrop team decides to bid--
    and I hope they do, I hope they do, but I don't know that they
    will--it's still going to be a problem that is not going away.
    There is now a perception, and I believe a correct one, that
    politics somehow influenced the changes that were made.
        I took notice from my colleagues in the Seattle Times after
    the new RFP came out. This is the lead sentence in that
    article: ``The final RFP for the long-delayed $40 billion Air
    Force refueling tanker contract, issued Wednesday, appears to
    heavily favor Boeing's Everett-built 767 plane over the
    rival.''
        It goes on to quote Ashton Carter, the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as saying:
    ``This is not a price showdown.'' But they note: ``But analysts
    noted that only in very limited circumstances will credit be
    given for extra capabilities.''
        The article goes on to say: ``The much larger Airbus 330
    can deliver more fuel per trip than the Boeing 767 and carry
    extra troops and cargo, but the evaluation process will credit
    those items only if the two bids are within 1 percent of each
    other on cost.''
        Lauren Thompson, defense industry analyst at the Lexington
    Institute, said: ``This becomes nothing more than a cost
    competition and a bigger plane costs more.'' He goes on to say:
    ``It's Boeing's competition to lose. This is playing out just
    the way Northrop feared.''
        I'm a believer in DOD. I believe in the integrity of DOD,
    but I am very troubled. I remember with great clarity Senator
    McCain challenging the Air Force's decision with Darleen Druyun
    to give, in effect, a sole source contract to Boeing, and what
    did we find out? Ms. Druyun went to jail and members of the
    leadership team at Boeing had to resign, if not be prosecuted.
    I think some were prosecuted. It was a very, very sad thing.
        Politics should not enter into this. I just would tell you,
    I know it was made an issue in the campaign. Senator McCain,
    who saved $8 billion by advocating that this not be a sole-
    source contract for DOD, was criticized in the campaign for his
    activity that virtually this whole committee supported. Senator
    Levin supported it. We required a bid. We passed a law that
    said this will be bid. There are only two bidders in the world.
    So, if you doctor a bid that favors only one configured
    aircraft over another and don't consider the total value to the
    Country, then you've I think done something that frustrated,
    really, the intent of Congress.
        Secretary Donley, don't you feel that in a procurement of
    this size that the Air Force should insist that the aircraft
    chosen not only just the cheapest price--that's not the only
    thing--but also that we should consider the other capabilities
    that the Air Force has and that the RFP should be crafted in
    such a way that those extra capabilities are given legitimate
    weight in the evaluation?
        Mr. Donley. Senator, we've had this conversation and, with
    all due respect, I think we probably disagree on how to
    characterize the RFP. DOD has been very careful about how it
    structured this competition and how it structured the
    requirements and the acquisition strategy. We believe this is a
    fair approach, it's balanced, and it has favored no one.
        Senator Sessions. So you believe that?
        Mr. Donley. The Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary Carter,
    and I have played this, DOD has played this, straight down the
    middle as best we possibly can, given all the pressures on both
    sides of these arguments.
        I would also like to remind the committee that in the
    context of the acquisition strategy, the capabilities of the
    aircraft are evaluated in the wartime model, in the peacetime
    fuel burn, and in the needed military construction (MILCON). So
    we have multiple evaluations of the aircraft involved in the
    evaluation upfront. That is part of our work.
        We've been very careful to identify what we need to go to
    war on day 1.
        Senator Sessions. So you would disagree with the paper's
    reporting?
        Mr. Donley. Air Mobility Command has been scrupulous in the
    way this has been put together.
        Senator Sessions. The article says the evaluation process
    will credit those extras only if the two bids are within 1
    percent of each other.
        Mr. Donley. Sir, I understand that there are extra
    capabilities beyond the 1 percent gate. But before the 1
    percent gate, the costs and benefits of smaller airplanes and
    larger airplanes are measured in the warfighting model, in the
    peacetime operating model, and in the MILCON costs. So the
    advantages of one plane over another in that evaluation is
    undertaken before you get to the 1 percent gate.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. My time is up. I don't agree.
    This is not going to go away, and I just feel it's just so sad
    that we're in this. I think anybody in DOD or the Air Force who
    have talked to me about this bid process will know I never
    asked for any special advantage. I simply said you should craft
    a process to select the best value, not just the more expensive
    or cheaper aircraft, but the best value for the Air Force.
        I think there was a dramatic change in this bid process
    after you took office than there was previously, and I think
    it's resulted in a troubling situation. That's just my
    assessment. I have to say it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The wisest man in the world, King
    Solomon, faced the problem of who a baby's parent was between
    two women that said the baby was theirs. King Solomon solved
    the problem by saying: ``Well then, we'll just cut the baby in
    half and give a half to each.'' Then, of course, the real
    mother of the two said: ``No, no, your majesty; please give the
    baby to her.'' King Solomon then knew whose baby it was.
        Maybe the rumors are true out there that you're going to
    give this tanker aircraft contract to both contractors, and
    that's percolating. So I'd be interested to find out where the
    truth is here.
        I want to ask you for the record, because I have such a
    little bit of time, and if you'll just get back to me for the
    record, on space infrastructure.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Air Force is implementing the Launch Enterprise Transformation
    to support increasing launch demand. Ongoing range modernization and
    sustainment efforts are improving range reliability, availability, and
    maintainability. These efforts are enabling the Air Force to divest
    excess range infrastructure in favor of optimally sited, more reliable,
    and sustainable assets. Additionally, the Air Force is transitioning to
    greater use of on-board systems for tracking and command functions
    essential to range safety. In the near term, the Air Force is moving
    from primary reliance on radar tracking to a combination of on-board
    Global Positioning System (GPS) and inertial guidance tracking. Over
    the longer term, the ranges will transition from ground-based safety
    processes and systems to on-board autonomous flight safety systems. The
    decreased reliance on ground-based infrastructure increases range
    agility and enables the ranges to better satisfy the demands of
    changing launch schedules.
        In addition to these efforts, the Air Force is pursuing several
    initiatives to achieve greater launch flexibility. These include
    improving the launch manifesting process to maximize launch slots,
    optimizing launch vehicle throughput, and investigating the feasibility
    of launching GPS satellites from the west coast.
        The Commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC/CC) and the Director,
    National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) chartered a Tiger Team to
    recommend a revised way ahead for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
    (EELV) program. Among the items the Tiger Team is evaluating are a more
    flexible and transparent contract structure, and multi-vehicle
    procurement to include an fiscal year 2011 pathfinder ``Block Buy'' of
    launch services with the NRO and the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration. The Tiger Team is also looking at various pre-planned
    product improvement and sustainment options for EELV.
        The team is also reviewing a more flexible manifesting process.
    This ``Whitetail'' concept would manifest and start the manufacturing
    of an EELV that could launch any of several different spacecraft.
    Specific spacecraft assignment would occur later, thereby using finite
    launch opportunities more efficiently. This concept was utilized in the
    most recent Current Launch Schedule Review Board. As a result, some of
    the EELV's manifested for launch in the next year have multiple
    spacecraft assigned for the same launch date. This provides flexibility
    in the event a specific spacecraft slips from its assigned launch date,
    then another spacecraft has the opportunity to launch.
        The results of the Tiger Team efforts will provide the basis for
    the fiscal year 2010 congressional reports required for both EELV
    sustainment and multi-vehicle procurement. The estimated completion
    date for a new acquisition strategy is on or about June 1, 2010.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Our Air Force range system is not as
    flexible as it needs to be to ensure the growing number of
    launches that are required. I want you to respond to us in
    writing, what are your thoughts to upgrade the ranges and to
    support more flexible approaches to space launch? What are you
    looking at with regard to the buying of launch vehicles, and
    the fact that 80 percent of communications for the military now
    go on commercial satellites. What is the right mix, and is the
    Air Force discussing any future plans to increase military
    satellite communications capacity beyond the current generation
    of Wideband Global Satellite and Advanced Extremely High
    Frequency satellites?
        Next is the issue of space situational awareness. What are
    the ramifications for ensuring space situational awareness if
    your increased request in your budget is not appropriated?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ensuring our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have reliable,
    consistent access to communications is critical to successful military
    operations. The fielding of Wideband Global Satellite and the upcoming
    launch of Advanced Extremely High Frequency greatly improves access to
    Satellite Communications (SATCOM). However, these constellations cannot
    by themselves satisfy 100 percent of demand and commercial SATCOM will
    continue to provide needed service to the warfighter. The Air Force and
    the Department of Defense are reassessing SATCOM requirements and the
    Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) architecture, to include
    an analysis of the balance of commercial and military SATCOM.
        The increased funds proposed in the fiscal year 2011 President's
    budget would keep the development of new SSA capabilities, specifically
    Space Fence, Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Follow On, and SSA
    Environmental Monitoring (SSAEM) on schedule to replace the existing
    aging Space Surveillance Network infrastructure, and to maintain
    continuity of SSA services. Failure to fund these efforts will slip the
    delivery of these new capabilities and result in: (1) risk of a loss of
    near earth small object detection (Space Fence); (2) loss of Deep Space
    monitoring and tracking (SBSS) upon end of life of SBSS Block 10, and
    (3) loss of key environmental capabilities (SSAEM) that affect all
    space services to the warfighter.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Then, I have questions about
    operationally responsive space. What are your thoughts on
    increasing support to that?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request of $94 million for
    ORS continues to fund the enablers needed to build an ability to
    rapidly reconstitute, augment, and surge space capabilities. We believe
    this level of funding supports the enabling capabilities. We continue
    to closely monitor the ORS-1 satellite development and are prepared to
    address execution issues should they arise.

        Senator Bill Nelson. I would just add my comments on
    JSTARS, and I'd like to be kept in the loop, that, given the
    importance of this asset to the current fight, I'd like to have
    a timeline for a decision on the ground moving target indicator
    requirement, and on the re-engining. So if you'd put me in that
    information loop.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) requirements will be
    evaluated as part of the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
    System (JSTARS) Mission Area Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) which was
    formally initiated on March 16, 2010. The AoA will determine what GMTI
    sensors and platforms are best suited to address the Department of
    Defense's current capability gaps. Results from this effort are
    expected to be available in March 2011 to support the Air Force's
    fiscal year 2013 budget preparation.
        In parallel, the JSTARS program office is taking steps to address
    recommendations of the Air Force Fleet Viability Board (FVB) with
    regard to E-8C structural condition. The Air Force has recently placed
    Boeing on contract to determine the service life of the underlying 707-
    300 structure on which the E-8Cs were built; preliminary results of
    this effort are expected to be available in September 2010. Additional
    FVB remediation activity such as documentation review and a vertical
    stabilizer teardown will continue through early 2012.
        Development activity is ongoing for the JSTARS re-engining program.
    The first two production shipsets are expected to be available in July
    2012, at which time they will be installed on E-8C aircraft to support
    operational testing. Problems, however, have been identified with the
    new engine's bleed air design. The bleed air redesign is expected to be
    complete by July 2012. If the bleed air redesign is not complete in
    time for the engine delivery then a post delivery retrofit will be
    necessary. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests funding for
    two additional shipsets for purchase in 2011--these would be available
    for install in early fiscal year 2014.
        If the results of the AoA and E-8C structural analysis indicate
    that the JSTARS should be modernized, the Air Force will have the
    opportunity to include additional E-8C engine production in the fiscal
    year 2013 President's budget. Execution of such funding would be
    contingent on a successful operational test in March 2012.
        If, based on the AoA and structural analysis, the DOD decides to
    replace the JSTARS with a different GMTI capability, the Air Force
    would continue to sustain the E-8C while that replacement is designed,
    produced, and fielded.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Now, the remaining time that I have, I
    just want to say that last night I got a disturbing phone call
    about the Air Force's proposal to shut down 48 F-15s at Tyndall
    Air Force Base and that the job loss is not 594 personnel as
    originally expected. Last night, I found out it's 801
    personnel. I've been told the change is due to factors that
    were unaccounted for during your June 2009 study. But there's
    been no change in the number of departing aircraft.
        This is 15 percent of the total workforce at Tyndall Air
    Force Base that's going to be gone under your present plans. I
    would say that this hasn't been particularly well managed,
    particularly in light that there's not a follow-on mission
    there. We had been advocating to get F-35s to replace those F-
    15s, and now you've already testified that the F-35s are going
    to be considerably delayed.
        You know the excellent base that we have. You put the F-22s
    there for pilot training because of the huge Gulf Training and
    Testing Range that we have, which by the way I will continue to
    protect; in spite of the Air Force and the Navy's efforts, I
    will continue to protect so that you don't have the invasions
    there so that you can't test, train, and drop live ordnance.
        I would appreciate very much if you would check out this
    follow-on mission for Tyndall Air Force Base.
        Do you have any comments?
        General Schwartz. Senator Nelson, just a bit of background
    on the 594 to 801 increase in personnel cuts. There were a
    couple of factors involved in this, but the largest one was an
    expectation that we would in-source the F-22 back shop
    maintenance. In other words, it's currently done by contract,
    and the expectation was we would migrate that into blue suits,
    which would help maintain blue suit manpower at Tyndall.
        For a number of reasons, we're not prepared to do that. We
    may well do it in the future, but it's not the right time. That
    is the largest component of the reason for the 174, I guess,
    increase in the numbers, from 594 to 801.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The committee notes the difference would be 207 personnel.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I did share this in person yesterday with another member of
    the Florida delegation. Please forgive me for not getting to
    you in time.
        Tyndall is a very important place. The F-22 would not be
    there if it were not. As you suggested, the range availability
    there is precious.
        We have not made decisions on training space. It is true,
    the recent restructure of F-35, has pushed a little bit to the
    right decisions about where we would bed down the second
    training location. The first one is----
        Senator Bill Nelson. At Eglin.
        General Schwartz.--at Eglin, and it's 59 aircraft. The
    environmental impact statement is underway as we speak.
        It is clear to me that there's capacity at Eglin \2\ and we
    as an Air Force need to make prudential use of that capacity.
    We just haven't gotten to the point where we've decided exactly
    what that is. But it's well understood.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ General Schwartz intended to refer to Tyndall Air Force Base,
    as indicated by the later remarks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Senator Bill Nelson. You said ``Eglin,'' but you meant
    ``Tyndall.'' It's clear to you that there is capability at
    Tyndall.
        General Schwartz. Tyndall.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Right.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, General, thank you very much for your
    service in performing very difficult jobs. We keep making more
    and more demands and resources get more and more constrained
    all the time. I think the discussion this morning is a good
    example of that.
        General Schwartz, I wanted to ask you about, among other
    things, you placed the B-1 bomber high velocity maintenance
    funding as number one on your unfunded priority list. I
    understand that a part of that, the B-1 portion of this item,
    is around $25 million. Can you explain your rationale as to why
    this important maintenance for the B-1 wasn't funded in the
    base budget?
        General Schwartz. Sir, the background on high velocity
    maintenance is, the basic principle comes from the commercial
    sector, where you take airplanes into depot-level maintenance
    more frequently, in this case maybe every 18 months as opposed
    to every 4 or 5 years, and the net result of that is you have
    much less discovery; when you have airplanes come in after long
    intervals, then you discover things that are wrong that you
    didn't know about, such as with the structure and so on and so
    forth.
        The principle in the commercial sector demonstrates that
    looking at airplanes more frequently at the depot level can
    save you money. It is an appropriate initiative. But the bottom
    line was we were pressed. Just as in a case in point, we
    deferred in our budget, trying to make balance all the demands,
    109 depot visits of aircraft and 163 engine overhauls. That
    unfunded priority request helped bring some of those overhauls
    back, including the high velocity maintenance on the B-1s.
        I mean, think about this, Senator Thune. We're asking for
    additional dollars for sustainment, not for a platform, not for
    something you would expect, but to maintain our machines and to
    make sure that we maintain readiness. But the bottom line is we
    have pressures, we made choices, and the number one unfunded
    priority is sustainment.
        Senator Thune. How many B-1s do you think would be impacted
    by that requested funding?
        General Schwartz. We have 66, sir, and ultimately it would
    be all of them.
        Senator Thune. General, the integration of the Sniper
    Advanced Targeting Pod into the B-1 bomber, and other Air Force
    aircraft, has contributed greatly to effective close air
    support in Afghanistan. However, there seems to be a lack of
    these advanced targeting pods for training because they're in
    such high demand in theater. Crews then are using these
    advanced targeting pods overseas in combat. However, they're
    having a limited ability to train on them here at home.
        Does the Air Force have a need for additional advanced
    targeting pods for training use?
        General Schwartz. Sir, you make a good point. The program
    of record which is funded is to grow to 375 sniper pods in the
    Air Force. We've had 241 delivered thus far. When we get to the
    full program, we will be able to dedicate the pods to specific
    tail numbers. But until we get there, typically what we are
    doing, it is true, is bringing the pod to the unit that will be
    deploying 3 to 4 months in advance of their deployment, so they
    can refine their skills and such with respect to the precision
    targeting.
        Again, this is a matter of a temporal issue. This is not a
    funding issue. We will get well as the additional pods are
    delivered.
        Senator Thune. Due to General McChrystal's directive
    restricting close air support operations, my understanding is
    that B-1 crews are frequently being used,instead of for their
    sniper pod capability, to provide ISR to ground troops without
    resorting to any sort of kinetic strike. Do you have any idea
    or notion of how frequently air crews are being utilized by
    ground troops in Afghanistan simply for ISR purposes?
        General Schwartz. Frequently, sir, I don't think that we
    should find that to be a problem. If the aircraft are airborne
    and they do not have a valid target to engage, to support our
    folks on the ground with the view from above and be able to
    provide that view via datalink to folks with Rover terminals on
    the ground, is exactly what we should be doing.
        I can understand why folks would ask this; they know their
    primary mission is delivering iron on target. If it's not
    needed during that sortie, certainly we should make the best
    possible use of the capability of the airplane, including the
    sniper pod.
        Senator Thune. General Schwartz--and Secretary Donley, I
    direct this to you as well--with regard to the Future Years
    Defense Program force structure set out in the new QDR for the
    Air Force, there is a proposal for 5 long-range strike wings
    with up to 96 primary mission aircraft. According to the latest
    Air Force Almanac, the Air Force currently has 153 bomber
    aircraft.
        Now, when I posed a question about the substantial cut to
    the bomber force to Admiral Mullen a few weeks ago, he said
    there is currently consideration for a reduction in the number
    of overall bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty.
    That's cause for concern in my view because I have long
    expressed the fear that it would be proposed by the
    administration in effect as a way to negotiate the bomber leg
    of the nuclear triad away.
        Are these not substantial cuts to the bomber force as are
    being envisioned by the QDR?
        General Schwartz. Sir, there actually are 162 bomber
    platforms, B-1 and B-52 and B-2. The 96 are what we call
    combat-coded aircraft. So you have training aircraft, you have
    attrition Reserve. It's a complicated formula. In reality, 96
    translates to the current fleet of 162.
        But with respect to potential changes in mission, I do not
    foresee a reduction in B-52 force structure if there is an
    adjustment to nuclear tasking. As you are well aware, the B-1
    is not a nuclear-tasked platform; the B-52 is. If there is a
    requirement for fewer B-52s on the nuclear side, we will still
    require their capability on the conventional side. They simply
    will no longer be dual tasked.
        Senator Thune. Do you think that the cuts to delivery
    vehicles contemplated in the START Treaty, though, in those
    negotiations, are likely to come primarily out of the bomber
    force?
        General Schwartz. Sir, I don't think that'll be the case. I
    do not.
        Senator Thune. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman. But if
    I have one quick question, can I ask?
        Chairman Levin. All right, yes.
        Senator Thune. General Cartwright indicated--and this is
    quick--that we run the risk of making the triad a diad if we go
    below 800 delivery vehicles in the follow-on START. Do you
    share that concern?
        General Schwartz. The issue for the Air Force, sir, is what
    I would call critical mass, both on the bomber side and the
    missile side. This has less to do with being able to meet
    targeting requirements than it does to be able to maintain the
    talent pool, the expertise in the nuclear enterprise that we
    need. If you get too small, you don't have enough people to
    fill the enterprise with the kind of talent you need.
        So for me, there is a minimum size that really is driven by
    human capital concerns, less than sort of traditional sort of
    targeting concerns.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Nelson, I'm going to have to
    leave for a few minutes. If I'm not back, I'd appreciate your
    calling on the next person. Thank you.
        Senator Ben Nelson [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Will do.
        Gentlemen, I appreciate your service and the men and women
    in uniform and civilians that do such a great job on behalf of
    the American people through the Air Force and through your
    leadership.
        The 55th Wing at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska operates
    a fleet of uniquely equipped RC-135 aircraft. Of course,
    they're individually equipped with unique combinations of ISR
    collections systems. Up to now, these collection capabilities
    are not fully supported by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
        In the budget request in fiscal year 2011, the request
    includes $2.2 billion for UASs and supports an increase in
    combat air patrols from 37 to 65 by 2013. Obviously, the
    primary focus of this expansion is via ISR, and it's been on
    UASs. My question is: As the Air Force budgets to meet these
    mission requirements and begins divesting itself of older
    airframes to pay for new technologies and programs, how do you
    see the technology of remotely piloted platforms affecting
    platforms like the RC-135? Perhaps, General Schwartz, you'd
    like to respond to that first.
        General Schwartz. Sir, I would say that is not an immediate
    concern. The issue for us right now really is the high-altitude
    transition between the U-2 and the Global Hawk, and getting the
    Global Hawk, particularly the so-called Block 40 Global Hawk,
    which has a radar sensor--the Block 30 is the more signals
    intelligence-based platform--getting those fielded. That is the
    real issue that we are dealing with.
        I do not foresee remotely piloted aircraft beginning to
    supplant the large fixed-wing capability that particularly
    resides in the RC-135 in the near term.
        Senator Ben Nelson. What efforts are underway in fiscal
    year 2011 to modernize the RC-135 to obviously keep it at the
    highest level of performance?
        General Schwartz. Sir, I'd like to take that question and
    give you a detailed answer for the record, if that's okay.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, I don't want to use all my time on
    that.
        General Schwartz. This airplane continues to improve.
    Certainly the sensor capability on the machine improves. We
    have initiatives there to deal with new signals, new modes of
    collection, and what have you, as well as the airframe, re-
    engining, and such, that you're aware. But I'll get you a
    detailed answer on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Fiscal year 2011 will see the continued development and upgrade of
    the RC-135. These upgrades ensure the RC-135 remains operationally
    viable and tactically relevant in its ability to collect, process,
    analyze, and disseminate evolving and emerging adversarial threats--
    specifically the collection of advanced digital low-power systems used
    by terrorists and insurgents worldwide. These programmed upgrades will
    enable the RC-135 to continue to rapidly and reliably respond to
    national Intelligence Community taskings, as well as the time-sensitive
    threat warning and force protection requirements of commanders in the
    field.
        Fiscal year 2011 modernization efforts will be the start of the
    largest technology refreshment ever introduced in a single RC-135
    baseline upgrade and will include the following:

          1.   CORVUS: Replaces the Automatic ELINT Emitter Locator System
    (AEELS) which has been on-board the RC-135 since 1991. Due to
    diminishing vendor inventories, the AEELS is at a critical juncture and
    must be replaced or faces potential mission failure in the near future.
    CORVUS significantly improves the probability to intercept signals from
    integrated air defense systems, surface-to-air missile systems, and
    advanced adversary fighter aircraft.
          2.   Digital Multi-threaded Collection Architecture (DMCA):
    Fields a common digital hardware and software architecture for all core
    communications exploitation applications to include searching, copying,
    and geo-locating high-priority targets of interest.
          3.   Wideband Global Satellite (WGS): Accomplishes initial
    engineering test and hardware integration for WGS receiver equipment
    on-board the RC-135. WGS will provide the bandwidth needed for nearly
    all near-term distributed operations capabilities. Currently the single
    greatest barrier to enhanced enterprise integration for the RC-135 is
    lack of data link connectivity bandwidth. WGS will fix this
    shortcoming.
          4.   Ship-wide Interphone: Full replacement of cockpit and
    reconnaissance compartment interphone, voice radio access, and recon
    audio access/control functions for communications; allows timely
    support to national and theater intelligence consumers.
          5.   External Communications Suite Upgrade: Deploys new NSA
    software (Radiant Mercury), providing a data guard that allows multi-
    level secure communications. Ensures tactical data links are segregated
    without compromising the integrity and security of any network
    (collateral links from SCI networks). Fields an upgraded suite of
    digital line-of-sight and SATCOM radios compatible with current and
    programmed strategic and tactical secure communications networks.
          6.   General Technology Refreshment: Re-hosts 51 of 54 computer
    processors, ensuring state-of-the-art capability to keep pace with
    ever-changing enemy technologies; purchases new digital recorders to
    archive collected data for real-time and post-mission analysis and
    reporting; purchases new Local Area Network (LAN) switch mainframes;
    and replaces legacy communication receivers with state-of-the-art
    digital tuners.
          7.   Signal Search Research and Development (Special Signals):
    Upgrades legacy equipment, ensuring continued collection capability
    against advanced, digital, high-capacity special signals of interest.
    This upgrade purchases enhanced recording functions and upgrades
    existing analysis systems. This upgrade ensures the RC-135 continues to
    have one of the most technologically advanced mobile signals search and
    analysis capability of all fielded ISR platforms.
          8.   Maintenance Upgrades: Equipment replaces aging maintenance
    equipment, including new cooling systems for multiple computer
    processors, allowing sustained system reliability.
          9.   Enhanced Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT):
    Capability provides highly precise fused national/tactical geo-location
    to theater and battlefield commanders.
        10.   Expanded Aircrew Capability Extension System Applications:
    Supports distributed operations with ground collection and processing;
    net-centric enabler integrates the RC-135 into national intelligence
    processing, analysis, and reporting systems; supports in-garrison
    linguist training and expanded combat proficiency.

        Senator Ben Nelson. That would be helpful.
        In that connection, I understand that there is no effort
    underway right now to grow the end strength. But as we bring in
    new missions, new technology, and retain existing technology
    and existing systems, there's going to be pressure on personnel
    and the human capital will obviously be affected by that. Are
    you planning training differences or is there a reduction in
    force required for certain systems over other systems?
        General Schwartz. Sir, let me give you a quick example and
    perhaps the Secretary will want to amplify. Right now we have
    put more than 4,000 people, airmen, into the ISR mission. That
    is, as the Secretary suggested earlier, both operators and
    maintainers and a very substantial number of intel folks to
    process the data take. We cannot sustain that indefinitely. We
    can't go from 50 to 65 percent and keep doing it just the same
    way.
        What that suggests is technology has to help us. For
    example, at the moment we have one pilot and one sensor
    operator, fly one platform with one sensor on it, looking at
    one spot on the ground. So it's a one to one to one to one
    relationship. What we need to be able to do is get to the point
    where one operator can operate multiple aircraft, maybe as many
    as four, perhaps more, and gain efficiencies there.
        Likewise, we need on the processing side to use the kind of
    software that we know is available, that you and I saw when we
    were watching the Olympic Games or when we watch football on
    Sundays. We need to have automation in the process of watching
    video, picking out the relevant pieces of video and so on. That
    will reduce the manpower demand.
        Part of this is right now doing what we have to do. This is
    not the way that this needs to be structured indefinitely.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate that.
        Mr. Donley. Just to amplify on the personnel side, I think
    our Air Force has a very strong reputation for the relationship
    that we have between the Active, the Guard, and Reserve
    components, a very close lashup among the Reserve components
    with the Active-Duty component. We've applied that in many
    different mission areas.
        One of the initiatives I put out this year, and we hope to
    get some results on further along in the calendar year, is
    taking those success stories at individual locations and
    establishing for the Air Force as an institution a little bit
    better business case analysis, a little bit better model for
    the cost effectiveness of our total force initiatives across
    all components, especially in some areas where we have many
    airmen involved but who do not always deploy abroad. There may
    be a slice of the force that requires deployment forward at any
    given time, but in many ways CONUS-based operations or static
    operations, if you will, even though they're in support of the
    combatant commanders, need us to find out whether or not we can
    get better, cost-effective combinations of our Active, Guard,
    and Reserve personnel, and our civilian workforce as well.
        We're looking for better cost-effective models in that
    broad area going forward.
        Senator Ben Nelson. There's one other question. My time's
    out. I'd like you to respond back in writing on this. I noticed
    in the Air Force's unfunded requirements under MILCON an entry
    item of $57.1 million to address Guard and Reserve vehicle
    replacement and equipment. I know the Army in its posture
    hearing last week expressed some concerns about being able to
    deal with the MILCON requirements for the Guard and Reserve.
    Perhaps you can outline to me whether or not the Air National
    Guard (ANG) is suffering from the same facility requirements
    and shortfalls as well. Obviously, as we use the Air Force and
    the Guard as Operational Reserves, their MILCON requirements
    are going to be increasing over a period of time.
        I thank both of you for your time. Did you have a response
    to that?
        Mr. Donley. Sir, we can give you a more specific response
    for the record, but we have been taking increased risk in our
    infrastructure. Tactical and administrative vehicles is an area
    that also gets typically less attention and is an area where we
    take risks. These are things that affect all of our force. But
    we'll get you a more specific answer on the Guard.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In our fiscal year 2011 budget request, we had to make a number of
    difficult choices, including continued risk in some of our
    infrastructure accounts. However, we believe that these risks are
    necessary, given numerous other priorities that we face in this time of
    conflict; and, we have ensured that our budget request remains aligned
    to our fundamental priorities. Therefore, the Air Force is placing its
    most urgent military construction projects in the Future Year's Defense
    Program (FYDP) and we are working to ensure that all critical
    requirements are met. We will re-examine the requirements for both
    Active and Reserve components during the fiscal years 2012 to 2017 FYDP
    development.

        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Thanks, both of you.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, gentlemen. General Schwartz, your comments about
    the Olympics and the technology there made me think about our
    Olympic team, almost another form of an Air Force, Olympic Air
    Force, though a lot of them operating without chutes and nets.
    What a great result we had in Vancouver.
        I was at another hearing in the Energy and Natural
    Resources Committee, and I missed the exchange on ``Don't Ask,
    Don't Tell.'' I understand it was healthy and frank, and I want
    to compliment everybody involved in this important discussion
    for being forthcoming with their point of view.
        I remain a stalwart supporter of the Lieberman-Levin
    legislation. I have no doubt, given the exemplary fashion in
    which human resources operate in the military, that once we
    decide how to implement this change, that the military will do
    it in a way that makes us proud. Thanks to both of you for
    being clear with your points of view.
        If I might, let me turn to the legacy aircraft retirement
    situation. You've announced plans to retire legacy aircraft in
    order to, as I understand, fund a smaller, more capable force
    and redistribute those personnel to higher priority missions.
    The plan raised some questions here, and I'd like to ask you in
    that context if you have a plan to recapitalize the ANG units,
    which are performing air sovereignty alert missions and whether
    there are concerns you have about potential gaps in the
    homeland defense systems?
        General Schwartz. Sir, we certainly do have a tight
    coupling, as the Secretary suggested, with the ANG. With
    respect to the air sovereignty alert, there are 18 locations, 2
    of which are Active Duty, 16 are covered by the ANG. Of those,
    we have two of which are soon to be F-22 locations. You have,
    if I recall correctly, six are F-16, and the remainder are F-15
    covered.
        The bottom line is that that mission will not diminish in
    coverage as a result of the reductions that we've recommended,
    and that we will make sure that the air sovereignty mission and
    the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)-U.S.
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) requirements are satisfied through
    either reallocation of assets if we have to or service life
    extension if that's required. Clearly, some of that coverage
    will be performed by F-35s in due course.
        Senator Udall. I think it wouldn't surprise you and the
    Secretary to know that the Guard, whether it's the ANG or the
    Army Guard, are always keen to take advantage of equipment that
    may be available. They make the most with equipment that often
    has been used.
        General Schwartz. I think and I do believe that our Guard
    and our Reserve are models for complete integration within the
    larger total force context of our Air Force, and I certainly
    would expect that as we get additional equipment and personnel
    and modernize, I would say both in terms of the tankers and in
    terms of the fighters, you will see an appropriate contribution
    from the Guard and the Reserve in both those mission areas.
        Senator Udall. Good luck in that regard. By the way, I
    think Boeing and Northrop are both great companies.
        Let me move to the space posture review. Senator McCain
    mentioned we required in the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2009 a report by December 1 last year. I
    understand it won't be completed until the summer. Can you tell
    us anything about what's in the works that's been performed so
    far, the QDR process, and how that might have affected
    modernization and investment plans for security space systems?
    Mr. Secretary, do you care to comment, or General Schwartz?
        Mr. Donley. I wouldn't want to preempt the policy
    discussions that are underway, but I'll just highlight that
    they do reflect themes that are familiar to this committee and
    to prior year testimony from the Air Force, and from Air Force
    Space Command in particular, about the importance of this
    domain to our national security establishment. We need to set
    the right balance between U.S. and partner capabilities as we
    think about those aspects of our major mission areas like
    missile warning, satellite communications systems, weather,
    intelligence and surveillance, all these are mission areas
    within the space domain, and what kind of capabilities we need
    as a military going forward. We also must find the right
    balance between those that we need to own and those that we can
    buy or lease from others, how to set up more effective
    partnerships with our international partners, and our
    commercial partners going forward.
        These are roughly the themes that you will see. Space is
    more crowded than it was 20 or 30 years ago, more congested and
    more contested. The importance of space situational awareness
    as a foundation for our work going forward I think is very
    important. We need to have the capabilities in place that help
    us understand what is happening in that domain with full
    knowledge of all the actors and capabilities that are operating
    in that domain and to be able to attribute actions in that
    domain that could potentially impact U.S. capabilities.
        Senator Udall. I look forward to the report, obviously.
        Let me, in the remaining time I have move to cyberspace. We
    have the 24th stood up at Peterson Air Force Base. We're
    honored to be able to host the 24th and Peterson in general.
    Can you give us a little bit of an update on the 24th and the
    cyberspace mission in general?
        General Schwartz. Just to clarify that, of course, Air
    Force Space Command at Peterson is the senior headquarters to
    the 24th. Actually, the 24th is based in San Antonio, sir.
        Senator Udall. I thank you for that clarification. I didn't
    want to suggest to my friends from Texas that the 24th is in
    Colorado.
        General Schwartz. I understand.
        I think the key thing about 24th is that it is the focus
    for our efforts in cyberspace. There are two major components
    of that. One is defending the net, defending our networks,
    because they are not just administrative entities; they are
    command and control, they're involved in command, control,
    operations, and so on. Defending the net is a major obligation
    and they have infrastructure and people in the command
    relationship to execute that mission.
        In addition, there is the question of what I would refer to
    as the offensive use of cyber. That is, use of cyber in ways
    that would support other aspects of the Air Force mission. For
    example, if you are trying to neutralize an integrated air
    defense system, you can do that with kinetic weapons or
    perhaps, perhaps, you could do it with some cyber capabilities.
        So the 24th is focused on that part, not more broadly, but
    to those kinds of capabilities that would enable other Air
    Force missions. That's the basic theme for 24th. They're
    growing. They will have the talent of our Air Force with
    respect to all things cyber, and it will also be the Air Force
    component command, for the subunified Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)
    when it's established.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, General.
        One final comment. My time has expired. There's an
    interesting analogue here between the conversation we're having
    about offensive activity in space and offensive activity in
    cyberspace. I think there are probably lessons that we can
    learn and discussions that will parallel each other as we
    grapple with those tough, but very serious, questions.
        Thanks again, gentlemen, for being here.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, thank you so much
    for your service and for your testimony today. The Air Force
    contributes so much to today's irregular warfare environment in
    substantial ways, and our airmen do an excellent job in
    providing situational awareness and air-ground integration on
    the battlefield.
        I also want to emphasize the contributions of our Air Force
    Special Operations combat controllers who conduct combat search
    and rescue operations, set up air assault zones, and manage the
    air space.
        Lastly, I want to thank you for the Air Force contributions
    to the efforts in Haiti. I understand there were 600 airmen
    supporting over 120 flights a day and handling at least 12
    million pounds of relief supplies and emergency response
    equipment. The 21st Special Tactics Squadron from the Pope Air
    Force Base did a fantastic job in managing the air space and
    ensuring the flow of supplies. I thank you for that.
        Secretary Donley, I wanted to follow up a little bit, too,
    on the cyber security issue. You mentioned that the Air Force
    is investing additional personnel in cyber security. I
    understand Senator Udall might have just asked some of the
    questions concerning cyber security, but how is the Air Force
    consolidating efforts to protect our computer networks and how
    is the Air Force Space Command going to work with the newly
    created Cyber Security Command?
        Mr. Donley. Well, as the Chief mentioned a few moments ago,
    the 24th Air Force standup in San Antonio is the focus, and has
    been the focus, of our effort of consolidating our network
    operations and network defensive capabilities. 24th Air Force
    reports to Air Force Space Command and 24th Air Force will be
    the Air Force component to the CYBERCOM which is being created
    at Fort Meade. So that's the institutional and the operational
    relationship.
        Space Command has done a tremendous job in overseeing the
    standup of 24th Air Force in the last year, and especially in
    the development and consolidation of career fields for this
    important area, so that we are well positioned with the right
    kind of talent and the right kind of backgrounds.
        We're anticipating that the future demand for how much and
    precisely what kinds of capabilities need to be developed will
    await the standup of CYBERCOM. We'll get the demand signal from
    the joint community on that, probably later this year. We're
    undertaking the actions that we can and should within our Air
    Force, but we think there's more work to be done on the joint
    side, and we'll probably get tasked more specifically later.
        General Schwartz. Ma'am, if I can just elaborate on one
    point. You may wonder why we aligned the 24th with Air Force
    Space Command. The reason is because space and cyber, I would
    argue, are both fundamentally engineering disciplines. You have
    a command that is focused on space and cyber. There was a lot
    of synergy between the two, as Senator Udall suggested, and we
    think that that was the right institutional alignment, as the
    Secretary suggested.
        Senator Hagan. What about the career development and
    finding the right people to go into this area? Can you explain
    a little bit further on that?
        General Schwartz. Sure. There are two aspects to this. One
    is creating organic capability, and so there are joint courses.
    The Navy runs a major course at Pensacola, for example. We also
    have courses at Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi that will
    prepare our airmen with the skills in order to do this work.
    There's advanced kinds of things which other agencies within
    DOD to help us train and maintain the readiness of our airmen.
        The other part of this, though, is recognizing that it is
    unlikely that DOD will ever be able to have all the cyber
    talent it needs and that actually, the predominance of that
    talent's going to be in the private sector. One of the things
    we're doing, which I think has lots of merit is, let's say we
    have an ANG unit in the State of Washington and its purpose is
    cyber. It can access the talent pool in Everett or in Seattle
    with Microsoft and elsewhere or, in the case of California, in
    Silicon Valley, where we can have folks that every day do their
    work in the cyber business, but also serve in the ANG or the
    Reserve. We think that is a high payoff strategy.
        Senator Hagan. Let me mention, too, that North Carolina has
    an excellent Research Triangle Park with a lot of talent that
    might be utilized also.
        One of the most important issues to me is ensuring family
    support programs across the services are appropriately
    resourced. Improving the quality of life for our airmen and
    their families is extremely important. How is the Air Force's
    family support program keeping pace with our current operations
    and what are some of the latest initiatives with respect to
    family support?
        Mr. Donley. We have a number underway, Senator, and this is
    an extremely important area for our Air Force, especially given
    the pattern of deployments that we've experienced over the past
    several years. We have underway an Air Force Year of the Family
    that is completely reviewing the whole set of capabilities and
    programs that we have with respect to spousal support and
    education, with respect to housing, with respect to health,
    child care, et cetera. We have a full range of programs in
    place already.
        A couple that we have bumped up in importance over the last
    year or so involve greater focus on families with exceptional
    family members who need additional support as they move from
    installation to installation for their particular family member
    to meet those special needs of those family members.
        We've focused more attention on the key spouses program in
    our Air Force and the support network of spouses that support
    our airmen and their families when airmen are deployed forward.
    It's an extremely important early warning network for us. It's
    an extremely important reinforcing of the Air Force community
    at the local level.
        General Schwartz. If I might add, ma'am, we're also paying
    attention to schools. Schools are the coin of the realm to most
    families. So that is a very important aspect of making bases
    attractive, ensuring that schools there to support the
    education of the youngsters in the best possible way.
        Senator Hagan. Secretary Donley, you mentioned about
    spouses and education. It has come to my attention that so many
    people have registered and taking advantage of that program
    there might have been a hold put on participation. Can you
    elaborate on that?
        Mr. Donley. We are familiar with this. This is a program
    administered at the DOD level which was so popular that it
    became overwhelmed, and so there was a need to take a pause and
    that is underway. But I know Dr. Stanley, Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness, is working this very hard
    with the rest of the manpower community to determine the proper
    way forward there.
        Senator Hagan. I think a lot of the people who were
    currently receiving tuition assistance had not been notified
    that a hold has been put on that, and I think that there's a
    lot of consternation and a lot of upset spouses at the moment.
        Mr. Donley. We understand.
        Senator Hagan. What's the plan going forward?
        Mr. Donley. We don't have that plan worked out just yet.
    The OSD folks are working on that with the rest of the manpower
    community. We can get back to you as soon as we have an answer
    from DOD. I have not heard in the last 48 hours the future plan
    for that particular program.
        Senator Hagan. I would appreciate that, because there are a
    lot of spouses in North Carolina that are calling my office.
    Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Last month, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) placed the
    My Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) spouse tuition assistance program
    on hold. As of 13 March, MyCAA resumed operations for military spouses
    with currently existing accounts. These spouses are able to submit and
    receive approval for financial assistance. OSD is still developing
    long-term program options and expects to announce details soon. Until
    that time, no new accounts can be created. OSD/Military Community and
    Family Policy has advised the Air Force it is reviewing software
    applications, financial assistance documents, and the overall program,
    and that the short pause in the program will allow it to better assess
    the program and ensure it is meeting the goal of providing spouses
    access to education and training for portable high-growth careers.

        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you. General Schwartz, good to see you
    again. I consider you an Alaskan from many aspects. But thank
    you very much for being here today, and especially in your
    position. I didn't think, back when you were in Alaska and I
    was on the city council and then later mayor, that we would
    probably visualize us both here across the table. It's an
    amazing thing, but it's good.
        Let me, if I can, just lay a little bit out, following up
    on Senator Udall's and others in regards to the retiring of the
    F-15s. You're very familiar, obviously, with this. For
    Elmendorf Air Force Base there are 24 aircraft that will be
    totally retired and literally go to the lower 48 States to
    another Guard unit or Guard units, however you determine that
    and deploy that.
        You understand the importance of the F-15 as part of the
    19th Fighter Squadron. It's dedicated solely for air
    sovereignty alert missions. That is run by NORAD in partnership
    with Canada. Putting that over here for a second, recognizing
    the retirement that's occurring in regards to those, the F-15s,
    we also have the 36 F-22s, which we're very proud of, in the
    two squads there. But the reality is, those are used on
    multiple missions. One squad seems to always be down in Guam,
    for some of the work that's there, training, maintenance, and a
    variety of other requirements for the F-22s.
        How are we going to accomplish the mission that the F-15s
    have been so successful at and have been literally from
    Alaska's perspective, and I think from the Nation's
    perspective, a real shining bright star? How are we going to
    have that mission, knowing that the F-22s are already being in
    some cases maximized in their utilization, at least from our
    perspective, in the work that they do for Pacific Command as
    well as NORTHCOM?
        General Schwartz. Sir, as I indicated earlier, this is both
    true in Alaska and Hawaii, and while there is a deployment
    requirement, and the F-15s actually had a deployment mission as
    well, over the last decade or two, since Operations Desert
    Shield/Desert Storm, there's been a relatively modest need for
    air superiority kind of deployments. The bottom line is that
    both in Alaska and in Hawaii the F-22s will support the air
    sovereignty mission.
        With respect to whatever capacity is left, and it will be
    substantial, they will be available for deployment for other
    missions in support of other combatant commanders. But I have
    no doubt that those machines will support the air sovereignty
    requirement that's specified by NORAD and NORTHCOM.
        Senator Begich. Can you walk me through the force
    restructuring? I know, and I can't remember the exact timing,
    but the force restructuring, the capability gaps, and the whole
    report that's due at some point. Can you give me an update?
        General Schwartz. In fact, the report was, if I'm not
    mistaken--perhaps the staff can confirm--delivered yesterday. I
    read it one last time on Sunday cover to cover, and at least in
    my view it makes a pretty compelling case.
        Senator Begich. I guess the thing I recognize, and you
    understand the uniqueness of what we have in Alaska, so I just
    want to underline my concern still because of the capacity and
    the amount of responsibility that our units have up there. I
    agree with Hawaii, too, but I want to underline my concern
    there.
        If I can move to maybe three other areas very quickly.
    First, and this is more of a comment, when Senator Bill Nelson
    was talking about launches and so forth, we would underline
    that Kodiak is a great investment that the military has made
    and we would encourage you to continue to look at that as an
    asset. I know some might think because of the cost, and
    question if it is the right location and so forth, but in a lot
    of cases it is. I would hope that you would consider the Kodiak
    Launch Complex as an important asset in how you utilize assets
    around the country for launches.
        We know they have done some incredible work and the
    military and the Federal Government have put an enormous
    investment in that. We would not want to see that become an
    idle investment when there's a value for it, especially as we
    move into more and more space activity.
        I know you know this, and I always get to do this, my
    friend from Colorado, Senator Udall, I always get to do this
    when he's out of the room. We have superior air space in our
    State. He'll tell me later--the last time I said something
    about the mountains and he harassed me and I told him Colorado
    has hills; we have mountains.
        Chairman Levin. You realize, Senator, these proceedings are
    being recorded.
        Senator Begich. Absolutely, and my Alaskans will appreciate
    it. [Laughter.]
        But I know there is a lot of discussion ongoing about
    utilization of air space and making sure we have enough air
    space and uninterrupted air space. That is becoming a growing
    problem for every branch. So again, I know there's a lot of
    work the Air Force has been focused on and looking at Alaska in
    some respect. I just want to continue to keep that point
    clearly on your radar screen. I know it is because you're very
    familiar with the air space there.
        I don't know if you have any comments you want to dare to
    dive into, knowing the chairman will probably add about his air
    space, too, and my colleague to the right will, too.
        General Schwartz. Senator, clearly there are a couple of
    places in the country that are extraordinary in terms of the
    availability of air space. Alaska is one. Clearly, the Barry
    Goldwater Range in Arizona is another. The Nellis Range in
    Nevada, the Utah Testing and Training Range in Utah. There are
    others, but those are the major ones.
        I would just make the point that it is very important, it
    is a national imperative, that we manage this air space
    carefully. There are pressures from development to energy,
    numerous, numerous pressures. We have to be very, very careful
    about eroding those very precious places where we have, as you
    said, continuous, contiguous air space that allows us to train,
    that allows us to test in a controlled fashion, and again,
    underwrites the readiness of all the forces.
        Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you.
        My time is up, and I'll just leave you this for the record,
    if you could. You folks recently provided me some information
    on radars and the air defense mission for fiscal year 2010. In
    there, there's about $31 million, give or take a few dollars of
    unfunded tasks for some of the projects, as well as contractor-
    required parts. Can you give me, again for the record, what the
    strategy is there to deal with that underfunding and long-term
    ability to make sure we continue to move ahead on the
    maintenance issues, which only get more expensive as time goes
    on. Delayed maintenance just means delayed costs, increase
    means increased costs. Please, if you could do that for the
    record.
        General Schwartz. Just to clarify, sir.
        Senator Begich. Sure.
        General Schwartz. You're talking about long-range radar
    sites?
        Senator Begich. Yes.
        General Schwartz. Yes, got it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Currently, the Air Force supports numerous long-range radars,
    including 15 FPS-117 radars in Alaska. These radars are a key component
    in the defense of our Nation and provide support to Operation Noble
    Eagle. To ensure they remain fully operational, the Air Force added
    $19.7 million in the fiscal year 2010 President's budget for the
    replacement of long-range radar essential parts. The Air Force
    continued its commitment by including $34.9 million in the fiscal year
    2011 President's budget for the replacement of essential parts and an
    additional $12.75 million for the long-range radar service life
    extension program.

        Senator Begich. Great. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
        Senator Burris.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Last but not least, gentlemen. I don't know if there will
    be another round, but I just want to extend my thanks for your
    service, Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz. Just one little
    comment, because I know I have several points here. Mr.
    Chairman, I certainly will submit my other questions for the
    record.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on your position with
    ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'' I would just like to ask the
    General. You seem like a young man, much younger than I am. But
    General, in terms of the service, we did not have the best and
    brightest in the service prior to the integration and President
    Truman making his statement, making his executive order. Though
    we had separate services, you saw the Tuskegee Airmen, how they
    performed under very adverse conditions because they were
    committed to the service and to the survival of this great
    Country of ours.
        I also learned since I've been in the Senate, and I did not
    even know anything about it, but Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
    from Texas spoke about the Women's Air Force that came
    together, paid their own way to Texas, had to pay their way
    back home to train because we had so many men in the military
    that they couldn't fly the missions and women flew the
    missions. There was also discrimination against women,
    discrimination against blacks.
        All the Services, General, have adjusted to this to get the
    best and the brightest. We've had an African-American Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now, under that program if we had
    started studying and waiting Colin Powell never would have made
    it, probably never would have made it, because of the delays in
    the understanding a need to integrate.
        So General, I just hope, in the interest of consideration,
    that you would think about this, that a person's sexual
    orientation has absolutely nothing to do with his or her
    ability and commitment. They're already lying to get in to
    serve this Country voluntarily, to defend this Country, and
    they have to lie to do it. I agree with the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen, who made the statement that--
    that's where I got the statement from--that they lied.
        So just keep that in mind as you go through your thoughts,
    General, and consider the decision.
        General Schwartz. I absolutely will, sir.
        Senator Burris. I appreciate that.
        Now, General, Scott Air Force Base is the home of three
    major commands, whose missions include providing strategic
    airlift and aerial medical operations in support of Iraq and
    Afghanistan. An increase in the missions and personnel on the
    base presents some challenges to providing base services down
    there. In your operations and maintenance request, what
    priorities did you have or did you give to the requirement for
    Scott Air Force Base in terms of the demands being placed on
    that facility?
        General Schwartz. Certainly, Scott Air Force Base, being
    the headquarters for both our Air Mobility Command and the
    Joint Transportation Command, is a location that has at least
    an equal distribution of our support dollars relative to other
    installations. A case in point is there's a new facility there
    at Scott which is absorbing one of the component commands of
    the Transportation Command, in this case the Army's component
    command, that moved to Scott as a result of base closure.
    There's a new facility, and there was a consolidation of
    Transportation Command elements from around the base, which
    were important. The opening, the grand opening, if you will,
    will occur in July of this year.
        Senator Burris. General, as I understand it, there are some
    construction projects that are underway, but there might be
    some delays. I just hope those are funded. I don't know whether
    or not, Mr. Secretary, but there is a need for covering some
    expansion, for the growth of the facilities and land
    acquisition down there. I hope that that's also covered in the
    2011 budget. Is that correct?
        General Schwartz. As the Secretary suggested, Senator
    Burris, we are tight on military construction. There's no
    question about that. This is a case of first priority. We will
    offer for you the exact profile of what's happening at Scott
    for the record, but I can assure you that with a unified
    command and an Air Force major command at that installation,
    they are getting at least equal treatment.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                            Scott Air Force Base, IL
                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Fiscal Year
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2007...............................  ADAL/TRANSCOM                  83.8
                                          Consolidation (BRAC).
    2007...............................  Addition To EOD                 0.9
                                          Facility.
    2007...............................  Contractor Logisitics           4.4
                                          Support Storage
                                          Facility.
    2007...............................  Dormitory (120 Rm)....         20.0
    2007...............................  Mobility AF(MAF)                8.8
                                          Logistics Support
                                          Cen(LSC), Phase II
                                          (BRAC).
    2007...............................  Squadron Operations            10.2
                                          Facility.
    2008...............................  Child Development               8.2
                                          Center.
    2008...............................  Construct Pavements             1.5
                                          And Grounds Facility.
    2008...............................  Security Forces                16.7
                                          Operations.
    2009...............................  USTRANSCOM Joint               14.0
                                          Intelligence
                                          Operations Center.
    2010...............................  Aeromedical Evacuation          7.4
                                          Faciuty.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Senator Burris. General, you mentioned something, because I
    was down at Scott and you talked about the school facilities,
    and we got a little bit more money for the impact that they
    would make. I was down there and saw what Scott Air Force Base
    is doing for the community of Mascoutah, IL, which is the
    closest school district to Scott Air Force Base. We actually
    dedicated or broke the ground for a new high school, and the
    colonel was there at the groundbreaking. The Scott Air Force
    Base personnel are very involved in the community, and that
    just really excited me, to see that type of support.
        General Schwartz. I would just emphasize, sir, that this is
    an example of a cooperative effort. It may be the lasting thing
    that comes out of our Year of the Air Force Family, is to make
    our installations more inviting, more accommodating to
    families, to make them magnets for folks that want to live at a
    place where they can still leave their doors unlocked, where
    their kids can be safe.
        Senator Burris. I wish that would happen. Don't come to
    Chicago.
        General Schwartz. I understand. But where kids can play,
    you don't have to fret, and you can get good education for your
    kids. We're working hard on it. That will be, I think, one of
    our lasting accomplishments.
        Senator Burris. I grew up about 30 miles from Scott Air
    Force Base. My hometown is Centralia. So I am really glad to
    see that the Air Force is doing a lot for that facility.
        Did you want to say something, Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Donley. Sir, I'd just like to follow up just very
    quickly, to reemphasize the point that you made and that
    Senator Hagan made about the Air Force support to operations in
    Haiti, and especially at Scott, the importance of the Tanker
    Airlift Control Center. It is playing a critical role right now
    in the surge and in helping Air Mobility Command and
    Transportation Command manage the tremendous pressure on the
    transportation system to deliver capabilities to theater. It's
    a tremendous capability.
        As we put the operation together in Haiti, it played a key
    role, along with our 1st Air Force and our 12th Air Force as
    well. It was a tremendous team effort across the Active and
    Reserve components as well. So Scott has played, and plays a
    critical role, and I believe does get good support from our Air
    Force.
        Senator Burris. Mr. Chairman, just one last question if I
    may, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Sure.
        Senator Burris. Thank you so much.
        I'm concerned about the cancellation of the C-17. Isn't
    that going to impact our readiness and our ability, because all
    those C-130s? I mean, I flew in one of those things in Iraq. It
    shook me to death. It was about 40 years old, and they're using
    spit, wire, and glue to keep the thing together. How are we
    going to be ready if we cancel the C-17? Please help me.
        General Schwartz. Sir, the C-130 that you flew on is a
    little different place in the inventory than the C-17s. The
    logic is that too much aluminum is as bad as not enough. By
    that, I'm saying if you have more airplanes than you need in a
    surge scenario, you are using resources and people in a way
    that, in a situation where you have limited resources, limited
    manpower, is not the most efficient way.
        Our view is that 223 C-17s is enough and that the remaining
    89-plus C-5s, which will be both re-engined and non-re-engined
    versions of the C-5, will satisfy the requirements that we have
    for surge transportation.
        Senator Burris. General, I'll just have to take your word
    for it. I'm concerned about our ability to transport our troops
    in the field with equipment that's not broken down and needing
    repairs.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
        General, first of all, Senator Burris' eloquent comments
    reflect my own views and a number of others, obviously not all
    the members of the committee. But in addition to taking to
    heart his heartfelt comments, I would also hope that, if you
    haven't already done so, you talk to some airmen who have been
    discharged solely because of their sexual orientation, who have
    led units and been highly decorated. I have met with those men
    and women, and I think it's just an unconscionable policy.
    Other allies of ours do not follow that policy and have had no
    problems of morale or cohesion.
        I would hope that you would, in addition, again listen very
    carefully to what Senator Burris' comments on our history were,
    that you would also take some time to talk to some of these
    discharged men and women. They'd be very happy to talk to you.
        Finally on that subject, while you're looking and
    determining whether there are any impacts from a change in
    policy, I also hope you give some thought to the unfairness
    that would be involved in discharging people now solely for
    sexual orientation while we're considering whether to end this
    policy. To me, it's just unconscionable that someone's going to
    be discharged next month for sexual orientation and nothing
    else if 6 months or 8 months from now, that person would not be
    discharged, and when we know that there is either likely to be
    a change or there's going to be a serious effort to make a
    change and when the Commander in Chief and the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs think it is wrong to discharge people solely for
    sexual orientation.
        I hope you would also give some thought to this interim
    issue as to whether we should not suspend the discharges while
    we are going or you are going through this process of assessing
    impacts. If you'd give that some thought, too, I'd appreciate
    it.
        Senator Burris, do you have any additional comments?
        Senator Burris. No.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. We will stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
                 alternate engine for the joint strike fighter
        1. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz,
    Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in his statement before the Senate
    Armed Services Committee on May 2, 2009, said, ``the facts and analysis
    simply do not support the case for adding an alternate engine program.
    There are several rationales for this conclusion: First, even after
    factoring in Congress' additional funding, the engine would still
    require a further investment of $2.5 billion over the next 5 years.
    Second, the additional costs are not offset by potential savings
    generated through competition.'' Secretary Gates cited additional
    factors before concluding that ``we have reached a critical point in
    this debate where spending more money on a second engine for the [F-35
    Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)] is unnecessary, wasteful, and simply
    diverts precious modernization funds from other more pressing
    priorities. Accordingly, should Congress add more funds to continue
    this unneeded program, I will strongly recommend that the President
    veto such legislation.'' Do you agree with the Secretary's conclusion
    that continued development of the alternate engine would be unnecessary
    and wasteful?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force supports
    Secretary Gates' conclusion to not pursue a competitive engine.
    Maintaining two engine suppliers will result in increased development,
    production, and support costs in the near-term. The Air Force maintains
    that the risks involved with a single engine supplier are acceptable,
    and savings associated with competition, which may be realized in the
    future, will not sufficiently offset the upfront development costs when
    competing against existing Department priorities. Recent experience
    with engine development for the F-22 and F/A-18/E/F indicates that sole
    source risks are modest and acceptable. Despite the recognized
    developmental issues and schedule delays experienced so far, the F135
    Pratt & Whitney engine continues to meet or exceed the stringent
    performance requirements associated with the F-35 propulsion system.

        2. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you
    also agree with the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
    office conclusion that even if Congress were to continue funding the
    development alternate engine, we have not yet passed the halfway mark
    in terms of the total funding the alternate engine would require before
    it could be competed against the current JSF engine?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. We agree with the CAPE
    office assessment that the program will require approximately $2.9
    billion to get to a competition culmination point. Their estimate
    includes development funding, but also considers the production funding
    necessary to perform directed buys and the support costs associated
    with maintaining the additional engine. It is reasonable to include all
    the costs associated with the alternate engine as the Services would
    incur these costs to continue the alternate engine program.

        3. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you
    support Secretary Gates' recommendation that the President veto any
    bill that contains funding for the alternate engine? Please explain.
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. We support the Secretary's
    decision not to pursue an alternate engine.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                               personnel training
        4. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley, our Nation and military must
    grow our foreign language capability. In a recent speech, you mentioned
    the Air Force Culture, Region, and Language Flight Plan as a means to
    help our airmen understand other cultures and languages. How will this
    plan address the development of language skills and cultural knowledge
    for our airmen to better perform warfighting and non-warfighting
    activities?
        Secretary Donley. The Air Force Culture, Region, and Language
    Flight Plan provides a framework to ensure our strategy, requirements,
    and force development policy and programming are synchronized to
    achieve the desired end-state of all airmen being developed and
    sustained with appropriate levels of culture, region, and language
    knowledge.
        The plan's overarching objective is to develop airmen capable of
    influencing the outcomes of U.S., allied, and coalition operations, and
    to maximize our operational capabilities through building partnerships.
    One of the ways we do this is by ensuring all airmen receive
    appropriate culture and language training prior to deployments.
    Specific to language skills, we will continue to focus on our
    cryptolinguist and regional affairs strategist capability, but we will
    also execute the Language Enabled Airmen Program. This program will
    build surge capability and ensure our ability to meet current taskings
    by building a ready foreign language capability across all specialties.
    Execution of the program will include identifying individuals with a
    propensity to study languages, based on overall academic standing,
    demonstrated foreign language proficiency and foreign language aptitude
    and motivation, through recruiting and U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA)
    and Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) commissioning
    programs, providing these individuals with initial and recurring
    training, and sustaining their capabilities throughout their career.
    These personnel will be utilized for missions across the spectrum, from
    building partnerships to combat. Additionally, all airmen are receiving
    culture education and training through professional military education
    as well as prior to deployments with the goal of developing cross-
    culturally competent airmen.

        5. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley, it is vitally important that
    our citizens, both in and out of uniform, understand the importance of
    saving, debt reduction, planning for retirement, and understanding
    investments. It is also important that our troops be protected from
    predatory practices of some companies that specifically target them.
    Can you tell me what the Air Force is doing to educate its members to
    become more financially literate?
        Secretary Donley. The Air Force recognizes that many airmen enter
    the Service young and with little to no prior financial education or
    training, making them vulnerable to financial difficulties. Because of
    this, we begin financial readiness training at Basic Military Training,
    instructing airmen on financial readiness fundamentals such as personal
    financial responsibility, budgeting, saving, and investing. New airmen
    are again given mandatory financial readiness training at their first
    duty station, including more in-depth discussions of saving and
    investment, estate planning, consumer protection, debt, credit
    management, and awareness of predatory trends and/or practices.
    Throughout their careers, airmen and their families are also eligible
    for one-on-one financial counseling services or topic seminars via our
    Airman and Family Readiness Centers which educates and assists with
    financial management needs by offering free training and counseling to
    help airmen and their families achieve their financial goals.
    Additionally, Air Force installations actively participate in ongoing
    financial awareness campaigns, such as Military Saves, to reinforce the
    message of responsible spending and saving. This year during Military
    Saves week, over 4,500 airmen took the ``Savers Pledge'' and
    participated in more than 100 financial presentations, seminars, and
    activities across the Air Force.

                       acquisition process and personnel
        6. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley, last April, Secretary Gates
    announced a multiyear plan to increase the Department of Defense (DOD)
    in-house acquisition workforce by 20,000. That number included an
    allocation of more than 4,800 positions for the Air Force, of which
    3,400 positions will come from contractor-to-civilian conversions. Such
    action is needed to reduce costs and increase efficiencies. Another way
    to address cost overruns is to limit the expansion of initial
    requirements and existing performance requirements for items that are
    obtained through the Air Force acquisition process. Can you give me an
    update on your hiring efforts, as well as any efforts to enhance the
    Air Force acquisition process to help prevent requirements expansion
    and obtain the best possible cost estimates?
        Secretary Donley. We started on our journey to strengthen the
    acquisition process back in September 2008. A major part of this
    endeavor was to ensure that we had the right number of people that were
    adequately trained and experienced to meet the acquisition mission
    demands in support of warfighter needs.
        To date, the Air Force has programmed over 5,200 new civilian
    acquisition workforce positions by the end of the Future Years Defense
    Plan (FYDP), starting with 1,100 civilian positions in fiscal year
    2010. With the help of Expedited Hiring Authority and the resources
    provided through Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, the
    Air Force has been and is projecting to be successful in both hiring
    this acquisition workforce growth and replenishing the normal
    workforce. Moreover, the Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP) directs the
    implementation of six actions to improve the requirements generation
    process and help prevent requirements expansion:

        1.  Ensure acquisition involvement and leadership in support of the
    lead command early in the development of program requirements;
        2.  Require that the Service Acquisition Executive and when
    appropriate, the Commander Air Force Materiel Command or Commander Air
    Force Space Command certify that the acquisition community can
    successfully fulfill the requirements in the warfighter command's
    requirements document;
        3.  Require the Program Executive Officers to coordinate the system
    requirements document used in conjunction with a Request for Proposal
    with the lead user Command Commander or his/her designee based on
    acquisition category level;
        4.  Carefully minimize the number of Key Performance Parameters
    (KPP) and other requirements to the appropriate level for each program,
    and ensure all requirements are finite, measurable, prioritized, and
    can be evaluated during a source selection;
        5.  Require consideration of incremental acquisition strategies
    that reduce cost, schedule, and technical risk, and produce operational
    capability earlier; and,
        6.  Freeze program requirements at contract award, and require
    subsequent changes to Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) KPPs be
    accompanied with adequate funding and schedule considerations that are
    reviewed and agreed upon by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and
    similarly require changes to other requirements be reviewed or proposed
    by the lead Major Command (MAJCOM) commanders (or his/her designee).

        These six AIP institutionalized improvements will continue to pay
    dividends for years to come.
        In addition, the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009
    requires that the Director, CAPE, and the Directors of DOD component
    cost agencies, state the confidence level used in establishing the cost
    estimate for MDAPs and Major Automated Information Systems programs,
    the rationale for selecting the confidence level, and if the confidence
    level is less than 80 percent, the justification for selecting the
    lower confidence level.

                             strategic capabilities
        7. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, it is
    crucial that America protect and defend its vital interests in the
    realm of cyberspace. A recent memorandum to all airmen stated that
    cyberspace is critical to today's fight and to the future U.S. military
    advantage over our adversaries. This memo also stated that the Air
    Force would provide a full spectrum of cyberspace capabilities to Joint
    Force Commanders whenever and wherever needed. What unique capabilities
    does the Air Force bring to this vital domain and are any additional
    resources required to help Joint Force Commanders fully confront the
    cyber-related challenges of today and tomorrow?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The U.S. Air Force is
    evolving and integrating the unique capabilities we bring to the Joint
    fight. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC), as the lead Air
    Force Major Command for cyber, has the following activities underway:

             Positioning the Air Force with enhanced and
            differentiated capabilities complementing those of our sister
            Services, executed through our 24th Air Force at Lackland AFB,
            TX.

                     The Air Force will seek to develop cyber
                    capabilities that complement those of other Services
                    and will explore the combination of cyber with other
                    non-kinetic capabilities to achieve synergies.
                     Assuring the mission by securing the Air Force
                    portion of DOD's information networks under one
                    commander, the 24th Air Force commander who is also the
                    Commander of Air Force Network Operations.
                     The Air Force will establish an integrated
                    cyber operations center that is fully integrated with
                    those of our joint partners to serve as the
                    intersection for a full range of cyber capabilities.

             Fusing cyber and intelligence functions to create
            seamless operations.

                     The Air Force will work to integrate space and
                    cyberspace indicators and warnings to develop an
                    advanced early warning architecture across the Air
                    Force information networks. Like offense and defense in
                    the other operational domains, operations and
                    intelligence in cyberspace must not be separated.

             Institutionalizing a cyber culture and mindset.

                     The Air Force is changing its cultural mindset
                    in the day-to-day execution of cyber operations. The
                    importance of cultivating a new mindset demands a
                    fundamental shift in leadership that encourages
                    creative, yet critical thinking, and rewards innovative
                    activities and solutions. Cyberspace does not function
                    independently of other capabilities provided by the Air
                    Force or other DOD agencies. In addition, we are
                    working to integrate cyberspace into permanent doctrine
                    development, accession and advanced training,
                    professional military education, exercises, wargames,
                    recruitment, and day-to-day operations.

             The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request
            appropriately funds and resources Air Force priorities in this
            domain and places us on the correct path to increase the
            Nation's capacity and capability in cyber.

        8. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, it is my
    understanding that China is investing heavily in fourth-generation
    fighters and advanced surface-to-air missiles. F-22s are being phased
    into U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). F-22s are in Alaska and are
    scheduled to be at Hickam Air Force Base (AFB) in Hawaii in the future.
    Can you discuss the importance of having these assets in the Pacific
    given recent developments in the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR)?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. As the threats in the
    Pacific theater continue to mature, our F-22s in Alaska already provide
    essential fifth generation capability to PACOM. Additionally, those
    soon to be delivered to Hawaii will add to this capability. Future F-35
    procurement is vitally important to ensure sufficient Joint air
    dominance in the event of a contingency. Finally, forward basing of F-
    22s in the Pacific AOR provides the PACOM commander rapid access to
    critical fifth generation capability.

        9. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, please
    provide an update on the Hickam AFB schedule for F-22s.
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The transition to the F-22
    Raptor at Hickam AFB is on track. Hawaii's F-15 mission is drawing down
    this year to support the F-22 build up starting this fall. The Hawaii
    Air National Guard (ANG) will receive 20 F-22s from Langley AFB, VA,
    with the first 2 aircraft arriving in July 2010. The remaining aircraft
    will arrive throughout calendar year 2011.

                       active duty and guard cooperation
        10. Senator Akaka. General Schwartz, the current mission of the
    Active Duty 15th Airlift Wing is to partner with the ANG in Hawaii to
    provide strategic and tactical airlift capability to support local and
    worldwide missions of combat support and humanitarian or disaster
    relief. How has this partnership effort between Active Duty and the ANG
    worked?
        General Schwartz. The Total Force partnership between the 15th
    Airlift Wing and the 154th Wing is working effectively. These airmen's
    collaborative efforts have supported strategic and tactical airlift in
    response to recent short-notice humanitarian relief efforts, flying
    Operation Pacific Wave missions to aid tsunami-stricken American Samoa
    and Operation Unified Response missions supporting earthquake-ravaged
    Haiti. These missions delivered key personnel and 1.7 million pounds of
    vital relief supplies and equipment. The association was also able to
    provide airlift for the recent Pacific Angel humanitarian deployment,
    further developing Pacific Air Forces and PACOM building partnership
    capacity programs. Additionally, the wings teamed to support critical
    combat missions sustaining Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, and
    support Theater Security Cooperation exercises Cope Tiger in Thailand,
    Talisman Saber in Australia, and Cope India. With the current surge
    operation in Afghanistan, the partnership between the two wings has
    enabled Pacific Air Forces to fully support increased future
    requirements from U.S. Transportation Command. The success of this
    partnership was further evidenced during the preparations for and
    execution of the 2009 joint 15th Airlift Wing and 154th Wing
    Operational Readiness Inspection, where both wings received
    ``Excellent'' ratings, validating their wartime readiness.

        11. Senator Akaka. General Schwartz, what are some of the
    challenges that remain in partnering Active Duty and ANG forces?
        General Schwartz. The partnership between the Air Force's Active
    and Reserve components has made good progress in the recent past;
    however, partnering challenges still exist. Within the fiscally
    constrained budget, prioritization and reallocation of scarce manpower
    and equipment resources is difficult. The Air Force is carefully
    analyzing a number of factors with respect to future partnering
    opportunities, with the goal of optimizing our delivery of combat
    capability to the joint team.
                                     ______

               Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
                              c-135 sustainability
        12. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the
    next generation tanker program aims to recapitalize nearly half of your
    aging tanker fleet by 2020. What effects will significantly reducing
    the size of the KC-135 fleet have on the long-term sustainment and
    affordability of the remaining KC-135 tankers, as well as your other
    remaining C-135 class aircraft?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Based on the fiscal year
    2011 President's budget, we expect the delivery of 79 KC-X aircraft
    between 2015 and 2020. We have not programmed the retirement of any KC-
    135s as we receive KC-X aircraft. The Aerospace Maintenance and
    Regeneration Group and Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center are in the
    process of conducting a 6-year tear-down study on three retired KC-135
    aircraft to identify future sustainment and modification costs for the
    remaining KC-135s in the inventory. The study focuses on identification
    of structural integrity and corrosion issues. Upon completion of this
    study in fiscal year 2015, we will have a more complete picture of
    future sustainment costs and a stronger basis for programming future
    KC-135 retirements as KC-X enters the inventory.

        13. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as
    you field next generation tankers, do you have an estimated timeline
    and strategy for how the ANG units that have KC-135s will be rolled
    into the fielding plan?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Basing locations for the
    next generation tanker are dependent upon results of the Air Force
    strategic basing process. The Air Force is accomplishing an
    ``Enterprise-Wide Look'' for the basing of the new Tanker aircraft to
    ensure an objective review of all potential operational and training
    basing options. Air Mobility Command (AMC), as the lead major command,
    is developing operational and training criteria that, upon approval by
    the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
    will be used to evaluate all Air Force installations. The first phase
    of the tanker operational and training basing criteria should be
    completed and released in the coming months. Based on the results of
    these initial efforts, the Air Force plans to announce the preferred
    alternative locations by late summer of 2011 with a final basing
    decision expected in fall 2012.

                                 human capital
        14. Senator Ben Nelson. General Schwartz, from a human capital
    perspective, one of the biggest challenges facing the Services will be
    managing expanding and new missions while maintaining a fixed end-
    strength. The Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
    mission is an area that is seeing a great deal of growth across all of
    the Services due in large part to the significant expansion of unmanned
    aerial vehicles (UAV) or remotely piloted aircraft. What is the current
    state of your training pipeline for operators and analysts?
        General Schwartz. The Air Force continues to use all available
    resources to meet training requirements as we surge to meet the 65 MQ-
    1/9 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) goal by the fourth quarter of fiscal year
    2013. In addition to continuing to crossflow experienced aviators from
    other airframes into the MQ-1 and MQ-9, we have begun providing
    Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) assignments to our new Specialized
    Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) graduates.
        Last year, the Air Force also initiated a test program to train
    non-SUPT graduates in RPA employment. This program is geared towards
    taking officers without aviation experience and training them to employ
    an RPA, and will reduce the need to use experienced aviators as RPA
    pilots by developing a core group of officers dedicated to this career
    field. Our first group of graduates has successfully completed the
    required training to become RPA pilots and some have begun flying
    operational sorties. The Air Force is currently reviewing the first
    group's performance.
        Our analyst training is also at surge capacity and is supported by
    active duty and ANG trainers. Training occurs at Goodfellow AFB, TX
    with crypto linguists attending the Defense Language Institute in
    Monterey, CA, prior to arriving at Goodfellow. After qualification from
    the basic course, Initial Mission Qualification training will occur
    either at Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) Formal
    Training Units (FTU), Goodfellow AFB, and/or at their first duty
    location.

        15. Senator Ben Nelson. General Schwartz, how are you expanding ISR
    and UAV training to meet demand?
        General Schwartz. The Air Force continues to use all available
    resources to meet training requirements as we surge to meet the 65 MQ-
    1/9 CAP goal by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013. In 2005, the
    FTU at Creech AFB trained 40 crews. In recent years, the Air Force has
    opened FTUs at both March AFB and Holloman AFB to increase the
    throughput to 400 crews a year starting in fiscal year 2011.

        16. Senator Ben Nelson. General Schwartz, what kind of retention
    rates are you seeing in UAV pilot and sensor operators and intelligence
    analyst specialties?
        General Schwartz. The UAV [now classified as the Remotely Piloted
    Aircraft (RPA)] pilots do not yet have a core ID with which to track
    retention because this career field is very new. Historically, 68
    percent of all rated officers at the 8-year point will stay through
    their 14th year of service. We will closely follow the RPA force as
    these operators progress through their careers.
        The RPA Sensor Operator career field was created at the end of
    April 2009, and the first class of non-prior service airmen graduated
    in December 2009. Retention data for the career field will not be
    available until late 2010 or early 2011. The sensor operator career
    field is being manned as quickly as possible given its vital nature to
    the Air Force's ISR mission.
        The career field most heavily involved in RPA intelligence analysis
    currently is the Geospatial Intelligence Analyst career field; it is
    currently at 108 percent of its retention goal.

                               unmanned aircraft
        17. Senator Ben Nelson. General Schwartz, with regard to mission
    effectiveness, how are you coordinating efforts with the Army to
    integrate your unmanned and manned aircraft with their growing fleet of
    medium altitude UAVs into concept of operations that will ensure safe
    and effective mission execution?
        General Schwartz. All aviation operations--manned and unmanned; Air
    Force, Army, Navy, Marine or Coalition--are coordinated with the
    Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) using Joint doctrine
    procedures to ensure safe mission execution. Joint Doctrine also
    addresses effective mission execution, and the processes to provide and
    prioritize the CFACC allocated assets. With regard to unmanned assets,
    Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Air Force Air Combat
    Command (ACC) signed the Army-Air Force Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
    Enabling Concept document that describes how the Services will
    integrate theater-capable, multi-role unmanned aircraft. This document
    will be added to the existing Joint Concept of Operations for UASs
    which was published by Joint Forces Command. To further increase the
    Air Force's direct contribution to ground forces, we have deployed
    additional ISR liaison officers with our Expeditionary Air Support
    Operations Squadrons--the units we assign to provide tactical command
    and control of air power and liaison between the CFACC and directly
    supported Army field units. These individuals provide greater expertise
    in ISR operations to assist Army commanders with the planning and
    execution of their missions.

        18. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Donley, what process does the DOD
    have to produce a comprehensive plan to integrate policy and
    requirements across the Services for unmanned aircraft programs?
        Secretary Donley. The responsible organization for DOD policy and
    requirements integration for unmanned programs is the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition (USD [AT&L]). USD (AT&L) established the UAS
    Task Force (and subordinate Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)) to focus
    on policy and requirements in the areas of airspace integration,
    interoperability, frequency and bandwidth, payloads and sensors, and
    research and engineering. The Air Force participates in the working
    groups (and leads several IPTs).
        Additionally, we developed an Air Force UAS Flight Plan to harness
    the increasing automation, modularity, and sustainability of unmanned
    systems to maximize combat capabilities for the Joint Force. Our Flight
    Plan vision is to collaborate with the other Services, our Allies,
    academia, and industry to capitalize on the unique unmanned aircraft
    attributes of persistence, connectivity, flexibility, autonomy, and
    efficiency, and work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
    to chart a course to address the future requirements of combatant
    commanders.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
                           readiness and maintenance
        19. Senator Bayh. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, in the
    fiscal year 2011 budget request unfunded priorities list (UPL), you
    have included $337.2 million for depot maintenance activities such as
    service life extension programs (SLEPs), special structural
    inspections, and engine overhauls. I commend you for placing an
    emphasis on improving readiness and vital depot maintenance
    requirements across the Active Duty, Air Force Reserve (AFR), and ANG
    forces. However, even if the Air Force's unfunded maintenance
    priorities and weapon system sustainment programs were fully funded,
    the result would still be well below 100 percent of needed funding.
    Even with baseline, overseas contingency operations (OCO), and UPL
    funding, Air Force depots would still only be funded at 84 percent for
    the Active component, 89 percent for the ANG, and 90 percent for the
    AFR component. How much risk are we accepting by not fully funding our
    maintenance requirements and do the depots have the capacity to accept
    and execute 100 percent of the Air Force's maintenance requirements?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. With the requested UPL and
    OCO funds, 85 percent of the Air Force Weapon System Sustainment
    requirement is funded. The remaining 15 percent equates to $2.0 billion
    in unfunded requirements, which represents a manageable level of risk
    in the form of materiel readiness. This $2.0 billion includes a mix of
    Depot Purchase Equipment Maintenance (DPEM), Contract Logistics
    Support, Sustaining Engineering, and Technical Order requirements. This
    risk is mitigated through enterprise-wide prioritization to fund the
    highest priority platforms/systems in year of execution.
        Between contract and organic capabilities, Air Force can execute
    100 percent of the required funding; however, depots would need time to
    ramp up to address manpower, infrastructure, and parts constraints. In
    addition, the Air Force would not be able to complete all funded work
    in fiscal year 2011 (causing a temporary increase in carryover), and
    this effort would require careful balancing to maintain compliance with
    legislation (50/50 + DPEM floor).

        20. Senator Bayh. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what are
    the risks in terms of long-term sustainment, reduction of the expected
    service life, and the burden of increased flying hours related to
    combat operations in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. There is manageable risk in
    terms of long-term sustainment, reduction of the expected service life,
    and the burden of increased flying hours related to combat operations
    in Afghanistan. With few exceptions (e.g. sand damage/foreign object
    damage and increased engine overhauls), the Air Force does not have a
    precise means of attributing increased maintenance due to contingency
    operations. We are, however, seeing depot-level workload increases
    above planned work packages.

        21. Senator Bayh. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the Navy
    has issues with deferred maintenance and currently has a backlog of
    depot maintenance. Does the Air Force have a similar backlog?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force does not
    currently have an issue with deferred depot-level maintenance, as
    defined as maintenance that was: not performed when it should have been
    or when it was scheduled, and which therefore, is put off or delayed.
    We currently have a manageable backlog of maintenance work at our three
    Air Logistics Centers. Backlog is a different management category than
    deferred maintenance.
        The Air Force made decisions not to perform some depot-level
    maintenance on aircraft targeted for retirement and defer depot-level
    maintenance on aircraft required to support on-going contingency
    operations. These decisions are made in accordance with applicable
    guidance and technical data. Additionally, aircraft waived from depot
    maintenance due to operations are reinserted into the Programmed Depot
    Maintenance schedule as soon as possible.

        22. Senator Bayh. General Schwartz, why is depot maintenance
    funding critical to the Air Force's mission and what are the specific
    impacts of not receiving the fiscal year 2011 unfunded depot
    maintenance requirements?
        General Schwartz. Depot maintenance funding is a critical component
    of the Air Force Weapon System Sustainment (WSS) strategy. Underfunding
    creates potential aircraft/engine deferrals and backlogs, and impacts
    aircraft availability required by warfighters. Funds to support OCOs
    and funds to support UPL requirements help mitigate this risk. The Air
    Force requested $337.2 million in UPL funding to fund additional
    aircraft Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDMs) and engine overhauls.
    Specifically, the UPL is programmed to fund 16 aircraft PDMs, 6 engine
    overhauls, and Air Force Space Command software maintenance
    requirements.

        23. Senator Bayh. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what are
    the impacts to Air Force readiness if you do not receive unfunded
    aircraft depot maintenance requirements in fiscal year 2011?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Depot maintenance funding is
    a critical component of the Air Force WSS strategy. Underfunding
    creates potential for aircraft and engine deferrals, and thereby a
    potential decrease in aircraft availability for the warfighter.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                          initial operating capability
        24. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, when
    Secretary Gates testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in
    February 2010, he said that the JSF program is holding schedule in
    terms of when the Services can expect to take delivery of fighters with
    ``initial operating capability'' (IOC). However, just a couple of days
    ago, you announced that the Air Force would be extending that IOC date
    from 2013 to 2015. To me, that suggests that even over the last few
    weeks the amount of risk associated with the program was probably not
    fully appreciated. Please explain what the current expected IOC date is
    and why the Air Force is extending that IOC date from what was
    announced just weeks ago.
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The IOC date for the Air
    Force is still being evaluated in light of the program restructure, but
    is currently estimated to be in 2016. The Air Force is extending the
    expected IOC date because it is closely associated with Block 3
    capability that will not complete operational testing until early 2016.
    The Air Force still expects to receive its first operational F-35 in
    2013.

        25. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how many
    fighters with IOC will be delivered to the Air Force at the new IOC
    date and exactly what kind of capability will they have?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. If the President's budget is
    supported by Congress, the Air Force will have approximately 102 F-35
    Block 3 aircraft by the end of 2015, including 12 aircraft that will be
    used for operational test.

        26. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
    effect, if any, will this decision have on the unit cost of buying the
    Air Force's version of the JSF?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. None. IOC is not a factor in
    the unit cost of the aircraft.

        27. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
    effect, if any, will this decision have on the Air Force's anticipated
    fighter shortfall?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The delayed F-35 IOC will
    minimally impact the Air Force's anticipated fighter shortfall. As
    reported in the Air Force's Report to the Congressional Defense
    Committees, House Report 2647 (Public Law 111-84) Sec 1075 (Fighter
    Force Structure Shortfalls), the Air Force is investigating actions to
    increase the service lives of our A-10 and F-16 fleets which are the
    legacy aircraft the F-35 is intended to replace. The Air Force has
    already taken the required steps, to include full scale fatigue testing
    and ``thick skin'' wing replacement to ensure our A-10 fleet will
    remain viable until the year 2030. The Air Force is also conducting
    full scale fatigue testing to determine the feasibility and cost-
    benefit of extending our F-16 Block 40s and 50s beyond their current
    estimated service life.

        28. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, looking
    ahead, exactly what milestones do you believe the Joint Program Office
    and prime contractor must complete on time and on budget to achieve the
    Air Force's IOC date?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. In order to achieve the Air
    Force's IOC date, the Joint Program Office and prime contractor must,
    first and foremost, deliver the test and production aircraft as
    currently planned. In addition, they must successfully complete
    developmental test for the program, releasing and testing each
    increment of capability (i.e. Block 1, Block 2, or Block 3) on time.
    This on time delivery will allow the Air Force to successfully complete
    operational test.

                                  cost growth
        29. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you
    expect that additional cost growth in the JSF program arising from
    Secretary Gates' decision to restructure the program in December 2009
    will trigger a Nunn-McCurdy breach? Please explain your answer.
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The restructure was
    accomplished under the premise that the program was already going to
    experience a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach. The restructure was designed
    to baseline the program to a higher confidence cost and schedule and
    mitigate future cost and schedule increases by properly resourcing the
    program. As noted in the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report the program
    added development and procurement risk funding consistent with the
    Joint Estimate Team assessment, including less airframe commonality
    than originally envisioned. Also, the planned Multi-Year Procurement
    was delayed to 2016, and the production quantities were updated to
    reflect DOD and International Partner procurements. We believe these
    actions should result in an executable cost and schedule and thus an
    executable program.

        30. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, after
    the breach, how much will it cost per unit to buy the Air Force's
    variant of the JSF?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. As reported in the 2009
    Selected Acquisition Report, the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC)
    for a Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) is $71 million in Base
    Year 2002 dollars. However, consistent with Nunn-McCurdy statutory
    requirements, a complete Independent Cost Estimate is in process. The
    Department expects this analysis will result in increases to the stated
    Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) and APUC estimates. The projected
    range of estimates for all variants are $97-$115 million PAUC and $79-
    95 million APUC in Base Year 2002 dollars.

                         testing and engineering issues
        31. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, Naval Air Systems Command
    (NAVAIR) effectively determined a few weeks ago that the Marine Corps
    and the Navy's version of JSF might end up being too expensive to
    operate, with each flight hour ultimately costing about $31,000,
    compared with about $19,000 per flight hour for current F/A-18 Hornets
    and AV-8B Harriers. Have you independently reviewed and validated
    NAVAIR's analysis, and if so, do you agree with its finding on expected
    operating costs?
        General Schwartz. The Naval Air Systems Command cost team brief on
    total ownership costs was developed to inform leadership of ongoing
    technical analyses, and provide options and consequences as we work to
    deliver affordable programs. In a program such as the JSF, these
    analyses are constantly evolving. The brief is an internal pre-
    decisional document and provides points for discussion in support of
    achieving successful and affordable fielding of all variants of the
    JSF.
        As the CTOL variant of the F-35 transitions to developmental
    testing, the Air Force is conducting necessary assessments to ensure
    readiness to affordably support introduction of this critical
    capability, including reviewing the NAVAIR brief and its implications
    for the CTOL. Deployment and sustainment plans are being reviewed to
    identify cost drivers and develop mitigation strategies. All elements
    of operating and support cost are under thorough review, including
    those driven by program requirements as well as the effects of changes
    in the global aerospace industry.

        32. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what does the NAVAIR analysis
    mean for the Air Force's JSF program?
        General Schwartz. The Naval Air Systems Command cost team brief on
    total ownership costs was developed to inform leadership of ongoing
    technical analyses and provide options and consequences as we work to
    deliver affordable programs. In a program such as the JSF, these
    analyses are constantly evolving. The brief is an internal pre-
    decisional document, and provides points for discussion in support of
    achieving successful and affordable fielding of all variants of the
    JSF.
        As the CTOL variant of the F-35 transitions to developmental
    testing, the Air Force is conducting necessary assessments to ensure
    readiness to affordably support introduction of this critical
    capability. This includes reviewing the NAVAIR brief and its
    implications for the CTOL. Deployment and sustainment plans are being
    reviewed to identify cost drivers and develop mitigation strategies.
    Additionally, all elements of operating and support cost are under
    thorough review, including those driven by program requirements as well
    as the effects of changes in the global aerospace industry.

        33. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what is being done to
    mitigate the potential JSF flight hour costs going forward?
        General Schwartz. As the CTOL variant of the F-35 transitions to
    developmental testing, the Air Force is conducting necessary
    assessments to ensure readiness to affordably support introduction of
    this critical capability, including reviewing the NAVAIR brief and its
    implications for the CTOL. Additionally, we are reviewing deployment
    and sustainment plans to identify cost drivers and develop mitigation
    strategies. All elements of operating and support cost are under
    thorough review, including those driven by program requirements, as
    well as the effects of changes in the global aerospace industry.

                  air force requirement for tactical fighters
        34. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, with the Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR) now complete, what is the Air Force's current total
    requirement for tactical fighters?
        General Schwartz. The Air Force reviewed its force structure
    requirements following the QDR. The Air Force requires approximately
    1,200 Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory/2,000 Total Active Inventory
    to meet the National Defense Strategy objectives at a moderate level of
    risk.

        35. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what is the Air Force's total
    requirement for JSF?
        General Schwartz. The Air Force's total requirement for JSF remains
    unchanged with a planned buy of 1,763 CTOL F-35As. This inventory was
    determined during the 1997 QDR, and reconfirmed during the 2006 and
    2010 QDRs. These F-35As will replace our aging fleets of F-16s and A-
    10s, which are approaching the end of their Economic Service Life
    (ESL). In addition, the Air Force has included sufficient numbers of
    aircraft for homeland defense missions, initial aircrew and maintenance
    training, United States Air Force Weapons School and advanced tactics
    training, follow-on capability testing and validation, and program life
    cycle attrition.

                             military construction
        36. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, the President's budget
    request for fiscal year 2011 contains three military construction
    projects for the Air Force totaling over $76 million that will support
    the stationing of JSF squadrons in 2013. Does the potential slippage of
    JSF IOC dates affect the timing that these projects will need? Please
    explain your answer.
        Secretary Donley. The three fiscal year 2011 JSF Military
    Construction (MILCON) projects will not be early to need. Aircraft
    delivery schedule slippage affects aircraft delivered to the second
    operations and third training location and beyond. The three fiscal
    year 2011 projects are needed to stand up the first operations and
    second training locations, which will have their first F-35s delivered
    in calendar year 2013.

        37. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, does the slippage affect the
    date for which the Air Force has targeted for the completion of the
    environmental impact study (EIS) and records of decision regarding
    bases for training and operations of Active and ANG personnel? Please
    explain your answer.
        Secretary Donley. The IOC slippage does not affect the EIS and
    Record of Decision (ROD) timeline because they are required to support
    the MILCON timeline necessary for receipt and beddown of the first
    operational and training F-35 aircraft. The first operational aircraft
    will be delivered to the first operational location in the summer of
    2013. The 25 Air Force training aircraft for Eglin AFB or the first
    aircraft for the second training location will be delivered fall 2013.
    fiscal year 2011 MILCON is required to support beddown at these to-be-
    determined locations. This requires the operations and training
    locations be announced by operations and training EIS RODs in January/
    February 2011.

                            earned value management
        38. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    indicated, the earned value management (EVM) system is the best way of
    managing cost and schedule on major weapon systems. I understand that
    DOD has had major problems with the JSF prime contractor's EVM system
    and has held out the possibility of decertifying that system (thereby
    disabling the contractor from being able to obtain new defense
    contracts) if it does not demonstrate progress that it was fixing
    documented deficiencies. What is your assessment of the prime
    contractor's EVM system and how close is DOD to formally allowing the
    Defense Contract Management Agency to decertify the system pending a
    demonstration of progress in fixing documented deficiencies?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force is committed
    to obtaining and using quality earned value information as the best way
    for the Government and Contractors to manage cost and schedule on major
    weapons systems. We support OSD as they determine if the concerns
    warrant de-certification.

                 overseas contingency operations budget request
        39. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, among
    the items in the fiscal year 2011 OCOs Supplemental Budget Request is a
    request for one JSF aircraft. I understand that this aircraft is
    intended to replace an F-15E fighter plane from the 336th Fighter
    Squadron that crashed while conducting combat operations in eastern
    Afghanistan in July 2009. I also understand that the existing ground
    rules for determining what projects can be funded with the supplemental
    allow for the replacement of combat equipment because of loss during
    combat operations. Nevertheless, I have been told that because the Air
    Force can no longer procure F-15E aircraft from the prime contractor,
    you elected to procure a fighter aircraft currently in production.
        I am troubled by this request. This JSF request in the supplemental
    should be included in the base budget--not the supplemental. The JSF
    aircraft you are proposing to buy here will cost $205 million. That is
    about double what I understand the unit cost of a JSF to be (about $100
    million) and considerably more expensive than how much it costs to buy
    one F-15E. More importantly, the very earliest that the Air Force can
    accept delivery of a JSF with IOC will be 2013, with development not
    expected to be completed until a few years later. Exactly why is the
    Air Force asking $205 million for that one JSF aircraft in the
    supplemental?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. In early summer 2009 we were
    asked to provide an estimate for a fiscal year 2011 OCO F-35 aircraft.
    At that time, the estimate was $204.9 million. This cost control was
    subsequently used to develop the detailed cost breakout that appeared
    in DOD's fiscal year 2011 PB Justification. If Congress approves the
    additional OCO aircraft, the unit cost for 23 aircraft (fiscal year
    2011 22 aircraft plus 1 OCO aircraft) would be approximately $182.5
    million. OCO funds appropriated above this amount will be used for
    initial spares associated with the OCO F-35. The table below reflects
    the numbers which were submitted in the fiscal year 2011 PB
    documentation for the base and OCO request, and what the OCO numbers
    should have been in the documentation for the same weapon system unit
    cost ($182.5 million).

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Docs (As
                                                                          Submitted)                Fiscal Year 2011
                                                            --------------------------------------  OCO Should Read

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Proc Quantity..........................................          22 (base)            1 (OCO)            1 (OCO)
    Cost (in millions of dollars)..........................             3729.2              204.9              170.8
    Advance Proc Cost......................................              257.0                                  11.7
    Weapon System Cost.....................................             3986.2              204.9              182.5
    Initial Spares.........................................              263.6                                  22.4
    Total Proc Cost........................................             4249.8              204.9              204.9
    Weapon Sys Unit Cost...................................              182.5              204.9              182.5
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        40. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, would
    you agree that the ground rules for determining what projects can be
    funded with the supplemental were never intended for the DOD to replace
    combat loss with a system that will not--for at least another 6 years--
    be fully integrated and capable with all the weapons systems and
    sensors needed to serve in a combat role?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. OSD/Office of Management and
    Budget (OMB) policy is that DOD may request replacements for combat
    losses. If the original item is currently in production it should be
    used as the replacement. If not, an upgraded capability may be
    requested if it provides replacement capability for the combat loss.

        41. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, will
    supplemental funds be used in the future to fund JSF requests?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. If future OMB and OSD
    direction remains consistent with the fiscal years 2011-2015 OSD
    Integrated Program and Budget Submission Guidance, and additional
    aircraft are lost in combat, we will request supplemental funds for
    future JSF procurements that meet these combat loss replacement
    criteria.

        42. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as a
    cost effective alternative to buying a JSF aircraft here and to ensure
    timely fielding of needed strike fighter capability in the combat
    theater, did you explore the possibility of ``refixing'' a legacy F-15E
    intended for retirement, or one that has actually been retired--under,
    for example, the Air Force's Combat Air Forces Restructure Plan?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The F-15Es are some of the
    newest fighters in the Air Force active inventory. We have not retired
    nor do we plan to retire any for the foreseeable future. Additionally,
    the Air Force is making investments in F-15E modernization to ensure
    its combat capability well into the future.

                  air force 2010 force structure announcement
        43. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, on June 26, 2009, the Air
    Force formally announced force structure realignments for fiscal year
    2010, which outlined increases and decreases to manpower at units
    around the country. It contained the following announcement for the
    Arizona ANG at Davis-Monthan AFB: ``The 214th Reconnaissance Group has
    an increase of 217 drill positions to meet validated [Predator UAV] MQ-
    1 shortfalls. Total impact is an increase of 217 drill positions.''
    From this statement, the Air Force clearly identified a need to meet
    validated MQ-1 mission shortfalls. Can you describe the nature and
    details of the validated MQ-1 shortfall that was described in the
    announcement?
        General Schwartz. The Air Force fiscal year 2010 Force Structure
    Announcement (fiscal year 2010 FSA) released in June of 2009 included
    information on MQ-1 manpower changes at the 214th Reconnaissance Group.
    The impact to ANG units as a result of the Combat Air Force restructure
    was minimal and did not require a manpower adjustment to the 214th RG.
    The unit is currently manned to their program of record, which is to
    support one steady-state CAP and zero surge CAPs (``1+0''); they have
    sufficient manning for that requirement. For the past 2 years, the
    214th RG has volunteered to ``surge'' to a second MQ-1 CAP, and have
    done an extraordinary job in doing so. As additional ANG units
    transition to MQ-1 operations, the 214th RG will return to normal
    operations.

        44. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, given the extremely high
    demand placed on personnel in MQ-1 squadrons, are these units
    adequately and uniformly manned across the Air Force?
        General Schwartz. The Air Force is working to fill every available
    Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) pilot and sensor operator training slot
    to meet mission requirements. Unit manning (as of 4 Mar 10) is provided
    below. Low numbers in some units are due to recent unit activations,
    increased manpower requirements, and/or limited training availability.
    These numbers will steadily increase as requirements stabilize, and
    more pilots and sensor operators complete training. In addition to the
    units listed below, six ANG and Air Force Reserve units are in the
    process of activation.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Location                      Unit              Position        Authorized    Assigned     Percent
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Creech AFB......................  11 Recon Sq........  Pilot.............          44           36           82
                                                           Sensor Operator...          59           68          115
                                     -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      15 Recon Sq........  Pilot.............          86           57           66
                                                           Sensor Operator...         126          131          104
                                     -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      17 Recon Sq........  Pilot.............          92           72           78
                                                           Sensor Operator...         110          110          100
                                     -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      30 Recon Sq........  Pilot.............          29           17           59
                                                           Sensor Operator...          54           31           57
                                     -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      42 Attack Sq.......  Pilot.............          89           47           53
                                                           Sensor Operator...         133          102           77
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Cannon AFB......................  3 Spec Ops Sq......  Pilot.............         103          118          115
                                                           Sensor Operator...         128          136          106
                                     -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      33 Spec Ops Sq.....  Pilot.............          37           27           73
                                                           Sensor Operator...          51           34           67
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Holloman AFB....................  6 Recon Sq.........  Pilot.............          41           13           32
                                                           Sensor Operator...          53           23           43
                                     -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      29 Attack Sq.......  Pilot.............          41           22           54
                                                           Sensor Operator...          54           36           67
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        45. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, other than adding manpower to
    the 214th, what is the Air Force doing to address this issue of high
    demand on MQ-1 squadron personnel?
        General Schwartz. The MQ-1 personnel are in high demand and will
    continue to be so as we expand to 65 MQ-1/9 CAPs. The Air Force has
    planned ahead to mitigate this increased demand in three ways. First,
    we have increased our MQ-1 combat capability by increasing the size and
    numbers of units. In addition to manning increases at the 214th at
    Davis-Monthan, five other ANG and Air Force Reserve MQ-1/9 units have
    been or are being stood up. Second, we have increased the MQ-1 training
    pipeline with the start of the new FTU at Holloman in October 2009,
    which graduated its first class in December. Third, while ANG and AFRC
    MQ-1 individuals were mobilized through December 2009, we will continue
    to support surge CAPs through volunteerism and active duty augmentation
    through December 2010 to minimize involuntary mobilizations.

        46. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what is the status of the
    action for the 214th and when will the positions be filled?
        General Schwartz. The reference to an increase of 217 drill
    positions for the 214th Reconnaissance Group in the fiscal year 2010
    Force Structure Announcement (fiscal year 2010 FSA) was an error--those
    positions were not placed on the unit's manning document and were a
    direct result of attempting to mitigate the loss of manpower due to a
    fiscal year 2010 Combat Air Forces restructure proposal affecting
    Arizona that was not enacted. The unit is currently manned to their
    program of record, which is to support one steady-state CAP and zero
    surge CAPs (``1+0''); current manning is sufficient for that
    requirement.

        47. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what process does the Air
    Force undertake to ensure that Force Structure Announcements are
    accurate and definitive?
        General Schwartz. The Air Force goes through a very detailed and
    deliberate process to ensure Force Structure Announcements are
    accurate. The major commands submit manpower and aircraft moves for
    every Air Force installation to Headquarters Air Force. The major
    commands' inputs are compiled into a single draft document, checked for
    consistency, and then briefed to the Strategic Basing Executive
    Steering Group and Air Force Board. The proposed final Force Structure
    Announcement is then staffed through every major headquarters staff
    directorate and the major commands to ensure accuracy and completeness.
    Finally, the Force Structure Announcement is approved by both the
    Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force prior to
    public release.

                          international pilot training
        48. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, many of our allies choose to
    conduct fighter pilot training here in the United States for various
    reasons ranging from the availability of adequate ranges to cost and
    the quality of training. This obviously affords the Air Force an
    outstanding opportunity to partner and train with NATO and other allied
    pilots. I am proud to note that most of this training is conducted by
    the Arizona ANG at the 162nd Fighter Wing operating out of Tucson
    International Airport, AZ. How is the process supposed to work for a
    partner nation's selection of the best location among candidate bases?
        Secretary Donley. The US Air Force provides tuition-based pilot
    training at 14 locations, and each location, with the exception of
    undergraduate pilot training, is the sole provider of tuition-based
    training for a particular aircraft. For example, all F-16 tuition-based
    training is done at Tucson ANGB, AZ, through the 162nd Fighter Wing and
    their assigned F-16 aircraft and instructor pilots.
        When a partner nation desires to beddown its own aircraft at a
    CONUS AFB, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International
    Affairs (SAF/IA) provides options based on the country's requested
    training needs and budgetary requirements. When presented with
    available locations, training capabilities, and pricing information, we
    expect the partner nation to choose the training venue that best meets
    their needs. The U.S. Air Force is committed to providing the most
    effective training venue available for our international partners
    consistent with their training needs and budget by dispassionately
    providing the facts and costs for the available training.

        49. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, does the White House or OSD
    normally guide or influence decisions for where to train?
        Secretary Donley. No.

        50. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, would OSD have any reason to
    provide guidance to the Air Force to encourage an allied nation to
    remain at a certain location, regardless of the cost or quality of
    training? Please provide specific circumstances, if applicable.
        Secretary Donley. There are occasions when discussions take place
    between the appropriate DOD offices and a partner nation concerning
    their choice of a bed down training location, usually when information
    is requested by the partner nation. Cost and quality of training are
    always considered in these discussions and are provided on all
    available training locations. Once the data is provided, we expect the
    partner nation to make a decision that best meets their training needs
    and budgetary requirements.

        51. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, has the Air Force received
    direction or guidance in 2010 to influence an allied partner to select
    a certain base, regardless of the cost or other benefits? If this has
    occurred, what was the intent of the guidance?
        Secretary Donley. The Air Force provides cost and other benefit-
    related information to partner nations supporting base selection for
    beddown and tuition-based training. There are occasions when
    discussions take place between the appropriate DOD offices and a
    partner nation concerning their choice of a beddown location, but once
    DOD provides available options to the partner, we expect the partner
    nation to make an appropriate decision that best meets their training
    needs and budgetary requirements.

             increased maintenance requirements for the f-22 raptor
        52. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, the President's budget
    submission for fiscal year 2011 contains a request of $8.8 million to
    add a hangar bay at Langley AFB for additional requirements related to
    the maintenance and restoration of F-22 low observable (LO) aircraft
    surfaces. The budget justification states, ``the existing LO repair
    facility has two bays that operate at a 97 percent usage rate and
    cannot handle an increased LO repair load as the aircraft matures and
    packaged maintenance plans become more extensive.'' I note that Langley
    AFB currently is home to about half the number of F-22s as was
    originally planned and yet the existing facilities need to be expanded.
    What trends are emerging concerning the time, manpower, and resources
    required to maintain the F-22?
        General Schwartz. The requested funds are for facilities within the
    current F-22 Facilities Requirement Plan (FRP). Reference F-22 FRP pg
    6-44 (dated December 2008), F-22 bases with one 18-24 Primary Aircraft
    Inventory (PAI) squadron of aircraft require two aircraft-size booth
    inserts/bays, while bases with more than one squadron of aircraft
    assigned will need one additional bay per 18-24 PAI squadron to support
    increased LO restoration and on-equipment composite repairs. By this
    criteria, Langley requires three LO Bays. While LO materials initially
    imposed a greater workload than anticipated, improved materials have
    increased their durability and sub-system reliability enhancements have
    decreased the frequency of LO panel removal, resulting in reductions to
    the initially unforeseen LO maintenance requirements.

        53. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, can you estimate how these
    trends translate into increased operating and maintenance costs for the
    F-22 over what was originally planned when the aircraft first entered
    the Air Force inventory?
        General Schwartz. F-22 Program estimates for life cycle mission
    personnel costs in 2004 were $5.7 billion dollars and currently are
    estimated at $9.0 billion dollars. The majority of the increase in
    mission personnel costs was due to LO manpower increases, greater than
    forecasted military pay increases, and the addition of ANG and Air
    Force Reserve units, which were not part of the 2004 Program Office
    Estimate.
        In addition to manpower, the rise in O&M costs can be attributed to
    subsystem reliability and the corresponding increase in LO maintenance
    recovery time. The Reliability and Maintainability Maturation Program
    modifications will alleviate many of the issues but will take time.
    Furthermore, the use of contract field teams (CFT) to augment the units
    has also driven up the cost of the program. The CFT is being used as a
    LO manning stop gap and will be required until the active duty manning
    authorizations are filled and experience levels have matured in the
    field. The F-22 Program Office is working diligently with Lockheed
    Martin and the Air Force manpower community to accelerate the effort as
    much as possible.

        54. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, are you satisfied with the
    mission capable rates of the F-22 and the maintenance hours compared to
    flying hours?
        General Schwartz. The fiscal year 2009 F-22 fleet average mission
    capable rate was 65 percent and the current rate is 67 percent. Direct
    Maintenance Man Hours (DMMH) per flight hour are also heading in the
    right direction. The current goal for DMMH is 12.4 or less, and we are
    exceeding the goal and holding steady at 11.0. We are satisfied with
    the trends and the current improvement efforts (Reliability and
    Maintainability Maturation Program) will continue the upward trends.

                     military construction in the air force
        55. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, you mention in your opening
    statement and in your comments at today's hearing that the Air Force is
    assuming risk in the proposed investment levels for facilities and
    infrastructure. The President's budget for fiscal year 2011 for Air
    Force MILCON totals almost $1.5 billion, but barely 12 percent of that
    amount addresses the recapitalization of existing facilities, while the
    rest goes to other new mission priorities. As a result, the AFR, which
    accounts for 71,263 members of the Total Force, 3 numbered Air Forces,
    and over 2,890 facilities supporting 348 aircraft, will benefit from
    exactly one project totaling $3.4 million at Patrick AFB in Florida. At
    that pace, it would take about 1,000 years to replace each existing
    facility in the AFR. The lack of investment in existing facilities and
    infrastructure has a direct impact on military readiness and is a
    substantial risk. How long can the Air Force sustain the acceptance of
    this risk before it becomes a threat to military operations and
    readiness?
        General Schwartz. The Air Force has taken increased risk in
    infrastructure across the entire Active and Reserve component, without
    significant impacts to readiness. We will not allow risk taken in our
    facilities and infrastructure to jeopardize our ability to conduct
    critical operations from our installation weapon systems. This year, as
    in past years, we have had to make hard decisions in order to fund our
    most critical mission requirements. We have done our best to balance
    shortfalls fairly between Active, ANG, and AFR forces. We continue to
    mitigate this risk by funding facility sustainment to the 90 percent
    level to ensure that we preserve the quality of our facilities. We will
    closely examine the requirements of the Active and Reserve components
    as part of this mitigation strategy as we build the fiscal year 2012
    Program Objective Memorandum.

        56. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, how do you plan to address
    this risk of underinvestment in existing facilities in the future?
        General Schwartz. The Air Force will continue to carefully balance
    risk in infrastructure against other pressing requirements. Each budget
    cycle, we carefully evaluate facility requirements to ensure that those
    most critical to operations and readiness are funded. We remain
    committed to ensuring a minimum level of investment in our facilities
    and will minimize any impacts to readiness. We continue to mitigate
    risk by funding facility sustainment to the 90 percent level to ensure
    that we ``keep our good facilities good.''

                                 military space
        57. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, is the Air Force committed to
    its space acquisition mission?
        Secretary Donley. Yes, the Air Force is committed to space. We
    currently manage 35 space programs, and 7 of those are in the top 20 of
    largest Air Force acquisition programs with $8 billion total space
    investment in fiscal year 2011. The cornerstone to effectively managing
    the Air Force Space portfolio is the AIP, published in May 2009, which
    serves as the strategic framework for re-instilling excellence in space
    systems acquisition. The Air Force AIP focuses on five major
    initiatives: workforce, requirements generation, budget discipline,
    source selection, and lines of authority. We will complete these 5
    initiatives and the 33 associated tasks this spring with the intent to
    have the Air Force Audit Agency inspect our efforts after 1 and 2 years
    to verify that they have taken hold. This plan has postured the Air
    Force for success in Space Acquisition.

        58. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, I understand that the roles
    and responsibilities for the Air Force in space policy are currently
    under review by OSD and the Air Force. When do you plan to define these
    roles and responsibilities and do you intend to designate an executive
    agent (EA) for space?
        Secretary Donley. Last fall, I directed a review of Headquarters
    Air Force Management of Space Responsibilities. In December 2009, I
    asked Rich McKinney, an experienced Space acquisition expert (prior
    Director for Air Force Space Acquisition and a retired Air Force
    Colonel), to examine how the Air Force headquarters should be organized
    in light of the multiple changes within the Department in this area
    since 2001. In preparing his analysis, Mr. McKinney has interviewed
    many members of the space community--both inside and outside the Air
    Force. Upon review of this report and in coordination with OSD, I will
    select the best option to manage Air Force space responsibilities to
    include planning and programming, acquisition oversight, and
    coordination with other DOD components and agencies.

        59. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, I understand the Space
    Posture Review, originally due to Congress last December, is going to
    be considerably delayed, perhaps up to a year late. Please explain in
    detail the cause or causes for this delay and what steps are being
    taken to remedy the problem.
        Secretary Donley. DOD and DNI submitted an Interim Space Posture
    Review to Congress on March 15, 2010. The Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy (USD(P)) is the lead for DOD on this effort, but we
    understand the final report will be submitted in mid-summer 2010.

        60. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, how informed can the fiscal
    year 2011 budget be without any strategy for our short- and long-term
    space needs?
        Secretary Donley. Over the past year, the Air Force has been
    intimately involved in multi-agency strategic discussions regarding the
    development of a new National Space Policy and the Space Posture
    Review. This experience informed Air Force funding decisions for fiscal
    year 2011 with regard to national security space priorities. In
    addition, we routinely engage the combatant commanders, OSD, and the
    Joint Staff to provide a clear understanding of the threat environment
    and any associated capability shortfalls.

                    air force next generation bomber program
        61. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, at an April 6, 2009, news
    conference on recommendations he was making for the proposed fiscal
    year 2010 defense budget, Secretary Gates announced, among other
    things, that he would recommend deferring the start of a Next
    Generation Bomber (NGB) program, since much of today's inventory will
    remain relevant through 2040. As the Air Force modernizes the existing
    bomber fleet to provide long-range strike capability, simultaneous
    investments in Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) for a
    follow-on bomber will be required. In your view, does Secretary Gates'
    decision last year on NGB require upgrading the current B-52, B-l, and
    B-2 fleets?
        Secretary Donley. Yes, and the Air Force is programming for
    upgrades to these fleets to ensure they remain capable.

        62. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, how are NGB and EMD decisions
    reflected in your budget request for fiscal year 2011?
        Secretary Donley. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget reflects
    the Department's plan to invest $1.7 billion of Research Development
    Testing and Evaluation funding across the FYDP to support a future Long
    Range Strike (LRS) program. Funding requested in fiscal years 2011 and
    2012 would provide approximately $200 million each year to keep the
    technology industrial base active and viable in the near-term. This
    funding would provide capability improvements in the areas of strike
    responsiveness, survivability, lethality, connectivity, and
    affordability. Investment areas of interest include advanced sensors,
    electronic warfare and countermeasures, survivability, manufacturing
    readiness, net-ready communications, open systems and multi-level
    security architectures, mission management, weapon effectiveness and
    survivability, and combat identification.
        The Air Force would invest fiscal year 2011 funds using a three-
    tiered approach:

          Tier 1: Reduce risk for enabling technologies with LRS
    application.
          Tier 2: Enable at-risk critical industry skills while reducing
    program and technical risk through integration and demonstration
    efforts applicable to LRS capabilities.
          Tier 3: Refine LRS requirements and develop concepts with
    engineered, cost-driven capability options.

        63. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, are there sufficient
    resources in the fiscal year 2011 budget to sustain the long-range
    strike aircraft fleet?
        Secretary Donley. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget (PB)
    contains sufficient resources to maintain current operations and
    maintain capabilities of the legacy bomber fleet. In addition, the
    legacy bombers (B-1 and B-2) are included as part of the Weapon System
    Sustainment Unfunded Priority List to increase aircraft availability.
        The following modernization programs for each legacy bomber are
    funded throughout the FYDP:
    B-52:
        CONECT (Combat Network Communications Technology)
        SR2 (Strategic Radar Replacement)
        EHF (Extremely High Frequency)
        1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade
    B-2:
        RMP (Radar Modernization Program)
        DMS (Defensive Management System)
        EHF (Extremely High Frequency)
    B-1:
        IBS (Integrated Battle Station)
        RMIP (Radar Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program)
        INS & GSS (Inertial Navigation System & Gyro Stabilization System)

        64. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, please describe where the Air
    Force is going to make these investments in long-range strike
    capability this fiscal year and in the coming years.
        Secretary Donley. The fiscal year 2011 funds complement and further
    expand the Air Force's fiscal year 2010 technology investment plan, and
    supports the 2010 QDR directed studies and vision as the DOD defines
    future LRS requirements. This coordinated plan maximizes use of
    previous work and best positions the Air Force for future LRS program
    efforts.
        Fiscal year 2011 investments would be used to reduce technology
    risk, preserve critical industrial base skills, and refine requirements
    for a future LRS ``family of systems'' (FoS). Investment areas of
    interest include: advanced sensors, electronic warfare, survivability,
    manufacturing readiness, net-ready communications, open systems and
    multi-level security architectures, mission management, weapon
    effectiveness and survivability, and combat identification.
        The Air Force would invest fiscal year 2011 funds using a three-
    tiered approach:

          Tier 1: Reduce risk for enabling technologies with LRS
    application.
          Tier 2: Enable at-risk critical industry skills while reducing
    program and technical risk through integration and demonstration
    efforts applicable to LRS capabilities.
          Tier 3: Refine LRS requirements and develop concepts with
    engineered, cost-driven capability options.

        The fiscal year 2011 and beyond investments will be tailored as a
    result of the DOD directed studies that define LRS requirements and the
    Air Force will program appropriately in future budget submissions.

        65. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, please describe what sort of
    characteristics and requirements the Air Force and the combatant
    commanders are considering in a replacement aircraft for long-range
    strike.
        General Schwartz. ACC and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC),
    assisted by Headquarters Air Force, have led the effort within the Air
    Force to develop and document LRS platform requirements and attributes
    based on the appropriate threat scenarios and target sets. Specific
    attributes of interest include: survivability, range, payload, manned
    or unmanned configuration, and nuclear capability requirements.
    Additionally, in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget, OSD directed
    OSD/Policy to lead a post-2010 QDR study to further refine the LRS
    platform requirements and attributes, as part of an LRS Family of
    Systems that includes a penetrating aircraft, standoff cruise missiles,
    and conventional prompt global strike capabilities. The results of this
    follow-up QDR study are expected in September 2010.

        66. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, given the decision on NGB,
    what concerns, if any, do you have about increasingly relying on the
    old B-52 platform to satisfy our long-range strike capability beyond
    the 2018 threshold?
        General Schwartz. While the B-52 is the oldest Air Force bomber,
    robust design and structural upgrades have extended the B-52's service
    life (currently projected beyond 2040) and will allow it to remain in
    flyable condition well beyond 2018. The Air Force has a rigorous
    maintenance program to keep the B-52 flying, including a thorough
    Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) refurbishment program during which
    each jet is inspected (and defects corrected) every 5 years. Despite
    its age, the B-52 maintains the highest mission capable (aircraft
    availability) rate and has the lowest operating cost of any Air Force
    bomber.
        In addition to the focused aircraft maintenance program, the Air
    Force ensures mission relevance through modernization and sustainment
    modification initiatives. The B-52 has programs to address issues with
    communications, navigation, electronic attack, and weapons delivery
    systems, as well as programs for integrating new weapons. While the B-
    52 is not survivable against advanced air defenses, it continues to
    provide standoff weapons capability in the advanced threat environment,
    as well as direct attack capability in lower threat environments. These
    modifications enable the B-52 to continue as a responsive, flexible,
    adaptive, and lethal platform to support a share of the Nation's long-
    range strike requirements.

                           c-5 galaxy cargo aircraft
        67. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, do you anticipate that the
    new Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study (MCRS) will call for
    additional strategic airlift or do we have enough capability to meet
    National Military Strategy?
        General Schwartz. We have adequate capability to meet the National
    Military Strategy and do not need additional strategic airlift. The
    latest study, MCRS-16, stated that the current National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Program of Record of 223 C-17s,
    52 C-5Ms, and 59 C-5As exceeded the demand required in the 3 scenarios
    it examined. Accordingly, C-5 retirements requested in the fiscal year
    2011 PB are based on this excess capacity and the strategic airlift
    fleet should not grow based on MCRS-16. Since this result is consistent
    with guidance in the recently released QDR, we also do not see a need
    for a new study of strategic lift in this quadrennial cycle.

        68. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, it is my understanding that
    there have been several recent studies done by DOD, Air Force, and even
    one directed by Congress that have looked at the strategic airlift
    question and whether the Nation has sufficient strategic airlift
    capability currently available. Can you comment on whether any of these
    studies establish a requirement for additional new strategic airlift
    aircraft this year?
        General Schwartz. In 2009, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)
    released the ``Study on Size and Mix of Airlift Force.'' Results of
    this study indicated the existing Program of Record (POR) (fiscal year
    2009 PB enacted) was both sufficient and cost effective. More recently,
    DOD released the ``Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016''
    (MCRS-16). This study was aligned with the QDR and examined QDR
    relevant cases. MCRS-16 highlighted an excess in strategic airlift and
    influenced recommended fiscal year 2011 strategic airlift force
    reductions.

        69. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, do any recent studies
    conclude that we need additional C-17s?
        General Schwartz. None of the current studies indicate that we need
    additional C-17s. The current strategic airlift program of record (POR)
    exceeds the most demanding scenarios/cases found in all recent mobility
    studies. The Air Force is aware of two recent studies that looked at
    strategic lift. In 2009, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)
    released the ``Study on Size and Mix of Airlift Force.'' Results of
    this study indicated the existing POR was both sufficient and cost
    effective. More recently, DOD released the ``Mobility Capabilities and
    Requirements Study 2016'' (MCRS-16). This study was aligned with the
    QDR, and examined QDR relevant cases. MCRS-16 validated the current
    strategic airlift POR exceeds all examined cases.

        70. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I have
    heard that the C-5M Galaxy Cargo modernization program is progressing
    well and that the Air Force is pleased with its performance. I
    understand the C-5Ms also have demonstrated some very impressive
    operational capabilities, including setting 42 world records as part of
    their operational test and evaluation. Can you share your impression on
    whether the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program is
    meeting Air Force's expectations?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The C-5M modernization
    program is progressing well and is tracking to the AT&L-directed cost
    and schedule. Operational test and evaluation (OT&E) was completed in
    January 2010, and included a 30-day ``surge.'' During OT&E, 175
    missions and 1,336 hours were flown, including 23 days of maintenance
    demonstrations. This OT&E also included cold weather testing at Eielson
    AFB, AK. The C-5M did set 42 records--these assessments were sponsored
    by the vendor and conducted on a non-interference basis during
    operational testing.

        71. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, is the
    Air Force satisfied with the C-5M's operational performance?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force is satisfied
    with the C-5M's performance. Three development C-5Ms have demonstrated
    the capability to move a wartime cargo load 5,000 statute miles
    unrefueled while decreasing closure time via reduced en route stops.
    They also have improved take-off performance, resulting in
    approximately 20 percent more cargo per mission and 27 percent
    improvement in range. These enhancements translate into fewer landings,
    less aerial refueling, and more rapid delivery of cargo.

        72. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what is
    the estimated reduction in total ownership costs for the C-5M Galaxy
    Cargo aircraft?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Cost Analysis
    Improvement Group (CAIG) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) projected
    reduction in total ownership costs for 52 C-5Ms and 59 C-5As (111 C-5
    aircraft) is $10.7 Billion in Base Year 08.

        73. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, I am concerned that the Air
    Force has not properly addressed the future of the C-5A aircraft. What
    action is the Air Force taking to address modernization of the ANG and
    AFR C-5As?
        Secretary Donley. The Air Force has fully funded the Avionics
    Modernization Program (AMP) for all ANG and AFRC C-5As not projected
    for retirement in the fiscal year 2011 President's Budget. The AMP
    program implements communications, navigation, surveillance and air
    traffic management (CNS/ATM) upgrades, and mandated safety
    modifications.

        74. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, over the last 4 years,
    Congress has added 44 C-17s, at a cost of over $14 billion. It is my
    understanding that these earmarks have now created a potential excess
    of Air Force strategic airlift capability and, because of this, the Air
    Force is being forced to consider retiring perfectly capable C-5
    aircraft that, according to the Air Force Fleet Viability Board, could
    serve this Nation or our allies for another 30-40 years. Is my analysis
    correct?
        Secretary Donley. The current strategic fleet exceeds all
    requirements from the newly released Mobility Capabilities and
    Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16). The increase of 15 C-17s in fiscal
    year 2008 influenced the decision to upgrade only 52 of the 111 C-5s
    with the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP). Since
    that time, 18 more C-17s have been added. By retiring some of the
    older, less capable C-5As, we are able to fund the permanent bed down
    of 16 C-17s within the Air Reserve component and appropriately size our
    strategic airlift fleet to meet the Nation's requirements.

        75. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, to what extent is the Air
    Force looking at alternatives to simply getting rid of perfectly good
    cargo aircraft, such as storing them in a backup inventory status, or
    giving them to trusted allies who desperately need out-sized lift, or
    selling them to a U.S.-flagged Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet provider?
        Secretary Donley. The C-5A aircraft requested to retire in the
    fiscal year 2011 PB exceed capability requirements validated by the
    Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16).
    Maintaining them as Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) incurs unnecessary
    sustainment and avionics modernization costs plus stresses limited ramp
    space. The Air Force will use these retired aircraft to support the
    actively flying C-5 fleet as a ready source for aircraft parts. Further
    analysis of BAI conversion will be provided in the C-5 retirement
    report required by Section 137 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
        For aircraft to be made available for security assistance purposes,
    they must be declared Excess Defense Articles (i.e., they must be
    excess to the requirements of the DOD). Retiring C-5 aircraft will
    continue to support the actively flying fleet as a ready source for
    aircraft parts and will not be excess to Department requirements.
        Finally, CRAF capacity exceeds all MCRS-16 scenarios. Currently,
    DOD regulations prohibit the transfer or sale of C-5 aircraft for
    commercial purposes.

                        kc-x tanker replacement program
        76. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, as the Air Force's fleet of
    tanker aircraft ages, new tankers will be needed to provide in-flight
    refueling support for U.S. military aircraft and for aviation forces of
    coalition partners. Under the current draft request for proposal, the
    Air Force plans to procure 109 new KC-X tankers by 2020. Is the current
    tanker fleet of KC-135 and KC-10 tankers robust and stable to last
    until 2040, as has been reported in the Air Force's report, Tanker
    Replacement Study 2005, and other recent studies?
        General Schwartz. The current fleet of KC-135 and KC-10 tankers
    have been robust and stable to date due to the impact of regularly
    scheduled maintenance. Maintaining the KC-135 and KC-10 fleet until
    year 2040 has been, and will continue to be, a multi-faceted and
    aggressive approach involving KC-135 Programmed Depot Maintenance
    (PDM), KC-10 Contracted Logistics Support, and select investment/
    modernization programs that will ensure safety of flight and access to
    the global airspace system.

        77. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, do you anticipate that
    additional resources will be necessary to fill seams or gaps in the
    tanker replacement plan?
        Secretary Donley. No additional resource needs are anticipated at
    this time, and investment and sustainment funding is programmed for the
    tanker fleet through the FYDP.

                across-the-board pay raise and incentive bonuses
        78. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, the Air Force intends to add
    500 Active-Duty airmen and 1,700 reservists in fiscal year 2011. You
    note in your written statement for today's hearing that the Air Force
    budget includes a 1.4 percent across-the-board pay raise, but you
    request $645 million for recruiting and retention bonuses targeted at
    critical wartime skills. Please explain where the personnel shortfalls
    are in the Air Force and how the combination of these approaches (a pay
    raise and bonuses) will work to shape the Air Force to its best
    advantage.
        General Schwartz. The fiscal year 2011 Air Force Recruiting and
    Retention budget for the Total Force is $644.8 million. This budget
    focuses on targeted, critical career fields that are difficult to
    recruit and retain, or are new and emerging missions requiring urgent,
    immediate increases. The annual across-the-board pay raises help
    tremendously as individuals calculate their service and retirement
    benefits. This twofold strategy addresses both our targeted, critical
    personnel and the force as a whole.
    Active Duty: $480.1 million
        Although the Air Force is experiencing high retention in broad
    areas of the force, the Air Force has focused needs within the combat
    and critical skills (both officer and enlisted) and in the health
    professions. For non-medical officers, the Air Force has a Critical
    Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) budget of $20.2 million which will
    continue bonuses for special operations forces and contracting
    officers, and will start bonuses for 6 stressed career fields:
    Intelligence, Civil Engineer, Public Affairs, OSI (Cyber), Airfield
    Operations, and Logistics Readiness. Additionally, the Air Force has
    budgeted $97.1 million in Aviation Continuation Pay to shape its rated
    force by retaining aviators in specified year groups and at critical
    career decision points. Included in this effort are critical bonuses
    used to move personnel from traditional aviation specialties to new
    mission areas in remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), special operations,
    and ISR, which are increasing rapidly without additional manpower
    authorizations. For the enlisted force, the Air Force manages a
    Selective Reenlistment Bonus budget of $248.2 million, targeting
    critical skills in 91 air force specialty codes, ranging from: sensor
    operators, intelligence analyst specialists, combat controllers,
    pararescue personnel, vehicle maintainers, civil engineering
    specialists, security forces personnel, and contracting specialists.
        Recruiting and retention of the health professions specialties are
    particularly difficult. For accession bonuses, we are using over $14
    million to attract surgeons, nurses, mental health specialists, and
    other health professions to the Air Force Medical Service. The
    retention bonuses are critical to the career longevity of those skilled
    practitioners with years of military and medical expertise. It often
    takes years of intensive training to create a skilled health care
    provider or surgeon that can provide life and limb-saving care under
    austere, battlefield conditions, in tent operating theaters, and state-
    of-the-art medical centers. Once trained, it is imperative we keep
    these experts. Therefore, we have programmed $65 million in multiyear
    contractual retention bonuses at selectively targeted health care
    fields such as our physician and dental surgeons, operating room
    nurses, mental health providers, and other skilled healthcare
    professions. The health professions career fields have some of the
    lowest retention rates in the Services, and often leave at their first
    opportunity after their educational obligations are fulfilled.
    Reserves: $47.7 million
        The Air Force will recruit and retain personnel in combat related
    and medical career fields, specifically survival, evasion, resistance
    and escape (SERE), pararescue, explosive ordnance disposal, aerial
    gunners, logistics, and a number of other career fields deemed vital to
    mission success.
    Air National Guard: $117.0 million
        The Air Force will recruit and retain personnel in critical skills,
    combat related and medical career fields, specifically aircraft
    maintenance/systems, civil engineering, air battle managers, remotely
    operated aircraft, physicians, pharmacists, nurses and surgeons.

            combat search and rescue helicopter replacement program
        79. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I am
    concerned by recent press reports and testimony from Air Force
    officials indicating that the Air Force is considering a multi-billion
    dollar sole-source procurement to replace its aging fleet of HH-60G
    Pave Hawk search and rescue helicopters with newer models of the same
    aircraft. If true, this may raise serious questions regarding the Air
    Force acquisition process. Is the Air Force considering a sole-source
    procurement to recapitalize its fleet of HH-60G helicopters? Please
    explain why.
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. No decisions on an
    acquisition strategy for HH-60 recapitalization have been made at this
    time. The Air Force is currently working with OSD and the Joint Staff
    to finalize requirements and acquisition strategy for this needed
    capability.

        80. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how did
    the Air Force arrive at its decision to purchase newer models of the
    same aircraft when better alternatives for combat search and rescue
    (CSAR) are available?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force will procure
    newer HH-60 models to replace aircraft lost in combat (Operational Loss
    Replacement). No decisions have been made on aircraft types for the HH-
    60 recapitalization program, which will replace the entire HH-60 fleet.
    The Air Force is currently finalizing the requirements and acquisition
    strategy for this program through close coordination with OSD and Joint
    Staff.

        81. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, has the
    Air Force abandoned plans for a modern CSAR helicopter fleet?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. No, the Air Force has a need
    to recapitalize the existing HH-60G fleet. The fiscal year 2011
    President's budget begins the program as a new start in fiscal year
    2011, and begins procurement funding in fiscal year 2012.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                risk assessment of fighter aircraft inventories
        82. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as
    stated in your opening remarks, the Air Force has been engaged in
    continuous combat and expeditionary operations since August 1990, which
    means we are coming up on 20 years of persistent operations over places
    like Southwest Asia, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan, as
    well as the air bridge between the United States and every location we
    have U.S. forces. The mass retirement of so many legacy fighters
    concerns me because the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force fighter gaps
    are only growing more quickly each year with no fix in sight. Can you
    give me an overall risk assessment of the Air Force?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. In April 2008 congressional
    testimony, the Air Force projected a fighter gap of over 800 aircraft.
    Since that time, three key assumptions unpinning the 2008 analysis have
    changed. First, the Air Force elected to accept increased warfighting
    risk. Second, the planned F-35 procurement rate was increased from 48
    to 80 aircraft per year in fiscal year 2016. Third, the Air Force
    refined its approach to fighter service life computations. The
    combination of these changes significantly reduced the projected
    fighter force structure shortfall. Actual risk level and an expanded
    discussion are available in a study the Air Force submitted in response
    to House Report 2647 (Public Law 111-84) Section 1075.

        83. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, are
    there any missions you feel are at high risk?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The greatest challenge
    continues to be performance across all core missions in the high end of
    the Range of Military Operations against a near-peer competitor. As we
    continue to rebalance the force structure, we must guard against over-
    optimization of the force for today's fight at the expense of
    capability against this near-peer threat. These risks are exacerbated
    in anti-access, area denial and electronic attack environments. In this
    environment some of our current weapons are losing ground in both
    capability and sufficiency to rapidly improving near-peer capabilities.
    Underpinning this challenge is the growing risk to our airborne ISR
    mission. This is due primarily to the increasing vulnerabilities of the
    satellite communication architecture. As the Air Force transitions to a
    greater reliance on remotely-piloted aircraft for the preponderance of
    its airborne ISR capability, the security of our satellite
    communications has become increasingly critical to the enterprise. This
    includes not only the maintenance of robust and secure satellite
    communication links, but the protection of space assets themselves
    against a growing array of potential adversary threats.

        84. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, is the
    Air Force still predicting shortfalls in its fighter and attack
    aircraft inventory?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes, given current
    requirements, the Air Force is predicting a modest shortfall in its
    fighter inventory. In April 2008, the Air Force informed the Congress
    of a projected fighter force structure gap of over 800 aircraft in
    2024. Since that testimony, 3 key force structure assumptions have
    changed significantly, reducing the fighter shortfall in 2024 from 800
    aircraft to 182 aircraft. First, the Air Force elected to accept
    increased warfighting risk, going from ``low-to-moderate'' to
    ``moderate.'' Second, the planned F-35 procurement rate was increased
    from 48 to 80 aircraft per year. Third, the Air Force refined its
    approach to computing fighter service life. The Air Force is closely
    monitoring fighter force structure, and will review the potential need
    for SLEPs as part of the fiscal year 2012 budget process.

        85. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, can the
    ANG continue to support the current 18 Air Sovereignty Alert sights
    with proposed inventory and budget cuts?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes. ANG can cover the 18
    sites with the fiscal year 2010 Combat Air Forces (CAF) Restructure.
    Operation Noble Eagle Ground Alert is not affected by the fiscal year
    2010 CAF Restructure.

                                fighter aircraft
        86. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the Air
    Force will not have its first unit of combat-ready JSF until at least
    2015. F-22 production will end at 187 aircraft, leaving approximately
    120 combat-coded aircraft to ``prevail in a broad range of operations
    that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping timeframes . . .
    [including] the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state
    aggressors'' as stated in the 2010 QDR. Moreover, foreign surface-to-
    air missiles and integrated air defense systems continue to improve and
    proliferate; Russia and China continue their military build-up and
    modernization to include development of the J-12 fighter aircraft in
    China and flight testing of the PAK-FA fighter in Russia; and, Prime
    Minister Vladimir Putin said Russia will start building a new strategic
    bomber and announced that the Russian military will commission 1,500
    new military aircraft and helicopters so that the air force will have
    80 percent modern aircraft by 2020. What is the status of our fighter
    fleet and its ability to respond to these threats?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The fiscal year 2011 budget
    includes $12.5 billion over the FYDP to sustain America's air
    superiority advantage. Building on the multi-role nature of our most
    advanced aircraft, we are also adding precision attack capabilities
    such as the Small Diameter Bomb. The Air Force will also continue the
    development and procurement of air-to-air munitions and defenses for
    the F-22 such as the AIM-9X, AIM-120D, and electronic warfare
    capabilities. We assess that by the time these aircraft are fielded,
    our investment in fifth generation aircraft, associated weapons and
    defensive architectures will allow us to maintain an acceptable level
    of risk.

        87. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
    plans does the Air Force have in place if the JSF continues to slip to
    later dates in the future?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force believes the
    restructured F-35 program provides a realistic schedule, however, the
    Air Force has postured the A-10 and F-16 fleets to accept potential
    delays in the F-35 program which is designed and being fielded as their
    replacement. Legacy aircraft SLEPs and modernization are significantly
    more cost effective means to mitigate any risks from potential gaps in
    fighter force structure capacity. The Air Force has also refined our
    ability to quantify aircraft service life. The most accurate depiction
    of the Combat Air Force status is achieved using ESL, which is based on
    MIL STD 1530C and captures both the capability and structural integrity
    of an aircraft constrained by economic reality.
        In 2006, the Air Force conducted a fleet viability review of the A-
    10 because of a requirement to fly the aircraft until approximately
    2028. The Fleet Viability Board (FVB) concluded that with proper care,
    investment, and fleet management, the Air Force can keep the fleet
    viable. Structural fatigue testing for the wings was conducted in the
    late 1970s and early 1980s, and the Air Force has recently completed
    component structural tests on the fuselage and empennage to 16,000
    hours. The Air Force is drafting the final report, which will recommend
    future inspection and repair processes. The Air Force is also
    conducting Scheduled Structural Inspections (SSIs) every 2,000 flight
    hours after the initial SLEP inspection conducted at approximately
    8,000 flight hours. In addition, A-10s manufactured with ``thin-skin''
    center wing panels will be modified with new wings that have ``thick-
    skin'' center wing panels as part of the fully funded A-10 wing
    replacement program. These inspections and modifications will ensure
    the A-10 fleet is viable to the ESL of 14,000 equivalent flight hours
    (EFH) which equates to approximately 2030.
        More information regarding F-16 service life is in development and
    the Air Force is currently conducting fleet viability assessments for
    the F-16C/D fleet. The first FVB for Block 25, 30, and 32 aircraft will
    conclude by the end of fiscal year 2010. Immediately following the
    initial FVB, the Air Force will conduct FVBs for the Block 50/52 and
    then Block 40/42 aircraft, and they are scheduled to conclude by the
    end of fiscal year 2011. The Air Force is also requesting funds in the
    fiscal year 2011 President's budget to initiate a full-scale fatigue
    test (FSFT) on an F-16 Block 50 airframe specimen, which will be
    stressed to 24,000 hours. This test is expected to complete by the end
    of fiscal year 2013. Analysis of structural components and failure
    modes relevant to the Block 40-52 fleet will determine the exact
    structural modifications necessary to extend the service life beyond
    8,000 hours. The FVBs and FSFT will provide the Air Force with
    information and data pertinent to extend the service life of the F-16
    fleet beyond the ESL of 9,000 EFH for the Block 25-32s and 8,000 EFH
    for Block 40-52s.

        88. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
    will be the impact on legacy aircraft if JSF production slips further
    than currently planned?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Further slips to JSF
    production are expected to have minimal impact to legacy aircraft. The
    Air Force has believes the restructured F-35 program provides a
    realistic schedule, however the Air Force has postured the A-10 and F-
    16 fleets (aircraft the F-35 is designed to replace), as well as the F-
    15E Strike Eagle, to be able to accept delays in the F-35 program. The
    A-10 ESL is 14,000 EFHs and, at current usage rates, it has planned
    viability until approximately 2030. A majority of the A-10 fleet is
    already receiving new wing replacements with ``thick skin'' center wing
    panels, and all aircraft are undergoing regular Scheduled Structural
    Inspections (SSIs) every 2,000 flight hours after the initial SLEP
    inspection conducted at 8,000 flight hours.
        Further delays to F-35 production may impact the Air Force's
    ability to retire additional older model F-16s (Block 30/32s), however,
    more information regarding F-16 service life is in development. The Air
    Force is currently conducting Fleet Viability Boards (FVBs) on the F-16
    fleet that will be completed by the end of fiscal year 2011. The F-16
    ESL is 9,000 EFH for Block 25-32s and 8,000 EFH for Block 40-52s. The
    Air Force has requested funds in the fiscal year 2011 President's
    budget to initiate a Full-Scale Fatigue Test on an F-16 Block 50 test
    article to determine structural modifications necessary to extend the
    F-16 Block 40-52 service life beyond 8,000 hours. This testing starts
    in fiscal year 2011 and is estimated to be complete by fiscal year
    2013. These aircraft are expected to remain in service until at least
    2025. The FVB and FSFT will prepare the Air Force to extend the life of
    the F-16 fleet, and the Air Force will continue to evaluate options
    each budget cycle to mitigate the impacts from potential F-35 program
    slips on the aging F-16 fleet.
        The F-15E Strike Eagles are some of the newest fighters in the Air
    Force active inventory. The F-15E has an ESL of 13,500 EFH, and as of
    today, none of them have been retired or are planned to be retired.
    Further, the Air Force is making steady investments in F-15E
    modernization to ensure its combat capability well into the future.

        89. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what is
    the current cost estimate of the JSF overall and per aircraft?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. As of 26 April 2010, the
    total cost of the program is $328.3 billion (Then Year Dollars) and the
    Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) for all variants of the JSF is $79
    million (Base Year 2002 Dollars)/$113.6 million (Then Year Dollars) as
    reflected in the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). However,
    Consistent with Nunn-McCurdy statutory requirements, a complete
    Independent Cost Estimate is in process. The Department expects this
    analysis will result in increases to the stated Program Acquisition
    Unit Cost (PAUC) and APUC estimates. The projected range of estimates
    for all variants is $97-$115 million PAUC and $79-95 million APUC in
    Base Year 2002 dollars.

        90. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you
    expect cost estimates to change based on cost increases or decreases in
    the number to be procured? Please explain why.
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Production profile changes
    did impact the unit cost estimates as reported in the F-35 December
    2009 SAR. However, these changes were necessary to institute an
    optimized ramp rate commensurate with the Independent Manufacturing
    Review Team recommendation.
        Any further reduction of fiscal year 2011 Low Rate Initial
    Production 5 jets would:

             Increase unit costs of remaining fiscal year 2011 DOD
            and Partner jets;
             Increase FYDP costs due to learning curve effects;
             Delay Services' fielding of critical capability;
             Exacerbate Tactical Air Force structure shortfalls;
             Increase F-35 FYDP unit costs; and
             Likely cause further delays in some partner
            procurements, which in turn would further increase DOD unit
            costs

        Executing the optimized F-35 procurement ramp is key to: (1)
    lowering F-35 unit cost by capitalizing on learning, manufacturing
    efficiencies and economies of scale; and (2) addressing the Services'
    force structure shortfalls.

                combat search and rescue helicopter replacement
        91. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the
    fiscal year 2010 budget terminated the Combat Search and Rescue
    Helicopter Replacement (CSAR-X) program. In announcing the termination,
    Secretary Gates questioned the need for a single service, single
    purpose program. Until CSAR-X was terminated, it was the Air Force's
    number-two acquisition priority right behind KC-X. It now appears that
    the Air Force is moving away from platforms that are more capable to
    lower end platforms as more of a budget decision than what provides our
    forces the best capabilities. Joint Forces Command directed study
    validated the need for a new CSAR helicopter in even greater numbers
    than previously planned. In addition, the Air Force has performed
    thousands of joint and coalition recoveries in Central Command's AOR.
    Is CSAR still a core competency for the Air Force?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes, CSAR is an important
    mission for the Air Force. In accordance with guidance set forth by
    Secretary Gates, CSAR now falls under the Service Core Functions of
    Personnel Recovery (PR). The Air Force released the Operational Concept
    for PR in September 2009 as part of a continuing effort to adapt to the
    current irregular warfare environment and to meet all the Joint force
    requirements for personnel recovery. In these challenging fiscal times,
    the Air Force is working to provide our forces with the best
    capabilities possible. The current HH-60 Operations Loss Replacement
    and subsequent recapitalization program will allow the Air Force to
    continue to support Joint MEDEVAC, CASEVAC, CSAR, and other PR
    missions. The Air Force will continue to work with OSD to ensure that
    the right numbers of aircraft with all the required equipment are
    getting to our warfighters.

        92. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what was
    the result of the Air Force's 2002 study for a new CSAR platform?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force Combat Rescue
    Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was conducted to provide DOD acquisition
    decision makers one or more affordable upgrade or replacement options
    for the HH-60G recovery vehicle. After careful consideration among five
    concepts and over 25 alternatives, the AoA study team recommended a new
    medium-lift helicopter as the best concept for a replacement of the HH-
    60G.

        93. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what are
    the current plans for replacing the aging fleet of HH-60G Pave Hawks?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The current plans for
    replacing the HH-60G fleet involve two efforts, HH-60G Operational Loss
    Replacement (OLR) and HH-60 Recapitalization. HH-60G OLR is the Air
    Force's plan to replace HH-60G Pave Hawks lost in combat and other
    operational missions to sustain the current HH-60 fleet strength. HH-60
    Recapitalization will be a long-term recapitalization effort to replace
    the entire fleet.

        94. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, will
    this Nation be getting the most capable CSAR platform for our airmen or
    are we compromising based on available budget?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force is working
    with OSD and Joint Staff to finalize requirements and an acquisition
    strategy that supports an HH-60 recapitalization program to replace the
    fleet of aging HH-60Gs. Initial program funding is contained in the
    fiscal year 2011 President's budget. A Request for Information has been
    released to obtain industry's ability to provide the Air Force with a
    CSAR platform. The Air Force will procure a CSAR platform that meets
    warfighter requirements.

                              joint cargo aircraft
        95. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the DOD
    plan in 2008 was to acquire 75 C-27s for military transport. That
    number was dropped in 2009 to 38 aircraft and eight were funded in the
    fiscal year 2010 budget. The fiscal year 2011 budget requests another
    eight aircraft. From my understanding, the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council (JROC) validated the requirement for the Joint Cargo Aircraft
    (JCA) and a minimum number of 75 JCA. What is the current requirement
    for C-27s?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. A June 2007 Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Acquisition
    Decision Memorandum concerning this issue stated, ``The Acquisition
    Program Baseline shall reflect an initial procurement quantity of 78
    aircraft (54 Army, 24 Air Force).'' This quantity matches the aircraft
    procurement through 2013, as presented to the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Committee and the Defense Acquisition Board. Resource
    Management Decision 802 assigned the Direct Support Time Sensitive/
    Mission Critical (TS/MC) mission to the Air Force and revised the total
    number of C-27s to 38. The transfer of the TS/MC airlift mission is
    intended to capitalize on efficiencies gained by operating the tactical
    airlift fleet under a single Service, thereby maximizing the robust
    capabilities resident in the existing intra-theater airlift fleet to
    ensure all requirements are met.

        96. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
    mission or missions are driving the required number of C-27s?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Resource Management Decision
    802 assigned the Army's time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) mission
    to the Air Force, and revised the total number of C-27s to 38. The Air
    Force will use the C-27 primarily for TS/MC missions supporting the
    U.S. Army. As an Air Force asset, the C-27s can also be operated and
    managed through the Global Force Management process to answer all
    intra-theater airlift requirements (general support in addition to
    direct support).

        97. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how will
    JCAs support homeland security missions such as natural and manmade
    disasters?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The C-27 will be an ANG
    asset and will be incorporated into the Global Force Management process
    to support the needs of states (Title 32) and geographic combatant
    commanders (Title 10). Airlift requirements in support of homeland
    security and disaster assistance will be met utilizing the Global Force
    Management process to ensure the combatant commander receives the most
    effective airlift platform. The C-27 will operate similar to ANG C-130
    units in response to preparation and recovery efforts.

                             nuclear modernization
        98. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, your
    posture statement highlights Air Force actions over the past 2 years to
    reinvigorate Air Force stewardship over the ground and air legs of the
    nuclear triad. The fiscal year 2011 budget request shows a planned
    investment of $295 million over the FYDP to keep the aging Minuteman
    III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) operational. How long do
    you expect this missile type to stay in the operational force?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force is committed
    to sustaining and modernizing the current Minuteman III ICBM through
    2030, per congressional direction.

        99. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, at what
    point must we make a decision to begin development of a follow-on ICBM
    to the Minuteman?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. As long as the Nation
    requires an ICBM, the Air Force will steward that capability to ensure
    we always have safe, secure, and reliable systems. An analysis of
    alternatives will be performed during this FYDP to assess alternatives
    for 2030 and beyond.

        100. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, is
    there funding in the fiscal year 2011 request for a follow-on ICBM?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. There is no funding in the
    fiscal year 2011 budget. The Air Force is working to define attributes
    and characteristics for a follow-on capability beyond 2030.

        101. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you
    believe it is necessary to continue to maintain the ICBM leg of the
    Strategic Nuclear Triad?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes. ICBMs remain an
    important part of the Nation's nuclear deterrent with attributes that
    ensure the TRIAD is balanced, responsive, and adaptable. The foundation
    of America's strategic and nuclear deterrence effectiveness depends on
    the balance of overall TRIAD capabilities. As such, specific ICBM
    attributes include: high readiness, responsiveness, survivability,
    positive control, rapid retargeting, and day-to-day stability.

        102. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, $800
    million is requested over the FYDP to modernize the B-52 and B-2
    bombers to ensure survivability against increasingly capable air
    defense systems. $200 million is requested for research and development
    for the next-generation bomber. You state, ``the proliferation of area
    denial and anti-access capabilities will challenge the ability of . . .
    legacy bombers to penetrate contested airspace.'' Will our current U.S.
    strategic bombers be able to fulfill their nuclear deterrent missions
    given the antiaccess threat?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. We are actively sustaining
    and modernizing all strategic Air Force bomber and fighter platforms to
    fulfill the demands of strategic deterrence and conventional warfare
    missions into the future.
        The ongoing B-2 radar, defensive management, and strategic
    communications system upgrades will ensure penetrating capability into
    the mid-term, while B-52 computer system architecture, strategic radar,
    and strategic communication improvements will keep our legacy long-
    range strike force operationally relevant through at least 2035. We are
    also in the early stages of examining a follow-on air-launched cruise
    missile which will permit our legacy platforms to fulfill their nuclear
    deterrent mission in future threat environments.

        103. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, there
    does not appear to be funding in the fiscal year 2011 request to make
    JSF dual-capable. Are there plans to request such funding in the
    future?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes, the Air Force remains
    committed to our strategic deterrent mission and will ensure the JSF
    will be dual capable in time to meet strategic requirements. Dual
    capable aircraft (DCA) capability for the F-35 were not funded in the
    fiscal year 2011 President's budget due to weapon maturity and
    availability issues. The Air Force has multiple options within our
    legacy fighter fleet to ensure seamless DCA mission capability while
    transitioning to the F-35. This includes monitoring the legacy fighter
    force structure closely for any potential need for service life
    extensions. The Air Force continues to evaluate the necessary
    programmatic initiatives to include integrating DCA capability on the
    JSF in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission.

        104. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how
    will the United States be able to deliver tactical nuclear weapons
    without a dual-capable JSF?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force will maintain
    the ability to employ tactical nuclear weapons through proper
    management of the F-16 and F-15E fleets. The ability of these aircraft
    to penetrate sophisticated adversary air defenses, however, will
    continue to be challenged as anti-aircraft radar and missile systems
    technology proliferates. Therefore, the Air Force continues to pursue
    dual-capable aircraft (DCA) capability on the JSF. F-35 integration
    will maintain this mission capability, enabling the United States to
    seamlessly provide extended deterrence and meet its treaty and alliance
    commitments.

        105. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
    implications will a non-dual capable JSF have for U.S. security
    guarantees to our European allies?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The 2010 NPR affirmed the
    United States' commitment to strengthening regional deterrence and
    reassuring U.S. allies and partners. The Air Force remains committed to
    replacing the current inventory of F-16s with a dual capable JSF,
    ensuring there is no gap in the dual capable mission as the JSF becomes
    operational in this mission area.

                             next generation bomber
        106. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, in
    February 2006, DOD called for a new long-range bomber to be fielded by
    2018. Prior to release of the fiscal year 2010 budget request,
    Secretary Gates announced on April 6, 2009, that DOD ``will not pursue
    a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have a
    better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the
    technology.'' From my understanding, the Air Force conducted numerous
    studies and analyses with the assistance of the Institute for Defense
    Analyses and the Defense Science Board to determine ``if'' and ``what
    type'' of new bomber platform was required to meet future threats. I
    also believe the JROC approved an Initial Capabilities Document and an
    acquisition strategy was formulated and approved by the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in late 2008.
    Finally, I believe efforts were underway to seek approval by the JROC
    of the Capabilities Development Document in 2009. If all these reviews
    have been done, why is more time needed to study the bomber platform
    again to determine what type is needed?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. As stated, the Secretary of
    Defense (SECDEF) delayed the development of an Air Force follow-on
    bomber until the DOD could better understand the need, requirement, and
    technology associated with the weapon system. To satisfy his concerns
    about developing a new LRS platform, the SECDEF directed the formation
    of a Tiger Team. This team, part of the High End Asymmetric Team
    (HEAT), took an in-depth look at long-range strike--including the LRS
    need, requirement, and technology--all within the larger 2010 QDR
    process. The team's conclusions were supportive of pursuing a new LRS
    platform, but identified the need for additional analysis to explore
    options for reducing costs and accelerating fielding timelines. Based
    upon the need for additional analysis, the SECDEF chartered a
    subsequent study to examine a broader array of long-range strike issues
    and options including: the appropriate mix of long-range strike
    capabilities; upgrades to legacy bombers; manned and unmanned force
    structure numbers; stand-off and penetrating platform ratio; stand-off
    cruise missile requirements; ISR demands; and conventional prompt
    global strike needs.
        The DOD's rationale for the study is that expanded analysis is
    needed to fully understand how all potential LRS options could
    contribute the country's national defense and national military
    strategies and objectives before large amounts of funding are committed
    to the program. The results of the study are expected in fall 2010.

        107. Senator Inhofe. General Schwartz, General Corley, Commander of
    ACC, has said that the fleet of B-2 bombers is too small for persistent
    attacks in heavily defended airspace, and the B-1s and B-52s are not
    survivable in heavily defended airspace. Lieutenant General Klotz, Air
    Force Global Strike Command, said there will continue to be a need for
    long-range strike capabilities. You said to expect major work to start
    on a new LRS platform in 2013 but the timing was not definitive. What
    do you mean by expect major work to start by 2013?
        General Schwartz. Work beginning in 2013 is dependent on finalizing
    requirements and establishing and funding a program of record that
    would lead to further design, development, and production. Work prior
    to that would be focused on technology maturation, risk reduction,
    concept development, and requirements definition.

        108. Senator Inhofe. General Schwartz, if work started in 2013,
    when will we see a new bomber?
        General Schwartz. If focused system level design work begins in
    2013, a new bomber could be in flight test in the 2021-2025 timeframe
    with operational capability coming on-line in the 2025-2030 timeframe.

        109. Senator Inhofe. General Schwartz, will we be able to sustain
    the current fleet of bombers to meet national security requirements
    until the next generation bomber is operational?
        General Schwartz. Yes, the current fleet of bombers will be
    maintained to continue to meet national security requirements until a
    future LRS capability is operational. Current modernization efforts
    focus on lethality, responsiveness, survivability, and sustainment.
    Very little can be done to make the B-1 or the B-52 survivable against
    today's modern air defenses; however, the B-1 and B-52 will be equipped
    with extended range munitions to mitigate risk from advanced integrated
    air defense systems in the future. Some efforts like Defensive
    Management System (DMS) Modernization can improve the B-2's
    survivability, but the B-2 will still face survivability challenges in
    the mid-term against emerging advanced air defenses. The ongoing OSD-
    led ``Analysis of LRS Options'' study directed by the 2010 QDR will
    inform senior leadership on future LRS investments to address these
    survivability concerns. The following modernization programs are
    currently programmed throughout the FYDP:
    B-52:
        CONECT (Combat Network Communications Technology)
        SR2 (Strategic Radar Replacement)
        EHF (Extremely High Frequency)
        1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade
    B-2:
        RMP (Radar Modernization Program)
        DMS (Defensive Management System)
        EHF (Extremely High Frequency)
    B-1:
        IBS (Integrated Battle Station)
        RMIP (Radar Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program)
        INS & GSS (Inertial Navigation System & Gyro Stabilization System)
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                            kc-135 depot maintenance
        110. Senator Sessions. Secretary Donley, 2 years ago, Boeing was
    awarded the KC-135 Programmed Depot Level Maintenance contract over
    Alabama Aircraft Industries Incorporated (AAII). AAII is awaiting a
    ruling from the U.S. Court of Appeals concerning this contract, and we
    will let the legal process run its course. My concern is with the
    Birmingham, AL, aerospace industrial base should Boeing retain the
    contract. This industrial base has a skilled workforce of 800 employees
    who have a reputation for on-time completion with the fewest faults.
    What is the Air Force doing to preserve this military industrial base?
        Secretary Donley. Throughout our dealings with the industrial base,
    the Air Force must rely on the free and open competition afforded to
    all companies.

                roles and missions with unmanned aerial systems
        111. Senator Sessions. General Schwartz, 2 years ago when General
    Moseley was Chief of Staff of the Air Force, he tried unsuccessfully to
    make the Air Force the EA for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) as well as
    placing operational control of these assets under the regional Air
    Component Commander. Instead, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon
    England stood up a DOD UAS Task Force. Last time we talked about this
    issue, you assured me that there was no intent to move from the status
    quo. Unfortunately, I am hearing rumblings that this contentious issue
    may yet again surface. Please provide me an update regarding UAS roles
    and missions in the Air Force and how you are coordinating these
    functions with the Army.
        General Schwartz. The Air Force strongly believes in the tenets of
    Joint doctrine that establishes the Joint Force Commander as the
    authority for the use and prioritization of UAS or Remotely Piloted
    Aircraft (RPA). The Joint Force Air Component Commander executes the
    Joint Force Commander's operational objectives using assigned Joint air
    assets. The intent of the 2007 proposal to establish an Executive Agent
    (EA) for UAS was to establish a Joint organization to specifically
    address the myriad outstanding UAS/RPA issues to include Joint concepts
    of operation to integrate all Service component UAS/RPA systems,
    airspace control, air defense, and acquisition, standardization, and
    interoperability. Since September 2007, the Air Force has been, along
    with the other Services, an active participant on the OSD AT&L UAS Task
    Force that was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in lieu
    of an EA for UAS. I believe it is essential for the Air Force and other
    services to continue working together to collectively determine the
    optimal way ahead for UAS/RPA.
        The Air Force is actively engaged with OSD, the Joint Staff, and
    the other Services in determining how to maximize the capabilities that
    various RPA provide. Service responsibilities are to organize, train,
    and equip combat forces for use by Joint force commanders. Combat
    operations are guided by established Joint Doctrine that stipulates
    that priorities for use of Service component forces are determined by
    the JFC-Services do not direct or establish Joint force employment
    priorities. The role of the Combined or Joint Force Air Component
    Commander is to execute air operations in accordance with the
    priorities of the Combined or Joint Force Commander to meet his
    specified mission objectives.
        More specifically dealing with RPAs, last year the Army's Training
    and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Air Force's ACC signed the Army-
    Air Force UAS Enabling Concept that describes a concept for how
    theater-capable, multi-role UAS should be integrated. This document
    will be added to Joint Forces Command's Joint Concept of Operations for
    UAS.

                          joint strike fighter basing
        112. Senator Sessions. General Schwartz, the Air Force published
    the Notice of Intent concerning JSF basing on December 30, 2009. I
    understand that the decision on which ANG units will receive the first
    JSFs was very difficult. I am concerned with the fact that the aging F-
    16 fleet will begin reaching the end of their service life at the end
    of this decade. Can you give me some indication as to when the next
    round of JSF ANG basing assignments will be announced and how many
    additional units will be on this list?
        General Schwartz. Yes. The first basing decisions will identify the
    training and operational basing for delivery of F-35 aircraft between
    2013 and 2017. Formal environmental impact surveys will be completed
    for the preferred locations and reasonable alternatives, with records
    of decision issued in 2011. The Air Force has currently programmed to
    purchase up to a total of 1,763 aircraft between 2013 and 2035.
    Consequently, the basing process will be repeated every 2 years for
    future bases, and will consider both the Active and Reserve
    installations.

                            active association units
        113. Senator Sessions. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, last
    time we spoke, you strongly supported the active Association Program
    where ANG and AFR serve alongside Active Duty personnel. I am hearing
    that while Active Duty billets currently exist at ANG and AFR units, no
    personnel have been assigned to these positions. In light of this, can
    you tell me whether the Air Force is still committed to this concept
    and process?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes, the Air Force remains
    committed to the Total Force integration process. Active duty personnel
    have been serving in active associations in the ANG/AFR units since
    2007. Our desired end state is a leaner, more capable, and more
    efficient Air Force that leverages the strengths of our Active and
    Reserve components. We fully expect to create more associations, both
    active and classic, as we continue to transform our Air Force for the
    future.

        114. Senator Sessions. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, when
    should these units expect to see their first Active Duty personnel
    arrive?
        Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Active Duty Air Force is
    committed to Total Force Integration Initiatives and has been manning
    positions in the ANG/AFR units since 2007. The table below shows two
    examples of active duty personnel who are already in place, one unit
    from the Mobility Air Forces (KC-135) and the other unit from the
    Combat Air Forces (F-16). The 99th Air Refueling Squadron at Birmingham
    ANG, AL, is currently manned at 100 percent for officers (7 authorized/
    7 assigned) with another 8 inbound as the unit gains more billets;
    enlisted manning for the same unit is currently 50 percent (60
    authorized/30 assigned) with an additional 33 inbound. Similarly, the
    157th Fighter Squadron at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, SC, is
    manned at 100 percent for officers and 87 percent for enlisted.

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Platform                    Location                Unit                Position        Authorized  Assigned   Percent        Comments
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    KC-135...........................  Birmingham ANG, AL..  99th Air Refueling    Officer.............          7         7       100   8 add'l inbound
                                                              Recon Sq.
                                                                                   Enlisted............         60        30        50   33 add'l inbound
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    F-16.............................  McEntire Joint        157th Fighter         Officer.............          9         9       100
                                        National Guard        Squadron.
                                        Base, SC.
                                                                                   Enlisted............          8         7        87   1 add'l inbound
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
                            barksdale air force base
        115. Senator Vitter. Secretary Donley, I want to again express my
    deep appreciation that the Air Force chose to locate Global Strike
    Command (AFGSC) at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana. How important do you
    view AFGSC in the Air Force's long-term plans?
        Secretary Donley. ``Continuing to Strengthen the Nuclear
    Enterprise'' is the Air Force's top priority. Establishing a new
    command dedicated to this effort was essential to strengthening the
    Nuclear Enterprise.
        The fundamental mission of Air Force Global Strike Command is to
    provide safe, secure, and effective forces for strategic deterrence and
    for global strike capabilities both to deter aggression against the
    United States and to provide assurance to our allies.
        AFGSC is critical to the Air Force's contribution to strategic
    deterrence. Over the past year, we transferred 8th Air Force and 20th
    Air Force to AFGSC along with their associated nuclear-capable bombers
    and ICBMs. These forces represent two-thirds of our strategic nuclear
    Triad and are vital to the day-to-day deterrence operations for our
    Nation.

        116. Senator Vitter. Secretary Donley, is there consideration by
    the Air Force to make AFGSC a four-star command?
        Secretary Donley. There is no consideration at this time to make
    AFGSC a four-star command.

        117. Senator Vitter. Secretary Donley, I understand that the Air
    Force has decided to wait until the conclusion of a Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on and the Nuclear Posture Review to
    make a final decision on whether or not to execute the recertification
    of the Weapons Storage Area (WSA) at Barksdale AFB, despite Congress
    appropriating $77 million for the project to fulfill the Air Force's
    fiscal year 2010 budget request. Can you give me some insight as to
    what scenarios and outcomes might preclude the Air Force from moving
    forward with the re-certification of the Barksdale WSA?
        Secretary Donley. The New START treaty reduces U.S. nuclear force
    structure. The Air Force has elected to delay a final decision on the
    Barksdale WSA until the New START treaty force structure is decided.
    Once a final force structure is determined, we will work closely with
    the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command to determine the
    requirements and operational considerations required to support the
    revised force structure.

                      space and cyberspace vulnerabilities
        118. Senator Vitter. General Schwartz, last month you stated that
    our space and cyberspace missions are at risk. We are increasingly
    reliant on our technology that helps make our military the best in the
    world, and we clearly need to address potential vulnerabilities. Please
    describe the most prominent space and cyberspace vulnerabilities that
    concern you.
        General Schwartz. The details of adversary threats to our space
    systems are classified at numerous different levels. At an unclassified
    level, we've seen a demonstrated anti-satellite kill capability and a
    historic well-developed counter-space program threatening our strategic
    communications, navigation/timing, and overhead collection satellite
    missions. On a broader scale, due to the widespread proliferation of
    satellite communication and Global Positioning System jammers among
    multiple other nations, U.S. tactical military advantage on the
    battlefield in local conflicts can be degraded.
        Conceptually, just as effective is a cyber attack on the satellite
    system ground infrastructure that serves command and control, and data
    links. Cyber attack on the ground networks could potentially degrade an
    individual satellite or an entire constellation. DOD depends on a
    robust command and control, and information sharing network. Our
    adversaries know this and undoubtedly seek to deny us this capability.
        The Air Force has a significant program underway to evolve to one
    Air Force network. Additionally, with the establishment of 24th Air
    Force under Air Force Space Command, the Air Force is refining its
    command and control relationships for network operations, not only
    within the Air Force, but with the Joint Information Enterprise as
    well. This single network, reporting to one Air Force Network
    Operations Commander, reduces our vulnerabilities, and leads to a more
    efficient and effective command and control, and information sharing
    construct.

        119. Senator Vitter. General Schwartz, are you confident that the
    President's budget request fully addresses potential vulnerabilities
    that concern you?
        General Schwartz. The President's budget request addresses these
    vulnerabilities and is based on inputs from the combatant commanders,
    and guidance from OSD and the Joint Staff to prioritize our
    capabilities and warfighting dependencies. Armed with a clear
    understanding of the threat environment and associated capability
    shortfalls, we developed an optimized investment strategy aimed at
    reducing risk in our highest priority programs.

        120. Senator Vitter. General Schwartz, do you think the budget
    request is ambitious and forward-looking to address vulnerabilities in
    space and cyberspace?
        General Schwartz. In building the fiscal year 2011 President's
    budget request, we conducted rigorous enterprise-wide assessments that
    considered the threats of a future operating environment, capability
    shortfalls, space and cyberspace system solutions, and reasonable
    fiscal projections, with the goal of maximizing Air Force contributions
    to national defense in these increasingly contested domains. The budget
    request is designed to reduce risk in our highest priority programs,
    while accepting more risk where feasible.

        121. Senator Vitter. General Schwartz, are there other space or
    cyberspace investments or initiatives that should be funded that were
    not included in the President's budget?
        General Schwartz. Consistent with national imperatives and space
    and cyber policy objectives, we have put forward a budget request that
    reflects our strategy of sustaining current capabilities while also
    delivering new capabilities to combatant commanders and national
    agencies.

                         air force personnel recruiting
        122. Senator Vitter. Secretary Donley, military recruiting picked
    up last year as Services met and exceeded goals. To what do you
    attribute this success?
        Secretary Donley. Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS) continued
    success with enlisted accessions goals can be credited to the numerous
    opportunities we provide, as well as the Air Force reputation and
    lifestyle. Additionally, our highly-motivated, trained, all-volunteer
    recruiting force enthusiastically gets the word out to the young men
    and women in the Nation to be a part of the Air Force team. For some of
    our harder to fill specialties, a vital element for successful
    recruiting is the ability to offer bonuses and incentives where we have
    traditionally experienced shortfalls.

        123. Senator Vitter. Secretary Donley, do you believe that the Air
    Force can meet or exceed recruiting goals this year?
        Secretary Donley. The Air Force is on track to meet its enlisted
    goal and is currently at 100 percent (12,950 of 12,950) of the October
    through February goal. Officer accession is projected at 92.4 percent
    (4,604 of 4,979) for the yearly goal. Of the 4,979 goal, USAFA, AFROTC,
    AECP, and other programs account for 3,276 accessions (66 percent). The
    remaining 1,703 is the Air Force Recruiting Service's share, which
    accounts for health professions, chaplains, and OTS candidates. Of that
    group, recruiting fully qualified health professionals continues to be
    a challenge. As of 28 Feb, we have accessed 16.4 percent (130 of 794).
    The Health Professional Scholarship Program allows us to ``grow our
    own,'' and continued funding is critical to the success of this program
    because Health Professional Scholarship Program accessions are
    historically better than recruiting fully qualified health
    professionals. The program received more bonus dollars this year, but
    still not enough to match bonuses to accession requirements. For
    example: 65 Pharmacist requirements and only 45 bonuses; 43 Public
    Health requirements and 10 bonuses; 60 Psychologist requirements and 15
    bonuses.
        The Air Force Reserve is on track to meet its enlisted and officer
    goals; it is currently at 100.4 percent (4,265 of 4,250) and 96.5
    percent (410 of 425) respectively, of the October through February
    goals.
        The ANG is on track to meet its enlisted goal and is currently at
    111.7 percent (3,041 of 2,722) of the October through February goal.
    Officer accessions, currently at 45.4 percent (470 of 1,036) of the
    October through February goal, remain a challenge. The Guard has issued
    a national incentive-eligible list of critically manned skills, and has
    provided the Retention Office Managers real-time capability to review
    data and make national updates.

        [Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT FORCES
                                    COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Bill Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, and LeMieux.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
    research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff
    member; Gerard J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel;
    William G.P. Monahan, counsel; John H. Quirk V, professional
    staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member;
    Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner,
    professional staff member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
    staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I.
    Lloyd, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed;
    Greta Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Roger Pena,
    assistant to Senator Hagan; John Richards, assistant to Senator
    Begich; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Jason
    Lawrence, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek,
    assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine Wells III, assistant to
    Senator Wicker; and Victor Cervino and Brian Walsh, assistants
    to Senator LeMieux.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today's hearing is
    the first in a series of hearings that our committee will hold
    over the coming weeks with our combatant commanders to receive
    their testimony on the U.S. military strategy and operational
    requirements in their areas of responsibility (AORs). This is
    part of the committee's review of the National Defense
    Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2011.
        This morning, the committee receives testimony from Admiral
    James Stavridis, Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and
    the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Supreme Allied
    Commander Europe; General William Ward, Commander, U.S. Africa
    Command (AFRICOM); and General James Mattis, Commander, U.S.
    Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
        First let me take this opportunity on behalf of the
    committee to request that you pass along our gratitude to the
    men and women in your command and to their families for their
    commitment and their sacrifice in carrying out the missions of
    our commands.
        While Admiral Stavridis is not new to appearing before this
    committee, this is his first time testifying as EUCOM Commander
    and Supreme Allied Commander Europe. EUCOM's engagement with
    our allies and partners in Europe is an essential component of
    the trans-Atlantic relationship. Nowhere are the benefits of
    this relationship more clearly demonstrated than in
    Afghanistan, where 43 countries and nearly 40,000 non-U.S.
    troops, the vast majority of which come from countries in the
    EUCOM AOR, are participating in the NATO-led International
    Security Assistance Force (ISAF). EUCOM's efforts to build the
    capacity and interoperability of our allies and partners in
    Europe are an important contribution to ISAF's mission to bring
    security and stability to Afghanistan.
        We welcome the increased commitment of forces by our ISAF
    coalition partners since President Obama announced the
    commitment of additional U.S. forces in December. In addition,
    ISAF soldiers from Britain, Denmark, Estonia, and Canada joined
    U.S. soldiers and marines and Afghan troops in the recent
    combat operations in Helmand Province, and more than a dozen
    ISAF troops have died in that operation. We honor their
    sacrifice and the sacrifice of their families.
        At the same time, an issue that I want to get into further
    this morning is the continuing shortfall by our NATO allies to
    provide the additional trainers the NATO training mission in
    Afghanistan needs to build up the Afghan National Army and
    Police. It's apparent that growing the Afghan security forces
    so that they can take responsibility for ensuring their
    country's security is essential for the success of our
    counterinsurgency strategy and for meeting the July 2011 date
    that President Obama has set for the start of the reduction of
    U.S. troops in Afghanistan. There is no shortage of recruits
    for the Afghan Army, thanks in part to that July 2011 date,
    which has energized Afghanistan's leaders to bring in more
    recruits.
        According to General Bill Caldwell, the head of our
    training mission in Afghanistan, a major problem is the
    continuing shortage of trainers to provide the initial basic
    training. Training the Afghan Army is a mission that our NATO
    allies should embrace, regardless of their ability or their
    willingness to be on the front line of the fight. Yet, at a
    recent conference to generate forces NATO members pledged fewer
    than half of the approximately 1,200 additional NATO trainers
    sought by General Caldwell. That is more than disappointing; it
    is unacceptable.
        EUCOM faces a number of other security challenges within
    its AOR. President Obama's new plan for missile defense in
    Europe, the Phased Adaptive Approach, is supported by our NATO
    allies. In addition, later this year NATO plans to complete a
    revised strategic concept for how the alliance should adapt to
    today's security challenges, the first major revision of NATO's
    strategic concept since the events of September 11.
        General Ward, the challenges in the AFRICOM AOR are
    staggering, from the conflicts that rage across borders to
    fragile governments, to nations where peacekeeping or peace-
    enforcing forces are the best and sometimes only hope for
    security and stability, and to the spread of violent extremism.
        While confronting some of these issues falls squarely in
    the lap of a military command, many do not. Your command is
    being directed to assist in nontraditional ways where the
    jurisdictional lines between the Departments of State and
    Defense are blurred at best. The committee looks forward to
    your testimony on these issues and AFRICOM's activities
    designed to confront and to counter them.
        The threat of terrorism from Africa, and particularly the
    potential for havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists in
    ungoverned or undergoverned areas, are cause for deep concern.
    The attempted Christmas Day bombing of an airliner reminds
    everybody that al Qaeda and violent extremists who share their
    ideology are not just located in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
    region, but in places like Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, and Niger.
    The committee is eager to hear how AFRICOM is working to
    confront those very real threats.
        Turning to JFCOM, General Mattis is responsible for the
    training, certification, and mission readiness of our Armed
    Forces as the joint force provider for present and future
    operational needs. I hope that General Mattis will discuss how
    JFCOM has changed and promoted Department of Defense (DOD)
    practices that result in more efficient and effective policies
    and coordination with respect to joint operations, as well as
    meeting the anticipated threats of the future.
        We're also interested in hearing about the role of JFCOM
    with respect to the drawdown of forces in Iraq. Specifically of
    interest would be your views on: how the withdrawal of U.S.
    forces from Iraq will have an impact on JFCOM's ability to
    source the combatant commander's requirements in the future;
    how the Services and other Government agencies are preparing to
    execute the drawdown, and how well the Services are meeting
    their expected dwell times to restore readiness rates.
        In addition, as persistent conflicts in Afghanistan and
    Iraq continue to stress our Armed Forces, our committee is
    interested in hearing your assessment, General, of the
    readiness of deploying forces.
        Again, we thank our witnesses for their dedicated and
    continued service and we look forward to your testimony.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all
    the witnesses for being here today. I'm grateful for your
    service and that of all the brave men and women under your
    commands.
        Many of my colleagues and I have been strong supporters of
    our trans-Atlantic partnerships in the NATO alliance. During
    the Cold War, NATO succeeded, as we all know, in promoting and
    protecting freedom and democracy in Europe and we won. But
    today the alliance is facing a number of very significant
    challenges. Secretary Gates rightly said in his speech at the
    NATO strategic concept seminar last month, ``Unless the
    strategic concept spurs operational and institutional changes,
    it will not be worth the paper it's printed on.''
        Right now the alliance has serious budgetary problems and
    is facing a budget shortfall of some $900 million. The problem
    is not just the current underfunding of NATO. Over the years,
    NATO and the national defense budgets consistently have
    declined to where only 5 of its 28 member states are obligating
    the required defense spending of 2 percent of gross domestic
    product.
        While the war in Afghanistan has shown a light on NATO's
    diminished capacity, these shortcomings are not new. For years
    before Afghanistan NATO, due to its limited budgets, has let
    its capabilities decline. For example, NATO lacks the cargo
    airlift, the helicopters, aerial refueling tankers, and
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms
    needed to be effective in Afghanistan or in any other future
    conflict.
        Member states should be explaining to their parliaments and
    to their citizens that NATO faces common threats and shares
    common goals. I am concerned that they continue to allow the
    idea to build up among their publics that NATO is fighting wars
    because the Americans are making them do it. The alliance must
    be about more than fulfilling our obligations under Article 5,
    as essential as that is. It must also serve to deter potential
    adversaries and build partner capacity within the alliance and
    beyond. Only then can we begin to collectively transform our
    alliance from one of common defense to one of common security.
        Admiral Stavridis, I look forward to hearing your thoughts
    on the future of defense spending among our NATO allies and
    your prescription for developing and better leveraging NATO's
    capabilities to meet future threats.
        I strongly believe it's important to nurture and scrutinize
    old friendships. It's equally important to develop and foster
    new ones. Africa is a continent full of potential friends and
    allies. We often grow too complacent and lack the foresight to
    prepare for the things we don't expect, and that's why I'm glad
    we have AFRICOM. Africa, as we know, has always been vulnerable
    to illicit trafficking due to widespread corruption, poor
    governance, and abject poverty.
        Somalis continue to flow into Yemen and train with al Qaeda
    and its affiliates, and we don't have to look any further than
    the Christmas Day bomber, a Nigerian, as proof that violent
    extremists exist in many places we're not thinking about or
    fighting a war.
        But we have partners in the region. Malian troops have
    launched an offensive against al Qaeda along its northern
    border with Algieria and lost as many as 13 troops last summer.
    African nations are vulnerable to a variety of threats,
    narcotrafficking, piracy, and terrorism, any of which would
    further weaken an already fragile region.
        So, General Ward, I look forward to hearing your testimony
    and your command's need for trainers, forces, and resources.
        General Mattis, your leadership of JFCOM comes at a time
    when our troops are engaged more than ever in joint operations.
    The branches of our Armed Forces are expected not only to team
    with one another, but with allies and host nation troops, as we
    have seen most recently in the offensive in Marjah. The
    committee is interested in understanding how JFCOM is preparing
    our troops to operate jointly and what steps you believe the
    Services should be taking in this regard. I'm also curious
    about how the rapidly changing feedback from the field in Iraq
    and Afghanistan will be incorporated in JFCOM's future
    doctrinal development.
        You're all highly decorated and highly respected members of
    the military. I appreciate your service and weigh your
    opinions, requests, and predictions heavily, so I look forward
    to hearing all of your testimonies.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to the witnesses. I am
    grateful for your service, and that of all of the brave men and women
    under your command.
        Many of my colleagues and I have been strong supporters of our
    trans-Atlantic partnerships and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO) alliance. During the Cold War, NATO succeeded in promoting and
    protecting freedom and democracy in Europe--and we won. But today, the
    alliance is facing a number of problems.
        Secretary Gates rightly said in his speech at the NATO Strategic
    Concept Seminar last month, `` . . . unless, the Strategic Concept
    spurs operational and institutional changes . . . it will not be worth
    the paper it is printed on.' ''
        Right now, the alliance has serious budgetary problems and is
    facing a budget shortfall of some $900 million. The problem is not just
    the current underfunding of NATO. Over the years, NATO and national
    defense budgets consistently have declined to where only 5 of its 28
    member states are paying the required defense spending of 2 percent of
    gross domestic product.
        While the war in Afghanistan has shined a light on NATO's
    diminished capacity, these shortcomings are not new. For years before
    Afghanistan, NATO--due to limited budgets--has let its capabilities
    decline. For example, NATO lacks the cargo airlift, the helicopters,
    aerial refueling tankers and the ISR platforms needed to be effective
    in Afghanistan or any other future conflict.
        Member states must explain to their parliaments and to their
    citizens that NATO faces common threats and shares common goals. They
    cannot continue to allow the idea to build up among their publics that
    NATO is fighting wars because the Americans are making them do it. The
    alliance must be about more than fulfilling our obligations under
    Article 5, as essential as that is. It must also serve to deter
    potential adversaries and build partner capacity within the alliance
    and beyond. Only then can we begin to collectively transform our
    alliance from one of common defense to one of common security.
        Admiral Stavridis, I look forward to hearing your thoughts on the
    future of defense spending among our NATO allies and your prescription
    for developing and better leveraging NATO's capabilities to meet future
    threats.
        While I strongly believe it is important to nurture and scrutinize
    old friendships, it is equally important to develop and foster new
    ones. Africa is a continent full of potential friends and allies. We
    often grow too complacent and lack the foresight to prepare for the
    things we don't expect. That is why I am glad we have Africa Command.
        Africa has always been vulnerable to illicit trafficking due to
    widespread corruption, poor governance and abject poverty. Somalis
    continue to flow into Yemen and train with al Qaeda and its affiliates
    and we don't have to look any further than the Christmas Day bomber, a
    Nigerian, as proof that violent extremists exist in many places we're
    not thinking about or fighting a war.
        But we have partners in the region. Malian troops have launched
    offensives against al Qaeda along its northern border with Algiers and
    lost as many as 33 troops last summer. African nations are vulnerable
    to a variety of threats: narco-trafficking, piracy and terrorism. Any
    of which could further weaken an already fragile region. So, General
    Ward, I look forward to hearing your testimony and your command's need
    for trainers, forces and resources.
        General Mattis, your leadership of Joint Forces Command comes at a
    time when our troops are engaged more than ever in `joint' operations.
    The branches of our armed services are expected not only to team with
    one another but with allies and host-nation troops, as we have seen
    most recently in the offensive in Marjah. The Committee is interested
    in understanding how Joint Forces Command is preparing our troops to
    operate `jointly' and what steps you believe the Services should be
    taking in this regard. I am also curious about how the rapidly changing
    feedback from the field in Iraq and Afghanistan will be incorporated in
    Joint Command's future doctrinal development.
        You are all highly decorated officers, and I appreciate your
    service and weigh your opinions, requests and predictions heavily. So,
    I look forward to hearing all of your testimonies.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        We'll start with you, Admiral Stavridis.

       STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            EUROPEAN COMMAND

        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you very much, Senator Levin,
    Senator McCain, and all the members of the committee who are
    taking the time to hear from my two very good friends and
    wingmen this morning, General Kip Ward and General Jim Mattis.
    I feel as a Navy Admiral very safe between these two
    distinguished combat veterans.
        I want to thank Congress, I want to thank this committee,
    for the support you give us in all of our operations. It's
    vital and it translates directly to our men and women, and we
    thank you for it.
        I'll be glad to talk about all of the things that were
    raised by the chairman and the ranking member. In Afghanistan,
    I would say that I am cautiously optimistic. I think Secretary
    Gates yesterday in Afghanistan put it very well: We have some
    challenges ahead, but we are seeing some bits and pieces of
    good news. I'll be glad to talk about some of those.
        Senator Levin, I agree completely that we need to focus
    like a laser on trainers for the NATO forces. I'm committed to
    doing that and I'll talk about it as we go along.
        I did want to mention also we're very engaged from a EUCOM
    perspective in the Balkans. We don't talk a lot about that
    these days, but I think we see a real success story emerging in
    the Balkans. If we look back 10 years ago when we had almost
    30,000 U.S. troops in the Balkans, today we're down to about
    1,200, and our allies are working very hard in the Balkans as
    we move toward a safer and more secure area there.
        I'd also like to touch on cyber and some of my concerns
    there, talk a little about Iran and potential threats to
    Europe, touch on our relations with Russia, and then talk a bit
    about some of the initiatives we're undertaking at EUCOM which
    focus on interagency, international, private-public partnering,
    and the use of effective strategic communications.
        Sir, I'll close by saying I represent here 80,000 brave men
    and women from EUCOM. They're all proud to serve. They're all
    volunteers. They thank you for your support.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]
               Prepared Statement by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
    the committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you today to share with you the challenges and successes
    achieved by the men and women of both European Command and Allied
    Command Operations. Although I have only been at the helm of these
    Commands for less than a year, I am happy to report we are making great
    progress and we are moving assertively toward stronger partnerships for
    our shared security. Truly, the most important activities we have
    undertaken in the past year have been those in which we worked together
    with our Allies and partners to build their capacity, as well as our
    own, to ensure security in the European theater and defend our homeland
    forward. These kinds of activities demonstrate the three essential
    pillars I believe are necessary for success.
        First, we must understand the military is but one link in the chain
    anchoring our national security. Those of us in uniform are well
    trained and capable of performing a wide range of duties, but many of
    the dangers posed to our national security elicit more than just a
    military response. Instead, they call for a ``whole-of-government''
    approach that requires partnering with other agencies such as the
    Department of State (DOS) leading diplomacy, U.S. Agency for
    International Development leading development, Department of the
    Treasury, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and
    other departments and agencies of our Government to ensure we use all
    the means available to ensure our national security. Several U.S.
    Departments and Agencies either have representatives at our
    headquarters in Stuttgart or will have them in place this fiscal year.
    More than a tool or a method, ``Interagency Partnering'' is an
    expanding paradigm at EUCOM and we are intent on serving as a model of
    interagency cooperation.
        Second, not only must we work with our interagency partners, we
    must also cooperate closely with our international partners as well.
    Our aim is to undertake international security cooperation in a way
    that recognizes and leverages the histories, cultures, and languages of
    our allies and partners, and enhances our collective capability.
        Finally, it is important that we employ effective strategic
    communication in everything we do. Our deeds and words should
    communicate clearly and credibly our values and priorities to allies,
    partners, friends, and even enemies.
        Our partnerships in Europe are strong. We share a great deal of
    history and culture based on democratic values. Our own democracy was
    born of the great European thinkers from Plato to Voltaire, and great
    works that shaped our own Constitution, like the Magna Carta. Waves of
    immigrants from Europe have helped build our country, and many of the
    families of those immigrants still have strong ties to societies on the
    European continent. These strong personal transatlantic ties unite us
    in common goals and enduring partnerships.

        During the past year, European Command's 80,000 soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, and civilians have executed many programs, side-by-
    side with our allies and partners, which have truly made us ``Stronger
    Together.'' Let me summarize some key European Command accomplishments
    and initiatives:

          Provided predeployment training to thousands of Europe-
    based U.S. forces and over 100 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO) Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams slated for deployment in
    Afghanistan
          Provided forces and critical support for the movement of
    equipment and personnel between the Continental United States and the
    Central Command Region in support of overseas contingency operations
          Provided a world class medical center, Landstuhl Regional
    Medical Center, used as the primary trauma facility supporting U.S.
    forces in Europe and the Middle East
          Executed 38 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S.,
    allied, and partner nation personnel and 45 partner nations
          Conducted 151 security assistance projects in 19
    countries
          Reorganized to better engage and collaborate with NATO,
    the interagency, academia, the private sector, think tanks, and
    international and nongovernmental organizations

                                    progress
        Think of U.S. European Command as part of a bridge: one that spans
    the broad North Atlantic. Our fundamental purpose is to defend the
    United States of America. To do so, we must keep that trans-Atlantic
    bridge strong.
        In a dynamic region, European Command continues achieving success
    by partnering with allies to increase their capacity and ours to
    contribute to international security-enhancing solutions. Below are
    some examples highlighting this approach:
    Joint Multi-National Readiness Center
        The Joint Multi-National Readiness Center supports European Command
    and Central Command operations by providing predeployment training to
    Europe-based U.S. forces and NATO Operational Mentoring and Liaison
    Teams slated for deployment to Afghanistan. Currently, the Center
    provides enduring Observer/Controller support to the United States
    Security Coordinator (USSC) Israel to train the Palestinian National
    Security Forces. Joint Multi-National Readiness Center observer/
    controllers were also instrumental in the successful predeployment
    training of the Jordanian 2nd Ranger Battalion for operations in
    support of Afghanistan's national elections. We have trained almost
    4,000 soldiers thus far. Through these training efforts, EUCOM enabled
    partner nations in making contributions to the effort in Afghanistan.
    However, we require expanded long-term authorities and funding to
    enhance and continue these efforts.

    Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force
        Marine Forces Europe directly supports the Republic of Georgia's 2-
    year program to deploy Georgian forces alongside Marine Forces to
    Afghanistan. The Georgia Deployment Program-International Security
    Assistance Force will deploy four rotations of a Georgian battalion
    with a Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Afghanistan. As
    capabilities improve, Georgian forces are expected to be able to
    operate independently. By using Georgian shadow instructors Marine
    Forces Europe will create a Georgian training group that will largely
    take over the Partnership Training Program by their fourth rotation.
    The National Guard State Partnership Program
        The National Guard State Partnership Program links individual State
    National Guard organizations with a particular European nation. The
    National Guard of Illinois, for example, partners with Poland. The
    State Partnership Program makes large multi-faceted contributions to
    security both within and outside Europe. The 21 European State
    Partnerships undertake a broad range of projects, including a capacity-
    building program generating 4 enduring European Command State
    Partnership Program Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams conducting
    combat operations in Afghanistan. This program has the additional
    benefit of building critical long-term personal and professional
    relationships between the States and European nations because many of
    the same personnel return year after year to train with their
    counterparts.

    Support to NATO Response Force
        We are providing personnel to support multiple 2009 training and
    certification events through U.S. European Command. This effort
    enhanced the training and certification of the Land Component Command
    and assisted the NATO Response Force's Joint Logistics Support Group in
    reaching advanced operational capability. This high level of
    operational acumen is key to ensuring the Force maintains the
    deployment capability required to execute its core mission.
    Support to Operation Joint Guardian, Kosovo
        The United States' continuing support to NATO's Kosovo Force
    Operation Joint Guardian helps maintain stability in Kosovo and
    advances security progress alongside our NATO and European Union
    partners. European Command supports Kosovo Force through our land
    component, U.S. Army Europe, and leverages National Guard Bureau forces
    to source Task Force Falcon (Multi-national Task Force-East), Regional
    Mentoring and Liaison Teams, NATO Training Teams, elements of the
    Kosovo Force Headquarters, as well as augmenting the Kosovo Force
    Military-Civilian Advisory Division by providing mentors and advisors.
    In June of last year, the North Atlantic Council approved the plan to
    begin a drawdown from Focused Engagement (current force structure) to a
    Deterrent Presence. Accomplishment of Deterrent Presence, which will
    reduce NATO force presence from approximately 14,000 to 2,500, began in
    January 2010 and, based on a coordinated review of political and
    security conditions on the ground may occur in three phases. Today
    Kosovo remains stable and secure--a real allied success, but NATO's
    North Atlantic Council will continue to evaluate further drawdown.
    Reduction of U.S. presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina
        European Command has played a significant role in Bosnia's progress
    since the 1995 implementation of the Dayton Accords. At the height of
    Operation Joint Endeavor in 1996, more than 20,000 U.S. servicemembers
    served in Bosnia. The September 2009 deactivation of Task Force Dayton,
    the last U.S. entity operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, marked a
    significant milestone for U.S. European Command. Less than 20 U.S.
    personnel now remain in Bosnia assigned to the NATO Headquarters-
    Sarajevo and the U.S. Balkans National Support Element. European
    Command continues building partnership capacity with Bosnia through
    focused security cooperation initiatives to include International
    Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, Joint
    Contact Team Program familiarizations, and the State Partnership
    Program with Maryland's Army National Guard. In a show of its
    increasing capacity, Bosnia assumed a key leadership role during
    European Command's 2009 Combined Endeavor exercise involving 39
    countries and 1,200 personnel. European Command is also developing a
    bilateral exercise program to further focus on defense reform, Euro-
    Atlantic integration, support to Overseas Contingency Operations, and
    capacity building. Because of the progress in Bosnia, the Nation
    contributed consistently to the coalition effort in Iraq between 2005
    and 2008 and will deploy personnel to Afghanistan in the near future.
    Multi-National Joint and Interagency Exercises
        The most intensive form of peacetime interaction with our allies
    and partners occurs in the conduct of joint exercises. European Command
    maintained a robust bilateral and multilateral exercise program last
    year, executing 38 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S.,
    allied, and partner nation personnel and 45 partner nations. The
    exercises focused on preparing partner nations for ongoing coalition
    operations to include International Security Assistance Force in
    Afghanistan, NATO interoperability, and improving our military
    capability and interoperability with Israel.
        In support of NATO, European Command provided forces for 12 NATO
    and NATO Partnership for Peace events in the Baltics. U.S. Naval Forces
    Europe also executed Exercise Baltic Operations, a longstanding
    multinational maritime exercise including 14 nations focused on
    maritime and amphibious interoperability. In the Balkans, two major
    exercises, Medical Central and Eastern Europe Exercise 2009 and
    Combined Endeavor, discussed above, bolstered partner capabilities and
    eased regional tensions. Medical Central and Eastern Europe Exercise
    2009, U.S. European Command's first large scale exercise in Serbia,
    included 14 nations and focused on medical readiness and disaster
    response. This exercise also supported the U.S. Agency for
    International Development's Preparedness, Planning and Economic
    Security program that has been making Serbian municipalities more
    resilient to crises and disasters.
        Of particular note, European Command conducted a theater-wide
    Exercise, Jackal Stone, a Special Operations Headquarters and Field
    Training Exercise executed in Croatia and distributed locations
    throughout the theater involving more than 10 nations and 1,500 partner
    nation Special Operation Forces personnel. This event, along with other
    special operations exercises and Joint Combined Exchange Training
    events in over 30 countries, directly supported U.S. and partner
    Special Operations Forces readiness and contributions to International
    Security Assistance Force and other endeavors.
        European Command continues a high level of engagement with Israel,
    conducting 500+ theater security cooperation events annually and
    chairing four bi-lateral, biennial conferences spanning planning,
    logistics, exercises, and interoperability. The U.S.-Israel exercise
    portfolio also includes eight major reoccurring exercises. European
    Command leadership and staff maintain uniquely strong, recurring,
    personal and direct interactions with counterparts on the Israel
    Defense Force. These regular and direct relationships have paid
    dividends as the placement of the AN/TPY-2 radar in Israel resulted in
    a dramatic uptick in both senior level and operator level interaction.
    European Command Headquarters executed Austere Challenge 2009, the
    premier joint force headquarters exercise in the European Command
    Theater, with a crisis action planning phase in January 2009 and an
    operations phase in May 2009.
        Building on the success from Southern Command's exercise Blue
    Advance 2008, European Command benefitted from the participation of an
    Integration Planning Cell with representatives from the U.S. Department
    of Agriculture, the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Agency for
    International Development. The Department of State's Office of the
    Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization led the Integration
    Planning Cell, which also featured the first-time participation of the
    newly formed Advance Civilian Team, which was colocated with EUCOM's
    Joint Task Force headquarters. Together, the Integration Planning Cell
    and Advance Civilian Team comprised the largest interagency involvement
    to date in any Combatant Command exercise. The benefits of this
    structure are clear: most real-world challenges require an interagency
    approach to solve and our robust exercise program reflects this
    understanding.
        Austere Challenge 2010 will feature multiple event-driven scenarios
    requiring multiple joint task forces and will involve a Combined Joint
    Air Coordination Center led for the first time by the French Air Force.
    On a smaller scale, Flexible Leader is a Command Post Exercise,
    focusing on Foreign Consequence Management and Humanitarian Assistance/
    Disaster Relief planning and operations, and strengthening our ``whole-
    of-government'' approach through engagement with various U.S. agencies
    as well as partner nations and nongovernmental organizations.
        None of these events would be possible without Commander Exercise
    Engagement and Training Transformation Funding. The support from Joint
    Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center is also a keystone to this
    command's capability to plan, manage, and execute these challenging
    joint exercises. In addition to the extensive engagement European
    Command has with partner nations, there are additional major projects.
    Logistical Support to Contingency Operations from Spain
        In support of ongoing overseas contingency operations, European
    Command continues providing critical coordination and support for the
    movement of key U.S. equipment and personnel between the Continental
    United States and the Central Command region.
    Exercising Nuclear Command and Control
        In May 2009, the Joint Staff conducted a Staff Assessment Visit on
    the European Command Joint Operations Center and Joint Nuclear
    Operations Center, and the Joint Staff inspectors rated both centers'
    performance as ``excellent,'' a repeat from last year's positive
    assessment.
    Assistance to Turkey
        Increased intelligence sharing with the Turkish General Staff has
    increased the effectiveness of Turkish cross-border counterterrorism
    operations in Northern Iraq, leading to more precise Turkish action
    that reduces potential collateral damage and increases stability in the
    region.

    Humanitarian Assistance Programs
        European Command's Humanitarian Assistance programs directly
    benefit the Nations where they are executed and consist of the
    Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program, the Humanitarian Assistance-
    Other Program, and Humanitarian Assistance Program-Excess Property.
        Projects funded through these resources complement U.S. Agency for
    International Development efforts, enhance regional security
    cooperation, and advance U.S. interests throughout the region. They
    also bolster a country's own capability to respond to disasters,
    thereby diminishing the need for future U.S. involvement, and provide
    an example of the value of a military during times of peace. While the
    European Command Humanitarian Assistance budget is relatively small, it
    has a disproportionately high and positive impact. Last year, the
    command executed over $9 million in Humanitarian Assistance Project
    funding for 151 security assistance related projects in 19 countries.
    Whole-of-Government/Whole-of-Society Approach
        Our  Nation's  success  in  developing  conventional  combat  power
     has  driven  our adversaries to other forms of warfare, necessitating
    a whole-of-government/whole-of-society approach. Interagency and
    international military partnering is the ``heart of the enterprise''
    for this command.
        Embassy Country Teams, a perfect example of interagency partnering
    themselves, are our primary engagement entities for the 51 countries in
    our region. At the theater or regional level, however, the Geographic
    Combatant Commands can serve as a platform for hosting interagency
    partners wishing to coordinate their activities with the U.S. military.
    European Command presently hosts interagency representatives from the
    Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Agency for
    International Development, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement, and the Global Center for Security
    Cooperation; we will soon add representatives from Department of
    Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Energy,
    and the Drug Enforcement Administration. This cooperation helps us
    interact with allied and partner militaries who perform many
    nontraditional military activities: patrolling borders; responding to
    natural disasters; providing coastal security; and performing civilian
    air traffic control.
        We recently changed the organizational structure of European
    Command to better facilitate integration of our interagency partners.
    Starting at the top, we established a civilian deputy, an office now
    filled by Ambassador Kate Canavan, who in addition serves as European
    Command's Political Advisor. Additionally, European Command's newly
    formed J9 Interagency Directorate engages and collaborates with
    international and nongovernmental organizations, academia, the private
    sector, think tanks, and military organizations. We gain many
    advantages by leveraging the knowledge and fresh thinking of academics
    and business professionals, and international organizations and
    nongovernmental organizations have capabilities, access, and
    credibility in areas where the military does not.
        For example, we are in the very early stages of pursuing a whole-
    of-government/whole-of-society approach in addressing regional
    narcotics and terrorism threats in Europe and Eurasia, similar to the
    interagency effort led by Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Key
    West. This would synchronize multiple combatant commands (European
    Command, Central Command, Africa Command) and the multitude of agencies
    working border control, counternarcotics, counterterrorism and
    trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, creating synergies that
    would add considerable capability and trust for our international
    partners while defending our Homeland forward.
                      european command service components
        U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe, U.S. Naval
    Forces Europe, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, as well as European Command's
    functional subordinate unified command for special operations, Special
    Operations Command Europe, are responsible for supporting our Theater
    Campaign Plan and implementing our Theater Security Cooperation
    programs across the region. The Service components provide the
    capabilities necessary to build military capacity among our partners
    and allies, conduct military operations, and promote vital national
    security interests. Reductions in their forces imposed by budget
    constraints necessarily diminish what they can accomplish.

        With over 69,000 Active-Duty, Reserve, and civilian employees
    operating in 10 main Army communities, U.S. Army Europe leads and
    supports 11 brigades postured in geographically-separated locations
    throughout Central Europe, from Mons, Belgium to Livorno, Italy. U.S.
    Army Europe provides key tactical and operational forces to include
    full spectrum combat units and strategic enablers for European Command,
    Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the
    International Security Assistance Force. The command currently has 25
    percent of its soldiers operationally deployed but still continues to
    lead daily to build partner capacity and execute Theater Security
    Cooperation in support of USEUCOM's strategy of active security and
    global requirements. U.S. Army Europe directly participates in
    cooperative efforts with over 80 percent of the countries that have
    forces actively serving in partnership with the United States in
    Overseas Contingency Operations.
    Activities with Allies and Partners
        U.S. Army Europe's Joint Multinational Training Command in Germany
    is pivotal to the Building Partner Capacity mission. Joint
    Multinational Training Command builds expeditionary competencies and
    increased interoperability between partner nations' militaries through
    collective multinational training and through certifying U.S. and
    coalition forces for deployments to International Security Assistance
    Force, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Kosovo Force missions.
    Additionally, Joint Multinational Training Command has qualified over
    500 soldiers from 21 nations in Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
    training and conducted mission rehearsal exercises for International
    Security Assistance Force North, South, and Central Regional Commands.

        U.S. Army Europe leads Task Force-East as a European Command
    vehicle for fulfillment of the Theater Security Cooperation mission
    requirements set forth by the Defense Department and to reaffirm the
    U.S. commitment to our Black Sea allies. The command continuously
    maintains Task Force-East facilities and support services, and can
    quickly transition the facilities to support an increased posture for
    all European Command components and partners. Task Force-East provides
    important training opportunities not only for the U.S. military, but
    also to new Allies close to their forces' home station. U.S. Army
    Europe's forward presence in Romania and Bulgaria continues to
    facilitate NATO efforts to build and maintain an Alliance for the 21st
    century.
        This year, U.S. Army Europe participated in 26 major exercises in
    22 different countries with 34 participating nations, of which 6 were
    in direct support to U.S. Africa Command. These exercises enabled U.S.
    Army Europe to meet European Command's priority of sustaining the
    relevance of, and U.S. leadership within, NATO; assisting NATO
    countries with the capability to conduct out-of-area operations and
    ensuring a successful transition of U.S. Africa Command into a fully
    operational combatant command. U.S. Army Europe also acted as the lead
    organization in Austere Challenge 2009, a comprehensive command post
    exercise involving over 3,400 European Command forces, which certified
    European Command's Combined Joint Task Force.
        U.S. Army Europe continues supporting Operations Iraqi Freedom and
    Enduring Freedom. In 2009, over half of U.S. Army Europe's units
    trained and deployed to or returned from these operations. Currently,
    the 1st Armored Division Headquarters, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat
    Team, and 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment are deployed in support of
    Overseas Contingency Operations. V Corps inactivation was delayed in
    order to deploy to Afghanistan, where it currently forms the core of
    International Security Assistance Force's 3-star level command and
    control headquarters.

        U.S. Army Europe also continues contributing significant
    operational support and sustainment forces in support of Overseas
    Contingency Operations in the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa
    Command region. Additionally, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment provided
    rotational forces for Task Force East in Romania and Bulgaria while at
    the same time supporting Denmark in their train-up for NATO Response
    Force-14. The 172nd Brigade Combat Team and 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored
    Division, which recently reflagged as the 170th Brigade Combat Team,
    redeployed from Iraq and are preparing for possible future rotations
    while completing their reset and dwell.
    Activities Conducted Unilaterally
        U.S. Army Europe continues executing its title 10 responsibilities
    through transformation planning initiatives in support of modernization
    and efficient basing. This past year, U.S. Army Europe transformed into
    a Theater Army functional staff configuration. This restructuring will
    result in European Command losing one of its Full Spectrum Joint Task
    Force/Joint Forces Land Component Command capable headquarters. This
    loss, combined with significant force requirements in support of
    Overseas Contingency Operations outside the European Command region,
    makes retaining one Tactical Intermediate Headquarters and four Brigade
    Combat Teams critical to U.S. Army Europe's and European Command's
    mission. Without the four Brigade Combat Teams and one tactical
    intermediate headquarters capability, European Command assumes risk in
    its capability to conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping,
    and contingency missions. Deterrence and reassurance are at increased
    risk.
        While U.S. Army Europe is transforming, it is also optimizing its
    footprint and gaining basing efficiencies by consolidating across six
    Main Operating Bases in Germany and Italy by 2015. In support of this
    initiative, this past year U.S. Army Europe returned eight sites to
    host nation control. U.S. Army Europe projects a decrease in 1,400
    soldiers this year as it continues to consolidate forces.

        With only a small service component headquarters, Marine Forces
    Europe very effectively leverages the capabilities of the Marine Corps
    in support of European Command objectives. Marine Forces Europe's
    engagement in the region follows three lines of operation: (1) building
    partner capacity, particularly through combined exercises; (2)
    utilizing expeditionary forces to contribute to conventional
    deterrence; and (3) supporting operations in Afghanistan. The primary
    focus of Marine Forces Europe Theater Security Cooperation activities
    is defense sector reform and professionalization of partner nations'
    militaries in the Caucasus. The primary focus of Marine Forces Europe
    Theater Security Cooperation activities is defense sector reform and
    professionalization of partner nations' militaries in the Caucasus.
    Collective Training Programs
        Engagements in Task Force East, Bulgaria and Volos, Greece
        Marine Forces Europe, in coordination with U.S. Naval Forces
    Europe, employed over 2,000 marines and sailors of the 22d Marine
    Expeditionary Unit between May and June 2009 on a scale not seen since
    Operation Iraqi Freedom.
        Maritime Prepositioning Force exercise, Loyal Midas
        Loyal Midas improved prepositioning equipment in support of
    expeditionary operations; a core competency. Loyal Midas experimented
    with procedures for tracking offloaded cargo from a prepositioning ship
    using new wireless technologies, and significantly improved European
    Command's ability to rapidly deploy and assemble expeditionary forces
    in the region.
        Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway
        Using this program, the Marine Corps worked with the Norwegian
    Defense Staff and Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, and the European
    Command staff to develop a plan that enhances access to prepositioned
    equipment ashore. Participants analyzed joint U.S.-Norwegian
    agreements, and initiated a long-range plan for instituting an
    operating concept for the prepositioning facility.
        Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force
        This program supports the sustained deployment of a Georgian
    infantry battalion to Afghanistan to operate as part of the Marine
    Expeditionary Brigade for 2 years. The initial deployment occurs this
    coming spring.
        Coalition Embarkation Support
        Personnel from the Marine Forces Europe Strategic Mobility section
    used this European Command-led International Security Assistance Force
    effort to familiarize partner nations with U.S. embarkation procedures.
    Partner nation self-deployment to Afghanistan or other regional
    contingencies is the overall goal of the program.
        Marine Forces Europe is planning for a company-sized rotational
    force to deploy to Task Force East this summer. This force, which is a
    proof of concept for the Marine Corps' Security Cooperation Marine Air
    Ground Task Force, plans to accomplish in only 90 days what previously
    required a full year of Theater Security Cooperation activity by
    forward-deploying and utilizing the forward operating site in Romania.
        Force Posture
        Despite these successes, the lack of a sustained Amphibious Ready
    Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit in the European Command region curtails
    engagement opportunity with Allies and partners and detracts from
    active deterrence. Resuming a sustained presence in the European
    Command region would deter adversaries and assure allies and partners
    of our commitment to stability in Europe.

        With more than 8,000 Active-Duty, Reserve, and civilian employees
    operating from 5 main installations supporting rotational surface, air,
    submarine and expeditionary forces, U.S. Naval Forces Europe conducts
    the full range of maritime operations and Theater Security Cooperation
    in concert with coalition, joint, interagency and other partners to
    advance security and stability in Europe. NAVEUR continues to
    strengthen relationships with enduring Allies and emerging partners
    while maintaining naval leadership and combat readiness. U.S. Naval
    Forces Europe leverages its maritime expertise to support and improve
    regional maritime safety and security. Through ballistic missile
    defense, anti-submarine warfare, expeditionary force engagement, a
    continuing surface presence, and other activities, U.S. Naval Forces
    Europe enhanced maritime safety, security and cooperation throughout
    the European Command region in 2009.
        Theater Security Cooperation and other Activities with Allies and
            Partners
        Through military-to-military activities demonstrating our naval
    commitment, U.S. Naval Forces Europe promotes maritime domain
    awareness, maritime security operations, security assistance, NATO
    interoperability, and information sharing.
        Taken together, U.S. Naval Forces Europe's anti-submarine warfare
    program, Ballistic Missile Defense initiatives, and partner capacity
    building efforts are improving maritime stability and ensuring U.S. and
    partner access to the maritime domain. Theater Security Cooperation
    highlights include:

        Afloat Ballistic Missile Defense
        A survivable sea-based ballistic missile defense system is an
    important component of the phased adaptive approach to defend the
    Homeland, as well as allies and partners in Europe and Eurasia. U.S.
    Naval Forces Europe is developing the necessary ballistic missile
    defense command and control architecture while mitigating
    vulnerabilities to the sea-based ballistic missile defense network with
    air and undersea capabilities. A U.S. Naval Forces Europe Flag Officer
    commanded Juniper Cobra 2010, a joint missile defense exercise with
    Israel, incorporating all aspects of both land and sea-based missile
    defense and stands as a hallmark of the future of our ballistic missile
    defense program.

        Enhanced Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability
        In partnership with our allies, U.S. Naval Forces Europe continues
    upgrading procedures, training and qualifications to enhance theater
    anti-submarine warfare capability through Commander, Task Force 69.
        Explosive Ordnance Disposal
        Naval Forces Europe's Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Eight
    provides extensive military-to-military training programs with the
    partner nations' expeditionary forces and provides explosive ordnance
    disposal support to International Security Assistance Force
    contributors. In addition to supporting U.S. and NATO exercises
    throughout the region, the unit provided real-world explosive ordnance
    disposal to several European nations.
        Response to Piracy
        Maritime Expeditionary Security Detachment provides shipboard
    security teams to U.S. military support vessels, participates in
    exercises and contributes to theater security cooperation engagements.
        Construction Support
        Naval Construction Forces (Seabees) completed a diverse array of
    construction projects emphasizing humanitarian civil assistance and
    military-to-military engagements as well as construction support to
    exercises Baltic Operations, Medical Training Exercise in Central and
    Eastern Europe, Seabreeze, and Jackal Stone. The Seabees completed
    construction of operation centers, training infrastructure, and quality
    of life projects, including a Military Operation Urban Terrain facility
    used for Close Quarters Combat training in Zadar, Croatia, and
    renovation of the Padarevo Kindergarten facility in Padarevo, Bulgaria.
        Maritime Domain Awareness
        U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Sixth Fleet continues actively developing
    and validating advanced maritime domain awareness procedures. Several
    maritime domain awareness exercises, including Autumn Blitz 2009, were
    conducted with NATO's Maritime Component Command-Naples to advance the
    interoperability and information processing necessary for effective
    planning and conduct of maritime operations, such as NATO's Operation
    Active Endeavour, between NATO and U.S. commands.

        Eurasia Partnership Capstone
        In 2009, U.S. Naval Forces Europe's primary Black Sea-Eurasia
    region engagement vehicle took place at Souda Bay, Crete. Personnel
    from 11 nations participated.
        Port Visits
        Ship visits demonstrate U.S. Naval Forces Europe's commitment to
    improving maritime safety and security and strengthen partner
    relationships through training activities with host nation militaries.
    For example, following Joint Warrior 2009, the three participating U.S.
    ships conducted Theater Security Cooperation port visits in six
    countries.
        Exercises with Allies and Partners
        U.S. Naval Forces Europe participated in 19 exercises with 25
    allies and partners covering the full range of maritime activity.
    Highlights include:

             Exercise Baltic Operations 2009: U.S. Naval Forces
            Europe-Sixth Fleet sponsored and executed the 37th annual
            Baltic Operations with 43 ships from 12 participating nations.
            This European Command-directed multinational exercise enhanced
            maritime safety and security in the Baltic Sea by increasing
            interoperability and cooperation among regional allies.
             Phoenix Express 2009: Members of the U.S. Naval Forces
            Europe-Sixth Fleet Staff, USS Mount Whitney and USS Robert G.
            Bradley along with several European and North African navies
            conducted the 2-week Exercise Phoenix Express 2009, leveraging
            the capability of European and African partnerships in order to
            enhance stability in the Mediterranean region through increased
            interoperability and cooperation.
             Exercise Frukus 2009: U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Sixth
            Fleet staff and USS Klakring participated in Exercise Frukus
            2009 (France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States). This
            confidence-building exercise focused on resuming the maritime
            partnership between NATO's major Navies and the Russian
            Federation Navy.
             Reliant Mermaid 2009: USS Stout and members of the
            U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Sixth Fleet staff participated in the
            trilateral maritime search and rescue exercise Reliant Mermaid
            2009 with maritime forces from Turkey and Israel. This annual
            exercise contributed to overall joint readiness in response to
            possible humanitarian assistance efforts or maritime search and
            rescue operations in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and helped
            improve engagement between Turkey and Israel, key U.S. allies
            and partners in the region.
             Way ahead: Our efforts will remain focused on the
            Black Sea-Eurasia and eastern Mediterranean regions and follow
            European Command Country Campaign Plans. U.S. Naval Forces
            Europe is also embarking on an effort to establish a
            Mediterranean Sea Fleet Commanders Forum to enhance
            interoperability among capable allies and partners and increase
            efficiencies in the international military partnership realm.

        With more than 42,000 Active-Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian
    employees operating from 7 main installations supporting 8 wings and 80
    geographically separated locations, U.S. Air Forces, Europe is a key
    force provider of tactical combat air forces, tanker, and airlift
    assets for European Command, Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Enduring
    Freedom (OEF), and the International Security Assistance Force.
    Crucially, it also provides a large number of forces for building
    partnership capacity on a daily basis, with approximately 740 annual
    events that promote enduring relationships and increase security within
    and beyond Europe.
        Additionally, U.S. Air Forces in Europe provides full-spectrum air,
    space, and cyberspace capabilities promoting regional stability through
    focused theater engagement and supporting combat operations,
    humanitarian assistance, and Ballistic Missile Defense. U.S. Air Forces
    in Europe is also European Command's lead agent for personnel recovery,
    theater air mobility, and aeromedical evacuation. They execute the
    EUCOM mission with forward-based air power to provide forces for global
    operations, ensure strategic access, assure allies, deter aggression,
    and, key to our approach overall, build partnerships.
        Provide Forces for Global Operations
        U.S. Air Forces in Europe's top priority to partner with the joint
    and combined team to win today's fight. They do this by providing
    expeditionary forces as well as a warfighting headquarters that can
    plan, deploy, command, control, and coordinate air, space, and
    cyberspace capabilities across the full range of military operations.
        Ensure Strategic Access
        Forward basing of air assets and the establishment of mobility hubs
    in the European theater ensure strategic access for operations in
    Europe as well as to the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command
    regions. U.S. Air Forces in Europe maintains robust support for U.S.
    Transportation Command's enroute locations, enabling global operations
    by permitting the full spectrum of passenger and cargo movement through
    bases throughout Europe. In addition, the command has enhanced
    strategic flexibility by opening up new access points through
    engagement with new NATO partners.

        The activation of the Strategic Airlift Consortium at Papa Air
    Base, Hungary exemplified this, with NATO members Bulgaria, Estonia,
    Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia
    and the U.S., as well as Partnership for Peace nations Finland and
    Sweden. The result was the creation of a 12-member Heavy Airlift Wing
    consisting of 3 C-17 Globemaster IIIs. The Strategic Airlift Consortium
    is a watershed event in international military cooperation.
        Assure Allies and Deter Aggression
        U.S. Air Forces in Europe continues building and sustaining a
    credible capability to dissuade aggressors. Its interoperability with
    alliance partners through exercises and operations remains crucial for
    ensuring primacy of the Alliance and the U.S. leadership role.
        U.S. Air Forces in Europe is EUCOM's lead agent for Integrated Air
    and Missile Defense. It operates a Command, Control, Battle Management,
    and Communication suite to provide the commander with Ballistic Missile
    Defense situational awareness, early warning, and possible defensive
    countermeasures. The suite is designed to be interoperable with NATO
    systems in order to support the Presidential decision to employ a
    Phased Adaptive Approach to the Ballistic Missile Defense of Europe.
        NATO remains the primary security institution in Europe. Forward
    U.S. presence and interoperability with Alliance partners is crucial
    for ensuring primacy of the Alliance and a U.S. leadership role. The
    planned basing of new systems such as Global Hawk, 5th generation
    fighter capabilities on schedule with our allies, and the potential for
    a future Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance aircraft capability in
    theater will provide opportunities for the United States to display its
    commitment and resolve, provide critical tools for engagement, and
    enhance allied and partner contributions to global operations. In
    accordance with NATO's strategic concept, the U.S. Air Forces in Europe
    fulfills the U.S. commitment to allied extended nuclear deterrence with
    Dual Capable Aircraft, and personnel who ensure the custody, safety,
    and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.
        Build Partnerships
        In a program with long-term benefit, U.S. Air Forces in Europe's
    efforts build partner capabilities, increase their ability to
    counterterrorism, protect homelands and common interests, and counter
    emerging threats. Their ``Building Partnerships'' program contributes
    to the building of key relationships, promoting U.S. strategic
    interests, providing for essential peacetime and contingency access and
    enroute infrastructure, and improving information exchange and
    intelligence sharing. Within the past 12 months, the command conducted
    approximately 740 building partnership events with 51 partners and
    allies, including theater security cooperation events, exercises,
    aerial events, and military-to-military engagements. In addition to
    partner engagement, they actively engage, in accordance with European
    Command direction, to advance regional stability.

        Exercises with Allies and Partners
        U.S. Air Forces, Europe develops increased Alliance capability to
    support Overseas Contingency Operations through participation and
    leadership in 20 combined exercises and operations, including Unified
    Engagement, Medical Training Exercise in Central and Eastern Europe,
    Combined Endeavor, Austere Challenge, Juniper Cobra, and the Baltic
    Region Training Exercises, as well as the Tactical Leadership Program.
    Key cross-border programs include:

             Baltic States Air Capability Development. U.S. Air
            Forces, Europe led a series of four-nation symposia with
            Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to develop the basis for
            establishing fundamental air combat capabilities leading to
            ministerial-level buy-in of a concept of operations and a long-
            term strategy for aviation excellence and eventual self-
            reliance.
             Enhancing Nordic States interoperability with NATO. In
            2009, U.S. Air Forces in Europe led and fostered efforts to
            enable the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces to participate in
            NATO and coalition air operations.
             Developing capability of ``near-4th generation
            fighter'' nations. U.S. Air Forces, Europe placed strong
            emphasis on helping these partner nations transition smoothly
            to 4th-generation operations. To support Poland's new force of
            48 F-16s, a very successful sister-wing relationship between
            the 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB, Germany and the Polish
            AF was established. It is now instrumental in spreading
            lessons-learned and best practices, as the Polish AF strives
            toward its goal of expeditionary F-16 operations. Additionally,
            deployments to Bulgaria and Romania fostered those countries'
            efforts to adopt NATO-interoperable tactics, techniques, and
            procedures.
             Build/Sustain Joint Terminal Attack Controllers
            capability. Working to increase the number of Joint Terminal
            Attack Controllers available to deploy to International
            Security Assistance Force, U.S. Air Forces in Europe trained 25
            new partner nation Controllers in 2009 and estimates training
            30 more in 2010. Work with Poland will provide an organic
            regional Air Ground Operations School training capability.
            Continuing training relationships with French pilots enable
            them to train with native English speakers prior to deploying
            into Afghanistan.

        U.S. Air Forces in Europe's forward-based forces provide the Nation
    a 3-for-1 efficiency by providing forces for global operations,
    promoting regional stability (with capabilities to deter aggressors and
    assure allies), and building partnerships. Unfortunately, the reduction
    of 24 fighter aircraft will significantly limit the resources available
    for these activities. As we move forward, we must ensure that our
    forward-based posture is adequate to support our Nation's strategic
    objectives.

        Special Operations Command, Europe, comprised of more than 1,600
    Active-Duty, Reserve, and civilian employees operating from two main
    locations, remains the preeminent U.S. Special Operations Force
    provider to the International Security Assistance Force; provides such
    forces for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom; contributes
    significantly to the development of allied and partner special
    operations forces; and stands, prepared and ready, to defend against
    transnational threats and rapidly respond to unforeseen contingencies
    within the EUCOM Area of Responsibility.
        Special Operations Command, Europe's capacity building efforts
    relies on three elements: the Partner Development Program, support to
    the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Center--now evolving
    into the NATO Special Operations Headquarters--and deployments in
    support of NATO International Security Assistance Force operations.
    Special Operations Command, Europe remained heavily engaged throughout
    2009, conducting 29 Joint Combined Exchange Training events, 8
    bilateral training activities, 9 military-to-military engagements, and
    6 counternarcoterrorism missions in 18 countries. Along with these
    activities, the Command conducted numerous staff and key leader
    engagements. These events focused on developing more capable and
    professional American and Allied Special Operations Forces, while
    building the relationships required to increase the support and
    commitment of European political and military leadership.
    Activities and Exercises with Allies and Partners:
        Partner Development Program
        Partner Development Program allows Special Operations Command,
    Europe to link disparate programs and training venues to build partner
    Special Operations Forces capacity. It focuses on those allies and
    partners that demonstrate willingness to deploy Special Operations
    Forces in support of NATO operations in Afghanistan and the capability
    over time to sustain their increased Special Operations Forces
    capacity. Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Lithuania are a few of the
    countries that have participated in this program and have deployed
    Special Operations Forces for the benefit of the alliance.
        The Command's exercise program exemplifies Partner Development
    Program's utility. The annual Special Operations Command, Europe
    capstone exercise, Jackal Stone 2009, brought together approximately
    1,500 Special Operations Forces servicemembers from 10 countries--9 out
    of 10 currently contribute Special Operations Forces to International
    Security Assistance Force operations, or have indicated a willingness
    to do so in the future.
        Special Operations Command, Europe Support to the NATO Special
            Operations Headquarters
        The second critical element of American Special Operations Forces
    capacity building objectives in Europe is Special Operations Command,
    Europe support to the NATO Special Operations Headquarters. The NATO
    Special Operations Headquarters, now being established from the NATO
    Special Operations Forces Coordination Center, is already making
    significant contributions to Special Operations Command, Europe and
    Allied efforts by developing common NATO Special Operations Forces
    standards and encouraging allied integration.
        Special Operations Command, Europe Support to International
            Security Assistance Force
        Since 2007, Special Operations Command, Europe has maintained a
    Special Operations Task Group (one U.S. Special Operations Company and
    associated staff officers) under NATO command in Afghanistan, separate
    from Operation Enduring Freedom. Special Operations Command, Europe
    deployments to International Security Assistance Force also showcase
    ``best practices'' to our Special Operations Forces partners and
    encourage equally capable Special Operations Forces allies to mentor
    other developing partners.

        As a direct result of Partner Development Program and NATO Special
    Operations Headquarters initiatives, European national Special
    Operations Forces contributions to International Security Assistance
    Force have steadily increased providing strategic relief for already
    committed U.S. and allied Special Operations Forces. Special Operations
    Command, Europe, through European Command, Special Operations Command,
    and the Department of Defense, continues to work with the Department of
    State and Congress to develop the mechanisms necessary to advance to
    the next stage of partnership cooperation.
        Defense Against Transnational Threats
        Special Operations Command, Europe contributes to American, Allied,
    and partner nation efforts to defend against transnational threats
    through sharing information, building capacity, reinforcing strategic
    communications messages, and, if required, conducting or supporting
    kinetic special operations. For example, throughout 2009, Special
    Operations Command, Europe sponsored a weekly video teleconference,
    allowing Department of Defense and other Government agencies from
    around the globe to share intelligence and evidentiary information that
    closed intergovernmental and international seams and synergized law
    enforcement and military operations against complex non-state global
    networks.
        Preparation for Contingency Operations
        Though the European continent is relatively stable, it has numerous
    potential flashpoints from the Balkans to the Caucasus. In 2010, the
    Command plans to increase regional security through 36 different
    engagement events with 30 countries. The Partner Development Program
    will begin to focus on filling collective rotary wing aviation gaps,
    combining efforts with Department of State to take a lead role in the
    development of interoperable Special Operations Forces aviation
    capacity.
                                   challenges
    Afghanistan
        Of the 43 nations contributing forces to the International Security
    Assistance Force besides the United States, 80 percent of them (36
    nations) come from the European Theater and those 36 nations represent
    approximately 42 percent of the coalition's personnel. Many nations are
    making particularly large contributions of forces and have suffered
    high casualty rates relative to their populations. Our partners
    understand the importance of this mission and they are willing to send
    their sons and daughters in harm's way alongside our own to bring
    peace, security, and prosperity to the people of Afghanistan. Many of
    these nations wish to contribute more capability and other nations have
    the will to join the International Security Assistance Force but lack
    the capacity to do so. Within the European Theater itself, European
    Command's primary focus is to lend whatever support it can to these
    other nations as they seek to contribute to security and stability
    efforts in Afghanistan. Within the framework of contributing to
    international efforts in Afghanistan, and within the boundaries and
    authorities set by law and regulation and by international agreements,
    this support involves providing training, equipment, logistical
    assistance, and personnel augmentation to nations that desire to
    contribute to the International Security Assistance Force.
    Terrorism in Europe
        Our role in the fight against transnational terrorism in the region
    is primarily one of engagement and intelligence sharing. Terrorist
    networks use Europe principally to recruit fighters, garner financial
    and logistic support, and provide sanctuary. They cooperate closely
    with criminal networks and engage in numerous illegal activities as
    fund raising mechanisms. Well-established and commendable European
    civil liberties and the loosening of border controls provide
    opportunities for terrorist support and logistic activities.
    Nonetheless, Europe is not immune to al Qaeda affiliated terror attacks
    or the threat of them. Al Qaeda has consistently and recently stated a
    desire to strike directly against our European allies. The reverse flow
    of foreign fighters out of Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with the bona
    fides and experience these fighters will have gained there may increase
    the terror threat in Europe in the future.

        The possibility of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass
    destruction adds another dimension. Al Qaeda has consistently striven
    to incorporate weapons of mass destruction into their attacks and the
    majority of the world's nuclear weapons are within the European
    Command's area of responsibility. The security of these weapons and
    weapons material is a significant aspect of European Command's efforts
    to counter weapons of mass destruction.

        The biggest impact we can have on terror networks in Europe is
    through enabling and partnering with our friends and allies. A good
    example of this is our intelligence sharing with Turkey regarding
    Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorists. In addition to partnering
    with other nations in Europe, we are also closely partnering with other
    arms of the U.S. Government, where appropriate, to ensure all the
    levers of our national power are applied against these networks in a
    coordinated fashion.
    Potential Regional Conflicts
        In spite of European integration, European Command continues to
    face an environment in fluid transition, and we are coping with the
    insecurity associated with 21st century challenges and unsolved 20th
    century security problems. The outbreak of conflict between Georgia and
    Russia served as a reminder that war has not disappeared from the
    European Command Theater.
        Secessionist pressures, unresolved or suspended conflicts, and
    ethnic and religious tensions make European Command's Black Sea and
    Eurasia regions the most conflict-plagued area along the Euro-Atlantic
    perimeter. Russia's North Caucasus remains an area of persistent
    conflict. Armenia and Azerbaijan are at a stalemate over Nagorno-
    Karabakh. The South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia are a
    continuing source of tension between Georgia and Russia, the more so
    given the Russian military presence in those regions and Russian
    recognition of their independence from Georgia. Little progress has
    been made toward a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, which
    divides Moldova and hinders solely needed economic development.
    Conflict persists between Israel and Palestinian groups. The sources,
    complexities, and significant tertiary effects of these regional
    conflicts require an integrated interagency approach in concert with
    our European partners and security organizations.
    Russia
        The complexities of managing a military-to-military relationship
    with Russia are high. On one hand, there are many areas of potential
    cooperation and partnership, including Afghanistan, arms control,
    counterterrorism, counterpiracy, counternarcotics, and eventually
    missile defense. On the other hand, many of our allies and friends in
    the region remain concerned about Russian actions, including the
    conflict with Georgia in the summer of 2008, exercises on their borders
    like the Zapad series in 2009, and Russia's continuing suspension of
    implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.
        Working with Russia is about balance and seeking to find the
    potential for cooperation, while maintaining an honest and open
    dialogue about all aspects of our relationship, including where we
    disagree. While a great deal of engagement with Russia is handled
    either by State Department in the diplomatic realm or directly by the
    Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, we at European
    Command are ready to pursue military-to-military communication,
    engagement, and even training and operations with Russia where and when
    appropriate.
    Energy Security
        A massive amount of energy is produced in or transits through
    European Command's region. Russia, Azerbaijan, Norway, and other
    countries produce large amounts of hydrocarbons. Approximately 3
    million barrels of oil transit the Bosporus and the Dardanelles each
    day.
        European Command is and must be a major participant in the
    interagency efforts to ensure the security of energy flows to, from,
    and through our region. The Command already has several interagency
    representatives on staff to better synchronize our efforts. We are
    already working to promote integrated planning and exercises and build
    up the capabilities of our European partners through technical
    assistance, the Partnership for Peace program, and other train and
    equip efforts. The Command is also collaborating with other U.S.
    Government partners and like-minded NATO allies to develop a framework
    to develop common solutions for major energy security issues. Finally,
    we view Russia as a key partner in these efforts and will work with
    Moscow in areas of common interest. However, where our interests do not
    intersect, we will work with other European partners to develop
    solutions for all of Europe.
    The Arctic
        Changes in the Arctic create both challenges and opportunities.
    Climate changes may result in open shipping routes, which link Asia to
    Europe, cutting the distance on these routes by up to 40 percent and
    transit time by 10 days.
        The Arctic is emerging as a complex but potentially productive
    region for oil, gas and new industrial activity. Unresolved issues will
    become more pressing as economic activities expand. For example, there
    are eight bilateral boundary issues involving all states in the region,
    and the northernmost extension of the continental shelves in the Arctic
    is unresolved.

        States, particularly the traditional great powers, will play a key
    role in determining patterns of cooperation and tension within the
    Arctic. Russia's activities in the Arctic include producing and
    modernizing icebreakers, resuming submarine and long-range aviation
    patrols, stationing more researchers throughout the region, and
    asserting extensive territorial claims. Russia's latest Arctic policy
    paper states that the Arctic must become Russia's top strategic
    resource base by 2020. It further states that they must complete
    geological studies to prove their claim to Arctic resources and create
    a new group of forces to ensure military security under various
    political-military circumstances.

        As the Arctic emerges as a region of economic significance and we
    develop our relationship with Russia, there may be opportunities for
    increased military activities with Russia to directly support U.S.
    policy initiatives. We see the Arctic as not an area of confrontational
    challenges but one of shared opportunities for cooperation and
    partnership that will benefit all states of the region. Early
    investment in an open and meaningful interagency dialog with Russia in
    the very near future, could avoid potential conflict in the more
    distant future.
    Force Posture
        The interrelationship of U.S. forces, their footprint, and our
    relationships with other nations, is key to achieving national
    objectives in the European Command Theater. The presence of U.S.
    forces--air, land, and sea--in Europe fosters relationships and deepens
    partnerships in multiple ways, including the shared use of training
    facilities and other building partner capacity and international
    military partnering events.
        The nations within the European Command region are of significant
    importance to U.S. global strategic interests as evidenced by the
    overwhelming number of ISAF troop contributing nations from the EUCOM
    AOR. Our ability to develop coalitions and the capabilities of European
    coalition partners are central to advancing our national security
    priorities. Building partnerships and building partnership capacity is
    therefore job number one for European Command.
        The forces stationed in Europe today are a key element of America's
    strength and they promote our values, protect our interests, and are
    tangible reminders to friends and foes alike of our dedicated
    commitment to a strong trans-Atlantic relationship based on cooperation
    and adherence to fundamental ideals. As the post-Cold War security
    environment changed, the size of our forces required to maintain our
    leadership role also changed. The number of U.S. personnel in Europe
    has gone from 300,000 during the Cold War to less than 80,000 today.
    European Command forces assure our Allies and deter and dissuade our
    adversaries, and are the most visible indication of the ongoing U.S.
    commitment to the NATO Alliance.

        European Command's footprint is pivotal to U.S. global operations.
    Sites and installations in Europe provide superb power projection
    facilities for the support of coalition operations and overseas
    contingency operations. Installations in the European Command region
    coupled with longstanding and emerging relationships contribute to
    assured access and strategic reach to and from Europe.
        Force posture initiatives for European Command support building the
    capability and capacity of partner nations in Europe, increased
    expeditionary capability from Europe, and achieve basing efficiencies.
    Our posture initiatives support two major categories: operational
    capability development and improvements for basing efficiencies in
    sustainment and Quality of Life. Operational capability development
    initiatives include assessments for stationing of forces anticipated to
    deploy to the European theater and a new prepositioning strategy that
    transforms portions of European Command prepositioning equipment to
    support soft power employment for missions such as Humanitarian
    Assistance and Disaster Response.
        Other force posture initiatives focus on achieving basing
    efficiencies through coordinated review of infrastructure capacity as
    well as supporting service component efforts to optimize resources
    supporting of European Command forces. Sustainment initiatives include
    the continuous review of Quality of Life requirements such as education
    and housing services for European Command personnel and their families.

        European Command has aligned its posture planning processes to
    support the Department's efforts in addressing global force posture.
    The European Command staff coordinates strategic assessment,
    implementation feasibility, and theater prioritization of force posture
    issues through a posture forum that maximizes outreach and integration
    in posture development among Combatant Commands, our European Command
    Service Component Commands, and our interagency partners. Our posture
    planning necessarily involves coordination across the whole of
    government, as we integrate Defense Department posture overseas with
    State Department representatives and ultimately our relationships with
    European hosts.
                                 opportunities
        Many of our challenges also present opportunities for international
    military partnering that bring benefit to today's issues such as
    Afghanistan but also for those that we will face tomorrow.
    Afghanistan
        Supporting the International Security Assistance Force has given
    European Command the opportunity to deepen its relationship with our
    Allies and partners using our expertise and experience to inculcate an
    expeditionary mindset and train deploying partnered-country forces in
    irregular warfare. The contributions and sacrifice of Eurasian and
    European nations in Afghanistan have demonstrated the credibility,
    legitimacy, and effectiveness of international military cooperation.
    The scale of Allied and partner force contributions to the
    International Security Assistance Force has allowed the hand-over of
    significant responsibility for regional operations to coalition
    partners. NATO's Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams program
    directly supports the development of the Afghanistan National Army and
    the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams program supports the
    expansion of the Afghan National Police. Under these programs, European
    Allies and partners are currently providing approximately 50 percent of
    the number of teams required to train Afghanistan's security forces.
    Right now, U.S. Forces assigned to European Command are deployed to
    Afghanistan and make vital contributions on a daily basis. However,
    within the European theater itself, European Command's primary focus is
    to lend whatever support it can to other nations as they seek to
    contribute to the security and stability efforts in Afghanistan.

    Engagement with Russia
        In 2009, European Command authored a framework document to resume
    military-to-military cooperation with Russia in an equal, pragmatic,
    transparent, and mutually beneficial manner. This framework not only
    addresses crisis response operations, but also seeks to promote
    interaction and ensure mutual support in conducting counterterrorism
    and counterpiracy operations; peacekeeping; missile, space, and
    ballistic missile-defense; as well as search and rescue. This framework
    document was signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
    the Russian Chief of Defense during the July 2009 Presidential Summit
    in Moscow. This framework begins to rebuild a structure for our
    bilateral defense relationship with Russia that allows wide-ranging and
    candid engagement on all issues of concern.
        In rebuilding the bilateral relationship with Russia, however,
    European Command will work with NATO and partners to develop an
    integrated and inclusive security cooperation architecture beneficial
    to all participants that does not come at the expense of Allies and
    partners.
    European Missile Defense
        European Command looks forward to operationalizing the recently
    announced Phased Adaptive Approach, a complete revision of how the U.S.
    manages ballistic missile defense of Europe. The phased implementation
    of the proposed network of sensors, interceptors and associated Command
    and Control structures will provide a regional capability that is
    flexible, scalable, and responsive. The architecture aims to provide
    the right level of capability, at the right time, in the right location
    based on the emerging threat. The new approach provides increased
    opportunity for interagency and international military partnering.
    European Command is actively cooperating with the Department of State,
    Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, and others as the United
    States builds the plan for international engagement in the region. The
    capabilities delivered with the new phased, adaptive approach will
    serve as a catalyst to develop a cooperative solution with our allies
    and partners in the region.
    Balkans: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo
        Today, almost 15 years after the Dayton Peace Accords and 10 years
    after the NATO military campaign to end atrocities in Kosovo, Bosnia-
    Herzegovina and Kosovo still evince the problems present throughout
    this volatile region: endemic corruption, organized crime, deep-rooted
    ethnic divisions, decrepit infrastructures, and weak economies with
    little foreign direct investment. Such an environment invites organized
    criminals and limits the capabilities of governments to effectively
    provide essential services. Despite these challenges, the United States
    remains committed to bringing lasting stability to the Balkans, and we
    have been making steady progress in the region, as exemplified by the
    April 2009 admission of Croatia and Albania into NATO and recent
    democratic elections in Kosovo.
        In this region, European Command focuses on enhancing transatlantic
    security through defense modernization and reform efforts; defense
    institution building activities to improve the organic capacity of
    countries to recruit, train, and sustain their own military forces;
    humanitarian assistance operations; and demilitarization of unexploded
    ordnance to eliminate the threat to lives, property, and government
    stability.
        Significant political and cultural divisions remain in both Bosnia
    and Kosovo. In Bosnia, uncompromising, ethnic-based rhetoric continues
    to stall reform efforts. While the ``Butmir Talks'' last fall were a
    step in the right direction, Bosnia will need to progress politically
    toward stability. Although many problems in Kosovo are simply growing
    pains of a new state, the institutions in Kosovo face stark challenges
    to strengthen weak government institutions, combat corruption and
    illicit trafficking, and improve provision of essential services. Most
    of our military-to-military engagement is at a basic level, such as
    training the Kosovo Security Force and the provision of personal
    equipment like boots and uniforms. The programmed reduction of NATO and
    European Union forces in the Balkans may induce additional risk and
    requires continued monitoring to guard against others in the region
    from exploiting weaknesses.
        Despite these challenges, there are solid prospects for success
    given that we are prepared to devote the necessary attention and
    resources to the region. Bosnia and Kosovo, like their Balkan
    neighbors, generally hold the United States in high regard. To be
    effective, we must continue to coordinate our efforts with our European
    Allies and partners. We must expand our efforts to persuade NATO and
    European Union partners to persevere in these efforts. Maintaining
    stability at the southeastern corner of Europe remains an important
    transatlantic interest.
    Cyberspace
        Cyberspace enables and supports all of the efforts, challenges, and
    opportunities above. The cyberspace domain and the ability to operate
    freely in Cyberspace are of great importance to European Command. The
    21st century and many events of the 20th century will be defined or
    redefined by the development, movement, and consumption of information
    in a holistic and collaborative environment. Our ability to freely
    operate and shape that environment has significant implications on both
    our leadership and partnerships in Europe.

        European Command is already building that advantage and defining
    that success. Access to reliable cyberspace has become imperative to
    our national security, economics, and way of life. We must gain greater
    visibility of disruptive activities, determine how and to what extent
    these actions increase the risk to security and stability, and build
    the ability to maintain freedom of maneuver in the cyber domain for
    ourselves, our friends, and the voices of truth. We have established a
    Network Warfare Center to provide a fused cyber operations,
    intelligence and defense capability. We have also reached out to NATO
    and other partners to establish cyber information sharing agreements.
    These agreements provide great value by enhancing awareness, building
    common understanding and developing operational trust. Finally,
    European Command continues to see the need for continued investment and
    development of both joint and multi-national cyber capabilities. These
    capabilities must be integrated, layered, responsive, and assured. U.S.
    European Command sees great promise in the continued development and
    use of cyberspace in Europe both as a mission enabler and as a common
    interest area with European allies and partners.
    Innovation Cell
        Because innovation is so important to maintaining effectiveness, we
    have established a small, dedicated innovation cell. In the first 6
    months, this team closed a gap in U.S.-foreign partner security
    cooperation. As a result, it uncovered an interesting human detection
    technology in the Slovak Republic, accelerated a project with the
    French Armaments Agency to put a wireless internet router in space, and
    connected over a dozen different organizations together to demonstrate
    innovative ways to build partner nation and public-private partnerships
    to counter piracy.
    Building Partner Capacity Center
        Building Partner Capacity is at the heart of EUCOM's mission and
    the key to strengthening stability in our region and the regions to
    which we project military forces. It requires, however, complex and
    astute interactions with our allies and partners, and the application
    of lessons learned in many different regions. For those reasons, we are
    investigating the establishment of a Building Partner Capacity Center
    that will bring together subject matter experts in a way that makes
    their knowledge accessible to all and facilitates an in-depth
    examination of the issues.
    Counternarcotics Task Force
        In another very critical area, EUCOM and its naval component have
    conducted a full mission analysis for a Counternarcotics Task Force and
    have begun establishing one. U.S. Naval Forces Europe is initially
    staffing the Task Force from its intelligence directorate. The Task
    Force has initiated preliminary outreach to the Maritime Analysis and
    Operations Center-Narcotics in Lisbon and with the Center for Combating
    Smuggling in the Mediterranean (CeCLAD) in Toulon. To accelerate
    establishment, Naval Forces Europe will resource the task force with
    its own personnel and funding and has set aside additional funding for
    fiscal year 2010 as start-up money.
    Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction
        In the last decade, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine
    have experienced accidental explosions of their aging conventional
    munitions, destroying infrastructure and causing military and civilian
    casualties. The amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO), excess, and
    unstable munitions in our theater is great and of serious concern. We
    are working with the Department of State, the Federal lead for weapons
    removal and abatement, to enhance their recent stockpile reduction
    initiative and address with a greater sense of urgency these stockpiles
    that are aging, destabilizing, and exploding unintentionally. Together
    we want to preclude another incident that would threaten lives and
    decrease stability.
                   taking care of european command personnel
    Quality of Life
        European Command is committed to support and maintain a quality of
    life for our assigned personnel commensurate to the Nation we serve and
    defend. We also recognize that forward deployed forces are better able
    to focus on the mission when their families are properly cared for
    through quality living quarters, educational opportunities for their
    children, and medical care.
    Deployment, Behavioral Health and Compassion Fatigue Support
        Protracted combat operations, multiple deployments, insufficient
    dwell time and casualties have critically increased the immediate and
    future demand for Behavioral Health Specialists for our servicemembers
    and their families. Multiple studies, for example the Department of
    Defense Mental Health Task Force, have identified the need for
    increased behavioral health support to military and family members.
    Component commanders have identified the need for additional behavioral
    health providers and technicians for European Command military and
    family members.
        As we continue to maintain mission readiness, our warriors and
    families require access to these vital programs and services without
    stovepipes in a stigma-free environment. A 360-degree review of
    programs and the connection between at-risk indicators and catalysts is
    needed to eliminate gaps in support. The goal is alignment of focused
    care-giver teams with corresponding indicator data systems to ensure
    the health of our force and family.
        European Command community caregivers providing warfighter and
    family support continue to show signs of stress, burnout and compassion
    fatigue. European Command, with funding from European Regional Medical
    Command, contracted to develop and deliver a comprehensive compassion
    fatigue program titled Providing Outreach While Enhancing Readiness--
    Caring for the Caregiver, which focuses on providing caregivers with
    tools and strategies to prevent the risk of burnout, stress and
    compassion fatigue.
    Dependent Education
        The quality of the President's school system, managed by the
    Department of Defense Education Activity, is a major contributor to the
    Quality of Life of European Command members. European Command's system
    is a benchmark for other school systems and we need your continued
    support and funding to ensure we maintain high educational standards.
        We continue to work collaboratively with the Department of Defense
    Education Activity to ensure funding for programs such as The Virtual
    School for our approximately 2,000 students in the European Command
    region located in areas with no school. Because funding for educational
    support in remote areas has not kept pace with new mission
    requirements, we need your support for this leading edge educational
    system for our youth. We are now just beginning to see the effect of
    nearly $100 million to replace our schools, many of which are 1950s
    barracks. We must continue funding this endeavor in future years.
        We look forward to sustaining the recent accomplishments in Quality
    of Life and base infrastructure. Taking care of people enhances
    readiness. In the short term, this includes ensuring the capability of
    the community support base to deploy servicemembers and support their
    families. In the long term, it enables the military services to attract
    and retain the high quality force our mission demands.

                 european command infrastructure and logistics
        As a large organization with responsibilities spanning Europe,
    European Command has major infrastructure and logistics
    responsibilities.
    Theater Infrastructure
        At enduring locations, we must continue to sustain and recapitalize
    our infrastructure through responsible use of both the Sustainment,
    Restoration, and Modernization program and the Military Construction
    program. At non-enduring locations, we must optimize use of all
    available resources to ensure these installations remain fully mission
    effective until the installations are removed from the inventory.
        Thanks to strong congressional support, previous annual Military
    Construction authorizations and appropriations have enabled European
    Command to address a balanced mix of our most pressing mission, mission
    support, quality of life, and housing requirements. The Kaiserslautern
    Military Community Housing project is nearing completion and is one of
    several showcase examples of the impact that Military Construction
    program support has for our community. Continued support of these
    investments will enable us to eliminate inadequate housing and this
    will pay dividends as we divest non-enduring bases and consolidate our
    forces into more efficient communities. European Command's future
    requirements will appear in our Theater Posture Plan and military
    construction requests.
    Strategic Mobility and Maneuver
        Because facilities and forces must be effectively linked,
    dependable and available sealift, strategic and tactical airlift, and
    ground transportation systems are essential elements of European
    Command's strategy. The fielding of the Joint High Speed Vessel and its
    assignment to the region will significantly enhance our capability to
    deploy and transport forces along sea lines of communication. The
    ability of the Joint High Speed Vessel rapidly to transport large
    volumes of material will provide a critical engagement platform to
    support Military Partnership activities and improve our ability to
    respond to potential contingencies such as non-combatant evacuation
    operations.
        European Command's fleet of C-130s is currently undergoing an
    important upgrade from 17 older C-130E aircraft to 14 new, more capable
    C-130Js. The payload, capacity, and range constraints of even these
    aircraft limit European Command's ability rapidly to deliver forces or
    materiel across our theater.

        Strategic airlift is also an important force enabled in the region.
    We applaud the stand-up of the Strategic Airlift Consortium-Heavy
    Airlift Wing that commenced operations July of 2009 at Papa Air Base,
    Hungary. The wing operates 3 C-17 aircraft, shared by a consortium of
    10 NATO and 2 Partnership for Peace nations, and is the product of a
    groundbreaking building partner capacity initiative that provides
    European Command with access to robust theater-based strategic lift
    capability. European Command will continue to pursue increased organic
    lift capability to enable the full range of engagement and contingency
    activities.
        European Command's principal contribution to global logistics
    throughput in support of ongoing operations is to the Central Command
    region. For example, lines of communication and distribution routing
    for logistics support through the European region should be able to
    support all of the International Security Assistance Force logistics
    requirements in the event other routes are unable to maintain the
    required capacity. European Command continually coordinates logistics
    planning with Transportation Command and the Defense Logistics Agency
    as well as Central Command to ensure global air, sea, and land lines of
    communication are identified and maintained to support global
    operations.
    Prepositioned Equipment
        Prepositioned equipment reduces demands on the transportation
    system and appreciably shortens crisis response time by providing a
    scalable capability and enabling the assembly of deploying forces with
    equipment already staged in the European Command's region. Continued
    support of the Services' Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel programs
    also demonstrates commitment through presence and preserves a broad
    spectrum of response options, from that of traditional crisis response
    through support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. As we
    transition to a more expeditionary posture, there is a heightened need
    for Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel equipment configured to support
    both kinetic and nonkinetic operations, positioned in strategically
    flexible locations, and enablers such as the Joint High Speed Vessel.
    Exercising prepositioned stocks also builds military partner capacity
    with allies and provides ready assets for units arriving in theater for
    training/engagement and security cooperation missions.
        All four Services maintain Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel in
    the European Command's region, either on land or afloat. U.S. Air
    Forces, Europe maintains Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel at main
    operating bases within the theater, with centrally managed storage
    sites in Norway and Luxembourg. U.S. Marine Forces Europe maintains
    Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway and assets afloat in the
    Mediterranean via Maritime Prepositioned Force ships. U.S. Army Europe
    maintains propositioned stocks via the Department of the Army's Heavy
    Brigade Combat Team prepositioned set at Camp Darby near Livorno,
    Italy.
        Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel currently requires upgrade. Over
    two-thirds of the Marine Corps's Prepositioning Program-Norway stocks
    were withdrawn in direct support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and
    Enduring Freedom. Army preposition stocks at Camp Darby have also been
    reduced to support these operations as well as the International
    Security Assistance Force. We do not expect this equipment to reset
    until at least 2015.
        European Command is actively involved in Defense Department-led
    studies examining the global disposition of Prepositioned War Reserve
    Materiel and is working to ensure that these studies incorporate our
    strategic direction and operational requirements.

        NATO has been the anchor of Trans-Atlantic security for more than
    60 years ensuring the security of its members, enhancing peace and
    stability throughout Europe, and countering threats across the globe.
    It is inescapable in any alliance that differences will emerge,
    consensus becomes difficult, and perpetual challenge makes members
    weary; thus making NATO's success that much more impressive, though not
    surprising. The Alliance endures because the principles it defends are
    timeless and the determination to safeguard freedom is boundless.
        In the relative comfort of this success, set against an
    extraordinary amount of post-Cold War challenges, it would be tempting
    to address European security as a less pressing matter. U.S.
    commitment, distinguished by force levels in Europe and leadership
    positions throughout the NATO command structure, will remain a critical
    piece in Trans-Atlantic security in the 21st century.

        The NATO Secretary General began a multi-faceted review of NATO's
    Strategic Concept with an eye to the future--the results of which will
    ensure NATO continues being relevant and responsive to future security
    needs and clearly acknowledges that its most significant contributions
    still lie ahead. Thanks to the efforts of former Secretary of State
    Madeleine Albright and the 12-member Group of Experts, who at the
    request of the Secretary General are leading an exercise of reflection
    and consultation among allies, partner nations, NGOs and others
    interested in the future of NATO, careful examination of threat
    perceptions, future challenges to our security, and NATO's role in
    meeting them is underway.
        Whatever the Alliance's level of ambition, we need to align policy
    and resourcing in the same timeframe. NATO does not maintain a
    permanent set of forces; as such, our ability to carry out operations
    is defined by the armed forces the member nations develop and maintain.
    Regardless of the willingness of members to contribute, the burden of
    deployed operations is, and will be, borne by those nations whose armed
    forces are structured for expeditionary warfare.
        NATO needs to be capable of making decisions that may defuse a
    crisis. There are an infinite number of challenges we may face in the
    next decade and we must be ready to respond with appropriate capability
    across the full spectrum. This does not mean we should be looking first
    for military solutions; instead, we will require creative work,
    unparalleled cooperation and active partnerships. Whatever the final
    solutions, there is no substitute for clear objectives and an honest
    commitment to achieve them.

    Comprehensive Approach
        Since the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO has become increasingly
    committed to implementing a Comprehensive Approach towards crisis
    management. The mission in Afghanistan, in particular, has emphasised
    the necessity to align security, governance and development activities
    to achieve holistic benefit. Governance, development and security are
    inextricably linked and cannot succeed without complementing each other
    through the collaboration between military and civilian agencies and
    organisations. However, while the aspiration for a Comprehensive
    Approach is noteworthy and the principle agreed universally, it is
    somewhat more difficult to realize.
        The principle of cooperation is universally accepted, however,
    without enlightened and firm leadership, will not be realized and
    optimal progress enjoyed. As the most accepted and legitimate
    organization, the United Nations must be encouraged to take a greater
    and more robust lead in a truly Comprehensive Approach. While there is
    cooperation on the ground between NATO, Security, Governance and
    Development organizations and agencies at national, regional and global
    levels, senior United Nations leadership must act with determined
    resolve. I would encourage our Government to advocate for a High
    Commissioner who is willing to embrace the leadership necessary to see
    this critical mission through.

    NATO-EU Relations
        The European Union is another potential partner for NATO in its
    Comprehensive Approach. However, political differences continue to
    hamper greater collaboration. There is a genuine need to enhance NATO-
    EU cooperation, whether within or beyond the 2003 `Berlin Plus'
    framework. Currently, NATO and the European Union may conduct parallel
    military and civilian operations with no established or formalized
    mechanisms for coordination and cooperation. Field commanders then
    resort to informal but pragmatic ad hoc arrangements to harmonize their
    missions. Although these arrangements are a means to an end, they
    cannot fully harness the true potential effects of NATO-European Union
    collaboration during all phases of crisis management. NATO and the
    European Union may offer capabilities that are complementary for
    addressing a given situation. The challenge is to find an appropriate
    mechanism for achieving unity of effort without unnecessary
    duplication.

        From a military perspective, we do our very best to collaborate
    both in terms of planning and execution. However, we will not be able
    to deliver a complementary, holistic effect without high level
    political agreement between NATO and the European Union. While I am
    confident that NATO's Secretary General and his European Union
    counterpart are doing their utmost to resolve the matter, it will take
    time and patience before we reach a meaningful and efficient level of
    cooperation.
        While paving the way to the future, NATO must balance the urgent
    with the important and commanding forces is my highest priority. Since
    its first military intervention in 1995, NATO has been engaged in an
    increasingly diverse array of operations. Today roughly 100,000
    military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world,
    successfully managing complex ground, air and naval operations in all
    types of environments.
    Kosovo
        Today, approximately 10,000 troops from NATO's Kosovo Force are
    deployed in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment,
    preserving the peace that was imposed by NATO nearly a decade earlier.
    Following Kosovo's declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, the
    Alliance reaffirmed that Kosovo Force shall remain in Kosovo on the
    basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. NATO and Kosovo Force
    will continue to work with the authorities and will cooperate with and
    assist the UN, the EU, in particular Eulex, the EU Rule of Law mission
    in Kosovo, and other international actors, as appropriate, to support
    the further development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and
    peaceful Kosovo.

    NATO and Iraq
        At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies agreed to be part
    of the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and
    accountable security forces. The outcome was the creation of the NATO
    Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), which to date has trained over 14,000
    Iraqi security sector personnel. NTM-I is involved in police training,
    establishing and mentoring Iraq's military academies, and facilitating
    substantial equipment donations and regular out-of-country training
    hosted by NATO Allies. All NATO Allies contribute to the training
    effort through deployment of trainers, provision of equipment, or
    NATO's financial contribution. The Government of Iraq regularly praises
    NTM-I, and continues to request its continuation and expansion.

    Active Endeavor
        Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are patrolling the
    Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help detect, deter and protect
    against terrorist activity. The operation evolved out of NATO's
    immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States
    of 11 September 2001 and, in view of its success, is continuing. As the
    Alliance has refined its counterterrorism role in the intervening
    years, the experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavour has
    given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in the deterrence of maritime
    terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO forces have hailed
    over 100,000 merchant vessels and boarded 155 suspect ships.
        By conducting these maritime operations against terrorist activity,
    NATO's presence in these waters has benefited all shipping traveling
    through the Straits. Moreover, this operation is also enabling NATO to
    strengthen its relations with partner countries, especially those
    participating in the Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue.

    Supporting the African Union
        Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to
    support the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping missions on the
    African continent. Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the African Union
    Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for African
    Union peacekeepers. Following renewed African Union requests, the North
    Atlantic Council has agreed to extend its support by periods of 6
    months on several occasions. NATO also continues to work with the
    African Union in identifying further areas where NATO could support the
    African Standby Force. NATO's continuing support to the African Union
    is a testament to the Alliance's commitment to building partnerships
    and supporting peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts beyond the Euro-
    Atlantic region.
    Operation Ocean Shield
        Building on previous counterpiracy missions conducted by NATO
    beginning in 2008 to protect World Food Program deliveries, Operation
    Ocean Shield is focusing on at-sea counterpiracy operations off the
    Horn of Africa. Approved on 17 August 2009 by the North Atlantic
    Council, the current operation continues to contribute to international
    efforts to combat piracy in the area. It is also offering, to regional
    states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to
    combat piracy activities.
        NATO Special Operations Forces
        The U.S.-led NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre has
    continued to serve as a dynamic engine of transformation within the
    Alliance. As a result, in September 2009, the North Atlantic Council
    approved its reorganization into the NATO Special Operations
    Headquarters. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters, projected to be
    fully operational in 2012, will continue to provide coordination,
    support, training, and enabling functions for NATO SOF, but will also
    fill a void in the Alliance's crisis response options, establishing an
    assured, rapidly deployable SOF command and control capability, by
    providing the core elements of a deployed special operations
    headquarters. Evolving to a headquarters will better enable the
    synchronization of SOF across the Alliance, enhance NATO SOF unity of
    effort, and provide Allied SOF with a multinational out of area command
    and control capability.
        The NSHQ's SOF Communications Network underpins Allied and Partner
    SOF collaboration by providing an unprecedented vehicle for command,
    control, communications, and intelligence sharing for networked
    operations. The NSHQ's Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell (SOFFC) in
    Kabul, Afghanistan is demonstrative of the operational impact among
    Allied and Partner SOF. This stakeholder run enterprise, manned by some
    40 personnel from 11 nations and several agencies, focuses on garnering
    information from a multitude of Allied and Partner sources, fusing that
    information with operational requirements to produce and disseminate
    actionable intelligence to ISAF SOF Special Operations Task Groups
    (SOTGs) and our Afghan partners.
        The NSHQ is building enduring operational capabilities,
    collaborative policies and procedures, and networked command, control,
    and communications mechanisms among NATO SOF. Collaborative training
    and exercises reinforce this framework to ensure Allied and Partner SOF
    are interoperable in order to operate more effectively in designated
    combined operations well into the future.
        Afghanistan
        NATO's operation in Afghanistan currently constitutes the
    Alliance's most significant operational commitment to date. America's
    Allies in NATO have shared the risks, costs and burdens of this mission
    from the beginning. They have contributed to International Security
    Assistance Force and the Afghan National Security Forces, as well as
    significant non-military contributions.
        The situation in Afghanistan today is complicated and challenging.
    As the President has stated, Afghanistan is the epicenter of the
    violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. For this reason, I strongly
    support the President's new strategy for Afghanistan and I will
    continue to work with our allies as we all contribute to this
    challenge. Our allies have already contributed a great deal to this
    war, fighting, bleeding, and dying side-by-side with our own troops.
    Many have committed further contributions following President Obama's
    announcement, strengthening their resolve and partnership.

        I believe there are four areas in which we must succeed in order to
    win in Afghanistan. First, we must strike the right balance between our
    civilian and military efforts. Success cannot be achieved solely by the
    military. In addition to strong military and police forces to ensure
    security, Afghanistan needs a credible government taking active,
    visible steps to show that it is stamping out corruption, improving
    efficiency and delivering necessary services to its people effectively.
    This is where concentrated civilian efforts are needed the most, for it
    is they who have the expertise and credibility on topics such as rule
    of law, economics, and agriculture--three areas that are critical to
    Afghanistan's reconstruction and development.
        Second, if Afghanistan is to become a secure and stable nation, the
    Afghans themselves must be at the center of this effort. Our allies
    must partner with Afghan security forces and civilian personnel to
    mentor and develop their own capabilities to conduct these critical
    activities on their own. The Afghan people must assume responsibility
    for the well-being of their country and they must feel confident in
    their own government's ability to provide basic security and services
    absent of corruption and tribal favoritism.
        Third, strategic communication will be a key method of ensuring
    that the Afghans, as well as our enemies, understand the United States
    and our allies are committed to a secure and stable Afghanistan.
        Finally, the most important role that the military can play in this
    strategy is to increase the size and capability of the Afghan National
    Security Forces (ANSF), through training and mentoring, to be able to
    take the lead responsibility for securing their country.
        Again, the challenges facing Afghanistan today are serious and
    complex. However, I am confident that the Afghan people will prevail.
    We have the right strategy and resources in place to partner
    successfully with the Afghans to develop their capacity to self-secure.
        A recent survey conducted in Afghanistan by the Afghan Center for
    Socio-Economic and Opinion Research underscores how our strategy is
    indeed bringing us closer to our goals in Afghanistan. That survey
    revealed that nearly three out of four Afghans interviewed expect
    things to be either somewhat better or much better in a year. That
    sentiment reflected a 51 percent improvement over the year prior and is
    indicative of a spreading feeling of hope, not hopelessness.
        The survey also revealed that 85 percent of Afghans interviewed
    rate the work of Afghanistan present government as either fair, good,
    or excellent, and nearly 90 percent also rated their provincial
    governments as fair, good or excellent. Both the Afghan National Police
    and the Afghan National Army received an 89 percent approval rating,
    indicative that our investments in training these security forces are
    paying off. 90 percent of Afghans interviewed also said they would
    rather have Afghanistan's current government in place than the Taliban
    or another government and 69 percent said they considered the Taliban
    the biggest danger to Afghanistan.

        These are all good news indicators that validate our effort to put
    the Afghan people at the center of the equation in Afghanistan. We need
    to continue giving the Afghan people hope that they are not destined to
    live under the yoke of tyranny and offering them every opportunity to
    live in an Afghanistan with a future worthy of their sacrifices.

                                   conclusion
        The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians at European
    Command and Allied Command Operations contribute to our national
    security everyday with their professional engagements with our allies
    and partners in the European theater. As we look forward to continued
    success, I ask for your continued support of these men and women and
    their families to ensure they receive the care and benefits they
    deserve.
        Operationally, we must continuously strive to find flexible
    authorities and funding mechanisms to build the capacity of those
    partner nations willing to fight side-by-side with us. This has become
    increasingly important because of the recent surge in activities in
    Afghanistan and the need to get our allies and partners more involved.
    Your continued support and expansion of authorities like the National
    Defense Authorization Act, section 1206, particularly allowing their
    use for partner nation forces deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, has
    been absolutely pivotal in enabling our strategic efforts in the
    European theater. With these programs, we are able to provide our
    allies and partners with the training and equipment necessary to
    achieve interoperability with our own forces engaged in ongoing
    overseas contingency operations. They will be able to arrive in theater
    better prepared to assume the responsibilities they have committed
    their forces to undertake, further reducing the risk of injury and loss
    of life.

        Furthermore, our efforts to fulfill this short-term task of
    building enduring capability are vital to ensuring the long-term
    stability and security of Europe. In addition to increasing the
    contributions of our allies and partners to operations outside Europe,
    building partner capacity allows us to make significant progress toward
    achieving strategic objectives within the AOR. For example, we have
    been able to conduct security sector reform assessments in Albania, an
    interagency effort critical to integrating Balkan countries in the
    European community. We also have numerous programs targeted at
    countering the proliferation of WMD throughout the theater such as the
    Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat
    Nuclear Terrorism. But we cannot stop there. With greater flexibility,
    these authorities can achieve greater strategic goals in support of our
    theater and national objectives.
        European Command and Allied Command Operations serve as important
    links between the United States and our friends in Europe, effectively
    ``bridging'' the Atlantic. We are building and strengthening relations
    with our European partners that will help us ensure the security of the
    United States at home and abroad.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        General Ward.

     STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA
                                COMMAND

        General Ward. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
    and distinguished members of the committee. It's great for me
    to be here this morning as well alongside my two great friends,
    the Admiral and the General, who we've come to partner with
    over time, and I think our collaboration has been good for our
    men and women who serve with us as well as for our Nation.
        I am very happy to be here to address the points that
    you've raised as well as others, and I'd like to start off by
    just thanking this committee for the great support that has
    been provided to my command and its men and women as we have
    carried forth our mission on behalf of our Nation.
        We do what we do in AFRICOM to protect American lives and
    to promote American interests, and we do it by supporting
    security and stability programs in Africa and its island
    nations. We concentrate our efforts on helping African states
    build capable and professional militaries that respect human
    rights, adhere to the rule of law, and more effectively
    contribute to stability in Africa.
        We are assisting our African partners in building
    capacities to counter transnational threats from violent
    extremist organizations, to stem illicit trafficking, to
    support peacekeeping operations, and to address the
    consequences of natural disasters.
        Supporting the development of professional and capable
    militaries contributes to increased security and stability in
    Africa, and allows African nations and regional organizations
    to promote good governance, expand development, provide for
    their common defense, and better serve their people.
        The Africa Partnership Station, which includes our European
    and African partners as members of the staff, is now on its
    fifth deployment and has expanded from the initial focus in the
    Gulf of Guinea to other African coastal nations. Africa
    Endeavor, a continental-wide command and control (C2) exercise,
    has been seeing a steady increase in participation and will
    amount to 30 nations participating this year. Exercise Natural
    Fire, conducted by the Nations in East Africa, is a
    tremendously successful program that looks at how these nations
    respond collectively to a natural disaster.
        These programs reflect the willingness of our partners to
    work with us and with each other against common threats and
    reflect that our programs and activities are indeed producing
    tangible results. My focus is on activities, programs, and
    communications that support our national interests and also
    reinforce success in ways that assure progress toward the long-
    term goals our African partners have established for themselves
    as they align with our national security objectives.
        We closely harmonize our activities with our colleagues at
    the Department of State (DOS), USAID, and other agencies. Our
    service components are in fact maturing. Our Office of Security
    Cooperation, defense attaches, the network of forward operating
    sites and cooperative security locations, including Camp
    Lemonnier in Djibouti, are tremendously valuable as we pursue
    our U.S. security interests.
        It's my honor to serve with the very distinguished
    uniformed and civilian members of DOD and our command who work
    every day alongside our interagency partners making a
    difference in this vitally important part of the world as we
    look to cause their work to lead to more effective global
    stability.
        Their dedicated efforts exemplify the spirit and
    determination of the American people, and they do contribute to
    the strength of our Nation and the security and stability on
    the African continent, directly supporting our interests there.
        I'm pleased to also say that, representing those men and
    women, I brought along today our Command Sergeant Major, the
    command's senior enlisted leader, Command Sergeant Major Mark
    Ripka as someone who just exemplifies the goodness of that
    great, great team.
        So again I thank you for your support. I thank you for what
    you do to cause our mission to be successful, and I stand ready
    to add any additional information that I can. Thank you very
    much.
        [The prepared statement of General Ward follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by GEN William E. Ward, USA
                                  introduction
        It is my privilege as Commander of U.S. Africa Command to present
    to Congress our Posture Statement for 2010. U.S. Africa Command's
    operations and programs protect American lives and interests, in Africa
    and in the homeland, by supporting security and stability in Africa and
    its island states. We concentrate our strategy and efforts on helping
    African states build capable and professional militaries that are
    subordinate to civilian authority, respect human rights, and adhere to
    the rule of law. We are assisting our African partners in building
    capacities to counter transnational threats from violent extremist
    organizations; to stem illicit trafficking in humans, narcotics, and
    weapons; to support peacekeeping operations; and to address the
    consequences of humanitarian disasters--whether man-made or natural--
    that cause loss of life and displace populations.
        Supporting the development of professional and capable militaries
    contributes to increasing security and stability in Africa--allowing
    African states and regional organizations to promote democracy, to
    expand development, to provide for their common defense, and to better
    serve their people. In his address in Ghana last July, President Obama
    reaffirmed Africa's strategic importance to the United States and our
    national interests. He identified four priorities for the U.S.
    Government's (USG) engagement efforts:

          Supporting strong and sustainable democracies and good
    governance
          Fostering sustained economic growth and development
          Increasing access to quality health and education
          Helping to prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict

        Through sustained security engagement with African militaries, U.S.
    Africa Command is supporting U.S. national interests and both the
    President's priorities and our African partners' objectives--now and in
    the long-term.
        In this report, I provide an overview of the strategic environment
    in Africa, explain our strategic approach, and show how our security
    cooperation efforts, designed and executed in close coordination with
    our interagency partners, are promoting stability in Africa in support
    of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.
                             strategic environment
        The challenges and opportunities in U.S. Africa Command's Area of
    Responsibility (AOR) are complex and dynamic. The application of only
    military means is insufficient to help our partners address them. U.S.
    Africa Command seeks to be part of a coordinated effort that integrates
    all tools available to our international and interagency partners.
        Our discussion of the strategic environment in Africa begins with
    the key Defense Department concerns noted by the President: the
    potential for conflict, transnational threats, and other threats to
    peace and security. It is followed by an overview of the important
    issues faced by our African partner militaries as they seek to confront
    these threats.
    Nature of the Environment
        Africa is a large and diverse continent whose land mass is about
    three and a half times the size of the continental United States. The
    distance from Africa's northernmost tip to its southernmost tip is
    roughly equal to the distance from New York to Moscow. Its 53 countries
    each have unique histories.
        Africa is home to 1 billion people, divided among 800 ethnicities
    and speaking about 1,000 different languages. Ethnic ties are strong,
    and ethnic dynamics often influence national politics. Africa's
    population growth rate is the highest in the world. Of the 40 countries
    worldwide with the highest rates of growth, 34 are African.
        While an increasing number of African states are conducting
    elections, many of the requirements of enduring liberal democracies,
    such as the rule of law, protection of individual rights, and a vibrant
    civil society, are nascent or non-existent. Additionally, in some
    countries previously demonstrating liberalization and democratization,
    increasing examples of authoritarianism are emerging.
    Areas of Potential Conflict and Impacts on Peace and Security
        Africa is still dealing with the effects of widespread conflict
    that engulfed the continent following the independence movements of the
    last half of the last century, with some still ongoing today. The
    effects of armed conflict in Africa are severe. The African Union (AU)
    estimates that Africa has the world's largest number of forcibly
    displaced individuals, with close to 3 million refugees and
    approximately 11.6 million internally displaced persons in 19 countries
    across the continent. According to a 2007 study by Oxfam International
    on the economic impact of armed conflict, 23 African countries lost an
    estimated $284 billion in revenue between 1990 and 2005 as a result of
    armed conflict. Oxfam estimated that an armed conflict in Africa
    contracts a country's economy on average by 15 percent. Conflict is a
    major obstacle to development and the delivery of basic services, such
    as health and education.
        Today, 8 of the 17 ongoing peacekeeping operations or political
    missions administered by the United Nations (UN) are on the African
    continent. The eight missions in Africa account for approximately 75
    percent of the UNs' military, police, and civilian peacekeepers
    deployed worldwide. The number and scale of peacekeeping missions
    increasingly strain donor states and regional organizations. Therefore,
    it is in our interests to help our African partners improve their
    capabilities and broaden their capacities. While the number of violent
    conflicts in Africa has decreased over the past 10 years, significant
    potential for new and continued conflict remains.

          In Sudan, Darfur remains insecure, violence has increased
    in Southern Sudan, and tensions continue in border areas.
          Somalia remains a country in armed conflict, as its
    Transitional Federal Government (TFG) battles violent Islamic
    extremists.
          Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces
    (UPDF), scattered elements of the Lord's Resistance Army continue to
    operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations in the
    Central African Republic, northern Democratic Republic of the Congo
    (DRC), and Southern Sudan.
          In the DRC, independent local militias, the insurgent
    Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, and some ill-
    disciplined Congolese armed forces remain destabilizing forces in the
    country's eastern region.
    Transnational Challenges
        Threats to stability do not necessarily manifest themselves in
    conflict, but can nevertheless have a corrosive influence on the
    development of good governance, viable market economies, and effective
    security sectors. Weakly governed spaces provide favorable operating
    environments for violent extremism, piracy, and trafficking of humans,
    weapons, and drugs, posing direct threats to the U.S. homeland and our
    interests abroad.
        Violent Extremism
        Violent extremism by transnational terrorist organizations is a
    major source of regional instability. In the last year, al Qaeda and
    terrorist groups in Africa appear to have strengthened their
    collaboration. Al Qaeda operatives are active in East Africa, while al
    Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates across the
    trans-Sahara region of Northern and Western Africa. The leaders of
    Somalia-based Al-Shabaab have publicly aligned themselves with al
    Qaeda, having issued public statements praising Osama Bin Ladin and
    linking Somalia to al Qaeda's global operations. Al-Shabaab also
    announced its support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) at
    the same time that AQAP activities increased in Yemen, separated from
    Somalia by the 20-mile wide Bab-el-Mandab Strait. Al-Shabaab continues
    to operate multiple terrorist training camps in Somalia with al Qaeda
    participation.
        Al Qaeda and al Qaeda affiliates also target the United States and
    our European and African partners across North Africa and the Sahel.
    Terrorist activities, kidnapping, illicit trafficking of all types
    (humans, weapons, drugs), and the existence of undergoverned spaces in
    the Sahel contribute to the region's vulnerability and make it
    susceptible to extremist influences.
        Countries of the Maghreb, like Algeria and Morocco, partner with
    the United States to respond to terrorism and check the western
    extension of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Yet, enhancing security
    depends upon regional cooperation and the development of stable and
    growing economies to undercut the recruiting activities of violent
    extremist organizations.
        Illicit Trafficking
        Narcotics trafficking is a growing concern in Africa. West Africa
    is a node for Latin American drugs transiting to their primary
    destination in European markets. In addition, drugs originating in Asia
    are transported through South and East Africa on their way to Europe.
    The destabilizing and corrupting influence of narcotics trafficking
    threatens to turn Guinea-Bissau into a narco-state and helps to expand
    the Latin American cartel's network and influence throughout the
    region. Many African countries lack the capability to interdict the
    flow of narcotics--on land, air, or sea. While not as directly impacted
    by narcotics flows through Africa as our European allies, the United
    States has a vested interest in countering the destabilizing impacts of
    drug trafficking on security, stability, and development in Africa.
        Many Africans also remain vulnerable to human trafficking in the
    forms of forced labor, child labor, child soldiers, and slavery. While
    some countries are making strides to counter trafficking in persons,
    many lack the law enforcement capacity to address this problem.
        Piracy
        Incidents of piracy in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden have
    continued to receive international attention. In 2009, pirate attacks
    continued to escalate in frequency and expanded their geographic range
    in the western Indian Ocean out to 1,000 nautical miles from the
    African coast. U.S. Africa Command continues to support counterpiracy
    operations through the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and
    Maritime Patrol Aircraft temporarily based in the Seychelles.
    Public Health, Economic Development, and Democratization
        Public health, economic development, and democratization challenges
    continue to significantly impact the security environment in Africa.
        Public Health Sector
        African populations remain at great risk to a host of infectious
    diseases, including 2009 H1N1 Influenza. The Human Immunodeficiency
    Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), tuberculosis, and
    malaria are the leading causes of adult mortality in Africa. Most
    African countries lack adequate capacity and capability to contain or
    mitigate the threat of pandemic diseases.
        Pandemic disease is not only a human security issue, but also a
    military readiness challenge. For example, some of our African partners
    have professional and capable militaries that contribute thousands of
    soldiers to UN and AU missions in Somalia, Sudan, DRC, and elsewhere.
    However, they would have even greater peacekeeping capacities if it
    were not for the high rates of HIV/AIDS incidence found in their
    military forces.
        Economic Development
        Until the global economic crisis of late 2008, Africa as a whole
    experienced a 10-year trend of sustained economic growth, averaging
    over 5 percent growth in gross domestic product per year. High oil
    prices enabled some African oil-producing countries to achieve economic
    growth that rivaled the world's highest rates. However, countries
    solely dependent on oil and extractive commodities revenue were
    vulnerable to falling prices. In many cases, undiversified economies,
    high unemployment, and corruption, have prevented the wealth generated
    by Africa's natural resources from finding its way to the neediest
    segments of African societies. The UN identified Africa as the world's
    most impoverished continent, containing 25 of the world's poorest
    countries.
        Democratization
        Over the past 20 years, many African countries have moved toward
    democratic processes, good governance, and the rule of law. In January
    2009, Ghanaian voters conducted their fourth free and fair presidential
    election in 15 years. For the second time, the ruling party was
    peacefully replaced by the opposition. In April 2009, over 13 million
    South Africans went to the polls and elected Jacob Zuma, the country's
    fourth president since the end of apartheid, and Botswana, in October
    2009, held its 10th democratic presidential election since
    independence--the most of any post-colonial sub-Saharan African
    country. Since the 1990s, many African states have also moved from
    dictatorship toward democracy.
    The African Security Sector
        Although African countries have consistently expressed a strong
    desire to provide for their security and address these various
    challenges themselves, many lack sufficient means to do so without
    foreign assistance. The challenges they face can be broadly described
    as:

             Militaries have frequently been used as tools of
            authoritarian regimes to protect their leaders and suppress the
            opposition. This has led to corruption and distrust by the
            populace.
             Increased professionalization of many African
            militaries remains a work in progress. Traditionally, the
            development of maritime and air components has lagged that of
            land components in most African militaries.
             The legacy of Cold War politics flooded Africa with
            competing streams of military equipment, tactics, and doctrine.
            Much of what remains is poorly functioning and ill-suited for
            confronting today's challenges.
             Although regional cooperation has improved
            tremendously, combined efforts to confront transnational
            challenges are limited. Domestic politics can inhibit a
            government's willingness to take strong action against a
            violent extremist organization or other direct threats.
             The AU's African Standby Force and its five Brigades
            have shown continued development, but are not yet fully mission
            capable. They lack sufficient enablers to become self-
            sustaining as a peacekeeping and crisis response force.
            National peacekeeping capabilities are similarly lacking,
            although some countries have made regular and substantial
            contributions to international peacekeeping missions.
                         u.s. africa command's approach
        Our approach is founded in our overall national security interests
    on the continent as outlined by the President and Secretaries of State
    and Defense. The United States and our African partners have strong
    mutual interests in promoting security and stability on the continent
    of Africa, its island states, and maritime zones. Advancing these
    interests requires a unified approach that integrates our efforts with
    those of other USG departments, agencies, and our African and other
    international partners.
        Our programs and activities support U.S. national interests as well
    as pursue four defense-oriented goals expressed by our African
    partners:
        First, that they have capable and accountable military forces that
    perform professionally and with integrity;
        Second, that their forces are supported and sustained by effective,
    legitimate, and professional security institutions;
        Third, that they have the capability to exercise the means
    nationally and regionally to dissuade, deter, and defeat transnational
    threats;
        Fourth, that they have the capacity to increase their support to
    international peacekeeping efforts.
        Fostering stability supports the pursuit of these goals, and allows
    further opportunities to reinforce success.
        Our approach is subordinate to overall USG policy goals. We work in
    concert with our interagency partners, such as the U.S. Department of
    State (DOS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), to
    ensure our plans and activities directly support U.S. foreign policy
    objectives.
        Africa's challenges require a holistic view of security that
    includes defense, law enforcement, and customs and border security.
    Addressing defense-related challenges must be pursued in concert with
    other USG and partner security-related endeavors to sustain unity of
    effort.
        Our activities must provide immediate benefits and help our
    partners progress toward their long-term goals. Our mission is
    ``sustained security engagement''; providing programs and activities
    that build for the future and reinforce success.
        Regional cooperation is critical, whether it be neighboring
    countries working together against mutual threats, or region-wide
    efforts to establish common security networks, such as the AU's
    cooperative security architecture. Our approach focuses on mutual
    interests, fostering interoperability and common situational awareness,
    regionally-oriented capacity building, and enhancing relationships
    built on trust and cooperation. The more the countries of Africa work
    together, the greater the likelihood that the continent will achieve
    lasting stability.
        These goals support our national security interests. Increasing
    African partner capability to identify and interdict threats emanating
    from the continent enhances the security of the U.S. homeland.
    Enhancing the capacity of African forces to respond to threats to peace
    and stability on the continent allows the United States to use its
    forces for other operations. The development of capable and
    professional military forces can support efforts to consolidate
    democratic principles and good governance by fostering transparency and
    accountability in the military, which historically has been one of the
    most important institutions in modern African societies.
                  u.s. africa command programs and activities
        U.S. Africa Command's programs and activities support the
    development of capable, professional partner military forces, and are
    integrated and coordinated with the DOS, U.S. Chiefs of Mission, and
    our international partners. Africa Command conducts several categories
    of activities to support our four primary goals and address current
    security challenges that threaten stability. The primary purposes of
    our activities can be categorized as follows:

             Building the capacity of partner conventional forces
             Supporting capacity building of partner security
            forces
             Building the capacity of partner enabling forces
             Fostering strong strategic relationships
             Conducting defense sector reform
             Fostering regional cooperation, situational awareness,
            and interoperability
             Countering transnational and extremist threats
             Contributing to stability in current zones of conflict
             Addressing conditions that contribute to instability
    Building Capacity of Partner Conventional Forces
        U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are terrific trainers
    and exemplary examples of military professionalism and our core
    national values. The training and exercises they conduct encourage the
    development of partner security capabilities and the instilling of
    professional ethos among African military elements. Moreover, most of
    these activities can be performed with small numbers of U.S. forces.
    Some examples of our recent activities include:
        Natural Fire, Uganda
        In October 2009, U.S. Africa Command, with U.S. Army Africa
    (USARAF) as the lead component, brought together more than 1,200
    soldiers and civilians from 6 countries for Exercise Natural Fire 10 in
    Uganda. The exercise improved interoperability and helped build African
    partner capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies. The
    region jointly exercised contingency plans designed to address a global
    health threat of pandemic influenza. Approximately 550 U.S. personnel
    and 650 soldiers from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda
    participated.
        Africa Partnership Station
        Africa Partnership Station (APS) is U.S. Africa Command's primary
    maritime security engagement initiative and is now a program of record.
    In cooperation with partner states and nongovernmental organizations
    (NGOs), APS builds maritime security capabilities in our Africa
    partners using sea-based training platforms to provide predictable
    regional presence with a minimal footprint ashore. Our training and
    assistance focuses on strengthening four pillars of maritime sector
    development: a competent and professional maritime security force;
    secure infrastructure to sustain maritime operations; maritime domain
    awareness; and maritime response capability. Our African partners view
    APS as a successful maritime initiative and are enthusiastic
    participants.
        From January through May 2009, the Command employed the USS
    NASHVILLE to support APS. With representatives from 9 European allies,
    10 African countries, and Brazil, APS doubled the number of partners
    participating in the planning and execution compared to previous
    engagements. APS conducted 10 engagements in 7 countries--Senegal,
    Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe, and Gabon.
    U.S. Marines and their counterparts from Spain and Portugal conducted
    security cooperation events with over 800 African military
    professionals in Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon.
    Over 1,750 African professionals were engaged in 64 workshops and
    seminars.
        The success and effectiveness of our engagements was demonstrated
    when the Benin Navy boarded and freed a pirated tanker without loss of
    life. APS in Benin was a principal enabler for that mission. Benin's
    Navy participated in APS instruction focused on Visit, Board, Search
    and Seizure, small boat operations, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection,
    and use of the Automated Information System (AIS), which was installed
    during their training. The Benin Navy used maritime domain awareness
    tools provided by APS to guide one of its ships to assist the tanker,
    allowing its Navy to take action against a threat affecting the
    interests of Benin, the United States, and the international community.
        U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF), is building on the success of
    the APS in West Africa by conducting similar activities in East Africa.
    APS-East will work to build our African partners' capabilities in small
    boat operations. Our partners include Kenya, Mozambique, the
    Seychelles, Mauritius, and Tanzania. The activities of the USS Bradley
    and the USS Arleigh Burke in 2009 served as a pilot deployment for APS-
    East and made great inroads in South and East Africa. In addition, the
    Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) established a
    maritime center of excellence in Mombasa, Kenya, to provide maritime
    training to African states. Both DOS and DOD approved a section 1206
    (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended)
    program to provide small boats, AIS, and surface search radars to
    Djibouti, Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and
    Comoros. The latter effort will establish a basic surveillance
    capability along the entire East African coast. We plan to sustain and
    supplement this project through Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
        African Lion, Morocco
        African Lion is an annual exercise with Morocco, a key regional
    ally and active contributor to international peacekeeping operations.
    U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) is U.S. Africa Command's
    lead component for the exercise, which focuses on U.S.-Morocco
    interoperability, air and ground combined arms training, staff
    training, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) training, medical and disaster
    response training, public affairs training, and humanitarian civic
    assistance operations. Last year, during African Lion 09, medical teams
    conducted humanitarian civic assistance in 5 villages, treating over
    17,000 Moroccans and over 9,500 livestock. Numerous fiscal year 2010-
    2011 Exercise Related Construction projects are scheduled to improve
    training ranges, strategic access, and delivery of logistics support in
    support of African Lion. U.S Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) will
    spearhead its participation in African Lion through the State
    Partnership Program, with the Utah Air National Guard providing KC-135
    tankers and personnel.
        Building effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps
        Several African countries have underdeveloped NCO corps, which in
    some cases are vulnerable to corruptive influences. Our African
    partners recognize that effective NCO corps as essential to developing
    capable and sustainable units, which will contribute to overall
    stability and security. They have turned to us for assistance. By
    helping partners develop their NCO corps, we have an opportunity to
    instill the qualities and character that will allow them to train and
    guide their own development in this area.
        Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
        A particular challenge many of our partners face is the lack of
    serviceable equipment--from individual military gear to vehicles to
    other major systems. FMF and FMS are two programs we are leveraging to
    help address these shortfalls. U.S. Africa Command is working with U.S.
    country teams to develop and implement FMF programs to procure systems
    that increase interoperability among African partners, international
    allies, and the United States. U.S. Africa Command is employing the
    Excess Defense Articles program under FMS to supply trucks, personal
    soldier equipment, and uniforms to support the deployment of
    peacekeeping battalions to Darfur, Somalia, and Liberia.
    Supporting Capacity Building of Partner Security Forces
        Achieving security and stability in Africa requires more than the
    contributions of the military alone. Security is a holistic function
    that includes nonmilitary elements such as law enforcement, border
    patrol, customs, and judiciary. U.S. Africa Command works closely with
    USG departments and agencies to ensure that we plan and conduct our
    efforts as seamlessly as possible.
        African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP)
        AMLEP is a cooperative maritime law enforcement program with the
    U.S. Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Coast Guard and host nation
    Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET) embark on U.S. and host nation
    ships and law enforcement vessels to provide the vessel with the
    necessary authorities and capabilities to conduct boardings, search,
    seizure, and arrests within the participating African country's
    Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
        AMLEP operations were conducted with Senegal, Morocco, Sierra
    Leone, and Cape Verde, with the support of DOS, French Maritime Air
    Forces, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Collectively, our operations
    accomplished the following: Maritime Law Enforcement and small boat
    training for LEDET personnel; the integration of French Maritime Patrol
    Aircraft capability; and vessel boardings led by the respective
    country's LEDET team.
        The highlight of our engagements occurred in August when the
    Republic of Sierra Leone's Armed Forces Maritime Wing detained the 750-
    ton Taiwan F/V YU FENG 102 for fishing illegally in the Sierra Leone
    EEZ. The YU FENG's 11 crewmembers were deported to Taiwan and the Feng
    was impounded by the Government of Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone
    forces again demonstrated their resolve and capability by seizing four
    vessels for violation of Sierra Leonean law during December AMLEP
    operations.
        Security Sector Assessments
        An integrated and harmonized assessment of a partner nations'
    requirements is helpful in developing effective and coordinated
    activities. This past year, U.S. Africa Command participated in DOS-led
    Security Sector Assessments in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Togo,
    Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cape Verde, and Mozambique. The resulting
    interagency plans will ensure our military engagements with these
    countries are consistent with policy objectives and mutually reinforce
    the activities of other USG departments and agencies.
    Building Capacity of Partner Enabling Forces
        Enablers such as logistics, intelligence, communications, and de-
    mining capabilities play vital roles in the U.S. military, and
    facilitate our ability to sustain operations independently. Developing
    similar enablers or enabling capabilities among African countries can
    help reduce their dependence on foreign assistance when conducting
    military operations. Many of our capacity building activities in this
    area add tremendous value while requiring only a minimal commitment of
    U.S. personnel.
        Logistics Capacity Building
        Our African partners recognize the importance of logistics and have
    benefitted from several U.S. Africa Command training events and
    symposia in this area. For example, experts from U.S. MARFORAF provided
    vital logistics support and guidance to assist the Republic of Sierra
    Leone Armed Forces in packaging and loading a UN ship in preparation
    for their first United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
    deployment.
        The Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT) develops
    African military logistics capacities to enable them to manage and
    support peacekeeping operations. ADAPT training provided by U.S. Africa
    Command's Army and Air Force components enabled the Rwandan Defense
    Force to load and deploy vehicles, equipment, and supplies to support
    UNAMID. ADAPT also allowed the Ugandan People's Defense Force to
    certify Ugandan soldiers to load equipment on U.S. military aircraft
    (C-130 and C-17), strengthening their ability to support peacekeeping
    operations and disaster response operations employing U.S. or UN cargo
    aircraft. These soldiers will also serve as co-trainers for future
    ADAPT activities. ADAPT activities are planned in Nigeria and Tanzania
    in 2010.
        In 2009, U.S. Africa Command conducted the first Partnership for
    Integrated Logistics, Operations, and Tactics (PILOT) symposium with 25
    African participants. PILOT is an operational-level seminar jointly
    designed and funded through partnership with the Canadian Ministry of
    Defense, Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Center. PILOT focuses on
    familiarization with the legal and ethical aspects of peacekeeping; the
    roles, missions, and functions of the AU and the UN in peacekeeping;
    planning logistics staff estimates for PKO; planning Reception,
    Staging, Onward Movement and Integration operations; planning Force
    Deployment Planning and Execution; and an overview of the Joint
    Operational Planning Process.
        Intelligence Capacity Building
        Military intelligence is an essential capability for all
    professional militaries. The ability to collect, analyze, and
    synthesize information is key to developing effective military plans.
    U.S. Africa Command's Intelligence Security Cooperation and Engagement
    (ISCE) Program seeks to build sustainable military intelligence
    capacity in designated partner nations and regional organizations. ISCE
    develops and implements common military intelligence doctrine and
    procedures. It emphasizes the rule of law, respect for human rights,
    and civil authority in order to reverse the historical stigma
    associated with many African intelligence and security services.
    Program activities include familiarization seminars; senior
    intelligence officer visits; Director of Military Intelligence
    conferences; intelligence exchanges and analyst roundtables; and a
    series of officer and noncommissioned officer intelligence training
    courses.
        The Military Intelligence Basic Officer Course-Africa (MIBOC-A) is
    a course offered to junior military intelligence officers, primarily
    from north and west Africa. In addition to teaching professional
    intelligence skills, it promotes relationships among the intelligence
    communities that encourage greater cooperation in the future. U.S.
    Africa Command conducted two MIBOC-A courses in fiscal year 2009 and
    one so far in fiscal year 2010.
        Communications Systems Development
        One way to foster regional cooperation is to establish means by
    which partner militaries can reliably and effectively communicate with
    each other. However, because African communications infrastructure is
    underdeveloped, U.S. Africa Command is developing programs that improve
    the communications architecture among African military leaders.
        The AU Command, Control, Communications, and Information Systems
    initiative is an effort to enable the AU's command and control of its
    Standby Force. This initiative achieved its first milestone with the
    recent ribbon-cutting of the new AU Peace Support Operations Center,
    and will continue by establishing similar command and control nodes at
    the regional Standby Brigade Headquarters, planning cells, and
    logistics cells. This initiative is also pursuing connectivity with the
    AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
        We are also supporting two other regional initiatives. The Economic
    Community of Western African States' (ECOWAS) Regional Information
    Exchange System provides workstations, internet access, and telephone
    services to senior defense leaders in 11 ECOWAS countries, and this
    will soon expand to 13. Meanwhile, the Multinational Information
    Sharing Initiative has just begun, and it will provide similar mobile
    capabilities to the Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)
    countries over the next 3 years.
        De-Mining Capacity Building
        U.S. Africa Command conducts ``Train-the-Trainer'' Humanitarian
    Mine Action missions to build our partners' anti-mine capacities and
    support broader U.S. and international efforts to eliminate landmines
    and other explosive remnants of war. We initiated programs in Kenya,
    Burundi, Mozambique, and Namibia in 2009, and will expand mine action
    programs to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, and Chad in
    2010. We are also working with Uganda to develop anti-mine capabilities
    in support of Ugandan peacekeeping deployments to AMISOM.
        Special Staff Programs
        Efforts to establish capable and accountable forces involve
    mechanisms that allow the partner military leadership to establish and
    enforce standards of conduct and readiness. These mechanisms should be
    transparent to ensure equal treatment, fairness, and common
    expectations. Through mentoring and information exchanges, our
    inspector general, chaplain, legal counsel, surgeon, public affairs,
    and other special staff elements work closely with partner countries to
    build capacity in these areas in support of improving the military's
    standing with its government and people.
    Fostering Strong Strategic Relationships
        Strong strategic relationships are important enablers for
    sustaining the positive gains of our capacity building activities. They
    encourage our partners to assume greater ownership of their newfound
    capabilities. They provide ready opportunities to reinforce success
    through follow-on activities and open communication links that
    facilitate new or evolving requirements. They also encourage dialogue
    with other partners.
        The National Guard State Partnership Program
        The State Partnership Program is a superb tool that fosters a
    variety of military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civilian-to-
    civilian engagements using National Guard and U.S. States'
    capabilities. Eight African countries currently partner with U.S.
    states through this program: Tunisia-Wyoming; Morocco-Utah; Ghana-North
    Dakota; South Africa-New York; Nigeria-California; Senegal-Vermont;
    Liberia-Michigan; and Botswana-North Carolina.
        The benefits of this program from the past year are many and
    impressive. For example, in Tunisia, the Wyoming Guard is helping the
    Tunisian Government integrate Ground Surveillance Radar into border
    patrol operations. In West Africa, U.S. Africa Command's Air Force
    Component, U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA), partnered with the Deputy
    Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, the
    Tennessee Air National Guard, and the Warner-Robins Air Logistics
    Center to coordinate military-to-military efforts to rebuild the first
    of four Nigerian C-130s. In Botswana, the North Carolina Air Guard
    demonstrated its Modular Airborne Firefighting System capability; an
    event of key importance to Botswana due to the annual range fires that
    destroy grazing land and the habitat for one of Botswana's most
    important national resources--its wildlife.
        The State Partnership Program delivers programs and activities that
    build broad capabilities with our African partners. The habitual
    relationships this builds adds tremendous value to our efforts. This
    program is very valuable to U.S. Africa Command, and we look forward to
    expanding it as our African partners request greater participation. I
    urge your continued support.
        International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded
            IMET (E-IMET)
        Professionalizing militaries and reinforcing the democratic value
    of elected civilian authority are among the benefits of the DOS-led
    IMET and E-IMET programs. These comprise the most widely-used military
    assistance programs in U.S. Africa Command's AOR. Approximately 900
    military and civilian students from 44 African countries received
    education and training in the United States or their own countries
    valued at $19.8 million. Many officers and enlisted IMET graduates go
    on to fill key positions in our African partners' militaries and
    governments, and the relationships built in the academic environment
    directly contribute to stronger bi-lateral military relationships
    between the United States and partner countries.
        IMET funded regional seminars with a Defense Institute for
    International Legal Studies Military Education Teams (MET) for Chad,
    Cameroon, DRC, Mauritius and Sierra Leone, and also supported a Center
    for Civil Military Relations MET for Cameroon, Comoros, DRC, Mauritius,
    and Guinea Bissau. Sustained support for robust IMET and E-IMET
    programs is an investment in our future, and directly supports long-
    term U.S. interests and relationships in Africa. It is one of our most
    desired and productive programs.
        Military-to-Military Engagement Programs
        U.S. Africa Command uses military-to-military (mil-to-mil) programs
    to strengthen key relationships and familiarize partners with U.S.
    military techniques, tactics, and procedures they can employ to address
    a broad range of security challenges, including conducting peacekeeping
    operations and countering terrorism. Mil-to-mil also assists partners
    in improving deployment procedures, logistics systems, maintenance
    operations, force protection, and the conduct of their own training. In
    fiscal year 2004, the initial year of the program, less than $500,000
    was spent in Africa for mil-to-mil programs. Today the mil-to-mil
    program is the cornerstone of U.S. Africa Command's engagement
    activities, with $6.3 million allocated and 431 events planned in 40
    countries in fiscal year 2010. This is a relatively small investment
    with substantial dividends.
    Conducting Defense Sector Reform
        U.S. Africa Command is a key contributor to the long-term
    development of professional defense forces as part of broader security
    sector reform efforts led by the Department of State.
        Liberia
        To solidify gains made under the DOS' Security Sector Reform
    program, U.S. Africa Command commenced a 5-year mentorship program with
    the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) Headquarters Staff and Liberia's 23rd
    Brigade. We have 56 military mentors in Liberia to continue the
    professional development of the AFL. Onward Liberty is one of three
    lines of effort in our overarching Defense Sector Reform program in
    Liberia. We are also working with the U.S. Coast Guard to help the AFL
    re-establish a Coast Guard-like capability, and with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense to mentor the Liberian Ministry of Defense.
        Democratic Republic of Congo
        At the request of the Department of State and DRC, U.S. Africa
    Command is training and equipping a battalion of the Armed Forces of
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) in support of USG
    objectives and priorities established by Secretary of State Clinton
    during her visit to the DRC in August 2009. We will help the FARDC to:
    (1) improve its capacity to lead, manage, and sustain its force; (2)
    enhance its ability to investigate and prosecute its personnel accused
    of human rights violations and other crimes; and (3) reduce sexual and
    gender-based violence (SGBV) by the military.
        The third objective, mitigating SGBV, is important to helping heal
    the wounds of past conflicts in DRC. We are working closely with the
    country team and USAID to identify opportunities to provide support to
    survivors of SGBV. We are pursuing funding for the completion of a
    maternity hospital in the capital city of Kinshasa that will also
    provide counseling for SGBV survivors and perform fistula repairs. In
    South Kivu Province, we are seeking to secure funding for two projects:
    the construction of a primary school, whose pupils will consist of HIV
    orphans or survivors and children of SGBV; and a Reference Hospital in
    Wolungu serving a large, rural population that includes SGBV survivors.
    Fostering Regional Cooperation, Situational Awareness, and
            Interoperability
        The spirit of cooperation is growing very strong among African
    states. Over the past 2 years, participation by African countries has
    increased steadily in many of our regional activities. All of our
    activities seek to capitalize on this spirit by bringing partners
    together to develop collaborative solutions to shared security
    challenges. The following activities are noteworthy in their emphasis
    on interoperability.
        Exercise Africa Endeavor
        Africa Endeavor is our premier communications interoperability
    exercise that involves the greatest number of partner countries, and it
    continues to grow. Exercise Africa Endeavor 09 in Gabon brought
    together 25 countries and 3 regional organizations (the AU, ECOWAS, and
    the Economic Community of Central African States). Focusing on
    information sharing among African states via communication networks,
    the exercise developed communications links with the United States,
    NATO, and other countries with common stability, security, and
    sustainment goals for the region. Participation in this summer's Africa
    Endeavor 10 exercise in Ghana is expected to expand to 30 African
    states.
        Exercise Phoenix Express, North Africa
        Phoenix Express is a multinational maritime security exercise led
    by U.S. NAVAF and focused on maritime interdiction, communications, and
    information sharing. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia increased
    their participation in the exercise this past year.
        Working With Partners to Counter Transnational and Extremist
            Threats
        Transnational challenges in Africa are a threat to the United
    States, our partners, and our allies. Transnational threats exacerbate
    difficult circumstances for local populations and complicate efforts to
    create a secure and stable environment conducive to development. We
    conduct operations and capacity building programs and activities to
    address the threat of terrorism, piracy, narcotics, and other illicit
    trafficking.
        Counter-terrorism Efforts in North Africa and the Sahel--Operation
            Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)
        Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA) conducts OEF-TS to
    counter the terrorism threat in North and West Africa. OEF-TS supports
    the DOS-led Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) by
    increasing our partners' capabilities to deny safe havens to
    terrorists, improving border security, promoting democratic governance,
    and reinforcing regional as well as bilateral military ties. OEF-TS
    activities are designed to defeat violent extremist organizations
    throughout the region.
        U.S. Africa Command works closely with the DOS and U.S. embassies
    to ensure we provide the military support needed to meet the objectives
    of TSCTP, including the following major elements: information
    operations; train, advise and assist activities; intelligence capacity
    building; coalition development; military exercise programs; and
    development and establishment of a regional computer-based information
    network. All OEF-TS activities are closely coordinated with the State
    Department and our U.S. embassy country teams.
        SOCAFRICA remained very active last year with OEF-TS. Military
    Information Support Teams assisted DOS public diplomacy efforts in
    countering extremist ideology in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and
    Nigeria. OEF-TS created High Frequency-Radio Tactical Communications
    Interoperability between Algeria and Niger, and Mobile Training Teams
    (MTTs) trained new Counter-Terrorism (CT) light infantry companies in
    Mali. The MTTs also trained existing CT units in Tunisia, Morocco,
    Nigeria, and Senegal. OEF-TS Military Intelligence courses trained
    students from 7 OEF-TS countries, and the Trans-Sahara Security
    Symposium civil-military course trained nearly 100 students from 4 OEF-
    TS partner countries. Additionally, OEF-TS Civil-Military Support
    Elements have completed or are planning 79 humanitarian assistance
    projects.
        In the last year, political conditions have allowed us to resume
    engagement with Mauritania, to include our efforts to build a CT
    company. Mauritanian security forces lack the capability to
    logistically sustain themselves during operations. Helping Mauritania
    develop a logistics capacity will provide Mauritanian security forces
    with the capability to push supplies and personnel to its forward-
    deployed CT companies, which operate hundreds of miles away in
    extremely austere territory. Through U.S. assistance, Mauritania will
    be able to sustain CT operations within its borders and in partnership
    with other regional forces.
        In West Africa, we are building on efforts in Mali, Nigeria,
    Senegal, and Burkina Faso. Our activities range from training and
    equipping specialized CT units to increasing intelligence capabilities
    and information sharing to supporting efforts that counter extremist
    ideology in the region. We are working with Mali to develop an
    intermediate level maintenance and vehicle repair capability, and to
    improve its air mobility, intelligence, and reconnaissance
    capabilities. These two programs will bolster the ability of Malian
    security forces to take direct action against AQIM.
        Counterterrorism Efforts in East Africa
        In East Africa, U.S. Africa Command's CJTF-HOA conducts operations
    to counter violent extremists throughout the region to protect U.S. and
    coalition interests. In cooperation with other USG departments and
    agencies, CJTF-HOA focuses its operations on building regional security
    capacity to combat terrorism, deny safe havens, and reduce support to
    violent extremist organizations. It accomplishes these objectives
    through the use of Civil Affairs Teams, Seabee construction teams,
    military advisors, and by importing security courses of instruction.
        U.S. Africa Command has focused the majority of its CT capacity
    building activities in East Africa on Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and
    Uganda, which--aside from Somalia--are the countries directly
    threatened by terrorists. For example, in Kenya, the Command is
    assisting in establishing a Ranger Strike Force and a Special Boat
    Unit, which will become the country's primary CT and border security
    forces. SOCAFRICA completed training two companies of the Kenyan Ranger
    Strike Force, and our Special Operations Forces (SOF) maritime efforts
    have created a nascent Kenyan Special Boat Unit capability to enhance
    Kenyan maritime security. When completed, Kenya will have a
    significantly improved capacity to counter the terrorist threat
    emanating from Somalia.
        In Djibouti, U.S. Africa Command is assisting with training of the
    Djiboutian counter-terrorism unit, the Groupe d'Intervention de la
    Gendarmerie Nationale. We are helping with the repair and transfer of
    12 vehicles from the AU to Djibouti. The vehicles are specifically for
    counter-terrorism and border security operations. The Uganda People's
    Defense Forces (UPDF) is one of the region's most professional
    militaries. It is a reliable partner in combating terrorism and, in
    collaboration with regional partners, is leading operations against the
    Lord's Resistance Army. Uganda's peacekeeping force in Somalia has
    played a critical role in providing the TFG an opportunity to establish
    itself. U.S. Africa Command and CJTF-HOA continue to work with the UPDF
    to enhance peacekeeping and CT capabilities through Africa Contingency
    Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), IMET, and PKO funded training.
        Counter-Narcotics Programs
        Our counternarcotics programs train, equip, and support partner
    nation law enforcement, paramilitary, and military units that have a
    counternarcotics and narcoterrorism mission. They build partner
    capacity to conduct the full range of counter-drug activities, such as
    sharing information, detecting threats, and interdicting and seizing
    vessels.
        One success from the past year was the construction of a multi-
    national and interagency fusion center in Cape Verde, funded by our
    Counternarcotics Division. The center incorporates U.S. law
    enforcement, International Police, and Cape Verde law enforcement
    agencies and maritime forces, and U.S. FMS projects will provide
    vessels. Our naval component, along with the U.S. Coast Guard, is
    providing maritime interdiction training and familiarization. The U.S.
    Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Justice, and Department of State
    are also significant contributors. The goal is to develop a Cape Verde
    maritime force capable of detecting and interdicting illicit
    traffickers, and sharing critical law enforcement information with the
    United States and the international community.
        Operation Objective Voice (OOV)
        OOV is U.S. Africa Command's information operations effort to
    counter violent extremism by leveraging media capabilities in ways that
    encourage the public to repudiate extremist ideologies. OOV is closely
    coordinated with U.S. embassies, DOS, and USAID, and employs a variety
    of messaging platforms, such as the African Web Initiative, to
    challenge the views of terrorist groups and provide a forum for the
    expression of alternative points of view. OOV also supports local
    outreach efforts to foster peace, tolerance, and understanding.
    Examples included a `youth peace games' in Mali and a film project in
    northern Nigeria. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the enhanced
    dialogue has had a positive impact. We are currently collecting
    baseline data and developing assessments to quantify the overall
    effects.
    Contributing to Stability in Current Zones of Conflict
        Long-term efforts to build security capacity can only succeed in an
    environment of sufficient stability. The United States is supporting
    African efforts to stabilize current and potential zones of conflict
    through peacekeeping missions and the growth of robust peacekeeping
    capacity that includes the AU's African Standby Force.
        Sudan
        U.S. Africa Command is closely working with USG stakeholders to
    support implementation of the comprehensive U.S. Strategy for Sudan. In
    Southern Sudan, the Command supports professional military education
    and non-commissioned officer development programs, HIV/AIDS courses and
    seminars, as well as familiarization events across professional
    military skills and functional areas. Additionally, we are examining
    ways in which our assets and resources can strengthen the UN missions
    operating in the country, and how we can continue to provide support to
    DOS-led Security Sector Reform efforts.
        Somalia
        The lack of an effective central governing authority in Somalia for
    nearly two decades has created a multitude of de-stabilizing
    conditions. It has left the country vulnerable to terrorist
    exploitation, and fosters a permissive environment for piracy and other
    illicit activities. It also exacerbates a severe humanitarian crisis.
    AMISOM, the multilateral AU Mission in Somalia, is severely under-
    resourced, but is essential to securing key TFG locations. The USG's
    support to AMISOM includes training, equipping, and logistical support
    for Ugandan and Burundian forces. Additionally, U.S. Africa Command
    provides military mentors to ACOTA pre-deployment training for AMISOM
    forces. Before deploying, each battalion receives staff training and
    soldier skills training tailored to PKO and the operational environment
    in Somalia.
        We also provide support to U.S. Central Command operations to
    address the increase of piracy in the western Indian Ocean. Counter-
    piracy training is also a part of our maritime capacity building
    efforts in east and southern Africa, such as Africa Partnership
    Station-East.
        Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
        GPOI is a DOS program that builds peacekeeping capacity in targeted
    partners and organizations. The GPOI-funded ACOTA program is regularly
    supported by U.S. Africa Command with officers and non-commissioned
    officers that serve as trainers and mentors. ACOTA has trained and
    provided equipment for Ugandan and Burundian forces for AMISOM, and
    trained Rwandan, South African, Zambian, and Tanzanian Forces for
    UNAMID.
        For fiscal year 2010, U.S. Africa Command has requested GPOI
    funding to support training programs to enhance the capabilities of the
    AU peacekeeping staff, the Economic Community of West African States,
    the Economic Community of Central African States, and the Southern
    African Development Community Standby Brigade Headquarters. We have
    also sought funding for designated member states' tactical units
    pledged to the respective Regional Standby Brigades.
    Addressing Conditions that Contribute to Instability
        The U.S. military has a number of civil-military programs that
    promote good civil-military relations, provide military training
    benefits, and help develop the humanitarian capacity of African
    countries. They complement civilian development efforts and are closely
    coordinated with U.S. embassy country teams.
        Exercise MEDFLAG
        In August 2009, MEDFLAG 09 was conducted with the Umbutfo Swaziland
    Defense Force as a joint Medical/Dental/Veterinary Capabilities
    Exercise. U.S. Army Africa and U.S. Air Forces Africa designed a mass
    casualty scenario that exercised the Defense Force's response
    capabilities and its interoperability with civilian first-responders.
    The exercise assisted the Swazi ministries of Health and Defense in
    jointly examining their emergency response plans and procedures.
    MEDFLAG 09 helped improve Swaziland's capacity to support future
    regional AU or UN PKO missions, while highlighting our support for this
    region of the continent.
        Pandemic Response Program
        Because infectious disease outbreaks have the potential to rapidly
    become global crises, U.S. Africa Command works with African partner
    countries, the interagency, international organizations, and NGOs to
    build partner military capacity to mitigate the effects of a pandemic.
    Our efforts are reinforced with 3 years of funding from USAID, which
    cooperates with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
    Crescent Societies and other partner organizations in African
    countries.
        Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
            (HIV/AIDS) Program
        U.S. Africa Command's military HIV/AIDS program is aimed at
    mitigating the impacts of the disease on African military readiness.
    The program includes activities that help prevent the escalation of
    HIV/AIDS infection rates within African security forces, and provide
    care and treatment for the servicemembers and families infected or
    affected by the disease. DOD activities that support African
    militaries' fight against HIV/AIDS now reach 39 African countries.
    During the first half of fiscal year 2009, U.S. Africa Command's
    programs reached over 117,000 African troops and family members with
    prevention messages, and provided counseling and testing services for
    114,430 servicemembers and their families. In addition, 111 senior
    military leaders have been trained on HIV/AIDS policies, and 2,396 peer
    educators and 517 health care workers have received HIV/AIDs training.
    Over 19,000 individuals are on antiretroviral treatment as a result of
    these collaborative efforts. The fight against HIV/AIDs in Africa is
    having an impact. Recently, a leader of a southern African country
    remarked that, 3 years ago, he was conducting burials everyday for an
    HIV related death; however, today he conducts one burial every 8 to 10
    days.
        Shared Accord, Benin
        When possible, we integrate civil-military operations into our
    exercises. Shared Accord is one example. Conducted by U.S. MARFORAF,
    Shared Accord's primary purpose is to train for peacekeeping and peace
    support operations, and the exercise successfully integrated two
    Beninese Infantry Companies with two Marine Corps Infantry Companies.
    An additional component of the exercise was a Medical/Dental Civic
    Action Program, which treated 7,370 patients during visits to three
    villages over an 8 day period. A separate Veterinary Civic Action
    Program treated 92,410 animals while visiting 7 villages over the same
    period. An exercise-related construction project to increase the
    Beninese capacity to conduct peacekeeper training at the Bembereke
    Peace Keeping Training Center was also completed.
             u.s africa command component and subordinate commands
        U.S. Africa Command has four component commands, one sub-unified
    command, and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Our
    components are newly established and have inherited legacy efforts that
    they must mold to fit the Command's strategy. U.S. Africa Command's
    components and subordinate commands are the primary implementers of our
    programs and activities on the continent. Since our components have no
    assigned forces, we rely on the DOD Request for Forces process for the
    resources necessary to support our engagements in Africa.
    U.S. Army Africa (USARAF)
        On 1 October 2009, the Secretary of the Army designated U.S. Army
    Africa as the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) to U.S. Africa
    Command. USARAF will be fully operational capable (FOC) as an ASCC in
    fiscal year 2012, and has doubled in size during the last 15 months.
    USARAF is heavily involved in the professional development of African
    land forces, which remain the dominant military force in most African
    states. USARAF's goal is to help transform our partners' land forces
    into contributors to peace and stability, with the capabilities and
    capacities required to accomplish their missions in support of
    legitimate authority.
        USARAF continues to forge cooperative relationships and enduring
    partnerships that contribute to self-sustaining African security
    capacity. Key to USARAF's success is collaborating with both military
    and non-military partners. USARAF is fostering new partnerships and
    enhancing existing ones, to include partnerships with other USG
    agencies.
        USARAF sponsored NATURAL FIRE, the largest exercise on the
    continent last year. It brought together U.S. forces from Europe and
    the United States to join with forces from five African states in a
    Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief exercise in Uganda.
    U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF)
        NAVAF's primary mission is to improve the maritime security
    capability and capacity of our African partners. Beyond APS, law
    enforcement operations, and Theater Security Cooperation activities,
    NAVAF is working to enhance maritime security by focusing on the
    development of maritime domain awareness, trained professionals,
    maritime infrastructure, response capabilities, regional integration,
    and a comprehensive approach for planning and execution. These
    capabilities will improve maritime security and contribute to
    development and stability by allowing our partners to take advantage of
    the resources in their exclusive economic zones.
        NAVAF, located in Naples, Italy, supports the creation of an
    environment where all African countries take a proactive interest in
    their own maritime security and in the overall security of the region.
    NAVAF utilizes maritime engagement activities to build trust, mutual
    cooperation, and respect in order to protect U.S. interests, reduce
    demand for U.S. resources, and ensure reliable and open access to
    ports, territorial waters, and other resources required for conducting
    sustained maritime operations.
    U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA/17AF)
        The 17th Air Force is the Air Force component to U.S. Africa
    Command. AFAFRICA continues its growth in capacity to command and
    control air forces in Africa for the purpose of conducting security
    engagement and operations, and to promote development, air safety, and
    security.
        AFAFRICA is organized into an Air Force Forces (AFFOR) staff and
    the 617th Air and Space Operations Center (AOC). AFAFRICA's AFFOR staff
    reached FOC on 1 October 2009. The 617th AOC is expected to achieve FOC
    on 1 June 2010. The AOC provides continuous air command and control
    capability for all theater security cooperation exercise and engagement
    activities and crisis response operations such as foreign humanitarian
    assistance and non-combatant evacuation operations. Eventually, the AOC
    will provide a common operating picture of all air and space missions
    over the continent. Located at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, the 300-
    person command is administratively assigned to the U.S. Air Forces
    Europe for DOD funding support. AFAFRICA answers directly to U.S.
    Africa Command for operational assignments and joint support.
        One of AFAFRICA's key programs is the Air Domain Safety and
    Security (ADSS) program, which is a long-term Air Force program of
    record with fiscal year 2010 funding of $2.6 million. Funding is
    projected to grow to $3.1 million in fiscal year 2011. AFAFRICA will
    expand ADSS significantly in 2010, by utilizing general purpose air
    forces and working together with USG departments and agencies and other
    partners to develop African capacity to provide regional air safety and
    security solutions to the civil and military air domains. Discussions
    with Rwanda, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana are underway, and will lay the
    foundation for a common regional air picture.
    U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF)
        MARFORAF, located in Stuttgart, Germany, conducts operations,
    exercises, training, and security cooperation activities throughout the
    AOR. In 2009, MARFORAF participated in 15 ACOTA missions aimed at
    improving partners' capabilities to provide logistical support, employ
    military police, and exercise command and control over deployed forces.
    As the executive agent for the Non-Lethal Weapons program, MARFORAF
    conducted a very successful capabilities exercise attended by 11
    African countries. This exercise highlighted a wide range of weapons
    that can limit the escalation of force and increase a tactical
    commander's ability to control a situation short of lethal force.
        MARFORAF conducted mil-to-mil events in 2009 designed to
    familiarize our African partners with nearly every facet of military
    operations and procedures, including use of unmanned aerial vehicles,
    tactics, and medical skills. MARFORAF, as the lead component, continues
    to conduct Exercise African Lion in Morocco--the largest annual
    Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) exercise on the African
    continent--as well as Exercise Shared Accord 10, which will be the
    first CJCS exercise conducted in Mozambique.
    U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA)
        On 1 October 2008, SOCAFRICA was formed as a Special Operations
    Forces (SOF) Functional Sub-Unified Command for U.S. Africa Command.
    SOCAFRICA is colocated with U.S. Africa Command at Kelley Barracks,
    Stuttgart, Germany.
        Also on 1 October 2008, SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for the
    Special Operations Command and Control Element-Horn of Africa, and on
    15 May 2009, SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for Joint Special
    Operations Task Force Trans-Sahara (JSOTF-TS)--the SOF component of
    Operation Enduring Freedom--Trans-Sahara.
        SOCAFRICA's objectives are to build operational capacity,
    strengthen regional security and capacity initiatives, implement
    effective communication strategies in support of strategic objectives,
    and eradicate violent extremist organizations and their supporting
    networks. SOCAFRICA forces work closely with both U.S. Embassy country
    teams and African partners, maintaining a small but sustained presence
    throughout Africa, predominantly in the OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA regions.
    SOCAFRICA's persistent SOF presence provides an invaluable resource
    that furthers USG efforts to combat violent extremist groups and builds
    partner nation CT capacity.
    Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
        In East and Central Africa, CJTF-HOA is critical to U.S. Africa
    Command's efforts to build partner capacity to counter violent
    extremists and address other regional security challenges. Its mission
    to counter violent extremism and its location at Camp Lemonnier remain
    of utmost importance given the rising regional threat from al Qaeda and
    al Shabaab in Somalia and al Qaeda in Yemen. To counter extremist
    influences, CJTF-HOA works along several lines of effort:
        Fostering Regional Security Cooperation: CJTF-HOA works in close
    coordination with coalition members, African partners, other USG
    departments and agencies, and NGOs operating in the Joint Operations
    Area. CJTF-HOA fosters regional security cooperation through support to
    the East African Standby Force, the International Peace Support
    Training Center, the Humanitarian Peace Support School, ACOTA, the East
    African Community, and the East African regional disaster preparedness
    exercises Natural Fire and Golden Spear.
        Strengthening Partner Nation Security Capacity: Civil-military
    Operations, activities, and development programs offer U.S Africa
    Command various pathways to strengthen partner security capacity. Civil
    Affairs (CA) teams help our partners promote the legitimacy of their
    governments and military forces. Coordinated with USAID and DOS, civil
    affairs activities help mitigate the underlying stresses that can
    contribute to regional instability. CJTF-HOA also strengthens partner
    security capacity by supporting APS; providing opportunities for our
    African partners' militaries to work closely with our CA Teams;
    developing Maritime Safety and Security/Counter-Piracy capability and
    capacity; and by providing opportunities for African military liaison
    officers to serve on the CJTF-HOA staff.
        CJTF-HOA's support for Djibouti's efforts to train Somali TFG
    soldiers and support to the East African Standby Force Field Training
    Exercise has improved Djibouti's capacity to assume a larger role in
    promoting peace in the Horn of Africa.
                 command enablers: challenges and opportunities
        The breadth and scope of U.S. Africa Command's programs and
    activities in Africa are significant and growing. Our ability to
    sustain forward progress toward our long-term goals in Africa is
    dependent on several factors that enable our efforts. Some, such as
    limits on authorities, present us with challenges where we seek
    assistance. Others, such as interagency integration, present
    opportunities for growth and development of new or improved programs
    and activities that we wish to sustain.
    Authorities
        Sustaining our long-term security cooperation programs and
    activities in Africa requires flexible, multi-year authorities.
    Existing authorities are designed to support the conduct of individual
    short-term activities or long-term programs, but do not support the
    transition from the former to the latter. They are also insufficiently
    responsive to changing conditions, such as when train and equip efforts
    initiated in response to emergent threats highlight the need for long-
    term capacity building.
        The authorities and programs we currently use for building partner
    capacity are essential, and I ask for your continued support in the
    following areas:

             Full support of the President's budget request for the
            global train and equip program.
             Support of the Department of State's request for
            programs in Africa.
             Support of the Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund,
            with increased flexibility for foreign military education and
            training activities.

        We encourage dialogue on ways to streamline or modify legislative
    authorities to enable sustained security engagement with our African
    partners, ranging from train and equip programs that respond quickly to
    changing conditions to long-term partner capacity-building, especially
    in countering violent extremism.
    Theater Infrastructure and Posture Requirements
        U.S. Africa Command's theater posture was inherited from the three
    previous commands that formerly had DOD responsibility for Africa. U.S.
    Africa Command, in close cooperation with DOS, is evaluating and
    refining its access needs based on our theater-wide requirements. This
    centers primarily on gaining and maintaining the access and freedom of
    movement necessary to conduct both day-to-day security cooperation
    activities and, if required, crisis response operations. We are working
    with our components, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and DOS to
    identify the network of Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) and
    supporting agreements required to enable the Command to carry out these
    activities. Currently, 10 CSLs have been identified, 8 of which were
    previously established by U.S. European Command and U.S. Central
    Command. The Command's posture plan and facilities master plan are
    designed to address our emerging support requirements.
        Forward Operating Sites (FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations
            (CSLs) in U.S. Africa Command's AOR
        Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) is an enduring location essential
    to U.S. security interests in East Africa and the greater Indian Ocean
    basin. This facility supports efforts in the Gulf of Aden as well as
    U.S. Central Command's objectives for Yemen. Colocation with Djibouti
    Airport and proximity to Djibouti's seaport make CLDJ an ideal site for
    supporting U.S. Africa Command operations throughout the region, and of
    equal importance is the Camp's ability to support DOD's global
    transportation infrastructure network as a key node. Camp Lemonnier
    also supports our international partners as we work together to counter
    piracy in the region.
        We are transitioning CLDJ from its previous contingency footing to
    an enduring presence through the construction of permanent facilities
    funded through a military construction program of record. The first
    series of projects will improve security and safety. Subsequent
    projects will improve the capacity to sustain operations.
        The second of our two FOSs, Ascension Island, is also critical to
    the strategic transportation network supporting U.S. Africa Command--
    extending our operational reach to the west and south Africa. U.S.
    Africa Command is working with U.S. Transportation Command to develop
    the infrastructure of this FOS so that it can provide broader support
    to the Command's mission.
        Enroute Infrastructure outside U.S. Africa Command's AOR
        In addition to the transportation infrastructure inside our AOR,
    U.S. Africa Command continues to depend on adjacent command
    infrastructure and main operating bases in Rota (Spain), Sigonella
    (Italy), Aruba (Lesser Antilles), Souda Bay (Greece), and Ramstein
    (Germany) for logistical support. Although these sites are located in
    other geographic combatant command AOR, they are critical intermediate
    nodes that support operations in Africa.
        Command, Control, Communications, and Computer System (C4S)
            Infrastructure
        All the above leads to a requirement for significant investment in
    the development of its C4S capabilities for our enduring locations--
    Camp Lemonnier, FOSs, CSLs, and enroute locations. The expanse of the
    African Continent and U.S. Africa Command's limited forces necessitate
    a steady-state C4S requirement met by limited commercial capability or
    deployed tactical networks. The migration and improvement of legacy
    C4S, as well as tactical networks, to a robust and sustainable
    infrastructure will continue to be an investment priority for U.S.
    Africa Command.
    Resources
        The level of funding for programs under the authority of DOS that
    are available to Africa has increased since the creation of U.S. Africa
    Command, and we request continued funding to allow us to fully pursue
    the defense aspects of the President's stated priorities. The countries
    in our AOR are among the poorest in the world. Many of their militaries
    are inappropriately trained, equipped, and prepared for their primary
    missions--the defense of their state or participation in peacekeeping
    operations. Movement of U.S. and African military personnel and
    equipment to meet emergent threats, conduct capacity building
    activities, and respond to crises, is heavily dependent on U.S.
    military air and sealift.
        Fully funding DOS-led programs is necessary to assist our partners
    in maintaining stability that fosters development, while helping them
    transform their security sectors. The greatest needs include the
    following.
        Funding for the FMF Program
        Fiscal year 2011 FMF request totals for Africa are approximately
    $38 million, of which $14 million is allocated to Tunisia and Morocco.
    If we are to achieve our strategic objectives and avoid undesirable
    long-term consequences, we must fully fund our requested FMF commitment
    to the African continent. FMF is critical to accomplishing the U.S.
    mission in Africa and constitutes a long-term investment in critical
    relationships. Inadequate funding of our FMF request or inconsistent
    year-to-year distribution can compromise our efforts, turn our partners
    towards other sources, and inhibit peacekeeping operations. FMF is
    fundamental to our strategy of preventative rather than reactive
    response.
        Funding for Exercises
        A key component of our capacity building is our Joint and Combined
    Exercise program. This program is conducted under the auspices of the
    CJCS exercise program, and is dependent upon funding from the Combatant
    Commander's Exercise and Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2)
    Program. As the command continues to mature and our exercise program
    expands to meet the readiness needs of U.S. forces and partner
    militaries, U.S. Africa Command will place increasing demands for
    limited CE2T2 funds. We ask for your continued support of the
    Department's request for the Combatant Commander's Exercise and
    Engagement and Training Transformation Program.
        Funding for Counternarcotics Efforts
        Revenue from the sale of illegal narcotics trans-shipped through
    Africa directly benefits the same drug cartels who resolutely
    distribute narcotics on the streets of the United States. The influence
    of drug money in developing states breeds corruption and instability,
    which may threaten the availability of African natural resources
    critical to the U.S. and global economy. Countering the flow of
    narcotics through Africa has direct relevance to U.S. national
    security, and we urge you to consider giving this program your full
    support.
    Interagency Integration and Contribution
        The construct of U.S. Africa Command is based on the premise that
    interagency partner integration leads to better planning and greater
    unity of effort by all USG stakeholders. As mentioned in this
    statement, our national interests have benefited from U.S. Africa
    Command's interagency collaboration. Our collective efforts have
    produced significant positive results in the areas of security sector
    reform, military professionalization, peacekeeping, humanitarian
    assistance, disaster preparedness, pandemic response programs,
    counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.
        U.S. Africa Command is working to improve and expand its
    interagency partner integration. Currently U.S. Africa Command has
    memoranda of agreement with 11 departments and agencies. Opportunities
    are expanding with the recent addition of the U.S. Geological Survey,
    the Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the
    Department of the Interior, and the Transportation Security
    Administration.
        Challenges of successfully embedding interagency personnel in the
    Command have been identified recently through a comprehensive internal
    survey. As a result, initiatives are being implemented to address
    training issues, collaborative exercise planning, and the education of
    DOD personnel concerning interagency capabilities. We understand that
    other USG agencies have different obligations and objectives, and that
    interagency cooperation is a two-way street. In all we do, we seek to
    ensure that the programs and actions of this Command support overall
    U.S. policy in Africa. We continue to work diligently to ensure that
    interagency participation with U.S. Africa Command is beneficial to all
    participants and, particularly, to our national interests.
        Increases in funding for defense-related programs must be
    accompanied by adequate resourcing of parallel efforts in diplomacy and
    development programs. Adequate TSCTP funding enables civilian agency
    efforts to help our partners develop and sustain conditions to counter
    violent extremism. We encourage Congress to support USG efforts in
    their entirety when it comes to diplomacy, development, and defense.
    Well-Being Programs
        Our Quality of Life (QoL) Office promotes accessibility, equity,
    and an increased quality of life through services and programs for the
    U.S. Africa Command family. To help us identify QoL focus areas, Africa
    Command Families on the African Continent conferences are held to
    address challenges faced by families living in Africa. To assist our
    team members and their families in solving problems resulting from
    deployments and other family changes, we have implemented the Military
    and Family Life Consultant Program. Concerning education, our
    partnership with the Department of Defense Education Activity and the
    Department of Defense Dependent Schools, Europe, ensures educational
    support to all U.S. Africa Command members. U.S. Africa Command will
    continue to support and expand these initiatives in fiscal year 2011.
        The Command will continuously assess the theater-wide environment
    in order to identify emerging and unusually sensitive QoL challenges.
    We will strengthen our strategic partnerships to leverage best business
    practices and collaborate on solutions to mitigate or resolve quality
    of life issues. We continue to focus our efforts on our members and
    their families, both on and off the African continent, to ensure their
    quality of life remains a priority and is funded properly.
                                   conclusion
        U.S. Africa Command's priority is to conduct effective and
    sustained security cooperation programs and military operations to
    advance and protect U.S. interests in Africa. Our programs are helping
    our African partners assume an ever-increasing role in addressing the
    security concerns of the continent and its island states. By focusing
    on long-term capacity building, we are implementing a preventative
    strategy that serves the interests of the United States, our African
    partners, and our allies.
        The United States achieves its greatest effect when all U.S.
    Government agencies work collaboratively in applying the tools of
    diplomacy, development, and defense to meet our national security
    objectives. Congress can modernize our Nation's approach to emergent
    challenges made evident in the first decade of this new century by
    supporting funding and further development of the other USG departments
    and agencies with whom we partner and support. Revising security
    assistance authorities will allow all agencies that contribute to our
    foreign policy and national security effort to improve our unity of
    effort, and thus ensure we outpace transnational threats that know no
    lawful limits.
        I am grateful for the outstanding congressional support to U.S.
    Africa Command (AFRICOM). Your continued devotion to the men and women
    from DOD and other U.S. Government departments and agencies assigned to
    the Command will allow their good work to protect and advance the
    interests of the United States. I am proud to serve on the U.S. AFRICOM
    team with these dedicated Americans.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
        General Mattis.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT
                             FORCES COMMAND

        General Mattis. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of
    the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I
    request my written statement be placed in the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be.
        General Mattis. Over the course of this past year, JFCOM
    has continued to provide combat-ready forces to combatant
    commanders to support the military operations and continue to
    prepare for future conflicts while looking ahead. After an
    historic change of command in NATO, which got handed over to
    the Supreme Commander, Allied Command Transformation, we
    continue to ensure JFCOM remains closely linked with our allies
    and partners in NATO.
        The character of this current conflict remains different
    or, better said, irregular. We have continued to adapt our
    forces in stride and become increasingly confident in irregular
    warfare. Across the board, JFCOM has significantly adapted to
    this new environment. Our watchword is balance. The Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense have stated that
    we must not lose our conventional superiority in the process of
    adapting. Even as we continue to prepare and deploy forces in
    the irregular fights in Iraq and Afghanistan, we cannot permit
    dormancy of our conventional ability.
        Our forces are achieving balance and will continue to do so
    as dwell times build with the Iraqi drawdown. Through effective
    training and education across the force, we can strike the
    appropriate balance while ensuring our current and future
    combat readiness.
        I returned a week ago from Afghanistan and our field
    commanders there confirm that our troops are superbly trained
    for the fight, even as we use lessons learned to further
    improve our readiness and not fall back on complacency. Based
    on the reality of current active operations and future trends
    outlined in our work on the future, JFCOM's top priority
    continues to reflect this balance between support for the
    current fight and our constant assessment of the future to
    ensure we remain the most capable military in the world.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Mattis follows:]
                Prepared Statement by Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on Joint Forces
    Command. Joint Forces Command is comprised of 1.16 million Active Duty,
    National Guard, and Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Our
    command provides combat-ready forces to our Nation's geographic
    combatant commanders around the globe in support of today's fight,
    while we simultaneously prepare the joint force for future conflicts.
    Successful accomplishment of our mission ensures we field the most
    capable and ready joint force the world has ever known. At the same
    time we keep a weather eye on the future to ensure our Nation has the
    fewest regrets when future surprises occur, as they surely will if
    history is a guide.
     joint operating environment and capstone concept for joint operations
        Our thinking about how to prepare our forces for the future must be
    informed by the past. No one has a crystal ball to accurately predict
    the threats and challenges we could face. But if we're to reduce the
    potential for being caught flat-footed, we must explore the strategic
    and operational depths of the future to provide the most reasoned
    mental framework within which will come the challenges that our
    political and military leaders will confront in the future. Developed
    at Joint Forces Command for defense planners and decisionmakers, The
    Joint Operating Environment (JOE) provides a framework of trends,
    contexts, and strategic implications as a basis for thinking about the
    world over the next quarter century. Its purpose is not to predict, but
    to suggest ways leaders might think about the future.
        First published in 2008, the JOE was updated and will be re-
    released later this month. This new edition of the JOE continues to be
    historically informed and forward looking, and this year the JOE
    includes a new section that looks at the world's tenuous financial
    stability, a growing U.S. national debt, and what this all might mean
    for future national security and defense planning. By considering how
    global trends will drive change, we draw general conclusions about the
    military implications. Those implications set the framework for our
    concept development.
        If the JOE is the ``problem statement'' for the future joint force,
    then the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is the
    ``solution.'' The CCJO is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
    statement for how the joint force will operate in the future threat
    environment described in the JOE. As the Capstone Concept, it was
    drafted with active engagement of the Joint Chiefs and combatant
    commanders under the guidance of the Chairman. This past summer a
    series of war games tested the CCJO and found it conceptually
    sufficient. The games also highlighted several key areas that require
    focus and improvement for the joint force and informed the Quadrennial
    Defense Review (QDR).
        Throughout history every military organization that has
    successfully adapted has done so by clearly articulating the problem as
    we have in the JOE, and then resolving the problem as the Chairman has
    outlined in the CCJO. With the QDR, JOE and the CCJO providing our
    backdrop, Joint Forces Command remains focused this year on prevailing
    in the current conflict, preparing for a wide range of future
    contingencies, and preserving and enhancing the joint force, including
    its ability to work harmoniously with other elements of the U.S.
    Government and allies.
                          prevail in today's conflicts
        Supporting the current active operations overseas commands much of
    our effort. We are engaged in training and deploying forces, analyzing
    and applying lessons learned, and overseeing the development of joint
    capabilities in response to our warfighting commanders needs. These
    activities demand a sense of urgency. It is imperative that we adapt
    and evolve the force to confound our enemies, keeping our forces at
    their top effectiveness.
        As the joint force provider, Joint Forces Command is responsible
    for providing trained and ready forces to combatant commanders in
    support of current operations and global contingencies. This mission
    area has the most immediate and visible impact on current joint
    operations. During the past year, we responded to more than 390
    rotational and emergent requests for forces from combatant commanders
    resulting in the sourcing of more than 398,000 personnel supporting
    numerous global missions. Key among these is the troop increase in
    Afghanistan, while continuing to satisfy requirements in Iraq and other
    regions.
        In reserve, as a shock absorber for unpredictable events like the
    surprises outlined in the JOE, Joint Forces Command maintains the
    Global Response Force ready to respond to unforeseen crises at home or
    abroad. This force, most recently deployed in support of Haiti,
    provides the Commander in Chief with flexible options to respond to a
    variety of crises while we simultaneously fulfill our commitments in
    Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere around the world.
        The character of ongoing operations has resulted in unusual stress
    on ``high-demand, low density'' assets and requires accelerated force
    structure changes. In some cases the demand requires new capabilities
    be developed. The work associated with the QDR resulted in considerable
    gains in identifying shortfalls and validating the need to balance the
    force. Although the Services are continuing to increase these
    capabilities, persistent shortfalls exist in electronic warfare, civil
    affairs, engineering, military intelligence, military police, and
    intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
        While we cannot accurately predict the type warfare in which we
    must be ready to engage in the future, we recognize that we cannot
    adopt a single, preclusive view of war. Balance is key. Our forces must
    be tailored to provide the maximum flexibility to deal with a wide
    range of conflicts and contingencies, because today's strategic and
    operational environment is characterized by the constants of rapid
    change and complexity. Today, we recognize that the force must be
    balanced to effectively meet various challenges to U.S. interests and
    an irregular threat, without compromising our nuclear deterrent or
    conventional capabilities and at a time when the distinctions between
    types of warfare are blurring. Our military leaders and our forces will
    need to be the most versatile in our Nation's history.
        In support of this line of thinking, in March of 2009 Joint Forces
    Command published a vision for Irregular Warfare (IW) and established a
    set of goals and objectives to advance counterinsurgency,
    counterterrorism, and stability operations capabilities as a core
    competency within the General Purpose Forces (GPF). Our Joint Irregular
    Warfare Center is the command's catalyst and driving force behind
    establishing IW as a core competency for the joint force. This team is
    building bridges across the Services, Service labs, industry, academia,
    civilian partners, and with allies to harvest the best ideas on how to
    address this challenging form of warfare and steal a march on our
    enemy.
        The non-state, insurgent and terrorist adversaries we face today in
    the Middle East and elsewhere have chosen approaches to warfare that
    avoids our conventional strengths. We have adapted to these changing
    approaches to war and will continue to do so across the joint force.
    The asymmetric approach of our enemy has in some cases negated our
    technologically superior, iconic weapon systems, putting the
    preponderance of enemy engagements in the hands of our ground troops in
    close quarters combat. In this unforgiving environment, our ground
    units are employed every day, and this is where over 80 percent of our
    casualties occur, often in the initial firefights.
        Across all warfighting communities, training advances have been
    significant, yet the use of advanced simulation technology has not yet
    achieved for infantry training what we take as routine for aviation,
    armor or maritime simulation training. While there are a host of
    reasons, and the different combat training regimes pose notably
    different simulation challenges, dramatic advances in immersive
    simulation, artificial intelligence, and gaming technology must now be
    harnessed to bring state-of-the-art simulation to small infantry units.
    Though the rudimentary simulation designed for close combat currently
    affords units some level of challenge, it does not yet approach the
    level of sophistication deemed essential in other disciplines.
        The Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed funding to the
    Services and Joint Forces Command to support the urgent development of
    infantry immersive training simulators as part of a broader national
    effort for small unit excellence. As our troops are engaged around the
    world and assigned a variety of missions confronting insurgents on the
    ground, the development of a close combat/infantry immersive training
    simulator is a national priority in terms of creating top-performing
    small units able to take advantage of joint surveillance and fire
    support. Our immediate task is to create prototype immersive training
    simulators as a means to enhance warfighter survivability, amplify
    exposure to joint and combined assets, improve the employment of our
    joint-asymmetric capabilities, and increase the overall effectiveness
    of our close combat/infantry small unit performance to defeat the enemy
    while protecting the innocent intentionally jeopardized by our enemies'
    tactics.
        Focusing efforts to enable small units to combine initiative,
    critical thinking, and joint warfighting experience will allow for
    brilliance in combat skill basics and agile responses to the enemies we
    face. Casualty reduction, fewer ethical missteps, psychological
    resilience and enhanced mission success rates are the goals. We will
    remain responsive and innovative to confront the challenges our close
    combat and small infantry units encounter today and tomorrow. Other
    communities have demonstrated that simulator training is an effective
    tool to increase operational effectiveness. America's close combat/
    infantry forces will get our best effort to provide them every
    advantage and prepare them fully to achieve success in battle.
        In addition to improved simulation training capabilities, Joint
    Forces Command continues its efforts to enhance small unit
    effectiveness. We have brought together the trainers, coaches,
    educators, social and human scientists, academia, and technical and
    cognitive assessment experts to form a community of interest that will
    improve the combat effectiveness of our small units. Paramount to this
    effort is the development of leaders who are capable of operating
    against a broad spectrum of threats, while retaining and enhancing
    their ability to lead in a more conventional environment. The complex
    and dynamic security environment demands that we have small units and
    leaders that are able to take advantage of fleeting opportunities on
    the battlefield. These small units and leaders must be able to operate
    independently, possessing the full knowledge and ability to employ
    joint and combined capabilities, and subsequently be empowered to make
    critical decisions under stressful conditions--the same attributes we
    anticipate will be required on future battlefields, conventional or
    otherwise.
        Working with the Services, Joint Forces Command has developed a
    Concept for Joint Distributed Operations in support of experimentation
    to be conducted this summer. This concept describes how joint enabling
    capabilities can be made more effectively and efficiently available to
    smaller distributed units and that these joint capabilities can be
    pushed to lower echelons. Current operations demonstrate that
    distributed operations are becoming more the norm, and this experiment
    will draw on lessons learned and best practices from recent experience
    to determine what solutions should be incorporated into future joint
    force capabilities.
        In Afghanistan, U.S. airpower represents one of our joint force's
    greatest asymmetric advantages over the enemy. The employment of air-
    based joint fires, used properly, will wreak havoc on enemy forces. In
    the fluid environment of a counter-insurgency fight, the decision to
    employ these joint air-based fires will come from leaders who
    understand that to be effective these fires must be employed rapidly
    and precisely against the enemy while avoiding civilian casualties.
    Effective employment often requires persistent observation, integrated
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and shortened approval
    procedures. Our airpower is unmatched in the world, however today's
    approach of loitering multi-million dollar aircraft and using a system-
    of-systems procedure for the approval and employment of airpower is not
    the most effective use of aviation fires in this irregular fight. A
    Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft capability has the
    potential to shift air support from a reactive threat response, to a
    more proactive approach that reduces sensor-to-shooter timelines, with
    immediate and accurate fires, providing surveillance and reconnaissance
    throughout a mission, while providing communication and navigation
    support to troops on the ground. Additionally, a LAAR capability can
    provide a means to build partner capacity with effective, relevant air
    support. This year Joint Forces Command will closely follow a project
    called Imminent Fury where the Navy and Air Force will employ a LAAR
    capability to reinforce our asymmetric advantage over the enemy.
        Presently, one of the enemy's most effective weapons is the
    Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Joint Forces Command is
    collaborating closely with the Joint IED Defeat Organization to defeat
    this enemy capability, sharing lessons learned and adapting our
    operating concept and training efforts. Joint Forces Command continues
    to prepare the joint force to conduct operations in urban environments
    to defeat adversaries who are embedded and diffused within a population
    without causing catastrophic damage to the functioning society. In
    collaboration with the Services and international partners, we will
    strive to leverage relevant efforts that address gaps in our ability to
    effectively operate within cities and complex terrain.
        The joint force has learned and adapted to counterinsurgency,
    counterterrorism, and required stability operations conducted in a
    complex environment. Recently, the Services and Joint Forces Command
    completed an initial assessment of U.S. GPF readiness and proficiency
    for irregular warfare. This first effort provides a primarily
    qualitative assessment of proficiency and readiness, and will serve as
    a baseline for future work. As we incorporate IW--relevant tasks,
    skills, and experiences into our tracking mechanisms and further
    institutionalize the enduring lessons learned from Iraq and
    Afghanistan, subsequent assessments will provide a more quantitative
    and focused picture of the GPF's proficiency and readiness for IW.
        The complex series of coincident challenges continues to demand
    highly educated warriors and leaders. Joint Forces Command continues to
    provide a robust Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) program to support
    the training of deploying headquarters elements to Afghanistan. These
    have included the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Marine
    Expeditionary Force Forward. These exercises are continually improved
    to stress cultural awareness and the decisionmaking skills required in
    the irregular warfare environment, including interagency, coalition and
    Afghan Security Force representatives in attendance. During 2009, the
    exercise support to Central Command's Combined Transition Command-
    Afghanistan helped prepare that staff to assist the Afghan National
    Army to assume national responsibilities. The exercises remained
    tightly linked to our joint and NATO lessons learned processes, and
    feedback from the field continues to shape the scenarios and
    operational problems within which we train and evaluate deploying
    commanders and their staffs.
        Through Joint Knowledge Development and Delivery Capability (JKDDC)
    and Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), Joint Forces Command continues to
    provide virtual classroom training to cover a wide array of training
    topics. The JKO Portal hosts more than 330 courses, including many
    developed by coalition partner nations to build partner capacity
    through sharing information and security related training. The portal
    also offers basic language training and tailored pre-deployment
    training for Individual Augmentees (IAs) and coalition partners
    participating in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many resources
    found on the JKO Portal also are available to interagency,
    international and nongovernmental organizations. To date, JKO reports
    over 100,000 registered users and 230,000 course completions. In 2009
    JKDDC invested in research and development for advanced technology
    capabilities that targeted specific training gaps. These fielded and
    available applications include the Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer
    and the Small Group Scenario Trainer, specifically addressing
    operations, tailored cultural awareness training, and small group
    training capability needs. These applications provide some rudimentary
    capabilities to satisfy basic warfighter training needs.
                               coalition efforts
        The United States will seldom choose to go it alone. Allies and
    coalition partners play a key role across the full range of military
    operations today and those anticipated in the future. The presence of
    allies and partners will likely exert a major influence on the military
    balance in future operations. Our friends can and do provide critical
    support. We must continue to broaden and deepen relationships with
    capable security partners. Joint Forces Command continues to strengthen
    partnerships through engagement with DOD and NATO, via Allied Command
    Transformation (ACT), and representatives from other nations assigned
    to the command. The command remains actively linked to ACT, not only
    because of its proximity, but also because of the productive working
    relationships fostered between the headquarters' staffs. As of December
    2009, Joint Forces Command routinely collaborates bilaterally with
    representatives from 48 nations. These relationships are critical to
    building the trust and interoperability necessary to build and sustain
    strong alliances and coalitions.
        The Joint Forces Command led Multi-National Experiment (MNE) 6 is a
    2-year, multinational and interagency effort to improve coalition
    capabilities against enemies employing a mix of irregular operational
    methods, adaptive technologies, and hybrid approaches to warfare
    through a whole-of-government approach. Participants include military
    and civilian sectors of 18 NATO and non-NATO nations, NATO's ACT, and
    U.S. Special Operations Command. MNE 6 produced draft products on the
    assessment of operational progress and cross-cultural awareness in the
    first year. The remainder of the experiment is focused on developing
    and implementing at national and international levels solutions for
    coordination of partner efforts to solve a crisis, assess campaign
    progress with valid metrics, and develop a strategy for information
    sharing and situational understanding.
        A common, often daunting, task for the geographic combatant
    commander is strengthening indigenous security forces. As articulated
    in the QDR report, Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a cornerstone for
    establishing regional security. Effective indigenous security forces
    can preclude or minimize conflict and thereby strengthen the collective
    security against threats and security challenges, reducing the
    potential demand for U.S forces. While Security Force Assistance
    expertise traditionally resides within Special Operations Forces (SOF),
    some aspects of SFA are well suited to GPF. Transitioning portions of
    these responsibilities will relieve pressure on our over-extended SOF.
    The GPF possesses robust capability that can be used more effectively
    to provide full spectrum SFA support. For example, a maritime SFA
    possesses the expertise to support everything from low-end
    opportunities such as small boat engine maintenance, to ballistic
    missile defense, one of the most complex aspects of modern warfare.
        Presently, the joint force is not optimally trained and organized
    to advise and assist with building partnerships, although real progress
    has been demonstrated. As the provider of the majority of the GPF to
    the combatant commanders, we remain fully engaged with Special
    Operations Command to expand these capabilities, particularly the
    emerging role of SFA. We envision selected SFA executed by GPF in small
    units, task organized for the mission, operating in a distributed
    manner and building partner security capability in support of theater
    campaign plans. This vision includes SFA support within the ground, air
    and maritime domains. Our maritime forces are uniquely positioned to
    support this mission, by providing SFA from the sea, thereby sustaining
    U.S. influence while minimizing the U.S. footprint ashore, and
    maintaining the security of the global commons. To support this vision
    of an expanded GPF role, we have adapted the global force management
    process to account for SFA, and are addressing this capability in joint
    concept development and experimentation like the Joint Distributed
    Operations experiment, ensuring the Services have a model for these
    operations and highlighting Service strengths, such as our asymmetric
    naval capabilities.
                                    prepare
        Where deterrence fails and enemies threaten our national interests,
    the joint force must have the capacity and capability to apply force.
    It must be prepared to operate with success in a wide range of
    contingencies. Preparing the joint force for these future contingencies
    is the focus of Joint Forces Command's effort supporting the
    development of fully interoperable joint warfighting capabilities and
    concepts.
        Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is the means to
    develop our future leaders for the complexity of the threat environment
    in which those leaders will find themselves. Viewed broadly, JPME is a
    strategic asset for our Nation that shapes the understanding of not
    just American officers, but also for preparing and building personal
    relationships and trust with our allied or partner nations whose
    officers also attend our schools. Today, JPME is essential to
    understanding the multiplicity of state and non-state actors, the
    nature of warfare, and building partner capacity to operate in an era
    of persistent engagement. The complexities of today's complex security
    environment demand the most innovative and versatile leaders to execute
    a strategy that demands melding military, civil and cultural factors. A
    trained warfighter must perform acceptably against a range of threats
    and in dynamic security environments, which demand highly-educated
    warriors who can adapt opportunistically in order to prevail. A
    critical thinker/warrior will know how to acquire knowledge, process
    information from multiple sources, and make timely, accurate decisions
    in complex, ethically challenging and ever-changing environments. We
    now place greater emphasis on the study of history, culture and
    language beyond their broad incorporation into training and exercise
    scenarios, including efforts employing the latest modeling and
    simulation technology.
        We are taking concrete steps to translate battlefield adaptations
    into rapid institutional change. Our maturing relationship with the
    National Defense University (NDU) is one effort to improve JPME and
    ensure it is aligned properly with the current realities and future
    challenges that we pick up in lessons learned, mission rehearsal
    exercises, and concept development. Results from the ongoing House
    Armed Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee,
    National Defense University, and Service school evaluations of the
    entire JPME program can provide insights to transform JPME, making it
    more effective and relevant to meet the demands of both the present and
    future operating environments. In conjunction with Special Operations
    Command and NDU, we will stand-up an Irregular Warfare Academic Center
    of Excellence to provide a capability which harnesses the work of the
    many academic institutions studying counterinsurgency,
    counterterrorism, stability operations, unconventional operational
    methods, and hybrid approaches to warfare and to make their lessons
    relevant and available to the joint force. I strongly urge your
    continued support of our efforts to expand allied and partner access to
    our educational institutions to further build trust and
    interoperability among our forces, while broadly sharing our ethical
    grounding. We are also swiftly incorporating battlefield lessons
    learned into rehearsal exercises and senior leader education programs
    like the Pinnacle, Capstone and Keystone courses. Participants' surveys
    consistently note the relevance of both lessons learned and interaction
    with senior level warfighters who bring a wealth of experience to bear.
        As a means to promote the necessary cognitive approaches, the
    application of `operational design' will help leaders understand the
    problem, understand the environment, design an approach to solve the
    problem, and reframe the problem when circumstances change. Joint
    Forces Command has initiated a program to move operational design
    forward at the tactical, operational and strategic levels; focused on a
    cognitive approach vice procedural approach; built with the best of
    breed; developed in a joint context; and in collaboration with all the
    Services, while leveraging the Army's mature work along these lines.
        During the past year, Joint Forces Command examined the adequacy of
    the joint force to execute the precepts outlined in the Capstone
    Concept for Joint Operations. Through wargaming activity, and drawing
    on the extensive experience and broad perspective of participants who
    included seven ambassadors; four former combatant commanders; active
    flag and general officers from the United States, United Kingdom, and
    Australia; subject matter experts from all services and combatant
    commands; and representatives from relevant U.S. Government departments
    and the National Security Council, this examination identified risk
    areas where the joint force's ability to achieve its mission are most
    vulnerable, and evaluated potential mitigating actions.
        The CCJO wargame identified force development implications in order
    to address the changing nuclear landscape, gaining and maintaining
    access around the globe, interagency integration, situational
    understanding, and overcoming digital dependence. Detailed insights and
    recommendations from the experiment were provided to joint and Service
    policy and decisionmakers and helped inform the QDR. The CCJO and
    related experimentation are also shaping the development of supporting
    concepts focused on combat, security, engagement, and relief and
    reconstruction, which in turn will update our guiding doctrine.
        We have no sense of complacency. The enemy doesn't rest, nor will
    we as we move to check his capabilities. With the proliferation of
    inexpensive and capable technology, our enemies are gaining precision
    capability, and this is no longer an exclusive advantage of U.S./NATO
    forces. This precision capability will allow modestly funded states or
    non-state actors to acquire long-range precision munitions, project
    power from farther out, and with greater accuracy. We are just now
    scratching the surface on how best to defend against and defeat this
    threat and overcome the anti-access threat they constitute.
        During the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, Hezbollah employed
    unmanned aerial vehicles on several occasions. This use of low cost,
    tactical unmanned aerial vehicles demonstrated that sophistication is
    not the sole realm of developed states. Again, the proliferation of
    relatively cheap and capable technology is creating threats we must be
    prepared to reckon with. Presently, our Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
    Center of Excellence, in conjunction with the Joint Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense Office, is developing a concept of operations to
    address challenges and evaluate capabilities associated with countering
    adversary unmanned aerial systems.
        With almost a decade of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is
    inevitable that some currently unused capabilities may atrophy. In many
    cases, there are now joint warfighters who have never assaulted a beach
    or hit a drop-zone by parachute. Because of this, we are seeing a
    decline in our ability to conduct forcible entry operations, operations
    that can reassure our friends and temper our adversaries' designs.
    Additionally, the continued development and proliferation of longer
    range, precision guided munitions challenge our ability to perform
    these operations in the contested littorals around the globe. The
    battle for access may prove not only the most important, but the most
    difficult, requiring forcible entry capabilities and sustainment
    capabilities. Couple this readiness issue with aging ships, aerial
    tankers and strategic bombers, and our ability to gain access and
    influence actions over strategic distances needs to receive increased
    attention. Seabasing is a highly relevant supporting effort as we look
    toward our asymmetric strengths to create cost-imposing dilemmas on
    future enemies.
        Joint Force Commanders require robust command and control (C2)
    capabilities that enable agile decisionmaking and information flow from
    the operational to tactical level across today's global domain. This
    domain encompasses cyberspace, all wired and wireless communications,
    and fixed and mobile warfighting customers, to include the networks
    that support them down to the tactical edge. Robust C2 implies a degree
    of reliability, redundancy, and agility necessary to effectively
    operate, both independently and with our coalition partners and allies,
    in degraded and/or austere conditions. Developing enhanced, robust C2
    capabilities in the near-term requires adoption of an integrated C2
    triad network approach; specifically the blending of surface (including
    maritime), air and space systems into a resilient network. We are
    working to develop an operational context for objective joint analysis,
    assessment and training, and common standards to verify operational
    effectiveness of information exchanges and interoperability.
        As the C2 capability portfolio manager, Joint Forces Command is
    responsible for leading a number of efforts across the C2 Joint
    Capability Area which directly supports the establishment of an
    integrated C2 triad network. These integration efforts will enhance our
    wired and wireless cyberspace capabilities, while leveraging and
    creating cyberspace opportunities. To better enable our small units
    operating at the wireless tactical edge in austere and/or hostile
    environments, we are working in coordination with Special Operations
    Command, Strategic Command, the Joint Staff and the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration to
    develop C2 On-the-Move and Joint Aerial Layer Network capabilities.
    Central to this effort is the stand-up of the Joint Systems Integration
    and Interoperability Lab to conduct full-spectrum C2 capability
    analyses and up-front Joint Systems Engineering to improve joint
    interoperability and integration. Finally, we continue to advocate on
    behalf of the warfighter ensuring the sustainment and synchronization
    of our C2 legacy systems as we migrate to objective joint C2
    capabilities, including an Adaptive Planning and Execution capability
    that strives to reduce the time required for warfighter plan
    development to under a year, and accelerate plan execution to near real
    time.
        In Iraq and Afghanistan our opponents have displayed considerable
    capacity to learn and adapt in both the political and tactical arenas.
    We anticipate we will see more of this in the future; more
    sophisticated opponents of U.S. military forces will certainly attack
    perceived American vulnerabilities. It is highly likely that attacks on
    our computers, space and communications systems will severely degrade
    command and control of U.S. forces. Thus, those forces must possess the
    ability to operate effectively against denial operations and in
    degraded conditions.
        For this reason our leaders must understand that, first and
    foremost, C2 is a human endeavor. C2 must be leader-centric and
    network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decisionmaking at the
    lowest level possible. While materiel solutions, processes, and
    engineering can enable decisionmaking, command and control is not
    synonymous with network operations nor the employment of advanced
    technology. The joint force must have the flexibility to exploit both.
    Commanders must be skilled at crafting and articulating their intent,
    enabling junior leaders to exercise initiative and take advantage of
    fleeting opportunities in the decentralized operations we anticipate,
    vice centralizing decisionmaking at high levels. This is vital in both
    conventional force-on-force warfare and decentralized operations that
    we observe in the combat zone.
                              preserve /conclusion
        We must continue to seek ways to ensure the vitality and the
    quality of the All-Volunteer Force. As the joint force provider, I have
    a vested interest in the vitality and quality of the force. Our number
    one priority remains supporting the warfighters around the globe to
    prevail in today's wars. Essential to this effort is sustaining the
    All-Volunteer Force to maintain the combat effectiveness of our
    warfighting formations.
        Our guiding principle is balance as we craft our approach to
    countering any specific threat or scenario while protecting against the
    surprises that are sure to come. Our force must be designed with the
    aim of having the fewest regrets when surprises strike. From applying
    lessons learned to our current efforts, to guiding sound concept
    development and experimentation to build future combat power, with your
    support, Joint Forces Command will continue to press ahead in our
    efforts.
        On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Joint Forces Command, I
    thank you for the opportunity to report. I look forward to working with
    you to ensure the continued security of America.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
        Let's try an 8-minute first round of questioning.
        Admiral, there have been a number of reports about the
    performance of the Afghan Army during the recent operation to
    clear the Taliban from Central Helmand Valley. Marine Brigadier
    General Larry Nicholson said that Afghan forces are not
    cosmetic; they are in the fight. But at the same time, there
    have been anecdotal accounts of Afghan soldiers looting the
    bazaar in Marjah, smoking hashish, and failing to help our
    marines in fortifying their positions.
        Admiral, give us your assessment of the performance of
    Afghan soldiers that are partnered with coalition forces in the
    fighting in Helmand?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, as you can imagine, I discuss this
    frequently with General Stan McChrystal, my NATO subordinate,
    who is directing operations. I also receive reports on a daily
    basis. I am satisfied with the progress of the Afghan National
    Army and overall its performance I think has been effective in
    Marjah.
        As you recall, Senator, when we went south about a year ago
    the ratio of ISAF troops to Afghan troops was 10 of the ISAF
    for every 1 of the Afghan. In this particular operation, we are
    at one ISAF troop and about just less than one Afghan. So we're
    approaching that 1 to 1 ratio. The quantity piece has improved
    dramatically.
        As for the quality piece, I think General Nicholson is spot
    on. We're seeing them actually in the fight. We're also seeing
    instances where the Afghan troops are stepping ahead of the
    coalition forces and saying, let me go through that door first,
    let me go up that road first. We're seeing that kind of
    shoulder-to-shoulder effective combat fight out of our Afghan
    partners.
        In terms of individual instances or anecdotes, we follow up
    on every one of those. We report them. Action is taken by the
    Afghan chain of command. But overall, Senator, I am satisfied
    with the progress we've seen over the course of the year and I
    think the operation in Marjah shows that.
        Chairman Levin. Well, that's important news. I want to just
    focus for a minute on that ratio. When we were there the first
    time, maybe a year ago now, and got into this issue, it was a
    five to one ratio, five of our marines for one Afghan. We heard
    that in Marjah, for that effort it was about two of ours to one
    of theirs.
        Now you're telling us that it was actually a lot better
    than that, closer to 1 to 1, which is very significant and
    important news, because that's critically important, not just
    in terms of the turning over of responsibility for Afghan
    security to the Afghans, which is surely a major part of our
    mission, but also in terms of the credibility of what we're
    doing there to the people who live there, but also to the
    training of Afghan troops, so that we can have that close
    training relationship. The closer that ratio is, not just 1 to
    1, but two of theirs to one of ours, the closer we are to our
    own standard and our own goal.
        We read in the paper this morning that, however, when that
    effort was undertaken that Afghan troops, or perhaps it was
    some marines, left a nearby area without adequate protection at
    all and a number of the Taliban just simply moved next door.
    Can you tell us anything about that and, if that was happening,
    why was there not a plan, particularly given the size of the
    Afghan Army, to have Afghan forces secure places where other
    combat troops were leaving in order to succeed in the fight in
    Marjah?
        Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I'll have to take that one for
    the record and get back to you on that particular incident. I'm
    not familiar with it.
        Chairman Levin. You'll see a report in this morning's
    paper.
        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General McChrystal has implemented a population centric counter-
    insurgency strategy that calls for focusing coalition and Afghan
    security forces in and around population centers; specifically those
    population centers most threatened by insurgents. Despite the build-up
    of U.S. and coalition forces and the increasing size and capability of
    the Afghan Army, we cannot focus our forces everywhere. I can assure
    you that Zabul Province has not been abandoned to the Taliban as the
    article suggests; however, our focus is on protecting the people of
    Afghanistan and not on attempting to track down individual Taliban
    members moving around the countryside.

        Chairman Levin. As I mentioned in the opening statement,
    NATO members are falling short once again. At the most recent
    force generation conference, they fell short in meeting the
    NATO mission requirements, in particular the 1,200 trainers
    that Lieutenant General Caldwell needs and NATO has committed
    to provide.
        Can you give us any kind of assurance as to whether the
    NATO countries that have fallen short of their commitments and
    obligations are going to be forthcoming?
        Admiral Stavridis. First of all, let me give you the exact
    numbers. We're looking for an additional 1,278 and we have
    pledges at this point for 541. So it is absolutely correct to
    say that NATO has fallen short in providing these vital
    trainers.
        What we are doing about it is taking further steps in terms
    of contacting each of the Nations individually and going one by
    one through the precise requirement for each of the Nations in
    terms of where they could most effectively fill in the trainer
    mix. That effort is going on in real time both from my
    headquarters and up in Brussels, where the Secretary General is
    very engaged at the political level. So we will continue to
    hammer away at this until we fulfil that commitment, and I will
    continue to place it, as I told you, Senator Levin, at the top
    of my priority list.
        Chairman Levin. We appreciate that. General Caldwell, at a
    press conference last week, said that Afghan Army recruitment
    is very, very strong. I think he said there was an 800 percent
    increase in army recruitment over the last 4 or 5 months. But
    they can't put them into basic training right away because of
    the shortage of trainers, and that is totally unacceptable.
    It's almost unbelievable to me that we can't get NATO allies to
    carry out that kind of commitment, which is not the most
    dangerous of the positions that they need to fill. It's
    training. There's obviously danger anywhere, but compared to
    being in combat, it falls well short of that. We need to do
    everything we can, and I'm not sure what more we can do, but if
    there is anything more we can do, Admiral, please let us know.
        In your judgment, can the recruiting trend, which is to a
    great extent due, according to General Caldwell, to the efforts
    of the Afghan leadership to stimulate recruiting, as well as an
    increase in pay, but he attributes the large increase more to
    the leadership of the Afghans than to the pay increase when we
    met with him. But will that recruiting trend in your judgment
    be maintained or is it maintainable right into the spring?
        Admiral Stavridis. I believe it will be maintained,
    Senator. I am also very focused on the other end of that
    equation, which is the retention piece, which is not going as
    well. We have to continue to focus on retaining, just as we do
    here in the United States, it's so important to have the
    retention along with the recruitment piece.
        I'm confident we will continue to be strong on the
    recruiting side. I'm working very hard with Stan McChrystal and
    Bill Caldwell to focus on the retention side as well.
        Chairman Levin. There's a new missile defense plan in
    Europe called Phased Adaptive Approach that the Obama
    administration has announced and begun to implement. Does NATO
    support that new missile defense plan?
        Admiral Stavridis. NATO is beginning that conversation. At
    the moment what we have is a ballistic missile defense C2
    nascent structure, which is being explored to decide where,
    when, and how NATO could connect into this if the alliance
    decides to do so. I anticipate there will be a significant
    discussion about that at the defense ministerial, which will be
    in the May timeframe, and I'm hoping to see a decision taken
    toward the time of the summit, which is in Lisbon in November.
    So it's very much an active conversation.
        I don't want to prejudge the political decisions of the
    Nations, but it's certainly on the agenda.
        Chairman Levin. From what you know, can you say that there
    seems to be a positive response to it?
        Admiral Stavridis. I think overall that would be fair to
    say.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, as I understand, the President's proposal was that
    we would be adding approximately 30,000 troops and our allies,
    including in and out of NATO, would be adding an additional
    10,000.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. How are we on track for that 10,000?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, we're in pretty good shape. We're
    at 9,500 troops. If I can get the additional 700 trainers that
    I just talked to the chairman about, then that would put us
    over the 10,000 mark overall.
        Senator McCain. Does that include the 2,000 Dutch troops
    that are scheduled to leave?
        Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, it does not.
        Senator McCain. So you're really talking about 7,500
    troops. You don't have any illusion about the Dutch troops
    remaining, do you?
        Admiral Stavridis. My sense is, listening to the political
    dialogue out of The Netherlands, that they will be leaving.
        Senator McCain. So we're really not on track, then. It's
    nice to say, but if you're going to lose 2,000 Dutch troops,
    who are, by the way, great fighters from my visits, it's not
    9,500; it's closer to 7,500. There are others of our allies
    whose commitments have certainly not been firmed up yet.
        The Afghan Army, as I understand, needs to be around
    300,000 troops and 100,000 police; is that the right numbers
    that we would like to see over time?
        Admiral Stavridis. I think over time, yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. How do we expect over time to pay for the
    Afghan Army?
        Admiral Stavridis. I think the international community will
    have to be in a position to continue to support it for a great
    deal of time to come.
        Senator McCain. Roughly how much would that cost be on an
    annual basis?
        Admiral Stavridis. I don't have that number at my
    fingertips, but it would certainly be in the billions, probably
    in the low billions.
        Senator McCain. We would expect our allies to foot the bill
    for that?
        Admiral Stavridis. I think it is fair to say that it's an
    international effort and we would hope that all in the
    international community would continue to support it moving
    forward.
        Senator McCain. Overall, the operation in Marjah was
    successful?
        Admiral Stavridis. I think it is going very successfully,
    certainly through the clearing phase. We're now in the build
    and hold phase, which I think will be challenging. But I am
    confident that the plans that we have in place will give us a
    very good chance at overall success as we go through clear,
    build, hold, and ultimately transition.
        Senator McCain. What presence did our NATO allies have in
    the Marjah operation?
        Admiral Stavridis. The Marjah operation, of the ISAF
    forces, was around 25 to 30 percent.
        Senator McCain. That was in direct combat roles?
        Admiral Stavridis. Largely, yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. So some of our allies are fighting very
    well. Some of them have very restrictive rules of engagement,
    right?
        Admiral Stavridis. We have 22 nations that have no caveats
    and we have about 20 nations that have caveats, yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. Some of these caveats are very disturbing.
        Admiral Stavridis. Some of them are very restrictive and we
    work very hard to try and reduce those wherever we can.
        Senator McCain. I thank you. There's a lot going on in NATO
    and in Europe and we appreciate the great work you're doing.
        General Ward, this sounds like perhaps a question that need
    not be asked, but should we be looking as part of AFRICOM at
    some headquarters located in Africa?
        General Ward. Senator, the work of the command is in its
    programs, its activities, and its exercises. The things that we
    do across the continent to help the nations of Africa increase
    their capacity. The headquarters location, quite candidly,
    doesn't affect that work, where we plan those activities, where
    we look to resource those activities. It's not something that
    the leaders in Africa are asking me about and at this time it
    is my estimation that any great efforts to locate an American-
    size headquarters of that nature would probably be more
    counterproductive than productive.
        Senator McCain. Because?
        General Ward. Because of perceptions, because of the
    reactions to neighbors, and to parts of the continent where the
    headquarters might not be located. Many unintended consequences
    I think would fall out from that type of a move.
        Senator McCain. Could you tell us a couple of countries
    that are of your greatest concern, General Ward?
        General Ward. Senator, as we look at the continent, clearly
    the challenges are there. There are also opportunities. But
    when we talk about what's going on----
        Senator McCain. What countries are of your greatest
    concern, General?
        General Ward. There is what's going on in Somalia, what's
    going on in Sudan, what's going on in Nigeria, the
    extrajudicial means of changes of government that we saw in
    Niger, and in Guinea. Those activities are concerning.
        Senator McCain. Since it's not in the news, perhaps it's
    obvious we are making some progress on the piracy issue.
        General Ward. We are making progress from the standpoint of
    addressing the threat at sea. The weather lately also helped
    because of the high sea state and the inability of those small
    skiffs to go out and operate freely. The coalition that occurs
    at sea is an effective coalition. It is a big ocean, however,
    as you are aware, and so these skiffs do in fact go around and
    get through.
        That piracy threat is not just in the Gulf of Aden and the
    East Indian Ocean. It's also in the west coast of Africa. Our
    work to help these African nations increase their capacity to
    deal with their territorial waters is certainly making a
    difference. In addition to that, I would offer that the work
    that would need to occur on land, especially pertaining to good
    governance or governments that are more than less able to
    control their territories, will also contribute to increased
    stability and reducing the effects of piracy.
        Senator McCain. The main area of piracy operations is
    where?
        General Ward. Predominantly the Gulf of Aden.
        Senator McCain. What country?
        General Ward. Somalia.
        Senator McCain. Somalia, an incredibly unstable country.
        General Ward. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. Very little prospect for stability in the
    future.
        General Ward. It's a work in progress, to be sure. Small
    things are happening now, but much work needs to be done.
        Senator McCain. Could you just make a comment about
    Ethiopia and the situation there?
        General Ward. Ethiopia remains a friend and a partner in
    our efforts to help produce stability there in the region. The
    work that the Ethiopians do in the counterterror business, as
    well as in the work of their participation in peacekeeping
    operations, is important work, and I think our partnering with
    the Ethiopians as well as other East African nations is
    something that we would continue to look at in ways of helping
    to produce stability in that part of the world.
        Senator McCain. I thank you, General.
        Thank you, Admiral. Thank you very much, General Mattis.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to the three of you for your extraordinary service.
    General Ward, let me just pick up where Senator McCain was,
    particularly in Somalia. We know from experience that where
    there's no government, trouble grows, either as piracy or the
    provision of space for terrorists, Islamist terrorists
    particularly, to operate.
        I gather that there is an attempt by the provisional
    government to retake the capital city of Mogadishu, and I
    wonder if you could give us both your estimate of how that's
    going and to what extent we're able to be supportive of that
    effort?
        General Ward. Senator, Somalia has been an ungoverned space
    for almost 20 years.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Ward. What we're facing today is clearly not new.
    What I will say is the current Transition Federal Government
    (TFG), being supported by the African Union's (AU) Mission in
    Somalia (AMISOM), and being supported by others of the
    international community, including the United States, is an
    effort that I would continue to endorse and think that it has
    for now our best potential for helping to turn around some of
    the instability and lack of governance that we've experienced
    there.
        What's going on in Mogadishu with respect to the desires of
    the transition government to reclaim parts of Mogadishu is a
    work in progress. I'm not aware of the specifics. I'll have to
    come back to you, sir, with the specifics on what that current
    operation looks like.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Operations intended to relieve pressure on the Transitional Federal
    Government (TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in
    Mogadishu are planned. The intent of these operations is to clear
    extremist-held areas.

             On 10 and 11 March 2010, TFG and AMISOM forces clashed
            with al-Shabaab militia in eastern Mogadishu. The TFG,
            supported by AMISOM, ultimately lost that skirmish-probably due
            to poor command and control, and insufficient logistics.
             TFG operations, under constant Islamic insurgent
            assault, remain hamstrung by weak command and control, supply,
            and administrative systems, and clan and personality-based
            governance dysfunction.

        General Ward. To the degree the TFG can, in fact, reexert
    control over Mogadishu with the help of AMISOM and others I
    think is something that we would look to do and support, as
    well as the other provisions of the Djibouti process that look
    to instilling governance, instilling developmental things that
    will serve the benefit of the Somali people to cause that
    situation to reverse itself.
        We look to participate with those who also support them,
    the other nations and the neighbors who contribute to the
    AMISOM mission, in particular Uganda and Burundi. We support
    their work and try to lend the hand that they lend to the TFG
    to increase stability. So those efforts are ongoing. It's an
    effort that I think we would certainly support and we would
    look to do it in ways that add to stability in that part of the
    continent.
        Senator Lieberman. Let me go to the Sudan. There's a lot of
    continuing concern here about the situation in Sudan. We're in
    a critical period in the coming year with national elections
    next month, which are the first in more than 2 decades. Then
    there's a referendum in the south in January 2011.
        I'd like to hear first what your command is doing to
    support the United Nations (U.N.)-AU force in Darfur, where
    unfortunately the human rights abuses are continuing; and then
    second, what AFRICOM can and is doing to support implementation
    of the comprehensive peace agreement of January 2005?
        General Ward. Senator, our support to the UN-AU Mission in
    Darfur (UNAMID) is in the form of training assistance,
    logistics assistance, and support to those forces who have been
    declared a part of that UNAMID mission. We provide logistics,
    lift support, as I've mentioned, and we continue to do that in
    support of the peacekeeping effort there in Darfur.
        We have no direct, on-the-ground involvement there. Those
    processes as a part of the comprehensive peace agreement are
    essentially political processes that we certainly support. We
    do support the formation of the Southern Liberation Army in
    southern Sudan, some of their professional development
    initiatives, some of their training initiatives, and we do that
    through and in conjunction with DOS, working with the Special
    Envoy and doing those things that help increase the
    professionalism of that southern Sudanese force.
        Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you how you would suggest
    that we interpret the statements that President Bashir has made
    that essentially the war is over? How should we interpret
    those?
        General Ward. Senator, the cooperation that we see emerging
    between Chad and Sudan, between President Debi and Bashir, I
    think we would look to that as an encouraging sign.
        Senator Lieberman. So it's real? Something is changing
    there?
        General Ward. Something is changing.
        Senator Lieberman. For the better?
        General Ward. It's for the better. It's still fragile. It's
    not irreversible, to be sure. But I think we should be
    encouraged by those signs and we look forward to more of that
    as this political dialogue continues.
        Senator Lieberman. Admiral Stavridis, let me ask you about
    Bosnia-Herzegovina. Senator McCain and I and a couple of
    colleagues visited there last month. I think we feel a sense of
    pride about what the United States was able to do in the 1990s
    to stop the aggression and genocide there. But as you indicate
    in your posture statement, the problems continue, particularly
    the ethnic divisions. It's not what it was in the 1990s, of
    course, but you have some really explosive situations and
    people there, particularly Mr. Dodek in the Republika Srpska.
        I will tell you that the one most encouraging experience
    that we had was visiting with the military of Bosnia-
    Herzegovina, and I think EUCOM has had a lot to do with that.
    You have all the ethnic groups in there. They're functioning
    together. They're at a higher level.
        I want to quote from something which you said in your
    statement because it's really the question I want to ask after
    your evaluation. You warn that ``the programmed reduction of
    NATO and European Union forces in the Balkans may induce
    additional risk of instability in the region.'' I'd like to ask
    you to evaluate the situation, but then specifically would you
    counsel now that the programmed reduction of NATO and European
    Union forces in the Balkans should not go forward, that it
    involves too much risk?
        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Senator. The context of the
    reduction of U.S. troops in the Balkans is really quite
    remarkable; 20,000 in Bosnia alone. We're down to 20 there now.
    In Kosovo we had as many as almost 10,000. We're down to about
    1,200 troops there now.
        In Bosnia, you correctly hit on I believe a central
    element, which is the security force there, the armed forces.
    Moving them in a direction that is integrated I think will be
    very encouraging to the body politic in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
        In terms of Kosovo, we had 15,000 NATO troops there as
    recently as December. We've been able to draw down to about
    10,000 NATO troops there now, again about 1,200 U.S. troops.
    The next step in that process is for me to provide military
    advice to the Secretary General about whether to take the step
    to go from 10,000 down to 5,000. I'm evaluating that very
    carefully. There is still tension, understandably, between
    Serbia and what they perceive as a breakaway province of
    Serbia, but what the United States and 62 other nations have
    recognized as the independent country of Kosovo.
        So I think we need to move carefully in the Balkans so that
    we don't fall back. The progress has been extraordinary. We
    don't want to let it unravel. I will be looking very carefully
    in Kosovo. We'll continue our encouraging efforts in Bosnia.
    Overall, I'm confident we'll continue to move in a good
    direction, but it requires watchful approaches.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. I'm encouraged by it.
    I guess I'd encourage you to err on the side of caution.
        Admiral Stavridis. I agree.
        Senator Lieberman. I understand the pressure to reduce, but
    we may look back and really regret it.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Just to end on a bright note, I remember
    one of the stories we were told by the commander of the
    military in Bosnia-Herzegovina was that at one point Dodek from
    Srpska called on all the Serbian members of the Bosnia-
    Herzegovina armed forces to return home and no one came. That's
    a great comment and a tribute also, I think, to EUCOM's role in
    training that force.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Since Senator Lieberman ended on a bright note, I'll start
    on a bright note. Some of the things that are working--and
    we've talked about this before, in fact every time we have a
    hearing or a meeting in private, like the train and equip
    program, 1206, 1207, 1208, the International Military Education
    and Training (IMET) program, the Commander's Emergency Response
    Program (CERP), and the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
    (CCIF), those programs are working well.
        Admiral Stavridis, I would ask you, with some of these
    things that have been changed recently, like in the 1207, the
    whole reason for structuring these programs the way they're
    structured with DOD is so that they can be activated quickly
    and get an immediate response. Now we're kind of going the
    other direction with the 1207. Do you want to comment on that?
        Admiral Stavridis. Senator, first of all, I completely
    agree that the 1206 and the IMET programs have been superb. I
    think each of the combatant commanders has testified to that
    over the last couple years, and I've benefited from them
    greatly in 3 years at U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and
    continue to be a strong advocate here at EUCOM.
        The 1207 money is kind of dual-keyed between DOS and DOD. I
    think that any time there's a dual key it's going to take a
    little bit longer to work through the challenges. So some of
    that immediacy that is so valuable in the 1206 funding is not
    as readily available in the 1207. But we're committed to work
    with our partners in DOS to make it go as rapidly as possible.
        Senator Inhofe. Of course, I understand that's civilian-to-
    civilian.
        Are you satisfied with the funding level of the CCIF
    program?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. All right. General Mattis, with all the
    great things that are happening in simulation and modeling now,
    yesterday we broke ground on the new building for the Joint
    Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS) program. By the way, I
    appreciate very much your personal attention, going down and
    watching that. We have people from all over the world there
    under our IMET program. I think some 250 coalition members are
    being trained by this JFETS program.
        So that's just another example of how IMET is working, and
    also an example of how the JFETS program is working. Why don't
    you just give us an update as to what you think is happening in
    terms of things with the JFETS program?
        General Mattis. Thanks, Senator. This is an issue near and
    dear to my heart. In preparing our troops, which is ultimately
    my responsibility, we cannot do it as efficiently or as
    effectively or as cheaply as we can in the real world as we
    could using simulation. One of the biggest challenges we face
    is breaking the old paradigm that somehow simulators are good
    for Navy submarines, good for aviation, good for ship drivers,
    good for ballistic missile defense preparations, but somehow we
    leave the people who take 80 percent of our casualties off the
    ledger.
        So we are going forward very strongly with this from the
    small unit level, to how we integrate joint intelligence,
    reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) and more importantly
    joint fires, because as we distribute our forces more broadly
    on the battlefield we need to reduce the risk to them. That
    means they can access joint ISR and know what's over the next
    hill. That means they can access and use joint fires.
        The installation out in your district I'll just tell you,
    sir, is absolutely critical to the maturation of this.
        Senator Inhofe. I think the best way to break that paradigm
    is to get the people out there to see it.
        General Mattis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Because it's one of these things that you
    can't explain to someone, the actual conditions that they
    experience out there. It's mind-boggling.
        General Mattis. Yes, sir. We have a couple of programs to
    do that right now, and we're getting a lot of interest. We've
    actually had significant support from this committee.
        Senator Inhofe. Good.
        General Ward, as you well know, I've been very interested
    in Africa. In fact, I've been criticized for the amount of time
    that I spend in Africa. Back when we had it, it was hard for me
    to understand why we would have Africa under three commands as
    we did. Now things I think are working.
        As I've told you before, I would have preferred to have the
    headquarters in Africa someplace down there. I know the
    political problems that come with that. I was recently in
    Djibouti. I talked to Admiral Fitzgerald and to Rear Admiral
    Kurta. It's heavy lifting over there. But everything is
    happening there. Briefly tell us what is happening in Djibouti
    and what are some of the successes there?
        General Ward. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
    support to the command and also to our security efforts on the
    continent. We feel that and we appreciate it.
        In Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
    (CJTF-HOA), we assumed responsibility for C2 when we became a
    fully endorsed unified command a little over a year ago.
    Djibouti's programs, or the CJTF-HOA programs, that we
    undertake in the eastern part of the continent, but also in
    other places as I determine a skill set that they possess
    that's required, provide the type of training support, the type
    of mentoring, coaching, the type of programs that we are using,
    along with our civil affairs activities, to help the Nations in
    Africa concentrate their efforts in causing a degree of
    harmonization of the training, the professionalism, as well as
    the regionalization of security assistance and cooperation
    programs that I think are proving very, very beneficial insofar
    as moving to the next level the capacity of many of these
    African nations to increase their military and security
    capacity. Because of our long-term approach to doing business,
    doing it in ways that fully integrate the elements of
    diplomacy, development, as well as defense. Not that we do
    those things, Senator, but because we understand the importance
    of those activities being a part of this dynamic, the
    comprehensive approach, it is working.
        Senator Inhofe. I want to expand on that a little bit. But
    first, on the cuts that were there on your information
    operations program, are they going to hurt you? Is that
    serious?
        General Ward. It is serious. The information programs that
    we look to do, where we were cut by $3 million, that was about
    a third of what we wanted to do. The focus for those additional
    programs would have been in the East Africa region, to
    complement what we're doing in the Sahel and in North Africa.
        Senator Inhofe. It's a huge area. I think people just don't
    really comprehend that.
        How about in the other equipment? At first there were some
    problems there. Do you feel fairly comfortable with the
    resources that you have?
        General Ward. We are always looking for resources, Senator.
    What they have are sufficient to do the work that we want to
    do. We could enhance that with additional resources, but the
    work that we are able to do working with those nations, to
    include assisting them through the various programs, the 1206
    program, are very important and beneficial, as we have worked
    with the nations on their territorial security as well as their
    maritime security and capacity-building.
        Senator Inhofe. I'm running out of time here. But do this
    for me. The reason that our activity in Djibouti is acceptable
    with the rest of the continent is because we were already
    there. It's more difficult if you were to start anew. I have
    felt that, as large as that continent is, we ought to have
    something probably in Ghana. The Economic Community of West
    African States (ECOWAS) is there now.
        Lastly, I've been heartened a little bit by some of the new
    faces in Zimbabwe that have been on the other side of Mugabe. I
    feel for the first time in many years somewhat optimistic that
    these new faces that want to bring that country hopefully back
    to where it was at one time, the breadbasket of sub-Saharan
    Africa. Do you share that there is room for optimism now in
    Zimbabwe?
        General Ward. I do. I had a conversation with our new
    ambassador who's been posted there and he is going there,
    Senator, with that same sense of optimism to look to take
    advantage of what might be a changing political environment.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your distinguished service.
    Admiral Stavridis, not to be overly simplistic, but the last
    several years have forced us operationally, in our budgets and
    in acquisition, to become expeditionary. Has that same fever
    caught on in the NATO countries? Can you describe their budget
    acquisition and military policy?
        Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I think a little bit would be
    the answer. There's more of a sense of expeditionary, and this
    is part of what General Mattis tried to work so hard, and I
    think he successfully moved the Europeans somewhat in this
    direction when he was the Supreme Allied Commander for
    Transformation, and I think that work continues in that side of
    the NATO organization. It's had some salutary effect.
        Just the thought that we today have 100,000 NATO troops
    engaged on 3 continents speaks to a certain level of
    expeditionary, including counter-piracy, including the Balkans,
    which is enormously expeditionary, but somewhat of course in
    Afghanistan.
        So I think there's movement in that direction, and I really
    commend the work of JFCOM and Allied Command Transformation. We
    need to continue to encourage that and move it forward, because
    the nature of threats in this 21st century is going to demand
    more than just sitting behind our borders.
        Senator Reed. Has the military and political leadership got
    the idea and now is it a question of implementation? Or is it
    still something that's unresolved and under debate?
        Admiral Stavridis. I think it is under debate, but I think
    increasingly the forces of security, the demands of these non-
    traditional threats, these trans-border threats, are moving the
    Europeans in this direction. I'm confident as the NATO
    strategic concept is unveiled in Lisbon in the fall we'll see
    further movement in that direction, sir.
        Senator Reed. General Mattis, if you want to comment on
    that.
        General Mattis. Yes, Senator, and I completely agree with
    where Admiral Stavridis assessed this effort. In an explanation
    to the Nations, I made the point that Italian troops going to
    Afghanistan or Italian troops going to the Baltics would have
    to deploy about the same distance, when you look at what the
    alliance is trying to do under Article 5. So it's not an
    either-or. If you want the alliance to defend more than its own
    home turf, each army in its own country, they must be
    expeditionary.
        I think that is becoming politically more acceptable, where
    at one time it was seen more along the lines of what Senator
    McCain brought up, that it was the Americans trying to get the
    Europeans to fight an American war. I don't think the
    expeditionary argument is any longer characterized like that.
    So I am optimistic, like Admiral Stavridis.
        Senator Reed. Let me turn to one aspect of the way forward
    in Iraq, and that's the advise and assist brigades. I wonder if
    JFCOM has had a chance to evaluate these brigades. They've been
    configured to retain combat power, but also, as the name
    implies, to essentially be a trainer, mentor, and integrator
    with Iraqi forces. Our success in drawing down our forces and
    stabilizing Iraq rests on their performance. I wonder if you at
    JFCOM have done any work?
        General Mattis. Senator, we leave that tactical training,
    of course, to the Chief of Staff of the Army. However, we have
    looked closely at it and it is the behavior of the troops as
    much as any significant shift in their capabilities that is
    important. What I mean to say is that when those troops go in
    they will focus on the train and assist, but it would be ill-
    advised for the enemy to mess with them. They will still have
    their capability to fight and, should the Iraqis ask for it or
    should force protection demand it, these forces are quite
    capable of rocking the enemy back on their heels.
        But they are going in with the mission and the troops are
    trained and adjusted to a train, advise, and assist mission to
    the Iraqis. Right now, from our perspective these troops are
    exactly the right thing at the right time, and their
    preparation looks sound.
        Senator Reed. Just a follow-up question, because part of
    this is sustaining this effort with the best, highest quality
    forces we can. Is it your impression that within DOD,
    particularly the Department of the Army, that this mission is
    highest priority and they will organize these brigades in a way
    that we have the best possible component elements?
        General Mattis. Sir, obviously we're having to juggle a
    number of very high priorities. We also send combat troops in
    that can partner in Afghanistan. But the theme that we're
    seeing more and more now is that all of our troops going in
    must have this ability to fight in a coalition atmosphere and
    be able to partner, whether it be with Estonians, Afghans, or
    Iraqis. This is part of the shift that Secretary Gates and
    Chairman Mullen have directed, where the entire military force
    is becoming more attuned to this advise and assist effort,
    whether it be in Africa, Afghanistan, or Iraq.
        I believe because of that there will be no lowered priority
    on something that is now considered an inherent part of the
    primary mission.
        Senator Reed. Can we assume that this model will be adapted
    into Afghanistan also, that as we make progress in terms of
    reducing the capabilities of the Taliban that we'll be able to
    put more of these type of units on the ground?
        General Mattis. Sir, I'd go so far to say that the units
    we're sending over there now into the area that Admiral
    Stavridis spoke about in Marjah are completely capable on their
    own as combat units of partnering with the Afghans. We are
    learning. As a British prime minister put it, once we've
    exhausted all the alternatives we'll do the right thing. We
    have it right this time and we are using these lessons learned
    to change the very makeup of the unit training.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        General Ward, can you describe the nature of the
    partnership between AFRICOM and the AU Standby Force of five
    brigades?
        General Ward. The command, Senator, has a relationship
    where we have a presidential determination being put in place
    that allows us to work with these five standby brigades.
    Currently that determination is in place for the Southern
    African Standby Force and the West African Standby Force. We're
    working on one for the East African Standby Force.
        We see that these regional alignments for peace are very
    critical, and where they don't exist we still work on a
    bilateral basis with the nations who would send forces to these
    standby brigades to increase their capacity as well. So it's a
    training relationship, in some instances it is an equipping
    relationship. In some instances it is a doctrinal relationship
    where we provide that type of assistance to these standby
    forces that are part of these regional economic communities.
        Senator Reed. Do we have an ongoing liaison with them in
    terms of personnel on the ground on a day-to-day basis?
        General Ward. We have a liaison officer with the AU, which
    is obviously the continental organization. We have a liaison
    with ECOWAS and their standby force. We do not have a permanent
    liaison with the Southern African Developmental, or with the
    East African. But we do have a day-to-day relationship in East
    Africa with those East African forces as well. We have
    supported each of them as they conducted training, exercises,
    and other things to help increase their capacity to bring these
    brigades together, yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. I want to thank you, General Ward. I also
    want to thank you for your service, because it's a long time
    since we taught together at West Point and I'm awfully proud of
    what you've accomplished for the military and for the Army.
    Thank you, sir.
        General Ward. Thank you for the support, Senator. Thank
    you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
        Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Ward. Admiral Stavridis, nice to see you
    again. General Mattis, thank you for your service to the
    country. Thank you for being here to answer our questions
    today.
        Admiral Stavridis, I want to talk to you about a report
    that came out, I guess it was last week, where a Spanish judge
    accused the Government of Venezuela of maintaining illicit ties
    with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and ETA
    terrorists planning to kill senior government officials in
    Spain, including President Uribe. The reason I'm asking you,
    not only because of the Spanish connection, but your previous
    work at SOUTHCOM.
        Is there good cooperation between your command and SOUTHCOM
    to make sure that we're staying in front of these issues?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, very much so. I'm in quite a
    bit of dialogue with General Fraser. Another example would be
    since the earthquake in Haiti, he and I have been in close
    coordination in terms of support from the many European nations
    who have pitched in and helped. There is a very strong
    relationship there, and also a strong relationship with
    AFRICOM. Those three combatant commands--EUCOM, AFRICOM, and
    SOUTHCOM--tend to work together very closely. It's partially
    the propinquity of geography, partially the personal
    friendships, and partially the geopolitical issues that you
    correctly highlight.
        Senator LeMieux. I have a concern that touches this issue
    that I just raised, with potentially an assassination plot
    against President Uribe running through Spain. It is also
    geopolitical, as you said, with the concern that Iran, with
    projecting its influence through Spain and also through Latin
    America, is becoming a destabilizing force. Certainly Europe is
    tremendously important for our security interests, and if we
    have a nuclear-armed Iran that's going to impact your AOR.
        Can you speak to that issue?
        Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I find Iran alarming in any
    number of dimensions, not the least of which is, as you
    mentioned, increasing Iranian influence throughout Latin
    America and the Caribbean, drawing on my previous experience,
    their very active sponsorship of terrorism, and their pursuit,
    not only of a nuclear weapon, but also of ballistic missiles
    which can deliver such weapons. It's one of the reasons I think
    missile defense is particularly important, and I think a
    concerned international effort to focus on the dangers of Iran
    is well warranted.
        Senator LeMieux. The administration recently made a
    decision about ground-based interceptors and not pursuing that
    in the Czech Republic and in Poland. Do you feel that the plan
    going forward to make sure that we have an adequate missile
    defense to protect Europe and the United States is adequate?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I do. I think the Phased
    Adaptive Approach is timely and flexible. It will provide the
    capability and be able to step up, hence the phased and
    adaptive aspects of the title, as the Iranian ability to use
    ballistic missiles goes forward.
        It is being well received in Europe. We're in dialogue with
    a variety of the potential partners for emplacement of it.
    Secretary Ellen Tauscher is in charge of that particular
    effort. She's doing a very good job working with the allies to
    move forward on it. So overall, yes, I am a supporter of it and
    I believe that it will be very effective in defending Europe
    over time, as well as the United States, of course.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Admiral.
        General, can you give us an update of the status of al
    Qaeda in Africa?
        General Ward. We look at al Qaeda in Africa, Senator, in
    two locations essentially, although it is likely that they're
    in more, but predominantly East Africa al Qaeda and al Qaeda
    Islamic Maghreb. We see in the northern part of the continent
    al Qaeda Islamic Maghreb. They are operating, conducting
    kidnappings, and other sorts of activities that certainly
    threaten our interests and the interests of our partners in the
    region.
        In the eastern part of the continent, we see East Africa al
    Qaeda. Recently the claims of a merging between the Al Shabab
    in Somalia with East Africa al Qaeda are there, and linkages
    between East Africa al Qaeda and al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula. I would say that we certainly see indications of the
    presence of al Qaeda in Africa, predominantly in the East
    Africa region, as well as in the Sahel in the greater Sahara
    part of the continent as well, sir.
        Senator LeMieux. Is it a growing influence? Are they
    becoming more organized?
        General Ward. I would not characterize it there. I would
    like to come back with something for the record with more
    specific detail. But I would also offer that, based on what
    they are saying, they are seeking to expand their influence in
    the East Africa region as well as in the North Africa region.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Al Qaeda's influence in Africa has grown in recent years, as
    demonstrated by its increased ties with extremist groups in both East
    and North Africa. As al Qaeda becomes less focused on operations in
    Iraq, the group's influence on the continent of Africa is likely to
    expand.

             On 11 September 2006, the Algeria-based Salafist Group
            for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) officially merged with al
            Qaeda, becoming al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
            (AQIM). Since the merger, AQIM has developed into al Qaeda's
            regional arm, increasingly adopting al Qaeda-style tactics,
            ideology, and propaganda. While primarily focused on North
            Africa and the Sahel, AQIM is attempting to increase its reach
            into West Africa and Europe, expanding al Qaeda's presence.
             A limited number of al Qaeda operatives, notably Harun
            Fazul, likely remain active in East Africa.
             Over the past 18 months, al Qaeda leaders in
            Afghanistan/Pakistan and al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia have
            exchanged messages of mutual support.
             A growing number of foreign fighters are entering
            Somalia to train and fight with al-Shabaab against the African
            Union Mission to Somalia and Somali Transitional Federal
            Government forces. Al Shabaab and the foreign fighters
            increasingly use tactics and methods typically associated with
            al Qaeda.

        Senator LeMieux. General, this weekend we learned that 500
    people, including women and babies, were massacred in Nigeria.
    What's our current strategy to curtail human rights abuses in
    Africa?
        General Ward. As we conduct our military-to-military
    relations with the various nations of Africa, we encourage the
    promotion of human rights. We encourage the conduct of
    militaries in professional ways. Obviously, those activities
    that you described, I've seen nothing to point that they were
    committed by the military of Nigeria. Clearly the role that's
    been taken by the Nigerians to go in and stop that action is
    something that we applaud. We certainly, like all others,
    deplore that type of activity, the killing of any innocent
    people. We would certainly encourage the work that's being done
    by the Government of Nigeria to address those atrocities, those
    who are responsible, to arrest them, and do their very best to
    prevent that. But we clearly see that as something that is
    deplorable and we certainly regret the loss of innocent life to
    those means.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, General.
        General Mattis, there was a London Times article earlier
    this week which talked about our European allies and their
    vulnerability to a cyber attack and the rise of China as a
    hostile cyber combatant. What are we doing to strengthen our
    allies' defenses and safeguard the sensitive information that
    we share with them?
        General Mattis. Senator, I'd have to take that for the
    record to give you more data. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
    is our main effort on the cyber effort, and we're in constant
    contact with them. We also work on the concepts. Frankly, we're
    scrambling to find a concept that takes into account how best
    to protect our networks, and obviously we must maintain an
    exploitation capability against the enemy. It is hard to come
    up with a theory that also includes the constitutional issues
    within our own country as far as how we do this protection.
        Our first step is to protect our DOD networks. We work
    closely with our NATO allies, but also some other allies in the
    world, who work with us on putting these concepts together.
    We're drawing a fair amount of traction with STRATCOM now that
    they've been assigned this and they're maturing it. I'd have to
    get back to you with more detail, which I can do. But I will do
    so by going to STRATCOM to make sure I'm current.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Cyber defense is a critical warfighter challenge in today's joint
    and coalition operational environment. The recent Quadrennial Defense
    Review identified cyber as a priority area for the Department of
    Defense and we are working with our partners to mitigate cyber
    vulnerabilities, increase the resilience of key U.S. and coalition
    command and control infrastructures, and develop a shared cyber
    doctrine to facilitate the sharing of information and technology. In
    coordination with U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint Staff, the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO), we have incorporated cyber operations into the wargaming,
    limited objective experiments and training events that we conduct with
    our allies. Future interactions will take advantage of NATO's
    Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to advance cyber defense
    capabilities of U.S and other NATO nations and enhance our
    interoperability in the field of cooperative cyber defense.

        Admiral Stavridis. Senator, may I just add that in Europe
    NATO has established a center for cyber. It's in Estonia, which
    is appropriate since they suffered a severe cyber attack 2
    years ago. I think, as General Mattis says, it's indicative
    that all of these organizations are reaching to build the first
    nascent structures that can focus on this problem. But I
    believe it's vital, and it is something we think about a lot in
    EUCOM. I know all the combatant commanders do.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you. I think it's vital, too, and I
    appreciate getting a follow-up on that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Stavridis, you recently discussed your concerns
    with me on cyber security and in the broader context how you
    view the vastness of this realm as a cyber sea. In a recent
    paper that you authored, I want to give a quote that really
    paints a picture of this sea for me. You wrote: ``The seas I
    refer to, however, are not of water and waves, but of zeros and
    ones, optic fibers and photons, routers and browsers, and
    satellites and servers. The cyber sea is the new global commons
    and it is untamed.''
        Two recent examples that I can think of for cyber security
    attacks is when the Iraqi insurgents recently intercepted video
    feeds from a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle using off-the-
    shelf software, and then a second one concerning Google
    claiming that Chinese hackers stole some of its computer coding
    and attempted to break into Chinese dissidents' emails.
        Will you describe your principal concerns with cyber
    security and how you think we can best mitigate our exposure?
        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Senator. I completely agree
    with the thrust of Senator LeMieux's questions, as well as
    General Mattis's response. I think that today we have a billion
    devices that are accessing the Internet. Our economies are
    fundamentally intertwined in this cyber sea, and it is an
    outlaw sea. We do not have the norms, the buoy systems, the
    navigation, or the satellites. Nothing really exists to develop
    norms of behavior in the cyber world.
        So I think that there's a military component to this, but
    it's actually a much larger problem. This is a classic example
    of whole of society approach must really be taken into account
    here. It's not even whole of government. As you point out,
    Google and many other private companies are very engaged in
    this.
        From the military perspective, what we're trying to do in
    EUCOM and in NATO is to highlight the challenges ahead, put in
    place initial structures, do the kind of damage control that
    General Mattis is talking about to initially at least protect
    ourselves, and then I think what's necessary is to think our
    way forward through a process that can create these kind of
    global norms.
        That may be a process that brings a lot of nations together
    to have this conversation. Just as we gather to talk about the
    climate and have a global summit on the climate, I think at
    some point there needs to be a very global conversation on this
    challenge.
        Senator Hagan. Well, I understand that in the summer of
    2009 EUCOM held an exercise called the Combined Endeavor, which
    included a mix of international, interagency, and public-
    private entities focused on computer network defense. I also
    understand that NATO recently established a cooperative cyber
    defense center of excellence in Estonia to enhance the
    capability, cooperation, and information-sharing among NATO
    nations and our partners in cyber defense.
        How can this endeavor serve as a model for the development
    of multi-national policies to ensure continued unimpeded and
    lawful access to cyber space?
        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you for highlighting those
    activities of EUCOM. I hasten to say that each of the combatant
    commanders is taking this on. I know General Ward is doing
    this. I know obviously STRATCOM is at the very heart of it, as
    General Mattis said. We're all grappling with this. I think
    that the more we cross-communicate and cross-level our efforts
    at this stage, the more effective we'll be in dealing with
    this.
        So I believe that exercises that bring international,
    inter-agency, and private-public actors together as we try to
    do a combined endeavor need to be elevated and taken to a
    higher level by the nations that want to connect on this. We're
    working that very hard, as you mentioned, on the NATO side
    through the center in Estonia.
        Senator Hagan. I'm very concerned about this because I see
    numerous examples going forward of where we will be subject to
    much more attack on the cyber sea.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Hagan. General Ward, the U.N. peacekeeping mission
    in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the largest
    and most expensive, and reportedly the U.N. could begin
    withdrawing its troops from the western portion of the country
    as early as June 2010. Additionally, the U.N. peacekeeping
    mission reportedly plans to begin withdrawing from the unstable
    eastern portion of the country in June 2011.
        Studies estimate that up to 1,200 people die each day from
    conflict-related causes as well as diseases and malnutrition.
    Rampant corruption and pervasive weak government allows members
    of the national army and members of armed groups alike to abuse
    civilians.
        Can you please describe the effects that a U.N.
    peacekeeping mission withdrawal from the DRC would have on the
    stability of the country and region, and what plans are in
    place to counter the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
    Rwanda (FDLR) that's focused on destabilizing the eastern
    portion of the DRC? I'll be happy to repeat any of that.
        General Ward. Well, thank you, Senator. I am sure if I
    don't get to everything you'll remind me.
        First, as President Kabila talks to the U.N. on the
    withdrawal of those forces from the DRC, I too think it would
    not be a good idea for that to occur too quickly. The
    conditions that you described with respect to the corruption,
    the professionalism of the armed forces of the DRC, their
    activity, the lawlessness in the eastern part of the country to
    be sure, all contribute to abuses to the population and to
    instability.
        The U.N. force that's there has clearly been a force for
    good in addressing those conditions. Large as that contingent
    is, given the size of the DRC, it is still not covering that
    entire country. But any place where those forces are reduced
    would have I believe a negative effect. Right now the western
    part of the country is in fact the most stable, so it would
    probably be least affected with the withdrawal of U.N. forces.
    But clearly in the eastern part of the country, where the
    majority of the things occur against the people, either being
    committed by rebel groups who operate in that region or in some
    cases by the armed forces of the DRC itself, I think the
    removal of U.N. forces would have a detrimental effect on those
    overall conditions.
        As we work with DOS and others with the Congolese as they
    address in a comprehensive way the plethora of conditions that
    contribute to the instability and the lawlessness, our focus
    now is moving ahead with training of a battalion that hopefully
    can serve as a model for what professional behavior is and what
    it could lead to for other parts of the armed forces of the
    DRC.
        We have begun that program in earnest about 2 weeks ago. It
    will run about another 6 or 7 months, and should it prove
    successful there's potential that it could be expanded to other
    battalions as well to help a process of increasing
    professionalism and ability of the armed forces of the DRC to
    move ahead.
        The work being done by the FDLR in the east, the Congolese
    are addressing that through some of their activities, supported
    by the U.N., and I think that too is important work as a part
    of the overall comprehensive way that those rebel groups have
    to be addressed. As we've also seen, I might add, with the
    cooperation that has existed between Uganda, the Congo, Rwanda,
    as well as the Central African Republic in a regional way to
    address these common threats is something that we also will
    continue to encourage.
        Senator Hagan. Well, I'm extremely concerned about the
    number of people that are dying every day and certainly the
    abuse of their men and women is just reprehensible. But thank
    you for your testimony.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Burris.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to add
    my thanks to these three distinguished Americans who've
    dedicated their lives to protecting us. So from me to you,
    thank you, gentlemen.
        I will submit, Mr. Chairman, some questions for the record,
    because I have a whole list of them here, and I'm going to
    start with General Ward. General, your command was designed to
    employ the whole-of-government approach to executing theater
    security cooperation and to facilitate counterterrorism efforts
    within the African nations. General, what is the future role of
    the JTF-HOA and the military base in Djibouti?
        General Ward. Sir, Camp Lemonnier is I believe a very
    critical part of our national structure in that part of the
    continent. It serves four combatant commands, not just mine. It
    also serves U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Special
    Operations Command, as well as U.S. Transportation Command as a
    logistics hub, as an infrastructure point, as well as a
    training platform.
        I think it is in the long-term interest of the United
    States to maintain that facility to the degree that we have and
    continue to improve upon it, that will allow our activities in
    support of our missions in that part of the world to be
    facilitated. It is very important to us. I think it has great
    long-term meaning for us and I will clearly endorse it over the
    long term.
        JTF-HOA, which is my force that's there right now,
    continues to do work in the region insofar as helping build the
    capacity of those nations in East Africa to counter the terror
    threat, as well as to be able to deal with the threat of terror
    by increasing their capacity. We are providing training
    assistance, equipping assistance, mentoring assistance,
    professionalization of their militaries, as well as helping to
    bring them together in a regional way as they continue to work
    together to address that common thread.
        So both activities and the platform itself, being Camp
    Lemonnier, are important. The work being done by the JTF-HOA as
    it executes its programs, fully aligned with the goals and
    objectives of AFRICOM are also very, very instrumental in
    promoting that degree of professionalism in East Africa and in
    other parts of the continent where we see those unique
    capabilities that could be applied, in particular the civil
    affairs work.
        Senator Burris. General, do you feel, since you're the last
    command to be stood up here, that you are fully operative and
    fully personnel-staffed correctly? Or do you really need
    additional staff personnel?
        General Ward. Senator, we always look for more. The Deputy
    Secretary of Defense has written to all of his colleagues
    asking for additional interagency support. Not that we would do
    the work of the interagency, but so that the interagency input
    to our work could be further assuring that what we do in fact
    is in keeping with supporting the overall comprehensive work
    being done by other parts of our Government.
        We don't have all that we would like to have, but there is
    a recognition on the part of our interagency partners that they
    should be and want to be a part of this command, and as we
    continue to move forward we see that occurring. That's why I
    endorse all that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman says
    about increasing the capacities of our interagency partners as
    well, so that they can in fact participate.
        Senator Burris. Are you going to get Egypt into your
    AFRICOM? When do you anticipate that taking place?
        General Ward. Egypt, as you pointed out, Senator, is
    aligned with CENTCOM. But for matters of the continent of
    Africa, currently we can work with Egypt. In fact, I will be in
    Egypt in a matter of a couple weeks working with them on
    matters of the continent.
        Senator Burris. Also, General, the reason why we have not
    been able to locate AFRICOM in an African country is because of
    the politics of these countries and locating the right country
    would be a major undertaking. Is that the reason why we have
    not located it there and it's still in Stuttgart, or can we
    find a very friendly African country to headquarter AFRICOM on
    the continent of Africa?
        General Ward. Senator, that is very complex. The reasons
    that you cite are part of it. But it's more than that. At this
    point in time, I think if our work is to be about increasing
    the capacity of African nations, it's our programs and our
    activities that we do in about 38 different countries right
    now. That's the important part, and the effort to find a
    location with all the other associated issues would be
    distracting to the real work of the command, that is through
    our programs.
        Senator Burris. Admiral, theater engagement seems to be a
    major tool used by the command when partnering with the nations
    within your AOR. How is the National Guard's State partnership
    program integrated into your theater engagement strategy?
        Admiral Stavridis. Deeply, deeply engaged. This State
    partnership program, which brings the State Guard into
    individual nations to partner with their militaries, is
    fundamental to what we're doing. We have 26 of them around
    EUCOM, and I'd highlight just one among many, which is the
    Georgia Guard, which is partnered with the military of the
    Republic of Georgia. The two of them are working hand in hand
    to prepare a deployment of the Republic of Georgia's brave
    soldiers. They're going to send 750 to Afghanistan.
        So multiply that by 26 programs around the theater and you
    get a sense of how important this is, sir.
        Senator Burris. Thank you.
        General Mattis, you have a completed draft document,
    ``Education and Employment Principles for Interagency
    Operations and Integration.'' One of your working concepts is
    to stand up an exploratory civilian force. What is the mission
    and employment of the expeditionary civilian force?
        General Mattis. Sir, there are two expeditionary civilian
    forces that we're looking at. One is inside DOD, and this is
    where you actually take DOD civilians who can fill certain jobs
    overseas on these joint coalition interagency staffs in these
    irregular wars.
        I think the one you're referring to there is the one where
    we work with Ambassador Herbst in Secretary Clinton's DOS, and
    that is where we are putting together, with their help,
    concepts that would integrate better the civilian-military
    interface when we enter into these kinds of wars that cannot be
    won by military means alone. There will be an immediate
    response force that's being built. These will be people who
    have been trained. It's their primary job. Their packs are
    packed. They have their shots. They've been through various
    exercises with the military, and are ready to go on short
    notice.
        Then there will be a response force of members of various
    agencies, and they will be ones who are basically trained.
    They're like the reserves. They go to some training every year.
    They're maintained as far as health records and deployment
    records, and they know what to do. But it would take us
    anywhere from 30 to 90 days to get them deployed.
        Then there's a larger force of people that we would
    endeavor to train as well, and that would be the sustainment
    force that would replace these others.
        Senator Burris. We are using contractors for some of this
    service, are we not, for these forces? The private contractors
    that you see in the theater.
        General Mattis. The ones we're looking at, that I just
    described, are under DOS, Ambassador Herbst's effort, and those
    are all Government employees. Contractors would be a separate
    issue, and we do that when we have to fill the gaps when we
    don't have the Active Duty or active government civilians that
    we can put in.
        Senator Burris. My time has expired, so I will yield, Mr.
    Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your public service. Tomorrow in
    our Emerging Threats Subcommittee we're going to look at the
    comprehensive way that the military, integrating with the
    civilian agencies, can best project U.S. power and interests.
    This is particularly applicable to General Ward and Admiral
    Stavridis, not only with regard to your present interests in
    Afghanistan, Admiral, but also your previous command of
    SOUTHCOM. General Ward, clearly AFRICOM is taking this
    comprehensive approach.
        Mr. Chairman, I was not very satisfied when we had the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ms. Flournoy, come to talk to
    us about the policy. It didn't seem to me that DOD had its act
    together on integrating, and it was like there were the same
    old answers about stovepipes that we're trying to break down.
        You give your commanders on the ground the opportunity that
    they have a certain amount of CERP funds that they can go out
    and dig a well or build a school. But above that, an integrated
    approach, which is key to Afghanistan, which is key to Africa,
    which is key to Latin America, things like wells, education,
    training for jobs, the position of women, medical, all of these
    things that for us to be successful in third world areas like
    we are projected, there has to be a holistic approach.
        The military has been so good as the one who leads it, and
    that of course is what is the thrust of AFRICOM and, Admiral
    Stavridis, your former command. I'd like to have you reflect,
    because I'm worried about Afghanistan that once we get beyond
    those CERP funds that these courageous young officers can go in
    and utilize, that then we get right back into the old
    stovepipes.
        I have the head of USAID coming in in the morning and I
    want to talk to that person about this. So can the two of you
    give me some advice, and also advice for our Emerging Threats
    Subcommittee, which it's the subject of our hearing tomorrow,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I fully share your
    prescription, which is that we have to put together a
    comprehensive approach. It's a whole of society approach. It
    really is interagency, international, private-public, and it
    all has to be connected in a way that we have not been
    terrifically effective at in any of these theaters.
        We will never deliver security in Afghanistan from the
    barrel of a gun. It has to be some as a result of all of these
    mechanisms working together. To that end, I just met with Dr.
    Shah, the Administrator of USAID. He's extremely impressive,
    highly energized and energetic, and he's coming out of the
    Gates Foundation, which gives him a very significant grounding
    in this private-public kind of connection.
        We're exploring with him how we can better partner. State
    Department, as General Mattis is talking about, is working very
    hard at this with Ambassador Herbst and his team. We have a
    long way to go, but I believe that this precise issue is the
    most important security issue for the United States moving
    forward in this 21st century.
        Back to the cyber piece, if you look at cyber as one of
    these emerging threats, it's a classic example of why this
    comprehensive approach is needed. It is fully validated. I
    believe all of the departments should continue to be pushed
    very hard to integrate their efforts at all levels, and that
    getting that balance of civilian, military, private, public,
    and interagency is crucial to our security going forward.
        Kip?
        General Ward. Senator, I clearly concur with what Admiral
    Stavridis just indicated. We know that it's something that's
    important to do. We have not broken the code on how to do it at
    each echelon. We do it fairly well on the ground. The country
    teams in the countries where DOS, USAID, and other members of
    the interagency who are there working with the military
    component, do a fairly good job of harmonizing the activities
    that occur on the ground. We need to do better at how we plan
    those endeavors. In my command, as we bring in members of the
    interagency to help us with our planning, it's a two-way street
    because through their understanding of us, their input back to
    their parent organization can help ensure a harmonization of
    the planning that occurs.
        As the Secretary has pointed out, we think that the
    capacity of some of the interagency partners to do that needs
    to be more robust. So we support those efforts that would in
    fact increase their capacity to participate in the planning as
    well as in the execution of these programs that bring the
    comprehensive effects to stability that you address.
        So we recognize it's an issue. It works more, better than
    not, at the lower echelon. We need to expand that through every
    echelon so that at the inception of our work we have done a
    better job of combining what we call this 3D approach, the
    issues of development--obviously, a public-private
    partnership--the issues of diplomacy, which includes obviously
    good governance and those things that address how a society is
    governed; and defense, those security aspects that need to be
    there so that those other things can in fact work.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, what advice should I give to the
    head of USAID tomorrow? What questions should I ask in our
    hearing tomorrow that would get around USAID, they go out and
    they contract with somebody to do this, let's say it's digging
    wells, but there's clearly need for education over here--let's
    take Afghanistan--and a medical clinic and training for jobs.
        How do we get the comprehensive approach? You have each of
    these nongovernmental organizations and they want to do their
    thing. How do we get it all combined in an approach?
        Admiral Stavridis. Two thoughts. One is the Quadrennial
    Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which is what USAID
    and DOS are working together now; this is happening in real
    time. So I think that that's an opportunity to work on the
    integration, the alignment, and the partnering between USAID
    and DOS and how that marries up with the QDR, the DOD document,
    is a place where you could get the three main actors in this
    security mix coordinating their plans at the very highest
    level.
        If you click down one, General Ward has it exactly right,
    which is it's the planning. It's the planning that we ought to
    go after, because that's where our other agencies are off doing
    their plans and we're doing our plans, and then we meet in
    Afghanistan and the plans aren't particularly aligned.
        I think bringing together a layer of planning below that
    strategic layer represented by the QDR and the QDDR, I think in
    terms of how we can encourage the agencies to do plans
    together, to have transparency in planning, to show across the
    board what the big muscle movements are country by country, and
    integrate those plans, so there is not duplication.
        So as General Ward says, one level down, now we're at the
    tactical level, it's seamless. It proceeds from the strategic
    through the operational planning down to the tactical
    execution. I'd focus in on that planning piece, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, Admiral, General, thank you very much for being
    here and thank you for your outstanding service to our country.
        General Mattis, I wanted to get your views on the
    development of the air-sea battle concept. The new QDR directs
    the Navy and the Air Force to develop a joint air-sea battle
    concept for defeating adversaries with sophisticated anti-
    access and area denial capabilities, which in turn will help
    guide the development of future capabilities needed for
    effective power projection operations.
        Could you provide your views on the development of this new
    air-sea battle concept so far and where does JFCOM fit into the
    development, evaluation, and implementation of this concept?
        General Mattis. Yes, Senator. Thank you. The air-sea battle
    concept grew out of identification of a military problem, and
    that problem is how do we work together jointly in order to
    maintain control of one of the commons, the sea lanes. The
    situation is changing. It's always changing security-wise and
    adapting to that problem has brought these two Services
    together.
        JFCOM is part of this effort. We're monitoring it right
    now, but we're monitoring it to make sure that what we've done
    in past experiments and concept development guides this forward
    and also that we harvest from them the lessons that they're
    learning as they come to grips with this problem broken down
    into bite-sized pieces.
        What we're seeing is more and more this integration at
    every level of war. At one time we basically integrated at the
    strategic level and that was good. Then we got into the
    operational level of integration. You saw that in Operation
    Desert Storm and certainly in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-1.
    We're now integrating down at the tactical level. No longer can
    any service go into even one of its primary domains--the Army
    on the land, the Navy at sea, the Air Force in the air--and not
    integrate with others.
        It's the nature of warfare today, it's the nature of a lot
    of things, that you have to integrate more than ever in this
    age. So it's going forward well. I think the identification of
    the problems is maturing well. I would say we're in very good
    shape on that. The solutions are not completely clarified yet,
    and we will also uncover additional problems as we go forward.
        Ultimately we will see an increased reliance on naval
    forces as we look toward the future security situation. It must
    be that way for matters of limited access in certain areas for
    political or military reasons, and to bring the Air Force and
    the Navy together I think is a very healthy thing at this
    point, even though we have not completely got all the problems
    outlined. But we're getting there.
        Senator Thune. In your opinion how will long-range strike
    capabilities fit into this new air-sea battle concept?
        General Mattis. Sir, we look at these issues in phases.
    Certainly during phase zero, when we're engaging along the
    lines of what AFRICOM has been testifying to here today, what
    we're doing is we're trying to deter enemies and potential
    adversaries from ever doing something that we don't want them
    to do that would be disadvantageous to international stability.
        When you put together a strong capability like this, you
    temper our potential adversaries' designs. Should it go into a
    combat phase, the planning for this comes under something
    called campaign design. In that area, the strike capability
    that would be built would be fundamental to ensuring that we
    deter our enemies and reassure our friends that we can get
    through to them and support them.
        Senator Thune. Do you foresee in any future budget requests
    changes based on this new concept? For example, equipment
    requests with regard to this new concept?
        General Mattis. Sir, I'd like to take a pause on that one,
    because I think first we need to get the concept right before
    we come to you asking for money. Certainly the strike
    capabilities will have to be maintained at the cutting edge.
    But I can't really forecast until we get the concept right,
    which is based on a very clear problem statement of what we're
    trying to solve, whether or not that will mean new programs.
        Senator Thune. Admiral, advanced weapons systems designed
    for anti-access and area denial are being proliferated
    throughout the world, including in the EUCOM AOR. Russia's
    developing advanced surface-to-air missile systems, advanced
    fifth generation type fighter aircraft, and even hinting at
    plans to develop a new long-range bomber.
        While the likelihood of conflict with Russia is low, it
    seems more likely that we will be involved in a future conflict
    against adversaries who possess advanced anti-aircraft and area
    denial weapons systems sold to them by the Russians. What are
    your views on these activities by the Russians to develop and
    proliferate anti-access and area denial systems?
        Admiral Stavridis. Senator, we continuously evaluate
    globally all of the threat systems that are emerging, and
    indeed Russia is developing some very sophisticated ones that
    you mentioned, along with some, I would add, subsurface,
    submarine kinds of capabilities. So clearly we have to pace
    that. Clearly we have to maintain our superiority at all levels
    as we go forward, and I think that applies not solely to
    Russia, but really looking globally at all the threats that's a
    fundamental responsibility of the Department.
        Senator Thune. Do you view Russia's development of a fifth
    generation fighter aircraft as a cause for concern?
        Admiral Stavridis. I do.
        Senator Thune. How about their planned development of a new
    long-range bomber?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, I would put that again in the
    category of a wide variety of emerging global threats. But
    those would be among them.
        Senator Thune. I have one other question I wanted to ask.
    The Russians are seeking to link missile defense to a follow-on
    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and negotiations, as we
    understand, have stalled over the Russian demand for the option
    to withdraw from the treaty unilaterally if they determine that
    our missile defenses would threaten its nuclear missile force.
        To the best of your knowledge, is there any effort to
    negotiate a side agreement with the Russians on this issue?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I have no idea. That would be
    squarely in the purview of DOS.
        Senator Thune. All right.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
        We expect votes just about now. There's four votes coming.
    So let's try to have a second round for everybody. Do you have
    additional questions, Senator Burris?
        Senator Burris. No, Mr. Chairman. I'm just trying to listen
    to these distinguished gentlemen.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, great. I just have a few and then we
    can turn it over to Senator Inhofe.
        You've spoken about your support, Admiral, of the new
    Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defense. One of the
    possibilities being considered is to ask Russia to cooperate in
    the European missile defense effort with their radar
    information as a way to enhance security against shared missile
    threats. Do you support that idea?
        Admiral Stavridis. I do, sir.
        Chairman Levin. If we were able to achieve it, what would
    it be?
        Admiral Stavridis. First, it would create a zone of
    cooperation with Russia, which I think is an important good as
    I look at the military-to-military responsibilities I have in
    EUCOM.
        Second, I think it could technically add to the early
    warning time because of the location of the system.
        Then third, I think it creates confidence-building measures
    between ourselves and the Russians.
        Chairman Levin. Does the Polish Government now support the
    missile defense approach?
        Admiral Stavridis. I think it's fair to say in general
    terms they do, yes, sir. I would not speak for the Polish
    Government.
        Chairman Levin. All right. Have they spoken on it yet?
        Admiral Stavridis. They have not. That's my intuition based
    on my conversations, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Is there discussions or agreements with the
    Polish Government relative to the deployment of a Patriot
    training battery in Poland?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, there is.
        Chairman Levin. Has that been completed yet, those
    discussions?
        Admiral Stavridis. I think we are literally signing the
    final memorandum of understanding this week, and I anticipate
    that deployment going forward in the next 30 days.
        Chairman Levin. The AFRICOM manning issue has been raised,
    General, as to whether or not you have enough personnel. You've
    indicated you'd like some more if you can get them. But my
    question has to do with this. Apparently your Service
    components are not assigned to you as assigned forces; is that
    correct?
        General Ward. The Service components are assigned, sir.
    They have no assigned forces under them, but my components are
    assigned to me.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. But underneath them there are no
    forces; do I have that right now?
        General Ward. That's correct.
        Chairman Levin. Those forces are generally provided through
    a global force management and request for forces system. Have
    you applied for forces? Have you made that request through that
    system?
        General Ward. I have. I use the global force management
    process, as do the other combatant commands as well, for
    satisfying my requirements for forces to do our missions that
    we have to undertake on the continent.
        Chairman Levin. Finally, the Department is currently in the
    process of updating the guidance for employment of the force
    (GEF) which establishes the Department's strategic objectives
    for campaign planning and security cooperation and the
    priorities to be established. There's an ongoing rewrite of the
    GEF. It's the first, I think, since AFRICOM was established. Is
    AFRICOM receiving a fair hearing under that revision process?
        General Ward. Yes, Senator. I've been a part of that
    process and I'm fully aware that DOD, as it looks at its
    revision of the GEF, is looking at ensuring that the
    requirement that we have for resources to conduct the very
    essential building partner capacity is being treated at a level
    of priority different than the past, so that those forces that
    are required to do that mission will enjoy a higher priority
    than has been the case in the past. We are participating in
    that process.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator Inhofe.
        General Mattis. Can I just associate myself with General
    Ward on that particular issue. I think it is a bit of a sea
    change in the Department and it's a good one.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Stavridis, there's only one area where I disagree
    with you, and I've told you this before. But I'd like to have
    you tell me where I'm wrong on this. Our intelligence tells us
    that Iran would have the long-range ballistic capability
    somewhere between 2015 and 2020. I'd say 2015 then, as serious
    as that is. The SM-31B, which is short- and medium-range, that
    would be 2015, but it doesn't matter. That doesn't have the
    capability, nor does the 2A variety, which would get into
    intermediate, and that's supposed to be somewhere around 2018.
        The SM-32B, which is supposed to be comparable to what we
    would have had--at least I think this is the case--if we had
    had and kept the ground-based system or the ground-based
    interceptor in Poland, there is no date on that.
        I objected to that first budget of the President just for
    the terminating of all these programs, such as the F-22, the C-
    17, and the Future Combat System. But the thing I found most
    objectionable was when he pulled the rug out from under Poland
    and the Czech Republic. I was with Vaclav Klaus this last
    Friday.
        I understand the argument that we have the ground-based
    system in Alaska and California. I don't have the confidence
    that that would have that coverage that far for the eastern
    United States. I guess I would just say, just briefly, what am
    I overlooking?
        Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I'm going to ask to take that
    one for the record and come back to you. I think it's a
    technical issue that I would like to provide you a little more
    data on. I will say that, as a naval officer who has commanded
    multiple Aegis ships at sea, I am extremely impressed,
    naturally given my background, with the Aegis system and its
    ability to adapt. So part of my confidence comes out of my
    grounding in my many years at sea operating with that system
    and my belief that it can be successfully transitioned ashore.
        Having said that, I want to provide you the hard data on
    this and I'd like to take that for the record to do that, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator Inhofe. That's all right, and I don't disagree with
    you. I've been a strong supporter of the Aegis system. But
    we're talking about long-range intercontinental ballistic
    missiles (ICBMs). Okay, fine, we'll get that for the record.
        General Ward, I was appreciative of the fact that you said
    some good things about Ethiopia in the response to, I believe
    it was, the chairman's question. Specifically, I know that the
    one who has been under attack in Ethiopia more than anyone else
    is Prime Minister Meles. My personal feeling is he has a tough
    job, but he's a tough guy and he's been able to do it.
        Would you make the same comments about his leadership as
    you would just Ethiopia in general?
        General Ward. Senator, I meet with Prime Minister Meles
    quite regularly and I have a huge respect for his leadership
    and the work that he does, especially as it pertains to
    addressing the threat of terror and cooperating with those who
    also address that threat of terror in East Africa.
        Senator Inhofe. The fact that he was there with us when the
    Somalia thing happened--I think he's taking a bum rap is my
    position.
        You talked, when you were talking to Senator Hagan, about
    the cooperation between Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC. I
    personally have talked to Museveni and Kagame and Kabila on
    their cooperation with each other, but in another area, and
    that is the area of the LRA in northern Uganda, or wherever
    they are right now. We made a point to go over to East Africa
    to Goma thinking that was about where he was last seen, and
    he's had another reign of terror since that time.
        We have legislation right now that is going to try to give
    more assistance to those presidents and those countries to try
    to end what I call one of the worst reigns of terror I've ever
    personally observed, and I've been there and have observed it.
    Do you think we should be helping with more resources to end
    that particular LRA problem? Would you support me on that?
        General Ward. Yes, sir. The work being done by that group
    of countries to combat the atrocities that the LRA has
    committed for over 25 years is work that's important and I
    think our support to those ongoing efforts is important
    support.
        Senator Inhofe. I think most of the members on this
    committee are actually co-sponsors of the legislation that we
    have that would be helpful to resolve that. One of the problems
    we have is that all three of these presidents came from a
    military background and there's always a little bit of a
    concern over, is this reflecting that I can't do it myself? But
    I think we're finally in a position to jointly work on this
    thing.
        Let's see. Is there anything else in terms of what is
    taking place right now in Africa? Maybe you can give us a
    couple of examples of the improvements you've made working with
    the African militaries, some of the successes there.
        General Ward. Thank you, Senator. There are several. As an
    example, as we work with the littoral nations on their maritime
    safety and security, our various programs, one we call the
    AFRICOM Maritime Law Enforcement Program, it's an interagency
    construct. We bring in members of Homeland Security and the
    Coast Guard working with African nations and their legal
    systems such that they have a better ability to provide for the
    territorial integrity of their waters. That is working.
        We conducted an exercise in East Africa whereby we had five
    participating nations, the first time ever. They came together
    jointly working to help address a natural disaster or
    humanitarian assistance scenario. But as was pointed out to me
    by a chief of defense of one of these nations, as convoys moved
    through that part of the continent 10 years ago you would not
    have thought that they would have come together to link up and
    then move to a common objective that was conducted in the north
    of Uganda, where the LRA had just 3 short years ago been
    running with abandon and devastating the populations there.
        Those are happening all over the place. We had a training
    operation in Mali. In the chairman's opening statement he
    mentioned what went on in Mali last summer. A member who
    received training this past January said had he had that
    training prior to that last July situation where the Malians
    encountered al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb forces, he said
    that would not have happened.
        So our work to train and assist these countries so that
    they can be in a better position to address these threats
    themselves is paying off.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I applaud all three of you for the great work you're doing.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        I'm going to have to leave now, so I'll turn the gavel over
    to Senator Lieberman.
        Thank you all very much for your service.
        Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        General Ward, I just wanted to say to you first how
    impressed I am as I hear you answer the questions about what's
    happening within the African continent and your involvement in
    it, your knowledge of it, and how important it is, that we
    created AFRICOM, because I think we were paying too little
    attention to this critically important continent.
        I think you're bringing to it the same kind of critical
    relationship with the leaders there. In some of the regions of
    the world, the most important person in the region really is
    our regional commander. Now, as you said to me when I began
    this conversation before the hearing, it's only in a sense the
    door in and it hopefully leads to other relationships,
    diplomatic, political, economic, etcetera.
        Anyway, I wanted to thank you for the way in which you've
    done your job, and it's been very important.
        Admiral Stavridis, I know you've been asked already about
    missile defense. In your role, you are going to be responsible
    for operating the early stages of the Phased Adaptive Missile
    Defense System for Europe. I thought I'd ask you first for an
    analysis, if you will, or a report on what the state of
    European public opinion is about missile defense? In other
    words, do the Europeans feel vulnerable now? There have been
    times in the not so distant history where I think they haven't.
    Do they feel vulnerable, and if so who are they worried about
    firing missiles at them?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think there's a growing
    appreciation in Europe for the danger specifically from Iran. I
    think they look at the nature of that regime, clearly a state
    sponsor of terrorism, working hard to develop a nuclear device.
    Additionally, I think there's a great deal of understanding
    that the ballistic missile technology that the Iranians possess
    is moving apace. So that is having a salutary effect on the
    European proclivity to be engaged with us in missile defense.
        It varies from country to country, and there are a number
    of factors that range from geography to relationships with the
    United States to general world outlook that shape it. But I
    think in my opinion it's fair to say that we are seeing a
    growing appreciation of it. Again, I have to applaud assistant
    Secretary Ellen Tauscher, who is moving forward on the
    diplomatic side of this thing. She's an expert in all of this
    and she's doing, I think, a very credible job of forging the
    practical partnerships which I believe over time will grow into
    a fully integrated missile defense.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the
    work that Ellen Tauscher has done, as you do.
        There was some concern here on Capitol Hill when the
    decision was made to pull back from the Polish-Czech plan. How
    are we doing? I know you've answered this in part, but how are
    we doing on the development of the alternative system? Are you
    confident that it will meet the target dates we've set so it
    will provide adequate defense?
        Admiral Stavridis. I'm certainly confident that the first
    stage will. It'll be sea-based and, as you heard me say to
    Senator Inhofe, I have a great deal of confidence in that part
    of it. Given the track record of that system and the technology
    embedded in it, I am reasonably confident that it will be
    adapted and will transition to a shore-based system within the
    targets that are set for it.
        Nobody can predict the delivery of defense technology.
    We've all been surprised on that occasionally. But given the
    track record of the system and given my understanding of where
    we are, I think it's very reasonable to expect that we will hit
    those bells as we move forward.
        Senator Lieberman. That's good to hear.
        There was a related article in the Washington Post this
    morning about the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS).
    It says, ``After several failed attempts, the Army is trying
    again to cancel the $19 billion missile defense system that the
    United States is developing in partnership with Italy and
    Germany. Known as MEADS, it has been in the works for more than
    a decade and is designed to replace in part the Army's aging
    Patriot system.''
        I wanted to ask you whether you've been involved in
    discussions with your Army colleagues about this program and
    what your opinion of it is, and ultimately the unique feature
    of this is that we have a couple of our European allies, not
    only involved, but picking up a big chunk of the bill--whether
    you see the MEADS as part of the phased adaptive missile
    defense system that you're now helping to implement?
        Admiral Stavridis. I have not gone into detail on MEADS
    with my Army brethren who are developing that here in the
    United States. I will tell you in Europe there is a sense that
    the system can be a functioning part of a missile defense
    system. I recently spoke with several chiefs of defense from
    the participating nations who mentioned that.
        I think, Senator Lieberman, it's also indicative of the
    relationship between the United States and Israel, where we are
    working and looking at some of the Israeli capabilities that
    you're aware of, the Iron Dome System and the Arrow System. I
    think we in the United States do not have the market cornered
    on all the smart technology. We would be well served by
    reaching out to our allies and finding what can be integrated.
    I think MEADS potentially is in fact a player in that.
        So I will continue to follow the MEADS story as it unfolds.
    But I think it's more important as an example of how additional
    technologies can be adapted to the Phased Adaptive Approach,
    which is one reason it's an attractive system.
        Senator Lieberman. So at this point you're inclined to
    favor the continuation of the MEADS program?
        Admiral Stavridis. I don't know enough about MEADS to make
    that statement, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Right, okay. But I agree with you.
    There's a growing appreciation among allies in Europe, in the
    Middle East, and in Asia of the missile threat, particularly
    from Iran and North Korea. It just makes a lot of sense for us
    to operate, as we have been, cooperatively.
        You're right, the last time I was in Israel I saw some
    video of testing of the Iron Dome System, which is a defense
    against short-range missiles or rockets. It was quite
    impressive. We're partners in that with the Israelis and we'll
    have full benefit, I think, from its technologies in terms, for
    instance, of protecting American personnel and bases in places
    like Europe or the Middle East from potential short-range
    missile rocket attack.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. That's it for me. I have to go over to
    vote. It's been a very informational and encouraging hearing.
    I'm sure the committee, as it normally does, will try our best
    to authorize to a level that will continue to allow the three
    of you and the many men and women in uniform who serve under
    you to do the job that we ask you to do in defense of our
    security and our freedom.
        Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                          u.s. army posture in europe
        1. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, pending the review of the
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Strategic Concept and an
    accompanying U.S. assessment of our European defense posture network,
    the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommended maintaining four
    brigade combat teams (BCTs) and an Army Corps headquarters forward
    stationed on the European continent. In your written statement, you
    stated ``without the four BCTs and one tactical intermediate
    headquarters capability, European Command (EUCOM) assumes risk in its
    capability to conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping, and
    contingency missions. Deterrence and reassurance are at increased
    risk.'' How important for your priority initiatives is it to retain
    four BCTs forward stationed on the European continent?
        Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM's forward stationed forces and bases are
    critical elements of U.S. national security and diplomatic strategy.
    They are important symbols of continued U.S. support for and leadership
    of NATO. Our forces provide essential elements of U.S. assurance,
    dissuasion, and deterrence across the entire European and Eurasian
    theater. They also provide superb power projection facilities for the
    support of coalition operations and contingencies in Europe, Eurasia
    and Africa.
        Taking into account the demands of a dynamic and complex security
    environment; directed tasks associated with U.S. defense strategy;
    requirements to sustain robust levels of engagement with allies and
    friends; the need for forces, bases, and access and treaty agreements
    to support global operations; and a recognition that posture decisions
    are more often than not, irreversible, it is my opinion that the four
    BCTs and a Corps Headquarters is the minimal forward stationed Army
    force requirements for the theater.

        2. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, what would be the impact of
    redeploying two BCTs out of Europe on EUCOM's ability to engage with
    our European allies and maintain the transatlantic relationship?
        Admiral Stavridis. Should the two heavy brigades return to the
    continental United States (CONUS), the impact on EUCOM's ability to
    engage with our European allies and maintain the transatlantic
    relationship would be significant. Their physical presence in Europe
    serves to further assure our allies of the longstanding U.S. commitment
    to NATO and the region in general. U.S. Army forces located in Europe,
    in between their out-of-area deployments, are available for training
    and security cooperation events with our NATO allies and aspiring NATO
    members. These activities are part of the Building Partnership Capacity
    priority for EUCOM and encourage the development of partners to
    increase capability and capacity for expeditionary operations in
    support of global security strategies.
        Furthermore, in-theater forces can respond to short-fused
    opportunities that could not be performed by rotational forces. EUCOM
    realizes that both brigades have not yet converted to the modular BCT
    formation. Ideally, these two brigades can be converted such that EUCOM
    would have assigned each of the four types of Army BCTs to maximize our
    capability with respect to interoperability training with our allies
    and friends. These two BCTs do everything stateside forces do . . .
    plus they build relationships; assure, deter, and dissuade, provide
    operational flexibility, ensure global access, provide our forces
    multinational training opportunities, and build partner capacity at a
    marginal cost.
        Additionally, with Army force generation requirements and rotation
    goals, maintaining these additional BCTs in Europe reduces deployment
    stress on the Army's BCTs. Maintaining the four BCTs in theater ensures
    a BCT in ready status for contingency operations and security
    cooperation activities while another is in reset and the remaining two
    are deploying, redeploying and/or conducting out-of-area operations.

        3. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, if these units remain on the
    continent, what is your assessment of the condition of the facilities
    that will house them and whether you have adequate facilities to
    conduct the necessary training to maintain these units?
        Admiral Stavridis. If retained, the 170th Infantry Brigade and
    172nd Infantry Brigade will remain stationed at their current
    locations. The 170th Infantry Brigade is at Baumholder, Germany, and
    the 172nd Infantry Brigade will complete consolidation at Grafenwohr,
    Germany, by the end of 2010. Facilities at both locations are generally
    in very good condition and suitable to meet unit requirements; however,
    a significant portion of the Military Family Housing at Baumholder is
    in need of recapitalization. Accordingly, U.S. Army Installation
    Management Command Europe began execution of a multi-year housing
    recapitalization program in fiscal year 2010. It is important to note
    that Baumholder will remain an enduring location even if the 170th
    Infantry Brigade returns to the CONUS.
        Training areas currently available to these units are world class.
    Both Baumholder and Grafenwohr have their own maneuver and training
    areas where the BCTs can conduct all required training. In addition,
    the Joint Maneuver Training Center (JMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany,
    provides the same fully instrumented training capability as the
    National Training Center in Fort Irwin. The Grafenwohr/JMTC training
    facilities were originally designed for a much larger number of forces
    than there will be with just four BCTs. Those four BCTs will have far
    more opportunity to conduct combined and collective training than CONUS
    units waiting their turn for National Training Center or Joint
    Readiness Training Center. Additionally, our European based U.S. forces
    train with their European partners utilizing both U.S. controlled and
    host nation facilities.

                           nuclear posture in europe
        4. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, as NATO continues its work on
    a new Strategic Concept, do you see any consensus developing on the
    future role, if there is one, for nuclear weapons in NATO?
        Admiral Stavridis. The future role of nuclear weapons in NATO is
    being discussed as part of the Strategic Concept deliberations. We
    expect the new Strategic Concept to be released this Fall. Until its
    release, I cannot speculate on what the final document will state.

                  al qaeda in the land of the islamic maghreb
        5. Senator Levin. General Ward, the failed Christmas Day airline
    bombing reminded the counterterrorism community that al Qaeda is not an
    organization limited to the rugged terrain of Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    but is a global terrorist organization with an insatiable desire to
    strike targets anywhere they can. In northwest Africa, U.S. Africa
    Command (AFRICOM) is dealing with one of al Qaeda's affiliate
    organizations, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
    Governments in northwest Africa have not demonstrated a consistent
    commitment to work on a regional basis to combat this threat. This
    provides AQIM with a broader operational space. Would you say the
    ambitions of AQIM are different from those of al Qaeda in Pakistan or
    al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?
        General Ward. There is no fundamental difference in the ambitions
    of AQIM and al Qaeda elements in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula.
    Both groups devote significant energy towards attempting to overthrow
    apostate governments in their respective regions. The distinction
    between the organizations is a difference in operational capability,
    focus, and tactics.

             Since merging with al Qaeda on 11 September 2006, AQIM
            has emerged as al Qaeda's regional arm in North Africa and the
            Sahel. This transformation has been reflected in AQIM's
            tactics, ideology, and propaganda, which now more closely align
            with those of al Qaeda. Although AQIM remains intent on
            targeting the Algerian Government and other regional
            governments--especially Mauritania-AQIM is increasingly
            targeting Western interests, as evidenced by recent kidnappings
            in Mali.
             AQIM aspires to conduct operations outside of Africa
            but has yet to demonstrate a significant capacity to project
            force beyond its traditional operating areas in North Africa
            and the Sahel.
             Over the next year, AQIM will likely concentrate on
            expanding the group's operational reach in North Africa, the
            Sahel, and West Africa.
             AQIM has limited influence in Europe and no known
            capability in the United States. However, AQIM is willing to
            support operational planning in Europe and may be willing to
            support operational planning in the United States if the
            opportunity arises.

        6. Senator Levin. General Ward, what is your assessment of the
    prospects for regional counterterrorism cooperation in northwest
    Africa?
        General Ward. [Deleted.]

        7. Senator Levin. General Ward, what programs has AFRICOM initiated
    to address this burgeoning threat, and are they adequately resourced?
        General Ward. [Deleted.]

                                    somalia
        8. Senator Levin. General Ward, much of the training assistance
    provided today is through the African Union Mission to the Transitional
    Federal Government in Somalia. Very little, if any, assistance is
    provided to Somaliland and Puntland forces. Do you see a role for
    AFRICOM in providing train-and-equip assistance either directly or via
    contractors to Somaliland or Puntland?
        General Ward. [Deleted.]

                       program for small unit excellence
        9. Senator Levin. General Mattis, last year U.S. Joint Forces
    Command (JFCOM) began the Program for Small Unit Excellence which
    focuses on specialized training for squad- and fire team-sized elements
    as well as developing better concepts and researching small unit
    training. How does the Program for Small Unit Excellence differ from
    what is already being conducted by the Services and to what extent are
    the Services already conducting squad- and fire-team level training?
        General Mattis. JFCOM did not institute a Small Unit Excellence
    program in 2010 because the programmed funding was not appropriated in
    the fiscal year 2010 Appropriations Bill. JFCOM acknowledges the
    outstanding work the Services are doing in preparing small units for
    ground combat, but also recognizes the Irregular Warfare (IW)
    environment places unique demands on the tactical, behavioral, and
    ethical decisionmaking capabilities of small units. While the Services
    continue to perform squad and fire-team level training, JFCOM seeks to
    complement Service training by providing a joint context, amplifying
    the exposure of small units and their leaders to joint command and
    control; joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and
    joint fires. The goal is to develop small units who are knowledgeable
    of employment of the full array of joint capabilities to defeat the
    enemy, while also improving small unit cognitive competencies,
    increasing individual survivability, decreasing ethical missteps in
    combat, and bolstering psychological resilience.

        10. Senator Levin. General Mattis, how has JFCOM been able to
    rapidly field immersive infantry trainers and simulators with realistic
    environments and how can such trainers and simulators improve small-
    team close combat effectiveness?
        General Mattis. Presently, JFCOM is working closely with the
    Services to support their efforts to field immersive infantry trainers
    and simulators that possess realistic environments that are fully
    integrated with joint enablers such as joint ISR and joint fires
    platforms. JFCOM has partnered with the USMC to integrate real-world
    Afghan terrain data into an immersive simulator, the USMC-developed
    Virtual Battlespace version 2 (VBS2). In turn JFCOM also fielded the
    terrain data capability to a Fort Bragg-based Army unit in preparation
    for their upcoming deployment to Afghanistan.
        As the combatant command sponsor for the Future Immersive Training
    Environment (FITE) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD),
    JFCOM has initiated a program to holistically integrate technological
    advances across the DOD to create capabilities focused on immersive
    infantry trainers and close-combat simulators. These capabilities will
    enable resource efficient solutions that replicate the effects and
    conditions of the operational environment.
        On March 8, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed out a letter
    directing the Department to immediately develop a state-of-the-art
    simulation capability for training of ground forces to meet the urgent
    requirements demanded by the current fight. This letter specifically
    directs JFCOM to contribute to the integration efforts in the
    development of this capability, while also providing the joint context
    (joint C2, joint ISR, joint fires) to the creation of the virtual
    environments. JFCOM will also work with the Joint Improvised Explosive
    Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to focus on incorporation of the
    counter IED challenge.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
                              supplemental request
        11. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis, there is a $20 billion
    supplemental request for fiscal year 2010 in addition to $102.2 billion
    Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request for fiscal year 2011. If
    the supplemental is being replaced by the OCO request, then why is
    there such a large disparity?
        Admiral Stavridis. The answer to this question is more
    appropriately answered by the Department of the Army or Office of
    Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller.

                          theater engagement strategy
        12. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis and General Ward, theater
    engagement seems to be a major tool used by combatant commands when
    partnering with the Nations within each of your areas of responsibility
    (AORs). What assets do you have and where are they located?
        Admiral Stavridis and General Ward. U.S. Marine Corps Forces
    Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and U.S.
    Army Europe, as well as EUCOMs' functional subordinate unified command
    for special operations, Special Operations Command Europe, are
    responsible for supporting our Theater Campaign Plan and implementing
    our Theater Security Cooperation programs across the region. The
    Service Components provide the capabilities necessary to engage with
    and build military capacity among our partners and Allies. These forces
    are located on nineteen Main Operating Bases, twelve Forward Operating
    Sites and seven Cooperative Security Locations across the European
    continent. EUCOM's ability to operate from locations in Germany, Italy,
    England, Benelux, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Greenland, Turkey, Portugal,
    Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland creates openings for the United States to
    work together with allies and partners on shared regional and global
    security opportunities and challenges.

        13. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis, how is the National Guard's
    State Partnership Program integrated into your theater engagement
    strategy?
        Admiral Stavridis. The National Guard State Partnership Program is
    completely integrated into EUCOM's theater engagement strategy. The
    National Guard is the force provider for the State Partnership Program
    and is critical for supporting and strengthening regional security and
    stability in 21 partner nations in EUCOM's area of focus. The State
    Partnership Program accounts for over 35 percent of all military-to-
    military engagements in EUCOM's area of focus and is mightily engaged
    in civil security cooperation.

                           nato's role in afghanistan
        14. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis, in your predecessor's 2009
    posture statement, building partner capacity is a means for providing
    flexible response to this broad spectrum of threats. NATO continues to
    work with EUCOM to support partnership efforts with its member nations
    and former Warsaw pact nations. Will NATO play a greater role in the
    ongoing efforts in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Stavridis. NATO already plays a huge role in Afghanistan
    and our Allies continue to make additional contributions. Right now,
    there are almost 40,000 non-U.S. troops in AFG as part of the
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). We have also had a
    recent surge of commitments from our Allies following the President's
    announcement of the new strategy for Afghanistan. So far, the non-U.S.
    additional pledges total 9,500.
        NATO has also provided over a thousand trainers, which are critical
    to increasing Afghan capacity to lead their own efforts. European
    Allies and partners provide approximately 50 percent of the Operational
    Mentor and Liaison Teams required to train the Afghan National Army.
    Also, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland have already
    deployed Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams to train Afghan
    National Police.
        Our Allies also hold key leadership positions and carry significant
    regional authority throughout ISAF. For example, Germany leads RC-
    North, Italy leads RC-West, and Turkey leads RC-Capital. The
    Netherlands, Canada, and the United Kingdom have rotational
    responsibility for RC-South.
        In addition to this direct support to combat and training, our
    Allies are also contributing to stability and development efforts in
    Afghanistan through participation in Provincial Reconstruction Teams
    and other civilian and private ventures throughout the country.

        15. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis, will NATO lessen their
    national level caveats for forces they deploy to Afghanistan to allow
    them to take a more active role in combat operations?
        Admiral Stavridis. Caveats are imposed and controlled by individual
    NATO member countries in response to their internal political
    situation. Overall, the trend is positive. We have 22 of 43 nations
    completely caveat-free. There are 56 total caveats, down from 83 since
    April 2008. The caveats are not a significant impediment to operations
    in AFG. That said, I am committed to engaging NATO members and partners
    to reduce or remove caveats on their forces. It is my expectation that
    the positive trends concerning caveats will continue and provide
    COMISAF with greater operational flexibility.

                    providing services to africom personnel
        16. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis, are there any significant
    impacts of providing various military and family services to AFRICOM
    personnel by the various military communities that are currently under
    your control?
        Admiral Stavridis. U.S. EUCOM partners with our Stuttgart neighbor,
    U.S. AFRICOM, in a tenant support relationship which extends services
    to staff and families who call Germany their home away from home.
        We also collaborate with U.S. AFRICOM on an Executive Agency level
    through our naval component, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, who oversees
    previously brokered longstanding cross service agreements which support
    the infrastructure needs of Camp Lemonier in Djibouti from which
    Commander, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) operates.

                                   personnel
        17. Senator Burris. General Ward, AFRICOM is the newest unified
    command and has been fully operational capable since October 2008. As
    of October 2009, you also have approximately 1,200 personnel in your
    headquarters. Do you have enough personnel in your headquarters to
    provide adequate staff and command oversight over the missions within
    your AOR?
        General Ward. U.S. AFRICOM is an economy of force operation. We
    have a relatively small staff in Stuttgart compared to the amount of
    activity the command is tasked to oversee on a daily basis. The
    personnel assigned to our headquarters on manpower documents include
    the sub-Unified Command Special Operations Command-Africa as well as
    all military assigned to support our ambassadors in our African
    embassies. As we build our programs and capabilities in support of
    engagement on the continent, we continue to assess our needs for
    manpower, anticipating additional personnel requirements.

        18. Senator Burris. General Ward, what personnel from other
    Government agencies are part of your permanent staff?
        General Ward.

             There are 27 interagency personnel integrated across
            the command in long-term assignments.
             Five members are Senior Executive, or Senior Foreign
            Service personnel with strategic decisionmaking roles.
             The remaining 22 personnel are GS-15 equivalent or
            junior personnel, and are embedded within the headquarters
            planning staff.
             They provide subject-matter expertise to the planning
            process.
             Currently, there are 15 interagency personnel
            temporarily assigned to the command to support specific
            planning events.
             U.S. AFRICOM, through the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
            has requested an additional 33 personnel from other U.S.
            Government departments and agencies to support the command.

                                     egypt
        19. Senator Burris. General Ward, will Egypt eventually transition
    from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to your AOR?
        General Ward. There are no immediate plans to transfer Egypt from
    CENTCOM to U.S. AFRICOM. The Unified Command Plan (UCP), which
    addresses the boundaries of Combatant Commands, is reviewed every 2
    years. This formal UCP review process affords us ample opportunity to
    review and modify the existing arrangement with regard to Egypt should
    we believe a change is necessary. Currently AFRICOM has a standing
    memorandum of understanding (MOU) with CENTCOM whereby AFRICOM goals
    and objectives on the continent vis-a-vis Egypt are addressed directly
    with Egypt in close coordination with the Office of Military
    Cooperation-Egypt. We have conducted senior leader visits, participated
    in the US-Egypt Military Cooperation Council, and have held action
    officer-level planning meetings to continue to develop our engagement
    with the Egyptians.

                  risk involved in accomplishing mission sets
        20. Senator Burris. General Ward, AFRICOM's AOR encompasses 53
    countries and water space that equates to the over four times the size
    of the CONUS. How would you describe the risk involved in accomplishing
    your various mission sets?
        General Ward. [Deleted.]

                        partnership with african nations
        21. Senator Burris. General Ward, AFRICOM was designed to employ a
    whole-of-government approach to executing theater security cooperation,
    and to facilitate counterterrorism efforts with the African nations.
    How has the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
    program assisted in this effort?
        General Ward. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
    (ACOTA) is an extremely important engagement tool for building military
    capacity and professionalism-both of which are essential ingredients
    for executing theater security cooperation and in developing forces
    capable of successful counterterrorism efforts. Focused on developing
    self-sustaining peacekeeping training programs with African partner
    nations, ACOTA enables African partners to support UN and AU
    peacekeeping missions and, as a by-product, directly supports
    USAFRICOM's theater security cooperation goals and objectives.
        Through the development of peacekeeping units and partner capacity
    to train their own peacekeepers, ACOTA training directly supports DOD's
    Guidance for Employment of the Force theater strategic end states for
    Africa:

             To enable African countries to provide their own
            security and contribute to security on the continent;
             To assist African countries maintain professional
            militaries that respond to civilian authorities, respect the
            rule of law and abide by international human rights norms.

        In addition to training with partners throughout Africa, ACOTA is
    being used to develop National Peace Mission Training Centers (PMTCs).
    This investment in training centers will allow our partners to develop
    the capacity to generate their own peacekeeping units, and eventually
    develop the ability to sustain those forces when deployed.
        AFRICOM coordinates closely with the Department of State (DOS) as
    ACOTA partners are identified and looks for ways to supplement ACOTA
    training with uniformed U.S. military servicemembers. Much of ACOTA's
    equipping programs are coordinated through AFRICOM's Offices of
    Security Cooperation.

        22. Senator Burris. General Ward, what countries are prime
    candidates for a successful Security Sector Reform (SSR) program?
        General Ward. DOS has the lead for SSR. A successful SSR requires a
    comprehensive analysis and approach. U.S. AFRICOM, in cooperation with
    the DOS, examines countries for the attributes that may lead to
    successful SSR and Defense Sector Reform (DSR) efforts.
        Those attributes include, but are not limited to: (1) the country
    is of strategic importance to the United States; (2) the country in
    question is committed to reform and is ready to take ownership of
    reform programs with which the U.S. and other partners will assist; (3)
    the level of resources required to conduct SSR/DSR can be met by the
    recipient and donor nations; (4) the recipient is also making
    improvements in other sectors of the government necessary for
    successful SSR/DSR such as the justice sector and interior ministry;
    (5) the potential recipient has the ability to sustain reforms in the
    future.
        We are pleased with the progress in Armed Forces of Liberia given
    the level of U.S. Government investment there, but remained concerned
    about other elements of the Liberia's security sector such as its
    police forces and its inability to secure its maritime domain. Our
    collaborative efforts, with the State Department may well be a model
    for SSR efforts of similar scale elsewhere on the continent. AFRICOM's
    Defense Sector Reform effort with Liberia, Operation Onward Liberty,
    provides experienced military mentors to the nascent Armed Forces of
    Liberia. We're also working to help develop a Liberian Coast Guard that
    will enhance maritime domain awareness to address illicit trafficking
    while providing maritime security and safety. The Secretary's Defense
    Institution Reform Initiative is assessing the requirement for
    ministerial-level reform efforts and is equipped to provide skilled
    mentors if necessary. Taken as a whole, the successes we've realized in
    Liberia is a result of a whole-of-government approach with a willing
    partner.
        However, in some cases we may be directed to initiate limited SSR
    activities in environments where our prospects of success may be less
    certain, such as Southern Sudan and Somalia. AFRICOM will continue to
    provide our best military advice and support to all SSR efforts in
    which we participate.

        23. Senator Burris. General Ward, what are some examples where the
    military-to-military engagement has led to enhancing the
    professionalism of any of the African partner nations?
        General Ward. Support to the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff
    College (EDCSC) has been one of the U.S. Government's most successful
    security engagement programs in Ethiopia, allowing U.S. military daily
    access to and influence over future ENDF leaders. The U.S. provides
    three O-5 instructors to the EDCSC via the Foreign Military Financing
    program. In an attempt to increase Ethiopian ownership, these U.S.
    officers are assuming an advisory role to Ethiopian instructors and our
    presence will scale back to two senior assistants to the Commandant in
    fiscal year 2011 and one senior assistant to the Commandant in fiscal
    year 2012.
        U.S. AFRICOM supports efforts to improve the capabilities of the
    Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in accordance with the U.S.
    Strategy for Sudan. Through AFRICOM's Military Advisor to the SPLA and
    Security Assistance Program Manager in Juba, the Command conducts mil-
    to-mil events, Counterterrorism Fellowship-funded seminars,
    International Military Education and Training (IMET) courses and
    mentor/advisor training. Cross-functional military familiarization
    events with the SPLA have been conducted on a variety of topics to
    include: border/riverine security; military intelligence; HIV/AIDS
    programs and stockpile management. Additionally, Noncommissioned
    Officer (NCO) development is one area of focus for the Command. CJTF-
    HOA currently has eight NCOs deployed to the NCO Academy in Mapel,
    Southern Sudan for 1 year to assist in training and mentoring the SPLA
    instructors.
        In fiscal year 2009, U.S. AFRICOM engaged over 800 African military
    intelligence partners in a variety of seminars, familiarizations, and
    conferences designed to instill military intelligence professionalism
    and further enhance bilateral relationships. This investment in
    training and capacity building will pay dividends as these graduates
    begin to assume key positions in partner country military units. In
    fiscal year 2010, U.S. AFRICOM expects to reach approximately 1,500
    military intelligence participants in these events.

             U.S. AFRICOM has trained 106 African partners in the
            Military Intelligence Basic Officers Course and 42 in the
            Military Intelligence Professionals Course.

        24. Senator Burris. General Ward, what is the future role of Joint
    Task Force-Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) and the military base in Djibouti?
        General Ward. [Deleted.]

        25. Senator Burris. General Ward, are there any plans to have a
    greater presence in your AOR, beyond JTF-HOA?
        General Ward. [Deleted.]

                          role as joint force provider
        26. Senator Burris. General Mattis, your role as the Joint Force
    Provider makes you responsible for providing forces to all commands and
    agencies in the Department of Defense (DOD) and other Government
    agencies throughout the world. What are the challenges you face meeting
    the requests in a timely fashion?
        General Mattis. During fiscal year 2010, JFCOM identified and
    assigned over 480,000 personnel to fulfill Combatant Commander (CCDR)
    requirements. These 480,000 personnel represent over 90 percent of the
    overall CCDR requests. The main challenge is fulfilling the final 10
    percent of CCDR requirements.
        Shortfalls fall into one of four general areas: lack of capability,
    lack of inventory, policy restriction, or lack of process architecture.
    When JFCOM receives a request for a capability that does not exist,
    units may be temporarily converted from one core mission to fill
    another. An example might be tasking an artillery unit to fill a CCDR
    requirement for a security forces unit. Units temporarily converted
    along these lines are designated ``In-Lieu-Of ``(ILO) sourcing
    solutions. In some situations, JFCOM builds new units from the ground
    up by moving individual personnel from several standing units to form a
    new `unit' to meet CCDR requirements. These are designated ``Ad Hoc''
    units. Sourcing CCDR requirements using either ILO or Ad Hoc units
    requires time and training to ensure the unit has the ability to
    accomplish the desired mission. JFCOM also participates in a force
    sufficiency process to address requirements for cases where a
    capability exists, but in insufficient numbers to satisfy overall CCDR
    demand.
        Department and personnel policy sometimes constrains force
    providing. DOD and Service personnel deployment policies exist to
    maintain the long-term morale, health, and welfare of the force, while
    others exist to ensure undue hardship is not placed on the force or
    that personnel or equipment are not unnecessarily placed at risk.
    Examples of policies impacting force-providing include: Boots on the
    Ground (BOG) limits (limitations on deployment duration) and dwell
    requirements (minimum time at home between deployments). These policies
    can constrain the force supply to meet CCDR demand for forces, but
    these policy restrictions also ensure that short term requirements do
    not supersede the maintenance and long term health of the force
    requirements.
        Though improvements have been made, the processes and technical
    capabilities required for force management continue to challenge the
    force providing mission. Since being assigned the mission, JFCOM has
    established a Force Management Integration Project (FMIP) Team to
    develop and execute a plan to integrate and synchronize policy,
    processes, authoritative databases and technology affecting Joint Force
    sourcing and Global Force Management (GFM). While challenges will
    inevitably continue to arise, the improving processes, policies and
    technical capabilities working together are producing a robust global
    force management capability for the Department.

        27. Senator Burris. General Mattis, what other Government agencies,
    other than the military, do you provide forces to?
        General Mattis. While JFCOM provides forces to Geographic Combatant
    Commanders, many of those forces support other Government agencies
    while under the operational control of a CCDR. As an example, JFCOM
    provides forces to USNORTHCOM for their use in direct support of the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS). JFCOM provided forces to USSOUTHCOM for their
    use in direct support of USAID in Haiti following the earthquake. JFCOM
    does not provide forces directly to other Government agencies, but
    forces provided to CCDRs do perform missions in direct support of other
    agency missions.

                            joint qualified services
        28. Senator Burris. General Mattis, what percentage of the Military
    Services are joint qualified?
        General Mattis. USD P&R is responsible for the policy of Joint
    Officer Management and the Joint Staff J1 is involved in tracking joint
    qualified officers. JFCOM does not track the numbers of joint qualified
    members across the Services. I have passed your question to the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. A copy of my letter
    to him is next under.

        29. Senator Burris. General Mattis, if there are disparities in the
    joint education opportunities between Active and Reserve component
    forces, what are they?
        General Mattis. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
    Services can probably provide a more thorough response as they control
    all phases of Joint Professional Military Education. Steps have been
    taken to increase the opportunities for members of the Reserve
    Component (RC) to receive joint education. Advanced Joint Professional
    Military Education (AJPME) is a RC course taught at Joint Forces Staff
    College (JFSC) that is similar in content to the in-residence JFSC JPME
    Phase II course. It is only offered to RC officers. As a pre-requisite
    AJPME students must have completed JPME Phase I. The subsequent AJPME
    course then builds upon the foundation established in JPME Phase I. It
    prepares RC officers (O-4 to O-6) for joint duty assignments. RC
    officers may complete AJPME in lieu of JPME Phase II. In addition to
    AJPME, RC officers are still provided quotas in the JPME Phase II
    course.

                          mission readiness exercises
        30. Senator Burris. General Mattis, how are mission readiness
    exercises value-added to deploying commanders and staffs?
        General Mattis. JFCOM's mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) program
    addresses the mission-essential training requirements for commanders
    and staffs deploying to Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa. JFCOM
    is partnered with ISAF, USF-I and AFRICOM in designing, planning, and
    executing each MRX event to ensure MRX training reinforces existing
    theater policies and guidance. The formal and informal feedback from
    training audiences indicates a high level of satisfaction with the
    MRXs.
        JFCOM's forward deployed support elements, Joint Center for
    Operational Analysis (JCOA) teams, Joint Enabling Capability Command
    elements, and Deployable Training Teams all undergird the MRX program
    with timely training requirement feedback. When enemy tactics and
    techniques shift, or theater Commander policies or command and staff
    processes and procedures change, JFCOM captures these insights and
    lessons learned through persistent interfaces. For example, during the
    recent MRX at Fort Campbell for the 101st ABN (AASLT) Division, MRX
    planners dynamically introduced vignettes that drove the commander and
    staff to work through ISAF Commander's most recent night raid
    directive, which was published 2 days prior to start of the MRX.
        The Afghanistan training community of interest (COI) meets biweekly
    and is comprised of participants from across the Joint Training
    Enterprise. The COI provides the latest updates and training
    recommendations for troops deploying into theater during these
    sessions. COI issues such as reduction of civilian casualties,
    escalation/de-escalation of force and rules of engagement have been
    incorporated into the MRX program. JFCOM is currently working with ISAF
    planners to ensure the latest guidance regarding development and
    leverage of the Afghanistan Mission Network is being built into the MRX
    program. This will ensure commanders and staffs, and subordinate units
    and their equipment are properly set and aligned during pre-deployment
    training for theater specific C\4\I interoperability requirements.
        MRXs are conducted in partnership with DOD, U.S. Government, and
    multi-national partners to continuously exchange and incorporate
    theater lessons learned and training requirements. During the most
    recent MRX for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the commander
    and staff were able to work with the actual French and Polish Brigades
    who will be joining them in theater, and also with the Afghanistan Army
    Brigade Commanders and staffs who will operate in their sector. Also
    personnel from over 30 different agencies participated in the mission
    rehearsal.

                          multi-national collaboration
        31. Senator Burris. General Mattis, what is your role in providing
    multi-national collaboration to NATO and non-NATO nations?
        General Mattis. The multi-national program at JFCOM fulfills the
    command's Unified Command Plan responsibility to support multi-national
    integration of joint training, concept development and experimentation,
    and capability development. JFCOM provides a joint context for multi-
    national collaboration. JFCOM's geographic co-location with NATO's
    Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, VA, continues to
    facilitate opportunities for JFCOM to be actively engaged with NATO's
    training, experimentation, and capability development efforts.
        In addition to NATO, JFCOM's current multi-national program
    consists of bilateral agreements with 19 partner nations represented by
    29 liaison and exchange officers. Another 14 nations have requested
    partnership with JFCOM. Their agreements are in various stages of
    review. These agreements forge military-to-military relationships that
    create greater opportunities for training, concept development and
    experimentation, and capability development, all within a joint context
    provided by JFCOM. These agreements also build operational
    interoperability with foreign militaries and trust.

                                 joint training
        32. Senator Burris. General Mattis, I understand that in order to
    train a joint warrior, joint education and training has to be a core
    competency for the command. What technology and tools are you employing
    to better facilitate joint training?
        General Mattis. Primarily, communications technology enables JFCOM
    to conduct training in a distributed manner by moving data instead of
    people, thus saving cost and time. The Joint Training and
    Experimentation Network (JTEN) is a communications technology tool that
    provides persistent long-haul network connectivity for the following
    types of joint training information: scenario data, live-range data,
    Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance data, exercise control information,
    voice communications (operational and exercise control), video
    teleconferencing (VTC), e-mail, and after-action reporting data.
    Opposing force technology ensures enemy forces are accurately
    replicated and portrayed in training. Modeling and Simulation (M&S)
    technology enables JFCOM to integrate joint enablers into joint
    training to overcome constraints of time, distance, and resource
    availability. JFCOM also relies on M&S to support the joint warfighter
    in the areas of testing, training, and experimentation.
        JFCOM fields, maintains and continuously enhances the Joint
    Knowledge Online (JKO) distance learning capability to provide online
    training for U.S. and multi-national command, interagency, and
    intergovernmental partner personnel preparing for joint operations.
    Online training courses and curriculums are tailored to areas of
    deployment including Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. The
    combatant commands and other stakeholders are also actively engaged in
    shaping JKO to meet their ongoing operational training needs. Recently,
    JFCOM introduced a targeted culture awareness training application
    utilizing immersive, media-rich training technologies. Also in
    development is a cultural trainer for Afghanistan. This web-based,
    game-based system trains language translation in the context of
    specific mission scenarios, each of which were identified by subject
    matter experts with direct experience in the respective region.

        33. Senator Burris. General Mattis, is there a timeline for getting
    military personnel joint trained? If so, what is that timeline?
        General Mattis. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness, the Services, and Joint Staff J1 maintain and monitor the
    Joint Officer Management Program. This program provides guidance on the
    timing of officers meeting gates and criteria to attain different
    levels of joint qualification, which includes training and education.
        For the past decade, JFCOM has supported senior leader education in
    the form of Operations Modules for the NDU-sponsored Capstone,
    Keystone, and Pinnacle programs. While these programs and other forms
    of Joint Professional Military Education address officer development,
    JFCOM sees a growing requirement for joint skills and competencies at
    ever lower tactical echelons, requiring Service personnel to receive
    joint training earlier in their careers and at lower ranks.
        There is no single, all encompassing timeline for getting joint
    training to all levels of military personnel, nor is there a mechanism
    to displace critical Service training requirements with joint training
    requirements. Any timelines for training are driven by deployment
    schedules as well as the throughput capacity of training centers and
    schools. JFCOM is working to identify that specific joint knowledge,
    and those skills and abilities that are required at lower Service
    echelons and are developing tailored methods to ensure that the
    appropriate personnel receive required joint training. Depending on the
    nature of the required skills and the specific audience that requires
    training, this individual training may be accomplished through
    distributed training employing our Joint Knowledge Online (JKO)
    courses, through support to Service training programs leveraging the
    Joint National Training capability, or through the mission rehearsal
    exercise program and support to the Combatant Command exercise program.

                          expeditionary civilian force
        34. Senator Burris. General Mattis, you have completed draft
    doctrine, education, and employment principles for interagency
    operations and integration. One of your working concepts is to stand up
    an Expeditionary Civilian Force. What is the mission and employment of
    the Expeditionary Civilian Force?
        General Mattis. The DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) is a
    program implemented and administered by the OSD. The purpose/mission of
    the program is to establish a DOD civilian workforce that is organized,
    trained, and equipped to ensure their readiness to deploy in support of
    Department of Defense contingency operations including emergency
    operations, humanitarian missions, disaster relief, restoration of
    order, drug interdiction and stability operations. CEW has provided a
    useful pool of willing professionals to JFCOM force providers to
    satisfy some CCDR requirements.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                         building partnership capacity
        35. Senator McCain. General Ward, with respect to the interagency
    or legislation, what is the greatest obstacle your command faces in
    building partnership capacity on the continent?
        General Ward. Our greatest obstacle is, in a word, responsiveness.
    When our African partners request training, assistance or material from
    AFRICOM, with the exception of natural disaster and/or humanitarian
    crises, we are unable to respond in a timely manner.
        In many cases, our African partners' governmental institutions have
    not developed to the point where planning for an exercise or engagement
    at a relatively distant point in the future is a simple matter. Often,
    when we receive assistance requests from our partners, they desire to
    engage with us in the near term-in a matter of weeks, or only as far
    out as several months from the request. Planning a year or more in
    advance is generally not possible for many of our partners due to
    financial instability or other reasons. The U.S. Government mechanisms
    currently in place to provide funding and/or authority for security
    cooperation activities are not responsive or flexible enough to meet
    partner nation's time-lines. In addition, AFRICOM does not yet have
    immediate access to assigned or rotationally allocated forces, and is
    required to use DOD's global force management/request for forces
    system, which requires long lead times. As global demand for forces
    eases in the coming years, we believe the Command will see improvement
    in its ability to access responsive forces. For example, the U.S.
    Marine Corps is working to provide the command a special purpose task
    force to carry out the command's steady state activities on the
    continent. The U.S. Army is likewise seeking to identify BCTs to
    routinely make available for security force assistance.
        The Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund is our most responsive
    funding source; however, it is extremely limited in funding and overall
    flexibility. Other frequently used options are Section 1206 funding,
    which may require a full year from request to execution, and Title 22
    programs, such as Foreign Military Finance and International Military
    Education and Training (IMET), which may require 2 or more years from
    request to execution.
        AFRICOM's inability to respond quickly to partner needs may
    increase risk to enhance the capacity of our partner nations and
    organizations in Africa. We are working closely with the Joint Staff,
    OSD, and our partners in DOS to develop solutions to these challenges.

        36. Senator McCain. General Ward, over the past decade, the African
    Union has taken on several difficult missions (e.g. Sudan, Somalia, and
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Given the demands on U.S.
    troops, how will AFRICOM enhance its partnerships and build greater
    professionalism among the continent's militaries?
        General Ward. AFRICOM has several title 10- and 22-funded tools at
    its disposal to build professionalism and enhance partnerships.

             The DOS funded Africa Contingency Operations Training
            and Assistance (ACOTA) is an extremely important engagement
            tool for building military capacity and professionalism and for
            developing forces capable of conducting successful peacekeeping
            efforts. We partner with DOS to the extent possible in
            implementing ACOTA.
             We will build partner capacity through the
            International Military Education and Training (IMET) program,
            which trains foreign military personnel at U.S. facilities.
            Approximately 900 military and civilian students from 44
            African countries received education and training in the United
            States or their own countries valued at $19.8 million. It
            remains the premier program in building professionalism over
            the long term.
             Additionally, we will select carefully and assist
            African partners to train and mentor other African militaries.
             We provide partner nations with the opportunity to
            participate in the Africa Partnership Station (APS) and the
            Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP)-key
            programs aimed at developing the capabilities of coastal
            forces.
             We have expanded the National Guard State Partnership
            Program to eight African countries, a program that builds
            habitual relationships over a sustained period while delivering
            broad capacity building programs.
             We also conduct a vigorous series of exercises that
            have continued to grow in magnitude. These programs build the
            capacity of the participants, improve our partnerships, and
            enhance partner activities between participating African states
            as well.
             Additionally, our military-to-military engagement
            program was funded at less than $500,000 in fiscal year 2004,
            but has now expanded to $6.3 million for fiscal year 2010 with
            431 events planned in 40 countries. This program assists
            partners in improving deployment procedures, logistics systems,
            maintenance operations, force protection, and the conduct of
            their own training.
             U.S. AFRICOM addresses African intelligence capability
            challenges through bilateral and regional training, emphasizing
            respect for the rule of law and civilian authority.

                              resources and forces
        37. Senator McCain. General Ward, with personnel primarily located
    in Germany and Djibouti, are you comfortable with AFRICOM's ability to
    execute a noncombatant evacuation operation anywhere on the continent?
        General Ward. A successful noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO)
    requires a well-trained combatant command staff, defined and rehearsed
    procedures that have been coordinated with U.S. embassies, and the
    forces necessary to carry out the actual operation on the ground. The
    Command has developed the staff skills required, and has developed a
    NEO plan. Two of the Command's Service components--Naval Forces Africa
    and U.S. Army Africa--are capable, with some augmentation, of
    successfully directing Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in our AOR.
    Finally, while U.S. AFRICOM has not been assigned dedicated forces, in
    the event of a NEO the Department of Defense would make the required
    forces immediately available to the Command.

        38. Senator McCain. General Ward, are your component commands
    adequately staffed and resourced to execute AFRICOM's mission?
        General Ward. The Services' efforts to staff our Service components
    appropriately continues. For example, the U.S. Army has designated U.S.
    Army Africa as an Army Service component and is working to round out
    the manning. Both the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army are seeking
    to have security force capacity building assets routinely identified in
    support of AFRICOM. The U.S. Navy's commitment in support of the Africa
    Partnership Station program remains firm. The U.S. Air Force has
    methodically supported U.S. Air Forces Africa requirements in
    resourcing the 17th Air Force and associated air operations
    requirements. Given global demands for forces, the Services are also
    doing their best to support requests for forces required to carry out
    our theater security cooperation activities and our named operations.
    Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa is adequately staffed to
    conduct its assigned missions.

                          u.s. army posture in europe
        39. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, the 2009 QDR recommends
    keeping four U.S. Army BCTs in Europe, pending the review of NATO's
    Strategic Concept and an accompanying U.S. assessment of our European
    defense posture. This recommendation is a change from the 2003
    Integrated Global Posture Review, which called for most Europe-based
    BCTs return to the United States, leaving two BCTS in Europe--one in
    Germany and one in Italy. If a decision is made to keep two additional
    BCTs in Europe, where will they be stationed?
        Admiral Stavridis. The two brigades in question are the 170th
    Infantry Brigade, currently home stationed in Baumholder, Germany, and
    the 172nd Infantry Brigade which will be consolidated in Grafenwoehr,
    Germany, by the end of this year. If they are permanently retained,
    they will remain stationed at these locations. Both of these
    installations contain excellent training ranges and maneuver areas.

        40. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, regarding the review of
    NATO's Strategic Concept, to what degree will Army BCTs in Europe
    support NATO missions and qualify for funding support under the NATO
    Security Investment Program?
        Admiral Stavridis. Ground forces in Europe will continue to support
    NATO as part of any Article V action. Additionally, forces assigned to
    EUCOM are part of the global force pool and will deploy as ordered to
    support any global requirement as determined by the department's global
    force management process, which includes such operations as those under
    the ISAF. Furthermore, U.S. Army Europe forces located in Europe in
    between their out-of-area deployments are available for training and
    security cooperation events with our NATO allies and aspiring NATO
    members; these activities are part of the Building Partner Capacity
    priority for EUCOM, and encourage the development of NATO partners to
    increase capability and capacity for expeditionary operations in
    support of global security strategies.
        To be eligible for funding support under the NATO Security
    Investment Program, requirements must be linked to an approved NATO
    capability package. Requirements supporting Army BCTs in Europe cannot
    be readily linked to any existing capability packages. NATO's evolving
    role in out of area operations and the ongoing review of the NATO
    Strategic Concept may present an opportunity for development of new or
    revised capability packages that open the door to NATO funding of Army
    BCT requirements.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                            european missile defense
        41. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, the Phased Adaptive
    Approach to missile defense in Europe calls for fielding land-based SM-
    3 Block IB missiles in Europe starting in 2015. Is the IB missile on
    schedule, and have you identified the two countries that will host its
    deployment in 2015?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes. The SM-3 Blk IB development and testing
    remain on schedule. The first flight test, Flight Test Maritime-16, is
    scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2011.
        EUCOM is in full support of DOS-led efforts to conclude the
    negotiations and appropriate basing agreements with Host Nations.
    Romania and Poland are the initial intended host countries for European
    Aegis Ashore with land-based SM-3 capability.

        42. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, last year Secretary Gates
    testified that the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) will
    continue development as a hedge against technical difficulties with the
    SM-3 Block IIA and IIB missiles. Is this still the plan?
        Admiral Stavridis. Any decision to shift from or change the Phased
    Adaptive Approach strategy to include elements of the previous European
    missile defense strategy would be done through close consultation and
    coordination between the NSC, DOD, DOS, and DNI and executed by the
    Missile Defense Agency.
        EUCOM recommends that questions pertaining to two-stage GBI
    capabilities and the associated development schedule milestones be
    forwarded to the Missile Defense Agency.

        43. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, how and when would we know
    that it is necessary to substitute the two-stage GBI for the SM-3 Block
    II missile?
        Admiral Stavridis. Any decision to shift from or change the Phased
    Adaptive Approach strategy to include elements from the previous
    European missile defense strategy would be done through close
    consultation and coordination between the NSC, DOD, DOS, and DNI and
    executed by the Missile Defense Agency. Such a decision would only be
    precipitated due to a revised assessment of Iranian ICBM missile
    capability and development timeline.

        44. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, what has been Russia's
    reaction to the new missile defense plans for Europe?
        Admiral Stavridis. While initially somewhat better than the
    reactions to the previous plan, the current reaction from the Russian
    Government has been one of suspicion.
        Russian representatives have stated that in their view the threat
    that a rogue may attack is largely theoretical. In their analysis,
    therefore, the United States and Europe must have ulterior motives.
    This view, taken in conjunction with Russia's heavy reliance on its
    aging nuclear missile force, casts some light on their negative
    reactions.
        As an example, in Russia's new military doctrine, strategic missile
    defense will ``undermine global stability and destroy the balance of
    power in the nuclear missile sphere.''

        45. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, I've seen press reports
    that Russia may now be concerned that the SM-3 Block II missile may be
    a threat to their strategic forces and that Russia will seek to limit
    its deployment in the ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
    follow-on negotiations. What can you tell me?
        Admiral Stavridis. Boris Gryzlov, Speaker of Russia's Lower House
    of Parliament, has said that the new treaty would have to contain tough
    language linking the need to limit defensive weapons with any
    reductions of offensive missiles. ``Without that, there is no chance
    the treaty will be ratified in the Duma.''
        Keeping that in mind, EUCOM will act in accordance with President
    Obama's Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) (www.defense.gov/bmdr)
    which states the United States will:

              ``Conduct a substantive and sustained dialogue with Russia on
            all dimensions of the missile defense issue. However, the
            United States will not negotiate restraints on U.S. BMD
            capabilities.''

        The BMDR also states that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system
    does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian missile
    attacks and is not intended to affect the strategic balance with
    Russia.

        46. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, the administration's new
    approach to missile defense in Europe hopes to solicit allied
    participation. We are hearing, however, that NATO is facing a funding
    crisis due to the operational demands related to Afghanistan. How
    likely is it that we can expect European contributions to the defense
    of their territory against medium- and long-range ballistic missiles?
        Admiral Stavridis. The Alliance recognizes that ballistic missile
    proliferation poses a significant threat to the Allies. NATO believes
    that Missile Defense plays an important role for the Alliance as part
    of a broader response to counter this threat. NATO has welcomed the new
    Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) introduced by the United States and is
    exploring the potential for linking its systems to those of the United
    States.
        EUCOM is cautiously optimistic that NATO will accept territorial
    BMD as a valid mission during the November NATO Summit in Lisbon,
    Portugal. Such a decision would represent the political will required
    by NATO militaries and the first step in gaining traction for NATO
    commitment. It should be noted however, that European contributions are
    already taking place outside of NATO. Poland and Romania have offered
    to host land-based SM-3 capabilities. EUCOM is in full support of the
    DOS-led efforts to negotiate the necessary agreements with these
    important allies.

                   missile defense and freedom of navigation
        47. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, it was reported by the
    Information Telegraph Agency of Russia on February 15 that Under
    Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher told journalists that the United
    States has no plans to deploy missile defense elements in the Black
    Sea, to include Aegis ships and sea-based missile defense components.
    The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability is currently
    installed on 4 cruisers and 16 destroyers. All Arleigh Burke class
    destroyers and nine of the Ticonderoga Class cruisers are planned to
    receive BMD capability--a significant portion of our cruiser and
    destroyer fleet.
        Aegis class ships have sailed into the Black Sea seven times over
    the past 5 years--the last such deployment occurring in July 2009. Ms.
    Tauscher's comments are disturbing because it would seem to indicate a
    new policy to restrict U.S. Aegis ship deployments into the Black Sea--
    presumably in response to Russian missile defense concerns. Are there
    any restrictions in deploying U.S. Aegis class destroyers and cruisers
    into the Black Sea?
        Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM and the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey are
    unaware of any policy decision to `prevent' the deployment of Aegis
    equipped vessels from deploying to the Black Sea.

        48. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, are you aware of any plans
    to change this policy?
        Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM is not aware of any policy changes as to
    restricting Aegis BMD ships from the Black Sea in response to Russian
    missile defense concerns.

        49. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, is it important that the
    United States maintains the right to transit ships, including Aegis
    class ships, into the Black Sea?
        Admiral Stavridis. Freedom of Navigation is one of the pillars of
    U.S. maritime policy.
        The only statutory or policy limit on the deployment of U.S. naval
    forces to the Black Sea is the Montreux Convention, which has been in
    force since 1936. This Convention has played an essential role in
    maintaining stability in the Black Sea, particularly throughout the
    period of the Cold War. It is the policy of the United States to
    support the Montreux Convention. The Convention, while it assures the
    free transit of safe commercial shipping, sets some limits on the
    ability of non-Black Sea states to deploy naval forces in the Black
    Sea. These limits do not prevent the transit of Aegis-equipped vessels
    to the Black Sea, but they limit the maximum tonnage of warships which
    are part of the fleets of non-Black Sea states. None of the U.S. Navy
    ships equipped with Aegis exceed this tonnage limit.

                     afghanistan-local defense initiatives
        50. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, I think we would all agree
    that the Anbar Awakening during the Iraq war was a great success and
    signaled the beginning of stabilization in that troubled theater. A
    Washington Post article that appeared on January 22 highlights
    CENTCOM's use of local defense initiatives (LDIs) to similarly train
    local militias as security forces to bridge the gap until more Afghan
    army and police forces can be trained. Recent estimates imply that
    32,000 soldiers need to be added over the next 10 months in order to
    meet the stated goal of 134,000 troops by the end of the year. While
    not all lessons from the Iraq war can be applied to Afghanistan, former
    Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf recently wrote, ``Afghanistan for
    centuries has been governed loosely through a social covenant between
    all the ethnic groups, under a sovereign king. This structure is needed
    again to bring peace and harmony.'' Would you agree that this program
    will spread coalition influence into remote regions and bridge the gap
    until we can recruit and train adequate Afghan army and police forces?
        Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

        51. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, do you think the Afghani
    Government can be persuaded to support this program or is this
    something that will have to be implemented independently?
        Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

        52. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, what is your opinion on
    our ability to adequately screen militia candidates for this program to
    ensure that we are not training the wrong folks?
        Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

        53. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, the Post article addressed
    differences between DOD and DOS concerning implementation timeline.
    General McChrystal has already implemented this program on a small
    scale using existing funding. In order to fully implement, Ambassador
    Eikenberry must release additional funds. How are existing Commander's
    Emergency Response Program funds being used to support this program and
    are these funds adequate to fully implement LDIs?
        Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

        54. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, what support is needed
    from DOS and what is DOD doing to resolve these differences in a timely
    manner?
        Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

                         afghanistan-close air support
        55. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, an article in the Atlanta
    Journal from last weekend talked about a change in policy concerning
    limiting night raids by coalition forces. This follows on the heels of
    a decision to also limit airstrikes in the Afghan theater. While I
    understand the sensitivities over collateral damage resulting from
    airstrikes and local population concerns over the use of night raids, I
    am concerned that policies that limit the use of force prevent us from
    supporting our troops in contact with the enemy. Will either of these
    policies prevent us from responding when our troops are in direct
    contact with the enemy?
        Admiral Stavridis. The new policies described above in no way
    prevent us from responding when our troops are in direct combat with
    the enemy. Under the rules of engagement troops retain their inherent
    right of self-defense at all times and may defend themselves against
    hostile acts and they may defend themselves from individuals or groups
    demonstrating hostile intent.
        The Tactical Directive does not completely prohibit the use of
    combined arms support for our troops. The restrictions on combined arms
    support only apply against residential compounds inhabited by civilians
    and only then under limited circumstances. The Night Raids Tactical
    Directive has no practical effect of limiting force in self-defense.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                                     angola
        56. Senator Wicker. General Ward, Angola's oil exports have been
    growing at a fast pace. The exports have grown so large that Angola has
    even overtaken Saudi Arabia and Iran to become China's biggest oil
    supplier. How is Angola's sporadic economic growth affecting the
    politics in sub-Sahara Africa?
        General Ward. [Deleted.]

        57. Senator Wicker. General Ward, with this growth tied so closely
    with Angola's debt to China, what are the political and security
    implications of China in Africa?
        General Ward. [Deleted.]

                                france and nato
        58. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, last year, France made the
    historic motion to rejoin NATO. France also has one of the largest
    military budgets in the world. In July 2008, France embarked on an in-
    depth overhaul of its security and defense strategy. This strategy has
    it building up the force, with a more expeditionary strategy, and
    integrating more with Europe. Some advocate for the European Union to
    become an organization that is a major player in international security
    and is an organization not led by the United States. As France grows as
    a security leader in Europe, urging countries to be more involved in
    European security, does this come at the detriment to NATO's strength?
        Admiral Stavridis. No, European countries generally depend on the
    primacy of NATO for their security. Resources committed to European
    defense institutions do not necessarily have to come at a cost to NATO.
        A complementary capability on the part of the Europeans generally
    and the French specifically may allow for greater geopolitical burden-
    sharing that does not cost the U.S. taxpayer although it benefits U.S.
    security. While NATO can offer high level force projection capability,
    the EU can fill gaps in areas of policy where the NATO and the U.S. may
    not be interested or willing to operate.
        As an example, France participates in European defense institutions
    that provide stability in areas of interest to NATO and the U.S.
    (Balkans) as well as in areas that may be less accessible to NATO or
    the U.S. (Democratic Republic of Congo). Operation Althea in Bosnia
    Herzegovina, launched December 2004, has seen the EU deploy 7,000
    personnel and still acts within its peace enforcement mandate
    supporting the Dayton/Paris Peace agreement today. When Europeans are
    able to provide their own security in their own backyard on their own
    terms, we all benefit. In Kosovo today, allies provide 8,800 of the
    10,000 troops there. A second large military operation, the first EU
    military mission outside of Europe, was Operation Artemis in the
    Democratic Republic of Congo, involving about 1,500 personnel and led
    by France. Certainly, the U.S. and NATO cannot provide coverage for all
    of Africa, but where Europeans are able to operate and provide
    coverage, the United States can benefit.

        59. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, will France's efforts to
    increase their own national defense challenge NATO's relevance?
        Admiral Stavridis. No. France is a full and active member of NATO.
    If France is successful in restructuring its national defense posture
    and increasing its expeditionary capabilities, it becomes a more
    effective and valuable member of the alliance. The United States should
    welcome all efforts of any member to meet the NATO national defense
    expenditure goals. A capable NATO is a relevant NATO.

        60. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, in your professional
    opinion, does France want to create a European Union-centric security
    force?
        Admiral Stavridis. France has been a driving force behind EUROCORPS
    and supports the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU. It
    currently hosts the EUROCORPS headquarters in Strasbourg, France.
    EUROCORPS is not an EU Defense organization, but is the closest thing
    to it composed of five framework nations of France, Belgium, Germany,
    Spain, and Luxembourg.
        The important takeaway, though, is that an EU-centric security
    force can support U.S. and NATO security goals. EUROCORPS will deploy
    in 2012 to Afghanistan in support of ISAF. There have been no
    indications that France is forming military units and capabilities that
    can only support EUROCORPS and not NATO missions. In the future,
    EUROCORPS may be deployed to out-of-area operations where the United
    States might not have an abiding interest to contribute forces through
    a NATO mission, but where the United States would nonetheless benefit
    from and welcome security and stability.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator David Vitter
        61. Senator Vitter. General Ward, please provide me with an update
    on AFRICOM integration with non-defense U.S. actors such as DOS and the
    U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In this update,
    please provide an assessment of DOS and USAID capabilities in regards
    to their stability operations role in Africa.
        General Ward. Interagency personnel, DOS and USAID in particular,
    are integrated into U.S. AFRICOM's staff through multiple mechanisms--
    in particular through having interagency personnel on the Command and
    their regular communication and coordination with their home agencies.
    We have developed strong relationships with these agencies, and we
    continue to seek ways to improve them. We coordinate our activities
    with DOS to ensure our actions are complementary to broader U.S.
    Government efforts. Our assigned interagency experts play a vital role
    in informing our activities and plans, and as a result, our planning
    efforts are better advised and more effective.

             As of 15 January 2010, there were 27 interagency
            personnel integrated across the command in long-term
            assignments. Currently, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has
            requested an additional 33 personnel from other U.S. Government
            departments and agencies be assigned to the command.
             Five members are Senior Executive, or Senior Foreign
            Service personnel with strategic decisionmaking roles.
             The remaining 22 personnel are GS15 equivalent or
            junior personnel, and are embedded within the headquarters
            planning staff.
             Currently, there are 15 interagency personnel assigned
            to the command for temporary assignments related to specific
            planning events.
             Additionally, we have had a significant number of
            personnel on temporary duty from other agencies over the last 2
            years. These personnel come by invitation or voluntarily to
            determine how they can best work in the command.

        Concerning operations, our interagency partnerships have made
    significant contributions that otherwise would have not been possible:

             The AMLEP Operation, employing a U.S. Coast Guard
            cutter with members of Sierra Leone's armed forces, conducted
            the first successful seizure by Sierra Leone of a vessel
            operating illegally in the country's waters.
             The command's U.S. Treasury Department Advisor from
            the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence coordinated
            and developed counter-terrorist and illicit financing
            collaborative initiatives between Treasury and USAFRICOM.
             Through the efforts of our humanitarian assistance
            team (led by a USAID employee,) USAFRICOM's humanitarian
            efforts complement and support USAID's lead on development
            initiatives.

        DOS and USAID capabilities and their partnership, advice,
    significantly contribute to everything that USAFRICOM does in support
    of our primary DOD mission, as well as our supporting role to U.S.
    Government activities where they are the lead agency. However, I will
    echo the Secretary of Defense's call for continued congressional
    support for DOS and USAID efforts to increase their capacity to carry
    out their missions, including conducting stability operations.

        [Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:09 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Bill Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe,
    Chambliss, Thune, LeMieux, Burr, and Collins.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
    professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
    member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J.
    Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel;
    Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and William K. Sutey,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
    Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
    minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G.
    Lang, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator
    Reed; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Michael
    Harney, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
    assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to
    Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
    Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Matthew R.
    Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek,
    assistant to Senator Thune; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator
    LeMieux; Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; and Chip
    Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        The committee meets today for two hearings. The first
    hearing will be to receive testimony from the combatant
    commanders of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the U.S.
    Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Then, at the conclusion of that
    hearing, we'll take a very brief break and start a second
    hearing, with four senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials
    and a witness from the Government Accountability Office, to
    consider the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft program.
        Before we start this hearing, I just want to remind DOD
    that formal statements of witnesses before the committee are
    due 48 hours before the hearing. Now, we make this requirement
    very clear in our formal communications with the Department,
    and it's important that that rule be met. We understand that
    there are circumstances beyond the control of individual
    witnesses, that are the cause frequently, so we're not using
    this hearing to target or single out this panel, or any member
    of this panel. We've had this problem in a number of recent
    hearings, and I would just simply ask our witnesses and
    representatives of DOD to take this message back to the
    Department.
        We welcome General Gene Renuart, the Commander of NORTHCOM,
    and also of the North American Aerospace Defense Command
    (NORAD); and General Doug Fraser, the Commander of SOUTHCOM.
        General Renuart is nearing the completion of his tour of
    duty as commander, and he's planning to retire later this year.
    We understand that this could be his last appearance before
    this committee. We give him, therefore, a special welcome and a
    special thank you for his long service.
        General Fraser is appearing before us for the first time as
    the SOUTHCOM commander. We thank you, General, for your many
    years of dedicated service to the Nation.
        We, again, want to just offer you our best wishes, General
    Renuart, as you conclude your long and outstanding career.
        We also would ask both of you to convey our gratitude to
    the men and women who serve in your commands, and to their
    families for their commitment and their sacrifice in carrying
    out the missions of the commands, and the commands in which
    they now serve and have previously served.
        NORTHCOM was created following the terrorist attacks of
    September 11. It is charged with two primary missions: defense
    of the United States and providing defense support to civil
    authorities in circumstances where the U.S. military is needed
    to respond to natural or manmade disasters.
        The commander of NORTHCOM is also dual-hatted as the
    commander of NORAD, our binational command with Canada that
    provides aerospace warning and control, and maritime warning
    for North America. As indicated in our letter of invitation, we
    hope that General Renuart will describe the synergies between
    these two interrelated commands. In addition to Canada, Mexico
    is also in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR); and given
    the continuing high level of drug-related violence in Mexico
    and the attendant risks to our southern border region, we hope
    that General Renuart will update us on his view of the current
    situation, relative to Mexico.
        Finally, General Renuart is the combatant commander
    responsible for the operation of the Ground-Based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) system that has interceptors deployed in Alaska
    and California to defend our Nation from long-range missile
    attack. That system has been of considerable interest to this
    committee, and we look forward to discussing it today.
        Turning to SOUTHCOM's AOR, General Fraser and Lieutenant
    General Keene, his deputy commander, and commander of the Joint
    Task Force (JTF) in Haiti, have spent much of the last 2 months
    responding to the devastating human tragedies in Haiti, and,
    more recently, to a lesser extent, in Chile. The scope and
    scale of these tragedies remains difficult to imagine, but the
    stories that have emerged have captured all of our hearts, have
    called our people to action, and have put the Haitian and the
    Chilean people in our thoughts and our prayers. We applaud the
    work of tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines who responded quickly and provided much-needed
    emergency relief to the people of Haiti.
        Beyond Haiti and Chile, General Fraser, the other
    challenges that we face in our hemisphere remain complex and
    interwoven. The drug trade in South and Central America
    continues to boom, and the illicit southward flow of guns and
    money continues to foster violence, corruption, and political
    instability. The region is not without its bad political
    actors, as well. President Chavez continues to work to
    undermine U.S. interests in the region, to do everything
    possible to maintain his own power and align himself more
    closely with countries of concern, like Iran. President
    Chavez's activities, coupled with the money, corruption, guns,
    and violence in the drug trade, are cause for great concern.
        The SOUTHCOM AOR does, however, have a good news story, as
    well. The Colombian Government continues to consolidate the
    gains of Plan Colombia by expanding security in government
    services to the farthest reaches of Colombia. Later this year,
    the Colombians will head to the polls to elect a new president,
    following a Constitutional Court decision that prevented
    President Uribe from running for a third term.
        So, gentlemen, again, we thank you. We look forward to your
    testimony.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to join you
    in welcoming our witnesses today.
        I know that executing two wars in the U.S. Central Command
    (CENTCOM) AOR has robbed other combatant commands of the
    sustained attention of Congress and the American people.
    However, I want to make it clear that the success of your
    commands' daily operations, and the fact that we don't hear
    about you every day in the news, is a credit to you. It means
    that Americans are safe along our northern and southern
    approaches. So, I thank you both for your long years of service
    and for the service of all the courageous soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines under your command.
        General Renuart, as was mentioned, this is your last
    appearance before the committee. We thank you for your years of
    dedicated service to this Nation.
        There's no doubt that NORTHCOM and NORAD play a vital role
    in the defense of our Homeland. Whether it's dispatching jets
    to respond to unidentified intrusions into our airspace or
    providing support to civil authorities in the aftermath of a
    chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack, the
    resources and capabilities that NORTHCOM brings to the table
    are invaluable. Since its creation, NORTHCOM has experienced
    growing pains common to a new combatant command.
        I'm interested, General, in hearing what steps you're
    taking to better operate in today's security environment,
    particularly those outlined in the recent Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR). I also look forward to hearing how the command is
    improving coordination and reliable communication
    interoperability between local, State, and Federal authorities
    so that we avoid the confusion of September 11th.
        Not only as ranking member of this committee, and a member
    of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
    but as representing the State of Arizona, I'm also particularly
    concerned about how NORTHCOM coordinates with the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) and the Government of Mexico to
    confront the growing scourge of violence along our southern
    border and the growing threat of the drug cartels to the very
    existence of the Government of Mexico.
        The increasingly capable and lethal drug cartels threaten
    not only our border States, like Arizona, but the entire
    country. I believe there's no more important mission than
    protection of the homeland, and I look forward to your
    testimony.
        General Fraser, it's been a trial by fire for you. The
    Senate confirmed you less than a year ago, and your AOR has
    experienced two of the worst earthquakes on record in the
    region, little more than a month apart. So, I want to
    congratulate you and your team for the exceptional work you
    have all done supporting the international relief effort in
    Haiti and providing needed communications and cargo airlift
    support to the Chilean Government as it rebuilds in the
    aftermath of its 8.8-magnitude earthquake last month.
        We have a number of interests in the Caribbean and Central
    and South America, but none so important than helping a
    neighbor in need. I'm proud of SOUTHCOM's efforts, and proud of
    the men and women serving on the USNS Comfort, whom I am sure
    take for granted how critical they are to the lives of not only
    our wounded warriors, but to the innocent victims of natural
    calamity around world.
        So, I look forward to hearing about how SOUTHCOM is coping
    with the unexpected costs associated with these efforts, a
    status report on our military-to-military relations in the
    region. I've long believed that consistent engagement is the
    key to enhancing security. By improving partner capacity, we
    can help the region decrease gang violence, drug trafficking,
    and human trafficking, all of which threatens both regional and
    global stability.
        I look forward to your testimony.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses
    today. I know that executing two wars in the Central Command area of
    responsibility (AOR) has robbed other combatant commands of the
    sustained attention of Congress and the American people. However, I
    want to make clear that the success of your commands' daily operations
    and the fact that we don't hear about you every day in the news is a
    credit to you, because it means that Americans are safe from the air,
    the sea, and from our northern and southern approaches. So, I thank you
    both for your long years of service and for the service of all the
    courageous soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines under your command.
        General Renaurt, there is no doubt that Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
    and NORAD play a vital role in the defense of our homeland. Whether it
    is dispatching jets to respond to unidentified intrusions into U.S.
    airspace, or providing support to civil authorities in the aftermath of
    a catastrophic chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological attack,
    the resources and capabilities that NORTHCOM brings to the table are
    invaluable. Since its creation, NORTHCOM has experienced the growing
    pains common to any new combatant command. I am interested in hearing
    what steps the command is taking to better operate in today's security
    environment, particularly those outlined in the recent Quadrennial
    Defense Review.
        I also look forward to hearing how the command is improving
    coordination and ensuring reliable communication interoperability
    between local, State, and Federal authorities so that we prevent
    similar mistakes of September 11. Not only as ranking member of this
    committee and as member of the Committee on Homeland Security and
    Governmental Affairs, but as the Senator from Arizona, I am also
    particularly concerned about how NORTHCOM coordinates with the
    Department of Homeland Security and the Government of Mexico to
    confront the growing scourge of violence along our southern border.
        The increasingly capable and lethal drug cartels operating to our
    south threaten not only Border States, like Arizona, but the entire
    country. There is no more important mission than the protection of the
    homeland and I look forward to your testimony.
        General Fraser, it's been trial by fire for you. The Senate
    confirmed you less than a year ago and your AOR has experienced two of
    the worse earthquakes on record in the region--little more than a month
    apart. So, I want to congratulate you and your team for the exceptional
    work you all have done supporting the international relief effort in
    Haiti and providing needed communications and cargo airlift support to
    the Chilean Government as it rebuilds in the aftermath of its 8.8
    magnitude earthquake last month.
        We have a number of interests in the Caribbean, and Central and
    South America, but none so important than helping a neighbor in need. I
    am proud of SOUTHCOM's efforts, proud of the men and women serving on
    the USNS Comfort, whom I am sure take for granted how critical they are
    to the lives of not only our wounded warriors but to the innocent
    victims of natural calamity around the world.
        I look forward to hearing about how SOUTHCOM is coping with the
    unexpected costs associated with these efforts as well as get a status
    report on our ongoing engagements in the region. I've long believed
    that continuing engagement in the region is the key to enhancing
    security. By improving partner capacity, we can help the region
    decrease gang violence, drug-trafficking, and human trafficking all of
    which threatens both regional and global stability. I look forward to
    your testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much Senator McCain.
        Let me start with General Renuart.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
       NORTHERN COMMAND, AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
                            DEFENSE COMMAND

        General Renuart. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of
    the committee----
        You'd think I'd have learned that by now.
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee,
    good morning. As you are so kind to mention, this may be my
    last appearance before the committee, and I want to thank all
    of the members of the committee for the sustained support that
    you've provided to not only our commands, but, of course, the
    men and women serving in our military today.
        It is good to be back with you today and represent the men
    and women of both of our commands, and to talk about some of
    the developments that we've had over the last year, and to
    mention some areas where I think we can continue to grow and
    improve.
        Of course, we have to thank the men and women who serve,
    each day, who wear the uniform, the cloth of our Nation, as
    they defend our homeland, both here and abroad. It's also
    important that we recognize the contributions of our senior
    enlisted leaders. I'm pleased to have with me today my
    command's senior enlisted leader, Chief Master Sergeant Allen
    Usry, seated here behind me. Chief Usry is the first National
    Guard senior enlisted leader selected for NORTHCOM. I would say
    that was a competitive selection across Active, Reserve, and
    Guard, senior noncommissioned officers, and we're pleased to
    have Chief Usry as part of the team.
        I'm also very pleased to sit next to my good friend Doug
    Fraser. As you both mentioned, during the past months our
    commands have partnered substantially across a broad variety of
    areas. First, to fight the narcoterrorism in our region, the
    movement of drugs, to support law enforcement to ensure that
    illicit trade and trafficking is reduced in our region. But,
    we've also partnered together to support SOUTHCOM in their
    efforts to provide the military support to humanitarian relief
    efforts in the wake of the devastating earthquake in Haiti.
    We're pleased to be part of Doug's team.
        As Commander of both NORAD and NORTHCOM, I really have two
    principal missions. Chairman Levin, you mentioned those, so I
    won't repeat them. But, it's important to ensure that, across a
    broad spectrum of missions--from air sovereignty, to maritime
    homeland defense, to ballistic missile defense, to support the
    law enforcement along our borders, and to support Federal
    agencies, both in natural and manmade disasters, as well as
    large-scale events, like the Vancouver Olympics--our two
    commands have created a synergy between each other that is now
    inseparable. From warning to consequence management, that
    spectrum of activity is really the symbol of what these two
    commands have grown to be. I'm pleased to talk about those both
    today.
        It's important also to note that we're members of a
    combined national response in many of these areas. We don't do
    it alone. DOD should not be the lead in many of these areas,
    but is an integral and important partner. We've worked very
    hard with our teammates in both Federal and State agencies.
    We've spent a great deal of time on the ground talking to
    adjutants general in the States, to the Governors, and to their
    senior emergency managers to ensure that we create an
    integrated team for success.
        It's also important to note that we have excellent
    relations with our international partners. Both the chairman
    and Senator McCain mentioned Mexico; certainly Mexico is in a
    difficult struggle, continuing to work hard on countering the
    drug-trafficking organizations in their country. We work very
    closely with our Mexican military and their interagency
    partners to ensure that the lessons we've learned in other
    places around the world are shared so that we can create strong
    capacity within the Mexican military and within their
    governmental agencies to allow them to succeed. They face
    significant challenges. We'll continue to work with them
    aggressively. I look forward to discussing that with you here
    today.
        As for our Canadian teammates, they stand shoulder by
    shoulder with us on the battlefields of Afghanistan, but also
    here in this hemisphere. We work very closely with them in air
    sovereignty. They partner with us in the Joint Interagency Task
    Force (JIATF)-South to counter drug-trafficking. We've worked
    very closely to provide support to them in special events in
    their country. I mention the Vancouver Olympics one more time.
        Finally, I want to thank the committee for the support
    you've provided for the Western Hemisphere Institute for
    Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). WHINSEC is an important element
    to both of our commands. It allows us to establish
    relationships with senior military and civilian leaders from
    other countries, and it has allowed us, then, to bridge into
    some of these tough topics that we'll talk about maybe a little
    later in the hearing. So, we both feel that WHINSEC is critical
    to our ability to interoperate in our region.
        Thanks for your support also to keep the personal security,
    the individuals attending these schools, confidential. It
    allows them to speak openly, to understand and maintain that
    academic freedom that we value in our institutions.
        Our commands train hard to ensure our operational readiness
    and our mission effectiveness are always the best they can be.
    Protecting our families, our Nation, and our communities is the
    most important mission we have, and we take that very
    seriously.
        Mr. Chairman, as I complete my service to the Nation, I
    want to tell you that this past 3 years in these two commands
    has been an extraordinary experience, much more complex than I
    would have imagined, and it created challenges that we are
    meeting and successfully achieving every day.
        I have to close by saying thank you to my family. For 39
    plus years, my wife has quietly endured the moves, the changes,
    the challenges, from Operation Desert Storm to Operation
    Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to here today in
    the homeland. So, I want to go on the record to say thank you
    to her for her support, and our two sons, who are both serving
    in their own way.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions
    here today. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of General Renuart follows:]
            Prepared Statement by Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
    Committee, thank you for this opportunity to report on the posture,
    challenges, and future direction of North American Aerospace Defense
    Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Every day, the
    Commands' soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, National
    Guardsmen, reservists, and civilians defend the United States and
    Canada from external threats and aggression-protecting our citizens,
    national power, and freedom of action. Due to their efforts, North
    America enjoys continued security and freedom.
                    homeland defense is our highest priority
        NORAD and NORTHCOM are inextricably linked Commands that have
    complementary missions and work closely together to protect our
    homelands. Incorporating an integrated headquarters staff, our Commands
    have forged an indispensible partnership operating within a common
    security environment, and together are dedicated to defending the
    United States and Canada. The synergies that exist between these two
    Commands enable us to conduct our missions with a sense of urgency in
    the face of very real threats.
        NORTHCOM is responsible for homeland defense, sustaining continuous
    situational awareness and readiness to protect the United States
    against a range of symmetric and asymmetric threats in all domains.
    NORTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) includes air, land, and sea
    approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska,
    Canada, Mexico, Saint Pierre and Miquelon (French Territory off the
    northeast coast of Canada), The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
    Islands, and three British Overseas Territories: Bermuda, Turks and
    Caicos Islands, and British Virgin Islands, as well as the surrounding
    water out to approximately 500 nautical miles, the Gulf of Mexico and
    the Straits of Florida. NORTHCOM is also responsible for leading the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts for theater security cooperation
    with Canada, Mexico, and Caribbean nations within the NORTHCOM AOR.
        Day to day, we are focused on deterring, preventing, and defeating
    attacks against the United States. We also stand ready to support
    primary agencies, when directed by the President or Secretary of
    Defense, in responding quickly to natural and man-made disasters. To
    accomplish our civil support mission, we stay close to our Federal
    partners to anticipate and plan for how and when the DOD can assist in
    preventing and minimizing loss of life, suffering, and property damage.
    We continually assess threats to our security, improve our homeland
    defense and civil support plans and capabilities, and strengthen
    relationships with our mission partners. We work diligently to ensure
    our Nation's military is ready and immediately accessible to support
    our fellow citizens when called upon.
        NORAD is the binational U.S. and Canadian command charged with the
    missions of aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning
    for North America. Aerospace warning includes the detection,
    validation, and warning of attack against North America--by aircraft,
    missiles, or space vehicles--through mutual support arrangements with
    other commands. Aerospace control includes ensuring air sovereignty and
    air defense of the airspace of the United States and Canada. The
    renewal of the NORAD Agreement in May 2006 added the maritime warning
    mission, which entails a shared awareness and understanding of the
    activities conducted in U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime
    areas, and internal waterways.
                            intelligence activities
        To perform our missions, we rely on the sharing of intelligence
    among Federal, State, and local agencies. NORTHCOM's Joint Intelligence
    Operations Center (JIOC-North) coordinates the acquisition, analysis,
    and fusion of intelligence, counterintelligence, and appropriate DOD-
    related law enforcement information for the NORTHCOM AOR, and shares
    that information with organizations at the national, State, and local
    levels. JIOC-North maintains a dual focus on monitoring both non-state
    and nation-state threats to North America.
        In countering transnational terrorism, we continue to rely on our
    established connections within the intelligence and Federal law
    enforcement communities, seeking as much legally appropriate
    information as possible. NORTHCOM maintains liaison officers with the
    National Counterterrorism Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
    (FBI) National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Department of
    Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
    Beginning in 2009, DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis placed a
    liaison officer with JIOC-North. In the wake of the Fort Hood shootings
    in November 2009, we established a daily terrorism and force protection
    information sharing group to improve the manner in which potential
    threats are identified, assessed, and acted upon. We perform our
    intelligence activities with a focus on safeguarding the civil rights
    and civil liberties of U.S. citizens and adhering to appropriate
    statutes and DOD regulations.
       homeland defense operations--protecting what americans value most
        NORTHCOM may be known best for leading the DOD response to
    disasters in our AOR; however, we remain vigilant in our number one
    responsibility, homeland defense, as we monitor an average of 12-20
    potentially dangerous events each day. Through our operational missile
    defense program and our maritime and air defense activities, NORTHCOM
    maintains a high state of readiness to respond as necessary against
    manmade threats.
    Ballistic Missile Defense
        NORTHCOM is responsible for ballistic missile defense operations
    within our AOR and other areas as directed to protect the homeland,
    allies, friends, and other national interests from potentially hostile
    acts. Our ability to carry out this mission continues to mature. The
    Ballistic Missile Defense System has been in nearly continuous
    operations since 2006 against potential threats to the defended area.
    Although it is a Missile Defense Agency (MDA) asset, the Sea-Based X-
    Band radar capability has also been included in our operational
    baseline during heightened threat periods since 2008.
        Our missile defense crews are trained and our procedures are
    continuously validated and exercised, so that we can meet the high
    standards required to defend the Nation. Furthermore, NORTHCOM is
    active in the ground and flight testing programs to ensure the tests
    are more operationally realistic. Our immediate challenge is balancing
    a real-time defensive capability with requirements of MDA's Research,
    Development, Test, and Evaluation activities.
        NORTHCOM is working closely with the other Combatant Commands to
    develop a Global Force Management Plan to address the Phased Adaptive
    Approach and improved capabilities to defend the homeland. This effort
    will assess operational planning, force structure, and budgetary
    implications to better meet global ballistic missile defense
    requirements. We are working with MDA to ensure that the Phased
    Adaptive Approach includes upgraded sensor systems with real-time
    discrimination capability; improved deployable and fixed-site
    interceptors; enhanced command and control systems that provide a
    common operating picture across the strategic, operational and tactical
    levels; and an additional Fire Control node at Fort Greely, AK. MDA's
    Concurrent Test, Training, and Operations and Simultaneous Test and
    Operations, with the additional Fort Greely equipment, will bridge the
    gap between operational capability and Research, Development, Test, and
    Evaluation activities.
    Operation Noble Eagle
        Operation Noble Eagle began immediately after the September 11
    attacks and continues today to protect and defend the United States and
    Canada with airspace surveillance, ready alert forces, and the U.S.
    National Capital Region (NCR) Integrated Air Defense System. Air
    National Guardsmen and Air Force reservists have flown more than 80
    percent of the more than 55,000 Operation Noble Eagle missions.
        The security and defense of the NCR against terrorist air threats
    is one of our highest priorities. NORAD works closely with DHS, the
    Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
    to ensure the skies over the NCR are protected. We are prepared to
    provide a rapid, reliable response as incidents unfold. As part of the
    NCR Integrated Air Defense System, NORAD and the USCG provide air
    patrol and alert aircraft to counter fast- and slow-moving air threats
    that may penetrate the NCR Air Defense Identification Zone.
        NORAD also provides tailored air defense for National Special
    Security Events (NSSE) in the United States and similar events in
    Canada.
        We are implementing a ``risk assessment'' model as recommended in
    the GAO-09-184 report ``Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air
    Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace.'' This risk
    assessment will enhance NORAD's ability to determine and apply
    appropriate requested levels and types of units, personnel, and
    aircraft.
    Northern Sovereignty Operations
        During 2009, NORAD launched fighter aircraft on 14 occasions in
    response to TU-95 Bear and TU-160 Blackjack aircraft not on
    international flight plans that penetrated North America's Air Defense
    Identification Zone. Because these flights did not violate U.S. or
    Canadian airspace, they were not considered threats to national
    sovereignty. The response was a means of identifying unknown aircraft
    operating in relative proximity to U.S. and Canadian sovereign
    airspace. In 2009, for the first time, a NORAD representative was
    included at the annual U.S.-Russia Prevention of Incidents over the
    High Seas staff talks. We anticipate continued NORAD and Russian Long
    Range Aviation dialog in 2010 to reduce the ambiguity of Russian
    military flights near our borders and promote safe flight operations
    within international airspace. NORAD operations in Alaska will remain a
    key avenue for positive interaction with Russian military counterparts
    during the reset of relationships between our Nations; continued
    support for military-to-military engagement opportunities is essential
    to maintain this professional dialog.
    Maritime Domain Awareness
        Maritime Domain Awareness is the comprehensive understanding of the
    global maritime domain as it relates to the security, safety, economy,
    and environment of the homeland.
        In the fall of 2008, a Russian Surface Action Group, led by a KIROV
    class cruiser, transited the NORTHCOM AOR en route to participate in a
    naval exercise with Venezuela and a port visit in Cuba. Additionally,
    in the summer of 2009, we were involved with monitoring the activity of
    a Russian support ship and a pair of nuclear-powered Russian submarines
    patrolling covertly off our Eastern seaboard. Although these vessels
    were not considered a threat to our homeland, their presence off the
    coast of the United States cannot be ignored and requires naval assets
    to be in a readiness posture to respond in any way necessary to defend
    the homeland, if required.
        NORTHCOM has aggressively pursued interagency and partner-nation
    cooperation for Maritime Domain Awareness. NORTHCOM has partnered with
    Mexico to better integrate regional efforts by initiating the
    development of an automated identification system architecture, which
    will contribute to increased information exchange and Maritime Domain
    Awareness. This will have a positive impact on our combined capability
    to combat illicit traffic.
        NORTHCOM is the Operational Manager for two Joint Capability
    Technology Demonstrations, which transitioned to Programs of Record in
    2009. These complementary programs--Maritime Automated Super Track
    Enhanced Reporting and Comprehensive Maritime Awareness--automatically
    fuse maritime-related intelligence to allow joint and interagency
    analysts to provide decisionmakers, planners, and operators the
    capability to rapidly evaluate and respond to potential maritime
    threats. These programs are fully operational and are employed in the
    NORAD and NORTHCOM Command Center, as well as the Navy's maritime
    operations centers.
        As the Arctic emerges as an area of increased activity, NORTHCOM
    has taken steps to evaluate DOD's ability to maintain Maritime Domain
    Awareness in the region. To establish this foundation, NORTHCOM has
    commissioned a surveillance study with the intent of identifying
    current capabilities to determine where gaps exist. The study will be
    completed in the fall of 2010.
    NORAD Maritime Warning
        The NORAD maritime warning mission continues to evolve as NORAD
    planners work in close coordination with Canadian and interagency
    partners. Collaboration on several planning documents with these many
    organizations established and reaffirmed formal and informal
    relationships required for binational and bilateral maritime
    operations.
        The past year's accomplishments and ongoing efforts have resulted
    in enhanced bi-national information sharing and comprehensive
    understanding of the maritime domain among our mission partners. We
    worked aggressively to address gaps and seams documented in an internal
    Information Sharing Architecture study that identified barriers to
    achieving full mission capability status. The study further identified
    critical steps and processes necessary to close these gaps within the
    NORAD maritime warning mission. We have also moved forward in the
    development of a shared binational common operating picture of the
    maritime domain. We continue to be challenged in a constrained
    environment to match the Canadian manpower commitment to this important
    mission area.
    Maritime Homeland Defense
        Commander, NORTHCOM (CDRNORTHCOM) is the operational commander
    responsible for Maritime Homeland Defense within the AOR. Commander,
    U.S. Fleet Forces Command is under the operational control of
    CDRNORTHCOM for Maritime Homeland Defense. Maritime threats,
    particularly asymmetric maritime threats in close proximity to the
    homeland, require defensive capabilities ready to respond on extremely
    short notice. NORTHCOM is developing a short-notice maritime response
    concept of operations that will provide an anti-ship defeat capability
    for short-range emergent threats leveraging U.S. interagency and
    partner-nation capabilities.
        NORTHCOM faces a wide spectrum of maritime vulnerabilities that
    warrant a comprehensive analytic study of ``Short-Notice Maritime
    Response'' to identify Maritime Homeland Defense capability gaps from a
    whole-of-government perspective. The nation's ability to respond to a
    maritime threat in the NORTHCOM AOR requires the full integration of
    DOD maritime operations with those of interagency partners and, where
    appropriate, international partners, anchored on the principle of unity
    of effort. To respond to a maritime threat within the NORTHCOM AOR, the
    Nation depends on synchronized security efforts at the operational
    level along the approaches to and within the United States. The
    capability to intercept vessels of interest beyond their ability to
    impact population centers, critical infrastructure, and key resources,
    and the ability to respond quickly to maritime indications and warning
    are essential to protecting the United States from external threats and
    aggression. In sum, a whole-of-government approach is required to
    leverage NORTHCOM maritime partner capabilities and resources.
    Mine Countermeasure Contingency Operations
        The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan outlines roles
    and responsibilities that enable the U.S. Government to respond quickly
    and decisively to threats against the United States and its interests
    in the maritime domain. In accordance with the MOTR Plan, NORTHCOM is
    responsible for Mine Countermeasure (MCM) operations in U.S. waters. In
    2009, in order to consolidate logistics and maintenance infrastructure,
    the Navy completed the homeport shift of all surface MCM forces
    (minesweeping vessels) to San Diego, CA, and all Aviation MCM forces
    (mine sweeping helicopter squadrons) to Norfolk, VA. In May 2009, an
    experiment conducted in the port of Corpus Christi, TX confirmed that
    surveys and port folders completed prior to a mining incident can
    significantly reduce the time required to mitigate the mining threat
    and restore port operations.
    Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP)
        NORTHCOM protects DOD assets in our AOR by executing a
    comprehensive all-hazards approach to the AT/FP mission that provides
    DOD personnel (active duty, reservists, civilians, and family members),
    assets, facilities, installations and infrastructure protection from
    the full spectrum of threats in order to ensure mission accomplishment.
    NORTHCOM has established theater policy, standards, and training, and
    verifies program execution and compliance through an exercise program
    and AT Program Reviews. We also integrate operational protection
    efforts with DHS to create a synchronized defense strategy for the AOR.
        NORTHCOM supports new processes and technologies that sustain the
    force protection mission. During the past year, we participated in a
    pilot program, with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, to identify a
    suspicious activity reporting and sharing capability for the DOD. The
    unclassified FBI eGuardian system is anticipated to be the DOD
    suspicious activity reporting system when designated by the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense. The eGuardian system will share potential
    terrorist threats, terrorist events, and suspicious activity
    information with State, Local, Tribal, Federal Law Enforcement
    Agencies, State Fusion Centers, and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task
    Forces. The eGuardian system will provide a continuous law enforcement
    force protection threat information sharing environment to identify
    emerging threats to DOD.
    Critical Infrastructure Protection/Critical Resource Protection
        The Secretary of the DHS is responsible for coordinating the
    national effort to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure
    and key resources (CI/KR) in the United States. The DHS Secretary
    serves as the Principal Federal Official to lead, integrate, and
    coordinate implementation of CI/KR protection efforts among Federal
    departments and agencies, State and local governments, and private
    sector. NORTHCOM continues outreach with DHS and infrastructure sector
    partners to ensure effective critical infrastructure information
    sharing for the execution of its missions.
        As assigned by the Secretary of Defense, combatant commands act to
    prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation of DOD-owned critical
    assets within their AOR. For non-DOD owned critical assets, combatant
    commands act to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation only at the
    direction of the Secretary of Defense, with the exception of responding
    to a time-critical event that requires specific actions by military
    forces to prevent significant damage to mission-critical
    infrastructure.
        NORTHCOM retains DOD Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) focus
    in three areas: (1) AOR or those DOD assets that are owned, leased, or
    managed by DOD; (2) Area of Influence to include the Defense Industrial
    Base; and (3) Area of Interest that is non-DOD assets that are critical
    to sustaining U.S. military operations.
                      civil support--helping those in need
        When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM
    supports the primary agency, typically DHS, in responding to natural
    and manmade disasters by conducting operations to save lives, reduce
    suffering, and protect the infrastructure of our Homeland. The
    Department of State may request DOD support in response to requests
    from other countries within and outside the NORTHCOM AOR. DOD is
    prepared to support primary agencies with military-unique capabilities
    such as fixed- and rotary-wing airlift, search and rescue teams, mobile
    medical facilities, communications infrastructure, and catastrophic
    planning expertise.
        A key component of NORTHCOM's support is Incident Awareness and
    Assessment to provided critical imagery for local responders. Military
    aircraft over disaster sites provide Full Motion Video and still
    imagery to give responders on the ground their first look at affected
    areas. At the request of the primary agency, NORTHCOM is prepared to
    provide a variety of aircraft and satellites to gather photos and video
    that allow Federal, State, and local response assets to quickly respond
    to situations. We conduct these Incident Awareness and Assessment
    activities while simultaneously safeguarding the civil liberties of
    American citizens and adhering to appropriate statutes and DOD
    regulations.
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives
            Consequence Management.
        Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield
    Explosives (CBRNE) incidents pose a great and foreseeable challenge to
    the security of the American people. A terrorist attack on U.S. soil or
    an accidental CBRNE incident could create catastrophic results that
    would likely exceed the response capabilities of civil authorities. As
    a result, DOD established a requirement for CBRNE Consequence
    Management Response Forces (CCMRF) to be trained and ready to respond
    to requests from civil authorities to save lives, help mitigate pain
    and suffering, and reduce property damage.
        A CCMRF is a brigade-sized task force that operates under the
    authority of Title 10 of the United States Code. CCMRFs are self-
    sustaining and may be tailored to any CBRNE event. A CCMRF is composed
    of Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy units with unique CBRNE training
    and equipment, as well as general purpose units trained to operate in a
    CBRNE environment. CCMRF capabilities include event assessment, robust
    command and control, comprehensive decontamination of personnel and
    equipment, hazardous material handling and disposal, medical support,
    air and land transportation, aerial evacuation, mortuary affairs, and
    general logistical support for extended operations. The CCMRF augments
    the consequence management efforts of State and local first responders,
    National Guard forces, and Federal agencies by providing complementary
    and unique capabilities when the effects of a CBRNE event exceed their
    capabilities.
        In November 2009, NORTHCOM and Army North (ARNORTH), NORTHCOM's
    Army Component Command, conducted the Vibrant Response 10.1 Field
    Training Exercise (VR 10.1 FTX), the first full-scale, full-deployment
    exercise for a CCMRF, confirming the CCMRF's capability to deploy to
    and support a catastrophic CBRNE Consequence Management event from a
    standing alert status. VR 10.1 FTX involved a simulated Improvised
    Nuclear Device detonation at Muscatatuck Center for Complex Operations
    near Camp Atterbury, IN. This challenging scenario is one of the 15
    National Planning Scenarios established as a common interagency
    baseline, and the exercise set the stage for CCMRF 10.1 to fulfill its
    assignment through the remainder of fiscal year 2010.
        Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), a NORTHCOM subordinate
    command, plans and integrates DOD support to the designated primary
    agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management operations. When
    approved by the Secretary of Defense and directed by CDRNORTHCOM, JTF-
    CS deploys to the incident site and executes timely and effective
    command and control of designated DOD forces, providing support to
    civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary
    critical life support. Some typical JTF-CS tasks include incident site
    support, casualty medical assistance and treatment, displaced populace
    support, mortuary affairs support, logistics support, and air
    operations.
        The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008,
    section 1082, as amended by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, section
    1034, directed DOD to establish an advisory panel to carry out an
    assessment of the capabilities of DOD to provide support to U.S. civil
    authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident. This advisory panel was
    sworn in on 15 September 2009 and will submit their report with
    recommendations to Congress within 12 months. NORTHCOM hosted the
    Advisory Panel's second meeting at our Headquarters on 23 November 2009
    in closed session for classified command mission briefings and
    discussions. The Command will continue to engage with the Advisory
    Panel throughout its efforts and we look forward to assisting them in
    additional research and insight into the Department's CBRNE consequence
    management mission sets.
    Response to Haiti Earthquake
        NORTHCOM is supporting U.S. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) response
    and support for Haiti Earthquake relief efforts. NORTHCOM and our
    components contributed more than 170 people. Air operations experts
    from Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH), assisted SOUTHCOM by transforming
    the 601st Air Mobility Division's Regional Air Movement Control Center
    into the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center to control the
    smooth flow of aircraft into Port-au-Prince Airport. AFNORTH's
    Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, Air Force Reserve officers
    assigned to respond to natural and man-made disasters in the United
    States, were onsite at facilities set up in the Southeast Region to
    support Haitian earthquake relief efforts. ARNORTH's Defense
    Coordinating Officer/Element worked closely with Federal, State,
    tribal, and local officials to determine which DOD capabilities can
    assist in mitigating the effects of the Haiti disaster.
    Cyber Operations
        NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to rely on data systems, the Internet,
    and networked commercial and military infrastructure to accomplish our
    missions. Cyber threats to these infrastructures include nation-state
    actors, terrorists, and criminal organizations, and are increasing in
    sophistication and occurrence. These cyber threats pose potentially
    grave damage to the ability of NORAD and NORTHCOM to conduct aerospace,
    maritime, and homeland defense, as well as DSCA missions. Our
    dependence on critical information systems leaves us vulnerable to
    potentially pervasive and sustained cyber attacks from global actors.
        The Commands partner with U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the
    Military Services, DOD agencies, DHS, and other Federal agencies to
    share cyber threat and related information, reduce cyberspace
    vulnerabilities, and defend against information infrastructure attacks.
    Efforts such as the U.S. Government's plans to increase information
    sharing with the private sector, and its migration to trusted Internet
    connections for the government and military networks, will help promote
    situational awareness and reduce vulnerabilities.
        In 2009, NORTHCOM, along with DHS, STRATCOM, and other mission
    partners, developed a plan tailored to provide rapid assistance to DHS
    and other Federal agencies for cyber-related events. This DOD cyber
    support would fall under our DSCA mission area and be provided in a
    similar fashion as hurricane relief, wildfire support, and responses to
    other national disasters. NORTHCOM is also conducting an analysis of
    providing a cyber response under our homeland defense responsibilities.
    H1N1 Operations
        NORTHCOM is executing Phase 1 of our Pandemic Influenza response
    plan. As part of our response, we identified five Regional Joint Task
    Force (RJTF) Headquarters. The RJTFs, along with NORTHCOM subordinate
    commands, continue to prepare to assist the primary agency. To date,
    NORTHCOM has not received any requests from the primary agency for DOD
    capabilities.
        In addition, NORTHCOM is the DOD lead for globally synchronizing
    military efforts to minimize contamination and prevent further spread
    of pandemic influenza. The DOD Global Synchronization Plan for Pandemic
    Influenza provides guidance to all the Geographic Combatant Commands,
    Functional Combatant Commands, Services, and DOD Agencies to assist in
    development of regional plans addressing operations in a pandemic
    influenza environment. Our efforts are focused on ensuring our military
    remains combat ready while taking care of interagency actions to keep
    military families safe at home.
    Support to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics
        The 2010 Winter Olympics began on 12 February 2010 in Vancouver,
    British Columbia. The Canadian Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
    Preparedness was charged with overall security for the Games and
    delegated the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as the lead agency
    for this task. At the same time, the Minister formally requested
    Canadian Department of National Defence assistance for the RCMP. As a
    result of this request, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General
    Walter Natynczyk, tasked CDRNORAD with the aerospace warning, aerospace
    control, and maritime warning for this event.
    Inland Search and Rescue (SAR) Coordinator
        In addition to defending our freedom, our lives, and our territory,
    SAR is a priority mission for NORTHCOM. On 4 November 2009, the
    Secretary of Defense designated CDRNORTHCOM as the U.S. Inland SAR
    Coordinator, which made NORTHCOM responsible for civil SAR involving
    the inland portion of the 48 contiguous States. NORTHCOM stands ready
    to coordinate the full spectrum of SAR, from normal SAR, such as
    searching for a lost hiker, to responding to catastrophic incidents,
    such as a large-scale earthquake, through our Rescue Coordination
    Center (RCC). The RCC is our key node for inland SAR and is under the
    purview of NORTHCOM's Service Component Command, AFNORTH. In addition,
    our Joint Personnel Recovery Center at Tyndall AFB, FL, allows us to
    have experts in place for routine SAR missions and to have those same
    experts at AFNORTH lead the way for a catastrophic incident SAR
    mission. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request for
    recapitalization of the Air Force's current rotary-wing SAR capability
    supports the continued viability of our SAR mission. Full funding of
    this fiscal year 2011 request keeps us on a path to continue providing
    SAR support to American citizens in those critical early hours of a
    crisis when aerial life support is a no-fail mission.
                      support to law enforcement agencies
    Joint Task Force-North Operations
        Joint Task Force-North (JTF-North), a NORTHCOM subordinate command,
    provides military support to Federal law enforcement agencies to assist
    in the identification and interdiction of transnational threats within
    and along the approaches to the United States. During fiscal year 2009,
    JTF-North coordinated 61 missions in support of Federal law enforcement
    agencies. In accordance with DOD policy for supporting law enforcement
    counterdrug efforts, JTF-North employed joint air, ground, and maritime
    sensors along the Nation's Southern and Northern borders and coasts;
    conducted detection and monitoring of suspected trafficking threats;
    provided for information and intelligence sharing among law enforcement
    agencies; supported Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) request for
    enhanced tactical infrastructure along the Southwest border; assisted
    with building planning capability within CBP; and provided Federal law
    enforcement with other support such as transportation, tunnel detection
    capabilities, and basic military skills training.
        At the request of DHS Assistant Secretary Alan Bersin, JTF-North
    provided support to the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, a
    multi-agency operation, in the State of Arizona. JTF-North facilitated
    intelligence and operational planning, and provided sensor capabilities
    during execution of this intelligence-driven operation.
        Through JTF-North's missions and activities, NORTHCOM continues to
    sustain important relationships with Federal law enforcement agencies
    in securing our Nation's borders against drug traffickers and their
    associated activities. Robust collaboration exists today between JTF-
    North and operational-level leaders in CBP, Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the FBI.
    Counternarcotics (CN) Programs
        NORTHCOM's CN Program is an integral part of the defense and
    security of our Nation. We continue to build NORTHCOM's capabilities
    and establish coordinated efforts supporting our partner agencies and
    partner nations to address the illicit narcotics trafficking threat to
    the homeland.
        NORTHCOM's CN efforts support Law Enforcement Agencies through
    information collection, analysis, fusion, and sharing, as well as
    theater security cooperation and partnership programs. These efforts
    are closely coordinated among the NORTHCOM staff and subordinate
    commands.
        In addition to our southwest border, there are ongoing efforts with
    our Canadian partners along our 5,000 mile long northern border. This
    U.S.-Canadian cooperation has uncovered and is addressing widespread
    illicit narcotics trafficking in our shared land, air, and sea domains
    that does not currently exhibit the level of violence as on our border
    with Mexico, but nevertheless remains a serious transnational threat to
    the United States. Illicit trafficking also poses a threat to The
    Bahamas, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, which are now in the NORTHCOM
    AOR. Accordingly, we are exploring how to better coordinate CN efforts
    with SOUTHCOM in this region.
        NORTHCOM has also made tremendous strides in supporting national CN
    efforts by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the
    Interdiction Committee (TIC) as part of their coordination with DOD.
    TIC membership consists of 17 agencies and commands led by a chairman
    appointed by the ONDCP Director. TIC provides advice to ONDCP on
    activities and threats posed by all illicit drug trafficking that
    threatens the United States and its interests in the Western
    Hemisphere. NORTHCOM is now represented quarterly as a TIC participant
    with JTF-North.
    Counter-Tunnel Initiative
        NORTHCOM is working with DHS, other combatant commands, and
    coalition partners to explore, map, and characterize illicit
    subterranean structures. Among these enhanced capabilities are seismic-
    acoustic and linear fiber-optic sensors, robotics, and other
    technologies. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and
    Development Center, is the technical lead for this initiative and
    continues to work in support of multiple combatant commands to solve
    this difficult problem. Within the past year, DOD support has resulted
    in the preemptive interdiction of two unfinished tunnels on the
    Southwest border. The Southwest border is a perfect test-bed for this
    capability. Results of this initiative benefit all combatant commands
    and help our interagency partners in their border security mission.
                 the national guard and reserves--our partners
        National Guard and Reserve Forces are critical to NORTHCOM's
    ability to carry out our assigned homeland defense and civil support
    missions. As such, NORTHCOM advocates for National Guard and Reserve
    capabilities in support of the Command's mission. In each of our annual
    Integrated Priority List and Program Objective Memorandum submissions
    to the DOD, we advocate for and support resolution of National Guard
    and Reserve capability concerns. We further advocate for changes to DOD
    policies that allow for more collaborative planning to ensure proper
    resourcing for National Guard and Reserve units' equipment, personnel
    and training for civil support operations. We also advocate for and
    support key issues such as equipment modernization in the Weapons of
    Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.
        We recognize the National Guard as a fundamental partner in the
    Total Force and essential to the security and defense of our Nation.
    The Air National Guard provides the bulk of NORAD's operational force
    for Air Sovereignty Alert missions, and is developing additional
    capabilities in support of domestic requirements. The Army National
    Guard provides all of the manning at our Ground-Based Interceptor sites
    in support of missile defense requirements. Additionally, the Army
    National Guard provides the bulk of personnel for ground-based air
    defense capabilities protecting the National Capital Region.
        The National Guard has made a significant investment in personnel
    assigned to NORTHCOM. In fact, NORTHCOM has the largest concentration
    of Title 10 National Guard officers in a joint organization outside of
    the National Guard Bureau. There are over 50 full-time National Guard
    authorizations in NORTHCOM HQ; however, only 39 of those positions are
    filled. In addition, Guard general officers serve in nominative
    positions as my NORTHCOM Deputy Commander, Director of Operations, and
    one Deputy Director of Plans and Policy. Our ongoing partnerships with
    the National Guard have increased our ability to coordinate and
    integrate joint and interagency operations. While we still have work to
    do, I am pleased to report our collaboration with the National Guard
    has never been better, and the experience gained by Guard members
    serving throughout NORTHCOM ensures we have a strong foundation for
    enhancing this relationship as these servicemembers progress through
    their careers.
                     plans--the cornerstone of our success
        NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil support plans are vital to
    our Nation's ability to deter, detect and defeat threats to our
    security, and assist civil authorities when called upon by the
    President or Secretary of Defense. Our plans are modified as threats,
    observations, and lessons learned from exercises and real-world
    operations dictate.
        On 2 November 2009, the Secretary of Defense established a Civil
    Support Plan category of DOD plans that may be shared with State,
    local, tribal, and other Federal authorities that play a mission-
    critical role in the development, review or execution of the plans.
    This Civil Support plan category of DOD plans contains seven NORTHCOM
    plans.
        The NORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan provides the framework for all
    of our planning efforts and is the primary means by which we
    synchronize day-to-day operations for homeland defense, civil support,
    and theater security cooperation activities. The operations and
    activities outlined in the campaign plan place strong emphasis on
    anticipating threats, improving our homeland defense and civil support
    capabilities, and strengthening relationships with our mission
    partners, at home and in the North American region. We continually
    assess the campaign plan to evaluate our progress toward achieving the
    long-term goals and objectives outlined in national and DOD strategies.
                          theater security cooperation
        Our top theater security cooperation priority is to build the
    capacity of allies and partners to help create an environment in North
    America that is inhospitable to terrorism. NORTHCOM's long-range vision
    focuses on establishing a comprehensive defense architecture where the
    United States works with its international partners to deter, prevent,
    and if necessary, defeat mutual threats. To achieve this, we plan,
    execute, and assess theater security cooperation programs, events, and
    activities with The Bahamas, Canada, and Mexico to support national and
    Command goals and objectives. This requires us to direct theater
    security cooperation activities toward improving partner-nation defense
    capacities, using a capacities-based planning approach, to promote
    regional cooperation and enhanced interoperability.
        The focus for our efforts is on building partner capacities with
    The Bahamas and Mexico and on enhancing coordination and
    interoperability with Canada. Our goal is to strengthen homeland
    defense through mutually beneficial partnerships in the AOR that
    counter terrorism, trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and
    illicit narcotics and other transnational and irregular threats and
    their consequences, while contributing to national security objectives.
        We have worked over the past year with the Department of State,
    U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Geological Survey,
    Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Environmental
    Protection Agency to strengthen those relationships to further North
    American security and prosperity. Recent, ongoing, and planned
    initiatives include building relationships and capabilities and
    creating enduring partnerships that result in enhanced safety and
    security along our common borders and within the region. Activities
    have focused on developing and improving procedures to prepare for and
    respond to potentially catastrophic events such as pandemic influenza
    outbreak, mass exposure to dangerous chemicals and/or materials, and
    natural and/or manmade disasters.
    Canada
        The relationship among NORAD, NORTHCOM and Canada Command is a
    tremendous example of the strong and mutually beneficial military-to-
    military ties between our Nations. I reported last year that we had
    signed the Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan, which is the
    framework for forces from one nation providing support to forces of the
    other nation for timely, effective, and efficient support to their
    respective civil authorities. We used the Civil Assistance Plan in our
    deliberate planning process, as the U.S. Government responded to
    requests from the Government of Canada for NORTHCOM support to Canada
    Command when they supported Royal Canadian Mounted Police security
    efforts for the 2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver.
        NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to develop our relationships with
    Canada Command. This past year, we concluded a comprehensive Tri
    Command Study that examined future roles, missions and relationships to
    increase North American defense and security while enhancing the valued
    relationship between Canada and the United States. The Tri Command
    Study identified several initiatives to further integrate and
    synchronize our operations and created a Framework for Enhanced
    Military Cooperation among NORAD, NORTHCOM, and Canada Command that
    highlights fundamental relationships and underscores individual command
    responsibilities for mutual support and cooperation.
    Mexico
        NORTHCOM leads Theater Security Cooperation and Building
    Partnership activities with Mexico to promote specific U.S. security
    interests and support the development of Mexican military capabilities
    for self-defense and coordinated operations. Our military-to-military
    relationship with Mexico is growing stronger, with full respect for
    Mexican sovereignty and a shared responsibility for countering the
    transnational illicit trafficking activity affecting our Nations.
        As one essential element of the U.S. whole-of-government approach,
    NORTHCOM's most significant contribution is in strengthening the
    operational capacity of the Mexican Army, Air Force, and Navy. Our
    engagement goes beyond providing hardware and the associated training;
    it also focuses on developing the ability to analyze and share the
    information that will allow the Mexican military to conduct operations
    against the drug trafficking organizations to systematically dismantle
    them. We are committed to a long-term military partnership with Mexico
    that is beneficial to both nations.
        NORTHCOM works in partnership with the Mexican military to support
    its efforts to increase capacities and execute its current strategy to
    counter Mexico's security threats. The level of communication,
    interchange, cooperation, and training exchanges between U.S. and
    Mexican armed forces has increased dramatically over the last 2 years
    and represents a historic opportunity for long-term strategic
    improvement of the U.S.-Mexico security partnership.
        Through our Theater Security Cooperation Plan and activities,
    NORTHCOM plays a significant role in supporting the Mexican military
    and improving the security situation in Mexico through the execution of
    the following programs:

             The Merida Initiative: $415.5 million appropriated in
            fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 Foreign Military
            Financing funds to purchase aircraft (up to eight Bell 412
            helicopters, up to five Sikorsky UH-60M helicopters and up to
            four CASA aircraft) to improve the Mexican military's ability
            to deploy rapid-reaction forces quickly in support of police
            operations against drug cartels, and to conduct maritime
            surveillance in an effort to deny the use of the eastern
            Pacific and western Caribbean to transnational criminal
            organizations, including drug traffickers and potential
            terrorists. In addition, funding will procure ion scanners to
            help detect illicit drugs. NORTHCOM's actions are in
            coordination with efforts to build up the capabilities of
            Mexico's civilian law enforcement entities by the U.S.
            Department of State and other agencies.
             Section 1206 assistance: $14.0 million for equipment
            such as Night Vision Goggles, Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats,
            personal protective equipment, digital media forensics,
            tactical communications equipment, and specialized training.
             Section 1004 counterdrug support: $18.0 million for
            pilot training, specialized skills training, and intelligence
            training.
             Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic
            Aid: $3.0 million in fiscal years 2008-2010 for hazardous
            materials response, flood early warning and emergency
            management training.
             Facilitated training support in the areas of Night
            Vision Goggle maintenance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal/
            Hazardous Material team training, and Aviation Training.
            Additionally, our Service components are actively engaged with
            their Mexican counterparts in subject matter exchanges and
            sharing lessons learned from our experiences in the areas of
            civil-military relations and urban operations.

        I have engaged with senior officers in the Mexican armed forces
    over the past few months who have expressed an interest in more
    detailed discussion and training in the areas of military justice and
    operational law (and inherent human rights issues) and administrative
    law. As a result, we are developing Subject Matter Expert Exchange and
    Mobile Training Team events (in conjunction with the Defense Institute
    for International Legal Studies) in order to enhance respect for the
    rule of law and human rights within the Mexican armed forces. For
    example, NORTHCOM attorneys and attorneys from the Mexican armed forces
    have already participated in conferences designed to develop curricula
    for the professional development of military attorneys. Additionally,
    senior attorneys from the Mexican armed forces have visited various
    U.S. military entities to get a first-hand view of how the U.S.
    military is organized and trained for the administration of military
    justice and for conducting operations in compliance with domestic and
    international law.
        NORTHCOM continues to support the Department of State's ``Beyond
    Merida Initiative.'' NORTHCOM has partnered with the Mexican military
    in support of disrupting the capacity of organized crime to operate and
    institutionalizing capacity to sustain the rule of law, thus helping to
    build strong and resilient communities on both sides of the border.
        We will continue to work proactively with our mission partners and
    with the Mexican military to achieve the joint goals of the United
    States and the Government of Mexico. It is important to recognize that
    while we are currently working with Mexico to develop and strengthen
    its military's capability to defeat the drug trafficking organizations,
    our long-term goal is to establish an enduring relationship--built upon
    trust and confidence--so that we can cooperate in the future on other
    mutual security issues.
    The Bahamas
        On 17 December 2008, Theater Security Cooperation responsibility
    for The Bahamas was transferred from SOUTHCOM to NORTHCOM. This Unified
    Command Plan transfer enhances our homeland defense mission through our
    partnership with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF), and
    strengthens our civil support missions with Puerto Rico and the U.S.
    Virgin Islands. This past year, my staff coordinated closely with
    SOUTHCOM and RBDF staffs to ensure smooth planning and execution of
    this shift in mission and responsibilities. We have developed a
    comprehensive Bahamas engagement plan as part of our Theater Campaign
    Plan that will enhance the U.S.-Bahamian relationship and integrate The
    Bahamas as a participant in the President's Caribbean Basin Security
    Initiative.
    Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
        NORTHCOM representatives participated in the WHINSEC Board of
    Visitors in June and December 2009. We worked closely with the WHINSEC
    staff to ensure their curriculum is fully compliant with U.S. Code and
    supportive of human rights. I have tasked WHINSEC to provide human
    rights training to the Mexican armed forces in the upcoming months;
    however, I continue to believe that open disclosure of the names of all
    WHINSEC graduates intrudes upon students' privacy and, more
    importantly, would assist drug trafficking organizations or terrorist
    groups to target the best and the brightest graduates from Latin
    America.
                          interoperable communications
        For mission success, our communications activities are focused on
    ensuring DOD interoperability with our DHS, State, and local partners
    to rapidly and effectively share information to ensure a prompt,
    coordinated response in the aftermath of a disaster.
        In partnership with the Defense Information Systems Agency, each
    year we sponsor the VITAL CONNECTION Communications Exercise (VCCE),
    which provides a realistic, controlled environment for DOD and its
    partners to train and collaborate on communications systems and
    capabilities that facilitate effective and efficient interoperability.
        In 2009, there were four venues where DOD, State, and local first
    responders developed and refined their techniques and procedures to
    improve interoperability in the event of a natural disaster or national
    emergency.
        NORTHCOM continues to partner with FEMA and the National Guard in
    the employment of Deployable Cellular-Based Suites, which include
    cellular towers, satellite communications connectivity, Land Mobile
    Radio interfaces, and ancillary devices to improve interoperability and
    service to emergency responders. NORTHCOM procured four additional
    Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video communications
    suites through the Combatant Commander Initiative Program that are
    positioned within AFNORTH Headquarters and Air Combat Command
    Communication Squadrons to provide enhanced Incident Awareness and
    Assessment/Full Motion Video capabilities to incident commanders. These
    suites provide additional capability to enhance situational awareness
    during disasters and emergency events for both incident on-scene
    commanders and our national leadership.
                       exercises, training, and education
        NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to derive exceptional training value
    from our participation in the National Exercise Program (NEP). In 2009,
    we participated in each of the Tier I and Tier II NEP exercises,
    including the National Level Exercise in July that represented the
    capstone event for the first-ever New Administration Transition
    Training program.
        Our own two major exercises, Ardent Sentry 09 (AS 09) in June 2009
    and Vigilant Shield 10 (VS 10) in November 2009, represented
    extraordinary training opportunities with scores of Federal, State,
    local, tribal, non-government organizations, private sector, and multi-
    national partners.
        In AS 09, we ran agro-terror and other asymmetric exercise
    incidents in Iowa and three surrounding States, a Deployable Homeland
    Air and Cruise Missile Defense scenario off the coast of Oregon, and a
    nuclear weapon accident/incident vignette in Wyoming, all while
    simulating loss of the use of our primary operations facility and
    having to move to an alternate location.
        In VS 10, we linked to the main Canadian exercises supporting
    preparation for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics (including how we
    would provide civil support if requested), and simultaneously conducted
    an earthquake exercise in up-State New York. Each of these major
    exercises was linked to a Vigilant Guard exercise, the series we
    conduct in support of State National Guard Headquarters and Joint Task
    Forces.
        In 2010, we will again participate in the National Level Exercise,
    and Ardent Sentry 10 will further exercise our civil support mission.
    We will also practice our homeland defense missions in Vigilant Shield
    11, linked to STRATCOM's exercise Global Thunder 11. We are also
    continuing a series of Pandemic Influenza exercises in preparation for
    future DOD-wide and U.S. Government-wide Pandemic Influenza exercises.
        All in all, we annually conduct or participate in approximately 50
    exercises of varying type, length, and complexity, to maintain our
    readiness across diverse NORAD and NORTHCOM mission sets detailed in
    over 10 Concept Plans. We engage our training partners at every level
    of Federal, State, tribal, and local government to employ the most
    comprehensive and realistic scenarios.
        The newest complement of our civil support series of training
    courses is our DSCA Senior Executive Seminar. Hosted in our
    Headquarters, this 2-day seminar provides a great opportunity for me to
    meet with State Governors and The Adjutants General (TAGs) (ranging
    from one to five at a time), for them to receive capabilities briefs
    from various staff Directorates regarding DSCA operations, and orient
    themselves to NORTHCOM's missions.
                                  partnerships
        Working with our mission partners is essential to ensuring the
    American people receive assistance during times of need, whether at the
    international, interagency, or State and local level. Our Nation's
    Governors take very seriously their role as Commanders in Chief of
    their State and we respect that authority. Our job is to support our
    Nation's Governors in responding to emergency situations and threats in
    their States.
    States and Territories
        In an effort to understand each State's risks and capabilities and
    in order to anticipate the best response for DOD requested assets, I
    participated in the initial meeting of the congressionally-directed
    Council of Governors and have also separately engaged with Governors,
    Lieutenant Governors, various State Directors of Emergency Management
    and the TAGs. Since taking command, I have met with a total of 27 State
    Governors and/or Lieutenant Governors. I have also met individually
    with 37 different States' TAGs and have addressed all 54 TAGs at
    various National Guard senior leader conferences. The most recent
    conference was the 2010 National Guard Bureau/NORTHCOM Hurricane
    Planning Workshop, 18-22 January 2010, in Tampa, FL, where several
    hundred representatives from 30 States and for the first time senior
    officials from DHS and FEMA addressed hurricane emergency response
    preparedness. Next year, we plan to expand the scope of the planning
    conference to include all hazards. These engagements strengthen the
    relationships between the State and DOD, improve mutual understanding
    of the critical balance each State must maintain between its
    requirements and resources to ensure support of the State's civil
    authorities during a major disaster, crisis, or NSSE; enhance sharing
    of information and lessons learned from previous responses to disasters
    and events; and support the State's understanding of NORAD and NORTHCOM
    and our missions.
        NORAD and NORTHCOM provide a training and exercise program that
    actively engages the States and Territories. The Vigilant Guard Joint
    Regional Exercise Program is sponsored by NORTHCOM and executed in
    conjunction with the NGB. Four Vigilant Guard (VG) exercises are
    conducted each year, and when feasible, two are linked to NORAD and
    NORTHCOM-sponsored exercises (VG Iowa with Ardent Sentry 09 and VG New
    York with Vigilant Shield 10). All VG exercises include some degree of
    local/county government participation.
    Interagency Community
        NORAD and NORTHCOM have strong relationships with many non-DOD
    Federal Agencies and Departments. Agency representatives and NORTHCOM
    liaison officers provide an established reach-back capability to their
    parent organizations. These relationships provide the essential
    interagency context during operations planning and execution, while
    also providing the DOD's perspective to external agencies.
    Private Sector
        Our Private Sector Engagement Team has worked closely with DHS,
    particularly FEMA, to support a comprehensive outreach program to non-
    profit and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), businesses, academia,
    faith-based organizations, and public-private partnerships throughout
    the country. The tremendous capabilities, resources, and willingness of
    the private sector and NGOs community are essential to successful
    disaster response. Achieving unity of effort is our goal.
                                   challenges
        We are aggressively tackling impediments to our efforts to improve
    air and maritime domain awareness, interagency information sharing, and
    consequence management operations. As we move forward with these
    efforts and others this year, we solicit and appreciate your continued
    support.
    Aircraft Recapitalization
        Legacy fighters, tankers, and airborne early warning aircraft in
    use today adequately meet all aspects of the Air Sovereignty Alert
    mission; however, recapitalization of these legacy aircraft is critical
    to the future success of the NORAD mission set.
        Legacy fighters are aging and will be stressed to maintain
    reliability and capability as we move into the 2015-2030 timeframe.
    Recapitalizing the fighter, tanker, and airborne early warning aircraft
    will remain a challenge, given the DOD's post-September 11 long-term
    mission requirements. NORAD's mission readiness will be affected if Air
    Sovereignty Alert aircraft are not recapitalized in accordance with the
    fiscal year 2011 President's budget request.
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace
        NORTHCOM is fully engaged with the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
    community through our membership on the Joint UAS Center of Excellence
    Advisory Council; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
    Technology & Logistics-led UAS Task Force; and our participation on the
    Policy Board for the Federal Aviation UAS Subgroup. NORTHCOM is also an
    advisory member to the newly formed UAS Executive Committee, co-chaired
    by the FAA and DOD, which is addressing the numerous national airspace
    access issues for public users. We are eager to team with our partners
    in the interagency community as they expand their UAS operations to
    achieve synergy in our homeland defense and civil support efforts. We
    continue to work with the FAA on finding the best way forward on
    employing UAS in the National Airspace outside restricted airspace.
    Deployable-Integrated Air Defense System
        One of the greatest challenges facing the Commands is the lack of
    an integrated air and cruise missile defense capability to counter
    threats from low-flying aircraft, UAS, and cruise missiles. As these
    threats grow, it becomes increasingly important to develop an
    integrated air and cruise missile defense system-of-systems to defend
    the homeland. In the past year, NORAD and NORTHCOM worked closely with
    the Joint Air Defense Operations-Homeland Joint Test Team as the
    operational sponsor in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures
    for a Deployable-Integrated Air Defense System capability, which could
    be employed to protect a particular venue or city which may be
    threatened or at risk.
        National Security Implications of Arctic Change. The 1982
    Convention on the Law of the Sea is a seminal agreement of the
    extensive international legal framework that applies to the Arctic
    Ocean. Global interest in the Arctic region shows no hint of ebbing,
    evidenced by the summer 2009 transit of two German-owned cargo vessels
    through the Northern Sea Route, westbound from the Atlantic to the
    Pacific Ocean. Increased activity necessitates that the United States
    become party to the Convention in order to protect and advance national
    interests in the Arctic by enhancing our national security (including
    the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces), securing U.S. sovereignty
    rights over extensive marine areas (including the valuable natural
    resources they contain), and giving the United States a seat at the
    table when rights vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.
        To bolster our efforts for the Arctic region, I support the stated
    desires of our respective U.S. and Canadian civilian defense leadership
    to reinvigorate the Permanent Joint Board on Defense as highlighted by
    Secretary of Defense Gates' and Minister McKay's November 2009 Halifax
    Security Talks.
                              future capabilities
        As we investigate existing technologies and capabilities for
    innovative uses, we are also focusing on emerging technologies to meet
    our requirements. We urge Congress to support the following
    initiatives.
    Air Domain Awareness
        In March 2007, the National Strategy for Aviation Security (NSAS)
    was published to enhance public safety and economic growth by promoting
    global aviation security through reducing vulnerabilities. The NSAS
    states: ``Together, the Strategy and seven supporting plans present a
    comprehensive national effort to prevent hostile or illegal acts within
    the air domain, promote global economic stability, and protect
    legitimate aviation activities.''
        To achieve the objectives of the NSAS, the whole-of-government must
    be committed to the guidance provided within the NSAS and supporting
    plans to achieve global air domain awareness (ADA). ADA crosses many
    Departments and Agencies within the government, thus requiring a
    coordinated approach. Historically, the operational synergism and cost
    efficiencies associated with the principle of unity of effort have not
    been completely realized for ADA because neither an interagency
    governance mechanism nor an information sharing infrastructure has yet
    been established.
        To meet this challenge, NORAD and NORTHCOM have teamed with DHS and
    other organizations across the U.S. Government to collaboratively
    develop solutions and lay the foundation for ADA. The desired end-state
    is development and implementation of a work plan leading to a joint,
    interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational ADA governance
    mechanism, interdepartmental capabilities and resourcing roadmap, and
    information sharing infrastructure to synchronize the disparate efforts
    of ADA mission partners.
        DHS, NORAD, and NORTHCOM hosted an Interagency ADA Summit on 13-14
    January 2010 bringing together senior leaders from numerous Federal
    agencies. The summit leadership provided guidance to three working
    groups facilitating development of processes for governance,
    information sharing, and capabilities and resources. Additional summits
    are planned at 6-month intervals and will bring in participation from
    industry, State, local, tribal, and international partners.
    NORAD and NORTHCOM Defense Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy
        Wide-area surveillance is a key component of Air Domain Awareness
    and is critical to air and missile defense of the homeland; however,
    NORAD and NORTHCOM lack adequate real-time, persistent, multi-domain
    surveillance. The NORAD and NORTHCOM Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy
    proposes to rectify this problem by providing the Commands with a
    foundation to develop a family of systems permitting persistent wide-
    area air and maritime surveillance to enhance defense against threats
    in the interior of and in the approaches to North America.
        The C2 Gap Filler Joint Capability Technology Demonstration will
    demonstrate a capability that enables efficient, secure, timely and
    trusted exchange of information resulting in enhanced C2 capabilities
    for NORAD and NORTHCOM.
        A second effort is the Next Generation Over-the-Horizon Radar
    (OTHR) Technical Risk Reduction Initiative (TRRI) Phase 1 project. TRRI
    was developed to minimize the technical risks of building a next
    generation OTHR prototype while simultaneously raising technical
    readiness levels of advanced radar technologies. Over-the-horizon
    radars are proven, wide-area surveillance systems with the ability to
    detect and track thousands of air and maritime targets at ranges
    exceeding 1,500 miles from the radar site. When completed, these
    initiatives will improve wide-area surveillance around North America.
    Radar Interference
        Comprehensive Air Domain Awareness will not be attained unless we
    can resolve the growing issue of radar interference. As such, NORAD and
    NORTHCOM support the establishment of an interagency process to allow
    the accurate assessment of existing and future plans for obstructions
    that potentially disrupt various radars within our area of operations.
    A formal vetting process is required with the necessary authorities to
    prevent projects from interfering with the defense of North America,
    while supporting the expansion of alternative energy sources, such as
    wind farms. To that end, NORAD has taken the initiative to form a radar
    obstruction evaluation team to quantify the impacts of proposed wind
    energy projects in close proximity to our radars.
    Long-Range Radar Sustainment and Future Plans
        DHS, NORAD, and NORTHCOM use long-range radars to detect and
    monitor non-cooperative targets. Many of these radars are 1950s vintage
    technology and in some cases are well beyond their life expectancy. To
    help with the maintenance of these radars, the Service Life Extension
    Program (SLEP) was approved, has been funded since fiscal year 2006,
    and again requested in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget.
    Upgrades to the radars are currently being completed. The goal is to
    sustain the existing systems another 15-20 years and use modern
    technology to play an integral part in the SLEP.
                                 final thoughts
        NORAD and NORTHCOM have demonstrated our ability to meet emerging
    threats to the homeland and support civil authorities in times of
    crisis. We are committed to remaining strong and reliable partners,
    working together to protect and defend our Nations, people, and way of
    life.
        Our Commands' success depends on the dedication, professionalism
    and sacrifice of our service men and women. We appreciate what the
    members of this committee have done to ensure the men and women of
    NORAD and NORTHCOM have the best possible resources to maintain world-
    class capabilities.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, General, for your testimony.
    Thank you for bringing Chief Master Sergeant Usry with you, as
    a matter of fact. We welcome him, as well.
        General Fraser.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            SOUTHERN COMMAND

        General Fraser. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator
    McCain, distinguished members of the committee. I'm honored to
    have this opportunity to appear before you today and provide my
    assessment of SOUTHCOM and our assigned area of responsibility.
        I'm joined this morning by my wife, Rena. I just want to
    echo what General Renuart has said. Her dedication, her support
    has been immense throughout, so I just appreciate that
    continued support.
        It's also my privilege to share this table with my good
    friend and mentor, General Renuart, because our appearance
    together represents the close coordination, alignment, and
    relationship between our two combatant commands. I also want to
    thank the members of this committee for your continued strong
    support of SOUTHCOM and your outstanding soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen, and the civilian
    personnel, whom I'm privilege to lead.
        I've personally seen what these outstanding men and women
    are capable of doing during the response to the earthquake that
    struck Haiti on January 12, 2010. The devastation was
    tremendous. Latest U.N. estimates indicate that over 222,000
    people were killed, 300,000 people injured, and 1.2 million
    people displaced by the earthquake. The U.S. response was
    swift, coordinated, and aggressive and comprised Federal,
    State, military and civilian agencies and units, exemplifying
    joint and interagency teamwork, all under the United States
    Agency for International Development (USAID) as the lead
    Federal agent.
        Fortunately, several DOD and U.S. Government assets were in
    the vicinity of Haiti when the earthquake happened. As you
    mentioned, Chairman Levin, Lieutenant General Keen, the Deputy
    Commander of SOUTHCOM, was visiting Haiti when the earthquake
    happened. He remains in place, commanding JTF-Haiti, providing
    superb leadership to the JTF-Haiti.
        Within the 24 hours of the earthquake, a U.S. Coast Guard
    cutter was off the coast of Port-au-Prince, and a U.S. Coast
    Guard C-130 was on the ground supporting relief efforts. Air
    Force elements began surveying the international airport. U.S.
    Navy P-3 aircraft, from our cooperative security location at
    Comalapa, El Salvador, conducted the first U.S. aerial
    reconnaissance of the area affected by the earthquake. Members
    of SOUTHCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters landed and
    began the initial assessments. The first U.S. Urban Search and
    Rescue (US&R) Team, a 72-member unit from Fairfax County, VA,
    arrived. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and Air
    Mobility Command had established an air bridge. Additionally,
    the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and the USS Bataan
    Amphibious Ready Group with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
    (MEU) embarked were ordered to make best possible speed to
    Haiti. Joint, interagency, Federal, and State responders, all
    these agencies were working to support the people and
    Government of Haiti before the first 24 hours had elapsed.
        Over the span of the next 3 weeks, the size and scope of
    the military response grew to a peak of just over 22,000
    personnel involved in the relief effort, including an Airborne
    Brigade Combat Team, the hospital ship USNS Comfort, a second
    MEU, as well as engineer, planning, communications, and medical
    experts. They coordinated with the U.S. Embassy, USAID, the
    United Nations, and other international organizations to
    determine where the capabilities of the military could rapidly
    be brought to bear to support the Government of Haiti.
        Supported by TRANSCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and every
    branch of our Armed Forces, our forces dramatically expanded
    the airport's capacity and opened the seaport to enable the
    vital flow of supplies. JTF-Haiti forces distributed 2.6
    million liters of water, 2.2 million meals, and 149,000 pounds
    of medical supplies, performing 1,025 surgeries, and assisting
    the World Food Programme in distributing 17 million pounds of
    bulk food.
        As the capabilities of the Government of Haiti, USAID,
    U.N., and nongovernmental organizations have increased, and as
    the relief needs have been met, we are transitioning many of
    our functions to capable partners, and are conducting a
    deliberate, conditions-based drawdown of our forces.
        The men and women who deployed to Haiti have performed
    magnificently and are the very embodiment of the teamwork and
    the jointness across DOD. They have been outstanding
    representatives of our military with their professionalism,
    sense of urgency, focus, and compassion. They continue to make
    us all extremely proud.
        I would not have been able to perform this mission to the
    level of success we achieved without the support of the other
    geographic commanders, and unified combatant commanders, the
    Services, Joint Staff, and the Office of Secretary of Defense.
    General Gene Renuart and NORTHCOM provided invaluable
    assistance. We could not have accomplished so much so quickly
    without the personnel his command and others sent to augment
    our staff, both in Miami and on the ground in Haiti.
        Less than 2 months after the catastrophe in Haiti, tragedy
    once again struck in the region, when an 8.8 magnitude
    earthquake shook Chile. Working through military liaison
    personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy, SOUTHCOM offered to
    assist in whatever manner the Government of Chile needed.
    Within a day of the earthquake, we distributed imagery of the
    affected areas to the Chileans, and sent satellite phones.
    Additionally, we are supporting Chile with transport aircraft,
    a field hospital, and a port survey team. As the U.S. Embassy
    coordinates with the Government of Chile to determine what
    additional support is needed, we stand by to assist whenever
    possible.
        While the majority of our attention and resources recently
    has been focused on responding to natural disasters in Haiti
    and Chile, we continue to address other challenges in our
    region. Illicit trafficking, narcoterrorism, gangs, and
    potential for the spread of weapons of mass destruction pose
    the principal security threats in the region. The region
    remains very dynamic. Brazil continues its rapid emergence as a
    regional leader with global influence. Globalization of
    information, markets, resources, and financial transactions
    remain a force for change in the region, both positive and
    negative. Competing ideologies within the region are stressing
    democratic and human rights advances. The increasing engagement
    of international players from outside the region, such as
    China, Iran, and Russia, continues to broaden the regional
    outlooks and positions.
        Addressing the challenges of our region requires the truly
    whole-of-government approach in which DOD normally plays a
    supporting role. To that end, SOUTHCOM works not only to
    strengthen partner capability and capacity, but also to build
    important cooperative security relationships throughout the
    region with our partners, foreign and domestic, military and
    civilian, in the public and private sector. For the most part,
    our military-to-military relations throughout the region remain
    strong.
        Finally, I'd like to thank this committee for your
    continued strong support for the WHINSEC and for the hard work
    of my fellow board members who sit on this committee. As a
    customer of WHINSEC, I can attest to its critical role in our
    security cooperation, especially in its focus on human rights.
        Let me close by saying that the tragedy in Haiti is a stark
    reminder of the nature and potential severity of challenges we
    face in the region. The culture of cooperation, openness, and
    transparency we have developed, the relationships we have built
    through our enduring and consistent engagement throughout the
    region, and the emphasis SOUTHCOM has placed on partnering in
    the past few years have all paid a particularly high return on
    the investment in Operation Unified Response (OUR), the largest
    humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission ever
    conducted in the region.
        I think also, Mr. Chairman, it's important to recognize
    that General Keen attended the Brazilian Staff College. One of
    his classmates was the commander of the Brazilian United
    Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)--or the U.N.-
    led MINUSTA force on Haiti, so the relationship had started a
    long time ago, and paid huge dividends during OUR.
        Once again, thank you for your interest in our vital
    region, and your support of SOUTHCOM. I look forward to
    answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Fraser follows:]
               Prepared Statement by Gen. Douglas M. Fraser, USAF
                                  introduction
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
    discuss the U.S. Southern Command and our area of responsibility in
    Latin America and the Caribbean. It is my privilege to report to you on
    the successes and accomplishments of our men and women over the past
    year, and to share our appreciation for the outstanding support
    Congress has shown us. The devastating earthquake in Haiti has shown
    how suddenly the strategic environment can change; but it has also
    shown how your investments in U.S. Southern Command through the years
    enable us to respond to such challenges. With your continued support,
    we will build upon this foundation and strengthen the bonds of security
    cooperation throughout this region.
        The nations of the Americas are strongly linked together in ways
    beyond physical and sociological proximity: our hemisphere is linked
    demographically, economically, socially, politically, culturally,
    linguistically and militarily. These shared qualities and beliefs
    connect us and provide the basis for addressing the common challenges
    that affect the security and stability of all nations in the region,
    today. These common traits also enable strong partnerships and serve as
    the foundation for the enduring relationships we will need as we face
    the future together.
        As globalization trends continue, our security will depend upon
    expanding cooperative engagement with multinational, multiagency and
    public-private partners in our hemisphere. We will be better able to
    meet complex challenges of the 21st century security environment by
    building robust, enduring partnerships now. Together we are stronger
    and more effective than working as a single organization or nation
    operating individually. Our vision embodies this belief.
                       the region--enduring and evolving
        U.S. Southern Command is responsible for conducting military
    operations and promoting security cooperation in Central America, the
    Caribbean and South America in order to achieve U.S. strategic
    objectives. Successfully accomplishing this mission enhances the
    security and stability in the Western Hemisphere and ensures the
    forward defense of the United States.
        The Americas, a home we share, is a strategically vital, culturally
    rich, and widely diverse and vibrant region. Since taking command 9
    months ago, I have traveled extensively throughout the region and have
    witnessed the challenges facing regional leaders and their people. I
    have also learned that many of these challenges are shared by all of
    us. Although our Nations may at times disagree on political and
    economic matters, we are united by a common view that we can settle our
    problems through negotiated agreements. This view provides the key for
    security for our citizens and requires a steadfast dedication to
    protecting our fundamental liberties and defending our common
    commitment to maintaining democracy and the rule of law.
        International commerce and trade between the United States and
    Latin American and Caribbean countries is strong, and experts forecast
    this growth to continue. The Western Hemisphere is the United States'
    largest market with nearly 38 percent of U.S. trade travelling north
    and south, equating to $1.5 trillion.\1\ We obtain more crude oil
    imports--52 percent--from this region than from the Persian Gulf, which
    only provides 13 percent.\2\ The Panama Canal is paramount in strategic
    and economic importance as nearly two-thirds of ships transiting the
    Canal are going to or coming from a U.S. port, carrying 16 percent of
    U.S. trade; expansion of the Canal is expected to almost double the
    capacity to approximately 600 million tons a year.\3\ The Commerce
    Department reports the overall sum of U.S. foreign direct investment in
    the hemisphere (minus Canada) is 17.8 percent of our total foreign
    direct investment worldwide. Further, 10 of the 17 U.S. Free Trade
    Agreements are with countries in the Americas. In terms of percentage,
    our total foreign direct investment in the hemisphere (including
    Canada) equals our direct investment in Asia, the Middle East and
    Africa, combined. Additionally, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
    studies estimate $42.3 billion in remittances flowed from the U.S. to
    the region in 2009, slightly more than two-thirds of the IADB's
    estimated worldwide total of remittances.\4\ Economic partnerships are
    strong today, and according to Commerce Department and World Trade
    Organization data, by 2011, U.S. trade with Latin America is expected
    to exceed trade with Europe and Japan.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Economic Interdependence 2008 Trade Figures (www.census.gov/
    foreign-trade). 38 percent to Western Hemisphere versus 31 percent to
    PACRIM and 21 percent to Europe.
        \2\ Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov) Aug 2009
    Figures: More than 52 percent from Western Hemisphere (incl CAN and
    MEX), 30 percent from LATAM (incl MEX), 19 percent from AOR, versus 13
    percent from Persian Gulf.
        \3\ Panama Canal Authority (www.pancanal.com) 5 percent of world
    trade transits the canal/16 percent of U.S. trade transits the canal,
    two thirds ships transiting Panama Canal are going to/from U.S. ports.
        \4\ Inter-American Development Bank, Press Release, Migrant
    Remittances, October 18, 2009, December 7, 2009, http://www.iadb.org/
    NEWS/articledetail.cfm?Language=En2&artType+ PR&artid=3348.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to demographic and economic ties with Latin America and
    the Caribbean, we share social and political views rooted in a common
    commitment to democracy, freedom, justice and respect for human rights.
    Compared to three decades ago when the form of government in the
    majority of these countries was nondemocratic, most nations in the
    region now subscribe to democracy and agree that free governments
    should be accountable to their people in order to govern effectively.
        We are fortunate to share similar main languages and interwoven
    cultures. Although there are many different dialects, people of the
    region use four primary languages: English, Spanish, Portuguese and
    French. While the United States is thought of as a primarily English-
    speaking nation, we are also the fifth largest Spanish speaking country
    in the world. Our significant cultural ties will grow stronger in the
    decades ahead, as by 2050, the number of people in the United States
    citing Hispanic heritage will comprise approximately 30 percent of the
    total U.S. population.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Source: Pew Research Center, U.S. Population Projections: 2005-
    2050: February 2008.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Despite the constant ebb and flow of political tides in this
    hemisphere, U.S. Southern Command has been fortunate to maintain strong
    professional relationships with our military and security force
    counterparts in almost every nation in the region. We engage with these
    nations continuously during peacetime through numerous bilateral and
    multilateral exercises, conferences, and other training engagements
    designed to prepare for the host of challenges that may confront us.
    Regional partnerships with and among our partner forces directly
    enhance hemispheric security and stability, as evidenced by the
    outstanding professional teamwork and unity of effort displayed by the
    region's militaries as part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission
    in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Operation Unified Response.
        In addition to our more than 20 large-scale joint and combined
    exercises annually, we host and sponsor hundreds of unit and individual
    exchanges, and assist with arrangements for approximately 5,000
    students from Latin America and the Caribbean who attend U.S. military
    schools and training sessions throughout the region. Future senior
    military leaders interact with U.S. military personnel at the Western
    Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, Center for Hemispheric
    Defense Studies, the Inter-American Defense College, and the Inter-
    American Air Forces Academy. The camaraderie developed and the school's
    strong emphasis on democratic values and respect for human rights
    contribute to the professionalization of military establishments who
    are subordinate to civilian control and capable of effective combined
    operations.
        Despite the number of enduring linkages we share with our neighbors
    in the region, we are also in a period of profound strategic change.
    Globalization has enabled nations, non-state actors, multilateral
    institutions and nongovernmental organizations to affect--both
    positively and negatively--the condition of millions throughout our
    region and across the globe. Our world is shrinking. The Atlantic and
    Pacific oceans are not the borders or barriers they once were. There
    are multiple approaches in several domains--including, increasingly,
    cyberspace--by which adversaries can enter the United States. At U.S.
    Southern Command, we remain committed to helping achieve hemispheric
    security by developing and maintaining strong partnerships to meet the
    dynamic and uncertain future.
                                   challenges
        The nations within our area of responsibility are largely at peace
    with one another and have formally foresworn the development of weapons
    of mass destruction (WMD). Military spending on a per capita basis
    remains lower in Latin America and the Caribbean than anywhere else in
    the world. The likelihood of conventional 20th century military threats
    also remains low for the foreseeable future. However, we do face
    nontraditional challenges that threaten security and stability
    throughout the hemisphere.
        These challenges are multiple and complex and include a broad and
    growing spectrum of public security threats, the possibility of natural
    and manmade disasters, and an emerging class of issues, such as those
    relating to the environment. More specifically, illicit trafficking,
    transnational terrorism, crime, gangs and the potential spread of WMD
    pose the principal security challenges within the region, none of which
    fall to DOD to take the lead in confronting. Most of these issues, in
    turn, are fueled by the endemic and underlying conditions of poverty,
    income inequality and corruption. Thus, our primary focus is on doing
    what we can to support other agencies of our government and our partner
    nations as they confront these problems and try to prevent them from
    becoming issues that require the military to address.
    Poverty and Income Inequality
        Perhaps the single factor contributing most to unrest, insecurity
    and instability in our region is the pervasive nature of poverty.
    According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
    and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2009, the number of people living in
    poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean--defined as living on less
    than $2 a day--rose for the first time in 6 years, increasing by 1.1
    percent over the previous year, from 180 million to 189 million people,
    or just over 34 percent of the population. The number of truly
    destitute--those living in extreme poverty, defined as living on less
    than $1 a day--increased from 71 to 76 million. That is an additional 9
    million people living in poverty and 5 million living in extreme
    poverty. These figures illustrate in very real terms the enormous
    challenges faced by our partner nations and neighbors in the region.
    Coupled with this poverty is a disparity in income levels that is,
    according to the World Bank, the most unequal subregion in the world.
    The richest 10 percent of the Latin American population earns 48
    percent of the region's income, 30 times the percentage of the poorest
    10 percent, which earns 1.6 percent.
        Areas with lower levels of economic investment, development, and
    growth can provide a breeding ground for illicit trafficking, other
    related criminal activities, and the full range of terrorism.
    Impoverished citizens, with little trust in their governments or hope
    for a better life, are easy prey for illicit traffickers, terrorist
    organizations and political demagogues. They provide fertile soil in
    which international criminals and terrorists can recruit, take root,
    and flourish, thus directly undermining State sovereignty, threatening
    public safety, and contributing to rising regional instability.
    Illicit trafficking
        The confluence of money, power, and the ability to breach the
    integrity of national borders makes the illicit trafficking problem a
    significant security challenge for nations throughout the Americas.
    Border insecurity, increased violence, public fear, corruption,
    weakening support for democratic institutions, and heavily burdened
    local, county, and State agencies are the by-products of this
    illegitimate and criminal activity, which is estimated to cost
    legitimate economies more than $245 billion annually. Furthermore, the
    same routes and networks by which illicit traffickers smuggle 1,250-
    1,500 metric tons of cocaine per year around the region, could be used
    wittingly or unwittingly to smuggle weapons, cash, fissile material or
    terrorists. As a threat to our homeland and the long-term stability of
    the region, illicit trafficking is of critical concern as it provides a
    possible nexus for transnational terrorism and the potential
    proliferation of WMD.
        Internal and cross-border--via air, land and/or sea--trafficking in
    drugs, weapons, human beings, money and terrorists poses a threat to
    every nation's security and stability. Revenue from illicit trafficking
    has weakened state structures throughout the region, subverted the rule
    of law, and ripped apart the fabric of social order. I am particularly
    troubled by the progressively negative impact of these activities on
    the Caribbean and Central America regions. As progress in Colombia
    continues, air and maritime interdiction efforts are increasingly
    effective, and the Government of Mexico continues to apply pressure to
    drug trafficking organizations, these traffickers are being
    progressively squeezed out of their previous operating locations. This
    resultant ``balloon effect'' causes the trafficking organizations to
    seek safe havens in ``undergoverned spaces'' like the Peten in
    Guatemala, the Miskito Coast in Honduras and Nicaragua, and the Darien
    regions in Panama. Similarly, our Caribbean neighbors are also seeing
    an increase and return of illicit trafficking organization presence in
    their territories, particularly the island of Hispaniola. The
    governments and institutions in these countries contend with the
    onslaught of violence, instability and insecurity associated with
    illicit trafficking as best they can, but they do not yet possess the
    capability or capacity to do so without help.
        Underlying all this is the illegal narcotics industry. According to
    the Drug Enforcement Administration, 31,000 deaths in the United States
    each year are attributed directly to drug-induced causes. The demand
    for drugs in the United States remains strong and creates incentives
    for illegal activities. The Andean Ridge produces nearly all of the
    world's cocaine and it and Central America are increasingly providers
    of heroin consumed in the United States. Of the approximately 1200
    metric tons of export quality cocaine that shipped from source
    countries in South America in 2009, approximately 60 percent of that
    was headed north, destined for the United States; in addition, we are
    seeing a growing amount (approximately 30 percent) heading to new and
    expanding markets in Europe and the Middle East, as evidenced by Spain
    becoming the world's largest per capita drug user.
        This is not simply an issue of supply and demand for illegal
    narcotics, however. Traffic is bidirectional and equally congested in
    both lanes with contraband. As traffickers exchange drugs for arms and
    services in the transit zones, transit nations become drug consumers as
    well. Brazil provides an illustration of how such an evolution can
    occur, as it is now the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world
    behind the U.S. While drugs and people tend to go out from the region,
    increasingly, we are seeing money, arms and technology/know-how (from
    communications gear to gangland tactics) flowing back into the region.
    This cycle has expanded to become more than a localized or even
    regional issue--it has become a global enterprise and thus requires a
    global strategy to countermand it. While partner nations are willing to
    work with us to develop regional approaches to counter the production
    and trafficking of illegal narcotics, effective and sustainable counter
    illicit trafficking operations severely test the capabilities and
    capacity of their thinly stretched forces. I see the illicit
    trafficking threat as a multi-faceted equation--demand, production,
    transit and finances--all supporting micro-markets of instability and
    violence.
        The Drug Enforcement Administration estimates the illegal worldwide
    trafficking industry to be a $394 billion per year industry. In
    addition to illegal narcotics, illicit human trafficking nets
    approximately $32 billion per year; illegal arms smuggling nets roughly
    $10 billion per year, and the exotic wildlife industry nets a
    surprising $80 billion a year. Traffickers are constantly developing
    new means of preventing interference with their illegal activities. As
    we modify our tactics, drug producers and traffickers find innovative
    methods to develop the drugs as well as alternative trafficking routes
    to transport them. The traffickers of yesterday have become much more
    lethal today, and this trend is expected to continue.
    Terrorism
        The blurring of the lines that used to separate terrorists from
    narcotics traffickers can be seen in groups like the Revolutionary
    Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in
    Peru. These entities define a category of ``narco-terrorists'' and they
    derive a majority of their funding and power from their involvement in
    the illicit drugs industry. These organizations and a number of
    extremely violent gangs have driven up the rates of homicide and
    kidnappings throughout the region and do not operate within traditional
    nation-state boundaries--they live among and terrorize the populace,
    and take advantage of ungoverned and undergoverned spaces without any
    regard or respect for national sovereignty.
        As these two threat vectors merge into one new hybrid, so must our
    efforts to counter it. We thank Congress for providing the dedicated
    resources necessary for this mission and for working with us in the
    specific case of Colombia to authorize flexible funding sources that
    allow us to adapt and stay ahead with a blending of counterterrorism
    (CT) and counternarcotics (CN). This expanded authority and flexibility
    is essential to helping us rapidly address emerging capability gaps
    with our partners as the strategic situation continues to evolve. We
    now need to ensure that we have this authority in other areas as
    appropriate where we see this nexus potentially occurring, such as
    Peru.
    Crime and gangs
        A close corollary of the spread of illegal trafficking is the
    alarming growth of criminal violence in the region. Rising crime,
    coupled with corruption, exacerbates the conditions of poverty and
    inequality, hampering development efforts and reducing an already
    fragile economic growth environment. One out of every three homicides
    in the world takes place in our region, as does one out of every two
    kidnappings. According to United Nations data, Latin America and the
    Caribbean's annual homicide rate is one of the highest in the world,
    with more than 27 homicides per 100,000 people--murder now ranks as one
    of the five main causes of death in several Central American countries.
    Central America is the region with the highest levels of non-political
    crime worldwide, with an average murder rate of 33 per 100,000
    inhabitants last year, three times greater than the global average,
    according to the UN Development Program (UNDP) Report on Human
    Development in Central America 2009-2010. These reports all emphasize
    the toll--both human and economic--of insecurity, violence and crime on
    the day-to-day decisions of the population, making insecurity a clear
    impediment to development and a destabilizing element for many nations
    in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in recent surveys of the
    region, delinquency and lack of personal security rank as the top
    social ill for the majority of countries.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Latinobarometro.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The growing presence and influence of gangs contributes to rising
    crime rates and severely challenges personal security in many areas. In
    Central America, Jamaica, and major cities in Brazil, gangs are
    infecting society's ability to provide basic functions and necessities,
    and are thus becoming a significant security priority. The overall gang
    population is estimated to reach into the hundreds of thousands,
    primarily filling their ranks with disenfranchised youth. According to
    a comprehensive study conducted by the National Public Security Council
    in El Salvador in 2008, violent crime cost the five countries examined
    a combined $6.5 billion, equivalent to 7.7 percent of Gross Domestic
    Product (GDP).\7\ The GDP losses to crime came at the expense of
    government investment in social services like spending on development,
    infrastructure, public safety and education. Increasingly, the threat
    posed by gangs reaches beyond Latin America and the Caribbean--the more
    sophisticated groups operate regionally and even globally with deep
    reach back into the United States from California to Washington, DC,
    and increasingly into Europe.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Los Costos Economicos de la Violencia en Centroamerica (The
    Economic Cost of Violence in Central America), El Salvador, 2008, pp.
    13-14. In 2008, the National Public Security Council of the Salvadoran
    presidency's office commissioned a study compiling the excess direct
    spending and losses caused by violence in five Central American
    countries in four areas, namely: increased health care; increased
    government spending for crime prevention, law enforcement and justice;
    spending on private security; and, material losses from crime. This
    landmark analysis found that in 2006, violent crime cost the combined
    States $6.5 billion--equivalent to 7.7 percent of GDP. Though all
    nations suffered significant losses, the total cost of violence varied
    between countries: $2.9 billion in Guatemala (7.7 percent GDP); $2.01
    billion in El Salvador (10.8 percent GDP); $885 million in Honduras
    (9.6 percent GDP); $790 million in Costa Rica (3.6 percent GDP); and,
    $529 million in Nicaragua (10.0 percent GDP).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The compounded effects of urban violence and transnational gangs
    are an undeniable threat to our national security and to the larger
    long-term security and stability of the region. The Departments of
    State, Justice, Homeland Security, and the U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID) each have programs that fit together
    to augment the efforts of the Nations most affected by youth violence.
    In each case, U.S. Southern Command closely coordinates with and
    supports the lead Federal agency and the U.S. Ambassador; at the same
    time, we continue working arm-in-arm with partner nation military and
    security forces in the region to build the necessary capabilities to
    enable them to provide their own national security and be able to
    provide responsible support to civilian authorities when required.
    Competitive Marketplace
        Because of globalization and its inherent empowerment of new
    actors, the United States can no longer take for granted that our way
    of life is the sole ideology of choice in this region. We must now
    actively compete to ensure our message is accurately transmitted and
    received by the appropriate audience. Populism, socialism and democracy
    are all now prevalent ideas within the region. Money, trade, and other
    interaction from expanding players like China, Russia and Iran exist in
    Latin America and the Caribbean. We are also beginning to see a renewed
    polarization in the region. All of these factors combine to form a
    competitive marketplace of ideas, within which nontraditional actors
    have become very adept at operating.
        To compete in this venue, we engage proactively and counter anti-
    U.S. messaging with persistent demonstrations of our goodwill,
    competence and professionalism. We convey the strength of our ideas in
    both words and deeds by training and working with our regional partners
    to improve security, provide humanitarian assistance, and respond to
    disasters. We remain engaged in this marketplace through dialogue and
    open discussion with partners within the region as well as players
    external to our AOR.
        China's evolving relationship with Latin America through a growing
    number of linkages and longer-term investments is impacting the
    strategic landscape in the region and further emphasizes the
    interconnectedness of the 21st century. According to the International
    Monetary Fund, total bilateral trade between China (excluding Hong
    Kong) and Latin America has risen from $39.3 billion in 2004 to almost
    $147 billion in 2008. China is already the second largest user of the
    Panama Canal. The rapid growth of China's trade with Latin America and
    the Caribbean shows the likelihood China could become an enduring part
    of the economic landscape of the Americas.
        We have also noticed a marked increase in military-to-military and
    technology-based relations between China, Russia, Iran, and the region.
    China is conducting more military training and educational exchanges,
    entering into a larger number of technology transfers agreements, and
    selling sophisticated defensive military items such as air surveillance
    radars and military aircraft. China is also finding new areas for
    cooperation in the commercial space sector as seen in the China-Brazil
    Earth Research Satellite program. Russia has followed suit, with arms
    sales and a naval tour of the Caribbean. Russia has publicly stated
    that improving relations with Latin America is a top priority, focused
    primarily on Cuba and then Venezuela. They have also increased their
    outreach to other countries in the region as evidenced by signing a
    military and scientific bilateral agreement with Peru, offering
    increased support to Bolivia's counter-narcotics operations, and
    seeking a Free Trade Agreement with Chile.
        Iran, too, is strengthening its ties to the region, focusing
    primarily on Venezuela, while developing relationships with other
    nations, as evidenced by opening 11 new embassies with a 12th expected
    to open in the Caribbean later this year. Iran's trade activities have
    thus far focused on infrastructure development, medical exchanges,
    agriculture, mining and the oil industry. Finally, a Trade Memoranda of
    Understanding between Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela since 2005 has now
    surpassed $7 billion.
        As we face this complex, dynamic and continually evolving security
    environment at Southern Command, we are constantly reminded that
    achieving our desired end state of secure stable, democratic and
    prosperous States throughout the Americas requires a wide variety of
    tool sets beyond pure military activity. We continue to look for
    creative ways to approach partnerships throughout the region. We seek
    innovative ways to organize, plan, train, and operate; to adapt new
    technology to ever-changing challenges; and to communicate, including
    how we describe and frame our challenges both with our partners and
    with the public in general.
           strategic framework: initiatives, exercises and operations
        Our strategic approach is balanced and prioritized--confronting the
    most pressing and probable threats to the Nation today, while at the
    same time, posturing the joint, combined and multinational force to
    prevent, and if necessary, defeat the most consequential threats to
    tomorrow. We take a regional, global, and long-term view of our
    strategic environment, our objectives, and the implications for
    strategic risk. It is imperative we remain capable of executing our
    plans, while still engaging throughout the region at the appropriate
    levels: building, complementing or enhancing, as appropriate, partner
    capability and capacity; improving international and interagency
    cooperation; and, fostering both security and stability.
        As we confront the considerable range of challenges before us in
    our AOR, we continually ensure coordination across multiple levels in
    more than one agency and in more than one nation. This is a
    prerequisite for any project, exercise, initiative or operation within
    our region: each issue needs to be assessed as part of an
    interconnected and unified strategy. For example, the illicit
    trafficking issue cannot be adequately addressed in isolation from
    issues of illegal narcotics, migration, arms trafficking, money-
    laundering, and radical ideological terrorists. Furthermore, our
    strategic approach is based on the affirmation of common values held
    throughout the hemisphere: democracy, liberty, and human rights.
        In terms of military-to-military contact, Latin America and the
    Caribbean represent many opportunities of U.S. engagement. We have
    witnessed numerous positive results from nontraditional approaches to
    partnering that integrate talents and capabilities from foreign and
    domestic, military and civilian, public and private sector entities.
    These efforts may be relatively low visibility, but they have a huge
    impact on U.S. military and partner nation military and security force
    readiness, particularly when they are accomplished in a consistent and
    enduring manner. We pursue a host of programs in support of other lead
    agencies and government entities to include numerous training
    exercises, educational programs, technology sharing, intelligence
    sharing, security procurement assistance, humanitarian aid, among
    others. Our evolving engagement strategy commits us to build or enhance
    the security capability of our military counterparts and to expand the
    capacity for all of us to work together. Joint, international,
    interagency, and public-private is the essence of everything we do.
    Joint Interagency Task Force-South
        At the tactical and operational level within U.S. Southern Command,
    a model for this regional engagement and international and interagency
    coordination is Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South)
    located in Key West, FL. JIATF-South exists to spearhead the effort to
    fight one of the most pressing challenges facing the region--illicit
    trafficking--with an acknowledged potential nexus with narco-terrorism.
    This interagency task force, which celebrated 20 years of excellence
    last year, is led by a U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral and is comprised
    of truly amazing individuals from all 4 branches of the military, 14
    different agencies, and 13 partner nations. This group, beyond doubt,
    is a team: a joint, interagency, international, combined and allied
    team--a creative and innovative body that defines ``synergy'', the
    blending of experience, professionalism and knowledge being greater
    than the sum of its individual parts.
        JIATF-South continues to make incredible headway, producing
    extraordinary results every year. For example: JIATF-South's joint
    operating area (JOA) covers nearly 42 million square miles, almost 21
    percent of the Earth's surface; in the 20 years it has been conducting
    operations in this region, 2,500 metric tons of cocaine have been
    seized, 705,000 pounds of marijuana interdicted, 4,600 traffickers
    arrested, 1,100 vessels captured, and a grand total of approximately
    $195 billion taken out of the pockets of the drug cartels. They have
    accomplished these results while possessing zero assets of their own--
    every aircraft and vessel involved with detection, monitoring,
    interdiction and apprehension is allocated through the Department of
    Defense Global Force Management process, Department of Homeland
    Security Statement of Intent, and International contributions that
    place the assets under tactical control (TACON) of JIATF-South, which
    can be recalled by their service provider or operational control
    (OPCON) authority if unexpected circumstances warrant, such as Haiti
    relief efforts, search and rescue (SAR), or other national interests.
    In 2009, JIATF-South had TACON of USCG, USN, and international ships
    for a total of 2,915 on-station days, equating to an approximately 8.0
    surface asset laydown on any given day within the JIATF-South JOA.
    Similarly, JIATF-South had TACON of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP),
    USCG, DOD and international long range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA)
    for a total of 9,446 on-station hours, equating to an approximately 3.0
    air asset laydown on any given day within the JIATF-South JOA. Based on
    JIATF-South's analysis, a 14.0 surface asset laydown and a 5.0 air
    asset laydown are required to meet the National Interdiction goal of 40
    percent.
        In addition to the need for organic surface and air assets,
    additional challenges that restrict JIATF-South from realizing their
    full effectiveness include: policy limitations on the amount and degree
    of intelligence and other data that can be shared with partner agencies
    and nations; structural and technological hurdles in situational
    awareness, particularly Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); and, an
    unequal level of ``end game'' capabilities present in the military and
    security forces in the AOR. Still, in 2009, JIATF-South was responsible
    for greater than 61 percent of all global transit zone seizures and
    disruptions, and 45 percent of all cocaine seizures in the world;
    additionally, they were responsible for the interdiction of 226 metric
    tons of cocaine, equivalent to a net $4.5 billion loss for the cartels
    and traffickers. While doing all this, JIATF-South set the benchmark
    for workplace quality in a recent organizational study.\8\ This kind of
    success demands total commitment from the entire organization--
    inspirational leadership, complete integration, collaboration and
    partnership which exists at every level throughout the command. JIATF-
    South is the standard for integrating and synchronizing ``whole of
    government'', ``whole of nation'', and ``whole of many nations''
    solutions in confronting challenges to our national and shared regional
    security.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ 2009 Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)
    Organizational Climate Survey: JIATF-South surpassed the national
    average in every category (13 of 13).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Exercises
        Southern Command is committed to being a good partner--more to the
    point, we want to be the enduring partner of choice throughout the
    region. Day in and day out, year after year, we dedicate the majority
    of our resources toward strengthening the security capabilities of our
    partners, while working to encourage an environment of cooperation
    among all the Nations in the region. We conduct frequent and wide-
    ranging multinational exercises and international exchanges with our
    partners, send thousands of partner military and civilian experts to
    various leading academic institutions, and provide other critical
    security assistance to our friends in the region. All these activities
    focus on strengthening regional bonds and enhancing collective
    capabilities we believe are integral to U.S. national security and
    stability in the Western Hemisphere as a whole. These exercises focus
    on confronting regional threats such as maritime insecurity, terrorism,
    illicit trafficking, and illegal migration, while also increasing
    partner nation ability to support peacekeeping, disaster relief and
    humanitarian assistance operations. The fruit of these labors can be
    seen in the overwhelmingly positive and unified response in Haiti.
    Panamax, Unitas, and Fuerzas Commando
        Building confidence, capability, and cooperation within our AOR is
    essential to confronting today's security challenges. Our exercise
    Fuerzas Aliadas (Allied Forces) Panamax has matured over the last 7
    years and has become one of our flagship programs as well as the
    world's largest multinational and multi-agency training exercise.
    Panamax focuses on improving the hemisphere's ability to provide air,
    sea and land forces to assist the government of Panama in its excellent
    work of securing the Panama Canal and defending it from traditional and
    non-traditional threats. The exercise began in 2003 as a limited naval
    exercise with just three participating nations: Panama, Chile, and the
    United States. Due to past successes and efforts to expand
    partnerships, the exercise has grown to include a roster of more than
    20 nations, several U.S. Government departments and agencies,
    international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
    multiple military branches of Service.
        Another large-scale exercise we support that emphasizes such
    cooperation and integration is Unitas, which trains participating
    forces to ensure maximum interoperability in future coalition
    operations. We hosted the 50th iteration and celebration in
    Jacksonville in May 2009. Seven thousand international sailors and
    mariners participated, including personnel from Canada and Germany,
    making it the longest running multinational maritime training exercise
    in the world.
        Shortly afterward, U.S. Southern Command hosted Counter Terrorism
    Exercise Fuerzas Commando in Brazil in 2009. This unique exercise
    consisting of 21 partner nations involved a competition in
    counterterrorism (CT) skills by the elite CT units in the region as
    well as bringing together civilian counterterrorism leadership from
    each of the countries to exchange ideas on training and complementary
    evolutions. Exercises like Panamax, Unitas, and Fuerzas Comando provide
    excellent forums for military-to-military relationship building and I
    thank Congress for providing the flexibility in my Combatant Commander
    Exercise Engagement funds that allow us to execute these kinds of
    exercises, as well as the funds designed to assist the participation of
    the developing countries within our AOR.
    Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
        While our programs and initiatives focus primarily on security,
    increasingly our approach has broadened to support stability efforts as
    part of a larger national path to true partnering and engagement in the
    Western Hemisphere. A key element of these efforts is a variety of
    humanitarian goodwill activities that directly help those in need while
    providing needed training to our team. These engagement missions range
    from planned events such as the construction and/or refurbishment of
    wells, schools, community centers and medical facilities to rapid
    response missions in the wake of disasters.
        In 2009, as part of our annual operation Continuing Promise, USNS
    Comfort returned to our waters with the mission to bring short-term
    modern medical care, provide preventive medicine engagement, and
    conduct long-term medical training and education. With over 100,000
    patient encounters, 1,600 surgeries performed, 135,000 pharmacies
    dispensed, 13,000 animals treated and 37,000 students trained, we were
    able to engage on a scale previously unimaginable just 4 years ago. In
    2010, through Continuing Promise in combination with our Medical
    Readiness and Dental Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs and
    DENTRETEs, respectively), we hope to surpass the `1 million patient
    treatments' mark since the inception of this program.
        The impact of Continuing Promise on the Host Nations has been
    greater than just numbers, however; the types of procedures performed
    and training conducted speak to the long-term positive effects on
    society and citizen security as our joint, combined and integrated
    crews focused on hysterectomies, thyroids, cataract removals, and
    education on disease prevention. The impact has been more than just the
    USNS Comfort, as well. On the engineering side for example,
    Construction Battalions (SeaBees) personnel repaired and improved five
    hospitals and clinics; provided refurbishments to seven schools; and
    renovated one baseball field. Additionally, in direct support of
    existing USAID projects, USNS Comfort personnel assisted in a
    laboratory completion in the Dominican Republic and assisted in dock
    repairs in Panama that buttressed a USAID eco-tourism project.
        Access to health care is a critical component of security and
    stability and the Comfort's mission is only one of many medical
    outreach efforts. As mentioned previously, U.S. Southern Command also
    sponsors MEDRETEs and DENTRETEs, consisting of military medical teams
    that treat over a quarter of a million patients annually in the region,
    focusing primarily on needy rural, isolated populations. These unique
    training exercises have had tremendous impact inland throughout the AOR
    over 75 separate locations--changing lives, providing alternative
    perceptions, and spreading goodwill through quality donated medical
    assistance. In 2009, 89 MEDRETEs were conducted in 18 countries,
    treating over 220,000 patients, performing almost 1,200 surgeries and
    inoculating and treating more than 31,000 animals. More than just a
    medical deployment, these humanitarian assistance missions have also
    provided dental care to approximately 50,000 patients, conducted
    medical training for almost 60,000 host nation students and medical
    providers, and sponsored over 40 construction and restoration projects
    at local schools and health care facilities. These visits also extended
    veterinarian services throughout their journeys, treating and
    vaccinating thousands of animals, which constitute the livelihood of
    many families.
        Throughout the year, U.S. Southern Command's Humanitarian
    Assistance Program augments traditional military-to-civilian engagement
    activities in order to increase our partner nations' ability to respond
    independently to natural and man-made disasters. New Horizons (Andean
    Ridge) and Beyond the Horizons (Caribbean and Central Americas) are a
    series of joint and combined humanitarian assistance exercises that
    U.S. Southern Command conducts with Latin American and Caribbean
    nations to provide readiness training for U.S. Engineer, Medical, and
    Combat Service Support units, but also provide great benefit to the
    host nation. Each exercise lasts several months and usually takes place
    in remote areas. We strive to combine these efforts with those of host
    nation doctors and civic personnel. Our programs help local populations
    who can benefit from completed projects such as schools, clinics,
    community centers, orphanages, emergency operations centers, disaster
    response warehouses, wells, and potable water systems. In 2009, we
    conducted these exercises in 6 countries in the AOR, supporting the
    renovation, construction, and repair on 12 schools, 2 community
    centers, 4 health clinics, 3 water wells, 2 sports complexes, 2 road
    repairs, and 1 pedestrian bridge, in addition to providing critical
    training programs for first responders, disaster managers,
    firefighters, and disaster warehouse managers.
        These examples of our consistent and enduring engagement throughout
    the region further advance our strategic messaging and help build
    confidence, capability, and goodwill in numerous countries in the
    region, bring renewed hope to those enduring hardship and challenging
    conditions, and serve as a visible and lasting counterweight to anti-
    U.S. messaging. The cumulative effects of our humanitarian assistance
    missions have directly and indirectly touched and bettered the lives of
    several hundred thousand throughout our shared home, as well as laying
    the foundation for relationships and experience that pays large
    dividends when the United States responds to a humanitarian crisis in
    the region . . . as we did and are still doing in Haiti.
                       haiti--operation unified response
        On January 12, the nation of Haiti experienced a 7.0 magnitude
    earthquake with an epicenter located approximately 10 miles WSW of its
    capital city, Port au Prince. The size and destructive capability of
    this temblor was made even worse by several contributing factors,
    namely: the earthquake was relatively shallow, making the shockwaves
    much more pronounced; the capital city was overcrowded and over-
    developed with construction standards inconsistently applied and
    loosely enforced; and, much of Haiti was still recovering from a string
    of three hurricanes and one tropical storm that struck during a 23-day
    period in the summer of 2008. It had been almost 150 years since an
    earthquake of this magnitude had struck Haiti and the devastation was
    tremendous. Latest U.N. estimates indicate over 222,517 people were
    killed, 300,000 injured, and 1.2 million displaced by the earthquake
    and the 59 subsequent aftershocks. Thirteen of the 15 government
    ministry buildings were completely destroyed. Between 40-50 percent of
    all buildings sustained significant damage in Port au Prince and
    surrounding villages, with some suffering as much as 80 percent damage
    as in Leogane. The airport control tower was rendered inoperable and
    more than half the seaport was left in ruins. Later that night, the
    President of Haiti declared a national state of emergency and in doing
    so, requested the United States assist in providing humanitarian
    assistance and disaster relief aid. The U.S. Ambassador to Haiti
    responded by issuing a disaster declaration, confirming the situation
    warranted U.S. Government assistance.
        The U.S. response was swift and comprised of Federal, State,
    military, and civilian agencies and units. There were several DOD and
    U.S. Government assets already in the vicinity of Haiti. Just before
    dawn the next morning, 13 January, the USCG Cutter Forward arrived off
    the coast of Haiti, established a liaison with the Haitian Coast Guard
    facility at Killick to conduct damage assessments, set up critical
    command and control procedures, and began providing humanitarian
    assistance, helping the most seriously wounded, and evacuating injured
    American citizens. Shortly thereafter, two USCG C-130 aircraft also
    arrived to support U.S. relief efforts.
        At 10:20 that morning, President Obama expressed ``the deep
    condolences and declared the unwavering support of the American
    people'' and ordered a ``swift, coordinated and aggressive effort to
    save lives'' with USAID designated as the Lead Federal Agency. During
    the course of the day, an Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) assessment team
    landed in Port au Prince to survey the airport while elements of the
    First Special Operations Wing arrived to reopen Port au Prince
    International Airport. A U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft from the Cooperative
    Security Location of Comalapa, El Salvador, conducted the first U.S.
    aerial reconnaissance of the area affected by the earthquake. DOD
    officials ordered the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and USS Bataan
    Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary
    Unit (22nd MEU) embarked to make best speed to Haiti. The first U.S.
    urban search and rescue team, a 72-member unit from Fairfax County, VA,
    arrived in Haiti before even 24 hours had elapsed.
        Later that day U.S. Southern Command deployed two planeloads of
    personnel from our Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ) element,
    an organic, free-standing, deployable joint military headquarters,
    which included experts in the field of engineering, operational
    planners, communications specialists, medicine, interagency
    coordination, and a command and control group. They arrived and began
    coordinating with the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince, as well as United
    Nations and other international personnel who were leading the initial
    recovery efforts. In addition, this core team began conducting
    assessments of damage and determining areas where the unique
    capabilities of the military could rapidly be brought to bear in
    support of the Government of Haiti.
        On 14 January, the size and scope of DOD's response grew as more
    forces flowed to the assistance and relief effort. Four more USCG
    Cutters and the USS Higgins arrived off shore. Throughout the day, P-3s
    continued aerial reconnaissance. An engineering assessment team arrived
    and determined the pier and wharf at Port au Prince port were
    inoperable for movement of bulk stores. Later that night, the Secretary
    of Defense ordered the USS Nassau ARG with the 24th Marine
    Expeditionary Unit (24th MEU) embarked, the XVIII Airborne Corps, 2nd
    Brigade Combat Team 82nd Airborne Division, and the hospital ship USNS
    Comfort to deploy to Haiti. As elements of these assets and others
    arrived over the course of the next 4 days, they formed the core of
    DOD's overall contribution to the massive humanitarian assistance
    mission--providing unique capabilities and an initial surge capacity in
    what became our primary lines of operation: security, critical
    engineering, medical and logistics. To organize the response of the
    military forces, we established Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H) under
    the command of my Deputy, Lieutenant General Keen, who was already on
    the ground in Haiti for previously scheduled meetings.
        The mission of JTF-H was to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
    and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) in support of U.S. Government efforts in
    Haiti, in order to mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate
    recovery. We would not have been able to perform this mission to the
    level of success we have achieved if not for the more than 500
    augmentees we requested and received from every other geographic
    combatant command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation
    Command, the Services, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense. The General and Flag Officers, Action Officers and civilian
    personnel we received were immediately value-added and were
    instrumental in helping us develop well-coordinated planning efforts
    that translated into unity of effort on the ground. These personnel
    were also distributed to JTF-H in the form of planning staffs, the
    Joint Information Center (JIC), assessment teams, Joint Center
    Operational Analysis (JCOA) teams, and many other teams. The men and
    women of these contributing units have performed magnificently and been
    the very embodiment of teamwork and jointness across the Department of
    Defense. They have been outstanding representatives of your military
    with their professionalism, sense of urgency, focus and compassion.
    They continue to make all of us extremely proud.
    Security
        Apart from isolated looting incidents, small-scale crime and
    demonstrations which parallel the security environment prior to the
    earthquake, the situation in Haiti remains relatively calm. U.S.
    military personnel are engaged primarily with safeguarding humanitarian
    supplies and distribution networks in support of MINUSTAH, who has
    maintained a peacekeeping presence since 2004, comprised of primarily
    Latin American military forces under Brazilian leadership. They have
    been working with the Haitian government to provide security and build
    the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Our JTF Commander
    and the Brazilian MINUSTAH Commander have had an outstanding personal
    and professional relationship. This has permeated all levels of
    interaction and engagement between the two forces, alleviating many of
    the potential frictions that could arise from two parallel military
    command structures operating in the same vicinity. A division of labor
    was established whereby JTF-H military forces would provide local
    security for humanitarian assistance missions, while MINUSTAH and the
    HNP maintained overall responsibility for security in the country. To
    underscore the scope of responsibility, on 19 January, the U.N.
    Security Council authorized the expansion of MINUSTAH's force size by
    2,000 military and 1,500 police personnel.
    Critical Engineering
        Initial assessment teams determined that although there was no
    physical damage to the airport runway, taxiway and field operations,
    the field was unusable because of no power and structural damage to the
    control tower. Similarly, a team of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
    assessed the entire sea port at Port au Prince was unusable for large
    vessels, with buildings, cranes and piers damaged, and debris and
    containers in the water. The roads remained largely impassable except
    by motorcycle and foot traffic. Communication services in Haiti were
    severely degraded, with the power grid, radio, landline, and cellular
    telephone services working sporadically in pockets.
        Assessments and emergency repairs continued throughout Haiti, but
    the primary focus of initial effort was the seaport in Port Au Prince.
    Haiti has other port facilities throughout the country, but due to
    proximity to the most affected areas and the depth of water, Port au
    Prince was critical to the relief efforts. The North pier was
    completely destroyed and the South pier, missing 700 feet, was
    determined to be non-operational. To address this requirement, U.S.
    Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) immediately deployed Joint Task
    Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO), a unit capable of port command and control
    and operations, followed closely by service contributions in the form
    of Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS). The JLOTS capability
    consisted of boats, literage, cranes and crane ships allowing for rapid
    cargo offload at other locations within the harbor, thus overcoming the
    logistical hurdles caused by damage. TRANSCOM also contracted with
    marine engineering experts from Crowley Marine to begin installation of
    a combination of barges and cranes that would eventually restore
    operational capability to the port. Utilizing this combination of JLOTS
    and commercial capability, the seaport capacity exceeded pre-quake
    offload capacity by 22 January and steadily increased as additional
    over-the-shore assets arrived.
        The current container per day capacity, based only on the in-place
    commercial capability, exceeds demand, thus enabling the GOH, the U.N.
    Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and USAID to
    manage flow based on the requirements on the ground while also enabling
    Haitian commercial capabilities to resume. Overseas Humanitarian,
    Disaster and Civic Aid Appropriation (OHDACA) funded repairs to the
    South Pier are underway, as are contracted removal of a gantry crane
    and other debris which had fouled the port during the earthquake. In
    addition, U.S. military engineer teams continue to assess critical
    infrastructure, including port facilities and piers, airfields, roads,
    bridges, water wells, and electrical grids to determine how best to
    assist repair and restore these essential needs. Future U.S. Southern
    Command-sponsored MEDRETEs, New Horizons and Beyond the Horizons
    medical, construction and engineering exercises will provide a
    consistent and continuing assistance to the Haitian people as part of
    our larger Theater Security Cooperation program.
    Medical
        The magnitude of the catastrophe necessitated the rapid deployment
    of military assets with sufficient medical capability to help alleviate
    suffering and save lives in the wake of the disaster. U.S. Southern
    Command responded by requesting the deployment of needed medical
    capability to Haiti. The USS Carl Vinson arrived on 15 January; the USS
    Bataan and JTF-B Forward Surgical Team (FST) on 18 January; the USNS
    Comfort on 20 January; and, the 24th Medical Group Expeditionary
    Medical Support (EMEDS) on 24 January. USNS Comfort arrived on station
    just 6 days after the initial mobilization order; she and her nearly
    1000 medical personnel--including medical and surgical teams from
    Project Hope, Operation Smile, Red Cross translators and support
    personnel, and medical schools around the U.S.--joined other DOD assets
    already on station to provide an immediate surge triage capability and
    1400-plus bed capacity to help cope with the enormity of the task. We
    are fortunate to have worked with many of these professionals
    previously; they had come together to provide humanitarian assistance
    and preventative medical treatment and training as part of our annual
    Continuing Promise which visited Haiti in the summer of 2009 and will
    return to the many countries of the AOR during the summer of 2010. As
    of 28 February, DOD personnel were directly responsible for performing
    964 total surgeries and treating 9,985 patients.
        The GOH Ministry of Health initial priorities outlined to JTF-H
    were medical supplies and emergency/trauma medical care. Numerous field
    hospitals were established by international partners including
    Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Israel, Jordan, Mexico,
    Russia, Spain, and Turkey, in addition to the six Haitian hospitals
    that remained operational and another nine that were partially
    operational. Combined afloat and ashore medical professionals provided
    medical evacuation and care to thousands of injured Haitians daily and
    conducted hundreds of complex surgical procedures as part of the
    concerted international effort. The Program on Essential Medicine and
    Supplies (PROMESS) warehouse continues to be a key institution in post-
    earthquake Haiti. U.S. military medical logistics experts assisted in
    the initial setup and organization of PROMESS, which has now become a
    nerve center for distribution of supplies to healthcare facilities
    throughout Port au prince.
        The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) supported USAID
    in its coordination of the U.S. medical and public health response and
    later activated the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to
    facilitate the transfer of non-U.S. citizens to medical facilities in
    the United States. As of 28 February, 189 Haitian citizens in need of
    higher levels of care have been transferred via U.S. military aircraft
    to healthcare facilities within the United States. Despite initial
    fears, there was no indication of widespread communicable diseases and
    no report to indicate an imminent epidemic. Public health experts from
    the HHS Centers for Disease Control and Prevention continue to monitor
    health conditions related to water safety, food supply, shelter
    conditions and other health threats in order to prioritize immediate
    interventions aimed at preventing major health-related crises. The
    capability of off-shore medical treatment by our surface assets has
    largely been assumed by the GoH, U.N. and nongovernmental organization
    expertise on the ground and we anticipate being able to release these
    assets in the near future.
    Logistics
        Joint Task Force-Haiti, in support of the lead Federal agency,
    USAID, focused on expanding and securing aid distribution networks to
    speed delivery of relief supplies to the Haitian people. With the port
    damaged, the only means of initially flowing relief supplies in--and
    evacuating U.S. citizens and eligible family members, orphans, and
    medical patients out--was through the Port au Prince airport. Although
    the control tower was destroyed, the runway was intact. We therefore
    immediately requested specialized capabilities to rapidly open the
    airport to receive relief supplies, equipment, personnel, and forces.
    This included the combat controllers of the 720th Special Operations
    Group who were on the ground within 26 hours of the earthquake,
    providing critical Air Traffic Control capabilities as well as
    directing ramp operations. From zero inbound traffic hours after the
    quake, these battlefield Airmen had the airport back operating at 60
    flights per day within 72 hours, approximately triple the normal
    capacity before the earthquake. These specialists worked all-day, all-
    night, and in all weather conditions . . . and they did all this
    without any radar. The special operators were followed closely by
    aviation elements from TRANSCOM as part of their JTF-PO deployment. To
    meet the tremendous demand, we also worked with the government of the
    Dominican Republic and opened additional air and sea ports of entry
    within their territory and contracted commercial carriers to move
    supplies and equipment overland from these airfields into Haiti.
        Working with Haitian aviation administration officials, JTF-H
    personnel established the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center
    which constructed a phone, then web-based, system for flight slot
    allocation scheduling. This greatly increased our scheduling efficiency
    and tracking effectiveness, quickly bringing the airfield to a 120-140
    flights per day average. The total number of flights eventually began a
    steady decline at the airport as demand decreased and efforts to reopen
    the seaport steadily progressed to eventually exceeding pre-quake
    delivery capacity. Today the majority of flights are being controlled
    by Haitian air traffic controllers. On 18 February, we safely and
    successfully evacuated the last of 16,412 U.S. citizens and eligible
    family members, perhaps the largest ever peacetime single evacuation of
    U.S. citizens. Beginning 19 February, commercial air service from
    American Airlines resumed with 3 daily flights between Haiti and the
    United States and twice a week Air France flights between Paris and
    Haiti. The return of service is a positive indicator of stability and
    signals to the international community that the situation is
    normalizing.
        In addition to airlift assistance, elements of JTF-Haiti continue
    delivering supplies, equipment, and personnel. As of 26 February, DOD
    has distributed 2,292,431 meals and 2,615,888 bottles of water, in
    addition to assisting in expanding and securing aid distribution
    networks to speed delivery of relief supplies to the Haitian people.
    The demand for JTF assistance in the distribution of supplies has
    dropped significantly as the capacity of the U.N., USAID, and
    nongovernmental organizations has increased. Our personnel continue to
    coordinate with USAID and OCHA to define areas in which U.S. military
    support is required.
        Under the leadership of the GoH, the WFP began a targeted and
    systematic food distribution effort using predetermined distribution
    locations. In consultation with the GoH and interested stakeholders, 16
    different sites around the capital were identified to serve as fixed
    distribution points, instead of attempting to deliver to different
    settlements throughout the city. U.S. military forces from the 82nd
    Airborne Division and the 22nd and 24th MEUs worked closely with
    MINUSTAH forces and Haitian National Police personnel to ensure
    locations, routes and distribution of aid was calm, orderly and without
    incident. In total, the program provided humanitarian assistance (in
    quantities of 15-day rations) to approximately 9,000 families per site,
    per day. The initial 14-day operation was a large success in
    establishing a sustainable and predictable food distribution program
    that reached over 2.9 million Haitians, exceeding their original goal
    by almost 1 million people. WFP's Food Surge 7-day Phase 1B concluded
    on 20 February with an estimated 19,000 families reached. The WFP
    estimates that the Port-au-Prince area consumes 16-20 metric tons of
    rice per month. Through the combined efforts of the U.N., USAID, eight
    nongovernmental organizations, and U.S. forces, the surge was able to
    provide approximately two-thirds of the rice needed in the Port-au-
    Prince area for the past 30 days. The WFP began their current phase of
    operations on 6 March and has stated no U.S. military presence or other
    support was needed, as MINUSTAH and HNP personnel would be utilized
    exclusively.
    Overall Assessment
        It has been 2 months since the earthquake and signs of recovery are
    emerging. The massive outpouring of international relief efforts, with
    strong support from Latin America and Caribbean countries, has not only
    sped up the recovery but also enabled the building of a better Haiti.
    The overall security situation remains stable and continues to improve,
    with only sporadic incidents of small-scale violence occurring.
    MINUSTAH forces, in conjunction with a revitalized Haitian National
    Police force, have a presence throughout the country with specific
    emphasis on historical hot spots like Cite Soleil and other areas in
    and around Port au Prince.
        Consistent and predictive aid distribution remains the single-most
    important factor in maintaining the relatively calm security situation.
    The immediate needs of food and water have been replaced by the more
    enduring stability requirements of adequate shelter and proper
    sanitation, particularly as the rainy season approaches. Infrastructure
    repairs have begun and are primarily being carried out by civilian
    engineering experts under contract, like the arrangement between
    Crowley Marine and the National Port Authority (APN). Beginning 25
    February, Crowley brought their own temporary barge, placed it in the
    inner harbor, and then the following day the M/V Crowley Shipper
    delivered 50 foot sections to be used as ramps. On 27 February, APN
    Blue--the Crowley temporary next to the north pier of Port au Prince
    achieved initial operational capability (IOC) for the first time since
    the earthquake. As a result of such relief efforts, airport and seaport
    commerce are returning to pre-earthquake or higher levels of business.
    From all sources, there are no indications an external mass migration
    is imminent.
        Our original mission assigned to us was conduct Foreign
    Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) in support of U.S.
    Government efforts in Haiti, in order to mitigate near term human
    suffering and accelerate recovery. As we near achievement of that
    mission, I am taking a broader look at how we will support the larger
    U.S. Government and U.N. through more traditional security cooperation
    means to sustain security and stability. Although we have made great
    strides, coordinated planning and on-going communications toward unity
    of effort remains a challenging task; these are critical enablers to
    ensuring the conditions are right for our transition. The Armed Forces
    will continue to execute the mission in support of USAID and the
    international community in providing humanitarian aid and disaster
    relief. We do not intend to leave a large military footprint, but we
    will continue to plan for and remain prepared to respond with a range
    of options to contingency situations, such as another natural disaster,
    which may necessitate a return to Haiti in the future.
        When the appropriate conditions are met, we will effectively
    transition our relief efforts to other U.S. Government agencies, the
    U.N., and nongovernmental organizations, thereby demonstrating the
    ability to conduct an effective transfer of responsibility to civilian
    authority. The culture of cooperation, openness and transparency we
    have developed; the relationships we have built; and, the emphasis U.S.
    Southern Command has placed on partnering in the past few years have
    all paid a particularly high return on investment in Operation Unified
    Response, the largest humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
    mission ever conducted in this region. Haiti may serve as a rare
    unifying event, not only for the agencies and departments of the U.S.
    Government, but also for the Nations of this region--at the end of the
    day, we are all here for one reason: the people of Haiti.
        Finally, I offer one personal observation: I have now made five
    different trips to Haiti--one before the earthquake and four since--and
    on each occasion, I continue to be amazed by the strength, courage and
    resiliency of the Haitian people. Their collective character is evident
    throughout this tragedy. This is a powerful display of stoic
    determination--accepting and enduring the reality of the present, while
    foreseeing, believing in and taking the first basic steps to ensure,
    the promise of a better future. The citizens of Haiti have shown
    themselves to be a proud, strong, and persevering people.
                                  requirements
        Illegal trafficking, associated criminal activity, gangs, terrorist
    financing and recruitment, natural disasters--none of these recognize
    national sovereignty or stop at a nation's border. These challenges to
    collective security, stability and prosperity cannot be overcome by any
    one nation alone; they require transnational solutions. They cannot be
    overcome by the military alone; they require a truly integrated
    interagency, non-governmental organization and even private sector
    approach.
        To that end, U.S. Southern Command works not only to build partner
    capability and capacity, but also to build strategically important
    cooperative security relationships throughout the region. Among the
    military and security forces in the region, we focus on helping to
    build greater capability and capacity, as well as striving to improve
    our collective ability to plan, direct, and operate. Within the
    interagency community, we endeavor to enhance cooperation while
    advocating for our partner's greater capability and capacity at every
    opportunity. Finally, with the private sector, business community, and
    non-governmental organizations, we seek to leverage their skills and
    expertise to greatly improve our combined impact and effect.
    Supporting Interagency Partners
        While remaining fully ready for combat operations, diplomacy
    dominates so much of what we do, and development is a mandatory
    requisite feature of true, long-term stability and prosperity. We
    support our interagency partners who have the lead in addressing the
    significant illicit trafficking and crime challenges in the region. To
    that end, we support initiatives to increase the pool of resources
    available to our partner agencies who are the leads and experts in
    these arenas. As we engage and support the lead efforts of the State
    Department, USAID, DHS, Justice, and others in the field, we also lend
    our advocacy for increased resources for these agencies to more
    effectively deal with the endemic problems in the region, improve the
    capabilities of partner nations' police and law enforcement agencies,
    and strengthen judicial systems and institutions.
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
        U.S. Southern Command has a continuous requirement for persistent
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), defined as having
    the right asset able to observe and understand what is going on,
    especially in denied areas. Whether conducting CN/CT operations or
    large-scale foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
    missions, we need fast, flexible and properly vetted information that
    then becomes actionable intelligence and we pinpoint the locations
    where our forces and resources can do the most good--with sufficient
    time to get them there. However, this requires improved imagery
    intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor integration, signals
    intelligence, moving target indicators, layered ISR architecture and
    management tools, biometrics, counterintelligence and human collectors.
    The combined products create a common operating picture that can and
    needs to be shared with our partners and allies whenever possible. This
    requires, then, all-source synthesis-node sensor resource management.
    We continue to work with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
    and industry for innovative solutions to address additional ISR sources
    to gain improved situational awareness.
        Throughout Operation Unified Response, ISR assets have been an
    invaluable resource. UAVs and other assets have provided outstanding
    situational awareness and early warning indicators in areas of
    potential violence, determining status of critical infrastructure,
    assessing gathering crowds, analyzing internally displaced person
    camps, determining traffic ability of lines of communication, and
    security at WFP distribution points. ISR assets have had a positive
    impact on decisionmaking by enabling the efficient use of scarce
    resources.
        In particular, the information provided has assisted in placing
    only the necessary number of USAID and nongovernmental organization
    workers at distribution sites, scheduling the movement of supplies and
    personnel along the most efficient routes, and when and where to deploy
    security forces.
        We conduct varied and diverse detection and monitoring operations
    that require a high state of readiness and a joint effort to link
    multi-intelligence collectors targeted against strategic, operational
    and tactical requirements. Expanding the melding of organic and
    national collection resources will improve operations and fulfill the
    ongoing requirement for continuous and persistent intelligence,
    surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). This effort requires the
    appropriate awareness systems, namely: unmanned aerial craft with rapid
    response and good transit and loiter capability; remote light detection
    and ranging for foliage penetration; high-speed, unmanned surface
    vessels for detection and identification to support maritime domain
    awareness; commercial satellite sensors with the ability to detect `go-
    fast' boats; next generation `over the horizon' radars; non-electro-
    optical imagery that enables change detection; and, novel applications
    of existing technology to facilitate cross-domain awareness.
    Continued Commitment to Colombia
        One of the most dramatic examples of U.S. Southern Command working
    to build partner nation capability and capacity in our AOR can be found
    in our enduring engagement through providing training, logistical, and
    technical support to the military and security forces of Colombia.
    Colombia is a strategic ally, an important friend, and a crucial anchor
    for security and stability in the region. Unfortunately, they are also
    the world's predominant source of cocaine and home to the narco-
    terrorist group the FARC.
        Over the last 8 years, the Colombians have done a magnificent job
    of reclaiming their nation from both right-wing and left-wing illegal
    armed groups. Through its own military and whole-of-government efforts,
    and a steady stream of resources and support from the U.S., Colombia
    has made great strides towards building security and stability. Today,
    the approval rating of the democratically elected government led by
    President Uribe is just under 70 percent. The approval rating of the
    FARC, on the other hand, is less than 2 percent. Despite this dwindling
    public support, the FARC still maintains approximately 8,500 fighters
    in the field, down from approximately 18,000. They remain kidnappers,
    torturers, murderers, and drug dealers. This is essentially their
    `business model' and they are unfortunately and definitively still in
    business.
        The government's and military's efforts against the FARC have also
    significantly impacted drug cartels, as Colombia has extradited more
    than 900 drug traffickers to the United States. Although cocaine
    production is still a critical concern, interdiction and seizures of
    cocaine headed to the United States and to other destinations in the
    region and abroad, have more than doubled in the last 10 years. This
    increase indicates improved state control, successful government
    strategies, and overall better interagency and international
    coordination and collaboration. These efforts have helped contribute to
    the fastest sustained economic growth in a decade--greater than 5
    percent annually from 2006-2008, providing a sense of positive momentum
    for the entire country.
        We must now capitalize on the successes achieved thus far to ensure
    Colombia remains a long-term strategic regional and global partner.
    Continued U.S. commitment and support for the Colombian Armed Forces'
    campaign to defeat the FARC, as well as for Colombian interagency
    efforts to bring governance and economic opportunity to areas
    recaptured from the FARC, is essential. This support can come in many
    forms but should entail continued training and development of key
    capabilities we are seeing showcased in their cooperation with Mexico
    and deployment to Haiti, and human rights programs to continue the
    significant improvements in human rights by the Armed Forces in recent
    years. With U.S. help, a stable and secure Colombia is achievable in
    the near term as they emerge as a strategic partner, positive exporter
    of security and democratic model for the region, directly increasing
    the security of all citizens of the Americas.
    Countering Illicit Trafficking
        The November 2009 Central American and Caribbean Chiefs of Mission
    Conference held at our headquarters in Miami highlighted the need for a
    regional, synergistic whole-of-many-governments approach to counter
    illicit trafficking. Just as the successes of the Governments of Peru
    and Bolivia in reducing coca cultivation in their countries during the
    1980s and early 1990s caused a shift in cultivation and production to
    Colombia, we are concerned that current eradication and interdiction
    successes in Colombia are causing a corresponding increase in Peruvian
    and Bolivian cultivation. For example, according to the most recent
    crop estimate from the U.S. Government, potential cocaine production in
    Columbia dropped 39 percent between 2007 and 2008. The potential
    production of pure cocaine fell from an estimated 485 metric tons in
    2007 to 295 metric tons in 2008. Further, the area under cultivation
    dropped 29 percent during the same timeframe while Peruvian cultivation
    increased by 14 percent and Bolivian cultivation by 8 percent in the
    same time period. Furthermore, from 2000-2008, Peru's total area under
    illicit coca cultivation increased by 30 percent, while Bolivia's has
    nearly doubled.
        Similarly, as President Calderon takes the fight to illicit
    trafficking organizations in Mexico, Central America is experiencing an
    increase in activity as traffickers are squeezed between Colombia and
    Mexico. This movement is exacerbated by successes of aerial and
    maritime interdiction efforts, which are pushing traffickers to favor
    land routes through the Central American isthmus. As traffickers and
    their support networks relocate to Central America, they also bring
    with them the associated ills of government corruption, crime, and gang
    activity which undermine good governance and threaten public security.
        As a result of the discussions during the Chiefs of Mission
    Conference, we are working with the Intelligence Community to produce
    an analysis of the larger, regional and global illicit trafficking
    enterprise, looking at networks, routes and organizations throughout
    the entire region, as opposed to just one or two countries. The
    construct we are using encompasses the production, acquisition, storage
    and/or transfer of illicit drugs; illegal arms trafficking; money
    laundering; human trafficking and smuggling of special interest aliens;
    WMD and WMD precursors; and, all of their supporting activities.
        This analysis will help the Department of State and the interagency
    community to coordinate an integrated approach to counter illicit
    trafficking and associated activities in the Western Hemisphere. The
    Department of State already has several excellent sub-regional
    strategies to address this challenge such as Beyond Merida, the Central
    American Regional Security Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security
    Initiative, and the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative. U.S.
    Southern Command performs Theater Security Cooperation activities that
    are in support of Merida Initiative and Caribbean security initiative
    efforts, and help to build partner nation military capability and
    capacity in Central America and the Caribbean. Lessons learned from
    U.S. support to Colombia show the importance of an integrated and
    unified overarching strategy to address insecurity and instability
    caused by the combined ills of illicit trafficking.
                                   conclusion
        During my 9 months of leading the outstanding men and women of U.S.
    Southern Command, I have been fortunate to work closely with our
    civilian and military leaders, as well as with our partners to the
    south, to improve the security and stability of our region. Together we
    are continuing the great work of those who have gone before us and
    building upon the foundation of their efforts in seeking multinational,
    ``whole of government'' and in some cases ``whole of society''
    approaches to create a secure and stable environment that set the
    conditions for long-term prosperity for the Americas.
        This region plays a critical role in the security and prosperity of
    the United States. Despite some challenges, I believe that through the
    sharing of ideas, economic interdependence, cultural understanding and
    harnessing innovation, we can strengthen existing ties of friendship to
    build an integrated approach to partnering that will ensure U.S.
    Southern Command is a welcomed military partner of choice in this
    hemisphere. There are many opportunities ahead to improve hemispheric
    security cooperation. We will continue to pursue multinational, multi-
    agency and public-private partnerships to confront the challenges and
    embrace the opportunities of the Americas. We will continue to dedicate
    the majority of our resources to building and complementing the
    security capabilities of our partners while encouraging an environment
    of cooperation among the Nations in the region. We will continue to
    defend the United States, foster regional security, and be an enduring
    partner to help enhance regional hemispheric security and stability.
    The mutual benefits of these partnering efforts are profound.
        Ultimately, our success in pursuit of these objectives depends upon
    our military and civilian personnel and their families, as well as
    those men and women serving with us from our partner agencies. I thank
    you again for your continued interest in, dedication to and support of
    the men and women of U.S. Southern Command and their families--they are
    volunteers and patriots, and I am humbled to lead them and serve with
    them every day.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Fraser.
        We welcome, also, your wife here, but she must be a little
    bit jealous when she hears General Renuart's wife is going to
    have her hubby back full-time.
        Let me ask you some questions, General Renuart. First, one
    of the major objectives in the creation of NORTHCOM was to
    create a dedicated command to support civil authorities. DOD is
    now standing up a subunified Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), under
    U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), that--it appears that that
    command is going to provide direct support to civil authorities
    in cyberspace, both in defense of the government and in defense
    of commercial networks. Is there a role for NORTHCOM in
    cybersecurity? If so, what is it?
        General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, there absolutely is a role,
    and I think we have developed a very strong relationship with
    STRATCOM. As CYBERCOM fully stands up, we'll continue that
    relationship with them.
        Our role is, if you will, a consumer of the cybersecurity
    that STRATCOM and CYBERCOM have been designed to provide. We
    have a unique circumstance, in that many of our mission
    partners operate outside of the traditional so-called dot-mil
    [.mil] environment. So our partnership with DHS, as they
    provide protection to the dot-gov [.gov] domains, and then with
    the commercial private-sector partners, like Google and
    Microsoft and others, we are building a close relationship. We
    then determine the requirements that STRATCOM must meet in
    order to provide that security.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        I forgot to mention, let's have an 8-minute first round of
    questioning.
        General Renuart, the administration has a policy of
    requiring operationally-realistic testing of missile defense
    systems, and there is a new Missile Defense Master Test Plan,
    that's designed to collect the data necessary to provide
    confidence in the operational effectiveness of all of our
    missile defense systems, including the GMD system. First, do
    you agree it is necessary to have operationally realistic
    testing? Do you agree with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA),
    that the new test plan will provide operationally realistic
    data and will provide the basis for having confidence in the
    capability and the reliability of the GMD system over its
    service life?
        General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I do support that, and I do
    believe it will give us good data to support the systems, and
    we work closely with the MDA on this.
        Chairman Levin. Last year, Secretary Gates decided to cap
    deployment of the GMD system in Alaska and California at 30
    operational ground-based interceptors (GBIs), and to make
    significant improvements in their reliability. This committee
    and Congress approved that plan. Do you agree with Defense
    Secretary Gates that deploying 30 operationally effective and
    reliable GBIs would provide an effective defense against the
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile threat from North Korea and
    Iran?
        General Renuart. Mr. Chairman I do believe it provides us
    that capability. I'm confident in the capabilities of the
    systems. I think the phased adaptive approach identified by the
    Secretary will allow us to grow a broader system of capability
    against potential growing Iranian threats.
        Chairman Levin. As you just mentioned, the President
    announced a new missile defense plan for Europe that had been
    unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff. That plan includes a number of elements that are
    intended to enhance defense of the United States against
    potential future long-range Iranian missiles: a forward-
    deployed radar in southeastern Europe, and development of an
    improved version of the Standard Missile-3 Block II for
    deployment in Europe. Do you agree that this phased adaptive
    approach that's being planned for Europe will improve our
    capability to defend the homeland against potential future
    long-range missiles from Iran?
        General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely do agree. I
    think there is, and we'll continue to see the testing and
    development of the systems as they mature, but initial
    information looks very promising.
        Chairman Levin. All right. Finally, on this subject, there
    was a recent GMD flight test--it was at the end of January, I
    believe--where the system failed to achieve an intercept. Can
    you tell us why it failed?
        General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I'm not a true expert at
    this, but my understanding, as the operational commander, is
    that the integration between the sea-based X-band radar and the
    missile--the test intercept vehicle itself--had a software
    glitch in there which prevent information from reaching the
    interceptor in an important phase of that flight test. I know
    that General O'Reilly is working very carefully to correct the
    software issues there, and we look forward to the FTG-07, which
    will be the next test, coming up in the not too distant future.
        Chairman Levin. We understand there were two issues there,
    and if you would submit, for the record, whether that's
    accurate; and if so, what the second problem was.
        General Renuart. Chairman, if I could, can I take that
    for----
        Chairman Levin. Yes, for the record.
        General Renuart. Please, and we'll get that specific detail
    back to the committee.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The recent Ground-Based Midcourse Defense flight test number -06,
    conducted on 31 January 2010, did not result in an intercept. There
    were two issues and early indications are that either issue could have
    led to a failed intercept. The two issues appear unrelated at this
    time.
        The first issue observed in the test was the Sea-based X-Band Radar
    stopped operating prior to providing adequate information needed by the
    interceptor in an important phase of the flight. The second issue
    observed in the test was the interceptor did not successfully complete
    the final phases of flight required for an intercept.
        The Missile Defense Agency has an extensive investigation ongoing
    to determine the causes of the failure to intercept.

        Chairman Levin. That would be fine.
        General Fraser, last month the Colombian Constitutional
    Court ruled that President Uribe would not be permitted to run
    for a third term. Has there been a fallout from that? Is there
    enough time to have an appropriate election? It's a fairly
    short period, apparently, before that election takes place. Are
    things calm? Are there any concerns?
        General Fraser. Chairman Levin, I do not have any concerns.
    I think there is adequate time to hold the election. The
    election process has been going on while their Supreme Court
    was deliberating on its decision, so I think there's adequate
    time. There's a number of candidates who are actively running,
    and so, I'm confident that Colombia will be able to run a fair
    and equitable election.
        Chairman Levin. General Fraser, the--relative to Cuba--as I
    understand it, we have almost no military contact with Cuba.
    The only ongoing contact is apparently this low-level, kind of,
    monthly fence talks, I guess they're called. But, there's also
    a case-by-case cooperation in the antidrug efforts,
    particularly at sea. Apparently, there's notice if there's fast
    boats going through Cuban waters. I'm wondering, assuming that
    there is no prohibition in law--and we don't think Helms-Burton
    does have a prohibition of that kind of contact with the
    Cubans--is there any value in increased U.S. military contact
    with the Cuban military?
        General Fraser. Chairman Levin, there is, as you mentioned,
    tactical-level interaction--fence-line talks--and the U.S.
    Coast Guard has a liaison in the U.S.-interest mission there in
    Havana. Our understanding--and I'll go back and check this--is
    that military-to-military relations are prohibited until the
    Government of Cuba elects a democratically-elected government,
    and does not include either Fidel Castro or President Raul
    Castro in as part of that government. So that's our
    understanding of it, from an engagement with militaries, we
    look to engage with every military organization within the
    region. We continue to do that with all our partners. So if the
    opportunity is presented for us to do that, we would welcome
    that opportunity.
        Chairman Levin. All right. Well, doublecheck Helms-Burton,
    if you would, because----
        General Fraser. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin.--we don't read it that way. We welcome your
    testimony.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator, our understanding is Helms-Burton does not prohibit
    military-to-military contact with the Government of Cuba. Certainly,
    placing a U.S. servicemember at the Interest Section in Havana, could
    conceivably offer an opportunity to build rapport and trust. However,
    current Department of State and U.S. Government policy is that such
    military-to-military meetings and contact with the Government of Cuba
    are restricted as part of a U.S. Government effort to ensure
    consistency of message and to deny the Cuban regime the opportunity to
    mischaracterize contacts between U.S. and Cuban officials.

        General Fraser, there's a--in terms of the situation in
    Haiti, I believe you--you've mentioned that there's some
    redeployments now that are going on, and that will continue,
    but there's some enablers that SOUTHCOM apparently will leave,
    some capabilities that you're going to leave in Haiti. Can you
    just describe that briefly?
        General Fraser. Mr. Chairman, we're still early in the
    discussion and planning of that. It's an evolving situation.
    The focus right now on the ground is helping make sure shelter,
    sanitation, and security needs are met, especially for the
    numbers of displaced people. That is the evolving situation
    right now. So, we're looking to support USAID, the other
    international efforts, with the right types of capability. So,
    I don't have good definition for you right now of what that
    will be.
        Chairman Levin. All right.
        Let me ask both of you, on a subject which we've spent some
    time on, and obviously will be considering, and that's the
    possible repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'' Let me just ask
    you your personal views, essentially.
        General Renuart, let me start with you. What are your
    personal views as to whether we should continue that policy or
    whether we ought to repeal it?
        General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I think--my personal view, I
    think, probably is very close to what you heard with General
    Petraeus, his testimony a short time ago. I believe that we
    have all served, through the course of our tenure, with
    individuals who were gay or lesbian, and who were not allowed
    to talk about that. I think those individuals served honorably.
    I think the importance of maintaining the standards of
    discipline is critical to our military. But, I believe that we
    should not hold, if you will, those individuals ``hostage''
    because of the policy we have.
        So, I think it's appropriate that we conduct the detailed
    study the Secretary has asked us to conduct and--so that we
    understand the implications, and then we move forward.
        Chairman Levin. Okay.
        General Fraser, do you have a personal view?
        General Fraser. Chairman Levin, my views very much
    correspond to that of General Renuart, and that is that I think
    it's really appropriate that we do a very deliberate
    understanding of what the President's intent is in relation to
    ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'' So I support what General Renuart
    said.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Well, thank you Mr. Chairman.
        Obviously all of us have served with people who are of that
    sexual orientation. They have served honorably. That's not the
    question. It's the question, which I think you have answered,
    and I guess I'd ask you to repeat, is that we have to
    understand the implications of repeal before we make a decision
    on repeal. Would that be an accurate reflection of your views?
        General Renuart. Senator McCain, it would be.
        Senator McCain. General Fraser?
        General Fraser. Senator McCain, I agree.
        Senator McCain. So, a moratorium would obviously be a de
    facto repeal of the policy before we have understood the
    implications for battle effectiveness on the men and women in
    the military. So, I'd--I appreciate your views, and I share
    them. For the Congress of the United States to take action
    before we have had a thorough review of the policy, not of the
    way to repeal the policy would be the best way to proceed,
    would you agree?
        General Renuart. Senator McCain, just to be clear, I guess.
    Is it my view that we should have a moratorium?
        Senator McCain. Yes.
        General Renuart. I think we ought not to have a moratorium
    while we conduct this. I think, as the Secretary and the
    Chairman and the Service Chiefs have all indicated, that would
    cause, I think, some confusion in that process. So I think,
    better to let the study go, and then make a decision.
        Senator McCain. Thank you very much. Unfortunately, there
    are efforts to impose a moratorium, which would be tantamount
    to repeal. But, I'd like to move on.
        General Renuart, could you describe to me, in--as short as
    possible, but terms that perhaps Americans can understand, how
    dangerous the situation is on our southern border vis-a-vis the
    drug cartels, the existential threat to the Government of
    Mexico--I'm asking you to make it short, but speak to the
    problems of corruption, and the possibility that that violence
    can spill over onto our side of the border. This is an issue
    that I--I don't know why we haven't--Americans haven't had the
    visibility of how great a threat and danger this is to the very
    existence of the Government of Mexico, and the effect that it's
    having on public opinion in Mexico.
        General Renuart. Senator McCain, thanks for that question.
    This is, as you mentioned, really the principal struggle that
    the Government of Mexico is undergoing. President Calderon has
    courageously put his military in the field to take this on,
    where local law enforcement officials have been corrupted or
    intimidated. That's not the traditional role of the Mexican
    military, and it does put some strain on them, but we are
    working very closely to share the lessons we've learned, in
    places like Afghanistan and others, to do that.
        The violence in places like Juarez has been substantial. I
    think we are close to 7,000 murders that occurred in 2009.
        Senator McCain. At 7,000 murders.
        General Renuart.--7,000, and I must say, drug-related
    murders that generally were cartel-on-cartel, but that spills
    over into the population. The Mexicans----
        Senator McCain. Murders of individuals who are part of the
    Mexican drug enforcement and military and others; they've
    singled them out for assassination, including those that have
    been trained by the United States.
        Is that true?
        General Renuart. Senator, I'm not sure about the last
    statement, ``including those trained.'' I know we've had some
    people that we have trained in the past that were involved and
    corrupted--
        Senator McCain. No, I meant who were assassinated.
        General Renuart. Senator, I believe there are a small
    number that were U.S.-trained Mexicans. But, certainly your
    other statement is absolutely correct. These are individuals
    who are competing for, if you will, market share in the drug
    business. Cartels are very aggressively taking each other on
    to, if you will, build the distribution process, the market
    share.
        So, that continues, and we are working aggressively with
    our Mexican partners to help build an interagency capacity for
    Mexico to deal with this. I'm cautious, when we talk about the
    level of threat to the Mexican Government, because I think
    President Calderon is strong, I think he enjoys support, and I
    think he's aggressively working this, and growing an
    interagency team that can be effective.
        Senator McCain. I don't mean to interrupt you, but isn't it
    also true, though, that Mexican public opinion, because of this
    level of violence, is beginning to turn, frankly, in the wrong
    direction? Is that----
        General Renuart. Yes.
        Senator McCain. Do you have----
        General Renuart. We have----
        Senator McCain.--indications of that?
        General Renuart.--seen that the public opinion polls have
    come down, on this regard. Although, I will say, in recent--in
    just the recent month, I've seen some numbers where the Mexican
    people have continued to express their support in Calderon's
    efforts. So, it's a little bit of a balance in that regard.
        Finally, Senator, just very quickly with respect to the
    border area, here----
        Senator McCain. Would you also mention the problem of
    corruption?
        General Renuart. Absolutely. Across--especially in the
    local police areas, the local governing officials, that element
    of corruption has become significant. It is the means by which
    the cartels, if you will, create their influence on government,
    essentially to leave them alone, to not interfere with the
    drug-trade business. There has been a substantial effort placed
    by the Mexican government to replace corrupt officials in the
    towns and communities; but it takes time to build those
    credible leaders back up, and that's still a work in progress.
        Senator McCain. Would you, for the record, provide the
    committee with recommendations of what more you think we need
    to do, including the success or failures of Plan Merida? I'd
    appreciate that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator, I believe the way ahead for Plan Merida is to focus a
    greater part of our effort on Central America via the Central American
    Region Security Initiative in an overall strategic framework to enhance
    our Central American partners' territorial control capabilities in the
    maritime, land, and air corridors. The end state would be to maximize
    our effectiveness to fight criminal organizations by assisting our
    regional partners in the disruption of illicit activities such as drug,
    weapons, and human trafficking that adversely impact the sovereign
    control of their territories and threaten the southern approaches to
    the United States. We have been successful by accelerating the
    expansion of the maritime interdiction capabilities of five of our
    Central American partners.

        Senator McCain. I understand we're spending about $400
    million in a year cooperating with the Mexican Government on
    this issue.
        General Renuart. Yes, sir. That's correct. Senator McCain,
    if I could, for the record, give you a much more detailed look,
    both in that area and our cooperation with law enforcement
    along the border, because I think there's a good news story
    there.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Through the Merida Initiative, $415.5 million in Foreign Military
    Financing funds was appropriated in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the
    purchase of the following military equipment for Mexico:

             $200 million for four CASA maritime surveillance
            aircraft
             $110 million for three UH-60M helicopters
             $105 million for eight Bell 412 helicopters, seven of
            which are funded.
             Congress is withholding 15 percent of the fiscal year
            2009 Omnibus appropriation ($5.85 million) due to their
            concerns over the Mexican military's human rights record
             $500,000 for 13 handheld ion scanners

        These deliverables will provide the Mexican military with urgently-
    needed capabilities in the areas of tactical rapid troop transport,
    overwater surveillance, and drug detection to support Mexican law
    enforcement. I believe they will be valuable additions to the Mexican
    military's capabilities that will immediately be used to help tackle
    illicit narcotics trafficking operations. As long as the Mexican
    military has a leading role in Mexico's national campaign to disrupt
    the capacity of organized crime to operate and manage their land and
    maritime borders, my belief is that they will continue to need these
    kinds of assets. This is a national-level campaign that requires
    national-level capabilities.
        The Mexican Government has embarked on a long-term effort to
    rebuild their security institutions. Training is a major component of
    this initiative and focused equipment is necessary to building security
    capacity. Along these lines, they will need a large infusion of
    additional support to build the kinds of capacities needed to defend
    Mexican territorial sovereignty and counter transnational threats like
    illicit trafficking. Their most urgent needs are troop and equipment
    airlift; secure communications; information collection, analysis,
    sharing, and fusion with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement communities;
    riverine and littoral operations; border surveillance; and military
    justice reform (for dealing with an internal security situation for
    which they are not designed to handle). The Merida Initiative thus far
    has been an excellent injection of needed support under a shared U.S.-
    Mexican agreement. But, it's not the final solution to Mexico's
    security requirements.
        The Mexican military is a transitional security force, working now
    in the cities and communities to make gains in combating the cartels
    until the Mexican law enforcement agencies are retooled and ready to
    rejoin the fight. When that happens, the deliverables provided by the
    Merida Initiative and related support should well position the Mexican
    military to focus their emphasis on defending Mexico's territorial
    sovereignty, their air and maritime approaches, having the all-domain
    awareness to detect threats at a distance and interdict them before
    they reach Mexican land. This creates a layered defense for the United
    States and enables a more effective security partnership. For that
    mission, assets such as those from the Merida Initiative will assist in
    developing national-level capacities for all domain awareness, command
    and control, interdiction of threats such as weapons of mass
    destruction and other illicit materials.
        [Deleted.]

        Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
        General Fraser, could I turn to Cuba, a second? They, just
    in the last week or so, a young man named Orlando Zapata died
    on a hunger strike, as a political prisoner in Cuba. After a
    brief experimentation with a small amount of free enterprise,
    the Cuban Government has cracked down. They have even been more
    brutal in their repression of human rights, and their prisons
    have a large number of political dissidents who have simply
    sought to exercise their rights as human beings. Is that true?
        General Fraser. Yes, Senator, that's true.
        Senator McCain. Isn't there also evidence that, from time
    to time, there has been the Cuban government and military
    facilitating the drug trade?
        General Fraser. Senator, I can't confirm that. I'll have to
    take that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I have no evidence that the Cuban Government or military facilitate
    the drug trade.

        Senator McCain. Has there been any cooperation that you
    know of on the part of the Cuban government in trying to
    restrain the drug trade?
        General Fraser. Senator, we have had cooperation, as I
    mentioned--and I'm not the expert on this, because it's really
    within the U.S. Coast Guard--as we look at migration as well as
    the drug trade there within the straits around Cuba.
        Senator McCain. Is there any doubt that the--that Raul
    Castro and Fidel have been more repressive in the last year or
    2 than they were in the past?
        General Fraser. Senator, I think they have continued to
    remain fairly strict on the populace, but I can't quantify
    whether that has been more restrictive over the last couple of
    years than before. So, I need to also get back to you on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Since Raul Castro replaced his brother Fidel Castro as chief of
    state, the government's human rights record has been essentially
    unchanged. When comparing the last two to three years of each Castro's
    rule, the frequency of government crackdowns under Fidel (2003 and
    2005) are consistent with Raul's directed crackdowns (2006, 2008,
    2010), averaging one government crackdown on dissent every 2 years.
    More than 200 political prisoners are currently detained in Cuba; most
    began their sentences under Fidel's reign. For example, in the ``Black
    Spring'' of March 2003, the government arrested 75 human rights
    activists on various charges, ranging from aiding a foreign power to
    violating national security laws. As of March 2010, 54 of the original
    75 prisoners remained incarcerated.

        Senator McCain. Well, then let me commend, for your
    reading, various human rights organizations who have written
    and testified that the Cuban Government is even more
    repressive. I strongly suggest you read that, General. It might
    be illuminating for you.
        Finally, how do you assess the threat of the cooperation
    between Iran and Venezuela? Last week Spain's high court said
    the Venezuelan Government facilitated contacts between the
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and ETA to plan
    the assassination of Colombian officials visiting Spain,
    including President Uribe. Do you have any information on that
    and other activities on the part of the Venezuelan Government?
        General Fraser. Senator, I do not have any direct
    information on that. We have continued to watch very closely
    for any connections between illicit and terrorist organization
    activity within the region. We have not seen any connections,
    specifically, that I can verify that there has been a direct
    government-to-terrorist connection. We are concerned about it.
    I'm skeptical. I continue to watch for it.
        Senator McCain. You have seen evidence of the relationship
    between FARC and the Venezuelan Government. I mean, that's been
    published many times.
        General Fraser. Senator, I know that there's evidence of
    FARC.
        Senator McCain. I mean, they have the hard drives. When
    they raided the FARC camp on the Venezuelan side of the border.
        General Fraser. Sir, the raid where that happened----
        Senator McCain. Excuse me. On the other side of the border.
        General Fraser. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. Yes.
        General Fraser. So, there has been some old evidence, but I
    don't see that evidence. I can't tell you, specifically,
    whether that continues or not.
        Senator McCain. My time is expired.
        I thank the witnesses.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, to both of you, for your service and leadership.
        General Renuart, let me add my personal thank you to you
    for four decades of service to our country. You've done it with
    real honor and excellence, and personally, it's been a pleasure
    to get to know you. I wish you the best in your next chapter. I
    know your wife, as you said, will be happy with your
    retirement, but having watched others retire, I would say, on
    her behalf, that I hope you at least get a part-time job.
        General Renuart. Senator I'm going to work on that.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay. I wish you the best.
        Let me begin with you, General. I am, of course, as chair
    of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
    very interested and appreciative of the way in which NORTHCOM
    has organized and consolidated the U.S. military's involvement
    in homeland defense. You bring unique and critically important
    skills together with DHS.
        DOD has been standing up three brigade-size Consequence
    Management Response Forces (CMRFs) to respond to a chemical,
    biological, radiological, or nuclear attack by terrorists or
    others on our Homeland. I've been very impressed by that, and
    appreciative of it.
        I was unsettled a bit when the recent QDR said that it
    would basically scrap the second and third of those, and
    replace them with 10 smaller Homeland Response Forces to be put
    in each of the 10, basically, Federal Emergency Management
    Agency (FEMA) regions around the country, under DHS. I mean,
    the regional forces have some appeal, but I'm troubled by the
    loss of those two brigade-sized Response Management Forces
    because of the tremendous skills and specialties that they
    would have brought wherever an attack on our country, of this
    serious nature, might occur. So, I wanted to ask you as you
    depart this command, how you feel about that change and whether
    you feel it--these regional forces can do a--as good a job of
    homeland defense as the three brigade-sized CMRFs.
        General Renuart. Senator, thanks. This is an issue that
    obviously went through a lot of discussion within the QDR.
    We've worked very hard to create those brigade-sized forces,
    over the last few years, and, with both the support of the
    committee and the Secretary, have crafted two of those. The
    third was to be made operational this year.
        The concern within the discussions of the QDR is that these
    forces may not be as responsive as a force that is, if you
    will, deployed and lives out in each of these FEMA regions.
    After much discussion, the Secretaries made a decision to
    adjust this format a bit.
        I think our role in this has been certainly involved in the
    discussions, but--to take the concept that was developed
    through the QDR discussions and turn it into an operational
    construct that is effective and executable. That work is
    ongoing today, Senator Lieberman. I think that there is some
    work to do, still, to ensure that, not only do you have trained
    and equipped forces in these regional areas, but they are
    accessible and agile and deployable enough to meet the
    expectations and the assumptions that were central to the QDR
    discussions.
        We still have a little work to do on that. Is it possible
    that they will be as effective? Yes, sir, I think it is. It
    really depends on the fact that we will make a commitment to
    train and fund and make these integratable, if you will, into a
    capable force when a large-scale event occurs. That's our role
    in NORTHCOM. We're working hard on that. We still have work to
    do before I can give you a definitive answer.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay. Well, we're going to keep in touch
    on that, because--and you phrased it exactly in terms of my
    concerns, which is whether these 10 regional forces will be
    able to quickly deploy with the range of skills to the site of
    an attack where we'll need something as large as a brigade, or
    two or three, to protect the people and stand up the region
    again.
        I want to understand--make, just, clear for the record--
    will the one brigade-sized force remain in effect?
        General Renuart. Yes, Senator, it will. In fact, it will
    grow----
        Senator Lieberman. Yes.
        General Renuart.--by about 700 individuals of--with those
    same critical lifesaving skill sets.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Renuart. So, that will remain. It will be focused
    on an Active Duty brigade, so it gives you the most rapid
    access to that----
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Renuart.--to that force. In addition, then, we will
    have two smaller forces that will be predominantly the command
    and control, the logistics, the joint reception, and some
    immediate lifesaving capability in those two smaller forces.
    But, they're really designed to receive so-called general-
    purpose forces in a large-scale event.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay.
        Let me move on to the GMD system that has been mentioned.
    In the move to the phased adaptive system that we're going to
    now, the--there's some question about the future of the two-
    stage GBI. I know there's supposed to still be some testing of
    it going on.
        I wanted to ask you, as you sort of prepare to retire,
    whether you believe we should continue to develop and test the
    two-stage GBI, for instance, as a hedge against a possible
    Iranian breakout, and whether--particularly in regard to the
    homeland defense, whether NORTHCOM has studied options for
    deploying a two-stage GBI in the United States to give another
    layer of defense to our homeland.
        General Renuart. Senator, the operational test program does
    continue to include both the two- and the three-stage test. We
    are fully supportive of that. As we have had discussions with
    both DOD and with the MDA, our support for the phased adaptive
    approach is strong. We're confident that it has real potential,
    but we've also asked the Secretary and received, I think,
    budgetary support to not foreclose the capabilities that might
    be resident in a two- or a three-stage interceptor. So, we do
    support that continued testing; and my information is, that
    continues to stay on track.
        With respect to the phased adaptive approach, I think that
    the--certainly the information, so far, looks very positive, a
    very capable system. So, we're supportive of that. We think it
    gives us great added depth to our homeland defense capability.
    Again, we don't want to foreclose any possibilities in the
    future, so continuing that testing is important to us.
        Senator Lieberman. Good. Good to hear. I agree with that
    totally.
        General Fraser, let me ask you a big-picture question,
    because I think we often find that the regional commanders have
    some of the best views of the regions in which they lead,
    because of the comprehensiveness of their context with the
    region. So, as you step back and look at SOUTHCOM, Latin
    America generally, plus, there seems to be, here, as in other
    parts of the world, an ongoing, sort of, conflict or
    competition between the forces of freedom, generally speaking,
    and the forces of dictatorship; the forces of socialist
    economies, and free economies; friends of the United States,
    and enemies of the United States. So, at this moment, where
    would you say the momentum is? Who's winning? How are we--and,
    in a more direct sense, how are we doing in the area of your
    responsibility?
        General Fraser. Senator, I think, overall, we are doing
    well. We continue to have positive relations with most of the
    Nations within the region, especially from military-to-military
    standpoint; we see that very directly. There's only a couple of
    instances where that has really been reduced. Our relations
    with the military in Venezuela is one of those; also, with the
    military in Bolivia, is another. But, overall, those relations
    remain good.
        I see a real competition, as you mentioned, within the
    region, for various ideologies, and they're coming from various
    different directions. That competition continues today.
        Really, I see the view of the United States growing.
    There's a 71-percent approval rating of the U.S. image within
    the general populace within Latin America. So, I see a positive
    trend from our relations within the region growing.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you for that. That 71-percent
    appreciation of the United States in Latin America may be
    higher than the appreciation of the United States in America
    today. I hope we can catch up with them.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, let me echo the comments everyone's made
    about your great service, and how much I appreciate both of
    you, your great wives, and all that stuff.
        General Fraser, let me tell you what I'm not going to ask
    you. I'm not going to ask you if we ought to close Gantanamo
    Bay (GTMO). But, I do want to get something in the record here,
    of my personal feelings. I've had a chance to really get into
    it. I've studied it. There's never been a case of water-
    boarding, and the conditions, the treatment of the people, are
    good down there. It's a secure location. There are
    approximately 200 terrorists left. The low-hanging fruit is
    gone. Of that low-hanging fruit, about 20 percent have the--
    have been back in the fight, according to reports that I have.
    Once the terrorists are physically in the United States, there
    should be no doubt to anyone in this room that these terrorists
    will gain additional constitutional rights and fall within the
    jurisdiction of the Federal courts.
        The attacks leading up to September 11 were not the result
    of holding detainees in GTMO. The attacks of September 11 were
    not the result of holding detainees. The repeated attempts to
    attack this country were not a result of holding detainees.
        Moving detainees held in GTMO to the United States would
    not stop future terrorist attacks to this country. Those guys
    hate us. They want to kill everyone in this room.
        The Americans across the country, they understand this. The
    polling is showing that 2-to-1 say that it shouldn't be closed.
    All these people who are coming up with these great ideas on
    what we can do to bring the terrorists to the United States for
    either incarceration or for trial go to all elaborate detail as
    to how we can do this, what it's going to cost, how we're going
    to build the courts. There's a simpler answer, just leave it
    open.
        Now, again, I'm not going to ask you that question. But, I
    would ask you this. You have had opportunity to go there,
    General Fraser. Just very briefly, in terms of your impression
    of the operations and of the treatment of detainees, do you
    have any comment to make?
        General Fraser. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Our responsibility in SOUTHCOM is for the safe, legal,
    transparent, and humane treatment of the detainees at the
    facility in GTMO.
        Senator Inhofe. Are they being treated that way?
        General Fraser. Yes, sir, they are very much being treated
    that way. I'm very proud of the men and women from the military
    who come and provide that----
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, you don't need to elaborate. There's
    a Sergeant Major Carter from Fort Sill who had been stationed
    there several times. Her comment to me--she's in charge of the
    prison system we have at Fort Sill, and she said, ``I don't
    know what's wrong with those people in Washington. Go back and
    tell them, that is a jewel that's been run properly.'' She's
    the one who has actually been there. I don't want to belabor
    that, because that's a decision that was made by your Commander
    in Chief, and I don't want to put you in an awkward position.
        But, following up on something that has been said by
    Senator Lieberman, General Renuart, I--you and I talked about
    this in my office. It is true that I was very strongly in
    support of the third site in Poland. That's a site that would
    have given us the capability of knocking something down. At the
    time, by 2012--with slippage, maybe 2015--ironically, that's
    when we think that the Iranians are going to have the
    capability of sending something over. Now, I know, in response
    to the Chairman's question, that we have a lot of ground-based
    stuff out there. It's in California and Alaska. I'm not
    comfortable, when I look at these maps. So, I won't ask you how
    you would stand on going back to that position with the--with
    Poland and the Czech Republic, but I would say that, since
    we're looking at the SM-3 2B, out there someplace, to be
    determined--we don't have a date on that yet; we do have a date
    on the SM-3 2A, but that's for short and medium range--of 2018.
    I still believe that we should reconsider that. I would only
    ask you this question. Are you at all concerned that we're
    going to have the--well, it would have to be the 3M--SM-3 2B
    capability soon enough?
        General Renuart. Senator, the intelligence estimates on
    when the Iranians will field a real capability obviously have
    moved around a bunch. So, we want to make sure that we are
    providing sufficient capability to defend our own country. I
    believe, with the current Alaska-based and Vandenberg-based
    systems, we can meet that need. If we see proliferation of
    capabilities from Iran, we certainly need to consider expanding
    that capability.
        Senator Inhofe. All right, that's good enough. Now, since
    you're going to be bailing out of this--and we have talked
    about that. I certainly wish you luck. It's been 39 years, is
    that how long?
        General Renuart. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Goodness. Well, that's great. It's been a
    great service. I would ask you, just in the remainder of the
    time that I have, now that you're going out and you can reflect
    back, and General Fraser knows, how strongly I feel about our
    partnership programs, our train-and-equip programs, my concern
    that I had, that perhaps the--some of these programs were not--
    like the 1207, the civilian-to-civilian, maybe should have been
    left where it was. That's my own personal opinion.
        But, in terms of one-size-fits-all, we're talking about the
    train-and-equip programs, International Military Education
    Training (IMET), the Combatant Commander's Intiative Fund
    programs, the Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the Foreign
    Military Sales (FMS), and all of that. What's your thought
    about, between countries, the tailor-making of these things?
    Any thoughts you'd like to leave with us on that subject?
        General Renuart. Senator Inhofe----
        Senator Inhofe. It's a good program. We all agree with
    that, I think. But, can it be better if we could figure out a
    way to tailor it better?
        General Renuart. Yes, sir. This is key and essential to all
    of our operations around the world. I spent 13 years in the
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), I've spent 5\1/2\
    years in southeast--southwest Asia as part of the CENTCOM AOR,
    and, of course, in the Pacific, as well. In every case, those
    combatant commanders would tell you that the 1206, 1207, 1208,
    FMF, FMS, all of those building-partnership-capacity programs
    are critical to allow us to do just what General Fraser said,
    where Ken Keen and the Brazilian counterpart know each other
    because they've worked together, they've been to school
    together, we've created training relationships together. We
    have to absolutely keep those programs intact, and support
    them, and work through the department-to-department challenges
    between, primarily, State and Defense, on making them easier to
    take advantage of. They are critical to a combatant commander's
    success.
        Senator Inhofe. I've spent a disordinate amount of time in
    some of the African nations, and I've left--not just there, but
    in the Balkans, and everyplace else--with the idea that we made
    a mistake, at one time, on our IMET program. We had a--we're
    kind of treating it as if we're doing them a favor by allowing
    them to come here to our country to train, and train with our
    people. I became pretty convinced, after a period of time, that
    we should have lifted, which we did, the article of response--
    requirement that we had before allowing them to come in, that
    it was really to our benefit more than it is to their benefit,
    that once these people come in, they train--whether it's a--it
    doesn't matter what facility it is, but train with our people,
    get that quality training--an allegiance is formed that never
    leaves. Do you think that's right?
        General Renuart. Senator, very shortly, absolutely. I--my
    youngest son spent 27 months in Senegal in the Peace Corps, and
    he will tell you, firsthand, that the relationships of American
    outreach to these countries are incredible.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, my time's expired, but, General
    Fraser, do you generally agree with our conversation here, and
    our opinions?
        General Fraser. Yes, Senator, I completely agree.
        Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you very--thank you Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your dedication
    to not only the American military but to the Nation. So, thank
    you very much.
        General Renuart, a disturbing phenomena seems to be the
    increasing sophistication in armaments of the Mexican drug
    cartels--assault weapons, antitank weapons, sophisticated
    night-vision devices, sophisticated communication devices.
    Where are all these coming from?
        General Renuart. Senator, thanks. On the very first meeting
    that I had in Mexico, their senior military leadership outlined
    their concern over what they called ``U.S. trafficking of
    weapons into Mexico.'' Clearly, there is no doubt that there
    are weapons moving north to south into Mexico, and we partner
    very closely with our law enforcement friends to help provide
    information from the Mexican military, as they've collected the
    forensics of these, so that we can, in fact, prosecute. There
    have been over 40 prosecutions, over the last 2 years, of--I'll
    call them ``weapons dealers.'' But, certainly we see an
    involvement from here in this country with respect to illicit
    weapons trade. We're also seeing that move from other nations
    around the world, as well.
        So, I think this is a hemispheric problem--both General
    Fraser and I have talked about this--and something we need to
    continue to work.
        Senator Reed. But, do you think we're taking effective
    steps? Again, what seems to be very ironic is that, in some of
    these recorded incidents, the drug cartels outgun the military
    and the police. That's unfortunate.
        General Renuart. Yes, sir. In fact, we see 50-caliber
    weapons, we see rocket-propelled grenades, we see a variety of
    those things being used. That is increasingly of concern to the
    Mexican military. It has resulted, by the way, in them being
    much more forthcoming with serial numbers and that sort of
    thing, so it allows our law enforcement to really take some
    action.
        Senator Reed. Do we have to do much more on our side of the
    border to control?
        General Renuart. Yes sir, I believe we do. I think our law
    enforcement partners are very eager to do that. It's continuing
    that information-sharing between the two nations that will
    assist.
        Senator Reed. On the other side--we're supplying both
    sides, essentially, in this battle. Under the Department of
    State's Merida Initiative, we provided the helicopters and
    light attack aircraft, inflatable boats, et cetera. Can you
    tell us if that's being used effectively?
        General Renuart. Senator, I can, and it is. The Mexicans
    were very appreciative that we accelerated that process to help
    meet the Merida objectives. We delivered the first five of the
    Bell helicopters this past December. We'll deliver two or three
    more this year. Patrol aircraft, computer systems that will
    allow them to fuse information to do border security, to
    communicate better--all have been put in place--night-vision
    goggles. The Mexicans are also reaching out to us for the
    training associated with integrating these to be effective, and
    we've made great progress in that regard. We need to continue
    that effort. Merida shouldn't just be a 1- or 2-year event, but
    it's a relationship over time.
        Senator Reed. Is there a danger of some of the border
    States of Mexico becoming ungoverned spaces that would invite
    not just narco-gangs, but more sophisticated international
    terrorists to set up shop?
        General Renuart. Senator, I think there's--I would not
    characterize ``ungoverned spaces,'' because I think there's--
        Senator Reed. I don't want to--I don't want to suggest that
    the Government of Mexico isn't competent, capable down to every
    level, but it's just the turmoil there, I guess, which--
        General Renuart. There is significant turmoil, and
    certainly local governance is corrupted in some places, but
    that's very much on the focus of President Calderon and his
    senior--both attorney general, as well has his senior military
    leaders. That's allowed him to push--or it's enabled him to
    push forces out to try to help reduce that. We have a very good
    relationship with the Mexican border-state commanders, as well.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Fraser, your comments on, sort of, the flow of
    weapons and other items, not from the United States, but from
    other areas in the hemisphere.
        General Fraser. Senator, thank you.
        We find that there is a flow. A lot of the flow is headed
    towards Colombia right now, but it also is into Central
    America. A lot of the weapons that are flowing originating--are
    originating in Central America from weapons that were sold
    there in the 1980s, but we also see a flow that's coming out of
    the United States in that direction, also.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Just--let me switch back to General Renuart, to the
    chemical, biological, radiological, high-yield explosive
    (CBRNE) teams that you've put together, and the CMRF. Can you
    give us an update of their deployment. There's two, I believe.
        General Renuart. There are, sir. Just very quickly, we
    actually exercised one of those forces this year from a
    standing start; we mobilized them, deployed them, and put them
    into action in a very realistic scenario in Indiana, earlier--
    at the end of last year. Comments from the US&R Association,
    the professionals in this business, were that it was as good as
    any they've seen--the Fairfax unit, for example, that we've
    talked about--any they've seen in the world. So, I'm very happy
    with the quality and capability of these forces.
        As I mentioned to Senator Lieberman, as we continue to grow
    this concept that has come from the QDR, we want to maintain
    that standard of capability for the people of this country, and
    we'll work hard at that.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask you a general question, General
    Renuart, and that is the status of the equipment for National
    Guard. Since they're a major partner in your efforts in
    NORTHCOM, can you give just a general view of----
        General Renuart. Yes. Very quickly--and what I'll do is, if
    I may, provide some more data for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        For the Army National Guard, dual-use equipment (items identified
    as critical to domestic missions) is currently at 83 percent.
    Approximately, 65 percent of the dual-use equipment is available to the
    Governors after accounting for items that are deployed in support of
    Federal missions.

        General Renuart. But, the National Guard, on the average
    across the country now, is up from 40- or 50-percent equipage,
    now, to 70, 70-plus. That's new equipment. The training quality
    is up. We're especially pleased that the equipment related to
    these homeland support missions is close to 100 percent in most
    of the States.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Fraser, you have many roles, both air, sea, and
    land, but, can you kind of brief us about SOUTHCOM's Naval
    Force's Southern Commmand, the naval forces and
    counternarcotics operations?
        General Fraser. Senator, the DOD mission within
    counternarcotics is to support the detection and monitoring of
    the transit of illicit goods, if you will, primarily through
    the maritime environments, the Caribbean and the Eastern
    Pacific. So, working through JIATF-South, an interagency group,
    we support the detection and monitoring in those areas. The
    U.S. Navy ships do that, as well as U.S. Coast Guard ships, as
    well as aircraft. Then, once those are detected, then hand them
    off for intercept and detention to the law enforcement
    organization.
        Senator Reed. Just a quick followup. We all read recently
    about the growing use of submersible vehicles and submarines to
    move drugs around. Is that a continuing upward trend?
        General Fraser. Actually, Senator, it's decreased. We saw
    68 movements primarily in the Eastern Pacific in 2008. Last
    year, we saw 46. So, we've seen a decline. Now, that's just a
    1-year sample size.
        Senator Reed. Right.
        General Fraser. But, that's the most recent data, and
    that's the first decline we've seen.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        General, thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
    want to thank you for your opening comments that discussed the
    connections between Iran and Venezuela. I know Senator McCain
    spoke about that, too.
        General Fraser, you and I have had an opportunity to speak
    a lot about that. So, that's a topic that I want to explore
    today.
        Start off by saying, thank you both for your service.
        General Renuart thank you--39 years, that's incredible.
    Thank you, to both of your spouses. We put our spouses through
    a lot. So, I'm appreciative of them, as well.
        In speaking about the growing projection of influence of
    Iran in the region, I recently had an opportunity to visit
    Colombia and to visit with our military folks there who are
    assisting with the military leaders in Colombia in the fight
    against the FARC. There is this concern. Senator McCain spoke
    about the recent revelations of the judge in Spain, about the
    assassination attempt on President Uribe. We know that the
    drug-trafficking flights are flying over Venezuela to get to
    Central America to bring those drugs into the United States. Do
    you consider Venezuela to be the biggest stabilizing--
    destabilizing factor in the region, in terms of our national
    security interests?
        General Fraser. Senator, I don't know if I would take it as
    far as the ``biggest destabilizing factor.'' They are
    continuing on a pursuit of reducing U.S. influence in the
    region. They are working with various countries and entities to
    try and enable that.
        Senator LeMieux. Let me try it this way. Is there a country
    in Latin America that is working against our interests as much
    as Venezuela?
        General Fraser. Senator, I would argue that, as we look at
    Cuba, they're also in that same vein.
        Senator LeMieux. We've seen some recent articles even
    calling it ``Venecuba,'' that there are Cuban military
    officials working within the Venezuelan Government. The concern
    I have--and I think this touches on both of your focuses, with
    you, General Renuart, having the focus on Mexico, as well--is
    that we have this whole Central American region that runs--we
    have Colombia, obviously, on the tip of South America, and then
    it runs up through the region into Mexico. We have these drug
    trafficking chains. Some have described it to me as, ``We
    squeeze the balloon in one place, they find another way to
    go.'' If we shut down the semisubmersibles, or we work against
    that, they take more air flights. If we stop them at sea--
    which, you just had a recent success, General--then they come
    over land. I know our Ambassador in Panama is concerned about
    the increased traffic through the isthmus there.
        So what's your focus--and I assume that there's
    coordination between the two of you--what's the focus, and
    what's the plan, going forward, to combat this narco-drug
    trafficking? Do you have any concerns that, with the projection
    of influence of Iran in the region--the idea that we know that
    Hezbollah and Hamas are--have set up shop in the region--that
    there could be a combination between those groups and the
    narcotraffickers?
        General Fraser. Senator, if I could start with that. From a
    destabilizing standpoint, the biggest concern I have in the
    region is illicit trafficking. I think it's growing as a
    regional issue throughout, and spreading to other parts of the
    region. Brazil is now the second largest cocaine user in the
    world. So, it is--the criminal elements of that is the illicit
    trafficking that really is my biggest concern. What we are
    looking to do is the--our national Intelligence Community is
    taking an opportunity to look at illicit trafficking as a
    regional enterprise, not just what's affecting individual
    countries, so that we have the opportunity to understand that
    enterprise, as an enterprise, to try and push on all sides of
    the balloon, if you will, rather than just on one part of that
    balloon, to see if we can start squeezing that balloon effect
    down. So, that's really the efforts that were ongoing. That's
    in direct correlation and coordination with NORTHCOM, JIATF-
    South, JTF-North. Everybody is working this--in addition, with
    law enforcement--to try to get a better understanding.
        Senator LeMieux. General Renuart?
        General Renuart. Senator, I'd first agree that--with
    General Fraser's comment, that this is an enterprise. We have
    to approach it as an enterprise. I'd add, that starts in our
    own cities; 230 cities in our country have seen increases in
    drug-related gang violence. We need to work that internally.
    But, in addition, coordination from the supply through the
    demand is critical if you're going to really make a difference.
    Our two commands work very closely, and have partnered with
    Mexico from the south and the north, for example, to try to
    arrest some of that flow. The Mexicans have been increasingly
    eager for that coordinated support from both of us.
        So, I think there's a real opportunity, and we're going
    to--we're both committed to continue working that. More
    importantly, we have support from our friends in Customs and
    Border and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the other
    Federal agencies.
        Senator LeMieux. Well, I appreciate that. I appreciate your
    good work on that. I know, in traveling to Colombia, that now
    the Colombian military's going to be training some folks from
    Mexico on helicopter operations, so I think that's a good step.
        I want to just--and I--General Fraser, you and I have
    discussed this, in private--is that--I want you to stay
    focused, if you will, on Iran's projection of influence in the
    region, because I'm worried that those trafficking chains could
    be used for other purposes. We had an Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities Subcommittee hearing yesterday, chaired by my
    colleague Senator Nelson, and, to a person, everyone
    acknowledged that Iran is the world's number one State sponsor
    of terror. When I see Ahmadinejad traveling the world,
    including spending several stops in Latin America, whether it's
    Venezuela or even some of friendly nations down there, I'm
    concerned about it. So, I want you--if you would, please keep a
    focus on that.
        General Fraser. Senator, we're focused on that.
        Senator LeMieux. Right.
        Let me ask you a question, General Fraser, about Colombia,
    specifically. We've been trying to pass this Colombia Free
    Trade Agreement. I think it's an agreement that has
    implications beyond trade. I think it has implications to our
    alliances and our friendship with Colombia. Do you see that, in
    terms of our national security interests, as being a positive
    step forward, if we could get that agreement ratified?
        General Fraser. Senator, I think it would be a very
    positive step forward. One of the things that supports security
    within the region is the opportunity to have stable economies,
    and vibrant economies. Colombia has that. I think a Free Trade
    Agreement would enhance that capability and give an alternative
    to the illicit traffickers.
        Senator LeMieux. I would assume you would agree that a Free
    Trade Agreement with Panama would also be productive.
        General Fraser. Yes, Senator, I would.
        Senator LeMieux. Right.
        General Renuart, just to switch gears a little, you--in
    your opening statement that I reviewed, you refer to Russian
    Bear Tu-95 flights probing American and Canadian airspace. Can
    you comment on the activities of the--those Russian airplanes?
    I know they weren't--they were probing our airspace, maybe not
    specifically in it. You sent up some fighters, I guess, in
    response. Can you talk to that a little bit?
        General Renuart. Senator, just very quickly, we've seen an
    increase, in the last few years, of Russian--their words,
    ``long-range training flights'' approaching our sovereign
    airspace. In our NORAD role, we have been conducting this
    surveillance and response mission for over 52 years. We have
    trained, well-equipped capabilities to monitor our airspace.
    Really, we attempt to identify any aircraft that is not on a
    flight plan, unidentified, not talking to people on the radio,
    so that we understand their intentions. We continue to do that.
    We've had a couple instances this year where the Russians have
    flown close to our airspace in the Aleutian Chain. Nothing is
    threatening us, their aviators act professionally. But, again,
    we want to make sure that we don't allow any aircraft from any
    source to enter our airspace without being identified.
        Senator LeMieux. Do you have an assessment of their
    intentions?
        General Renuart. I think the Russians have neglected their
    bomber force for many years. I think, because of financial
    concerns, they are--the influx of energy money has allowed them
    to refocus some of that, and we're seeing more of the training
    that they used to conduct, not at the levels of the Cold War
    days, but certainly enough to keep pilots proficient. That--I
    think it characterizes the most--the bulk of what they're
    doing.
        Senator LeMieux. Okay. Thank you both.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
        Let me just quickly mention, since we've talked about
    Chile, that there's a report that, right in the middle,
    apparently, of President Pinera's inauguration ceremonies,
    there was a magnitude-7.2 quake reported in Chile. So, it's not
    as bad as the earlier one, obviously, but it's still a
    significant-size earthquake.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Actually, I thought I wouldn't have time, and I snuck
    around. I broke some rule, I'm sure. Doug, I gave your wife a
    hug. I hope--behind your back, I want you to know that, in all
    full disclosure. But, it's good to see you again, and Rena.
        General Renuart, I have a couple questions first, and then
    I'm going to have a couple for General Fraser.
        But, first with the Arctic and some of the work that's now
    going on, especially--on two fronts, one is the climate change
    that's occurring, and the Arctic ice melting, and that you have
    three commands, really, that kind of manage the Arctic. Is
    there discussion, or is there an opinion you have in regards to
    this, that--my personal view--and I leave it to the military to
    figure this out--that we probably have to unify this in--at
    some point, like we did--I think it was with--Africa Command
    was a similar situation, two or three commands.
        Is there discussions now about trying to figure this out,
    as we move more and more into understanding what opportunities,
    but also, really, challenges--and I think Senator LeMieux just
    mentioned one of those, but that's in the Aleutian. Some would
    think that's close to Alaska. It is, but it's hundreds of miles
    from the north. But, are you now, as an organization, starting
    to think about this, or can you give me some thoughts on that?
        General Renuart. Senator Begich, you bet. I was a former
    vice commander of Pacific Air Forces, in fact. Doug Fraser was
    the commander of 11th Air Force, and he wore four hats.
        Senator Begich. I know.
        General Renuart. I always felt that it was important for
    NORTHCOM and NORAD to try to help reduce the number of hats
    that we asked him to wear.
        We continue that effort. We will have some discussions this
    year with the Chairman and the Service Chiefs in the unified
    command plan discussion, to help streamline that process.
        Certainly, there is concern that we provide for an active
    defense capability for Alaska. During World War II, the
    Aleutian Chain were invaded and held by the Japanese. That's
    something we don't want to repeat. The missions of that
    homeland defense falls in NORTHCOM. So, we want to partner with
    Pacific Command and with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs, to
    try to better streamline that process. So, maybe we can take
    one hat or two hats off, and get down to just a manageable
    amount.
        Senator Begich. Do you agree, as the Arctic continues its
    process--as we know, problem in 30 years, is the estimate, that
    all summer will be ice-free, that there's going to be a lot of
    other activity, civilian and military, by other countries,
    within that region, and thinking now about it is probably to
    our advantage, rather than thinking 10 years or 15 years down
    the line. Is that a fair statement?
        General Renuart. Senator, absolutely. The Arctic--none of
    us are expert enough to know how much open water, for how long.
    But, certainly we're going to see more navigable water in the
    Arctic. It's an area where we had not focused our attention--
    national attention for quite a period of time. Before the last
    administration left, they published a paper indicating strategy
    for the Arctic. I think that's a great start. We need to
    continue that effort and, I think, partner with the Arctic
    Council nations on a common strategy for research and for
    development, to settle disputes.
        Then, finally--and I know the Senate will continue to
    consider this--the U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty is something that
    is critical to give us a seat at the table to be involved in
    these discussions.
        Senator Begich. The Law of the Sea.
        General Renuart. We very much support ratification of that
    treaty as soon as we can.
        Senator Begich. You have my next question, which was Law of
    the Sea. I guess one question that comes up--and tell me, if
    you can--very short answer--some are concerned that--by the
    United States being a part of that--the Law of the Sea--that we
    will give up some of our sovereignty. Do you believe that
    statement?
        General Renuart. No, sir, I don't. I think U.S. sovereignty
    is something we hold and protect very dearly, and I don't
    believe we would give that up.
        Senator Begich. Very good. Let me ask you, if I can, on the
    missile defense system in Alaska. Great debate last year,
    ``Should it be 40-plus, or should it be 30?'' The decision was,
    through mutual discussions--and I think this committee did a
    lot of work to get to the agreement of 30--and do you still
    agree with that statement, that it should be 30 operational
    GBIs there?
        General Renuart. Yes, Senator, I think 30 is the right
    number. I would point out that the additional missiles that
    will be constructed are not restricted from being used, if we
    were to need them.
        Senator Begich. Correct.
        General Renuart. I think that gives us some capacity----
        Senator Begich. Right.
        General Renuart.--to plus, if that would be required.
        Senator Begich. Right, and I had wanted to comment on that.
    I want to thank you for that, because I think one of the things
    you have done, especially in the last 4 or 5 months, maybe 6
    months, is create that flexibility that, depending on the
    situation, you could plus-up and have a situation available, or
    infrastructure available, to handle that, is part of the plan.
    Is that a fair statement?
        General Renuart. That's a fair statement. Yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. In that regard, one of the things that I
    want to make sure--I know, in the 2010 budget, there's
    probably, I--I want to say--this might be close number--$13-,
    $14 million to continue to deal with Field 2 up there, to get
    it completed. We know, through our work and through your
    agencies--or agency of DOD, that it needs closer to about $100
    million to finish out all the work that's necessary to keep
    that flexibility as they close down Field 1, which is just--was
    kind of a test site of six. How do you think you'll be able to
    go about making sure those revenues, those resource are there
    to continue to make sure the base infrastructure is available
    to take care of the Field 1, which is in deplorable condition?
    Give me your----
        General Renuart. Senator----
        Senator Begich.--those are my words. I know those aren't
    the technical words, but--
        General Renuart. If I could--let me provide you some more
    detail for the record.
        Senator Begich. Okay.
        General Renuart. But, we work very closely with General
    O'Reilly. I believe his view is that he has sufficient
    flexibility to be able to ensure that we can keep Field 2 on
    track, and--but let us get back to you with some more specifics
    on that.
        Senator Begich. That'd be great. I just want to echo that,
    please, whatever he could do to keep that moving along, because
    the mobilization of the equipment and the people are working.
    When you demobe, it just is more costly, and this is a huge
    opportunity. So, I--I know he has a lot of flexibility, because
    the way we wrote that last year was to give him the
    flexibility, as he saw fit. So, if you could get us that that'd
    be great, and I'd encourage him to move forward.
        General Renuart. Yes, sir, will do.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requested the funding
    needed to continue the operations, sustainment, and maintenance of
    Missile Field 1 and to complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo
    configuration. The request reflects funds required in addition to
    fiscal year 2009 funds previously appropriated for work on Missile
    Field 2 and fiscal year 2010 funds previously appropriated to suspend
    work on Missile Field 2. On February 17 2010, the Missile Defense
    Agency submitted a reprogramming request to the Department's
    Comptroller for the realignment of $72.8 million of fiscal year 2009
    research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds and $16
    million of fiscal year 2010 RDT&E funds within the Ballistic Missile
    Defense System Midcourse Defense program element for the continuation
    of Missile Field 2.

        Senator Begich. Last question then. Doug--I don't want to
    leave you out--General Fraser. But, one--as more and more
    alternative renewable energy is being debated in Alaska, one of
    the big issues is wind turbines. General Renuart, this is the
    last question for you. Are you dealing with that and
    understanding--and I know it's a very small--but, I know we're
    starting to hear some concerns that it may interfere with the
    mission and airspace. Are you working with the civilian
    population to make sure we manage this correctly? Are there
    things we need to be looking out for as we deal, for example,
    with an energy bill and making sure that the military is not
    forgotten in this equation?
        General Renuart. Senator, that's a great question. Very
    quickly, there is a challenge, as we develop, particularly,
    wind farms, but we also see with new building construction,
    where those--that development has--interferes with the send/
    receive capability of our ground-based radars. I sent a letter
    to Secretary Gates asking for a formal body to be formed,
    allowing us to review these, so that a developer has a place to
    come to ask these questions.
        Senator Begich. Oh, great.
        General Renuart. Secretary's committed--Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul Stockton--to lead that
    effort for that Department. We're partnering with the Federal
    Aviation Administration and others. But, we are--we need to
    continue to make this process mature. We've had questions from
    Senator Webb and others on similar issues, and we know that's a
    real concern, and we're committed to work that aggressively.
        Senator Begich. Great. Please keep us informed on that.
    That'd be--that's great to hear that.
        General Renuart. Yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. General Fraser, I feel like I have to ask
    you a question, because I don't want to leave you there. You
    are a great addition to our Alaska team up there, and I know
    you're doing a great job in SOUTHCOM. We've had some great
    discussion in regards to that.
        One of the things I want to just ask--you and I have had a
    conversation about a special unit within your organization that
    deals with, kind of, the humanitarian component and the work
    you do. Do you--and we talked briefly about--about how it's
    appropriate for your command, it may not be as appropriate for
    other commands--but, have you found that component, that unit,
    of high value for your command, in assisting you with some of
    the unique situations you have in Central America in the
    SOUTHCOM section? Maybe you could just expand a little bit on
    that.
        General Fraser. Yes, Senator----
        Senator Begich. I found it very intriguing that you had
    this underneath your----
        General Fraser. You're talking human rights or----
        Senator Begich. Yes.
        General Fraser. Yes. We have a human rights office that
    was--has been in existence for quite a number of years now, has
    a human rights initiative in which 34 countries from around the
    region have all signed up to. A very active program. Has made
    and helped enable a lot of significant progress throughout the
    region. Colombia has come up fairly dramatically in their
    efforts and their focus on this. Guatemala has the same.
    They're very much connected within this. So, it's a very
    vibrant office, and is out actively pursuing and enabling and
    enriching human rights discussions throughout the region.
        Senator Begich. It's unique to SOUTHCOM, is that correct?
        General Fraser. SOUTHCOM is the only combatant command that
    has one of these, and it's a resource that's available to any
    of the combatant commanders.
        Senator Begich. Very good. I, again, want to thank you for
    our conversation, especially during the earthquake, and the
    work you have done there, and your troops have done, and all
    the affiliated services that, kind of, came to the call
    immediately. As--I had heard great descriptions of your
    capacity to stay up many long nights, and sleep on whatever's
    available, in order to continue to keep the command working. I
    just wanted to thank you and the troops for doing such a good
    job under a very unique situation, and how fast you mobilized.
        General Fraser. Senator, it's a great team effort. Thank
    you.
        Senator Begich. Very good.
        Good to see you both. General, thank you very much.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
        Let me just announce that, when we begin the second
    hearing, we will follow the same order of recognition that
    we've been following for the first hearing. We're not going to
    start a new or changed order, in terms of recognition of
    Senators, so that everybody can know where they stand.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        General, let me thank you for your 39 years of
    extraordinary service. I assume that, now that you're retiring,
    you will be able to get to Maine's Franco-American Festivals,
    that we've talked about before, to celebrate your heritage. I
    look forward to being your personal guide in any of those
    festivals.
        I want to bring up an issue that is an increasing problem
    in my State, and that is the problem of drug trafficking across
    the northern border. There's been a great deal of focus, and
    indeed discussion this morning, about the problem with the
    Mexican drug cartels. Fortunately, the violence level at the
    northern border isn't anything close to what we're seeing at
    the southern border, but that doesn't mean that drug
    trafficking is not a problem. Indeed, it's such a problem that,
    last December, Maine's Federal judges met with me to express
    their alarm about the enormous increase in drug trafficking,
    particularly of methamphetamine, across the Canadian border.
    They told me that Canada is now one of the world's top
    producers of meth, and that this dangerous drug is increasingly
    being smuggled across the border in Maine.
        I understand that the violence associated with the Mexican
    drug cartels demands that the majority of the resources be
    focused on that. But, I'm concerned about whether there is a
    sufficient focus on the smuggling of meth and other dangerous
    drugs into the State of Maine.
        Could you give me more information on what you're doing to
    counter what you call, in your testimony, ``a serious
    transnational threat to our country''?
        General Renuart. Senator, first, I look forward to having
    you host me at a great event in Maine in the coming days. That
    would be wonderful.
        I think you hit on a very important element. We do tend to
    focus on drug trafficking south to north, and if--as I talk to
    my Canadian counterparts, both in the military and in the Royal
    Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), they also indicate an alarming
    increase in drug activity, drug-related violence, in Canada. We
    have our JTF-North, who is focused on DOD support along the
    borders, both north and south, as well as in the maritime. This
    year, we actually are increasing the number of small but
    effective operations that we will conduct along the northern
    border, in partnership with both our Federal law enforcement--
    DEA and others--and our RCMP friends.
        Let me get that data with more specifics, and I'll take
    that question, if I may, for the record and get that back to
    you specifically as it looks to Maine.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator Collins. Thank you. I also noted that, in your
    testimony, you indicated that you had taken steps to identify
    threats similar to the threat posed by Major Hasan at Fort
    Hood. Have you specifically directed your personnel to do more
    training on the signs of violent radicalization, particularly
    Islamist radicalization within the ranks?
        General Renuart. Senator, Secretary Gates directed a fairly
    detailed study of the Hasan case. Out of that, there are a
    number of recommendations. They're primarily pushed to the
    Services, because they have the responsibility for organize,
    train, and equip.
        Our role is to ensure that, if you will, facilities are
    then provided the right kinds of information so that their
    local officials can focus on--focus their attention on specific
    events. To that degree, we have worked very closely with our
    friends in the law--in the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI) on information-sharing of a nature that would be
    important to our military facilities. We've increased that kind
    of activity over the last, really, couple years and certainly
    accelerated some of the programs after the Hasan case.
        So, I--our role is to look at how these Services all view
    these. We're comfortable that the recommendations out of the
    Secretary's investigation committee make a lot of sense, and
    we're continuing to support those.
        Senator Collins. General Fraser, do you have anything to
    add on that issue?
        General Fraser. No, ma'am. We're very much in the same
    position as General Renuart. So, it's really focused--the only
    other piece I would put in--those people who are assigned to
    our organizations, especially the headquarters, then we do have
    a specific focus on supporting their needs.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Finally, I want to associate myself with the comments that
    Senator Lieberman made about the change and the new teams that
    are going to take the place of two of the three CBRNE CMRFs.
    I'm very concerned about whether adequate resources are going
    to be invested so that we can respond effectively to a weapon
    of mass destruction. My specific question is how the new
    Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) would coordinate, plan, train,
    and exercise with the regional FEMA offices. I worked very hard
    to create a regional FEMA response team that would be across
    agency lines in response to the failed response to Hurricane
    Katrina. So, that kind of coordination is very important if
    we're going in a different direction.
        General Renuart. Senator, again, just very quickly, we have
    been asked to create the concept of operations that ensures
    just that kind of coordination is done. I think there will be a
    resourcing element of that, that we have to focus on very
    clearly, because these HRFs are hosted by--under the command of
    a Governor. So on a day-to-day basis, we have to ensure that,
    across the enterprise of consequence management, all of those
    are talking. By the way, they are also connected to the Federal
    agencies, like FEMA. So, this is a bit of work in progress. We
    owe the Secretary back a concept brief at the end of this
    month, and I think we'll have identified some of those very
    issues that you mentioned.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, Generals.
        General Renuart, thank you for taking the time to visit
    with me yesterday. As I thought more about your plans to retire
    in Colorado, I was struck by the old adage that a--at least for
    us elected officials, a statesman is a dead politician. We--
    some wag said, ``We need more statesmen,'' but I'll leave that
    for another conversation. I don't know your long-term plans
    are, I don't know what the equivalent in the military is, but
    we're looking forward to the benefit of your advice and your
    senior retired status. Although you don't look senior to me;
    you're fit. I know we welcome you as a permanent resident in
    Colorado.
        General Renuart. Thanks, Senator.
        Senator Udall. I'm going to lean on you for further
    insights and advice.
        Would you talk about the National Guard commission
    recommendations, and specifically how you've increased
    guardsmen at the headquarters, and how they've been
    incorporated? I think you and I have talked about what a great
    opportunity this is to further enhance the role of the Guard,
    to better understand how we utilize and deploy the Guard. I
    want to tip my hat to you, in the Northern Command, for what
    you've done in that regard, but please elaborate.
        General Renuart. Senator, we've--we have 50 full-time
    National Guard positions in our headquarters; 45 of those are
    filled. We've grown that number over time. That's very
    effective. But, across my headquarters, a substantial
    percentage of the military--Active military have served in a
    position where they've been associated with either the Reserves
    or the Guard. A substantial percentage of my civilians have--
    are former members of the National Guard or the Reserve. So, we
    have a very good flavor and footprint in that regard.
        In fact, the State of Colorado has been particularly
    supportive, as we have 25 Colorado guardsmen who are a part of
    that full-time support. I just hired a new military assistant
    for NORAD, and he will come from the Colorado Air National
    Guard. So, we've built a close relationship, and I'm very
    pleased with that.
        I think we need to continue to look for opportunities to
    bring our Reserve component in as active participants in our
    headquarters. We have over 130 positions that could be filled,
    and we're working closely with both the Reserves of our
    Services, as well as National Guard Bureau, to try to keep
    those all as full as is possible.
        So, we're very proud of our relationship. I think we've
    built a closer relationship with the National Guard Bureau
    itself than we've ever had before.
        Senator Udall. Kudos to you. I think you and I share a
    philosophy, and I think General Fraser does, as well, that the
    Reserves and the Guard in this era of the All-Volunteer Force,
    and as powerful and as sophisticated as it is, there's a
    tendency for it to become isolated from society. The Reserves
    and the Guard provide that pipeline, if you will, and that
    connection between civilians and those who serve us so ably in
    the military.
        Let me turn to educational opportunities. General Fraser, I
    want to ask you to comment, as well. I know General Renuart's
    really been interested in this, particularly in the area of
    homeland security. Do you think the Joint Command educational
    opportunities should be expanded, maybe to include Ph.D.
    programs? In your experience, are those advanced degrees truly
    effective at bringing back a level of expertise to the force?
    If so, could they be enhanced? Maybe, General Renuart, start
    with you, and then----
        General Renuart. Senator, I think----
        Senator Udall.--General Fraser, if you'd like to----
        General Renuart.--the--in our traditional paradigm, the
    Services, each of them, direct the education programs for their
    individual people. As we've seen the growth of joint commands,
    I think that there is an opportunity for joint combatant
    commands to focus educational opportunities on skill sets that
    are unique to them. In our case, with homeland defense,
    homeland security, civil support, many of those skills don't
    traditionally reside in our service-focused education programs.
    So I think there is an opportunity for us to relook this
    paradigm and look for opportunities to allow combatant
    commanders to target, a small number potentially, but a number
    of unique education programs that will then benefit their
    commands. Then, I think we have to work the personnel system to
    allow us to take advantage of that. We do that, currently, with
    Chairman Mullen's initiative on the AfPakans, where we're
    developing, if you will, area experts in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan.
        Senator Udall. General Fraser, do you care to comment?
        General Fraser. Yes, Senator, thank you.
        I agree with General Renuart, and I would probably add on
    another part to that, especially as we've just--working through
    our experience in Haiti--and that is to also include an
    interagency part to that. Because it's not only the joint
    piece, but it is understanding the other parts of our
    interagency, our counterparts there, that will have great
    benefit as we apply a whole-of-government approach in many of
    the situations that we face in the future.
        Senator Udall. Yes, that's helpful. General Renuart and I
    talked yesterday about DHS and the Mexican border situation and
    what's unfolding there.
        Final question, General Renuart--and I think, in a sense,
    this is--strikes right at your legacy. Talk just a little about
    the relationship between the two commands that you oversee,
    NORAD and NORTHCOM. Why is it important to have a common
    commander and staff, in the future?
        General Renuart. Well, I think, when the two commands were
    formed, there was clearly an opportunity there to create a
    transparent--or a transition from warning of threats, that
    NORAD has traditionally provided, to the real operational
    defense of the homeland, whether its missile or maritime
    homeland defense, into consequence management of a natural
    disaster or manmade event. Over the years, the relationships
    between those two commands have become truly interdependent.
    Today, you can't separate the functions of warning from the
    functions of defense actions from the functions of consequence
    management. The structure that it takes to operate in that
    spectrum is consistently tied at every level. While there is
    certainly a difference between the binational command, NORAD,
    and our--the operations there, and the U.S. national
    authorities for NORTHCOM, the opportunity to keep them
    connected, almost at every level, provides great synergy for
    the Nation.
        In terms of the commander, I believe that it would be
    difficult not to have the same person in command of both of
    those headquarters because it--because of that synergy. I think
    we've seen, in the last 3 years, a real move to operationalize
    that. I think the results speak for themselves. We are
    increasingly effective in that regard, and very proud of that.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that--insights. Again, thank
    you for your service.
        Thank you, to both of you, for taking care of our
    hemisphere--the American Hemisphere and all the opportunities
    we have here, and in maintaining our leadership role.
        Finally, a shout out to the Canadians, who've been such
    great partners of ours, and we're so fortunate to have them on
    our northern border, and to share a common culture and values
    and outlook. General, you've maintained, enhanced, and nurtured
    that relationship. I know they're--I've talked to some of the
    Canadian general officers, and they are sorry to see you go,
    because you've had such a great relationship with them.
        General Renuart. Well, it's in my family blood, so I have
    to. Thank you.
        Senator Udall. That's right. That's right. Yes.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to both of you for your great leadership, your
    service to our country.
        General Renuart, as you wind down these 37 years--I know
    it's been a long time since your commissioning in 1972, but
    what great leadership, what great selfless service you have
    provided to our country. You're certainly a model to that next
    generation of leaders in every branch of our Service. So,
    thanks for your commitment. Thanks for your service.
    Personally, thanks for your friendship over the years. You've
    been a great asset to me as we've traversed through any number
    of issues. So, we appreciate you very much.
        We're not going to let you retire yet, General Fraser.
    We're going to keep you around a while, so----[Laughter.]
        Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, in highlighting the
    importance of partnering in partnership with nations in
    SOUTHCOM area of operations, currently one of the best ways
    that we have to build and sustain those partnerships is through
    WHINSEC. I was pleased to see both of you comment on that in
    your opening statements, as well as your written statement.
        Senator Levin and I are pleased to serve on the board for
    WHINSEC, and I've seen, firsthand, the value of the training
    that WHINSEC conducts and the partnerships with our southern
    allies that it helps to create. What are your thoughts
    regarding WHINSEC? How does it help you carry out your mission?
    What does it provide to nations that choose to send personnel
    to WHINSEC?
        General Fraser. Senator, thank you for that question. It's
    a very important institution for us. It provides a lot of
    capability-building. It has a real focus on democratic values,
    on human rights instruction. In fact, 10 percent of the course
    load is specifically focused on human rights. But, as you
    mentioned, it's really that partnership-building. It's not only
    partnership-building with members of the U.S. military, but
    it's across all the militaries who attend those courses.
        So, much like we've experienced in Haiti, where I've had at
    least a couple of instances where the U.S. officers had gone to
    school and--with, one case, a Canadian counterpart, in another
    case, a Brazilian counterpart, and they understood one another
    right away, and it really facilitated the operations in the
    future. So, no matter where we go, in a partnership-building
    capacity throughout the region, or specifically in working
    each--in working together on crises, it makes a huge difference
    for us.
        Senator Chambliss. The current Defense authorization bill
    contains a provision requiring public disclosure of names and--
    of students and instructors who attend WHINSEC, as well as
    their countries of origin. In your opinion, what effect will
    this provision have on foreign countries' willingness to send
    students, as well as instructors, to WHINSEC? What effect will
    it have on WHINSEC's ability to help SOUTHCOM carry out its
    mission?
        General Fraser. Senator, I'm concerned that it will have a
    negative impact on it, that we have gone out and at least
    looked, and discussed with some of our partners there; they
    would be concerned if those names were released. I'm concerned,
    even for the U.S. military personnel and their families who
    support WHINSEC, with the release of that. So, I personally do
    not support the release of names.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
        General Renuart, as you complete your third year as the
    commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM, as we look forward, what do
    you think are the biggest challenges out there for these
    respective commands?
        General Renuart. Senator, I think, as we see in many of the
    Services, recapitalization of our infrastructure is important
    to us. The age of our Air Sovereignty Fighter Force obviously
    is growing, and we want to continue to monitor very closely the
    development, the fielding of new systems that can allow us to
    maintain the air sovereignty of our two nations. The radar
    sites also are aging, and we have initiatives in place. So
    continuing to support the modernization of those are the things
    that I think are very important for the NORAD role.
        For NORTHCOM, I think continuing to work more closely with
    our border security partners, our interagency partners,
    continue to work closely with Mexico, especially in this area
    of countering illicit trade and traffic, I think are some of
    the future challenges. As Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman
    mentioned, making sure that the CMRF is well-organized,
    trained, and equipped, and executable for the Nation. Because
    we don't know when one of those events will occur, we have to
    be ready at any moment.
        Senator Chambliss. In November 2007, over 450 F-15s were
    grounded due to structural concerns, a number of them under
    your command. As a result of that, in NORTHCOM we had to call
    on the Canadians, who flew CF-18s, to fill in for F-15s for a
    period of about 3 weeks. As our F-15 platforms continue to
    age--and they're a part of that aging fleet that you alluded
    to--and they make their way towards retirement, are you
    concerned about available assets and the level of acceptable
    risk in the conduct of your air sovereign mission?
        General Renuart. Senator, I'm very concerned that we
    maintain an acceptable force level so that we can keep that
    mission intact. The Air Force is conducting a--if you will, a
    fighter force review that will target, not only the assignment
    of its aircraft in places, but where we invest money, from the
    Air Force's perspective, in maintaining that fighter force, as
    new systems come aboard. I think you're going to have a hearing
    about one of those in just a few minutes. I do monitor that
    very carefully. I've said, often publicly, on the record, that
    the baseline force that we have has to be maintained. I'm very
    comfortable, so far, that DOD--and certainly Department of the
    Air Force--are committed to maintaining that. But, it's
    something we monitor as you see adjustments in delivery rates
    or in aging rates of each of our systems.
        Senator Chambliss. Well, you're right, we're going to be
    talking about the F-35 here a little later on this morning. You
    and I have had opportunity to visit, relative to the
    performance of the F-22. I'd like for you to comment on that,
    as you have seen it firsthand. Second, what effect or impact
    will a slippage in the initial operational capability on the F-
    35 have on NORTHCOM?
        General Renuart. Senator, first, on the F-22, it has proven
    itself to be an excellent weapon system. We've used it in our
    air defense missions in Alaska and have found it to be a very
    capable system. I think the Department is committed to continue
    its spiral development into the modern versions of the airplane
    that were planned. So, I'm very comfortable that it give us a
    capability that's much needed in our Air Force.
        With respect to the F-35 timing, again, if we see that
    program delay, then it's--of--it will be of interest to me to
    ensure that we maintain the quality and capability of our
    existing F-16, F-15 fleet--again, to maintain that air defense.
    For right now, I am not--I don't feel there's an unacceptable
    level of risk, because I think the two match pretty well. But,
    obviously if something changes, we'll monitor that very
    carefully.
        Senator Chambliss. Okay. Thank you very much.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        We're ready to proceed, I believe, now, to our second
    hearing.
        Senator Collins, if you don't have an additional question.
        We thank you both. We are, again, very appreciative of the
    service that you have always provided this Nation; your
    families' great support, we thank them for that.
        Again, General Renuart, all the best to you on your
    upcoming retirement.
        General Renuart. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. We're going to take a 3-minute recess.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                          haiti reconstruction relief
        1. Senator Bill Nelson. General Fraser, it is my understanding that
    the USNS Comfort has departed Haiti and we are in the process of
    drawing down our forces to approximately 8,000 over the next couple of
    days. What will be the biggest challenge as we draw down U.S. forces in
    Haiti and turn over responsibilities to the United Nations (U.N.)
    Peacekeeping Force?
        General Fraser. Our greatest challenge as we draw down U.S. forces
    in Haiti is to ensure, together with our U.S. Agency for International
    Development (USAID), U.N., and nongovernmental organization (NGO)
    partners, sufficient engineering improvement in Internally Displaced
    Person (IDP) camps to weather the upcoming rainy season. We also may
    need to assist in the movement of as many as 9,000 at-risk people prior
    to the rainy season in order to prevent potential loss of life due to
    flash flooding and mud slides. For this reason, our drawdown will be
    somewhat slower than originally contemplated and we intend to maintain
    some capacity in Haiti through the hurricane season.

        2. Senator Bill Nelson. General Fraser, what are your greatest
    security concerns in Haiti post-earthquake i.e. drug trafficking,
    gangs, general instability?
        General Fraser. First let me say that the security situation in
    Haiti remains stable; however, challenges persist.
        The most immediate security issue is the overcrowded camps due to
    the thousands of internally displaced Haitians living there, and in
    many cases, lacking adequate sanitation and internal camp security.
    Anecdotal reporting indicates crime within these camps, most prevalent
    after dark, ranges from petty theft to rape. I would note that the
    U.S., Government of Haiti, and the international community are taking
    steps to improve camp security, including additional police patrolling
    and physical improvement such as lighting.
        Finally, I would like to say the Haitian populace has demonstrated
    a remarkable level of patience since the January 12th earthquake. While
    it is possible that general instability could result from the rainy
    season or hurricane season, we believe this is unlikely.

        3. Senator Bill Nelson. General Fraser, a recent New York Times
    article on Haiti reports that, ``according to a U.N. map of greater
    Port-au-Prince circulating among recovery teams, 21 out of the 500
    makeshift settlements are considered high risk for flooding,
    landslides, or overcrowding. Seven--home to 150,000 to 200,000 people--
    are deemed life-threatening.'' With the rainy season officially
    beginning on April 15, what are we doing to help internally displaced
    Haitians in and around Port-au-Prince with shelter and sanitation?
        General Fraser. Shelter and sanitation continue to be the top
    priorities for the Government of Haiti. Operation Unified Response
    personnel qualified in building damage assessment recently trained
    Haitian responders in damage assessment, enabling them to continue
    assessments of buildings and homes across Port au Prince with an eye
    towards urging Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) to return to those
    homes deemed structurally safe. The distribution of shelter material
    continues to be a high percentage of total relief supplies
    distribution.
        The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is working
    closely with the Haitian Government, U.N., and NGO partners, and camp
    populations to establish a real-time sanitation monitoring system. The
    system will track the sanitary situation in displacement sites and
    detect immediate and structural challenges. Over the coming weeks,
    IOM's environmental health and sanitation unit will train residents in
    several camps to report on crucial health issues such as water,
    sanitation and hygiene issues. The teams will also focus on fighting
    mosquitoes in order to prevent malaria and dengue fever, as well as
    environmental hazards, especially flood and mud-slide risks.
        Over the last several weeks, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and
    others have undertaken engineering projects at the most vulnerable
    camps to reduce the risk of flooding. At this point we believe that
    perhaps 9,000 IDP residents will need to be moved to safer sites.

        4. Senator Bill Nelson. General Fraser, are you satisfied that our
    civilian agencies will pick up the slack on the humanitarian
    operations--including the security of food distribution--when the U.S.
    military departs?
        General Fraser. Yes, I am satisfied that the Government of Haiti
    assisted by the U.N., USAID, and NGOs can and will successfully conduct
    the full range of needed humanitarian assistance as U.S. military
    forces continue to depart. I would stress that we have always linked
    any reduction of DOD forces to the clear capacity on the ground of
    other organizations to assume our activities.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
                      defense support to civil authorities
        5. Senator Burris. General Renuart, I understand that you provide
    command and control for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) as
    part of your mission to conduct civil support operations. How do you
    integrate the forces of the National Guard and the Reserves of all
    Services into DSCA operations?
        General Renuart. National Guard forces will normally respond to a
    catastrophic event in State Active Duty or Title 32 Status, under the
    command of a Governor. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) coordinates
    with the National Guard to synchronize and integrate Federal and State
    military operations to avoid duplication and achieve unity of effort.
        NORTHCOM integrates Title 10 Reserve units and individuals into
    DSCA operations when they are mobilized or activated. For example, the
    Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) program consists of more
    than 400 Reserve officers who belong to the Services (Army, Navy, Air
    Force, and Marine Corps) and have volunteered to support DSCA
    operations. As reservists, EPLOs possess unique knowledge about their
    regions and States, including: capabilities, key infrastructure,
    transportation systems, and local geography. NORTHCOM will normally
    request EPLO activation before, during, or after an incident or event
    to assist the Defense Coordinating Officer and our components in
    coordinating DOD's response. Additionally, NORTHCOM sponsors an annual
    workshop to train and educate EPLOs on DOD and NORTHCOM policies,
    plans, and procedures.

        6. Senator Burris. General Renuart, are there any restrictions?
        General Renuart. Yes, in accordance with Title 10, Army, Navy, Air
    Force, and Marine Federal reservists are only available for civil
    emergencies while in voluntary inactive duty for training status. To
    eliminate this restriction, we support a statutory change to allow the
    Secretary of Defense to order Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
    reservists to active duty to provide assistance in large-scale,
    manmade, natural, and accidental disasters or catastrophes when the
    response capabilities of Federal, State, and local civilian agencies
    have been, or will be, exceeded. This authority will enable the nearest
    unit, which is often Reserve, to respond--saving time, money, and
    American lives.

        7. Senator Burris. General Renuart, what specific roles does the
    Coast Guard play in DSCA?
        General Renuart. DSCA is conducted by the Department of Defense
    (DOD). Though a military service, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is a part
    of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and therefore does not
    conduct DSCA. However, NORTHCOM and the USCG are mission partners in
    responding to domestic contingency operations. Additionally, the USCG,
    due to its statutory responsibilities, is engaged daily in civil
    support well before DOD assistance is requested.
        NORTHCOM and the USCG coordinate routinely to ensure unity of
    effort in the area of civil support operations. Regular missions
    performed by the Coast Guard include maritime Search and Rescue, Port
    Waterways and Coastal Security, and waterways management, including
    prevention and response to natural and man-made disasters in the U.S.
    marine transportation system.
        There are 20 full-time USCG positions, including one flag officer
    (Deputy Director of Operations), within the NORTHCOM headquarters.

        8. Senator Burris. General Renuart, how many personnel from other
    government agencies are permanently assigned to your command?
        General Renuart. Thirty-one people from non-DOD government agencies
    are permanently assigned to North American Aerospace Defense Command
    (NORAD) and NORTHCOM. In addition, there are 20 agency representatives,
    who reside with their parent agency, but are permanently assigned as
    the primary liaison between NORAD and NORTHCOM and their agency.

        9. Senator Burris. General Renuart, what are the advantages of
    having these agencies assigned versus detailed to your command?
        General Renuart. Having agency representatives permanently assigned
    to NORTHCOM allows for a truly ``collaborative'' environment in which
    agencies jointly develop and execute integrated plans and operations,
    and processes which fuse our cultures together in a common purpose.
    Permanently assigned agency representatives throughout NORAD and
    NORTHCOM provide interagency synchronization. They assist and
    facilitate coordination of interagency issues, initiatives and
    operations between the NORAD and NORTHCOM Battle Staff, components,
    deployed assets and external agencies. Resident agency representatives
    also facilitate interagency information sharing.
        Interorganizational representatives are the primary enablers in
    coordinating additional or refined connectivity as required with key
    external partners to ensure NORTHCOM is connected correctly to support
    day-to-day exercise and contingency operations. These representatives
    are essential for providing interagency context to our decisionmaking
    process, providing the interagency perspective to the NORTHCOM staff
    and providing the DOD perspective back to their parent organizations.
    This level of action and insight is only realized when an agency is
    fully integrated into the Command.

        10. Senator Burris. General Renuart, what role does Joint Task
    Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) play in DSCA?
        General Renuart. JTF-CS plans and integrates DOD support to the
    designated primary agency for domestic chemical, biological,
    radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence
    management operations. When approved by the Secretary of Defense and
    directed by the Commander of NORTHCOM, JTF-CS deploys to the incident
    site and executes timely and effective command and control of
    designated DOD forces, providing support to civil authorities to save
    lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support.
        JTF-CS focuses on responding to the effects of a CBRNE incident
    after civilian resources have been utilized first and fully. Some
    typical JTF-CS tasks include incident site support, casualty medical
    assistance and treatment, displaced populace support, mortuary affairs
    support, logistics support, and air operations.
        JTF-CS accomplishes its consequence management mission in strict
    adherence to existing Federal law, which carefully balances the support
    capabilities within the U.S. military with the needs of civil
    authorities during emergencies. In most instances, JTF-CS and its
    designated forces are deployed only after a State or territorial
    Governor requests Federal assistance from the president. In any
    domestic setting, JTF-CS remains in support of the primary agency
    throughout the CBRNE consequence management operation.
        JTF-CS can also conduct non-CBRNE DSCA missions at the direction of
    NORTHCOM. However, due to the unique capabilities that JTF-CS affords
    the national-level CBRNE response, considerations will be made at all
    levels to select alternative capabilities to meet non-CBRNE mission
    requirements.

        11. Senator Burris. General Renuart, is there a plan to give the
    civil support teams the ability to provide mission support and advice
    to the combatant commanders, in addition to their role to support the
    governors?
        General Renuart. There is no plan to have Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) provide direct mission
    support to combatant commanders. However, WMD-CST situation reports do
    currently flow from the States to NORTHCOM through the National Guard
    Bureau.

                  laboratory personnel demonstration programs
        12. Senator Burris. General Renuart, the command has permanently
    assigned members of the National Guard and the Reserves. Do you feel
    the mix of Active and full-time Reserve component personnel is
    sufficient to carry out the mission of the command?
        General Renuart. There are over 50 full-time Reserve component
    authorizations in NORTHCOM headquarters; however, only 45 of those
    positions are filled. More work is needed to fund and fill these
    important positions. Our mix of Active Duty and Reserve component is
    about right, if we can get the current positions filled. We have a
    Reserve component presence in every staff directorate in my
    headquarters working alongside their Active Duty brethren with the
    heaviest concentration in the Operations Directorate. I'm confident the
    Reserve component is represented in everything we do in the
    headquarters. I would submit that any change would be driven by funding
    and availability. I need either Active Duty manpower to fill valid
    positions or the Reserve Component funding to compensate for active
    duty shortages. The mission will not suffer depending on the type of
    manpower, but a lack of manpower could increase risk. The National
    Guard has made a significant investment in personnel assigned to
    NORTHCOM. In fact, NORTHCOM has the largest concentration of Title 10
    National Guard officers in a joint organization outside of the National
    Guard Bureau.

        13. Senator Burris. General Renuart, how do you interface with the
    DHS and are you in support of their efforts?
        General Renuart. NORTHCOM routinely works with the DHS on
    operational planning, training and execution of homeland defense and
    civil support missions. For defense support of civil authorities
    missions, NORTHCOM supports requests from the DHS in accordance with
    direction from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

        14. Senator Burris. General Renuart, illegal drugs continue to be
    problematic in the Southwest Border (SWB) States. You have a role to
    play in providing support to that effort. How long do you anticipate
    that the SWB mission using National Guard troops will be required?
        General Renuart. In order to effectively counter the threat of
    transnational criminal organizations in the SWB region, the U.S.
    Government needs to leverage the potential synergies among many
    agencies with homeland security, law enforcement, and defense missions
    while deepening the U.S. strategic alliance with the Government of
    Mexico.
        The Joint Staff advised NORTHCOM in 2009 of a request for forces
    from the DHS for military support along the SWB. The request was in
    anticipation of potential spill over violence by Mexican Drug
    Trafficking Organizations attempting to solidify control of territorial
    smuggling corridors. The request for DOD support was patterned after
    Operation Jump Start (2005-2007) to bridge capabilities until U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection could train new personnel to cover the
    expansion of requirements along the northern and southern borders of
    the United States. NORTHCOM has not been tasked by the Secretary of
    Defense to fill those positions with Title 10 forces. The National
    Guard Bureau, through the Joint Staff, has been tasked with planning
    how to support DHS with Title 32 forces.

        15. Senator Burris. General Renuart, how effective is your joint
    intelligence fusion cell in providing actionable intelligence/
    information to various law enforcement agencies?
        General Renuart. [Deleted].

        16. Senator Burris. General Renuart, within the mission to provide
    theater security cooperation, what specific training programs do you
    provide Mexico?
        General Renuart. NORTHCOM coordinates the following kinds of
    training for the Mexican military:

             Professional development
             Professional military education in U.S. War Colleges
            and Staff Colleges
             English language training
             Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection
             Combat medical training
             Port Security training
             Logistics, supply, and warehouse training
             Combat strategic intelligence training
             Human rights training
             Military justice/Rule of Law training
             Tactical intelligence training
             Public Affairs training
             Information Systems training
             Naval operations training
             Patrol craft operations training
             Ship repair training
             Initial helicopter pilot training
             Helicopter maintenance training
             Aircraft pilot upgrade training
             Aircraft maintenance training (hydraulics,
            electronics, pneumatics, corrosion control)
             Maintenance supervisor training
             Operational law training
             Anti-corruption workshop/training
             Aviation safety training
             Joint training
             Ship inspection and container security training
             Ship power plant--maintenance training
             Civil-Military operations training
             Urban operations training
             Riverine training
             Counter Terrorism fellowship training
             International Dynamics of Terrorism courses
             Senior executive level courses on global security
            threats
             Aircrew weapons director training
             Aircrew simulator training
             Counter Narcotics Operations training
             Aviation survival training
             Pilot instrument procedures training
             Army Ranger training
             Jumpmaster training
             Dive training
             Search and rescue training
             Hemispheric security and defense training
             Psychological operations training

        17. Senator Burris. General Renuart, what specific programs and
    DSCA support do you cooperate with Canada along our northern border?
        General Renuart. Defense Support of Civil Authorities is not
    conducted outside of the United States and its territories. However,
    NORTHCOM has signed the Canada-U.S. Civil Assistance Plan (CANUS CAP)
    with Canada Command (CANADACOM) establishing the framework for the
    military of one nation to support the military of the other nation
    pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes. If support is provided to
    civil authorities, it is still under military-to-military support, that
    is, the military forces of one nation supports the military forces of
    the other nation that are providing military support of civil
    authorities. The CANUS CAP was used during crisis action planning in
    the 2008 hurricane season, and for deliberate planning in response to
    requests from the Government of Canada for support during the Vancouver
    2010 Winter Olympic Games. During the 2010 Olympic Games, NORTHCOM was
    prepared to provide support to CANADACOM as they supported Public
    Safety Canada.

                       disaster relief in haiti and chile
        18. Senator Burris. General Fraser, I want to commend your command
    for providing the initial support to the relief efforts in Haiti and
    your potential support to Chile. What impact will these operations have
    on your other efforts within your Area of Responsibility (AOR)?
        General Fraser. Due to the increased operational tempo required of
    the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) staff and its components as a result of
    the Haitian and Chilean crisis, we canceled two of our Foreign Military
    Interaction exercises this year, Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias and the
    command post exercise portion of Peacekeeping Operations-Americas (PKO-
    A). Although these training opportunities were lost for this year, we
    anticipate executing them as planned next year, so there will not be
    any long term impact to the region. Other exercises will require some
    modification.
        In order to support the U.S. effort in Haiti, 12 of the SOUTHCOM's
    Medical Readiness and Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) were refocused on
    Haiti (6 previously programmed in Haiti, 4 reprogrammed from other
    countries, and 2 were created). Although redirecting four MEDRETEs from
    their original countries impacted our original theater security
    cooperation priorities, the high level of need in Haiti demanded the
    change. More significantly, with the tremendous support of the
    Louisiana National Guard, we created an additional New Horizons
    exercise for Haiti. This Humanitarian Civic Assistance exercise
    includes engineering, construction, and medical projects, selected in
    consultation with USAID and the U.S. Embassy in Haiti that will
    complement the U.S. relief effort while providing U.S. troops realistic
    training.
        With regard to SOUTHCOM Humanitarian Assistance Program, our
    ability to engage with other partner nations in the region and to fund
    potential disaster response operations throughout the AOR has been
    diminished until the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
    baseline is restored by the pending Haiti supplemental request.

                   joint capability technology demonstrations
        19. Senator Burris. General Fraser, I understand that you have been
    approved to conduct Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD)
    to address a permanent solution for responding to foreign disasters.
    What are the objectives and expected outcomes of the JCTD?
        General Fraser. SOUTHCOM is the operational lead or co-lead for
    three Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) pertaining to
    military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/
    DR) activities. While it is not possible to field a permanent solution
    to the multitude of HA/DR challenges, we expect each of these JCTDs to
    improve our ability to support interagency and international efforts
    when disasters strike.
        Transnational Information Sharing and Cooperation (TISC) JCTD has
    an objective of adapting best-of-breed information sharing capabilities
    to facilitate collaboration with traditional and non-traditional
    partners in complex environments. It leverages Internet Web 2.0
    technologies, such as interactive forums, chats, blogs, wikis, etc., to
    facilitate timely information sharing among U.S. and partner nation
    militaries, government agencies, non-governmental and international
    organizations, and other interested stakeholders. Central to TISC is a
    customized implementation of the All Partners Access Network (APAN),
    based on the Asia-Pacific Area Network hosted by the U.S. Pacific
    Command. TISC is in operational use today and has already yielded great
    dividends in Haiti. Within hours of the January 12, 2010 earthquake, a
    dedicated Haiti HA/DR community of 1,900+ registered members began
    sharing situational information, and quickly transitioned to using
    TISCs tools to coordinate actions.
        The Cooperative Security (CS) JCTD goes beyond TISC/APAN
    information sharing, with an objective of providing harmonized activity
    planning, execution monitoring, and feedback between DOD and the many
    U.S. Government interagency organizations and cultures; and eventually
    provide interfaces to support other national and international
    stakeholders. Currently under development, the CS design is projected
    to incorporate further refinements to APAN, and integrate advanced
    knowledge management and decision support capabilities.
        The Pre-positioned Expeditionary Assistance Kits (PEAK) JCTD
    recently kicked off with an objective of developing a modular, easy to
    transport kit that provides deployable water purification, renewable
    energy, basic situational awareness, and essential communications
    capabilities. PEAK will support a full spectrum of operations, to
    include HA/DR, bare-base deployments, peacekeeping operations, and
    support to law enforcement and civil authorities. The first six
    prototype units are projected to be available on or about June 30,
    2010, less than 4 months from idea to fielded capability.

                            reserve component forces
        20. Senator Burris. General Fraser, are you taking advantage of the
    civilian acquired skill sets that the Reserve component forces have to
    offer?
        General Fraser. Yes, the Reserve components brings a wealth of
    experience and knowledge that SOUTHCOM uses every day. In Haiti, we
    leveraged this extensive pool of experience by filling critical hard-
    to-fill positions with reservists trained as surgeons, pilots,
    logisticians, and, search and rescue experts.
        In addition, Reserve component civilian acquired skill sets are key
    to ensuring successful State Partnership Programs (SPPs) projects. For
    example this year events have been executed focusing on the following
    civilian skills:

             Full time civilian teachers who are soldiers at the
            New Hampshire National Guard and the Ministry of Education from
            El Salvador conducted a training project focused on improving
            the techniques of teachers of special education.
             Soldiers who work as divers for the New Hampshire
            police conducted exchanges on underwater search and rescue
            operations with El Salvador Police department.

        Many projects are conducted in Latin America that are focused on
    developing the civilian capabilities of our partner nations in managing
    disaster response utilizing our National Guard members who work as
    civilians in U.S. government disaster management agencies.
        Throughout the years, Reserve Component forces have also
    participated in projects focused on agricultural development, city
    planning, well digging and many more civilian acquired skill sets that
    have been key for engaging with our partner nations throughout
    SOUTHCOM.

                         security sector reform program
        21. Senator Burris. General Fraser, what countries are prime
    candidates for a successful security sector reform program?
        General Fraser. SOUTHCOM participates in broader U.S. Government
    security sector reform (SSR) efforts through interagency review of U.S.
    Embassy requests for Section 1207 funds to support host nation SSR
    programs. Haiti, Colombia, Panama, and Paraguay received 1207 funding,
    and remain viable candidates for further security sector reform
    programs. In addition, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica,
    Honduras, and Jamaica are prime candidates for security sector reform
    programs. The security challenges posed by illicit trafficking in Peru,
    Central America, and Jamaica adversely affect the security of these
    States and their people. In addition, gangs in Central America and
    Jamaica contribute to serious security challenges. Integrating defense
    and police against illicit trafficking organizations and gangs,
    including measures to increase their effectiveness of their joint
    operations, is critical to the security of these countries and
    ultimately, the United States.
        As one aspect of security sector reform, SOUTHCOM has worked with
    the defense establishments of various partners in the region, including
    Colombia and Panama, at their request, to realize more efficient and
    streamlined structures to manage their defense efforts. Professional
    militaries are a touchstone of stable and secure societies and
    professionalization begins at the individual level. To that end, DOD
    hosts a number of foreign defense establishment students at educational
    facilities such as the Western Hemisphere Institute of Security
    Cooperation and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, where DOD
    provides its best practices on a range of issues, including strategic
    planning, resource management, and human rights.

                 counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts
        22. Senator Burris. General Fraser, can you identify some examples
    where the military-to-military engagement has led to enhancing the U.S.
    counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts?
        General Fraser. SOUTHCOM continues to coordinate and implement a
    focused Counter Narcotics (CN) program, a basic element of which
    supports the development of a more robust Partner Nation air/maritime
    interdiction capability. The intent of this effort is to enable Partner
    Nations to respond independently or in concert with other Partner
    Nations against the CN threat. When integrated into Joint Interagency
    Task Force-South's (JIATF-S) overarching CN architecture this
    capability provides needed synergy to a diminishing number of US air/
    maritime interdiction assets. Examples where this effort is proving its
    worth include the following:
        Through the Enduring Friendship (EF) Program, SOUTHCOM has assisted
    Partner Nations in the Caribbean and Central America to enhance their
    maritime intercept and C2 capability to conduct counter illicit
    trafficking operations. In fiscal year 2009, SOUTHCOM delivered
    interceptor boats to the Bahamas (2), Belize (2), Dominican Republic
    (4), Honduras (4), Nicaragua (4), and Jamaica (2). Additionally,
    SOUTHCOM provided C2 capability: Harris HF/VHF radios (land based and
    shipboard), Over the Horizon Tactical Tracking System and Cooperating
    Nations Information Exchange System, a maintenance and spare parts
    package for boats and radios, and a training package consisting of
    command, control and communications (C3), tactical boat operations and
    equipment maintenance. Nicaragua is an excellent example of how this
    maritime interdiction capability is being used, as security forces from
    that nation consistently respond to JIATF-S cued intelligence to
    support Law Enforcement Agencies in the interdiction and apprehension
    of illicit traffickers.
        Colombia Maritime Interdiction Capability--DOD purchased Midnight
    Express interdiction boats were delivered beginning in 2006 concurrent
    with the development of multiple supporting infrastructure projects on
    both the Pacific and north coast of Colombia. The initial 12 DOD
    purchased boats all actively engaged in CN maritime interdiction
    missions responding to Colombian/JIATF-S cued intelligence. Colombian
    Navy has purchased an additional 14 boats with their own funds with
    delivery of the first 6 scheduled in July of this fiscal year. Long-
    term sustainment for the capability has shifted to the Colombian Navy
    with minimal additional support from the Department of State Narcotics
    Affairs Section in Colombia. The boats have been active against the
    Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles threat particularly on the Pacific
    Coast in/around Buenaventura. JIATF-S and the Colombian Navy work
    closely in coordinating operations that employ the Midnight Express
    boats as a force multiplier in the maritime interdiction environment.
        SOUTHCOM maintains military-to-military relationships and enhances
    Host Nation Military Counter Narcotics/Counterterrorism abilities with
    countries throughout the AOR by conducting a series of recurring
    engagements which include: Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, Combined
    Multinational Exercises, Counternarcotics Assistance Missions,
    Humanitarian Assistance Programs, Intelligence Sharing and Intelligence
    Cooperation, and Security Assistance Programs. These engagements serve
    as the foundation to the SOUTHCOM Commander's Theater Campaign Plan and
    directly enhance and assist these countries' Counter Terrorist Forces
    and Counternarcotics Forces' effectiveness while enhancing the U.S.'s
    own counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts.

                           state partnership program
        23. Senator Burris. General Fraser, how is the National Guard's SPP
    integrated into your theater engagement strategy?
        General Fraser. The National Guard's SPP is integrated in the
    SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy through a balanced
    approach of military to military, military to civil, and civil to
    military activities that sustain positive trends, reinforce successes,
    and cooperatively meet shared transnational challenges. It creates
    opportunities to develop capabilities within partner countries that
    support conditions to advance democracy, promote regional security,
    support hemispheric cooperation, foster future economic opportunities,
    and build partner nation capacity.
        In addition through the office of the Governor, institutional and
    people-to-people relationships are developed that can be sustained over
    the long term. The State facilitates local government, academic, and
    economic contacts, as well as National Guard and civilian community
    involvement in people-to-people contacts with the Partner Nation. This
    involves linking the right people, with the right skills and
    qualifications, at the right time to accomplish the mission and support
    my SOUTHCOM Strategy 2020.
        At this time 20 nations in the region are partnering with the
    National Guard from 17 States. Over the past year Guard units have
    participated in engagement opportunities such as engineering and
    medical exercises. Most recently, I am pleased to note Louisiana and
    Haiti are about to finalize the details of an SPP relationship.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                         ground-based midcourse defense
        24. Senator Sessions. General Renuart, although the Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA) has established a Stockpile Reliability Program to ensure
    ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) reliability over its service life,
    there appears to be very little emphasis on actual flight testing.
    Instead, MDA believes it can utilize ground-tests and inspections,
    coupled with modeling and simulation, to assess the reliability of the
    ground-based interceptor (GBI). This obviates the need for flight
    testing, reducing the number of required GBIs, which in turn reduces
    costs. The GMD program manager and the MDA Executive Director have
    briefed staff that MDA plans to acquire only 52 GBIs: 30 will be
    deployed, while the remaining 22 will be used for testing. By fiscal
    year 2019, MDA assumes developmental testing will be complete and that
    three GBIs will remain for stockpile reliability testing through 2032.
    In other words, MDA concludes that only three GBI flight tests over 12
    years will be sufficient to maintain system reliability. As the
    combatant commander responsible for defending the Homeland against
    ballistic missile attack, have you been asked to concur on MDA's
    stockpile reliability plan for the GMD system?
        General Renuart. No, we are aware of the Missile Defense Agency's
    Stockpile Reliability Program, but have not been asked to formally
    review the plan.

        25. Senator Sessions. General Renuart, do you agree with MDA's
    position that only three GBIs are required between 2019 and 2032 to
    conduct flight testing to assure the reliability of the GBI and the GMD
    system as a whole?
        General Renuart. We believe that a reliability program does need to
    be based on a representative sample of empirical missile tests at the
    full up round and component level. In order for MDA to be able to do an
    increased number of tests, additional funding is required to procure an
    adequate number of new missiles. This empirical testing, coupled with a
    comprehensive modeling and simulation approach to assess system
    reliability, can be combined with the lessons we learn through the
    Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP). The IMTP is not a replacement for a
    continued reliability assessment program. However, it is a useful tool
    for the warfighter, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) (as the
    Functional Manager and Synchronizer), and the combatant commands to
    work with MDA to develop a comprehensive long-term testing and
    reliability program.

        26. Senator Sessions. General Renuart, if three to four flight
    tests are required for intercontinental ballistic missiles and
    submarine-launched ballistic missiles every year to assure the
    Commander of STRATCOM and the Secretary of Defense that our nuclear
    deterrent remains reliable, why are only three GBI flight tests
    necessary over the course of a dozen years?
        General Renuart. We believe that an effective stockpile reliability
    program is contingent on a sufficient number of items for testing as
    demonstrated by the reliability programs used by the individual
    Services for missiles like our ICBMs, Patriot, or current fleet of
    Standard Missiles. If further evaluation indicates a need for
    additional quantities, my understanding is that MDA can make that buy
    as late as fiscal year 2013 without incurring a production line break.

        27. Senator Sessions. General Renuart, will you personally examine
    the MDA's plan for GMD stockpile reliability to ensure sufficient
    flight testing is built into the program to maintain system reliability
    over the life of the GMD system?
        General Renuart. Yes, I look forward to reviewing and provide
    comments to the GMD stockpile reliability plan. Additionally, in
    coordination with MDA, I will work with STRATCOM and Joint Forces
    Component Command, Integrated Missile Defense as the functional manager
    and synchronizer to ensure our homeland defense requirements continue
    to be addressed throughout the life of the GMD program.

        [Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

            U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall,
    Hagan, Begich, Burris, Kaufman, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
    Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, Brown, Burr, Vitter,
    and Collins.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Howard H. Hoege III,
    counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J.
    Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel;
    Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel;
    Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips,
    professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
    staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
    Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; David M.
    Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
    staff member, and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G.
    Lang, and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator
    Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick
    Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Greta Lundeberg, assistant
    to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben
    Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer
    Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to
    Senator Hagan; Brady King, assistant to Senator Burris; Halie
    Soifer, assistant to Senator Kaufman; Anthony J. Lazarski,
    assistant to Senator Inhofe, Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator
    Sessions, Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
    Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells
    III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to
    Senator LeMieux; Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; Kyle
    Ruckert, assistant to Senator Vitter; and Chip Kennett,
    assistant to Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        Before we begin the hearing, I want to take this
    opportunity to welcome one of our three new members to the
    Armed Services Committee. Senator Kaufman is the first Senator
    from the First State, which is Delaware's famous name; he's the
    first one to serve on this committee, according to our Senate
    historian. We know Senator Kaufman for his long, valuable
    service to the Senate, both as a Senator and before that as a
    member of the Senate staff.
        A special welcome to you, Senator Kaufman. We'll welcome
    the others when they get here, but a special welcome to you.
    Delighted to have you.
        The committee receives testimony this morning from General
    David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and
    Admiral Eric Olson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
    (SOCOM). Today's hearing continues the committee's review of
    the missions and operational requirements of our combatant
    commanders, in light of the priorities that are set out in the
    President's fiscal year 20ll budget request.
        Nowhere will the President's budget priorities have a
    greater impact than with the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), including
    a significant portion of our Special Operations Forces (SOF).
    The men and women of CENTCOM and SOCOM have been engaged in
    major military operations for nearly 8\1/2\ years, most having
    served multiple deployments. Our SOF are facing the highest
    operational tempo in their history. Yet, in Afghanistan and
    Iraq, our troops' morale is very high, they are dedicated to
    their mission, and they are serving with courage and
    distinction.
        General Petraeus and Admiral Olson, thank you for your
    leadership, and, on behalf of this committee, please pass along
    our gratitude to the troops that serve under your command.
        The next 12 months will be critical in both Afghanistan and
    Iraq. The challenges are significant. In Afghanistan, the
    military operations in the central Helmand River valley are
    just the opening salvo, as General Petraeus has said, of a long
    campaign, under General McChrystal's command, to implement the
    President's counterinsurgency strategy. As General Gates told
    Afghan soldiers in Kabul last week, this conflict is their
    fight to win, and Afghanistan's future is in their hands.
        Key to this effort is the partnering of Afghan soldiers
    with U.S. and coalition forces living and operating together in
    the planning and conduct of military operations. Last week, the
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied
    Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, said that the
    partnering ratio in Helmand Province had improved to nearly 1
    to 1; close to one Afghan soldier for each coalition soldier in
    the fight.
        General Petraeus, I hope you're going to update us this
    morning on the progress of our partnering efforts in
    Afghanistan.
        I have been deeply concerned, however, that the effort to
    grow the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police is being slowed
    by a lack of trainers. Earlier this month, Lieutenant General
    Bill Caldwell, the head of the NATO Training Mission in
    Afghanistan, reported an almost 900 percent increase in Afghan
    Army recruits in training, from 830 in September to 7,400 in
    January of this year. But, at the same time, he reported that
    the NATO Training Command remains at just over half of the
    number of instructors and advisers required. At a recent
    conference to generate forces, NATO members pledged fewer than
    half the approximately 1,200 additional NATO trainers that are
    needed. As a result of this shortfall, Afghan Army recruits are
    having to wait to receive their basic training course.
        General Petraeus, the committee would be interested in any
    recommendations that you might have for addressing these
    resource shortfalls.
        Our SOF in Afghanistan are also faced with resource
    challenges, particularly due to the lack of enabling
    capabilities, such as rotary wing aircraft support. We'd be
    interested in hearing from our witnesses as to what is being
    done to address this issue for our SOF in theater today.
        I believe there are reasons for cautious optimism. An ABC/
    BBC public opinion survey in Afghanistan in January found that
    70 percent of the Afghans polled believed their country was
    headed in the right direction. In terms of governance, the
    Afghan Government is apparently now working better with local
    leaders in Helmand to deliver services, which surely improves
    the chances of building support in the country for the Afghan
    Government.
        With regard to Afghanistan's long-term economic future,
    President Karzai recently announced that a soon-to-be-released
    U.S. Geological survey report will show that Afghanistan has
    nearly a trillion dollars in petroleum reserves and mineral
    deposits, which are in great demand.
        The coming months will also be important for the
    President's strategy in Iraq. By September 1, the U.S. combat
    mission in Iraq will end and U.S. forces will transition to the
    role of advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
    According to General Odierno, our commander in Iraq, the ISF
    performed well during the recent parliamentary elections, and
    that only a catastrophic event, in his words, would prevent the
    drawdown of U.S. forces from 96,000, currently, to 50,000 by
    the end of August. The drawdown of those forces will be an
    important milestone on the way to withdrawing all U.S. forces
    from Iraq by the end of 2011, redefining the U.S.-Iraq
    strategic relationship, and transferring responsibility for
    Iraq's security to Iraqis, while keeping the pressure on Iraqi
    leaders to reach the political settlements and decisions so
    essential to achieving security in Iraq.
        While our conventional forces reduce their footprint in
    Iraq, the requirement for SOF and the unique skills they bring
    to the effort will continue. Special operators will have a
    continuing requirement for support from their general-purpose
    force counterparts, including for airlift, medical evacuation,
    and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as
    those SOF continue throughout the U.S. drawdown to provide
    support to the ISF.
        The attempted Christmas Day airline bombing near Detroit
    reminded every American that al Qaeda is a global organization
    that continues to threaten harm to anyone that does not share
    its radical views. That nearly catastrophic incident also
    focused attention on Yemen, a country with an uneven record on
    counterterrorism and large ungoverned spaces that serve as
    attractive sanctuaries for al Qaeda and its recruits.
        General Petraeus, I hope that you will let us know this
    morning what, in your opinion, our Government is doing to
    support Yemen's capacity to respond to the al Qaeda threat and
    to stabilize its territory, and your recommendations for what
    more can be done.
        Because the threat of violent extremism is not confined to
    Yemen or the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, SOCOM
    maintains a global focus. SOCOM personnel are deployed to
    dozens of countries around the world, working to address the
    underlying causes of violent extremism and helping to build the
    capacity of other nations to address the mutual threats that we
    face. Working with U.S. ambassadors in priority countries,
    these special operators engage in a variety of training, civil
    affairs, and information operations (IO) intended to counter
    the spread of violent ideology.
        Admiral Olson, we hope that you'll update the committee on
    the progress of those efforts to address violent extremism
    globally.
        Finally, Iran remains a major security challenge. Iran
    continues to work to undermine stability in the Middle East and
    to stoke fears across the region. The brutal tactics and human
    rights abuses of the Government of Iran in its efforts to
    silence the voices of the people of Iran are of deep concern.
    As the administration continues its push for more significant
    sanctions against Iran, it will be critical to continue to work
    with our partners in the CENTCOM AOR on robust sanctions
    enforcement. This is going to require intense coordination and
    collaboration with other nations in the region.
        General Petraeus, we look forward to hearing your
    assessment of the willingness of other nations in the region to
    cooperate in the robust enforcement of current sanctions
    against Iran and support even stronger sanctions against Iran
    until they comply with United Nations (U.N.) resolutions
    relative to the Iranian nuclear program. Nuclear arms in
    possession of Iran, in violation of those U.N. resolutions,
    will threaten the stability of the region and cannot be
    accepted by the world community.
        I understand, now, that another new member of our committee
    has joined us. We welcome Senator Brown; he's the newest member
    of the Senate. He brings a very valuable perspective of having
    served for more than 30 years in the Massachusetts Army
    National Guard, and that is a very, very important contribution
    to us. We all welcome you to a committee which is famous for
    working on a bipartisan basis. We all enjoy working here, for
    many reasons; obviously, the security of this country being our
    common mission, but it's also because we work so well together
    across party lines. So, we welcome you.
        We've already welcomed Senator Kaufman, and there's just
    one other Senator. If Senator Bingaman is not here yet, we will
    welcome him when he arrives.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I join you in welcoming an old and dear friend, Senator
    Kaufman of Delaware, who I've known for many, many years.
        I would also like to welcome Senator Brown, a member of the
    Massachusetts Guard for 30 years, and all of that is very good
    news. Unfortunately, he joins Senator Graham as a lawyer.
    [Laughter.]
        But, we welcome him to the committee. He brings knowledge
    and expertise of the challenges that our men and women serving
    in the military face on a day-to-day basis as we are engaged in
    two wars.
        I thank our witnesses today, Admiral Olson and General
    Petraeus, for joining us. Let me extend my thanks to the men
    and women serving under your command, especially the families,
    who endure so much for the security and betterment of our
    country.
        Amid the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the ongoing fight
    against violent Islamic extremism, the focus of the U.S.
    military, especially our lead forces, is the Middle East and
    South and Central Asia. Obviously, this is the responsibility
    of CENTCOM and the chief priority of SOCOM. So, it's fitting
    and important that both combatant commanders are here today
    together.
        I'll keep my remarks brief and to the point. I'm concerned
    at what appear to be dangerous and growing doubts about U.S.
    power and commitment on the part of both our friends and our
    enemies in the broader Middle East today. On the one hand, this
    perception is profoundly unjustified. America enjoys a position
    of extraordinary power and influence in this region. The United
    States did not abandon Iraq when the going got tough. Instead,
    we succeeded in turning it around, in large part, thanks to
    your leadership, General Petraeus.
        A moderate majority was empowered in Iraq to turn the tide
    against violent extremists, and today the emergence of a
    democratic Iraq that can defend and sustain itself is becoming
    a hopeful new presence in an unstable region. I might add, Iraq
    is the only country in the Middle East, outside of Israel, that
    has a contested election.
        In Afghanistan, thanks to President Obama's decision to
    increase our civil-military commitment, the United States and
    our allies are now in a position to break the momentum of the
    insurgency and help our Afghan friends to secure their own
    country.
        As you've noted before to this committee, Admiral Olson,
    our SOF are making major strides in targeting the Taliban's
    leadership and keeping the pressure on al Qaeda; not just in
    Afghanistan, but also in places like Pakistan and Yemen.
        At the same time, as you have noted before, General
    Petraeus, the United States is building an elaborate and robust
    security architecture in the broader Middle East, including
    shared early-warning systems, ballistic missile defenses (BMD),
    and major sales of defensive weapons that enhance the
    capabilities of our friends to defend themselves and to deter
    our enemies. Though we admittedly face many difficult
    challenges in the broader Middle East, the fact is, the U.S.
    capability and lead in this region is strong and enduring.
        Yet, military capability is not the only measure of
    leadership. There's also the perception of our political
    resolve, and this is what concerns me. I'm concerned that the
    Government of Iran has spurned the President's offer of
    engagement. Not only has it experienced no real consequences
    for doing so, our deadlines for actions have slipped from
    September of last year to the beginning of this year, and now
    it's mid-March, and still there have been no consequences.
        So, too, with the Syrian Government. There's been plenty of
    U.S. engagement since the beginning of last year, but seemingly
    few changes to Syria's destabilizing behavior in the region as
    a result. Instead, the Syrian President is openly mocking U.S.
    leaders while meeting with the President of Iran and the head
    of Hezbollah. Meanwhile, despite constant refrains about
    cutting off the supply of arms to Hezbollah, the fact remains
    that Hezbollah is better armed today than ever before. When our
    allies and friends in the Levant and the Gulf look at these
    events, I worry that it feeds a lack of confidence in America's
    commitment to regional security.
        In South Asia, meanwhile, the pledge to begin withdrawing
    our forces by July 2011 has injected unnecessary doubts about
    U.S. commitment in the minds of friends and foes alike, from
    Afghan fence-sitters to Pakistan's leaders to our strategic
    partners in India. Reports over the weekend that reconciliation
    with Taliban leaders is now being explored before the vast
    majority of the 30,000-troop surge has even arrived in the
    country only feed the perception in the region that the U.S.
    Government is more eager to leave Afghanistan than to succeed
    there.
        In short, I'm concerned that we are heading toward a
    situation in the broader Middle East where our friends don't
    trust us and our enemies don't fear us, because both doubt our
    staying power, our determination, and our resolve. We may be
    heading there, but we aren't there yet. Though this perceived
    lack of U.S. commitment may take a lot of time and effort to
    reverse, I'm confident that it can be reversed. As I said, the
    U.S. capacity to lead remains strong; what's more, our country
    is blessed with some truly first-rate civilian and military
    leaders, individuals like our two distinguished witnesses today
    and the brave men and women under their command. It's our job,
    here in Washington, to support their needs, including the
    resources they require to succeed in their missions on our
    behalf. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how we
    will all work together to address the serious challenges we
    face, especially in this vital part of the world.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        We now have a quorum of our committee; and so, I would ask
    the committee to consider three civilian nominations and a list
    of 802 pending military nominations.
        First, the civilian nominations: I ask the committee to
    consider the nominations of Jessie Hill Roberson, Joseph F.
    Bader, and Peter Stanley Winokur to be members of the Defense
    Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Is there a motion to favorably
    report these nominees?
        Senator McCain. So moved.
        Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
        Senator Reed. Second.
        Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye? [Chorus of ayes.]
        Opposed, nay? [No response.]
        The ayes have it.
        Next, I ask the committee to consider a list of 802 pending
    military nominations. They've been before the committee the
    required length of time. Is there a motion to report these
    nominations?
        Senator McCain. So moved.
        Chairman Levin. Second?
        Senator Reed. Second.
        Chairman Levin. There's a second.
        All in favor, say aye? [Chorus of ayes.]
        Opposed, nay? [No response.]
        The motion carries.
        Admiral, I think we'll start with you this morning.
        Admiral Olson.

     STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL
                           OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Admiral Olson. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator
    McCain, and other distinguished members of the committee. Thank
    you for the opportunity to appear again before this body to
    highlight the posture of SOCOM.
        It's a pleasure to join General Petraeus here this morning.
        Your continued support and oversight of SOCOM and its
    assigned forces has ensured that our Nation has the broad
    special operations capabilities that it needs and expects.
        With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I'll submit my written
    posture statement for the record, and open with a briefer set
    of remarks.
        Chairman Levin. That'll be fine.
        Admiral Olson. SOCOM's Service Component Commands--those
    being the Army SOCOM, the Air Force SOCOM, the Naval Special
    Warfare Command, and the Marine Corps Forces SOCOM--through
    them, SOCOM organizes, equips, trains, and provides fully-
    capable SOF to serve under the operational control of regional
    combatant commanders around the world, and, as you noted, by a
    wide margin, our forces are most heavily committed to
    supporting operations in the CENTCOM AOR under the operational
    command of General Petraeus.
        On an average day, though, over 12,000 members of the SOF
    are present in about 75 countries. They conduct a wide variety
    of activities. You listed several, Mr. Chairman. They range
    from civil-military operations, like local infrastructure
    development in relatively benign environments, to
    counterterrorist operations under extremely demanding
    conditions. These indirect and direct actions conducted by SOF
    are intended to support each other in contributing to
    environments where security and stability can be further
    developed and sustained by local organizations and forces. In
    fact, nearly every mission performed by SOF is in support of an
    indigenous partner force.
        SOF do what other military forces are not doctrinally
    organized, trained, or equipped to do. The powerful effects of
    SOF in the areas where they are properly employed are often
    recognized as game-changers. Our force operates very
    effectively in small numbers, in remote regions, often with a
    low profile, under austere conditions.
        The deployment rate of SOF is high. Although the demand is
    outpacing the supply, I remain firm in limiting our request for
    manpower growth to the range of 3 to 5 percent per year.
        If approved, the President's fiscal year 2011 budget would
    grow SOF personnel by 4.5 percent. The overall baseline budget
    for SOCOM would grow by about 5.7 percent, to just over $6.3
    billion, with most of that increase in the operations and
    maintenance (O&M) account.
        Significantly, the overseas contingency operations funds
    would increase by $464 million, compared to 2010, bringing that
    account to about $3.5 billion, for a total 2011 SOCOM budget of
    $9.8 billion. This is sufficient to support our current level
    of special operations-peculiar activities around the world, as
    long as we are able to depend on the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
    Marine Corps for service-common items and support.
        The budget and acquisition authorities held by the
    Commander of SOCOM are similar to the military departments,
    although not on the same scale. They are essential to meeting
    the emergent needs of an innovative force with a unique mission
    set, and this applies equally to SOCOM's research and
    development authorities, which enable rapid application of
    science and technology to meet urgent operational needs.
        In my role as the commander responsible for the readiness
    of the SOF, I give high priority to training and education
    programs and to influencing, where I can, the career
    development of special operations personnel. Along with the
    pure operational skills that enable success in very complex and
    demanding operational environments, language skills and
    subregional expertise remain primary focus areas.
        The special operations community, of course, includes the
    families of our service men and women, and caring for our
    injured and wounded, and for the families of those killed in
    action, is among our most solemn responsibilities. We are proud
    of our many successes in returning wounded warriors to their
    teams and of our lifelong commitment to those who are unable to
    do so.
        You, on this committee, and all Americans, can be fiercely
    proud of your SOF. They are fit, focused, supremely capable,
    and incredibly courageous. They have impact well beyond their
    relatively small numbers, and I'm deeply honored by this
    opportunity to represent them to you today.
        I stand ready for your questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by ADM Eric T. Olson, USN
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
    for this opportunity to update you on the U.S. Special Operations
    Command (SOCOM). It is an honor to do so for the third time as
    Commander.
        Over 2 decades ago, Congress directed the establishment of a
    headquarters dedicated to prepare Special Operations Forces (SOFs) to
    carry out assigned missions. in support of Geographic Combatant
    Commanders. Since then, the forces and the missions have expanded and
    changed in response to very dynamic global conditions and threats.
        In this `new normal` in which our forces operate, emerging security
    challenges to our Nation come evermore from agile and elusive adversary
    networks versus traditional, uniformed military formations. Therefore,
    the value of adaptive SOFs is at least as much in their mindset as in
    their skill set.
        U.S. SOF respond to the sound of guns with a combination of speed,
    discipline, and tenacity. They also apply their knowledge and
    experience well ahead of the sound of the guns to prevent violence from
    erupting whenever and wherever possible. These are warriors who can act
    swiftly with precision and lethality, yet remain simultaneously capable
    of building long-term relationships and trust with international
    partners.
                         resourcing: force and mission
        On an average day, in excess of 12,000 SOF and SOF support
    personnel are deployed in more than 75 countries across the globe. An
    invaluable ingredient is our Reserve element, about 14 percent of SOF`s
    total manpower.
        Currently, 86 percent of deployed SOF are in U.S. Central Command's
    (CENTCOM) area of responsibility under the operational control of
    General Petraeus. The rest of the deployed force--along with over 3,000
    members permanently stationed in Europe and the Pacific--are serving
    the other Geographic Combatant Commanders.
        To support special operators and their capabilities, the
    President`s proposed budget request for fiscal year 2011 is about $6.3
    billion in baseline and $3.5 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations
    funding. Managing these funds is my responsibility.
        Along with SOCOM`s Major Force Program (MFP)-11 funding--one
    intended to fund SOF-peculiar requirements--the Command is heavily
    dependent on each of the Military Services for key enablers to special
    operations. Within our organic structure--both to provide sufficient
    speed of response and a degree of reliable sustainability--SOCOM is
    growing organic combat service and service support assets for SOFs, to
    include: communications, information support specialists, forensic
    analysts, military working dog teams, intelligence experts, and more.
    The fiscal year 2011 budget proposes a total manpower increase of 2,700
    people across the Force, a 4.6 percent growth from the previous fiscal
    year.
        Working closely with Joint Force Commanders, senior Department of
    Defense (DOD) leaders, and Congress, SOCOM also develops SOF-specific
    doctrine, and advises on policy and legislation supporting these
    activities.
        SOCOM is tasked to synchronize planning for global operations
    against terrorist networks. The 7500 series of Concept Plans
    (CONPLANs), crafted at SOCOM and approved by the Secretary of Defense,
    continue to function as both the framework for planning within DOD and
    a supporting mechanism within the interagency environment for combating
    global terror networks. The plans are supported by regional plans
    formulated by each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders specific to
    threats within their areas of responsibility.
        In our role, SOCOM receives, analyzes, and prioritizes these
    regional plans, and makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
    and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on force and resource
    allocations. We also serve as an extension of the Joint Staff in
    coordinating SOF programs and operations with our interagency partners.
        The authority most often referred to as `Section 1208'--unique to
    SOCOM since 2005--is a key tool for our widely dispersed and often
    isolated SOFs around the world. This authority enables SOF to train and
    equip indigenous forces, both regular and irregular, and to enable them
    to support ongoing counterterrorism operations. Indigenous forces--
    while serving a leading role and supported by SOF--provide essential
    access to locations, populations, and information otherwise
    inaccessible. Support to indigenous forces through section 1208
    reprioritization of funding has resulted in many successful
    counterterrorist operations.
                    strategy: direct and indirect approaches
        CONPLAN 7500 calls for the use of both a direct and indirect
    approach to fighting terrorist networks. The direct approach to violent
    extremists consists of SOF efforts that disrupt terrorist organizations
    by capturing, killing, and interdicting extremist networks and
    resources, thereby preventing them from harming us in the near term.
    These actions include denial of access and use of weapons of mass
    destruction.
        The direct approach is urgent, necessary, and largely kinetic. In
    the last year, SOF--deployed in support of geographic combatant
    commanders--inflicted substantial losses against the leadership and
    operational capacity of al Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates.
    These effects--while significant in the short term--are not by
    themselves decisive.
        The enduring results come from indirect approaches--those in which
    we enable partners to combat extremist organizations themselves by
    contributing to their capabilities through advising, training, and--
    when authorized and funded--equipping. This includes efforts to deter
    active and tacit support for violent extremist organizations in areas
    where the existing government is either unwilling or unable to remove
    terrorist sanctuaries.
        Central to SOCOM`s contribution are our career, multi-dimensional
    operators, individuals adept in defense, diplomacy, and development.
    SOF operators are often locally grounded in their areas of
    responsibility, diplomatically astute, and experts in specialized
    tactical skills. It is demanding work.
        The number of individuals both eager and qualified to serve as SOF
    operators is limited. Overall, SOF personnel growth continues to be
    managed at about 3 percent annually, a strategy intended to retain the
    best while adding additional manpower only as it can be recruited,
    trained, absorbed and deployed.
        Still, direct and indirect approaches must be carefully balanced.
    While the direct approach is often necessary and has immediate impact,
    it essentially creates time for the indirect approach to achieve
    lasting outcomes through other means.
        Security Force Assistance (SFA) remains a highlight of SOF indirect
    action. SFA is a collaboration engine for the Command to include:
    security cooperation, security assistance, foreign internal defense,
    internal defense and development, and security sector reform.
        SFA enhances the military capabilities and capacities of our allies
    and partners via training, advising, assistance, and--as authorized--
    equipping and supporting foreign military and security forces.
    ``Build[ing] the security capacity of partner states'' is directly
    referenced within the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as one of
    six key missions.
        The paradigm of national sovereignty is challenged by the trends of
    crime, migration, extremism, and the competition for resources which
    drive populations and provoke conflict. Recognizing this, the Command`s
    engagement efforts through the `Sovereign Challenge` Program continue
    as a unique method of establishing relationships with senior military
    leaders from around the world. The program--in collaboration with the
    U.S. Department of State--aims to provide venues in which robust dialog
    about threats to sovereignty can take place. In this indirect and
    mutually beneficial approach to military relationships, long-term
    success is measured by other countries' actions in their own and the
    region`s security interests.
                             global synchronization
        As previously stated, SOCOM is designated as the command
    responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations against
    terrorist networks. In this ongoing Global Synchronization Process,
    SOCOM coordinates with other combatant commanders, the Services, and--
    as directed--appropriate U.S. Government agencies and international
    partners to deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorism across the globe.
    Regular meetings, video teleconferences, and `community of interest`
    forums facilitate planning, promote situational awareness, and enhance
    synergy within the overall war on terror effort. The Command`s Global
    Synchronization Workshops--now 5 years old--unite hundreds of planners
    from across the Global Synchronization Process Community.
                               enablers: mobility
        While attention is first given to operators conducting missions
    around the globe, these individuals are supported by a set of essential
    mobility capabilities that allow SOF to move, influence the
    environment, share information, and strike when necessary. In
    challenging settings and situations, success can depend upon these
    capabilities. For example, in Haiti`s Operation Unified Response this
    mobility allowed SOF to open a closed and damaged airfield to enable
    relief efforts. This was accomplished within 26 hours of the
    earthquake, and 28 minutes of being on the ground. SOF personnel
    subsequently assisted with medical and humanitarian assistance to
    include rescue of trapped citizens, injury treatment, and continuous
    broadcasting of relief locations and protocols.
        I`ve paid particular attention to mobility enabling capabilities,
    making them a focal point of the SOCOM Strategic Plan. This importance
    is echoed by the Secretary of Defense in the 2010 QDR, calling to
    ``increase key enabling assets for SOFs.''
        For the Special Operator, mobility enhancements mean a variety of
    improved strategic and tactical capabilities. These provide, for
    example, quick strike capabilities regardless of terrain. In
    cooperation with the Army, we will grow SOCOM`s helicopter fleet by
    eight MH-47 Chinooks by fiscal year 2015. We are also nearing fielding
    completion of upgraded MH-47G and new MH-60M helicopters, improvements
    that provide SOF with modernized helicopters specifically adapted to
    SOF-peculiar requirements like aerial refueling, advanced night
    operations, and terrain-hugging flight profiles.
        Growth is also evident in the Tilt/Hybrid Wing Aircraft Programs.
    The CV-22 Osprey offers high-speed, long-range insertion and extraction
    of SOF. SOCOM currently has 12 CV-22s, growing to 50 by fiscal year
    2016.
        In their first combat deployment, 6 CV-22s logged over 600 flight
    hours, performing 45 direct action assault force missions and 100+
    combat service support missions in the process. A recent national
    contingency mission used three of these aircraft for combat search and
    rescue, personnel recovery, and quick reaction force support.
        Our goal is to accelerate delivery of CV-22s to better support the
    forces requiring them. We are looking to add five more CV-22s in the
    coming year.
        The C-130--in several variants--remains the workhorse of the SOF,
    fixed-wing mobility fleet. C-130s provide SOF with important tactical
    lift and precision fire for our ground and maritime forces. Ongoing
    efforts to recapitalize the oldest of these airframes are a current top
    priority for Air Force SOCOM, our air component.
        Finally, the Non-Standard Aviation Program supports Theater SOCOM
    mobility requirements worldwide. This program includes short takeoff
    and landing, light and medium, intra-theater aircraft. The fiscal year
    2011 budget request includes funds to procure nine additional light and
    medium aircraft plus associated spares and repair parts.
        On land, a new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicle
    will increase ground mobility for SOF. The new model--funded through
    the Joint Program Office--provides improved safety, visibility,
    control, and storage.
        In the maritime environment, SOCOM remains committed to developing
    undersea submersible platforms that will provide assured, clandestine
    access to denied and politically sensitive areas while enabling
    persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in
    support of high-priority SOF requirements. The Advanced SEAL Delivery
    System Program (ASDS)--one well-supported by Congress--delivered these
    operational capabilities until it suffered a significant lithium-ion
    battery fire.
        As noted in last year's National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2010, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is
    coordinating with the Director of National Intelligence to assess the
    feasibility of establishing a cost-sharing agreement for ASDS follow-on
    capabilities. If approved, these capabilities are expected to
    capitalize on improved battery technologies, ones recommended to the
    Navy by the investigation panel reviewing the ASDS lithium-ion battery
    fire. The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes funds to conduct
    research and development on the Joint Multimission Submersible which
    will provide these capabilities.
            enablers: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
        These efforts are complemented by planned upgrades to SOF`s
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) portfolio. ISR
    remains an invaluable asset, most notably in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility. The ISR program is not about platforms; it is about
    complete systems including the people who operate them.
        Proposed plans--contained within a Joint Staff-approved
    capabilities document and seconded by the Secretary of Defense within
    the 2010 QDR (``expanding manned and unmanned systems for intelligence,
    surveillance and reconnaissance'') entail expansion of the Program`s
    inventory to include both manned and unmanned systems. These systems
    will be supported by Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination
    capabilities, and robust communication architecture. Airborne ISR
    remains complemented by maritime capabilities.
                         enablers: information sharing
        Effective use of ISR, however, can only occur on communications
    systems and networks designed to handle the large amounts of
    information developed. Our evolving mission sets form a difficult and
    increasingly expensive information sharing reality, with data residing
    on, and transiting through, a variety of systems under varying security
    criteria.
        Recognizing this problem, SOCOM is moving toward a globally
    responsive network capable of cross-domain data sharing. SOCOM`s SOF
    Information Environment (SIE) is our portion of DOD`s Global
    Information Grid. The SIE is a SOF information technology enterprise
    that will offer permissions-based, single sign-on access to SOF
    resources from anywhere on the globe.
                        enablers: science and technology
        SOCOM`s modernization, research and development and acquisition
    enabling processes are interconnected to ensure needed technological
    agility. The Command`s Rapid Exploitation of Innovative Technology
    (REITS) Program provides SOCOM with the ability to identify, assess and
    exploit emerging technologies for SOF-peculiar applications.
        REITS funds are assisting in the development of next generation
    software and antenna design for ``on-the-move,'' mounted and dismounted
    geo-location technology. This new capability will conform to both
    current tactical vehicles and radio frequency systems, while providing
    organic, small unit find, fix, and finish capabilities within a single
    tactical ground asset.
                     enablers: agile acquisition processes
        Rapid fielding of the Dragon Spear Precision Strike Platform (PSP)
    is an example of the benefits of an acquisition process designed for
    flexibility and agility. This system benefits from the Combat Missions
    Needs Statement (C-MNS) process which quickly addresses critical
    capability gaps that put missions or lives at risk. Funding execution
    responsibilities for C-MNS reside with the Joint Acquisition Task
    Force, meaning faster operational implementation.
        By design, PSP is a modular, scalable weapons system, one flexible
    enough for many platforms and configurations. Four Dragon Spear systems
    are currently being fielded. Ongoing MC-130W Dragon Spear improvements
    include upgrades to its sensors, a Standoff Precision Guided Munitions
    system and supporting 30mm gun, a sensor operator console, and
    communication equipment and flight deck hardware.
        SOF MC-130 console reconfigurations enable aircrews to operate more
    efficiently and effectively. Improved infrared warning systems result
    in better threat detection. Updated line-of-sight antennae produce more
    communications capacity with improved reliability. All are
    modernization initiatives designed to cost-effectively optimize current
    SOF aircraft.
                              enablers: education
        The unique nature of special operations enables us to focus people
    on specific regions more so than other forces can. This ensures we are
    doing the best we can with what we have.
        SOCOM--partnered with the Services--is intensifying its efforts in
    training and personnel management to create opportunities for our
    personnel to truly build productive and enduring relationships with our
    partners. DOD Directive 5100.1 aims to address many of these issues by
    enhancing SOCOM`s ability to influence management of our assigned
    manpower.
        Our culture and language programs are supplemented with increased
    attention to interagency collaboration and information sharing, with
    specific emphasis on subregional and microregional knowledge.
        I`ve directed SOF schools to pay more attention to curricula
    dedicated to advanced language skills and regional expertise.
    Specifically, we will ensure better alignment of language skills,
    career management, and incentives within our force.
        To prepare SOF for the challenges ahead, we`re prioritizing career
    development toward areas best suited for irregular environments with
    emphasis on specialized versus generalized operator performance. This
    entails building creative, adaptive and flexible leaders at every level
    of the enlisted and officer ranks.
        SOCOM`s Lessons Learned Program supplements these efforts with
    vital, in the field knowledge. This program emphasizes analysis and
    information sharing relevant to the SOF Community, one that now
    includes research, development, technology and experimentation
    activities.
                                 care coalition
        We cannot sustain combat effectiveness without the enduring support
    of our families. Our operators are asked to do a great many things to
    protect our Nation, and all of them place additional demands on those
    who are closest to us. Continuing care for our wounded or injured
    operators--and for the families of those who have been seriously
    injured or killed--is among our most solemn responsibilities. The 2010
    QDR highlights the importance of such programs: ``caring for our
    wounded warriors is our highest priority, and we will work to provide
    them top-quality care that reflects their service and sacrifice.''
        SOCOM`s Care Coalition currently supports over 2,800 wounded SOF
    operators by matching medical needs with available providers. The goal
    of this clearinghouse - via advocacy, education, treatment, recovery,
    and rehabilitation - is to increase the likelihood of returning to duty
    and/or succeeding in post-military service. Additional efforts include
    proactive programs by SOCOM to identify, treat and prevent mental
    health care problems before they arise.
        Along with its SOCOM headquarters-based staff, eleven hospital
    liaisons help extend Care Coalition`s reach across the country and
    globe. These efforts are also supplemented by support from over 70
    partner organizations.
        When supporting our wounded, ill and/or injured and their families,
    our job is never done. We still need to improve synchronization among
    the various government agencies supporting these individuals, also
    refine legislation to fund them.
        Your support is essential. Over the past couple of years alone, SOF
    operators benefited from legislation that introduced a cognitive
    rehabilitation pilot program, pay and allowance continuation for
    wounded operators, care giver training and compensation, expansion of
    invitational travel orders for families of wounded, traumatic
    serviceman group life insurance, and memorial service support to our
    surviving families.
                                looking forward
        The three priorities on which SOFs need to focus--mission, people,
    and equipment--are enduring. Through direct action, we deter, disrupt
    and defeat terrorist threats across the globe. In tandem, indirect
    action creates and sustains environments to empower longer-term
    success.
        As we remain prepared for urgent, bold and decisive action, we
    recognize that it is high-quality, low-profile, long-term engagement
    that fosters trust and enables essential partnerships. In this regard,
    we should measure success by how well we have prepared others to face
    their security challenges, not by what we do for them.
        We also recognize that as we look forward, success increasingly
    depends upon the larger combination of defense, diplomacy, and
    development activities. In relaying his sentiments on the Afghanistan
    conflict, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mullen indicated
    that ``winning is not solely the responsibility of the U.S. Military.''
    ``Success,'' he said, ``will come by and only through a concerted
    effort by other agencies and partners.'' We applaud policy and funding
    that provide other agencies the capabilities to contribute to this
    effort.
        As always, SOCOM and SOF--with your continued support--will answer
    the needs of operational commanders. Technology areas seen as vital to
    short- and long-term intervention will continue as focus areas for
    SOCOM research and development. Key enabling mechanisms across all
    terrains will yield the most effective, strategic, and tactical
    implementation of our forces.
        SOCOM will emphasize even more precise methods for gathering,
    analyzing, processing and sharing of information and intelligence about
    these domains. We will continue to engender existing relationships with
    interagency partners while exploring opportunities to further improve
    them. Our technology investments will permit us to better locate, tag
    and track threats before they strike.
        Sufficient infrastructure is essential to supporting our operators,
    and many of our existing facilities are in need of expansion or
    upgrade. The military construction program proposed for fiscal year
    2011 will help to improve this situation. Much-needed construction and
    modernization on 19 different projects at 9 different installations
    will sustain SOF operations support, operational communications,
    aircraft maintenance and capabilities, and intelligence functions.
        The contributions of this force amaze me every day. While
    relatively small in number, their dramatic, positive impact is of the
    greatest magnitude. They remain the world`s most precise and lethal
    counterterrorism force, and the most effective special operations
    trainers, advisors and combat partners. It is a profound honor to be
    associated with this extraordinarily capable and uniquely innovative
    force and to represent them before this committee.
        Our successes are only possible because of this committee`s active
    advocacy for the Command and its mission. Speaking on behalf of the
    entire community, your visits to the theater and to troops in recovery
    are deeply appreciated. Your support of the President`s budget will
    enable special operations to continue to meet our great Nation`s
    highest expectations. Again, thank you.

        Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you so much.
        General Petraeus, welcome.

       STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            CENTRAL COMMAND

        General Petraeus. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    provide an update on the situation in the CENTCOM AOR, and an
    opportunity to discuss CENTCOM's strategy and priorities for
    the year ahead.
        It is a pleasure to be here with my colleague and good
    friend, Admiral Olson.
        I, too, have submitted a written statement for the record,
    and will summarize it here.
        CENTCOM is now in its ninth consecutive year of combat
    operations. It oversees the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and
    Iraq and the assistance to Pakistan, as well as a theaterwide
    campaign against al Qaeda. We are also, of course, working on
    numerous contingency plans, and we continue the effort to build
    partnerships throughout the AOR, working in concert with our
    diplomatic colleagues as part of whole-of-government approaches
    to help increase the capabilities of partner-nation security
    forces.
        Meanwhile, the conditions and dynamics that shape the
    security environment continue to evolve. Today, I'll briefly
    discuss these developments and our ongoing missions, as well as
    some of the dynamics that shape activities in the CENTCOM AOR.
        First, Afghanistan. As President Obama observed in
    announcing his new policy, ``It is in our vital national
    interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to
    Afghanistan.'' As he noted, these forces will provide the
    resources that we need to seize the initiative while building
    the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition
    of our forces out of Afghanistan.
        Clearly, the challenges there are considerable, but success
    there is, as General McChrystal has observed, both important
    and achievable. Our goals in Afghanistan and in that region are
    clear. They are to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and
    its extremist allies, and to set conditions in Afghanistan to
    prevent reestablishment of transnational extremist sanctuaries,
    like the ones al Qaeda enjoyed there prior to September 11.
        To accomplish this task, we are working with our
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan
    partners to improve security for the Afghan people, to wrest
    the initiative from the Taliban and other insurgent elements,
    to develop the Afghan security forces, and to support
    establishment of Afghan governance that is seen as legitimate
    in the eyes of the people.
        We spent much of the past year working to get the inputs
    right in Afghanistan; establishing the structures and
    organizations needed to carry out a comprehensive civil-
    military campaign plan; putting our best leaders in charge of
    those organizations; developing the right concepts to guide our
    operations--the comprehensive campaign plan, the ISAF
    counterinsurgency guidance, and the tactical directive issues
    by General McChrystal; and providing the authorities and
    deploying the resources needed to achieve unity of effort and
    to implement the concepts developed.
        These resources include the forces deployed in 2009 and the
    30,000 additional U.S. forces currently deploying, some 9,000
    more forces from partner nations, additional civilian experts,
    and funding to enable our operations in the training and
    equipping of 100,000 additional Afghan security force members
    over the next year and a half. I should note that the flow of
    additional forces and associated equipment would not have been
    possible without your continued support, in general, and your
    support of our expeditionary military construction program, in
    particular.
        With the inputs largely in place now in Afghanistan, we are
    starting to see the first of the outputs. Indeed, the recent
    offensive in central Helmand Province represented the first
    operation of the overall civil-military campaign plan developed
    by ISAF and its civilian partners, together with Afghan
    civilian and security force leaders.
        Central to progress in Afghanistan will be developing the
    Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), an effort made possible
    by your sustained support of the Afghan Security Forces Fund.
    Expansion of Afghanistan's security forces is now underway in
    earnest in the wake of the Afghan and international community
    decision to authorize an additional 100,000 security force
    members between now and the fall of 2011.
        This effort is facilitated considerably by the recent
    establishment of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, led by
    Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell. ISAF-member nations are now
    working hard to field the additional trainers, mentors, partner
    elements, and transition teams to enable the considerably
    augmented partnering, training, and recruiting that are
    essential to the way ahead in this important area.
        The civil-military campaign on which we have embarked in
    Afghanistan will unfold over the next 18 months, and as many of
    us have observed, the going is likely to get harder before it
    gets easier. As we seek to expand security for the people and
    to take from the Taliban control of key areas, the enemy will
    fight back. Moreover, we are not likely to see the kind of
    dramatic reduction in violence that we saw about 6 months into
    the surge in Iraq; in part, because the levels of violence in
    Afghanistan are nowhere near those of Iraq at the height of the
    sectarian violence, though they clearly are at levels that make
    progress in certain areas very difficult.
        In any event, 2010 will be a difficult year, a year that
    will see progress in a reversal of Taliban momentum in
    important areas, but also a year in which there will be tough
    fighting and periodic setbacks.
        We have seen important change in Pakistan over the past
    year. During that time, the Pakistani people, political
    leaders, and clerics united in recognizing that the most
    pressing threat to their country's very existence was that
    posed by certain internal extremist groups; in particular, the
    Pakistani Taliban. Pakistani citizens saw the Taliban's
    barbaric activities, indiscriminate violence, and repressive
    practices in the Northwest Frontier Province and Federally
    Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs), and even in some of
    Pakistan's so-called settled areas, and they realized that the
    Taliban wanted to take Pakistan backwards several centuries,
    not forward.
        With the support of Pakistan's people and leaders, the
    Pakistani military has carried out impressive counterinsurgency
    operations over the past 10 months. The Army and the Frontier
    Corps have, during that time, cleared the Taliban from Swat
    District, which I visited 3 weeks ago, and from other areas of
    the Northwest Frontier Province, as well. Now, they are
    holding, building, and beginning to transition in those areas.
        They have also carried out impressive operations in South
    Waziristan, home to the former Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of
    the extremist elements that assassinated Benazir Bhutto and
    blew up thousands of innocent Pakistanis and security force
    members in recent years. They have carried out good operations
    in some other areas of the FATA as well, including in Baijaur
    Agency most recently.
        These latter operations have been carefully coordinated
    with ISAF and Regional Command (RC)-East, and that coordination
    enabled RC-East elements to engage extremists who fled
    Pakistani operations and crossed the Durand Line into
    Afghanistan. In short, Pakistani forces have been carrying out
    an impressive campaign, and the Pakistani forces and people
    have suffered tough losses during the course of it.
        We recognize the need for considerable assistance to
    Pakistan as they continue their operations, and we will
    continue to work with Congress in seeking ways to support
    Pakistan's military.
        Our focus has been on supporting the Pakistani forces. They
    are doing the fighting. We are providing various forms of
    assistance. Our task, as Secretary Gates has observed, has to
    be to show that we are going to be a steadfast partner, that we
    are not going to do to Pakistan what we've done before, such as
    after Charlie Wilson's War, when we provided a substantial
    amount of assistance and then left precipitously, leaving
    Pakistan to deal with a situation we'd helped create.
        It is, therefore, important that we provide a sustained,
    substantial commitment, and that is what we are endeavoring to
    do, with your support. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill does that by
    providing $1.5 billion in economic assistance per year for 5
    years. The provision of coalition support funding, foreign
    military financing, the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Fund, and
    other forms of security assistance provide further critical
    assistance for Pakistan's security forces. Together, this
    funding and our assistance demonstrate America's desire to
    strengthen this important strategic partnership and help our
    Pakistani colleagues.
        In the 3 years since the conduct of the surge, security in
    Iraq has improved significantly. Numbers of attacks, violent
    civilian deaths, and high-profile attacks are all down by well
    over 90 percent from their highs in 2006 and 2007. With the
    improvements in security has also come progress in a variety of
    other areas: in the repair of infrastructure damaged during the
    violence; in the provision of basic services; in attracting
    international investment; and even in various social and
    political areas.
        The conduct of the elections on March 7, during which an
    impressive turnout of Iraqi voters defied al Qaeda attempts to
    intimidate them, provided the latest example of Iraq's progress
    since the sectarian violence of 2006 and 2007 ripped apart the
    very fabric of Iraqi society. As always, however, the progress
    in Iraq is still fragile, and it could still be reversed. Iraq
    still faces innumerable challenges, and they will be evident
    during what will likely be a difficult process as the newly-
    elected Council of Representatives selects the next prime
    minister, president, and speaker of the council, and seeks
    agreement on other key decisions, as well.
        Our task in Iraq is to continue to help the ISF--in part,
    through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund--as we continue to draw
    down our forces in a responsible manner. This task has been
    guided by the policy announced by President Obama about a year
    ago. Since that announcement, we have reduced our forces in
    Iraq by well over 30,000, to some 97,000, and we are on track
    to reduce that number to 50,000 by the end of August, at which
    time we will also complete a change in mission that marks the
    transition of our forces from a combat role to one of advising
    and assisting Iraq Security Forces.
        As we draw down our forces in Iraq and increase our efforts
    in Afghanistan, we must not lose sight of other developments in
    the CENTCOM AOR. I want to highlight the developments in two
    countries in particular: Yemen and Iran.
        In Yemen, we have seen an increase in the prominence of al
    Qaeda as it exploits the country's security, economic, and
    social challenges. The threat to Yemen, to the region, and
    indeed to the U.S. Homeland, posed by what is now called al
    Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has been demonstrated by
    suicide bombers trying to carry out operations in Yemen's
    capital, by the attempt to assassinate the assistant Minister
    of Interior in Saudi Arabia, and by the attempted bombing of a
    U.S. airliner on Christmas Day.
        In fact, a number of us have been increasingly concerned
    over the past 2\1/2\ years by the developments we have observed
    in Yemen. Last April, I approved a plan, developed in concert
    with our ambassador in Yemen, U.S. intelligence agencies, and
    the State Department, to expand our assistance to key security
    elements in Yemen. With Yemeni President Saleh's approval, we
    began executing that plan last summer, and this helped
    strengthen the capabilities demonstrated by the Yemeni
    operations that were carried out against al Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula in mid-December, and that have been executed
    periodically since then, as well. With your support, we are
    working toward expanded, sustained levels of assistance in
    Yemen.
        In fact, our efforts in Yemen should not just be seen as
    part of our overall counterterrorist campaign, but also as part
    of what might be termed preventive counterinsurgency
    operations, for our efforts not only help develop key security
    forces in Yemen, they also contribute to the overall effort to
    help Yemen deal with challenges that could become much more
    significant if not dealt with early on.
        Iran poses the major state-level threat to regional
    stability in the CENTCOM AOR. Despite numerous U.N. Security
    Council resolutions and extensive diplomatic efforts by the P5-
    plus-1 and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Iranian
    regime continues its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran is assessed
    by many analysts to be engaged in pursuing a nuclear weapons
    capability, the advent of which would destabilize the region
    and likely spur a regional arms race.
        The Iranian regime also continues to arm, fund, train,
    equip, and direct proxy extremist elements in Iraq, Lebanon,
    Gaza, and, to a lesser degree, Afghanistan. It continues
    significant intervention in the domestic politics in each of
    those locations, as well.
        The Iranian regime's internal activities are also
    troubling, as its violent suppression of opposition groups and
    demonstrations in the wake of last years' highjacked elections
    has made a mockery of the human rights of the Iranian people
    and fomented further unrest. Those internal developments have
    also resulted in greater reliance than ever on Iran's security
    services to sustain the regime's grip on power.
        Having discussed the developments in these countries, I'd
    now like to explain the importance of two key enablers in our
    ongoing missions, and to raise one additional issue. The
    Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) continues to be a
    vital tool for our commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small
    CERP projects are often the most responsive and effective means
    to address a local community's needs. Where security is
    challenged, CERP often provides the only tool to address
    pressing requirements.
        In the past year, we have taken a number of actions to
    ensure that we observe the original intent for CERP, and also
    to ensure adequate oversight for use of this important tool. I
    have, for example, withheld approval for projects over $1
    million, at my level, and there has only been one such project
    since late last September. In the past year we've asked the
    Army Audit Agency to conduct audits of the CERPs in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. We've established guidelines for the number of
    projects each CERP team should oversee, and we have coordinated
    with the military Services to ensure adequate training and
    preparation of those who will perform functions connected with
    CERP in theater, while we have also established procedures to
    take cash off the battlefield.
        Beyond that, the Department of Defense (DOD) is currently
    performing an internal assessment and undertaking additional
    initiatives. With the force increases in Afghanistan, CERP
    funding priority has understandably shifted from Iraq to
    Afghanistan. We pledge to continue aggressive oversight of the
    CERP as this shift takes place. In addition, we will continue
    to seek innovative mechanisms and authorities to allow for
    greater cost-sharing and to spur the development of similar
    counterinsurgency tools by coalition and host-nation partners.
        In the past year, CENTCOM has pursued several initiatives
    to improve our capabilities in the information domain, and we
    have coordinated these actions closely with the State
    Department's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Judith
    McHale. This past year, we made significant headway in
    improving our ability to counter adversary IO, including
    establishing a full-fledged Joint IO Task Force in Afghanistan.
    Nonetheless, we still have a long way to go, and we desperately
    need to build the capabilities of a regional IO task force to
    complement the operations of the task force that has done such
    impressive work in Iraq, and the one that is now beginning to
    do the same in Afghanistan.
        In the broader CENTCOM AOR, Operation Earnest Voice (OEV)
    is the critical program of record that resources our efforts to
    synchronize our IO activities, to counter extremist ideology
    and propaganda, and to ensure that credible voices in the
    region are heard. OEV provides CENTCOM with direct
    communication capabilities to reach regional audiences through
    traditional media, as well as via Web sites and regional public
    affairs blogging. In each of these efforts, we follow
    admonition we practiced in Iraq, that of being first with the
    truth. Full and enduring funding of OEV and other DOD IO
    efforts will, in coordination with State Department
    initiatives, enable us to do just that, and, in so doing, to
    communicate critical messages and to counter the propaganda of
    our adversaries.
        Cyberspace is becoming an extension of the battlefield, and
    we cannot allow it to be uncontested enemy territory. Indeed,
    in the years ahead, extremist activities in cyberspace will
    undoubtedly pose increasing threats to our military, and our
    Nation as a whole. DOD and other elements of our Government are
    working to come to grips with this emerging threat. Clearly,
    this is an area in which we need to develop additional
    policies, build capabilities, and ensure adequate resources. I
    suspect that legislation will be required over time, as well.
        Within DOD, the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command,
    proposed by Secretary Gates, represents an essential step in
    the right direction. This initiative is very important, because
    extremist elements are very active in cyberspace. They recruit
    there, they prosthelytize there, they coordinate attacks there,
    and they share tactics and techniques there. We have to ask
    ourselves if this is something that we should allow to
    continue; and, if not, then we have to determine how to prevent
    or disrupt it without infringing on free speech.
        In conclusion, there are currently some 210,000 soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen serving in the
    CENTCOM AOR. Day after day, on the ground, in the air, and at
    sea, these courageous and committed troopers perform difficult
    missions against tough enemies under the most challenging of
    conditions. Together with our many civilian and coalition
    partners, they have constituted the central element in our
    effort to promote security, stability, and prosperity in the
    region. These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers
    stationed around the world constitute the most experienced,
    most capable military in our Nation's history. They and their
    families have made tremendous sacrifices, and nothing means
    more to these great Americans than the sense that those back
    home appreciate their service to our country.
        In view of that, and on behalf of all those serving in the
    CENTCOM AOR, I want to take this opportunity to thank the
    American people for their extraordinary support of our men and
    women in uniform. I also want to take this opportunity to thank
    the members of this committee and of Congress overall for their
    unwavering support and abiding concern for our troops and their
    families.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]
                Prepared Statement by GEN David H. Petraeus, USA
                                i. introduction
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, U.S.
    Central Command (CENTCOM) is now in its ninth consecutive year of major
    combat operations in an area of the world critical to the interests of
    the United States and our allies. With our national and international
    partners, CENTCOM promotes security cooperation among nations; responds
    to crises; deters or defeats state and non-state aggression; and
    supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to
    establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and
    prosperity. Typically, executing this mission and achieving U.S.
    national goals and objectives in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility
    (AOR) involves more than just the traditional application of military
    power. In many cases, a whole-of-government approach is required, one
    that integrates all the tools available to international and
    interagency partners to defeat transnational groups that pose a threat
    to the United States or our partners; to secure host-nation
    populations; to conduct comprehensive counterinsurgency and security
    operations; to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
    (WMD); to help reform, and in some cases build, governmental and
    institutional capacity; and to promote economic development.
        These are challenging missions, and the conditions and dynamics
    shaping the region's security environment are constantly evolving. In
    the past year, there have been several important developments in the
    AOR--some representing progress, others presenting challenges. These
    changes include increased operations by the Pakistani military against
    groups that threaten the writ of governance in Pakistan, as well as
    continued improvements in the capabilities and self-reliance of the
    Iraqi Security Forces coupled with the degradation of the capabilities
    of militant groups in Iraq. We have also seen increased insurgent
    violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a general diminution of al Qaeda
    in the region despite an increase in the prominence of al Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula in Yemen (AQAP), the emergence of significant
    domestic unrest and opposition in Iran accompanied by the regime's
    continued intransigence over its nuclear program and its support to
    militant proxies, an increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the
    coast of Somalia, and the continuing fallout from the global financial
    crisis.
        The progress we have seen has not simply happened of its own
    accord. It is, to a great extent, the result of the work of U.S.,
    partner, and coalition forces operating in the AOR over the past year.
    Since the delivery of last year's Posture Statement, CENTCOM has worked
    to implement national policies as well as the recommendations of the
    comprehensive strategic review we conducted last winter. We have begun
    the responsible drawdown of forces from Iraq, working to sustain the
    hard-won security gains achieved since the summer of 2007 and placing
    us on track to have 50,000 troops in Iraq after this August. We are
    implementing the President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to
    include an increase in forces and non-military resources. Having put
    into place the proper organizations, people, and concepts for the
    civil-military campaign in Afghanistan, we are currently deploying
    additional resources to halt the downward spiral in security and expand
    the size and capabilities of the Afghan security forces. We have placed
    great pressure against al Qaeda's networks and senior leadership, and
    we have also made good strides in developing a Regional Security
    Architecture to address common security threats in the region. All the
    while, CENTCOM forces have continued to provide military support to
    major diplomatic initiatives in the region and to maintain a ready
    posture to respond to unforeseen crises.
        Building on our past successes and achievements and responding to
    the region's dynamics, CENTCOM will focus on the following priority
    tasks in the coming year:

             Reversing the momentum of the insurgency in
            Afghanistan and training Afghan security forces to regain the
            initiative against militants and to increase public confidence
            in the government;
             Helping our Iraqi partners build on their progress
            while sustaining hard-won security gains, reducing U.S. forces
            in the country, and transitioning to a new mission of advising
            and assisting the Iraqi security forces;
             Maintaining persistent kinetic and non-kinetic
            pressure to degrade and counter transnational terrorist and
            militant organizations that threaten the security of the United
            States and our allies;
             Expanding our partnership with the Pakistani military,
            supporting its operations against militant groups, and
            assisting in the development of its counterinsurgency
            capabilities;
             Countering destabilizing Iranian activities and
            policies;
             Countering the proliferation of WMD and related
            material, technology, and expertise, while building the
            capacity and interoperability of our partners to prevent and,
            if necessary, respond to the use of WMD;
             Bolstering the military and security capabilities of
            our partner nations' security forces;
             Working with our partners to counter piracy, illegal
            narcotics trafficking, and arms smuggling;
             Bolstering oversight and ensuring responsible
            expenditure of U.S. funding; and
             Working with the U.S. military services to reduce the
            strain on our forces and the cost of our operations.

        The intent of the remainder of this Posture Statement is to address
    these priorities and the broader, long term solutions they support by
    providing a more detailed overview of the AOR, a description of our
    strategic approach to defending and advancing our interests,
    assessments of the situation in each of the AOR's major sub-regions,
    and comments on the programs and systems that enable our operations.
                        ii. overview of the centcom aor
    A. Nature of the AOR
        The lands and waters of the CENTCOM AOR span several critical and
    distinct regions. It stretches across more than 4.6 million square
    miles and 20 countries in the Middle East and South and Central Asia
    and contains vital transportation and trade routes, including the Red
    Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf, as well as
    strategic maritime choke points at the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb,
    and the Strait of Hormuz. The AOR encompasses the world's most energy-
    rich region, with the Arabian Gulf region and Central Asia together
    accounting for at least 64 percent of the world's known petroleum
    reserves, 34 percent of its crude oil production, and 46 percent of its
    known natural gas reserves.
        Social, political, and economic conditions vary greatly throughout
    the region. The region is home to some of the world's wealthiest and
    poorest states, with annual per capita incomes ranging from $800 to
    over $100,000. Despite important pockets of affluence, many of the more
    than 530 million people living in the AOR suffer from inadequate
    governance, underdeveloped civil institutions, unsettling corruption,
    and high unemployment.
        As a result of these contrasts and the proliferation of global
    communications and mass media, many people in the AOR are struggling to
    balance modern influences with traditional social and cultural
    authorities and to manage change at a pace that reinforces stability
    rather than erodes it. For the past century, the sub-regions of the AOR
    have been torn by conflict as new states and old societies have
    struggled to erect a new order in the wake of the collapse of
    traditional empires. These conflicts have intensified in the past three
    decades with the emergence of al Qaeda and its Associated Movements,
    the specter of nuclear weapons, and enormous wealth derived from
    petroleum and illegal narcotics. Today we see stability in the AOR
    threatened by interstate tensions, the proliferation of ballistic
    missile and nuclear weapons technology and expertise, ethno-sectarian
    violence, insurgencies and sub-state militias, as well as horrific acts
    of terrorism.
    B. U.S. Interests and the Most Significant Threats to Them
        Because of the CENTCOM AOR's geography, control of much of the
    world's energy reserves, and propensity for instability, the United
    States has substantial strategic interests in, and related to, the
    region. Chief among these are:

             the security of U.S. citizens and the U.S. Homeland;
             regional stability;
             international access to strategic resources, critical
            infrastructure, and markets; and
             the promotion of human rights, the rule of law,
            responsible and effective governance, and broad-based economic
            growth and opportunity.

        The most serious threats to these interests lie at the nexus of
    militant groups, hostile states, and WMD. Across the AOR, al Qaeda and
    its Associated Movements are fueling insurgencies to reduce U.S.
    influence and to destabilize the existing political, social, and
    economic order. Meanwhile, some countries in the AOR play a dangerous
    game of allowing or accepting terrorist networks and facilitators to
    operate from or through their territory, believing that their own
    people and governments will be immune to their threat. Efforts to
    develop or acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems magnify the
    potential dangers of the marriage between some states and their
    militant proxies. Indeed, the acquisition of nuclear arms by hostile
    states or terrorist organizations would constitute a grave threat to
    the United States, our allies, and the countries of the region and
    would likely spark a destabilizing arms race.
        In the near term, the greatest potential for such a threat to arise
    is found in the instability in South Asia, the activities and policies
    of the Iranian regime, the situation in Iraq, and the growth of AQAP in
    Yemen.

             Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The
            insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan constitute the most
            urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR. Al Qaeda, the Taliban,
            and the syndicate of militant groups operating in the border
            region between Afghanistan and Pakistan are engaging in an
            increasingly violent campaign against the people and
            Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both states face a
            serious threat from these groups, and though some of these
            organizations perpetrate acts of terrorism against local
            targets and others operate internationally, these groups have
            increasingly cooperative, even symbiotic, relationships. As a
            result, the control by any of these groups of major population
            centers or significant economic or financial resources would
            present an enormous challenge to security in the region and
            across the globe.
             Iran's Destabilizing Activities and Policies. The
            activities and policies of the Iranian regime constitute the
            major state-level threats to regional stability. Despite
            repeated International Atomic Energy Agency findings of Iranian
            violations of non-proliferation obligations, five United
            Nations Security Council
             Situation in Iraq. Security in Iraq has improved
            significantly since the peak of the sectarian violence in mid-
            2007, but the gains there remain fragile and reversible, though
            increasingly less so. In Iraq, a number of factors continue to
            pose serious risks to U.S. interests and have the potential to
            undermine regional stability, disrupt international access to
            strategic resources, and frustrate efforts to deny terrorist
            safe havens and support bases. Internally, fundamental issues
            such as the distribution of political power and resources
            remain to be settled. The Iraqi state is still developing, and
            numerous challenges confront its leaders and people,
             Instability in Yemen. The inability of the Yemeni
            Government to effectively secure and exercise control over all
            its territory offers AQAP a safe haven in which to plan,
            organize, and support terrorist operations. This network poses
            a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland, as evidenced by recent
            plots, including the attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner on
            Christmas Day 2009. At the same time, the Yemeni state faces
            challenges from separatist movements in the South and a 6-year
            conflict with Houthi rebels, which despite the cease-fire in
            February could reignite and again spill over into Saudi Arabia.
            Moreover, the influx of refugees from Africa, pervasive arms
            smuggling, a deteriorating economic situation, and piracy
            continue to challenge the capabilities of the Yemeni
            Government.
    C. Cross-cutting Challenges to Security and Stability
        While this statement will describe in greater detail the dynamics
    and challenges in the sub-regions of the AOR, there are a number of
    cross-cutting issues that serve as major drivers of instability, inter-
    state tensions, and conflict. These factors can serve as root causes of
    instability or as obstacles to security.

             Insufficient progress toward a comprehensive Middle
            East peace. The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of
            its neighbors present distinct challenges to our ability to
            advance our interests in the AOR. Israeli-Palestinian tensions
            often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations.
            The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a
            perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the
            Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S.
            partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and
            weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world.
            Meanwhile, al Qaeda and other militant groups exploit that
            anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran
            influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese
            Hizballah and Hamas.
             Militant Islamist movements. The CENTCOM AOR is home
            to militant Islamist movements that threaten states in the
            region, exploit local conflicts, and foster instability through
            acts of terrorism. The most significant of these is al Qaeda,
            which, along with its Associated Movements, seeks to impose its
             Proliferation of WMD. The AOR contains states and
            terrorist organizations that actively seek WMD capabilities and
            have previously proliferated WMD-related material, technology,
            and expertise outside established international monitoring
            regimes. In addition, regional states are increasingly
            interested in the development of nuclear programs, which, if
            not properly managed, could lead to the proliferation of
            illicit nuclear material or a regional arms race.
             Ungoverned, poorly governed, and alternatively
            governed spaces. Weak civil and security institutions and the
            inability of certain governments in the region to exert full
            control over their territories are conditions that insurgent
            groups can exploit to create physical safe havens in which they
            can plan, train for, and launch operations or pursue narco-
            criminal activities. We have seen these groups develop, or
            attempt to develop, what might be termed sub-states,
            particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen,
            and the Palestinian territories.
             Significant sources of terrorist financing and
            facilitation. The AOR remains a primary source of illicit
            funding and facilitation for global terrorist organizations and
            other militant groups. All this financing is transmitted
            through a variety of formal and informal networks, which
            include financial operatives and front companies throughout the
            region.
             Piracy. The lack of governance in Somalia has allowed
            piracy to grow off the coast and in the Horn of Africa
            threatening the flow of commerce through the region. Since the
            spike in piracy in 2008, we have worked in close cooperation
            with the international community to counter this trend by
            focusing on increasing international presence, encouraging the
            shipping industry to adopt best practices to defend against
            piracy, and establishing a sound international legal framework
            for resolving piracy cases. Despite some reduction in the
            number of successful pirate attacks in the region, piracy
            remains lucrative--increasingly so, as the ransom rates have
            nearly doubled over the previous year's--and pirates continue
            to modify their area of operations and techniques to avoid
            coalition presence.
             Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian rivalries. Within
            certain countries, the politicization of ethnicity, tribal
            affiliation, and religious sect serves to disrupt the
            development of national civil institutions and social cohesion,
            at times to the point of violence. Between countries in the
            region, such rivalries can heighten political tension and serve
            as catalysts for conflict and insurgency.
             Disputed territories and access to vital resources.
            Unresolved issues of disputed territorial boundaries and
            disagreements over the sharing of vital resources, such as
            water, oil, and natural gas, serve as sources of tension and
            conflict between and within states in the region.
             Criminal activities, such as weapons, narcotics, and
            human trafficking. Weapons smuggling, narcotics trafficking,
            and associated criminal activities undermine security, spur
            corruption, and inhibit legitimate economic activity and good
            governance throughout the AOR. In particular, state-sponsored
            weapons trafficking in support of groups like Lebanese
            Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad undermines
            regional security and the Middle East Peace Process.
             Uneven economic development and lack of employment
            opportunities. Despite substantial economic growth rates
            throughout much of the region over the past few years,
            significant segments of the population in the region remain
            economically disenfranchised, under-educated, and without
            sufficient opportunity. In addition many countries in the
            region face growing ``youth bulges'' that will strain their
            economies' abilities to produce sufficient employment
            opportunities. The recent global economic downturn has
            heightened these problems. Without sustained, broad-based
            economic development, increased employment opportunities are
            unlikely given the growing proportions of young people relative
            to overall populations.
             Lack of regional and global economic integration. The
            AOR is characterized by low levels of trade and commerce among
            countries, which diminish prospects for long term economic
            growth, as well as opportunities to deepen interdependence
            through increased political, commercial, social, and cultural
            ties.
                             iii. regional strategy
        To help defend and advance our national interests, CENTCOM executes
    a strategy that promotes security and stability in our AOR. In
    cooperation with our partners and in concert with national policy, we
    work to deter aggression as well as eliminate the conditions that
    foment conflict. Given the complexities of the AOR and its many
    security challenges, we have adopted a strategy that consists of active
    engagement in the region as well as prudent preparation for
    contingencies. The following sections describe the highlights of this
    strategy by outlining the strategic vision we seek to achieve and the
    guiding principles and major activities that characterize our approach.
    A. Strategic Vision.
        The conditions needed for security, stability, and prosperity in
    the region constitute the strategic vision we are working toward and
    the ultimate goals of our activities. They reflect our desire to
    strengthen the international system, while promoting effective and
    responsible governance and broad-based economic development throughout
    the region. Specifically, we seek a region

             that is at peace with itself and its neighbors;
             that is focused on common security and cooperation;
             with stable governments that are responsive to the
            needs of their people;
             with patterns of economic development that advance
            people's well-being;
             where nuclear proliferation is not a threat and where
            nuclear energy use is verifiable and for peaceful purposes;
             with unhindered international access to strategic
            resources, critical infrastructure, and markets; and
             from which, and within which, groups such as al Qaeda
            do not threaten the United States or our allies.

        Working towards these objectives, in concert with the Department of
    State, is the most feasible and acceptable strategy for addressing the
    threats to our interests. To be sure, these objectives are broad and
    far-reaching, but they are nonetheless attainable.
    B. Strategic Approach.
        Achieving this vision and establishing these conditions necessarily
    requires changing--in some respects significantly changing--the
    security environment in the region, and as a result, our activities
    must be guided by the principle that our security solutions be
    comprehensive, cooperative, and enduring. This guidance recognizes that
    we must simultaneously address security, political, and economic
    challenges in the region; that we cannot do this through military means
    alone or without the cooperation of our partners in the region and the
    broader international community; and that these changes must be
    longlasting and, eventually, self-sustaining.

             Comprehensive Solutions. Because instability and
            insecurity in the AOR stem from a complex mix of security,
            political, and economic challenges, we must pursue
            comprehensive solutions to problems in the region. This
            requires us to apply whole-of-government approaches that fully
            integrate our military and non-military efforts and those of
            our partners. For example, to address the threat posed by
            insurgent groups we are dismantling their networks and
            leadership, often through the use of security forces, while
            also working to eliminate their sources of support by
            protecting populations from these groups, disrupting their
            financial networks and sources of financing, delegitimizing
            their methods and ideologies, and addressing legitimate
            grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population.
            We constantly strive to understand the complexities of these
            challenges and tailor our approaches to the unique
            circumstances on the ground.
             Cooperative Solutions. Because the challenges in the
            region are often transnational ones and because no nation can
            protect itself from these threats without cooperation from
            others, we must pursue cooperative, multilateral solutions. We
            seek collective action and an atmosphere of broad inclusivity
            and partnership to attract the needed pool of resources and to
            leverage each country's
             Enduring Solutions. Finally, because we want lasting
            conditions of security and prosperity, we must seek long term,
            enduring solutions to the challenges in the region. To this
            end, we work to address the root causes of instability rather
            than apply quick fixes to their symptoms. Also, to achieve the
            cooperation described above, we pursue strategic partnerships
            with the Nations of the region rather than short-term
            transactional relationships. Lastly, we strive to increase
            integration and interdependence in the region in many different
            areas--diplomatic, commercial, social, and cultural--under the
            belief that increased interaction is a positive-sum game that
            benefits all parties and reduces the incentives for conflict.
            All of our efforts require sustained commitments of our
            attention, energy, and, in some cases, resources.

        Adhering to these principles in our strategic approach and in the
    execution of our operations places a premium on unity of effort at all
    levels and with all participants. At the combatant command level, this
    means working with our interagency and international partners to
    develop joint action or campaign plans that establish appropriate
    missions and objectives for our subordinate elements, from major
    commands such as U.S. Forces-Iraq and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)
    to our country-based offices of military cooperation. To effectively
    carry out these plans, we work carefully to coordinate our military
    elements with the corresponding State Department envoy or ambassador as
    well as our international and host nation partners.
    C. Major Activities
        In addition to our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our
    forces are engaged in numerous, wide-ranging endeavors designed to
    establish the conditions described above for security, stability, and
    prosperity in the region. Chief among these major activities are our
    efforts designed to do the following:

             Defeat al Qaeda and its Associated Movements
             Deny sanctuaries and disrupt support for insurgent
            groups
             Counterproliferation of WMD and associated technology
             Deter and counter state-based aggression and proxy
            activities
             Support the peaceful resolution of longstanding
            interstate conflicts
             Build bilateral and multilateral security partnerships
             Develop partner nation security capacity
             Help nations protect their critical infrastructure and
            support infrastructure development
             Bolster at-risk states
             Respond to humanitarian crises, when called upon by
            our Ambassadors
             Counter arms smuggling
             Protect freedom of navigation
                   iv. critical subregions of the centcom aor
        The complexity and uniqueness of local conditions in the CENTCOM
    AOR defy attempts to formulate an aggregated estimate of the situation
    that can address, with complete satisfaction, all of the pertinent
    issues. Thus, the best way to approach the challenges in the AOR is
    through a disaggregation of the problem set into six sub-regions,
    described as follows:

             Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (though India does
            not lie within the boundaries of the CENTCOM AOR)
             Iran
             Iraq
             The Arabian Peninsula, comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait,
            Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and
            Yemen
             Egypt and the Levant, comprised of Syria, Lebanon, and
            Jordan (as well as Israel and the Palestinian territories,
            which do not lie within the CENTCOM AOR)
             Central Asia, comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
            Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
    A. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India
        Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan poses the most urgent
    problem set in the CENTCOM AOR and requires complementary and
    integrated civil-military, whole-of-government approaches. The two
    countries are linked by tribal affiliations and a porous border that
    permits terrorists, insurgents, and criminals to move relatively freely
    to and from their safe havens. Indeed, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
    insurgent groups operating from the border region are engaged in an
    increasingly violent campaign against Afghan and coalition Forces and
    the developing Afghan state. However, while it is important to note
    that the problem sets are related, the United States must forge a
    unique partnership with each country.
        Afghanistan
        The past year was marked by a shift in strategic focus in
    Afghanistan. Over the course of the conflict, the Afghan insurgency had
    expanded its strength and influence--particularly in the South and
    East--and 2009 levels of violence were significantly higher than those
    of 2008. The Taliban have been resilient, with their activities fueled
    by revenues from outside the region as well as from narcotics-
    trafficking, the freedom of movement they enjoy in the border region
    between Afghanistan and Pakistan, ineffective governance and services
    in parts of the country, as well as by contributions from other
    militant groups outside Afghanistan and Pakistan. To reverse this
    momentum and the downward spiral in security, we have embarked on a new
    12-to-18-month civil-military campaign plan, and coalition forces and
    their Afghan partners are fighting to retake the initiative from the
    insurgency. The main goals of our strategy, announced by President
    Obama last December, include the following:

             reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military
            action,
             denying the Taliban access to and control of key
            population and production centers and lines of communication,
             disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and
            preventing al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan,
             degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the
            Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF),
             increasing the size and capability of the ANSF and
            employing other local forces selectively to begin a conditions-
            based transition of security responsibility to the Afghan
            Government by July 2011, and
             supporting U.S. Government efforts to build the
            capacity of the Afghan Government, particularly in key
            ministries.

        To implement this strategy, we and our North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) partners have spent a great deal of effort putting
    into place the right organizations and command and control structures
    needed to carry out a comprehensive civil-military campaign. This
    includes the capabilities for targeting of insurgents' resources and
    finances, detention operations, ministerial capacity building, border
    coordination, strategic communications, and the conduct of
    reconciliation efforts. This began by ensuring the International
    Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander was dual-hatted as both a
    NATO Commander and the commander of U.S. forces, which helped to reduce
    many of the organizational firewalls between ISAF and Operation
    Enduring Freedom elements. We created the ISAF Intermediate Joint
    Command (IJC), a three-star headquarters to oversee operational
    execution of the counterinsurgency campaign. We established a Joint
    Task Force to address detainee operations and help develop rule of law
    capacity within the Afghan Government, from policing and incarceration
    to trials and convictions. We developed a Force Reintegration Cell
    within the ISAF headquarters to support the reintegration and
    reconciliation process at the national level. We established an
    interagency threat finance cell, an intelligence fusion cell, and a
    full-fledged Joint Information Operations Task Force to conduct
    strategic communications. We formed the NATO Training Mission-
    Afghanistan and made several other command and control adjustments,
    such as the integration of mentoring teams under the IJC and its battle
    space commanders and the restructuring of Army brigades, to improve our
    ability to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. Lastly, we
    formed the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell on the Joint Staff
    and inaugurated the Afghanistan-Pakistan Intelligence Center of
    Excellence at CENTCOM to better organize our resources here at home.
    All of these organizations tie together and support the numerous
    activities taking place at the unit level across the country as our
    operations move forward over time, and to run them we have hand-
    selected some of nation's best civilian and military leaders, all of
    whom have been involved with counterinsurgency operations for quite
    some time.
        Just as critical, we have strengthened our counterinsurgency
    approach and established a wide-spread understanding of the critical
    concepts guiding and governing our operations. First and foremost in
    this approach is a commitment to protecting and serving the people.
    This focus is captured in Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and General
    Stanley McChrystal's Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan, which
    directs our military and civilian components to take a residential
    approach and, in a culturally acceptable way, live among the people,
    understand their neighborhoods, and invest in relationships. General
    McChrystal has also published counterinsurgency guidance, has pushed to
    achieve greater unity of effort, has aggressively pursued the mission
    of partnering with the Afghan security forces, and has issued
    appropriate guidance on detention, reintegration, joint night raids,
    and tactical driving. All of these concepts are designed to secure the
    Afghan people, to reduce civilian casualties, and to build their trust
    in ISAF forces and the national government.
        Critical to the organizations, leaders, and strategies we have put
    in place in Afghanistan are the resources needed to support them, in
    this case, 30,000 additional U.S. forces, additional civilians experts,
    and appropriate funding, each of which was announced by the President
    in December at West Point. Just as important are the additional
    commitments from other NATO and coalition partners totaling more than
    9,000 troops. These resources are starting to flow into the country,
    and they will allow us to better expand the security presence in
    population centers and along major lines of communication, to better
    hold areas cleared of insurgent groups, and to build a new level of
    Afghan governmental control.
        As a part of this approach, we will also invigorate efforts to
    develop the capabilities of the ANSF, including the Afghan National
    Army, the Afghan Uniform Police, the Afghan Gendarmerie Force, the
    Afghan Border Police, specialized counternarcotics units, and other
    security forces. We recognize the fact that international forces must
    eventually transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces.
    In January 2009, the ANSF numbered 156,000; today, there are over
    206,000 assigned, but significant work remains in improving the quality
    of the Afghan force through enhanced partnering, training, and
    recruiting. General McChrystal has placed a premium on comprehensive
    partnering with the ANSF, an emphasis that is being demonstrated in the
    ongoing Operation Moshtarak, in which ISAF and ANSF operate at close to
    a 1-to-1 ratio. Of equal importance, ISAF and ANSF leaders worked
    together in partnership to plan all aspects of the operation, a signal
    of ANSF development that goes beyond the number of ANSF boots on the
    ground. A properly sized, trained, and equipped ANSF is a prerequisite
    for any eventual drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan, and
    through our support and the assistance of the Afghan Security Forces
    Fund, the ANSF will continue to expand so that they will be more able
    to meet their country's security needs.
        In addition, we, along with our civilian colleagues, will bolster
    the capabilities and the legitimacy of the other elements of the Afghan
    Government--an effort in which, in much of Afghanistan, we will be
    building, not rebuilding. We will do this through our support to local
    government at the provincial and district levels, utilizing the new
    structure of civilian representatives at each level of our deployed
    military. These, along with the efforts of Provincial Reconstruction
    Teams and national level civil-military and ministerial capacity
    building teams are empowering Afghans to solve Afghan problems and
    promoting local reintegration where possible. Most recently, we are
    supporting governance and development efforts as part of ongoing
    operations in Helmand Province.
        Another major component of our strategy is to disrupt narcotics
    trafficking, which provides significant funding to the Taliban
    insurgency. This drug money has been the ``oxygen'' in the air that
    allows these groups to operate. With the extension of authority granted
    to U.S. forces to conduct counter-narcotics operations, we are able to
    more closely work with the Afghan Government to disrupt the illicit
    narcotics industry though interdiction of the narco-trafficking
    network. To complement this effort, we support and promote viable
    agricultural and economic alternatives and the requisite infrastructure
    to help Afghans bring licit products to market for sale and
    distribution.
        Executing this strategy requires clear unity of effort at all
    levels and with all participants. Our senior commanders (and I) have
    worked with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Special
    Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Ambassador Eikenberry, the
    U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan; Stefan di Mistura, the United Nations
    Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan;
    Ambassador Mark Sedwill, NATO's new Senior Civilian Representative in
    Afghanistan; and the Afghan leadership to improve and synchronize the
    whole-of-government approach. Our security efforts have been integrated
    into the broader plan to promote political and economic development. We
    have urged partner nations to continue the invaluable support they are
    providing and to seek additional support as required for mission
    accomplishment.
        The changes in approach launched in 2009 and 2010 (e.g., greater
    military and civilian resources, enhanced unity of effort and
    partnering) can help turn the tide over time, but we must manage
    expectations as we continue the buildup in our forces. Progress will be
    incremental and difficult. In 2010, the Taliban and other insurgent
    groups will attempt to build on their previous momentum and create
    further instability in the Afghan provinces, particularly in the South
    and East. We will endeavor not only to prevent that but to wrest the
    initiative from the Taliban.
        Pakistan
        The possibility of significant instability in Pakistan poses a
    serious threat to regional and global security, in large part, because
    Pakistan remains a critical strategic foothold for al Qaeda and is
    important to the organization's efforts to rally supporters worldwide.
    Although al Qaeda senior leaders are under considerably more pressure
    in Pakistan than in previous years, the Federally Administered Tribal
    Area (FATA) still serves as al Qaeda's principal sanctuary. More
    important, these leaders continue to plan and inspire regional and
    transnational operations from the FATA, while maintaining the ability
    to function as a structured organization, and foreign fighters continue
    to travel to Pakistan for training and to join al Qaeda. Additionally,
    Pakistan continues to face a serious insurgency fueled by militants
    operating from the country's tribal areas with casualties from violent
    incidents in Pakistan, particularly bombings and suicide attacks having
    increased dramatically over the past year.
        However, the people and leaders of Pakistan have increasingly grown
    to see these groups as serious threats, and the Pakistani security
    forces have stepped up operations against insurgents, showing
    impressive determination and skill. They have conducted operations in
    the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the FATA on an unprecedented
    scale, successfully re-taking territory from the insurgent groups.
    Pakistan has sustained very tough losses in this effort, and it is
    clear that the country's leaders are keenly aware of the severity of
    the threat posed by these groups to the people and government.
        We are working to forge a stronger partnership with Pakistan and to
    support its efforts in two ways. First, we aim to strengthen the
    military's capacity to target insurgent groups through the development
    of Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities. Second, we support
    Pakistan's governmental and economic development. Our efforts have
    helped as the Pakistani military has made progress in its
    counterinsurgency operations. The Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps
    have cleared many areas of militant groups. However, the hold and build
    phases of these operations and the subsequent transition to civil
    authority challenge the army and Pakistan's civil institutions. In
    fact, these institutions will be pressed by militant efforts to
    reassert control over the territory gained in 2009, risking a reversal
    of the past year's gains. The passage of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill,
    the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, the $11.3 billion
    International Monetary Fund grant, and other key initiatives
    temporarily pulled Pakistan back from the brink of an impending
    economic collapse a year ago and helped increase Pakistan's capacity
    for counterinsurgency operations. Continued support for these
    initiatives is critical to enabling the Pakistan to continue its fight
    and to expand the writ of governance.
        Finally, we are working to reduce regional tensions to enable
    adequate focus on the existential threat of militant Islamist movements
    in Pakistan. Though Indo-Pakistani tensions have eased since 2008, they
    could easily reignite in 2010, particularly in the event of another
    significant terrorist attack in India. A major escalation in these
    tensions would almost certainly result in the immediate redeployment to
    the east of Pakistani forces currently deployed to confront militants
    in the West, risking forfeiture of gains in FATA and the NWFP. This
    suggests a need for India and Pakistan to continue discussions begun on
    February 25 in order to reduce the strategic tension and the risk of
    miscalculation between these nuclear states.
    B. Iran
        The Iranian regime is the primary state-level threat to stability
    in the region. Throughout much of the region, the regime pursues a
    dual-track foreign policy. Overtly, the Iranian Government cooperates
    with regional states through bilateral arrangements to promote Iran as
    an economic, political, and military power. In parallel, the regime
    entrusts the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force to
    execute covert aspects of its foreign policy using political influence,
    covert businesses, lethal and non-lethal aid, and training to militants
    supportive of the regime's agenda. The Qods Force is active throughout
    the region, and, in fact, controls Iranian foreign policy in Iraq,
    Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza and influences heavily in Afghanistan and the
    Gulf Region. Through Qods Force soft power initiatives and
    destabilizing activities, such as coercion and direct attacks, Iran is
    subverting democratic processes and intimidating the nascent
    governments of our partners. The regime continues to intervene in the
    Israeli-Palestinian situation through its support to Hamas and Lebanese
    Hizballah, and it remains in violation of six United Nations Security
    Council Resolutions regarding its nuclear program and arms transfers.
        Iran's nuclear program is a serious, destabilizing factor in the
    region and is widely believed to be a part of the regime's broader
    effort to expand its influence. Although the regime has stated the
    purpose of its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful, civilian
    use, Iranian officials have consistently failed to provide the
    assurances and transparency necessary for full international
    confidence. This includes failure to provide verification as required
    by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory,
    and failure to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency's
    (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which would allow for more comprehensive
    inspections. The regime's obstinacy and obfuscation have forced Iran's
    neighbors and the international community to conclude the worst about
    the regime's intentions, as confirmed by the recent IAEA Board of
    Governors' near unanimous censure of Iran's recent disclosure of a
    secret nuclear facility near Qom. It appears that, at a minimum, Tehran
    is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. Iran continues
    to develop and improve its uranium enrichment infrastructure and is
    likely to use its gas centrifuges to produce fissile material for a
    weapon, should it make the political decision to do so. This pattern of
    conduct coupled with its rejection of international responsibilities is
    troubling, especially when viewed in the context that other regional
    states have recently announced their intentions to develop nuclear
    power programs. This behavior poses a clear challenge to international
    nonproliferation goals due to the possibility of such technologies
    being transferred to terrorist groups and the potential for a regional
    arms race, as other regional states may seek nuclear parity.
        Domestically, the regime is taking dramatic steps to maintain power
    in reaction to the persistent civil unrest sparked by the apparent
    election manipulation leading to President Ahmadinejad's re-election in
    June 2009. The aftermath of the presidential election created a
    political rift among regime elites and further hardened certain
    leaders' views toward the U.S. and the West over alleged involvement in
    supporting a ``soft revolution'' in Iran. Tehran has deployed
    significant numbers of security forces, mainly comprised of Basij
    militia, to crack down on street protests and conduct mass arrests of
    protestors. The regime has also taken sweeping steps to control the
    information environment by slowing or shutting down the internet,
    telephone networks, and other forms of social media used by protestors
    to organize, execute, and publicize their efforts. The opposition
    movement, led by former regime insiders, poses the most serious
    political challenge to the regime since the advent of the Islamic
    Republic.
        The Iranian regime has also attempted to thwart U.S. and
    international efforts to bring stability to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
    broader region. In Afghanistan, the Iranian regime appears to have
    hedged its longstanding public support for the Karzai Government by
    providing opportunistic support to the Taliban. In Iraq, however, the
    Iranian regime has embarked on a broad campaign led by the IRGC-Qods
    Force to influence Iraqi politics and support, through various means,
    parties loyal to Iran. The Qods Force also maintains its lethal support
    to Shia Iraqi militia groups, providing them with weapons, funding, and
    training. Additionally, al Qaeda continues to use Iran as a key
    facilitation hub, where facilitators connect al Qaeda's senior
    leadership to regional affiliates. Although Iranian authorities do
    periodically disrupt this network by detaining select al Qaeda
    facilitators and operational planners, Tehran's policy in this regard
    is often unpredictable.
        Pursuing our longstanding regional goals and improving key
    relationships within and outside the AOR help to limit the negative
    impact of Iran's policies. A credible U.S. effort on Arab-Israeli
    issues that provides regional governments and populations a way to
    achieve a comprehensive settlement of the disputes would undercut
    Iran's policy of militant ``resistance,'' which the Iranian regime and
    insurgent groups have been free to exploit. Additionally, progress on
    the Israel-Syria peace track could disrupt Iran's lines of support to
    Hamas and Hizballah. Moreover, our development of a cooperative
    Regional Security Architecture, which includes a regional network of
    air and missile defense systems as well as hardening and protecting our
    partners' critical infrastructure, can help dissuade aggressive Iranian
    behavior. In all of these initiatives, our military activities will
    continue to support our diplomatic efforts, and we will remain vigilant
    across a wide range of contingencies.
    C. Iraq
        Iraq made steady progress throughout 2009, a year that brought
    significant change in the security situation and in Iraqi politics. A
    broad backlash against the Islamist parties that have dominated the
    Iraqi Government since 2005, along with the Iraqi people's increasing
    preference for emerging secular, nationalist parties and leaders,
    yielded a stunning result in January 2009's largely violence-free
    provincial elections and a peaceful transfer of power in every province
    that held an election. Various internal dynamics, however, have
    exacerbated the Arab-Kurd dispute over Kirkuk and other territories,
    and this issue now looms as the greatest potential Iraqi flashpoint.
        The security situation in Iraq remained stable during the
    implementation of the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, the handover of
    lead responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces, and the drawdown of
    U.S. forces from some 130,000 in March 2009 to 96,000 today. The level
    of violence generally remained at record lows following the withdrawal
    of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities in June, demonstrating the Iraqi
    Security Forces' growing capability to handle security responsibilities
    independently. November witnessed the lowest number of civilian deaths
    since spring 2003, and December was the first month since the March
    2003 invasion in which no U.S. forces died in combat in Iraq. A number
    of high-profile attacks in the second half of 2009 showed, nonetheless,
    that the Iraqis still have much work to do in developing
    counterterrorism capabilities. While al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) attempt
    to discredit and destabilize the government through massive bombings
    did not succeed, it did demonstrate AQI's resilience. At the same time,
    the Arab-Kurd dispute has lent new life to Ba'athist-related insurgent
    groups in northern Iraq, which have attempted to ignite a conflict
    along the Green Line. As we continue to draw down our forces in a
    responsible manner and comply with our commitments under the U.S.-Iraq
    Security Agreement, key to further improving the security situation and
    mitigating remaining risks will be continuing to help the Iraqi
    Security Forces and developing their capabilities through our advisory
    and security assistance programs and the Iraq Security Forces Fund.
        This year will bring far-reaching developments in Iraqi politics
    and the U.S.-Iraq relationship. Just this month, Iraqis took to the
    polls and expressed their political will in parliamentary elections
    made possible by the security provided by the ISF. The significance of
    the elections was clearly evidenced by the strong voter turnout across
    the country and the political maneuvering--including the campaign by
    some Shia Islamists officials to ban a number of former Baathists and
    secularists from running--leading up to election day. The formation of
    the new national government following the election will shape the
    resolution of outstanding fundamental issues about the nature of the
    Iraqi state, including the Arab-Kurd question and the balance between
    central and provincial authority. As such, we expect Iraq's internal
    political landscape to continue to face evolutionary challenges. We
    will continue to work with the new Iraqi Government to implement the
    Strategic Framework Agreement and strengthen our bilateral
    relationship.
    D. The Arabian Peninsula
        The Arabian Peninsula commands significant U.S. attention and focus
    because of its importance to our interests and its potential for
    insecurity. These Arab states on the Peninsula are the Nations of the
    AOR most politically and commercially connected to the United States
    and Europe. They are more developed economically than any of their
    neighbors, collectively wield substantial defense forces, and are major
    providers of the world's energy resources. However, the Peninsula has,
    in the past, been a significant source of funding and manpower for
    terrorist groups and foreign fighters. Where governments face internal
    challenges, the situation is often aggravated and intensified by
    external factors, such as the Iranian regime's destabilizing behavior,
    instability in the Palestinian territories and southern Lebanon,
    political and security troubles in Iraq, and weapons proliferation.
        Over the past few years, we have worked with the countries of the
    Arabian Peninsula, as well as other partners in the region, to develop
    a Regional Security Architecture to address common security challenges.
    This architecture is made up of an array of major components including
    a Shared Early Warning system; an increasingly integrated air and
    missile defense network; and an extensive array of ground, maritime,
    aviation, and special operations exercises each designed to respond to
    different types of threats. All of these cooperative efforts are
    facilitated by the critical base, port, and training facilities
    provided by Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and others throughout the
    AOR.
        This emerging but, nonetheless, significantly developed collection
    of partnerships improves our interoperability and our overall
    effectiveness in ongoing multi-lateral operations and security
    initiatives. The mechanisms and capabilities put in place to coordinate
    efforts in one area, such as piracy, smuggling, and littoral security,
    can often be employed to respond rapidly to crises in other areas.
    Moreover, progress made in generating cooperation on one set of issues
    can serve as an opening for engagement on other issues, thereby
    promoting greater interdependence in the region. Contributions of
    funding and forces by regional partners to our operations in
    Afghanistan evidence some of these positive spillover effects. Now that
    our Gulf partners have begun working closely to address common threats,
    the logical next step is to expand the model and encourage the
    integration of Iraq with our Gulf partners. Such a step would benefit
    the entire region.
        Yemen stands out from its neighbors because of its underdeveloped
    governmental institutions and weak economy and because of its numerous
    security challenges, which include the Southern secessionist movement,
    the Houthi tribal rebellion, and the presence of AQAP. Yemen's
    strategic location facilitates AQAP's freedom of movement and allows it
    to threaten not only Yemen's neighbors but also the United States and
    Europe. In recent months we have seen several terrorist attacks
    attempted within and emanating from Yemen, the spillover of the Houthi
    rebellion into Saudi Arabia, the resurgence of Yemen's Southern
    secessionists, and the negative influence of al-Shabaab in Somalia. In
    view of these developments, we are working toward expanded, sustained,
    and predictable efforts to help build Yemen's security,
    counterinsurgency, and counterterrorist capabilities, and we seek to
    nearly double U.S. security assistance to the country in the coming
    year.
    E. Egypt and the Levant
        The Levant and Egypt subregion is the traditional political,
    social, and intellectual heart of the Arab world and is vital to
    security and stability in the CENTCOM AOR. Because of its history as a
    primary battleground between rival ideologies, the dynamics of this
    sub-region, particularly with regard to Israel, influence the internal
    and external politics of states outside the region as well. In
    addition, U.S. policy and actions in the Levant affect the strength of
    our relationships with partners in the AOR. As such, progress toward
    resolving the political disputes in the Levant, particularly the Arab-
    Israeli conflict, is a major concern for CENTCOM. Through a significant
    expansion of our engagement program, capacity building efforts,
    training exercises, deployment of Navy vessels to the Red Sea, and
    information sharing, we are working with our partners in Egypt and the
    Levant to build the capabilities of legitimate security forces, defeat
    transnational and sub-state militant groups, combat the spread of WMD
    and related materials, and disrupt illegal arms smuggling. In addition,
    we will work to develop the mechanisms of security and confidence
    building to support efforts to achieve a comprehensive Middle East
    peace.
        Egypt remains a leading Arab state, a staunch U.S. ally, and a key
    actor in the Middle East Peace Process. In recent years, however, the
    Egyptian Government has had to deal with serious economic challenges
    and an internal militant Islamist threat; as such, U.S. foreign aid has
    been a critical reinforcement to the Egyptian Government. At the same
    time, concern over the possibility of the spillover of instability in
    Gaza has led Egypt to play a pivotal role in international efforts to
    address the situation there, to improve border security, and to
    interdict illicit arms shipments to Palestinian militants. In
    partnership with U.S. Africa Command, we are working with Egypt to
    combat militancy and smuggling across the Red Sea, Horn of Africa, Nile
    basin, and northern Africa.
        Jordan continues to be a key partner in the region. The Kingdom's
    forces participate in many regional security initiatives and are at the
    forefront of police and military training for regional security forces.
    In addition to its regular participation in multilateral training
    exercises, Jordan promotes regional cooperation and builds our partner
    nations' security capacity through its recently opened King Abdullah
    Special Operations Training Center, Peace Operations Training Center,
    International Police Training Center, and Cooperative Management
    Center. We support these efforts, as they are critical to the continued
    development of legitimate security forces throughout the region,
    especially in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories and, as a
    consequence, will be important to the long term viability of the Middle
    East Peace Process.
        In Lebanon, Hizballah's rearmament following its conflict with
    Israel in 2006, particularly its rocket and missile stocks, portends
    continued instability in the region. Hizballah continues to undermine
    the authority of the legitimate Lebanese security forces, threaten
    Israel, and provide training and support to militant groups outside the
    country. Stabilizing Lebanon ultimately requires strengthening the
    capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, fully implementing United
    Nations Security Council Resolutions, including 1559 and 1701, ending
    Iran's illegal support to Hizballah, and assisting the Lebanese
    Government in developing a comprehensive national defense strategy
    through which the government can exercise its sovereignty, free of
    external intervention.
        Last, despite continued support to Hizballah, interference in
    Lebanese internal politics, and accommodation of foreign fighter
    networks and facilitators operating from and through its territory, the
    Asad regime in Syria appears to be slowly seeking rapprochement with
    its neighbors and the United States.
    F. Central Asia
        Central Asia is a pivotal region on the Eurasian continent between
    Russia, China, Iran, and South Asia, has extensive national resources,
    particularly hydrocarbons, and serves as a major transit route for
    regional and international commerce and for supplies supporting
    coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Ensuring stability in Central Asia
    requires abandoning the outdated, zero-sum paradigms of international
    politics associated with the so-called ``Great Game,'' replacing them
    with broad partnerships to address common challenges such as terrorism,
    WMD proliferation, and illegal narcotics trafficking. There are
    numerous opportunities in Central Asia for cooperation that can
    simultaneously advance the interests of the Central Asian States and
    their neighbors.
        However, public and civic institutions in Central Asia are still
    developing in the aftermath of decades of Soviet rule, and they present
    challenges to our efforts to promote security, development, and
    cooperation. Although there is interdependence across a broad range of
    social, economic, and security matters, these nations have not yet
    fully established a productive regional modus vivendi. Overcoming these
    challenges requires incremental approaches that focus on the
    alleviation of near term needs, the establishment of better governance,
    the integration of markets for energy and other commercial activity,
    and grass-roots economic development.
        Over the past 2 years, a primary focus of our engagement with the
    Central Asian States has been the development and expansion of our
    Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which supports coalition forces in
    Afghanistan. Through diligent work by the State Department and U.S.
    Transportation Command, we have improved the flexibility, efficiency,
    and reliability of our logistical support to our operations in
    Afghanistan by diversifying the routes, approaches, and contracts that
    comprise the logistical network. In 2010, we anticipate expanding our
    use of the NDN as additional routes and methods of delivery become
    available. In addition to improving our regional access and logistics
    capabilities, work on the NDN has significantly increased our contact
    with our regional partners and provided opportunities to engage on
    numerous common causes and to increase our commercial ties.
        In addition to increasing our engagement with the Central Asian
    States through the NDN, we continue to help build the capabilities of
    indigenous security forces, as well as the mechanisms for regional
    cooperation. We provide training, equipment, and facilities for various
    army, national guard, and border security forces through our Building
    Partnership Capacity programs. In addition, we continue to work with
    national level organizations to facilitate dialogue on security and
    emergency response issues through numerous bilateral training exercises
    and initiatives such as our annual Chiefs of Defense Conferences and
    the multilateral Exercise Regional Cooperation.
                          v. critical mission enablers
        Success in our ongoing missions and achieving comprehensive,
    cooperative, and enduring solutions to our challenges in the AOR, all
    the while maintaining a credible, responsive contingency capacity,
    requires the support of several key mission enablers. The effects of
    these capabilities range from the tactical to the strategic, and
    CENTCOM fully supports their continuation, expansion, and improvement.
        In requesting and employing these enablers, we recognize the
    critical importance of proper oversight to ensure their proper usage,
    particularly for funding authorities. In many cases, we have
    established control mechanisms that exceed those mandated by Congress,
    including numerous additional outside audits and command reviews. This
    oversight helps us know whether these programs are being properly
    implemented and, equally important, whether these programs are
    effective.
    A. Building Partnership Capacity
        Our security cooperation and security assistance efforts are
    critical to improving security and stability in the region. They help
    strengthen our relationships and build the security and response
    capabilities of our partners in the AOR. Continued strong support for
    global train and equip resources; Coalition Support Funds; and the
    State Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military
    Sales (FMS), and counter-narcotics security assistance and
    reimbursement programs are essential to generating comprehensive and
    cooperative solutions to defeat insurgent groups. FMF and FMS remain
    our mainstay security assistance tools, but the International Military
    Education and Training program is also an important contributor to
    developing partner nation capabilities and enduring ties, particularly
    for the officers of nascent security forces and from Pakistan, with
    whom we must reestablish personal bonds and trust after years without
    substantive interaction. While these programs are reasonably successful
    in meeting needs in a peacetime environment, we support the reformation
    of the security assistance programs and processes described in this
    year's Quadrennial Defense Review to create new, more responsive, long
    term mechanisms for developing our partner nations' security capacity.
        Additionally, in the face of enduring conflict in the region, we
    look to expanded special authorities and multi-year appropriations to
    quickly meet the emerging needs of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,
    and Foreign Internal Defense/Security Force Assistance activities.
    Multi-year programs-of-record that provide training, equipment, and
    infrastructure for our partner nations' security forces enabled our
    successes in Iraq and are of prime importance if we are to achieve
    comparable progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These critical
    programs include the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the Afghanistan
    Security Forces Fund, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, and the
    Cooperative Defense Program.
    B. Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
        CERP continues to be a vital counterinsurgency tool for our
    commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small CERP projects can be the most
    efficient and effective means to address a local community's emergent
    needs, and where security is a challenge, it is often the only
    immediate means for addressing those needs. CERP spending is not
    intended to replace longer term development assistance administered by
    agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
    but rather to complement and potentially serve as a catalyst for these
    projects. In Iraq as the security situation has improved and allowed
    USAID full access, CERP funding has been reduced commensurately.
    However, we fully support ongoing efforts to enhance U.S. humanitarian
    assistance programs in other parts of the CENTCOM AOR, particularly in
    Pakistan. In concert with the State Department, we also seek innovative
    mechanisms and authorities to allow for greater cost-sharing and to
    create similar counterinsurgency tools for use by coalition and host
    nation partners. These tools should allow for a variety of funding
    sources, to include contributions from nongovernmental organizations,
    international governmental organizations, and partner governments.
        Critical to CERP is its proper oversight. We support the ongoing
    Department of Defense internal assessment of the program and its
    consideration of establishing a Department-wide CERP coordinator. We
    will continue to sponsor outside audits and to work with the Services
    to ensure proper pre-deployment training for CERP managers and
    contracting personnel.
    C. Information Operations
        Operation Earnest Voice (OEV) is the critical program of record we
    use to synchronize and oversee our Information Operations activities,
    to counter our adversaries' ideology and propaganda in the AOR, and to
    amplify credible voices in the region, all in close coordination with
    the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. OEV provides CENTCOM
    direct communication capabilities to a regional audience through
    traditional media as well as trans-regional websites and public affairs
    regional blogging. Strategic, long term effects are achieved through
    our supporting Building Partnership Capacity programs, humanitarian
    relief efforts, demining activities, Cooperative Defense Initiatives,
    and counterterrorist operations. The audience analysis and assessment
    component of OEV provides critical cultural understanding required to
    connect with the region's population, tell us which techniques are
    effective over time and which are not, and gives us the long term
    ability to assess our success or failure in the war of ideas. Full and
    enduring funding of OEV and other Defense Department information
    operations efforts will best enable us to communicate our strategic
    messages and to counter those of our adversaries.
    D. Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs)
        Initiatives focused on countering the threat of IEDs are of
    paramount importance to our operations in the AOR. IEDs continue to be
    the primary threat to our ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
    efforts to expedite the acquisition and fielding of personal protective
    equipment, IED jammers, route clearance vehicles and equipment, and the
    Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles, which
    includes the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle, have saved countless lives. An
    urgent priority for us is the rapid fielding of MRAPs to support the
    increase in U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Because we expect
    IEDs to remain a key weapon in the arsenals of militants and insurgents
    for years to come, we urge continued support for the Joint IED Defeat
    Organization; the Services' baseline sustainment for the MRAP family of
    vehicles, base defense initiatives, and Counter-IED efforts; and
    Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation funding and procurement of
    equipment to counter IED tactics and networks.
    E. Intelligence
        Detailed and timely tactical, operational, and strategic level
    intelligence collection and analysis remain vital to all aspects of our
    operations. While we continue to balance the allocation of our
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and to
    refine and optimize our procedures and existing architecture, changes
    in the operating environment and the expiration of old systems will
    require new, improved, or increased intelligence capabilities. We
    support the Department of Defense's planned growth in human
    intelligence and counterintelligence specialists, interrogators, and
    intelligence analysts, but we also have come to recognize the
    importance of non-traditional specialists such as threat finance
    analysts, human terrain teams, and document exploitation specialists.
    In addition, our requirements for signals intelligence geo-location
    capabilities, Ground Moving Target Indicator information, and aerial
    imagery from remotely piloted systems, including sea-based ISR,
    continue to grow. We also look to Operationally Responsive Space to
    temporarily fill the space-based reconnaissance gap to be created as
    several current systems reach the end of their operational lives.
    Finally, managing these capabilities and fully harvesting the
    information they provide requires innovative databases (such as the
    Combined Information Data Network Exchange system), applications, and
    communication systems.
    F. Adaptable Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
            Systems
        Continued operations across a dispersed AOR call for a robust,
    interoperable, high-volume theater C4 infrastructure. We are working to
    meet C4 requirements for current operations and to posture enduring
    theater C4 capabilities to meet post-conflict requirements as well as
    prepare for contingencies. Concurrently, we are working to expand our
    information sharing and to improve our partners' commercial and
    military C4 capabilities.
        We aggressively seek greater bandwidth capacity to improve the
    reliability and diversity of our C4 networks. CENTCOM currently
    utilizes all available bandwidth to full capacity, but theater fiber
    networks are vulnerable to single points of failure in the global
    information grid. Military Satellite Communications capabilities are
    critical to theater operations, and the acceleration of
    transformational upgrades to these systems would reduce our reliance on
    commercial providers.
        We are also pursuing the means to extend Joint Theater
    Expeditionary Command, Control, and Communications support and services
    to disadvantaged users throughout the AOR. Some of these means include
    our sponsorship of Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs).
    Under the JCTD Tactical Service Provider (TSP) program, we developed
    the capability to more effectively manage available bandwidth and
    provide coverage to frontline units. We continue to field and further
    develop the Distributed Tactical Communications System, which leverages
    new technologies to deliver reliable, critical communications
    capabilities to the most remote users. Additional fielding and
    technology efforts include the Radio over Internet Protocol Routed
    Network and the Joint Airborne Communications System. Despite
    tremendous actions by the Department of Defense to help us overcome our
    communication and network challenges, to be more effective and
    efficient, we require a fully integrated space and terrestrial
    communications infrastructure that supports all joint and potential
    partner nation users.
    G. Cyberspace Capabilities and Authorities
        The openness of the global cyber commons exposes us to low risk,
    low cost threats from our adversaries. Our networks are constantly
    threatened by a range of actors from hackers to criminal organizations
    to state-sponsored saboteurs. This activity is aimed at retrieving
    sensitive information, exploiting our public domain information to gain
    an operational advantage, and disrupting our networks. In addition, our
    adversaries use the internet for command and control, recruiting, and
    fund raising.
        To help address these challenges, we welcome the development and
    institutionalization of cyberspace capabilities to help us protect and
    operate within these critical systems. The formation of U.S. Cyber
    Command and other Defense Department-wide cyberspace activities will
    facilitate the fusion of intelligence, operations, and communications
    essential to our computer network operations. At the combatant command
    level, we have created our own Cyberspace Warfare Cell composed of
    intelligence, operations, and communications personnel to synchronize
    our cyberspace activities and to integrate with national level efforts.
    H. Joint and Multinational Logistics
        The primary focus of our logistics efforts is the timely
    deployment, equipping, and sustainment of units engaged in combat
    operations. With our multinational and strategic national logistics
    partners, we continue to work toward an efficient and effective
    logistics architecture that supports our forces and operations and
    minimizes costs. Our logistics posture consists of pre-positioned
    inventories, air and sealift capabilities, and access to bases with
    critical infrastructure, all of which are key logistics components that
    support operational flexibility. To maintain this posture and our
    readiness, we must quickly reconstitute our Army and Marine Corps pre-
    positioned stocks and properly reset returning forces. Moreover, this
    logistics posture enables the increase in forces in Afghanistan while
    simultaneously supporting the drawdown of forces from Iraq, both of
    which remain on track to meet the President's timelines.
        The Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan continues to
    support CENTCOM, USF-I, and USFOR-A by providing responsive contracting
    of supplies, services, and construction, and lays the groundwork for
    the capacity building efforts within Iraqi and Afghan ministries. As a
    result, in fiscal year 2009, the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and
    Afghanistan executed over 33,000 contract actions and obligated a total
    of $5.4 billion. Over 36 percent of this funding went to Iraqi and
    Afghan firms. CENTCOM is transitioning the Joint Contracting Command to
    a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, an initiative that will
    enhance management and synchronize contracting across a greater portion
    of the AOR. We continue to improve contractor oversight through other
    initiatives such as increasing the in-theater presence of Contracting
    Officer Representatives and Quality Assurance Representatives, early
    identification and training of these representatives for deploying
    units, and mandating the use of automated Letters of Authorization for
    contractors.
        In an effort to lessen our reliance on the ground supply lines
    through Pakistan, we are moving an increasing amount of non-military
    supplies into Afghanistan via an air and surface intermodal NDN, which
    transits through the Central Asian States. We have also established
    routes to transport military equipment from Iraq through Turkey merging
    with the NDN for onward movement to Afghanistan. Continued expansion of
    the NDN and additional host nation access remain logistics priorities
    as we shift more sustainment from the routes through Pakistan to the
    NDN and optimize the Pakistan routes for units and equipment supporting
    the increase in forces in Afghanistan. Our relationships with the
    Central Asian States continue to improve as a result of our NDN
    efforts, and this is supported by legislation that allows us to expand
    our partnerships by locally purchasing supplies for forces in
    Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region.
    I. Overseas Basing and Theater Posture
        CENTCOM's overseas basing strategy and its associated overseas
    Military Construction projects are developing the infrastructure
    necessary for the conduct of ongoing operations, as well as supporting
    global access, projection, sustainment, and protection of our combined
    forces in the AOR. Fully functional Forward Operating Sites and
    Cooperative Security Locations are essential to our ability to conduct
    the full spectrum of military operations, engage with and enable
    partner nations, and act promptly and decisively. Prepositioned stocks
    and reset equipment provide critical support to this strategy but
    require reconstitution and modernization after having been partially
    expended to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Even with generous Overseas Contingency Operations budgets,
    military construction timelines are too slow to respond to changes in a
    combat environment. Major events such as the approval of the Strategic
    Partnership Agreement with Iraq and the recent decision to send
    additional forces to Afghanistan show how rapidly basing requirements
    can change. Expanded Contingency Construction Authorities made
    available across the entire CENTCOM AOR can serve as partial, interim
    solutions because they push construction decisionmaking authority to
    our engaged commanders in the field. Also, increasing the Operations
    and Maintenance construction threshold for minor construction in
    support of combat operations across the AOR would increase the ability
    of our commanders to quickly meet mission requirements and fully
    support and protect our deployed forces.
    J. Adaptive Requirements, Acquisition, and Technology Processes
        The technical community writ-large has responded exceptionally well
    over the past few years to the needs of our warfighters in the CENTCOM
    AOR. While the Services, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD) have responded to our calls for assistance, the Joint IED
    Defeat Organization, the Rapid Equipping Force, and Army Material
    Command's Fielded Assistance in Science and Technology programs have
    been particularly helpful in ensuring that our troopers receive the
    best, most advanced equipment and tools to make them effective and to
    keep them safe during the execution of their missions. In addition,
    several organizations under OSD-Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    and OSD-Defense Research and Engineering, in cooperation with the
    Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, have been instrumental in
    the discovery, rapid development, and early fielding of critical
    operational capabilities, such as more capable ISR systems, human
    terrain mapping and analytical tools, and improved ballistic protection
    for MRAPs. Last, the Quick Reaction Test Program has helped us use
    existing technologies in new and more efficient ways.
        The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) has proven important to
    addressing non-counter-IED rapid acquisition needs for our operations,
    and we will continue to use the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON)
    process to support our warfighters. However, because the JUON process
    requires execution year reprogramming by the Services, we found in the
    past that the Rapid Acquisition Fund (RAF) was a useful JRAC tool for
    supporting immediate needs. When the authority existed, the JRAC used
    the RAF to field capabilities such as radio systems used for
    Afghanistan-Pakistan cross-border communications, which were procured
    in less than 4 months from the initial identification of the need. The
    JRAC has also used RAF funding to initiate the fielding of critical
    biometrics equipment until the JUON process could further source the
    program, significantly reducing the time required to deploy the
    technology. Reinstating RAF funding and using it as a complement to the
    JUON process would allow CENTCOM to more quickly resolve warfighter
    needs.
    K. Personnel
        Having appropriately trained personnel in sufficient quantities for
    our commands and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) is critical to accomplishing
    our assigned missions and achieving our theater objectives. The CENTCOM
    headquarters has been satisfactorily manned through temporary
    augmentation but may require additional permanent manpower for enduring
    mission sets as well as mechanisms for quickly generating temporary
    manpower for contingency operations. Within our JTFs and deployed
    units, there continue to be shortfalls in many low-density, high-demand
    occupational specialties and enabling force structures. Most notably,
    critical shortages of intelligence specialists, counterintelligence and
    human intelligence collectors, interrogators, document exploitation
    specialists, detainee operations specialists, engineers, and military
    police continue to degrade mission effectiveness. As operations
    continue in Afghanistan, we see a critical need for increased public
    affairs and information operations personnel to improve our strategic
    communications capabilities. Moreover, as we complete our combat
    mission in Iraq, we will require non-traditional enabling capabilities
    such as leaders to augment newly formed advisory assistance units,
    personnel to follow money trails in support of our threat finance
    cells, and an increased number of multi-functional logisticians to man
    critical logistics units. At the same time, we support a significant
    expansion of the U.S. Government's vital, deployable civilian capacity,
    particularly in the State Department and USAID.
        Quality of life, family support, and retention programs remain
    important to our operations in the AOR. The Rest and Recuperation
    program continues to be a success, having served over 875,000 since its
    inception in September 2003. We also continue to depend heavily on
    entitlement programs such as Combat Zone Tax Relief, Imminent Danger
    Pay, and Special Leave Accrual to support our deployed servicemembers.
                                 vi. conclusion
        There are currently over 220,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, and coast guardsmen serving in the CENTCOM AOR and soldiering
    magnificently against tough enemies during challenging operations in
    punishing terrain and extreme weather. Together with our many civilian
    and coalition partners, they have been the central element to the
    security, stability, and prosperity we have increasingly promoted
    throughout the region. They will be the key to achieving further
    progress in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan and other locations where
    serious work is being done. These wonderful Americans and their fellow
    troopers around the world constitute the most experienced, most capable
    military in our Nation's history. They and their families have made
    great sacrifices since September 11, and nothing means more to these
    great Americans than the sense that those back home appreciate their
    service and sacrifice.
        All those in CENTCOM thank the American people for their
    extraordinary support of our military men and women and their families.
    We thank the Members of Congress for their unwavering support and
    abiding concern for our troopers and their families as well.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Petraeus.
        We're going to try a 6-minute round of questions, given the
    large turnout this morning.
        General Petraeus, Iran's actions and lack of willingness to
    comply with U.N. resolutions regarding their nuclear program
    continues to undermine security in the region. I believe that
    stronger U.N. sanctions against Iran are not only essential,
    it's critically important that they be enforced.
        The President has--rightly, in my judgment--kept a military
    option to take against nuclear facilities in Iran on the table,
    should they be used for production of nuclear weapons in
    violation of U.N. resolutions. I also believe that the
    possibility of a blockade or quarantine of Iran's oil exports
    and refined petroleum product imports should also be on a list
    of possible options for action. Can you comment on what actions
    you think might be successful in terms of sanctions against
    Iran, should they continue to violate U.N. resolutions relative
    to their nuclear program, but also as to whether we ought to
    keep those other options on the table?
        General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, as you noted, the
    President has explicitly stated that he has not taken the
    military option off the table. As you noted in your statement
    earlier, we have worked hard in the region to build the so-
    called regional security architecture, to build a network of
    shared early warning, of BMD, and of other security
    relationships and partnerships that have been brought about in
    large measure because of concern by those states with whom we
    are carrying out these activities, about the developments in
    Iran that I spoke of in my opening statement.
        With regard to specific contingency plans or activities,
    that would obviously be something that we would want to do in a
    closed session. But, clearly now, having given Iran every
    opportunity--not just the United States, but all of the
    countries engaged in this effort--the focus is shifting to what
    is termed the pressure track, and there is a variety of
    sanctions included that are now being discussed in the
    administration. I don't want to get ahead of them in discussing
    those particular items.
        Chairman Levin. We are going to have a full hearing on
    Iran, and we'll have both an open hearing, as I've mentioned to
    you in my office, as well as a closed hearing on that subject.
        General Caldwell, who's the head of our NATO training
    mission in Afghanistan, has reported a very large increase in
    the number of Afghan Army recruits that are awaiting training.
    There's a shortage of trainers. We've gone into that, and I
    think you would agree that, one way or another, we have to get
    those trainers present to increase the speed with which the
    size of that army is increased.
        What General Caldwell told us when we visited him is that
    there were a number of reasons for that significant increase in
    the number of recruits, that one of them was the increase in
    pay, but he also said that a very significant cause of that
    increase in the number of Afghan recruits was that the Afghan
    leaders are reaching out to the people in the provinces to
    increase, significantly, the number of recruits that are coming
    in. One of the things that focused the mind of the Afghan
    leaders to do that was the decision of the President to set
    that July 2011 date to begin to reduce the presence of American
    forces; not to pull our forces out, not to have a total exit in
    any sense, but simply to begin reductions as a way of focusing
    the minds of the Afghan leaders on their responsibility to
    provide for their own security and to transition more of that
    responsibility to them.
        Do you both support the 30,000 troop surge, and do you also
    support the setting of that July 2011 date by the President?
        General Petraeus. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. There is a
    shortage of trainers. Admiral Stavridis and the NATO Secretary
    General did a force-generation effort. They got about half of
    those pledged. As you noted, we have to figure out how to get
    the rest of those, and we are looking at various options for
    doing that, on the U.S. side, while still urging NATO to
    generate the remainder.
        The surge in recruits, I think, was a result of two
    factors: One, the increased pay, without question, but also a
    sense by Afghan leaders that they do have to get on with it. In
    the speech at West Point, the President sent two messages. One
    was additional commitment, the other was urgency. The urgency
    component of that was connected to the July 2011 date. It has
    concentrated the minds of Afghan leaders, to a degree, while we
    have also sought to reassure leaders in the region that that is
    not a date when we bolt for the exits, but it is, rather, a
    date on which we begin a conditions-based process of
    transitioning some tasks to Afghan forces and begin a
    responsible reduction of our forces.
        Chairman Levin. Do you personally support that?
        General Petraeus. I did. Yes, I have stated that on the
    record, many times.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank the witnesses.
        General Petraeus, I want to talk about the issue with you
    that has dominated the news in the last few days, and that is
    the increased tensions between the United States and Israel
    over the settlements issue, the timing of it, and the
    implications of it. I note there's been increased Palestinian
    demonstrations and violence in the last day or 2 in Gaza and
    West Bank. First of all, I understand that you have the
    greatest confidence in Senator Mitchell and his work to try to
    bring about progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
    Is that true?
        General Petraeus. That is absolutely true, Senator.
        Senator McCain. I just wanted to get that on the record.
        General Petraeus. That's why we've invited him to every
    single conference that we have hosted with CENTCOM, with
    ambassadors, with commanders, and so forth.
        Senator McCain. The present issue is over some increased
    construction of settlements in Jerusalem, which Israelis view
    within the State of Israel when the peace process is concluded;
    Palestinians view it as part of a new Palestinian state. Isn't
    the issue not the issue of settlements as much as it is the
    existence of the State of Israel? Its neighbors, with
    exceptions, have dedicated themselves to the extermination of
    the State of Israel. Ahmadinejad has said, time after time,
    they want to wipe Israel off the map. Isn't it true that the
    Israelis left Gaza on the presumption that then there would be
    progress, and instead they got rocket attacks? So, maybe you
    could put this in a larger context for us of what needs to be
    done to reduce the tensions between the United States and
    Israel, our closest ally and friend, in many respects. We'd
    like to hear a little bit about your views on that situation
    and what needs to be done to defuse it.
        General Petraeus. Thanks, Senator.
        First of all, just a reminder for all, neither Israel nor
    the Palestinian territories are in the CENTCOM AOR.
        Having said that, we keep a very close eye on what goes on
    there, because of the impact that it has on that part of
    CENTCOM that is the Arab world. In fact, we've urged, at
    various times, that this is a critical component. It's one
    reason we invite Senator Mitchell to brief all of the different
    conferences that we host, and seek to support him in any way
    that we can when he's in the CENTCOM part of the region, just
    as we support Lieutenant General Dayton, who is supporting the
    training of the Palestinian security forces from a location
    that is in the CENTCOM AOR, as well.
        Asking for the Palestinian territories to be added to the
    CENTCOM AOR, I have never made that a formal recommendation for
    the Unified Command Plan, and that was not in what I submitted
    this year, nor have I sent a memo to the White House on any of
    this. Some of this was in the press, so I welcome the
    opportunity to point that out.
        Clearly the tensions, the issues, and so forth, have an
    enormous effect. They set the strategic context within which we
    operate in the CENTCOM AOR. My thrust has generally been to
    encourage that process that can indeed get that recognition
    that you talked about, and indeed get a sense of progress in
    the overall peace process because of the effect that it has on
    what I think we would term the moderate governments in our
    area. That really is about the extent of our involvement in
    that, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Do you believe that a policy of containment
    would be an effective option for dealing with a nuclear-armed
    Iran?
        General Petraeus. Sir, I think that is a big policy
    hypothetical that I would like to go around, rather than into.
    I think the policy right now is very clear. The President has
    said that Iran cannot have nuclear weapons.
        Senator McCain. Are you concerned about the fact that the
    President's plan was 30,000 American troops, with 10,000
    additional ally contributions. We now have the Dutch obviously
    going to remove 2,000 troops. As Senator Levin pointed out, we
    don't have a sufficient number of trainers. Do we have any
    plans for the additional troops that are necessary? Can we
    accommodate for what is clearly a shortfall of the number of
    troops that was, in my view, a minimum of what was recommended
    by General McChrystal?
        General Petraeus. Senator, part of that is why we sought
    the additional 100,000 authorization for the ANSF, which came
    in the wake of the policy announcement.
        It is also why Secretary Gates asked for and received some
    flex factor that he has discussed. That is in the background
    there; if there came to be an emergent emergency need that is
    available, as well.
        Senator McCain. Finally, General and Admiral Olson, do you
    believe that Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) needs a thorough
    review before action is taken?
        General Petraeus. Senator, can I give my statement on that?
        Senator McCain. We're short of time, but please, go ahead.
        Chairman Levin. How long is that statement?
        General Petraeus. About 8 minutes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. No, no.
        General Petraeus. Sir, this is not a sound-bite issue.
        Chairman Levin. I understand.
        Senator McCain. It's a pretty straightforward question,
    though.
        Chairman Levin. We respect, believe me, the thoughtfulness
    that you are applying to it. We've read your public statements.
    But, an 8-minute answer, unless someone else wants to use all
    of their time for it, I'm afraid would violate the spirit of
    our rules.
        I would suggest, however, that if nobody asks you that
    question and their time is used for that purpose, that you make
    that part of the record. But, someone may very well ask you. I
    just don't think it would be right, because of our time limit,
    to take 8 minutes out of someone else's time.
        General Petraeus. I understand.
        Senator McCain. I think you've just made it very unlikely
    that you'll be asked, if it's 8 minutes. [Laughter.]
        Admiral, do you want to make a comment? My question is
    pretty straightforward, to be honest with you. Do you believe
    that a thorough review of the policy and the legislation needs
    to be conducted before repeal?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, I do.
        Senator McCain. Thank you.
        General Petraeus. Senator, let me just answer that. I
    believe the time has come to consider a change to DADT, but I
    think it should be done in a thoughtful and deliberative manner
    that should include the conduct of the review that Secretary
    Gates has directed; that would consider the views in the force
    on a change in the policy; that would include an assessment of
    the likely effects on recruiting, retention, morale, and
    cohesion; and would include an identification of what policies
    might be needed in the event of a change, and recommend those
    policies, as well.
        Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        As you've said, I believe, in my office, the likely effects
    could go in either direction, either negative or positive, the
    study could show.
        General Petraeus. It could, it could.
        Chairman Levin. Okay.
        General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, to both of you, for your leadership.
        General Petraeus, I just want to ask you a couple of quick
    questions about Iran, first. I thought your prepared testimony
    was very strong and clear, here. You describe Iran as ``the
    primary state-level threat to stability in the region,'' add
    that its nuclear program is, to use your words, ``serious,''
    and ``part of the regime's broader effort to expand its
    influence.'' I agree, of course.
        You also mentioned, just in response to questions, that
    President Obama has said that the military option remains on
    the table. It's not our first choice, obviously; that's why
    we're pursuing economic sanctions.
        I just want to reinforce the fact that previously you've
    said that in the exercise of your responsibility at CENTCOM,
    you are working on actual military plans with regard to Iran,
    which, we all hope, you never have to use, but as the military
    works on contingency plans for a host of scenarios around the
    world. Is that correct?
        General Petraeus. Sir, probably best for a closed session,
    but we get paid to prepare for contingencies; it would be
    irresponsible if we didn't do that.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Petraeus. We try not to be irresponsible.
        Senator Lieberman. Because I know how responsible you are,
    I assume you're working on plans. So, I'll leave it at that for
    now.
        Let me go to Iraq. We've watched the election that's going
    on there now with great satisfaction. It's not a perfect
    situation, but when you think about the fact that, a little
    more than 3 years ago, it looked like Iraq was going to descend
    into chaos, and now we have a government operating, an economy
    coming together, and increasing self-defense by ISF. I was
    struck by the success of the united parties, as it were, the
    nonsectarian parties, and I look forward to continued progress
    there.
        There was a time when we'd say gains in Iraq were fragile
    and reversible. Today, I note in your statement, you say,
    ``Gains in Iraq remain fragile and reversible, but increasingly
    less so.'' I appreciate those four additional words.
        I wanted to ask you, in light of all that, but
    understanding that our gains in Iraq remain fragile and
    reversible, whether it is still going to be possible to draw
    down to 50,000 American troops in Iraq by September 1 of this
    year. It's a drawdown required by the Status-of-Forces
    Agreement with Iraq. It's a good goal, but I'm sure you'd be
    the first to say that we don't want to arbitrarily go to it if
    we think there's significant risk of reversal as a result. Give
    me your sense, at this moment, of whether we're going to be
    able to get down to the 50,000 by September 1.
        General Petraeus. I think we will be able to do that,
    Senator. I think that we may reconfigure the force a bit over
    what we originally were thinking it would look like 4 months
    ago or so. We're constantly tinkering with it. There's a
    possibility that we may want to keep an additional brigade
    headquarters, as an example, but then slim out some of its
    organic forces and some of the other organic forces elsewhere.
    Headquarters really matter because they're the element of
    engagement. If we think that there's a particularly fragile
    situation in a certain area in the north, then we might do
    that. That's something that we are looking at. But, we still
    believe that we will be able to stay on track to get down to
    that 50,000 figure.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay, that's encouraging. That would
    mean, I assume, that there'd potentially be a 7th Brigade
    headquarters.
        General Petraeus. That's correct. That is one option that
    we are looking at, but still within the broad 50,000.
        Senator Lieberman. I take it, from what you've said, that
    that probably would be in the areas of Kurdish-Arab conflict
    around Kirkuk, where I know that our forces, working with other
    forces there, have really helped to maintain stability.
        General Petraeus. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that.
        Let me go to Afghanistan with this question. There's been a
    lot of public discussion recently about reconciliation with
    senior Taliban leaders. Some senior officials in our coalition
    seem to be pushing really aggressively on the idea that we
    should try to cut some sort of deal with the Taliban, perhaps
    with the help of historic allies of theirs in Pakistan.
    Personally, I worry that these ideas are ill-advised, although
    I'm sure we all look forward to the time when there can be
    reconciliation, particularly beginning with lower-level
    Taliban, or probably not zealots. In that regard, I agree with
    Secretary Gates, that we need to first make the Taliban
    understand that they are destined to lose this fight, before
    any serious consideration of reconciliation at the higher
    levels can take place. Therefore, I worry that the current
    public talk about reconciliation is counterproductive. I want
    to ask you what your view is on that.
        General Petraeus. I agree with Secretary Gates on that,
    Senator. Certainly, thinking ahead to that moment when perhaps
    senior-level Taliban can be integrated, because there has been
    what's called reintegration at low- and mid-levels. In fact,
    yesterday there were open reports about a couple of Taliban
    leaders coming in with their hands up. It is not an uncommon
    event over there; but there are many low- and mid-level
    leaders. That's part of the strategy, is reintegration with our
    Afghan partners to try to break off from the greater-Taliban
    movement, those who might become part of the solution instead
    of a continuing part of the problem.
        On the other hand, reconciliation at the senior levels, as
    Secretary Gates has observed, is probably a bit unlikely, at
    the conditions that the Afghan Government has established for
    it if they are not feeling a considerably greater amount of
    pressure than they probably are right now. That's what's behind
    Secretary Gates' view, and that happens to be my view, as well.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that, and that's
    reassuring. Thank you very, very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I wasn't going to ask this question, but General Petraeus,
    you spent quite a bit of time talking about the CERP, and my
    favorite program is the partner programs that train and equip--
    1206, 1207, 1208 and the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
    (CCIF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET)
    and all that.
        General Petraeus. Right.
        Senator Inhofe. The whole reason for this, initially, was
    to get more authority to the commanders in the field to be able
    to do things, to respond. We've had some testimony that talks
    about how much more effective it is if you're able to do this
    without going through a lot of the bureaucratic time delays
    that would come otherwise. I'd like to know, since they're
    talking about 1207, which is the civilian-to-civilian portion
    of this, now kind of reverting more back to the way it was
    before, or at least having a greater State Department influence
    in it, do you see this creating any kind of a problem, number
    one? Number two, do you think, starting with this, that it may
    spread to some of the other elements of train-and-equip?
        General Petraeus. CERP is hugely important. We want to
    continue it. We want to make sure we have the oversight that
    can guarantee to you and to the other committees that we're
    responsibly overseeing the expenditure of taxpayer dollars. We
    are trying to work very closely with our partners in the U.S.
    Agency for International Development (USAID) and other civilian
    elements, to make sure that we do coordinate what we are doing
    in the field. One of the achievements in RC-East, in
    particular, of ISAF, has been to build a civilian chain that
    parallels the military chain all the way back to Kabul, and
    allows them to coordinate much more closely in their thresholds
    for various levels as you go up. I think that's working well. I
    think we have to continue it. We also want to make sure that it
    can be the responsive tool that it is; so, we're sensitive to a
    sense, if there's too much bureaucracy building up, then that
    would defeat the purpose of it in the first place. We're trying
    to find that balance between a sufficient amount of
    coordination and oversight and still allowing the free use of
    it in the way that it was intended.
        Senator Inhofe. If you see that the effectiveness is
    impaired at all, if you'd let us know, that would be very
    helpful.
        Would you agree with his comments, Admiral Olson, first of
    all, on all of these programs; and second, his comments about
    what changes might be coming, and what to look for?
        Admiral Olson. Absolutely, sir. I agree 100 percent. I
    think the 1206, 1207, 1208, and, as you mentioned, but which is
    often neglected in the conversation, the IMET funding, are
    absolutely key to success. I applaud the initiative for CERP. I
    think that combatant commanders responsible for military
    success in the region ought to have the kind of responsiveness
    that CERP funds provide.
        Senator Inhofe. You also agree, then, because you have a
    broader responsibility, that the CCIF in other areas is a good
    program.
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, I do.
        Senator Inhofe. Admiral Olson, I've always been very
    sensitive to the training process in Afghanistan, and one
    reason is that, way back, probably 5 or 6 years ago, our
    Oklahoma Guard over there was very active in the training of
    the trainers. Right now you have Special Forces and
    conventional forces that are involved in the training. How is
    that broken up?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, the cleanest way to divide it is that
    the Special Forces trainers are training their Afghan
    counterparts. They're in a program that originated as a
    commando training program, selecting battalions, kandaks, from
    the ANA and putting them through a 12-week training course that
    then created a commando program within the ANA. That's now been
    expanded recently to include a special forces counterpart
    within the ANA. Most of the training of the ANA--the raising of
    the army, if you will--is being done by our general-purpose
    force trainers.
        Senator Inhofe. Good.
        In terms of your responsibility in the special operations,
    the fact that you're not only dealing with an asymmetric
    threat, but also with the more conventional threats posed by
    North Korea and Iran; do you have the resources to be able to
    confront those threats, in your opinion?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. Depending on Army, Navy, Air
    Force, and Marine Corps for service com and support, we are in
    the tracking and planning business. To go beyond that, I think
    we should go into closed session.
        Senator Inhofe. What's the ratio right now of special
    operations to conventional forces that are deployed in numbers
    of personnel?
        Admiral Olson. SOF number about plus or minus 10 percent.
        Senator Inhofe. Roughly 10 to 1.
        Admiral Olson. Roughly 6,000 troops each in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, relative to just about 100,000 conventional forces
    in Iraq now, as that draws down and as Afghanistan moves up
    again.
        Senator Inhofe. So, when the drawdown occurs, would you see
    somewhat of a proportional drawdown? Do you have any thoughts
    on that?
        Admiral Olson. No, sir. We don't expect to see that. In all
    my conversations with General Odierno and General Petraeus,
    it's my expectation that the level of Special Operations Forces
    will remain about constant in Iraq.
        Senator Inhofe. As we continue to fund Pakistan's efforts,
    a concern has resonated, at least with me, that we might be
    inadvertently getting those fundings to the wrong places, like
    the Pakistan-based jihadists, either through the madrassas or
    the Federal funds going to Pakistan. What kind of precautions
    are we taking to make sure they don't get to the wrong people?
        General Petraeus. The security force funding elements are
    going directly to the security forces. Any of the different
    categories of funding that we have for them--whether it's
    foreign military financing, IMET, Pakistani Counterinsurgency
    Capability Fund, 1206, whatever--these all buy either
    equipment, training, or education for members of the Pakistani
    military.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay.
        General Petraeus. I'm confident that money is going where
    it should.
        Senator Inhofe. That's good. There have been a few articles
    that have been written that have drawn some question to that,
    and I felt that was the case.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
        General Petraeus, can you give us your initial evaluation
    of the election in Iraq? It appears that in terms of the
    sectarian lines, there has been a lot of discussion of these
    nonsectarian alliances, but the results of the votes appear to
    strengthen some of the sectarian positions.
        General Petraeus. Prime Minister Maliki's State of Law
    coalition is the leader, overall, and it will certainly not get
    a majority; it will get a plurality. Second, interestingly,
    although it's very close, is former Prime Minister Allawi's
    coalition. He is a Shia leader of a coalition that has
    substantial Sunni backing. His was the leading coalition in
    many of the Sunni-majority provinces. Very close to him is the
    coalition of the Supreme Council and Sadrists and Prime
    Minister Jaafari's party, Chalabi's party, so that is in there,
    as well. Then the overall number of Kurdish votes is in there,
    also.
        At the end of the day, clearly there will have to be, at
    the very least, cross-ethnic coalitions. There will certainly
    have to be Arab and Kurd, without question. I think what
    remains to be seen is how much cross-sectarian coalition-
    building will take place. That will be the dynamic, I think.
        Senator Reed. You expect this process of selecting a new
    government to stretch for several months?
        General Petraeus. Yes, we do.
        Senator Reed. One of the interesting results is the
    apparent success of Sadr and his party, or at least his
    grouping.
        General Petraeus. I don't know if it would be a surprise,
    candidly. I think those who watch it would have predicted that.
    I think the fact that Maliki's coalition is higher, actually,
    is quite significant.
        The parties don't have to stay with their coalition. They
    can join other coalitions. That's going to be the interesting
    dynamic that plays out.
        Senator Reed. One final question about the elections. The
    Iranians were involved, at least in the sense of supporting,
    financially, some of the parties. What influence do you think
    they'll have, given what we know preliminarily?
        General Petraeus. I think Iran, in the past, has had
    influence when it comes to deal brokering. They're not alone in
    influencing those, certainly. Other actors in the region will
    have some degree of influence, as well. I'm sure that they will
    continue to try to exercise that. The fact, however, that they
    were not able to succeed in getting all of the Shi'a major
    parties to run as one coalition was quite significant, as that
    was a goal of theirs. The fact that, in the January 2009
    elections, the parties most associated with them did not do all
    that well, was significant. Frankly, the fact that there was a
    strategic agreement is quite significant in that regard, as
    well.
        You still have this dynamic that Ambassador Ryan Crocker
    used to talk about, that there is a certain degree of self-
    limiting aspect to some of Iran's influence, given that Iraq
    does not want to be the 51st state, if you will, of Iran, in
    that it is very conscious of its Arab identity, versus the
    Persian identity.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Admiral Olson, can you comment about Yemen? I know it's an
    area that you're concerned with. Then I'll ask General Petraeus
    afterwards. It is a country beset with huge problems. They're
    depleting their oil resources; they're depleting their water
    resources; they have demographic challenges; a youthful
    population; and they have a civil war, despite al Qaeda. With
    that good news, besides saving money on your car insurance,
    what can you tell us? [Laughter.]
        Admiral Olson. Sir, Yemen is clearly a place that's being
    challenged. I second what General Petraeus said about the
    rising presence of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and their
    focus on Yemen as a place where they are seeking some
    sanctuary.
        Our involvement, from the special operations community, is
    relatively low-level. We have a relatively small training
    engagement with certain Yemeni forces. But, beyond that, I
    think we'd have to go into closed discussion.
        Senator Reed. General Petraeus, you want to comment
    further?
        General Petraeus. I'd just second the motion.
        Senator Reed. Very good.
        Let me switch to Pakistan. The Quetta Shura appears to be
    dispersing to Karachi and elsewhere. Is that a result of what
    you talked about, the different orientation of the Pakistani
    Armed Forces and Security Services? Are they putting real
    pressure on the Quetta Shura?
        General Petraeus. I think there's a number of factors in
    play. That may be one of them. Certainly, pressure--just in
    Afghanistan--is yet another factor, and just perceptions or
    fears that have resulted from the campaign by the Pakistani
    Army and Frontier Corps targeted at the Pakistani Taliban, as
    distinguished from the Quetta Shura or Afghan Taliban. But
    several Afghan Taliban shadow governors, Mullah Baradar and
    others, are detained in Pakistan, just as there have been some
    also in Afghanistan. I think just feeling a bit more pressure,
    worried about what might be out there in the future, has
    resulted in some of this dispersal.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, as we continue down this road of trying to make
    sure that we recruit and retain the finest men and women that
    America has to offer, it's the two of you guys that our junior
    officers, mid-level career folks continue to look to; you're
    providing the right kind of leadership that's going to allow us
    to retain those folks. So, thank you for the great work you do.
        General Petraeus, I want to go back to what Senator
    Lieberman was talking about, relative to meeting this goal of
    50,000 troops in Iraq by the end of August. General Odierno, as
    well as General Cucolo, has recently expressed some concern
    about the fact that we're going to need some probably buffer-
    zone-type troops, maybe a brigade combat team, in the northern
    end, because of the Iraqi National Forces and the Kurdish
    Regional Forces issue up there. Is that going to be a part of
    this plan that you're talking about, from a disbursement
    standpoint, is this going to be additional troops we're going
    to need?
        General Petraeus. No. Our goal right now, and we think
    we're on track to achieve it, is to reach the 50,000 possibly
    with some rescoping. With possibly a 7th Brigade headquarters,
    not necessarily all of the brigade's elements; we don't need
    all of those. What we need are headquarters. Headquarters
    matter enormously when you're coming down, because they are the
    engagement element that is there, and particularly in an area
    where our contributions, as honest brokers and so forth, are
    important. That is seen as an option that we're looking at. No
    decision has been made on that yet. The intent would be to do
    that within the 50,000, so it would be a rescoping of the
    force, rather than an increase.
        Senator Chambliss. Okay.
        General, two of the issues that we've had ongoing in
    Afghanistan are the rule of law, or lack thereof, as well as a
    corruption issue in the government. Can you bring us up-to-date
    on both those issues, please?
        General Petraeus. For the rule of law, there are three
    elements of that. As always, much more emphasis on not only
    training police, but also on partnering with them and insisting
    that before they actually put the uniform on, they receive
    training. This is all part of getting the inputs right and the
    concepts right. Those are among those.
        The detention side of that, the corrections side, we're
    working hard to help them. The Bureau of International
    Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) does it with the
    Afghans directly. We're doing it with an element that will
    eventually be able to take over the detention facility that we
    have at Bagram, a goal that we have for early next year; and
    that is on track so far.
        Then, the judicial leg of the three-legged stool of rule of
    law is an area that I think everyone agrees there needs to be
    greater effort. There have been additional resources and
    partnering activities carried out, with a special element in
    Kabul that has been productive; supported by the Federal Bureau
    of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), as
    well. We think that is an effort, overall, that is going to
    need to expand over time, just as we had to do in Iraq.
        With respect to corruption, President Karzai announced his
    anticorruption campaign. There have been some actions taken to
    remove corrupt individuals, and there is no question that there
    need to be more.
        Senator Chambliss. With respect to prisoners that we have
    arrested and are being detained at Bagram, the President looks
    like he's committed to moving down a path of closing
    Guantanamo. What are we going to do with all those battlefield
    combatants that we have picked up and are now being housed at
    Bagram?
        General Petraeus. What we're doing with respect to those
    that are at Bagram is preparing a plan to transition control of
    that to an Afghan corrections force that we are training,
    equipping, and will mentor and partner with. We won't just hand
    it to them and leave; we will provide continuing partnering
    with them for some period of time. That's the plan for what we
    want to do in Bagram.
        Senator Chambliss. At this point in time, are you confident
    that we're going to be able to take those prisoners who are
    comparable to the remaining prisoners that we have at
    Guantanamo, and that the Afghans are going to be able to deal
    with them a way that doesn't put them back on the battlefield,
    either in Afghanistan or potentially in some other country
    around the world, including maybe the United States?
        General Petraeus. That is certainly what we're endeavoring
    to do. That also includes rehabilitation efforts; it includes
    engaging tribal leaders and mullahs and families as we did in
    Iraq. I might note that, in Iraq yesterday, we transitioned the
    Taji detainee facility. We're now down somewhere in the 2,000
    to 2,500 number of detainees from some 27,000 that we had there
    during the height of the surge. That is quite an accomplishment
    for those of our elements that have been engaged in that,
    including at various times, Colonel Lindsey Graham, U.S. Air
    Force, but also very much the Iraqi security force elements
    that are in charge of that now. We don't just hand off to them;
    we train, we equip, we mentor, we monitor, and so forth.
        Senator Chambliss. I'm always concerned about the security
    of our country when Colonel Graham is in theater over there.
    [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. Let me give Senator Graham an extra minute
    on his time. [Laughter.]
        Senator Chambliss. He needs more than that to defend
    himself. [Laughter.]
        The glide path for troop strength in Afghanistan and the
    collateral issue of training the security forces in Iraq, are
    we on the right glide path? Are we going to be able to meet
    that goal of next year?
        General Petraeus. You're talking about Afghanistan?
        Senator Chambliss. Yes, Afghanistan.
        General Petraeus. Not in terms of the deployment of the
    additional forces, we made the commitment to the President to
    have them all there by the end of August, with the exception of
    a division headquarters that's not needed by that time, so it's
    about 99 percent of the 30,000. We are on track to do that. I
    can tell you that Transportation Command, the logisticians of
    the world, and others, have done absolutely magnificent work to
    enable that, and to also get their equipment into theater so
    that they have what they need shortly after they get there or
    beforehand. That's on track.
        We're somewhere close to the 10,000 mark of the 30,000.
    It's increased a good bit recently. That's on track.
        With respect to the ANSF, we are behind a bit on the ANA
    side, somewhere around 1,300 or so below the glide path that we
    need to be on to take us to that additional figure that we've
    talked about out in the future for them. As I mentioned, the
    combination of additional army and police will be somewhere
    around 100,000 over the next 18 months or so.
        Clearly there's going to have to be greater recruiting and
    better retention on the part of the ANA. That's the goal. It is
    an important reason that Afghan leaders have to grip this, and
    that's exactly what they have done, as I think Senator Levin
    mentioned. We also have to expand the training capacity there,
    and that's linked to the need for the additional trainers;
    there's no question about that. That is part of General
    Caldwell's plan with NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to add my welcome to Admiral Olson and General
    Petraeus and thank you very much for your leadership and your
    distinguished service to our country. Also, thank you, the men
    and women that you lead, and also their families, for the
    support that they give our troops. We're really grateful.
        General Petraeus, Afghan forces are taking an important
    part in operations. Many times, leading and even making up the
    bulk of forces involved, Afghan soldiers and police forces must
    not only expand greatly in a short amount of time, but they
    must be trained to a higher standard in order for them to gain
    the trust and confidence of the people. I believe a well-
    trained and properly-sized ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP)
    forces are a prerequisite to America leaving Afghanistan.
        My question to you, General, is, what are the most
    difficult obstacles to successfully building the ANA and ANP?
    How are we coping with these obstacles?
        General Petraeus. Senator, you're exactly right, this is a
    critical component of the overall strategy. Among the
    challenges is insufficient training capacity. Right now, with
    this authorization of the additional forces, we need to ramp up
    the capacity to train them. That's not just basic recruit
    training, but it's also branch training for the different
    elements of the military and the police, it is leader training,
    it's development of institutions, as well as just basic
    trainees.
        A challenge there, beyond needing more trainers and, in
    some cases, more facilities, is also the challenge of
    illiteracy. Illiteracy runs somewhere in the 70-or-so-percent
    range in Afghanistan, a bit less in the cities, a bit more in
    the rural areas; and obviously that's a challenge if you want
    the police to be able to read the laws that they should be
    enforcing. So, there is actually going to be a modest component
    of literacy training made part of the training plans. It will
    be brought in a bit at a time, and we'll work with this, but to
    see if that can help with the effort as we go forward, as well.
        I think that the facilities, the equipping, and the other
    components are generally surmountable. I think it comes back to
    the issues of having the numbers of trainers and then partner
    elements over time. Then dealing with a culture in which there
    is an acceptance of a degree of corruption in which tribal
    norms, and so forth, intrude as well.
        Senator Akaka. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, since
    you mentioned the culture, I believe we must grow our foreign
    language capability. There seems to be an emphasis within DOD
    to improve these capabilities so that our servicemembers can
    better perform counterinsurgency and stability operations.
    Admiral and General, what are your impressions regarding DOD's
    efforts to develop servicemembers' cultural knowledge and
    foreign-language skills to better perform traditional and
    nontraditional warfighting activities?
        Admiral?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, I applaud the efforts of the Department
    and the Services to increase language skills, and regional and
    subregional and microregional expertise along with it. I think
    that they are progressing in that regard. I think that they are
    demonstrating much more effectiveness in projecting a
    relatively shallow level of language and regional skills across
    a very broad force. We're still challenged to steep people in
    the environments, develop true expertise, native-level language
    and native-born regional skills, if you will. But, the
    discussions are taking place, and I think the latest
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the latest budget
    submission highlight those requirements.
        Senator Akaka. General Petraeus?
        General Petraeus. Senator, I also agree with the need. It's
    not just language, it's cultural awareness and appreciation, as
    well. There have been a number of initiatives pursued, some of
    them at a fairly shallow level but that is very, very helpful
    for our forces. Beyond that, there are other initiatives,
    including targeted recruiting, reenlistment bonuses,
    proficiency pays, and others, to try to demonstrate the
    Department's recognition of the importance of language
    proficiency.
        With respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, there's a program
    called the Af-Pak Hands Program, led out of the Joint Staff,
    but with both of our headquarters involved in it, and the
    Services, as well, to develop individuals who have a real
    understanding of the culture, language, history, and so on of
    Afghanistan and Pakistan and then do repetitive tours, either
    out in the region or in assignments back in the States, that
    keep them working in that particular arena.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The 96-hour rule, I understand that's under review, and
    we're getting some relief from that rule. Is that correct?
        General Petraeus. There is, Senator. The Secretary of
    Defense has approved, in a sense, a U.S. caveat that goes along
    with our transitioning of authority of U.S. Forces to NATO
    control, and it includes up to 14 days for interrogation, for
    analysis, and then, in some cases, for those who need longer
    detention, that is also available, as well.
        Senator Graham. I want to thank you for leading that
    charge, because I think our warfighters will appreciate that,
    particularly the marines down south. Has that been well-
    received by the force?
        General Petraeus. It has, sir. If you want to live your
    values, you have to set conditions in which our troopers can do
    just that.
        Senator Graham. Thank you. Yes, I'm glad you've been given
    some relief, because the old rule just didn't make a whole lot
    of sense. I think the new way forward does make sense.
        We've talked a little bit about Iran. From your point of
    view, how much time is available to the world before Iran gets
    a nuclear weapon, given what they're doing today?
        General Petraeus. Again, probably best for a closed
    session.
        Senator Graham. Gotcha.
        General Petraeus. But it has, thankfully, slid to the right
    a bit, and it is not this calendar year, I don't think.
        Senator Graham. Okay. But, it's not forever, either.
        General Petraeus. It is not infinite.
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        Now, my favorite topic: detainees. I just want to let the
    committee know that you and Doug Stone and others involved with
    Camp Bucca is probably one of the great, great success stories
    of Iraq, maybe military history, really, turning a prison
    around that was a recruiting center for the enemy and becoming
    part of the counterinsurgency operations. I just want to put on
    the record how much I appreciate what you all were able to do
    with Camp Bucca, to turn it into a model military prison that
    would rehabilitate people. Those that were irreconcilable were
    segregated out, and it is a great success story.
        But, that takes us now to Afghanistan. Detention operations
    over there are part of this surge, I would think. Is that
    correct?
        General Petraeus. They are, Senator. In fact, your former
    wingman, Brigadier General Mark Martins, is a full-time
    resident of the area of Bagram at the detention facility there,
    now called the Parwan detention facility. He is spearheading
    the effort to ensure absolutely the same kinds of initiatives
    are pursued there that you saw firsthand in Iraq, and then to
    help develop the concepts, and then implement the concepts, for
    Afghan Forces to be trained, equipped, and then take on the
    tasks there, increasingly, so that we can step back in a number
    of areas in which over time we'll need to step back. That's the
    plan for there.
        His boss, Vice Admiral Harward, out of the SEAL community,
    is the overall Task Force 435 commander. General Martins is the
    deputy. Vice Admiral Harward is overseeing the overall effort,
    also working more with our State Department colleagues, INL and
    others, to ensure that the Afghan facilities outside Kabul and
    Kandahar and other places are also conducting their business
    appropriately. There are also partnerships of the future in
    some of the other rule-of-law areas, as well.
        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        Do we have people in the Bagram confinement facility that
    are non-Afghan foreign fighters?
        General Petraeus. We do. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say, we need a closed
    session, eventually, about this, Mr. Chairman, but just put out
    for public consumption, the best I can, that we have a dilemma
    in this war; we're running out of jail space for certain
    people, and we need to find confinement facilities that work.
    Would you support sending Guantanamo Bay detainees to
    Afghanistan, to Bagram? Is that a good idea? Some have
    suggested that.
        General Petraeus. I think that, at the very least, over
    time, that's an idea that we need to go sit under a tree until
    it passes, I think.
        Senator Graham. I'll take that to be, ``That's not a good
    idea.''
        General Petraeus. If we transition this to Afghan control,
    as we should----
        Senator Graham. But, I'm talking about taking Guantanamo
    people here, and sending them to Afghanistan. Wouldn't that
    create great problems for the Afghan Government if you did
    that?
        General Petraeus. This is why I think that we need to think
    pretty hard about that. We're going to transition this facility
    to Afghan control.
        Senator Graham. Right.
        General Petraeus. We're going to do it in the relatively
    near term, in the course of a year.
        Senator Graham. These foreign fighters that we're talking
    about, are the Afghans willing to take them?
        General Petraeus. Sir, I'd defer to DOJ or others, because
    this is a big policy issue.
        Senator Graham. Isn't it fair to say, General, there are
    some prisoners in Afghanistan, that are non-Afghan, held by the
    American military, that it may be very difficult to convince
    the Afghans to take them, or it may not be wise to send them to
    the Afghans. Is that a fair summary?
        General Petraeus. Sir, you're the lawyer.
        Senator Graham. Just say yes, then. [Laughter.]
        General Petraeus. The fact is that those individuals broke
    the laws in Afghanistan.
        Senator Graham. Yes.
        General Petraeus. So, as we're transitioning to
    Afghanistan, that's an Afghan legal issue. But, I'll be happy
    to defer to the legal community.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Admiral Olson, we catch somebody in
    Yemen. Where do we send them?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, that's a question that, on so many
    levels, we would have to go into a closed session.
        Senator Graham. Okay, fair enough.
        Last question. General Petraeus, you've indicated in the
    past--and, I think, very eloquently--that Guantanamo is
    counterproductive to the war effort and, if possible, should be
    closed. Could you tell me why you believe that?
        General Petraeus. Rightly or wrongly, and probably wrongly,
    because I think that facility--and many of you have visited
    it--actually is conducted in an appropriate manner, but, at the
    very least, it has a symbol attached to it that is one that is
    used in our AOR against us. It, in some cases, is even lumped
    in with Abu Ghraib. Completely different case, there's no
    reason to do that, but again, it has become iconic in certain
    respects, and those are not helpful respects in the CENTCOM
    AOR.
        Senator Graham. One last, very simple question. Isn't it
    true that some of our allies refuse to turn prisoners over to
    us if they believe they could work their way to Guantanamo?
        General Petraeus. Sir, I don't know the answer to that
    question.
        Senator Graham. You've never had an ally tell you that,
    ``We can't turn a prisoner over to the Americans if they're
    going to go to Guantanamo?''
        General Petraeus. I'm not sure we've sent anybody to
    Guantanamo on my watch as the CENTCOM Commander.
        Senator Graham. We haven't sent anybody to Guantanamo on
    your watch?
        General Petraeus. I don't think so.
        Senator Graham. I think you're right. I think you're right.
        Okay, thanks.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being here
    with us today.
        General Petraeus, we've heard from all of the Services that
    combatant commanders have difficulty getting enough ISR. This
    budget starts to address that by adding more unmanned aerial
    vehicles (UAV), but the focus has primarily been on the number
    of aircraft and not on the personnel required to operate the
    aircraft and analyze the intelligence collected. In some
    respects, it seems to me that the easier part may be getting
    the UAVs, the tougher part may be in manning the UAV mission,
    in terms of staffing as well as intelligence. Can you give us
    your opinion on this overall picture of ISR personnel versus
    equipment?
        General Petraeus. I'd be happy to, sir. There's something
    called the F3EAD process; that is find, fix, finish, exploit,
    analyze--or assess--and disseminate (F3EAD). Of that, the
    hardware you've just talked about, what might be on a UAV, is a
    subset of that. It's a very, very critical subset.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
        General Petraeus. But without all the people that do the
    tasks associated with the F3EAD process, it is not fully
    exploited to the extent that we need to. We have actually spent
    quite a bit of time pulling back up to strategic level, when
    folks start talking procurement issues, and talking about the
    overall intelligence process that involves these various
    platforms, and a whole host of other platforms and
    capabilities. I think that the Air Force is to be commended for
    the enormous shifts that it has made, in particular, to man all
    of these different elements, and the same for the other
    Services, and the Intelligence Community (IC) more broadly.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Between the Army and the Air Force the
    fiscal year 2011 budget request includes about $1.6 billion to
    buy 77 Predator-class UAVs. By 2016, both Services project to
    have spent $10.2 billion on 499 of these UAVs. In looking at
    the unmanned platforms and the requirements for staffing to fit
    all of those requirements, is there adequate coordination
    between the Services to get that done so that we don't end up
    with a stovepiping of each branch having its own approach to
    dealing with this?
        General Petraeus. There is, sir. In the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD), there's an ISR task force that
    looks at this very broadly and analyzes it, together with the
    Services, all the way down to the tactical level and up to the
    strategic level. It is a hugely important element of what we
    need out there. Hardware without the people is not sufficient,
    and they're addressing that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. In achieving the goals, sometimes
    referred to as benchmarks, can you take two of the major
    benchmarks and give us your impression of how we're doing on
    achieving those goals--two of the most important ones?
        General Petraeus. I hate to go back to hardware, but
    hardware is one of them, because I think we've literally maxed
    out the production capacity. There's been intense scrutiny on
    where every one of these platforms are. Then there's been equal
    scrutiny on what is termed the back end. It's everything that
    allows it to stay in the sky, a line, as we call it, to stay in
    the sky for 24 hours a day, to provide the unblinking eye.
        In each of those areas, I think we've pushed industry about
    as far as it can go, is my understanding. The personnel
    pipeline has been expanded dramatically, not just in terms of
    those who pilot these unmanned systems, but also in terms of
    all of the others who are doing the exploit, analyze,
    disseminate piece.
        Fusion. Because the real breakthrough in intelligence in
    recent years has been fusion of imagery, human intelligence,
    signals intelligence, and measurement intelligence. It's been
    pulling all of that together. That's the real key.
        Senator Ben Nelson. We're in the midst of implementing a
    new missile defense plan in Europe, called Phased Adaptive
    Approach. One of the benefits of this is it allows for an
    immediate missile defense system against Iran. What impact does
    the approach have affecting regional stability in the AOR?
        General Petraeus. We're looking at the BMD in the AOR
    itself. We have made our requirements known to the Department,
    and also there's an effort to tie in what we do, because now
    it's all about shared early warning, and sharing across
    combatant commands. So, as the deployment sequences are sorted
    out, we will then tie in with our European Command brethren in
    making sure that what we see, they see, and vice versa.
        Senator Ben Nelson. An area that has more intrigue perhaps
    than others is piracy in the vicinity. How much of our time and
    our financial resources and personnel and equipment would be
    assigned to dealing with piracy in the vicinity that is within
    the AOR?
        General Petraeus. It's not a substantial portion of Naval
    Forces CENTCOM, but it is an important mission that the naval
    component of CENTCOM performs. But, it does so, together with a
    coalition maritime force, and also with European Union (EU),
    NATO, and even independent elements, including China; and
    Russia has been out there, as well. Ultimately, Senator, the
    key there is going to be maritime shipping companies taking
    more defensive measures, including up to, we think, at some
    point armed security elements.
        We have changed our tactics and so forth, as well. We've
    learned a lot about the networks that carry out the pirate
    attacks, which are really quite extraordinary; in some cases up
    to 600 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia, in very open
    boats with big, huge, 55-gallon drums of fuel throughout them,
    and their other paraphernalia.
        But, it's a very challenging mission, because we have the
    authorities relative to pirates only that police have relative
    to an alleged criminal. This is not the declared hostile enemy
    for a military force; it is a reduced set of authorities that
    we have in this arena. So, if you then detain a pirate, you are
    right back to the question of, who do you turn them over to?
    There are not authorities in Somalia that will deal with them.
    We've made arrangements with some neighboring countries in the
    region, but some of their facilities are starting to get fairly
    full.
        Senator Ben Nelson. With respect to those authorities--and
    my time is up--is that something we should be looking at, in
    terms of rules of engagement, if we're going to be patrolling
    and protecting those arenas? I realize it's very sensitive.
        General Petraeus. It is a sensitive one, sir. We've offered
    this to the policy arena. It becomes an international legal
    issue and so forth. I think the U.N. has given about the
    authorities that, generally, the international community is
    willing to provide.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Thanks to both of you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral and General, thank you very much for your
    extraordinary service to our country during some very
    interesting and dangerous times.
        General Petraeus, the advanced weapons systems designed for
    anti-access and area-denial are being proliferated through the
    world, including in the CENTCOM AOR. Iran, for example, is
    seeking to purchase one of the latest, most advanced surface-
    to-air-missile systems, the Russian S-300. I'm interested in
    what your views are with regard to the activities by the
    Iranians to pursue some of these anti-access and area-denial
    strategies.
        General Petraeus. With respect to the S-300, I think you
    know that has not been delivered. There's quite a bit of focus
    on that, whether it will be delivered, because it would
    represent a significant increase in the air and missile defense
    capability of the Iranian forces.
        There's no question that they are trying to increase their
    anti-access capabilities against maritime as well as air
    threats. It's something that we watch, and that regional
    partners and others in that area watch very closely, as well.
        Senator Thune. What's your view on this strategy by Iran,
    and how it would affect our ability to project power in the
    Middle East; specifically, in the Gulf of Iran and the Strait
    of Hormuz?
        General Petraeus. We have the most capable military in the
    world. We can deal with the threats that are there, but they
    make it more difficult. That's basically the short answer to
    that, without getting into the specifics of each type of system
    and what we have in return.
        We think, for example, that we could keep the Strait of
    Hormuz open, in the event of a crisis, if we are properly
    positioned, and so forth. But, that would be a challenging
    task. These are the kind of tasks that we have to be prepared
    to perform.
        Senator Thune. General, I wanted to get your views, too, on
    the development of the air-sea battle concept that's currently
    underway in the Pentagon. The new QDR directs the Navy and the
    Air Force to develop a joint air-sea battle concept for
    defeating adversaries with some of these anti-access and area-
    denial capabilities that I just mentioned, which, in turn, will
    help guide the development of future capabilities that will be
    needed for effective power-projection operations. Some of these
    anti-access and area-denial weapons can be low-tech weapons,
    such as mines or small boats using swarm tactics, and sometimes
    can be just as effective in creating these denied areas. Could
    you give us your views on the development of this new air-sea
    battle concept so far? Where does CENTCOM fit into the overall
    concept and development and evaluation, and ultimately, the
    implementation of that concept?
        General Petraeus. We are being consulted on that, but I
    can't really give you all that much, because it is very much in
    the early conceptual stages at this point in time. The truth
    is, our focus, as a combatant command, is on dealing with what
    we know exists right now, and could exist in the near-term with
    what we have right now, and know we'll have in the near-term.
    That really is our focus, although we do get the opportunity to
    contribute to the Services developing these concepts.
        Senator Thune. Okay. I assume they're consulting and there
    are discussions that are occurring.
        General Petraeus. Absolutely.
        Senator Thune. Do you have a view about how long-range
    strike capabilities would fit into an air-sea battle concept?
        General Petraeus. Unless we get into real specifics, I'm
    not sure where I would head with that.
        Senator Thune. Okay.
        General Petraeus. We have a variety of long-range strike
    capabilities.
        Senator Thune. Right.
        General Petraeus. Some, quite impressive. We've used some
    of those in recent years, certainly.
        Senator Thune. Okay.
        Let me ask one other question, if I might, having to deal
    with Afghanistan. It has to do with the military intelligence
    operations there. I'd direct this both to you, General, and to
    you, Admiral. Major General Michael Flynn, who's the top
    military intelligence officer in Afghanistan, published what he
    titled, ``A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in
    Afghanistan.'' The report notes that, ``Our intelligence
    apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental
    questions about the environment in which we operate and the
    people we're trying to protect and persuade.'' I would pose
    this question to both of you, do you agree with General Flynn's
    overall assessment in this report? What actions are you taking
    in response to that report, and have any of the initiatives
    that he directs in the report been carried out?
        General Petraeus. When we conducted the strategic
    assessment that's customary with a new commander coming in to a
    position like that of CENTCOM, one of the biggest of the big
    ideas was that our capacity and capability for Afghanistan and
    Pakistan was not adequate. I went to Admiral Blair early on and
    asked if he would appoint a mission manager for Af-Pak; he did
    one better, he appointed an associate deputy director of
    national intelligence for that. We then set about beefing up
    the capability and capacity there, including sending General
    Flynn there, among others to help build that. We formed a
    Center of Excellence for Af-Pak in the Joint Intelligence
    Center at CENTCOM. The Af-Pak cell has also done the same. So,
    what we've tried to do, as part of the overall effort, is just
    to build the capability that we had. This is not unlike what we
    did in Iraq, as well. In early 2007, one of the first requests
    I made, before even going to take command of Multi-National
    Force-Iraq was a substantial augmentation of our intelligence
    capability. We got that, and we've been working on providing
    that kind of augmentation in Afghanistan, as well.
        Senator Thune. Okay.
        Anything to add, Admiral?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, I think it's natural for the early
    energy of the IC to be focused on identifying the immediate
    threats to our force, but as the battlefield has evolved, the
    transition into using intelligence capabilities to better
    develop our understanding of the environment, and to seek
    opportunities for engagement, is a transition that I applaud.
        Senator Thune. Okay. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your continued service to our
    country. I'm especially proud that both of you reside in my
    State, in the wonderful area of Tampa.
        Gentlemen, last week I did a hearing for the chairman in
    our Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on the
    increased radicalization of young men and the extremist
    elements that are so bedeviling the civilized world. The
    conclusion that came out of a lot of the testimony in this
    hearing was that we could continue to do everything that the
    military is doing, just exceptionally well, particularly in the
    responsibility that you give to these young officers with the
    CERP funds, that they can go in and help a village, a
    community, and it helps us, ultimately, from our military
    objectives. We talked about how all the other agencies of
    government, working with the military in a place like
    Afghanistan--agriculture, health, digging wells, education--all
    of these things are so important, but that if you don't get
    right to it, about the radicalization of young men by
    presenting Islam as something that is not taught in the Koran,
    you're still going to have these extremists that'll go out and
    blow themselves up and threaten stability. I'd love to have
    your comments on that conclusion.
        General Petraeus. Senator, I think this really gets at the
    heart of one of the big ideas out there, which is that it takes
    much more than just military security activities, it takes
    whole-of-government approaches. Not just our Government, but
    host-nation governments and all other partners. You have to get
    at the conditions that give rise to extremism, to the kind of
    discontent and unfulfilled expectations and all of the rest of
    that, that can give rise to extremism, and you have to get at
    the issues of actual education, which in some cases creates
    fertile ground for the planting of extremist seeds. That takes
    a very comprehensive approach; it is one that some of our
    partners in the region have actually done quite well in recent
    years, if you look at some of the countries in the Arabian
    Peninsula, in particular; some others have not. But, that is
    the kind of approach that is necessary to this overall
    challenge.
        Admiral Olson. Senator, I agree with that completely. I'd
    just add that the DOD plan for addressing a violent extremist
    threat does include actions led by the military, as you laid it
    out, to conduct the traditional military kinds of actions, but
    it also lends strong military support to the whole-of-
    government, whole-of-nations approach to dealing with the
    environment.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If you are as successful as you have
    been, certainly in Iraq and, we hope, in Afghanistan, and now
    in our relations through the Pakistani Government, that they
    are successful, too--but if young men are led astray as to what
    the Koran teaches, and they're willing to go and commit
    suicide, that is going to continue to be a great hindrance to
    us. I think we have to look at this through our Northern
    Command as well, the radicalization of young men here, inside
    the United States. But, that means we have to be able to find
    clerics who know what true Islam is and are willing to go out
    and educate the ones that are being radicalized. How do we do
    that?
        General Petraeus. Sir, I think the answer has to lie,
    needless to say, in the Islamic world. It has to start there.
    It has to be Islamic leaders who identify the issue that you
    have just raised about the importance of religious leaders who
    have the courage to deny extremism as an aspect of Islam. Those
    leaders are out there; they are carrying out some of these
    initiatives. Some of their countries were threatened enormously
    by this extremism, correctly diagnosed the threat, and have
    then taken appropriate actions in the wake of that. That has to
    continue to spread to address this threat of extremism as
    you've laid it out.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right, you take a country like
    Saudi Arabia, they can deal with the radicalization problems by
    going to the tribes, which is the family of the young fellow
    that's been radicalized, and work at it that way. They've had
    some measure of success in doing that. But, in other countries
    you can't do that, you can't work through the tribes.
        I want to lay the problem out. I want to continue to work
    with both of you and with the overall problem that's in this
    country, as well.
        General Petraeus. Senator, just a follow up. Saudi Arabia
    has not just worked it through the tribes. That's been an
    important component, but they've done a very whole-of-
    government approach to this overall issue. It has been quite
    impressive for a country that, 5 years ago, was seriously
    threatened by extremists who blew up their Ministry of Interior
    building, so threatened foreign-oil workers that thousands of
    them departed, took over our consulate in Jeddah, and so forth.
    What they have done has been quite impressive.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Thanks to both of you for your service to our country. The
    more, I think, the American people see our men and women in
    uniform perform, the prouder they are of them. I continue to
    talk to them in airports and places like that, and they're just
    an inspiration to me. But, good leadership is important, it
    does make a difference, and you're providing that. Thank you so
    much.
        With regard to the training of the Afghan military and
    police, General Petraeus, your second tour in Iraq was to come
    back and train there, and you spent a year or so training a
    force. I'm sure you developed some ideas about how that ought
    to be done. It seems to me that, if you have a local defense
    force that's willing to defend their community against Taliban
    or al Qaeda, perfect training, if it's going to delay
    dramatically the ability of those people to be effective is a
    danger. I recall the al Anbar model, where we quickly got Sunni
    tribal leaders to empower their local young men to turn on al
    Qaeda, and that was an effective part of that effort.
        My question to you is, I see there's some tension in the
    State Department, or other people within the military, about
    how much training by the central government they need before
    they can be allowed to defend their home territories, and with
    a little salary and support of a good tribal leader or mayor or
    a community leader, much good can be done. Do you understand?
    Where are we? Are we demanding too much centralized training
    before we join with friendly local leaders?
        General Petraeus. We are trying to take advantage of that
    in cases where that's appropriate, Senator, and to empower, in
    some cases, with good oversight and partnering some local
    elements. It's called the Community Defense Initiative. Now I
    think there's eight or nine or so that are ongoing, these great
    Special Forces elements that are typically the ones partnering
    with them, tied into the Afghan Ministry of Interior, because
    it's very important that we not just empower warlords to stand
    up their forces, given the effort that it took to disperse and
    disarm a number of those elements.
        Really, it is the same dynamic that we had in Iraq;
    different terrain, different culture, different social makeup
    and so forth. It's every valley, as opposed to larger tribal
    areas, say, in Anbar. But in Anbar over time--and we knew this
    in the beginning--the situation in Iraq was so desperate that
    we were willing to just take individuals who were willing to
    oppose al Qaeda, and then we would figure out afterwards how we
    were going to mesh them into the greater Iraqi structure. It
    has taken us quite some time to do that, but it has happened;
    and Iraq now pays the salaries of all of the remaining so-
    called Sons of Iraq who still have not been provided jobs in
    various ministries, or what have you. A number of them have
    already transitioned in that form.
        So, that's what we have to be sensitive to here, as well;
    and recognizing that Afghanistan is a country that doesn't have
    the financial means that Iraq has. That's yet another dynamic
    that we're wrestling with.
        But, we are taking advantage of some of these opportunities
    in very careful ways in partnership with our Iraqi colleagues.
        Senator Sessions. This is a large country--25, 23 million
    people--we'll soon be drawing down our troop levels, many of
    them now are going to have to be concentrated in some of the
    more dangerous areas, and that leaves a lot of areas that we
    don't have any presence in, or very little presence, so it
    seems to me that we may be desperate enough, we may have to
    take some chances with leaders we believe are pretty good local
    leaders, and see if we can't support them. Do you agree?
        General Petraeus. Some of this is going on naturally. There
    are areas in which Afghans are the security forces, and have
    been for some time. These are areas in the north, for example,
    where we have virtually no other presence than perhaps the
    force protection elements that work with the Provincial
    Reconstruction Teams. So, there's a variety, as always; these
    endeavors are somewhat of a patchwork quilt. What you're trying
    to find is the right answer for that particular location, and
    then to try to figure out how to make it an enduring answer.
        Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, with regard to the
    shortage of trainers, perhaps our trainers can be a little less
    skilled as trainers or something? It seems to me that would be
    one area you really don't want to be short on. How long will it
    be before we can get to sufficient number of trainers there?
        General Petraeus. What we would like to see right now is
    for our NATO partners to generate the additional trainers that
    have been requested. In the theory of always having contingency
    plans, there are thoughts about how to fill that, if we have
    to, in other ways.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Olson, with regard to the CERP
    and how you train our SOF, isn't it true that we believe the
    best policy of our Government is to have a seamless
    relationship between government aid and our SOF and that we use
    all of those factors--political, financial, as well as
    military--to achieve maximum progress toward our goals?
        Admiral Olson. Senator, I'd say it's certainly true that
    the more interagency cooperation there is, the better the
    outcome typically is.
        Senator Sessions. With regard to the aid that's going
    through USAID and State Department and other things, it seems
    to me that when you have a skilled SOF team in an area, and
    they really have little or no other U.S. Government presence
    there, aren't they sort of the representative of the United
    States? Do you feel like they're empowered sufficiently,
    financially, to make commitments with those leaders to say,
    ``If you will do this, we'll do this''? If they're empowered
    greater, could they be more effective in reducing violence and
    protecting the lives of our own people?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, I'd leave the answer regarding
    sufficiency to General Petraeus, because the money flows
    through him, for the most part.
        It is true that SOF often are somewhat more remote and do
    become, if not diplomats, at least representatives of the U.S.
    presence. It is important that they be able to apply benefits
    in the regions where they live. So, within the special
    operations community resides the Active component of the civil
    affairs capability of the Army and strengthening a relationship
    between USAID and the special operations community in many of
    those regions.
        Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, do you feel like we've
    made progress in that area, and can we make more?
        General Petraeus. I think we've made progress, but I think
    we can make more. One of the important elements of General
    McChrystal's overall approach is to achieve greater unity of
    effort. That means conventional forces, special forces,
    civilian elements, and so forth, all working together to a
    common aim, trying not to duplicate efforts, and trying to do
    it in a way that is as little bureaucracy as necessary, but
    recognizing that some of that is necessary. There is a need to
    do more in this area, and that is one of General McChrystal's
    thrusts in his effort.
        Senator Sessions. I strongly support that.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, as other members of the
    committee have already said, I thank you for your service to
    our country and for your testimony today.
        I am proud that North Carolina is home to the Joint Special
    Operations Medical Training Center at Fort Bragg. All special
    joint operations combat medics are trained at this facility to
    obtain the skills they need on the battlefield. Just several
    months ago, I had the opportunity to visit this facility and
    witness the great training that's taking place there. But, I
    understand that combat medics need to have the capability to
    perform complicated procedures, often in the dark, in the
    middle of the night, and under hostile live-fire conditions in
    remote locations. I also understand that DOD sees tremendous
    value in live-tissue training, especially since they're faced
    with the task of taking these young men and women, with no
    prior medical schooling, and transforming them into combat
    trauma specialists in 26 weeks.
        While simulators may hold promise, according to OSD,
    simulators currently lack the realism and the ability to
    replicate combat wounds and the emotional stress found on the
    battlefield. Also, moreover, all patients don't bleed the same
    or react to medical procedures in the same fashion.
        Admiral Olson, can you describe the operational and the
    institutional impact we would see if live-tissue training was
    stopped?
        Admiral Olson. Senator, there are many compelling examples
    of how live-tissue training has directly contributed to the
    preservation of human life on the battlefield. I have not been
    exposed to any simulation, any technology that adequately
    substitutes for live-tissue training.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        I'm also pleased that the U.S. Army SOCOM and the Marine
    Corps SOCOM have developed a close relationship with the
    University of North Carolina (UNC). UNC recently signed a
    memorandum of understanding (MOU) with both Special Operations
    Commands. This MOU includes, but is not limited to, cultural
    awareness and linguistic training, business practices, degree-
    completion opportunities, and a senior service college
    fellowship program.
        My question is, Admiral Olson, can you provide your view on
    the educational needs of our special forces and how public and
    private universities can assist, and are you interested in
    creating a fellowship in counterterrorism and public policy for
    members of the U.S. Special Operations community?
        Admiral Olson. The way you've highlighted it really is a
    good example of how the military and the academic communities
    are interacting. The kind of relationship that we've developed
    enables us in areas where we simply don't have the capacity
    within the military forces to perform that kind of training,
    that kind of education. I certainly would support an effort to
    create similar kinds of fellowships for specialized kinds of
    education, as you've described.
        Senator Hagan. Around the Fort Bragg area, the UNC system
    has 16 public universities, with Fayetteville State, NC State,
    and Chapel Hill all very close, and then we have some excellent
    private universities, too, such as Duke University and Wake
    Forest, that do excellent work. So, I think this MOU will go a
    long way to helping, from educational needs, especially from
    the linguistics and cultural, for our men and women in the
    special operations in these special forces.
        I also wanted to talk about the Iranian influence in Iraq.
    Despite the fact that the Iraqis are increasingly expressing
    their discontent with Iranian influence in Iraq, we need to
    keep in mind that Iran has people in Iraq that it uses to drive
    a wedge between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites in Iraq, and these
    actions ignite the ethnosectarian tensions. These Iranian
    actions can undermine Iraqi security in the delicate political
    situation. How do you foresee DOD using its future relationship
    with the ISF to steer Iraq's defense strategy and acquisition
    of weapon systems in order to avoid Iranian meddling that could
    jeopardize Iraq's stability?
        General Petraeus. Senator, I don't think we'll have to
    steer at all. Iraq's leaders and its security force leaders
    share a concern about neighbors who arm, train, fund, equip,
    and direct proxy elements on their soil. They have continued to
    carry out operations against these illegal elements, and I'm
    confident that they will continue to do that in the future,
    even as we draw down. They've conducted a number of unilateral
    operations against these elements, as well.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Petraeus, Chairman Levin began early on asking
    about Iran. He mentioned the U.N. resolutions and asked about
    being more explicit about the possibility of a blockade or
    quarantine. You said that the President was explicit not to
    take the military option off the table. You recently talked
    about combining engagement with Iranian leaders, backed up by
    the threat of further sanctions. I think this is a quote of
    yours: ``That puts us in a solid foundation now to go on what
    is termed the pressure track. That's the course on which we're
    embarked now.'' You alluded to that, but if you could explain a
    little more about what the pressure track will involve, and if
    you could tell us, has anything the international community
    done so far yielded positive results? Do we have any success
    stories at all, with regard to all of these sanctions and
    options and all of the talk that we've done about Iran? Then,
    after that, I want to ask you about the dissidents in Tehran.
    But, if you'd answer the first part of it, I would appreciate
    it.
        General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, over the course of
    last year, the effort has focused on the diplomatic track. All
    the countries of the world have given Iran ample opportunity to
    discuss the issues that are out there, and to try to resolve
    them. Of course, that has not happened.
        Senator Wicker. Then it's totally unsuccessful.
        General Petraeus. That has led to what the President and
    others have termed the pressure track. That is the effort now,
    with the U.N. Security Council, other countries, and other
    organizations, as well. The EU is involved in this, countries
    do it as single actors in a variety of different ways,
    everything from on the U.S. side, Treasury designations and a
    host of financial and trade restrictions, and so forth. That is
    now about to ramp up, needless to say; that's what the
    increased pressure will result from.
        With respect to what this has done in the past, indeed some
    of these actions have resulted in the interdiction of money,
    weapons, technology, and so forth. It has limited even the
    travel of some of the leaders of the key security elements. So,
    there have been.
        Now, has it dissuaded them from the path that some analysts
    believe they're on, in terms of developing the components of a
    nuclear weapon? There may have been some initiatives that have
    made that more difficult; a good bit more difficult perhaps;
    but, I think the assessment of all that continues to march on.
        Senator Wicker. Have we squandered precious time?
        General Petraeus. I don't think so. In fact, I think that
    this has given us a very firm foundation from which to work as
    we transition to the pressure track. No one can say that Iran
    has not had every opportunity made possible to them, including
    the reaching out of the open hand, and they have not grasped
    that. The response has been the opposite. Again, that provides
    that now no one can say that the United States and the other
    countries of the world have not given that every opportunity.
    Therefore, I think, that translates into the greater
    possibility that the pressure track could come up with
    meaningful actions.
        Senator Wicker. The actions on the pressure track will have
    to be agreed to by the United States and a number of our allies
    or would it be solely American action?
        General Petraeus. It depends which action you are talking
    about. If you're talking about U.N. Security Council
    resolutions, it obviously has to be the Perm-5 and then there
    have to be nine total members. So, either abstention or for, in
    the case of the Perm-5, and then nine total votes in the
    affirmative, as I understand it. But, I'd be happy to defer to
    the State Department on that.
        Senator Wicker. How public have we been about what form
    these actions might take?
        General Petraeus. Again, I'd defer to the State Department
    on that. A lot of this is understandably, I think, going on
    behind closed doors; that's how that is generally best pursued.
        Senator Wicker. Okay, well, you may want to defer to the
    State Department on this next question.
        General Petraeus. Okay.
        Senator Wicker. But, I do want to ask it. It's been said in
    this committee, and it's been said on the floor, we should be
    showing our moral support for the reformers in Iran, for the
    people who are willing to take to the street and stand up and
    risk their lives and safeties. If you were a reformer in
    Tehran, what you would be hoping the United States would do? Do
    we need to send some signals as to the limits of what can be
    expected of us, as we try to give some sort of moral support,
    but we also try to be realistic about what we can do to help
    these people who are striving for freedom and democracy?
        General Petraeus. As you suggested, Senator, with respect,
    I think that's one for the State Department and the folks who
    pull together all the different strands of this policy, because
    I think just talking about one element of this without talking
    about the others in a comprehensive approach could be
    misleading.
        Senator Wicker. All right.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Following up on some of the sanction stuff on Iran, the
    Iran Sanctions Act was passed 14 years ago, and we've never
    enforced it. Recently there has been some attention given to
    this. One example, of many examples, is a very large South
    Korean engineering firm that entered into a contract with Iran
    to upgrade oil fields in Iran, in 2007. It was a $700 million
    contract. In 2009, the U.S. Army gave the same company a
    contract for $100 million to build housing for our Army in
    South Korea. Then, just a few months after that, they entered
    into another contract with Iran.
        I understand that we have not enforced this law because our
    European allies squawked about it when it was first passed.
    Then, when we tried to enforce it with a company in Japan,
    Japan squawked and said, ``you didn't enforce it against the
    European countries.'' Brazil, we just gave a huge export/import
    loan to, in an effort to try to get some oil out of Brazil, as
    opposed to all of it being in the Middle East. Then, what do
    they do? They turn around and have Ahmadinejad come to town and
    kiss and hug.
        I'm a little worried that our talk of sanctions has been
    too much talk, and that we haven't even followed up within our
    military contracts to make sure we're not contracting with
    people who are doing business with Iran, especially in the oil
    and gas and the petroleum sector.
        Do you have any take on that, General Petraeus, and whether
    or not this is something that is being driven through the State
    Department, as opposed to whether or not the military is taking
    a look at their contractors and whether or not we're doing
    business with the wrong people?
        General Petraeus. I honestly don't. I'm not in the
    contracting business. I don't know what it takes to get someone
    on a blacklist, where they can't compete for a contract, and
    what that process is, and why, for example, a particular
    country that has done something in Iran is not on that list.
    It's not my area of expertise. My apologies.
        Senator McCaskill. I'll continue to follow up on it, but I
    think it's maybe one of the reasons Iran is not taking us as
    seriously as they should. Because we talk about the carrot and
    stick, and using the stick, and frankly, I don't think we've
    used the stick very effectively in a law that's been on our
    books for 14 years.
        Let me talk also a bit about the size of the military. You
    and I had a chance to talk after I got back from Afghanistan,
    but I want to put this on the record, Mr. Chairman, because I
    think it's important that this be talked about, the size of the
    army we're building and Afghanistan's ability to sustain that
    military. If you're over there, the Afghans say that they want
    400,000 troops. I think we're at the number 300,000 troops, and
    there has been no indication that we're going to build an army
    above 300,000. But, even if we keep it at 300,000, General
    Caldwell briefed me that that's going to be somewhere around
    $5.5 billion to sustain that level of military in Afghanistan.
    Their gross domestic product, depending on which number you
    look at, is somewhere between $10 and $12 billion. I'd like to
    put on the record your response to that problem and whether or
    not we have signed up for the American people to do the heavy
    lifting, in terms of sustaining the Afghanistan military for
    decades to come?
        General Petraeus. I'm not aware of anyone signing up to do
    that for decades to come, but clearly we are helping
    Afghanistan build a military force to which we can transition
    tasks so that our forces can go home. It's a lot more expensive
    to maintain our forces in Afghanistan than it is to maintain
    even the comparable number of Afghan forces that might be able
    to replace our forces in that country. In a business sense, I
    think there is some logic to continuing to support--although
    obviously no commitments have been made in that regard--but
    continuing to support, over time, a substantial ANSF, and
    indeed, one that they will not be able to pay all the expenses
    for over that time.
        Senator McCaskill. I did notice much more of an
    international presence there than I did in Iraq, and I guess we
    can continue to hope that our friends in NATO will step up,
    although so far while they're there and they're making a bigger
    commitment, in terms of monetary support, we are still
    shouldering the vast majority of that. Isn't that correct?
        General Petraeus. It is. You should note that there are
    some very important non-NATO nations, as well. Japan, I think,
    I would single out as providing quite substantial resources
    also.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the radical terrorist group in
    Pakistan--I know this is more of a priority for the Pacific
    Command than your command--but all indications are that one of
    the very destructive bombs that went off recently in Kabul was
    LeT. As we've made great progress against the Taliban in
    Afghanistan and the Taliban in Pakistan and the al Qaeda that
    we have successfully targeted and gone after, I'm worrying that
    this organization is growing in strength. I know it's tricky
    because of the historical connection between LeT and the
    Pakistani military and their government, because of the Kashmir
    area, but I do want to sound an alarm that I'm concerned about
    LeT and whether or not it is high enough on our priority list.
    Are we putting enough pressure on Pakistan? They've responded,
    I think, well in terms of their military going after terrorism
    in their country now, but I wonder if we're pushing hard enough
    on that front.
        General Petraeus. It certainly has been a source of
    dialogue. The real issue in this regard was the bombing in
    Mumbai, which by all accounts was carried out by LeT. I think
    different elements of our Government have had quite a bit of
    interaction with the Government of Pakistan over this.
    Obviously, India has expressed its concerns, as well.
        There's no question that there are elements in Pakistan
    that have not yet been the focus of the Pakistani
    counterinsurgency efforts, but there's also no disputing the
    fact that the Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps have a lot of
    short sticks and a lot of hornet nests right now in the
    Northwest Frontier Province and the FATA. They are continuing
    those campaigns. They are not just holding what they have; they
    do continue their efforts. I know what the plan is, and it is
    impressive. They've taken very tough losses in the course of
    this, as has their civilian population.
        Senator McCaskill. I know I'm out of time. Let me briefly
    say there's some good news. Premature to say how effective it's
    going to be. But, compared to when I went to Iraq on contract
    oversight, the systems that are in place in Afghanistan are
    much better. I want to compliment you and General McChrystal
    and everyone for realizing that we had the wild west of
    contracting in Iraq, in terms of logistical support and a lot
    of other contracting issues. I think we have the structures in
    place now. Now, it remains to be seen whether those structures
    are going to provide the oversight that we need, but at least
    we have the right people gathered in the right rooms.
        I have some significant questions about CERP, big projects
    and continuity, but I'm out of time. So, what I will do, Mr.
    Chairman, is I will make those questions for the record. I know
    67 percent of the CERP money is going to projects over
    $500,000.
        General Petraeus. Actually, Senator, I need to give you
    numbers on that, because the average project in fiscal year
    2010 is somewhere around $20,000 per project in Iraq, and
    $40,000 in the other country. Or is it vice versa? I'm looking
    at my J8. Anyway, the average is somewhere around $30,000 this
    year.
        Senator McCaskill. So we're pulling back down from----
        General Petraeus. We have pulled way down.
        Senator McCaskill. That's great.
        General Petraeus. I think I mentioned that in my opening
    statement, that I retain approval authority for the $1 million
    projects and above. I've only approved one of those in quite
    some time. That's right.
        Senator McCaskill. I knew that there was a bunch of them
    because some of the folks I talked to over there talked about
    the continuity and the problem as units would rotate out, the
    big CERP projects that started before, they didn't want to
    finish those, because they weren't going to get credit for
    them, they wanted to start ones that they thought they could
    finish on their watch and some stuff was sitting on the shelf,
    and so forth.
        General Petraeus. I think we have good oversight and a
    rational approach. We're trying to find that right balance
    between not too much bureaucracy, but enough, and not such high
    level that they're doing USAID's work instead of USAID. I'll
    pass on your comments to those who are in the contracting
    business. We do try to be a learning organization, and we've
    learned a great deal about contracting over the course of the
    last decade or so.
        Senator McCaskill. Over the course of the last 3 years.
        General Petraeus. That, too.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, General. I'll get my
    questions to the record.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Petraeus, for that
    continuing effort at oversight. It's very important to this
    committee.
        We want to especially thank Senator McCaskill for her
    special efforts in this regard. They're very, very important to
    the citizenry of our country.
        Senator Brown.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to first thank you for your warm welcome. I
    appreciate your recognition of my service.
        Just to correct the record a little bit, General and
    Admiral, I started out as an enlisted man and was branch-
    qualified as an infantry officer at Benning and then quarter
    master, now I'm a Judge Advocate General (JAG) and a head trial
    defense attorney in Massachusetts, so I have some knowledge
    that I don't think the average attorney understands, just being
    a traditional JAG.
        One of the things that Senator Graham was commenting on
    that I have great concern about, because when I hear about the
    guardsmen serving from Massachusetts and throughout New
    England, they are confused a little bit as to how they treat
    folks when they are captured. I also want to go on the same
    vein. I'm concerned about how we treat the detainees and where
    we send them. What rights are they actually given? Then, do we
    send them to Afghanistan, do we keep them where they're
    captured, do we bring them to U.S. soil, do we get them to
    Guantanamo? I know I'm new here, but, being in the military,
    these are the questions that my troops are passing on to me
    when I'm representing them. If there's any insight you can give
    as to where we're heading with that, or if it's an offline
    conversation, I'm all ears, because I think it's creating
    indecision with our soldiers as to what to do with the folks
    when they're captured.
        General Petraeus. Senator, let me talk about that, because
    I don't think there's indecision in Iraq or Afghanistan, and
    I'm not aware of us detaining people anywhere else in quite
    some time. When someone's detained in Iraq or Afghanistan,
    there are quite clear procedures that are done. By the way, we
    don't detain virtually any at all in any significant number in
    Iraq at this point. The operations are generally led by ISF,
    and they are now warrant-based there. We believe in the rule of
    law, and we are helping the Iraqis. They have taken the lead in
    terms of making arrests based on warrants, except in the cases
    where obviously someone has threatened our soldiers directly or
    you have a case of self-defense or an immediate threat
    response.
        In Afghanistan, as I explained to Senator Graham, we have
    clear rules. Now, they have recently been implemented for all
    of our forces that have transitioned to NATO, and we are able
    to hold them for 14 days, if necessary, and can send them to
    Bagram if they hit a certain category after that. Then, we're
    working hard at Bagram over time to transition that facility
    and the tasks of running it to our Afghan partners so that over
    time that transition can take place.
        But, we've worked very hard, because of the idea that you
    have to create conditions in which your soldiers can live our
    values. One of those values has to be, if someone puts his
    hands in the air, you detain him instead of shoot him. But, if
    you think he's going to be back on the street within 96 hours,
    or something like that, because of a catch-and-release policy,
    then it becomes much more difficult to live your values. We
    take that very seriously. We've worked this very hard. As
    Senator Graham highlighted, this policy has gone into place.
        Senator Brown. There's more in Afghanistan than Iraq. I
    know in Iraq that that's been settled somewhat. But,
    Afghanistan, I know there was a transition period, and there
    had been some concerns. I'll speak to Senator Graham about some
    additional questions that he and I were discussing, and maybe
    we can, offline, touch base.
        But, I am chairing a hearing on Afghan police training next
    week, and I'm concerned and wondering if the mission has lagged
    as it's been divided between the State Department and DOD.
        General Petraeus. I think, candidly, that there's a reason
    that we have, over time, transitioned tasks from traditional
    executive branch elements to the military, and that is because
    we have more capacity and capability. I stood up the Multi-
    National Security Transition Command-Iraq, and, over time, we
    took on more and more responsibility because the capacity of
    our partners in some of these areas. There's a bunch of heroes
    in INL, but they are armies of one, in many cases.
        Now, we are going to transition the police task back to the
    State Department in Iraq, and we believe that that process can
    work. But, with respect to Afghanistan, we have taken on more
    and more of that, and we are now going to oversee the training
    aspect of that, as you probably know.
        Senator Brown. Great. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Admiral.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.
        We thank you both. We will have a hearing on Iran. With
    whoever our witnesses will be, and they're not yet determined,
    we will have an executive session at that time, taking up some
    of the questions that you left for the executive session. It's
    possible that some of our questions for the record to you may
    relate to Iran, that you could perhaps answer, even though you
    won't be there, in a classified way for that executive session.
        General Petraeus, you have spent a lot of time on the DADT
    issue, thinking about it, and we would welcome your statement
    for the record, but we leave it up to you. Usually we don't do
    that, we just simply ask people for a statement for the record,
    but in this case, I think I'll just simply say we would welcome
    that statement for the record, leaving it up to you as to
    whether you would prefer to do it that way, which means it
    would be immediately made public or whether you'd prefer to
    give your thoughts in a different form at a different time. We
    didn't give you that opportunity, because of our schedule here,
    to do that. So, that's something we would just leave up to your
    good judgment. But, we would very much welcome that statement,
    and if so, then it would be made public at that time.
        General Petraeus. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Just again, Admiral, thank you so much for
    your service. All of us feel very deeply about the men and
    women that you command and that you work with. We thank them
    through you.
        We will stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb
                      contracting in iraq and afghanistan
        1. Senator Webb. General Petraeus, I have long been concerned with
    the systemic problems related to wartime-support contracting in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, including continued instances of waste, fraud, and
    abuse revealed by inspector general investigations and the Commission
    on Wartime Contracting. A March 13, 2010, New York Times article
    reported that investigators have opened more than 50 new reconstruction
    fraud cases in Iraq in the last 6 months. A March 17, 2010, Defense
    News article stated contractors still lack sufficient oversight by
    trained personnel.
        The Commission on Wartime Contracting's June 2009 report stated the
    effectiveness of contractor support of expanded U.S. operations in
    Afghanistan is compromised by the failure to apply lessons learned in
    Iraq. The Commission later reported in its September 2009 special
    report that weak control systems must be strengthened and defense
    agencies must improve their oversight of contractor business systems to
    reduce waste, fraud, and abuse.
        What specific actions has U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) taken to
    address the Commission on Wartime Contracting's issues of immediate
    concern and other time-sensitive recommendations contained in its June
    2009 report?
        General Petraeus. CENTCOM has taken several actions to address the
    Commission's findings and recommendations from the June 2009 report.
    CENTCOM has transferred several lessons learned from Iraq to
    Afghanistan aimed at reducing fraud, waste, and abuse. We've formed the
    Armed Contractor Oversight Division (ACOD), which implements the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) ACOD policies and procedures, and
    oversees Private Security Contractors (PSCs). We're transitioning Joint
    Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) to a Joint Theater
    Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) for better synchronization and
    efficiency of contracting in the theater. We're applying acquisition
    strategies that have increased firm fixed-price competitive contract
    awards with reduced reliance on the Logistics Civil Augmentation
    Program (LOGCAP). JCC-I/A continues to refine its processes by
    leveraging Rock Island Arsenal on contracts that are complex, resource
    intense, and require a detailed Source Selection process.
        CENTCOM and DOD have improved Contracting Officer Representative
    (COR) resourcing and training. Defense Acquisition University (DAU)
    initiated online and resident courses to train our CORs, and the
    Department of Army directed deploying units to identify and train their
    CORs prior to deployment. The number of CORs in Afghanistan has
    dramatically increased with fill rates now of over 90 percent. The CORs
    are better trained not only in general contract management, but are
    specifically selected for their technical expertise to oversee
    contractors performing services such as food preparation, water
    purification, and fuels distribution.
        We are teaming with the Procurement Fraud Task Force to combat
    corruption, and we are consulting with Contracting/Procurement and
    Financial Management experts to strengthen the business environment
    within the area of responsibility (AOR) and enhance resource control.

        2. Senator Webb. General Petraeus, what assurances and examples of
    strengthened contracting oversight can you provide that demonstrate the
    lessons learned in contracting in Iraq are being applied in Afghanistan
    to reduce the incidence of waste, fraud, and abuse?
        General Petraeus. CENTCOM transferred lessons learned from Iraq to
    Afghanistan specifically aimed at reducing fraud, waste, and abuse.
    We've formed the ACOD, which implements DOD's ACOD policies and
    procedures and oversees PSCs. We're transitioning JCC-I/A to a JTSCC
    for better synchronization and efficiency of contracting in theater.
    We're applying acquisition strategies that have increased firm fixed-
    price competitive contract awards with reduced reliance on LOGCAP. JCC-
    I/A continues to refine its processes by leveraging Rock Island Arsenal
    on contracts that are complex, resource intense, and require a detailed
    Source Selection process. This allows the contracting officer on the
    ground to pay attention to more tactical contractor oversight.
        CENTCOM and DOD have improved COR resourcing and training. DAU
    initiated online and resident courses to better train our CORs, and the
    Department of Army directed deploying units to identify and train their
    CORs prior to deployment. The number of CORs in Afghanistan has
    dramatically increased with fill rates now over 90 percent. The CORs
    are trained not only in general contract management, but are
    specifically selected for their technical expertise to oversee
    contractors performing services such as food preparation, water
    purification, and fuels distribution. Defense Contract Management
    Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) have also
    increased the number of personnel in Afghanistan to improve contract
    oversight.
        CENTCOM has ordered the use of the Synchronized Predeployment and
    Operational Tracker (SPOT) reporting for contractors performing valid
    work in the CENTCOM AOR. This system will increase the quality and
    reliability of contractor data thereby avoiding instances such as
    fraudulent duplication of numbers on task order contracts and over-
    provisioning of DOD food and supplies based on ineligible contracting
    personnel.
        To facilitate the integration of contractors when defining the
    strategic plan for future CENTCOM operations, documents such as the
    National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review
    (QDR) will feature a greater emphasis on contractor requirements. Other
    Field Manuals, DOD Instructions, and new Joint Doctrine support the
    growing importance of integrating contract support into operational
    planning.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
                     commanders' emergency response program
        3. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, while the Commanders'
    Emergency Response Program (CERP) is considered an essential tool for
    General McChrystal and other senior commanders on the ground in
    Afghanistan, there have been problems with the program. Since 2004,
    Congress has provided $1.6 billion to DOD for CERP in Afghanistan for
    programs primarily designed to fund small-scale projects to meet urgent
    humanitarian and reconstruction needs at the community and provincial
    levels. For fiscal year 2011, DOD has requested $1.3 billion in CERP
    funds DOD-wide, but about $1 billion of that money will go to
    Afghanistan. A May 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
    recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct CENTCOM to evaluate
    workforce requirements and ensure adequate staff to administer CERP and
    establish training requirements for CERP personnel administering the
    program. GAO further recommended that the Secretary of Defense and the
    Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
    collaborate to create a centralized project-development database for
    use by U.S. Government agencies in Afghanistan, including establishing
    specific milestones for its development and implementation. What is
    CENTCOM doing to train CERP managers in the types and scale of projects
    that they will handle in Afghanistan?
        General Petraeus. The entire CERP community has worked diligently
    to strengthen the oversight and training of personnel who administer
    CERP in theater. Commanders in theater, working with Army CENTCOM, have
    improved in-theater training. In September 2009, I wrote to the Chief
    of Staff of the Army and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and
    requested that they develop and implement pre-deployment training for
    all who will have CERP responsibilities. General Casey directed that
    units must identify and train all key CERP personnel prior to
    deployment. The Army and Marine Corps have coordinated on training
    materials and they have made the CERP curriculum available for
    individuals to access world wide.

        4. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, which of GAO's
    recommendations from the May 2009 report have been implemented?
        General Petraeus. The May 2009 GAO Audit of CERP in Afghanistan
    contained three broad recommendations for the Department to consider.
    Two of the recommendations address sufficient staffing and training for
    administering CERP. The Army and CENTCOM have worked to implement both
    recommendations and will continue to evaluate progress. The third
    recommendation requested the Department and Administrator of USAID
    collaborate on a centralized project development CERP database. DOD's
    Business Transformation Agency is working to develop an unclassified
    interface that will allow USAID to access CERP data via the World Wide
    Web.

        5. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, what is the status of the
    creation of the common USAID/DOD database to track projects?
        General Petraeus. DOD's Business Transformation Agency is working
    to develop an unclassified interface that will allow USAID to access
    CERP data via the World Wide Web. The most recent process improvements
    can be obtained from the Business Transformation Agency.

        6. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how will DOD's current
    review of CERP affect the timeline of the implementation of the GAO
    recommendations?
        General Petraeus. I do not see the current DOD review of CERP
    affecting the implementation timeline for recommendations contained in
    the May 2009 GAO audit report. The Department has focused on
    strengthening the oversight and management of CERP. All recognize a
    need for continued program assessment and the potential of additional
    process improvements.

        7. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how many CERP projects does
    CENTCOM currently have that are over $500,000 and how many are under
    $5,000?
        General Petraeus. For the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, Iraq
    and Afghanistan reported a total of 13 projects over $500,000 and 1,432
    projects under $5,000.

        8. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how are those figures
    affected by micro-loans and what is the average project size when the
    micro-loans are subtracted?
        General Petraeus. USAID oversees the micro-loans program. DOD CERP
    does not allow micro-loans, but it does allow micro-grants. The desired
    goal of micro-grants is to stimulate economic activity that supports
    stability operations with a focus on areas underserved by other micro-
    credit and assistance programs. The average project size, after
    subtracting micro-grants, in fiscal year 2010 (first quarter) CERP
    Report from Iraq and Afghanistan is $47,200. During the same timeframe,
    there were 280 micro-grants issued out of 1,445 CERP projects.

        9. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how are large-scale CERP
    projects vetted within the greater framework of reconstruction in
    Afghanistan to ensure their utility and prevent duplication or unneeded
    projects?
        General Petraeus. CERP projects greater than $1 million are vetted
    through review boards at several levels within the chain of command
    before a recommendation for approval is forwarded to CENTCOM. The
    review board includes members from interagency groups (USAID,
    Department of Agriculture) and U.S. Embassy personnel to prevent
    duplication and to ensure projects are inline with the strategic goals
    for Afghanistan. Sustainment of projects is coordinated through
    Memoranda of Agreement with donor nations, nongovernmental
    organizations, or Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
    (GIRoA) officials.

        10. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, what is the largest CERP
    project being conducted in Afghanistan, who is overseeing it, and how
    long will it take to implement?
        General Petraeus. As of 16 Mar 10, the largest fiscal year 2010
    CERP project being conducted in Afghanistan is the $9.5 million Spin
    Boldak road project. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Afghanistan
    Engineering District is providing the program management and oversight
    for this project. It is estimated the project will take 8 months to
    complete.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
                                  afghanistan
        11. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, some experts have suggested
    increasing the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to as large as
    250,000 and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to 150,000, respectively.
    What is the planned number of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),
    and is it sufficient for a country the size of Afghanistan?
        General Petraeus. The planned numbers for the ANSF are listed in
    the following table:

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   10 FEB 10    31 OCT 10      JUL 11       OCT 11
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Afghan National Army........................................     104,296      134,000      159,000      171,600
    Afghan National Police......................................      98,256      109,000      123,000      134,000
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
      Total Afghan National Security Forces.....................     202,561      243,000      282,000      305,600
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        We will conduct an assessment in 2011 to determine if these planned
    numbers are sufficient to protect the population, which is essential in
    conducting counterinsurgency operations.

        12. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, Afghanistan cannot
    financially support its security forces. Raising additional security
    forces or increasing the pay of the security forces will require the
    United States or other international donors to absorb this cost. What
    are your best estimates on the cost and for how long the ANSF will have
    to be financially supported by the United States, the North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO), or other international partners?
        General Petraeus. The annual programmed cost to maintain the ANSF
    at 305,600 personnel is projected to cost $6.2 billion. Our ultimate
    goal of the ANSF at a combined strength (ANA/ANP) of 400,000 personnel
    has an estimated annual cost of $10.3 billion. The need for the ANSF to
    be supported by the international community will continue into the
    foreseeable future. The growth of Afghanistan's economy is the key to
    self-sustainment of the ANSF.

        13. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, what attempts are being made
    to enable the government in Afghanistan to bring in revenue?
        General Petraeus. This question is best answered by my colleagues
    within the State Department. I respectfully refer you to the
    ``Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy'' which is a
    comprehensive and collaborative document updated in late February 2010,
    authored by the State Department. According to the International
    Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and other authorities, internally-
    derived revenues from Afghanistan have steadily increased since 2005.
    Looking only at 2008 and 2009, revenues from taxes increased from $317
    million to $414 million; customs revenues from $270 million to $347
    million; and non-tax revenues $199 million to $227 million.

        14. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, helping to rebuild the Afghan
    Government, economy, and security forces, while helping the Pakistan
    people improve their economy, government, and security, is likely to be
    a significant effort over many years. How long do you expect the United
    States to have significant levels of troops in Afghanistan and be
    providing significant amounts of funding for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    and how much do you expect this to cost?
        General Petraeus. I expect the United States to have significant
    troop levels in Afghanistan for the next few years. Beginning in July
    2011, as the President stated in his 1 December 2009 speech, we will
    begin a withdrawal of our forces. This will be a conditions-based
    withdrawal, and the rate at which we will withdraw will be determined
    by the readiness of the ANSF to protect their population, and by the
    level of governance established by the Afghan Government. While we have
    significant troop levels, we must continue to provide funding to enable
    our allies and partners to support our efforts in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan. Due to our conditions-based withdrawal, we are unable to
    estimate the cost because there are too many unknowns.

        15. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, what should we expect in
    terms of NATO's and international partners' contributions and length of
    commitment to the region?
        General Petraeus. NATO and our international partners are currently
    providing significant levels of support for the war in Afghanistan,
    with total troop strength totaling approximately 44,500. Almost all of
    the troop contributing nations have expressed their commitment to stay
    in Afghanistan until our objectives have been attained. Of the 43 troop
    contributing nations, each sets its own timeline for troop rotations,
    and force increases or decreases. The Netherlands has announced the
    withdrawal of combat forces no later than the end of 2010, and Canada
    has announced its withdrawal in 2011. All of the other nations remain
    committed for the foreseeable future.

        16. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, initially, there was a 400
    civilian personnel requirement to assist with efforts in Afghanistan.
    What is the requirement now?
        General Petraeus. This might be more appropriately addressed by the
    Department of State (DOS), but as far as the reports I have seen, the
    requirement, currently in staffing now, is over 1,000 U.S. Government
    civilians.

        17. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, please provide an update on
    the status of civilians supporting the efforts in Afghanistan.
        General Petraeus. While I respectfully defer to our partners at DOS
    and USAID as the leads, let me share what I know from reports I see
    from the department and agency. As of 1 April, approximately 1,000 U.S.
    Government civilians are in Afghanistan, more than triple the level
    from a year ago. They are assigned both at the U.S. Embassy and out in
    the field and are integrated at every level with the International
    Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan (USFOR-
    A) to include at the Regional Commands, Brigade Task Forces, Provincial
    Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Agricultural Development Teams (ADT),
    District Support Teams (DST), and numerous interagency organizations
    such as the Border Management Task Force. Within that overall figure,
    we count some 350 civilians in the field, up from 67 a year ago. They
    live and work along side their military counterparts in the same field
    conditions and level of danger. I would expect civilians to deploy in
    growing numbers to Afghanistan in the coming year as a critical
    component of the President's Afghanistan strategy. According to the
    requests we have seen from Embassy Kabul, staffing would increase by an
    additional 20 to 30 percent by the end of 2010 and 40 to 50 percent by
    the end of 2011.

        18. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, what are the plans to enhance
    coordination of civilian, military, and international efforts in
    Afghanistan?
        General Petraeus. The strategy for enhanced coordination in
    Afghanistan is detailed in the U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-
    Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (August 2009). The
    Plan represents the collaborative efforts of all the U.S. Government
    departments and agencies operating in Afghanistan and the range of
    different equities, resources, and approaches. It is based on close
    collaboration with the ISAF as well as the United Nations Assistance
    Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and partner nations to build effective
    civilian and military mechanisms for integrated assistance. The Plan's
    most important component is a strong partnership with the GIRoA to
    build the capacity needed to provide Afghanistan with a stable future.
        In April 2010, we completed a civilian-military coordination
    conference in Kabul, Afghanistan. Participants came from across the
    interagency and the international communities including USFOR-A, ISAF,
    the U.S. and partner nation embassies, and key GIRoA ministries. The
    primary objectives of the civilian-military coordination conference
    were program integration between US Embassy and USFOR-A/ISAF, and
    improved coordination between GIRoA, U.S. Embassy, ISAF, UNAMA, and the
    rest of the international community. The interagency civilan-military
    working groups established to support the civilan-military coordination
    conference will endure to ensure continuing coordination and
    integration of our civilan-military efforts.

        19. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, to your knowledge, have there
    been any civilian assistance requests made to other allied nations?
        General Petraeus. I do not know of any civilian assistance requests
    made to other allied nations. These requests would normally be handled
    by NATO and submitted to allied nations. Since U.S. forces are
    operating in support of ISAF, these requests are not usually routed
    through CENTCOM.

                                      iraq
        20. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, the Iraqi Security Forces
    (ISF) are not yet fully capable of protecting themselves from external
    threats. What steps are you taking to enable Iraq to defend itself from
    external threats?
        General Petraeus. Our U.S. forces in Iraq continue work on
    improving the ISF capabilities through increased training and
    equipping. The ISF continue to make progress towards attaining the
    Minimum Essential Capability (MEC) necessary to defend Iraq's
    sovereignty on land, at sea, and in the air.
        The Iraqi Army continues progress toward MEC but will not achieve a
    foundation for defense against external threats before December 2011
    due to equipment procurement timelines and subsequent training
    requirements. Specifically, equipping, training, and combined arms
    integration of the M1A1 fleet, artillery units, and key mechanized
    enablers will not be complete prior to December 2011.
        The Iraqi Navy is on track to achieve MEC by December 2011,
    although there are risks if shortfalls in manning, C4ISR, maintenance,
    and infrastructure are not adequately addressed in coming months. The
    Iraqi Navy will assume responsibility for protection of the oil
    platforms in 2011; however, the importance of these oil terminals to
    the Iraqi economy requires an even higher level of capability. A
    requirement for a regional presence that can respond to emergencies in
    support of the Iraqi Navy as it matures from MEC to a fully capable
    force is anticipated.
        The Iraqi Air Force is on the path to achieving MEC by the end of
    2011 in all mission categories except airspace control and fixed-wing
    airlift. Specifically, multi-role fighter, long-range radar, and C-130J
    delivery and fielding will not be complete prior to December 2011. The
    Iraqi Air Force's December 2011 goal is the development of a capability
    to support ISF counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and have an initial
    air sovereignty capability in place. Delayed execution of the Iraqi Air
    Force Service Plan and lack of funding for acquisitions, accessions,
    contract logistics support, and sustainment of current fleet all
    present obstacles to achieving the capability to conduct minimal air
    sovereignty operations by December 2011.
        Although the ISF are not on track to achieve full MEC for external
    security by the end of 2011, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
    will continue to support Iraqi efforts toward achieving that goal
    through training and equipping.

        21. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, will there be additional
    military cooperation after January 1, 2012, to support the ISF?
        General Petraeus. We anticipate additional military cooperation
    will continue after January 1, 2012, through an Office of Security
    Cooperation-Iraq under Title 22 authorities. Support provided to the
    ISF will continue with training and equipping programs that contribute
    to a mutually beneficial bilateral security relationship with the
    Government of Iraq from 2012 and beyond.

        22. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, how are those efforts to
    support the ISF reflected?
        General Petraeus. Efforts to support the ISF after January 1, 2012,
    will be provided through an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq under
    Title 22 authorities. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq will
    directly support DOS efforts with continued security training and
    equipping programs for the ISF. Planning efforts are still ongoing to
    adequately define the size and composition necessary to fully accept
    the responsibilities essential to continued ISF development.

        23. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, what type of equipment is the
    United States transferring to the Iraqis and what impact will the
    transfer of that equipment have on the availability of equipment for
    our forces?
        General Petraeus. Equipment being transferred is generally
    categorized as either excess or non-excess. Excess equipment is that
    which has been determined to have no required use by U.S. forces, as
    such, its transfer has no impact on equipping U.S. forces. Excess
    equipment comprises a wide range from office equipment to machinery.
    Non-excess equipment comprises major end items which have been
    identified as essential to Iraq's MEC. The Services have determined
    that transferring the non-excess equipment identified in Iraq's MEC
    presents no adverse impact to equipping U.S. forces.

        24. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, how much revenue does oil
    bring to Iraq?
        General Petraeus. The Government of Iraq relies on oil exports for
    approximately 91 percent of its revenue. Of the total revenues planned
    for fiscal year 2010, approximately $49 billion is attributed to oil
    exports. This is based on 2.1 million barrels/day at an average market
    price of $62.50/barrel. Additional revenue of approximately $4.9
    billion in revenue is expected to come from a combination of public
    service fees, personal and corporate taxes, customs duties, interest,
    and profit from state-owned enterprises.

        25. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, with billions of dollars in
    oil revenue, how much longer will the United States provide financial
    assistance to Iraq?
        General Petraeus. The length of time the United States will provide
    financial support to Iraq is uncertain because it depends on numerous
    factors such as, but not limited to, oil production, oil prices, and
    budgetary outlays. Iraq is dependent on oil revenue for 85 percent of
    government funding and annual budgets are vulnerable to significant oil
    price fluctuations. In 2009, Iraq's budget contained a 34 percent
    deficit and relied on bond financing, World Bank loans, and an IMF
    Stand-By Loan Arrangement. Iraq's Ministry of Defense requested $8
    billion in the Government of Iraq 2009 budget request, but only
    received $4.1 billion (50 percent) of funding requested. Budget
    shortfalls left critical budget gaps in logistic support units and
    sustainment areas of Iraqi Army and Air Force fleets. In an effort to
    close existing gaps, DOD requested $1 billion in the fiscal year 2010
    supplemental and $2 billion in fiscal year 2011. DOS controlled Foreign
    Military Financing should address fiscal requirements beyond 2011.

        26. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, has the distribution of
    revenues issue been addressed and has progress been made?
        General Petraeus. Iraq's Council of Representatives has yet to
    approve the Iraq Hydrocarbon Law. Nevertheless, progress has been made
    in the absence of new legislation to address distribution of revenues
    through interim sharing mechanisms and agreements established between
    the central government and the regions. Additionally, new interim
    measures are routinely offered. For example, we are aware of a proposal
    submitted to the parliament to approve a $1/barrel return to each local
    region for the oil exported. These types of provisional arrangements
    demonstrate the practical aspects to address revenue sharing while the
    final laws are codified and adopted.
        However, in the absence of new hydrocarbons legislation, both the
    Kurdistan Regional Government and the Government of Iraq have
    separately pursued development contracts with international oil
    companies. Fundamental differences remain in Iraq over Federal and
    regional authority to contract and manage the oil and gas sector.
    Therefore, in the long term, it is essential that the Government of
    Iraq enact laws governing hydrocarbons and revenue sharing to
    permanently codify future control of resources and allocation of
    revenues.
        For further revenue questions, I respectfully recommend you refer
    to DOS which follows Iraq's economy closely.

                                   terrorism
        27. Senator Begich. Admiral Olson, what additional authorities
    might you need to combat terrorism and manage your command?
        Admiral Olson. I have a need for greater involvement in the
    preparedness, promotions, assignments, retention, training, and
    professional military education of Special Operations Forces (SOF)
    personnel; the Department is currently taking actions to provide me
    with such authorities.
        Title 10 assigns the responsibility for the combat readiness of SOF
    to the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and the 2009
    National Defense Authorization Act (section 901) directed me to develop
    a SOF personnel management plan to improve SOF readiness. In response
    to this requirement, I submitted a report to the Secretary of Defense
    on 09 May 2009, wherein, I proposed that Title 10 language be modified
    to give Commander, SOCOM ``coordinating'' rather than ``monitoring''
    responsibilities for the readiness of SOF. There is a subtle yet
    important difference between these two terms. The former term implies
    my active involvement in significant SOF personnel decisions; whereas
    the later term implies that I am merely an observer to the process.
        The Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff proposed, rather than modifying legislation, that the same effect
    would be achieved by modifying DOD Policy. The Service Chiefs concurred
    with this proposal, as have I.
        A revised DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of DOD and its
    components, is currently in staffing and includes a requirement for the
    Services to ``coordinate'' with SOCOM on issues affecting the personnel
    readiness of SOF. Once approved, it will be sufficient to implement
    much of the substance of the SOCOM plan for the personnel management of
    SOF.

                          afghanistan-pakistan border
        28. Senator Begich. Admiral Olson, what can you tell me about the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and the cooperation of the
    respective Pakistani defense and intelligence communities?
        Admiral Olson. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains as a
    sanctuary for Taliban, local militants, and foreign fighters. Al Qaeda
    senior leaders likely remain in the region despite operations being
    conducted against numerous militant compounds. Having said that,
    however, credit must be given to Pakistan for aggressively moving
    against extremist elements on the Pakistan side of the border. Pakistan
    has conducted military operations on an unprecedented scale within its
    tribal region over the past 2 years disrupting critical strongholds of
    the Pakistani Taliban and foreign terrorist elements. U.S. military
    cooperation with Pakistan has expanded and the Pakistani military have
    embraced training efforts by the U.S. SOF community. Recent attention
    has been placed on the arrests of senior Afghan Taliban officials
    within Pakistan. While the full impact of this is yet to be determined,
    it does indicate a more flexible response from Pakistan, its military,
    and its intelligence service to work in cooperation with the United
    States. This border region will remain problematic for the foreseeable
    future with regard to efforts to expand good governance on both sides
    of the Durand line.

                 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
        29. Senator Begich. Admiral Olson, what are SOCOM's intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) needs for prosecuting its
    mission?
        Admiral Olson. SOCOM requires the support of a robust mix of
    persistent ISR capabilities: air, ground and maritime-based collection,
    accompanying processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED)
    capabilities, and supporting integrated ISR architecture.
        SOF requires the ability to sense and exploit, to detect/identify/
    track through cover and weather in high-clutter environments, and the
    ability to track high value individuals (HVIs) over global distances.
    SOF requires collection platforms which have long on-station loiter
    times, support multiple sensors, have sufficient room for expansion for
    future sensors, have suppressed visual and acoustic signatures, and are
    all-weather/day/night capable.
        SOF at all echelons, from JSOTF down to team level, has a high
    demand for readily exploitable data, from numerous data sources to
    include finished products, partially exploited data, and raw feeds. SOF
    requires the support of a highly scalable, worldwide integrated ISR
    architecture, interoperable with service, Intelligence Community (IC)
    and coalition/partner systems. This ISR architecture must enable
    seamless dataflow, efficient workflow and effective decisionmaking,
    starting from collection at each individual sensor, through all phases
    of PED and mission execution. SOF partner nation/host nation train,
    equip, and advise activities increase the requirement for ISR
    architecture (collection, PED and communications) which seamlessly
    enables information sharing.

        30. Senator Begich. Admiral Olson, what is the SOCOM ISR
    requirement beyond the CENTCOM AOR?
        Admiral Olson. The CENTCOM AOR is ideally suited to Full Motion
    Video (FMV) collection and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) operations--
    more diverse operational environments outside the CENTCOM AOR, i.e.
    weather and heavy foliage will drive sensor and PED requirements beyond
    FMV. Basing, airspace, and host-nation limitations will also drive an
    increased reliance on both manned and maritime-based ISR platforms.
        SOCOM requires the support of a robust mix of persistent ISR
    capabilities: air, ground and maritime based collection, accompanying
    PED capabilities, and supporting integrated ISR architecture.
        SOF requires the ability to sense and exploit, to detect/identify/
    track through cover and weather in high-clutter environments, and the
    ability to track HVIs over global distances. SOF requires collection
    platforms which have long on-station loiter times, support multiple
    sensors, have sufficient room for expansion for future sensors, have
    suppressed visual and acoustic signatures, and are all weather/day/
    night capable.
        SOF at all echelons, from JSOTF down to team level, has a high
    demand for readily-exploitable data, from numerous data sources to
    include finished products, partially exploited data, and raw feeds. SOF
    requires the support of a highly scalable, worldwide integrated ISR
    architecture, interoperable with service, IC and coalition/partner
    systems. This ISR architecture must enable seamless dataflow, efficient
    workflow and effective decisionmaking, starting from collection at each
    individual sensor, through all phases of PED and mission execution. SOF
    partner nation/host nation train, equip, and advise activities increase
    the requirement for ISR architecture (collection, PED and
    communications) which seamlessly enables information sharing.

                   iraq, afghanistan, and the horn of africa
        31. Senator Begich. Admiral Olson, please discuss the nature of the
    conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. How are they
    similar, how are they different, and what challenges are unique to each
    location?
        Admiral Olson. The ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
    Horn of Africa are difficult problems that will continue to challenge
    the United States and our regional allies for some time to come. In
    each case, there is a confluence of challenges including limited or
    non-existence governance combined with the introduction of a largely
    foreign ideology of Islamic extremism. In each case, we face a
    challenge from local extremists with their own grievances, and in each
    case, this challenge is exacerbated by Islamic extremists inspired by,
    and with varying connections to, the al Qaeda network. The greatest
    difference we face in each area is the ability and commitment of our
    local partners to address these challenges. The Iraqi Government
    continues to expand and improve its ability to address its security
    challenges, and as that happens, it is requiring less assistance from
    U.S. forces. In Afghanistan, the Afghan Government, army, and police
    force have not progressed as far as their Iraqi counterparts, but they
    are improving and enhancing their ability to address Afghanistan's
    problems is an instrumental element of our role there. We face the
    greatest challenge in this area in the Horn of Africa. The Transitional
    Federal Government in Somalia only controls a very limited section of
    territory inside Somalia and they are heavily dependent on assistance
    from other African nations to achieve that. In the long run, enhancing
    the ability of our local allies to address their unique challenges will
    be the most important element to address the challenges in each of
    these areas.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
                                     piracy
        32. Senator Burris. Admiral Olson, how is SOCOM integrated in the
    anti-piracy strategy?
        Admiral Olson. SOCOM is a force provider, responsible for
    organizing, training, and equipping personnel who may be called upon by
    the geographic combatant commands to conduct anti-piracy operations.
    This would most likely be done in conjunction with geographically-
    oriented naval forces under NAVCENT control in the CENTCOM AOR.
    Otherwise, SOCOM has no direct involvement with these operations unless
    the line between piracy and terrorism begins to blur.

        33. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, what is the current policy
    for captured pirates with regard to detention and prosecution?
        General Petraeus. Once a U.S. Navy vessel captures a suspected
    pirate, the individual is held onboard and given due care. To ensure
    safe and humane treatment is provided to suspects temporarily held
    aboard U.S. Navy vessels, crews undertake training such as in-depth
    guidance on use-of-force and responding to the religious needs of
    suspects.
        In terms of due process, while a suspected pirate is held onboard,
    evidence is compiled and the case examined for validity. Concurrently,
    the State Department determines where to send the individual for
    prosecution should the evidence support a likely conviction. In
    determining location, the State Department looks to an affected state
    to both favorably consider and make appropriate effort to prosecute a
    suspect. Affected states include the following: the state whose flag is
    flown by the attacked ship; the state(s) from which the ship's owners
    originate; and the state(s) from which the crew or passengers
    originate. In certain cases, where all affected states are unable or
    unwilling to prosecute, the case could be prosecuted in a national
    court in the region where the act of piracy occurred, with appropriate
    enabling support.
        If there is subsequently no interest by any of the affected states,
    the U.S. Government has the option to use the Memorandum of
    Understanding with the Government of Kenya (signed 16 January 2009)
    concerning the transfer of suspected pirates. Upon reasonable request
    by the United States, the Republic of Kenya will accept custody of any
    person suspected of committing (or attempting to commit) an act of
    piracy or armed robbery against ships.
        Under these circumstances, Kenya will review the case and indeed
    may opt not to prosecute based on the evidence provided and the
    strength of possible conviction. If Kenya chooses not to prosecute, the
    suspect will then be released by the warship in which he or she is
    being held.

                              illegal trafficking
        34. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, what are the concerns with
    regard to the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in your
    AOR?
        General Petraeus. State-sponsored WMD programs and extremists
    seeking to acquire such weapons pose a grave threat to our allies and
    interests in the U.S. CENTCOM AOR. We must understand the motivations
    of those who pursue or stockpile these weapons and team with our
    partners to stop such activity. Where appropriate, we must implement
    incentives to encourage states to change their attitudes toward WMD and
    offer other security alternatives. Several regional countries maintain
    WMD stockpiles. When coupled with advanced delivery means, such as
    long-range rockets or ballistic missiles, these weapons pose
    significant offensive threats and serve as strategic deterrents. Such
    programs affect current and future behavior of regional leaders, create
    tensions, and undermine regional stability. Countries such as Iran and
    Syria continue to import dual-use, WMD-related technologies to remain
    relevant and exert influence in the region, while non-state actors
    desire these weapons to inflict mass casualties. We remain at a cross-
    road with Iran and Syria regarding their WMD programs and their
    relationship with surrogates. To counter the increasing threat of WMD
    proliferation and related technology, we must leverage all-domain
    interdiction processes and capabilities to identify proliferation
    networks and then track and interdict suspected shipments. To aid in
    these efforts, we must seek regional support or participate in counter-
    proliferation agreements, activities, and exercises. We recognize that
    U.S. counter-proliferation efforts will be significantly enhanced by
    the increased awareness of partner nations and their willingness to
    take action with respect to interdiction and border security. To this
    end, CENTCOM, through its Cooperative Defense Program, continues to
    conduct numerous engagement activities with select partner nations
    along the lines of interdiction, border security, consequence
    management, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense
    to assist in increasing their counter-proliferation capabilities.

        35. Senator Burris. Admiral Olson, how is SOCOM supporting the
    combatant commands in their counter-trafficking efforts?
        Admiral Olson. SOCOM supports the combatant commands in their
    counter-trafficking efforts with the allocation of resources and SOF.
    These forces routinely train partner nation personnel or enhance
    combatant commands capabilities to address the unique challenges of
    trafficking networks operating in their AOR. Specially trained and
    equipped to deal with irregular warfare, SOF brings unique expertise
    and operational know-how to properly train or support efforts against
    the shadowy elements involved in illegal trafficking.
        Because the trafficking of weapons, drugs, or people routinely
    follows a path that crosses multiple international borders or combatant
    commands' boundaries, SOCOM studies these networks from a global
    perspective. SOCOM looks at gaps and seams between the commands and
    makes combatant commands aware of opportunities and trafficking
    networks' vulnerabilities. Major trafficking networks could not be
    significantly dismantled or destroyed if addressed only with isolated
    regional actions.

                           special operations command
        36. Senator Burris. Admiral Olson, how have things developed or
    changed since you took command of SOCOM?
        Admiral Olson. During my tenure as its commander, arguably the most
    significant evolution for our command and force was a strategic one,
    reorienting approaches to address more fluid environments and
    adversaries. We have referred to this shift as the reality of a new
    normal, where the greatest security challenges to our Nation reside in
    agile and elusive enemy networks versus traditional, uniformed military
    formations of the past.
        In this shift, however, we did not forget our origins. To be
    successful in this ``new normal'' requires consistent pressure to kill
    and capture our adversaries with even greater precision and potency
    while simultaneously addressing indirect approaches and building
    capacity in our partners. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan currently
    necessitate an increased manpower commitment to this region to
    accomplish assigned tasks and missions. This commitment has placed
    unprecedented demands on SOF, where maintaining an enduring presence
    and global footprint across the remaining combatant commands is a
    constant challenge.
        More than ever, the command has maximized Security Force Assistance
    (SFA) as a vital element to enhance the military capabilities and
    capacities of our allies and partners via training, advising,
    assistance, and--as authorized--equipping and supporting foreign
    military and security forces. As we move forward, we should measure our
    success by how well we have prepared others to face their security
    challenges, not by what we do for them.
        In this environment of increasing partnership, we have emphasized
    the command's role in synchronization, improving the sharing of
    information across various government, DOD, intelligence, and partner
    nation organizations to increase expediency and effectiveness. This
    includes the direct embedding of SOF personnel in these organizations
    to provide subject matter expertise and planning support.
        Fiscally, we have carefully maximized our unique funding
    authorities, such as Section 1208 and Combat Mission Needs Statements
    (CMNS), to produce enabling SOF-specific capabilities required by the
    combatant commanders--we've recently upgraded and/or replaced critical
    mobility, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision
    strike platform capabilities.
        Last and perhaps most importantly, the command continues to improve
    in the execution of one of its most solemn duties: the care of our
    wounded warriors and their families. With the reality of nearly a
    decade of continuous combat, the increases in strain and debilitating
    injuries such as post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain
    injuries have required increased emphasis in both policy and practice
    to ensure the mental and physical well-being of our operators.

        37. Senator Burris. Admiral Olson, what are the biggest challenges
    facing the command in the near future?
        Admiral Olson. The challenges that we foresee over the short- to
    mid-term are presented in three areas: the enemy in our current wars,
    how SOF are employed, and how we will prepare the force for future
    operations. These challenges manifest themselves in our
    responsibilities as a force provider, our traditional Title 10
    responsibilities (Organize, Train, and Equip Special Operations
    Forces), and as the synchronizer of plans and planning in the war
    against al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs).
    Enemy challenges--countering the adaptive, asymmetric, and increasingly
            networked enemy.
             We must ensure we have a comprehensive strategy
            addressing the root causes of the irregular threat, while fully
            developing indirect approaches that mobilize friendly networks
            to counter the enemy's network. We must diligently work to
            integrate all elements of national power while continuing to
            apply direct lines of operations to ensure disruptive pressure
            is brought to bear.
             The scope of the enemy challenge dictates partnering
            with others that have shared interests against violent
            extremists. We must also act to build the capacity of nation
            states so they are capable of containing the violence while
            long-term actions have time to show effect.
    Force Employment
             ``Prevail in today's wars'' using the correct
            application of conventional forces and SOF skills is the
            county's highest priority. This priority cannot be separated
            from another priority of ``prevent and deter future conflict''
            (both detailed in the Chairman's Risk Assessment)--we must work
            to reemphasize the unique nature of SOF in preventing future
            conflict in fragile regions that are currently under-resourced.
            In SOF terms, this means persistent engagement to the places
            where we can influence or have effect on the upstream factors
            that lead to violent extremism. Building of these enduring
            relationships is the key to our success in building partner
            capacity to minimize the threats to U.S. interests and
            protecting our Homeland.
             SOCOM must work with the geographic combatant
            commanders, the Joint Staff, DOS, and other U.S. governmental
            agencies to identify, synchronize, and properly resource united
            efforts against both current and future challenges. This is
            particularly important in the areas of interagency cooperation,
            planning, authorities, and strategies.
    Force Development and Preparation
             We must enhance our understanding of the strategic
            environment and develop sound human capital, force development,
            and agile acquisition strategy that get ahead of resourcing
            issues in an environment likely to include increasing budget
            pressures. We must anticipate the activities, mission areas,
            and geographic regions most likely to present problems, and
            strive for the agility to respond effectively.
             We must provide for the proper enabling of SOF to
            assure mission success. SOF must be enabled by inherent organic
            enablers, but we cannot succeed without service partner support
            and enablers as well.
             We must remain committed to caring for our wounded
            warriors and their families. As casualties rise through the
            years of combat so too must our funding of programs that help
            our operators restore their lives or assist family members to
            cope and endure with loss.

        To meet these challenges SOCOM must present the force to the
    geographic combatant commanders with the proper structure and skills to
    fulfill an array of strategic options against a variety of missions.
    Organize:
             While meeting today's enemy and employment challenges
            we are aware of the increasing appetite for the use of SOF in
            an irregular environment. Our special skills often make us the
            force of choice. We must ensure rapid growth does not dilute
            the very skills that are required to accomplish our mission. As
            stated in my testimony, we must manage our growth, ``only as it
            can be recruited, trained, absorbed, and deployed.''
             A potential retention challenge for the near future
            may arise as we move from many of the kinetic activities to the
            more commonplace skills of presence, engagement, and capacity
            building. We must also be mindful of the ``SOF for life''
            skills our operators possess and can be used after they remove
            the uniform.
    Train:
             The Chairman indicated, ``winning is not solely the
            responsibility of the U.S. Military.'' With this in mind, SOF
            must be prepared to operate in a synchronized ``Diplomacy,
            Development, Defense'' environment, possessing the advanced
            education and maturity to deal with complexity and ambiguity.
            We must train our operators in this multi-dimensional
            application of national power to have greatest effect.
             The infrastructure and institutional requirements are
            essential to supporting the operators who must meet the
            challenging demands. My testimony points to many construction
            and modernization programs focused on sustaining SOF operations
            support.
    Equip:
             I spent considerable time in my testimony discussing
            the essential enabling aspects to SOF. Many of these are my
            responsibility in the allocated MFP-11 budget process. As SOF
            is not a separate service, we also rely on service provided
            enablers that are just as essential for mission success.
            Increasingly, my expenditures are beginning to cover shortfalls
            in enablers that the Services have difficulty funding. This
            equipping issue may become more acute if overseas contingency
            operations funding falls short of helping the military meet its
            commitments.
             Our enemies, as I stated at the outset, are adaptive
            and increasingly use available technologies against us. Our
            acquisition processes must become more agile to meet the enemy,
            force employment, and force development challenges. Our ability
            to field, adapt, and out maneuver the enemy can be hamstrung by
            the acquisition process.
    Synchronizer:
             Addressing the enemy challenges from a DOD perspective
            is difficult enough. To fully realize a synchronized whole-of-
            government effort against our enemies requires continued
            emphasis on understanding and cooperation from all elements of
            our national power structure. From strategies, through the
            operational art to the tactical level our strategic messaging
            must have a more consistent voice/deed alignment. Along with
            budgeting issues this is where Congress and our national
            leadership can have the greatest effect.

        Certainly, these are not the only challenges facing SOCOM and SOF
    for the near future. These issues identified will give us the agility
    and unity of effort to help confront these challenges and respond to
    unexpected challenges as well.

                                     africa
        38. Senator Burris. Admiral Olson, please describe how SOCOM is
    supporting U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) efforts in Operation
    Enduring Freedom (OEF) Trans Sahara and the Joint Task Force Horn of
    Africa?
        Admiral Olson. SOCOM provides forces to execute activities as
    directed by Commander, AFRICOM. SOF elements support OEF Trans Sahara,
    JTF Horn of Africa, and other efforts totaling 55 activities in 16
    countries across the African continent; this equates to approximately 4
    percent of the globally deployed SOF. The focus of SOF operations in
    AFRICOM is to build partner nation capacity and regional stability
    through both persistent engagement and episodic training; we provide
    persistent elements such as Civil Military Support Teams and Military
    Information Support Teams in nine countries while Army Special Forces,
    Marine Special Operations teams, and Naval Special Warfare elements
    provide training to build the capacity of partner nations in the
    region.

                              contractor oversight
        39. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, private contractor support
    continues to receive increased scrutiny in light of recent abuses in
    both Iraq and Afghanistan. Contractor fraud, waste, and abuse are not
    only financially damaging, but our strategic efforts are undermined as
    well. How will CENTCOM provide better oversight of private contractors'
    efforts?
        General Petraeus. CENTCOM has taken several actions to provide
    better oversight of private contractor efforts. We've formed the ACOD,
    which implements DOD's Armed Contractor policies and procedures and
    oversees PSCs. We're transitioning JCC-I/A to a JTSCC for better
    synchronization and efficiency of contracting in the theater. We're
    leveraging Rock Island Arsenal on contracts that are complex, resource
    intense, and require a detailed Source Selection process. This allows
    the contracting officer on the ground to pay attention to more
    tactical, day-to-day issues affecting the warfighter.
        CENTCOM and DOD have improved COR resource and training. DAU
    initiated online resident courses to train our CORs, and the Department
    of Army directed deploying units to identify and train their CORs prior
    to deployment. The number of CORs in Afghanistan has dramatically
    increased with fill rates now over 90 percent. The CORs are trained not
    only in general contract management, but are specifically selected for
    their technical expertise to oversee contractors performing services
    such as food preparation, water purification, and fuels distribution.
    DCMA and DCAA have also increased the number of personnel in
    Afghanistan to improve contract oversight.
        CENTCOM has ordered the use of the SPOT reporting for contractors
    performing valid work in the CENTCOM AOR. This system will increase the
    quality and reliability of contractor data thereby avoiding fraudulent
    duplication of numbers on task order contracts and over-provisioning of
    DOD food and supplies based on ineligible contracting personnel.
        To facilitate the integration of contractors when defining the
    strategic plan for future CENTCOM operations, documents such as the NDS
    and QDR will feature a greater emphasis on contractor requirements.
    Other Field Manuals, DOD Instructions, and new Joint Doctrine support
    the growing importance of integrating contractors.

        40. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, could the missions being
    fulfilled by private contractors be better handled by military
    personnel?
        General Petraeus. While our military forces are exceptionally well-
    trained and capable, a contract work force allows us to increase and
    decrease capacity very quickly. It takes years to build military
    personnel capacity with the requisite experience level. Contractors
    bring to the table the required experience at the required time without
    the commitment to growing end strength.

        41. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, could reservists and
    guardsmen provide this type of support?
        General Petraeus. Reservists and guardsmen are already contributing
    essential skill sets to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While
    our Guard and Reserve forces are exceptionally well-trained and
    capable, a contract work force allows us to increase and decrease
    capacity very quickly. It takes years to build military personnel
    capacity with the requisite experience level. Contractors bring to the
    table the required experience at the required time without the
    commitment to growing end strength.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Bingaman
                      air force special operations command
        42. Senator Bingaman. Admiral Olson, your testimony describes the
    rapid prototyping that took place to convert the Air Force Special
    Operations Command's (AFSOC) C-130W aircraft to gunships. Does SOCOM
    need any additional authorities to help its rapid prototyping efforts?
        Admiral Olson. The Dragon Spear project was successful due, in
    part, to strong congressional support and authorities afforded SOCOM to
    rapidly field technology to the SOF warfighter. The specific
    authorities that benefitted the Dragon Spear project included the
    ability to execute a CMNS and congressional support for Above-Threshold
    Reprogramming (ATR) requests to fund pulling available technology into
    the Precision Strike Package (PSP) and to fund modification of the
    entire MC-130W fleet. SOCOM appreciates the continued congressional
    support through authorities such as CMNS, ATR support, and capital
    leasing to rapidly acquire new technology and field capability to
    respond to emergent mission requirements.
        A slight modification to the existing Below Threshold Reprogramming
    (BTR) language would further help SOCOM rapidly acquire and field
    innovative technology. Reverting back to the (pre-2004) BTR language
    which provided the command the authority to reprogram funds to the RDTE
    threshold of $10 million, the procurement threshold of $20 million, or
    20 percent of the item, whichever is greater will allow SOCOM to
    reprogram MFP-11 funds to support emergent SOF requirements and quickly
    react to meet Secretary of Defense priorities. The 2004 change in
    language to read ``whichever is less'' is restrictive as the SOCOM
    budget is smaller than traditional service budgets.
        The command continues to succeed in rapidly fielding capability in
    support of SOF emergent requirements. The support provided by Congress
    has been a critical enabler to SOCOM's mission success. The enhanced
    reprogramming authority described in this response would provide SOCOM
    the flexibility to redirect already approved MFP-11 funding to rapidly
    acquire new technology to adjust to changing mission requirements.

        43. Senator Bingaman. Admiral Olson, your testimony describes
    SOCOM's efforts in the area of ISR. I am particularly interested in
    AFSOC's use of the MQ-1 Reaper aircraft given that it will eventually
    be phased out of the inventory--are there plans to replace it?
        Admiral Olson. SOCOM continues to monitor USAF MQ-1 Predator to the
    MQ-9 Reaper transition plans. SOCOM currently has 26 MQ-1 Predators and
    four MQ-9 Reapers. We expect to receive three additional MQ-9 aircraft
    in 2010, nine in 2011, four in 2012, two in 2013, and three in 2016.
    SOCOM's inventory end state is 26 MQ-1s and 25 MQ-9s by fourth quarter
    2016.

        44. Senator Bingaman. Admiral Olson, in your testimony you describe
    the acquisition of nonstandard aircraft so that SOF can be inserted
    without attention. Does AFSOC plan to acquire or lease these aircraft
    and can you tell me the trade-offs in each case?
        Admiral Olson. SOCOM's Non-Standard Aviation (NSAV) inventory
    comprises both light and medium category mobility platforms for intra-
    theater cargo airlift. Since the beginning of SOCOM's NSAV program in
    fiscal year 2008, nine NSAV Lights (eight PC-12s and one M-28) were
    procured and delivered to the AFSOC. NSAV Medium procurement funding
    did not begin until fiscal year 2010; as such, SOCOM leased four
    Bombardier Q200s to meet the interim medium mobility mission
    requirement. Although the Q200s do not fully meet the NSAV Medium
    requirements, this specific lease allows SOCOM to partially meet the
    capability gap until the procured NSAV Mediums are delivered beginning
    in fiscal year 2011.
        Regarding the acquire versus lease trade-off, SOCOM has an enduring
    requirement for intra-theater mobility to remote locations that makes
    procurement of aircraft more cost effective and advantageous over
    leasing.

        45. Senator Bingaman. Admiral Olson, my understanding is that
    General Stanley McChrystal is emphasizing daylight operations as part
    of a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan. What do you need to
    better equip and train your SOF for daylight operations given that
    night time operations have been a hallmark of SOF and AFSOC, in
    particular?
        Admiral Olson. Irregular warfare activities such as Key Leader
    Engagement, SFA, and Foreign Internal Defense are typically conducted
    during daylight hours and should not be significantly affected by an
    emphasis on daylight operations.
        Some SOF operations, however, such as direct action missions to
    capture key enemy leadership and disrupt enemy networks, are normally
    conducted at night; this allows SOF to take advantage of the natural
    concealment of darkness and optimize circadian rhythm relative to the
    enemy. Through the use of specialized equipment, SOF is able to
    overcome low/no-light situations which provide a further advantage.
    Daylight operations offset these tactical advantages, placing SOF at
    increased risk.
        Changes to the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed
    in such missions are being implemented to mitigate the risks associated
    with daylight execution. With appropriate changes to TTPs, the overall
    operational risk is manageable in most cases and daylight execution
    does not appear to have a significant impact.
        SOCOM has efforts underway to expand ISR capabilities and increase
    human intelligence capacity; such efforts will provide deployed SOF
    with increased situational awareness of geographic objectives, enemy
    capabilities, and intentions, and further mitigate operational risk in
    daylight operations. Additionally, the command is exploring equipment
    that can reduce the warning time at the point of action, and turn
    ``day'' into ``night'' for the other senses; examples of such equipment
    include: advanced phone/radio/noise jammers, directed energy (sound)
    equipment, and low-signature (noise) packages for air or ground
    mobility assets.
        SOF aviation has engaged in limited operations during daylight
    hours. SOF aviation typically flies during darkness due to the risk to
    the aircraft at the objective during daylight. Current programs to
    field Hostile Fire Indication Systems, Lightweight Ballistic Protection
    Systems, fire and forget missiles, missile warning receiver and
    countermeasures, digital-aided close air support technologies and laser
    designation systems will help mitigate the riskier daylight operations.

                          weapons of mass destruction
        46. Senator Bingaman. Admiral Olson, a critical area of SOCOM
    pertains to countering WMD. Do you feel with the demands of the ongoing
    operations overseas that this area could use more support?
        Admiral Olson. Yes. The Nation must prepare for the evolving WMD
    threats of tomorrow. The continuing progress of science and technology
    can be expected to present opportunities to develop new and even more
    troublesome means of perpetrating mass destruction. The Nation will
    need to invest in anticipating and preparing to preempt or counter such
    developments as it strives to ensure that our worst fears about the
    proliferation and use of WMD remain unfulfilled.
        Counterproliferation is one of SOCOM's core mission areas. Due to
    the high tempo of ongoing overseas operations, SOCOM has had to balance
    counterproliferation training and equipping with the more immediate
    demands of the current fight. SOCOM continues to evolve to meet these
    emerging threats and strives to achieve the appropriate balance between
    the current fight and the ability to get out in front of future
    threats.
        Currently, SOCOM has the capability to conduct counterproliferation
    activities but the capacity is limited. Ongoing global contingency
    operations have SOCOM counterproliferation forces conducting
    counterterrorism missions. The result is a reduction in the number of
    forces available for counterproliferation and reduced
    counterproliferation expertise due to decreased level of training.
        The threat of proliferation and use of WMD by an extremist
    organization is greater now than at any other time in history. As U.S.
    efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, SOCOM's role with regard to
    counterproliferation needs to be redoubled. In order to do this, we
    need to redeploy, reconstitute, and retrain forces returning from
    overseas. In the interim, SOCOM needs to train and equip additional
    forces to accomplish some portions of the counterproliferation mission
    in order to increase capacity.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                 afghanistan/pakistan---taliban reconciliation
        47. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, last week while in
    Afghanistan, Secretary Gates said this about the prospects of
    reconciliation with Taliban leaders: ``I do believe that the senior
    Taliban are only going to be interested in reconciling in terms that
    are acceptable to the Afghan Government, and those of us supporting it,
    when they see that the likelihood of their being successful has been
    cast into serious doubt. My guess is they're not at that point yet.''
    Do you believe we are now at a point where the Taliban doubt their
    likelihood of success and would be willing to reconcile on acceptable
    terms?
        General Petraeus. [Deleted.]

        48. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, what would be the minimally
    required changes to the security conditions on the ground in
    Afghanistan before the United States would enter into or support
    substantive reconciliation talks with senior Taliban leaders?
        General Petraeus. [Deleted.]

        49. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, how do you interpret
    Pakistan's recent successes in capturing senior Afghan Taliban leaders
    in Pakistan?
        General Petraeus. The arrests of Afghan Taliban Senior Leadership
    (TBSL) figures most likely represent an effort to capitalize on the
    positive developments following the London Conference. Islamabad seeks
    to minimize Indian influence in Afghanistan, establish Pakistan's role
    in shaping Afghan Reintegration and Reconciliation (R2), and enhance
    their strategic relationship with the United States. Pakistan has used
    the arrests to demonstrate its unique capability to influence
    reconciliation (due to proximity and access to TBSL), something India
    cannot offer Afghanistan. Further, Islamabad has demonstrated to TBSL
    that Pakistan at present plays reluctant host, not a strategic partner
    or sponsor to the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan's concerns--as expressed in
    their recent visit to Washington, DC, for strategic dialogue--remain
    firmly centered on countering Indian regional ambitions. Although the
    United States and Pakistan have agreed to a framework of working group
    discussions to mitigate a number of lesser concerns, Pakistan
    ultimately seeks a lasting strategic partnership with the United
    States. With respect to Afghanistan and the eventual U.S. withdrawal,
    Pakistan's desired end-state remains unchanged: a friendly Afghanistan
    Government independent of Indian influence--fully integrated with
    ethnic Pashtun representation--and recognizing the Durand line as the
    national border.

                         afghanistan/pakistan--kandahar
        50. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, in the aftermath of the
    recent operation in Marjah, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs recently
    said: ``Kandahar will be next.'' Other senior leaders have said the
    same. Can you tell me what to expect in the coming months in Kandahar?
        General Petraeus. Operations in Kandahar will build on the momentum
    created in Central Helmand. Unlike Central Helmand, Kandahar is urban,
    densely populated and has some, albeit weak, Afghan Government ANSF
    structures. One of the requirements for securing the population and
    delivering governance is the correct force density, both ANSF and
    coalition, in order to secure the population. The key to this will be
    to ensure that the U.S. Marine Corps, together with Afghan and United
    Kingdom forces, continue comprehensive COIN operations in Marjah and
    Nad `Ali in order to strengthen the authority of the Afghan Government
    in Central Helmand. In parallel, we have started deliberate COIN
    operations to set conditions in Kandahar province during the coming
    months.
        Our intention is to expand the security zones in Kandahar and the
    surrounding districts, thereby bringing a significant portion of
    southern Afghanistan's population under Afghan Government control, as
    well as denying the insurgents vital terrain, limiting their freedom of
    movement and access to key population centers.
        Progress in Kandahar is the next step in convincing Afghans of
    their government's capacity and resolve to succeed. The insurgents
    recognize the threat of a more credible Afghan Government and the
    ISAF's COIN approach and will likely react aggressively to prevent
    coalition success in Kandahar. Kandahar underpins the Taliban power
    base and holds significant importance as the Taliban's former capital;
    they still have a disproportionate effect on the population and
    continue to exert control through intimidation and shadow governance
    structures.

        51. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, how would you describe the
    objective and the strategy to achieve that objective?
        General Petraeus. The objective of Hamkari Baraye Kandahar
    (Cooperation for Kandahar) is to provide credible, transparent,
    inclusive, and representative governance connected to the population,
    enabled by steady, incremental improvements to overall security,
    providing space for governance to develop. To achieve this objective,
    the ISAF strategy is focused on improving governance and political
    engagement, addressing inequality and corruption, facilitating
    stabilization and reconstruction, and providing security. To improve
    governance and political engagement, ISAF is conducting multi-layered
    political engagement and outreach to obtain Government of Islamic
    Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) commitment, to strengthen government
    capacity, to reduce parallel influences, and to build representative
    structures. ISAF is also working with GIRoA to visibly demonstrate the
    government's intent to distribute wealth more evenly, to regulate
    parallel governance structures, and to counter corruption.

        52. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, do you believe the current
    Marine Corps operations in Helmand are constraining our forces from
    conducting the necessary operations in Kandahar?
        General Petraeus. Operations in Helmand are not constraining the
    effort in Kandahar but, in fact, will provide necessary momentum upon
    which to build. Unlike Central Helmand, Kandahar is urban, densely
    populated and has some, albeit weak, Afghan Government structures. One
    of the requirements for securing the population and delivering
    governance is the correct force density, both ANSF and coalition, in
    order to secure the population. The key to this will be to ensure that
    the U.S. Marine Corps, together with Afghan and United Kingdom forces,
    continue comprehensive COIN operations in Marjah and Nad `Ali in order
    to strengthen the authority of the Afghan Government in Central
    Helmand. In parallel, we have started deliberate COIN operations to set
    conditions in Kandahar province during the coming months. Far from
    constraining operations in Kandahar, Marine Corps operations in Helmand
    are a critical precursor and enabler to success there.

        53. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, do you believe we can be
    successful in Kandahar without committing significant numbers of U.S.
    and NATO troops into Kandahar City?
        General Petraeus. A significant portion of the anticipated U.S. and
    NATO force uplift will be allocated to Kandahar. Currently, there are
    6,900 ISAF personnel and 5,300 ANSF personnel in Kandahar. By August,
    there will be 11,850 ISAF personnel and 8,500 ANSF in the region.
    Kandahar is a very different situation than the GIRoA and ISAF faced in
    Marjah. While there are clearly security challenges, Kandahar is not a
    city that must be ``taken back'' with major clearing operations, but
    rather an area where a thickening of existing forces and more robust
    partnering with ISAF forces will contribute to security gains over
    time. However, more important than the number of forces flowing into
    the area is what they will be doing. The campaign for Kandahar is
    designed to leverage existing security structures, incoming ISAF
    forces, and ANSF to improve security to bring stability and improved
    governance. Over the next 9 months, ISAF will continue to partner with
    GIRoA and the international community to assist in improving governance
    and political engagement; addressing inequality and corruption;
    facilitating stabilization and reconstruction; and providing security.
    To develop governance and political engagement, ISAF is conducting
    multi-layered political engagement and outreach to obtain GIRoA
    commitment, strengthen government capacity, reduce parallel influences,
    and build representative structures.
        ISAF is also working with GIRoA to visibly demonstrate the
    government's intent to distribute wealth more evenly, regulate parallel
    governance structures, and counter corruption. Security within Kandahar
    City will be layered to control movement in and around the city. The
    core and inner layers are being built upon the existing police
    substation structure that delivers security through community policing,
    supported through more effective surveillance and information sharing
    among ISAF, National Directorate of Security, ANP, and ANA. The outer
    ring is composed of an increased ANSF footprint on the periphery of
    Kandahar City, partnered with ISAF elements, that controls movement
    into and out of the city, establishing quick reaction forces to address
    more significant threats inside the city. There are some police
    districts inside Kandahar City contested by either insurgents or a mix
    of insurgents and criminal elements; Provincial Governor Wesa's plan is
    to clear these areas of insurgents and, over time, remove criminal
    elements through ANP-led security operations.

                      military construction in afghanistan
        54. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, why is over $1.2 billion
    requested in the fiscal year 2011 budget for military construction
    projects to support current operations in Afghanistan when many of
    these projects won't be completed until the summer of 2012, a full year
    beyond the date set by the President to initiate a drawdown of forces?
        General Petraeus. The military construction projects are needed to
    support deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. forces
    throughout the drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. The projects
    will also enhance our transition of forward operating bases from U.S.
    forces to Afghan forces.

                                      iran
        55. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, what effect would a nuclear-
    armed Iran have on the broader Middle East?
        General Petraeus. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically shift the
    balance of power between Iran and key regional nations. A nuclear-armed
    Iran would likely spark a regional arms race as Iran's neighbors seek
    to redress the imbalance.

        56. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, do you believe that a policy
    of containment would be an effective option for dealing with a nuclear-
    armed Iran? Please explain why or why not.
        General Petraeus. As Secretary Clinton has said, U.S. interests are
    inextricably linked to the future of the Middle East. Preserving
    stability, human rights, preventing proliferation of WMD, maintaining
    security and availability of energy and energy transport routes,
    protecting critical infrastructure, supporting democratic ideals, and
    the rule of law are key U.S. interests in the Middle East. In agreement
    with international non-proliferation goals, the President clearly has
    said he is committed to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. A containment
    policy is currently outside the framework of the stated U.S. policy
    toward Iran's nuclear intentions and makes the very idea of a
    containment policy hypothetical. In support of ongoing U.S. Government
    efforts, CENTCOM's military activities will continue to support the
    diplomatic efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran. We will
    also remain vigilant across a wide range of contingencies to support
    U.S. and regional security objectives.

        57. General Petraeus, how do you assess the stability of the
    Iranian Government in the aftermath of the June 12, 2009, election and
    the popular uprising that followed?
        General Petraeus. The Iranian Government remains stable despite
    ongoing political rifts among regime elites, namely the conservatives
    and ultraconservatives, and regime legitimacy issues created by the
    June 2009 presidential elections and the opposition movement. Although
    public dissent centered on the reelection of President Mahmud Ahmadi-
    Nejad, the behind-the-scenes wrangling was believed to have also
    focused on the political and religious legitimacy of Supreme Leader
    Khamenei for openly supporting Ahmadi-Nejad. Reformists could not
    muster enough support among regime elites to challenge the Supreme
    Leader, eventually causing reformist leaders, such as Ayatollah
    Rafsanjani, to back down and at least publicly reconcile with the
    regime. Concurrently, Supreme Leader Khamenei appears to have
    consolidated his circle of advisors, consulting only with those
    conservatives who share his views of clerical rule. Despite having
    fewer people involved in decisionmaking, the process remains divided,
    as ideological differences and personality conflicts arise more
    frequently. Following the initially large protests, Iranian security
    forces, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), prevented
    the opposition from coalescing into a viable near-term threat to the
    regime and inhibited the opposition's ability to communicate and
    organize anti-regime protests. Supreme Leader Khamenei used the post-
    election political dynamics and the IRGC to consolidate his power and
    suppress what he believed was a Western-backed ``soft-power
    revolution'' against the Islamic Republic. Khamenei's handling of
    election unrest demonstrated his dominance over the security apparatus
    and his dependence on the IRGC to maintain regime survivability and his
    own political position. The regime realized lessons from the 1979
    Islamic Revolution and prevented the IRGC from overreacting to
    opposition protests and creating a continual cycle of violence, as
    occurred between the Iranian population and the Shah's security
    services in 1978 to 1979.

        58. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, the focus of U.S. policy
    toward Iran is now shifting to sanctions. Should we be preparing to
    deploy every sanction at our disposal against the Iranian regime or
    should we be holding back some in reserve for the future?
        General Petraeus. Although Iran is in our AOR, questions concerning
    our national policy toward Iran and how we use the various tools
    available are better posed to the administration and the State
    Department. Regarding security concerns, Iran continues to present a
    profound and complicated challenge. I would note that Ambassador Burns
    eloquently addressed our efforts regarding Iran in his April 14, 2010,
    Senate Armed Services Committee testimony. President Obama has sought
    to strengthen our diplomatic options for dealing with the challenges
    posed by Iran, and has made it clear the United States is prepared to
    deal with the Islamic Republic on the basis of mutual respect and
    interest. As Iran remains recalcitrant, we now see a broader
    international consensus about the urgency of the Iranian threat and new
    frustration among even some of Iran's friends and trade partners. As
    the President said in Prague recently, we must insist that Iran face
    consequences because it has continually failed to meet its obligations.
    Ambassador Burns recounted that the United States is moving with a
    sense of urgency toward a new U.N. Security Council Resolution.
    Meanwhile, the United States continues to work with our regional
    partners as they develop mechanisms to better manage the political,
    diplomatic, and security challenges Iran poses. We have launched
    intensive diplomatic outreach efforts to other key states to discuss
    the need for additional pressure to bring Iran back to the negotiating
    table. Equally important to Iran are the informal expressions of
    international censure, including the voluntary departure of
    longstanding foreign investors and trade partners, and growing
    isolation. Neither formal penalties nor increasing international
    ostracism will alter Iran's agenda overnight, but the mounting weight
    of political and financial pressures can persuade Iran's leadership to
    reassess their approach to the world.

                                      iraq
        59. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, in a recent interview, your
    former partner in Baghdad, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, voiced concern with
    the President's plan to have U.S. forces down to 50,000 by August of
    this year. He said this: ``The [Status of Forces Agreement] I helped
    negotiate had an intermediate timeline to have forces out of cities and
    towns by mid-2009, which was accomplished, and full withdrawal by 2011.
    The August 2010 date was not part of that agreement. I would have
    preferred to see us keep maximum flexibility with the Iraqis between
    now and 2011.'' Are you confident that we are on track to meet this
    50,000-troop benchmark in light of the recent election? If so, please
    explain why.
        General Petraeus. I am confident we are on track to meet this
    50,000-troop benchmark. The Iraqis are increasingly providing for their
    own security and are achieving the security and governance goals that
    were established. This will allow the United States to continue to
    decrease troop levels to 50,000 in August 2010. Although the overall
    troop strength goal is 50,000, the mix of forces in that number is
    still capable of performing missions throughout Iraq. This provides the
    flexibility needed to adjust to any new developments or unexpected
    circumstances.

        60. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, when I was in Baghdad in
    January, General Raymond Odierno said he had drawn up a contingency
    plan to keep an extra brigade in Iraq, which would leave more than
    50,000 U.S. forces in Iraq beyond the President's August 2010 deadline.
    Has this request been made? If not, do you expect it to be?
        General Petraeus. We are on target to meet the 50,000 forces
    requirement in Iraq by August 31, 2010. The USF-I request has been made
    to retain an Advise and Assist Task Force (AATF). This force will be
    comprised of 962 personnel, much smaller than a brigade, but with
    inherent force protection and engagement elements. The AATF provides
    the essential capabilities we need and keeps us on track to meet the
    50,000-troop benchmark.

                           iraq counterterrorism law
        61. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, what is the status of the
    counterterrorism law pending in the Iraqi parliament?
        General Petraeus. A counterterrorism law was read once in the
    Council of Representatives but was not voted upon. At the end of last
    year, we observed some Iraqi politicians pushing for a more
    comprehensive national security law in which a counterterrorism law was
    merely one subcomponent. However, until the newly-elected Council of
    Representatives is seated, it is unlikely there will be any progress in
    this area.

        62. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, do you expect any action to
    be taken on this legislation in the near term?
        General Petraeus. Until the newly elected Council of
    Representatives is seated, it is unlikely there will be any progress in
    this area.

        63. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, what are the implications of
    this legislation not being enacted?
        General Petraeus. Without passage of a counterterrorism law, there
    remains the possibility that Iraq's population will perceive the
    Counterterrorism Service as overly aggressive, or worse, a ``secret
    police'' under the direct control of the Prime Minister. Further, this
    could heighten sectarian tensions within Iraq. Additionally, the lack
    of clear organizational structures and specific legal guidelines for
    decisionmaking may negatively impact the budgetary and administrative
    processes necessary for an effective, transparent, and legally-
    compliant force. Notwithstanding Iraqi's historical sensitivities to
    human rights abuses by previous regimes, the Counterterrorism Service
    appears to act upon internal threats based on fact and impartiality.
    This is evidenced by operations in heavily-populated Shia provinces as
    well as targeting Shia extremist networks. Fortunately, the Government
    of Iraq, as a whole, recognizes the need for an effective
    Counterterrorism Service and supports the agency's requirements.

                                lashkar-e-taiba
        64. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has
    demonstrated its ability to plan and execute large-scale attacks with
    the potential to upset the already tenuous balance between Pakistan and
    India. During a recent visit to New Delhi, Secretary of Defense Gates
    assessed the threat posed by such groups as one that could
    ``destabilize not just Afghanistan, not just Pakistan, but potentially
    the whole region.'' What is your assessment of LeT's capability and
    intent?
        Admiral Olson. LeT remains the most capable and dangerous terrorist
    organization in South Asia and retains the capability to conduct
    attacks against targets across India with little to no notice. LeT
    remains focused on its goals to liberate Kashmir, and establish Islamic
    states in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and India. LeT has demonstrated
    their ability by conducting numerous attacks against Indian Government,
    military, commercial, and transportation infrastructure targets through
    bombings and small unit assaults in Kashmir and major cities across
    India. LeT has demonstrated their ability to infiltrate by both ground
    and sea. LeT utilizes criminal smuggling networks and legitimate
    businesses to move funds, supplies, and personnel. Although several
    high-value members have been detained since the 2008 Mumbai attacks,
    including LeT's operations chief, LeT remains capable of destabilizing
    the region in order to attain their goals.

        65. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what level of support does LeT
    receive from the Pakistani Government?
        Admiral Olson. There is no evidence that LeT receives active overt
    organizational support from the Government of Pakistan. Although the
    Government of Pakistan has detained several members in the wake of the
    2008 Mumbai attacks and temporarily closed some businesses and
    facilities associated with LeT, LeT continues to operate. LeT is a
    large and adaptive organization that has the capability to operate
    independently due to its public service and commercial enterprises,
    such as Jamaat ud-Dawa (JUD), LeT's Humanitarian Service Organization
    and its public face. JUD operates schools, reading rooms, mosques,
    medical clinics, and ambulance services across Pakistan. JUD, through
    their humanitarian efforts, have become an integral part of Pakistani
    society and they operate openly throughout Pakistan. LeT also receives
    donations from foreign donors and income from businesses, public and
    private, criminal and legitimate, that its members and sympathizers
    operate throughout South Asia, South East Asia, the Arabian Peninsula,
    the Far East, Europe, and North and South America. LeT also receives
    donations from members of the Pakistani Diaspora from all over the
    world. This has apparently made the Government of Pakistan reluctant
    and unable to eliminate support to LeT and has allowed LeT to survive.
    Although the Pakistani Government may not actively support LeT, it
    passively supports it by not being able to control it.

        66. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, have we, in coordination with
    partners in the region such as Bangladesh, been effective in
    constraining LeT's freedom of movement and sphere of influence in the
    region?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, cooperation between regional partners, in
    particular India and Bangladesh, have been instrumental in constraining
    LeT's ability to plan and conduct attacks. Building the capacity to
    counter threats posed by groups like LeT promotes regional stability
    and builds trust. We must continue to build the capacity of all nations
    in South Asia to enable them to counter the threats posed by groups
    like LeT. Building the counterterrorism capabilities in our regional
    partners is a long term effort and requires long-term commitment. We
    must continue this effort to build and develop capacity in other
    partners in the region such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. SOF
    continue to lead this effort through recurring training events and
    persistent engagement. However, building military capabilities is only
    one aspect in building regional stability. Law enforcement and
    information sharing are also crucial issues that will enable our
    regional partners to mitigate the threats posed by terrorist
    organizations like LeT.

                                 force enablers
        67. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, concerns have been raised about
    the availability of enabling forces to support SOF in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan, such as transportation, ISR, and logistics. You have
    stated, `` . . . the non-availability of these force enablers has
    become our most vexing issue in the operational environment.'' What
    steps are you taking to mitigate the lack of these force enablers in
    Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Admiral Olson. U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) commanders have stated that
    they will continue to provide existing enabler support to SOF without
    degradation. Logistics support, ISR, and mobility assets will continue
    to be backfilled to support SOF remaining in Iraq. Other enabling
    support will be mitigated through the use of ISF or additional local
    contracting.

        68. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, are you confident that there
    will be sufficient support forces remaining in Iraq to support
    essential SOF following the drawdown of conventional forces later this
    year?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, we continue to work very closely with CENTCOM
    to ensure sufficient support remains in Iraq to support those SOF who
    will continue to train, advise, and assist ISF units. USF-I plans to
    provide existing enabler support to SOF without degradation. USF-I will
    provide logistical, medical, and basing support as well as sustainment
    to any remote areas which SOF may operate in. Drawdown planning is
    fluid based on Iraqi elections and we will continue to monitor its
    impacts to ensure adequate support for SOF exists as it is currently
    planned.

        69. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, where do you envision the
    largest strain on enabling forces?
        Admiral Olson. Our greatest strain on enabling forces continues to
    be ISR platform support, and enhanced mobility capability. ISR remains
    an invaluable asset in low or limited-access battle spaces, most
    notably in the CENTCOM AOR. Enhanced mobility, for instance, results in
    quick strike capabilities regardless of terrain. Significant
    enhancements are underway for SOCOM's helicopter, CV-22 Tilt Rotor
    aircraft, and light/medium nonstandard aviation fleets. Additional
    enhancements are also needed in mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP)
    vehicles. These assets are in high demand and are rarely available in
    sufficient numbers. SOCOM will continue to rely on support by
    conventional forces which possess the majority of these assets.

        70. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, do you plan to use contractors
    to provide any enabling support to SOF in Iraq once the bulk of
    conventional forces depart?
        Admiral Olson. Yes, some enabling support is already contracted.
    For example, interpreters and security forces are currently provided
    through a combination of contracted support and military forces. Any
    further reduction in U.S. military forces will require enabling support
    from Iraqi military forces or local contracting.

                    capability of indigenous security forces
        71. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, SOF plays a large role in the
    training of indigenous security forces, particularly elite
    counterterrorism units. What is your assessment of the capabilities and
    professionalism of Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF)?
        Admiral Olson. The ISOF have shown remarkable progress in a
    relatively short period of time. Since ISOF have trained with both U.S.
    and coalition forces to acquire the needed skill sets to provide
    security, their learning curve has been tremendously steep. Undaunted,
    ISOF have overcome many obstacles and surpassed expectations. They have
    shown great potential and have demonstrated a high degree of
    professionalism while supporting combat operations. These results are
    directly attributable to the confidence they have in their mission,
    their men, and their country.

        72. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, how is ISOF affected by the
    counterterrorism law not being enacted?
        Admiral Olson. The effect on ISOF of the counterterrorism law not
    being enacted is detrimental. Without clear guidance from legislation,
    ISOF's ability to support the government will undoubtedly turn into an
    ebb and flow scenario with many fits and starts. Unfortunately, the
    real casualty will be the Iraqi people, and their security, as ISOF
    employment becomes more of a political issue for debate rather than a
    dedicated security force.

        73. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what is your assessment of the
    capabilities and professionalism of the Afghan Kandak commando units?
        Admiral Olson. Since the conception of the Afghan Kandak Commandos,
    enormous strides have been made to build operationally effective units.
    Afghan Commandos are now typically in the lead in the operations that
    they conduct with U.S. support, compared to years past where U.S.
    forces led all operations with Afghan Commando support. Afghan
    Commandos play a critical role in capturing or killing insurgent
    leaders and bomb makers. There have been operations in which civilian
    deaths have been blamed on Afghan Commandos, but these cases are
    typically unfounded. The Afghan Commandos are a very professional
    fighting force that receives recurring and extensive training from U.S.
    instructors who encourage discipline and attention to detail.

        74. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, how are the Afghan Kandak
    Commando units perceived by the Afghan population?
        Admiral Olson. The Afghan Kandak Commando units are perceived by
    the locals as elite fighters compared to the ANA and the ANP. While a
    majority of the Afghan population believes that the ANA are not a fully
    professionalized force and the ANP are corrupt and provide little in
    the way of protection to the population, the Afghan Commandos are seen
    as incorruptible and as a source of pride for the Afghan population.
    Additionally, the population views the Commandos as a more cohesive
    force, uniting members from different ethnic groups.

         requested increase in combat mission needs statement authority
        75. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, SOCOM is requesting an increase
    in its Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS) authority to $50 million,
    a $30 million, or 150 percent, increase over its currently authorized
    level. In what ways is the currently authorized level of $20 million
    inadequate to address the needs of SOCOM to meet emerging requirements
    in theater?
        Admiral Olson. The $50 million request is based on the command's
    historical experience with CMNS requirements, as well as projected
    requirements based on recent Request for Forces to support ongoing and
    surge operations.

        a.  Historically, SOCOM has received and approved CMNS over and
    above the $20 million appropriated in the baseline for use in overseas
    contingencies. In fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007, this line item
    was substantially increased by reprogrammings and supplemental
    appropriations--an increase of $66 million and $158 million,
    respectively. The majority of the CMNS were submitted on behalf of
    Joint Special Operations Task Forces working in the CENTCOM AOR.
    Examples include sensors and tracking devices, signals intelligence
    equipment, MRAP vehicles, nonstandard commercial vehicles, vehicle and
    body armor, weapons and munitions, aircraft, and jammers.
        b.  In fiscal year 2009, I approved the MC-130W PSP modification
    CMNS (Dragon Spear). The estimated cost to modify the MC-130W fleet (12
    aircraft) was $415 million. Because the PSP requirement was urgently
    needed for current operations, I used the fiscal year 2009 Combat
    Mission Requirements funds ($20 million) and $1 million of other
    baseline procurement to immediately initiate this urgent combat
    capability. The Department provided the sources for the remaining
    aircraft modifications, to include over $63 million of fiscal year 2007
    supplemental funds for ammunition.
        c.  In the past year, SOCOM has received several short-notice
    requests for additional forces and equipment to support surge
    operations in the CENTCOM AOR. The command reprogrammed over $8 million
    of procurement funds from other baseline priorities in fiscal year 2009
    to ensure deploying forces were properly equipped with items identified
    through the CMNS process.

        The additional $30 million in the fiscal year 2011 OCO request will
    provide the command with the resourcing flexibility needed to quickly
    address future surge requirements approved via the CMNS process, which
    will result in providing deploying forces with equipment needed to
    prevent loss of life or mission failure. If appropriated, the command
    will provide Congress the specific equipment purchased with these funds
    in the Quarterly CMNS Report.

        76. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what circumstances have arisen
    to necessitate a 150 percent increase in CMNS authority?
        Admiral Olson. See answer to question #75.

                      countering violent extremism efforts
        77. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, following the attacks on
    September 11, 2001, SOCOM was designated as the lead synchronizer for
    countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts for DOD. These efforts
    encompass both kinetic and nonkinetic efforts. Concerns have been
    raised about the ineffective coordination internally and between the
    relevant interagency stakeholders. What is SOCOM doing to ensure that
    our efforts both on the ground and in the strategic communication arena
    are synchronized?
        Admiral Olson. I see SOCOM's role in CVE as two-fold: as a force
    provider, we leverage SOF's persistent presence in over 75 countries to
    conduct high quality, low profile, long-term engagements in SFA. These
    actions foster trust, and enable partners to directly combat extremist
    organizations through advising, training, and--when authorized and
    funded--equipping of forces. Functionally, this is executed by
    providing SOF to GCCs, and in some cases, authorized via a funding
    mechanism commonly referred to as section 1208. This mechanism affords
    the training and equipping of indigenous forces, both regular and
    irregular, in support of ongoing U.S. counterterrorism operations.
        Second, we work as a synchronizer for DOD for the global campaign
    against terrorist networks, and so we look across the spectrum of what
    our partners do in CVE. SOCOM plays a large role in synchronization
    through the crafting of DOD strategy that ensures all GCCs are
    executing regional/country plans within the architecture of the larger
    global plan, and that are applying similar and consistent metrics
    across regions to determine the best application of SOF resources. The
    current version of DOD CONPLAN 7500 recognizes that to achieve success
    requires a broader focus, one which addresses the underlying causes of
    extremism. The strategy reflects the primacy of indirect approaches,
    both to deter active and tacit support for VEOs and to erode extremist
    support for VEO ideology. Specifically, the focus must include indirect
    and ideologically-based activities CVE, while building organic
    capacities toward this end among our allies and partners. This plan in
    turn supports the National Implementation Plan for the War and Terror
    (NIP), sponsored by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The
    NIP is comprised of four pillars, one of which CVE underpins the other
    three: protection and defense of the homeland, preventing terrorist
    acquisition of WMD, and attacking terrorists and their capacity to
    operate.
        In our role as synchronizer, we conduct semi-annual forums where we
    bring together our partners in DOD, in the interagency, and our
    partners in certain international countries to begin to work together
    to apply the strategy and translate that into operational actions. From
    these work groups come specific tasks that various communities of
    interest accept, and strive through a variety of venues to provide an
    acceptable resolution for all involved.
        The command believes in cultivating credible influence to build the
    foundation for change, one which promotes ideologies that reject
    extremist affiliation and action. In tandem, we undercut the resources
    and recruitment efforts of VEOs to limit both their sustainment and
    freedom of action.
        The Expanded Trans-Regional Psychological Operations Program (ETRP)
    is the mortar in this ideological foundation, one providing a uniform
    set of objectives available to all GCCs to conduct CVE-centric,
    psychological operations (PSYOP) activities in support of CONPLAN 7500.
    Within ETRP is a system of checks and balances, an approval process to
    ensure DOD-conducted PSYOP activities are executed with full awareness
    and approval of the appropriate DOS representative. This includes U.S.
    ambassadors within countries where these capabilities are employed.
        SOCOM's program of record, ETRP-MIST (Military Information Support
    Team), provides the resourcing and deployment mechanism for the forces
    executing these operations. ETRP-MIST is currently supporting 25 SOCOM
    MISTs, units deployed at the specific request of U.S. ambassadors
    around the globe. Working closely with and authorized by embassy public
    affairs and diplomacy staffs, MISTs--usually small in number--conduct
    local information programs via local media in service to ETRP and DOS
    Mission Strategic Plan CVE goals.
        SOCOM's Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) provides
    operational planning, analytic research and production support for all
    of the GCCs. JMISC produces six military-to-military journals, one for
    each GCC, with particular topical emphasis on CVE and regional
    security. In tandem, the JMISC's four regional influence web sites
    counter Internet-based misinformation supporting extremism, while
    synchronizing DOD's web-based messages on CVE topics.
        As a point of distinction, SOCOM remains steadfast in
    distinguishing between DOS diplomacy efforts and DOD-led influence
    campaigns. While both directly address CVE, our efforts are
    specifically designed to deter, prevent, and disrupt violent
    extremists. Still, we recognize and appreciate the logic of
    coordinating and synchronizing these endeavors toward a common
    objective of reducing the appeal of violent extremism.
        While the military is not the lead in this effort, SOF Civil
    Affairs teams conduct a diverse set of activities promoting development
    and goodwill through building of infrastructure, job skill training,
    and the provision of medical, dental, and veterinary care in areas
    where existing governance structures are unable or unwilling to provide
    these services. Again, as with SFA, the focus of SOF Civil Affairs is
    on long-term capacity building within local and national structures.
        The paradigm of national sovereignty is challenged by the trends of
    crime, migration, and extremism, and the competition of resources which
    drive populations and provoke conflict. Recognizing this, SOCOM's
    engagement efforts through the Sovereign Challenge Program continue as
    a unique method of establishing relationships with senior military
    leaders from around the world. The program, in collaboration with the
    DOS, aims to provide venues in which robust dialogue about threats to
    sovereignty can take place. In this indirect and mutually beneficial
    approach to military relationships, long-term success is measured by
    other countries' actions in their own and the region's security
    interests.
        Finally, the command simultaneously strikes at the financial center
    of VEOs, serving as the DOD lead in Counter Threat Finance. In close
    partnership with other combatant commanders, the Services, and--as
    directed--appropriate U.S. Government agencies and international
    partners, we spearhead DOD efforts to identify, track, and dry up this
    flow of capital in the interest of national security.

        78. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what is your assessment of the
    effectiveness of current U.S. efforts to CVE?
        Admiral Olson. Current U.S. efforts to CVE have had some successes
    but they still have a way to go in combating the multi-pronged
    ideological appeal of our enemies. By highlighting the violence against
    Muslim civilians and the oppression associated with violent extremist
    in Iraq and Afghanistan, our efforts have helped undercut the appeal of
    VEOs and al Qaeda. Despite these successes, our enemies have
    demonstrated a great deal of effectiveness by appealing to regional
    frustration over the continued delays in the Middle East peace process,
    and by raising questions over the legitimacy of other regional
    governments. Those issues have been endemic to the region for decades,
    and will continue to pose a challenge to U.S. efforts to undermine the
    appeal of VEOs.

        79. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, where can DOD and its civilian
    counterparts improve coordination and eliminate redundant efforts?
        Admiral Olson. I can only speak to this issue from my perspective
    as Commander, SOCOM; however, our working arrangement with most of DOD
    provides me with some unique insight on this central question.
        We have a number of activities at HQ SOCOM that address this matter
    daily to include our Interagency Task Force (IATF). Interagency
    coordination is one of the responsibilities assigned to SOCOM in DOD's
    CONPLAN 7500. This CONPLAN outlines the Department's campaign to deter,
    disrupt, and defeat al Qaeda and transnational terrorist organizations
    and it directs SOCOM to serve as the global synchronizer for such
    efforts within the U.S. Government.
        Our interagency relationships are further enhanced by the Special
    Operations Support Teams, a network of IATF-managed liaison and
    advisory experts with deep Special Operations backgrounds, posted at
    the headquarters and activities of key interagency organizations and
    command partners across the whole of government.
        We believe the coordination mechanisms and processes are robust and
    working well, and that we can typically collaborate across the
    interagency spectrum in a timely and effective manner. SOCOM has an
    excellent track record over the past 5 years of coordinating and
    resolving contentious issues and new requirements by leveraging senior
    leader-to-action officer engagements such as: combatant command and
    interagency planning conferences, working groups, the SOCOM Global
    Synchronization Conference for counterterrorism, strategic planning
    forums, and JCS OSD plans reviews. What we have less ability to do is
    influence matters of redundancy in policy, planning, and implementation
    matters beyond our statutory and post-September 11 policy authorities.
    There are routine issues involving SOF that are clearly both functional
    (our job for force preparation, posturing, delivery/replacement, and
    support) and geographic (the primary purview of the GCCs). Here, where
    these domains intersect at the operational level, we collaborate with
    the GCCs and with the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs);
    examples of this collaboration include reviews of the theater
    operational plans, analytical and assessment support to theater and
    TSOC activities employing SOF, and SOF support to the Provisional
    Reconstruction Teams (PRT). We see much less redundancy in these areas
    than in more macro-level, national policy generated initiatives.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                                   cerp funds
        80. Senator Sessions. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, when you
    compare the effectiveness of DOD in implementing CERP funds versus DOS/
    USAID in implementing the same type of funding, which agency is the
    most effective?
        Admiral Olson. I am not in a position to provide you with an
    informed answer as SOCOM does not manage CERP funds. CENTCOM is better
    positioned to compare the effectiveness of the DOD and DOS/USAID
    programs.
        General Petraeus. CERP and DOS/USAID programs are complementary in
    nature and we work together to ensure the most effective application of
    resources. Metrics to determine which agency is more effective in
    implementing the same type of funding do not exist.

        81. Senator Sessions. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, compared
    to CERP funding, does DOS/USAID get a disproportional percentage of DOD
    Section 1207-type funds than they should based on value added in the
    field?
        Admiral Olson. SOCOM does not execute funding provided under the
    1207 program. Additionally, beginning with the fiscal year 2011
    President's budget request, all funding for the 1207 program was
    transferred to DOS.
        General Petraeus. Given a lack of formal metrics for a comparison
    basis, it would be difficult to determine if DOS/USAID receives a
    disproportionate percentage of DOD Section 1207 type funds. Any formal
    assessment as to the sufficiency of 1207 type funds for DOS/USAID
    should be provided by that agency.

        82. Senator Sessions. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, are the
    policy objectives of DOS and DOD tied closely enough when executing
    foreign and security assistance programs?
        Admiral Olson. At the strategic level, the policy objectives of DOD
    and DOS are nested in support of the National Security Strategy. We
    have achieved good results in the building of ISF and are moving toward
    a sustainable program in Afghanistan. The difficulty is between policy
    goals and program execution. While policy objectives are aligned in
    areas outside of Operation Iraqi Freedom and OEF, the execution of
    foreign and security assistance programs are not achieving enduring
    results. Geographic combatant commands and U.S. embassies are
    challenged with Cold War-era security assistance programs that, while
    sufficient for the threat at that time, are not responsive or broad
    enough to adequately address current threats.
        General Petraeus. Yes, DOD and DOS policies on foreign and security
    assistance programs are closely integrated at every level. The DOD
    personnel within the country team assist in the development of the
    Mission Strategic Resources Plan and DOS personnel assist DOD in
    security cooperation planning. For grant recipient countries, DOS and
    DOD personnel jointly develop the foreign military financing budget.
    Both departments closely coordinate on Foreign Military Sales and
    International Military Education and Training Programs. DOS and DOD
    cooperate on the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative programs to
    improve partner capacity in responding to U.N.-brokered peacekeeping
    missions and additionally, programs planned for partner nations under
    the Global Train and Equip authority are developed in synchronization
    with, and are approved only after, concurrence from DOS. A particularly
    notable example of the strong cooperation between DOS and DOD is the
    execution of section 1206 projects which receive dual Departments of
    Defense and State vetting with the country teams, then continued dual
    vetting from the action officers to the Secretary level within the
    departments.
        During the Theater Strategy and Campaign plan development, CENTCOM
    uses DOS policy guidance and Mission Strategic Resources Plans in order
    to synchronize our efforts with DOS elements within our AOR. Finally,
    we routinely invite leaders in the State Regional Bureaus and Chiefs of
    Mission to participate in conferences and strategic discussions in
    order to integrate our efforts and benefit from the full range of
    political-military perspectives and insight.

                                  afghanistan
        83. Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, is there enough emphasis on
    stabilization progress in remote locations as compared to heavy
    population areas?
        General Petraeus. The stabilization/reconstruction efforts of the
    coalition and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan
    consist of building physical infrastructure, fostering economic
    development, and promoting good governance. Showcasing CENTCOM's
    involvement are the 27 U.S. and Coalition PRTs and 9 U.S. Agribusiness
    Development Teams (ADT) operating in 31 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.
        While it is true that these are headquartered in the most populated
    areas, that is by design. As General McChrystal, Commander of the ISAF
    stated in his Initial Assessment of August 2009, our COIN efforts are
    concentrated in high-population areas because they're the most highly
    contested with the insurgency. Similarly, stabilization activities are
    focused in those locations because their existing infrastructure can be
    leveraged for maximum gains.
        We would always like to do more; and, as opportunities arise, we're
    expanding our efforts. In March, a 13th U.S. PRT began operation in
    Kapisa province. In July, the Republic of South Korea is establishing a
    PRT in Parwan. Turkey is working to assume PRT duties in Jowzjan and
    Sar-I Pul, freeing Sweden to concentrate its focus on Balkh and
    Samangan. In March a ninth ADT moved into Zabul. In addition, a
    concerted civilian uplift effort has tripled the number of governance
    and development experts in theater from roughly 300 to 1,000 since
    January 2009, with an additional 20 to 30 percent increase anticipated
    by the end of this year.
        In order to ensure we have a balanced perspective on apportioning
    efforts between rural and developed areas, the coalition is
    increasingly relying on the Government of Afghanistan to decide where
    those activities are focused. Across the board, implementing partners
    are working with 26,000 Afghans to institute stabilization activities,
    including the USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, which is
    establishing links with 264 local representatives at districts/village
    level. In addition, DOS's Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional
    Stabilization Strategy has set goals of: authorizing six Afghanistan
    ministries to receive direct U.S. assistance by December 2010;
    channeling at least 40 percent of U.S. Government development
    assistance through the Afghanistan Government and local Afghanistan
    NGOs by December 2010; increasing local procurement of supplies to 20
    percent by July 2011; ensuring 200,000 farmers and entrepreneurs have
    access to credit; establishing District Development Working Groups in 6
    pilot districts in Regional Commands East and South; providing block
    grants to mayors in 42 municipalities to improve delivery of services;
    expanding the ability of Afghanistan's core ministries to oversee and
    implement programs; implementing and monitoring new flexible funding
    strategies, such as the Performance Based Governors Fund, in 2010; and
    developing a plan to mitigate indirect effects of corruption resulting
    from increased military and civilian presence.
        Partnering between national, provincial, district, and community
    officials will best address each level's needs. This won't maximize
    achievements at any given level, but it will optimize gains across the
    whole of Afghanistan.

        84. Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, to what degree does success
    in the remote locations affect our overall objectives?
        General Petraeus. In line with the COIN doctrine, the main effort
    will be directed to the centers of population and expanding the
    security zones in these areas and the surrounding districts. This will
    bring a significant portion of the population under the GIRoA control,
    as well as denying insurgents vital terrain, limiting their freedom of
    movement and access to key population centers. However, as a result,
    insurgents are likely to move to the less populated and more remote
    areas. In doing so, they are separated from the population and have
    less ability to negatively influence them. Moreover, in remote areas,
    the insurgent is easier to identify, he is separated from the majority
    of his arms caches, and he can be tracked as he moves into the
    populated areas to undertake his attacks.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                         rights of women in afghanistan
        85. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, I recently traveled to
    Afghanistan, and during that travel I visited Garmsir, the Helmand
    provincial capital just weeks before the start of the recent Helmand
    offensive. One particular thing that struck me as I walked freely
    around, without a flak jacket, was the absence of women. I was in an
    open marketplace, yet there were no women to be found. Knowing that a
    key component of the COIN model is the reintegrating of the Taliban
    into Afghanistan society, do you see the future rights of women as a
    cause for concern?
        General Petraeus. CENTCOM supports the current efforts of the DOS
    as they work with the GIRoA to develop effective governance that
    includes and respects the rights of women. This is consistent within
    the greater COIN context focused on protecting the entire population.
        The Women's Action Plan which Secretary Clinton announced at the
    London Conference is comprehensive and signals our sustained commitment
    to improving women's rights. This is a key component of our efforts to
    strengthen Afghan communities against the effects of extremist
    ideologies. The ISAF is working with Embassy Kabul to ensure
    reintegration efforts incorporate elements of these programs and
    continue to advance women's rights. More broadly, as the President
    emphasized in his State of the Union Address, our policies in
    Afghanistan will also reflect our national values, including support
    for universally recognized human rights.
        The prevailing imperative remains to provide security so
    development can occur. Violence against women and girls is endemic and
    much remains to be done including increased access for women to
    institutions of justice, civic education, and prosecution of crimes.
    Further, we must work with DOS and USAID to implement programs as soon
    as the security situation will allow in all regions. The women of
    Afghanistan are critical to progress and stability in their war torn
    country.
        Of important note, we have seen some success toward Afghan women's
    rights over the last 8 years. These gains include businesses'
    ownership, voting, positions in government and professions such as
    medicine, law, and academia, but are mostly limited to the urban areas.
    Embassy Kabul is intensifying their efforts to help women. One example
    is a new $27 million fund of small, flexible, rapid response grants
    targeted to empower Afghan women-led NGOs at the local level to serve
    their fellow citizens. The grants provide technical assistance and
    support for programs ranging from economic development, literacy,
    training, and health care.

                                     syria
        86. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, recently Ambassador Robert
    Ford was nominated to be the next Ambassador to Syria. We withdrew the
    U.S. Ambassador from Damascus in 2005 because of terrorism issues. As
    early as last year you discussed that Syria was allowing or accepting
    terrorism facilitators to operate from and through Syrian territory. In
    your opinion, is this the right time to send an ambassador to Syria?
        General Petraeus. I believe it is the right time. The U.S.
    Government seeks to improve engagement with Syria in the international
    arena and the essential element to restarting a relationship is an in-
    country ambassador to coordinating U.S. Government policy. We need to
    reestablish our ambassadorial presence to permit access and recurring
    state-to-state engagement between Syria and the United States.

        87. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, how does engagement with a
    nation aiding terrorists help your position in the region?
        General Petraeus. Engagement with Syria demonstrates to our Arab
    partners in the region that we are committed to regional stability and
    our engagement enables increased opportunities to explore mutual
    interests with Syria. Only through direct engagement can we build the
    foundation for a stable partnership that challenges violent extremism,
    contributes to stability in the Middle East, and encourages Syria to
    broaden its national objectives and become a cooperative nation that
    pursues policies to enhance stability and economic opportunity in the
    region.

                                     yemen
        88. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, despite internal challenges
    that include a rebellion in the north and a secessionist movement in
    the south, you have mentioned in the past that Yemen has made security
    improvements with regard to combating terrorism. However, as is well
    known, Yemen has long been a refuge for terrorists. Despite U.S.
    funding for counterterrorism, I see little progress in that country to
    fight terrorism. Just last month you mentioned that Saudi Arabia and
    the other Middle East peninsula countries have continued to make gains
    with the obvious exception of Yemen. What is really needed to help
    Yemen make substantial security gains?
        General Petraeus. Yemen faces internal threats with a rebellion in
    the north and a secessionist movement in the south. The conditions in
    Yemen must improve to deny al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
    access to sanctuary and training camps--like the one used by the
    Christmas bomber. Since December 2009, Yemen has had some success in
    counter-terrorist operations against AQAP. Currently, the Republic of
    Yemen, under President Saleh, is maintaining a cease-fire with the
    rebels in the north who are adhering to the conditions set forth by the
    government. This cease-fire brings some stability and now permits the
    Government of Yemen to increase its focus on combating terrorism.
        In the past year, U.S. counterterrorism funding for Yemen has more
    than doubled from $67.2 million in fiscal year 2009 to $137.2 million
    in fiscal year 2010. This increase aligns with CENTCOM's plan to
    enhance the capability and capacity of the Yemeni security and
    counterterrorism forces. However, the challenges associated with
    Yemen's counterterror operations capability and capacity require a
    long-term, sustained commitment to a whole-of-government approach that
    addresses governance, security, and economic development. This program
    must include persistent U.S. Government engagement and security
    assistance to address these challenges. We must also continue to
    encourage other nations, both regionally and around the world, to
    assist Yemen with its security challenges and provide increased
    economic opportunities which address the conditions necessary for
    improved security.

                                   tajikistan
        89. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, Tajikistan recently held
    parliamentary elections in which the ruling party won almost 72 percent
    of the vote. Most outside observers, including the Office for
    Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, described the election as
    ``failing on many basic democratic standards.'' The results also reveal
    some of the problems within this country. From what I have read, over
    70 percent of the population in Tajikistan live in abject poverty and
    over half of the labor force actually works in Russia or Kazakhstan.
    Some have predicted it is on its way to becoming a failed state. Since
    it shares over 800 miles of border with Northern Afghanistan, what
    occurs in Tajikistan is important to our efforts in Afghanistan. What
    is your assessment of the situation in Tajikistan?
        General Petraeus. Tajikistan is considered the poorest country from
    the former Soviet Union. Economic growth is limited due to extremely
    harsh environmental conditions, extremely limited sources of income,
    and rampant corruption. It is the second-most mountainous country in
    the world, and is routinely plagued by earthquakes, blizzards, floods,
    droughts, locust infestations, and extreme weather. Parts of the
    country are frequently cut off by snow, landslides, and avalanches.
    Floods in May 2009 caused an estimated $100 million in damage and
    required large amounts of immediate international assistance.
    Tajikistan remains heavily reliant on the Tajik Aluminum Company plant
    as its major source of foreign income, despite a one-third reduction in
    aluminum prices world wide. Its second-most important income source,
    remittances from citizens working in Russia, Kazakhstan, and other
    countries, has also been affected by the worldwide economic slowdown,
    which had some effect on the Russian and Kazakhstani economies.
    Furthermore, policies in Russia are forcing some Tajikistanis to return
    to Tajikistan or pay more in costs to live in Russia. Corruption at all
    levels causes international investors to view Tajikistan as a
    remarkably difficult place to do business. Tajikistan is also a major
    processing and transportation hub for narcotics emanating from
    Afghanistan. Tajikistan requires international assistance to meet its
    development and humanitarian needs.
        In addition to its economic and environmental plight, Tajikistan's
    government struggles to advance political reforms or improve governance
    to a level acceptable by western standards. There is little in the way
    of an organized opposition in the country. The upper military
    leadership is hand-picked and loyal to President Rahmon. Although the
    Tajiks are the best news is that Tajikistan remains mindful of the
    damage caused to its society by the civil war in the 1990s and there is
    a broad consensus that all want to avoid a relapse into such violence.
    The power-sharing arrangement that ended the civil war has gradually
    eroded over time.
        Tajik elections routinely fail to meet basic democratic standards,
    situation in Central Asia. Tajikistan does have a government-authorized
    political party formed specifically around an Islamic identity, the
    Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan led by Muhiddin Kabiri.
    Recently, the government appeared to be increasing pressure on foreign
    religious organizations. Political parties in Tajikistan will require
    international assistance to reach effective political mobilization, and
    Tajikistan's laws have made rendering this assistance problematic.
        Internationally, the Government of Tajikistan is most enthusiastic
    about cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism, border
    security, and counternarcotics. Tajikistan joined the Global
    Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, and is committed to fielding a
    peacekeeping company by 2010. Tajikistan agreed to our request to allow
    transit of non-lethal supplies to our forces in Afghanistan. Continued
    security cooperation and improved economic assistance to Tajikistan not
    only contributes to regional stability by helping one of Afghanistan's
    neighbors, but also builds opportunity for other international
    assistance to address socio-economic and political freedom issues in
    Tajikistan.

        90. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, are you concerned that
    Tajikistan could be a possible refuge for Taliban fighters and possibly
    other terrorist elements?
        General Petraeus. Tajikistan is an unlikely refuge for Taliban
    fighters and would not provide a sanctuary similar to the Federally
    Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. Although historical precedent
    indicates some Central Asian terrorist groups, such as the Islamic
    Movement of Uzbekistan, have used Tajikistan for refuge, current
    terrorist elements in Tajikistan are limited and small in number. The
    primary concern regarding Tajikistan is its use as a trafficking route
    for narcotics, weapons, and other illicit items that can be used to
    support and facilitate the insurgency in Afghanistan. Tajikistan has
    become a key route for smugglers due to a lack of resources to apply to
    border security; however, the Government of Tajikistan actively combats
    concentrations of suspected militants within its borders as evidenced
    by several operations against alleged extremists in the past year.

                                     israel
        91. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, the Israeli-Palestinian
    conflict is obviously a central issue in the Middle East. Yet, Israel
    is the one Middle Eastern country not within your AOR. In some cases,
    like India and Pakistan, it can be very helpful to divide the AORs
    along political lines. Why should Israel be a part of U.S. European
    Command (EUCOM) and not CENTCOM?
        General Petraeus. Historically, Israel has been part of EUCOM. They
    have an established relationship that goes back many years that
    includes a long period of continuous contact enabling effective
    engagement with Israel on military-to-military activities. While some
    could argue the value of moving Israel into the CENTCOM AOR based on
    geography and the important role Israel plays in Middle Eastern
    events--I believe that the present arrangement best serves U.S.
    interests. The current theater boundaries allow CENTCOM to interact
    effectively with the current countries in our AOR. Any adjustments in
    the boundary now could have significant consequences and might
    negatively impact our access to key areas that support military
    operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the effort to counter piracy.

        92. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, do you support moving Israel
    into CENTCOM?
        General Petraeus. I support the current COCOM boundary with Israel
    remaining assigned to EUCOM. CENTCOM has developed new relationships
    and strengthened partnerships across our region without the inclusion
    of Israel and believe there is no compelling reason to change the
    current arrangement. We coordinate very closely with EUCOM on
    significant events and issues that affect both our AORs, including
    those issues that center on Israel.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator George S. LeMieux
                                   venezuela
        93. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Olson, President Chavez has
    considerably deepened his country's cooperation with state sponsors of
    terror. Since 2007, there have been weekly Tehran-Damascus-Caracas
    flights that are not subject to appropriate checks. In January 2009 he
    called for, and the Venezuelan National Assembly obediently approved, a
    resolution calling for international recognition of the Revolutionary
    Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army as
    belligerent forces, rather than terrorist groups. In July 2009, the
    Colombian Government seized several sophisticated Swedish-made antitank
    rockets that had been originally sold to the Venezuelan army. The
    Venezuelan Government has yet to fully explain how these sophisticated
    weapons ended up in the hands of a terrorist organization for which
    President Chavez has ideological sympathies. On March 1, 2010, a
    Spanish judge accused the Basque separatist group ETA and Colombia's
    FARC of plotting to kill Colombian politicians in Spain with Venezuelan
    Government cooperation. Is Venezuela behaving like a state sponsor of
    terrorism?
        Admiral Olson. Since 1999, Venezuela, under President Hugo Chavez,
    has increasingly demonstrated domestic and international behavior
    patterns which mirror similar past behavior patterns of the four
    current state sponsors of terrorism which include Iran, Syria, Sudan,
    and Cuba. President Chavez's main international mission is to challenge
    U.S. interests in the Americas and around the globe. This mission is
    accomplished through the provisions of ``passive'' support to regional
    terrorist groups and paramilitary forces which presents an attractive
    safe haven or way-station for terrorists due to Venezuela's
    unwillingness to deny terrorists use of its territory. Corruption
    within the Venezuelan Government and military, ideological ties with
    the FARC and ELN, maturing relationships with the other state sponsors
    of terrorism, easily obtainable travel documents, and weak
    international counternarcotics cooperation are all factors that have
    helped to fuel a permissive operating environment for terrorists and
    drug traffickers. These factors may also lead to the potential increase
    in transit to the United States and Europe of illicit goods and
    activities.
        Under President Chavez's direction, Venezuela has provided
    political and logistical support to the FARC. Specifically, he has
    permitted senior FARC officials, such as Rodrigo Granda, Marin Arango
    (aka Ivan Marquez), and Rodrigo London Echeverry (aka Timochenko or
    Timoleon Jiminez) to move freely within Venezuela and across its
    international borders. Arango/Marquez currently plays an important role
    as an intermediary in developing international connections and support
    for FARC.
        On March 1, 2008, after a Colombian military strike against a FARC
    camp on Ecuador's side of the shared border resulted in the death of
    FARC's chief of staff, Luis Edgar Devia Silva (aka Raul Reyes) and 24
    FARC members and sympathizers, computers belonging to the FARC
    commander were retrieved. These computers yielded an intelligence
    bonanza for Colombia, including evidence from Reyes' computers that
    Chavez and his lieutenants were in frequent contact with FARC leaders
    and regularly discussing ways to assist the group with money, arms,
    logistical support, and strategic advice. Particularly worrisome was
    the readiness of Chavez's agents to propose up to $300 million in aid
    to FARC and to act as facilitators for FARC to acquire sophisticated
    weaponry, particularly surface-to-air missiles or manportable air
    defense systems.
        In September 2008, after a review of the intelligence collected
    from the Reyes laptops, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of
    Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) identified two senior Venezuelan
    officials--General Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, Director of
    Venezuela's Military Intelligence (DGIM); and Henry de Jesus Rangel
    Silva, Head of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Service
    (DISIP), Venezuela's FBI; as well as former Justice and Interior
    Minister Ramon Rodriguez Chacin--as materially assisting FARC narcotics
    trafficking under the Kingpin Act. Carvajal, in particular, has long
    figured as a primary intermediary between the FARC and the Chavez
    Government.
        In July 2009, Colombian officials disclosed that their Army had
    recovered three anti-tank weapons from FARC. These weapons, AT-4 anti-
    tank rockets, were swiftly traced back to their Swedish manufacturer,
    which reported the weapons were sold to the Venezuelan army in the
    1980s. President Chavez at first called the entire report false. Later
    he reversed this position, claiming the weapons were stolen in 1995
    during a FARC raid into Venezuela. Chavez could not explain why
    communications exchanges between FARC leaders in early 2007 that are
    documented in the Reyes laptops spoke of a recent transfer of ``85mm
    antitank rockets'' from Venezuela to FARC, precisely the weapons
    recovered by the Colombians.

        94. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Olson, in your opinion, should the
    United States designate Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism?
        Admiral Olson. According to the DOS, there are currently four
    countries officially designated as state sponsors of terrorism--Iran,
    Syria, Sudan, and Cuba. Venezuela is not on the official list but their
    cooperation in the international campaign against terrorism has
    steadily declined over the past several years. President Chavez has
    been vocal in his public criticism of U.S. counterterrorism efforts,
    championing Iraqi terrorists, and deepening ties with state sponsors of
    terrorism such as Iran, Syria, and Cuba through increased military,
    and/or commercial cooperation.
        In addition, President Chavez's ideological sympathy for the FARC
    and the National Liberation Army (ELN) limits Venezuelan cooperation
    with the United States and Colombia in combating regional terrorism.
    The FARC, ELN, and other paramilitary groups often use the Venezuelan
    border region to secure logistical supplies, as well as support the
    transshipment of arms and drugs.
        At this time, Venezuela does not represent a direct military or
    terrorist threat to the United States, but Venezuela's ``passive''
    support to regional terrorist groups and paramilitary forces, maturing
    relationship with state sponsors of terrorism and permissive operating
    environment for terrorists and drug traffickers suggest increased
    scrutiny by the United States is warranted.

        95. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, do you believe Iran is a
    growing threat to stability in our hemisphere based on their increased
    cooperation with Venezuela and other states hostile to the United
    States?
        General Petraeus. This assessment would be better answered by our
    intelligence agencies in conjunction with the Commander, U.S. Southern
    Command (SOUTHCOM).

                             information operations
        96. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, the insurgents seem to have
    a better network to get their messages out after an attack. To win the
    hearts and minds of the populace, we need to have a robust information
    environment that provides an accurate account of military operations;
    additionally, we need to be the first to admit to mistakes that lead to
    civilian casualties. What are we doing to counter the inaccurate and
    negative accounts of military operations in your AOR?
        General Petraeus. Unlike our adversaries, our mission is to be
    ``first with the truth.'' Often times, getting to the truth takes time,
    but we're working hard to decrease the time it takes us to get our word
    out. We are currently adding a team of communicators, including
    language specialists, to the ISAF Joint Headquarters Joint Operations
    Center in Afghanistan to provide a rapid response capability, similar
    to the capability we had in Baghdad. By positioning professional
    communicators in the Joint Operations Center, they can monitor
    operations unfolding and plan in advance for events that require
    messaging and responses. These personnel also monitor media reporting,
    and work to correct factual errors as appropriate, while also providing
    accurate information quickly to news organizations in the language of
    the medium.
        A major investment is also being made in our information operations
    capability in Afghanistan with the recent stand up of the Information
    Operations Task Force, or IOTF, operating in the realms of PSYOPS,
    electronic warfare, computer network operations, operations security,
    and military deception. We formed this Task Force based on the lessons
    we learned in Iraq with the IOTF we had there, but the Afghanistan
    version has been considerably adapted to better operate in the vastly
    different information environment of that country, where literacy is a
    significant challenge and traditional communication and radio dominate
    as means of dissemination.
        Since the establishment of USFOR-A's IOTF, that organization is
    combating the insurgency's narrative daily, attacking not only the
    adversary's message but also attacking, both kinetically and
    nonkinetically, the adversary's messengers and their networks. Since
    achieving full operational capacity shortly after the turn of this
    year, the IOTF has established three major efforts with seven
    subordinate operations that serve to counter the adversary's
    propaganda, encourage the reintegration of low- to mid-level fighters
    back into Afghan society, target individual bad actors, and amplify the
    growing capacity and will of our uniformed partners in the ANA, the
    ANP, and Afghan Border Police as they assume more of the fight from
    U.S. and coalition forces.
        At CENTCOM headquarters, there are several communication activities
    we are currently engaged in to counter inaccuracies and negative
    reporting. We have implemented a headquarter-led Communication
    Integration Working Group that helps synchronize communication efforts
    across the AOR. This weekly collaboration and cross-purpose command
    function is a cornerstone activity that helps us effectively address
    communication issues and ensure more accurate reporting in the media
    and in social networks. We also have media watch personnel in the
    CENTCOM headquarters who monitor the press constantly while assessing
    press reporting. These analysts work hand-in-hand with senior military
    public affairs officers. A 24/7 operation, these media monitors also
    help to develop time sensitive press guidance and analysis on various
    issues. With all our communication activities, we continually strive to
    align our words, actions, and images to achieve desired outcomes.

        97. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, one of the tenets of SOF is
    the use of leverage to get results disproportionate to level of effort.
    Radio-in-a-box (RIAB) devices are currently being used to put out news
    and information including messages from U.S. forces. The last update I
    had on this program was over 1,500 of these sets had been distributed
    throughout Afghanistan. Has this been an effective strategy?
        General Petraeus. Use of RIAB is an effective strategy. Radio
    programming is the most common method of mass media in Afghanistan and
    reaches the largest audiences. This is due to high illiteracy rates (72
    percent of the population), lack of infrastructure in rural areas to
    provide terrestrial TV, cost of TVs, low satellite TV installation and
    reception, and very low internet penetration.
        The estimate of 1,500 RIAB systems distributed across Afghanistan
    appears to be too high. According to ISAF Joint Command (IJC) there are
    currently 123 RIAB systems operating in Afghanistan. There are an
    additional 50 RIABs in various states of repair.
        The majority of the RIAB systems belong to battle space owners and
    are operated by their information operations personnel. Most systems
    are run by contracted local nationals who provide information in the
    local dialect making the content more acceptable to the local
    population.
        The RIAB is an effective tool used to disseminate news, public
    service announcements, and command information to the local population.
    Improvements are planned in training, maintenance, and message
    synchronization to improve RIABs' usefulness to battle space
    commanders.

        98. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, have we put enough out or do
    we need more and are there other information operations (IO) we should
    be exploiting, but are not?
        General Petraeus. We must expand our capability to contest
    extremist groups and adversaries in the IO battle space, in particular,
    fourth generation communications (4G) will play a critical role in the
    years to come. 4G provides a secure and comprehensive all-IP-based
    solution where services (gaming, multi-media, ultra broad band
    internet, and IP telephony) can be streamlined instantly to the end
    user. Many countries within our area of operations skip a generation of
    communication infrastructure and move towards faster, real-time
    information platforms. Our ability to stay competitive with our
    enemies' dissemination of information is crucial to long-term success
    in the fight. Our adversaries understand the nature of this fight, and
    they use every method of influence available to them. The information
    space in which this war is fought has become increasingly complex with
    violent extremist groups displaying the ability to use emerging media
    conduits, including the expanded use of the Internet and Web 2.0
    technologies (mobile communications devices, blogs, social networking
    sites, et cetera) to recruit forces, solicit funding, share tradecraft,
    and spread their ideology. Extremist groups realize they cannot
    effectively defeat us or overthrow governments in the region through
    conventional military operations. Thus, they use the information
    environment as a key line of effort for their campaigns, and they use
    kinetic attacks to enable their IO and to kill and injure our forces,
    our partners, and innocent civilians.

        99. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, what is the training
    pipeline for soldiers who conduct IO?
        General Petraeus. The Services have the mission of providing
    trained IO personnel to the combatant commanders. Each Service has a
    different method of accomplishing this task, based on its institutional
    history, mission, and organization.
        The Army has several Military Occupational Specialties (MOS)
    involved in IO for both officers and enlisted. Functional Areas (FA)
    within the IO construct include FA 30 Information Operations Officer,
    FA 29 Electronic Warfare, FA 37A PSYOP Officer, and FA 59 Strategic
    Planner. There are school houses at various installations, such as Fort
    Leavenworth's Combined Arms Center, that function as educational
    establishments and functional proponents.
        The Air Force, in contrast, does not have a dedicated IO Specialty
    Code. The Air Force IO Career Field is managed via Special Experience
    Identifiers (SEIs) and an Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). These
    identifiers and codes are awarded for attending training, on the job
    experience, and based on a commander's recommendation.
        The Navy has established the Information Dominance Corps to lead
    and manage a cadre of officers, enlisted and civilian IO professionals.
    IO personnel are given functional training, and acquire advanced
    education and significant experience. Officers are given an IO
    designation and enlisted personnel get Navy Enlisted Codes (NECs) upon
    accomplishing established prerequisites.
        The Marine Corps IO Force does not have a primary MOS, but does
    have four additional MOSs to designate IO specialists. Like the Air
    Force and Navy, the Marine Corps requires their IO specialists to meet
    educational goals, on the job training, and successful completion of
    Active Duty tours to be awarded specific MOSs.
        The combatant command has the responsibility to provide correct
    demand signals to the Services so they provide the right numbers of
    people, with the right skills, at the right time. This is done through
    the Joint Manning Document and Joint Lessons Learned.

        100. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, how is the private sector
    being utilized to help the military adopt the best practices for IO?
        General Petraeus. We place heavy emphasis on the best commercial
    solutions to achieve our military information objectives. Specifically,
    we have sought the largest and most successful global firms, and the
    most cutting edge technologies to provide the scope, breadth, and reach
    needed to effectively counter our adversaries.
        Some areas to which we have applied commercial best practices
    include a true `integrated,' open source Web 2.0 (applications that
    facilitate interactive information sharing, interoperability, and
    collaboration, such as Facebook) multimedia platform and accompanying
    social networking platform with Consumer Generated Content Monitors to
    engage online social networks. This effort has provided the capability
    to counter rapid dissemination of extremist influence, reduce support
    for extremist ideology, methodology, and leadership.
        We continue to apply best industry practices and seek out
    commercial off-the-shelf solutions in the marketing realm to bridge the
    technological gap, and we will continue to invest in research and
    development capacity to seek out and exploit emerging technology to
    stay ahead of our adversaries.

        101. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, how are we empowering the
    Afghans to spread news more rapidly to local populations?
        General Petraeus. There are three current IO programs that are
    designed to enhance communication throughout Afghan local populations.
    One program is conducted by Task Force 41 (TF41). Two programs are
    conducted by the Military Information Support Team (MIST), which is a
    seven-man team assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan to provide
    military support to public diplomacy for the country team.
        Within the MIST, a program called ``The Voices of a Nation'' has
    been established to empower the Afghan population to spread news more
    rapidly. This program educates the Afghan population on principles of
    democracy, and provides students with the means to develop and
    disseminate moderate messages throughout Afghanistan. Voices of a
    Nation trains and equips Afghanistan university students to provide a
    native message to counter extremists and insurgent messaging.
        Another MIST initiative includes University Media Infrastructure
    Upgrades. These upgrades at Kabul University, Jalalabad University,
    Mazar-e Sharif University, Herat University, Kandahar University, and
    Khost University include structural construction and renovation,
    digital equipment upgrade, radio production and broadcast capability,
    television production capability, print production, and publication
    capability. Like Voices of a Nation, this initiative supports
    university students' ability to counter insurgent messaging. DOD is
    providing only technical support to this effort which is led by DOS.

        102. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, I thought DOS was the
    agency in charge of public diplomacy; however, it seems like DOD is
    encroaching into public diplomacy through IO. Please explain how IO is
    not another form of the public diplomacy role that has always been
    associated with DOS.
        General Petraeus. It would not be accurate to characterize Military
    Information Operations as another form of Public Diplomacy, primarily
    because they have clearly different objectives. DOD, and particularly
    CENTCOM, focus our Military Information Operations toward fighting the
    enemy in the information domain. We see Public Diplomacy efforts
    focused primarily toward promoting U.S. polices and values abroad.
    Frankly, DOS has been under-resourced in this area. Clearly, there is
    overlap of domains, but not overlap of purpose.
        Our extremist adversaries are engaged in an information war for the
    hearts and minds of men and women throughout the CENTCOM AOR. To
    counter this threat, we must use IO to attack the enemy along four
    critical lines of operation: command and control, funding, recruiting,
    and training. We must also counter the violent extremist ideology that
    permeates and enables these four areas.
        To do this, IO exploit as many information conduits as possible to
    achieve desired effects against our enemy.

        103. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, I understand that you are
    requesting funding for IO--what is this funding for?
        General Petraeus. The funding is for Operation Earnest Voice (OEV),
    which is CENTCOM's primary nonkinetic information operation tool to
    degrade enemy recruiting and fund raising support. Our adversaries are
    adept at exploiting misinformation and cultural differences to recruit
    and raise funds for their operations. OEV provides us the ability to
    degrade the enemy's recruiting and funding efforts by directly
    countering their narrative and by amplifying the message of those who
    stand against violent extremist ideologies.
        Currently, we have two major ongoing operations: the Regional Web
    Interaction Program (RWIP) and Credible Voices Program (CVP). RWIP
    requires an additional $6.1 million for continued capability and
    expansion. RWIP focuses on informing and influencing foreign target
    audiences to counter violent extremist ideology and enemy propaganda,
    and amplify messages of credible voices to reduce VEO effectiveness in
    soliciting recruits and financial support for their operations.
        CVP line of operation requires an additional $38.5 million to
    effectively use web-based operations to link disparate credible
    networks and organizations to counter our adversaries' messages of
    violence. The program's objective is to expand and amplify moderate
    messages within the contested information space to reduce extremists'
    effectiveness in soliciting recruits and gaining financial support.
        IO requires robust recurring funding in order to stop the enemies'
    recruiting, training, and their financial support. Full funding for
    RWIP and CVP will put us a step ahead of our enemies' efforts and allow
    us many opportunities to stop terrorist activities before they happen.

        104. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, in fiscal year 2010, the
    Appropriations Committees of Congress cut your IO budget approximately
    in half. What operations were affected by a budget cut of this
    magnitude?
        General Petraeus. The areas affected by the budget cut are the two
    critical operational activities conducted at CENTCOM to interdict VEO
    recruiting and funding raising efforts. These activities are the RWIP
    and CVP.
        RWIP focuses on informing and influencing foreign target audiences
    to reduce VEO effectiveness in soliciting recruits and funding by
    countering violent extremist ideology and enemy propaganda, and amplify
    messages of CVP.
        To date, monthly assessments of the RWIP show the positive effects
    the program has on the tone of discussion threads by shifting sentiment
    away from support of VEO. We strongly believe this leads to decreases
    in recruits, funding support, and save havens, all of which are
    critical enablers to the enemy's fighting capability.
        The budget decrement has impeded our ability to reach full
    operational capacity, and has delayed our ability to counter the
    violent extremist ideology that sustains their ability to fight,
    recruit, train, and gain funding.
        The CVP uses web-based operations to link disparate credible
    networks and organizations to counter our adversaries' messages of
    violence. The program's objective is to expand and amplify moderate
    messages within the contested information space to reduce extremists'
    effectiveness in soliciting recruits and funding.
        The themes of CVP products directly counter VEO narratives to
    interdict their ability to seek recruits, funding, and additional
    support for their military objectives.
        PSYOPS doctrine requires long-term and repetitive messaging to
    change attitudes, perceptions, and ultimately behaviors. However, the
    current budget allocation prevents our ability to deliver a persistent
    capability to amplify CVP throughout our area of operation.

    new headquarters for special operations command south at homestead air
                                   force base
        105. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Olson, I understand the President's
    budget includes $41 million in the Army military construction account
    to construct a new headquarters for Special Operations Command South
    (SOCSOUTH) at Homestead Air Force Base (AFB). Could you please explain
    the need for this new facility?
        Admiral Olson. SOCSOUTH requires permanent facilities. They have
    been occupying temporary, hurricane-susceptible modular facilities on
    Homestead Air Reserve Base (ARB) ever since their relocation from
    Puerto Rico in 2004.

        106. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Olson, would you please explain why
    Homestead AFB was chosen as the preferred site?
        Admiral Olson. It is ultimately the GCC's decision where their TSOC
    headquarters will be located. Operationally and logistically, it makes
    the most sense for TSOCs to be located as close as possible to the
    GCC's headquarters in order to facilitate command and control. SOCSOUTH
    has been occupying temporary modular facilities on Homestead ARB ever
    since its relocation from Puerto Rico in 2004. Homestead ARB provides
    SOCSOUTH the benefit of close proximity to the SOUTHCOM headquarters,
    while also effecting rapid and efficient access to the SOUTHCOM region.
    The proximity to the military airfield on Homestead ARB provides ample
    staging capability to facilitate rapid deployment of SOF into the
    SOUTHCOM AOR, as was demonstrated by the recent Haiti earthquake
    disaster response.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator David Vitter
                           non-military stakeholders
        107. Senator Vitter. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, as CENTCOM
    and SOCOM commanders, please provide your assessment of the evolving
    and growing relationship between DOD and non-military stakeholders such
    as the DOS and USAID. The efforts of these non-military entities are
    crucial to the overall success of virtually every major military effort
    we are engaged in today. In your assessment, please include an
    evaluation of the ability of DOS to execute its role as lead agency in
    stability operations.
        Admiral Olson. The relationship between SOCOM and non-military
    stakeholders, such as DOS and USAID, has been evolving and deepening
    over the past years. The level of success we have achieved thus far is
    a result of three main efforts: developing long-term relationships,
    creating and participating in predictable collaborative events, and
    education. Specific examples of success to date include the high level
    of coordination that was achieved between SOCOM and USAID during the
    recent Haiti earthquake disaster. Due to the fact that SOCOM and USAID
    had a developed and mature partnership program prior to the crisis, the
    two organizations were able to quickly and effectively respond. Other
    examples include SOCOM's ongoing collaboration with Ambassador
    Benjamin's office (DOS S/CT), NCTC, and other agencies in the
    development of deradicalization programs to counter violent extremists.
    Regardless of which organization has lead, operations--to include
    stability operations--are best executed when all organizations involved
    establish transparent collaborative events that seek to develop a
    common understanding of the problem-set, inform leadership of issues
    and impediments, and develop synchronized actions that leverage the
    full capabilities and authorities of the whole-of-government.
        General Petraeus. The interagency, whole-of-government approach has
    greatly improved since the start of OEF. In fact, it is now nearly
    impossible to believe that only one government agency has the ability
    to conduct successful stability operations by itself. Success requires
    the full strength and capabilities that only a whole-of-government
    approach can provide. DOS has made significant progress in improving
    their expertise available on the ground in Afghanistan. As of April 1,
    2010, there are over 1,000 civilians in country. U.S. civilians have
    established DSTs in 32 of ISAF's focus districts with an additional 8
    DSTs scheduled for activation in 2010.
        CENTCOM is in constant contact with Ambassador Holbrooke and we
    hold weekly meetings to address critical civilian-military
    effectiveness issues. In fact, I believe that the partnership between
    the government agencies and departments working in Afghanistan is the
    strongest seen to date. To enhance our ability to work as a strong
    reliable partner, CENTCOM has embedded members of other U.S. Government
    agencies in our headquarters. These interagency experts provide key
    links into their parent organizations and are full members of the
    command that work closely to shape strategic-level planning on
    counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and humanitarian assistance.
        DOS is more than capable of taking over the lead role for stability
    operations in Afghanistan. As was proven after clearing operations for
    Operation Moshtarak, DOS along with USAID deployed several staff
    members, contractors, and coalition partners to initiate stability
    operations that included infrastructure repairs, agricultural
    initiatives, emergency humanitarian assistance, civil administration
    development, and political outreach.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
                                  afghanistan
        108. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, last August when I traveled
    to Afghanistan with Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Graham, we received
    a bleak report from General McChrystal. In essence, he told us that the
    Taliban had the momentum and that the situation was serious and
    deteriorating. What is your current assessment of the situation in
    Afghanistan compared to the August assessment of General McChrystal?
        General Petraeus. The security situation in Afghanistan remains
    serious but is no longer deteriorating. We have made progress in
    Afghanistan since last August 2009 in strategy, manning, and the
    overall situation on the ground. We have the right strategy that
    addresses building the ANSF and creates the security structure needed
    for good governance and development to take place. We have the troops
    ready to take the initiative and momentum away from the insurgency as
    we get close to having most of the 30,000 additional troops in place.
    The organizational, leadership, strategy, and resource initiatives we
    have worked this past year have already begun to change the dynamics in
    important ways. The loss of innocent life, for example, has been
    dramatically reduced in the past year.
        No doubt, 2010 will be a tough year and I expect that the endeavor
    in Afghanistan will, as was the case when we conducted the surge in
    Iraq, become harder before it gets easier. However, I believe we will
    soon begin to see the positive results of our planning and operational
    efforts.

                                      iraq
        109. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, following last week's Iraqi
    election, General Odierno said that the United States is sticking with
    its plan to draw down troops to 50,000 by the summer and that the ISF
    will be ready by the end of next year to take complete responsibility
    for security in Iraq. However, there have been some recent reports that
    the Iraqis are hedging as to their commitment to ending U.S. military
    involvement in 2011 and Prime Minister Maliki raised the possibility of
    asking U.S. forces to remain beyond the 2011 deadline. In your opinion,
    will the Iraqis be ready to assume control when U.S. forces draw down
    to 50,000 troops?
        General Petraeus. The ISF are on track to achieve the MEC to assume
    full control of internal security on December 31, 2011; however, the
    ISF will require continued assistance as they progress towards the MEC
    necessary for external security. Through General Odierno and our U.S.
    forces in Iraq, we continue to work on improving their external
    security capabilities with increased training and equipping.
        The Iraqi Army continues to make steady progress toward MEC but
    will not achieve the necessary foundation for defense against external
    threats before December 2011 due to equipment procurement timelines and
    subsequent training requirements. Specifically, equipping, training,
    and combined arms integration of the M1A1 fleet, artillery units, and
    key mechanized enablers will not be complete prior to December 2011.
        The Iraqi Navy is on track to achieve MEC by December 2011,
    although there are risks if shortfalls in manning, C4ISR, maintenance,
    and infrastructure are not adequately addressed. The Iraqi Navy will
    assume responsibility for protection of the oil platforms in 2011. Due
    to the importance of these oil terminals to the Iraqi economy, a higher
    level of capability is required.
        The Iraqi Air Force is on the path to achieving MEC by the end of
    2011 in all mission categories except airspace control and fixed-wing
    airlift. Specifically, multi-role fighter, long-range radar, and C-130J
    delivery and fielding will not be complete prior to December 2011. The
    Iraqi Air Force's December 2011 goal is the development of a capability
    to support ISF COIN operations and have an initial air sovereignty
    capability in place. Delayed execution of the Iraqi Air Force Service
    Plan and lack of funding for acquisitions, accessions, contract
    logistics support, and sustainment of current fleet all present
    obstacles to achieving the capability to conduct minimal air
    sovereignty operations by December 2011.
        Although the ISF are not on track to achieve MEC for external
    security by the end of 2011, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
    will continue the training and equipping process post December 2011 to
    attain MEC for external security.

        110. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, according to the Pentagon's
    most recent quarterly report to Congress on Iraq, ``Iran continues to
    fund, train, equip, and give some direction to residual Shia militias
    and extremist elements in Iraq.'' How much influence does Iran have in
    Iraq?
        General Petraeus. Iran still has a significant amount of influence
    in Iraq which it exerts via the primary Shia militias it supports, such
    as Asa'ib al Haqq (AAH) and Kata'ib Hizballah (KH), as well as
    political influence through a variety of different Iraqi interlocutors
    within the Government of Iraq. However, Iran has experienced setbacks
    to its influence campaign, such as Prime Minister Maliki's March 2008
    ``Operation Charge of the Knights'' where Iranian-backed Shia militias
    were forced out of key terrain in Iraq, and the passage of the U.S.-
    Iraq Security Agreement, which Iran vehemently opposed.
        The Iraqi election is a more recent case study on Iranian influence
    in Iraq and may illustrate Iran's current ability to exert influence.
    Iran desires a weak Shia-dominated central government in Iraq, amenable
    to Iranian influence. Iran would like the two rival Shia parties, Iraqi
    National Alliance (INA) and Prime Minister Maliki's State of Law (SoL),
    to unite following the 7 March 2010 elections. Though it is still too
    early to tell whether Iran will be able to successfully mediate the
    disputes between INA and SoL, Iran's ability to do so may produce an
    Iraqi Government willing to seek counsel and support from Iran.
    Regardless of whether such a union emerges, Iran will retain some
    degree of influence over the Iraqi Government through individual Iraqis
    with longstanding cultural, religious, political, and financial ties to
    Iran.
        There continues to be evidence of Iran's support to multiple Shia
    militias in Iraq via the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force
    (IRGC-QF). The Government of Iraq's willingness to confront Tehran,
    coupled with an aggressive U.S. force protection posture, did have an
    impact on IRGC-QF's support to these militias. It appears the impact
    was temporary as both AAH and KH continue to receive training, funding,
    safe-haven, and guidance from the IRGC-QF. While we assess the quantity
    of IRGC-QF's provision of lethal aid has decreased, the sophistication
    of the weaponry IRGC-QF provides has increased over the same period.

        111. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, you testified that no
    captured terrorists in your AOR have been sent for detention in
    Guantanamo during the last 18 months. Where are captured terrorists
    being held?
        General Petraeus. Captured enemy combatants who are not released or
    turned over to the host nation are held by U.S. forces in one of two
    theater internment facilities (TIFs). The U.S. TIF in Iraq, Camp
    Cropper, is located in Baghdad. The U.S. TIF in Afghanistan, also known
    as the Detention Facility in Parwan, is located on Bagram Air Field.

        [Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

                                  ----------

                             FRIDAY, MARCH 26, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

      U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:04 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
    Akaka, Ben Nelson, Kaufman, LeMieux, and Burr.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
    Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Jason W. Maroney,
    counsel; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; and
    Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
    member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Brian F.
    Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin and Vance
    Serchuk, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Nick Ikeda, assistant
    to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson;
    Halie Soifer, assistant to Senator Kaufman; Lenwood Landrum,
    assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
    Senator Chambliss; Victor Cervino and Brian Walsh, assistants
    to Senator LeMieux; and Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        Today, we're going to be hearing from three of our
    combatant commanders to receive testimony regarding the issues
    and the challenges that they face in their respective mission
    areas.
        On behalf of the committee, let me welcome back General
    Chilton, Commander of our U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM);
    Admiral Willard, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM);
    and General Sharp, Commander of the United Nations Command
    (UNC), Combined Forces Command (CFC), and U.S. Forces Korea
    (USFK).
        This committee appreciates your many years of faithful
    service to this country and the many sacrifices that you and
    your families make in that cause. We would appreciate your
    thanking, on behalf of our committee, the men and women that
    you lead, both military and civilian, for their service, their
    patriotism, and their dedication.
        We also want to thank you for rearranging your schedules to
    be here this morning. We know these hours that you have here
    are precious, and we thought it would be better to go ahead
    today, even though our attendance is going to be less, rather
    than to bring you back at some future time, which would really
    disrupt your schedules. The rather arcane rule of the Senate
    that was used to prevent us from meeting on Wednesday is still
    a rule of the Senate, and as long as it's there, somebody can
    exercise that right. It was exercised, and, as a result,
    inconvenienced you and many members of this committee, as well.
    But, that's where we are, so thank you for your flexibility in
    this matter.
        Today's hearing, we're going to hear the views and
    assessments of senior U.S. Commanders in the Asia Pacific
    region, together with the global perspectives of STRATCOM for
    those issues that pertain across the combatant commands.
        First, on PACOM: U.S. PACOM's geographic area of
    responsibility (AOR) is home to over half of the world's
    population and to five of the world's six largest militaries.
    Stability and security in this vast region is vital to our
    interests, as well as to the interests of our allies and our
    partners. While the region as a whole remains relatively
    stable, we cannot afford to take this stability for granted. We
    must remain vigilant in the region and reassure our allies that
    we will continue to work with them to further our mutual
    interests.
        The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains tense,
    although relatively quiet compared to a year ago, when North
    Korea's aggressive rhetoric, multiple ballistic missile test
    launches, and nuclear detonation heightened regional concerns
    and resulted in a tightening of U.N. sanctions.
        In recent months, the United States and North Korea have
    had modest bilateral discussions in a effort to regain traction
    in the Six-Party process, but there's been no meaningful
    progress so far.
        Since nuclear inspectors left North Korea last year, the
    status of North Korea's nuclear program has been largely
    unknown. While the nuclear issue garners much of the
    international attention, also of concern is the apparent
    unstable nature of the North Korean regime, coupled with a
    conventional military capability that represents a significant
    threat to security on the peninsula.
        China's influence continues to grow regionally and
    globally, and, at the same time, China continues to grow its
    military. It is important to anticipate and understand the
    intended and unintended consequences of these developments on
    the region at large. As China's influence and military grow,
    traditional alliances and partnerships in the region may come
    under pressure from a perception that the balance of power is
    shifting, and other countries in the region may deem it
    necessary to grow their militaries, as well. Such developments
    need to be understood and inform our decisionmaking.
        China's growing involvement with Iran, including investment
    in the Iranian energy sector, is an example of China's global
    influence expansion efforts. China is the primary obstacle to
    more stringent United Nations Security Council sanctions
    against Iran.
        In Japan, the installation of a new government last summer
    represented new challenges and opportunities in the
    longstanding defense relationship between our countries. For
    instance, the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI),
    negotiated between our two countries over a number of years,
    and agreed to in 2006, has been the subject of renewed
    consideration by the Japanese, particularly as it relates to
    the movement of U.S. marines on Okinawa and the relocation of
    some of those marines to Guam. This matter needs to be
    resolved, as does the impact of the associated military buildup
    on Guam, and the details of the plan to ensure that the influx
    of military personnel and their families is done with due
    regard to the effects on the Island of Guam and their
    population.
        The committee is also interested in U.S. efforts in the
    Asia Pacific region to provide humanitarian assistance and
    disaster relief, to expand the already strong partnerships with
    friends like Australia and India and others, and to combat
    violent extremism, particularly in Southeast Asia.
        STRATCOM has global responsibilities that require it to
    work with all the combatant and regional commands. STRATCOM's
    broad mission includes both operational and coordinating
    responsibilities. The Command has operational responsibility
    for strategic deterrence in space and cyberspace operations. It
    coordinates actions across the Commands in areas of missile
    defense, combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
    allocation of high-demand/low-density intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, such as unmanned
    aerial vehicles, and helps integrate information operations.
    Also, with the growing threat to cyberoperations, the new Cyber
    Command (CYBERCOM) is being established as a subunified command
    of STRATCOM.
        Very shortly, we expect to have a new treaty, which will be
    the successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),
    and a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Both of these are
    expected to bring about new and carefully considered changes to
    the role of nuclear weapons and national strategy, and the size
    of the stockpile to support that role. We hope to hold hearings
    on the NPR when both are submitted to Congress. General
    Chilton, as Commander of STRATCOM, will play an important role
    in the ratification process, and we look forward to working
    closely together in that process.
        A second domain over which STRATCOM has responsibility is
    space. As the leading spacefaring nation, the United States
    must sustain and protect its space assets. On the other hand,
    how these space assets actually contribute to military
    operations is not always well understood. Today we have an
    opportunity, with Admiral Willard and General Sharp here, to
    explore the importance of space systems and what would happen
    to our military capabilities if these assets were lost or
    degraded.
        Finally, the role of the military and combating WMD, and
    how these capabilities are integrated with other elements of
    the U.S. Government and the international community, is an
    additional challenge confronting both STRATCOM and PACOM.
        The Asia Pacific region continues to be one of the hotbeds
    of proliferation for both nuclear and missile technologies.
    There is continuing evidence of nuclear smuggling in the region
    and around the world that each regional commander must address
    in a coordinated fashion. We look forward to hearing from our
    witnesses about that.
        It's a pleasure to have each of you with us this morning.
    We look forward to your testimony and to the questions. I
    don't--I know that General--that Senator McCain was unable to
    make it here this morning.
        Senator Burr.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD BURR

        Senator Burr. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the recognition.
        Before I ask that Senator McCain's remarks be put in the
    record, since I feel somewhat personally responsible for this
    Friday hearing, I would like to say to the Chair and to my
    colleagues what I have said to our panel of witnesses
    privately, that I certainly do apologize for the delay in the
    hearing and causing this Friday hearing. Sometimes things are
    out of our control as it relates to the functions of the
    Senate.
        I would ask, at this time, that Senator McCain's entire
    opening statement be included in the record.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. It will be included in the
    record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses
    today. I am grateful to each of you for your long and distinguished
    service to our country, and I hope that you will convey my sincere
    appreciation to all the courageous men and women under your command.
        Our Nation faces significant challenges around the world--and in
    few places are those challenges more complicated than in the Asia-
    Pacific region. Asia's economies and militaries are growing in strength
    and influence. Our Nation has long relied on our strong alliances with
    Japan, South Korea and Australia to promote security in the region--and
    increasingly, beyond it as well. Today, more than 2,000 troops from the
    Asia-Pacific region are serving and sacrificing alongside our men and
    women in uniform in Afghanistan.
        In addition, allies like the Philippines and partner nations like
    Indonesia are working with us to counter violent extremists in their
    own countries. The Filipino military has made great strides in
    combating Abu Sayyaf, an al Qaeda affiliate, in the southern
    Philippines. Despite a hiatus in our military relationship with
    Indonesia, the U.S.-Indonesia partnership has proven to be invaluable
    in the fight against violent extremists in the region. We should work
    to build our relationship with Indonesia into a genuine strategic
    partnership to tackle today's global threats.
        Beyond combating terrorism, the United States must forge deeper and
    more comprehensive partnerships with other emerging powers in Asia--
    with Vietnam, Malaysia, and especially India, among others. Our
    relationship with New Delhi has never been simple, and it never will
    be, but the fact is, we are now expanding our strategic partnership
    with India to address issues not only of regional, but of global,
    importance: from nonproliferation and cyber security, to humanitarian
    assistance and the promotion of freedom. Our Nation has vital interests
    in the Asia-Pacific region, and it is imperative that we expand the
    circle of capable friends and allies who can help us share the burden
    of long-term security.
        General Sharp: I am encouraged by the progress that U.S. Forces-
    Korea has made in transitioning the U.S. Headquarters Command into a
    Combined Forces Command. I am also pleased to hear that South Korea
    will deploy 350 troops to support a Provincial Readiness Team in
    Afghanistan in July. I look forward to hearing your assessment of the
    current readiness of South Korean forces and your thoughts about the
    recent claim that North Korea has increased its missile arsenal by 25
    percent in the last 2 years, a total of some 1,000 missiles, including
    intermediate range missiles that can hit all of Japan and threaten
    Guam.
        Admiral Willard, our relationship with China is complicated. I
    believe that a U.S. partnership with a strong and successful China--a
    China that shares the responsibilities, not just the benefits, open
    regional and international order--can be an important force for
    stability in the 21st century. But many of China's actions at present
    are very worrisome.
        I am concerned by Beijing's ongoing and largely opaque military
    build-up, including anti-satellite and anti-access capabilities, as
    well as other new and significant tools of power projection. I am
    concerned about China's irregular engagement with U.S. vessels and
    their aggressive sovereign aspirations in international waters--further
    exacerbating existing regional maritime disputes. I am deeply concerned
    by China's increasing willingness to use its rising power to shield and
    support some of the worst behavior by some of the world's most
    destabilizing actors, especially the Government of Iran. Admiral
    Willard, I look forward to your assessment of China's growing
    capabilities, its strategic intentions, and its conduct in common
    global spaces--air, sea, land, and space.
        Finally, General Chilton, as Commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
    you are responsible for the health and readiness of our strategic
    deterrent. While we have yet to see the President's delayed Nuclear
    Posture Review, the current condition of the nuclear complex is not
    sustainable. In order to responsibly reduce the size of our arsenal, we
    must provide the resources necessary to recapitalize and modernize the
    long-neglected infrastructure responsible for ensuring the safety,
    security, reliability, and credibility of our national deterrent. While
    the fiscal year 2011 budget request is a step forward in making the
    necessary investments for modernization, a sustained long-term
    commitment is essential. I look forward to hearing from you how well
    the proposed fiscal year 2011 funding addresses the vital needs of our
    stockpile.
        While our troops face many formidable challenges in the world,
    especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, we cannot lose sight of the need to
    enhance our global capacity to deter threats, defend friends, defeat
    enemies, and provide needed humanitarian assistance. All three of you
    are a credit to your service and to our Nation. I thank you all, and I
    look forward to your testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Levin. Senator, it is very clear that the delay
    here was not your doing whatsoever. You had nothing to do with
    it, except you happened to be on the floor at the moment when
    someone else wanted to raise an objection, and you did what you
    are, I think, dutybound to do as a member of your caucus, which
    is to reflect that objection. But, it's clear that you had
    nothing to do with it, except being at the wrong place at the
    wrong time, basically.
        So, we will now--I think we're going to be calling on our
    witnesses in the order--going from our left to your right, I
    believe.
        So, General Chilton, we're going to start with you and then
    we're going to move down the table.

       STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
                           STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Chilton. Very good. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin, Senator Burr, and members of the committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I assure you,
    sir, it's no burden for us to reschedule and appear before this
    committee.
        It's a great honor to represent the extraordinary men and
    women of STRATCOM. I'm privileged to showcase this joint team's
    achievements, discuss our requirements, and highlight future
    national security challenges across our diverse and global
    mission areas.
        STRATCOM's Active Duty, Reserve military members,
    civilians, and contractors form a superb joint team, whose
    dedicated planning, advocacy, and operational execution efforts
    advance our warfighting priorities. We continue to strengthen
    and sharpen our focus on deterrence, while at the same time
    focusing on preserving our freedom of action in space and
    cyberspace.
        In all of these efforts, we greatly appreciate the support
    of Members of Congress, and particularly this committee and
    your staff, whose legislative investments across our mission
    areas enable us to deliver global security for America.
        Over the past year, we have actively supported the
    administration's four major defense policy reviews, which
    uniquely impacted STRATCOM: the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
    NPR, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and the Space
    Posture Review, which is still in work. We also provided
    analytical and intellectual capital to the New START treaty
    negotiations. While not all yet completed, these reviews will
    shape the role of our strategic capabilities and define the
    investments necessary to recapitalize and sustain them.
        Their focus areas also highlight STRATCOM's place at the
    nexus of today's national security challenges. Global security
    in general, and the United States specifically, face a myriad
    of challenges today, from economic and political turmoil,
    nontraditional threats, terrorism, and continuing oversea
    contingency operations. Actors continue to seek ways to
    challenge the United States and our allies and the conventional
    and asymmetric means by which to do so.
        STRATCOM remains committed to conducting deterrence, space,
    and cyberspace operations, and advocating for the capabilities
    our national leadership and geographic commanders need each and
    every day in the areas of missile defense, information
    operations, ISR, and combating WMD.
        In the deterrence arena, our energetic exercise program
    conducted Exercise Global Lightning 2009 this past year, the
    most extensive nuclear command and control and communications
    field exercise in over a decade. Our forces' success proved
    America's well-placed confidence in our Nation's strategic
    deterrent and our--and demonstrated the success of this
    Command's effort to reemphasize a culture of excellence across
    the nuclear enterprise.
        In space, our acceptance of the Space Situational Awareness
    Sharing Mission expanded the Command's relationships with
    international and commercial partners toward ensuring a safe
    and responsibly managed space domain. Future space surveillance
    and situational awareness efforts and space investments must
    continue to build on recent advances, including greater
    collision avoidance analysis to ensure the availability of
    essential space-based capabilities for, not only the United
    States, but for our warfighters.
        Moreover, the Department of Defense (DOD) sustained its
    progress in defending DOD information networks by unifying
    STRATCOM's components for network warfare and global network
    operations, by increasing the training of cyberprofessionals,
    and by welcoming the standup of service cybercomponents. We
    carefully planned for the standup of CYBERCOM and look forward
    to the confirmation of its first commander. Additionally, in
    the past year, we dramatically expanded our military-to-
    military outreach program to promote open dialogue and examine
    the possibility of new partnerships in space and cyberspace.
        Although not contained within the DOD budget, I would like
    to mention my support for the administration's fiscal year 2011
    request for the National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA). The budget seeks nearly a 13-percent increase for NNSA
    to provide much-needed infrastructure, human capital, and
    stockpile management investments. I have long advocated for
    such critical investments, which help keep our stockpile safe,
    secure, and effective. Our deterrence credibility rests on such
    confidence, and I appreciate this committee's support for the
    request.
        In the year ahead, STRATCOM will address the challenges I
    have mentioned above as we focus on further developing our
    workforce, sustaining a culture of excellence in the nuclear
    enterprise, and integrating our global missions. STRATCOM's
    uniquely global missions support national objectives, whole-of-
    government solutions, and enhanced international cooperation.
    Our future success requires investments in deterrence, the
    standup of CYBERCOM, and expanding our awareness of, and
    sustaining our capability investments within, the space domain.
        As we move forward, I look forward to continuing to partner
    with this committee and your staff. Thank you again for the
    opportunity to testify before this committee today. I look
    forward to your questions. I would ask that my posture
    statement be accepted for the record.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General. Your entire
    statement will be made part of the record.
        [The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:]
               Prepared Statement by Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF
        Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of the
    Committee on Armed Services, thank you for the opportunity to testify
    today, representing the extraordinary men and women of U.S. Strategic
    Command (STRATCOM). I'm privileged to showcase this joint team's
    achievements, discuss our requirements, and highlight future national
    security challenges across our mission areas. STRATCOM's Active Duty
    and Reserve military members, civilians, and contractors form a superb
    joint team, whose dedicated planning, advocacy, and operational
    execution efforts advance our warfighting priorities. We continue to
    strengthen and sharpen our focus on deterrence while at the same time
    preserving our freedom of action in space and cyberspace. Before
    continuing, I must say that we appreciate your support, because
    legislative investments across our mission areas are essential to our
    providing global security for America.
        Admiral Mullen's memorandum Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Guidance for 2009-2010 detailed the Joint Force's strategic objectives
    through 2010. These objectives include defending our national interests
    in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia, considering ways and
    means to improve the force's health, and balancing global strategic
    risks through deterrence. The uninformed observer might expect STRATCOM
    to aid the Joint Force only with deterrence, but this globally
    operational command does much more. In fact, the Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR) identified six key missions for the Department of Defense
    (DOD),\1\ and STRATCOM plays a role in each of these missions, whether
    by conducting operations, supporting and advocating for global
    warfighter needs, closing gaps in geographic seams, or building
    relationships across a growing range of partners.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The six mission areas are: (1) defend the United States and
    support civil authorities at home, (2) succeed in counterinsurgency,
    stability, and counterterrorism operations, (3) build the security
    capacity of partner states, (4) deter and defeat aggression in anti-
    access environments, (5) prevent proliferation and counter weapons of
    mass destruction, and (6) operate effectively in cyberspace.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        STRATCOM continues to support actively the DOD work on the QDR,
    Space Posture Review, Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Ballistic Missile
    Defense Review (BMDR), and the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
    (START) negotiations. These reviews and START will shape the role of
    our strategic capabilities and define the investments necessary to
    recapitalize and sustain them, while highlighting STRATCOM's place at
    the nexus of today's primary national security challenges. We are now
    helping to translate these reports into the strategy and plans that our
    components and the joint force need. This year we will continue to
    focus on further developing our workforce, sustaining the highest
    possible standards in the nuclear enterprise, and integrating our
    global capabilities to support national and theater objectives. These
    efforts will require investing in the deterrent enterprise, identifying
    mechanisms to better integrate operations, plans, requirements, and
    activities among our components, standing up U.S. Cyber Command
    (CYBERCOM) to better execute our cyber mission, and sustaining the
    critical national security capabilities provided by on-orbit satellite
    constellations.
                             u.s. strategic command
        As we address today's challenges, STRATCOM has already devoted
    significant effort to align our priorities, plans, and investments
    across our components while simultaneously executing deterrence, space,
    and cyberspace operations. We have initiated and sustained several
    successful engagement efforts. STRATCOM's reinvigorated military-to-
    military outreach programs, which included senior-leader discussions
    with key friends and allies, including the United Kingdom, France,
    Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Israel on such topics as deterrence,
    space, cyberspace, and missile defense. STRATCOM was honored to host
    the United Kingdom's First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope;
    Australia's Vice Chief of Defence Force, Lieutenant General David
    Hurley; France's Chief of the Defense Staff, General Jean-Louis
    Georgelin; and China's Vice Chairman of the Central Military
    Commission, Gen Xu Caihou. Gen Xu's request to visit STRATCOM during
    his U.S. tour highlighted China's recognition of STRATCOM's global
    role, and our very positive exchange showcased the tremendous potential
    of military-to-military relationships to build confidence and
    understanding between our countries. These dialogues are important and
    must continue.
        Over the past year, we welcomed the stand-up of Air Force Global
    Strike Command and our components' increased focus on the deterrence
    mission. In addition to maturing the adjustments we made in our
    headquarters staff, STRATCOM's Global Thunder 2009 deterrence exercise
    constituted the most extensive nuclear command, control, and
    communications (NC3) field exercise in over a decade. It demonstrated
    the full range of nuclear deterrence capabilities by integrating
    submarine strategic deterrent patrols, more than 90 aircraft sorties,
    an ICBM test launch, and 5 days of continuous airborne command-and-
    control operations. Global Thunder's success demonstrated the readiness
    of America's strategic forces. Continued support for the joint training
    requirements and the established Combatant Commander Exercise
    Engagement (CE2) Defense-wide account is essential to ensuring future
    STRATCOM mission readiness.
        Today's strategic mission requirements also demand the finest in
    command, control, and communications capabilities. Our 1950s-era
    headquarters falls short of providing the capabilities we need. We
    appreciate congressional support for the planning and design funds
    appropriated in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and requested for 2011.
    These investments move us closer to a 21st century headquarters and
    command center for deterrence, space, and cyberspace operations.
        In the cyber domain, the Secretary of Defense directed STRATCOM to
    establish CYBERCOM as a sub-unified command. This effort continued the
    reorganization of cyber forces that began with the Secretary's
    direction in October 2008 to place STRATCOM's Joint Task Force for
    Global Network Operations (JTF GNO) under the operational control of
    Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC NW). From
    their inception, JFCC NW and JTF GNO had segregated offensive and
    defensive military cyber operations. This segregation detracts from
    natural synergies and ignores our experience in organizing to operate
    in the air, land, sea, and space domains. The establishment of CYBERCOM
    will remedy this problem in the cyber domain and create a robust sub-
    unified command to address the growing importance of the cyber domain
    to national security. We have already begun consolidating JTF GNO and
    JFCC NW in preparation for the formal establishment of CYBERCOM, which
    awaits confirmation of the nominated commander. We look forward to
    continuing to work with Congress and our Agency partners as we move
    forward to establish CYBERCOM.
        The Services are also reorganizing their cyber forces in order to
    present trained and equipped cyber operators to the Joint Force. Over
    the past year, each Service reshaped the alignment of its cyber forces
    into a more unified organization, and we welcome the stand-up of Army
    Forces CYBERCOM, Marine Corps Forces CYBERCOM, Fleet CYBERCOM, and the
    24th Air Force. These forces will enhance our ability to operate and
    defend DOD information networks and provide the President with response
    options in cyberspace.
        To enhance the level of global strategic dialogue and STRATCOM's
    support to other combatant commands, we are more broadly engaging our
    military and non-military partners. In 2009, STRATCOM launched new or
    renewed annual symposia for each of our three lines of operation. More
    than 5,000 attendees, representing multiple commands, universities,
    industry, and at least 10 other countries (including His Excellency
    Sergey Kislyak, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United
    States) held substantive discussions on challenges facing our
    deterrence, space, and cyberspace professionals. STRATCOM teams also
    deployed across the globe to provide in-theater subject-matter
    expertise. Our teams facilitated more effective employment of our
    capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
    space, operational security, electronic warfare (EW), and cyber. These
    accomplishments, along with development of integrated missile defense
    (IMD) capabilities and increases in space situational awareness (SSA),
    represent just a small part of STRATCOM's accomplishments.
                               strategic context
        Last spring, President Obama stated that as the world ``has become
    more interconnected . . . we've seen events move faster than our
    ability to control them.'' Global economic and political turmoil,
    rapidly evolving information technology, nontraditional threats,
    continuing overseas contingency operations, and terrorism represent
    just some of the factors influencing global and regional security
    challenges. Moreover, state and non-state actors pursue traditional and
    asymmetric means to challenge the United States and our allies. With
    the exception of the United States, all nuclear weapon states continue
    to modernize their nuclear weapon stockpiles and in some cases grow
    them further. Although the United States and Russia are reducing their
    strategic arsenals, North Korea and Iran remain on a dangerous nuclear
    path. Additionally, we find increasing threats to our freedom of action
    in the global commons of space and cyberspace, even as the importance
    of these domains to our national security continues to grow. For
    example, Iran's successful February 2009 satellite launch and North
    Korea's attempt a few months later illustrate the spread of space
    launch technology. However, successful space-launch vehicles can also
    represent progress toward an effective intercontinental ballistic
    missile capability. If perfected, such long-range ballistic missiles
    would place a larger area of the world at risk.
        Cyber networks weave through every facet of our lives and enable
    extraordinary communication, intelligence, and command and control
    capabilities. However, an adversary acting in cyberspace can steal
    critical information, thwart vital data transmissions, or create
    devastating effects beyond the cyber domain. Governments, militaries,
    corporations, universities, and the individual computer user must guard
    against vulnerabilities that are open to criminals, organized
    hacktivists, state actors, and insider threats. Addressing these
    challenges while capitalizing on the dramatic enabling capabilities of
    cyberspace requires an unwavering watchfulness, a dynamic defense-in-
    depth construct, a workforce that is carefully recruited, trained, and
    properly retained, strong partnerships, an infrastructure that supports
    global employment of DOD forces, and a realization that DOD's cyber
    culture, conduct, and capabilities must change.
                              strategic deterrence
        In an environment of such rapid economic, political, military, and
    technological changes, many wonder if ``deterrence'' is still possible.
    Today's multi-polar and increasingly complex strategic environment,
    which includes threats posed by proliferation and terrorism, requires
    that we increase our focus on deterrence because effectively deterring
    threats to our Nation and our allies is not only possible, it is
    essential.
        Since the end of the Cold War, however, the serious study of
    deterrence theory and strategy has been inadequate. Much like our
    changing global context, modern deterrence challenges necessitate more
    complex approaches. The modern era of smart power requires a commitment
    to a whole-of-government deterrence effort that capitalizes on the full
    range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic activities.
    Despite this complex environment, we have skipped an entire generation
    of future policy makers, strategists, academics, and military
    professionals in terms of training and developing them in the field of
    deterrence. Preliminary work on the NPR and New START treaty revealed
    this shortage of human capital. STRATCOM's first annual Deterrence
    Symposium, held this past summer in Omaha, was our initial public
    effort to revitalize attention to deterrence theory, thought, and
    practice.
        Speaking in Prague last year, President Obama articulated his goal
    of moving toward a world without nuclear weapons, including a desire to
    reduce global nuclear dangers and the role of nuclear weapons in our
    national security strategy, while urging other nations to do the same.
    The President also asserted that ``as long as these weapons exist, the
    United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to
    deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.'' Just
    days before the President's remarks, the Strategic Posture Commission
    concluded that ``nuclear weapons are both the greatest potential threat
    to our way of life and important guarantors of U.S. security.'' The
    commissioners agreed on two parallel paths forward: ``one path which
    reduces nuclear dangers by maintaining our deterrence, and the other
    which reduces nuclear dangers through arms control and international
    programs to prevent proliferation.'' As the command uniquely
    responsible for our nuclear deterrent and for synchronizing DOD
    combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) planning, STRATCOM finds
    itself actively engaged in all of these endeavors.
        Throughout the 65-year history of nuclear weapons, no nuclear power
    has been conquered or even put at risk of conquest, nor has the world
    witnessed the globe-consuming conflicts of earlier history. More than
    180 state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
    Weapons (NPT) have either foresworn the pursuit of nuclear weapons (in
    many cases because of the promise of America's extended deterrent
    umbrella) or pledged in good faith to move toward eventual disarmament.
    The United States and Russia have made steep reductions in their
    nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War (a seldom recognized but
    important demonstration of U.S. commitment) while joining together to
    pursue the goals of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We have
    invested considerable intellectual effort toward a stable world order,
    where nuclear weapons seem at once dangerous, undesirable, expensive, a
    tempting source of power and prestige, and yet also essential to
    continued peace and stability.
        Today, our nuclear weapons and triad of delivery systems remain
    essential to our national security. Nonetheless, in light of the global
    security environment, we should continually consider to what degree
    nuclear weapons remain relevant, whether ours measurably encourage or
    discourage proliferation, and to what extent reductions and/or force
    size and posture changes enhance peace and strategic stability. At the
    end of the day, all of our actions must enhance the security of the
    United States, our most solemn responsibility.
        The role of our Nation's nuclear weapons in maintaining peace and
    stability, and therefore the security of the United States, is
    deterrence. Our deterrence strategy is predicated on the effectiveness
    of six distinct facets that in the aggregate make our strategy
    credible. These six facets are weapons, delivery systems, threat
    warning, nuclear command and control (NC2), weapon production, and
    industrial base. I will briefly discuss each of these.
    Weapons
        Nuclear weapons remain fundamental to our deterrent capability.
    Increasing the safety, security, and long-term confidence in the U.S.
    nuclear arsenal remains a top priority. However, the weapons we rely on
    today for deterrence were designed for short operating lives in a
    different era with different safety and security requirements. While
    individual components may last for years, combining the components in a
    radioactive environment has effects that we cannot fully predict. As
    recently noted in government review of the stockpile assessment, our
    current approaches to delivery system sustainment are not tenable over
    the long term and, for the weapons themselves, they are also not
    tenable if we desire to implement improvements to safety and security
    features.
        As we ramp up to full-rate W76-1 production, we must also address
    promptly the B61 warhead life extension. By doing the B61 nuclear life
    extension now along with the funded non-nuclear life extension, we have
    an opportunity to save cost by avoiding a second life extension in the
    2020s while increasing confidence in the safety, security, and
    effectiveness of the stockpile consistent with the President's vision.
    We must act now to fit the life extension within the narrow window of
    opportunity in the production complex.
        We must also begin exploring sustainment options for the W78
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and W88 SLBM warheads. The
    Strategic Posture Commission noted that any options would require some
    combination of refurbishment, reuse, and replacement, with decisions
    best made on a case-by-case basis. The Nuclear Posture Review is
    examining the appropriate policy guidance for considering future
    choices between refurbishment, reuse, and replacement. A recent study
    by the JASON Defense Advisory Group concluded that only reuse or
    replacement options allow for the inclusion of intrinsic surety
    features that would be the last line of defense against unauthorized
    use. I urge you to support life extension studies requested this year
    to best inform the administration and Congress for future decisions.
        The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 created
    the Stockpile Management Program to increase safety, security, and
    long-term effectiveness of the U.S. stockpile without nuclear testing.
    I believe we can meet the goals of this program without seeking new
    military capabilities or resorting to nuclear testing. Reductions in
    the number of warhead types and in the size of the hedge stockpile are
    also possible.
    Delivery Systems
        The triad of diverse and complementary strategic delivery systems
    has supported our national security objectives in the past and will
    continue to do so well into the future. STRATCOM is actively working
    with the Services to validate proposals to recapitalize and modernize
    our forces. Our ICBM force celebrated its 50th birthday in 2009 and
    remains the most responsive and cost-effective leg of the triad. The
    Air Force is concluding a decade-long modernization effort to sustain
    the Minuteman III through 2020 and is continuing the necessary steps to
    meet the congressional mandate to sustain the system through 2030.
    STRATCOM actively supports current life-extension programs and is
    working closely with the Air Force to determine the requirements of our
    next land-based strategic deterrent system. The Navy's SLBMs constitute
    the triad's most survivable and assured response element. A stealthy
    delivery platform and a highly reliable weapon system have proven an
    effective strategic deterrent combination, and STRATCOM supports the
    Navy's efforts to design a replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic
    missile submarine and sustain the Trident II D5 ballistic missile to
    meet future deterrent requirements. Finally, our Nation will continue
    to require a nuclear-capable bomber's inherent flexibility to address a
    variety of possible adversaries and contingencies. STRATCOM supports
    the Air Force's efforts to sustain and modernize mission-critical B-2
    and B-52 systems. We are also working with the Air Force to identify
    requirements for the next manned, nuclear-capable, long-range strike
    platform and air-delivered standoff weapon.
    Threat Warning
        Another key element of credible deterrence is threat warning that
    provides attribution. For decades, the Defense Support Program (DSP)
    and our early warning radars have provided the essential data necessary
    to ensure timely and informed decisions. They provide prompt and
    accurate data to the President and combatant commanders for detection,
    identification, and predicted impact point of ballistic missiles.
    Sustainment of our early warning radars and fielding of the Space Based
    Infrared Satellite (SBIRS) geosynchronous constellation are essential
    to maintaining timely threat warning and attribution. However, though
    SBIRS was originally programmed to launch in 2002 as a replacement for
    DSP, we have not yet launched a single SBIRS satellite, and current
    schedules forecast that the first will not be ready before December
    2010. I encourage your continued support to ensure the successful
    deployment of this system.
    NC2
        For deterrence to be effective, potential adversaries must know
    that the President can direct our nuclear forces under all
    circumstances. This requires a reliable and secure NC2 architecture.
    Our NC2 systems deliver warning and attribution information, provide
    for positive control of nuclear forces, and ensure our ability to
    employ nuclear weapons per Presidential direction. To remain effective
    in the most hostile nuclear environment, our NC2 relies on resilient
    satellite communication constellations (MILSTAR and its replacement,
    the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)), cryptographic
    protection, and hardening. Many of our current NC2 systems were built
    during the Cold War and therefore require new investment for upgrades
    or replacement. Additionally, continued delays in procurement of AEHF-
    related equipment are a concern. The vital task of fielding modern and
    survivable NC2 systems is worthy of your full support.
    Weapons Production
        The Strategic Posture Commission and JASON noted that regardless of
    which life-extension options we choose for existing warheads, success
    relies on maintaining and renewing expertise and capabilities in
    science, technology, engineering, and production techniques unique to
    the nuclear weapons program. The National Nuclear Security
    Administration's (NNSA) aging infrastructure limits its sustainment
    capacity, forcing all life extension activities into a tight,
    sequential, and delicately balanced timeline that incurs undue risk.
    Moreover, our nuclear weapons design and manufacturing workforce is
    both aging and shrinking due to a lack of meaningful work, unstable
    funding, and the perception that nuclear weapons work is not important.
    The custodians of America's nuclear deterrent--NNSA and its National
    Laboratories--have long labored in deteriorating plutonium and uranium
    facilities that date to the Manhattan Project and that the Strategic
    Posture Commission termed ``decrepit.'' Decrepit is unacceptable. We
    owe our people at NNSA and the National Laboratories better. We owe our
    Nation better.
        To sustain the nuclear deterrent and successfully execute the
    Stockpile Management and Stewardship Programs, we must invest in new
    plutonium and uranium facilities, strengthen the science, technology,
    and engineering base needed to sustain and certify the stockpile, and
    seek out and develop our very best scientists and engineers. The
    President's 13 percent increase in requested NNSA funding represents a
    long-overdue investment in the nuclear complex and its people. I
    strongly urge you to support this request.
    Industrial Base
        Industrial base challenges complicate the sustainment of current
    and the development of future delivery systems. An inability to produce
    items such as solid rocket motors and advanced navigation and control
    systems would threaten our ability to maintain strategic platforms.
    Perishable skills and technologies are required to sustain current
    systems beyond their expected life span and to develop the systems
    required for the future. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requirement to
    develop a SRM industrial base plan is an important step toward ensuring
    essential skills and capabilities in that portion of the deterrent
    industrial base, and we look forward to the results of the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense led task force chartered to fulfill this
    direction. Sufficient funding to sustain a responsive industrial base
    is a critical element of maintaining the credibility of deterrence, and
    we ask for continued congressional support.
                                 global strike
        A limited, credible conventional prompt global strike capability
    would provide the President a broader range of non-nuclear options to
    address emerging threats rapidly. However, we continue to lack the
    ability to promptly deliver conventional effects against targets in
    denied or geographically isolated areas. As we continue to make
    progress through research, development, test, and evaluation
    subprojects, I ask for your continued support for a PGS capability that
    will be carefully sized to avoid perturbing our strategic relationships
    with Russia and China.
                                     space
        Operations in the space domain continue to enable an increasing
    number of capabilities that are essential to military operations, as
    well as the U.S. and global economy. At the same time, events during
    the past few years have reminded the world that space is no longer a
    pristine or unchallenged domain, but one that is subject to
    consequential mishaps, whether malicious or unintended. This was
    apparent in the aftermath of last year's Iridium/Cosmos satellite
    collision, which removed any uncertainty about the destructive threat
    of space objects. We need sustained investment to provide comprehensive
    SSA, actionable collision avoidance (conjunction) analysis, robust on-
    orbit space constellations, and modeling and simulation capabilities.
        The importance of SSA to effective and sustained space operations
    grows each day. Trackable space debris grows each time existing debris
    collides or breaks apart, new objects enter orbit, or our sensors
    improve to reveal increasingly smaller objects. Despite significant SSA
    investments and advances to ensure our freedom of action in space,
    debris growth (4,600 objects in 1980; more than 21,000 today) continues
    to outpace SSA upgrades. This places a new urgency on improving SSA
    sensors and the technical and human capital resources performing
    collision avoidance analysis. In addition to maintaining critical
    legacy capabilities, new investments must focus on sensors, data
    fusion, network linkages, and our human capital base.
        Most of today's sensors reside on legacy missile-warning platforms
    in the northern hemisphere. This coverage remains important but is
    inadequate for today. We must continue to work with international
    partners to expand the few sensors that make up our current capability.
    Further, we must provide space operators the same situational awareness
    we expect in every other domain, along with the tools and information
    to operate and protect national assets. The next generation of SSA
    sensors will provide coverage from space itself--a new vantage point.
    The Space Based Surveillance System will provide such coverage, and we
    continue to support this important step forward.
        A noteworthy SSA advancement began when Congress authorized the Air
    Force's pilot program on the desirability and feasibility of providing
    collision avoidance data to commercial and non-U.S. Government
    partners. After the successful development of the Commercial and
    Foreign Entities (CFE) program, DOD transitioned operational
    responsibility for CFE from the Air Force to STRATCOM's Joint
    Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC Space) in 2009. JFCC
    Space's Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base now
    provides important data to prevent collisions between satellites,
    manned space craft, and debris. In this effort, cooperative
    relationships between DOD and owner-operators are essential to
    developing behavioral norms for responsible space-faring nations.
    STRATCOM will continue to refine collision-avoidance measures, sponsor
    agreements with space-faring nations and commercial entities, and
    foster greater mutual support through allied and partner engagements.
        Another consequential area of space interest lies in how we manage
    the sustainment of our current constellations. The past decade's strong
    focus on improving efficiency and cost effectiveness now threatens the
    uninterrupted delivery of several essential capabilities, as
    requirements for increasingly complex and efficient systems push
    delivery timelines to the future, exhaust our stock of replacement
    vehicles, increase costs, and leave capabilities at risk. We worked
    closely in the last year with a variety of independent commissions,
    studies mandated by Congress, and DOD examinations that revealed
    shortfalls in capacity and capabilities in the next 5 to 7 years.
    Program schedule delays, cost overruns, dwindling inventories, and over
    confidence derived from our highly successful launch record could
    create the circumstance where just a single launch failure creates a
    capability gap.
        Lastly, effective 21st century space operations will depend on our
    ability to accurately model the environment and employ simulators for
    training our operators. Modeling and simulation capabilities provide
    operators the ability to experiment, fail, adjust, and try again with a
    mere fraction of the resources. Once a robust simulation capability
    exists, new and increasingly complex exercises can demonstrate
    successes and vulnerabilities, facilitate new tactics, techniques, and
    procedures, and dramatically expand our understanding of, and ability
    to operate within, the space domain. The ability to experiment with new
    platforms and capabilities will enhance U.S. freedom of action and
    further improve U.S. space operations in a way that further aligns
    space and space-based capability requirements with those in every other
    domain.
                                   cyberspace
        Interest in the cyber domain grows daily. Most of this is positive,
    as technology connects the world and enables commerce, communication,
    transit, and research in ways never before imagined. The practical
    reality of Moore's Law \2\ is a world where many technological
    platforms seem obsolete just as they are widely fielded. Unfortunately,
    as Secretary of State Clinton noted in January, ``these technologies
    are not an unmitigated blessing.'' We can anticipate that adversarial
    actors will make cyberspace a battle front in future warfare. Even
    today, intrusions and espionage into our networks, as well as cyber
    incidents abroad, highlight the unprecedented and diverse challenges we
    face in the battle for information.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Moore's Law, named for Intel co-founder Gordon E. Moore, is the
    observation that processing speed and memory capacity for commercially
    available computers tend to double about every 2 years.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In May 2009, the administration finished a detailed Cyberspace
    Policy Review. It concluded that ``the architecture of the Nation's
    digital infrastructure . . . is not secure or resilient'' and ``without
    major advances in the security of these systems or significant change
    in how they are constructed or operated, it is doubtful that the United
    States can protect itself.'' Both the White House's Cyberspace Policy
    Review and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
    Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency concluded that
    national cyber security requires dramatically enhanced policy and
    operational coordination. These reports highlighted the need for a
    uniform, rapid, dynamic, and machine-speed approach. Such an approach
    demands a culture of responsibility and an ``always-on'' enterprise
    infrastructure to support global employment of our military forces.
        STRATCOM is responsible for operating DOD information networks,
    planning against cyber threats, advocating for new capabilities, and
    coordinating with other commands and Agencies. I noted last year that
    cyberspace is our least mature line of operation, and it is likely to
    remain so for some time, as cyberspace presents new and unique
    challenges and opportunities. Cyber operations revolutionize the way we
    move information, conduct commerce, and fight wars. We have had
    technological revolutions before, most notably a century ago when
    people first took to the skies. Some wondered why we would ever need to
    fly, but no one today can imagine life without air travel or national
    security without air forces. In the 1970s, few people felt they would
    ever need a personal computer, but a network outage today is a serious
    concern for the largest corporations, the smallest businesses, and most
    American households. Just as the United States mastered the air domain,
    we will continue to strive to preserve our freedom of action in
    cyberspace.
        Significant change seldom comes without a seminal event. In the
    strategic and space arenas, we have experienced nuclear procedure
    issues, the Iridium-Cosmos satellite collision, and China's Anti-
    Satellite weapon tests. Last year, the cyberspace domain had just such
    an event as DOD information networks experienced a serious intrusion,
    resulting in a ban on removable media and other corrective actions. The
    event identified best practices and shortcomings in network security
    procedures and hardware accountability, causing us to ask not just what
    we knew about network health but how we knew it--and whether that
    information was reliable. Our forces developed new network monitoring
    and evaluation systems and grappled with the security needs of
    sprawling networks where low cost and efficiency have often taken
    priority over security. Cyberspace weaves through our lives in ways
    that make network problems a concern for everyone. Each and every
    individual user is a critical element of cyber defense.
        Our national defense capabilities are now underpinned by the
    assured availability of the enterprise IT infrastructure and our
    command-and-control and information-sharing systems. These constitute
    the DOD information networks. STRATCOM must continue to defend while
    actively improving DOD information networks--interdependent
    imperatives--with new and expanded cyber capabilities. The networks
    requires improved defense-in-depth measures from the perimeter down to
    individual users, like the Host-Based Security System (HBSS), and a
    shareable, common operating picture that allows for the free flow of
    information among the combatant commanders, Services, and Agencies.
        Additionally, we require continued congressional support for
    critical DOD programs and initiatives through which we build, operate,
    harden, and assure robust and resilient command-and-control and
    information-sharing systems. These programs and initiatives include
    globally diverse terrestrial and satellite communications networks,
    emerging commercial satellite communication capabilities, and the
    globally available enterprise IT services that reside on them.
                    global synergy--joint enabling missions
    Integrated Missile Defense
        Many rogue actors consider terror, blackmail, and weapons of mass
    destruction to be increasingly attractive capabilities. The recently
    completed BMDR notes the growing threat of ballistic missiles as they
    become more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate from
    greater ranges. Countering the growing desire among many states for
    such cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power requires
    sustained and carefully designed missile defense investments.
        As the lead combatant command for missile-defense advocacy,
    STRATCOM continues to work closely with the Services, Missile Defense
    Agency, and the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) to shape
    investments. Improvements in sensor and shooter platforms, including
    upgrades to the Aegis weapon system and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3),
    production of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and
    fielding of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based X-band radar provide more
    effective capabilities for our geographic combatant commanders.
    However, these advances have required an increased focus at STRATCOM
    and within the MDEB and Global Force Management processes on how best
    to satisfy the requirements of multiple geographic combatant commanders
    while appropriately balancing theater and homeland defense efforts.
    Strong congressional support is enabling the rapid fielding of regional
    systems.
        One of the most significant recent missile defense developments is
    the administration's Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense.
    Given necessary funding and timely fielding, PAA offers an effective
    and flexible way to address the growing Iranian threat. PAA also
    addresses the most urgent threats first with proven, cost-effective
    platforms as we continue to defend our forward-deployed forces and
    allies. It also requires that missile defense becomes an increasing
    part of our international cooperation efforts. The total effect of PAA
    will provide significantly more capability to counter today's regional
    threats and improve our ability to defend the United States against any
    future Iranian ICBM.
        A defensive system, however, will be ineffective if not supported
    by accurate and timely warning and intelligence. Ballistic missiles and
    space launch vehicles share significant similarities, making launch
    characterization--the ability to rapidly determine a vehicle's
    ballistic or orbital trajectory and therefore its intent--essential to
    recommending appropriate pre-launch postures and post-launch actions.
    STRATCOM's ongoing efforts to refine this capability include sensor and
    communications upgrades and analytical expansion. As noted above, we
    face ongoing challenges to sustaining our missile warning
    constellation's long-term health. The SBIRS geostationary orbit
    satellite constellation is critical to any missile defense
    architecture. Additionally, the two Space Tracking and Surveillance
    System (STSS) demonstrator satellites launched in late 2009 will
    validate key concepts for a future missile defense satellite
    constellation. The STSS has the potential to greatly improve our
    ability to detect, track, and defeat ballistic missiles.
    Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
        The specter of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of
    terrorists poses a threat to the United States, our allies, and global
    security at large. STRATCOM is responsible to synchronize DOD-wide
    planning for counter-WMD (CWMD). Our CWMD campaign plan framework,
    detailing linkages between military strategic objectives and desired
    effects, has become the CWMD planning standard for geographic combatant
    commands.
        To further enhance regional combatant commander and interagency
    planning, STRATCOM has developed a Joint Elimination Coordination
    Element in order to support WMD elimination efforts. This unit will
    also support DOD efforts to establish a Joint Task Force-Elimination
    headquarters to provide specialized command and control for WMD
    elimination operations. Additionally, STRATCOM has advanced the
    development of the Interagency CWMD Database of Responsibilities,
    Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC) system to inform planning,
    training, advocacy, and other partnerships across the government.
    Further, we lead semiannual Global Synchronization Conferences to
    enhance CWMD planning across other commands, the broader whole of
    government, and our key allies and partners.
        To improve the Nation's existing capabilities for nuclear forensics
    and attribution, we are sponsoring a Joint Capabilities Technology
    Demonstration for National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF). It is
    designed to improve existing air- and ground-sample collection
    capabilities. In coordination with U.S. Joint Forces Command, we have
    conducted a series of experiments to determine the best uses of active
    interrogation technology to extend the detection ranges of our nuclear
    and radiological passive detectors. DOD has proposed additional CWMD
    funding in its fiscal year 2011 budget for DOD nonproliferation,
    counterproliferation, and consequence management programs to accelerate
    the closure of capability gaps. This additional funding would be
    applied to nuclear and biological threat reduction; combating nuclear
    terrorism; nuclear search, detection, and forensics; technical
    reachback and planning support for the combatant commanders; and
    integration of CWMD technical, operational, and intelligence expertise
    for improved WMD threat anticipation and response. We fully support
    these investments and the efforts of the Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency (DTRA).
        Finally, the STRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC WMD) plays a
    key role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a proven
    counterproliferation architecture. This past year SCC WMD supported the
    embedding of PSI activities into a number of combatant commands'
    exercise programs, developed international PSI training scenarios, and
    published the first PSI exercise planning handbook. We look forward to
    accelerating exercise engagements and increasing our focus on potential
    sources of proliferation.
                             information operations
        With the exception of psychological operations (PSYOP), STRATCOM
    plans, coordinates, supports, and advocates for information operations
    (IO) across geographic combatant commands' areas of responsibility. We
    execute these responsibilities through our joint components: JFCC NW
    and JTF GNO for cyber operations; and the Joint Information Operations
    Warfare Center (JIOWC) for electronic warfare (EW), military deception
    (MILDEC), and operational security (OPSEC).
        This year, we will participate in reviews of joint and Service
    doctrine to evaluate and assess how we conduct warfare in the
    information environment. Additionally, we are conducting a Strategic
    Communication Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), as tasked by the
    JROC. This CBA will identify requirements and capability gaps among the
    combatant commands and Joint Staff, including perspectives from the
    intelligence community, in order to standardize terminology and to
    resource appropriate DOD strategic communication capabilities.
        A wide range of military operations depend on unfettered access to
    the electromagnetic spectrum. For several decades, forces have taken
    advantage of relatively uncontested access to the electromagnetic
    spectrum, but spectrum requirements are growing not only for DOD
    missions but across Federal agencies, state, and local governments and
    commercial industry. Further, rapidly expanding spectrum usage and
    technology evolution now threaten to impede our ability to conduct
    successful military operations. As regions of the spectrum continue to
    be crowded by commercial and scientific entities and other nations, the
    warfighter's electromagnetic maneuver space will become more
    restricted. Future spectrum policy and use must carefully consider and
    balance national and economic security interests to enable commercial
    growth while protecting the equities of DOD and Federal agencies.
        To address these accessibility concerns and to preserve essential
    information transfer capabilities, the JROC approved the STRATCOM EW
    CBA. STRATCOM also produced a follow-on Initial Capabilities Document
    (ICD) that identified capability gaps and potential solutions. The ICD
    also emphasized the need for focused leadership in the EW area and a
    comprehensive joint investment strategy. In the coming year, and in
    conjunction with federally funded research and development centers,
    STRATCOM and U.S. Joint Forces Command will study approaches to
    responding to emerging electromagnetic threats. This review is intended
    to identify organizational and management approaches that will enable
    timely, prioritized, and effective EW resourcing decisions.
                 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
        Over the past decade, geographic combatant commanders' requirements
    have increased ISR demand, as highlighted in Iraq and Afghanistan. New
    and irregular threats reshaped the battlefield and the information
    required to operate successfully. Today, rapidly increasing
    capabilities to support the warfighter remain a key geographic
    combatant commander priority. Determining the appropriate ISR force
    size is important, given limited resources and dynamic theater needs.
    STRATCOM is leading efforts to develop an ISR force-sizing construct
    for the Department. This initiative will develop a sound analytical
    foundation for future ISR allocation and procurement decisions.
        To date, DOD has rapidly expanded ISR platform acquisition and
    fielding, thereby broadening theater access to intelligence. To
    complement this initiative and as a key facet to meeting the rising
    demand for ISR products, DOD is also expanding our processing,
    exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities. Rapid collection-
    capability growth challenges our ability to transform raw data into
    information of intelligence value and to disseminate it to combat
    forces in a timely fashion. STRATCOM continues to advocate for needed
    PED capabilities with the Services and combat-support agencies and is
    also developing methods to align ISR allocation with PED capacity to
    ensure collection effectiveness and to better integrate existing
    resources. Finally, new assets and new challenges require bases from
    which to access many regions, such as USAFRICOM's Camp Lemonnier,
    Djibouti. This important facility deserves sustained support because it
    provides access to multiple countries and the Horn of Africa while
    enabling the employment of air and naval assets supporting DOD
    operations in the region.
        As new ISR capabilities come on line, we must transition legacy
    capabilities to new systems. The Air Force has fielded the first Global
    Hawk in theater, but challenges remain before it could replace today's
    U-2 capability. Chief among these is sufficient wideband satellite
    communications to permit necessary throughput in the Global Hawk
    communications architecture. STRATCOM is working to make sure that a
    comprehensive communications capability is capable of providing
    worldwide support prior to the U-2 retirement.
        Whether making carefully nuanced deterrence recommendations,
    evaluating space capabilities, understanding the new and dynamic
    cyberspace domain, or sustaining our superior strategic capability
    knowledge base, intelligence provides operational context fundamental
    to every commander's decision calculus. Since I assumed command of
    STRATCOM in the fall of 2007, my intelligence directorate has done
    tremendous work using limited resources to support our three lines of
    operations and our enabling missions. Recently, we received a modest
    but essential increase in intelligence billet authorizations to
    establish the STRATCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center. This
    important investment will increase our headquarters capabilities to
    provide the level of strategic intelligence we require and to
    distribute appropriate capabilities to several of our components. We
    are also working with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence to establish a second Joint Intelligence Operations Center
    to support CYBERCOM. We appreciate continued congressional support for
    these initiatives.
                                   conclusion
        STRATCOM continues to enhance our ability to deliver global
    security for America each and every day. We have re-emphasized the
    importance of our nuclear deterrence mission and proven America's long
    held confidence in our nuclear forces, while also expanding
    capabilities crucial to operating in the space and cyberspace domain.
    We enable many space-based and cyberspace capabilities essential to
    military operations and daily life by sustaining our freedom of action
    in these domains. STRATCOM's uniquely global missions support national
    objectives, whole-of-government solutions, regional requirements, and
    enhanced cooperation with our international partners. While many
    challenges remain in our increasingly interconnected and rapidly
    changing world, STRATCOM is fully engaged to address them. We greatly
    appreciate the support of Congress.

        Chairman Levin. Before I call on Admiral Willard, let me
    just say a word to my colleagues about a situation which has
    existed for far too long, which I'm going to do my best to
    correct this morning. I go to the floor at about 10:30, and if
    we're still in session here at that time, Senator Lieberman was
    kind enough to say that he would be able to take over.
        We've had a general, who's been nominated for a second
    star, who's been on the Senate calendar since October. His name
    is General Michael J. Walsh. He was unanimously approved by
    this committee. But, there's been a hold on his nomination, for
    a totally unrelated issue. Senator Vitter has been the one--he
    admitted--he acknowledges it, so I'm not disclosing anything
    which isn't out there. But, it's unconscionable. This is a
    military officer whose nomination--excuse me--whose approval of
    a second star is being held up by one Senator, for unrelated
    purposes. In about an hour, I'm going to go down and try and
    get unanimous consent that that nomination come off the
    calendar--that approval come off the calendar and be approved
    by the Senate.
        So, any of you who have some feelings on that subject, you
    may want to say something to Senator Vitter, or to his office.
    It would be appreciated.
        But, I believe that the committee should be, and I think
    is, united on this, by the way. I've talked to Senator McCain.
    Senator McCain agrees with me. He will be joining me in my
    unanimous consent request. But, I would ask any other members
    of the committee who feel strongly enough about this to get
    hold of Senator Vitter's office, please do so. Because, again,
    I think that this committee's jurisdiction and our obligation
    and responsibility to our men and women in uniform is really at
    issue here if we can't get approval of a second star for a
    fully qualified brigadier general to be a major general.
        Admiral Willard.

       STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            PACIFIC COMMAND

        Admiral Willard. Thank you, Chairman.
        So, that we can get to the committee's questions, I'll keep
    my remarks brief, but I also ask that my full statement be
    included for the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be.
        Admiral Willard. Chairman Levin, Senator Burr, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today and to discuss PACOM and
    the Asia Pacific region.
        Seated behind me is my wife, Donna, who's been at my side
    for 36 years. She's an outstanding ambassador of our Nation,
    and a tireless advocate for the men and women of our military
    and their families.
        Chairman Levin. Special welcome to her.
        Admiral Willard. Thank you.
        I also would like to thank you for your interest in our
    AOR. I've either met many of you en route to the region or
    followed your travels with great interest. Your presence and
    interest sends a strong message throughout the Asia Pacific,
    and I invite all of you to stop by Hawaii either on your way
    into the region, so my staff and I may brief you on the
    security situation, or on your return trip, in order that I may
    gain from your insights from your engagements.
        Additionally, when in Hawaii, I'd be honored to entertain
    you in the quarters of a former Commander in Chief, U.S.
    Pacific Command, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.
        Today is my first posture hearing as the Commander of
    PACOM. Since taking command last October, I've had the chance
    to meet with many of my counterparts, travel throughout the
    region, and exercise a few of our contingency plans.
        When combined with my previous years of service in the Asia
    Pacific, these experiences have led me to the following
    conclusions, which I would hope we can expand on during today's
    hearing.
        The Asia Pacific region is vital to our Nation, and it's
    quickly becoming the strategic nexus of the globe, due to its
    economic expansion and great potential. Key to our commitment
    in the region is our forward-deployed and postured forces. We
    face challenges in building partner capacity under the current
    patchwork of authorities and programs designed to support our
    security assistance efforts. The United States remains the
    preeminent power in the Asia Pacific. Modernizing and expanding
    our relationships with our allies and security partners is also
    vital to maintaining stability and enhancing security in the
    region.
        China's growing presence and influence in the region create
    both challenges and opportunities for the United States and for
    the regional countries. China's rapid and comprehensive
    transformation of its armed forces is affecting regional
    military balances and holds implications beyond the Asia
    Pacific region. Of particular concern is that elements of
    China's military modernization appear designed to challenge our
    freedom of action in the region.
        Finally, India's strategic location, shared democratic
    values, growing economy, and evolution as a regional partner
    and power combine to make them the partner with whom we need to
    work much more closely.
        Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, the Asia
    Pacific is a region of great potential and is vital to the
    interests of the United States. Every day, the soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of PACOM are working
    with our allies, partners, and friends to maintain this
    region's security. Our success has been enabled by this
    committee's longstanding support. You've provided us with the
    most technically advanced systems in the world and with a
    military quality of life worthy of the contributions of our
    All-Volunteer Force. On behalf of more than 300,000 men and
    women of PACOM, thank you for your support and for this
    opportunity to testify on the defense posture of this Command.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Willard follows:]
                Prepared Statement by ADM Robert F. Willard, USN
                                  introduction
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee,
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
    the United States Pacific Command and our area of responsibility (AOR)
    in the Asia-Pacific. I am pleased to report that 2009 was a very
    productive year for us and, through your continued support, we
    anticipate 2010 to be the same. I also would like to thank you for your
    interest in the AOR. I have either met many of you en route to the
    region or followed your travels with great interest. Your presence and
    interest send a strong message, and I invite all of you to stop by
    Hawaii either on your way into the region so my staff and I may brief
    you on the security environment or on the return trip to share your
    impressions from your engagements.
        Today is my first posture hearing as the Pacific Command Commander.
    Since taking command last October, I have had the chance to meet with
    many of my counterparts, travel throughout the region and exercise a
    few of our contingency plans. Based on that experience, I would hope
    that we could expand our discussion on the following areas during my
    testimony:

             The Asia-Pacific region is vital to our Nation; it is
            quickly becoming the strategic nexus of the globe due to its
            economic expansion and potential.
             Key to our commitment to the region is our forward-
            deployed/postured forces.
             We face challenges in building partner capacity under
            the current patchwork of authorities and programs designed to
            support our Security assistant efforts.
             The United States remains the preeminent power in the
            Asia-Pacific. Modernizing and expanding our relationships with
            our allies and security partners is vital to maintaining
            stability and enhancing security in the region.
             China's growing presence and influence in the region
            create both challenges and opportunities for the United States
            and regional countries.
             China's rapid and comprehensive transformation of its
            armed forces is affecting regional military balances and holds
            implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region. Of particular
            concern is that elements of China's military modernization
            appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the
            region.
             India's strategic location, shared democratic values,
            growing economy and evolution as a regional power combine to
            make them a partner with whom we need to work much more
            closely.

        For over 60 years U.S. Pacific Command has helped provide a secure
    environment within the AOR that has allowed the regional countries to
    focus on developing their economies and building strong government
    institutions. Today we see the benefits of these efforts as the global
    economic center of gravity shifts into the region in alignment with our
    own nation's interests. Consider the following achievements over the
    past year:

             On a combined basis, the Nations in the AOR had an
            estimated GDP (on an exchange rate basis) of $15.1 trillion;
            compared to total U.S. GDP of $14.3 trillion.
             U.S. two-way trade in goods and services with
            countries in the AOR totaled nearly $1.3 trillion.
             In 2009, China surpassed Germany as the world's third
            largest economy behind the United States and Japan.
             Five of our ``Top Ten'' trading partners are now Asia-
            Pacific countries.
             The Strait of Malacca remains one of the world's most
            strategic waterways with over 60,000 ships transiting annually,
            carrying half of the world's oil and 90 percent of the oil
            imported by China, Japan and South Korea--our second, fourth
            and seventh largest trading partners, respectively. Due to the
            cooperative efforts of the Nations bordering this waterway,
            piracy has dropped from a high of 38 incidents a year in 2004
            to just 2 in 2009.

        In my travels and discussions with leaders in the region both as
    the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and now as the Commander, U.S.
    Pacific Command, I have found that our continuous regional presence is
    not only welcomed, but strongly desired. Maintaining such a posture is
    not a simple task given size and diversity of our AOR. For example,
    sitting in my headquarters in Honolulu, I am closer to New York City
    than Sydney, Australia. A soldier at Fort Lewis in Washington State is
    closer to Kuwait City than he is to Bangkok, Thailand. These vast
    distances make our forward-deployed and forward-stationed forces all
    the more important if we desire to remain a highly effective influence
    in the region. The abilities of the more than 140,000 men and women--
    who represent our forward-stationed/deployed joint forces--to project
    credible combat power serves as an effective deterrent to those who
    would disrupt the Asia-Pacific security environment or threaten our
    friends and allies. In no other region of the world is the requirement
    for a properly postured, ready force with dominant high-end
    capabilities more vital than in the Asia-Pacific. The forward forces
    are the strongest statement of U.S. commitment to the region and any
    reduction in their posture, readiness or capability is regarded as
    waning interest and diminished U.S. influence.
        The military and government leaders that I have spoken with have
    also made it clear that we should not take our level of influence
    within the region for granted. Many countries, most notably China, see
    the same strategic opportunities that we do and are seeking to increase
    their level of access and influence throughout the Asia-Pacific by
    building and expanding economic, diplomatic and security relationships.
    While we remain the current ``partner of choice,'' leaders consistently
    tell me it's growing more difficult to be a U.S. partner given the
    ``constraints,'' such as limitations of our security assistance
    programs that often accompany that partnership.
        Among our most powerful programs for the region are the security
    assistance programs that focus on building partner capacity in
    security-related areas. These programs expose future leaders of other
    countries to our values and culture through education and training;
    present opportunities for nations to purchase U.S. military equipment
    that enables greater interoperability in our combined operations; and
    provide engagement opportunities for our best ambassadors, our young
    servicemen and women, to develop relationships with the region's
    military personnel and general populations. Unfortunately, these
    programs have not evolved much since the end of the Cold War. As
    reported by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), these security
    assistance programs are constrained by a ``patchwork of authorities,
    persistent shortfalls in the resources, unwieldy processes and a
    limited ability to sustain such undertakings beyond a short period of
    time.'' I agree with this description and fully support the
    administration's efforts to reform and enhance these important programs
    as essential to maintaining, and, in some cases, regaining our
    competitive edge. I hope you will support the administration efforts in
    this regard.
        I would like to discuss in detail some of my priorities for the
    region which include: allies and partners, China, India, North Korea,
    and transnational threats.
                              allies and partners
        Five of our Nation's seven mutual defense treaties are with nations
    in the Asia-Pacific region. We continue to work closely with these
    regional treaty allies--Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic
    of the Philippines and Thailand--to strengthen and leverage our
    relationships to enhance security within the region.
    Australia
        Australia remains a steadfast ally that is firmly committed to
    enhancing global and regional security and to providing institutional
    assistance throughout the Pacific. Australia is particularly active
    leading the International Stabilization Force in Timor-Leste and the
    Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Their contributions
    to global security are evident by their recently increased force
    presence in Afghanistan. As the largest non-NATO force provider,
    Australia has committed to contribute to our effort to stabilize
    Afghanistan.
        Australia highly values advancing interoperability and enhanced
    defense cooperation with the United States, particularly through
    training events and acquisition programs. Last year, Talisman Saber
    2009, a large scale biennial, bilateral combined arms exercise that
    focuses on strengthening the U.S.-Australian military-to-military
    relationship, enjoyed unprecedented participation (of 24,000 U.S. and
    Australian military personnel). The exercise enhanced interoperability
    and our collective ability to provide security in the region by
    focusing heavily on combined command and control, amphibious
    operations, close combat and combined arms, and joint and coalition
    logistics. The U.S. and Australian militaries also collaborate
    extensively in many other areas including Intelligence, Surveillance,
    and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
    Relief (HA/DR).
    Japan
        Our alliance with Japan is the cornerstone of our security strategy
    in Northeast Asia. Despite some recent challenges related to U.S.
    basing in Japan, the military relationship, as well as the overall
    alliance, remain strong, as evidenced by Prime Minister Hatoyama's
    recent pledge of support. That being said, we must make every effort--
    particularly as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the alliance--to
    remind the citizens of both the United States and Japan of the
    importance of our alliance to enduring regional security and
    prosperity.
        U.S. Pacific Command remains committed to the implementation of the
    Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). Initiated by the U.S.
    Secretaries of State and Defense with their Japanese counterparts in
    2002, progress on Alliance Transformation and Realignment through the
    execution of the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment are critical next steps.
    Major elements of the Realignment Roadmap with Japan include:
    relocating a Marine Corps Air Station and a portion of a carrier
    airwing from urbanized to rural areas; co-locating U.S. and Japanese
    command and control capabilities; deploying U.S. missile defense
    capabilities to Japan in conjunction with their own deployments;
    improving operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces;
    and adjusting the burden-sharing arrangement through the relocation of
    ground forces.
        The rebasing of 8,000 marines and their dependents from Okinawa to
    Guam remains a key element of the Realignment Roadmap. Guam-based
    marines, in addition to those Marine Forces that remain in Okinawa,
    will sustain the advantages of having forward-based ground forces in
    the Pacific Command AOR. Currently the Government of Japan (GOJ) is
    reviewing one of the realignment elements that addresses the Futenma
    Replacement Facility (FRF) and related movement of Marine Corps
    aviation assets in Okinawa; an action which is directly linked to the
    relocation of marines to Guam and a plan to return significant land
    area to Japan. The GOJ has indicated it expects to complete its review
    by May of this year. The United States remains committed to the 2006
    DPRI Roadmap as agreed to by both countries.
        The Japan Self Defense Force is advancing its regional and global
    influence. In the spring and early summer of 2009, Japan deployed two
    JMSDF ships and two patrol aircraft to the Gulf of Aden region for
    counter-piracy operations. Although their Indian Ocean-based refueling
    mission recently ended, Japan remains engaged in the region by
    providing civil and financial support for reconstruction and
    humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the foreseeable
    future.
        Although the Japanese defense budget has decreased each year since
    2002, the Japan Self Defense Forces continue their regular bilateral
    interactions with the United States, and in some multi-lateral
    engagements with the United States and our other allies, such as the
    Republic of Korea and Australia. Last year witnessed the completion of
    several successful milestones in our bilateral relationship, including
    the completion of a year-long study of contingency command and control
    relationships and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) testing of a third
    Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Aegis destroyer. Japan continues to
    maintain over $4 billion in annual Host Nation Support (HNS) to our
    Japan-based force. Japan HNS contribution remains a vital strategic
    pillar of respective U.S. and Japanese alliance commitments.
    Republic of Korea (ROK)
        The U.S.-ROK alliance remains strong and critical to our regional
    strategy in Northeast Asia. General Sharp and I are aligned in our
    efforts to do what is right for the United States and the ROK as this
    alliance undergoes a major transformation. I will defer to General
    Sharp's testimony to provide the details of our relationship on the
    Peninsula, but note that General Sharp's progress in handling the
    transition of wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK military
    has been exceptional as has his leadership of U.S. Forces Korea.
        The transformation of the U.S.-ROK alliance will ultimately assist
    the ROK to better meet security challenges both on and off the
    peninsula. The ROK currently maintains a warship in the Gulf of Aden in
    support of counter-piracy and maritime security operations, and has
    provided direct assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom, including
    demonstrating strong leadership in its decision to deploy a Provincial
    Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan this year. Of particular note is the
    evolving trilateral security cooperation between the United States,
    ROK, and Japan. Although there are still policy issues to be addressed
    in realizing its full potential, the shared values, financial
    resources, logistical capability, and the planning ability to address
    complex contingencies throughout the region make this tri-lateral
    partnership a goal worth pursuing.
    Republic of the Philippines
        The Republic of the Philippines (RP) is simultaneously conducting a
    force-wide defense reform, transforming internal security operations,
    and developing a maritime security capability. These efforts in turn
    support important U.S. regional initiatives and contribute to a
    stronger Philippine Government capable of assuming a greater role in
    providing for its own regional security.
        In close partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
    (AFP), U.S. Pacific Command continues to support Philippine Defense
    Reform (PDR). Most significantly, the Philippines is actively working
    to transition their forces from a focus on internal security operations
    to territorial defense by 2016.
        Lastly, USPACOM continues to support the AFP in their counter-
    insurgency and counter-terror efforts in the south. 2009 marked some
    notable AFP successes and we have seen that its momentum has carried
    over to 2010.
    Thailand
        Thailand remains a critical Southeast Asian ally and engagement
    partner. In addition, we appreciate Thailand's important global
    security contributions to overseas contingency operations, counter-
    narcotics efforts, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations
    (such as their upcoming deployment to Darfur).
        In Thailand, U.S. PACOM forces enjoy unmatched access and support.
    We recently completed the 29th Exercise Cobra Gold which we co-host
    with/and in Thailand. Cobra Gold remains the premier U.S. Pacific
    Command multilateral exercise which this year had 6 participants and
    observers from more than 15 nations.
        The United States and Thailand share important mutual goals on
    democracy, regional stability, counterterrorism, and
    counterproliferation. Thailand is a positive contributor to the
    regional security environment and I am committed to strengthening and
    broadening our alliance even further.
                                  partnerships
        Successfully managing the many security challenges in the region
    depends upon a collaborative approach between like-minded nations who
    appreciate the fundamental relationship between security and enduring
    prosperity. U.S. Pacific Command expends significant time and resources
    developing relationships with non-ally nations who understand the role
    common cause partnerships play in the establishment of regional
    security. While these relationships often begin or focus on narrow or
    specific areas of shared interest, as trust grows and common values are
    realigned, broader regional security contributions often result. U.S.
    Pacific Command appreciates that strong bilateral relationships advance
    in complexity and effectiveness on the basis of individual engagements
    and according to capacities, capabilities, and a partner-nation's
    desire and national interest. That being said, there is regional
    security benefit provided by all of the partnerships we enjoy among the
    36 Asia-Pacific nations.
        An example of such a partnership--one that has matured
    significantly in the past several years and one that contributes in
    many ways to enhanced regional security--is the one we share with
    Singapore. Initially a relationship focused on trade, maritime
    security, and a modest U.S. logistics presence, it has since expanded
    into other areas. In 2005, the relationship was formalized with the
    signing of a security agreement which identified Singapore and the
    United States as ``Major Security Cooperation Partners.'' Today
    Singapore is one of our strongest security partners in the region,
    hosting many of our transiting ships and deploying personnel, working
    with U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and commanding the multi-national,
    counter-piracy, Combined Task Force in the Gulf of Aden.
        Our rapidly developing relationship with Indonesia--the largest
    Muslim-majority democracy in the world--provides another excellent
    example of a partnership of great importance to enduring regional
    security. After years of limited engagement with the Indonesian armed
    forces (TNI), the significant level of transparency and extent of
    institutional reforms initiated by President Yudhoyono has provided
    impetus to renew and advance our military relationship. Based on a
    desire to contribute more to the regional security effort, the TNI now
    plays a larger leading role in multilateral events and exercises that
    focus on capabilities such as HA/DR and peace keeping. We are looking
    forward to supporting Indonesia's developing security role in the
    region, particularly as the administration builds towards a new
    ``comprehensive partnership.''
                                     china
        One cannot engage within the region without having a discussion
    about the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's national strategy
    remains primarily focused on economic development which emphasizes
    domestic stability and maintaining an international security
    environment conducive to continued economic growth. This new found
    economic wealth is funding a military modernization program that has
    raised concerns in the region over the lack of transparency into
    Beijing's emerging military capabilities and the intentions that
    motivate them--a concern shared by the United States. China's interest
    in a peaceful and stable environment that will support the country's
    developmental goals is difficult to reconcile with the evolving
    military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of
    action in the region or exercise aggression or coercion of its
    neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and partners. Reconciling the
    apparent gap between the PRC's statements and its observed military
    capabilities serves to underscore the importance of maintaining open
    channels of communication and of building toward a continuous dialogue
    with China's armed forces based on open and substantive discussion of
    strategic issues. However, that type of frank and candid discussion
    requires a stable and reliable U.S.-China military-to-military
    relationship--a relationship that does not yet exist with the Peoples'
    Liberation Army (PLA).
    People's Liberation Army (PLA) Modernization
        China has continued a rapid, comprehensive program of military
    modernization with supporting doctrine and a professionalization of the
    officer and enlisted ranks. This program of modernization has been
    supported by a military budget that has grown annually by double digits
    over the last decade. Beijing publicly asserts that China's military
    modernization is ``purely defensive in nature,'' and aimed solely at
    protecting China's security and interests. Over the past several years,
    China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to
    articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond China's
    immediate territorial concerns, but has left unclear to the
    international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA's
    evolving doctrine and capabilities.
        The PLA has placed increasing emphasis on attracting and retaining
    a professional cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers.
    Incentives include advanced training and education, as well as housing
    and post-service employment preferences that should lead to a more
    motivated, better trained and professional military capable of a
    broader range of combined arms missions.
        China continues to develop weapons systems, technologies and
    concepts of operation that support anti-access and area denial
    strategies in the Western Pacific by holding air and maritime forces at
    risk at extended distances from the PRC coastline. The PLA Navy is
    continuing to develop a ``Blue Water'' capability that includes the
    ability to surge surface combatants and submarines at extended
    distances from the PRC mainland. Modernization programs have included
    development of sophisticated shipboard air defense systems as well as
    supersonic sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles.
        China's leaders are pursuing an aircraft carrier capability. In
    1998 China purchased an incomplete former Soviet Kuznetsov class
    aircraft carrier, which began renovations in 2002 at its shipyard in
    Dalian. I expect this carrier to become operational around 2012 and
    likely be used to develop basic carrier skills.
        China continues to field the largest conventional submarine force
    in the world totaling more than 60 boats; while the quality of China's
    submarine fleet is mixed the percentage of modern, quiet submarines in
    the fleet is growing. This fleet also includes a number of nuclear
    powered fast attack and ballistic missile submarines. China is also
    developing a new submarine launched nuclear ballistic missile, the JL-
    2, capable of ranging the western United States.
        China fields a growing number of sophisticated multi-role fighter
    aircraft, including the SU-27 and SU-30 purchased from Russia and
    indigenously produced 4th generation aircraft. The PLA Air Force and
    naval air forces have continued to focus on improving pilot and
    controller proficiencies in complex, multi-plane combat scenarios,
    including operations over water. The PLA has focused considerable
    effort on building up its integrated air defense capabilities and has
    deployed an increasing number of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU 2 long
    range surface-to-air missile systems along the Taiwan Strait. China is
    also developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile
    based on the DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM designed specifically to target aircraft
    carriers.
        Until recently, ``jointness'' in the PLA meant that different
    services operated toward a common goal in a joint or combined campaign
    with operations separated by time and distance. However, years of
    observing U.S. military operations and modern warfare campaigns have
    convinced PLA leadership of the need for greater integration between
    services to include enhanced joint operations at the tactical level.
    The PLA has adopted the concept of ``Integrated Joint Operations'' as a
    goal for the Chinese military to allow it to conduct integrated
    operations on a campaign level. Additionally, the PLA has placed
    increased emphasis on training in more demanding conditions, such as
    complex electromagnetic environments.
    China's Strategic Capabilities
        China maintains a nuclear force capable of ranging most of the
    world, including the continental United States. This capability has
    been enhanced through the development of increasingly sophisticated
    road mobile delivery systems as well as the development of the Type 094
    nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (JIN-class SSBN). Despite
    assertions that China opposes the ``weaponization'' of space, the PLA
    is developing a multi-dimensional program to deny potential adversaries
    the use of space, an element of which was demonstrated in January 2007
    when China intentionally destroyed one of its own weather satellites
    with a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon.
        U.S. military and government networks and computer systems continue
    to be the target of intrusions that appear to have originated from
    within the PRC. Although most intrusions focus on exfiltrating data,
    the skills being demonstrated would also apply to network attacks.
    China's Ongoing ``Sovereignty'' Campaigns
        Beijing remains committed to eventual unification with Taiwan, and
    has not ruled out the use of force to achieve that goal. The PLA's
    continued military advancements sustain a trend of shifting the cross-
    Strait military balance in Beijing's favor. The Taiwan Relations Act
    provides that it is U.S. policy ``to provide Taiwan with arms of a
    defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United States
    to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would
    jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the
    people on Taiwan.'' At the U.S. Pacific Command, we fulfill these
    obligations on a daily basis.
        Motivated by a need for indigenous natural resources and
    consolidation of self-proclaimed sovereignty limits, the PRC has re-
    asserted its claims to most of the South China Sea and reinforced its
    position in the region, including the contested Spratly and Paracel
    Islands. The PLA Navy has increased its patrols throughout the region
    and has shown an increased willingness to confront regional nations on
    the high seas and within the contested island chains. Additionally,
    China lays claim to the Senkakus, administered by Japan, and contests
    areas on its border with India.
        As an integral part of its strategy, the PRC has interpreted
    certain international laws in ways contrary to international norms,
    such as the U.N. Convention for Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and has passed
    domestic laws that further reinforce its sovereignty claims.
    U.S./China Military Relationship and Security Cooperation
        U.S. Pacific Command is committed to the development of a stable
    and reliable military-to-military relationship with the PRC, which is
    critical to avoiding misperception and miscalculation and, ultimately,
    building the type of partnership that leaders in both countries aspire
    to. Although we are currently in a period of reduced engagement
    activity due to the PRC's reaction to the notification of arms sales to
    Taiwan, last year's military-to-military activities were highlighted by
    exchange visits by senior leaders from both sides. During his visit to
    Washington, DC in November 2009, General XU Caihou, Vice Chairman of
    the Central Military Commission, agreed with Defense Secretary Gates to
    further develop the military aspect of the U.S.-People's Republic of
    China (PRC) relationship. U.S. Pacific Command looks forward to working
    with the PLA on concrete and practical measures to strengthen our
    military relationship in order to improve the security interests of
    both the United States and China. These measures include senior leader
    visits, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise observer
    exchanges, a naval passing exercise, and a military medical exchange.
    The PLA leadership has also shown a willingness to expand military
    engagement to areas such as counterterrorism, counter-piracy, maritime
    safety, and non-proliferation.
        As the Executive Agent for the U.S.-PRC Military Maritime
    Consultative Agreement (MMCA), U.S. Pacific Command co-led senior
    leader bilateral MMCA discussions last summer in Beijing. The MMCA
    forum was initiated in 1998 and is intended to improve safety for
    airmen and sailors when our Nations' vessels and aircraft operate in
    proximity to one another. During the December 2009 Defense Policy
    Coordination Talks held in Honolulu, both sides agreed to reinvigorate
    the MMCA as a viable diplomatic mechanism through which we can manage
    issues related to maritime and air safety.
                                     india
        The complexity, unique significance, and growing importance of the
    U.S.-India Strategic Partnership warrant considering this nation apart
    from the broader Allies and Partners focus previously discussed. Our
    Nation's partnership with India is especially important to long term
    South and Central Asia regional security and to U.S. national interests
    in this vital sub-region. India's leadership as the largest democracy,
    its rising economic power, and its influence across South Asia as well
    as its global influence attest to its pivotal role in shaping the
    regional security environment. We must continue to strengthen this
    relationship and, while our near-term challenges in Central Command are
    of great strategic importance, we must ensure the U.S.-India
    relationship remains rooted in our extensive common interests of which
    the Afghanistan-Pakistan issue is only one. U.S. Pacific Command is
    working hard to develop bonds that are trust-based, leverage our shared
    values, and endure beyond current conflicts. Such an approach is
    critical to taking advantage of the full potential of our relationship;
    and to effectively collaborating on the wide range opportunities
    available in an area of the world that is not only home to some of the
    most contentious geo-political and transnational challenges, but also
    to some of the most vital sea, air, and land lines of communication.
        Our relationship has grown significantly over the past 5 years as
    both countries work to overcome apprehensions formed during the Cold
    War era, particularly with respect to defense cooperation. Resolution
    of the long-standing End User Monitoring (EUM) issue removed a major
    obstacle to a more robust and sophisticated defense sales program. To
    date, for example, the Government of India has purchased Lockheed
    Martin C-130Js and Boeing P-8I aircraft; expressed their interest to
    acquire C-17s; and conducted flight tests of F-16s and F/A-18s (under
    consideration in the medium multi-mission role combat aircraft
    competition). The recent increase in defense sales, which exceeded $2
    billion in 2009, not only enhances U.S. access to one of the largest
    defense markets in the world, but more importantly enables greater
    cooperation between our armed forces.
        The complexity of our exercises and training events is increasing
    and we are expanding our cooperation in the Indian Ocean and beyond. We
    currently engage together combating piracy in Gulf of Aden, countering
    terrorism, enhancing maritime security, expanding POW/MIA recovery
    missions, and conducting HA/DR events. One of our most notable
    accomplishments was last year's bi-lateral Exercise Yudh Abhyas.
    Located in India, it included the largest deployment of U.S. Stryker
    vehicles outside of the Middle East. Such events offer unique training
    opportunities, allow for increased personal and professional
    interaction and relationship building, and improve our ability to work
    together across a sophisticated range of operations.
        We continue to search for new areas to cooperate as our
    relationship develops. One area that has been prominently mentioned in
    the QDR is managing the global commons. Threats in the maritime, air,
    space, and cyberspace domains will be of increasing concern to both our
    Nations; and we see many opportunities for U.S.-India cooperation to
    address broad threats to the region's and the world's common areas.
        As our relationship develops, U.S. Pacific Command remains mindful
    of the significance of India-Pakistan tensions, particularly as they
    relate to the broader security discussion and the management of geo-
    political challenges that span Combatant Commands (Pakistan resides
    within Central Command's AOR and India resides in the Pacific AOR). We
    are keenly aware of the importance of a peaceful co-existence between
    these two nuclear-armed nations and stand ready to assist with this
    goal in conjunction with interagency partners.
                                  north korea
        As President Obama has said, ``the path for North Korea to realize
    its future is clear: a return to the Six-Party Talks; upholding
    previous commitments, including a return to the Nuclear Non-
    Proliferation Treaty; and the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
    denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.'' We remain convinced that
    our strong bilateral alliances with Japan and the ROK, as well as our
    growing trilateral cooperation, are critical to deterring the DPRK and
    to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We continue
    to work with our interagency partners to ensure military involvement in
    relevant areas such as PSI, operations to enforce UNSC resolutions, and
    multilateral non-proliferation exercises are synchronized with
    diplomatic approaches and that they contribute to the transmission of a
    clear and consistent message to the DPRK.
                             transnational threats
    CounterTerrorism
        U.S. Pacific Command has long employed a strategy of working ``by,
    with, and through'' regional partners to combat terrorism in the
    region. Our main effort, the Joint Special Operations Task Force-
    Philippines (JSOTF-P), operates in support of the Armed Forces of the
    Philippines (AFP) in Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago Region.
    The work of U.S. forces--advising, training, exercising, and
    informing--in conjunction with the resolute commitment and impressive
    abilities of AFP personnel, has resulted in great success. Over the
    past year the AFP has captured or killed more than a dozen Abu Sayyaf
    Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) leaders. Perhaps more importantly,
    the effort has resulted in enhanced quality of life and denial of safe
    haven to extremists in the area.
        Leveraging the lessons learned in Southeast Asia, and in concert
    with our interagency and regional partners, we are developing plans to
    combat extremism in South Asia. Our efforts there will undoubtedly
    require a whole-of-government approach and a coordinated multi-national
    effort given the extent of the problem and the variety of regional CT
    organizations, responsibilities, authorities, and policies.
    Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
        Our main effort to counter the spread of WMD is through support for
    the State Department's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Fifteen
    nations in the AOR have endorsed the PSI. Of particular note is the
    success by Thailand to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874
    last December when they intercepted 35 tons of illicit weaponry that
    had originated from North Korea.
        In October 2009, Singapore hosted the 38th PSI Exercise, Deep Sabre
    II, in which U.S. Navy and Coast Guard personnel participated--with the
    armed forces of 18 other nations--in maritime interdiction exercises
    designed to enhance the capabilities and improve the coordination of
    participating nations. We are looking forward to supporting future
    regional PSI Exercises. Additionally, and in support of the Office of
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, we conducted Chemical,
    Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Defense and Consequence
    Management bilateral working groups with Japan and the Republic of
    Korea with the intent of improving interoperability and growing
    regional capability and capacity.
                                 northeast asia
    Mongolia
        A strong partner, Mongolia continues to demonstrate support for
    U.S. regional and global policy objectives, while managing positive
    relations with its two neighbors, China and Russia. The Mongolia
    Defense Reform (MDR) assists the Mongolian Armed Forces with their
    transformation into a self-sustaining, international peacekeeping force
    capable of contributing to UN, international, and coalition missions.
    In support of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which
    serves as the Executive Agent for MDR, U.S. Pacific Command implements
    bilaterally agreed-to initiatives and priorities further the defense
    relationship between the United States and Mongolia.
        Members of the Mongolia Armed Forces regularly participate in
    bilateral and multilateral for a such as the Pacific Army Management
    Seminar, Pacific Rim Air Chiefs Conference, Chief of Defense
    Conference, and NCO subject matter expert exchanges.
        Mongolia continues to support peacekeeping and coalition operations
    and, with assistance from the Global Peace Operations Initiative
    (GPOI), continues to develop the Five Hills Training Center into a
    national, and eventually, a regional peacekeeping training center which
    hosts U.N.-certified training and component-level peacekeeping
    exercises for regional participants. Every year, the Mongolian Armed
    Forces partner with either U.S. Army Pacific or U.S. Marine Forces
    Pacific to host KHAAN QUEST. Following 2 years as the GPOI capstone
    peacekeeping exercise in 2006 and 2007, KHAAN QUEST remains an
    important multi-lateral peacekeeping exercise.
        Finally, I would like to add that Mongolia committed to deploying
    800 personnel to Chad in late-2009 in support of the U.N., while
    continuing to support the U.N. in Sierra Leone and other UN missions in
    Africa. A strong supporter in U.S. overseas contingency operations, in
    the fall of 2009, Mongolia deployed 200 troops in Afghanistan, with a
    security company and a mobile training team under Operation Enduring
    Freedom and a 40 soldier security detachment under the Germans as part
    of the International Security Assistance Force.
    Russia
        U.S. Pacific Command coordinates all Russian security cooperation
    activities with U.S. European Command to ensure the efforts of both
    geographic combatant commands are mutually supportive. We seek
    engagement with Russia in areas of mutual interest such as counter-
    terrorism, peacekeeping, and search-and-rescue operations. U.S. Pacific
    Command contacts were re-established in 2009 when the USS Cowpens and
    USS Stethem conducted port visits to Vladivostok. These port visits
    were symbolic of the historic and positive relationship that has
    existed in recent years between U.S. Pacific Command and Russia's Far
    East Command, particularly between our two navies. We plan to build on
    the success of these port visits by continuing to engage Russia in
    areas of mutual interest in accordance with the Military Cooperation
    Work Plan.
                                 southeast asia
    Malaysia
        Our military-to-military ties with Malaysia remain solid amidst a
    warming bilateral political relationship and enhanced ties between the
    U.S. and ASEAN nations. In 2009, U.S. Pacific Command developed closer
    ties to the Malaysian Joint Forces Command by participating in major
    command post exercises and by supporting their forces to enhance their
    capacity in maritime security operations. Malaysia maintains a strong
    leadership role in the region by being tough on terrorism, serious
    about maritime security, and committed to global peace and stability.
    We will continue to expand our cooperation with Malaysia and address
    our common security challenges.
        Cambodia is emerging as a strong supporter of U.S. policy in the
    region. The Cambodia Ministry of National Defense and Royal Cambodian
    Armed Forces are seeking U.S. engagement opportunities. In 2009, U.S.
    Pacific Command supported Cambodia's major initiatives of counter-
    terrorism, maritime security, defense reform, HA/DR, and peacekeeping
    operations. In 2010, we will continue to assist Cambodia on its Defense
    Reform initiative; augment its counter-terrorism efforts with 1206
    funding; and, together with Australia and Japan, work with their
    defense establishment and interagency to achieve their maritime
    security goals.
    Laos
        With the U.S. Defense Attache now in place, U.S.-Laos military-to-
    military engagement is expanding. The Joint Task Force Full Accounting
    recovery mission, led by the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC),
    continues to be an important focus in developing U.S.-Laos military
    relations. Laos has placed a priority on English language training to
    enable greater training opportunities and participation in bilateral or
    multilateral operations. In our bilateral defense discussions with the
    Ministry of National Defense, both sides agreed to explore greater
    engagement opportunities associated with military medical cooperation,
    civil military operations, training and education, and counter-
    narcotics cooperation.
    Vietnam
        As we prepare to mark the 15th anniversary of the normalization of
    U.S.-Vietnam relations, our military-to-military relationship with
    Vietnam continues to improve. Vietnam hosted several ship visits this
    year including the Seventh Fleet Flag Ship, the USS Blue Ridge, and its
    escort, the USS Lassen, whose commanding officer was born in Vietnam.
    In support of JPAC, USNS Bruce Heezen, with embarked Vietnamese
    scientists and personnel, conducted the first combined hydrographic
    survey in Vietnamese waters, successfully identifying potential crash
    sites. During his visit to Pacific Command last December, Vietnam's
    Minister of Defense indicated a desire for activities that foster
    greater understanding and cooperation in various areas such as disaster
    management, conflict resolution, trafficking in persons, and improving
    relations with its neighbors. We look forward to Vietnam's chairmanship
    of ASEAN this year and its desire to take a more responsible role in
    promoting peace and security in the region.
    Timor-Leste
        U.S. Pacific Command remains optimistic about the future of this
    young democracy. The Government of Timor-Leste managed to maintain
    control of the country and return home more than 10 percent of its
    population who were living in IDP camps. Timor-Leste is working with
    several other countries to begin critical institutional development
    which includes the Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL). Although its
    soldiers lack many basic capabilities, the F-FDTL leadership is
    developing a recruiting and training program to establish a legitimate,
    professional military.
        U.S. Pacific Command's interaction with Timor-Leste increased
    significantly in 2009, highlighted by our first military-to-military
    bilateral discussions. The F-FDTL participated in the Marine Exercise
    Marex 09, a multilateral exercise with Timorese and Australian Defense
    Forces that concentrated on basic infantry skills and medical and
    dental readiness. Although current engagement with Timor-Leste is
    mostly in the form of medical and dental readiness exercises and
    engineer assistance by U.S. Navy Seabees, we are hopeful that
    engagements such as Marex 09 will form the basis of our relationship as
    the F-FDTL develops into a professional military.
    Burma
        Beyond the significant issues associated with their human rights
    record, Burma presents challenges to regional stability in a number of
    other areas, including a maritime border dispute with Bangladesh,
    narcotics trafficking, trafficking-in-persons, and potential for rapid
    spread of pandemic disease. The recently completed U.S. Government
    policy review and subsequent high level visits to Burma by senior-level
    members of the U.S. Government have not altered our military engagement
    with Burma. It remains essentially non-existent as a matter of policy
    and public law. That said, U.S. Pacific Command is prepared to re-
    engage in a military-to-military dialogue with the Burmese whenever
    U.S. policy allows.
                                   south asia
    Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
        The conclusion of the Government of Sri Lanka's war against the
    Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorist group in May 2009
    brought about an uneasy peace to Sri Lanka. Concerns over the welfare
    of nearly 300,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) initially caused
    the international community to pressure the Government of Sri Lanka to
    better provide for the IDPs while expediting the return to their homes.
    To its credit, the Government of Sri Lanka has taken steps to lower the
    number of IDPs in camps to a current estimate of around 100,000.
        As a consequence of allegations of human rights violations, all
    U.S. military-to-military engagement with Sri Lanka was halted in
    August 2009, with the exception of humanitarian assistance. In the
    meantime, we await development of a U.S. Government strategy that may
    include enhanced military-to-military.
    Republic of Maldives
        Since President Nasheed took office in November 2008, we have seen
    a marked increase with Maldives' desire to interact with U.S. Pacific
    Command. Maldives strategic location astride key shipping lanes in
    addition to its archipelagic geography make it a key region for
    maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Maldives requested U.S.
    assistance in helping the Maldives National Defense Force transform
    itself into a force more capable of defending against the threats of
    terrorism, piracy, and illegal drug trafficking. In response to the
    Government of Maldives' concerns that international terrorist
    organizations were actively recruiting Maldivian citizens, we provided
    assistance in development of a national intelligence capability
    enabling quicker responses across various agencies of their government.
    Nepal
        The resignation by the Maoist Government in May 2009 resulted in a
    political stalemate that continues to cast serious doubts as to whether
    Nepal's Constituent Assembly can ratify a constitution by the May 2010
    deadline. The Maoists, who still control a plurality of seats in the
    Assembly, have staged numerous walkouts and demonstrations, effectively
    impeding the Constituent Assembly and the constitution drafting
    process.
        Due to the potential for the current peace to unravel, U.S. Pacific
    Command's focus is on humanitarian assistance and efforts to support
    the peaceful integration of members of the Maoist People's Liberation
    Army into the Nepalese security forces. Senior level dialogue and
    defense sector reform events are the primary means to assist this
    change. Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command continues to assist Nepal in
    the development of its peacekeeping operations and training
    capabilities through GPOI. While PACOM is focused on humanitarian
    assistance and peacekeeping activities, we are also noting an increase
    in violence in the southern Terai region. These poorly governed areas
    are susceptible to exploitation by terrorist groups in South Asia.
    PACOM will continue to closely monitor this issue and stands ready to
    assist Nepal in building its CT capacity.
    People's Republic of Bangladesh
        The return to democracy in Bangladesh, while a positive step, has
    also resulted in occasional civilian-military tension that could
    potentially destabilize this moderate nation of 150 million people.
    U.S. Pacific Command has initiated several programs and events to
    assist in promoting civilian-military trust, transparency and
    cooperation.
        Despite their political issues, Bangladesh continues to be a strong
    partner who works closely with the United States to enhance regional
    security. The establishment of a naval counter-terrorism force and
    their hosting of a regional forum to counter violent extremist
    organizations are examples of Bangladesh's commitment to improve their
    counter-terrorism capacity. We also continue to work closely with
    Bangladesh to expand and improve their peacekeeping, HA/DR and maritime
    security capabilities.
                                    oceania
    New Zealand
        New Zealand shares many U.S. security concerns such as terrorism,
    maritime security, transnational crime, and the proliferation of
    weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand is supportive of our overseas
    contingency operations, deployed for the fourth round its Special Air
    Service (SAS) special operations troops to Afghanistan and has extended
    their commitment to lead the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan
    Province, Afghanistan until September 2010.
        While the New Zealand nuclear-free zone legislation and resultant
    U.S. defense policy guidelines constrain some bilateral military-to-
    military engagement, the New Zealand Defense Force participates in many
    multilateral events that advance our common security interests. In
    2010, New Zealand will be an observer in ``Rim of the Pacific''
    (RIMPAC)--the Pacific AOR premier multinational naval exercise. Our
    Marines continue to assist in New Zealand's efforts to integrate their
    multi-role maritime patrol vessel into regional HA/DR operations.
        New Zealand remains active in global security initiatives, from
    stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, to
    operations in Korea, Sudan, and throughout the Middle East.
    Additionally, the New Zealand Defense Force supports our National
    Science Foundation efforts in Antarctica by serving as the primary
    staging area for the multinational Operation Deep Freeze.
    Compact Nations
        U.S. Pacific Command values our partnership with the three Compact
    Nations--the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the
    Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau. We meet our defense
    obligations to these nations under the Compacts of Free Association
    through implementation of our Homeland Defense planning and
    preparation. Additionally, we commend the professional Pacific Patrol
    Boat crews and fully support each nation's initiatives to expand
    operations to protect their valuable EEZ resources. We also recognize
    the significant contributions of the proud citizens of these nations as
    they serve in the U.S. Armed Forces and Coast Guard in Operations such
    as Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
    Guam
        As a U.S. territory in a strategically important location, Guam is
    host to a variety of U.S. Joint Forces, critically important Navy and
    Air Force installations and the headquarters for Commander U.S. Forces
    Marianas. Efforts are ongoing to simultaneously prepare for increased
    Marine Corps presence on Guam, improve Navy and Air Force
    infrastructure, and improve the quality of life for servicemembers and
    their families stationed there.
                       u.s. pacific command organizations
    Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
        While Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) is not
    subordinate to U.S. Pacific Command, it is a Department of Defense
    academic institute that supports U.S. Pacific Command by developing
    professional and personal ties among national security establishments
    throughout the region. The Center's focus is on multilateral approaches
    to security cooperation and capacity-building through its three
    academic components: executive education, conferences, and research and
    publications. In fiscal year 2009, 628 students joined the more than
    4,000 fellows from nations in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The
    success of APCSS programs is regularly demonstrated through the courses
    and seminars that the center offers, and its extensive networking
    efforts (there are currently 45 alumni associations in as many
    nations). APCSS builds its programs to address areas of mutual interest
    and concern held by the United States and the countries in the Asia-
    Pacific region.
    Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command
        Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) has the important mission
    of achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing from
    our Nation's conflicts. Last year, JPAC successfully completed 69
    missions globally and, in cooperation with 16 nations on 4 continents,
    identified 93 Americans missing from the Vietnam War, Korean War, and
    World Wars I and II. We expect another successful year in 2010 and are
    projected to execute 75 missions. Of note, engagement with North Korea
    remains suspended, but we are prepared to resume discussions and
    operations as soon as conditions permit.
    Joint Interagency Task Force West
        Joint Interagency Task Force West's (JIATF-West) mission is to
    conduct activities to detect, disrupt, and dismantle drug-related
    transnational threats in Asia and the Pacific by providing interagency
    intelligence fusion, supporting U.S. law enforcement, and developing
    partner nation capacity. The command was essential to several
    significant victories this past year that included JIATF-West Tactical
    Analysis Team support to law enforcement operations which dismantled
    several transnational criminal organizations. JIATF-West also worked
    directly with the Drug Enforcement Agency in the multi-ton seizure
    operation of Asian precursor chemicals destined to methamphetamine
    laboratories in Mexico and Guatemala.
        With respect to capacity building successes in 2009, JIATF-West
    supported the establishment of Vehicle Control Checkpoint (VCC)
    facilities in Sikhiu and Chumphon, Thailand. These VCCs were
    specifically set up to enhance border security and interdiction
    capacity in a region known for illicit trafficking. Also this year,
    JIATF-West executed 17 counter-narco-terrorism training missions which
    trained 1,578 partner nation law enforcement officials from Malaysia,
    Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam in ground and maritime
    interdiction skills.
        Although JIATF-West's authorities allow us to act against
    transnational criminal organizations, inclusion of Indonesia and the
    Republic of the Philippines under 1033 authority would allow us to
    better support U.S. and partner-nation Law Enforcement Agencies. This
    authority would allow JIATF-West to provide tools and training to
    maintain operational maritime assets, and automated data processing and
    information technology networking equipment for JIATF-West--constructed
    interagency fusion centers.
                                    programs
    Security Assistance
        Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military
    Education and Training (IMET), executed in partnership with the
    Department of State and our embassy country teams, are powerful
    engagement tools for building security partnerships with developing
    countries. FMF--the program for financing the acquisition of U.S.
    military articles, service, and training that support U.S. regional
    stability goals--continues to demonstrate its worth. It has been
    particularly important to supporting partners engaged in combating
    violent extremism, especially the Philippines and Indonesia. The IMET
    program--which provides education and training to students from allied
    and friendly nations--also continued to provide lasting value to all
    participants. The program is a modest but highly effective investment
    that yields the professional and personal relationships that are so
    important to regional security.
    Science and Technology
        The U.S. Pacific Command Science and Technology (S&T) Advisor
    actively engages with Service and Defense S&T organizations to identify
    potential solutions to operational problems that have a critical impact
    on combat readiness. This advisor is also responsible for executing the
    S&T Strategy in support of the lines of operation in our Theater
    Campaign Plan. That strategy focuses on improving partnership
    opportunities throughout the AOR and encourages cooperative S&T efforts
    through the extensive use of OSD's Joint Capability Technology
    Demonstration (JCTD) and Coalition Warfare Program (CWP).
    Pacific Partnership
        One of the U.S. Navy's newest cargo ships, USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-
    AKE 4), successfully deployed to Oceania on a five-country, 3-month
    humanitarian and civic assistance mission from June to September 2009.
    The mission travelled, for the first time to Samoa, Tonga, and Kiribati
    and returned for a second visit to Solomon Islands and the Republic of
    the Marshall Islands. This annual deployment is designed to build
    partner capacity and multilateral capability in medical, dental,
    veterinary and engineering disciplines to enhance regional security and
    better prepare participating organizations to respond to regional
    crises. It is a remarkable multinational and multi-organizational
    evolution that, this year, involved personnel from 14 nations and
    countless international and host-nation Nongovernmental Organizations
    (NGOs). In all, the mission treated more than 22,000 medical and dental
    patients, conducted 116 community relations projects, and completed 17
    engineering and infrastructure projects. This summer Pacific
    Partnership will return to the region aboard USNS Mercy, the Navy's
    West Coast hospital ship, to deliver help and hope to the people of
    Indonesia, Timor Leste, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
    Pacific Angel
        Pacific Angel employs the exceptional capabilities of the Pacific
    Air Forces International Health Services to conduct humanitarian
    assistance and public diplomacy in less accessible areas of South East
    Asia. This unique C-17, C-130, and KC-135-based operation is designed
    to increase public health capacity as well as cooperation and
    understanding among the armed forces, NGOs, regional partners, and
    peoples of Vietnam, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and the United States.
    Assisted by partner-nation and NGO medical personnel, Pacific Angel
    conducted six Medical Civic Action programs, cared for 14,978 medical
    and 1,010 dental patients, and completed 6 engineering civic-actions
    projects.
    NDAA Section 1206
        Congressional 1206 authority is the only partner capability/
    capacity building tool that we have to address urgent or emergent needs
    in the region. Last year U.S. Pacific Command contributed more than $31
    million to the maritime security capabilities of Bangladesh and the
    Philippines. In fiscal year 2010, we intend to build upon the
    initiatives funded in 2009 and to expand counterterrorism capability/
    capacity in South and Southeast Asia. Given the success of these
    efforts to date, we very much support the President's request.
    Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
        In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60
    days. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds
    enable Pacific Command forces to respond quickly to those in need when
    these inevitable disasters occur. Additionally, OHDACA-supported
    activities promote interoperability and coalition-building with foreign
    military and civilian counterparts, and improve basic living conditions
    for populations in countries and regions that are particularly
    susceptible to violent extremism. OHDACA projects offer a significant
    and sometimes unique opportunity in the region; and have been
    particularly helpful to decreasing the operating space of terrorists
    and violent extremists. OHDACA is a critical element in PACOM's
    comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in South Asia; specifically
    in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
    Global Peace Operations Initiative
        Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is rooted in a G-8
    commitment to address major gaps in peace operations around the world.
    The global initiative aims to build and maintain the capability,
    capacity, effectiveness of professional peacekeeping forces. Within the
    Asia-Pacific region, U.S. Pacific Command's GPOI program leverages
    existing host-nation programs, institutions, policies, and exercises.
    We encourage long-term sustainment of qualified forces through a
    ``train-the-trainer'' approach, which enables standardization and
    interoperability, and works within the framework of United Nations
    guidelines. The GPOI program has been fully implemented by U.S. Pacific
    Command in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal,
    Thailand, and Tonga; and this year we will begin implementation in the
    Philippines. Also in 2010, U.S. Pacific Command will co-host with
    Cambodia the largest multinational peacekeeping capstone exercise
    conducted in the Asia-Pacific region. We expect participation in this
    exercise, Angkor Sentinel, more than 20 of our regional GPOI partners.
    Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
        The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program is a
    cooperative, multi-national effort to facilitate the rapid and
    effective establishment of a multinational headquarters in response to
    an HA/DR event in the Asia-Pacific region. The vision of the program is
    to develop a cadre of multinational military planners from regional
    nations. The MPAT effort--which currently involves more than 30
    nations--works to provide coalition and combined expertise in crisis
    action planning and seeks to develop procedures that promote
    multinational partnerships and cooperation in response to military
    operations other than war and small scale contingencies. Recent MPAT
    events have focused on building capacity for response to humanitarian
    crises and on developing standardized operating procedures.
                                   challenges
    Multi-National Information Sharing
        The ability to exchange information among DOD components, all
    levels of U.S. Government, coalition partners, and the private sector
    is becoming increasingly important to regional operations; and
    increasingly dependent on Multi-National Information Sharing (MNIS)
    efforts such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Informational Exchange
    Cross Enclave Requirement Program and the Improved Connectivity
    Initiative.
    Joint Information Environment
        Within DOD, Services IT architectures are often redundant or
    incompatible. In an attempt to address this issue, U.S. Pacific Command
    is partnering with the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Joint Staff,
    all Services, and Industry to develop a Joint Information Environment
    (JIE) that moves to a unified and integrated net-centric environment.
    When realized, this environment will eliminate the need for Joint Force
    Commanders to integrate networks; further, it will enable personnel
    access to the information with a single log-on from anywhere on a DOD
    network.
    Cyberspace
        U.S. Pacific Command faces increasingly active and sophisticated
    threats to our information and computer infrastructure. These threats
    challenge our ability to operate freely in the cyber commons, which in
    turn challenges our ability to conduct operations during peacetime and
    in times of crisis. U.S. Pacific Command, in conjunction with the newly
    established U.S. Cyber Command and other Service and Agencies, is
    working on solutions to detecting these attacks on our networks and to
    responding to them in near real-time.
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
        Given the size and nature of the Asia-Pacific region, effective
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is essential to
    obtaining critical insights into the plans, capabilities, and intent of
    our current and potential adversaries. We continue to work with the
    National Intelligence Community, the Undersecretary of Defense for
    Intelligence, and the Joint Staff to effectively address our
    intelligence collection priorities, capability gaps, deployments of
    assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information
    to maximize situational awareness and warning.
    Missile Defense
        To defend U.S. forces, interests, allies and friends from short-,
    medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, U.S. Pacific
    Command seeks a forward-deployed, layered, and integrated air and
    missile defense system capable of intercepting threat missiles
    throughout their entire time of flight. Additionally, we are
    coordinating with the Government of Japan to leverage the newest
    Japanese systems--such as PATRIOT PAC-3, AEGIS SM-3 capable ships and
    their associated radars.
    Piracy
        The U.S. Pacific Command continues to facilitate multilateral
    efforts to improve regional and global maritime security, especially in
    the Strait of Malacca, the archipelagic regions of South East Asia, and
    in the Gulf of Aden. In Southeast Asia, U.S. Pacific Fleet conducted
    the annual Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism exercise, which
    is designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-
    national coordination (participants included Brunei, Malaysia, the
    Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; Indonesia participated this past
    year as an observer). Also of note is the cooperation between
    Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and most recently, Thailand, to patrol
    the Malacca Straits, an effort which has contributed significantly to
    reduced incidents of piracy in that vital choke point. Lastly, in the
    tri-border area where Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia share
    common maritime boundaries, terrorist freedom of action has been
    curtailed as a consequence of improved maritime surveillance and
    response capabilities procured using 1206 authorities.
    Pandemic Influenza
        U.S. Pacific Command maintains a robust pandemic influenza (PI)
    response plan that supports force health protection, Defense Support of
    Civil Authorities, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Advise, and
    Assess teams are available to provide assistance and to coordinate
    additional support for U.S. States and Territories. Additionally, we
    are postured to deploy teams to advise U.S. Country Teams and partner
    nations on PI response and to assess infectious disease control and
    surveillance programs, laboratories and response team capabilities.
        This past year, we conducted more than a dozen PI-related events
    that included bi-and multi-lateral exercises and subject matter
    exchanges within our AOR. Highlights from the past year include the
    Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense exercise Lightning Rescue 2009, which
    tested the State of Hawaii's PI response and validated domestic
    relationships and linkages to the U.S. Pacific Command PI plan.
                                    closing
        U.S. Pacific Command must be recognized as both an extension of
    U.S. military power as well as a committed and trusted partner in the
    Asia-Pacific. Our every endeavor must promote a region whose nations
    are secure and prosperous. Throughout the AOR, we are fortunate to have
    allies, partners and friends who willingly and effectively contribute
    to regional security and who seek to advance their partnerships with
    the United States on behalf of the 36 nations and 3.4 billion people
    who reside in the Asia-Pacific region.
        In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to the
    Committee for the long-standing support you have provided our military.
    Your efforts have provided our members with the most technically
    advanced systems and with a quality of life that recognizes the
    contributions our young men and women make to our Nation every day. On
    behalf of the more than 300,000 men and women of the Pacific Command,
    thank you for your support and for this opportunity to testify on the
    defense posture in the U.S. Pacific Command.

        Chairman Levin. Admiral, we thank you so much. Thank you
    for those comments, as well, about the work of this committee.
        General Sharp.

       STATEMENT OF GEN WALTER L. SHARP, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
      NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, U.S. FORCES-KOREA

        General Sharp. Chairman Levin, Senator Burr, and
    distinguished members of this committee, I really appreciate
    the opportunity to report to you today on the state of the UNC,
    CFC, and USFK.
        This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Korean war.
    Since 1950, Congress and the American people have made an
    enormous investment in blood and treasure to first defeat and
    then deter North Korean aggression. The alliance continues to
    reap the returns of that investment. The Republic of Korea
    (ROK) bears the majority of the burden of defending itself, and
    in 2012, wartime operational control (OPCON) transitions from
    CFC to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
        Beyond its borders, the ROK has become an important part of
    the international efforts to keep peace and respond to
    disasters. With significant forces deployed to Lebanon, Haiti,
    the Horn of Africa, and on other missions, the ROK is fast
    becoming a global strategic ally envisioned by the 2009 Joint
    Vision Statement signed by Presidents Lee and Obama. With our
    long-term commitment of 28,500 troops, we will continue to
    deter aggression and maintain peace, not only on the Korean
    Peninsula, but throughout Northeast Asia.
        Last year, I spoke about my three command priorities.
    Thanks to your support and funding, I am able to share with you
    the progress that we have made since then.
        First, the U.S. forces in the ROK-U.S. Alliance are
    prepared to fight and win. I flew here directly from our annual
    Key Resolve/Foal Eagle combined exercise. This exercise
    demonstrated that the U.S. and ROK forces and staffs are
    trained and ready to fight, tonight, on the Korean Peninsula.
        Second, the ROK-U.S. Alliance continues to grow and
    strengthen. Militarily, we will be prepared to transition
    wartime OPCON to the ROK JCS on 17 April 2012. In last year's
    Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise, we successfully stood up and
    tested many post-OPCON transition command-and-control
    structures. Through our Strategic Transition Plan, future Ulchi
    Freedom Guardian exercises, and the final certification
    exercise, we will ensure the readiness of the ROK JCS to accept
    wartime OPCON in 2012 and the ability for the U.S. Korea
    Command to become the supporting command.
        My third priority is improving quality of life for the
    command personnel. We are making substantial progress here,
    and, with Congress's support, we will be able to achieve all of
    our goals. We are improving the quality of life through two
    main key initiatives. The first is the relocation of U.S.
    forces. By consolidating U.S. forces from 105 facilities that
    we maintained in 2002 to 48 sites in 2 hubs, we will make
    better use of limited resources and be better positioned to
    support our servicemembers and families.
        The second initiative toward normalization goes hand-in-
    hand with the relocation. As we consolidate bases, we are
    building the world-class facilities and housing that are
    transforming USFK from a command where 1-year tours are the
    norm to one where single servicemembers serve for 2 years and
    those with families stay for 3. In the last 2 years, the number
    of families in the Korean Peninsula has increased from
    approximately 1,600 to 3,900. By keeping trained personnel in
    Korea for normal lengths, we retain institutional knowledge,
    create a more capable force, and are better able to support the
    Alliance and deter aggression, and we demonstrate our
    commitment to Northeast Asia. At the same time, we are
    eliminating an unneeded unaccompanied tour and building the
    strong families that are key to retention and effectiveness in
    this time of ongoing conflict.
        To close, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has never been stronger.
    The Alliance has successfully deterred aggression on the Korean
    Peninsula for 57 years. In doing so, it has helped make
    Northeast Asia a remarkable--remarkably peaceful and prosperous
    place. With the ROK contributing a substantial portion of the
    Alliance's cost, we are maintaining the combat readiness and
    improving the quality of life of our military personnel.
        I thank you for supporting our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, and DOD civilians, and their families, serving in the
    great nation of Korea.
        This concludes my remarks, and I look forward to the
    committee's questions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of General Sharp follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by GEN Walter L. Sharp, USA
                                i. introduction
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am
    honored to provide my statement to you. As the Commander, United
    Nations Command (UNC); Commander, Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined
    Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK),
    it is a privilege to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
    Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and their families who serve our
    great Nation in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of these
    outstanding men and women, thank you for your support of American
    forces stationed in the ROK and your commitment to improving the
    quality of life for Command personnel and their families. Your
    sustained support allows us to deter aggression against the ROK and
    promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, which in turn
    promotes peace and stability in the region of Northeast Asia and helps
    protect the national interests we share with regional partners. I
    appreciate this opportunity to report on the state of affairs on the
    Korean Peninsula, my Command priorities, the plans in place for
    organizational transformation of the commands I lead, and how this
    change will strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance.
        This year we mark the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean
    War, a 3-year conflict that resulted in millions of military and
    civilian casualties and has yet to be concluded by a formal peace
    agreement. This year my commands will support a host of ROK led events
    to honor those who played a role in repelling North Korea's aggression
    of six decades ago. Also this year we recognize the 57th anniversary of
    signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Serving as a cornerstone
    for the broader ROK-U.S. Alliance, mutual commitments under the treaty
    have allowed the Alliance to deter aggression against the ROK and
    promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast
    Asia.
        The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of Northeast Asia--a
    dynamic region that has significant national interests for the United
    States. \1\ Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest
    militaries in terms of personnel and two nuclear powers (China and
    Russia).\2\ The region contains 25 percent of the world's population
    and is an economic powerhouse.\3\ In 2009, Northeast Asia housed 5 of
    the world's 19 largest economies that collectively accounted for 24.8
    percent of global gross domestic product during that year.\4\ Countries
    in the region also accounted for 25.8 percent of U.S. trade in goods
    during 2009.\5\ At the end of 2008, the U.S. direct investment position
    in Northeast Asia was valued at $220.7 billion.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The region of Northeast Asia is defined to include the
    following countries and special administrative regions: China, North
    Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, ROK, Russia, and Taiwan.
        \2\ In terms of number of personnel in the armed forces, the
    world's six largest militaries during 2009 were: China (2.1 million
    personnel); United States (1.54 million); India (1.28 million); North
    Korea (1.2 million); Russia (1.02 million); and the ROK (687,000).
    Personnel data obtained from The Military Balance 2009, produced by the
    International Institute for Strategic Studies.
        \3\ Population percentage calculated with data obtained from the
    Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook. Percentage is as of
    July 2009.
        \4\ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at purchasing power parity in 2009
    for the economies of Northeast Asia were: China-$8.7 trillion; Japan-
    $4.1 trillion; Russia-$2.1 trillion; ROK-$1.3 trillion; Taiwan-$693
    billion; Hong Kong-$301 billion; North Korea-$40 billion (2008); Macau-
    $18 billion; and Mongolia-$10 billion. GDP data obtained from the CIA
    World Factbook.
        \5\ U.S. trade in goods during 2009 was valued at $366 billion with
    China, $147 billion with Japan, $67 billion with the ROK, $46 billion
    with Taiwan, $23 billion with Russia, $55 million with Mongolia, $24
    billion with Hong Kong, $446 million with Macau, and $900,000 with
    North Korea. Trade data was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.
        \6\ The direct investment figure is on a historical cost basis and
    was obtained from data published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic
    Analysis. Countries/special administrative region included in the
    valuation are China, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and the ROK.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While Northeast Asia has grown into a major economic region, it is
    also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change.
    Historical animosities, territorial disputes, competition over access
    to resources, and struggles for regional hegemony have combined to pose
    difficult and long-term security challenges not only for regional
    states but also for the international community. U.S. force presence in
    the ROK is a long-term investment in regional peace and stability and
    both maintains security commitments to the ROK established under the
    Mutual Defense Treaty and reinforces American engagement with actors
    throughout Northeast Asia. U.S. force presence in the ROK also helps
    set the conditions for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and
    eventual reunification of the two Koreas in a peaceful manner. A strong
    ROK-U.S. Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean
    Peninsula, is essential to meet the security challenges posed in the
    dynamic and economically growing region of Northeast Asia. As observed
    in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, achieving core missions of
    American armed forces requires strong security relationships with
    allies and partners that are best enabled and maintained through long-
    term presence and sustained interaction.
                         ii. state of affairs in korea
    Assessment of the ROK
        Last month ROK President Lee Myung-bak marked the start of the
    third year of his 5-year term in office.\7\ President Lee Myung-bak has
    committed the ROK to taking on a more global orientation in its
    policies and to assume a greater role in the international community.
    Indeed, President Lee has made the development of a ``Global Korea''
    one of five national goals for the ROK.\8\ Later this year the city of
    Seoul will host a Group of 20 (G20) summit and at the end of 2009 the
    ROK officially joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
    Development's Development Assistance Committee, pledging to nearly
    triple its current level of official development assistance to a value
    that will equal 0.25 percent of gross national income in 2015. The
    ROK's commitment to assume a greater role in the international
    community is evidenced by its participation in about a dozen
    peacekeeping operations around the world, its plans to form a 3,000
    person military unit that can be rapidly deployed in support of such
    operations, and a general willingness to support international
    stability and reconstruction operations such as in Haiti and
    Afghanistan (where in Afghanistan the ROK will deploy a Provincial
    Reconstruction Team later this year).\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ In the ROK, Presidents serve a single, 5-year term of office
    without the possibility of re-election.
        \8\ The other four national goals are to develop a government
    serving the people, a lively market economy, active welfare, and a
    country rich in talent. See the ROK Office of the President (Blue
    House) Web site.
        \9\ Peacekeeping operations include UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNOMIL
    (Liberia), UNAMA (Afghanistan), UNMIS (Sudan), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIN
    (Nepal), UNOCI (Ivory Coast), MINURSO (Western Sahara), UNMOGIP (India/
    Pakistan), Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In June 2009 the ROK Government released a revision to its National
    Defense Reform 2020 plan. First written in 2005, the defense reform
    plan aims to modernize and restructure the ROK military through 2020 so
    that it is ready to address the future security environment and
    challenges. The revised plan focuses on developing capabilities to
    address North Korea's asymmetric threats (identified as its nuclear and
    missile programs), successful transition of wartime operational control
    (OPCON) to the ROK military, enhancing jointness, developing network
    centric warfare capabilities, increasing managerial efficiencies to
    include the extensive use of civil resources, enhancing the ability to
    participate in operations sponsored by the international community, and
    contributing to development of the national economy. The objective is
    to develop an information and technology-intensive military force that
    can cope well with a comprehensive set of security threats. As stated
    by President Lee during his 1 October 2009 Armed Forces Day speech, the
    ROK military must transform into a highly efficient multi-purpose
    professional elite force that can support Korea's bid to carry out
    roles commensurate with its growing international stature. Through 2020
    the ROK plans on spending an accumulative 599.3 trillion won ($466
    billion) on defense to include expenditures on this reform initiative.
    I fully support the ROK's Defense Reform 2020 initiative and hope the
    plan is fully resourced throughout the life of the program.
    Assessment of North Korea
        North Korea continues to be a threat to regional as well as global
    security and prosperity. Over the past year, Pyongyang's foreign policy
    alternated from provocative actions to a willingness to engage in some
    forms of dialogue. North Korea tested its nuclear and missile
    capabilities and continued attempts to proliferate conventional arms
    and other materials in violation of United Nations Security Council
    resolutions. Pyongyang has also maintained its aging but massive
    forward deployed conventional military force. North Korea will remain a
    serious security threat in the region and a significant concern for the
    U.S and the international community for the foreseeable future.
        Strategy, Goals, and Internal Dynamics
        Kim Jong-il's strategic goal is the survival and continuance of his
    regime. North Korea's efforts to build a nuclear arms program have
    become the key component of its strategy to guarantee regime survival.
    This program is now assessed to have enough plutonium for several
    nuclear weapons. Nearly 16 years after the signing of the 1994 Agreed
    Framework, Pyongyang continues to try to develop nuclear capabilities.
    In 2009, it announced a second nuclear test, made public statements
    about its plutonium reprocessing and weaponization activities, and
    announced progress in uranium enrichment. These efforts, along with the
    sustained development of a complementary missile delivery system, will
    likely continue into the foreseeable future. North Korea appears to
    desire international recognition as a nuclear weapons state, which the
    United States, the ROK, and many members of the international community
    (including five members of the Six-Party Talks) have made clear is
    unacceptable.
        On the domestic front, Kim Jong-il appears to have recovered from
    an apparent stroke in the summer of 2008 and remains in full control of
    North Korea. Over the past year Kim has systematically introduced his
    third and youngest son--Kim Jong-eun--as the heir apparent. Meanwhile,
    North Korea's ruling elite, whose privileged position apparently rests
    upon continuance of the status quo, appears unwavering in its loyalty
    to Kim Jong-il. The role of the military in Pyongyang's decisionmaking
    apparatus appears to be more prominent, as highlighted by last year's
    expansion of the National Defense Commission authorities. North Korea's
    conventional and asymmetric military forces remain the guarantor of
    Kim's power. The regime manufactures the perception of an external
    threat--primarily from the United States--to maintain internal control
    and justify its ``military first'' policy.
        A Year of Pyongyang Provocations and Posturing
        Last year, North Korea initiated a series of provocative actions
    against the ROK, including announcing its unilateral nullification of
    the 1991 South-North Basic Agreement, restrictions of ROK activity at
    the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), and threats against ROK naval
    forces off the western coast of the Peninsula. Pyongyang in April
    launched a Taepo Dong-2 and in May announced that it conducted a second
    nuclear test in defiance of United Nations Security Council
    resolutions. North Korea also launched multiple shorter range missiles
    off its eastern coast, reversed disablement procedures at its Yongbyon
    nuclear facility, announced the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to
    obtain additional fissile material, announced its withdrawal from the
    Six-Party Talks, and stated its intent not to abide by the 1953
    Armistice Agreement.
        In August, Pyongyang released two detained American journalists, a
    detained South Korean KIC employee, and four detained ROK fisherman.
    Pyongyang also lifted its earlier imposed KIC border restrictions and
    allowed inter-Korean family reunions at Mount Kumgang. But in October,
    North Korea launched more missiles, announced that its uranium
    enrichment development program was in its final stages and that all
    plutonium had been harvested and would be weaponized, and provoked an
    inter-Korean naval skirmish.
        North Korea's provocations during the first half of 2009 may have
    been intended to test the resolve of the new administration in
    Washington, create tension in ROK domestic politics, or set conditions
    internally for the introduction of a regime successor. Of North Korea's
    true intentions, we know little. But what is clear is that these
    actions resulted in the North's further isolation--highlighted by
    unanimous passage of additional United Nations Security Council
    sanctions--and pressure to return to denuclearization talks from all
    five parties, including China and Russia. After these events, North
    Korea launched a ``charm offensive'' in the second half of 2009,
    inviting foreign visitors and business interests to visit the country.
    This has not yet led to any measurable progress towards the complete
    and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea.
        Last year, North Korea's annual domestic food production remained
    dismal, with the country dependent upon international assistance to
    meet its basic subsistence requirements. Despite its serious economic
    problems, Pyongyang reportedly continued to divert precious national
    resources to its conventional and asymmetric military forces. At year's
    end, North Korea announced a currency redenomination which appears to
    have confiscated what little wealth might have been accumulated by
    private farmers and traders and which many now regard as a failure.
        Though aging and technologically inferior, North Korea's massive
    army and vast artillery forces continue to represent a substantial
    threat capable of initiating limited offensives against the ROK that
    could potentially cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars in
    damage. North Korea also continued to develop its missile forces by
    attempting a multi-stage space launch vehicle, as well as multiple
    theater ballistic missile launches. Pyongyang continued to focus
    resources on its conventional and asymmetric military forces despite
    food shortages and a faltering economy. North Korea's missile
    capabilities remain a significant regional and global threat.
        North Korea Threat Outlook
        My number one concern will remain Pyongyang's continuing attempts
    to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities. The full potential of
    these capabilities would threaten the United States, our regional
    allies, and the international community. We must also be mindful of the
    potential for instability in North Korea. Combined with the country's
    disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector,
    insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and
    developing nuclear programs, the possibility of a sudden leadership
    change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable.
        In the future, Pyongyang may continue its strategy of periodically
    heightening tensions. We must never be complacent about the possibility
    that North Korea might take additional provocative steps or even launch
    an attack on the ROK. To address this threat, UNC/CFC/USFK must
    maintain the highest level of readiness.
                            iii. command priorities
        I have established three priorities for the commands. These
    priorities have remained constant and serve as the guiding principles
    for all key initiatives pursued. The three priorities are: (1) be
    prepared to fight and win; (2) strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance; and
    (3) improve the quality of life for all servicemembers, DOD civilians,
    and their families. I will address each of these priorities and the key
    initiatives within each below.
    Prepared to Fight and Win
        My first priority as Commander of UNC, CFC, and USFK is to maintain
    trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are
    prepared to fight and win. This has been the focus of U.S. forces
    stationed in Korea for more than 50 years and for the CFC since it was
    established in 1978. Maintaining ``fight tonight'' readiness is the
    primary reason U.S. forces are stationed in the ROK, supporting the
    alliance between the American and Korean people in defense of the ROK.
    The Alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that
    could emerge with little warning on the Korean Peninsula. This spectrum
    of conflict ranges from major combat operations under conditions of
    general war or provocation, to multiple possibilities of destabilizing
    conditions on the Peninsula, to humanitarian assistance operations, and
    even the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Given these varied
    potential security challenges, it is imperative that our forces
    maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness.
        In order to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge
    on the Korean Peninsula, the Command has developed and constantly
    refines plans to deter aggression against the ROK, defeat aggression
    should deterrence fail, and respond to other destabilizing conditions
    that could affect the ROK. U.S. and ROK military personnel develop and
    maintain their warfighting skills through tough, realistic training to
    include theater-level exercises that leverage a variety of facilities
    and ranges located in the ROK.
        The Command conducts two annual exercises: Key Resolve/Foal Eagle
    and Ulchi Freedom Guardian. Key Resolve, a Command Post Exercise
    focused on crisis management, trains and sharpens skills on how we will
    fight today using existing organizational structures where CFC executes
    command and control over the combined force. Foal Eagle is a large-
    scale combined field training exercise that includes the strategic
    deployment of American forces from bases in the United States as well
    as the participation of thousands of ROK troops. Key Resolve and Foal
    Eagle ensure that CFC remains ready today to decisively defeat any
    aggression that is directed against the ROK. The second annual
    exercise--Ulchi Freedom Guardian--is a computer-simulated warfighting
    exercise that focuses on the development of Alliance command and
    control structures that will exist after the transition of wartime
    OPCON of ROK forces in April 2012.
        Maintaining ``fight tonight'' readiness can only occur when
    training is conducted that prepares forces to address the full spectrum
    of operations that characterizes today's complex operational
    environment. It is vital that Command training facilities and events
    support the full transformation of U.S. military forces stationed in
    the ROK. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps possess adequate training
    resources in the ROK to maintain unit combat readiness to include the
    rehearsal of robust amphibious operations. But USFK still faces
    challenges with respect to the training of air forces located in the
    ROK. We have made progress with our ROK hosts in scheduling and
    maximizing use of limited ranges. However, there is still insufficient
    training range capability and capacity. A continued shortfall in
    electronic warfare training capability and restrictions placed on
    precision guided munitions training pose deficiencies that must be
    addressed. Deployments of U.S. air forces to training events outside
    the Korean Peninsula mitigate current training shortfalls and ensure
    the same standard of training and readiness as American combat air
    forces not located in the ROK. This is not a long-term solution,
    however, and I continue to work with the ROK Government to find a
    solution to this key training and readiness issue.
    Strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance
        My second priority is to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance. This
    supports the June 2009 ROK-U.S. Joint Vision statement that commits
    both nations to build an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and
    prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region,
    and the world as a whole.
        The most significant Alliance strengthening initiative is the
    transition to ROK-led defense on the Korean Peninsula. That is, the
    transition of wartime OPCON. Following the transition of peacetime
    OPCON in 1994, this initiative to transition wartime OPCON resumed in
    October 2005, when the ROK President stated that the time had come for
    Seoul to be responsible for its own defense. In early 2007, it was
    determined that the ROK would assume wartime OPCON of its forces by
    April 2012. Under OPCON transition, the ROK and United States will
    disestablish CFC and stand up separate, but complementary, national
    commands consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty to focus on combined
    defense of the ROK. After OPCON transition the ROK Joint Chiefs of
    Staff (JCS) will become the supported--or lead--command and the newly
    created U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be the supporting command.
    OPCON transition will not result in independent OPCON nor require
    independent, self-reliant ROK forces. It also will not lead to a
    reduction in USFK forces or weaken the U.S. commitment to provide
    reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula. Rather, the Alliance will
    continue close strategic coordination and consultation to ensure the
    appropriate capabilities are in place to meet future threats. The
    United States will have the same commitment to the Alliance after OPCON
    transition that it does now--to include the provision of extended
    deterrence using the full range of military capabilities.
        The combined roadmap toward OPCON transition is laid out in the
    Strategic Transition Plan (STP). The STP summarizes 20 high level tasks
    and associated sub-tasks and milestones needed to develop appropriate
    ROK and U.S. organizations, plans, processes, and systems for the
    future Alliance military structure. It is a methodical approach that
    ensures the new command and control relationship between ROK and U.S.
    forces will be even more effective than the current CFC construct. To
    ensure that all tasks are completed to standard, a detailed
    certification process has been established. Both American and Korean
    external senior observers are being used to help evaluate the new
    commands. These advisors use a detailed checklist to report to the ROK
    JCS Chairman and U.S. KORCOM commander as well as to the U.S. Secretary
    of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense during the annual
    Security Consultative Meeting.
        Additional evaluation and further development is conducted through
    the Command theater exercise program. The Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG)
    computer simulated warfighting exercise is the Command's preeminent
    combined exercise to test, develop, and refine post-OPCON transition
    command and control arrangements. Two UFG exercises have already been
    conducted and two more will be held prior to a final OPCON transition
    certification exercise in 2012. These exercises help ensure that the
    new combined command structure will be trained and ready to fight and
    win on the day of OPCON transition. The STP is on track as planned and
    we are working hard to ensure that all conditions will be met for a
    smooth OPCON transition on 17 April 2012.
        The rationale for OPCON transition emanates from the tremendous
    changes that have occurred in the ROK since the Mutual Defense Treaty
    was signed in 1953. The ROK today is a secure democracy and a global
    economic leader. By assuming the lead for its own defense, the ROK will
    send a strong message not only to North Korea but to the rest of the
    world that it has a strong, competent, and capable military that can
    take the lead role in securing peace and stability on the Korean
    Peninsula. South Korean leaders have proven their ability to lead
    forces in a changing regional and global environment. They are members
    of a combined task force and are participating in United Nations
    peacekeeping operations. Officers of the ROK military, who have grown
    up in the Korean culture and are well versed with relevant operations
    plans while also being familiar with the Korean Peninsula's terrain,
    are best equipped to protect the Korean people. After OPCON transition
    occurs, the ROK military will be fully capable of leading the combined
    warfight in defense of its people and the United States will remain
    committed to ROK defense through its supporting role.
        Another key Alliance strengthening initiative was the conclusion of
    a 5-year (2009-2013) cost sharing agreement in January 2009. Known as
    the Special Measures Agreement (SMA), this cost sharing arrangement has
    the ROK provide USFK with valuable labor and logistics services as well
    as the design (paid for in cash) and in-kind construction of facilities
    and infrastructure needed for daily operation of the Command. Under the
    SMA, ROK support for the maintenance of USFK ensures that the Command
    maintains its ``fight tonight'' readiness, a factor that helps deter
    aggression against the ROK and preserves peace and stability on the
    Korean Peninsula. SMA contributions also help build the infrastructure
    needed for a long-term U.S. force presence in the ROK. SMA funds help
    stimulate the ROK economy through the payment of Korean national
    employee wages, Korean service contracts, and Korean construction
    contracts, serving as a source of economic growth for communities that
    host USFK facilities. During calendar year 2010 the ROK will provide
    USFK with 790.4 billion won ($664 million) in cost sharing support.\10\
    Future increases in the ROK cost sharing contribution through 2013 are
    tied to changes in the ROK consumer price index.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ U.S. dollar figure calculated by using a forecasted average
    2010 won-$U.S. exchange rate of 1,191. This forecasted exchange rate
    was obtained from the U.S. DOD.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, the Command's Good Neighbor Program continues to make
    great progress in strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The purpose of
    the program is to conduct community outreach events that engage and
    connect the Command with the Korean community. Good Neighbor Program
    events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with the mission and
    purpose of USFK. This direct engagement allows Americans and Koreans to
    develop mutual understanding of one another's cultures, customs, and
    lifestyles, often leading to the formation of lifelong friendships
    between members of the two communities. Examples of events conducted by
    the Good Neighbor Program include English-language camps, speaking
    engagements by U.S. military personnel, and tours of the Joint Security
    Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK installations. The program promotes
    two-way exchange between USFK personnel and people of our host country.
    The program helps foster exchange, understanding, and cooperation
    between members of my Command and the Korean communities that exist
    alongside USFK facilities. In 2009 alone, 2,043 events were conducted
    with the participation of over 139,000 local nationals. The ROK
    Ministry of National Defense operates similar programs called Friends
    Forever and the Experience Korean Culture Program. Under these two
    programs, USFK personnel are given the opportunity to experience Korean
    culture by participating in various host-nation sponsored events and
    tours. These programs strengthen the Alliance at both the professional
    and personal levels.
    Improve Quality of Life for Command Personnel
        Improving the quality of life for servicemembers, DOD civilians,
    and their families is my third priority. My overall objective is to
    establish the infrastructure and operational climate that makes Korea
    the assignment of choice for DOD personnel. In order to achieve this
    objective and support this priority, the Command is currently
    implementing two key initiatives: the relocation of U.S. forces
    stationed in the ROK and tour normalization.
        Relocation of U.S. Forces in the ROK
        The Command is implementing two separate relocation plans. Once
    completed, American forces will be stationed in the ROK on two primary
    ``hubs'' of five enduring sites.\11\ The first plan--named the Yongsan
    Relocation Plan (YRP)--will move forces currently stationed in and
    around the capital city of Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison (USAG)
    Humphreys, which is located near the city of Pyeongtaek some 40 miles
    south of Seoul. The majority of costs associated with this relocation
    plan will be paid by the ROK. The second plan, called the Land
    Partnership Plan (LPP), moves the 2nd Infantry Division from locations
    north of Seoul to areas south of the Han River and expands
    infrastructure at Osan Air Base and Camp Mujuk. Costs associated with
    the LPP will be shared between the ROK and United States. While the YRP
    and LPP programs are being executed, actions will be taken to maintain
    our current facilities at an acceptable standard in order to support
    current operations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ The two primary hubs are centered on Osan Air Base/United
    States Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys and USAG Daegu. The five enduring
    sites are Osan Air Base, USAG Humphreys, USAG Daegu, Chinhae Naval
    Base, and Kunsan Air Base.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The relocation of U.S. forces in Korea will occur in two distinct
    phases: consolidation and relocation. Phase I--consolidation--is
    currently underway. The current U.S. troop level of 28,500 personnel
    will remain on the Peninsula. The Command has returned 37 installations
    to the ROK so far, in the process giving thousands of acres of land
    back to the Korean people. In turn, the ROK has purchased land that is
    needed to accommodate USFK relocation. The ROK government has granted
    land at USAG Humphreys, an action that has enabled the ROK-U.S.
    Alliance to begin designing, planning, and construction of what will
    become one of the best Army installations in the world. The major
    facilities that will be constructed include medical facilities,
    headquarters buildings, family housing, schools, a communications
    center, and other operational and support infrastructure needed to
    accommodate the relocation of 2nd Infantry Division.
        Phase II of USFK relocation will involve the movement of Army
    forces to one of the two enduring hubs that will be located south of
    Seoul. Once this phase is completed, USFK forces will utilize 48
    separate sites, well below the 104 facilities USFK maintained in 2002.
    The success of the relocation initiative will sustain USFK's ``fight
    tonight'' readiness. Unit moves in the relocation plan will be packaged
    and executed in manageable components, which will allow units to
    maintain their full spectrum of operational and support capabilities.
    Completion of the relocation initiative will be a great boon for the
    ROK-U.S. Alliance because it improves readiness and soldier quality of
    life, realizes stationing efficiencies, signals continued U.S.
    commitment to the region, improves the combined capability to deter and
    defend against aggression directed at the ROK, and optimizes use of
    Korean land by creating a less intrusive military footprint, thus
    enhancing force protection for USFK.
        Tour Normalization
        DOD approved plans to normalize the tours of all servicemembers in
    the ROK on December 1, 2008.\12\ As noted in the 2010 Quadrennial
    Defense Review, DOD's long-term goal is to phase out all unaccompanied
    tours in Korea. This goal will mean all servicemembers stationed in the
    ROK will be on 36-month accompanied or 24-month unaccompanied tours.
    Single troops will serve 24-months. Prior to this policy change, the
    majority of U.S. military personnel serving in the ROK were on 1-year
    unaccompanied assignments. For military personnel with dependents, tour
    normalization means that they can be accompanied by their family
    members while serving our Nation in the ROK, something that has been
    done in Europe for decades. Once complete, there will be approximately
    14,500 families in Korea.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ It should be noted that in August 2009 the standard length of
    tour for USFK civilian personnel was increased from 24-months to 36-
    months.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Phase I is currently underway and will run through fiscal year
    2011. During this phase, the number of command sponsored families in
    the ROK will almost triple from the start of this phase, to 4,932. The
    length of accompanied tours offered in five locations--Seoul, Osan,
    Pyeongtaek, Daegu, and Chinhae--are now 36 months and for areas north
    of Seoul (Dongducheon and Uijeongbu, referred to as Area I) are 24
    months. Single soldiers serve a 12-month tour.
        The tour normalization process will synchronize increases in the
    number of command sponsored (accompanied tour) servicemembers and their
    families with the expansion of necessary infrastructure such as
    housing, schools, medical facilities, and other infrastructure needed
    to accommodate this growth. Throughout the phased tour normalization
    process, the funding for needed infrastructure could come from three
    key sources: public and private ventures, appropriated military
    construction funds, and ROK cost sharing contributions where
    appropriate.
        The tour normalization initiative benefits the Command, DOD
    personnel serving in the ROK, military families, the ROK-U.S. Alliance,
    and U.S. national interests. Full implementation of this initiative
    improves force readiness and combat capability by keeping trained
    military personnel in place for longer periods of time, thus enhancing
    continuity, stability, and the retention of institutional, regional,
    and cultural knowledge. It will also reduce the stress placed on troops
    and units by frequent rotations and supports the 2010 Quadrennial
    Defense Review's ``preserve and enhance'' objective by establishing a
    sustainable rotation rate that helps protect the force's long-term
    health. Quality of life for our servicemembers will be greatly improved
    through the elimination of needless separation from their families and
    the use of modern DOD standard design facilities. The ROK-U.S. Alliance
    will be enhanced by the more meaningful and deeper interaction between
    Americans and Koreans that can occur during a tour of longer duration.
    Finally, U.S. national interests are supported through the signal tour
    normalization sends on U.S. commitment to the long-term security and
    stability of the ROK as well as Northeast Asia as a whole.
                      iv. future of the rok-u.s. alliance
        A key part of U.S. security policy in Asia is the construction of a
    comprehensive strategic alliance with the ROK as specified in the June
    2009 Joint Vision statement. This comprehensive strategic alliance will
    be bilateral, regional, and global in scope and will be based on common
    values and mutual trust. We will maintain a robust defense posture
    backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security
    interests. Just as today, in the future the ROK-U.S. Alliance will
    remain vital to securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
    and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The United States will maintain its
    commitment to the defense of the ROK through the employment of
    capabilities postured both on and off the Korean Peninsula. Similarly,
    the United States welcomes recent moves by the ROK to expand its role
    in the international community at a level that is commensurate with its
    growing international stature. The United States will continue to
    provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of
    military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional
    strike, and missile defense capabilities. As the ROK-U.S. Alliance
    evolves in the future, we will cooperate on a wide-ranging set of
    global security challenges that are of mutual interest to include
    peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts,
    humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.
        Over the next decade or so the security component of the Alliance
    will experience some of the most profound changes since the Mutual
    Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. Three of these key changes are the
    transition of wartime OPCON, relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the
    ROK onto two enduring hubs, and tour normalization. These
    transformational changes will strengthen the Alliance and enhance its
    stabilizing role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider area of
    Northeast Asia. The process of change will also be supported by
    implementation of the ROK Defense Reform 2020 initiative. As the
    Alliance transforms, United Nations Command will continue to provide a
    coalition of 15 nations ready to provide support for defense of the ROK
    as well as conduct its armistice maintenance functions through the
    Military Armistice Commission.
        Through Alliance transformation we seek to build a better future
    for Koreans and Americans by establishing a durable peace on the Korean
    Peninsula and Northeast Asia and setting the conditions for peaceful
    reunification of the two Koreas. As Alliance partners, the ROK and
    United States will work together toward achieving complete and
    verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile
    programs. In the Asia-Pacific region the Alliance will work jointly
    with regional institutions and partners to foster prosperity, maintain
    peace, and improve the daily lives of people. To enhance security in
    the Asia-Pacific area the ROK and U.S. Governments will advocate for--
    and take part in--effective cooperative regional efforts to promote
    mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency regarding security
    issues among nations of this region. The two governments will also work
    closely to address the global challenges of the North Korean threat,
    terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and piracy. The
    ROK and United States will also enhance coordination on peacekeeping
    operations and post-conflict stabilization and development assistance.
    In the end, the two countries will work toward achieving Alliance goals
    through strategic cooperation at every level.
                                   v. summary
        This year marks the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean
    War. Thanks to the sacrifice and selfless service of a countless number
    of Koreans, Americans, and people of other nationalities, North Korea's
    aggression was repelled. This year also marks the 57th anniversary of
    signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Thanks to the peace and
    stability created by the Alliance structures that emanated from this
    mutual defense pact, the ROK has been able to develop into a democratic
    industrialized state with a high standard of living and a growing role
    in the international community. By promoting peace and stability on the
    Korean Peninsula, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has not only set the conditions
    for successful development of the ROK over the last six decades, but
    also promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast
    Asia--a region of key national interest to the United States.
        The ROK-U.S. Joint Vision statement of June 2009 looks to the
    future and sets out a path for taking the next step in Alliance
    development--building a comprehensive strategic alliance. My three
    command priorities of being prepared to fight and win, strengthening
    the Alliance, and improving the quality of life for Command personnel
    support this next step in Alliance evolution. In particular, the
    transition of wartime OPCON recognizes the substantial growth and
    development that has occurred in the ROK over the last 60 years, and
    rightly places the ROK in the lead position for its own defense. The
    relocation of U.S. forces in the ROK improves readiness and soldier
    quality of life. Finally, tour normalization greatly increases our
    capability and demonstrates long-term U.S. commitment to the Alliance,
    an Alliance that has served the Korean and American people so well for
    over half a century.
        I am extremely proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, DOD
    civilians, and their families serving our great Nation in the ROK.
    Their selfless service promotes peace and stability on the Korean
    Peninsula as well as in the broader region of Northeast Asia. Your
    support for them and the ROK-U.S. Alliance is greatly appreciated. I am
    certain you will agree that our men and women in uniform deserve the
    very best working, living, and training environment that can be
    provided, and that we should do everything in our power to provide it.
    Thank you.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Sharp.
        We'll have an 8-minute first round of questioning.
        General Chilton, let me start with you. STRATCOM is going
    to play an important role in the Senate's consideration of a
    new START follow-on, the successor to START. Have you been
    involved in developing the force-structure positions in support
    of the force structure and the warhead discussions?
        General Chilton. Senator, STRATCOM has been involved in
    supporting DOD in developing their positions with regard to the
    negotiating positions on START from the perspective of--we
    looked at what it would take to support the current strategy
    that's in existence today, and then, from that, what force
    structure and weapons would be required to support that
    strategy, and then provided analysis for options that were
    being considered throughout the process. So, we were always
    consulted as those negotiations were going forward, and I think
    that was a healthy relationship we had through the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy.
        Chairman Levin. Are you satisfied with the extent of those
    consultations?
        General Chilton. Certainly with the extent of them,
    Senator, I'm satisfied with those. We don't ever want to say we
    agreed on everything.
        Chairman Levin. Of course.
        General Chilton. That's, of course, appropriate, that we
    have areas of disagreement and discussions on those. But, I
    couldn't be more satisfied with the level of participation that
    was offered to STRATCOM throughout the negotiating period.
        Chairman Levin. When the treaty is finally entered into and
    presented to the Senate, I presume, then, that you will be
    asked for your reaction; we can get into it at that time.
        General Chilton. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. On the CYBERCOM issue, what is the plan for
    managing and dealing with the lines of authority and command
    between the intelligence operations and military operations?
    How's that going to be handled?
        General Chilton. I would see them as no different than
    today, Senator, for intelligence operations and military
    operations in any regional combatant command or any military
    area. Those monies that are appropriated for intelligence need
    to stay and be accounted for, and spent in the intelligence
    area; the same with those that are appropriated for other force
    structure and mission areas.
        We will rely, in the cyberspace domain, on intelligence;
    not just, I should say, from all-source intelligence, so from
    human intelligence to reconnaissance to signals intelligence to
    support, our--the development of our plans and operations for
    operating the networks, defending the networks, and, in crisis,
    utilizing them as part of the platform to support other
    operations.
        Chairman Levin. Are there going to be two separate approval
    and review processes through the two different chains of
    command? Will that remain? For approval of action from higher
    up----
        General Chilton. Right.
        Chairman Levin.--or for review and oversight of action from
    either higher-up or from Congress. Is that going to remain the
    same for those two chains of command, intelligence--
        General Chilton. I see no change in that, Senator. I mean,
    what I will be asked to do, as the combatant commander, will
    stay in the typical Title 10 lanes and under the Title 50
    authorities that are normally afforded to combatant commanders,
    and flow down through the subunified command for that mission
    area. Those intelligence-area investments and decisions that
    are made would still flow down through the intelligence chain
    to the various intelligence committees and communities.
        Chairman Levin. You think those lanes are going to be
    clearly defined.
        General Chilton. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. General Chilton, there's a new approach,
    called phase adaptive approach (PAA), relative to the missile
    defense plan for Europe. I think your prepared testimony, and
    maybe your oral testimony, covered this; but, if so, I missed
    it. In your judgment, does the PAA give us an effective way to
    address the Iranian missile threat, which is a growing threat?
        General Chilton. I do believe it does, Senator. I think it
    shifted our focus more toward addressing the shorter- and mid-
    range threats first, and last year, when we looked at the JCM-2
    study, it recommended that we increase our investments in
    addressing those threats, with increased investments in Theatre
    High Altitude Area Defense and Standard Missile-3, which have
    been brought forward in this budget. But taking a look at the
    Iranian threat, it puts us in a position to address what is a
    growing short- and medium-range palpable threat--that's
    measurable--sooner, and yet preserves the opportunity to
    address the longer-range threat, which we do have some
    capability against today, already.
        Chairman Levin. All right. I believe, in your written
    statement, you conclude by saying, ``The total effect of the
    PAA will provide significantly more capability to counter
    today's regional threats''--I emphasize the word ``today's
    regional threats''--``and to improve our ability''--and I'm
    quoting you, here--``to defend the United States against any
    future Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).'' Is
    that a capsule----
        General Chilton. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin.--of your----
        General Chilton. I think so. As you look to the future,
    we'll have, I believe, more capability, in this plan, in the
    2020 timeframe than we otherwise would have had with this
    approach, for both of those threats, both to the region and to
    the United States.
        Chairman Levin. So, is it fair to say that this plan, then,
    in your judgment, will provide a better defense of Europe,
    especially against those short- and medium-range missiles than
    the previous missile defense plan?
        General Chilton. I think it will, Senator, because there
    will be more capability deployed, and also, I think it gives us
    an opportunity to do some further burden-sharing with our
    allies in the region, which--of course, they're eminently
    interested in the defense of that region, as well.
        Chairman Levin. A possible spinoff--still only
    ``possible''--of the plan might be the inclusion of information
    from radars--from Russian radars as part of a missile defense
    capability. That's not yet a fact, but it, I gather, is still a
    possibility. My question to you is then, that if that occurred,
    if that cooperation with Russia took place, would that be in
    our interest? Do you think that it could send a powerful
    message to Iran that we are united, the world is united, in
    opposition to Iran's threats to the region?
        General Chilton. Senator, sensors are a key element of any
    missile defense system, and having additional sensor capability
    that would augment the defense of Europe from any potential
    aggression by Iran, I think, would be welcome.
        Chairman Levin. Is that additional sensor capability that
    you're referring to the possible Russian additional sensor?
        General Chilton. I think there's opportunity to examine
    that.
        Chairman Levin. But, the sensors that you were referring to
    are the Russian sensors that we--that I referred to in my
    question?
        General Chilton. Yes, and so, I would say that
    opportunities for additional sensors, to include Russians',
    could be beneficial. But, I would also emphasize that the
    sensors that we provide are an essential element of this. Too
    often we get focused on just counting missiles. The sensors are
    very key.
        Chairman Levin. That's an important----
        General Chilton. Part of the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA)
    architecture.
        Chairman Levin.--an important point. Thank you.
        General Sharp----
        Okay, my time's up.
        Senator Burr.
        Senator Burr. Mr. Chairman.
        Again, welcome, to all three of our panelists today.
        General Chilton, as you continue your preparation for
    standing up CYBERCOM, to the degree that you can elaborate,
    what are some of the steps that are being taken in the short
    term to ensure the safety and security of our Nation's computer
    networks?
        General Chilton. Senator, we've done a lot of work to
    prepare for the standup of CYBERCOM, to include completing an
    implementation plan. Also, as part of our normal plan,
    independent of the standup of CYBERCOM, we took steps, this
    past year, to combine the Global Network Operations Team with
    the Network Warfare Team into a single entity so that we could
    bring together closer sharing of information and teamwork
    between those two entities that are responsible for operating
    and defending the networks, as well as preparing for
    contingency operations.
        I would remind this committee that what we are chartered to
    do at STRATCOM is to operate and defend military networks only.
    So, we do not have the responsibility for defending other U.S.
    networks that--those fall under the responsibility of the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        But, it will be essential, in any contingency in the
    future, that we preserve our military network so that we can
    conduct operations, should this--military operations--should
    our Nation come under attack. So, we have a laser-beam focus on
    doing that. I think we've made significant strides in three
    areas:
        One, changing the culture of the military with regard to
    how we look at our systems. They are no longer systems used for
    convenience; they are systems that we require and are a
    necessity in warfare. So, changing that mindset, making it a
    commander's business, not just the technicians' business, to
    assure that our networks are ready and available to the
    warfighter, is absolute an important change.
        The way we conduct ourselves on the networks, improve
    training for our people, to make sure we tighten security for
    them, and teach them how to behave properly on the networks to
    minimize vulnerabilities, is the conduct part, as well as
    inspecting our units, globally, to make sure that they're
    following instructions and directions put out to ensure Web
    security.
        Finally, increased investments in capabilities, which we
    greatly appreciate the support of this committee on, and
    technologies that allows us to get out in front of threats
    coming into the military networks, are absolutely essential.
        Senator Burr. Just very quickly, do you see the threat,
    specifically to the military infrastructure, from
    cybercapabilities as great as other threats that are more
    physical?
        General Chilton. I do--
        Senator Burr. Specifically as it relates to our
    capabilities.
        General Chilton. Well, I look at it just like I do the
    space domain. I don't think we can imagine operations today--
    and I'll defer to my colleagues to the left on this--but, I
    don't think we can imagine military operations today without
    the advantages we have obtained from missile warning in space,
    global communications, GPS position navigation and tracking--
    or, timing. The same thing in cyberspace. The way we conduct
    our planning today, the way we issue orders, the way we assess
    our operations, so much rely on our military networks. So that
    is a capability that we depend on, and we must anticipate we
    will be challenged in these domains of space and cyberspace, in
    any military operation in the future.
        Senator Burr. Thank you, General.
        Admiral, we have approximately 49,000 military personnel,
    mostly marines, at Futenma Airbase in Japan, with an
    uncertainty about their future. According to a Reuters article
    posted yesterday, the Prime Minister has not made a final
    decision on his commitment to the 2006 Accord, in providing a
    location for the airbase at Okinawa to move. What's the latest
    information that you can share on the matter? If you can,
    what's the road ahead for us?
        Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. The first point I
    think I'd make is just to reaffirm the importance of the U.S.-
    Japan alliance as it exists today. It remains a cornerstone for
    security in Northeast Asia, and I think both nations recognize
    that. Prime Minster Hatoyama has come out reaffirming the
    importance in--that he places on the alliance, and certainly we
    do; and I state that frequently.
        With regard to this relatively tactical-level issue in
    Okinawa, which is the replacement of the Futenma Airbase, as
    you suggest, the Japanese have been deliberating on this now
    for several months. We have a commitment from the Japanese
    Government that they'll disclose their options and decision
    regarding the review of whether the existing Futenma
    replacement facility (FRF) is agreeable to them, by May of this
    year. We don't know whether we'll have disclosures of various
    options to consider before that, so I'm awaiting, with some
    interest, what the Japanese have to say.
        I would offer that we've been discussing Futenma
    replacement on Okinawa now for the better part of 17 years with
    the Japanese, so this is not a new issue for us. The agreement
    that was discussed and come to in 2006 on the FRF was very much
    an agreement where the Japanese had a majority vote--the people
    of Okinawa and the Government of Japan, both--and we continue
    to believe that the FRF in the current plan is the best
    locating option for that airfield in Okinawa.
        Senator Burr. But, you are confident that, in the next
    several months, there'll be additional direction on how we move
    forward.
        Admiral Willard. Yes, I'm confident that the Government of
    Japan will meet their commitment to come forward with their
    assessment of this particular item and their options, or
    agreement, that the existing FRF is what they will advocate
    for.
        Senator Burr. Thank you, Admiral.
        General Sharp, I think I understand your goal of increasing
    the number of command-sponsored families and the tour-length
    increase of up to 3 years. I also understand that there are
    considerable limitations in funds and resources to support
    families; specifically, healthcare, schools, jobs for spouses,
    all of the things that we all look at to try to accommodate the
    service of our servicemembers.
        You talked a little bit about the process and how we've
    moved forward. Anything more you want to elaborate on that
    process? But, also, can you share with us any projected
    shortfalls that we're going to have?
        General Sharp. Thank you, Senator. The process is--that is
    now ongoing is--as I've said, we have gone from about 1,600
    families in the June 2008 time period to about 3,900 now. By
    this time--by next summer, by the end of next summer, we'll be
    up to 4,900 families. Those are the families that I can handle
    with the infrastructure I have in place right now on the
    peninsula; infrastructure, meaning housing, schools, and
    hospital, primarily.
        What--the goal--to be able to go from that 4,900 to when
    all servicemembers can bring their families for 3 years, which
    will get us up to about 14,000 families, is really the process
    that's going on right now in the deliberations in DOD for the
    program objective memorandum (POM) 12-17 submission.
        I tell my people, ``I can't get ahead of my own
    headlights.'' I want to make sure that we have the proper
    infrastructure in place in order to be able to handle those
    families. That's what you will see when the Department comes
    forward with the budget in January as we look out over the POM
    years.
        But, tour normalization is really making a huge difference
    in Korea, not only for the families, in eliminating another
    unaccompanied tour, but--and it greatly increases our
    capability there, and I think it really shows our long-term
    commitment to, not only the ROK, but all to--to all of
    Northeast Asia, which I think is important, not just looking at
    the Korean Peninsula, but how we are viewed for our long-term
    commitment in that very important part of the world.
        Senator Burr. Great. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, to the three of you, for your service.
        I must say that Chairman Levin and I were just agreeing
    that the three of you, and the combatant commanders we see in
    this series of hearings, are really most impressive, and we
    thank you for your service.
        Now I'll go on to ask critical questions, of course.
    [Laughter.]
        But no really Admiral, I thank you--Admiral Willard, I
    thank you for your overview, a quick overview of the region. I
    thought your prepared statement was really excellent, that you
    entered into the record. It reminds us, even though we're
    focused, because of combat going on in Afghanistan and Iraq, on
    other parts of the world in Central Command (CENTCOM), that the
    Asia Pacific is really critical to us. You have some numbers in
    here that--it's very important to remember that 5 of our top 10
    trading partners are now Asia Pacific countries. China, Japan,
    and South Korea are the second-, fourth-, and seventh-largest
    trading partners. Obviously, an enormous number of people. We
    have, really, an excellent group of allies in the region.
    Japan, as you mentioned, foundation for a long time. South
    Korea, very important. Australia. Now, India really rising as a
    critically important ally. I want to thank you for your
    statement, and I repeat it, ``India's strategic location,
    shared democratic values, growing economy, and evolution as a
    regional power combine to make them a partner with whom we need
    to work much more closely.'' I think the military-to-military
    relationship that--there can be critical.
        I wanted to focus, first, in questioning, on another of our
    great allies there, which is South Korea. Continuing--though
    we've been, as you say in your prepared statement, General
    Sharp, ``North Korea undertook a charm offensive''--``charm,''
    of course, like most other human activities, is a relative
    concept, relatively--``charming during the second half of
    2009,'' although, as you say, ``it's not yet led to any
    measurable progress towards the complete and verifiable
    denuclearization of North Korea,'' end of quote. So, the North
    Korean threat remains.
        Here's what I want to focus on. As you all know, in 2007,
    President Roh, of South Korea, and President Bush entered into
    an agreement, whereby transfer of wartime OPCON in the U.S.-ROK
    CFC will go to South Korea in 2012. I want to express to you my
    concern about that. I share what you've expressed, which is
    your faith, both Admiral Willard and General Sharp, in the
    professionalism skill of our South Korean allies, but I worry
    about the timing, because 2012 is a year in which both the
    United States and South Korea will hold presidential elections.
    We know, in our last presidential year, North Korea acted up.
    May have been coincidental; I don't think so. I was struck--and
    North Korea has already said that they intend to make 2012 a
    special year. I believe it's the 100th birthday--100th
    anniversary of the birth of the previous great leader. Then I
    saw, recently, Minister of Defense Tae-young Kim, of South
    Korea, said, and I quote, late February, ``The military must
    always prepare for the worst, and the worst scenario is the
    transfer of wartime OPCON in 2012,'' end quote.
        I wanted to ask both Admiral Willard and General Sharp
    whether this is inevitably going to happen, this OPCON
    transfer, whether we're reviewing it. I worry about it, both in
    terms of the Korean Peninsula, but, frankly, also its impact on
    other areas of the world, including, particularly, Afghanistan
    and Pakistan, where they worry about whether we're going to
    leave before the job is done, as it were.
        So, Admiral Willard, would you take a first stab at that?
        Admiral Willard. I will, Senator Lieberman.
        First, this alliance between the ROK and United States, as
    General Sharp indicated in his remarks, is as strong as I've
    ever witnessed it----
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Admiral Willard.--bar none. We've been continually
    impressed by the ROK armed forces capabilities in the field and
    capabilities in leadership throughout the exercise series that
    General Sharp oversees. So, we're convinced that operational
    transition--OPCON transition could clearly occur in 2012.
        As you suggest, this is a Government of Korea decision, or
    certainly OPCON transition will be considered by the Government
    of Korea for its import and its impact on the region. We think
    that it strengthens the ROK's armed forces position on the
    peninsula to take overall OPCON of their own defense; and we
    think they're ready for it.
        To the extent that the government would question that, I
    think, then, it becomes a government-to-government decision
    between the United States and the ROK. Our role in this--and
    General Sharp can be very specific regarding the many actions
    that he's taken to help prepare for this transition to occur--
    has been to conduct a series of exercises and take all of the
    actions necessary to bring the moving parts together to make
    OPCON transition a reality, April 12, 2012.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. So, the transfer is not of OPCON
    to the South Korean military--is not inevitable. In other
    words, it--that is, for the 2012 timeframe. I appreciate what
    you've said, that if the Government of Korea has second
    thoughts about it--and, incidentally, I appreciate what you've
    said. Our relations with South Korea are probably better than
    they've ever been, today. This agreement, in 2007, was signed
    at a time when the relations weren't as good as they are today.
        But, anyway, I hear you say that if the Government of the
    ROK has second thoughts about assuming OPCON in 2012, then that
    essentially gets bounced up to the political leadership of both
    countries. Is that correct?
        Admiral Willard. I think so, yes.
        Senator Lieberman. General Sharp, do you want to add to
    that?
        General Sharp. Senator, a couple of things. First off, from
    a military perspective, I'm absolutely confident we will be
    ready to do OPCON transition on 17 April 2012. We are on the
    second version of the plan, the bilateral plan that both
    countries will agree to, that will determine what is the
    supporting/supported relationship that mission and forces of
    ours in the ROK would do in the defense of the ROK. We are
    already starting to stand up the organizations that need to be
    in place in order for that to happen, both on the ROK side and
    on the U.S. side.
        We have exercised this several times in our Ulchi Freedom
    Guardian exercises. We have people that are working on this--
    the plans, organizations, processes, and systems--literally on
    a daily basis. I am confident in the ROK military leadership in
    the processes that need to be in place for an effective
    command-and-control relationship for us to be able to defend
    the ROK.
        Having said that, I also believe that it is the right thing
    to do. The number-one responsibility of any nation is to defend
    their own country. In a country that is advanced as Korea is,
    the 13th richest country in the world, a country that has a
    military that's as strong as it is, it's their responsibility
    to take the lead role in defending the ROK.
        I think it also sends a very strong message to North Korea
    and to other people in the region that the Korean military is
    so strong that the United States is willing to go in a
    supported-to-supported relationship, and willing to do it in
    2012. To delay that time, I think, sends exactly the opposite
    signal, which I think is not the right thing to do, against
    North Korea or other parts of the--parts of Northeast Asia.
        Again, as Admiral Willard said, if North--if the ROK comes
    and asks for a delay, I'm sure that will be a discussion at the
    highest levels of both governments, because both governments
    agree to this timeline of 17 April 2012. To change that
    timeline, both governments will have to agree to change that.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answer. Look, I agree
    that the transfer of OPCON is the right thing to do. The
    question I'm raising is whether 2012 is the right time to do
    it, and also, of course, to make clear, as I think you have,
    that if OPCON occurs then, or a year later or 2 years later, it
    doesn't mean that the United States is exiting South Korea, or
    that part of the world.
        General Sharp. Exactly, sir. The commitment of 28,500
    troops to the Korean Peninsula for the foreseeable future--the
    words Secretary Gates and the President have used--and I think
    it's a great investment, and it has been for the last 60 years,
    to be able to maintain peace and security there. As we move
    forward in OPCON transition--one of the things that I think is
    misunderstood, especially on the Korean Peninsula, is, there is
    a belief that, after OPCON transition, the total responsibility
    for defending the ROK lies with the Korean military. That can't
    be further from the truth. I've heard words of ``independent,
    self-reliant forces'' in South Korea. The fight--and the
    commitment--that we have to the ROK does not change. It will be
    a combined warfight, just like it is today, after OPCON
    transition.
        As Admiral Willard said, I'm very confident it will make
    the ROK military even stronger, just as it has been since 1994,
    when they took armistice OPCON of their military, and all the
    progress that has been made along those lines.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you both.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        I just want to let you know, General Sharp, how much I
    welcome your comments about the importance of that transition
    date being sustained, and the reasons that you give for it.
        Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your service. Thank
    you for being here this morning.
        The first question I have is to Admiral Willard, but,
    General Chilton, you may also want to respond to this.
        Last week, the Washington Times cited a 2009 Central
    Intelligence Agency report to Congress stating that assistance
    from Chinese and Russian entities had helped Iran move toward
    self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. What
    is your assessment of China's support to Iran's ballistic
    missile program?
        Admiral?
        Admiral Willard. I would probably defer to General Chilton
    to get his assessment of this. I would offer that, in the
    military-to-military relations that China has across the
    region, there are always oversight by us and concerns with
    regard to proliferation that might occur to accompany that. So,
    this is the issue of who is selling ballistic missile
    capability to whom. In the case of North Korea, that we've been
    discussing over the past few minutes, who might proliferate,
    worse than that.
        So, proliferation concerns, I would offer, certainly exist.
    In terms of specifics between China and Iran, I'm not prepared
    to discuss it.
        Senator LeMieux. General?
        General Chilton. Senator, nor am I prepared to discuss
    specifics--and this would be out of ignorance--between China,
    specifically, and Iran. I share--agree completely with Admiral
    Willard's comments, that proliferation, in general, is a
    concern. Certainly we have seen North Korea proliferating
    missile technology, and that has been a focus and an area of
    concern for us all.
        Senator LeMieux. Just as a followup to that, have you seen
    any evidence of Iran trying to project influence into your
    region?
        Admiral?
        Admiral Willard. Iran has military partnerships within our
    region. In that sense, yes. Iran's influence in the region, by
    and large, has to do with Iran's energy resources and the
    dependence by Asia Pacific countries on those resources. So, to
    a great extent, the economic relationship of a great many
    countries in the Asia Pacific with Iran has to do with oil. At
    the same time, there are, yes, military-to-military
    relationships that we monitor between Iran and some Asia
    Pacific countries.
        Senator LeMieux. Admiral, in terms of Islamic extremist
    groups, what gives you the most concern within your region?
        Admiral Willard. For the past half a dozen years, we've
    been working with the armed forces of the Philippines--in the
    Southern Philippines, against a variety of groups--Abu Sayyef
    group being predominant.
        With Indonesia, we work with the Indonesians with regard to
    their Jemaah Islamiyah concerns. In both these countries, we
    have been successful in our work with their respective armed
    forces and police forces in the conduct of counterterrorism.
    Right now our concern is the movement of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
    the terrorist group that emanates from Pakistan that was
    responsible for the Mumbai attacks in India, and specifically
    their positioning in Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives, and Sri
    Lanka. We're working very closely with the Indians, and we're
    working within our own community to develop the necessary plans
    to counter that particular terror group as they migrate into
    the Asia Pacific region.
        Senator LeMieux. Are they a regional threat, or just a
    threat to India?
        Admiral Willard. We're attempting to develop a further
    understanding of the extent to which they're a regional threat.
    If you'll recall, LeT was evidenced in Chicago, with the arrest
    of Headley, and we have, certainly, knowledge of their
    influence within the region, beyond the countries that I just
    mentioned. The extent of that influence is what we're taking
    under study. They are predominantly a threat to India.
        Senator LeMieux. General Chilton, I want to talk to you
    about the importance of manned spaceflight and the work of the
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and how
    it impacts STRATCOM, and the relationship thereto. I know this
    is something you're uniquely capable to speak about.
        The administration has proposed to abandon the
    Constellation program and abandon our short-term lower Earth
    orbit capabilities, rely instead upon the Russians to get us to
    the International Space Station. Does this have any concern to
    you as the combatant commander for STRATCOM?
        General Chilton. There's just one second-order effect of
    that, that I think we need to study, but, I'll speak about it
    in a more broad sense, and that has to do with industrial-base
    issues. So, NASA was, in their plan for Constellation, going to
    use a large solid rocket motor as part of that architecture.
    Now I have to take that into context with--moving away from
    that--in the context of requirements for sustainment of the D-5
    for our submarine-launched ballistic missiles and for the
    Minuteman III, for the ICBM. So, I think it warrants us to then
    evaluate the impacts on the industrial base. I can't say that
    there are clear impacts that would affect STRATCOM, but it
    warrants us to take a look at industrial--potential industrial-
    base issues with regard to that critical industrial base, which
    allows us to build large solid rocket motors for the strategic
    deterrent.
        Senator LeMieux. Beyond the industrial-base capabilities
    and the requirements that you need for your missiles, is
    there--it would occur to me that NASA's innovation and the way
    that they bring new innovations to--not just space exploration,
    but to missile technology and other aerospace technologies,
    that that would have some impact upon what you do if they were
    no longer pushing the envelope in that regard.
        General Chilton. Well, sir, I guess I can't comment on
    whether NASA will continue to push the envelope or not. I
    suspect they will. They certainly--as we look through our
    history, we have benefited, not only in space, but in
    aeronautics, from the great research and development and
    technology that has been developed by NASA over the years. I
    look forward to them continuing to push the envelope in both
    domains, because we have benefited from that in the past.
        Senator LeMieux. Admiral Willard, there was some discussion
    earlier about our relationships with China. We have China
    reacting to our military exchange with Taiwan, and they reacted
    previously, in 2008, when there was a similar exchange. Do you
    think there's--this is business as usual for them, or are there
    any additional long-term ramifications to their response to our
    agreements with Taiwan?
        Admiral Willard. Well, certainly the suspension of
    military-to-military relationships is consistent with what
    we've seen in the past from China when they've had a
    disagreement with our Nation; in this case, with regard to an
    announcement of Taiwan arms sales. We've been in dialogue with
    China, prior to this particular suspension taking place,
    offering that the military-to-military relationship is worth
    continuing, worth sustaining, regardless of disagreements
    between our two nations. We believe that strongly. We think
    that across all of the engagement with China that's currently
    occurring with the Departments of the United States, that the
    military-to-military relationship tends to lag behind the other
    forms of engagement, and that that shouldn't be the case, so
    that we can, number one, find areas of common interest, where
    we can begin to advance our relationship into the future, and,
    second, so that we can have frank discussions about areas of
    disagreement, which, clearly, when we suspend military-to-
    military relationships, that dialogue stops. So, we think that
    it's certainly in both countries' interest. They get a vote,
    and they must see the value in it, as we do, I think, to see
    anything other than this predictable behavior occurring in the
    future.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time is up, but I would like to
    submit some questions for the record that I would have asked
    concerning cybersecurity. We know, recently, that Google has
    experienced attacks, and I was at a China Commission--bicameral
    commission meeting this week. It was not articulated directly
    by the folks from Google, but there certainly seems to be the
    indication that those attacks came from the--sponsored by the
    Chinese Government.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator LeMieux, for
    those questions, which I think will be important--the answers
    will be important to all the members of this committee and
    Congress, because you've pointed to an extremely important
    issue that is ongoing.
        Now, I understand that Senator Akaka has been happy to
    yield to Senator Nelson.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, thank you very much.
        Thank you, Senator Akaka, for your courtesies, extending me
    this opportunity to ask a question, because I have an airplane
    to catch here shortly.
        General Chilton, it's a military construction question. For
    some time, you and I and others have talked about the need for
    a new STRATCOM headquarters building. So I've been very pleased
    with the progress that we've made towards addressing this vital
    need. The facility's shortcomings and problems are well known.
    They've put STRATCOM's mission and its personnel at some risk.
    The existing headquarters was built in 1957; it's weathered the
    five decades with little renovation. In recent years, the
    building's experienced failures in electrical service, as well
    as some fires and flooding. The Air Force and the President
    have addressed these shortcomings so that, in fiscal year 2011,
    there'll be money to complete the plan and design of the
    headquarters facility, with construction beginning in fiscal
    year 2012. When we talked last, I think you probably said it
    the best I've ever heard it, that STRATCOM headquarters is the
    nuclear command-and-control node for the United States, and we
    must make the appropriate investments.
        Can you speak to why this facility has been a priority for
    you, as combatant commander, and what you foresee as the value
    of a new headquarters, in terms of our capabilities?
        General Chilton. Thank you, Senator. I'm happy to talk to
    it.
        When I got to the Command, of course, you first reviewed
    the working conditions and--for your people. I've walked the
    halls and the tunnels of the headquarters extensively. I think
    the context is, this headquarters was built with a large
    underground facility that extends seven floors below the
    surface, to our Global Operations Center, in a time--at the
    height of the cold war, when it was felt necessary to bury
    things as such.
        Since then, technology has evolved and we started using
    computers, bringing a lot of computer capability into this
    infrastructure that was absolutely not designed to handle that,
    so heat loads, working-space conditions are intolerable in some
    areas, for some of our people; and we are actually constrained
    in the capabilities that we would like to deploy in the
    building, both on how we would organize and implement the
    critical functions that we have, to include nuclear command and
    control, and add on to that the new mission sets that we've
    had. So, we've had mission growth in space and cyberspace,
    which also demands better support and integration.
        So, this is about not only the fact that we live in a
    building that was designed to--and occupied early on--over 50
    years ago, for a different era and a different sole mission
    set, with different technologies. It's about mission growth and
    it's about doing what we need to do for the country, both as a
    nuclear command-and-control node, but as a cyberspace node and
    a space node for this Nation.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Now, would you--would it be safe to say
    that it's a fairly large multistory bomb shelter?
        General Chilton. There's quite a bit underground, Senator.
    I don't believe we need that anymore today.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Right.
        General Chilton. I don't believe we need the deep
    underground capability. We do need protections for our people
    in our command centers to withstand weather phenomenon in the
    area, and to ensure that it's always there for America. So I
    think we have a--we've worked very hard on the design of a new
    infrastructure and facility to take us into the 21st century
    and what this command needs to do its missions in the future.
    I'm satisfied we're on track. We appreciate your support and
    the support of this committee.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I want to thank you and the many
    personnel, both civilian and military, who make STRATCOM such
    an important part of our national security and help keep us as
    safe as possible.
        I thank you, Admiral and General, for your commitment and
    your very diligent and impressive work, as well.
        Thank you, Senator Akaka. I appreciate that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to say aloha and welcome to Admiral Willard and
    General Chilton and General Sharp. I want to thank you very
    much for your distinguished service to our country, and also
    all the military personnel that serve under you to assure that
    the security is there.
        The posture of PACOM and also USFK is of particular
    interest to me because of the strategic location of Hawaii in
    the Pacific. The growing economies, also, of the Pacific
    region, and particularly China, India, and South Korea, present
    both opportunities and challenges. But, I continue to be
    interested in the readiness of our forces in the Pacific as
    challenges in other parts of the world continue to compete for
    military resources. Of course, we're always looking at
    resources for our military and to be certain that we have it
    ready for our forces.
        Admiral Willard, India is becoming a growing economic and
    military power in the region. Last year, the United States and
    India reached agreements in military cooperation, space issues,
    and peaceful nuclear energy generation, during the visit of
    Secretary Clinton. Admiral, can you tell us how we are working
    with India's military and about any future developments? Of
    course, I ask this for information that you can reveal in this
    forum.
        Admiral Willard. Aloha, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Aloha.
        Admiral Willard. Thank you very much for the question.
        Senator Akaka. Also let me say welcome to Donna.
        Admiral Willard. Thank you very much, Senator, and happy to
    answer the question.
        The military-to-military relationship with India has been
    evolving now for most of the last decade, and really started at
    the tactical level, service-to-service-type interaction, some
    of which I experienced while I was the Seventh Fleet Commander
    in hosting executive steering groups with my counterparts in
    the Indian Navy. At the same time, we've had, in the past,
    modest exercise series with the Indians that have grown over
    the years to become, now, complex exercise series with the
    Indians.
        And as our military-to-military relationship has advanced,
    it's also elevated itself such that we're now holding
    strategic-level discussions with the Indians, and very complex
    military discussions regarding our respective advancements and
    our future, in terms of exercising together. Then there is a
    growing foreign military sales relationship with the Indians as
    they've expressed interest in acquiring United States-produced
    military hardware. So, in my engagement with India--and I just
    returned, about 3 weeks ago, from a military-to-military
    exchange with them--we discuss in great detail their interest
    in acquiring U.S. systems.
        So, I would offer that not only is India now an economic
    and regional power, certainly in the Indian Ocean region, but
    it has global implications, as well, in the relationship
    between the United States and India has been evolving, through
    my experience, to a point where it's very strong, at the
    moment.
        Senator Akaka. Admiral, I want to commend you and our
    military for continuing to keep, as you were mentioning, the
    relationships between the military and our friendly countries,
    and also to try to continue to work with them in their
    exercises, as well.
        General Chilton, the establishment of U.S. CYBERCOM
    recognizes the growing importance of the cyberdomain to
    national security. This growing importance will require forces
    that are able to operate and defend DOD information networks
    and provide the President with response options in cyberspace.
        General, can you tell us how your organization is giving
    your personnel the knowledge and tools they require to operate
    effectively in this environment?
        General Chilton. Thank you, Senator. You've hit on a very
    key point, and that is growing and sustaining cyber-expertise
    in the military. We have a couple of things that have happened
    over the past year, that have been very encouraging. One, all
    of the Services are now organizing in such a fashion as to
    present cyberforces to STRATCOM to do those critical missions
    of operating and defending the networks and responding, when
    required. I would point out the Navy's new fleet organization,
    as well as the Air Force's new Numbered Air Force, as two
    examples of this. What that means is, the individual Services
    who are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping
    forces for the combatant commanders are organizing in such a
    fashion to put focus on the training of those personnel. So, we
    will see the Services increase the tension on accessions and
    training and growing the expertise of individuals in the
    various Services, and making them available to STRATCOM to
    conduct our operations.
        Internal to the headquarters and STRATCOM, we are taking
    seriously educational opportunities and growth opportunities
    for the people, particularly our civil servants that work in
    the headquarters, who will be there for the long haul, for
    these very critical mission areas of space, cyberspace, and
    deterrence. So we're paying attention to that.
        Lastly, Senator, I would say DOD, under the leadership of
    Secretary Gates, has increased the capacity of the joint
    school, down in Pensacola, that is run by the U.S. Navy, to
    provide increased educational opportunities for the personnel
    we will need, from all the Services, in CYBERCOM to execute our
    mission.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for that information. If
    I have time, I'll come back with further questions on
    cyberspace.
        General Chilton. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Akaka. Admiral Willard, it is my understanding that
    China is investing heavily in fourth-generation fighters and
    advanced surface-to-air missiles. Admiral, F-22s are being
    phased into PACOM. They are in Alaska, and are scheduled to be
    in Hawaii in the near future. Can you discuss the importance of
    having these assets in the Pacific, and provide an update of
    the Hickam basing schedule?
        Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. I think the statement
    that you made regarding China's advancements in capability and
    capacities in some very high-tech areas, and their--
    particularly their investment in the People's Liberation Army
    (PLA) air force assets, fourth-generation fighter capabilities,
    combined with their integrated air defense systems, which are,
    as well, very sophisticated, are illustrative of why the F-22
    is particularly well suited to the Pacific, given its very
    unique capabilities.
        So, as the PACOM commander--and I know that General North,
    my Pacific Air Force commander, would attest, as well--we're
    very pleased that the F-22 forces in Alaska, and eventually in
    Hawaii, will be made available to us. Again, a very unique
    capability that is particularly well suited to some of the
    potential contingencies in our AOR; and, as well, contributing
    to extended deterrence throughout the Pacific. So, we look
    forward to those assets. They have served in the Pacific, often
    a squadron in Guam, at Anderson Air Force Base, and they will
    play a key role, I'm sure, in our various Air Force operations
    in the Pacific.
        In terms of the timing for the Hawaii Air National Guard to
    acquire F-22s, without being definitive about a very specific
    date, I would offer that both in the Alaskan Command, as well
    as at Hickam Air Force Base, as you're well aware, we're
    currently expending the military construction funds, over the
    next several years, to equip both of these sites to accommodate
    the F-22. Provided those military construction funds are timely
    and we're able to complete the advancements in ramp space,
    hangar space, and the necessary support facilities for that
    unique aircraft, then I'm hopeful that their laydown, both in
    Alaska, as well as Hawaii, will occur on time.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Burr, it's my inclination to go a couple of more
    questions, if that's okay. Obviously, give you the opportunity,
    as well.
        Senator Burr. That's fine, Mr. Chairman. I have no
    additional questions at this time.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        Admiral, I wanted to go back to China, and I appreciate the
    statements that you made in your opening statement, I quote
    again here, ``China's rapid and comprehensive transformation of
    its armed forces is affecting regional military balances and
    holds implications beyond the Asia Pacific region. Of
    particular concern is that elements of China's military
    modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of
    action in the region,'' end of quote from your opening
    statement.
        So, it's certainly my impression that, over the last year
    or so, there seems to have been a move up in the assertiveness
    of China, economically, diplomatically, and militarily. I take
    it, from that statement that I read from your opening
    statement, that you agree. If I'm right, why do you think this
    is happening now?
        Admiral Willard. Thank you for the question, Senator. I
    think that we have seen a change in tenor from the People's
    Republic of China (PRC) in the last year or so, such that the
    exchanges that occur--in my instance, military-to-military, and
    often in other fora with our Government and with regional
    partners--is a changed tone that, as you suggest, demonstrates
    more assertiveness on the part of the Chinese.
        It would be hard to speculate as to why that has occurred
    at this particular time. But, when you consider the very rapid
    growth of capability in the PLA armed forces over the past
    decade, combined with the economic growth of China and its
    growing global influence, there is a level of confidence, I
    believe, that comes with that pronounced assertiveness, that
    we're all experiencing.
        I think it will be very important for the PRC to regard
    that level of influence and their responsibilities now as a
    very influential global partner, to dialogue with the
    international community and with the United States in a very
    responsible manner, and take their place at the table, to
    ensure that, rather than shrill exchanges, that we're on common
    ground with regard to meeting our global responsibilities. I
    think they certainly have them.
        Senator Lieberman. Well, I agree with what you said, all
    parts of your statement, including, obviously, the fact that we
    acknowledge and respect the growth in China's economy, its
    importance in the world. We seek a constructive, obviously a
    peaceful, relationship with them, but we also have both
    historic presence in the Asia Pacific region, and we have
    national security interests in the region, and very important
    allies that depend on us in the region. So, we have to both
    maintain the peacefulness of the relationship, but a clarity
    and an honesty in our relations with the Chinese.
        Tell me what you meant when you said that elements of
    China's military modernization appear designed to challenge our
    freedom of action in the region.
        Admiral Willard. China has made a number of investments in
    a variety of anti-access-capability areas; area denial, perhaps
    another way to think about it. This ranges from integrated air
    defense systems off their coastline which stand off well beyond
    their territorial waters and airspace, to their investments in
    submarines, which is pretty profound, and that particular
    capability, now, that is ranging throughout the South China
    Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea, and beyond, and other
    capabilities that, together, provide sizable area-denial
    capability.
        Over time, they have very much appeared to zero in on U.S.
    capabilities and the potential ability to counter those, as a
    framework for these investments. But, I would offer that they
    not only concern the United States, but our regional allies as
    well.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Admiral Willard. As you suggest, Japan, the ROK, our allies
    in Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and our
    partners in Vietnam and elsewhere in the region, all have to
    deal, now, with capabilities that could potentially infringe on
    their freedom of action throughout this very important part of
    the world.
        I would just remind that we've been present in these
    waters, and in this airspace, for the past 150 years.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Admiral Willard. We've been providing security for sea
    lines of communication that are moving over a trillion dollars
    of commerce per year, both back and forth to the United States
    and to our important allies and partners in the region, which
    has also provided for the economic growth of China.
        Senator Lieberman. Correct.
        Admiral Willard. We don't intend to cede any of that space,
    but, rather, continue to protect those sea lines of
    communication that are so vital to the United States and the
    Asia Pacific region as a whole.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that statement very much,
    and also the fact that China's growth and assertiveness is not
    just a concern of ours, parochially, it is very much a concern
    of most of the rest of the countries in the region who are
    allies. I gather, unfortunately, that the kind of military-to-
    military relationships that have otherwise been quite useful in
    diminishing tension between countries has actually not done
    very well, yet, with the PRC. Now, if I'm not mistaken, the
    military-to-military contacts are suspended as a result of
    Chinese reaction to our recent arms sales to Taiwan. I wonder
    if you have anything to say about the state of our military-to-
    military relationship with China.
        Admiral Willard. You describe it accurately, Senator
    Lieberman, when you refer to the suspension and also the fact
    that our military-to-military relationship tends to lag behind
    the other engagements that we enjoy with the PRC. We believed
    that we were making progress last year, when General Xu, one of
    the very high-ranking members of the Central Military
    Commission, visited Washington, to include Secretary Gates, and
    agreed upon a method to advance our military-to-military
    relationship, and mature it. He stopped in Hawaii on his way
    back to Beijing, and he and I spent a day or so together, again
    revisiting the areas of common interest that we thought we
    could advance discussions and relations with, and also the
    opportunity that military-to-military dialogue provides, in
    terms of dealing with our differences.
        Regretfully, those engagements that had been agreed upon
    with the PRC are part of this suspension, to include the high-
    level visits--invitations extended to the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs, Secretary Gates, and, lastly, myself--were part of this
    demarche. So, we believe strongly that China needs to revisit
    the value of a continuum of military-to-military relationship
    and dialogue with the United States and determine its value in
    their self-interest, which we believe strongly in, and we--
    we're hopeful that they'll have that internal discussion and
    ultimately we'll be able to depart on a more continuous
    relationship.
        Senator Lieberman. Well said, thanks.
        General Chilton, one quick question. This morning, as I'm
    sure you know, President Obama and, I presume, President
    Medvedev will be announcing the successful conclusion of START
    negotiations, and that they'll be submitting, in this case, the
    treaty to the Senate for consideration. Many of us here have
    been concerned that the Russians might try to bring into the
    treaty some limitations on our freedom of action with regard to
    defensive systems, missile defense systems, particularly. I
    gather that there's a reference to defensive systems in the
    preamble, but nothing in the heart of the treaty, that the
    Russians are apparently going to say, publicly, in a separate
    statement, that they reserve the right to leave the treaty if
    they think our defensive missile systems are, in some sense,
    threatening them.
        Do you agree that START should be a separate matter for
    consideration, which is basically the reduction of our nuclear
    weapons inventories, on both great powers, and leave the
    question of defenses separate from that?
        General Chilton. Senator, I do. That's the short answer.
        Senator Lieberman. It's a good one.
        General Chilton. Missile defense--in spite of our--all our
    efforts--and we need to continue these efforts--the U.S.
    Missile Defense System has been fielded for two purposes; one,
    to counter a Korean capability----
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Chilton.--that, in some future date, should we not
    have a missile defense, might put them in a position to deter
    the United States from meeting our responsibilities and our
    commitments to the people of South Korea.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Chilton. Likewise, to prevent Iran from fielding a
    system that they could blindly blackmail, or use to blackmail
    or threaten, our friends and allies, both in the CENTCOM
    region, but also in the European Command region.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes.
        General Chilton. That is our focus. If you put on a pair of
    Russian shoes and look at it from their perspective, their
    concern is that there's more to this than that, perhaps. So we
    need to continue dialogue with the Russians to assure them that
    is not the case, not only through dialogue, but through our
    actions. I think our actions to date have shown that we're
    fielding a limited system, with focused capabilities, to
    address those two focused threats--those two specific threat
    areas.
        Again, this kind of circles back to the point on military-
    to-military discussions. Military-to-military discussions with
    Russia, as well as China, are important.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Chilton. Russia, on this particular topic, China,
    on this particular topic, as well as, certainly, others when we
    start talking about strategic deterrence and posturing for
    strategic deterrence between those three countries--the United
    States, China, and Russia.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        Senator Burr.
        Senator Akaka, do you want to ask another question?
        Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, may I?
        Senator Lieberman. Please, go ahead.
        Senator Akaka. Yes.
        Admiral Willard and General Sharp, I believe we must expand
    our foreign language capability, and also our cultural
    knowledge. There seems to be an emphasis within DOD to improve
    these capabilities within our forces. Admiral and General, what
    are your thinking of the Department's efforts to develop
    servicemembers' cultural knowledge and foreign language skills
    in order to better perform their roles in counterinsurgency and
    stability operations?
        Admiral Willard. Yes, thank you, Senator Akaka. It's an
    important question. In my previous assignment as the Vice Chief
    of Navy, I was a party to many of the discussions inside the
    Pentagon regarding the need to increase our investments in
    foreign language skills and cultural awareness, which was
    fundamentally an increase in the number of foreign area trained
    officers for very specific areas of the world, that each of the
    Services were making. We have made sizable investments within
    DOD to support those increases in language training and the
    increases in foreign area officers. As a PACOM commander, I'm
    enjoying the benefits of that, such that now a sizable number
    of my headquarters' staff members--I know it's true in the
    components, as well, having previously served as the Pacific
    Fleet commander--we're enjoying greater language skills among
    our junior officers and senior enlisted personnel, such that,
    when they conduct their engagements and capacity-building
    around the Asia Pacific region, they're much better able to
    converse across the wide number of languages and dialects that
    you're more than familiar with exist in our part of the world.
        So, this has been a great investment, and I am assured the
    Services all will continue to make this investment, as I think
    we've learned some lessons regarding its importance to the work
    that we do out there.
        Senator Akaka. General Sharp?
        General Sharp. I agree completely with Admiral Willard. I
    think the initiative that the Department has undertaken toward
    normalization of longer tours in Korea also greatly contributes
    to the cultural understanding and the capabilities that we
    have, specifically in the ROK. I was in the building at the
    same time as Admiral Willard, working on this same initiative,
    and agree with him that it is critically important for our
    Services to step up to this and make more language and cultural
    awareness among all of our forces. I think they're doing very
    well at that. It's critically important.
        Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much for those
    responses. I'm happy to hear that.
        Mr. Chairman, I asked the question because it goes back to
    World War II, when the Military Intelligence Services (MIS)--
    Japanese from our country--made a huge difference with General
    MacArthur in Japan and believed that they helped to build a
    base that has become what Japan has succeeded to be through
    their efforts and through the language and cultural skills that
    our military had at that time, and was able to deal with Japan.
    I look upon that as an important part of our future strategies
    as we work with other countries.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
        General Chilton, Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thanks for
    your service, thanks for your testimony today, thanks for your
    patience with Senate procedure during the week. It's been a
    really helpful and informative discussion this morning. I know
    I can say, on behalf of Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, Senator
    Burr, and everybody else here on this committee, that we
    appreciate very much what you're doing for us in very important
    aspects of our security around the world, and we'll try our
    best, in our authorization responsibility, to give you the
    support that you, and all those men and women in uniform
    serving under you, deserve.
        So, thank you very much.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
               Questions submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
                 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
        1. Senator Ben Nelson. General Chilton, Secretary Gates testified
    that the combatant commanders have an insatiable appetite for
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). This year's
    budget request seems to address that need. Collectively, the Services
    are planning on spending $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2011 for new
    unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities.
        From my vantage point, it seems the focus has been on how many UAVs
    are in the field and how quickly we can get more, and, in doing so, we
    overlook critical aspects of expanding ISR- like how the Services plan
    to train the analysts that will be required to process the expanding
    volumes of data, and what infrastructure will be required to move data
    and share it with those that need it. The easy part is buying the next
    Predator--the hard part is exploiting and using the intelligence.
        A Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) report issued last week
    states that within U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), less than half of
    the electronic signals collected by Predator are exploited. The report
    identifies a shortage in analytical staff to process ISR data and
    limited bandwidth to disseminate intelligence as principle challenges.
    At the Air Force posture hearing this month, I asked General Schwartz
    about manning the ISR mission and he stated that the current manning
    structure to support UAV operations was unsustainable in light of
    projected growth. It doesn't appear that the Department's capacity to
    process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence has kept pace with its
    ability to collect it.
        Last week I addressed ISR shortfalls with General Petraeus, and he
    testified that the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) ISR Task Force
    is coordinating the activities among the Services to support operations
    in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Could you comment on your
    role in these coordinating activities with the OSD ISR Task Force?
        General Chilton. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is the DOD Joint
    Functional Manager (JFM) for ISR and associated processing,
    exploitation, and dissemination (PED). STRATCOM executes its command
    responsibilities through its Joint Functional Component Command for ISR
    (JFCC-ISR). As a point of reference, STRATCOM personnel were primary
    sources of information for the GAO report, ISR: Overarching Guidance is
    Needed to Advance Information Sharing, noted by Senator Nelson. As the
    JFM for ISR, STRATCOM works closely with the OSD ISR Task Force to
    identify current PED gaps and shortfalls, as well as forecast future
    PED issues with the acquisition of new platforms and sensors. This
    coordination helps to ensure any additional capabilities fielded look
    beyond the platform and take into account all aspects of collection,
    PED.
        To address the PED adequacy concerns raised by Senator Nelson,
    STRATCOM is developing a comprehensive plan to align PED with the
    allocation of ISR platforms to the combatant commands, ensuring PED
    capacity with an ultimate goal of better aligning with ISR collection.
    To this end, STRATCOM is working to formalize PED relationships with
    the Military Services and Combat Support Agencies in an attempt to
    maximize and target use of PED capacity as a DOD Intelligence
    Enterprise.
        STRATCOM is also conducting a assessment to determine overall PED
    capability and capacity across the DOD based upon a detailed analysis
    of the ISR/PED architecture. This assessment will help STRATCOM
    highlight gaps, shortfalls, or possible redundancies within the current
    system to the Services and Combat Support Agencies. The desired outcome
    is the ability to specifically identify bottlenecks and logjams to
    include any aspect from lack of bandwidth to types of linguist to
    proficiency of imagery analysts.

        2. Senator Ben Nelson. General Chilton, beyond the needs of
    CENTCOM, can you further speak to any shortfalls that you are seeing
    generally in ISR personnel and bandwidth?
        General Chilton. Recognizing that the preponderance of available
    ISR capability and capacity are engaged in the CENTCOM AOR, the recent
    earthquake in Haiti highlighted challenges the Department faces in
    satisfying ISR and PED requirements in other geographic combatant
    commands. During the Department's initial response to the humanitarian
    crisis in Haiti, Operation Unified Response (OUR), STRATCOM noted
    shortfalls related to processing, exploitation, and dissemination.
        Following the initial ISR deployments to support OUR, analysis
    revealed some limitations in our ability to establish an expeditionary
    ISR architecture during the early stages of the operation. Specific
    bandwidth and equipment issues prevented direct communication between
    ground-based personnel and airborne platforms, hampering the JTF-
    Haiti's ability to respond to problem areas. STRATCOM in coordination
    with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) developed an in-theater and
    beyond line of sight dissemination architecture for the full motion
    video capability, ensuring all collection was available to forward
    commanders. The challenges noted during this experience are not unique
    to SOUTHCOM and are applicable across multiple combatant commands.
        Airborne ISR requests for forces submitted by geographic combatant
    commands also show shortages in intelligence personnel with requisite
    language skills. As new collection systems are brought on line,
    fielding of the PED expertise to support their full employment lags
    behind. STRATCOM is partnered with the Defense Intelligence Operations
    Coordination Center to identify and where feasible mitigate
    intelligence personnel shortfalls and identify efficiencies within the
    DOD Intelligence Enterprise. STRATCOM is also working with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to help the combatant commands
    identify their key signals intelligence language requirements and help
    the military departments source the required manpower.

        3. Senator Ben Nelson. General Chilton, are these issues being
    addressed and do you have any recommendations as to how they should be
    addressed?
        General Chilton. STRATCOM and its ISR component JFCC-ISR, continues
    to take a leading role within the Department in advocating for ISR
    capabilities to address current and future warfighting requirements. As
    the military co-lead for the Battlespace Awareness Portfolio, the
    Command conducts an annual ISR-related Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF)
    to develop and prioritize needed ISR and PED attributes along with
    combatant command shortfalls and gaps for all ISR to include overhead
    systems. As an example, STRATCOM recently conducted a SWarF to develop
    a combatant command statement of urgent need for space-based ISR
    capabilities. The Command takes a global perspective and coordinates
    with the military departments, the combat support agencies, and the
    combatant commands in developing courses of action to address these
    issues. In essence, STRATCOM is the combatant commands ``voice'' to
    ensure the warfighters ISR shortfalls and gaps are addressed.
        To help to address the gap between growth in ISR requirements and
    projected ISR capabilities, STRATCOM is developing an ISR Force Sizing
    Construct to inform future ISR allocation and procurement. The
    combatant command focused ISR assessments construct and resulting ISR
    Measure of Merit is intended to give decisionmakers an analytical basis
    for a relative comparison of force mixes. The Force Sizing Construct
    will provide a scalable, tailorable, and repeatable process to
    determine regional combatant commander demands and expectations in
    order to better inform future acquisition decisions.

        4. Senator Ben Nelson. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, with
    regard to ISR personnel, can you discuss whether you are seeing
    shortfalls in ISR personnel and what is being done to address personnel
    shortfalls for analysts to process, exploit and disseminate
    intelligence?
        Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]
        General Sharp. [Deleted.]

        5. Senator Ben Nelson. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, what are
    your recommendations?
        Admiral Willard. Numbers are only part of the solution. Realizing
    the potential of our ability to process information requires changes in
    culture, policy, procedure, governance, and information technology. We
    continue to actively engage with the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence (USD(I)) and other Intelligence Community leaders to
    ensure they understand our requirements, capabilities and shortfalls.
    Additionally, we continue to work with the Services and the broader
    Intelligence Community to provide the right-sized, right-qualified,
    right-equipped ISR force.
        General Sharp. In order to compensate for military department
    intelligence billet shortfalls, United States Forces Korea is
    considering converting many more of these positions to Defense
    Intelligence Agency (DIA) civilian billets. If DIA is unable to hire
    and fill civilian billets for the Combatant Command, that payroll
    should become available to the Joint Intelligence Operations Center to
    pay for contractors or temporary duty assistance. Increase the priority
    fill for intelligence personnel working the North Korea problem at the
    operational, theater and strategic level. We ask for the committee's
    support in this effort.
        Another challenge we face is the short tour lengths for both
    civilian and military personnel assigned to the Republic of Korea
    (ROK). One and 2 year tours have a negative effect on the continuity of
    our workforce. Standard tour normalization of 3 years for personnel
    assigned to Korea will help to mitigate this problem. We ask that the
    committee support this effort as well.

                  interagency coordination cyber/intelligence
        6. Senator Ben Nelson. General Chilton, one thing that I commonly
    look for are stovepipes and whether the Services are duplicating
    efforts or truly enhancing overall mission effectiveness. Last year at
    the STRATCOM hearing, you highlighted the importance of sharing
    information among agencies, including the Department of Homeland
    Security, the Intelligence Community, and the Department of Defense
    (DOD), in addressing security risks in cyberspace. I want to ensure
    proper coordination is taking place between agencies to ensure that
    each agency is not creating its own unique defenses. If each agency
    builds their own protective walls, they will ultimately stifle
    collaboration and the ability to disseminate intelligence information
    among agencies, which has been our Achilles heel--an inability to share
    intelligence, connect the dots, and prevent future attacks. How are we
    doing at interagency coordination of cyber security and information
    exchange protocols?
        General Chilton. I believe we are making progress in improving
    interagency coordination of cyber security and information exchange
    protocols.
        Efforts to improve our interagency coordination begin with our
    continued participation in Joint Interagency Task Force-Cyber (JIATF-
    Cyber). Current member organizations of the JIATF-Cyber include the
    National Security Agency/Central Security Service, DIA, Central
    Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Joint
    Warfare Analysis Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint
    Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Joint Functional Component
    Command-Network Warfare (JFCC-NW), Joint Task Force-Global Network
    Operations (JTF-GNO), Joint Functional Component Command for Global
    Strike, Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC),
    Departments of Treasury (DOT), State (DOS), and Homeland Security and
    the combatant commands.
        As U.S. Cyber Command stands up, it will look to improve our
    coordination by transitioning JIATF-Cyber to a Joint Interagency
    Coordination Group--Cyber, a multi-functional, advisory element that
    represents civilian departments and agencies at U.S. Cyber Command and
    facilitates information sharing across the interagency and key partner
    nations.
        We intend to further coordination with the placement of liaison
    officers with the following organizations in coming year: FBI, CIA,
    DoT, DoS, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), and the
    combatant commands. Additionally, plans are developing to place LNOs
    with the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.
        U.S. Cyber Command will also leverage JTF-GNO's full-time Law
    Enforcement/Counter-intelligence (LE/CI) Center for coordinating LE/CI
    activities in support of defensive cyberspace operations. Today, DOD
    LE/CI agencies have assigned agents that support our efforts to improve
    cyber security, including Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Defense
    Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special
    Investigations, Army Criminal Investigations Command, and Army
    Intelligence and Security Command.
        Finally, we continue to work hard at sharing information on cyber
    threats among a variety of DOD and interagency partners everyday.
    Establishing the connective tissue among our partners is a significant
    challenge, but one we see as essential to deter our adversaries and
    prevent future attacks.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
                       active and reserve duty components
        7. Senator Burris. Admiral Willard, General Chilton, and General
    Sharp, do you believe you have the right mix of Active Duty and Reserve
    component presence within your command? If not, what are your
    shortfalls in capabilities or skill sets?
        Admiral Willard. Yes, we have the right mix of Active Duty and
    Reserve component presence within the PACOM command. However, as an
    Active-Duty Force we see shortfalls in Foreign Area Officers,
    intelligence professionals and those with skills sets in the areas of
    Security Cooperation, POW/MIA identification and accounting, and cyber
    active and passive defense.
        General Chilton. U.S. Strategic Command's global, operational
    missions demand several unique (often high-demand, low-density) skill
    sets. The Command continually balances mission and workforce
    requirement growth across our team through a robust and carefully
    managed total force approach. We are also dedicated to pursuing and
    advocating for expanded deterrence, space, and cyberspace professional
    development opportunities, to ensure we remain as fully capable of
    executing our missions as we are today.
        There always exists unsatisfied demands which stretch the limits of
    active duty resources, and reservists can provide the ability to
    quickly respond to address expertise or manning shortfalls until the
    operational requirement has passed. Our reserve utilization is aligned
    to STRATCOM's global mission set that draws on highly specialized
    skills encompassing subsurface, land/sea, nuclear, space, and cyber
    warfare areas.
        Since the end of the Cold War and particularly since September 11,
    2001, we have increasingly relied on the Reserve component as an
    ``operational reserve.'' In fact, STRATCOM's reserve utilization rate
    has increased substantially in the last 3 years from 48,000 man days
    per year in 2008 to a projected 85,000 in 2010. The level of Active/
    Reserve integration within this command is such that there is no
    discernable difference operationally in the workplace.
        General Sharp. National Guard and Reserve component forces provide
    greater than 60 percent of the Combat Support/Combat Service Support
    units in support of our operations plan. Successful accomplishment of
    our objectives is not possible without them. Tour normalization for our
    Active component forces should reduce ramp-up time for maneuver and
    fires units while reducing risk to training and proficiency. At the
    same time, tour normalization provides continuity, ensures theater-
    specific experience, and enhances interoperability with forces from the
    ROK.
        In spite of the steps we have taken, Combined Forces Command
    struggles with a number of personnel-related capability gaps. For
    example, the Korean Theater of Operations has endured a chronic
    shortage of trained Tactical Air Control Party and Joint Terminal
    Attack Controller (JTAC) personnel. The intense, complex training
    requirements, language skill requirements, and deployment operations
    tempo for that career field result in a capability void which we labor
    to bridge. The impact to the operations plan is a reduced ability to
    direct close air support for our forces on the forward line of our own
    troops and our forces in the rear area countering the threat posed by
    North Korean special operations forces.

                    pacific command disaster relief efforts
        8. Senator Burris. Admiral Willard, Pacific Command (PACOM) played
    a tremendous role in the humanitarian operations following the 2004
    Indian Ocean tsunami. How are you working with the other combatant
    commands, such as U.S. SOUTHCOM following the earthquakes in Haiti and
    Chile, to better prepare for natural disaster response efforts?
        Admiral Willard. It is important to note that PACOM forces respond
    to a natural disaster on the average of every 60 days. That said, PACOM
    sent a five man planning team to assist SOUTHCOM for Operation Unified
    Response within days of the event. The team became the core planning
    element and assisted in the preparation of SOUTHCOMs Strategic
    Framework and Transition Strategy, as well as performing as the conduit
    for United Nations and interagency planning. The augmentation support
    mission also provided an opportunity for PACOM and SOUTHCOM to share
    their HA/DR response plans which further prompted a greater level of
    collaboration with European Command and Africa Command.

                    illegal narcotics and human trafficking
        9. Senator Burris. Admiral Willard, the trafficking of illegal
    narcotics, humans, and arms continues to be a priority for your
    command. What is your current strategy for countering these threats?
        Admiral Willard. These kinds of transnational threats are indeed a
    priority for the PACOM. Our strategy is to work through the Interagency
    to develop ``whole-of-government'' approaches to build in the capacity
    of our regional allies and partners to counter these threats.
        The Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) is the PACOM
    Executive Agent (EA) for DOD support to counterdrug initiatives in the
    PACOM AOR. As EA, JIATF-W uses delegated authorities and funding to
    combat drug-related transnational organized crime in the Asia-Pacific
    region. JIATF-W sources capabilities from all five U.S. Military
    Services as well as the entire U.S. Intelligence Community.
        Strategic Goals:

             Support ongoing and developing LE operations to
            disrupt and dismantle drug-related transnational criminal
            organizations.
             Build partner nation capacity to combat drug-related
            transnational crime.
             Enhance and support a cooperative network of
            partnerships across Asia-Pacific to combat transnational crime.

        10. Senator Burris. Admiral Willard, how are you working with other
    combatant commands to address this concern?
        Admiral Willard. The Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W)
    participates in planning conferences hosted by other combatant commands
    counterdrug (CD) executive agents (EA). Each year we participate in the
    counterdrug and border security planning efforts of Joint Interagency
    Task Force South (JIATF-S), the CD EA for Southern Command, and Joint
    Task Force North (JTF-N), the CD EA for Northern Command.
        JIATF-W attends the DOD Combatant Command Counter-Narcoterrorism
    Conference hosted by OSD SO/LIC&IC&CN>. This is a Director level
    conference to discuss regional and national CD policy, strategy and
    programs.
        JIATF-W also coordinates and exchanges intelligence on a regular
    basis CD EA in Northern Command and Southern Command on the global
    movement of illegal drugs and drug precursors.

                              private contractors
        11. Senator Burris. General Chilton, private contractor support
    continues to receive increased scrutiny due to abuses in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Most recently, there were allegations of unauthorized
    intelligence gathering operations by contractors. Abuses by contractors
    continue to undermine our strategic efforts and bilk the taxpayers out
    of millions of dollars. How will STRATCOM provide better oversight of
    private contractors?
        General Chilton. STRATCOM/J8 has a contracts branch within its
    headquarters which monitors STRATCOM contracts and will provide better
    oversight of private contracting as outlined below. They will ensure
    contract personnel are trained to oversee their respective contracts.
    As a result of recent allegations pertaining to contracts in
    Afghanistan, J8 has implemented a process in which all intelligence
    related requirements for new contracts and modifications to existing
    contracts must be reviewed by J8 and STRATCOM's legal office. J8 has
    also implemented a second level of control by requiring a division
    chief or deputy division chief as an additional level of contract
    oversight above the trained personnel. A rigorous funding review
    process is also conducted before STRATCOM funding is approved.
    Organizations must submit a spend plan based upon an approved financial
    review by the STRATCOM Deputy Commander. Once the spend plan is
    approved by J8, funding documents are prepared and reviewed within the
    user's office and by at least two other personnel within J8. The
    contracting and funding processes work hand in hand to ensure no
    ``abuses'' occur.
        Presently, there are three ongoing investigations looking into
    allegations relating to unauthorized intelligence gathering by
    contractors. None of these investigations are complete, so it would be
    premature to form conclusions as to the facts or findings these
    investigations will reveal. However, none of these are funded with
    STRATCOM funding.

        12. Senator Burris. General Chilton, could the missions being
    fulfilled by private contractors be better handled by military
    personnel?
        General Chilton. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has implemented
    guidelines for managing functional and geographic combatant command's
    manpower baselines. He has also established business rules to govern
    the management of manpower resource relationships among the Services,
    combatant commanders, and the combatant command support agents. These
    guidelines state that once the baseline is established, permanent
    military billets will only be adjusted based on approved programmed
    changes. In light of this STRATCOM is working hard with DOD to convert
    contractor positions into civilian billets based on in-sourcing
    guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Wherever possible, we
    are converting contractor positions to civilian billets based on cost
    effectiveness and whether the work is inherently governmental. However,
    there are certain functions that should continue to be contracted
    because of specialized expertise which are not reasonably available
    within the military or civilian communities and which are not an
    inherently governmental function.

                                 cyber command
        13. Senator Burris. General Chilton, the President has stated that
    cyber security is ``one of the most serious economic and national
    security challenges we face as a Nation.'' As the new U.S. Cyber
    Command (CYBERCOM) continues to take form, what is your strategy for
    addressing the threat?
        General Chilton. As CYBERCOM stands up it will need to continue to
    change our DOD cyber culture, build capacity; increase capability; and
    strengthen partnerships to effectively address the growing threats we
    face within cyberspace.
        With respect to changing culture, CYBERCOM will work with the
    combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies to refine the way in
    which we execute our responsibilities and grow our cyber expertise.
    Through education and training, CYBERCOM will improve understanding
    among all DOD personnel that every networked computer is on the front
    line. Everyone who logs on is a cyber defender first. There are no
    `protected zones' or `rear areas'; all are equally vulnerable.
        CYBERCOM will work with the Services and their designated cyber
    components to ensure we are able to build capacity through the
    recruitment and retention of a world-class cadre of military cyber
    forces. The skills required include operators, planners, analysts and
    engineers. These cyber forces will require focused training, just like
    other forces required to operate our most sophisticated and complex
    weapons systems. Fundamental to this effort will be an ability to
    manage this diverse but vital talent, and also to promote a culture of
    creativity and innovation that will allow us to maintain our
    technological edge in the cyberspace domain.
        CYBERCOM will also increase our capability to deliver integrated
    effects in cyberspace. These effects include building a shared
    situational awareness of DOD networks; developing faster and more
    comprehensive early warning; and improving our ability to plan and
    execute dynamic defense operations. These effects will enable a
    paradigm shift in the way we defend our networks--a move from a
    reactive and passive posture to a proactive, prepared one.
        Finally, CYBERCOM will focus on strengthening critical
    partnerships. While the primary mission of U.S. Cyber Command will be
    to secure our military's classified and unclassified networks, the
    interconnected nature of these networks and the free flow of
    information across them will necessitate an active partnership between
    CYBERCOM and the other combatant commands, the Intelligence Community,
    departments and agencies across the U.S. Government, and our allies, to
    ensure that we work together to eliminate our collective
    vulnerabilities. In addition, given that the private sector controls
    the vast majority of our Nation's cyber infrastructure, a strong and
    transparent partnership between U.S. Cyber Command and private industry
    will be critical to allow for the exchange and development of new
    technologies.

        14. Senator Burris. General Chilton, how will CYBERCOM work with
    other Federal and State agencies?
        General Chilton. CYBERCOM Implementation Plan guidance directs the
    establishment of two interagency coordination bodies. One body will be
    focused on day-to-day operational planning, deconfliction and
    execution. The second body, comprised of senior leadership from the
    participating agencies, will meet periodically and review interagency
    posture, operations and plans, and offer a forum for issue resolution,
    communication facilitation, and the elevation of issues to senior U.S.
    Government leadership.
        CYBERCOM will also provide liaison officers (LNOs) to key
    interagency partners in order to facilitate information sharing and
    improve CYBERCOM's understanding of their partners' missions,
    operations, and staffs. While at their host organization, these LNOs
    will maintain routine contact with the CYBERCOM staff. Upon
    establishment, CYBERCOM will maintain the existing LNO relationships
    that are held by JFCC NW and JTF-GNO and will establish LNOs at other
    key organizations as additional resources become available.
        A Reserve component (RC) Joint Reserve Unit including elements from
    each Service component, the Army National Guard, and the Air National
    Guard, will be created at CYBERCOM. These elements will provide
    CYBERCOM staff support, coordinate and provide situational awareness,
    and ensure an understanding of unique roles and capabilities of the RC.

        15. Senator Burris. General Chilton, how will you integrate the
    National Guard and Reserve Forces into CYBERCOM?
        General Chilton. CYBERCOM will communicate and coordinate through
    the National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Coordination Center (JoCC)
    to leverage National Guard Title 32/State Active Duty cyber forces of
    the States and territories. The Army National Guard and Air National
    Guard maintain units that provide full spectrum information operations
    and cyberspace operations capabilities, including computer network
    defense, computer network exploitation, and computer network attack.
    These capabilities meet Service and combatant commander requirements
    and can be leveraged under state authorities to assist civil
    authorities in the National Guard's Homeland Security and Defense
    Support of Civil Authorities role.
        A Reserve Component Joint Reserve Unit including elements from each
    Service component, the Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard,
    will be created at CYBERCOM. These elements will provide CYBERCOM staff
    support, coordinate and provide situational awareness, and ensure an
    understanding of unique roles and capabilities of the Reserve
    component. The need for additional CYBERCOM Reserve requirements and
    structure will continue to be analyzed as the Department's
    understanding of the domain matures.

                      the strategic arms reduction treaty
        16. Senator Burris. General Chilton, Secretary of State Clinton
    said last week that the United States and Russia are on the brink of
    completing a new nonproliferation treaty. What are your biggest
    concerns with regard to nuclear security and the adoption of a new
    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement?
        General Chilton. My biggest concern is the modernization of our
    nuclear weapons infrastructure, and approval of the administration's
    request for funding that modernization. The proposed investment in the
    infrastructure will enable improved security and reliability of our
    nuclear weapons while at the same time enabling further reductions in
    our hedge requirements, once the infrastructure improvements are
    achieved.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                                missile defense
        17. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, while I am most concerned
    about Iran and North Korea and generally wary of China and Russia,
    rogue nation states and non-state actors continue to pursue nuclear
    weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. It is
    critical that the Nuclear Triad, as well as Missile Defense, remain a
    viable and effective mechanism for preventing those that mean this
    country harm from doing so. Our Trident submarines have an average age
    of 20 years old, with replacement build not starting until 2019 and
    tentatively completed by 2028. The associated D5 missiles will undergo
    modernization as well. Our nuclear stockpile will undergo life
    extension programs for the W-76 warhead and the B-61 bomb. Both pre-
    date the 1960s with variants as late as the mid-1990s. Our strategic
    bomber fleet of B52s, B1s and B2s vary in age from 10-30 years. The
    Secretary of Defense recently stated that 2020 may be the first time we
    see a new bomber. $200 million has been requested for research and
    development (R&D) of a new strategic bomber, but it is unclear what the
    administration intends to do about a replacement for the 30 year-old
    nuclear Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), a follow-on to the
    Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), and the F-35
    ``dual-capable'' aircraft. Are we assuming too much risk by only
    modernizing our fleets and limiting the R&D necessary to keep our
    qualitative edge over current and future adversaries?
        General Chilton. Efforts are underway with participation by
    STRATCOM to modernize the SSBN, Bomber, Cruise Missile, ICBM, and
    nuclear weapons. As part of our support to the NPR we developed and
    laid out our recommended capabilities in the triad. Specifically, our
    recommendations included to extend the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030
    and conduct studies now to inform decisions on a follow-on ICBM; to
    replace the Ohio-class SSBN at the existing ships' end of life; and to
    study future long-range bomber capabilities and also support moving
    forward with full-rate production for the W76-1 warhead for our
    submarine leg of the triad; full-scope (nuclear and non-nuclear) life
    extension of the B-61 bomb to sustain its strategic deterrence and
    extended deterrence role; and initiating studies to develop life
    extension options for the W78 ICBM warhead. In this latter effort, we
    should include the possibility of adapting the resulting warhead for
    sea launched ballistic missiles and thereby reducing the number of
    warhead types. This blueprint would allow us to be adequately postured
    to deter strategic threats throughout the next 20-30 years.

        18. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, do you believe that the fiscal
    year 2011 budget request adequately funds what is needed to maintain
    our deterrent and global strike capabilities?
        General Chilton. Yes, the President's budget provides adequate
    funding to address our Nation's most critical needs to maintain our
    deterrent and global strike capabilities. Specific significant budget
    decisions included $561 million transferred from DOD to the Department
    of Energy ($160 million addition for B-61 life-extension) to ensure we
    maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile, $493 million
    for the Ohio-class replacement SSBN, $130 million for ICBM mods and
    upgrades and a UH-1 helicopter replacement start, $240 million for
    required bomber upgrades and industrial base sustainment, and $33
    million for joint ballistic missile advanced fuze technologies.

        19. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, what impacts will the START
    follow-on agreement have on our deterrent and global strike
    capabilities?
        General Chilton. We were involved and consulted in the development
    of the central limits of the New START treaty. I assess this Nation and
    our allies will continue to be safe and our forces sufficiently robust.
    New START retains U.S. global strike capabilities-necessary to meet our
    strategic deterrence requirements.

        20. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, what is the plan for our
    stockpile of ALCM?
        General Chilton. The current plan is to sustain our ALCM fleet
    (warhead and missile) until 2030 or until a replacement capability can
    be fielded. The Future Strategic Standoff Weapon Initial Capabilities
    Document is scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2010. Starting in
    fiscal year 2011, the Air Force will determine the need and
    capabilities for a follow-on cruise missile through an Analysis of
    Alternatives.

                       republic of korea missile defense
        21. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, North Korea is a threat and
    their pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities should not
    be misinterpreted. Not only is North Korea pursuing their own
    capabilities but they are also selling missiles, material, and
    technology to other countries to include Iran. From the information I
    have been provided, I understand that North Korea can produce up to
    five nuclear bombs and are working on a two-stage missile that can
    range Alaska and Hawaii and a three-stage missile that could range the
    continental United States. As General Sharp outlined in his comments, a
    transition to a ROK-led defense on the Korean Peninsula, relocation and
    consolidation of U.S. forces into two areas, and the normalization of
    servicemember tours, will strengthen U.S.-ROK relations while still
    providing a strong deterrence against North Korean threats.
        With the changes you highlighted, as well as the U.S. military
    personnel cap of 28,500, is the ROK adequately supported and/or
    prepared to defend itself against a North Korean ground, air, or
    missile attack?
        General Sharp. The short answer is ``yes,'' with our ROK allies,
    our prepared defenses, and considering the U.S. forces planned to flow
    into theater, Combined Forces Command is ready to repel a North Korean
    ground, air, or maritime incursion into ROK territory. However, there
    are notable capability gaps for which we either accept or must attempt
    to further mitigate risk.
        Specifically, North Korean ballistic missiles with chemical
    warheads remain the single greatest threat to our bases and the ROK
    civilian population in general. As you pointed out, the North Korean
    missile threat continues to grow in number and capability. It demands a
    combined and joint effort to provide a robust, active, layered theater
    missile defense.
        We need the capability to engage North Korean missiles at various
    stages of flight. Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) could
    provide the Korean Theater of Operations with a midcourse interceptor
    for SCUD and NoDong threats. As an area defense weapon, THAAD is
    capable of providing a layered defense as well as coverage to assets
    currently on the CAL but not the CAL. PATRIOTS contribute a terminal
    low-altitude layer of defense against short and medium range ballistic
    missiles.
        Currently, the Korean Theater of Operations only has PATRIOT for
    on-peninsula TBM threats and AEGIS/SM-3s for shots against targets
    outside the theater (Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska). North Korea has
    more missiles than we have counter-measures. We have the technology to
    counter the threat; we need to take the steps to field a layered
    ballistic missile defense in Korea which mitigates the risk to our
    assets and personnel.

                        defense policy review initiative
        22. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, what, if any, response will we
    see from the North Koreans with the potential realignment of U.S.
    Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam and the deployment of U.S. missile
    defense capabilities to Japan, as part of the Defense Policy Review
    Initiative?
        General Sharp. North Korea likely has already begun to respond to
    the potential realignment of U.S. Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to
    Guam primarily by editorials denouncing the United States.
        The Korean People's Army (KPA) likely will not perceive a
    realignment of U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces from Okinawa to Guam as
    a significant change to the U.S. posture or threats facing it. The
    added distance will somewhat increase USMC response times to a
    potential Korean Peninsula crisis, but added response time is of little
    benefit to the KPA since ROK forces are already responsible for and
    capable of halting an initial North Korean attack. The USMC realignment
    removes some U.S. forces from North Korean TBM range--thereby reducing
    the number of strategic targets available for Pyongyang to threaten.
    Guam likely remains within range of North Korea's new long range
    theater ballistic missile. Additionally, North Korean intelligence
    operations will likely shift from Okinawa to Guam.
        North Korea has already attempted to score propaganda points about
    the USMC move from Okinawa to Guam although it has been unable to
    attract much attention to the issue. A recent Pyongyang editorial
    alleged that the U.S. is using global realignment to gain hegemony, and
    ``respond rapidly to a `contingency' on the Korean peninsula . . . ''
    \1\ North Korea will continue to protest U.S. forces' maneuvering and
    expansion of overseas bases as proof of hostile and malignant
    imperialistic intent. We expect to see editorials and pronouncements
    denouncing realignment that are read mostly by Pyongyang elites and
    international analysts--and believed by no one.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Nam CH`o'n-ung: ``What is the U.S. Forces Relocation Aimed
    At?'' DPRK Cabinet Paper on U.S. Strategy Behind Planned Relocation of
    U.S. Marines to Guam (U). Open Source Center. KPP20090324045005
    Pyongyang Minju Joson (Electronic Edition) in Korean 24 Mar 09.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        North Korea will likely also portray the USMC as an unwelcome
    `Occupying Force' that was finally expelled from Asia by the indigenous
    population (Pyongyang will likely avoid congratulating Japan or the
    Japanese directly). North Korea will attempt to use the USMC
    `expulsion' as an example to encourage `Anti-Colonialist' forces to
    expel Westerners and imperialist influence throughout Asia and
    worldwide. Pyongyang will also likely declare that the United States
    and USMC were cowed by the resolute KPA deterrence--thereby claiming
    the realignment as a North Korean victory to bolster its internal
    popular legitimacy. This particular line of propaganda reinforces North
    Korea's self-portrayal as the defender of the true ethnic/cultural
    Korean Nation from imperialist Westerners. Pyongyang will attempt to
    rebut all U.S. military statements about force posture; U.S. statements
    that it remains ready to defend allies and interests will be portrayed
    as belligerence against North Korea; and U.S. statements that it is not
    threatening the North will be dismissed as lies intended to deceive the
    KPA.

        22a. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, what, if any, response will we
    see from the North Koreans with the deployment of U.S. Missile Defense
    to Japan?
        General Sharp. North Korea will likely respond to further
    development of U.S. missile defense capabilities in Japan (which
    significantly impacts Pyongyang's strategic capabilities) by attempting
    to negate missile defense capabilities and by vociferously complaining
    about the U.S. military buildup.
        North Korea will correctly perceive regional missile defense
    capabilities as negating hard-won North Korean strategic deterrence
    (TBM, IRBM) and rendering it vulnerable to strategic coercion without
    significant recourse. Most critically, North Korea might fear the U.S.-
    ROK-Japan alliance will be emboldened to attempt a 'Regime Change'
    offensive campaign if Pyongyang loses its strategic deterrence,\2\
    particularly since the KPA conventional capabilities have atrophied
    relative to the ROK.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Ri Hyo'n-to; ``Missile Madness that Brings Fiery Clouds of
    War'' DPRK Party Organ: U.S. Missile Defense in Asia, ROK Aims at
    'Preemptive' Attack (U). Open Source Center. KPP20091007106001
    Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun (Electronic Edition) in Korean 07 Oct 09.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        North Korea will likely strive to develop countermeasures such as
    increasing numbers of missiles, changing strategic theater targets,
    developing missile defense countermeasures and asymmetric means, in
    order to circumvent, overwhelm, or defeat any missile defense system.
    Pyongyang has poured massive resources into developing its strategic
    strike capability to guarantee the regime and cannot allow that
    capability to be neutralized without adequate replacement. It is also
    likely that further development of strategic strike capability will add
    significant additional stress to the North Korean economy. Conversely,
    North Korea might view its TBMs as minimally sufficient to deter
    `Regime Change' despite a Japanese-based missile defense and continue
    to rely on its developing a nuclear ICBM rather than expend resources
    on increasing its TBM capability. In the same manner, North Korea has
    declined to modernize the aging KPA and instead shifted its defense
    responsibility to a strategic nuclear deterrent.
        North Korea will criticize the U.S. and Japan for developing/
    fielding missile defense systems that threaten the `peace' of Northeast
    Asia. Pyongyang will protest the expansion of regional U.S.
    capabilities and influence as further evidence of imperialism, and
    might attempt to mis-characterize U.S. defensive missile systems as
    having offensive strike capabilities. North Korea will likely criticize
    Japan for increasing its perceived offensive capabilities and for its
    complicity in U.S. efforts to expand its imperial influence in Asia.

                          pacific regional influencers
        23. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, are there any other viable
    influencers within the region besides China? If so, what level of
    influence do they have?
        General Sharp. As the U.S. Forces Korea Commander, I will focus on
    the part of this question as it applies to the area of Northeast Asia.
    The region of Northeast Asia is defined to include the following
    countries and special administrative regions: China, Hong Kong, Japan,
    Macau, Mongolia, North Korea, ROK, Russia, and Taiwan. As noted in my
    Posture Statement, Northeast Asia is home to 4 of the world's 6 largest
    militaries in terms of personnel, 25 percent of the world's population,
    and 5 of the world's 19 largest economies (that collectively accounted
    for 24.8 percent of global gross domestic product in 2009). Thus, when
    viewed collectively, the military, demographic, and economic power of
    the entities in Northeast Asia makes this area a major influencer in
    the Pacific region as a whole. This influence in the Pacific region is
    expected to grow over time as the countries in Northeast expand their
    economies, military power, and presence in regional diplomatic and
    political affairs as well as assume a growing role in regional
    multilateral organizations such as the Asia Development Bank.
        Within Northeast Asia, the ability of individual states--excluding
    China and its special administrative regions as specified in your
    question--to influence the Pacific region varies. As the world's third
    largest economy in 2009 when gross domestic product is measured on a
    purchasing power parity basis, Japan exerts influence in the Pacific
    region due to its trade and foreign direct investment relationships
    with nations of the area. Tokyo's political influence is moderated by
    20th century historical issues that have yet to be resolved with many
    Pacific area states. Russia has the ability to exert influence in the
    Pacific through military sales and its large stock of natural resources
    which the growing economies of Asia are eager to purchase. Due to its
    relatively small economy and military, Mongolia's ability to influence
    affairs in the Pacific is limited, although it has provided support to
    international peacekeeping operations.
        I expect that the ROK's influence in Pacific affairs will grow over
    time. The current ROK President, Lee Myung-bak, has committed his
    country to taking on a more regional and global orientation in its
    policies and actions. Indeed, creating a ``Global Korea'' is now a
    national goal. Later this year the city of Seoul will host a Group of
    20 (G20) Summit and the ROK has pledged to triple its level of official
    development assistance to a value that will equal 0.25 percent of gross
    national income in 2015. Additionally, the country has increased its
    participation in international peacekeeping operations and plans to
    form a 3,000 person military unit that can be rapidly deployed in
    support of such operations. The ROK is also a major trading partner for
    many countries in the Pacific area and a source of foreign direct
    investment as well as a provider of developmental assistance/advice for
    regional states. Seoul has also increased its role and activity in
    regional multilateral organizations and groupings. Thus, in terms of
    diplomacy, security, and the economy, I believe that the ROK is already
    exerting a degree of influence in the Pacific region and this influence
    will grow over time.
        On the flip side, North Korea exerts a negative influence in the
    Pacific region through its provocations, nuclear, missile, and
    proliferation activities. These activities inject instability and
    uncertainty into the Pacific area and create a security concern for
    regional states. Additionally, threats to security caused by North
    Korea's behavior have a dampening effect on regional economic
    development.

                            china's defense spending
        24. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, Taiwan, along with Japan and
    South Korea, continues to be one of the strongest democratic partners
    of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region and serves as a model
    of freedom and democracy. I continue to be concerned about the friction
    over Taiwan's status as a sovereign nation in the context of the
    People's Republic of China (PRC). The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
    Review highlight of the continued concern over China's missile buildup
    and increasingly advanced capabilities in the Pacific region, in
    particular the Taiwan Strait, reinforces my concerns. You have stated,
    ``it is difficult to reconcile China's developmental goals with its
    evolving military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S.
    freedom of action in the region or exercise aggression or coercion of
    its neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and partners.'' I fully
    support the recent decision to sell U.S. military weapon systems to
    Taiwan, even with the concerns voiced by China. However, I do not agree
    with the decision to not sell F-16s as part of this package. What
    effects are China's significant increases in defense spending, foreign
    military sales (FMS), and use of soft power having in the PACOM region?
        Admiral Willard. China's significant increases in defense spending,
    FMS, and use of soft power have challenged parts of the status quo and
    have the potential to challenge the relative stability at a time when
    the economic locus is shifting east. China's rapid increases in defense
    spending have focused in large measure on developing China's
    capabilities to deter Taiwan independence and eventually compel
    unification of Taiwan and mainland China. This increase in Chinese
    military capability vis-a-vis Taiwan poses a continued military threat
    to Taiwan and remains a significant obstacle to improved cross-Strait
    relations.
        China's increasing military budget and capabilities have also
    focused on power projection and area denial, both of which are of some
    concern to me at the U.S. Pacific Command. China is pursuing a variety
    of air, sea, space, and counter-space, and information warfare systems
    and operational concepts to deny other countries' military forces--most
    notably those of the U.S. access to the air and sea space near China's
    periphery. This capability could pose an increasing challenge to the
    U.S. military's ability to operate in the Western Pacific during a
    crisis. The Chinese military's focus on operating at greater distances
    from China is allowing Beijing to focus greater attention on perceived
    security issues in the East and South China Seas, and potentially in
    the Indian Ocean as well. This creates both opportunities for
    cooperation--as in the Gulf of Aden--and potential emerging challenges
    to the United States and its allies and partners as the Chinese
    military--the navy in particular--expands its area of operations.
        China's military modernization is occurring alongside a broader
    Chinese effort to build its global influence and soft power, with a
    particular focus on countries within the PACOM AOR. China's deepening
    economic relationships within the region remain its most potent levers
    of influence with its regional neighbors. One recent and salient
    example is the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which went into
    effect in January 2010. This FTA will allow China to further deepen
    economic ties to Southeast Asia--a region of considerable and growing
    importance to PACOM. This expansion of Southeast Asia trade
    relationships is occurring alongside increasing Chinese trade ties with
    the region's other major economic powers. China's economic influence is
    not limited to trade ties; China regularly uses grants, low-interest
    loans, and Chinese-financed infrastructure projects as influence-
    building tools--particularly among the developing nations of Oceania,
    Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
        China's military is a growing part of China's influence-building
    effort. China conducted several first-ever bilateral exercises in
    region over the past 3 years--including exercises with India, Mongolia,
    Thailand, and Singapore. China continues to use FMS to developing
    countries of South and Southeast Asia as means to build influence.
    While China's FMS in the PACOM AOR has been modest when compared to its
    sales to Pakistan, parts of the Middle East, and parts of sub-Saharan
    Africa, they nevertheless are significant to developing countries with
    modest defense budgets.
        China's expanding military power and growing influence in the
    region are having important effects on how countries in the region are
    viewing their own security situations as well as their relationships
    with the United States and their regional neighbors. China's neighbors
    are uneasy about China's military rise. Many have openly questioned
    China's long-term strategic intentions and called on Beijing to be more
    transparent in explaining to the region for what purpose is China so
    rapidly developing its military capabilities. Some regional countries
    are rethinking their defense strategies and procurements to hedge
    against a more assertive China. While China's neighbors are seeking
    greater diplomatic, economic, and military engagement with Beijing,
    these same countries are also continuing--for the most part--to call
    for a strong U.S. military presence in the region as a stabilizing
    force.

                           1979 taiwan relations act
        25. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, do you have any concerns
    regarding our ability to comply with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and
    how it impacts relations with China and stability in the region?
        Admiral Willard. No. For more than 30 years the United States has
    fulfilled its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. By doing so,
    we are helping to ensure stability in the Taiwan Strait, and throughout
    the region.
        General Sharp. Issues such as this related to Taiwan fall outside
    my AOR and under the purview of PACOM. Thus, I will defer to Admiral
    Willard on this question.

        26. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, where do we stand with respect
    to selling more advanced F-16 fighters to Taiwan?
        Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]
        General Sharp. Issues such as this related to Taiwan fall outside
    my AOR and under the purview of PACOM. Thus, I will defer to Admiral
    Willard on this question.

                        u.s. foreign engagement programs
        27. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, your comments that ``we cannot
    take our influence in the region for granted and that our status as the
    partner of choice is difficult to maintain given the constraints such
    as limitation of our security assistance programs'' is quite telling
    and cannot be disregarded. Our military-to-military (1206), civilian-
    to-civilian (1207), small-scale special forces (1208), Commander's
    Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Combatant Commander's Initiative
    Fund (CCIF) have been incredibly successful in aiding developing
    nations, fighting terrorism, and providing resources for emergency
    situations. I was pleased to see an increase in 1206 funding in the
    fiscal year 2011 budget . . . increasing funding from $350 million to
    $500 million. I have voiced my concern about the level of funding of
    CCIF and movement of 1207 funds to the Department of State in the
    fiscal year 2011 DOD request. It is evident in your comments that you
    believe these programs are truly beneficial, yet suffer from being Cold
    War era programs subjected to a multitude of influencers; what
    constraints or concerns would you like to emphasize to ensure we do not
    lose our influence in the region?
        Admiral Willard. I would refer you to Secretary Gates' speech to
    the Nixon Center in February where he laid out the following key
    principles that should be included in any security assistance reform
    effort:

             The programs must be flexible, and able to respond to
            emergent crisis
             There must be provisions for appropriate congressional
            oversight
             Security Assistance programs must take the long view
            toward the political crisis of the day
             The State Department's leading role in crafting U.S.
            foreign policy must be reinforced
             Capacity building programs must acknowledge that
            partnerships will always mean relinquishing some degree of
            control.

        28. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, do you have concerns over the
    fiscal year 2011 funding breakout for your engagement programs?
        Admiral Willard. Although we could always use more, I am generally
    pleased with the breakout of funding allocated to the Pacific Command
    in fiscal year 2010, and that projected for 2011. These are very
    important programs that provide an incredible return on our investment.

        29. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, can each of
    you give me an update on how these programs are doing in PACOM and in
    the ROK?
        Admiral Willard. Foreign engagement programs are the backbone of
    PACOM's success in the region. Together with other U.S. Government
    agencies, PACOM has successfully protected our territory and interests.
    Showing countries their relevance to the AOR and building their
    capacity to protect their own interests, essentially helps the United
    States in solidifying trust and protecting shared interests with
    partner nations. Additionally, utilizing the whole-of-government
    approach, in concert with the interagency, gives us the ability to
    affect all sides of the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic
    (DIME) construct. The result is that the Asia Pacific region is stable
    and secure.
        General Sharp. The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
    International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs are
    powerful engagement tools for building security partnerships with
    nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Since purview over these programs
    in Northeast Asia lies with United States Pacific Command, I will defer
    to Admiral Willard for an update on how these programs are progressing.
    I can, however, provide a brief update on the status of FMS to the ROK.
    Administered through the Joint United States Military Affairs Group
    Korea, the ROK has been a major purchaser of U.S. defense articles.
    During the years 2002 thru 2008 the ROK spent over $5.6 billion on FMS
    defense articles and another $9.6 billion on direct commercial sales of
    U.S. defense products. From 2005-2008, the ROK spent over $47 million
    on military training in the United States via the FMS program. In 2009,
    the ROK sent 648 personnel to the United States for training in 987
    different courses. Currently, the ROK has an active FMS program of
    nearly 600 active cases valued at over $12 billion. Some of the major
    items purchased through the FMS program include the F-4, F-5, F-15, and
    F-16 fighters, AWACS, P-3 patrol planes, MLRS, Patriot, SM-2, and AEGIS
    combat system. The robust FMS program with the ROK as described above
    maintains a high degree of interoperability between U.S. and ROK
    military forces and in turn enhances the deterrent and warfighting
    capabilities of Combined Forces Command.
        Separate from the programs discussed above, my Command is
    conducting a wide array of engagement events with the ROK. Contained
    within our Good Neighbor Program, a host of activities are conducted
    that engage and connect the Command with the Korean community. Good
    Neighbor Program events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with
    the mission and purpose of USFK. This direct engagement allows
    Americans and Koreans to develop mutual understanding of one another's
    cultures, customs, and lifestyles, often leading to the formation of
    lifelong friendships between members of the two communities. Examples
    of events conducted by the Good Neighbor Program include English-
    language camps, speaking engagements by U.S. military personnel, and
    tours of the Joint Security Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK
    installations. The program promotes two-way exchange between USFK
    personnel and people of our host nation. The program helps foster
    exchange, understanding, and cooperation between members of my Command
    and the Korean communities that exist along USFK facilities. In 2009
    alone, 2,043 events were conducted with the participation of over
    139,000 local nationals. All of these events strengthen the ROK-U.S.
    Alliance at both the professional and personal levels.

        30. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, with the
    movement of 1207 funding to State, do you have concerns that the State
    Department will not be able to execute 1207 as rapidly as DOD has and
    how will you ensure all these programs continue to be synchronized
    between Defense and State?
        Admiral Willard. Turning over 1207 to State should not impact the
    speed of execution. State already had the lead on the 1207 process,
    with Defense coordinating at the Country Team level. Defense
    representatives at each Embassy will continue coordination with State
    at the local level and provide feedback to the Pacific Command to
    ensure overall synchronization with broader security assistance
    engagement activities.
        General Sharp. In the Department of Defense, offices that play a
    role in management and execution of the section 1207 program are the
    Office of the Secretary Defense, Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands.
    Thus, as a sub-unified commander, I do not participate in the operation
    of this program. Additionally, to date no projects have been conducted
    with the ROK nor do I know of any 1207 project proposals that involve
    the ROK. Thus, I will defer to Admiral Willard of U.S. Pacific Command
    on this question, where several 1207 projects have been conducted with
    countries in his AOR.

                                 cyber command
        31. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, you have made significant
    gains since our last discussion over cyberspace. I am specifically
    pleased to see that you have consolidated both the JTF-GNO and the
    Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare, which I know
    was an issue. I understand that Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, the
    current Director of the National Security Agency, is still pending
    nomination approval for Commander, CYBERCOM. What issues are you facing
    with the stand up of CYBERCOM?
        General Chilton. Our primary concern is hiring the skilled
    workforce required for the cyberspace mission. The Department has
    placed a very high emphasis on training programs and we are working
    with the Services to ensure that standardized curriculums are in place.
    These programs are intense and require some of the greatest time
    commitments of any in the Department. We have increased the throughput
    of students at the school house to help solve this problem, but it will
    take some time to generate the capacity required. We continue to work
    on technical solutions to take advantage of the speed of maneuver
    required for cyberspace operations. Additionally, we need to improve
    the defensibility of our military networks as they exist today, to
    include building a shared situational awareness of DOD networks;
    developing faster and more comprehensive early warning on impending
    intrusions into our networks; and improving our ability to implement,
    plan and execute dynamic network defense operations.
        Moreover, we will need to focus on increasing our capability to
    deliver integrated cyber effects in support of combatant commander, to
    include developing an agile, transparent, and responsive cyberspace
    requirements process.
        Simultaneously, we must mature the command, building the staff,
    while working closely with the military departments and their
    designated cyber components to ensure that we are able to retain a
    world-class cadre of military cyber forces that we have trained and
    developed.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                         chinese military modernization
        32. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Willard, you comment in your written
    statement that ``China continues to develop weapons systems,
    technologies and concepts of operation that support anti-access and
    area denial strategies in the Western Pacific by holding air and
    maritime forces at risk at extended distances from the PRC coastline.''
    From a tactical air and long-range bomber perspective, how confident
    are you that, if required, you will have the assets you need as a
    combatant commander to prevail in the event of a conflict?
        Admiral Willard. In the short term, I believe that U.S. forces have
    the ability to prevail in the event of a conflict in the PACOM AOR.
    However, we need to monitor carefully China's developing ability to
    execute anti-access and area denial strategies and develop mitigating
    approaches. The developing Air-Sea Battle Concept is one such
    mitigation, and will need to be evaluated and, when mature,
    implemented. In the longer run, other mitigations for such strategies
    may need to be developed and acquired, including a new generation of
    aerial refueling aircraft and long-range strike systems.

        33. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Willard, where do you see risks for
    the United States in this area?
        Admiral Willard. I think we see some risk in the development of
    anti-access and area denial capabilities that may come from China's
    military modernization. Additionally, there may be some risk for the
    United States in the potential shift in the regional balance of power
    and increased competition over energy resources that could result from
    a rapid increase in Chinese military strength. I also think that the
    development of mitigating strategies and capabilities along with
    continued cooperation with regional allies and partners and engagement
    with China are vital to approaching these risks.

        34. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Willard, thinking 5 to 10 years down
    the road and based on the trajectories of currently planned U.S. force
    development and projected Chinese force development, what is your
    assessment of the risks for the United States in that timeframe.
        Admiral Willard. Given the current rate of China's military
    modernization in the areas of naval, air, missile, and space, China
    will develop a substantial power projection capability out to 300
    nautical miles from its shores by 2015. They will have the ability to
    rival U.S. military force presence in the Western Pacific. By 2020,
    Chinese capabilities will likely expand to directly challenge U.S.
    military force presence in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea.
    U.S. military forces have been in the Western Pacific since the end of
    the Second World War. Through the decades those forces have acted as a
    guarantor of security not only for U.S. interests, but for the entire
    region. A shift in the balance of power in East Asia due to the growth
    of Chinese military strength could risk a loss of confidence in U.S.
    security from regional U.S. partners and allies. This could result in
    regional powers hedging against China by building their own domestic
    military capabilities, making compromises with China over a range of
    issues, and potentially engaging in regional conflicts over vital
    energy resources.

                         pacific regional relationships
        35. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Willard, your AOR is huge both in
    terms of area and population. As you look 20 and 30 years down the
    road, are there places within the PACOM AOR where the U.S. needs to be
    thinking about establishing closer relationships, perhaps to include
    basing rights, to ensure we can provide the kind of security and
    stability in the coming decades as we provide today?
        Admiral Willard. As you look out 20-30 years in the future, U.S.
    interests in South Asia will only increase. In fact, the importance of
    the Indian Ocean Region to global stability and economic revitalization
    has increased considerably over the past decade. India is crucial to
    maintaining stability and growth in the region. Our relationship with
    India continues to mature and it is important we work to sustain this.
    Working with India, there is an opportunity for the U.S. to play a
    vital role in establishing more robust and proactive regional
    cooperation with other South Asia partners, like Bangladesh, Nepal, the
    Maldives, and Sri Lanka, to root out violent extremism and their safe
    havens and to establish the infrastructure that provides the capability
    and capacity for these partners to respond effectively to provide
    humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in response to the many
    natural disasters that plague this region. In concert with CENTCOM,
    this regional cooperation needs to extend to Pakistan in order to
    foster the economic stability and then growth that will benefit all the
    countries in the region. The situation in each country is unique and
    pursuing basing rights will not necessarily facilitate closer
    relationships. But it will be necessary to assess what infrastructure
    and support is necessary for the capabilities and cooperation required
    to achieve true regional cooperation in which the U.S. is viewed as a
    viable partner.
        Southeast Asia is another critical region. Leaders in Association
    of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states have expressed a general
    agreement that a U.S. forward presence is essential to regional
    stability in view of a myriad of transnational security threats and the
    rise of China. In this context major Southeast Asia states--Indonesia,
    Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam--are seeking
    opportunities to expand bilateral, as well as multilateral engagement
    with the U.S. in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster
    relief, maritime security and countering violent extremism. Long-term
    stability in the Asia-Pacific region will be directly dependent on the
    near-term success of the United States in building the needed
    relationships with major ASEAN states to become the enduring partner-
    of-choice.

        36. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Willard, what do we need to be doing
    as a Nation now to lay the ground work for those relationships?
        Admiral Willard. The situation in each country is unique, but
    utilizing consistent messaging across the spectrum of civilian and
    military leadership, the media, and think tanks, we want to emphasize
    direct benefits to the individual country, vice stressing mutual
    benefits. This approach, along with continued patient and persistent
    engagement, will help the Nation lay the ground work for expanding and
    strengthening relationships.
        Vital tools for U.S. efforts in building allied and partner nation
    capacity include Exercise Related Construction, the Asia-Pacific
    Regional Initiative, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, IMET,
    and the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) 1206 and 1207.
    Increasing the funding and reliability of these programs will
    facilitate whole-of-government and multilateral relationships for U.S.
    access for needed training and operations. As a Nation,
    institutionalizing these key programs, and others like it, will be
    viewed as a commitment to U.S. presence in the region.

                              u.s. missile defense
        37. Senator Chambliss. General Chilton, in your written statement
    you comment that ``with the exception of the U.S., all nuclear weapon
    states continue to modernize their nuclear weapon stockpiles and in
    some cases grow them further.'' In your view, what risks is the United
    States accepting by not modernizing our nuclear weapon stockpiles and
    what specific actions do you recommend in this regard?
        General Chilton. The Nuclear Posture Review calls for sustained
    interagency and bipartisan efforts to address the risks associated with
    an aging stockpile and changes in the international security
    environment. PB11 begins the process to reduce these risks, as it
    supports: (1) Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons enterprise
    infrastructure--physical and human capital, (2) Timely warhead life
    extension programs that explore the full range of life extension
    options, and (3) Robust stockpile assessment and surveillance programs.
    These actions will ensure the United States sustains a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear arsenal.

        38. Senator Chambliss. General Chilton, regarding prompt global
    strike, what are the specific barriers to pursuing this non-nuclear
    strike capability and, in your view, what is a feasible timeline for
    developing this capability that will--as you say--``provide the
    President a broader range of non-nuclear options to address emerging
    threats rapidly''?
        General Chilton. There are no specific barriers in the pursuit of
    this capability; however the Department is utilizing an event based
    acquisitions approach that focuses on maturing critical technologies
    before executing Service-led Conventional Prompt Global Strike
    acquisition programs. Under USD AT&L leadership, the Department is
    making progress in efforts to mature important hypersonic strike
    technologies, which include: thermal protection structures, advanced
    materials, communications, flight controls, navigation and guidance and
    autonomous flight safety system.
        Planned flight experiments in fiscal year 2011 will provide the
    Department quantitative data regarding the maturity of technologies
    which will inform future potential timelines.

        39. Senator Chambliss. General Chilton, in your written statement
    you refer to the Administration's Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
    defense which seeks to address what are judged to be the most urgent
    threats first with proven, cost-effective platforms. There has not been
    universal acceptance in Congress of this approach. Any approach accepts
    a certain amount of risk. Could you offer your assessment of what risks
    the current Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense may accept and
    the extent to which you believe accepting risk in these areas is wise
    and warranted?
        General Chilton. As stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review,
    it is inherently difficult to predict the nature of the threat our
    Nation will face in the years to come; however, it is a fact that the
    threat from ballistic missiles--of all ranges--will continue to grow.
    The Phased Adaptive Approach should allow us to tailor our capabilities
    and associated architectures in response to the threat, and as such,
    allow us to manage technological challenges we may encounter during
    development, deployment or in operations. The National Intelligence
    Estimate has characterized short-range ballistic missiles as the most
    immediate threat to our deployed forces, Allies and friends. To
    adequately equip our missile defense forces to meet this threat, Joint
    Staff J8 has initiated a Joint Capability Mix (JCM) study to examine
    sufficiency needed to counter the threat. Additionally, STRATCOM and
    MDA conduct an annual review of capabilities being fielded versus the
    assessed threats. These reviews ensure the warfighter view of the
    threat and missile defense capabilities are presented to the OSD staff
    and OSD leadership. As the Phased Adaptive Approach is fielded missile
    defense will be flexible to meet the threat. To enhance regional
    defense of our deployed forces, Allies and friends, PB11 requests
    funding for MDA and Navy to add 10 AEGIS BMD ships between fiscal year
    2010-2012 and funds the purchase of 436 SM-3 interceptors by fiscal
    year 2015. Additionally, PB11 funds 9 THAAD batteries and 431 THAAD
    interceptors by fiscal year 2015.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
                         long-range strike capabilities
        40. Senator Thune. Admiral Willard, you note in your prepared
    testimony that ``elements of China's military modernization appear
    designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region'' and that
    ``China continues to develop weapons systems, technologies and concepts
    of operation that support anti-access and area denial strategies in the
    Western Pacific by holding air and maritime forces at risk at extended
    distances from the PRC coastline.'' As the combatant commander
    responsible for the Pacific theater, how important is it to you that
    the Air Force develops a new long-range bomber that is capable of
    penetrating these anti-access and area denial systems and technologies?
        Admiral Willard. My primary interest is ensuring that U.S. forces
    in PACOM have adequate freedom of action to ensure their ability to
    accomplish assigned missions, including in anti-access and area denial
    environments. Long-range strike capabilities are an important part of
    ensuring U.S. freedom of action. In addition to penetrating bombers,
    there are several other approaches to conducting long-range strike. A
    family-of-systems approach may be the most cost-effective to attaining
    the capabilities that are needed.

        41. Senator Thune. General Chilton, how important is it to you as
    the head of STRATCOM that the Air Force develops a new long range
    bomber that is capable of penetrating these anti-access and area denial
    systems and technologies?
        General Chilton. As we sustain and modernize the nuclear triad, our
    Nation will continue to require a nuclear-capable bomber leg's inherent
    flexibility to address a variety of possible adversaries and
    threatening contingencies. We are working with the Office of Secretary
    of Defense's Long-Range Strike study to identify requirements for the
    next long-range bomber that will meet combatant commander's needs and
    ensure no gap in capabilities.

        42. Senator Thune. General Chilton, you note in your prepared
    testimony that you are working with the Air Force to ``identify
    requirements for the next manned, nuclear-capable long range strike
    platform.'' My understanding had been that no decision had been made
    yet as to whether the next long range strike platform would be manned
    and whether it would be nuclear capable. Is it now set in stone that
    the new bomber will be manned and nuclear capable?
        General Chilton. No decision on the platform characteristics has
    been made. STRATCOM is participating in the Secretary of Defense's Long
    Range Strike Study, to identify and assess necessary capabilities and
    attributes for the new bomber. We anticipate the new study will be
    completed in time to inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012
    budget submission.

        43. Senator Thune. General Chilton, when was that decision made?
        General Chilton. No decision on the platform characteristics has
    been made. STRATCOM is participating in the Secretary of Defense's Long
    Range Strike Study, to identify and assess necessary capabilities and
    attributes for the new bomber. We anticipate the new study will be
    completed in time to inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012
    budget submission.

        44. Senator Thune. General Chilton, the new Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR) report states that Secretary Gates has ordered a follow-on
    study with regard to expanding long range strike capabilities. Have you
    been involved at all with this new study, and if so, can you provide an
    update on the progress of this study to date?
        General Chilton. STRATCOM has been involved from the very beginning
    of this study. I am a member of the Senior Working Group providing
    oversight and my staff is directly integrated into the study effort. We
    are working to fully understand how potential long-range strike options
    and supporting capabilities contribute to our Nation's security goals.
    We anticipate the new study will be completed in time to inform
    decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012 budget submission.

        45. Senator Thune. General Chilton, when do you expect this study
    to be completed?
        General Chilton. We anticipate the new study will be completed in
    time to inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012 budget
    submission

        46. Senator Thune. General Chilton, to the best of your knowledge,
    how many studies have been conducted by the Pentagon with regard to
    developing a follow-on long range strike platform?
        General Chilton. During my tenure at STRATCOM since the fall of
    2007, there have been a number of Service and OSD(AT&L)-led studies of
    required capabilities for long-range air-delivered strike. Significant
    studies include: The Air Force Bomber Force Structure study (May 2008),
    QDR Tiger Team (November 2009), and the ongoing Secretary of Defense
    directed Long Range Strike study.

                             air-sea battle concept
        47. Senator Thune. Admiral Willard, I wanted to get your views on
    the development of an Air-Sea Battle concept that is currently under
    way in the Pentagon. The new QDR directs the Navy and the Air Force to
    develop a new joint Air-Sea Battle concept for defeating adversaries
    with anti-access and area denial capabilities, which in turn will help
    guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power
    projection operations. As you know, anti-access and area denial systems
    are being aggressively pursued by nations in your AOR. Could you
    provide your views on how this new concept will affect the way you
    currently operate and the way you will operate in the future?
        Admiral Willard. I am very interested in any concept that helps
    preserve and extend freedom of action in the PACOM AOR, especially in a
    contested environment, should that occur. The Air-Sea Battle concept is
    one of those. My staff continues to monitor the work of the joint Navy-
    Air Force Air-Sea Battle study group. This work will help the PACOM
    staff identify where unaddressed capability gaps exist, especially in
    countering anti-access/area denial strategies. These gaps may require
    development and acquisition of additional capabilities.

        48. Senator Thune. Admiral Willard, where does PACOM fit into the
    overall development, evaluation, and implementation of this concept?
        Admiral Willard. Development of the Air-Sea battle concept is being
    performed by a joint Navy-Air Force study team. The PACOM Staff is
    monitoring its development with great interest, and we look forward to
    the study team's report. Along with the other combatant commands, we
    expect to be active in evaluation of the study team's recommendations
    and in its implementation when it achieves an appropriate level of
    maturity.

        49. Senator Thune. Admiral Willard, in your view, how will long-
    range strike capabilities fit into this new Air-Sea battle concept?
        Admiral Willard. Long-range strike capabilities contribute to the
    Air-Sea battle concept by helping to eliminate or limit the
    effectiveness of adversary anti-access and area denial capabilities,
    whether they are land- or sea-based.

        50. Senator Thune. General Chilton, have you been involved at all
    with the development of this new Air-Sea battle concept? If so, could
    you provide your views and activities in developing this new concept?
        General Chilton. I and my staff are aware of this effort but to
    date have not materially participated.

                                follow-on start
        51. Senator Thune. General Chilton, the START follow-on agreement
    will include a ceiling on operationally deployed nuclear delivery
    vehicles of 700. What are the implications for each leg of the nuclear
    triad under these limitations?
        General Chilton. While decisions on the planned force have yet to
    be finalized, the force structure flexibility within New START ensures
    the continued viability of all legs of the triad to meet strategic
    deterrent requirements. We are progressing as quickly as possible to
    provide the New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure
    Plans as directed by Section 1251 of the NDAA of 2010 to Congress.

        52. Senator Thune. General Chilton, according to the testimony of
    Admiral Mullen before this committee earlier this year, there is
    currently consideration for a reduction in the number of overall
    bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty. I assume this means
    that the START follow-on treaty is likely to result in a reduction of
    deployed strategic bombers. How do you believe these reductions would
    be apportioned between the B-52 and B-2, and at what level of reduction
    do you become nervous about the viability of the bomber leg of the
    triad?
        General Chilton. The START follow-on treaty did not require a
    specific reduction to either the B-2 or B-52. NPR guidance was to
    retain both bombers and convert some B-52H, to a conventional only
    role. The conversion of a portion of the B-52 force to conventional
    only will allow the Air Force to retain sufficient dual-capable B-52s
    to support conventional requirements, and provide extended deterrence
    to our allies, deter our adversaries, and maintain a hedge against
    future uncertainty. Force structure flexibility within New START
    enables the enduring viability of all legs of the triad and will
    preserve our current global strike capabilities. We are progressing as
    quickly as possible to provide the New START Treaty Framework and
    Nuclear Force Structure Plans as directed by section 1251 of the NDAA
    of 2010 to Congress.

                                 airborne laser
        53. Senator Thune. General Chilton, on February 11 of this year,
    the MDA completed a successful destruction of a threat representative
    missile in its boost phase using a high energy laser beam from the
    Airborne Laser aircraft. This is a remarkable accomplishment. What are
    your views of this successful test of the Airborne Laser program, and
    do you think it marks the beginning of a revolution in military
    affairs?
        General Chilton. The recent feasibility tests of the Airborne Laser
    Test Bed--that being, successful detection, tracking, and engagement of
    boosting threat-representative missiles--highlight the important work
    accomplished by MDA in the directed energy arena to this point. These
    tests are also illustrative of potential new capabilities that further
    development of this technology could provide to combatant commanders.
        Directed energy technology holds promise for boost-phase intercept
    and handling increasing raid sizes, and could contribute to an
    offsetting strategy for missile vs. missile which is cost imposing on
    adversaries. STRATCOM supports the continued research and development
    of directed energy projects, although the actual technology development
    is not a combatant command responsibility.
        U.S. Strategic Command fully supports the Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA) and Director of Defense Research and Engineering as they begin
    over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to build on Airborne Laser
    Test Bed lessons and research and test operationally viable and
    affordable directed energy concepts and platforms.

        54. Senator Thune. General Chilton, what are your views about how
    this program should move forward?
        General Chilton. STRATCOM supports the continued research and
    development of directed energy projects, although the actual technology
    development is not a combatant command responsibility.
        STRATCOM fully supports the MDA and Director of Defense Research
    and Engineering as they begin over the FYDP to build on Airborne Laser
    Test Bed lessons and research and test operationally viable and
    affordable directed energy concepts and platforms.

        55. Senator Thune. General Chilton, should we be aggressively
    leveraging this new technology?
        General Chilton. Yes. The recent feasibility tests of the Airborne
    Laser Test Bed--that being, successful detection, tracking, and
    engagement of boosting threat-representative missiles--highlight the
    incredible work accomplished in the directed energy arena to this
    point, and portend the revolutionary capabilities further development
    of this technology could provide.
        Directed energy technology holds promise for boost-phase intercept
    and for handling of increased raid size, and offers an offsetting
    strategy for missile vs. missile which is cost imposing. STRATCOM
    supports the continued research and development of directed energy
    projects, although the actual technology development is not a combatant
    command responsibility.

        56. Senator Thune. General Sharp, in light of the successful test
    of the Airborne Laser in shooting down a boosting missile, do you view
    its continued development as important to our future ability to defend
    the Korean theater?
        General Sharp. I believe key technological advances such as the
    Airborne Laser's ability to defeat Theater Ballistic Missiles are
    uniquely suited for our Area of Operation. With the tremendous
    accomplishments the Airborne Laser has enjoyed in the last year, I feel
    that we need to continue to build upon this capability so that it is
    more reliable, less operationally constrictive and more responsive in
    nature based on conditions of limited warning.

        [Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, McCain,
    Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Wicker, and LeMieux.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff member present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member;
    and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jennifer R.
    Knowles, and Breon N. Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed;
    Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant
    to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator
    Bayh; Marta McLellan Ross and Gordon I. Peterson, assistants to
    Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill;
    Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena,
    assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to
    Senator Begich; Anthony J. Lazarski and Rob Soofer, assistants
    to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants
    to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
    Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine
    Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant
    to Senator LeMieux; and Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets today to consider the ballistic missile defense (BMD)
    policies and programs accompanying the President's budget
    request for fiscal year 2011. We're pleased to have four
    distinguished witnesses with us today to consider these
    matters. Dr. Jim Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy, has been deeply involved in all facets of
    the administration's missile defense policy consideration and
    their efforts. This includes the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)
    to missile defense in Europe announced by the President last
    September, as well as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), and the recently
    released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
        Dr. Michael Gilmore is the Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation (DOT&E) at the Department of Defense (DOD). His
    office plays a crucial role in the Nation's ability to have
    confidence that our weapons systems work as intended, and this
    committee has sponsored many improvements in the DOT&E ability
    to assess the capabilities and testing of our missile defense
    systems. He has recently submitted to Congress a number of
    reports related to missile defense and his organization has
    been instrumental in the development of the new missile defense
    integrated master test plan (IMTP).
        Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly is the Director of the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which is charged with designing,
    developing, and producing all the elements of the BMD system
    and ensuring that they work together effectively in an
    integrated fashion to defend our Homeland and our forward-
    deployed forces, our allies, and our partners. We will be
    interested to hear how the $8.4 billion budget request for the
    MDA supports the policies and strategies presented in the BMDR.
        Rear Admiral Archer Macy is the Director of the Joint
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) of the
    Joint Staff. His organization works with the combatant
    commanders to ensure that our missile defense programs are
    meeting their needs and to consider future needs for our
    missile defense capabilities. For example, several years ago
    his organization conducted an important analysis of our
    combatant commanders' upper tier missile defense needs as
    compared to the threats facing them. This study, called the
    Joint Capabilities Mix Study, concluded that we needed to buy
    at least twice as many Standard Missile 3 and Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors as planned to meet
    the warfighters' needs and that is what this administration
    plans on doing.
        We thank our witnesses for their service, their numerous
    contributions to the security of our Nation, including
    improving our missile defense policy and programs.
        The past year has been a busy one for missile defense. Last
    April, Secretary Gates announced a number of significant
    changes to our missile defense approach and programs, including
    the termination of a number of troubled programs and an
    increased focus on our regional missile defense. In September
    President Obama announced a new PAA to missile defense in
    Europe, which was unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates
    and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        This February, along with the budget request, the
    administration submitted the QDR and the BMDR. The latter was
    born in this committee. Just a few weeks ago, the
    administration submitted the NPR, which was also initiated by
    this committee.
        I want to commend the administration and our witnesses
    today for their thoughtful and thorough approach to these
    missile defense matters. I think there are a number of
    significant improvements in missile defense that are consistent
    with this committee's recommendations and they deserve strong
    bipartisan support. First, much greater emphasis on meeting the
    needs of the combatant commanders and in providing the
    capabilities to defend our forward-deployed forces, our allies,
    and partners against existing short- and medium-range missile
    threats from nations like North Korea and Iran. This focus is
    embodied in the PAA that is being used for Europe and other
    regions. In this regard, the good news, which sometimes seems
    overlooked, is that we are ahead of the threat in defending our
    Homeland. We already have a missile defense system in place for
    the United States, whereas those nations have not deployed
    long-range missiles that could reach our shores, and our system
    is being improved and will be supplemented by elements of the
    PAA in Europe.
        Second, the administration has adopted a policy of
    requiring realistic testing and operational testing to
    demonstrate that our missile defense systems work before we
    deploy them. This ``fly-before-you-buy'' approach is long
    overdue and brings missile defense into line with all of our
    other major defense acquisition programs. The new missile
    defense test plan reflects and supports this new policy and is
    a significant improvement.
        Third, the management and oversight of the MDA's programs
    has been strengthened through the Missile Defense Executive
    Board and by making the MDA programs consistent with the
    Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. The
    administration's focus on fiscally sustainable missile defense
    is both realistic and essential.
        Fourth, the emphasis on international efforts and
    cooperation should help strengthen regional security against
    missile threats from nations like Iran and North Korea. This
    includes our work with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO) on missile defense in Europe and with regional allies
    and partners in the Middle East and East Asia. In this context,
    I would highlight the possibility of missile defense
    cooperation with Russia. U.S.-Russia cooperation against Iran
    would send a powerful signal to Iran of the unity of the world
    against their threatening policies and programs. We have an
    important opportunity to improve our security through
    cooperation and I look forward to hearing about that potential
    from our witnesses.
        On a final note concerning the New Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty (START), the administration said from the beginning of
    the negotiations that the treaty does not limit missile
    defenses, the treaty is about reductions of strategic nuclear
    arms, and I hope our witnesses will comment on that.
        Before recognizing our witnesses, let me call on Senator
    McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
    welcoming our witnesses.
        Over the past year our national policy on missile defense
    has been substantially revised. I believed, and said so at the
    time, that this administration got off on the wrong foot with
    its plans for missile defense, undermining two NATO allies who
    had much at stake in our previous deployment of these
    capabilities in Europe. But with the BMDR and with an increased
    level of funding for missile defense in the fiscal year 2011
    budget request, the administration appears to have embraced
    missile defense. Their proposal to establish a layered global
    missile defense architecture seems to be scaleable and flexible
    enough to address the threats of today and prepare for those of
    tomorrow. By rapidly pursuing the PAA, while also providing
    much-needed modernization, sustainment, and development funding
    for legacy systems, such as our Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD) System, this budget represents a seriousness on missile
    defense from this administration.
        Nonetheless, given their abrupt actions in the past, the
    administration must make a long-term commitment to missile
    defense and honor all of the long-term goals established within
    their BMDR, especially the development of the SM-3 Block II-B
    interceptor, which will provide additional defense to the
    Homeland.
        In the event that the proposed development and deployment
    of later generations of the SM-3 interceptor are not achieved
    within the planned 2018-to-2020 timeframe, it's imperative that
    the administration fully support and fund the development of
    the two-stage ground-based interceptor (GBI) as a technological
    hedge.
        The management of the MDA appears to be turning a corner,
    as recently highlighted by the Government Accountability
    Office. Still, there's more to be done, including the
    establishment of key baselines across all programs and
    addressing both inadequate quality control and substandard
    contractor performance. Poor contractor performance has long
    plagued many of the Department's multi-billion dollar
    acquisition programs, and I'm encouraged by the steps the MDA
    is undertaking to withhold profits from contractors responsible
    for unacceptable, poor, or substandard performance.
        To illustrate this point, the failed THAAD test in December
    is indicative of the financial and operational consequences
    that can result from one contractor's carelessness. This
    critical test, one of the last necessary to certify the
    operational capability of this important missile defense
    system, required hundreds of hours to coordinate and over $50
    million to field. However, the test was rendered useless when
    the air-launched target, as a result of blatant contractor
    error, failed to ignite, fell from the back of a C-17, and sank
    to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean.
        For far too long, contractors have attempted to cut corners
    on quality control at an increased cost to the taxpayer. This
    is simply unacceptable, and I look forward to hearing what more
    you are doing to ensure that all future contracts are
    structured to demand both accountability and performance.
        Missile defense is a key national security priority and its
    importance will only grow as we take responsible steps to
    reduce our nuclear arsenal. While the New START has not
    officially been transmitted to the Senate, Secretary Gates has
    affirmed that this treaty will not ``limit plans to protect the
    United States and our allies by improving and deploying missile
    defense systems.'' Nonetheless, I'm concerned that the treaty
    may establish a low threshold for Russia to withdraw, citing
    future U.S. missile defense deployments as the rationale.
    Unilateral Russian statements to this effect are troubling.
    Missile defense is not and should not be viewed in Moscow as
    some new form of post-Cold War aggression. It is, rather, a
    reasonable and prudent response to the very real threats that
    the Iranian and North Korean regimes pose to the United States,
    our friends, and our allies.
        In the coming months we will have the opportunity to assess
    the treaty and confirm that nothing inhibits our ability to
    deploy defensive weapons to counter the missile threats of
    rogue states. Russia must not have veto power over U.S.
    decisions on our missile defense architecture and I will reject
    any attempts by this administration, or any future
    administration, to do so.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for
    their hard work.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Let us start with Secretary Miller.

       STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
                    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

        Dr. Miller. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today. It is a pleasure to join my colleagues here on
    the panel.
        In February, as the chairman noted, DOD published the
    report of the first-ever BMDR. In requiring that DOD conduct
    this review, Congress stipulated that we started with an
    updated threat assessment. The ballistic missile threat today
    is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively and is
    likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Several
    states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and-or biological
    warheads for their missiles.
        The threat to the U.S. Homeland from states like North
    Korea and Iran continues to develop. Neither has yet acquired
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the
    United States, but both are working to acquire and/or develop
    long-range ballistic missile capabilities, including space
    launch vehicles which include many of the necessary
    technologies.
        The threat from short- and medium-range missiles has
    developed rapidly over the past decade. Both Iran and North
    Korea present a significant regional missile threat. These
    conclusions of the BMDR have been reinforced by a report
    submitted recently by DOD on the military power of Iran. This
    report notes that Iran is continuing to improve its missile
    capabilities and it is also ``at a minimum, keeping open the
    option to develop nuclear weapons if it chooses to do so.''
        Based on this threat assessment, the BMDR set six policy
    priorities for U.S. missile defense: First, the United States
    will continue to defend the Homeland against the threat of
    limited ballistic missile attack. The top priority for U.S.
    missile defense efforts is to defend the United States from the
    threat of missile attack by regional actors such as North Korea
    or Iran. The United States does not intend for missile defenses
    to affect the strategic balance with Russia or China. Through
    our missile defense programs, the United States seeks to
    dissuade states such as North Korea or Iran from developing an
    ICBM and, failing this, to deter them from using it or, if
    necessary, to defeat their attacks.
        The second policy priority is that the United States will
    defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces while
    protecting our allies and partners and helping to enable them
    to protect themselves. As was noted in September 2009, based on
    the unanimous advice of the civilian and military leadership of
    DOD, the President endorsed a new PAA for missile defense in
    Europe. Since then we have concluded agreements with Romania
    and Poland to host the two planned land-based sites for BMD
    interceptors in 2015 and 2018 respectively and, more broadly,
    we have worked closely with our NATO allies on the way ahead
    for the alliance on missile defense.
        The BMDR concluded that the United States should pursue a
    PAA not only in Europe, but also in other regions, particularly
    Northeast Asia and the Middle East, and that this approach will
    be tailored to the threats appropriate to those regions.
        The third policy priority stipulated by the BMDR was that
    before new capabilities are developed they must undergo testing
    that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions.
    As the chairman noted, we believe in ``fly before you buy.''
    Flight testing under realistic operational conditions is needed
    to provide proven capabilities for the defense of the Nation
    and of our warfighters, and our other witnesses, including Dr.
    Gilmore, will have more to say about that.
        The fourth policy priority was that the commitment to new
    capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term.
    Our investments in BMD, as in other areas, must be managed to
    ensure that there are sound capability improvements at
    reasonable cost and in overall balance with other defense
    priorities.
        The fifth policy priority is that the U.S. BMD capabilities
    must be flexible enough to adapt as the threat changes. Our BMD
    program is building systems that are mobile and modular to
    ensure that we can quickly reinforce capabilities in a given
    region and also so that we can successfully adapt capabilities
    as the threat evolves. We're also taking a number of steps to
    hedge against potential increases in the threat, including, for
    example, completing Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK. This
    will provide the ability to rapidly deploy eight additional
    GBIs if needed.
        Sixth and finally, the United States will lead expanded
    international efforts for missile defense. We are working with
    allies and partners to strengthen deterrence and build regional
    security architectures through improved missile defenses and
    through other measures, and my full statement includes many
    relevant details. These cooperative efforts are essential to
    the credibility of extended deterrence and reassurance of our
    allies and partners.
        In sum, the BMDR comprehensively considered U.S. missile
    defense policies, strategies, plans, and programs in the
    context of current and emerging ballistic missile threats to
    the U.S. Homeland, to our deployed forces, and to our allies
    and partners. It resulted in a $700 million increase in our BMD
    funding request for fiscal year 2011 over 2010, and we believe
    that it provides a clear and sensible path forward for U.S.
    missile defenses.
        Before closing, I'd like to offer brief comments on the New
    START and U.S. missile defenses. As General O'Reilly's
    statement makes clear, the New START does not constrain the
    United States from deploying the most effective missile
    defenses possible, nor does it increase cost or add
    inconvenience. Senator McCain commented on the Russian
    unilateral statement on missile defense associated with the New
    START and I ask to submit it for the record along with the
    related U.S. unilateral statement.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Dr. Miller. Thank you.
        I want to note here that these statements are not part of
    the treaty, obviously. That's why they're called ``unilateral
    statements.'' They're not unilaterally binding. But they do
    provide some insight into Russian and U.S. thinking. I'll take
    just a moment to speak to that.
        The Russian unilateral statement suggests that Russia would
    consider withdrawing from the New START if there is ``a buildup
    in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States
    of America such that it would give rise to a threat to the
    strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation.''
    That is not the case today, nor do we expect it to be the case
    in the future.
        In fact, both sides would have the right to withdraw from a
    New START if they deemed it necessary for their supreme
    national interest. The previous START and most other arms
    control agreements have similar provisions.
        The U.S. unilateral statement notes that, as we stated in
    the BMDR, U.S. missile defenses are not intended to affect the
    strategic balance with Russia. It then says quite directly and
    quite accurately that ``the United States intends to continue
    improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to
    defend itself against limited attack and as part of our
    collaborative approach to strengthen stability in key
    regions.''
        As this U.S. unilateral statement, the BMDR, and our budget
    proposals all make clear, this administration is committed to
    continuing to improve our missile defenses as needed to defend
    the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and
    partners.
        I ask that my full written statement be entered into the
    record and I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record, as will
    all of the statements. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Dr. James N. Miller
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for inviting me here today to testify on the
    Department's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. BMD is a key
    strategic issue for the United States and I look forward to testifying
    and answering your questions about our policies and plans.
        In February, the Department of Defense published the report of the
    first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The review
    comprehensively considered U.S. BMD policies, strategies, plans, and
    programs in the context of current and emerging ballistic missile
    threats to the Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and
    partners. It provides a clear and sensible path forward for U.S.
    missile defenses.
        We are here today to testify on the President's fiscal year 2011
    request for BMD and how it is aligned with the policies and strategies
    reported in the BMDR. We have taken many steps to ensure a close
    alignment of budgets with the Defense Department's strategic reviews--
    not just BMDR but also the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear
    Posture Review, as it was being developed.
        I will first review the key recommendations of the BMDR, and then
    describe our actions to implement it. The committee has also asked that
    I address the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) in some detail.
                            ballistic missile threat
        In charging the Defense Department with the responsibility to
    conduct a BMDR, last year's legislation clearly specified the starting
    point: an updated threat assessment. Accordingly, the review began with
    a review of the ballistic missile threat and key trends.
        The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and
    qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade.
    Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are
    becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate,
    while also increasing in range. A number of states are also working to
    increase the protection of their ballistic missiles from pre-launch
    attack and to increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile
    defenses. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or
    biological warheads for their missiles.
        The threat to the Homeland from states like North Korea and Iran
    continues to develop. Although neither has yet acquired or deployed
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), both are working to
    acquire and/or develop long-range ballistic missile capabilities, a
    threat that has proven to be inherently difficult to predict.
        Of particular concern, North Korea has demonstrated its nuclear
    ambitions, and it appears that Iran is determined to continue its
    longstanding defiance of its international obligations on its nuclear
    program.
        The threat from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles has
    developed rapidly over the past decade. Both Iran and North Korea
    present a significant regional missile threat.
        Iran has developed and acquired ballistic missiles capable of
    striking deployed forces, allies, and partners in the Middle East and
    Southern Europe. It is fielding increased numbers of mobile regional
    ballistic missiles and has claimed that it has incorporated anti-
    missile-defense tactics and capabilities into its ballistic missile
    forces. Iran has flight-tested a new solid-propellant medium-range
    ballistic missile (MRBM) with a claimed range of 2,000 kilometers. Iran
    is also likely working to improve the accuracy of its short-range
    ballistic missiles (SRBMs).
        North Korea has developed a solid-propellant SRBM, and is
    developing a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). It has
    also conducted test launches of multiple theater ballistic missiles,
    demonstrating a capability to threaten U.S. and allied forces.
                         strategy and policy framework
        The BMDR set the following policy priorities based on Presidential
    guidance:

        1.  The United States will continue to defend the Homeland against
    the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.

        This remains the top priority for U.S. missile defenses, with a
    focus on the threat from limited ballistic missile attack by regional
    actors such as North Korea or Iran. The United States does not intend
    to affect the strategic balance with Russia or to undermine strategic
    stability with China. The United States seeks to dissuade states such
    as North Korea and Iran from developing an ICBM and, failing this, to
    deter them from using it or to defeat their attacks should deterrence
    fail.

        2.  The United States will defend against regional missile threats
    to U.S. forces, while protecting our allies and partners and enabling
    them to defend themselves.

        This policy has guided the development of U.S. capabilities since
    the emergence of the missile proliferation problem in the 1980s. The
    security of our deployed troops, and our allies and partners, requires
    this.

        3.  Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing
    that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions.

        We believe in ``fly before you buy.'' Flight testing under
    realistic operational conditions is needed and cannot be conducted from
    facilities not equipped or properly located for this purpose. This will
    result in a posture based on proven technology with improved
    reliability, confidence, and cost control.

        4.  The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable
    over the long term.

        Our investments in this area must be managed to ensure that there
    are sound capability improvements at reasonable cost and in overall
    balance with other defense priorities.

        5.  U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as
    threats change.

        Building capabilities that are mobile and modular ensures we can
    successfully adapt as the threat evolves, and our own technology
    advances. Hedging against potential changes in the threat is essential
    given the uncertainty associated with the ballistic missile
    capabilities of potential adversaries.

        6.  The United States will lead expanded international efforts for
    missile defense.

        We will work with allies and partners to strengthen regional
    security architectures. This theme cuts across all of the Department's
    policy and posture reviews. Cooperative efforts are essential to the
    credibility of extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies and
    partners. Our commitment to seeking strategic stability with Russia and
    China means that engagement with them is also needed.
                             defending the homeland
        The U.S. Homeland is currently protected against the threat of
    limited ICBM attack, as a result of investments made over the past
    decade in the system based on Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD). By
    the end of this fiscal year, the United States will deploy a total of
    30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg
    Air Force Base, CA, along with a global architecture of sensors and
    command and control systems. The United States now possesses a capacity
    to counter the projected threats from North Korea and Iran for the
    foreseeable future.
        At the same time, because the threat is unpredictable, the United
    States must be well hedged against the possibility of rapid threat
    developments. The focus now must be on maintaining the current level of
    capability while developing future capabilities that will enhance
    Homeland defense if and as new threats emerge. We are taking the
    following steps to strengthen our hedging posture:

        1.  Continue the development and assessment of a two-stage GBI. The
    two-stage GBI is only a development program and no decision has been
    made to acquire or deploy operational interceptors at this time.
        2.  Complete construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK, to
    the originally planned configuration of 14 operationally-capable silos.
    Finishing Missile Field 2 will allow us to replace older, inadequate
    silos from Missile Field 1, provide the most reliable and effective
    silo configurations to the warfighter, and establish a Reserve
    capability to rapidly deploy up to 8 additional interceptors if needed.
        3.  Pursue advanced sensors to strengthen existing networks. MDA is
    currently developing air- and space-based sensors that will bring new
    capabilities to the fight by allowing us to detect enemy launches,
    handle larger raid sizes, and track them earlier and longer through all
    phases of their flight.
        4.  Invest in advanced technologies such as directed energy and its
    potential use for missile defense, early-intercept capabilities that
    allow us to engage threats earlier in their flight, and the ability to
    launch interceptors and engage ballistic missiles based on information
    from external, forward-deployed sensors.
        5.  Implement Phase 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe
    which will provide supplemental capabilities for the protection of
    Europe and the Homeland from Middle East threats.
                       defending against regional threats
        Over the past decade, significant progress has been made in
    developing capabilities for protection against attack from short- and
    medium-range ballistic missiles. Critical new systems have begun to be
    deployed. But these deployments remain modest in number in comparison
    to the rapidly expanding regional threat. The BMDR reflects the
    commitment to significantly accelerate the acquisition and deployment
    of these mature systems and to invest in follow-on capabilities.
        The benefits of improving capabilities are best ensured by
    tailoring regional deterrence and defense architectures to the unique
    requirements of each region. The effort to develop tailored approaches
    will be guided by the following key principles:

        1.  Regional deterrence must be built on a solid foundation of
    strong cooperative relationships and appropriate burden sharing between
    the United States and our allies. While missile defenses play an
    important role in regional deterrence, other components will also be
    significant. As the Nuclear Posture Review has made clear, the U.S.
    nuclear umbrella will remain in place so long as nuclear threats to our
    allies remain.
        2.  The United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach within
    each region that is tailored to the threats unique to that region,
    including their scale, the scope and pace of their development, and the
    capabilities available and most suited for deployment.
        3.  Because the potential global demand for missile defense assets
    over the next decade may exceed supply, the United States will develop
    capabilities that are mobile and re-locatable.

        Let me further explain what we mean by ``phased'' and ``adaptive.''
    The phases are designed to implement the best available technology to
    meet existing and potential threats. As more capable interceptor
    technology is tested, proven, and available, we will phase that
    technology in to counter the increasing range and complexity of missile
    threats we face.
        The approach is adaptive in that it relies largely on sea-based and
    other mobile capabilities that can be surged into troubled regions in
    times of political-military crisis. We must plan to surge for the
    simple reason that the potential demand for regional missile defense
    assets will exceed supply for years to come. Although the missile
    threat is developing at different rates in different regions, overall
    it is developing rapidly--both in quality and quantity. Today there are
    thousands of ballistic missiles and hundreds of launchers; roughly 90
    percent of those missiles have ranges less than 1,000 kilometers.
    Against this threat, the United States currently has only a few hundred
    defensive interceptors deployed in multiple regions. To manage the
    supply/demand challenge, the military utilizes the Global Force
    Management process. This will help to ensure that our missile defenses
    can face the most pressing regional threats, and that we have
    capabilities that are responsive to changes in the threat environment.
                            the bmdr and the budget
        The Department's budget request aligns with the policies identified
    in the BMDR and reflects an increased emphasis on strengthening our
    Homeland and regional missile defense capabilities. The fiscal year
    2011 President's budget requests approximately $500 million more than
    was appropriated in fiscal year 2010. Furthermore, our plan for fiscal
    years 2011-2015 is $3.2 billion above what was planned for last year.
    MDA Director O'Reilly will provide a more detailed overview of the
    programmatic investments in fiscal year 2011 and beyond.
        The legislation mandating the BMDR specifically posed a question
    about the needed balance between investments in Homeland and regional
    defenses. Clearly, we need strong investments in both areas. We also
    need to be well hedged in both against potential developments in the
    threat. We also need to accelerate the fielding and further development
    of capabilities to deal with regional threats because of the dramatic
    growth in that dimension.
        We have emphasized the following key investment priorities for
    fiscal year 2011 and the 5 year defense plan:

             To increase the inventory of near-term, mature
            systems, including interceptors, sensor networks, and command
            and control capabilities, in order to provide our military
            forces with what they need now.
             To rigorously test our missile defense systems as they
            are developed to ensure we are investing in operationally-
            effective and reliable sensors and shooters.
             To invest in advanced technologies and follow-on
            capabilities so that we continue to outpace new developments in
            our adversaries' ballistic missile capabilities.
             To maintain and improve existing capabilities.

        We believe these increased investments are essential, and
    consistent with a key principle of the BMDR, fiscally sustainable.
                           missile defense in europe
        In conducting the BMDR, we were also specifically directed to
    assess the pathway forward for missile defense in Europe. Having
    reviewed the threat and set out our policy priorities, that pathway
    forward emerged clearly.

             The accelerating threat from short-, medium-, and
            intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Middle East
            pointed to the need to accelerate missile defense protection of
            U.S. forces and allies in Europe.
             The inherently unpredictable nature of the threat
            pointed to the need for a missile defense approach with
            flexibility to adapt to developments in the threat.
             The need to hedge against future threats, whether to
            U.S. deployed forces, allies, or the Homeland, pointed to the
            need for an approach in Europe that could be adaptive to this
            purpose as required.
             The commitment to lead expanded international efforts
            pointed to the value of a broader alliance approach that would
            enable effective sharing of burdens and risks.

        The previous ``Third Site'' approach scored poorly against these
    objectives. The small number (10) of interceptors meant that the system
    could be overwhelmed by the launch of as few as five missiles. The high
    expense of the interceptors limited future capability growth. The Third
    Site approach did not include any specific components for defending our
    allies and forces from the threat posed by short- and medium-range
    ballistic missiles.
        The BMDR developed a more adaptive approach, which utilizes proven
    technologies that are flexible and responsive to current and future
    threat developments. Based on the unanimous advice of the civilian and
    military leadership in the Department of Defense, the President
    endorsed the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe.
        It is useful to recall here the four phases described in the BMDR:

             In Phase 1, out through the 2011 timeframe, existing
            missile defenses to defend against short- and medium-range
            ballistic missiles will be deployed. Phase 1 will be
            accomplished by deploying a forward-based sensor and utilizing
            BMD-capable Aegis ships carrying SM-3 Block IA interceptors.
             In Phase 2, in the 2015 timeframe, improved
            interceptors and sensors to defend against SRBMs and MRBMs will
            be deployed. The architecture will be expanded with a land-
            based SM-3 site in Southern Europe and the deployment of SM-3
            Block IB interceptors.
             In Phase 3, in the 2018 timeframe, to improve coverage
            against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, a
            second land-based SM-3 site will be deployed in Northern
            Europe. This will include use of the more capable SM-3 Block
            IIA interceptors on land and at sea to cover all NATO Europe
            countries.
             In Phase 4, a decade from now, to address the threat
            of potential ICBM attack from the Middle East, the next
            generation SM-3 interceptor, the Block IIB, will be available
            for land-based sites. This interceptor, with its higher
            velocity, is intended to provide the ability to engage longer-
            range ballistic missiles and to intercept threats in their
            ascent phase.
                           implementing paa in europe
        Since the announcement of the new approach to missile defense in
    Europe in September 2009, the administration has worked to engage
    allies, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to begin to bring together
    the needed building blocks for this approach. Key milestones in this
    process to implement the EPAA are summarized below:

             In September 2009, the Czech Republic expressed its
            continued strong support for missile defenses and stated its
            interest in being involved with the EPAA. As we consider ways
            to cooperate on areas related to the PAA over the longer term,
            including through research and development activities, we are
            already in the process of working with the Czechs to establish
            a near-term arrangement for sharing information on ballistic
            missile launches.
             In October 2009, Poland agreed to host a land-based
            SM-3 interceptor site on its territory, as called for in the
            Phase 3 of the EPAA (2018 timeframe). This site will be located
            at the same former military installation in northwestern Poland
            that would have housed the GBIs under the ``Third Site'' plan.
            The U.S.-Poland Ballistic Missile Defense Basing Agreement was
            signed in August 2008. In February 2010, the U.S. and Poland
            concluded negotiations on an amendment to that agreement to
            allow the deployment of a land-based SM-3 site in Poland.
            Additionally, in 2010, the Polish parliament ratified the U.S.-
            Poland supplemental Status of Forces Agreement required for the
            deployment of U.S. forces in Poland, including personnel
            associated with missile defense.
             In February 2010, Romania agreed in principle to host
            the Phase 2 Southern Europe land-based SM-3 interceptor site in
            the 2015 timeframe. The U.S. is preparing for negotiations with
            the Romanian Government concerning the details of hosting the
            site.
             We are currently in discussions regarding the
            potential location of the forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar, which
            we would like to deploy in Southern Europe in the 2011
            timeframe. As these discussions mature, we will be able to
            provide more information.
             We are also working to coordinate our EPAA missile
            defense efforts with those of our NATO Allies that are seeking
            to counter shorter-range ballistic missile threats to deployed
            forces. Several NATO countries already possess or are acquiring
            such missile defense capabilities. For example, several have
            Patriot systems (Netherlands, Germany, and Greece). Some are
            working cooperatively with the United States to develop the
            MEADS system (i.e., Italy and Germany). Others have expressed
            interest in acquiring systems like Patriot, SM-3, and sensor
            technology.

        These bilateral efforts have been paralleled by multilateral
    efforts within NATO. The administration is working to ensure the EPAA
    is implemented in a strong NATO context--meaning it has NATO's
    political support, complements current and future NATO efforts, and
    offers enhanced opportunities for cooperation.

             The EPAA closely aligns with NATO political guidance
            on missile defense, issued unanimously in April 2009 by allied
            heads of State and Government, which states that ``missile
            threats should be addressed in a prioritized manner that
            includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat
            and the level of acceptable risk.'' Accordingly, our NATO
            allies have responded positively to EPAA. NATO unanimously
            welcomed the PAA at its December 2009 Foreign Ministerial, a
            key first step in cooperation with NATO on European missile
            defense.
             NATO is also developing a command and control network
            that will allow Allies to link their missile defense assets
            together, called the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile
            Defense (ALTBMD) program, creating a more efficient
            architecture. The United States is working to ensure U.S.
            assets will be interoperable with NATO's ALTBMD program. NATO
            is also examining the implications and costs of potentially
            expanding ALTBMD to include command and control for territorial
            missile defense. ALTBMD and potential expansions for it would
            facilitate greater interoperability and shared situational
            awareness among Allied missile defense assets.

        In combination, these efforts have helped to generate a significant
    new level of alliance commitment to missile defense. As a result, there
    is greater potential for cooperation with NATO on a potential Alliance-
    wide initiative to protect NATO territory from ballistic missiles.
        It is important to understand that working to ensure protection of
    all NATO Allies does not give NATO a ``veto'' over the protection of
    the United States and our deployed forces. Interoperability with NATO
    command and control systems will not diminish our ability to defend
    U.S. deployed forces, our allies, and our partners.
        All of these efforts represent significant progress towards
    implementing the BMDR and PAA in Europe--in just over 6 months since
    the announcement of the new approach.
                      the paa in asia and the middle east
        The European PAA is representative of our new approach to regional
    missile defense. It shows how we plan to apply in practice those policy
    priorities that we established in the BMDR.
        However, it is important to note that the regions differ in the
    range, scale, and technical sophistication of the existing and
    potential threat. This variation has important implications for how
    phased adaptive approaches to missile defense are applied in each
    regional context. The regions also differ in terms of the U.S. role. In
    Europe, the United States engages as a party to a multilateral
    alliance; in East Asia, the United States cooperates through bilateral
    alliances and with key partners; in the Middle East, the United States
    has a number of key partners. The United States has deployed forces
    across the globe. Regional differences have important implications for
    the authorities under which the United States is able to operationally
    employ defenses in protection of local partners.
        We are also working in East Asia and the Middle East to implement
    the phased adaptive approach to missile defense in these regions. As I
    mentioned earlier, these approaches must be tailored to the specific
    threat and geopolitical characteristics of each region.

             The United States and Japan have made considerable
            strides in BMD cooperation and interoperability in support of
            bilateral missile defense operations. Japan has acquired a
            layered integrated missile defense system that includes Aegis
            BMD ships with Standard Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot
            Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire units, early warning radars,
            and a command and control system. The United States and Japan
            regularly train together, and our forces have successfully
            executed cooperative BMD operations. One of our most
            significant cooperative efforts is the co-development of a
            next-generation SM-3 interceptor, called the Block IIA. This
            codevelopment program represents not only an area of
            significant technical cooperation but also the basis for
            enhanced operational cooperation to strengthen regional
            security. The U.S.-Japan partnership is an outstanding example
            of the kind of cooperation the United States seeks in order to
            tailor a phased adaptive approach to the unique threats and
            capabilities in a region.
             The United States also has ongoing discussions with
            South Korea and Australia related to missile defense and we
            look forward to further cooperation should either country make
            the decision to acquire missile defense capabilities.
             In the Middle East, we have a longstanding
            relationship with Israel on BMD. In addition to conducting a
            major missile defense exercise with Israel in November 2009,
            the United States and Israel continue to meet regularly and
            coordinate extensively on a wide range of missile defense
            issues. During a recent bilateral discussion in Tel Aviv in
            March 2010, ways in which elements of the BMDR would help our
            cooperative efforts to defend Israel were analyzed. This set of
            bilateral discussions on missile defense will be continued
            later this year in the United States. In addition to
            cooperating on plans and operations, our extensive support for
            Israeli missile defense programs continues to include the
            existing Arrow Weapons System and a new program for defeating
            short range ballistic missiles known as David's Sling.
            Improvements in the U.S. missile defense posture as a result of
            the BMDR benefits regional stability and benefits Israel's
            security.
             The United States currently has a robust mix of BMD
            assets forward deployed to provide BMD for our troops and
            facilities in the Persian Gulf Region. This includes the
            command and control equipment, and personnel necessary to
            direct BMD engagements. Currently, a series of bilateral MD
            agreements between the United States and host GCC nations
            exist. Central Command continues to work on establishing a
            Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture for
            the GCC nations.
                            cooperation with russia
        As noted in the BMDR, the administration has given a special
    emphasis to renewing cooperation with Russia on missile defense. From
    discussions at the most senior levels, when Presidents Obama and
    Medvedev met at the July 2009 Moscow Summit, to technical discussions,
    we are making a concerted effort to identify areas where the United
    States and Russia can pursue meaningful cooperation. We are open to a
    wide-range of cooperative activities.
        Some examples of cooperation that we have recently examined with
    the Russians include sharing data gathered by existing U.S. and Russian
    radar installations; conducting collaborative missile defense flight-
    tests; and undertaking experiments that would combine data from U.S.
    ground- and space-based sensors with data from Russian sensors such as
    the radars at Qabala, Azerbaijan and at Armavir, in southern Russia.
    Pursuant to President Obama's and President Medvedev's agreement at
    their July 2009 summit in Moscow, the United States and Russia are
    conducting a joint assessment of ballistic missile threats and
    challenges. Also, we are attempting to work with Russia to implement
    the 2000 Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) agreement. The JDEC
    agreement would establish a joint ballistic missile early warning
    center in Moscow.
                                   conclusion
        In the BMDR we have a new policy document outlining the
    administration's approach to missile defense. We have accordingly
    shifted budgetary requests, increasing investments in missile defenses
    in the fiscal year 2011 budget. We have already begun to execute those
    policies as demonstrated by our progress on the implementation of the
    PAA in Europe, and we are working closely with other allies and
    partners.
        The threat posed by ballistic missiles is real, and it is growing.
    After years of development, our missile defenses today are also very
    real, and vital to coping with this growing threat. We look forward to
    working with Congress in ensuring continued progress.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Levin. Dr. Gilmore.

      STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL
               TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Dr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the
    committee, I'll very briefly summarize my written statement.
        First, my characterization of demonstrated performance in
    BMD is contained in the report that I submitted to Congress
    this past February, which is required by law as part of the
    oversight regime that Congress and particularly this committee
    has created and the role that my office plays in overseeing
    testing progress in BMD.
        In that report I characterize the demonstrated performance
    of the elements of the BMD system using a one to six rating
    scale, with one being the lowest demonstrated capability and
    six being the highest. Generally, Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot--
    against short-range ballistic missiles--are rated at the
    highest levels, from four to six. There has been relatively
    extensive testing against short-range threats. Aegis, ground-
    based missile defense and THAAD against medium-range ballistic
    missiles (MRBM), intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and
    intercontinental-range ballistic missiles generally have
    demonstrated less capability, and the less capability is
    demonstrated as the range of the missiles increases.
        With regard to major events over the last year, of course,
    there was the successful shootdown of a threat-representative
    missile by the Airborne Laser. With regard to developments in
    test planning, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, there was the
    development of the IMTP, an exercise in which my office played
    a substantial role. The IMTP is, in my view, a rigorous plan
    for conducting the tests and collecting the information that
    will be needed to verify, validate, and accredit all of the
    models that will be absolutely essential to demonstrating
    confidence in the performance of the missile defense system,
    because we will never be able to test in live flight tests, the
    system throughout the entire battle space that will be
    relevant.
        With regard to challenges in the future, missile defense
    testing is some of the most complex testing that DOD conducts.
    It's very difficult to execute these tests successfully. There
    have been failures in the past, both with regard to
    interceptors and to targets, and targets in particular are a
    real challenge, as I'm sure General O'Reilly will discuss. The
    realism and reliability of the targets is something that needs
    work and General O'Reilly has a plan to work on that and to
    procure a new family of targets that we hope will be more
    reliable than the ones in the past.
        Thank you and I'll be happy to respond to your questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Gilmore.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Dr. J. Michael Gilmore
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Ballistic
    Missile Defense System, or BMDS, its test program, recent results, and
    challenges. I will focus my remarks in three areas:
        First, my assessment of current missile defense programs, the
    details of which are in my annual report submitted to you on February
    12;
        Second, the major events from last year that will shape the course
    of future BMDS testing; and
        Finally, the challenges to BMDS test and evaluation.
                        current missile defense programs
        Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) has not yet attempted an
    intercept of an intercontinental ballistic missile target. The
    intercept flight tests it has conducted on intermediate range missiles
    have been conducted under a limited set of operationally-realistic
    engagement parameters.
        GMD flight test FTG-05, conducted in the first quarter of fiscal
    year 2009, was the third successful intercept using the currently
    fielded operational capability. It was the first flight test requiring
    the GMD fire control to correlate multiple sensor inputs and supply a
    weapons task plan to the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle. FTG-06 was
    conducted in January 2010; it was the first flight test of an
    interceptor equipped with the Capability Enhancement II Exo-atmospheric
    Kill Vehicle and was meant to demonstrate the use of the sea-based X-
    band radar to perform tracking and discrimination. The intercept
    attempt failed for reasons that the MDA continues to investigate.
        Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, or Aegis BMD, has demonstrated
    that it can detect, track, and engage simple non-separating and
    separating short-range ballistic missiles (those with ranges below
    about 1,000 kilometers). Using Aegis BMD 3.6 hardware and software and
    SM-3 Block IA hit-to-kill interceptors, Aegis BMD has demonstrated it
    is operationally effective for performing midcourse intercept of short-
    range ballistic missiles. Additionally, follow-on operational testing
    of Aegis BMD 3.6.1 hardware and software demonstrated Aegis BMD's
    capability to engage simple short range ballistic missiles in the
    terminal phase with modified SM-2 Block IV warhead interceptors.
        During 2009, Aegis BMD completed two U.S. flight tests, Stellar
    Daggers and FTM-17. The two tests addressed midcourse-phase and
    terminal-phase engagement capabilities for Aegis BMD 3.6.1. Stellar
    Daggers performed a simultaneous engagement of a short range ballistic
    missile in the terminal phase of flight with a modified SM-2 Block IV
    interceptor, and a cruise missile target with a SM-2 Block IIIA
    interceptor. FTM-17 completed the planned follow-on operational test
    and evaluation flight testing phase for Aegis BMD 3.6.1. It also
    provided a venue for regression testing of midcourse-phase engagement
    capability following the upgrade from Aegis BMD 3.6 to Aegis BMD 3.6.1.
    The latter introduced the capability for terminal intercepts and merged
    anti-submarine warfare functionality into the system software.
        The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) has demonstrated
    the ability to detect, track, and engage unitary and simple separating
    short-range ballistic missiles. In six flight tests, THAAD intercepted
    four of four unitary short-range ballistic missiles, and two of two
    simple separating short range ballistic missiles. One flight test
    demonstrated a salvo engagement of two THAAD interceptors against a
    single threat, consistent with plans for actual tactical operations.
    THAAD has also demonstrated a capability to intercept threat missiles
    both inside and outside the atmosphere, the only BMDS element
    specifically designed with this capability. Although THAAD has
    demonstrated the ability to detect, track, and successfully engage a
    target exhibiting medium-range, ballistic missile characteristics, it
    has not yet been tested against a true medium-range ballistic missile.
        During 2009, THAAD conducted flight tests FTT-10a and FTT-11. In
    March, THAAD successfully completed FTT-10a, a salvo of two THAAD
    interceptors against a single separating short-range ballistic missile.
    The MDA ``cold conditioned'' the first THAAD interceptor before the
    test to simulate operations in a cold environment. The test was a
    combined developmental and operational test, with minimal contractor
    involvement. FTT-10a was also a BMDS-level test, with Aegis BMD
    providing a cue to THAAD as part of the engagement. In December, THAAD
    attempted FTT-11, an exo-atmospheric intercept of a complex separating
    short-range ballistic missile. The target, planned as an air launch
    from a C-17 cargo aircraft, had a relatively low infrared signature and
    radar cross section. This was the first flight test to include all
    major tactical software builds planned for initial deployment,
    including radar advanced discrimination algorithms. Unfortunately,
    after the target was released from the C-17, it failed to deploy
    properly and was lost. DOT&E is assessing the extent to which the data
    that would have been collected during this test can be collected during
    subsequent testing.
        Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) has
    demonstrated the ability to command and control the AN/TPY-2 X-band
    radar in its forward-based mode, and provide track data to other BMDS
    elements for engagement support (GMD) and simulated launch-on
    engagements (Aegis BMD). C2BMC has provided situational awareness
    information to military command authorities during all three GMD flight
    tests. During the past 2 years, C2BMC has demonstrated Aegis BMD launch
    on Aegis BMD cueing in three ground tests, and simulated Aegis BMD
    launch on AN/TPY-2 cueing in four ground tests and two flight tests.
    THAAD does not currently have a launch-on-remote capability which will
    require modifications to the THAAD fire control software to achieve.
                                  major events
        In the first quarter of fiscal year 2009, the MDA implemented an
    evaluation-based strategy for testing the BMDS, an approach that DOT&E
    has been advocating for the past several years. This approach
    emphasizes testing under so-called Critical Engagement Conditions
    (CECs), and collecting the data on system performance under those
    conditions necessary to verify, validate, and accredit (VV&A), the BMDS
    models and simulations to be used to assess overall BMDS capability.
    The MDA codified this approach in an Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP)
    that documents their planned testing through the period spanning the
    Future Years Defense Program. The MDA staff, staff from the combatant
    commands and the BMDS Operational Test Agency participated in
    developing the IMTP, as did staff from DOT&E.
        DOT&E has been involved in the evolution of the evaluation-based
    strategy and the revised IMTP since General O'Reilly initiated its
    development in December 2008. For example, DOT&E provided the MDA with
    critical operational issues the new test program must resolve. Over the
    next 6 months, the DOT&E staff reviewed with MDA staff the details
    underpinning all the CECs associated with resolving the critical
    operational issues, the ground and flight testing needed to collect the
    associated data, and the development of the final integrated test
    schedule. This effort culminated in an IMTP approved jointly by MDA and
    DOT&E in July 2009.
        In August 2009, when the President announced the phased, adaptive
    approach (PAA) for the defense of Europe, MDA initiated a revision of
    the IMTP to incorporate the testing needed to support the PAA. DOT&E
    participated in this effort in a manner analogous to its participation
    in the development of the previous IMTP. My office provided the MDA
    with a detailed test concept for Phase 1 of the PAA as well as a test
    concept outline for the remaining phases. That concept included the
    need for a test of Aegis Block 3.6.1 and SM-3 Block IA against longer-
    range threats than had previously been tested, as well as the need to
    test the use of launch-on-remote capability.
        In particular, when the President announced the PAA for the defense
    of Europe, a revision of the new IMTP became necessary. The PAA uses
    Aegis BMD and forward-based  sensors  to  defend  Europe  and  the
    United  States  from  short-,  medium-, intermediate-, and
    intercontinental-range ballistic missiles as Aegis BMD evolves with
    increasing capability. While the MDA has adequately demonstrated
    current Aegis BMD capability to defeat short range ballistic missiles,
    the MDA test program has not yet demonstrated current Aegis BMD
    capability to defeat medium or intermediate range ballistic missiles.
    The MDA must successfully complete flight tests against these longer-
    range threats to demonstrate ballistic missile defense of Europe.
        The revised IMTP, approved jointly by DOT&E and the MDA this past
    February, incorporates such tests. Phase 1 of the IMTP is the most
    detailed, as it concentrates on testing and fielding near term defenses
    by the end of 2011. Both Aegis BMD and THAAD will conduct flight tests
    to demonstrate capability against intermediate and medium range
    ballistic missiles respectively. The MDA will also conduct ground
    testing of the command, control, and communications required to support
    Phase 1 implementation. U.S. European Command is working to develop the
    operations concept and the tactics, techniques, and procedures that
    will be used during these ground tests.
        One other noteworthy event occurred recently. The Airborne Laser,
    now designated the Airborne Laser Test Bed, successfully engaged a
    boosting, threat-representative short range ballistic missile. This
    accomplishment demonstrates that it is technologically possible to
    ``shoot down'' a boosting, ballistic missile using a laser carried on a
    large aircraft. The program had to overcome difficult technological
    challenges, such as the effects of the atmosphere on the laser beam and
    the difficulty of holding the laser on the desired aim-point
    sufficiently long to cause the threat missile to fail. However, the
    engagement was not an operational test conducted under operationally-
    realistic conditions using an aircraft that is fully ready to conduct
    combat operations. For example, the Active Ranging System (ARS), a
    precision laser ranging system that is a key component of the detection
    and tracking system, was not available for the test. To compensate, the
    aircrew utilized the aircraft's Wide Area Surveillance System as well
    as a priori knowledge of the threat missile launch location, timing,
    and aim point; this approach generally could not be used during combat.
    The incorporation of the ARS and numerous other capabilities would be
    necessary before the Airborne Laser (ABL) could be evaluated for
    operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and survivability
    when performing missile defense. The ABL would need to incorporate a
    laser with sufficient power to successfully engage, at operationally
    realistic standoff ranges and without a priori knowledge, a variety of
    threat missile types using countermeasures designed to defeat laser
    effectiveness. It must demonstrate reliability, availability, and
    maintainability, particularly during missions performed from deployed
    locations. It must also implement basic survivability features,
    including self-protection systems and airframe modifications to reduce
    the effects of damage caused by anti-aircraft weapons. If the
    Department should determine at a future time that it is appropriate to
    develop and field an Airborne Laser system, an extensive program of
    additional developmental testing culminating in realistic operational
    testing would be needed.
                       challenges to future bmds testing.
    Targets
        THAAD flight testing has experienced target failures. The one
    flight test completed in 2009 was a successful repeat of a flight test
    first attempted in September 2008 that suffered a target failure. The
    second flight test attempted in 2009 also ended with a target failure.
    When the targets have flown successfully, THAAD has successfully
    intercepted and destroyed them. These target failures have prevented
    THAAD from progressing to flight testing against threat-representative
    medium range ballistic missiles.
        GMD also has experienced target failures. Flight test FTG-03a was a
    repeat of FTG-03 that suffered a target failure. The target used for
    flight test FTG-05 did not deploy the associated objects needed to
    accomplish important test objectives. The MDA delayed flight test FTG-
    06 due primarily to readiness issues associated with the first-time
    flight of a new longer-range target. This new target flew nominally and
    correctly deployed its associated objects when FTG-06 was flown this
    past January.
        The MDA recognizes that its targets are very complex. This
    complexity is a key factor contributing to the failures that have
    occurred. Such failures may well be a fact of life for several more
    years until the MDA can transition from using its legacy targets and
    field a new set of more reliable targets.
    Executing the IMTP
        The IMTP is a rigorous plan for obtaining the test information
    needed to assess BMDS performance quantitatively. However, I am
    concerned that it is success-oriented with limited schedule flexibility
    and no incorporation of repeat, or backup, tests to compensate for test
    failures. The ripple effects of a test failure, such as the recent GMD
    flight test FTG-06, can be significant. An Aegis BMD test failure in
    the next year could affect the full implementation and assessment of
    Phase 1 of the phased, adaptive approach for the defense of Europe, as
    Aegis BMD would not have demonstrated capability against the longer-
    range threats that might need to be countered in that timeframe.
    Test Complexity
        Realistic BMDS testing is difficult. Assessing the capability of
    each phase of the PAA will require some of the most complex testing
    ever attempted by the Department of Defense. The majority of the
    testing is planned to be conducted on the Pacific test ranges. The MDA
    will be challenged to replicate realistic radar acquisition and
    intercept geometries in the Pacific. In addition, testing of the
    command and control linkages and systems to be used for the first phase
    of European missile defense will have to be conducted using ground
    testing in the theater and surrogate testing elsewhere concurrent with
    development and implementation. Executing the first operationally-
    realistic combined test of Aegis BMD, THAAD, and Patriot in 2012 will
    tax MDA's capabilities for test planning and execution. In particular,
    performing the planning and marshalling the resources necessary to
    handle the safety requirements associated with what could be as many as
    10 missiles--both targets and interceptors--in flight nearly
    simultaneously will be a substantial challenge, as will executing the
    actual test.
                                   conclusion
        The ability to conduct comprehensive and objective assessments of
    BMDS capability is still a number of years away. If the MDA can execute
    the revised IMTP, the data needed to validate models and perform
    quantitative assessments of BMDS performance will become available.
    However, it will take as many as 5 to 7 years to collect those data.
        This concludes my remarks and I welcome your questions.

        Chairman Levin. General O'Reilly.

     STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
                             DEFENSE AGENCY

        General O'Reilly. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    McCain, and other distinguished members of the committee. It is
    an honor to testify before you today on the MDA's activities to
    continue developing and fielding an integrated layered BMD
    system to defend the United States, its deployed forces,
    allies, and friends.
        Under the oversight and direction of the DOD Missile
    Defense Executive Board, MDA proposes an $8.4 billion fiscal
    year 2011 program that is balanced to achieve six policy goals
    of the BMDR's report and the combatant commanders' and the
    Services' missile defense needs stated in the latest U.S.
    Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) prioritized missile defense
    capabilities list.
        First, defense of the Homeland against limited attack. We
    continue to upgrade the GMD system to increase reliability,
    survivability, ability to leverage a new generation of missile
    defense sensors and testing to accredit our simulations.
    Missile fields in Alaska are in an optimum location to
    intercept missiles from either North Korea or Iran. The
    purchase of five additional GBIs and the production of
    components to support extensive reliability testing and missile
    refurbishment will sustain our production capability until 2016
    and critical component manufacturing beyond 2020.
        Second, defense against regional threats. By 2015, we plan
    to buy 436 SM-3 I-A and I-B interceptors, 431 THAAD
    interceptors, 14 AN-TPY-2 radars, 9 THAAD batteries, and have
    38 BMD-capable ships available. Our regional missile defenses
    are adaptable to the unique circumstances of each combatant
    command. For example, we determined, based on updated
    intelligence estimates, that our previous plan for the defense
    of Europe could be rapidly overwhelmed and thus made
    ineffective by the large number of Iranian medium-range
    ballistic missiles today. Additionally, the previous program
    did not cover most of Southeastern Europe exposed to the
    ballistic missile threats today, would not have been available
    until 2017, and was not adaptable to changes in future threats
    to Europe. Therefore we plan to deploy a larger number of
    interceptors in Europe in four phases as missile threats from
    the Middle East evolve.
        Two phases in 2011 and 2015, respectively, provide
    protection against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
    The third phase in 2018 provides protection against
    intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and the fourth phase in
    2020 provides capability to intercept ICBMs from the region in
    which they are launched.
        Third, prove the BMD system works. We have submitted a
    comprehensive IMTP signed by Dr. Gilmore, the Services'
    operational test agencies, and the Commander of STRATCOM, to
    ensure we fly our missiles before we buy them.
        However, the two greatest challenges that we face in
    developing missile defense are acquiring cost-effective,
    reliable targets and improving quality control of all products.
    Over the past year, we have initiated a new target acquisition
    strategy to increase competition, improve quality control,
    reduce costs, and provide backup targets starting in 2012.
        However, the precision of missile defense systems requires
    stringent manufacturing standards. Until we complete planned
    competitions including the greater use of firm fixed-price
    contracts and defect clauses, we will have to motivate some
    senior industry management through intensive inspections, low
    award fees, issuing cure notices, stopping the funding of new
    contract scope, and documenting inadequate quality control
    performance to influence future contract awards.
        Fourth, hedging against uncertainty. In accordance with
    warfighter priorities, we are focusing our future technologies
    to develop more accurate and faster tracking sensors on
    platforms to enable early intercepts, enhanced command and
    control networks to rapidly fuse sensor data to handle large
    raid sizes, a more agile version of our SM-3 interceptor to
    destroy long-range missiles, reentry vehicles discrimination,
    and the development of high-energy lasers.
        Fifth, deploy new fiscally sustainable capabilities over
    the long term. MDA is complying with the WSARA of 2009 by
    establishing and managing six baselines, cost, schedule,
    technical, test, contract, and operational baselines,
    increasing service and combatant commander participation, and
    increasing emphasis on competition at all phases of a program's
    acquisition life cycle. We are reviewing over $37 billion in
    new contracts for competition over the next 2 years.
        Sixth, expand international missile cooperation. We are
    currently engaged in missile defense projects, studies, and
    analysis with many countries, including Japan, Poland, the
    Czech Republic, Israel, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany,
    South Korea, NATO, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi
    Arabia, and Kuwait. Additionally, Poland and Romania have
    agreed to host our Aegis Ashore sites and we are cooperatively
    developing the SM-3 II-A interceptor with Japan, in which they
    are investing over $1 billion.
        We also continue to support expert dialogue on cooperative
    efforts with the Russian Federation, whose location of
    surveillance radars would significantly enhance our ability to
    monitor ballistic missile development and flight testing in
    Southwest Asia.
        Relative to the recently expired START, the New START
    actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile
    defense program. Unless they have New START-accountable first
    stages, which we do not plan to use, our targets will no longer
    be subject to START constraints, which previously limited our
    use of air-to-surface and waterborne launches of targets, which
    are essential for the cost-effective testing of missile defense
    interceptors against medium and intermediate-range ballistic
    missile targets in the Pacific area. In addition, under New
    START we no longer will be limited to five space launch
    facilities for launching targets.
        The New START also has no constraints on BMD system
    deployment. Article 5, section 3, of the treaty prohibits the
    conversion of ICBM or sea-launched ballistic missile launchers
    to missile defense launchers, and vice versa, while
    grandfathering five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg Air Force
    Base already converted for GBIs. MDA never had a plan to
    convert additional ICBM silos at Vandenberg. Moreover, we've
    determined that if more interceptors are added to Vandenberg
    Air Force Base it would be less expensive to build a new GBI
    missile field, which is not prohibited by the treaty.
        Regarding sea-launched ballistic missile launchers, some
    time ago we examined the concept of launching BMD interceptors
    from submarines and found it an unattractive and extremely
    expensive option. As the committee knows, we have a very good
    and significantly growing capability for sea-based missile
    defense on Aegis-capable ships.
        In conclusion, MDA is teamed with the combatant commanders,
    services, other DOD agencies, academia, industry, and
    international partners to address the challenges of managing,
    developing, testing, and fielding capabilities to deter the use
    of ballistic missiles and effectively destroy them once
    launched.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General O'Reilly follows:]
               Prepared Statement by LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA
        Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, other distinguished
    members of the committee. It is an honor to testify before you today on
    the Missile Defense Agency's support to the Ballistic Missile Defense
    Review (BMDR) and our $8.4 billion fiscal year 2011 budget request to
    continue our mission to develop and field an integrated, layered,
    Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to defend the United States,
    its deployed forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missiles of
    all ranges and in all phases of flight. This budget request reflects
    the strategy and policy stated in the BMDR report and the prioritized
    missile defense needs of our combatant commanders and the Services as
    stated in the latest U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) Prioritized
    Capabilities List (PCL).
        The Missile Defense Agency has been operating in accordance with
    the principles outlined in last year's Weapons System Acquisition
    Reform Act. This includes establishment of formal baselines for the
    system component managers, Service participation through the STRATCOM-
    led Warfighter Involvement Process, and increased emphasis on
    competition at all phases of a program's acquisition life cycle. All of
    these steps, I believe, will maximize the return on the taxpayer's
    investment dollar.
        Under the oversight and direction of the Missile Defense Executive
    Board (MDEB), chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), MDA proposes a
    fiscal year 2011 program that is balanced to achieve the six strategy
    and policy goals documented in the BMDR report:

             Defend the Homeland against a limited ballistic
            missile attack
             Defend U.S. forces, allies, and partners against
            regional threats
             Deploy new systems only after effectiveness and
            reliability have been determined through testing under
            realistic conditions
             Develop new capabilities that are fiscally sustainable
            over the long term
             Develop flexible capabilities that can be adapted as
            threats change
             Expand international cooperation

                 defense of the homeland against limited attack
        The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system forms the
    foundation of our Homeland missile defense against limited ICBM attack
    today. We continue to upgrade GMD to increase reliability and
    survivability and expand the ability to leverage new BMDS sensors as
    well as test GMD to accredit our simulations. Since the beginning of
    fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered five new GBIs, upgraded Fire
    Control and Command Launch Equipment software, completed construction
    of a second GBI missile field at Fort Greely, AK, and delivered a new
    silo and an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data
    Terminal at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), CA. Additionally, we are
    completing the missile defense upgrades to the Upgraded Early Warning
    Radar (UEWR) in Thule, Greenland, and we have transferred operation of
    the Cobra Dane Early Warning Radar and the Beale and Fylingdales UEWRs
    to the Air Force. We are continuing planning and design work to upgrade
    the Clear, AK Early Warning Radar.
        We are requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to
    continue our GBI refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs to:
    help sustain the fleet to 2032 and support a service life extension
    decision around 2027; procure an additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile
    Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration to accommodate a contingency
    deployment of 8 additional GBIs; upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system
    software to ensure GMD leverages BMDS increased discrimination and
    tracking capability as sensor, data fusion and battle management
    network matures; and complete the installation of a second GMD command
    and control node at Fort Greely, AK. Additionally, we will continue
    operations and sustainment of the Sea-Based X-band radar (SBX) platform
    to prepare for transfer of the SBX operations to the U.S. Navy in 2012.
    Finally, we will continue development of technologies to enhance
    Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) variants to protect our Homeland in the
    future by having the capability to intercept long-range ballistic
    missiles early in flight in the regions from which they were launched.
    To validate this concept, the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)
    requested the Defense Science Board independently assess the viability
    of developing capability for early intercept of ICBMs. Our GMD
    sustainment, refurbishment, and test strategy gives us the flexibility
    to adjust to the uncertainty in the future ICBM threat. Although, we
    experienced a GBI vendor production break after the last procurement of
    GBIs in 2006, the purchase of five additional GBIs, and supplying
    ``limited life'' GBI components for refurbishments will sustain our
    production capacity until 2016 and beyond. We will conduct stockpile
    surveillance of GBIs by testing all limited life components as GBIs are
    refurbished through 2032. Data collected from future GMD flight tests,
    results from the aging surveillance program, and future intelligence
    estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will inform decisions on
    the need to procure additional GBIs.
                        defense against regional threats
        Our fiscal year 2011 budget request balances the warfighter's needs
    to develop new capabilities and grow our missile defense capacity. An
    integrated deployment of Aegis BMD and Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense (THAAD) forms an effective, layered, regional missile defense.
    The Aegis BMD is a mobile system, designed to defeat short- to
    intermediate-range missiles above the earth's atmosphere, and the THAAD
    is a rapidly deployable system, designed to engage short- to medium-
    range missiles both above and within the Earth's atmosphere. Aegis has
    more than twice the engagement range of THAAD. Additionally, Patriot
    Advanced Capability 3 can add an additional layer and point defense
    against Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs).
        We are developing regional missile defense elements that can be
    adapted to the unique circumstances of each Combatant Command region.
    For example, we plan to deploy missile defenses in Europe in four
    phases as missile threats from the Middle East evolve over time. The
    Phase 1 capability (planned to begin deployment in 2011) will provide
    initial protection for southern Europe from existing short- and medium-
    range threats using sea-based interceptors and forward-based sensors.
    Phase 2 (2015) deploys the SM-3 IB interceptor at sea and at an Aegis
    Ashore/land-based SM-3 site. In collaboration with OSD Policy,
    STRATCOM, the Department of State, and U.S. European Command (EUCOM),
    we are preparing to begin negotiations with Romania to locate an Aegis
    Ashore/land-based SM-3 site on its territory in 2015. Phase 3 (2018)
    employs SM-3 IIA on land and at sea to protect NATO from SRBM, MRBM,
    and IRBM threats. Poland has agreed to host this Aegis Ashore/land-
    based SM-3 site. The Phase 4 architecture (2020 timeframe) features
    the higher velocity land-based SM-3 IIB, a persistent sensor network,
    and enhanced command and control system to intercept large raids of
    medium- to long-range missiles from the Middle East early in flight.
        Since the beginning of fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered 27 SM-3
    Block IA interceptors and upgraded 3 additional ships (for a total
    today of 20 Aegis BMD ships); upgraded the USS Lake Erie with the next
    generation BMD fire control software that increases the number of
    threat missiles that can be simultaneously engaged and more effectively
    uses data from missile defense sensors external to the ship. We have
    also delivered two THAAD batteries (the first unit is planned to be
    operationally accepted by the Army by the end of this year). We have
    separately deployed one U.S.-operated X-band AN/TPY-2 radar to Israel
    on a contingency basis. We have also installed C2BMC hardware and
    software upgrades at command and control nodes at U.S. Pacific Command,
    STRATCOM, U.S. Northern Command, and EUCOM and began C2BMC installation
    in the U.S. Central Command.
        We are requesting $1.6 billion for Aegis in fiscal year 2011. We
    will continue the design, qualification, and testing of the SM-3 IB
    interceptor; manufacture 30 SM-3 IB test and production verification
    interceptors (we plan to procure a total of 436 Aegis SM-3 IA and IB
    interceptors by 2015), and upgrade 3 additional Aegis BMD engagement
    ships (2 Aegis BMD 3.6.1 destroyers and 1 4.0.1 destroyer) for a total
    of 23 BMD capable ships by the end of fiscal year 2011 and 38 BMD
    capable ships by 2015. We will continue development and testing of the
    Aegis BMD 4.0.1 and 5.0 fire control system to launch SM-3 IB and IA
    interceptors against threat missiles when they are beyond the range of
    the ship's own radar. We also will continue the co-development of the
    SM-3 IIA interceptor with the Government of Japan to increase
    significantly the area defended by the Aegis BMD system with its 21-
    inch diameter rocket motors, two-color seeker, and increased kinetic
    warhead divert capability. We also will continue to design the first
    Aegis Ashore battery that will be installed for testing at the Pacific
    Missile Range Facility in 2012.
        We are requesting $1.3 billion for THAAD in fiscal year 2011. We
    plan to deliver the second THAAD battery (we plan to procure 6
    batteries by 2015), add a second launcher platoon to each battery to
    double the firepower to 48 interceptors, procure 67 interceptors (we
    plan to procure a total of 431 interceptors by 2015), and complete
    hardware and software upgrades to the communications suite to enable
    THAAD to use fused data from all BMDS sensors.
        We are requesting $455 million for sensors in fiscal year 2011. We
    plan to upgrade the AN/TPY-2 radar software to facilitate its use as a
    surveillance radar or as a THAAD battery fire-control radar, optimize
    the radar's ability to leverage assistance by external sensors, and
    support the contingency operations of AN/TPY-2 radars deployed in Japan
    and Israel. We will continue to develop a Concurrent Test, Training and
    Operations capability to provide operational BMDS sensors (including
    the UEWRs, Cobra Dane and Sea-Based X-band radars) the capability to
    conduct training and testing while continuing to provide on-line
    missile defense, upgrade AN/TPY-2 and Sea-Based X-band radar
    discrimination and dense track management software, and conduct ground
    and flight testing to support accreditation of sensor models and
    simulations.
        We are requesting $343 million for Command and Control, Battle
    Management and Communications (C2BMC) in fiscal year 2011. We plan to
    provide automated planners to aid a Combatant Command's deployment of
    BMD assets according to its concept of operations and conduct ballistic
    missile defense battles according to its tactics, techniques, and
    procedures. Furthermore, we will develop and deploy an upgraded version
    of our C2BMC hardware and software to provide new battle management
    functions that enable shoot-look-shoot tactics between layers of U.S.
    and international partners' missile defense assets, control multiple
    BMDS radars, correlate and combine sensor data from multiple sensors
    tracking the same threat into one system track, provide real-time
    awareness of the battle as it develops in accordance with a Combatant
    Command's concept of operations, and enable engagement coordination
    among BMDS elements in accordance with regional Area Air Defense Plans.
    Additionally, C2BMC will participate in and analyze results of ground
    and flight tests to support accreditation of models and simulations and
    support war games and exercises.
        MDA played a significant role in the conduct of the Ballistic
    Missile Defense Review. The agency provided technical analysis and data
    as required by the leaders of the review to support their effort to
    answer the questions posed by Congress. Preliminary analytical results
    were then presented to the departmental leaders, including the
    Secretary and Chairman, who then made recommendations to the President.
    Although MDA provided these architecture assessments, it is important
    to recognize the decision to deploy the recommended European PAA
    architecture was not based solely on detailed performance predictions.
    Rather, the decision to deploy an Aegis SM-3-based architecture to
    Europe was based on the need for a flexible defense against an evolving
    threat from the Middle East. First, the previously proposed European
    missile defense architecture lacked a sufficient number of interceptors
    to defend against the current and emerging numbers of medium-range
    ballistic missiles (MRBMs) being fielded by Iran. Simply put, with a
    notional 2 interceptor shot doctrine, the 10 GBI interceptors proposed
    for Poland would easily be overwhelmed by a raid size of 6 threat
    missiles launched towards European targets. Second, with the European
    PAA, we can deploy a missile defense capability to Europe earlier than
    the previous Program of Record, with GBIs in Poland and an X-Band Radar
    in the Czech Republic. NATO Europe is threatened by a short-range and
    medium-range ballistic missile threat now, so this was an important
    variable in the decision. Upon the completion of testing in 2011, we
    could begin the deployment of proven capabilities to defend against the
    MRBM threat. Third, by creating a re-locatable, land-based version of
    our most capable regional missile defense system, the Aegis Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD) system, Combatant Commanders could have the
    capability to adjust their missile defense architectures to address the
    uncertainty of future missile threats without the need to develop a new
    missile defense system. These systems can be deployed in any theater in
    a reasonably short period of time. Fourth, the increased defended areas
    and larger raid size capacity resulting from planned enhancements to
    the Aegis BMD system are expected to increase the cost-effectiveness of
    a European missile defense against the growing missile threat over this
    decade. Finally, while we currently have a limited defense system
    against potential Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threats
    originating in the Middle East or Northeast Asia, there is no technical
    reason to indicate that this system would not be further enhanced by
    the deployments envisioned in Phase 4 of the PAA. It is important to
    note that the missile defense capability needs identified in the BMDR
    are consistent with capability needs listed in the recently approved,
    independently developed, classified STRATCOM missile defense
    Prioritized Capability List.
               proving the ballistic missile defense system works
        A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test the capabilities
    and limitations of a missile defense system before we begin
    procurement, or we will ``fly before we buy.'' As such, missile defense
    projects are subject to production decisions by USD(AT&L).
    Additionally, we use the Services' standard material release and
    operational certification processes that also rely on developmental and
    operational test data prior to formally fielding initial capability.
    Both THAAD and AN/TPY-2 have production decisions by USD(AT&L) and Army
    Material Review Boards planned for this year. We are requesting $1.1
    billion in fiscal year 2011 to provide targets and support to missile
    defense projects to test new capabilities under developmental and
    operational conditions, including the use of actual threat missiles, to
    support accrediting our models and simulations and production decisions
    by USD(AT&L). In collaboration with the Services' Operational Test
    Agencies, STRATCOM, and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
    we submitted a comprehensive Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) in
    March that describes our plan through fiscal year 2015 to conduct over
    150 test events to obtain specific data necessary to accredit our
    models and simulations and support operational assessments. The IMTP
    also describes our testing to support European PAA deployment
    decisions. To support a Phase 1 decision in 2011, we have completed 10
    Aegis BMD intercept tests of short range targets. We will conduct an
    Aegis BMD test against an intermediate-range ballistic missile target
    prior to the Phase 1 deployment. Likewise, there are system level
    ground tests, exercises, and simulations to test system effectiveness
    and interoperability. The IMTP also describes our testing of the two-
    stage GBI and several GMD intercept tests against long-range targets. I
    concur with the January 2010 DOT&E January assessment that ``if MDA can
    execute the IMTP as planned, successful VV&A of BMDS models and
    simulations should result, enabling quantitative and objective rather
    than subjective assessments of the BMDS capability in the future.'' I
    further agree with the DOT&E conclusion that ``objective assessments of
    the BMDS capability are still a number of years in the future.''
        Our recent flight test results have been mixed. From October 2008
    through today MDA achieved 5 of 7 successful hit-to-kill intercepts and
    a number of ``firsts'' in BMDS testing. In December 2008, the GMD
    system engaged an IRBM target launched from Kodiak Island, AK, using a
    GBI launched from VAFB in the most operationally realistic test to date
    that demonstrated our ability to fuse sensor data from five on-line
    sensors. Unfortunately, the target in that flight test failed to
    release countermeasures. In March 2009, with soldiers operating the
    system using tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by the U.S.
    Army, we conducted THAAD's first dual salvo endo-atmospheric engagement
    of a threat-representative separating ballistic target. The Navy
    conducted an intercept using an Aegis SM-2 Block IV (terminal defense)
    in February 2009, and we conducted an SM-3 IA intercept in July 2009.
    In October 2009, we supported Japan's intercept test of an SRBM using
    the Japanese destroyer JS MYOKO.
        Although we have had three intercepts out of three previous
    attempts using the GMD system, our newest variant of the kill vehicle,
    relying on data from the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar, failed to
    intercept a target in January 2010 during a flight test to measure
    GMD's performance at its maximum operational intercept range. The GBI
    launched successfully from VAFB and the newly designed LV-2 long-range
    target successfully flew for the first time out of the Reagan Test Site
    in the Kwajalein Atoll 7,500 km away. It was a very valuable test
    because we collected extensive data on the performance of the SBX and
    GBI, the advanced exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), and the target.
    We discovered new failure modes for the SBX, the EKV flew more than
    twice the distance it had flown in previous tests, and we collected
    significant new data on the EKV's ability to acquire, track, and
    discriminate the target. The failure investigation is expected to
    continue for several more months before root-cause is determined and
    verified. It is my intent to immediately correct any deficiency and
    repeat the test as soon as feasible. In contrast, the most recent
    attempt to conduct a THAAD test last December was of no value because
    of a target missile failure. The THAAD interceptor was not launched and
    the system was not exercised. Despite the cost of more than $40 million
    for that test and subsequent program delays, we gained no new
    information on the performance of the THAAD system.
        The two largest challenges to executing the U.S. missile defense
    program is acquiring a cost effective set of reliable targets and
    improving quality control. Over the past year we have initiated steps
    to acquire a new set of targets of all ranges, including Foreign
    Material Acquisitions, to verify the performance of the BMDS. Our new
    target acquisition strategy, initiated in fiscal year 2009, procures
    targets in production lots to increase competition, quality control,
    reduce costs, and ensures the availability of backup targets starting
    in 2012. For the next 3 years, we must continue to rely on an intensive
    inspection and oversight process to motivate mission assurance.
        Due to the precise nature of the operation of missile defense
    systems, very high standards of quality control and an enduring culture
    of disciplined mission assurance by the industry workforce is
    essential. We have had many successes in improving our prime contractor
    and supplier quality assurance. In each case, companies have been
    willing to identify shortfalls, invest in new capital assets and attain
    experienced leadership in changing cultures to establish the enduring
    discipline required to consistently deliver precision missile defense
    products. However, not all companies have sufficiently improved. Until
    we complete planned competitions, including the greater use of firm
    fixed price contracts, we will have to motivate greater attention by
    senior industry management through intensive government inspections,
    low award fees, the issuance of cure notices, stopping the funding of
    new contract scope, and documenting inadequate quality control
    performance to influence future contract awards by DOD.
                       hedging against threat uncertainty
        Missile defense technologies must be developed to adapt and upgrade
    our systems to counter future changing threats. In accordance with the
    PCL, we are focusing our future technologies in four areas: (1)
    developing more accurate and faster tracking sensors on platforms to
    enable early fire control solutions and intercepts; (2) developing
    enhanced command and control networks to link and rapidly fuse sensor
    data to handle large raid sizes of missile threats; (3) developing a
    faster, more agile version of our SM-3 interceptor to destroy long-
    range missiles early in flight; and (4) developing discrimination
    techniques to rapidly resolve Reentry Vehicles from other nearby
    objects. Additionally, we continue to research technologies for
    destroying boosting missiles with directed energy. We are developing
    more mature technologies for mid-term deployment decisions around 2015
    and conducting science and technology experiments for far-term (around
    2020) advanced capability deployment decisions.
        One of the highest priority capabilities requested by the
    warfighter community is a persistent and precise missile tracking
    capability. We are requesting $113 million in fiscal year 2011 for the
    Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) and Near Field Infra-Red
    Experiment satellite operations. This space operations work will
    demonstrate the utility of remote missile tracking from space and
    reduce the risk of integrating the remote tracking data of future
    satellites into missile defense fire control systems. MDA launched two
    STSS demonstration satellites on 25 September 2009. We continue testing
    and operating the two demonstration satellites, including cooperative
    tests with other BMDS elements, and demonstrating these satellites
    against targets of opportunity and scheduled tests involving targets.
    We are also requesting $67 million in fiscal year 2011 for a new
    program start, the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS), comprised of
    a network of remote tracking satellites, communications, and ground
    stations. Key attributes of the PTSS are its limited mission,
    uncomplicated design, lower costs, use of mature technologies, and
    integration with legacy data management and control systems to provide
    a persistent remote missile tracking capability of the areas of the
    earth that are of most concern for missile defense. Lessons learned
    from the two STSS demonstration satellites currently on orbit will
    inform decisions on the development of a prototype PTSS capability by
    the end of 2014. After validating the prototype design in ground
    testing in 2014, we plan to fly the first prototypes while we have
    industry teams compete to produce the remaining satellite constellation
    for initial constellation operations by 2018.
        We are also requesting $112 million for fiscal year 2011 for the
    development and testing of a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) based
    missile tracking sensor system, or Airborne Infrared (ABIR) sensor
    system, to track large raids of ballistic missiles early in flight. We
    are completing an analysis of the optimum RPV platform and sensors to
    integrate into an effective early missile tracking system.
        For fiscal year 2011, we are requesting $52 million for C2BMC
    enhancements to develop a net-centric, Service-oriented architecture,
    to rapidly fuse sensor data and provide data to distributed fire
    control systems to intercept enemy reentry vehicles early, optimize
    shoot-look-shoot opportunities, and economize the number of
    interceptors required to defeat a raid of threat missiles. We are
    pursuing enhanced C2BMC capabilities and experiments to integrate
    interceptor fire control systems with ABIR, STSS, and other new sensor
    technologies. We work closely with STRATCOM and the COCOMs to develop
    and deliver the optimum C2BMC architectures in their regions.
        We are requesting $41 million in fiscal year 2011 to develop
    components that increase the speed of our SM-3 family of interceptors
    with advanced divert capability, faster boosters, and lighter kill
    vehicles. We are studying the use of a derivative SM-3 IB kill vehicle
    and derivatives of the first and second stages of the SM-3 IIA
    interceptor as part of the development of the SM-3 IIB long-range
    missile interceptor.
        We are requesting $99 million for fiscal year 2011 to conduct
    continued research on high energy lasers. This past year we saw the
    significant accomplishments of the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) as it
    completed preparatory tests which ultimately led to two successful and
    historic experimental shoot-downs of a solid rocket on February 3,
    2010, and a boosting, liquid-fueled, Foreign Material Acquisition (FMA)
    target on February 11, 2010. We are preparing for another test against
    an FMA, at nearly twice the distance, later this spring. We will
    continue to investigate multiple high energy laser technologies to
    characterize their performance while validating the modeling and
    simulation of long range directed energy beam propagation and beam
    control. Additionally, we are currently supporting the USD(AT&L)/
    Director for Development, Research, and Engineering (DDR&E)
    comprehensive review of all DOD high energy laser programs to establish
    a department wide program for developing and applying high energy laser
    capabilities. We anticipate this review will define the ALTB's role in
    the future development of high energy lasers.
       develop new, fiscally sustainable capabilities over the long term
        MDA's preferred approach to developing new missile defense
    capabilities is to evolve and upgrade existing capabilities to leverage
    the cost-effectiveness of utilizing existing Service training,
    personnel and logistics infrastructures. The fiscal sustainability of
    missile defense systems is largely determined by the cost of operations
    and sustainment. Therefore, MDA executes ``hybrid management'' of
    projects with the designated lead Services by embedding ``Service
    cells'' in MDA joint project offices to make design and development
    decisions associated with Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership,
    Personnel, and Facilities to assure MDA products efficiently align with
    Service processes and operational concepts.
        MDA has established six baselines (cost, schedule, technical, test,
    contract, and operational baselines) to plan and manage the execution
    of missile defense projects. I approve the baselines of technology
    programs, but jointly approve with lead Service Acquisition Executives
    the baselines of MDA projects in product development. These baselines
    not only assist in our cost-effective management of MDA projects, but
    also provide visibility to the MDEB and Congress on the progress of our
    execution. The baselines of all of our projects are established in
    spring and will be submitted to Congress in a Baseline Acquisition
    Report (BAR) in June. Finally, these baselines will form the basis for
    USD(AT&L) production decisions.
                expand international missile defense cooperation
        As stated in the BMDR and Quadrennial Defense Review, a key
    strategic goal is to develop the missile defense capacity of our
    international partners. We are currently engaged in missile defense
    projects, studies and analysis with over 20 countries. Our largest
    international partnership is with Japan. We are co-developing the SM-3
    IIA missile, studying future architectures, and supporting their SM-3
    IA flight test program. In Europe, we are participating in the NATO
    Active Layer Theater Ballistic Missile Defense command and control
    program and war games, continuing technology research projects with the
    Czech Republic, and planning for the European PAA deployments, which
    include the installation of Aegis Ashore sites, one each in Romania and
    Poland. Collaboration with Israel has grown to involve the development
    and deployment of the Arrow Weapon System, which is interoperable with
    the U.S. missile defense system. MDA has completed and the United
    States is now in the final negotiation of an Upper Tier Project
    Agreement with Israel for cooperative development of an exo-atmospheric
    interceptor and amending the U.S.-Israel Arrow Weapon System
    Improvement Program agreement to extend the system's battle space and
    enhance its ability to defeat long-range ballistic missiles and
    countermeasures. MDA and Israel are also jointly developing the David's
    Sling Weapon System to defend against shorter-range threats, to include
    some ranges that the PAC-3 system cannot engage. Additionally, MDA is
    active in supporting the Combatant Commands through international
    symposiums, bilateral and multi-lateral dialogs, planning, and analysis
    with Allies and international partners to help them understand the
    benefits of integrated missile defense in their regions.
                                   conclusion
        Missile defense is a key part of our national security strategy
    described in the BMDR to counter the growing threat of ballistic
    missile proliferation. The New START treaty has no constraints on
    current and future components of the BMDS development or deployment.
    Article V, Section 3 of the treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM or
    Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) launchers to missile
    defense launchers, and vice versa, while ``grandfathering'' the five
    former ICBM silos at Vandenberg AFB already converted for Ground Based
    Interceptors. MDA never had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos at
    Vandenberg and intends to hedge against increased BMDS requirements by
    completing construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely. Moreover, we
    determined that if more interceptors were to be added at Vandenberg
    AFB, it would be less expensive to build a new GBI missile field (which
    is not prohibited by the treaty). Regarding SLBM launchers, some time
    ago we examined the concept of launching missile defense interceptors
    from submarines and found it an unattractive and extremely expensive
    option. As the committee knows, we have a very good and significantly
    growing capability for sea-based missile defense on Aegis-capable
    ships.
        Relative to the recently expired START Treaty, the New START treaty
    actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense
    program. Unless they have New-START accountable first stages (which we
    do not plan to use), our targets will no longer be subject to START
    constraints, which limited our use of air-to-surface and waterborne
    launches of targets which are essential for the cost-effective testing
    of missile defense interceptors against MRBM and IRBM targets in the
    Pacific area. In addition, under New START, we will no longer be
    limited to five space launch facilities for target launches.
        MDA is working with the combatant commanders, Services, other DOD
    agencies, academia, industry and international partners to address the
    challenges and difficulties of managing, developing, testing and
    fielding new military capabilities to deter use of ballistic missiles
    and effectively destroy them once launched. Implementing these
    warfighter priorities takes time, since the production time for a
    missile and radar is over 2 years and establishing and training a unit
    to create and deploy a military capability takes an additional year.
    Our fiscal year 2011 budget funds the warfighters' near-term priorities
    while building the foundation of a layered defense system with our
    partners and friends that can provide an adaptive, cost-effective
    strategy to counter ballistic missile proliferation in the future.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your
    questions.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
        Admiral Macy.

      STATEMENT OF RADM ARCHER M. MACY, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, JOINT
      INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION, AND DEPUTY
          DIRECTOR FOR FORCE PROTECTION, J-8, THE JOINT STAFF

        Admiral Macy. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
    distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate the
    opportunity to discuss missile defense and the roles and
    functions of the JIAMDO with you. I have submitted written
    testimony for the committee and I would like to take a few
    minutes to summarize the key points.
        The JIAMDO is a small group of military and government
    civilian personnel that supports the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff, and the combatant
    commanders. Our mission is to identify and coordinate joint
    requirements for air defense, cruise missile defense, and BMD
    to support development of solutions for the warfighter.
        Key tasks for my organization include: advocating for the
    warfighter's desired air and missile defense capabilities;
    providing air and missile defense subject matter expertise and
    advice to the CJCS, and to the Commander of STRATCOM;
    facilitating combatant command and service collaborative
    efforts to identify and develop operational concepts, joint
    requirements, system interoperability, and operational
    architectures; developing and maintaining an air and missile
    defense road map; and finally, assessing and validating
    integrated air and missile defense capabilities.
        Our manning is tailored to provide current operational
    expertise in air and missile defense and is drawn from across
    the services. Our staff officers include Air Force E-3 AWACS
    air battle management specialists, Army Patriot surface-to-air
    missile officers, Navy Aegis surface warfare officers, and
    Marine Corps fighter pilots. The background and experience of
    these military personnel provide them operational credibility
    and standing when discussing requirements with the warfighter
    and enables them to translate operational needs into
    requirements documents, analysis and study activities, and
    demonstrations. It also provides a pool of experts to support
    the CJCS in the development of policies and programs for the
    warfighter.
        JIAMDO provides the CJCS with direct input and assessment
    on combatant command air and missile defense needs and options
    on how to meet those needs. JIAMDO is very focused on ensuring
    DOD is delivering capabilities that support combatant command
    operational plans and that address their air and missile
    defense gaps. We are an important conduit for the combatant
    commanders to get their air and missile defense needs into DOD.
    We have liaison personnel at Central Command, European Command,
    STRATCOM, Joint Forces Command, Pacific Command, Northern
    Command, NORAD, U.S. Forces Korea, and U.S. Forces Japan, and
    we support the STRATCOM in their role as the air and missile
    defense integrating authority.
        JIAMDO applies its extensive air and missile defense
    expertise, operational analysis capabilities, and Pentagon
    process knowledge to serve as a link between the combatant
    commands and the joint and Service staffs.
        JIAMDO has been positioned by the CJCS to be at the
    intersection of the requirements processes for air defense and
    BMD and to act as an integration mechanism for harmonizing both
    common and differing needs across multiple services, platforms,
    and systems. Some recent and upcoming activities highlight
    this. During the BMDR, I was one of the three directors of the
    review and two of my senior officers served as co-chairs of the
    programmatic, process, and execution working groups, and
    requirements teams.
        JIAMDO also recently completed a BMD inventory analysis,
    the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study, as alluded to by the
    chairman. This was a STRATCOM requested study to determine the
    warfighter's requirement for upper tier interceptors. Working
    with the combatant commands, the Services, and MDA, JIAMDO was
    able to quantify how many interceptors were needed and the
    effect those numbers had on warfighting capability. It is
    important to emphasize that this was not a unilateral effort by
    JIAMDO and in fact would not have been possible without the
    support, input, and participation of the MDA and the combatant
    commands.
        With the advent of the PAA for missile defense, we are
    embarking on a new round of analysis to understand the
    implications of that decision on our needs for sensors,
    weapons, and systems. The PAA concept will affect each
    combatant commander differently and each will have their own
    requirements for accomplishing their BMD responsibilities. In
    order to integrate these needs, we are undertaking a new round
    of analysis, the JCM-3 study. This is in its initial stages and
    we are targeting completion for about this time next year.
        Finally, as the Director of JIAMDO, I am the U.S.
    representative to the NATO Air Defense Committee and am
    responsible for addressing air and missile defense-related
    issues in NATO and for drafting and coordinating U.S.
    positions. In this role I recently had the privilege of working
    with the NATO staff and member countries to discuss the
    application of the PAA in Europe and the potential for regional
    missile defense capability in the NATO context.
        I should also note that I had the opportunity to observe
    yesterday when the North Atlantic Council was briefed on the
    PAA in Europe by the Vice CJCS, General Cartwright.
        In conclusion, developing the right capability for the
    warfighter is a challenging task. JIAMDO is a unique
    organization positioned and manned to meet this challenge and
    to support joint and coalition air and missile defense.
        Thank you for your time and I look forward to answering
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Macy follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by RADM Archer M. Macy, USN
        Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished
    members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify. It
    is an honor and pleasure to join Dr. Miller, Mr. Gilmore, and
    Lieutenant General O'Reilly to discuss missile defense and the roles
    and functions of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
    Organization.
        The Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization is a
    small group of 30 military and government civilian personnel with
    support staff that supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    the Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders. Our mission is to
    identify and coordinate joint requirements to support efforts to
    develop air defense, cruise missile defense, and ballistic missile
    defense solutions for the warfighter. Key tasks for the organization
    are:
        Advocating for warfighter's desired air and missile defense
    capabilities within the requirements and budgeting processes.
        Providing air and missile defense subject matter expertise and
    advice to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander U.S.
    Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
        Facilitating combatant command and Service collaborative efforts to
    identify and develop operational concepts, joint requirements, system
    interoperability, and operational architectures.
        Developing and maintaining an air and missile defense roadmap to
    correlate capabilities to weapons systems and track progress towards
    delivering those capabilities to the warfighter.
        Assessing and validating integrated air and missile defense
    capabilities by means of simulations, technology demonstrations, and
    wargames.
             joint integrated air and missile defense organization
        These are challenging activities that will be discussed in more
    detail, but I want to provide some background on how Joint Integrated
    Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) is structured. We are a
    Chairman Controlled Activity that functions within the Joint Staff.
    Chairman Controlled Activities are specialized organizations designed
    to address unique, overarching areas that are of joint interest.
    JIAMDO's manning is tailored to provide current operational expertise
    in air and missile defense and is drawn from across the Services, and
    in our case is primarily from air and missile defense specialties.
    Some, examples are: Air Force E-3 AWACS air battle management
    specialist, Army Patriot surface-to-air missile officers, Navy Aegis
    Surface Warfare Officers, Marine Corps F/A-18 fighter pilot. The
    background and experience of these military experts allows them to
    relate at an operational level with the warfighter and enables them to
    translate operational needs into requirements documents, analysis and
    study activities, and demonstrations. It also provides an unequaled
    pool of experts to support the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
    development of policies and programs for the warfighter. JIAMDO reports
    to the Chairman through the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure,
    Resources, and Assessment (Joint Staff J-8).
        Originally the organization was focused on addressing air and
    missile defense within a single theater of operations. However, the
    theater ballistic missile threat is evolving and one of its principal
    characteristics is increasing range, which enables a threat country to
    attack targets thousands of miles away. This attack could be crossing
    through one or more combatant commanders' area of operations or
    Theaters, which has made the term ``Theater'' missile defense obsolete.
    Because of this, the decision was made to change the name of the
    organization to the Joint ``Integrated'' Air and Missile Defense
    Organization. This reflected several factors. First, was the
    Department's overall shift to address the emergence of longer range
    ballistic missile threats. Second, it recognized the desire to more
    closely integrate air defense capabilities with ballistic missile
    defense capabilities. Third, it helped align the organization to
    support STRATCOM, which as a result of the changing air and missile
    defense environment had been assigned the task to synchronize planning
    for global missile defense.
                    joint integrated air and missile defense
        Before continuing, I want to take a moment to provide a brief
    summary of what we mean by the air and missile defense concept that we
    support. Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense is defined as the
    integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the
    Homeland and U.S. national interests, protect the Joint Force, and
    enable freedom of action by negating an adversary's ability to achieve
    adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities. This
    capability provides full spectrum dominance against aerial threats--
    space-based, and ballistic missile reentry vehicles; intercontinental
    through short-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; manned and
    unmanned aircraft; rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM). The
    Protection extends from the Homeland, through friendly nations and
    coalition partners in a region, and within areas of military
    operations.
        The key enabling factors for integrated air and missile defense
    include the abilities to provide a battle space picture in which the
    commander is confident of it's accuracy and completeness; that key
    intercept systems and shooters have the same high quality picture; that
    we can defend a broader area through mutually supporting, joint,
    interoperable forces; that we can increase the commander's confidence
    of successful engagement; and, that the commander has the flexibility
    to rapidly shift resources to best focus their effects on the
    adversary.
                       jiamdo as part of the joint staff
        JIAMDO is the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff cadre of experts on
    air and missile defense. One of the duties of the Director, JIAMDO is
    to serve as the Deputy Director for Force Protection on the Joint
    Staff. In this function, the Director is responsible for overseeing the
    full scope of force protection activities in the capabilities
    development processes including those for air and missile defense.
    JIAMDO provides the Chairman direct input and assessments on combatant
    command air and missile defense needs that are put forward in their
    Integrated Priority Lists. Options on how to address those needs are
    developed in conjunction with the Services, and JIAMDO tracks the
    recommended courses of action from approval through the budgeting
    process to fielding.
        Weapon system fielding is another area where JIAMDO works critical
    issues in support of the Chairman. The fielding plan for new missile
    defense systems developed by MDA identified a need for the department
    to develop a process to transition and transfer those systems from MDA
    to the Services. JIAMDO worked closely with Service staffs and MDA to
    develop business rules and processes to handle this, and was the lead
    to take the new process to the JROC for approval.
        The most recent example of support to the Chairman was during the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). JIAMDO had four key roles in
    the BMDR. The Director, JIAMDO, was one of the directors of the review;
    other JIAMDO personnel served as co-chair of the Programmatic Process &
    Execution Working Group, led the Requirements issue team, and served in
    the directorate of activities. In short, JIAMDO played a central role
    in the development of the BMDR.
               the air and missile defense integrating authority
        In July 2008, STRATCOM was designated the Air and Missile Defense
    Integrating Authority (AMD IA) and directed to serve as the combatant
    commands' representative for air and missile defense. This was an
    outgrowth of STRATCOM's ballistic missile defense role where they are
    the warfighter voice to MDA. JIAMDO's role was also expanded at this
    time to include support to STRATCOM in the AMD IA capacity. This is a
    natural synergy where JIAMDO is able to apply its more extensive air
    and missile defense expertise and capabilities process knowledge to
    support the AMD IA. In addition to serving as a link between STRATCOM
    and the Joint and Service staffs, and facilitating meetings, document
    staffing, and briefings, JIAMDO also provides operational expertise and
    analytic support. This will be critical as the Department evolves the
    Prioritized Capabilities List, currently how ballistic missile
    requirements are documented for MDA, to encompass the full scope of air
    and missile defense. The expanded Prioritized Capability List will
    provide transparency and insight for developers in the Services for air
    defense, and in MDA for missile defense. It will also provide a common
    requirements view for senior decision makers.
                       jiamdo and the combatant commands
        A key part of our contribution is advocacy for combatant commands.
    JIAMDO is very focused on ensuring the Department is delivering
    capabilities that support combatant command Operational Plans and that
    address their air and missile defense gaps. The principal avenues used
    to coordinate the warfighters needs are the capability gap assessments
    and through a liaison program.
        The capability gap assessment is an annual Department process to
    address the combatant commands' critical warfighting capability gaps in
    their Integrated Priority Lists or IPLs that identify risk in
    accomplishing their specific Unified Command Plan missions. Integration
    and assessment of air and missile defense inputs from the IPLs are the
    responsibility of JIAMDO. Through direct action officer level
    discussions with combatant command staffs we coalesce similar inputs
    from multiple combatant commands into what we call synthesized gaps. At
    this point JIAMDO begins a detailed cross-walk of gaps to current and
    planned programs, assesses the ongoing efforts to close or mitigate
    those gaps, and provides a balanced approach to recommend programmatic
    and/or non-programmatic solutions to close or mitigate remaining gaps
    against available resources.
        Again, through discussions with combatant command staffs we query
    them as to whether the plan fully meets their needs, partially
    satisfies it, or does not meet it at all, and carry that position
    forward in Department discussions and reviews. We also use our
    relationship with the combatant commands to gain insight into how to
    quantify the risk for those gaps that are not fully satisfied. JIAMDO
    then prepares a formal briefing for the JROC that addresses how the
    gaps are being met, or recommendations on how to address them, which in
    some cases means accepting risk. As is true throughout this process,
    JIAMDO coordinates directly with the combatant command staffs on all
    recommendations.
        From this point forward the coordination becomes more formal. The
    Director of JIAMDO will accompany members of the Joint Staff, Services,
    and OSD on several trips to the combatant command headquarters. The
    first trip occurs after the JROC is briefed to ensure combatant
    commands understand and agree with the plan to address their gaps. For
    this trip JIAMDO will brief the consolidated gaps and recommended
    mitigation for the combatant command's gaps from the synthesized group
    and specifically match it to planned actions. On a follow-on trip, the
    Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of JIAMDO
    will go to individual Combatant Commanders and provide a forum to more
    closely examine plans to mitigate that command's gaps and provide an
    opportunity to address other pressing concerns. This close coordination
    and contact from the action office level up to the Flag level is the
    way we meet our advocacy responsibilities and in my opinion the key to
    successful capabilities development. This direct and repeated contact
    with the combatant commands enables the Department to understand the
    full impact of its decisions on the warfighter.
        In addition to JIAMDO's role in the joint staff capabilities
    processes, we have liaison personnel at CENTCOM, EUCOM, STRATCOM,
    JFCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, NORAD, USFK, and USFJ. The liaison provides a
    direct link between JIAMDO and the combatant commands. The liaisons are
    located within the combatant command headquarters staffs, and work air
    and missile defense day-to-day issues for both the hosting command and
    JIAMDO. In many cases they serve as both liaison and as the command's
    expert on joint air and missile defense. The ability to leverage direct
    combatant command input on key issues, as well as analysis and
    wargaming inputs, enables all of our activities to maintain a
    warfighting focus. This relationship has served both the combatant
    commands and JIAMDO well, and provides a responsive and accurate avenue
    to gain answers to immediate inquiries within the Department of
    Defense.
                       jiamdo in the requirements process
        With that background, I would like to move on to discussing what
    JIAMDO's role is in the Department requirements processes. Meeting the
    challenges of countering air and missile threats is inherently a joint
    activity that requires not just the participation of assets from all
    our Services, but coherently integrated employment of those assets.
    Similarly, the proper development of requirements and weapon systems
    depends on the participation of all our Services, combatant commanders,
    and key Agencies. JIAMDO serves at the intersection of the requirements
    processes for air defense and for ballistic missile defense, and acts
    to integrate and harmonize both their common and differing needs across
    multiple services, platforms, and systems.
        The Joint Capabilities Integrated Development System (JCIDS) is the
    Department process used for air defense requirements and JIAMDO is at
    the hub of this process. I chair the first level of formal review and
    approval in JCIDS, and my deputy runs the joint working group that
    directs and vets analysis and requirements. As I mentioned earlier,
    JIAMDO also supports STRATCOM as AMD IA in their development of the
    Prioritized Capability List, which is MDA's equivalent of JCIDS.
    JIAMDO's alignment with the AMD IA positions us to fully examine
    employment and development interdependencies between ballistic missile
    defense and air defense, and explore the potential for innovative
    cross-utilization of technologies. In effect, JIAMDO serves as a bridge
    between the Department's capabilities development process and the PCL
    process and enables the warfighter's needs to remain as the focus of
    both those activities
        This is why JIAMDO is manned with air and missile defense
    operational personnel and positioned within the joint staff. These
    unique attributes, and the growing linkage between JCIDS and the PCL
    allows us to understand what is needed for the joint fight, and
    recognize opportunities to leverage capabilities across the air and
    missile defense mission area.
        the integrated air and missile defense roadmap and operational
                                  architecture
        One of the techniques central to achieving the vision of integrated
    air and missile defense (IAMD), in the practical landscape of budgets,
    technology and time, is the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Roadmap,
    which supports the IAMD Operational Architecture. JIAMDO works with
    STRATCOM, the Combatant Commands, and the Services, to develop the
    roadmap as a culmination activity where the hardware needed to meet
    operational concepts, architectures, and requirements is brought
    together to provide a moving snapshot of progress toward meeting
    warfighter needs. Getting to this point requires significant effort in
    many areas. It begins by bringing the Services and combatant commands
    to agreement at the macro level on what the air and missile defense
    problems are, now and in the future, and what the desired end state is.
    An Operational Concept does that. Through a process of joint meetings
    and discussions, and iterative written drafts, a document is developed
    that describes the end state of joint air and missile defense
    employment and shortfalls that must be overcome to reach it. That
    concept forms the basis for developing an operational architecture
    which in essence is a hierarchical listing of mission tasks that must
    be accomplished to execute air and missile defense. The Operational
    Architecture provides a common lexicon and conceptual structure that
    can be used across the Services to delineate what tasks a specific
    weapon systems must be capable of based on its role in the air and
    missile defense mission. The architecture does not specify what
    equipment should be used to conduct a task, only what tasks must be
    completed to enable joint employment. It is a necessary first step in
    order to develop the systems architecture which does specify the
    hardware and software that will be used for each task. This assortment
    of documents provides the necessary framework and structure the
    Services need to be able to build joint systems that enable the
    warfighter to have a plug and fight capability across the Services.
        The following example may help explain this process. Today's
    surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have very long fly-out ranges. In order
    to engage a target the SAM needs a radar to detect and track that
    target and provide tracking information to the missile. Historically,
    SAMs have their own organic radar positioned side by side with it, like
    the Patriot and Aegis weapon systems. Unfortunately, that means that in
    many cases, and especially for low altitude targets, the SAM's fly-out
    range is well beyond where its organic radar can see. To regain that
    lost range, another radar that is closer to the target can be used as a
    surrogate for the SAM's organic radar. The closer radar, which can be
    airborne and from another Service, digitally replaces the SAM's organic
    radar track. The SAM is now able to fly-out to its maximum range. One
    of the desired end states in the current operational concept is to be
    able to have an Army radar provide the target tracking data to a Navy
    SAM to engage low altitude cruise missiles beyond the Navy radar's line
    of sight. However, before that happens there must be agreement that
    there is a need (Requirement) for this capability against low altitude
    threats; the idea of jointly engaging needs to be described in
    operational terms (Operational Concept); a list of tasks to be executed
    must be determined and documented (Operational Architecture); and
    identification of what hardware and software is needed must be compiled
    (Systems Architecture). The lynchpin in the process is developing it
    all jointly so that regardless of which Service the SAM or radar is
    from the capability is there to complete the engagement.
        We have found that using a roadmap is the best method to bring
    these disparate but related pieces of information together. In close
    coordination with the Services and combatant commands, we have built an
    IAMD Roadmap which identifies a way forward for developing, and
    ultimately fielding, joint capabilities described in the operational
    concept/architecture. The purpose of IAMD Roadmaps is to enhance senior
    leader abilities to make better-informed and timely decisions. The
    Roadmap examines capabilities of the Service's individual systems
    within a Family-of-Systems context and projects how these systems will
    contribute to achieving desired Joint capabilities. Specifically, the
    JROC-approved IAMD Roadmap Version 3 defined Air and Cruise Missile
    Defense (ACMD) capabilities that will enable the warfighter to employ
    Service specific and Joint IAMD capabilities within an integrated Joint
    Engagement Zone. Additionally, Version 3 addresses the Wide Area Air
    Surveillance (WAAS) challenges for the defense of the Homeland against
    air and cruise missile threats and includes a Ballistic Missile Defense
    (BMD) Appendix. Further, IAMD Roadmap Version 3 made recommendations
    which influenced Program Review (PR)-11 studies and will inform Program
    Objective Memorandum (POM)-12 budget planning. The JROC accepted the
    Roadmap recommendations for action and requested that JIAMDO return to
    the JROC to provide an update on the status of those recommendations,
    an assessment of kill chains that cross Service lines, and Service
    implementation of IAMD Roadmap in POM-12. Future IAMD Roadmaps will be
    developed in time to support budget decisions and influence guidance
    for developing the force.
        The Department has documented the operational needs for air defense
    in Joint Capability Documents and in the Prioritized Capabilities List
    for ballistic missile defense, and JIAMDO has published the Operational
    Concept and Operational Architecture. A System Architecture as well as
    the next version of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Roadmap is
    in development.
           assessing operational architectures and operating concepts
        A concurrent responsibility for the Joint Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense Organization is assessing and validating operational
    concepts and architectures, and helping combatant commands and Services
    define and refine requirements. This is performed primarily through
    studies and analyses and modeling and simulation. Study activities vary
    from inventory analysis to examinations of surveillance coverage and
    options for various mixes of surveillance sensors. A ballistic missile
    defense study is illustrative of this area. JIAMDO recently completed
    an inventory analysis, Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study, in support of
    STRATCOM. They had requested a study to determine what the warfighter
    requirement was for upper tier interceptors for ballistic missile
    defense. The information was needed to support production and budget
    decisions. Working with the combatant commands, the Services, and the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA), JIAMDO was able to quantify how many
    interceptors were needed and the affect on warfighter capability. The
    results were used to support recent programming decisions on missile
    defense. It is important to emphasize that this was not a unilateral
    effort by JIAMDO, and in fact would not have been possible without the
    support, input, and participation of the MDA and all the combatant
    commands.
        With the advent of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile
    defense, we are embarking on a new round of analysis to understand the
    implications of that decision on our needs for sensors, weapons and
    systems. The PAA concept will be applied in the different areas of
    responsibility of the combatant commanders, and each will have their
    own needs for how to accomplish their ballistic missile defense
    responsibilities. In order to integrate these needs across the
    Department, we are the initial stages of conducting the next round of
    analysis in this area with JCM-3, which we are targeting for completion
    about this time next year. I have included a graphic on the Senior
    Review Group of the study to illustrate the inclusive approach we use
    for our analysis.
        Modeling, simulation, and wargames are also used for analysis. A
    centerpiece of JIAMDO's analysis is the Nimble Fire modeling and
    simulation activity. Nimble Fire is a U.S. classified operator-in-the-
    loop simulation where Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army
    operational personnel come together to execute joint air and missile
    defense missions. The events are structured to allow operational
    personnel to employ as they deem appropriate and the data we obtain is
    used to define and refine capability gaps, requirements, concepts, and
    in some instances employment techniques. It is a fully functional joint
    architecture capable of executing current and future concepts with
    operationally representative positions for Aegis, Patriot, AWACS, E-2,
    F/A-18, F-15, F-22, and JLENS among others. The simulation can conduct
    distributed operations to U.S. and overseas military locations and
    annually executes a combined air, cruise missile, ballistic missile
    defense event in conjunction with MDA's Missile Defense Integrated
    Operations Center simulation at Colorado Springs. Analysis events are
    based on combatant command war plans and routinely have participants
    from the commands in the operational positions. Results are out-briefed
    to the combatant command as well as the Services and agencies. Nimble
    Fire is a one of a kind capability that has proven to be invaluable in
    analyzing concepts and requirements.
        Two of the premier ballistic missile defense wargames, Nimble
    Titan, and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Wargame, are not
    conducted by JIAMDO, but JIAMDO provides analytical support and
    coordinates combatant command participation and input. Nimble Titan is
    sponsored by STRATCOM and led by the Joint Force Component Command,
    Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD). It is a policy and military
    wargame designed to assess and evaluate coalition and allied
    participation in missile defense. U.S. and international missile
    defense experts from both ministries of foreign affairs and ministries
    of defense take part in the events. Eight nations currently participate
    with more countries to be added in 2012. Insights from these wargames
    allow the U.S. and its partners to identify potential policy and
    military issues such as command and control, information sharing, and
    coalition decision making.
        The BMDS Wargame, sponsored by the MDA, is a U.S. only classified
    tactical level simulation that brings together warfighters and
    developers to work collaboratively to examine how to fight the future
    ballistic missile defense system. This wargame explores areas such as
    shot doctrine, sensor control, interceptor inventory management, and
    force employment. JIAMDO provides development, planning, execution, and
    analytic support for these wargames. We also leverage findings from
    these events to support other analyses, and used the shot doctrine
    developed during the BMDS wargame in the models for the JCM studies.
            jiamdo and the north atlantic treaty organization (nato)
        Closely associated with combatant command relationships are the
    NATO responsibilities of JIAMDO. The Director, JIAMDO is the U.S.
    Representative to the NATO Air Defense Committee. In this role the
    Director is responsible for addressing air and missile defense related
    issues in NATO. The Director drafts U.S. positions for NATO, and
    coordinates them with other U.S. stakeholders. The Director's unique
    position allows insight into policy and military issues from both a
    U.S. and coalition point of view, and enables JIAMDO to understand and
    address tactical level integration of coalition partners in analysis
    and studies, and during the development of employment concepts. In this
    regard I have had the privilege of working with the NATO staff and
    appearing before the North Atlantic Council to discuss the application
    of the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe and the potential for
    regional missile defense capability in a NATO context.
                                   conclusion
        In my opinion JIAMDO is uniquely and correctly positioned and
    manned to provide the kind of support the Department needs to meet the
    President's air and missile defense objectives. The Department has
    recognized that air and missile defense is a complex mission area and
    has committed to joint warfighting. JIAMDO is part of that commitment
    and we are working hard to ensure that warfighter needs are met. Thank
    you for your time, and I look forward to answering your questions.

        Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you very much.
        Let's have an 8-minute first round for questioning.
        Secretary Miller, you outlined the four phases over the
    next decade for the PAA, so I'm not going to go into that in
    more detail. But I am going to be asking you, General O'Reilly,
    to go through some of the reasons why the military uniformly
    supported it. I'm going to just tell you what I understand the
    advantages of the new system are and then see if you agree. You
    outlined some of them, but I don't think it was as
    comprehensive as it could be, so let me go through them.
        First, does the new plan, the PAA, provide protection 5
    years sooner than the old plan? In other words, the old plan
    would have been deployed around 2017, I understand, while the
    new system will be deployed starting in 2011. Is that true?
        Dr. Miller. Yes, Senator. We would estimate 5 to 6 years
    earlier.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, doctor, you can chime in. If either
    of you have a different answer on this let me know.
        Second, the new plan protects the most vulnerable areas
    first. The old system would not have provided any protection
    for Southeastern NATO Europe, the portions that are currently
    within range of Iranian missiles. The new plan starts by
    protecting the areas that are currently within range of
    existing Iranian missiles. Is that true?
        Dr. Miller. That's correct.
        Chairman Levin. Third, the new plan protects all of NATO
    Europe by 2018, and will provide additional protection to the
    United States with phase four in the 2020 timeframe, unlike the
    old system, which never would have covered more than 70 to 75
    percent of NATO Europe. Is that true?
        Dr. Miller. That's right.
        Chairman Levin. General?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Fourth, the old plan, with 10 interceptors
    in Poland, could have been overwhelmed with just 5 Iranian
    missiles or more. The new system, with many SM-3 interceptors
    at sea and on land and the potential for adding more with a
    naval surge, could handle many more Iranian missiles of all
    ranges.
        Dr. Miller. Yes, sir, that's correct.
        Chairman Levin. General?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Next, the old system only defended against
    longer-range Iranian missile threats, which Iran does not yet
    have. The new system starts with capability against existing
    threats, but then adds capability against future threats. Is
    that true, doctor?
        Dr. Miller. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. General?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, the old system could be used to
    defend against medium-range ballistic missiles, and that was
    part of our concern. It was a mismatch of our capability versus
    that medium-range threat.
        Dr. Miller. Excuse me, just to amplify on the General's
    statement. The old system would not have covered the shorter-
    range systems of 500 kilometers or 1,000 kilometers or under.
        General O'Reilly. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. The PAA is a plus in that regard as well?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Dr. Miller, do you agree? You're shaking
    your head.
        Dr. Miller. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Finally, the old system was a fixed-site
    system that could not be moved to adapt to a changing threat.
    The new system is inherently flexible and adaptable. The Aegis
    BMD ships can move quickly. The land-based SM-3 sites can be
    relocated within about 4 months if a changed threat warranted
    it. Is that correct?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
        Dr. Miller. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Now, the baselines. General, you talked
    about I think six baselines for acquisition, including cost,
    schedule, performance, testing. One of the issues here, which
    Senator McCain raised, has to do with some of the problems that
    we have because of the cost-plus contracts that have been given
    in this area and some of the losses that we've suffered as a
    result of not being able to go after a contractor for defects.
    He listed one of the major defects which has recently been
    clear.
        You mentioned, General, that you used the figure $37
    billion. You're looking through that number of potential
    contract awards to see where competition can be used more
    often. That, of course, is one way to keep costs down. But
    we're going to need to have some kind of warranties against
    defects, it seems to me. Right now, we've lost tens of millions
    of dollars, more than that, hundreds of millions of dollars,
    based on small defects, which means that systems were presented
    to us that did not do the job that they were supposed to do.
        I'm just wondering whether or not, in addition to looking
    for greater opportunities for competition to reduce the cost,
    you're also going to be looking for a system which is not as
    much based on cost-plus, but is based on warranties and defects
    that would have to be paid for by the contractors?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. As I review the acquisition
    strategy for the value of $37 billion of contracts in the next
    2 years, that is one of the criteria that I review for, is
    where can we apply both fixed-price contracts, which puts the
    penalty of not delivering a fully operational, functional end
    item on the producer, not only that, but also look for defect
    clauses.
        The problem that I have right now is with a lot of these
    contracts on the developmental side. There was an intent for
    the government and industry to share risk, but that risk we
    were talking about was a developmental risk and risk of
    technology and new manufacturing processes. Unfortunately, that
    cost-plus coverage to handle those risks limits our ability to
    enforce the fact when defects occur and the contractor is still
    not liable for those defects because of the way the contracts
    were constructed.
        So yes, sir, we are reviewing the actual construct of each
    one of those contracts.
        Chairman Levin. That's very important to us. We just had
    the reform acquisition law which this committee initiated and
    promoted, and it was signed by the President. I understand
    sharing risks in the developmental stage. That is clear. You're
    not going to get too many contractors who are going to be
    willing to take the risk of a new system which is under
    development.
        That's very different, however, from producing something
    with a defect in it which is not supposed to be there. It's a
    manufacturing defect. Something is left out which is supposed
    to be there. Something is put in the wrong place. That's not
    supposed to be a shared risk. That's a failure of
    manufacturing.
        I'm glad, and I know that Senator McCain raised this point
    very strongly and feels very strongly, and I think all the
    members of this committee do because we've been so actively
    involved in the reform effort here in terms of acquisition.
    Your determination in this area is very important to us.
        Dr. Gilmore, you have some skin in that game as well, and
    I'm sure that this effort that has been described and was part
    of your testimony is also good news for you as well. Is that
    accurate?
        Dr. Gilmore. That's correct. The pace of testing now is
    largely limited by the availability of targets. So the sooner
    that we can get reliable targets, the more testing can be done.
        Chairman Levin. Dr. Miller, do you want to add anything to
    that issue in terms of cost-plus versus fixed price and getting
    guarantees, warranties against defective manufacturing?
        Dr. Miller. Senator, I'll just say that I agree with the
    statements of both General O'Reilly and Dr. Gilmore.
        Chairman Levin. All right, thank you.
        My time is up. Senator Inhofe is next.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm going to cover three things pretty quick here. First of
    all, the chairman spent a long time talking about the old
    system, the new system. We're talking about the third site in
    Poland, which is one that I very strongly supported during that
    time. Do you agree that initially we were talking about having
    that capability of knocking down an ICBM from Iran in the third
    site originally by 2013? That slipped probably to about 2015.
    Am I generally right there? Actually, originally I think it was
    2012, but then it started slipping.
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. Then the requirements for
    ratification of the treaties before we could begin work--to
    build the missile field is 5\1/2\ years, another year and a
    half to integrate it and complete the operational certification
    by the combatant command in Europe. So it was 2017 we reached
    the point before we could have the first operational site.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. Now, I disagree with that, and I will
    submit for the record evidence that it would have been 2015.
    It's not that big a deal, but that's an opinion that I'm
    expressing.
        [The information referred to, submitted by Senator Inhofe,
    follows:]

        The 2007 report by the Department of Defense and the Department of
    State, Proposed U.S. Missile Defense Assets in Europe, stated that, the
    proposed European interceptor site would include ``up to 10 silo-based
    long-range interceptors located in central Europe (2011-2013).''

        [The information referred to, submitted by the Department
    of Defense, follows:]

        Missile field construction was estimated at 5\1/2\ years plus 1
    year operational integration. The starting date slipped due to
    Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement ratification requirements, which
    moved the operational capability from 2014 to 2017.

        Senator Inhofe. The second thing I want to get out is how
    this treaty affects our ability to protect America, our
    national missile defense system. Dr. Miller, I looked in your
    written testimony after you made a statement and I couldn't
    find it, but you said something to the effect that there is no
    restriction by Russia in terms of our ability for a national
    missile defense system.
        I did find, however, in General O'Reilly's statement it
    says that ``the New START has no constraints on current and
    future components of the BMD's development or deployment.'' Let
    me just suggest to you that there are a lot of people who
    disagree with that. How do you respond, very briefly, and just
    take one of you--perhaps, General O'Reilly, you'd be the right
    one--when you have the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Lavrov,
    who stated that linkage to missile defense is clearly spelled
    out in the accord and legally binding and the Russians will
    have the right to exit the accord if the U.S. is building up a
    missile defense strategy.
        I also have actually from the unilateral statement by
    Russia where they say the same thing, that yes, they do have
    that restriction on the United States and it is legally
    binding.
        Any response to that?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, the DOD General Counsel, the State
    Department General Counsel, and the National Security Council
    General Counsel have all advised me that it is not legally
    binding.
        Senator Inhofe. So that's us. We're saying it's not legally
    binding, although the Russians say it is legally binding. Does
    that bother you?
        General O'Reilly. No, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. It bothers me.
        Dr. Miller. Sir, it's clear that the Russian unilateral
    statement is not unilaterally binding. But it's also clear that
    they have the right to withdraw from New START, once ratified
    and implemented, should they see it in their national security
    interests. We don't expect that to be the case.
        I would also note that the Russians made a similar
    statement with respect to New START I and concerns about BMD
    development.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, I know that.
        Dr. Miller. The United States then withdrew from the Anti-
    Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Russians stayed in START I at
    that time. We can expect them to make decisions that are based
    on their national interest.
        Senator Inhofe. The third thing that I want to get into the
    record--and there's not going to be a lot of time to do all
    this--would be the issue that comes out as to when Iran is
    going to have the capability, and we spent a long time looking
    at this. We know that we have GBIs in California. We know we
    have them in Alaska. We've seen the map showing the footprint.
    Yes, it does reach the east coast of the United States barely,
    and a lot of people have said, well, that's assuming we're
    lucky with one shot, and then there's a percentage that's
    attached to that.
        I think the previous administration, in talking about the
    third site, felt the same as I do. That that is not a comfort
    level that I feel that I'm enjoying.
        Would anyone like to volunteer as to when you think that
    the Iranians are going to have the capability of sending an
    ICBM to the continental United States?
        Dr. Miller. Sir, that's an inherently uncertain question.
    The current estimates, as included in a recent unclassified
    report submitted by DOD, say that it could potentially be as
    soon as 2015.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. I agree with that, and that's the
    first thing we agree on.
        That being 2015 and the capability as I look at this--and
    we've been talking about the old system and the new system. I'm
    familiar with the SM-3 Block I-A, what its capabilities are.
    That's 2010, that's now. The Block 1-B, 2015; Block II-Alpha,
    that would be 2018, but really to have the capability of a
    ground-based system that would have been in this case in
    Poland--at one time we were talking about doing that in Florida
    and decided that we wanted to have something that would also be
    defensive for Western Europe, and I agreed with that at the
    time.
        But to get to that you have to have an SM-3 Block II-B,
    Bravo. Does anyone want to venture a guess as to when that II-
    Bravo would be effective, deployable?
        Dr. Miller. Sir, we estimate that for 2020. If I could
    briefly add, the current planned deployment for the PAA
    includes the placement of a forward-based radar in Europe in
    the 2011 timeframe. That radar will not only help the defense
    of Europe. It will also help the defense of the United States,
    and it was indeed the most important contribution of the
    previous architecture. That's a common element from the past
    architecture. We moved it forward from what we estimated to be
    2017 deployment to a 2011 deployment to provide that capability
    for improved national missile defenses earlier.
        Senator Inhofe. It's my understanding that this 2020 date
    on the phase four is one--do you all stand behind that date?
    Because I don't. I've read a lot of things to the contrary,
    that there's not any level of certainty to that. Does anyone
    feel very confident?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. I've developed four missile
    systems. This is very feasible. We used very conservative
    timelines. We've looked at the technology. I've had two
    independent estimates. I've asked the Defense Science Board and
    the Secretary of Defense has supported me in an independent
    assessment of that this year to verify----
        Senator Inhofe. I want you to send me something that is
    convincing that we would have that by 2020. Now, even if that's
    true--and I would question that; I do want to see what you have
    and I want to give you the benefit of that doubt, General. But
    even if that's true, we still have that timeframe between 2015
    and 2020 that is very disturbing to me.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) established the
    goals and timelines for the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in Europe.
    The PAA will build on already fielded Ballistic Missile Defense System
    assets to deploy capability in four phases, delivering missile defenses
    earlier than prior plans for defense of Europe, and will complement the
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile defense activities. The BMDR
    states that, ``under this approach, in Phase 4 (2020 timeframe), an
    additional capability against a potential ICBM launched from the Middle
    East against the United States will be available. This phase will take
    advantage of an upgrade to the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), the Block
    IIB.''
        The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) program and budget documentation
    supports and reflects a 2020 deployment of Phase 4. For example, MDA's
    fiscal year 2011 budget justification documentation states that, ``in
    the 2020 timeframe, we intend to field in Phase 4 more advanced land-
    based capabilities in Europe using a more capable SM-3 Block IIB
    missile and space sensors to handle large raid sizes.'' MDA requested
    $40 million in fiscal year 2011 to initiate this effort.
        Additionally, MDA has base-lined the schedule, technical, resource,
    and contract plans that will lead up to a 2020 deployment of the SM-3
    Block IIB missile and other Phase 4 activities. These plans will be
    included in the congressionally-mandated Ballistic Missile Defense
    Accountability Report, which will be completed and delivered to the
    Congressional Defense Committees in June 2010.

        Senator Inhofe. This whole idea on the estimates that we
    have had in the past is a great deal of concern. You've heard
    me say this before, because I was there in 1998, in August
    1998, when we asked the question, when will North Korea have
    the multiple-stage capability. At that time the intelligence
    estimate, and it came out of the White House also, somewhere
    between 5 and 10 years. That was August 24, 1998. Seven days
    later, August 31, they fired one.
        I'd rather be conservative in our estimates. I have to at
    least express the opinion of one member of this panel who's
    very much disturbed over what could happen to the United States
    with this change in policy.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me first thank all of you for the extraordinary work
    that you've done. I've said this before in previous years, but
    it's not so long ago that there were a lot of people around
    here and elsewhere who thought that the whole idea of a BMD was
    really pie in the sky, no pun intended, I mean that it just was
    a ridiculous waste of money. I remember people saying, how are
    you ever going to have a bullet that could hit another bullet?
    Well, you have done it. It's a remarkable technological and
    management breakthrough, and I just don't think we can thank
    you enough for it, because it has direct relevance to the
    security of the American people.
        My God, you've actually even done a successful test of the
    Airborne Laser, General O'Reilly. That was thought to be the
    biggest mind trip and waste of money, and yet it holds
    tremendous potential for giving us a number of capabilities,
    including hitting missiles in the launch phase, which is
    probably the best time we'd want to hit them.
        So the first thing I wanted to do is thank you for the work
    you're doing.
        Second, last year in this committee we had a really
    vigorous debate in light of what many of us thought were
    excessive cuts in the MDA's budget. I'm really glad that the
    President has proposed in the budget for the coming fiscal year
    restoring well over $500 million in funding to the MDA. I think
    that's a very constructive step forward.
        I want to get into some of the discussion that both Senator
    Levin and Senator Inhofe had about the PAA and the two-stage
    GBI. If it's possible, I find myself agreeing with what
    Chairman Levin has argued are the positive results of the PAA
    in terms of the defense of Europe and the Middle East, our NATO
    allies, and our allies in the Middle East in terms of short-
    and medium-range missiles which Iran has now.
        But I also agree with Senator Inhofe and I share his
    concerns about what we lost when we stopped the change from so-
    called ``old'' to the new approach in terms of the GBI. Last
    week, General Burgess, the head of the Defense Intelligence
    Agency, was before this committee and echoing or paralleling
    what you said, Dr. Miller. He told us that their estimate was
    that Iran could have an ICBM that could hit the United States
    by 2015 with foreign assistance.
        When we pressed him on that, he said he was thinking about
    North Korea, and of course it's quite plausible that North
    Korea would sell Iran such foreign assistance. The problem here
    is that the two-stage GBI was supposed to be done by 2015,
    maybe 2017, as time went on. It's pretty clear in the exchange
    between Senator Inhofe and yourself that the SM-3 Phase II-B
    that will be capable of hitting a missile fired from Iran to
    the United States won't be ready until 2020 at best.
        There is a gap there. It's not a total vulnerability
    because of course we have the missiles in California and Alaska
    if, God forbid, the Iranian missile came over. General
    O'Reilly, I was pleased that the BMDR describes the
    administration's commitment to ``continued development and
    assessment of the two-stage GBI'' as a hedge against the risks
    that either a threat to the American Homeland will develop
    sooner than expected or the SM-3 program will run into
    currently unanticipated technical challenges.
        I think that's a very important statement to make because I
    think, as you would I guess agree, the two-stage GBI was a very
    good program, moving in the right direction.
        But here's my concern. In your testimony you highlighted
    the upcoming two tests for the two-stage GBI as laid out in
    MDA's IMTP. But if I'm reading things correctly, I'm concerned
    that, although that pair of tests is scheduled through 2012, no
    other tests are planned until 2016. So quite directly, I'm
    asking how can the two-stage GBI serve as an adequate hedge in
    the way that I described for defense of the Homeland, shoot,
    look, shoot--shoot from Europe, if we miss look, California,
    Alaska, pick it up? How can the two-stage GBI serve as an
    adequate hedge if it will not be sufficiently tested until
    later in the decade?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, first of all, the two-stage GBI has
    the same components as the three-stage, except the third stage
    is removed and we have an adapter in there. The actual
    appearance of them, the length, everything, is identical.
        We will test the two-stage GBI in June and that will verify
    any differences between the two-stage and the three-stage GBI.
    The important part of this interceptor is the kill vehicle
    itself, and the kill vehicle is identical between the two- and
    three-stage GBI. So our choice of when we were testing the two-
    stage GBI was basically driven on what type of environments we
    wanted to test the kill vehicle in, because we believe after
    this test in June we will have satisfied any differences
    between the two and three-stage and literally at that point on
    the performance of a two-stage is directly correlated and
    identical to the performance of a three-stage, because the
    front end after the first few minutes of flight is identical
    between the two.
        Senator Lieberman. So you're saying that the program to
    develop the SM-3 systems will also facilitate or bring about
    the realization of the two-stage GBI as a hedge?
        General O'Reilly. The two-stage GBI, as we said, in June we
    believe will verify any distinctive differences. At that point
    it'll be a very mature missile, because of the part that's so
    key. The development of the SM-3 II-B is a separate,
    independent activity. If we did have a problem with that,
    another way of achieving a hedge against a launch from either
    North Korea or Iran is to have another shot opportunity from
    our current missile fields, and that's what a two-stage GBI
    would provide you.
        Senator Lieberman. Current missile fields in Alaska.
        General O'Reilly. Yes, in Alaska.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, I wanted to get to that.
        Let me just come back to the strategy of this. I assume
    that you would agree that the sooner we can have the capability
    to shoot, look, and shoot--that is, shoot at an Iranian or
    North Korean missile, Iranian particularly, from Europe and
    then look and see if we hit it, and if we don't, shoot again
    from California and Alaska--the sooner we have that capability,
    the better?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
        Dr. Miller. May I briefly----
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, go ahead, Dr. Miller. I'd invite
    you into the conversation.
        Dr. Miller. Thank you very much. I just want to add that if
    we were 100 percent sure that a GBI interceptor would work
    effectively against this Iranian threat, we wouldn't have been
    talking about the possibility of a third site. So you're right
    that the idea of multiple shots is an important element.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Dr. Miller. What the SM-3 II-B provides is a different
    phenomenology, because it would have an ascent phase intercept.
    If there's a problem with the sensor of the GBI, which is
    common to both the two-stage and three-stage, the SM-3 II-B
    will provide a different way to get after that future threat
    that's independent and in our view a much greater contribution
    to the overall defense of the United States against that
    threat.
        Senator Lieberman. I think you're going to increasingly be
    asked about the potential gap here between when Iran has an
    ICBM and when we have the shoot, look, the two opportunities
    here. So I urge you to please be as direct as you need to be
    with us about what you need financially to really develop the
    two-stage GBI as a hedge, including, as you said, General
    O'Reilly, the potential for basing some of those two-stage GBIs
    in the United States for defense of our Homeland.
        I thank you. My time is up.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for all of your
    work on these important subjects.
        I want to come back, if I can, briefly to some questions
    that Senator Inhofe had asked with regard to New START. I'm
    concerned that the administration may not fully implement its
    Phased Adaptive plans for missile defense in Europe or that it
    may seek to slow down that implementation to avoid Russian
    withdrawal from the New START. What types of missile defense
    activities will the administration avoid to diminish the
    chances that the Russians will withdraw from the New START?
        Dr. Miller. Senator Thune, this administration has
    attempted to make as clear as possible in the Missile Defense
    Review and in other statements that it will do everything
    necessary to defend the U.S. Homeland, our troops overseas, and
    to work with our allies and partners to defend them as well--
    full stop.
        Senator Thune. I know your argument has been that these
    unilateral agreements, either side can walk away from this
    thing. But there's certainly an implication that the Russians I
    think believe that there is more to this than what we're being
    led to believe. I think it's an important element as we look at
    this treaty, because missile defense plays so heavily in the
    defense not only of the United States, but our allies.
        So that's something my guess is we'll continue to pursue.
        Dr. Miller. Sir, could I add just a brief note on the
    mathematics here? Currently we have 30 GBIs, by the end of this
    fiscal year, that will be deployed. Even with the potential
    growth in that, consider the difference in that scale relative
    to the 1550 warheads that are allowed under the New START.
    Whatever the concerns that the Russian Federation may have
    about the future of U.S. missile defense, the scale of the
    defensive capabilities that we have is nowhere near the
    potential of affecting the stability of the strategic
    deterrence relationship.
        Senator Thune. I appreciate that. I think sometimes too,
    though, that it gives them an out, a convenient out, an excuse
    at some point in the future.
        But let me ask you, Secretary Miller, if I might. In 2007,
    I should say, the Director of National Assessment--I want to
    quote for you what they said here: ``The individual Russian
    entities continue to provide assistance to Iran's ballistic
    missile programs. We judge that Russian entity assistance,
    along with assistance from entities in China and North Korea,
    has helped Iran move towards self-sufficiency in the production
    of ballistic missiles. The Russian Government has taken steps
    to improve controls on ballistic missile technology and its
    record of enforcement, though still mixed, has improved over
    the decade.''
        What level of assistance do you see from Russia today in
    helping Iran develop its ballistic missile capabilities or
    capacities?
        Dr. Miller. Sir, I believe that the 2000 assessment still
    stands, but I'd like to take that question for the record and
    provide a detailed response if I could.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Moscow is not providing state-to-state assistance to Tehran to
    further its ballistic missile and space launch vehicle research and
    development efforts. However, Russia's advanced ballistic missile
    production infrastructure has technologies that could further current
    and future Iranian goals. Russian-based Iranian defense officials and
    intermediaries have access to Russian academics, companies, and
    research organizations, and some of these individuals and entities
    likely assist Iran with technologies that could assist in its ballistic
    missile programs. Iran is likely attempting to obtain Russian expertise
    in missile guidance systems to improve accuracy, composite structural
    materials to save weight and increase range, high temperature materials
    for reentry vehicles, and possibly with more energetic propellants.

        Senator Thune. This is a follow-up to that one, so I don't
    know if you want to maybe take this one for the record, too. On
    Thursday, April 15, there was a Washington Times newspaper
    article that reported that the Central Intelligence Agency's
    Weapons Intelligence Nonproliferation Arms Control Center this
    year linked Chinese companies to missile programs in Iran. Do
    your missile defense plans take into account longstanding and
    possible present day cooperation and support by Russia and
    China for Iran's ballistic missile program?
        Dr. Miller. Sir, yes, they do, and I will provide more
    details with respect to the Chinese side of that equation as
    well for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Beijing is not providing state-to-state assistance to Tehran to
    further its ballistic missile and space launch vehicle research and
    development efforts, but Chinese individuals and entities provide Iran
    with controlled and dual-use technologies needed to advance in these
    areas. China-based Iranian defense officials and intermediaries have
    access to Chinese academics, companies, and research organizations,
    some of which continue to provide support despite being sanctioned.
    Iran is receiving materiel and technological assistance with missile
    guidance systems, raw materials, production machinery, and propellants.

        Senator Thune. Thank you.
        This I would direct to you, Secretary Miller, as well as to
    General O'Reilly. As part of the PAA to European missile
    defense, my understanding is the administration is now seeking
    to establish a ground-based SM-3 missile defense site in
    Romania by 2015. What countries do you envision will be
    protected by that site? How do you envision that the command
    and control process will work? What policies and procedures
    would likely be at work in the event that a launch would be
    detected?
        Dr. Miller. The capabilities of the PAA in terms of
    coverage of Europe will grow over time. By the time of phase
    three, which is 2018, it will have complete coverage of Europe,
    and that will be a combined contribution of the site in
    Romania, the site in Poland, and any additional sea-based sites
    as well.
        With respect to command and control, this is a conversation
    that we are having now with our NATO allies and we expect that
    the command and control for the PAA, which is intended to be
    the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense, would be through
    the European Command, and then we are having discussions with
    our European allies with respect to NATO command and control
    arrangements.
        There's an important program there called Active-Layered
    Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALT-BMD), a NATO program
    that's currently funded for study and that provides the command
    and control architecture to integrate countries' contributions
    to missile defense as well. I think General O'Reilly will
    probably want to add something, perhaps Admiral Macy as well.
        General O'Reilly. Sir, the ALT-BMD program is focused on a
    lower tier and, as we've said, the most effective missile
    defense has both an upper and a lower tier. So you have
    multiple shot opportunities using different systems. They are
    reviewing, going through studies, as we speak in order to
    determine what their contribution would be from a lower tier
    and then how to integrate it with our systems that we're
    proposing.
        This obviously will need the decision made at the Lisbon
    summit later this year with NATO to determine whether or not
    territorial defense in Europe is going to be a policy and a
    priority for them. If it is, the ALT-BMD system then would
    readily be available to integrate with the PAA.
        Senator Thune. I want to ask one question that Senator
    Lieberman alluded to earlier. On February 11 of this year, MDA
    completed a successful destruction of a threat-representative
    missile in its boost phase using the high-energy laser beam
    from the Airborne Laser aircraft, which I think is a pretty
    remarkable accomplishment and in my view could lead to a
    revolution in military affairs.
        I'm interested in knowing what your views are regarding the
    successful test of the Airborne Laser program. Do you think it
    marks the beginning of sort of a revolution, and what are your
    views about this program as we move forward and how should we
    be leveraging the new technology that it represents?
        Dr. Miller. I'll speak very briefly, then ask my colleagues
    to come in.
        The test represented an important milestone in showing that
    directed energy technologies can play an important role in the
    future in missile defense. As the Secretary of Defense had
    noted in the decision to terminate the program just about a
    year ago, the concern was not about the technological
    capabilities of the system, but about the operational concept
    for applying it and the reality that there would have to be
    large numbers of aircraft relatively close to the threats and
    there are serious concerns about the survivability of that
    platform and the lack of a concept of operations that would
    make it effective in an actual theater warfighting scenario.
        General O'Reilly. Sir, that intercept and destruction of
    the missile a few seconds after liftoff on 11 February
    demonstrated many scientific breakthroughs. There was a
    hierarchy of first-time accomplishments, and it went a long way
    with moving us from theory to empirical data that we're
    collecting on these systems.
        That design was largely designed during the 90s that you
    saw on that platform. The platform demonstrated the beam
    control and the ability to propagate in the earth's atmosphere.
    Since then, we have also been developing other technologies
    which produce more power in smaller packages, and our budget
    requests continue development of those so that we are readily
    available, or we have a platform readily available, in order to
    take these newer technologies and gain the standoff distances
    that we've been referring to that make them very operationally
    capable.
        Senator Thune. I appreciate the doubts that have been
    expressed by some about the concept of operations in an actual
    conflict. But there are others who I think have great
    confidence in the aircraft. It seems to me at least that these
    directed energy type weapons have great potential to transform
    our future deterrence capability. So I hope that we can
    continue dialogue about how to use those technologies as we go
    forward.
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
        Senator Thune. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me thank you, gentlemen, for your service as well. I
    want to go a little more into the PAA. In his testimony before
    this committee last month, General Chilton, the Commander in
    Chief at STRATCOM, talked about STRATCOM being the ``lead
    combatant command for missile defense advocacy'' and indicated
    he was working to shape missile defense investments that
    ``provide more effective capabilities for our geographic
    combatant commanders.''
        This goes to you, Admiral Macy. Have geographic combatant
    commanders requested increased regional missile defense
    capabilities?
        Admiral Macy. Yes, sir, they have, if by ``increased'' you
    mean additional assets. Following the generation of the PAA and
    the concept of having different abilities which could be
    tailored to regional needs, all of the combatant commanders
    with current significant issues in missile defense have been
    looking specifically at the PAA and how to adapt it to their
    region.
        I should take the opportunity to say that the PAA is not a
    system, but a concept of how you provide a regional missile
    defense. The systems, if you will, are the toolkit provided by
    General O'Reilly, which includes your interceptors, sensor
    packages, and command and control. There are differences in the
    regions between the Pacific, the Central region, and the
    European region, of politics, of threat, of geography, both
    technical and operational issues. So each of the combatant
    commanders are looking at that, and have come forward with
    their initial estimates, and we are in the process now within
    the Joint Staff and with STRATCOM of looking at how to balance
    those assets and to meet their needs in the different regions.
        Senator Ben Nelson. There are obviously going to be
    different needs depending on the location of the combatant
    commander. So you're requesting their input to determine how
    best to meet those needs, because there may be multiple needs
    and there may be some overlay of needs depending on the
    geographic location?
        Admiral Macy. Yes, sir. We have two primary means in which
    we can ascertain and address the COCOMs' needs. The first is,
    if you will, through their systemic and technical capabilities
    desires, which are expressed in the prioritized capabilities
    list for missile defense, which has inputs from all of the
    COCOMs and is collated and signed forward by General Chilton to
    General O'Reilly as what he sees as the need for General
    O'Reilly to provide.
        Separately, on the operational end we have, as we do for
    all our forces, a global force management process with a series
    of steps and boards that meet to figure out how to divvy up, if
    you will, all of our assets around the globe. We have, over the
    last 6 months, been engaged in an effort to understand how to
    put the missile defense issues into that same process, because
    the process works. The trick here, if you will, is getting the
    business rules for missile defense to provide to the global
    force managers. That is coming to a conclusion here in the next
    few months, and incorporates those things such as I mentioned
    that the combatant commanders have been looking at: What would
    be the laydown for PAA in their area?
        Senator Ben Nelson. Different warheads, different delivery
    systems, different capabilities, different needs, but
    coordination of them and the integration of that total arsenal;
    is that what we're attempting to do here?
        Admiral Macy. Yes, sir, exactly that, if you will, the
    toolkit of interceptors is fixed with the different types as
    sensors, and how do you apply those in the different regions.
    The other is recognizing that right now we don't have enough,
    so how do you prioritize and how do you manage the risk between
    regions, which is what we do on a daily basis with all of our
    forces, whether it's armor or ships or bombers or whatever. But
    the same thing applies to missile defense, yes, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Secretary Miller, do you support the PAA for missile
    defense in Europe, and is this a template for a regional
    missile defense in, let's say, the Middle East or Asia as well?
        Dr. Miller. Yes, sir, I do, and it is. As Admiral Macy
    noted, its instantiation will be different in each region, and
    we are working with our partners and allies to define those
    various architectures at this time, and also to do our own
    internal analysis of what makes most sense.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Miller, you heard the
    questions regarding the unique unilateral statements regarding
    the implications of our missile defense programs on the New
    START agreement. Is this a 'tis and 'taint situation, where
    they're saying one thing and we're saying another thing?
    Because unilateral statements that are contradictory are
    problematic in and of themselves. The question is what's the
    impact of the differences in understanding or different
    agreement about what the treaty says?
        If Russia decides to get out in the future at some point,
    is that a problem? Will we have achieved sufficient results
    being in the treaty for having gotten into the treaty in the
    first place? In other words, what is the impact if we end up in
    the situation where we part ways on the treaty, either we
    decide it's not in our national interests or they decide it's
    not in their national interests? What are the implications,
    positive and negative?
        Dr. Miller. Senator Nelson, let me say at the outset that I
    do not expect that that is a likely outcome at all. This treaty
    is in the national security interests of both the United States
    and the Russian Federation, and that is true taking account of
    the verification provisions in the treaty, of the reduction of
    delivery vehicles and warheads, and of the data exchanges and
    other steps that will take place to make it so that both sides
    have a better understanding of each other's capabilities.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So that's the essence of the treaty
    from the standpoint of Russia and from the standpoint of the
    United States. Are they just stating for their own political
    purposes back home about the missile defense system or do they
    truly believe that they have some control or some limitation on
    what we do with missile defense, recognizing the consequences
    if they get out, if they disagree?
        Dr. Miller. Senator Nelson, I think that the history of our
    discussions and of the choices of this administration and of
    past administrations make it clear that we will continue to
    invest in missile defenses and deploy missile defenses in order
    to protect the Homeland and to protect our forces overseas and
    our allies and partners.
        We've also made clear in the Missile Defense Review, and in
    the BMDR, that it is not our intention to change the strategic
    balance with respect to Russia, and the relatively small
    numbers of interceptors that we have today and the relatively
    small numbers we would have even if we increased that, compared
    to the 1,550 accountable strategic nuclear warheads under the
    New START, make it clear to me at least that we are a very long
    distance away from our defenses having any impact on strategic
    stability.
        We would like to continue discussions with Russia on
    missile defense cooperation. As Senator Levin noted, we believe
    we have a common interest in that area and would like to go
    forward from the current work on a common threat assessment to
    looking to include their radar, one at Armavir, and potentially
    other elements, to help improve our PAA in Europe. We think we
    have a lot of common interests, both in moving forward in
    missile defense and in reducing our nuclear weapons.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I agree with you, and this afternoon
    I'll be discussing that area of cooperation between Russia and
    the United States with Senator Margelov, who is the chairman of
    the Russian Federation Council's equivalent of their Foreign
    Relations Committee. There are areas where I think cooperation
    is possible. It appears that both sides are posturing to keep
    their own position open with respect to national defense and
    it's not necessarily the threat of a divorce before the
    prenuptual agreement is entered into. Is that fair?
        Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. I'd go further to say I expect
    throughout the duration of the treaty--it's a 7-year
    implementation period and it would be a 10-year period of
    implementation, with the possibility of a 5-year extension.
    Within that period, and I believe further, it's in the interest
    of the United States and Russia to continue to reduce our
    nuclear weapons and to exchange information and to conduct the
    type of verification that we will under the New START.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So even if one side or the other side
    decides to get out, there's still value in getting into the
    agreement?
        Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. As I said, I don't expect that that
    would be an outcome.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Macy, let me begin with you and ask you to explore
    with us the effect that this PAA will have on Aegis
    shipbuilding and deployment. Perhaps others will want to
    contribute to this discussion. There are worries that valuable
    Aegis ships might be locked into the BMD mission. These ships
    carry out a wide range of other warfighting tasks and are very
    much in high demand. Was there collaboration between the Navy
    and the other agencies represented at the table on the creation
    of this plan, and does the Navy's shipbuilding plan take into
    account the increased need for BMD-capable ships under this
    approach?
        Admiral Macy. Senator, thank you. To answer a couple of
    different pieces here: Yes, we had participation during the
    discussions last year and this year as part of the BMDR, which
    engendered the concept of the PAA as part of our analysis, with
    the other Services and with the COCOMs.
        We are certainly conscious of the impact of that on Aegis
    shipbuilding and ship tasking. I can't tell you right now that
    there's a plan to increase the shipbuilding as a result
    strictly of this tasking, because partly for the reason that
    you noted, that these are multi-mission ships, and they will be
    doing very many different missions at different times.
        As I mentioned earlier in my discussion with Senator
    Nelson, that is part of the global force management process,
    which is where you send ships and what you use them for. We do
    not anticipate at this time, nor have we to date, taken a ship
    and permanently assigned it to doing nothing but missile
    defense, whether it was part of the efforts that we have in the
    Seventh Fleet with potential risks from North Korea or in other
    parts of the world.
        I will note that in an earlier time in my life I served on
    a Tomahawk-capable ship and we performed a number of different
    missions. From time to time, depending on the needs of that
    combatant commander, we would be assigned to be the Tomahawk
    shooter, in which case we were geographically constrained
    within a certain area to be prepared to launch on a moment's
    notice. That certainly could be a possibility in the future,
    depending on a BMD risk.
        But that doesn't mean that that is all that ship would ever
    do. Part of what you do in global force management on an annual
    basis, what you do in operational management, command and
    control on a day-to-day and a week-to-week basis, is to move
    your assets around.
        Now, we do need more Aegis BMD-capability, which is not
    necessarily the same thing as more Aegis BMD ships, because we
    are looking to convert certain numbers of our current Aegis
    ships to BMD capability.
        Senator Wicker. How many?
        Admiral Macy. I believe it's a total of 38 across the
    Future Years Defense Program. I'd have to defer to General
    O'Reilly for the specific number.
        General O'Reilly. Yes, it will be 38 by 2015.
        Senator Wicker. How long ago was that decision made? Did
    that decision predate the decision to move toward this phased
    approach?
        Admiral Macy. I would say it was done in consonance with it
    and the discussions over the last year to 2 years as we
    developed this idea. The PAA did not spring full-blown on a
    day, and there were a lot of discussions looking at that. The
    chairman alluded earlier to the Joint Capabilities Mix Study.
        Senator Wicker. I hate to interject, but when was the PAA
    announced?
        Admiral Macy. The PAA was announced on September 17 of last
    year.
        Senator Wicker. Of 2009?
        Admiral Macy. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. The decision with regard to the number of
    ships predated that?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, last year's budget request was for
    27 ships by the end of this time, and we have increased that,
    working with the Navy, 11 more since the PAA has been decided
    and announced.
        Senator Wicker. Largely as a result of the PAA?
        General O'Reilly. Yes--well----
        Admiral Macy. No, sir. A combination. The original----
        Senator Wicker. General O'Reilly says yes and Admiral Macy
    says no.
        Admiral Macy. I would submit, sir, that the original
    increase up to 27 was as a result partly of the studies we had
    done saying that we need more. Then when the PAA came into
    being, the General was asked what more will it take, and that
    resulted in a further increase in the number of ships.
        Senator Wicker. For the two of you at that end of the
    table, are you telling the Senate that under the present plan
    we're going to have enough Aegis ships to carry out this new
    PAA and all the other missions that are going to be required?
    Are you comfortable with that number?
        Admiral Macy. Based on the information we have now, we
    think that is a good number. It is a step in the right
    direction. Whether it is the total number will be part of the
    analysis I alluded to earlier, that will be conducted over the
    next year, the JCM-3 study. The last study just looked at
    interceptors. This new study will look at interceptors, launch
    systems, and sensors.
        Dr. Miller. Senator, could I very briefly? Prior to the PAA
    decision, the plan was for 27 Aegis-capable ships. After the
    decision, the plan was changed to 38 Aegis-capable ships, and
    we will continue to look at that question, I'm sure not just
    with the current study but over the years, as we see how the
    threat changes and how our capabilities develop. That's a
    fundamental element of the adaptive part of that PAA.
        Senator Wicker. Let me move on to one other thing. Dr.
    Gilmore, in your testimony you talk about the ripple effects of
    a test failure, such as the recent GMD flight test FTG-06, and
    say that the ripple effect can be significant. I think our
    chairman and ranking member alluded to this in their
    statements. Can you give us, in a nutshell, why we had this
    failure?
        Dr. Gilmore. General O'Reilly can talk about it as well as
    I can and perhaps better. But the failure investigation is
    under way. I'm not sure exactly what we can say about the
    failure.
        Senator Wicker. Is it classified or is it just premature to
    answer that?
        General O'Reilly. It's classified, sir. But I can say, sir,
    that there were two failure modes. The first was the sea-based
    X-band radar stopped transmitting at a certain point in time,
    and we understand why now. Second of all, we had a new version
    of the GMD kill vehicle. It was the first time being flown, the
    longest any kill vehicle's been flown. We also encountered a
    problem that we've been able to identify on that design, and
    our intent is to make those corrections and test again this
    year.
        Senator Wicker. Dr. Gilmore, I guess my question is,
    according to your testimony the testing is very complex and
    fraught with potential for other failures. Can technology
    realistically meet the goals of this PAA? What are we to draw
    from your testimony that says an Aegis BMD test failure in the
    next year could impact the full implementation and assessment
    of phase one in the PAA for the defense of Europe?
        The test that you spoke of in your testimony, what did it
    do to our timeline, and what effect might one of these very
    possible failures have on the timeline?
        Dr. Gilmore. When there is a test failure, there is less
    knowledge gained and it will take longer to gain the amount of
    knowledge that we wanted to gain. So in the case of the failure
    of FTG-06, I think that General O'Reilly is still assessing
    what changes will have to be implemented in the IMTP, and that
    will be something that you would decide within the next 6
    months or so, I think.
        But there's a potential for tests to get bumped down the
    road in order to collect in the next test the information that
    would have been collected in this test. So the implication is
    that there would be less knowledge known in any given point in
    time.
        With regard to the PAA and whether it's technologically
    feasible, yes, in my view it's certainly technologically
    feasible. It will take time to test it, just like it takes time
    to test all of these complex systems. These are particularly
    complex systems, but all defense systems are complex, and we
    have a history of learning as we go along and some of the
    programs taking longer to test and pan out than we had
    originally hoped.
        But I have no reason to expect that testing of the PAA
    through the various versions of the SM-3 interceptor will be
    particularly unique in the testing history of this program or
    other programs.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Bill Nelson, with thanks to Senator Hagan.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Miller, with the Czech
    Republic we're going to have some form of shared missile launch
    information. You mentioned this in your prepared statement. You
    indicate it's a near-term effort. Do we need to provide for
    some funds or authority to conduct such information-sharing?
        Dr. Miller. Senator, we've begun discussions with the Czech
    Republic on shared early warning. The required funds are
    relatively quite small. We are currently assessing whether the
    MDA and/or the Army have the authority to expend those funds.
    Sir, if we are unable to resolve that in the very near term, we
    may come back and ask for specific legislative authority. This
    would be in the single digits of millions of dollars.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask Dr. Gilmore. In your
    prepared testimony, you stated, talking about the Airborne
    Laser: ``The engagement was not an operational test conducted
    under operationally realistic conditions.'' Then why don't you
    give us more detail why this was not an operationally realistic
    test and why it's not a basis for using this aircraft as an
    operational weapons system.
        Dr. Gilmore. I'd be happy to do that. I can summarize some
    of those reasons immediately and then I can also refer you to
    the report on the Airborne Laser that I submitted to Congress
    this past January, which will spell out in greater detail, a
    lot greater detail, what I'm about to say.
        The range at which the intercept was conducted is not
    operationally realistic because modern air defenses would
    preclude the aircraft from penetrating into the air space of
    any country, even a small country like North Korea, to a
    position such that the range at which this particular foreign
    military asset was engaged was realistic. So you would have to
    demonstrate the capability to engage threats successfully at
    several times the range that was recently demonstrated.
        The next test will be at about twice the range of the
    initial test, but even that would not be an operationally
    realistic range for an engagement. In the case of larger
    countries like Korea, unless the power of the laser was
    substantially larger than the laser power in the current system
    or even the objective power that was originally sought, which
    was I think about three times the amount of power that's in the
    current system, even with a much larger power laser. In a
    larger country like Iran there would probably always be
    locations from which a launch could occur that an airborne
    laser that had to stand off outside the Iranian borders could
    engage.
        In addition, there are other things that some people may
    regard as more mundane, but which are very important for a
    system to be operationally effective in combat. For example,
    you have to have a logistics system that will support the
    operations of the aircraft when it's deployed. We don't have
    that for this aircraft. It could be gotten, but we don't have
    it currently.
        There would have to be a relatively large fleet of
    aircraft. You would probably need one or two orbits of aircraft
    even to defend launches against a country like North Korea.
    Each orbit would have to have two aircraft in it to assure that
    one aircraft at any given time could engage. If you want two
    aircraft up, and they would have to be up continuously because
    you can't give the enemy an opportunity to shoot when the
    aircraft land, then you would have to have another three to
    five aircraft to support those two up continuously. That's a
    fleet of 10 or more aircraft would be needed in order to have
    an operationally effective system.
        Those are the highlights, and there are more details in the
    report I submitted.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What about the difference between
    chemical lasers and solid state?
        Dr. Gilmore. As General O'Reilly can discuss probably in
    greater detail than I can, there are concepts, some of which
    are being worked on at some of the national laboratories, for
    solid state lasers which would have higher power than the
    current sort of hybrid solid state-chemical lasers, but in a
    much smaller package. That means that you could put it on an
    aircraft that's smaller than the large 747 on which the COIL,
    which stands for Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser, is emplaced.
        MDA is pursuing those kinds of technologies, so they do
    offer promise. General O'Reilly could probably say more about
    that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want the record to
    reflect that several predecessors ago of General O'Reilly,
    General Kadish testified to this committee--and this is years
    ago--that the chemical Airborne Laser by the time that he
    testified was going to be ready within 10 months. Of course,
    we've heard the testimony today that it's nowhere near it. I
    thought that strange at the time and have made some remarks
    since about that kind of information coming to this committee,
    which was wildly optimistic, indeed a fantasy, is not the kind
    of testimony that this committee should be receiving.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you for the recollection. You have
    the memory here, institutional memory on this subject, but a
    lot of other subjects as well, which is invaluable to us.
        Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank all of you for your service and for the
    important work that you're doing on missile defense. It's
    really essential for the emerging threats we have in the world
    that we're facing.
        I want to go back to something, Dr. Miller, that you talked
    about and see if everybody's in agreement with this. I believe
    that you testified that you believe that Iran could possibly
    have an ICBM by 2015?
        Dr. Miller. That's correct. As was noted, that would assume
    foreign assistance.
        Senator LeMieux. Is that everyone on the panel's opinion as
    well? Any differing opinion?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, I don't have a differing opinion.
        Senator LeMieux. We heard from General Cartwright, I
    believe it was, a couple of hearings ago in terms of
    development of a nuclear weapon by Iran, that he thought that
    that would be, at its earliest, maybe a 3- to 5-year period,
    which would also bring us to about 2015. Is that your
    understanding as well?
        Dr. Miller. Sir, there's a tremendous amount of uncertainty
    associated with both of those estimates. With respect to a
    nuclear weapon, I think one can have confidence that it's well
    beyond a year and it is more likely in that 3-plus time,
    timeframe.
        Senator LeMieux. I want to focus you on a topic, if I can,
    in another potential area of threat that's not talked about a
    lot, but it's being talked about more and more in this
    committee. The chairman and ranking member and myself have
    raised this issue when we've talked to our friends from
    SOUTHCOM. I want to set the table for you on this topic because
    I think it has an impact on missile defense.
        More and more we're seeing Venezuela as an emerging threat,
    I believe, to the United States. We have evidence from a
    Spanish judge that Venezuela was collaborating with a group in
    Spain to potentially assassinate President Uribe. I had the
    opportunity this past weekend to go to our joint interagency
    task force in Key West, which does tremendous work on
    interdicting narcoterrorism, and we know that Venezuela is
    allowing for airplanes to fly over its space to bring drugs and
    other contraband up Central America towards Mexico to the
    United States, and that they're a willing collaborator with the
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia.
        We know that Hezbollah and Hamas now have a presence in
    Latin America, and we know that Tehran and Venezuela through
    Chavez and Caracas have more and more connections.
        I want to pose to you and put on your radar screen for
    thought and contemplation that we should not be just concerned
    about a threat from Iran from the east, but we should be
    concerned about a threat from Iran from the south. I'm worried
    that in the next 10 years we're going to be talking about
    Venezuela trying to obtain a nuclear weapon. With this
    dangerous alliance that's growing between Iraq and Venezuela, I
    want to pose to you the question of whether or not our missile
    defense system would be capable of intercepting a weapon that
    was launched from South America?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, the PAA that we're using for missile
    defense applies, of course, to other areas other than Europe,
    especially in the United States. The PAA applied here to our
    territory would provide that defense.
        Senator LeMieux. Would that be through Aegis ships or what
    would be the mechanism for that defense?
        General O'Reilly. For the type of ranges you're referring
    to, you would need to use Aegis, either Aegis Ashore or Aegis
    on ships, which we can surge into the area.
        Senator LeMieux. Right now am I correct, Admiral, that
    there are two Aegis ships that are on the east coast of the
    United States, or BMD-capable ships?
        Admiral Macy. At any given moment, it could be anywhere
    from two to five, and there are more as time goes on, because
    we are increasing the number of East Coast Aegis ships with BMD
    capability, not necessarily for that reason, even though, as
    the General pointed out, you would apply it in that direction
    should you feel the threat develop, but as a matter of, if you
    will, just practical fleet management. It's closer to the
    Mediterranean and parts of the Middle East from Norfolk than it
    is from San Diego. So the Navy is looking to more evenly
    distribute the number of BMD ships they have, if you will, in
    the two major fleets, Atlantic and Pacific.
        Senator LeMieux. In terms of the Atlantic, that would
    obviously provide for those ships to be in the south around
    Florida and the Gulf of Mexico?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. Again, as you adapt in phases
    to what you believe Venezuela may be doing, it would be exactly
    that, and do you have ships, would there be Aegis Ashore sites
    placed in various locations, and then you would build up the
    architecture appropriate to that region.
        Senator LeMieux. In terms of a missile, you would not, I
    assume, need an ICBM to launch from South America to hit the
    United States? It would be a mid-range missile, is that
    correct?
        General O'Reilly. Mid-range to intermediate-range, and then
    we can talk about who thinks how many thousand kilometers is
    which. But yes, sir.
        Dr. Miller. Sir, if I could interject very briefly, I just
    want to clarify that we have no plans to deploy Aegis Ashore
    within the United States. One of the advantages of the PAA is
    that that option would always be available in the future. But
    as was suggested, should the threat you posited arise, a sea-
    based capability should be able to cope with it.
        Senator LeMieux. Does Iran now possess medium-range
    missiles or short-range missiles?
        Dr. Miller. Sir, the answer is yes to both of those
    questions.
        Senator LeMieux. I ask that you, as I have asked our
    leaders in CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM and others, to put this in your
    analysis if you've not already done so, going forward, because
    I believe that there is a gathering storm in this alliance
    between Iraq and Venezuela. I was also concerned to see that
    China has decided to give billions of dollars in aid to
    Venezuela. I ask that you focus on this topic because I think
    it's something that we're going to be dealing with in the years
    to come.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks for your testimony today. I do support the
    administration's PAA to BMD because it incorporates the
    relevant technologies in an accelerated time fashion to respond
    to the evolving threats that are out there. This approach
    augments our current technologies in place to protect the U.S.
    Homeland against long-range and ICBM threats. It also provides
    an enhanced capability to defend against short- and medium-
    range ballistic missile threats to our personnel that are
    deployed in the regional forward operating bases and
    headquarters, and obviously as well our allies in Europe, the
    Middle East, and Southwest Asia.
        The Navy's mission of protecting Europe from ballistic
    missile attacks has widespread implications for the surface
    fleet, potential deployment schedules, crewing arrangements,
    and command and control procedures for cruisers and destroyers.
    Admiral Macy, what will be the command and control procedures
    regarding the use of sea-based SM-3s for the purpose of
    intercepting ballistic missiles fired toward Europe from Iran
    or some other rogue country in the Middle East or Southwest
    Asia, and will the authority to fire the missile rest with the
    regional combatant commanders?
        Admiral Macy. To answer the last one first, yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hagan. Okay.
        Admiral Macy. If I may take a moment, in BMD command and
    control can be thought of as encompassing two areas of effort:
    the command area, which is where you do your planning, you
    determine your preplanned responses, your rules of engagement,
    those assets you're most particularly going to focus on
    protecting, and so forth. You can think of the control area as
    being the execution part.
        Once the missiles are flying, the timelines are such that
    the interaction and control is very limited, and you find that
    in order to be successful the operational commanders down to
    the level of the commanding officer of that destroyer needs to
    have the authority to carry out the plan that was developed
    earlier in order to succeed in the intercept.
        So we talk about the arrangements in the control area. It
    would follow if we were conducting this in a U.S. context, it
    would be in a line of command that comes down from European
    Command, through an area air defense commander, notionally
    possibly down to a regional defense commander, to the
    commanding officer of that ship, but who would be carrying out
    the plans he was given until told to stop, because that's where
    command interaction in BMD most often comes in, is to tell you
    to stop, not to go.
        We like to tell people that to be effective the first phone
    call you're going to get from that young commander is not what
    he wants to do, but what he just did. So the issue is on the
    command side. That's where your planning and your
    decisionmaking occurs.
        In a U.S. context, that would be under, in the case of
    Europe, the command of European Command, Admiral Stavrides in
    his U.S. hat. General Brady is the U.S. Air Force Europe
    Commander, and would also have the responsibility for missile
    defense efforts under Admiral Stavrides. So that would be that
    organization.
        As I mentioned in my opening comments, I did have the
    opportunity yesterday to participate with the Vice Chairman on
    briefing the North Atlantic Council and that was a part of the
    discussion in a NATO context. It is our belief that should NATO
    take this as a mission we would then develop the missile
    defense command and control within a NATO context, in which you
    would have a missile defense adaptation of the military
    procedures that we follow now. NATO would be involved in the
    command part developing the plans, understanding what the rules
    of engagement would be, under what circumstances you would
    start to commence active missile defense launching
    interceptors. The NATO command and control, once they had the
    capability, the physical capability to participate, through
    adaptation of the ALT-BMD system or others--we believe the ALT-
    BMD system is the proper approach to take that up to an upper
    tier and to a territorial capability--would have more and more
    hands-on involvement in the command of it and it would fall
    under the NATO military procedures, where the Supreme Allied
    Command Europe (SACEUR) and Admiral Stavrides in his role as
    SACEUR, with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
    underneath him.
        As it happens, the U.S. air defense command focus is at
    Ramstein and that is also where the NATO air defense command
    focus, the buildings, are located. So it would be done in that
    context.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Admiral Macy. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hagan. As you've indicated, the administration's
    PAA for BMD involves building two land-based Aegis BMD systems
    in Europe. Some observers suggest that the establishment of two
    Aegis Ashore sites would allow a reduction in the number of
    BMD-capable Aegis ships needed for European BMD operations.
    General O'Reilly, what modifications are needed to make the SM-
    3 suitable for use as a land-based missile and what are the
    technical risks associated with these modifications?
        General O'Reilly. Senator, one of the advantages of the
    land-based SM-3 is that we would not change the missile
    configuration used at sea or at land. It gives the Navy and the
    combatant commanders a greater pool of missiles to manage from,
    more operational flexibility. Each site can maintain between 80
    to 120 missiles, so there's a tremendous amount of firepower at
    each location.
        We literally are taking the Aegis system so that it is
    duplicated on the land. We have no special logistics
    requirements or training requirements or manning or command and
    control. So that in fact it is very adaptable to the Navy.
    Again, it can be moved within 4 months, if we see the threat
    has diminished in one location or moved to another. It is very
    readily adaptable to remote sites or large protection.
        We don't plan on making any unique changes of the Aegis
    system to be adapted to the land.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        I know, General O'Reilly, when you were in my office
    recently I was asking you the question on where you get the
    highly capable, trained individuals who do the technology, the
    individuals, the scientists. I do want to thank you for
    recruiting also at the universities and schools within North
    Carolina, because I know we have a lot of very capable
    individuals in our State, too.
        Following the official signing of the New START, the
    Russian Government announced that it reserves the right to
    withdraw from the treaty if its national interests are
    threatened. The Russian Government also announced that New
    START will only be effective if there's no buildup in
    capabilities to the U.S. missile defense system.
        Dr. Miller, how is the administration reconciling Russia's
    caveats under the New START treaty with Central Europe's
    demands for a role in U.S. missile defense plans?
        Dr. Miller. Senator, the United States made a unilateral
    statement as well with respect to New START, and I'll just give
    you the relevant element of it. I had asked earlier that it be
    submitted for the record. That is that the statement says very
    directly that ``The United States intends to continue improving
    and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend
    itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative
    approach to strengthening stability in key regions.''
        What that means is that, both with respect to any necessary
    improvements for our Homeland defense and for the PAA in Europe
    and in other regions, we intend to make what improvements are
    necessary to continue to protect our Homeland, our forces
    deployed overseas, and our partners and allies.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        My time is up. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General O'Reilly, I'm concerned about whether or not we're
    going to adequately continue to complete the deployment of our
    missile defense system, the GMD system that we spent decades
    perfecting, and it's really exceeded most people's, almost
    everybody's expectations in technology, its proven
    effectiveness, and that sort of thing.
        There are some that have opposed it and as a result it
    seems this administration to me is penny wise, pound foolish,
    in the sense that once we have done all this let's complete it.
    I'm concerned about whether or not we are deploying enough of
    these missiles, number one, and number two, whether we have
    enough to maintain the kind of testing that we need.
        The GMD program manager and the executive director briefed
    staff that the MDA, your agency, plans to acquire only 52 GBIs.
    Thirty will be deployed and put in the ground, while the
    remaining 22 will be used for testing. By fiscal year 2019,
    based on the plans that are ongoing, MDA assumes that the
    initial developmental testing will be complete, but that will
    leave only three GBIs for stockpile reliability testing through
    2032.
        So from 2019 to 2032 we have only three missiles, according
    to our present plans, 12 years, to do testing. By contrast, the
    Air Force conducts three flight tests each year on the
    Minuteman III ICBM and the Navy conducts four on the Trident
    Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).
        So is this enough? Don't we need to, while the assembly
    process is still available to us, produce enough of these
    missiles so that we can maintain testing in the years to come?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, working with the test community,
    represented by Dr. Gilmore and the operational test
    communities, we did work together and determine that by 2019 if
    the tests are successful, we do believe that we will have the
    data necessary to confirm the performance of the GMD system in
    all anticipated flight regimes.
        We also have designed a missile which has an incredible
    capability of maintaining its health and status. Not only do we
    constantly maintain the health and status of these missiles, we
    also run periodic checks thoroughly to verify its performance
    and the proper functioning of all of the systems. We will
    conduct 4.3 million checks of these 30 missiles over a 20-year
    period, plus 600 other tests where we remove the missiles,
    remove components from them, test those components, and
    refurbish the missiles with brand new components.
        Senator Sessions. I think this idea came from on high
    somewhere, to cut the number back. But are you confident that
    enough analysis has been done to conclude that through that 12
    years there's going to be enough missiles to do actual testing?
    Will you let us know if you conclude there's a problem? Don't
    we need to do it soon; otherwise we'll have to restart an
    entire assembly process?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, we do today have to restart an
    entire assembly process. I'm faced with that right now. What we
    currently are building will take us through 2016 with the full
    production line. But yes, sir, I do have monitoring
    responsibilities to ensure that we have a production base that
    will take our refurbishments all the way to 2026, and we do
    need an industrial base to do that.
        So yes, sir, and I will report back if I determine that we
    need more missiles based on our estimation.
        Senator Sessions. I firmly believe that we're cutting the
    number too close and I hope that it's not too late to
    reevaluate that now. It would be a lot less costly.
        General O'Reilly and Dr. Gilmore, the industrial base
    supporting the production of solid rocket motors necessary for
    the ICBMs, SLBMs, and evolved expendable launch vehicles
    (EELVs) is under strain. The recent decision to cancel NASA's
    Constellation program will likely reduce the customer base for
    solid rocket motors substantially, raising costs and perhaps
    leading to a loss of industry proficiency. It's estimated that
    costs for solid rocket motors programs could rise as much as
    150 to 200 percent for DOD.
        This is because, as I understand it, NASA has been
    consuming about 70 percent of these solid rocket motors and
    keeping the system moving forward. General O'Reilly, I
    understand that you or DOD were not consulted about the NASA
    decision on cancelling the Constellation program. This is our
    manned spaceflight plan for the future. What impact does that
    decision have on MDA?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, for GMD we were not consulted. Our
    solid rocket motor usage for large solid rocket motors was
    about 8 percent of the total production done in the United
    States every year. So we had a very small part to play. As you
    said, it was dominated by NASA's use of the solid rocket
    motors.
        We have an increase in the small solid rocket motors based
    on the proposed budget that we have submitted to Congress,
    where we will consume over 550 tons of solid rocket motors in
    the next 5 years. So we actually have the reverse process or
    challenge of having that production capability for small solid
    rocket motors. Yet at the same time, as you said, we have had a
    severe reduction in the industrial capacity to produce the
    large solid rocket motors.
        We are procuring five additional booster sets for our GBIs.
    One reason is they are economical to buy now to use them at a
    later date if we need to for testing or other purposes.
        Senator Sessions. I'm worried about it.
        Dr. Gilmore, is the Secretary of Defense concerned about
    the shrinking solid rocket motor industrial base and the issues
    that General O'Reilly mentioned?
        Dr. Gilmore. Senator, with all due respect, I think that
    General O'Reilly tracks the industrial base issues more than I
    do. I focus on the testing issues, not on the industrial base
    issues. So he would be the best one to answer that question.
        Dr. Miller. Senator, if I could interject very quickly, I
    do know that the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology,
    and Logistics, Dr. Carter, is currently undertaking a study of
    the industrial base for solid rocket motors.
        Senator Sessions. The President has already indicated that
    he's rethinking some of the NASA issues, which I appreciate him
    doing, and I really think that he should do that, because I
    strongly believe we don't need to abandon our leadership in
    space; and second, there may be ways in which we can recognize
    this symbiotic relationship between NASA and DOD that could be
    a basis for being able to continue that program.
        Mr. Chairman, I would just say I won't ask the question at
    this point, but I may submit for the record my concern over the
    fact that we were ready to test the two-stage GBI, which was
    going to be deployed in Europe and will be deployed in the
    United States, and it's ready to go forward. But our plan to
    create an interceptor in Europe capable of knocking down an
    ICBM that would hit the United States, appears to be delayed as
    late as 2020. I think that's a mistake and we'll want to pursue
    that as we go forward.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions. If that's
    submitted for the record, the answer will be forthcoming
    promptly, we hope.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen. General O'Reilly, in your opening
    comments you made the point that missile fields in Alaska were
    positioned to engage both Korea and Iran. Just a point of
    clarification. Does that affect the launchers or the radars and
    the launchers? Can the radar as it was configured in Alaska
    pick up a target coming from Iran?
        General O'Reilly. From a polar projection, the closest
    point to the United States from Iran is actually Alaska, and
    the same with North Korea. For our radars, we have the
    Fylingdales radar in England and coming on line next month will
    be the Thule radar in Greenland. They provide our northern
    observation and tracking of missiles launched from that part of
    the globe.
        Senator Reed. So that both in terms of acquisition of the
    target and launching to intercept, Alaska is well positioned
    vis-a-vis Iran and North Korea?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. As Secretary Miller said
    earlier, the contribution of a forward-based radar in Southern
    Europe adds tremendously to that capability also because we
    could track even sooner.
        Senator Reed. One other aspect of this is not only the
    forward-based radar, but also space satellite observation and
    integration. Does that enhance our ability to acquire the
    target and engage it?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. We currently have a satellite
    system that tracks booster launches. But we have put into space
    last year two demonstrator satellites that not only demonstrate
    tracking a missile in launch, but the entire flight of the
    missile. Yes, sir, we have a proposal for the Precision
    Tracking Space System (PTSS), which then would be established
    by the middle of this decade, that would also track hundreds of
    missiles being launched over their entire flight and would
    provide information to both GMD and the Aegis system for
    intercepting.
        Senator Reed. The plan now would be--or I'll ask you the
    question. I don't presume the answer. The Aegis would engage
    first, and then the ground-based missile would engage later in
    the flight?
        General O'Reilly. In the 2020 time, sir, in the timeline,
    we believe it's very feasible to have a high acceleration
    interceptor in an Aegis system; yes, sir, the plan would be to
    have an early intercept soon after boost and destroy the
    missiles early in flight; and if not, then we have the GMD
    system for the second attempt.
        Senator Reed. Relatively speaking, the reconfiguration of
    the system, has that advanced our ability to engage Iranian
    targets or delayed it?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, it has greatly advanced it, because
    we now have the capability to utilize sensors, not only on
    ships, for example, but they also have the ability to use
    sensors at any location, of any frequency, of any bandwidth.
    That significantly helps us launch interceptors sooner, so we
    don't have to wait for the missile to get close enough to a
    ship in order to launch. The ship actually uses all sensors
    available to it.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask another question about Aegis, and
    that is the shore sites. You talked to Senator Hagan about
    this, but one of the constraints, obviously, is vessels at sea
    and operational. The shore-based Aegis will, in fact, relieve
    some of that pressure. Admiral Macy, do you want to respond?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, I'll just say yes, sir. That was the
    discussion last year and it was highly discussed with the Joint
    Staff and the Navy, and I'll defer to Admiral Macy.
        Admiral Macy. One other point, sir. I'm in violent
    agreement with the General. It is also attractive financially.
    In simplistic terms, we're taking the top third of the
    destroyer and putting it on a concrete pad. Therefore I don't
    have to buy or operate the bottom two-thirds. This is not going
    to redo the U.S. budget, but we do expect to see some savings
    from being able to station the capability that way without all
    the attendant things that come with the ship.
        Senator Reed. Are you planning just for the contingency to
    scale up, to have multiple further sites?
        Admiral Macy. As the need, yes, sir, that would be the
    point. Right now the plan is for two. As I mentioned earlier, I
    believe in my conversation with Senator Hagan, the other
    combatant commanders are also looking at it. None has as yet
    expressed the need, but they are certainly looking at it. In a
    number of ways it's just as attractive to that commander
    because he also has to buy fuel and take care of that ship when
    it's in his area of responsibility. So one of the big things
    about this is we could put one in other areas, including the
    SOUTHCOM region, though, as Dr. Miller said, right now we don't
    have a plan.
        But yes, sir, we could buy more and do that.
        Senator Reed. The launching system is relocatable, so you
    could move these. You wouldn't have to buy another set. You
    could, if the need arose, just move it to another location.
        Admiral Macy. Yes, sir, that is our concept for how this
    would go. We have asked the MDA to include as part of their
    engineering assessment the ability to move this in 4 months as
    a starting point, and then we'll understand from them the costs
    and difficulties of doing it. But definitely we would like to
    be able to pick it up and move it somewhere else.
        Senator Reed. Let me just ask the question and someone can
    decide who should answer it. That is that we've cancelled the
    cruiser CGX and we're going to essentially replace that with
    the Flight 3 DDG-51s. The radar on the Flight 3 is a scaled-
    down version of the AMDR which was going to go on the cruiser.
    Are you losing anything in that scaling down, any capabilities?
    What are the implications, essentially, of cancelling CGX to
    the BMD program?
        Admiral Macy. We believe that within the BMD program the
    implications can be handled by a different architecture. Though
    you have notionally a scaled-down radar--and I want to be
    careful how I say that. As I'm sure you're aware, sir, if we
    get too much farther into that discussion we'll have to have it
    in a separate room.
        But the other thing I want to go back to is what the
    General brought up. We are looking to the future to create an
    architecture which takes advantage of all of the sensors that
    are available in the particular battle space, such that you are
    not limited to the instrumented range of a SPY-1 or a THAAD or
    any other sensor, that by using what we call the engage-on-
    remote technique you will have one launching system launching
    one or more interceptors, which are being guided by data coming
    from separate sensors, not necessarily part of their generic
    system, and quite likely controlled by a battle management
    system in a third area and a third capability, to get beyond
    the limitations of such things as the curvature of the earth
    that just gets in the way of your radar. So we'd like to get
    beyond that.
        So the goal here is to not be focusing on an architecture
    which is a closed system fire control system, but an expanded
    engage-on-remote capability.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        One final quick question, Dr. Miller. New START has been
    discussed and one of the conditions is that we would not,
    except for grandfathered silos, convert silos to be BMD
    capable. My understanding is that we have no intention to do
    that, that it's actually cheaper to build new silos.
        Dr. Miller. Senator Reed, that's absolutely correct. The
    existing silos at Vandenberg were grandfathered by the treaty
    and we have no plans to do additional conversions. As I believe
    General O'Reilly's statement included, in fact, if we were to
    go forward with additional silos it would be cheaper to build
    new ones than to convert.
        Senator Reed. So if that was a key negotiating point, we
    gave something away that we weren't going to use anyway. That
    would be my comment, not yours. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen. I want to thank the chairman too
    for his patience and for staying here and giving me an
    opportunity to ask some questions as well this morning.
        Dr. Miller, thank you for your commonsense explanations of
    New START. There are certainly voices that I think have in some
    cases, whether intentionally or not, muddied the waters. I for
    one look forward to the treaty coming to the floor of the
    Senate. I can't imagine we wouldn't find the votes to ratify
    it, in part because of your incisive and helpful explanations
    of what is included.
        If I might, I'd like to follow on and talk a little bit
    about NATO-izing European missile defense. I know that there
    have been some positive statements issued on the PAA, but there
    has been no collective endorsement by the NATO heads. I
    understand the administration is hoping to secure such an
    endorsement at the Lisbon summit later.
        Can you discuss any progress that's been made within the
    alliance on this subject?
        Dr. Miller. Senator Udall, we began conversations with our
    NATO allies about the PAA as we were conducting the BMDR, so
    they were not surprised as we went forward with this approach,
    and in fact very shortly thereafter issued a statement of
    support as an alliance for PAA for Europe.
        Since then we've continued discussions as we've moved
    forward with first agreement by Poland to host a land-based
    site, then agreement by Romania to do the same. As we discussed
    earlier, we're moving forward with the Czech Republic in
    developing a shared early warning capability as well.
        With respect to command and control, we will continue to
    work within a NATO context. We see the PAA as being the U.S.
    contribution to a NATO territorial missile defense. Sir, you're
    correct, we hope that at Lisbon the alliance will in fact
    approve that as a NATO mission.
        Senator Udall. Doctor, I understand part of the focus is on
    protecting civilian populations, not that military assets
    should not be protected as well, but there is a focus on
    civilian populations, is there not?
        Dr. Miller. As the system develops through its phases, by
    phase three we have the capability for territorial defense of
    NATO Europe, which would include defense of populations.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        Dr. Miller. Earlier phases would, of course, have the same
    capability, but just not over the same breadth of geographic
    area.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that.
        General O'Reilly, good to see you. We're proud, in
    Colorado, to host the Missile Defense Integration and
    Operations Center at Schriever. I always look forward to going
    down there and at least understanding a bit of what's going on
    down there, because we have such smart people there on the
    ground.
        I understand you've created a new program this year, the
    PTSS and it would enhance the effectiveness of all missile
    defense systems and reduce reliance on land- and sea-based
    sensors. Given the ongoing challenges in space acquisition,
    which we have talked about in other ways this morning, can you
    assure the committee that this program can be delivered in a
    timely way, at a reasonable cost? As a follow-on, can you
    explain why the MDA is planning on acquiring a satellite
    capability when the Air Force has primary expertise for space
    systems?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, the PTSS, the strategy to develop it
    was based on many studies in the past of what were the
    challenges and problems with previous satellite development
    programs. Two of them were the requirements being quite large
    on a small package; and second was to use technology that
    wasn't mature at the time the program started.
        So the PTSS was designed to be a very simple satellite
    system, and that's a key hallmark of it, is the size of it. It
    is designed to stare at certain parts of the Earth and do just
    that and transmit down what it sees for fusing with our battle
    management control systems on the ground. So we believe the
    strategy that was laid out and the cost estimates--we've had
    several independent cost estimates and we've been very
    conservative to ensure that this can be developed on the
    timeline stated and in fact endure setbacks and still be
    developed on the timeline stated, and the costs are very
    conservative for this. The approach is very simple and we did
    that intentionally in order to ensure we don't have problems in
    executing this.
        The MDA actually will not manage the satellite aspect of
    this program. It is a system, though, that involves the command
    and control, the whole fire control system, the information
    transmitting and so forth. So the entire network needs to be
    integrated into our Aegis system especially and our GMD system.
    That's the expertise and the integration that MDA brings.
        We are utilizing the Navy research lab and Johns Hopkins
    University, which have a history of successful launches of
    these size of satellites, in order for us to verify we
    understand the requirements, again going back, looking at the
    history of satellite programs and where they've had trouble. We
    want to assure we know what we're going to ask industry to
    build.
        At that point we will compete the satellite system for
    development. Ultimately, sir, you're correct, the Air Force
    will be managing this and therefore they have an Air Force cell
    that's embedded in our team, so that we ensure that everything
    we're developing follows their data management and their ground
    control systems out at Schriever, which will be operating the
    system.
        We believe we've built a team together, capitalizing on the
    core competencies, and then the MDA has to be the one that is
    ultimately responsible of delivering a missile defense
    capability with all our fire control systems and utilizing the
    benefits of those space-based sensors.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for walking me through that
    process and that construct.
        Dr. Miller, Admiral Macy, let me turn to East Asia and the
    Middle East, the BMDR. Incidentally, I think the SECDEF put
    together a very comprehensive and helpful approach to missile
    defense in general. But according to the BMDR, the
    administration plans to tailor the PAA to East Asia and the
    Middle East. I understand that these regional missile defense
    architecture plans are still in development, so the inventory
    and resources requirements for Aegis and SM-3 and Patriots and
    THAAD are not certain.
        The BMDR says the Joint Staff and STRATCOM are developing a
    comprehensive force management process, recognizing that the
    regional demand for U.S. BMD assets is likely to exceed supply
    for some years to come. The new PAA to missile defense is
    likely to have significant force structure implications. Have
    these requirements been quantified yet and, given the fact that
    regional demand is likely to exceed supply for years to come,
    when do you think the comprehensive force management process
    will be completed to allocate what seemingly are scarce
    resources? Admiral Macy, let's start with you.
        Admiral Macy. Senator, we are close to finishing up the
    initial estimate on the global force management issues and
    processes. We've been doing a study since last fall when it
    became apparent that this was going to be an issue when you
    apply a PAA to all three major regions with the current missile
    defense issues. That effort has been led by STRATCOM and by my
    organization, JIAMDO, on the Joint Staff. We are bringing that
    to a close in the next few months and we'll be briefing it up
    to the Secretary, hopefully by June, if not before, to address
    the current near-term needs of allocating the available ships,
    interceptors, THAAD units, et cetera.
        In the longer term, we will be shortly starting the Joint
    Capability Mix-3 (JCM-3) study. This is a follow-on from JCM-2
    that was done a couple of years ago, looking at the sufficiency
    of interceptors. This one will be, if you will, a repeat where
    we look at scenarios across the three regions, compare them
    against the COCOMs' warfighting plans, and understand the
    implications. We don't expect to be fighting in all three
    places at one time, but how much overlap do you assess or
    believe? Then this JCM-3 study, as it's going to be called,
    will be starting soon, and expects to finish about this time
    next year.
        The big difference between it and the previous study is it
    will look not only at interceptors, but it will also look at
    launch systems, such as ships and THAAD batteries, and it will
    look at independent sensors such as airborne sensors, TPY-2
    radars, and so forth.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        Dr. Miller?
        Dr. Miller. Senator Udall, I'd just add very briefly that
    DOD has an existing global force management process and over
    the last year we've worked to integrate missile defense assets
    into that process. I expect that, even with the accelerated
    purchases of missile defense assets, including THAAD missiles
    and including SM-3 capabilities, that we'll continue to have to
    manage that process for some years to come.
        Senator Udall. I see my time has expired, but, Dr. Miller,
    I assume that in the process of developing these plans we're
    also working with the nations in those various theaters that
    are inclined to be supportive of our efforts and would like to
    be a part of the process of developing further missile defense
    capabilities?
        Dr. Miller. Yes, sir, we are.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Let me just summarize some of the points that have been
    made on the Phased Adaptive System. There has been a reference
    made to a gap and the reference is to the following: that if,
    in fact, Iran gets foreign assistance, they could have a long-
    range missile by 2015 or 2017. Our second missile defense
    system that would be able to defend against a long-range
    Iranian missile would not be deployed until about 2020. That is
    characterized as a gap of 3 years or so, having one system
    instead of two.
        Now let's look at the other side of the equation, where the
    Phased Adaptive System will have far superior radars. They will
    be able to use sensors from many sources, including satellite
    sensors and airborne sensors. So on the sensor side and the
    radar side, the Phased Adaptive System will be far more
    capable.
        On the interceptor side, the third site or the old system
    would be limited to ten missiles, which means you could maybe
    deal with five Iranian missiles, and the new system will have
    many, many more interceptors that will be available to it.
        You really have a double gap with the old system. You have
    a radar gap, the old system having far less capable radars, and
    you have a numerical missile or interceptor gap as well with
    the old system.
        Would you agree with that, Dr. Miller?
        Dr. Miller. Senator, yes, I would agree. I would add that
    the PAA, because we place the forward-based radar in Europe in
    2011, that will improve our national missile defense
    capabilities significantly. So, if you will, that's an implicit
    gap that was closed by the change in approach. We'll have
    greater capability, sooner than we would have, for the defense
    of the United States.
        Chairman Levin. Greater capability for the ground-based
    system?
        Dr. Miller. That's right. It will tie into the ground-based
    system.
        Chairman Levin. So we'll have a greater, more capable
    system than we have now in Alaska and California?
        Dr. Miller. It will augment that system and improve its
    capabilities.
        Chairman Levin. The first defense will be more capable, the
    second defense will be far more capable than the third site
    would have been, although it will not be available for perhaps
    3 to 5 years later if Iran gets foreign assistance and comes up
    with an ICBM. So from my perspective, you have at least a
    double gap if you go to the old system compared to at best a
    very short-term, or at worst, a very short-term 3-year gap in
    having a second system in place. General, do you agree with
    that? Since you're a General, will you generally agree with me
    on that?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, I would. On top of that, there
    was some discussion about the ability of the GMD system to
    intercept one time. When we have the forward-based sensors,
    that also gives us the ability for GMD itself to intercept more
    than once, have more than one opportunity in the defense from a
    launch from the Middle East.
        Chairman Levin. In addition, the more capable radars on the
    new system are moveable; is that correct?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. The old radar was fixed at the third site.
    So there are other advantages as well. But I think if people
    want to talk about a gap, the number of gaps are much greater
    with the old system than with the new, at least a double gap
    with the old system, maybe a triple gap, compared to that very
    short-term so-called gap where you just have one system in
    place, even though it's more capable than having two systems.
        Senator Udall, do you want to ask anything else?
        Senator Udall. No, thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you all. It's been a very, very
    useful morning. We appreciate your being here. We'll stand
    adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                     advantages of phased adaptive approach
        1. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
    Macy, please list and explain all of the advantages and benefits, as
    well as the drawbacks, if any, of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)
    for missile defense in Europe, compared to the previously proposed
    third Site missile defense system in Europe.
        Secretary Miller. A key factor in any comparison between the
    European PAA and the former ``Third Site'' plan is the updated U.S.
    ballistic missile threat assessment. The threat from short- and medium-
    range missiles has developed very quickly. In the face of the growing
    regional threat, protection for U.S. forces, allies, and partners is
    provided sooner under the PAA than the previous plan. The PAA will
    allow us to field capabilities in the 2011 timeframe; the former Third
    Site plan would have added capabilities in 2017 or 2018.
        The European PAA provides coverage to the area that is most
    threatened first, and expands to cover all of our European North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies in the 2018 timeframe. Under
    the former approach, we did not provide full protection of our NATO
    Allies, and the areas left unprotected were those that were closest to
    the threat.
        With the PAA, we are able to deploy systems that are capable
    against larger numbers of missiles than the previous plan. With a
    ``shot doctrine'' of two shots per missile, only five threat missiles
    would be needed to overwhelm the previous architecture.
        The European PAA will improve the capabilities for defense of the
    United States in 2011 with the forward-based radar; which will increase
    the capabilities of the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) based in the
    United States. This improvement in defense of the Homeland will be
    available 6 to 7 years earlier than the previous architecture.
        The new approach is also more cost-effective. We expect
    requirements to increase as the threat grows; thus, it is more cost-
    effective to use the PAA's Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), which is less
    than one-fifth the price of one GBI.
        The new approach also allows for greater cooperation with our
    allies. NATO's views of missile defense have evolved in recent years.
    We are seeking a NATO decision to take on territorial defense as a NATO
    mission. We see positive indicators that NATO is interested in doing
    so, including the unanimous Foreign Ministerial statement in December
    2009 that the Alliance welcomes the U.S. European PAA.
        The European PAA is also much more flexible than the Third Site
    approach: The SM-3 and other PAA systems are mobile, while the Third
    Site would have required large missiles at fixed locations.
        General O'Reilly. The PAA offers several advantages over the
    previous approach: increased number of interceptors, lower cost,
    increased coverage, earlier availability, increased adaptability,
    reduced deployment time and wider applicability.
        The previously proposed European missile defense architecture
    lacked a sufficient number of sensors and interceptors to defend
    against the current and emerging ballistic missile threat from by Iran.
    Simply put, with a notional two interceptor shot doctrine, the 10 GBI
    interceptors proposed for Poland would easily be overwhelmed by a raid
    size of 6 long-range threat missiles launched towards European targets.
    Furthermore, the GBIs would have been unable to defend against shorter-
    range ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. deployed forces and allies
    in the region.
        The Department of Defense (DOD) now plans to deploy missile
    defenses in Europe through a PAA that will combine stronger sensor
    networks with an Aegis SM-3-based architecture to provide a flexible
    defense against an uncertain and growing missile threat. Each of the
    four phases that comprise the European PAA (EPAA) will leverage more
    capable variants of the SM-3 missiles as they become available. The SM-
    3 is more affordable than GBIs and increases the cost-effectiveness of
    a European missile defense (you can buy four to seven production
    variants of the SM-3s (IA or IB) for the cost of one GBI).
        The previous program did not cover most of Southeastern Europe,
    which today is exposed to Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)
    threats. The previous program would not have been available until 2017
    and was not adaptable to changes in future threats to Europe. Under the
    EPAA, however, we will begin deployment of missile defense capabilities
    in 2011 (Phase I). Additionally, by fielding mobile capabilities in
    phases, combatant commanders can adapt their missile defense
    architectures to address the uncertainty of future missile threats.
    These systems can be deployed in any theater in a reasonably short
    period of time.
        Finally, efforts over the next several years to develop, test, and
    procure the sensor, command and control, and interceptor upgrades for
    deployment of the EPAA architecture have application in theaters other
    than Europe.
        Admiral Macy. The PAA offers several advantages over the previous
    approach: increased number of interceptors, lower cost, increased
    coverage, earlier availability, increased adaptability, reduced
    deployment time and wider applicability.
        The previously proposed European missile defense architecture
    lacked a sufficient number of sensors and interceptors to defend
    against the current and emerging ballistic missile threat from by Iran.
    Simply put, with a notional 2 interceptor shot doctrine, the 10 GBI
    interceptors proposed for Poland would easily be overwhelmed by a raid
    size of 6 long-range threat missiles launched towards European targets.
    Furthermore, the GBIs would have been unable to defend against shorter-
    range ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. deployed forces and allies
    in the region.
        DOD now plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe through a PAA
    that will combine stronger sensor networks with an Aegis SM-3-based
    architecture to provide a flexible defense against an uncertain and
    growing missile threat. Each of the four phases that comprise the
    European PAA (EPAA) will leverage more capable variants of the SM-3
    missiles as they become available. The SM-3 is more affordable than
    GBIs and increases the cost-effectiveness of a European missile defense
    (you can buy four to seven production variants of the SM-3s (IA or IB)
    for the cost of one GBI).
        The previous program did not cover most of Southeastern Europe,
    which today is exposed to MRBM threats. The previous program would not
    have been available until 2017 and was not adaptable to changes in
    future threats to Europe. Under the EPAA, however, we will begin
    deployment of missile defense capabilities in 2011 (Phase I).
    Additionally, by fielding mobile capabilities in phases, combatant
    commanders can adapt their missile defense architectures to address the
    uncertainty of future missile threats. These systems can be deployed in
    any theater in a reasonably short period of time.
        Finally, efforts over the next several years to develop, test, and
    procure the sensor, command and control, and interceptor upgrades for
    deployment of the EPAA architecture have application in theaters other
    than Europe.

        2. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
    Macy, Phase 4 of the PAA to missile defense in Europe is planned to
    have the capability, using the SM-3, Block IIB variant interceptor, to
    defeat potential future long-range Iranian missiles in the 2020
    timeframe. There has been a suggestion that, since Iran might, with
    sufficient foreign assistance, be able to develop a long-range missile
    by 2015, there is a 5-year gap between our missile defense capability
    and Iran's potential for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
    capability. Please provide your views on whether such a gap would
    exist.
        Secretary Miller. No, there would not be a gap in our capability.
    The United States is currently protected against any attacks from North
    Korea or Iran if they were able to develop an effective ICBM capability
    today. This protection is a result of investments made over the past
    decade in a system based on ground-based midcourse defense (GMD).
    Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of
    GBIs now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-
    range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a
    capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran
    for the foreseeable future.
        Given uncertainty about the future ICBM threat, including the rate
    at which it will mature, it is important that the United States
    maintain this advantageous position. In order to maintain this position
    we will: continue to develop existing capabilities for our GMD system,
    complete the second field of 14 silos at Fort Greely, deploy new
    sensors in Europe to improve cueing for missiles launched at the United
    States, invest in further development of the SM-3 for future land-based
    deployment in Europe, increase investments in sensors and early
    intercept kill systems to help defeat missile defense countermeasures,
    and advance other hedging strategies including continued development
    and assessment of a two-stage GBI and directed energy technologies.
        General O'Reilly. There is no ``gap'' in which the United States
    would be unprotected from potential Iranian long-range ballistic
    missile threats. The United States is already protected against limited
    long-range ballistic missile attacks, including against current and
    projected future threats from Iran. As part of the Ballistic Missile
    Defense System (BMDS), the GMD element, with missile fields at Fort
    Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, provides continuous
    operational capability to protect the Homeland against ICBMs. Given the
    uncertainties of future ICBM threats, including the rate at which they
    will mature, we plan to preserve our position of advantage by
    maintaining and enhancing our current midcourse defense capabilities.
        To that end, we will continue development of technologies to
    enhance SM-3 variants to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. With
    deployments of the SM-3 IIA (2018) and SM-3 IIB (2020) in Europe, we
    will augment Homeland defenses by intercepting long-range ballistic
    missiles earlier in their flight.
        Admiral Macy. There is no ``gap'' in which the United States would
    be unprotected from potential Iranian long-range ballistic missile
    threats. The United States is already protected against limited long-
    range ballistic missile attacks, including against current and
    projected future threats from Iran. As part of the BMDS, the GMD
    element, with missile fields at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air
    Force Base, CA, provides continuous operational capability to protect
    the Homeland against ICBMs. Given the uncertainties of future ICBM
    threats, including the rate at which they will mature, we plan to
    preserve our position of advantage by maintaining and enhancing our
    current midcourse defense capabilities.
        To that end, we will continue development of technologies to
    enhance SM-3 variants to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. With
    deployments of the SM-3 IIA (2018) and SM-3 IIB (2020) in Europe, we
    will augment Homeland defenses by intercepting long-range ballistic
    missiles earlier in their flight.

        3. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
    Macy, isn't it true that the currently deployed GMD system has the
    ability to defend the United States from a potential future Iranian
    long-range missile threat?
        Secretary Miller. Yes, the current GMD system is designed to
    protect the United States against limited ICBM attacks. This capability
    is a result of investments made over the past decade. Because of
    continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of GBIs now
    deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-range
    ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a
    capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran
    for the foreseeable future.
        General O'Reilly. Yes. The United States is already protected
    against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks, including
    projected future threats from Iran. By the end of fiscal year 2010, 30
    GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS. This capability will defend
    the Homeland for the foreseeable future from the potential ballistic
    missile threats from Iran.
        Admiral Macy. Yes. The United States is already protected against
    limited long-range ballistic missile attacks, including projected
    future threats from Iran. By the end of fiscal year 2010, 30 GBIs will
    be deployed as part of the BMDS. This capability will defend the
    Homeland for the foreseeable future from the potential ballistic
    missile threats from Iran.

        4. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
    Macy, please describe the capability of our current GMD system and the
    capability planned with future GMD upgrades.
        Secretary Miller. By the end of fiscal year 2010, a total of 30
    GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS. Given the continuing
    improvements planned for the GMD element, 30 operational GBIs will
    defend the Homeland for the foreseeable future against the projected
    threat from North Korea and Iran. Eight additional empty silos, and
    storage of test and spare GBIs, will provide a hedge against any
    unanticipated ICBM threat growth. We will conduct stockpile
    surveillance of GBIs by testing all limited life components as GBIs are
    refurbished through 2032. Data collected from future GMD flight tests,
    results from the age surveillance program, and future intelligence
    estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will inform decisions on
    the need to procure additional GBIs. We continue to upgrade GMD to
    increase reliability and survivability and expand the ability to
    leverage new BMDS sensors as well as test GMD to accredit our
    simulations.
        The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request provides a
    substantial investment in the GMD element, a total of $5.9 billion
    across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) intended to ensure the GMD
    element remains viable over the long term. We are requesting $1.3
    billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to continue our GBI refurbishment
    and reliability sustainment programs to: help sustain the fleet to 2032
    and support a service life extension decision around 2027; procure an
    additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration
    to accommodate a contingency deployment of eight additional GBIs;
    upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software to ensure GMD leverages
    BMDS increased discrimination and tracking capability as sensor, data
    fusion, and battle management network matures; and complete the
    installation of a second GMD command and control node at Fort Greely,
    AK. Additionally, we will continue operations and sustainment of the
    Sea-Based X-band radar (SBX) platform to prepare for transfer of the
    SBX operations to the U.S. Navy in 2012.
        General O'Reilly. The GMD system forms the foundation of our
    Homeland missile defense against limited ICBM attack today. By the end
    of fiscal year 2010, a total of 30 GBIs will be deployed as part of the
    BMDS with 26 at Fort Greely, AK and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.
    Given the continuing improvements planned for the GMD element, 30
    operational GBIs will defend the Homeland for the foreseeable future
    against the projected threat from North Korea and Iran. Eight
    additional empty silos and storage of test and spare GBIs will provide
    a hedge against unanticipated ICBM threat growth. We will conduct
    stockpile surveillance of GBIs by testing all limited life components
    as GBIs are refurbished through 2032. Data collected from future GMD
    flight tests, results from the aging and surveillance program, and
    future intelligence estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will
    inform decisions on the need to procure additional GBIs.
        We continue to upgrade GMD to increase reliability and
    survivability, expand the ability to leverage new BMDS sensors, and
    test GMD to accredit our models and simulations. Since the beginning of
    fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered five new GBIs, upgraded Fire
    Control and Command Launch Equipment software, completed construction
    of a second GBI missile field at Fort Greely, AK, and delivered a new
    silo and an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data
    Terminal at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Additionally, we are
    completing the missile defense upgrades to the Upgraded Early Warning
    Radar (UEWR) in Thule, Greenland, and we have transferred operation of
    the Cobra Dane Early Warning Radar and the Beale and Fylingdales UEWRs
    to the Air Force. We are continuing planning and design work to upgrade
    the Clear, AK Early Warning Radar.
        The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request provides a
    substantial investment in the GMD element, a total of $5.9 billion
    across the FYDP ensuring the GMD element remains effective and viable
    over the long term by funding element and system improvements. We are
    requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to continue our GBI
    refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs to help sustain the
    fleet to 2032 and support a service life extension decision around
    2027; procure an additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-
    silo configuration to accommodate a contingency deployment of 8
    additional GBIs; upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software to
    ensure GMD leverages BMDS increased discrimination and tracking
    capability as sensor, data fusion and battle management network
    matures; and complete the installation of a second GMD command and
    control node at Fort Greely, AK. Additionally, we will continue
    operations and sustainment of the SBX radar platform to prepare for
    transfer of the SBX operations to the U.S. Navy in 2012.
        Admiral Macy. The GMD system forms the foundation of our Homeland
    missile defense against limited ICBM attack today. By the end of fiscal
    year 2010, a total of 30 GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS with
    26 at Fort Greely, AK, and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Given
    the continuing improvements planned for the GMD element, 30 operational
    GBIs will defend the Homeland for the foreseeable future against the
    projected threat from North Korea and Iran. Eight additional empty
    silos and storage of test and spare GBIs will provide a hedge against
    unanticipated ICBM threat growth. We will conduct stockpile
    surveillance of GBIs by testing all limited life components as GBIs are
    refurbished through 2032. Data collected from future GMD flight tests,
    results from the aging and surveillance program, and future
    intelligence estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will inform
    decisions on the need to procure additional GBIs.
        We continue to upgrade GMD to increase reliability and
    survivability, expand the ability to leverage new BMDS sensors, and
    test GMD to accredit our models and simulations. Since the beginning of
    fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered five new GBIs, upgraded Fire
    Control and Command Launch Equipment software, completed construction
    of a second GBI missile field at Fort Greely, AK, and delivered a new
    silo and an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data
    Terminal at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Additionally, we are
    completing the missile defense upgrades to the UEWR in Thule,
    Greenland, and we have transferred operation of the Cobra Dane Early
    Warning Radar and the Beale and Fylingdales UEWRs to the Air Force. We
    are continuing planning and design work to upgrade the Clear, AK Early
    Warning Radar.
        The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request provides a
    substantial investment in the GMD element, a total of $5.9 billion
    across the FYDP ensuring the GMD element remains effective and viable
    over the long term by funding element and system improvements. We are
    requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to continue our GBI
    refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs to help sustain the
    fleet to 2032 and support a service life extension decision around
    2027; procure an additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-
    silo configuration to accommodate a contingency deployment of 8
    additional GBIs; upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software to
    ensure GMD leverages BMDS increased discrimination and tracking
    capability as sensor, data fusion and battle management network
    matures; and complete the installation of a second GMD command and
    control node at Fort Greely, AK. Additionally, we will continue
    operations and sustainment of the SBX radar platform to prepare for
    transfer of the SBX operations to the U.S. Navy in 2012.

                                gmd enhancement
        5. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, Phase 1 of the European PAA
    includes the planned deployment in the 2011 timeframe of a forward-
    deployed AN/TPY-2 radar in southeastern Europe. You have indicated that
    this deployment will enhance the capability of the GMD system to defend
    against a potential future threat from Iran. Please describe the GMD
    capability enhancement that will come from such a deployment. For
    example, will the deployment of the AN/TPY-2 allow a more efficient use
    of GBIs against a potential future Iranian ICBM threat, or even permit
    a ``shoot-look-shoot'' firing doctrine?
        General O'Reilly. The United States plans to deploy missile
    defenses to counter more immediate regional ballistic missile threats
    to our forward-deployed troops and to our Allies in Europe. These plans
    involve a forward-deployed radar in Europe that will improve Homeland
    defense by detecting and tracking threat missiles launched out of the
    Middle East much earlier in the threat trajectory and provide high
    quality tracking information to the GMD element. This will increase the
    U.S. defended area performance and provide increased shoot-look-shoot
    capability across a greater portion of the United States.

                        commitment to fly-before-you-buy
        6. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, one of the key points of the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) is the policy that missile
    defense systems must be tested realistically and successfully to permit
    deployment. According to the BMDR, ``Before new capabilities are
    deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under
    realistic operational conditions.'' Are DOD and the administration
    fully committed to operationally realistic testing and demonstrating
    capability before deploying new missile defense capabilities?
        Secretary Miller. The administration is committed to deploying
    capabilities that have been proven under extensive testing and
    assessment and are affordable over the long term. To strengthen the
    testing program, a number of steps are being taken. Working in close
    partnership with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, as
    requested by Congress, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced a new
    approach to testing in June 2009.
        This program projects necessary test activities over the full
    course of each system's development, not just 2 years into the future
    as under the former program. These activities include a comprehensive
    set of ground and flight tests designed to demonstrate operational
    performance and validate models used to support an evaluation of system
    effectiveness. The new master plan is to be reviewed and updated
    semiannually. This new approach will be evaluated after 1 year of
    experience (June 2010), and any necessary adjustments will be made at
    that time.

        7. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, General O'Reilly, and Admiral Macy,
    do you agree that this fly-before-you-buy approach is the right
    approach to take?
        Dr. Gilmore. Senator Levin's opening statement noted DOD has
    adopted a policy of requiring realistic and operational testing to
    demonstrate that our missile defense systems work before we deploy
    them. I agree that this ``fly-before-you-buy'' approach is correct. The
    MDA's Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), if successfully executed,
    should put into practice this approach and, over time, provide the data
    needed to evaluate quantitatively levels of confidence in the system's
    performance. My office will continue to work closely with the MDA, the
    BMDS Operational Test Agency, and the Combatant Commands to assure that
    system capabilities are adequately demonstrated by realistic testing
    prior to transitioning those systems to the acquiring services.
        General O'Reilly. A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test
    the capabilities and limitations of a missile defense system before we
    begin procurement, or ``fly before we buy.'' As such, missile defense
    projects are subject to production decisions by USD(AT&L).
    Additionally, we use the Services' standard material release and
    operational certification processes that also rely on developmental and
    operational test data prior to formally fielding initial capability.
        Admiral Macy. Absolutely. Testing new systems under operationally
    realistic conditions before committing to full-scale procurement is a
    key factor in ensuring the reliability of fielded assets.

                        operational testing now planned
        8. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, for years I have been asking if the
    missile defense test plan included dedicated operational tests, and the
    answer has always been: No. This has been a disappointment, especially
    since some of the systems were deployed operationally. Does the current
    IMTP include plans for dedicated operational tests? If so, how soon
    would they begin?
        Dr. Gilmore. The current IMTP does include plans for dedicated
    operational testing. Operational testing, both ground and flight
    testing, is planned for each phase of the PAA. In fiscal year 2012
    (post Phase 1), the MDA intends to conduct a system-level operational
    test, FTO-1, featuring three ballistic missile targets to be
    intercepted by Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) (version
    3.6.1), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Patriot. FTO-2
    is planned for fiscal year 2015 (Phase 2) and is a BMDS operational
    system-level flight test against five ballistic missile targets to be
    intercepted by GMD, Aegis BMD, THAAD, Aegis Ashore, and Patriot. FTO-3
    is planned for fiscal year 2018 (Phase 3) and is a BMDS operational
    system-level flight test against five ballistic missile targets
    employing the same elements as FTO-2 but in their upgraded
    configurations. The IMTP does not currently address Phase 4 testing
    that would be conducted in fiscal year 2020.
        Additionally, Aegis BMD will conduct flight test FTM-15 in third
    quarter fiscal year 2011 and THAAD will conduct flight test FTT-13 in
    second quarter fiscal year 2011. Both of these operationally realistic
    flight tests are planned to demonstrate capability against intermediate
    and medium range ballistic missiles, respectively, and to support my
    assessment of the PAA Phase 1 capability prior to the planned fiscal
    year 2011 deployments of these systems to the European theater. The MDA
    also plans to conduct ground testing of the command, control, battle
    management, and communications system in fiscal year 2011 to support
    the Phase 1 implementation.

        9. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, has your organization reviewed and
    approved the plans for any such operational tests?
        Dr. Gilmore. My staff, along with the MDA, the combatant commands,
    and the BMDS Operational Test Agency participated in the development of
    the IMTP. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has been
    involved in the evaluation-based strategy underpinning the IMTP since
    General O'Reilly initiated its development in December 2008. In
    addition to detailed and day-to-day staff involvement in the
    formulation of the IMTP, I personally participated in a number of
    executive-level reviews and provided comments and guidance to the MDA.
    I approved the IMTP, which includes plans for operational testing. I
    expect that as the IMTP is executed, I will continue to review and
    approve the detailed operational test plans that support all
    significant BMDS operational testing, and that the realism of the
    testing conducted will increase over time.

                               no icbm tests yet
        10. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, in your prepared testimony, you
    note that the GMD system ``has not yet attempted an intercept of an
    ICBM target.'' Since the purpose of the GMD system is to defend the
    United States against ICBMs, and it has not demonstrated such a
    capability, does this fact affect your assessment of the operational
    capability of GMD to defeat ICBM threats?
        Dr. Gilmore. As discussed in my February 2010 report to Congress
    assessing ballistic missile defense, GMD Flight tests FTG-02, FTG-03a,
    and FTG-05 demonstrated that the GMD has a limited capability to
    intercept a simple ballistic missile threat. Although the MDA used
    target missiles for these flight tests that did not duplicate the
    ranges that define ICBMs, re-entry vehicles that exhibited
    characteristics of ICBM re-entry vehicles were used. These tests
    provided data for a small portion of the substantial GMD performance
    envelope. The MDA is developing an ICBM class target. The current IMTP
    includes six GMD flight tests using these ICBM targets beginning in the
    third quarter of fiscal year 2015. Data obtained from these flight
    tests will inform future assessments.

        11. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, if the GMD system demonstrates a
    capability to intercept ICBM targets, will that increase your
    confidence in the capability of the system?
        Dr. Gilmore. Test data from intercepts of ICBM targets are only
    some of the data I will need to determine a quantitative assessment of
    confidence in the capability provided by GMD. I will also need
    verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations that
    accurately replicate GMD performance. All the GMD flight tests and
    ground tests will be used to accomplish this task. These accredited
    models and simulations would then allow evaluation in the areas of the
    GMD performance envelope that are necessary for assessment but may be
    impossible to test due to safety or environmental reasons. The newly
    revised IMTP lays out a plan to obtain the data needed to rigorously
    accredit these models.

     no objective ballistic missile defense system assessment possible yet
        12. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, in your prepared testimony, you
    state that ``the ability to conduct comprehensive and objective
    assessments of BMDS capability is still a number of years away,'' and
    that ``it will take as many as 5 to 7 years'' to collect the test data
    needed to validate models for missile defense capability. Does that
    mean that the ``comprehensive and objective assessments'' of our
    missile defense capability are at least 5 to 7 years away?
        Dr. Gilmore. Based upon the testing described in the most recent
    IMTP, my assessment is that it will take 5 to 7 years to collect the
    data needed to support rigorous, comprehensive, quantitative
    assessments of BMDS performance. During this time, however, there will
    be opportunities to complete limited verification, validation, and
    accreditation (VV&A) of some models and simulations. This should allow
    for some similarly limited quantitative assessments of the performance
    of selected BMDS elements.

        13. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, since you note that there has been
    a history of missile defense test failures and delays, what affect
    would such delays in the future have on the schedule for collecting the
    necessary data and conducting the ``comprehensive and objective
    assessments'' you mentioned?
        Dr. Gilmore. In the IMTP, each test is designed to collect data for
    VV&A of the models and simulations. These data elements are defined as
    either Critical Engagement Conditions (CECs) or Empirical Measurement
    Events (EMEs). The IMTP is revised every 6 months. When a test failure
    occurs, preventing collection of planned CECs/EMEs, the IMTP revision
    process, in which my office participates, reviews the current test
    program for opportunities to collect the CECs/EMEs using other tests or
    to add new tests, as necessary. This is the case with the recent
    failure during FTG-06. FTG-06a is being planned and will be
    incorporated in a revised IMTP.
        No test plan as complex as the IMTP has ever been executed exactly
    as planned. There are always unforeseen system responses and failures
    that occur and require adjustments to the test plan. If such problems
    do not arise, it likely means that the testing being conducted is not
    robust. The delays in collecting data caused by test failures could
    vary from several months to more than 1 year depending upon many
    details including the BMDS element involved in the test and the targets
    used in the test.

        14. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, do you agree with Dr. Gilmore
    that only subjective assessments of the missile defense system
    capability are possible to date, and not objective assessments, because
    of the lack of test data?
        General O'Reilly. I concur with the January 2010 DOT&E assessment
    that ``if MDA can execute the IMTP as planned, successful VV&A of BMDS
    models and simulations should result, enabling quantitative and
    objective rather than subjective assessments of the BMDS capability in
    the future.'' I further agree with the DOT&E conclusion that
    ``objective assessments of the BMDS capability are still a number of
    years in the future.''

                           ftg-06 flight test problem
        15. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, what went wrong with the most
    recent GMD flight test at the end of January, FTG-06?
        General O'Reilly. Although we have had three intercepts out of
    three previous attempts (FTG-02, FTG-03a, FTG-05) using the GMD system,
    our newest variant of the kill vehicle, relying on data from the Sea-
    Based X-band (SBX) radar, failed to intercept a target in January 2010
    during FTG-06, a flight test to measure GMD's performance closer to its
    maximum operational intercept range. The GBI launched successfully from
    Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) and the newly designed LV-2 long-range
    target successfully flew for the first time out of the Reagan Test Site
    in the Kwajalein Atoll 7,500 km away.
        The target complex was acquired and initially tracked by the SBX in
    the Pacific and track data was provided to GMD Fire Control (GFC). A
    Weapons Task Plan was generated and transmitted to the Command Launch
    Equipment located at VAFB. A GBI was then launched from an
    operationally-configured GMD silo, at VAFB. After the GBI launched, the
    SBX ceased providing data to the GFC earlier than planned.
        Even without target position updates from the SBX, the
    Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) transitioned to target acquisition
    mode, but, due to an on-board failure, the EKV was unable to intercept
    the target. The SBX and EKV failures are under investigation by the
    FTG-06 Failure Investigation Team.
        Despite the failure to intercept, we collected extensive system and
    component performance data on the SBX, the GBI, the EKV, and the
    target. We discovered new failure modes for the SBX, the EKV flew more
    than twice the distance it had flown in previous tests, and we
    collected significant new data on its ability to acquire and track the
    target.
        During FTG-06, we obtained model validation data on CECs related to
    long interceptor time-of-flight. We collected EME data on EKV
    performance against a complex ballistic missile threat scene and a
    medium closing velocity intercept. As a result, current deployed
    systems will benefit from FTG-06 because it advanced simulation
    development and confirmed BMDS performance metrics.

        16. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, when do you expect the Failure
    Review Board to complete its assessment?
        General O'Reilly. A Failure Investigation Team was chartered on
    February 4, 2010 to investigate and determine the precise root cause of
    failure. The failure investigation is expected to continue for several
    more months before root-cause is determined and verified. The expected
    date for completion of a final report including an assessment of the
    failure is August 2010.

        17. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, what do you plan to do about
    fixing the problems?
        General O'Reilly. I intend to implement corrective actions once the
    root cause of the failure is confirmed.

        18. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, will you repeat the test after
    you think you have fixed the problem?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, I intend to repeat the test as soon as
    feasible after the root cause of the failure is confirmed and we have
    implemented corrective actions.

        19. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, what implications are there,
    if any, for currently deployed systems?
        General O'Reilly. After a final report and assessment of the
    failure is provided, we will examine any implications to the deployed
    BMDS.

                         new start and missile defense
        20. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
    Macy, there have been some concerns expressed by critics that the New
    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) constrains our BMD program.
    Does the treaty constrain U.S. missile defense capabilities or
    programs?
        Secretary Miller. The New START treaty does not constrain the
    United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses
    possible, nor does the New START treaty add any additional cost or
    inconvenience to our missile defense plans. As the BMDR, our budget
    submission and projections, and the U.S. unilateral statement made in
    connection with the New START treaty all make clear, the United States
    will continue to improve its missile defenses throughout the next
    decade.
        The New START treaty touches on missile defense in three parts: in
    the Preamble, in Article V, and in the unilateral statements made by
    both Russia and the United States.
        The Preamble of the Treaty contains a statement acknowledging the
    interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.
    President Obama and President Medvedev recognized in their Joint
    Understanding of July 2009 that this relationship will become more
    important as strategic offensive arms are reduced; they note current
    strategic defensive forces do not threaten to undermine the
    effectiveness of the Parties' strategic offensive arms.
        Regarding the treaty's ban in Article V, paragraph 3, on the
    conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor
    launchers and vice versa, MDA Director Lieutenant General O'Reilly has
    made clear that this ban does not constrain MDA's plans. Should
    additional missile defense launchers be needed, we would build the
    smaller, much less expensive, tailor-made GBI silos rather than convert
    costly ICBM silos. Moreover, use of SLBM launchers for missile defense
    interceptors is an unattractive option and would be unreasonably
    expensive.
        Russia's unilateral statement made in connection with the treaty
    raises the possibility of Russian withdrawal from the treaty if
    qualitative and quantitative improvements in U.S. missile defense were
    to threaten the viability of the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent.
    In fact, both sides have the right to withdraw from the treaty under
    Article XIV if they deem it necessary due to extraordinary developments
    which threaten supreme national interests. Such withdrawal clauses are
    common in treaties, especially in the case of arms control agreements.
    The U.S. unilateral statement takes note of the Russian statement but
    makes clear that U.S. missile defense systems do not threaten Russia
    and that the United States intends to continue to deploy improved
    missile defense systems to defend the U.S. Homeland from limited
    attacks and to defend collaboratively its deployed forces, allies, and
    partners against regional threats.
        General O'Reilly. The New START treaty does not impede the
    development and fielding of U.S. missile defenses, and it eliminates
    START constraints on development and testing. The New START treaty does
    not contain limitations that impact the U.S. plan to develop and field
    missile interceptor systems.
        Specifically, missile defense targets will no longer be subject to
    START constraints which limited and complicated MDA use of air-launched
    and waterborne launches of target missiles. Use of these targets is
    essential for the cost-effective testing of missile defense
    interceptors against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
    in the Pacific region.
        Admiral Macy. The New START treaty does not place constraints on
    missile defense testing programs as did START, which banned production,
    testing, or deployment of ballistic missiles or their launchers on
    waterborne vehicles other than submarines. This same ban also applied
    to air-to-surface ballistic missiles. New START has done away with
    these prohibitions and provides MDA with more flexibility in its
    testing capabilities. New START also has no constraints on MDA to
    conduct missile launches from any number of space launch facilities as
    the previous START had limited.

        21. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, there were suggestions that,
    rather than negotiating a New START, we should simply extend the
    previous START I agreement. You have expressed the view that the
    previous START constrained our missile defense testing options. If we
    had extended the previous START I agreement, would that have
    perpetuated the constraints on our missile defense testing options?
        General O'Reilly. Yes. MDA's intermediate-range LV-2 target missile
    system, used in key tests to demonstrate Homeland defense capabilities
    and the first phase of the new PAA to missile defense, was accountable
    under the START because it employs the first stage of the now-retired
    long-range Trident I SLBM. Due to the LV-2's accountability under START
    it was subject to START movement reporting, launch location
    restrictions and telemetry collection and sharing requirements. These
    constraints limited the value the of LV-2 target system in BMDS testing
    by, among other things, restricting the number of locations from which
    the LV-2 could be launched.

        22. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, from your perspective, is the
    New START better than the old START from a missile defense testing and
    development standpoint?
        General O'Reilly. The New START treaty does not impede the
    development and fielding of U.S. missile defenses, and it eliminates
    START constraints on development and testing. The New START treaty does
    not contain limitations that impact the U.S. plan to develop and field
    missile interceptor systems.
        Specifically, because the Trident I is not included in the New
    START treaty the LV-2 is no longer subject to START constraints. This
    will allow MDA to examine alternative LV-2 target launch sites for more
    efficient test architectures and geometries by exploring other ways to
    make use of this target that is now free from START constraints. The
    result is that MDA will be able to improve BMDS performance for defense
    of the Homeland and examine efficiencies and enhancements to the BMDS
    testing program by taking advantage of new flexibilities, as well as
    opportunities to reduce cost.

                    missile defense cooperation with russia
        23. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, in your prepared testimony,
    you state that ``the administration has given special emphasis to
    renewing cooperation with Russia on missile defense,'' and that ``we
    are making a concerted effort to identify areas where the United States
    and Russia can pursue meaningful cooperation'' on missile defense. You
    then describe a number of options being considered, including ``sharing
    data gathered by existing U.S. and Russian radar installations;
    conducting collaborative missile defense flight tests; and undertaking
    experiments that would combine data from U.S. ground- and space-based
    sensors with data from Russian sensors such as the radars at Qabala,
    Azerbaijan and at Armavir, in southern Russia.'' Do you agree that such
    cooperation with Russia would send a powerful signal to Iran that we
    are united against their threatening policies and programs?
        Secretary Miller. Yes. Cooperation with Russia on missile defense
    would send a powerful signal to Iran that Russia and the United States
    are working together to counter the threat posed by Iran's
    proliferating of ballistic missiles and pursuit of nuclear capability.

        24. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly and Admiral Macy, do you
    believe such cooperation, particularly sharing radar data on missile
    launches, and cooperative flight tests, would be beneficial to our
    missile defense capabilities?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, we continue to support expert dialogue on
    cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation, whose surveillance
    radars would enhance our ability to monitor ballistic missile
    development and flight testing in Southwest Asia. There are
    opportunities for us to cooperate in sharing our sensor data, our
    future research and development, and our command and control activities
    and exercises in order to build confidence between both sides that
    we're not threatening each other, but we are building ourselves a
    defense against the proliferation of these missiles.
        Admiral Macy. Yes, we continue to support expert dialogue on
    cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation, whose surveillance
    radars would enhance our ability to monitor ballistic missile
    development and flight testing in Southwest Asia. There are
    opportunities for us to cooperate in the areas of shared sensor data,
    research and development, and command and control activities and
    exercises in order to build confidence between both sides that we're
    not threatening each other, but we are building ourselves a defense
    against the proliferation of these missiles.

        25. Senator Levin. Admiral Macy and General O'Reilly, do you think
    it is technically possible that the PAA to missile defense could
    provide defensive coverage of parts of western Russia against Iranian
    missiles?
        Admiral Macy. Yes, it is technically possible.
        General O'Reilly. Yes, it is technically possible.

                             contractor performance
        26. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, you have expressed
    disappointment with the poor quality of some contractors' performance,
    including the failure of an air-launched target in an important THAAD
    flight test. Please describe your quality concerns, using specific
    examples.
        General O'Reilly. After the failure of a target missile in a THAAD
    test last December we convened a Failure Review Board. This board
    determined that a contractor had unacceptably low standards of
    engineering rigor, quality control and mission assurance which led to
    the root cause failure. Subsequently, we suspended the use of air-
    launched targets and prohibited the use of ballistic targets contracted
    or subcontracted from that contractor. MDA is awaiting evidence of
    improvement at the contractor before we continue funding.

        27. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, what steps are you taking to
    rectify the poor performance of the contractors and to ensure sustained
    quality improvements in the future?
        General O'Reilly. The precision of missile defense systems requires
    stringent manufacturing standards and quality control of all products.
    We have had many successes in improving our prime contractor and
    supplier quality assurance. In each case, companies were willing to
    identify shortfalls, invest in new capital assets and attain
    experienced leadership in changing cultures to establish the enduring
    discipline required to consistently deliver precision missile defense
    products. However, not all companies have sufficiently improved.
        Until we complete planned competitions with updated contract
    incentive types appropriate for the particular phase of development
    (e.g., firm fixed price, cost plus award fee, etc.) and defect clauses,
    we will continue to motivate senior industry management to improve
    through intensive inspections, low award fees, issuance of cure
    notices, stopping the funding of new contract scope, and documentation
    of inadequate quality control performance to influence future contract
    awards. We are increasing emphasis on competition at all phases of a
    program's acquisition life cycle to ensure the highest performance and
    quality standards are sustained throughout development.
        Additionally, over the past year, we have initiated a new target
    acquisition strategy to increase competition, improve quality control,
    and reduce costs.

                    aegis ashore test facility authorization
        28. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, last year Congress
    appropriated $68.5 million for construction of an Aegis Ashore Test
    Facility at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii to permit
    testing of the planned land-based SM-3 interceptor system for Europe.
    However, the request came after the Defense Authorization process was
    complete, and there was not enough information available for us to
    authorize the project separately. Senator McCain and I filed a separate
    bill to authorize the project as soon as the project information was
    complete, but we understand that DOD is seeking to have Congress
    authorize the project, as an amendment to the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Is it correct that DOD needs
    this Aegis Ashore Test Facility authorized now, in order to permit the
    testing that is needed to maintain the President's schedule for Phase
    II of the PAA to missile defense in Europe in the 2015 timeframe?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, authorization of the $68.5 million of fiscal
    year 2010 Military Construction (MILCON) funding for the Aegis Ashore
    Missile Defense Test Complex (AAMDTC) at the Pacific Missile Range
    Facility in Hawaii is needed before we can carry out the project. The
    funds must be placed on contract in the first half of fiscal year 2011
    to meet Aegis Ashore development and test schedules.
        In Phase II of the PAA, the first operational Aegis Ashore system
    will be installed in Romania in fiscal year 2015. The AAMDTC provides
    an operationally realistic environment to prove the effectiveness and
    suitability of Aegis Ashore prior to deployment in a host nation and is
    consistent with the Department's fly-before-you-buy approach.
        If the Department does not receive authorization of the $68.5
    million of MILCON in fiscal year 2011, the availability of the land-
    based SM-3 Block IB to be fielded in Phase II will be delayed a year,
    to the end of 2016. Therefore, fiscal year 2011 authorization of the
    fiscal year 2010 MILCON funding of $68.5 million for the AAMDTC is
    crucial.

        29. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, is DOD still planning to meet
    the President's 2015 schedule for Phase II?
        Secretary Miller. Yes.

                         acquisition oversight process
        30. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, the MDA has a unique high-
    level acquisition oversight process through an organization called the
    Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). The BMDR stated that this
    process is adequate, and there is no need to place MDA under the
    Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process. Can you explain why you and
    DOD believe the MDEB process is sufficiently rigorous, and why you
    believe it is a better mechanism than the DAB would be?
        General O'Reilly. The characteristics of the MDEB acquisition
    oversight process are uniquely suited to managing the BMDS. For
    example:

            - MDEB meets more frequently on the BMDS than similar boards
            (e.g., Defense Acquisition Board) that govern a broader mission
            area across the DOD.
            - The MDEB leadership and decisionmakers (USD(AT&L) and VCJCS)
            have more BMDS-specific information available to them
            concerning the focused BMD mission area.
            - The MDEB as well as the Deputy Secretary of Defense-directed
            Life Cycle Management Process, enables collaboration between
            the acquisition and requirements decision authorities.

        The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reported (GAO
    10-311) on the MDA acquisition process stating ``importantly, the
    Director has begun new initiatives and in accordance with guiding
    principles of DOD's acquisition policies, which already embrace
    knowledge-based practices and sound management controls.''

                       establishing acquisition baselines
        31. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, you have stated your plan to
    establish acquisition baselines for a number of components of your
    program, including cost, schedule, performance, and testing. This is
    something that GAO has been recommending for many years, and something
    this committee has encouraged also. Previous MDA directors have said
    they would establish such baselines, but it did not happen.
    Specifically what baselines are you planning to establish, and how will
    they be used to help manage and evaluate your acquisition programs?
        General O'Reilly. MDA has established six baselines (resource,
    schedule, technical, test, contract, and operational baselines) to plan
    and manage the execution of missile defense projects. I approve the
    baselines of technology development programs, and jointly sign with
    lead Service Acquisition Executives the baselines of MDA projects in
    product development. These six baselines not only assist in our cost-
    effective management of MDA projects, but also provide transparency and
    accountability to the MDEB and Congress on the progress of our
    execution. The cost (resource), schedule, performance (technical), and
    test baselines being established this spring will be submitted to
    Congress in a BMDS Accountability Report in June. We will update the
    baselines, as required, through the MDA Program Change Board process.
    Finally, the baselines for the Product Development projects will form
    the basis for USD(AT&L) production decisions.

        32. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, are you committed to
    establishing these baselines and providing them to Congress, as well as
    to the MDEB and to GAO?
        General O'Reilly. Yes. The baselines will provide the basis for our
    annual report to Congress (BMDS Accountability Report), which is also
    provided to USD(AT&L) and GAO.

                         patriot deployments to poland
        33. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, your prepared testimony
    indicates that Poland has ratified the supplemental Status of Forces
    Agreement (SOFA) with the United States, which covers the stationing of
    U.S. military personnel in Poland in association with missile defense.
    I understood that at some point after that ratification, the United
    States would begin rotational deployments of a U.S. Army Patriot
    battery for training purposes in Poland. Is that rotational deployment
    of a Patriot training battery still on track, and if so, when will it
    begin?
        Secretary Miller. The rotational deployment of a Patriot training
    battery is still on track. The Polish ratification of the Status of
    Forces Supplemental Agreement took place on February 26, 2010, and the
    deployment will begin within 90 days of Poland's ratification.

        34. Senator Levin. Admiral Macy, does this rotational deployment to
    Poland have an impact on our planning and force management for possible
    contingency deployment of Patriot capabilities elsewhere?
        Admiral Macy. There is an impact but it is manageable. Planning and
    force management for possible contingencies elsewhere is a normal part
    of all deployments and operations. When any unit is engaged in a
    mission for a finite amount of time--such as a 30-day rotational
    deployment to Poland--the combatant command will assess how it will
    meet directed contingency missions elsewhere and plan accordingly.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
                     nato and the phased adaptive approach
        35. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I think everyone in NATO
    can agree that Iran is a clear and dangerous threat. But I know our
    allies have many questions about the new European PAA. France, for
    example, has publicly expressed concerns. Like me, they want to know
    about cost, implementation, and effectiveness of this program. In
    particular, in these economically strained times, I am wondering how
    NATO allies are looking to the future on funding this program. You have
    Greece in financial crisis and our smaller allies, such as the Baltic
    States, really straining to contribute to missions in Afghanistan,
    address their important economic needs, and keep their publics in
    support of broader NATO missions. Please explain what kind of cost
    implication the new PAA strategy has for NATO allies and whether they
    are enthusiastic about participating or not.
        Secretary Miller. At the NATO Foreign Ministerial in December 2009,
    Allies unanimously stated, ``We welcome the new PAA of the United
    States to missile defence, which further reinforces NATO's central role
    in missile defence in Europe.'' In addition, Romania and Poland have
    agreed to host land-based sites in of the European PAA in 2015 and 2018
    respectively. Thus, even amidst financial challenges, NATO members have
    embraced the collective importance of missile defense in recognition of
    the evolving threat.
        The United States will fund the European PAA. This U.S.-funded
    European PAA will be the U.S. contribution to NATO's missile defense
    efforts. NATO and Allies including the French, Germans, Dutch, Greeks,
    Italians, and Spanish have focused their missile defense efforts in
    recent years on missile defense systems to protect deployed forces from
    shorter-range ballistic missile threats. These NATO countries already
    possess, or are acquiring, missile defense capabilities.
        NATO is also developing a command and control network called the
    Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program that
    will allow Allies to link their missile defense assets together. ALTBMD
    could allow current and future NATO national systems-including those of
    the United States-to be able to ``plug-and-play'' with the overall NATO
    effort and the PAA assets.
        NATO is currently funding the component of ALTBMD that will provide
    command and control for defense of deployed forces only. Allies' costs
    for territorial missile defense in Europe would come from the potential
    expansion of ALTBMD, including command and control linkages for Allies'
    territorial missile defense efforts. NATO has funded a study to examine
    the implications and costs of expanding ALTBMD's mission to include
    command and control (C2) for defense of territory.

        36. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, if the United States is
    going to burden the lion's share of the cost, which I expect it will,
    how are those costs factored into the new cost of the system?
        Secretary Miller. The President's budget request for fiscal year
    2011 includes $2.7 billion for regional missile defense. If
    appropriated, this will begin funding the conversion of additional
    Aegis ships to be BMD capable, and the purchase of additional SM-3
    interceptors, THAAD batteries, and AN/TPY-2 radars, along with covering
    other costs associated with the PAA for Europe. The FYDP will also
    reflect the longer-term cost associated with European PAA.

                                   new start
        37. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I applaud you all for your
    efforts in getting New START signed. That is a great step with Russia
    and an important step related to nuclear arms reductions. But in my
    experience, there is usually a tradeoff for most advances with the
    Russians. Where are you in dissuading Russia from delivering to Iran
    the S-300 anti-aircraft system?
        Secretary Miller. We have continued to make clear to the Russian
    government that we oppose the delivery of the S-300 and believe it
    would be a destabilizing and counterproductive step given Iran's
    refusal to live up to its international obligations and that Russia and
    the United States are currently discussing possible new U.N. sanctions
    on Iran. We are pleased that, to date, Russia has not delivered the
    system. However, to date Russia has declined to cancel the sale.

        38. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, if Iran were to get the
    system, would it be a setback to our missile defense deterrent, as Iran
    has recently boasted?
        Secretary Miller. If Iran were to acquire the S-300 air defense
    system, it would not affect the deterrent and defensive value of our
    missile defenses. However, we have continued to make clear to the
    Russian Government that we oppose the delivery of the S-300 and believe
    it would be a destabilizing and counterproductive step given Iran's
    refusal to live up to its international obligations.

                            israeli missile defense
        39. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, when Under Secretary
    Flournoy discussed missile defense before this committee last
    September, she said that Israel had not explicitly consulted on the new
    PAA but that the system would be compatible with Israel's ongoing
    missile defense programs. Are you confident that our new PAA is able to
    be integrated with Israel's missile defense system?
        Secretary Miller. Israel was not explicitly consulted about our
    change in missile defense approach for Europe. However, the United
    States and Israel coordinate extensively on missile defense issues. We
    have a long history of cooperative research and development, which has
    borne fruit in the deployment of Israel's Arrow missile defense system.
    Arrow is interoperable with U.S. systems. The United States and Israel
    also cooperate on missile defense operational issues through a program
    of joint exercises. The PAA--particularly its emphasis on advanced
    mobile BMD systems--is an advantageous framework when applied to
    ballistic missile defense cooperation with Israel. The applicability of
    this approach was successfully examined at recent exercises, such as
    the U.S.-Israel Juniper Cobra exercise.

        40. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, please explain what value
    added Israel will get from the new PAA in terms of protection and
    strategic advantage. Is Israel more protected by the new system?
        Secretary Miller. The increase in investments in regional missile
    defense assets and flexible capabilities associated with a PAA to
    regional missile defense, which can surge into the region in times of a
    political-military crisis, would benefit Israel. Our missile defense
    cooperation with Israel is already advanced and will continue.
        In addition to conducting major missile defense exercises with
    Israel, the most recent of which occurred in November 2009, the United
    States and Israel continue to meet regularly and coordinate extensively
    on a wide range of missile defense plans and operations. Moreover, our
    extensive support for Israel includes deployment of a US forward based
    AN/TPY-2 X-band radar to Israel, and support for Israeli missile
    defense programs such as the existing Arrow Weapons System, Arrow-2
    production, Arrow-3 development, and the development of a new program,
    David's Sling, for defeating short-range ballistic missiles.

        41. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, how will the new PAA
    approach provide added protection to our friends in the Gulf?
        Secretary Miller. The United States will pursue a PAA within each
    region that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including
    their scale, the scope and pace of their development, and the
    capabilities available and most suited for deployment.
        In the Persian Gulf, the United States has a continuous missile
    defense presence and seeks to build on the Bilateral Air Defense
    Initiative to strengthen cooperation. The United States is also working
    with a number of partners in the region on purchases of missile defense
    capabilities under the auspices of the foreign military sales program.

        42. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, is this system integrated
    with our efforts in Israel?
        Secretary Miller. Israel's missile defense assets are designed to
    be interoperable with U.S. systems.

                               pakistan and india
        43. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I'd like to push more on
    how the new PAA approach affects countries to the north and east of
    Iran, which the Pentagon has not addressed much. Can you explain how,
    if at all, Pakistan (which borders Iran) fits into the new PAA
    calculus?
        Secretary Miller. While Pakistan is an important security partner,
    we are not engaged in missile defense cooperation activities at this
    time.

        44. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, what missile defense
    protection do the Pakistanis currently receive from U.S. assets in the
    region?
        Secretary Miller. While Pakistan is an important security partner,
    we are not engaged in missile defense cooperation activities with
    Pakistan at this time.

        45. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, will the Aegis ship
    approach provide them with any additional protection?
        Secretary Miller. While Pakistan is an important security partner,
    we are not engaged in missile defense cooperation activities with
    Pakistan at this time.

        46. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I know India has recently
    done testing for its own missile defense systems, including its
    interceptors. Where are we in terms of integrating our own missile
    defense strategy with India, and how is Iran factored into our mutual
    calculus, if at all?
        Secretary Miller. In the 2005 ``New Framework for the U.S.-India
    Defense Relationship,'' the governments of the United States and India
    agreed to expand collaboration relating to missile defense. This
    resulted in three successful U.S.-India missile defense table-top
    exercises and a bilateral meeting in 2008 to discuss ideas for further
    cooperation. We look forward to continued cooperation with India.

        47. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, how will the new PAA (and
    sea-based approach) help India, if at all?
        Secretary Miller. India is an important security partner, but we do
    not have operational missile defense cooperation activities with India
    at this time.

                           missile defense capability
        48. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Macy and General O'Reilly, section
    125 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
    requires the Secretary of the Navy to submit a joint review with the
    head of the MDA to set forth requirements for investment in Aegis BMD-
    capable cruisers and destroyers. Please provide the status of where
    this review is headed with respect to determining the final number of
    Aegis ships that will be equipped with missile defense capabilities.
        Admiral Macy and General O'Reilly. Navy and the MDA completed the
    requested report and forwarded to Congress on April 19, 2010. The
    conclusions of the report state:
        ``Navy and MDA have jointly concluded that the plan for 38 funded
    surface combatants with Aegis BMD (by fiscal year 2015) contained in
    PB11 reflects an achievable balance of capacity and capability, while
    sustaining the requisite number of multi-mission Aegis cruisers and
    destroyers deployed worldwide to meet concurrent surface combatant
    requirements. The plan is consistent with QDR force-sizing guidance.
    Further increases to BMD capacity through additional new construction
    Aegis ships beyond those contained in Navy's 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
    are not considered necessary.''

        49. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Macy, what percentage of your future
    cruisers and destroyers (not the current fleet) are planned to be
    missile-defense capable?
        Admiral Macy. Under the program of record, 33 of the Navy's 88
    Aegis ships will be BMD capable by the end of the FYDP (2015), for a
    total of 43 percent. Under the current modernization plan, this
    percentage is expected to increase to 75 percent by 2025 and approach
    100 percent by 2030.

        50. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I recently returned from a
    trip to Afghanistan that also included time at NATO headquarters in
    Brussels, where I received briefings on missile defense and met with
    key NATO allies on the implications of the new PAA to missile defense.
    Many of the allies I spoke with were interested in how we plan to
    resource and distribute our missile defense--capable Aegis assets and
    how they will be included in that calculus. Where are U.S. European
    Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Central Command in the planning process for
    testing of Aegis systems in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR)?
        Secretary Miller. The Department will rely on the Global Force
    Management (GFM) process to assist in decisions on the allocation of
    missile defense forces among the geographical combatant commands.
        The GFM process is designed to adjudicate competing requirements
    from the various combatant commands. This approach underscores the
    value of developing capabilities that are flexible and adaptive and
    also relocatable, so that they can be surged into regions, as
    necessary.
        The United States will test PAA assets including Aegis systems
    prior to their deployment. Most of our operational testing takes place
    in the Pacific using our test range and the missile defense test
    monitoring equipment there. Our missile defense assets are or will be
    tested before they are deployed to the combatant commanders' AORs.

        51. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, are we on track for tests
    to begin in 2011?
        Secretary Miller. Our missile defense assets are or will be tested
    before they are deployed to the Combatant Commanders' areas of
    responsibility. For example, those Aegis BMD ships that are currently
    deployed have already been tested and are fully operational.

        52. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, which allies will be
    included in that process and to what extent?
        Secretary Miller. As part of our Phase 1 architecture, we plan to
    deploy a forward-based radar in Southeastern Europe. The other assets
    that are to be deployed as part of Phase 1 of the European PAA are sea-
    based and will not require any formal bilateral cooperation other than
    that which already exists for such activities as port calls, refueling,
    etc.
        In addition, the United States will continue its cooperative
    efforts with NATO Allies. The PAA aligns U.S. missile defense plans in
    Europe more closely with Allies' existing missile defense efforts. NATO
    missile defense efforts in recent years have focused on missile defense
    systems to protect deployed forces from shorter range ballistic missile
    threats. Several NATO countries already possess or are acquiring
    missile defense capabilities. For example, several have PATRIOT systems
    (Netherlands, Germany, and Greece). Italy, Germany, and the United
    States are cooperatively developing the Medium Extended Air Defense
    System (MEADS). Others have expressed interest in acquiring systems
    like Patriot and the SM-3. NATO is also developing a command and
    control network that will allow Allies to link their missile defense
    assets together, called the ALTBMD program. ALTBMD could allow current
    and future national systems--including those of the United States--to
    ``plug-and-play'' with the overall NATO effort and the PAA assets.

        53. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I know that some allies
    have a greater comfort level than others with Russian involvement in
    building the missile defense ``roof,'' so to speak, over Europe. Are
    you considering including Russia in any Aegis-related exercises or
    activities, either bilaterally or through the NATO forum?
        Secretary Miller. We are continuing bilateral discussions with
    Russia on missile defense cooperation focusing on a broad agenda that
    includes shared early warning of missile launches, possible technical
    cooperation, and even eventual operational cooperation with Russia. We
    believe we share common interests in missile defense cooperation, and
    are undertaking a common threat assessment as an initial cooperative
    step.
        We are also exploring NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation. As
    Secretary Clinton said in April 2010, ``Following the restart of the
    NATO-Russia Council last December and the recent signing of the New
    START treaty, there is considerable momentum within the alliance for
    moving ahead with Russia on areas of common concern and shared
    responsibility. We are exploring how best to work within the NATO-
    Russia Council itself and we are committed to obtaining greater
    transparency and practical cooperation on issues like missile
    defense.''
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
                        precision tracking space system
        54. Senator Udall. General O'Reilly, I'd like to follow up on my
    questions about MDA's acquisition of the Precision Tracking Space
    System (PTSS) program. As I understand this program, it will grow on
    the lessons learned in the Space Tracking Space System (STSS) program,
    eventually fielding 9 to 12 satellites and associated ground stations.
    You indicated that the PTSS program is being managed by Johns Hopkins
    University and the Naval Research Lab (NRL), as they have a proven
    track record for launching satellites of this size. It is my
    understanding that these organizations have a history of providing
    experimental satellites, but I am not aware that they have experience
    with the acquisition of an operational satellite constellation. What
    operational space programs has the NRL or Johns Hopkins fielded?
        General O'Reilly. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
    Laboratory (APL) and the NRL have a long history of developing
    prototype space systems and transitioning them to Government
    operational elements with industry suppliers. The PTSS plan is for APL
    and NRL, in collaboration with laboratory partners such as Sandia
    National Labs, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Labs, and
    Utah State University's Space Dynamics Lab, to conduct a prototyping
    effort for PTSS and transition the production effort to industry. MDA
    does not intend for APL or NRL to field the operational PTSS.
        MDA is implementing Service Cells within the PTSS project office--a
    lesson learned from the experience transferring Cobra Dane Upgrade from
    MDA to the Air Force in early 2009. Specifically, Service
    representatives embedded in BMDS program offices during development
    improve MDA-Service interaction, transparency and program efficiency.
        In April and May 2010, the Air Force and MDA conducted discussions
    for an Air Force Space Command cell in the PTSS project office in
    anticipation that the Air Force will be designated as Lead Service of
    PTSS. The final arrangements are being worked with the envisioned
    objective for the Air Force to have overall authorities for PTSS
    doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel
    and facilities. In June 2010 the Navy and MDA will discuss a similar,
    embedded cell arrangement for the Navy to leverage PTSS capability from
    an overall architecture aspect in support of missile defense with the
    next generation radar suite aboard Navy surface combatants.

        55. Senator Udall. General O'Reilly, what operational space
    programs of this scale has MDA fielded?
        General O'Reilly. None. However, MDA fielded several space programs
    of similar scale as the PTSS prototype program. On September 25, 2009,
    MDA launched the STSS. While PTSS will be less complex than STSS, we
    are similarly pursuing the simultaneous development, test, and launch
    of two spacecraft. Another example includes the successful Near Field
    Infrared Experiment, launched in April 2007.
        A more complex space program undertaken by MDA is the Mid-Course
    Space Experiment launched in April 1996. Although not a dual spacecraft
    manifest, this system compares similarly to PTSS in several areas, most
    notably in the optical telescope and multi-band tracking payload.
        MDA has not fielded a constellation of operational spacecraft of
    the scale proposed for the PTSS.

        56. Senator Udall. General O'Reilly, you also mentioned an Air
    Force cell within MDA working on the PTSS program. Please respond with
    their roles, responsibilities, and authorities.
        General O'Reilly. In anticipation of Air Force's designation as
    Lead Service for PTSS, MDA and the Air Force have begun preliminary
    discussions on an Air Force cell in the PTSS Project Office. We
    envision the Air Force will have overall authorities for PTSS doctrine,
    organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, and
    facilities. Final roles, responsibilities, and authorities are still
    pending.

        57. Senator Udall. General O'Reilly, please discuss the planned
    interoperability of this satellite system with other Air Force systems.
        General O'Reilly. PTSS will be an element within the BMDS and
    interface within the broader U.S. National Security Space enterprise.
    We plan for PTSS to connect with the Air Force Satellite Control
    Network and other U.S. communication system assets, and the system will
    interface with Air Force and government overhead persistent infrared
    systems (OPIR). That interface will provide real time coordinated
    tasking between the PTSS, the BMDS, and the external OPIR systems as
    well as real time data dissemination of OPIR data necessary to develop
    state vector cues to the PTSS. The MDA is working with the joint OPIR
    community to develop a plan for posting PTSS data to the real time data
    service to make it accessible to other mission areas such as missile
    warning, technical intelligence, and space situational awareness.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                   new start and missile defense restrictions
        58. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, I appreciate the administration's
    persistence against the numerous attempts by Russia to link missile
    defense to START. Nonetheless, in a recent interview, Russian President
    Dmitry Medvedev stated that he would consider withdrawing from the New
    START should the U.S. missile defense program in Europe create an
    imbalance. How do you perceive what the Russians mean by imbalance?
        Dr. Miller. We view Russia's concern about imbalance as a
    hypothetical situation where our missile defense capabilities might be
    able to undermine the credibility of Russia's strategic deterrent.
        Various American interlocutors repeatedly told their Russian
    counterparts that the PAA in Europe will not pose a threat to Russia
    because the United States does not view Russia as an adversary and the
    capabilities to be deployed during each phase will not pose a threat to
    Russian offensive missile forces.
        The missile defense interceptors we are planning to deploy as part
    of the European PAA will not have the speed necessary to intercept
    Russian ICBMs heading to the United States.
        In addition, the relatively small numbers of GBIs deployed at Fort
    Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, designed to defeat first
    generation North Korean and Iranian ICBMs will not have significant
    capability against Russia's strategic deterrent, which, under the New
    START treaty will include well over 1,000 warheads deployed on several
    hundreds of advanced ICBMs and SLBMs.
        For these reasons, we do not believe that U.S. missile defenses
    will threaten Russia's strategic deterrent, nor that Russia will have a
    legitimate missile defense-related reason to withdraw from the New
    START treaty.

        59. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, can you assure me that Russia will
    not have veto power within this administration going forward on the
    design, development, and deployment of our missile defenses?
        Dr. Miller. Yes. During the course of the New START treaty
    negotiations, U.S. officials, including President Obama, repeatedly
    told their Russian counterparts that the United States would not accept
    any constraints on its ability to develop and deploy ballistic missile
    defenses to protect the U.S. Homeland and to defend our deployed
    forces, allies, and partners from regional missile threats. And, true
    to our declarations, we did not agree to any provision under New START
    that would constrain our missile defense programs.
        As the U.S. unilateral statement regarding missile defense, the
    BMDR, and our budgetary plans all make clear, the United States will
    continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed, to defend the U.S.
    Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners.

        60. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, are DOD and the administration
    fully committed to the development and procurement of the SM-3 block
    IIA and block IIB, irrespective of Russian concerns?
        Dr. Miller. DOD and administration are committed to developing and
    deploying the missile defense assets needed to protect ourselves and
    our allies from the threat of ballistic missiles from defiant states,
    such as Iran and North Korea. Our plans include the SM-3 Block IIA and
    the IIB.
        The United States will continue to address stated Russian concerns
    over our future BMD capabilities, and we plan to continue to engage
    Russia on a broad range of cooperative initiatives, as well as on
    transparency and confidence-building measures. However, this will not
    limit the U.S. ability to develop and procure the capabilities we need.

        61. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, given this administration's
    eagerness towards pursuing arms control, why should we not believe the
    Russians will hold future missile defense endeavors hostage by
    threatening to back out of New START?
        Dr. Miller. The United States made clear to Russia that it would
    reject any restraints on our ability to provide protection from
    ballistic missile threats to the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces,
    allies, and partners. As the U.S. unilateral statement regarding
    missile defense, the BMDR, and our budgetary plans all make clear, the
    United States will continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed,
    to defend the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and
    partners.

                        north korean and iranian threat
        62. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, according to
    an unclassified DOD report on Iran sent to Congress on April 19, 2010,
    Iran with ``sufficient foreign assistance . . . could probably develop
    and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.'' If
    the Iranian or North Korean threat were to evolve faster than
    predicted, is the MDA ready and poised to expedite development,
    testing, and fielding of the PAA?
        Dr. Miller. The United States is currently protected against the
    attacks that North Korea or Iran would be able to launch if they were
    able to develop an ICBM capability. This protection is a result of
    investments made over the past decade in a system based on GMD.
    Continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of GBIs now
    deployed gives us confidence that we can meet a potential North Korean
    and Iranian long-range ballistic missile threat.
        In addition to improving the GMD system, the United States is also
    pursuing several other hedging strategies for defense of the Homeland
    against a ballistic missile attack. For example, the United States will
    continue development and assessment of a two-stage GBI. We will also
    pursue multiple paths to develop and deploy ballistic missile sensors,
    including both airborne and space-based detection and tracking systems.
        The Department also plans to complete the construction of Missile
    Field 2 in Fort Greely, AK, by emplacing the full 14 GBI silos and
    making those silos operationally ready. This will both replace older,
    inadequate silos from Missile Field 1 and provide a Reserve capability
    to deploy rapidly up to eight additional GBIs from the pool of
    interceptors currently designated for testing. Although the Department
    does not currently foresee a need for more than 30 deployed GBIs, these
    extra operational silos will provide an additional hedge against future
    threat uncertainty.
        General O'Reilly. The United States is already protected against
    limited long-range ballistic missile attacks, including projected
    future threats from Iran. As part of the BMDS, the GMD element provides
    continuous operational capability to protect the Homeland against
    ICBMs.
        By the end of fiscal year 2010, 30 operational GBIs will be
    deployed as part of the BMDS. We plan to preserve our position of
    advantage by maintaining and enhancing our current midcourse defense
    capabilities and given continuing improvements planned for the GMD
    element, 30 operational GBIs will defend the Homeland for the
    foreseeable future against the projected threat from North Korea and
    Iran. Eight additional empty silos and storage of test and spare GBIs
    will provide a hedge against unanticipated ICBM threat growth.
        The United States plans to deploy missile defenses to counter more
    immediate regional ballistic missile threats to our forward deployed
    troops and to our Allies in Europe. These plans involve a forward-
    deployed radar in Europe that will provide data earlier in the
    engagement and augment Homeland defense capabilities already in place
    at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.
        Additionally, we will continue development of technologies to
    enhance SM-3 variants to add additional protection to our Homeland in
    the future. Deployments of the SM-3 IIB (2020) in Europe will augment
    the GMD system with a capability to intercept Iranian long-range
    ballistic missiles early in flight in the regions from which they were
    launched.
        The BMDS IMTP, Version 10.1, lays out the current plan for testing
    the PAA capabilities. We review and update the IMTP semi-annually to
    ensure our test program is consistent with MDA priorities, capability
    development schedules, and funding.

        63. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, what about the
    testing and fielding of the two-stage GBIs?
        Dr. Miller. The fiscal year 2011 budget request funds continued
    development and testing of the two-stage GBI. The two-stage GBI is
    scheduled for one booster verification flight test in fiscal year 2010
    and two intercept flight tests, the first in fiscal year 2012 and the
    second in fiscal year 2016. Any potential operational use of the two-
    stage GBI is yet to be determined.
        General O'Reilly. The schedule for testing the two-stage GBI is
    part of our overall IMTP objective to collect the data needed to anchor
    our models and simulation. The two-stage GBI test dates are driven by
    the types of engagements in which we need to test the GBI kill vehicle.
    We will test the two-stage GBI for the first time in June 2010 to
    verify differences between the performance of two-stage and the three-
    stage GBIs. After this test and the subsequent intercept events we
    believe we will have characterized differences between the two and will
    be able to evaluate the performance of a two-stage GBI using data
    collected from three-stage testing.
        This is possible because the two-stage GBI builds upon the success
    of the three-stage GBI and has many of the same components, except the
    third stage is removed. The two-stage reuses existing flight-qualified
    components from its three-stage counterpart. Key common components are
    the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, BAM electronics, stage 2/3
    interstage, and first and second stage motors. As part of the three-
    stage development effort, these common components have undergone
    ground, flight, and qualification testing. Changes from the three-stage
    GBI are limited to the removal of the third stage motor, relocation of
    the BAM, and minor modifications to navigation and guidance software
    for the two-stage flight.
        The most specialized and critical technology in a GBI is the kill
    vehicle itself and the kill vehicle for both the two- and three-stage
    interceptors is identical.

                  north korean and iranian missile development
        64. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, the notion of collaboration
    between North Korea and Iran is not new. Earlier this month, press
    reports cited that Iran is building a new short-range missile launch
    site from an existing complex and appears to be working with North
    Korea. Do you currently see any evidence of technology transfer between
    Iran and North Korea?
        General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]

        65. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, do you agree that estimates
    on Iran's timeline for ICBM development should take into account North
    Korean space launch and ICBM development?
        General O'Reilly. MDA relies on the Intelligence Community
    assessments of Iranian long-range missile developments, and defers to
    the IC. The current DIA assessment is that Iran could develop and test
    an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015 with sufficient,
    continued foreign support.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ DIA, Unclassified Report on the Military Power of Iran, April
    2010.

                                quality control
        66. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, as I mentioned earlier,
    contractor performance and a lack of contractor quality control is
    unacceptable and the description of the failed test in December is
    indicative of the significant impact just one contractor can have.
    While you have ceased to conduct any business with L-3/Coleman, the
    company responsible for the target in that test, I get the impression
    that L-3/Coleman is just the most recent example, certainly not the
    only one. During the press conference for the fiscal year 2011 budget
    release, the MDA Executive Director was quoted with the following
    statement: ``I'm not going to name names today, but I'm going to tell
    you we continue to be disappointed in the quality that we are receiving
    from our prime contractors and their subs--very, very disappointed;
    quality-design issues, but more in quality of products delivered, which
    then results in rework and which reserved--because most of these
    contracts are cost contracts, it costs the taxpayer more.'' Given the
    cost-plus nature of many of these contracts and the allegation that
    reckless failures by contractors are resulting in unnecessary cost
    increases, how do you intend to address these concerns, both
    proactively within MDA and across the DOD?
        General O'Reilly. MDA is committed to improving missile defense
    acquisition to overcome significant flight test delays, target and
    interceptor failures, cost growth, quality control, and program delays
    we have encountered in the past.
        Moving forward, MDA is implementing the Weapon Systems Acquisition
    Reform Act of 2009, including provisions related to contract
    competition, and it is our intent to use greater firm fixed price
    contracts and defect clauses as we complete planned competitions. We
    are increasing emphasis on competition at all phases of a program's
    acquisition life cycle to ensure the highest performance and quality
    standards are sustained throughout development.
        However, until we complete planned competitions we will have to
    motivate some senior industry management through intensive inspections,
    low award fees, issuing cure notices, consideration of pending quality
    concerns during funding decisions for new contract scope, and
    documenting inadequate quality control performance to influence future
    contract awards by DOD.

        67. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, what steps can be taken to
    ensure that contractors are held responsible to provide quality
    products without unnecessary increases in cost?
        General O'Reilly. As the Acquisition Executive Agent responsible
    for Missile Defense, I continue to pursue knowledge-based program
    performance practices and sound management controls in accordance with
    guiding principles of DOD's acquisition policies, to include
    competition-based acquisition. Historical experience has demonstrated
    that competition-based acquisition results in contractors delivering
    reliable, high-quality products that meet performance specification
    thresholds within the cost and schedule parameters.
        The use of competition-based acquisition is an effective strategy
    to ensure quality control and contain costs for programs. As contracted
    activities come up for renewal or to adjust the scope of work, vigorous
    competition is pursued and knowledge points are established within
    contracts so progress can be assessed and alternatives evaluated.
    Competition ensures we have viable, multiple sources to motivate high
    reliability and quality at the lowest cost. Industry reacts to
    incentives from competition and is motivated to sustain and gain
    business by providing quality products on time and within cost. Vendors
    whose cost controls or products do not meet required metrics are faced
    with lost business opportunities. Companies must deliver cost-
    effective, high-quality, reliable products and services to be awarded
    contracts and win competitions, as well as retain contract performance
    history. Contract performance histories re-enforce this approach by
    informing future contract awards from MDA.

        68. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, what incentives does a cost-
    plus contract have to have to prevent unnecessary increases in cost
    resulting from carelessness?
        General O'Reilly. In order to prevent increases in cost, a cost-
    plus contract must have quality and mission assurance incentives. MDA
    development and sustainment cost-plus contracts have incentives that
    address, at a minimum, a mission success performance element. These
    incentives measure the timeliness and effectiveness of contractor
    performance on events that are key to successful BMDS performance. This
    ensures contractor focus on quality and mission assurance in addition
    to strict adherence of their corporate best practices. In order to
    prevent or minimize unnecessary cost increases and ensure quality
    products, cost-plus contracts reward a contractor for achieving
    performance at or below the set limit of the contract cost. A fee
    structure is also included that appropriately rewards a contractor for
    delivering required products that demonstrate performance.
        Should a contractor fail to achieve cost control and/or
    performance, award fees are appropriately reduced. Consistently poor
    work or a significant failure may result in the contract and/or work
    scope being restructured or the contract terminated, impacting the
    current work and award level of the contractor and opening the door for
    competitors to complete remaining work. The contractor's performance
    assessment ratings may also be negatively affected, reducing the
    contractor's ability to secure future contracts from MDA. FAR Part 46--
    Quality Assurance requires that clause 52.246-3 Inspection of
    Supplies--Cost Reimbursement be included in cost reimbursement
    contracts to ensure that no additional fee will be paid to the
    contractor for the correction of defects.
        MDA takes full advantage of cost-plus incentive contracts within a
    competition-based acquisition strategy to ensure quality control and
    contain costs. As contracted activities come up for renewal or to
    adjust the scope of work, vigorous competition is pursued and knowledge
    points are established within the contracts so progress can be assessed
    and alternatives evaluated. Competition ensures we have viable,
    multiple sources to motivate high reliability and quality at the lowest
    cost. Industry reacts to incentives from competition and is motivated
    to sustain and gain business by providing quality products on time and
    within cost. Vendors whose cost controls or products do not meet
    required metrics are faced with lost business opportunities. Companies
    must deliver cost-effective, high-quality, reliable products and
    services to be awarded contracts and win competitions, as well as
    retain contract performance history. Contract performance histories re-
    enforce this approach by informing future contract awards from MDA.

                                schedule delays
        69. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, in GAO's recently released
    Assessment of Major Weapons Programs, they boldly asserted that ``the
    Aegis BMD program is putting the SM-3 Block 1B at risk for cost growth
    and schedule delays by planning to begin manufacturing in 2010 before
    its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic
    environment.'' Is it true that technologies will not be fully mature
    until after the decision to produce the first 18 SM-3 Block 1Bs?
        General O'Reilly. The MDA disagrees with the GAO's assertion that
    the program is putting the SM-3 Block IB missile at risk for cost
    growth and schedule delays by beginning manufacturing in 2010 before
    its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic
    environment.
        For the SM-3 Block IB technologies to be fully mature, they must
    function properly during a flight test in the expected environment.
    These 18 SM-3 Block IB Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
    (RDT&E) rounds are being built to support flight testing that will
    demonstrate the maturity of the critical technologies and to prove-out
    manufacturing processes.

        70. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, as concluded by GAO, do you
    agree that such an approach increases the risk of costly design changes
    in the event unexpected issues arise during testing?
        General O'Reilly. The MDA disagrees with the GAO's assertion that
    the program is putting the SM-3 Block IB missile at risk for cost
    growth and schedule delays by beginning manufacturing in 2010 before
    its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic
    environment. The procurement that is mentioned by the GAO in their
    report is for SM-3 Block 1B developmental test rounds to conduct flight
    testing of the second generation Aegis BMD/SM-3 weapon system. These
    rounds will also be used to validate production line processes. During
    fiscal year's 2010 and 2011, all critical technologies will have
    completed developmental testing, a successful flight test will have
    been conducted and the manufacturing readiness review would have been
    concluded. Only after the successful testing of these RDT&E missiles
    will an initial production decision be made by the USD(AT&L).

        71. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, given the key role the SM-3
    Block 1B and future variants will play within our global missile
    defense architecture, are you concerned cost growth and schedule delay
    could greatly impede our ability to field the 1Bs on schedule and in
    the quantities budgeted?
        General O'Reilly. The SM-3 Block IB RDT&E rounds purchased in
    fiscal year 2010 are necessary to conduct flight test for the second
    generation Aegis BMD/SM-3 weapon system. In addition to providing
    assets to support test, these rounds will also be used to validate
    production line processes prior to a full rate production decision in
    2012.

                       medium extended air defense system
        72. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, in their most
    recent assessment of the Patriot follow-on, MEADS program, GAO assessed
    that while critical technologies are finally becoming mature, the
    program will likely face an 18-month delay and require at least an
    additional $1 billion to address issues that arose during the program's
    preliminary design review (PDR) in 2008. GAO cites progress; however, I
    remain concerned especially in light of recent press reports stating
    the Army ``MEADS is taking too long to develop and has become too
    expensive.'' The Army is rumored to be in preliminary program transfer
    discussions with MDA; is this true?
        Dr. Miller. The Department of the Army currently has program
    support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. Discussions
    regarding a possible transfer to the MDA have occurred; however, no
    decision has been made to date. We will consult with Congress regarding
    any plans to realign this important program.
        General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
    budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. Discussions regarding a
    possible transfer to the MDA have occurred; however, no decision has
    been made to date.

        73. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, is it true
    that the program will need an additional $1 billion and are any
    additional increases expected?
        Dr. Miller. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), along with the Department of the
    Army, has responsibility for this program. According to AT&L, cost,
    schedule, and performance issues emerged during the MEADS PDR, which
    led to a tri-national Independent Review Team (IRT) assessment. The IRT
    review found that radar development had been delayed (leading to cost
    overruns), the program development and testing were high-risk due to
    tight schedules and engineering concurrency leading to the Critical
    Design Review (CDR), and the overall management and governance of the
    program were inefficient and needed to be improved. The IRT determined
    that the planned MEADS Design & Development (D&D) Program of Record
    (POR) would likely not produce the required performance within the
    original cost and schedule and estimated approximately $1 billion cost
    growth and a 12-24 months schedule slip in order to correct the
    identified deficiencies and reduce program risk going forward.
        In late 2008, the National Armaments Directors of the MEADS partner
    nations agreed in principle to proceed with the program to CDR, and
    agreed to delay the CDR by 1 year until August 2010 to mitigate program
    risks. Concurrently, the partner nations began work on an amendment to
    the program Memorandum of Understanding to revise the D&D POR and to
    re-evaluate the expected cost and schedule based on the IRT findings.
    The DOD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office is in the final
    stages of updating an independent cost estimate that will be available
    in time to inform the System Program Review, following the CDR later
    this year. At that time, the partner nations will have a full
    understanding of the cost, schedule, and technical maturity of the
    MEADS program.
        General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
    budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army's
    senior leadership on questions pertaining to the program's cost.

        74. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, is 18 months
    the full extent of the schedule delay?
        Dr. Miller. Please see response to Question #73.
        General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
    budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army's
    senior leadership on questions pertaining to the program's schedule.

        75. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, given the
    international collaboration associated with MEADS, is it true that this
    program is exempt from traditional DOD acquisition regulations? If so,
    was or is MEADS in risk of breaching Nunn-McCurdy?
        Dr. Miller. The MEADS program, under co-development in a
    partnership among the United States, Germany, and Italy, is the only
    active missile defense development program the United States currently
    has with NATO partners. We believe that honoring the U.S. commitments
    to cooperative program partners is critical.
        According to the USD(AT&L), who along with the Department of the
    Army has responsibility for this program; the MEADS program was
    designed to adopt many of the DOD 5000-series procedures and program
    documentation standards, but the MEADS program is managed by a NATO-
    chartered Agency. The NATO MEADS Management Agency administers the
    MEADS prime contract and is overseen by a tri-national Board of
    Directors who report to their respective acquisition authorities. DOD
    evaluates program performance in accordance with traditional
    acquisition practices and standards. Although an independent review of
    MEADS did identify significant cost and schedule growth, it is our
    understanding that MEADS has not breached the Nunn-McCurdy thresholds.
    The DOD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office is in the final
    stages of updating an independent cost estimate, and the NATO MEADS
    Management Agency is awaiting a restructure proposal from industry that
    will better define the actual magnitude of cost and schedule growth.
        General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
    budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army's
    senior leadership and the USD(AT&L) on whether the program is at risk
    for breaching Nunn-McCurdy restrictions.

        76. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, what steps are
    being taken to ensure that the program stays within budget and
    schedule?
        Dr. Miller. According to the USD(AT&L), who along with the
    Department of the Army has responsibility for this program, the
    National Armaments Directors of the MEADS partner nations agreed in
    principle in late 2008 to proceed with the program to Critical Design
    Review (CDR), but agreed to delay the CDR by 1 year until August 2010
    to allow time to correct technical issues and mitigate program risks.
    The partner nations agreed to revise the government oversight construct
    for MEADS and approved structural changes proposed within industry
    systems engineering and management. The NATO MEADS Management Agency
    and industry implemented a number of management and technical
    recommendations provided by an Independent Review Team of the MEADS
    program.
        The partner nations are working on an amendment to the program
    Memorandum of Understanding to revise further the remainder of the
    Design and Development program to reduce overall risk. The NATO MEADS
    Management Agency and the partner nations involved are re-evaluating
    the expected cost, schedule, and technical maturity of the program
    through the run-up to the CDR. The DOD Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation office is in the final stages of updating an independent
    cost estimate. The Army and OSD are jointly conducting a comprehensive
    U.S. System Program Review, which will be complete following the CDR
    later this year. At that time, each partner nation will have a full
    understanding of the cost, schedule, and technical maturity of the
    MEADS program.
        General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
    budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army's
    senior leadership on actions being taken to ensure the program stays
    within its budget and remains on schedule.

        77. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, is the Army,
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), or MDA looking at any
    alternatives to a Patriot follow-on system in the event it is
    determined that MEADS technologies will not materialize on time and
    within budget?
        Dr. Miller. The MEADS program, under co-development in a
    partnership among the United States, Germany, and Italy, is the only
    active missile defense development program the United States currently
    has with NATO partners.
        Although there have been numerous schedule delays and cost growth
    in the MEADS program, the program is being restructured so that it can
    better meet its cost, schedule, and performance goals.
        When ready, MEADS will offer a replacement for the Patriot system
    that is more capable, more easily sustained, and more mobile. It could
    be an important part of a NATO missile defense effort. At this time, we
    are not considering alternatives to MEADS.
        General O'Reilly. The MDA has not been directed to examine
    alternatives to the MEADS program. MDA is also not aware of any Army or
    OSD initiatives pertaining to a Patriot follow-on system should MEADS
    not be available.

        78. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, how concerned
    is DOD with the affordability of this program?
        Dr. Miller. Although there have been numerous schedule delays and
    cost growth in the MEADS program, the program is being restructured so
    that it can better meet its cost, schedule, and performance goals.
        General O'Reilly. Army currently has program support and budgetary
    responsibility for the MEADS programs. I defer to the Army's senior
    leadership and the USD(AT&L) on questions pertaining to the
    affordability of the program.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                            phased adaptive approach
        79. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, the central difference
    between the previous plan for missile defense in Europe and the PAA is
    the substitution of SM-3 missiles in Romania and Poland for the 10
    long-range GBIs intended for Poland. Current, if somewhat vague, plans
    call for land-based SM-3 Block IB missiles in Romania by 2015 to
    address the medium range threat from Iran, and then land-based SM-3
    Block IIA missiles in Poland by 2018 to address the intermediate range
    threat. By 2020, phase IV of the PAA is supposed to deliver the new SM-
    3 Block IIB missile, which will be capable against ICBM-class Iranian
    missiles, providing the United States an additional layer of
    protection. There are scant details, even in the BMDR, about the PAA.
    How many ships, interceptors, and radars are required for each phase of
    the PAA and how much this will cost?
        General O'Reilly. The PAA is not a defined system or capability,
    but rather a policy approach that guides the fielding of ballistic
    missile defense architectures tailored to an individual region. The
    interceptors, sensors, and command and control system are part of the
    tool kit MDA provides to the COCOMs to deploy the right mix of BMD
    capabilities in their Areas of Responsibility. For the European region,
    the Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) must consider
    force structure requirements and allocate missile defenses to meet
    EUCOM's needs. There is a GFM process to figure out how to allocate
    assets around the globe. At this point in time, a determination of how
    many ships, interceptors, and sensors are required for each phase of
    the PAA has not been made, but will be determined through the GFM
    process. While the exact force structure and inventory numbers for each
    of the Phases are still being determined, Phase I will leverage
    existing and maturing systems to counter the short- and medium-range
    ballistic missile (S/MRBM) threat from the Middle East, while improving
    Homeland defense. Phase II will build upon Phase I by using existing
    and new capabilities to enhance our defense against the SRBM/MRBM
    threat from the Middle East. Phases III and IV will employ follow-on
    variants of the interceptors used in Phases I and II to expand
    defensive coverage of Europe against longer-range ballistic missile
    threats.

        80. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, does your testing and
    procurement plan support your fielding goals that I just laid out?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, MDA has developed and documented the test
    and procurement plans required to field the PAA. In February 2010, we
    finalized version 10.1 of our IMTP that outlines the first three phases
    of the PAA test program and have provided it to the four congressional
    defense committees. The IMTP is a collaborative effort in which we
    partnered with the DOT&E, STRATCOM, and the Service's Operational Test
    Agencies to define the test data required to support both procurement
    and fielding decisions. The PAA procurement plan for the first three
    phases is outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense congressional
    oversight documents (R-docs, P-docs) and the details of the phase IV
    procurement are still in development.

                  two-stage gbi development and flight testing
        81. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, according to the February
    2010 BMDR, the United States ``will continue development and assessment
    of a two-stage GBI'' as a hedging strategy for defense of the Homeland.
    Yet the testing schedule for the two-stage GBI is such that it may not
    be available in time should the SM-3 Block II missile encounter
    technical difficulties. Under the current schedule, which appears to be
    slipping, the SM-3 Block IIA may be available for deployment in 2018,
    while the IIB missile might be available no earlier than 2020. First
    flight test (non-intercept) of the two-stage GBI is scheduled for
    fiscal year 2010; first intercept is scheduled for end of fiscal year
    2012; the next intercept test might occur in fiscal year 2016. What
    will be the role of the two-stage GBI in the BMD arsenal?
        General O'Reilly. DOD is investing in new missile defense capacity
    and capabilities to hedge against future uncertainties in both the
    ballistic missile threat and the technical risk inherent to our own
    development plans. One such hedge effort is the development and testing
    of a two-stage GBI. While there are no plans to field this interceptor
    at this time, maintaining a two-stage GBI development and testing
    program preserves national policy options to field missile defenses in
    a timely and effective manner. Accordingly, we will be flight testing
    the two-stage GBI for the first time in June.
        A two-stage interceptor has less burn time than the three-stage
    version, which allows it to operate within a shorter engagement
    timeline. Deployment of two-stage GBIs at Fort Greely, Alaska would
    provide additional time and additional opportunities to defend the
    United States from threat missiles launched from locations such as
    Iran. MDA has conducted studies to support two-stage GBI basing options
    for both the United States and Europe. At this time, however, there is
    currently no request from the combatant commanders to deploy a two-
    stage GBI.

        82. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, is the current development
    and testing schedule adequate to preserve the two-stage GBI option?
        General O'Reilly. Yes. The schedule for testing the two-stage GBI
    is part of our overall IMTP objective to collect the data needed to
    anchor our models and simulation. The two-stage GBI test dates are
    driven by the types of engagements in which we need to test the GBI
    kill vehicle. We will test the two-stage GBI for the first time in June
    2010 to verify differences between the performance of two-stage and the
    three-stage GBIs. After this test and the subsequent intercept events
    we believe we will have characterized differences between the two and
    will be able to evaluate the performance of a two-stage GBI using data
    collected from three-stage testing.
        This is possible because the two-stage GBI builds upon the success
    of the three-stage GBI and has many of the same components, except the
    third stage is removed. The two-stage reuses existing flight-qualified
    components from its three-stage counterpart. Key common components are
    the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, Booster Avionics Module (BAM)
    electronics, stage 2/3 interstage, and 1st and 2nd stage motors. As
    part of the three-stage development effort, these common components
    have undergone ground, flight, and qualification testing. Changes from
    the three-stage GBI are limited to the removal of the 3rd stage motor,
    relocation of the BAM, and minor modifications to navigation and
    guidance software for the two-stage flight.
        The most specialized and critical technology in a GBI is the kill
    vehicle itself and the kill vehicle for both the 2- and 3- stage
    interceptors is identical.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                                   aegis bmd
        83. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Miller, while I'm confident that
    the Aegis/SM-3 system may succeed, I'm concerned about future policy-
    related and programmatic challenges. What additional funding and assets
    might DOD need to implement the PAA, particularly as it relates to
    additional SM-3 interceptors and Aegis ships?
        Secretary Miller. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request
    includes $2.7 billion for regional missile defense. This investment
    will be used to convert additional Aegis ships to BMD-capable, adding 8
    Aegis BMD ships between fiscal year 2010-2012 and a total of 292 SM-3
    interceptors by fiscal year 2015, field additional THAAD batteries and
    launchers for a total of 6 batteries and 281 Terminal High-Altitude
    Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors by fiscal year 2015, and to field
    additional AN/TPY-2 radars for a total of 14 by fiscal year 2015.
        Continued investments in regional missile defense will be necessary
    to meet these production goals, and to field the necessary capabilities
    to protect deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners from regional
    ballistic missile threats.

        84. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Miller, with regards to the
    proposed Aegis-Ashore BMD site in Romania that was announced in
    February, have there been any offers of assistance from NATO or our
    other European friends in the form of financial support for this
    effort?
        Secretary Miller. The land-based SM-3 site in Romania will be
    deployed based on a bilateral agreement. Our NATO Allies are not
    directly involved in funding that or other elements of the European
    PAA. The United States will fund the European PAA, and the European PAA
    will represent the U.S. contribution to NATO's missile defense efforts.
        Regarding NATO and Allied efforts, NATO is also developing a
    command and control network called the ALTBMD program that will allow
    Allies to link their missile defense assets together, creating a more
    efficient architecture. In addition, NATO countries already possess or
    are acquiring national missile defense capabilities. Several countries
    have Patriot systems (Netherlands, Germany, Greece). Italy, Germany,
    and the United States are cooperatively developing the MEADS. Others
    have expressed interest in acquiring systems like Patriot and SM-3.
    ALTBMD could allow current and future NATO systems--including those of
    the United States--to be able to ``plug-and-play'' with the overall
    NATO effort and the Europan PAA assets.
        Currently NATO is funding the component of ALTBMD that will provide
    command and control for defense of deployed forces only, rather than
    territorial missile defense. The United States strongly supports
    continued funding for ALTBMD and its expansion because it will allow
    Allies' missile defense systems to be interoperable and more efficient.

        85. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Miller, will the Aegis-Ashore
    system in Romania be able to defend against Iran's Shahab-3 missile?
        Secretary Miller. Yes. The SM-3 interceptors and planned follow-on
    versions are designed to intercept MRBMs, including the Shahab-3.

        86. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Miller and General O'Reilly, DOD's
    BMDR discusses the expansion of countermeasures other nations are using
    to confuse and overwhelm BMDs. What can you tell me about how the U.S.
    BMD program is or is not responsive to these developments in
    countermeasures?
        Secretary Miller. We see an increased desire on the part of
    potential adversaries to increase the numbers of ballistic missile
    systems and their operational performance. Some states aim to defeat
    missile defenses through operational countermeasures, such as large
    raid sizes and salvo launches, and technical countermeasures to enable
    penetration of missile defenses. The MDA has completed several external
    ``red team'' studies to provide insight into the possible future
    changes of the threat in these areas.
        Significant technical countermeasures are not expected to be
    deployed by potential adversaries within the near to midterm. However,
    adversary countermeasure capabilities may mature and deploy more
    rapidly than predicted. Ballistic missile defense capabilities and
    development must be agile so as to adjust to unexpected evolutions of
    the threat.
        MDA's budget includes a portfolio of investments in capabilities to
    hedge against the possibility of more rapid than projected developments
    of the threat, including the use of countermeasures. These hedge
    capabilities include improvements in sensors to support our ability to
    intercept missiles before they can completely deploy countermeasures
    and to counter larger raid sizes. The Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB system,
    available in the midterm, will have improved on-board discrimination
    and greater area coverage. The PAA provides an inherent hedge against
    threat uncertainties by deploying scalable, relocatable missile
    defenses. Moveable assets enable more rapid increases in capability
    against larger threat sizes. Scalable systems allow flexible
    integration of new technologies into the existing architecture to deal
    with uncertainty in the performance of threat systems. These approaches
    provide the United States with flexible responses to new threats and
    capabilities as they materialize.
        General O'Reilly. We see an increased desire on the part of threat
    states to increase the numbers of ballistic missile systems and their
    operational performance. Some states aim to defeat missile defenses
    through operational countermeasures, such as large raids and salvo
    launches, and technical countermeasures to enable penetration of
    missile defenses. MDA has completed several external red team studies
    to provide insight into the possible future changes of the threat in
    these areas.
        Capabilities in the area of technical countermeasures are not
    expected to be deployed by adversaries of concern within the near to
    midterm. However, adversary countermeasure capabilities may mature and
    deploy more rapidly than predicted. Ballistic Missile Defense
    capabilities and development must be agile so as to adjust to
    unexpected evolutions of the threat.
        MDA's budget includes a portfolio of investments in capabilities to
    hedge against the possibility of more rapid than projected qualitative
    developments of the threat, including their use of countermeasures.
    These hedge capabilities include improvements in sensors to support our
    ability to intercept threat missiles before they can completely deploy
    countermeasures and to counter larger raid sizes. The Aegis BMD SM-3
    Block IB system, available in the midterm, will have improved on-board
    discrimination and greater area coverage. Research into the utility of
    directed energy systems for missile defenses is being funded by MDA.
    The PAA provides an inherent hedge against threat uncertainties by
    deploying scalable, relocatable missile defenses. Moveable assets
    enable more rapid increases in capability against larger threat sizes.
    Scalable systems allow flexible integration of new technologies into
    the existing architecture to deal with uncertainty in the performance
    of threat systems. These approaches provide the United States with
    flexible responses to new threats and capabilities as they materialize.

        87. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Macy, I have some general concerns
    about the ability of the Navy to accommodate what appears to be a
    significant amount of growth over the next few years in the realm of
    missile defense. Given the multi-mission role of our Aegis-equipped
    ships, are you confident that the Navy can both refit their cruiser-
    destroyer force with Aegis technology while simultaneously meeting the
    maritime demands of our regional combatant commanders, all the while
    operating with a total of 88 cruisers and destroyers?
        Admiral Macy. The anticipated force requirements, as informed by
    the decision on the PAA, were taken into consideration in the Navy's
    scheduling decisions on Aegis BMD refits. The GFM process is completely
    capable of managing our available forces to balance combatant commander
    requirements and U.S. commitments.

        88. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Macy, as far as equipment and
    technology, what modifications are required for the sea-based Aegis
    system to be converted to the land-based Aegis Ashore system?
        Admiral Macy. With regard to the Aegis weapons system itself,
    little to no changes are required to convert it to Aegis Ashore.
    Certain mechanical, electrical, and structural modifications will be
    required to house the weapons system in the shore based structures.
    These details will be worked out during MDA's system development
    efforts.

        89. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Macy, do you foresee any challenges
    to meeting the fiscal year 2015-fiscal year 2018 timeline?
        Admiral Macy. While any technology development effort entails a
    certain amount of risk, I foresee no significant challenges to meeting
    the fiscal year 2015-fiscal year 2018 timeline. The challenges normally
    found in a new program are being mitigated through the use of the same
    Aegis BMD configuration and functionality found on Aegis BMD ships, as
    well as the existing Navy infrastructure to meet training and personnel
    requirements.

        90. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Macy, considering that a significant
    amount of the Navy's resources will be dedicated to refitting its ships
    with Aegis BMD capabilities, how will we train, man, and equip the two
    planned Aegis Ashore sites (Romania and Poland) in this timeframe?
        Admiral Macy. Many of the manning requirements for the Aegis Ashore
    sites in Romania and Poland will be determined as we negotiate the
    basing agreements with the host-nations, including manning for site
    security, support facilities, etc. With respect to the manning required
    specifically to operate the weapons system, it will be significantly
    less than that of a ship. This is estimated to be 1/4 to 1/3 or less of
    an equivalent ship's complement. As part of the duties of lead service,
    the Navy will assess the manning requirements for these systems and
    incorporate them into the Navy's overall manning plan. The training
    requirements for Aegis Ashore will be common to that for Aegis
    operators afloat, as will the majority of the system parts support.
    Parts support for Aegis Ashore specific components will be addressed
    during system development, but will leverage existing Navy logistics
    and logistics infrastructures.

        91. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Miller and General O'Reilly,
    regarding the issue of testing, the administration's policy emphasizes
    the need for operationally relevant testing and a fly-before-you-buy
    approach to BMD development and fielding. In my view, BMD testing is
    qualitatively different from testing for other types of weapon systems.
    If 99 percent of the time an airplane took off it was able to land
    successfully, but 1 percent of the time it crashed, that would be
    unacceptable and we would never tolerate it. However, if 99 percent of
    the time we launched a ballistic missile interceptor it hit its target,
    but 1 percent of the time it missed, in my view that is a great track
    record and is infinitely better than having no missile defense system
    at all. I am in favor of operationally realistic testing and flying
    before we buy, but I do not think we should demand the same level of
    reliability as we do for other systems. We need effective systems, but
    we shouldn't require perfect systems. What are your comments on this
    issue?
        Secretary Miller. We agree that it is important to balance
    reliability against availability regarding our missile defense systems.
        A key tenet of the BMDR is to test sufficiently the capabilities
    and limitations of a missile defense system before we begin
    procurement. Missile defense systems are subject to production
    decisions by USD(AT&L). Additionally, we use the military departments'
    standard material release and operational certification processes that
    also rely on developmental and operational test data prior to formally
    fielding, initial capability.
        A related effort is the execution of the IMTP. In collaboration
    with the military departments Operational Test Agencies, STRATCOM, and
    the DOT&E, the MDA submitted a comprehensive IMTP in March 2010 that
    describes the test program through fiscal year 2015 to conduct more
    than 150 test events to obtain specific data necessary to accredit our
    models and simulations and support operational assessments.
        General O'Reilly. MDA is enforcing rigorous developmental testing
    to mitigate risk prior to operational assessments, consistent with the
    Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 which directs enhanced focus on solid
    developmental testing. There is a clear benefit of early operational
    input to the development of missile defense systems. However, premature
    entry into operational development and testing (i.e., before the design
    and configuration has been stabilized and basic technical concepts have
    been validated) risks expensive repetition of non-recurring engineering
    and operational development.
        A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test the capabilities
    and limitations of a missile defense system before we begin
    procurement, or ``fly before we buy.'' As such, missile defense
    projects are subject to production decisions by USD(AT&L).
    Additionally, we use the Services' standard material release and
    operational certification processes that also rely on developmental and
    operational test data prior to formally fielding initial capability.
        Another critical Department effort is the execution of the IMTP. In
    collaboration with the Services' Operational Test Agencies, STRATCOM,
    and the DOT&E, MDA submitted a comprehensive IMTP in March that
    describes our plan through fiscal year 2015 to conduct over 150 test
    events to obtain specific data necessary to accredit our models and
    simulations and support operational assessments.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
                      russian and chinese support for iran
        92. Senator Thune. Secretary Miller, in 2007, the Director of
    National Intelligence assessed that ``individual Russian entities
    continue to provide assistance to Iran's ballistic missile programs. We
    judge that Russian-entity assistance, along with assistance from
    entities in China and North Korea, has helped Iran move toward self-
    sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. The Russian
    Government has taken steps to improve controls on ballistic-missile
    technology, and its record of enforcement--though still mixed--has
    improved over the last decade.'' What level of assistance do you see
    from Russia today, in helping Iran develop its ballistic missile
    capabilities or capacities?
        Secretary Miller. Moscow is not providing state-to-state assistance
    to Tehran to further its ballistic missile and space launch vehicle
    research and development efforts. However, Russia's advanced ballistic
    missile production infrastructure has technologies that could further
    current and future Iranian goals. Russian-based Iranian defense
    officials and intermediaries have access to Russian academics,
    companies, and research organizations, and some of these individuals
    and entities likely assist Iran with technologies that could assist in
    its ballistic missile programs. Iran is likely attempting to obtain
    Russian expertise in missile guidance systems to improve accuracy,
    composite structural materials to save weight and increase range, in
    high temperature materials for reentry vehicles, and possibly in more
    energetic propellants.

        93. Senator Thune. Secretary Miller, a Thursday, April 15, 2010,
    Washington Times newspaper article reported that CIA's Weapons
    Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center this year linked
    Chinese companies to missile programs in Iran. Do your missile defense
    plans take into account longstanding and possibly present day
    cooperation and support by Russia and China for Iran's ballistic
    missile program?
        Secretary Miller. Beijing is not providing state-to-state
    assistance to Tehran to further its ballistic missile and space launch
    vehicle research and development efforts, but Chinese individuals and
    entities provide Iran with controlled and dual-use technologies needed
    to advance in these areas. China-based Iranian defense officials and
    intermediaries have access to Chinese academics, companies, and
    research organizations, some of which continue to provide support
    despite being sanctioned. Iran is receiving materiel and technological
    assistance with missile guidance systems, raw materials, production
    machinery, and propellants.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
                               long-range threats
        94. Senator Vitter. Secretary Miller, Dr. Gilmore, General
    O'Reilly, and Admiral Macy, do you think that an additional missile
    field on the U.S. east coast would provide more protection from long-
    range threats to address a coverage gap?
        Secretary Miller. [Deleted.]
        Dr. Gilmore. The additional area of defense provided by a missile
    field on the East Coast of the United States would depend upon the
    types of interceptors emplaced, as well as the radars and other sensors
    available. Whether such a field is needed is a question that should be
    answered by those in the Department responsible for determining
    military requirements.
        General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
        Admiral Macy. An additional missile field on the U.S. east coast
    would provide some redundant coverage against long-range threats, but
    would provide no additional coverage. The west coast missile fields
    already provide coverage for 100 percent of the Homeland.

        95. Senator Vitter. Secretary Miller, Dr. Gilmore, General
    O'Reilly, and Admiral Macy, do you think such a site would be
    beneficial to further hedge against long-range threats?
        Secretary Miller. Given continuing improvements in the GMD system
    and the number of GBIs currently deployed, the United States possesses
    a capacity to counter the projected threats of North Korea and Iran.
    Therefore, based on current threat projections, deployment of
    interceptors at an east coast site is not warranted.
        Dr. Gilmore. The additional area of defense provided by a missile
    field on the east coast of the United States would depend upon the
    types of interceptors emplaced, as well as the radars and other sensors
    available. Whether such a field is needed is a question that should be
    answered by those in the Department responsible for determining
    military requirements.
        General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
        Admiral Macy. In the current budget climate, the redundancy
    afforded by a U.S. east coast missile field would provide less
    additional capability than would be lost as a result of the budget
    restructuring required to establish the new field.

        96. Senator Vitter. Secretary Miller, Dr. Gilmore, General
    O'Reilly, and Admiral Macy, how quickly could the United States have an
    operational east coast missile field?
        Secretary Miller. Establishing a fully operational east coast
    missile field would require a minimum of 5 years from receiving funding
    and authority to proceed. This estimate factors in considerations such
    as site selection, environmental survey/approval, site clearing and
    construction, and equipment production.
        Dr. Gilmore. I believe the answer to this question is best left to
    the MDA and the operational user. If a decision is made to deploy a
    missile field to the U.S. East Coast, I will ensure that appropriate
    operational testing is accomplished in a timely fashion.
        General O'Reilly. From authority to proceed and assuming funding is
    provided, fielding of a fully operational East Coast Missile Field (MF)
    would require a minimum 5 years of construction and check out plus a
    year for operational integration based on the following assumptions:

        (1)  Located on a military base and within a single contiguous area
    similar to the GMD Missile Defense Complex (MDC) located at Fort
    Greely, AK.
        (2)  Consisting of a 10-Silo configuration
        (3)  Support facilities and equipment would include:

            a.  Controlled entry point/force protection, security boundary/
    fencing, roads, local power and associated facilities support structure
            b.  Missile Field - Mechanical Electrical Building (MEB)
            c.  Command Launch Equipment/Readiness and Control Building
            d.  Two In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data
    Terminals
            e.  Missile Assembly Building (MAB)
            f.  Satellite Communications
            g.  Self Sustaining Power Source

        (4)  Approximately 2 years required for site selection,
    preconstruction and design, approval and environmental survey/approval.
        (5)  Minimum of 3 years required for construction (initial site
    clearing to facilities with system equipment installed).
        (6)  Minimum of 1 year for establishing initial operations and
    deployment, training, exercises, and verification of integration into
    GMD operational baseline.

        The time required to field a fully operational east coast MF could
    increase if the requirements for the site and capability exceeded these
    basic assumptions.
        Admiral Macy. Establishing a fully operational east coast missile
    field would require a minimum of 5 years from receiving funding and
    authority to proceed. This estimate factors in considerations such as
    site selection, environmental survey/approval, site clearing and
    construction, and equipment production.

                         missile defense and new start
        97. Senator Vitter. Secretary Miller, there seems to be conflicting
    reports and conflicting interpretation on limitations on missile
    defense in the START follow-on agreement. I find this troubling because
    it seems that Russia is adamant that this concession was provided in
    the negotiations, despite promises from the administration that such a
    concession would not be made. Was any promise made by the United States
    to Russia regarding missile defense during the negotiations or in the
    treaty?
        Secretary Miller. No ``promise'' to or ``side deal'' with Russia
    has been made regarding missile defenses. The legally-binding documents
    connected to the New START treaty represent the only U.S. obligations.
        Specifically, Article V, section 3 of the treaty prohibits the
    conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense launchers and
    vice versa; that is, the conversion of missile defense launchers to
    launch ICBMs or SLBMs. This section also ``grandfathers'' the five
    former ICBM silos at Vandenberg AFB that were converted for the
    placement of GBIs within them over the past several years. If more
    interceptors were to be added at Vandenberg AFB, it would be less
    expensive to build a new field of GBI silos, which is not prohibited by
    the treaty, than to convert additional ICBM test launchers. Regarding
    SLBM launchers, the MDA examined the concept of launching missile
    defense interceptors from submarines and found it an unattractive and
    unreasonably expensive option.
        The Preamble of the Treaty contains a statement acknowledging the
    interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms
    and recognizing that this relationship will become more important as
    strategic offensive arms are reduced. This statement also notes that
    current strategic defensive forces do not threaten to undermine the
    effectiveness of either Parties' strategic offensive arms. The Preamble
    does not limit the United States.
        Both the United States and the Russian Federation made unilateral
    statements concerning ballistic missile defense just prior to signing
    the New START treaty.
        Russia asserted in its unilateral statement that any build-up in
    U.S. missile defenses that would ``give rise to a threat to the
    strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation'' would
    justify Russia's withdrawal from the treaty. This statement is not
    legally binding and does not constrain U.S. missile defense programs.
    In fact, both sides have the right to withdraw from the treaty under
    Article XIV, if they deem it necessary due to a threat to their supreme
    national interests. Such withdrawal clauses are common to treaties,
    especially in the case of arms control agreements.
        The United States also issued a unilateral statement concerning
    missile defense in connection with the New START treaty, stating that
    ``the United States intends to continue improving and deploying its
    missile defense systems in order to defend against limited attack and
    as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key
    regions.'' The statement takes note of Russia's views expressed in its
    unilateral statement and makes clear that U.S. missile defenses ``are
    not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia,'' but instead
    are intended to defend the United States against limited missile
    launches and to protect U.S. deployed forces, our allies and partners
    from regional threats.
        As the U.S. unilateral statement, the BMDR, and our budgetary plans
    all make clear, the United States will continue to improve our missile
    defenses as needed to defend the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces,
    and our allies and partners. Nothing in the New START treaty, or in any
    other statements, limits our ability to do this.

        [Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2011

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2010

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                        LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Bill
    Nelson, Hagan, Coons, McCain, Sessions, LeMieux, Brown, and
    Collins.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
    professional staff member; and Michael J. Noblet, professional
    staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative
    counsel; and Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Brian F.
    Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Neal Higgins, assistant to Senator
    Bill Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
    Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
    assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to
    Senator Manchin; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to
    Senator Sessions; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune;
    Erskine Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh,
    assistant to Senator LeMieux; and Scott Schrage, assistant to
    Senator Brown.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. I want to
    welcome our witnesses today: from the Navy, Secretary Mabus,
    Secretary Stackley, Admiral Roughead, and Rear Admiral
    Pandolfe; from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Paul
    Francis; from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Dr. Eric
    Labs; and from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Ron
    O'Rourke.
        The Navy continues to be faced with a number of critical
    issues as it tries to balance its modernization needs and
    procurement needs against the costs of current operations. The
    shipbuilding budget remains at a level where it will be
    difficult at best to field the Navy that we must have.
    Therefore, we need to be looking for ways to make the
    shipbuilding program more affordable.
        The original Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) acquisition plan
    would have had the Navy buying both types of LCS vehicles for
    some time while the Navy evaluated the capabilities of each
    vessel. At some time in the future, the Navy would have had the
    option to down-select to building one type of vessel, but in
    any case the Navy would have been operating some number of each
    type of LCS vessels in the fleet, which means that the Navy
    would have been dealing with two shipyards, two supply chains,
    two training pipelines, et cetera.
        Last year, the Navy decided upon a winner-take-all
    acquisition strategy to procure the fiscal year 2010 vessels
    under a fixed-price contract, with fixed-price options for two
    ships per year for the next 4 years. This revised strategy
    included obtaining the data rights for the winning ship design
    and competing for a second source for the winning design among
    other shipyards, starting in fiscal year 2012. The Navy did
    this after determining that the original acquisition strategy,
    an approach of buying at least one ship from each shipyard in
    fiscal year 2010 under a noncompetitive solicitation, was
    unaffordable. Earlier this year, the Navy released the
    solicitation under the revised strategy and has been in
    discussions with the two contractor teams and evaluating those
    proposals since that time.
        The Navy has decided, upon reviewing the bids from the two
    contractor teams, to modify its strategy for the following
    reasons: First, both teams have made offers that are much more
    attractive than had been expected and both are priced well
    below the original noncompetitive offers; and second,
    continuing the winner-take-all down-select would save roughly
    $1.9 billion compared with what had been budgeted for the LCS
    program in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
        But the Navy has also determined that accepting the offers
    from both LCS contractor teams, rather than down-selecting to
    one design and starting a second source building the winning
    design, would save $2.9 billion, or $1 billion more than the
    program of record, and would allow the Navy to purchase an
    additional LCS vessel during this same period of the FYDP, 20
    ships rather than 19 ships.
        The Navy has also determined that, using net present value
    calculations, additional operation and support costs for
    maintaining two separate designs in the fleet for their service
    life over 40 to 50 years would be much less than the additional
    savings that could be achieved through buying both the ships
    during the FYDP period.
        The Navy first conveyed to Congress its interest in
    modifying the LCS acquisition strategy in early November and
    said that they needed to act before the bid prices were set to
    expire on December 14, 2010. Since then, the Navy has requested
    and the contractors have agreed that the LCS teams extend these
    bid prices until the end of this month.
        I understand that the Navy has been briefing members and
    staffs in the Senate and House of Representatives since
    announcing its revised plan.
        From a broad policy perspective, I believe the Navy
    approach of a competitive dual-source alternative could help
    ensure maximum competition throughout the life cycle of the
    program, meeting the spirit and intent of the Weapon Systems
    Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. Specifically, it calls
    for two shipbuilders in continuous competition to build the
    ships for the life of the program. The Navy plans to build a
    total of 55 of these ships, so that competition would be going
    on for a number of years.
        The Navy has been prevented from sharing specific bid
    information that would violate the competitive source selection
    process by revealing proprietary information about the two
    contractors' bids. This has led some to ask whether these bids
    can be independently verified. We should hear in detail from
    the Navy witnesses today about that issue and also why they
    believe that these bids are realistic bids.
        In that regard, I take some comfort from knowing that these
    bids are for fixed-price contracts and not for cost-type
    contracts, where a contractor has little to lose from
    underbidding a contract.
        As far as the capability of the two vessels, we will hear
    from Admiral Roughead today on whether each of the two vessels
    would meet the Navy's requirements for the LCS program and why
    he favors the modified approach.
        Reports by CRS and other individuals have raised a number
    of questions about the strategy change. This hearing, that was
    called at the request of Senator McCain, by the way, will give
    us an opportunity to get answers about the Navy's proposal.
        The CBO analysis also estimates that continuing competition
    between the two teams, as envisioned by the revised Navy
    strategy, would cost more than going ahead with the winner-
    take-all option. CBO, however, was unable to factor into their
    analysis the actual fixed-price bid data to which the
    contractors are willing to agree, because of the information-
    sharing constraints surrounding an ongoing competition.
        The GAO has raised concerns about potential cost growth
    from design changes, additional operation and support costs,
    and mission package development. We will need to hear from the
    Navy witnesses whether design changes are a significant threat
    to realizing the price reductions and why the Navy has
    confidence in its estimate that the operating and support cost
    increases are far less than the expected acquisition savings.
        As far as the progress in development of the mission
    packages is concerned, I believe the Navy's fundamental
    architecture of the LCS program divorces changes in the mission
    package from changes that perturb the ship design and ship
    construction. In the past when there were problems with
    developing the right combat capability on a ship, this almost
    inevitably caused problems in the construction program. In the
    case of the LCS, I understand that the combat capability
    largely resides in the mission packages that connect to either
    LCS vessel through defined interfaces. Now, what that means, I
    believe, is that changes inside the mission packages should not
    translate into changes during the ship construction schedule,
    that they're interchangeable, and whatever is happening in the
    mission package development program would apparently apply
    equally to either the down-select strategy or the dual-source
    strategy. We'll need to hear from Navy witnesses today to
    describe that relationship in greater detail.
        In terms of the proposal's effects on the industrial base
    and therefore on the future of competition, I would think that
    there would be a net positive. The Navy would have the
    opportunity to compete throughout the life of the program and
    any erosion in contractor performance could be corrected by
    competitive pressures. For the industrial base, there would be
    more stability in the shipbuilding program, and a number of
    Navy witnesses have previously testified that one of the
    important things that we could do for the Navy is to help the
    shipbuilders achieve stability in our shipbuilding programs.
        To me, the Navy's proposal seems to promote that goal while
    effectively continuing competition throughout the program and
    at the same time reducing acquisition costs and buying an
    additional ship over the FYDP.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    you for holding this hearing. This is a very important issue
    that is upon us in the final days of a lame duck session.
        I want to thank GAO, CRS, and CBO for raising important
    questions that should have answers before I believe we should
    consider approving this proposal.
        Mr. Chairman, we can't consider this LCS in a vacuum. The
    story of this ship is one that makes me ashamed and embarrassed
    as a former Navy person and as a person who's responsible to
    the taxpayers of my State. I'd like to just review with you a
    little background and one of the reasons why I remain
    incredibly skeptical about this latest rush proposal that we
    have to approve in a lame duck session.
        The background is that in November 2001, the LCS program
    was started. In 2004, the Navy awarded contracts to two teams
    led by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. The initial
    contract price was $188 million per ship.
        In the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
    Congress set a cost cap of $220 million per ship. In the 2008
    NDAA, Congress increased the cost cap to $460 million per ship.
    In the 2009 NDAA, Congress amended the cost cap again by
    deferring its implementation by 2 years, as the Navy requested.
    In the 2010 NDAA, Congress increased the cost cap to $480
    million per ship.
        In 2007, the LCS unit procurement cost tripled to over $700
    million. Later, outside the congressional budget review
    process, the Navy proposed to substantially restructure the LCS
    program. So 6 years later, after expenditure of roughly $8
    billion, the Navy decided to restructure the program.
        Then, of course, we went through the strategy of the down-
    select and the competition of 10 LCSs, that one contractor
    would build 10 LCSs over a 5-year period, and the Navy decided
    to make a down-select decision and award the contract to build
    the 10 LCSs some time this summer. It delayed its decision
    twice. The award decision would not be made in December 2010.
    Then in November they came up with a great idea.
        I'd remind the witnesses and the taxpayers, the cost of the
    LCS from 2005 to 2010 has been $8 billion of the taxpayers'
    dollars. What do we have to show for it? The first LCS was
    funded in 2005 and it was commissioned in November 2008 at a
    cost of $637 million. The second LCS, funded in 2006, was
    commissioned in January 2010 at a cost of $704 million.
        Then numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 funded and cancelled by the
    Navy; the third one, funded in 2006, cancelled in 2007; the
    fourth one, funded in 2006, canceled in 2007. The list goes on.
        Then we get to the eighth LCS, funded in 2009, christened
    in 2010, and now is about 80 percent complete. The ninth LCS,
    funded in 2009, is under construction and is about 40 percent
    complete.
        So we've spent $8 billion. We have two ships commissioned,
    another one 80 percent complete and the other 40 percent
    complete. If my figures are wrong, which we got from the Navy,
    I will be glad to stand corrected.
        So here we are now with a brand-new idea as to how we
    should apportion the funding for the LCSs. Somehow,
    miraculously, a month or so ago the two shipbuilders came in
    with very low estimates. Now, we are told by the Navy those are
    very low estimates, but we don't know what those numbers are
    because it's proprietary information.
        I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, I have never in the 20-
    some years that I've been a member of this committee approved
    of a program that I don't know what the cost is. At least I owe
    it to the taxpayers of Arizona to know what the cost is. But
    with a record like this of $8 billion for four ships and an
    estimated cost of about $11 billion from 2010 to 2015, I'm
    supposed to say: Hey, this is a good deal.
        GAO has said they have concerns that decisionmakers need
    more information, cost savings are uncertain, future
    performance is an open question, the Navy's assessment of
    design stability may be too optimistic, and the proposal is
    fundamentally inconsistent with an important GAO
    recommendation.
        CRS's concerns are: How the proposal was presented raises
    issues; potential relative costs and risks of the two
    strategies is unclear; the proposal could hinder competition;
    the industrial base implications are uncertain; how the mission
    packages would be procured is unclear; and CBO's concerns about
    costs and savings remain unclear, certainly, and the cost of
    operating and maintaining the LCS are probably more than the
    Navy's estimate.
        The Navy may have overstated the costs of the current plan,
    and using two different combat systems for each LCS version may
    drive costs up. If you build two different ships, then you have
    two different supply lines, you have two different training
    regimens for the crew, and you have, obviously, dramatically
    increased costs, plus a problem with cross-training and safety
    concerns.
        Mr. Chairman, I understand that the two very generous
    offers have now been extended to December 30. I see no reason
    why those offers could not be extended to January or February
    or March, so that this committee could at least address the
    concerns that GAO, CBO, and CRS have raised. They're important
    questions.
        When you look at the history of this ship, and now we're
    supposed to buy an additional 15 ships based on costs we
    haven't been told, with the incredible and disgraceful waste of
    the taxpayers' money that has characterized this whole program,
    Mr. Chairman, I have greater responsibilities to the taxpayers
    of my State.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator McCain.
        Let me start with Secretary Mabus.

     STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

        Mr. Mabus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished
    members of this committee: Thank you for this opportunity to
    appear before you to discuss the LCS program. Following my
    comments, Admiral Roughead will have a short opening statement.
    Our Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and
    Acquisition, Sean Stackley, is also here and is prepared, with
    your permission, to briefly offer some more specifics on the
    numbers involved in this proposal.
        The LCS brings critically needed capabilities and numbers
    to our Nation's fleet which are necessary to give the Navy the
    force structure to meet the missions we've been given. For the
    future strength of our Navy, it's vitally important that we
    succeed in delivering this 55-ship class affordably,
    effectively, and quickly, while at the same time exercising
    sound judgment and solid oversight.
        As Secretary, I take this process extraordinarily seriously
    and I would not have made this recommendation if I did not
    firmly believe that giving us the authority to move forward
    with a dual award of 10 ships to each of 2 shipbuilders, as we
    are requesting, is in the best interests of the taxpayers, our
    Navy, and our Nation.
        This authority, which I emphasize requires no additional
    funding, will enable us to purchase more high-quality ships for
    less money and get them into service in less time. It will help
    preserve jobs in our industrial shipbuilding base and will
    create new employment opportunities in an economic sector that
    is critical to our Nation's military and economic security.
        We recognize that this proposal comes outside the normal
    budget process. However, a key focus of this Department for the
    last 2 years has been to build as many ships for the Navy as
    possible, as affordably as we can. As a result, I believe it
    was my duty to present Congress with this opportunity.
        The timing of this request is the result of a very thorough
    analysis. Once we received the bids, we conducted two rounds of
    discussion with industry to assure ourselves that the bids were
    realistic and sustainable. That examination demonstrated that
    we achieved our goal, one we share with this committee, of
    driving down the cost of these ships.
        We next needed to examine the proposal from the standpoint
    of naval operations, which was done by the Chief of Naval
    Operations (CNO) and the Navy staff. As the CNO will explain in
    a moment, they concluded that a dual award created important
    operational flexibility. Finally, we met with Pentagon
    leadership for their review and concurrence with this proposal.
        This process took some time, but I believe it was critical
    to ensuring that we were making an operationally sound and
    fiscally responsible proposal that meets congressional
    guidelines, as well as the intent and the spirit of the WSARA
    of 2009.
        As you're aware, both the lead LCSs fully meet performance
    requirements. Both the lead ships of each variant are currently
    in service and already performing well, while also conducting a
    comprehensive test and evaluation program. LCS-1, the Freedom,
    demonstrated some of the things we can expect during her maiden
    deployment earlier this year, a deployment done 2 years ahead
    of schedule. In less than 3 weeks of counternarcotics operation
    in the Caribbean, she made three major drug seizures and
    recovered more than three tons of cocaine. It was because of
    her capabilities that she was able to run down fast drug boats
    that otherwise would have escaped.
        I recognize that this program has historically had
    problems. The program's early shortfalls and initially
    unrealistic cost expectations, stretching back nearly a decade,
    have been pointed out by members of this committee and
    oversight organizations. It was precisely because of this poor
    performance record that last year, with the concurrence of
    Congress, we made very significant changes to our LCS
    procurement strategy. The message from this committee and
    Congress was unmistakably clear: The Navy needs more ships, but
    they have to be more affordable. We heard that message and
    established and enforced a strict policy to limit design
    changes and their debilitating impact on cost and schedule. We
    worked with industry to ensure the lessons learned building the
    lead ships were put in place for efficient construction of
    successive ships. We put a talented, highly capable team in
    charge of this process.
        In 2009, when bids for follow-on ships of both variants
    came in unacceptably high, we made the two industry teams
    compete against each other to get costs down. In this, we
    structured a highly competitive, fixed-price procurement
    strategy to award 10 ships of a single design over 5 years to a
    single builder, with an additional 5 ships to be built by a
    second builder after another round of competition, with the
    Navy owning the technical data package for construction of all
    ships.
        In response to this down-select, industry competitors
    restructured their respective teaming agreements to eliminate
    excess overhead and unnecessary costs. They leveraged the 10-
    ship plan to drive down material costs with their vendors and
    they used the long-term nature of the contract to plan facility
    improvements to further reduce labor costs.
        These bids and the cost reductions we have seen
    demonstrated on LCS-3 and -4 will save the taxpayer
    approximately $1.9 billion in fiscal years 2011 through 2016.
    More importantly, the fact that prices were so dramatically
    reduced presented an opportunity to save an additional $1
    billion, for a total of $2.9 billion, through a dual award of a
    10-ship contract to each bidder.
        Each of the variants included in the two contracts will
    fall significantly below the cost cap established by Congress
    in 2010. If our request is approved, it would also enable
    purchase of an additional ship through the realized savings. In
    short, we'll get 20 ships for the price of 19.
        It's important to note that these will be block buys and
    not multi-year contracts. We will not be contractually required
    to buy any ships after the first year and there are no
    termination or cancellation costs. Therefore, both Congress and
    the Navy will have continuing supervision and the ability to
    ensure this program stays on track.
        Senator Levin, Senator McCain, members of this committee:
    You have worked for years on behalf of our service men and
    women to provide them with what they need to protect our
    Nation, while also ensuring proper oversight to protect the
    interests of taxpayers. The LCS proposal you have before you is
    the fruit of those efforts. It delivers better value to the
    taxpayer and greater capability to our fleet.
        I believe we have arrived at an opportunity to realize
    significant real savings within our shipbuilding program, and
    we have done so by following congressional guidance. This is
    good for the Navy, good for the taxpayers, good for industry,
    good for workers, and good for our Nation.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Mabus.
        Now, I believe you wished our CNO, Admiral Roughead, to
    follow? Okay, Admiral Roughead.

     STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

        Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator
    McCain, distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for
    the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the LCS
    and the dual-award proposal that I believe is good for the
    Navy, for our critical shipbuilding base, and for the taxpayer.
    The LCS will bring new and needed capabilities to our fleet. It
    fills critical current and future warfighting needs in anti-
    submarine warfare, mine warfare, and surface warfare, close to
    shore, in areas of strategic interest, areas where we need
    shallow draft, speed, onboard capacity, and the flexibility to
    reconfigure our ships to optimize those missions. These same
    characteristics also allow the LCS to take part in blue water
    operations. Having commanded the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, I
    know the value of such a ship.
        Accordingly, getting LCS into the fleet quickly,
    affordably, and in sufficient numbers became one of my highest
    priorities as CNO. The first step to get there, ironically and
    as was mentioned by Senator McCain, was to cancel LCSs we had
    planned for in 2007 because of unacceptable costs. What
    followed was extraordinary cooperation among my staff, the
    acquisition community, and the fleet. With the support of
    Congress, an acquisition strategy was developed and executed
    with discipline that gave us the opportunity to acquire LCSs at
    great savings.
        We have taken firm control of the program. Requirements
    have been controlled and we have held the line on changes to
    LCSs under construction today. I deployed the LCS earlier than
    any other ship class to assure we were on the right path
    operationally. It is clear to me that we are.
        The dual award will bring important stability to the
    industrial base and is a major step in getting to the floor of
    313 ships in our fleet. It enables more rapid production by
    involving two shipyards with two designs that fulfill LCS
    mission requirements and that have complementary features. It
    allows us to take advantage of the solid progress and
    infrastructure investments made by both builders. It will
    sustain competition.
        The dual award also allows us to reduce costs by further
    locking in a price for 20 ships, enabling us to acquire the LCS
    at significant savings to American taxpayers and permitting the
    use of shipbuilding funds for other shipbuilding programs.
        What we have proposed is outside the normal process, but it
    is an opportunity that, when it became apparent, was one that
    was to be seized. While it locks the price in, it does not lock
    out control by Navy or Congress, as it is not a multi-year
    procurement. Our ship construction budget, of which these ships
    are a part, will be authorized annually.
        These are good ships. The LCS concept is a sound systems
    approach and we have brought the program under control.
        I respectfully request your support of the Navy's LCS dual-
    award proposal. It is good for the Navy, for the Nation's
    industrial base, and for our taxpayers. I look forward to your
    questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Secretary Stackley, you will be next, and then we'll call
    on Admiral Pandolfe if he has testimony.

    STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
            NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION

        Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Senator Levin, Senator McCain,
    members of the committee: I'd like to provide amplifying
    information regarding cost numbers to better inform the
    committee members where we are today and why we believe that
    the numbers that we're looking at inside the bids are both
    credible and are very affordable.
        To provide baseline information, as Senator McCain pointed
    out, the lead ships' construction costs to the taxpayer, the
    Navy, and the government are between $600 million and $700
    million each. Those numbers reflect the shipbuilders' costs as
    well as government-furnished equipment and any changes that
    were brought to bear on those ships. We will refer to that as
    the baseline cost when we talk about cost cap information.
        The follow ships, which are currently under construction at
    both Marinette and Austal, were negotiated ships inside of
    fixed-price contracts. Those are negotiated at target prices of
    about $500 million each, which includes the shipbuilder's cost
    plus government-furnished equipment. Now, we also have budgeted
    above those targets change orders at 5 percent, as well as a
    share line that runs to a ceiling on the contract. So inside of
    the fixed-price construct, we're sitting at targets for ship
    construction of about $500 million, with a range that could go
    as high as about $585 million for those ships if they don't
    perform in accordance with the contract.
        Today, LCS-3, which launched at Marinette at about 81
    percent complete, is on schedule and on budget. So she is
    hitting her numbers in accordance with the target on the
    contract.
        When we look at change order activity, which crippled the
    lead ships, the change order activity on LCS-3 is below 3
    percent. So at 80 percent complete, change orders are
    performing at below 3 percent, which is also well below the 5
    percent budgeted. So we see construction and performance to a
    contract that is demonstrating stability and capturing lessons
    learned from the lead ship.
        For LCS-4 at Austal, she is 9 to 12 months behind LCS-3 by
    the natural progression of the contracts, she's about 42
    percent complete and on track for her launch at about 80
    percent complete. While it's still early in that ship's overall
    construction, she is performing in accordance with her target.
    Also, change orders on that ship are minimal, less than 1
    percent thus far. So we're seeing demonstrated performance on
    the first follow ship, lessons learned and change order
    activity throttled to the extent necessary to ensure these
    ships hit their cost and schedule targets.
        Now we move to the solicitation that was cancelled in the
    summer of 2009. In 2009 we went out for bids for the 2010
    ships. Proposals that came in were going in the wrong
    direction. So where we saw progression from the first to the
    second ship targets, we were seeing a reversal of that trend in
    these proposals, which reflected to a great extent the
    introduction of new shipyards inside the teaming agreements
    held by industry, and also risk that they viewed since they
    were very early on in construction of the follow ships at the
    time and had not demonstrated the learning that we are in fact
    seeing today.
        We cancelled that solicitation, as you're well aware, and
    went out with the down-select, the solicitation for 10 ships, 2
    ships per year over a 5-year period. So inside of the fiscal
    year 2010 through fiscal year 2015 period, where we have a
    total of 19 LCSs programmed, 10 of those ships were to be down-
    selected and the remaining ships were to be opened up for
    competition for a second source, and then between the first and
    second source they would be competed in 2015. So there's 19
    ships in fiscal years 2010 through 2015, 10 bid in the down-
    select.
        At the same time, as Senator McCain pointed out, the cost
    cap was established at $480 million, with an escalation
    provided for the cost cap. So over those ships the cost cap is
    averaged to about $538 million. So we have a cost cap of $538
    million and then we get bids in hand. We evaluate the bids and,
    while we can't provide specific details on individual bids or
    individual ships to avoid violating the competition
    sensitivity, I'm going to provide averages per the 20-ship bid
    numbers.
        For 20 ships from the 2 competitors, average, including the
    shipbuilder's cost for construction plus the government 5
    percent budget for change orders, plus a margin for potential
    cost growth for unknowns or other performance considerations,
    the Navy is holding in its budget of $440 million per ship--
    that's inside of a fixed-price contract--bid numbers, our
    government-furnished equipment, our budget for change orders,
    plus a management reserve budget for any cost performance or
    other issues that would impinge on the contract.
        In the worst case, which we do not anticipate and have no
    cause to believe, but within the fixed-price contract at
    ceiling, plus government-furnished equipment, plus the budget
    for change orders, the price to the government is on the order
    of $460 million average over the 20 ships. So under all
    circumstances, the pricing for these ships fall well below the
    cost cap and well below the budgeted amount, which is how we
    derive the savings that we've calculated.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Admiral Pandolfe.

      STATEMENT OF RADM FRANK C. PANDOLFE, USN, DIRECTOR, SURFACE
                       WARFARE DIVISION OPNAV N86

        Admiral Pandolfe. Sir, very briefly, this program was
    founded in validated requirements arising from growing threats
    in the littorals from submarines, mines, and surface crafts,
    that we have to counter. In response to our request, both
    builders have produced highly capable ships that exemplify
    speed and maneuverability and adaptability.
        As mentioned, due to competition we now have favorable
    pricing, which allows us, with your permission, sir, to move
    forward with this program.
        Senator, we need these ships and we ask for your support.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
        I think, Dr. Labs, you're next on our list, so we'll start
    with you.
        Thank you all for being here, by the way. I think I
    mentioned that at the beginning, but this is very short notice.
    We very much appreciate your all being here.
        Dr. Labs.

      STATEMENT OF ERIC J. LABS, Ph.D., SENIOR ANALYST FOR NAVAL
            FORCES AND WEAPONS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

        Dr. Labs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator
    McCain, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity
    to discuss the Navy's LCS program with you today.
        Director Elmendorf sent a letter to Senator McCain on
    Friday in response to his request that CBO conduct an
    evaluation of the cost implications of the Navy's proposal to
    change its LCS acquisition strategy. I ask that the full text
    of the CBO's letter to Senator McCain be entered into the
    record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Dr. Labs. CBO's analysis suggests the following five
    conclusions: First, under either plan, costs for the first 19
    ships are likely to be less than the amounts included in the
    Navy's 2011 budget and FYDP;
        Second, CBO's estimates show per-ship construction costs
    that are about the same for the two plans, but those estimates
    do not take into account the bids the Navy received;
        Third, adopting the dual-award plan might yield savings in
    construction costs, both from the possibility that the bids are
    lower than they would be in a subsequent competition when the
    economic environment could be different and from avoiding the
    need for a new contract to develop the infrastructure and
    expertise to build a new kind of ship;
        Fourth, operating and maintaining two types of ships would
    probably be more expensive than operating just one; and
        Fifth, if the Navy later decides to use a common combat
    system for all LCSs, the cost for developing, procuring, and
    installing that system could be significant.
        Let me first address the Navy's estimates. In the 2011
    FYDP, the Navy proposed spending almost $12 billion in current
    dollars to procure 19 LCSs under the down-select plan. The Navy
    now estimates the cost for that plan to be $10.4 billion, or
    about $1.5 billion less than its earlier estimate. Now, with
    the 2 bids in hand, the Navy proposes to purchase 20 ships, 10
    from each contractor, for about $9.8 billion through 2015, or
    $600 million less than it currently estimates for the down-
    select plan and $2.1 billion less than its 2011 FYDP.
        The Navy briefed CBO on those estimates, but did not
    provide the detailed contractor data or the Navy's detailed
    analysis of those data. If the contractors' proposals for the
    10-ship award are robust and do not change, the Navy's
    estimates would be plausible. In fact, in today's dollars and
    on a per-ton basis the cost of the LCSs under each strategy
    align well with the historical costs of the Oliver Perry-class
    frigate, the ship in the Navy's inventory that is most similar
    to the LCS. But CBO has no independent data to verify the
    Navy's savings estimate and total costs could grow by several
    hundred million dollars if the shipbuilders experience
    overruns.
        In contrast, CBO's own estimates of costs are higher and
    indicate little difference in the per-ship cost of the two
    plans. But CBO's estimates do not incorporate any benefits of
    competition that may have arisen as a result of the Navy's
    existing down-select strategy. The Navy argues that benefits
    would be locked in by the fixed-price plus incentive contracts.
    CBO estimates that the down-select plan would cost the Navy
    about $583 million per ship, compared with an estimated cost of
    $591 million per ship under the dual-award plan. Given the
    uncertainties that surround such estimate, that difference,
    less than 2 percent, is not significant.
        Overall, CBO's estimates of the costs for the down-select
    and the dual-award strategies are higher than the Navy's by
    $680 million and $2 billion, respectively. However, in light of
    the contract bids, it is not clear that CBO's cost estimating
    model is a better predictor of LCS costs through 2015 than the
    Navy's estimates. Still, changes in design to address technical
    problems, changes in the number of ships purchased, inflation,
    or other escalation clauses could add to costs.
        The Navy decision to buy both types of ships through 2015
    would have cost implications after 2015, but whether those
    costs will be higher or lower depends on at least three aspects
    of the Navy's decision: First, which of the two ship designs
    the Navy would have selected under its original down-select
    plan; second, whether the Navy will buy one or both types of
    ship after 2015; and third, whether the Navy decides to develop
    a common combat system for both LCSs or keep the two separate
    combat systems under the dual-award approach.
        CBO cannot estimate those costs beyond 2015 because it does
    not know what the Navy is likely to decide in those areas.
    However, I would like to highlight the issue of the common
    combat system for the LCS. If the Navy were to decide that it
    wanted all LCSs to share the same system, it would be
    considerably more expensive to backfit the 12 LCSs under the
    dual-award strategy than the 2 orphan LCSs under the down-
    select strategy.
        The combat system of an LCS today costs about $70 million.
    Thus, if future Navy leaders decided that a common combat
    system were desirable, developing, purchasing, and installing
    new combat systems in 12 LCSs would cost more than the savings
    that the Navy is asserting that the dual award offers over the
    next 5 years.
        Thank you and I'm happy to answer any questions you might
    have.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Labs.
        Mr. O'Rourke.

      STATEMENT OF RONALD O'ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL AFFAIRS,
                     CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

        Mr. O'Rourke. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished
    members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today. With your permission, I'd like to submit my
    written statement for the record and summarize it here briefly.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. They will all be made part of
    the record.
        Mr. O'Rourke. The Navy's proposed dual-award strategy is
    the third time in the history of the LCS program that the Navy
    has presented Congress with an important choice about the
    future of the LCS program late in the congressional budget
    review cycle, after Congress has completed its spring budget
    review hearings and some of its committee markups. The first
    instance was in mid-2002 when the Navy submitted an amended
    request to Congress for fiscal year 2003 funding to get the LCS
    program started using a rapid acquisition strategy. The second
    instance was in September 2009 when the Navy announced its
    proposed down-select strategy.
        The timing of the Navy's new proposal for using a dual-
    award strategy provides relatively little time for Congress to
    collect cost or other information from the Navy, to solicit
    cost and other information from independent sources such as CBO
    and GAO, for CBO and GAO to develop such information and
    provide it to Congress, and for Congress to then evaluate all
    this information.
        This situation raises a potential issue for Congress
    concerning the possible implications for the LCS program and
    for congressional oversight of defense acquisition programs in
    general of proceeding with the LCS program in part on the basis
    of policies originally presented to Congress late in the
    congressional budget review cycle.
        There are a number of issues to consider in evaluating the
    relative merits of the down-select and dual-award strategies,
    including their potential relative costs, and on this key
    question the available information is fragmentary and not well
    vetted. Although the Navy's statements in recent weeks about
    the cost implications of the dual-award strategy have tended to
    focus on ship acquisition costs, this is only one of at least
    three significant cost elements that can be examined in
    comparing potential costs of the down-select and dual-award
    strategies.
        Regarding ship procurement costs, there's a notable
    difference between the Navy's estimate and CBO's estimate. The
    Navy estimates that, compared to the down-select strategy, the
    dual-award strategy would reduce ship procurement costs by $1
    billion through fiscal year 2016. CBO in contrast estimates
    that, compared to the down-select strategy, the dual-award
    strategy would increase ship procurement costs by $740 million
    through fiscal year 2015. That's quite a difference in
    estimates.
        The second cost element to factor in are potential
    additional costs under the dual-award strategy for possibly
    developing, procuring, and installing a common combat system
    for LCSs. Depending on what the Navy now or years from now
    decides to do regarding LCS combat system commonality, these
    additional costs can either be negligible or significant.
    Neither the Navy nor CBO has released estimates of these costs
    as of yesterday, but at the potential high end they could be
    enough to cancel out or even exceed any savings in ship
    procurement costs that might be realized through the dual-award
    strategy. The Navy's intentions regarding LCS combat systems
    are not clear.
        The third cost element to factor in are the potential
    additional costs under the dual-award strategy for operating
    and supporting significant numbers of two LCS designs over
    their live cycles. GAO has reported a Navy estimate of $295
    million in net present value terms for this additional cost,
    but this figure does not appear to have been vetted yet by an
    independent entity outside DOD. Both CBO and GAO have
    highlighted uncertainties regarding estimates of relative life
    cycle operation and support (O&S) costs under the down-select
    and dual-award strategies.
        When I put together the information on these three cost
    elements that was available as of yesterday, I get a range of
    possibilities. At one end of the range, the dual-award strategy
    might cost about $700 million less than the down-select
    strategy. Toward the other end of the range, the dual-award
    strategy might cost hundreds of millions dollars more than the
    down-select strategy. The wide degree of uncertainty from one
    end of the range to the other can be viewed as an expression of
    how imperfectly understood the potential relative costs of the
    down-select and dual-award strategies are at this point.
        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, this
    concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the opportunity to
    testify and I'll be pleased to respond to any questions you
    might have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. O'Rourke follows:]
                     Prepared Statement by Ronald O'Rourke
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
    discuss acquisition strategies for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
    program.
                                  introduction
    Down-Select Strategy Proposed In September 2009
        On September 16, 2009, the Navy announced a proposed LCS
    acquisition strategy under which the Navy would hold a competition to
    pick a single design to which all LCSs procured in fiscal year 2010 and
    subsequent years would be built. (The process of selecting the single
    design for all future production is called a down select.) The winner
    of the down select would be awarded a contract to build 10 LCSs over
    the 5-year period fiscal years 2010-2014, at a rate of two ships per
    year. The Navy would then hold a second competition--open to all
    bidders other than the shipyard building the 10 LCSs in fiscal years
    2010-2014--to select a second shipyard to build up to five additional
    LCSs to the same design in fiscal years 2012-2014 (one ship in fiscal
    year 2012, and two ships per year in fiscal year 2013-2014). These two
    shipyards would then compete for contracts to build LCSs procured in
    fiscal year 2015 and subsequent years.
        Section 121 (a) and (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2010 (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) grant
    the Navy contracting and other authority needed to implement this LCS
    acquisition strategy.
        The Navy had planned to make the down-select decision and award the
    contract to build the 10 LCSs sometime this past summer, but the
    decision was delayed to as late as December 14. (The final bids
    submitted by the two LCS contractors were submitted on about September
    15, and were valid for another 90 days, or until December 14.)
                 dual-award strategy proposed in november 2010
        On November 3, 2010, the Navy notified congressional offices that
    it was prepared to implement an alternative LCS acquisition strategy
    that would involve awarding 10-ship contracts to both LCS bidders. The
    Navy would need additional legislative authority from Congress to
    implement this dual-award strategy. The Navy stated on November 3 that
    if the additional authority were not granted by December 14, the Navy
    would proceed to announce its down-select decision under the
    acquisition strategy announced on September 16, 2009. On December 13,
    it was reported that the two LCS bidders, at the Navy's request, had
    extended the prices in their bids to December 30.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Anthony Capaccio, ``Lockheed, Austal Extend Prices on Littoral
    Ship Bids,'' Bloomberg.com, December 13, 2010; Christopher P. Cavas,
    ``Deadline Looms For U.S. Navy's LCS,'' Defense News, December 13,
    2010: 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Navy's proposed dual-award strategy poses a near-term issue for
    Congress of whether this strategy would be preferable to the down-
    select strategy, and whether Congress should grant the Navy, by
    December 30, the additional legislative authority the Navy would need
    to implement the dual-award strategy.
        On December 8, 2010, the House passed H.R. 3082, a full-year
    continuing appropriations bill for fiscal year 2011.\2\ Section 2314 of
    H.R. 3082 would provide the legislative authority the Navy needs to
    implement its proposed dual-award acquisition strategy for the LCS
    program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ H.R. 3082 was originally the fiscal year 2010 military
    construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related agencies
    appropriations bill.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       observations regarding information on potential comparative costs
        The potential comparative costs of the down-select and dual-award
    strategies are not clear. Observations that might be made about these
    costs as of December 13 include but are not limited to the following:

             There is a significant difference between the Navy and
            the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) regarding relative LCS
            procurement costs under the down-select and dual-award
            strategies. The Navy estimates that, compared to the down-
            select strategy, the dual-award strategy could reduce LCS
            procurement costs by $1 billion through fiscal year 2016. CBO,
            in contrast, estimates that compared to the down-select
            strategy, the dual-award strategy could increase LCS
            procurement costs by $740 million through fiscal year 2015.
             As of December 13, there were no available estimates
            from the Navy or CBO regarding potential additional costs under
            the dual-award strategy for developing and installing a common
            combat system on some or all of the first 24 LCSs.\3\ Depending
            on what the Navy decides to do regarding LCS combat systems,
            these additional costs could be negligible or significant. The
            Navy's intentions regarding the LCS combat systems are not
            clear.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ The LCS combat system referred to in this discussion is the
    ship's built-in collection of sensors, weapons, displays, and software,
    and not the LCS mission modules that can be placed on or taken off the
    ship.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             According to the Government Accountability Office
            (GAO), the Navy estimates that, compared to the down-select
            strategy, the dual-award strategy would increase LCS life-cycle
            operating and support (O&S) costs by $295 million (net present
            value). Both GAO's December 8 report on the LCS program \4\ and
            CBO's December 10 letter report on the LCS program \5\ express
            uncertainty regarding estimates of relative life-cycle O&S
            costs under the down-select and dual-award strategies.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Government Accountability Office, Navy's Proposed Dual Award
    Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-11-249R,
    December 8, 2010, 14 pp.
        \5\ Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John
    McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, 7 pp.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             CBO's letter report included several cautionary
            statements about its estimates relating to limits on the
            information available to CBO in developing its estimates.
                             general discussion \6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ This section is adapted from the December 13 update of CRS
    Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
    Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    November 4 Navy Point Paper on Dual-Award Strategy
        A November 4, 2010, Navy point paper on the dual-award strategy
    stated the following (this is the full text of the point paper): \7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Source: Navy point paper on proposed alternative LCS
    acquisition strategy dated November 4, 2010.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Littoral Combat Ship Proposed Revised Acquisition--Dual 10 Ship
            Awards
             In summer 2009 Navy received bids for three fiscal
            year 2010 ships from Lockheed Martin/Marinette Marine/Bollinger
            and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works/Austal USA industry teams.
            These bids did not reflect competitive pricing and well
            exceeded the Congressional Cost Cap. In order to reverse cost
            trends on the program, the acquisition strategy was revised to
            the current down-select strategy.
             The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship acquisition strategy
            to down select to a single design has resulted in a highly
            effective competition between the industry bidders. Navy is on
            the path to down select in accordance with the terms of the
            current solicitation.
             The industry response to the competitive acquisition
            strategy has resulted in reduction in cost for the LCSs
            relative to the previous bids. These competitive bids, coupled
            with Navy's desires to increase ship procurement rates to
            support operational requirements, has created an opportunity to
            award each bidder a fixed-price 10-ship block buy--a total of
            20 ships from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2015. A
            comparison between the two strategies of which ships are
            included in a down select/second source versus dual 10 ship
            block buy appears in the table below.
             The current National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
            anguage permits the Navy to procure up to 10 ships in a block
            buy. In order to execute a dual 10 ship award, Navy believes
            congressional authorization is required.
             If congressional support for this approach is granted,
            Navy will work with industry to revise the ship procurement
            schedules within current proposal pricing (fiscals year 2010-
            2015 vice fiscal years 2010-2014).
             Navy is continuing on the path to down select and
            absent authorization, we will proceed to down select by mid-
            December 2010.
             There are numerous benefits to this approach including
            stabilizing the LCS program and the industrial base with award
            of 20 ships; increasing ship procurement rate to support
            operational requirements; sustaining competition through the
            program; and enhancing Foreign Military Sales opportunities.
             The Navy intends to procure the Technical Data Package
            for both designs and if necessary a second source for either or
            both designs could be brought into the program.
             Either approach will ensure the Navy procures
            affordably priced ships.

    Some General Observations About the Dual-Award Strategy
        General observations that can be made on the Navy's proposed dual-
    award strategy include but are not limited to the following:

             The dual-award strategy would avoid, at least for now,
            the possibility of a contract protest being filed against a
            Navy down-select decision.
             Although the dual-award strategy includes the
            possibility of the Navy at some point bringing a second source
            into the program for either or both LCS designs, the dual-award
            strategy does not include the guaranteed opportunity present in
            the down-select strategy for shipyards not currently involved
            in building LCSs to compete for the right to become the second
            LCS builder.
             The Navy's November 4, 2010, point paper on the dual-
            award strategy does not outline the Navy's intentions regarding
            the currently different combat systems on the two LCS designs.
             The dual-award strategy would require each LCS
            contractor to build 10 ships over a period of 6 years (fiscal
            years 2010-2015) rather than 5 years (fiscal years 2010-2014),
            but at the same price that was bid for the 5-year schedule. In
            addition, LCSs built under the dual-award strategy would
            incorporate combat systems that would be built by combat system
            manufacturers in smaller annual quantities than would be the
            case under the down-select strategy, possibly increasing the
            costs of these combat systems. Factors such as these could, at
            the margin, alter the profitability for each contractor of
            building its respective group of 10 ships.
    Potential Oversight Questions for Congress
        Potential oversight questions for Congress in assessing whether the
    proposed dual-award strategy would be preferable to the down-select
    strategy announced by the Navy on September 16, 2009, and whether to
    grant the Navy, by December 30, the additional legislative authority
    the Navy would need to implement the dual-award strategy, include but
    are not limited to the following:

             Does the timing of the Navy's proposal provide
            Congress with enough time to adequately assess the relative
            merits of the down-select strategy and the dual-award strategy?
            Given that the contractors submitted their bids by about
            September 15, could the Navy have notified Congress of the
            proposed dual-award strategy sooner than November 3, giving
            Congress more time to seek information on and evaluate the
            proposal? Should the Navy ask the contractors to extend their
            bid prices for another, say, 30 or 60 or 90 days beyond the
            original December 14 expiration date, so as to provide more
            time for congressional review of the Navy's proposal? \8\ (As
            mentioned earlier, on December 13, it was reported that the two
            LCS bidders, at the Navy's request, had extended the prices in
            their bids for 16 days, to December 30.)
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ A December 6, 2010, press report states: ``Lockheed officials
    have indicated that they could extend the pricing in their proposal for
    a short while beyond December 14, to allow time for Congress to approve
    the change. Lockheed Chief Financial Officer Bruce Tanner told an
    investment conference last week that Lockheed could extend the prices
    it offered for a day or 2, but not indefinitely . . . . Analysts said
    they expected both companies to show some flexibility on the expiration
    of their pricing, given that each firm stood to win a contract valued
    at around $5 billion.'' (Andrea Shalal-Esa, ``U.S. Navy Hopeful
    Congress Will Approve Ship Buys,'' Reuters.com, December 6, 2010.)
    Another December 6, 2010, press report that was posted online on
    December 3, 2010, stated: ``Theoretically, Lockheed Martin and Austal
    could likely agree to extend the price deadline, but the Navy has not
    asked them to do so yet, [Navy spokeswoman Captain Cate] Mueller
    said.'' (Cid Standifer, ``Stand-Alone Bill May Be Needed To Approve LCS
    Dual Block Buy Plan,'' Inside the Navy, December 6, 2010.)
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             What role, if any, did a desire by the Navy to avoid a
            potential contract protest against the Navy's down-select
            decision play in the Navy's decision to propose the alternate
            dual-award strategy? For example, how concerned, if at all, was
            the Navy that the announcement of an LCS down-select decision
            might lead to a contract protest and controversy somewhat like
            what has been experienced in the Air Force's KC-X aerial
            refueling tanker acquisition program? \9\ A December 13, 2010,
            press report on the LCS program stated: ``One high-level Navy
            source recently said that without the dual-ship approach,
            `there is 100 percent chance of a protest.' '' \10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ For more on the KC-X program, see CRS Report RL34398, Air Force
    KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
    Jeremiah Gertler.
        \10\ Christopher P. Cavas, ``Deadline Looms For U.S. Navy's LCS,''
    Defense News, December 13, 2010: 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             What are the potential relative costs of the down-
            select and dual-award acquisition strategies, including
            development costs, procurement costs, and life-cycle operation
            and support (O&S) costs? Has the Navy fully and accurately
            estimated these costs--including potential costs for
            developing, procuring, and installing a common combat system
            for both LCS designs--and reported all these potential costs to
            Congress?
             What are the potential relative risks of the down-
            select and dual-award acquisition strategies, including
            development risks, production cost risks, production schedule
            risks, and life-cycle O&S risks? Has the Navy fully and
            accurately estimated these risks, and reported all these
            potential risks to Congress?
             What are the Navy's intentions, under the proposed
            dual-award acquisition strategy, regarding the currently
            different combat systems on the two LCS designs? Does the Navy
            intend to leave them unchanged, adopt one of the combat systems
            as the common system for both designs, or develop a new combat
            system for both designs? If the Navy intends to pursue the
            second or third of these paths, what is the Navy's plan
            (including schedule) for doing so? If the Navy does not have a
            definite plan regarding the combat systems for the ships, how
            well can the potential costs and risks of the dual-award
            strategy be estimated and compared to those of the down-select
            strategy?
             What are the potential industrial-base impacts of the
            dual-award strategy, including impacts on the two LCS
            contractors, on shipyards that could, under the down-select
            strategy, bid for the right to become the second LCS builder,
            and on combat system manufacturers?
             What impact, if any, might the Navy's proposal to
            shift from its down-select strategy to the dual-award strategy
            have on the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to
            implement down-select strategies for other acquisition
            programs? For example, will the Navy's proposal to shift to the
            dual-award strategy cause contractors bidding for other
            acquisition programs to treat with increased skepticism stated
            DOD intentions to carry out down selects? If so, could that
            reduce the benefits of competition that DOD might hope to
            achieve through the use of down-select strategies?
    Enough Time for Adequate Congressional Review of Navy Proposal?
        Regarding whether the timing of the Navy's proposal provides
    Congress with enough time to adequately assess the relative merits of
    the down-select strategy and the dual-award strategy, it can be noted
    that this is the third time in the history of the LCS program that the
    Navy has presented Congress with an important choice about the future
    of the LCS program late in the congressional budget-review cycle, after
    Congress had completed its spring budget-review hearings and some of
    its committee markups. The first instance was in mid-2002, when the
    Navy submitted an amended request to Congress for fiscal year 2003
    funding to get the LCS program started using a rapid acquisition
    strategy.\11\ The second was in September 2009, when the Navy announced
    its proposed down-select strategy for the LCS program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ The Navy's original fiscal year 2003 budget request, submitted
    to Congress in February 2002, contained no apparent funding for
    development of the LCS. In addition, the Navy in early 2002 had not yet
    announced that it intended to employ a rapid acquisition strategy for
    the LCS program. As a result, in the early months of 2002, there may
    have been little reason within Congress to view the LCS program as a
    significant fiscal year 2003 budget-review issue. In the middle of
    2002, the Navy submitted an amended request asking for $33 million in
    fiscal year 2003 development funding for the LCS program. Navy
    officials explained that they did not decide until the middle of 2002
    that they wanted to pursue a rapid acquisition strategy for the LCS
    program, and consequently did not realize until then that there was a
    need to request $33 million in fiscal year 2003 funding for the
    program. By the middle of 2002, however, the House and Senate Armed
    Services committees had already held their spring fiscal year 2003
    budget-review hearings and marked up their respective versions of the
    fiscal year 2003 defense authorization bill. These two committees thus
    did not have an opportunity to use the spring 2002 budget-review season
    to review in detail the Navy's accelerated acquisition plan for the LCS
    program or the supporting request for $33 million in funding.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In light of the third instance--the Navy's proposal of November 3,
    2010, for using a dual-award strategy rather than a down-select
    strategy--a potential issue for Congress are the implications for the
    LCS program and congressional oversight of defense acquisition programs
    in general of proceeding with the LCS program in part on the basis of
    policies originally presented as proposals to Congress late in the
    congressional budget-review cycle, after Congress had completed its
    spring budget-review hearings and some of its committee markups. The
    Navy's November 3, 2010, notification to Congress of the proposed dual-
    award strategy, combined with a request by the Navy that Congress act
    on that proposal by December 30, provides relatively little time for
    Congress to collect cost and other information from the Navy (including
    information that Navy might not offer in initial briefings to
    individual congressional offices), for Congress to solicit cost and
    other information from independent sources such as the Congressional
    Budget Office (CBO) and GAO, for CBO and GAO to develop such
    information and provide it to Congress, for Congress to hold hearings
    at which all this information might be discussed in a group setting,
    with multiple parties present, and for congressional offices to then
    form their evaluations of the Navy's proposal.
    Potential Relative Ship Procurement Costs
        Regarding potential relative costs of the down-select and dual-
    award acquisition strategies, the Navy has stated that it estimates
    that procuring LCSs under the dual-award strategy would cost $1 billion
    less through fiscal year 2016 than procuring them under the down-select
    strategy.\12\ According to CBO, the Navy's estimated savings through
    fiscal year 2015--the final year covered in the table shown in the
    Navy's November 4 point paper--is $600 million.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ Source: DOD letter to GAO dated December 6, 2010, p. 2, as
    reprinted in Government Accountability Office, Navy's Proposed Dual
    Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-
    11-249R, December 8, 2010, p. 12. The GAO report states on page 2:
    ``According to the Navy, $1.9 billion in savings resulted from the
    competition between the two offerors and is common to both strategies.
    However, the Navy estimates that approximately $1.0 billion in
    additional cost savings would be realized under the proposed dual award
    strategy because of the avoidance of higher start-up costs and risks
    associated with the second source planned for fiscal year 2012, among
    other factors. According to the Navy, these additional savings would be
    offset, in part, by increased total ownership costs.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CBO in its December 10 letter report provided its own estimate of
    the relative ship procurement costs of the down-select and dual-award
    strategies through fiscal year 2015. As shown in Table 1, CBO estimates
    that the dual-award strategy would cost $740 million more in ship
    procurement costs than the down-select strategy through fiscal year
    2015.

        CBO's letter report included several cautionary statements about
    its estimates relating to limits on the information available to CBO in
    developing its estimates.
        Under the down-select strategy, shipyards competing to become the
    second LCS builder could include yards that currently build other ships
    for the Navy, such as, possibly, General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works (GD/
    BIW) of Bath, ME, Northrop Grumman's Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula,
    MS, or General Dynamics' National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
    (NASSCO) of San Diego, CA. If such a yard were to be selected under the
    down-select strategy to become the second LCS builder, it could reduce
    the cost of other Navy ships being built at that yard by more fully
    spreading the fixed overhead costs of that yard. It is not clear
    whether the Navy estimate in Table 1 accounts for a possible reduction
    in the cost of other Navy ships that might be realized under the down-
    select strategy through more full spreading of shipyard fixed overhead
    costs. The CBO estimate does not account for this possible
    reduction.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Source: Telephone conversation with CBO, December 10, 2010.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Potential Combat System-Related Investment Costs
        Any savings the dual-award strategy might realize relative to the
    down-select strategy in terms of costs for procuring LCSs could be
    offset by potential additional costs under the dual-award strategy for
    developing, procuring, and installing a common combat system for the
    two LCS designs. Developing a new common combat system for the two LCS
    designs might cost tens of millions of dollars. Procuring replacement
    combat systems for LCSs could cost tens of millions or dollars per
    ship. Removing an LCS's existing combat system and installing a
    replacement system could cost several millions of dollars per ship.
    CBO's letter report states that ``if the Navy later decided to use a
    common combat system for all LCSs (rather than the different ones that
    would initially be installed on the two different types of vessels),
    the costs for developing, procuring, and installing that system could
    be significant.'' \14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John
    McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, p. 3.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        If, for example, the Navy decided to develop a new common combat
    system for both LCS designs, developed that new system at a one-time
    cost of, say, $30 million, procured 24 copies of that system at a
    recurring cost of, say, $50 million per copy, and installed them on the
    first 24 LCSs (i.e., LCSs 1 through 4, plus the 20 ships to be awarded
    under the dual-award strategy's two 10-ship block-buy contracts) at a
    recurring installation cost of, say, $5 million per ship, the total
    cost would be $1,350 million.
        If, as another example, the Navy decided to adopt one of the two
    existing LCS combat systems as the common combat system for both
    designs, adapted that existing system for the other LCS design at a
    one-time cost of, say, $10 million, procured 12 copies of that system
    at a recurring cost of, say, $50 million per copy, and installed them
    on 12 of the first 24 LCSs (i.e., the LCSs originally built or to be
    built with the other combat system ) at a recurring installation cost
    of, say, $5 million per ship, the total cost would be $670 million.
        CBO's December 10 letter report states that the existing combat
    systems on the two LCS designs cost about $70 million per ship.\15\
    Using this figure (instead of $50 million) as the basis for estimating
    the cost of a replacement combat system, the estimates of $1,350
    million and $670 million in the preceding two paragraphs would become
    $1,830 million and $910 million, respectively.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John
    McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, p. 7.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Regarding the Navy's intentions for the combat systems on the two
    LCS designs, a November 29, 2010, press report states that ``the Navy
    intends to keep separate the combat systems of the Lockheed and Austal
    USA versions of the Littoral Combat Ships for its dual buy strategy,
    but will `procure the tech data package to allow for consideration of
    [a] common combat system in the future,' according to Navy spokeswoman
    Capt. Cate Mueller.'' The report also quoted an industry official as
    saying that the Navy is likely ``still strategizing as to how they're
    going to single up on a combat system.'' \16\ A December 13, 2010,
    press report described as an ``analysis'' article stated:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ Andrew Burt, ``Navy Open To Combining Combat Systems On Both
    Littoral Combat Ships,'' Inside the Navy, November 29, 2010. Material
    in brackets as in original. The Austal USA version of the LCS is the
    version developed by the General Dynamics-led LCS industry team.

              To speed development [of the LCS], each [LCS industry] design
            team was allowed to develop its own system. [For the Lockheed
            team's LCS design,] Lockheed came up with COMBATSS-21, in some
            ways a lightweight derivative of the Aegis combat system built
            by the company and fielded on nearly 80 U.S. Navy cruisers and
            destroyers. General Dynamics' Advanced Information Systems
            (AIS) developed an entirely new system for [the General
            Dynamics team's LCS] design, a system the company claims more
            closely embodies the open architecture concept espoused by the
            Navy for virtually all its new computer systems.
              Each combat system requires its own support pipeline:
            maintenance and parts chains, training programs, operational
            characteristics. Even if the Navy had simply picked one, it
            would still have been unique in a fleet that has striven for
            homogeneity and relative simplicity.
              Navy officials downplay the impact of fielding separate
            systems, and claim competition will hold prices in check. But
            sooner or later, whether today's management team supports both
            combat systems or not, an official will come into office who
            sees the dual-system setup as wasteful and unsupportable. When
            that happens, the ships with one of the systems will likely be
            taken out of service--years before they're used up--and
            probably made available for foreign military sales.
              The Navy reportedly has a plan to deal with the dual combat
            systems, but it's not saying what it is, possibly because
            officials lack the authority to discuss details of a dual-ship
            buy. While a number of congressional staffers and analysts have
            been briefed on the plan, they've been sworn to secrecy. Even
            among those who have been briefed, there are concerns that this
            is an issue the Navy needs to address publicly before the buy-
            bothdesigns plan can be approved.
              What's the Plan?
              So what is the Navy's plan for the combat systems? Sean
            Stackley, the service's top weapons buyer, gave some clues in
            September 2009 when he announced the service would have a
            competition to buy only one of the designs. As a key factor in
            the strategy to keep a lid on cost growth and perhaps drive
            prices down, the Navy would compete multiple elements of each
            LCS design, including the combat systems, weapons and engines.
            Eventually, the service wants to purchase the technical package
            both for the design and for the combat system, thus allowing
            other companies to bid for construction.
              After sailors have a chance to put each LCS combat system
            through its paces, the service will begin to pick and choose
            among the various elements of each system. Those elements will
            be incorporated into what would become, in essence, a third
            combat system. Another competition would then be held for that,
            allowing companies such as Northrop Grumman, Raytheon or even
            Saab to bid as the combat system integrator.
              Under this scenario, a third system might be developed in
            time to begin incorporating the new, one-size-fits-both combat
            system into the later ships of each company's 10-ship buy. Even
            if the new system isn't ready by then, it could become a key
            element in follow-on LCSs, beginning with the 25th LCS in 2016.

        What would become of the earlier ships featuring individual combat
    systems is not yet clear.\17\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ Christopher P. Cavas, ``Two LCS Designs, One Big Dilemma,''
    Defense News, December 13, 2010: 22.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Potential Relative Life-Cycle Operation and Support (O&S) Costs
        Any savings the dual-award strategy might realize relative to the
    down-select strategy in terms of costs for procuring LCSs could also be
    offset by potential additional life-cycle operation and support (O&S)
    costs of operating significant numbers of two different LCS designs.
    GAO's December 8 report states: ``According to the Navy, [estimated
    savings in LCS procurement costs under the dual-award strategy] would
    be offset, in part, by an additional $842 million in total ownership
    costs, which the Navy equates to a net present value of $295 million.''
    \18\ The GAO report also states:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ Government Accountability Office, Navy's Proposed Dual Award
    Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship

              Navy officials expressed confidence that their cost estimate
            supporting the dual award provides details on the costs to
            operate and support both designs. However, since little actual
            LCS operating and support data are available to date, the
            Navy's estimates for these costs are currently based on data
            from other ships and could change as actual cost data become
            more available. These estimates are also based on new
            operational concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance
            that have not been fully developed, tested, and implemented.
            For example, the Navy has not yet implemented a comprehensive
            training plan, and it is possible that the plan could cost more
            or less than the training costs currently accounted for by the
            Navy.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ Government Accountability Office, Navy's Proposed Dual Award
    Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-11-249R,
    December 8, 2010, p. 6.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CBO's December 10 letter report stated:

              Operating and maintaining two types of ships would probably
            be more expensive, however. The Navy has stated that the
            differences in costs are small (and more than offset by
            procurement savings), but there is considerable uncertainty
            about how to estimate those differences because the Navy does
            not yet have much experience in operating such ships.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John
    McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, p. 3.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Potential Resulting Relative Net Costs
        Using information available as of December 13, potential relative
    costs of the down-select and dual-award strategies might be bounded as
    follows:

              On the one hand, compared to the down-select strategy, the
            dual award strategy might cost a net total of $705 million
            less. This net figure includes $1 billion in Navy-estimated
            ship procurement cost savings through fiscal year 2016, no
            additional combat system-related investment costs (i.e., the
            Navy decides not to pursue a common combat system for the two
            LCS designs), and $295 million in additional life-cycle O&S
            costs (net present value) for operating significant numbers of
            both LCS designs.
              On the other hand, compared to the down-select strategy, the
            dual award strategy might cost a net total of as much as $2,865
            million more. This net figure includes $740 million in CBO-
            estimated higher ship procurement costs through fiscal year
            2015, as much as $1,830 million in additional combat system
            related costs (i.e., the Navy decides to develop, procure, and
            install on 24 LCSs a new common combat system with a
            procurement cost of as much as $70 million per ship), and $295
            million in additional life-cycle O&S costs (net present value)
            for operating significant numbers of both LCS designs.
                            potential relative risks
        Regarding the potential relative risks of the down-select and dual-
    award acquisition strategies, the GAO report states that ``a second
    ship design and source provided under the dual award strategy could
    provide the Navy an additional hedge against risk, should one design
    prove problematic.'' \21\ A converse argument might be that managing
    the construction of two very different LCS designs could place
    increased demands on overall Navy program management capacities and on
    the Program, GAO-11-249R, December 8, 2010, Table 1 on page 3.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ Government Accountability Office, Navy's Proposed Dual Award
    Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-11-249R,
    December 8, 2010, p. 4.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) capabilities for on-
    site monitoring of the construction of Navy ships--factors that might
    increase the chances of program-management challenges in the LCS
    program or of the Navy not detecting in a timely manner construction-
    quality problems that might occur in one or both LCS designs.\22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ Limits on Navy SUPSHIP capacities may have been a factor in
    the delayed discovery by the Navy of construction quality problems on
    Navy San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships. For a discussion of
    LPD-17 class construction quality problems, CRS Report RL34476, Navy
    LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for
    Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, this
    concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear
    before you to discuss these issues. I will be pleased to respond to any
    questions you might have.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Rourke.
        Mr. Francis.

     STATEMENT OF PAUL L. FRANCIS, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION
       AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Francis. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
    and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    talk about the LCS today.
        We've been involved in the program on or off for about the
    past 5 years and I would say I think the Navy's done quite a
    bit of work, particularly in the last year, to get the program
    on track, but in our view the program is not out of the woods
    yet. We see risks in three areas.
        First would be the seaframes. The third and fourth
    seaframes are undergoing construction right now. There are
    design changes. Some design changes are being postponed to post
    delivery. I believe the Navy feels that they have adequately
    provided for these changes financially and managerially, but
    time will tell whether that's sufficient.
        The second area is the mission equipment packages. The
    mission equipment packages have had difficulty in development
    and testing over the years. To illustrate, in 2007 the Navy had
    anticipated having delivered 16 mission equipment packages
    through fiscal year 2012. Right now the estimate is at about
    eight and those mission equipment packages will be less capable
    than envisioned.
        The third area is integrated testing, that is bringing the
    mission equipment packages and the seaframes together. At this
    point, no operational testing of either the seaframes or the
    mission equipment packages has been done yet. Right now I
    believe the schedule is the first operational testing of the
    seaframes and two mission equipment packages, will be finished
    on the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. The third mission
    equipment package will be operationally tested in fiscal year
    2015. There's potential for discovery there when those systems
    are brought together and operationally tested.
        In August 2010, we raised the concern that the ships and
    the seaframes may be proceeding too quickly before the
    operational testing was done, and we made a recommendation to
    the Navy that they reconsider sequencing the mission equipment
    packages and the seaframes so that one didn't get ahead of the
    other. The Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with
    that recommendation, but we haven't seen that followed up in
    the new dual strategy proposal.
        In closing, I'd say the risks that I cite in the programs
    are not materially different in either strategy. So for
    example, if the dual strategy were not followed and the
    existing down-select to 10 ships were followed, we'd have many
    of the same risks. I think by the Navy saying they're willing
    to back 20 ships it does signal that the Navy is more confident
    in the ships and could create some expectations on the part of
    industry downstream. On the other hand, I think that having a
    second source could provide an additional hedge against risk
    should one seaframe develop some problems.
        Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement and I'd be glad
    to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Francis follows:]
                     Prepared Statement by Paul L. Francis
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am pleased to be here
    today to discuss the Department of the Navy's proposed dual ship
    acquisition strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. LCS is
    envisioned as a vessel able to be reconfigured to meet three different
    mission areas: mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and antisubmarine
    warfare. Its design concept consists of two distinct parts--the ship
    itself (seaframe) and the mission package it carries and deploys. The
    Navy is procuring the first four ships in two different designs from
    shipbuilding teams led by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, which
    currently build their designs at Marinette Marine and Austal USA
    shipyards, respectively.
        The Navy's strategy for procuring LCS has evolved over the years.
    Prior to September 2009, the Navy planned to continue building the
    class using both ship designs. This strategy changed following
    unsuccessful contract negotiations that same year for fiscal year 2010
    funded seaframes--an outcome attributable to industry proposals priced
    significantly above Navy expectations. In September 2009, the Navy
    announced that in an effort to improve affordability, it was revising
    the LCS program's acquisition strategy and would select one seaframe
    design before awarding contracts for any additional ships.\1\ Following
    approval of this strategy in January 2010, the Navy issued a new
    solicitation--intended to lead to a downselect--for fiscal year 2010
    seaframes. In support of this strategy, Congress authorized the Navy to
    procure up to 10 seaframes and 15 LCS control and weapon systems. The
    Navy planned to have a second competition in 2012 and provide five of
    the ship control and weapon systems to the winning contractor, who
    would construct up to 5 ships of the same design and install the
    systems. However, in November 2010, following receipt of new industry
    proposals for the fiscal year 2010 seaframes, the Navy proposed to
    change its acquisition strategy back to awarding new construction
    contracts to both industry teams.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The decision to select a single ship design is referred to as
    the ``downselect.''
        \2\ In response to the Navy's September 2009 LCS acquisition
    strategy change, General Dynamics and Austal USA revoked their teaming
    arrangement for future seaframes, in turn allowing the General Dynamics
    Bath Iron Works shipyard to compete for selection as the planned
    potential second source of the winning design. Austal USA and Lockheed
    Martin are the prime contractors competing for the current 10-ship
    program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In August 2010, we issued a report evaluating LCS planning and
    implementation efforts that identified technical, design, and
    construction challenges that could impact the Navy's ability to deliver
    promised LCS capabilities.\3\ This statement highlights findings from
    that report and a subsequent report issued on December 8, 2010, which
    assessed risks that could affect the Navy's ability to execute the LCS
    program.\4\ As detailed in our most recent report, we found that
    regardless of the strategy selected, the Navy continues to face design
    and construction risks in executing the LCS program, given its stage of
    maturity and its unique mission, design, and operational concept. These
    risks threaten the Navy's ability to achieve the cost savings it
    estimates under either of its acquisition strategies.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Navy's Ability to Overcome
    Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual
    Capabilities, GAO-10-523 (Washington, DC: Aug. 31, 2010).
        \4\ See GAO, Navy's Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for
    the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-11-249R (Washington, DC: Dec. 8,
    2010).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In preparing this testimony, we relied primarily on work supporting
    our most recent LCS report. That report contains a detailed overview of
    our scope and methodology. All of our work for this report was
    performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
    to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
    basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
    We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
    our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
                                    summary
        Successful business cases for shipbuilding programs require balance
    between the concept selected to satisfy warfighter needs and the
    resources--technologies, design knowledge, funding, time, and
    management capacity--needed to transform that concept into a product.
    Without a sound business case, program execution will be hampered,
    regardless of the contracting strategy. The LCS, given its stage of
    maturity and its unique mission, design, and operational concept, still
    faces design and construction risks. Most of these risks appear to be
    inherent to the program, regardless of which acquisition strategy is
    followed. Navy officials believe that experience to date on the
    program, coupled with fixed-price contracts and a sufficient budget for
    ship changes, mitigates this risk. However, much work and demonstration
    remains for LCS, and other shipbuilding programs have had difficulty at
    this stage. On the other hand, a second ship design and source provided
    under the dual award strategy could provide the Navy an additional
    hedge against risk, should one design prove problematic. Mission
    equipment packages are common to both ships and would pose the same
    execution risks, apart from integration.
          key features of the downselect and the dual-award strategies
        The Navy estimates that both its existing and proposed acquisition
    strategies will generate significant cost savings to the government.
    According to the Navy, $1.9 billion in savings resulted from the
    competition between the two offerors and is common to both strategies.
    However, the Navy estimates that approximately $1.0 billion in
    additional cost savings would be realized under the proposed dual award
    strategy because of the avoidance of higher start-up costs and risks
    associated with the second source planned for fiscal year 2012, among
    other factors. According to the Navy, these additional savings would be
    offset, in part, by increased total ownership costs. The Navy plans to
    use some of the remaining savings, if realized, to fund construction of
    an additional LCS seaframe in fiscal year 2012. Table 1 compares the
    key tenets of each strategy.

        The quantities planned under both of the Navy's strategies are
    similar through fiscal year 2015. These similarities are outlined in
    table 2, which details the Navy's procurement plans for seaframes under
    both the existing downselect strategy and the proposed dual award
    strategy.

        Under the dual award strategy, the government will be authorized to
    contract for up to 20 ships. In contrast, the existing downselect
    strategy limits this authorization to up to 10 ships until fiscal year
    2012, when the Navy planned to solicit a second source for additional
    ships.
     design changes could increase near-term costs above current estimates
        Under both the existing downselect strategy and the proposed dual
    award strategy, the Navy plans to award fixed-price incentive contracts
    for new seaframes. This type of contract provides for adjusting profit
    and establishing the final contract price by application of a formula
    based on the relationship of total final negotiated cost to total
    target cost. The final price is subject to a price ceiling, negotiated
    at the outset. In the case of LCS, the solicitation stated that the
    government would share 50 percent of costs above the target cost, up to
    the price ceiling. Navy officials also stated that they have budgeted
    management reserve funds to accommodate potential impacts to cost
    performance during program execution. In other programs, the Navy has
    returned to Congress to request funding for costs exceeding the target
    costs. In the near term, cost increases are likely but it is unknown
    whether increases will exceed what the Navy has budgeted for fiscal
    years 2010 and beyond. The likely source of these cost increases is
    design changes, which result in out-of-sequence work, potentially
    limiting the shipbuilders' ability to achieve the benefits they
    anticipate from construction process improvements and shipyard capital
    investments.
        Our August 2010 report on LCS discussed issues with the performance
    of particular ship systems at the time of lead ship deliveries and as a
    result of subsequent operating experience.\5\ In an effort to address
    technical issues on the first two ships, the Navy has implemented
    design changes for the third and fourth LCS seaframes (LCS-3 and LCS-
    4), several of which are not yet complete. These changes are
    significant and have affected the configuration of several major ship
    systems including propulsion, communications, electrical, and
    navigation. In addition, launch, handling, and recovery systems for
    both designs are still being refined, although the Navy reports recent
    progress related to each of these systems.\6\ To the extent that these
    design changes necessitate modifications in the ship specifications on
    which the contractors based their proposals for future ships, contract
    modifications will need to be negotiated and priced. According to the
    Navy, it estimates funding requirements for these change orders to
    total 5 percent for all future follow-on ships produced, regardless of
    whether it proceeds with a downselect strategy or the proposed dual
    award strategy. In addition, Navy officials stated that the seaframe
    solicitation includes a provision that agreed to design changes are
    ``not to exceed'' $12 million--a feature that Navy officials state will
    bound government cost risk due to design changes. Pending full
    identification and resolution of deficiencies affecting the lead ships,
    the Navy's ability to stay within its budgeted limits remains to be
    seen.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO-10-523.
        \6\ According to Navy officials, the most recent progress related
    to LCS launch, handling, and recovery systems consists of: (1)
    successful operation and movement of an embarked 11-meter rigid-hull
    inflatable boat onboard LCS-1 in March 2010; (2) synthetic lift lines
    on LCS-2 successfully completing a 200 percent lift test; and (3)
    routine usage of a straddle carrier to move an 11-meter rigid-hull
    inflatable boat (with stowage cradle) and berthing modules around the
    LCS-2 mission bay. In addition, Navy officials state that LCS-1's
    system is scheduled to begin testing with the mine countermeasures
    mission package in fiscal year 2011 and testing of LCS-2's twin-boom
    extensible crane is progressing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As we reported earlier this year, the LCS shipbuilding teams have
    implemented process and capacity improvements based on lessons learned
    from constructing lead ships and have made capital investments in their
    yards in an effort to increase efficiency.\7\ Fully realizing these
    improvements may be challenging given the design changes still
    occurring in the program. To the extent that addressing technical
    issues disrupts the optimal construction sequence for follow-on ships,
    additional labor hours could be required beyond current forecasts.
    Introducing such inefficiencies could offset initial benefits obtained
    from the process improvements and new facilities the shipbuilders have
    put into place, increasing the risk of out-of-sequence work and rework.
    Some level of design changes can be reasonably expected given the
    testing that remains. To date, however, Navy officials report that LCS-
    3 and LCS-4 changes are being managed efficiently--citing improved cost
    and schedule performance by both shipbuilders. The Navy also believes
    that the LCS seaframe may be less affected by mission equipment changes
    than other ships given the equipment's modular design. Maintaining a
    high level of performance will depend on avoiding significant design
    changes to seaframes under construction.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Guidance Needed on Navy's Use of
    Investment Incentives at Private Shipyards, GAO-10-686 (Washington, DC:
    July 26, 2010) and GAO-10-523.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
               operations and support costs difficult to estimate
        Navy officials expressed confidence that their cost estimate
    supporting the dual award provides details on the costs to operate and
    support both designs. However, since little actual LCS operating and
    support data are available to date, the Navy's estimates for these
    costs are currently based on data from other ships and could change as
    actual cost data become more available. These estimates are also based
    on new operational concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance
    that have not been fully developed, tested, and implemented. For
    example, the Navy has not yet implemented a comprehensive training
    plan, and it is possible that the plan could cost more or less than the
    training costs currently accounted for by the Navy.
        In addition, the Navy has not studied--within the context of the
    downselect strategy--the potential savings associated with early
    retirement of the two nonselected design ships. As such, decision
    makers do not have a complete picture of the various options available
    to them related to choosing between the downselect and dual award
    strategies. Under the existing downselect strategy, the Navy's
    intention is to keep in service--at least initially--the other two
    ships of the design not selected for long-term production. The Navy
    acknowledged that operating and supporting two different designs
    carries increased costs as compared to the costs of employing only one
    design. As we previously reported, these costs include separate
    training facilities because each design has unique equipment and
    therefore different operating and maintenance requirements.\8\ In
    February 2010, we recommended that the Navy conduct a cost-benefit
    analysis of options for these two ships, including the possibility of
    retiring them from service--a recommendation with which the Department
    of Defense agreed. As we point out in the February report, it is
    important that estimates of long-term operating and support costs are
    available to assess alternatives before a decision is made,
    particularly since these costs constitute over 70 percent of a system's
    life cycle costs. However, in discussions with Navy officials in
    November 2010, they told us that their latest assessment of the long-
    term costs of maintaining two ship designs does not consider the option
    of retiring the two nonselected ships.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ See GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve
    Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New
    Concepts, GAO-10-257 (Washington, DC: Feb. 2, 2010).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    mission package uncertainties and delays
        The Navy's request to double its current 10-ship authorization to
    20 ships--at a time when the mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and
    antisubmarine warfare mission packages continue to face significant
    developmental challenges--highlights the Navy's risk of investing in a
    fleet of ships that has not yet demonstrated its promised capability.
    Absent significant capability within its mission packages, seaframe
    functionality is largely constrained to self-defense as opposed to
    mission-related tasks.
        Navy officials acknowledged that mission package systems have taken
    significantly longer to develop and field than anticipated.
    Underscoring this situation is the fact that development efforts for
    most of these systems predate the LCS program--in some cases by 10
    years or more. However, Navy officials expressed confidence that their
    latest testing and production plans for mission package systems are
    executable.
        Recent testing of mission package systems has yielded mixed
    results. The Navy reports that two systems within the mine
    countermeasures mission package recently completed developmental
    testing, but another system is undergoing reliability improvements
    following production of several units that did not meet performance
    requirements.\9\ Further, test failures contributed to the cancellation
    of a key surface warfare mission package system, and the future
    composition of the package remains undetermined.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ According to Navy officials, the AN/AQS-20A sonar and Airborne
    Laser Mine Detection System recently completed developmental testing in
    August and October 2010, respectively. Alternatively, the Remote
    Minehunting System--produced since 2005--continues to struggle with
    reliability shortfalls. This has prompted the Navy to implement a
    series of design changes to the vehicle component and evaluate reducing
    the system's performance requirements.
        \10\ Development of the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System--an
    anticipated key system within the surface warfare package--was canceled
    in 2010 following test failures and higher than expected cost
    estimates. The Navy continues to evaluate alternatives to replace this
    capability onboard LCS.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Developmental challenges facing individual systems have led to
    procurement delays for all three mission packages and have disrupted
    program test schedules. Most notably, the Navy reports the first
    operational testing event involving a seaframe and partial mission
    package is now scheduled for late second quarter of fiscal year 2012,
    and the Navy expects individual mission package systems to remain in
    development through 2017.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ According to Navy officials, the planned fiscal year 2012
    operational test will employ the first LCS (LCS-1) seaframe and a
    (partial) surface warfare mission package. This date represents a
    recent update to the program's testing plan as the Navy's fiscal year
    2011 budget estimates showed this event occurring in the third quarter
    of fiscal year 2013.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To safeguard against excess quantities of ships and mission
    packages being purchased before their combined capabilities are
    demonstrated, we recommended in our August 2010 report that the
    Secretary of Defense update the LCS acquisition strategy to account for
    operational testing delays in the program and resequence planned
    purchases of ships and mission packages, as appropriate.\12\ The
    Department of Defense agreed with this recommendation, stating that an
    updated schedule was under development to better align seaframe and
    mission module production milestones. However, it is unclear how the
    department's concurrence with our recommendation can be reconciled
    against the Navy's current request to increase the planned seaframe
    commitment, particularly since no operational testing involving mission
    packages--or any of their individual systems--has since taken place.
    Until mission package and operational testing progresses--and key mine
    countermeasures, surface warfare, and antisubmarine warfare systems are
    proven effective and suitable onboard seaframes--the Navy cannot be
    certain that the LCS will deliver the full capability desired. This
    risk would increase with a commitment to higher quantities. The Navy
    believes this increased commitment is appropriately balanced against
    competing risks in the program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ GAO-10-523.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
    answer any questions.
                       contact and staff acknowledgments
        For future questions about this statement, please contact me at
    (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. Individuals making key
    contributions to this report were Belva Martin, Acting Director; Diana
    Moldafsky, assistant Director; Christopher R. Durbin; Jeremy Hawk;
    Kristine Hassinger; Simon Hirschfeld; and Karen Zuckerstein.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Francis.
        Let's try a first round of 8 minutes.
        First let me ask you, Secretary Stackley. You've heard now
    the testimony of CBO, GAO, and CRS. Do you want to comment or
    react to any of the testimony that you've heard, before I ask
    specific questions?
        Mr. Stackley. Let me make a few comments. First, I believe
    Dr. Labs pointed out in his assessment that he basically
    estimated what the ships would cost in accordance with his cost
    model, but his information is uninformed by the bids. What we
    are bringing to the table is information inside of the bids
    that would take CBO's cost estimates, which are within I would
    say 5 percent of the Navy's budget and the Navy's estimate of a
    year plus ago, and then bring against that demonstrated
    performance in the course of the past year on the first follow
    ships and fixed-price proposals inside the bids we have.
        So his estimate balanced against the fixed-price bids that
    we have are consistent in terms of the determination of the
    savings that we have here. I believe that CBO's estimate and
    the Navy's estimate and the Navy's proposal for a dual award to
    provide savings are all consistent.
        Chairman Levin. The reason that they're uninformed is that
    he did not have that information available to him, for
    proprietary reasons, is that correct?
        Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Nonetheless, looking at ranges, is that
    what you're saying, they are consistent with your estimates?
        Mr. Stackley. His estimate is within a few percent of the
    Navy's estimate and the Navy's budget in 2011. When you bring
    the bids against that and you factor in, as I have described,
    the fixed price and the margins that we're including for both
    change and any cost excursions, then we have a solid number to
    go against an estimate, and the difference is the savings that
    we're bringing to the table.
        The second comment has to deal with, there's a common theme
    between CBO, CRS, and GAO regarding risk; it's risk and
    unknowns. I will describe that this program, as I mentioned in
    my opening remarks on the numbers has done a complete turn-
    around in terms of stabilizing design, stabilizing production
    processes, and driving lessons learned on the part of industry
    into their processes.
        So what that has resulted in is performance far improved,
    not just on this program, but also compared to other historical
    performance on shipbuilding programs at this stage in their
    respective contracts. The key indicators I would tell you are
    what we're seeing in terms of cost performance on the first
    ships, the first follow ships, and control of changes on the
    first follow ships, and then what we're seeing in terms of
    remaining risk on the test program.
        So we have very much controlled change, controlled the risk
    that the program is staring at in the future. Then the mission
    package discussion has isolated any risk associated with the
    mission packages from the seaframes themselves. So we have a
    different view on risk, that yes, there is risk, but it is very
    well-controlled and contained within the estimates that we have
    on the program, which supports our assessment of the savings
    that we're bringing to the table.
        Chairman Levin. Let me pick up where you just left off.
        Admiral Roughead, one ship of each design has been
    delivered. They've gained some operating experience. Do both of
    these vessels in their current configuration meet the Navy's
    requirements?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator, both ships do.
        Chairman Levin. The CRS report lists some cost risks of
    pursuing a down-source strategy. As we've heard, the largest of
    these appears to be related to replacing the ship's combat
    systems. If we were to do that as part of the plan, it would
    seem to eliminate some of the additional savings of the dual-
    source strategy.
        But I would note that the CRS report says that we might
    want to replace the combat system on all LCSs bought to date
    with a new common combat system. Admiral Roughead or Admiral
    Pandolfe, is the current combat system on each type of vessel
    adequate to meet your requirements?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, they are.
        Chairman Levin. If the combat systems fail in the future to
    meet requirements, then we would have to replace or upgrade
    those. But would that not be a decision unrelated to current
    acquisition strategy? Secretary Stackley, let me ask you that
    question.
        Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. The current acquisition strategy
    does not call for the changeout of the combat system.
        Let me describe some characteristics of the combat system.
    As it was mentioned earlier, the total cost for the combat
    system is on the order of about $70 million. When we think of
    the combat system, we break it down into a couple key
    components, weapons, sensors, and command and control system.
    We have, in fact, on the weapons side of the combat system,
    commonality. Both ships have 57-millimeter Bofors guns, both
    ships we're looking at Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortor
    (CRAM) weapons systems. So the weapon system is already common
    both between them and also with other ships in the inventory.
        On the sensor side, we have contemplated moving towards a
    common sensor, and inside of this solicitation the Navy asked
    for priced bids for a new sensor to consider for the future. In
    total, the cost for bringing a new sensor--that's both common
    for LCS and with the rest of the fleet--is about $20 million
    nonrecurring and about $2 million a ship difference.
        So weapons are common. If the Navy chose to go to a common
    system for performance reasons, the cost impact would be about
    $20 million nonrecurring and a couple million dollars a ship.
        Then on the C and D side, which is largely the software
    system and displays and processors, the Navy does not have a
    drive right now to go towards common C and D for this class
    either in the down-select or dual-award. It is something that
    we could consider in the future.
        Chairman Levin. Another concern which has been raised by
    Mr. Francis is that if the Navy has to make changes in the
    mission package that would result in cost growth. As I
    understand the LCS architecture specifying how the mission
    packages plug into and operate on the ship through defined
    interfaces, the LCS program divorces mission package changes
    from the ship construction program and ship construction
    changes from the mission package program.
        Let me ask you, Secretary Stackley: Do I have that right so
    far or am I off, and if so, correct me?
        Mr. Stackley. No, sir, you have that correct. There is a
    strict interface control document that serves both the seaframe
    and the mission packages. So the seaframe is designed in
    accordance with the interface control document, the mission
    packages are designed in accordance with the interface control
    document, so that when you bring them together, form, fit,
    function, space, weight, power, and cooling support the mission
    packages as well as the seaframe design.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. I want to thank the witnesses.
        Dr. Labs, we've seen this movie before, haven't we? Isn't
    this the third time that the Navy has come in late in the game
    with proposals for a LCS?
        Dr. Labs. This has not been the first time where the Navy
    has come in, as you say, to change a major aspect of the
    program in a very short period of time. Mr. O'Rourke's report
    certainly goes into that history in some detail.
        Senator McCain. The third time after the NDAA was done, the
    Navy has come in and said, ``Gee, we have it solved now and we
    need significant changes.'' Obviously, I read off the results
    of those significant changes twice before.
        Mr. O'Rourke, you've been following this kind of business
    for about 30 years, is that right?
        Mr. O'Rourke. Twenty-seven years in January.
        Senator McCain. Have you ever seen one quite like this?
        Mr. O'Rourke. I cannot think of another shipbuilding
    program that has had this many changes proposed over the years
    within that program at such a late stage in the congressional
    review process.
        Senator McCain. Mr. Francis, did you have a chance to look
    at one of the concerns that's been raised about the combat
    systems, the different combat systems in the different ships?
        Mr. Francis. Senator McCain, we have not had a chance to
    look at the issue of the combat systems. I have read what Dr.
    Labs and Mr. O'Rourke have written, but we have not covered
    that ourselves.
        Senator McCain. Dr. Labs, do you agree with Secretary
    Stackley's remarks about the relative ease on the whole issue
    of combat systems on the different ships?
        Dr. Labs. Senator McCain, I honestly do not have enough
    information to comment intelligently on what Secretary Stackley
    offered up in response to those comments.
        Senator McCain. Do you agree with Mr. O'Rourke's statement
    that the costs of this new proposal could be $700 million less
    and in some cases could also be as much as over $2 billion
    more?
        Dr. Labs. I would say that, since a large part of the $2
    billion more is being driven by the CBO estimate of what the
    dual-award strategy would be, it would depend very much on
    detailed examination of the contract bids, because the CBO
    model is just that, it's a model. It takes what the Navy has
    been paying for the ship so far, it runs it down a learning
    curve, it applies rate factors and things like that.
        It did not take into consideration any benefits of
    competition, what the actual contract bids might be. If I were
    to have more access to that kind of data in a detailed way,
    it's possible that the CBO estimate could change in response to
    that.
        There is certainly a potential range here because there's
    still potential for cost growth within the context of those
    contracts. There is potential for cost growth even outside of
    those contracts if other decisions are made to address
    technical problems that arise on the ship, as Mr. Francis has
    stated. So there is certainly a possible range there, but
    without knowing more detailed information I can't comment on
    whether I think the high end of the range is more likely than
    the lower end of the range or vice versa.
        Senator McCain. But you agree there is a range?
        Dr. Labs. There is a range, yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. Mr. Francis, do you agree that Mr. O'Rourke
    states on the one hand, compared with the down-select strategy,
    the dual-award might cost a net total of $705 million less. On
    the other hand, compared to the down-select strategy, the dual-
    award strategy might cost a net total of as much as $2.8
    billion more?
        Mr. Francis. Senator McCain, I would agree that there is a
    range. I'm not sure what the numbers are. As Dr. Labs
    explained, his numbers are not based on the current bid
    proposals. But we do think there is potential for risk. The
    Navy could be exactly right on what it's estimating, but we
    will have to see whether they've adequately provided for that
    risk.
        Senator McCain. But the three witnesses, Dr. Labs, Mr.
    O'Rourke, and Mr. Francis, are operating at a certain
    disadvantage because you don't, as I don't, know the exact cost
    that's bid; is that correct?
        Mr. O'Rourke. That's correct.
        Dr. Labs. Yes, sir.
        Mr. O'Rourke. There's one more factor I think that needs to
    be considered, which is the unknown of what the bid prices
    would be under the second-stage competition that would be held
    under the down-select strategy. The Navy is saying in essence
    that they were pleasantly surprised by the bid prices they
    received on this solicitation, but might not they be also
    pleasantly surprised by the bid prices that would be submitted
    under the second-stage competition that would be held under the
    down-select strategy? What are the Navy's assumptions regarding
    the kind of bid prices they might receive under that second-
    stage competition and are they as optimistic or as pleasantly
    surprising as what they have realized here?
        It's also possible that if you were to implement the down-
    select strategy and hold the second-stage competition, the bid
    prices in that second-stage competition could be even better
    than the bid prices under this first one, because the number of
    bidders involved and the various talents they would bring to
    bear in putting their bids together could be as great or
    greater than what was available among the universe of bidders
    in this solicitation.
        So when the Navy says that they think they will get a
    billion dollars savings more under dual-award than under down-
    select, they are comparing known bid prices for this down-
    select to an unknown bid price for a down-select that would
    take place 2 or 3 years from now and one which might also be
    pleasantly surprising to the Navy. That is one dimension of how
    we cannot be all that certain about what the comparative prices
    are if we were to move forward with the down-select versus
    dual-award strategies.
        Dr. Labs. That's a point, Senator McCain, that I raise in
    my report as well.
        Senator McCain. Obviously, you would agree with the
    obvious. It takes a lot of training and a lot of skill to man
    one of these ships efficiently, with the latest technology and
    equipment. Yet now we are asking the men and women in the Navy
    to be trained in two separate ships, two separate systems, two
    separate supply chains, two separate maintenance regimens, and
    we have obviously a very large number of questions that remain
    unresolved, not because you three aren't doing your job. You
    just don't have the information, and those questions are the
    difference in costs, deficiencies affecting the lead ships have
    not been identified and fully resolved. Has the combined
    capability of the LCS seaframes with their mission modules been
    sufficiently demonstrated, so that increasing the Navy's
    commitment to seaframes at this time would be appropriate? Why
    would operating and maintaining two different combat systems,
    that is sensors, weapons, and software, that are unique to each
    LCS version not offset the Navy's savings estimates or
    ultimately prove to be wasteful and unsupportable; and how
    consistent is the Navy's plan with GAO's recommendations for
    the program?
        What is the down side to delaying this decision? The
    bidders have already agreed to one extension to December 30.
    What's the down side to waiting, say 2 months, while we can get
    the complete information and for the people that Congress
    relies on for objective opinions and views and information, to
    give you a couple of extra months to look at and get the
    specifics that you don't have now in order to make the kind of
    informed judgment and recommendations to Congress which,
    frankly, are your duties?
        Could I ask, maybe beginning with you, Dr. Labs? In other
    words, what's the rush?
        Dr. Labs. It seems to me that the down side that I can
    imagine to this would depend very much on the type of
    negotiations the Navy has been having with the contractors and
    the process by which those contractors are involved in building
    LCS-3 and -4. If, for example, delaying the contracts, the
    letting of the 10-ship contract under the down-select strategy,
    by a few months leads to layoffs at the shipyard, if it leads
    to a loss of learning because there isn't work for people to do
    because they were expecting the fiscal year 2010 ships, which
    have not even been awarded yet. That could lead to increased
    costs for that down-select strategy compared to what the Navy
    is presenting today.
        I have no idea as to what the range of that potential
    increased cost could be. It could be very small. It could be
    something significant. But that seems to me what would be the
    potential down side to it.
        On the positive side of the equation are many of the things
    that you've mentioned, that we'd have much more time to look at
    the details of the proposals and the details of the operating
    cost issues, which we have very little information to go on,
    and to make a more informed decision. That to me are the two
    sides of the equation as I see it.
        Senator McCain. Mr. O'Rourke.
        Mr. O'Rourke. I think the premise of your question included
    if the bids could be extended by another month or 2 or 3, and I
    don't know whether that's possible. But if the bids could be
    extended, it would provide more time to get at questions of,
    for example, the potential investment costs of moving toward
    commonality on the combat systems. That's not something you
    would do because of any inadequacy of the current combat
    systems. It's because you're trying to streamline the number of
    combat systems that the Navy would be supporting across its
    surface fleet at any one time.
        So it would provide more time for that. It would provide
    more time to vet the number on life cycle operation and support
    costs and what the interaction between that number is, and also
    the interaction between that number and investments that you
    make in combat system commonality, because the more common you
    make the combat system, it could actually bring down whatever
    the premium is for life cycle O&S costs.
        In general, it's better to get ships under contract sooner
    rather than later. I think as a general practice people in most
    cases would prefer to get the ships under contract. But if we
    were to wait more time and not have these ships under contract
    for 1 or 2 or 3 more months, it would not be the only
    shipbuilding program that has experienced that kind of a delay
    while we were waiting for issues to be sorted out. The contract
    award on the DDG-1000 destroyers was held, on the second and
    third ships in the program, in abeyance all through this year
    while we put the DDG-1000 back through the Nunn-McCurdy
    recertification process. The Navy had to do that. More
    generally, those two ships, the second and third ship in the
    DDG-1000 program, have not been awarded, even though the second
    ship was funded in the 2007-2008 timeframe and the third ship
    was funded in the 2009 timeframe.
        So there are other examples of ships that have waited for
    some time after they were funded until the contracts were
    awarded. It's not a preferable practice, but if you can get
    value out of it in terms of developing firmer information on
    which to base a decision, then observers might judge that value
    to be worth it.
        Mr. Francis. Senator McCain, if the bid prices can be
    extended I think a down side would potentially be work in the
    yard, particularly for LCS-3, which was recently launched and
    is 80 percent complete. There'd be fabrication shops and so
    forth earlier in the process that might be looking for work.
        But apart from that, I think there are up sides
    programmatically to have more time to go through and analyze
    what we're getting ourselves into and what the downstream
    effects are. I'll give you one example. In the current
    estimate, the net present value of O&S costs to operate a
    second ship is put at $295 million. But last year when the
    strategy was changed to a down-select strategy the Navy cited
    substantial O&S cost savings by going down to one design. So a
    good analytical question would be, how does that $295 million
    cost in this strategy compare with what savings were estimated
    in the last strategy?
        Senator McCain. I thank you. I thank the witnesses.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it's obvious that this
    is a rush to judgment on a program that has been plagued with
    billions and billions of cost overruns and waste of taxpayers'
    dollars. I obviously am deeply concerned about that from the
    taxpayers' standpoint.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I believe Senator McCain has asked the right question and I
    think the Navy should respond. So, Secretary Mabus, Secretary
    Stackley, and Admiral Roughead, can you respond? What is lost
    or what do you gain by waiting?
        Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me start with the time line
    that we've been on. This is a 2010 solicitation for the 2010
    ships. We, in fact, received the bids back in May. The
    competing industry teams who put together these fixed-price
    bids have gone out through their vendor base to secure long-
    term vendor agreements, looking for 10-ship buys with their
    vendors over a 5-year period. So they have agreements with
    their vendor base for that piece of their proposals to lock in
    those fixed prices.
        The other key components of their bids are their own labor
    learning and the overhead rates that come with that. Those were
    in the proposals received in May. We went through the
    evaluation, two series of discussions, and that brought us to
    the fall. The pricing was extended to expire in mid-December,
    and we have pushed that back to the end of the month.
        When we have discussions with industry about the impacts of
    further delay to the award, that's where their proposals start
    to come apart. We have both hiring freezes and layoffs in
    effect at the competing shipyards, and we have vendor
    agreements that have been extended far beyond what was
    anticipated when they went out with their first go-arounds with
    the vendors.
        So their comeback to the Navy has been: We are at the point
    where we have to press on. The workforce is leaving, hiring
    freezes are in effect, and vendors are stressed in terms of
    their ability to keep faith with the fixed-price proposals that
    they have put in place. They will need to go back with any
    further delay and reprice their proposals.
        Today we have very affordable fixed-price proposals in
    hand, which is why we are here, and we do not propose to give
    those up for further delay.
        Senator Reed. If I can follow up with just one question in
    this area. In order to make a decision, you would have to at
    least implicitly assume the additional cost to the Navy for the
    2- or 3-month delay, given what the vendors and the contractors
    are saying. I would assume in your comments you assume it would
    be a significant increase, not something that could be
    acceptable to the Navy; is that correct?
        Mr. Stackley. I think that they have gotten very hard
    commitments from their vendors. This program has been very
    troubled. It started, stopped, started, and stopped. With this
    solicitation we are looking for stability. That has been the
    forcing function, to get costs under control and to get the
    competitive pressure that we've brought to bear.
        If we have another start-stop with the vendors, I just
    don't have confidence that we'd be seeing the same type of
    pricing coming back in a repricing drill.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask you another question. You've
    talked about average cost of ships, but we don't do things on
    the average. We do things year-by-year, ship-by-ship. Can you
    plot out the graph of the year-by-year, ship-by-ship? Is it
    going to start off at a point and go up, up, up, and then peak?
        Mr. Stackley. No, sir. This is the stability issue and
    industry responding to the issues that we have driven in terms
    of performance. We are looking at going from ship 1 to ship 2,
    in terms of production labor, which is a big component of your
    cost. We're seeing on average about a one-third reduction in
    labor hours between the first and second ship, which is
    phenomenal. This is rooting out the issues that plagued us on
    the lead ships.
        Then inside of the proposals across the 5 years, what we
    are seeing is very steady, aggressive learning proposed based
    on what we're seeing for demonstrated performance to date, what
    they have locked in in terms of fixed prices with their
    vendors, a reasonable expectation of control of overhead rates
    based on this business base.
        So we continue down a learning curve nominally in the mid-
    80s, which is very good but not unreasonable in terms of
    comparison with other shipbuilding programs. The 51 program,
    for example, experienced learning in the 85 to 90 percent
    range. We're seeing the Virginia-class in about the 90 percent
    range.
        They've made a significant drop in their costs from the
    first to the second ship and then they're extending continued
    good learning throughout the period of this contract, and then
    backing it up with, as I described, locking in the material
    costs. Then you have escalation effects. In fact, the learning
    that we're seeing dominates over any escalation effects in the
    period of this contract.
        Senator Reed. Let me turn to another subject that's been
    discussed. That is life cycle costs. Points have been raised by
    the oversight organizations that suggest that one of the
    motivating elements for a single contract was saving on life
    cycle costs, the points that Senator McCain made so eloquently
    about crew training and standardization. Now we have two ships
    and the life cycle costs are very vague, to say the least.
    They're influenced by systems--anti-submarine systems, anti-
    mine systems--that are still being developed.
        Can you give us a notion of how you're estimating life
    cycle costs, and how confident you are of that estimate?
        Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me start with the elements of
    the life cycle, the total ownership cost. We have what's
    referred to as a program life cycle cost estimate, which was
    completed in the June-July timeframe. Independent of the
    design, whether it's design A or design B, the program life
    cycle cost estimate is on the order of $83 billion. The two
    different designs are pretty much on top of each other in that
    estimate.
        When we look at a dual design versus a single design in the
    life cycle, what we focus on are those elements of the life
    cycle cost that are affected by the design characteristics. So
    when it comes to manpower, for example, manpower is equal for
    the two because they're both 40-man crews, and so you can
    remove that as a determinant in O&S costs. When you look at
    repair parts, whether it's a diesel on the Austal version of
    the ship or the diesel on the LCS version of the ship, the
    repair part is about the same. So repair part costs get pushed
    off to the side in the assessment.
        Then you have maintenance and fuel costs. Those are pulled
    off to the side in the dual versus single design. The
    determining characteristics in placing the premium on dual
    design have to do with things like configuration management,
    in-service engineering support, software maintenance, and then
    nonrecurring associated with modernization. Then there's the
    piece associated with training for the crew that Senator McCain
    highlighted. When you look at that portion of the life cycle
    and you estimate what the premium is for dual design versus
    single design, and take into account the fact that we have
    already paid for a lot of the nonrecurring cost, so by
    delivering two ships we have already absorbed those costs, and
    we also are going to continue to support the two ships that we
    have for either of the non-selected class in a down-select
    mode, that's where you arrive at a fairly manageable premium
    associated with O&S for dual design, which in net present value
    is about $300 million.
        That's the estimate. Today we went back to the 2006
    business case analysis that was done at that point in time,
    because this same question was being viewed, and on a percent
    basis it is consistent with the 2006 assessment, it's
    consistent with the program life cycle cost estimate done this
    year and then when we looked at it again in the fall.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        My time has expired, but I think these questions should be
    posed, and I will follow up, either in writing or if I get back
    for a second round, to the oversight, because this is a
    critical issue. I think it's such a highly complex and
    technical nature that it deserves a discussion from both
    perspectives.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    for having this hearing. I think it's good to air these
    questions. I appreciate Senator McCain's commitment to
    containing costs and I think some of his criticisms early on of
    this program have been exactly correct. I think all of us
    recognize the program had an inauspicious beginning.
        I would just ask Admiral Roughead and Admiral Pandolfe, how
    many years do you two have working with building ships?
        Admiral Roughead. I've been involved with ships for going
    on 38 years now, Senator. I've had the opportunity to put the
    second ship of a class in commission, and I understand what the
    challenges are associated with that. As I said in my statement,
    these ships are needed, but what we're seeing as we get on to
    building the second ship of the class or the second ship of
    each design is some pretty remarkable improvements that in my
    experience not only are encouraging, but they give me the
    confidence to go forward.
        Senator Sessions. The drop in price as the new ships come
    on, does that exceed what you have seen normally in your
    previous history?
        Admiral Roughead. Mr. Stackley can talk more about the
    pricing of ships, but what I have seen in the way of the
    learning curve as we go forward on these ships I think is
    really quite good.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Pandolfe, how many years have you
    had?
        Admiral Pandolfe. Sir, I've just gone over 30 years of
    operating and maintaining war ships. To the CNO's point, I
    think the team has worked extraordinarily hard over the last
    year to bring this program to where it needs to be, to put
    rigor into the requirements and to work with our shipbuilders,
    and to get some affordable pricing that can lead to program
    stability. That's what this program needs, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Stackley, how many years have
    you been working in this area?
        Mr. Stackley. About 30 years, sir.
        Senator Sessions. I think you have almost 100 years here of
    experience. You've been living with this a lot closer than any
    of us in the Senate have been living with it. The House has
    approved this plan that you've asked them to approve, and I'm
    inclined to agree, based on what I know.
        I think we ought to examine it, but I think we should have
    an open mind. Mr. Stackley, regarding to additional delays,
    you've mentioned a number of points. One of our reviewers in
    analyzing this talked about uncertainty in programs. We've
    already had a lot of uncertainty and a lot of delays in this
    program. Could this cause a bad reputation for DOD, in general,
    to a bidder thinking, no matter what I do, it's going to be put
    off and delayed and costs are going to run up? Is that a
    concern we should have?
        Mr. Stackley. Sir, I think one of the most critical aspects
    of cost control on any major defense program is stability;
    stability of requirements, stability of design, stability in
    budgeting, stability in scheduling and contracting. Delaying
    the program tends to destabilize what we're trying to
    accomplish here.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Roughead, you've heard from CBO,
    GAO, and CRS. But the Navy has its own plan. It's your ship,
    it's your money that's getting spent. Do you believe that your
    analysis of these bids and the decision you've reached is based
    on intense evaluation that is more in depth than the three that
    have been proposed here? Not that they're not valuable, not
    that a fresh look at this isn't very valuable. But tell me how
    you evaluate your own plan? It's not as if you haven't analyzed
    these factors yourself.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I think as the other witnesses
    mentioned, they're working from models and from estimates.
    We're working from known figures. We can get into why it is
    that way. I think even a delay may not even solve that problem,
    simply because of the restrictions that we have on making that
    information available.
        So a delay doesn't get us any farther down the road. But
    we're working from known figures; they're at the disadvantage
    of not having those figures.
        The other point that I would make and one of the reasons
    why I have confidence in the ships is that we've had these to
    sea. There is no other ship class that I'm aware of that 2
    years ahead of schedule I directed Admiral Pandolfe and his
    team to deploy the ship within a matter of months and the ship
    deployed, not only to the Caribbean in real operations, but
    then we pushed it out to Hawaii, where it participated in the
    largest maritime exercise in the world with other countries and
    with our high-end capabilities, an aircraft carrier. The ship
    has performed well.
        The mission modules are plug-and-play, so the complexity of
    the mission capabilities of the ship allows us to change those
    as we go along. I think there are so many attributes to this.
    I'm confident with the way we've seen both designs work at sea,
    and I'm comfortable with where we are.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, I know that when you
    came on board there was a lot of criticism of this program. It
    seems to me I have to say you've done what Congress asked.
    You've confronted the cost. My criticism to you and Mr.
    Stackley was you emphasized cost so much that maybe you weren't
    evaluating which ship had the greatest capabilities. But we had
    a cost problem. Congress told you to deal with the cost
    problem.
        I'm actually quite surprised and pleased that you've
    brought this under the cost cap and to a point where you can,
    as I understand it, add an additional ship and still have money
    left over, according to your estimates.
        Would you comment on that?
        Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. Thank you. I sat in this room at my
    confirmation hearings, listened to the concerns raised,
    particularly on acquisition, on cost control of certain
    programs. I watched as this committee passed the WSARA of 2009
    almost immediately after I was confirmed. In this we set about
    to use that Act as almost a checklist to go down, to put
    competition in the programs, to do firm fixed-price contracts
    whenever possible, to demand improvement as programs went
    along, to demand a learning curve, and that prices, time, and
    schedule should improve as programs mature, to make sure that
    designs did not change to any significant degree during
    construction, that designs be mature, and that technology be
    mature.
        To the CNO's point, because these are modular ships,
    because you can remove and replace weapons systems, you have a
    very stable hull, a very stable platform for these weapons
    systems, so that you don't have to redesign an entire ship as
    technology improves or as weapons systems change.
        I think, as I said in my statement, that this is a great
    example of the WSARA of 2009 working, that we have taken a
    program that had problems, particularly in cost, but also in
    stability, and have stabilized the program, have driven costs
    down by using the intent, the spirit, and the specifications of
    that Act.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Stackley, I believe one of our
    witnesses testified that the follow-on contract bid if we use
    the original proposal, the single source proposal, could be
    lower than you've estimated as you evaluated the viability of
    this dual award. Isn't it possible that they could also be
    higher than you presently estimate?
        Mr. Stackley. I read CBO's report and understand the
    information that's in their table and the differences in terms
    of the way the Naval Sea Systems Command and CBO estimate. In
    terms of the baseline for the down-select, we are within 5
    percent of each other relative to the estimate. But again, CBO
    does not have the insight into the specific bid information
    that we have that gives us far greater confidence in terms of
    the numbers that we're bringing forward.
        Senator Sessions. You're getting a fixed-price contract and
    I believe it's CBO's numbers using inflation of 1.0 in 2011,
    edging up to 2.3 in 2015. If it goes above that, are the
    bidders required to eat that cost?
        Mr. Stackley. The proposals that we received are what's
    referred to as forward-priced, which means that they have
    included escalation inside of their bids.
        Senator Sessions. So if it goes higher than that, they eat
    that cost?
        Mr. Stackley. It's all in accordance with the terms and
    conditions of that fixed-price contract, yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Even though it's a fixed-price contract,
    you're not contractually obligated to even buy them. If
    Congress decides not to fund the ship in the future, there will
    be no penalty if the government fails to purchase another ship?
        Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. When we award these contracts,
    we're funding the first ships on the contract, but the ships
    that are in the out-years are subject to the annual
    appropriations. So if either the Navy or Congress determine not
    to fund the out-year ships, there is no termination liability
    or cancellation ceiling.
        Senator Sessions. I think it's a pretty tough negotiation,
    Mr. Chairman. I think they've done a pretty good job.
        Chairman Levin. It's the first bit of daylight in this
    program, actually.
        Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Before I start on my questions, I wanted to take a moment
    of personal privilege. I think this will be my last Senate
    Armed Services Committee meeting. I'm not sure, but I think so.
        Chairman Levin. You never know around here.
        Senator LeMieux. You never know. There could be one
    tomorrow.
        Chairman Levin. It's been our privilege to have you be with
    us.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you for the good work that you've
    done, thank you to Senator McCain, it is especially important
    work as we're fighting two wars. So I just wanted to make a
    note of that.
        Admiral Roughead, in listening to this it occurs to me that
    we've had a competition here with two ships and we're in the
    situation now where the proposal is on the table to not pick
    one or the other, but to pick both. Why is it in the best
    interest of the Navy and why does it serve the requirements of
    the Navy to have both of these ships, as opposed to just have
    one?
        Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator. I think there are a
    couple of reasons. One, it is clearly going to allow us to
    begin introduction of the ships at a more rapid rate, simply
    because we'll have two shipyards building, so we'll have two
    production lines moving.
        There is no question that both of these designs meet the
    LCS requirement. That said, there are attributes in each design
    that I believe in the future will prove to be operationally
    advantageous. Operating the ships in tandem, a particular ship
    with another collection of ships, I think will give us
    capabilities that we would not have had before.
        Then coupled with that are the savings that are realized by
    going down this path. So from what I would call the speed to
    the fleet, the flexibility that we get, and then the advantage
    to the taxpayer in the cost of the program, I think those are
    the advantages that are apparent to me.
        Senator LeMieux. Operationally, would you potentially
    deploy one ship or the other depending upon the mission based
    upon the unique capabilities of those ships if you had both in
    your arsenal?
        Admiral Roughead. I think that each ship has some
    attributes that favor one over the other. What is the mission,
    what is the environment, what are the other ships that are in
    company? I think all those are factors that will allow us to
    put together better mixes of capability simply because of the
    attributes of each design.
        They both fit the bill, and I think it's going to give our
    Navy increased flexibility.
        Senator LeMieux. I don't have a problem with that and
    that's a compelling argument to me. I want the Navy to have all
    of the tools it needs to be able to accomplish whatever mission
    there is. If they both fit the bill but there's one that has a
    unique advantage in a specific situation, I think that makes a
    lot of sense, for you to have that.
        I am concerned, however, with the point that Senator McCain
    brought up, is that it's hard for us to do our oversight
    function if we're not able to rely upon CBO to look inside the
    numbers. I trust you, but I adhere to the old Reagan
    expression, ``trust, but verify.'' Our job is to know.
        Maybe the chairman and the ranking member have been privy
    to this information. We don't have the privy of this
    information. On its face, the idea that we have two ships, we
    had a competition and we're supposed to get to one, and now
    we're going to take both and that's going to save us money,
    doesn't make intuitive sense. It doesn't make sense to have two
    ships which require two maintenance programs, which require two
    training regimens, which are going to require different
    attributes for the Navy to be able to deal with these two ships
    over time. That doesn't make intuitive sense.
        If it is true that you can save $600 million, or even $1
    billion, which is another number I heard, as opposed to the
    number that our friends at GAO, CBO, and CRS suggest, which
    will cost more, that's fine. But we need to have that
    information.
        Mr. Chairman, this may not be something that happens when
    I'm here, but it seems to me that in the future we need to make
    sure that the folks who do this evaluation for us have this
    information and then we, whether it's in executive session or
    not, can have that information. We can't do our job without it.
        I feel a little bit hamstrung without knowing exactly what
    the numbers are and what the attributes of the particular ship
    are. If we could have a candid conversation about why you like
    this ship better than that one, I think we could do a better
    job.
        It's hard for me to come to a final conclusion. I am
    appreciative of your comments and I certainly want you to have
    all the tools you need, but I also have to look out for the
    taxpayer, and it's hard for me to make that evaluation.
        I appreciate what you've done. I appreciate Secretary
    Mabus' work on this, because I know cost-cutting, as my
    colleague from Alabama said, has been something that you've
    been focused on. So I appreciate that.
        I don't have any additional questions, Mr. Chairman,
    because I feel at a loss if we don't have that information. I
    hope going forward that this committee will have the ability to
    be able to truly evaluate the pros and the cons with the
    information before it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. There's no doubt that there's a
    disadvantage in that regard in terms of oversight. I don't know
    myself how to get around the proprietary protection.
        By the way, we don't have that information, either. We're
    relying on the Navy and then our oversight folks to the extent
    they're able to do it, and they tell us what they can do and
    what they can't do, and give us the range of their limitations.
    It is a disadvantage, it seems to me, and we will look into how
    we can possibly in the future deal with that. I'm not sure that
    they've solved that in the past that we can, but it's an
    important point.
        Senator LeMieux. If I could just suggest, in the
    procurement process going forward, I know that these companies
    have proprietary information. There's going to have to be some
    ability to have a limited waiver of that, because we can't do
    our job under the Constitution if we can't know what the
    information is.
        Chairman Levin. Yes, it definitely is a problem for us, and
    we have to weigh the limitations in our judgment as to what
    we're operating under.
        In terms of the attributes, though, I don't know that that
    is privileged information. The CNO has given us the statement
    that each ship has certain attributes. I think that part of it
    probably is available to us. Is that right?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I would say it is. A lot of it
    is simply in the configurations of the ship, the volume that is
    available in one, boat-handling capability that's available in
    another. The first time I walked aboard the LCS was back in
    2007 as the first two were being built, I was struck at the
    potential that was in the ship, the volume, the aviation
    capability, the ability to move boats on and off.
        Each one is different, as a fleet commander both in the
    Atlantic and Pacific and having operated globally, I could
    envision each one of those ships bringing great versatility,
    agility, and capability to our Navy. One thing our commanders
    will do is they'll mix and match this capability for the
    mission, for the environment, to get the best effect. I think
    it really gives us some incredible capability, not just in what
    we've been talking about, in cost and stability to program and
    to the industrial base, but I think it gives us great
    operational flexibility.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux, and thank you
    for your great service to this committee and to our State and
    to our country. We really appreciate your being with us. You've
    been a very, very active participant in the work of this
    committee and we deeply appreciate it.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to join you in
    that. Senator LeMieux's been a great member of the Senate and
    this committee. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, before Senator LeMieux
    leaves, I just want to point out to my colleagues that, who
    knows, he may be back on this committee some day.
        Chairman Levin. I can't say exactly with a straight face
    that I would look forward to that, as much as I look forward to
    the service that you've given to us. [Laughter.]
        But I think Senator LeMieux understands I'm an honest
    person and you put me in a very difficult position.
        Senator Collins. I apologize, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. That's all right.
        Senator Collins. I just couldn't quite resist the
    opportunity there.
        Chairman Levin. I do repeat my strong feeling that you've
    been a major contributor to this committee. That is sincere and
    I would want to keep that sincerity in my response in reaction
    to Senator Collins' comment.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        On a more serious note--though that was a serious note--I
    want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding
    this hearing today on what is a very important issue. I must
    say that the Navy's latest decision on this program took me by
    surprise. I've had a very helpful opportunity to talk to some
    of the members of this panel as well as to other experts. But,
    like many of my colleagues, I've not yet reached a final
    decision on the Navy's proposal.
        Since that decision is upon us, since language is included
    in the omnibus, I very much welcome this opportunity today to
    better understand the Navy's rationale for this change in its
    strategy. Both the Secretary and Admiral Roughead have said
    that this plan is good for our shipbuilding industrial base. As
    all the members of this panel as well as my colleagues on this
    committee know, preserving the industrial base is a major
    concern of mine and a major concern of the Navy's.
        Let me start by first exploring that issue with you, and
    I'll start with you, Admiral Roughead. When the Navy announced
    last year that it was going to hold an LCS down-select
    competition and cease to build the two different designs, it
    stated that the winning shipbuilder would build 10 ships in the
    near term and then there would be a second competition that
    would be held by the Navy to introduce the second source
    shipbuilder.
        A number of Navy shipbuilders, including Bath Iron Works
    (BIW) in my home State, relied on the Navy's announced plan and
    thought that they might well end up competing to be that second
    source for the ship that was produced as a result of the down-
    select. The reason that this is important to our shipbuilders
    is many of them, including BIW, are looking out and seeing gaps
    in their workload, and the potential of being able to build
    some of the LCSs would help fill in some of those gaps.
        Under the Navy's new proposal, however, the Navy will
    continue to build both designs with the two current
    shipbuilders and there's no longer a definitive plan or
    commitment by the Navy to introduce competition by other
    shipbuilders in fiscal year 2012, which had been the original
    plan.
        I understand the case that you're making for the new plan
    and I understand the advantages that it could have, including
    certain cost advantages. But I'm concerned that you're removing
    an opportunity for more volume to help fill in those gaps for
    other shipbuilders that had hoped to build LCSs in the future
    and now are unlikely to have the opportunity to do so.
        I realize that's a long introduction to my concern. But
    given your new proposed strategies, what specific actions will
    the Navy's leaders take to preserve shipbuilding volume and
    stability at critical shipyards like BIW if it now appears that
    they're not going to be involved in building the LCS? I ask
    this in particular because of my concern that we still don't
    have the DDG-1000, the second and third ship, under
    construction contracts, even though they've been fully
    authorized and appropriated, and in view of my concern about
    the low level of procurement on the DDG-51, a concern that I
    know you share.
        Admiral, if you could address that concern on how you plan
    to preserve shipbuilding volume and stability necessary for our
    shipyards if you go this new route.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question.
    In fact, even if we go with the 20-ship option that we're
    talking about here, that's only about half the ship class. So
    our commitment is to continue to build the LCS, to get to the
    target of 55 that we need. So there is more shipbuilding that
    will go on as a result of the LCS.
        This is not an operational factor for me, but I also
    believe that the designs of the ships, the flexibility in the
    ships, and also the cost of these ships open up potential for
    foreign military sales that would otherwise not be there. Then
    on top of that, is the savings that we derive, because we look
    at our shipbuilding account in its entirety. These savings also
    enable us to look at how we can shift around other procurements
    that we may need because we've realized these savings.
        Senator Collins. I guess my concern is if you have the two
    current shipbuilders each building 10 ships--and I understand
    the advantage if you can get 20 ships for the cost of 19, that
    that is powerful--but it seems very unlikely to me that other
    shipbuilders are going to be able to come in at that point.
    That's very different from a down-select that produced 1 ship
    design, the first shipbuilder would build 10, and then it's a
    tossup or an open competition. It's very different if you're
    going with 20 ships, 10 at each shipyard, and it seems to me
    that does make it unlikely for others to bid in the future.
        Let me go to your second point about cost and ask the
    Secretary and you both this question. The Navy has asserted
    that the dual-award strategy not only adds stability to the LCS
    program, but will produce savings that could benefit
    shipbuilding programs as a whole. Earlier this year, as you're
    all aware, both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
    House Armed Services Committee expressed concern in our
    committee reports that the procurement rate for destroyers is
    insufficient.
        If the Navy's large surface combatants continue their
    historical average service lives of 25 to 30 years, we are
    never going to reach the Navy's goal of 88 large surface
    combatants. Furthermore, if you look at the independent Perry
    and Hadley panel which reviewed the Quadrennial Defense Review,
    that panel recommended a fleet of 346 Navy ships. Admiral
    Roughead, every time we've talked you've always been careful to
    say 313 is the floor, and so I suspect that higher number is
    not really a surprise to you. These are actual requirements.
    This isn't pie in the sky. These are to meet our military
    presence requirements.
        Secretary Mabus, we'll start with you: Do you believe that
    the change that you're proposing for the LCS program will make
    it easier for you to address the budget shortfalls facing the
    shipbuilding budget?
        Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. Yes, as Secretary Stackley
    said earlier, we would propose taking the savings that we get
    from the proposed dual buy and keeping it in shipbuilding, so
    that we can procure more ships, for the same amount of money
    over the next 5 years.
        Admiral Roughead and I share your concern that we keep
    these critical skills in our shipyards, because shipbuilding
    skills tend to be unique and if you lose those skills they are
    very hard, if not impossible, to regain. Second, as this
    committee has authorized, the DDG-51 line has been restarted,
    because it is one of our crucial platforms. It's one of the
    most flexible platforms that we have, and that's particularly
    true since the President has given the Navy the mission of
    being the first antiballistic missile defense in the Phased
    Adaptive Approach. We're the first phase, the Aegis system that
    goes on the DDG-51.
        So it would certainly be our hope and our recommendation
    that any savings we get from the LCS program go back into
    building more of other classes of ships.
        Senator Collins. Admiral Roughead, do you want to add to
    that or give me a similar commitment that the savings would be
    not diverted for other purposes, but help meet the shortfall
    that is so clear in the shipbuilding budget?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator. I am committed to the force
    structure. I think I've been consistent with that during my
    time as CNO. I'm also very focused on the need for
    recapitalizing the combatant fleet when we get to the 20s. That
    is an issue that I would submit is bigger than the Navy,
    because it is about our ability to field that type of force as
    part of our national interest. It's also significantly
    important to our industrial base and what we will be doing as
    the ships that we built in numbers in the 80s age out. Key to
    that, one of those large number-drivers, are our combatants,
    the DDG-51s, and so that is the strategy that we as a Navy and
    we as a Nation have to take forward into the 2020s.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Starting round two, I just have really one additional
    question. There's been the question of the additional O&S costs
    of operating two different ships here. I think you told us,
    Secretary Stackley, that we're going to be operating ships in
    each class in any event since we will have at least two in each
    class. So the question is how confident are you that you have
    adequately estimated the marginal costs of operating a larger
    number of the ship class that might have only included two
    ships?
        Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. We have broken down the different
    categories of costs and to the extent that we can at this stage
    in what will be about a 40-year life cycle for the program,
    have tried to discretely cost out the research and development
    (R&D), the procurement, and the operations and maintenance
    (O&M) bills associated with the dual design. We start on the
    R&D side on the upfront. We have a good understanding today of
    things like training systems required for the two different
    ship types, and in fact we have training systems that we've
    already procured for the two different ship types, so we have
    high fidelity in the remaining costs in that category.
        We're sustaining two different design efforts today inside
    of the procurement. We look at the premium associated in plans
    and engineering in a down select versus the dual-award inside
    of the budget, and then we are able to extrapolate that outside
    of the FYDP carrying that on into the life cycle for the class.
    So we believe we have good fidelity there.
        When you get into software maintenance and modernization,
    that's subjective and it's subjective by way of there are
    future decisions that we're going to make on the class that
    will impact that. So while we have what I'll call a plug number
    in there in our estimate, throughout the life cycle we're going
    to be continually reevaluating what modernization at what
    cycle, what point in the program, do we insert new capabilities
    or do baseline upgrades. That's a little bit more subjective.
    It doesn't have the fidelity as compared to the other
    categories that I've described.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I appreciate all of you. I know that the Navy has worked
    hard to bring this program under control. I think earlier when
    our independent evaluators were criticizing the program I think
    the Navy's defense was not so good. But I do believe you've
    gotten this program under control and I thank you for that. I
    think that criticism and objective view helped get us to the
    position we are today.
        But ultimately it is the Navy who handles this weapons
    system, who's working with it daily, who's had people in the
    shipyards monitoring every step of the construction. I value
    your opinion and you've seen both the ships and you say both
    would be helpful to you. I think that's something that we
    should consider.
        It does seem to me, Admiral Roughead, that if a decade from
    now a new anti-mine warfare system, a new surveillance system,
    a new weapons system, came about and you decided to put it on
    15, 20, or 30 of the ships, might not one of those ships be
    better able to handle it, and could that be an advantage from
    having ships with slightly different capabilities?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I think the two different types
    give us a certain amount of flexibility and versatility, as I
    talked earlier about this ability to mix the capabilities of a
    force that we put in there.
        The other thing I would say that the LCS gives us that
    other ships do not is that if we are upgrading a mine warfare
    capability in the LCS that seaframe can be off doing something
    in anti-submarine warfare. Today, if we want to take it in and
    upgrade a capability, that ship comes off line. In the case of
    the LCS, we can upgrade the mine countermeasure package while
    the ship is doing anti-submarine warfare or surface warfare.
        The ability to increase capability on these ships on both
    designs is really quite extraordinary. That's why the system
    that we're putting together is for more than a ship. It really
    is a capability that we've not had before.
        Senator Sessions. I think you could argue that there could
    be a minor extra cost because one ship is presumably slightly
    less expensive than the other, but apparently they're pretty
    close, from what I understand from your testimony. So I think
    that the additional advantage is helpful.
        One thing about our industrial capacity, Secretary Mabus.
    We often sell ships to our allies and it's both good for our
    shipbuilding capacity and for those countries.
        Having two ships, might that be somewhat of an advantage
    for our ability to export weapons systems to our allies?
        Mr. Mabus. I think it would, Senator. I think, like
    operationally, in terms of foreign military sales, having both
    versions gives us more flexibility. Some countries may want one
    version for specific reasons. Others may want the other. I
    think it gives us a better opportunity to make those sales and
    make more of them than with one version.
        Senator Sessions. I just don't think there's any doubt, Mr.
    Chairman. If these shipyards are preparing to go forward,
    they're at a point where the delays do impact them. I see one
    Navy source in a recent article said there's a 100 percent
    chance of a contest or a protest. I don't know whether that's
    accurate or not. But certainly we would be in a position to
    move forward with a lot less potential delays in this
    recommendation of the Navy. I'm inclined to think it's well
    thought out.
        Thank you for having this hearing.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
        I'll just close with one request and then one comment. The
    request is that the agencies that help us to oversee these kind
    of issues--we've run into this proprietary issue before. It's
    not the first time. So we would ask you to give some thought as
    to how we can in the future address that issue. You have the
    same issue. You're unable to be more specific because you don't
    have the information. It's proprietary and these contractors
    are not going to disclose it.
        We have the Navy, on the other hand, that has seen it, and
    has given us the assurances. These are fixed-price contracts.
    If these weren't fixed-price contracts, let me tell you, I'd
    have plenty of problems with these contracts. They're fixed-
    price contracts, so we have a pretty fair handle on that. But
    still, if we can solve that proprietary information issue in
    the future, I think it would be helpful to you and it would be
    helpful to us as well.
        In terms of my comment, this has been a troubled program,
    obviously. The Senate has been deeply involved in trying to get
    this back on track. It seems like it is on track. This is the
    first daylight in this program that I think we've seen, and
    it's very welcome. We are grateful that all of you would come
    here today again on short notice; it was important that you be
    available to answer these questions. I think you've done a
    very, very good job of doing that.
        Thank you all. With that very positive comment, we now
    stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

                                    &&