[Senate Hearing 111-660]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-660
UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 14, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
DeMint, Jim, U.S. Senator From South Carolina.................... 24
Prepared Statement........................................... 24
Gordon, Hon. Philip, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe And
Euasian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC........... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............ 1
Vejvoda, Ivan, Executive Director, Balkan Trust for Democracy,
The German Marshall Fund of The United States, Belgrade, Serbia 38
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Vershbow, Hon. Alexander, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator From Ohio................ 3
Volker, Hon. Kurt, Senior Fellow And Managing Director, Center On
Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Washington,
DC............................................................. 30
Prepared statement........................................... 33
(iii)
UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne
Shaheen, presiding.
Present: Senators Shaheen, DeMint.
Also present: Senator Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Shaheen. Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for
joining us for what I hope will be a very insightful discussion
about the current political, economic, and security trends in
the Western Balkans.
I'm very pleased to be joined this afternoon by a former
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator
Voinovich, who has been a long-time champion of the Western
Balkans.
Today we have two very impressive panels and I will reserve
introductions for a little later, after I've given an opening
statement.
In February Senator Voinovich and I made an extensive trip
to Southwest Europe where we had the opportunity to sit down
with military and political leaders from across the Western
Balkans. We were struck by the progress that has been made and
we reiterated our commitment to support for continued U.S.
engagement in the region. Most importantly, we expressed our
joint vision of a Western Balkans region that is fully
integrated into the EU and NATO.
Though we will likely focus much of our time today on the
challenges that remain in the region, I think it's important to
begin by putting the current situation in context. It was only
15 years ago that the Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to
the war in Bosnia and it was only 10 years ago this spring that
NATO bombs fell on Belgrade.
When you consider the very recent history of divisiveness
and violence that befell this region, it is difficult to
overstate the impressive successes that we've seen there over
the past decade. Slovenia is a thriving member of the EU and
NATO. Croatia, already a NATO member, is on the doorstep of the
EU. Serbia's current government has shown impressive leadership
in anchoring Belgrade's future to the West and most recently
made a very important notable attempt to turn the page on a
difficult past by passing a resolution apologizing for the 1995
massacre at Srebrenica.
In addition, several countries of the Western Balkans have
gained visa liberalization within Europe, and most have a
realistic path toward NATO and EU membership. The trends are
positive throughout the region, and many countries should be
commended for their commitment to tackling political, economic,
and military reforms.
Despite these positive signs in the region, some major
concerns remain. First and foremost is the situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Many of us here know well the political
challenges in Bosnia and the need for significant reforms.
Unfortunately, the current election season does not bode well
for serious internal political change.
A well-timed strong commitment to eventually bring Bosnia
into NATO's sphere through the Membership Action Plan could
undermine those leaders who would exploit fear and uncertainty
during this election process.
Now, I certainly understand that some are reticent to be
seen as rewarding the current Bosnian leadership. However, what
we heard in the region was unanimous agreement that a strong
commitment from NATO at this time could help propel Bosnia's
leadership into action. At the very least, hopefully the people
of Bosnia will see a realistic path forward, a possible work
plan or roadmap.
Another critical challenge for the region is the situation
between Kosovo and Serbia. There's no question that the dream
of the united Europe will not be realized without Serbia. To
its great credit, the leadership in Belgrade has demonstrated
their commitment to Western institutions and has made EU
membership its top foreign policy priority.
As Vice President Biden said during his trip to Belgrade,
``We continue to agree to disagree'' over Kosovo and although
recognition of Kosovo should not be a precondition of our
ongoing support for Serbia eventually becoming a member of the
EU, it's evident that the disagreement over Northern Kosovo
will remain a stumbling block for future integration prospects.
With an expected opinion from the International Court of
Justice this year on Kosovo's independence, it's critical that
we begin to lay the foundation now for finding a creative,
pragmatic, and sustainable resolution between Kosovo and
Serbia.
Finally, I want to express concern over what we heard in so
many capitals that we visited about the widely held perception
of so-called EU enlargement fatigue. The worry that there will
be no viable membership path for the countries of this region
could undermine their reform agenda and stop the positive
momentum we've seen in recent years.
Deputy Secretary of State [James] Steinberg's recent trip
to the region with the Spanish Foreign Minister, whose country
holds the rotating Presidency of the EU, sends an important
signal that both the United States and the EU will remain
robustly engaged in the region.
If we're to help keep these countries on the path toward
European integration, the United States will need to continue
to work closely with Brussels and the capitals of our European
allies. Over 60 years ago, after two devastating World Wars on
the European Continent, the United States and our transatlantic
allies made the historic commitment to bring about a Europe
that is whole, free, and at peace. Our pledge to rebuild this
continent has come with extraordinary effort, time, and cost,
and yet it still remains incomplete.
We have an opportunity to help the people of Southeast
Europe finally turn the page on their past and start a new
chapter in their shared history. We've invested far too much in
this effort to let it slip now.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their
ideas and plans for accomplishing this important vision, and
now I'm happy to turn over to Senator Voinovich the opportunity
to make an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. I am really
very happy to be given this opportunity to come back and visit
the Foreign Relations Committee and appreciate your making it
possible for me to sit with you in what I consider to be a very
important hearing on the unfinished business in Southeast
Europe.
I'd also like to thank the chairman of the committee,
Ranking Member Lugar, and Senator DeMint, for allowing me the
courtesy of participating at today's hearing.
This is going to be my last year in the Senate, and many of
you know that I've been working on Southeast European issues
since my arrival to the Senate and, quite frankly, before that
as, not officially, but as Governor of the State of Ohio, and I
am truly heartened that Senator Shaheen, as chairman of the
European Subcommittee, has provided some wonderful leadership
in this area and is as familiar with it as I have been, and I'm
grateful to be able to publicly to thank her for the time that
we spent together there which involved, I think, six countries
and 26 meetings; it was very, very worthwhile.
During the time that we were there, we talked about
constitutional reform and expedited map status for Bosnia, the
need to maintain KFOR troop levels in Kosovo given the
impending International Court of Justice decision on Kosovo
independence, and the need for an expeditious and amicable
resolution of the Macedonia--the FYROM (Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia)--name issue so that we can quickly
integrate that country into the European atlantic institutions.
During all our meetings, what was made clear is the
security, stability, and economic well-being of the region. It
was very interesting. I met yesterday with businessmen that
have been in it for about 15 years and talked about our visit
there, and they applauded the fact that we continue to work to
make sure that the right infrastructure is there. They're as
much concerned about some of this as we are because they've
worked so hard. They would not like to see black holes that
just don't seem to be going anywhere and would not be part of
our vision to get everyone into NATO and into the European
Union.
We have some distinguished witnesses here today. I welcome
Ambassador Vershbow here and Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon.
We had a chance to meet when we were in Brussels, and the two
other witnesses that we're going to have, Ivan Vejvoda was at
Brussels and Kurt Volker was with us 2 years ago, and so we're
appreciative of your being here today.
I'd like to underscore the positive comments that the
chairman made in regard to what's happened in the region. It's
almost miraculous. One of the great days of my life was to be
involved in a panel with the two presidents, Josipovic from
Croatia and Tadic from Serbia, and the man that's in charge of
European Enlargement, but the thing that really made an
impression on me was here were the President of Serbia, the
President of Croatia sitting on the same platform together,
both talking about how they were going to try to work to make
sure that things work out in Bosnia, both talking about how
they're going to try to work together to improve the
environment in the region and that was supported from the
meetings that we had with others throughout the region.
It was very interesting. Everyone was interested in their
particular country, but everyone understood that there was this
symbiotic relationship among the countries that were there and
that the more they were able to cooperate with each other the
better off all of them were going to be which is something that
I've dreamed for for a long period of time.
So, Madam Chairman, thank you very much for giving me this
chance to sit here; I'm anxious to hear from our witnesses.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich,
and let me just recognize some of the ambassadors who are in
the audience. Maybe you could just indicate who you are when I
announce you so that I know you're in the audience. I just am
not sure where you are.
We have the Croatian Ambassador right in front. Thank you.
The Macedonian Ambassador. The Serbian Ambassador. Bosnian
Ambassador. Montenegrin Ambassador. Thank you all very much for
joining us this afternoon. Oh, I'm sorry. Kosovo Ambassador.
We'll have to improve on our briefings from now on.
As Senator Voinovich has indicated, on our first panel we
have the Honorable Philip Gordon, who is the Assistant
Secretary of State at the Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs, and the Honorable Alexander Vershbow, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
These officials are responsible for coordinating U.S.
policies in the Balkans Region. Both have spent their long and
distinguished careers working extensively on European affairs.
Thank you both for coming. We're pleased to have you in
front of this subcommittee and we look forward to your insights
and ideas on this important region.
Ambassador, Assistant Secretary Gordon, would you like to
begin?
STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP GORDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EUROPE AND EUASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Gordon. Sure. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Shaheen.
It's a pleasure to be here, and I want to thank you for
inviting me to discuss our policy toward the Western Balkans,
what the committee has rightly defined as unfinished business.
This is a region that we consider to be crucial for
Europe's future. It is a region that has been the focus of
continued intensive engagement by the Obama administration. I
look forward to updating you on our efforts.
I also want to acknowledge the presence here of Senator
Voinovich who, as already noted, with whom I had an excellent
meeting in Brussels a couple of weeks ago on the very subject
that we are discussing today.
Senator, I think everybody in this room knows that your
leadership on United States policy toward the Balkans has been
instrumental in the past couple of decades in moving this
region toward peace and democracy. We're all grateful to you
for that.
I welcome the opportunity to work with Chairwoman Shaheen,
Senator DeMint, and other members of the committee to build on
the legacy that you have left.
The recent trip that Senator Voinovich and Senator Shaheen
took to the region highlighted, as they summarized in their
opening statements, both the progress the region has made as
well as the challenges that remain, and I look forward to
discussing both of those today.
United States objectives in the Western Balkans are bound
up with the historic work of building a prosperous, democratic,
unified, and secure Europe. This is a goal that has been
pursued with determination and vision by generations of
Europeans and Americans--Americans from both sides of the
political spectrum.
The last two decades have witnessed extraordinary success
as the nations of Central and Eastern Europe have joined the
European Project, but this project is not yet complete. It must
extend to all countries across the Continent and that includes
the Western Balkans. We believe the path to completing this
project for the Balkans is through integration into Europe's
political and economic institutions.
The progress we have seen during the last 10 years is
testament to the power of sustained outside engagement,
internal political reform, and the process of EuroAtlantic
integration.
When I served in government in the late 1990s, alongside
Assistant Secretary Vershbow in the Clinton administration, war
in Bosnia was still a fresh memory, and Kosovo was consumed by
violence and so-called ethnic cleansing. Today, following a
decade of hard work, we have witnessed dramatic political and
social transitions in both places.
With Montenegro's peaceful separation from Serbia in 2006
and Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008, the final
chapter in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia was closed. Now
the nations of the Balkans are on the path toward integration
into Europe's community of political and economic freedom.
Nearly every country in the Balkans has taken steps toward EU
membership.
Croatia has moved forward in its EU accession negotiations.
Macedonia is a candidate and Serbia and Albania have submitted
membership applications. Countries of the region are also well
on their way to integration within NATO. Croatia and Albania
became members of NATO in 2009. Macedonia is on NATO's doorstep
and will receive an invitation to join as soon as the dispute
over its name is resolved.
At the end of last year, Montenegro embarked on a
membership action, plan and Bosnia will do so when it completes
the necessary reforms. Though the progress we have seen is
encouraging, there remains substantial distance to travel, and
I would like to just mention three important challenges to
completing the integration of the Western Balkans into the
EuroAtlantic community: The political situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Kosovo's stabilization, and the ongoing dispute
between Greece and Macedonia over the latter's name.
We are determined to move Bosnia along the path of
political reform. We will work alongside the EU to continue the
dialogue on reform, to protect the integrity of the Dayton
Agreement in Bosnia and state institutions, and to promote a
productive atmosphere leading up to the October 2010 national
elections in Bosnia.
This is the message that Deputy Secretary of State Jim
Steinberg, alongside Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, took
to Sarajevo just last week. Bosnia's political leaders have, so
far, not demonstrated the political will necessary to advance
reforms. However, we know that Bosnia's citizens, especially
its young people, want to be part of Europe and to take
advantage of all the opportunities that come with that,
including travel, education, and commerce. It is to them that
Bosnia's leaders are ultimately answerable.
Kosovo has come far in its 2 years of independence but has
much work to do. Sixty-six countries across the world have now
recognized that it is a sovereign and independent state.
Kosovo's independence is irreversible. The important task of
decentralizing government must continue. The protection of Serb
religious and cultural sites remains an important priority that
will have an impact on the success of decentralization and
interethnic relations throughout Kosovo.
Kosovo's Government must also move aggressively to improve
the rule of law in the country by passing and implementing
critical legislation that will strengthen Kosovo's
institutions, modernize its judicial process, and update its
legal codes and in line with democratic standards. On the
economic front, the Government must implement the reforms
necessary for the private sector to grow.
Serbia also has an important role to play on issues that
will have practical benefits for the people of Kosovo. Dialogue
and cooperation to address practical day to day issues, such as
electricity supply, customs, and courts, are in everyone's
interests and will improve the lives of all people in Kosovo,
including Kosovo's Serbs.
Supporting Macedonia's integration into NATO and the EU
remains a vital element in our efforts to promote peace and
stability in the Balkan region. To bring this about, the
ongoing name dispute with Greece must be resolved as soon as
possible.
We are encouraged by bilateral contacts at the highest
levels in recent months to build confidence and to make
progress on this issue. In the interests of both countries and,
indeed, in the stability of the entire region, leaders in both
Macedonia and Greece must now take bold and decisive action to
resolve this issue once and for all.
Despite the challenges that remain, the Obama
administration remains confident that, with close coordination
with our European partners and the willingness of regional
leaders to make the right choices, the Western Balkans can
complete their path towards EuroAtlantic integration.
Credible prospects of membership in the EU and NATO remain
the most powerful incentive for continued reforms. To ensure
the positive effect of these incentives continues, we must not
compromise on the high standards we expect of prospective EU
and NATO members.
Ultimately, of course, the burden of achieving EuroAtlantic
integration and through it security and prosperity lies with
the leadership and the people of the Western Balkans. If the
countries of the Western Balkans are willing to make the hard
choices necessary, the United States, the Obama administration
will stand with them.
Madam Chairwoman, Senator Voinovich, thank you for this
opportunity, and I look forward to responding to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, DC
Chairwoman Shaheen, Ranking Member DeMint, members of the
committee, thank you very much for inviting me here today to discuss
U.S. policy toward the Western Balkans. This is a region that is
crucial to Europe's future. For that reason, it has been the focus of
continued and intensive engagement by the Obama administration and I
look forward to updating you on our efforts.
Today, I would like to do four things. First, I would like to
explain why the integration of the Western Balkans into the Euro-
Atlantic community is a high priority for the United States. Second, I
will outline the progress we have seen in recent years in the region.
Third, I will describe challenges that remain in the region--in
particular, the absence of political compromise in Bosnia, the
stabilization of Kosovo, and the dispute between Greece and Macedonia
over the latter's name. Finally, I would like to describe policies that
the administration will pursue, in close coordination with our European
partners--and in consultation with Congress--to achieve our long-term
objective of successfully integrating the region into the Euro-Atlantic
community.
the western balkans and euro-atlantic integration
Our objectives in the Western Balkans are bound up with the
historic work of building a democratic, prosperous, unified, and secure
Europe. This is a goal that has been pursued with determination and
vision by generations of Europeans and Americans. The last two decades
have witnessed extraordinary success as the newly free nations of
Central and Eastern Europe have joined the European project. But it is
a project that is not yet complete. It must extend to all countries
across the continent, and that includes the Western Balkans. We have a
vision of a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous region and we believe
the path to achieving this vision for the Balkans is through
integration into Europe's political and economic institutions.
Perhaps the best way to understand the logic of this approach is to
briefly consider the troubled history of this part of Europe. Consider
what Southeastern Europe looked like at both the beginning and end of
the 20th century. The Balkan wars preceding World War I and those of
the 1990s saw the region racked by ethnic rivalry, hypernationalism,
and bloody wars. These conflicts demonstrate the stakes of politics in
the region--for the citizens who live there and for outside powers that
were inevitably drawn in. Though the experience of the 1990s differs in
many ways from that of pre-World War I Europe, I think it is fair to
say that the fundamental problem that lay behind this history of
conflict was the mismatch between geopolitical and ethnic boundaries
and the absence of adequate political mechanisms to deal with this
mismatch. What this difficult history teaches us is that attempts to
resolve this contradiction through force are doomed to foster only
further conflict and violence.
Other parts of Europe have faced these same challenges, and the
experience of Western Europe after World War II and Eastern Europe
after the cold war demonstrates that there is another and a better way:
the path of political and economic integration. The twin pillars of
this process are NATO and the European Union. Progress for the
continent has come from transnational cooperation and institutions that
guarantee the rights of citizens, promote economic freedom, ensure the
inviolability of borders, and provide a reliable forum for the peaceful
resolution of disputes. Moreover, the opportunity for political
engagement that crosses national borders reduces the salience and
pressure of ethnic and regional disputes within nations. That is the
promise of the project of European integration: the peaceful resolution
of disputes through a common political enterprise and shared wealth and
opportunity through a common market.
The lesson of the 1990s is that significant portions of
Southeastern Europe did not share in this experience and we saw the
tragic human consequences. The United States and European countries and
institutions have an essential role to play in engaging with the region
in a strategic and sustained manner. But the responsibility ultimately
lies with the countries of the region themselves who must do the hard
political work of reform and reconciliation.
progress to date
The progress we have seen during the last 10 years is testament to
the power of sustained outside engagement, internal political reform,
and the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. When I was last in
government, in the late 1990s during the Clinton administration, war in
Bosnia was still a fresh memory and Kosovo was consumed by violence and
ethnic ``cleansing.'' A decade of hard work has brought us much closer
to realizing our goal of including the Western Balkans in a peaceful
and democratic Europe. All of the countries of the region have
undergone dramatic political and social transitions in recent years.
With Montenegro's peaceful separation from Serbia in 2006 and Kosovo's
declaration of independence in 2008, the final chapter in the breakup
of the former Yugoslavia was closed. Now, nearly every country in the
region has taken concrete steps toward integration into Euro-Atlantic
structures.
Two years after independence, Kosovo's leadership has made
tremendous progress. The Government of Kosovo is building roads and
schools as well as ministries and agencies. Two thousand nine was a
year of growth and consolidation for Kosovo's institutions, marked by
the birth of the Constitutional Court and the success of the first
democratic elections managed by Kosovo's Central Elections Commission.
Kosovo Serb turnout in the newly established Serb-majority
municipalities was significant, and four new ethnic Serb mayors were
elected. Kosovo and Macedonia also reached a historic agreement
demarcating their shared border and opened full diplomatic relations.
Kosovo and Montenegro have also established full diplomatic relations.
The EU is a crucial partner to the United States in our efforts to
keep Kosovo on the path of reform and progress. We were pleased to see
the European Commission's October 2009 strategy paper, which set forth
practical measures that underscore Kosovo's European perspective and
will help to ensure Kosovo moves forward along with other countries in
the Western Balkans. We appreciated EU High Representative Ashton's
recent visit to Kosovo to reinforce the message that it, too, has a
future in the EU, along with its neighbors in the region, and that the
EU is working with Kosovo toward visa liberalization and an interim
trade agreement. The United States is proud to contribute personnel to
the European Rule of Law mission, EULEX, deployed in December 2008,
which is now building capacity in Kosovo's police, customs, and
judicial institutions. Because of advances in establishing peace and
stability, NATO's Kosovo force has begun a phased process to drawdown
its forces.
This year, Bosnia and Herzegovina will mark 15 years since the
genocide at Srebrenica and the subsequent signing of the Dayton Peace
Accords. Bosnia has made significant progress addressing the problems
and challenges that are the legacy of the war. Today, Bosnia has a
single military, is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace, and has
taken the first major step on the road to EU membership by signing a
Stabilization and Association agreement with the EU.
Serbia has elected a pro-European, democratic government, which is
moving to institute rule-of-law and market reforms and pursuing
improved relations with its neighbors--with the important exception of
Kosovo. The Serbian National Assembly passed a resolution on March 31
condemning the crimes committed at Srebrenica and calling for the
capture of war crimes fugitive Ratko Mladic. In addition, we were
pleased to see Serbia take three significant steps toward EU
integration in 2009. In addition to the EU decision to extend visa-free
travel in the Schengen zone to Serbian citizens--as well as Macedonians
and Montenegrins--Serbia's Interim Trade Agreement with the EU was
unfrozen, and Belgrade submitted its EU membership application; these
actions all represent positive signs of Serbia's progress on its
European path. We understand the EU will review Serbia's Stabilization
and Association Agreement later this year, perhaps as early as this
summer.
We also support Albania's full integration into the Euro-Atlantic
fold. While we believe the Albanian Government should do more to combat
corruption, and we hope to see an end to the country's parliamentary
stalemate, Albania has played a constructive role in the region and
beyond, by engaging ethnic Albanians in the region, bringing about
reconciliation of Albanian and Serbian communities, by renewing high-
level political exchanges with the Government of Serbia after a 5-year
hiatus, and by supporting Serbia's and Kosovo's Euro-Atlantic
integration. Albania has also just submitted its answers to the
European Commission's membership questionnaire.
Croatia is far along in its EU accession negotiations and we are
paying close attention to efforts to resolve the Slovenia-Croatia
border dispute. The United States supports Croatia's European Union
candidacy. We hope and expect Croatia can complete negotiations this
year. If an accession treaty is ratified quickly, Croatia might enter
the EU in early 2012. Of course, this timeline is based upon Croatia's
maintaining its pace of reform, including continuing its cooperation
with the ICTY and following through on recent commitments to ratchet up
the fight against corruption.
The countries of the region have also taken steps toward
integration into NATO. Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance in 2009.
Macedonia will receive an invitation to join NATO as soon as the
dispute with Greece over its name is resolved. Montenegro was invited
to enter the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the December 2009 NATO
Ministerial and will start its first MAP cycle this fall. We would like
to see Bosnia's candidacy for NATO membership move forward. As
Ministers noted in December, Bosnia will join MAP once it achieves the
necessary progress in its reform efforts. Holding countries to their
reform commitments is of fundamental importance to the integrity of the
membership process. In the interim, we and our NATO allies will support
and assist Bosnia's Government to make the necessary changes.
The door to NATO remains open for Serbia. We were pleased when
Serbia appointed an ambassador and military representative to NATO last
year and we look forward to the implementation of an information
security agreement that will enable the opening of Serbia's mission to
NATO in 2010. We also hope Serbia will take a more active role in the
Partnership for Peace Program, which it joined in 2006, to complement
our very robust bilateral military-to-military contacts. Serbia joined
the South East Defense Ministerial in 2009, which should lead to
increased regional engagement. We've also encouraged Serbia to seek
opportunities to participate in international peacekeeping efforts.
Finally, let me note that almost all countries in the region are
contributing forces to help advance stability in other regions of the
world, including to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan. For those countries still aspiring to join NATO, their
ISAF involvement is a tangible expression of their willingness to take
up the burden of international security.
remaining challenges
Though the progress we have seen is encouraging and demonstrates
how far the Western Balkans have come, there still remains substantial
distance to travel before the region is fully integrated into the
fabric of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Addressing the last
remaining obstacles to full Euro-Atlantic integration is the
responsibility of leaders in the Western Balkans and it is also the
object of coordinated U.S. and European engagement in the region. I
will focus my remarks on three principal issues which are of the
greatest concern to the United States and whose resolution can make the
greatest difference to the region's prospects for joining the Euro-
Atlantic community: the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo's stabilization, and the ongoing dispute between Greece and
Macedonia over the latter's name.
Bosnia
For the better part of the last 4 years, Bosnia's political leaders
have not demonstrated the political will necessary to advance reforms.
They have been stuck in a vicious cycle where narrow ethnic and short-
term personal political interests have trumped shared, long-term
objectives that would benefit all of Bosnia's communities. During his
May 2009 speech to the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vice
President Biden emphasized the need for Bosnian authorities to work
together across ethnic and party lines so that Bosnia could function as
a single, sovereign state. Last October we and the EU started intensive
consultations with the political party leaders in Bosnia--the so called
Butmir process, named for the military base where the talks began. The
goal of this initiative was to reach consensus among the parties to
improve the functionality of the state so as to position Bosnia for EU
candidacy and the NATO membership process, and resolve the so-called 5-
plus-2 objectives and conditions established by the Peace
Implementation Council for closing the Office of the High
Representative. It was not an attempt to radically change Dayton,
create a centralized state, or alter Bosnia's two-entity structure. But
the initiative would resolve basic inconsistencies between the Dayton
constitutional framework and the European Convention on Human Rights,
give the Bosnian state the clear lead on matters related to EU
accession, and improve efficiency and effectiveness of decisionmaking--
all of which are needed for Bosnia to move closer to NATO and the EU.
The parties regrettably have not found a way to move the process
forward, and we are now entering an election season, making prospects
for compromise and agreement all the more challenging. Nevertheless, we
are making clear to Bosnian party leaders that the election is not an
excuse to do nothing and that they have an obligation to work in the
best interests of their citizens. This is the message Deputy Secretary
Jim Steinberg, along with Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos,
took to Sarajevo last week. We are determined, along with the EU, to
continue the dialogue on reform, protect the integrity of the Dayton
Agreement and Bosnian state institutions, and promote a productive
atmosphere leading up to the October 2010 national elections in Bosnia
and beyond. Ultimately, however, the burden of achieving Bosnia's
aspirations rests on Bosnia's political leaders and their willingness
to compromise. If they choose not to do so, they will have to explain
to their voters why Bosnia's neighbors are moving ahead, while Bosnia
is left behind. Bosnia's citizens, especially its young people, want to
be part of Europe and to take advantage of all the opportunities that
come with that, including travel, education, and commerce, and it is to
them that Bosnia's leaders are answerable.
Kosovo
Sixty-five countries across the world have recognized Kosovo as a
sovereign and independent state--Kosovo's independence is irreversible.
Kosovo has come far in its first 2 years of independence, but has much
work to do. We are working closely with Kosovo's Government to address
a range of remaining challenges. The important task of decentralizing
government must continue. To succeed, the government must step up its
outreach to Kosovo's Serb community, including in northern Kosovo, to
outline the benefits of decentralization, which will bring governance
closer to the people. The government must also ensure that
municipalities have all the support they need to succeed in exercising
their new functions and providing services to citizens. The protection
of Serb religious and cultural sites remains an important priority that
will have an impact on the success of decentralization and interethnic
relations throughout Kosovo. Getting decentralization right will help
lay the groundwork for a prosperous, democratic future for all of
Kosovo's citizens.
Strengthening rule of law is a critical priority for Kosovo; in
fact it is the key to success in other areas. The Kosovo Government has
begun to build the legal framework and judicial institutions for a
stable, successful justice system. But the government must move
aggressively now to tackle remaining deficits by passing and
implementing critical legislation that will strengthen Kosovo's
institutions, modernize its judicial process, and update its legal
codes in line with democratic standards. The government must take
energetic steps to root out corruption and fight organized crime, in
close cooperation with the EULEX Rule of Law mission. With these
reforms in place, Kosovo can continue its steady progress toward
fulfilling its promise as Europe's newest country.
On the economic front, the government must implement the reforms
necessary for the private sector to grow. Here Kosovo is particularly
challenged by a legacy of socialism and strife, with high unemployment,
low investment rates, and a relatively small economic base on which to
build. We are working closely with the Kosovo Government, the EU, and
other international partners to help implement the reforms that will
spur private-sector led investment and growth. Clear and transparent
privatizations remain integral to building trust with citizens and
international partners alike, and developing an attractive investment
climate. Equally important, until revenues increase, the Government of
Kosovo must implement a sustainable budget. We are also supporting
comprehensive energy sector reform, another key component to ensuring
stable growth and one that cannot afford further delay.
Serbia has an important role to play on issues that will have
practical benefits for the people of Kosovo. We urge Belgrade to find
ways to cooperate on concrete humanitarian issues in Kosovo that would
help the ethnic Serb communities there to improve their quality of
life. Our vision for the Western Balkans relies on Serbia and her
neighbors maintaining good relations, including supporting the
participation of all countries in the Western Balkans in regional fora
so they can address issues of mutual concern. The United States
welcomes the recent joint initiative of Serbian President Tadic and
Croatian President Josipovic for strengthening bilateral cooperation
between the two countries. We hope that Serbia will continue to improve
its efforts to ensure stability throughout the Balkans, including in
Kosovo. Dialogue and cooperation to address practical, day-to-day
issues such as electricity supply, customs, and courts are in
everyone's interest and will improve the lives of all people in Kosovo,
including Kosovo Serbs.
The United States remains committed to Kosovo's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Kosovo's independence is a force for stability
in the region, as all the countries in the Western Balkans are now free
to focus on promoting good relations and advancing on their respective
tracks to full Euro-Atlantic integration.
Macedonia
Supporting Macedonia's integration into NATO and the EU remains a
vital element in our efforts to promote peace and stability in the
Balkan region. Macedonia has met nearly all of the technical reform
benchmarks set by the EU, and the European Commission has recommended
setting a start date for accession negotiations. We also commend
Macedonia and Kosovo on completing the demarcation of their mutual
border in October of last year and on establishing formal diplomatic
relations. This is a major step for regional stability. Macedonia is an
active participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace and Membership
Action Plan. It is also one of the highest per capita troop
contributors to ISAF. Macedonia's troop commitments are a reflection of
the substantial progress the country has made in recent years in
meeting NATO's standards in the defense sector.
To maintain this positive momentum, there are further steps we
encourage Macedonia to take. We encourage the Macedonian Government to
prioritize improving interethnic relations by continuing to implement
both the letter and spirit of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. In
addition, Macedonia must continue to focus on reforms, particularly in
the area of rule of law.
Most crucially, the ongoing name dispute with Greece must be
resolved as soon as possible. The United States strongly supports the
ongoing U.N. negotiation efforts, led by Matthew Nimetz. We will
embrace any mutually acceptable solution that emerges from the
negotiations, but there must be a solution and soon. Active,
constructive engagement between Athens and Skopje is vital to any
positive outcome. We are encouraged by bilateral contacts at the
highest levels in recent months to build confidence and to make
progress on this issue. The dispute continues to impede Macedonia's
integration into NATO and the EU and is therefore a potential threat to
the stability of the whole region. In the interests of both countries
and indeed of the entire region, leaders in both Macedonia and Greece
must now take bold and decisive action to resolve this issue once and
for all.
the way forward
Despite the challenges that remain, this administration remains
confident that, with close coordination with our European partners and
the willingness of regional leaders to make the right choices, the
Western Balkans can complete their path toward Euro-Atlantic
integration. Nowhere else has U.S.-EU cooperation been more important
or more promising than in Southeast Europe, where we have worked
together successfully for over a decade to move the Balkans beyond the
bloody and divisive mindset that tore apart the region in the 1990s.
And indeed, while Balkan policy once divided the United States and
Europe, today we are united in our determination to see this process
through to a successful conclusion.
This administration has also reinvigorated our engagement in the
Balkans. Vice President Biden's May 2009 visit to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo underscored our commitment to help the
countries of the region realize their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. And,
as I mentioned earlier, Deputy Secretary Steinberg just completed the
most recent of his many trips to the area. Together with our European
partners, we are seeking to facilitate the resolution of those disputes
that are holding back integration and reform. And we are backing this
commitment with considerable resources: Our assistance effort in the
Balkans has amounted to over $5 billion since 1995, helping these
countries to meet the needs of their people, develop their economies,
and build their institutions so that they can become full partners of
the United States and members of the Euro-Atlantic community.
More than ever before, credible prospects of membership in the EU
and NATO remain the most powerful incentive for continued reforms. The
``Open Door'' must be tangible, and the prospect of EU and NATO
membership real, to continue driving necessary reforms. At the same
time, to ensure the positive effect of these incentives continues, we
must not compromise on the high standards we expect of prospective EU
and NATO members. This is why we have been closely monitoring and
encouraging efforts to resolve the border dispute between Croatia and
Slovenia and the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece, so that
other current and future candidates with unresolved bilateral disputes
do not become discouraged.
The EU's decision last year to grant visa-free travel throughout
the entire Schengen area to Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia was an
important signal of the tangible benefits of progress toward
integration. While Bosnia was unable to meet the EU requirements at
that time, it has since made tremendous progress in addressing the
outstanding technical requirements. We hope it will earn the right to
visa-free travel sometime this year. Further, we welcome the EU's
commitment to provide Kosovo with technical advice to help the
government complete reforms that will qualify it for EU visa
liberalization.
Ultimately, of course, the burden of achieving Euro-Atlantic
integration, and through it security and prosperity, lies with the
leadership and the people of the Western Balkans. One of the most
promising developments of the last decade is the increasing realization
among countries in the region that their prospects rise and fall
together. This understanding has spurred the steps toward regional
cooperation and ethnic reconciliation that we have seen, though there
is still more to do. If the countries of the Western Balkans are
willing to make the hard choices necessary for reform and joining the
Euro-Atlantic community, the United States will stand with them.
Madam Chairwoman, Senator DeMint, members of the committee, I am
grateful for the opportunity to speak before you today, and I welcome
the opportunity to respond to your questions.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Vershbow.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Vershbow. Thank you, Chairwoman Shaheen. Thank you and
other members of the subcommittee for inviting me here for this
timely discussion on the Western Balkans.
Before I begin, I'd also like to take a brief moment to
thank Senator Voinovich for his steadfast commitment to the
Balkan region. Your dedication to resolving these issues over
many years has been of great benefit to U.S. policy in this
critical but sometimes overlooked part of the world.
I have a longer statement that I'd like to submit for the
record, so I'll keep my opening remarks brief, especially since
I think that at least all those who've spoken are pretty much
on the same page.
As our two Senators here have observed during their recent
visit, the region has made remarkable, indeed breathtaking
progress, but it also still faces a number of challenges.
As has been mentioned this year marks the 15th anniversary
of the genocidal acts of Srebrenitza, a reminder of the
violence and the brutal ethnic cleansing that followed the
breakup of the former Yugoslavia. This was a searing experience
for me for a large part of my career with the Department of
State. As a Deputy Permanent Representative of NATO in 1991, as
NSC Senior Director in the mid-1990s, and as Ambassador to NATO
from 1998 to 2001, I worked closely with our NATO allies and
with Members of the Congress to end the wars in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo and to help the Balkans follow the rest
of Central and Eastern Europe along the path of EuroAtlantic
integration, and it is heartening that since that time, we have
seen some very dramatic transformations.
The majority of Balkan States have transitioned from being
security consumers to security providers, contributing to NATO
operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In a region where 11
years ago NATO was carrying out an air campaign, three
countries are now alliance members, one is firmly on its
doorstep, and all the others are on the path to the
EuroAtlantic community.
But as everyone has stressed, there are some big challenges
that remain to be met. Kosovo has seen political and economic
gains since independence but work still remains to be done to
integrate all of Kosovo's communities, and we face an important
transition as NATO forces gradually draw down.
In Bosnia, interethnic tensions and dysfunctional
institutions impede progress toward EuroAtlantic integration.
Building stronger, more transparent and effective institutions,
strengthening the rule of law, and deepening defense reform
remain critical needs for these two countries and for the
entire region.
Let me offer a few brief comments on our defense
relationships in the wider region, starting with Slovenia,
Croatia, and Albania, who are now NATO members, as well as
Macedonia, which is, as we've said, firmly on its doorstep but
hopefully will cross into the room soon. I have more detailed
remarks in my written statement.
First, Slovenia. Slovenia, a NATO member since 2004, is an
able partner in Afghanistan and a very welcomed participant in
KFOR and other regional EU and OSCE missions. Its institution-
building assistance to neighbors and its work with Croatia to
resolve a longstanding bilateral dispute are especially
noteworthy.
Croatia also is a valued NATO ally and it contributes 300
troops to ISAF and it has played an important role in the
training and mentoring of the Afghan National Police. We hope
Croatia will continue to play a constructive leadership role in
the Balkans and we encourage Croatian leaders to maintain
positive momentum on domestic reforms.
NATO warmly welcomed Albania into the alliance last year.
Albania has actively contributed to ISAF and to peacekeeping
operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo and earlier supported
coalition operations in Iraq.
Challenges in the security sector remain, however,
including destroying excess munitions and modernizing their
military in line with NATO standards, and we'll continue to
focus our bilateral defense cooperation on supporting this
process.
As Phil Gordon has just said, Macedonia's NATO invitation
remains unfinished business. At the Strasbourg-Kehl summit,
allies reaffirmed their commitment to extend an invitation to
Macedonia as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name
issue is reached and we certainly believe that the time to end
the name dispute is now and we continue to encourage renewed
efforts under the auspices of the U.N. mediator to resolve the
issue.
But from a Defense point of view, Macedonia has
successfully implemented critical defense reforms and has
consistently punched above its weight in contributions to
international security operations, including Afghanistan.
Now let me offer a couple of comments on the two aspiring
NATO members, Montenegro and Bosnia.
Montenegro was accepted into the Membership Action Plan
last December and last month deployed its first unit to support
ISAF in Afghanistan. We applaud Montenegro's steps to implement
needed reforms and we are encouraging continued efforts to
address crime and corruption as Montenegro seeks EU membership.
Bosnia is actively seeking to enter into a NATO Membership
Action Plan, as well, and we firmly support that country's
EuroAtlantic aspirations. Bosnia has made some successful
contributions to international efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
and the integration of Bosnia's Armed Forces was a significant
step forward, but as my colleague has stressed, more needs to
be done.
In recent years defense reform has faltered and intensified
political wrangling among Bosnia's three ethnic groups has
stalled development of a functional government. The
government's inability to agree on the number of critical
issues still raises some questions about its ability to
implement the rigorous requirements of a membership action
plan. So with ethnic agendas still dominating the political
process, we're concerned that Bosnia's future remains
precarious.
My department will continue to engage closely with our
Bosnian partners on defense reform and modernization. High-
level bilateral defense consultations in Sarajevo recently
addressed Bosnia's security assistance priorities and United
States funding for those efforts. We'll continue to support and
train Bosnian Armed Forces, assist the state level defense
institutions, and strengthen Bosnian capacity for ammunition
destruction. As we do, the support of Bosnia's neighbors and
partners will be vital.
Of course, the most important neighbor in this regard is
Serbia which has the opportunity to play a constructive role in
Bosnia and elsewhere. A stable democratic and economically
prosperous Serbia is critical to the integration of the Balkans
into the European community and there's clear interest within
Serbia in moving in that direction.
Serbian Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac has sought to
strengthen our bilateral defense relationship and to increase
his country's participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace.
The bilateral relationship especially between our militaries
has greatly improved, but this encouraging vision could be
hindered by Belgrade's continued focus on one particular part
of its past, Kosovo.
As has been mentioned, during the Vice President's visit
last spring, we agreed to disagree on Kosovo's independence, so
we could focus instead on other areas of our bilateral and
multilateral relationship.
However, Serbian leaders have continued to pursue an active
campaign against Kosovo's independence and these activities
threaten to reverse the trend toward regional stability and
they could potentially limit Serbia's EU ambitions.
So as we see it, Serbia's standing today at crossroads.
Will it move toward a European future or remain mired in
obsession with the past? We hope that our friends in Belgrade
will make the right choice.
We continue to closely monitor developments inside Kosovo.
The security situation has improved since independence. The
recent elections were a positive step. However, the environment
in Northern Kosovo remains tense and we continue to monitor the
situation closely in advance of an advisory opinion by the ICJ.
The mission of the NATO-led Kosovo force KFOR will continue
to adapt as the political and security conditions evolve. In
June of 2009, amidst increasing stability in Kosovo, NATO
Defense Ministers decided progressively to adjust KFOR's force
posture to what's called a deterrent presence as conditions on
the ground permit. This approach will allow a coordinated
sensible adjustment in force levels and help to avoid
uncoordinated unilateral withdrawals by individual nations.
Secretary Gates regularly reminds allies of the importance
of adhering to the in-together/out-together approach when it
comes to Kosovo.
Since June 2008, NATO has also undertaken the task of
supporting the Kosovo Security Force, the KSF, as it develops
into a professional democratic and multiethnic force. The KSF
reached initial operational capability last September. Through
NATO, the United States has played an active role in helping to
prepare the KSF for its core missions of explosive ordnance
disposal, control and clearance of hazardous materials, search
and rescue, and firefighting, and my department, in partnership
with other agencies, is also maintaining a robust humanitarian
assistance program and working to help promote the rule of law
and border security in Kosovo.
So I look forward, as well, to answering your questions and
I want to just end with an assurance that the Obama
administration is firmly committed to stability and progress in
the Western Balkans. Thankfully, we're not working alone. This
effort is possible only with regional leadership and the active
cooperation of European partners and international
organizations and, of course, it benefits from the continued
interest and support from the Congress.
The continued expansion of this zone of security and
prosperity is critical to the consolidation of peace in the
Balkans and to our enduring vision of a Europe cold-free and at
peace.
I would agree that we have, indeed, invested a lot over the
past decade and a half and we certainly should not quit now.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vershbow follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of
Defense, Washington, DC
introduction
Chairwoman Shaheen, Senator DeMint, Senators, and Congressmen,
thank you for inviting me here for this timely discussion on the
Western Balkans. As Senators Voinovich and Shaheen observed during
their recent visit, the region has made remarkable progress, but still
faces a number of daunting challenges.
This year marks the 15th anniversary of the genocidal acts at
Srebrenica--a reminder of the violence and brutal ethnic cleansing that
followed the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. As a Deputy PermRep at
NATO in 1991, as an NSC Senior Director in the mid-90s, and as
Ambassador to NATO from 1998 to 2001, I worked closely with our NATO
allies and the Congress to end the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Kosovo, and to help the Balkans follow the rest of Central and
Eastern Europe along the path of Euro-Atlantic integration.
The Western Balkans region has transformed dramatically over the
last two decades, from a region in conflict to a region of independent,
democratic nations that resolve disputes peacefully and work together
to address regional and global challenges. Most nations have
transitioned from security consumers to security providers,
contributing to NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In a region
where 11 years ago NATO was carrying out an air campaign, three
countries--Albania, Croatia, and Slovenia--are now alliance members,
one--Macedonia--is firmly on its doorstep, and all others are on the
path to Euro-Atlantic integration.
However, a number of challenges remain. The global recession has
limited the resources available for accomplishing our shared
objectives, and exacerbated social pressures within the region. In
Bosnia, interethnic tensions and poorly functioning government
institutions continue to threaten progress toward Euro-Atlantic
integration. In Kosovo, independence has brought political and economic
gains, but work remains to integrate all of Kosovo's communities, and
we face an important transition as KFOR gradually draws down. Building
stronger, more transparent and effective institutions; strengthening
rule of law and deepening defense reform remain critical needs for
these two countries and for the region.
The key to resolving these challenges lies ultimately with the
countries themselves--they must provide responsible and committed
political leadership, and their citizens should demand such leadership.
The United States remains firmly committed to supporting these efforts,
building on the progress in the region, and tackling remaining
challenges in concert with our European partners.
The possibility of NATO and EU membership has proven to be a
powerful incentive for reform and remains the cornerstone of U.S.
policy in the region. Allow me to review the progress each of the
countries in the Western Balkans has made on that path and briefly
address our engagement with each of the nations.
kosovo
I turn first to Kosovo, the one nation in the region where NATO
remains engaged operationally. There are currently just under 10,000
troops from 31 countries (24 NATO and 7 non-NATO) deployed with the
NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). U.S. troops make up approximately 10
percent of the force. KFOR's mission is to maintain a safe and secure
environment and to ensure freedom of movement for all citizens,
irrespective of their ethnic origin.
Following Kosovo's declaration of independence on February 17,
2008, NATO reaffirmed that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, and this was welcomed by the
government. KFOR continues to work with Kosovo authorities throughout
the country and cooperate with and assist the EU, the U.N., and other
international actors to support the development of stable, democratic,
and multiethnic institutions. In June 2008, NATO agreed to take on a
new task to support the development of a professional, multiethnic
Kosovo Security Force (KSF).
The United States contributes to the improvement of security in
Kosovo by, in addition to other engagement, strengthening the rule of
law, working to increase border security, assisting in
professionalization of the KSF, and conducting humanitarian assistance
operations. The KSF reached Initial Operational Capability in September
2009, and through NATO, we continue to assist in preparing the KSF for
its core missions: explosive ordinance disposal; control and clearance
of hazardous materials; search and rescue; and firefighting. The
Department of Defense and other interagency partners also maintain a
robust humanitarian assistance program and play a role in promoting the
rule of law and border security.
We are encouraged that the security situation in Kosovo has
continued to improve since independence, but while the security
situation is generally calm, we need to remain vigilant for potential
flashpoints. The November 2009 elections were successfully run by
Kosovo institutions and included significant participation from Kosovo
Serbs in the south. However, the environment in northern Kosovo remains
tense. We continue to monitor the situation closely in advance of an
advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice.
KFOR has reshaped and adapted to the changing security environment
in Kosovo while still retaining an adequate level of capability to
accomplish its tasks. In June 2009, in view of the stabilizing
environment in the country, NATO decided to gradually adjust KFOR's
force posture to what is called a ``deterrent presence.'' This approach
will allow a coordinated, sensible adjustment in force levels and help
to avoid uncoordinated, unilateral withdrawals by individual nations.
Secretary Gates regularly reminds allies of the importance of adhering
to an ``in together--out together'' approach in Kosovo.
In the transition to Deterrent Presence, NATO will gradually reduce
the number of forces on the ground through progressive ``gates,'' as
security and political conditions allow. We are presently at Gate 1
with a troop strength of approximately 10,000. The next steps along
this path will be to draw force levels down to approximately 5,000
troops at Gate 2 and then to 2,500 troops at Gate 3. At lower levels,
the remaining forces will be supported by increased intelligence
capability and marked by greater operational flexibility.
It's important to emphasize that each stage in this transition will
only be implemented if supported by conditions on the ground, at the
recommendation of the KFOR Commander to SACEUR and upon approval by the
North Atlantic Council. The decision will be based on a thorough and
deliberate assessment of all the factors that contribute to a safe and
secure environment, including the capacity of the Kosovo Government,
supported by EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), to assume
security functions.
I turn now to Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania, the three nations of
Southeastern Europe that are now members of NATO, as well as Macedonia,
which remains firmly on its doorstep.
slovenia
Slovenia, a NATO member since 2004, is a regional success story and
plays an important leadership role within the Western Balkans. The
country's key foreign and defense policy priorities are the
development, integration, and security of the region. Slovenia provides
training to its neighbors in critical government functions and
organization, as well as economic assistance through connections and
expertise in regional business and trade. Slovenia has ardently
advocated for neighboring countries' membership in NATO and the EU,
including those with which they may have disagreement, as a means of
bringing further stability and reform to the region. Notably, this
includes working constructively with Croatia on resolving a bilateral
dispute, so that Croatia can progress in its EU accession negotiations.
These initiatives and others serve to solidify its example as a
consistent partner.
Despite its small size, Slovenia participates in regional EU and
OSCE missions, KFOR and other peacekeeping missions, and is an able
partner for Afghanistan. In part, these engagements are possible due to
Slovenia's transformation over the last decade to a more capable and
modern military force, which is lauded as extremely professional and
effective.
croatia
Croatia has long been a valued NATO partner, and we are pleased to
now call it a NATO ally. Our bilateral defense relationship is strong,
and Croatia's nearly 300 troops in Afghanistan are helping to fill
critical requirements, particularly in training the Afghan Security
Forces. Croatia also contributes to regional stability through its
participation in KFOR. The Croatian Armed Forces have undertaken
significant restructuring and reforms but work remains on
modernization, deployability, and interoperability. Croatia's continued
political and economic progress is reflected in its positive outreach
in the region--a trend we encourage and welcome. Even though Croatia
still has reforms to complete, it serves as a constructive regional
leader and mentor. The current government, for which EU accession is
top priority, should be commended for its anticorruption efforts,
contributions to NATO operations, and tangible progress on resolving
the border dispute with Slovenia. The willingness of Slovenian and
Croatian leaders to make tough and politically risky decisions for the
longer term interests of their countries and the region is remarkable,
and serves as a model for others to follow. We urge both sides to
retain the momentum to deal with the remainder of their unfinished
business.
albania
In 2009, NATO warmly welcomed Albania into the Alliance. Albania
has actively contributed to ISAF since 2003, committing over 300
troops. It has also actively supplied troops to peacekeeping operations
in Iraq and Bosnia. Challenges in the security sector remain, such as
the destruction of excess stockpiles of munitions and weapons, and the
further development of a modern, light, and mobile military.
Fortunately, the history of NATO enlargement has shown that once
countries join the Alliance, they continue the reform process rather
than resting on previous achievements and, the United States will focus
its bilateral defense cooperation on supporting this process.
macedonia
At the 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl summit, allies reiterated that
Macedonia will be invited to join NATO as soon as a mutually acceptable
solution to the name issue has been reached. Macedonia has successfully
implemented key defense reforms as a result of its NATO aspirations,
and has consistently punched above its weight in contributions to
international security operations, including Afghanistan where it is
among the top five per capita contributors. Our bilateral defense
relations and cooperation with Macedonia remain excellent, as evidenced
by the recent joint deployment of the Macedonian Armed Forces and
Vermont National Guard to Afghanistan.
We view Macedonia's NATO invitation as unfinished business--their
membership is important for regional security and stability. We are
aware that the dispute over Macedonia's name is a difficult issue, and
we continue to encourage renewed efforts under the auspices of the
United Nations mediator to resolve this issue.
Across Southeastern Europe, governments face pressures that have
implications for continued reform, defense transformation, and
international deployments. While emphasizing the need for national
responsibility and strong leadership, we must continue to engage and
maintain our support for a critical region that we can always count on
to answer our call. We must continue to evolve our current relationship
by working toward increased collaboration to ensure that the Balkans
continue their progress forward toward the Euro-Atlantic community.
montenegro
The United States continues to strongly support Montenegro's and
Bosnia and Herzegovina's aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration.
We can point to notable successes in Montenegro. We have a strong
partnership with the second-newest country in the world and our defense
ties are particularly robust. Montenegro joined NATO's Membership
Action Plan (MAP) in December 2009 and is focused on implementing the
reforms necessary to meet NATO standards. In March, Montenegro sent its
first unit to support ISAF. Montenegro has recognized Kosovo's
independence and is a contributor to regional security. Montenegro
applied to join the EU in December 2008 and expects to get candidate
status later this year. Fighting organized crime and corruption remain
key challenges for Montenegro as it progresses on its Euro-Atlantic
integration path. Fortunately, Montenegro has suffered less from the
world's economic downturn than most and the government has reaffirmed
its commitment to meeting the challenge of overhauling its institutions
to meet NATO and EU membership standards.
bosnia and herzegovina
The U.S. firmly supports Bosnia's NATO membership aspirations;
however, its political leadership has done little to break through
nationalistic barriers in order to advance its candidacy.
Bosnia's passage of the 2005 defense legislation, which ended
conscription, dissolved entity-level armies, and created a State-level
Ministry of Defense, was a significant success. Bosnia has also made
important contributions to international security with a number of
successful rotations in Iraq and its current contributions to
Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, despite commendable efforts by the Bosnian Ministry
of Defense, progress on defense reform has faltered as it has fallen
victim to the broader political stalemate. The wrangling among the
three main ethnic groups has intensified ahead of the October elections
and has stalled the process of building a more functional government
capable of implementing needed reforms. This is vividly illustrated by
the Bosnian Presidency's inability to adopt a critically needed
decision to destroy its increasingly dangerous and unstable munitions
and light weapons stockpiles. Besides the obvious threats of theft or
self-ignition, the presence of the excess materials burdens the Armed
Forces, which dedicate a significant portion of the infantry to guard
duty, and impedes efforts to reform or modernize the Armed Forces.
There are indications that a solution to this issue may finally be at
hand, which is welcome. But the fact that it took over 2 years to
resolve this issue is illustrative of the fundamental structural and
political issues that need to be addressed for the country to
successfully carry out the reforms that will be necessary to carry out
the rigorous requirements that will be necessary as part of a
Membership Action Plan.
The administration remains concerned that narrow ethnic and
personal agendas still trump common objectives in Bosnia, stilting the
country's development and ability to keep pace with the rest of the
region. But we are pleased that we continue to receive excellent
cooperation on practical and technical defense and military issues that
are not subject to political infighting. We are committed to continuing
to work closely with Bosnia to ensure that progress on the defense
reform and modernization agenda can continue, wherever possible.
Earlier this year, we held bilateral defense consultations in Sarajevo
in order to ensure that security assistance priorities were being
addressed and that U.S. funding was targeting those priorities. We will
continue to provide support and training to Bosnian Armed Forces,
execute assistance programs for state-level defense institutions,
assist with building capacity for ammunition destruction, and support
the strengthening of defense institutions.
serbia
A stable, democratic, and economically prosperous Serbia is
integral to the integration of the Balkans to the European community.
Serbia has made great progress since the elimination of the Milosevic
regime. Radical nationalist political parties have been marginalized
and the majority of Serbians, particularly the young, have rejected
isolation and yearn to integrate into the European community. The
current government, under the leadership of President Boris Tadic, has
dedicated itself to performing the various reforms necessary to achieve
EU membership, and Serbia has made significant progress on this path.
In an effort to close a chapter of its history, Belgrade is committed
to actively pursuing Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic, the remaining two
fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia for war crimes. Additionally, bilateral United
States-Serbian relations, particularly between our militaries, continue
to grow.
However, this encouraging vision could be hindered by Belgrade's
continued focus on one particular part of its past: Kosovo. During Vice
President Biden's May 2009 visit, we ``agreed to disagree'' on Kosovo's
independence, so we could focus instead on other areas of our bilateral
and multilateral relationship. However, Serbian leadership has
continued to pursue an active campaign against Kosovo's independence.
These activities threaten to reverse the trend toward regional
stability and could potentially limit Serbia's EU ambitions. Serbia is
at a crossroads--will it move toward the European future it says it
desires, or be mired in an obsession with the past. Currently Belgrade
is attempting to do both, a position we believe to be unsustainable.
conclusion
The United States is committed to ensuring continued stability in
the Western Balkans. This effort is only possible with the leadership
of nations in the region and cooperation with our European partners and
international organizations. EU and NATO membership serve as a powerful
incentive for continued reforms, the peaceful resolution of disputes
and regional cooperation. The continued spread of this zone of security
and prosperity is critical to the consolidation of peace in the Balkans
and a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. We've been joined by
Ranking Member DeMint, and I will turn to him for an opening
statement.
Senator DeMint. I'd like to yield to my colleague, Senator
Voinovich, while I continue to go through my notes and align
them with what we just heard.
Senator Shaheen. While you look for--go through your
information, let me begin with Dr. Gordon.
You mentioned the young people of Bosnia in your remarks
and while we were in Sarajevo, Senator Voinovich and I had the
opportunity to have lunch with a group of university students,
all very bright, but what distressed me was that in the course
of that conversation, it was very clear that they were very
pessimistic about their economic future in Bosnia and about the
potential for things to change in the country and when I asked
them if they didn't think about getting involved in the
political process and maybe helping to make some changes in the
country to address some of their concerns, they were almost
unanimous in saying that that was not something that they were
interested in doing. They seemed to feel almost powerless about
their ability to change things.
So how do we help these students? How do we address that
powerlessness that we heard from those young people about the
ability to effect the future of their country?
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Senator, for sharing those
observations with us which alas are somewhat consistent with
our own in the sense that I think you're right about an abiding
or even growing pessimism which stems from, I think, the fact--
I think it's fair to say that in the 10 years after the Dayton
Agreement, as difficult as progress was, there was a sense of
moving forward in Bosnia-Herzogovina.
It was a country ripped apart by a vicious civil war that,
with our help and the help of the people there we managed to
put back on the path towards stability and that path was being
pursued with the bumps in the road but nonetheless for a good
10 years.
I think around 2006 that progress both stalled or perhaps
even turned into in some ways regression. It is a sad reality
that in many ways some of the political leaders in Bosnia have
tended to put party interests or ethnic interests or personal
interests or entity interests above the national interests and
no doubt it is that sense that is reflected in the pessimism
that you heard among young people and that is why we have
stepped up our engagement.
I think, you know, both Alex Vershbow and I noted our
involvement in these issues previously and I think for many in
the Obama administration coming back to this, we were
disappointed to see that stalling after all of the progress
that had been made and so we have stepped up our engagement. In
Bosnia, in particular, I know I referred to Deputy Secretary
Steinberg's trip last week. That was his fourth trip to Bosnia
in this first year of the administration to try to instill--and
he spent a lot of his time there engaging not just in the
political leaders but with some of the very young people and
public opinion, if you will, that you refer to because we need
to communicate to them the message that there is a more hopeful
future and it's the hopeful future that is being a part of
EuroAtlantic institutions and that is what we're trying to tell
them.
We are with you. We're still with you and we want to help
you get there and we are trying to communicate that message to
the political leaders and to the extent that they won't listen,
we're taking that message directly to the people and maybe the
next generation will be willing and able to reach some of the
agreements that will put Bosnia on this path to Europe that
some of the current leaders have been unwilling to do.
Senator Shaheen. And how much do you think the structure of
the Government in Bosnia that came as a result of the Dayton
Agreement is responsible for some of the stalemate there?
Mr. Gordon. I don't think anyone would deny, Senator, that
the Dayton Agreement and the constitutional structures of
Bosnia-Herzogovinia are complicated. That's, you know, probably
not what you would design if you were starting from scratch and
imagining a constitution and an arrangement.
But all constitutions are complicated. What matters is
whether there's a will of the people to get over their
differences and see that the future lies in making those
institutions work. The United States had to overcome some
difficulties in putting together its political system, as have
many other countries.
So no doubt there are challenges inherent in the makeup of
that country, but I think one of the lessons of the European
Union experience is that political and economic integration can
get you beyond such difficulties where borders and ethnicities
matter less and everybody is part of a broader union of
diversity and that's the path that we think Bosnia is on and
needs to be on.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Ambassador Vershbow, you talked
about defense reforms having stalled in Bosnia.
Are there specific reforms that need to be in place in
order for NATO to look more favorably on the MAP process?
Mr. Vershbow. Yes. Yes, indeed. I mean, I think there's
some specific tasks that we've been waiting for several years
for them to undertake which is to dispose of the large
quantities of surplus munitions and weapons that are in storage
and are tying up a huge amount of personnel and resources in
the process of guarding them and then there's a longstanding
dispute over defense properties, the status of which is still
in dispute among the different entities. So those are sort of
two of the tests that we've been setting for them for several
years which we're still waiting for them to take action on.
I think in terms of the broader efforts of the Minister of
Defense, we are often pointing out that the fact that we have a
single military is actually one of the bright spots in Bosnia's
evolution over the past 15 years and the fact that they are
able to produce some small but important deployments in support
of international operations is a sign of the potential that
this country has to play.
But until these longstanding issues can be resolved, I
think we still have our doubts that the military, despite its
formal unified status, is really a functioning entity and, of
course, its emblematic of the wider problems that Phil Gordon
has mentioned with regard to the institutions of the Bosnia
state at large.
Senator Shaheen. And how much is the pending election, do
you think, responsible for some of those efforts being stalled?
Mr. Vershbow. Well, I think that as the fall elections draw
near, it becomes less easy for important decisions of this kind
to be taken. That's true in any country.
But we're hopeful that the continuing discussions with NATO
on how to meet the requirements for the Membership Action Plan
will inspire them to take these decisions over the coming
months, at least it would be an important contribution to
meeting the tests that NATO Ministers set for the Bosnians when
they last considered the MAP issue in December.
We certainly would like to see Bosnia in the Membership
Action Program, but further reforms are needed, I think, to
convince us that this is appropriate.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. My time is up.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. All right. I would like to continue to
pursue the Bosnian situation.
The interesting thing that Senator Shaheen and I picked up
as we traveled through Southeast Europe was the consensus from
most of the people that we talked with that the Butmir process
was not as fruitful and that they really felt that between now
and the election that some of the changes that we'd like to see
made are not going to occur and that if we push and push and
push, that that issue could become involved in the election
campaign and there's a possibility that after the election
things would be more difficult to take care of than if we kind
of backed off and looked at some other options.
Two things that they mentioned. One was the fact that many
of the countries had received visa waiver from the European
Union and felt that it would be very helpful if that were
offered by the European Union to Bosnia. Understanding that
there were some significant things that still needed to be done
in terms of NATO, that the prospect of a MAP, it was felt,
would be very, very worthwhile prior to the election. Some
mentioned that Montenegro has now--it's been offered MAP and
that in spite of the fact that probably if you took a poll in
the Republic of Serbska today, they would not want to be
involved in NATO.
We were impressed that the President of the Republic of
Serbska and we understand the Prime Minister Dodik both have
indicated that they would like to see Bosnia-Herzogovinia be
part of NATO.
So the question is what's the wisest policy between now and
then to create an environment that, once the election is over,
that we can move on with some of the other things that need to
be done in order to get them qualified for NATO and for
membership in the European Union?
Mr. Gordon. I'd be happy to begin with the series of issues
that you raised and I'll start with Butmir, what you refer to
as the Butmir process which, of course, is the process of a
discussion of potential constitutional reform that Deputy
Secretary Steinberg, along with Carl Bildt, then in the
rotating EU presidency, undertook over the past 9 months or so.
It's related in fact to the answer I gave to Senator
Shaheen about the obstacles within the Bosnia political
structure and, you know, just to be clear, when I said that the
structures in Bosnia are not necessarily the impediment to
Bosnia's path to EuroAtlantic integration, it's really whether
the people are willing to get along. That's not to say that
those political structures couldn't be improved and, indeed,
that was at the heart of the process of Butmir, to consult with
the parties and see if ways couldn't be found to make Bosnia,
the Bosnian Government structures more efficient and functional
because the reality is they are often dysfunctional because of
the difficulty in reaching a common agreement and that's what
that process was designed to try to achieve, again in
consultation with the parties.
Are there ways that these structures could be modified so
that Bosnia would be a more effective functional government
that could be considered for EU membership because the reality
is the European Union is not going to take in a country that
can't reach coherent decisions and so we worked with the
parties to try to put those ideas on the table and you're
right, Senator, they have not been accepted but they're still
out there.
I mean, ultimately, this is a process for the Bosnian
leaders. We can't do it for them. We can't impose a new
constitution or changes on them. We can simply work with them
to try to find ways to make that a more efficient government.
I think it's probably fair to say that these changes will
not be pursued before the elections, but I'm hopeful that
afterward the parties will come back to this agenda because
ultimately, if they do want to get moving down this path to EU
integration and NATO integration, they're likely to have to
make some changes in their structures so that they can be more
efficient and functional.
As for the Bosnia MAP issue that you raise, it is rightly a
question of finding the best approach to make it an incentive
to do the right thing. I want to recall that--I want to
underscore, first of all, that we agree with you that MAP can
be an incentive for Bosnians and we want to give them hope and
put them on the path to NATO and I want to recall that all
allies agree with that because that was the decision last
December at the Ministerial in Brussels, that allies decided
that Bosnia-Herzogovinia will join MAP and then once necessary
progress has been made on reforms. So I think all allies are on
record as having agreed that they want to see Bosnia in MAP.
The question of necessary reforms being made refers to what
I just alluded to which is the capacity of Bosnia to act as a
coherent responsible player in an international organization.
Senator Voinovich. One of the things that came up, we had a
very good meeting with the Defense Minister who we were quite
impressed with, and I think it's really significant that
they've come together as a country in terms of defense and that
they're participating. That's terrific.
And we talked about the issue of armaments and the
destruction of it and we raised the issue of how fast could it
get done and we tried to figure out who was in charge and who's
going to--and there was some talk about, well, I think maybe in
the Republic of Serbska, they've talked about maybe selling it
and making some money on it and so forth.
But why not come up with maybe some realistic challenge for
them between now and the election and say, look, this is a big
deal. If you want to get this done, you can get it done and
there's plenty of folks out there that are willing to help you.
Now let's, you know, get on with it and if you're able to do
that, then that's an indication that maybe we should--this
would be offered to you in the very near future and preferably
before the election.
Mr. Gordon. We would like to see just that and I would even
add, you know, why wait for the election? This is something
that they could do sooner, if they wanted to do it.
Senator Voinovich. Well, that's what I'm saying. Is it that
you say to them you can get--you can move very quickly on this
and you can have one person that would ascertain it. It would
be the person because they didn't give me the name, didn't give
us the name of the one person. They said, oh, we're all working
together. I said that's not the way you do it. You set up a
plan and you have metrics and you see whether or not it's
getting done or not and if you get it done, then that's a good
sign that you're being responsible and would be an indication
that perhaps MAP should be reconsidered.
Mr. Gordon. Sandy will no doubt want to comment on this, as
well, but I think that's exactly right, and when NATO said to
them progress on political reforms, one of the categories that
we have made clear that we're referring to is we want to see
progress on this issue of excess munitions and defense
property.
Mr. Vershbow. If I could add, I agree with what Phil has
said. We have, I think, been taking the approach that you
recommend, Senator Voinovich.
The Ministers said in December that they will be in MAP if
they make progress on reforms and I think we're not setting a
very high bar for them to jump over, and I think there's
different ways that they could meet the test that the NATO
Ministers set.
But we do think that reform does need to precede entry into
the MAP because the MAP itself is a very rigorous process that
involves even more far-reaching reforms of not only the defense
establishment but political and economic reforms.
So I think for us to be confident that they'll be able to
make good use of MAP, we want to see at least some progress,
but there's numerous decision points coming up. There's a NATO
Foreign Ministers Meeting just next week and perhaps the
pressure of a deadline will focus people's minds and we'll see
some progress before then.
There's also a Defense Ministers Meeting of NATO in June.
So there's several milestones ahead well before the elections
and we would be delighted if we could see the kind of progress
that would enable them to enter the MAP this year.
So I think that we're trying to achieve the same end, but
having set a certain standard back in December, we don't want
to give them MAP for free.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I'll just
submit an opening statement for the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator DeMint follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim DeMint, U.S. Senator From South Carolina
Madame Chairwoman, distinguished witnesses, I thank the committee
for holding this hearing.
Over the past two decades, the Western Balkans have gone through
significant changes. The fighting has ended and the democracies that
now fill the region are seeking to strengthen ties with the
transatlantic community, to improve the rule of law, and to increase
stability and regional cooperation.European Union and NATO membership
opportunities have provided an extra incentive for Western Balkan
governments to implement reforms and resolve bilateral disputes.
Today, Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania are all valued NATO members.
Montenegro joined NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) in December 2009.
Other aspiring nations would also benefit from the structure and
incentive of a MAP, to clarify the conditions and define the
requirements necessary for NATO membership. Slovenia is already a
member of the European Union, and numerous other countries are moving
quickly toward that goal. In December 2009, the European Union
announced visa liberalization for Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia;
other countries are now working to achieve that benefit as well.
However, despite significant improvements and greater integration,
numerous challenges and obstacles remain, hindering full regional
stability and integration.
One issue of concern is the bilateral name dispute between
Macedonia and Greece. Macedonia is on the brink of joining the EU and
NATO, but it is unable to do so until the dispute over the country's
name has been resolved. I hope that both countries will recommit to
resolving the issue without further delay.
Kosovo's internal progress, the Serbia-Kosovo relationship, the
political situation in Bosnia, organized crime, and corruption remain
challenges for the entire region.
Despite these challenges, I believe that significant progress has
been made in the region. Western Balkan governments have had to
implement tough reforms, in many instances, to transition to free-
market and Western standards, and their commitment and willingness to
tackle these issues is commendable. I look forward to hearing your
testimonies and suggestions for ways the United States and our allies
can help strengthen regional stability and the integration process.
Senator DeMint. I thank you both for your service and for
being here today, and I would just like to ask a broader
question than relates to the specific countries we've been
discussing.
Going back to my meeting last year with some European
leaders, I realize that we face a dilemma as a member of NATO
and they're very clear that they expect the United States to
play a stronger and more aggressive leadership role privately
than they're willing to express publicly.
Publicly, particularly our traditional European NATO
allies, want us to appear with other NATO members, but
privately will urge us that unless the United States leads and
takes a more aggressive leadership role, particularly in the
Balkans, that NATO will not succeed long term.
That creates a dilemma for us in public policy, but it
sounds like we have to, particularly in the Balkans, take more
of a hand-holding and more of a pushing role, a little more of
an aggressive role than our allies publicly expressed that we
should, and I know in your diplomatic positions it's difficult
to carry that out, but I'd just like you to comment on that
because I felt a sense of urgency from the European countries
that America has got to be more forceful to work out a lot of
these things that we're talking about today.
I'll just start with you, Mr. Gordon, and then.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you. I think one of the things we've
learned in the past 15 years of engagement in the Balkans is it
has to be United States/European effort, a joint transatlantic
effort, either extreme, and we have at times experimented with
both, where it's just the United States trying to get things
done or we step back and expect the Europeans to take the lead.
I suppose there's a third alternative where we're both engaged
but at cross purposes. None of those things work, and I think
we have been trying very hard, indeed even succeeding, in
learning the lessons of that and working together.
I referred to the Steinberg-built effort on political
reform. We could have easily disagreed with the Europeans on
Bosnia and its future and let the parties play us off of each
other, but our first step was to unify on a transatlantic
approach and then deploy it together.
When Vice President Biden went to Bosnia, Serbia, and
Kosovo last spring, he didn't go alone, he went with Javier
Solana, who was then our representative for the European Union,
and they took a joint message to the parties, and I was myself,
when I saw Senator Voinovich in Brussels, it was following a
2\1/2\-hour meeting with the counterparts on Serbia and Kosovo
because we had decided that it only works when we're in it
together.
So I think it's somewhere between--you're right that U.S.
leadership is necessary, but we also acknowledge we need--you
know, this is their backyard. This is their neighborhood. We
need to be on the same page as the Europeans at the same time.
Senator DeMint. Yes, sir.
Mr. Vershbow.
Mr. Vershbow. Thank you, Senator. It's an interesting
observation which I agree with.
Going back to the early days of the Balkan crisis in the
early 1990s, Europeans initially said we can take care of this,
and clearly they had difficulty. They were struggling with the
issue, and I think they were greatly relieved when President
Clinton decided to assert leadership and work with the
Europeans and with the Russians, for that matter, to come up
with a more effective strategy that did succeed in ending the
war in Bosnia.
But I think it was not, as Phil suggested, a European
effort to ``cop out'' and turn this one over to the United
States. I think the Europeans accepted their responsibility and
played an important part in the success of the strategy leading
up to Dayton and in the implementation thereafter and the same
can be said of Kosovo. In both cases, European forces
constituted the majority of the peacekeeping mission right from
the very start.
I think that as we deal with the current challenges, this
kind of combined effort is really essential, and I think we are
seeing leadership on the part of the Europeans as we grapple
with these bits of unfinished business in Bosnia and in Kosovo.
I think that's a healthy model for solving other international
problems, as well.
Senator DeMint. It's obviously a delicate balance and you
appear to be trying to reach that, but it's an interesting
dilemma to be faced with as they actually want you to do more,
want us to do more than they're willing to admit back home and
even publicly, but I appreciate the philosophy of trying to
find that balance where we lead and bring them along with us in
a positive way.
So thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I want to just follow up a
little bit on that question because, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, one of the things that we heard when we were
in the region was concern about enlargement fatigue among EU
members.
Is that something that we should be concerned about or are
you all comfortable that there is a shared optimism among the
other EU members that there will be an opportunity for all of
the countries of the Western Balkans to hopefully eventually be
on the road to EU membership?
Mr. Gordon. I would say both. We should be concerned about
it. You can't deny that enlargement fatigue exists, not least
after the expansion in 2004 to 10 more countries. It is taking
Europeans some time to get used to a much larger European Union
and there has always been concerns about taking in new
countries who have to demonstrate their political stability,
some of whom have GDP per capita that is less than the European
norm. So there's fear about immigration or undercutting wage
rates and there's no doubt that Europeans have concerns and
questions about it continuing.
So that's one reason we should be concerned because
enlargement fatigue does exist, and the second reason is that
it would be a colossal setback for our own interests if
European enlargement stopped. There has not been a greater
program for democratization or prosperity spreading than the
enlargement of the European Union and so we have a profound
interest in seeing it continue through Central and Northern and
Eastern Europe and through the Western Balkans, as well.
We sometimes have to remind ourselves we're not members of
the European Union, but that doesn't mean we can't have this
view or express it and I think that enlightened European
leaders have the same one and are doing what they can.
I actually asked, I think, Senator Voinovich and I talked a
little bit about this in Brussels and we both saw Commissioner
Fuller, who's responsible for this, who was clear on behalf of
the European Union that enlargement will go on. They are
determined. They have criteria. They're tough criteria.
Countries have to meet them, but European leaders know that
it's in their interests to continue with this process and we'll
support them in those efforts.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Ambassador, did you have
anything you wanted to add to that?
Mr. Vershbow. Just that that's my impression, as well. I
think when it comes to the Western Balkans, Europeans clearly
have a strategic vision that this whole region should
ultimately find its place within the European Union. It is a
complex process, and it may take many, many years to unfold,
but I think the idea that there could be some gaps, some holes
in the fabric is not one that's shared by any of the Europeans
I've talked to.
So I think in that sense, we're very much in alignment.
There may be differences on other parts of the EU enlargement
agenda when you get beyond the Western Balkans, but I think
that there they share the same vision and I think they want to
use the incentive, the magnetic power of the European
integration, to help encourage these countries to take the
necessary decisions on reform, and that's why I think we're
working so well together with our European partners.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich, did you have other questions?
Senator Voinovich. Yes. I'd just like to follow up on the
European enlargement.
We've found that that was very, very important to the
future of the region, that, you know, the Croatians are going
to be coming in, the Serbs are anticipating--by the way, Ali
Wren, who was in charge of enlargement for the EU, I thought
did a marvelous job in Serbia. I think he was influential in
the people deciding to go to the future rather than to the
past, and Stephen Fuller said that, you know, we're going to
eliminate that from our vocabulary and I think that really sent
a nice message out there to everyone that was concerned. We're
going to shut it off.
I'd like to just get back to Kosovo for a minute. We know
that the Court's going to decide. We know that the CART
decision will be--we don't know what it's going to be, but some
say it's going to say that the independence of Kosovo is OK,
others think it's not, but I'm concerned that there should be
some significant dialogue going on between the Serbs and the
Kosovars to talk about what happens after that and what bothers
me a bit is that we've kind of let that alone because it was
like ``let's not get our stick in there because it could be a
hornet's nest,'' and so things are kind of quiet right now from
what I understand and now I think we're talking about, well,
we've got some new ideas and this is the way it's going to be
and so on and so forth.
And I would suggest that a lot of thought be given to just
ultimately what's going to be the status of Metroviza. That's
the biggie. I think that the mayors that we met in Kosovo that
are in Serbian enclaves seem to be relatively happy. Although
we will say that the Serbian church are very concerned about
their patrimonial sites and they're concerned about cutting
back on NATO troops or KFOR troops there prior to that decision
by the Court.
The Kosovars are interested in making sure that when the
Patriarch is to be installed in Petch that that doesn't turn
into some political thing and so I'm just saying that anything
that we can do to be constructive to start talking about some
of these things I think would be very, very helpful to all of
the parties involved.
We don't need another March 17 like we had back in 2004
where all hell broke loose. So I would just urge you to do as
much as you can to see if you can't get some dialogue going on
between them in terms of that.
And last but not least, we applaud your effort in terms of
the FYROM Macedonia, and I think it's really important that we
take advantage of an opportunity that we have because the Prime
Minister Papandreou has indicated to me personally his desire
to work something out. We met with Geriefski, and he seems to
be very interested in it, but it should be made very clear that
if this thing isn't worked out in the next 6 months, Macedonia
could become a black hole. In other words, a play area of
instability. It wouldn't be good for the region. It wouldn't be
good for Macedonia.
They have a large minority population in Macedonia that
they're working together right now, but I'll never forget the
situation with Sertigora, Montenegro, and because of the fact
that Kostonitza seemed to be more interested in the past than
in the future and working things out, Montenegro now is a
separate country, and I think that all of the people that are
involved have to look at the big picture here about what's the
future of the region.
For the Greeks, it's important that they have a stable
Macedonia and really work it out. The more I think you can
emphasize how important it is for people to get at that and get
at it now the better off I think we're all going to be.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Either of you want to respond at all to
that?
Mr. Gordon. Very briefly on those two important points. On
the first, Senator, you're right. We don't know what the ICJ
decision will be and there's no point in speculating about it.
Our view on the substance is clear, that we and 65-66 other
countries recognize Kosovo's sovereignty and territory
integrity and don't have any intention whatever to revisit that
question. We think that piece of it is settled.
We also, though, as you suggest, need to get on with
encouraging talks between Kosovo and Serbia. We agreed with
Serbia, as Vice President Biden told them, we have a
different--they have a different view and we accept that and we
don't expect them in the near future to be recognizing Kosovo,
but especially if we get this Court decision out of the way, it
will be time to focus on practical issues and get on with
practical solutions on things like courts and customs and
electricity and get on with--get beyond these debates about
status, take the notion of partition off the table and get on
with the business of helping real people live their lives on a
daily basis, and the two countries need to talk to get that
done.
You referred to elections, municipal elections. We have
already seen that in the south of Kosovo. It is possible to
hold elections in Serb-majority municipalities and those
elections can go well and Serb mayors with whom you met can be
elected, and that's what we would like to see throughout the
country and that really is the model for moving forward.
On Greece-Macedonia, I couldn't agree more that now is the
time. Waiting could put the stability of that country and the
region at risk. It has been far too long. Both countries, as
you note, have leaders who are ready to act, and we have been
very much engaged in urging them to do so and we thank you for
your efforts along the same lines.
Mr. Vershbow. If I could just add that I agree with what my
colleague has said. In terms of the security inside Kosovo, we
recognize that when the ICJ decision comes, whenever that may
be, there could be some political ripple effects on the ground;
but we do believe that, even at the reduced levels that KFOR
now maintains, we have the capacity to detect and deter and
respond to any incident that may occur, and I think that as we
consider potential further reductions in accordance with the
step-by-step plan that NATO has adopted, we'll be very
attentive to the conditions on the ground, be sure that any
further reductions can--are compatible with potential future
developments.
But I would stress that KFOR now relies more heavily on
mobile forces that are able to move quickly and decisively to
respond to incidents, backing up the local police and the ELEX
police forces. So KFOR has already become kind of a third
responder but it does have the ability to respond quickly.
That also applies to KFOR's approach to the monasteries and
churches, the patrimonial sites. The process of turning them
over to Kosovar responsibility is going to be a very deliberate
one, based on a case by case assessment of the conditions on
the ground and only after a clear recommendation by NATO
Supreme Allied Commander Admiral Stavritis.
We did have one successful transfer just this past March,
the Gazimistand Monument. It went smoothly. The Kosovo Police
are there as the first line of defense, but KFOR is standing in
the background if there should be any difficulties that require
its intervention.
So I think that on the security side we've got it covered,
but I would agree that it is essential that a dialogue begin
between the Serbians and the Kosovar authorities. We're not
expecting them to change their stance on recognition of
Kosovo's independence but there are practical issues, including
security along the borders between Serbia and Kosovo, that can
only be addressed in a long-term fashion through a cooperative
approach rather than by taking steps that are aimed at
undermining Kosovo's authority and independence.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, both, very much. I have
many more questions, but we have another panel. We want to get
you all out of here, but as we're winding up this panel, let me
just tell you both how impressed I have been with the levels of
engagement of this administration in the Western Balkans in
finishing the work there. Whether it was the Vice President's
trip last year or the Butmir process that you all mentioned,
even though it did come up short, it has reinvigorated the
dialogue about the region between the United States, the EU,
and the region. So thank you both for your continuing efforts
in that part of the world and for being with us this afternoon.
Thank you, both, very much.
While they are leaving, let me recognize the second panel
who are with us this afternoon and ask them if they would come
to the front.
First on our second panel is Ambassador Kurt Volker. He's
the senior fellow and managing director of the Center on
Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies. Previously, he served for over two
decades in the Senior Foreign Service with extensive experience
dealing with European political and security issues under five
U.S. administrations. Most recently, he was Ambassador--U.S.
Ambassador to NATO. He is no stranger to this subcommittee.
We're delighted to have him back today.
And joining him on the panel is Ivan Vejvoda, the executive
director for the Balkan Trust for Democracy, a project of the
German Marshall Fund that is dedicated to strengthening
democratic institutions in Southeast Europe.
Mr. Vejvoda joins us all the way from Belgrade, Serbia. You
clearly win the award for farthest travel for this hearing, and
it's great to see you again. Senator Voinovich and I had the
opportunity to see you when we visited Belgrade, and we know
that you've had a distinguished career in the Serbian
Government as a senior advisor to a number of Serbian Prime
Ministers. You remain one of the most widely renowned experts
on the Balkans region.
As Senator Voinovich has already pointed out, you were
critical in convening that historic panel that Senator
Voinovich participated in with the Presidents of Serbia and
Croatia. Congratulations to you and to the German Marshall
Fund.
It's a pleasure to have you both here today, and Ambassador
Volker, I'll begin with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. KURT VOLKER, SENIOR FELLOW AND MANAGING
DIRECTOR, CENTER ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Volker. Thank you for having me here, Madam Chairwoman,
Senator DeMint, Senator Voinovich, for giving me the
opportunity to testify about the Balkans region.
I do have a written statement that I'd like to ask be
submitted for the record.
I suppose if I had to summarize my comments in a short
sentence, it's that we're at a stage where we need to turn up
the heat. We need to put our foot on the gas a little bit, and
I think I detected that in some of your questions. I share that
sentiment.
As you noted, I have an extensive diplomatic background
which, throughout the course of my career, kept intersecting
with the Balkans, whether it was taking part in the peace
negotiations for Bosnia back in 1993, the Vance-Owen process,
being at NATO during the Kosovo air campaign, working with
Secretary General Robertson and Javier Solano in unwinding
ethnic conflict in Macedonia at the time, and working on NATO
enlargements substantially. So I've had a lot of experience
working through the region.
I've also had experience in other areas, including, for
example, Afghanistan, and so taking those things together, let
me make a few observations, if I could, about where we are
today.
First, as you heard from the earlier panel, we've seen
substantial progress in the Balkans over 20 years, and I think
we have to remember that. I remember very well the days when
war was raging between Serbia and Croatia or in Bosnia among
three parties and there were a lot of fatalistic comments made
at the time that there are centuries of ethnic hatred here, we
can never sort this out, if we get in, we'll never get out,
and, you know, we don't--frankly, when it comes to these ethnic
conflicts, we don't have a dog in that fight.
I have to say with 18 years of hindsight, that was
completely wrong. We just got it wrong. While we may not have a
view about who should win among ethnic groups, we definitely
have a dog in the fight about there not being a fight and the
Balkans region has to be a stable, prosperous part of the
mainstream of Europe and we've invested heavily in that and
made a lot of success.
But then the second point I would make is we never finished
the job and I think, you know, if you think about Europe, the
history of Europe is one of overcoming history, whether it's
France and Germany or Hungary and Romania and Transylvania or
the South Tirol or any other number of areas, and it's hard
work, and it is very difficult for leaders or for publics to be
willing to give up on a nationalist dream, a territorial
ambition, the grievances of past wars in order to look at a
future, but that's exactly what happened in Western Europe and
what's happened with the European Union and what needs to
happen in the Balkans.
And, frankly, it's that vision of being part of a stable,
prosperous, democratic Europe that can motivate the kinds of
change that we need to see in the Balkans. So I agree with
those who say that conditions need to be met in order for
countries to join NATO or the EU, but we need to do a much
better job, as the European Union, as the United States, as
NATO, in holding out the light at the end of the tunnel and
saying this is where we all want you to go and we will do
everything we can to help you get there.
When you look at why we haven't finished the job or how we
haven't, I'd just say, as you heard from some of the other
panelists, where states did not make it so far to be in the
Membership Action Plan or a member of the EU or member of NATO,
we've seen regression. Where they have made it, we've seen
continued progress. I think that's something to remember.
Leaders with nationalist agendas feel more empowered when
the vision is weak. When the vision is strong, it empowers the
reformers. I think that we ratcheted down the U.S. and EU
engagement in the region too quickly, taking our foot off the
gas before we had really gotten to the destination, and now, as
you mentioned, Senator, in your question, I do think that the
sense of fatigue about enlargement is very real and I think
there are a number of dangerous aspects to that.
It comes from a lot of different things. You have members
of the EU who put a narrow national agenda ahead of the vital
agenda seeing the Balkan region integrated, for instance, on
recognition of Kosovo or not, on the name issue. You have
countries, like Germany, concerned about the Euro and what's
happened with the Euro crisis or concerned about Turkish
membership in the EU and this has led to a general sentiment
that maybe the EU shouldn't be enlarging very much for any time
to come.
In fact, despite the stated policies of the European Union
and NATO, the chatter is that none of this is going to happen
for a really long time to come. Once Croatia's in, we're not
going to see very much. If that's the message that people are
getting in the region, and I believe it is, that's a very
disturbing message to get.
So I would recommend, I won't detail all the difficulties,
but I would recommend a much more assertive action plan for the
United States, the European Union, and NATO. I have to say I
applaud the engagement of Deputy Secretary Steinberg and
Foreign Minister Moratinos and their recent travel and their
repetitive travel to the region. I'd like to see Baroness
Ashton take part in a followup trip. I'd like to see Secretary
General Rasmussen invited to take part or for him to send a
designate, and I'd like to see an operationalization of the
goal and if I could make a few specific suggestions.
First, I think we need to renew in rhetorical terms the
firm positive commitment to a vision of the Balkans region as
all members of NATO and the EU, if they choose to be.
Second, to do that, we have to engage both in those
institutions, so in our relationship with European Union, in
our relations with NATO, and also bilaterally with key
countries, and I believe, as examples, France, Germany,
countries that have not recognized Kosovo, for instance, such
as Spain, Greece, of course, because of the Macedonia issue. We
should be very active in that process.
Third, we should have a concrete action plan of how to use
the tools at our disposal, and I would say that both NATO and
the EU have a robust set of tools that we can use, we have used
successfully in the past, and we should be willing to use them
again now.
I remember the 1999 Washington summit where we created the
Membership Action Plan. In fact, Ambassador Vershbow was the
NATO Ambassador at the time. There were no criteria for
countries to be a member of the Membership Action Plan. It was
simply by self-designation that they wanted to be a candidate
and this was NATO's tool for helping them.
Now we've moved away from that simple proposition over the
years. It's probably too late to go back to that, but I do
think we owe it to Bosnia to give very specific criteria of
what they need to do and a timeline and then to help them get
there so that this becomes much more tangible. I think right
now it still seems very dim and that empowers the wrong kinds
of people and process.
I also think that the EU could be much more assertive, as
well, as I said, and I think we should encourage them to use
their toolbox.
Fourth, I think we need to maintain a robust international
presence in Bosnia, that is, a United States Deputy in the High
Representative's Office, a continued existence in the High
Representative's Office, a European force that doesn't drawdown
prematurely because, frankly, the situation is worse than it
was a year ago and it doesn't make sense to drawdown on the
investment now when it's headed in the wrong direction. We
actually need to use the powers and use the resources that we
have to proactively promote continued change.
Fifth, I would say the same about Kosovo. We can't drawdown
prematurely there exactly for the reasons Senator Voinovich
mentioned, Metroviza and integration of Serb communities. Our
presence gives confidence to that process and since the process
hasn't been completed, our presence remains essential.
Sixth, I do agree, also, we need to give renewed impetus to
the Macedonia name issue. I'm also encouraged by the statements
that Prime Minister Papandreou has made and I believe that
there is an opportunity. I think some confidence-building
measures, as my friend Zoran Jolevski and I, the Macedonian
Ambassador, have discussed this week, some confidence-building
measures for Macedonia's part could be help.
Ultimately, though, it's going to have to be a compromise.
There's no zero-sum 100-percent solution. It's a recognition
that the advancement of the region serves the interests of both
countries.
Seventh, it hasn't been mentioned today and I want to
mention it. We need to be forward-leaning with respect to
Montenegro. Montenegro has done some remarkable work as an
independent country in the past few years. It's important to
have a successful model for countries for the future and I
think that Montenegro can play that role and both for NATO.
Giving them the Membership Action Plan last December was a good
idea.
I'd like to see the EU engage more forcefully and to see us
help Montenegro be a good example for Serbia and for other
countries in the region.
Eighth, we do need a robust bilateral agenda with Serbia.
That's been discussed.
And ninth, I don't want to forget about Albania either.
Albania has done tremendous work as a member of NATO but still
suffers from a lack of political maturity, corruption,
transparency issues, and a weak economy, and this is where
again a light at the end of the tunnel from the EU, combined
with very firm demands about what Albania must do to reach that
light at the end of the tunnel, can try to motivate the
political parties in the process there in ways that haven't
been done recently.
Those, Madam Chairwoman and distinguished Senators, those
are my ideas for elements of a robust agenda. They're not all
new. Of course, the administration's doing a lot of these and I
believe that experts in the administration could flesh these
out even more and add to them, but I generally believe that the
attitude has to be one of turning on the gas.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Volker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kurt Volker, Senior Fellow and Managing Director,
Center on Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, DC
Thank you Madame Chairwoman, Senator DeMint, and all the
distinguished Senators here today for the opportunity to testify about
the Balkans region.
Like a whole class of U.S. diplomats, I first worked on and in the
Balkans region some 18 years ago, during the height of the Bosnian war.
I had served in the NATO office of the State Department, dealing with
the changes to European security as wars first broke out in the former
Yugoslavia. I was with Secretary of State Eagleburger in Geneva in
December 1992 when he gave a major push toward establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
I then served as an Assistant to the Clinton administration's first
U.S. Special Representative for Bosnian Peace Negotiations, Ambassador
Reginald Bartholomew, and in that capacity, had the experience of
taking part in the Vance-Owen negotiations, and sitting in bilateral
and multilateral meetings with Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic,
Franjo Tudjman, Alija Izetbegovic and many others involved in the war,
many of whom have later been placed on trial in the ICTY. I have a
vivid recollection of flying into Sarajevo when it was under siege, and
hearing mortar shells explode outside while we visited a hospital,
which itself had been targeted.
Immediately following, I served in Hungary and helped establish the
first U.S. military bases in a former Warsaw Pact country, in order to
facilitate the deployment of U.S. military forces from Germany to
Bosnia, beginning in December 1995.
I again worked on the Balkans when war in Kosovo broke out, working
for my colleague here, Assistant Secretary Vershbow, when he was U.S.
Ambassador to NATO, and then as Deputy Director of the Private Office
of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, as we strengthened the KFOR
peacekeeping mission. I then also worked with Lord Robertson, EU High
Representative Solana, and others, in the successful effort to unwind
the ethnic conflict that threatened to engulf Macedonia.
And finally, in working on every round of NATO enlargement since
the fall of the Berlin Wall, I have helped support the democratic
transition and Euro-Atlantic integration of the nations of the region.
In the State Department and as Ambassador to NATO, I have worked with
Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Albania--all as members of
NATO--in dealing with common challenges in the region as well as in
Afghanistan and elsewhere. I have worked closely with the EU, Turkey,
and Greece, and occasionally waded into the fraught ``name issue''
concerning Macedonia. I have traveled extensively in the region,
including well outside the capitals, and developed close contacts with
senior diplomats and officials in every country there.
With that background, and having dealt with other serious security
challenges facing our transatlantic community, such as Afghanistan, I
would like to make a few observations about the Western Balkans--and
U.S. and European policy--as I see it today.
First, I want to stress the degree of progress that has already
been made.
I remember well the days when war was raging between Serbia and
Croatia, or among the three sides in the Bosnia conflict, the war
crimes and ethnic cleansing. And I remember the fatalism present in
much of the commentary at the time: that the Balkans were an
intractable region with centuries of ethnic hatred, with no tradition
of democracy, that it would be impossible to get right, impossible to
get out once we get in, impossible to get involved without taking
sides, and frankly, ``we have no dog in that fight.''
We had just drafted a NATO Strategic Concept in 1991 where we spoke
of NATO's role in crisis management and preventing conflict in Europe.
Yet when war broke out, the United States and NATO engaged
diplomatically, but otherwise--tragically--stayed on the sidelines
until after the Srebrenica massacre.
Well, frankly, and with 18 years of hindsight, the fatalism present
in those early debates was entirely wrong. Though challenges of course
remain, we have seen enormous successes and progress throughout the
region. The Western Balkans region is now surrounded by stable,
successful democracies that are members of the EU and NATO--Greece,
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Italy.
And many within the Western Balkans have themselves become
extraordinary success stories. Slovenia and Croatia are vibrant
democracies, increasingly prosperous, and members of NATO. Slovenia is
also a member of the EU, and has even served a term in the rotating EU
Presidency, and Croatia is well on the way to EU membership. Albania
has been successful as a member of NATO and despite its continuing
political and economic difficulties remains far ahead of where it stood
at the end of the cold war. Montenegro is making rapid strides on all
fronts.
And one thing is now crystal clear, even if was not clear back in
1992: We may not ``have a dog in the fight'' when it comes to favoring
one ethnic group over another, but we clearly have a very strong U.S.
interest in there not being a fight to begin with. Instability and
violence in the Balkans affects us all; and the success of the Balkans
region is a benefit to us all. We have invested heavily there over the
years, and for good reason, and with good effect. This is a region that
can make it.
And this brings up my second point: The progress we have seen in
the Balkans is directly attributable to robust U.S. and European
policies, including a strong emphasis on NATO and EU enlargement.
Where Europe has been successful, it has found ways to overcome the
divisions of history. Whether it is France and Germany, Protestant and
Catholic in Northern Ireland, the Tirol, Transylvania, or Germany and
Central Europe, the key to success in European political, economic, and
security development has been integration, benefiting Europe's citizens
today, overtaking divisions based in history and emotion that spiral
downward.
Overcoming history is no easy task. It takes strong incentives, and
powerful disincentives, for nations and leaders to let go of
irredentism, the memories of territories lost, the grievances of past
warfare, and to instead invest in the future. Here, the real and near
term prospect of membership in NATO and the EU--and the political and
economic benefits that come with that--have provided that kind of
incentive structure for all the states of Central and Eastern Europe,
including Slovenia, Croatia, and others in the Balkans. It strengthens
the hand of reformers in convincing publics that short-term pain, and
giving up on nationalist agendas, will deliver greater benefits in the
near term, and that the contrast, wallowing in these agendas, will
separate a nation from a growing, integrated European family.
I agree with those who stress that countries must meet the
conditions of membership. No doubt about it. But we can be passive or
active. A passive stance gives little incentive to reform, and empowers
those with narrow agendas. But an activist stance, where we stress our
willingness to admit new members and we work with candidate countries
on specific reforms and criteria empowers those who are prepared to
implement the fastest and farthest reaching reforms.
My third point, therefore, is to state the obvious: We never finished
the job. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that we started
packing up prematurely:
That where states never reached the level of NATO or EU
membership, there has been regression;
That leaders with nationalist agendas remain strong;
That there has been political regression on many fronts;
That narrow agendas--in the region, but also among EU Member
States--are taking precedence over the strategic goal of
integrating the region as a whole;
That U.S. and EU engagement and assistance was ratcheted
downward too quickly in an effort to hand over responsibilities
and focus on even more serious challenges in Afghanistan and
Iraq; and
That despite the formal positions of NATO and the EU, the
reality is that further NATO and EU membership is now seen as a
dim prospect, not a near term possibility that can inspire hard
work and hard choices today.
And indeed, this is really unacceptable--to have made so much
progress, and then see it now at risk. The costs of finishing the job
in the region now are far lower than what were the costs of war, and
stopping war, in the past--and indeed lower than the costs of dealing
with a potential return to instability in the future.
Today, we are putting an extraordinary military, civilian,
political, and regional effort into Afghanistan--and rightly so. The
challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan--and with violent, Islamist
extremism on a wider scale--are enormously difficult and complex. And
the security of our country and of our transatlantic community depends
on success there.
By contrast, the Balkans is far easier to help today: there is no
active fighting; there is a literate population and skilled workforce;
the economy is far more advanced, more integrated regionally, and open
to the outside world; and there is a surrounding region that is stable
and supportive of success within the Balkans. While the politics are of
course difficult, we have every advantage in getting the Balkans
right--and finishing the job--compared to the magnitude of the
challenges we face in Afghanistan.
And yet we see a number of areas where the region is stuck, where
narrow and divisive agendas are triumphing over long-term progress. Let
me name a few examples:
First, and most glaring, is Bosnia. Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke, who is now the United States Afghanistan Envoy, did
an extraordinary job in the 1990s ending the war and putting in
place the Dayton Peace agreement. It was a huge accomplishment
and probably the best that anybody could do at the time.
But Dayton's achievement was to freeze the conflict in place,
giving time and space for political negotiations, rather than
violence, to shape a long-term settlement. While we did well in
the early years, in the past several years, efforts to
strengthen institutions, reform the constitution, improve
governance, and reconcile competing structures have gone
nowhere. Once NATO handed over security responsibility to the
EU, the EU swiftly downsized the security presence. And in
taking over the Office of the High Representative, the EU has
been too hesitant in exercising the powers of the office to
drive through necessary change. Now the talk is about reducing
EUFOR further, when the forces of separatism are stronger than
at many points in the past.
Kosovo also risks being stuck. Frankly, the fact that a
handful of EU Member States do not recognize Kosovo's
independence has been extremely damaging to Kosovo's ability to
move forward, and thus to wider progress in the region. It has
complicated economic development, inhibited certain types of EU
engagement, signaled to Serbia that there may yet be a chance
of reversing independence, and kept the extremely dangerous
talk of eventual partition alive. The reasons for not
recognizing Kosovo clearly satisfy certain national or
neighborly interests--but the net result is a far larger
diminution of security, stability, and long-term political and
economic development affecting all of Europe.
Likewise, it is tragic that the name of Macedonia as a
country has prevented that nation from moving forward into NATO
and EU membership. It is clearly in the interests of Macedonia
to become a member of these institutions, and clearly in the
interests of Greece to see Macedonia and the wider Balkans
region moving forward. Indeed, under Prime Minister Papandreou,
this renewed push for integration of the Balkans has been
striking and welcome. But 2 years after the Bucharest NATO
summit, where Greece blocked Macedonian membership--even under
the old formula of ``former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia''--
the issue remains an impediment, and arguably has gotten worse.
Serbia remains in a mixed position vis-a-vis the region and
Europe, and the question is how Serbia itself can move forward.
The combination of the impossibility of accepting Kosovo
independence, the vestiges of extreme nationalism, and the
painstakingly difficult engagement with the EU and NATO have
combined to keep this critical country in the region from
taking decisive steps forward domestically, and in contributing
to a more vibrant, prosperous Balkans region.
Montenegro has fared far better, making significant strides
on politics, governance, development, anticorruption, and good
neighborly relations, in just a few years. It has entered
NATO's Membership Action Plan. But this now also begs the
question of next steps in regional and European integration.
Albania has made it into NATO, but is far from EU membership
and is still struggling with the maturation of political
institutions, economic development, and fighting corruption and
crime.
And finally, a comment about the EU and NATO as a whole. The
EU already has a long-established case of ``enlargement
fatigue.'' This is compounded by the desire of some to prevent
Turkish membership in the EU--and thus any step toward
enlargement which could have the effect of bringing the Turkish
question closer to today's agenda. The Euro crisis has brought
out a wave of recriminations within the EU, and especially
Germany, that expands beyond the mere question whether the Euro
zone was enlarged too loosely, but whether any further
enlargement is wise or viable. Despite the EU's formal position
on Balkan enlargement, the chatter is that Croatian membership
with be the last enlargement of the EU for a very long time.
NATO has done better--bringing in Albania as a member, keeping
Macedonian membership as a live option if the name issue is
resolved, bringing Montenegro into the Membership Action Plan,
and working with Bosnia and Serbia through the Partnership for
Peace. But NATO, too, has deemphasized the prospect of future
enlargement, and this is noticed both by reformers and
nationalists in the region.
And with this snapshot of the region, it brings me to my fourth and
final point: We should aggressively pursue an ambitious strategy of
engagement in the region aimed at finishing the job as quickly as
possible; of making the Balkans region every bit as ``mainstream'' in
Europe as the Czech Republic or Portugal; of ensuring that every
country in the region has the opportunity to become a NATO and EU
member if it so chooses, and (with our help) does the hard work
necessary.
Here, let me applaud the recent trip to the region of Deputy
Secretary of State Steinberg, and Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos.
It is tremendously important to show engagement at that level, and
important that the United States and EU are seen acting together. And
this is just the latest of several such trips.
In the future, I hope that EU High Representative Catherine Ashton
takes part in such a joint visit, and that NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen or his designee is also invited to take part. It is important
to show a strong, united position of the entire transatlantic
community, and to get back on track in emphasizing the realistic
prospect of NATO and EU membership.
To operationalize this engagement further, I believe it is
important that the United States and Europe pursue a concrete agenda on
several fronts. It is worth greater investment of resources, and
indeed, greater political risk-taking, because the gains are worth it,
and the risks of not doing so are even greater.
The following steps, some of which are already being pursued, when
taken together can become a key part of such an ambitious transatlantic
agenda for the Balkans:
First, we must renew the positive commitment of the EU and NATO to
enlargement in the Balkans. At upcoming NATO and EU ministerial
meetings, and especially at the NATO summit and U.S.-EU summit this
autumn, we should make a clear and unequivocal statement that we are
prepared to admit new members in the region as quickly as they are able
to meet the criteria of membership. On the EU side, there should be no
linkage to Turkey or any other factors; and on the NATO side, no
linkage to Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, or other enlargement
considerations. This is simply about the Balkans.
Second, to do this, it is particularly important to engage not only
the EU and NATO as institutions, but also the Member States. And when
it comes to further enlargement, it is particularly important to engage
Germany and France, though of course all members are critical. It also
vitally important to engage directly with those states that do not yet
recognize Kosovo as an independent state to urge maximum flexibility on
their part for the good of the region as a whole.
Third, this renewed rhetorical commitment must be followed up by
concrete actions. The EU and NATO should aggressively use the tools
already at their disposal to put countries on a membership track and
use the mechanisms within that track to push for necessary reforms. For
the EU, this means association agreements, candidate status, detailed
consultations about requirements to implement over time the EU acquis.
It also means visa-free travel for all the citizens of the region, and
in this context, Foreign Minister Moratinos' comments about visa-free
travel for Bosnia being discussed by the EU in June are encouraging.
In the case of NATO in particular, we should make clear our
willingness to admit Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Membership Action
Plan (MAP), based on their meeting clearly defined criteria (e.g.,
settlement of defense property questions) in the near term.
It is worth recalling that when the MAP was created at the
Washington summit in 1999, there were no criteria whatsoever--it was
simply a tool established by NATO to help countries meet the
requirements of membership. We have consistently drifted away from that
position over the years, insisting, for example, on a period of
``intensified dialogue'' before offering MAP, and setting out other
conditions. This led to the unhelpful outcome of the Bucharest summit,
where we promised membership to Georgia and Ukraine without offering
MAP as a framework for helping them meet the criteria of membership--a
complete reversal of the sequencing applied by NATO in the preceding
decade. We are now too far along to offer MAP to Bosnia without their
meeting any criteria, but we should define those criteria and help see
that they are met quickly, and that MAP is offered as both incentive
and reward. We should return to seeing MAP as a tool worth using.
Fourth, we should maintain a robust international presence and
commitment in Bosnia, including a strong OHR with a U.S. Deputy and a
robust EU Force, until Bosnia sustainably implements far-reaching
reforms. The fact is that the situation has deteriorated in recent
months and years, and further international community drawdowns would
only further that disintegration. We need to increase our investment
and commitment, in order to push through necessary reforms and enable
long-term success.
Fifth, likewise, we need to maintain our robust commitment in
Kosovo as well--both through KFOR and through the EULEX operation. We
must work patiently but determinedly to ensure that minority rights are
respected, to remove parallel governing structures, and to facilitate
the integration of north Mitrovica into Kosovo as a whole. And we must
be categorical in rejecting any proposals for partition of Kosovo.
Sixth, we need to give a renewed impetus to the effort to resolve
the Macedonia name issue. Here, the U.N. has the lead, under negotiator
Matthew Nimitz, but the United States can play a critical role behind
the scenes. Macedonia has the greatest interest in a resolution of the
issue, because membership in NATO and the EU awaits, but Greece too has
a direct interest in seeing all of its neighbors advancing in political
stability, economic prosperity, and security through EU and NATO
membership. Direct meetings between the Prime Ministers have already
taken place, and these are essential. Further confidence-building
measures would be helpful--for example, from Macedonia, in reversing
provocative steps such as the name of the airport and highways, removal
of certain public statues. And in the end, a compromise--not a zero-sum
or 100-percent solution--must be found, and the basis for such a
compromise already exists within the framework offered through the U.N.
negotiations.
Seventh, we should be forward-leaning with Montenegro as a success
story that can help generate greater momentum in the region. The
decision to admit them to the Membership Action Plan of NATO last
December was a wise one. Montenegro has further work to do on
strengthening democratic habits and institutions and fighting
corruption, but the progress it has made already is impressive.
Successful integration of Montenegro into Europe, based on Montenegro's
own performance, can be a powerful example for Serbia, Albania, and
others.
Eighth, as the United States and the EU, we should carry out a
robust, bilateral agenda with Serbia. It is too much to expect that
Serbia could recognize Kosovo in any foreseeable timeframe, and yet
Kosovo's independence is a fact that will not change. This
contradiction creates a drag on the entire region. In this unsettled
situation, however, the best we can do is reach out to Serbia as a
country and as a people to help them reinforce democratic institutions
and integration as a whole, while simultaneously working to strengthen
Kosovo as a democratic state that is itself integrating in the region
and in Europe. At the end of the day, the mutual integration of Serbia
and Kosovo into a larger framework may be the only way to get beyond
the zero sum approaches to independence in play today.
Ninth, as the U.S. and EU, we should continue to encourage Albania
in strengthening its democratic institutions, its economy, and
government transparency and anticorruption. And this again depends on a
clear light at the end of the tunnel in terms of EU membership,
provided Albania implements the necessary reforms effectively over a
sustained period of time. This is obviously not a near-term prospect,
but at the same time, the direction must be clear.
Madame Chairwoman, these elements are the beginnings of an
aggressive strategy and agenda for finishing the job in the Balkans--a
job we started almost 20 years ago. I am sure that experts in the
administration can sharpen these elements and add additional ones. But
the critical thing is that we make our intentions clear, we act
affirmatively, we mobilize others, particularly in NATO and the EU, and
we assist reformers in the region to bring their own countries forward.
If we are passive, we will see continued backsliding, at risk to the
region and ourselves. But if we are active, we have a realistic, near-
term chance to bring the region into the transatlantic mainstream once
and for all.
And given all the other problems we must deal with in the world,
achieving a realizable success is certainly worth the investment it
will require.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Vejvoda.
STATEMENT OF IVAN VEJVODA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BALKAN TRUST FOR
DEMOCRACY, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE United States,
BELGRADE, SERBIA
Mr. Vejvoda. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, Senator
DeMint, and Senator Voinovich. It's a true honor to be once
again at the United States Senate to testify on issues of the
Balkans.
The visit of Vice President Biden for this administration
was, I think, a crucial reminder that there was unfinished
business and that it required the joint efforts of the United
States and of the European Union to continue to reach a goal
that is within reach, and I think that compared to all the
other burning issues on the international agenda that we all
confront and they need no mention, I think this is one where we
can have a success all together, first of all, for the benefit
of the citizens of the region where I come from and for the
transatlantic community.
That said, of course, the closer one gets to the goal, the
more difficult it gets to put the final pieces in place.
I would remind that Baroness Ashton in her new position
made her first visit outside of the European Union to the
Balkans after having come to the United States and I think that
was a very robust message that this was a priority for the
European Union and it is heartening to hear the United States
administration, in the guise of the previous speakers and of
the Congress, that this joint effort will be continued. It
needs to be maintained.
Movement toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration is
extremely important and any stagnation could lead to festering
and to at least worsening some of the situations internal to
the country.
That brings me to the region and I think that even though
we talk of individual countries and I agree with what has been
said on their progress and we applaud that progress and I think
we're becoming better at becoming each other's champions in EU
and NATO integration, but what I mean by region is that
positive dynamics affect each other as do negative dynamics.
Just as the Slovenia-Croatian border dispute sent a bad message
of the whole region to the rest, so the resolution or opening
of the resolution sent a good message.
We do communicate--we do function as communicating vessels
and so the positive signs that we have seen recently, as
Senator Voinovich mentioned, the meeting at the Brussels forum
organized by the German Marshall Fund, between President Tadic
and President Josipovic, after their very successful meeting in
Croatia, was extremely important. They sent very clear messages
together on the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and
Herzogovinia on the need to work together. The two governments
of Croatia under Prime Minister Kosor and Prime Minister
Srbijie of Serbia are working out concrete ways into which to
start revolving the numerous bilateral issues. This is
leadership and both presidents have spoken about European
partnership and leadership as they have addressed this issue.
One example of this cooperation which is in fact not only
regional but transatlantic cooperation has been mentioned here
today is the fight against organized crime. The United States
agencies that are fighting drug trafficking have worked
together with Serbia and Croatia and have successfully managed
to capture 2.2 tons of cocaine in Mid-Atlantic and in fact
yesterday the Serbian Judiciary indicted a certain Darkosharish
and his people for these organized crime activities that are
extremely dangerous and that are even threatening to maybe
eliminate some of the leaders in Serbia because they have hit
the hornet's nest. These are people who have millions, if not
billions, in cash and can buy anything and thus are very
dangerous.
I mention this because this has propelled regional
cooperation. The work of security forces in the region between
Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro has been very important and
in fact Serbia has suggested that the Regional Crime Center be
organized and Croatia's already indicated its support to this.
So again, without the United States, without the EU, we cannot
tackle these global issues that affect all of us, just as we
fight global terrorism together.
I would like to give a few examples just in the past few
days of how positive this development continues to be. Just
today, I believe, the Ministers of Defense of Serbia and
Montenegro have signed an agreement on further deepening of
cooperation. Just 2 weeks ago, the Albanian Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister Ilya Meta visited Belgrade after
7 years and indicated with his Serbian counterparts, meeting
with President Tadic, that he wanted to reinforce bilateral
relations, traveled to South Serbia, spoke to the Albanian
community there jointly with his Serbian Minister of Local
Government and said that Albanian Serbia would work together to
help the economic prosperity of that community.
Today, President Josipovic of Croatia was in Bosnia and
gave a strong statement apologizing for what Croatia did during
the war in Bosnia. President Tadic was in Mostar in Bosnia-
Herzegovina just 2 days ago, invited to open the Trade Fair and
Serbia being the guest country, meeting with Bosnia leaders.
What I want to say is there is intense cooperation that is
not visible to the common eye. Even those of us who are in the
region do not see the myriad of activities and relations that
are there. They now have to bubble up to the top to resolve the
unfinished business that remains.
Let me also say that coming from civil society, the role
that civil society organizations play in their countries
individually but also in regional cooperation is extremely
important. Those relations are a dense network of
interconnectivity, of cross-border cooperation, of dialogue
between Serbs and Albanians in what we call the Dayton
Quadrangle, the effort at a reconciliation effort and Truth
Commissions called RECOM between organizations working on
confronting the past, and, of course, not to mention the
declaration on Srebrenitza that you mentioned in your opening
statement.
That is extremely important for Parliament of a nation 15
years after the massacre and genocide that occurred in
Srebrenitza is, I think, foreboding of how the region is moving
in that direction.
USAID has, I think, with other donors played an extremely
important role and we are heartened to hear that USAID will
stay in the region for at least 5 more years to come. I think
that's a very wise and prudent decision that has been made to
help all of these efforts.
Finally, a word on the economy which we haven't mentioned.
The IMF and the World Bank continue to play a very significant
role as we confront the global crisis. It would be important,
also, to see WTO membership for those countries that have not
yet joined Serbia among them and thus a proactive, pragmatic
and constructive approach by the United States together with
Europe, which is the home of Southeastern Europe, is warranted
for.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I'm ready to answer any of
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vejvoda follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ivan Vejvoda, Executive Director, Balkan Trust
for Democracy, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Belgrade,
Serbia
Madame Chairperson, Senators, it is a truly great honor to be
invited to speak today before this subcommittee of the United States
Senate at this significant moment in the dynamics of Euroatlantic
integration of the Western Balkans region as it continues the
consolidation of democracy, peace, and stability. I am here to offer my
personal views on the current issues and the opportunities and
challenges that lie ahead.
introduction: western balkans: 10 years after
milosevic, 15 years after dayton
This year marks two important anniversaries: 10 years of the end of
the Milosevic regime in Serbia through a peaceful electoral process and
15 years of the Dayton/Paris Peace accords. The region of the Western
Balkans has in this period moved forward with significant successes yet
sometimes with ongoing challenges and unresolved issues. The fact that
it lies in core geographic Europe, an ``inner courtyard'' of Europe
surrounded by EU and NATO members (Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, and Greece) has been conducive to the advancement of the
region in European and Euroatlantic integration processes. The joint
transatlantic, U.S., and EU support to the processes of stabilization
and democratization of the Western Balkans has been a key element in
this forward-moving dynamic.
In my introduction to a hearing before the U.S. Senate on 14 July
2004, I wrote: ``The point of these introductory thoughts is to say
that there is a positive story in the Balkans that is not getting out.
The reasons are many: attention internationally has shifted elsewhere,
there are more burning issues in other parts of the world, the Balkans
seem by comparison in less need of attention, but also because when
focus on the Balkans occurs it is most often solely because of the
outstanding and still unresolved issues.''
Nearly 6 years later this situation still holds. The Western
Balkans are firmly on their way to join the EU and NATO (with the
exception of Serbia on NATO). Whatever the remaining challenges, and
these should in no manner be underestimated or belittled, they seem be
of a nature that with engagement and commitment of all parties,
domestic and international, prudence and realism, lead in a reasonable
timeframe to resolution.
That is why it is important to not forget the Western Balkans and
to see this democratic peace project through to its Euroatlantic haven.
european union: the peace project and the promise of membership
The European Union as it stands today is at origin an emphatic
political post-World War II peace project. It has created an
institutional framework encompassing 27 Member States, comprising close
to half a billion citizens. The Western Balkans constitutes the next
crucial chapter of that project.
As with other countries of the post-Communist world, the Western
Balkans strongly aspire and endeavor to join that peace project and its
present institutional framework.
The soft-power of the European Union with its policy of open doors
to further enlargement is both a strong incentive and an enabler and
facilitator for the necessary difficult and deep-seeded democratic and
market reforms required for these new European democracies to become
consolidated.
As with the enlargement of the EU (then European Community) to the
two post-dictatorship countries of the Iberian Peninsula, Spain and
Portugal in the 1970s, and to Greece after the dictatorship in 1981, so
the embracing of the Central and East European countries after 1989--
the ``return to Europe''--has been a fundamental shift in the political
geography of Europe.
The Balkan Peninsula, after the Apennine and Iberian Peninsulas, is
the final Southern European component that will join the EU--thus
continuing the unfinished business of creating a Europe whole and free
and at peace.
Geography matters and the case of the Balkans confirms it. But
history has an equal if not greater impact. The former Yugoslavia took
``a wrong turn'' in 1991 and descended into a violent breakdown when
all others were ``returning to Europe.'' Now the region with its
difficult historical legacy, both of communism and of the devastating
1990s has chosen to join the others who have preceded it on the path to
Euroatlanticism.
The promise that the EU gave at its summit in Thessaloniki in June
2003 was crucial in opening the route forward. Predictability and
credibility of the path were essential to the endeavor and have brought
the region to where it is today. Without this broad roadmap, without
the realization of the polities of region that they too were in reach
of joining their European kin, it would have been much harder to engage
in the painstaking work of changing these societies and economies that
had been left in a dire state after the violent conflicts of the 1990s.
The presence and support of the United States to these efforts has
been of the essence in the whole region. Only by joint action has
forward movement been possible.
two fundamental positive presuppositions
That one can be cautiously optimistic about this dynamic of
democratization and Euroatlantic integration is predicated upon two
fundamental agreed upon positions of all of the democratically elected
leaders and governments of the region:
--All of the Western Balkans leaders and governments have been
democratically elected and have committed their countries to
integration into the European Union and NATO (with the exception of
Serbia for NATO).
--All of the Western Balkans leaders and governments have underscored
that whatever outstanding challenges and unresolved issues stand
before them they will address them solely by institutional, legal,
and diplomatic means.
We have been seeing the positive consequences of these clear policy
choices in the recent past and we are witnessing them today in a
reinforced and multifold way.
euroatlantic enlargement
The European Union
All of the Balkan countries are now at some stage of integration
with the EU. Croatia is the furthest ahead and is negotiating the final
chapters of its accession. Macedonia is a full candidate awaiting a
date for the beginning of its negotiations for entry. Montenegro has
fulfilled the extensive questionnaire of the EU and awaits candidate
status. Albania is in the process of filling out the questionnaire.
Serbia presented its candidacy in December 2009 to the Swedish
Presidency of the EU and awaits the month of June 2010 to see whether
it will be moved to the next stage, receiving the questionnaire and
seeing the beginning of the ratification process of the Stabilization
and Association Agreement. Bosnia-Herzegovina has signed a
Stabilization and Association Agreement and is expected to pose its
candidacy for membership as the next step. Kosovo has a separate,
parallel track and the EU is in the process of assessing next steps.
Visa-free travel remains a goal for Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and Kosovo after Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia successfully
attained this status in November 2009. This is crucial because it is
probably the most tangible measure for individual citizens on the long
road to accession. The visa-free regime is very simply a message from
the EU which says: we do not wish to build walls; on the contrary you
are welcome in our midst.
All are thus now embedded in and encompassed by the institutions,
rules, and procedures of the European Union. This is of historical
significance for the region, for Europe, for the United States, and for
transatlantic relations. The processes of democratic reform,
strengthening of rule of law, improving governance and transparency,
fighting organized crime and corruption, and developing mutually
beneficial regional relations are fully engaged to a greater or lesser
extent. As the countries get closer to the EU these processes require
more intense engagement and results.
The experiences of the EU accessions of Romania and Bulgaria in
2007 have made the rules of entry more stringent and rigorous for the
Western Balkans countries. The governments of the region are well aware
of this fact. It is clear that there will be no free pass for EU entry.
It is of paramount importance that the movement of EU integration
progress on the basis of the merit of accomplished domestic reforms.
The incremental integration of these countries is essential in
motivating those who work on reform processes, but also because it
helps address the outstanding unresolved issues in the region. The EU
and Euroatlantic process has an enabling and soothing element in
tackling the most difficult issues.
The Lisbon Treaty has given new impetus to the enlargement process.
It has been very important that Baroness Catherine Ashton the High
Representative of the European Union for Foreign and Security Policy
made her first official visit outside of the EU, after visiting the
United States, to the Western Balkans in February. She came with
clarity of purpose emphasizing that the Western Balkans enlargement was
a priority of the EU and her office. She was quickly followed by the
new EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, Stefan
Fule.
Frequent visits to Brussels EU headquarters, but also European
Member-State capitals, by all regional leaders are equally important
for the ongoing exchange of information. This is vital in particular in
view of the challenge of so-called ``fatigue'' with enlargement among
certain quarters of the European Union states and publics. This is an
issue that both the EU and the aspiring Western Balkan countries must
bear in mind as they go forward. This is also where the United States
can be supportive in stressing the importance of the continued forward
movement of integration without fits and starts.
NATO
The enlargement of NATO has been a parallel and equally important
process for the stabilization of the region and the consolidation of
peace. The accession of Albania and Croatia to full membership in NATO
in April 2008 at the Strasbourg-Kehl summit was a landmark in security
for the region.
Unfortunately, Macedonia had fully qualified for membership but
could not accede due to the veto from Greece. It is of the utmost
importance for Macedonia and the region as a whole that the name issue
between the two countries be resolved after 18 years in the shortest
possible timeframe because it is not aiding the Euroatlantic
integration process, nor allowing Macedonia to begin negotiations with
the EU. There are certain cautious signs that maybe 2010 could be the
year in which there will be positive movement on this issue.
The November 2006 acceptance of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and
Serbia into the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) was a judicious,
although somewhat belated, decision. It helped foster further
stabilization and greater security for the region.
Montenegro has applied for and received a Membership Action Plan
(MAP) in December 2009, while Bosnia-Herzegovina applied for a MAP in
October 2009. It would be conducive to the further security of the
region and in the interest of Bosnia's sovereignty and integrity were
it to receive a MAP sooner rather than later. It is not without
significance that Serbia is fully supportive of Bosnia's Euroatlantic
aspirations and path.
Serbia is a PfP member and will open its mission at NATO in the
coming months, the Ambassador having already been appointed. Serbia is
currently an exception to the rule of all countries in the region
moving fully toward NATO membership. This is not surprising given the
bombing by NATO in 1999. Irrespective, cooperation with NATO is intense
and ongoing on all issues. The Serbian Armed Forces, as with others in
the region, are adopting and complying with NATO standards. There is a
vivid and lively debate in Serbian public opinion and civil society
about the benefits and disadvantages of NATO membership. This open
approach to an unresolved policy question is proof of its open-ended
character. Serbia, in 2000, after the fall of Milosevic under the Prime
Minstership of Zoran Djindjic, was fully in favor of joining NATO and
stated this in official documents. This policy was then halted and a
policy of neutrality instilled under Prime Minister Kostunica.
NATO is most importantly present in Kosovo through its KFOR (Kosovo
Force) mission. The NATO mission in Kosovo, which also involves non-
NATO countries, has now been brought down to 10.000.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO handed over its mission to the EU
mission EUFOR, which currently has 2,000 soldiers.
It is important to note that bilateral military relations between
all of the countries of the region and U.S. defense and military
institutions are developing in a positive way. For example, in Serbia,
Minister of Defense Sutanovac made his first official visit to the
Pentagon in the fall of 2009, followed by a visit of the Serbian Chief
of Staff General Miletic rapidly thereafter. Admiral Mullen made a
visit to Serbia, and military cooperation with the Ohio National Guard
has been outstanding by all counts.
regional cooperation--key indicator
If the recent reopening of the railway connection between Belgrade
and Sarajevo is anything to go by, then it is clearly there are
positive developments in the region.
Regional cooperation has been ongoing at all levels. It has been
substantive and varied over the past 10 years and has not seriously
suffered from the passing political surface tension created by a number
of situations related, in particular, to issues of the recognition of
Kosovo's independence by countries neighboring Serbia. Economic
relations have been enhanced, mutual investments have been made across
borders, and visits of and cooperation between governmental and
nongovernmental actors has been constant.
There has recently been a substantive political improvement in
regional and bilateral relations within the Balkan region. For example,
the understanding reached between Slovenia and Croatia last year to
move toward resolving their border dispute, the election of President
Ivo Josipovic in Croatia in February opening a new chapter in Croatian-
Serbian bilateral relations, the visa liberalization for Macedonia,
Montenegro, and Serbia that came into effect in December 2009 to enable
travel to Europe, and Serbia putting forward it's candidacy for the EU
in December 2009 cementing its orientation to the EU--each has shown
that the leaders and countries of the region want to move forward.
Presidents Tadic and Josipovic have given a powerful show of what
they have themselves termed ``European partnership'': a strong desire
to move not only their own countries but also the entire region toward
full stability and consolidated democracy. In a short span of time,
they have already met twice in March for substantive meetings--once in
Opatija, Croatia, and then 3 days later they joined each other on a
panel at the Brussels Forum 2010 organized by the German Marshall Fund
of the United States. They have charted a way forward demonstrating
strong political will, determination, and commitment to resolving their
outstanding bilateral issues. Both Presidents, as well as their
governments, have also repeatedly and continually underscored their
strong support to the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Albanian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ilir Meta made an official visit to Belgrade last month and reiterated
Albania's interest in developing the closest possible relations with
Serbia. President Tadic accepted an invitation to visit Tirana this
year. Ilir Meta visited the south of Serbia, where a sizable community
of ethnic Albanians who are Serbian citizens live. He said, while
visiting with the Serbian Minister for Local Government, that Albania
and Serbia would work together in helping better their existence.
In a demonstration of Albania's good will toward enhancing close
neighborhood relationships, the country permanently abolished the need
for visas for Serbian citizens yesterday.
All the countries of the region have been affected by the global
economic crisis and this has raised awareness of the extent to which
they depend on each other for enhanced economic activity, trade, and
exchange. They also fully understand that only as a region are they
economically significant on the world market.
A trade fair that was opened for 2 days in the Bosnian city of
Mostar by President Silajdzic and President Tadic of Serbia, as the
special guest country of the fair, is a testimony to the awareness of
the importance of regional economic and trade cooperation, particularly
during globally difficult economic times. ``Nobody will invest in
countries captured by the past but will in those facing the future and
agreeable to the fact that we must rely on each other'' said Tadic at
the opening.
The fact that the Western Balkans have now been for several years
part of a unified Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) which
is a mechanism allowing for the free flow of goods has helped them
weather the global crisis to a certain extent. They have not been hit
as severely as some other countries.
This does not mean that that growing unemployment, decline in
economic growth, and loss of foreign direct investment has not caused
serious difficulties, social pressures, and tensions ( in some
countries more so than in others). Interestingly, remittances from
abroad have remained at levels comparable to those in prior years,
which has somewhat alleviated the strain. The governments of the region
are struggling to cope, and to find ways to develop productive
activities and enhance exports.
The Regional Cooperation Center in Sarajevo, the legacy
organization that followed the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe
(created in July 1999 in Sarajevo) has an important role to play in
aiding a variety of efforts at the regional level. It is now in the
process of defining its next 3-year strategy.
Fighting Organized Crime Together--Another Transatlantic Endeavor
Another very positive development has been provoked by the
realization that criminals ``cooperate'' across borders with the
greatest delight. The tragic assassination of the editor in chief of a
Croatian daily newspaper in downtown Zagreb that involved ``regional
cooperation'' between Croatian and Serbian criminals made authorities
aware that if they did not robustly reinforce their own cooperation and
exchange of information, that there was a severe danger of organized
crime delving ever more deeply into state structures.
This new, intense cooperation produced effective results, including
arrests of the assassins and organizers. There is now concerted talk of
creating a regional center for fighting organized crime to be located,
possibly, in Belgrade.
Cooperation with U.S. agencies, in particular the DEA, and with
British agencies over a longer period of time produced the dramatic
capture of 2.5 tons of cocaine on a ship in mid-Atlantic. Yesterday,
the prosecutor for organized crime presented an indictment against
Darko Saric, the alleged crime boss, and 18 other people for criminal
activities and money-laundering on a huge scale.
Fighting organized crime and the trafficking of drugs, people, and
weapons, only makes sense if tackled jointly in the region and
globally. These challenges, that have their roots in the
criminalization of the region that occurred during the conflicts of the
1990s, will have to be dealt with in an intense manner with important
human and intelligence resources. Again, the role and support of the
United States has been extremely fruitful and significant in this area.
Fighting global terrorism is also an important issue in which the
region can give a valuable contribution.
Confronting the Past
The consequences of the 1990s conflict will remain with us for many
years to come. Justice is being conducted in domestic war crimes
tribunals and at the International Court of Justice for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Netherlands. But the work of society with
itself in understanding and condemning what was done in its name will
be a much longer process, as we know from other historical precedents.
An important step was made on March 31 when the Serbian National
Assembly voted in a Declaration condemning the massacre in Srebrenica
in July 1995, calling upon the ruling of the International Court of
Justice in The Hague that qualified Srebrenica as a genocide,
expressing condolences and regret to the victims' families, condemning
the fateful decision in the 1990s to use violence in resolving existing
challenges, and reiterating the determination to arrest Ratko Mladic.
This follows the presence of President Tadic in Srebrenica for the 10th
anniversary of the genocide perpetrated there. The declaration was met
with international approval. In Bosnia-Herzegovina itself, there were
mixed appraisals but Suleiman Tlhic, leader of the main Bosniac party
SDA, hailed the declaration and stated he would visit Belgrade soon.
There is still much to be done. First and foremost Serbia must
arrest Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic, the two remaining indictees of
the ICTY. In November 2009, the chief prosecutor of the ICTY gave a
positive assessment of Serbia's efforts and will most likely produce a
similar report in June this year. Until these indictees are arrested,
this chapter will not be able to be closed.
Equally important, civil society organizations and journalists have
been doing their part in contributing to these efforts at confronting
the past and helping heal wounds that the conflicts created. One
important effort is a regionwide project with civil society
organizations from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro
called RECOM which intends to establish a regional process of truth
commission work. Several meetings have already been held, the most
recent one in Novi Sad last month. This initiative is directly
supported by the European Union, among others.
The renewed dynamic of overall cooperation heralds a new dawn in
the Western Balkans.
remaining challenges
The region, as compared to other parts of the world that have
unresolved issues, fares relatively well. Peace has been achieved,
stability is being reinforced, and a common awareness is arising about
the need to champion each on the way forward.
The region is small. It holds 20 million inhabitants. It will join
an EU of half a billion citizens. In the words of an entrepreneur, it
is a ``micro-region'' in global economic terms and can only fare in the
global market if it links up its economic potential. Late Prime
Minister of Serbia Zoran Djindjic used to say: ``We are only
significant as a region of 50 million people in economic terms'' (he
was speaking of the Balkans as a whole, including Romania and
Bulgaria).
Success for all--foremost for the citizens of the countries of the
region, and then for all those around them, as well as for friends and
allies, and for the United States and EU--is relatively close at hand.
The final chapters of the unfinished business have to be written
together.
It is the region and its Euroatlantic movement that will ultimately
cure the remaining ills. We already see this dynamic at work. It is
just as with the fact of being geographically part of Europe. The
effects of the EU are palpable in the way the region is conducting
itself. There is bond of mutual responsibility of the aspiring Member
States and of the Euroatlantic family to see the process of integration
come to fruition.
Nothing is simple or quick about this dynamic and thus
determination and political will are essential.
I wrote in my testimony to this committee on July 14, 2004: ``When
domestic actors are incapable of solving a contentious issue and
require a third party to mediate, then all parties become stakeholders.
The crucial stakeholders are the domestic ones and unless they arrive
at a solution based on compromise through negotiations then no solution
will be found, or only half measures will be achieved. The lack of a
solution in Cyprus, because one of the key communities was not on board
with the proposed agreement, is an example of this, again all things
being equal. [ . . . ] as in other similar/dissimilar seemingly
``intractable'' conflict or post-conflict situations (Northern Ireland,
Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Basque country, Israel-Palestine, etc.) the
solution is in bringing the voices of moderation, pragmatism, and
realism forward while blunting the arguments and basis of grievance of
the extremists wherever they may be. The engaging of the dialogue is
essential [ . . . ]. This long and arduous dialogue [ . . . ] should be
resumed, reengaged, and broadened.''
Bosnia-Herzegovina will need the commitment of its citizens and of
its leaders to find it in themselves to move forward. They will have to
take responsibility and realize that the rest of the region is moving
and that they must not lag behind. An example of what is possible was
given when the announcement of visa-free travel was announced last year
for Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Suddenly, the Bosnian
administration began fulfilling requirements of the EU ``visa roadmap''
bringing Bosnia close to getting a visa-free status during the course
of the year and maybe even by this summer.
The EU has clearly stated that until the Office of the High
Representative is closed, Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot make its next step
forward. This means that Bosnia needs to fulfill the remainder of the
five conditions and two objectives.
One cannot not help but recall the failure of the so-called April
constitutional reform package in 2006, when everyone had accepted what
was proposed except for one political party that impeded its passage in
the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Missed opportunities of that
magnitude lead to the situation that we all find ourselves in today: an
apparent impasse with jockeying of all political actors for pole
position in the pending parliamentary elections in October 2010.
It is thus unlikely that any agreement can be reached before then
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The unhelpful rhetoric from one or the other
side is detrimental to the search for a compromise.
The visit of Vice President Biden, made on behalf of President
Obama, to the Western Balkans in May 2009 was of great importance,
visiting Sarajevo together with then-High Representative of the EU
Javier Solana, and also visiting Belgrade and Pristina. This was a
strong message with a unified position of the United States with the EU
on the future of the region.
It was of the utmost importance that U.S. Vice President Joseph
Biden reiterated the principle that no one was questioning the
fundamental structure of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, namely the
bientity structure, but that a way forward for greater functionality of
central government had to found. All things being equal, the example of
Belgium could possibly both inspire and sooth the key political actors,
in that it is possible to have a structure of two entities with all of
their identity, rights, and prerogatives, and yet have a functioning
government.
Serbia and Croatia are among other guarantors of the Dayton
Agreement. They have a key supportive role to play, along with the
United States and EU, and they have been playing it.
The continued recent involvement of the United States through the
presence of Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg during the so-
called (and temporarily failed) Butmir process, trying to help Bosnia
to add a level of functionality to its central government so as to be
able to make the next step to the EU, was a significant step in
continuing U.S. commitment. Steinberg visited the region once again
last week and this engagement and constructive concern has been well-
received in the region.
Kosovo declared independence in February 2008. The presence of
international organizations is and continues to be of the greatest
significance. U.N. Resolution 1244 is still in vigor. The KFOR military
mission acts under UNSC Resolution 1244 as does the OSCE mission.
It has been 2 years in which an EU rule of law mission, EULex,
numbering some 2,000 policemen, judges, prosecutors, and customs
officials, has been in operation. Even though five EU Member States
have not recognized the independence of Kosovo, they are all in
agreement on the EULex mission.
KFOR has said that it has reduced the number of troops on the
ground after assessing that there was a degree of improvement in the
security situation. Yet much needs to be done for the lives of all
citizens, and particularly in the Serbian community in Kosovo.
Kosovo, to date, has been recognized by 65 states, roughly a third
of U.N. members. They are, however, the most important countries for
the Euroatlantic integration of the region. A question has been put to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by the U.N. General Assembly
in 2009 and the ICJ is supposed to give its nonbinding opinion on
whether Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence was in line
with international law. Whatever the opinion of the ICJ, and it will be
significant for the practice of international law in similar complex
situations, the situation on the ground will not change. The opinion of
the ICJ will be an opportunity for Belgrade and Pristina to possibly
move toward settling what remains unsettled and to work toward further
stabilization and peace.
President Tadic of Serbia has spoken of the need for Serbia to be
part of the solution, a need for a more flexible approach to the
challenge of Kosovo, about the year 2010 as a year in which a step
forward in further stability and resolution of open issues is possible.
He has spoken of the understanding and need for Pristina to be part of
regional meetings, but under the label of Kosovo-UNMIK.
Authorities in Pristina have, for their part, voiced a willingness
to engage as good neighbors with Serbia.
The two sides remain firm on principled positions: Serbia is clear
that it will not recognize Kosovo's independence, while Pristina
maintains the fact of its independent status. It has been clearly
stated, though, that these principled positions have not impeded the
way toward finding solutions to a number of existential issues.
While both sides are committed to bettering the lot of ordinary
citizens, and of the Serbian community in particular, there is space to
move toward a framework solution of the outstanding issues. What that
will be it is hard to say at this juncture. One can detect signs of a
willingness to address what remains unresolved and to look for closure.
Europe has seen similar, although always different, historical
examples of this. Europe and the international community have a tool
box and many precedents. It can be surmised that given the EU and
Euroatlantic orientation of all leaders involved, there will be a way
because there is a will.
A pragmatic and constructive approach which reinforces and
underpins the positive domestic and regional dynamics that are at work
is what is warranted at this juncture in the Western Balkans, given the
above-stated clear commitments of all in the region to Euroatlantic
integration and to resolution of all outstanding issues through
peaceful means.
unfinished business in 2004 versus unfinished business in 2010
I was first honored to be invited to testify in the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on 14 July 2004. The title of the hearing 6
years ago was ``U.S. Policy toward Southeast Europe: Unfinished
Business in the Balkans.''
Understandably, the unfinished business of 2004 is different in
large part than that in 2010 and yet in other respects similar. The
domestic challenges of strengthening democratic institutions, a
democratic political culture, the rule of law, more effective
governance and transparency, and the fight against organized crime and
corruption have made headway but much remains to be done throughout the
region. Each of the region's governments are now fully part of the EU
integration process, which means pursuing deep-seated reforms in key
sectors of society and preparing their economies to join a single
market where competition will be fierce and unyielding. But as they all
prepare entrance and then enter as full-members, they will benefit from
the support of the so-called structural funds that help align the
economies of the new countries with the rest of the EU nations.
The EU itself will change in time and will grow to a Union of
around 36 states.
One of the key reasons why there is overwhelming support for EU
integration in the public opinion of these countries is that citizens
realize, without needing to comprehend the intricacies of the workings
of the acquis communautaire, that there is simply a little more
security, a little more certainty, and the possibility for somewhat
more prosperity by being a member of the EU rather than remaining
outside of it.
The same goes for NATO integration in nearly all the countries.
Metaphorically, citizens wish of their own free will to construct, as
with the EU, a political, economical, and security roof which will make
life somewhat more predictable after the devastating experience they
had lived through during the 1990s.
All this still requires, above all, the close concerted efforts of
the vital transatlantic partners that are the United States and EU.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin
with you, Ambassador Volker, because I had a question about
something you said in your testimony.
You talked about confidence-building measures for
Macedonia. What specifically are you talking about?
Mr. Volker. Well, to give you a couple of examples, as you
know, the airport in Macedonia is called Alexander the Great
Airport. There have been acquisitions of some statues that are
representative of what Greeks consider to be Greek historical
figures, naming of highways or schools. These are things that
irritate. They don't amount to a threat to Greece. They don't
amount to a grab for territory, but nonetheless they're an
irritant that's unnecessary and so to find some areas where you
could do the opposite, make a gesture to Greece, and were
respectful of Greece's cultural identity, Greece's history as
well as Macedonian history.
We're interested in being a good neighbor. Let's work on
some things together. This is far apart from the name issue, by
the way. This is just a matter of confidence-building in order
to establish the relations to be able to deal with the name
issue later on. I'm encouraged by the fact that the Prime
Ministers have in fact met and will meet again. That's a good
step.
I think that for a Greek public, they need to have
confidence that a Macedonia is going to be moving ahead, away
from the symbolism, just as the Macedonians need to have
confidence that Greece is prepared to finally cut a deal on the
name rather than adopt a maximilist position as was articulated
by the previous Greek Government.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Senator Voinovich and the
previous panel both mentioned the level of KFOR Forces in
Kosovo.
Given your former position as Ambassador to NATO, I'm sure
you have particular insights into what might be important to
maintain there when it comes to KFOR Forces.
Do you think reducing forces would undermine stability in
the region, and are you comfortable with the current level? As
you look ahead to the ICJ decision, do you think we should be
prepared to do more?
Mr. Volker. Difficult question. Let me start with a more
general point before addressing your point about force levels.
What you need to have in Kosovo is confidence on the part
of the population and acceptance on the part of the region
where this country is going and you don't have that level of
confidence right now and there are a number of factors.
Part of it is the sense of fatigue that you talked about on
the EU's engagement in the region and commitment to
enlargement. Part of it is the fact that a number of EU
countries have not recognized Kosovo and this gives Serbia
encouragement in a sense to think maybe this is reversible,
maybe we should be holding out, maybe partition is possible. So
it creates an instability over that.
There has been a lot of up and downs in the EULEX vision
and the EU police presence and that with KFOR being the third
line of defense behind first the Kosovo Security Services,
second, EU-led police and then KFOR, people aren't confident in
the first two and so KFOR is there as the guarantee, but it
doesn't give people day to day confidence because KFOR doesn't
do the direct policing.
So there's still a lack of confidence and direction which,
in my view, means we have to retain a substantial commitment
and presence throughout all of Kosovo.
Now that said, as you know, I've also worked on Afghanistan
and if we had the density of forces in Afghanistan that we have
in Kosovo, we'd be swimming in success. So I do recognize what
our military leaders have said about the relative concentration
of forces, relative to size of territory and population for
Kosovo, compared to Afghanistan, and I do have a great deal of
sympathy for that.
But on the other hand, and as I mentioned in my testimony,
my written testimony, this is an area where it's ripe for
success. We don't have active conflicts. We have an educated
population. We have a capable workforce. We have a regional
economy that can get access to a global economy. We have a
political process that we've invested in for some time.
It would be a huge mistake to disinvest too quickly and not
achieve the success that we could.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Well, Mr. Vejvoda, you're
clearly in maybe the best position to tell us what resolution
to the Serbian-Kosovo issue might look like and how it could be
accomplished and what a sustainable Kosovo might look like.
Do you want to give us your insights on that issue?
Mr. Vejvoda. Madam Chairwoman, that's a very tall order. I
can only speak on behalf of myself and as a citizen of the
region who tries to lean as far forward as one can and
understand each other's sensitivities and preoccupations.
May I just add, which I didn't say at the beginning, I've
also submitted a written statement which is broader.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Vejvoda. First of all, let me say that I think that
partly the confidence that I have that we are not only moving
in the right direction but that we will get to a resolution is
the fact that all of the elected governments and Presidents in
the region have committed themselves to European and Euro-
Atlantic NATO integration, barring Serbia for NATO because of
the known issues, but even Serbia supports Bosnia's movement
towards NATO, and I think that is extremely politically
important for the issue at hand.
Second, all the same elected democratic governments have
restated that they will resolve any outstanding issues, the
ones we are talking about, by peaceful, diplomatic, legal, and
institutional means, and I think that sets the framework and
the stage for these challenges that remain that we have been
talking about.
Now you asked me about Kosovo and I agree with what has
been said. Kosovo has been recognized by 65-66 countries.
That's a third of U.N. members. Two-thirds have not recognized.
The process of recognition has been slower than many thought.
That's partly due to the efforts of the Serbian Government but
also because many countries have similar challenges. Spain, for
example, and there's a bipartisan, if I can put a consensus in
Spain, not to recognize.
So there's nothing easy about the issue that we're talking
about, but I think that the fact that President Tadic, for
example, from the Serbian side has spoken about the need for
greater flexibility for 2010 as the year of possibly beginning
to address this issue more substantively, his statement at the
Brussels Forum in March, the panel at which Senator Voinovich
was, that, of course, Kosovo must be part of regional
integration, all these are signals as from the Kosovar side.
The Government in Pristina has talked about the willingness
to be a good neighbor of Serbia and that means that both sides
retain their principle positions, that Serbia does not want to
recognize Kosovo, Kosovo is an independent state, and there's a
movement toward understanding that there's something unresolved
there. Until one recognizes each other, there's something
unresolved and that creates space for dialogue, for resolution,
for pragmatic solutions but that have a framework.
Senator Voinovich mentioned the North of Kosovo. That's
somehow unresolved. Now, we can take sides on how we see the
North. The North is part of the territory of what Serbia calls
the autonomous province of Kosovo and yet Pristina does not
have control of the North. The North is under the control of
NATO, of EULEX, of the U.N., and maybe there's space there to
speak very neutrally and loosely to see what it is, what is it
that the two sides could agree upon.
Whether one calls that opening status talks or not, that's
up for grabs, I would say. I definitely think that the opinion,
the nonbinding opinion that will be given by the International
Court of Justice is a sort of marker in time that may allow
then the sides, Belgrade and Pristina, to move forward on this.
What I think is very important to understand, there is an
awareness, I think everywhere, starting with Pristina and
Belgrade, that Brussels, the European Union, will not take in a
new Cypress, a situation 40 years unresolved. That's a no-go
and that's fully understood.
But even more importantly, I think that the domestic actors
in the region, again Belgrade and Pristina, understand that it
is better for them to move forward to find closure and
resolution because of the citizens, because Europe will not see
to it if we remain difficult with each other on this, and again
I think no one neglects the difficulty of finding that way
forward. That is why again U.S. and European engagement is so
important because it needs the confidence, it needs the support
to foster the proper forward movement that already exists.
There needs to be that, you know, creative support, finding
ideas. There are--you know, I call this movement a European
solution. Europe--this is not a new situation in Europe. You
know, talk of Northern Ireland, of South Tirol, if you know
your history a little better, the Schleznik Holschtein between
Germany and Denmark. Europe has seen very difficult situations
such as these. It has a toolbox. There are tools on the shelf
that can be used.
The main thing is that the parties are willing to sit down
and engage and use the appropriate tools with the help of the
allies that we want to be part of and that we are in fact part
of already. Once you're a candidate, you are part of the
European Union. The European Union spends--is the biggest
donor--so much moneys, not to mention United States efforts and
NATO presence in itself.
So without having answered very clearly your question, what
I'm trying to transmit to you is the atmosphere, the spirit and
the leadership that now exists that wants to really bring this
home. Whether it takes 1 year or 2 or 3 years, I don't think
that anybody is thinking in terms of 10 years on this issue.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. I can see why you got
your reputation.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. Real quick on Kosovo. You've kind
of laid it out.
First of all, the Court decision is not going to be
binding. So what the reaction to that is going to be who knows.
If it goes, it could end up in the Security Council again with
Russia vetoing it and regardless of whatever happens here, the
Metroviza thing's got to be worked out. That's the big issue,
and again, as I mentioned earlier, I think that the sooner
people start talking about all of the options that this happens
or that happens, but it's still there. It's got to be--it has
to be dealt with.
The other issue is, is that, you've got somebody in Kosovo
right now who went to The Hague and the witnesses weren't there
and so he's back raising a lot of fuss and he's probably going
to go--he's more of a nationalist, even though if you look at
his record, he understands the reality but may try to take
advantage of this in terms of a political campaign. If he
becomes involved in a political campaign, then it becomes more
difficult for people to sit at a table because it's now
politics.
So I just end on that, but I just think that the sooner
people start to think about that, the better off everybody's
going to be.
The other issue is Bosnia. What is the model for Bosnia?
You know, do you think that the model they're talking about is
a realistic one? Is there another one that could maybe make it
more easy for the people to come together and get the job done
that we'd like to see interface with NATO and the European
Union, some other creative thinking in that regard, and then
the issue of the European Union and how important that is to
try and emphasize that and to the future of the area.
Mr. Vejvoda, you mentioned a couple of things that haven't
been really talked about. One is organized crime and how it has
a way of--it's an undertow that pulls down work toward the free
market and in terms of reform of institutions and also the
economy.
I met with a group yesterday that have been in for 15 years
and recommendations to our government about how could the USAID
be more creative. When we were in Serbia, for instance, we had
some goods in our room that came about as a result of new
businesses that had been created in Serbia because they went
out into the hinterland and worked with people to create an
economy.
In other words, the big issue here is what? Jobs, better
economy, better wages and so forth. It seems to me that ought
to be looked at more by our country.
And then the IMF and the World Bank, other institutions
there that could provide--I think--what was his name? George
Soros had a fund that spent more--supposed to have been on
democracy-building but at that time I know several years ago
when we talked about it, they were talking about getting some
people together to create a pool of money that could provide
some loans.
But I raised a lot of issues here, but I think the crime
thing and, you know, when we talked to the President of Serbia,
you've got to have cooperation from the other countries. Thank
God Croatia and Serbia are working. What about the other ones
that are there? What kind of cooperation are they getting in
Kosovo or, say, Montenegro or some of the other places that are
there?
I hit a lot of things. I guess the last one is how do you
feel about the recommendation that we got from everybody and
that was visa waiver and MAP before the election?
Sorry, Madam Chairman.
Senator Shaheen. And we only have 10 or 15 minutes. So I
know you could probably go on all afternoon on those.
Mr. Vejvoda. OK. I'll try and be telegraphic, Madam
Chairwoman.
Let me start out by saying that why is this Serbia and
Croatia so important. Historically, those of you who know the
region of Southeast Europe, historically from the 19th century,
this relationship constituted the backbone of the Southern
Slavic/Southeast European region, and when relations between
Serbia and Croatia were positive, the whole region somehow also
was pulled by this positive relationship.
This is particularly true for Bosnia and Herzogovinia that
is encircled by Croatia and Serbia geographically. These two
countries are guarantors of the Dayton and Paris Peace Accords
and they have a crucial role to play, for example, here, but
they're also economically the strongest countries in what
entrepreneurs say is a micro region.
We are a region of 20 million people. This will be a drop
in the water of the bucket of the \1/2\ billion European Union
member citizens, but a very important region because it is
unfinished European post-Second World War peace business and
that is why if there we have a positive movement, I think it
will actually affect, it will have a pulling effect on the rest
of the region, and I would say on Bosnia and Herzogovinia.
We have seen this with the visa waiver effect. As soon as
the announcement was made that Montenegro, Macedonia, and
Serbia would get a visa waiver, suddenly Bosnia kicked into
gear and began doing the roadmap conditionality and hopefully
they will get the visa waiver regime by July and hopefully MAP.
As I said, I think many of us strongly believe that this is
very important for the security of the region itself.
All countries clearly advance at their own pace. This is
the rule in the European Union, but it is not good if anyone
falls behind and I think that's where a lot of preoccupation in
particular at this moment with Bosnia and Herzogovinia and
clearly with Kosovo equally, although Kosovo has been clearly
given a signal from the European Union that it also has its
path. Commissioner Stephen Fuller, Katherine Ashton and others,
in their visits to the region, not to mention the United
States, have repeated this.
But these issues, whether we're talking about Kosovo or
Bosnia-Herzogovinia, and I think you both mentioned and Senator
Voinovich in particular, we're really talking not about
floating islands in a global international agenda that have to
be solved. This is directly related to jobs and foreign direct
investments, and I think when I speak about the democratically
elected leaders, they are fully aware that they have to create
jobs and, in particular, in a situation of global economic
crisis.
In fact, the region has become aware how mutually dependent
we are. We have, as a region, survived because of the
interregional trade. We have CEFTA, the Central European Free
Trade Agreement, strangely called, but now basically in
Southeastern Europe. This is very, very important because it
creates the framework for what in fact will be our situation in
a single market in Europe.
But as I said, this Trade Fair in Mostar is a small example
of how the entrepreneurs are in fact pushing the political
leaders to open up, to invest. There are many mutual
investments in the region, some in some directions more than in
others, but to your point about USAID, USAID sponsored 15
small- and medium-sized enterprises from Serbia to be present
at this fair in Mostar.
So again, the donor work, just as the political work, of
the United States is extremely important to help because there
are no real financial resources in the region to create jobs.
We need foreign direct investments and this has been a rather
dire period since the global crisis kicked in.
I would say, finally, that the economy is absolutely
crucial at this moment. The region has fared rather well
compared to other parts of the world and some other European
countries. I think this is in part due to the catastrophe of
the 1990s where we paid a huge price. So there were more
conservative policies in macroeconomic stability that were run
through the region. This allowed us to weather the crisis all
together, but again I think just because we had this terrible
experience all together and, of course, some paid a higher
price than others, nobody wants to go there.
The citizens, first of all, they want normalcy. They want a
return to a somewhat more secure and predictable life with
somewhat more prosperity and that is why we have strong
majorities of public opinion who want to join the European
Union and NATO in this region, and I think the constructive
support coming from the Transatlantic Partnership that is the
United States and the EU is cardinal to seeing this brought to
a safe haven that are the memberships in these two
organizations.
Mr. Volker. If I may just offer a few brief comments on
some of the issues. I won't cover everything.
First off, I think, starting with the issue of the status
of Kosovo and status of Metroviza that you raised, I think what
we do not have right now is a sense of inevitability. This is
still very much open in the minds of Serbia, in the minds of
people in Metroviza, and as a result, there's not really a
willingness to negotiate on terms.
How do you protect the people of Metroviza? How do you
guarantee Serb patrimony? If the whole issue is still seen to
be on the table, then it's hard to get to a negotiation of what
the right protections are. So I think to some degree perhaps
the Court case can help. Certainly the European Union can help.
We need to establish a sense that this--it is going to be a
fact, that Kosovo is going to be an independent state.
Secondly, I think it would be a mistake to try to put
Serbia in a corner and insist that they recognize in a legal
formal way this independent state. That's just not going to
happen any time soon.
I think it is quite possible for Serbian leadership,
Serbian people to accept a fact on the ground, but not to be
made as a matter of principle to say, yes, we endorse this.
Senator Voinovich. Let me interrupt. It seems to me that
just recently, we have now started to work with the Kosovars to
talk about Metroviza. We have the grand plan, the United States
has, and from my perspective, I don't think that's smart.
We've left it alone for a long time because we know if we
stuck our stick in there, we'd have a hornet's nest. So
everything's kind of quieted down and they're getting along.
You've got South meets the North. But now, like the United
States right now, we've got a new idea about how this is going
to be and I'd just like your reaction.
Maybe we ought to cool it on this thing until some of these
other things are worked out before we start getting in there
and pushing things.
Mr. Volker. Well, I think you're raising an issue that I
sympathize with, as well, which is, if you try to force people
on a position of principle, you're going to stir up reaction to
that, antibodies to that, that are going to give you trouble.
What we need in talking about the long term of Kosovo,
rather than insisting on Serb recognition, what I think you
could have agreement on is that both sides want to see both
Serbia and Kosovo integrate into a larger whole, into a region,
into a European Union.
I wonder if the parallel of Cypress is really a good
parallel. Maybe the answer with Cypress would have been if you
had Cypress and Turkey at the same time, you wouldn't have the
same problem and maybe that's a way to look at that parallel
instead.
But I do think that stirring up the issues of principle
when you can instead make progress on issues of practice is
something that we should be very concerned or thoughtful about.
A few other points on issues that you raised. I do think
visa access is terribly important because that is what helps
give the people of the region a vision for where they're going,
what kind of society are they going to live in, what is going
to be their relationships, what is it like in the other
countries that they visit, and the ease of access. It's a
signal about being a part of Europe and it is something that
can inspire people to saying this is where we want to see our
country end up. So I do think that's terribly important.
I spoke about MAP earlier for Bosnia and just on the issue
of Bosnia where you had talked about the model, is this the
right model or the wrong model, again a very difficult
question.
Ultimately, the Dayton Accords were tremendously important
in order to stop the war, but what they did is they stopped the
conflict in place and they didn't really give us the ability to
have a full settlement and they gave us time and political
process that could be used to create a settlement. In fact, it
hasn't turned out that way.
So I don't think that the institutions as they exist are
going to work in the long term. However, I don't think you can
agree today on any changes to these institutions because they
will be seen by one side or the other as damaging their
particular interests. It's going to advantage someone and hurt
someone else.
So I think the first step, which is what we're doing, is
try to make the institutions work and insist that the parties
there do everything possible to make them work and that should
get us back to a place where we can talk about more structural
reforms that will need to be made for Bosnia to be sustainable
in the long term.
Mr. Vejvoda. If I may, Madam Chairwoman. At a conference in
Dubrovnik, Croatia, the Croatian summit last July, at the end
of a long day of discussions along these questions, someone
raised their hand. It was the Irish Minister for European
Affairs, and he said, ``I don't know the first thing about the
Balkans but I've been listening very carefully and I recognize
very many similarities,'' and he said, ``Look. We understood we
could keep to our principle positions and yet slowly move
forward and find the moment of the Good Friday Agreement and
then 10 years later Jerry Adams and EM Paisley Act. He's
sitting down without shaking hands at the same table.''
I think, to put it in a nutshell, that's the model and I
think Ambassador Volker is absolutely right. Nobody should be
forced to do anything at this moment to relinquish their
principle position. That is why I'm talking about the spirit of
openness that I detect on both sides to understand that we need
to move to resolving it and without putting any substance on
resolving, but there needs to be a framework. It involves
practical things like electricity, like, you know, customs and
who the judges and prosecutors will be, but there must be
something at the end where somebody signs something on the
dotted line or doesn't.
There's somehow a resolution which has a framework and no
one goes home totally defeated. No one goes totally the winner.
This is not a zero-sum game, and I think--and again, Ambassador
Volker put it right. Serbia should not be put in a corner nor
should Kosovo, Pristina, you know, be forced to relinquish on
something they believe.
Because this is a European space, I think we can move
forward on this and on Bosnia-Herzogovinia, without going into
the long and deep history, this is a very particular case, but
remember we do have, all things being equal, a country in
Europe called Belgium that has two entities, that has a
capital. Yes, deep history, much richer country, traditions. It
is the capital of Europe, you know. Billions are flowing in
because of the administrators, not to mention the Eurocrats who
sort of pay high rents there, but I think it's a model worthy
to be looking at.
During the Brussels Forum, I spoke with some European
officials. They said, oh, maybe we'll commission a study to see
how, you know, Belgium came to be. I think, I think that we
have had democracy in Bosnia and Herzogovinia for 15 years now.
There have been elections. It has not delivered what, you know,
everyone desired, normalcy to the people, economic progress,
but, on the other hand, not one single soldier of the
International NATO Force was killed there, you know, and need
not put it into comparison with things further eastward.
There are many things going for finding the resolution. We
need patience at a time where we're all impatient to see
success in the unfinished business and that is why we have to
stay the course. We, of course, in the region have to do the
hard work of change, of democratic reform, of judicial reform,
rule of law. We know that that's the only way we will advance,
but we need you to be there for us to support this forward-
movement and to actually incite at certain moments, whether
it's putting the heat on, as Ambassador Volker says, or any
other metaphor.
I think it's basically working with your friends to incite
them to continue where they've already begun walking.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, both, very much for your
insights. I know we could go on much longer, but a vote has
been called. So Senator Voinovich and I are going to have to go
vote.
Thank you, all, very much for joining us and we look
forward to your continued advice and counsel.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 pm the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
[From the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 15, 2010]
Unfinished Work in the Balkans
on the cusp of a europe whole and free, now is not the time to risk
hard-earned gains in southeastern europe
(By Jeanne Shaheen and George Voinovich)
After two devastating world wars on the European continent, the
United States and its trans-Atlantic allies made a difficult but strong
commitment to build a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. This
historic endeavor has not been easy, and it has come with extraordinary
effort, time, and cost. Although the U.S. has made tremendous progress
over the past 60 years, the job is not yet finished.
The Western Balkans remains the missing piece of the puzzle in
Europe, and its integration into trans-Atlantic institutions remains a
critical and elusive goal. Based on our meetings with leaders in the
region last month, when we visited Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Macedonia, and Serbia, we believe it is vital that the U.S. and Europe
renew their commitment to this joint vision of a united Europe.
It is only 15 years now since Bosnia was delivered from war, and
only 10 years since NATO bombs stopped falling on Belgrade. In that
short time, the region has taken momentous steps away from its troubled
history. Most countries have now charted a realistic path for future
membership in NATO and the EU. But while the U.S. and Europe are on the
cusp of realizing their vision and reaping the benefits of their
significant investments in this region, this is an extremely sensitive
time in the Western Balkans. None of the backers of this project can
let their attention drift or their commitment fade.
The situation in Bosnia remains a serious concern. To rise above
its recent past, Bosnia needs to undertake some significant political
and constitutional reforms. But politicians continue to use fear and
division as a tool for consolidating political power--no matter the
cost to their country. In Sarajevo, we sat down with a group of
university students, and it was clear that the next generation of
Bosnians have little confidence in their political leaders to meet the
country's considerable challenges. It was disheartening to hear their
unanimous distrust of Bosnia's politicians and their pessimism about
the leadership's ability to move beyond the petty differences of the
past.
With an upcoming election in the fall, Bosnia's current political
situation does not bode well for real change in the near future.
However, we believe that a well-timed expression of support from the
Euro-Atlantic community could push the debate in the right direction in
the months before the election. A commitment to bring Bosnia into the
Euro-Atlantic sphere through the NATO Membership Action Plan process,
along with a European Union visa-liberalization agreement, could
undermine those political leaders exploiting fear and uncertainty and
who would poison the well of European integration. A strong signal now
could remind the people of Bosnia that their future is in Europe, and
that they should choose leaders willing to bring them there.
Aside from Bosnia, the situation between Kosovo and Serbia remains
a possible flash-point for the region. There is little doubt that the
dream of a united Europe will not be realized without Serbia playing a
leading role in the neighborhood. To its great credit, the Serbian
leadership has demonstrated its commitment to European institutions.
However, differences over Kosovo remain a stumbling block for continued
advancement. Though Belgrade and Pristina have mutual disagreements,
it's hardly unrealistic to hope for a creative, pragmatic, and
sustainable solution that best protects and improves the lives of all
ethnicities throughout the region.
One key contribution the trans-Atlantic alliance has made is to the
region's ongoing security. Since 1999, NATO troops in Kosovo have
played an integral role in establishing a secure environment there. We
heard from leaders across the Western Balkans, without exception, that
the situation remains too uncertain for the force to be withdrawn or
reduced. Although we understand the need for additional peacekeeping
forces around the world, now is not the time to risk hard-earned gains
in southeastern Europe.
Outside the region, Brussels will play an integral role in the
coming months and years. The perception of so-called ``enlargement
fatigue'' from the EU is a real danger. The worry that there will be no
viable EU membership path for the Western Balkan countries could
undermine their reform agenda, and stop the positive momentum we have
seen in recent years. If the U.S. is to help keep these countries
moving towards European integration, we will need high level support
from Brussels and our European allies.
It is incumbent upon all of the countries in southeastern Europe to
play a constructive role in helping the region as a whole move forward.
All of these countries need to recognize that they are all connected.
None of them will find success and progress if any one of them are left
behind. They have a shared history, and they all will have a shared
future tied to Europe.
The countries comprising southeastern Europe are a vibrant
kaleidoscope of histories, cultures, and religions, a mosaic of
differences that has in the past been hijacked by political leaders and
exploited to bring about division and war. The people of this region
have an opportunity to turn the page on a difficult past and embark on
a new chapter in their shared history. America and Europe have a chance
to help them realize these dreams, but more importantly to realize our
own mutual vision of a united, peaceful Europe. We have invested so
much in this effort. Now is not the time to lose sight of that vision.
______
Responses of Hon. Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for
Europe and Eurasian Affairs, to Questions Submitted by Senator John
Kerry
Question. In your testimony, you stated that two primary obstacles
presently preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina from entry into a NATO
Membership Action Plan (MAP) are continued disagreement among Bosnia's
leaders on the dispensation of defense property and disposal of the
country's unstable munitions and light weapons stockpiles. The Peace
Implementation Council also has stated repeatedly that a decision by
Bosnia's Government on defense property is one of the objectives that
must be fulfilled before the closure of the Office of the High
Representative (OHR).
Other important issues that have affected Bosnia's progress toward
NATO are the decisionmaking process on national security issues of the
country's tripartite Presidency and related reforms to the country's
council of ministers. Broader reforms to Bosnia's state institutions
have also been raised in the context of NATO integration. A prospective
country's ability to contribute to NATO missions and exercises remains
a significant metric the alliance uses when considering a MAP.
What led to the prioritization of resolving defense property
and the undisposed munitions when formulating the requirements
of a MAP for Bosnia? Does the United States consider reforms to
Bosnia's Government and its contributions to NATO missions to
fall outside the consideration of granting a MAP?
Is the ``5+2'' conditionality for the closure of OHR
insufficient to incentivize Bosnia's leaders to agree on
defense property? Is the apparent addition of the prospect of a
MAP to incentivize a resolution on defense property a
recognition that the international community's conditionality
has opposite effects among the leaders of Bosnia's constituent
peoples?
Answer. The issues of movable (surplus weapons and ammunition) and
immovable (land, buildings) defense property have been pending
resolution since the passage of the 2005 Law on Defense, which created
the unified Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both were key
objectives identified by the Bosnian Government in its Individual
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP).
On April 14, the Bosnian Tri-Presidency agreed on a plan to destroy
all of the country's surplus weapons and ammunition as well as to
contribute up to 100 infantry troops in support of ISAF. We supported
these decisions on their own merits, and also as an indication of the
kind of decisions that Bosnia needs to be able to make to succeed in
NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. However, immovable
property issues remain unresolved. On this basis, allies agreed at the
April 22-23 informal Foreign Ministerial in Tallinn to invite Bosnia
into MAP, but to condition submission of its first Annual National
Program on resolution of immovable defense property.
We believe all parties in Bosnia continue to have a strong
incentive to meet the ``5+2'' requirements, which includes resolution
of defense property issues, for closure of the Office of the High
Representative (OHR). The EU has made clear that Bosnia will be unable
to achieve membership candidacy status until OHR has closed. All of the
major political parties in Bosnia and the vast majority of Bosnian
citizens have identified EU integration as a top priority.
Question. Why did the recent U.S.- and EU-led negotiations at Camp
Butmir on government reform and the closure of OHR come to a
standstill? Every major Bosnian politician rejected the first U.S.
package, which reportedly was offered on a ``take it or leave it
basis.'' Later negotiations would also see the rejection of a second,
negotiable, U.S. and EU package--why? Did the United States attempt to
accomplish too much on the issue of reforming Bosnia's Government
instead of focusing on fulfillment of the objectives and conditions for
OHR's closure?
Answer. After several rounds of meetings with all of the parties,
including three visits to Sarajevo by Deputy Secretary Steinberg, it
became clear that the parties were unable to make the necessary
compromises to reach agreement. With the exception of SDA President
Sulejman Tihic, the party leaders did not demonstrate the required
flexibility during the talks. Several party leaders made clear to us
that their views and willingness to compromise were affected by
electoral considerations in advance of the October 2010 general
elections.
The 5+2 criteria for OHR closure were integral elements of the
proposed package. While constitutional reform is not part of the 5+2
agenda, some of the parties expressed concern about the functionality
of the State after OHR closure and indicated that progress on
constitutional reform would facilitate agreement on 5+2. Constitutional
reforms also are needed for Bosnia to become a credible candidate for
EU and NATO membership. Looking ahead, together with our EU partners,
we will continue to foster dialogue with party leaders to maintain
focus on reforms necessary for Euro-Atlantic integration, including
constitutional reform, and promote a nonnationalist, issues-based
election campaign.
Question. What powers should OHR's eventual EU-only replacement
have? Should a future EU representative have certain ``executive''
powers that the high representative currently exercises under Annex 10
of the Dayton agreement? What would be the mandate of such a
``reinforced'' EU special representative? Should some of OHR's
executive powers be vested in Bosnia's domestic judicial system?
Answer. The issue of the EU Special Representative (EUSR)'s role
following the closure of the Office of the High Representative, as well
as the High Representative's Dayton authorities post-OHR, remains under
discussion in the Peace Implementation Council and within the EU. We
have stressed to the EU the importance of ensuring the EUSR have
sufficient authorities to maintain stability and facilitate cooperation
among the Bosnians after OHR closes. In the meantime, we continue to
support the OHR and its efforts to resolve the outstanding 5+2
criteria, contribute to a positive election campaign and foster
stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina ahead of the October elections.
Question. Serbia's President Boris Tadic has made repeated
statements in support of Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity
in compliance with the Dayton Agreement. Despite these statements,
Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik continues to make worrying moves
that hint of outright secession. How much influence does Serbia have on
Dodik's actions? Are Dodik's threats credible or is he trying to
position himself with his constituents and assume a maximalist position
in future negotiations with other Bosnian leaders on the powers of the
state?
Answer. Serbia has publicly committed itself, as a signatory of the
Dayton Accords, to uphold it and oppose any changes to the Dayton
framework without agreement between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.
President Tadic has repeatedly made constructive statements to this
effect and has emphasized Bosnia-Herzegovina's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. In light of Serbia's historical ties to Bosnia
and its European aspirations, Serbia can and should play an important
role in assisting the parties to reach viable, long-term solutions that
enhance Bosnia's stability and Euro-Atlantic integration. President
Tadic and Foreign Minister Jeremic have engaged with Milorad Dodik and
other parties on constitutional reform to encourage them to engage in
real dialogue. We encourage the Serbian leadership to continue to play
a constructive role on these issues.
I look forward to working together with the Serbian leadership to
encourage reforms and promote reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We
too remain committed to upholding the framework established by the
Dayton Accords, strengthening State institutions, and maintaining the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are
also determined, along with the EU and the international community, to
protect the integrity of the Dayton Accords and State institutions
against any attempts to undermine them.
Question. The European Commission's Enlargement Strategy and Main
Challenges 2009-10 report found that ``Montenegro will need to
demonstrate concrete results regarding consolidation of the rule of
law, particularly on judicial reform and the fight against
corruption.'' In December 2009, NATO offered Montenegro a MAP.
A. What progress has Montenegro made in the fight against
corruption and organized crime? How did such progress affect
the alliance's decision to offer Montenegro a MAP?
B. Are you satisfied with Montenegro's cooperation with the
United States, the EU, Serbia, Croatia, and other countries in
the fight against narcotics and organized crime? How would you
characterize Montenegro's participation in the search for Darko
Sari?, who was recently indicted by the Serbian Prosecutor's
Office for Organized Crime and whom some allege is hiding in
Montenegro?
Answer A. Montenegro, like other countries aspiring to join NATO
and the EU, must meet the rigid membership standards of the two
organizations. This means that Montenegro must demonstrate its capacity
to fight organized crime and corruption and to bolster public
confidence in its justice sector institutions. The Government of
Montenegro recognizes the fight against organized crime and corruption
as a key priority and is making significant progress in implementing
its multiyear strategy to reform the judiciary and strengthen the rule
of law, as demonstrated by the new Criminal Procedure Code and the
creation of an interagency taskforce--supported by the President and
Prime Minister--to fight organized crime and corruption. More work
remains to be done, of course, but we believe Montenegro is on the
right track, and the United States stands ready to help bilaterally and
through Montenegro's cooperation with NATO.
We are already helping Montenegro on this front through various
assistance programs aimed at strengthening Montenegro's criminal
justice system, establishing more transparency in its institutions, and
expanding the role of civil society and the media in this effort. In
fact, more than half our current assistance to Montenegro is for rule
of law programs. As a participant in NATO's Membership Action Plan
(MAP), Montenegro has set reform objectives across a broad spectrum of
areas, including judicial and rule of law, and is working with the
Alliance to implement them. In fact, we have tripled assistance to
Montenegro in the areas of Democracy & Rule of Law in the last 3 years.
Answer B. We continue to encourage Montenegro, Serbia, Croatia, and
other countries in the region to cooperate with each other as well as
with the United States and European Union in the fight against
organized crime and corruption. We coordinate closely with our
international partners in this effort, and we stand ready to help all
of these countries as they strengthen their cooperation. Senior
Government of Montenegro officials have issued public and private
assurances that Saric will be arrested if located on Montenegro's
territory.
Question. The Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (MAOC), based
in Lisbon, Portugal, coordinates antinarcotics efforts with several EU
Member States. The United States participates in MAOC through a joint
interagency task force. What is MAOC's relationship with Montenegro?
Does Montenegro adequately patrol its maritime borders to protect
against the inflow of narcotics?
Answer. Southern Europe has long been a conduit for illicit drug
shipments destined for Western European markets. Montenegro is part of
this traditional ``Balkans Route'' for Afghan heroin and, similarly, is
a pathway for the growing trade in South American cocaine--including
shipments transiting West Africa. To counter the surge in trafficking
from Africa and South America, seven European Union Member States
(France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom) developed the Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-
Narcotics (MAOC) in Lisbon, Portugal. The Center coordinates the aerial
detection and monitoring and maritime interdiction operations of the
participating nations while maintaining seamless coordination with USG
counterparts.
Montenegro is not a member of MAOC, nor does it have the capacity
to perform aerial surveillance or maritime interdiction operations on
the high seas. Nevertheless, the Government of Montenegro does
participate in regional law enforcement coordination efforts in
southern Europe. Bilaterally, the USG provides significant law
enforcement assistance to the Government of Montenegro, including
maritime border enforcement training. The Department of Defense has
provided support for an electronic surveillance radar system to monitor
ship traffic.
Question. How do you think Serbia's Government will react to the
nonbinding opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the
legality of Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence? Do you think
Serbia's pro-Western government is seeking a favorable opinion so
Serbia can proceed with EU integration, or might the government use the
opinion to seek an agreement on Kosovo's status? What could such a deal
look like? If territorial discussions involving Serbia and Kosovo are
conducted on the basis of seeking mutual agreement between two
sovereign states, would an agreement produced by such a process set a
dangerous precedent elsewhere in the region?
Answer. We have made quite clear to the Serbian Government our
position firmly opposing new status talks or any partition of Kosovo.
With Kosovo's independence in February 2008, the final chapter in the
breakup of the former Yugoslavia was closed. Kosovo's status is
irreversible and its borders are settled. Attempts to foment partition
or to divide the Balkans along ethnic lines could endanger peace and
stability in Kosovo and the region. Kosovo has established a
multiethnic democracy and a progressive Constitution, and is committed
to governing itself in a way that is responsive to all its citizens.
Question. In December 2009, Serge Brammertz, chief prosecutor of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
stated before the U.N. Security Council that Serbia's cooperation with
the tribunal ``has continued to progress'' and that ``Serbia must
maintain these efforts with the clear objective of apprehending the
fugitives,'' which includes ICTY-indicted war criminal Ratko Mladic.
Has Serbia maintained these efforts since December 2009? Do you expect
Brammertz to find Serbia in full compliance with the ICTY when he next
reports to the U.N.? How would such a report affect Serbia's EU
negotiations with or without the apprehension of Mladic?
Answer. The current government, led by President Tadic, has made
progress on cooperation with the ICTY, including the July 2008 arrest
in Belgrade of former Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic. Karadzic
is now on trial in The Hague. The Serbian Government has declared ICTY
cooperation, including the capture and transfer to The Hague of
remaining war crimes fugitives, to be one of its top priorities.
President Tadic has directed his National Security Council to make the
hunt for fugitives its primary focus. While ICTY Chief Prosecutor Serge
Brammertz reported in December 2009 that he was satisfied with the
current level of Serbia's cooperation, he ``insist[ed] that Serbia
maintain these efforts in order to achieve additional positive
results,'' and we support this position. Of particular importance,
Belgrade must ensure that the two remaining ICTY fugitives, former
Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic and former Croatian Serb leader Goran
Hadzic, are apprehended and transferred to The Hague. Our expectations
remain that Belgrade will continue to focus on cooperation with the
ICTY and that the remaining indictees will be arrested and transferred
to The Hague.
Question. Please assess Russia's relations with Serbia and Croatia.
Is Russia a historical ally of Serbia or is their current partnership
based on energy, investment, and common cause over Kosovo? What are
Russia's intentions in its recent acquisition of and agreements with
Serbian and Croatian energy companies? How might Croatia's 2010 signing
of an agreement of intent to join Russia's South Stream pipeline
project affect the Nabucco project and diversification of Europe's
energy supply?
Answer. Russia can claim historical ties and ongoing bilateral
cooperation with both Serbia and Croatia. We support healthy, balanced
relationships with Russia for Serbia and Croatia, along with good ties
to other European neighbors. Serbia and Russia have active economic
relations which have faltered somewhat due to the global economic
crisis. Russia is Serbia's second largest trading partner (after
Germany), and has agreed to provide Serbia an approximately $200
million loan for budget support. The most significant area of defense
cooperation between Serbia and Russia is maintenance and training for
the Soviet-era planes and other military equipment that Serbia still
uses. The respective Ministries of Defense maintain a regular dialogue,
and Serbia periodically sends students to Russian military academies.
Russia has conducted several high-profile de-mining operations to
remove unexploded ordnance (UXO) dating from the Kosovo conflict.
During President Medvedev's October 2009 visit to Belgrade, the Serbian
Ministry of Interior and the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations
agreed to establish a regional humanitarian crisis response center in
Nis, Serbia that would involve other Balkan countries and be dedicated
primarily to fighting forest fires.
Energy issues are a major focus of Zagreb's engagement with Moscow.
Russia remains a major supplier of Croatian gas imports, and Croatia
and Russia are currently in discussions on an extension of gas supply
contracts. Russian exports of gas are likely to be a longstanding
feature of Croatia's energy supplies, but the Croatian Government is
well aware of the benefits of having diversity in energy sources, as
reflected by their plans for an LNG terminal and the nearly complete
gas interconnector with Hungary. With regard to South Stream, various
countries have signed MOUs with Russia on this pipeline project. We do
not oppose South Stream, but we do have some questions about its
economic viability. We do believe that Nabucco will positively
contribute to Europe's energy security.
Question. Please assess Turkey's foreign policy in the Western
Balkans, especially toward Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.
Are ongoing Turkish initiatives in the region consistent with
traditional Turkish foreign policy toward Europe, or more similar to
Turkey's so-called neo-Ottomanism in the Near East and elsewhere? How
has Turkey facilitated rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia? How
does Turkey's involvement in the region affect its EU membership
aspirations?
Answer. Turkey is a strategic partner and NATO ally of the United
States. The Government of Turkey's foreign policy of ``zero problems''
with neighbors has served to complement our efforts in many areas,
namely Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the Balkans.
As part of its efforts to enhance regional cooperation, increase
trade, and advocate the region's Euro-Atlantic integration, Turkey is
focused on the Balkans and, in particular, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey
strongly advocated in favor of NATO's decision to grant Bosnia entry
into the Membership Action Plan at the April NATO Informal Foreign
Ministerial in Estonia. In addition, Turkey helped establish trilateral
mechanisms with Serbia and Bosnia as well as with Croatia and Bosnia to
further regional cooperation, with regular meetings held since October
2009. The Turkey-Bosnia-Serbia trilateral process helped facilitate the
normalization of relations and exchange of Ambassadors between Bosnia
and Serbia. Turkey's chairmanship of the South-East European
Cooperation Process (SEECP) until June 2010 is another example of
Turkey's constructive role in the region. Turkey has also recognized
Kosovo.
______
Responses of Hon. Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, to Questions Submitted by Senator
John Kerry
Question. In your testimony, you stated that two primary obstacles
presently preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina from entry into a NATO
Membership Action Plan (MAP) are continued disagreement among Bosnia's
leaders on the dispensation of defense property and disposal of the
country's unstable munitions and light weapons stockpiles. In your
prepared remarks, you wrote that ``[t]here are indications that a
solution...may finally be at hand'' to the issue of the un-disposed
armaments. The Peace Implementation Council also has stated repeatedly
that a decision by Bosnia's government on defense property is one of
the objectives that must be fulfilled before the closure of the Office
of the High Representative (OHR).
Other important issues that have affected Bosnia's progress toward
NATO are the decision-making process on national security issues of the
country's tripartite presidency and related reforms to the country's
council of ministers. Broader reforms to Bosnia's state institutions
have also been raised in the context of NATO integration. A prospective
country's ability to contribute to NATO missions and exercises remains
a significant metric the alliance uses when considering a MAP.
What led to the prioritization of resolving defense property and
the un-disposed munitions when formulating the requirements of a MAP
for Bosnia? Does the U.S. consider reforms to Bosnia's government and
its contributions to NATO missions to fall outside the consideration of
granting a MAP?
Is the ``5+2'' conditionality for the closure of OHR insufficient
to incentivize Bosnia's leaders to agree on defense property? Is the
apparent addition of the prospect of a MAP to incentivize a resolution
on defense property a recognition that the international community's
conditionality has opposite effects among the leaders of Bosnia's
constituent peoples?
Answer. The Department of Defense concurs fully with the answer
provided to this question by the Department of State (See above).
The remark that a ``solution.may finally be at hand'' referred to
the anticipated Bosnian Tri-Presidency decision on the disposal of
movable property (surplus weapons and ammunition). That decision,
issued on the evening of April 14, approved the destruction of all of
Bosnia's surplus light weapons, high risk ammunition, mines and
explosives.
Question. Why did the recent U.S.- and EU-led negotiations at Camp
Butmir on government reform and the closure of OHR come to a
standstill? Every major Bosnian politician rejected the first U.S.
package, which reportedly was offered on a ``take-it-or-leave-it
basis.'' Later negotiations would also see the rejection of a second,
negotiable, U.S. and EU package--why? Did the U.S. attempt to
accomplish too much on the issue of reforming Bosnia's government
instead of focusing on fulfillment of the objectives and conditions for
OHR's closure?
Answer. The Department of Defense concurs fully with the answer
provided to this question by the Department of State (See above).
Question. In your testimony, you stated that Serbia eventually must
``choose'' between its EU aspirations and its opposition to Kosovo's
independence, and that its attempt ``to do both is unsustainable.''
However, Vice President Biden stated in May 2009 that the U.S. and
Serbia ``can agree to disagree'' on the issue of Kosovo and that the
U.S. ``will use our influence, our energy and our resources to promote
Serbia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.''How do you reconcile your
statements with the Vice President's remarks? Do your remarks represent
the position of the Department of Defense? Do they signal a departure
from current U.S. policy?
Answer. My statement that Serbia cannot both ``move toward the
European future it says it desires'' and ``be mired in an obsession
with the past'' is neither a departure from current U.S. policy nor a
contradiction of Vice President Biden's statement. While the U.S. does
not expect Serbia to recognize Kosovo independence, we want to see
Serbian leadership cease its attempts to undermine stability in Kosovo
and work with Pristina, the United States and the European Union to
find pragmatic solutions that would improve the life of all Kosovo
residents. This is essential to Serbia's EU future - the EU stated in
its Partnership Document with Serbia that one of its key priorities for
engagement is that Serbia ``cooperates constructively on matters
relating to Kosovo.''
Question. In your testimony, you stated that ``[f]ighting organized
crime and corruption remain key challenges for Montenegro as it
progresses on its Euro-Atlantic integration path.'' The European
Commission's Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010 found
that ``Montenegro will need to demonstrate concrete results regarding
consolidation of the rule of law, particularly on judicial reform and
the fight against corruption.'' In December 2009, NATO offered
Montenegro a MAP. What progress has Montenegro made in the fight
against corruption and organized crime? How did such progress affect
the alliance's decision to offer Montenegro a MAP?Are you satisfied
with Montenegro's cooperation with the U.S., the EU, Serbia, Croatia
and other countries in the fight against narcotics and organized crime?
How would you characterize Montenegro's participation in the search for
Darko Saric, who was recently indicted by the Serbian Prosecutor's
Office for Organised Crime and whom some allege is hiding in
Montenegro?
Answer. The Department of Defense concurs fully with the answer
provided to this question by the Department of State (See above).
Question. The Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (MAOC), based
in Lisbon, Portugal, coordinates anti-narcotics efforts with several EU
member states. The U.S. participates in MAOC through a joint
interagency task force. What is MAOC's relationship with Montenegro?
Does Montenegro adequately patrol its maritime borders to protect
against the inflow of narcotics?
Answer. The Department of Defense concurs fully with the answer
provided to this question by the Department of State (See above).