    [Senate Hearing 111-415]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 111-415

                                  AFGHANISTAN

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                             DECEMBER 2 AND 8, 2009

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
    PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                   Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                   __________

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

                                  Afghanistan

                                december 2, 2009

                                                                       Page

    Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense......................     5
    Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, Secretary of State.................    11
     Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
      Staff..........................................................    17

                  Continue to Receive Testimony on Afghanistan

                                december 8, 2009

    McChrystal, GEN Stanley A. USA, Commander, International Security
      Assistance Force and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan........   103
    Eikenberry, Hon. Karl W., Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador to
      Afghanistan....................................................   109

                                     (iii)

                                  AFGHANISTAN

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2009

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, Udall,
    Hagan, Begich, Burris, Kirk, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
    Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, Burr, Vitter, and
    Collins.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer,
    nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
    research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; William G.P.
    Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member;
    Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; and William K.
    Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
    Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Michael V.
    Kostiw, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
    professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel;
    and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Paul J. Hubbard,
    Jennifer R. Knowles, Hannah I. Lloyd, and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator
    Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick
    Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant
    to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben
    Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I.
    Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger,
    assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to
    Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay
    Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield,
    assistant to Senator Burris; Bethany Bassett, assistant to
    Senator Kirk; Brandon Andrews, Anthony J. Lazarski, and Rob
    Soofer, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Robert La Branche and
    Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor
    IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam Brake, assistant to
    Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune;
    Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh,
    assistant to Senator LeMieux; Charles Brittingham, assistant to
    Senator Vitter; and Rob Epplin and Chip Kennett, assistants to
    Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Secretary Clinton,
    Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, welcome. Thank you all for
    your many contributions to our Nation.
        Today, the committee receives testimony from the
    President's senior advisors on his strategy in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan, which the President set out last evening. The United
    States has important security interests in the Afghanistan-
    Pakistan region. Instability in Afghanistan or the return of
    the Taliban to power would not only provide fertile ground for
    al Qaeda and other extremists to regroup and renew plots
    against the United States and its allies, but it would also
    threaten the stability of neighboring Pakistan, a nuclear-armed
    country.
        For the sake of our military men and women who are, or will
    be, deployed in harm's way, as well as the well-being of our
    Nation, we have to get the strategy right. Our purpose and our
    mission, what we are trying to accomplish, must be clear.
        I agree with the President's emphasis on the training and
    rapid growth of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)
    and transitioning responsibility to the Afghan Government for
    Afghanistan's security. Indeed, I have long believed that the
    most urgent need in Afghanistan is to provide the training,
    from basic training to mentoring to side-by-side partnering on
    the battlefield, along with the equipment and the other support
    elements to rapidly build the capabilities of the Afghan
    National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). An Afghan
    surge should be our goal, and any U.S. surge should be related
    to that goal.
        The President has also called for increased contributions
    from our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. We
    need not only to ``Afghanize,'' but also to ``NATOize'' the
    Afghanistan mission.
        I also agree with the President's emphasis on the
    importance of efforts to reintegrate local Taliban fighters
    into Afghan society. An adequately funded plan for
    reintegration is long overdue.
        The President's strategy also makes clear that our
    commitment to the future of Afghanistan requires action from
    the Government of Afghanistan. That means recruiting of
    soldiers and police needed to quickly expand Afghan forces; it
    means serious anticorruption efforts; it means national
    reintegration and reconciliation policies, and retention and
    support for honest, competent ministry officials.
        President Karzai has pledged to do these things, and
    President Obama rightly insists on holding him to that pledge.
    Setting the July 2011 date to begin the reduction of our forces
    is a reasonable way, under the circumstances, to produce the
    sense of urgency in the Afghan Government that has been lacking
    up to now and is essential to success.
        I believe the principal mission of U.S. troop increases in
    Afghanistan should be to accelerate the transition to Afghan
    forces to take the lead for providing Afghan security. This is
    an important part of the approach outlined by the President.
    Where I have questions is whether the rapid deployment of a
    large number of U.S. combat forces, without an adequate number
    of ANSF for our troops to partner with, serves that mission.
        A critical component of transitioning to Afghan
    responsibility will be the on-the-job partnering of ANSF with
    U.S. and coalition forces. That partnering is vital to success
    in Afghanistan, for the Afghans and for us. But, the current
    shortfall, in terms of partnering, is not a shortage of
    American combat troops, it's a shortage of Afghan troops.
        In the key province of Helmand, the ratio of U.S. troops to
    Afghan troops is about five U.S. troops to one Afghan soldier.
    We are now partnered with about 2,000 Afghans in Helmand. The
    desired ratio, according to Pentagon doctrine, is close to the
    opposite: three Afghans for one U.S. soldier or marine. So, we
    have enough troops in Helmand right now--about 10,000--to
    partner with more than 20,000 additional Afghan troops, more
    than are expected to be available to partner with us there next
    year, according to Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Great
    Britain. If so, doubling the number of U.S. troops in the south
    will only worsen a ratio under which our forces are already
    matched up with fewer Afghan troops than they can and should
    partner with.
        General James Conway, the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
    said in September, ``If I could change only one thing in the
    south of Afghanistan, it would be to have more Afghan troops.''
    A few days ago, General Conway reiterated the point this way:
    ``To have American marines standing on a corner in a key
    village isn't nearly as effective as having an Afghan policeman
    or an Afghan soldier.''
        It seems to me that the large influx of U.S. combat troops
    will put more U.S. marines on street corners in Afghan
    villages, with too few Afghan partners alongside them.
    Partnering with, equipping, and in other ways empowering Afghan
    forces to provide security for their country will demonstrate
    our resolve and commitment to a stable future for Afghanistan
    and the region. That should be the stated mission, and troop
    increases should be judged by whether they advance that
    mission.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me thank Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
    Admiral Mullen for joining us today to discuss the vital issue
    of Afghanistan.
        Let me first reiterate, as I said yesterday, that I think
    President Obama has made the right decision to embrace a
    counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan and to resource it
    properly. I would have much preferred that General McChrystal
    receive the entire force he had requested, but I've spoken with
    our military and civilian leaders, and I think the 30,000
    additional U.S. troops that the President has called for, plus
    greater force commitments from our allies, will enable us to
    reverse the momentum of the insurgency and create the
    conditions for success in Afghanistan.
        I support the President's decision, and I think it deserves
    the support of all Americans, both Republicans and Democrats.
        What I don't support and what concerns me greatly is the
    President's decision to set an arbitrary date to begin
    withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan. A date for withdrawal
    sends exactly the wrong message to both our friends and our
    enemies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the entire region, all of
    whom currently doubt whether America is committed to winning
    this war. A withdrawal date only emboldens al Qaeda and the
    Taliban, while dispiriting our Afghan partners and making it
    less likely that they will risk their lives to take our side in
    this fight.
        Yes, our commitment to Afghanistan is not open-ended. Yes,
    large numbers of U.S. combat troops will not remain there
    indefinitely; and yes, this war will one day end. But, it
    should end when we have achieved our goals. Success is the real
    exit strategy. When conditions on the ground have decisively
    begun to change for the better, that is when our troops should
    start to return home with honor. Not 1 minute longer, not 1
    minute sooner, and certainly not on some arbitrary date in July
    2011, which our enemies can exploit to weaken and intimidate
    our friends.
        I am eager to hear from our distinguished witnesses how we
    can say, as the President did last night, that our withdrawal
    will begin in July 2011, no matter what, but that this
    arbitrary date will also take into account conditions on the
    ground. That seems logically incoherent to me, and I welcome
    some clarity on this matter.
        Another concern that I have has to do with the civilian
    side of our counterinsurgency strategy. Greater military force
    is necessary to succeed in Afghanistan, but it's not
    sufficient. I am confident in our military strategy and
    leadership, and I believe our troops can do everything that
    General McChrystal laid out in his assessment of this summer. I
    believe we can ``clear and hold,'' but I am concerned that we
    and our allies do not have a unified plan to ``build,'' to work
    with and support our Afghan partners in Kabul and beyond as
    they build their own nation, their own economy, and their own
    free institutions.
        I'm also concerned by reports of divisions in our Embassy
    and by major differences between our Commander and our
    Ambassador. We can only succeed in Afghanistan if we have a
    joint civil-military campaign plan unified at every level from
    top to bottom, much as Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus
    established in Iraq during the surge. I look forward to hearing
    what progress we're making on creating such a joint civil-
    military effort.
        I've been critical of the President during the past several
    months, but that is now behind us. Our focus going forward must
    be on winning the war in Afghanistan. I emphasize ``winning.''
    This depends as much on the substance of our policy as the
    signals we send to actors in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the
    region.
        The President was wrong to signal our intention to begin
    leaving Afghanistan on an arbitrary date, but the fact is we
    now have the right mission, we now have the right leadership,
    and we now have a request for sufficient resources to succeed,
    so our friends can know that we will support them, our enemies
    can know that we will defeat them, and all can know that we are
    committed to the long-term success of Afghanistan and Pakistan
    as stable states that can govern themselves, secure themselves,
    and sustain their own development. Though the nature of our
    commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and their region will
    change over time, our commitment to their success will endure.
        We now have an opportunity to build a bipartisan consensus
    in support of a vital national security priority, defeating al
    Qaeda and its violent extremist allies in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan, and ensuring that these countries never again serve
    as bases for attacks against America and our allies.
        Americans need to know why winning this war is essential to
    our country's security. They need to know that things in
    Afghanistan will get worse before they get better, that,
    unfortunately, casualties will likely rise in the year to come,
    but that, ultimately, we will succeed.
        I look to the President and to our witnesses here today to
    lead an unfailing effort to build bipartisan support for the
    war in Afghanistan, both among the public and here in Congress.
    I will be an ally in this effort, and I pledge to do everything
    in my power to ensure that we win this war--not just end it,
    but win it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        I understand that the order that our witnesses desire to be
    recognized is Secretary Gates first, then Secretary Clinton,
    and then Admiral Mullen.
        Secretary Gates, welcome.

        STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, I think
    the Secretary of State's microphone is the only one working, so
    perhaps we should allow her to be the only witness today.
    [Laughter.]
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for
    inviting us to testify today.
        Last night, President Obama announced a renewed commitment
    and more focused strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I would
    like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and
    context behind his decisions--in particular, the nexus among al
    Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, and Afghanistan--our objectives,
    how the President's strategy aims to accomplish them, and the
    military forces required.
        As the President first stated in March and reemphasized
    last night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to
    prevent its return to both countries. The international
    military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to
    achieve this overarching goal. Defeating al Qaeda and enhancing
    Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot
    be untethered from one another, as much as we might wish that
    to be the case.
        While al Qaeda is under great pressure now, and dependent
    on the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the
    success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen al Qaeda's
    message to the Muslim world that violent extremists are on the
    winning side of history. Put simply, the Taliban and al Qaeda
    have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and
    mythology of the other. Al Qaeda leaders have stated this
    explicitly and repeatedly. Taliban success in retaking and
    holding parts of Afghanistan against the combined forces of
    multiple modern armies, the current direction of events, has
    dramatically strengthened the extremist mythology and popular
    perceptions of who is winning and who is losing.
        The lesson of the Taliban's revival for al Qaeda is that
    time and will are on their side; that, with a Western defeat,
    they could regain their strength and achieve a major strategic
    victory as long as their senior leadership lives and can
    continue to inspire and attract followers and funding. Rolling
    back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to
    the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda.
        At the same time, one cannot separate the security
    situation in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan, a
    nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people now also explicitly
    targeted by Islamic extremists. The two countries, bound by
    ties of tribe and faith, share a porous border of more than
    1,500 miles. Giving extremists breathing room in Pakistan led
    to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated,
    sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a sanctuary for
    extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet
    more pressure on a Pakistani Government already under attack
    from groups operating in the border region.
        Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, in just the last year or so,
    has become a real threat to Pakistan's own domestic peace and
    stability, carrying out, with al Qaeda's help, escalating
    bombing attacks throughout the country. It is these attacks and
    the Taliban's movement toward Islamabad 7 months ago that
    largely motivated the current operations by the Pakistani army.
    We know the Pakistan Taliban operate in collusion with both the
    Taliban in Afghanistan and al Qaeda.
        I would like to make a related point with respect to
    Pakistan: Because of American withdrawal from the region in the
    early 1990s, followed by a severing of military-to-military
    relations, many Pakistanis are skeptical that the United States
    is a reliable, long-term strategic partner. We must change that
    perception.
        Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of
    much, if not most, of the country, and likely a renewed civil
    war. Taliban-ruled areas could, in short order become, once
    again, sanctuary for al Qaeda, as well as a staging area for
    resurgent militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan. Success
    in south and central Asia by Islamic extremists, as was the
    case 20 years ago, would beget success on other fronts. It
    would strengthen the al Qaeda narrative, providing renewed
    opportunities for recruitment, fundraising, and more
    sophisticated operations. Aided by the Internet, many more
    followers could join their ranks, both in the region and in
    susceptible populations across the globe.
        It is true that al Qaeda and its followers can plot and
    execute attacks from a variety of locations, from Munich to
    London to Denver. But, what makes the border area between
    Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other
    location, including Somalia, Yemen, and other possible
    hideouts, is that this part of the world represents the
    epicenter of extremist jihadism, the historic place where
    native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in
    their view, caused its collapse at home. For them to be seen to
    defeat the sole remaining superpower in the same place would
    have severe consequences for the United States and the world.
        Some say this is similar to the domino theory that
    underpinned and, ultimately, muddied the thinking behind the
    U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however,
    is that we have very real and very recent history that shows
    just what can happen in this part of the world when extremists
    have breathing space, safe havens, and governments complicit
    with, and in support of, their mission. Less than 5 years after
    the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out of
    Afghanistan, in 1993, Islamic militants launched their first
    attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford
    to make a similar mistake again.
        A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    one that is sustainable over the long term by their
    governments, is vital to our national security. By the same
    token, the current status quo in Afghanistan, the slow but
    steady deterioration of the security situation and growing
    influence of the Taliban, is unacceptable. So, too, is the
    status quo ante, a largely ungoverned region controlled by
    extremists, in which the United States had little influence or
    ability to gain actionable intelligence on the ground.
        The President's new strategic concept aims to reverse the
    Taliban's momentum and reduce its strength while providing the
    time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough
    security and governance capacity to stabilize their own
    country. We will focus our resources where the population is
    most threatened, and align military and civilian efforts
    accordingly, with six primary objectives: reversing Taliban
    momentum through sustained military action by the United
    States, our allies, and the Afghans; denying the Taliban access
    to, and control of, key population and production centers and
    lines of communication; disrupting the Taliban outside secured
    areas and preventing al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in
    Afghanistan; degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by
    ANSF; increasing the size and capability of the ANSF, and
    employing other local forces selectively, to begin
    transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan Government
    within 18 months; and finally, selectively building the
    capacity of Afghan Government, particularly in key ministries.
        This approach is not open-ended nation-building. It is
    neither necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized,
    Western-style Afghan nation-state, the likes of which has never
    been seen in that country; nor does it entail pacifying every
    village and conducting textbook counterinsurgency from one end
    of Afghanistan to the other. It is, instead, a narrower focus
    tied more tightly to our core goal of disrupting, dismantling,
    and eventually defeating al Qaeda by building the capacity of
    the Afghans, capacity that will be measured by observable
    progress on clear objectives, and not simply by the passage of
    time.
        The essence of our civil-military plan is to ``clear, hold,
    build, and transfer.'' Beginning to transfer security
    responsibility to the Afghans in summer 2011 is critical, and,
    in my view, achievable. This transfer will occur, district by
    district, province by province, depending on conditions on the
    ground. The process will be similar to what we did in Iraq,
    where international security forces provided overwatch, first
    at the tactical level and then at the strategic level.
        Even after we transfer security responsibility to the
    Afghans and draw down our combat forces, the United States will
    continue to support their development as an important partner
    for the long haul. We will not repeat the mistakes of 1989,
    when we abandoned the country only to see it descend into chaos
    and into Taliban hands.
        Making this transition possible requires accelerating the
    development of a significantly larger and more capable ANA and
    ANP through intensive partnering with International Security
    Assistance Forces (ISAF), especially in combat. It also means
    achieving a better balance between national and local forces,
    increasing Afghan unconventional warfare capabilities, engaging
    communities to enlist more local security forces to protect
    their own territory, and bolstering Afghan-led reintegration
    and reconciliation efforts.
        At the strategic level, the President's plan will achieve a
    better balance between investments in the central government
    and subnational entities. At the national level, the focus will
    be primarily on reforming essential ministries and pressing for
    the appointment of competent and honest ministers and
    governors. At the local and regional level, there will be a
    shift to work through existing traditional structures rather
    than building new ones.
        In all of these efforts, we must have a committed partner
    in the Afghan people and government. That is one reason why
    there will be very clear and definitive timeframes for
    reviewing our, and their, progress.
        As the President announced, the United States will commit
    an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan for an extended
    surge of 18 to 24 months. These forces, the U.S. contribution
    to the fight, will be deployed and concentrated in the southern
    and eastern parts of the country. The first of these forces
    will begin to arrive in Afghanistan within 2 to 3 weeks.
        In all, since taking office, President Obama has committed
    nearly 52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, for a total
    U.S. force of approximately 100,000. We are looking to NATO and
    to our other partners to send a parallel international message
    of strong resolve. Our allies must take the lead and focus
    their resources in the north and west to prevent the insurgency
    from establishing new footholds. We will seek some 5,000 to
    7,000 troops from NATO, and expect the allies to share more of
    the burden in training, equipping, and funding the ANA and ANP.
        Let me offer a few closing thoughts. It is worth
    remembering that the security situation in Afghanistan, though
    serious, does not begin to approach the scale of violence that
    consumed Iraq and confronted our forces there when I was
    confirmed as Secretary of Defense 3 years ago this week. With
    all the resources already committed to this campaign, plus
    those the President has just announced, I believe the pieces
    are being put in place to make real and measurable progress in
    Afghanistan over the next 18 to 24 months.
        The President believes, as do I, that, in the end, we
    cannot defeat al Qaeda and its toxic ideology without improving
    and stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan. The
    President's decision offers the best possibility to decisively
    change the momentum in Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the
    strategic equation in Pakistan and central Asia, all necessary
    to protect the United States, our allies, and our vital
    interests.
        So, I ask for your full support of this decision to provide
    both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources
    they need to be successful. This will take more patience,
    perseverance, and sacrifice by the United States and by our
    allies. As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and
    women who have volunteered and, in many cases, revolunteered,
    to serve their country in uniform. I know they will be
    uppermost in our minds and prayers as we take on this arduous
    but vitally necessary mission.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates

        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
        Thank you for inviting us to testify today. Last night, President
    Obama announced a renewed commitment and more focused strategy for
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. I would like to provide an overview of the
    strategic thinking and context behind his decisions, in particular:

          The nexus among al Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, and
    Afghanistan;
          Our objectives and how the President's strategy aims to
    accomplish them; and
          The military forces required.

                                 WHERE WE STAND

        As the President first stated in March, and re-emphasized last
    night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to
    disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to prevent its return to
    both countries. The international military effort to stabilize
    Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal. Defeating al
    Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions.
    They cannot be untethered from one another, as much as we might wish
    that to be the case.
        While al Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the
    Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the
    Taliban would vastly strengthen al Qaeda's message to the Muslim world:
    that violent extremists are on the winning side of history. Put simply,
    the Taliban and al Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from
    the success and mythology of the other. Al Qaeda leaders have stated
    this explicitly and repeatedly.
        Taliban success in retaking and holding parts of Afghanistan
    against the combined forces of multiple, modern armies--the current
    direction of events--has dramatically strengthened the extremist
    mythology and popular perceptions of who is winning and who is losing.
    The lesson of the Taliban's revival for al Qaeda is that time and will
    are on their side. That, with a Western defeat, they could regain their
    strength and achieve a major strategic victory--as long as their senior
    leadership lives and can continue to inspire and attract followers and
    funding. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not
    sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda.
        At the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in
    Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan--a nuclear-armed nation of
    175 million people now also explicitly targeted by Islamic extremists.
    The two countries, bound by ties of tribe and faith, share a porous
    border of more than 1,500 miles. Giving extremists breathing room in
    Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated,
    sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a sanctuary for
    extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more
    pressure on a Pakistani Government already under attack from groups
    operating in the border region. Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, just in
    the last year or so, has become a real threat to Pakistan's own
    domestic peace and stability, carrying out--with al Qaeda's help--
    escalating bombing attacks throughout the country. It is these attacks,
    and the Taliban's movement toward Islamabad 7 months ago, that largely
    motivated the current operations by the Pakistani army. We know the
    Pakistan Taliban operate in collusion with both the Taliban in
    Afghanistan and al Qaeda.
        A related point with regard to Pakistan: Because of American
    withdrawal from the region in the early 1990s, followed by a severing
    of military-to-military relations, many Pakistanis are skeptical that
    the United States is a reliable, long-term strategic partner.

                            CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE

        Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if
    not most, of the country and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled
    areas could in short order become, once again, a sanctuary for al Qaeda
    as well as a staging area for resurgent militant groups on the
    offensive in Pakistan.
        Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists--as was the
    case 20 years ago--would beget success on other fronts. It would
    strengthen the al Qaeda narrative, providing renewed opportunities for
    recruitment, fund-raising, and more sophisticated operations. Aided by
    the Internet, many more followers could join their ranks, both in the
    region and in susceptible populations across the globe.
        It is true that al Qaeda and its followers can plot and execute
    attacks from a variety of locations--from Munich to London to Denver.
    But what makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan
    uniquely different from any other location--including Somalia, Yemen,
    and other possible redoubts--is that this part of the world represents
    the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic place where native
    and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused
    its collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining
    superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for the
    United States and the world.
        Some may say this is similar to the ``domino theory'' that
    underpinned and ultimately muddied the thinking behind the U.S.
    military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is that we
    have very real--and very recent--history that shows just what can
    happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing space,
    safe havens, and governments complicit with and supportive of their
    mission. Less than 5 years after the last Soviet tank crossed the
    Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, Islamic militants launched their
    first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to
    make a similar mistake again.

                                 THE WAY AHEAD

        A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan--one that
    is sustainable over the long term by their governments--is vital to our
    national security. By the same token, the current status quo in
    Afghanistan--the slow but steady deterioration of the security
    situation and growing influence of the Taliban--is unacceptable. So too
    is the status quo ante--a largely ungoverned region controlled by
    extremists in which the United States had little influence or ability
    to gain actionable intelligence on the ground.
        The President's new strategic concept aims to reverse the Taliban's
    momentum and reduce its strength while providing the time and space
    necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance
    capacity to stabilize their own country.
        We will focus our resources where the population is most
    threatened, and align military and civilian efforts accordingly--with
    six primary objectives:

          Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military
    action by the U.S., our allies, and the Afghans;
          Denying the Taliban access to and control of key
    population and production centers and lines of communications;
          Disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and
    preventing al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan;
          Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghan
    National Security Forces;
          Increasing the size and capability of the ANSF and
    employing other local forces selectively to begin transitioning
    security responsibility to the Afghan Government within 18 months; and
          Selectively building the capacity of the Afghan
    Government, particularly in key ministries.

        This approach is not open-ended ``nation building.'' It is neither
    necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized, Western-style
    Afghan nation-state--the likes of which has never been seen in that
    country. Nor does it entail pacifying every village and conducting
    textbook counterinsurgency from one end of Afghanistan to the other.
        It is, instead, a narrower focus tied more tightly to our core goal
    of disrupting, dismantling and eventually defeating al Qaeda by
    building the capacity of the Afghans--capacity that will be measured by
    observable progress on clear objectives, and not simply by the passage
    of time.
        The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold, build,
    and transfer. Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the
    Afghans in summer 2011 is critical--and, in my, view achievable. This
    transfer will occur district by district, province by province,
    depending on local circumstances. The process will be similar to what
    we did in Iraq, where international security forces provided
    ``overwatch''--first at the tactical level, then at the strategic
    level. Even after we transfer security responsibility to the Afghans
    and draw down our combat forces, the United States will continue to
    support their development as an important partner for the long haul. We
    will not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country
    only to see it descend into civil war, and then into Taliban hands.
        Making this transition possible requires accelerating the
    development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan army and
    police through intensive partnering with ISAF, especially in combat. It
    also means achieving a better balance between national and local
    forces; increasing Afghan unconventional warfare capabilities; engaging
    communities to enlist more local security forces to protect their own
    territory; and bolstering Afghan-led reintegration and reconciliation
    efforts.
        At the strategic level, the President's plan will achieve a better
    balance between investments in the central government and subnational
    entities. At the national level, the focus will be primarily on
    reforming essential ministries and pressing for the appointment of
    competent and honest ministers and governors. At the local and regional
    level, there will be a shift to work through existing, traditional
    structures rather than building new ones. In all of these efforts, we
    must have a committed partner in the Afghan people and government. That
    is one reason why there will be very clear and definitive timeframes
    for reviewing our--and their--progress.

                             ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES

        As the President announced, the United States will commit an
    additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 to
    24 months. These forces--the U.S. contribution to this fight--will be
    deployed and concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the
    country. The first of these units will arrive in Afghanistan early in
    2010.
        In all, since taking office President Obama has committed nearly
    52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of
    approximately 100,000. We are looking to NATO and our other partners to
    send a parallel international message of strong resolve. Our allies
    must take the lead and focus their resources in the north and west to
    prevent the insurgency from establishing new footholds. We will seek
    some 5 to 7,000 troops from NATO and expect the Allies to share more of
    the burden in training, equipping, and funding the Afghan National Army
    and police.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Let me offer a few closing thoughts.
        It is worth remembering that the security situation in
    Afghanistan--though serious--does not begin to approach the scale of
    violence that consumed Iraq and confronted our forces there when I was
    confirmed as secretary of defense 3 years ago this week. With all the
    resources already committed to this campaign--plus those the President
    has just announced--I believe the pieces are being put in place to make
    real and measurable progress in Afghanistan over the next 18 to 24
    months.
        The President believes, as do I, that, in the end, we cannot defeat
    al Qaeda and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the
    security situation in Afghanistan. The President's decision offers the
    best possibility to decisively change the momentum in Afghanistan, and
    fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central
    Asia--all necessary to protect the United States, our allies, and our
    vital interests. So, I ask for your full support of this decision to
    provide both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources
    they need to be successful.
        This is will take more patience, perseverance, and sacrifice by the
    United States and our allies. As always, the heaviest burden will fall
    on the men and women who have volunteered--and in many cases
    revolunteered--to serve their country in uniform. I know they will be
    uppermost in our minds and prayers as we take on this arduous but
    vitally necessary mission.
        Thank you.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Gates.
        Secretary Clinton.

      STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE

        Secretary Clinton. Thank you. Chairman Levin, Senator
    McCain, members of the committee, I am grateful for this
    opportunity to testify before so many former colleagues and
    friends. My experience on this committee helped form my views
    on many of the issues facing our Nation, and it's a privilege
    to be here before you now in this different role.
        Yesterday, President Obama presented the administration's
    strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, Secretary Gates,
    Admiral Mullen, and I will all be providing you with additional
    details. But, let me speak briefly at a more personal level
    about why we are making this commitment.
        Simply put, among a range of difficult choices, this is the
    best way to protect our Nation now and in the future. The
    extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan have
    attacked us and our allies before. If we allow them access to
    the very same safe havens they used before 2001, they will have
    a greater capacity to regroup and attack again. They could drag
    an entire region into chaos.
        Our civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan have
    reported that the situation is serious and worsening, and we
    agree. In the aftermath of September 11, I grieved with sons,
    daughters, husbands, and wives whose loved ones were murdered.
    It was an attack on our country and an attack on the
    constituents I then represented. I witnessed the tragic
    consequences in the lives of thousands of innocent families and
    the damage done to our economy and our sense of security. So, I
    feel a personal responsibility to help protect our Nation from
    such violence.
        The case for action against al Qaeda and its allies has
    always been clear, but the United States' course of action over
    the last 8 years has not. The fog of another war obscured our
    focus. While our attention was focused elsewhere, the Taliban
    gained momentum in Afghanistan and the extremist threat grew in
    Pakistan, a country with 175 million people, a nuclear arsenal,
    and more than its share of challenges.
        It was against this backdrop that President Obama called
    for a careful, thorough review of the strategy. I was proud to
    be part of that process, which questioned every assumption and
    took nothing for granted. Our objectives are clear: We will
    work with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to eliminate
    safe havens for those plotting to attack against us, our
    allies, and our interests. We will help to stabilize a region
    that we believe is fundamental to our national security, and we
    will develop a long-term, sustainable relationship with both
    Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes
    of the past.
        The duration of our military presence is not open-ended,
    but our civilian commitment must continue, even as our troops
    begin, eventually, to come home. Accomplishing this mission and
    ensuring the safety of the American people will not be easy. It
    will mean sending not only more troops, but more civilians and
    more assistance to Afghanistan, and significantly expanding our
    civilian efforts in Pakistan.
        The men and women carrying out this military-civilian
    mission are not members of a list or items on a PowerPoint
    slide; they are our friends and neighbors, our sons and
    daughters, our brothers and sisters. We will be asking them and
    the American people to make extraordinary sacrifices on behalf
    of our security.
        I want to assure this committee, that I know takes its
    oversight responsibility so seriously, that we will do
    everything we can to make sure their sacrifices are honored and
    make our Nation safer.
        The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but
    it is not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in
    public, and the beginning of President Karzai's second term has
    opened a new window of opportunity. We have real concerns about
    the influence of corrupt officials in the Afghan Government,
    and we will continue to pursue them. But, in his inauguration
    speech last week that I was privileged to attend, I witnessed
    President Karzai's call for a new compact with his country. He
    pledged to combat corruption, improve governance, and deliver
    for the people of his country. His words were long in coming,
    but they were welcome. They must now be matched with action.
        The Afghan people, the United States, and the international
    community must hold the Afghan Government accountable for
    making good on these commitments. We will help by working to
    strengthen institutions at every level of Afghan society so we
    don't leave chaos behind when our combat troops begin to
    depart.
        The President has outlined a timeframe for transition to
    Afghan responsibility, something that President Karzai assumed
    would happen, and which we took as a very good sign of a
    renewed understanding of the necessity of Afghanization.
        That transition will begin in the summer of 2011, when we
    expect ANSF and the Afghan Government will have the capacity to
    start assuming ownership for defending their own country. As
    the President has said, we will execute the transition
    responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.
        But, we think a timeframe for such a transition will
    provide a sense of urgency in working with the Afghan
    Government. It should be clear to everyone that, unlike the
    past, the United States, our allies, and partners have an
    enduring commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region,
    so our resolve in this fight is reflected in the substantial
    commitment of troops and in the significant civilian commitment
    that will continue long after combat forces leave.
        That civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian
    experts and advisors are helping to craft policy inside
    government ministries, providing development assistance in the
    field, and working in scores of other roles. When our marines
    went into Nawa this July, we had civilians on the ground with
    them to coordinate assistance the next day. As operations
    progress, our civilian-military coordination is growing even
    stronger.
        We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions
    in Afghanistan, to 974, by early next year. On average, each of
    these civilians leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally
    employed staff to experts with U.S.-funded nongovernmental
    organizations (NGOs). It's a cliche to say we have our best
    people in these jobs, but it happens to be true.
        When I was in Kabul a few weeks ago, I met with an American
    colonel, who told me that, while he had thousands of
    outstanding soldiers under his command, none of them had the 40
    years of agricultural experience of the U.S. Department of
    Agriculture (USDA) civilian serving alongside his battalion or
    the rule-of-law and governance expertise of their civilian
    experts from the Department of State (DOS). He told me, ``I'm
    happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need,
    and we need more of them.'' The President's strategy will make
    that possible.
        Not only do we have the right people to achieve our
    objectives, we also have a sound strategy. We will be
    delivering high-impact assistance and bolstering Afghanistan's
    agricultural sector, the traditional core of the Afghan
    economy. This will create jobs, reduce the funding that the
    Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents
    off of the battlefield.
        We will also support an Afghan-led effort to open the door
    to those Taliban who renounce al Qaeda, abandon violence, and
    want to reintegrate into Afghan society. We understand some of
    those who fight with the insurgency do not do so out of
    conviction, but due to coercion or money. So, all Afghans
    should have the choice to pursue a better future if they do so
    peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow
    citizens, and reintegrate into their society.
        Our regional diplomacy complements this approach by seeking
    to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and working to
    shift the calculus of neighboring countries from competition
    for influence to cooperation and economic integration.
        We also believe a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must
    be a key partner in the fight against violent extremism, and
    people in Pakistan are increasingly coming to view that we do
    share a common enemy. I heard this repeatedly during my recent
    visit. So, our relationship needs to be anchored in common
    goals of civilian rule, robust economic development, and the
    defeat of those who threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United
    States, and the rest of the world.
        We'll significantly expand support intended for Pakistan to
    develop the potential of their people. We will do so by
    demonstrating a commitment to Pakistan that has been questioned
    by the Pakistanis in the past. We will make sure that the
    people of Pakistan know that we wish to be their partner for
    the long term, and that we intend to do all that we can to
    bolster their futures.
        Now, we're not going to be facing these challenges alone.
    We share this responsibility with governments around the world.
    I will go to Brussels tomorrow to begin the process of securing
    additional alliance commitments of troops, trainers, and
    resources. We expect Secretary General Rasmussen to have an
    announcement today about the progress we're making in that
    effort. Ambassador Holbrooke, our Special Representative, is
    already there, consulting with our allies.
        We're also asking the international community to expand its
    support to Pakistan. Our objectives are shared by people and
    governments across the world, and we are particularly reaching
    out to Muslims everywhere.
        Let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult
    choices in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the President's plan
    represents the best way we know to protect our Nation today and
    in the future. The task we face is as complex as any national
    security challenge in our lifetimes. We will not succeed if
    people view this effort as a responsibility of a single party,
    a single agency within our government, or a single country.
        We owe it to the troops and civilians, who will face these
    dangers, to come together as Americans, and come together with
    allies and international partners who are ready to step up and
    do more.
        We have to accomplish this mission, and I look forward to
    working with you to help meet this challenge.
        Thank you all very much.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton

        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, I'm
    grateful for this opportunity to testify before so many good friends.
    My experience on the Armed Services Committee helped form my views on
    many of the issues facing our Nation. It's a privilege to be before you
    now in this different role.
        Yesterday, President Obama presented the administration's strategy
    for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen,
    and I will all be providing you with additional details. But let me
    speak briefly at a more personal level about why we are making this
    commitment.
        Simply put, among a range of difficult choices, this is the best
    way to protect our Nation now and in the future.
        The extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan have
    attacked us and our allies before. If we allow them access to the very
    same safe havens they used before 2001, they will have a greater
    capacity to regroup and attack again. They could drag an entire region
    into chaos. Our civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan have
    reported that the situation is serious and worsening. We agree.
        In the aftermath of September 11th, I grieved with sons, daughters,
    husbands, and wives whose loved ones were murdered. It was an attack on
    our country, but it was also an attack on my constituents. I witnessed
    the tragic consequences in the lives of thousands of innocent families,
    and the damage done to our economy and our sense of security. So I feel
    a personal responsibility to help protect our Nation from such
    violence.

                                  THE MISSION

        The case for action against al Qaeda and its allies has always been
    clear, but the United States' course of action over the last 8 years
    has not. The fog of another war obscured our focus. While our attention
    was focused elsewhere, the Taliban gained momentum in Afghanistan. The
    extremist threat grew in Pakistan--a country with 175 million people, a
    nuclear arsenal, and more than its share of challenges.
        It was against this backdrop that the President called for a
    careful, thorough review of our strategy. I was proud to be a part of
    that process. Our objectives are clear:

          We will work with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to
    eliminate safe havens for those plotting attacks against us, our
    allies, and our interests;
          We will help to stabilize a region that is fundamental to
    our national security; and
          We will develop a long-term, sustainable relationship
    with Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes of
    the past. The duration of our military presence will be limited, but
    our civilian commitment must continue even as our troops begin to come
    home.

        Accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of the American
    people will not be easy. It will mean sending more civilians, troops,
    and assistance to Afghanistan, and significantly expanding our civilian
    efforts in Pakistan.
        The men and women carrying out this mission are not numbers on a
    PowerPoint slide. They are our friends and neighbors, our sons and
    daughters, our brothers and sisters. We will be asking them--and the
    American people who support them--to make extraordinary sacrifices on
    behalf of our security. I want to assure the Committee that we will do
    everything we can to make sure their sacrifices make our Nation safer.

                                  THE METHODS

        The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but it is
    not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in public. The
    beginning of President Karzai's second term has opened a new window of
    opportunity. We have real concerns about the influence of corrupt
    officials in the Afghan Government, and we will continue to pursue
    them. But in his inauguration speech last month, I witnessed President
    Karzai call for a new compact with his country. He pledged to combat
    corruption, improve governance, and deliver for the people of his
    country. His words were long in coming, but welcome. They must now be
    matched with action. The Afghan people, the United States, and the
    international community will hold the Afghan Government accountable for
    making good on these commitments.
        We will help by working with our Afghan partners to strengthen
    institutions at every level of Afghan society so that we don't leave
    chaos behind when our combat troops begin to depart.
        The President has outlined a timeframe for transition to Afghan
    responsibility. That transition will begin in the summer of 2011, when
    we expect Afghan security forces and the Afghan Government will have
    the capacity to start assuming ownership for defending their country.
    As the President said, we will execute the transition responsibly,
    taking into account conditions on the ground. A timeframe for
    transition will provide a sense of urgency in working with the Afghan
    Government. But it should be clear to everyone that--unlike the past--
    the United States and our allies and partners will have an enduring
    commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region. Our resolve in
    this fight is reflected in the substantial commitment of troops since
    the President took office and in the significant civilian commitment
    that will continue long after our combat forces leave.
        That civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian experts and
    advisors are helping to craft policy inside government ministries,
    providing development assistance in the field, and working in scores of
    other roles. When our marines went into Nawa this July, we had
    civilians on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the next
    day. As operations progress, our civ-mil coordination is growing even
    stronger.
        We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions in
    Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. On average, each of these
    civilians leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed staff to
    experts with U.S.-funded nongovernmental organizations. It's cliche to
    say that we have our best people in these jobs, but it also happens to
    be true. When I was in Kabul a few weeks ago, I met with an American
    colonel who told me that while he had thousands of outstanding soldiers
    under his command, none of them had the 40 years of agricultural
    experience of the U.S. Department of Agriculture civilian serving
    alongside his battalion, or the rule of law and governance expertise of
    their civilian experts from the State Department. He told me: ``I am
    happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need, and we
    need more of them.'' The President's strategy will make that possible.
        Not only do we have the right people to achieve our objectives, we
    also have a sound strategy. We will be delivering high-impact economic
    assistance and bolstering Afghanistan's agricultural sector--the
    traditional core of the Afghan economy. This will create jobs, reduce
    the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw
    insurgents off of the battlefield.
        We will also support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to those
    Taliban who abandon violence and want to reintegrate into Afghan
    society. We understand that some of those who fight with the insurgency
    do so not out of conviction, but due to coercion or money. All Afghans
    should have the choice to pursue a better future if they do so
    peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow citizens,
    and renounce al Qaeda.
        Our regional diplomacy complements this political approach, by
    seeking to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and working to
    shift the calculus of neighboring countries from competition for
    influence to cooperation and economic integration.
        We also believe that a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must be
    a key partner for the United States, and an ally in the fight against
    violent extremism. People in Pakistan are increasingly coming to the
    view that we share a common enemy. I heard this repeatedly during my
    recent visit. Our relationship is anchored in our common goals of
    civilian rule; robust economic development; and the defeat of those who
    threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the peace of the world.
        We will significantly expand support intended to help develop the
    potential of Pakistan and its people. Our assistance will demonstrate
    the United States' commitment to addressing problems that affect the
    everyday lives of Pakistanis and bring our people closer together. But
    it will also bolster Pakistan against the threat of extremism. A
    village where girls have had the opportunity to get an education will
    be more resistant to al Qaeda and the Taliban. A young man with a
    bright future in a growing economy is less likely to waste his
    potential in a suicide bombing.
        We will not be facing these challenges alone. We share this
    responsibility with governments around the world. Our North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have already made significant
    contributions of their own in Afghanistan, and tomorrow I will go to
    Brussels to begin the process of securing additional Alliance
    commitments of troops, trainers, and resources. Ambassador Holbrooke,
    our Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, is already
    there consulting with our allies.
        The international community is also expanding its support to
    Pakistan, and we are in close touch with partners to coordinate
    assistance. We are also looking beyond NATO to build the broadest
    possible global coalition to meet this challenge. Our objectives are
    shared by people and governments from Europe to Australia, from Russia
    to China to India, and across the Middle East. Beginning with the
    President's speech in Cairo, we are reaching out to Muslims everywhere
    to make it clear that the United States seeks to build a better future
    with them in a spirit of mutual respect and partnership.

                                  THE MESSAGE

        Let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult choices
    in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the President's plan represents the
    best way we know to protect our Nation today and in the future. The
    task we face is as complex as any national security challenge in our
    lifetimes. We will not succeed if people view this effort as the
    responsibility of a single party, a single agency within our
    Government, or a single country. We owe it to the troops and civilians
    who will face these dangers to come together as Americans--and come
    together with our allies and international partners--to help them
    accomplish this mission. I look forward to working with you to meet
    this challenge. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
        Admiral Mullen.

    STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished
    members of this committee, thank you for your time today.
        Let me state, right up front, that I support fully and
    without hesitation the President's decision, and I appreciated
    the opportunity to contribute to what I believe was a healthy
    and productive discussion. I've seen my share of internal
    debates about various national security issues, especially over
    the course of these last 2 years, and I can honestly say that I
    do not recall an issue so thoroughly or so thoughtfully
    considered as this one.
        Every military leader in the chain of command, as well as
    those of the Joint Chiefs, was given voice throughout this
    process, and every one of us used it. We now have before us a
    strategy more appropriately matched to the situation on the
    ground in Afghanistan, and resources matched more appropriately
    to that strategy, particularly with regard to reversing the
    insurgency's momentum in 2010. Given the stakes in Afghanistan
    for our own national security, as well as that of our partners
    around the world, I believe the time we took was well worth it.
        Secretaries Clinton and Gates have already walked you
    through the large policy issues in question. I will not repeat
    them.
        From a purely military perspective, I believe our new
    approach does three critical things:
        First, by providing more discrete objectives, it offers
    better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to employ
    their forces. They will still work to disrupt, dismantle, and
    defeat al Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe
    haven. They will still strive to protect the Afghan people, who
    remain the center of gravity. They will still pursue major
    elements of the counterinsurgency campaign desired and designed
    by General McChrystal, which, as we all know, involves at least
    some measure of active counterterrorism operations. But, now
    they will tailor this campaign and those operations by focusing
    on key population areas, by increasing pressure on al Qaeda's
    leadership, by more effectively working to degrade the
    Taliban's influence, and by streamlining and accelerating the
    growth of competent ANSF.
        At its core, our strategy is about providing breathing
    space for the Afghans to secure their own people and to
    stabilize their own country. It's about partnering and
    mentoring just as much, if not more, than it is about fighting.
    Where once we believed that finishing the job meant, to a large
    degree, doing it ourselves, we now know that it cannot truly,
    or permanently, be done by anyone other than the Afghans
    themselves. Fully a third of the U.S. troops in theater are
    partnered with Afghan forces, and I expect that number to rise
    significantly throughout 2010.
        Second, but not insignificantly, this new strategy gives
    commanders on the ground the resources and the support they
    need to reverse the momentum of the Taliban insurgency and to
    accomplish these more limited objectives. I've said it before,
    and I believe it still today, this region is the epicenter of
    global Islamic extremism. It is the place from which we were
    attacked on September 11. Should we be hit again, it's the
    place from which I am convinced the planning, training, and
    funding will emanate. Al Qaeda may, in fact, be the architect
    of such an attack, but the Taliban will be the bricklayers.
        Though hardly a uniform body, Taliban groups have grown
    bolder and more sophisticated. We saw that just a few months
    ago in the Korengal Valley, where Taliban forces attacked
    coalition outposts using what I would call almost conventional
    small-unit tactics. Their fighters are better organized and
    better equipped than they were just 1 year ago. In fact,
    coalition forces experienced record-high violence this past
    summer, with insurgent attacks more than 60 percent above 2008
    levels. Through brutal intimidation, the Taliban has
    established shadow governments across the country, coercing the
    reluctant support of many locals, and challenging the authority
    of elected leaders and state institutions. Indeed, we believe
    the insurgency has achieved a dominant influence in 11 of
    Afghanistan's 34 provinces. To say that there is no serious
    threat of Afghanistan falling once again into Taliban hands
    ignores the audacity of even the insurgency's most public
    statements. To argue that, should they have that power, the
    Taliban would not at least tolerate the presence of al Qaeda on
    Afghan soil, is to ignore both the recent past and the evidence
    we see every day of collusion between these factions on both
    sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
        The cost of failure is, then, grave. That is why the
    President's decision for an extended surge to Afghanistan of
    30,000 additional forces is so important. It gets the most U.S.
    force into the fight as quickly as possible, giving General
    McChrystal everything he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative.
        It validates our adherence to a counterinsurgency approach,
    and it offers our troops in Afghanistan the best possible
    chance to set the security conditions; for the Afghan people to
    see our commitment to their future; for the Karzai government
    to know our strong desire to see his promised reforms; for the
    Afghan Taliban to understand they will not, they cannot, take
    back Afghanistan; and for those beyond Afghanistan who support
    the Taliban, or would see the return of al Qaeda, to realize
    the futility of their pursuit.
        I should add that these reinforcements come on top of the
    21,000 troops the President ordered shortly after taking
    office, troops which have already made a huge difference in the
    southern Helmand Valley. But, as I have testified before, Mr.
    Chairman, no amount of troops in no amount of time will ever be
    enough to completely achieve success in such a fight. They
    simply must be accompanied by good governance and healthy
    public administration. This, not troop numbers, is the area of
    my greatest concern.
        Like everyone else, I look forward to working with the
    Karzai government, but we must have the support of the
    interagency and international communities, as well.
        That brings me to my final point. The President's new
    strategy still recognizes the criticality of a broadbased
    approach to regional problems. He does not view Afghanistan in
    isolation any more than he views the ties between al Qaeda and
    the Taliban as superficial. He has called for stronger and more
    productive cooperation with neighboring Pakistan, which is,
    likewise, under the threat from radical elements, and whose
    support remains vital to our ability to eliminate safe havens.
    He has pledged, and we in the military welcome, renewed
    emphasis on securing more civilian expertise to the effort--and
    that is happening--more contributions by other NATO nations,
    and a realistic plan to transition responsibilities to the
    Afghans. His is a more balanced, more flexible, and more
    achievable strategy than we've had in the past, one based on
    pragmatism and real possibilities. Speaking for the 2.2 million
    men and women who must execute it, and who, with their
    families, have borne the brunt of the stress and the strain of
    8 years of constant combat, I support his decision and
    appreciate his leadership.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]

                Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN

        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the subject of
    the President's newly announced strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
        The President's Tuesday evening announcement at West Point of our
    strategy and increased military resources for Afghanistan culminates a
    process of deliberate strategic review that began with the arrival of
    General McChrystal's interim assessment in early September. I believe
    this national-level review has been sober and essential. The challenges
    we face in Afghanistan and Pakistan are great, and our interests there
    are significant. This administration needed to take the time to look at
    all the options and craft a balanced and sustainable approach. I
    believe that the review has met this aim.
        I support fully, and without hesitation, the President's decision.

                             REFINING THE STRATEGY

        The facts compel us to act. Our strategic review confirmed that the
    overarching policy goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle and
    defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its
    capacity to threaten America and our allies from either country in the
    future.
        South Asia is the epicenter of global Islamic extremism; the
    location of al Qaeda's core leadership and the terrain that dozens of
    Islamic terrorist groups call home. It is the location from which the
    September 11 attacks on America were planned and driven. If the United
    States should be hit again, I remain convinced that the planning,
    training and funding for such an attack will emanate there. It is a
    region where a nuclear weapons state, Pakistan, is under direct threat
    from al Qaeda and affiliated Pakistani-Taliban groups that aspire to
    acquire and use nuclear weapons against the United States and our
    allies. Thus, it is a region with a unique--and deadly--combination of
    the most dangerous terrorists and the most dangerous technology in the
    world. Our actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan seek to prevent
    catastrophic outcomes from these toxic forces, and constitute a most
    critical national interest.
        Our strategic review paid particular attention to Pakistan. The
    people of Pakistan are under as much, if not greater, threat from al
    Qaeda and Islamic terrorism than are we. We must encourage and aid the
    Pakistani military fight against these extremists in South Waziristan,
    in SWAT, and across Pakistan. We must also help Pakistan widen its
    aperture in seeking out and eliminating all forms of extremism and
    terrorism--those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan,
    the wider South Asia region, and the globe. We are deepening ties with
    the people of Pakistan as well as with their security forces. We see
    progress with our Pakistani allies as paramount to the way ahead.
        In Afghanistan, we narrowed-in on a challenging, but attainable
    goal: to deny al Qaeda safe haven and the Afghan-Taliban the ability to
    overthrow the duly elected Afghan government. To achieve this refined
    strategic aim, we must continue to deny al Qaeda any Afghanistan toe-
    hold, reverse the momentum of the Taliban insurgency, and build
    sufficient Afghan Government and security capacity to eventually defeat
    the insurgent threat. Our review also narrowed and refined the military
    objectives for General McChrystal's North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO)-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)--focusing it on
    security of key population areas while Afghan forces grow in size and
    capability, prioritizing a robust NATO-ISAF program of training and
    mentoring Afghan military and police, and establishing the conditions
    necessary for Afghans to assume their own security. Each of these
    objectives will hasten the day when we can begin thinning the U.S./
    NATO-ISAF security forces presence, turning the internal security of
    Afghanistan over to the Afghans. This strategy provides the time and
    space for the Afghans themselves to build sufficient security and
    governance capacity to stabilize their country.
        Our refined military objectives for Afghanistan complement those in
    the political and economic spheres. They also support diplomatic,
    political, and military programs that the President's strategy calls
    for us to undertake with neighboring countries--especially Pakistan--
    that increase pressure against al Qaeda's leadership; that expand
    counterinsurgency operations against Taliban insurgents who threaten
    Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the wider region; and that help set the
    conditions for improved regional security and stability.

                        MATCHING STRATEGY AND RESOURCES

        Throughout this strategic review, I advised the Secretary of
    Defense and the President that our commitment of military resources
    must match our strategy.
        I am pleased to inform this committee that the President's decision
    accommodates this advice. The strategy he approved commits 30,000 more
    U.S. forces, with some number of additional enablers, while calling for
    our NATO and non-NATO allies to generate additional forces. This rapid,
    coalition-wide build-up of force aligns with General McChrystal's
    recommendations, even more so in light of the narrowing of objectives
    for Afghanistan that the President announced Tuesday night.
        The President's commitment is to rapidly send these additional
    forces forward--to get as much force into the fight as fast as General
    McChrystal can absorb it. This allows Generals McChrystal and Petraeus
    to plan for cohesive logistics and transportation support over the
    course of the coming year. While there are no guarantees in war, I
    expect that we will make significant headway in the next 18-24 months.
    I also believe we could begin to thin our combat forces in about the
    same timeframe. From a military standpoint, the President's commitment
    to an increase in military force, especially backed by an increase in
    civilian resources, is much better than one featuring periodic
    assessments that trigger incremental force escalation.
        The President's decision also supports accelerated expansion of
    Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--a critical initiative. We
    simply must invest in the growth of an Afghan security force--through
    more radical and in-depth partnering. The additional U.S. and coalition
    forces heading to Afghanistan will focus a great amount of time and
    energy toward empowering a strong and capable ANSF.
        General McChrystal intends to use these additional U.S. troops to
    conduct more focused counterinsurgency operations that enhance
    population security against the Taliban in south and east Afghanistan.
    As in Iraq, our troops will live among the population. Thus--and as
    General McChrystal has successfully emphasized since his arrival as
    Commander of ISAF last June--we will continue to make every effort to
    eliminate civilian casualties, not just because this is the right thing
    to do, but because these casualties work against our goal of Afghan
    population security. Although we must expect higher alliance casualties
    in coming months as we dedicate more U.S. forces to protect the
    population and mentor the ANSF, our extended security presence must--
    and will--improve security for the Afghan people and limit both future
    civilian and military casualties

                           MOVING FORWARD--CONCLUSION

        No commitment of additional force in the number we plan for
    Afghanistan is without risk. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I assess the
    risks to our military forces and our military missions--at home and
    abroad--from this force deployment decision to be acceptable. We can
    continue to balance the additional force flow requirements for
    Afghanistan against those coming available from draw-down trajectory
    programmed for, and on track in, Iraq.
        I believe that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be
    gradual, and sometimes halting. Yet I believe we can succeed. The
    President's announced strategy and this force flow decision give us the
    best possible chance for success. We must exhibit vision, apply
    sufficient resources, and display endurance to realize our objectives
    for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most challenges we now confront in the
    South Asia region are not military in nature. They require solutions
    from and led by national and local governments. Yet none of these
    solutions are possible in an environment of insecurity. Our role must
    be to fill the security gap for a short time, concurrently growing our
    partner government's capacity to self-secure. Pursued with resolve, our
    actions will send an unmistakable message that the U.S. remains
    committed to the common good, while steadily expanding the sets of
    partnerships available to address future challenges without a long-term
    need for large numbers of U.S. combat forces.
        In providing advice to this President over the past 10 months, one
    important point I have made, consonant with other key presidential
    advisers, is that our military activities must support rather than lead
    our Nation's foreign policy. Our warfighting ability will never be in
    doubt. But we have learned from the past 8 years of war that we serve
    this Nation best when we are part of a comprehensive, integrated
    approach that employs all elements of national power to achieve the
    policy goals set by our civilian leaders. This approach remains crucial
    in Afghanistan, Pakistan and across South Central Asia.
        On behalf of our service members, I would like to thank the members
    of this committee--and Congress as a whole--for the sustained
    investment in our brave young men and women in uniform, and for your
    unwavering support of them and their families as they continue to serve
    so magnificently and selflessly in this time of protracted war.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral Mullen.
        We're going to have 6-minute rounds, and I will ask members
    to strictly adhere to that 6 minutes, so we will all have an
    opportunity to ask questions.
        There's been some confusion about whether the beginning
    date for U.S. troop reductions is set for July 2011, with the
    pace of those reductions being condition-based, or whether the
    July 2011 starting date itself is dependent on conditions on
    the ground. Secretary Gates, which is it?
        Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, July 2011 is when we expect
    the transition process to begin.
        Chairman Levin. But, is that date conditions-based, or not?
        Secretary Gates. No, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. Next question. This question has to
    do with the partnering ratio. There are currently just over
    10,000 U.S. troops in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan,
    and they are partnered with only 1,500 or so Afghan soldiers.
    The partnering goal for the United States is almost the
    reverse, as measured in units: three Afghan companies to one
    U.S. company. Now, paraphrasing the National Security Council's
    Director for Afghanistan, the 3-Afghan-to-1-U.S. ratio helps
    prevent Afghan units from relying too much on the U.S. unit, to
    the detriment of the Afghan unit's development. So, the current
    number of troops could and should, under our own doctrine, be
    partnering with 20,000 or so Afghan troops in Helmand. We don't
    need more troops to partner more Afghans; we have more than
    enough for that purpose. Nor do we expect 20,000 or more Afghan
    troops to be assigned to partner with us in Helmand next year.
    According to Prime Minister Brown of Great Britain, there will
    be 10,000 more Afghan troops deployed to Helmand in the coming
    year, to be divided approximately equally between U.S. and
    British forces for partnering.
        So, first, Secretary Gates, are my numbers correct?
        Secretary Gates. Let me defer to Admiral Mullen.
        Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, I think your numbers, as far
    as those that are currently partnered, are correct, given the
    availability of Afghan forces in the south, in Helmand.
        Chairman Levin. In terms of what we expect to be deployed
    by Afghanistan for their troops in the coming year?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, it sounds about right.
        Chairman Levin. Okay.
        Now, I thought I heard the President, at the meeting
    yesterday in the Old Executive Office Building, say that we
    would not have our troops clear an area unless they could turn
    the cleared area over to Afghans. Now, Secretary Gates, did I
    hear him correctly? If so, how is that possible, given the
    paucity of available Afghan forces?
        Secretary Gates. Let me start and then invite Admiral
    Mullen to chime in.
        First of all, clearly, as I've indicated, accelerating the
    growth of the ANA and ANP is vitally important, but we are also
    looking, as I suggested in my remarks, at local forces, as
    well, partnering with local security forces. There is more than
    just the ANP and the ANA in this mix. The plan clearly is that
    we will not transition security responsibility to the Afghans
    until the Afghans have the capacity in that district or that
    province to be able to manage the security situation on their
    own, with our allies and us initially in a tactical overwatch
    and then a strategic overwatch situation.
        The reality is that the circumstances, very much as in
    Iraq, differ from district to district and province to
    province, so the ability of the Afghans to take this on will
    depend on the circumstances in each of these areas. In some
    areas, it will take fewer Afghans. But, clearly a big part of
    this is additional training, both basic training, but then
    partnering in combat as training, to put more and more Afghans
    into the fight and into a position where they can take
    responsibility for security, and particularly in the context of
    degraded Taliban capabilities. One of the purposes of the
    United States going in with additional forces is, not just to
    partner with the Afghans, and not just to train the Afghans,
    but to degrade the capabilities of the Taliban. So, you have
    the situation in which the capabilities of the ANSF are rising
    at a time when our combat forces are degrading the capabilities
    of the Taliban, and it's the point at which the Afghans are
    able to handle that degraded threat that we would make the
    transition.
        Chairman Levin. Do I understand from your answer then, that
    there will be situations where our troops will be clearing an
    area and not have Afghans available yet, at that point, to turn
    that cleared area over to? Is that fair?
        Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, I think it is.
        Chairman Levin. All right.
        Admiral Mullen. But, if I may, just briefly. When General
    McChrystal showed up, in June 2009, there were virtually no
    units partnered. There are some 280 units out of 351 right now
    who are partnered.
        Chairman Levin. With some partners, not the 3-to-1 ratio.
        Admiral Mullen. No, sir, we're not there yet.
        Chairman Levin. Okay.
        Admiral Mullen. But, this is companies by companies. This
    is in training and in fighting.
        Chairman Levin. My final question, because I'm out of time,
    is: What will be the ANA's projected size by July 2011?
        Secretary Gates. The goal, by December 2010, is 134,000.
        Chairman Levin. No, my question is July 2011.
        Admiral Mullen. It'll be about 170,000.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Following the hearing, Admiral Mullen clarified for the
    committee that the Department of Defense currently expects 162,000
    Afghan National Army in place by July 2011.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Mullen, do you think it's important to tell the
    American people it's very likely that casualties will go up
    during the course of this troop increase that's envisioned?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator McCain, when we added the 21,000
    marines, I was very clear about the potential that casualties
    would go up. I don't think there's any question that casualties
    are a part of the risk associated with these additional troops,
    and that they will go up.
        Senator McCain. I think the American people need to
    understand that.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I agree with you.
        Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in your answer to Chairman
    Levin's question, if I understand your answer--Chairman Levin
    asked if the withdrawal plan for July 2011 was condition-based,
    and you said, ``No.'' Will we withdraw our forces based on
    conditions on the ground or based on an arbitrary date,
    regardless of conditions on the ground?
        Secretary Gates. What we're talking about, Senator McCain,
    is the beginning of a process, not the end of that process.
    Approximately 60 percent of Afghanistan today is not controlled
    by the Taliban or have significant Taliban influence.
        Senator McCain. I'd say, with respect, Secretary Gates, my
    question is: Will the date of withdrawal, 2011, which the
    President set, be based on an arbitrary date of July 2011,
    regardless of conditions on the ground?
        Secretary Gates. I think it's the judgment of all of us in
    the Department of Defense (DOD) involved in this process that
    we will be in a position, in particularly uncontested areas,
    where we will be able to begin that transition in July 2011.
        Senator McCain. Let's suppose you're not. Let's suppose
    that conditions on the ground are poor so that our commanders
    believe that it would jeopardize the success of the mission if
    we start a withdrawal in July 2011. Will we do it anyway?
        Secretary Gates. The President has indicated that we will
    have a thorough review of how we're doing in December 2010, and
    I think we will be in a position then to evaluate whether or
    not we can begin that transition in July.
        Senator McCain. I say with great respect, Secretary Gates,
    the President announced that we would begin withdrawing on a
    hard date of July 2011. I don't know why that date was
    particularly picked and that may be a question in another
    session, but he's announced that. At the same time, you said
    conditions on the ground would determine withdrawal. Now, those
    are two incompatible statements. You either have a winning
    strategy and do as we did in Iraq, and then, once it succeeds,
    we withdraw, or we, as the President said, have a date
    beginning withdrawal in July 2011. Which is it? It has to be
    one or the other. It has to be the appropriate conditions or it
    has to be an arbitrary date. You can't have both.
        Secretary Gates. Where we begin the transition is, I think,
    the key factor here, Senator. As I suggested, we will have a
    thorough review in December 2010. If it appears that the
    strategy's not working and that we are not going to be able to
    transition in 2011, then we will take a hard look at the
    strategy itself.
        Senator McCain. I say, with respect, I think the American
    people need to know whether we will begin withdrawing in 2011
    and conditions are ripe for that, or whether we will just be
    withdrawing, no matter what.
        Secretary Gates. Our current plan is that we will begin the
    transition, in local areas, in July 2011. We will evaluate, in
    December 2010, whether we believe we will be able to meet that
    objective.
        Senator McCain. I think that has to be made very clear.
    Right now the expectation level of the American people, because
    of the President's speech, is that we will be withdrawing, as
    of July 2011, regardless of conditions on the ground. I think
    that's the wrong impression to give our friends, it's the wrong
    impression to give our enemies, and it's the wrong impression
    to give the men and women who want to go over there and win; we
    should not start withdrawing on an arbitrary date.
    Unfortunately, that has not been made clear at all.
        By the way, Admiral Mullen, the Army Counterinsurgency
    Field Manual says, ``counterinsurgents should prepare for a
    long-term commitment. The populace must have confidence in the
    staying power of both the counterinsurgents and the host-nation
    government.'' By announcing a date for withdrawal, don't you
    think that contradicts the counterinsurgency manual?
        Admiral Mullen. Sir, I believe, and the military leadership
    believes, by mid-2011, we'll know how this is going. The
    Secretary talked to the assessment. In fact, it's General
    McChrystal's view that these additional forces will allow him
    to reverse the momentum and head us in the right direction.
    We'll have very solid indicators at that point, and then,
    obviously, the July 2011 date is a day we start transitioning
    and transferring responsibility; it's not a date that we're
    leaving. The President also said that this will be based on
    conditions on the ground.
        Senator McCain. Then it makes no sense for him to have
    announced the date. But I'm sure we'll continue this
    discussion.
        Secretary Clinton, I appreciate your statement, but I would
    like a lot more specifics. We know that there are divisions
    within the Embassy in Kabul. We know that cables were leaked,
    and that the Ambassador there was against any increases in
    troops there. We know that relations within the Embassy have at
    least three factions. We also know that the ability of DOS
    personnel has been significantly limited, as it was prior to
    the surge in Iraq, because the environment is not safe for them
    to go out and operate.
        I have great confidence in the military operational
    planning, and I'm confident it can succeed. But, as I said
    earlier, I don't see the ``build'' component yet, and I would
    like for you to submit to this committee a very specific plan,
    just as we are receiving a very specific military plan, on
    exactly how we're going to achieve the ``build'' part of it,
    which I think there is an adequate model for it, in the case of
    Iraq.
        So, I appreciate your statements, and I agree with you
    about the quality of personnel. I have yet to see a
    comprehensive, cohesive, convincing plan to implement the
    essential civil side of any successful surge.
        Secretary Clinton. Senator McCain, first let me say, we are
    more than happy to submit a plan. We have obviously been
    working with our committee of jurisdiction and authorization on
    a very close ongoing basis, and we'll be happy to share a lot
    of the information with you, and we would welcome your response
    and your advice.
        I have to say, however, that the process that we engaged in
    solicited opinions, and I thought it was a great tribute to the
    President and to National Security Advisor General Jones that
    the White House ran a process that actually sought out and made
    it clear that diversity of opinion was welcome. I thought it
    was useful to hear from a variety of sources. It wouldn't
    surprise you, as it didn't surprise me, that people had
    different opinions based on their perspective. But, as Admiral
    Mullen just eloquently said, the President's made a decision.
    There is no division. There is absolute unity and a commitment
    to carrying out the mission. We'll be happy to share the
    specifics of that with you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
        I thank all the witnesses. We appreciate, enormously, their
    contributions to our country.
        Chairman Levin. We're going to take advantage of the
    presence of a quorum here now to take 1 minute to consider the
    1,938 pending military nominations, as well as the civilian
    nominations of Dr. Clifford Stanley to be Under Secretary of
    Defense; Frank Kendall III to be Principal Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense; Erin Conaton to be the Under Secretary of
    the Air Force; Terry Yonkers to be Assistant Secretary of the
    Air Force; and Lawrence Romo to be Director of the Selective
    Service.
        Do I hear a motion to, en bloc, approve those nominations?
        Senator Lieberman. So moved.
        Chairman Levin. Second?
        Voice. Second.
        Chairman Levin. Second.
        All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman Levin. Opposed, nay? [No response.]
        The ayes have it.
        Thank you very much.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gates. By the way, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. I knew you would appreciate that
    intervention.
        Senator Lieberman. Oh, one more item of business.
        Chairman Levin. I included the 1,938 pending military
    nominations.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks also to Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and
    Admiral Mullen for your excellent opening statements and for
    all the hard and effective work that you did in support of the
    policy that the President announced last night.
        I agree with what Senator McCain said, that the President
    has made the right decision in embracing a counterinsurgency
    strategy for Afghanistan and resourcing it properly. In making
    this decision, President Obama has respectfully disagreed with
    the majority of members of his own political party, according
    to every public opinion poll I've seen, and therefore, I think
    it's fair to say that the President has quite literally put our
    national security interests ahead of partisan political
    interests. I hope that fact will inspire and encourage a
    majority of members of both political parties to do the same
    and to, thereby, show that America's political leadership is
    still capable of suspending partisanship at the water's edge
    when our security and our troops are on the line.
        As chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and
    Governmental Affairs Committee, I'm very grateful that
    President Obama argued so effectively last night that the war
    in Afghanistan is a war of necessity because its outcome is
    inseparable from our security here at home. That is why I
    believe there is no substitute for victory over the Islamist
    extremists and terrorists in Afghanistan. A war of necessity
    must not just be fought, it must, of necessity, be won. Last
    night, in the most controversial paragraph of his speech,
    President Obama said that we will ``begin the transfer of our
    forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011.'' That troubled me when
    I heard it. But, then the President added words that reassured
    me, which were that ``We will execute this transition
    responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.''
        Secretary Gates, this morning in your opening statement,
    you added more detail and Admiral Mullen, you did, too, I
    think, to the mode by which we will begin this transition in
    July 2011. I'm particularly struck that you refer to it as a
    ``transfer of security responsibility,'' and you also say that
    it will be very much like what we did in Iraq, where
    international security forces provided overwatch, first at the
    tactical level, then at the strategic level.
        So, Secretary Gates, I want to ask you, as I read your
    words today, am I correct in concluding that what will
    definitely begin in July 2011 is a transfer of security
    responsibility to the Afghans, but may not include,
    immediately, a withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. No, and that is correct. I think as we
    turn over more districts and more provinces to Afghan security
    control, much as we did with the provincial Iraqi control, that
    there will be a thinning of our forces and a gradual drawdown.
    I would remind folks, here, since this is the second surge I've
    been up here defending, that the surge in Iraq lasted 14
    months: January 2007 to March 2008. Frankly, it was pretty
    apparent to our adversaries in Iraq all along that the surge
    was a very tentative situation because we were up here
    defending it practically every day. So, the notion that our
    adversaries in Afghanistan are not aware of the debates in this
    country, and the debates in Europe and elsewhere, is, I think,
    unrealistic.
        Senator Lieberman. I agree.
        Secretary Gates. They know these things. But, the reality
    is, this is going to be a process. I think it has much in
    common with the way that we began to draw down in Iraq.
        Senator Lieberman. Am I right, then, that we're likely to
    transfer security responsibilities to the Afghans in the areas
    that are most stable, that are most uncontested at the
    beginning? At the beginning, we probably will put our troops
    back a ways, just to see how that works, rather than taking
    them out of the country?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, we're not just going to throw these
    guys into the swimming pool and walk away. The reality is,
    first of all, those transfers are going to take place in the
    most uncontested places in Afghanistan. So, just as in Iraq,
    you may have some districts and provinces being transferred to
    Afghan security responsibility, and, at the very same time,
    have extraordinarily heavy combat going on in other provinces
    around the country, which is exactly what we saw in Iraq.
        Senator Lieberman. Am I right that, in the policy that the
    President announced last night, which does begin a transfer of
    security responsibility of July 2011 to the Afghans, there is
    no deadline for the end of that transfer; it will be based on
    conditions on the ground?
        Secretary Gates. It will be based on conditions on the
    ground. But, by the same token, we want to communicate to the
    Afghans this is not an open-ended commitment on the part of the
    American people and our allies around the world.
        Senator Lieberman. I agree with that.
        Secretary Gates. We have to build a fire under them,
    frankly, to get them to do the kind of recruitment, retention,
    training, and so on, for their forces that allow us to make
    this transition.
        Let me just draw one other analogy to Iraq. In Iraq, once
    it was clear the surge was working, it was pretty plain that
    the Iraqis wanted us out about as fast as possible. The
    security agreement and everything flowed from that. That's not
    entirely clear in Afghanistan. They live in a very rough
    neighborhood. So, we have the balancing act here. Frankly, the
    centerpiece of our debates for the last several months have
    been: How do you get the Afghans to begin to step up to
    responsibility for their own future, their own security in a
    way that allows us to have confidence that they will not once
    again become the safe haven for al Qaeda? Figuring out that
    balance, in terms of how you incentivize and give a sense of
    urgency to the Afghans, and at the same time signal resolve to
    our adversaries, was the tough part of this for us.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that answer. I think you
    strike exactly the right balance, and I appreciate what you
    said. We're not just going to throw the Afghans into the pool
    and run away, until we're sure that they can swim on their own.
    To me, that's the essence of moving down the road to victory in
    Afghanistan.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I was going to start up with the end status and state, but
    it's been pretty well covered right now. I would only say this,
    though. I am probably speaking on behalf of all of the members
    up here because all of us have been both to Afghanistan and
    Iraq. The troops themselves, they want to win, and they don't
    like to even talk about a withdrawal date and that type of
    thing.
        Let me just ask you a quick question, Admiral Mullen. Most
    of the time, when commanders talk about different options and
    courses of action, they talk about the risk involved. The risk
    is usually low, medium, or high. What was the risk level
    associated with General McChrystal's 40,000 increase?
        Admiral Mullen. Notionally and broadly moderate, but the
    real critical path here is the development of the ANSF, which
    we all think is high risk, particularly on the ANP side. That's
    one of the reasons General McChrystal has shifted to
    partnering, and one of the reasons that we are devoting our
    best people, best leaders, and resources to accelerating that,
    so that we can do what Secretary Gates mentioned earlier.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. I'll pursue that in just a minute,
    here. So, I would assume that the number 30,000 would be a
    little higher risk than the moderate risk that comes with
    40,000 troops?
        Admiral Mullen. Sir, what I said in my statement is,
    General McChrystal is going to get these forces this year in as
    fast as we can get them there. His biggest concern is to
    reverse the momentum. He thinks he can do that with these
    forces. He's going to get them on the same timeline he asked
    for and at about the same level.
        Senator Inhofe. I understand. Now, I was privileged to be
    with now National Security Advisor General Jones the last week
    that he was on the job over there, and I know some of the
    differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, but I've been asked,
    many times--and I think we should get what we're looking at on
    the record. During the peak of the surge in Iraq, we had about
    165,000 Americans, and then in Afghanistan, when you start with
    68,000, add 30,000 to it, you're talking about 100,000 in a
    country that's about twice the size of Iraq. Why does it take
    fewer troops? What's the major reason it takes fewer of our
    troops, our participation, in Afghanistan, relative to the
    size, as it did in Iraq?
        Admiral Mullen. One of the great strengthens of the review
    was to focus the objectives specifically, and, in particular,
    focus the objectives on key population centers. So, the troops
    that General McChrystal has asked for, and that will add up to
    about 100,000, are in key areas, particularly, the Pashtun
    Belt, where he fundamentally believes, with these troops, he
    can turn this around. While the ratio is a guide, it is not
    sacrosanct, and he's able to focus where we need to focus to
    get at this insurgency. Actually, the same was true in Iraq;
    it's just that this need, with respect to these ratios and
    these numbers, is about right for Afghanistan.
        Secretary Gates. Let me just add one sentence. That is one
    of the reasons why the added contributions from our allies and
    partners are so important, because, basically, we want them to
    take responsibility for the northern and western parts of
    Afghanistan so that we can concentrate and focus our efforts in
    the southern and eastern parts of the country.
        Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates, I think one thing that all
    of you have said in your opening statements is, we need greater
    participation by the Afghans, the ANA, and we also need greater
    participation by the non-American coalition. We all agree with
    that. I happened to be over there in 2003, when we were turning
    over the training of the ANA to the Afghans, and it happened to
    be Oklahoma's 45th Guard Unit that was in charge of that.
    Afghans contend that they're great warriors; and yet, you
    looked around--and I have ever since then--you see so many of
    these young, healthy Afghans, that are walking the streets, who
    ought to be in the military. What can we do differently than
    what we've done in the past to encourage a greater
    participation with the ANA?
        Secretary Gates. Let me start, and then I'll ask Admiral
    Mullen to contribute.
        One of the things that they are doing that actually, I
    think, makes a real difference is significantly increasing the
    pay, both for the ANP and the ANA. The reality is that, based
    on the information available to us, in many instances the
    Taliban actually pay more than the Afghan Government. So, one
    of the things that we can do, particularly in terms of
    retention, is to increase their pay. I think most people
    believe that pay increase will have a real impact.
        Admiral Mullen. The Secretary talked earlier about
    retention and recruiting; clearly, incentivizing that, from a
    pay standpoint, is critical.
        The other fundamental difference from several years ago, or
    really since General McChrystal got there, is this partnership
    piece. What I think you saw, Senator, was mentoring and
    training teams, that kind of thing.
        Senator Inhofe. That's correct.
        Admiral Mullen. This is partnering, and it's getting
    everybody off their bases and out with the community. Those two
    differences are significant.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, I appreciate it. I was going to ask a
    similar question. What can we do differently, in terms of
    encouraging more non-American coalition forces? I was pleased
    with the one statement that the President made when he talked
    about the fact that he had actually talked to some of the NATO
    allies before coming out with this. I wish he had done the same
    thing on the third missile defense site in Poland. But, by
    doing that, do you think that's going to encourage them and
    make them feel they're more a part of this? Was that a good
    move?
        Secretary Gates. Absolutely.
        Senator Inhofe. What else can we do to encourage more of
    the non-American coalition?
        Secretary Gates. Secretary Clinton has been talking to her
    counterparts, I've been talking to my counterparts, and we are
    both hearing: 1,000 here, 800 there, and so on. I think that we
    will make the 5,000 to 7,000 goal, and I think, as somebody who
    has been critical of the allies and was once derided by my
    British colleague for megaphone diplomacy because I was giving
    them such a hard time on this, we have to realize that the non-
    U.S. forces have increased in the last 2 years, from about
    17,000 to 18,000 troops, to almost 44,000 troops. So, with this
    add, we will be at nearly 50,000 non-U.S. troops in
    Afghanistan, and I think that's a pretty significant
    commitment.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes.
        My time has expired, but, for the record, Madam Secretary,
    you made a statement about President Karzai and the speech that
    he recently made. I hope it's not just empty words. But, if you
    would, for the record, give us your indication, your feelings,
    about what he can do now to accomplish what you had suggested.
        Secretary Clinton. I certainly will, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Clinton. If I could just quickly add, one of the
    most important parts of President Kazai's speech was his
    assertion that ANSF would be taking responsibility for many
    important parts of the country within 3 years, and that they
    would be responsible for the entire country within 5 years.
    That is very much along the lines of the kind of partnering and
    transition that we think is realistic; we just have to keep the
    feet to the fire and keep pushing it forward.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, and Mr.
    Chairman.
        There's been much made about this withdrawal goal as an
    arbitrary one, but let me ask you, Admiral Mullen: This was
    based on the advice of General McChrystal, and your advice,
    about your expectation of what the situation on the ground
    would be in 2011, given these additional resources and
    additional change of policy, correct?
        Admiral Mullen. I have a very clear view, and, I think, so
    do General Petraeus and General McChrystal, that by mid-2011 we
    will know whether we are going to succeed here or not. That has
    been something that we've discussed and we agreed on. That's
    why getting these forces in so quickly is so important to try
    to reverse this thing. Some of it is based on the fact that the
    Marines have been in Helmand this year, so, in fact, the
    Marines will be in one of the toughest places for three
    fighting seasons, if you will--2009, 2010, and 2011--and we
    think, with the additional forces, we will have very strong
    indicators about how this is going and our ability to transfer
    and transition at that point.
        Senator Reed. So you wouldn't describe the date as
    arbitrary?
        Admiral Mullen. No, sir. It wasn't arbitrary.
        That said, what the President also said, the transition
    would be responsible and it would be based on conditions. All
    of us can look out and speculate what those conditions will be,
    but I think we have to be careful about that. Transition in
    July 2011 is the goal right now.
        Secretary Gates. I would just clarify, if I could, Senator?
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Gates. The July 2011 date was chosen because it
    will be 2 years after the Marines arrived in Helmand.
        Senator Reed. Giving them the fighting opportunities, for
    want of a better term, perhaps fighting obligations or fighting
    challenges, that have a deadline.
        The issue of the deadline also raises the issue of our
    posture in Iraq. There is a deadline there, too, Mr. Secretary,
    and that is a legal deadline, which I understand can't be
    changed without the permission of the Iraqis, even if
    conditions deteriorated. Is that correct?
        Secretary Gates. That's correct. All of our combat forces
    are to be out by the end of August 2010, and all forces out by
    the end of 2011. We do have some flexibility, in terms of the
    pacing of the withdrawals between now and the end of August,
    but even with the hiccups over the elections and the problems
    with respect to the election law, at this point General Odierno
    does not see any need to alter the pacing of the draw-downs in
    Iraq.
        Senator Reed. But, that was agreed to by the Bush
    administration as a hard deadline without conditions, is that
    correct?
        Secretary Gates. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. One of the other aspects of this new plan was
    the process of deliberation that went into it. It took time.
    But, from your comments this morning, that time, I sense, was
    well spent. One aspect of this I think, Admiral Mullen, was
    that the original plan by General McChrystal with 40,000 troops
    would not have had the flow of forces as quickly as the final
    plan adopted by the President. Is that correct?
        Admiral Mullen. In particular, with respect to the NATO
    forces, they're not committed yet, but we're hopeful that they
    will be available more quickly and that we will do everything
    that we can to get as much capability and as quickly as
    possible.
        Senator Reed. But, that is only about NATO.
        Admiral Mullen. I don't want to overstate that.
        Senator Reed. Right.
        Admiral Mullen. It is accelerated, to some degree; I don't
    want to overstate that, but it really gets him the forces he
    needs this year to turn this thing around.
        Secretary Gates. I would add that the final component of
    his original request, the final brigade combat team (BCT),
    would not have arrived in Afghanistan until the summer of 2011.
    My own personal recommendation was, there's no need to commit
    to that since it's so far in the future, and so, to Admiral
    Mullen's point earlier, fundamentally General McChrystal is
    getting more troops faster than under the original plan.
        Senator Reed. All right, let me just rephrase that.
        This process, as you've suggested, has produced, in your
    minds, a better proposal across the board than originally was
    submitted by the individual components: the Ambassador, General
    McChrystal, U.S. Central Command, et cetera. Is that your
    assessment?
        Secretary Gates. I'm convinced everybody in the process
    feels that way. One of the things that was clearly an issue,
    and one of the concerns that I had, coming out of the March
    decisions, was that they were interpreted very broadly, in the
    press and elsewhere, as a commitment to full-scale nation-
    building and creating a strong central government in Kabul.
    There was understandable skepticism over such broad objectives,
    and it sounded very open-ended. So, one of the principal
    components of the dialogue over the last 3 months was: How do
    we refine and narrow the mission to make it achievable, and
    achieve the objectives, in terms of our own security?
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, some of the criticism of even
    talking about a date--regardless of whether it's a hard
    unconditional withdrawal as in Iraq, or the proposal of the
    President for Afghanistan--is that it would embolden the enemy,
    on one hand, or, on the other hand, they would lie low and wait
    us out. It strikes me that the Taliban has been emboldened
    quite aggressively over the last several years without any type
    of deadline, and if they sit it out, what will you do if they
    simply gave up the operational space to us for 18 months or 2
    years?
        Secretary Gates. We certainly would welcome them not being
    active for the next 18 months because it would give us open-
    field running, with our allies and the Afghans, to build
    capacity. I think, as you make the point, we are already in a
    situation in which they are emboldened and in which they are
    being aggressive and where they have the momentum right now.
    It's not clear to me what more they could do than they're doing
    right now. The forces that we're sending in are intended, in
    the first instance, as the Admiral has said, to reverse that
    momentum and deny them the ability to control territory.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. I thank all of you for all your
    presentations this morning and for your service to the Country.
        We only have one Commander in Chief, and I want to be
    supportive. I think this plan is within the framework of
    something I think can be effective. I intend to support you and
    examine it as we go forward to make sure that we're fulfilling
    our role here in Congress to provide oversight and our
    responsibility to our constituents. I want to thank you for
    your presentations.
        Secretary Gates, we talked earlier this year about too-
    grandiose expectations for a country that has as many
    difficulties and is as poor, such as with Iraq or Afghanistan,
    and you recognized that in your answer to our questions. I'd
    like to pursue that a little bit. That is, what can we
    realistically expect? How can we create stability and order in
    Afghanistan as soon as possible so that we can reduce our
    troops as soon as possible from that country?
        Most of the talk I've been hearing, and in your statements,
    indicate a commitment to ANA, which I assume is commanded and
    directed from the central government in Kabul. But, you did
    indicate in your statement that you would want to engage
    communities to enlist more local security forces to protect
    their own territory. I heard former National Security Advisor
    Brzezinski this morning on television talk about the need for
    local militias. I saw former President Musharraf from Pakistan
    in his op-ed in the Wall Street Journal saying that Afghans,
    for centuries, have been governed loosely, through a social
    compact between all the ethnic groups under a sovereign king.
    So, again, how do you envision making progress to transitioning
    to local security forces? To what extent must those forces be
    directly accountable to Kabul, and to what extent can they be
    local?
        Secretary Gates. There is a balance that we have to strike,
    and we do. I have felt, ever since I got this job, that we have
    been too focused on the central government in Kabul, and not
    enough on the provinces, the districts, and the tribes. The key
    here is community security organizations that are willing to
    work with the government in Kabul and that do not become the
    militias for warlords.
        The balance we're trying to strike, and what General
    McChrystal cares about a lot, as does everybody else, is: How
    do we encourage these local policing functions? Some of the
    efforts I've seen at work in Wardak Province, where they
    recruit locals. The tribal elders are telling me the roads that
    have been closed by the Taliban for years have been reopened by
    these local groups, but they are within the framework of the
    provincial governor and the district leadership, so that
    they're not operating independently or working for warlords.
    Figuring out how to encourage that kind of activity and build
    on it, but keep it within the framework of people who are in
    governing positions and not just independent warlords, is the
    key to that effort.
        But, that kind of subnational subprovincial effort, I
    think, ultimately will play an important role in all of this.
        Senator Sessions. Of course, the National Guards are an
    example. Every State has a National Guard, and the Governors
    still appoint the commanders of those National Guards in
    America. I think there is a sense of loyalty and fierce
    commitment to local areas in nations like Afghanistan that we
    may not be fully respecting. I think you're on the right track
    with that thought.
        One of the generals whom I met in the Pentagon recently had
    a picture of one of the local officials on his wall, and he was
    very impressed with him. A very strong leader who was doing
    good work. I'm not sure how well he would perform if he thought
    that everything had to be run through the national government.
        Secretary Gates. I would just add, Senator, I think that
    one of the keys here is, in a country that is as rural and as
    tribal as Afghanistan, I think one of the challenges in
    recruiting people for the ANA and the ANP is getting them to
    leave their local area. That's why I think these local security
    activities, if we can work with the Afghans to keep them within
    a governance model, have such promise because these guys are
    basically protecting their own turf.
        Senator Sessions. I couldn't agree more, and they can be
    paid what, for them, would be a good wage, but far less than it
    would cost to have an American soldier there.
        Mr. Secretary, I regret to have to raise the problem with
    the tanker competition. I notice the Northrop Grumman team has
    announced a concern so great that they are announcing they may
    pull out from the competition.
        A number of serious changes were made in the Request for
    Proposal (RFP), each one of those tilted against a
    transformational aircraft, tilted against a larger aircraft, an
    aircraft that could provide more cargo capacity and other
    capabilities. The RFP was received with great concern by the
    Northrop team because it's quite different from the original
    RFP. There's no doubt about that. All the change is tilted in
    the way I've mentioned.
        So, my question, briefly, to you is: Do you believe that
    competition is important in this aircraft for DOD and the
    warfighter? Will you consider discussing some of these matters
    and be open to changing an RFP if it's not fair and does not do
    the job that you need for DOD? Or has a final decision been
    made, given the entire process of discussion has produced no
    alteration to make absolutely no changes in the tentative RFP
    that's out there?
        Secretary Gates. We promised a fair and highly transparent
    process. We believe that the RFP is evenhanded. We are in a
    comment period, and we have received a lot of comments, both
    from the competitors and from Congress, as well as others. The
    comment period is coming to a close. If we were totally locked
    into not changing anything, we wouldn't have gone through the
    comment period. We will look at the comments that have been
    made and make a judgment at that point. We believe that both of
    the principal competitors are highly qualified, and we would
    like to see competition continue in this process.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for your
    public service and for your continued public service.
        During the 1970s and the 1980s, I had the privilege of
    serving with Congressman Charlie Wilson in the House of
    Representatives. Mr. Secretary, I am so happy to see in your
    statement, and I quote you, ``We will not repeat the mistakes
    of 1989, when we abandoned the country only to see it descend
    into civil war and then into Taliban hands.''
        It was Congressman Charlie Wilson at that time who
    singularly had been, in large part, responsible for us getting
    into Afghanistan in the first place and fought us getting out.
    So, thank you for stating the United States policy as strongly
    as you have.
        Now, I'm going to ask you and Secretary Clinton a couple of
    questions that I think are for the long term. Other than the
    policy that was announced last night by the President with
    regard to the military activities, for the long term, we have
    to integrate the military with the other agencies of government
    to help stabilize the country. For example, Congress has
    provided our commanders in the field with the Commanders
    Emergency Response Program (CERP) to quickly initiate
    reconstruction projects and provide immediate assistance to the
    Afghan communities after they've actually finished their
    combat. But, we don't seem to have done a great job in
    answering how we move from the post-conflict reconstruction
    projects, often overseen by the military, to the long-term
    development projects overseen by civilians? I wish you all
    would address how DOD and DOS are working together to make that
    transition for the long term in Afghanistan more seamless.
        Secretary Clinton, DOS has undertaken a major review of
    U.S. assistance programs, including agricultural assistance,
    particularly with regard to malnutrition as well as alternate
    livelihoods to growing poppies in Afghanistan. The United
    States has tended to favor large development contracts using
    third-country nationals instead of investing in the Afghans
    themselves, the grassroots efforts that employ Afghans, and
    therefore providing them with the skills and assistance to get
    their crops to markets. So, if you would share with the
    committee about your review of agricultural assistance, and how
    we're going to work to make it more effective as you and DOD
    work together, please.
        Secretary Gates. First I would say that this situation in
    Afghanistan has been, shall we say, personally of interest to
    me, having worked with Congressman Charlie Wilson back in the
    1980s, which was always an interesting experience.
        First of all, the specific answer to your question is,
    Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal are, as we speak,
    working on their joint civil-military campaign plan, which I
    think will establish the basis for the kind of transition that
    you're talking about. But, I would tell you, one of the
    obstacles, at least in my opinion from observing, is that DOS
    does not have the kind of flexibility in the way that it spends
    money, and the ability to do so quickly and make commitments
    quickly and have agility because of the number of restrictions
    and processes that they have to go through with respect to
    their funds. Frankly, I think one of the things that the CERP
    funds have taught us, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that
    that kind of flexibility and agility has been a huge asset for
    the United States in both places.
        Secretary Clinton. Senator Nelson, let me start by saying
    that it's been a real privilege working with Secretary Gates
    and DOD in trying to figure out how to have a more integrated
    civilian-military strategy. Secretary Gates has been one of the
    best advocates that DOS and the U.S. Agency for International
    Development (USAID) have for increasing our funding, our
    personnel, our flexibility and agility, so that we do have the
    resources and capacity to be quickly responsive.
        What we have done in the last 10 months is, number one, to
    investigate very thoroughly what was on the ground in
    Afghanistan, and we didn't particularly come away impressed. As
    I said in my testimony, there were a little over 300 civilians.
    Many of them were on 6-month rotations. If you looked at their
    in-country time, a lot of them spent time out of the country.
    They did not have well-defined missions. Most of our civilian
    aid going into Afghanistan had been contracted out without
    adequate oversight or accountability.
        We stopped all contracts going into Afghanistan. We began
    doing a complete scrub of them. I'm not saying that we have yet
    perfected our oversight, but we have been working very hard to
    improve it dramatically.
        We are strongly supporting the Special Inspector General
    for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). We would like to
    actually learn from the mistakes that are being made and in a
    timely way, rather than waiting, as we did in Iraq, and then
    being told that we've wasted tens of billions of dollars, which
    is just unacceptable.
        We also began to recruit civilians who were well suited for
    the jobs we needed. There was a tendency in the past, for both
    Iraq and Afghanistan, to basically tell Foreign Service
    Officers, Civil Service Officers, in both DOS and USAID, that
    if they went, spent their 6 months in one of those two places,
    they would have an advantage in getting the best assignment
    next. So, if you wanted to end up in Paris, you'd go to Baghdad
    for 6 months, whether your particular expertise and experience
    was needed or not.
        So, we have painstakingly, under the leadership of Deputy
    Secretary Jack Lew, actually matched each individual to the job
    that was required. We will triple the numbers that we have on
    the ground by early January. We've also required all of our
    civilians to train at Camp Atterbury in Indiana, where our
    military Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) members train, so
    that we can, from the very beginning, start integrating our
    civilian-military forces.
        I think that we're learning a lot of lessons as we go, but
    you put your finger on one of our biggest problems. The CERP
    funds that are accessible to our military forces, both in and
    immediately after combat operations, are a tremendous tool for
    doing projects and for winning allegiance. It's even being
    used, as it was in Iraq, for enticing people off the
    battlefield. There's nothing comparable on the civilian side.
    We have to requisition money, we have to wait. A young captain
    can access CERP funds in a matter of hours; an experienced
    agricultural specialist, a rule-of-law specialist, has to wait
    weeks, if not months, to get a project approved.
        So, if we're going to be successful, and if we're going to,
    frankly, be the kind of partners that our military needs, we
    have to have more tools. We're getting more resources, but the
    budget situation is going to be very tight, as everybody knows,
    and whether our civilian personnel will have the resources they
    need to be the partners they are required to be is going to be
    challenging.
        We will come with a very specific set of tasks, but your
    question really goes to the heart of what we are trying to
    achieve.
        The final point I would make is that we have civilians in
    DOS and from USAID serving all over the world in very dangerous
    settings. They are in war and conflict areas, like Eastern
    Congo, without any security support. When we have our troops on
    the ground, as we do in Iraq or in Afghanistan, we try to take
    even additional measures to make sure that our people can get
    around. But, as Senator McCain said, it's very difficult
    because of the security situation.
        What we are doing is partnering more by embedding our
    civilians with our troops. That carries a mixed message, as you
    might guess, because we're trying to have a civilian face on
    it, but we have to have enough security to function.
        This is a highly complex assignment. We send individuals on
    the civilian side; DOD sends units, battalions, brigades. We
    are trying to do something that's never been done before, and
    we need the advice, the help, and the resources that are
    required.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Since we have to be successful at the end of this trial
    time, we'll look forward to that appropriation request, Madam
    Secretary, and see if we can act expeditiously on it.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, to
    all three of you, for your leadership at this very critical
    time in the history of the world, not just our country.
        Secretary Gates, I thought the President did a good job
    last night of laying out the scenario as well as the way
    forward. However, having just heard your opening statement, I
    thought you were much stronger, even much more powerful, and I
    hope that you will carry the message you brought to this
    committee to our friends in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan
    because, as you said, the perception among the Pakistanis has
    to be that we're going to be there. The perception among the
    Afghans has to be that we're going to stay there for the long
    term. Otherwise, as one of the Taliban commented in the Afghan
    press when I was over there last week over Thanksgiving, that,
    ``If the President comes out and says that, `In 2013, the
    United States is out of here,' then we're going to sit back and
    just wait until 2013.'' We all know that's the case. So, you're
    exactly right, and I do truly hope that you will take that
    message to our folks in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan at the
    leadership level.
        Admiral Mullen, you made a comment that I want to drill
    down on for just a second. You said we will know by mid-2011 if
    we're going to be successful. Now, let's assume that we are
    being successful, that General Carter is doing well down in
    Regional Command (RC)-South, that General Scaparotti is doing
    well in RC-East, moving against the Haqqani Network, and that
    the Pakistanis are stepping up in a greater fashion and helping
    us out.
        What does this mean, with the President having said that
    we're going to start bringing our troops home in 18 months, but
    if we are successful, what does that mean with respect to
    bringing home the troops?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator Chambliss, I think you very
    accurately captured the overall situation. The Pakistanis have
    started to move; we have a new government with a newly-elected
    President in Afghanistan; we have great commanders on the
    ground in our leadership; we have an increased level of
    support, not just in terms of numbers, but, really, support
    from our NATO allies; and we have a very unpopular insurgency
    with respect to the Afghan people. I think there are great
    opportunities here over the next 18 to 24 months. One of the
    reasons it's so important, and to get these troops there is, as
    I've said before, to turn this insurgency around. General
    McChrystal believes, General Petraeus believes, and I believe
    we can do that over the course of the next 18 to 24 months.
    That will then provide an opportunity to start a kind of
    transition, as far as security responsibility and thinning of
    our forces, there. It's very difficult to know exactly what the
    conditions will be, but if we get this right, they'll be a lot
    better in the east and a lot better in the south, and provide
    us an opportunity to transition; which is why, on the other
    side, if we are unable to do that by then, I think we have to
    reassess our strategy.
        Senator Chambliss. So, what I'm hearing is that there is
    flexibility in that timeline, based upon success or lack
    thereof?
        Admiral Mullen. I think the timeline is clear. I think the
    flexibility is in where we transition and where we turn over
    responsibility. This is something we all understand, and we
    think we'll be able to do that. It's a little difficult to
    predict exactly where that's going to occur, right now.
        Senator Chambliss. Right.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, if I might just add because I
    appreciated your comments about the longer term. Now, what I'm
    about to state is just my opinion, because, frankly, this
    wasn't a part of our dialogue over the past 2 or 3 months, or
    not a significant part of it. But, in my mind I think that--
    particularly if the Afghans want us to--we need to think in
    terms of a very long-term willingness to work with the Afghans,
    in terms of military training, in terms of equipping, the kind
    of long-term partnership we have with many countries around the
    world, where we have a certain military presence in that
    country, but--it's not a combat presence, it's a training-and-
    equipping and that kind of a role--one where we are clearly
    seen as their continuing partner. That would be my personal
    opinion of how I would see this unfolding long-term, after our
    combat forces are principally gone from Afghanistan.
        Senator Chambliss. I appreciate that. My worry is, though,
    that the headline in the Islamabad press today is that,
    ``President Sending 30,000 Troops; They're Coming Out in 18
    Months.'' That's why I think what you are saying is important.
    You carry your message--all of you--of exactly what we mean by
    that 18 months.
        Secretary Clinton, I have not always been a fan of the work
    that USAID has done, but I've been in Afghanistan--not just
    last Thursday, but about 6 months ago also--and had the
    opportunity to visit with your folks. I have to say that
    they're doing an amazing job over there, with respect to
    educating children--we've gone from 900,000 to 6 million
    children in school--and we still have another 6 million to go.
    But, it's because, in my opinion, of what USAID has done, and
    with the security that's been given by the military, that we
    are seeing those children educated, which, for the long term, I
    think is the biggest issue that we have.
        Now, we assumed the other day that we knew what the
    President might say, and he did call for a surge. When I told
    your folks that, while we're surging troops, there also needed
    to be a surge on the civilian side. You have indicated that
    you're plussing-up those folks; that is the same thing DOS told
    us the other day.
        But, I worry about what's going to happen in 18 months.
    Because security in Afghanistan has to be the way forward, not
    just from the military standpoint; your folks on the ground,
    DOS civilians, have to have security in order to be able to
    improve the lives of the Afghans.
        I'd just like your comment on whether or not you think the
    levels you're talking about are enough. Are you going to ask
    for more resources, for more people? Where do you see the way
    forward?
        Secretary Clinton. Senator, thank you for those very kind
    words, which are so well-deserved by our people on the ground
    in Afghanistan and elsewhere. They are really responding to the
    mission and working extremely hard; but, of course, they have
    to do so within a secure environment.
        Our civilians are out around the country. They are also, of
    course, in Kabul, working with government ministries. USAID is
    certifying ministries, so we can determine which ones are
    accountable and transparent enough to receive additional funds
    from us. They are truly working at all levels of the Afghan
    Government and in many sectors of society. But, security is a
    key element as to whether they can be effective. Now, a lot of
    our civilian workers are veterans of other very difficult
    security environments; they are willing to go places that a lot
    of folks are not, and I give them great credit for that. I
    think we just have to come to you with our best estimate as to
    what will be required to have the kind of civilian surge you
    just referred to, because, as we put additional troops in, we
    want to have more civilians embedded with them, we want to have
    them right there, on the ground when combat is over, to begin
    the building process and partnering with their civilian
    counterparts. We are tripling the number that we found when we
    got there, and we're changing their mission and requiring much
    more of them. But, the numbers are going to have to grow if we
    expect to deliver on what is required.
        Senator Chambliss. You have an amazing PRT down in Lashkar
    Gah; they're doing great work.
        Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me add my appreciation to the three of you for your
    continuing service, as well.
        I've been a long-time advocate for benchmarks or
    measurements to develop in the conduct of our missions, so we
    can measure progress and continue to be objective while
    engaging the efforts in Afghanistan-Pakistan. I know this
    administration is committed--our allies--are committed to
    proffering these objective benchmarks.
        Are we in the process of developing new benchmarks in
    connection with the new mission so that we can determine
    whether we're 25 percent towards achieving certain goals, 50
    percent, or a lot more needs to be done? If we are in the
    process of doing that, will we be in a position to change the
    benchmarks as things develop on the ground?
        I'll start with you, Secretary Gates.
        Secretary Gates. The answer is yes. I mentioned earlier
    that the President has made it clear that there will be another
    thorough review in a year, in December 2010, but we have
    developed some clear benchmarks, in terms of not only the
    security arena, but in terms of ANSF recruitment, retention,
    fielding, partnering, and so on. The President made it pretty
    clear and, I think, mentioned to the congressional leadership
    yesterday, that he's expecting to get monthly reports on how
    we're doing against these. We also have benchmarks on the
    civilian side, as well.
        Secretary Clinton. Senator Nelson, our civilian, military,
    and intelligence agencies have all developed a range of
    benchmarks, and they're in a constant process of being refined.
    As Secretary Gates said, we're going to be looking to report on
    those going forward.
        The military has their own benchmarks, but, as Admiral
    Mullen referenced, we have taken a much closer look at
    districts, who controls what, what the capacity of governance
    is, whether there's a shadow government, how much of national
    sovereignty can be asserted. We're looking at those kinds of
    yardstick measurements on the military side.
        On the civilian side, a lot of it depends upon our
    assessment of where we're starting. As Senator Chambliss said,
    when President Karzai took office, there were a little less
    than a million students in school, and they were virtually all
    boys; now there are 7 million, and about 40 percent are girls.
    But, there are 5 to 6 million yet to go. So, that's a very
    clear benchmark.
        In the agricultural area, we've already rehabilitated
    irrigation canals and we've worked closely with the
    agricultural ministry. We helped them, as did other
    international donors with whom we coordinate, to provide
    heartier seeds so that they had a bumper wheat crop. They just
    had their first big shipment of apples and pomegranates to
    India. We are supporting their acquisition of better fertilizer
    and farm equipment. So, again, there are measurable benchmarks.
    How much is the agricultural economy improving? How many people
    are employed? What is the relationship between a lower poppy
    crop and a higher crop of licit goods?
        We are working with governance and rule-of-law challenges,
    as well.
        So, in each of these areas, we have realistic expectations,
    we are trying to have good measurements, and we will be
    carefully following that to see what kind of progress we're
    making.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate that. I think that is
    critically important for not only determining how we're doing,
    but also, I think, in keeping the support of the American
    people, in seeing that progress is, in fact, being made, and
    where it isn't, that a plan is now in place to try to change
    the direction.
        In that connection, do we have any specific ideas about how
    to assist President Karzai in rooting out--if we can be of
    assistance in that--the corruption within the government? It's
    one thing to tell them that stopping corruption is what needs
    to be done; it's another thing to expect it to be done. Can we
    be of assistance, which I think probably would assure us of
    some success?
        Secretary Clinton. Senator Nelson, we have made a number of
    requests of the Karzai Government. Obviously, who is put into
    the cabinet, who are named as governors, and those who hold
    other responsible positions are key to everything that happens
    going forward.
        We have focused our efforts in four areas. First, to
    enhance law enforcement cooperation. When I talk about the
    civilian work that is being done, I don't want just to talk
    about DOS and USAID. We have a lot of very experienced
    officials from the Drug Enforcement Agency, from the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation, from the Department of Justice, as
    well as places like USDA. We are enhancing intelligence-sharing
    and cooperation on corruption and major crime.
        Second, we are certifying Afghan ministries, and there are
    some ministries that we believe are functioning well enough now
    that we can, with confidence, provide funding and hold their
    leadership accountable; others we're not going to touch until
    they're cleaned out. They're not getting any U.S. civilian
    assistance.
        Third, we want to strengthen SIGAR. We are asking for
    additional resources on the ground with auditors because we
    want realtime reports.
        Fourth, we are supporting the Major Crimes Task Force
    (MCTF) and other Afghan anticorruption efforts. The MCTF is a
    vetted Afghan unit supported by U.S. and British law
    enforcement officials. It's focusing on corruption as part of
    its mandate. It's recently charged several Afghan officials,
    and others are under investigation.
        Ultimately, it's up to the Afghans to end corruption, and
    we have an expectation of that. We have no illusions that this
    is going to happen easily or quickly, but we know how important
    it is to be working to try to root it out.
        Secretary Gates. I would just add, Senator, that I think we
    have to be honest with ourselves that the massive influx of
    money into Afghanistan that comes from ourselves and our
    international partners is a huge factor in this, or at least a
    significant factor. As Secretary Clinton has suggested, I think
    we need to go back and look at how we are dispensing money and
    how we are contracting and so on. The subject, I know, is near
    and dear to Senator McCaskill's heart. But, how can we leverage
    the areas where we're writing the checks into minimizing the
    opportunities for that money to be siphoned off on its way to
    the purpose we intend?
        Secretary Clinton. Senator Nelson, if I could just add,
    because Secretary Gates raised an issue that is connected with
    this, and that is our contracting processes, something that
    Senator McCaskill is focused on. Think about the long supply-
    chain lines that we have getting into Afghanistan. When our
    equipment, our food, everything that our troops use, our
    civilians depend on, largely comes from the outside; when a
    ship docks at Karachi, and the goods get loaded onto trucks,
    and then the trucks start that long trip through Pakistan, up
    into Afghanistan. It's a very difficult environment to operate
    in. There's a lot of evidence that, in addition to funding from
    the Persian Gulf and the illegal narcotics trade, that
    siphoning off contractual money from the international
    community--not just in terms of outright fraud and corruption,
    but also intimidation and extortion--is a major source of
    funding for the Taliban. We just have to be honest, here, about
    how complex and difficult this problem is, and how, frankly, it
    is not all an Afghan problem.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for coming. I know it's been a difficult
    process you've been involved in.
        As you were debating what to do, did all of you realize
    this is the last best chance America has to get it right in
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Clinton. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Politically, militarily, and
    otherwise?
        Secretary Clinton. We also realized how sad it was that we
    were trying to make that decision 8 years later.
        Senator Graham. Yes, ma'am. It is sad. It would have been
    sad to have lost in Iraq. It would have been devastating.
        Secretary Clinton. We'll talk about that offline sometime.
        Senator Graham. There you go. [Laughter.]
        We're talking about the future now. We're talking about
    winning, I hope.
        Please rank the consequences of a failed state in
    Afghanistan to our national security interest, 1 being
    inconsequential, 10 being grave. Where would you put a failed
    state in Afghanistan, in terms of our national security
    interest?
        Secretary Clinton?
        Secretary Clinton. Senator Graham, I would put it at a 10.
    I think a failed state that is totally lawless, that is a safe
    haven for terrorists, particularly the syndicate of terrorism
    headed by al Qaeda, poses a direct threat to the security of
    the United States of America.
        Senator Graham. I think that does it. Do both of you,
    Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, agree with that? [Both
    answered in the affirmative.] Okay. I think that is a good
    evaluation. As to those who criticized the President, I think
    all 3 of our witnesses are right; he did this because he
    realized it was a 10, too, I hope. I'm sure he did.
        The July 2011 withdrawal statement--Secretary Gates, who is
    the audience for that statement?
        Secretary Gates. I think that there are at least two
    principal audiences. One audience--and a very important one--is
    the Afghan Government, that they must accept responsibility, in
    terms of their own governance, in terms of their own security
    forces, in terms of accepting their responsibility and
    understanding that they must take ownership of this conflict on
    their own soil, that it's not just going to be fought by
    foreigners on their behalf.
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        Secretary Gates. I think the other audience, frankly, is
    the American people, who are weary after 8 years of war, and to
    let them know this isn't going to go on for another 10 years.
        Senator Graham. But, there are other people listening, and
    I guess that's my problem. I can understand the frustration of
    the American people. We've been here 8 years, and it seems to
    be that it's not working out the way we would all hope. I can
    understand that. But, I can't understand letting Afghanistan go
    back into the abyss again. That's my dilemma.
        In December 2010, you will begin to evaluate Afghanistan
    anew, is that correct? Check our progress?
        Secretary Gates. We're going to have a continuing process,
    but there will be a full-scale reevaluation of where we stand
    in December, yes.
        Senator Graham. My question is, will the evaluation
    decision be how fast we withdraw or whether or not we should
    withdraw?
        Secretary Gates. I think it'll be principally about whether
    the strategy that we've put in place is working.
        Senator Graham. Is it possible, in December 2010, to reach
    the conclusion, ``It is not wise to withdraw anyone in July
    2011?'' Is that possible?
        Secretary Gates. I think the President, as Commander in
    Chief, always has the option to adjust his decision.
        Senator Graham. So, it is not locked in that we're going to
    be withdrawing troops in July 2011; we're going to look,
    throughout the process, particularly in December 2010, and make
    a decision then as to whether we should withdraw at a certain
    pace or not withdraw at all. Is that correct?
        Secretary Gates. I guess the way I would phrase it is that
    it is our plan to begin this transition process in July 2011.
    If circumstances dictate in December, I think, as I say, the
    President always has the freedom to adjust his decisions.
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        Admiral Mullen, is it your understanding that it's
    possible, in December 2010, not to begin to withdraw in 2011?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, I'd reiterate the President has
    choices, as the President.
        Senator Graham. So, his statement last night did not bind
    him to start withdrawing in 2011. That's the understanding of
    this panel?
        Secretary Gates. I'd defer to Secretary Clinton, but I
    think it was a clear statement of his strong intent.
        Senator Graham. Right. I understand why he'd want to let
    the American people know that we're not going to be there
    forever, but this is a critically important event. I think that
    the success of this operation depends on will and resolve, and
    I just don't want the July 2011 statement to be seen by our
    enemy, which is not one of the audiences you mentioned, which I
    think are listening, that we have somehow locked ourselves into
    leaving.
        The question is, have we locked ourselves into leaving,
    Secretary Clinton, in July 2011?
        Secretary Clinton. Senator Graham, I do not believe we have
    locked ourselves into leaving, but what we have done--and I
    think it was an appropriate position for the President to
    take--is to signal very clearly, to all audiences, that the
    United States is not interested in occupying Afghanistan.
        Senator Graham. Right.
        Secretary Clinton. We are not interested in running their
    country or building their nation. We are trying to give them
    the space and time to be able to build up sufficient forces to
    defend themselves. It is the best assessment of our military
    experts, as evidenced by Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen,
    General Petraeus, General McChrystal, and others, that by July
    2011, there can be the beginning of a responsible transition
    that will, of course, be based on conditions.
        Here's what the President said, ``Allow us to begin the
    transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011. We will
    execute this transition responsibly, taking into account
    conditions on the ground.'' To me, that is exactly the
    appropriate approach for the President to take. As Secretary
    Gates has said, the President's authority and his
    responsibility as Commander in Chief require him to be
    constantly assessing the situation, which he will do.
        Senator Graham. Thank you. My time is up, but I would just
    like to remind everyone there is another audience that wasn't
    mentioned by Secretary Gates. It's the enemy. They have a vote
    in this war. They are a participant in it.
        Finally, the last question, if you could, Secretary Gates
    and Admiral Mullen, would you grade NATO in terms of their
    effectiveness as a fighting force over the last several years?
        Secretary Gates. I think that it varies from country to
    country, Senator.
        Admiral Mullen. Senator, they have bled and died.
        Senator Graham. I know they have, but would you give them
    an A to an F? How is NATO as an effective fighting force, an A
    to an F? Not just part of it, all of it.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, in all honesty, I don't think any
    good purpose is served by doing that. I would say that those
    who have been fighting with us in the south: the Australians,
    the British, the Dutch, the Danes, the Canadians, the Poles,
    I'd give them all an A.
        Senator Graham. Great.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me begin by again communicating my respect for all
    three of you for the service that you have given our country,
    and for the good of our country, in a lot of different ways. I
    also respect the process that this administration has gone
    through, with you and others, such as National Security Advisor
    General Jones, in terms of trying to work out what you may call
    the ``best possible formula,'' perhaps it's the most realistic,
    in your view. There's not a lot of good in the options that are
    available in that part of the world.
        There's been a lot of time spent on the notion of the dates
    that were mentioned in the President's speech. I would prefer
    to focus, as I have in the past, on the conditions that might
    bring about an endpoint to our involvement. I would like to see
    an endpoint, and this is something that you can expect to hear
    more on, from our perspective, over the coming months. What
    exactly is going to bring about the conditions under which we
    can end our involvement?
        There's also been a good bit of discussion about the nature
    of the Karzai Government and issues such as corruption. I would
    like to defer a dialogue on that until tomorrow; I'm on the
    Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I would like to address
    this tomorrow. I think perhaps we may reach a point where we
    might encourage the Afghanis to examine their constitution that
    was arrived at, at the Bonn Conference in 2001, to try to
    enable a greater devolution of this government, so you can get
    into issues such as local authority and corruption at a local
    level.
        Where I really would like to spend my time today is how we
    are separating out who actually should be confronted as an
    enemy on the battlefield. As all of you know, a defining
    characteristic throughout the history of Afghanistan has been
    its resistance to foreign influence, particularly foreign
    occupation, and I would say, very successful resistance. When
    we talk about the Taliban, we're talking about terms that we
    use interchangeably, but which aren't particularly
    interchangeable. We had a pretty vicious Taliban Government,
    which we assisted in getting rid of. We have an ideologically
    charged group right now that operates principally in Pakistan,
    which is associated with the forces of international terrorism.
    Then, we have a third group which many believe is a group that
    is growing with the greatest speed and that from the
    perspective of many Afghanis, is ideological only in the sense
    that it resents our presence, and is not viewed as a terrorist
    organization, specifically, or even aligned with terrorist
    organizations. It's viewed by many in Afghanistan as a popular
    movement, who doesn't like a central government and whose size
    can actually be elevated, its recruitment process can be
    increased, by the wrong application of American force.
        In that respect, rather than being an element that is
    aligned with international terrorism, it is viewed by many
    Afghanis as something of a regional militia that doesn't
    particularly want to threaten U.S. interests outside of
    Afghanistan. I would like to hear from you, and I'll start with
    Admiral Mullen, but I invite anyone who wants to contribute,
    how were these distinctions, in terms of history and in terms
    of participation, made as you developed the policy that was now
    announced?
        Admiral Mullen. The citizens of Afghanistan are a people
    very tired of war. They are very much waiting on the fence to
    see which way this is going to go. All the information I've
    gotten, both personally when I've been there as well as from
    the commanders on the ground, indicate not only are they tired,
    but they're not very supportive or not supportive at all of the
    Taliban. It's a very small percentage that is supportive. I'm
    talking about the last group, more specifically.
        We believe there's a large percentage of that group,
    Taliban sympathizers, which can be reconciled and reintegrated
    with the right approach.
        The other thing, in a larger sense, that I've watched over
    the last couple of years, which is of growing concern, is the
    collaboration of the Taliban. I understand that they can have
    somewhat ideologically different perspectives, but they have
    come together in ways that actually are hugely concerning to
    me, on both sides.
        Senator Webb. Since my time is running out, I want to seize
    on something you just said, because I think it's a very
    important clarification that you can make here. If those are
    people who can be brought over to our view, and if we're having
    trouble recruiting on the ANA, which we seem to be, while the
    size of this resistance element seems to be growing, how are
    you making the distinction, in terms of operational policy that
    would give them reason to change their affiliation?
        Admiral Mullen. If I understand your question correctly,
    it's really done through direct engagement at the local level.
    We've seen, very recently, numbers of them say, ``No, I don't
    want to do this anymore.'' But, as I think you understand as
    well as or better than anybody, we have to have a secure
    environment in which they can do this. We don't have that in
    many places.
        So, General McChrystal and others are actually very
    optimistic with respect to doing this, but we can't do it
    without a level of security we just don't have in many of these
    places.
        Senator Webb. So, you do have an optimism that, over time,
    these are people who, and despite the characterization that we
    presently use, can be convinced to affiliate with the national
    government?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, I do, I think they can.
        In the end, I think the only way that we're not going to
    occupy them is to not occupy them. That is a challenge that we
    are, over time, committed to not doing that. The President
    spoke to that last night. But, that's a message, obviously, we
    have to deliver in fact, not just speaking to it, and to give
    them responsibility for their own security. There's a big part
    of the strategy that focuses locally--the Secretary talked
    about it earlier--to not turn it back into warlordism. That's a
    very delicate balance. But, the commanders on the ground that
    I've engaged with are comfortable that this is very possible.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Clinton, welcome back to the committee. Secretary
    Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you very much for your service.
        I think there's already been some discussion about the ANP
    and ANSF, at least in terms of the numbers. I'm interested in
    knowing how analogous the situation there is with the training
    and equipping of the ANSF to Iraq, and just in terms of their
    capacity to take over battlespace, and how that fits in with
    the timeline that you have laid out. What made the Iraq surge,
    I think, so effective, along with the counterinsurgency
    strategy there, was that the Iraqi Security Forces eventually
    were able to step up and provide security for the population.
    Do you see parallels there? How quickly might we expect that
    capacity and capability to grow?
        Admiral Mullen. I think, Senator, it's very much tied to
    the momentum piece, which is going against us right now.
    Turning this momentum around in a positive way makes a lot of
    things possible, including improved retention, improved
    recruiting, reduced attrition, and a much better overall ANSF.
    That's why the security piece and the momentum piece are so
    critical.
        There are many analogies, I think, that are comparable
    between both Iraq and Afghanistan. We're very concerned about
    creating midgrade leaders, junior leaders, as well as officer
    leaders, in both the ANA and ANP. That was a significant
    challenge in Iraq. It is more so on the ANP side than on the
    ANA side. Again, the same was true in Iraq. In fact, it was
    really late 2007 before the police in Iraq really started to
    step out and the leadership was there.
        I think we have to be careful with comparisons. This is a
    force that's been around. Certainly on the ANA side, they've
    been in the fight, they've been in the fight a long time, and
    they're good warriors. They have taken to this partnership
    approach that General McChrystal has put in place. So, I think
    there's a lot of potential there. There are similarities and
    there are differences, and we're trying to take advantage of
    those lessons to integrate those into an accelerated training
    and equipping plan right now for them.
        Senator Thune. Last night, the President said that we will
    support efforts by the Afghan Government to open the door to
    those Taliban who abandon violence. General Petraeus has
    previously indicated that we lacked the nuanced and
    sophisticated understanding of the Taliban to identify and
    distinguish between reconcilable and irreconcilable elements of
    the Taliban. My question is, how do we go about reliably
    identifying the reconcilable elements of the Taliban?
        Secretary Clinton. Senator, there are several efforts
    already underway to answer the questions that General Petraeus
    and others have posed. As you might know, General McChrystal
    has asked General Lamb, a retired British general who was
    instrumental in the work that was done in Iraq, to come to
    Afghanistan to advise him. The Afghans themselves, led by
    President Karzai, have a pretty good idea of who they think
    can, if persuaded, be reintegrated.
        But, this is very much a case-by-case effort. There are
    certain aspects of it that we are very insistent on. One, that
    they have to renounce any ties to al Qaeda, they have to
    renounce violence, and they have to be willing to reintegrate
    into Afghan society in a peaceful way.
        We know that some of the Taliban will not renounce al
    Qaeda; they are too closely interconnected. We know that
    others, who call themselves ``Taliban,'' want to have a
    continuing means of acting in a military capacity, and we want
    them to have to give up their commitment to violence and, maybe
    join the ANA, if that's appropriate, or join one of the
    community defense initiatives. This is very painstaking work.
    We have very high expectations for who we would support
    reintegrating.
        Secretary Gates. Let me just add to that. I think that,
    here again, there may be some parallels with Iraq.
        First of all, I think that reintegration, particularly at
    the front end, is going to be retail, not wholesale. We will
    end up, as we did in Iraq, turning to local leaders that we
    have confidence in who will, in turn, then vouch for these
    people and who will essentially pledge their community to the
    reliability of these people that are willing to come away from
    the Taliban.
        A second point, we think that there's a fair percentage of
    the foot soldiers in the Taliban that basically do this for
    pay. So, creating economic opportunities as an alternative in
    order to support their families is another vehicle for this.
        Finally, to the Admiral's point, security is essential.
    There are too many examples of people who have tried to leave
    the Taliban themselves and all of their family have been
    killed. Until we can provide a secure environment, at the local
    level, that gives them some confidence they will not be
    retaliated against, it will be a problem.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to echo the comments of some of my colleagues, that
    I think the President is very fortunate to have the three of
    you, and our country is even more fortunate. I appreciate your
    service, and I appreciate how hard you have worked at coming up
    with the best answer among a list of very bad choices.
        It won't surprise you that I want to talk a little bit
    about contracting. I will tell you that we've made progress.
    When I joined this committee in 2007, no one could tell us how
    many contractors were in Iraq. There wasn't even a number
    available. We have made progress.
        Now I want to talk a little bit today, if I have time,
    about the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker,
    the database that we put in place to try to track contractors,
    and the problems that are arising about a lack of consistency
    between DOS, USAID, and DOD on how they're utilizing this
    database, and how much we can rely on the numbers. To the
    extent that we can rely on the numbers, we know we have, as of
    June, approximately 75,000 contractors in Afghanistan and 5,200
    private security contractors in Afghanistan. One of the stark
    differences between the contracting force in Afghanistan and
    that in Iraq is the predominance of Afghans in our contracting
    force; 50,000-plus of the contractors are Afghans and 5,000 of
    the 5,200 private security contractors are Afghans. It's not
    clear to me whether this has been purposeful or situational. I
    would appreciate if any of you could briefly address whether or
    not this is purposeful or situational.
        Secretary Clinton. Senator, I share the experience you just
    described, because in February, when I asked to see a list of
    all the contracts in Afghanistan, at that time we couldn't
    produce such a list. We have been trying to not only get a
    handle on the contracts, but trying to persuade contractors to
    employ more Afghans. I think what you referred to is probably
    both. I think it is, to some extent, a message, but it's also
    just the reality of who is there and what the mission requires.
        Clearly, what we're trying to do is review every single
    contract. We stopped every one until we had a better idea of
    what they were for and who they went to. We're trying to assert
    more DOS and USAID oversight, and that's why we asked
    Ambassador Tony Wayne to go to Afghanistan to run the civilian
    side. We have to do a better job coordinating with, not just
    our friends at DOD, but all the other government agencies. We
    really welcome your efforts, and we want to be as cooperative
    as we can.
        Senator McCaskill. Let's talk a little bit about the U.S.
    Army's Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program IV (LOGCAP IV).
    Good news: We competed it. Good news: We ended up with three
    different companies that are eligible for contracts under
    LOGCAP IV. Not as good of news: I think I understand the
    reality of why this probably occurred; we now have, instead of
    one monopoly on logistical support for our troops, two
    monopolies, in that we have given the contracts on a regional
    basis as opposed to a task basis. Fluor has gotten the north
    and DynCorp has gotten the south. They are not task-competing;
    they have, in fact, been selected, it's my understanding from
    the research we've done, to do everything in those regions.
        I understand the efficiencies you get by doing that, but
    what it really brings up again is the incredible importance of
    monitoring and oversight, because when you have one company
    doing all the work, even though it's not the whole contingency
    operation, it is certainly within the north and the south. What
    I am worried about is that there was testimony this summer that
    we had 600 oversight positions vacant in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    It wasn't clear from the testimony that was given at the time
    how many of those positions were in Afghanistan. But, are we
    plussed-up to where we need to be with oversight and monitoring
    of these logistical contracts that cost us way more than they
    ever should have cost us in Iraq?
        Secretary Gates. As is often the case with these things,
    you're probably better informed than we are. But, what I will
    tell you is, we do not have as many contract monitors in
    Afghanistan as we want. One of the things that I have
    mentioned, both at the White House and within DOD as we talk
    about 30,000 troops and so on, is, let's not forget about
    contract monitors, logistical experts, and so on, to make sure
    that we're doing this right. What I would like to do, Senator,
    is take your question for the record, and we'll get back to you
    on the number of vacancies we have for contract monitors in
    Afghanistan.
        Senator McCaskill. That would be great.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) in Afghanistan: CORs are
    trained and appointed to provide day-to-day oversight of Department of
    Defense (DOD) contracts. DOD has a broad-based, focused effort to
    identify and train CORs prior to deployment as part of our overall
    effort to improve oversight of contracts in support of contingency
    operations. DOD tracks required and assigned CORs on contracts in
    Afghanistan, especially given the coming surge in requirements in
    support of the Afghan theater. For example, contracts delegated to
    Defense Contract Management Agency for administration in Afghanistan
    currently require 473 CORs and have 414 CORs assigned for an 88 percent
    fill rate as of January 2009. Achieving 88 percent this month
    represents a 38 percentage point surge since September 2009. This rapid
    increase highlights DOD's ongoing efforts to improve contract oversight
    through the timely training and assignment of CORs.

        Admiral Mullen. Senator, if I can only add one thing. This
    goes back to your first question. In particular, I've asked
    this question in RC-East, of General Scaparotti and his people
    a few months ago, with respect to who gets contracts. There's a
    very specific effort there to hire Afghans first. That, I
    think, is represented in the numbers that you're talking about,
    which, to me, makes all the sense in the world. You obviously
    have to have somebody qualified. But to be able to put that
    kind of income into that country is really critical.
        Secretary Clinton. Senator, could I just add one other
    consideration that I wish we could take into account?
        There is an inherent tension between more monitoring, more
    auditing, more contract oversight, and the kind of flexibility
    and agility that we were talking about with Senator Bill
    Nelson's question. We have to figure out how to manage risk
    without being overly adverse to risk. We have to give our
    people in the field--and I'm talking just on the civilian side
    right now--enough discretion to be able to make smart
    decisions, and yes, maybe even make some mistakes, because they
    might have made an investment where it didn't pay off, but it
    was worth trying.
        It's complicated. We want to account for every single
    penny, but we also want to be sure we have enough flexibility
    to be smart as we try to do the job we've been given.
        I don't know what the answer to that is, but I'd ask for
    your consideration as we move forward so we strike the right
    balance.
        Senator McCaskill. I understand that tension, and it is a
    real tension. I think, unfortunately, the lesson learned in
    Iraq was that there wasn't enough of that tension. It was all
    about, ``We need it today. We need it tomorrow. We don't care
    what it costs. Get it here.'' Finding that balance is what
    we're talking about here. That's why the data being input
    correctly and why the oversight personnel are so important; if
    we don't have those, we never create that tension. That's my
    concern.
        My time's up, and I don't have time to go into CERP. I do
    think we need to take a hard look at CERP and whether it has
    morphed into something other than what it was intended to be,
    whether we're doing too many big projects. Are we monitoring or
    are we just obligating? I know we've executed about $1.6
    billion in CERP in Afghanistan since 2004. I think we need to
    continue to look at CERP.
        I'll do some questions for the record on the CERP funds
    since I don't have time in my questioning today. I will look
    forward to continuing to work on these issues with you and your
    great folks that are trying hard.
        Thank you again.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
    Admiral Mullen. I've not had the opportunity to talk to you
    about these issues because I'm a new Senator, but I appreciate
    that opportunity today.
        Let me say, first, that I want to join my colleagues in
    commending the President for his recommendation for the
    additional troops. I think it's the right thing to do. I had
    the opportunity to go to Afghanistan in late October and meet
    with General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry and talk
    about these issues. I believe that the counterinsurgency
    strategy is the right tactic that we need for success.
        There's been a lot of discussion this morning about the 18
    months and what that really means. I appreciate the elaboration
    that was given.
        Let me ask you this question. In every plan, you hope for a
    successful ending, and you must have in your minds what that
    successful ending looks like. If we are able to meet the
    President's commitment to remove troops in July 2011, how do
    you envision success looking like at that time? Secretary
    Gates?
        Secretary Gates. Sure. First of all, let me just again
    underscore that what we were talking about in July 2011 is the
    beginning of what we expect will be a gradual process of
    thinning and reducing U.S. forces.
        I think the end state in Afghanistan looks a lot like what
    we see in Iraq, and that is the gradual transfer of
    responsibility for security to the indigenous forces in
    government and a security situation that allows us to drawn
    down our forces. We have gone from 20 brigades to what will
    soon be 10 brigades in Iraq. We have the agreements that we
    talked about earlier, in terms of combat forces being out at
    the end of the August 2010.
        What you will see, in my view, is a map, if you will, that
    changes colors in different places at different times, but
    increasingly in terms of the Afghan Government's control or
    control by local governments, district governments, and
    provincial governments that are associated with the national
    government and hostile to the Taliban and to al Qaeda. I think
    this gradual transfer of security responsibility, with a
    continuing role on our part as a partner for that country in
    the long-term, is what I would call success in Afghanistan.
        Senator LeMieux. To follow up on the questions of Senator
    Ben Nelson, in terms of benchmarking, do you have specific
    benchmarks that you have put in place for this next period,
    this 18-month period, when the withdrawal of American troops
    would begin, that would say there would be only this many
    American casualties or this many Afghan troops trained as we
    talked about before? Are those benchmarks in place now as you
    work forward in the next 18 months?
        Secretary Gates. We would not have U.S. casualties as a
    benchmark, but we have some very specific benchmarks for us,
    for the Afghans, and for our international partners, in terms
    of whether they are fulfilling the commitments that have been
    made.
        Senator LeMieux. Just to touch quickly on the international
    partner issue, you mentioned bringing 5,000 to 7,000 more
    troops from international partners. In the past, you have been,
    as you stated, somewhat critical of those troops, and you
    wanted to make sure that those troops were caveat-free. Do you
    believe that these troops that are coming, hopefully the 5,000
    to 7,000 troops will be, as you said before, caveat-free and be
    able to fully engage?
        Secretary Gates. One of the positive developments I would
    say of the last year, but especially since the NATO summit last
    spring, has been a fairly steady reduction in the number of
    caveats that are being imposed by governments. I think they are
    realizing the need for this. You heard the German Defense
    Minister a couple of weeks ago for the first time in Germany
    refer to what is going on in Afghanistan as a ``war'' or
    ``warlike.'' So, they are, I think, domestically, beginning to
    deal with the realities of Afghanistan, and I think that has
    contributed to a reduction in the caveats.
        Senator LeMieux. Secretary Clinton, we haven't talked a lot
    today about Pakistan. Certainly, Pakistan is of huge importance
    to the success in this region. What commitments do you think we
    will get from Pakistan to continue in their efforts? I know
    they launched this offensive in Waziristan that's been somewhat
    successful and continues on. Where do you see their
    participation, in the next 18 months, to make sure that we're
    succeeding?
        Secretary Clinton. Senator, over the last year they have
    certainly demonstrated their commitment and willingness to take
    on the Pakistan Taliban, who directly threaten them. I spent 3
    days in Pakistan recently, and spoke at length with both the
    civilian and the military intelligence leadership, as well as
    many citizens, press, and others. I think the unity of support
    that the people of Pakistan are showing for this effort is
    profoundly significant. But, as we have said, it is not enough.
    It is difficult to parse out the different groups that are
    operating within Pakistan, all of whom we think are connected
    in one way or another with al Qaeda, and partition some off and
    go after the others.
        It will be our continuing effort--and Admiral Mullen has
    been instrumental in working on this with his counterparts--to
    make the case that the Pakistanis have to do more against all
    of the insurgent terrorist groups that are threatening them,
    that are threatening us in Afghanistan, that are threatening
    the Afghan people, and are threatening other neighbors in the
    region. We hope that we'll be able to make that case
    successfully.
        Senator LeMieux. Does Pakistan understand now that having a
    stable and secure Afghanistan is in their national interests?
        Secretary Clinton. I think that they certainly understand
    that having an unstable, destabilizing Afghanistan that offers
    launching grounds and training for those who threaten them is
    not in their interests.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you to the witnesses.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux and others have talked about the
    benchmarks, and you've indicated that they exist in whatever
    the current form is. Would you submit those to us for the
    record? We saw an earlier version, but we'd like to see the
    current version of the benchmarks, for the record. If there's
    any classified benchmarks, we will, of course, honor that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of Defense is currently in the process of reviewing
    our metrics for Afghanistan. We have scheduled a briefing for Members
    of Congress in March on the revised metrics.

        Chairman Levin. Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, to the three of you. The unanimity that you
    represent by being here together is powerful and inspirational.
    I want to thank you, along with the members of the committee,
    for your leadership and your service. I, too, hope and will do
    my part to assure that the politics in this important policy
    debate we're having end at the water's edge. Again, your
    presence here today makes that statement loud and clear.
        Secretary Clinton, if I could just follow up on Pakistan,
    do you have any concerns that the July 2011 transition date
    sends a message to the Pakistanis that we're going to leave the
    region, that we're not committed in a long-term way?
        Secretary Clinton. Again, I think that the messages that
    are being heard by different audiences are consistent with
    their perspectives. As Senator LeMieux seemed to imply in his
    question, there is a lot of concern in Pakistan about what our
    commitment means, both in terms of whether we put more troops
    in or not, whether we leave them in or not. The Pakistanis,
    understandably, worry that our actions in Afghanistan increase
    cross-border efforts that threaten them, which they are not,
    obviously, in favor of seeing increase.
        We have worked very hard with our Pakistani counterparts to
    explain that we have a long-term commitment to Pakistan; we are
    not going to be in and out, the way we have in the past; we
    want to be partnering with the Pakistanis; we want to be
    supporting their democracy and their development--and that is
    independent from Afghanistan; but that we have unfinished
    business in Afghanistan, and that requires us to take the
    steps, which the President outlined, but that we also are
    asking for more help from the Pakistanis to go after al Qaeda
    and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban inside their own
    territory.
        Senator Udall. So, in an ideal world, we would get the job
    done militarily in the short-term; in the medium- and long-
    term, we would have a presence in the region, economically,
    diplomatically, and politically.
        Secretary Clinton. As we have with so many other countries,
    we have troops in a limited number of countries around the
    world; some have been there for 50 or 60 years, but we have
    long-term economic assistance and development programs in many
    others. We think that's a likely outcome in both Afghanistan
    and Pakistan, that we will be there with a long-term
    commitment.
        Senator Udall. Let me turn, if I could, to the civilian
    surge. I had a close friend who follows what's happening very
    closely, and he said, ``Who's going to be in charge of the
    civilian surge?'' I've heard some discussion of a civilian
    counterpart to an ISAF commander for the civilian efforts that
    we're going to put forth.
        Secretary Clinton, could you speak to whether there would
    be an official who's in charge of the surge, and what sort of
    authority that person might have?
        Secretary Clinton. We are actually discussing that with our
    allies. It's one of the issues I will be talking to them about
    in Brussels. You know there's a United Nations presence in
    Afghanistan. There is also the NATO ISAF presence. Not everyone
    who contributes civilian aid is a member of NATO or ISAF, but
    they all are members of the United Nations. So, how we
    coordinate and better hold accountable our civilian aid is a
    matter of great concern to all of the contributing nations,
    whether they are troop-contributing, nontroop civilian, or non-
    NATO.
        For example, Japan has just announced a significant
    civilian commitment of $5 billion. They're not a member of
    NATO. They don't have troops in NATO ISAF. So, we're looking at
    the United Nations, we're looking at NATO ISAF, but we're going
    to come up with a coordinating mechanism that can meet the
    needs of all the various parties who want to contribute to
    Afghanistan's future.
        Senator Udall. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I assume
    that General McChrystal understands the importance of that
    handoff and that coordination.
        Secretary Gates. Nobody wants it more than he does.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Udall. Let me turn to the Secretary and Admiral
    Mullen. Given that this increase in troops in Afghanistan will
    occur prior to the official drawdown in Iraq, what effect do
    you see this additional deployment having on dwell time and the
    length of deployment cycles, reset, and then the Services'
    requirements to take care of our troops both here at home and
    in theater?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator, that is not just tied to this
    decision; it's something I think that we watch carefully and
    have for the last several years. What is happening in the
    Marine Corps--and the ground forces, obviously, absorb the
    brunt of these deployments--is actually moving out to a dwell
    time ratio of almost 2 to 1. They're at 1.5 to 1 right now. We
    want to get to a point where they're home twice as long, the
    ``2,'' as they are deployed, and that, in this deployment
    cycle, General Conway thinks he'll be able to continue to
    progress out in that direction, with the exception of some of
    the smaller, more critical enabling kind of capabilities, over
    the next year or so.
        On the Army side, we're actually making progress as well,
    moving away from 1 to 1 dwell time ratios, though not as
    rapidly; with this deployment decision, we expect it to
    probably take a couple more years to get to a point where he's
    out to a 2 to 1 dwell time ratio.
        The Iraq drawdown is taken into consideration in all this.
    We're still able to gradually improve dwell times, although we
    are extremely concerned about the continued pressure, stress,
    and strain that our military, our ground forces in particular,
    and their families have gone through. We're paying a lot of
    attention to that.
        General Casey sent a note yesterday to the J-1, the
    manpower and personnel staff section of the Joint Staff,
    reemphasizing what he had said before, that this can be
    managed; certainly there are challenges associated with that,
    but he's comfortable that he can lead his Army through this at
    this enormously important time.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gates, I'm going to explore with you an issue
    that Senator Graham raised, and it's an issue that you touched
    on in your testimony. I think it is a fundamental question, and
    that is, why Afghanistan?
        In your statement, you list six primary objectives of the
    strategy, one of which is preventing al Qaeda from regaining
    sanctuary in Afghanistan; yet, we know that al Qaeda has the
    presence in as many as 20 countries. In Yemen, for example, al
    Qaeda's strong enough that a cell there was able to launch a
    successful attack on our Embassy just a year ago.
        The fundamental question to me is, how will it make us
    safer to invest more troops and more treasure in Afghanistan as
    long as al Qaeda still has the ability to establish safe havens
    in other countries? What is it about Afghanistan that makes it
    critical that we invest more troops, more civilian personnel,
    and put more people at risk in that country?
        Secretary Gates. First of all, as the President indicated
    last night, this is the country where, when the Taliban
    governed it, the attack against us was launched in 2001. It is
    the only country from which we have been attacked successfully.
        Al Qaeda and its leadership are still in the border area of
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is still the wellspring of
    inspiration for extremist jihadism everywhere. Afghanistan is
    where these extremists, in many respects, consider that they
    defeated the Soviet Union and, in fact, give themselves credit
    for its ultimate collapse. Whether it's in the United States
    and the plots that we continue to see, or in Somalia or Yemen,
    the fact is that the inspiration, and oftentimes the guidance
    and strategic leadership, comes from the al Qaeda leadership
    that is there in that border area.
        What we have seen develop in the last year is an unholy
    alliance, if you will, of al Qaeda, the Taliban in Pakistan,
    and the Taliban in Afghanistan. These people work off of each
    other's mythology, off of each other's narrative. Success of
    one contributes to the success of the other.
        If anything, the situation, I think, is more serious today
    than it was a year ago, because of the attacks of the Taliban
    in Pakistan on Pakistan and the effort of al Qaeda, in
    collusion with the Taliban in Pakistan, to try and destabilize
    Pakistan itself. More safe havens on the Pakistani side create
    opportunities for success in Afghanistan. But, we know, from
    historical experience, that safe havens and Taliban control of
    space in Afghanistan not only gives them the opportunity to
    organize better attacks against the West and our allies and
    friends, but now creates an opportunity for them to further
    destabilize Pakistan.
        This area--as the President said last night and as I said
    in my opening remarks--that we're talking about, Afghanistan in
    particular, is the epicenter of global extremist jihad. If that
    center were to disappear, if that leadership were to disappear,
    and al Qaeda were defeated in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I think
    you would face a very different and very significantly less
    important threat from these various regional movements that put
    enormous emphasis on their alliance with al Qaeda in Pakistan-
    Afghanistan. Whether it's al Qaeda in the Maghreb or whether
    it's al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa, they put enormous value on
    this connection back into the al Qaeda that have fled
    Afghanistan.
        I think that Afghanistan has a unique place in the
    historical narrative of these extremists that makes it
    especially important to us and, as the President said last
    night, preventing the Taliban from returning and defeating al
    Qaeda is in our vital national interest.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates has given an excellent
    answer to the question of, ``Why Afghanistan?'' My question for
    you is, can we succeed, despite the brilliance of our leaders,
    the courage of our troops, and the efforts of the civilian
    component? Is this an impossible task? We have a corrupt and
    ineffective government as a partner. We've seen, in the last 2
    years, even with the presence of NATO troops, the government
    lose control of much of the country. Can this work, despite
    everybody's best efforts?
        Secretary Clinton. Senator, we believe we can. I think it
    is important to underscore your question, because, along with
    the question about, ``Who is the enemy?'', this is the critical
    question as to the commitment that the President has made.
        The reasons why we do believe success is possible is,
    number one, we think that the Afghan leadership and the people
    of Afghanistan are ready for an approach that makes them more
    accountable, responsible, and a true partner. I've been to
    Afghanistan in the past. In the last trip, I was struck by what
    Defense Minister Wardak told me. He said it was the first time,
    with General McChrystal now in charge of NATO ISAF, that they,
    the Afghans, felt like they were full partners. They'd been
    invited into NATO ISAF headquarters, they were getting access
    to intelligence that they'd never been given before. His
    enthusiasm for the new leadership that we have on the military
    side was striking to me, because I've known him for all these
    years. He has been truly a good soldier, just trying the best
    he could under very difficult circumstances, but he didn't feel
    like he was fully supported or partnered until relatively
    recently.
        Second, I think that the wake-up call about the
    deteriorating situation has not only been heard by the United
    States, but by our friends and allies. I think that there was
    an attitude, perhaps, that, ``Okay, the Americans want us
    there. We'll show up. We'll do the best we can.'' As Secretary
    Gates said, some of our NATO ISAF troops were extraordinarily
    brave, courageous, and successful; others were kind of just
    there to fulfill a commitment. But, there seems to be a new
    awareness that this is not just America's fight, and I'm very
    encouraged by that.
        Third, look, I've spent a lot of time with and around
    President Karzai, and I really believe that, if we work with
    him in a more effective manner, we will get a better outcome
    from him and from the team around him. He has some very good
    cabinet ministers who are doing really excellent work. There
    needs to be more of them. They need to be supported more. They
    need to be held accountable. But, my sense from the very long
    and candid conversations I had with him is that there's a
    window of opportunity here that we have to seize.
        Finally, I think that the impetus that the President's
    decision is giving us will change the reality on the ground.
    The President's announcement last night, the resolve that he's
    showing, the fact that very obviously this is not an easy
    political call for him to make, it has significant budget
    implications for our country, I think will help to summon the
    very best of everybody and will give us the chance of success
    that I believe we can achieve.
        So, I'm not naive about how hard this will be, but I think
    it's the right decision. I think it can lead to success if we
    implement it the way we should.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I, too, want to echo my sentiment about having you here and
    the service that you are providing, not only to our President,
    to our country, but I want to thank each and every one of you
    for the fact that you have spent 3 hours already answering
    questions.
        Some of these questions you've already talked about a
    little bit, but let me just ask another specific question
    concerning NATO. Obviously, the President talked about the fact
    that we're going to look to NATO to help send additional
    troops. I think that we do know that some of them are
    constrained by some of the mandates that their countries have
    put on them. I think, Secretary Gates, you mentioned a little
    bit about that. But, I do know that some of the countries have
    mentioned, in the past, about starting their own withdrawals.
    In particular, I believe Germany has suggested a transition by
    2013, and they have 4,000 troops; Canada suggesting some
    pullout in 2011 in Kandahar, and they have 2,500 troops; the
    Italian leaders, with 2,800 troops, leaving Herat by December
    2011; Dutch leaders suggesting they might want to pull out by
    2010. I was just wondering if that is still a concern.
        Secretary Gates, do you have some information on that?
        Secretary Gates. It is a concern. The only two firm
    decisions that have been made that I'm aware of are that the
    Dutch will leave next year with their forces, and the Canadians
    will leave by the end of 2011. These are parliamentary
    decisions that have been made.
        Frankly, our hope, just going back to Secretary Clinton's
    final remarks in response to Senator Collins' questions, our
    hope is that the President's speech last night, and his
    decisions, will help change the political dynamic among some of
    our allies. I must say, just the first reactions that I saw on
    the news this morning from the Europeans, I think, were very
    encouraging--President Sarkozy's comments, the comments of the
    NATO Secretary General, and so on.
        I'm not aware of a German commitment or any kind of firm
    decision to leave at a particular time, but our hope is that
    what the President has decided will change the political
    dynamic.
        The truth of the matter is, the governments--Admiral Mullen
    and I run into this all the time--of our allies are really very
    strongly supportive of the mission in Afghanistan. The military
    and defense leaders in these countries--and, I think probably
    also the foreign ministers--are very supportive. The problem
    is, some of these governments are in very delicate coalition
    governments, and so their domestic politics are a real concern
    for them, in terms of what they can do. The will is there; the
    political capacity to deliver has been a challenge for some of
    them. Our hope is that what the President has decided will help
    change that dynamic.
        But, specifically, to your question, I'm only aware of the
    Canadians and the Dutch that have a specific deadline.
        Senator Hagan. I was also wondering about the budgets. I
    know that many countries are experiencing a decline in the
    economy right now and budgets are tight. Admiral Mullen, I was
    wondering how this is affecting NATO, and particularly some of
    the PRT projects. How do you foresee Admiral Stavridis
    addressing these issues?
        Admiral Mullen. Not unlike what you've heard from Secretary
    Clinton and Secretary Gates, he has been incredibly active in
    engaging the leadership--both civilian and military
    leadership--of these NATO countries.
        What I have seen, certainly that they have concerns, just
    like we do, with respect to the budget, but they are less with
    time. The demarcation point was the NATO summit in April, where
    the support, enthusiasm, and actually hard work to figure out
    how we can do this better together has taken a marked turn for
    the positive. It is very unlike anything that I've seen for the
    previous 2 or 3 years.
        There are concerns about budgets in each of these
    countries, and yet they continue to contribute; in many cases,
    now, they've added more troops and more capabilities. They're
    making contributions in very difficult economic times, though
    not as many as we would like, sometimes. But, again, the
    overall thrust and approach from NATO and other non-NATO
    contributing nations has been very, very positive, and I am
    encouraged by that.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Secretary Gates. Could I just say that when I listed some
    of our NATO allies and the contribution and the sacrifices
    they've made, and giving them an A in response to Senator
    Graham's question, there is a non-NATO ally that has played a
    significant role with us in RC-South, and that's the
    Australians. I wouldn't want to omit the contribution and the
    sacrifice they've made.
        Senator Hagan. They're doing a great job.
        Secretary Clinton. I would just add that we don't want to
    get in trouble with any of our friends or allies. There are
    many smaller countries that have really punched way above their
    weight. We'll submit, for the record, a list of all of them. We
    are also seeing a number of them, the Poles, for example, that
    have been extremely responsive and very helpful. There are a
    lot of other countries that have done their part.
        We also are seeing, in some ways, more of an international
    element to this. Again, when all of it's put together, we'll
    submit that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Hagan. I see that my time is up, but I did want to
    say that I know that the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade from
    Camp Lejeune is fighting the terrorists in Afghanistan, as well
    as Fort Bragg's 82nd Airborne, and I wanted to echo the support
    that I have from North Carolina on behalf of all the troops
    that are serving us in such a valiant way.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, to all three members of our
    panel. It's been a long and good hearing, and all three of you
    have been wonderful.
        I have to say, first, I want to thank Senator Sessions for
    bringing up the issue of the tanker.
        Secretary Gates, I want to say that I agree with everything
    you said. There were minimal discrepancies last year that
    caused this award to Northrop Grumman to be tossed out, and one
    can only read the RFP this year as almost directing a lighter,
    smaller, and inferior product. I think Northrop Grumman is
    absolutely justified to take itself out of the competition at
    this point. I hope that can be rectified.
        Admiral Mullen, how quickly can we deploy these additional
    30,000 American troops and their equipment not just to the
    theater, but the ultimate destination? How difficult will that
    be?
        I noticed in the press yesterday, a White House official
    said, ``The President is saying this has to happen, so the
    military will make it happen.'' How difficult is that going to
    be?
        Admiral Mullen. There is a big difference between Iraq and
    Afghanistan; we don't have a Kuwait. So, what we deploy into
    Afghanistan, in great part, goes straight in. It's not as
    robust, from an infrastructure standpoint, et cetera. So, the
    logistics challenges are significant.
        Senator Wicker. Significantly greater.
        Admiral Mullen. They're significantly greater than Iraq.
    But, we've been working this for months. As Secretary Gates
    said in his opening statement, actually the first troops will
    be there in a couple of weeks and are already under orders
    since the President made his announcement last night.
    Significant numbers of them will arrive in the spring--March-
    April timeframe--and roughly 20,000 to 25,000 by the July
    timeframe. That is getting them in, getting them prepared, and
    obviously getting them on mission.
        Senator Wicker. When will we be at 30,000 additional troops
    sir?
        Admiral Mullen. Later in the summer is the estimate--
    summer/fall for precision there. One of the things that the
    President did in his decision was give the commander on the
    ground the flexibility to say what troops he wants and when.
    We're working our way through that, quite frankly, with General
    McChrystal, given that flexibility, and so it'll take us a
    while to be exact. But, the vast majority of them will go by
    the summertime, and certainly finish out by the fall.
        Senator Wicker. Have we ever done it that quickly before?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes. In fact, in Iraq we actually did it
    more quickly because we had a better infrastructure.
        Senator Wicker. Under less difficult circumstances.
        Admiral Mullen. I'd say less difficult circumstances.
        Senator Wicker. All right, sir.
        I'm batting cleanup on our side. I was to ask about the
    allied troops and our hope for 5,000 to 7,000 additional troops
    from those allies. By the way, let me say, I'm glad, Secretary
    Clinton, that you hastened to add that the smaller deployments
    are also appreciated. Secretary Gates, you mentioned
    specifically several countries as getting an ``A,'' and I'm
    afraid that those that weren't specifically named may be
    wondering what their grade is going to be.
        But, it appears from what you say, the firm information we
    have actually takes us in the wrong direction, that the two
    firm numbers we have mean less allied help. So, our decision
    not to deploy 40,000 of our own troops, and rather deploy the
    30,000, is based on a hope and not based on any assurances from
    these allies. I think that's the testimony today, but I just
    wanted to nail that down.
        Secretary Gates. The situation that we have is that we have
    received private commitments from some countries, but, because
    they have not yet announced them at home, we're not in a
    position to make that announcement for them. I will just give
    you an example. I made two telephone calls the day before
    yesterday, and I received the assurances of between 1,800 and
    2,000 troops.
        Senator Wicker. Additional troops?
        Secretary Gates. Yes. We've all been talking to different
    people. I think there's a fair degree of optimism in terms of
    the additional troops.
        I would also make the point that I made earlier in the
    hearing with respect to the 40,000 U.S. troops. Early in this
    process, it seemed to me that, because the final BCT that
    General McChrystal had asked for could not deploy before July
    2011, there was no need to make a commitment to that upfront. I
    would rather use a smaller number on the American side to
    leverage both the Afghans and our allies. But, General
    McChrystal, essentially, is going to get more troops, earlier
    than he would have with the original 40,000 U.S. troop request.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Mullen, you've been doing this a long time. You're
    a graduate of Annapolis with advanced degrees. When in history
    has a commander ever announced both a surge and a withdrawal at
    the same time? I think that's been very rare in history. If so,
    what gives us a comfort level that this sort of approach is
    going to work?
        Admiral Mullen. I have great comfort in the quickness with
    which we will deploy these forces to reverse the momentum,
    which is absolutely critical. I spoke earlier to my belief that
    we will know well by mid-2011 where we stand and which
    direction--whether we're succeeding or whether we're not. From
    my perspective, the President said we will start to transition
    and transfer responsibility, which is critical; it really is
    the way home, as it has been in Iraq, to transfer that security
    responsibility, and then start to transition, based on the
    conditions on the ground at the time.
        I think that is doable. That, from my perspective, makes
    sense at this point, based on our overall understanding of the
    situation. From that standpoint, again, I'm very supportive of
    the decision.
        The message that it sends to the Afghans and to our allies,
    the commitment and the resolve that this additional troop force
    shows, as well--all those are really positive messages. But,
    come mid-2011, we're going to know whether this is working or
    not.
        Senator Wicker. I'm going to support this Commander in
    Chief because the alternative is unacceptable. Perhaps you
    would like to submit for the record, if you can think of ever
    an occasion in history when a commander has announced both a
    surge and a withdrawal at the same time.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In 1972, the United States was in the process of withdrawing from
    Vietnam. The goal was to reach troop strength of 30,000 by 1 July 1972
    and 15,000 by 1 December 1972. In the midst of this withdrawal, the
    North Vietnamese launched the Easter Offensive in April 1972. The
    United States surged Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft to halt this
    offensive. In 60 days, 18,000 sorties were flown. This surge of
    sorties, during the troop withdrawal, halted the North Vietnamese
    advance. President Nixon responding to a request from General Abrams
    slowed the withdrawal to 49,000 by 1 July.
        In December 1972, the peace negotiations between the United States
    and North Vietnam stalled. The United States still in the process of
    withdrawing troops from South Vietnam again surged aviation assets to
    bring North Vietnam back to the peace table. From 18-30 December 1972,
    700 B-52s conducted 4,000 sorties against Hanoi and Haiphong. The North
    Vietnamese got the message and returned to the peace talks.

        Senator Wicker. You're in a very difficult position. You've
    had to parse words today and make sense out of a contradictory
    policy, a policy that, at first blush, on its face, is a
    paradox and a contradiction. I expect the left is going to rise
    up this afternoon, based on testimony, based on your answers to
    Senator Graham, and protest vehemently the statements that
    you've made about the flexibility and about the President
    always having the opportunity to change his mind and do what's
    right for the Country and right for national security.
        I'm going to support this President. I put great stock,
    Admiral Mullen, in your statement that you enthusiastically and
    without hesitation, without qualification, support this policy.
    I wish you well. I want to be your teammate.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, all three of you. Being one of the last
    Senators, most of my questions have been answered, but I do
    want to say, I don't think you're necessarily in a difficult
    position; I think you've done very well for the last 3 hours,
    answering questions very directly about the policy, the
    comments you've made, that this patience that we have to have
    as a Country of what more sacrifices we have to make, and
    giving us the sense of the civilian and, the military end. The
    President spending the time to review the policy and set it out
    and create flexibility, I think, has been the right move. So, I
    disagree with my counterpart on the other side, my Republican
    friend.
        I would say that one thing I want to put to rest, and I
    want to make sure I'm clear on this because I think you've said
    it 100 times and I'm going to pound this 1 more time, is the
    whole issue of withdrawal. You've made it very clear, withdraw
    and transition are similar but different. I hope that I'm right
    on this, that in July 2011, withdraw will occur, in some form;
    it might be 100 troops, it might be 50,000 troops. That is
    undetermined. It may last 1 year, it may last 1 month, or it
    might last 3 years. But, the withdrawal process, which really
    is a transition process, is a goal that we're shooting for in
    2011. Is that what I understand?
        Secretary Gates. Yes.
        Senator Begich. Okay. I've heard this, and we're going to
    continue to hear this, though I hate to say this because I
    think this committee is very bipartisan. We all are spending
    the time to look at this issue and there's agreement, all
    across the board here, supporting the President's mission, and
    I agree with it 100 percent. But, this whole issue of the
    withdrawal, everyone's trying to pull that apart. Really what
    you've done is set a target, giving the Afghan Government a
    target of what we're trying to shoot for, in the sense of when
    we think their commitment's going to be at the highest level
    possible to make this transition. Then, there will be decisions
    made, at the end of December, leading into July, of what level
    of transition that might be. It might be very small. It might
    be very large. That's undetermined yet, but that's the target.
    Am I correct in saying that?
        Admiral Mullen. That's fair.
        Secretary Gates. December is more about: is the strategy
    working? Are we headed in the right direction? Are things
    moving the way we anticipated they would? The decisions with
    respect to transition would begin in July, as you've described
    it.
        Senator Begich. Great. I'm just hoping, as we move forward
    on this discussion, we're not going to beat the withdrawal
    issue over the head so many times. It's not a hard deadline; it
    is a target--a target that may mean a few people, it may mean
    thousands of people, but that will be determined as the
    strategy plays out. I want to just echo that. Hopefully, we'll
    be done with that discussion, we'll support the Commander in
    Chief, you all, the efforts of our troops on the ground, and
    the effort we need to do in Afghanistan.
        I want to ask you a little more in depth in regards to the
    Afghan troops and how you see them training up. I know you had
    some target amounts of 134,000 troops in December 2010, and
    moving that up to 170,000 troops, I think, by July. How
    confident, if you were to measure, on a percentage scale of 100
    percent--obviously, 100 percent confident--that you can reach
    that successfully? What would be one or two challenges that may
    cause us to not get to that goal?
        Admiral Mullen. I think that area is the highest risk area
    for us. We all identified that throughout the review and
    believe that. That's where General McChrystal is. We've put
    great leadership in place to address that. It has to be led by
    security, or we can't get there, so that we can create an
    environment in which more Afghans participate. There is a
    fundamental shift with the partnership piece, which is a
    significant breakthrough on how to do this, and we have a lot
    more confidence in that regard. But, it's one of the reasons we
    really have annual targets, so that we can look at how we're
    doing and adjust accordingly. Secretary Gates talked earlier
    about retention, attrition, and all those challenges that we
    have, more so on the ANP-side than on the ANA-side. I think
    we're very clear-eyed on what the challenge is; we are going to
    assess ourselves rigorously throughout the process. Training is
    probably the biggest challenge that we have with respect to
    meeting the goals that we've set out for ourselves.
        Senator Begich. Very good.
        Secretary Clinton, I want to follow up with you. I'm
    actually very supportive of you getting as much flexibility
    with the use of your monies. I would even offer to suggest
    that, as we deal with the Defense Appropriation bill, why we
    don't figure out how to fix this now rather than waiting until
    next summer, because we'll lose 8 or 9 months, which every
    month, every day, seems critical. So, I would look to you and
    the administration to have a suggestion, seeing that we haven't
    done the defense components, so why not figure out how to make
    that happen.
        I think you said you're going to triple up or get about 970
    civilians on the ground, give or take a few there. But, you
    also indicated that you need more, in time. Have you figured
    out what that number is? I agree with you. I think, as we do
    the military plus-up, the civilian component is critical. I
    appreciate your review and change that you've done to really
    focus on this component and getting unified efforts with the
    military. I think that is critical.
        Have you thought of a number? Or is that something you can
    give for the record at some point?
        Secretary Clinton. Senator, thank you. I'm hesitant to
    state a number now, but we will provide it for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Clinton. But, there is a large idea that I think
    your question suggests. We should start looking at our budgets
    as national security budgets if we're really intent upon having
    an integrated civilian-military strategy. Again, I have to
    compliment Secretary Gates, who's been an advocate of this long
    before I ever thought I'd be sitting here at this table in this
    position. We have to be willing to look across the government
    at a whole-of-government approach to something as critical as
    our national security and the mission in Afghanistan. That's
    going to take some changes in how we do business and how we
    think about it.
        So, I would, obviously, welcome the continuing support from
    this committee and others as we try to get it right. This will
    be, I'm sure, the subject of the Appropriations Committee, but
    where's the money going to come from? Is it going to be part of
    the budget? How's it going to be costed out? All of that has to
    be worked through between the administration and Congress. But,
    as we're doing that, I think we have to quit stovepiping our
    efforts and start thinking more holistically, which is really
    what our policy intends to present.
        Senator Begich. My time is up, and, Secretary Clinton, I
    want to say I 100 percent agree with you; this hearing today--
    and I want to thank the chairman for doing this--has what I
    consider three critical pieces to the equation that are sitting
    in front of us today, and not just one component. So, I really
    do appreciate your comments. Anything I can do as an individual
    member, I'll be happy to do that. Thank you again for all your
    service. Thank you for bringing forward 3 hours of answers to
    many questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Begich.
        Senator Kirk.
        Senator Kirk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, let me add a word with my colleagues, to
    thank you for your patience this morning, but, far more
    importantly, for your patriotic service to the country and your
    service to our Commander in Chief.
        I wanted to just follow up a little bit on Senator Collins'
    question. If I understand it, when General McChrystal advocated
    a strategy along these lines, it wasn't just the troops, he
    said, and I'm quoting here, ``A foreign army alone cannot beat
    an insurgency. The insurgency in Afghanistan requires an Afghan
    solution. This is their war.'' He went on to say, any success
    must come ``by, with, and through the Afghan Government.'' In
    other words, without a legitimate, credible, reliable Afghan
    governmental partner, it sounds to me like the strategy would
    be flawed.
        By all reports that we have, President Karzai had been
    installed, basically, as a result of a flawed election, if not
    a fraudulent election, by default, and that he presides over a
    culture of corruption and is dependent on, unfortunately, an
    opium economy.
        What I'm concerned about is whether we are taking a leap of
    faith here with respect to our Afghan governmental partner and,
    not irrespective of that but related to that, if we're going to
    send 30,000 more troops and spend additional United States
    dollars, should we not be looking for more indices or evidence
    that he truly will be a partner that has the response from his
    own citizens, and support of them, so that we're not just in
    there without him and, maybe, unfortunately, being perceived as
    ``occupiers''?
        On the one hand, obviously, Secretary Clinton, you, as you
    have said, have been closer to him. You've heard the words.
    But, I think a lot of us are wondering whether this is for
    real, on their side.
        Secretary Clinton. Senator Kirk, first let me say, with
    respect to the strategy and the execution, I think it is fair
    to say that probably the two experts in the world right now on
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are, on
    counterinsurgency, General Petraeus; on counterterrorism,
    General McChrystal. They are very committed and confident that
    we will see success. Now, they could be wrong. We're all human
    and we can make a different assessment, or reality can turn out
    to be a lot more ugly and difficult than any of us imagined.
    But, on the side of the positive with respect to the strategy,
    I certainly put a lot of stock into what they say, and up the
    chain of command to Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates.
        It is absolutely the case that General McChrystal pointed
    out one of the salient features of the campaign that we are
    waging, and that is to have a good, solid partner in the Afghan
    Government.
        I think it is unfair to paint with such a broad brush the
    President and Government of Afghanistan and to basically
    declare that they are incapable and unwilling to defend and
    protect their own country, and that they are fatally flawed. I
    do not believe that.
        I believe it is a much more complex picture, as most human
    situations are. I believe that the way that our government
    interacted with President Karzai and his government over the
    last several years bred a lot of the confusion and the
    inadequacy that we are now having to contend with.
        I am not making the case that this is a perfect
    partnership, but I think it has the elements of real progress,
    if we are smart enough, as to how to put them together into a
    winning strategy.
        The people on the ground, the people who are responsible
    for implementing this strategy, including Ambassador
    Eikenberry, who wholeheartedly endorses the President's
    definition of our mission, believe it's hard, but doable. That
    is what I believe. As we say, the proof is in the pudding;
    we're going to find out because of the President's decision.
        I think your caution has to be kept in mind. But, I also
    believe that we have to come at this with a sense of resolve,
    determination, and a cautious optimism that we can make this
    work. I think that there is a very strong argument that we can.
        Secretary Gates. I would just like to pitch in and echo
    Secretary Clinton's comments about the dangers of painting the
    Afghan Government with too broad a brush. The reality is, as
    she indicated earlier, there are some number of ministers--and
    I would say, including two that we work the most closely with,
    in Defense and Interior--who are quite competent, quite
    capable, and have been good partners for us. Similarly, when we
    have had a good governor go into a province, we have seen a
    situation turn around, literally in months, when a competent,
    honest governor is put in place. There are more than a few of
    those in Afghanistan.
        All the problems that you've described and that have been
    discussed here this morning are real, they exist, but there are
    enough examples of the kind of people we need to partner with,
    who are already in the Afghan Government or are governors, that
    I think is what contributes to, I won't say optimism, but a
    feeling of some confidence that this is going to work.
        Senator Kirk. Thank you.
        One other question. It goes back to the Pakistan situation.
    With the nuclear capabilities there, the place is rife with al
    Qaeda; whereas, less so, according to National Security Advisor
    General Jones, on the Afghanistan side. Could you just give us
    a little bit of flavor about the thinking of another option
    which might more directly or readily address the President's
    concerns and his mission: the option of trying to secure and
    seal the Afghanistan-Pakistan border while we're working to
    ensure the security and stability of nuclear weapons, and doing
    what we can to destroy the safe havens in Pakistan while we
    seal the border so the terrorists aren't fleeing back into
    Afghanistan, as one strategy, as opposed to the 30,000 troops
    in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator, there are a lot of views on
    borders around the world. My experience and the experience of
    an awful lot of people who have been doing this for a long time
    is that borders are pretty tough to seal, and certainly this
    one is probably as tough as any in the world.
        At least from my perspective, it doesn't mean we shouldn't
    have security up there, because we do. In fact, we're working
    very hard to establish centers that are manned by both
    Afghanistan and Pakistani military members--and we have one--to
    better secure that border. I think that getting to the point
    where you think you can secure that I just don't think that it
    can be done, first of all.
        Second, the focus on Pakistan; it's been mentioned here,
    and I won't belabor it. Pakistan's own effort is absolutely
    vital here. It's a sovereign country. They've really done a
    lot. A lot of us, a year ago, would not have predicted that
    they would have undertaken the efforts that they have to go
    into South Waziristan, and Swat before that. We're working to
    support that and their interests. Our interests are very much
    mutual because of the threat that has been discussed before.
    It's going to take some time to do that.
        Then, there's that long-term partnership, actually on both
    sides of the border, that is absolutely critical. When I go
    there, one of the questions that comes very quickly from
    military and civilians in both those countries is, ``Are you
    leaving? Are you going to abandon us again?'' The importance of
    the President's message last night, and this decision, is a
    significant step in that direction, to reaffirm that's not the
    case. We can't afford to do that again.
        Senator Kirk. Thank you very much. Thank you all very much
    again for your service and your patience.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kirk.
        Senator Bayh.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know whether
    this is a case of saving the best for last or simply the last
    for last. [Laughter.]
        I have been very gratified to hear the testimony of these
    three distinguished Americans here today.
        Admiral, I want to thank you for your lifetime commitment
    to our Armed Forces.
        Secretary Gates, I want to thank you for your continued
    service. The President was wise to ask you to remain, and you
    were a true public servant to decide, in spite of the
    advantages of private life, to remain. I'm grateful to you for
    that.
        Secretary Clinton, I remember with a great deal of fondness
    our service on this panel together, literally side by side, and
    the journey that we took together to Afghanistan several years
    ago. I can't help but think that if we had had the kind of
    nuanced and complex analysis at that point, perhaps we wouldn't
    be here today. But, we are. I am gratified that all of you,
    along with the President, took the time to think this through
    to maximize our chances of getting it right. So, it's good to
    see you again. On a somewhat lighter note, I haven't had a
    chance to see you since the news about your daughter's
    engagement was announced. Congratulations.
        Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much.
        Senator Bayh. The bottom line for me--and several of you
    have stated this--is there are no easy answers here; there are
    only difficult choices. There are no guarantees, but it does
    seem to me the strategy you've settled on maximizes the chances
    of success, maximizes the chances that we will be able to
    ultimately leave Afghanistan, not temporarily, but permanently,
    while securing the national security interests of the United
    States. That's what this ultimately has to be all about.
        I think it's important to note that I'm sure none of you
    want to be here recommending that we spend more money in
    Afghanistan or that we send more troops to Afghanistan. But, we
    have to remind ourselves, and the American public, that we are
    there because we were attacked from that place and 3,000
    innocent Americans lost their lives as a result of that. We owe
    it to the American public that we maximize the chances of that
    not happening again. I think your strategy does that.
        Regrettably, we are likely to remain under threat from
    radical Islam and organizations like al Qaeda, no matter what
    we do. If we leave, we run the risk of it returning to a safe
    haven from which attacks can be launched on our Homeland. If we
    stay, regrettably our service men and women are placed in
    harm's way. But, I do think the strategy you've settled on
    maximizes the chances of minimizing those combined risks on an
    ongoing basis. I thank you for that.
        Although neither one of them is here, I want to thank
    Senator Lieberman for his comments. I think he was exactly
    right when he pointed out, ``Look, you're receiving some tough
    questions from both the right and the left today.'' The
    President is not doing this because it is politically
    expedient; he's doing it because he believes it's in the
    national security interests of the United States. That's the
    kind of decisionmaking I want to see in a chief executive, and
    I think it's the kind of decisionmaking he has, with your help,
    exhibited here today.
        I also want to associate myself with some of the comments
    of Senator McCain and several of our colleagues on the other
    side of the aisle who are going to support this President in
    his decisionmaking. For those who believe that the ability to
    forge bipartisan decision making is just impossible in
    Washington, their comments today are evidence that that is not
    necessarily so. I want to thank them for putting partisanship
    aside and choosing to support our Commander in Chief in a very
    difficult situation.
        I do take issue with a couple of things that were raised by
    Senator McCain. I would associate myself with your comments. I
    think that the notion of--and I think, Secretary Gates, you
    mentioned this--demonstrating both resolve as well as a sense
    of urgency simultaneously is exactly the combination we need to
    exhibit here. So, we demonstrate resolve by maintaining our
    commitment, but, at the same time, we insist that the Afghans
    have the sense of urgency which is ultimately going to do more
    than we can do to make this a successful undertaking.
        So, by having an exit strategy in place, I think we say to
    them, ``We are with you, but only so long as you do your
    part.'' I think that's vitally important to the ultimate
    success of this undertaking. I personally don't find it
    incompatible to have a deadline that we aspire to meet, we do
    everything to meet, that we expect to meet, but, at the same
    time, of course take into account changes in facts on the
    ground that may occur over the next year and a half. As you
    pointed out, this is a longer period of time than it took for
    the surge in Iraq to prove to be successful. So, I think it's
    important to keep that in mind.
        I do have two brief questions. You've been very patient and
    you've stayed a long time. But, these are two critiques that
    have been offered, and I want to give you an opportunity to
    address them. You have, in part, already.
        But, you hear some people say, ``The Taliban and al Qaeda
    are two different phenomena, and we can address combating al
    Qaeda without really having to combat the Taliban within
    Afghanistan.'' You've pointed out that the Taliban is not a
    homogeneous group; there are differences, and we're going to
    try and appeal to the reconcilable, to peel them away from the
    irreconcilables. But, there is still a hard core there. I think
    the words that you've used--one of you used the words that they
    ``collude in some of their operations,'' that there's a
    ``symbiotic relationship between the irreconcilable elements of
    Taliban and al Qaeda.'' So, I'd like to give you a chance, both
    Secretaries, to address this issue, which I understand your
    testimony already touched on with regard to that irreducible
    hard core of the Taliban; it simply is not possible to defeat
    al Qaeda or minimize the risk from al Qaeda without also
    combating that irreconcilable element of the Taliban.
        Secretary Gates. I would just say that we have to remember
    that it's the part of the Taliban that we think is
    irreconcilable that, in fact, provided the safe haven for al
    Qaeda. There is just a significant amount of intelligence of al
    Qaeda identifying themselves with the Taliban's aspirations in
    Afghanistan, and the Taliban talking about their relationship
    with al Qaeda and the message that al Qaeda has.
        The Taliban are clever. We wouldn't be in the situation
    we're in if we did not face an adaptable and clever adversary.
    They recognize that the reason they're not in power right now
    is because they allowed al Qaeda to launch the attack against
    the United States. So, every now and then you'll see some
    report or another that the Taliban is saying, ``Let's downplay
    the relationship with al Qaeda so we don't get hit again.''
    But, the fact is, there is plenty of evidence of these two
    organizations and, as I put it in my opening statement, their
    symbiotic relationship.
        What has made it more dangerous over the last year, as I
    said earlier, is that now we have the Tehrik-e-Taliban
    Pakistan, the Taliban in Pakistan, whose target is the
    Pakistani Government and who are working closely with al Qaeda,
    along with their compatriots in Afghanistan.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Clinton, anything you'd like to add?
        Secretary Clinton. Senator Bayh, in addition to the
    inspirational and aspirational role that al Qaeda plays, they
    provide very specific services; they help to provide funding
    and they help to provide targeting, training, and equipping.
    Very often they have their planners working closely with the
    elements of the Taliban, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, in
    order to target both institutions of the respective
    governments, as well as international sites, embassies of other
    countries, and certainly our own presence and our troops.
        I don't think there's any doubt any longer that there has
    been a developing syndicate of terror, and those tentacles
    reach far and wide. Yes, they do reach to Somalia, to Yemen, to
    the Maghreb, et cetera, but they are focused and grounded in
    the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
        It's our assessment that it might have been possible, if we
    had gone at it somewhat differently in the beginning of this
    war, to have captured and killed enough of the al Qaeda and the
    Taliban leadership to have made a difference. But, we are where
    we are right now, and we know that the training that is done
    and the communication that is done out of that area poses
    direct threats to us, our friends, and our allies.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you.
        If I could be permitted one final question.
        Another point of view that's offered, voices that are
    raised, suggests, ``We're focusing on the wrong place. Al Qaeda
    is now principally located in the tribal areas of Pakistan. We
    should focus on Pakistan. Why are we doing this in
    Afghanistan?'' My understanding of your testimony here today is
    that, number one, were we to adopt that strategy, the Taliban
    would, over time, reassert itself in Afghanistan, having safe
    havens there from which to launch attacks against America and
    our interests. That's number one. Number two, we can't go into
    Pakistan; we have to try and build up the Pakistanis'
    capability of dealing with the problem on the ground there.
    Number three, we are doing that. This is not an either/or
    choice. In fact, if you made it one, ignoring one would
    undermine the other, so we have to look at these two theaters
    in conjunction, doing both simultaneously, to ensure that we
    combat the threat.
        So, if you'd care to address this notion that we could do
    one, but not the other, which seems to be out there in the
    minds of some.
        Admiral Mullen. They're inextricably linked, and there's no
    question that if the Taliban came back--their strategic goal is
    to take over the government again in Afghanistan--that they
    certainly have all the ability to provide that kind of safe
    haven because they are so linked across that border. I see the
    linkage between these two countries in my travels; nothing is
    more evident than that. That's why the President's strategy,
    even in March, drove this to a regional approach, not a single-
    country approach. You just can't do one without doing the
    other.
        Secretary Gates. Let me just say, and this may be the last
    thing I say in this hearing, what is essential for our national
    security is that we have two long-term partners in Afghanistan
    and Pakistan. Quite frankly, I detest the phrase ``exit
    strategy'' because what we are looking at over time is a
    transition in our relationship with the Afghans, a relationship
    that now, where there is the preponderance of a military
    relationship as we try to secure the country and put it in a
    position where they can accept responsibility for their own
    security, and, frankly, to prevent al Qaeda from coming back.
    Over time, as we are successful in that, the civilian component
    and the development component of our relationship with
    Afghanistan will become predominant. We may have a small
    residual military training-and-equipping role with Afghanistan
    in the future.
        This goes to the point I made in my testimony. We will not
    repeat the mistake--and we must not repeat the mistake--of 1989
    and turn our backs on these folks and, when we have the
    security situation with them under control, then the civilian
    and the development part must be the preponderant part of our
    relationship far into the future.
        Senator Bayh. That's one of the truly refreshing things. In
    past administrations from time to time, there had been friction
    between DOD and DOS, but here you're working hand in hand, and,
    in fact, understand that you both have to go forward together
    to truly get the job done on a permanent basis. I'm most
    gratified for your collaboration.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for your patience.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Bayh.
        Our witnesses, you've been excellent. You've been
    responsive. You've been more than patient. Because we promised
    you that you'd be out of here by 12:30 p.m., I believe, we owe
    you 10 minutes, and a lot more than that.
        Thank you.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

                               AID TO AFGHANISTAN

        1. Senator Akaka. Secretary Clinton, some argue that progress in
    Afghanistan had stalled in recent years, in part, due to insufficient
    accountability. Metrics, proper oversight, and benchmarks will be
    critical to the success of the strategy outlined by President Obama.
    What are the administration's plans to maintain accountability to
    determine whether Afghan ministries and agencies are worthy of
    receiving direct U.S. aid?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        2. Senator Akaka. Secretary Clinton, please describe the positive
    and negative possible outcomes of sending some aid directly to
    ministries and entities in Afghanistan.
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

                              CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

        3. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, civilian casualties from air
    strikes draw a strong reaction from leaders in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
    region. The smallest number of civilian deaths can become an invaluable
    propaganda tool for the insurgents. Earlier this year, General
    McChrystal issued guidance directing restraint in the use of close air
    support (CAS). However, air strikes remain a key part of our regional
    strategy. Do you think we have found the proper balance in the use of
    air strikes in the region?
        Secretary Gates. I do believe we have struck the right balance
    between minimizing civilian casualties and retaining the benefits of
    air power. Air power can be essential for self defense and as an
    asymmetrical advantage. However, its use must be judicious. I believe
    the Tactical Directive has achieved that balance.
        With regards to limiting civilian casualties, the Tactical
    Directive issued in July 2009 states:

            ``. . . I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit
            the use of force like CAS against residential compounds and
            other locations likely to produce civilian casualties in
            accordance with this guidance. Commanders must weigh the gain
            of using CAS against the cost of civilian casualties, which in
            the long run make mission success more difficult and turn the
            Afghan people against us. . . The use of air-to-ground
            munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is
            only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions.''

        The above quotes deal directly with Rules of Engagement (ROE) and
    troops requiring CAS in self defense. The Tactical Directive does not
    prevent troops from protecting themselves as a matter of self defense,
    but makes them determine whether CAS is the only option available to
    them.
        Deliberate air strikes are used against specific targets, but only
    after the request has gone through an intense targeting process, where
    intelligence is closely scrutinized to protect against civilian
    casualties. Air strikes are a valuable tool and I believe we have
    struck the right balance in conducting air strikes against necessary
    targets, protecting our troops, and limiting civilian casualties.

                                    PAKISTAN

        4. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, there continues to be concern
    over Pakistan's role in the conflict. This will become more significant
    in light of the President's strategy if extremists continue to cross
    the border easily. Do you feel the current effort to improve security
    and governance in the Pakistan and Afghanistan border areas will
    support our new Afghanistan strategy?
        Secretary Gates. Our support for Pakistan in their efforts to
    improve security and strengthen their government institutions is a
    vital part of the President's strategy. We fully recognize that our
    success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with
    Pakistan. That is why we need a strategy that works on both sides of
    the border. The Pakistani people are beginning to understand that they
    are the ones most endangered by extremism as terrorist attacks on
    targets in cities and settled areas increase. The Pakistan army has
    gone on its largest offensive in years with the overwhelming support of
    the Pakistani people. The questions that have been raised in the past
    about Pakistan's capacity and resolve are being answered by the
    Pakistani people and the actions that the Pakistan military has taken
    in Swat and South Waziristan. They are an important first step.
        However, much remains to be done. To assist Pakistan in these
    efforts, the United States has committed $1.2 billion to support
    counterinsurgency operations and $7.8 billion over the next 5 years to
    expand economic and social opportunities available to the Pakistani
    people. If we are going to successfully rid the region of violent
    extremism, we must confront all threats to stability and security of
    the Pakistani people.

                          MEDICAL EVACUATION CAPACITY

        5. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, you stated earlier this year
    that the goal in Iraq was to have a soldier in a medical facility
    within 1 hour of being wounded. In Afghanistan, the time was closer to
    2 hours. I know you have been working diligently to reduce this
    timeframe. As we increase the number of troops in the region, what is
    your assessment of the medical evacuation capability in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. In November 2008, I directed a comprehensive
    bottom-to-top review on how to best synchronize efforts in theater and
    accomplish the goal of improving the Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC)
    benchmark to a 1-hour execution standard in Afghanistan. Improving
    MEDEVAC response times requires a systematic approach and the
    synchronization of aircraft, medical capabilities, communication,
    infrastructure, and security to support these operations.
        We must always remember that the single most important factor in
    the execution of the MEDEVAC mission is patient care. The effort to
    save human life warrants accepting additional risk when there is a
    reasonable expectation of success. So while we have changed the MEDEVAC
    standard to reflect a 60-minute total mission time, commanders and
    flight crews must not be so overly focused on meeting the 1-hour
    standard, as patient needs may dictate longer flight legs to
    appropriate medical care and surgical intervention.
        Over the last 12 months, we have executed a number of force build-
    ups across Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States and our
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners have increased the
    MEDEVAC and surgical platforms in theater to best support this increase
    of forces and the battlefield dispersion of personnel. Based on
    detailed analysis and coordination, we are now executing a course of
    action that will maintain and sustain the 60-minute or better average
    for MEDEVAC missions in Afghanistan that we are achieving to date. This
    analysis was used in determining the correct mix of MEDEVAC
    organizations associated with the force expansion.

                  NEW STRATEGY, FORCES, AND FORCE RESTRICTIONS

        6. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, we have been fighting in
    Afghanistan for 8 years. Now, we are facing a more sophisticated and
    resilient insurgency than any time since 2001. What are the key
    elements in our new strategy that will allow us to reverse the momentum
    in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. Reversing the Taliban-led insurgency's momentum and
    denying their access to, and control of, key population and production
    centers are at the top of the list of focused objectives that we share
    with our Afghan partners. Reversing the momentum requires us to reverse
    the trend of expanding Taliban influence over the population,
    particularly in the south. This means we must increase the number of
    districts that are under government or local control and reduce the
    number of districts that are contested or under Taliban control. In
    addition, establishing security in these districts, focused efforts to
    build Afghan governance capacity, and to enable the Afghan people to
    hold their officials accountable are critical and will increase the
    people's trust and confidence.
        This strategy is coupled with the expansion in the quantity and
    quality of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Growing the
    Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) and
    training them to a sufficient level will allow Afghans to take control
    of the security of their own country.
        Population-centric counterinsurgency has proven effective at
    reversing negative trends in the areas where International Security
    Assistance Force (ISAF) forces have cleared and held and have enabled
    Afghan security and governance to develop. By July 2010, the bulk of
    the additional forces approved by the President will be in Afghanistan
    and partnered with an expanded ANSF. These forces will expand and
    consolidate the security zones to connect key population and production
    centers, with our main efforts initially focused in the south--at the
    historic heart of the Afghan Taliban insurgency.

        7. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, many of our allies have
    restrictions on how their troops can be used in Afghanistan. In some
    cases, this even restricts their troops from offensive combat. Do you
    foresee any of these restrictions being modified or removed as we
    execute the next phase of the war in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, in fact, some of the restrictions have already
    been modified or removed based on the last Supreme Headquarters Allied
    Powers Europe (SHAPE) ISAF Caveat report. Two nations removed all
    caveats: Estonia and Portugal. Three nations reduced caveats: Bulgaria,
    Italy, and Slovenia. Only one nation increased their caveat and that
    was the Netherlands.

        8. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, since the release of General
    McChrystal's assessment, there has been a healthy debate over the
    number of troops being deployed to Afghanistan. However, we should not
    focus solely on the number of troops alone. Ignoring the total number
    of troops proposed by the administration, what is your assessment of
    the mix of U.S. forces by capability? Will we have the right equipment
    and personnel in place to achieve our goals in the region?
        Admiral Mullen. The mix of forces is based on capabilities
    requested by General McChrystal. As he has testified, he is getting the
    force structure he needs to be successful. The reality is, however, the
    requirement will continue to change, so we have to keep on it. We have
    made extraordinary improvements in things like intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment, but this progress will need
    to continue. With the additional forces that have been approved, we are
    going to have to work through getting additional equipment to support
    our troops, including, for example, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
    vehicles and engineer equipment to help us find and dispose of
    improvised explosive devices. I think we are doing an extraordinary job
    across our government providing this equipment, but I think it is
    something we have to watch constantly.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

                           CERP PROJECTS AND TRACKING

        9. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, an
    October 2009 quarterly report to Congress by the Special Inspector
    General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) indicates ongoing problems
    with the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). Congress has
    provided $1.6 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for CERP in
    Afghanistan, and that CERP was created to fund primarily small-scale
    projects to meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs at the
    community and provincial levels. However, SIGAR found that while DOD
    has established procedures to account for CERP funds, it has not
    established adequate mechanisms for monitoring and executing CERP
    projects. The report goes on to claim that program managers have
    limited visibility over the execution of CERP projects in part because
    U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), which oversees CERP, has no central
    system for retaining the physical files in Afghanistan, and electronic
    records are either incomplete or nonexistent.
        SIGAR also found that CERP funds increasingly are being obligated
    for large-scale projects that cost $500,000 or more. While these large-
    scale projects account for only 3 percent of all projects, they consume
    67 percent of CERP funds. These projects pose increased risks for CERP
    because they are usually more complex than the small projects and
    require several years to complete. Most CERP managers have been trained
    to implement smaller-scale projects. Moreover, troop rotation schedules
    result in a lack of continuity in the management of large, long-term
    projects. SIGAR recommended that the Commander of USFOR-A develop and
    implement: (1) a process to systematically collect and track
    information on CERP projects; (2) a centralized system for maintaining
    records; and (3) a plan that addresses how to manage the heightened
    risks associated with projects costing $500,000 or more.
        What has DOD specifically done to address the findings of this
    SIGAR report as it relates to its management of the CERP in
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. By its nature, CERP involves
    decentralized implementation by local commanders in theater. Its
    hallmarks are responsiveness to urgent needs and flexibility. We have
    heard the concerns expressed by Members of Congress, studied the
    findings of recent audit reports, and examined lessons learned from
    previous deployments. We have taken steps within DOD, the Army, and the
    U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) theater to improve the oversight of the
    program--all without diminishing the key element of flexibility and
    responsiveness this program provides to the commander in the field.
        DOD recognizes that additional improvements can be made in the
    management of CERP to maintain the flexibility and accountability
    essential to a field-driven program. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is
    leading a review of CERP to examine ways to make the program more
    efficient and effective. The review will examine the issues you raise
    as well as others that we view as important to implementation of this
    crucial program. Following this review a report will be made available
    in the spring to Congress.

        10. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is
    the plan for implementing a central system for retaining physical files
    and electronic records of CERP handled by USFOR-A?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
    is leading a review of the CERP to examine ways to make the program
    more efficient and effective. This report will be completed and made
    available to Congress in the spring. As part of the review, DOD is
    examining the current CERP data management system in theater with the
    goal of improving efficiency, transparency, and accuracy of data
    recordkeeping and reporting. DOD is also working with the U.S. Agency
    for International Development (USAID) to ensure compatible electronic
    recordkeeping to improve interagency coordination on CERP projects. We
    believe CERP managers are doing a commendable job implementing the
    program under difficult conditions, and believe the Deputy Secretary's
    comprehensive review of the program will ensure they have the proper
    tools required to execute this crucial program.

        11. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, do you
    think there needs to be congressional reforms to preserve the integrity
    of the CERP while also ensuring proper oversight of these projects and
    funds available for use by field commanders? If so, what might you
    propose?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Current legislation provides
    sufficient oversight for the CERP. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is
    leading a review of CERP to examine ways to make the program more
    efficient and effective. Following this review, a report will be made
    available to Congress in the spring.
        CERP is critical to supporting commanders in the field in executing
    counterinsurgency operations in support of the President's strategy.
    DOD continues to support congressional reforms to improve the
    flexibility of traditional foreign assistance programs and facilitate
    interagency cooperation.

        12. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is
    DOD doing to better train CERP managers in the types and scale of
    projects that they will handle in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. As noted in the recent report
    (House Report 111-105) submitted to the 2009 Supplemental
    Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2346), which requested a description of the
    ``training provided for members of the U.S. Armed Forces deploying to
    Afghanistan and Iraq on the use of funds under the CERP,'' training is
    vital to the success of CERP. Adequate training ensures the following:
    deployed commanders and their appointed representatives in theater use
    appropriate criteria when choosing and monitoring CERP projects;
    financial agents and managers for CERP place sufficient controls on,
    and accurately account for, the funds appropriated under CERP; and the
    program helps further the strategic goals of the CENTCOM Commander.
        As the Executive Agent for the CERP, the Army currently conducts
    training in the continental United States (CONUS); for deploying
    individuals and units; and in theater, for individuals and units
    already deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has enhanced CERP
    training for four key positions: the project manager, the project
    purchasing officer, the paying agent, and the unit commander. The first
    three positions form a triad of expertise that every project must have.
    Unit commanders are vital to ensure the appropriate projects are
    identified. Integrated training and detailed procedures provide the
    checks and balances necessary in every project. In addition, there are
    numerous initiatives underway to enhance CERP training for individuals
    and units, both pre-deployment and in theater. The existing training,
    plus the Mobile Training Team and Distance Learning programs being
    developed, provides the necessary tools to ensure effective and
    efficient management of the CERP.

        13. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how are
    large-scale CERP projects vetted within the greater framework of
    reconstruction in Afghanistan to ensure their utility and prevent
    duplication or unneeded projects?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. In Afghanistan, the U.S.
    Government Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan provides the
    overarching framework for reconstruction in Afghanistan within which
    CERP projects are vetted and coordinated.
        As part of the plan, DOD and the Department of State (DOS)
    established an executive working group with 14 subworking groups. One
    of these subgroups is the infrastructure working group (IWG) under
    USAID. The meetings are co-chaired by USAID, USFOR-A (through the Joint
    Project Integration Office (JPIO)) and the U.S. Embassy. The IWG, as a
    priority, is working to establish a number of infrastructure
    strategies. The first three are for water (completed), roads (working),
    and energy (scheduled for development in January 2010) sectors, and IWG
    provides overarching guidance for CERP projects as well.
        USAID now participates as a voting member on the CERP review board
    at the command level. Their participation prevents duplication of
    effort and also helps identify any problems with sustainment of
    projects nominated for CERP. The increase of U.S. Government civilians
    in the field significantly improves the integration coordination and
    de-confliction of reconstruction projects across civilian and military
    funding streams.

        14. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what do
    you feel is an acceptable cost limit that should be in place on the
    type of CERP projects that field managers could implement?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD) provides guidance on the CERP approval authorities in
    theater. This guidance is supplemented by approval limits provided by
    CENTCOM, USFOR-A, and U.S. Forces-Iraq, and all procedures are
    continually reviewed to ensure they are responsive to changing
    operational requirements. Projects in Iraq are capped at $2 million and
    require a Secretary of Defense waiver to exceed that limit. Projects
    over $1 million in Iraq and Afghanistan require approval by the
    Commander, CENTCOM.
        DOD strives to ensure commanders in the field have flexible
    resources to address local urgent reconstruction requirements as part
    of the counterinsurgency campaign. Therefore, DOD does not seek to
    institute cost limits but rather ensure the appropriate approval
    authorities are in place and adequate numbers of trained personnel are
    available to commanders to manage CERP projects. The Deputy Secretary
    of Defense is leading a review of CERP to examine ways to make the
    program more efficient and effective. Following this review, a report
    will be made available to Congress in the spring.
        Finally, DOD is aware that the project requirements in Afghanistan
    are different than project requirements in Iraq, based on the unique
    conditions in each country, the nature of the conflict, other available
    foreign assistance, local government resources, and our own force
    presence. In Afghanistan, as we increase the forces available to
    implement the President's strategy, CERP will become an even more
    critical tool to respond to humanitarian needs, to help address
    grievances of local populations, and to enable economic opportunity
    through complementary larger-scale infrastructure projects.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris

                            TIMELINE IN AFGHANISTAN

        15. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, in August 2009, General
    McChrystal stated that if additional resources are not provided, we
    ``risk an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer
    possible'' and that we risk ``mission failure.'' What are the current
    risks to mission success as these additional troops flow into theater
    over the timeline you presented?
        Secretary Gates. The President's decision rapidly resources our
    strategy, recognizing that the next 18 months will likely be decisive
    and ultimately enable success. We have greater clarity on the way
    forward and additional forces will begin to deploy shortly. By this
    time next year, our intent is to demonstrate that the insurgency has
    lost the momentum. By the summer of 2011, we intend to make it clear to
    the Afghan people that the insurgency will not win, allowing them to
    side with their government. Increasing our capability and strategy will
    involve much more than just force increases, but the additional forces
    are significant.
        The commitment of all coalition nations will be buttressed by a
    clear understanding of how we will mitigate risks. I'll briefly mention
    three. The first is the Afghan Government's credibility deficit, which
    must be recognized by all, including Afghan officials, as a critical
    area of focus and change. Equally important is our ability to
    accelerate development of the Afghan security forces. Third, the hazard
    posed by extremists that operate and easily pass through both sides of
    the border with Pakistan must be mitigated by enhanced cross-border
    coordination and enhanced Pakistani engagement.
        Looking ahead, we are confident we have both the right strategy and
    the right resources to mitigate these risks.

        16. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, how will this increase affect
    the ongoing drawdown of troops in Iraq?
        Secretary Gates. The responsible drawdown of troops in Iraq
    continues forward as planned. While the responsible drawdown in Iraq
    will be executed concurrently with the increase in forces in
    Afghanistan, the Iraq drawdown is not dependent upon the Afghanistan
    increase and the Afghanistan increase is not dependent on the Iraq
    drawdown. The transportation feasibility analysis at this time also
    indicates no significant impact to Iraq drawdown as we increase forces
    in Afghanistan.
        The U.S. policy on Iraq has not changed; we are committed to
    fulfilling our responsibility as outlined in the security agreement
    between the United States and Iraq. Our drawdown following the national
    elections will be based on the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
    Commander's assessment that security conditions remain stable and will
    follow our strategy to transform the force into an advisory and
    assistance role. As our requirements in Iraq continue to decrease,
    units that redeploy from or are no longer required to deploy to Iraq
    will return to the pool of forces available to deploy in support of our
    mission in Afghanistan or other global requirements.
        We will continue to analyze and monitor this issue closely and if
    conditions change to impose emerging impacts on the Iraq drawdown as a
    consequence of the Afghanistan troop increase, then we will certainly
    keep you informed.

        17. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, is there sufficient air and
    sealift assets to meet timelines in Afghanistan and Iraq?
        Secretary Gates. We have a large number of professionals who are
    balancing the demands of both operations. Their greatest challenge is
    overcoming the differences that exist between Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Iraq's infrastructure is more accommodating. Afghanistan does not have
    a neighbor like Kuwait that provides a major logistics hub.
    Additionally, Afghanistan does not have the number of runways, rail
    hubs, or road networks like those that exist in Iraq. I remain
    confident that our professionals will continue to adapt and execute the
    mission we have assigned them.

        18. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, the President stated that a
    responsible withdrawal of troops will begin in summer 2011. Are there
    any caveats to this timeline?
        Secretary Gates. The President did not pick the summer 2011 date
    arbitrarily. During the strategy review, we looked closely at the
    current and projected capacity of the ANSF in some parts of the
    country. Based on that analysis, we reached the conclusion that July
    2011 is a realistic date for us to plan to begin transferring
    responsibility for security to the ANSF in some parts of the country.
    At the same time, we will assess conditions as we move forward. Based
    on those assessments, the President will determine the scope and pace
    of a gradual and responsible draw down of U.S. combat forces.
        This is an issue of balance. We need to show both our partners and
    our adversaries in the region that we mean business: we will deploy the
    forces and the civilian resources that we believe are necessary to
    accomplish our strategic goals, and retain the tactical flexibility to
    adapt if circumstances require. At the same time, we have to send a
    clear message to the Afghan Government that the U.S. military is not
    going to be there forever. We are not an occupation force. Afghans must
    take primary responsibility for defending their own country and prepare
    to do so with a sense of purpose and urgency.

                  PROJECTED NUMBERS OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

        19. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, as we work to increase the
    capability of the ANSF, please clarify the security force goals. Are we
    aiming to meet the projected numbers established by March 2009 goals of
    134,000 ANA and 82,000 ANP, or levels recommended by General McChrystal
    of 240,000 ANA and 160,000 ANP?
        Secretary Gates. We plan to grow the ANSF to 134,000 ANA and 96,800
    ANP forces by October 2010. As of early December of last year, ANP
    strength was already approaching 95,000, and we expect to reach the ANP
    target well ahead of October 2010. Looking beyond October 2010, we will
    continue to set annual goals to grow the ANA and ANP based on an
    ongoing evaluation of our capabilities and the requirement to develop
    additional ANSF.

        20. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, when will we reach our goal
    numbers for the ANA and ANP?
        Secretary Gates. We are on track to meet our current goal of
    134,000 ANA forces by October 2010. We expect to reach our goal of
    96,800 ANP forces early in 2010, well ahead of schedule. We will
    continue to reevaluate our needs and capabilities in regards to growing
    the ANSF.

                           COSTS OF EACH NEW SOLDIER

        21. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, the Office of Management and
    Budget (OMB) estimated that each additional soldier deployed to
    Afghanistan will cost $1 million. Is this estimate accurate?
        Secretary Gates. That estimate is roughly accurate if all costs, to
    include new and expanded base camps and additional equipment, are
    included.

        22. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, does this OMB cost estimate
    include any contractor support?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, the OMB estimate includes all costs and,
    therefore, incorporates functions performed by contractors.

                       REINTEGRATION OF FORMER INSURGENTS

        23. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, how effective has the effort
    been to reintegrate former Taliban, the Northern Alliance, and
    Mujahedeen fighters so that they are no longer fighting for the
    insurgency?
        Secretary Gates. The insurgency in Afghanistan is composed of a
    complex network of alliance and allegiances among various groups.
    Reintegration efforts will help break down these connections,
    separating hard-core Taliban from those fighting for non-ideological
    reasons. Any reintegration effort will also need to ensure that those
    groups aligned against the insurgency (e.g., the Northern Alliance) and
    those ``on the fence'' (e.g., many former mujahideen who fought against
    the Soviets) do not feel that reintegration programs provide perverse
    incentives for members of the Taliban and other insurgent groups.
        To implement the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
    (DDR) process, the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) was
    established in March 2003. The United Nations Development Programme
    (UNDP) implemented the ANPB on behalf of the Afghan Government, the
    United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and Japan as the lead
    country on DDR issues. The ANBP disarmament and demobilization process
    lasted from October 2003 to November 2005. The Disbandment of Illegally
    Armed Groups project, established in 2005, was designed to follow the
    DDR program. This program focused on reintegrating Northern Alliance
    and associated groups following the fall of the Taliban. It still
    exists today and discussions are underway on how to coordinate this
    effort with programs to reintegrate former Taliban.
        Previous reintegration efforts in Afghanistan did not achieve
    significant results. Reintegration of those insurgents and their
    leaders who want to renounce violence and join mainstream Afghan
    society is an important effort, which must be led by the Government of
    the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and be community-focused.
    Our civil-military team is actively working alongside GIRoA to develop
    their reintegration program. Part of the reintegration program includes
    utilizing local leaders to vouch for the reliability of those who are
    willing to leave the insurgency.
        To assist the GIRoA in assimilating these insurgents, USFOR-A is
    working with ISAF to develop support to a GIRoA reintegration program
    in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2010. Job training, education, and relocation assistance stand out
    as potential opportunities for support.
        Finally, security is also essential. To attract insurgents to an
    Afghan-led reintegration program, ISAF will partner with ANSF and
    community leaders to provide sufficient security and prevent
    retribution.

                          POLICY GOALS IN AFGHANISTAN

        24. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, what overall U.S. policy
    goals are being pursued in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Clinton. As President Obama reaffirmed in his December 1
    remarks at West Point, our core goal in Afghanistan remains: to
    disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their
    return to Afghanistan. To do so, we and our allies will surge our
    forces, targeting elements of the insurgency and securing key
    population centers, training Afghan forces, and transferring
    responsibility to a capable Afghan partner.
        Our governance efforts will help develop more responsive, visible,
    and accountable institutions in Kabul and at the provincial, district,
    and local level, where everyday Afghans encounter their government. We
    will increase the number of civilian technical advisers in key central
    government ministries, as well as in provincial capitals and district
    centers, to partner with Afghans in this capacity building effort. We
    will support the Afghan Government's reinvigorated plans to fight
    corruption, with concrete measures of progress toward greater
    accountability.
        We believe job creation is critical to undermine extremists' appeal
    in the short-term and for sustainable economic growth in the long-term.
    Our top reconstruction priority is implementing a civilian-military
    agriculture redevelopment strategy to restore Afghanistan's once
    vibrant agriculture sector. This will help sap the insurgency of
    fighters and of income from poppy cultivation. Creating links to cross-
    border trade with Pakistan will support sustainable long-term economic
    growth and job creation. Simultaneously, we will sustain our successful
    efforts to build the Afghan Government's capacity to provide improved
    health services and educational opportunities to the Afghan people.
    Improving educational opportunities for all Afghans, regardless of
    gender, is a top priority for the Afghan people. It is also a necessary
    step for diminishing the influence of extremists, improving the pool of
    qualified individuals who can serve in Afghanistan's security forces,
    and improving Afghanistan's long-term economic potential.
        This region is the heart of the global violent extremism pursued by
    al Qaeda, and the region from which we were attacked on September 11.
    New attacks are being planned there now, a fact borne out by a recent
    plot, uncovered and disrupted by American authorities. We will prevent
    the Taliban from turning Afghanistan back into a safe haven from which
    international terrorists can strike at us or our allies. This would
    pose a direct threat to the American Homeland, and that is a threat
    that we cannot tolerate.

        25. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, what policy goals and
    benchmarks are tied to the withdrawal of forces in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

            STRATEGY TO REDUCE CORRUPTION AND THE FLOW OF NARCOTICS

        26. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, I assume that we have as
    part of our new strategy a plan to better address governance and
    corruption. In his inauguration, President Hamid Karzai stated that he
    was going to fight corruption. What tangible steps has he outlined?
        Secretary Clinton. Yes. We are developing robust plans for
    addressing governance and corruption and are working more directly with
    the Afghan Government on these critical issues. The Afghan Government's
    most significant progress to date is the creation of the Major-Crimes
    Task Force (MCTF), a multi-ministry initiative responsible for
    investigating corruption, kidnapping, and organized crime cases and
    preparing them for prosecution and an anti-corruption prosecution unit
    within the Attorney General's Office. The Afghan Government also has
    agreed to establish an Anti-Corruption Tribunal of specially vetted
    judges to oversee high-profile cases. The MCTF receives financial and
    technical support from DOD and the Department of State's (DOS) Bureau
    for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, while Department of
    Justice provides technical support.
        To improve transparency and accountability, the Afghan Government
    has been active in implementing hiring reforms and a vetting process
    for Afghan Government employees through the Civil Service Commission,
    and in improving the capacity of the High Office of Oversight (HOO) so
    that these entities can better serve as oversight mechanisms for
    corruption efforts nationwide. Embassy Kabul, the International
    Community, and the Afghan Government are in extended discussions about
    the future of the HOO and how to make the body as effective as
    possible. At a recent press conference, the HOO publicly named the
    Afghan ministers who had not yet filed asset declaration forms and it
    is actively working to secure 100 percent compliance.
        In December, the Government of Afghanistan hosted a high-level
    conference in Kabul to address corruption where President Karzai and
    others spoke frankly and openly about the challenges that corruption
    creates for Afghanistan. Karzai's recent cabinet appointments also
    suggest that he is taking corruption seriously and seeking to limit
    corruption at higher levels of government.
        Unfortunately, this progress has yet to be complemented with
    tangible actions against any of the high-level government officials
    accused of corruption. We will watch the Afghan Government very closely
    over the next few months and expect to see some substantive changes in
    the near future.

        27. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, what is President Karzai
    doing to increase transparency in the appointment of provincial and
    ministerial posts?
        Secretary Clinton. We remain concerned about the appointment
    process for ministerial and provincial posts in the Afghan Government.
    While the Government of Afghanistan has made steps in the right
    direction, significant challenges remain.
        The Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service Commission
    and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance are jointly
    responsible for the appointment of high-level Afghan Government
    officials, including provincial governors. With the assistance of the
    international community, these institutions have established a set of
    mechanisms to adequately identify, recruit, vet, and hire high-level
    government officials. Unfortunately, the Government of Afghanistan is
    not adequately utilizing these resources, particularly for politically
    influential positions and important governorships. In many cases,
    President Karzai continues to rely on political patronage networks in
    choosing leaders for key positions.

        28. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, overall development of the
    Afghan economy appears to be at a standstill. The issue of poppy
    eradication continues to be a roadblock for agriculture development.
    What is being done to provide security for farmers who do not grow
    poppy, so that the Taliban do not intimidate the farmers? Is a
    comprehensive development strategy being developed?
        Secretary Clinton. I would not say that economic development in
    Afghanistan is at a standstill. There have been some important
    successes in this last year--including a deal with India involving
    exports from Wardak province in Afghanistan--that are encouraging.
        Large-scale eradication targeted at individual farmers as part of
    our counternarcotics approach over the last few years proved
    problematic because it gave the Taliban a way to step in as protectors
    of farmers, driving a wedge between farmers and their government and
    us. In recognition of this, we revised our counternarcotics strategy
    during the summer so that we are putting greater focus now on
    interdiction of the nexus between narco-traffickers and the insurgents,
    and on the connection between the poppy trade and corruption; and on
    helping farmers to grow legal crops that will be profitable and able to
    supplant opium poppy in the long term. We are thus taking the
    counternarcotics fight to the people who are ultimately hurting farmers
    and undermining the Afghan Government and rule of law, and at the same
    time helping link farmers to their government through Afghan Government
    programs that supply farmers with agricultural inputs and help to
    develop agricultural value chains. Our revised counternarcotics
    strategy is integrated with our Agricultural Strategy, and in this way
    helps to create jobs and restore Afghanistan's once vibrant
    agricultural sector. Our counternarcotics strategy is thus part of a
    comprehensive, whole-of-government approach aimed at helping the Afghan
    Government wage a counterinsurgency and develop the country at the same
    time.
        General McChrystal's counterinsurgency approach centers on
    protecting the population, and this includes farmers. We will expect
    the Afghan national security forces to be involved in this as well,
    further forging a positive connection between the people and their
    government.

                  DIPLOMATIC TEAM DYNAMICS AND ALLIED SUPPORT

        29. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, an effective and continuous
    diplomatic effort is key to progress for the Afghan Government, and an
    effective ambassadorial team is critical to facilitating that progress.
    What is the working relationship between Ambassador Eikenberry,
    Ambassador Holbrooke, and Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        30. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, I understand that many of
    the troop-contributing nations for Afghanistan have placed very
    specific caveats on what missions and what type of support that they
    will provide. What, if any, are the caveats, and do these caveats pose
    an obstacle to meeting our stated objectives?
        Secretary Clinton. I appreciate the continued commitment of our
    NATO allies and other partners to the international mission in
    Afghanistan. Forty-three NATO and non-NATO countries provide over
    40,000 troops with thousands more arriving in 2010 to reinforce the
    ISAF. Over 600 allied and partner military personnel have been killed
    serving in Afghanistan. U.S. allies and partners recognize that
    securing Afghanistan against the threat posed by extremists and
    terrorists and providing a better future for the Afghan people is in
    our common interest.
        Caveats that limit the geographic and operational flexibility of
    ISAF forces remain a challenge in Afghanistan. Despite this challenge,
    the trend over the last year has been positive with several nations
    dropping specific caveats and a majority of ISAF troop contingents are
    now caveat free. We continue to impress upon our allies and partners
    the importance of providing the commanders on the ground the maximum
    possible flexibility in the employment of ISAF forces.
        I defer to DOD for a detailed discussion of how caveats impact the
    operations of U.S. forces.

                         TIMELINE AND RESULTING CHANGES

        31. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how long do you expect it to
    take to build up capability to affect an increased level of security?
        Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]

        32. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, will there be an increase in
    contractor support based on this troop increase?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes. Contractors are a critical enabler in
    Afghanistan and will continue to provide a wide range of tasks
    essential for operations including maintenance, construction,
    transportation, security, and base support. The contractor footprint in
    Afghanistan increased substantially during the fourth quarter and now
    stands at 104,000. CENTCOM estimates the number of contractors will
    grow to 148,000 to 186,000 in support of the increase in forces.
    Approximately 75 percent of these will be Afghani nationals, providing
    a boost to the economy and promoting stability.

        33. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, what additional costs will be
    necessary for contractor support of these additional troops in
    Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. OSD Comptroller is working with the military
    departments and CENTCOM to determine the additional operational costs
    needed for the additional troops. The Secretary of Defense has stated
    that the total cost will be between $30 billion to $35 billion per
    year. The additional costs required for contractor support will be a
    subset of the operations and maintenance request. Contractors are a
    critical enabler in Afghanistan and will continue to provide a wide
    range of tasks essential for operations including maintenance,
    construction, transportation, security, and base support. The costs
    associated with contracted support are impossible to determine in
    advance of requirement development, however, these costs will not be
    over and above any funds requested by the Department in support of the
    troop increase.

        34. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how is the normal force
    rotation and dwell time affected by the troop increase?
        Admiral Mullen. The 30,000 troop increase will have no significant
    effect on normal force rotation or dwell for the Services.
        The Army will be able to source the requested capabilities on the
    anticipated timelines without breaking 1:1 unit dwell.
        While current Marine Corps deployment-to-dwell policy of 1:3 is not
    being met, the Active component goal of 1:2 is being met across many
    core units. The challenges associated with meeting these goals remain
    acceptable to the Marine Corps.
        The Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard reported that the troop
    increase will have no significant overarching effect on force rotation
    and dwell time.

                             TROOP NUMBERS AND USE

        35. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, when all of the troops are in
    place, how many of them will be solely dedicated to training the ANSF?
        Admiral Mullen. Currently, in NATO Training Mission Afghanistan
    (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),
    there are approximately 830 U.S. forces whose sole task is to train
    ANSF forces in institutions, schools, and other formalized programs of
    instruction. These forces train ANSF trainers, coordinate resources
    exclusively in support of training, and advise and coach the ANSF on
    management of institutional training.
        4/82 IBCT and 48th IBCT, consisting of approximately 6,000
    soldiers, provide Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and Police Mentor
    Teams (PMTs) to fielded ANA units from battalion to corps level and to
    ANP units from district to police region level.
        When all of our forces are in place, these troops will be augmented
    by a infantry battalion from the 10th Mountain Division, which is
    approximately 600 soldiers.
        However, our relationship with the ANSF extends far beyond these
    institutional training programs. A key tenet of General McChrystal's
    strategy is partnering with the Afghan security forces in order to help
    them build capacity so that they can assume responsibility for their
    nation's security as quickly and as successfully as possible. These
    partnered forces provide daily operational, doctrinal, and logistical
    advice, mentoring, and coaching.
        All U.S. combat brigades deployed to Afghanistan will be partnered
    with Afghan forces across all echelons of command. Therefore, as
    additional U.S. forces deploy to Afghanistan and we accelerate the
    growth of ANSF units, the number of U.S. forces partnered with Afghan
    units will also rise.

        36. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how many U.S. forces are
    currently training ANSF?
        Admiral Mullen. Currently, in NTM-A/CSTC-A, there are approximately
    830 U.S. forces whose sole task is to train ANSF forces in
    institutions, schools, and other formalized programs of instruction.
    These forces train ANSF trainers, coordinate resources exclusively in
    support of training, and advise and coach the ANSF on management of
    institutional training.
        4/82 IBCT and 48th IBCT, consisting of approximately 6,000
    soldiers, provide ETTs and PMTs to fielded ANA units from battalion to
    corps level and to ANP units from district to police region level.
        However, our relationship with the ANSF extends far beyond these
    institutional training programs. A key tenet of General McChrystal's
    strategy is partnering with the Afghan security forces in order to help
    them build capacity so that they can assume responsibility for their
    nation's security as quickly and as successfully as possible. These
    partnered forces provide daily operational, doctrinal, and logistical
    advice, mentoring, and coaching.
        All U.S. combat brigades deployed to Afghanistan will be partnered
    with Afghan forces across all echelons of command. Therefore, as
    additional U.S. forces deploy to Afghanistan and we accelerate the
    growth of ANSF units, the number of U.S. forces partnered with Afghan
    units will also rise.

        37. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how many ISAFs are currently
    conducting the mission in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. As of 9 December, coalition forces in Afghanistan
    total 109,370. The United States contribution of that is 67,640.

        38. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, for those U.S. troops whose
    responsibility is to train the Afghan forces, what portion will be
    embedded with the Afghan forces?
        Admiral Mullen. A key tenet of General McChrystal's strategy is
    partnering with the Afghan security forces in order to help them build
    capacity and assume lead security responsibility as quickly and as
    successfully as possible. Today, 26 out of 40 U.S. battalions, or about
    14,000 troops, are partnered with ANSF in this capacity and provide
    daily training to ANSF units. As additional U.S. forces deploy to
    Afghanistan and we accelerate the growth of ANSF units, the number of
    U.S. forces partnered with Afghan units will also rise.

                             TRAINING AFGHAN FORCES

        39. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how long does it take for U.S.
    troops to train Afghan forces?
        Admiral Mullen. There are three main efforts in training the ANSF.
    The first is institutional, where soldiers and police receive basic
    training through schools and other formalized programs. Basic training
    for the infantry soldier, who make up the majority of the ANA is 8
    weeks long. Those soldiers who will become part of a newly formed
    battalion receive an additional 5 weeks of unit collective training at
    the Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC). Soldiers selected to be NCOs
    during basic training receive another 3 weeks of training. Those
    soldiers who serve in specialty billets can receive 6 to 8 more weeks
    of specialty training after basic training. ANA officers receive
    between 20 weeks to 4 years of training depending on the program.
    Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) receive 8 weeks of basic training either as
    new recruits or with their district as part of Focused District
    Development (FDD) or Directed District Development (D3). Afghan Border
    Police (ABP) also attend 8 weeks of basic training, either as new
    recruits, or as serving police as part of Focused Border Development
    (FBD). Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) receive 16 weeks of
    training, consisting of 8 weeks of basic training and 8 weeks of
    specialized training. ANP officers receive between 6 months and 3 years
    of training, depending on the program.
        However, the process of training the ANSF is a long-term commitment
    by U.S. forces that extends well beyond basic training programs. The
    second training effort for U.S. forces are ETTs and PMTs, which are
    provided to fielded ANA units from the battalion to corps level and to
    ANP units from the district to police region level. There are currently
    two U.S. BCTs providing ETTs and PMTs: the 48th IBCT and 4/82 IBCT.
        The third training effort is U.S. partnership with ANSF units. This
    partnering is a key tenet of General McChrystal's strategy, and is
    designed to help ANSF build capacity and assume lead security
    responsibility as quickly and as successfully as possible. Once units
    graduate from their respective institutional training programs, they
    continue to receive advice, mentoring, and coaching through their
    partnership with U.S. and coalition forces. For instance, upon
    graduation, every ANA Kandak and higher level headquarters is partnered
    with a coalition unit and receives daily doctrinal, operational,
    administrative, and logistical training. Furthermore, when these ANA
    units are employed operationally, they routinely fight alongside a
    coalition operational unit.
        As a result of force expansion, all ANA and ANP in critical
    districts will be partnered with IJC forces.

        40. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, when will there be sufficient
    and fully trained Afghan forces prepared to protect their own country?
        Admiral Mullen. As the President articulated in his December 1
    address, U.S. forces will begin transitioning responsibility to the
    ANSF in July 2011. This transition will occur province by province, and
    will be executed responsibly, taking into account conditions on the
    ground. While the conditions necessary to transition responsibility
    will be present in some provinces in the summer of 2011, others will
    likely require further U.S. training and assistance before this process
    can begin.
        In part, decisions about the location and pace of U.S. transition
    and eventual withdrawal will be made based on the capability of the
    local ANSF. A key tenet of our strategy is to accelerate the growth and
    build the capacity of the ANSF so that they can assume responsibility
    for their nation's security as quickly as possible. Decisions about the
    targeted growth of the ANSF will be made on a year-by-year basis, based
    on current security conditions and past progress.
        As President Karzai articulated in his November inaugural address,
    the Afghan Government's goal is to assume security responsibility for
    the entire country within the next 5 years. We will work with our
    Afghan partners to support this goal.

        41. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, given the current proficiency
    of the ANP Force, will Afghan police officers who were trained locally
    in provinces outside of the new academy in Kabul be retrained with
    revised law enforcement standards?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes. AUP recruited and trained locally will
    complete the ``Basic 8'' 8-week training program. This program uses a
    curriculum reviewed by the DOS International Law Enforcement and
    Narcotics Division and approved by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior
    (MoI).
        AUP patrolmen are being trained at a Regional Training Center
    either individually or a part of their district through the Focused
    District Development program or in their home district through the
    Directed District Development (D3) program. MoI and NTM-A/CSTC-A are
    coordinating to maximize the rate of untrained police completing this
    reform training.

        42. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, which American contracting
    company is supporting the training of the ANP?
        Admiral Mullen. Currently, support for the training of ANP is
    provided under a DOS contract with Dyncorp International, LLC. However,
    we intend to transition the training effort to a DOD-managed contract
    to improve oversight and maximize efficiencies. The new acquisition
    strategy will leverage an existing Counter-Narcoterrorism and
    Technology Program Office (CNTPO) multiple award Indefinite Delivery/
    Indefinite Quantity contract with the following companies: Lockheed
    Martin Integrated Systems; Northrup Grumman Information Technology;
    Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, LLC; Raytheon Technical Services;
    and ARINC Engineering Services, LLC. The contract with Dyncorp has been
    extended until 31 March 2010 to allow time for the transition and to
    minimize disruption and risk to performance of this critical mission.

        43. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how long have they been
    assigned this task, and how long will they stay should their contract
    be renewed?
        Admiral Mullen. The current DOS contractor (Dyncorp) has been in
    place since 2003. This contract has been extended until 31 March 2010
    to allow time for transition to a DOD-managed contract.

                             RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

        44. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, I have not heard much about the
    successes in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. What is the
    overall plan and who leads the effort?
        Admiral Mullen. DOS and USAID are the leads for U.S. government
    reconstruction efforts, as part of a broader international effort in
    Afghanistan. DOD does provide reconstruction assistance through the
    CERP funds and some DOD organizations (like the U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers) provide assistance upon request on a reimbursable basis to
    USAID/DOS.
        Under the CERP, the field commanders are using these funds to
    address a number of areas that help our counterinsurgency efforts in
    supporting the Afghan people and, as needed, do small-scale
    infrastructure projects that help improve people's lives and provide
    humanitarian assistance. Of the $1.2 billion appropriated for CERP in
    fiscal year 2009 for use by both Iraq and Afghanistan, about $550.7
    million is being spent to support over 2,215 projects. DOD support to
    Afghan reconstruction efforts is most visible through the 12 U.S.-led
    Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that operate at the provincial
    level. The DOD components of PRTs utilize CERP funds to support
    reconstruction priorities at the provincial/district levels based on
    Afghan-led prioritized plans. These Provincial Development Plans (PDPs)
    were developed by Afghans at the district/provincial level and were
    approved by the National Government of Afghanistan in alignment with
    the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The PRTs (and maneuver
    forces) and other donors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) work
    with the provincial development committees to align CERP and other
    donor funds to prioritized requirements in the PDPs. As a result, CERP
    funds and other donor funds are used to build, for example, schools,
    roads, power systems, irrigation, medical clinics, and government
    buildings.
        On August 10, 2009, General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry
    established an overarching civilian-military plan titled: ``U.S.
    Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan For Support to
    Afghanistan''. This civilian-military plan is working to integrate all
    U.S. Government capabilities and resources in Afghanistan, and provides
    U.S. Government priorities and objectives for the 11 transformative
    effects areas broken out by regional commands for fiscal year 2010
    through fiscal year 2012.
        In summary, the DOS leads U.S. Government development efforts in
    Afghanistan, and like other donors, is guided by the ANDS. DOD supports
    these efforts and employs CERP for projects that enhance
    counterinsurgency operations, i.e., those that focus on the security of
    the Afghan population.

        45. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, are relief and other
    reconstruction efforts aided or hampered by the presence of the PRT?
    Does this vary by region?
        Admiral Mullen. PRTs provide critical capabilities in that they
    generate immediate local relief efforts and support more expansive
    reconstruction efforts. Both effects are essential to execution of the
    President's strategy for Afghansitan and Pakistan. PRTs provide
    immediate local relief, using discretionary funds to accomplish short-
    term employment, self-help, and minor construction efforts that assist
    field commanders in the hold and early build phases of
    counterinsurgency operations. When synchronized properly, PRT efforts
    are complimentary with and greatly enhance reconstruction work executed
    by the GIRoA, the U.N., other U.S. Government agencies, and numerous
    NGOs--development efforts that anchor the build phase of
    counterinsurgency operations. The effectiveness of reconstruction
    efforts in general, and the effectiveness of PRTs in support of
    reconstruction in particular, depends upon several factors unique to
    different regions of the country, including the security environment
    (permissive, semi-permissive, or non-permissive), human terrain
    factors, and governance capability, among others. I am unaware of any
    down-side to PRTs. One recent study highlights the manner in which PRTs
    made a positive impact on relief and reconstruction, reducing violence,
    increasing local political participation, and facilitating a linkage
    between tribes and the government.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Malkasian, Carter & Meyerle, Gerald. March 2009. ``Provincial
    Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work?'' Strategic Studies
    Institute. P. VIII.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Paul G. Kirk

                        PRESIDENT KARZAI AND CORRUPTION

        46. Senator Kirk. Secretary Clinton, you recently returned from
    Afghanistan. Having attended the inauguration of President Karzai after
    an election most are calling fraudulent and having sat face-to-face
    with him, I would like to hear your thoughts on President Karzai and
    whether demonstrable progress on his part is a realistic goal. Should
    not demonstrable progress be a pre-condition to further commitment of
    our troops?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        47. Senator Kirk. Secretary Clinton, news reports indicate that you
    warned President Karzai to reduce corruption or lose foreign
    assistance. How accurate is that statement?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        48. Senator Kirk. Secretary Clinton, how do we measure progress by
    the Karzai Government, and what is our timetable for his progress?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        49. Senator Kirk. Secretary Clinton, what will you or the President
    do if President Karzai cannot or will not meet our requirements for
    progress?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        50. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates, you recently indicated that a
    way to hold the Afghan Government accountable would be to withhold
    funds for projects ``where we can control the flow of dollars.'' Can
    you elaborate on that statement? What projects are you referring to?
        Secretary Gates. The international presence in Afghanistan has
    significantly increased the influx of assistance dollars and, as a
    result, the number of contracts. Corruption--which may be associated
    with contracts awarded, work that we are having done, and development
    projects with others (including the Afghans)--is a major concern.
    Corruption can occur at any level. The very presence of large amounts
    of assistance in a society where rule of law is virtually absent and
    the institutions of government are weak opens up opportunities for
    corruption.
        While the United States works vigilantly to ensure the contracts we
    enter into and the contractors we work with are not engaging in
    corruption, this is primarily an Afghan issue--effective anti-
    corruption measures require laws, regulations, and an effective
    enforcement infrastructure, none of which Afghanistan yet has. We
    welcome President Karzai's recent commitments to a more active effort
    to combat corruption.
        As the Secretary of State noted in her testimony, USAID is working
    on a process to certify Afghan ministries to receive direct funding
    from the U.S. Government, based on their financial and human resources
    management capabilities and transparency. I refer you to USAID for
    further details regarding this process.
        DOD and DOS are also reviewing our contracting processes to find
    ways to improve our ability to respond directly to the needs of the
    Afghan people, and to reduce avenues for potential corruption. These
    efforts include awarding smaller contracts, increasing local
    procurement, and deploying additional contracting officers to the field
    to oversee contracts and partner with Afghans.

                           COSTS OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS

        51. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates, as Secretary of Defense, how do
    you plan to pay for a continuing war in Afghanistan with 30,000 more
    U.S. troops? Do you anticipate a supplemental spending bill? Will there
    be bridge funding?
        Secretary Gates. I will work with the OMB on how best to address
    the funding. I anticipate requesting a supplemental appropriation for
    fiscal year 2010. Our fiscal year 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations
    budget request will cover all approved operations.

        52. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates, with this many more troops going
    in, what will the budget for fiscal year 2011 look like?
        Secretary Gates. We are in the final stages of developing the
    fiscal year 2011 budget request. Once the President approves the
    request, I will be able to discuss the details.

        53. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates, how much more do we plan to
    spend in Afghanistan going forward until the Afghan Government is ready
    to assume responsibility for its security and development?
        Secretary Gates. The amount we plan to spend will depend on how
    much longer we need to be in Afghanistan, the number of forces required
    to accomplish the mission, and how much training and equipment the ANSF
    requires to assume the lead for security responsibility. All
    considerations are subject to conditions on the ground and how quickly
    we progress towards our goals.
        There are numerous considerations to take into account when trying
    to estimate how much we plan to spend in Afghanistan before the Afghan
    Government is ready to assume responsibility for security and
    development. While I cannot address development costs, military cost
    considerations for sustaining Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the
    U.S. commitment to the ISAF, and contributing to the NATO Training
    Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) include:

          Troop subsistence; special pay; supplies; fuel;
    ammunition; and transportation for troops, vehicles, tanks, helicopters
    and other equipment.
          Repair or replacement of equipment that has been
    destroyed, damaged, or worn out during operations.
          Funds for training and equipping Afghan military and
    police units, as well as funds to help the Government of Pakistan build
    a counterinsurgency capability that will support U.S. military efforts
    in Afghanistan.

                           LOCAL AND REGIONAL EFFORTS

        54. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, as part of
    the national security team, I believe you were asked earlier this year
    by the President to identify and evaluate regional and local Afghan
    leaders who might support a political solution. New efforts are now
    reported in Afghanistan's eastern region to get the Taliban to sit down
    and talk. What do you see as the prospects for these regional and local
    efforts?
        Secretary Gates. Reintegration of those insurgents and their
    leaders who want to renounce violence and join mainstream Afghan
    society is an important effort, which must be led by the GIRoA and be
    community-focused. Our civil-military team is actively working
    alongside GIRoA to develop their reintegration program. Part of the
    reintegration program includes utilizing local leaders to vouch for the
    reliability of those who are willing to leave the insurgency.
        To assist the GIRoA in assimilating these insurgents, USFOR-A is
    working with the ISAF to develop support to a GIRoA reintegration
    program in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2010. Job training, education, and relocation assistance
    stand out as potential opportunities for support.
        Finally, security is also essential. To attract insurgents to an
    Afghan-led reintegration program, ISAF will partner with ANSF and
    community leaders to provide sufficient security and prevent
    retribution.
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        55. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, what more
    can we and our NATO allies do to strengthen these prospects going
    forward?
        Secretary Gates. Afghanistan's international partners have
    demonstrated their strong commitment to our common goal in Afghanistan.
    As the U.S. Government has increased its troop levels, so have our
    partners in the ISAF. As a result of recent NATO and non-NATO pledges
    to commit approximately 7,000 forces, international assistance will
    reach 50,000 forces. Furthermore, several allies and partners, led by
    Japan, have made major financial contributions to programs to help the
    Afghan military and economy.
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

                     ROLE OF NEW TROOPS AND ALLIED SUPPORT

        56. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, you have described our mission in
    Afghanistan as ``hand in glove.'' What do you mean by that?
        Admiral Mullen. Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan requires
    more than military might. Our strategy includes civil and military
    efforts that work together to achieve success in the region. The
    duration of our military presence is not open-ended--nor does it need
    to be. However, our civilian commitment must continue, even as our
    troops begin eventually to come home. Our counterinsurgency approach
    focuses on measurable security progress and protecting the Afghan
    population. Supporting the establishment of responsible security
    elements and government at the sub-national level is an important
    example of integrating civil and military efforts. For example, our
    support for Afghan reintegration policies and anti-corruption efforts
    demonstrate the importance of coordinated civil-military action that
    will greatly contribute to our progress. Similarly, through the U.S.
    Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan For Support to
    Afghanistan, military components work closely with international and
    Afghan governments and NGOs to ensure military plans and operations
    account for the contributions of civilian agencies. Civilian expertise
    is needed from the very beginning to shape governance conditions and
    help build Afghan capacity.

        57. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, you seem to envision our troops
    in Afghanistan playing some role in development. What is that role
    specifically?
        Admiral Mullen. DOS and USAID are the lead for development for the
    U.S. Government. By working with U.S. Government civilians, our forces
    play a significant supporting role in helping the Government of
    Afghanistan provide public services within key areas of Afghanistan.
        Traditionally, U.S. and combined operations secure the populace,
    providing access for government development specialists. Having secured
    the area, commanders work with other U.S. Government agencies, the
    GIRoA, and international NGOs to identify and coordinate projects that
    will provide both immediate benefit and lasting effects.
        In a more recent development, U.S. forces have been able to
    contribute to stability through the National Guard's Agri-business
    Development Teams (ADTs). These teams, comprised of Army National Guard
    members and USDA and USAID civilians, provide technical assistance to
    Afghan farmers in Afghanistan. In addition to aiding farmers, ADTs
    advise Afghan officials assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture,
    Irrigation, and Livestock on how to best assist the population--a
    short-term investment in building the long-term confidence Afghans must
    have in their government. ADT efforts are coordinated with U.S.
    development and security programs. Recently, the U.S. Embassy hosted an
    agricultural aid conference to share information and organize efforts.

        58. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, what do you see as the difference
    in mission for the 68,000 already deployed and the 30,000 more that
    will be deploying? Will these new troops have a greater focus on
    development?
        Admiral Mullen. The additional 30,000 U.S. forces will include
    three maneuver brigade combat teams to perform comprehensive
    operations, a training brigade, and required associated enablers. The
    additional forces that will arrive in 2010 will expand upon the gains
    made by the existing and additional forces added in 2009, and
    collectively will allow us to more effectively execute our new
    strategy. Their presence will accelerate the growth and development of
    ANSF through direct training by ISAF training forces and comprehensive
    partnering with both existing and additional counterinsurgent maneuver
    brigades. In addition, these forces will serve as a bridging force to
    provide the space and time to support improvements to governance, the
    capacity of the Afghan Government, and to grow the ANSF.
        I fully support the expansion of civilian efforts in Afghanistan as
    part of an all-of-government approach. Enabling economic development
    will offer the Afghan people the ability to sustain security gains and
    is among the key efforts of our fully-integrated civil-military plan.
    Additional forces, together with the existing 68,000 U.S. forces and
    our allies and partners, will work hand-in-hand with civilian partners
    to achieve the President's objectives and our long-term core goal.

        59. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, where do NATO troops fit into
    this mission as we send additional troops to Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. NATO troops continue to play an integral role in
    our strategy in Afghanistan and their additional troop offerings
    provide increased flexibility and coverage across a range of missions.
    They are lead nation for Regional Command (RC)-North (Germany), RC-West
    (Italy), RC-South (UK), and RC-Capital (Turkey). Additionally, they
    provide Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) that mentor, train,
    and now partner with the ANA and Police Operational Mentor Liaison
    Teams (POMLTs) that mentor, train, and partner with the ANP.

        60. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, what commitment do we have from
    NATO today, December 2, 2009, to also send more troops and resources to
    the region? Will we have help militarily, financially, or both?
        Admiral Mullen. As of December 2, 2009, there was discussion and
    political commitment of 5,000 additional forces from international
    partners. After the December 4, 2009, NATO Foreign Ministerial and the
    December 7, 2009, ISAF Force Generation Conference, NATO and non-NATO
    Troop Contributing Nations pledged 6,800 forces, which was more than we
    originally expected. Additional commitments are also possible. Several
    shortages in capabilities remain, including the need for additional
    trainers, OMLTS, and POMLTs. There are a number of nations that the
    United States may have to assist militarily and/or financially, within
    the existing budgeted resources and authorities. Some of these nations
    have provided combat forces without caveats, offsetting the need to use
    U.S. forces.

        61. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, you have also indicated that our
    troops are not yet at their ``tipping point.'' Do you think this
    increase in troops will keep our military forces from tipping at all?
        Admiral Mullen. Our men and women in uniform and their families
    continue to bear a significant burden. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I,
    along with the Secretary of Defense, closely monitor the health of the
    force and are taking active measures to address and mitigate risks.
        The deployment of 30,000 additional forces to Afghanistan comes
    alongside a parallel drawdown of forces which will reduce forces in
    Iraq from about 115,000 to 50,000 by August 2010. The Iraq drawdown
    remains on track and on schedule.
        The Army's overall operational tempo will reduce slightly in the
    coming year, although reaching the desired long-term ratio of dwell
    time to boots-on-ground time of 2-to-1 will come a bit more slowly than
    originally planned. Current Army assessments indicate that at least 70
    percent of our Active component forces will be able to achieve the 2-
    to-1 ratio in 2011. We will continue to make significant progress
    toward dwell-time goals in the Marine Corps. Across the force, we are
    closely managing the deployment of small-unit enablers, who often
    operate at a 1-to-1 ratio.
        Meanwhile, the Services continue their efforts to care for
    servicemembers and their families. These efforts include a vast array
    of initiatives that will continue to address servicemembers' mental and
    emotional health, quality of life, predictability in their assignments
    and deployments, and recruiting and retention.

        62. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, will deployment lengths or dwell
    times change as a result of sending more troops to Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. The Services do not anticipate any increase to
    deployment lengths and dwell times will remain above Service redlines
    as a result of sending additional troops to Afghanistan.
        The Army has already programmed growth in capabilities needed to
    support ongoing operations which will lead to improved dwell ratios in
    both Active and Reserve components.
        The Marine Corps deployment lengths will not change as a result of
    the addition to the force in Afghanistan.
        The Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard reported that the troop
    increase will have no significant overarching effect on deployment
    lengths and dwell time.

        63. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, how heavily will we rely on our
    National Guard and Reserves for this troop increase in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. The Services will continue to rely on the National
    Guard and the Reserves as a part of the total force in support of OEF.
        Commander, U.S. CENTCOM has not yet completely defined his
    requirement for optimal use of the 30,000 authorization; therefore, the
    ultimate composition of Active and Reserve component forces cannot yet
    be determined.
        For the Army, of the approximately 13,000 soldiers currently
    scheduled for deployments associated with the Afghanistan
    reinforcement, only approximately 1,000 of them are Reserve component
    members.
        The Marine Corps will continue to rely on its Reserve component
    through a rotation of forces while continuing to meet its deployment-
    to-dwell policy of 1:4.

        64. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, please describe the training
    mission. How dangerous will embedding additional trainers and an
    increased force presence in the region be for our troops and allies?
        Admiral Mullen. Our new approach toward training ANSF includes
    tighter, restructured training programs to deliver more
    counterinsurgency-capable units. ANA and ANP elements upon completion
    of a formal program of instruction will have the capability of
    conducting hold operations with some capability to clear while closely
    partnered with coalition forces.
        However, the ANSF training mission extends beyond the initial
    program of instruction at the training center. Coalition advisory teams
    will join ANSF units before entering training and remain with ANSF
    units through training and beyond as they are fielded. ISAF maneuver
    units are partnering with ANSF elements to provide mentoring and
    valuable on-the-job training, as well as enabler support while Afghan
    enabler capabilities are subsequently developed.
        Advisory teams are indeed largely provided by coalition allies. We
    expect that ANSF units and their mentors, not unlike the coalition
    maneuver units with which they are partnered, will face an increased
    threat in the initial months of the deployment of additional forces as
    the insurgency's momentum is reversed. ISAF training, advising,
    mentoring, and partnering will prove critical to mitigate risks as
    rapidly expanded ANSF growth and fielding occurs and ANSF capabilities
    develop.

                       CIVILIAN EFFORT AND COLLABORATION

        65. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, we owe an immense debt to the
    troops serving in Afghanistan today. It is now time to strengthen their
    mission of training local army and police forces in preparation for the
    gradual reduction and ultimate disengagement of U.S. forces, so that
    our civilian personnel can help build responsive governance
    infrastructures at the provincial level. When will that happen and how
    would DOD support this?
        Admiral Mullen. The ANSF is continuously developing the capacity
    that will ultimately allow them to take responsibility for their
    nation's security. In some cases, ANSF units are already doing this. In
    all cases this will be executed responsibly, taking into account
    conditions on the ground which will differ from region to region.
        As U.S. forces are able to begin our military transition,
    international forces will continue to partner with and support the ANSF
    for some time. In addition, a significant civilian commitment will
    remain in Afghanistan during the progressive military drawdown and long
    after our troops depart in order to support Afghan programs and
    policies for political-economic development.
        However, our civilian commitment must continue, even as our troops
    begin eventually to come home. Our counterinsurgency approach focuses
    on measurable security progress and protecting the Afghan population.
    Supporting the establishment of responsible security elements and
    government at the subnational level is an important example of
    integrating civil and military efforts. For example, our support for
    Afghan reconciliation and reintegration policies and anti-corruption
    efforts demonstrates the importance of coordinated civil-military
    action that will greatly contribute to our progress. Similarly, through
    the ``U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan For
    Support to Afghanistan,'' military components work closely with
    international and Afghan governments and NGOs to ensure military plans
    and operations account for the contributions of civilian agencies. Our
    forces understand that security operations can provide a basis for
    stability, but civilian expertise is needed to provide mid- and long-
    term political-economic development.

        66. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, will there be a concentrated
    civilian effort with this surge?
        Admiral Mullen. DOD strongly supports civilian increases in
    Afghanistan as a critical element of our strategy and as an essential
    element of improving civil-military integration. We have already seen
    significant improvements with initial civilian increases in 2009 and
    the establishment of a U.S. Government senior civilian structure,
    whereby a U.S. Government civilian counterpart is established at each
    level of the military chain of command to coordinate civilian efforts.
    We are aware that military force increases put a further strain on
    scarce civilian expertise. DOS will work with our military commanders
    to identify civilian requirements. I refer you to DOS for further
    details.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

                       AIR FORCE AERIAL REFUELING TANKER

        67. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, General Duncan McNabb, the
    Commander of U.S. Transportation Command, testified before the House
    Armed Services Committee on March 17, 2009, to the following: ``The KC-
    X will be a game changer. Its value as a tanker will be tremendous. Its
    value as a multi-role platform to the mobility enterprise will be
    incomparable. It will do for the whole mobility world what the C-17 did
    for theater and strategic airlift. It will be an ultimate mobility
    force multiplier.''
        The logistical challenges that a landlocked country such as
    Afghanistan poses during a prolonged conflict such as OEF are
    undeniable. The military leader assigned the task of addressing those
    challenges recognizes the game changing value of a multi-role platform.
        With this information in mind, why would you not afford a certain
    amount of extra value on cargo capability in the assessment of a future
    tanker proposal in the upcoming competition?
        Secretary Gates. The Department has valued extra KC-X cargo
    capability in the draft Request for Proposal (RFP). For example, to
    meet the KC-X mandatory self-deployment requirement, the KC-X must be
    able to carry at least 14 cargo pallets. This exceeds the KC-135's
    capability of only six cargo pallets. In addition, the number of
    mandatory airlift requirements has increased from 6 in the last
    competition to 42 in the current draft RFP.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

                         REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES

        68. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, please provide details on
    all requests for U.S. Forces from U.S. commanders for Afghanistan
    between January 2002 through January 2009, including the number and
    type of forces requested, whether or not the request for forces were
    met, when it was met, and, if the request was declined, why it was not
    met. Please provide an unclassified response, and, if necessary, only
    classify those portions of the response considered to be classified.
        Admiral Mullen did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in committee files.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter

                                NATION BUILDING

        69. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, there is much talk of
    building capacity or fostering economic development in Afghanistan,
    though the administration has insisted that our efforts in Afghanistan
    do not constitute nation-building. Can you explain the difference
    between nation-building and what the President plans to do in
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

                             ALLIES AND THE REGION

        70. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, how have our key allies,
    including Canada, Britain, Germany, France, and other European allies,
    responded to the President's proposal?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        71. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, do you expect our key allies
    to fully cooperate with the President's request for additional
    coalition forces?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        72. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, is Pakistan fully prepared
    to cooperate with the President's latest plan, including providing full
    support and staging for intelligence gathering and airstrikes?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        73. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, to what extent do you
    believe that the stability of Pakistan is linked to the stability of
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        74. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, does the Pakistani
    Government share the view that the stability of Pakistan is linked to
    the stability of Afghanistan?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

                               ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE

        75. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, it is widely acknowledged
    that insurgents in Afghanistan profit directly from the narcotics
    trade, to the tune of hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars
    per year. Can you discuss what efforts are being undertaken to stem the
    illegal drug trade and what successes, if any, have been achieved?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        76. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, what is the status of
    agribusiness development efforts aimed at encouraging farmers to
    produce legitimate crops rather than narcotics?
        Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

                     NEW STRATEGY, TIMELINE, AND BENCHMARKS

        77. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, on March 27, 2009, President
    Obama announced a ``comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and
    Pakistan'' that included 21,000 new troops. Is the December 1, 2009,
    announcement an indication that the previous comprehensive strategy was
    insufficient and, if so, what new facts caused the President to realize
    this?
        Secretary Gates. The President made clear in March 2009 that it was
    important to regularly reassess our progress in Afghanistan to ensure
    that we had the right strategy, the appropriate mission, and the
    necessary resources. In the 6 months after the strategy was announced
    in March 2009, several important factors changed, resulting in the
    appointment of new U.S. leaders to Afghanistan. As General McChrystal
    reported in his September assessment, the situation in Afghanistan was
    more serious than we had believed and the Taliban had gained the
    initiative in many areas. In addition, the Afghan election process
    highlighted serious corruption within the Afghan Government and
    illustrated the necessity for effective governance in Afghanistan. In
    Pakistan, the situation had also changed as Pakistanis took the fight
    to the extremists that threatened their state.
        The strategic review completed on 1 December 2009 was a deliberate
    process to check alignment of goals, methods for attaining those goals,
    and resources required. This led to a more focused approach to
    achieving a clear set of concrete operational objectives in
    Afghanistan. Our refined strategy calls for a more rapid deployment of
    additional U.S. and international forces to reverse the Taliban's
    momentum and accelerate ANSF growth. Most important, the President's 1
    December speech reaffirmed the March 2009 core goal: to disrupt,
    dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return
    to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

        78. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, reports have indicated that
    General McChrystal's assessment requested up to 80,000 additional
    troops in Afghanistan. How did the President arrive at the troop figure
    he announced on December 1, 2009?
        Admiral Mullen. The strategic review was a deliberate and
    disciplined three-stage process to check alignment of goals, methods
    for attaining those goals, and resources required. The President
    focused on asking the hard questions and took the time to carefully
    consider all of the options before agreeing to send any additional U.S.
    forces to war. General McChrystal's assessment was certainly a key
    input into the process, as were consultations with our NATO allies,
    ISAF partners, and regional stakeholders.
        A number of issues were explored in depth: national interests, core
    objectives and goals, counterterrorism priorities, safe havens for
    terrorist groups in Pakistan, the health of the global U.S. military
    force, risks and costs associated with troop deployments, global
    deployment requirements, international cooperation and commitments for
    both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Afghan capacity in all areas to
    include Afghan security forces, central and sub-national governance and
    corruption (including the narcotics trade), and development and
    economic issues.
        After considering all of these issues, the president announced the
    deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces on an accelerated timeline.
    In addition, our allies and partners have added some 7,000 additional
    U.S. forces through the NATO/ISAF Force Generation Process. Additional
    international commitments are possible.

        79. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, do you believe that we can
    achieve victory in Afghanistan with fewer troops than General
    McChrystal said would be needed for maximum success?
        Admiral Mullen. I am confident that the President's decision to
    deploy 30,000 additional U.S. forces, along with at least approximately
    7,000 additional forces from our allies--all of which will arrive on an
    accelerated timeline in 2010--will give the commander on the ground the
    tools necessary to achieve the President's focused objectives.

        80. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, do you believe that a
    timetable for withdrawal is consistent with a commitment to victory in
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. The President did not pick the summer of 2011 date
    arbitrarily. During the strategy review, we looked closely at the
    current and projected capacity of the ANSF in some parts of the
    country. Based on that analysis, we reached the conclusion that July
    2011 is a realistic date for us to plan to begin transferring
    responsibility for security to the ANSF in some parts of the country.
    At the same time, we will assess conditions as we move forward. Based
    on those assessments, the President will determine the scope and pace
    of a gradual and responsible drawing down of U.S. combat forces.
        This is an issue of balance. We need to show both our partners and
    our adversaries in the region that we mean business: we will deploy the
    forces and the civilian resources that we believe are necessary to
    accomplish our strategic goals, and retain the tactical flexibility to
    adapt if circumstances require. At the same time, we have to send a
    clear message to the Afghan Government that the U.S. military is not
    going to be there forever. We are not an occupation force. Afghans must
    take primary responsibility for defending their own country--and
    prepare to do so with a sense of purpose and urgency.

        81. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, do you believe that the United
    States can afford to accept anything less than full achievement of its
    objectives in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. The goal of the United States in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to prevent
    its return to both countries. The international military effort to
    stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal.
    Defeating al Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually
    reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from one another, as
    much as we might wish that to be the case.
        The Taliban and al Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting
    from the success and mythology of the other. Taliban success in
    retaking and holding parts of Afghanistan against the combined forces
    of multiple, modern armies--the current direction of events--has
    dramatically strengthened the extremist mythology and popular
    perceptions of who is winning and who is losing. The lesson of the
    Taliban's revival for al Qaeda is that time and will are on their side.
    With a western defeat, they could regain their strength and achieve a
    major strategic victory--as long as their senior leadership lives and
    can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding. Rolling back
    the Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate
    defeat of al Qaeda.
        Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if
    not most, of the country and likely renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled
    areas could in short order become, once again, a sanctuary for al Qaeda
    as well as a staging area for resurgent militant groups on the
    offensive in Pakistan.
        What makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan
    uniquely different from any other location is that this part of the
    world represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic
    place where native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in
    their view, caused its collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat
    the sole remaining superpower in the same place would have severe
    consequences for the United States and the world.
        A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is vital to
    our national security. Success will require patience, perseverance, and
    sacrifice by the United States and our allies.

        82. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, you have indicated that the
    timetable in Afghanistan is not a fixed deadline for withdrawal. Can
    you explain why the summer of 2011 was selected as the target date for
    beginning troop withdrawals?
        Secretary Gates. As previously stated in my response to Question
    80, the President did not pick the summer of 2011 date arbitrarily.
    During the strategy review, we looked closely at the current and
    projected capacity of the ANSF in some parts of the country. Based on
    that analysis, we reached the conclusion that July 2011 is a realistic
    date for us to plan to begin transferring responsibility for security
    to the ANSF in some parts of the country. At the same time, we will
    assess conditions as we move forward. Based on those assessments, the
    President will determine the scope and pace of a gradual and
    responsible draw down of U.S. combat forces.
        This is an issue of balance. We need to show both our partners and
    our adversaries in the region that we mean business: we will deploy the
    forces and the civilian resources that we believe are necessary to
    accomplish our strategic goals, and retain the tactical flexibility to
    adapt if circumstances require. At the same time, we have to send a
    clear message to the Afghan Government that the U.S. military is not
    going to be there forever. We are not an occupation force. Afghans must
    take primary responsibility for defending their own country--and
    prepare to do so with a sense of purpose and urgency.

        83. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, under what circumstances could
    the summer of 2011 timetable be adjusted?
        Secretary Gates. As previously stated in my responses to Questions
    80 and 82, the President did not pick the summer of 2011 date
    arbitrarily. During the strategy review, we looked closely at the
    current and projected capacity of the ANSF in some parts of the
    country. Based on that analysis, we reached the conclusion that July
    2011 is a realistic date for us to plan to begin transferring
    responsibility for security to the ANSF in some parts of the country.
    At the same time, we will assess conditions as we move forward. Based
    on those assessments, the President will determine the scope and pace
    of a gradual and responsible draw down of U.S. combat forces.
        This is an issue of balance. We need to show both our partners and
    our adversaries in the region that we mean business: we will deploy the
    forces and the civilian resources that we believe are necessary to
    accomplish our strategic goals, and retain the tactical flexibility to
    adapt if circumstances require. At the same time, we have to send a
    clear message to the Afghan Government that the U.S. military is not
    going to be there forever. We are not an occupation force. Afghans must
    take primary responsibility for defending their own country and prepare
    to do so with a sense of purpose and urgency.

        84. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, what are the minimum benchmark
    conditions that would allow the United States to confidently begin
    withdrawing troops from Afghanistan with a minimal risk of a failed
    state or civil war?
        Admiral Mullen. DOD is currently working with our interagency
    partners to refine the benchmarks that we will use to measure progress
    in light of the President's new strategy. However, broadly speaking,
    success in Afghanistan will emerge as the ANSF develops the capacity to
    provide security for the nation and effective governance and
    development take root. As this happens, the United States will continue
    to provide overwatch, eventually withdrawing our troops to the point
    where we have a minimal presence. The pace and locations at which this
    process will take place will depend on several factors, the two most
    important of which are the performance of the Afghan Government at all
    levels and the development of the Afghan security forces. We will not
    transfer responsibility to the Afghans until the Afghans have the
    capacity to manage the security situation on their own.

        [Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

                  CONTINUE TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON AFGHANISTAN

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2009

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:35 p.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill,
    Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, Kirk, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
    Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, Vitter, and Collins.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer,
    nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Howard H. Hoege III,
    counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; William G.P.
    Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff
    member.
        Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
    Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler,
    professional staff member; and Dana W. White, professional
    staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Jennifer R.
    Knowles, Christine G. Lang, and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator
    Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick
    Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and Greta
    Lundeberg, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer,
    assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to
    Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
    Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena,
    assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to
    Senator Begich; Nathan Davern, assistant to Senator Burris;
    Bethany Bassett, assistant to Senator Kirk; Brandon Andrews,
    Anthony J. Lazarski, Mark Powers, and Jared Young, assistants
    to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants
    to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
    Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason
    Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells III,
    assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator
    LeMieux; Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; and Rob Epplin
    and Chip Kennett, assistants to Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody, and welcome.
    Today the committee hears from Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador
    to Afghanistan, and General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander of
    the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International
    Strategic Assistance Force (ISAF). Let me begin by thanking you
    both on behalf of the committee for your repeated and
    continuing service to our country. Thanks to your families for
    their continued support of the task that you've accepted, and
    please also convey our thanks to the troops and the civilians
    that you lead and their families for their extraordinary
    service.
        General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry, you're
    charged with executing a civilian-military plan of action to
    implement the strategy that the President announced last week.
    The President's plan emphasizes protecting the Afghan people
    consistent with the recommendations in General McChrystal's
    assessment, and includes military and civilian actions with the
    goal, according to Secretary Gates, to clear, hold, build, and
    transfer security responsibility to the Afghans.
        Key elements of the President's plan for going forward in
    Afghanistan include: First, training, equipping, and partnering
    with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to empower them
    to provide for Afghan security.
        Second, the President has called for rapidly deploying an
    additional 30,000 U.S. soldiers and marines over the coming
    months, likely to be joined by at least 7,000 additional
    soldiers from NATO and other allies participating in the
    Afghanistan mission.
        Third, the President has directed that a reduction of U.S.
    forces will begin in July 2011, with the pace and location of
    troop reductions to be determined by conditions on the ground.
        Our Achilles heel in Afghanistan, in the words of one
    Marine company commander, is not a shortage of U.S. troops;
    it's a shortage of Afghan troops. To succeed in Afghanistan, it
    is important that we have adequate Afghan partners in combat
    operations and that after a town or village is cleared of the
    Taliban the security forces left to maintain order are Afghan
    forces.
        In the key province of Helmand, the ratio of U.S. troops to
    Afghan troops is about five U.S. troops to one Afghan soldier.
    The desired ratio should be much different, one Afghan company
    to one U.S. company at the beginning of partnering, leading to
    three Afghan companies for every one U.S. company as training
    of Afghan troops progresses.
        Currently, the 10,000 U.S. marines in Helmand Province have
    approximately 1,500 Afghan soldiers and 700 Afghan police, just
    over 2,000 combined Afghan strategic forces, with whom to
    partner. Doubling the number of U.S. troops in the south
    without a much larger increase in available Afghan troops will
    only worsen a ratio under which our forces are already matched
    up with fewer Afghan troops than they can and should partner
    with.
        The limited availability of Afghan forces to partner with
    raises a troubling question: Why aren't there more Afghan
    forces in the fight? By most accounts, Afghan soldiers are good
    fighters, are motivated, and are well respected by the Afghan
    people. Yet there were recent news reports that the Afghan Army
    soldiers in Helmand were declining to go on some missions
    because they said they were not there to fight, but to rest.
    Last week Secretary Clinton was reported as saying: ``We have
    to bring the Afghan security forces into the fight.''
        According to the latest numbers from the Combined Security
    Transition Command in Afghanistan, there are currently some
    95,000 Afghan soldiers trained. Of this force, there are 80
    combat battalions. About half of those are listed as capable of
    independent operations or of leading operations with coalition
    support. But last week the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, Admiral Mullen, said in an interview that there are very
    few Afghan soldiers that are in the lead.
        I hope our witnesses this afternoon can give us the ground
    truth as to how many Afghan soldiers and police are present for
    duty and are now partnered with U.S. combat troops in the fight
    and how many Afghan units are in the lead in combat operations
    anywhere.
        In addition to the ANSF, there is a community defense
    initiative, which appears to be an Afghan version of the Sons
    of Iraq. I hope our witnesses will describe this initiative and
    discuss its strengths and weaknesses.
        I understand that the President has directed his military
    commanders not to begin clearing an area unless our troops will
    be able to turn that area over to Afghan security forces. What
    our witnesses could clarify is at what point in the ``clear,
    hold, build, and transfer'' process the Afghan forces will take
    over responsibility for an area's security. Is the plan that we
    hold? Do the Afghans hold? Do we hold together?
        As Marine Corps Commandant General Conway recently pointed
    out, ``It isn't nearly as effective to have U.S. marines
    standing on street corners in Afghan villages as it is to have
    an Afghan policeman or a soldier.'' I agree, U.S. troops should
    not be left for months holding street corners in villages
    recently cleared of the Taliban, waiting for Afghan security
    forces to take over that mission.
        Increasing the number of U.S. forces acting without
    sufficient Afghan partners will feed Taliban propaganda that
    portrays U.S. forces in Afghanistan as occupiers, and could
    lead to greater, instead of lesser, Afghan dependency upon us.
        The President's strategy also makes clear that our
    commitment to the future of Afghanistan requires action on the
    part of the Government of Afghanistan to fight corruption,
    deliver services, institute policies for reintegration of local
    Taliban fighters, and address other urgent problems. President
    Karzai has pledged to do these things and President Obama
    rightly insists on holding him to that pledge.
        Setting the July 2011 date to begin reductions of our
    forces is a reasonable way to impart to the Government of
    Afghanistan a sense of focus and urgency, something that has
    been lacking there up to now and is essential to success, both
    theirs and ours. President Karzai has acknowledged the value of
    the July 2011 date, saying that ``It's good that we are facing
    a deadline'' and that the Afghan people ``must begin to stand
    on our own feet.'' I'd like to hear from our witnesses whether
    they support and agree with the President's decision to
    establish a July 2011 date to begin a U.S. troop reduction.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank General McChrystal and Ambassador
    Eikenberry for joining us today. I want to thank you both for
    your many years of distinguished service to our country and I
    want to express my deep gratitude to the Americans you lead,
    both our civilians and our men and women in uniform, as well as
    their families, who are serving and sacrificing at this moment.
        I want to reiterate up front that I support the President's
    policy for Afghanistan. I think he made the right decision,
    really a brave decision, against the objections of many in his
    own party, to reject half measures, to affirm a
    counterinsurgency strategy and to resource it properly. I think
    this policy can succeed and I think it deserves robust public
    support, both from Republicans and Democrats alike.
        My main concern is the decision to begin withdrawing our
    forces in 2011 regardless of conditions on the ground. We
    discussed this issue a lot last week and I appreciate the
    efforts of Secretaries Clinton and Gates and Admiral Mullen to
    try to clarify the meaning of this decision. I understand that
    this date marks the beginning of a process and that the pace of
    our drawdown will be condition-based. Still, the fundamental
    problem remains: We've announced a date, divorced from
    conditions on the ground, when we will start to withdraw our
    troops.
        It doesn't matter whether we call it a cliff or a ramp or
    anything else. It's still an exit sign, and it sends the wrong
    signal to our friends and our enemies. On this issue, the
    administration and I will just have to agree to disagree.
        It matters immensely what signals we send. That's why I was
    very pleased to see Secretary Gates is in Kabul today and that
    the message he delivered was: ``We are in this thing to win.''
    I couldn't agree more, and we can win.
        With this counterinsurgency strategy, plus the additional
    troops and resources we are committing, we can reverse the
    momentum of the insurgency. We can create conditions for the
    vast majority of insurgents to lay down their arms and
    reconcile with their fellow Afghans. We can train appropriate
    numbers of more capable and battle-tested Afghan security
    forces to lead the fight in time against a degraded enemy. We
    can isolate al Qaeda and target them more effectively, and we
    can create the time and space for Afghan leaders, with our
    support and pressure, to reform their government, to crack down
    on corruption, and to build a nation that will never again
    serve as a base for attacks against America and our allies.
        That is our theory of victory. But we can only succeed if
    our civilian and military efforts are completely joint and
    integrated, beginning at the top with our distinguished
    witnesses today. We've all read the reports of differences
    between you gentlemen. I know you're both professionals and I
    trust that any tensions you may have had are now past and that
    you are now focused, as I am and as I trust the President is,
    on the future, on your common mission, and on succeeding.
        This requires a joint civilian-military campaign plan,
    which we were told last week that our civilian and military
    leaders are now in the process of drafting. We've heard a lot
    about numbers, both troop levels and civilian surges. We've
    heard a lot about dollar amounts and various programs. We've
    heard a lot about goals and aspirations.
        I want to hear about strategy. What is our strategy for
    helping the Afghans build political and economic order after we
    clear and hold ground? What is our strategy for supporting
    Afghan leaders in reforming and strengthening their government?
    What is our strategy for working with President Karzai in
    getting the best performance possible from him and his
    government? I hope we can gain greater clarity in this hearing
    today on the elements of our civil-military strategy.
        We have questions, of course. But we cannot lose sight of
    one important fact: We now have an opportunity to build a
    bipartisan consensus in support of a vital national security
    priority: defeating al Qaeda and its violent, extremist allies
    in Afghanistan and Pakistan and ensuring that these countries
    never again serve as bases for attacks against us and our
    allies.
        Americans need to know why winning this war is essential to
    our country's security. They need to know that things in
    Afghanistan will get worse before it gets better; that, sadly,
    casualties will likely rise in the year to come, but that
    ultimately we will succeed. Americans need to know these
    things, especially those brave Americans who are leading this
    fight.
        If you take only one thing back with you to our fellow
    citizens in Afghanistan, let it be this: America and this
    Congress are fully behind them. We believe in them. We believe
    in their mission. We believe they can succeed. We in Congress
    will do all in our power to get them everything they need to
    win and then to return home with the honor they deserve and the
    thanks of a grateful Nation.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        General McChrystal, let's start with you.

        STATEMENT OF GEN STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL, USA, COMMANDER,
      INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE AND COMMANDER, U.S.
                           FORCES AFGHANISTAN

        General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
    distinguished members of this committee: Thank you for the
    chance to appear before you today.
        I welcome this opportunity to testify on our way ahead in
    Afghanistan and I'm pleased to do so with Ambassador Karl
    Eikenberry, an old friend.
        Let me begin by saluting the bravery of the men and women
    of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
    They're anchored by over 68,000 courageous Americans, our close
    partners in the NATO alliance, and a 43-nation coalition. We
    honor the sacrifices of the fallen, the veterans, and their
    families.
        We also recognize the toll paid every day by our
    counterparts in the Afghan security forces and by Afghan
    civilians, who ultimately suffer the most from this insurgency.
    It is for them and for all of us that we seek a stable
    Afghanistan, a defunct al Qaeda, and a secure future----
    [Audience interruption.]
        Chairman Levin. You'll have to remain seated, please, and
    no more outbursts, please.
        Thank you. You can continue.
        General McChrystal.--and a secure future in that vital
    region of the world.
        I first deployed to Afghanistan in 2002 and have commanded
    forces there every year since. Despite that experience, there
    is much in Afghanistan that I have yet to fully understand. For
    all of us, Afghanistan is a challenge that is best approached
    with a balance of determination and humility.
        While U.S. forces have been at war in Afghanistan for 8
    years, the Afghans have been at it for more than 30. They are
    frustrated with international efforts that have failed to meet
    their expectations, confronting us with a crisis of confidence
    among Afghans who view the international effort as insufficient
    and their government as corrupt or at the very least
    inconsequential.
        We also face a complex and resilient insurgency. The Quetta
    Shura Taliban, or Afghan Taliban, is the prominent threat to
    the Government of Afghanistan, as they aspire to once again
    become the Government of Afghanistan. The Haqqani and Hizb-e
    Islami Gulbuddin insurgent groups have more limited
    geographical reach and objectives, but they are no less lethal.
    All three groups are supported to some degree by external
    elements in Iran and Pakistan, have ties with al Qaeda, and
    coexist within narcotics and criminal networks, both fueling
    and feeding off instability and insecurity in the region.
        The mission in Afghanistan is undeniably difficult and
    success will require steadfast commitment and incur significant
    costs. I participated fully in the President's assessment and
    decisionmaking process and was afforded multiple opportunities
    to provide my recommendations and best military advice, which I
    did. Combined with insights and policy considerations from
    across our government, I believe the decisions that came from
    that process reflect a realistic and effective approach.
        To pursue our core goal of defeating al Qaeda and
    preventing their return to Afghanistan, we must disrupt and
    degrade the Taliban's capacity, deny their access to the Afghan
    population, and strengthen the Afghan security forces. This
    means we must reverse the Taliban's current momentum and create
    the time and space to develop Afghan security and governance
    capacity.
        The President's decision rapidly resources our strategy,
    recognizing that the next 18 months will likely be decisive and
    ultimately enable success. I fully support the President's
    decision. The President also reiterated how this decision
    supports our national interest. Rolling back the Taliban is a
    prerequisite to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda.
        The mission is not only important, it is also achievable.
    We can and will accomplish this mission. Let me briefly explain
    why I believe so. My confidence derives first from the Afghans'
    resolve, since it is their actions that will ultimately matter
    most in ending this conflict with their interests and, by
    extension our own.
        Second, we do not confront a popular insurgency. The
    Taliban have no widespread constituency, have a history of
    failure in power, and lack an appealing vision.
        Third, where our strategy is applied we've begun to show
    that we can help the Afghans to establish more effective
    security and more credible governance.
        Finally, Afghans do not regard us as occupiers. They do not
    wish for us to remain forever, yet they see our support as a
    necessary bridge to future security and stability.
        I've been back in Afghanistan for 6 months now. I believe
    that with the President's decision and ongoing reforms I
    outlined in our initial assessment, our efforts are now
    empowered with a greater sense of clarity, capability,
    commitment, and confidence.
        Let me start with clarity. The President's recently
    completed review of our strategy, to include his deep and
    pointed questioning of all assumptions and recommendations, has
    produced greater clarity of our mission and objectives. We also
    have greater clarity on the way forward. Additional forces will
    begin to deploy shortly and by this time next year new security
    gains will be illuminated by specific indicators and it will be
    clear to us that the insurgency has lost the momentum. By the
    summer of 2011, it will be clear to the Afghan people that the
    insurgency will not win, giving them the chance to side with
    their government.
        From that point forward, while we plan to have fewer combat
    forces in harm's way, we will remain partnered with the Afghan
    security forces in a supporting role to consolidate and
    solidify their gains. Results may come more quickly and we must
    demonstrate progress towards measurable objectives, but the
    sober fact is that there are no silver bullets. Ultimate
    success will be the cumulative effect of sustained pressure
    across multiple lines of operation.
        Increasing our capability has been about much more than
    troop increases. For the past 6 months, we've been implementing
    organizational and operational changes that are already
    reflecting improvements in our effectiveness. But the
    additional forces announced by President Obama are significant.
    Forces to increase our capacity to train the ANSF and forces to
    partner with Afghan Army and police in expanding security zones
    in key areas will provide us the ability to reverse insurgent
    momentum and deny the Taliban the access to the population they
    require to survive.
        The additional capability we are building translates into
    credibility in the minds of Afghans, who demand proof, not only
    that we want to protect them, but that we can. In a war of
    perceptions where the battlefield is the mind of an Afghan
    elder, the hope of an Afghan mother, the aspirations of an
    Afghan child, this can be decisive. Our commitment is watched
    intently and constantly judged by our allies and by our
    enemies. The commitment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces, along
    with additional coalition forces and growing ANSF numbers, will
    be a significant step toward expanding security in critical
    areas and in demonstrating resolve.
        The commitment of all coalition nations will be buttressed
    by a clear understanding of how we will mitigate risks. I'll
    briefly mention three. The first is the Afghan Government's
    credibility deficit, which must be recognized by all, to
    include Afghan officials, as a critical area of focus and
    change.
        Equally important is our ability to accelerate development
    of the Afghan security forces. Measures such as increased pay
    and incentives, literacy training, leader development, and
    expanded partnering are necessary to position the ANSF to
    assume responsibility for long-term security.
        Third, the hazard posed by extremists that operate on both
    sides of the border with Pakistan, with freedom of movement
    across that border must be mitigated by enhanced cross-border
    coordinations and enhanced Pakistani engagement.
        Looking ahead, I'm confident that we have both the right
    strategy and the right resources. Every trip around Afghanistan
    reinforces my confidence in the coalition and Afghan forces we
    stand alongside in this effort. But I also find confidence in
    those we are trying to help. That confidence is found when an
    Afghan farmer chooses to harvest wheat rather than poppy, or
    where a young adult casts his or her vote to join the police,
    or where a group of villagers resolves to reject the local
    insurgency.
        We face many challenges in Afghanistan, but our efforts are
    sustained by one unassailable reality. Neither the Afghan
    people nor the international community want Afghanistan to
    remain a sanctuary for terror and violence. If we are to be
    confident of our mission and our prospects, we must also be
    accurate in our assessment of that progress. We owe ourselves,
    our leaders, and the American people transparency and candor,
    because the price to be paid is high and the stakes are even
    higher.
        In closing, my team and I would like to thank you and your
    colleagues for your support to the American men and women
    currently serving in Afghanistan and to tell you a bit about
    them. We risk letting numbers like 30,000 roll off our tongues
    without remembering that those are fathers, mothers, sons, and
    daughters serving far from home, selfless in their sacrifices
    for each of us.
        The other day I asked a young, combat-experienced, sergeant
    where he was on September 11 and his answer was, ``Getting my
    braces removed.'' It reminded me that it had been more than 8
    years since September 11, and many of our servicemembers and
    family have experienced and sacrificed much. But as I see them
    in action at remote bases, on patrol, partnering with Afghan
    forces, recovering in combat hospitals, they don't talk about
    all they've given up. They talk about all they are
    accomplishing and their determination in this endeavor.
        This is not a force of rookies or dilettantes. The brigade
    commander in Khost is completing his fourth combat tour in
    Afghanistan and his experience and expertise is reflective of
    the force that represents you. All have felt fear and
    loneliness. Most have lost comrades. None have lost heart.
        In their eyes, I see maturity beyond their years. In their
    actions, I see a commitment to succeed and a commitment to each
    other. I am confident that I share your pride in what these
    great Americans are doing for our country in Afghanistan, and
    it will be my privilege to accept your questions on their
    behalf.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of General McChrystal follows:]

              Prepared Statement by GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, USA

        Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of this
    committee, thank you for the chance to appear before you today.
        I welcome this opportunity to testify on our way ahead in
    Afghanistan, and I am pleased to do so with Ambassador Karl Eikenberry,
    an old friend.
        Let me begin by saluting the bravery of the men and women of the
    International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. They are
    anchored by over 68,000 courageous Americans, our close partners in the
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance, and a 43-nation coalition.
    We honor the sacrifices of the fallen, the veterans, and their
    families.
        We also recognize the toll paid every day by our counterparts in
    the Afghan Security Forces and by Afghan civilians, who ultimately
    suffer the most from this insurgency. It is for them--and for all of
    us--that we seek a stable Afghanistan, a defunct al Qaeda, and a secure
    future in that vital region of the world.
        I first deployed to Afghanistan in 2002 and have commanded forces
    there every year since.
        Despite that experience, there is much in Afghanistan that I have
    yet to fully understand. For all of us, Afghanistan is a challenge that
    is best approached with a balance of determination and humility.
        While U.S. forces have been at war in Afghanistan for 8 years, the
    Afghans have been at it for more than 30. They are frustrated with
    international efforts that have failed to meet their expectations,
    confronting us with a crisis of confidence among Afghans who view the
    international effort as insufficient and their government as corrupt
    or, at the very least, inconsequential.
        We also face a complex and resilient insurgency. The Quetta Shura
    Taliban, or Afghan Taliban, is the prominent threat to the Government
    of Afghanistan, as they aspire to once again become the Government of
    Afghanistan. The Haqqani and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin insurgent groups
    have more limited geographical reach and objectives, but they are no
    less lethal.
        All three groups are supported to some degree by external elements
    in Iran and Pakistan, have ties with al Qaeda, and co-exist within
    narcotics and criminal networks, both fueling and feeding off
    instability and insecurity in the region.
        The mission in Afghanistan is undeniably difficult, and success
    will require steadfast commitment and incur significant costs.
        I participated fully in the President's assessment and
    decisionmaking process and was afforded multiple opportunities to
    provide my recommendations and best military advice--which I did.
        Combined with insights and policy considerations from across our
    Government, I believe the decisions that came from that process reflect
    a realistic and effective approach.
        To pursue our core goal of defeating al Qaeda and preventing their
    return to Afghanistan, we must disrupt and degrade the Taliban's
    capacity, deny their access to the Afghan population, and strengthen
    the Afghan Security Forces.
        This means we must reverse the Taliban's current momentum and
    create the time and space to develop Afghan security and governance
    capacity.
        The President's decision rapidly resources our strategy, recognizes
    that the next 18 months will likely be decisive, and ultimately,
    enables success. I fully support the President's decision.
        The President has also reiterated how this decision supports our
    national interests. Rolling back the Taliban is a pre-requisite to the
    ultimate defeat of al Qaeda.
        The mission is not only important; it is also achievable.
        We can and will accomplish this mission.
        Let me briefly explain why I believe so.
        My confidence derives first from the Afghan's resolve, since it is
    their actions that will ultimately matter most in ending this conflict,
    with their interests--and by extension our own--secured.
        Second, we do not confront a popular insurgency. The Taliban have
    no wide-spread constituency, have a history of failure in power, and
    lack an appealing vision.
        Third, where our strategy is applied we've begun to show that we
    can help the Afghans establish more effective security and more
    credible governance.
        Finally, Afghans do not regard us as occupiers. They do not wish
    for us to remain forever, yet they see our support as a necessary
    bridge to future security and stability.
        I've been back in Afghanistan for 6 months now. I believe that with
    the President's decision and ongoing reforms I outlined in our Initial
    Assessment, our efforts are now empowered with a greater sense of
    clarity, capability, commitment, and confidence.
        Let me start with clarity.
        The President's recently completed review of our strategy--to
    include its deep and pointed questioning of all assumptions and
    recommendations--has produced greater clarity of our mission and
    objectives.
        We also have greater clarity on the way forward.
        Additional forces will begin to deploy shortly, and by this time
    next year, new security gains will be illuminated by specific
    indicators, and it will be clear to us that the insurgency has lost the
    momentum.
        By the summer of 2011, it will be clear to the Afghan people that
    the insurgency will not win, giving them the chance to side with their
    government.
        From that point forward, while we begin to reduce U.S. combat force
    levels, we will remain partnered with the Afghan security forces in a
    supporting role to consolidate and solidify their gains.
        Results may come more quickly, and we must demonstrate progress
    toward measurable objectives, but the sober fact is that there are no
    silver bullets. Ultimate success will be the cumulative effect of
    sustained pressure across multiple lines of operation.
        Increasing our capability has been about much more than just troop
    increases. For the past 6 months we have been implementing
    organizational and operational changes that are already reflecting
    improvements in our effectiveness.
        But the additional forces announced by President Obama are
    significant. Forces to increase our capacity to train Afghan National
    Security Forces (ANSF), and forces to partner with Afghan Army and
    Police in expanding security zones in key areas, will provide us the
    ability to reverse insurgent momentum and deny the Taliban the access
    to the population they require to survive.
        Our commitment is watched intently--and constantly judged--by our
    allies and by our enemies.
        The commitment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces, along with
    additional coalition forces and growing ANSF numbers, will be a
    significant step toward expanding security in critical areas--and in
    demonstrating resolve.
        The commitment of all coalition nations will be buttressed by a
    clear understanding of how we will mitigate risks. I'll briefly mention
    three.
        The first is the Afghan Government's credibility deficit, which
    must be recognized by all, to include Afghan officials, as a critical
    area of focus and change.
        Equally important is our ability to accelerate development of the
    Afghan security forces. Measures such as increased pay and incentives,
    literacy training, leader development, and expanded partnering are
    necessary to position the ANSF to assume responsibility for long-term
    security.
        Third, the hazard posed by extremists that operate on both sides of
    the border with Pakistan, with freedom of movement across that border,
    must be mitigated by enhanced cross-border coordination and enhanced
    Pakistani engagement.
        Looking ahead, I am confident that we have both the right strategy
    and the right resources.
        Every trip around Afghanistan reinforces my confidence in the
    coalition and Afghan forces we stand alongside in this effort.
        But I also find confidence in those we are trying to help.
        That confidence is found where an Afghan farmer chooses to harvest
    wheat rather than poppy . . . or where a young adult casts his or her
    vote or joins the police . . . or where a group of villagers resolves
    to reject the local insurgency.
        We face many challenges in Afghanistan, but our efforts are
    sustained by one unassailable reality: neither the Afghan people nor
    the international community want Afghanistan to remain a sanctuary for
    terror and violence.
        If we are to be confident of our mission and our prospects, we must
    also be accurate in our assessment of progress. We owe ourselves, our
    leaders, and the American people transparency and candor, because the
    price to be paid is high, and the stakes are even higher.
        In closing, my team and I would like to thank you and your
    colleagues for your support to the American men and women currently
    serving in Afghanistan--and to tell you a bit about them.
        We risk letting numbers like 30K roll off our tongues without
    remembering that those are fathers, mothers, sons, and daughters--
    serving far from home--selfless in their sacrifices for each of us.
        The other day I asked a young, but combat experienced Sergeant
    where he was on September 11 and his answer--``getting my braces
    removed''--reminded me that it has been more than 8 years since
    September 11.
        Many of our servicemembers and families have experienced and
    sacrificed much.
        But as I see them in action--at remote bases; on patrol; partnering
    with Afghan forces; recovering in combat hospitals--they don't talk
    about all they've given up. They talk about all they are
    accomplishing--and their determination in this endeavor.
        This is not a force of rookies or dilettantes. The Brigade
    Commander in Khowst is completing his fourth combat tour in
    Afghanistan--and his experience and expertise is reflective of the
    force that represents you. All have felt fear and loneliness--most have
    lost comrades. None have lost heart.
        In their eyes I see maturity beyond their years. In their actions I
    see a commitment to succeed--and commitment to each other.
        I am confident that I share your pride in what these great
    Americans are doing for our country in Afghanistan.
        It will be my privilege to accept your questions on their behalf.
    Thank you Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
        Ambassador Eikenberry.

       STATEMENT OF HON. KARL W. EIKENBERRY, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
                              AFGHANISTAN

        Ambassador Eikenberry. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
    McCain, and distinguished members of the committee: Thank you
    for the opportunity to present my views on Afghanistan today,
    and I'd like to ask that my full statement be submitted for the
    record.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. It will be.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Last week in his speech at West
    Point, President Obama presented the administration's strategy
    for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His decision came after an
    intensive, deliberative, far-reaching review. I'm honored to
    have been part of that.
        I believe that the course that the President has outlined
    offers our best path to stabilize Afghanistan and to ensure
    that al Qaeda cannot regain a foothold to plan new attacks
    against us. I can say without equivocation that I fully support
    this approach.
        I consider myself privileged to serve as the U.S.
    Ambassador and to represent an amazing team of diplomats,
    developmental specialists, and civilian experts who form the
    most capable and dedicated United States embassy anywhere in
    the world today, and I'm extraordinarily proud of them.
        I'm also honored to testify alongside General Stan
    McChrystal, my professional colleague and friend of many years.
    I want to say from the outset that General McChrystal and I are
    united in a joint effort where civilian and military personnel
    work together every day side by side with our Afghan partners
    and with our allies. We could not accomplish our objectives
    without this kind of cooperation.
        Mr. Chairman, the United States is at a critical juncture
    in our involvement in Afghanistan. On December 1, the President
    ordered 35,000 additional troops to deploy to Afghanistan on an
    accelerated timetable, with the goal of breaking the
    insurgency's momentum, hastening and improving the training of
    the ANSF, and establishing security in key parts of the
    country. On the civilian side, we aim to increase employment
    and provide essential services in areas of greatest insecurity,
    and to improve the critical ministries in the economy at the
    national level. These steps, taken together, I believe will
    help to remove insurgents from the battlefield and build
    support for the Afghan Government.
        As the President said, we will be clear about what to
    expect from those who receive our assistance. After a difficult
    election, the Afghan Government does show signs of recognizing
    the need to deliver better governance and security. We await
    urgent concrete steps in a number of areas.
        I would also like to briefly discuss the three main pillars
    of our efforts in Afghanistan: security, governance, and
    development. General McChrystal has already addressed our plans
    for improving security and building the ANSF. Since assuming my
    post, I've made a special point of getting outside of Kabul to
    see conditions firsthand, and I fully concur with General
    McChrystal's assessment that the security situation remains
    serious. Sending additional U.S. and other NATO ISAF forces to
    Afghanistan is critical to regaining the initiative and I'm
    confident that as these troops arrive, the situation will
    stabilize and turn in our favor. Additional troops will also
    permit us to expand our work with the Afghan Army and the
    Afghan police so that they may take a larger role in providing
    for the security of their own people.
        As President Obama said, ``The transition to Afghan
    responsibility will begin in the summer of 2011, when we expect
    Afghan security forces to begin assuming lead responsibility
    for defending their country.''
        Moving on from security, the second pillar of our
    comprehensive strategy focuses on governance. At the national
    and the sub-national levels, our overarching goal is to
    encourage improved governance so Afghans may benefit, see the
    benefits of supporting a legitimate government and the
    insurgency in turn loses its support.
        As General McChrystal has pointed out, one of the major
    impediments our strategy faces today is the Government of
    Afghanistan's lack of credibility with its own people. To
    strengthen its legitimacy, our approach at the national level
    is on improving key ministries by increasing the number of
    civilian technical advisers and by providing more developmental
    assistance directly through these ministries' budgets. By
    focusing on ministries that deliver essential services and
    security, we can accelerate the building of an Afghan
    Government that is sufficiently visible, effective, and
    accountable.
        At the provincial and the district levels, we're working
    jointly with our military partners through our provincial
    reconstruction teams, district development working groups, and
    district support teams, which help build Afghan capacity,
    particularly in the areas of greatest insecurity in southern
    and in eastern Afghanistan.
        Underpinning all of these efforts is the need to combat
    corruption and promote the rule of law. With our assistance,
    the Afghan Government is steadily building law enforcement
    institutions to fight corruption, organized crime, and drug
    trafficking. In his inaugural address, President Karzai stated
    his intention to make merit-based appointments in his new
    cabinet and to implement an anti-corruption strategy. We're
    encouraged by his statements.
        Cultivation of poppy and trafficking in opium also continue
    to have a debilitating effect on Afghan society. Our strategy
    is multi-pronged, involving demand reduction, efforts by law
    enforcement agencies and the military to detain traffickers and
    interdict drug shipments, and support for licit agricultural
    development.
        The narcotics problem will, of course, never have a
    solution without economic development. This leads to the third
    pillar of our effort, which is development. In recent months
    we've adjusted our approach to focus on building key elements
    of Afghanistan's private sector economy, increasing our
    emphasis on agriculture, enhancing government revenue
    collection, and improving the coordination of assistance within
    the U.S. Government and the international community. These
    steps were taken to produce improvements in the lives of
    ordinary Afghans and to contribute directly to more effective
    government and lessen support for the insurgency.
        Rebuilding the farm sector, in particular, is essential for
    the Afghan Government to reduce the pool of unemployed men who
    form the recruiting base for extremist groups. We estimate that
    some 80 percent of the Afghan population derives their income
    either directly or indirectly from agriculture.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that we're concentrating
    on what's essential and attainable. The President's strategy is
    based on a pragmatic assessment of the security interests of
    the United States and our belief that a sustainable
    representative Government of Afghanistan and a sustainable
    economy for Afghanistan are essential to success. We need a
    viable Afghan Government so our forces can draw down and the
    investment of U.S. taxpayers can be reduced.
        In closing, I need to mention two important risks we face
    in carrying out our strategy, and I know that General
    McChrystal shares these. The first is that, in spite of
    everything we do, Afghanistan may struggle to take over the
    essential tasks of governance and security on a timely basis;
    and the second is in our partnership with Pakistan. The efforts
    we're undertaking in Afghanistan are likely to fall short of
    our strategic goals unless there's more progress at eliminating
    the sanctuaries used by the Afghan Taliban and their associates
    in Pakistan.
        If the main elements of the President's plan are executed
    and if our Afghan partners and our allies do their part, I'm
    confident we can achieve our strategic objectives. I say this
    with conviction because, for the first time during my three
    tours of duty in Afghanistan, all of the elements of our
    national power are being employed with the full support of the
    President and increasingly of our allies.
        Achieving our goals for Afghanistan will not be easy, but
    I'm optimistic that we can succeed with the support of
    Congress. Our mission was underresourced for years, but it's
    now one of our government's highest priorities, with
    substantial development funds and hundreds more civilians.
        We will soon have increased our civilian presence in Kabul
    over threefold and in the field over sixfold, and this is just
    over the past year. We will, of course, need more.
        U.S. foreign assistance is also comparatively small, but an
    essential fraction of the total amount spent in Afghanistan
    over the last 8 years. Additional resources will be necessary
    and we look forward to sharing more details of our anticipated
    needs with Congress in the coming days and weeks.
        Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan represents a daunting challenge,
    and success is not guaranteed, but it is possible. With the
    additional troops and other resources provided by the President
    and with the help of Congress, we will work tirelessly to
    ensure al Qaeda never again finds refuge in Afghanistan and
    threatens our country and our Homeland.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Eikenberry follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
    the committee,
        Thank you for the opportunity to present my views on Afghanistan
    today. Last week, in his speech at West Point, President Obama
    presented the administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    His decision came after an intensive, deliberate and far-reaching
    review of conditions, risks, and options available. The course he
    outlined offers the best path to stabilize Afghanistan and to ensure al
    Qaeda and other terrorist groups cannot regain a foothold to plan new
    attacks against our country or our allies. I fully support this
    approach. It has been welcomed by the Afghan Government, which said it
    will spare no effort to achieve the strategy's key objectives. I hope
    it will be welcomed here in Congress.
        I consider myself privileged to serve in Kabul and to represent an
    extraordinary team of diplomats, development specialists, and civilian
    experts from many fields and multiple agencies who form the most
    capable and dedicated U.S. mission anywhere. Our civilian presence will
    have tripled by early 2010 and, with the support of Congress, we
    anticipate it will expand further next year. More important than the
    numbers of people are the skills that these men and women possess, and
    their willingness to work tirelessly under the most difficult
    conditions. Many of them are out in the field with our military at the
    forefront of our Nation's effort to stabilize Afghanistan and the
    region. I am extraordinarily proud of them.
        I am honored to testify alongside General Stan McChrystal, my
    professional colleague and friend of many years, to describe how we
    will carry out the President's strategy for Afghanistan. My testimony
    will focus on the civilian role in that strategy, but I want to
    underscore at the outset that General McChrystal and I are united in a
    joint effort in which civilian and military personnel work together
    every day, often literally side-by-side with our Afghan partners and
    allies. We could not accomplish our objectives without such a combined
    effort, and I am proud that we have forged a close working relationship
    at the top and throughout our organizations, one that will deepen in
    coming months as additional troops and civilians arrive.
        Our Nation is at a critical juncture in our involvement in
    Afghanistan, and my testimony today represents my assessment of the
    situation and prospects for achieving our goals.
        A mission that in past years was poorly defined and under-resourced
    is now clear and, thanks to Congress, better resourced. The President,
    on December 1, authorized 30,000 additional troops to deploy to
    Afghanistan on an accelerated timetable, with the goal of breaking the
    insurgency's momentum, hastening and improving the training of Afghan
    National Security Forces (ANSF), and restoring security in key areas of
    the country. I joined Secretary Clinton and General McChrystal in
    Brussels last week to present the administration's decisions to the
    allies, and we anticipate our troops will be joined by a substantial
    increase of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces. Our military
    effort and civilian assistance will be closely coordinated. On the
    civilian side, we aim to increase employment and provide essential
    services in areas of greatest insecurity, and to improve critical
    ministries and the economy at the national level. These steps will, I
    believe, help to remove insurgents from the battlefield and build
    support for the Afghan Government.
        As the President said, ``we will be clear about what we expect from
    those who receive our assistance.'' We expect the Afghan Government to
    take specific actions in the key areas of security, governance, and
    economic development on an urgent basis. In the eighth year of our
    involvement, Afghans must progressively take greater responsibility for
    their own affairs. As we reduce our combat role, we will be
    transforming our diplomatic, security, and economic relations to
    reflect a more fully sovereign Afghanistan.
        I firmly believe these adjustments to our course provide the best
    possible chance of achieving success on a reasonable timetable, but I
    will also give you my honest appraisal of the challenges as I see them.
        No way forward is without risk. Eight years after the terrorist
    attacks of September 11 and the removal of the Taliban from power,
    Afghanistan remains a disconnected society, divided by factionalism,
    plagued by corruption and illegal narcotics, and challenged by
    insecurity. These problems are in large measure the product of nearly
    three decades of war, which broke down the fabric of Afghanistan's
    centuries-old society and contributed to deep poverty, illiteracy, drug
    addiction, and unemployment. This has been compounded in recent years
    by a growing disillusionment among Afghans, both with their own
    government and with the uneven results of the assistance delivered by
    the international community. The United States must approach the
    daunting complexities of Afghanistan with an awareness of our
    limitations. Our forces and our civilians are trying to help a society
    that simultaneously wants and rejects outside intervention. Afghans
    yearn for the peace and stability that has been denied them for too
    long. We will not fully heal their society's deep-seated problems, but
    we can help them along a path to normalcy and stability that is key to
    protecting our own vital interests. We are, simply put, helping
    Afghanistan build security forces and other basic institutions of
    government to prevent a return to the conditions that it endured before
    September 11, 2001.
        Let me mention two challenges we face. The first is that, in spite
    of everything we do, Afghanistan may struggle to take over the
    essential tasks of governance; the second is our partnership with
    Pakistan, which the President has stated is inextricably linked to our
    success in Afghanistan. Though these risks cannot be discounted, if the
    main elements of the President's plan are executed, and if our Afghan
    partners and our allies do their part, I am confident we can achieve
    our strategic objectives.
        I say this with conviction, because for the first time in my three
    tours in Afghanistan--two while in uniform and now as ambassador--all
    the elements of our national power are employed with the full support
    of the President and, increasingly, of our allies. We have made great
    strides over the last 6 months in improving interagency coordination
    and civil-military collaboration. Our military and civilian teams on
    the ground are the best ever fielded. More important, after a difficult
    election, the Afghan Government shows signs of recognizing the need to
    deliver better governance and security, though we await concrete steps
    in many areas.
        Achieving our objectives on an accelerated timetable will almost
    certainly take additional resources--more troops, but also more
    development aid and additional civilian personnel to assist the Afghan
    Government and people, so they can assume control of their own affairs.
    The administration will be working with Congress in coming days and
    weeks to define our request.
        I would like to now discuss the three main pillars of our effort in
    Afghanistan--security, governance, and development--and then say a few
    words about the organization of our mission and about the wider region.

                                    SECURITY

        General McChrystal has already addressed our plans for improving
    security and building the Afghan National Security Forces. The civilian
    role in this effort at the local level is to partner with the military
    and with the Afghan Government in restoring basic services and economic
    opportunity in cleared areas. I will return to this partnership and our
    role in it shortly. First, though, let me give you my perspective as
    ambassador on the security situation.
        Since assuming my post in May, I have made a special point of
    getting outside Kabul as frequently as possible to see conditions
    around the country first-hand and to consult with Afghans, allies, and
    our own civilian and military personnel. I fully concur with General
    McChrystal's assessment that the security situation, which worsened
    dramatically this past year, remains serious. The Taliban and other
    extremists groups exercise increasing influence in many areas of the
    south and east, and attacks and instability are rising in parts of the
    north and west as well, which long have been relatively stable. The
    insurgents are loosely organized, yet resilient and effective in many
    areas. Augmenting U.S. and NATO-ISAF forces is critical to regain the
    initiative. I am confident that, as the additional U.S. troops arrive
    in coming months, the situation will stabilize and turn in our favor.
    Most Afghans have little interest in a future under the Taliban's
    brutal and arbitrary rule, and the troops now deploying will reassure
    them that they have the opportunity for a secure and better future. Our
    troops will serve as a bridge, improving security in key areas, just as
    the Marine and Army units sent earlier this year are doing with great
    skill in Helmand and Kandahar provinces.
        Additional troops will also permit us to expand our partnering with
    and training of the Afghan army and police, so they can take on a
    progressively larger role in providing security. We all recognize the
    extraordinary challenges of building competent security forces.
    Afghanistan has not had a national army recruited from all ethnic
    groups and regions for many years, and low literacy, high attrition,
    and the lack of resources and expertise pose continuing problems.
    However, our forces are highly skilled at this training and partnering
    mission, which they have performed ably under the most difficult
    circumstances in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan. I am confident that
    deployment of additional U.S. troops will yield improvements in the
    ANSF.
        On the civilian side, we are supporting our military's efforts. Our
    Drug Enforcement Administration provides specialized training to the
    Afghan Counternarcotics Police. Our Federal Bureau of Investigation
    assists the Afghan Ministry of Interior in improving law enforcement
    capabilities. Lastly, our Border Management Task Force, which includes
    U.S. Central Command, the Department of Homeland Security, and its
    Customs and Border Protection Agency, assists both the Afghan Border
    Police and the Customs Department.
        As part of assuming the sovereign responsibility of protecting its
    people, the Afghan Government must build the ministerial capacity to
    recruit, train, and sustain the army and police, so that when our
    support begins to diminish Afghan forces are capable of protecting the
    country on their own. Simply put, the Afghan army and police need the
    full commitment of their political leadership. As President Obama said,
    the transition to Afghan responsibility will begin in the summer of
    2011, when we expect Afghan security forces and the entire Afghan
    Government can begin assuming lead responsibility for defending their
    country.
        We should recognize that one reason Afghanistan has been slow to
    assume a larger role in providing for its own security is the
    widespread concern among the populace that it will be abandoned by the
    international community, as happened after the withdrawal of the Soviet
    Union in 1989. For more than a decade afterward, Afghanistan endured
    brutal civil war, anarchy and later, the repressive Taliban regime that
    harbored and enabled al Qaeda. The fear of once again having to fend
    for itself again is deeply felt in the country, which lies in a
    volatile region where many of its neighbors have competed to control
    events inside Afghan borders.
        While the United States does not intend to continue our high level
    of deployed forces indefinitely, we are fully committed to assisting
    Afghanistan. To give Afghans confidence that they will not be abandoned
    again, the United States is committed to engaging in a strategic
    dialogue to define our long-term relationship on the basis of shared
    interests and values, just as we do with other nations. We will
    continue to assist and advise the ANSF to ensure they succeed over the
    long term. Though our relations are today dominated by questions about
    security, we have no territorial ambitions and do not seek permanent
    military bases. Afghans should be confident the United States is a
    trustworthy friend on whom they can rely after our combat forces begin
    to go home. Afghanistan's place in Central and South Asia must be
    secure.

                                   GOVERNANCE

        The second pillar of our comprehensive strategy focuses on
    improving Afghan governance. I would like to describe the civilian role
    in this effort, first at the national level and then in the provinces
    and districts. At both levels, our overarching goal is to encourage
    good governance, free from corruption, so Afghans see the benefits of
    supporting the legitimate government, and the insurgency loses support.
        As General McChrystal points out, one of the major impediments our
    strategy faces is the Afghan Government's lack of credibility with its
    own people. To build its legitimacy, our approach at the national level
    is on improving key ministries, both by increasing the number of
    civilian technical advisers and by providing more development
    assistance directly through these ministries' budgets. By focusing on
    key ministries that deliver essential services and security, we can
    accelerate the building of an Afghan Government that is visible,
    effective, and accountable.
        We must support the government's ability to deliver for the Afghan
    people. Afghan ministers say that too much of the development
    assistance provided is spent outside their national budget, often on
    programs that are not their priorities. We agree, and as part of the
    President's new emphasis we are committed to providing more direct
    assistance. We are reviewing the financial management systems of these
    key ministries and, if their financial system can be certified as
    accountable and transparent, we provide direct funding to be used for
    basic services, such as health, education and agriculture. Similarly,
    to extend the government's reach around the country, Afghanistan needs
    educated, trained, and honest civil servants. To accomplish this, the
    United States and international partners will train current government
    employees in public administration and help build a pool of
    administrators and technical managers.
        Cutting across this entire effort to improve Afghans' confidence in
    their government is the need to combat corruption and promote the rule
    of law. Without institutions that serve the needs of ordinary Afghans
    and government officials who are accountable and honest, Afghanistan
    will always be in danger of returning to the conditions that made it a
    haven for violent extremists.
        With our assistance and that of our allies, the Afghan Government
    is steadily building law enforcement institutions to fight corruption,
    organized crime, and drug trafficking. With the support of the Federal
    Bureau of Investigations, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and our
    military, the Ministries of Interior and Counter Narcotics, and the
    Afghan National Directorate of Security recently created the Major
    Crimes Task Force, which is responsible for investigating major
    corruption, kidnapping, and organized crimes cases. Similarly,
    Afghanistan's Attorney General recently established a special Anti-
    Corruption Unit, aimed at prosecuting misconduct by mid-and high-level
    government officials. In addition, a specialized Anti-Corruption
    Tribunal is being created to handle significant corruption cases,
    including prosecutions involving provincial officials. Our Mission's
    Department of Justice team is also providing support.
        In his inaugural address, President Karzai stated his intention to
    make merit-based appointments in his new cabinet and to implement an
    anti-corruption strategy, including by expanding the powers of the
    existing High Office of Oversight. We are encouraged by his statements,
    but we need to work together to aggressively implement this goal and
    produce results. In addition to his cabinet, it is important that
    qualified appointments are made at the vice minister, provincial and
    district levels, which would give the Afghan Government greater
    credibility with its people and permit more rapid reforms. Secretary
    Clinton last month discussed with President Karzai the necessity of
    moving swiftly to develop concrete plans to implement this agenda to
    improve government accountability and performance.
        Beyond the national level, I would like to address our efforts to
    promote governance at the provincial and district levels. We are
    working jointly with the military through our Provincial Reconstruction
    Teams, District Development Working Groups, and District Support Teams,
    which help build Afghan capacity in key areas, particularly in areas of
    greatest insecurity in southern and eastern Afghanistan. We are
    improving governance beyond Kabul through rule-of-law programs and
    other mechanisms that have proven effective in giving Afghans a greater
    stake in their government, including through the National Solidarity
    Program. We have expanded our support for the Afghan Social Outreach
    Program to create provincial and district councils and build citizen
    involvement. We are working with the Afghan Government to provide
    incentives for sub-national leaders to improve performance. I would
    like to emphasize that we are concentrating on what is essential and
    attainable. In all of these efforts, we must not wait too long to
    create an Afghan autonomous capability, or we risk building a
    dependency that will be that much harder to break.
        Some might argue that we are reaching too high--that Afghanistan
    has rarely in its history had a central government capable of carrying
    out these tasks and that to expect a coherent state to emerge now is
    unrealistic and a waste of resources. I disagree with that argument on
    several levels. First, while the Afghan state has never been
    particularly strong, Afghanistan has had functioning governments in
    Kabul that were widely viewed as legitimate. Second, the government
    structure we are helping to develop is one with the minimum set of
    capabilities that any state must possess to serve its people.
        Our goal is not nation building, nor are we attempting to impose a
    Western model of governance. Afghanistan is a poor country that will
    remain dependent on international aid for years to come. This strategy
    for improving governance is based on a pragmatic assessment of the
    national security interests of the United States, and our belief that
    sustainable representative government is essential to success.
    Afghanistan needs a viable government so our forces can draw down and
    the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars can be reduced. Achieving those
    goals will prevent the need for the United States and its allies to
    intervene to protect ourselves from extremists who, unless we succeed,
    might once again find refuge in Afghanistan.
        The cultivation of poppy and the trafficking in opium without a
    doubt has the most debilitating effect on Afghan society, feeding
    corruption and undermining the legal economy, while generating funds
    for the insurgency. Our strategy for combating the pervasive impact of
    illegal narcotics is multi-pronged, involving demand reduction, efforts
    by law enforcement and the military to detain major traffickers and
    interdict drug shipments, and support for licit agricultural
    development. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration works closely
    with Afghan partners to investigate and prosecute major traffickers.
    With our support, the Counter-Narcotics Justice Task Force has become
    the most effective judicial organization in Afghanistan today, with
    successful investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of hundreds of
    drug traffickers. But the narcotics problem will never have a
    satisfactory solution without economic development in this still
    desperately poor country.

                                  DEVELOPMENT

        Along with security and governance, the third pillar of our effort
    is development assistance. In recent months, we have adjusted our
    approach to focus on building key elements of Afghanistan's private-
    sector economy, increasing our emphasis on agriculture, enhancing
    government revenue collection, and improving the coordination of
    assistance delivery within the U.S. Government and across the
    international community. These refinements are designed to produce
    measurable improvements in the lives of ordinary Afghans--and thus to
    contribute directly to more effective government and to lessened
    support for the insurgency.
        We are targeting much of our assistance where violence is worst and
    shifting to more flexible and faster contract and grant mechanisms, to
    ensure our dollars are effectively supporting our efforts in the
    provinces. Development specialists at the U.S. Agency for International
    Development (USAID), joined by experts from multiple departments and
    agencies of our government, are focusing on key sectors, such as
    agriculture. Rebuilding the farm sector is essential for the Afghan
    Government to reduce the pool of unemployed men who form the recruiting
    base for extremist groups. We estimate that at least 80 percent of the
    Afghan population derives their income, either directly or indirectly,
    from agriculture. Our agriculture efforts also seek to reinforce our
    governance strategy, so that the Agriculture Ministry will increasingly
    be--and be seen as--a tangible example of a more effective government.
        At the same time, we are encouraging long-term investment,
    specifically by funding water management and electrification projects
    that deliver power and large-scale irrigation, and we promote mining
    and light industry that leverage Afghanistan's agricultural products
    and natural resources.
        We are also helping Afghanistan's Government increase revenue
    collection. Without improvements in its ability to collect taxes and
    customs receipts, Afghanistan will always remain overly dependent on
    the international community and will struggle to meet the needs of its
    people. The Afghan Government has made progress in recent years in
    increasing domestic revenue collection, which has risen from 3.3
    percent of gross domestic product to 7.7 percent. That is still too
    low. Most low-income countries collect 11 to 12 percent of their gross
    domestic product on average, and we and our other partners are working
    with the Ministry of Finance on reforms that will further increase
    revenue. The biggest problem remains corruption, however. The current
    rough estimate is that only half of the revenue collected actually
    makes it into the treasury. Low domestic revenue undermines the Afghan
    Government's ability to provide services, while graft and bribery
    diminishes confidence in and support for the government.
    Representatives from the U.S. Treasury Department are working with the
    Afghan Finance Ministry and other essential ministries to build
    fiduciary systems that will permit us to provide them more direct
    funding.
        Additionally, our Department of State and Commerce experts are
    assisting the Afghans to promote regional trade to help their economy.
    We expect that Afghanistan and Pakistan will shortly conclude a Transit
    Trade Agreement that will open new opportunities for commerce between
    the two countries. Finally, we also seek Congressional support to soon
    pass Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation to create long-term
    and sustainable employment opportunities. Improving official commercial
    and trade relations will also contribute to an improved Afghanistan-
    Pakistan security relationship.

                              OUR CIVILIAN EFFORT

        Achieving our goals for Afghanistan will not be easy, but I am
    optimistic that we can succeed with the support of Congress. Under-
    resourced for years, our mission is now one of our government's highest
    priorities, with substantial additional development funds and hundreds
    of additional personnel. By early 2010, we will have almost 1,000
    civilians from numerous government departments and agencies on the
    ground in Afghanistan, tripling the total from the beginning of 2009.
    Of these, nearly 400 will serve out in the field with the military at
    Provincial Reconstruction Teams or at the brigade-level and on forward
    operating bases. By comparison, 1 year ago there were only 67 U.S.
    civilians serving outside Kabul. The hundreds of dedicated Americans
    who have taken on this assignment voluntarily accept hardship and risk
    and deserve our recognition and appreciation for the exemplary work
    they are performing under very difficult conditions. They are an
    extraordinarily skilled group, chosen because they have the proper
    skills and experience to achieve the results we seek.
        In coming months, as our troops conduct operations to stabilize new
    areas, they will be joined by additional civilian personnel to work
    with our Afghan partners to strengthen governance and provide basic
    services as rapidly as possible. The integration of civilian and
    military effort has greatly improved over the last year, a process that
    will deepen as additional troops arrive and our civilian effort
    expands. We have designated Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) as
    counterparts to NATO-ISAF commanders in each of the Regional Commands.
    These SCRs are senior professionals, experienced in conflict
    environments. They direct the work of U.S. Government civilians within
    their regions, subject to my overall guidance. This organizational
    structure has two important features: First, it ensures that our
    civilian efforts are fully integrated with the military's in the field.
    Second, it is decentralized, enabling quick response to local needs,
    which is essential to deal with the varying conditions in Afghanistan.
    To maximize our impact in priority areas, we have created District
    Support Teams, which allow civilians in the field to collaborate with
    the military to build Afghan capacity in assigned districts.
        U.S. foreign assistance is a comparatively small but essential
    fraction of the total dollars spent in Afghanistan over the last 8
    years. Our increased civilian presence has enabled us to more
    effectively and more rapidly invest our assistance in the areas of
    agriculture, job creation, education, health care, and infrastructure
    projects. Additional resources will be necessary for our effort to keep
    pace with the military's expansion, to carry out the President's
    strategy on a rapid timetable. We look forward to sharing additional
    details on our anticipated needs with Congress in the coming days and
    weeks.
        We have also improved our contracting to enhance performance and
    increase the effectiveness of our development aid programs. In a
    conflict zone, a degree of program risk is unavoidable, but U.S.
    Government agencies in the mission remain accountable to Congress for
    every dollar they spend. Given the great amount of resources and
    emphasis devoted to Afghanistan, our programs receive extraordinary
    oversight, including by a Kabul-based Special Inspector General for
    Afghan Reconstruction, multiple audits of USAID and International
    Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs, and a hotline to report fraud,
    waste, and abuse.

                                    PAKISTAN

        Finally, let me say a few words about Pakistan and the critical
    impact that developments in that country will have on our efforts over
    the next year. The expanded military and civilian effort we are
    undertaking in Afghanistan is likely to produce measurable improvements
    in security and in Afghanistan's governance capacity, but we will
    likely fall short of our strategic goals unless there is more progress
    at eliminating the sanctuaries used by Afghan Taliban and their allied
    militant extremists in Pakistan. The vast majority of enemy fighters
    our troops face on the battlefield are local Afghans, fighting in their
    home provinces or regions. But the Afghan Taliban and other insurgents
    receive significant aid and direction from senior leaders operating
    outside Afghanistan's borders. The Afghan Taliban's leadership may
    employ those sanctuaries, as they have in the past, to simply wait us
    out and renew their attacks once our troops begin to go home.
    Recognizing this, the administration has emphasized the need for a
    regional approach that deals with the interrelated problems of
    Afghanistan and Pakistan and seeks to improve relations between the two
    governments.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is a daunting challenge. I have tried to
    describe how our Mission, as part of an integrated civil-military team,
    will pursue the President's goals and our country's interests. I have
    also given you my best assessment of the risks we face. Let me, in
    closing, once again thank the men and women of the U.S. Mission in
    Afghanistan and our Armed Forces. Together with the members of other
    NATO-ISAF armed forces, the international community and our Afghan
    allies, they do exemplary work on a daily basis that helps to protect
    the American people. They are prepared to work even harder to help the
    Afghan Government to stand on its own and handle the threats it faces.
    They believe firmly that our mission is necessary and achievable, and
    so do I. Success is not guaranteed, but it is possible. With the
    additional troops and other resources provided by the President--and
    with the help of Congress--we can ensure al Qaeda never again finds
    refuge in Afghanistan and threatens our country.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
        We'll try a 7-minute round and hope that we can get to
    everybody by the time that you two have to leave us.
        General, let me ask you the first question. Is it your
    personal professional judgment that the President's strategic
    plan is the correct plan?
        General McChrystal. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is.
        Chairman Levin. Are there any elements of the plan you
    don't agree with?
        General McChrystal. I'm comfortable with the entire plan,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Ambassador, do you support the President's
    plan and each of its elements?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Now, the President has set a specific date
    of July 2011 for the start of U.S. troop reductions. It's
    specific and it's set, as directed by the President. He's also
    indicated that the pace of the reductions is dependent on
    conditions on the ground.
        General, do you fully agree with the July 2011 date which
    the President directed as the start of reductions of some U.S.
    forces?
        General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, I do, and I'd like to
    explain why.
        Chairman Levin. Please.
        General McChrystal. Sir, from the military strategy point,
    I view it in a wider context. First, most importantly, I think
    the President has stated and other leaders of our government
    have the commitment to a strategic partnership with Afghanistan
    and the Afghan people. So I believe that the context that
    provides, that we will not abandon them over time, is very,
    very important. It gives them a consistency in our commitment
    to them and some assurance for the future.
        Sir, on the other end of that, in the very near term, the
    President has provided our force additional combat forces,
    which I view, and I described in my opening statement, as being
    able to provide us time and space to reverse Taliban momentum
    and make progress against the insurgency in the near term,
    which I think the next 18 months are critical. During that
    period, I believe we'll be able to degrade the ability and the
    capacity of the insurgency significantly. Simultaneous to that
    will be growing the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan's
    security capability, the Afghan Army and Afghan police
    specifically, but also supported by governance.
        So I believe that when we hit July 2011 that's not a
    significant factor in our campaign plan. In fact, I think it
    has a positive forcing function on our Afghan partners in
    reminding them that, although we have a long-term commitment,
    we also have shared responsibility. So I think there are some
    positives.
        I do want to point out that I understand that there's an
    information operations challenge. The Taliban particularly will
    try to paint this in a particular picture, and I think we just
    have to deal and combat that.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General, how many Afghan soldiers are now partnered with
    U.S. combat troops and are in the fight in Regional Commands
    (RC)-South and RC-East, where the major fighting is occurring?
    What's that number?
        General McChrystal. Sir, if you'll permit me to pull out my
    numbers here.
        Chairman Levin. If you could just give us the number of
    Afghan soldiers, one number, partnered with U.S. combat forces,
    in the fight?
        General McChrystal. In RC-South, sir, that would be 16,700.
        Chairman Levin. 16,000?
        General McChrystal. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. How about east?
        General McChrystal. Sir, that would be 23,300 army. Neither
    of those numbers include the police.
        Chairman Levin. Now, in Operation Cobra Anger in Helmand
    it's reported we have 1,000 marines there right now in that
    operation and there's about 150 Afghan troops. When we were in
    Helmand Province, where we visited, there were five U.S. troops
    for each Afghan troop. I think I stated it correctly. But
    currently in Operation Anger there's 1,000 marines, joined by
    150 Afghans. That's about seven U.S. troops for every one
    Afghan.
        Given the number of Afghan troops that are there, why are
    these ratios so inconsistent with what our own doctrine is,
    which says that we should have a one-to-one partnership, one
    unit of ours for one unit of the Afghans, hopefully leading to
    one unit of ours to three Afghan units by the end of the
    partnering period? How come the ratio is so reversed of what
    our doctrine requires?
        General McChrystal. The primary reason is there are not yet
    enough Afghan National Army (ANA) or Afghan National Police
    (ANP). The main focus of our coalition element or strategy has
    recently been in the south. In the Helmand area, when you and I
    were there, you're correct, it was about one Afghan security
    force participant to five coalition. That's now 1 to 3.6 and by
    the end of January we'll have it 1 to 2.3.
        Chairman Levin. Now, the British insist on one-to-one. The
    Australians insist on one-to-one. It's their doctrine. It's
    their mission that they are mainly there for partnering with
    the Afghan troops, and so their requirement, which they insist
    on, is about a one-to-one to begin with. Why do we not have
    that same insistence, determination, that our doctrine, which
    is one-to-one, be implemented, since partnering and training
    the Afghan forces is such an important part of our mission?
        General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more.
    There are simply not yet an ANA to meet everyone's
    requirements. We are fielding as we speak this month 1,900
    additional ANA soldiers between December and January. That's 16
    new ANA companies. All will go into the Helmand area.
        Chairman Levin. We're going to have 20,000 there by what
    time?
        General McChrystal. Of our additional forces?
        Chairman Levin. No, of our forces. We have 10,000 in
    Helmand now. We're going to add another 9,000 or 10,000.
        General McChrystal. Sir, by mid-spring, late spring.
        Chairman Levin. So the ratio is still going to be
    overwhelmingly U.S. to Afghan, even after those Afghan
    additions; isn't that right?
        General McChrystal. Sir, by April we will create another
    brigade of ANA forces that will go to the south--I'm sorry. Two
    brigades by summer and an additional corps headquarters. We're
    flowing everything we can build in the Afghan army into that
    area. I absolutely agree with your point.
        Chairman Levin. General Jones indicated in a news interview
    last weekend, I believe, that currently at least 7 of the 34
    Afghan provinces today--that's 20 percent of their provinces--
    have the conditions for successful transition, right now. Now
    quoting General Jones: ``Specifically, security, economic
    development, and reasonably good governance.''
        Why not transfer responsibility now, since the conditions
    exist now for successful transition?
        General McChrystal. In fact, the Afghans have the lead over
    the entire country. Legally, they're a sovereign country. It's
    different than Iraq.
        Chairman Levin. Then why did Secretary Gates and Secretary
    Clinton repeatedly say that transition is going to begin in
    July 2011, if the conditions for transition in seven provinces
    exist now? Why wait?
        General McChrystal. Senator, in fact, the city of Kabul has
    already transferred to----
        Chairman Levin. How about the other seven provinces?
        General McChrystal. There are areas where they, in fact,
    have the lead now, they execute, because there are not
    coalition forces operating in those areas. So the legal mandate
    that might be executed to do that I think is really in that
    case a formality. They have the lead in most of those areas
    right now, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ambassador Eikenberry, during the decisionmaking process
    there were several cables that you sent back that were
    classified Secret and yet were revealed to the media. They
    indicated that you had strong reservations about the surge.
        Have those reservations been resolved in your mind?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, 100 percent with the
    refinement of the mission and with clarification on the ways
    that we're going to move forward and the resources allocated
    against this, absolutely.
        Senator McCain. General McChrystal, Secretary Gates said
    today in Kabul: ``We're in this thing to win.'' Do you agree
    with his statement and do you have what you need to win?
        General McChrystal. I agree with the Secretary's statement.
    We are in it to win. I think we have what we need to win. But I
    think the ultimate winners become the Afghan people.
        Senator McCain. What do you expect we will have achieved by
    2011? I understand there's going to be a major review of the
    plan by December 2010. What do you expect we will have achieved
    by 2011 when, as the response to Senator Levin's statement, is
    a firm date for beginning withdrawal of U.S. troops? We will
    have benchmarks that you will be sharing with us, I'm sure. Go
    ahead.
        General McChrystal. Absolutely. The most important thing we
    will have done by the summer of 2011 is convince the majority
    of the Afghan people that in fact we are going to win, we and
    the Afghan Government are going to win, and that, that is going
    to be the direction for the future. What we will do is start by
    reversing the Taliban momentum and the perception of momentum,
    because at the end of the day success in this fight is about
    what the people believe.
        We will be able, between now and summer of 2011, to reverse
    that momentum, to increase the number of security zones we
    have, providing more areas contiguous security. So for example,
    a farmer in Garmsir in the central Helmand River Valley, which
    has been secured now by a combination of Afghan forces and
    marines, who've done a great job, we'll be able to move product
    all the way from Garmsir to Lashkar Gah and Kandahar. Currently
    we don't have contiguous security; we have pockets of security.
    We'll be able to grow that. We'll be able to increase their
    ability not only to live in their own neighborhood more
    normally, but also to live a life more normally.
        Senator McCain. What if we haven't achieved those
    objectives by July 2011? What do we do then, since we have a
    firm date for the beginning of a withdrawal?
        General McChrystal. Sir, of course we always assess our
    strategy as we go along and make decisions based upon the
    situation.
        Senator McCain. But we still have a firm date.
        You said, General McChrystal, ``The success of this
    operation will be determined in the minds of the Afghan
    people.'' What would you say to Afghans, Pakistanis, and others
    in the region, both our friends and enemies, who may now feel
    like hedging their bets or sitting on the fence because they
    doubt America's commitment and resolve?
        General McChrystal. Sir, there will be some who are in
    opposition and some who are in ignorance, who will try to use
    that as a point of propaganda. I think if we point out the
    long-term strategic partnership both to the Government of
    Afghanistan and to our Pakistani partners, and our short-term
    clear commitment by the additional forces and the focus of our
    strategy, I believe that we can make that point effectively.
        Senator McCain. It is obvious from your experience in
    Afghanistan that the Afghan people do not want the return of
    the Taliban, and that is a significant advantage and one that
    perhaps has not been made as clear to the American people, not
    only because of the things they might do to harm the United
    States, but the terrible treatment of the Afghan people,
    including women in Afghanistan.
        General McChrystal. Senator, that is absolutely correct.
    Everywhere I go, I have never seen evidence that the Taliban
    have popular support, like a political liberation movement.
    They get their support largely through coercion. So the average
    people are simply waiting to see whether or not their
    government can defeat that insurgency.
        Senator McCain. Is it still your goal to train 400,000
    Afghan security forces by 2013?
        General McChrystal. Sir, I believe that we need to
    significantly increase the ANSF. I recommend that we stay on a
    very aggressive timeline to try to reach that, but adjust those
    goals on two things: one, if the insurgency's size creases, it
    might be able to be adjusted; and also the ability of the
    Afghan Government to provide recruits, retention, and those
    things which enable the growth.
        Senator McCain. What level do you expect it to be by July
    2011?
        General McChrystal. Sir, I believe between the army and
    police total it will be approaching 300,000 people.
        Senator McCain. What about the strain on the men and women
    in the military, General?
        General McChrystal. Sir, I think the strain is significant.
    But I was out at Walter Reed yesterday morning, as I went
    through with my wife and visited soldiers who'd been wounded,
    not just in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq. Every soldier we
    spoke to talked about wanting to get back in the fight, even
    though it was clear that many would be very challenged to do
    that.
        Every soldier that I see in the field expresses the same
    sort of focus. So I believe that while there's clear strain on
    families, and we cannot understate the importance of the
    programs that this body has done for wounded warriors and for
    families, I believe this force wants to win, and I believe that
    commitment is the most important thing.
        Senator McCain. How important is it that we find and bring
    to justice Osama bin Laden and what effect would that have on
    our effort there?
        I'd also be interested in your view, Ambassador.
        General McChrystal. Sir, I believe he is an iconic figure
    at this point, whose survival emboldens al Qaeda as a
    franchising organization across the world. It would not defeat
    al Qaeda to have him captured or killed, but I don't think that
    we can finally defeat al Qaeda until he is captured or killed.
        Senator McCain. Until he is captured or brought to justice.
        Ambassador?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I'd only add to that, that
    it does remain important to the American people, indeed the
    people of the world, that one day Osama bin Laden is either
    captured or killed or brought to justice for his responsibility
    for the murder of many Americans and citizens of the world on
    September 11, 2001.
        Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses. I know you have an
    enormous task ahead of you. You have our support and our
    thoughts and our prayers are with you. We look forward to
    making your life miserable by coming over to visit you.
    [Laughter.]
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I promise to come with Senator McCain and to the extent
    that I can try to make his visit less miserable for the two of
    you than it would otherwise be. [Laughter.]
        I thank you both for your extraordinary service. I do want
    to say a word about Senator McCain's opening statement today.
    It builds on what he said last week when Secretaries Gates and
    Clinton and Admiral Mullen were here. It's obvious that he
    disagrees on the question of the deadline, or whatever one
    calls it, for July 2011, exit strategy. But he made an
    important statement today, which is he's just going to have to
    agree to disagree. The administration and he are going to have
    to agree to disagree and go forward, because he supports the
    basic program.
        I hope this sets a tone for people in both parties. No
    matter what they feel about one or another detail of the
    decision the President made, it is now American policy, and the
    truth is we all ought to come together behind you, General
    McChrystal, and the troops that you're leading, and Ambassador
    Eikenberry, you and the civilian personnel you're leading, and
    give you 18 months when you don't have any carping or
    backbiting from Washington to get the job done for us. I thank
    you for that.
        I never felt uncomfortable or critical about the length of
    the deliberative process that President Obama conducted, but I
    thought the worst thing about it was that it appeared that
    people associated with it were leaking documents or arguments
    to try to affect public opinion, and one was this alleged email
    that you sent, Ambassador Eikenberry, because none of us,
    obviously, saw it. I didn't see it.
        I appreciate what you said to Senator McCain, that you have
    a good working relationship with General McChrystal. But what
    the media was reporting was that the substance of the email was
    your concern that if we sent too many troops too quickly, it
    would take the pressure off of the Afghan Government. I wanted
    to ask you to deal with that in two ways, if you would. It's
    awkward to ask it and yet the media is talking about it, so I
    think it's best to give you a chance to comment in public.
        The first is, to what extent the publication of that email,
    with its skepticism, that a lot of people here in Washington
    share, about the government in Kabul, what effect, if any, it's
    had on your relationship with President Karzai and the
    government. The second is, if you could deal with the
    substance, which is I gather--what we heard of the email, it
    had a substantial policy argument, which was that first we
    better get the Afghans to shape up before we send in more
    troops.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Thanks, Senator. Let me take the
    second half first, on the substance. There was a very
    deliberate review process that both General McChrystal and I
    talked about in our opening statements, and during that review
    process all of us were encouraged to render our best analysis
    and best advice. It was an extraordinary process, as it should
    have been given the complexities and the consequences of the
    decision. During that time, all of us participating had
    opportunities in videoteleconferences, through face-to-face
    discussions, through written correspondence, to submit our
    views.
        The second point I wanted to make is that at no time,
    Senator, was I opposed to additional forces being sent to
    Afghanistan. I do share General McChrystal's security analysis
    that he conducted. It was comprehensive and it was correct. The
    situation in parts of Afghanistan, the security had
    deteriorated, and still in parts of Afghanistan it remains very
    difficult.
        The only way to address those problems, those challenges of
    insecurity, is additional forces, whether U.S. or non-U.S. NATO
    forces. We have an absolute consensus that we need to
    accelerate the building of the Afghan army and police. The best
    way to do that is additional U.S. forces. But all of us had
    questions, of course, when we have a very significant decision
    to be made about additional forces, important to understand the
    number, the timeline, the purpose, the context.
        But the third point I'd make then: With the President's
    decision, with the refinement of the mission, with clarity on
    what ways we were going to use and what resources would be
    allocated against that, at that point in time I was 100
    percent, and am now 100 percent, supportive of the decision
    that was made.
        With regard to effect on my relations with the Afghan
    Government, I maintain, Senator, good relations with President
    Karzai. My embassy, our embassy, maintains excellent relations
    with the Government of Afghanistan, and we're going to continue
    to improve upon what is already a very good working
    relationship.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate both parts of your answer.
    When I was last there with Senator McCain in August, it was
    clear that you had a good, an honest relationship with
    President Karzai and the administration, there are
    disagreements, but then a commitment to one another, that's
    exactly what we want.
        General McChrystal, just following up, I take it that the
    leak of the email has had no lasting effect on your ability to
    work with Ambassador Eikenberry? Obviously, if we're going to
    employ all elements of our national resources to Afghanistan,
    the relationship between the two of you is critically important
    to that.
        General McChrystal. It's fine, Senator. We work together
    literally every day. We have dinner together. That is an
    absolute misperception. We also know that we're only going to
    be successful together, both the two of us, but then also all
    our coalition and Afghan partners.
        Senator Lieberman. That's great. Thank you.
        When Secretary Gates was before the committee last week, he
    told us: ``Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal are, as
    we speak, working on a joint civil-military campaign plan just
    as General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker developed for Iraq
    in 2007.''
        I wanted to ask you first whether the Secretary is correct?
    Are you writing such a plan? Second, if so, can you tell us a
    little bit about the process by which the plan is being
    written? Ambassador?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Actually, if I could, Senator, there
    is an existing civil-military plan. General McChrystal and
    myself back in August, after intensive combined staff work on
    the civil-military side, we had signed a joint campaign plan
    that General Petraeus, when he reviewed it along with
    Ambassador Holbrooke, said it was absolutely the best civil-
    military plan that he's ever seen. We're proud of the work that
    was done on it.
        We are in the process of having to revise that plan based
    upon the implementation now of the new strategy. This plan is
    not a document which sits on a shelf. To give you an example of
    the integration that follows from this plan, at the national
    level we have 14 national level working groups. What do I mean
    by that? We have a national level working group for
    agriculture, a national level working group for infrastructure
    development.
        These are fully integrated teams that sit on these working
    groups. For instance, agriculture; members of U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID) sit on the team, the
    Department of Agriculture. Very importantly, from General
    McChrystal's command, we have the National Guard sitting on
    there and more of their military command.
        I could go through all of these various functional groups
    that we've established. That's at the national level
    horizontally. But vertically, from Kabul all the way down
    through the province, all the way through the district, we have
    a fully integrated civil-military unified effort. We're
    impressed with what we have. We're committed to making it
    better.
        Senator Lieberman. General McChrystal, do you want to add
    to that? I'm curious as to whether you have integration at the
    staff level on civil-military to work on the next phase of the
    plan.
        General McChrystal. We absolutely do. On a daily basis,
    they are meeting and working.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you both.
        Thanks very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McChrystal, when there's fighting near the Afghan-
    Pakistan border area and our troops are engaged with the enemy
    insurgents, what have been the rules of engagement with regard
    to what our troops can do when the enemy retreats back into
    Pakistan?
        General McChrystal. The intent of our rules of engagement
    is always to protect our forces, to never take away from our
    forces the ability to protect themselves, their wellbeing. We
    have the ability to fire across the border--artillery, air
    strikes, direct fire weapons--and that actually happens with a
    fair amount of regularity. But it also happens with
    coordination. We have a series of mechanisms in place with the
    Pakistani army so that as an incident occurs, before we shoot
    we immediately contact them and try to work out all the details
    so that they in fact approve the engagement with the enemy.
    That reduces misunderstandings.
        There are times when there are misunderstandings about
    that. So we constantly work with our forces to try to make sure
    we don't create issues. But we also try to prevent, both the
    Pakistani military and us, there being any kind of a scene.
        Senator Wicker. So we don't pursue across the border? Our
    troops don't have the ability to do that; is that correct?
        General McChrystal. Sir, I'd like to take that part for the
    record, whether they actually legally can. We have not been
    doing that, not going across on the ground.
        Senator Wicker. So they're under orders not to do that?
        General McChrystal. Sir, let me take that for the record,
    to make sure.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator Wicker. I just wondered, because you had testified
    that ``organizational and operational changes were going to
    need to be implemented, and I just was curious, and maybe you
    might want to take for the record that question too, as to
    whether our ability to pursue the enemy across the border, with
    the cooperation of the Pakistanis, might be part of those
    changes.
        So thank you for that, and I look forward to your answer.
        Mr. Ambassador, there are going to be Afghan parliamentary
    elections next year. I think it's beyond dispute that the
    presidential election was riddled with fraud and that the
    turnout was much lower than expected because of intimidation by
    the Taliban. What are our lessons learned from the presidential
    election to help us going forward to the parliamentary
    election?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, clearly the presidential
    election that Afghanistan went through was a very difficult
    process. There was fraud. In areas of Afghanistan that were
    challenged by insecurity, there was lower voter turnout. I
    would emphasize, however, that the rule of law, the rules
    according to the constitution, remained intact, and for that
    the Afghan people are proud.
        In the early 1990s when there was a change of political
    power in Kabul, it took place through warlords firing rockets
    down into the city of Kabul. So the Afghan people are proud
    that they made it through this process, difficult though it
    was.
        Now, against that, what lessons were learned, Senator?
    There has to be improvement in the electoral system of
    Afghanistan. The commission which has the oversight for the
    running of the election, it needs improvement. It needs help
    from the international community in that regard.
        Second, I think that the Afghans are politically going to
    have to come together and look at the election cycles that
    they've established right now. Between this year and 2024,
    every year except one has elections. They're going to need to
    look hard at that pace of elections.
        Then third, there's going to have to be reform and work
    done for voter registration to get a better handle on who is
    actually eligible to vote out there. I think that the Afghan
    parliament and President Karzai's administration, over the next
    several months, will be looking at this. Right now the
    parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in the
    spring. That will be a very ambitious timeline. I know it has
    security consequences, but it's a major point on the political
    agenda, for Afghanistan, and we're talking with the government
    about this.
        Senator Wicker. Is a major point of your political agenda
    to provide better security against coercion of the voters? What
    would be our plans for that?
        Let me interject: Were you surprised at the low turnout?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I was, I was, Senator, not on the
    day of the election. If you had asked me when I first came into
    Afghanistan on this tour of duty in May 2009, several months
    before the election, I would have suggested a much higher voter
    turnout in eastern and southern Afghanistan. One of the key
    factors that voter turnout was not high in those areas was
    insecurity. So as I said earlier in the testimony that I agreed
    with General McChrystal's security assessment, low voter
    turnout in areas where there is insecurity, not surprising.
        I was surprised, though, to see how far security had
    trended downward.
        Senator Wicker. Is a major agenda item providing better
    security for voters so they'll have more confidence that they
    can get back and forth to the polls?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I'd defer to General McChrystal on
    that, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. Is that a major item, General?
        General McChrystal. It absolutely is, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. Let me ask this, then. President Karzai in
    his inauguration speech mentioned his desire to convene a loya
    jirga. It has been further elaborated on by spokesmen saying
    that members of the Taliban would be invited to this loya
    jirga.
        Was this an American idea? I understand much of the
    President's inaugural address was written in consultation with
    Americans. Is that our view, Mr. Ambassador, that a loya jirga
    would include members of the Taliban? When might this occur?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I know that President Karzai has
    discussed holding a loya jirga. He has articulated that the
    purpose of the loya jirga would be to gain a consensus among
    the people, renew their support for the presence of the
    international community in the way ahead.
        With regard to Taliban participation in this, Senator, I
    don't know. I have not discussed that with President Karzai.
        Senator Wicker. Do you have an opinion with regard to
    whether that would be advisable?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. With regard to political discussions
    between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, Senator,
    that's very much a political question for the Afghan
    Government's administration. The principles that President
    Karzai has set forth about discussions of anybody rejoining
    Afghan society, Taliban rejoining Afghan society, the set of
    principles that he's established--number one, that they would
    have to renounce their ties to international terrorism; number
    two, renounce violence; number three, to follow the
    constitution of the Government of Afghanistan--those are
    entirely consistent with our own views.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Just a quick procedural point.
        We do expect that we'll have an opportunity at least for a
    brief second round. I want everyone to know that we expect that
    opportunity will be present.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen.
        General McChrystal, the rules of engagement within Afghan
    emphasize minimizing civilian casualties. That was a point you
    made when you took over, and Admiral Mullen made the same point
    yesterday at Camp Lejeune. I don't want to be presumptuous, but
    my understanding is it is based on your experience, your
    understanding of counterinsurgency warfare, the experience of
    the Soviets before us; you were not directed to do that by
    anyone; is that correct?
        General McChrystal. That is correct, Senator. I did before
    I deployed out watch the situation going on, so I had formed
    opinions, but got no specific direction.
        Senator Reed. Very good.
        One of the issues here is not only the increase in size of
    forces, but it's the unity of command and the unity of effort.
    That stretches across several dimensions--COIN operations,
    counterterrorism operations, counternarcotic operations, civil-
    military coordination, operations between NATO and Afghan
    security forces, operations between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    intelligence operations versus tactical operations in the
    field.
        Can you in a few minutes tell me, Ambassador Eikenberry
    also, what are you doing specifically to address this issue of
    unity of effort, and how important is it to your success?
        General McChrystal. Senator, it's absolutely critical to
    our success, unity of effort across the civil-military and
    within military operations. What we have done is, as we arrived
    out, we've done some organizational changes. The standup of the
    Intermediate Joint Command, General Dave Rodriguez's command,
    provides a corps-like headquarters over the regional commands
    that allows him to orchestrate this fight much better than we
    could have done before or was the habit before.
        Additionally, internal to each what we call battle-space
    owner, starting at the regional command level down to typically
    a brigade combat team, we have moved to put all the elements
    that operate in that battle space under the control of that
    single battle space owner.
        I'll let Ambassador Eikenberry talk more about what they've
    done. But we've also established a civil-military lashup so
    that each regional commander has a senior civilian
    represenative that is right next to him all the time. So that
    gives us unity of effort so that they are literally joined at
    the hip as we move forward there.
        We've changed the structure and focus of our special
    operating forces so that they come under either the regional
    commander's focus, to ensure that they are implementing his.
    What we can't do is have multiple wars being fought. We have to
    have one overall effort.
        There is still a distance to go. There are some national
    limitations. There are cultural limitations within the U.S.
    military, and there are other steps. But we have made huge
    progress.
        The last point I'd make is, our effort to partner with the
    Afghans starts at the Ministry of Defense level, the Ministry
    of Interior, which is much more robust than we did before. I
    see the ministers almost every day. We have video
    teleconferences (VCTs) with them. They're in our VTCs every
    day. So that we and the Afghans are planning the fight
    together, executing the fight, talking about the fight
    afterward together. That goes down at the lower levels and
    increasingly, as Senator Levin said, the partnering down at the
    lowest levels, the closer we get, that gets us not only better
    forces, it gets us unity of effort.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Ambassador?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, four points in our own
    efforts on the embassy side to try to achieve unity of effort.
    First of all, within the government itself, within the embassy.
    I'd mention as an example of some of these working groups that
    we have established an agricultural working group. We're very
    proud of the success that we've had in pulling together the
    interagency on the civilian side of the government, so that you
    will not have one agricultural group meeting with USAID,
    another led by the Department of Agriculture--fully integrated.
    If you were to go into our rule of law group, you'll find in
    that same room the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug
    Enforcement Administration, the Department of Justice, State
    International Narcotics and Law, and the military.
        General McChrystal already mentioned the second point about
    our civil-military coordination. I mentioned that to Senator
    McCain. As you get down to outside of Kabul, for the first time
    I truly believe we've really got it lashed up well. The senior
    civilian representative concept we have for a military regional
    commander, not a political adviser but a fully empowered co-
    equal that has responsibility for all the civilians from all
    agencies assigned in that sector, and, very importantly, can
    take the resources assigned and can allocate them so that
    they're in support of major military efforts.
        Third point is with our unity that we have with the
    international community: difficult, challenging, but still the
    United Nations mission led by Kai Eide. We work closely with
    Mr. Eide. He's made good progress there. We have more work to
    do in that area. That's important because Afghanistan's going
    the need international commitment for many more years. So we
    continue to work hard to ensure that's a success.
        Then the fourth and final area, just what General
    McChrystal had said on the military side. Really, who's the key
    partner for our unity of effort? It is the Afghan people. So
    increasingly as we see more competency within Afghan
    ministries, we will be encouraging the Afghan ministry partners
    to lead the efforts. We'll go down to their ministry. We'll
    help them, but they'll be in the lead and we'll be in support
    of those efforts.
        Senator Reed. A quick question to follow up, Mr.
    Ambassador. In terms of the civilian surge, not just in
    numbers, but in the duration of the service: I think there are
    some agencies that are giving you or giving this effort 3
    months, 4 months, in terms of personal assignments. Is that
    adequate?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Tours of that length are not. We've
    made great progress, though, Senator, with support of most of
    our departments and agencies in really getting that turned
    around. There's a real commitment there. I'll give you an
    example. The Afghans have established a major crimes task force
    in Afghanistan. It's going to be their FBI. Our FBI has sent a
    group of mentors to work with them. The initial plan was each
    mentor would be there for several months and rotate out. We
    talked to Director Mueller directly and said, for an endeavor
    like this you can't build trust in a couple of months; it has
    to be a long-term endeavor. So he has 10 agents on the ground
    right now in Afghanistan, 1-year tours of duty each. So we're
    making a lot of progress in that area. We still need to do
    better, though.
        Senator Reed. General McChrystal, but you might want to
    also comment, Ambassador: Even with the most dedicated and
    talented government in Kabul, Afghani Government, the ability
    to reach out into the provinces is limited. It's limited by the
    constitution. The governors are appointed by President Karzai.
    It's limited by the lack of any ability to raise revenues
    locally. In the short run you're going to have to essentially
    fill in the gaps, which seems to be similar to the issue in
    Iraq with the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP)
    funding, where military units and their civilian counterparts
    were using funds to jump-start some of the build activity.
        Is that your plan, essentially?
        General McChrystal. Sir, it is. We will seek every chance
    we can to use the central government's ability to reach down,
    every chance we can to use existing provincial or district
    governments. But we'll also help wherever we can. In some
    cases, just security alone makes it difficult, for example, for
    a district subgovernor to get out and do the kinds of things
    that he wants to do or would normally do. So we're going to
    have to partner with them, and it'll be unique in every place,
    doing the right answer.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Ambassador?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I'd agree with what General
    McChrystal laid out. We are working very hard as well, Senator,
    with the different programs, with our developmental programs
    delivered in the civilian side, to make those much more agile
    and much more flexible, so that, as General McChrystal's forces
    move with ANSF into a new district and it becomes imperative
    that on an urgent basis we're able to start delivering economic
    assistance and try to get jobs created. We've made a lot of
    progress here in the last 6 months about refining programs, so
    that, as an example, when General McChrystal's marines went
    into Nawa District in Helmand Province in the summer, 24 hours
    later we had a USAID developmental specialist on the ground,
    several days after that agricultural programs, jobs for work
    programs, digging of irrigation districts, that was underway.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator LeMieux.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ambassador and General, thank you for being here. Thank you
    for your public service all these years.
        I had the opportunity to visit with you in Afghanistan
    along with Senator Burr and Senator Whitehouse at the end of
    October. Since the time of our trip--and perhaps, General
    McChrystal, you could answer this question first--has the
    situation improved in terms of our fight against the
    insurgency, stayed the same, or slid backwards?
        General McChrystal. Senator, I believe it's improved. I'm
    not going to say dramatically, and I try to always let events
    be provable. But I absolutely believe it's improved.
        Senator LeMieux. Ambassador?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I'd say, Senator, if we take this
    through the political lens, there's been some very significant
    improvement. Of course, what's happened since your visit, we
    made--the second round was decided upon, and then Abdul
    Abdullah withdrew, President Karzai elected, inauguration. I
    have to say that when we looked at President Karzai's--listened
    to his inauguration address, there was a lot of positive things
    in that about governance and about security.
        I think we're seeing more confidence being displayed right
    now from President Karzai's administration. Actions have to
    follow the words. I heard that Secretary Gates, today in his
    visit to Kabul, in his discussions with President Karzai and
    the national security team of President Karzai, came away with
    the very good impression that the Afghan leadership has a sense
    of determination about them.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you.
        General McChrystal, it seems to me with the addition of the
    30,000 troops and a goal, at least an aspirational goal, to
    draw down those troops, at least start to by July 2011, that
    this puts a lot of pressure on you and your team. You're going
    to get these troops starting in January. The troops I guess
    will not be fully deployed in theater until maybe the summer,
    and even that might be ambitious. So you have what it seems to
    me is a year to show real success with the full complement of
    the troops.
        Do you think that that's possible? Would you think that on
    a scale of one to ten, with ten being very likely and one being
    not likely at all, that you have a chance for success in that
    period of time?
        General McChrystal. I believe the chance is very high. I am
    confident that, although there's pressure on us to move
    forward, I think that's fine. There's also pressure on our
    Afghan partners, because they realize we need to move forward,
    and that's good. I think there's going to be a tremendous
    amount of pressure on the enemy. Because of the forces already
    on the ground and then the changes we've made and this
    additional 30,000, I think we're going to be able to make very,
    very significant progress.
        Senator LeMieux. Ambassador, do you think that the Afghan
    Government senses the pressure of this timeline and that they
    are fully engaged to make this a successful period for us?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I do. Success for all of us
    in Afghanistan, of course, is the point when the Government of
    Afghanistan is able to provide for the security of its own
    people. There's a bit of ambivalence right now on the Afghan
    leaders and their people, and it's understandable. On the one
    hand, they do want to stand up and have full control of their
    sovereignty. That was reflected in President Karzai's
    inauguration address, where he said within 5 years over the
    course of his second term he wants Afghanistan's security
    forces to be in the lead responsible for security nationwide.
        Against that, given the history of modern Afghanistan,
    given the uncertainty of the neighborhood that they live in,
    there's a nervousness about losing the presence of NATO ISAF
    and the Americans. So there's the tension. I believe, as the
    General does, that this July 2011 date is a very good forcing
    function to get the Afghan leadership to stand up, to have a
    hard target for their army and police to move to.
        President Karzai's initial reaction to it was positive. He
    said: ``We need that kind of pressure; we want to stand up.''
    But at the same time, as General McChrystal has said, we're
    going to have to be cognizant of Afghanistan's long-term needs
    for security. So, as President Karzai said in his inauguration
    address, the idea of having a strategic partnership with the
    United States or refining that is something that I think is
    going to be essential as we move forward and define what that
    long-term relationship with Afghanistan is about.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you.
        General, the American people still want us to capture and
    kill Osama bin Laden. It occurs to me that, in terms of your
    warfighting and trying to break the will of our enemy, that
    that would be an important strategic military goal as well. Are
    we still about the business of trying to capture and kill him?
    Recently Secretary Gates said that we haven't had good
    intelligence on his whereabouts in years. Can you discuss with
    us what part of the mission capturing and killing Osama bin
    Laden is for you right now?
        General McChrystal. Senator, I am responsible as Commander
    of ISAF for inside Afghanistan. Were Osama bin Laden to come in
    there, of course that would become a huge priority for all of
    our forces. If he is not inside, it's outside of my mandate
    right now. I do believe it's very important.
        Senator LeMieux. Ambassador, can you speak to that at all?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. The exact same perspective, Senator.
        Senator LeMieux. The last thing I'd like to discuss with
    you is Pakistan. Recently the President said that we cannot
    tolerate a safe haven for terrorists, and this might be where
    Osama bin Laden is, whose location is known and whose
    intentions are clear. The New York Times has reported that the
    administration has said in private that if the Pakistani
    leaders will not allow us to follow these insurgents and fight
    them, that we will continue to do so even without their
    permission.
        What kind of cooperation are you getting from Pakistan and
    do you believe that they are going to be willing and good
    partners as we fight this cross-border battle?
        General McChrystal. My current partnership with the
    Pakistani military, led by a personal relationship I have with
    General Kiyani, is very good and it's getting better all the
    time. Unlike a few years ago, they now face a very significant
    internal insurgency from the TTP or what we call the Pakistani
    Taliban. I believe that as they focus on that more, our shared
    strategic interests become closer in alignment, both ours the
    United States and Pakistan, but also Afghanistan's and
    Pakistan's, because neither can achieve security and stability
    without success on the other side of the border.
        I think that helps to pull us into alignment. Pakistan does
    have sovereign strategic interests, which I respect, and I
    think it's important that what we as a Nation do is recognize
    those and, just like we do with Afghanistan, reinforce that
    long-term partnership.
        Senator LeMieux. Ambassador?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, you know that a major shift
    that the administration made when it announced the strategy in
    March was to try to pull together the regional aspects of
    security in central and south Asia, so not looking just at
    Afghanistan or Pakistan in isolation, but looking at the two
    together. So with the naming of the special representative for
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, and his frequent
    partnership on the military side with General Dave Petraeus,
    there is a full-time effort being made.
        I would also say that when you talk about our embassy in
    Islamabad, Ambassador Anne Patterson, our embassy in Kabul,
    that we do work together under Ambassador Holbrooke's direction
    to try to find ways to facilitate cooperation beyond the
    military and security domain between Afghanistan and Pakistan--
    political dialogues that we try to encourage and more promising
    in the area of economic cooperation, trying to help both sides
    reach a transit trade agreement to improve trade, working with
    both sides to help improve customs posts along the frontier.
    Some of those projects have led to positive results. There's
    not going to be any real significant breakthroughs there, but
    we do have a comprehensive approach.
        Senator LeMieux. Thank you. Again, thank you both for your
    service.
        Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to say welcome, add my welcome to Ambassador
    Eikenberry and General McChrystal, and to thank you each for
    your extraordinary and dedicated service to our country.
        I also want to thank all the men and women under your
    leadership for their sacrifices. As we discuss Afghanistan
    policy today, I ask that we keep our military and civilians in
    mind and also in our prayers as they stand in harm's way.
        Ambassador Eikenberry, much has been said and written about
    the problems with the Afghan Government. One of them is
    corruption, of course. Clearly we must have a reliable Afghan
    Government to partner with in pursuing our new strategy.
    Without question, the goal of unity of effort I think has
    really set a new spirit in Afghanistan and has brought many
    parts of our government to bear on what we need to do.
        You also mentioned about improving the key ministries in
    order to build legitimacy in the Afghan Government. Ambassador,
    you have a first-hand view of the ministries and local
    governments in Afghanistan. What is your view of how the
    government is doing today? You've touched on this, do you want
    to go deeper into it as to what we need to do to bring an
    improvement about?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I'd start and say that,
    again having gone through a very difficult election process,
    President Karzai did emerge as the winner and he is our partner
    now as the leader of Afghanistan. I give you one area where I
    think we're doing reasonably well and I'm optimistic, another
    area where I think we can expect to see improvements; the third
    area will be the most difficult.
        First of all, at the national level. You've talked abut
    some of the ministries of Afghanistan. We're focusing our
    efforts on the key ministries, the security sector, the
    financial sector of course, key ministries that deliver
    important services, health and education; and finally, those
    ministries which are going to be very important to Afghanistan
    for the generation of income for its people--agriculture,
    mining potentially, energy, water management, and so forth.
        Those ministries have had a lot of progress over the last
    several years. We expect President Karzai over the next several
    days will announce his new cabinet. We're cautiously optimistic
    we're going to get generally good ministers named there. We'll
    work closely with those important ministries with good leaders.
    We think we have good programs aligned here to see further
    success in capacity-building.
        The next area is in the rule of law and justice. There is a
    lot of work that needs to be done, but we do have some success
    that we're building upon and we do have a commitment from
    President Karzai in his inauguration speech that he's going to
    tackle head-on the issue of corruption.
        It's not going to be an easy fight at all and indeed help
    is needed from the international community, help for programs.
    But also the international community has to change its way over
    time of how we dispense aid. A lot of money that goes into
    Afghanistan right now goes outside of the Government of
    Afghanistan. We'll work with the Afghan Government. I think our
    government's setting a very good example for the international
    community to make improvements in that area.
        The third area is at the sub-national level, and this,
    Senators, is the most difficult area, about how do you reach
    out into a district of Afghanistan, if you're a minister
    sitting in Kabul, and provide health services in insecure
    districts of Afghanistan right now that General McChrystal's
    forces and ANSF are moving into and trying to push the Taliban
    back. That's the area that is the most problematic. We have
    good work going on in that area. We have some good aid
    programs, but this is the one we're going to have to lean into
    very heavily with our Afghan partners to try to figure this
    out.
        We talk about clear, hold, build, and transfer. That
    transfer piece out in that far district, that's the one that's
    the most problematic for us.
        Senator Akaka. You mentioned these different departments
    that we are sending there to help the Afghan Government. One
    that you alluded to but didn't mention is Commerce and the
    possible development of businesses within these districts, and
    also the government level as well.
        General McChrystal, since the release of your assessment of
    the region there has been a healthy debate over the number of
    troops being deployed to Afghanistan. However, I feel we should
    not focus solely on the number of troops alone. General,
    ignoring the total number of troops proposed, my question has
    to do with equipment and with personnel. Are we sending the
    right personnel there, with the right equipment in place, to
    achieve the goals that we have in those regions?
        As you mentioned, the ultimate goal is the capture of al
    Qaeda. You probably know what you need in terms of personnel
    and equipment. So my question to you is, do we have the right
    equipment and personnel to achieve our goals in the region?
        General McChrystal. Sir, the short answer is we do, but the
    reality is the requirement keeps changing, so we have to keep
    on it. We've made extraordinary improvements in things like
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment.
    In many cases people think of Predators, but it's a really wide
    array of that, differing capabilities, to include people.
    That's one that keeps growing and we've done a tremendous
    effort at continuing to grow, but it will need to continue.
        Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, things to
    protect our forces; the engineer equipment to help us find and
    dispose of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). So the answer
    is, I think we're doing an extraordinary job across our
    government providing it, but I think it's something we have to
    watch constantly as this effort evolves in nature and scope.
        One area that I never cease to talk about, we are getting
    great people out there. As Ambassador Eikenberry mentioned,
    tour length is something I continue to encourage all the
    participants, to include our coalition partners, not to go with
    very short tours because you lose continuity and language
    training. This is one where I would tell you, we across the
    Department of Defense (DOD) can do better and must do better.
    We don't have enough people who speak Dari, Pashtu, Urdu, and
    we are not producing them fast enough.
        There is a ramp-up. Yesterday, I met with about 160 people
    that--under Chairman Mullen's direction we've created the
    Afghan Hands Program and I talked to them. They're midway
    through training, language training and cultural training in
    preparation to going to the key jobs. But that has to be a
    start. We have to produce people who are culturally aware,
    linguistically armed to be effective, and then have enough time
    in theater to be effective.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you both for your service to your
    country. I've been honored to visit you in the field and I
    appreciate that work and the good briefings we have gotten and
    the professionalism you've shown.
        At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee not too long ago,
    a Brookings individual testified that he wasn't sure whether we
    should increase troops or not, but no military in the world was
    better prepared than ours to be successful if given that
    challenge. I think that's very, very true. I couldn't be more
    proud of what you and your soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
    and guardsmen have done.
        General McChrystal, I read your assessment. I thought it
    was highly sophisticated and a nuanced analysis of the
    challenges that we face. Some people think the military never
    talks about civilian issues and economics and security and
    those kinds of things, but you are looking at it
    comprehensively. No issue I think raised by Members of Congress
    weren't at least addressed in your analysis of the challenges
    that we face.
        I do not like that we've had to commit more troops to
    Afghanistan. I had hoped that we could be able to bring down
    those troops. I think the Commander in Chief has analyzed this
    and come up with a proposal that I intend to support. You say
    you can make it work. It sounds like to me that it can be made
    to work consistent with my analysis of the events, and I intend
    to be supportive of it, and certainly look forward to the hope
    that we will be able to draw down our troops and turn over the
    government to the local people.
        Twice I've talked, or maybe three times, with Secretary
    Gates about the dangers of too great expectations about
    Afghanistan. They have historical challenges, regional history;
    extremely remote, extremely poor; and not a history of a strong
    national government. So I'd like to pursue this with you a bit.
        Secretary Gates recently indicated in his prepared
    statement for his appearance, I guess it was last week, that he
    would want to engage the communities in Afghanistan, to enlist
    more local security forces to protect their own territories. I
    heard former National Security Adviser Brzezinski on television
    a week or so ago, talk about the need for local militias, and I
    think I know what he meant by that. Former President Musharraf
    of Pakistan in a Wall Street Journal op-ed a few weeks ago
    reminded us that for centuries Afghans have been governed
    loosely through a social compact of sorts between all ethnic
    groups, but under a sovereign king or a sovereign central
    authority.
        Now, Ambassador Eikenberry, your statement made me a bit
    nervous. In your written statement you said that: ``Some might
    argue that we are reaching too high, that Afghanistan has
    rarely in its history had a central government capable of
    carrying out these tasks, that to expect a coherent state to
    now emerge is unrealistic and a waste of resources. I disagree
    with that argument on several levels.''
        I also believe that one of the breakthroughs in Iraq was in
    Anbar, al-Anbar, when the marines made a compact with tribal
    leaders and basically funded those leaders to use their young
    men to oust al Qaeda, who they did not like and wanted to see
    ousted. To my knowledge, they weren't all sent off to Baghdad
    to be trained. They were loyal to their local leaders. They
    shared a common goal with us.
        I know there's tension between creating militias not loyal
    to the central government. I know there's dangers in that. But
    it seems to me we have to take some risks and in some of these
    areas that are remote, that have good and decent leaders, that
    if we can just support them we could perhaps be able to not
    have to commit our own troops there.
        So I'll ask both of you: Do we have this right? Are we
    overcommitted to a centralized authority? Or are we willing to
    look sufficiently at local militias and national guard areas?
        General McChrystal. Senator, I think we are getting it
    right. Like you said, Afghanistan has a unique sensitivity to
    militias, even more so than Iraq did, because the history after
    the civil war that began in the period with the departure of
    the Soviets saw the rise in these militias that were predatory
    and they were under warlords, and they're just absolutely
    feared and hated today. But they also have a very strong local
    security tradition as well.
        What we're trying to do, and we're working in a number of
    areas with something called a community defense initiative to
    enable villages and small elements of tribes to deny their area
    to insurgent access. What that means is we'll support them and
    they provide local security. We don't want to create militias
    that then move around the battlefield and become a problem.
    There's a balance.
        There is still a need, in my opinion, for a very credible
    ANA because it helps bind the nation together. As we found in
    Iraq, it's also a source of pride there as well. So I think the
    combination of the two, keeping a very close eye on the
    sensitivity. Every time I talk to Afghans about the local
    security initiatives, I will get: ``Yes, but be very careful;
    yes, but make sure you don't arm the wrong group that will do
    it.'' So I think we need to do it, but with caution.
        Senator Sessions. Ambassador Eikenberry?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I agree with General
    McChrystal. There is a balance here. It's the absence of a
    coherent state of Afghanistan that paved the way for the rise
    of the Taliban and then facilitated the entry of al Qaeda. So
    you can't ignore the need for a central Government of
    Afghanistan with the ability to provide for the security of its
    people and deliver sets of basic services.
        Senator Sessions. Do you see as your vision that there has
    to be very strong control from the capital, from Kabul, to each
    one of the local security forces that might exist?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. No, I think I would agree with
    General McChrystal that it's essential that the Government of
    Afghanistan has a capable army that is able to reach throughout
    the country. It has to have control over its police forces.
    Then what's that right balance of minimum service provision
    from the Government of Afghanistan that has to flow through the
    country in the area of health care, education, I think that
    trying to get that proper balance right is essential.
        Senator Sessions. I hope so.
        My time is up, but I would say, Ambassador Eikenberry, that
    the Department of State (DOS) is challenged in fulfilling its
    responsibility, at least its paper responsibilities, in
    Afghanistan. We are well aware that the PRTs are dominated by
    the military because you don't have people there. Secretary
    Clinton said last week, I believe, that there are about 900
    civilian DOS people in the country, 900 plus. That would be
    about 1 percent of our total.
        So, if the DOS could fulfill a greater role, I would be
    supportive of it. But so far we're not seeing the numbers that
    justify confidence that you're going to get there.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Do I have a moment to respond,
    Senator?
        Senator Sessions. Yes.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, the civilian uplift that
    we've had over the last year is most impressive. I've had a 35-
    year military career and I have gained over this past year an
    extraordinary respect for how the civilian elements in our
    government have responded to the requirements of Afghanistan.
    We've had a threefold increase of civilian personnel assigned
    to our embassy and throughout Afghanistan, as I said in my
    opening statement, we'll soon reach that point over a 12-month
    period of time, a sixfold increase of who we have out in the
    field.
        Senator, it's not the number of people. Given that the
    numbers are impressive, but it's not the numbers of people
    ultimately that matter. An example: Right now in Helmand
    Province we have 5 agricultural experts who in turn are
    mobilizing a 500-man Afghan agricultural delivery capability
    that's reaching 14,000 farmers. We have in the Ministry of
    Agriculture several advisers and their expertise at the level
    that they're able to over time really help build a capable
    Ministry of Agriculture.
        So it's not necessarily the number of people; it's what
    those people can do. If we're talking about military units--the
    military deploys platoons, companies, battalions. On the
    civilian side, we deploy individuals. Every individual is
    unique, and I'm very proud of the fact that over this past year
    we've tripled our presence on the ground. We intend to keep
    going.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. It's still a small number.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'd like to begin by saying I share a number of the
    concerns that Senator Sessions just raised with respect to this
    potential contradiction between the cultural and political
    history of Afghanistan and what we are attempting to do in this
    policy.
        Ambassador Eikenberry, I'd like to start by saying I read
    your written statement in full. I really appreciate its
    frankness. I think it is important for us to set out with an
    awareness of the limitations that we have, which is something
    that you mentioned. I want to come back to that in a minute.
        Let me really begin here by saying I supported strongly
    this evaluation process, this lengthy evaluation process. I
    think it was very important for us to get the best minds of our
    government involved in it.
        In that respect, General McChrystal, I'm going to give you
    an opportunity here to straighten the record on something a
    little bit along the lines of what I think Senator Lieberman
    posed to the Ambassador. This process took several months. In
    early September the Senate Majority Leader wrote a letter to
    Secretary Gates asking for an update on the evaluation.
    Secretary Gates wrote back: ``Until the President makes his
    decision on the way forward in Afghanistan, it would be
    inappropriate for me or our military commanders to openly
    discuss the advice being provided or the nature of the
    discussions being carried out.''
        That was right about the time that you popped up on 60
    Minutes with a rather lengthy interview. When people were
    actually in the White House discussing options, you were seen
    giving a speech in London, and there are a number of people who
    believe that this was detrimental and even divisive as this
    process moved forward.
        So can you explain to us your view on how those actions
    were compatible with the policy outlined by the Secretary of
    Defense?
        General McChrystal. Yes, Senator. The 60 Minutes interview
    was scheduled before I deployed and filmed in July, so it was
    before this process and before that guidance. So there was no
    intent or connection with that.
        The discussion in London which you're referring to, there
    was no intent on my part to influence or in any way negatively
    impact the decisionmaking process. I regret if there's any
    impression that it did, but there was absolutely no intent for
    that.
        Senator Webb. You are aware that it was the same day that
    people were meeting in the White House to discuss the way
    forward?
        General McChrystal. I was not aware of that at the time.
        Senator Webb. Ambassador, I would like to ask you two
    questions. The first: In your testimony you talk about ``we
    need to address our efforts to promote governance at the
    provincial and district levels,'' which I totally agree with.
    My question for you is, do you believe this is achievable under
    the current constitutional system that Afghanistan has or would
    you prefer to see another system of government that devolves
    power in a way that would make this more compatible with the
    history and culture of Afghanistan?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I think the limiting factor right
    now is not the framework of the constitution; the limiting
    factor that exists, Senator, is just the difficulties that the
    Government of Afghanistan has, after 30 years of war, trying to
    develop the necessary organizational capacities to deliver
    services. They're challenged very much in terms of the
    development of human capital.
        Senator Webb. So it's your view that this is not a result
    of the present constitutional system, but rather just of
    governance, given the interruptions in the structure that has
    been in place?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. That would be my view. I know that
    the Afghan leadership right now, starting with President
    Karzai, is looking at the possibility of reforms that are
    perfectly within the constitution. A very important one is the
    idea of taking more financial resources and allocating that to
    a provincial governor, allocating that to a district governor.
    Right now they're really starved for funds.
        There is additional discussions going on about what should
    be the right mix of electoral bodies and representative bodies
    at the subnational level. But again, the way the constitution
    exists today I don't see that as a limiting factor. But I do
    see very significant challenges in developing governmental and
    economic livelihood at some of the most challenged districts in
    Afghanistan.
        Senator Webb. Thank you.
        I would like to pose another question for you that I think
    you are perhaps uniquely qualified to address, given your
    experience on many different levels with China culturally,
    historically, and also governmentally. The Chinese Government
    was known to be on a very good relationship with the Taliban
    Government prior to our driving it out. There are a number of
    reports about Chinese economic projects in Afghanistan right
    now. Could you give us a summation of the nature of the
    relationship between China and Afghanistan and in terms of
    China cooperating with us in the program that you're putting
    forward right now?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I think that clearly China sees a
    stable Afghanistan as in their own security interests. The
    Chinese Government has its own concerns with international
    terrorist groups that are known to operate in the border
    regions and inside of Pakistan, that have an impact on Chinese
    internal security. The Chinese have made very significant
    investments inside of Afghanistan. They have one major
    investment right now, a billion dollar investment in a copper
    mine in Logar Province, and they're looking at potential
    additional investments in other of the mining sectors of
    Afghanistan.
        Senator Webb. I'm aware of that project. It's an
    interesting one to follow.
        Are they cooperating with us on a government-to-government
    level with respect to what we're attempting to do here?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. We have an active dialogue with the
    Chinese Government, as we do with many others, in terms of the
    overall development strategy and political strategy in
    Afghanistan.
        Senator Webb. So are they proactively cooperating with the
    approach that we're taking? That's the question. Are you aware?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. They have their economic interests,
    which they've put investments into in Afghanistan----
        Senator Webb. Excuse me, but my time is up. Just as a
    question of fact, has there been a proactive announcement of
    any sort from China with respect to the policy that we're
    attempting to put into place?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. We have a good policy dialogue with
    the Chinese over Afghanistan----
        Senator Webb. Has there been a statement, yes or no, in
    terms of supporting what we're doing?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I would not say that their level of
    engagement in Afghanistan is on the level in terms of our----
        Senator Webb. Just answer, if you would, please. Has there
    been a statement to your knowledge from the Chinese Government
    that they support what we are attempting to do?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I'm not aware of policy----
        Senator Webb. Thank you.
        Ambassador Eikenberry.--not aware of policy statements from
    the Chinese.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, it's good to see you in this part of the world.
    Ambassador Eikenberry, thanks for your hospitality. General
    McChrystal, thanks for Thanksgiving dinner. We enjoyed visiting
    with 68,000 of your and my closest friends. It was a great day,
    and I want to second what you said about the morale of your
    troops. It's unbelievable that, in spite of the difficulties
    that we've had in Afghanistan, are continuing to have and will
    have, the morale over there is spectacular. I think a lot of
    that is attributable to leadership.
        General McChrystal, we had the opportunity to meet with
    some of your team that you put in place. First of all, let me
    just ask you. I know a lot of these folks have been hand-picked
    by you. Do you have your team in place? I don't expect you to
    discuss individuals or specifics, but is your team in place
    there now? Do you have what you want?
        General McChrystal. Sir, I do. I've been extraordinarily
    well-supported, not only by the leaders and organizations who
    provided me the people, but by the families who've given them
    up for this period.
        Senator Chambliss. Resource-wise, of course we know you're
    going to have to plus up as you bring additional troops, but
    where are you from the standpoint of having the equipment that
    you need to carry out your mission?
        General McChrystal. With the additional forces that have
    been approved, we're going to have to work through getting
    additional MRAPs. We're going to continue to increase our ISR
    equipment, and some other things. But it is generally on track,
    Senator.
        Senator Chambliss. I want you to walk through with us this
    issue of building up of the Afghan troops, both the military
    and the security police, because I went back and read your
    report again and also read your testimony from today and heard
    what you've had to say, and obviously the critical point that
    we can seriously think about turning that country over to the
    Afghan people from the standpoint of security--not governance,
    but from the standpoint of security--is the point in time when
    the military as well as the security police are trained to the
    point to be able to protect the citizens of Afghanistan.
        In your report you indicated that at that point in time we
    had about 94,000 Afghan military personnel trained. Is that
    still in the range of where we are?
        General McChrystal. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Chambliss. You indicated that we had about 84,000
    ANP trained. Again, is that in the range of where we are?
        General McChrystal. We're a little higher on the police
    now. It's in the low 90,000s.
        Senator Chambliss. Now, of those numbers, General, what
    percentage of that can we really count on? What's the hard-core
    number that you can say, ``go hold and secure X province'' or
    whatever?
        General McChrystal. For the Afghan army, we work with a
    calculus of about 77 percent present for duty. There are some
    not available in training, some that, in fact, are not
    available because they've gone AWOL and different challenges.
    But it's pretty good. So a significant percentage of that
    93,000 or 94,000 we can put out on actual operations.
        On the ANP, it's less, and that is because the level of
    training and the commitment that we've had over time is much
    newer and much more immature. So while there may be most of the
    92,000 or 93,000 ANP currently on the payroll out in their
    jobs, the ones that I would say are effective is smaller than
    that. They have a drug problem, they have a few other things.
        Senator Chambliss. On the military side, are the Taliban
    paying their soldiers more than we're paying Afghan troops?
        General McChrystal. Sir, there's no set pay scale, but by
    our intelligence they are paying them the equivalent of about
    300 U.S. dollars a month, and that is higher than we are paying
    Afghan army or police.
        Senator Chambliss. Do we intend to ratchet that pay up so
    that we can at least compete financially with the Taliban?
        General McChrystal. In coordination with the Government of
    Afghanistan, we just almost doubled Afghan army and police
    training. It's at parity now. It's less than $300 a month, but
    it's much closer.
        Senator Chambliss. I'd like for you to go through some
    benchmarks relative to these training numbers. My understanding
    is you eventually want to get to 240,000 military and 160,000
    police. You indicated to Senator McCain that you're still on
    the timeline of 2013 of accomplishing those numbers. But
    looking at where we are today and knowing that in 2010, the end
    of 2010, you're going to assess the situation on the ground,
    the biggest part of that assessment is going to be the number
    of military and security police that you have available to be
    assigned to different areas to start transitioning to them.
        How many do you expect to have trained by the end of 2010
    from both the military and security police standpoint?
        General McChrystal. Sir, for the Afghan army our goal is
    134,000 soldiers in the force trained, all have gone through
    initial entry training, and through partnering we expect to be
    able to raise the effectiveness of each of their force's
    individuals and organizations. But about 134,000. Of that,
    obviously less are actually in units in the field, but a good
    significant percentage would be.
        Sir, of the police, I expect to have us get over 100,000.
    They are currently authorized 98,000. Expect to get approval to
    increase that to the low 100,000 to 110,000 range. I think the
    biggest progress we can make in police, though, won't be in
    aggregate numbers. It will be in improving their leadership,
    improving their levels of training.
        We were only partnering with about 20 percent of the police
    as of this summer. We are increasing that dramatically with the
    forces that the President approved in March, and we will
    increase that significantly again with these additional forces
    that have come forward.
        Senator Chambliss. In your report to the President on
    August 30, you indicated by October 2010 you wanted to get to
    that 134,000. So the additional troops that are being sent are
    not going to plus up that number in your mind relative to the
    number of military folks you can have trained?
        General McChrystal. Sir, we don't believe that we can speed
    it up any faster than the 134,000 about a year from now,
    October 2010. But we are going to put a significant portion of
    the force that the President just authorized into both the
    training base, where they get initial training, and then the
    rest of the force will essentially all be partnering.
        Senator Chambliss. One of the areas where you're going to
    send some of these 30,000 additional troops is down into
    Helmand, where you're obviously having a very tough time, a
    very tough fight down there, where the Marine Corps deployed
    some additional marines recently. Let's assume that you have
    great success there. Assume you have great success against the
    Haqqani network over in RC-East. General, if you have that
    success and they get to the border and they cross the border
    into Pakistan, what do we have to have from the Pakistan
    military on the other side of that border to really accomplish
    our mission and meet the challenge that you've laid out there?
        General McChrystal. Sir, what I'm seeking the Government of
    Pakistan to do is essentially be intolerant of the Haqqani
    network. The Haqqanis are Afghans. They want a sphere of
    influence from the Khost bowl all the way up into Kabul. That's
    their aspiration. They live in northern Waziristan, in the
    Miram Shah area, and they have a sphere of influence there.
    They have had historic relations with al Qaeda and now with the
    TTP.
        What I am hopeful that the Pakistani Government will do is
    be intolerant of the existence of the Haqqani network inside
    Pakistan. If they will prosecute that policy, I believe inside
    Afghanistan we can deal with the remainder of the Haqqani
    network.
        Senator Chambliss. And Helmand?
        General McChrystal. Sir, in Helmand--one point I'd want to
    make. You're right, the Marine Corps and our British partners
    and the Danes and others--it's a team effort down there--we're
    not reinforcing failure; we're reinforcing success down there.
    We're expanding the areas. The additional forces are going to
    let us expand so that we have contiguous security zones.
        There's a significant area that I want to get at as soon as
    we get the first marine forces in and we're going to do that,
    and that's going to send not only a powerful operational pulse
    to us, but it's going to send a powerful communications network
    or message to not only the narcotraffickers but to the Taliban.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service to our country. While I
    think the President made the best choice, I think we have to
    remember that he made the best choice among a lot of bad
    choices.
        I would like to speak a little bit about contracting as it
    relates to the Afghans that are being hired. Following up a
    little bit on Senator Chambliss's line of questioning, I know
    the Joint Contracting Command has issued directives to some
    contractors, especially on security personnel, that at least
    half of the contracting force must be from the area, not just
    Afghans but Afghans in the immediate vicinity of the bases that
    we're hiring them to perform security on.
        I know that for the other civilian contractors we're
    running at a very, very high percentage of Afghans. It is a
    marked and much different situation than we had in Iraq. Now,
    it's my understanding that President Karzai has expressed
    frustration with this because these contractors are paying more
    than the military police and the army. So it is even worse than
    us competing against the Taliban; we're competing against
    ourselves since, as you have clearly stated, the most important
    part of this mission is to add to the police and the army.
        So how are we going to fix this problem?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, two points. What you're
    raising is very important. It's very important. First of all,
    President Karzai said in his inauguration speech that he would
    like to move forward and over the next several years take these
    various contracting companies, foreign contracting, private
    security companies, and move those under a more formal
    licensing from the Government of Afghanistan. We fully support
    that. It will be difficult to try to agree upon the standards,
    but we see examples where it can work and we think that's the
    direction that we should be going.
        That's very consistent with the idea over the next several
    years about Afghanistan taking further steps to really reclaim
    its full sovereignty, getting its army out front, its police
    out front. Private security contractors is another issue.
        Second, with regard to our own embassy policies, we're
    already working very hard, wherever we can, to try to take any
    kind of security contract group that is expatriate and we're
    trying to move that in the direction now where there's
    increasing numbers of Afghans, beginning with the strategic
    detachment for our U.S. embassy.
        Senator McCaskill. You haven't addressed the problem,
    though. I'm somebody, I'm an Afghan, and I am toying with
    whether or not I want to continue to be a hanger-on with the
    Taliban or I want to join the good side. I look and I can go
    and get trained as a police officer, or I can get hired--I have
    a little bit of English, just a little bit--or I can get hired
    for more money watching an American base.
        That's not hard. I go for the more money watching the
    American base, or even a more extreme example, which is even
    more frustrating, I can peel potatoes in the mess and make more
    money than taking up arms on behalf of my country.
        I understand that this was great in theory, but in
    executing this policy to use Afghans aren't we denying
    ourselves success in our own mission?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. When I talked about the move towards
    Afghan licensing of security companies, that would address--I
    didn't explain that, Senator. That would be a move to try to
    address what you're getting at then, pay structures that are
    inconsistent with the national security----
        Senator McCaskill. What about on our other kinds of
    contracts? What about the LOGCAP contract and all the people
    that are being hired in terms of moving supplies and food and
    all of those services? How are we addressing this pay
    disparity, that they're making more from us than they could
    make by joining forces with the Afghan Government?
        General McChrystal. You've hit something that's very, very
    important, and I bring it back to counterinsurgency and unity
    of effort. Counterinsurgency is a complex system. Every time
    you change one thing, it has intended and unintended effects
    somewhere else.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        General McChrystal. What we have done since 2001 is come in
    with all good intentions, and someone is given a requirement to
    do something like build a school. The quickest and most
    efficient way to do that particular task may be to hire people
    from outside Afghanistan. It may be to pay a higher wage
    because you can get it done faster. But the unintended
    consequences are that people who would be school teachers or
    people who would be soldiers pick up and move into something
    that is not effective or efficient for the nation for the long
    haul.
        What has happened in Afghanistan is a number of things are
    now out of balance. We have doctors and educated people doing
    things because they could make money, usually for the
    international community, but they're not taking their rightful
    place in the economic system overall.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        General McChrystal. This is where we have to improve unity
    of effort because when you aren't unified, decisions are made
    that seem to make sense, but it's very complex because it's not
    just U.S. military, it's not just U.S. Government, it's
    international community, and then, in some cases, just straight
    business interests.
        Senator McCaskill. I hope that you get with the Joint
    Contracting Command and discuss this because I hate that we
    could be working against ourselves on this. I get it that it
    was a good idea in isolation, but, as you said, it's like a lot
    of other things, there's always unintended consequences and I
    think we need to be realistic about the unintended consequences
    of this policy.
        On CERP funds, when I first came to this committee it was
    explained to me this was walking-around money for people on the
    ground to help. I remember General Petraeus explaining it to
    me, it would be like somebody realizing if they helped fix a
    storefront in Baghdad that could do more to stabilize that
    neighborhood than many other things we could be doing, and for
    them to be able to do that quickly and efficiently is great.
        What has happened in Afghanistan with the $1.6 billion
    we've spent there, now 67 percent of that money is being spent
    on projects that are bigger than a half a million dollars. We
    are doing big stuff. I'm very worried that we don't have a
    singular database between USAID and the military on these
    projects. I'm worried that the training for CERP was about
    committing funds, but not about monitoring or oversight of
    these large projects.
        General, who is the person that signs off on sometimes
    multimillion dollar projects that are much bigger than fixing a
    window on a storefront, or much bigger than what I believe CERP
    was originally intended to do?
        General McChrystal. Inside my command now, it goes by
    levels of spending. I sign some. Others have to go to General
    Petraeus for approval. But I absolutely agree that there is a
    need for walking-around money kind of CERP, and then there is a
    need for larger projects that particularly enable COIN.
        I bring up roads. Sometimes people ask me, ``how can you
    build a road with CERP?'' In fact, sometimes building a road is
    the best COIN thing we can do. I'm pretty proud of where we've
    gone. Ambassador Eikenberry and my teams have pulled together
    the review of all the money that's spent, USAID and CERP,
    because it's looked at together now. We don't spend CERP money
    without their team on it, and we're allowed to be part of the
    USAID part.
        It's not perfect, Senator, I'm not going to kid you.
        But I think we have come a long way and understand the
    importance of targeting that money effectively.
        Senator McCaskill. I think that's great. I'm going to
    continue to keep a very close eye on that, because I think
    there's going to be some problems if you don't stay joined at
    the hip on this particularly. I get the insurgency strategy,
    but I don't think the military ever envisioned training people
    to oversee large construction projects. That was why USAID got
    its mission. So I want to be careful that we don't drift too
    far away, especially if you guys are working together.
        I hope you're handing off to USAID where appropriate.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service. When our colleagues go
    over to visit, I would just make a recommendation to committee
    members. If you get a chance, go to the Bagram Confinement
    Facility.
        General McChrystal, you have done a great job. I wish we
    had jails like that in South Carolina. It really is a very
    impressive facility, and I want to commend you and your staff
    and the embassy, working together, to come up with a new
    detainee policy that I think will help the war effort. You've
    done a good job there.
        The narcotics court, where we're doing some of the high-
    profile narcotics cases, well-vetted judges, secure
    environment. Obviously, we need to expand that into the
    corruption area, but those are two facilities I think where you
    can see some real success. So I want to commend you both for
    that.
        Now, to make sure I understand the way forward, because
    it's been pretty difficult, quite frankly, to figure out what
    the rules are going forward, but I think I have a better
    understanding today. July 2011, it is my understanding that
    we're going to begin withdrawing troops on that date, according
    to President Obama. The only question is how many and how fast.
    Is that right, General McChrystal?
        General McChrystal. That's my understanding, Senator.
        Senator Graham. So let it be said that the policy going
    forward is that in July 2011 somebody in Afghanistan, even if
    it's just one guy, somebody's coming home, right?
        General McChrystal. That's correct.
        Senator Graham. Okay. On a scale of 1 to 10, failure in
    Afghanistan, a failed state, what would that mean to our
    national security, 1 being inconsequential, 10 being
    catastrophic?
        General McChrystal. I believe it would be a 9 or 10, not
    just because I believe al Qaeda would move back in, but also
    because I believe regional instability as it would spill over
    into Pakistan and other areas would be absolutely negative to
    our interests.
        Senator Graham. Ambassador Eikenberry, what would you say
    to that question?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I concur with General McChrystal's
    assessment.
        Senator Graham. How many Taliban are there, generally
    speaking? I know you don't have exact numbers.
        General McChrystal. Our estimate right now is between
    24,000 and 27,000 full-time fighters, with some people
    obviously part-time.
        Senator Graham. How much of the country do they have
    significant influence over?
        General McChrystal. They affect people's lives
    significantly in much of the south--Kandahar, Helmand, Gosni,
    Zabul, up to Kabul. They do so in significant parts of RC-East,
    and then in patches of north and west--Kanduz, Baklan, a little
    bit in the Balkh area, out in Bagdiz and out in Ferra. In the
    north, it doesn't change the pattern of life significantly for
    the average Afghan who lives up there, except in selected
    areas.
        In the south, because of their ability to impact things
    like the Ring Road and commerce, it is a significant impact on
    everything, the way everybody lives.
        Senator Graham. Is every Taliban a Pashtun?
        General McChrystal. The vast majority, Senator.
        Senator Graham. So that's one reason why they're a problem,
    because that's where they live.
        Now, how big is their air force? They don't have one. I
    don't mean to be cute. They don't have an air force. They don't
    have a navy. Their biggest weapons system would be what?
        General McChrystal. They have rockets, ground-launched
    rockets, 122s, things like that.
        Senator Graham. How have they been able to accomplish what
    they've been able to accomplish with thousands of coalition
    forces, 90,000 Afghan army folks, 90,000 Afghan police? How
    have they been able to come back so strongly?
        General McChrystal. Several reasons, I believe. The first
    is there weren't that many coalition forces or Afghan security
    forces.
        Senator Graham. That's a good point. If you had to rate the
    reasons in terms of the majority, would it be lack of security
    forces on our part?
        General McChrystal. I would put that right with weakness in
    governance at the local level in Afghanistan. The two together,
    weakness in security forces and inadequate governance, opened
    the door for them to come in.
        Senator Graham. Why haven't previous commanders asked for
    more troops if it was that obvious?
        General McChrystal. Sir, I haven't asked commanders. I know
    there were some previous requests tabled.
        Senator Graham. At the end of the day what part of the lack
    of governance has led--is it at least an equal contributing
    factor to them coming back, a lack of the Afghan Government to
    deliver basic services?
        General McChrystal. I believe that it is.
        Senator Graham. One of the reasons they've been able to
    seize power and influence is they can provide services the
    Afghan Government is unable to provide, like resolving legal
    disputes; is that true?
        General McChrystal. That's correct.
        Senator Graham. So in the next 18 months, to roll them back
    we're going to put combat power in that we've never had, right?
    We're going to do the governance piece differently than we've
    ever done; right, Ambassador Eikenberry?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. We're going to make efforts, yes,
    Senator.
        Senator Graham. On the legal system front, there are less
    than 500 lawyers in all of Afghanistan as I understand it. Is
    18 months realistic for us to basically recapture lost momentum
    in the area of governance and security, knowing that at the end
    of the 18 months we're going to be withdrawing no matter what?
        General McChrystal. I think when you look, I think we can
    reverse momentum, I absolutely do. I think the most important
    thing is much of what happens in an area determines who secures
    that area. If we secure that area and then we can provide the
    opportunity for the Government of Afghanistan, with assistance,
    to start to build those nascent legal capacities and what-not,
    I think that is much of it.
        What has happened is a vacuum of security and a vacuum of
    governance together.
        Senator Graham. Yes, sir. That vacuum is being filled in
    different forms throughout the country.
        Do you feel totally comfortable with the idea that the
    enemy now knows that we're going to be withdrawing, but they
    don't know at what pace; that that's not going to compromise
    your ability to be successful?
        General McChrystal. I think more importantly, if we
    carefully articulate and strongly articulate the concept of a
    strategic partnership over the long haul, that's a much more
    powerful idea. In the short term, we have a tremendous
    additional capability that's being fielded in addition to what
    we're already using, as you saw when you were out. Then the
    idea of a strategic partnership, in my view, that takes the
    strategic horizon away from the insurgents.
        Senator Graham. Let's go down on some of the constraints
    that both of you will be working under. I want the American
    public to know the hand you've been dealt and the assignments
    available to you. Number one, no matter how many Afghan army
    folks are on the payroll or numbers on a piece of paper, we're
    only using 150 in this new operation. So I think that says a
    lot about the state of the army.
        Another rule you have to operate under is the 96-hour rule.
    As I understand the policy, ISAF forces have to turn over a
    detainee within 96 hours of capture to the Afghan Government,
    and all they can do in field interrogation is basically ask
    them basic questions. Is that policy going to be in effect as
    we move forward?
        General McChrystal. Senator, we're working through that
    policy, how it will affect U.S. forces as we try to move
    additional forces under ISAF. I'm working with General Petraeus
    on what the right calculus is there. In the long term, as you
    mentioned, we now call it the Detainee Facility in Parwan. We
    changed the name of the Bagram facility. That will go to Afghan
    control, and with our assistance they will run that facility.
    We will help provide them expertise, particularly in things
    like exploitation, effective use of intelligence.
        I believe in the long term that's the most effective thing
    we can do, is build their capacity to do counterinsurgency when
    we partner with them.
        Senator Graham. My time has expired. Could you send the
    committee a list of the rules of engagement that each country
    operates under now and in the future, so we could evaluate what
    these new troops are actually able to do in terms of engaging
    the enemy?
        General McChrystal. Their caveats and what-not?
        Senator Graham. If you could do that.
        General McChrystal. Certainly, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator Graham. God bless. You have a big challenge and
    we'll be pulling for you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator Kirk.
        Senator Kirk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McChrystal, Ambassador Eikenberry, let me render my
    own salute to you for patriotism individually and the people
    that you represent. Thank you for your patience this afternoon.
        My first question, General, would go to you. It's a follow-
    up basically on the chairman's question about the disparity of
    troops, U.S. troops to Afghan troops. I understand we're
    working as hard as we possibly can to redress that imbalance.
    Just so we can understand perhaps what it is we're looking at
    here and what to prepare for, is there a risk until we close
    that gap in the trainers and the combat troops that our troops
    will be viewed more as occupiers and therefore we may incur or
    incite further insurgents and violence and therefore perhaps
    even put our guys and gals in more harm's way than otherwise?
        General McChrystal. There are several components to that.
    The first is, we know that how we are viewed will be based on
    how we operate, more than the numbers we have. So I think it's
    very important that our forces operate with a level of cultural
    respect and clear desire to protect the population. They're
    doing a good job of that, although we obviously can always
    continue to get better.
        As we work with the Afghans, they want to be secured by
    Afghans, but they are tolerant. They understand the need for
    coalition forces to do it until Afghan security forces are
    available to do it. So I would say that we need to continually
    communicate to them that, while we are doing this in the
    bridging period, that we are working as hard as we can to
    create their forces.
        I think if they didn't see and feel that effort was real
    and significant, that it would be difficult to continue to win
    their support.
        Senator Kirk. Just a follow-up. How do we communicate? Do
    we communicate through our trainees, to the population? Or is
    it we communicate as best we can in our combat gear that, we're
    really here to help you and not to occupy?
        General McChrystal. We do it on a number of levels. We
    start, of course, at the official interaction at the government
    level, then all the way down to our forces in the field and
    Ambassador Eikenberry's great civilians as we partner, to
    interface as much as we can, as often as we can--shuras at the
    local level, just day-to-day interactions.
        We also do a number of communications activities, where we
    use different media ability to communicate the reality of what
    we're doing to the Afghan people. I participate in some of
    that. I talk to youth forums, things like that. In every case,
    we try to give them a clear view of what our real efforts are
    and our real intentions.
        Senator Kirk. Thank you.
        This is also on training, because I understood that one of
    the problems or challenges that we face in our training is the
    fact that the middle level commanders, if you will, unlike our
    chain of command that's pretty direct and authoritarian, that a
    lot of these folks are cronies and that they're appointed
    through favoritism and so forth. I wondered first, is that an
    accurate representation? If not, maybe you could correct it. To
    the degree that it is accurate, how do we react to that? How
    long would it take to train and develop the kind of chain of
    command that we feel comfortable then handing off to, to know
    that the population is secure and they're doing their job?
        General McChrystal. Sir, we have an extraordinary military
    in the United States. So whenever we try to compare ours to
    anybody else's, it's very difficult because at every level in
    the chain of command we just over many years built a culture
    that is very effective.
        What I do recognize in the Afghan army and even more in the
    Afghan police is in many cases there's nepotism, there's
    corruption, there's inefficiency, and there isn't yet a culture
    that automatically produces those leaders. Yet for all the
    times we see challenges, I go out in Garmsir--Mr. Chairman, I
    think you met the young Afghan battalion commander, an
    extraordinary professional. Those kinds of leaders are the
    future, and if we partner effectively we'll grow those kinds.
        It will take them a generation or two to get to where I
    think they want to be. But we can make progress.
        Senator Kirk. Thank you.
        One other thing about this strategy, and I know you and I
    agree and I think the Ambassador agrees that this will only
    work if we can work it by, with, and through the Afghan
    Government. For everything I can see--a fraudulent sort of
    installation, an economy that's dependent on opium, corruption
    rampant throughout the government--am I wrong to say that we
    are taking a leap of faith here with President Karzai, and that
    my sense of it is--I have absolutely no doubt about the
    strength and the courage of our folks and what we're going to
    do, but the way I look at it, if there's a weak link in this
    formula, it's the bet we're placing on President Karzai.
        Can you tell me if that gives you pause, and if so, your
    degree of confidence that this at the end of the day is going
    to be a sound bet and not that we're betting on the wrong horse
    here?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, the challenge of
    establishing accountable governance in Afghanistan goes beyond
    one individual. This is a societal problem. This is a problem
    of a state that was utterly decimated by three decades of
    warfare. It's a state that has two generations really without
    education. It's a very profound challenge.
        We have programs that we're partnered with the Afghans to
    try to help them to develop accountable governance. We're
    making progress in certain areas, in the areas of law
    enforcement. We have a very robust training program, us with
    the international community and the Afghans, to try to help
    develop a more competent civil administration. It's a priority
    area for President Karzai. We support that.
        We have major efforts to try to improve the financial
    accountability of ministries. We're making progress in those
    areas.
        But against that, it remains an extraordinary challenge. We
    are encouraged with President Karzai's commitment in his
    inauguration address to try to place more emphasis on this
    area, and certainly political leadership and political emphasis
    is going to be absolutely indispensable to make further
    progress. But it's going to remain a challenge.
        Senator Kirk. General, is that good by you?
        General McChrystal. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kirk. I thank you very much. My time has expired. I
    wish you Godspeed and thank you once again.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kirk.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Let me first of all make sure you
    understand that I'm probably not alone in disagreeing with the
    comments made by the Senator who was somewhat critical of the
    way the CERP is put together. The CERP, train-and-equip, and
    IMET have been three of my favorite programs, and I think I've
    been somewhat responsible for advancing the CERP program and
    changing also the CCIF in other areas.
        What's good about the program is they don't have to go
    through all that stuff. I've probably been over there as many
    times as anyone else has. When I talked to the commanders in
    the field, they say that anything we can do in 3 days instead
    of 3 months is going to have 10 times the value. So I'm hoping
    that you will continue to talk about the success of that
    program.
        General McChrystal. Sir, I'd like to throw something in on
    there. It's important for several reasons. One, whatever you do
    quickly the Afghans appreciate more, because they understand.
    It also increases the credibility of the local leader, the
    decentralized leader we have forward. If that person can say
    yes and then produce quickly, it raises his ability to do
    future interactions and leverage. That's one of the huge values
    of it.
        Senator Inhofe. We'll continue to try to enhance that
    program.
        Several people have mentioned the agricultural development
    team, but not really giving it the credit that I think it's
    due. People talk about the negative things. From 2007, the
    number of hectares that was in poppy development went from
    193,000 to 157,000 to 123,000--a reduction of 22 percent in 3
    years.
        Now, I'm particularly proud of this because as we speak we
    have 60 of our Oklahoma 45th Infantry Division in a plane going
    over there for the second time. They come back and, Mr.
    Ambassador, they tell me the success of the story and the
    happiness that is generated by their relationships.
        So I'd like to ask you, of course, if you agree with that
    assessment.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I can go first. We
    absolutely agree with the assessment. The agricultural
    development teams, to include from the 45th of Oklahoma, are
    really making a profound difference.
        We have a very good civil-military integrated agricultural
    approach. Each element brings their own strength. The United
    States Department of Agriculture, they have tremendous
    technical expertise. They know how to build agricultural
    systems. Our USAID team members, they know how to deliver
    programs. What these agricultural development teams are able to
    do, they take the best of the military--they have their
    security, they have mobility--they can get out into parts of
    the farm areas of Afghanistan that are insecure.
        Senator Inhofe. They've actually had their hands in the
    dirt before. These guys know what they're doing.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Absolutely. It's a great compliment
    to our overall ag strategy. Indispensable.
        Senator Inhofe. Good. We want to just continue to see that
    success take place.
        General McChrystal, I asked this question when Secretary
    Gates was here and I didn't get the answer I felt real
    comfortable with. I just would like to have you give me an
    idea. You put together threat assessments when you make
    recommendations, threats low, medium, high. When you made the
    recommendation at 40,000, what was the threat assessment that
    you would have said was attached to that?
        General McChrystal. Moderate, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Moderate, all right. Then 30,000 would be
    what?
        General McChrystal. We didn't try to grade it in great
    detail.
        Senator Inhofe. All right, it would be below that.
        General McChrystal. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. I think that I would agree with that and I
    think that we need to have that for our own use to quantify
    some of the successes.
        Now, for only the second time since President Obama has
    been in office, I want to compliment him and tell him how
    pleased I am. I think there have been some unfair questions in
    this meeting, concerning the end game, because I was upset with
    the end game until West Point. In West Point, the speech that
    he made--and I'm quoting right now--the last thing he said in
    terms of that: ``Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute
    this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on
    the ground.''
        He said that. That's not you saying it. I know both of you
    agree with that, but that's the President saying it. To me,
    that means that the conditions on the ground are very important
    in any decisions to be made. It's not a calendar decision. It's
    a condition.
        Do you agree with my interpretation of that?
        General McChrystal. I do, Senator.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I do as well, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. You had made the statement, General
    McChrystal, ``We are in this thing to''--well, actually it was
    Secretary Gates: ``We're in this thing to win. We intend to
    partner for a long time to come.'' Keeping in mind, there will
    be troops over there for a long--we still have troops in
    Bosnia, in Kosovo, and some of these other places.
        But he said: ``We are in this to win.'' Would you define
    ``win"?
        General McChrystal. Absolutely, and I absolutely agree with
    the Secretary. I would define winning as when we have our
    partners in Afghanistan, the government and the ANSF, to the
    point where they can defend their sovereignty with very limited
    help from the outside; obviously a strategic partnership, but
    they can take the strong lead.
        What that then does is it allows them to enable the people
    of Afghanistan to build the nation, to shape their lives as
    they want to do that.
        Senator Inhofe. That's good. Do you agree with that, Mr.
    Ambassador?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I would say that it's very
    similar to what General McChrystal outlined: The Government of
    Afghanistan has the capacity to take responsibility for its own
    security, the Taliban's been degraded to levels that are
    manageable by their own security forces; most important, al
    Qaeda is prevented from regaining safe havens inside of
    Afghanistan.
        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Ambassador, the last time you and I
    talked you were in uniform, and I would just compliment both of
    you on the great job that you're doing.
        Lastly, because my time is about to expire, as people are
    talking about the non-U.S. participants we're going to try to--
    the plan is trying to get to the 7,000 figure. As I look
    through this thing--and I have a breakdown that at my request I
    got--Italy and Georgia are both at 1,000. All the rest of them,
    Poland, the rest, are way below that, considerably below that.
    If you add them all up, that's 4,300. That was my math, so I
    might be wrong on that.
        To get to 7,000, what can you do now? Is there any obvious
    thing you can do that you haven't done before? Because I know
    the effort has been there before, but is there something that's
    open to us now that wasn't there before? Perhaps one suggestion
    is that when the President made his commitment he first called
    the heads of state of our NATO and other allies over there, and
    I think that perhaps that might have changed their enthusiasm
    for sending troops and participating. What do you think?
        General McChrystal. Senator, I believe our level of clear
    commitment on the part of the United States is a big part of
    the calculus. I think another thing we can do is we can
    encourage our partners to contribute where they can most
    effectively. What I am doing is asking for additional help, the
    training realm is initial entry training and partnering,
    because in some cases, that fits very well with what partners
    can provide.
        Senator Inhofe. Do you agree with the fact that the
    President called these other heads of state and told them what
    he was going to say and what he was going to do was helpful?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I certainly do, Senator. Secretary
    Clinton, several days ago, with General McChrystal and I in
    attendance, was at the foreign ministers conference of NATO,
    and this was the first foreign ministers conference of NATO in
    Brussels since the President made his West Point speech. I
    think all of our sense was the reception there with General
    McChrystal's articulation of the strategy, understanding of
    what our way ahead was, it seemed to resonate well. So we left
    Brussels with some confidence.
        Senator Inhofe. That's good. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Udall is next.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good afternoon, gentlemen. As many of us have said up here,
    I want to thank you for your service. I look forward as well to
    joining Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman in their upcoming
    visits to Afghanistan as you begin to implement this important
    strategy.
        I know that we've all talked about, Secretary Gates and
    both of you, the limits of our ability to actually defeat the
    Taliban. There's been a lot of talk about reconciliation with
    the Taliban and how we drive wedges between those who are
    interested in the Taliban and its presence for political
    purposes versus those who are eager to push the forces of chaos
    and destruction and hatred.
        I know that we're not in the best position to pursue
    reconciliation right now, given that the Taliban are strong and
    they lack an incentive to change sides. But I'd like to think
    we're doing more in this area than we have been and that we're
    working closely with the Afghan Government. Could both of you
    comment on my question?
        General McChrystal. I certainly can. I can start. I don't
    agree when people say we cannot defeat the Taliban. I
    absolutely believe that we--and I mean the Government of
    Afghanistan with coalition help--can defeat the Taliban. I
    define that by meaning putting the Taliban in a position where
    they can no longer accomplish their objective of threatening
    the Government of Afghanistan. I believe that's absolutely
    achievable.
        I believe en route to that, as we reverse the momentum that
    they perceive that they have now, we will weaken the resolve of
    many of the members of the Taliban. I think it's important in
    that process as we talk about reintegration that there be
    opportunities for Afghans who might have sided with the
    Taliban, whether they fought with them or they just supported
    them, to be able to come back under the constitution of
    Afghanistan, under a program that must be supervised by the
    government, with respect and with honor, not to feel like they
    are criminals being brought back in, but instead being brought
    into the political fold.
        I think giving an opportunity for that if they are willing
    to meet the conditions of living under an Afghan Government
    with a constitution, I think makes a lot of sense, and we're
    working very closely with the government to do that.
        Senator Udall. Ambassador Eikenberry?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Again, Senator, I'd share General
    McChrystal's assessment that it's going to be important to have
    momentum in order then to push those fighters and mid-level
    commanders that are out there right now opposing the legitimate
    Government of Afghanistan to make the right choice. But with
    that momentum, I think that the push won't have to be that
    great in many areas.
        It was interesting, during this past presidential election
    in Afghanistan there were 42 presidential candidates and they
    were all unified on one issue: All 42 talked about
    reintegration and reconciliation. So there's a desire out there
    among the Afghan people to try to find a way to achieve peace.
        I know that President Karzai is very committed to it. He
    did mention it, again, in his inauguration address. We hope to
    soon have the delivery or decision by President Karzai to have
    the formal establishment within his government of a
    reconciliation, reintegration commission. With that then, I
    know that General McChrystal and NATO-ISAF are very prepared to
    provide full support in an array of areas in order to help the
    reintegration program achieve success.
        Senator Udall. Ambassador, if I might follow up on those
    comments. There is a perception among many ethnic Pashtuns that
    they don't really have a meaningful role in the central
    government, particularly in security institutions. Is this
    something we're attuned to? Do you agree with that assessment?
    Is this something that President Karzai could take the lead on,
    given that he is a Pashtun as I understand it?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I would say that if you look at
    President Karzai's cabinet, there is a very strong
    representation of Pashtuns. For instance, the Minister of
    Defense is a Pashtun, the Minister of Interior is a Pashtun.
        Separate though from that, is there a feeling of
    disconnection from many of the Pashtun population from their
    central government? I think that President Karzai would say
    that there is. But that's the question of insecurity right now
    that exists in the Pashtun tribal areas, and that's a very
    important part, if we have success in the year ahead and the
    next 18 months of further delivering security, that will have
    profound positive political impacts because it will help bring
    the Pashtun population then closer to their central government.
        Senator Udall. I would note for the record that the three
    Senators sitting right here met with you in May when we were in
    Afghanistan. We had a chance to meet with both of those
    ministers, Minister Wardak and Minister Atmar, and were very
    impressed with their plans and with the way they carried
    themselves, and we hope that that continues.
        General, if I could turn back to Pakistan. For me, my
    support is based as much on the fact that Pakistan is
    inextricably linked to success in Afghanistan. Pakistan's
    reaction, is critical to the President's speech and his new
    strategy. I imagine that the comment that Prime Minister Gilani
    made last week where he said: ``We need more clarity on it and
    when we get more clarity on it we can see what we can implement
    on that plan,'' I hope that was for public consumption.
        Are either of you concerned by his statement?
        General McChrystal. Not by his statement, Senator. I talk
    routinely with Pakistan military leadership and I believe that
    we always have to work through aligning our campaigns, but I
    believe that they have a shared interest in our success in
    Afghanistan, as we do in their success.
        Senator Udall. Ambassador, would you have any thoughts on
    that?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. No, I couldn't add to what General
    McChrystal laid out.
        Senator Udall. Let me move to the concept that the
    President proposed, which was to move the bell curve to the
    left, in other words get the troops into theater faster and
    then leave faster. I have a few questions about shifting the
    bell curve. I apologize for throwing them all at you at once.
    Maybe some you will have to take for the record.
        Are you confident you can expedite the deployment of these
    additional 30,000 troops? What sort of challenges would this
    pose for you logistically? Does this depend on a timely
    withdrawal from Iraq? General Odierno stated if the elections
    get pushed back this could make things more complicated in
    terms of getting our troops out as scheduled. In other words,
    would a slower withdrawal from Iraq impact the troop buildup in
    Afghanistan?
        I see my time has run out. Gentlemen, if you want to try
    and answer one or two of those and maybe field the rest of them
    for the record, I'd appreciate it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        General McChrystal. Senator, I would just say that the
    deployment part is very complex, but we have a really good team
    working it and I'm very comfortable we're going to get the
    forces in as fast as possible.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, Ambassador, it's great to see you. Like everyone
    else here, I was planning to reminisce about having seen you in
    Afghanistan in August. But since I saw both of you yesterday at
    the White House, it seems it's been taken over by events.
        Let me thank you both for your extraordinary service, which
    is so appreciated. I cannot imagine our having better leaders
    in Afghanistan than the two of you and I'm very grateful for
    your work.
        I also would guess, having seen part of your hearing on the
    House side earlier today, that you're eager to return to
    Afghanistan and get on with the job, rather than appearing here
    in Washington before the House and the Senate.
        General, you have such great knowledge and deep
    understanding of Afghanistan. You mentioned in your statement
    today that you were first deployed there in 2002 and that
    you've commanded troops there every single year since then,
    which is truly extraordinary. I also know that you've studied
    closely the history of Afghanistan. In fact, one of the first
    times that we met you told me you were reading ``The Great
    Game'' and that you were seeking to learn from the British and
    the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.
        At one point the Soviets had more than 100,000 troops in
    Afghanistan and yet they did not prevail. Now, clearly our
    goals in Afghanistan are completely different from the goals of
    the British in Afghanistan--the British and the Soviets. But
    still, that history of the British and the Soviet experience
    gives me pause, no matter how brilliant our leaders, how brave
    our troops, how successful the civilian surge.
        Could you share with us what lessons you take away from the
    failed British and Soviet experiences in Afghanistan, and why
    you believe that our experience can end up in a more positive
    way?
        General McChrystal. One of the things I have learned is to
    be very humble about thinking that we have the right idea, the
    better idea, and to be very careful as we go forward. I think
    the common theme that I see that caused failure in the past is
    when the Afghan people come to the conclusion that an outside
    force are either occupiers or they are culturally in opposition
    to the currents of Afghan history. In fact, Afghan leaders,
    Afghans, have been toppled because they went against the grain
    of the sense of the people, the social fabric of the people.
        My view of both the British experience and the Soviet
    experience is, there came a time when there coalesced a sense,
    almost antibodies, in Afghan society against their presence. In
    the Soviet case, we can't be too superior thinking about this
    because they did a lot of things correctly. They did a lot of
    tactical things correctly. They did a lot of programs
    correctly. But at the end of the day they couldn't change the
    perception that they were outside occupiers trying to impose on
    Afghanistan a foreign system, a foreign thought process, in
    this case it was communism, but it was also a number of other
    social changes that just ran against the grain of society.
        So I think it's very important that, from an overall point
    of view, we understand how Afghan culture must define itself
    and we be limited in our desire to change the fundamentals of
    it. We have to respect those, and I think that's important.
        Then tactically, in the counterinsurgence system, of course
    the Soviets became fairly heavy-handed and they killed more
    than a million Afghans in the process. Of course, that worked
    to cause their defeat. One of the reasons why we're working so
    hard on counterinsurgency with and respecting the people is
    because we understand it's only with their partnership that we
    can be effective here. So it's a very careful strategy, almost
    admitting what we don't know. What I tell people is every time
    you go to do something in Afghanistan, realize there's a lot of
    things going on you don't understand, and don't pretend that
    it's more simple than it really is.
        Senator Collins. I think those are very wise lessons
    indeed.
        When I look at the President's plan and his date for
    beginning the transition and the withdrawal of forces, while I
    share the concerns of some of my colleagues about the signal
    that sends, it may in fact be a helpful signal because it shows
    that we're not like the Soviets, that we're not trying to stay
    there and impose our way of life on them. So it may cut both
    ways.
        Ambassador, let me ask you about another issue that
    troubles me gravely. We know that the Taliban is securing
    funding for its operations from the narcotics trade in
    Afghanistan. But another significant source is from wealthy
    individuals and bogus charitable organizations or charitable
    organizations that have two purposes from the Middle East, from
    Saudi Arabia, for example.
        Do we have a strategy for engaging the countries whose
    citizens are funneling money to the Taliban fighters?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. In short, yes, we do, Senator. It's
    a pretty robust strategy. You're correct, sources of Taliban
    funding right now, it comes from profits from narcotrafficking,
    increasingly from taxation of areas that they might dominate,
    and then the third important source of funding is external
    funding coming from cover nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
    and individuals from the Gulf and Pakistan itself.
        Against that, we have a very vigorous law enforcement
    effort where we're trying to track finances, and we are working
    very closely with countries within the Gulf, to include Saudi
    Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others, in order to try
    to get at these sources and find ways to shut it down.
        Senator Collins. Are you optimistic about securing full
    cooperation from the Gulf countries?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. We're making some progress there,
    Senator. I wouldn't want to get into the specifics, but if
    you'd like for the record perhaps we can submit something to
    you. Progress is being made, but it's difficult. Trying to
    track finances in any kind of environment is difficult work,
    but we are making progress.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
        Today, Secretary Gates and President Hamed Karzai in
    Afghanistan had a press conference. I'm going to read to you
    from the Web site of the New York Times: ``President Karzai
    said that his country would not have the resources to pay for
    its own security for another 15 to 20 years and would remain
    dependent on American and NATO financial aid until then.''
        So how does that comport with what you have announced,
    given that President Karzai has said this today?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, just four points on that.
    The first point would be that, as General McChrystal has said,
    we have to have a long-term relationship with Afghanistan that
    our leadership has talked about, a long-term diplomatic
    relationship, an economic and assistance relationship, also a
    relationship which is one of providing support for the ANA and
    ANP over time, their security organizations. That will be an
    effort that we'll do together, we hope, with NATO and with
    other countries. We don't know exactly what the cost will be,
    but it will have to be long-term assistance.
        The second point is, against that, we recognize that this
    will be a burden on the Government of Afghanistan. They'll need
    assistance. So a lot of our economic programs that we are
    emphasizing right now are aimed at the generation of wealth and
    at the same time trying to find ways to help the Afghan
    Government with revenue collection. So we're looking at that.
        The third point would be that, with regard to longer-term
    costs, while I don't know what the order of magnitude is for
    the cost of an American soldier or marine for 1 year in
    Afghanistan compared to an ANA soldier or police, but we know
    the orders of magnitude are probably 20, 30 to 1. So it's
    clearly, if nothing else, in our own long-term economic
    interest and certainly in the Afghan interest to continue to
    help the Afghans stand their police up and their army forces
    up. That's a pretty good tradeoff. If we're not having to send
    more U.S. soldiers and marines, but instead Afghan soldiers are
    on the front line taking their own place, that's a pretty good
    return.
        The fourth point would be, as we move forward and
    Afghanistan does gain more security perhaps the army and the
    police of Afghanistan, perhaps they won't need very high levels
    in the future. Maybe at some point in time 10 years from now
    the army of Afghanistan might be a smaller force than it is 5
    years from now.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That's what Charlie Wilson was arguing
    for in 1989, to keep a presence going. But we pulled out and we
    made a mistake. Last week I recalled that for Secretary Gates
    when he was in front of us and he said we're not going to make
    that mistake again.
        Let me ask you, General McChrystal. One of the things that
    I asked Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton last week, we
    have a military force that can be all the more effective, not
    in nation-building, but in getting things settled down, if we
    use all the other civilian agencies of government along with
    NGOs. Do you want to sketch briefly for the committee how we're
    doing that and to whom you're listening as you set that policy
    as the commander?
        General McChrystal. The person I listen to the most is
    about 3 feet on my right. What we do is, before we even go into
    an area, we work together to figure out what's going to be
    required as we provide security to make it durable, because the
    governance and development parts need to flow in almost
    simultaneously.
        Of course, our Afghan partners aren't here today, but
    they're in that same meeting as we try to pull that together.
    We're working plans for an additional operation in the Central
    Helmand River Valley now, which will happen later this winter,
    and the idea is as security elements go in every other aspect
    is literally waiting to flow in with it and then grow.
        It's not easy, so I don't want to paint it as a simple
    process. But it's very important.
        The harder part is coordinating NGOs and other
    international partners. We do that through PRTs in many cases.
    We do that through other nations and the United Nations
    Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is helpful in doing
    that. But that's one of the areas where we need to continue to
    seek unity of effort so that every dollar or euro or man-hour
    of effort is focused towards a single outcome in Afghanistan.
    We are doing a lot of coordination. UNAMA is part of our
    planning process. They're in our planning process as we develop
    our campaign plan.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General, let me recommend something
    for you to think about. You have been so successful with your
    CERP funds for your commanders. After combat, they have a ready
    pot of money that they have the authority to build a bridge or
    to repair a school or whatever, and it's been terrific. Don't
    we need that same kind of authority for the civilian agencies,
    Instead of having to go through this requisition process that
    takes months and months, where the people on the ground can
    make something happen just like your commanders can?
        General McChrystal. Senator, I haven't been a civilian
    since I was 17, so I'd probably be out of my lane. But I
    absolutely agree that that's the right thing, and I'd defer to
    my friend.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, you're correct. We're
    taking measures right now to try to be faster, more responsive.
    We've gotten great support from Congress. We have what we call
    the quick response fund which is available to our DOS officers
    throughout Afghanistan. That's more of a quick spending
    program.
        We're changing the nature of our contracts. Rather than
    have long, multi-year contracts, we're shifting to 1-year
    contracts. We get better performance from contractors as a
    result of that, NGOs that we work with frequently as
    implementing partners.
        The last point I'd make is, with the reorganization of our
    civilian effort as we talked earlier about this concept of
    having senior civilian representatives out in regional commands
    that have really chief of mission kind of authorities within
    the region. They're a counterpart of the military commander.
    We're also now looking at ways we might be able to innovate to
    push then down more of the decisionmaking and the authorities
    for developmental assistance funds down to the regional level
    and perhaps even farther down, closer to the district level.
        So we are innovating and in certain areas we may be coming
    back to Congress and asking for some help.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your outstanding
    service to our country. You have what is a very challenging job
    on a good day and there haven't been many good days recently in
    Afghanistan. But I think the reason that the President and
    Members of Congress on both sides and the American people are
    willing to commit to this mission, to this effort, is because
    they have such a high level of confidence in your leadership.
    So thank you for your willingness to take that on.
        I guess when you get to this point in a hearing pretty much
    all of the questions that can be asked have been asked. But I
    want to just touch on a couple of areas that I think are really
    important to our success.
        By the way, just a clarification, too. There was the
    announcement of the additional NATO troops, but there was a
    report I think today in The Times of London that more than
    1,500 of those extra troops that have been pledged by the
    allies to back up our surge there are already in the country
    and have been counted before, so that there may be some double
    counting going on.
        Do you know exactly what that number is and how close that
    will bring us to the 40,000 number that you had requested,
    General?
        General McChrystal. I don't know that right now, Senator.
        Senator Thune. With regard to the NATO allies and the
    important role that they play in our effort there, one of the
    things I think that has impeded and inhibited our ability to
    make the best use of our forces has been some of the caveats
    that have been attached to some of the troops that have come in
    from other countries. Of the 43 countries that are allies in
    this fight, how many of them do have caveats and what are you
    doing to try and get some of those removed so that we can get
    everybody engaged more in the fight?
        General McChrystal. The first thing I'd say is when I deal
    with it as the coalition commander I'm actually surprised by
    how little the limitations are compared to the advantages of
    having the coalition. One of the advantages of the coalition is
    everybody is a little stronger together, and in the eyes of the
    Afghans we are a lot more credible than we would be as a single
    country. Even though clearly the United States is a huge
    factor, the fact that we are a coalition with the Afghan people
    I think is key.
        Each of the countries brings different strengths and
    weaknesses. Some have caveats that I have urged be adjusted,
    give us a little bit more flexibility. Across the force what
    I've asked is for all countries to look at the policies that
    they have for their people. In some cases, their forces are not
    allowed to move out of a geographical area. But if they are
    partnered with an Afghan Army battalion and they can't move,
    then there's hesitation to let that ANA battalion move and that
    takes away from ANA leadership the ability to mass forces for
    operations, and it's one of the things that we'd asked people
    to work with.
        In other cases there are limitations on night operations or
    things like that. So what we're doing is asking each of our
    partners to move more toward full counterinsurgency, and we do
    have progress in that, and then to look at all their caveats.
        Some of our partners as well don't have caveats, but they
    have limitations in mobility, vehicles, or things like that,
    and the degree to which we can help them with that enables them
    to do even more.
        Senator Thune. Of the Afghan security forces--and there's
    been a lot of focus, as there should be, on getting them
    trained and ready. That again, I think as we have seen
    demonstrated in Iraq, is so critical. Are the Afghan security
    forces willing to take on the Taliban?
        General McChrystal. They are. The Afghan police die at the
    highest rate, then the Afghan Army, before coalition forces.
    They absolutely are.
        Senator Thune. There has been a lot of discussion about
    also integrating, reconciling elements of the Taliban that
    might be reconcilable, and I know I think that's been touched
    on already. But General Petraeus had indicated previously that
    we lack the nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the
    Taliban to be able to identify and distinguish between
    reconcilable and irreconcilable elements.
        My understanding is that you have selected retired British
    General Lamb to head a program of reconciliation with members
    of the Taliban based on some of the success that he had in
    Iraq. I'm just wondering if you could provide some of the
    details of those efforts or at least maybe some of the broad
    features of the program?
        General McChrystal. Senator, it's a partnered program,
    first. It has to be an Afghan program. It has to be under the
    Government of Afghanistan. So what we'd be doing is empowering
    them as much as we can with resources, some expertise and
    experience, and things like that.
        What we've stood up with General Lamb is a section in my
    command. He also has now an additional British two-star general
    that has been provided, and we have a full element that works
    with the Government of Afghanistan to help craft their policy,
    help work this forward, partner with not just the U.S. embassy,
    but other embassies as well, so that as we go forward we have a
    program that is not only effective, but it's also understood by
    people.
        Reintegration is really a question of confidence, and it's
    confidence on multiple levels, as we remember from Iraq. It's
    first the confidence of the individual who's going to
    reintegrate, that has to believe that as he comes back in he
    will be protected from his former Taliban partners, he'll also
    be protected from anyone in the Government of Afghanistan who
    might target him or throw him in jail or something.
        It's also a question of confidence on the part of the
    government that the people they bring in are genuine, that
    they're not seeding the Taliban inside their ranks as well.
    Then the last part of the confidence is it's to undermine the
    confidence of the Taliban. So to the degree to which we can
    start to pull people out and they start to look at each other,
    it has a very good effect.
        But for this reason, it's very important that this program
    be very carefully thought out and coordinated, because as soon
    as somebody loses confidence in it, it boomerangs on us.
        Senator Thune. Ambassador, do you have anything to add?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. No, Senator. We're fully engaged
    with General McChrystal's program. We have a DOS officer that
    serves as one of General Lamb's staff, and we're optimistic
    about the potential. It will certainly be predicated upon
    having some momentum, though, against the Taliban. With that
    momentum, with a good reintegration program, I think it will be
    a very important tool.
        Senator Thune. General, one last question--my time's
    running out. Over the past few years, the demand for persistent
    ISR capabilities has spurred the Air Force to field unmanned
    aerial systems (UAS) more rapidly than originally planned. The
    Air Force now has a goal of fielding enough Predator and Reaper
    drones by 2012 to man 50 orbits around the clock. The majority
    of this new capability has been dedicated to Iraq.
        As we begin this drawdown in Iraq, the persistent ISR
    requirement there is not likely to decrease. So with fewer
    soldiers and marines on the ground that are gathering
    information, the joint forces are going to rely more heavily on
    the air component to provide intelligence.
        Meanwhile, with the increasing troop presence in
    Afghanistan, you're going to have the need for persistent ISR
    in that area of operation, too. So I guess the question is, are
    you comfortable with the Air Force's current plan to operate 50
    of those round-the-clock orbits by 2012 in order to meet the
    requirements in both Iraq and Afghanistan, or do we need to
    invest in a UAS capability over and above the current plan to
    ensure that those requirements are addressed?
        General McChrystal. Senator, I haven't looked at exactly
    how they're going to break out around the world. I have looked
    at the balance between Afghanistan and Iraq. Secretary Gates
    leads a very focused effort.
        The one thing I would say is almost everything we do to
    increase our ISR capacity, not just the unmanned, but also
    there's a number of manned aspects, and then there's what we
    call the part that digests it, or PED. It's people and it's
    information systems. It takes what we get and turns it into
    real intelligence. Those programs are expensive, but they are
    extraordinarily effective and extraordinary value added,
    because they allow us to operate with smaller numbers of our
    forces on the ground. The more we have those, we can go after
    IEDs, we can go after terrorist leaders, we can protect our
    forces.
        So there's almost no amount of ISR in my view that would
    not be value added to my effort in Afghanistan.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry, I welcome
    your testimony and I want to thank you for your sacrifice and
    your extremely hard work that you do every day on behalf of all
    of us. As Senator Udall said, Senator Begich and I and others
    visited Afghanistan and Pakistan back in May, Ambassador
    Eikenberry, just several days, I think, after you had taken
    over the post. I wanted to thank you for your hosting us, but I
    also want you to give my best wishes to your wife. I think the
    fact that she is there touring the country with you by your
    side in a war-torn country says a lot about her character. I
    also think it speaks volumes to the Afghani women and in
    committee the Afghani men. So please give her our best wishes.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Hagan. We've had some questions concerning the
    Pashtuns. My understanding is that currently Pashtun
    recruitment to the ANSF is difficult along the Pashtun tribal
    belt that, General McChrystal, you mentioned, the southern and
    southeastern Afghanistan, because the Pashtuns would run the
    risk of having their families subjected to Taliban retribution.
        General McChrystal, can you describe the ethnic composition
    of the ANSF?
        General McChrystal. Yes, ma'am. I can get it to you for the
    record in exact numbers, but we're about 42 percent of the
    population is Pashtun and almost exactly that is the
    representation in the army. So Pashtun participation in the
    army matches it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The objective is to closely match the composition of the Afghan
    National Security Forces (ANSF) with the country's ethnic breakdown.
    Pashtuns represent 42 percent of the Afghan population and comprise
    41.83 percent of the ANSF (41.32 percent in the Army and 42.36 percent
    in the Police). Tajiks comprise 27 percent of the population, but
    represent 38.10 percent of the security forces (34.06 percent in the
    Army and 42.33 percent in the Police). Uzbeks and Hazaras each
    represent 9 percent of the Afghan population. Uzbeks comprise 6.19
    percent of the ANSF (7.23 percent in the Army and 5.09 percent in the
    Police) while the Hazaras represent 8.17 percent of the ANSF (11.69
    percent of the Army and 4.48 percent of the Police). Afghanistan's
    seven other ethnic minorities--Turkmen, Pashayee, Balooch, Bayat,
    Sadat, Arabs, and Nooristani--round out the remaining 13 percent of the
    population. These minorities comprise 5.71 percent of the ANSF (5.70
    percent of the Army and 5.73 percent of the Police).

        General McChrystal. However, I would say that is Pashtun,
    but it is not represented from the south, as you mentioned.
    Kandahar and Helmand and those areas which have been under
    Taliban either control or threat are very underrepresented. So
    it's important to us that we be able to recruit from there.
        But what we have to do first is get security there. So the
    effort now is to increase security, make their families feel
    comfortable, and then go.
        The rest of the breakdown of the ANA falls pretty much
    along ethnic percentages in the country writ large, except for
    the Tajiks are slightly overrepresented in the army.
        Senator Hagan. Does an ethnically unbalanced ANSF pose
    linguistic and ethnic barriers within the local Afghan villages
    along this Pashtun tribal belt, as well as the legitimacy
    concerns and securing the local population and, as you
    mentioned, in the Helmand Province how does that affect our
    marines and allies? I understand the Tajiks speak actually a
    different language or a different dialect.
        General McChrystal. It's a challenge. There are two parts
    to this. First, every Kandak or Afghan battalion that we field
    is ethnically balanced as it comes out of training. So we field
    the force so that it has a mix. We don't field a Tajik
    battalion or a Hazara battalion or a Pashtun battalion, for the
    obvious reasons.
        Senator Hagan. But do you have enough of the different
    ethnicities to do that?
        General McChrystal. We have enough of the ethnicities. What
    we don't have enough of is southern Pashtuns. So we have to
    recruit better.
        So the things that you said about a battalion operating in
    Helmand, we would like to have more representation in that
    battalion of people from that area. But we wouldn't want to
    create again southern Helmand kandaks.
        Senator Hagan. How do you recruit these individuals?
        General McChrystal. The first thing we have to do is
    establish security there.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Pakistan continues to pursue a dual-track policy of
    disrupting the Pakistani Taliban in its tribal areas, most
    notably in South Waziristan, while elements of Pakistan's
    military support the Afghan Taliban networks also in its tribal
    areas, most notably in North Waziristan, and the Afghan Taliban
    high command in its Baluchistan Province. The key question is
    if elements of Pakistan's military can be persuaded to change
    this dual track policy. In order to do that, we have to address
    Pakistan's regional concerns, taking into account its
    relationships with Afghanistan and India.
        The Durand Line cuts across the Pashtun tribes and reduced
    the Afghanistan Pashtun territory and, as you mentioned, the
    Pashtuns comprise about 15 percent of Pakistan's population, or
    close to 26 million people, whereas, in Afghanistan it's about
    12 million Pashtuns.
        Despite Pakistan's attempt to permanently demarcate its
    border with Afghanistan, the Afghans claim Pakistan's Pashtun
    areas on the ground that Afghanistan is the home to all of the
    Pashtuns. Ever since the partition of India, Islamabad has
    attempted to utilize its proxies, I believe, to install a
    friendly Pashtun government in Afghanistan that would preserve
    the de facto border and prevent Pashtun aspirations of a
    homeland and prevent Indian involvement in Afghanistan.
        Ambassador Eikenberry, in the interest of Afghanistan's
    stability, how are you working with the U.S. Ambassador to
    Pakistan, and our Indian Ambassador Tim Romer, as well as
    Ambassador Holbrooke, to facilitate positive relations between
    Islamabad, New Delhi, and Kabul?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, let me concentrate on
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ambassador Holbrooke is the special
    representative that has responsibilities for Afghanistan and
    Pakistan. Clearly the security relationship between India and
    Pakistan has consequences for Afghanistan, as you've
    articulated. But more specifically, with our efforts in Kabul
    have a very strong relationship with our embassy down in
    Islamabad. At the level of Ambassador Holbrooke and General
    Petraeus, they have a close civil-military partnership
    themselves and provide overall policy direction and have sets
    of programs that they've set into motion.
        Then between Ambassador Patterson and myself, we take that
    direction. We are looking and continuously searching for ways
    to facilitate political dialogue between Kabul and Islamabad.
    They're leading. We try to facilitate wherever we can. We have
    an array of programs to try to develop mutual trust and
    confidence, anywhere between the law enforcement area, where
    Director Mueller from the FBI hosts trilateral initiatives led
    by himself, but partnered with the Ministries of Interior of
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. We have programs to help both sides
    to improve their customs programs along the border. We have a
    very promising initiative in which we're hoping to see further
    progress between Afghanistan and Pakistan to reach an agreement
    for transit trade.
        So it's a comprehensive effort that gets into improvements
    in law enforcement, trade, economics, and diplomacy, and then,
    of course, General McChrystal has a very robust program with
    the military tripartite between Afghanistan and Pakistan and
    NATO.
        Senator Hagan. That was my next question: What are you in
    CENTCOM doing to facilitate military-to-military confidence-
    building between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and then I threw in
    India too?
        General McChrystal. At our level what we're doing is, as
    Ambassador Eikenberry mentioned, we have a series of tripartite
    meetings at the principals level, myself, General Kiyani, and
    General Bismullah Mohamedi for the Afghans. But then we also
    below that have operational lower levels that happen very
    regularly. We have a series of border coordination centers.
    There's one in operation. There's a second one just moving
    toward that. There'll be a total of six.
        We also have--for example, about a month ago we went over
    and briefed our full campaign plan to General Kiyani and his
    staff. They did the same back to U.S. forces some time back.
        The idea is confidence-building. It's to get on the same
    page, but then also to have the mechanics in place for things
    like cross-border incidents, so that they don't become
    something that's a negative. There's a whole series of
    activities.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, also if I could add one
    important area that has been underway for several years. That
    is efforts to improve intelligence exchanges and cooperation
    between the United States and Afghanistan and Pakistan. Those
    efforts are led by CIA Director Leon Paneta and his
    counterparts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's been a very
    robust program as well.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        My time is out. Godspeed.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Burris.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        To our distinguished gentlemen testifying, General
    McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry, I want to congratulate
    you also, as my colleagues have done. I just want to say most
    all the questions have been asked and I don't know what else
    you have to answer. I hope to be on a trip next month to
    Afghanistan. I just came back from Iraq and had a very
    interesting visit there, and I'm encouraged by what has taken
    place in Iraq and the confidence that the Iraqi Government
    officials--we didn't see too many Iraqi personnel because it
    just wasn't safe. But I was very encouraged by what the
    officials are saying, that the Americans are carrying out what
    they promised to do, and that is key.
        So just permit me, gentlemen, to try to get some
    clarification, because the questions have been answered; so if
    I repeat some of these and you want to make your answers short,
    I would appreciate it because I have several clarifications to
    make.
        Number one, how effective have the efforts been to
    reintegrate the former Taliban and the Northern Alliance and
    the mujahedin fighters so that they will no longer fight for
    the insurgency? How is reintegration going?
        General McChrystal. Senator, in the case of the Taliban,
    that effort is still very young and has not yet, in my opinion,
    been effective. But we are posturing ourselves to do that.
        Senator Burris. Ambassador, in terms of understanding that
    Kabul and President Karzai and the central government only
    control so many of those 37 provinces there in Afghanistan,
    what is taking place in the local provinces and working with
    the local tribal leaders to try to understand the issues that
    are taking place?
        Are we working, not only on the military side, but also on
    the resource side, with the locals where, because of the
    divisions of that country and all the different ethnicities,
    the locals are really in charge?
        So do we have a specific program that's working with the
    local provinces, with the governors that are there or the local
    councils that are there?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, our principal voice is
    working through the Government of Afghanistan.
        Senator Burris. The central government?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Working through the Government of
    Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan, of course, it
    appoints at the national government level, it appoints
    provincial governors. It appoints district chiefs. So when I
    say ``district chiefs,'' district governors. The police force
    of Afghanistan, it stretches down to the district level. The
    district level of Afghanistan is at the county level.
        What I want to say first and foremost, though, is that our
    programs that we're delivering do work through the Government
    of Afghanistan. What we're trying to do in partnership with the
    Government of Afghanistan is help them get their reach down
    further, down to that local level. We do that through
    reinforcing what have been some very promising programs that
    have developed over the past 3, 4, 5 years.
        An example of a program that has worked well, a
    developmental program, is called the National Solidarity
    Program. It's run by the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and
    Development and it's a program in which a community, a village,
    will elect for a particular small developmental project to
    benefit that particular community or village--it may be wells,
    it may be a road that connects them to the district center. But
    it's a program which empowers the community then through
    electing or voting on developmental projects.
        So we have programs like that, that we're partnering with
    the Government of Afghanistan to try to extend further and
    farther across the country, that delivers security. Also, we're
    working right now with key ministries to see over the next
    year, the next 18 months, how more progress can be made in
    strengthening government at the local level and developing
    capability to deliver a very basic set of services, education,
    health, and so forth.
        Senator Burris. Mr. Ambassador, Senator Hagan just raised a
    question about languages. Are we trying to teach them English?
    Are we trying to learn their dialect and their native tongue?
    The American personnel that's there or any foreign personnel in
    any of those various provinces, whether it's British, German,
    or Polish?
        Are we trying to teach them English or are we trying to
    learn their language so we can communicate with them in their
    language?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. First of all, let me say, Senator,
    the most popular foreign language on demand right now within
    Afghanistan in all the schools is the English language.
        Senator Burris. Unfortunately. Mr. Ambassador, we must
    learn the language of the natives and they will accept us
    better when we can speak their language. As a student who
    studied abroad and speaks another foreign language, which was
    German, the fact that I could speak German, I was very well
    received. That is what we must do as Americans, is to learn the
    language there. I hope that we'll learn it.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, you had asked about the
    English language. Your separate point here about our need to
    develop better language skills inside of Afghanistan--I know
    General McChrystal said earlier about the Afghan Hands Program
    being developed by DOD and the military. We're doing better on
    the civilian side. Many more of our political officers being
    assigned to Afghanistan are coming in now with a year of Dari
    language training or some Pashtun. We need to do better,
    though.
        Senator Burris. Let me ask the General. Now, in terms of
    just for clarification, General, on the drawdown dates, what
    little I know about the military, I heard one of our
    distinguished Senators ask about whether they were going to
    start withdrawing the first troops on that date. There are
    rotations regularly in and out of Afghanistan, are there not?
    So I don't think we're going to be able to really zero in on
    whether on July 1 the first soldier is going to be withdrawn
    from the area. Am I correct in that assessment, General?
        General McChrystal. Sir, the way we are interpreting the
    President's guidance is we would do troop rotations, but not
    count them in that drawdown. In July 2011 we believe--I am
    comfortable it is his intent we start to reduce the overall
    number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. But the rate and pace of
    that reduction will be based upon conditions on the ground at
    that time.
        Senator Burris. I see my time has expired, but you also
    indicated to another Senator--and I think it's a clarification,
    and please correct me--that on July 1 we will make the first
    withdrawal. That's what I understood you to say.
        General McChrystal. In July 2011, that's correct, Senator.
        Senator Burris. But how do you reconcile that with, we will
    begin to assess it? As Secretary Gates said, he'll start
    assessing it in January 2011, and they're going to start the
    assessment, and if the assessment is not right and the ground
    is not right we may not withdraw a troop on July 1, 2011. Is
    that possible?
        General McChrystal. Senator, we will be making constant
    assessments, with a formal assessment a year from now, and then
    in July 2011, I believe that the President has given us
    instructions to start to reduce U.S. force numbers, but that
    the pace and scope of that, how fast that happens, would be
    based upon the assessments and the conditions at the time.
        Senator Burris. I see. So you could then withdraw one
    battalion or a squadron can go home and say, ``well, now we've
    started our withdrawal,'' and then we halt it to see because we
    don't know what the conditions are?
        General McChrystal. Senator, we would coordinate that with
    our entire chain of command up to, obviously, the President to
    meet his intent. We would have no intent not to do that.
        Senator Burris. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I hope to
    see you all next month, and if everything goes well, I'll
    celebrate New Year's with you over there.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. You have been so patient and what you have
    seen is a slow withdrawal of the Senate from this committee
    room. So it's all how we measure things in withdrawal.
        Let me say thank you for enduring 3 hours or so of
    questioning, comments, and commentary from us. But it is an
    important issue. Again, I want to thank you both for your
    service to our country. Thank you both.
        I want to follow up, in seriousness, about the transition
    and withdrawal. This is just for clarification, but I know some
    continue to bat this around, what is withdrawal, what is not
    withdrawal. Really, probably the proper word would have been in
    July 2011 we're going to start a transition, because a
    withdrawal could be 5 people, it could be 5,000 people; it
    could be 1 day, it could be 10 years. That's a determination
    that will come over time, not July hits and suddenly
    everything's starting to move out. It's a process, and
    transition is really what it's about. Is that a fair statement?
        General McChrystal. Senator, I want to make sure that I'm
    clear. I think that is. I think transition is also a process. I
    think we'll be transferring to Afghan lead in areas across the
    country as conditions permit, and I think that will occur. It
    may not wait until July 2011.
        Senator Begich. Right.
        General McChrystal. I do believe that the President wants
    us to understand that we are absolutely going to start a
    reduction in forces in July 2011.
        Senator Begich. Right. But that will all be determined on
    the quantity and the timing of that, in the sense you may start
    it, but it may be a short period, it may be a long period, it
    may be large numbers, it may be small numbers. Is that a fair
    statement?
        General McChrystal. Exactly, Senator.
        Senator Begich. I know I hear from others sometimes--and
    Senator Inhofe was very good in repeating the President's words
    that it's not a sudden, July hits and our enemies know exactly
    what we're doing. They'll know no matter what, whenever we do
    withdrawal, because everything we do is very transparent. They
    will notice that and they'll have their own decisions as to
    what they will do or not do, and hopefully we'll be successful
    and they won't be doing much. So I want to make sure that's
    clear.
        The other thing, I want to really echo what some other
    members said. I think what you've been able to do with the CERP
    monies has been very powerful, very positive. Are there always
    rooms for improvement on accountability? Absolutely. I don't
    care how much money you have, if you have $10 or one point some
    billion dollars. There's an option, an opportunity to continue
    to improve, and it sounds like you folks have been doing that.
        But I would also echo what Senator Nelson said, that I
    agree that the DOS should have as much flexibility in those
    dollars. I assume, Ambassador, you will agree with that. But
    I'm curious from the General's perspective: Would you agree
    also that the DOS should have some more flexibility with their
    dollars to do very similar activities, so you can join these
    resources together? Is that a fair statement?
        General McChrystal. I absolutely would agree.
        Senator Begich. I again want to echo that anything, and I
    know you heard a couple Senators here, very aggressive about
    this: Whatever we can do to help streamline the rules, the
    regulation, and/or statutory issues, please let us know. We are
    motivated. We recognize there will be a little tug-of-war here
    on this committee, but I think there's a sizable majority that
    recognize the success you've had with the CERP funds and we
    should see the same with the DOS, rather than going through
    this maze that you have to go through to access their money and
    then access your money. So anything we can do, please feel free
    as we move through this process.
        Mr. Ambassador, do you have any comment you want to add to
    that?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. No. We'd welcome that support,
    Senator.
        Senator Begich. Okay. The other one I want to clarify--and
    Mr. Ambassador, I know it seemed like you wanted to go a little
    further in clarifying this--on do I think that going from 300
    to 900-plus individuals from your operation is a great move?
    Absolutely. You're tripling it. Some will argue it's only 1
    percent of the total force, but if I took both of your total
    workforces, the majority of what the military does is deploy
    people. You don't necessarily have that luxury. You have a huge
    number of people to deploy at any given time. You have to pick
    and select and be very selective.
        So I understand the differences. I'm sure we would love a
    higher percentage, but that's not realistic based on the
    capacity that the DOD has in the sense of deployment between
    the military.
        In your 2011-2012 budget process, 2011 that's moving
    forward, and you may not be able to tell us here, but are you
    looking at additional resources that could be added to your
    budget to create a more robust deployable force in the sense of
    what you need on the ground to assist the military in the
    civilian activities?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Indeed we are, Senator, both in
    terms of the personnel and in terms of our development
    programs. We're doing now a very careful analysis against
    General McChrystal's military campaign. In order to support
    that, we are going to need more civilians out in rural areas,
    out in different population centers to support. As he clears
    and holds areas, then it shifts on the civilian side to the
    building. So we're looking at additional civilians and
    development programs in order to support that. So there will be
    increases, yes.
        Senator Begich. Would it be fair to say that----
        Chairman Levin. Senator Begich, if I could interrupt you
    for a moment. I'm going to have to leave for a few moments.
        Senator Begich. I'll close it off.
        Chairman Levin. I don't want you to close it, because I
    have some additional questions. If you are finished before I
    get back, which will just be a few moments, would you just
    recess for a couple minutes.
        Senator Begich. Sure, I'd be happy to do that, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Begich [presiding]. Boy, I get the whole--this is a
    good opportunity. It's always good to be last.
        I want to make sure one other piece in your allocation of
    resources for those people. Again, I'm not in your business,
    but my assumption is your people will need also longer-term
    potential with the country of Afghanistan because of the work
    you'll be doing.
        It's not just you'll be doing the water lines, sewer lines,
    governance, and be done. You'll actually be moving through.
        So that resource is not just about a 1-year, but a few
    years out. Is that how you look at it? That's how I look at it.
    I just want to make sure I'm on the same page.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Yes, Senator, absolutely, multi-year
    and the whole of government. We'll have to be looking then at
    the sustainment of our civilian force. There'll be changes in
    the composition, but it'll still be a sizable presence, and it
    will be multi-year. So it's not only the challenge of getting
    it there over the next year, year and a half. We would
    anticipate this to be a multi-year requirement and have to
    think through how we'll sustain that kind of presence.
        Senator Begich. I guess I'm supportive of that. I just want
    to warn you ahead that's some of the questioning I'll have as
    we move down that path, and I just wanted to convey that to
    you.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. If I could, Senator, though, a point
    of emphasis here. More civilians needed, but to continue to
    emphasize that as our civilians move forward they're
    multiplying their effects through Afghans.
        Senator Begich. Correct.
        Ambassador Eikenberry. As we now are starting to reach a
    point in Afghanistan where you had 7, 8 years after the fall of
    the Taliban more children, more young adults starting to
    graduate from high school, vocational schools, universities,
    the pool out there of talented people is starting to enlarge,
    and our civilians as they come in, they're going to be able to
    leverage that in increasing numbers. You can reach a point
    where it's starting to get diminishing returns, too costly, and
    also the possibility of dependency building up.
        Senator Begich. I agree. I think that's a great outcome, if
    you have more of a larger Afghan pool.
        General, you reminded me of this and I'm just trying to
    remember from our briefings when I was there and some of the
    folks you had on the ground. We have in Afghanistan, I want to
    say, ``West Point Lite'' for officer training--explain what we
    have there in regards to trying to do what we can to ensure
    that we have an officer corps within the Afghan Army that's
    well trained? Remind me of that just so I'm clear on that?
        General McChrystal. Senator, they have stood up a military
    academy.
        Senator Begich. That's right.
        General McChrystal. They are expanding the size of that
    military academy in the next year or so. So that will provide a
    corps. But then they also have other commissioning entry ways
    as well. For their noncommissioned officer corps, which is
    critical, they have a sergeants major academy and then a series
    of stairstep professional development programs for their
    noncommissioned officer corps as well, and I think that's going
    to be very important for them.
        Senator Begich. How involved are we now with that and how
    long before they take a very sizable role in managing those
    academies? Or are they doing it now?
        General McChrystal. They really do it now. They get
    assistance on many of the courses, but they really do it now.
        Senator Begich. They manage it with their own teaching aids
    and all the other aspects of it?
        General McChrystal. That's correct. Again, we assist, but
    they run it.
        Senator Begich. One last question I think I'll have time
    for, and that is, the efforts of their national security force
    and their police force, what do you think is the major change
    that can move them into these higher numbers that we want to
    get them to in short order? What's the one or two things that
    you think is going to make the difference, or that you believe
    is making the difference now?
        General McChrystal. Senator, it's partnering. It's where we
    put our units with them and operate, often colocated in the
    same outpost together, and then as we go together. It's that
    shoulder-to-shoulder partnering that I think's going to help
    increase their professionalism and development most rapidly.
        Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you very much.
        I know, Mr. Chairman, you were very generous with allowing
    me more time as you vacated. So thank you very much.
        Thank you again for your service.
        Chairman Levin. Actually, Senator Begich, your last
    question segues perfectly into the first question I was going
    to ask. It goes back to this question of partnering. Our
    understanding is that we have about 19,000 U.S. troops now in
    RC-South. We have about 11 combat battalions in RC-South, with
    perhaps 40 companies, more or less. My question is: How many of
    those 11 U.S. battalions in RC-South are actually partnered
    with, colocated with, as you just put it, shoulder-to-shoulder
    now with Afghan units?
        General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, I would say I don't know
    the number that are colocated on the bases, but in terms of
    partnered, 100 percent.
        Chairman Levin. What I'm talking about is colocation,
    actually physically with, eating with, living with, colocated
    with. How many of the 11 battalions or approximately 40
    companies are physically actually colocated with Afghan units?
        General McChrystal. I'll have to take that for the record,
    Mr. Chairman.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Although the percentage of companies physically colocated with
    Afghan units varies daily, all of the U.S. battalions in Regional
    Command-South are partnered with the Afghan National Security Forces.

        Chairman Levin. Could it be few? Might the answer be few?
        General McChrystal. I do not believe so, but I'd like to
    take that for the record and make sure it's accurate.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.
        When General Jones tells us that we have to get more Afghan
    troops out of their garrisons, that's to me a major challenge.
    It's something that I think needs to be our mission. This
    partnering needs to be our mission to the same extent that it's
    a British mission or an Australian mission. We had a little
    discussion about this before, but I want to be more precise.
    Our COIN doctrine is that our partnering strategy is aimed at
    achieving a ratio of one U.S. company--leading to three Afghan
    companies for every one U.S. company as their partnering
    progresses.
        Is that your understanding?
        General McChrystal. It is.
        Chairman Levin. Those ratios that you gave us that we
    currently have and that we hope to have will ideally lead up to
    that. But we're nowhere near one to one, quite the opposite in
    Helmand, from everything we can understand.
        There was an article in the Washington Post this morning
    which described the increasing influence of Taliban shadow
    governments. I don't think anyone's asked you about this today
    here. If not, I would like to just quickly ask you this. Our
    votes have begun, so you're almost free.
        These shadow governors establish Taliban governors, police
    chiefs, administrators, and judges in nearly all the Afghan
    provinces. Did you see the article this morning? Did you read
    the article, and do you agree with that report? Ambassador?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I did see the article and, Mr.
    Chairman, what I'd say is that this growth of parallel
    governance, in some provinces of Afghanistan effective shadow
    governance with real consequences and real capabilities--when I
    came into Afghanistan on my third tour of duty in May of this
    year and did my own assessment of the security situation, for
    me the development of this shadow governance was the most
    striking change that I had seen since early 2007 when I last
    left.
        In that regard then, when General McChrystal did his
    security assessment and highlighted the deterioration of the
    security situation in important parts of the country, I had
    keyed in on that and that was one of the factors that led me to
    be in absolute concurrence with his own analysis of the
    deterioration of security.
        Chairman Levin. Would you say it's as extensive as the Post
    article suggested? Is that about accurate in terms of its----
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I'd defer to General McChrystal for
    specifics.
        Chairman Levin. General, have you had a chance to read the
    article?
        General McChrystal. I did.
        Chairman Levin. Is the shadow government's existence by the
    Taliban as extensive or approximately as extensive as the Post
    article stated?
        General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, it is, but I'd like to
    provide some wider context.
        Chairman Levin. Sure.
        General McChrystal. They have established shadow governors
    in 33 of the 34 provinces. In some areas those shadow governors
    can do what was outlined in that article and have an awful lot
    of influence. In other areas it's more aspirational. They have
    a shadow governor, but the individual doesn't have that kind of
    reach or control. Even within a province where they have a
    shadow governor, they will typically have areas where they have
    a tremendous amount of influence--south primarily, some in the
    east.
        So what was described in the article was accurate, but not
    for everywhere.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.
        On the reintegration initiatives, you were both, I think,
    extremely clear about the importance of these initiatives
    taking place and that the Afghan Government is going to have to
    lead those initiatives. General, you talked about keeping open
    the door to reconciliation. General, you said there are some
    important opportunities--it's important that there be
    opportunities for Afghans to come back under government rule,
    and that they be treated when they do so, providing they abide
    by the rules, treated with respect when they do that.
        Ambassador, you also felt that we have to try to find a
    way; more importantly, the Afghan Government has to try to find
    a way for this reintegration; and that there's a commission
    which is going to be created, you indicated.
        Have we been supportive of that reintegration effort?
        Whenever I talk to President Karzai he says: ``You know the
    reason we haven't gone ahead with this; your guys don't want us
    to.'' Have we been an impediment to this in any way? Or to put
    it positively, are we clearly supportive of this effort,
    whether it's a reintegration commission or whether it's a plan
    for reintegration? Is it clear to President Karzai that we're
    supportive of that effort?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. It's absolutely clear.
        Chairman Levin. Have we not been supportive over the last
    year, say?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. Mr. Chairman, the efforts up until
    today have been very uneven, very uneven success by the
    Government of Afghanistan.
        Chairman Levin. Is that partly our fault, that we've sent
    signals that we have some reluctance in this area?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. I don't know going back to 2004 and
    2005. I was not in a position at that point----
        Chairman Levin. How about in the last year?
        Ambassador Eikenberry. In the last year, it's been very
    clear. I would say since the arrival of General McChrystal and
    myself it's been crystal clear, absolutely clear to President
    Karzai and the Afghan leadership that we would be in full
    support of their efforts.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. Would you agree with that, General?
        General McChrystal. Absolutely.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. That's fine. Thank you.
        Can you get us that figure which I asked you about? Can you
    get us that, if possible, overnight?
        General McChrystal. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you. I would really appreciate
    it.
        We all very much appreciate your staying power, not just in
    Afghanistan, but your steadfastness through this process of
    ours. I know you're committed to the process in Afghanistan. We
    all wish you, obviously, godspeed and good luck in that regard.
    Your answers today, I think, have been clear. Your
    understanding of the President's directives, it seems to me, is
    clear. You both indicated you not only support them, you agree
    with them. I think that's clear and it's important, because the
    clarity of our mission is essential as well as the resources to
    accomplish it.
        I know I'm speaking on behalf of everybody, everyone but me
    who is now voting in the Senate, that we're grateful again to
    you, your families, your troops, the people who work with you
    on the civilian side. Just pass along our thanks if you would
    and our gratitude and support for this effort.
        Thank you. We will stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris

                                 TROOP INCREASE

        1. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, do you believe that the
    President's new strategy of quickly deploying 30,000 additional troops
    will be sufficient to stop the insurgency within the timeframe to begin
    transition and withdrawal in July 2011?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        2. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, what is the timeline for the
    deployment of all 30,000 troops?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        3. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, regarding logistics for
    deploying these 30,000 troops quickly, please explain the challenges
    associated with a less than robust theater logistics and throughput
    infrastructure?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        4. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how are you mitigating any
    major shortcomings to ensure that quality is not sacrificed for speed?
        General McChrystal. I have been given great flexibility by the
    President and the Secretary of Defense in determining the composition
    of the additional 30,000 forces. While these forces will deploy on an
    accelerated timeline, I am confident that I am getting the force
    structure I need to be successful.
        The reality, however, is that requirements will continue to change
    commensurate with conditions on the ground. I will consistently review
    our progress towards meeting our military objectives to ensure that we
    have the right mix of forces.

        5. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, is there sufficient air and
    sealift assets to meet the troop deployment timeline?
        General McChrystal. Yes, we currently assess air and sealift assets
    as adequate to meet troop deployment timelines. We will further refine
    this assessment during the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)/U.S.
    Central Command (CENTCOM) Force Flow Workshop, which will directly
    address this assessment.

        6. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how will this troop increase
    affect the ongoing drawdown of troops in Iraq?
        General McChrystal. As the Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan, I
    do not make decisions on resource requirements across different
    theaters. As such, it would be improper of me to speculate on how
    future changes in General Odierno's area of operations (AOR) may affect
    the flow of forces into Afghanistan. As Commander of U.S. CENTCOM,
    General David Petraeus is best suited to answer this question.

        7. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how is the normal force
    rotation and dwell time affected by the troop increase given the
    planned rapid pace of deployment of additional troops?
        General McChrystal. Our men and women in uniform and their families
    continue to bear a significant burden. The issues of force rotation and
    dwell time are best answered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    and the individual Service Chiefs, executing their duties under title
    10. I am confident that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff closely monitor the health of the force and are taking active
    measures to address and mitigate risks.

                        AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

        8. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, as we work to increase the
    capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), can you
    please clarify the security force goals? Are we aiming at meeting the
    projected March 2009 goals of 134,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) and
    82,000 Afghan National Police (ANP)--or levels you recommended of
    240,000 ANA and 160,000 ANP?
        General McChrystal. We are no longer using the March 2009 goals.
    Our current growth objective is to grow to 134,000 ANA and 96,800 ANP
    by October 2010. Pending approval by the Secretary of Defense, we will
    request to grow the ANP to 109,000 by October 2010. We will also
    request to continue growth of the ANA to 171,600 and the ANP to 134,000
    by October 2011. We will reexamine the need for any future growth based
    on security conditions and ANSF performance.

        9. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how many U.S. forces are
    currently training ANSF?
        General McChrystal. The primary means for U.S. forces to train ANSF
    is by partnering with them in order to help them build capacity and
    assume responsibility for their nation's security as quickly and as
    successfully as possible. As of December 2009, 32 of the 44 U.S. combat
    battalions were partnered.
        U.S. forces also contribute to institutional training. Currently,
    in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission
    Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
    (CSTC-A), there are approximately 830 U.S. servicemembers whose sole
    task is to instruct and advise ANSF in institutions, schools, and other
    formalized programs of instruction. These forces instruct ANSF
    trainers, coordinate resources exclusively in support of training, and
    advise and coach the ANSF on management of institutional training.

        10. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, when all of the U.S. troops
    are in place, how many of them will be solely dedicated to training the
    ANSF?
        General McChrystal. Under current plans, there will be in excess of
    1,800 U.S. servicemembers whose sole task is to train ANSF forces in
    institutions, schools, and other formalized programs of instruction.
    These forces advise ANSF trainers, coordinate resources exclusively in
    support of training, and advise and coach the ANSF on management of
    institutional training.

        11. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, for those U.S. troops whose
    responsibility is to train the Afghan forces, what portion are/will be
    embedded with the Afghan Forces?
        General McChrystal. A key tenet of International Security
    Assistance Force's (ISAF) strategy is partnering with the Afghan
    security forces in order to help them build capability and capacity,
    and assume responsibility as quickly and as successfully as possible.
    Today, 32 of 44 U.S. combat battalions that are capable of partnering
    are fully partnered and conducting daily combined operations with the
    ANSF. It is my intent that all U.S. forces will partner with Afghan
    units by December 2010.

        12. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how long will it take for
    American troops to train Afghan forces?
        General McChrystal. The process of training the ANSF is a long-term
    commitment by U.S. forces that includes three main efforts. The first
    is institutional, where soldiers and police receive basic training
    through schools and other formalized programs. American forces provide
    instructors and advisors to the ANA and ANP training institutions, with
    the intention that Afghans take on increasing responsibility for their
    own training.
        The second training effort for U.S. forces are Embedded Training
    Teams (ETTs) and Police Mentor Teams (PMTs), which are provided to
    fielded ANA units from the battalion to corps level and to ANP units
    from the district to police region level. There are currently two U.S.
    BCTs providing ETTs and PMTs: the 48th IBCT and 4/82 IBCT. ETTS and
    PMTs will remain with an ANSF unit until that particular unit has
    achieved the capability to operate independently.
        The third training effort is U.S. partnership with ANSF units. This
    partnering is a key tenet of our strategy, and is designed to help the
    ANSF build capacity and assume lead security responsibility as quickly
    and as successfully as possible. Once units graduate from their
    respective institutional training programs, they continue to develop
    through their partnership with U.S. and coalition forces.

        13. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, when will there be
    sufficient and--I stress--fully trained Afghan forces prepared to
    protect their own country?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        14. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, given the current
    proficiency of the ANP Force, will Afghan policemen who were trained
    locally--in provinces outside of the new academy in Kabul--be retrained
    with the revised law enforcement standards?
        General McChrystal. Yes. Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) recruited and
    trained locally will complete the ``Basic 8'' 8-week training program.
    This program uses a curriculum reviewed by the Department of State's
    International Law Enforcement and Narcotics Division and approved by
    the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MoI).
        AUP patrolmen are being trained at a Regional Training Center
    either individually, or as part of their district through the Focused
    District Development Program, or in their home district through the
    Directed District Development program. MoI and NTM-A/CSTC-A are
    coordinating to maximize the rate of untrained police completing this
    reform training.

        15. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how effective has the
    effort been to reintegrate former Taliban, Northern Alliance, and
    Mujahedeen fighters so that they are no longer fighting for the
    insurgency?
        General McChrystal. The Afghan Government is currently developing
    their policy for reintegration, while leveraging lessons from earlier
    programs. These previous programs suffered from a shortage of Afghan
    political leadership, a lack of fiscal transparency, and deficiencies
    in monitoring and accountability of those who joined the program. The
    emerging Afghan reintegration policy aims to rectify these problems and
    our collaboration with them will help ensure the proper measures are
    put in place for a successful program. Once the policy is approved, the
    Afghan Government will develop an implementation plan. ISAF is working
    with members of the Afghan Government and the international community
    on the policy and implementation plan.

                                   WITHDRAWAL

        16. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, the President stated that a
    responsible withdrawal of troops will begin in summer 2011 but would
    also depend on conditions on the ground. What types of conditions would
    delay withdrawal or transition?
        General McChrystal. The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently
    working with our interagency and multinational partners to refine the
    benchmarks that we will use to measure progress in light of the
    President's new strategy. However, broadly speaking, progress in
    Afghanistan will emerge as the ANSF develop the capacity to provide
    security for the nation and effective governance and development takes
    root. As this happens, the United States and our ISAF partners will
    continue to provide overwatch. The pace and locations at which this
    process will take place will depend on several factors, the two most
    important of which are the performance of the Afghan government at all
    levels, and the development of the ANSF. The pace of transition will
    occur at a rate consistent with Afghan capacity to manage the security
    situation, with requisite support, and preparedness of governance.
        A delay in transition could emerge due to any number of factors.
    The population is the ultimate arbiter of these conditions based on
    their confidence in their security situation. The insurgency is
    competing for control of the population through intimidation and
    coercion; ISAF and ANSF forces need to provide confidence to the
    population. In some areas, the insurgency is sufficiently rooted to a
    point where it could take a period of time to generate the necessary
    confidence that causes the population to identify and eliminate the
    threat. Commensurate with this situation is generation and employment
    of ANSF that can effectively maintain security in these areas. Finally,
    the pace of transition must be such that there is no deterioration in
    the security situation in areas that have undergone the transition
    process. Ensuring that the security situation does not regress in areas
    that have transitioned may necessitate an adjustment to the pace of
    transition based upon conditions on the ground.

        17. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, what policy goals and
    benchmarks are tied to the withdrawal of forces in Afghanistan?
        General McChrystal. DOD is currently working with our interagency
    and multinational partners to refine the benchmarks that we will use to
    measure progress in light of the President's new strategy. However,
    broadly speaking, progress in Afghanistan will emerge as the ANSF
    develop the capacity to provide security for their nation and effective
    governance and development take root. As this happens, the United
    States and our ISAF partners will continue to provide overwatch,
    eventually drawing down. The pace and locations at which this process
    will take place will depend on several factors, the two most important
    of which are the performance of the Afghan government at all levels,
    and the development of the ANSF. We will not transfer responsibility to
    the Afghans until they have the capacity to manage the situation on
    their own.

                                      COST

        18. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, the Office of Management
    and Budget Director estimated that each additional soldier sent to
    Afghanistan will cost $1 million. Is this estimate accurate?
        General McChrystal. My staff does not manage the estimate you are
    requesting. Those functions are managed by each of the military
    departments and then integrated by the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense.

        19. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, does this cost estimate
    include any contractor support?
        General McChrystal. My staff does not manage the additional costs
    of contractor support in Afghanistan. Those functions are managed by
    each of the military departments and then integrated by the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense.

                    INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

        20. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, I understand that many of
    the troop-contributing nations have placed very specific caveats on
    what missions and what type of support that they will provide. What, if
    any, are the challenges, and do these caveats pose an obstacle to
    meeting our stated objectives?
        General McChrystal. Military planners consider the constraints and
    restraints facing the unit--actions they must do and cannot do.
    National caveats are one form of those constraints. They do not prevent
    planning or execution, they merely need to be taken into account while
    planning.
        These caveats do not impact our ability to reach our stated
    objectives. Some nations have placed legal caveats, mainly limiting the
    use of force by their soldiers, in accordance with their legal system.
    Other nations have placed operational caveats, limiting their
    operations to a specific area, for instance. We understand these
    caveats, put in place by their political authorities, who took into
    account their national sensitivities or simply the capabilities of
    their forces.

        21. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how many ISAF are currently
    conducting the mission?
        General McChrystal. As of 9 December 2009, coalition forces in
    Afghanistan total 109,370.

                                  CONTRACTORS

        22. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, will there be an increase
    in contractor support based on this troop increase? If so, what
    additional costs will be necessary?
        General McChrystal. The increase in forces will generate an
    increase in contractor support. However, those functions are managed by
    each of the military departments and then integrated by the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense.
        With the dispersed force laydown throughout the country of
    Afghanistan, and the need to ensure the majority of the additional
    forces are operators rather than force support personnel, contractors
    will be necessary to provide the supplies, services, and construction
    needs of establishing new and expanding current base camps; as well as
    logistic and other noncombat related services, such as dining
    facilities. Contract Support Integration ensures contracted support is
    planned, defined, prioritized, and validated prior to being delivered
    to the joint force. Contracted support is considered throughout the
    planning process to ensure mission success.
        With regard to necessary additional costs, this amount is not
    readily available as it depends on the timing of both the force flow
    and duration of need; the existing capability of facilities at new
    beddown locations; and the division of support between the civil
    augmentation program contracts and local procurement, among others. I
    assure you, our contracting professionals regularly seek more efficient
    and cost effective ways to provide support, while the requirement
    determination and review processes ensure procurement of only valid
    requirements.

        23. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, which American contracting
    companies are supporting the training of the ANP?
        General McChrystal. U.S. Training Center trains the Afghan Border
    Police; DynCorps trains the Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan National
    Civil Order Police.

        24. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how long have contactors
    been assigned this task, and how long will they stay should their
    contract be renewed?
        General McChrystal. U.S. Training Center has held the Afghan Border
    Police contract since September 2008. The contract will expire in
    August 2010. DynCorp has held the Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan
    National Civil Order Police since August 2008. The contract will expire
    in March 2010. The replacement for both contracts is in the award
    process with an anticipated award of no later than March 2010.

                                PRESIDENT KARZAI

        25. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, I assume that we have as
    part of our goals to address governance and corruption. In his
    inauguration, President Hamid Karzai stated that he was going to fight
    corruption. What tangible steps has he outlined?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        26. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, what is President Karzai
    doing to increase transparency in the appointment of provincial and
    ministerial posts?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

                                  AGRICULTURE

        27. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, overall development of
    the Afghan economy appears to be at a standstill and further
    agricultural development is necessary. What is being done to provide
    security for farmers who do not grow poppy so that the Taliban does not
    intimidate the farmers?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        28. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, is there a comprehensive
    agricultural development strategy?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

                               DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

        29. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, diplomatic effort is
    essential to the stability and governance of Afghanistan. What is the
    division of responsibility between Ambassador Holbrooke, Deputy
    Ambassador Ricciardone, and yourself?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        30. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, can you describe how and
    the extent of coordination between yourself and Ambassador Holbrooke?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        31. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, what is the overall plan
    for reconstruction and who is leading the effort?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        32. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, are relief and other
    reconstruction efforts aided or hampered by the presence of the
    Provincial Reconstruction Team? Does this vary by region?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                                    ENABLERS

        33. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, what is your plan for
    and how many enablers are required to support the additional 30,000
    combat forces ordered to Afghanistan?
        General McChrystal. The 30,000 additional forces include
    approximately 12,500 enablers. These enablers include personnel with
    expertise in military intelligence, route clearance, aviation, and
    numerous other capabilities which allow forces to properly conduct
    their assigned missions.

                             AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

        34. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, what is your
    assessment of the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) and other
    local security forces?
        General McChrystal. The AP3 is fulfilling its intent of providing
    security at the local level with forces recruited from the same
    communities they serve. We are beginning to see a reduced requirement
    for the presence and employment of coalition forces for security
    purposes in areas where the AP3 forces are currently being utilized.
        With regards to other local security forces, the Local Defense
    Initiative remains in nascent stages of development but has been
    operationalized in three communities. The program has had positive
    effects in these communities to include increased security, cooperation
    with GIRoA, and the beginnings of economic development. However, while
    AP3 has shown some small successes, it is important to remember local
    security initiatives that work in some regions are not necessarily
    transferable to all parts of the country.

        35. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, are there plans to
    expand this program to other areas of Afghanistan?
        General McChrystal. There are no plans to expand the AP3 beyond
    Wardak Province at this time.

                                    PAKISTAN

        36. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal and Ambassador
    Eikenberry, how will the stability of Pakistan be affected by the surge
    of troops in Afghanistan?
        General McChrystal. Your question would be best served by asking
    Admiral Mullen or General Petraeus, both of whom have Pakistan within
    their respective areas of responsibility.
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        37. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, what type of border
    coordination is taking place between the United States and ISAF, and
    the Pakistani military and Pakistani civilian government to ensure that
    Taliban fighters are engaged once they cross the border into Pakistan?
        General McChrystal. Coordination between ISAF and Pakistan occurs
    at a variety of levels. At the tactical level, radios have been
    distributed to the Pakistan military (PAKMIL) and Pakistan Frontier
    Corps. These radios are used to coordinate and deconflict kinetic
    activities. Additionally, computer systems are being added to PAKMIL
    and Frontier Corps Battalions that will allow email communication
    between units across the border. The radios and computer systems
    improve situational awareness and coordination between coalition and
    Pakistan units, allowing coalition and Pakistan forces to effectively
    execute cross border direct and indirect fires against malign actors.
        At the operational level, Border Coordination Centers (BCCs)
    improve situational awareness between the coalition and Pakistani
    security forces. BCCs are made up of officers from Afghanistan,
    Pakistan, and the coalition that work as a team to deconflict fires and
    reduce tension along the border. BCCs have been very successful as a
    confidence building measure and have improved coordination and resolved
    border issues at the lowest levels.
        At the strategic level, ISAF has two organizations that work to
    deconflict issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan: the Tripartite
    Joint Intelligence Operations Center (T-JIOC) and the Border Issues
    Working Group (BIWG). The T-JIOC, established in 2007, brings senior
    Afghan and PAKMIL officers together to address border issues and keep
    each nation informed of operations and issues that impact the two
    nations. Since 2009, the BIWG has brought embassies, international
    organizations, GIRoA, and ISAF together to focus on issues that impact
    Afghanistan's borders.

                           INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

        38. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, how has the
    streamlining of your command--overseeing ISAF and U.S. forces in
    Afghanistan--affected coordination and cooperation at the tactical and
    strategic level?
        General McChrystal. The establishment of the ISAF Joint Command
    (IJC) and NTM-A has greatly increased the efficiency of command and
    control. It is important to understand that prior to the establishment
    of these three-star commands, ISAF was providing the direction and
    guidance to the five regional commands, coordinating force generation
    with the CSTC-A, responding to the NATO command channels via Joint
    Forces Command-Brunssum and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe,
    while also conducting coordination with the Government of the Islamic
    Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to address issues from the strategic to
    the tactical level. Creation of the IJC and NTM-A has allowed ISAF to
    focus ``up and out,'' for increased coordination with our partners in
    GIRoA and the international community in Kabul and to communicate
    ISAF's requirements more clearly to NATO. By providing direction and
    guidance to the IJC and NTM-A, ISAF can focus attention on the efforts
    that enable the subordinates to accomplish assigned missions. In the
    case of the IJC, by focusing ``down and in,'' they are able to provide
    greater operational direction and guidance to the regional commands,
    coordinating their efforts in a manner that has not occurred
    previously.

        39. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, the additional marines
    ordered to deploy to Afghanistan will do so as a Marine Air Ground Task
    Force (MAGTF). Please describe how the Marines' air combat element will
    fit into the other air force elements supporting ISAF. Please describe
    the command and control plan for combat air support, medical
    evacuation, and air transportation and logistics. Will all air elements
    fall under the same structure? How are they different?
        General McChrystal. The MAGTF Commander retains operational control
    of all organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF aviation
    combat element is support of the MAGTF ground combat element. U.S.
    Marine Corps aviation fits into the Combined Force Air Component
    Commander (CFACC) operational design by its inclusion in the Air
    Tasking Order and operating under the direction of the Airspace Control
    Plan.
        The CFACC, as the airspace control authority, directs the
    employment of the theater air ground system that orchestrates the
    command and control of air operations. The Marines contribute by
    executing air command and control within the MAGTF AORs, by providing
    the CFACC with a radar control facility, and by providing excess
    sorties and theater aviation support as required.
        Medical evacuation in RC(S) in Afghanistan is conducted by special
    medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) crews provided by the U.S. Army, U.S. Air
    Force, and the U.K. Royal Air Force. These forces are geographically
    distributed throughout the battlespace to meet casualty movement needs.
    They launch in support of MEDEVAC missions when notified by RC(S),
    though their command relationships vary. All of these commanders retain
    launch authority for MEDEVAC missions while RC(S) holds release
    authority.
        All non-U.S. Marine Corps aviation units fall under the same
    structure: the theater air ground system. Marine aviation differs
    because they are operationally controlled by the MAGTF when in the
    MAGTF AORs.

        40. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, in the past, U.S.
    Forces in Afghanistan, ISAF, the United Nations, and U.S. Agency for
    International Development maintained separate lists of completed and
    existing development projects in Afghanistan. What is the status of
    effort to coordinate and streamline theses lists between the various
    actors?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        41. Ambassador Eikenberry, how is this effort being coordinated
    with the various Afghan ministries?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        42. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, what are your
    thoughts on the prospects of negotiating with elements of the Taliban?
    The Government of Japan has sponsored some discussions along these
    lines--would the United States consider playing a larger role in such
    discussions?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        43. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, Germany and France
    are spearheading an international conference on Afghanistan within the
    next several months. Will Iran be included in this conference?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        44. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, can you comment on
    Iran's political and economic involvement in Afghanistan?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        45. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, General McChrystal
    mentioned in his testimony that Iran is providing financial assistance
    to the Taliban. Do you share this assessment?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        46. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, what are the main
    sources of funding for the Taliban?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                                 TROOP INCREASE

        47. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, a former Commandant of the
    Marine Corps once said that ``Amateurs talk about tactics, but
    professionals study logistics.'' Unlike Iraq, where U.S. forces surged
    with the crucial assistance of neighboring countries and an advanced
    infrastructure network, we're about to surge at least 30,000 troops and
    their equipment into one of the most austere and undeveloped areas of
    the world in the dead of winter. A senior Army logistician was quoted
    in the December 7 edition of Defense News as saying, ''Where do you put
    all these people? Life is going to suck for the first 30, 60, 90
    days.'' The Washington Post reported on Secretary Gates' recent
    surprise visit to Afghanistan that ``he would seek soldiers' views on
    `the way forward.' That might include issues such as whether their
    equipment is adequate and whether they are ready to handle the
    difficult logistics of quickly moving 30,000 fresh troops into the
    country.'' The Post went on to quote Secretary Gates that ``It is going
    to be a heavy lift, there's no question about it.'' I want to ensure
    that we have a plan in place to ensure that this surge of forces is
    accomplished in a manner that does not present unnecessary risks beyond
    what will be asked of them in success of their mission. Are you
    currently requesting 30,000 or 33,000 total personnel?
        General McChrystal. I did not submit a request for any specific
    number of forces. As directed by my U.S. and NATO commanders, I
    provided my best military advice as the Commander, ISAF and the
    Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan up the appropriate military chains
    of command. This advice contained a recommendation for multiple force
    levels and their associated risks.

        48. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, given the cap on the number
    of troops you will receive--what is the right mix of combat forces,
    trainers, support forces, and other combat enablers in order to meet
    your objectives?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        49. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, as your deployment plan
    develops, do you feel you have the flexibility as the warfighting
    commander to ask for additional forces above and beyond 33,000 in order
    to accomplish your objectives?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        50. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, when do you expect to have
    the surge combat forces you have requested on the ground in Afghanistan
    and fully operational?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        51. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, how much of the success of
    your mission relies on the accelerated flow and onward movement of
    these forces throughout Afghanistan?
        General McChrystal. As I indicated in my opening remarks, time is
    critical. The insurgents have established momentum, particularly in the
    south. The rapid deployment of forces to key population centers is the
    critical factor in reversing this trend. Introducing additional
    coalition troops as a bridging force will buy time and space for the
    ANA and National Police to grow in both size and capability.
    Additionally, I believe that increased security, combined with a
    commensurate uplift in civil capability, will set the conditions for
    improved governance and development.

        52. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, what plans are in place to
    ensure that the arriving forces will have the right training (to
    include mission rehearsals), equipment, and base support in order for
    you to be able to carry out successful missions before the
    administration's review in December 2010?
        General McChrystal. Each of the Services is responsible for
    training their own personnel and I would direct you to them for
    specifics. ISAF has a Counterinsurgency Training Center-Afghanistan
    (CTC-A) where we train and educate coalition forces and Afghan security
    forces to enhance their capabilities to defeat the current insurgency
    and contribute to the stability of Afghanistan. CTC-A also conducts
    mobile training to deployed force elements to meet deployed force
    specified requirements as well as conducts a monthly central COIN
    leaders course in Kabul. ISAF's Counterinsurgency Advisory and
    Assistance Team also visits NATO training centers, coalition forces
    combat support units, and key members of the intelligence community to
    develop the skills necessary for counterinsurgency operations.

        53. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, does the current plan for
    the surge of forces ensure that arriving units will have all the
    vehicles, such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles and
    equipment they need for missions in high altitude and rugged terrain?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        54. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, what risks and challenges
    are inherent in an accelerated deployment schedule?
        General McChrystal. There are several challenges and risks
    associated with a deployment of a force this size in the timeframe
    demanded by the current strategic situation. I will focus my answer on
    three key factors that may influence the force flow. The first of these
    is the ability of Afghanistan's infrastructure to absorb and support a
    rapidly deploying force. This requires significant engineering and
    construction efforts. For example, we must provide water to our troops
    while minimizing the impact on the local population. This will
    challenge our engineers and logisticians to develop innovative
    solutions to problems that at first glance appear to have simple
    solutions. Second, the provision of Theatre Provided Equipment, (i.e
    material required for operations in Afghanistan that is not a part of a
    unit's peacetime inventory) will test our ability to identify sourcing,
    transport these materials, and prioritize our resources. The competing
    demands of resourcing a responsible draw down of forces in Iraq and
    flowing additional troops into Afghanistan may necessitate a
    reapportionment of specialized and low density equipment. Finally,
    managing dwell time for our returning servicemembers while
    simultaneously responsibly drawing down in Iraq will test our ability
    to meet a compressed timeline. Ultimately, I am confident that we will
    deliver a force that is appropriately trained, equipped, and ready to
    execute the mission.

        55. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, how do you plan to mitigate
    these risks?
        General McChrystal. The ISAF plan, developed in coordination with
    CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, and Joint Forces Command, addresses the challenges
    of this deployment. We are working to increase the capacity and
    throughput of Afghanistan's airfields. The acquisition of land and
    subsequent base construction are already underway. Without compromising
    force protection, initial modifications of base construction standards
    will greatly increase our ability to absorb the incoming forces.
    Coordination to increase both production and delivery of theater
    provided equipment began in early December. We will address this
    challenge by prioritizing equipment flows into theater and by deploying
    special teams and leadership to assist in planning and managing the
    flow. This will ensure that the troops who need it the most are
    provided with required equipment as they arrive. Finally, we are
    working closely with CENTCOM and Joint Forces Command to ensure that
    our units are appropriately supported by critical enablers.

        56. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, if the Services are delayed
    in flowing the resources you have requested, do you feel you have the
    flexibility to ask for extra time before conducting a formal review of
    the benchmarks and indicators?
        General McChrystal. My leadership at all levels continues to be
    fully supportive of the mission and cognizant of the most critical
    aspects of the campaign, including the challenges associated with
    flowing resources into the Afghanistan theater.

        57. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, what will need to be done
    to ensure we can adequately resupply 100,000 U.S. troops in a country
    with extremely limited infrastructure and limited routes into the
    country?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        58. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, what will be the most
    significant supply challenges?
        General McChrystal. The most significant supply challenge will be
    ensuring the ground lines of communication allow for the maximum of
    throughput at the traditional choke points, mainly the border crossing
    points, in a timely, safe manner to get the ground supplies to the
    forces beyond our operational logistics hubs. As we improve the Afghan
    Border Police and increase partners in these critical areas, we will
    implement sufficient control to ensure friendly force throughout
    operates at maximum efficiency.

        59. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, on the specific issue of
    rotary wing assets which seem to be a high demand asset for both U.S.
    and coalition forces, the Army's OH-58D Kiowa Warriors have only
    limited lift capability in Afghanistan's thin air. Does the current
    flow of forces provide for adequate numbers of utility and attack
    helicopters and aviation support personnel early enough in 2010 to
    support the full range of counterinsurgency operations throughout the
    country?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        60. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, please explain why your new
    strategy and the many additional troops you will receive can bring
    success in Afghanistan when past efforts have not fully done so?
        General McChrystal. There are three key aspects of the current
    campaign that differentiates it from previous ISAF strategies: (1) A
    change in the operational culture; (2) Embedded partnering; and (3)
    Adequate resources.
        The ISAF counterinsurgency strategy brings with it a clear mandate
    to protect the population. This orientation ensures that there is a
    distinct difference in how we interact with the population, in both
    word and deed, compared to the insurgent. This difference will be
    recognizable to the population.
        Second, employing embedded partnering is the most expeditious way
    to build a competent and confident counterinsurgency capable force.
    Embedded partnering differs from past partnering methods in that the
    partnership does not end at the gates of the respective force operating
    bases. Afghan and ISAF partners live together, plan together, execute
    operations jointly, and return to the same location to debrief the
    operation. It allows for ISAF to quickly learn the critical cultural
    aspects of the counterinsurgency environment while our partners receive
    the reciprocal benefits of force professionalization through
    observation and imitation.
        Finally, the forces directed by the President provide a bridging
    force to allow time and space for ANSF growth and a catalyst force that
    allows us to partner at substantially improved ratios. Previous
    personnel increases have arrived in theater behind the pace of the
    insurgency. At best, the previous additional forces were able to
    prevent the insurgency's ability to achieve their goals without being
    able to reverse the momentum of their growth.

                     AIRLIFT CAPABILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

        61. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, the Washington Post
    reported this morning in an interview with Admiral Mike Mullen that,
    ``To speed the flow of U.S. troops into Afghanistan, Mullen said the
    United States will build at least one new airfield in the land-locked
    country to accommodate U.S. cargo planes carrying new mine-resistant
    vehicles and weaponry.'' Where are you planning to build this airfield?
        General McChrystal. Between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2012,
    USFOR-A is planning almost $1 billion in improvements to 15 airfields
    across Afghanistan. There are other ongoing airfield projects at
    locations such as a $167 million effort to construct a runway,
    strategic parking apron, and a rotary wing ramp at Camp Bastion, due
    for completion in December 2010.

        62. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, when will you need to have
    this airfields constructed in order to support surge forces?
        General McChrystal. The airfields being programmed and the one
    being constructed at Camp Bastion will not be completed in time for the
    arrival of the troop increase. These airfields will be used for
    sustainment/resupply and to support combat operations.

        63. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, will this be the only
    significant investment in infrastructure and new bases required to
    support the surge? If not, can you provide what other infrastructure
    requirements you have identified are needed to support the additional
    troops?
        General McChrystal. To support the troop increase, USFOR-A
    submitted to CENTCOM almost $500 million in other infrastructure
    improvements as part of the fiscal year 2010 supplemental MILCON call.
    These projects include improvements to airfields, fuel and munitions
    storage areas, utility systems, and operations facilities.

                                DRUG TRAFFICKING

        64. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, what are ISAF's common
    rules of engagement and/or strategy with respect to interdicting narco-
    traffickers?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

                                   CIVILIANS

        65. Senator McCain. Ambassador Eikenberry, you have a lot of
    experience in Afghanistan. I'm not interested in the number of
    civilians we are now fielding, but in what they will do. Please explain
    how our current civilian strategy and operations are different than
    what we have done before, and why we can achieve success now when past
    efforts have not fully done so.
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        66. Senator McCain. Ambassador Eikenberry, the President greatly
    accelerated the deployment of U.S. forces to the middle of next year.
    Will our civilians be fully in place at that time and able to commit
    resources as necessary so that our counterinsurgency operations can be
    decisive?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        67. Senator McCain. Ambassador Eikenberry, do you have all the
    authorities you need to get our civilians into the field rapidly and to
    get our assistance programs implemented in a timely manner, with
    sufficient resources and flexibility, to achieve your mission?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter

                                    MISSION

        68. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, last week you said that
    President Obama's plan has provided you with ``a clear military
    mission.'' Can you please explain, as specifically as possible, what
    you understand that mission to be?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        69. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, do you intend to pursue
    victory in Afghanistan, and if so, what must you accomplish there to
    achieve that goal?
        General McChrystal. Ultimately, we want the Afghan people to win.
    We have a mission that we will accomplish, but it is in support of the
    Afghan people. We must defeat al Qaeda, disrupt the Taliban, and to
    assist with the growth and development of the ANSF.

        70. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, do you realistically expect
    a significant number of U.S. troops to begin withdrawing from
    Afghanistan by July 2011? What is the likelihood of this occurring?
        General McChrystal. As the President articulated in his 1 December
    announcement, U.S. combat forces will begin the process of withdrawal
    in July 2011. I will comply with the President's guidance, but the pace
    of the withdrawal is to be determined, as stated by the President, by
    conditions on the ground.

        71. Senator Vitter. Ambassador Eikenberry, do you consider our
    diplomatic and so-called ``capacity-building'' efforts in Afghanistan
    to be simply another form of ``nation building?'' Why or why not? If
    not, can you please explain the difference between our development
    efforts in Afghanistan and ``nation building,'' which the President has
    indicated that he does not wish to do?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

                                   AIRSTRIKES

        72. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, this summer, you issued new
    rules restricting the use of airstrikes in an effort to reduce civilian
    casualties. Have these rules in any way increased the danger to U.S.
    troops in Afghanistan?
        General McChrystal. I do not know of any incidents where these
    rules have directly resulted in increasing the danger to our troops.
    The Tactical Directive does not prevent troops from protecting
    themselves as a matter of self-defense. The restrictions described in
    the Tactical Directive create much less risk than the greater longer-
    term danger posed to U.S. troops from sustained insurgent
    determination, resolve, and recruitment brought about by indiscriminate
    use of airstrikes and consequent civilian casualties.

        73. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, to your knowledge, have any
    troops been killed as a result of delayed or denied airstrikes that
    would have been allowed under the previous rules?
        General McChrystal. No. The Tactical Directive does not prevent
    troops from protecting themselves as a matter of self defense. The
    restrictions described in the Tactical Directive create much less risk
    than the greater longer-term danger posed to U.S. troops from sustained
    insurgent determination, resolve, and recruitment brought about by
    indiscriminate use of airstrikes and consequent civilian casualties.

                                    PAKISTAN

        74. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, what is the status of your
    working relationship with Pakistani military leaders?
        General McChrystal. Very good. I regularly meet with General Kayani
    and our staffs have a solid working relationship.

        75. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, how would you characterize
    their support of the President's new plan for the region?
        General McChrystal. Pakistan's leaders recognize that extremist
    groups pose an existential threat to Pakistan's national security. They
    recognize that Afghanistan and Pakistan stability are inextricably
    linked as extremist threats transcend regional boundaries.

                     INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANT FORCE

        76. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, what is the status of the
    request for additional NATO troops?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

        77. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, how many of our allies have
    pledged troops since the President's speech last week, and how many
    troops do they intend to send?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

                                   CIVILIANS

        78. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, what is being done by non-
    military civilian roles to mitigate potential insurgent agendas?
        General McChrystal. Civilians in the U.S. Embassy work closely with
    the military. I personally meet with Ambassador Eikenberry on weekly
    basis to coordinate civil-military issues, and our staffs have multiple
    meetings where we communicate. As for their specific roles, Ambassador
    Eikenberry is better suited to answer your question.

        79. Senator Vitter. Ambassador Eikenberry, does the Civilian
    Response Corps have a role to play alongside the military in bolstering
    the commitment the United States has in Afghanistan?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

                            AFGHANISTAN'S GOVERNMENT

        80. Senator Vitter. Ambassador Eikenberry, what is your status of
    the overall stability of the Karzai Government?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        81. Senator Vitter. Ambassador Eikenberry, do you still believe
    that it is unwise to send additional American troops until the systemic
    corruption is addressed? Why or why not?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        82. Senator Vitter. Ambassador Eikenberry, can you provide an
    estimate of how much foreign aid, diplomatic spending, and economic
    development money has been allocated to the Karzai Government since
    Karzai initially took office? Of that amount, what percentage has
    ultimately been spent on the purposes for which it was originally
    intended?
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins

                                 TROOP TIMELINE

        83. Senator Collins. General McChrystal, optimistically speaking,
    if all goes as the administration plans, how long do you envision U.S.
    troops would be needed in Afghanistan?
        General McChrystal. [Deleted.]

                               PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

        84. Senator Collins. Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal,
    last week, the President announced his decision not only to the
    American people, but also to the people of Afghanistan, including
    President Karzai. What message do you think President Karzai received
    from the President's speech? Did he hear that the United States is
    sending more troops to do his job for him or did he hear ``you have
    until July 2011 to get your act together?''
        Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.
        General McChrystal. The President's speech conveyed a clear message
    that we seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect.
    In President Obama's words, we will ``forge a lasting friendship in
    which America is [Afghanistan's] partner, and never [their] patron.''
        The President's decision to deploy additional forces demonstrates
    the right level of commitment to reverse the insurgency's momentum, and
    build sustainable Afghan capabilities. Rather than do the job for the
    Afghans, our approach toward training the Afghan security forces is to
    partner with them at every level so that, as the President noted,
    ``more Afghans can get into the fight.''
        Both President Obama's West Point speech and President Karzai's
    inauguration remarks indicated a shared commitment to improve
    governance and hold those who are ineffective or corrupt accountable.
    We stand together with our allies, partners, and the Afghan Government
    to help Afghans assume an ever-increasing role in establishing and
    maintaining their security.

        [Whereupon, at 5:22 p.m., the committee adjourned.]