[Senate Hearing 111-622]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-622
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
MARCH 25, 2010--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
__________
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
TOM HARKIN, Iowa MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
PATTY MURRAY, Washington ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
JACK REED, Rhode Island LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
BEN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JON TESTER, Montana
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
Charles J. Houy, Staff Director
Bruce Evans, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Opening Statement of Chairman Daniel K. Inouye................... 1
Statement of Senator Thad Cochran................................ 2
Statement of Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State,
Department of State............................................ 3
Prepared Statement of........................................ 5
Statement of Hon. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense.......................................... 7
Prepared Statement of........................................ 10
Contingency Contracting (ANSF Police Contract)................... 11
Afghanistan National Security Forces Fund........................ 12
State Personnel.................................................. 12
Afghanistan/Pakistan Funding Execution........................... 13
Leahy Amendment.................................................. 14
National Guard Deploy............................................ 15
Air Force C-130.................................................. 15
Airlift.......................................................... 15
Detainees at Guantanamo.......................................... 16
Facility at Thompson............................................. 16
Base Realignment and Closure Commission.......................... 17
Goals in Afghanistan............................................. 17
Sufficient Funding at Department of State for Transition......... 18
Military Spouse Career Advancement Accounts Program.............. 18
Mi-17............................................................ 19
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Capability.............................. 20
UAV Exports/Sales................................................ 21
Counternarcotics in Afghanistan.................................. 22
Haiti Disaster Assistance........................................ 22
Haiti Humanitarian Assistance.................................... 23
Mideast Policy................................................... 24
NATO/Afghanistan Army............................................ 24
Future Supplementals............................................. 25
Status of Surge.................................................. 27
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)............. 28
Trust Issues in Afghanistan...................................... 29
Afghanistan...................................................... 30
Status of Women in Afghanistan................................... 31
Women's Rights/Reconciliation.................................... 31
Corruption....................................................... 32
Mideast Peace.................................................... 32
Pakistan and India............................................... 33
KCX Tanker/EADS.................................................. 34
WTO.............................................................. 35
Training Afghan Forces........................................... 36
Afghan Army...................................................... 36
Afghan Fighting Force............................................ 37
Afghan Army/Civilian Surge....................................... 37
Somalia.......................................................... 38
Additional Committee Questions................................... 39
Questions Submitted to Secretary Hillary Clinton................. 39
Question Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye.................. 39
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd.................... 40
Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl......................... 41
Question Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein................... 42
Counternarcotics Operations...................................... 42
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu.................. 42
Family Reunification............................................. 42
Universal Definition of Orphan................................... 43
Long-term Solutions.............................................. 43
Local Contracting................................................ 44
Hazard Mitigation................................................ 44
Sheltering....................................................... 45
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins..................... 46
Question Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski..................... 47
Questions Submitted to Hon. Robert M. Gates...................... 47
Questions Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye................. 47
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd.................... 48
Question Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl.......................... 50
State and Agriculture Role in Global Food Security............... 50
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray...................... 50
Haiti Support.................................................... 51
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein.................. 52
Counternarcotics Operations...................................... 52
Poppy Crop Eradication........................................... 52
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles......................................... 53
Cluster Munitions................................................ 54
Private DOD Contractors.......................................... 55
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Johnson....................... 55
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu.................. 67
Afghanistan Withdraw............................................. 67
Haiti Support.................................................... 68
Question Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg................ 68
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison.............. 69
Detainee Facility................................................ 69
Guam Relocation.................................................. 70
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins..................... 71
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 2:20 p.m., in room S-127, the Capitol,
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye, Leahy, Mikulski, Murray, Dorgan,
Feinstein, Landrieu, Nelson, Pryor, Tester, Specter, Cochran,
Bond, Shelby, Bennett, Hutchison, Brownback, Alexander,
Collins, Voinovich, and Murkowski.
opening statement of chairman daniel k. inouye
Chairman Inouye. Good afternoon.
This afternoon the committee meets to hear testimony on the
fiscal year 2010 supplemental request.
The request by the administration totals $47.5 billion in
discretionary spending, of which approximately $37.5 billion is
to support overseas contingency operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Late yesterday afternoon the
administration forwarded a request of $2.8 billion to support
our humanitarian operations in Haiti. The committee has not had
an opportunity to review this matter, but we'll do so over the
coming weeks. To review the defense and international affairs
portion of this supplemental request, the committee is pleased
to receive testimony from the Secretaries of State and Defense,
Ms. Hillary Clinton and Mr. Robert Gates.
It's good to see both of you. We look forward to your
responses to the many questions I'm certain we'll have.
Over 9 years ago, in response to the 9/11 attacks, our
Nation embarked on a mission to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban
and al Qaeda and to work to ensure security and stabilization
in the region. But, once we entered Iraq, many believe our
efforts in Afghanistan were shortchanged, and only now are we
refocusing on our primary missions, the defeat of al Qaeda and
regional stability. With a renewed effort and focus, President
Obama has approved a military and civilian strategy in
Afghanistan that will, hopefully, enable us to restore regional
stability and to begin withdrawing our forces from Afghanistan
in the summer of 2011.
The supplemental request before us provides the necessary
resources for a military and civilian surge that is critical if
we are to achieve that goal. We look forward to hearing, today,
about the preliminary results of this surge and the challenges
you face in meeting the President's timetable.
As I noted, we have been at this war for almost a decade,
and now we have our eye on the target. At the same time, we're
also seeing the spread of al Qaeda with cells in Yemen, al
Qaeda members showing up in Somalia, and related activity
elsewhere in Africa.
While we focus our efforts on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Iraq, we also need to allocate sufficient resources to curtail
the growth of these terrorist cells. We cannot allow new safe
havens to be created elsewhere as we tighten the stranglehold
on al Qaeda's senior leadership in the Afghanistan/Pakistan
region. We hope to get assurances from both Secretaries today
that they understand these dangers and are responding to these
hotspots with enhanced efforts and focus. Hopefully, these
issues will be among those addressed either in your statements
or in the questions that follow.
I would note to my colleagues that I recognize that there
are many issues which you may want to address and remind you
that today's hearing is on our wartime funding requirements and
not on other matters. I would urge you to focus your questions
on that topic.
In addition, as you can see, we have many Senators, but
they're all over the place. They are in press conferences, and
they are en route here. But, we'd like to limit our questions
to 4 minutes per Senator, and I would like to urge you to keep
your answers as brief as possible.
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, the committee thanks
you both for appearing today. Without objection, your full
statements will be made part of the record.
At this point, I'd like to yield to the vice chairman,
Senator Cochran, for any opening remarks he may wish to make.
statement of senator thad cochran
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm pleased to
join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses to this
hearing.
Of course, the focus of the hearing is on the immediate
need to address the President's request for full funding for
the mission that is now President Obama and his
administration's suggestion as to how we can better achieve
likely peace in the region and, in due course, begin
withdrawing some of the 30,000 troops that have now been
identified as needed for the effort in Afghanistan. We know
that's going to cost money. And we are anxious to get the facts
about what those funds are to be used for, and to justify the
appropriations request that this committee will transmit to the
full Senate.
I hope you will let us know of any urgent unmet
requirements that aren't reflected or haven't been discussed
publicly that we need to know about. I'm sure the committee is
going to want to move expeditiously, without delay, in acting
on this request and urging the Senate to follow the leadership
of this committee.
With respect to Iran, we would also appreciate your
thoughts on the challenges that we face through Iranian
activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and what that might mean
for the need for additional funds, as well.
We thank you for your distinguished service in the jobs you
have; they're very important. We want to be helpful, and I
think this hearing will help us start that process in the right
direction.
Thank you.
Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much.
And may I now call upon Secretary Clinton.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF
STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Vice Chairman Cochran and members of the committee. It's very
good seeing you all, and especially in this historic room to
have this hearing.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify alongside
Secretary Gates, because we are very much committed, together,
on behalf of our civilian and military efforts in the front-
line states. We don't think that they can be separated, because
the challenges we face demand that we draw on all of the tools
of American leadership and American power. And the strategies
we now have in place in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq do
exactly that.
This whole-of-government approach has shown results, and it
has also enabled us to more clearly understand the challenges
we face. That's why we're coming to you today with a $4.5
billion supplemental request. Without this new funding in 2010,
we will fall short in all three of the front-line states.
I am well aware of the economic strain we all face here at
home. And I believe, along with each of you, that every dollar
must deliver clear results. Our request addresses urgent
demands that will advance our efforts to bring stability to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and ensure a smooth transition to a
civilian-led effort in Iraq.
First, with respect to Afghanistan, we are implementing the
strategy President Obama announced in December. Success
requires a fully integrated civilian and military effort, one
in which security gains are followed immediately by economic
and political gains. As new troops arrive, our civilian surge
has already tripled the number of civilians on the ground, and
it is these civilian-led efforts that will translate the
bravery of our troops into stability for Afghanistan and
security for Americans. The challenges are still great. The
enemy is still determined. But, we are recapturing the momentum
in Afghanistan. New funds in 2010 will give us the capacity to
move forward at a time when every day is crucial.
Let me briefly describe what we are currently doing in
Marjah and the surrounding areas, for Marjah is a proving
ground for our strategy and the story, thus far, is an
encouraging one.
Our civilians were on the ground within hours and days of
the military operation. They quickly stood up a district
support team that has helped, already, to open two schools and
a prosecutor's office. They've registered more than 7,000
farmers to begin receiving supplies for licit crops. They've
employed more than 1,000 residents a day through cash-for-work
projects. A nearby United States Agency for International
Development-built (USAID) airstrip has allowed the Ministry of
Agriculture officials to reach Marjah's farmers, and a USAID
contract is paying a woman-owned Afghan firm to rebuild the
highway.
The military offensive, rightly, may get the headlines.
But, what happens behind the scenes is equally important. As
our military leaders put it, ``After clearing, we must hold,
build, and transition.'' And Marjah's residents have made it
clear they will judge the Afghan government and us on our
ability to help build enduring security and credible
governance. Our $2 billion request for Afghanistan supports
efforts like those in Marjah, which we are ramping up quickly
and which need additional assistance and operational funding in
2010.
New assistance will help Afghans provide for their families
and revitalize the agricultural sector, which is crucial to
reducing poppy cultivation and drawing insurgents back into
society. We also have funding for governance and rule-of-law
programs, as well as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund,
which helps build capable institutions. These will work in
conjunction with U.S. support for the Afghan National Security
Forces, which I also would urge you to fully fund. And through
all of this, we have maintained our focus on expanding women's
opportunities, one of our best tools for combating extremism
and spurring progress.
In Pakistan, our efforts are vital to success in
Afghanistan, but also to our own American security. We've made
it a strategic priority to strengthen our partnership with the
Pakistani people. And I'm under no illusion that success in
this arena will come quickly or easily, but think about where
we were 1 year ago. The extremists were 100 miles from
Islamabad. They met little resistance in launching attacks on
American troops from border areas. Since then, the Pakistani
Government has launched important offensives in Swat, South
Waziristan, and throughout the country. We're moving in the
right direction, and the progress that we've made is possible
because we have demonstrated a clear commitment to work with
the people and the Government of Pakistan.
Yesterday at the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, we
worked very hard--in fact, late into the night--to advance the
resolve that we have begun building with the Pakistani
leadership. The $370 million we're requesting for assistance
and operations in this supplemental will allow us to expand
civilian cooperation at a critical moment. The military
offensives have created new humanitarian needs that, if not
addressed immediately, could make these areas ripe for
extremism. And in much of the country, water, energy, and
economic problems create new challenges. So, our success
depends on rapidly and sustainably scaling up our efforts,
especially in high-impact projects that visibly demonstrate our
long-term commitment on helping the Pakistanis build capacity
while ensuring accountability.
In Iraq, we have different challenges. But, in the wake of
this election, we're at a moment of great opportunity to
consolidate stability and forge an enduring partnership
sustained by a strong diplomatic presence. Our $2.1 billion
supplemental request should be seen in light of the more than
$15 billion decrease in defense funding.
As we prepare to move from a defense-led to state-led
mission in Iraq at the end of August, new funding will allow us
to make sure our civilians can work safely in still dangerous
places. It will allow us to move from an intensive, defense-led
police training program to a smaller state-administered program
for police leadership. And our support of Iraqi civilian law
enforcement, like support for the Iraqi Security Forces, is
critical to the success of their new democracy.
Now, in putting this supplemental together, I've had to
make some tough calls and had to have some tough conversations
about priorities, and the decisions reflect that. The result is
a request that addresses only urgent needs directly related to
our security interests. And I want to emphasize, all of these
programs have been designed with careful attention to
accountability and a determination to learn from past mistakes.
Waste and corruption are fundamental threats to our success,
and we're serious about combating them. So, we have more funds
for strengthened oversight by the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction, and takes into account the problems
highlighted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction. We'll also be working with the Congress on
updated benchmarks.
Just a brief word on Haiti, Mr. Chairman. Despite the work
the United States has done to respond to the disaster, there is
still too much suffering. And our rebuilding, along with the
international community, is an important commitment to the
people of Haiti and to our hemisphere. Of our $1.6 billion
Haiti supplemental request, about $500 million will reimburse
relief efforts by State and USAID; the rest will go to
strategic investments coordinated with our international
partners.
I thank the Congress for the ongoing bipartisan support of
these efforts.
prepared statement
And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this committee's
continuing work on behalf of the missions and the priorities of
our country.
Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hillary Rodham Clinton
Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Cochran, and members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here. As always, it is a
pleasure to testify alongside Secretary Gates, a good friend as well as
a true champion of diplomacy and development.
We are here together because our civilian and military efforts in
front-line states cannot be separated. The challenges we face demand
that we draw on all the tools of American leadership and American
power. And the strategies we now have in place in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq do exactly that.
This whole-of-government approach has shown results. It has also
enabled us to assess more clearly the challenges we face. That is why
we are coming to you with a $4.5 billion supplemental request for
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Without this new funding in 2010, we
will fall short in all three of these front-line states.
I am well aware that, at a time of economic strain at home, every
dollar must deliver clear results. Our request addresses urgent demands
that will immediately advance our efforts to bring stability to
Afghanistan and Pakistan and ensure a smooth transition to a civilian-
led effort in Iraq.
Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, we are working to implement the new strategy
President Obama announced in December. Success requires a fully
integrated civilian-military effort, one in which security gains are
followed immediately by economic and political gains. As new troops
arrive, our civilian surge has already tripled the number of civilians
on the ground and will continue in the months ahead. It is up to these
civilian-led efforts to translate the bravery of our troops into
stability for Afghanistan and security for Americans.
The challenges are still great, the enemy is still determined, but
we are recapturing the momentum in Afghanistan. New funds in 2010 will
give us the capacity to move forward at a time when every day is
crucial.
Let me briefly describe what we are currently doing in Marjah and
the surrounding areas--for Marjah is a proving ground for our strategy,
and the story there is an encouraging one so far. Our civilians were on
the ground within days of the military operation, and they quickly
stood up a District Support Team that has helped open two schools and a
prosecutor's office; registered more than 7,000 farmers to receive
supplies; and employed more than a thousand residents a day through
cash-for-work projects. A nearby USAID-built airstrip has allowed
Ministry of Agriculture officials to reach Marjah's farmers, and a
USAID contract is paying a women-owned Afghan firm to rebuild the
highway.
The military offensive may get the headlines, but what happens
behind the scenes is equally important. As our military leaders put it,
after clearing, we must hold, build, and transition. And Marjah's
residents have made clear that they will judge the Afghan government
and us on our ability to build enduring security and credible
governance.
Our $2 billion request for Afghanistan will support efforts like
those in Marjah, which we are ramping up quickly and which need
additional assistance and operations funding in 2010 to continue. New
assistance will help Afghans provide for their families and revitalize
the agricultural sector, which is crucial to reducing poppy cultivation
and drawing insurgents back into society. New funding for governance
and rule-of-law programs, as well as for the Afghanistan Reconstruction
Trust Fund, will help build capable institutions free from corruption.
These will work in conjunction with U.S. support for the Afghan
National Security Forces--which I would also urge you to fully fund.
And through all of this, we have maintained our focus on expanding
women's opportunity, one of our best tools for combating extremism and
spurring progress.
Pakistan
In Pakistan, our efforts are vital to success in Afghanistan, and
also to American security in their own right. We have made it a
strategic priority to strengthen our partnership with the Pakistani
people and to bolster the Pakistani state's ability to counter
extremism and provide for its citizens.
I am under no illusion that success will come quickly or easily.
But think where we were 1 year ago. The extremists were 100 miles from
Islamabad and met little resistance in launching attacks on American
troops from border areas. Since then, the Pakistani government has
launched important offensives in Swat, in South Waziristan, and
throughout the country.
We are moving in the right direction, and this progress has been
possible because of our commitment to Pakistan's people and government.
I have had many opportunities to personally stress this commitment, and
yesterday, at the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, I once again saw
the Pakistani leadership's resolve to advance shared interests.
The $370 million for assistance and operations in this supplemental
will allow us to expand civilian cooperation at a critical moment, as a
down payment on our long-term partnership. The military offensives have
created new humanitarian needs that, if not addressed immediately,
could make these areas ripe for extremism. And in much of the country,
water, energy, and economic problems have created new challenges.
Our success depends on rapidly and sustainably scaling up our
efforts, especially high-impact projects that visibly demonstrate our
long-term commitment, and on bolstering the capacity of the Pakistanis
while ensuring accountability. That simply cannot happen without more
funds in the pipeline.
Iraq
In Iraq, we also face continued challenges. But in the wake of the
election, we are at a moment of great opportunity--to consolidate
stability and forge an enduring partnership sustained by a strong
diplomatic presence.
Our $2.1 billion supplemental request is a reasonable price to pay
to help finish the job. And it comes amid a more than $15 billion
decrease in Defense funding.
As we prepare to move from a Defense-led to a State-led mission in
Iraq at the end of August, new funding will allow us to make sure our
civilians can work safely in a still-dangerous place. And it will allow
us to move from an intensive Defense-led police-training program to a
smaller State-administered program for police leadership. Our support
of Iraqi civilian law enforcement--like support for the Iraqi Security
Forces--is critical to the success of Iraqi democracy.
We see on the horizon a self-sustaining Iraq that can meet the
needs of its people and play a positive regional role. But we are not
there yet. Even as we turn our attention to other conflicts, we must
remain patient and committed. This supplemental is a timely investment
in a strong partnership with a sovereign, democratic, and increasingly
capable Iraq.
A Strategy of Results
In putting this supplemental together, I've had some tough
conversations about priorities. And we've made some tough decisions.
The result is a request that addresses only urgent needs directly
related to our security interests.
I also want to emphasize that all of these programs have been
designed with careful attention to accountability and a determination
to learn from past mistakes. Waste and corruption are fundamental
threats to our success, and we are serious about combating them. Our
request includes funding for strengthened oversight by the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and takes into account
problems highlighted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction. We will also be working with you on updated benchmarks
and reporting back to you on how we're meeting them.
Haiti
Let me also mention the Haiti supplemental released yesterday.
Despite the work the United States has done to respond to the disaster
and start the recovery process, there is still too much suffering in
Haiti, and rebuilding will require billions of dollars in international
support. Of our $1.6 billion Haiti supplemental request, about $500
million will reimburse relief efforts by State and USAID, while the
rest will go to strategic investments that, coordinated with our
partners, will help drive recovery by building local capacity and
catalyzing development.
The ongoing bipartisan support of these efforts has made clear to
me that this Committee, Congress, and the American people understand
the importance of our challenges and the urgency of our task, in Haiti
and in frontline states. Thanks to the bravery and sacrifice of our
diplomats, our development experts, and our men and women in uniform,
we have reached a moment of opportunity. I thank you for your
commitment, and look forward to working with you closely as we move
forward.
Chairman Inouye. And now may I call upon Secretary Gates.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Cochran,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity this
afternoon to discuss the Defense Department's portion of the
fiscal year 2010 supplemental request.
I'm honored to appear with the Secretary of State. Our
joint testimony today reflects the close cooperation of our two
Departments and the importance of a properly funded and
integrated civil-military approach to the challenges we face in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. And at the outset, I
would like to offer my strong support for the important
programs funded in the State portion of the supplemental
request, without which our military efforts would not be--will
not be successful.
These times of economic and fiscal stress place enormous
pressure on all of us to be good stewards of the taxpayers'
dollars, including the two Departments represented here today.
That is why President Obama and I, in last year's and this
year's budget, made tough decisions about major programs that
were either performing poorly or an excess to real-world needs.
However, even at a time of budget pressures, I believe it is
critical to sustain an adequate sustainable level of investment
in the instruments of national security, be it defense,
diplomacy, or development, that are so essential to America's
security and position in the world.
I recently returned from a visit to Afghanistan. There I
had the chance to talk to our military commanders,
Afghanistan's leaders, and our troops serving at the tip of the
spear in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces. Overall, I believe
there are grounds for guarded optimism as our campaign to roll
back the Taliban gains momentum and as the Afghan government
shows an increasing willingness to take on additional
responsibilities. Nonetheless, there will be many long and
tough days ahead, and it may take several months to produce
visible results, as most of the additional forces ordered by
the President have not yet arrived in theater and begun
operations.
I would also caution against an overly ambitious view of
what true stability and security will look like in a place that
has known nothing but war for three decades. For most Afghans,
a roof over their heads, an opportunity for their children,
both boys and girls, to attend school, and the ability to
provide for the basic needs of their families, free from
violence, would be considered a pretty good life. The scale of
the international coalition's efforts and ambitions should
reflect that basic realty.
The fiscal year 2010 supplemental request totals $33
billion for the Defense Department, almost all of which is to
support operations in Afghanistan and the additional 30,000
troops being deployed as a part of the President's strategy
announced in December. We remain on schedule to see overall
U.S. troop levels reach 98,000 by the end of the fiscal year.
The request includes $1.1 billion, on top of the $11.3 billion
already enacted, to field and sustain life-saving mine-
resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles and the MRAP all-
terrain vehicles for troops already in theater and for the
additional forces being deployed.
Finally, this supplemental contains $2.6 billion to
strengthen the Afghan National Security Forces. The goal of the
President's strategy, and our supporting military efforts, is
to create conditions that will allow for a full transfer of
security responsibility to the Afghan government. Earlier this
month, I visited the Combined Fielding Center at Camp
Blackhorse near Kabul and had a chance to speak with Afghan
troops undergoing training. I told them that Afghanistan is
their country and ultimately this is their fight to win.
I know many of you have concerns about the Afghan Security
Forces. I share those concerns, as do our military commanders.
The Afghan Army has made real progress over the last year, and
many Afghan soldiers are shedding their blood for their
country. Increased Afghan involvement in operations is critical
to success and is being demonstrated in Marjah. Significant
work remains to be done with the police force, but there, too,
changes are underway that will, I believe, yield progress. As
you consider this request, I would emphasize that successfully
accomplishing the training mission represents both our exit
strategy and the key for long-term stability in Afghanistan.
The supplemental request also includes $1 billion to
strengthen Iraqi Security Forces. These additional resources
will be used this year to strengthen Iraqi capabilities in
areas General Odierno believes are important to ensure that the
Iraqis are fully prepared to assume internal security
responsibilities. The money will be spent by U.S. forces in
Iraq, not provided directly to the Government of Iraq.
In Haiti, as the President requested, the Department is
providing continuing support in the wake of January's
earthquake. Due to the urgent need for an immediate response,
the Department used funds from existing accounts, with the
understanding that these accounts would be replenished in a
supplemental. As such, the $655 million is part of an amendment
for Haiti that was recently submitted to Congress, and will
include funding to cover these costs.
All of these operations are fuel intensive. Due to rising
prices, our fuel costs this year in operations has been greater
than anticipated. And so, included in this request is $2
billion to partially offset the resulting shortfall in the
Department's base and overseas contingency operations--
operating accounts, and to ensure uninterrupted operations.
I should note that this Department has moved most funding
for programs not directly related to the war into the base
budget. The budget request being discussed today is a true
supplemental, as they were originally intended, for the
purposes of funding immediate and unforeseen requirements. In
this case, primarily the troop surge associated with the
President's new strategy for Afghanistan. And I urge approval
of this request by early spring to prevent costly and
counterproductive disruptions to the Department's operations.
Before closing, I'd like to say just a few words about the
Commander's Emergency Response Program, CERP, which continues
to be a powerful tool for military commanders in carrying out
counterinsurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
General Petraeus has called it ``the most important--his most
important authority.'' And I would urge the Congress to fully
fund the CERP programs contained in the budget's--the
Department's budget request.
Having said that, I understand there is concern--some
concern on this committee about the way CERP has been used in
recent years. The Department is currently performing an
internal assessment of existing processes which include
consideration of a single departmental coordinator; additional
dedicated CERP managers and contracting personnel in theater;
an increased premobilization and in-country training.
Nonetheless, even with improved execution and oversight, it is
unrealistic to expect a tool like CERP, whose very
effectiveness and existence is tied to its flexibly and the
discretion to--granted to local commanders in a war zone to
attain a zero-defect standard.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In conclusion, I'd like to thank the committee for your
support of the men and women of the military, extraordinary
Americans who have fought our Nation's wars, responded to
natural disasters, and protected our interests around the
world. I know their health, safety, and welfare will be your
top priority in making these difficult decisions in the weeks
ahead.
Thank you.
Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Gates
Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity this afternoon to discuss the Defense Department's
portion of the fiscal year 2010 supplemental request.
I am honored to appear with the Secretary of State. Our joint
testimony today reflects the close cooperation of our two departments,
and the importance of a properly funded and integrated civil-military
approach to the challenges we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the
world. At the outset, I would like to offer my strong support for the
important programs funded in the State portion of the supplemental
request, without which our military efforts will not be successful.
While this hearing is focused on the specifics of the fiscal year
2010 request, this occasion also represents an opportunity to discuss
broader national budget priorities. These times of economic and fiscal
stress place enormous pressure on all of us to be good stewards of
taxpayer dollars--including the agencies represented here today. That
is why President Obama and I--in last year's and this year's budget--
made tough decisions about major programs that were either performing
poorly or in excess to real world needs. However, even at a time of
budget pressures, I believe it is critical to sustain an adequate,
sustainable level of investment in the instruments of national power--
be it defense, diplomacy, or development--that are so essential to
America's security and position in the world.
As you know, I recently returned from a visit to Afghanistan.
There, I had a chance to talk to our military commanders, Afghanistan's
leaders, and our troops serving at the tip of the spear in Kandahar and
Helmand provinces. Overall, I believe there are grounds for guarded
optimism as our campaign to roll back the Taliban gains momentum, and
as the Afghan government shows an increasing willingness to take on
additional responsibilities. Nonetheless, there will be many tough and
long days ahead. And it may take several months to produce visible
results, as most of the additional forces ordered by the President have
not yet arrived in theater and begun operations.
I would also caution against an overly ambitious view of what true
stability and security will look like in a place that has known nothing
but war for three decades. For most Afghans, a roof over their heads,
an opportunity for their children to attend school, and the ability to
provide for the basic needs of their families free from violence would
be considered a very good life. The scale of the international
coalition's efforts and ambitions should reflect that basic reality.
The fiscal year 2010 supplemental request totals $33 billion,
almost all of which is to support operations in Afghanistan and the
additional 30,000 troops being deployed as part of the President's
strategy announced in December. We remain on schedule to see overall
U.S. troop levels reach 98,000 by the end of the fiscal year.
The request includes $1.1 billion--on top of the $11.3 billion
already enacted--to field and sustain lifesaving MRAPs and M-ATVs for
troops already in theater and for the additional forces being deployed.
Finally, this supplemental contains $2.6 billion to strengthen the
Afghan National Security Forces. The goal of the President's strategy
and our supporting military efforts is to create conditions that will
allow for a full transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan
government. Earlier this month, I visited the Combined Fielding Center
at Camp Blackhorse and had a chance to speak with Afghan troops
undergoing training. I told them that Afghanistan is their country, and
ultimately their fight to win. I know that many of you have concerns
about the Afghan security forces. I share those concerns--as do our
military commanders. The Afghan army has taken real strides over the
last year and many troops have shed blood for their country. Increased
Afghan involvement in operations is critical to success, as is being
demonstrated in Marjah. Significant work remains to be done with the
police force, but there, too, changes are underway that will, I
believe, yield progress in the near term. As you consider this request,
I would emphasize that successfully accomplishing the training mission
represents both our exit strategy and the key to long-term stability in
Afghanistan.
The supplemental request also includes $1 billion to strengthen
Iraqi security forces. These additional resources--which will be used
to strengthen Iraqi institutions such as the Ministry of Defense--are
needed this year to ensure that the Iraqis are fully prepared to assume
internal security responsibilities. This is a critical period in Iraq
as government forms and as we consolidate security gains.
In Haiti, as the President requested, the Department is providing
continuing support in the wake of January's earthquake. Due to the
urgent need for an immediate response, the Department used funds from
existing accounts, with the understanding that these accounts would be
replenished in a supplemental. As such, the $655 million is part of an
amendment for Haiti that was recently submitted to Congress and
includes funding to cover these costs.
All of these operations are fuel intensive. Due to rising prices,
our fuel cost this year has been greater than anticipated. Included in
this request is $2 billion to partially offset the resulting shortfall
in the Department's base and OCO operating accounts and ensure
uninterrupted operations.
I should note that this Department has moved most funding for
programs not directly related to the war into the base budget. The
budget request being discussed today is a true supplemental as they
were originally intended, for the purposes of funding immediate and
unforeseen requirements--in this case, primarily the troop surge
associated with the President's new strategy for Afghanistan. I urge
approval of this request by the spring to prevent costly and
counterproductive disruptions to the Department's operations.
Before closing, I'd like to say a few words about the Commander's
Emergency Response Program (CERP), which continues to be a powerful
tool for military commanders in carrying out counterinsurgency
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. General Petraeus has called it
his ``most important authority,'' and I would urge the Congress to
fully fund the CERP programs contained in the Department's budget
requests.
Having said that, I understand there is some concern on this
committee about the way CERP has been used in recent years. The
Department is currently performing an internal assessment of existing
processes, which includes consideration of a single departmental
coordinator, additional dedicated CERP managers and contracting
personnel in theater, and increased pre-mobilization and in-country
training. Nonetheless, even with improved execution and oversight, it
is unrealistic to expect a tool like CERP--whose very effectiveness is
tied to its flexibility and the discretion granted to local commanders
in a war zone--to attain a zero-defect standard.
In conclusion, thank you for your support of the men and women of
the U.S. military--extraordinary Americans who have fought our nation's
wars, responded to natural disasters, and protected our interests
around the world. I know their health, safety, and welfare will be your
top priority in making these difficult decisions in the weeks ahead.
Thank you.
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING (ANSF POLICE CONTRACT)
Chairman Inouye. Madam Secretary and Mr. Secretary, I'll be
submitting questions, but I would like to ask one. Recently,
the vice chairman and I submitted a request to the Department
of Defense inspector general, together with the Department of
State inspector general, to look over the contract of the
Afghan National Police Training Program. I think we all agree
that one of the key components that must be in place would be a
fully trained Afghan National Police Force before we can start
withdrawing; however, as you may be aware, the inspector
general came out with a rather negative report, criticizing the
contract and suggesting that the contract be held up. That, to
me, would seem like we will not be able to move out on time.
What are your thoughts on this?
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, if we're talking about the
same contract that--before there was--before it was
implemented, the contract was protested. The protest was upheld
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and so, the
contract has not been implemented. And the contract with
DynCorp has been extended. So, they will continue their
efforts. We've made some changes to improve the terms of the
contract, particularly in terms of what we're asking them to
do. But, that's the current situation with the would be
contract.
Chairman Inouye. So, you believe that the criticism that we
see in some of the publications has no bearing?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think--as I understand it, the
protest was grounded in the vehicle that was being used to let
the contract, and the protest was that it was an improper
vehicle for the kind of work that was being contracted for.
That's my understanding of what the key issue, at least in the
protest, was. In terms of some of the other criticisms, I'd
have to look at them in specifics.
Chairman Inouye. So, you believe that the timetable is
still in place on the withdrawal?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. The situation with this contract
will--as I understand it, will not delay the training.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman.
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES FUND
Mr. Secretary, the budget request before the committee
includes $2.6 billion for the Afghanistan National Security
Forces Fund. We are told it is for the purpose of accelerating
growth of the Afghan Security Force. Now, 8 years of training,
you would assume, would get the forces to where we think they
ought to be, and would be sufficient in their skills, would be
sufficient to help maintain, without so much active involvement
of American or other forces, approval of eligible quality
recruits to man the ranks of the army and police. Is that what
the administration is advocating here today?
Secretary Gates. It is, Senator. And I would just say that,
you know, at the--for the first several years, the size of the
Afghan National Security Forces, and particularly the army--and
I'm going back to a period when I wasn't in Government, so I
may be wrong on some of the particulars--but, the initial
planning for the ANSF was for forces that the Afghan government
itself could afford. So, for the first few years after we went
in, in 2001, 2002, it was limited to 5,000 or so. And the
dramatic expansion of the Afghan Security Forces really began 3
or 4 years ago.
And so, we are just really getting--and to tell you the
truth, both for the army and the police, there were significant
shortages in the resources available for training both of them.
We've done a lot better, in terms of training the army, where--
there is still a deficiency in the number of trainers needed
for both, but I would say that--you know, as opposed to looking
at it as an 8-year project that's just now ramping up, I'd say
it's more of a project that has begun to look at significant
numbers for both of those forces just within the last year or
two.
STATE PERSONNEL
Senator Cochran. Madam Secretary, does your Department not
have the infrastructure and people in place to administer the
programs that are needed now, as would be available for
traditional aid programs? What makes this a different kind of
program, to justify the increase in funding that you're
requesting?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, are you--well, your question
really could cover both Iraq and Afghanistan, because, in the
case of Iraq, we are taking over responsibilities from the
Defense Department that we are not fully equipped to do without
the additional funding.
Two aspects of that, which are important: One is that as
our troops leave, in accordance with the agreement entered into
between the United States and Iraq, they will be taking a lot
of their equipment and they will be turning over certain of
their facilities that are hardened. And we have to harden our
facilities for our civilians to be able to take over the
continued police training. As we do this transition, there are
certain adjustments that are going to have to be made, since
we'll no longer be able to rely on our military forces to
protect our civilians, to embed with them on existing military
bases. So, that's where the additional costs for Iraq come in,
so that we can be prepared to be ready to take on this
responsibility as the military leaves.
In Afghanistan, as Secretary Gates said, there has been a
decision to give the responsibility for police training to the
military, which we fully support, because we're trying to get
closer to something resembling a unity of command, so that
General McChrystal and General Caldwell and our other military
commanders are able to coordinate. Because when, for example,
they go into an area like Marjah, they have to be able to begin
to stand up the police force that will be there as our troops
transition. So, there's a very close connection between the
military and the police training and deployment work. And the
Defense Department will be taking over that responsibility.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. I'd like to advise the committee that our
witnesses cannot be here all afternoon, so please limit your
questions to about 4 minutes apiece.
And now may I recognize Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And during the hours we have, most of us wouldn't last all
afternoon either.
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN FUNDING EXECUTION
First off, I'm pleased to see Secretary Clinton--you and
Secretary Gates. You both know the high--very high regard I
have for both of you in doing a superb job for our Nation. I'm
also glad to see--and this is something I've talked with both
of you privately about--the effort of the Department of Defense
to have the Department of State take over those things that
really we--are best suited for the Department of State, which a
number of things the Department of Defense, by default, has
probably taken over in the past.
But, now we've got to figure out where the money goes. We
appropriated, in fiscal year 2010, a total of $4.9 billion for
assistance for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. We received a
spending plan for those funds only a couple of weeks ago,
didn't have a whole lot of detail. None of the funds have been
spent. And while the fiscal year 2009 funds have been
obligated, a lot of it remains to be disbursed. Now, you're
asking for another $2.6 billion.
I worry we're dealing with countries where in--particularly
in Afghanistan, Pakistan--where enormous corruption--a huge
amount of money already is in the pipeline. We're basically
borrowing this money from other countries to be able to spend
it here. Are we going too fast? I mean, what kind of controls?
Do we have a special inspector general, for example, to go over
these funds, I might ask, Madam Secretary? And I'm thinking
especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, we share your concerns
and appreciate the opportunity to work with you, as the chair
of the Appropriations Committee that considers these--the
subcommittee that considers these requests. We are ramping up
our spending. We are currently expending funds at an estimated
$324 million per month. We are growing that to $400 million,
with new projects that are starting up, in addition to
continued support to quick disbursing to programs such as the
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, that does have adequate
safeguards built in.
And what we are trying to do in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
in particular, is to build in safeguards to have certification
systems in place so that we can hold entities that we
contribute funds to, to account. It is an ongoing challenge.
I'm not going to sit here----
Senator Leahy. Well----
Secretary Clinton [continuing]. And tell you that it isn't.
Senator Leahy. Yeah. I mean, under our law, money cannot go
to army or police units that are violating human rights. I'm
quite familiar with that law. But, could we say, especially
today, that that law is not being violated in either Pakistan
or Afghanistan?
And I'll close with that question, Mr. Chairman, and submit
the rest of my questions.
But, I address that to both of you.
Secretary Clinton. Well, let me say, first of all, on the
nonhuman-rights front we are putting in new personnel; we're
beefing up our presence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in
order to have greater oversight, accountability, monitoring of
the funds. It is something that we take very seriously.
It's been challenging to get those people in, under the
conflict circumstances in Afghanistan, but we've made a lot of
progress. We've quadrupled the number of people that we
actually have on the ground in Afghanistan.
And in Pakistan, that's one of the areas that Secretary
Gates has been working on with the Pakistanis so that we can
have a better oversight mechanism on the funding part of it.
But, I'll let him respond to the second part of your question.
LEAHY AMENDMENT
Secretary Gates. We are very mindful of the Leahy
amendment. And I would just say, in this unclassified setting,
Senator, that we are monitoring the situation in multiple
countries very carefully. We have the attention of their
leaders on this subject. And if and when there are abuses, we
expect, and they have acknowledged the need, to take action.
Senator Leahy. Well, I don't want--I think we're both
referring to the same thing. I'm not going to go into it in a
open session like this. But, I would appreciate being advised
of just how that's done. I've already--the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs dropped to see me yesterday to help on this. And
I--it is a matter of some concern.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Bond.
Senator Bond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I welcome the Secretaries together, because your joint
appearance represents what we, I believe, all three on this
committee believes, is the only way we're going to make
progress. That is smart power, combining the military and the
economic/diplomatic efforts.
NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOY
And I believe that the work that has been done by the
National Guard teams, which began in Afghanistan in 2008, at a
time when we tried for 2 years to get the USAID to go there and
they could not go there--but, the National Guard units, with
their ability to carry weapons and bring training, have made
tremendous differences. And I understand that there are now
about 10 different State Guard units in different provinces,
which I think is one part of the solution. And, on that
subject, I have heard, firsthand, so many times, that the
importance of the Commander's Emergency Response Program funds,
which have funded those efforts--and, not only those, but,
again, I've heard firsthand how successful the CERP funds were
in supporting the counterinsurgency strategy, for example, in
2007, in Al Anbar Province. So, I am a strong supporter of it.
But, one thing I would caution as the State Department
begins to take over, I think there are many security challenges
still in Iraq, and I hope that the withdrawal of forces will be
conditioned on the ability of the remaining forces to provide
the security that's needed, not just for USAID and other State
agencies, but for our allies there. And I hope you will do
that.
AIR FORCE C-130
But, turning to a particular question: last year, Mr.
Secretary, you testified that Air Force had over 200 extra C-
130s aircraft, and the Air Force cut that number to 65. But, I
have just read, in Defense News, that there are only--that
there are less than 50 C-130s in southwest Asia. And the
reports are that they are--the commanders are requesting more
C-130s to relieve the burden on the CH-47 Chinook helicopters.
What is the situation with regard to the heavy lift in
southwest Asia?
Secretary Gates. What's the publication?
Senator Bond. This is Defense News.
Secretary Gates. Well, Defense News is apparently better
informed than I am.
Because I have not heard such a requirement from General
McChrystal, or General Odierno for that matter. I certainly
will ask the question, following the hearing.
AIRLIFT
Senator Bond. Well, I--they cited a Lieutenant General
Stevenson, so I--I will follow up with you later. But, I do
believe there is need for lift. And I am concerned that we not
overlook the need, not only for strategic lift, but for
tactical aircraft. And when the Air Force studies itself, I
am--have questions about the reliability of those studies. And
we will continue that discussion in other fora than today.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And it is good to see both of you. And I know how many
hours you're putting in and how hard you're working.
DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO
Mr. Secretary, I want to just talk to you about the issue
of Guantanamo detainees. As the ranking member of the Military
Construction Subcommittee of this committee, there is now a
$350 million request for transfer to prison; and $150 million
of that is for military construction, $200 million for startup
costs, and that is in addition to the cost of purchasing the
prison. In addition to that, we are told, at the committee
here, that we may need up to 1,000 personnel to man the prison,
and that they will live on the local economy.
So, I am very concerned about the costs. I'm concerned
about the security. And I just wondered if there is any effort
to look at these costs, considering that we've spent hundreds
of millions on Guantanamo Bay, and even just, in the recent
years, built a new state-of-the-art courthouse for trying the
detainees that are eligible for trial. Is there any thought
about reconsidering this, in light of costs of--or what is the
thinking behind this effort?
Secretary Gates. Well, the administration is still
committed to closing Guantanamo. Thomson is--it appears to be
the most likely civilian site. The costs that you cite are
substantial, but they are onetime costs. And our latest
estimates are that, once that transfer is made, that the actual
operational costs would be several million dollars a year less
than they are at Guantanamo. So, for the long term, the
operating costs would produce savings over keeping Guantanamo
open, despite the original construction costs.
FACILITY AT THOMPSON
Senator Hutchison. And do you--are you still believing that
the 1,000 people who would be the guards and personnel at the
prison can be accommodated in the local economy? It's a pretty
remote area, I'm told. Haven't been to this place in Illinois.
But, do you think that is going to add a significant cost, or
will there have to be future military construction requests for
the housing of the guards, as well?
Secretary Gates. I would have to get back to you on the
record, how much of the original costs that you've cited are
involved involve living quarters for the troops that would be
associated with the prison for guarding. I think some of those
costs are incorporated into that, but let me get back to you,
for the record, on that.
Senator Hutchison. All right. I would like that. I will
also have another area of questioning for the record.
[The information follows:]
The $350 million request does not include any costs to
construct living quarters for the troops associated with this
mission because our initial preliminary environmental
assessment shows that the local economy can support the
estimated number of personnel who will work at Thomson and Rock
Island Arsenal. Specifically, the analysis reveals that within
a 1 hour drive of Thomson Correctional Center, there are
approximately 14,000 vacant houses or apartments for rent, and
approximately 5,000 vacant houses or apartments for sale.
Until such time that a Combatant Commander is assigned and
they can perform the necessary mission analysis and threat
assessments necessary to support a DOD-constructed housing
solution, the Department does not recommend constructing
housing.
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
Senator Hutchison. Let me ask you one other one, though.
In--during the last Base Realignment and Closure Commission
(BRAC), Congress passed the Overseas Basing Commission, looking
at our overseas basing, the training constraints, the
contribution made by the host countries, and determined that we
could do better training and have more control when there are
training facilities in the United States, as compared to those
overseas.
Well, I see that my time has expired. I'm going to ask you
about that in writing, because I'm very concerned that the
previous administration's decision to move 70,000 troops back
from Germany and Korea, as well as the congressional act that
created this atmosphere, is being changed. And I want to know
more of the thinking about it. So, I will ask you that for the
record, as well.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
Since the Department reported on major Global Defense
Posture initiatives in 2004, including those reviewed by the
Overseas Basing Commissions, we have taken great strides to
transform our posture and returned many of our permanently
stationed overseas forces to the United States. During the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department placed special
emphasis on evaluating Global Defense Posture and the
principles by which it is maintained and enhanced.
Global defense posture is a key indicator of U.S. foreign
and security policy priorities. U.S. military personnel are
forward-stationed or rotationally deployed around the world to
help sustain U.S. capacity for global reach and power
projection. The Department must ensure that our overseas
posture adapts and evolves in ways that respond to, and
anticipate, changes in the international security environment.
The presence of U.S. military forces overseas can be a
powerful catalyst for promoting multilateral approaches and
regional security architectures that serve both United States
and partner states' interests. As such, training, quality-of-
life, and readiness are key factors whenever we consider
changes to defense posture overseas. The Department takes these
and other strategic factors into consideration whether
considering basing forces in the United States or abroad.
The Department will be guided by several principles in
making defense posture decisions: forward-stationed and
rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant and
required; our defense posture will balance the need for a
permanent overseas presence with the need for a flexible
ability to respond to contingencies; we will balance the need
for assured access with the risks of introducing fragility into
its lines of communication; the posture should provide a
stabilizing influence abroad; and the posture will continuously
adapt to changes in the strategic environment.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, to both of you, and thank you for the tremendous
jobs both of you are doing.
GOALS IN AFGHANISTAN
Secretary Gates, let me start with you. I think we all
recognize that the environment in Afghanistan is extremely
complex and our goals there are very challenging. I wanted to
ask you, given the current military and political and social
situation that we have there, what are your short-term goals
before the surge force departs?
Secretary Gates. Well, in--clearly, the thrust of General
McChrystal's campaign is to reverse the momentum of the
Taliban, to deny them control, particularly in the south of
populated areas and areas of production, and degrade their
capabilities. That has begun in Marjah, and the next major
campaign will be in the Kandahar area. But, an important part
of this--and it gets to the integrated civil-military
campaign--was the preparation, weeks in advance of the military
operation, to have civilians, both from the Afghan government
and from our Government and our coalition partners, ready to go
into Marjah and begin to provide development and governance.
So, that will be the same approach that we take in the environs
of Kandahar.
SUFFICIENT FUNDING AT DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR TRANSITION
Senator Murray. Secretary Clinton, then let me ask you. So,
we make that transition, assuming we're successful. Do you have
the funds that you need within your Department to adequately
staff for the transition that will need to take place?
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Senator.
That is one of the reasons for this supplemental. As we
evaluate the progress that was made with the Marjah operation
and the necessity for our civilian presence to move very
quickly, we want to be prepared, so we are ramping up our
planning and implementation. As Secretary Gates just said, it
is likely that an operation around Kandahar will be the next
mission that our military undertakes, which requires us to have
a greater capacity to partner with the Afghans, both on the
local level and on the national level. So, I am, you know, very
convinced that what we're asking for is necessary and will give
us exactly what your question implies we need.
Senator Murray. Okay. I appreciate that.
And, Secretary Gates, I will be submitting to you a
question about the transition for men and women, as they come
home, into the Veterans Administration (VA), and making sure we
have accurate data as an increasing number of casualties with
both physical and mental wounds of war are coming home. We need
to make sure we are keeping those connections. I want to ask
you that, off the record, once we're through here.
MILITARY SPOUSE CAREER ADVANCEMENT ACCOUNTS PROGRAM
But, I do want to, while I have a short time left, ask you
about the issue of the Military Spouse Career Advancement
Accounts, the MyCAA Program. It was a great program put out
there for spouses. About 136,000 military spouses have enrolled
in that program--very popular--in order to get training,
classes, and certificate training. A number of them were frozen
out of the program over management issues. I wrote to you about
this several weeks ago. I know you are aware of this, but I am
deeply concerned about the number of spouses out there who've
now been left out, and the importance of getting this back on
track. I want your commitment to work with me to ensure we get
that moving correctly forward.
Secretary Gates. I'm very familiar with it, since I
launched it, with the Secretary of Labor, a couple of years
ago. This is one of the--this is one of those cases, where we
had a program that ramped up slowly and then exploded in
popularity. Part of the problem that we have is that we have
$61 million in the budget for this program for fiscal year
2010, and I think we've only asked for $65 million, or
thereabouts, for fiscal year 2011, in the budget that we have.
The applications for the program, as I indicated--I know
you--first of all, you are correct, there are 135,000 spouses
that signed up, a little over that. The management of the
program shut it down entirely on--in mid-February, because of
the incredible demand. This was probably, in my view, a
mistake. We should have--all those who were still in the
program, we should have kept in the program, kept it open, put
the applications on hold. The program was reopened in mid-
March, to those who had already been enrolled, and we are
looking at the way ahead to see how we might be able to
accommodate this extraordinary demand. We are--the demand we
are looking at, potentially, could end up with this program
costing $1 billion to $2 billion. So, I mean, it's a measure of
the popularity of the program. But, it----
Secretary Gates [continuing]. Also becomes----
Senator Murray. Well, I think it----
Secretary Gates [continuing]. A real----
Senator Murray [continuing]. It's a measure----
Secretary Gates [continuing]. Challenge.
Senator Murray [continuing]. Of the significance of this
program, in terms of readiness, for these families who have
given so much. And if it's a matter of requesting money through
the supplemental, or whatever we need to do. We now have a
situation where spouses have gotten the money and the training,
and living right across the street from somebody who's not. It
has created a very unfair situation. It's an important benefit
and we want to work with you to make sure we get it moving
forward again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MI-17
Secretary Gates, as we review the year 2010 supplemental
request, there's an additional $72.6 million in there for the
Mi-17 sustainment and maintenance and training for the Russian
helicopter. This is on top of the $596 million that we put into
the Defense Appropriation bill of 2010. The committee is still
waiting, Mr. Secretary, the report required from the 2010
Defense Appropriation bill detailing the current and
anticipated demand for Mi-17s, which I--should have been
delivered 60 days after the enactment of the bill. I know
you're busy, and the Department is, but that was 97 days ago.
Instead, we received a fiscal year 2011 request that includes
the procurement of 10 more Mi-17s for Afghanistan, at a cost of
$180 million, which is $18 million per airframe, nearly triple
the price that we paid for an airframe in 2006. That's--pretty
good price. What's the status of the overdue report? And what's
going on here? Do you----
Secretary Gates. I'm aware of the requirement for the
report, Senator. I was not aware that it had not yet been
delivered.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
Secretary Gates. But, I'll find out.
Senator Shelby. Will you get back to us----
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby [continuing]. On that?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
The Mi-17 report was completed on March 24, 2010 and is in
the process of being delivered to the congressional defense
committees.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES CAPABILITY
Senator Shelby. And then--and I go to another subject:
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). And this is something you know
a lot about. It's been reported that, by 2015, Predator UAVs
will have so many simultaneous patrols--that's a long time
off--over Afghanistan that the Predator may soon exceed the
bandwidth to carry data to ground stations. A lot of people are
concerned that this data overload of networks in the theater
are insufficient to the point that information collected by
wide-area sensors is being saved on computer disks and flown
back to the United States before it can be reviewed. In other
words, it's not quite----
We could be retrieving actionable data in real time that
could save lives, hopefully, of the warfighters. Can you
discuss this issue and what the Department's doing to address
this? Are you familiar with that?
Secretary Gates. All I can tell you, Senator, is that I
know that bandwidth in both Iraq and Afghanistan is a
continuing concern, but I have not heard, from General
McChrystal or anyone else, frankly, until today, that it is a
current concern or that they are not expanding the bandwidth--
--
Senator Shelby. Okay.
Secretary Gates [continuing]. To take it--to take advantage
of the additional capabilities that we're putting in there. I
can just assure you, I wouldn't be asking for the extraordinary
uplift in the number of--the extraordinary increase in the
number of UAVs if I didn't think the intelligence we'd get from
them could be made operationally available almost in real time.
Senator Shelby. Okay. The command and control for the
unmanned systems--this has been an ongoing thing--one issue
that continues to be of concern to the--is the Army's ability
to continue utilizing unmanned systems when and where soldiers
want them. And we continue to hear from our commanders on the
ground about the importance of retaining control of tactical
UAVs.
A lot of our success depends on this. Some would like to
see the Army lose that. What's your opinion on all of that? I
know that's a kind of an interservice deal, but----
Secretary Gates. Well, I think that the key--what we have
seen with the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities that we have deployed, first in Iraq and now in
Afghanistan in ever growing numbers, is a unique fusion of
intelligence and operations in the history of warfare. My view
is that it has to be responsive to the needs of the commander
on the ground. And whatever mechanism is required to do that is
the way it ought to be handled. But, it--just as we need the
bandwidth so that it can--the intelligence itself can be
transmitted to the ground in real time, we need the capability
for those systems to be responsive to the commanders on the
ground in the same way.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Madam Secretary. Welcome, Secretary Gates.
Secretary Gates, let me follow up on Senator Shelby's
questions. I have a good deal of concern about UAV technology.
It is getting better. These are able to fly higher, stay in the
air longer; they can carry heavier payloads, a mix of both
guided and unguided munitions. And many of these advances are
now being made by foreign countries, which may or may not
support our international objectives. With technical
modifications, even UAVs that do not currently carry weapons
can, in fact, be modified into armed platforms. They are
proliferating all over the world.
So, I have three specific questions to ask of you and then
you can choose your answers.
UAV EXPORTS/SALES
One, what is DOD's current policy regarding the sale or
transfer of UAVs to foreign countries?
Two, what is your view on limiting the export of United
States UAV technology capable of being employed as a combat
platform?
And three, what is the Department doing to ensure that UAVs
are not used against American troops?
Secretary Gates. First of all, our policy toward the sale
of UAV technology--I would differentiate, first of all, between
armed and unarmed. But, overall, our policy is guided by the
missile technology control regime. And so, at this point, to
the best of my knowledge, we have only sold UAVs, at this
point, to Italy and the United Kingdom, two North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. There are other countries
that are very interested in this capability; and frankly, it
is, in my view, in our interest to see what we can do to
accommodate them. But, I am--I share your concern about the
possibility of the transfer of technology, or about these
capabilities getting into the hands of those who are our
adversaries. And the reality is that countries like Iran are
developing their own UAVs, and already have a UAV capability.
With respect to export, again, as I just suggested, I think
there are some specific cases where we have allies, with whom
we have formal treaty alliances, who have expressed interest in
these capabilities, and we have told them that we are limited
in what we can do, by the MTCR, but I think it's something we
need to pursue with them.
The reality is, so far, we have been in situations where
UAV technology cannot be used, or has not been used, against
our troops anywhere. I just referred to the fact that Iran has
UAVs, and that is a concern, because it is one of those areas
where, I suppose, if they chose to, in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, they could create difficulties for us.
By the same token UAVs are relatively slow flyers, and we
have very capable air forces. And so, I actually think that our
ability to protect our troops from these things, particularly
in a theater of combat like this, is quite good.
My worry would be capabilities like this getting into the
hands of nonstate actors who could use them for terrorist
purposes.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
COUNTERNARCOTICS IN AFGHANISTAN
The Drug Caucus of the Senate, which I happen to chair, has
been looking into the narcotics picture in Afghanistan. And
this raises--and let me just be very quick with this--this
raises the question of standing by and letting these opium
poppies grow. At the same time, the Taliban is emerging into a
major drug cartel. I think it's a problem. The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) tells me it's a problem. People that have
made the busts in Afghanistan tell me that it's a problem. And
I would be very interested in your response to that.
Secretary Gates. Well, about 1\1/2\ or 2 years ago, the
coalition in Afghanistan received changed rules of engagement
that allowed them to go after drug lords and drug labs. And we
have been fairly aggressive in doing that. Ninety-eight percent
of the poppies grown in Afghanistan are grown in seven
provinces, where--and they are the ones where we are engaged in
the most significant combat.
Let's just face facts, here. Until we have measures in
place--until we can establish a security environment that
allows us then to go forward with economic development and
provide alternative--the means to grow alternative crops for
these individual farmers--I have believed all along that if you
eradicate a man's crop without getting--giving him a substitute
income, you have just recruited a significant number of
additional Taliban. And so, we have to weigh aggressive efforts
to go after the lords and the labs, with providing the--with
the time required to provide the security where you have the
environment that we can go in, with the civilian capabilities,
and provide these people alternative means of supporting their
families so, frankly, they don't pick up a gun and start
shooting our soldiers.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Landrieu.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you very much.
HAITI DISASTER ASSISTANCE
Mr. Secretary, Madam Secretary, many of the questions that
I had on Afghanistan have been addressed. But, I wanted to
bring up Haiti if I could. I understand that's the subject of
this hearing, Mr. Chairman, is not? The Haiti supplemental? The
Haiti supplemental? Yes?
I know that you all are both aware, and maybe--the
committee, I know, has been focused on the tragedy in Haiti.
And I guess I'm particularly close to it, because we went
through a horrible situation just 4\1/2\ years ago in south
Louisiana and Mississippi. But, I just think, for the record,
it's important for us to focus just a minute, despite all the
extraordinary challenges of our military in other parts of the
world, that 220,000 individuals lost their lives in this
disaster, compared to about 2,000 on the gulf coast, just to
put it in scale; 1.3 million people are living in temporary
shelters. That's really a stretch of the imagination, because
actually it's a piece of plastic. There are 105,000 homes that
have been completely destroyed; 200,000 were severely damaged;
1,300 schools were destroyed, and 50 healthcare centers
collapsed.
HAITI HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
I know that Secretary Clinton's focus and heart and
attention have been on this. And so, my question, Madam
Secretary, might be with the documents that are before us,
which were just received last night, looking at the situation
for Haiti. I'm a little concerned that I'm only able to find
about $5 million, stuck down in the budget for USAID, to
completely repair, it looks like, these families, which is
going to be difficult, since I understand that most children in
Haiti don't even have a birth certificate.
So, this is going to be a long, hard road to climb, trying
to shelter--sustain these families with just the basics; help
with our international partners to get housing built quickly
for them; but also, Madam Secretary, trying to get the
wherewithal to create some sort of civil registry with our
international partners to just get the basic birth certificates
so we can start actually finding families for children, getting
them families if their families have been lost, et cetera, et
cetera. So, could you just comment on some of your ideas along
these lines?
Secretary Clinton. Yes, Senator.
And thank you, as always, for your deep concern about
children, and particularly children who are in the foster-care
system or who are orphaned. Your voice has been very, very
strong on that.
And, as you know so well, children, within the context of a
complex humanitarian emergency, such as we saw in Haiti, are
among the most vulnerable children in the world. And I want to
assure you that the United States Government recognizes that
the protection and caring for these children has to be one of
our highest priorities. So, we have been working to support
children on our own, in partnership with the United Nations,
other international organizations, NGOs, and many faith-based
organizations.
First and foremost, we continue to focus on meeting
children's emergency needs for medical care, shelter, food,
water. Simultaneously, we are supporting an effort, led by the
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Government of
Haiti, to find unaccompanied and separated children, and ensure
they are in a safe place until we can determine whether they
have any family at all that they can be reunited with, or what
alternative permanent care provisions can be made. We're also
expanding child-safe and child-friendly spaces within all of
the facilities that we are supporting in Haiti. And that
includes health, nutrition, education, and psychosocial
support.
The Haitian health professionals are asking for a lot of
assistance in understanding how to deal, in a psychological
way, with children who have been so traumatized. And we're
supporting the Government of Haiti and UNICEF to rapidly assess
all the orphanages in the earthquake-affected zone, with the
aim of addressing their security and subsistence needs. In all
of these efforts, we are coordinating closely with the U.N.
protection cluster and the Government of Haiti, which, as you
know, has very strong feelings about being in charge of their
children. And I understand that, and we're trying to provide
the support they need in order to meet their obligations.
But, we will continue to work closely with you and keep you
closely informed, because this is our very highest priority.
And we're trying to do it in cooperation with the many other
organizations that are as concerned as we are.
Senator Landrieu. And I thank you.
My time's expired, Mr. Chairman.
But, there are many members of this committee I've had
informal discussions with, Madam Secretary, and their support
for laying the foundation of a new, more vibrant Haiti focused
on strengthening each and every family in Haiti, and providing
every child--serving them through families, not independently,
not, you know, in an orphanage, but through families. So, I
thank you for your longstanding commitment to this issue.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And it's nice to see the two of you sitting next to each
other. And, Madam Secretary, you know, when you were on Foreign
Relations, people came in and said we need soft power, and
you're it.
MIDEAST POLICY
My question is this. I met with Ambassador Holbrooke in
October, and I'm very impressed with his plan in terms of
securing the environment there, and nation building. The
question I have is, How much is that costing us? number one.
And number two, How long are we going to have to be there?
Because I don't think that we should be, in terms of how long
it's going to be.
NATO/AFGHANISTAN ARMY
Next is, How much help are we getting from our NATO and
other allies, in terms of this nation building? So, that's on
your side of the coin.
Secretary Gates, on your side, I'd like to know--and you
don't have to, maybe, give it to me now, but I'd love to have
the information--is, How much help are you getting now from our
NATO allies with boots on the ground without the KDFs? We have
people there, but they have--still have KDFs. I've gone to
countries, and they've said, ``I'm sorry, Senator, we cannot
have our people involved in,'' you know, ``military activity,
but we're willing to train these individuals.'' So, the
question is, How much help are we getting there from them?
And last but not least, you're asking for $2.6 billion to
build up the--the Afghanistan Army. And the question I have, Is
anybody else pitching in to help pay for the Afghanistan Army?
And we know that we're probably going to have to spend maybe
twice that amount in the future, for a long period of time, in
order to maintain the security that you talked about, in terms
of dealing with the drug problem, and so forth.
So, could you both comment on what I've raised?
FUTURE SUPPLEMENTALS
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Senator.
And first let me say that our request is aimed at our
diplomatic and development efforts. We view these not as nation
building for Afghanistan, but as in the core security interests
of the United States. Without additional resources, we cannot
create that environment that our troops need as they clear----
Senator Voinovich. Yeah, I--listen, I understand that the
real issue here----
Secretary Clinton. Right.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Is about how much is that
costing us. And the question is, How long is that going to have
to continue to the point where we can kind of say, ``We've done
our thing''? Is it 5 years, 10 years, 15 years?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I don't know if I can
answer it that way, but I can answer it this way. We believe
that our efforts, which are coordinated so closely with our
military, will transform into a regular diplomatic and
development relationship. I mean, we provide development aid to
a lot of countries where we don't have troops, because we think
it's in our interest. And so, as we are in this intense phase,
that will be several years--obviously, I don't know that either
of us could put a timeline on it--what we're trying to do
simultaneously is clear territory from the Taliban, be able to
work more closely with the Afghan Army, that Secretary Gates
will talk about, by helping to build them up with our allies--
and we're getting a lot of support there; and at the same
time----
Senator Voinovich. But----
Secretary Clinton [continuing]. Create----
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. I mean could you----
Secretary Clinton [continuing]. More capacity----
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Outline the help that
you're getting from these people on that--in that score?
Secretary Clinton. Sure. And we can give you, in detail--
and we'd be happy to take that for the record.
[The information follows:]
During Secretary Clinton's testimony before the Senate Committee on
Appropriations on March 25, 2010, you asked the Secretary about
development assistance our allies and partners are providing in
Afghanistan.
Our efforts in Afghanistan have an international face with the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leading the military effort,
which is complimented by broad civilian contributions from our NATO
Allies and other partners including leadership and support to
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, police training efforts and local
development projects.
Following President Obama's December 1, 2009 declaration that we
would increase our troop strength, NATO Allies and other partners have
pledged an additional 9,000 troops, which are arriving alongside the
30,000 additional U.S. troops. Simultaneously, NATO Allies and other
partners have substantially increased their security forces' training
contributions to the NATO Training Mission--Afghanistan (NTM-A),
filling institutional trainer positions, Operational Liaison and Mentor
Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Liaison and Mentor Teams (POMLTs).
We continue to work with our NATO Allies and other partners to fill the
remaining trainer shortages and ensure a capable and sustained Afghan
National Security Forces.
Although the United States is the largest donor to Afghanistan's
civilian reconstruction efforts, our Allies and partners are sharing
the burden of the civilian mission in Afghanistan. Fourteen of 26 PRTs
are led by allies and partners, and provide training for the Afghan
National Security Forces and reconstruction assistance, as well as
humanitarian assistance in many cases. Forty-three percent of all
civilian assistance to Afghanistan comes from donors other than the
United States, as detailed in the attached table as provided by the
Afghan Ministry of Finance. The Asian Development Bank and World Bank
have contributed a combined $5 billion since 2001, in addition to
helping other donors through trust funds.
The European Union has contributed approximately $2 billion since
2001 and in 2009 pledged to increase its assistance significantly. Many
European countries also provide additional assistance bilaterally. The
United Kingdom is a major contributor to security and training missions
and civilian assistance, with nearly $3 billion in contributions since
2001. A number of countries have recently pledged to increase their
civilian assistance. For instance, in November 2009, Japan increased
its 5-year civilian commitment to Afghanistan from $1 billion to $5
billion. In January 2010, Germany doubled its assistance commitment to
430 million Euros annually through 2013.
Despite severe budgetary constraints over the past 2 years, even
smaller donors like Greece and Latvia have decided to make new
contributions in the past year. Our international outreach efforts have
inspired a growing list of nontraditional partners to play a larger
role in Afghanistan, including the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan,
Malaysia, India and others. Some of these countries are providing
financial assistance or funding the activities of other donors, while
some are providing civilian advisors, doctors, engineers, or other
human resources but rely on other sources of funding for their efforts.
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Donor Total Pledges
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japan................................................... 6,900.0
UK...................................................... 2,897.0
WB...................................................... 2,800.0
ADB..................................................... 2,200.0
EU/CE................................................... 1,768.7
Canada.................................................. 1,679.1
India................................................... 1,200.0
Germany................................................. 1,187.9
Norway.................................................. 938.0
Iran.................................................... 864.0
Netherlands............................................. 753.2
Denmark................................................. 672.8
Saudi Arabia............................................ 533.0
Italy................................................... 514.6
Spain................................................... 486.5
Australia............................................... 369.3
UAE..................................................... 307.7
Pakistan................................................ 305.0
Sweden.................................................. 288.6
ECHO.................................................... 268.2
U.N. Agencies........................................... 252.4
AKDN.................................................... 239.3
China................................................... 196.5
Turkey.................................................. 190.0
Finland................................................. 152.0
France.................................................. 151.8
Russian Fed............................................. 141.0
Switzerland............................................. 134.0
Other Donors............................................ 97.1
Belgium................................................. 86.8
Korea (Rep. of)......................................... 85.0
Islamic Dev Bank........................................ 70.0
Kuwait.................................................. 60.0
Ireland................................................. 33.4
New Zealand............................................. 30.3
Taiwan.................................................. 28.6
Croatia................................................. 28.1
Czech Republic.......................................... 22.0
Qatar................................................... 20.0
Org Islamic Conf........................................ 15.0
Austria................................................. 14.0
Greece.................................................. 11.7
Global Fund............................................. 11.5
Luxembourg.............................................. 7.2
Oman.................................................... 6.0
Poland.................................................. 5.0
Brunei.................................................. 3.6
Hungary................................................. 3.0
Malta................................................... 3.0
Kazakhistan............................................. 2.3
Egypt................................................... 2.0
Portugal................................................ 2.0
Lithuania............................................... 1.6
Greece.................................................. 1.6
Singapore............................................... 1.5
Estonia................................................. 1.2
Portugal................................................ 1.2
Slovakia................................................ 1.0
Brazil.................................................. 1.0
Vietnam................................................. ..............
---------------
Total............................................. 29,047.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATUS OF SURGE
Secretary Clinton. But, just as in Iraq--our troops are
going to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Well, we're going
to have relationships with Iraq. We're going to have an Embassy
with Iraq. We're going to continue to fulfill the request that
the Iraqis made to us in the framework agreement about
continuing assistance, and most particularly high-level police
training. So, we're going to continue to have relationships.
And so, that's going to go on for the foreseeable future, just
like--I was in Mexico Tuesday. We've got--you know, we're
putting money into Mexico, because there's a lot of challenges
that are in our interests.
So, it will be a different relationship, but it will still
be one of priority for the United States.
Secretary Gates. Senator, we have, at this point, pretty
close to 45,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan. There are
several thousand more that have been pledged, so that, by the
time the pledges that we see are fulfilled, there will be
pretty close to 50,000 non-U.S. troops. That's up from 17,000
in 2007. I would say that, for the last year, 1\1/2\ years, but
especially since the NATO summit last spring, we have seen a
number of NATO allies reduce or eliminate their caveats. And
so, the number of situations that we face now, where caveats
have prevented effective operations, have really dropped pretty
dramatically. So, I think we have really good cooperation from
our NATO and other partner nations, and they have really
stepped up to the plate, despite, in many cases, considerable
domestic opposition to it.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, for
being here. We appreciate very much your candor.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)
Secretary Gates, the materials that were submitted with the
fiscal year overseas contingency operations (OCO) supplemental
request highlight that you're requesting an additional $1.3
billion for the Military Intelligence Program to Enhance U.S.
Intelligence Capabilities and Operations, which includes ISR.
And I'd like to talk a little bit about the Department's
efforts to coordinate investments and enhance the ISR mission.
We've heard, from all of the services, that combatant
commanders have a large appetite for ISR. My concern is that
the focus has been on how many UAVs are in the field, which I
think is important, and how quickly we can get more. But, I
hope, in that effort, we're not overlooking the critical
aspects of expanding ISR, like how the services plan to train
the analysts that will be required to process the expanding
volumes of data, and what infrastructure will be required to
move data, and share it with those that need it. In a sense,
maybe the easy part is buying the--the hard part is exploiting
and using the intelligence that we're able to get from it.
A GAO report issued last week states that, ``Within Central
Command, less than half of the electronic signals collected by
Predator are exploited.'' The report also identifies a shortage
in analytical staff to process ISR--and you already mentioned
bandwidth--and limited bandwidth to disseminate intelligence,
as principal challenges. I've asked questions of General
Schwartz about the manning mission, and he stated that the
current manning structure was unsustainable. And I'm just
concerned.
So, can you give me some idea of what DOD is doing to help
coordinate services so that we match ISR capabilities with the
ability to access it, and also coordination within the
services?
Secretary Gates. The--there are two aspects to this. First
of all, when you say that the commanders' appetite for ISR is
large, I would say that's one of the great understatements of
all time.
Insatiable is more like it. We have taken--two things.
First of all, we understand--I understand very much that when
we talk about ISR, it is not just the platform. It's the
analysts, it's the linguists, it's the ground stations. And, in
fact, one of the problems that we had, 1\1/2\ or 2 years ago,
when we really began pushing this capability to the field in--
significantly added numbers--was the shortage of ground
stations. Another problem, that has been remedied by the Air
Force and the Army over the last year or so, was also a
shortage of crews to run these UAVs. So, I think we're
addressing those issues. I think that we have--linguists, I
would say, is a real challenge, as well as analysts.
There are two bureaucratic vehicles for coordinating this
effort on behalf of the Department. The first and the most
institutional is the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, General Clapper, who has complete overview of
this and watches the full package, not just the platforms. And
then the other has been the Special Task Force, that I
established on ISR about 1\1/2\ or 2 years ago, that has been
focused on, How can we get this capability in usable fashion to
the field? And using not only unpiloted vehicles, but also, we
are putting a number of what are the equivalent of King Airs in
there, the MC-12s, Liberty aircraft. So, all of these
capabilities, we are very mindful of the need for the full
package so that, as I told Senator Shelby, if we can't get the
stuff to the commanders in the field, it's not worth the
investment.
Senator Nelson. Well, and getting it adequately analyzed
would be just as significant a portion of getting it to them in
the field.
I appreciate your answers, and I hope that----
Secretary Gates. But, I would tell you--I went to a
counter-improvised explosive device (IED) facility the other
day that is run by DIA. And I had--I took the Canadian Defense
Minister there, and I have no idea. You know, we talk about the
commanders in the field, but with today's electronics, I walk
into a room that's probably got 60 analysts in it from all over
the intelligence community, sitting here in the Washington
area, with realtime links to the UAVs and other capabilities in
the theater, and providing information on IED networks to the
theater. So, the theater doesn't have to do all the analysis. A
lot of it can be done back here, with today's electronics. And
we have these capabilities. This was one of the things that
JIEDDO has done; this is under their auspices. So, there's a
lot of capability here, but as we try and ramp this up, there
are obviously going to be some imbalances that we have to try
and fix.
Senator Nelson. Well, I appreciate that you're on top of
it. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
I'd just like to announce that a vote just started. So, if
some of you wish to go, be my guest.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't think I'll go yet. How about that?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, thank you so much. Good
to see both of you again.
TRUST ISSUES IN AFGHANISTAN
So many of us have had an opportunity to travel recently to
Afghanistan, and certainly recognize the challenges, the great
difficulty that we face over there, that the men and women who
are serving us face every day.
We were in a situation--we were in--down in the--Helmand
Province, down outside of Garmsir, and were able to walk
through a market, and felt very comfortable, given the
situation; left, and 5 days later in that same community, eight
people died as a result of suicide bombing. So, we recognize
the volatility of the situation.
One term that we heard used quite frequently was this
``deficit of trust'' that remains there. And I think, Secretary
Gates, you have said that, ``Successfully accomplishing the
training mission represents both our exit strategy and the key
to long-term stability in Afghanistan.'' But, again, going back
to this ``deficit of trust'' situation that we heard so much
about, it was very clear that the people there appreciate that
there is a--there's a clear choice. You can either side with
the Americans, who, it's clear, will someday leave; or you side
with the Taliban, who will likely be there indefinitely. And
the question to you is, While an exit strategy is absolutely
necessary as part of any military operation, what assurance are
we able to give to the Afghan tribal leaders to ensure that
they do, in fact, remain on our side of the fight, that they
believe that it is more worthwhile, in the long term, to stay
on our side of the fight?
AFGHANISTAN
Secretary Gates. First of all, I think that the thing to
remember, historically and culturally, about the many Afghans
is that they've been at war for 30 years. And the average
Afghan is going to come down on one side or the other only when
he thinks he's spotted who's going to win. And that's part of
what our endeavors are about.
When I talked earlier about General McChrystal's first
objective being to reverse the momentum of the Taliban, that
is, in the first instance, about changing the psychology of the
people about who's going to win this struggle. I think that the
thing also to keep in mind is that the Taliban may be vicious,
but they're also incredibly unpopular in Afghanistan. Every
reliable poll that I've seen over the past couple of years
shows the Taliban support in Afghanistan at around 10 percent
or less. So, these people aren't fond of the Taliban, they're
just intimidated by them, for the most part.
And the key here is, when we begin the process of
transitioning security control to the Afghans, in a province-
by-province or district-by-district area, that we have degraded
the capabilities of the Taliban to the point where local
security forces and the Afghan National Army and various
national police units can sustain the security of the people.
So, it's not that the Afghan Army or Police are ever going to
achieve the skill level of American forces--the truth of the
matter is nobody in the world's ever going to do that, with all
due respect even to our allies--but, can we degrade the
capabilities and the numbers of the Taliban fighters to the
point where the local security forces and the Afghan Army can
keep them under control and provide the kind of local security
for people that is required.
The way this works is, if you get the population on your
side--and we saw this in Anbar--that is a self-reinforcer of
security. It is the local population in Anbar--once they
began--once they felt that they could defeat al Qaeda in Iraq,
that they began telling us where the IEDs were being planted,
and so on. We're beginning to see that in some places in
Afghanistan, where the local population is figuring, ``You
know, maybe this is going to go the way of the Afghan
government and the coalition.'' And so, they're beginning to
cooperate with us, and support us.
So, as Secretary Clinton talked about, this is a complex
business, but having the population not necessarily trust us,
but have confidence that their security will be protected, is a
mix of our capabilities over the next number of years,
capabilities of our allies, and the capabilities of the Afghan
forces themselves. And not just the national forces, but, I
would say, also local security forces.
Senator Murkowski. I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'll try to keep mine to 4 minutes, or less even, because I
know we have a vote.
Thank you both for being here.
STATUS OF WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN
Secretary Clinton, let me start with you, if I may. And
that is, I know that you have been a champion for women's
rights for a long time. And in Afghanistan, as I understand it
now, girls and women are doing three things that we take for
granted here in this country. They're going to school. They're
getting jobs. And they're actually participating in the
government.
I'd just like to hear your thoughts on where that stands
and if you think that is a long-term change in Afghanistan, or
if that's still in its infancy and could go away at any time?
Secretary Clinton. Thank you for asking that, Senator,
because I think it's important that we use that as one of the
markers for the kind of success that we're hoping to achieve
there. You're absolutely right, there has been a great deal of
change in the opportunities available to women and girls. When
you look at the increase in the number of young women going to
school, it's dramatic. But, there's still a long way to go.
There are a lot of obstacles that are deeply cultural and
historic. What we are looking out for is, not that we can
mandate a change in culture and history, but to keep that door
of opportunity open----
Senator Pryor. Right.
WOMEN'S RIGHTS/RECONCILIATION
Secretary Clinton [continuing]. And not let anything slam
it shut. So, we're particularly concerned about the
reintegrating/reconciliation plans that the Karzai government
has undertaken. They have, thus far, made it clear that they
are expecting people with whom they reconcile to abide by the
laws and constitution of Afghanistan, which does provide
protection for women's rights. But, thank you for raising it,
because it's a high priority of ours.
Senator Pryor. Well, thank you. I think it's a great policy
and a great priority.
I recently read that the United Nations Office of Drugs and
Crime estimates that corruption comprises 25 percent of
Afghanistan's GDP. When I see a number like that it--it's
obviously shocking, and it also makes me realize that we need
to be very, very careful in how we're spending U.S. tax dollars
in Afghanistan.
So, when it comes to accountability for our foreign aid
there, could you give us a status report of the things that
your Department is doing to try to make sure there is
sufficient accountability?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, we are increasing our support
for our inspectors general. We are also adding more auditors in
order to keep track of funding. We are certifying any Afghan
Government entity that would receive any of our funding, to be
clear that it is managing those funds in a way that we find
acceptable. We are working to put people into those agencies.
CORRUPTION
So, we're taking a lot of prophylactic steps. But, as you
point out, corruption is a deeply ingrained problem, and we
just have to be very vigilant about making sure that we're not
caught up in it.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Specter.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the final time, I propose to use it to raise a number of
questions. There's hardly time for questions and answers within
4 minutes. And I understand the limitations that we have here.
MIDEAST PEACE
The first question that I have relates to a report in The
Washington Post yesterday, where General Petraeus is quoted as
saying that, ``The conflict foments''--referring to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict--``The conflict foments anti-
American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism
toward Israel.'' His comment within the commentary is--the
paper--his comments suggested that U.S. military officials were
embracing the idea that failure to resolve the conflict had
begun to imperil American lives.'' Well, that's obviously very
serious and very heavy.
[The information follows:]
The Department of Defense does not believe that the U.S.
commitment to Israel's security or the failure to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict imperils U.S. lives, nor did
General Petraeus state this. However, a lack of progress in the
peace process is one of many issues that is distorted and
exploited by our adversaries in the region, thereby affecting
U.S. national security interests.
This Administration's commitment to Israel's security and
our defense relationship with Israel are based on mutual
security interests. Israel is one of our strongest allies, and,
in this role, is a crucial partner on security and anti-
terrorism in the region.
Peace in the Middle East is a national interest of the
United States, as well as of Israel, the Palestinians, and Arab
States. The Department of Defense has provided significant
support to both the Israelis and the Palestinians to increase
security for both populations and thus improve the chances of
attaining a just and lasting peace. The United States continues
to work through negotiations to assist the Israelis and
Palestinians to realize a solution with two states living side-
by-side in peace and security. In this effort, the Department
of Defense stands ready to assist Senator Mitchell in his work
to achieve a comprehensive Middle East Peace.
Senator Specter. And my question, which I would like you to
respond to for the record, would be, What evidence is there
to----
Mr. Secretary, we have an expensive war in Afghanistan. The
question of success in Afghanistan is very much open. I think
it's going very well, and I commend what's going on at the
present time, buttressed by a visit which I made recently there
with other colleagues. But, the question on my mind, when al
Qaeda can organize somewhere else, like Yemen or Somalia or
somewhere else, why fight in Afghanistan, where it is so costly
and where the Soviets, the Brits, going back to Alexander the
Great, have not met success?
[The information follows:]
A combination of personal, ethnic, tribal, historical, and
other ties to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region makes it al
Qaeda's preferred base of operations. Over the past 20 years,
al Qaeda has developed a network in this region that supports
training, financing, recruiting, and other operational needs.
Even if the lack of security in other regions is appealing to
al Qaeda, it would take years for al Qaeda to develop a new
network as robust as the present one.
There is a very sharp distinction between the historical
experience of many in Afghanistan, those who were there to
conquer, and our mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. campaign is
aimed at enabling the development of Afghan capacity so that
the Afghan Government may exert sovereignty over its own
territory and prevent al Qaeda and its affiliates from using
the country as a base of operations. The Taliban in
Afghanistan, because Afghans have experienced its rule, has
little popular support. Even in areas the Afghan Government has
yet to fully establish itself, the Taliban is not the preferred
choice for the Afghan people. This creates great opportunity
for us to help develop Afghan institutions and capacity that
are a viable alternative for the population. The United States
does not have the option of allowing al Qaeda and its
affiliates freedom of movement and sanctuary, given the threat
that they pose to our homeland and to our vital interests
abroad. Our campaign on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan
border, and our campaign against al Qaeda and its affiliates in
other locations around the world, put continuous pressure on
this network to disrupt their operations and deny their ability
to launch spectacular attacks. Denying sanctuary to al Qaeda
and its affiliates is critical to preventing their ability to
attack our homeland, our interests, and our forces and our
allies abroad.
PAKISTAN AND INDIA
Senator Specter. A third area of questioning is, What has
happened in Pakistan and India?
[The information follows:]
The United States encourages India and Pakistan to discuss
their differences bilaterally. We welcome recent meetings
between the two, and are prepared to assist if the two
countries so request.
Senator Specter. There have been some suggestions that
there could be a cooling of that--of the tension, which might
relieve a number of Pakistani military to assist the United
States in fighting al Qaeda or fighting the Taliban. In the
CODEL, where we met with the Indian Prime Minister, we raised
this, directly. And the Prime Minister of India was explicit,
saying that he would like to see a lessening of tensions,
soldiers released, but they're--they would have to be in
control of the terrorists by the Pakistan Government. And he
was asked, ``Well, do you think that's realistic?'' And he
said, very emphatically, ``Yes. They are their creation.'' So
that if there's a real prospect here of that, there may be more
Pakistani soldiers who could help us, and they might have some
more inclination to do so, and that would impact that picture
very decisively.
The area of sanctions is a very difficult one against Iran.
And we have been discussing that for a long time, in a lot of
contexts. And I know there's no simplistic answer. But, the
question that I get consistently involves, Where are we going?
The military option is on the table. Everybody says it's
unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon. President Obama
drew a line in the sand last December. Hard to really be
specific about lines in the sand, but that was my sense of if
it and the sense of a number of people.
So, the question is, What is it going to take? Is it a
constantly moving position by China? I don't envy either of
you, in dealing with China, or, for that matter, in dealing
with Russia, although we congratulate you on what appears to be
a really big breakthrough on nuclear weapons. But, what are we
looking for? There's talk about--gasoline could bring them to
their knees if we really got tough on financial matters.
[The information follows:]
As the President has stated, our policy goal is to prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. To ensure this, the
Administration is pursuing a dual-track strategy of engagement
with, and pressure on, Iran, while also building support with
our allies in the region and around the world. After a year of
attempts at principled engagement with Tehran, Iran's continued
nuclear intransigence left us with no other option but to
resort to the pressure track and pursue sanctions within the
United Nations Security Council, as well as additional
coordinated national measures with the European Union and other
like-minded states. We expect that these sanctions--although an
imperfect tool--will have both a material and psychological
effect on Iran, particularly when the sanctions have broad
international support, including from China and Russia. Whether
this will be sufficient to bring Iran back to the negotiating
table, or convince it to make material concessions on its
nuclear program, remains to be seen.
Senator Specter. It looks like I could go on indefinitely.
The chairman has left.
Do you have a question, Senator?
Senator Collins. I do.
Senator Specter. Well, I have posed those areas of concern.
And my request would be that you respond to them on the record,
as opposed to asking a question and a half, and having the 4
minutes go.
Thank you for your service. Thank you for taking the job,
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Secretary Gates. Great to see
you. Graduate of a grade school in Wichita, Kansas, that I
attended, doing so well in the tough Washington climate.
Well, Dole and I are from Russell, which is a smaller town.
Gates's experience in Kansas is limited to a big city, Wichita,
where I left when I was 12.
Thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Well, to another Kansan here----
Voice. There's Kansans everywhere.
Senator Brownback. Absolutely. I----
Voice. We're not in Kansas anymore.
Senator Brownback. Yeah, we're going to make the rest of
the country Kansas. That's how we're going to fix that.
Mr. Chairman, I didn't know if you knew this, but Secretary
Gates was Kansan of the Year this year.
Chairman Inouye. Really?
Senator Brownback. And his mother was at the ceremony, who
was very proud of her son, and we all were of what all he's
done, and very appreciative of that. It was a very touching
moment. Mr. Secretary, you gave a beautiful, beautiful speech
at it, as well.
KCX TANKER/EADS
A couple of things that I wanted to raise with you, if I
could, Secretary Gates, in particular. In one--this is the old
one that you're familiar with, very familiar with, on the
tanker contract. I've been reading that Airbus is asking for an
extension of your RFP time deadline so they can make another
bid on this contract. And I've been reading throughout the
European Press that Sarkozy and others are concerned, and they
think this RFP is terrible, that they haven't been able to
partner with Northrop. I would hope we would stick with the
timeframe and the timeline that this 10-year project is on and
hopefully getting close to a resolution and that it not be
extended for a bid to be put forward from EADS. Have you made a
decision on that? The last press account I recall seeing said
you were reviewing it.
Secretary Gates. That's correct. We have had some
informal--as best I've--as I'm up to date, we've had some
informal questions from EADS about it. And I think they were
going to do a letter to us. I have not seen that letter. I
don't know if it's been received in the Department. We will
look at it.
As I told the House Appropriations Committee, Defense
Subcommittee, yesterday, we will not change the requirements.
We are buying the best plane for the Air Force, and to meet Air
Force needs. And so, we will look at this letter. Believe me,
no one is more eager to get on with this than I am.
Senator Brownback. But, no decision has been made----
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Senator Brownback [continuing]. Whether to extend the time
deadline, because----
Secretary Gates. No.
Senator Brownback. Obviously I would urge you to stay with
the current time deadline. This thing has gone on far long
enough, and it's time to move on.
WTO
And then, you've also seen that the WTO has recently ruled
in the United States' favor that the airframe that EADS has
proposed to bid was an illegally subsidized airframe that they
developed. And that's now a final ruling by the WTO.
I saw in the----
Secretary Gates. Senator, I've just been handed a note.
``Late breaking news'' as it were, we have received the letter
requesting an extension from EADS, so we'll look at it and see
what it has to say.
Senator Brownback. Well, my vote's no on this, that we not
extend it, and certainly not based off of President Sarkozy's
concerns, because the very thing that they're going to bid is
the very plane that they used to beat our brains in on the
commercial marketplace for a number of years, and knocked
several of our big companies out. This has been a 20-year
litigation by USTR, that we just won. They've really driven
down our share in a commercial market space, and now they want
to take it in the military airframe space. I see no reason to
concede this to the Europeans, and particularly since they've
been cheating on subsidizing this aircraft and stealing
commercial market share from us with it. So, I really hope you
would look at that.
And I noticed, yesterday, you were saying that whether or
not the current DOD law actually prohibits you from addressing
the illegal subsidy issue, you said that you were not required
to include it. If I could get a point of clarification on that.
And if you can't address it here, I understand. But, do you
understand current law to actually prohibit DOD from addressing
the illegal subsidy issue, or are you saying only that no
provision requires DOD to account for illegal subsidies?
Secretary Gates. I think that we are prohibited, but let me
get you an accurate answer for the record.
Senator Brownback. Okay, if you could.
[The information follows:]
Article 23 of the international, multilateral Understanding
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes at the
World Trade Organization (WTO) establishes that the United
States Government's sole avenue for redress is through the WTO.
As the WTO itself has put forth in a formal, official
commentary on Article 23, ``Any attempt to seek `redress' can
take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and
pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU [Dispute
Settlement Understanding].''
TRAINING AFGHAN FORCES
Senator Brownback. And then, finally, General Caldwell is a
guy I got to know at Leavenworth that's working on the
operation to stand up Afghan security forces. That sure looks
like, to me, to be paramount for us to have an exit strategy in
Afghanistan. Do you have any idea on timeframes for having
sufficient Afghan troops stood up for us to be able to pull
down?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think it'll be a gradual process,
much as we saw in Iraq. Just as an example, when the marines
first went into the south last summer, the partnering with the
Afghans was about nine Americans to every Afghan. Now, in the
Marjah operation, it's three Americans for every two Afghans.
So, as they train up and get into the field and partner, those
ratios and capabilities will grow.
The--I think that, in some ways, the way to look at the
process that we will use is very similar to that, that we used
in Iraq. And it's better described as a transition than a
transfer.
Right now, in some of these places, we're in the lead and
the Afghans are with us. At a certain point, we will partner,
then they will be in the lead, then we will withdraw to a
tactical overwatch, and then a strategic overwatch. So, this
multiphase approach is the way we did province-by-province in
Iraq, and it really worked pretty well. And I think that
General McChrystal has the same kind of model in mind in
Afghanistan.
AFGHAN ARMY
So, we don't need the Afghan Army to be fully trained up
everywhere in the country at the same time. We will do it on a
province-by-province basis. And I think that he's pretty
optimistic he can make this work.
Senator Brownback. Over a 2- to 5-year timeframe?
Secretary Gates. Well, as his--as the President's made
clear, and as we agreed in the process, we will begin that
first transition, or that first transfer, if you will, in July
2011. But, from that point on, it will be decided on a
province-by-province basis, based on the conditions on the
ground.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you----
Secretary Gates. And I expect that to take some period of
time.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, while everyone was out of the room briefly, I
had this brief shining moment when I might be in your position.
Voice. Oh-ho-ho.
Senator Collins. And it was a wonderful feeling, however,
fleetingly it passed.
AFGHAN FIGHTING FORCE
Secretary Gates, I've read a lot of press reports recently
that describe our marines as extremely frustrated with their
Afghan counterparts. And I must say, I've been surprised
because I've always had an image of the Afghans as being very
good and effective fighters. But, there have been two major
stories that suggest the marines are so concerned that the
shortcomings of the Afghan soldiers could undermine our joint
efforts in the region. Could you give me your assessment of
whether these reports are valid, and whether the Afghans
themselves have the desire and the skills to succeed in the
fight?
Secretary Gates. First, just in terms of answering the last
questions--the last point first, this is actually one of the
principal reasons, Senator, why I came around to the view that
it was important to set a time when we would begin a transfer
or transition to Afghan security control. They need to know
this is their fight and that they are going to have to assume
responsibility for it, and not at some distant unknown date,
but beginning next year. And between that and the pay raises
that we saw last November, we have seen a significant increase
in recruitment in Afghanistan for both the Afghan Army and the
Police. Retention has improved significantly in the Army; it's
still a problem in the Police. But, we--they need to know that
this is going to be their fight at some point. And I think they
are taking that on board.
The feedback that I've gotten--I have not heard complaints
from General McChrystal or the commander in RC South, General
Carter, about the quality of the Afghan troops. I must say
that, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I went to Camp
Blackhorse, outside of Kabul, a couple of weeks ago when I was
there, where the Afghan Army is being trained, and the
Americans that I talked to there were pretty impressed with
them. By the same token, when I talk to our troops, I get mixed
reviews. Some of them say that they're really good fighters and
that they're really good partners and are very impressed with
them. That was certainly the case in Nawaz, where I toured a
marketplace. I didn't--you know, the security is a lot better
there, but I had no illusions as to the security that was
around because I was there. The--but, on the other hand, others
are not as impressed. And so, I think it's a mixed picture.
But, in terms of the views of the commanders, who have a view
of the entire battle space, I think they're very impressed with
the quality of the Afghan National Army, and believe that it's
making good progress.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
AFGHAN ARMY/CIVILIAN SURGE
Secretary Clinton, when I was last in Afghanistan, the most
common complaint that I heard from our military personnel was
the lack of a civilian surge. You commented earlier that we
have increased the number of civilians to do the civilian
component that is so essential to the counterinsurgency
strategy. Could you give a brief update, since I just got a
note that my time is expired, telling us your level of
satisfaction in meeting the requirements for civilian
employees?
Secretary Clinton. Yes, Senator. And thank you.
We have roughly quadrupled the number of civilians, in a
year. And they are both in Kabul, working with the Government
of Afghanistan; and then they are out in the country. They are,
in effect, embedded with our military, so they move with our
military, and they are working closely to leverage their
presence. You know, we don't have battalions of civilians. It's
a much smaller number, in comparison to our military forces.
But, each one leverages, on average, about 10 other civilians--
NGOs, partnering with civilians from other countries, who are
there as part of the government commitment, partnering with the
United Nations, partnering with Afghans, hiring Afghans.
And, you know, one of the examples that I was going to
give, if Senator Bond had asked, because I know how interested
he is on agriculture--and this is--just gives you a little bit
of a taste. You know, as soon as the marines secured Marjah,
civilians began to go out. And they have a program called the
Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture
Plus (AVIPA-Plus)--don't ask me why--the AVIPA-Plus program.
They've distributed 7,000 of those vouchers for fertilizers,
for new seeds, trellises for grapes. And it's that kind of
intensive work, on the ground, that doesn't take a lot of
civilians, it takes the right kind of civilians. So, we have
USDA agriculture experts. We have people, as Senator Bond has
pointed out, from National Guard units, who have expertise in
agriculture.
So, we are leveraging the presence of our civilians, and we
will probably be adding more, but we want to be sure that where
we add them is really critical to the mission.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, this afternoon we have
focused our attention on Afghanistan and Iraq, and I believe we
focused our resources there, also. However, we have been
receiving disturbing news on the conditions in Somalia and of
Somalia as a safe haven for al Qaeda.
SOMALIA
My question is, Do we have sufficient resources to counter
the Somalian threat? Has that become a sufficient threat to us,
the Somalian situation?
Secretary Gates. We probably both ought to both answer on
this one.
Secretary Clinton. I was just wondering where the buzzing
sound is from.
Senator, we are working very hard, again, in our civilian-
military cooperation, with the aim of trying to bolster the
transitional Federal Government in Somalia, which doesn't have
a lot of scope of authority. It's basically confined to a part
of Mogadishu. Our main source of support is the AMISOM, the
African Union troops primarily from Uganda that are providing a
lot of the logistical and backup support that the Somalis need.
Al Shabab is a threat. I mean, Al Shabab is a very clear
threat. And we see, unfortunately, it's morphing into a kind of
al Qaeda junior partner over the last year. But, there is a
growing sense that many of the Somalis themselves are no longer
willing to be intimidated by, or just give in to, Al Shabab.
They've been extremely brutal in their treatment of people--a
lot of amputations and other kinds of very barbaric
punishments. They have, you know, stolen and diverted food aid,
and prevented it from getting to the people. So, there's a
gradual growth of opposition internally in Somalia. But,
clearly our support for the African Union mission, and then the
additional help that our military is providing, in terms of
training, is critical to the survival of the nascent government
there and our hope that we can gain more ground by supporting
it.
Secretary Gates. That says it all.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Cochran, do you have anything
more?
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, no, except to thank our
witnesses, the Secretaries, for being here and helping us fully
understand what we need the funding for. I've been impressed by
their testimony and their leadership of their Departments.
Chairman Inouye. I wish to echo that, also.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing but
were submitted to the Departments for response subsequent to
the hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Secretary Hillary Clinton
Question Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye
Question. Secretary Clinton, several audits and reports from the
Department of State Inspector General, Department of Defense Inspector
General, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction have
uncovered several deficiencies with the Department of State's oversight
and management of contracts in theater and have made several
recommendations on ways to improve. Many of those recommendations are
not implemented and contract management and oversight staffing
shortfalls remain. How does the Department of State plan to improve its
management and oversight of its contracts in both Afghanistan and Iraq
especially as your Department takes over increased responsibility in
Iraq?
Answer. The Department of State is committed to strengthening our
contract management processes. The majority of the Department of State
(DoS) contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased the number of
overseas and domestic contract management staff significantly. For
example, in Iraq the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs Bureau (INL) is increasing their contract management support
from five individuals overseas and 9 domestic individuals in September
2008 to 15 overseas individuals and 24 domestic individuals by August
2010. In Afghanistan, INL is increasing their contract management
support from 6 individuals overseas and 15 domestic individuals to 25
individuals overseas and 25 domestic individuals by September 2010.
In the last 2 years, the Office of Acquisitions Management (A/LM/
AQM) created a strategy and established a business process for audits
of A/LM/AQM contracts. We developed a close and professional working
relationship with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) which are the Department's
audit agencies for major programs. We also issued an A/LM/AQM
operational policy pertaining to audit services to ensure staff is
aware of the policy. This strategy ensures that the Department meets
contract administration responsibilities required by the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR). During fiscal year 2009, the Department
initiated 12 external audits of significant programs. In addition to
financial audits, we initiated a series of business system audits to
review contractor accounting and internal controls, billing systems,
estimating systems, labor system controls, subcontractor systems, and
property management systems in conjunction with audits of specific
contracts on a pre-award and post-award basis. The Quality Assurance
Branch works closely and successfully with contracting officers, the
Office of Inspector General, and program offices to obtain
documentation, provide answers to audit related questions, support
negotiations, and reach settlement agreements.
Since 2008, A/LM/AQM has also significantly improved our contract
close-out process. A/LM/AQM designed an effective business process and
formed a team of close-out specialists, trained to identify contractual
and budget issues, perform contract analysis, and to reconcile and
document obligations and payments. This team is developing standard
operating procedures for all of our contract managers to follow and is
training their colleagues in A/LM/AQM on our new business process. In
fiscal year 2010, as of February 24, 2010, nearly 500 contracts have
been closed out.
The Department is continuing to examine other improvements to
contract oversight through the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review with USAID acquisitions offices.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
Question. Secretary Clinton, the fiscal year 2011 budget submitted
by the President includes estimates for overseas contingency operations
of $50 billion per year for fiscal year 2012 and beyond. Can you
address, in detail, the rationale behind the budget estimate and
whether the President is anticipating submitting revenue or spending
measures to offset the amount requested should it exceed $50 billion?
Answer. The Department of State defers to the Office of Management
and Budget and the Department of Defense in responding to this
question.
Question. Secretary Clinton, the Special Inspector General for
Iraqi Reconstruction has reported that corruption and mismanagement
continue to waste hundreds of millions of reconstruction dollars in
both Iraq and Afghanistan, but you have rejected his recommendation for
the creation of a new entity to coordinate and oversee reconstruction
efforts. What, then, are you doing to ensure that those monies are
spent effectively on projects that contribute to stability and that can
be maintained after the U.S. presence has withdrawn?
Answer. Corruption and the mismanagement of development resources
in Iraq and Afghanistan could undermine our efforts in both countries.
As a result, even though we have not accepted all of the Special
Inspector Generals' recommendations, we are taking concrete measures to
ensure U.S. government funds are well spent and carefully monitored in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, Stuart Bowen, has stated several times, including in
testimony before your Committee, that fraud has played a very small
role in the use of U.S. funds appropriated for Iraq reconstruction. We
have greatly benefitted from SIGIR's recommendations and have taken
steps to address deficiencies SIGIR has identified. We take seriously
findings from the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction
on the dangers of corruption and mismanagement of development funding
and are taking steps to address these concerns. Specifically, we are
increasing our staffing to improve programming and oversight;
developing alternative oversight mechanisms in situations where direct
access to development activities is not yet possible; and, through the
provision of technical assistance, are increasing the capacity of local
institutions to provide services to the population and make assistance
efforts more sustainable.
USAID is working intensively with our Missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan to discern mission staffing requirements, recruit, and
retain qualified staff for roles in capital cities and countryside.
These new personnel have a wide variety of backgrounds including
financial management, agriculture, governance, and engineering, and add
much needed development assistance to Afghanistan, while overseeing
projects they are able to access.
In areas where ongoing insecurity or military operations can make
supervisory visits by USAID direct hires more difficult, we have
devised methods to either allow U.S. personnel access to sites with
military escorts or facilitate locally engaged staff reporting visits.
We have developed and are continuing to refine ``movement agreements''
with our military colleagues that guarantee our development
representatives on PRTs regular access project sites, increasing their
ability to directly oversee development projects funded with U.S.
dollars. Where our American managers are unable to access development
sites, we rely on trusted local staff, Quality Assessment/Quality
Control (QA/QC) contractors, and implementing partners to oversee
projects.
Finally, and most importantly, we are working to develop native
Afghan ability to administer and oversee development throughout
Afghanistan. We are increasing the funds we send through local entities
(the government and private sector) via a robust certification process.
This shift is helping to build Afghan capacity to manage development
funds, make Afghan ministries and implementers more accountable, and
build Afghan capacity to support long-term, sustainable development.
Against this backdrop, USAID works collaboratively with our
inspector general community and promotes audits to enhance the
effectiveness of our activities and confirm that our efforts to weed
out corruption and mismanagement are successful.
Question. Secretary Clinton, what is the status of efforts to
address corruption and build a workable Afghan government that can
protect and continue the reconstruction work accomplished to date?
Answer. President Karzai spoke to the need for improved governance
and anti-corruption reforms in his inaugural address and at the London
Conference in January 2010. Since January, the Afghan government and
the international community have made several commitments to key
reforms and anti-corruption initiatives. Major successes include the
March 18 adoption of a presidential decree to tackle administrative
corruption and strengthen the High Office of Oversight (HOO),
Afghanistan's primary anti-corruption institution, but we still have
significant work to do.
The Afghan and U.S. governments have a variety of programs to
address governance and corruption. To improve the prosecution of
corruption-related offenses, the Afghan Government created the Major-
Crimes Task Force (MCTF), a multi-ministry initiative responsible for
investigating corruption, kidnapping and organized crime cases and
preparing them for prosecution, and the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU)
within the Attorney General's Office. The Afghan government also agreed
to establish an Anti-Corruption Tribunal (ACT) of specially vetted
judges to oversee high-profile cases. The MCTF receives financial and
technical support from the Department of Defense and the Department of
State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, while
the Department of Justice provides technical support. In March, the
MCTF conducted its first arrest and prosecution of an Afghan government
official.
To improve transparency and accountability, the Afghan government,
with USAID support, has implemented hiring reforms and a vetting
process for Afghan government employees through the Civil Service
Commission. We are also working to strengthen the HOO so that it can
better serve as an oversight mechanism for nationwide anti-corruption
efforts. At a recent press conference, the HOO publicly named the
Afghan Ministers who had not yet filed asset declaration forms. It is
now working to secure 100 percent compliance.
We are also reviewing our own procedures to ensure they do not
contribute to Afghan corruption. USAID is reviewing the financial,
management, procurement and expenditure systems of key ministries to
determine their capacity to accept U.S. direct assistance. We are also
using fewer big contractors, reducing the layers through which our
assistance flows. Finally, we are dramatically increasing the numbers
of USAID officers and inspectors to monitor our aid.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl
Question. Secretary Clinton, you are now requesting an additional
$150 million in food aid assistance for Haiti, which obviously
indicates the problems there are longer-term than first thought.
Do you expect the food aid needs in Haiti to continue next year?
Also, if that is the case, will the 2011 budget request for Public Law
480 still be adequate?
Answer. USAID anticipates that there will be a continued need for
food assistance to address both chronic and acute food insecurity in
Haiti over the next year. In addition to USAID's annual $35.5 million
non-emergency program, which addresses chronic food insecurity in
Haiti, USAID has provided approximately $125.3 million in emergency
food assistance in fiscal year 2010 to the World Food Program (WFP) and
private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to address acute food insecurity
associated with the earthquake. Emergency food assistance, ordered in
fiscal year 2010, will support WFP's emergency operation, which runs
through December 2010, and PVO emergency programs, which run through
February 2011. It is not possible at the present time to predict
emergency food aid needs for fiscal year 2011. The fiscal year 2011
Title II in-kind food aid request helps fulfill the Administration's
commitment to transparent budgeting by making the regular food aid
request closer to the historic average.
Question. Secretary Clinton, I know that you and Secretary Vilsack
are working together on the issue of global food security. It seems to
me that USDA, including the Extension Service and land grant
universities can make a significant contribution in that effort.
Secretary Clinton, can you please describe how you are working with
Secretary Vilsack on this effort and your views on enhanced
Agricultural research and extension efforts to assist developing
countries?
Answer. We have placed high priority on the role of agricultural
research under this initiative. USAID and USDA are collaborating on the
development of a new strategy for harnessing advances in science and
technology to promote food security and that will strengthen ties
between the United States, international, and developing country
research institutions. USAID brings a long history of leadership in
international agricultural research spanning back to the Green
Revolution. And, for more than 30 years under Title XII of the Foreign
Assistance Act, USAID has supported U.S. land grant universities to
engage in collaborative research with developing countries and to train
thousands of agricultural researchers and policy makers. USDA brings
additional expertise and dual use technologies through both their
intramural research and the extramural grants of the National Institute
for Food and Agriculture (NIFA). For example, USDA's Agricultural
Research Service has some of the world's leading expertise in wheat
stem rust, a disease of major significance to global food security. The
recently issued NIFA call for proposals includes an emphasis on food
security. We are integrating the efforts and strengths of both Agencies
into a single strategy that will contribute to the objectives of this
initiative.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
counternarcotics operations
Question. The U.S. military is planning to scale down its presence
in Afghanistan beginning in July 2011. Almost every counternarcotics
operation conducted in Afghanistan at this time is supported by the
U.S. military and these operations are increasing in number. In 2009,
DEA conducted 82 interdiction operations in Afghanistan compared with
43 in fiscal year 2008.
Looking ahead, does the State Department have a plan for continued
counternarcotics operational support after the departure of U.S. troops
from Afghanistan?
Answer. The State Department currently provides support for
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in a variety of ways; while it
is certainly true that military support is vital for conducting
interdiction operations in insecure areas, it has always been and
remains our goal, together with the DEA and the military, to build up
Afghan capacity to carry out all facets of the counternarcotics
mission, from investigations to operations and operational support. The
Afghan National Army has been involved in supporting some of these
operations already within the past year, and with the military's help,
we hope that they and the Afghan National Police will continue to
progress in their ability to conduct independent operations.
Additionally, INL's Air Wing in Afghanistan has provided operational
support to some CNPA/DEA missions, and will continue to do so on an as-
available and as-needed basis.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
family reunification
Question. As you are well aware, U.S. Federal law requires that
State officials who place children in foster care to pursue the primary
goal of family reunification, while at the same time, developing an
alternative permanency plan for the child. If the family reunification
efforts fail, then the alternate plan will already be in place and well
on its way to completion. This practice, which is called concurrent
planning, is intended to reduce the total period of time a child will
remain in out of home care before being permanently placed with a
family. Is this an approach the United States might encourage its
international partners to consider taking here so that children in
Haiti are not spending unnecessary time in non-permanent situations?
Answer. Yes, we are aware of and support the concept of concurrent
planning for children in care. We note that the main problem in Haiti
before and after the earthquake is that the GoH does not have a child
welfare system that is able to engage in case-by-case analysis of each
child's situation and needs so that, if needed, a concurrent plan could
be written, approved, and executed. Immediately after the earthquake so
many children were in need of emergency care--such as food, water and
shelter--that the immediate priority was to focus on those needs. In
the near future, with fiscal year 2010 bilateral and supplemental
funding, the USG will prioritize support to the GoH in building and
leading a national child protection plan based on international
standards, child welfare laws and regulations, and effective monitoring
and evaluation. Such a plan will lead to improved legislation and
policies, thus providing the legal framework for alternative care,
including conditions for placement of children with foster families.
universal definition of orphan
Question. As you know, one of the many challenges in addressing the
needs of orphan children in Haiti is the lack of a universally accepted
definition of what is an orphan. In fact, the often cited estimate that
there were 380,000 orphans in Haiti prior to the earthquake include
children who had one living parent and/or extended family.
What can the United States do to assist the Government of Haiti in
developing the data necessary to better understand what children's
precise needs are?
Answer. The United States Government is actively assisting in the
development of the data systems necessary to better understand
children's precise needs by providing expert technical assistance to
the U.S. Mission Child Protection Team, technical assistance and
transport for the Government of Haiti (GoH) and UNICEF assessments of
the needs of children in hundreds of orphanages in the Port-au-Prince
area, and by supporting nationally representative surveys such as
periodic demographic and health surveys (DHS) and a recent survey of
child trafficking, restaveks (children in residential care performing
household labor in slave-like conditions), and child victims of
violence.
The figure of 380,000 is the UNICEF estimate of the number of
children under 18, before the earthquake, who had lost one or both
parents. Of this number, 330,000 children had lost one parent and
50,000 had lost both parents. The great majority of these children were
living with the surviving parent (if a single orphan) or with extended
family members, usually a grandparent or aunt or uncle.
Prior to the earthquake, only 67 of an estimated 600 residential
care centers (referred to as ``orphanages,'' though many of the
children have one or both parents living) had been registered with the
GoH. Because a majority of these centers were unregistered, there is
little official data or statistics on children living in these
conditions. Approximately 300 of these centers were located in Port-au-
Prince and the surrounding earthquake-affected area.
The USG is supporting the GoH and UNICEF to map and build a
database of children's residential care centers to facilitate stronger
oversight through registration and monitoring in the future. As of
March 15, the UNICEF-led Child Protection Sub-cluster (CPSC) had
completed assessments in 488 residential care centers. More than 30,000
children were residing in assessed centers, while some were found to be
no longer hosting children. The USAID-funded database is now co-managed
by UNICEF and the Haiti Institute of Social Welfare and Research
(IBESR), and includes information made available and continuously
updated by 59 international and local non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), community-based groups and faith based organizations that
compose the Child Protection Sub-Cluster. This database has utmost
relevance as it represents the first ever baseline regarding the
situation of children in residential care in Haiti.
With USAID support, Haiti carried out demographic and health
surveys in 1994-1995, 2000, and 2005-2006. The 2005-2006 survey
included information for children under 18 about whether the parents
are alive, whether the children live with their parents and the
relationship to other members of the household.
Nonetheless, there is wide recognition that Haiti's knowledge base
about orphans and vulnerable children is not sufficient to immediately
inform program development. Within the next 6 months, UNICEF and the
Haitian Institute of Social Welfare and Research plan to conduct an
ample survey to investigate the root cause for the unprecedented
concentration of children in Port-au-Prince orphanages (e.g., direct
consequence of the earthquake, poverty-driven separation, and
displacement for household labor, among others) and to refine estimates
of the number of children in restavek.
The USG may assist the GoH to conduct this survey as soon as
possible, thus ensuring that accurate data is available and that child
protection activities are based on solid evidence, benefiting the
largest number possible of vulnerable children.
long-term solutions
Question. Long term solutions to the issues facing Haiti's orphan
children will undoubtedly require the mobilization and coordination of
both traditional and non-traditional partners. Have you given any
thought about how you might mobilize faith based, corporate and
professional partners around the goal of providing families for orphan
children?
Answer. Yes, a great deal of thought has been given to the
mobilization of such partners. Faith-based partners in particular have
long played a central and seminal role in assisting children and are
well positioned to scale-up such services. USG agencies are currently
working with a variety of faith-based partners in Haiti to address the
needs of orphans and vulnerable children.
Catholic Relief Services, the Adventist Development and Relief
Agency, Food for the Hungry, Samaritan's Purse, World Vision, Care
International and Save the Children, several of which are faith-based,
are among the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance's main
partners in the January to April emergency assistance phase. Together,
these organizations have received over $85 million from USAID to
provide shelter, food, water and emergency health services to Haiti's
vulnerable children and their caregivers.
local contracting
Question. Under the Stafford Act, preference is supposed to be
given to local contractors in disaster affected areas when bids on
Federal contracts are being awarded. However, following Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, Louisiana experienced a situation by which out-of-
state contractors coming in and underbidding local contractors for the
disaster recovery projects. In this instance the government needed to
enforce stricter oversight of contract awards to ensure that the
recovery contracts were not only going to help rebuild these
communities, but also ensure that local economies would benefit as
well.
Does the proposed funding for rebuilding Haiti include planning
provisions to provide preferences for local contracting as the country
works to rebuild its infrastructure and its economy?
Answer. The USG is committed to engaging local partners in its
reconstruction efforts. We are pursuing several different strategies to
ensure that local partners are included in ways that are transparent
and in compliance with USG contracting regulations.
For example, we will maximize local procurement and are developing
a program to assist local entities in understanding and complying with
USAID reporting guidelines. We are designing scopes of work and program
descriptions in a way that will emphasize a larger number of small
awards to open the contracting process to local enterprises. Engagement
with local partners will be part of the selection criteria in all of
our solicitations. Similarly, we will increase local participation by
making Creole language skills a requirement for certain personnel under
our contract solicitations.
hazard mitigation
Question. The U.S. government recognizes the importance of hazard
mitigation response particularly in the wake of a disaster. After the
President issues a disaster declaration Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
(HMGP) funding is made available to the disaster affected states. In
fact, a Congressional Budget Office study supports the concept of
funding hazard mitigation practices as a way for the Federal government
to ultimately save money. The study concluded that for every $1
invested in mitigation projects the Federal government saves $3.
Does the U.S. funding request for Haiti include a plan for hazard
mitigation assistance if the donated funds are used to rebuild the
damaged infrastructure?
Will USAID also provide technical assistance to the Haitian
government in regards to developing building codes that can withstand
future earthquake and hurricane damage?
Answer. Since 1994, Haiti has witnessed five devastating natural
catastrophes, each destroying livelihoods that Haitians worked hard to
rebuild. Overcoming this cycle of disaster requires an in-depth
understanding of the threats. The United States has worked with leading
scientists to map high-risk areas by tracking flooding, landslides and
storms over the past decades and complementing this analysis with
projections on future hazards. This analysis has been shared and
discussed with Haitian authorities and informed the GOH's preliminary
vision document. It is also informing the drafting of the final Haitian
National Reconstruction and Development Plan, which will be presented
at the March 31 donors conference in New York.
Recently the White House National Science and Technology Council
Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction (SDR) convened a meeting, co-
sponsored by USAID, Dept of State, and the U.N. International Strategy
on Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), on ``Rebuilding for Resilience: How
Science and Engineering Can Inform Haiti's Reconstruction''. This
workshop was held in Miami earlier this week and included academics,
practitioners, and policy makers representing the top scientists,
engineers, social scientists, land-use planners, and officials
associated with Haiti for hazard evaluation, construction, and social
structure. Among the 107 invited participants were nearly a dozen
Haitians, from academics to the Minister of the Environment. The intent
of the workshop was to establish a dialogue among all parties and to
produce a set of statements to guide donors and others in the effort to
build back with resilience in the face of multiple hazards. The
workshop was quite successful in meeting its goals.
The President's Supplemental Budget Request for Haiti, submitted to
Congress yesterday, recognizes that Port-au-Prince should be built back
to a better standard. Reconstruction investments must decongest the
city to a safer and more sustainable size, and institute building codes
and effective zoning. The same principles apply to the newly designated
growth poles. In all of the infrastructure and housing activities
described in the supplemental request, the United States will support
stronger building codes as part of our goal to ``build back better.''
sheltering
Question. Tragically, as a result of the earthquake in Haiti,
approximately 600,000 people are still living under tarps, tents or bed
sheets in an effort to find shelter. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
the U.S. government acknowledged that temporary housing options such as
travel trailers were not the only solution, clearly, tents are not a
long-term viable option for Haiti as the rainy season approaches.
What is the U.S. plan for long-term housing assistance to Haiti?
As we work to rebuild Haiti, does the U.S. government intend to
recommend the implementation of economical, environmentally sustainable
housing solutions like those being tested by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency in Emmetsburg, Maryland?
Answer. The durable plastic sheeting/tarps that USAID and other
partners distributed is on track to reach its May 1 target. Learning
from past disasters like the Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquake in
Pakistan, the humanitarian response in Haiti focused on waterproof,
rip-proof, and fire-resistant sheeting instead of tents, since tents
are not as durable or adaptable. The plastic sheets have been used as
weather-resistant covering for roofs and walls of emergency shelters,
and they will be integral in supporting the Government of Haiti's
longer-term housing response.
As hurricane season approaches and the humanitarian response begins
to focus on constructing more durable shelter, these sheets will be
combined with transitional shelter kits that contain cement, timber or
steel framing, tin roofs, and nails to create transitional shelters
that will protect from heavy winds and rain. The transitional shelter
kits can be recycled and re-used in the construction of more permanent
housing with a concrete slab floor, and can be easily assembled by
local labor. USAID, in keeping with the internationally accepted best
practices espoused by the U.N. Shelter Cluster, has encouraged these
community-based, equitable, and cost-effective transitional shelters
instead of larger pre-fab housing in order to minimize the opportunity
for social conflict, maximize cost-effectiveness, and ensure that
housing solutions are culturally and site-appropriate. Past experience
has shown that inequitable resource distribution--such as providing
pre-fab shelters to some, but not all community members--can be a
driver for conflict. Land scarcity and the relatively high cost of pre-
fab shelters would preclude their being distributed universally. By
using emergency shelter materials for more durable transitional and
permanent shelter, USAID is supporting economical and environmentally
sustainable housing that is culturally appropriate for the Haitian
context.
The President's supplemental request for Haiti includes $133
million for investments in new settlements. In Port-au-Prince, through
a ``sites and services'' approach, the program would deliver an
estimated 9,600 houses to homeless families. In two of the designated
secondary cities, an additional 14,400 families would benefit from this
program. These communities would have access to clean water, sewage,
and electricity. Homes on allocated lots would be constructed
incrementally to adequate building codes, supported by training in
construction, supervised by experts, and include materials appropriate
for the Haitian climates and customs. This would ensure the creation of
thousands of temporary jobs in the construction sector and allow
Haitians to gain the skills required to perform maintenance and find
future employment in this sector. These 24,000 units would be home to
100,000-120,000 people. They would be integrated with planned
investments by the United States and other donors and multilateral
partners in social sectors, roads, security, rule of law and
governance.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
Question. Just last week, The Washington Post featured an article
which reported that ``many Afghan women say they still feel
voiceless.'' And, CNN featured a heartbreaking story last week about a
19-year-old Afghan woman whose nose and ears were cut off for shaming
her in-laws. She had suffered torture and abuse for years.
It also is not surprising that there are media reports that say
that President Karzai's peace conference next month will have very
limited input from women.
During your service in the Senate, you and I had the opportunity to
travel to Afghanistan together where we met a group of Afghan women.
The progress we were seeing then seems so distant. We cannot forget
about these women.
Can you comment on any progress you are seeing in this area?
Answer. Women's empowerment in Afghanistan and their full and equal
participation in their society are fundamental prerequisites for
achieving a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. I underscored this in
my remarks in London earlier this year at the International Conference
on Afghanistan, where I met with the women from Afghan civil society
who addressed the conference and emphasized that women need to be
involved at every step of the way in the process of rebuilding Afghan
civil society. The participation of Afghan women is critical for
sustainable development, better governance, and peace--in short, they
are essential to securing a better future for Afghanistan.
As reintegration and reconciliation efforts move forward, the
United States is committed to ensuring that Afghan women's rights will
not be sacrificed. I underscored this during our recent United States-
Afghanistan Strategic Dialogue, where I met with the three women
members of the Afghan delegation. Women want peace. They do not want to
be sold out. We supported Afghan women civil society's own
recommendations to include 20 percent women at the Consultative Peace
Jirga that just took place between June 2 and June 4 as well as follow-
on shuras and consultations at all levels--at the national, provincial,
and local levels. There were 336 female delegates among the 1,600 total
delegates, which is approximately 21 percent. Women had diverse
experiences during the Consultative Peace Jirga. While some felt they
were able to participate in their committees and ensured that women
were mentioned in the outcome document, others were disappointed with
the outcomes of the peace jirga, since only one woman was a facilitator
out of 28 groups.
Via the Ambassador's Small Grants Fund, which aims to strengthen
the technical and organizational capacity of Afghan women-led NGOs, we
supported a 2-day pre-Peace Jirga conference for most of the female
Jirga participants, which helped provide them with the training and
skills necessary to assist them serve as key participants and
facilitators in the Consultative Peace Jirga. I assure you we will
continue to advocate for the full participation of women in the ongoing
discussions in Afghanistan on issues of peace, stability and security.
While there has been progress for women in certain areas, including
girls' education and women's political participation, much remains to
be done to improve the lives of women overall. Today, more than 6.2
million students are enrolled in Afghanistan's schools, of which 35
percent are girls. Nonetheless, overcoming years of exclusion from
education is a long process. Only an estimated 21 percent of Afghan
women are literate, and the female illiteracy rate is as high as 90
percent in rural areas. Although there is broad popular support for
girls' schooling, extremists still try to impose their brutal agenda by
force, by burning down schools, gassing schoolgirls, or throwing acid
in the faces of female students.
In health as well as in education, the Taliban excluded women from
all services. The legacy of those restrictions has left Afghanistan
with the second-highest maternal mortality rate in the world, and other
health indicators for women, particularly in the area of reproductive
health, are similarly low, although slowly making progress. With U.S.
government assistance, access to health services has risen dramatically
since 2001. The number of midwives available to assist with deliveries
has quadrupled; the number of health facilities with women health
workers has more than doubled. There has been a 26-percent increase in
the total number of antenatal visits and a 30-percent increase in the
number of women delivering with the assistance of a skilled midwife.
As you can see, while women's lives are improving in some areas,
there is still much more work to be done to achieve full political,
economic and social empowerment. I look forward to continuing to work
with you to ensure that our programs for Afghan women effectively
address their needs and promote their sustained political, economic,
and social progress.
Question. President Karzai has said an action plan for
reintegrating Taliban fighters into society and talking with the
insurgency's top leaders will be crafted at a spring peace conference
in Kabul. Can you comment on what you expect will be the outcome of
this conference?
Answer. President Karzai's Consultative Peace Jirga will build
momentum as a stepping stone toward the Kabul Conference and give voice
to the Afghan people in their efforts to end the insurgency.
Specifically, the Consultative Peace Jirga will unveil to a cross-
section of Afghan society the Afghan Government's peace plan, including
a program to reintegrate insurgent commanders and fighters peacefully
back into their communities. The jirga will seek to incorporate input
from participants on the peace plan and reintegration program. It will
be the first in a series of national-level meetings we expect to foster
discussion of the peace process in Afghanistan, including the Kabul
Conference, and a tentatively planned follow-on jirga in fall 2010.
We support Afghan-led reintegration of former insurgents--
identified as a priority by President Karzai in his November 2009
inauguration speech--as it is aimed at reducing fighting and
reintegrating insurgents peacefully into communities. Fighters must
pledge to cease violence, live in accordance with the Afghan
Constitution, and have no ties to al-Qaeda or affiliated transnational
terrorist organizations.
Reintegration will require the strong financial support of the
international community as well as political support in keeping with
the hard-won political and human rights of all Afghan citizens--men and
women alike--as enshrined in the Afghan Constitution. We support the
inclusion of Afghan women in the upcoming Consultative Peace Jirga
deliberations.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski
Question. In order to protect U.S. interests in the Arctic region,
I believe that it is vital for the Senate to ratify the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Secretary Clinton, you have
previously stated that you support ratification. What can we do to make
the Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty a priority for this
administration?
Answer. This Administration continues to strongly support accession
to the Law of the Sea Convention, and, as you are aware, we have
included the Convention on the Treaty Priority List as one for which
the Administration seeks Senate approval. As conveyed to Senators Kerry
and Lugar in October 2009, the Department of State stands ready to
facilitate the Senate's consideration of this treaty by providing
witnesses, testimony, and overall support. We appreciate your
leadership in our efforts to gain the necessary support for advice and
consent to accession of this vitally important treaty.
______
Questions Submitted to Hon. Robert M. Gates
Questions Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye
Question. Secretary Gates, one of our military strategies in
Afghanistan is to clear, hold, then build in an area. U.S. forces and
the Afghan National Army have begun that mission in Marja. They have
successfully cleared the area of the Taliban and are now in the process
of holding the area. The ability to hold an area in the long term will
largely come down to the Afghan National Police maintaining security.
Unfortunately, I am informed that the people of Marja have so little
faith in the Afghan National Police that some have stated they prefer
to have the Taliban over the Police force. If this is the perception of
the Afghan Police, how do we move forward with our strategy to hold and
build?
Answer. The premise of the question is only partly accurate. The
Taliban have controlled Marjah for several years. Prior to the Taliban
controlling Marjah, the local Afghan police were untrained and were led
by and loyal to a local strongman. When a combined effort of Afghan and
international forces pushed the Taliban out of Marjah, they were
welcomed by the local population who said they wanted neither the
Taliban nor the old abusive police back. International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) was well aware of the history and had planned
for this by having the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the
nationally led, well-trained element of the Afghan National Police
(ANP), ready to go into Marjah as combat ended. The ANCOP have been
deployed to Marjah for almost 2 months, and have been welcomed by the
local population as they build trust in the ANP as an institution. We
are working with the Afghans to develop their capabilities to improve
the ANP and begin the process of transition for the long term.
It is essential to our counterinsurgency strategy that the ANP be
trusted by the people, and perceived as effective and not corrupt. The
NATO Training Mission Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition
Command--Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) is working to increase
accountability and transparency, as well as to institutionalize
processes within the ANP to counter corruption.
Question. Secretary Gates, the supplemental request before the
Committee supports our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan but
also supports the troop surge of an additional 30,000 troops in
Afghanistan that President Obama approved in December 2009. Of those
30,000 troops, roughly 10,000 are already in theater and the remaining
20,000 are still being deployed by the Department and will largely
consist of Army units and enablers. If this surge is one of the keys to
success in Afghanistan, why is it taking so long for those troops to
get on the ground and why are the Marine units able to get on the
ground faster than the Army units?
Answer. The speed at which forces flow into theater is determined
by the sequence and timing specified by the Combatant Commander. The
flow of forces is also impacted by transportation availability and the
theater's ability to absorb (or accommodate) the arrival of incoming
forces.
The majority of the forces associated with the additional 30,000
troops were requested in three USCENTCOM Requests For Forces (RFFs).
The first 12,485 forces were ordered by the SecDef on December 4, 2009.
The Combatant Commander requested a Marine regiment to arrive in March
2010, Army brigades in July 2010, and an Army combat aviation brigade
in July 2010. Efforts to accelerate this force flow succeeded in
delivering the first of these forces to Afghanistan in mid-December
2009. While 97 percent of the requested forces are scheduled to arrive
in Afghanistan by august 31, 2010 in accordance with the Combatant
Commander's requirement, forces have requested arrival dates as far out
as November 15, 2010.
The first unit of the 30,000 additional forces to arrive in
Afghanistan was as Army aviation battalion in mid-December. This Army
battalion was immediately followed by two Marine battalions and another
Army infantry battalion which arrived at the end of January 2010. In
total, between December 15, 2009 and January 31, 2010 forces
approximately equal in size from both the Army and the Marines arrived
in Afghanistan.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
Question. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2011 budget submitted by
the President includes estimates for overseas contingency operations of
$50 billion per year for fiscal year 2012 and beyond. Can you address,
in detail, the rationale behind the budget estimate and whether the
President is anticipating submitting revenue or spending measures to
offset the amount requested should it exceed $50 billion?
Answer. The $50 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO)
for fiscal year 2012 and beyond is a placeholder developed by the
Administration. The actual OCO budget requests will be dependent upon
the security situation on the ground.
I do not know whether the President anticipates submitting revenue
or spending measures to offset the actual amount requested should it
exceed $50 billion.
Question. Secretary Gates, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi
Reconstruction has reported that corruption and mismanagement continue
to waste hundreds of millions of reconstruction dollars in both Iraq
and Afghanistan, but you have rejected his recommendation for the
creation of a new entity to coordinate and oversee reconstruction
efforts. What, then, are you doing to ensure that those monies are
spent effectively on projects that contribute to stability and that can
be maintained after the U.S. presence has withdrawn?
Answer. The Department places significant emphasis on addressing
waste, fraud, and abuse in reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The
Department works closely with the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) and other inspector general organizations to
ensure appropriate oversight.
From a practical standpoint, the creation of a new U.S. Government
oversight organization for reconstruction would likely take some time
to establish, which would exceed the timeline for the drawdown of
military presence in Iraq. Given the current conditions in Iraq,
theater guidance has continued to emphasize a shift towards smaller-
scale, capacity-building projects that contribute to stability.
Commanders on the ground work closely with local Iraqi organizations to
transfer responsibility for projects where necessary, to identify any
sustainment requirements, and to ensure there is the required Iraqi
commitment to a new initiative before it is launched.
Question. Secretary Gates, you and I have both devoted a great deal
of attention to addressing the timeliness of the medical evacuation
responses in Afghanistan. I recently learned that the average time of
these missions has been significantly decreased from over an hour and a
half to an average of less than 45 minutes from the time of
notification of the injury of a service member to the time of arrival
at a first level surgical facility. Recognizing that the more rapid the
response, the more lives are saved, what are the current challenges in
providing rapid evacuation and are you firmly committed to continue to
provide the most rapid response and evacuations possible?
Answer. [Deleted].
Question. Secretary Gates, I have been informed that certain NATO
allies have standards or caveats on their medical evacuation aircraft
limiting their support during certain times of the day and under
certain battlefield conditions. When U.S. combat forces operate in
these areas, they are often required to provide their own medical
evacuation capabilities because of either the NATO 90 minute response
standard or caveats on their operations limiting response to daylight
or non-combat response. What is being done to remedy this issue?
Answer. Seven nations currently have caveats on MEDEVAC missions
that include minimum night vision goggle illumination requirements,
dust limitations, constraints on flying in mountainous terrain,
requirements for landing zones to be secured, or higher headquarters
approval processes. Although the Departments of Defense and State
consistently appealed to ISAF nations to remove operationally
restrictive caveats, we are realistic that limitations in training and
budgets, as well as political factors, will preclude all caveats being
dropped. Therefore, as part of the President's increase in forces to
Afghanistan, a Combat Aviation Brigade is being deployed in RC-North to
provide, among other missions, timely MEDEVAC coverage. Additionally,
General McChrystal has directed regional commanders to ensure that all
Allied service personnel receive appropriate and expedient medical
care, ideally within 60 minutes of receipt of a MEDEVAC request.
To support achievement of the goal of 60 minutes for our servicemen
and women, in June 2009 I issued a memorandum to Commander, USCENTCOM
directing him to achieve medical evacuation parity between Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, with the standard for
both theaters at 60-minute mission completion time. I further
instructed General Petraeus to improve MEDEVAC response times in
Afghanistan by: establishing procedures to expedite MEDEVAC mission
launches without having to wait for approval; creating a process to
identify, analyze, and report all MEDEVAC missions that take longer
than 60 minutes; reviewing existing MEDEVAC approval and launch
procedures across Afghanistan; directing U.S. Forces--Afghanistan
(USFOR-A) to review International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/NATO
procedures and Standard Operating Procedures, and making
recommendations to ISAF for streamlining current requirements; and
requiring all U.S. forces in the USCENTCOM to review and understand
existing MEDEVAC procedures.
Question. Secretary Gates, it has been brought to my attention that
during operations in Afghanistan, U.S. forces enter areas believed to
be infiltrated by the Taliban and, because of the widespread
availability of cell phone and satellite phone technology, their
efforts to capture the enemy are thwarted when lookouts provide early
warning of their approach. What efforts can be undertaken to provide
readily available, comprehensive and continuous support to defeat this
enemy capability?
Answer. [Deleted].
Question. Secretary Gates, it has come to my attention from a
variety of sources that Special Operations forces in Afghanistan do not
have sufficient medivac, manned intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) platforms or dedicated air assets. As a result,
forces are at increased risk. What is being done to remedy this
situation and when can these units expect to receive additional
support?
Answer. [Deleted].
Question. Secretary Gates, I recently learned that the Air Force
plans to transfer 12 C-130 aircraft, including 2 from the 130th Airlift
Wing in Charleston, West Virginia, to an Air Force Reserve unit in
Arkansas without discussion with the National Guard and without
apparent consideration for the ability of the National Guard to sustain
its critical support mission during a period of active overseas
military operations. Please address the following:
What analyses was conducted by the U.S. Air Force to support the
transfer of the 12 C-130 aircraft from National Guard bases across the
United States to the Little Rock Air Force Base? My understanding of
this proposed reallocation is that, in order to avoid the expense
associated with recapitalization of an aging fleet, the Air Force is
simply commandeering aircraft from the Air National Guard.
Answer. The recently released Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study (MCRS) 2016 heavily influenced our decision during
the fiscal year 2011 budget development to reduce our C-130 force
structure. MCRS showed a decrease demand for tactical airlift, so we
opted to retire a portion of our oldest C-130Hs to avoid future
required modifications and increasingly costly sustainment.
Additionally, we were able to accelerate the planned retirement of C-
130Es, whose average age is 46 years. These retirements allowed us to
save $256 million in modification and operations cost over the Future
Years Defense Program. In retiring these aircraft we created a gap in
the C-130 schoolhouse which had to be sourced from within the remaining
C-130 fleet to meet our training requirements. As part of the Air Force
Corporate process, it was decided to take small reductions in aircraft
inventory from several Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
squadrons.
Question. If the decision is made to transfer these aircraft, will
you commit to supporting a request for the procurement of 12 new C-130
aircraft to replace those aircraft being taken from the Air National
Guard; aircraft which are very actively involved in support of the
homeland security mission as well as direct support of U.S. overseas
contingency operations in the theater of operations?
Answer. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS)
2016 showed a decreased demand for tactical airlift, so we opted to
retire a portion of our oldest C-130Hs to avoid future required
modifications and increasingly costly sustainment. These retirements
created gaps in the C-130 schoolhouse that we sourced from within the
remaining C-130 fleet. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request
reduces the total C-130 fleet based on the excess capacity identified
in MCRS. There is no current replacement plan to procure additional
aircraft specifically for the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve
which would add excess capacity into the C-130 fleet.
Question. The C-130 issue is not the first time the Air Force has
attempted to recapitalize the active force at the expense of the
National Guard. In the recent past, the Air Force also acquired six RC-
26 aircraft from the Air National Guard to supplement Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets in support of overseas
contingency operations as an enduring requirement. These aircraft which
are critical to the National Guard's homeland defense, homeland
security, and domestic counter-narcotics missions in the United States
have not been replaced.
Will you commit to supporting a request for the procurement of new
aircraft to provide suitable ISR capabilities to the Air National Guard
to reconstitute these capabilities?
Answer. The aircraft are operated and owned by the Air National
Guard (ANG). Consistent with their Federal role, the Air National Guard
has been supporting Air Force Special Operations Command requirements
by deploying a small number of RC-26 aircraft on a continuing basis in
the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The ANG has approached the Air
Force to advocate making the RC-26 an Air Force program of record.
Those discussions are ongoing and no decisions have been made. However,
prior to making any investment decisions, the Air Force would require
the ANG to complete a capabilities-based assessment, an initial
capabilities document and an analysis of alternatives to determine the
best solution to address this operational requirement.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl
state and agriculture role in global food security
Question. Secretary Gates, from a national and international
security perspective, and from your experience as the former president
of a land grant university, what are your views on this?
Answer. I wholeheartedly support the role of the U.S. Departments
of State and Agriculture in the Global Food Security initiative. The
Administration's Principles for Advancing Global Food Security provide
a good roadmap for addressing food security and world hunger issues,
which have definite implications for national security and state
stability. For any additional comment on global food security, I would
defer to the Departments of State and Agriculture.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
Question. If we are going to meet these growing needs, the VA is
going to have to accurately predict estimated casualties and develop a
long-range strategic casualty plan. And as you know, that is going to
take the full commitment of the Pentagon. So I want to make sure that
there is not a disconnect between the VA and DOD with regard to data
collection and forecasting the needs of our returning service members.
Can you tell me about how you are working to share information? Are
you working with the VA on developing and implementing a strategic
casualty plan?
Answer. Yes, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs
(VA) have been working closely in data sharing and on developing and
implementing a strategic casualty plan.
Since 2000, DOD has been providing automated daily updates of
Service member and veteran personnel data to the VA. By May 2010 the
data sent to VA will also include all members who became wounded,
injured, or ill (WII) while serving in the military.
Question. But as you also know, there are now an untold number of
military spouses who have been completely frozen out of the program
after it was closed off to new enrollees. Two weeks ago I sent a letter
to you outlining my disappointment in the management of this program
and requesting that you expand it to all military spouses from this
point forward.
Please comment on your commitment to working with me on reopening
this program to all military spouses so that we can better honor the
many sacrifices they make.
Answer. I am committed to working with Congress in supporting the
families and spouses of Service members.
On March 13, 2010 we resumed the MyCAA program for the 136,583
currently enrolled spouses (Phase 1). We continue to consider a wide
range of long-term options for its sustainment (Phase 2) and should
have a decision soon on the way ahead.
Question. You previously testified the Department would not change
the Air Force's tanker requirements in response to EADS' request for a
90-day extension to the May 10 proposal submittal deadline. However, I
am concerned about the recent DOD announcement that EADS would have an
additional 60 days if they committed to submitting a bid for the KC-X
tanker. They have been a participant in this process for several years
and have had ample time to consider whether or not to submit a bid. The
delays triggered by this decision will only result in further hindering
the replacement of these Eisenhower-era aircraft.
Why did the Department grant an extension for the KC-X tanker RFP
to accommodate EADS?
Answer. Competition on KC-X is in the best interest of the
Warfighter and taxpayer. In the DOD News Briefing on March 31, 2010,
the following was announced, ``The Defense Department informed both
EADS and Boeing that if we receive formal notification from EADS of
their intention to make an offer, we will extend the deadline for bids
from May 10 to July 9.'' Additionally, ``It is not uncommon to grant
reasonable extensions in competitions of this sort, and we consider 60
days to be reasonable in this case.'' On April 10, 2010, EADS-NA
announced their decision to bid on the KC-X proposal. As a result, the
Department granted a 60 day extension to all offerors.
Question. You had previously testified that the Department's
lawyers had indicated that there was no legal basis to account for
illegal European subsidies to Airbus in the KC-X tanker competition. I
would like for you to elaborate on this further as this should be a
factor in making a contract award that could negatively impact the U.S.
defense aerospace industry.
What did you mean by that statement?
Answer. It would be premature as well as inappropriate to take
account of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling in the RFP as any
attempt to seek redress can take place only within the institutional
framework of the WTO and pursuant to rules and procedures of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Question. Can you provide to the committee within the next week the
legal analysis you have undertaken that supports the position that
there is no basis for including or accounting for illegal European
subsidies to Airbus in the tanker competition?
Answer. No formal written legal position exists on this topic.
haiti support
Question. What legislation would be required for there to be a
basis on which you could address the illegal subsidies issue in the
tanker competition?
Answer. Legislation already exists. Section 886 of the Duncan
Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 directs
DOD to conduct a study of the impacts to the KC-X source selection from
subsidies after a ruling by the World Trade Organization that the
United States, the European Union, or any political entity within the
United States or the European Union, has provided a covered subsidy to
a manufacturer of large commercial aircraft. DOD is to complete the
review not later than 90 days after the World Trade Organization has
completed ruling on all cases involving the allegation of a covered
subsidy provided to a manufacturer of large commercial aircraft. We
intend to comply fully with this requirement.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
Question. According to a recent article, Abdul Qayum Zakir, who was
released from Guantanamo Bay this past December, has become a senior
Taliban military commander in Afghanistan, replacing Mullah Abdul Ghani
Baradar, whom Pakistani security forces captured last month. What
concerns me is that Zakir was released from U.S. custody on December 7.
Are you aware of other detainees that have been released since
January 2009 who have returned to the fight?
Answer. QFR response is classified and will be handled via
classified channels.
counternarcotics operations
Question. The U.S. military is planning to scale down its presence
in Afghanistan beginning in July 2011. Almost every counternarcotics
operation conducted in Afghanistan at this time is supported by the
U.S. military and these operations are increasing in number. In 2009,
DEA conducted 82 interdiction operations in Afghanistan compared with
43 in fiscal year 2008.
Looking ahead, has DOD begun to plan for continued counternarcotics
operational support after the departure of U.S. troops from
Afghanistan?
Answer. Since 2004, DOD has built counternarcotics capacity within
the Afghan Government, with the goal of creating self-supporting
organizations that contribute to the security and stability of
Afghanistan. The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) is the
lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics production
and distribution on Afghanistan. To assist with the long-term
development and transition of ownership to the Afghan Government, DOD
established the CNPA Development Cell (CDC) under the Combined Security
Transition Command (CSTC-A)/NATO Training Mission--Afghanistan (NTM-A),
with experts from DOJ's International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program (ICITAP). DOD, partnering with DEA and the
Department of State, will continue to build Afghan CNPA capacity to
ensure they are capable of countering narcotics trafficking in
Afghanistan.
poppy crop eradication
Question. It was reported that in the recent U.S. Marine offensive
in Marja, Afghanistan orders were given to leave the fields of opium
alone. A member of General McChrystal's strategic Advisory Group,
Commander Jeffery Eggers was quoted in the N.Y. Times as saying, ``We
don't trample the livelihood of those we're trying to win over.'' The
spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics said, ``How can
we allow the world to see lawful forces in charge of Marja next to the
fields full of opium, which one way or another will be harvested and
turned into poison that kills people all over the world?''
Answer. The current U.S. Counternarcotics (CN) Strategy for
Afghanistan focuses resources on those programs that will contribute
directly to (1) breaking the narcotics-insurgency-corruption nexus, and
(2) helping to connect the people of Afghanistan to their government.
U.S. resources are not being applied directly to eradication, which is
a shift from the previous CN strategy, but will focus instead on
interdiction of drug products, elimination of drug production
infrastructure, and development of alternative crops. Eradication
efforts are the responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan. The
Department appreciates that there is no single easy answer to dealing
with Marja's winter opium crop. It is critical that counterinsurgency
operations involving clearing and holding territory include CN efforts
within the subsequent ``build'' phase, during which counterinsurgency
forces build support for the Afghan government.
Question. The Taliban is both a terrorist organization and a drug
cartel that makes hundreds of millions of dollars a year selling the
heroin that comes from poppy plants in Afghanistan.
Why has DOD allowed the illegal poppy fields, that produce opium
and provide essential funding for the Taliban, to be harvested?
Answer. As part of the Administration's new Afghanistan strategy,
the U.S. Government no longer funds or supports large-scale eradication
of poppy fields which targets the local farmer, though we do not object
to Afghan-led eradication. Preventing workers from growing poppy as a
cash crop can lead to unrest and contributes to Taliban recruiting.
Moreover, payments to prevent poppy cultivation have also failed.
Instead, the Counternarcotics (CN) strategy is directly linked to the
counterinsurgency strategy undertaken in a ``whole-of-government''
approach. The new strategy is focused on the re-development of the
agricultural sector as an engine for job growth and higher incomes for
rural families, enabling farmers to choose licit alternatives to poppy
and promotes self reliance. At the same time, we focus on the
interdiction of drugs, precursor chemicals, stopping drug traffickers,
and arresting drug lords.
U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, along with their international
and Afghan partners, are clearing and holding key terrain, securing an
environment where a building effort can proceed. U.S. Marines are
currently providing micro-grants and loans to farmers in Marjah that
provide them agriculture inputs--things like tools, seeds, and
fertilizer--to grow licit summer crops. USAID and other United States,
Afghan, and international organizations are providing additional
developmental support to local Afghan populations to allow them to
participate in a legitimate economy.
unmanned aerial vehicles
Question. As you know, with some technical modifications unarmed
UAVs can be converted into capable armed platforms. With increased
proliferation of advanced UAV technology, I am concerned that the
military advantage the United States currently retains will be
undermined through unregulated exports or transfers of this technology
by our own country or other nations.
In detail, what is DOD's current policy regarding the sale or
transfer of UAVs to foreign countries?
Answer. Given the wide range of U.S.-origin UAV platforms and
systems that are available for sale, DOD evaluates proposed foreign
sales or transfers on a case-by-case basis since all UAV equipment and
technologies controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) are subject to a case-by-case review. MTCR Category I systems,
which include almost all armed UAVs in the Department of Defense's
inventory \1\, are subject to a strong presumption of denial and are
evaluated in accordance with the MTCR Guidelines and U.S.
nonproliferation policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The only armed MTCR Category II UAS in the U.S. inventory is
the Hunter B UAS. To date, there have been no exports of the armed
Hunter B UAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within DOD, the term ``Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)'' (rather
than ``UAVs'') is normally used to describe the complete capability
delivered with these systems, including the aircraft or vehicle,
payloads, control segment, and communications architecture. There are
several DOD policies and processes that are employed to assess proposed
foreign sales or transfers of UAS platforms and technologies. These DOD
policies and processes are also used to make recommendations to senior
DOD officials for or against proposed UAS sales, and establish proposed
terms and conditions for such sales if they are deemed to be in the
U.S. national security interest. DOD uses several technology security
and foreign disclosure processes (e.g., National Military Information
Disclosure Policy Committee; Low Observable/Counter Low Observable
Executive Committee; Committee for National Security Systems) to assess
proposed foreign sales or transfers of UASs. The Combatant Commanders'
opinions play a key role in these DOD decision processes. These DOD
assessments and recommendations, as well as the Department of State's
(DoS's) independent assessments and views, are considered in the DoS/
DOD MTCR process. If necessary, the National Security Council decision
process can be used to resolve divergent views within the interagency
arena and formulate an Administration position on a proposed UAS
foreign sale or transfer.
In the event the Administration decides a proposed UAS foreign sale
or transfer is needed to build the partner capacity of an allied or
friendly nation, specific details of the UAS capability and technology
offered for sale or transfer must be established by the Department. For
example, the Combatant Commanders have asked that modifications be made
in areas such as UAS sensor or data transmission capabilities in order
to retain the warfighting advantage for U.S. Forces. In addition, the
Department may implement anti-tamper techniques to protect UAS critical
program technology. To provide further protection against misuse or
diversion, the Department normally recommends that UASs with
significant military capability be sold via the Foreign Military Sales
program, including Enhanced End Use Monitoring of the sale or transfer
after delivery to the foreign government, consistent with Defense
Security Cooperation Agency policies and procedures.
Accordingly, the Department fully complies with all Arms Export
Control Act statutory requirements, as well as USG export control
regulations and DOD national disclosure policy requirements prior to
UAS foreign sales or transfers.
Question. Do you support limiting the export of U.S. UAV technology
capable of being employed to deliver munitions?
Answer. We believe the existing regulatory and statutory
limitations on the export of U.S. UAS technology capable of being
employed to deliver munitions are working well. As noted in a previous
answer, almost all current armed UASs in the DOD's inventory are
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I systems. These UASs
are subject to a strong presumption of denial and are fully evaluated
for missile proliferation issues consistent with our commitments under
the MTCR. Any proposed export of armed UASs undergoes an extensive
review and vetting through both the Departments of Defense and State.
Finally, the Administration (normally the Department of State) provides
applicable congressional notifications required by the Arms Export
Control Act and other relevant statutes prior to making a commitment to
sell or transfer such UASs. These notifications enable Legislative
Branch oversight of such proposed sales as an integral part of the
overall U.S. Government decisionmaking process.
Question. What is the Department doing to ensure that UAVs are not
used against American troops?
Answer. The Department is committed to ensuring that Unmanned Air
Systems (UAS) technologies do not fall into the wrong hands. We are
undertaking several initiatives to ensure these systems are
appropriately controlled.
Currently, all armed U.S. UASs are Missile Technology Control
Regime (MCTR) Category I systems, and as such, there is a presumption
of denial of any export. The Department evaluates any key operational
or strategic basis that could potentially overcome the presumption of
denial. The Department is working with the Department of State on a
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)-only policy specifically for MTCR Category
I systems. In addition to the FMS-only policy for armed UASs, all UAS
transfers are subject to enhanced use-monitoring using the Department's
Golden Sentry and end-use checks. In addition, the Department has
implemented a number of processes to ensure that the Direct Commercial
Sales of UAS do not pose a threat to U.S. Forces. These measures
include rigorous background end-user checks by the Departments of State
and Defense.
Question. Have you investigated the possibility of entering into
agreements with foreign nations and foreign producers of advanced UAV
technology to limit the sale or transfer of this technology?
Answer. Two multi-lateral regimes, the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, already address the export
of advanced UAVs, their subsystems and components, and associated
technologies (DOD uses the term UAS). The Department will continue to
work closely with our allies and partners to add export controls on
UAVs in the Wassenaar Arrangement. In addition, the Department is
continually updating the UAV technologies controlled under the MTCR.
Normally, the Department meets twice a year with our MTCR Partners to
consider updates to the list of items controlled. In addition, the
Department shares intelligence and proliferation trends at the MTCR
Information Exchange with our MTCR Partners to achieve a common
understanding of worldwide proliferation trends. The U.S. Government
does work with other countries in its efforts to limit UAS
proliferation to end-users of concern. Although the Department of
Defense is not the lead agency, it works closely with the Department of
State to address UAS proliferation issues, including by cooperating
with other countries to address potential exports that raise
proliferation concerns or may not be consistent with international
norms. Given the U.S. Government's extensive involvement in these
multilateral regimes and existing bilateral contacts, the Department
does not believe there is a need for additional arrangements with
foreign nations and producers of advanced UASs.
cluster munitions
Question. Secretary Gates, on September 29, 2009, Senator Leahy and
I sent a letter to the President along with 14 of our colleagues urging
him to conduct a thorough review of U.S. policy in cluster munitions.
As you may know, Senator Leahy and I have introduced the Cluster
Munitions Civilian Protection Act--co-sponsored by 25 of our
colleagues--to restrict the use of cluster bombs with high failure
rates. And on August 6, 2010, the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions
which prohibits the use of cluster bombs formally comes into effect. I
understand the White House has referred our letter to the Pentagon for
a response.
What is the status of your response?
Answer. The National Security Advisor, General Jones, provided a
written response to your letter on April 14. He said, in part, ``United
States policy on Conventional Weapons is a priority for the
Administration. We are already conducting a comprehensive policy review
on U.S. landmine policy. Once this is complete, we intend to initiate a
comparable comprehensive review of our cluster munitions policy, which
deserves equal attention.''
Currently, the Military Services are implementing the DOD policy
entitled ``DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to
Civilians'' which I signed in June 2008. This policy was the result of
a year-long Departmental review and requires that after 2018 all
cluster munitions, after arming, result in no more than 1 percent
unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational
environments. The policy establishes a comprehensive approach to
addressing concerns related to cluster munitions that will
significantly reduce the potential risk to civilians associated with
the use of cluster munitions while retaining an important military
capability. DOD will continue to ensure that employment of cluster
munitions is consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, U.S. targeting
methodologies and Rules of Engagement, and applicable international
agreements in order to minimize the impact on civilian populations and
infrastructure.
private dod contractors
Question. I understand that you have initiated a 15-day review to
look into reports that Michael D. Furlong used government funds to hire
private contractors to gather information on suspected insurgents in
Afghanistan. I have the following questions about your 15-day review.
Will the review also go beyond Mr. Furlong to examine the expanding
network of Pentagon contractors with professed expertise in
``information operations'' or intelligence collection?
Answer. There are no plans at this time to expand the review beyond
the examination of Mr. Furlong's activities.
Question. Will the results of the review be shared with the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee and with the Intelligence Committee?
Answer. Once the review has been completed the results will be
shared with the appropriate Congressional Committees.
Question. Is it true that the DOD Inspector General is also
investigating Mr. Furlong's work?
Answer. Formal investigations by the Defense Criminal Investigation
Service and Air Force Office of Special Investigations are underway, as
well as ATSD (IO), Mike Decker, conducting investigations on whether
Joint Information Operations Warfare Center personnel or contractors
were used to conduct HUMINT.
Question. Will the DOD IG's report be shared with the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee and with the Intelligence Committee?
Answer. The results from the various reports will be shared with
the appropriate Congressional Committees.
Question. If there were concerns raised about Mr. Furlong's
activities why was there no notification made to any Congressional
Committee?
Answer. The initial assessment addressed overall contracting
oversight and found no evidence of problems beyond this specific
contract. We have now focused investigations on this specific contract
and associated activities to determine whether contractual, security or
department policy violations may have occurred in the past. Once the
investigations are completed we will share the results with the
appropriate Congressional Committees.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Johnson
Question. The supplemental request includes $529 million for
military construction in Afghanistan to support the troop increase. The
fiscal year 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations request includes
another $1.26 billion for military construction to support the war in
Afghanistan. Most of the fiscal year 2011 projects are not scheduled
for completion until well into fiscal year 2012 or even 2013. Some are
at locations that are likely to be enduring, but others are not.
Given that the President has announced his intent to begin to
withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan in July 2011, how do you
reconcile the construction timeline for the projects at non-enduring
bases with the President's timeline for withdrawing troops from
Afghanistan?
Answer. In accordance with the Presidential timeline for
withdrawal, the International Security Assistance Force will, in July
2010, begin to transfer responsibility to the Afghans. Because this
transfer will occur district-by-district and province-by-province,
based upon conditions as they evolve on the ground, the USCENTCOM and
ISAF Commanders will continue to synchronize the application of
resources to include military construction funds within a dynamic
timeline.
Currently, military construction resources are primarily being
applied to the major logistical and command and control hubs;
designated as enduring bases. Other locations where military
construction funding is being applied include critical locations to
support the expansion of security and governance; focused on areas that
are unlikely candidates for early transition to Afghanistan. Finally,
some of the military construction projects are occurring at non-
enduring bases which address force protection issues, including life,
health, and safety concerns in compliance with Sections 317 and 807 of
the 2010 NDAA.
Question. If the primary purpose of these projects is to support
our troops, is there any reason why they shouldn't be funded in the
fiscal year 2010 supplemental in order to accelerate the construction
timeline?
Answer. There is no reason fiscal year 2011 OCO projects should not
be funded in the fiscal year 2010 supplemental. However, with the large
fiscal year 2010 program already appropriated and projects requested in
the fiscal year 2010 OCO Supplemental, accelerating the fiscal year
2011 program will be a challenge to execute by the end of fiscal year
2010. Our execution/contracting agents are nearing capacity and thus
would focus on those fiscal year 2011 projects for which earlier timing
would most benefit our forces on the ground. The majority of projects
in the fiscal year 2011 OCO request will most likely be awarded in
fiscal year 2011, regardless of the year of funding.
Question. In light of the President's timeline for troop
withdrawal, do you anticipate additional military construction
requirements beyond fiscal year 2011?
Answer. It is too early to determine if additional military
constructions requirements will be needed.
Question. An accounting of the total funding appropriated for
military construction in Iraq since 2003, by location, project, and
fiscal year, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Answer. The attached tables display the total funding for military
construction and contingency construction authority (CCA) projects in
Iraq since 2003 for all Services.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MILCON) FUNDING IN IRAQ--FISCAL YEAR 2004-FISCAL
YEAR 2010
[In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current
Appropriated Funding Level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriated MILCON \1\................. 1,502,780 1,237,174
Title 10 U.S.C. 2808.................... .............. 145,000
Contingency Construction Authority...... .............. 704,000
-------------------------------
Total Funding..................... 1,502,780 2,086,174
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The difference between the ``Appropriated'' and ``Current Funding
Level'' is attributable to the:
Fiscal year 2008 undistributed reduction (Public Law 111-32) in the
amount of $120,576,000.
Canceled projects. $56,780,000. $42,000,000 funded Title 10 U.S.C.
2808 projects.
Note: There were no Military Construction projects in Iraq for fiscal
years 2003, 2009, or 2010.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN IRAQ
[In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriated Current
Service Fiscal Year Location Project Amount Funding Level
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army............................... 2008.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Hot Cargo Ramp \1\....................................... 18,500 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Landfill Construction.................................... 3,100 2,100
Army............................... 2008.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... South Airfield Apron (India Ramp) \1\.................... 28,000 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Baghdad, Iraq........................... Water Supply, Treatment & Storage, PH III \1\............ 13,000 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Adder, Iraq........................ Convoy Support Center Relocation, Phase II............... 39,000 39,000
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Adder, Iraq........................ Petroleum Oil and Lubricant Storage Area \1\............. 10,000 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Adder, Iraq........................ Wastewater Treatment and Collection System............... 9,800 9,800
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Anaconda, Iraq..................... Hazardous Waste Incinerator \1\.......................... 4,300 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Anaconda, Iraq..................... Landfill Construction.................................... 6,200 2,800
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Constitution, Iraq................. Juvenille Tifric \2\..................................... 11,700 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Marez, Iraq........................ Landfill Construction.................................... 880 880
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Ramadi, Iraq....................... Landfill Construction.................................... 880 880
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Speicher, Iraq..................... Aviation Navigation Facilities \1\....................... 13,400 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Speicher, Iraq..................... Landfill Construction.................................... 5,900 3,900
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Speicher, Iraq..................... Military Control Point................................... 5,800 5,800
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Taqqadum, Iraq..................... Landfill Construction.................................... 880 880
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Victory, Iraq...................... Landfill Construction \2\................................ 6,200 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Victory, Iraq...................... Level 3 Hospital \1\..................................... 13,400 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Victory, Iraq...................... Wastewater Treatment and Collection System \1\........... 9,800 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Victory, Iraq...................... Water Treatment and Storage, Phase II \1\................ 18,000 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Camp Warrior, Iraq...................... Landfill Construction \2\................................ 880 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Fallujah, Iraq.......................... Landfill Construction.................................... 880 880
Army............................... 2008.................. Q-West, Iraq............................ North Entry Control Point................................ 11,400 11,400
Army............................... 2008.................. Q-West, Iraq............................ Perimeter Security Upgrade............................... 14,600 9,600
Army............................... 2008.................. Scania, Iraq............................ Entry Control Point \2\.................................. 5,000 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Scania, Iraq............................ Water Storage Tanks \2\.................................. 9,200 ..............
Army............................... 2008.................. Various Locations, Iraq................. E-Glass Overhead Cover, Phase IV......................... 105,000 105,000
Army............................... 2008.................. Various Locations, Iraq................. Overhead Cover E-Glass................................... 30,000 30,000
Air Force.......................... 2008.................. Balad AB, Iraq.......................... Fighter Ramp............................................. 11,000 11,000
Air Force.......................... 2008.................. Balad AB, Iraq.......................... Foxtrot Taxiway.......................................... 12,700 12,700
Air Force.......................... 2008.................. Balad AB, Iraq.......................... Helicopter Maintenance Facility.......................... 34,600 13,450
-------------------------------
Total 2008................... ...................... ........................................ ......................................................... 454,000 260,070
===============================
Army............................... 2007.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Heavy Aircraft Apron..................................... 14,400 11,700
Army............................... 2007.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Transient Aircraft Apron................................. 4,150 4,150
Army............................... 2007.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Runway with Shelters..................................... 13,600 13,600
Army............................... 2007.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Water Storage Tanks...................................... 14,000 9,200
Army............................... 2007.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Electrical Infrastructure Upgrades....................... 14,600 14,600
Army............................... 2007.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Facilities Replacement................................... 23,000 20,300
Army............................... 2007.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Life Support Area \3\.................................... 16,500 ..............
Army............................... 2007.................. Camp Adder, Iraq........................ Facilities Replacement................................... 1,800 1,800
Army............................... 2007.................. Camp Adder, Iraq........................ Life Support Area \3\.................................... 8,500 ..............
Army............................... 2007.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... Life Support Area \3\.................................... 8,500 ..............
Army............................... 2007.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... North Entry Control Point................................ 7,400 7,400
Army............................... 2007.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... South Entry Control Point................................ 7,500 7,500
Army............................... 2007.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... CJSOAC Operations Center................................. 3,450 3,450
Army............................... 2007.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... Truck Lane Access Road................................... 2,600 2,600
Army............................... 2007.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... Water Wells.............................................. 2,200 2,200
Army............................... 2007.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... Water Storage Tanks...................................... 10,000 10,000
Army............................... 2007.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... POL Tanks................................................ 9,900 9,900
Army............................... 2007.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... Facilities Replacement................................... 7,000 7,000
Army............................... 2007.................. Camp Speicher, Iraq..................... Facilities Replacement................................... 19,000 19,000
Army............................... 2007.................. Qayyarah West, Iraq..................... Facilities Replacement................................... 1,800 1,800
Army............................... 2007.................. Camp Scania, Iraq....................... Facilities Replacement................................... 2,400 2,400
Army............................... 2007.................. Camp Speicher, Iraq..................... Life Support Area \3\.................................... 8,500 ..............
Army............................... 2007.................. Victory Base Camp, Iraq................. Facilities Replacement................................... 33,000 33,000
Army............................... 2007.................. Various Locations, Iraq................. Facilities Replacement (Anti Terrorism/Force Protection). 8,000 8,000
-------------------------------
Total 2007................... ...................... ........................................ ......................................................... 241,800 189,600
===============================
Army............................... 2006.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Airfield Improvements.................................... 15,000 15,000
Army............................... 2006.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Electrical Distribution/Generation Station............... 8,900 8,900
Army............................... 2006.................. Al Asad, Iraq........................... Force Protection Improvements............................ 7,400 7,400
Army............................... 2006.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... Perimeter Security Upgrade............................... 12,000 12,000
Army............................... 2006.................. Baghdad, Iraq........................... Urban By-Pass............................................ 50,000 50,000
Army............................... 2006.................. Camp Talil, Iraq........................ Construct/replace Roads.................................. 5,700 5,700
Army............................... 2006.................. Camp Talil, Iraq........................ Base Security Fence...................................... 22,000 22,000
Army............................... 2006.................. Camp Talil, Iraq........................ Convoy Support Center Relocation......................... 21,000 21,000
Army............................... 2006.................. Camp Talil, Iraq........................ Dining Facility.......................................... 5,100 5,100
Air Force.......................... 2006.................. Balad AB, Iraq.......................... Material Handling Equipment.............................. 5,300 5,300
-------------------------------
Total 2006................... ...................... ........................................ ......................................................... 152,400 152,400
===============================
Army............................... 2005.................. Camp Hope, Iraq......................... CMU Barracks............................................. 2,500 2,500
Army............................... 2005.................. Camp Talil, Iraq........................ CMU Barracks............................................. 24,600 24,600
Army............................... 2005.................. Camp Warrior, Iraq...................... Medical Facility......................................... 7,500 7,500
Army............................... 2005.................. Camp Warrior, Iraq...................... Tactical Ops Building.................................... 6,100 6,100
Army............................... 2005.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... Battalion and Company HQ................................. 7,800 7,800
Army............................... 2005.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... Equipment Support Activity............................... 17,100 17,100
Army............................... 2005.................. LSA Anaconda, Iraq...................... Hospital Facility........................................ 39,000 39,000
Army............................... 2005.................. Marez, Iraq............................. CMU Barracks............................................. 9,300 9,300
Army............................... 2005.................. Marez, Iraq............................. Combat Support Hospital.................................. 9,900 9,900
Army............................... 2005.................. Marez, Iraq............................. Troop Medical Clinic..................................... 2,900 2,900
Army............................... 2005.................. Muthanna, Iraq.......................... Harden Ammunition Bunkers................................ 11,300 11,300
Army............................... 2005.................. Various locations, Iraq................. CMU Barracks............................................. 55,200 55,200
Army............................... 2005.................. Various locations, Iraq................. Overhead Cover System.................................... 250,000 250,000
Army............................... 2005.................. Various locations, Iraq................. Main Supply Route Aspen.................................. 36,000 27,001
Air Force.......................... 2005.................. Balad AB, Iraq.......................... Construct Cargo Marshalling Area......................... 15,000 16,715
Air Force.......................... 2005.................. Balad AB, Iraq.......................... Construct Hot Cargo Pad.................................. 3,500 3,408
Air Force.......................... 2005.................. Balad AB, Iraq.......................... Construct CSAR/JSOAD/MEDEVAC Alert Compound.............. 8,000 8,952
Air Force.......................... 2005.................. Balad AB, Iraq.......................... Construct and Repair Munitions Roads..................... 2,700 2,097
Air Force.......................... 2005.................. Balad AB, Iraq.......................... Repair/Install Airfield Lighting......................... 15,000 13,381
Air Force.......................... 2005.................. Balad AB, Iraq.......................... Construct Special Operations Compound.................... 2,850 2,850
Air Force.......................... 2005.................. Tallil AB, Iraq......................... Construct Temporary Cantonment Area \2\.................. 10,800 ..............
-------------------------------
Total 2005................... ...................... ........................................ ......................................................... 537,050 517,604
===============================
Army............................... 2004.................. Al Fallujah, Iraq....................... Power Plant and Electrical Distribution.................. 8,000 8,000
Army............................... 2004.................. Baghdad, Iraq........................... Entry Control Points..................................... 4,000 4,000
Army............................... 2004.................. Baghdad, Iraq........................... Power Plant and Electrical Distribution.................. 7,000 7,000
Army............................... 2004.................. Baghdad, Iraq........................... Power Plant.............................................. 11,500 11,500
Army............................... 2004.................. Baghdad, Iraq........................... Sensitive Comartmented Information Facility.............. 6,000 6,000
Army............................... 2004.................. Baghdad, Iraq........................... Joint Operations Center.................................. 3,500 3,500
Army............................... 2004.................. Baghdad, Iraq........................... Training Facility........................................ 2,200 2,200
Army............................... 2004.................. Balad, Iraq............................. Theater-wide Postal Distribution Facility................ 7,000 7,000
Army............................... 2004.................. Balad, Iraq............................. Power Plant and Electrical Distribution.................. 16,000 16,000
Army............................... 2004.................. Balad, Iraq............................. Base Camp Water Treatment Plant.......................... 9,800 9,800
Army............................... 2004.................. Balad, Iraq............................. Base Camp Wastewater Treatment Plant..................... 10,500 10,500
Army............................... 2004.................. Taji Military Complex, Iraq............. Power Plant and Electrical Distribution.................. 16,500 16,500
Army............................... 2004.................. Tikrit, Iraq............................ Power Plant and Electrical Distribution.................. 15,500 15,500
-------------------------------
Total 2004................... ...................... ........................................ ......................................................... 117,500 117,500
===============================
Grand Total--Appropriated.... ...................... ........................................ ......................................................... 1,502,750 1,237,174
===============================
Title 10 U.S.C. 2808 Construction
Authority in the Event of
Declaration of War or National
Emergency:
Army........................... 2007.................. Al Ramadi, Iraq......................... Brick Factory \3\........................................ .............. 3,900
Army........................... 2007.................. Al Taji, Iraq........................... TIFRIC and Brick Factory \3\............................. .............. 87,413
Army........................... 2007.................. Camp Bucca, Iraq........................ WasteWater Treatment Plant \3\........................... .............. 25,000
Army........................... 2007.................. Camp Bucca, Iraq........................ Water Treatment Plant \3\................................ .............. 18,987
Army........................... 2007.................. Camp Bucca, Iraq........................ Brick Factory \3\........................................ .............. 9,700
-------------------------------
Grand Total--Title 10 U.S.C. ...................... ........................................ ......................................................... .............. 145,000
2808.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reconciliation: Appropriated to Current Funding Level:
\1\ Fiscal Year 2008 Undistributed Rescission--Public Law 111-32................................ ($120,576)
\2\ Canceled Projects........................................................................... ($56,780)
\3\ Title 10 U.S.C. 2808 Authority.............................................................. ($42,000)
---------------
Total..................................................................................... $1,382,174
Question. Please provide for the record the following information:
A list of the U.S. bases in Iraq that have not yet been returned to the
Iraqis, and a list of the bases currently planned to be enduring sites.
Answer. As of March 31, 2010, U.S. Forces occupy 154 locations
consisting of eight co-located operating bases (COBs), 32 co-located
operating sites (COSs), 36 co-located operating locations (COLs), 32
facilities, and 46 partnered bases. Detailed list attached. The number
of enduring bases is unknown.
COMPLETE LIST OF AGREED FACILITIES AND AREAS REMAINING BASES AS OF March 31, 2010
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LAFA Basing Stance Estimated Closure or
# Base/Facility/Area Name Type of Base Current Base Type USG Location Inactive/Active Return Date
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
289 LOVE COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... 2-Apr-2010
293 CALDWELL COD........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... 2-Apr-2010
442 QASR AMIJ COMPOUND...................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 3-Apr-2010
398 YUSIFIYA, PB (Patrol Base) COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 10-Apr-2010
235 PHOENIX COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... 15-Apr-2010
240 PHOENIX BASE ANNEX MNSTC-I COMPOUND.............. US BASE............... USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... 15-Apr-2010
271 SUJ, JOINT SECURITY STATION COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 15-Apr-2010
135 SUMMERALL COS........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... 17-Apr-2010
182 ABU GHRAIB, JOINT COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 20-Apr-2010
COORDINATION CENTER
401 SALIE, JSS (Joint Security COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 20-Apr-2010
Station)
294 PALIWODA COS........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... 25-Apr-2010
340 ZAYTUN COS........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... 25-Apr-2010
258 UR, JOINT SECURITY STATION COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 30-Apr-2010
291 SHEIK AMIR, JOINT SECURITY COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 30-Apr-2010
STATION
307 ISTIQLAL, JOINT SECURITY COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 30-Apr-2010
STATION
411 TAJI RTC COMPOUND...................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 30-Apr-2010
13 UBAYDI, BATTLE POSITION COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 1-May-2010
246 EMBASSY ESTATES BILLETING LSA........................... US BASE............... USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... 1-May-2010
247 TRAVIS, CAMP BILLETING LSA........................... US BASE............... USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... 1-May-2010
248 BLACKHAWK ANNEX HOUSING AREA.................. US BASE............... USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... 1-May-2010
250 RIVERSIDE BILLETING LSA........................... US BASE............... USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... 1-May-2010
402 CLEARY, JSS (Joint Security COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 1-May-2010
Station)
304 ORYAN COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... 2-May-2010
278 763, COMBAT OUTPOST COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 7-May-2010
4 KOREAN VILLAGE, CAMP COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 5-May-2010
266 LOYALTY COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 10-May-2010
268 ZAFARANIYA, JOINT SECURITY COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 10-May-2010
STATION
263 BELADIYAT, JOINT SECURITY COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 13-May-2010
STATION
279 CAHILL, COMBAT OUTPOST COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 17-May-2010
280 CARVER COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 24-May-2010
331 BERNSTEIN COS........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... 25-May-2010
349 NORMANDY COS........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... 25-May-2010
308 TARMIYA, JOINT SECURITY COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 30-May-2010
STATION
281 ASSASSIN, PATROL BASE COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 1-Jun-2010
276 CASHE SOUTH, COS COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 5-Jun-2010
407 VOLUNTEER, JSS COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 15-Jun-2010
212 AL MAHMUDIYAH, CAMP COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 20-JuN-2010
297 MUSHADA, JOINT SECURITY COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVEE.......... 30-Jun-2010
STATION
405 AL MUTHANA AIRFIELD, JOINT COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 30-Jun-2010
SECURITY STATION
380 ABU GHRAIB WAREHOUSE FACILITY...................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 1-Jul-2010
269 MEADE COS........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 10-Jul-2010
251 DOURA, JOINT SECURITY COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 15-Jul-2010
STATION
179 NASIR WA SALAM, JOINT COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 30-Jul-2010
SECURITY STATION
285 BESMAYA RANGE COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 31-Jul-2010
434 Mithaq RETRANS JSS........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... 31-Ju1-2010
435 Tawila RETRANS JSS........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... 31-Ju1-2010
207 WAR EAGLE COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 10-Aug-2010
28 CEDAR II COS........................... US BASE............... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... 31-Aug-2010
217 FALCON COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... 15-Sep-2010
146 Q-WEST (CAMP AND AIR BASE). COS........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... Aug-2010
Also, ENDURANCE, FOB
150 QAYYAF PUMP HOUSE SUPPORTING FACILITY........... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... AuG-2010
147 ASHURA, CAMP COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... Jun-2010
175 SCANIA COS........................... US BASE............... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... Oct-2010
10 NIMR COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
11 SINJAR COMMUNICATIONS SITE COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
19 ECHO COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
20 ENDEAVOR, FORWARD OPERATING COS........................... US BASE............... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
BASE
23 JENKINS, JOINT SECURITY COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
STATION
25 EASTERN BARRACKS COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
20 GARRY OWEN COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
31 ADDER COS........................... HUB................... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
33 UR, CAMP COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
34 UR, CAMP LOCATION COMMAND OFFICE........................ PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
TALLIL (LCT)
38 APACHE (AL SHEEB) COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
40 SAFWAN HILL COL........................... US BASE............... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
44 BASRA AIR STATION COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
46 Wessam, Camp 1, MILITARY MITT CAMPS.................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
TRAINING TEAM (CAMP WESSAM
1)
47 Wessam, Camp, JOINT JOCC.......................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
OPERATIONS COMMAND CENTER
(CAMP
48 Wessam, Camp 2, MILITARY WITT CAMPS.................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
TRAINING TEAM (CAMP WESSAM
2)
5S BASRA OPERATIONAL COMMAND MITT CAMPS.................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
62 BUCCA COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
63 UMM QASR COL........................... US BASE............... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
65 AL TIB COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
66 SFER, COP COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
70 MINDEN, SHALAMSHAH, FORWARD COL........................... US BASE............... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
OPERATING BASE
73 SPARROWHAWK, CAMP JSS EQUIVALENT................ PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
79 BASRAH COMPLEX PB EQUIVALENT................. PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
82 AL ASAD COS........................... HUB................... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
85 HEIDER COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
86 SYKES COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
87 AL KASIK IRAQI MILITARY BASE BILLETING..................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
90 HABUR GATE POINT OF ENTRY................ US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
94 ANBAR PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
CENTER (PGC)
121 AR RAMADI, CAMP COS........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
133 KAUFMAN COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
137 BAYJI OIL REFINERY (BOR) COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
139 SPEICHER (CAMP AND AIR BASE) COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
143 DAGGER COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
144 JALIL IRAQI ARMY BASE WITH IA BASE W/CF.................. US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
COALITION FORCES
152 MCHENRY COS........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
154 DAHUK RESIDENT OFFICE OFFICE........................ US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
161 MAREZ/DIAMONDBACK COS........................... HUB................... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
162 AL KINDI IA BASE W/CF.................. US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
163 DAHUK TRAINING CENTER (1) TRAINING FACILITY............. US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
168 IMN, COMBAT OUTPOST COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
174 BABIL RESIDENCE OFFICE REGIONAL EMBASSY OFFICE....... US BASE............... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
181 HUSSINIYAH, CAMP COL........................... US BASE............... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
187 HAMIYAH, CAMP COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
188 VICTORY BASE COMPLEX COS........................... HUB................... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
209 JUSTICE COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
211 DEASON, JOINT SECURITY COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TEE
STATION
214 PROSPERITY COL........................... SPOKE................. USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... TBD
220 UNION III, FORWARD OPERATING COL........................... SPOKE................. USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... TBD
BASE
221 RASHEED, JOINT SECURITY COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
STATION (OLD MINISTRY OF
226 COMMAND LIAISON ELEMENT COMPOUND...................... US BASE............... USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... TBD
COMPOUND
233 COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL COMPOUND...................... US BASE............... USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... TBD
OPERATIONS TASK FORCE
COMPOUND
256 SHIELD COS........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
257 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICE........................ US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, 7TH
FLOOR
273 AL RASHEED AIRFIELD FACILITY...................... US BASE............... USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... TBD
284 ZULU, FORWARD OPERATING BASE COL........................... US BASE............... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
287 HAMMER COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
298 TAJI, CAMP COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
306 BALAD, JOINT BASE (CAMP AND COS........................... HUB................... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
AIR BASE)
315 GRIZZLY COS........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
316 KHAMEES (JEDI MAIN) MITT CAMPS.................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
317 WARHORSE COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
330 DORIA COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
334 GAINES-MILL COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
335 K1 COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
338 WARRIOR COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
339 ERBIL COL........................... SPOKE................. USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
342 IRBIL RESIDENT OFFICE AINKOWA ERBIL GOVERNATE....... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
343 DELTA COS........................... SPOKE................. USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
348 SHOCKER, PATROL BASE COL........................... US BASE............... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
352 KIRKUSH PROJECT OFFICE TRAINING FACILITY............. US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
353 KIRKUSH--LOGISTICS MILITARY TRAINING FACILITY/CHUS........ US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
ADVISORY TEAM
354 MUNTHERIA, CAMP--AKA EDGE COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
356 SULAMANIYAH RESIDENCE OFFICE RESIDENT OFFICE USAGE......... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
364 HEIDER, COMBAT OUTPOST JSS EQUIVALENT................ PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
366 SCHWEDLER, CAMP JSS EQUIVALENT................ PARTNIERED BASE....... CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
367 LEE, CAMP PB EQUIVALENT................. PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
368 OLSON, PATROL BASE JSS EQUIVALENT................ PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
369 SUMERALL, FORWARD OPERATING JSS EQUIVALENT................ PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
BASE
376 STACK HOUSE PB EQUIVALENT................. PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
383 APACHE, COMBAT OUTPOST PB EQUIVALENT................. PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
392 GABE, FORWARD OPERATING BASE JSS EQUIVALENT................ PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
394 IRBIL, CAMP JSS EQUIVALENT................ PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
395 COBRA, FORWARD OPERATING JSS EQUIVALENT................ SPOKE................. USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
BASE
396 CALDWELL, FORWARD OPERATING JSS EQUIVALENT................ PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
BASE
397 ANDREA, PATROL BASE JSS EQUIVALENT................ PARTNERED BASE........ CJSOTF........... ACTIVE........... TBD
404 DIBIS, JSS (Joint Security COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
Station)
406 AL RASHID, JOINT SECURITY COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
STATION
408 CONSTITUTION COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
410 MAHAWIL, PB COL........................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
413 RUSTAMIYAH NTM-I COL........................... US BASE............... USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
423 RAMADI, CAMP QUARTERS COMPOUND...................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
428 JBB OFFSITE BACKUP PUMPING SITE.......................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
STATION
431 CJSOTF COMPOUND FACILITY...................... US BASE............... USD-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... TBD
437 Tikrit JCC JCC/JSS EQUIVALENT............ US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
439 CRUZ-MORRIS (next to Gabe) COL........................... US BASE............... USD-N............ ACTIVE........... TBD
on Lion
443 BAGHDADI COMPOUND...................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
446 BLUE DIAMOND, COL COMPOUND...................... PARTNERED BASE........ USD-C............ ACTIVE........... TBD
447 ECP 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 17, 18 ECP........................... US BASE............... USC-C (IZ)....... ACTIVE........... TBD
262 KALSU COS........................... HUB................... USD-S............ ACTIVE........... TBD
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
afghanistan withdraw
Question. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander in
Afghanistan, has stated President Obama's additional goal to begin
withdrawing U.S. troops in July 2011 will force Afghan officials to
take the lead in ensuring their country's security. The United States
hope would be to grow the Afghan National Security Forces to their
authorized size of 170,000 soldiers and 134,000 police by the pullout
date.
With your recent visit, in your opinion do you think the Afghan
National Security Forces will meet those numbers?
Answer. The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police
(ANP) are on track to meet these goals. As of March 2010, the ANA had
112,779 personnel, which is slightly above its March goal of 112,700
personnel. The ANA has achieved high recruiting and good retention over
the past several months. We will continue to watch the program closely
and guard against the risk that the ANA might fall short of its larger
goals.
The ANP had 102,138 personnel as of March 2010, which was above its
goal of 99,261 personnel. The ANP's ability to meet its growth goals is
more at risk, as it has suffered high attrition and poor retention,
especially in the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), which
accounts for much of the growth in 2010 and 2011. NATO Training
Mission--Afghanistan (NTM-A), the Ministry of Interior, and the
European Union Police (EUPOL) established an ANCOP Working Group to
examine how to reduce attrition and improve the ANCOP program, for
example, by examining personal protection, pay, and quality of life
issues. In particular, the Working Group is examining a rotational
deployment model for the ANCOP to reduce operational stress. In June
2010, the group will reassess how new initiatives have affected the
ANCOP program.
One of the most significant changes to the Afghanistan National
Security Forces (ANSF) program is the embedding of international forces
to partner with the ANSF at all levels to provide mentorship and
leadership in the operational environment. The August 2009 initial
assessment by the Commander, International Security Assistance Force
(COMISAF), acknowledged the risks inherent in rapidly growing the ANSF,
including inadequate training, lack of enablers, and inexperienced
leadership. To mitigate these risks, ISAF instituted a program of close
partnership between operational ISAF forces and the ANSF. The
partnering concept is a critical piece of COMISAF's strategy and
requires international partners to integrate fully with the ANSF to
develop a full partnership with the shared goal of working together to
bring security to the Afghan people. Under partnering, ISAF units will
be physically co-located with the ANSF from the national headquarters
level through the regional, provincial, and district levels,
establishing the same battle rhythms while planning and executing
operations together. Embedded partnering is beginning to provide daily
mentoring, training, and operational oversight to mitigate risk and
develop more capable and professional army and police forces.
Question. Does the fiscal year 2010 supplemental request give us
additional assurance in helping them meet those goals?
Answer. Yes. In January 2010, the Joint Coordination Monitoring
Board (JCMB) approved the Afghan Government request to establish new
end-strength goals for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan
National Police (ANP). The new end-strength goals are shown in the
following table:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By October By October
2010 2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANA..................................... 134,000 171,600
ANP..................................... 109,000 134,000
-------------------------------
Total............................. 243,000 305,600
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In February 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted the
fiscal year 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Supplemental
request and the fiscal year 2011 OCO request to support the revised
ANSF end-strength goals of 243,000 by October 2010 and 305,600 by
October 2011. The fiscal year 2010 OCO Supplemental request includes
$2.6 billion for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and the fiscal
year 2011 OCO request includes $11.6 billion for the ASFF.
The fiscal year 2010 OCO Supplemental request supports the overall
program requirements and allows us to achieve accelerated growth of the
ANA beyond 134,000 and the growth and reform of the ANP beyond 109,000.
Ongoing and projected ASFF investments in fiscal year 2010 will
continue to advance the ASFF program toward the goal of developing the
capabilities of the ANA and the ANP to conduct and sustain independent
counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and counterinsurgency operations
with limited international partner support; perform law enforcement
functions; provide for the internal security of the population; gain
the trust of the population; and facilitate the rule of law throughout
Afghanistan, thereby helping set the conditions for the Afghans to
assume the lead responsibility for securing the country and improving
the legitimacy of the Afghan government.
haiti support
Question. I would like to congratulate the U.S.S. Bataan (LHD 5)
and the embarked Marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
for their recent completion, of their support to Operation Unified
Response yesterday (March 24) after 10 weeks on-station. I plan to make
a visit to Haiti in the near future to see the wonderful work our
military members have done with various United States and numerous
independent aid organizations to deliver aid, and helping the Haitians
prepare for long-term reconstruction.
Can you elaborate on some of the other Defense strategies to
partner with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to elevate stability
missions to the same priority as combat operations and the commitment
to working more closely with its civilian partners?
Answer. The Department takes its role in stability missions very
seriously, as emphasized by the critical policy document referenced by
your question. DOD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, states
that ``Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the
Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency
equivalent to combat operations.'' As recently noted in the Quadrennial
Defense Review, ``Reforming How We Do Business'' section, the
Department of Defense plays both lead and supporting roles in a range
of stability operations. Within these roles, we have engaged in
partnering efforts with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), often
acting as a facilitator by matching resources with needs in stability
missions. For example, recognizing the need for better communication
between physicians and victims of the earthquake in Haiti, U.S.
Southern Command partnered with academic institutions to bring in
translators to assist in the effort. Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command
has been exploring opportunities with the University of Hawaii to
develop--in partner nations--an executive-level course for emergency
management organizations, which would increase countries' ability to
respond more effectively in humanitarian and disaster relief
situations. Finally, on a broader note, the Department has been working
to define its relationship with NGOs more clearly in non-hostile,
humanitarian environments.
Question. Are there long term plans from the Defense Department
partnering with State to support Haiti in its rebuilding efforts?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to reduce its
military force footprint in Haiti as the humanitarian mission shifts
from relief and recovery to reconstruction. Following the transition of
Joint Task Force--Haiti to lead civilian agencies on June 1, the
USSOUTHCOM military liaison office (MLO) will continue to coordinate
DOD activities in support of USAID and the Department of State,
focusing on strengthening the capacity of the Haitian government to
provide essential services to its populace. DOD will also support
rebuilding efforts in Haiti through the ``New Horizons'' exercise,
which provides medical, construction, and engineering support from June
through September 2010, and the ``Continuing Promise 2010'' exercise,
which provides humanitarian and civic assistance from July 24 to August
3, 2010. Beyond September, DOD will continue to look for opportunities
to partner with USAID and the Department of State through additional
humanitarian assistance and disaster preparedness projects and
exercises that support Haiti's effort to rebuild.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
Question. In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, General Petraeus stated that the insufficient progress
toward a comprehensive Middle East peace is a cause of instability in
the region. However, Israel makes significant contributions to our
national security. Do you agree that America's relationship with Israel
plays an important and positive role in our national security?
Answer. Yes, Israel plays an important and positive role in our
national security and is one of our strongest regional partners.
This Administration's commitment to Israel's security is
unshakeable, and our defense relationship with Israel is as strong as
ever. The relationship supports both the security of Israel as well as
the advancement of U.S. national security interests.
Our military-to-military relationship continues to develop and
strengthen, as evidenced by the conclusion of the largest United
States-Israel joint exercise in history last October, Juniper Cobra,
with more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel from the U.S. European
Command participating in this exercise in Israel. Israel's
contributions to U.S. national security also include sharing of
military technology and anti-terrorism know-how.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
detainee facility
Question. The Department of Defense has requested $ 350 million in
the fiscal year 2011 budget for military construction related to
renovation and construction and start up cost at the maximum security
prison in Thomson, Illinois. While the decision by the Obama
Administration to close Guantanamo is a policy decision with which I
disagree, I am also concerned about whether or not the decision to
transfer the Guantanamo detainees to an existing prison in Illinois
with the associated construction and renovation costs is a fiscally
responsible decision and my questions for the record are focused on
additional costs associated by making the Illinois option the only
option.
Since 2002, what is the total cost of the facilities at Guantanamo
constructed primarily for the purpose of housing detainees or providing
support for military personnel related to the incarceration of
combatant detainees?
Answer. To date, the total construction cost of the detention
facilities at Guantanamo has been approximately $155 million.
Question. What was the cost for the courtroom facilities and does
the DOD contemplate replacing those facilities with new construction in
Illinois or at some other location?
Answer. The cost of the expeditionary legal complex (ELC) at
Guantanamo was approximately $12 million.
The plan for Thomson is to renovate the existing library into a
temporary courtroom and leverage office space at Rock Island Arsenal
while constructing two permanent courtrooms and supporting office
space. This will allow us to conduct single-defendant, non-high value
detainee commissions at Thomson once we reach initial operating
capability in 10-13 months.
To reach full operational capability, we will build a 24,000 square
foot modular building at Thomson with two courtroom facilities,
evidence holding/viewing rooms, conference rooms, offices,
administration, etc.), that will use equipment relocated from the
courtrooms in Guantanamo. We estimate the cost of this new facility to
be approximately $10 to $12 million.
The draft Military Construction Project Data Sheet (DD Form 1391),
which states the requirements and justification to support funding
requests for all projects requiring OSD approval and non-appropriated
fund military construction, includes the cost to construct the OMC
facility at Thomson. However, it is not possible to isolate the cost of
just the OMC facility as the courtroom building was part of a system of
buildings that supported the OMC function. For example, office space
for OMC personnel would be provided in part of a building at Rock
Island Arsenal; the cost for that building was not broken out in the
draft 1391. Additionally, the draft 1391 includes the cost of
renovating the prison library to serve as a temporary courtroom in case
there is a need to commence military commission proceedings quickly at
Thomson. If such a need should not arise, the cost of renovation will
be deducted from the original cost estimates.
Question. The Department of Defense has a request for $350 million
for renovation and construction at a prison currently owned by the
State of Illinois. Why was this site selected and what other locations
were considered?
Answer. The $350 million is a comprehensive request for detainee
operations involving Guantanamo detainees and not just for construction
and renovation at Thomson. Of the $350 million, approximately $100
million is for improvements at Thomson Correctional Center so that it
can accept detainees from Guantanamo, approximately $50 million is for
improvements at Rock Island Arsenal to support using Thomson to house
those detainees, approximately $35 million is for procuring capital
equipment for the facility, and approximately $60 million is for
investment equipment and supplies for detention operations. The
remaining $105 million is for operations at Guantanamo and Thomson, or
wherever the detainees are located.
This site was selected by the President both to reduce the Bureau
of Prisons' shortage of high-security, maximum custody cell space and
to accommodate the relocation of detainees from the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base, Cuba. The Department of Defense was tasked to considered
many military and civilian sites including facilities in Standish,
Michigan, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Charleston, South Carolina.
Question. I am concerned about the future support cost for the
personnel that will be assigned to the prison in Illinois. Were any
locations near existing military facilities considered for a new
detainee facility so we could leverage the existing support facilities?
Answer. Yes. Furthermore, the plan for use of the Thomson
Correctional Center for detention operations does leverage existing
support facilities at the nearby Rock Island Arsenal, as well as those
in the local community.
Question. Was a business case evaluated that resulted in the
selection of the Illinois prison? If so, what was the estimated cost to
build a new facility near an existing military facility?
Answer. The Department of Defense was tasked to develop options for
facilities in the continental United States, and a number of locations
and construction methods were examined. The President determined that
using Thomson Correctional Center as a ``joint use'' facility provided
the best solution for both the Bureau of Prisons and the Department of
Defense.
Question. What additional military requests are contemplated for
fiscal year 2012 and beyond for facilities to support military
personnel assigned to the guard force at the Illinois prison?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects
the results of all planning efforts completed to date. However, since
the Commander, USNORTHCOM, will conduct even more extensive mission
analysis and detailed planning efforts, this request is subject to
increase or decrease when those efforts are complete.
Question. What was the total cost to the State of Illinois for the
acquisition of the land and the construction of the current prison in
Illinois? And, what is the price being paid by the Federal Government
for the existing site in Thomson, Illinois?
Answer. According to public sources, the total cost to the State of
Illinois to construct the facility was approximately $140 million. The
Federal Government has not yet begun negotiating a price with the State
of Illinois because the Bureau of Prisons cannot negotiate before it
has the funds to purchase the facility.
Question. It has been suggested that the Federal Prison System has
the capacity to absorb all the detainees at existing Federal high
security prisons. Was the option of transferring the detainees to other
Federal high security prisons studied and rejected and if so, why?
Answer. According to the Bureau of Prisons, the Federal Prison
System is 35 percent over its capacity and, thus, it does not have the
additional capacity necessary to absorb the detention population.
guam relocation
Question. One of the major issues within the military construction
program is the Marine's relocation to Guam. I am deeply troubled by the
fact that this relocation move is in such disarray. The plan to
relocate 8,000 Marines and 9,000 family members to Guam is a massive
undertaking that presents several challenges and will place a serious
burden on the island's infrastructure. The infrastructure of Guam is
unsatisfactory before factoring in the Marine move. We have been
informed that the latest cost estimate for this relocation could
approach $13 billion. The report that the Governor of Guam needs $3
billion in Federal assistance before we spend $13 billion on Milcon is
just too much to ask of our taxpayers. The EPA reports the relocation
plan is unsatisfactory so our 2010 milcon projects are on hold. If the
Marines can't acquire enough land on the island to adequately train,
the move will not be advantageous to them. The plan is way over budget
and behind the time schedule already.
If the environmental and infrastructure issues are not successfully
resolved in a cost effective manner will you stop this relocation to
Guam?
Answer. The Department of Defense believes there are cost-effective
solutions to the environmental and infrastructure shortcomings
identified by the EPA and other U.S. departments and agencies. We are
committed to working with the Government of Guam and the Federal
partners to develop satisfactory mitigation strategies in the Final
Environmental Impact Statement, which will enable a Record of Decision
by fall. We are committed to spending the funds provided by the
Government of Japan and the MILCON funds appropriated by Congress in an
effective and cost-efficient manner. Also, the Japanese Government has
committed to contributing funds to offset the costs of dealing with the
environmental and infrastructure challenges of the Guam relocation.
Despite these challenges, it is important to keep in mind the
significant geo-strategic benefits of the Guam relocation. Guam
provides an excellent basing option in the region from which our forces
can respond quickly and effectively to any contingency scenarios. The
ability for U.S. forces to quickly mobilize and deploy in response to
all sorts of contingencies hinges on location. Forward deployment saves
us days in terms of response time.
Question. Considering the excessive cost and environmental concerns
involved in this relocation move, what alternatives were considered?
Answer. The move of Okinawa-based Marine units to Guam is first and
foremost an operational issue. We arrived at the current agreement
after conducting a thorough analysis of the full range of U.S. force
realignment alternatives. The Guam relocation is part of a larger force
restructuring under the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI)
process. The full realignment package will allow us to reposition more
than 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam and return nearly 70 percent of
land south of Kadena Air Base, benefiting the Okinawan people,
addressing noise, safety, and environmental concerns, and creating a
much more sustainable presence for U.S. forces on Okinawa, all without
adversely impacting the Alliance's operational needs and capabilities.
As a U.S. Territory strategically located in the Western Pacific,
forward deployment to Guam enabled us to meet our treaty and alliance
requirements with Japan, allows for rapid response to areas of
potential contingencies, and grants our forces freedom of action.
We believe there are technical solutions to the issues identified
in the draft Environmental Impact Statement, and we are working with
the Government of Guam and within the Federal Government to identify
mitigation strategies that are effective as well as cost-efficient.
Question. Was a business case developed that determined Guam was
the best location for the Marines, and what was the cost of other
alternatives?
Answer. Following the Department's through analysis of various
Asia-Pacific locations, Guam was identified as the best site for the
Marine move in terms of operational viability, political
sustainability, and strategic requirements. A strictly cost-based
comparison was not conducted. Estimates of the cost of relocation were
developed at the time of the United States-Japan negotiations in 2005
and 2006, however. On that basis, we were able to secure commitments
from the Government of Japan to fund up to $6.09 billion of the cost of
the move, including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions.
Question. What is the status of the Fentenma Air Field replacement,
and if that move does not take place will you stop the relocation to
Guam?
Answer. The Government of Japan (GOJ) is currently conducting a
review of the FRF and assessing alternatives. We respect the GOJ review
process and will consider any official proposals they may offer based
on their operational viability and political sustainability. Moving
forward on the Guam relocation depends upon tangible progress on
implementing the FRF agreement.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
Question. Prime Minister Maliki has raised the possibility of
asking U.S. Forces to remain beyond the 2011 deadline for the
withdrawal.
Secretary Gates, do you expect the Iraqi government to ask us to
stay in Iraq longer, or do you expect we will pull-out of Iraq by the
end of the year?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is on schedule to draw down
to 50,000 U.S. forces in Iraq and end the combat mission by August 31,
2010. The remaining U.S. forces will be engaged in training, equipping,
and advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); targeted counterterrorism
operations; and protection of U.S. military and civilian efforts. U.S.
forces will continue to draw down responsibly, consistent with the
Security Agreement, which terminates on December 31, 2011.
To date, the Iraqi government has not asked the United States to
retain forces in Iraq past the termination of the Security Agreement.
The Strategic Framework Agreement lays out a solid foundation for a
long-term and enduring strategic partnership with the Government of
Iraq and its people, across multiple lines of operation to support a
peaceful and prosperous Iraq.
Question. In the past, it took 4 to 6 months to form a government
in Iraq. With the added complexities caused by the De-Ba'athification
Commission, that timeline could be extended even further this year.
Some observers have suggested that this period of government formation
could bring significant risk of renewed violence. Do you agree?
Answer. We anticipate an extended government formation period. Both
United States and Iraqi officials are aware that a protracted,
contentious government formation period as experienced in 2006 will
offer opportunities for anti-Iraqi government forces to attempt to
reignite sectarian violence. Prior to the elections, we assisted the
Iraqi government in developing plans to ensure continuity in government
functions in its caretaker status, as well as to maintain Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) pressure on violent, extremist networks. We are
confident that the ISF, with U.S. support, are capable of maintaining
internal stability during this period.
Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) has sought to exploit the current period of
political transition by waging high-profile attacks designed to
undermine the Iraqi people's confidence in their government and the
ISF. Recent AQI leadership losses have seriously degraded the network's
capabilities, and both Iraqi leaders and citizens reject violence.
Despite recent high profile attacks, AQI has failed to trigger wide-
scale, retributive violence, or raise significant doubt about the ISF's
abilities. Overall, violence remains low and the ISF are working
closely with USF-I to maintain pressure on militant networks.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Chairman Inouye. And so, now the committee stands in recess
subject to the call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., Thursday, March 25, the hearing
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
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