    [Senate Hearing 111-649]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 111-649

          NEW BORDER WAR: CORRUPTION OF U.S. OFFICIALS BY DRUG CARTELS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                      AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL,
                AND PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                             HOMELAND SECURITY AND
                              GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 11, 2010

                                   __________

           Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                            and Governmental Affairs

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    58-385 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2010
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    20402-0001

            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    MARK l. PRYOR, Arkansas              GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    JON TESTER, Montana
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
    MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado

                      Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
         Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                      Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk

     AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, AND PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS
                                AND INTEGRATION

                       MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    JON TESTER, Montana                  LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
                         Kristin Sharp, Staff Director
                     Mike McBride, Minority Staff Director
                           Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Pryor................................................     1

                                   WITNESSES
                            Thursday, March 11, 2010

    Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative
      Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of
      Justice........................................................     3
    Thomas M. Frost, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations,
      Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
      Security.......................................................     4
    James F. Tomsheck, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal
      Affairs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of
      Homeland Security..............................................     6

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Frost, Thomas M.:
        Testimony....................................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................    23
    Perkins, Kevin L.:
        Testimony....................................................     3
        Prepared statement...........................................    19
    Tomsheck, James F.:
        Testimony....................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................    30

                                    APPENDIX

    Chart entitled ``CBP Growth: Staffing Levels FY 2004-2009,''
      submitted by Mr. Tomsheck......................................    32
    Chart entitled ``Cities Reporting the Presence of Mexican Drug
      Trafficking Organizations,'' submitted by Mr. Tomsheck.........    33
    Chart entitled ``CBP Corruption Related Arrests FY 2005 to
      Present,'' submitted by Mr. Tomsheck...........................    34
    Questions and responses submitted for the Record from:
        Mr. Perkins..................................................    35
        Mr. Tomsheck.................................................    37
        Mr. Frost....................................................    40

          NEW BORDER WAR: CORRUPTION OF U.S. OFFICIALS BY DRUG CARTELS

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010

                                     U.S. Senate,
                 Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and
               Private Sector Preparedness and Integration,
                        of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:07 a.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark L.
    Pryor, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senator Pryor.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR

        Senator Pryor. I will go ahead and call the Subcommittee to
    order. I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming to the
    Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness
    and Integration. We are meeting in the Homeland Security and
    Governmental Affairs Committee room. I want to thank all of you
    for being here and participating. What I would like to do is go
    ahead and give my opening statement--Senator Ensign is on his
    way, and maybe a couple of others; I am not quite sure--and
    then I will turn it over to the witnesses. Then we will ask
    questions.
        Let me start just with a couple of facts. Fact No. 1 is
    that Mexico ships over 50 percent of the methamphetamine and
    marijuana into the U.S. market. Over 50 percent of it comes
    from Mexico. And 90 percent of the cocaine in the United States
    comes from Mexico. That is about a $25 billion industry in
    Mexico, drugs, and drug trade.
        As a result of that, fact No. 2 would be that the U.S.
    border defenses have beefed up, and they have tried to squeeze
    these drug routes, which has been good, and to some extent that
    has been effective. But to gain an advantage, the cartels have
    begun to infiltrate U.S. law enforcement. I think that is very
    troubling for the Senate, and it is very troubling for most
    Americans, and it is troubling for those agencies.
        Our review suggests that the cartels are broadly targeting
    Federal border law enforcement as well as State and local
    governments. We are not going to focus on State and local
    today, but we have to acknowledge that is a large concern as
    well, and we will be working with the Federal agencies and the
    State and local governments to try to get a better handle on
    this and work through good strategies on how we can prevent
    this from happening.
        The Border Patrol seems to be the biggest target and have
    the most corruption. A news report recently said that there has
    been a 40-percent increase in U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) corruption arrests and there are dozens of
    open investigations. Other possible Federal targets would be
    the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Federal Bureau
    of Investigation (FBI), Transportation Security Administration
    (TSA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and probably a
    few more. But they seem to be less vulnerable, and I am
    assuming that is because the CBP is on the front line and they
    are the face of our border; and it has doubled its size in 10
    years with a lot of new people coming, new faces, and new
    personnel. I think we are starting to see some problems as a
    result of that.
        Our review suggests that CBP may not be using all of the
    accepted tools to screen job applicants. I think they have a
    goal of polygraphing all job applicants, but today they are
    only doing about 10 percent. So we want to talk about that
    today. And this is not just drugs, but there are guns and money
    that are moving across the border; largely from north to south
    across the border. And there is always the possibility of
    terrorists coming into the country if we have a weakened
    border.
        So these cartels in Mexico are very powerful. We should not
    underestimate their ability to try to corrupt U.S. law
    enforcement agencies. Right now we think that the Mexican drug
    cartels have drug operations in 230 U.S. cities. Three of those
    happen to be in my State: Fort Smith, Fayetteville, and Little
    Rock. And also in 2009, the statistics indicate that there were
    6,500 drug war-related deaths in Mexico.
        So this is a very serious problem. It is on our border.
    There is a war going on down around the border and in Mexico
    related to the drug cartels.
        What I would like to do now is go ahead and give a brief
    introduction for each of our witnesses, and I appreciate you
    all for being here. And in a few moments, when Senator Ensign
    comes, if he wants to make an opening statement, that would be
    great.
        What we are going to do is we are going to leave the record
    open for a week or 2 weeks for some of the Senators who could
    not be here today because of other committee hearings and what
    is going on on the floor, so we may have some written questions
    that we would ask you to follow up on.
        Our first witness is Kevin Perkins, the Assistant Director
    of the Criminal Investigative Division at the FBI. He began his
    career as a special agent in 1986 and has served in operational
    and investigative positions focusing extensively on white-
    collar crime and public corruption. The FBI has established
    several interagency Border Corruption Task Forces designed to
    bring local, State, and Federal parties together as needed to
    coordinate efforts on border-related corruption, but I
    understand your real claim to fame is you are from Mountain
    Home, Arkansas?
        Mr. Perkins. Graduated in 1978.
        Senator Pryor. There you go. We can talk more about that in
    a few minutes, but thank you. That is great.
        Mr. Perkins. Yes, sir.
        Senator Pryor. Our second witness will be Tom Frost. He is
    the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations of the
    Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Frost has been involved in
    and has served as a Federal law enforcement officer since 1976
    in a variety of investigative, protective, and leadership
    roles.
        And then our third witness today is James Tomsheck. He is
    the Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Internal Affairs at
    CBP. Mr. Tomsheck is a former Deputy Assistant Director of the
    Office of Investigations at the U.S. Secret Service as well as
    the former Deputy Assistant Director of the Office of
    Government and Public Affairs. The Office of Internal Affairs
    has developed and implemented a comprehensive integrity
    strategy designed to prevent, detect, and investigate all
    threats to the integrity of the CBP.
        With that, what I would like to do is call on Mr. Perkins,
    and what we are going to do is if you could limit your remarks
    to 5 minutes, please understand that we will put your written
    statements in the record, so that will be part of the record.
    But if you could limit your statements to 5 minutes, that would
    be perfect.
        Mr. Perkins.

    TESTIMONY OF KEVIN L. PERKINS,\1\ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL
     INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
                         DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

        Mr. Perkins. Good morning, Chairman Pryor. I am pleased to
    be here today to discuss the FBI's efforts to combat public
    corruption.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Perkins appears in the Appendix
    on page 19.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The FBI recognizes that fighting public corruption is vital
    to preserving our democracy, protecting our borders, and
    securing our communities. In fact, it is our top criminal
    priority following only the national security priorities of
    counterterrorism, counter-intelligence, and cyber crimes.
        We are directing resources to root out public corruption
    all across the country, but we cannot, and fortunately do not
    have to, do it alone. We rely heavily on our partners at all
    levels of law enforcement.
        Through our vigilance, we have achieved some notable
    successes. In the past 2 years alone, our efforts have helped
    convict 1,600 Federal, State, and local officials. We have
    approximately 2,500 pending corruption investigations ongoing
    today.
        The Southwest border is a particular focus of our
    corruption-fighting efforts. Of the 700 agents leading our
    charge against corruption, approximately 120 of those are
    working along our U.S. Southwest border.
        Our 12 Southwest Border Corruption Task Forces share
    information with the Southwest Intelligence Group, the El Paso
    Intelligence Center, and our Mexican legal attaches to both
    identify and disrupt Mexican drug-trafficking organizations
    from utilizing and soliciting U.S. public officials to commit
    criminal activities.
        One particular case highlights the potential national
    security implications of public corruption along our Nation's
    borders. In that case, an individual gained employment as a
    border inspector for the specific purpose of trafficking in
    drugs. Through our collaborative efforts and a year-long
    investigation, this public official pled guilty to one count of
    conspiracy to import more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana
    into the United States while at the same time receiving more
    than $5 million in bribe payments. This individual has since
    been sentenced to 20 years in Federal prison.
        While the threat posed in the region is real, the Southwest
    border is not and should not remain the only focus of our
    efforts. Each day the Federal Government is charged with
    protecting over 7,000 miles of land bordering Canada and Mexico
    and over 300 ports of entry across the United States. Each of
    these entry points has the potential for criminal and/or
    terrorist organizations to exploit corrupt officials willing to
    misuse their official positions for financial or personal gain.
        In fiscal year 2009 alone, FBI field offices along the
    Nation's Canadian border conducted nearly 300 public corruption
    investigations.
        The FBI has recognized the very real threat public
    corruption poses at our Nation's borders and ports of entry. We
    are working lock-step with our law enforcement partners to
    address that threat. At FBI Headquarters, for example, we have
    established our National Border Corruption Task Force.
    Consisting of representatives of the FBI, U.S. Department of
    Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Customs
    and Border Protection-Internal Affairs, and the Transportation
    Security Administration, this task force ensures general
    guidance and oversight of border corruption programs ongoing
    across the country.
        Through trend analysis, intelligence and information
    sharing, and the utilization of lessons learned and best
    practices, we are uniquely positioned to address the very real
    threat of border corruption and the risk it poses to our
    national security.
        To that end, our National Border Corruption Task Force is
    coordinating with other impacted divisions at FBI Headquarters.
    These include the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence, the
    Counterintelligence Division, the Counterterrorism Division,
    and our Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. By working
    together, sharing information, and becoming more creative in
    our approach, we are making great strides.
        I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify
    before you today and share some of the FBI's work in combating
    public corruption, and I will be able to answer your questions
    at the appropriate time. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you. Mr. Frost.

     TESTIMONY OF THOMAS M. FROST,\1\ ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL
         FOR INVESTIGATIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Frost. Chairman Pryor, thank you for the opportunity to
    discuss the work of the Department of Homeland Security Office
    of Inspector General. As Assistant Inspector General for
    Investigations, my office is responsible for investigating all
    allegations of DHS employee criminal misconduct, including
    those related to the security of the Nation's borders.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Frost appears in the Appendix on
    page 23.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Our mission, in part, is to strengthen the effectiveness
    and efficiency of DHS by conducting investigations and
    exercising oversight that will help protect the Nation from
    dangerous people and dangerous things. The OIG reports both to
    the Secretary and the Congress, and our position provides
    necessary objectivity to inspire the public trust and the
    confidence of the DHS workforce. We have a staff of highly
    trained and experienced criminal investigators deployed in 25
    offices in the United States and complemented by a staff of
    audit and inspection professionals.
        Border-related corruption is not limited to one DHS
    component. It can touch employees and contractors across DHS as
    well as employees of State and local governments.
        In fiscal year 2009, we opened over 839 criminal cases
    involving DHS employees and programs. Our investigations
    resulted in 313 arrests, 293 indictments, 281 convictions, and
    59 administrative actions.
        One of our strategies is to leverage existing resources and
    share intelligence through our working partnerships with the
    DEA, ICE, FBI, and others, and by participating on various task
    forces including the FBI's Border Corruption Task Force
    Initiative.
        Law enforcement has recognized that the smuggling of people
    and things across the border is large-scale business dominated
    by organized criminal enterprises. As we disrupt traditional
    smuggling routes and networks, organizations resort to
    alternative tactics, including bribing DHS employees,
    infiltrating our ranks, and engaging in fraudulent schemes to
    acquire immigration benefits. We have found the tactics used by
    the drug-trafficking organizations as they attempt to
    compromise our employees are similar to tactics used by foreign
    intelligence services to recruit spies.
        CBP staffing and funding levels have increased dramatically
    since 2003, creating the largest uniformed law enforcement
    agency in the country, an agency that, along with ICE, occupies
    the front line in securing our physical border.
        Since 2003, we have made arrests of 129 CBP officers and
    Border Patrol agents. For example, we recently arrested a CBP
    officer for alien and narcotic smuggling in a joint FBI
    investigation in Brownsville, Texas. The officer was sentenced
    to 135 months in Federal prison.
        As already noted, we are confronted with corruption in
    other layers of border security. Law enforcement officers from
    ICE and CBP have been corrupted for their access to sensitive
    law enforcement information. Drug-trafficking organizations
    have purchased information to vet their members, to track
    investigative activity, and to identify cooperating
    individuals.
        At international airports, or even on interstate highways,
    for that matter, you can have border corruption because these
    organizations need to move their product and proceeds further
    inland or out of the country. We have arrested TSA and other
    DHS employees as they smuggled narcotics and weapons onto
    aircrafts and even for selling TSA-screened baggage tags.
        As an example, we conducted an investigation with DEA of an
    ICE immigration enforcement agent who used his government
    credentials to bypass TSA security. We arrested him when he
    tried to smuggle 10 pounds of marijuana through the checkpoint
    in his carry-on luggage.
        Citizenship and Immigration Services employees are targeted
    because drug-trafficking organizations need to have personnel
    operating inside the United States to facilitate their
    business, and criminal organizations use corruption and fraud
    to obtain immigration benefits to place conspirators in
    position to assist their criminal enterprises.
        We have worked joint investigations along the Northern
    border with Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We have worked a
    case with the FBI where we arrested a Mexican chief of police
    who attempted to bribe a Border Patrol agent offering him
    $25,000 per load of marijuana. The police chief received a 90-
    month prison sentence.
        For all our successes, we recognize the need for continued
    improvement. We suggest increased suitability screening for
    prospective DHS employees, increased monitoring efforts on
    backgrounds of current employees, increased employee training
    through integrity briefings, enforcing administrative
    regulation, workplace rules, ensuring all relevant allegations
    are promptly and efficiently referred.
        Acts of corruption within the Department of Homeland
    Security represent a threat to our Nation and undermine the
    honest and hard-working employees of the Department.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will
    be pleased to answer any questions. Thank you.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you. Mr. Tomsheck.

      TESTIMONY OF JAMES F. TOMSHECK,\1\ ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
    OFFICE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
                  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Tomsheck. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
    to be here this morning and answer your questions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Tomsheck appears in the Appendix
    on page 30.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for
    securing our Nation's borders while at the same time
    facilitating the movement of legitimate travel and trade, both
    key components to our Nation's economy. Our purview spans more
    than 5,000 miles of border with Canada and 1,900 miles of
    border with Mexico. CBP is actually the largest law enforcement
    organization in the United States, comprised of 20,000 Border
    Patrol agents deployed between the ports of entry and over
    20,000 CBP officers actually stationed at the various land,
    air, and sea ports of entry throughout our country. They are
    joined by an 1,000-agent force of air and marine interdiction
    agents, whose job it is to implement the air and maritime
    responsibilities of CBP. There are an additional 2,300
    agricultural specialists and other professionals that bring the
    sum total of CBP staffing, as is reflected in the chart,\2\ to
    over 58,000 individuals.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The chart submitted by Senator Pryor appears in the Appendix on
    page 32.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A snapshot of what it is CBP is able to accomplish with
    that large workforce. In fiscal year 2009 alone, CBP processed
    more than 360 million pedestrians and passengers, 109 million
    conveyances, apprehended over 556,000 illegal aliens between
    our ports of entry, and encountered over 224,000 inadmissible
    aliens at our ports of entry. We also seized more than 5.2
    million pounds of illegal drugs. Every day, CBP processes over
    1 million travelers seeking to enter the United States by land,
    air, or sea.
        Unfortunately, we are encountering integrity challenges for
    any one of a number of reasons. We are the largest law
    enforcement agency in the country. For a large number of
    reasons, we are the most vulnerable to integrity threats. We
    deploy that very vulnerable workforce to the highest threat
    environment for integrity threats--our Southwest border that we
    share with the country of Mexico--and all of this is occurring
    at a point in time that transnational criminal organizations
    are doing all that they can to infiltrate CBP through our
    hiring initiatives and at the same time compromise our existing
    workforce through recruitment.
        The overwhelming majority of CBP employees routinely
    demonstrate the highest levels of integrity. Acts of
    corruption, unfortunately, do occur. Since October 1, 2004, 103
    of our agents or officers have been arrested for corruption.
    These charges include drug smuggling, alien smuggling, money
    laundering, and conspiracy.
        Corruption is an issue that CBP takes extremely seriously,
    and we are deeply concerned about our current state. CBP must
    ensure its employees adhere to a culture of integrity. Although
    the percentage of prosecutions for corruption is very small, no
    incident of corruption is tolerated.
        Please remember once again the overwhelming majority of CBP
    agents and officers perform their duties with honor and
    distinction. Those that do not put our country and our fellow
    agents and officers at risk.
        CBP's Office of Internal Affairs is fully committed to
    working in a cooperative and collaborative relationship with
    the FBI, DHS Office of Inspector General, Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement's Office of Professional Responsibility,
    and others to address all integrity-related issues within CBP.
    This layered approach we believe is the appropriate response to
    a multidimensional attack by those wishing to compromise our
    workforce.
        Placing the investigative resources of those agencies and
    our other key partners in the environment of the FBI-led Border
    Corruption Task Force (BCTF) facilitates the effective and
    efficient sharing of information and resources. The BCTFs also
    serve to deconflict investigations and enhance agent and
    officer safety issues and also assure that those cases
    presented for prosecution include all available evidence.
        Today CBP Office of Internal Affairs manages a wide array
    of integrity- and security-related functions or programs that
    combine to form, again, what you referred to as our
    comprehensive integrity strategy. This includes the three
    pillars of prevention, detection, and investigation--three
    initiatives that we believe are inextricably intertwined.
        Prevention, which is the prevention of bad people from
    entering CBP, we hope to accomplish through a combination of
    background investigations and the strategic application of the
    standard Federal law enforcement pre-employment polygraph
    examination, detection of bad people who have found their way
    into our workforce through a combination of research and all
    available information within the organization, and a careful
    analysis of our employees' behavior that may very well suggest
    integrity problems. Also, the use of periodic reinvestigations
    is a vital tool in the detection of corruption. Investigation
    of those bad people that have found their way into our
    workforce is accomplished in a partnership with the persons
    sitting here at the table with me and others not at this table
    but in this room.
        Our Investigative Operations Division is comprised of 214
    agents deployed to 22 locations currently there investigating
    in excess of 900 cases.
        Again, I very much appreciate the opportunity to be here
    this morning and look forward to answering your questions.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you very much. Let me follow up, if I
    can, Mr. Tomsheck, with you. I see this Customs and Border
    Protection chart we have here, and you can see the numbers have
    grown on this chart.\1\ I know there are a lot of good reasons
    why those numbers have grown, but my understanding is that the
    CBP policy is to do a polygraph on all the applicants.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The chart referred to submitted by Senator Pryor appears in the
    Appendix on page 32.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Tomsheck. That is our goal, sir.
        Senator Pryor. And my understanding is you are only doing
    about 10 percent right now. Is that right?
        Mr. Tomsheck. That is accurate. At this point we concluded
    calendar year 2009 testing closer to 15 percent of the
    applicant pool. That occurred because near the end of the year
    there was a dramatic decline in the size of the applicant pool.
    We are unable to deploy any additional polygraph examiners or
    agent polygraph examiners, but there were substantially fewer
    applicants to be tested in the final weeks of calendar year
    2009.
        Senator Pryor. And is the polygraphing a resource issue for
    you?
        Mr. Tomsheck. It is, sir.
        Senator Pryor. And of those who are polygraphed, what
    percentage are found unsuitable for service?
        Mr. Tomsheck. Approximately 60 percent.
        Senator Pryor. Sixty percent. Can we extrapolate from that,
    if there is 90 or even 85 percent of the folks that are on this
    chart that have not been polygraphed, maybe 60 percent of them
    might not pass the polygraph if they took the test?
        Mr. Tomsheck. We and others have done that analysis,
    Senator, and reached the same conclusion, that many of those
    persons hired during CBP's hiring initiatives who did not take
    a standard Federal law enforcement pre-employment polygraph
    exam may very well have entered into our workforce despite the
    fact that they were unsuitable.
        Senator Pryor. What can we do to address that with those
    employees now?
        Mr. Tomsheck. Again, it is our goal to reach that point
    that we are doing 100 percent polygraph screening of all of our
    applicant pool as soon as possible.
        Senator Pryor. How long will it take you to get to that
    goal?
        Mr. Tomsheck. At this point we are unable to expand our
    polygraph program beyond where it currently is staffed with 31
    agent examiners. It would require substantially more examiners
    to be certain that we would have adequate resources to screen
    just for that hiring that may occur by virtue of attrition
    within our workforce.
        Senator Pryor. Do you know how many more examiners you
    would need?
        Mr. Tomsheck. Approximately 50.
        Senator Pryor. And would those have to be full-time, or
    could you do them on a contract basis to get rid of the
    backlog?
        Mr. Tomsheck. We would have to utilize full-time employees
    to accomplish those polygraph exams. There are fairly rigid
    requirements associated with not allowing contractors to test
    full-time government employees or law enforcement applicants.
        Senator Pryor. OK. That 60-percent number is alarming to
    me.
        Mr. Tomsheck. It is to me as well, sir.
        Senator Pryor. Mr. Perkins, let me ask you, what Federal
    agencies have been targeted for infiltration? You all have
    covered this, but I just want to hear it again. My
    understanding is maybe the FBI, DEA, TSA, ICE, as well as CBP.
    Are there others that have been targeted for infiltration?
        Mr. Perkins. I cannot speak directly to which other
    agencies may have been infiltrated. I know speaking from the
    FBI's perspective, we are constantly on the lookout for outside
    on this--whether it is foreign government or a drug-trafficking
    organization or anything along those lines trying to infiltrate
    our ranks. We have fairly robust procedures in place involving
    polygraphs and the like. All of our special agents are required
    to maintain a top secret security clearance, which requires 5-
    year reinvestigations and the like, which includes a national
    security polygraph exam.
        While we are constantly on the lookout for that, I do not
    have the exact numbers of times attempts have been made to the
    Bureau, but I do know that has occurred.
        Senator Pryor. I know that we see some of these charts with
    how many arrests have been made in these agencies. But one
    thing that I think the Subcommittee is trying to get a handle
    on is how pervasive is this problem. Whether it be a percentage
    or a number, do you have a sense of how pervasive this problem
    is?
        Mr. Perkins. I can give an example that I think may get to
    the answer we need here. It is without a specific number, but
    if you look at the actual cases where we have had interdiction,
    the Crispin case, in fact, I mentioned in my opening statement.
    This individual was paid over $5 million in bribes. So when you
    back into that amount, you quickly figure out from a business
    standpoint exactly how valuable it is to the drug-trafficking
    organizations to get their loads and other things across the
    border that they are willing to pay an individual $5 million. I
    can extrapolate from that to say it is significantly pervasive.
        Senator Pryor. And in the Crispin case, I guess that is a
    Mr. Crispin.
        Mr. Perkins. Miss.
        Senator Crispin. Miss Crispin.
        Mr. Perkins. Margarita Crispin.
        Senator Pryor. What was her job title? What did she do?
        Mr. Perkins. She was a CBP officer, and essentially what
    she was able to do was clear vehicles coming through her
    checkpoint without inspection, knowing ahead of time which
    vehicles they were, which ones to wave through, and these
    vehicles were able to get into the country with no inspection
    at all.
        Senator Pryor. And do you know how long that went on before
    she was caught?
        Mr. Frost. Senator, that went on for many years. Prior to
    2003, she was suspected of being involved in smuggling
    operations. Additionally, Martha Garnica was an El Paso police
    officer we believe was also recruited to further the smuggling
    scheme by becoming a customs officer.
        Senator Pryor. Well, Mr. Tomsheck, on this chart,\1\ I
    think you mentioned that you have had 102 or 103 arrests, and I
    think that chart reflects that at CBP. Does a chart like this
    tell the whole story? I know you have some investigations, you
    have some arrests, but does it--can we look at that chart and
    say that this problem is getting worse and that this is
    something that if we do not get on top of--we already have a
    major problem, but it is about to get out of control?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The chart referenced by Senator Pryor appears in the Appendix
    on page 34.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Tomsheck. Senator, I believe that excellent chart,
    which I think was created by the ICE Office of Professional
    Responsibility, is a good insight as to what our current state
    actually is. It reflects the number of those persons who have
    actually been arrested by DHS-OIG, FBI, and other agencies
    participating in a collaborative way to accomplish that. But
    those are the persons that have been arrested. Those are the
    ones that we came to be aware of.
        Our grave concerns are how many other persons are in our
    workforce, how many other persons have gained access to our
    workforce through the hiring initiatives that are not recorded
    by that chart. But the chart would be a good indicator of how
    many might be in our workforce.
        Senator Pryor. Let me ask about your impression of this--I
    know there is no empirical data on this, but is your impression
    that there is a bigger problem with the new hires, that people
    may be intentionally trying to infiltrate and go in and try to
    do this on behalf of the cartels? Or is it the existing
    workforce, people out in the field right now that just over
    time get corrupted?
        Mr. Tomsheck. I think both of those scenarios are true,
    Chairman Pryor. The reality of it is we know from our analysis
    of those persons that have been arrested, at the beginning of
    my assignment at CBP, which began in June 2006, the vast
    majority of those persons arrested had nearly 10 years of
    service. Those numbers began to change significantly as CBP's
    hiring initiatives came about. We see a bimodal universe of the
    data at this point where there are two groups of persons being
    charged with corruption. They include both the more senior
    person who had been recruited, but they also include persons
    who clearly came to CBP solely for the purpose of being corrupt
    and taking advantage of the authorities they have as a CBP
    employee, a CBP law enforcement officer to further their pre-
    existing involvement in a criminal organization.
        The polygraph program, also, and the careful review of the
    information we obtain through the interviews following the exam
    has given us an insight to the number of persons who may have
    seized on our hiring initiatives to gain access to CBP.
        Senator Pryor. Mr. Perkins mentioned the Crispin case, and
    he mentioned a figure of $5 million. What is typical? How much
    money does it take to corrupt a Border Patrol officer?
        Mr. Tomsheck. Well, I am afraid, be it Border Patrol agents
    or CBP officers, we find that some are willing to compromise
    their authorities and sell out their allegiance to those that
    would harm our country in any way they can and harm our fellow
    agents in any way they can for remarkably small amounts of
    money.
        At the same time, some of the employees are determined to
    be corrupt, appear to have done so only after having been
    asked--or offered vast sums of money similar to what Ms.
    Crispin was determined to have taken.
        There is a wide array of what makes somebody decide to
    become corrupt.
        Senator Pryor. And we have talked about the polygraphs, but
    also, as I understand it, CBP and all Federal law enforcement
    agencies do a periodic reinvestigation background check on
    their current employees as well. I think it depends on the
    agency and the status of the employee. But how are there in
    terms of your checking the workforce you have in place right
    now?
        Mr. Tomsheck. To be honest, Chairman Pryor, we are
    challenged to keep up with the pace of the periodic
    reinvestigations that are required once every 5 years for a
    person in a sensitive position, as our CBP law enforcement
    officers. We have a backlog of periodic reinvestigations at
    this point, are doing everything we can to both improve the
    quality of those investigations while at the same time keep
    pace with the numbers that come due every year.
        Senator Pryor. OK. The two words you mentioned are
    ``challenged'' and ``backlogged.'' Give me a sense of how far
    behind you are, whether that is a percentage or a number or
    amount of years. How far behind are you on the periodic
    background checks?
        Mr. Tomsheck. Today over 10,000 of our employees are
    overdue to have their periodic reinvestigation concluded. By
    the end of this calendar year, there will be an additional
    9,000 of our law enforcement officers who are due to have their
    periodic reinvestigations updated, conducted. And it is an
    excellent tool to detect corruption in the workforce.
        Senator Pryor. And how many do you think you will be able
    to get done this year?
        Mr. Tomsheck. At this point our current budget situation
    does not allow for us to hopefully reach that 19,000 number.
    The goal is to accomplish as many as we can. If we are able to
    accomplish half, that may be what our budget situation
    currently allows for this calendar year.
        Senator Pryor. Half of the 19,000.
        Mr. Tomsheck. Yes. Some of that answer resides in how many
    persons are hired by CBP for the remainder of this calendar
    year.
        Senator Pryor. Right.
        Mr. Tomsheck. The same personnel security resources that do
    background investigations for new employees conduct those
    periodic reinvestigations. If we do hire substantially in this
    calendar year for attrition, we will have to divert some of
    those resources from periodic reinvestigations to do new
    applicant or new employee background investigations.
        Senator Pryor. Do you have a sense of what your oldest
    backlog is? In other words, if you have 19,000, are you 2, 3, 4
    years behind on some people? Or do you know?
        Mr. Tomsheck. That was the case at the beginning of this
    fiscal year because the hiring of CBP employees decreased
    drastically. In the last 3 months of calendar 2009, we were
    able to address some of those oldest periodic reinvestigations,
    and those were investigations that were a year or 18 months
    overdue.
        Senator Pryor. And I will ask a similar question as I did
    with the polygraph. How many employees do you get that do not
    pass one of these periodic background checks?
        Mr. Tomsheck. A small number of the periodic
    reinvestigations, actually less than 1 percent of the period
    reinvestigations, as they are conducted today, detect
    significant integrity issues.
        Senator Pryor. And you said ``as they are conducted today''
    because you indicated that you might also need to improve the
    quality and the thoroughness of the background checks?
        Mr. Tomsheck. We would like to see the periodic
    reinvestigations evolve into a continuous monitoring scenario,
    the never-ending background investigation, if you will. We
    would like to have the resources to continuously monitor our
    workforce, increasing and decreasing the intensity of that
    personnel security investigation, depending on what that
    employee is doing, what their assignment is, whether they are
    assigned to a high-risk environment, whether there is any
    information received that might indicate there is an integrity
    issue.
        Senator Pryor. OK. Do you have a sense of how many new
    personnel you would have to have in order to get to the level
    that you need to be?
        Mr. Tomsheck. Right now the vast majority of our background
    investigations and periodic reinvestigations are conducted by
    contractors. We recently had to reduce the staffing of rehired
    annuitants that were dedicated to personnel or to periodic
    reinvestigations. To maintain our own investigative source and
    to eliminate the use of contractors would require several
    hundred individuals dedicated to doing periodic
    reinvestigations.
        Unfortunately, we just had to furlough or relieve of their
    duties 99 of our persons that were rehired annuitants, retired
    former FBI agents, DEA agents, Secret Service agents, ICE,
    customs agents who were re-employed dedicated to doing periodic
    reinvestigations. Unfortunately, last pay period we had to
    release 99 of them--temporarily, hopefully.
        Senator Pryor. And that is because of budget issues?
        Mr. Tomsheck. It is, sir.
        Senator Pryor. OK. Mr. Perkins, we talked about these task
    forces or multiagency meetings that you have. Could you tell
    the Subcommittee a little bit more about that, please?
        Mr. Perkins. Certainly. Yes, Senator. Presently we have 12
    Border Corruption Task Forces established. What these are,
    these are operational entities that involve agents from the
    agencies sitting here at the table as well as the
    Transportation Security Administration. They work up and down
    the Southwest border--and not only there, but they are also on
    the Northern border of the country. They work specifically
    cases involving corruption along the border, particularly the
    Southwest border, obviously involving drug trafficking, but,
    really, whatever else might come along, whether it is State,
    Federal, local law enforcement individuals, members of CBP, or
    the like. These turned out to be very--we are trying to stay
    ahead of the curve as much as we can. We enjoy probably--in all
    the task force operations the Bureau is in that I oversee on
    the criminal side, these are among the best as far as
    cooperative efforts, sharing of information, and people working
    together along the border. We are looking to expand those to
    other points of entry around the United States, but right now
    we are focusing on the Southwest border.
        Senator Pryor. How often do they meet face to face? Or is
    this more of just a conference call meeting?
        Mr. Perkins. No. These are actually collocated physical
    space investigators.
        Senator Pryor. OK. Good. And is it your experience that by
    them sharing information and being around each other and
    spending a lot of time with each other that they actually--the
    Federal side is helping the State side and the county is
    helping the Federal side?
        Mr. Perkins. Without a doubt. It is vital to have those
    types of relationships to leverage the resources each one of us
    can bring to the table, the various expertise each one of us
    can bring to the table, and the information sharing that comes
    there also. Without a doubt, that is vital.
        Senator Pryor. I know this isn't the focus of this hearing,
    but in those task forces, are you seeing evidence of State and
    local corruption as well?
        Mr. Perkins. Yes, sir, that is the case. And, in fact, one
    of the things we are trying to do with everybody's budgets--we
    have to work and live within them. Recently in the 2010
    appropriation we were able to receive additional bodies to
    fight gang violence across the United States. So instead of
    parsing these out across the United States in little pieces, we
    decided to go where we thought we could make a major impact,
    and we went to the Southwest border, and we queried our SACs,
    our agents in charge, to provide proposals to us so that we
    could place, for instance, an entire squad--eight agents, an
    intelligence analyst, staffing, and the like--into a field
    office to address a particular issue.
        What we wanted them to do was, one, have something to do
    with gang violence; two, have some tie into public corruption
    along those lines; three, have something to do with money
    laundering. So it was kind of a joint, across-the-stovepipes
    effort.
        We have identified two of the three offices where we are
    going to select those squads right now and go forward. So we
    are trying to use that type of information that not only
    addresses gang violence in these areas but addresses State and
    local corruption along the border also.
        Senator Pryor. This next question might be a little bit
    sensitive, and if you cannot answer it, I understand. But one
    of the concerns when you hear a story about this, about
    corruption on the border and some problems with drugs, guns,
    money, etc., coming in and out, would be terrorism. Are you
    seeing any evidence of terrorists tapping into this and coming
    into the country?
        Mr. Perkins. I think what we are trying to identify, you
    step back and you look at individuals, if they are willing to
    wave a carload of marijuana or cocaine or illegal aliens
    through, why wouldn't they be willing to wave through a known
    terrorist or even perhaps some components to an improvised
    explosive device of some type? It is all the same to us. That
    is why we are trying to focus on this as seriously as we are to
    address these issues.
        If you recall back, I mean, history shows--it was on the
    Northern border when components attempted to smuggle in back
    during the millennium, back in 2000, an explosive device into
    the country. At that point that was successfully interdicted.
        So while I am not saying that--we are prepared for that. We
    suspect that is possible, and we are trying to do what we can
    with this effort to interdict those potentialities.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Frost, let me do a little follow-up with you. We have
    talked about Customs and Border Protection. Can you give us a
    sense, though, of ICE and TSA and other agencies in terms of
    the frequency of corruption or the scope and nature of it?
        Mr. Frost. Well, the numbers for ICE and CBP are quite
    different, but also their mission is different and their
    numbers of employees are different. Probably the--they are
    right about half, if you look at arrests and case openings and
    case investigations. But ICE also includes the element of ICE
    that deals with detainees, alien detainees, and transport of
    those individuals.
        Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) is probably,
    from a homeland security investigation standpoint, our area of
    most concern. Immigration benefits are such a valuable
    commodity to enemies of the United States, whether they are
    drug-trafficking organizations or other persons that would do
    us harm. And the ability of lower-level employees to make
    decisions on immigration benefits is disproportionate, similar,
    I would say, to CBP's authorities at the border where you have
    your average employee who is making decisions about whether
    someone could come in the country. Certainly with immigration
    benefits, the impact is even more lasting and profound.
        Senator Pryor. Do you have a sense of how these agents in
    the various agencies, are being penetrated and corrupted? How
    do they go from Point A to Point B in terms of being corrupted?
        Mr. Frost. Well, we have looked at kind of comparing it to
    the espionage-related corruption techniques where organized
    criminal groups actually look for vulnerable employees, and it
    may be someone that they already have a social relationship
    with. People down on the Southwest border like to say that to
    them the river is just a river. There is a lot of commerce,
    family, and other interaction between people on both sides of
    the border. And the same is true on the Canadian border where
    DHS employees often go to have meals or entertainment or just
    for tourism.
        So recruiters try and target people that are vulnerable or
    people that they know, people who are willing to talk about
    their work. And then they assess those people, and they look
    for those who have obvious vulnerabilities, who may be prone to
    infidelity or alcohol abuse. And then they target them and
    begin a relationship, a further relationship that starts with
    small favors and expands until they are committed to these
    levels of corruption that we believe are in some cases
    traitorous.
        Senator Pryor. There again, that is very concerning. So
    besides polygraphs and background checks that are supposed to
    happen every 5 years, what do you do to try to monitor your
    workforce in all your various agencies?
        Mr. Frost. Well, within the Department there are internal
    affairs components, both with CBP, ICE/OPR, Secret Service,
    TSA, Coast Guard, and we work closely with those internal
    affairs components to monitor those administrative-type cases.
        Senator from, I think, all of our perspectives,
    administrative-type cases are important tells, if you will, of
    employee misconduct. You know, a leaking faucet starts with a
    drip, and the first sign of corruption is not generally when
    someone is knee deep and already involved with an organization.
        Senator Pryor. Which, really also raises another question
    that we have not talked about, and that is, Mexico's commitment
    to thwarting the efforts of these cartels. This is really just
    for the panel at large, anyone who wants to answer. But what is
    your sense of Mexico's commitment, Mexico's level of
    determination to get these cartels under control and break them
    up, however they do that under Mexican law? What is your sense
    of their commitment level?
        Mr. Perkins. Speaking from the Bureau's perspective, we
    have a very good relationship with our colleagues on the
    Mexican side through our legal attache in the embassy and
    through other agents who are actually stationed and work in
    Mexico. Really, for the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Drug
    Enforcement Administration has the lead in working those
    matters, but we do receive a great deal of cooperation from the
    Mexican Government.
        Obviously, of late, a number of leaders of various drug-
    trafficking organizations have either been captured or killed
    within the last 6 months, which has caused somewhat of a
    destabilization in the area down there. That is kind of sorting
    itself out right now, and I know the Mexican Government is
    attempting to push harder and try to further destabilize these
    organizations and break them into components that can be dealt
    with directly.
        But from the Bureau's standpoint, we enjoy a very good
    relationship with the Mexican Government in the sharing of
    information.
        Senator Pryor. Great.
        Mr. Frost. Mr. Perkins is, I think, very correct that the
    level of violence, our understanding from our DEA law
    enforcement partners and ICE, who all have human intelligence
    assets wherever they can get them down there, the level of
    violence down there is very bad, and it causes the local
    government closest to the border to make some very difficult
    decisions about at what level and how they can cooperate with
    us in trying to stem this smuggling.
        Senator Pryor. Well, and I assume that a pretty healthy
    amount of drugs are smuggled in via air. Is that right as well?
    Or do they all come in vehicles over the road?
        Mr. Perkins. I think it is a combination of all--land, sea,
    and air--on that. The exact percentages I do not have with me.
        Senator Pryor. One of the questions I have--and this is
    more of an internal question--is I know you have IGs and you
    have Internal Affairs and you have different agencies that may
    have different structures and different personalities and
    missions and turf. How are the agencies doing in your view, Mr.
    Frost? How are the agencies doing internally in terms of making
    sure that these cases are being handled properly within the
    agency and if they need to work with another agency, that is
    being done and there is cooperation? How is that going
    internally?
        Mr. Frost. Well, I think we are making great strides there.
    You know, we have to recall that the Department of Homeland
    Security is pretty new still, relatively. And we are continuing
    to define our roles within the Department.
        The good news, the best news of this is that we all want
    the same thing. We are all dedicated to stopping this and to
    locking up the bad guys, and I am very confident that minor
    issues between agencies are things that will always occur and
    that we will always be able to work it out as long as we have
    that same goal.
        Senator Pryor. Mr. Tomsheck, do you have any comment on
    that?
        Mr. Tomsheck. I would, Senator. I think we need to continue
    to work really hard at working better together at each and
    every level. Previously, I mentioned the FBI-led Border
    Corruption Task Forces. I think having all of the agencies
    involved, working well in that environment, is the right
    response. I think working in genuine full partnerships in an
    atmosphere where you know there is redundant verification that
    information is being shared, that all available resources are
    being brought to bear in a coordinated way, is the only way
    forward.
        I believe all of us sitting at the table and ICE/OPR and
    other agencies need to bring to bear all of our resources
    working in a highly collaborative way. I have concerns that at
    the end of the day, resources being what they are in all of
    those agencies, if we are working in a perfectly harmonious
    way, we still may be short of what is needed.
        Senator Pryor. OK. So still work to be done there, then.
        Mr. Tomsheck. I believe it is something we need to
    continually work at.
        Senator Pryor. Now, I think almost everybody has mentioned
    here that you may need more resources, especially you, Mr.
    Tomsheck. You talked about at CBP you need more resources in
    terms of polygraph, etc.
        Aside from resources, can you all think of any changes in
    the law, any changes in legislation that would help this? Or do
    you see this as pretty much just a resource issue?
        Mr. Tomsheck. Senator, I believe having the authority to
    require polygraph examinations as part of the periodic
    reinvestigation process would be helpful. I do not know that we
    would necessarily administer periodic polygraph examinations to
    everyone in the CBP workforce, but do it on a strategic basis
    when we deem it is appropriate and necessary based on the
    degree of risk this employee may pose, based on their
    assignment, the nature of their duties, and other information
    that the periodic reinvestigation may have developed. We do not
    have that authority, and I think that is something that would
    be enormously beneficial.
        Senator Pryor. Good. Thank you. Anybody else on that?
        Mr. Perkins. I would just say at this point we are
    confident that we have the tools to move forward, but I will
    leave it also in the fact that I meet regularly, if not
    multiple times a week, with the Assistant Attorney General for
    Criminal Division, Lanny Breuer, at the Department of Justice,
    and these matters are always on the table and always being
    discussed, and I would defer to the Department on those
    matters. But for the time being, I believe we have the tools in
    place.
        Senator Pryor. OK. Well, that is encouraging, but please
    check back with us if you find something else, and the same for
    the other two witnesses.
        We are going to keep the record open for 15 days, and there
    will be some other questions from other Subcommittee Members
    who got caught up at hearings or down on the floor, because we
    have a busy floor schedule this week.
        I guess I would be remiss if I did not mention before we
    leave here that the vast majority of your agents and employees
    do a great job and they are not corrupt and they are out there
    putting their lives on the line every day to try to keep
    America secure. And we cannot forget them, and we cannot paint
    everybody with too broad of a brush here. But I do think that
    we have a very serious problem here that we need to address,
    and I think it is largely a resource issue. There may be a few
    changes in the law that we can make here or there to make this
    better.
        But I really want to thank all of you for coming today and
    being part of this hearing. I think you have helped us as a
    Subcommittee to understand the scope and nature of the problem.
    I think you have helped us identify some practical approaches
    to solve this and gave us a snapshot of where we are, and I
    think that is very helpful.
        But I will say this: I do think that this is something that
    is critically important that we address and address very
    quickly and thoroughly and do it in the right way. So I think I
    can speak for the whole Subcommittee and the whole Committee
    and probably the whole Senate in saying that we need to
    prioritize this and help you all solve this, because we are on
    very dangerous ground here with corruption within our Federal
    law enforcement agencies.
        So we will continue to work with you on this, and we would
    really appreciate your ideas, your suggestions, your
    recommendations, other people that we can talk to help us get a
    better feel for how we can address this, because it is a very
    serious need.
        But with that, what I will do is we will leave the record
    open for 15 days, and if other Senators have questions, which I
    know some will, we would love to get those back from you within
    the next 15 days.
        Unless there is something else, I will go ahead and close,
    but thank you very much for all your participation, your
    preparation, and your presence here today. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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