[Senate Hearing 111-622]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                        S. Hrg. 111-622

            SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

            COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            SPECIAL HEARING

                     MARCH 25, 2010--WASHINGTON, DC

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations




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                      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                   DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont            CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
TOM HARKIN, Iowa                     MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland        RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin                 JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
PATTY MURRAY, Washington             ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota        KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois          LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota            SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
JACK REED, Rhode Island              LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
BEN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JON TESTER, Montana
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

                    Charles J. Houy, Staff Director
                  Bruce Evans, Minority Staff Director

















                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Opening Statement of Chairman Daniel K. Inouye...................     1
Statement of Senator Thad Cochran................................     2
Statement of Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, 
  Department of State............................................     3
    Prepared Statement of........................................     5
Statement of Hon. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, 
  Department of Defense..........................................     7
    Prepared Statement of........................................    10
Contingency Contracting (ANSF Police Contract)...................    11
Afghanistan National Security Forces Fund........................    12
State Personnel..................................................    12
Afghanistan/Pakistan Funding Execution...........................    13
Leahy Amendment..................................................    14
National Guard Deploy............................................    15
Air Force C-130..................................................    15
Airlift..........................................................    15
Detainees at Guantanamo..........................................    16
Facility at Thompson.............................................    16
Base Realignment and Closure Commission..........................    17
Goals in Afghanistan.............................................    17
Sufficient Funding at Department of State for Transition.........    18
Military Spouse Career Advancement Accounts Program..............    18
Mi-17............................................................    19
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Capability..............................    20
UAV Exports/Sales................................................    21
Counternarcotics in Afghanistan..................................    22
Haiti Disaster Assistance........................................    22
Haiti Humanitarian Assistance....................................    23
Mideast Policy...................................................    24
NATO/Afghanistan Army............................................    24
Future Supplementals.............................................    25
Status of Surge..................................................    27
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).............    28
Trust Issues in Afghanistan......................................    29
Afghanistan......................................................    30
Status of Women in Afghanistan...................................    31
Women's Rights/Reconciliation....................................    31
Corruption.......................................................    32
Mideast Peace....................................................    32
Pakistan and India...............................................    33
KCX Tanker/EADS..................................................    34
WTO..............................................................    35
Training Afghan Forces...........................................    36
Afghan Army......................................................    36
Afghan Fighting Force............................................    37
Afghan Army/Civilian Surge.......................................    37
Somalia..........................................................    38
Additional Committee Questions...................................    39
Questions Submitted to Secretary Hillary Clinton.................    39
Question Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye..................    39
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd....................    40
Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl.........................    41
Question Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein...................    42
Counternarcotics Operations......................................    42
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu..................    42
Family Reunification.............................................    42
Universal Definition of Orphan...................................    43
Long-term Solutions..............................................    43
Local Contracting................................................    44
Hazard Mitigation................................................    44
Sheltering.......................................................    45
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins.....................    46
Question Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski.....................    47
Questions Submitted to Hon. Robert M. Gates......................    47
Questions Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye.................    47
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd....................    48
Question Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl..........................    50
State and Agriculture Role in Global Food Security...............    50
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray......................    50
Haiti Support....................................................    51
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein..................    52
Counternarcotics Operations......................................    52
Poppy Crop Eradication...........................................    52
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.........................................    53
Cluster Munitions................................................    54
Private DOD Contractors..........................................    55
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Johnson.......................    55
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu..................    67
Afghanistan Withdraw.............................................    67
Haiti Support....................................................    68
Question Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg................    68
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison..............    69
Detainee Facility................................................    69
Guam Relocation..................................................    70
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins.....................    71

 
            SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2010

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met at 2:20 p.m., in room S-127, the Capitol, 
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.
    Present: Senators Inouye, Leahy, Mikulski, Murray, Dorgan, 
Feinstein, Landrieu, Nelson, Pryor, Tester, Specter, Cochran, 
Bond, Shelby, Bennett, Hutchison, Brownback, Alexander, 
Collins, Voinovich, and Murkowski.


             opening statement of chairman daniel k. inouye


    Chairman Inouye. Good afternoon.
    This afternoon the committee meets to hear testimony on the 
fiscal year 2010 supplemental request.
    The request by the administration totals $47.5 billion in 
discretionary spending, of which approximately $37.5 billion is 
to support overseas contingency operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Late yesterday afternoon the 
administration forwarded a request of $2.8 billion to support 
our humanitarian operations in Haiti. The committee has not had 
an opportunity to review this matter, but we'll do so over the 
coming weeks. To review the defense and international affairs 
portion of this supplemental request, the committee is pleased 
to receive testimony from the Secretaries of State and Defense, 
Ms. Hillary Clinton and Mr. Robert Gates.
    It's good to see both of you. We look forward to your 
responses to the many questions I'm certain we'll have.
    Over 9 years ago, in response to the 9/11 attacks, our 
Nation embarked on a mission to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban 
and al Qaeda and to work to ensure security and stabilization 
in the region. But, once we entered Iraq, many believe our 
efforts in Afghanistan were shortchanged, and only now are we 
refocusing on our primary missions, the defeat of al Qaeda and 
regional stability. With a renewed effort and focus, President 
Obama has approved a military and civilian strategy in 
Afghanistan that will, hopefully, enable us to restore regional 
stability and to begin withdrawing our forces from Afghanistan 
in the summer of 2011.
    The supplemental request before us provides the necessary 
resources for a military and civilian surge that is critical if 
we are to achieve that goal. We look forward to hearing, today, 
about the preliminary results of this surge and the challenges 
you face in meeting the President's timetable.
    As I noted, we have been at this war for almost a decade, 
and now we have our eye on the target. At the same time, we're 
also seeing the spread of al Qaeda with cells in Yemen, al 
Qaeda members showing up in Somalia, and related activity 
elsewhere in Africa.
    While we focus our efforts on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
Iraq, we also need to allocate sufficient resources to curtail 
the growth of these terrorist cells. We cannot allow new safe 
havens to be created elsewhere as we tighten the stranglehold 
on al Qaeda's senior leadership in the Afghanistan/Pakistan 
region. We hope to get assurances from both Secretaries today 
that they understand these dangers and are responding to these 
hotspots with enhanced efforts and focus. Hopefully, these 
issues will be among those addressed either in your statements 
or in the questions that follow.
    I would note to my colleagues that I recognize that there 
are many issues which you may want to address and remind you 
that today's hearing is on our wartime funding requirements and 
not on other matters. I would urge you to focus your questions 
on that topic.
    In addition, as you can see, we have many Senators, but 
they're all over the place. They are in press conferences, and 
they are en route here. But, we'd like to limit our questions 
to 4 minutes per Senator, and I would like to urge you to keep 
your answers as brief as possible.
    Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, the committee thanks 
you both for appearing today. Without objection, your full 
statements will be made part of the record.
    At this point, I'd like to yield to the vice chairman, 
Senator Cochran, for any opening remarks he may wish to make.


                   statement of senator thad cochran


    Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm pleased to 
join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses to this 
hearing.
    Of course, the focus of the hearing is on the immediate 
need to address the President's request for full funding for 
the mission that is now President Obama and his 
administration's suggestion as to how we can better achieve 
likely peace in the region and, in due course, begin 
withdrawing some of the 30,000 troops that have now been 
identified as needed for the effort in Afghanistan. We know 
that's going to cost money. And we are anxious to get the facts 
about what those funds are to be used for, and to justify the 
appropriations request that this committee will transmit to the 
full Senate.
    I hope you will let us know of any urgent unmet 
requirements that aren't reflected or haven't been discussed 
publicly that we need to know about. I'm sure the committee is 
going to want to move expeditiously, without delay, in acting 
on this request and urging the Senate to follow the leadership 
of this committee.
    With respect to Iran, we would also appreciate your 
thoughts on the challenges that we face through Iranian 
activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and what that might mean 
for the need for additional funds, as well.
    We thank you for your distinguished service in the jobs you 
have; they're very important. We want to be helpful, and I 
think this hearing will help us start that process in the right 
direction.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much.
    And may I now call upon Secretary Clinton.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF 
            STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
    Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and 
Vice Chairman Cochran and members of the committee. It's very 
good seeing you all, and especially in this historic room to 
have this hearing.
    I thank you for the opportunity to testify alongside 
Secretary Gates, because we are very much committed, together, 
on behalf of our civilian and military efforts in the front-
line states. We don't think that they can be separated, because 
the challenges we face demand that we draw on all of the tools 
of American leadership and American power. And the strategies 
we now have in place in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq do 
exactly that.
    This whole-of-government approach has shown results, and it 
has also enabled us to more clearly understand the challenges 
we face. That's why we're coming to you today with a $4.5 
billion supplemental request. Without this new funding in 2010, 
we will fall short in all three of the front-line states.
    I am well aware of the economic strain we all face here at 
home. And I believe, along with each of you, that every dollar 
must deliver clear results. Our request addresses urgent 
demands that will advance our efforts to bring stability to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and ensure a smooth transition to a 
civilian-led effort in Iraq.
    First, with respect to Afghanistan, we are implementing the 
strategy President Obama announced in December. Success 
requires a fully integrated civilian and military effort, one 
in which security gains are followed immediately by economic 
and political gains. As new troops arrive, our civilian surge 
has already tripled the number of civilians on the ground, and 
it is these civilian-led efforts that will translate the 
bravery of our troops into stability for Afghanistan and 
security for Americans. The challenges are still great. The 
enemy is still determined. But, we are recapturing the momentum 
in Afghanistan. New funds in 2010 will give us the capacity to 
move forward at a time when every day is crucial.
    Let me briefly describe what we are currently doing in 
Marjah and the surrounding areas, for Marjah is a proving 
ground for our strategy and the story, thus far, is an 
encouraging one.
    Our civilians were on the ground within hours and days of 
the military operation. They quickly stood up a district 
support team that has helped, already, to open two schools and 
a prosecutor's office. They've registered more than 7,000 
farmers to begin receiving supplies for licit crops. They've 
employed more than 1,000 residents a day through cash-for-work 
projects. A nearby United States Agency for International 
Development-built (USAID) airstrip has allowed the Ministry of 
Agriculture officials to reach Marjah's farmers, and a USAID 
contract is paying a woman-owned Afghan firm to rebuild the 
highway.
    The military offensive, rightly, may get the headlines. 
But, what happens behind the scenes is equally important. As 
our military leaders put it, ``After clearing, we must hold, 
build, and transition.'' And Marjah's residents have made it 
clear they will judge the Afghan government and us on our 
ability to help build enduring security and credible 
governance. Our $2 billion request for Afghanistan supports 
efforts like those in Marjah, which we are ramping up quickly 
and which need additional assistance and operational funding in 
2010.
    New assistance will help Afghans provide for their families 
and revitalize the agricultural sector, which is crucial to 
reducing poppy cultivation and drawing insurgents back into 
society. We also have funding for governance and rule-of-law 
programs, as well as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, 
which helps build capable institutions. These will work in 
conjunction with U.S. support for the Afghan National Security 
Forces, which I also would urge you to fully fund. And through 
all of this, we have maintained our focus on expanding women's 
opportunities, one of our best tools for combating extremism 
and spurring progress.
    In Pakistan, our efforts are vital to success in 
Afghanistan, but also to our own American security. We've made 
it a strategic priority to strengthen our partnership with the 
Pakistani people. And I'm under no illusion that success in 
this arena will come quickly or easily, but think about where 
we were 1 year ago. The extremists were 100 miles from 
Islamabad. They met little resistance in launching attacks on 
American troops from border areas. Since then, the Pakistani 
Government has launched important offensives in Swat, South 
Waziristan, and throughout the country. We're moving in the 
right direction, and the progress that we've made is possible 
because we have demonstrated a clear commitment to work with 
the people and the Government of Pakistan.
    Yesterday at the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, we 
worked very hard--in fact, late into the night--to advance the 
resolve that we have begun building with the Pakistani 
leadership. The $370 million we're requesting for assistance 
and operations in this supplemental will allow us to expand 
civilian cooperation at a critical moment. The military 
offensives have created new humanitarian needs that, if not 
addressed immediately, could make these areas ripe for 
extremism. And in much of the country, water, energy, and 
economic problems create new challenges. So, our success 
depends on rapidly and sustainably scaling up our efforts, 
especially in high-impact projects that visibly demonstrate our 
long-term commitment on helping the Pakistanis build capacity 
while ensuring accountability.
    In Iraq, we have different challenges. But, in the wake of 
this election, we're at a moment of great opportunity to 
consolidate stability and forge an enduring partnership 
sustained by a strong diplomatic presence. Our $2.1 billion 
supplemental request should be seen in light of the more than 
$15 billion decrease in defense funding.
    As we prepare to move from a defense-led to state-led 
mission in Iraq at the end of August, new funding will allow us 
to make sure our civilians can work safely in still dangerous 
places. It will allow us to move from an intensive, defense-led 
police training program to a smaller state-administered program 
for police leadership. And our support of Iraqi civilian law 
enforcement, like support for the Iraqi Security Forces, is 
critical to the success of their new democracy.
    Now, in putting this supplemental together, I've had to 
make some tough calls and had to have some tough conversations 
about priorities, and the decisions reflect that. The result is 
a request that addresses only urgent needs directly related to 
our security interests. And I want to emphasize, all of these 
programs have been designed with careful attention to 
accountability and a determination to learn from past mistakes. 
Waste and corruption are fundamental threats to our success, 
and we're serious about combating them. So, we have more funds 
for strengthened oversight by the Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction, and takes into account the problems 
highlighted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction. We'll also be working with the Congress on 
updated benchmarks.
    Just a brief word on Haiti, Mr. Chairman. Despite the work 
the United States has done to respond to the disaster, there is 
still too much suffering. And our rebuilding, along with the 
international community, is an important commitment to the 
people of Haiti and to our hemisphere. Of our $1.6 billion 
Haiti supplemental request, about $500 million will reimburse 
relief efforts by State and USAID; the rest will go to 
strategic investments coordinated with our international 
partners.
    I thank the Congress for the ongoing bipartisan support of 
these efforts.


                           prepared statement


    And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this committee's 
continuing work on behalf of the missions and the priorities of 
our country.
    Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
    [The statement follows:]
              Prepared Statement of Hillary Rodham Clinton
    Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Cochran, and members of the 
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here. As always, it is a 
pleasure to testify alongside Secretary Gates, a good friend as well as 
a true champion of diplomacy and development.
    We are here together because our civilian and military efforts in 
front-line states cannot be separated. The challenges we face demand 
that we draw on all the tools of American leadership and American 
power. And the strategies we now have in place in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Iraq do exactly that.
    This whole-of-government approach has shown results. It has also 
enabled us to assess more clearly the challenges we face. That is why 
we are coming to you with a $4.5 billion supplemental request for 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Without this new funding in 2010, we 
will fall short in all three of these front-line states.
    I am well aware that, at a time of economic strain at home, every 
dollar must deliver clear results. Our request addresses urgent demands 
that will immediately advance our efforts to bring stability to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and ensure a smooth transition to a civilian-
led effort in Iraq.
Afghanistan
    In Afghanistan, we are working to implement the new strategy 
President Obama announced in December. Success requires a fully 
integrated civilian-military effort, one in which security gains are 
followed immediately by economic and political gains. As new troops 
arrive, our civilian surge has already tripled the number of civilians 
on the ground and will continue in the months ahead. It is up to these 
civilian-led efforts to translate the bravery of our troops into 
stability for Afghanistan and security for Americans.
    The challenges are still great, the enemy is still determined, but 
we are recapturing the momentum in Afghanistan. New funds in 2010 will 
give us the capacity to move forward at a time when every day is 
crucial.
    Let me briefly describe what we are currently doing in Marjah and 
the surrounding areas--for Marjah is a proving ground for our strategy, 
and the story there is an encouraging one so far. Our civilians were on 
the ground within days of the military operation, and they quickly 
stood up a District Support Team that has helped open two schools and a 
prosecutor's office; registered more than 7,000 farmers to receive 
supplies; and employed more than a thousand residents a day through 
cash-for-work projects. A nearby USAID-built airstrip has allowed 
Ministry of Agriculture officials to reach Marjah's farmers, and a 
USAID contract is paying a women-owned Afghan firm to rebuild the 
highway.
    The military offensive may get the headlines, but what happens 
behind the scenes is equally important. As our military leaders put it, 
after clearing, we must hold, build, and transition. And Marjah's 
residents have made clear that they will judge the Afghan government 
and us on our ability to build enduring security and credible 
governance.
    Our $2 billion request for Afghanistan will support efforts like 
those in Marjah, which we are ramping up quickly and which need 
additional assistance and operations funding in 2010 to continue. New 
assistance will help Afghans provide for their families and revitalize 
the agricultural sector, which is crucial to reducing poppy cultivation 
and drawing insurgents back into society. New funding for governance 
and rule-of-law programs, as well as for the Afghanistan Reconstruction 
Trust Fund, will help build capable institutions free from corruption. 
These will work in conjunction with U.S. support for the Afghan 
National Security Forces--which I would also urge you to fully fund. 
And through all of this, we have maintained our focus on expanding 
women's opportunity, one of our best tools for combating extremism and 
spurring progress.
Pakistan
    In Pakistan, our efforts are vital to success in Afghanistan, and 
also to American security in their own right. We have made it a 
strategic priority to strengthen our partnership with the Pakistani 
people and to bolster the Pakistani state's ability to counter 
extremism and provide for its citizens.
    I am under no illusion that success will come quickly or easily. 
But think where we were 1 year ago. The extremists were 100 miles from 
Islamabad and met little resistance in launching attacks on American 
troops from border areas. Since then, the Pakistani government has 
launched important offensives in Swat, in South Waziristan, and 
throughout the country.
    We are moving in the right direction, and this progress has been 
possible because of our commitment to Pakistan's people and government. 
I have had many opportunities to personally stress this commitment, and 
yesterday, at the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, I once again saw 
the Pakistani leadership's resolve to advance shared interests.
    The $370 million for assistance and operations in this supplemental 
will allow us to expand civilian cooperation at a critical moment, as a 
down payment on our long-term partnership. The military offensives have 
created new humanitarian needs that, if not addressed immediately, 
could make these areas ripe for extremism. And in much of the country, 
water, energy, and economic problems have created new challenges.
    Our success depends on rapidly and sustainably scaling up our 
efforts, especially high-impact projects that visibly demonstrate our 
long-term commitment, and on bolstering the capacity of the Pakistanis 
while ensuring accountability. That simply cannot happen without more 
funds in the pipeline.
Iraq
    In Iraq, we also face continued challenges. But in the wake of the 
election, we are at a moment of great opportunity--to consolidate 
stability and forge an enduring partnership sustained by a strong 
diplomatic presence.
    Our $2.1 billion supplemental request is a reasonable price to pay 
to help finish the job. And it comes amid a more than $15 billion 
decrease in Defense funding.
    As we prepare to move from a Defense-led to a State-led mission in 
Iraq at the end of August, new funding will allow us to make sure our 
civilians can work safely in a still-dangerous place. And it will allow 
us to move from an intensive Defense-led police-training program to a 
smaller State-administered program for police leadership. Our support 
of Iraqi civilian law enforcement--like support for the Iraqi Security 
Forces--is critical to the success of Iraqi democracy.
    We see on the horizon a self-sustaining Iraq that can meet the 
needs of its people and play a positive regional role. But we are not 
there yet. Even as we turn our attention to other conflicts, we must 
remain patient and committed. This supplemental is a timely investment 
in a strong partnership with a sovereign, democratic, and increasingly 
capable Iraq.
A Strategy of Results
    In putting this supplemental together, I've had some tough 
conversations about priorities. And we've made some tough decisions. 
The result is a request that addresses only urgent needs directly 
related to our security interests.
    I also want to emphasize that all of these programs have been 
designed with careful attention to accountability and a determination 
to learn from past mistakes. Waste and corruption are fundamental 
threats to our success, and we are serious about combating them. Our 
request includes funding for strengthened oversight by the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and takes into account 
problems highlighted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction. We will also be working with you on updated benchmarks 
and reporting back to you on how we're meeting them.
Haiti
    Let me also mention the Haiti supplemental released yesterday. 
Despite the work the United States has done to respond to the disaster 
and start the recovery process, there is still too much suffering in 
Haiti, and rebuilding will require billions of dollars in international 
support. Of our $1.6 billion Haiti supplemental request, about $500 
million will reimburse relief efforts by State and USAID, while the 
rest will go to strategic investments that, coordinated with our 
partners, will help drive recovery by building local capacity and 
catalyzing development.
    The ongoing bipartisan support of these efforts has made clear to 
me that this Committee, Congress, and the American people understand 
the importance of our challenges and the urgency of our task, in Haiti 
and in frontline states. Thanks to the bravery and sacrifice of our 
diplomats, our development experts, and our men and women in uniform, 
we have reached a moment of opportunity. I thank you for your 
commitment, and look forward to working with you closely as we move 
forward.

    Chairman Inouye. And now may I call upon Secretary Gates.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF 
            DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
    Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Cochran, 
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity this 
afternoon to discuss the Defense Department's portion of the 
fiscal year 2010 supplemental request.
    I'm honored to appear with the Secretary of State. Our 
joint testimony today reflects the close cooperation of our two 
Departments and the importance of a properly funded and 
integrated civil-military approach to the challenges we face in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. And at the outset, I 
would like to offer my strong support for the important 
programs funded in the State portion of the supplemental 
request, without which our military efforts would not be--will 
not be successful.
    These times of economic and fiscal stress place enormous 
pressure on all of us to be good stewards of the taxpayers' 
dollars, including the two Departments represented here today. 
That is why President Obama and I, in last year's and this 
year's budget, made tough decisions about major programs that 
were either performing poorly or an excess to real-world needs. 
However, even at a time of budget pressures, I believe it is 
critical to sustain an adequate sustainable level of investment 
in the instruments of national security, be it defense, 
diplomacy, or development, that are so essential to America's 
security and position in the world.
    I recently returned from a visit to Afghanistan. There I 
had the chance to talk to our military commanders, 
Afghanistan's leaders, and our troops serving at the tip of the 
spear in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces. Overall, I believe 
there are grounds for guarded optimism as our campaign to roll 
back the Taliban gains momentum and as the Afghan government 
shows an increasing willingness to take on additional 
responsibilities. Nonetheless, there will be many long and 
tough days ahead, and it may take several months to produce 
visible results, as most of the additional forces ordered by 
the President have not yet arrived in theater and begun 
operations.
    I would also caution against an overly ambitious view of 
what true stability and security will look like in a place that 
has known nothing but war for three decades. For most Afghans, 
a roof over their heads, an opportunity for their children, 
both boys and girls, to attend school, and the ability to 
provide for the basic needs of their families, free from 
violence, would be considered a pretty good life. The scale of 
the international coalition's efforts and ambitions should 
reflect that basic realty.
    The fiscal year 2010 supplemental request totals $33 
billion for the Defense Department, almost all of which is to 
support operations in Afghanistan and the additional 30,000 
troops being deployed as a part of the President's strategy 
announced in December. We remain on schedule to see overall 
U.S. troop levels reach 98,000 by the end of the fiscal year. 
The request includes $1.1 billion, on top of the $11.3 billion 
already enacted, to field and sustain life-saving mine-
resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles and the MRAP all-
terrain vehicles for troops already in theater and for the 
additional forces being deployed.
    Finally, this supplemental contains $2.6 billion to 
strengthen the Afghan National Security Forces. The goal of the 
President's strategy, and our supporting military efforts, is 
to create conditions that will allow for a full transfer of 
security responsibility to the Afghan government. Earlier this 
month, I visited the Combined Fielding Center at Camp 
Blackhorse near Kabul and had a chance to speak with Afghan 
troops undergoing training. I told them that Afghanistan is 
their country and ultimately this is their fight to win.
    I know many of you have concerns about the Afghan Security 
Forces. I share those concerns, as do our military commanders. 
The Afghan Army has made real progress over the last year, and 
many Afghan soldiers are shedding their blood for their 
country. Increased Afghan involvement in operations is critical 
to success and is being demonstrated in Marjah. Significant 
work remains to be done with the police force, but there, too, 
changes are underway that will, I believe, yield progress. As 
you consider this request, I would emphasize that successfully 
accomplishing the training mission represents both our exit 
strategy and the key for long-term stability in Afghanistan.
    The supplemental request also includes $1 billion to 
strengthen Iraqi Security Forces. These additional resources 
will be used this year to strengthen Iraqi capabilities in 
areas General Odierno believes are important to ensure that the 
Iraqis are fully prepared to assume internal security 
responsibilities. The money will be spent by U.S. forces in 
Iraq, not provided directly to the Government of Iraq.
    In Haiti, as the President requested, the Department is 
providing continuing support in the wake of January's 
earthquake. Due to the urgent need for an immediate response, 
the Department used funds from existing accounts, with the 
understanding that these accounts would be replenished in a 
supplemental. As such, the $655 million is part of an amendment 
for Haiti that was recently submitted to Congress, and will 
include funding to cover these costs.
    All of these operations are fuel intensive. Due to rising 
prices, our fuel costs this year in operations has been greater 
than anticipated. And so, included in this request is $2 
billion to partially offset the resulting shortfall in the 
Department's base and overseas contingency operations--
operating accounts, and to ensure uninterrupted operations.
    I should note that this Department has moved most funding 
for programs not directly related to the war into the base 
budget. The budget request being discussed today is a true 
supplemental, as they were originally intended, for the 
purposes of funding immediate and unforeseen requirements. In 
this case, primarily the troop surge associated with the 
President's new strategy for Afghanistan. And I urge approval 
of this request by early spring to prevent costly and 
counterproductive disruptions to the Department's operations.
    Before closing, I'd like to say just a few words about the 
Commander's Emergency Response Program, CERP, which continues 
to be a powerful tool for military commanders in carrying out 
counterinsurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
General Petraeus has called it ``the most important--his most 
important authority.'' And I would urge the Congress to fully 
fund the CERP programs contained in the budget's--the 
Department's budget request.
    Having said that, I understand there is concern--some 
concern on this committee about the way CERP has been used in 
recent years. The Department is currently performing an 
internal assessment of existing processes which include 
consideration of a single departmental coordinator; additional 
dedicated CERP managers and contracting personnel in theater; 
an increased premobilization and in-country training. 
Nonetheless, even with improved execution and oversight, it is 
unrealistic to expect a tool like CERP, whose very 
effectiveness and existence is tied to its flexibly and the 
discretion to--granted to local commanders in a war zone to 
attain a zero-defect standard.

                           PREPARED STATEMENT

    In conclusion, I'd like to thank the committee for your 
support of the men and women of the military, extraordinary 
Americans who have fought our Nation's wars, responded to 
natural disasters, and protected our interests around the 
world. I know their health, safety, and welfare will be your 
top priority in making these difficult decisions in the weeks 
ahead.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    [The statement follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Robert M. Gates
    Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee. Thank you 
for the opportunity this afternoon to discuss the Defense Department's 
portion of the fiscal year 2010 supplemental request.
    I am honored to appear with the Secretary of State. Our joint 
testimony today reflects the close cooperation of our two departments, 
and the importance of a properly funded and integrated civil-military 
approach to the challenges we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the 
world. At the outset, I would like to offer my strong support for the 
important programs funded in the State portion of the supplemental 
request, without which our military efforts will not be successful.
    While this hearing is focused on the specifics of the fiscal year 
2010 request, this occasion also represents an opportunity to discuss 
broader national budget priorities. These times of economic and fiscal 
stress place enormous pressure on all of us to be good stewards of 
taxpayer dollars--including the agencies represented here today. That 
is why President Obama and I--in last year's and this year's budget--
made tough decisions about major programs that were either performing 
poorly or in excess to real world needs. However, even at a time of 
budget pressures, I believe it is critical to sustain an adequate, 
sustainable level of investment in the instruments of national power--
be it defense, diplomacy, or development--that are so essential to 
America's security and position in the world.
    As you know, I recently returned from a visit to Afghanistan. 
There, I had a chance to talk to our military commanders, Afghanistan's 
leaders, and our troops serving at the tip of the spear in Kandahar and 
Helmand provinces. Overall, I believe there are grounds for guarded 
optimism as our campaign to roll back the Taliban gains momentum, and 
as the Afghan government shows an increasing willingness to take on 
additional responsibilities. Nonetheless, there will be many tough and 
long days ahead. And it may take several months to produce visible 
results, as most of the additional forces ordered by the President have 
not yet arrived in theater and begun operations.
    I would also caution against an overly ambitious view of what true 
stability and security will look like in a place that has known nothing 
but war for three decades. For most Afghans, a roof over their heads, 
an opportunity for their children to attend school, and the ability to 
provide for the basic needs of their families free from violence would 
be considered a very good life. The scale of the international 
coalition's efforts and ambitions should reflect that basic reality.
    The fiscal year 2010 supplemental request totals $33 billion, 
almost all of which is to support operations in Afghanistan and the 
additional 30,000 troops being deployed as part of the President's 
strategy announced in December. We remain on schedule to see overall 
U.S. troop levels reach 98,000 by the end of the fiscal year.
    The request includes $1.1 billion--on top of the $11.3 billion 
already enacted--to field and sustain lifesaving MRAPs and M-ATVs for 
troops already in theater and for the additional forces being deployed.
    Finally, this supplemental contains $2.6 billion to strengthen the 
Afghan National Security Forces. The goal of the President's strategy 
and our supporting military efforts is to create conditions that will 
allow for a full transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan 
government. Earlier this month, I visited the Combined Fielding Center 
at Camp Blackhorse and had a chance to speak with Afghan troops 
undergoing training. I told them that Afghanistan is their country, and 
ultimately their fight to win. I know that many of you have concerns 
about the Afghan security forces. I share those concerns--as do our 
military commanders. The Afghan army has taken real strides over the 
last year and many troops have shed blood for their country. Increased 
Afghan involvement in operations is critical to success, as is being 
demonstrated in Marjah. Significant work remains to be done with the 
police force, but there, too, changes are underway that will, I 
believe, yield progress in the near term. As you consider this request, 
I would emphasize that successfully accomplishing the training mission 
represents both our exit strategy and the key to long-term stability in 
Afghanistan.
    The supplemental request also includes $1 billion to strengthen 
Iraqi security forces. These additional resources--which will be used 
to strengthen Iraqi institutions such as the Ministry of Defense--are 
needed this year to ensure that the Iraqis are fully prepared to assume 
internal security responsibilities. This is a critical period in Iraq 
as government forms and as we consolidate security gains.
    In Haiti, as the President requested, the Department is providing 
continuing support in the wake of January's earthquake. Due to the 
urgent need for an immediate response, the Department used funds from 
existing accounts, with the understanding that these accounts would be 
replenished in a supplemental. As such, the $655 million is part of an 
amendment for Haiti that was recently submitted to Congress and 
includes funding to cover these costs.
    All of these operations are fuel intensive. Due to rising prices, 
our fuel cost this year has been greater than anticipated. Included in 
this request is $2 billion to partially offset the resulting shortfall 
in the Department's base and OCO operating accounts and ensure 
uninterrupted operations.
    I should note that this Department has moved most funding for 
programs not directly related to the war into the base budget. The 
budget request being discussed today is a true supplemental as they 
were originally intended, for the purposes of funding immediate and 
unforeseen requirements--in this case, primarily the troop surge 
associated with the President's new strategy for Afghanistan. I urge 
approval of this request by the spring to prevent costly and 
counterproductive disruptions to the Department's operations.
    Before closing, I'd like to say a few words about the Commander's 
Emergency Response Program (CERP), which continues to be a powerful 
tool for military commanders in carrying out counterinsurgency 
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. General Petraeus has called it 
his ``most important authority,'' and I would urge the Congress to 
fully fund the CERP programs contained in the Department's budget 
requests.
    Having said that, I understand there is some concern on this 
committee about the way CERP has been used in recent years. The 
Department is currently performing an internal assessment of existing 
processes, which includes consideration of a single departmental 
coordinator, additional dedicated CERP managers and contracting 
personnel in theater, and increased pre-mobilization and in-country 
training. Nonetheless, even with improved execution and oversight, it 
is unrealistic to expect a tool like CERP--whose very effectiveness is 
tied to its flexibility and the discretion granted to local commanders 
in a war zone--to attain a zero-defect standard.
    In conclusion, thank you for your support of the men and women of 
the U.S. military--extraordinary Americans who have fought our nation's 
wars, responded to natural disasters, and protected our interests 
around the world. I know their health, safety, and welfare will be your 
top priority in making these difficult decisions in the weeks ahead. 
Thank you.

             CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING (ANSF POLICE CONTRACT)

    Chairman Inouye. Madam Secretary and Mr. Secretary, I'll be 
submitting questions, but I would like to ask one. Recently, 
the vice chairman and I submitted a request to the Department 
of Defense inspector general, together with the Department of 
State inspector general, to look over the contract of the 
Afghan National Police Training Program. I think we all agree 
that one of the key components that must be in place would be a 
fully trained Afghan National Police Force before we can start 
withdrawing; however, as you may be aware, the inspector 
general came out with a rather negative report, criticizing the 
contract and suggesting that the contract be held up. That, to 
me, would seem like we will not be able to move out on time. 
What are your thoughts on this?
    Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, if we're talking about the 
same contract that--before there was--before it was 
implemented, the contract was protested. The protest was upheld 
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and so, the 
contract has not been implemented. And the contract with 
DynCorp has been extended. So, they will continue their 
efforts. We've made some changes to improve the terms of the 
contract, particularly in terms of what we're asking them to 
do. But, that's the current situation with the would be 
contract.
    Chairman Inouye. So, you believe that the criticism that we 
see in some of the publications has no bearing?
    Secretary Gates. Well, I think--as I understand it, the 
protest was grounded in the vehicle that was being used to let 
the contract, and the protest was that it was an improper 
vehicle for the kind of work that was being contracted for. 
That's my understanding of what the key issue, at least in the 
protest, was. In terms of some of the other criticisms, I'd 
have to look at them in specifics.
    Chairman Inouye. So, you believe that the timetable is 
still in place on the withdrawal?
    Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. The situation with this contract 
will--as I understand it, will not delay the training.
    Chairman Inouye. Senator Cochran.
    Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman.

               AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES FUND

    Mr. Secretary, the budget request before the committee 
includes $2.6 billion for the Afghanistan National Security 
Forces Fund. We are told it is for the purpose of accelerating 
growth of the Afghan Security Force. Now, 8 years of training, 
you would assume, would get the forces to where we think they 
ought to be, and would be sufficient in their skills, would be 
sufficient to help maintain, without so much active involvement 
of American or other forces, approval of eligible quality 
recruits to man the ranks of the army and police. Is that what 
the administration is advocating here today?
    Secretary Gates. It is, Senator. And I would just say that, 
you know, at the--for the first several years, the size of the 
Afghan National Security Forces, and particularly the army--and 
I'm going back to a period when I wasn't in Government, so I 
may be wrong on some of the particulars--but, the initial 
planning for the ANSF was for forces that the Afghan government 
itself could afford. So, for the first few years after we went 
in, in 2001, 2002, it was limited to 5,000 or so. And the 
dramatic expansion of the Afghan Security Forces really began 3 
or 4 years ago.
    And so, we are just really getting--and to tell you the 
truth, both for the army and the police, there were significant 
shortages in the resources available for training both of them. 
We've done a lot better, in terms of training the army, where--
there is still a deficiency in the number of trainers needed 
for both, but I would say that--you know, as opposed to looking 
at it as an 8-year project that's just now ramping up, I'd say 
it's more of a project that has begun to look at significant 
numbers for both of those forces just within the last year or 
two.

                            STATE PERSONNEL

    Senator Cochran. Madam Secretary, does your Department not 
have the infrastructure and people in place to administer the 
programs that are needed now, as would be available for 
traditional aid programs? What makes this a different kind of 
program, to justify the increase in funding that you're 
requesting?
    Secretary Clinton. Senator, are you--well, your question 
really could cover both Iraq and Afghanistan, because, in the 
case of Iraq, we are taking over responsibilities from the 
Defense Department that we are not fully equipped to do without 
the additional funding.
    Two aspects of that, which are important: One is that as 
our troops leave, in accordance with the agreement entered into 
between the United States and Iraq, they will be taking a lot 
of their equipment and they will be turning over certain of 
their facilities that are hardened. And we have to harden our 
facilities for our civilians to be able to take over the 
continued police training. As we do this transition, there are 
certain adjustments that are going to have to be made, since 
we'll no longer be able to rely on our military forces to 
protect our civilians, to embed with them on existing military 
bases. So, that's where the additional costs for Iraq come in, 
so that we can be prepared to be ready to take on this 
responsibility as the military leaves.
    In Afghanistan, as Secretary Gates said, there has been a 
decision to give the responsibility for police training to the 
military, which we fully support, because we're trying to get 
closer to something resembling a unity of command, so that 
General McChrystal and General Caldwell and our other military 
commanders are able to coordinate. Because when, for example, 
they go into an area like Marjah, they have to be able to begin 
to stand up the police force that will be there as our troops 
transition. So, there's a very close connection between the 
military and the police training and deployment work. And the 
Defense Department will be taking over that responsibility.
    Senator Cochran. Thank you.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. I'd like to advise the committee that our 
witnesses cannot be here all afternoon, so please limit your 
questions to about 4 minutes apiece.
    And now may I recognize Senator Leahy.
    Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And during the hours we have, most of us wouldn't last all 
afternoon either.

                 AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN FUNDING EXECUTION

    First off, I'm pleased to see Secretary Clinton--you and 
Secretary Gates. You both know the high--very high regard I 
have for both of you in doing a superb job for our Nation. I'm 
also glad to see--and this is something I've talked with both 
of you privately about--the effort of the Department of Defense 
to have the Department of State take over those things that 
really we--are best suited for the Department of State, which a 
number of things the Department of Defense, by default, has 
probably taken over in the past.
    But, now we've got to figure out where the money goes. We 
appropriated, in fiscal year 2010, a total of $4.9 billion for 
assistance for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. We received a 
spending plan for those funds only a couple of weeks ago, 
didn't have a whole lot of detail. None of the funds have been 
spent. And while the fiscal year 2009 funds have been 
obligated, a lot of it remains to be disbursed. Now, you're 
asking for another $2.6 billion.
    I worry we're dealing with countries where in--particularly 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan--where enormous corruption--a huge 
amount of money already is in the pipeline. We're basically 
borrowing this money from other countries to be able to spend 
it here. Are we going too fast? I mean, what kind of controls? 
Do we have a special inspector general, for example, to go over 
these funds, I might ask, Madam Secretary? And I'm thinking 
especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, we share your concerns 
and appreciate the opportunity to work with you, as the chair 
of the Appropriations Committee that considers these--the 
subcommittee that considers these requests. We are ramping up 
our spending. We are currently expending funds at an estimated 
$324 million per month. We are growing that to $400 million, 
with new projects that are starting up, in addition to 
continued support to quick disbursing to programs such as the 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, that does have adequate 
safeguards built in.
    And what we are trying to do in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
in particular, is to build in safeguards to have certification 
systems in place so that we can hold entities that we 
contribute funds to, to account. It is an ongoing challenge. 
I'm not going to sit here----
    Senator Leahy. Well----
    Secretary Clinton [continuing]. And tell you that it isn't.
    Senator Leahy. Yeah. I mean, under our law, money cannot go 
to army or police units that are violating human rights. I'm 
quite familiar with that law. But, could we say, especially 
today, that that law is not being violated in either Pakistan 
or Afghanistan?
    And I'll close with that question, Mr. Chairman, and submit 
the rest of my questions.
    But, I address that to both of you.
    Secretary Clinton. Well, let me say, first of all, on the 
nonhuman-rights front we are putting in new personnel; we're 
beefing up our presence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in 
order to have greater oversight, accountability, monitoring of 
the funds. It is something that we take very seriously.
    It's been challenging to get those people in, under the 
conflict circumstances in Afghanistan, but we've made a lot of 
progress. We've quadrupled the number of people that we 
actually have on the ground in Afghanistan.
    And in Pakistan, that's one of the areas that Secretary 
Gates has been working on with the Pakistanis so that we can 
have a better oversight mechanism on the funding part of it. 
But, I'll let him respond to the second part of your question.

                            LEAHY AMENDMENT

    Secretary Gates. We are very mindful of the Leahy 
amendment. And I would just say, in this unclassified setting, 
Senator, that we are monitoring the situation in multiple 
countries very carefully. We have the attention of their 
leaders on this subject. And if and when there are abuses, we 
expect, and they have acknowledged the need, to take action.
    Senator Leahy. Well, I don't want--I think we're both 
referring to the same thing. I'm not going to go into it in a 
open session like this. But, I would appreciate being advised 
of just how that's done. I've already--the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs dropped to see me yesterday to help on this. And 
I--it is a matter of some concern.
    Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
    Senator Bond.
    Senator Bond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I welcome the Secretaries together, because your joint 
appearance represents what we, I believe, all three on this 
committee believes, is the only way we're going to make 
progress. That is smart power, combining the military and the 
economic/diplomatic efforts.

                         NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOY

    And I believe that the work that has been done by the 
National Guard teams, which began in Afghanistan in 2008, at a 
time when we tried for 2 years to get the USAID to go there and 
they could not go there--but, the National Guard units, with 
their ability to carry weapons and bring training, have made 
tremendous differences. And I understand that there are now 
about 10 different State Guard units in different provinces, 
which I think is one part of the solution. And, on that 
subject, I have heard, firsthand, so many times, that the 
importance of the Commander's Emergency Response Program funds, 
which have funded those efforts--and, not only those, but, 
again, I've heard firsthand how successful the CERP funds were 
in supporting the counterinsurgency strategy, for example, in 
2007, in Al Anbar Province. So, I am a strong supporter of it.
    But, one thing I would caution as the State Department 
begins to take over, I think there are many security challenges 
still in Iraq, and I hope that the withdrawal of forces will be 
conditioned on the ability of the remaining forces to provide 
the security that's needed, not just for USAID and other State 
agencies, but for our allies there. And I hope you will do 
that.

                            AIR FORCE C-130

    But, turning to a particular question: last year, Mr. 
Secretary, you testified that Air Force had over 200 extra C-
130s aircraft, and the Air Force cut that number to 65. But, I 
have just read, in Defense News, that there are only--that 
there are less than 50 C-130s in southwest Asia. And the 
reports are that they are--the commanders are requesting more 
C-130s to relieve the burden on the CH-47 Chinook helicopters. 
What is the situation with regard to the heavy lift in 
southwest Asia?
    Secretary Gates. What's the publication?
    Senator Bond. This is Defense News.
    Secretary Gates. Well, Defense News is apparently better 
informed than I am.
    Because I have not heard such a requirement from General 
McChrystal, or General Odierno for that matter. I certainly 
will ask the question, following the hearing.

                                AIRLIFT

    Senator Bond. Well, I--they cited a Lieutenant General 
Stevenson, so I--I will follow up with you later. But, I do 
believe there is need for lift. And I am concerned that we not 
overlook the need, not only for strategic lift, but for 
tactical aircraft. And when the Air Force studies itself, I 
am--have questions about the reliability of those studies. And 
we will continue that discussion in other fora than today.
    And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
    Senator Hutchison.
    Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And it is good to see both of you. And I know how many 
hours you're putting in and how hard you're working.

                        DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO

    Mr. Secretary, I want to just talk to you about the issue 
of Guantanamo detainees. As the ranking member of the Military 
Construction Subcommittee of this committee, there is now a 
$350 million request for transfer to prison; and $150 million 
of that is for military construction, $200 million for startup 
costs, and that is in addition to the cost of purchasing the 
prison. In addition to that, we are told, at the committee 
here, that we may need up to 1,000 personnel to man the prison, 
and that they will live on the local economy.
    So, I am very concerned about the costs. I'm concerned 
about the security. And I just wondered if there is any effort 
to look at these costs, considering that we've spent hundreds 
of millions on Guantanamo Bay, and even just, in the recent 
years, built a new state-of-the-art courthouse for trying the 
detainees that are eligible for trial. Is there any thought 
about reconsidering this, in light of costs of--or what is the 
thinking behind this effort?
    Secretary Gates. Well, the administration is still 
committed to closing Guantanamo. Thomson is--it appears to be 
the most likely civilian site. The costs that you cite are 
substantial, but they are onetime costs. And our latest 
estimates are that, once that transfer is made, that the actual 
operational costs would be several million dollars a year less 
than they are at Guantanamo. So, for the long term, the 
operating costs would produce savings over keeping Guantanamo 
open, despite the original construction costs.

                          FACILITY AT THOMPSON

    Senator Hutchison. And do you--are you still believing that 
the 1,000 people who would be the guards and personnel at the 
prison can be accommodated in the local economy? It's a pretty 
remote area, I'm told. Haven't been to this place in Illinois. 
But, do you think that is going to add a significant cost, or 
will there have to be future military construction requests for 
the housing of the guards, as well?
    Secretary Gates. I would have to get back to you on the 
record, how much of the original costs that you've cited are 
involved involve living quarters for the troops that would be 
associated with the prison for guarding. I think some of those 
costs are incorporated into that, but let me get back to you, 
for the record, on that.
    Senator Hutchison. All right. I would like that. I will 
also have another area of questioning for the record.
    [The information follows:]

    The $350 million request does not include any costs to 
construct living quarters for the troops associated with this 
mission because our initial preliminary environmental 
assessment shows that the local economy can support the 
estimated number of personnel who will work at Thomson and Rock 
Island Arsenal. Specifically, the analysis reveals that within 
a 1 hour drive of Thomson Correctional Center, there are 
approximately 14,000 vacant houses or apartments for rent, and 
approximately 5,000 vacant houses or apartments for sale.
    Until such time that a Combatant Commander is assigned and 
they can perform the necessary mission analysis and threat 
assessments necessary to support a DOD-constructed housing 
solution, the Department does not recommend constructing 
housing.

                BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION

    Senator Hutchison. Let me ask you one other one, though. 
In--during the last Base Realignment and Closure Commission 
(BRAC), Congress passed the Overseas Basing Commission, looking 
at our overseas basing, the training constraints, the 
contribution made by the host countries, and determined that we 
could do better training and have more control when there are 
training facilities in the United States, as compared to those 
overseas.
    Well, I see that my time has expired. I'm going to ask you 
about that in writing, because I'm very concerned that the 
previous administration's decision to move 70,000 troops back 
from Germany and Korea, as well as the congressional act that 
created this atmosphere, is being changed. And I want to know 
more of the thinking about it. So, I will ask you that for the 
record, as well.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
    [The information follows:]

    Since the Department reported on major Global Defense 
Posture initiatives in 2004, including those reviewed by the 
Overseas Basing Commissions, we have taken great strides to 
transform our posture and returned many of our permanently 
stationed overseas forces to the United States. During the 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department placed special 
emphasis on evaluating Global Defense Posture and the 
principles by which it is maintained and enhanced.
    Global defense posture is a key indicator of U.S. foreign 
and security policy priorities. U.S. military personnel are 
forward-stationed or rotationally deployed around the world to 
help sustain U.S. capacity for global reach and power 
projection. The Department must ensure that our overseas 
posture adapts and evolves in ways that respond to, and 
anticipate, changes in the international security environment.
    The presence of U.S. military forces overseas can be a 
powerful catalyst for promoting multilateral approaches and 
regional security architectures that serve both United States 
and partner states' interests. As such, training, quality-of-
life, and readiness are key factors whenever we consider 
changes to defense posture overseas. The Department takes these 
and other strategic factors into consideration whether 
considering basing forces in the United States or abroad.
    The Department will be guided by several principles in 
making defense posture decisions: forward-stationed and 
rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant and 
required; our defense posture will balance the need for a 
permanent overseas presence with the need for a flexible 
ability to respond to contingencies; we will balance the need 
for assured access with the risks of introducing fragility into 
its lines of communication; the posture should provide a 
stabilizing influence abroad; and the posture will continuously 
adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

    Chairman Inouye. Senator Murray.
    Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Welcome, to both of you, and thank you for the tremendous 
jobs both of you are doing.

                          GOALS IN AFGHANISTAN

    Secretary Gates, let me start with you. I think we all 
recognize that the environment in Afghanistan is extremely 
complex and our goals there are very challenging. I wanted to 
ask you, given the current military and political and social 
situation that we have there, what are your short-term goals 
before the surge force departs?
    Secretary Gates. Well, in--clearly, the thrust of General 
McChrystal's campaign is to reverse the momentum of the 
Taliban, to deny them control, particularly in the south of 
populated areas and areas of production, and degrade their 
capabilities. That has begun in Marjah, and the next major 
campaign will be in the Kandahar area. But, an important part 
of this--and it gets to the integrated civil-military 
campaign--was the preparation, weeks in advance of the military 
operation, to have civilians, both from the Afghan government 
and from our Government and our coalition partners, ready to go 
into Marjah and begin to provide development and governance. 
So, that will be the same approach that we take in the environs 
of Kandahar.

        SUFFICIENT FUNDING AT DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR TRANSITION

    Senator Murray. Secretary Clinton, then let me ask you. So, 
we make that transition, assuming we're successful. Do you have 
the funds that you need within your Department to adequately 
staff for the transition that will need to take place?
    Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Senator.
    That is one of the reasons for this supplemental. As we 
evaluate the progress that was made with the Marjah operation 
and the necessity for our civilian presence to move very 
quickly, we want to be prepared, so we are ramping up our 
planning and implementation. As Secretary Gates just said, it 
is likely that an operation around Kandahar will be the next 
mission that our military undertakes, which requires us to have 
a greater capacity to partner with the Afghans, both on the 
local level and on the national level. So, I am, you know, very 
convinced that what we're asking for is necessary and will give 
us exactly what your question implies we need.
    Senator Murray. Okay. I appreciate that.
    And, Secretary Gates, I will be submitting to you a 
question about the transition for men and women, as they come 
home, into the Veterans Administration (VA), and making sure we 
have accurate data as an increasing number of casualties with 
both physical and mental wounds of war are coming home. We need 
to make sure we are keeping those connections. I want to ask 
you that, off the record, once we're through here.

          MILITARY SPOUSE CAREER ADVANCEMENT ACCOUNTS PROGRAM

    But, I do want to, while I have a short time left, ask you 
about the issue of the Military Spouse Career Advancement 
Accounts, the MyCAA Program. It was a great program put out 
there for spouses. About 136,000 military spouses have enrolled 
in that program--very popular--in order to get training, 
classes, and certificate training. A number of them were frozen 
out of the program over management issues. I wrote to you about 
this several weeks ago. I know you are aware of this, but I am 
deeply concerned about the number of spouses out there who've 
now been left out, and the importance of getting this back on 
track. I want your commitment to work with me to ensure we get 
that moving correctly forward.
    Secretary Gates. I'm very familiar with it, since I 
launched it, with the Secretary of Labor, a couple of years 
ago. This is one of the--this is one of those cases, where we 
had a program that ramped up slowly and then exploded in 
popularity. Part of the problem that we have is that we have 
$61 million in the budget for this program for fiscal year 
2010, and I think we've only asked for $65 million, or 
thereabouts, for fiscal year 2011, in the budget that we have.
    The applications for the program, as I indicated--I know 
you--first of all, you are correct, there are 135,000 spouses 
that signed up, a little over that. The management of the 
program shut it down entirely on--in mid-February, because of 
the incredible demand. This was probably, in my view, a 
mistake. We should have--all those who were still in the 
program, we should have kept in the program, kept it open, put 
the applications on hold. The program was reopened in mid-
March, to those who had already been enrolled, and we are 
looking at the way ahead to see how we might be able to 
accommodate this extraordinary demand. We are--the demand we 
are looking at, potentially, could end up with this program 
costing $1 billion to $2 billion. So, I mean, it's a measure of 
the popularity of the program. But, it----
    Secretary Gates [continuing]. Also becomes----
    Senator Murray. Well, I think it----
    Secretary Gates [continuing]. A real----
    Senator Murray [continuing]. It's a measure----
    Secretary Gates [continuing]. Challenge.
    Senator Murray [continuing]. Of the significance of this 
program, in terms of readiness, for these families who have 
given so much. And if it's a matter of requesting money through 
the supplemental, or whatever we need to do. We now have a 
situation where spouses have gotten the money and the training, 
and living right across the street from somebody who's not. It 
has created a very unfair situation. It's an important benefit 
and we want to work with you to make sure we get it moving 
forward again.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
    Senator Shelby.
    Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                                 MI-17

    Secretary Gates, as we review the year 2010 supplemental 
request, there's an additional $72.6 million in there for the 
Mi-17 sustainment and maintenance and training for the Russian 
helicopter. This is on top of the $596 million that we put into 
the Defense Appropriation bill of 2010. The committee is still 
waiting, Mr. Secretary, the report required from the 2010 
Defense Appropriation bill detailing the current and 
anticipated demand for Mi-17s, which I--should have been 
delivered 60 days after the enactment of the bill. I know 
you're busy, and the Department is, but that was 97 days ago. 
Instead, we received a fiscal year 2011 request that includes 
the procurement of 10 more Mi-17s for Afghanistan, at a cost of 
$180 million, which is $18 million per airframe, nearly triple 
the price that we paid for an airframe in 2006. That's--pretty 
good price. What's the status of the overdue report? And what's 
going on here? Do you----
    Secretary Gates. I'm aware of the requirement for the 
report, Senator. I was not aware that it had not yet been 
delivered.
    Senator Shelby. Okay.
    Secretary Gates. But, I'll find out.
    Senator Shelby. Will you get back to us----
    Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
    Senator Shelby [continuing]. On that?
    Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
    [The information follows:]

    The Mi-17 report was completed on March 24, 2010 and is in 
the process of being delivered to the congressional defense 
committees.

                  UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES CAPABILITY

    Senator Shelby. And then--and I go to another subject: 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). And this is something you know 
a lot about. It's been reported that, by 2015, Predator UAVs 
will have so many simultaneous patrols--that's a long time 
off--over Afghanistan that the Predator may soon exceed the 
bandwidth to carry data to ground stations. A lot of people are 
concerned that this data overload of networks in the theater 
are insufficient to the point that information collected by 
wide-area sensors is being saved on computer disks and flown 
back to the United States before it can be reviewed. In other 
words, it's not quite----
    We could be retrieving actionable data in real time that 
could save lives, hopefully, of the warfighters. Can you 
discuss this issue and what the Department's doing to address 
this? Are you familiar with that?
    Secretary Gates. All I can tell you, Senator, is that I 
know that bandwidth in both Iraq and Afghanistan is a 
continuing concern, but I have not heard, from General 
McChrystal or anyone else, frankly, until today, that it is a 
current concern or that they are not expanding the bandwidth--
--
    Senator Shelby. Okay.
    Secretary Gates [continuing]. To take it--to take advantage 
of the additional capabilities that we're putting in there. I 
can just assure you, I wouldn't be asking for the extraordinary 
uplift in the number of--the extraordinary increase in the 
number of UAVs if I didn't think the intelligence we'd get from 
them could be made operationally available almost in real time.
    Senator Shelby. Okay. The command and control for the 
unmanned systems--this has been an ongoing thing--one issue 
that continues to be of concern to the--is the Army's ability 
to continue utilizing unmanned systems when and where soldiers 
want them. And we continue to hear from our commanders on the 
ground about the importance of retaining control of tactical 
UAVs.
    A lot of our success depends on this. Some would like to 
see the Army lose that. What's your opinion on all of that? I 
know that's a kind of an interservice deal, but----
    Secretary Gates. Well, I think that the key--what we have 
seen with the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities that we have deployed, first in Iraq and now in 
Afghanistan in ever growing numbers, is a unique fusion of 
intelligence and operations in the history of warfare. My view 
is that it has to be responsive to the needs of the commander 
on the ground. And whatever mechanism is required to do that is 
the way it ought to be handled. But, it--just as we need the 
bandwidth so that it can--the intelligence itself can be 
transmitted to the ground in real time, we need the capability 
for those systems to be responsive to the commanders on the 
ground in the same way.
    Senator Shelby. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
    Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    And welcome, Madam Secretary. Welcome, Secretary Gates.
    Secretary Gates, let me follow up on Senator Shelby's 
questions. I have a good deal of concern about UAV technology. 
It is getting better. These are able to fly higher, stay in the 
air longer; they can carry heavier payloads, a mix of both 
guided and unguided munitions. And many of these advances are 
now being made by foreign countries, which may or may not 
support our international objectives. With technical 
modifications, even UAVs that do not currently carry weapons 
can, in fact, be modified into armed platforms. They are 
proliferating all over the world.
    So, I have three specific questions to ask of you and then 
you can choose your answers.

                           UAV EXPORTS/SALES

    One, what is DOD's current policy regarding the sale or 
transfer of UAVs to foreign countries?
    Two, what is your view on limiting the export of United 
States UAV technology capable of being employed as a combat 
platform?
    And three, what is the Department doing to ensure that UAVs 
are not used against American troops?
    Secretary Gates. First of all, our policy toward the sale 
of UAV technology--I would differentiate, first of all, between 
armed and unarmed. But, overall, our policy is guided by the 
missile technology control regime. And so, at this point, to 
the best of my knowledge, we have only sold UAVs, at this 
point, to Italy and the United Kingdom, two North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. There are other countries 
that are very interested in this capability; and frankly, it 
is, in my view, in our interest to see what we can do to 
accommodate them. But, I am--I share your concern about the 
possibility of the transfer of technology, or about these 
capabilities getting into the hands of those who are our 
adversaries. And the reality is that countries like Iran are 
developing their own UAVs, and already have a UAV capability.
    With respect to export, again, as I just suggested, I think 
there are some specific cases where we have allies, with whom 
we have formal treaty alliances, who have expressed interest in 
these capabilities, and we have told them that we are limited 
in what we can do, by the MTCR, but I think it's something we 
need to pursue with them.
    The reality is, so far, we have been in situations where 
UAV technology cannot be used, or has not been used, against 
our troops anywhere. I just referred to the fact that Iran has 
UAVs, and that is a concern, because it is one of those areas 
where, I suppose, if they chose to, in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, they could create difficulties for us.
    By the same token UAVs are relatively slow flyers, and we 
have very capable air forces. And so, I actually think that our 
ability to protect our troops from these things, particularly 
in a theater of combat like this, is quite good.
    My worry would be capabilities like this getting into the 
hands of nonstate actors who could use them for terrorist 
purposes.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.

                    COUNTERNARCOTICS IN AFGHANISTAN

    The Drug Caucus of the Senate, which I happen to chair, has 
been looking into the narcotics picture in Afghanistan. And 
this raises--and let me just be very quick with this--this 
raises the question of standing by and letting these opium 
poppies grow. At the same time, the Taliban is emerging into a 
major drug cartel. I think it's a problem. The Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) tells me it's a problem. People that have 
made the busts in Afghanistan tell me that it's a problem. And 
I would be very interested in your response to that.
    Secretary Gates. Well, about 1\1/2\ or 2 years ago, the 
coalition in Afghanistan received changed rules of engagement 
that allowed them to go after drug lords and drug labs. And we 
have been fairly aggressive in doing that. Ninety-eight percent 
of the poppies grown in Afghanistan are grown in seven 
provinces, where--and they are the ones where we are engaged in 
the most significant combat.
    Let's just face facts, here. Until we have measures in 
place--until we can establish a security environment that 
allows us then to go forward with economic development and 
provide alternative--the means to grow alternative crops for 
these individual farmers--I have believed all along that if you 
eradicate a man's crop without getting--giving him a substitute 
income, you have just recruited a significant number of 
additional Taliban. And so, we have to weigh aggressive efforts 
to go after the lords and the labs, with providing the--with 
the time required to provide the security where you have the 
environment that we can go in, with the civilian capabilities, 
and provide these people alternative means of supporting their 
families so, frankly, they don't pick up a gun and start 
shooting our soldiers.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
    Senator Landrieu.
    Senator Landrieu. Thank you very much.

                       HAITI DISASTER ASSISTANCE

    Mr. Secretary, Madam Secretary, many of the questions that 
I had on Afghanistan have been addressed. But, I wanted to 
bring up Haiti if I could. I understand that's the subject of 
this hearing, Mr. Chairman, is not? The Haiti supplemental? The 
Haiti supplemental? Yes?
    I know that you all are both aware, and maybe--the 
committee, I know, has been focused on the tragedy in Haiti. 
And I guess I'm particularly close to it, because we went 
through a horrible situation just 4\1/2\ years ago in south 
Louisiana and Mississippi. But, I just think, for the record, 
it's important for us to focus just a minute, despite all the 
extraordinary challenges of our military in other parts of the 
world, that 220,000 individuals lost their lives in this 
disaster, compared to about 2,000 on the gulf coast, just to 
put it in scale; 1.3 million people are living in temporary 
shelters. That's really a stretch of the imagination, because 
actually it's a piece of plastic. There are 105,000 homes that 
have been completely destroyed; 200,000 were severely damaged; 
1,300 schools were destroyed, and 50 healthcare centers 
collapsed.

                     HAITI HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

    I know that Secretary Clinton's focus and heart and 
attention have been on this. And so, my question, Madam 
Secretary, might be with the documents that are before us, 
which were just received last night, looking at the situation 
for Haiti. I'm a little concerned that I'm only able to find 
about $5 million, stuck down in the budget for USAID, to 
completely repair, it looks like, these families, which is 
going to be difficult, since I understand that most children in 
Haiti don't even have a birth certificate.
    So, this is going to be a long, hard road to climb, trying 
to shelter--sustain these families with just the basics; help 
with our international partners to get housing built quickly 
for them; but also, Madam Secretary, trying to get the 
wherewithal to create some sort of civil registry with our 
international partners to just get the basic birth certificates 
so we can start actually finding families for children, getting 
them families if their families have been lost, et cetera, et 
cetera. So, could you just comment on some of your ideas along 
these lines?
    Secretary Clinton. Yes, Senator.
    And thank you, as always, for your deep concern about 
children, and particularly children who are in the foster-care 
system or who are orphaned. Your voice has been very, very 
strong on that.
    And, as you know so well, children, within the context of a 
complex humanitarian emergency, such as we saw in Haiti, are 
among the most vulnerable children in the world. And I want to 
assure you that the United States Government recognizes that 
the protection and caring for these children has to be one of 
our highest priorities. So, we have been working to support 
children on our own, in partnership with the United Nations, 
other international organizations, NGOs, and many faith-based 
organizations.
    First and foremost, we continue to focus on meeting 
children's emergency needs for medical care, shelter, food, 
water. Simultaneously, we are supporting an effort, led by the 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Government of 
Haiti, to find unaccompanied and separated children, and ensure 
they are in a safe place until we can determine whether they 
have any family at all that they can be reunited with, or what 
alternative permanent care provisions can be made. We're also 
expanding child-safe and child-friendly spaces within all of 
the facilities that we are supporting in Haiti. And that 
includes health, nutrition, education, and psychosocial 
support.
    The Haitian health professionals are asking for a lot of 
assistance in understanding how to deal, in a psychological 
way, with children who have been so traumatized. And we're 
supporting the Government of Haiti and UNICEF to rapidly assess 
all the orphanages in the earthquake-affected zone, with the 
aim of addressing their security and subsistence needs. In all 
of these efforts, we are coordinating closely with the U.N. 
protection cluster and the Government of Haiti, which, as you 
know, has very strong feelings about being in charge of their 
children. And I understand that, and we're trying to provide 
the support they need in order to meet their obligations.
    But, we will continue to work closely with you and keep you 
closely informed, because this is our very highest priority. 
And we're trying to do it in cooperation with the many other 
organizations that are as concerned as we are.
    Senator Landrieu. And I thank you.
    My time's expired, Mr. Chairman.
    But, there are many members of this committee I've had 
informal discussions with, Madam Secretary, and their support 
for laying the foundation of a new, more vibrant Haiti focused 
on strengthening each and every family in Haiti, and providing 
every child--serving them through families, not independently, 
not, you know, in an orphanage, but through families. So, I 
thank you for your longstanding commitment to this issue.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
    Senator Voinovich.
    Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And it's nice to see the two of you sitting next to each 
other. And, Madam Secretary, you know, when you were on Foreign 
Relations, people came in and said we need soft power, and 
you're it.

                             MIDEAST POLICY

    My question is this. I met with Ambassador Holbrooke in 
October, and I'm very impressed with his plan in terms of 
securing the environment there, and nation building. The 
question I have is, How much is that costing us? number one. 
And number two, How long are we going to have to be there? 
Because I don't think that we should be, in terms of how long 
it's going to be.

                         NATO/AFGHANISTAN ARMY

    Next is, How much help are we getting from our NATO and 
other allies, in terms of this nation building? So, that's on 
your side of the coin.
    Secretary Gates, on your side, I'd like to know--and you 
don't have to, maybe, give it to me now, but I'd love to have 
the information--is, How much help are you getting now from our 
NATO allies with boots on the ground without the KDFs? We have 
people there, but they have--still have KDFs. I've gone to 
countries, and they've said, ``I'm sorry, Senator, we cannot 
have our people involved in,'' you know, ``military activity, 
but we're willing to train these individuals.'' So, the 
question is, How much help are we getting there from them?
    And last but not least, you're asking for $2.6 billion to 
build up the--the Afghanistan Army. And the question I have, Is 
anybody else pitching in to help pay for the Afghanistan Army? 
And we know that we're probably going to have to spend maybe 
twice that amount in the future, for a long period of time, in 
order to maintain the security that you talked about, in terms 
of dealing with the drug problem, and so forth.
    So, could you both comment on what I've raised?

                          FUTURE SUPPLEMENTALS

    Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Senator.
    And first let me say that our request is aimed at our 
diplomatic and development efforts. We view these not as nation 
building for Afghanistan, but as in the core security interests 
of the United States. Without additional resources, we cannot 
create that environment that our troops need as they clear----
    Senator Voinovich. Yeah, I--listen, I understand that the 
real issue here----
    Secretary Clinton. Right.
    Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Is about how much is that 
costing us. And the question is, How long is that going to have 
to continue to the point where we can kind of say, ``We've done 
our thing''? Is it 5 years, 10 years, 15 years?
    Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I don't know if I can 
answer it that way, but I can answer it this way. We believe 
that our efforts, which are coordinated so closely with our 
military, will transform into a regular diplomatic and 
development relationship. I mean, we provide development aid to 
a lot of countries where we don't have troops, because we think 
it's in our interest. And so, as we are in this intense phase, 
that will be several years--obviously, I don't know that either 
of us could put a timeline on it--what we're trying to do 
simultaneously is clear territory from the Taliban, be able to 
work more closely with the Afghan Army, that Secretary Gates 
will talk about, by helping to build them up with our allies--
and we're getting a lot of support there; and at the same 
time----
    Senator Voinovich. But----
    Secretary Clinton [continuing]. Create----
    Senator Voinovich [continuing]. I mean could you----
    Secretary Clinton [continuing]. More capacity----
    Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Outline the help that 
you're getting from these people on that--in that score?
    Secretary Clinton. Sure. And we can give you, in detail--
and we'd be happy to take that for the record.
    [The information follows:]

    During Secretary Clinton's testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations on March 25, 2010, you asked the Secretary about 
development assistance our allies and partners are providing in 
Afghanistan.
    Our efforts in Afghanistan have an international face with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leading the military effort, 
which is complimented by broad civilian contributions from our NATO 
Allies and other partners including leadership and support to 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, police training efforts and local 
development projects.
    Following President Obama's December 1, 2009 declaration that we 
would increase our troop strength, NATO Allies and other partners have 
pledged an additional 9,000 troops, which are arriving alongside the 
30,000 additional U.S. troops. Simultaneously, NATO Allies and other 
partners have substantially increased their security forces' training 
contributions to the NATO Training Mission--Afghanistan (NTM-A), 
filling institutional trainer positions, Operational Liaison and Mentor 
Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Liaison and Mentor Teams (POMLTs). 
We continue to work with our NATO Allies and other partners to fill the 
remaining trainer shortages and ensure a capable and sustained Afghan 
National Security Forces.
    Although the United States is the largest donor to Afghanistan's 
civilian reconstruction efforts, our Allies and partners are sharing 
the burden of the civilian mission in Afghanistan. Fourteen of 26 PRTs 
are led by allies and partners, and provide training for the Afghan 
National Security Forces and reconstruction assistance, as well as 
humanitarian assistance in many cases. Forty-three percent of all 
civilian assistance to Afghanistan comes from donors other than the 
United States, as detailed in the attached table as provided by the 
Afghan Ministry of Finance. The Asian Development Bank and World Bank 
have contributed a combined $5 billion since 2001, in addition to 
helping other donors through trust funds.
    The European Union has contributed approximately $2 billion since 
2001 and in 2009 pledged to increase its assistance significantly. Many 
European countries also provide additional assistance bilaterally. The 
United Kingdom is a major contributor to security and training missions 
and civilian assistance, with nearly $3 billion in contributions since 
2001. A number of countries have recently pledged to increase their 
civilian assistance. For instance, in November 2009, Japan increased 
its 5-year civilian commitment to Afghanistan from $1 billion to $5 
billion. In January 2010, Germany doubled its assistance commitment to 
430 million Euros annually through 2013.
    Despite severe budgetary constraints over the past 2 years, even 
smaller donors like Greece and Latvia have decided to make new 
contributions in the past year. Our international outreach efforts have 
inspired a growing list of nontraditional partners to play a larger 
role in Afghanistan, including the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, 
Malaysia, India and others. Some of these countries are providing 
financial assistance or funding the activities of other donors, while 
some are providing civilian advisors, doctors, engineers, or other 
human resources but rely on other sources of funding for their efforts.

                 INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN
                        [In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Donor                            Total Pledges
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japan...................................................         6,900.0
UK......................................................         2,897.0
WB......................................................         2,800.0
ADB.....................................................         2,200.0
EU/CE...................................................         1,768.7
Canada..................................................         1,679.1
India...................................................         1,200.0
Germany.................................................         1,187.9
Norway..................................................           938.0
Iran....................................................           864.0
Netherlands.............................................           753.2
Denmark.................................................           672.8
Saudi Arabia............................................           533.0
Italy...................................................           514.6
Spain...................................................           486.5
Australia...............................................           369.3
UAE.....................................................           307.7
Pakistan................................................           305.0
Sweden..................................................           288.6
ECHO....................................................           268.2
U.N. Agencies...........................................           252.4
AKDN....................................................           239.3
China...................................................           196.5
Turkey..................................................           190.0
Finland.................................................           152.0
France..................................................           151.8
Russian Fed.............................................           141.0
Switzerland.............................................           134.0
Other Donors............................................            97.1
Belgium.................................................            86.8
Korea (Rep. of).........................................            85.0
Islamic Dev Bank........................................            70.0
Kuwait..................................................            60.0
Ireland.................................................            33.4
New Zealand.............................................            30.3
Taiwan..................................................            28.6
Croatia.................................................            28.1
Czech Republic..........................................            22.0
Qatar...................................................            20.0
Org Islamic Conf........................................            15.0
Austria.................................................            14.0
Greece..................................................            11.7
Global Fund.............................................            11.5
Luxembourg..............................................             7.2
Oman....................................................             6.0
Poland..................................................             5.0
Brunei..................................................             3.6
Hungary.................................................             3.0
Malta...................................................             3.0
Kazakhistan.............................................             2.3
Egypt...................................................             2.0
Portugal................................................             2.0
Lithuania...............................................             1.6
Greece..................................................             1.6
Singapore...............................................             1.5
Estonia.................................................             1.2
Portugal................................................             1.2
Slovakia................................................             1.0
Brazil..................................................             1.0
Vietnam.................................................  ..............
                                                         ---------------
      Total.............................................        29,047.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            STATUS OF SURGE

    Secretary Clinton. But, just as in Iraq--our troops are 
going to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Well, we're going 
to have relationships with Iraq. We're going to have an Embassy 
with Iraq. We're going to continue to fulfill the request that 
the Iraqis made to us in the framework agreement about 
continuing assistance, and most particularly high-level police 
training. So, we're going to continue to have relationships. 
And so, that's going to go on for the foreseeable future, just 
like--I was in Mexico Tuesday. We've got--you know, we're 
putting money into Mexico, because there's a lot of challenges 
that are in our interests.
    So, it will be a different relationship, but it will still 
be one of priority for the United States.
    Secretary Gates. Senator, we have, at this point, pretty 
close to 45,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan. There are 
several thousand more that have been pledged, so that, by the 
time the pledges that we see are fulfilled, there will be 
pretty close to 50,000 non-U.S. troops. That's up from 17,000 
in 2007. I would say that, for the last year, 1\1/2\ years, but 
especially since the NATO summit last spring, we have seen a 
number of NATO allies reduce or eliminate their caveats. And 
so, the number of situations that we face now, where caveats 
have prevented effective operations, have really dropped pretty 
dramatically. So, I think we have really good cooperation from 
our NATO and other partner nations, and they have really 
stepped up to the plate, despite, in many cases, considerable 
domestic opposition to it.
    Chairman Inouye. Senator Nelson.
    Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, for 
being here. We appreciate very much your candor.

          INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

    Secretary Gates, the materials that were submitted with the 
fiscal year overseas contingency operations (OCO) supplemental 
request highlight that you're requesting an additional $1.3 
billion for the Military Intelligence Program to Enhance U.S. 
Intelligence Capabilities and Operations, which includes ISR. 
And I'd like to talk a little bit about the Department's 
efforts to coordinate investments and enhance the ISR mission.
    We've heard, from all of the services, that combatant 
commanders have a large appetite for ISR. My concern is that 
the focus has been on how many UAVs are in the field, which I 
think is important, and how quickly we can get more. But, I 
hope, in that effort, we're not overlooking the critical 
aspects of expanding ISR, like how the services plan to train 
the analysts that will be required to process the expanding 
volumes of data, and what infrastructure will be required to 
move data, and share it with those that need it. In a sense, 
maybe the easy part is buying the--the hard part is exploiting 
and using the intelligence that we're able to get from it.
    A GAO report issued last week states that, ``Within Central 
Command, less than half of the electronic signals collected by 
Predator are exploited.'' The report also identifies a shortage 
in analytical staff to process ISR--and you already mentioned 
bandwidth--and limited bandwidth to disseminate intelligence, 
as principal challenges. I've asked questions of General 
Schwartz about the manning mission, and he stated that the 
current manning structure was unsustainable. And I'm just 
concerned.
    So, can you give me some idea of what DOD is doing to help 
coordinate services so that we match ISR capabilities with the 
ability to access it, and also coordination within the 
services?
    Secretary Gates. The--there are two aspects to this. First 
of all, when you say that the commanders' appetite for ISR is 
large, I would say that's one of the great understatements of 
all time.
    Insatiable is more like it. We have taken--two things. 
First of all, we understand--I understand very much that when 
we talk about ISR, it is not just the platform. It's the 
analysts, it's the linguists, it's the ground stations. And, in 
fact, one of the problems that we had, 1\1/2\ or 2 years ago, 
when we really began pushing this capability to the field in--
significantly added numbers--was the shortage of ground 
stations. Another problem, that has been remedied by the Air 
Force and the Army over the last year or so, was also a 
shortage of crews to run these UAVs. So, I think we're 
addressing those issues. I think that we have--linguists, I 
would say, is a real challenge, as well as analysts.
    There are two bureaucratic vehicles for coordinating this 
effort on behalf of the Department. The first and the most 
institutional is the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence, General Clapper, who has complete overview of 
this and watches the full package, not just the platforms. And 
then the other has been the Special Task Force, that I 
established on ISR about 1\1/2\ or 2 years ago, that has been 
focused on, How can we get this capability in usable fashion to 
the field? And using not only unpiloted vehicles, but also, we 
are putting a number of what are the equivalent of King Airs in 
there, the MC-12s, Liberty aircraft. So, all of these 
capabilities, we are very mindful of the need for the full 
package so that, as I told Senator Shelby, if we can't get the 
stuff to the commanders in the field, it's not worth the 
investment.
    Senator Nelson. Well, and getting it adequately analyzed 
would be just as significant a portion of getting it to them in 
the field.
    I appreciate your answers, and I hope that----
    Secretary Gates. But, I would tell you--I went to a 
counter-improvised explosive device (IED) facility the other 
day that is run by DIA. And I had--I took the Canadian Defense 
Minister there, and I have no idea. You know, we talk about the 
commanders in the field, but with today's electronics, I walk 
into a room that's probably got 60 analysts in it from all over 
the intelligence community, sitting here in the Washington 
area, with realtime links to the UAVs and other capabilities in 
the theater, and providing information on IED networks to the 
theater. So, the theater doesn't have to do all the analysis. A 
lot of it can be done back here, with today's electronics. And 
we have these capabilities. This was one of the things that 
JIEDDO has done; this is under their auspices. So, there's a 
lot of capability here, but as we try and ramp this up, there 
are obviously going to be some imbalances that we have to try 
and fix.
    Senator Nelson. Well, I appreciate that you're on top of 
it. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
    I'd just like to announce that a vote just started. So, if 
some of you wish to go, be my guest.
    Senator Murkowski.
    Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I don't think I'll go yet. How about that?
    Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, thank you so much. Good 
to see both of you again.

                      TRUST ISSUES IN AFGHANISTAN

    So many of us have had an opportunity to travel recently to 
Afghanistan, and certainly recognize the challenges, the great 
difficulty that we face over there, that the men and women who 
are serving us face every day.
    We were in a situation--we were in--down in the--Helmand 
Province, down outside of Garmsir, and were able to walk 
through a market, and felt very comfortable, given the 
situation; left, and 5 days later in that same community, eight 
people died as a result of suicide bombing. So, we recognize 
the volatility of the situation.
    One term that we heard used quite frequently was this 
``deficit of trust'' that remains there. And I think, Secretary 
Gates, you have said that, ``Successfully accomplishing the 
training mission represents both our exit strategy and the key 
to long-term stability in Afghanistan.'' But, again, going back 
to this ``deficit of trust'' situation that we heard so much 
about, it was very clear that the people there appreciate that 
there is a--there's a clear choice. You can either side with 
the Americans, who, it's clear, will someday leave; or you side 
with the Taliban, who will likely be there indefinitely. And 
the question to you is, While an exit strategy is absolutely 
necessary as part of any military operation, what assurance are 
we able to give to the Afghan tribal leaders to ensure that 
they do, in fact, remain on our side of the fight, that they 
believe that it is more worthwhile, in the long term, to stay 
on our side of the fight?

                              AFGHANISTAN

    Secretary Gates. First of all, I think that the thing to 
remember, historically and culturally, about the many Afghans 
is that they've been at war for 30 years. And the average 
Afghan is going to come down on one side or the other only when 
he thinks he's spotted who's going to win. And that's part of 
what our endeavors are about.
    When I talked earlier about General McChrystal's first 
objective being to reverse the momentum of the Taliban, that 
is, in the first instance, about changing the psychology of the 
people about who's going to win this struggle. I think that the 
thing also to keep in mind is that the Taliban may be vicious, 
but they're also incredibly unpopular in Afghanistan. Every 
reliable poll that I've seen over the past couple of years 
shows the Taliban support in Afghanistan at around 10 percent 
or less. So, these people aren't fond of the Taliban, they're 
just intimidated by them, for the most part.
    And the key here is, when we begin the process of 
transitioning security control to the Afghans, in a province-
by-province or district-by-district area, that we have degraded 
the capabilities of the Taliban to the point where local 
security forces and the Afghan National Army and various 
national police units can sustain the security of the people. 
So, it's not that the Afghan Army or Police are ever going to 
achieve the skill level of American forces--the truth of the 
matter is nobody in the world's ever going to do that, with all 
due respect even to our allies--but, can we degrade the 
capabilities and the numbers of the Taliban fighters to the 
point where the local security forces and the Afghan Army can 
keep them under control and provide the kind of local security 
for people that is required.
    The way this works is, if you get the population on your 
side--and we saw this in Anbar--that is a self-reinforcer of 
security. It is the local population in Anbar--once they 
began--once they felt that they could defeat al Qaeda in Iraq, 
that they began telling us where the IEDs were being planted, 
and so on. We're beginning to see that in some places in 
Afghanistan, where the local population is figuring, ``You 
know, maybe this is going to go the way of the Afghan 
government and the coalition.'' And so, they're beginning to 
cooperate with us, and support us.
    So, as Secretary Clinton talked about, this is a complex 
business, but having the population not necessarily trust us, 
but have confidence that their security will be protected, is a 
mix of our capabilities over the next number of years, 
capabilities of our allies, and the capabilities of the Afghan 
forces themselves. And not just the national forces, but, I 
would say, also local security forces.
    Senator Murkowski. I thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
    Senator Pryor.
    Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'll try to keep mine to 4 minutes, or less even, because I 
know we have a vote.
    Thank you both for being here.

                     STATUS OF WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN

    Secretary Clinton, let me start with you, if I may. And 
that is, I know that you have been a champion for women's 
rights for a long time. And in Afghanistan, as I understand it 
now, girls and women are doing three things that we take for 
granted here in this country. They're going to school. They're 
getting jobs. And they're actually participating in the 
government.
    I'd just like to hear your thoughts on where that stands 
and if you think that is a long-term change in Afghanistan, or 
if that's still in its infancy and could go away at any time?
    Secretary Clinton. Thank you for asking that, Senator, 
because I think it's important that we use that as one of the 
markers for the kind of success that we're hoping to achieve 
there. You're absolutely right, there has been a great deal of 
change in the opportunities available to women and girls. When 
you look at the increase in the number of young women going to 
school, it's dramatic. But, there's still a long way to go. 
There are a lot of obstacles that are deeply cultural and 
historic. What we are looking out for is, not that we can 
mandate a change in culture and history, but to keep that door 
of opportunity open----
    Senator Pryor. Right.

                     WOMEN'S RIGHTS/RECONCILIATION

    Secretary Clinton [continuing]. And not let anything slam 
it shut. So, we're particularly concerned about the 
reintegrating/reconciliation plans that the Karzai government 
has undertaken. They have, thus far, made it clear that they 
are expecting people with whom they reconcile to abide by the 
laws and constitution of Afghanistan, which does provide 
protection for women's rights. But, thank you for raising it, 
because it's a high priority of ours.
    Senator Pryor. Well, thank you. I think it's a great policy 
and a great priority.
    I recently read that the United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime estimates that corruption comprises 25 percent of 
Afghanistan's GDP. When I see a number like that it--it's 
obviously shocking, and it also makes me realize that we need 
to be very, very careful in how we're spending U.S. tax dollars 
in Afghanistan.
    So, when it comes to accountability for our foreign aid 
there, could you give us a status report of the things that 
your Department is doing to try to make sure there is 
sufficient accountability?
    Secretary Clinton. Senator, we are increasing our support 
for our inspectors general. We are also adding more auditors in 
order to keep track of funding. We are certifying any Afghan 
Government entity that would receive any of our funding, to be 
clear that it is managing those funds in a way that we find 
acceptable. We are working to put people into those agencies.

                               CORRUPTION

    So, we're taking a lot of prophylactic steps. But, as you 
point out, corruption is a deeply ingrained problem, and we 
just have to be very vigilant about making sure that we're not 
caught up in it.
    Senator Pryor. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
    Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. Senator Specter.
    Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    In the final time, I propose to use it to raise a number of 
questions. There's hardly time for questions and answers within 
4 minutes. And I understand the limitations that we have here.

                             MIDEAST PEACE

    The first question that I have relates to a report in The 
Washington Post yesterday, where General Petraeus is quoted as 
saying that, ``The conflict foments''--referring to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict--``The conflict foments anti-
American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism 
toward Israel.'' His comment within the commentary is--the 
paper--his comments suggested that U.S. military officials were 
embracing the idea that failure to resolve the conflict had 
begun to imperil American lives.'' Well, that's obviously very 
serious and very heavy.
    [The information follows:]

    The Department of Defense does not believe that the U.S. 
commitment to Israel's security or the failure to resolve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict imperils U.S. lives, nor did 
General Petraeus state this. However, a lack of progress in the 
peace process is one of many issues that is distorted and 
exploited by our adversaries in the region, thereby affecting 
U.S. national security interests.
    This Administration's commitment to Israel's security and 
our defense relationship with Israel are based on mutual 
security interests. Israel is one of our strongest allies, and, 
in this role, is a crucial partner on security and anti-
terrorism in the region.
    Peace in the Middle East is a national interest of the 
United States, as well as of Israel, the Palestinians, and Arab 
States. The Department of Defense has provided significant 
support to both the Israelis and the Palestinians to increase 
security for both populations and thus improve the chances of 
attaining a just and lasting peace. The United States continues 
to work through negotiations to assist the Israelis and 
Palestinians to realize a solution with two states living side-
by-side in peace and security. In this effort, the Department 
of Defense stands ready to assist Senator Mitchell in his work 
to achieve a comprehensive Middle East Peace.

    Senator Specter. And my question, which I would like you to 
respond to for the record, would be, What evidence is there 
to----
    Mr. Secretary, we have an expensive war in Afghanistan. The 
question of success in Afghanistan is very much open. I think 
it's going very well, and I commend what's going on at the 
present time, buttressed by a visit which I made recently there 
with other colleagues. But, the question on my mind, when al 
Qaeda can organize somewhere else, like Yemen or Somalia or 
somewhere else, why fight in Afghanistan, where it is so costly 
and where the Soviets, the Brits, going back to Alexander the 
Great, have not met success?
    [The information follows:]

    A combination of personal, ethnic, tribal, historical, and 
other ties to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region makes it al 
Qaeda's preferred base of operations. Over the past 20 years, 
al Qaeda has developed a network in this region that supports 
training, financing, recruiting, and other operational needs. 
Even if the lack of security in other regions is appealing to 
al Qaeda, it would take years for al Qaeda to develop a new 
network as robust as the present one.
    There is a very sharp distinction between the historical 
experience of many in Afghanistan, those who were there to 
conquer, and our mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. campaign is 
aimed at enabling the development of Afghan capacity so that 
the Afghan Government may exert sovereignty over its own 
territory and prevent al Qaeda and its affiliates from using 
the country as a base of operations. The Taliban in 
Afghanistan, because Afghans have experienced its rule, has 
little popular support. Even in areas the Afghan Government has 
yet to fully establish itself, the Taliban is not the preferred 
choice for the Afghan people. This creates great opportunity 
for us to help develop Afghan institutions and capacity that 
are a viable alternative for the population. The United States 
does not have the option of allowing al Qaeda and its 
affiliates freedom of movement and sanctuary, given the threat 
that they pose to our homeland and to our vital interests 
abroad. Our campaign on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan 
border, and our campaign against al Qaeda and its affiliates in 
other locations around the world, put continuous pressure on 
this network to disrupt their operations and deny their ability 
to launch spectacular attacks. Denying sanctuary to al Qaeda 
and its affiliates is critical to preventing their ability to 
attack our homeland, our interests, and our forces and our 
allies abroad.

                           PAKISTAN AND INDIA

    Senator Specter. A third area of questioning is, What has 
happened in Pakistan and India?
    [The information follows:]

    The United States encourages India and Pakistan to discuss 
their differences bilaterally. We welcome recent meetings 
between the two, and are prepared to assist if the two 
countries so request.

    Senator Specter. There have been some suggestions that 
there could be a cooling of that--of the tension, which might 
relieve a number of Pakistani military to assist the United 
States in fighting al Qaeda or fighting the Taliban. In the 
CODEL, where we met with the Indian Prime Minister, we raised 
this, directly. And the Prime Minister of India was explicit, 
saying that he would like to see a lessening of tensions, 
soldiers released, but they're--they would have to be in 
control of the terrorists by the Pakistan Government. And he 
was asked, ``Well, do you think that's realistic?'' And he 
said, very emphatically, ``Yes. They are their creation.'' So 
that if there's a real prospect here of that, there may be more 
Pakistani soldiers who could help us, and they might have some 
more inclination to do so, and that would impact that picture 
very decisively.
    The area of sanctions is a very difficult one against Iran. 
And we have been discussing that for a long time, in a lot of 
contexts. And I know there's no simplistic answer. But, the 
question that I get consistently involves, Where are we going? 
The military option is on the table. Everybody says it's 
unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon. President Obama 
drew a line in the sand last December. Hard to really be 
specific about lines in the sand, but that was my sense of if 
it and the sense of a number of people.
    So, the question is, What is it going to take? Is it a 
constantly moving position by China? I don't envy either of 
you, in dealing with China, or, for that matter, in dealing 
with Russia, although we congratulate you on what appears to be 
a really big breakthrough on nuclear weapons. But, what are we 
looking for? There's talk about--gasoline could bring them to 
their knees if we really got tough on financial matters.
    [The information follows:]

    As the President has stated, our policy goal is to prevent 
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. To ensure this, the 
Administration is pursuing a dual-track strategy of engagement 
with, and pressure on, Iran, while also building support with 
our allies in the region and around the world. After a year of 
attempts at principled engagement with Tehran, Iran's continued 
nuclear intransigence left us with no other option but to 
resort to the pressure track and pursue sanctions within the 
United Nations Security Council, as well as additional 
coordinated national measures with the European Union and other 
like-minded states. We expect that these sanctions--although an 
imperfect tool--will have both a material and psychological 
effect on Iran, particularly when the sanctions have broad 
international support, including from China and Russia. Whether 
this will be sufficient to bring Iran back to the negotiating 
table, or convince it to make material concessions on its 
nuclear program, remains to be seen.

    Senator Specter. It looks like I could go on indefinitely. 
The chairman has left.
    Do you have a question, Senator?
    Senator Collins. I do.
    Senator Specter. Well, I have posed those areas of concern. 
And my request would be that you respond to them on the record, 
as opposed to asking a question and a half, and having the 4 
minutes go.
    Thank you for your service. Thank you for taking the job, 
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Secretary Gates. Great to see 
you. Graduate of a grade school in Wichita, Kansas, that I 
attended, doing so well in the tough Washington climate.
    Well, Dole and I are from Russell, which is a smaller town. 
Gates's experience in Kansas is limited to a big city, Wichita, 
where I left when I was 12.
    Thank you very much.
    Senator Brownback. Well, to another Kansan here----
    Voice. There's Kansans everywhere.
    Senator Brownback. Absolutely. I----
    Voice. We're not in Kansas anymore.
    Senator Brownback. Yeah, we're going to make the rest of 
the country Kansas. That's how we're going to fix that.
    Mr. Chairman, I didn't know if you knew this, but Secretary 
Gates was Kansan of the Year this year.
    Chairman Inouye. Really?
    Senator Brownback. And his mother was at the ceremony, who 
was very proud of her son, and we all were of what all he's 
done, and very appreciative of that. It was a very touching 
moment. Mr. Secretary, you gave a beautiful, beautiful speech 
at it, as well.

                            KCX TANKER/EADS

    A couple of things that I wanted to raise with you, if I 
could, Secretary Gates, in particular. In one--this is the old 
one that you're familiar with, very familiar with, on the 
tanker contract. I've been reading that Airbus is asking for an 
extension of your RFP time deadline so they can make another 
bid on this contract. And I've been reading throughout the 
European Press that Sarkozy and others are concerned, and they 
think this RFP is terrible, that they haven't been able to 
partner with Northrop. I would hope we would stick with the 
timeframe and the timeline that this 10-year project is on and 
hopefully getting close to a resolution and that it not be 
extended for a bid to be put forward from EADS. Have you made a 
decision on that? The last press account I recall seeing said 
you were reviewing it.
    Secretary Gates. That's correct. We have had some 
informal--as best I've--as I'm up to date, we've had some 
informal questions from EADS about it. And I think they were 
going to do a letter to us. I have not seen that letter. I 
don't know if it's been received in the Department. We will 
look at it.
    As I told the House Appropriations Committee, Defense 
Subcommittee, yesterday, we will not change the requirements. 
We are buying the best plane for the Air Force, and to meet Air 
Force needs. And so, we will look at this letter. Believe me, 
no one is more eager to get on with this than I am.
    Senator Brownback. But, no decision has been made----
    Secretary Gates. No, sir.
    Senator Brownback [continuing]. Whether to extend the time 
deadline, because----
    Secretary Gates. No.
    Senator Brownback. Obviously I would urge you to stay with 
the current time deadline. This thing has gone on far long 
enough, and it's time to move on.

                                  WTO

    And then, you've also seen that the WTO has recently ruled 
in the United States' favor that the airframe that EADS has 
proposed to bid was an illegally subsidized airframe that they 
developed. And that's now a final ruling by the WTO.
    I saw in the----
    Secretary Gates. Senator, I've just been handed a note. 
``Late breaking news'' as it were, we have received the letter 
requesting an extension from EADS, so we'll look at it and see 
what it has to say.
    Senator Brownback. Well, my vote's no on this, that we not 
extend it, and certainly not based off of President Sarkozy's 
concerns, because the very thing that they're going to bid is 
the very plane that they used to beat our brains in on the 
commercial marketplace for a number of years, and knocked 
several of our big companies out. This has been a 20-year 
litigation by USTR, that we just won. They've really driven 
down our share in a commercial market space, and now they want 
to take it in the military airframe space. I see no reason to 
concede this to the Europeans, and particularly since they've 
been cheating on subsidizing this aircraft and stealing 
commercial market share from us with it. So, I really hope you 
would look at that.
    And I noticed, yesterday, you were saying that whether or 
not the current DOD law actually prohibits you from addressing 
the illegal subsidy issue, you said that you were not required 
to include it. If I could get a point of clarification on that. 
And if you can't address it here, I understand. But, do you 
understand current law to actually prohibit DOD from addressing 
the illegal subsidy issue, or are you saying only that no 
provision requires DOD to account for illegal subsidies?
    Secretary Gates. I think that we are prohibited, but let me 
get you an accurate answer for the record.
    Senator Brownback. Okay, if you could.
    [The information follows:]

    Article 23 of the international, multilateral Understanding 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) establishes that the United 
States Government's sole avenue for redress is through the WTO. 
As the WTO itself has put forth in a formal, official 
commentary on Article 23, ``Any attempt to seek `redress' can 
take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and 
pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU [Dispute 
Settlement Understanding].''

                         TRAINING AFGHAN FORCES

    Senator Brownback. And then, finally, General Caldwell is a 
guy I got to know at Leavenworth that's working on the 
operation to stand up Afghan security forces. That sure looks 
like, to me, to be paramount for us to have an exit strategy in 
Afghanistan. Do you have any idea on timeframes for having 
sufficient Afghan troops stood up for us to be able to pull 
down?
    Secretary Gates. Well, I think it'll be a gradual process, 
much as we saw in Iraq. Just as an example, when the marines 
first went into the south last summer, the partnering with the 
Afghans was about nine Americans to every Afghan. Now, in the 
Marjah operation, it's three Americans for every two Afghans. 
So, as they train up and get into the field and partner, those 
ratios and capabilities will grow.
    The--I think that, in some ways, the way to look at the 
process that we will use is very similar to that, that we used 
in Iraq. And it's better described as a transition than a 
transfer.
    Right now, in some of these places, we're in the lead and 
the Afghans are with us. At a certain point, we will partner, 
then they will be in the lead, then we will withdraw to a 
tactical overwatch, and then a strategic overwatch. So, this 
multiphase approach is the way we did province-by-province in 
Iraq, and it really worked pretty well. And I think that 
General McChrystal has the same kind of model in mind in 
Afghanistan.

                              AFGHAN ARMY

    So, we don't need the Afghan Army to be fully trained up 
everywhere in the country at the same time. We will do it on a 
province-by-province basis. And I think that he's pretty 
optimistic he can make this work.
    Senator Brownback. Over a 2- to 5-year timeframe?
    Secretary Gates. Well, as his--as the President's made 
clear, and as we agreed in the process, we will begin that 
first transition, or that first transfer, if you will, in July 
2011. But, from that point on, it will be decided on a 
province-by-province basis, based on the conditions on the 
ground.
    Senator Brownback. Thank you.
    Thank you, Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you----
    Secretary Gates. And I expect that to take some period of 
time.
    Chairman Inouye. Senator Collins.
    Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, while everyone was out of the room briefly, I 
had this brief shining moment when I might be in your position.
    Voice. Oh-ho-ho.
    Senator Collins. And it was a wonderful feeling, however, 
fleetingly it passed.

                         AFGHAN FIGHTING FORCE

    Secretary Gates, I've read a lot of press reports recently 
that describe our marines as extremely frustrated with their 
Afghan counterparts. And I must say, I've been surprised 
because I've always had an image of the Afghans as being very 
good and effective fighters. But, there have been two major 
stories that suggest the marines are so concerned that the 
shortcomings of the Afghan soldiers could undermine our joint 
efforts in the region. Could you give me your assessment of 
whether these reports are valid, and whether the Afghans 
themselves have the desire and the skills to succeed in the 
fight?
    Secretary Gates. First, just in terms of answering the last 
questions--the last point first, this is actually one of the 
principal reasons, Senator, why I came around to the view that 
it was important to set a time when we would begin a transfer 
or transition to Afghan security control. They need to know 
this is their fight and that they are going to have to assume 
responsibility for it, and not at some distant unknown date, 
but beginning next year. And between that and the pay raises 
that we saw last November, we have seen a significant increase 
in recruitment in Afghanistan for both the Afghan Army and the 
Police. Retention has improved significantly in the Army; it's 
still a problem in the Police. But, we--they need to know that 
this is going to be their fight at some point. And I think they 
are taking that on board.
    The feedback that I've gotten--I have not heard complaints 
from General McChrystal or the commander in RC South, General 
Carter, about the quality of the Afghan troops. I must say 
that, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I went to Camp 
Blackhorse, outside of Kabul, a couple of weeks ago when I was 
there, where the Afghan Army is being trained, and the 
Americans that I talked to there were pretty impressed with 
them. By the same token, when I talk to our troops, I get mixed 
reviews. Some of them say that they're really good fighters and 
that they're really good partners and are very impressed with 
them. That was certainly the case in Nawaz, where I toured a 
marketplace. I didn't--you know, the security is a lot better 
there, but I had no illusions as to the security that was 
around because I was there. The--but, on the other hand, others 
are not as impressed. And so, I think it's a mixed picture. 
But, in terms of the views of the commanders, who have a view 
of the entire battle space, I think they're very impressed with 
the quality of the Afghan National Army, and believe that it's 
making good progress.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.

                       AFGHAN ARMY/CIVILIAN SURGE

    Secretary Clinton, when I was last in Afghanistan, the most 
common complaint that I heard from our military personnel was 
the lack of a civilian surge. You commented earlier that we 
have increased the number of civilians to do the civilian 
component that is so essential to the counterinsurgency 
strategy. Could you give a brief update, since I just got a 
note that my time is expired, telling us your level of 
satisfaction in meeting the requirements for civilian 
employees?
    Secretary Clinton. Yes, Senator. And thank you.
    We have roughly quadrupled the number of civilians, in a 
year. And they are both in Kabul, working with the Government 
of Afghanistan; and then they are out in the country. They are, 
in effect, embedded with our military, so they move with our 
military, and they are working closely to leverage their 
presence. You know, we don't have battalions of civilians. It's 
a much smaller number, in comparison to our military forces. 
But, each one leverages, on average, about 10 other civilians--
NGOs, partnering with civilians from other countries, who are 
there as part of the government commitment, partnering with the 
United Nations, partnering with Afghans, hiring Afghans.
    And, you know, one of the examples that I was going to 
give, if Senator Bond had asked, because I know how interested 
he is on agriculture--and this is--just gives you a little bit 
of a taste. You know, as soon as the marines secured Marjah, 
civilians began to go out. And they have a program called the 
Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture 
Plus (AVIPA-Plus)--don't ask me why--the AVIPA-Plus program. 
They've distributed 7,000 of those vouchers for fertilizers, 
for new seeds, trellises for grapes. And it's that kind of 
intensive work, on the ground, that doesn't take a lot of 
civilians, it takes the right kind of civilians. So, we have 
USDA agriculture experts. We have people, as Senator Bond has 
pointed out, from National Guard units, who have expertise in 
agriculture.
    So, we are leveraging the presence of our civilians, and we 
will probably be adding more, but we want to be sure that where 
we add them is really critical to the mission.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
    Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, this afternoon we have 
focused our attention on Afghanistan and Iraq, and I believe we 
focused our resources there, also. However, we have been 
receiving disturbing news on the conditions in Somalia and of 
Somalia as a safe haven for al Qaeda.

                                SOMALIA

    My question is, Do we have sufficient resources to counter 
the Somalian threat? Has that become a sufficient threat to us, 
the Somalian situation?
    Secretary Gates. We probably both ought to both answer on 
this one.
    Secretary Clinton. I was just wondering where the buzzing 
sound is from.
    Senator, we are working very hard, again, in our civilian-
military cooperation, with the aim of trying to bolster the 
transitional Federal Government in Somalia, which doesn't have 
a lot of scope of authority. It's basically confined to a part 
of Mogadishu. Our main source of support is the AMISOM, the 
African Union troops primarily from Uganda that are providing a 
lot of the logistical and backup support that the Somalis need. 
Al Shabab is a threat. I mean, Al Shabab is a very clear 
threat. And we see, unfortunately, it's morphing into a kind of 
al Qaeda junior partner over the last year. But, there is a 
growing sense that many of the Somalis themselves are no longer 
willing to be intimidated by, or just give in to, Al Shabab. 
They've been extremely brutal in their treatment of people--a 
lot of amputations and other kinds of very barbaric 
punishments. They have, you know, stolen and diverted food aid, 
and prevented it from getting to the people. So, there's a 
gradual growth of opposition internally in Somalia. But, 
clearly our support for the African Union mission, and then the 
additional help that our military is providing, in terms of 
training, is critical to the survival of the nascent government 
there and our hope that we can gain more ground by supporting 
it.
    Secretary Gates. That says it all.
    Chairman Inouye. Senator Cochran, do you have anything 
more?

                     ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

    Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, no, except to thank our 
witnesses, the Secretaries, for being here and helping us fully 
understand what we need the funding for. I've been impressed by 
their testimony and their leadership of their Departments.
    Chairman Inouye. I wish to echo that, also.
    [The following questions were not asked at the hearing but 
were submitted to the Departments for response subsequent to 
the hearing:]
            Questions Submitted to Secretary Hillary Clinton
            Question Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye
    Question. Secretary Clinton, several audits and reports from the 
Department of State Inspector General, Department of Defense Inspector 
General, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction have 
uncovered several deficiencies with the Department of State's oversight 
and management of contracts in theater and have made several 
recommendations on ways to improve. Many of those recommendations are 
not implemented and contract management and oversight staffing 
shortfalls remain. How does the Department of State plan to improve its 
management and oversight of its contracts in both Afghanistan and Iraq 
especially as your Department takes over increased responsibility in 
Iraq?
    Answer. The Department of State is committed to strengthening our 
contract management processes. The majority of the Department of State 
(DoS) contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased the number of 
overseas and domestic contract management staff significantly. For 
example, in Iraq the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs Bureau (INL) is increasing their contract management support 
from five individuals overseas and 9 domestic individuals in September 
2008 to 15 overseas individuals and 24 domestic individuals by August 
2010. In Afghanistan, INL is increasing their contract management 
support from 6 individuals overseas and 15 domestic individuals to 25 
individuals overseas and 25 domestic individuals by September 2010.
    In the last 2 years, the Office of Acquisitions Management (A/LM/
AQM) created a strategy and established a business process for audits 
of A/LM/AQM contracts. We developed a close and professional working 
relationship with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) which are the Department's 
audit agencies for major programs. We also issued an A/LM/AQM 
operational policy pertaining to audit services to ensure staff is 
aware of the policy. This strategy ensures that the Department meets 
contract administration responsibilities required by the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR). During fiscal year 2009, the Department 
initiated 12 external audits of significant programs. In addition to 
financial audits, we initiated a series of business system audits to 
review contractor accounting and internal controls, billing systems, 
estimating systems, labor system controls, subcontractor systems, and 
property management systems in conjunction with audits of specific 
contracts on a pre-award and post-award basis. The Quality Assurance 
Branch works closely and successfully with contracting officers, the 
Office of Inspector General, and program offices to obtain 
documentation, provide answers to audit related questions, support 
negotiations, and reach settlement agreements.
    Since 2008, A/LM/AQM has also significantly improved our contract 
close-out process. A/LM/AQM designed an effective business process and 
formed a team of close-out specialists, trained to identify contractual 
and budget issues, perform contract analysis, and to reconcile and 
document obligations and payments. This team is developing standard 
operating procedures for all of our contract managers to follow and is 
training their colleagues in A/LM/AQM on our new business process. In 
fiscal year 2010, as of February 24, 2010, nearly 500 contracts have 
been closed out.
    The Department is continuing to examine other improvements to 
contract oversight through the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
Review with USAID acquisitions offices.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
    Question. Secretary Clinton, the fiscal year 2011 budget submitted 
by the President includes estimates for overseas contingency operations 
of $50 billion per year for fiscal year 2012 and beyond. Can you 
address, in detail, the rationale behind the budget estimate and 
whether the President is anticipating submitting revenue or spending 
measures to offset the amount requested should it exceed $50 billion?
    Answer. The Department of State defers to the Office of Management 
and Budget and the Department of Defense in responding to this 
question.
    Question. Secretary Clinton, the Special Inspector General for 
Iraqi Reconstruction has reported that corruption and mismanagement 
continue to waste hundreds of millions of reconstruction dollars in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan, but you have rejected his recommendation for 
the creation of a new entity to coordinate and oversee reconstruction 
efforts. What, then, are you doing to ensure that those monies are 
spent effectively on projects that contribute to stability and that can 
be maintained after the U.S. presence has withdrawn?
    Answer. Corruption and the mismanagement of development resources 
in Iraq and Afghanistan could undermine our efforts in both countries. 
As a result, even though we have not accepted all of the Special 
Inspector Generals' recommendations, we are taking concrete measures to 
ensure U.S. government funds are well spent and carefully monitored in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction, Stuart Bowen, has stated several times, including in 
testimony before your Committee, that fraud has played a very small 
role in the use of U.S. funds appropriated for Iraq reconstruction. We 
have greatly benefitted from SIGIR's recommendations and have taken 
steps to address deficiencies SIGIR has identified. We take seriously 
findings from the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction 
on the dangers of corruption and mismanagement of development funding 
and are taking steps to address these concerns. Specifically, we are 
increasing our staffing to improve programming and oversight; 
developing alternative oversight mechanisms in situations where direct 
access to development activities is not yet possible; and, through the 
provision of technical assistance, are increasing the capacity of local 
institutions to provide services to the population and make assistance 
efforts more sustainable.
    USAID is working intensively with our Missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to discern mission staffing requirements, recruit, and 
retain qualified staff for roles in capital cities and countryside. 
These new personnel have a wide variety of backgrounds including 
financial management, agriculture, governance, and engineering, and add 
much needed development assistance to Afghanistan, while overseeing 
projects they are able to access.
    In areas where ongoing insecurity or military operations can make 
supervisory visits by USAID direct hires more difficult, we have 
devised methods to either allow U.S. personnel access to sites with 
military escorts or facilitate locally engaged staff reporting visits. 
We have developed and are continuing to refine ``movement agreements'' 
with our military colleagues that guarantee our development 
representatives on PRTs regular access project sites, increasing their 
ability to directly oversee development projects funded with U.S. 
dollars. Where our American managers are unable to access development 
sites, we rely on trusted local staff, Quality Assessment/Quality 
Control (QA/QC) contractors, and implementing partners to oversee 
projects.
    Finally, and most importantly, we are working to develop native 
Afghan ability to administer and oversee development throughout 
Afghanistan. We are increasing the funds we send through local entities 
(the government and private sector) via a robust certification process. 
This shift is helping to build Afghan capacity to manage development 
funds, make Afghan ministries and implementers more accountable, and 
build Afghan capacity to support long-term, sustainable development.
    Against this backdrop, USAID works collaboratively with our 
inspector general community and promotes audits to enhance the 
effectiveness of our activities and confirm that our efforts to weed 
out corruption and mismanagement are successful.
    Question. Secretary Clinton, what is the status of efforts to 
address corruption and build a workable Afghan government that can 
protect and continue the reconstruction work accomplished to date?
    Answer. President Karzai spoke to the need for improved governance 
and anti-corruption reforms in his inaugural address and at the London 
Conference in January 2010. Since January, the Afghan government and 
the international community have made several commitments to key 
reforms and anti-corruption initiatives. Major successes include the 
March 18 adoption of a presidential decree to tackle administrative 
corruption and strengthen the High Office of Oversight (HOO), 
Afghanistan's primary anti-corruption institution, but we still have 
significant work to do.
    The Afghan and U.S. governments have a variety of programs to 
address governance and corruption. To improve the prosecution of 
corruption-related offenses, the Afghan Government created the Major-
Crimes Task Force (MCTF), a multi-ministry initiative responsible for 
investigating corruption, kidnapping and organized crime cases and 
preparing them for prosecution, and the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) 
within the Attorney General's Office. The Afghan government also agreed 
to establish an Anti-Corruption Tribunal (ACT) of specially vetted 
judges to oversee high-profile cases. The MCTF receives financial and 
technical support from the Department of Defense and the Department of 
State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, while 
the Department of Justice provides technical support. In March, the 
MCTF conducted its first arrest and prosecution of an Afghan government 
official.
    To improve transparency and accountability, the Afghan government, 
with USAID support, has implemented hiring reforms and a vetting 
process for Afghan government employees through the Civil Service 
Commission. We are also working to strengthen the HOO so that it can 
better serve as an oversight mechanism for nationwide anti-corruption 
efforts. At a recent press conference, the HOO publicly named the 
Afghan Ministers who had not yet filed asset declaration forms. It is 
now working to secure 100 percent compliance.
    We are also reviewing our own procedures to ensure they do not 
contribute to Afghan corruption. USAID is reviewing the financial, 
management, procurement and expenditure systems of key ministries to 
determine their capacity to accept U.S. direct assistance. We are also 
using fewer big contractors, reducing the layers through which our 
assistance flows. Finally, we are dramatically increasing the numbers 
of USAID officers and inspectors to monitor our aid.
                                 ______
                                 
                Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl
    Question. Secretary Clinton, you are now requesting an additional 
$150 million in food aid assistance for Haiti, which obviously 
indicates the problems there are longer-term than first thought.
    Do you expect the food aid needs in Haiti to continue next year? 
Also, if that is the case, will the 2011 budget request for Public Law 
480 still be adequate?
    Answer. USAID anticipates that there will be a continued need for 
food assistance to address both chronic and acute food insecurity in 
Haiti over the next year. In addition to USAID's annual $35.5 million 
non-emergency program, which addresses chronic food insecurity in 
Haiti, USAID has provided approximately $125.3 million in emergency 
food assistance in fiscal year 2010 to the World Food Program (WFP) and 
private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to address acute food insecurity 
associated with the earthquake. Emergency food assistance, ordered in 
fiscal year 2010, will support WFP's emergency operation, which runs 
through December 2010, and PVO emergency programs, which run through 
February 2011. It is not possible at the present time to predict 
emergency food aid needs for fiscal year 2011. The fiscal year 2011 
Title II in-kind food aid request helps fulfill the Administration's 
commitment to transparent budgeting by making the regular food aid 
request closer to the historic average.
    Question. Secretary Clinton, I know that you and Secretary Vilsack 
are working together on the issue of global food security. It seems to 
me that USDA, including the Extension Service and land grant 
universities can make a significant contribution in that effort.
    Secretary Clinton, can you please describe how you are working with 
Secretary Vilsack on this effort and your views on enhanced 
Agricultural research and extension efforts to assist developing 
countries?
    Answer. We have placed high priority on the role of agricultural 
research under this initiative. USAID and USDA are collaborating on the 
development of a new strategy for harnessing advances in science and 
technology to promote food security and that will strengthen ties 
between the United States, international, and developing country 
research institutions. USAID brings a long history of leadership in 
international agricultural research spanning back to the Green 
Revolution. And, for more than 30 years under Title XII of the Foreign 
Assistance Act, USAID has supported U.S. land grant universities to 
engage in collaborative research with developing countries and to train 
thousands of agricultural researchers and policy makers. USDA brings 
additional expertise and dual use technologies through both their 
intramural research and the extramural grants of the National Institute 
for Food and Agriculture (NIFA). For example, USDA's Agricultural 
Research Service has some of the world's leading expertise in wheat 
stem rust, a disease of major significance to global food security. The 
recently issued NIFA call for proposals includes an emphasis on food 
security. We are integrating the efforts and strengths of both Agencies 
into a single strategy that will contribute to the objectives of this 
initiative.
                                 ______
                                 
             Question Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
                      counternarcotics operations
    Question. The U.S. military is planning to scale down its presence 
in Afghanistan beginning in July 2011. Almost every counternarcotics 
operation conducted in Afghanistan at this time is supported by the 
U.S. military and these operations are increasing in number. In 2009, 
DEA conducted 82 interdiction operations in Afghanistan compared with 
43 in fiscal year 2008.
    Looking ahead, does the State Department have a plan for continued 
counternarcotics operational support after the departure of U.S. troops 
from Afghanistan?
    Answer. The State Department currently provides support for 
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in a variety of ways; while it 
is certainly true that military support is vital for conducting 
interdiction operations in insecure areas, it has always been and 
remains our goal, together with the DEA and the military, to build up 
Afghan capacity to carry out all facets of the counternarcotics 
mission, from investigations to operations and operational support. The 
Afghan National Army has been involved in supporting some of these 
operations already within the past year, and with the military's help, 
we hope that they and the Afghan National Police will continue to 
progress in their ability to conduct independent operations. 
Additionally, INL's Air Wing in Afghanistan has provided operational 
support to some CNPA/DEA missions, and will continue to do so on an as-
available and as-needed basis.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
                          family reunification
    Question. As you are well aware, U.S. Federal law requires that 
State officials who place children in foster care to pursue the primary 
goal of family reunification, while at the same time, developing an 
alternative permanency plan for the child. If the family reunification 
efforts fail, then the alternate plan will already be in place and well 
on its way to completion. This practice, which is called concurrent 
planning, is intended to reduce the total period of time a child will 
remain in out of home care before being permanently placed with a 
family. Is this an approach the United States might encourage its 
international partners to consider taking here so that children in 
Haiti are not spending unnecessary time in non-permanent situations?
    Answer. Yes, we are aware of and support the concept of concurrent 
planning for children in care. We note that the main problem in Haiti 
before and after the earthquake is that the GoH does not have a child 
welfare system that is able to engage in case-by-case analysis of each 
child's situation and needs so that, if needed, a concurrent plan could 
be written, approved, and executed. Immediately after the earthquake so 
many children were in need of emergency care--such as food, water and 
shelter--that the immediate priority was to focus on those needs. In 
the near future, with fiscal year 2010 bilateral and supplemental 
funding, the USG will prioritize support to the GoH in building and 
leading a national child protection plan based on international 
standards, child welfare laws and regulations, and effective monitoring 
and evaluation. Such a plan will lead to improved legislation and 
policies, thus providing the legal framework for alternative care, 
including conditions for placement of children with foster families.
                     universal definition of orphan
    Question. As you know, one of the many challenges in addressing the 
needs of orphan children in Haiti is the lack of a universally accepted 
definition of what is an orphan. In fact, the often cited estimate that 
there were 380,000 orphans in Haiti prior to the earthquake include 
children who had one living parent and/or extended family.
    What can the United States do to assist the Government of Haiti in 
developing the data necessary to better understand what children's 
precise needs are?
    Answer. The United States Government is actively assisting in the 
development of the data systems necessary to better understand 
children's precise needs by providing expert technical assistance to 
the U.S. Mission Child Protection Team, technical assistance and 
transport for the Government of Haiti (GoH) and UNICEF assessments of 
the needs of children in hundreds of orphanages in the Port-au-Prince 
area, and by supporting nationally representative surveys such as 
periodic demographic and health surveys (DHS) and a recent survey of 
child trafficking, restaveks (children in residential care performing 
household labor in slave-like conditions), and child victims of 
violence.
    The figure of 380,000 is the UNICEF estimate of the number of 
children under 18, before the earthquake, who had lost one or both 
parents. Of this number, 330,000 children had lost one parent and 
50,000 had lost both parents. The great majority of these children were 
living with the surviving parent (if a single orphan) or with extended 
family members, usually a grandparent or aunt or uncle.
    Prior to the earthquake, only 67 of an estimated 600 residential 
care centers (referred to as ``orphanages,'' though many of the 
children have one or both parents living) had been registered with the 
GoH. Because a majority of these centers were unregistered, there is 
little official data or statistics on children living in these 
conditions. Approximately 300 of these centers were located in Port-au-
Prince and the surrounding earthquake-affected area.
    The USG is supporting the GoH and UNICEF to map and build a 
database of children's residential care centers to facilitate stronger 
oversight through registration and monitoring in the future. As of 
March 15, the UNICEF-led Child Protection Sub-cluster (CPSC) had 
completed assessments in 488 residential care centers. More than 30,000 
children were residing in assessed centers, while some were found to be 
no longer hosting children. The USAID-funded database is now co-managed 
by UNICEF and the Haiti Institute of Social Welfare and Research 
(IBESR), and includes information made available and continuously 
updated by 59 international and local non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), community-based groups and faith based organizations that 
compose the Child Protection Sub-Cluster. This database has utmost 
relevance as it represents the first ever baseline regarding the 
situation of children in residential care in Haiti.
    With USAID support, Haiti carried out demographic and health 
surveys in 1994-1995, 2000, and 2005-2006. The 2005-2006 survey 
included information for children under 18 about whether the parents 
are alive, whether the children live with their parents and the 
relationship to other members of the household.
    Nonetheless, there is wide recognition that Haiti's knowledge base 
about orphans and vulnerable children is not sufficient to immediately 
inform program development. Within the next 6 months, UNICEF and the 
Haitian Institute of Social Welfare and Research plan to conduct an 
ample survey to investigate the root cause for the unprecedented 
concentration of children in Port-au-Prince orphanages (e.g., direct 
consequence of the earthquake, poverty-driven separation, and 
displacement for household labor, among others) and to refine estimates 
of the number of children in restavek.
    The USG may assist the GoH to conduct this survey as soon as 
possible, thus ensuring that accurate data is available and that child 
protection activities are based on solid evidence, benefiting the 
largest number possible of vulnerable children.
                          long-term solutions
    Question. Long term solutions to the issues facing Haiti's orphan 
children will undoubtedly require the mobilization and coordination of 
both traditional and non-traditional partners. Have you given any 
thought about how you might mobilize faith based, corporate and 
professional partners around the goal of providing families for orphan 
children?
    Answer. Yes, a great deal of thought has been given to the 
mobilization of such partners. Faith-based partners in particular have 
long played a central and seminal role in assisting children and are 
well positioned to scale-up such services. USG agencies are currently 
working with a variety of faith-based partners in Haiti to address the 
needs of orphans and vulnerable children.
    Catholic Relief Services, the Adventist Development and Relief 
Agency, Food for the Hungry, Samaritan's Purse, World Vision, Care 
International and Save the Children, several of which are faith-based, 
are among the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance's main 
partners in the January to April emergency assistance phase. Together, 
these organizations have received over $85 million from USAID to 
provide shelter, food, water and emergency health services to Haiti's 
vulnerable children and their caregivers.
                           local contracting
    Question. Under the Stafford Act, preference is supposed to be 
given to local contractors in disaster affected areas when bids on 
Federal contracts are being awarded. However, following Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, Louisiana experienced a situation by which out-of-
state contractors coming in and underbidding local contractors for the 
disaster recovery projects. In this instance the government needed to 
enforce stricter oversight of contract awards to ensure that the 
recovery contracts were not only going to help rebuild these 
communities, but also ensure that local economies would benefit as 
well.
    Does the proposed funding for rebuilding Haiti include planning 
provisions to provide preferences for local contracting as the country 
works to rebuild its infrastructure and its economy?
    Answer. The USG is committed to engaging local partners in its 
reconstruction efforts. We are pursuing several different strategies to 
ensure that local partners are included in ways that are transparent 
and in compliance with USG contracting regulations.
    For example, we will maximize local procurement and are developing 
a program to assist local entities in understanding and complying with 
USAID reporting guidelines. We are designing scopes of work and program 
descriptions in a way that will emphasize a larger number of small 
awards to open the contracting process to local enterprises. Engagement 
with local partners will be part of the selection criteria in all of 
our solicitations. Similarly, we will increase local participation by 
making Creole language skills a requirement for certain personnel under 
our contract solicitations.
                           hazard mitigation
    Question. The U.S. government recognizes the importance of hazard 
mitigation response particularly in the wake of a disaster. After the 
President issues a disaster declaration Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP) funding is made available to the disaster affected states. In 
fact, a Congressional Budget Office study supports the concept of 
funding hazard mitigation practices as a way for the Federal government 
to ultimately save money. The study concluded that for every $1 
invested in mitigation projects the Federal government saves $3.
    Does the U.S. funding request for Haiti include a plan for hazard 
mitigation assistance if the donated funds are used to rebuild the 
damaged infrastructure?
    Will USAID also provide technical assistance to the Haitian 
government in regards to developing building codes that can withstand 
future earthquake and hurricane damage?
    Answer. Since 1994, Haiti has witnessed five devastating natural 
catastrophes, each destroying livelihoods that Haitians worked hard to 
rebuild. Overcoming this cycle of disaster requires an in-depth 
understanding of the threats. The United States has worked with leading 
scientists to map high-risk areas by tracking flooding, landslides and 
storms over the past decades and complementing this analysis with 
projections on future hazards. This analysis has been shared and 
discussed with Haitian authorities and informed the GOH's preliminary 
vision document. It is also informing the drafting of the final Haitian 
National Reconstruction and Development Plan, which will be presented 
at the March 31 donors conference in New York.
    Recently the White House National Science and Technology Council 
Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction (SDR) convened a meeting, co-
sponsored by USAID, Dept of State, and the U.N. International Strategy 
on Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), on ``Rebuilding for Resilience: How 
Science and Engineering Can Inform Haiti's Reconstruction''. This 
workshop was held in Miami earlier this week and included academics, 
practitioners, and policy makers representing the top scientists, 
engineers, social scientists, land-use planners, and officials 
associated with Haiti for hazard evaluation, construction, and social 
structure. Among the 107 invited participants were nearly a dozen 
Haitians, from academics to the Minister of the Environment. The intent 
of the workshop was to establish a dialogue among all parties and to 
produce a set of statements to guide donors and others in the effort to 
build back with resilience in the face of multiple hazards. The 
workshop was quite successful in meeting its goals.
    The President's Supplemental Budget Request for Haiti, submitted to 
Congress yesterday, recognizes that Port-au-Prince should be built back 
to a better standard. Reconstruction investments must decongest the 
city to a safer and more sustainable size, and institute building codes 
and effective zoning. The same principles apply to the newly designated 
growth poles. In all of the infrastructure and housing activities 
described in the supplemental request, the United States will support 
stronger building codes as part of our goal to ``build back better.''
                               sheltering
    Question. Tragically, as a result of the earthquake in Haiti, 
approximately 600,000 people are still living under tarps, tents or bed 
sheets in an effort to find shelter. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
the U.S. government acknowledged that temporary housing options such as 
travel trailers were not the only solution, clearly, tents are not a 
long-term viable option for Haiti as the rainy season approaches.
    What is the U.S. plan for long-term housing assistance to Haiti?
    As we work to rebuild Haiti, does the U.S. government intend to 
recommend the implementation of economical, environmentally sustainable 
housing solutions like those being tested by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency in Emmetsburg, Maryland?
    Answer. The durable plastic sheeting/tarps that USAID and other 
partners distributed is on track to reach its May 1 target. Learning 
from past disasters like the Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquake in 
Pakistan, the humanitarian response in Haiti focused on waterproof, 
rip-proof, and fire-resistant sheeting instead of tents, since tents 
are not as durable or adaptable. The plastic sheets have been used as 
weather-resistant covering for roofs and walls of emergency shelters, 
and they will be integral in supporting the Government of Haiti's 
longer-term housing response.
    As hurricane season approaches and the humanitarian response begins 
to focus on constructing more durable shelter, these sheets will be 
combined with transitional shelter kits that contain cement, timber or 
steel framing, tin roofs, and nails to create transitional shelters 
that will protect from heavy winds and rain. The transitional shelter 
kits can be recycled and re-used in the construction of more permanent 
housing with a concrete slab floor, and can be easily assembled by 
local labor. USAID, in keeping with the internationally accepted best 
practices espoused by the U.N. Shelter Cluster, has encouraged these 
community-based, equitable, and cost-effective transitional shelters 
instead of larger pre-fab housing in order to minimize the opportunity 
for social conflict, maximize cost-effectiveness, and ensure that 
housing solutions are culturally and site-appropriate. Past experience 
has shown that inequitable resource distribution--such as providing 
pre-fab shelters to some, but not all community members--can be a 
driver for conflict. Land scarcity and the relatively high cost of pre-
fab shelters would preclude their being distributed universally. By 
using emergency shelter materials for more durable transitional and 
permanent shelter, USAID is supporting economical and environmentally 
sustainable housing that is culturally appropriate for the Haitian 
context.
    The President's supplemental request for Haiti includes $133 
million for investments in new settlements. In Port-au-Prince, through 
a ``sites and services'' approach, the program would deliver an 
estimated 9,600 houses to homeless families. In two of the designated 
secondary cities, an additional 14,400 families would benefit from this 
program. These communities would have access to clean water, sewage, 
and electricity. Homes on allocated lots would be constructed 
incrementally to adequate building codes, supported by training in 
construction, supervised by experts, and include materials appropriate 
for the Haitian climates and customs. This would ensure the creation of 
thousands of temporary jobs in the construction sector and allow 
Haitians to gain the skills required to perform maintenance and find 
future employment in this sector. These 24,000 units would be home to 
100,000-120,000 people. They would be integrated with planned 
investments by the United States and other donors and multilateral 
partners in social sectors, roads, security, rule of law and 
governance.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
    Question. Just last week, The Washington Post featured an article 
which reported that ``many Afghan women say they still feel 
voiceless.'' And, CNN featured a heartbreaking story last week about a 
19-year-old Afghan woman whose nose and ears were cut off for shaming 
her in-laws. She had suffered torture and abuse for years.
    It also is not surprising that there are media reports that say 
that President Karzai's peace conference next month will have very 
limited input from women.
    During your service in the Senate, you and I had the opportunity to 
travel to Afghanistan together where we met a group of Afghan women. 
The progress we were seeing then seems so distant. We cannot forget 
about these women.
    Can you comment on any progress you are seeing in this area?
    Answer. Women's empowerment in Afghanistan and their full and equal 
participation in their society are fundamental prerequisites for 
achieving a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. I underscored this in 
my remarks in London earlier this year at the International Conference 
on Afghanistan, where I met with the women from Afghan civil society 
who addressed the conference and emphasized that women need to be 
involved at every step of the way in the process of rebuilding Afghan 
civil society. The participation of Afghan women is critical for 
sustainable development, better governance, and peace--in short, they 
are essential to securing a better future for Afghanistan.
    As reintegration and reconciliation efforts move forward, the 
United States is committed to ensuring that Afghan women's rights will 
not be sacrificed. I underscored this during our recent United States-
Afghanistan Strategic Dialogue, where I met with the three women 
members of the Afghan delegation. Women want peace. They do not want to 
be sold out. We supported Afghan women civil society's own 
recommendations to include 20 percent women at the Consultative Peace 
Jirga that just took place between June 2 and June 4 as well as follow-
on shuras and consultations at all levels--at the national, provincial, 
and local levels. There were 336 female delegates among the 1,600 total 
delegates, which is approximately 21 percent. Women had diverse 
experiences during the Consultative Peace Jirga. While some felt they 
were able to participate in their committees and ensured that women 
were mentioned in the outcome document, others were disappointed with 
the outcomes of the peace jirga, since only one woman was a facilitator 
out of 28 groups.
    Via the Ambassador's Small Grants Fund, which aims to strengthen 
the technical and organizational capacity of Afghan women-led NGOs, we 
supported a 2-day pre-Peace Jirga conference for most of the female 
Jirga participants, which helped provide them with the training and 
skills necessary to assist them serve as key participants and 
facilitators in the Consultative Peace Jirga. I assure you we will 
continue to advocate for the full participation of women in the ongoing 
discussions in Afghanistan on issues of peace, stability and security.
    While there has been progress for women in certain areas, including 
girls' education and women's political participation, much remains to 
be done to improve the lives of women overall. Today, more than 6.2 
million students are enrolled in Afghanistan's schools, of which 35 
percent are girls. Nonetheless, overcoming years of exclusion from 
education is a long process. Only an estimated 21 percent of Afghan 
women are literate, and the female illiteracy rate is as high as 90 
percent in rural areas. Although there is broad popular support for 
girls' schooling, extremists still try to impose their brutal agenda by 
force, by burning down schools, gassing schoolgirls, or throwing acid 
in the faces of female students.
    In health as well as in education, the Taliban excluded women from 
all services. The legacy of those restrictions has left Afghanistan 
with the second-highest maternal mortality rate in the world, and other 
health indicators for women, particularly in the area of reproductive 
health, are similarly low, although slowly making progress. With U.S. 
government assistance, access to health services has risen dramatically 
since 2001. The number of midwives available to assist with deliveries 
has quadrupled; the number of health facilities with women health 
workers has more than doubled. There has been a 26-percent increase in 
the total number of antenatal visits and a 30-percent increase in the 
number of women delivering with the assistance of a skilled midwife.
    As you can see, while women's lives are improving in some areas, 
there is still much more work to be done to achieve full political, 
economic and social empowerment. I look forward to continuing to work 
with you to ensure that our programs for Afghan women effectively 
address their needs and promote their sustained political, economic, 
and social progress.
    Question. President Karzai has said an action plan for 
reintegrating Taliban fighters into society and talking with the 
insurgency's top leaders will be crafted at a spring peace conference 
in Kabul. Can you comment on what you expect will be the outcome of 
this conference?
    Answer. President Karzai's Consultative Peace Jirga will build 
momentum as a stepping stone toward the Kabul Conference and give voice 
to the Afghan people in their efforts to end the insurgency. 
Specifically, the Consultative Peace Jirga will unveil to a cross-
section of Afghan society the Afghan Government's peace plan, including 
a program to reintegrate insurgent commanders and fighters peacefully 
back into their communities. The jirga will seek to incorporate input 
from participants on the peace plan and reintegration program. It will 
be the first in a series of national-level meetings we expect to foster 
discussion of the peace process in Afghanistan, including the Kabul 
Conference, and a tentatively planned follow-on jirga in fall 2010.
    We support Afghan-led reintegration of former insurgents--
identified as a priority by President Karzai in his November 2009 
inauguration speech--as it is aimed at reducing fighting and 
reintegrating insurgents peacefully into communities. Fighters must 
pledge to cease violence, live in accordance with the Afghan 
Constitution, and have no ties to al-Qaeda or affiliated transnational 
terrorist organizations.
    Reintegration will require the strong financial support of the 
international community as well as political support in keeping with 
the hard-won political and human rights of all Afghan citizens--men and 
women alike--as enshrined in the Afghan Constitution. We support the 
inclusion of Afghan women in the upcoming Consultative Peace Jirga 
deliberations.
                                 ______
                                 
              Question Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski
    Question. In order to protect U.S. interests in the Arctic region, 
I believe that it is vital for the Senate to ratify the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Secretary Clinton, you have 
previously stated that you support ratification. What can we do to make 
the Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty a priority for this 
administration?
    Answer. This Administration continues to strongly support accession 
to the Law of the Sea Convention, and, as you are aware, we have 
included the Convention on the Treaty Priority List as one for which 
the Administration seeks Senate approval. As conveyed to Senators Kerry 
and Lugar in October 2009, the Department of State stands ready to 
facilitate the Senate's consideration of this treaty by providing 
witnesses, testimony, and overall support. We appreciate your 
leadership in our efforts to gain the necessary support for advice and 
consent to accession of this vitally important treaty.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted to Hon. Robert M. Gates
            Questions Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye
    Question. Secretary Gates, one of our military strategies in 
Afghanistan is to clear, hold, then build in an area. U.S. forces and 
the Afghan National Army have begun that mission in Marja. They have 
successfully cleared the area of the Taliban and are now in the process 
of holding the area. The ability to hold an area in the long term will 
largely come down to the Afghan National Police maintaining security. 
Unfortunately, I am informed that the people of Marja have so little 
faith in the Afghan National Police that some have stated they prefer 
to have the Taliban over the Police force. If this is the perception of 
the Afghan Police, how do we move forward with our strategy to hold and 
build?
    Answer. The premise of the question is only partly accurate. The 
Taliban have controlled Marjah for several years. Prior to the Taliban 
controlling Marjah, the local Afghan police were untrained and were led 
by and loyal to a local strongman. When a combined effort of Afghan and 
international forces pushed the Taliban out of Marjah, they were 
welcomed by the local population who said they wanted neither the 
Taliban nor the old abusive police back. International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) was well aware of the history and had planned 
for this by having the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the 
nationally led, well-trained element of the Afghan National Police 
(ANP), ready to go into Marjah as combat ended. The ANCOP have been 
deployed to Marjah for almost 2 months, and have been welcomed by the 
local population as they build trust in the ANP as an institution. We 
are working with the Afghans to develop their capabilities to improve 
the ANP and begin the process of transition for the long term.
    It is essential to our counterinsurgency strategy that the ANP be 
trusted by the people, and perceived as effective and not corrupt. The 
NATO Training Mission Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition 
Command--Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) is working to increase 
accountability and transparency, as well as to institutionalize 
processes within the ANP to counter corruption.
    Question. Secretary Gates, the supplemental request before the 
Committee supports our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan but 
also supports the troop surge of an additional 30,000 troops in 
Afghanistan that President Obama approved in December 2009. Of those 
30,000 troops, roughly 10,000 are already in theater and the remaining 
20,000 are still being deployed by the Department and will largely 
consist of Army units and enablers. If this surge is one of the keys to 
success in Afghanistan, why is it taking so long for those troops to 
get on the ground and why are the Marine units able to get on the 
ground faster than the Army units?
    Answer. The speed at which forces flow into theater is determined 
by the sequence and timing specified by the Combatant Commander. The 
flow of forces is also impacted by transportation availability and the 
theater's ability to absorb (or accommodate) the arrival of incoming 
forces.
    The majority of the forces associated with the additional 30,000 
troops were requested in three USCENTCOM Requests For Forces (RFFs). 
The first 12,485 forces were ordered by the SecDef on December 4, 2009. 
The Combatant Commander requested a Marine regiment to arrive in March 
2010, Army brigades in July 2010, and an Army combat aviation brigade 
in July 2010. Efforts to accelerate this force flow succeeded in 
delivering the first of these forces to Afghanistan in mid-December 
2009. While 97 percent of the requested forces are scheduled to arrive 
in Afghanistan by august 31, 2010 in accordance with the Combatant 
Commander's requirement, forces have requested arrival dates as far out 
as November 15, 2010.
    The first unit of the 30,000 additional forces to arrive in 
Afghanistan was as Army aviation battalion in mid-December. This Army 
battalion was immediately followed by two Marine battalions and another 
Army infantry battalion which arrived at the end of January 2010. In 
total, between December 15, 2009 and January 31, 2010 forces 
approximately equal in size from both the Army and the Marines arrived 
in Afghanistan.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
    Question. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2011 budget submitted by 
the President includes estimates for overseas contingency operations of 
$50 billion per year for fiscal year 2012 and beyond. Can you address, 
in detail, the rationale behind the budget estimate and whether the 
President is anticipating submitting revenue or spending measures to 
offset the amount requested should it exceed $50 billion?
    Answer. The $50 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO) 
for fiscal year 2012 and beyond is a placeholder developed by the 
Administration. The actual OCO budget requests will be dependent upon 
the security situation on the ground.
    I do not know whether the President anticipates submitting revenue 
or spending measures to offset the actual amount requested should it 
exceed $50 billion.
    Question. Secretary Gates, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi 
Reconstruction has reported that corruption and mismanagement continue 
to waste hundreds of millions of reconstruction dollars in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan, but you have rejected his recommendation for the 
creation of a new entity to coordinate and oversee reconstruction 
efforts. What, then, are you doing to ensure that those monies are 
spent effectively on projects that contribute to stability and that can 
be maintained after the U.S. presence has withdrawn?
    Answer. The Department places significant emphasis on addressing 
waste, fraud, and abuse in reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The 
Department works closely with the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (SIGIR) and other inspector general organizations to 
ensure appropriate oversight.
    From a practical standpoint, the creation of a new U.S. Government 
oversight organization for reconstruction would likely take some time 
to establish, which would exceed the timeline for the drawdown of 
military presence in Iraq. Given the current conditions in Iraq, 
theater guidance has continued to emphasize a shift towards smaller-
scale, capacity-building projects that contribute to stability. 
Commanders on the ground work closely with local Iraqi organizations to 
transfer responsibility for projects where necessary, to identify any 
sustainment requirements, and to ensure there is the required Iraqi 
commitment to a new initiative before it is launched.
    Question. Secretary Gates, you and I have both devoted a great deal 
of attention to addressing the timeliness of the medical evacuation 
responses in Afghanistan. I recently learned that the average time of 
these missions has been significantly decreased from over an hour and a 
half to an average of less than 45 minutes from the time of 
notification of the injury of a service member to the time of arrival 
at a first level surgical facility. Recognizing that the more rapid the 
response, the more lives are saved, what are the current challenges in 
providing rapid evacuation and are you firmly committed to continue to 
provide the most rapid response and evacuations possible?
    Answer. [Deleted].
    Question. Secretary Gates, I have been informed that certain NATO 
allies have standards or caveats on their medical evacuation aircraft 
limiting their support during certain times of the day and under 
certain battlefield conditions. When U.S. combat forces operate in 
these areas, they are often required to provide their own medical 
evacuation capabilities because of either the NATO 90 minute response 
standard or caveats on their operations limiting response to daylight 
or non-combat response. What is being done to remedy this issue?
    Answer. Seven nations currently have caveats on MEDEVAC missions 
that include minimum night vision goggle illumination requirements, 
dust limitations, constraints on flying in mountainous terrain, 
requirements for landing zones to be secured, or higher headquarters 
approval processes. Although the Departments of Defense and State 
consistently appealed to ISAF nations to remove operationally 
restrictive caveats, we are realistic that limitations in training and 
budgets, as well as political factors, will preclude all caveats being 
dropped. Therefore, as part of the President's increase in forces to 
Afghanistan, a Combat Aviation Brigade is being deployed in RC-North to 
provide, among other missions, timely MEDEVAC coverage. Additionally, 
General McChrystal has directed regional commanders to ensure that all 
Allied service personnel receive appropriate and expedient medical 
care, ideally within 60 minutes of receipt of a MEDEVAC request.
    To support achievement of the goal of 60 minutes for our servicemen 
and women, in June 2009 I issued a memorandum to Commander, USCENTCOM 
directing him to achieve medical evacuation parity between Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, with the standard for 
both theaters at 60-minute mission completion time. I further 
instructed General Petraeus to improve MEDEVAC response times in 
Afghanistan by: establishing procedures to expedite MEDEVAC mission 
launches without having to wait for approval; creating a process to 
identify, analyze, and report all MEDEVAC missions that take longer 
than 60 minutes; reviewing existing MEDEVAC approval and launch 
procedures across Afghanistan; directing U.S. Forces--Afghanistan 
(USFOR-A) to review International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/NATO 
procedures and Standard Operating Procedures, and making 
recommendations to ISAF for streamlining current requirements; and 
requiring all U.S. forces in the USCENTCOM to review and understand 
existing MEDEVAC procedures.
    Question. Secretary Gates, it has been brought to my attention that 
during operations in Afghanistan, U.S. forces enter areas believed to 
be infiltrated by the Taliban and, because of the widespread 
availability of cell phone and satellite phone technology, their 
efforts to capture the enemy are thwarted when lookouts provide early 
warning of their approach. What efforts can be undertaken to provide 
readily available, comprehensive and continuous support to defeat this 
enemy capability?
    Answer. [Deleted].
    Question. Secretary Gates, it has come to my attention from a 
variety of sources that Special Operations forces in Afghanistan do not 
have sufficient medivac, manned intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) platforms or dedicated air assets. As a result, 
forces are at increased risk. What is being done to remedy this 
situation and when can these units expect to receive additional 
support?
    Answer. [Deleted].
    Question. Secretary Gates, I recently learned that the Air Force 
plans to transfer 12 C-130 aircraft, including 2 from the 130th Airlift 
Wing in Charleston, West Virginia, to an Air Force Reserve unit in 
Arkansas without discussion with the National Guard and without 
apparent consideration for the ability of the National Guard to sustain 
its critical support mission during a period of active overseas 
military operations. Please address the following:
    What analyses was conducted by the U.S. Air Force to support the 
transfer of the 12 C-130 aircraft from National Guard bases across the 
United States to the Little Rock Air Force Base? My understanding of 
this proposed reallocation is that, in order to avoid the expense 
associated with recapitalization of an aging fleet, the Air Force is 
simply commandeering aircraft from the Air National Guard.
    Answer. The recently released Mobility Capabilities and 
Requirements Study (MCRS) 2016 heavily influenced our decision during 
the fiscal year 2011 budget development to reduce our C-130 force 
structure. MCRS showed a decrease demand for tactical airlift, so we 
opted to retire a portion of our oldest C-130Hs to avoid future 
required modifications and increasingly costly sustainment. 
Additionally, we were able to accelerate the planned retirement of C-
130Es, whose average age is 46 years. These retirements allowed us to 
save $256 million in modification and operations cost over the Future 
Years Defense Program. In retiring these aircraft we created a gap in 
the C-130 schoolhouse which had to be sourced from within the remaining 
C-130 fleet to meet our training requirements. As part of the Air Force 
Corporate process, it was decided to take small reductions in aircraft 
inventory from several Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve 
squadrons.
    Question. If the decision is made to transfer these aircraft, will 
you commit to supporting a request for the procurement of 12 new C-130 
aircraft to replace those aircraft being taken from the Air National 
Guard; aircraft which are very actively involved in support of the 
homeland security mission as well as direct support of U.S. overseas 
contingency operations in the theater of operations?
    Answer. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS) 
2016 showed a decreased demand for tactical airlift, so we opted to 
retire a portion of our oldest C-130Hs to avoid future required 
modifications and increasingly costly sustainment. These retirements 
created gaps in the C-130 schoolhouse that we sourced from within the 
remaining C-130 fleet. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request 
reduces the total C-130 fleet based on the excess capacity identified 
in MCRS. There is no current replacement plan to procure additional 
aircraft specifically for the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve 
which would add excess capacity into the C-130 fleet.
    Question. The C-130 issue is not the first time the Air Force has 
attempted to recapitalize the active force at the expense of the 
National Guard. In the recent past, the Air Force also acquired six RC-
26 aircraft from the Air National Guard to supplement Intelligence 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets in support of overseas 
contingency operations as an enduring requirement. These aircraft which 
are critical to the National Guard's homeland defense, homeland 
security, and domestic counter-narcotics missions in the United States 
have not been replaced.
    Will you commit to supporting a request for the procurement of new 
aircraft to provide suitable ISR capabilities to the Air National Guard 
to reconstitute these capabilities?
    Answer. The aircraft are operated and owned by the Air National 
Guard (ANG). Consistent with their Federal role, the Air National Guard 
has been supporting Air Force Special Operations Command requirements 
by deploying a small number of RC-26 aircraft on a continuing basis in 
the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The ANG has approached the Air 
Force to advocate making the RC-26 an Air Force program of record. 
Those discussions are ongoing and no decisions have been made. However, 
prior to making any investment decisions, the Air Force would require 
the ANG to complete a capabilities-based assessment, an initial 
capabilities document and an analysis of alternatives to determine the 
best solution to address this operational requirement.
                                 ______
                                 
                Question Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl
           state and agriculture role in global food security
    Question. Secretary Gates, from a national and international 
security perspective, and from your experience as the former president 
of a land grant university, what are your views on this?
    Answer. I wholeheartedly support the role of the U.S. Departments 
of State and Agriculture in the Global Food Security initiative. The 
Administration's Principles for Advancing Global Food Security provide 
a good roadmap for addressing food security and world hunger issues, 
which have definite implications for national security and state 
stability. For any additional comment on global food security, I would 
defer to the Departments of State and Agriculture.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
    Question. If we are going to meet these growing needs, the VA is 
going to have to accurately predict estimated casualties and develop a 
long-range strategic casualty plan. And as you know, that is going to 
take the full commitment of the Pentagon. So I want to make sure that 
there is not a disconnect between the VA and DOD with regard to data 
collection and forecasting the needs of our returning service members.
    Can you tell me about how you are working to share information? Are 
you working with the VA on developing and implementing a strategic 
casualty plan?
    Answer. Yes, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs 
(VA) have been working closely in data sharing and on developing and 
implementing a strategic casualty plan.
    Since 2000, DOD has been providing automated daily updates of 
Service member and veteran personnel data to the VA. By May 2010 the 
data sent to VA will also include all members who became wounded, 
injured, or ill (WII) while serving in the military.
    Question. But as you also know, there are now an untold number of 
military spouses who have been completely frozen out of the program 
after it was closed off to new enrollees. Two weeks ago I sent a letter 
to you outlining my disappointment in the management of this program 
and requesting that you expand it to all military spouses from this 
point forward.
    Please comment on your commitment to working with me on reopening 
this program to all military spouses so that we can better honor the 
many sacrifices they make.
    Answer. I am committed to working with Congress in supporting the 
families and spouses of Service members.
    On March 13, 2010 we resumed the MyCAA program for the 136,583 
currently enrolled spouses (Phase 1). We continue to consider a wide 
range of long-term options for its sustainment (Phase 2) and should 
have a decision soon on the way ahead.
    Question. You previously testified the Department would not change 
the Air Force's tanker requirements in response to EADS' request for a 
90-day extension to the May 10 proposal submittal deadline. However, I 
am concerned about the recent DOD announcement that EADS would have an 
additional 60 days if they committed to submitting a bid for the KC-X 
tanker. They have been a participant in this process for several years 
and have had ample time to consider whether or not to submit a bid. The 
delays triggered by this decision will only result in further hindering 
the replacement of these Eisenhower-era aircraft.
    Why did the Department grant an extension for the KC-X tanker RFP 
to accommodate EADS?
    Answer. Competition on KC-X is in the best interest of the 
Warfighter and taxpayer. In the DOD News Briefing on March 31, 2010, 
the following was announced, ``The Defense Department informed both 
EADS and Boeing that if we receive formal notification from EADS of 
their intention to make an offer, we will extend the deadline for bids 
from May 10 to July 9.'' Additionally, ``It is not uncommon to grant 
reasonable extensions in competitions of this sort, and we consider 60 
days to be reasonable in this case.'' On April 10, 2010, EADS-NA 
announced their decision to bid on the KC-X proposal. As a result, the 
Department granted a 60 day extension to all offerors.
    Question. You had previously testified that the Department's 
lawyers had indicated that there was no legal basis to account for 
illegal European subsidies to Airbus in the KC-X tanker competition. I 
would like for you to elaborate on this further as this should be a 
factor in making a contract award that could negatively impact the U.S. 
defense aerospace industry.
    What did you mean by that statement?
    Answer. It would be premature as well as inappropriate to take 
account of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling in the RFP as any 
attempt to seek redress can take place only within the institutional 
framework of the WTO and pursuant to rules and procedures of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding.
    Question. Can you provide to the committee within the next week the 
legal analysis you have undertaken that supports the position that 
there is no basis for including or accounting for illegal European 
subsidies to Airbus in the tanker competition?
    Answer. No formal written legal position exists on this topic.
                             haiti support
    Question. What legislation would be required for there to be a 
basis on which you could address the illegal subsidies issue in the 
tanker competition?
    Answer. Legislation already exists. Section 886 of the Duncan 
Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 directs 
DOD to conduct a study of the impacts to the KC-X source selection from 
subsidies after a ruling by the World Trade Organization that the 
United States, the European Union, or any political entity within the 
United States or the European Union, has provided a covered subsidy to 
a manufacturer of large commercial aircraft. DOD is to complete the 
review not later than 90 days after the World Trade Organization has 
completed ruling on all cases involving the allegation of a covered 
subsidy provided to a manufacturer of large commercial aircraft. We 
intend to comply fully with this requirement.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
    Question. According to a recent article, Abdul Qayum Zakir, who was 
released from Guantanamo Bay this past December, has become a senior 
Taliban military commander in Afghanistan, replacing Mullah Abdul Ghani 
Baradar, whom Pakistani security forces captured last month. What 
concerns me is that Zakir was released from U.S. custody on December 7.
    Are you aware of other detainees that have been released since 
January 2009 who have returned to the fight?
    Answer. QFR response is classified and will be handled via 
classified channels.
                      counternarcotics operations
    Question. The U.S. military is planning to scale down its presence 
in Afghanistan beginning in July 2011. Almost every counternarcotics 
operation conducted in Afghanistan at this time is supported by the 
U.S. military and these operations are increasing in number. In 2009, 
DEA conducted 82 interdiction operations in Afghanistan compared with 
43 in fiscal year 2008.
    Looking ahead, has DOD begun to plan for continued counternarcotics 
operational support after the departure of U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan?
    Answer. Since 2004, DOD has built counternarcotics capacity within 
the Afghan Government, with the goal of creating self-supporting 
organizations that contribute to the security and stability of 
Afghanistan. The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) is the 
lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics production 
and distribution on Afghanistan. To assist with the long-term 
development and transition of ownership to the Afghan Government, DOD 
established the CNPA Development Cell (CDC) under the Combined Security 
Transition Command (CSTC-A)/NATO Training Mission--Afghanistan (NTM-A), 
with experts from DOJ's International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program (ICITAP). DOD, partnering with DEA and the 
Department of State, will continue to build Afghan CNPA capacity to 
ensure they are capable of countering narcotics trafficking in 
Afghanistan.
                         poppy crop eradication
    Question. It was reported that in the recent U.S. Marine offensive 
in Marja, Afghanistan orders were given to leave the fields of opium 
alone. A member of General McChrystal's strategic Advisory Group, 
Commander Jeffery Eggers was quoted in the N.Y. Times as saying, ``We 
don't trample the livelihood of those we're trying to win over.'' The 
spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics said, ``How can 
we allow the world to see lawful forces in charge of Marja next to the 
fields full of opium, which one way or another will be harvested and 
turned into poison that kills people all over the world?''
    Answer. The current U.S. Counternarcotics (CN) Strategy for 
Afghanistan focuses resources on those programs that will contribute 
directly to (1) breaking the narcotics-insurgency-corruption nexus, and 
(2) helping to connect the people of Afghanistan to their government. 
U.S. resources are not being applied directly to eradication, which is 
a shift from the previous CN strategy, but will focus instead on 
interdiction of drug products, elimination of drug production 
infrastructure, and development of alternative crops. Eradication 
efforts are the responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan. The 
Department appreciates that there is no single easy answer to dealing 
with Marja's winter opium crop. It is critical that counterinsurgency 
operations involving clearing and holding territory include CN efforts 
within the subsequent ``build'' phase, during which counterinsurgency 
forces build support for the Afghan government.
    Question. The Taliban is both a terrorist organization and a drug 
cartel that makes hundreds of millions of dollars a year selling the 
heroin that comes from poppy plants in Afghanistan.
    Why has DOD allowed the illegal poppy fields, that produce opium 
and provide essential funding for the Taliban, to be harvested?
    Answer. As part of the Administration's new Afghanistan strategy, 
the U.S. Government no longer funds or supports large-scale eradication 
of poppy fields which targets the local farmer, though we do not object 
to Afghan-led eradication. Preventing workers from growing poppy as a 
cash crop can lead to unrest and contributes to Taliban recruiting. 
Moreover, payments to prevent poppy cultivation have also failed. 
Instead, the Counternarcotics (CN) strategy is directly linked to the 
counterinsurgency strategy undertaken in a ``whole-of-government'' 
approach. The new strategy is focused on the re-development of the 
agricultural sector as an engine for job growth and higher incomes for 
rural families, enabling farmers to choose licit alternatives to poppy 
and promotes self reliance. At the same time, we focus on the 
interdiction of drugs, precursor chemicals, stopping drug traffickers, 
and arresting drug lords.
    U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, along with their international 
and Afghan partners, are clearing and holding key terrain, securing an 
environment where a building effort can proceed. U.S. Marines are 
currently providing micro-grants and loans to farmers in Marjah that 
provide them agriculture inputs--things like tools, seeds, and 
fertilizer--to grow licit summer crops. USAID and other United States, 
Afghan, and international organizations are providing additional 
developmental support to local Afghan populations to allow them to 
participate in a legitimate economy.
                        unmanned aerial vehicles
    Question. As you know, with some technical modifications unarmed 
UAVs can be converted into capable armed platforms. With increased 
proliferation of advanced UAV technology, I am concerned that the 
military advantage the United States currently retains will be 
undermined through unregulated exports or transfers of this technology 
by our own country or other nations.
    In detail, what is DOD's current policy regarding the sale or 
transfer of UAVs to foreign countries?
    Answer. Given the wide range of U.S.-origin UAV platforms and 
systems that are available for sale, DOD evaluates proposed foreign 
sales or transfers on a case-by-case basis since all UAV equipment and 
technologies controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) are subject to a case-by-case review. MTCR Category I systems, 
which include almost all armed UAVs in the Department of Defense's 
inventory \1\, are subject to a strong presumption of denial and are 
evaluated in accordance with the MTCR Guidelines and U.S. 
nonproliferation policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The only armed MTCR Category II UAS in the U.S. inventory is 
the Hunter B UAS. To date, there have been no exports of the armed 
Hunter B UAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Within DOD, the term ``Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)'' (rather 
than ``UAVs'') is normally used to describe the complete capability 
delivered with these systems, including the aircraft or vehicle, 
payloads, control segment, and communications architecture. There are 
several DOD policies and processes that are employed to assess proposed 
foreign sales or transfers of UAS platforms and technologies. These DOD 
policies and processes are also used to make recommendations to senior 
DOD officials for or against proposed UAS sales, and establish proposed 
terms and conditions for such sales if they are deemed to be in the 
U.S. national security interest. DOD uses several technology security 
and foreign disclosure processes (e.g., National Military Information 
Disclosure Policy Committee; Low Observable/Counter Low Observable 
Executive Committee; Committee for National Security Systems) to assess 
proposed foreign sales or transfers of UASs. The Combatant Commanders' 
opinions play a key role in these DOD decision processes. These DOD 
assessments and recommendations, as well as the Department of State's 
(DoS's) independent assessments and views, are considered in the DoS/
DOD MTCR process. If necessary, the National Security Council decision 
process can be used to resolve divergent views within the interagency 
arena and formulate an Administration position on a proposed UAS 
foreign sale or transfer.
    In the event the Administration decides a proposed UAS foreign sale 
or transfer is needed to build the partner capacity of an allied or 
friendly nation, specific details of the UAS capability and technology 
offered for sale or transfer must be established by the Department. For 
example, the Combatant Commanders have asked that modifications be made 
in areas such as UAS sensor or data transmission capabilities in order 
to retain the warfighting advantage for U.S. Forces. In addition, the 
Department may implement anti-tamper techniques to protect UAS critical 
program technology. To provide further protection against misuse or 
diversion, the Department normally recommends that UASs with 
significant military capability be sold via the Foreign Military Sales 
program, including Enhanced End Use Monitoring of the sale or transfer 
after delivery to the foreign government, consistent with Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency policies and procedures.
    Accordingly, the Department fully complies with all Arms Export 
Control Act statutory requirements, as well as USG export control 
regulations and DOD national disclosure policy requirements prior to 
UAS foreign sales or transfers.
    Question. Do you support limiting the export of U.S. UAV technology 
capable of being employed to deliver munitions?
    Answer. We believe the existing regulatory and statutory 
limitations on the export of U.S. UAS technology capable of being 
employed to deliver munitions are working well. As noted in a previous 
answer, almost all current armed UASs in the DOD's inventory are 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I systems. These UASs 
are subject to a strong presumption of denial and are fully evaluated 
for missile proliferation issues consistent with our commitments under 
the MTCR. Any proposed export of armed UASs undergoes an extensive 
review and vetting through both the Departments of Defense and State. 
Finally, the Administration (normally the Department of State) provides 
applicable congressional notifications required by the Arms Export 
Control Act and other relevant statutes prior to making a commitment to 
sell or transfer such UASs. These notifications enable Legislative 
Branch oversight of such proposed sales as an integral part of the 
overall U.S. Government decisionmaking process.
    Question. What is the Department doing to ensure that UAVs are not 
used against American troops?
    Answer. The Department is committed to ensuring that Unmanned Air 
Systems (UAS) technologies do not fall into the wrong hands. We are 
undertaking several initiatives to ensure these systems are 
appropriately controlled.
    Currently, all armed U.S. UASs are Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MCTR) Category I systems, and as such, there is a presumption 
of denial of any export. The Department evaluates any key operational 
or strategic basis that could potentially overcome the presumption of 
denial. The Department is working with the Department of State on a 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)-only policy specifically for MTCR Category 
I systems. In addition to the FMS-only policy for armed UASs, all UAS 
transfers are subject to enhanced use-monitoring using the Department's 
Golden Sentry and end-use checks. In addition, the Department has 
implemented a number of processes to ensure that the Direct Commercial 
Sales of UAS do not pose a threat to U.S. Forces. These measures 
include rigorous background end-user checks by the Departments of State 
and Defense.
    Question. Have you investigated the possibility of entering into 
agreements with foreign nations and foreign producers of advanced UAV 
technology to limit the sale or transfer of this technology?
    Answer. Two multi-lateral regimes, the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, already address the export 
of advanced UAVs, their subsystems and components, and associated 
technologies (DOD uses the term UAS). The Department will continue to 
work closely with our allies and partners to add export controls on 
UAVs in the Wassenaar Arrangement. In addition, the Department is 
continually updating the UAV technologies controlled under the MTCR. 
Normally, the Department meets twice a year with our MTCR Partners to 
consider updates to the list of items controlled. In addition, the 
Department shares intelligence and proliferation trends at the MTCR 
Information Exchange with our MTCR Partners to achieve a common 
understanding of worldwide proliferation trends. The U.S. Government 
does work with other countries in its efforts to limit UAS 
proliferation to end-users of concern. Although the Department of 
Defense is not the lead agency, it works closely with the Department of 
State to address UAS proliferation issues, including by cooperating 
with other countries to address potential exports that raise 
proliferation concerns or may not be consistent with international 
norms. Given the U.S. Government's extensive involvement in these 
multilateral regimes and existing bilateral contacts, the Department 
does not believe there is a need for additional arrangements with 
foreign nations and producers of advanced UASs.
                           cluster munitions
    Question. Secretary Gates, on September 29, 2009, Senator Leahy and 
I sent a letter to the President along with 14 of our colleagues urging 
him to conduct a thorough review of U.S. policy in cluster munitions. 
As you may know, Senator Leahy and I have introduced the Cluster 
Munitions Civilian Protection Act--co-sponsored by 25 of our 
colleagues--to restrict the use of cluster bombs with high failure 
rates. And on August 6, 2010, the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions 
which prohibits the use of cluster bombs formally comes into effect. I 
understand the White House has referred our letter to the Pentagon for 
a response.
    What is the status of your response?
    Answer. The National Security Advisor, General Jones, provided a 
written response to your letter on April 14. He said, in part, ``United 
States policy on Conventional Weapons is a priority for the 
Administration. We are already conducting a comprehensive policy review 
on U.S. landmine policy. Once this is complete, we intend to initiate a 
comparable comprehensive review of our cluster munitions policy, which 
deserves equal attention.''
    Currently, the Military Services are implementing the DOD policy 
entitled ``DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to 
Civilians'' which I signed in June 2008. This policy was the result of 
a year-long Departmental review and requires that after 2018 all 
cluster munitions, after arming, result in no more than 1 percent 
unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational 
environments. The policy establishes a comprehensive approach to 
addressing concerns related to cluster munitions that will 
significantly reduce the potential risk to civilians associated with 
the use of cluster munitions while retaining an important military 
capability. DOD will continue to ensure that employment of cluster 
munitions is consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, U.S. targeting 
methodologies and Rules of Engagement, and applicable international 
agreements in order to minimize the impact on civilian populations and 
infrastructure.
                        private dod contractors
    Question. I understand that you have initiated a 15-day review to 
look into reports that Michael D. Furlong used government funds to hire 
private contractors to gather information on suspected insurgents in 
Afghanistan. I have the following questions about your 15-day review.
    Will the review also go beyond Mr. Furlong to examine the expanding 
network of Pentagon contractors with professed expertise in 
``information operations'' or intelligence collection?
    Answer. There are no plans at this time to expand the review beyond 
the examination of Mr. Furlong's activities.
    Question. Will the results of the review be shared with the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee and with the Intelligence Committee?
    Answer. Once the review has been completed the results will be 
shared with the appropriate Congressional Committees.
    Question. Is it true that the DOD Inspector General is also 
investigating Mr. Furlong's work?
    Answer. Formal investigations by the Defense Criminal Investigation 
Service and Air Force Office of Special Investigations are underway, as 
well as ATSD (IO), Mike Decker, conducting investigations on whether 
Joint Information Operations Warfare Center personnel or contractors 
were used to conduct HUMINT.
    Question. Will the DOD IG's report be shared with the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee and with the Intelligence Committee?
    Answer. The results from the various reports will be shared with 
the appropriate Congressional Committees.
    Question. If there were concerns raised about Mr. Furlong's 
activities why was there no notification made to any Congressional 
Committee?
    Answer. The initial assessment addressed overall contracting 
oversight and found no evidence of problems beyond this specific 
contract. We have now focused investigations on this specific contract 
and associated activities to determine whether contractual, security or 
department policy violations may have occurred in the past. Once the 
investigations are completed we will share the results with the 
appropriate Congressional Committees.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Johnson
    Question. The supplemental request includes $529 million for 
military construction in Afghanistan to support the troop increase. The 
fiscal year 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations request includes 
another $1.26 billion for military construction to support the war in 
Afghanistan. Most of the fiscal year 2011 projects are not scheduled 
for completion until well into fiscal year 2012 or even 2013. Some are 
at locations that are likely to be enduring, but others are not.
    Given that the President has announced his intent to begin to 
withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan in July 2011, how do you 
reconcile the construction timeline for the projects at non-enduring 
bases with the President's timeline for withdrawing troops from 
Afghanistan?
    Answer. In accordance with the Presidential timeline for 
withdrawal, the International Security Assistance Force will, in July 
2010, begin to transfer responsibility to the Afghans. Because this 
transfer will occur district-by-district and province-by-province, 
based upon conditions as they evolve on the ground, the USCENTCOM and 
ISAF Commanders will continue to synchronize the application of 
resources to include military construction funds within a dynamic 
timeline.
    Currently, military construction resources are primarily being 
applied to the major logistical and command and control hubs; 
designated as enduring bases. Other locations where military 
construction funding is being applied include critical locations to 
support the expansion of security and governance; focused on areas that 
are unlikely candidates for early transition to Afghanistan. Finally, 
some of the military construction projects are occurring at non-
enduring bases which address force protection issues, including life, 
health, and safety concerns in compliance with Sections 317 and 807 of 
the 2010 NDAA.
    Question. If the primary purpose of these projects is to support 
our troops, is there any reason why they shouldn't be funded in the 
fiscal year 2010 supplemental in order to accelerate the construction 
timeline?
    Answer. There is no reason fiscal year 2011 OCO projects should not 
be funded in the fiscal year 2010 supplemental. However, with the large 
fiscal year 2010 program already appropriated and projects requested in 
the fiscal year 2010 OCO Supplemental, accelerating the fiscal year 
2011 program will be a challenge to execute by the end of fiscal year 
2010. Our execution/contracting agents are nearing capacity and thus 
would focus on those fiscal year 2011 projects for which earlier timing 
would most benefit our forces on the ground. The majority of projects 
in the fiscal year 2011 OCO request will most likely be awarded in 
fiscal year 2011, regardless of the year of funding.
    Question. In light of the President's timeline for troop 
withdrawal, do you anticipate additional military construction 
requirements beyond fiscal year 2011?
    Answer. It is too early to determine if additional military 
constructions requirements will be needed.
    Question. An accounting of the total funding appropriated for 
military construction in Iraq since 2003, by location, project, and 
fiscal year, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
    Answer. The attached tables display the total funding for military 
construction and contingency construction authority (CCA) projects in 
Iraq since 2003 for all Services.

 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MILCON) FUNDING IN IRAQ--FISCAL YEAR 2004-FISCAL
                                YEAR 2010
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Current
                                           Appropriated    Funding Level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriated MILCON \1\.................       1,502,780       1,237,174
Title 10 U.S.C. 2808....................  ..............         145,000
Contingency Construction Authority......  ..............         704,000
                                         -------------------------------
      Total Funding.....................       1,502,780       2,086,174
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The difference between the ``Appropriated'' and ``Current Funding
  Level'' is attributable to the:
    Fiscal year 2008 undistributed reduction (Public Law 111-32) in the
  amount of $120,576,000.
    Canceled projects. $56,780,000. $42,000,000 funded Title 10 U.S.C.
  2808 projects.

Note: There were no Military Construction projects in Iraq for fiscal
  years 2003, 2009, or 2010.


                                                                             MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN IRAQ
                                                                                    [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                                   Appropriated       Current
              Service                      Fiscal Year                       Location                                           Project                               Amount       Funding Level
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army...............................  2008..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Hot Cargo Ramp \1\.......................................          18,500  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Landfill Construction....................................           3,100           2,100
Army...............................  2008..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  South Airfield Apron (India Ramp) \1\....................          28,000  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Baghdad, Iraq...........................  Water Supply, Treatment & Storage, PH III \1\............          13,000  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Adder, Iraq........................  Convoy Support Center Relocation, Phase II...............          39,000          39,000
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Adder, Iraq........................  Petroleum Oil and Lubricant Storage Area \1\.............          10,000  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Adder, Iraq........................  Wastewater Treatment and Collection System...............           9,800           9,800
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Anaconda, Iraq.....................  Hazardous Waste Incinerator \1\..........................           4,300  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Anaconda, Iraq.....................  Landfill Construction....................................           6,200           2,800
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Constitution, Iraq.................  Juvenille Tifric \2\.....................................          11,700  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Marez, Iraq........................  Landfill Construction....................................             880             880
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Ramadi, Iraq.......................  Landfill Construction....................................             880             880
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Speicher, Iraq.....................  Aviation Navigation Facilities \1\.......................          13,400  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Speicher, Iraq.....................  Landfill Construction....................................           5,900           3,900
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Speicher, Iraq.....................  Military Control Point...................................           5,800           5,800
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Taqqadum, Iraq.....................  Landfill Construction....................................             880             880
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Victory, Iraq......................  Landfill Construction \2\................................           6,200  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Victory, Iraq......................  Level 3 Hospital \1\.....................................          13,400  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Victory, Iraq......................  Wastewater Treatment and Collection System \1\...........           9,800  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Victory, Iraq......................  Water Treatment and Storage, Phase II \1\................          18,000  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Camp Warrior, Iraq......................  Landfill Construction \2\................................             880  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Fallujah, Iraq..........................  Landfill Construction....................................             880             880
Army...............................  2008..................  Q-West, Iraq............................  North Entry Control Point................................          11,400          11,400
Army...............................  2008..................  Q-West, Iraq............................  Perimeter Security Upgrade...............................          14,600           9,600
Army...............................  2008..................  Scania, Iraq............................  Entry Control Point \2\..................................           5,000  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Scania, Iraq............................  Water Storage Tanks \2\..................................           9,200  ..............
Army...............................  2008..................  Various Locations, Iraq.................  E-Glass Overhead Cover, Phase IV.........................         105,000         105,000
Army...............................  2008..................  Various Locations, Iraq.................  Overhead Cover E-Glass...................................          30,000          30,000
Air Force..........................  2008..................  Balad AB, Iraq..........................  Fighter Ramp.............................................          11,000          11,000
Air Force..........................  2008..................  Balad AB, Iraq..........................  Foxtrot Taxiway..........................................          12,700          12,700
Air Force..........................  2008..................  Balad AB, Iraq..........................  Helicopter Maintenance Facility..........................          34,600          13,450
                                                                                                                                                                 -------------------------------
      Total 2008...................  ......................  ........................................  .........................................................         454,000         260,070
                                                                                                                                                                 ===============================
Army...............................  2007..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Heavy Aircraft Apron.....................................          14,400          11,700
Army...............................  2007..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Transient Aircraft Apron.................................           4,150           4,150
Army...............................  2007..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Runway with Shelters.....................................          13,600          13,600
Army...............................  2007..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Water Storage Tanks......................................          14,000           9,200
Army...............................  2007..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Electrical Infrastructure Upgrades.......................          14,600          14,600
Army...............................  2007..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Facilities Replacement...................................          23,000          20,300
Army...............................  2007..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Life Support Area \3\....................................          16,500  ..............
Army...............................  2007..................  Camp Adder, Iraq........................  Facilities Replacement...................................           1,800           1,800
Army...............................  2007..................  Camp Adder, Iraq........................  Life Support Area \3\....................................           8,500  ..............
Army...............................  2007..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  Life Support Area \3\....................................           8,500  ..............
Army...............................  2007..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  North Entry Control Point................................           7,400           7,400
Army...............................  2007..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  South Entry Control Point................................           7,500           7,500
Army...............................  2007..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  CJSOAC Operations Center.................................           3,450           3,450
Army...............................  2007..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  Truck Lane Access Road...................................           2,600           2,600
Army...............................  2007..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  Water Wells..............................................           2,200           2,200
Army...............................  2007..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  Water Storage Tanks......................................          10,000          10,000
Army...............................  2007..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  POL Tanks................................................           9,900           9,900
Army...............................  2007..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  Facilities Replacement...................................           7,000           7,000
Army...............................  2007..................  Camp Speicher, Iraq.....................  Facilities Replacement...................................          19,000          19,000
Army...............................  2007..................  Qayyarah West, Iraq.....................  Facilities Replacement...................................           1,800           1,800
Army...............................  2007..................  Camp Scania, Iraq.......................  Facilities Replacement...................................           2,400           2,400
Army...............................  2007..................  Camp Speicher, Iraq.....................  Life Support Area \3\....................................           8,500  ..............
Army...............................  2007..................  Victory Base Camp, Iraq.................  Facilities Replacement...................................          33,000          33,000
Army...............................  2007..................  Various Locations, Iraq.................  Facilities Replacement (Anti Terrorism/Force Protection).           8,000           8,000
                                                                                                                                                                 -------------------------------
      Total 2007...................  ......................  ........................................  .........................................................         241,800         189,600
                                                                                                                                                                 ===============================
Army...............................  2006..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Airfield Improvements....................................          15,000          15,000
Army...............................  2006..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Electrical Distribution/Generation Station...............           8,900           8,900
Army...............................  2006..................  Al Asad, Iraq...........................  Force Protection Improvements............................           7,400           7,400
Army...............................  2006..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  Perimeter Security Upgrade...............................          12,000          12,000
Army...............................  2006..................  Baghdad, Iraq...........................  Urban By-Pass............................................          50,000          50,000
Army...............................  2006..................  Camp Talil, Iraq........................  Construct/replace Roads..................................           5,700           5,700
Army...............................  2006..................  Camp Talil, Iraq........................  Base Security Fence......................................          22,000          22,000
Army...............................  2006..................  Camp Talil, Iraq........................  Convoy Support Center Relocation.........................          21,000          21,000
Army...............................  2006..................  Camp Talil, Iraq........................  Dining Facility..........................................           5,100           5,100
Air Force..........................  2006..................  Balad AB, Iraq..........................  Material Handling Equipment..............................           5,300           5,300
                                                                                                                                                                 -------------------------------
      Total 2006...................  ......................  ........................................  .........................................................         152,400         152,400
                                                                                                                                                                 ===============================
Army...............................  2005..................  Camp Hope, Iraq.........................  CMU Barracks.............................................           2,500           2,500
Army...............................  2005..................  Camp Talil, Iraq........................  CMU Barracks.............................................          24,600          24,600
Army...............................  2005..................  Camp Warrior, Iraq......................  Medical Facility.........................................           7,500           7,500
Army...............................  2005..................  Camp Warrior, Iraq......................  Tactical Ops Building....................................           6,100           6,100
Army...............................  2005..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  Battalion and Company HQ.................................           7,800           7,800
Army...............................  2005..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  Equipment Support Activity...............................          17,100          17,100
Army...............................  2005..................  LSA Anaconda, Iraq......................  Hospital Facility........................................          39,000          39,000
Army...............................  2005..................  Marez, Iraq.............................  CMU Barracks.............................................           9,300           9,300
Army...............................  2005..................  Marez, Iraq.............................  Combat Support Hospital..................................           9,900           9,900
Army...............................  2005..................  Marez, Iraq.............................  Troop Medical Clinic.....................................           2,900           2,900
Army...............................  2005..................  Muthanna, Iraq..........................  Harden Ammunition Bunkers................................          11,300          11,300
Army...............................  2005..................  Various locations, Iraq.................  CMU Barracks.............................................          55,200          55,200
Army...............................  2005..................  Various locations, Iraq.................  Overhead Cover System....................................         250,000         250,000
Army...............................  2005..................  Various locations, Iraq.................  Main Supply Route Aspen..................................          36,000          27,001
Air Force..........................  2005..................  Balad AB, Iraq..........................  Construct Cargo Marshalling Area.........................          15,000          16,715
Air Force..........................  2005..................  Balad AB, Iraq..........................  Construct Hot Cargo Pad..................................           3,500           3,408
Air Force..........................  2005..................  Balad AB, Iraq..........................  Construct CSAR/JSOAD/MEDEVAC Alert Compound..............           8,000           8,952
Air Force..........................  2005..................  Balad AB, Iraq..........................  Construct and Repair Munitions Roads.....................           2,700           2,097
Air Force..........................  2005..................  Balad AB, Iraq..........................  Repair/Install Airfield Lighting.........................          15,000          13,381
Air Force..........................  2005..................  Balad AB, Iraq..........................  Construct Special Operations Compound....................           2,850           2,850
Air Force..........................  2005..................  Tallil AB, Iraq.........................  Construct Temporary Cantonment Area \2\..................          10,800  ..............
                                                                                                                                                                 -------------------------------
      Total 2005...................  ......................  ........................................  .........................................................         537,050         517,604
                                                                                                                                                                 ===============================
Army...............................  2004..................  Al Fallujah, Iraq.......................  Power Plant and Electrical Distribution..................           8,000           8,000
Army...............................  2004..................  Baghdad, Iraq...........................  Entry Control Points.....................................           4,000           4,000
Army...............................  2004..................  Baghdad, Iraq...........................  Power Plant and Electrical Distribution..................           7,000           7,000
Army...............................  2004..................  Baghdad, Iraq...........................  Power Plant..............................................          11,500          11,500
Army...............................  2004..................  Baghdad, Iraq...........................  Sensitive Comartmented Information Facility..............           6,000           6,000
Army...............................  2004..................  Baghdad, Iraq...........................  Joint Operations Center..................................           3,500           3,500
Army...............................  2004..................  Baghdad, Iraq...........................  Training Facility........................................           2,200           2,200
Army...............................  2004..................  Balad, Iraq.............................  Theater-wide Postal Distribution Facility................           7,000           7,000
Army...............................  2004..................  Balad, Iraq.............................  Power Plant and Electrical Distribution..................          16,000          16,000
Army...............................  2004..................  Balad, Iraq.............................  Base Camp Water Treatment Plant..........................           9,800           9,800
Army...............................  2004..................  Balad, Iraq.............................  Base Camp Wastewater Treatment Plant.....................          10,500          10,500
Army...............................  2004..................  Taji Military Complex, Iraq.............  Power Plant and Electrical Distribution..................          16,500          16,500
Army...............................  2004..................  Tikrit, Iraq............................  Power Plant and Electrical Distribution..................          15,500          15,500
                                                                                                                                                                 -------------------------------
      Total 2004...................  ......................  ........................................  .........................................................         117,500         117,500
                                                                                                                                                                 ===============================
      Grand Total--Appropriated....  ......................  ........................................  .........................................................       1,502,750       1,237,174
                                                                                                                                                                 ===============================
Title 10 U.S.C. 2808 Construction
 Authority in the Event of
 Declaration of War or National
 Emergency:
    Army...........................  2007..................  Al Ramadi, Iraq.........................  Brick Factory \3\........................................  ..............           3,900
    Army...........................  2007..................  Al Taji, Iraq...........................  TIFRIC and Brick Factory \3\.............................  ..............          87,413
    Army...........................  2007..................  Camp Bucca, Iraq........................  WasteWater Treatment Plant \3\...........................  ..............          25,000
    Army...........................  2007..................  Camp Bucca, Iraq........................  Water Treatment Plant \3\................................  ..............          18,987
    Army...........................  2007..................  Camp Bucca, Iraq........................  Brick Factory \3\........................................  ..............           9,700
                                                                                                                                                                 -------------------------------
      Grand Total--Title 10 U.S.C.   ......................  ........................................  .........................................................  ..............         145,000
       2808.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Reconciliation: Appropriated to Current Funding Level:
\1\ Fiscal Year 2008 Undistributed Rescission--Public Law 111-32................................      ($120,576)
\2\ Canceled Projects...........................................................................       ($56,780)
\3\ Title 10 U.S.C. 2808 Authority..............................................................       ($42,000)
                                                                                                 ---------------
      Total.....................................................................................      $1,382,174


    Question. Please provide for the record the following information: 
A list of the U.S. bases in Iraq that have not yet been returned to the 
Iraqis, and a list of the bases currently planned to be enduring sites.
    Answer. As of March 31, 2010, U.S. Forces occupy 154 locations 
consisting of eight co-located operating bases (COBs), 32 co-located 
operating sites (COSs), 36 co-located operating locations (COLs), 32 
facilities, and 46 partnered bases. Detailed list attached. The number 
of enduring bases is unknown.

                                    COMPLETE LIST OF AGREED FACILITIES AND AREAS REMAINING BASES AS OF March 31, 2010
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 LAFA                                                                                                              Basing Stance    Estimated Closure or
  #       Base/Facility/Area Name              Type of Base              Current Base Type       USG Location     Inactive/Active        Return Date
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  289 LOVE                          COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  2-Apr-2010
  293 CALDWELL                      COD...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  2-Apr-2010
  442 QASR AMIJ                     COMPOUND......................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  3-Apr-2010
  398 YUSIFIYA, PB (Patrol Base)    COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  10-Apr-2010
  235 PHOENIX                       COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  15-Apr-2010
  240 PHOENIX BASE ANNEX            MNSTC-I COMPOUND..............  US BASE...............  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  15-Apr-2010
  271 SUJ, JOINT SECURITY STATION   COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  15-Apr-2010
  135 SUMMERALL                     COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  17-Apr-2010
  182 ABU GHRAIB, JOINT             COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  20-Apr-2010
       COORDINATION CENTER
  401 SALIE, JSS (Joint Security    COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  20-Apr-2010
       Station)
  294 PALIWODA                      COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  25-Apr-2010
  340 ZAYTUN                        COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  25-Apr-2010
  258 UR, JOINT SECURITY STATION    COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  30-Apr-2010
  291 SHEIK AMIR, JOINT SECURITY    COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  30-Apr-2010
       STATION
  307 ISTIQLAL, JOINT SECURITY      COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  30-Apr-2010
       STATION
  411 TAJI RTC                      COMPOUND......................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  30-Apr-2010
   13 UBAYDI, BATTLE POSITION       COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  1-May-2010
  246 EMBASSY ESTATES BILLETING     LSA...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  1-May-2010
  247 TRAVIS, CAMP BILLETING        LSA...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  1-May-2010
  248 BLACKHAWK ANNEX               HOUSING AREA..................  US BASE...............  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  1-May-2010
  250 RIVERSIDE BILLETING           LSA...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  1-May-2010
  402 CLEARY, JSS (Joint Security   COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  1-May-2010
       Station)
  304 ORYAN                         COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  2-May-2010
  278 763, COMBAT OUTPOST           COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  7-May-2010
    4 KOREAN VILLAGE, CAMP          COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  5-May-2010
  266 LOYALTY                       COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  10-May-2010
  268 ZAFARANIYA, JOINT SECURITY    COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  10-May-2010
       STATION
  263 BELADIYAT, JOINT SECURITY     COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  13-May-2010
       STATION
  279 CAHILL, COMBAT OUTPOST        COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  17-May-2010
  280 CARVER                        COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  24-May-2010
  331 BERNSTEIN                     COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  25-May-2010
  349 NORMANDY                      COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  25-May-2010
  308 TARMIYA, JOINT SECURITY       COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  30-May-2010
       STATION
  281 ASSASSIN, PATROL BASE         COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  1-Jun-2010
  276 CASHE SOUTH, COS              COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  5-Jun-2010
  407 VOLUNTEER, JSS                COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  15-Jun-2010
  212 AL MAHMUDIYAH, CAMP           COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  20-JuN-2010
  297 MUSHADA, JOINT SECURITY       COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVEE..........  30-Jun-2010
       STATION
  405 AL MUTHANA AIRFIELD, JOINT    COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  30-Jun-2010
       SECURITY STATION
  380 ABU GHRAIB WAREHOUSE          FACILITY......................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  1-Jul-2010
  269 MEADE                         COS...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  10-Jul-2010
  251 DOURA, JOINT SECURITY         COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  15-Jul-2010
       STATION
  179 NASIR WA SALAM, JOINT         COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  30-Jul-2010
       SECURITY STATION
  285 BESMAYA RANGE                 COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  31-Jul-2010
  434 Mithaq RETRANS                JSS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  31-Ju1-2010
  435 Tawila RETRANS                JSS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  31-Ju1-2010
  207 WAR EAGLE                     COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  10-Aug-2010
   28 CEDAR II                      COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  31-Aug-2010
  217 FALCON                        COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  15-Sep-2010
  146 Q-WEST (CAMP AND AIR BASE).   COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  Aug-2010
       Also, ENDURANCE, FOB
  150 QAYYAF PUMP HOUSE             SUPPORTING FACILITY...........  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  AuG-2010
  147 ASHURA, CAMP                  COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  Jun-2010
  175 SCANIA                        COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  Oct-2010
   10 NIMR                          COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   11 SINJAR COMMUNICATIONS SITE    COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   19 ECHO                          COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   20 ENDEAVOR, FORWARD OPERATING   COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       BASE
   23 JENKINS, JOINT SECURITY       COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       STATION
   25 EASTERN BARRACKS              COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   20 GARRY OWEN                    COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   31 ADDER                         COS...........................  HUB...................  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   33 UR, CAMP                      COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   34 UR, CAMP LOCATION COMMAND     OFFICE........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       TALLIL (LCT)
   38 APACHE (AL SHEEB)             COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   40 SAFWAN HILL                   COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   44 BASRA AIR STATION             COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   46 Wessam, Camp 1, MILITARY      MITT CAMPS....................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       TRAINING TEAM (CAMP WESSAM
       1)
   47 Wessam, Camp, JOINT           JOCC..........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       OPERATIONS COMMAND CENTER
       (CAMP
   48 Wessam, Camp 2, MILITARY      WITT CAMPS....................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       TRAINING TEAM (CAMP WESSAM
       2)
   5S BASRA OPERATIONAL COMMAND     MITT CAMPS....................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   62 BUCCA                         COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   63 UMM QASR                      COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   65 AL TIB                        COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   66 SFER, COP                     COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   70 MINDEN, SHALAMSHAH, FORWARD   COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       OPERATING BASE
   73 SPARROWHAWK, CAMP             JSS EQUIVALENT................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   79 BASRAH COMPLEX                PB EQUIVALENT.................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   82 AL ASAD                       COS...........................  HUB...................  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   85 HEIDER                        COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   86 SYKES                         COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   87 AL KASIK IRAQI MILITARY BASE  BILLETING.....................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   90 HABUR GATE                    POINT OF ENTRY................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
   94 ANBAR PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT   COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       CENTER (PGC)
  121 AR RAMADI, CAMP               COS...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  133 KAUFMAN                       COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  137 BAYJI OIL REFINERY (BOR)      COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  139 SPEICHER (CAMP AND AIR BASE)  COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  143 DAGGER                        COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  144 JALIL IRAQI ARMY BASE WITH    IA BASE W/CF..................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       COALITION FORCES
  152 MCHENRY                       COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  154 DAHUK RESIDENT OFFICE         OFFICE........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  161 MAREZ/DIAMONDBACK             COS...........................  HUB...................  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  162 AL KINDI                      IA BASE W/CF..................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  163 DAHUK TRAINING CENTER (1)     TRAINING FACILITY.............  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  168 IMN, COMBAT OUTPOST           COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  174 BABIL RESIDENCE OFFICE        REGIONAL EMBASSY OFFICE.......  US BASE...............  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  181 HUSSINIYAH, CAMP              COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  187 HAMIYAH, CAMP                 COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  188 VICTORY BASE COMPLEX          COS...........................  HUB...................  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  209 JUSTICE                       COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  211 DEASON, JOINT SECURITY        COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TEE
       STATION
  214 PROSPERITY                    COL...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  220 UNION III, FORWARD OPERATING  COL...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       BASE
  221 RASHEED, JOINT SECURITY       COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       STATION (OLD MINISTRY OF
  226 COMMAND LIAISON ELEMENT       COMPOUND......................  US BASE...............  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       COMPOUND
  233 COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL        COMPOUND......................  US BASE...............  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       OPERATIONS TASK FORCE
       COMPOUND
  256 SHIELD                        COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  257 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR          OFFICE........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, 7TH
       FLOOR
  273 AL RASHEED AIRFIELD           FACILITY......................  US BASE...............  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  284 ZULU, FORWARD OPERATING BASE  COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  287 HAMMER                        COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  298 TAJI, CAMP                    COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  306 BALAD, JOINT BASE (CAMP AND   COS...........................  HUB...................  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       AIR BASE)
  315 GRIZZLY                       COS...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  316 KHAMEES (JEDI MAIN)           MITT CAMPS....................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  317 WARHORSE                      COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  330 DORIA                         COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  334 GAINES-MILL                   COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  335 K1                            COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  338 WARRIOR                       COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  339 ERBIL                         COL...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  342 IRBIL RESIDENT OFFICE         AINKOWA ERBIL GOVERNATE.......  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  343 DELTA                         COS...........................  SPOKE.................  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  348 SHOCKER, PATROL BASE          COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  352 KIRKUSH PROJECT OFFICE        TRAINING FACILITY.............  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  353 KIRKUSH--LOGISTICS MILITARY   TRAINING FACILITY/CHUS........  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       ADVISORY TEAM
  354 MUNTHERIA, CAMP--AKA EDGE     COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  356 SULAMANIYAH RESIDENCE OFFICE  RESIDENT OFFICE USAGE.........  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  364 HEIDER, COMBAT OUTPOST        JSS EQUIVALENT................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  366 SCHWEDLER, CAMP               JSS EQUIVALENT................  PARTNIERED BASE.......  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  367 LEE, CAMP                     PB EQUIVALENT.................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  368 OLSON, PATROL BASE            JSS EQUIVALENT................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  369 SUMERALL, FORWARD OPERATING   JSS EQUIVALENT................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       BASE
  376 STACK HOUSE                   PB EQUIVALENT.................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  383 APACHE, COMBAT OUTPOST        PB EQUIVALENT.................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  392 GABE, FORWARD OPERATING BASE  JSS EQUIVALENT................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  394 IRBIL, CAMP                   JSS EQUIVALENT................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  395 COBRA, FORWARD OPERATING      JSS EQUIVALENT................  SPOKE.................  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       BASE
  396 CALDWELL, FORWARD OPERATING   JSS EQUIVALENT................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       BASE
  397 ANDREA, PATROL BASE           JSS EQUIVALENT................  PARTNERED BASE........  CJSOTF...........  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  404 DIBIS, JSS (Joint Security    COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       Station)
  406 AL RASHID, JOINT SECURITY     COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       STATION
  408 CONSTITUTION                  COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  410 MAHAWIL, PB                   COL...........................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  413 RUSTAMIYAH NTM-I              COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  423 RAMADI, CAMP QUARTERS         COMPOUND......................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  428 JBB OFFSITE BACKUP PUMPING    SITE..........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       STATION
  431 CJSOTF COMPOUND               FACILITY......................  US BASE...............  USD-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  437 Tikrit JCC                    JCC/JSS EQUIVALENT............  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  439 CRUZ-MORRIS (next to Gabe)    COL...........................  US BASE...............  USD-N............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
       on Lion
  443 BAGHDADI                      COMPOUND......................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  446 BLUE DIAMOND, COL             COMPOUND......................  PARTNERED BASE........  USD-C............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  447 ECP 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 17, 18   ECP...........................  US BASE...............  USC-C (IZ).......  ACTIVE...........  TBD
  262 KALSU                         COS...........................  HUB...................  USD-S............  ACTIVE...........  TBD
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
                          afghanistan withdraw
    Question. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander in 
Afghanistan, has stated President Obama's additional goal to begin 
withdrawing U.S. troops in July 2011 will force Afghan officials to 
take the lead in ensuring their country's security. The United States 
hope would be to grow the Afghan National Security Forces to their 
authorized size of 170,000 soldiers and 134,000 police by the pullout 
date.
    With your recent visit, in your opinion do you think the Afghan 
National Security Forces will meet those numbers?
    Answer. The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police 
(ANP) are on track to meet these goals. As of March 2010, the ANA had 
112,779 personnel, which is slightly above its March goal of 112,700 
personnel. The ANA has achieved high recruiting and good retention over 
the past several months. We will continue to watch the program closely 
and guard against the risk that the ANA might fall short of its larger 
goals.
    The ANP had 102,138 personnel as of March 2010, which was above its 
goal of 99,261 personnel. The ANP's ability to meet its growth goals is 
more at risk, as it has suffered high attrition and poor retention, 
especially in the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), which 
accounts for much of the growth in 2010 and 2011. NATO Training 
Mission--Afghanistan (NTM-A), the Ministry of Interior, and the 
European Union Police (EUPOL) established an ANCOP Working Group to 
examine how to reduce attrition and improve the ANCOP program, for 
example, by examining personal protection, pay, and quality of life 
issues. In particular, the Working Group is examining a rotational 
deployment model for the ANCOP to reduce operational stress. In June 
2010, the group will reassess how new initiatives have affected the 
ANCOP program.
    One of the most significant changes to the Afghanistan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) program is the embedding of international forces 
to partner with the ANSF at all levels to provide mentorship and 
leadership in the operational environment. The August 2009 initial 
assessment by the Commander, International Security Assistance Force 
(COMISAF), acknowledged the risks inherent in rapidly growing the ANSF, 
including inadequate training, lack of enablers, and inexperienced 
leadership. To mitigate these risks, ISAF instituted a program of close 
partnership between operational ISAF forces and the ANSF. The 
partnering concept is a critical piece of COMISAF's strategy and 
requires international partners to integrate fully with the ANSF to 
develop a full partnership with the shared goal of working together to 
bring security to the Afghan people. Under partnering, ISAF units will 
be physically co-located with the ANSF from the national headquarters 
level through the regional, provincial, and district levels, 
establishing the same battle rhythms while planning and executing 
operations together. Embedded partnering is beginning to provide daily 
mentoring, training, and operational oversight to mitigate risk and 
develop more capable and professional army and police forces.
    Question. Does the fiscal year 2010 supplemental request give us 
additional assurance in helping them meet those goals?
    Answer. Yes. In January 2010, the Joint Coordination Monitoring 
Board (JCMB) approved the Afghan Government request to establish new 
end-strength goals for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan 
National Police (ANP). The new end-strength goals are shown in the 
following table:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            By October      By October
                                               2010            2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANA.....................................         134,000         171,600
ANP.....................................         109,000         134,000
                                         -------------------------------
      Total.............................         243,000         305,600
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In February 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted the 
fiscal year 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Supplemental 
request and the fiscal year 2011 OCO request to support the revised 
ANSF end-strength goals of 243,000 by October 2010 and 305,600 by 
October 2011. The fiscal year 2010 OCO Supplemental request includes 
$2.6 billion for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and the fiscal 
year 2011 OCO request includes $11.6 billion for the ASFF.
    The fiscal year 2010 OCO Supplemental request supports the overall 
program requirements and allows us to achieve accelerated growth of the 
ANA beyond 134,000 and the growth and reform of the ANP beyond 109,000. 
Ongoing and projected ASFF investments in fiscal year 2010 will 
continue to advance the ASFF program toward the goal of developing the 
capabilities of the ANA and the ANP to conduct and sustain independent 
counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and counterinsurgency operations 
with limited international partner support; perform law enforcement 
functions; provide for the internal security of the population; gain 
the trust of the population; and facilitate the rule of law throughout 
Afghanistan, thereby helping set the conditions for the Afghans to 
assume the lead responsibility for securing the country and improving 
the legitimacy of the Afghan government.
                             haiti support
    Question. I would like to congratulate the U.S.S. Bataan (LHD 5) 
and the embarked Marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
for their recent completion, of their support to Operation Unified 
Response yesterday (March 24) after 10 weeks on-station. I plan to make 
a visit to Haiti in the near future to see the wonderful work our 
military members have done with various United States and numerous 
independent aid organizations to deliver aid, and helping the Haitians 
prepare for long-term reconstruction.
    Can you elaborate on some of the other Defense strategies to 
partner with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to elevate stability 
missions to the same priority as combat operations and the commitment 
to working more closely with its civilian partners?
    Answer. The Department takes its role in stability missions very 
seriously, as emphasized by the critical policy document referenced by 
your question. DOD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, states 
that ``Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the 
Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency 
equivalent to combat operations.'' As recently noted in the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, ``Reforming How We Do Business'' section, the 
Department of Defense plays both lead and supporting roles in a range 
of stability operations. Within these roles, we have engaged in 
partnering efforts with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), often 
acting as a facilitator by matching resources with needs in stability 
missions. For example, recognizing the need for better communication 
between physicians and victims of the earthquake in Haiti, U.S. 
Southern Command partnered with academic institutions to bring in 
translators to assist in the effort. Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command 
has been exploring opportunities with the University of Hawaii to 
develop--in partner nations--an executive-level course for emergency 
management organizations, which would increase countries' ability to 
respond more effectively in humanitarian and disaster relief 
situations. Finally, on a broader note, the Department has been working 
to define its relationship with NGOs more clearly in non-hostile, 
humanitarian environments.
    Question. Are there long term plans from the Defense Department 
partnering with State to support Haiti in its rebuilding efforts?
    Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to reduce its 
military force footprint in Haiti as the humanitarian mission shifts 
from relief and recovery to reconstruction. Following the transition of 
Joint Task Force--Haiti to lead civilian agencies on June 1, the 
USSOUTHCOM military liaison office (MLO) will continue to coordinate 
DOD activities in support of USAID and the Department of State, 
focusing on strengthening the capacity of the Haitian government to 
provide essential services to its populace. DOD will also support 
rebuilding efforts in Haiti through the ``New Horizons'' exercise, 
which provides medical, construction, and engineering support from June 
through September 2010, and the ``Continuing Promise 2010'' exercise, 
which provides humanitarian and civic assistance from July 24 to August 
3, 2010. Beyond September, DOD will continue to look for opportunities 
to partner with USAID and the Department of State through additional 
humanitarian assistance and disaster preparedness projects and 
exercises that support Haiti's effort to rebuild.
                                 ______
                                 
           Question Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
    Question. In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, General Petraeus stated that the insufficient progress 
toward a comprehensive Middle East peace is a cause of instability in 
the region. However, Israel makes significant contributions to our 
national security. Do you agree that America's relationship with Israel 
plays an important and positive role in our national security?
    Answer. Yes, Israel plays an important and positive role in our 
national security and is one of our strongest regional partners.
    This Administration's commitment to Israel's security is 
unshakeable, and our defense relationship with Israel is as strong as 
ever. The relationship supports both the security of Israel as well as 
the advancement of U.S. national security interests.
    Our military-to-military relationship continues to develop and 
strengthen, as evidenced by the conclusion of the largest United 
States-Israel joint exercise in history last October, Juniper Cobra, 
with more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel from the U.S. European 
Command participating in this exercise in Israel. Israel's 
contributions to U.S. national security also include sharing of 
military technology and anti-terrorism know-how.
                                 ______
                                 
          Questions Submitted by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
                           detainee facility
    Question. The Department of Defense has requested $ 350 million in 
the fiscal year 2011 budget for military construction related to 
renovation and construction and start up cost at the maximum security 
prison in Thomson, Illinois. While the decision by the Obama 
Administration to close Guantanamo is a policy decision with which I 
disagree, I am also concerned about whether or not the decision to 
transfer the Guantanamo detainees to an existing prison in Illinois 
with the associated construction and renovation costs is a fiscally 
responsible decision and my questions for the record are focused on 
additional costs associated by making the Illinois option the only 
option.
    Since 2002, what is the total cost of the facilities at Guantanamo 
constructed primarily for the purpose of housing detainees or providing 
support for military personnel related to the incarceration of 
combatant detainees?
    Answer. To date, the total construction cost of the detention 
facilities at Guantanamo has been approximately $155 million.
    Question. What was the cost for the courtroom facilities and does 
the DOD contemplate replacing those facilities with new construction in 
Illinois or at some other location?
    Answer. The cost of the expeditionary legal complex (ELC) at 
Guantanamo was approximately $12 million.
    The plan for Thomson is to renovate the existing library into a 
temporary courtroom and leverage office space at Rock Island Arsenal 
while constructing two permanent courtrooms and supporting office 
space. This will allow us to conduct single-defendant, non-high value 
detainee commissions at Thomson once we reach initial operating 
capability in 10-13 months.
    To reach full operational capability, we will build a 24,000 square 
foot modular building at Thomson with two courtroom facilities, 
evidence holding/viewing rooms, conference rooms, offices, 
administration, etc.), that will use equipment relocated from the 
courtrooms in Guantanamo. We estimate the cost of this new facility to 
be approximately $10 to $12 million.
    The draft Military Construction Project Data Sheet (DD Form 1391), 
which states the requirements and justification to support funding 
requests for all projects requiring OSD approval and non-appropriated 
fund military construction, includes the cost to construct the OMC 
facility at Thomson. However, it is not possible to isolate the cost of 
just the OMC facility as the courtroom building was part of a system of 
buildings that supported the OMC function. For example, office space 
for OMC personnel would be provided in part of a building at Rock 
Island Arsenal; the cost for that building was not broken out in the 
draft 1391. Additionally, the draft 1391 includes the cost of 
renovating the prison library to serve as a temporary courtroom in case 
there is a need to commence military commission proceedings quickly at 
Thomson. If such a need should not arise, the cost of renovation will 
be deducted from the original cost estimates.
    Question. The Department of Defense has a request for $350 million 
for renovation and construction at a prison currently owned by the 
State of Illinois. Why was this site selected and what other locations 
were considered?
    Answer. The $350 million is a comprehensive request for detainee 
operations involving Guantanamo detainees and not just for construction 
and renovation at Thomson. Of the $350 million, approximately $100 
million is for improvements at Thomson Correctional Center so that it 
can accept detainees from Guantanamo, approximately $50 million is for 
improvements at Rock Island Arsenal to support using Thomson to house 
those detainees, approximately $35 million is for procuring capital 
equipment for the facility, and approximately $60 million is for 
investment equipment and supplies for detention operations. The 
remaining $105 million is for operations at Guantanamo and Thomson, or 
wherever the detainees are located.
    This site was selected by the President both to reduce the Bureau 
of Prisons' shortage of high-security, maximum custody cell space and 
to accommodate the relocation of detainees from the Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base, Cuba. The Department of Defense was tasked to considered 
many military and civilian sites including facilities in Standish, 
Michigan, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Charleston, South Carolina.
    Question. I am concerned about the future support cost for the 
personnel that will be assigned to the prison in Illinois. Were any 
locations near existing military facilities considered for a new 
detainee facility so we could leverage the existing support facilities?
    Answer. Yes. Furthermore, the plan for use of the Thomson 
Correctional Center for detention operations does leverage existing 
support facilities at the nearby Rock Island Arsenal, as well as those 
in the local community.
    Question. Was a business case evaluated that resulted in the 
selection of the Illinois prison? If so, what was the estimated cost to 
build a new facility near an existing military facility?
    Answer. The Department of Defense was tasked to develop options for 
facilities in the continental United States, and a number of locations 
and construction methods were examined. The President determined that 
using Thomson Correctional Center as a ``joint use'' facility provided 
the best solution for both the Bureau of Prisons and the Department of 
Defense.
    Question. What additional military requests are contemplated for 
fiscal year 2012 and beyond for facilities to support military 
personnel assigned to the guard force at the Illinois prison?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects 
the results of all planning efforts completed to date. However, since 
the Commander, USNORTHCOM, will conduct even more extensive mission 
analysis and detailed planning efforts, this request is subject to 
increase or decrease when those efforts are complete.
    Question. What was the total cost to the State of Illinois for the 
acquisition of the land and the construction of the current prison in 
Illinois? And, what is the price being paid by the Federal Government 
for the existing site in Thomson, Illinois?
    Answer. According to public sources, the total cost to the State of 
Illinois to construct the facility was approximately $140 million. The 
Federal Government has not yet begun negotiating a price with the State 
of Illinois because the Bureau of Prisons cannot negotiate before it 
has the funds to purchase the facility.
    Question. It has been suggested that the Federal Prison System has 
the capacity to absorb all the detainees at existing Federal high 
security prisons. Was the option of transferring the detainees to other 
Federal high security prisons studied and rejected and if so, why?
    Answer. According to the Bureau of Prisons, the Federal Prison 
System is 35 percent over its capacity and, thus, it does not have the 
additional capacity necessary to absorb the detention population.
                            guam relocation
    Question. One of the major issues within the military construction 
program is the Marine's relocation to Guam. I am deeply troubled by the 
fact that this relocation move is in such disarray. The plan to 
relocate 8,000 Marines and 9,000 family members to Guam is a massive 
undertaking that presents several challenges and will place a serious 
burden on the island's infrastructure. The infrastructure of Guam is 
unsatisfactory before factoring in the Marine move. We have been 
informed that the latest cost estimate for this relocation could 
approach $13 billion. The report that the Governor of Guam needs $3 
billion in Federal assistance before we spend $13 billion on Milcon is 
just too much to ask of our taxpayers. The EPA reports the relocation 
plan is unsatisfactory so our 2010 milcon projects are on hold. If the 
Marines can't acquire enough land on the island to adequately train, 
the move will not be advantageous to them. The plan is way over budget 
and behind the time schedule already.
    If the environmental and infrastructure issues are not successfully 
resolved in a cost effective manner will you stop this relocation to 
Guam?
    Answer. The Department of Defense believes there are cost-effective 
solutions to the environmental and infrastructure shortcomings 
identified by the EPA and other U.S. departments and agencies. We are 
committed to working with the Government of Guam and the Federal 
partners to develop satisfactory mitigation strategies in the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement, which will enable a Record of Decision 
by fall. We are committed to spending the funds provided by the 
Government of Japan and the MILCON funds appropriated by Congress in an 
effective and cost-efficient manner. Also, the Japanese Government has 
committed to contributing funds to offset the costs of dealing with the 
environmental and infrastructure challenges of the Guam relocation.
    Despite these challenges, it is important to keep in mind the 
significant geo-strategic benefits of the Guam relocation. Guam 
provides an excellent basing option in the region from which our forces 
can respond quickly and effectively to any contingency scenarios. The 
ability for U.S. forces to quickly mobilize and deploy in response to 
all sorts of contingencies hinges on location. Forward deployment saves 
us days in terms of response time.
    Question. Considering the excessive cost and environmental concerns 
involved in this relocation move, what alternatives were considered?
    Answer. The move of Okinawa-based Marine units to Guam is first and 
foremost an operational issue. We arrived at the current agreement 
after conducting a thorough analysis of the full range of U.S. force 
realignment alternatives. The Guam relocation is part of a larger force 
restructuring under the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) 
process. The full realignment package will allow us to reposition more 
than 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam and return nearly 70 percent of 
land south of Kadena Air Base, benefiting the Okinawan people, 
addressing noise, safety, and environmental concerns, and creating a 
much more sustainable presence for U.S. forces on Okinawa, all without 
adversely impacting the Alliance's operational needs and capabilities. 
As a U.S. Territory strategically located in the Western Pacific, 
forward deployment to Guam enabled us to meet our treaty and alliance 
requirements with Japan, allows for rapid response to areas of 
potential contingencies, and grants our forces freedom of action.
    We believe there are technical solutions to the issues identified 
in the draft Environmental Impact Statement, and we are working with 
the Government of Guam and within the Federal Government to identify 
mitigation strategies that are effective as well as cost-efficient.
    Question. Was a business case developed that determined Guam was 
the best location for the Marines, and what was the cost of other 
alternatives?
    Answer. Following the Department's through analysis of various 
Asia-Pacific locations, Guam was identified as the best site for the 
Marine move in terms of operational viability, political 
sustainability, and strategic requirements. A strictly cost-based 
comparison was not conducted. Estimates of the cost of relocation were 
developed at the time of the United States-Japan negotiations in 2005 
and 2006, however. On that basis, we were able to secure commitments 
from the Government of Japan to fund up to $6.09 billion of the cost of 
the move, including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions.
    Question. What is the status of the Fentenma Air Field replacement, 
and if that move does not take place will you stop the relocation to 
Guam?
    Answer. The Government of Japan (GOJ) is currently conducting a 
review of the FRF and assessing alternatives. We respect the GOJ review 
process and will consider any official proposals they may offer based 
on their operational viability and political sustainability. Moving 
forward on the Guam relocation depends upon tangible progress on 
implementing the FRF agreement.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
    Question. Prime Minister Maliki has raised the possibility of 
asking U.S. Forces to remain beyond the 2011 deadline for the 
withdrawal.
    Secretary Gates, do you expect the Iraqi government to ask us to 
stay in Iraq longer, or do you expect we will pull-out of Iraq by the 
end of the year?
    Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is on schedule to draw down 
to 50,000 U.S. forces in Iraq and end the combat mission by August 31, 
2010. The remaining U.S. forces will be engaged in training, equipping, 
and advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); targeted counterterrorism 
operations; and protection of U.S. military and civilian efforts. U.S. 
forces will continue to draw down responsibly, consistent with the 
Security Agreement, which terminates on December 31, 2011.
    To date, the Iraqi government has not asked the United States to 
retain forces in Iraq past the termination of the Security Agreement.
    The Strategic Framework Agreement lays out a solid foundation for a 
long-term and enduring strategic partnership with the Government of 
Iraq and its people, across multiple lines of operation to support a 
peaceful and prosperous Iraq.
    Question. In the past, it took 4 to 6 months to form a government 
in Iraq. With the added complexities caused by the De-Ba'athification 
Commission, that timeline could be extended even further this year. 
Some observers have suggested that this period of government formation 
could bring significant risk of renewed violence. Do you agree?
    Answer. We anticipate an extended government formation period. Both 
United States and Iraqi officials are aware that a protracted, 
contentious government formation period as experienced in 2006 will 
offer opportunities for anti-Iraqi government forces to attempt to 
reignite sectarian violence. Prior to the elections, we assisted the 
Iraqi government in developing plans to ensure continuity in government 
functions in its caretaker status, as well as to maintain Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF) pressure on violent, extremist networks. We are 
confident that the ISF, with U.S. support, are capable of maintaining 
internal stability during this period.
    Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) has sought to exploit the current period of 
political transition by waging high-profile attacks designed to 
undermine the Iraqi people's confidence in their government and the 
ISF. Recent AQI leadership losses have seriously degraded the network's 
capabilities, and both Iraqi leaders and citizens reject violence. 
Despite recent high profile attacks, AQI has failed to trigger wide-
scale, retributive violence, or raise significant doubt about the ISF's 
abilities. Overall, violence remains low and the ISF are working 
closely with USF-I to maintain pressure on militant networks.

                         CONCLUSION OF HEARING

    Chairman Inouye. And so, now the committee stands in recess 
subject to the call of the Chair.
    [Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., Thursday, March 25, the hearing 
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene 
subject to the call of the Chair.]

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