[Senate Hearing 111-515]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-515
AVIATION SAFETY: PILOT FATIGUE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 1, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
54-497 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Acting Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota, JIM DeMINT, South Carolina,
Chairman Ranking Member
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Georgia
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK WARNER, Virginia
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on December 1, 2009................................. 1
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 5
Statement of Senator LeMieux..................................... 27
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 30
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 32
Witnesses
Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration................................ 7
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Basil J. Barimo, Vice President, Operations and Safety, Air
Transport Association of America, Inc.......................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Captain John Prater, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.................................................. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 15
William R. Voss, President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation..... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Appendix
Cargo Airline Association, prepared statement.................... 45
Ronald N. Priddy, President, National Air Carrier Association
(NACA), prepared statement..................................... 46
Captain Paul Onorato, President, Coalition of Airline Pilots
Associations, prepared statement............................... 47
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV to:
Margaret Gilligan............................................ 49
William R. Voss.............................................. 49
AVIATION SAFETY: PILOT FATIGUE
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation, Operations, Safety, and
Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L.
Dorgan, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. We're going to call the hearing to order.
This is a hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee,
Subcommittee on Aviation. My colleagues will be joining me
shortly, but I want to begin on time.
The discussion today is on the subject of pilot fatigue.
Now, let me describe my concern about this issue, and the
concern of a number of my colleagues. The issue of pilot
fatigue is not new. It has been on the National Transportation
Safety Board's most-wanted list for 19 years, since the list
was created. Pilot fatigue has consistently been an issue with
the NTSB and the FAA. The current flight rules, I believe, have
been in existence--with respect to duty time and so on, have
been in existence for some 40 or 50 years without much change.
The NTSB investigations have found that pilot fatigue was
either the probable or the contributory cause of 20 air carrier
accidents in the U.S., and has caused 273 fatalities between
1989 and 2008. So, this is not some issue without substantial
consequence.
The NTSB's outstanding pilot-fatigue-related safety
recommendation calls on the FAA to revise the flight- and duty-
time limitations to take into consideration research findings
on fatigue and sleep issues.
While the FAA also limits the amount of flight and duty
time a pilot may work in a day--and these--as I said, these
limits have existed for decades--commuting time, which is an
increasing phenomenon in recent decades, is not factored into
this requirement at all. And I'll talk just for a moment about
that today.
The stories that we have heard are fairly frightening. And
I want to say, from the outset, my goal today is not to alarm
the flying public, far from it. We have the safest skies in the
world, in my judgment. But, the issue of pilot fatigue is
serious and merits attention. While the skies are safe, they
are not perfect. And the--two events that focused more recent
attention on pilot fatigue--there was a Minneapolis overflight
recently, an incident last month that has sparked much comment
on how two pilots could have overflown their destination by 150
miles. There was speculation that perhaps the pilots were
asleep. The pilots indicated that they were working on
electronic devices. No one, I guess, quite knows all of those
answers at the moment.
The second is, the tragic crash of Colgan Air flight 3407.
We've held a couple of hearings that have discussed that at
some length. The NTSB is still conducting its investigation
into that tragic accident, and has yet to issue a report on the
cause of the accident. But, we do know that both pilots
commuted from across the country earlier that day, one from
Florida and one from Seattle, to reach their duty stations in
Newark.
What I want to do is go through a few charts, if I might.
And let me begin on the front side of this, with the first
chart, talking about crew rest. These are just some things that
most of you and I have heard and seen on investigative reports
and official reports. This happens to be a Wall Street Journal
article about fatigue. Tom Wychor, an 18-year veteran pilot,
describing the routine of commuter flights with short layovers
in the middle of the night, says, ``Take a shower, brush your
teeth, pretend you slept.'' ``Take a shower, brush your teeth,
pretend you slept.''
Well, I don't know Mr. Wychor, but that kind of comment by
somebody in the cockpit makes you question the issue of fatigue
and whether we have done all that is necessary to make certain
that fatigue is not a contributing factor to problems in the
cockpit.
Another pilot--and again, pilots, of course, are not in a
position to be able to speak very effectively or very candidly
about these things. This is an anonymous pilot of a 737 jet
flying to Denver. NBC News was quoting the pilot, when
discussing fatigue. The quote is, ``I have been doing
everything in my power to stay awake--coffee, gum, candy. But,
as we entered one of the most critical phases of flight, I had
been up for 20 straight hours.'' Fatigue in the cockpit by that
pilot? Perhaps.
New York Times report on fatigue, ``By the time Captain
Paul Nietz parked his aircraft at the last gate of the night,
he was exhausted, but he would be due back to work 8 hours and
15 minutes later.'' Quote ``At the very most,'' he said, ``if
you're the kind of person that could walk into a hotel room,
strip, and lay down, you might get 4 and a half hours of
sleep.'' Fatigue? Seems to me, probably so. And I happened to
have heard this sort of thing from a lot of pilots coming in
late at night to an airport, and by the time--on a late
flight--flying around, weather, and so on--by the time they get
to their hotel and get some rest and are required to report
back, the question of fatigue is a very real and a very serious
question.
I also wanted to discuss, just for a moment, the issue of
commuting. I've showed this chart once before. This was the
Colgan Air chart, Colgan Air pilots commuting to the Newark
base. And this is a different issue than duty time, but you can
see pilots commuting all across the country to the duty base.
In this case, the tragedy that occurred in Buffalo, New York,
the person flying in the right seat commuted all night long
from Seattle, Washington, to Newark.
The next chart shows part of the product of commuting. This
is a Washington Post report, ``A pilot watches a movie on his
computer at a crash house in Sterling Park, Virginia. The
houses, which can have up to 20 to 24 occupants at a time, are
designed to give flight crews from regional airlines a quiet
place to sleep near their base airports. Many can't afford
hotels, so they use the crash house, where rent is generally
$200 a month for a bed.''
Incidentally, on this issue, I ran into a pilot, about 2
weeks ago at an airport, a very young pilot, who told me that
he had just started his career, but was now quitting. And I
said, ``Why?'' And he said, ``Because I'm going to work for a
city's police department, and my salary will be twice as much
as my salary flying the commuter jet.'' And it relates to this
question of, Why can't someone afford a hotel and, instead,
uses crash pads as a part of their commuting across the
country--in many cases, across the country--in order to reach
their duty station?
The FAA announced earlier this year that they are going to
revise the flight- and duty-time rules. So, I'm glad they're
here today to tell us about that work. The FAA Administrator
Babbitt has said the agency plans to issue those new rules by
the end of next year. And, given the history on this issue, I
think it's important that they complete that work that was
begun by soliciting the recommendations of an Aviation
Rulemaking Committee. Another false start, and there have been
several, would really, in my judgment, be unacceptable.
I hope this hearing will bring some renewed focus to the
issue of pilot fatigue, flight- and duty-time rules, and also,
the issue of commuting. And I hope that we can take steps to
remove fatigue as a factor in aviation safety.
As I indicated when I started, there have been a fair
number of accidents that the NTSB attributes to fatigue. With
respect to commercial airlines, in my judgment, there's no room
for fatigue in the cockpit. We need to have duty times, flight
times and crew rest periods that are sufficient so that we are
not running into that problem.
Let me make one additional point. Some will make the case,
I think, today--and perhaps in questions and answers we'll
explore it more--there's a change in the way we fly in this
country. A lot of smaller planes, smaller commercial airplanes,
regional commuter planes that are up and down, up and down, up
and down all day long. And the take-offs and the landings are
the period where pilots, of course, are straining and--I
should--``straining'' is not the right word--but paying a great
deal of attention. There's no room for mistakes on take-offs
and landings. And so, there's a lot of tension in the cockpit
and a lot of attention paid to the way that airplane is being
flown. And so, that also creates fatigue. And I think this
hearing can be a catalyst, and hopefully will be helpful to the
FAA and the NTSB, in trying once again to put all the
spotlights on the same spot when it comes to this issue of
fatigue in the cockpit.
Mr. Lautenberg, let me call on you for a couple-of-minutes
opening statement and then we'll begin with the witnesses.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
When we look at the details behind the questions that are
being raised here now, it borders being shocking. Too much is
demanded of our pilots. Too many hours on too little sleep, and
operating complex machines with peoples' lives in their hands.
The slightest tip in this risky balancing act can cause a
disaster, as we saw on the Colgan flight number 3407. And I
heard the Chairman's review of that matter and the stress that
was on the copilot, and it's unfair to the individual. It
certainly was disastrous for all of them, including the pilots,
but the full airplane of travelers.
And in this holiday season, planes are packed. The last
thing a traveling family wants to worry about is a sleepy
pilot. It's an invitation to disaster.
Now, we have a great system. And it has been safe. But, I
think we're nibbling at the margins and that just the courage,
the response of a lot of well meaning people, has averted some
significant miscues. And whether it was over the Hudson River,
where two planes collided; one landed in the river--no area--
and this is turning, for a moment, away from the pilots--but,
turning to the rules that the FAA lays down for pilot training.
You wouldn't ask a brain surgeon to go--to take care of your
need if he was up 8 hours doing surgery someplace else. And
it's inappropriate with the system, with the value that we
have, in our aviation system, that we should ask pilots, who
make, in many cases, barely above the minimum wage. The
national minimum wage is $15,000 a year. They have pilots who
are going to work--$20,000 a year. The incident that you talked
about, Mr. Chairman, with the fellow going to the police--to a
police uniform because he was going to make that--so much more
money. A private in the Army, makes $16,800 a year--private in
the Army. And here we're asking someone who has a substantial
amount of training in order to get as far as they do to get a
commercial pilots license, and we're discarding what is fair
and appropriate to keep that person in the best of condition.
Athletes don't go out on the field without being ready to do
it, or should not. And we see consequences of those incidents
occurring.
So, Mr. Chairman, it's the right thing to do. And we----
Senator Dorgan. Senator Lautenberg----
Senator Lautenberg. I thank you for holding this hearing.
Senator Dorgan. Well, Senator Lautenberg, thank you for
your attention to all these aviation issues. As we've held
hearings, you've constantly come to these hearings and been
very active, and I know that you've spent a lot of time on
them. I appreciate that.
Let me appreciate the witnesses being here.
We are joined by Ms. Peggy Gilligan, the Associate
Administrator for Aviation Safety at the FAA; Mr. Basil Barimo,
the Vice President of Operations and Safety, the Air Transport
Association; Captain John Prater, President of Air Line Pilots
Association; and Mr. William Voss, President and CEO of Flight
Safety Foundation.
I--let me, as I call on Ms. Gilligan, say, in response to
what Senator Lautenberg said, we should not have to learn the
same lesson twice, or three or four or five times. We've been
through this, this is--you know like Groundhog's Day--we've had
discussion after discussion after discussion about fatigue. And
they--the same has been true with the NTSB. And having it on
the Most Wanted List for some 19 years is unacceptable. And I
appreciate the fact that Administrator Babbitt is now in the
process of taking action. We're going to hear that from Ms.
Gilligan. But, this has to be a catalyst--this hearing has to
be a catalyst for insisting at last--at long, long last, after
some 40 years or so--that we take a hard look at this and make
the changes that are necessary.
Ms. Gilligan.
STATEMENT OF MARGARET GILLIGAN,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, sir. Chairman Dorgan and Senator
DeMint, members of the Subcommittee, I'm pleased to be here
today to discuss the FAA's efforts to mitigate pilot fatigue.
As you know, the agency has been involved in revising the
current regulations on flight and duty time for some time. And
we are all frustrated by the amount of time we've spent. But, I
can tell you that this time our efforts are different.
Administrator Babbitt, himself a former commercial airline
pilot, has made this a high priority issue for the FAA. In
June, he chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee, comprised
of labor, industry, and FAA representatives, to develop
recommendations for a rule based on the current science of
fatigue and a review of international approaches to this issue.
The ARC was chartered to provide a forum for the U.S.
aviation community to discuss the current science of fatigue,
to discuss approaches to mitigating fatigue found in
international examples, and to make recommendations to the FAA
so that the United States could modify its regulations. The 18
members of the ARC, representing airlines and union
associations, were selected based on their extensive, direct
operational experience and their commitment to address this
safety risk. The ARC met for over 6 weeks, beginning July 7,
and on September 10, the ARC delivered its final report to the
FAA.
The Administrator has committed to issue a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking early in 2010. But, this effort is a
difficult and complicated effort, and it has taken longer than
any of us wanted or expected. The events of the last 15 years
are evidence of the complexity of the issue and the strong
concerns of all the parties involved. Those concerns are clear
in the current rulemaking process, as well. At the same time,
our focused efforts since June demonstrates the high priority
that Administrator Babbitt places on overcoming these
challenges and updating these regulations to enhance safety.
While we will need additional time to complete our analysis and
make sure that we get it right this time, I am confident we
will get there.
Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, members of the Committee,
this concludes my remarks, and I would be happy to answer
questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gilligan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for
Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration
Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA's) efforts to mitigate pilot fatigue.
Administrator Babbitt, himself a former commercial airline pilot, has
made this a high-priority issue for the agency. The FAA has always been
a leader in advancing measures targeted at preventing or mitigating
pilot fatigue through our sponsored research, dissemination of training
and educational materials, and, most significantly, through our
regulatory requirements. We believe that it is critical, whenever
possible, to incorporate scientific information on fatigue and human
sleep physiology into regulations on flight crew scheduling. Such
scientific information can help to maintain the safety margin and
promote optimum crew performance and alertness during flight
operations. Our task is to translate that knowledge to the operational
environmental in a sound and practical way. The complexity of our
current pilot flight and rest regulations, with varying standards for a
number of categories of aviation operations, developed through the
years as the aviation industry grew, adopted more advanced technology,
and employed diverse operational strategies.
Preventing and mitigating the effects of fatigue is a shared
responsibility that brings shared benefits in terms of increased
safety, better working conditions and greater operational efficiencies.
We at the FAA take our responsibility very seriously for investigating
any threat to safety in the aviation system and establishing the
regulatory framework to enhance the public's safety. To that end, we
are engaged in an effort to revise and update our rules on pilot flight
and rest, which I will describe in more detail below. At the same time,
carriers have the responsibility to conduct their operations at the
highest level of safety. That includes adopting appropriate scheduling
practices that provide the pilot a clearly identified opportunity to
rest. And, finally, pilots have the responsibility to take advantage of
the opportunity for rest and report for their assignments well rested
and ready for duty. We know that in the vast majority of cases,
carriers and pilots act in a professional manner and take this shared
responsibility seriously. We have a common goal to ensure that all
aviation operations are conducted safely.
Current Regulations
Current regulations place varying limits on the amount of time that
a flight crewmember can fly (i.e. per day, week, month, quarter, and
year), and require that a pilot be afforded a period of rest, free from
obligation to the employer. Flight time limitations are based on the
type of operation. For example, under current Part 121 rules, pilots in
a two-pilot crew, on domestic flights, can generally fly up to 8 hours
per day. Their workday can extend up to 16 hours, including time on the
ground between flights. In addition, there are no restrictions on
flying during the middle of the night or making numerous takeoffs and
landings. In addition to daily limitations, these flight crewmembers
are limited to 30 flight hours in any 7 consecutive days.
Flight crewmembers engaged in part 121 flag operations
(international passenger flights), are limited to 32 flight hours in
any 7 days. Part 121 supplemental operations (typically cargo, on-
demand or charter operations) have no 7 consecutive day limitations.
Flight crewmembers serving in part 121 domestic or flag operations are
limited to 100 hours per calendar month while flight crewmembers
serving in supplemental operations are limited to 100 flight hours in
any 30 consecutive days.
These differing regulations for different types of operations are
inconsistent and complex, and can be easily misunderstood, especially
when a pilot can be assigned to different types of operations. The
different rules developed over time, as the aviation industry changed
and expanded. While such variance in the rules may have been justified
when they were first adopted, these differences may no longer be valid
in today's operational environment. Our rulemaking will address this.
Current rules also require that a pilot be afforded an adequate
rest period. The ``crew rest'' elements of the regulation are designed
to mitigate cumulative and acute fatigue, primarily through limitations
on flight hours and defined hours of rest relative to flight hours. For
example, the regulation for domestic operations outlines:
No more than 30 flight hours in any 7 consecutive days.
At least 24 hours of consecutive rest during any 7
consecutive days.
Varying rest requirements relative to hours flown in any 24-
hour period.
The rule also defines rest period activities and prohibitions, and
provides provisions for circumstances under which flight time
limitations can be exceeded, such as in adverse weather operations. As
of late 2000, an FAA legal interpretation clarified that a pilot crew
member, flying under domestic flight rules, must ``look back'' 24 hours
and find 8 hours of uninterrupted rest before beginning any flight
segment.
Pilots also have a regulatory responsibility to not fly when they
are not fit, including being fatigued. Thus, while the carrier
schedules and manages pilots within these limitations and requirements,
the pilot has the responsibility to rest during the periods provided by
the regulations. The FAA has long held that it is the responsibility of
both the operator and the flight crewmember to prevent fatigue, not
only by following the regulations, but also by acting intelligently and
conscientiously while serving the traveling public. This means taking
into consideration weather conditions, air traffic, health of each
flight crewmember, or any other circumstances (personal problems, etc.)
that might affect the flight crewmember's alertness or judgment on a
particular flight.
FAA Actions
The FAA has initiated a number of fatigue mitigation efforts in
recent years:
1995 Proposal for Pilots: In 1995, the FAA proposed a rule to
change flight time and rest limits. The agency received more
than 2,000 comments from the aviation community and the public.
Most of those comments did not favor the rule as proposed, and
there was no clear consensus on what the final rule should say.
The FAA recently withdrew this proposed rule because it will be
superseded by the current rulemaking effort described below.
1998 ARAC: In July 1998, the FAA Administrator asked the
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to work with the
industry to reach a consensus and develop a new proposal. If no
consensus could be reached, the FAA would continue to enforce
the current regulations. In February 1999, ARAC reported that
there was no consensus in the aviation community. The group
offered five different proposals to update the flight and rest
regulations.
1999 Federal Register Notice: In response to concerns raised by
the pilot community, the FAA Administrator notified the
aviation community on June 15, 1999, that it had 6 months to
ensure that it was in full compliance with the agency's current
flight time and rest requirements. Reviews of airline
scheduling practices conducted in December 1999, and
discussions with pilot unions and airlines confirmed that the
vast majority of pilots were receiving the amount of rest
required by the FAA's rule.
2000 FAA letter: On November 20, 2000, the FAA responded to a
letter from the Allied Pilots Association that set forth
specific scenarios that could affect a very small number of all
commercial pilots. The FAA's response, known as the ``Whitlow
Letter,'' was consistent with the agency's long-standing
interpretation of the current rules. In summary, the FAA
reiterated that each flight crewmember must have a minimum of 8
hours of rest in any 24-hour period that includes flight time.
The scheduled flight time must be calculated using the actual
conditions on the day of departure regardless of whether the
length of the flight is longer or shorter than the originally
scheduled flight time.
2001 Federal Register Notice: The FAA published a notice in the
Federal Register on May 17, 2001, to reiterate its long-
standing interpretation of its pilot flight time and rest
rules. The notice informed airlines and flight crewmembers of
the FAA's intent to enforce its rules in accordance with the
Whitlow letter interpretation. Each flight crewmember must have
a minimum of 8 hours of rest in any 24-hour period that
includes flight time. That calculation must be based on the
actual conditions on the day of departure regardless of whether
the length of the flight is longer or shorter than the
originally scheduled flight time. The FAA did not anticipate
that the notice would result in major disruptions to airline
schedules. It stated that, beginning in November 2001, the FAA
would review airline flight scheduling practices and deal
stringently with violations that came to light.
2001 ATA/RAA Request: The FAA denied requests made on June 12,
2001, on behalf of the Air Transport Association (ATA) and
Regional Airline Association (RAA) to stay all agency action
regarding the November 20, 2000, Whitlow letter of
interpretation and the May 17, 2001, Federal Register notice of
the FAA's enforcement policy regarding pilot flight time and
rest. The FAA's letter and Federal Register notice were
consistent with the agency's long-standing interpretation of
the current rules. The documents were consistent with the
statutory mandate to issue rules governing the maximum hours or
periods of service, the use of plain language in regulations
and the regulatory history of the rules. ATA subsequently
petitioned for review of the Whitlow letter and the enforcement
policy.
On Sept. 5, 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia granted a motion by the ATA to stay the May 17, 2001,
Federal Register notice. On May 31, 2002, the court denied
ATA's petition for review, ruling in favor of the FAA. As a
result, the FAA has continued to enforce the current
regulations consistent with the Whitlow letter.
2008 FAA Fatigue Symposium: In June 2008, the FAA sponsored the
Fatigue Symposium: Partnerships for Solutions to encourage the
aviation community to proactively address aviation fatigue
management issues. Participants included the National
Transportation Safety Board, the Institutes for Behavior
Resources, Inc., and many of the world's leading authorities on
sleep and human performance. The symposium provided attendees
with the most current information on fatigue physiology,
management, and mitigation alternatives; perspectives from
aviation industry experts and scientists on fatigue management;
and information on the latest fatigue mitigation initiatives
and best practices.
Ultra Long-Range Flights: In 2006, the FAA worked with Delta
Air Lines to develop and approve fatigue mitigation for flights
between John F. Kennedy International Airport and Mumbai,
India. The flights were operated for more than 16 hours with
four pilots provided that the airline followed an FAA-approved
plan to manage rest and mitigate the risk posed by fatigue. The
mitigation, approved as an Operations Specification issued to
Delta Air Lines, was specific for that city pair. Although that
specific route is no longer flown by Delta, the FAA viewed
Delta's fatigue mitigation strategy as a model program.
As a result of Delta's efforts, the FAA proposed in November 2008,
to amend Delta, American, and Continental's Operations Specifications
to incorporate fatigue mitigation plans for their ultra long-range
flights. Based on comments received from the three air carriers, the
FAA withdrew the proposed amendments on March 12, 2009. The FAA is
currently working with airlines to gather data that will help the
agency enhance the safety requirements for ultra long-range flights.
The agency believes that it is in the best interest of passenger and
crew safety for airlines to use an FAA-approved fatigue mitigation
program to reduce the risk of pilot fatigue.
Rulemaking Underway
In June 2009, the FAA chartered the Flight and Duty Time
Limitations and Rest Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC)
comprised of labor, industry, and FAA representatives to develop
recommendations for an FAA rule based on current fatigue science and a
thorough review of international approaches to the issue. The ARC was
chartered to provide a forum for the U.S. aviation community to discuss
current approaches to mitigate fatigue found in international standards
and make recommendations on how the United States should modify its
regulations. The ARC consisted of 18 members representing airline and
labor associations. The members were selected based on their extensive
certificate holder management and/or direct operational experience.
Specifically, the FAA asked the ARC to consider and address the
following:
1. A single approach to addressing fatigue that consolidates
and replaces existing regulatory requirements for Parts 121 and
135.
2. Generally accepted principles of human physiology,
performance, and alertness based on the body of fatigue
science.
3. Information on sources of aviation fatigue.
4. Current approaches to address fatigue mitigation strategies
in international standards.
5. The incorporation of fatigue risk management systems (FRMS)
into a rulemaking. An FRMS is a data-driven process and
systematic method to monitor and manage safety risks associated
with fatigue-related error.
The ARC met over a 6-week period beginning July 7, 2009. Early on,
the FAA told the ARC members that it was very interested in the ARC's
recommendations, but that the agency retained the authority and
obligation to evaluate any proposals and independently determine how
best to amend the existing regulations. The agency reiterated that
participation on the ARC in no way precluded them from submitting
comments critical of the NPRM when it was published. On September 10,
2009, the ARC delivered its final report to the FAA.
We cannot discuss further particulars of the FAA's rulemaking
efforts at this time, however, we are working as quickly as possible to
complete a draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).I will readily
acknowledge that this effort has been difficult, and has taken us
longer than we wanted or expected. The events of the last 15 years
evidence the complexity of the issue and the strong concerns of the
parties involved, and those are clear in the current rulemaking as
well. At the same time, our focused effort since June demonstrates the
high priority that Administrator Babbitt and I, along with the rest of
the FAA team, place on overcoming these challenges and updating these
regulations to enhance safety. I am confident we will get there.
Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, members of the Subcommittee, this
concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions
that you might have.
Senator Dorgan. Ms. Gilligan, we will have a lot of
questions, so I appreciate your being here and your testimony.
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, sir.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Basil--is it ``Barreemo''?
Mr. Barimo. Yes, that's correct.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Basil Barimo, Vice President of
Operations and Safety, Air Transport Association. You may
proceed.
Let me say, to all four of you, that your entire statements
will be made a part of the permanent record and you may
summarize.
STATEMENT OF BASIL J. BARIMO,
VICE PRESIDENT, OPERATIONS AND SAFETY,
AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.
Mr. Barimo. Thank you. Good morning. I am Basil Barimo,
Vice President of Operations and Safety of the Air Transport
Association of America.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to join you this morning as you consider the impact
of pilot fatigue on aviation safety. This important subject
demands a collaborative, thorough, and science-based response.
ATA participated in the ARC that Ms. Gilligan mentioned. It
was a productive effort, but we must all recognize that the ARC
operated under significant time constraints. It wrapped up its
work in a 6-week period. Consequently, we may expand upon the
views that we expressed in the ARC and that I'll outline this
morning.
We support a duty-day regulation designed to account for
fatigue risks, including circadian cycles, time awake, time on
task, and acclimation to time zones. Our goal is to mitigate
fatigue risk by reducing the duty time of pilots, expanding
scheduled rest opportunities to ensure adequate rest, and
increasing pilots' awareness of fatigue risk in their personal
role in mitigating that risk. As in other aviation safety
efforts, success here will depend on data-driven analyses and
rigor in translating those analyses into regulatory action.
The recommendations that we, in conjunction with the Cargo
Airline Association and the Regional Airline Association,
provided to the ARC were divided into substantive and
procedural considerations.
We had five substantive issues:
First, we recommended that any new regulation establish a
minimum of 10 hours scheduled rest, before the beginning of a
flight period, at a domestic station and 12 hours at an
international station. And we went on to suggest that
additional detailed rest requirements were appropriate for
certain international flights.
Second, any new regulation should require each air carrier
to adopt an FAA-approved fatigue mitigation program. An
advisory circular could provide guidance in the necessary
flexibility to update fatigue mitigation programs as we gain
experience.
Third, we urge that any new regulation account for the wide
variety of operational environments, just as the current
regulation does. These include domestic and international
passenger operations, as well as cargo operations, and on-
demand charter operations. Science-based principles,
judiciously blended with decades of operational experience,
will allow the various air carrier models to continue to
operate safely.
Fourth, there also needs to be a focus on the individual in
the regulations. Regulatory language should clearly prescribe
the responsibility of the crew member to properly prepare him-
or herself for flight. No fatigue policy, without such an
admonition, can be regarded as comprehensive.
And fifth, the FAA should endorse controlled cockpit
napping, conducted in accordance with FAA-approved procedures,
to facilitate alertness during the critical phases of flight.
Previous NASA research has shown, overwhelmingly, that
controlled napping significantly mitigates fatigue risk.
On the procedural side, we had three issues:
We're particularly concerned about the ultimate scope of
any proposed regulation. Extraneous consideration should not
burden our efforts to improve aviation safety. A rulemaking
proceeding is not the forum in which to resolve collective-
bargaining issues.
Second, we are also concerned about the effect of proposed
duty and rest regulations on managers, who are also qualified
as line pilots. If time spent on administrative duties, such as
checking e-mail or making a phone call, count as duty, we risk
losing line-qualified pilot managers. These pilot managers have
played an essential role in safe airline operations, and the
consequence of this rule on those management positions must be
carefully considered.
And finally, as with any major regulatory change, covered
parties will need time to implement new policies requiring
programming and training. That is particularly so here, where
crew schedules will be impacted. We therefore ask that FAA
provide a transition period of at least 2 years after the
regulation is published.
ATA members are committed to using the best science
available, combined with proven operational experience, to
better manage pilot fatigue. We look forward to working with
the Committee, the FAA, and other stakeholders in this
endeavor.
That concludes my statement, and I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barimo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Basil J. Barimo, Vice President,
Operations and Safety, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.
The Air Transport Association of America appreciates this
opportunity to discuss pilot duty time and fatigue management issues
with the Subcommittee. This important subject demands a collaborative,
thorough and science-based response.
ATA participated in the FAA Flight and Duty Time Limitations and
Rest Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (``the ARC''). That was
a productive effort but we all must recognize that the ARC operated
under significant time constraints. In any future rulemaking
proceeding, consequently, we may expand upon the views that we
expressed in the ARC and that are outlined below.
We support a duty-day regulation designed to account for fatigue
risks, including circadian cycles, time awake, time on task and
acclimation to time zones. Our goal is to mitigate fatigue risk by:
reducing the duty time of pilots,
expanding scheduled rest opportunities to ensure adequate
rest, and
increasing pilots' awareness of fatigue risk and their
personal role in mitigating that risk.
As in other aviation-safety undertakings, success here will depend
on data-driven analyses and rigor in translating those analyses into
regulatory action.
The recommendations that we, in conjunction with the Cargo Airline
Association and the Regional Airline Association, provided to the ARC
were divided into substantive and procedural considerations.
Substantive Issues
With respect to substantive issues, we recommended that any new
regulation establish a minimum of 10 hours of scheduled rest before the
beginning of a flight-duty period at a domestic station and 12 hours of
scheduled rest at an international station, with the possibility of a
reduction of 1 hour in actual operations. We suggested additional,
detailed rest requirements for certain international flights.
Any new regulation should require each air carrier to adopt an FAA-
approved fatigue mitigation program documenting its mitigation policies
and training. Detailed means of compliance should be provided in an
accompanying FAA-issued Advisory Circular. Use of an AC will provide
the necessary flexibility to update airline fatigue mitigation programs
as we build on future experience.
Different air carrier operational environments must be recognized.
These include domestic and international passenger operations, domestic
and international cargo operations, and on-demand (nonscheduled)
charter operations. We strongly urge that any new regulation account
for the wide variety of operations, just as it does today. Nothing in
fatigue and sleep research justifies a one-size-fits-all approach.
Science-based principles, judiciously blended with many years of
operational experience, will allow the various air carrier models to
continue to operate safely.
There also needs to be a focus on the individual in the
regulations. Regulatory language should clearly prescribe the
responsibility of the crew member to properly prepare himself for a
flight. No fatigue policy without such an admonition can be regarded as
comprehensive. Such language will also help address the pilot commuting
issue.
The FAA should also endorse controlled cockpit napping conducted in
accordance with FAA-approved procedures to facilitate alertness during
the critical phases of flight. Previous NASA research provides
overwhelming evidence that controlled napping significantly mitigates
fatigue risk. We must act on that evidence.
Procedural Issues
We are particularly concerned about the ultimate scope of any
proposed regulation. Extraneous considerations should not burden our
efforts to improve safety. In particular, a rulemaking proceeding is
not the forum in which to resolve collective bargaining issues.
We are also concerned about the effect of proposed duty and rest
regulations on managers, who are also qualified as line pilots. If time
spent in administrative duties counts as ``duty'' for cumulative
purposes, or if a management pilot cannot have the discretion to check
e-mail or use the telephone during a scheduled rest period, the
possible result could be the end of line-qualified pilot managers,
chief pilots or directors of operations. Since the beginning of
commercial aviation, these pilot managers have played an essential role
in safe airline operations, and the consequence of this rule on those
management positions must be carefully considered. We recognize, of
course, the need for appropriate rest prior to flight. This might be
more appropriate for inclusion in a fatigue mitigation advisory
circular.
Finally, as in any major regulatory change, covered parties will
need time implement new policies requiring programming and training.
That is particularly so here where crew schedules will be affected. We,
therefore, ask that the FAA provide a transition period of at least 2
years after the final regulation is published.
Conclusion
ATA members are committed to using the best science available
combined with proven operational experience to improve pilot duty time
and fatigue management. We look forward to working with the Committee,
the FAA and other stakeholders in this important endeavor.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Barimo, thank you very much. We
appreciate your testimony.
Captain Prater--I think I called you Captain ``Pratter.'' I
didn't mean that--Captain Prater, welcome. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT,
AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Prater. Thank you. Chairman Dorgan, Ranking Member
DeMint, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for having us
here today to represent the views of the more than 53,000
members of the Air Line Pilots Association, International.
Pilot fatigue has loomed as a safety issue for our unions
since it was founded in 1931. During the difficult years
following 9/11, these long standing concerns have intensified
with bankruptcy, concessionary contracts, and the layoff of
thousands of pilots, forcing many of those who are still
working to fly longer hours and more grueling schedules. It is
a dire situation that I have experienced in my own cockpit.
Just one example from several years back: Flying on the
backside of a 5-day trip that took me from Newark to Japan and
back to Newark, my copilot and I were so fatigued from crossing
and recrossing numerous time zones that we were barely able to
stay awake to make a predawn landing during a stop in Honolulu.
At that time, I was in command of a 767 with over 240
passengers onboard. While this segment was legal to fly with
only two pilots because it was a few minutes short of the 8-
hour limit, it would have been far safer had we had the third
pilot to augment the crew, as had been the case for every other
leg of that specific trip. That would have allowed both me and
my first officer to catch a couple-hour nap in the cabin.
Current U.S. flight- and duty-time rules date from 1954,
when the DC-3 was the state-of-the-art. Times and equipment
have changed, but the rules have not. Since 1989, the National
Transportation Safety Board has issued more than 70 fatigue-
related safety recommendations. Few would deny that modern,
science-based regulations are urgently needed.
From our view from inside the cockpit, a rule must be
grounded on three basic tenets. One, it must be based on
science. Two, it must apply equally to all flight operations.
No exceptions, no carve-outs, no loop holes for air cargo or
charter operations. Three, a new rule must allow and encourage
air carriers to implement fatigue risk management systems,
known as FRMS.
During the past 60 years, scientists' understanding of
sleep, fatigue, and human performance has grown significantly.
Several recent studies have focused directly on aviation
fatigue. This science, gained through field and simulator
studies, confirms that current rules can lead to fatigue that
impairs pilot performance. The 190-nation International Civil
Aviation Organization, or ICAO, has mandated that flight
limitation rules be based on scientific principles to ensure
that flight crew members are well rested and alert. The United
States is compelled to comply with this international standard.
But, unfortunately, we don't, because the FAA current rules are
not science-based.
Second, one level of safety in flight- and duty-time
regulations is absolutely essential. The current FAA flight-
time limit for passenger-carrying pilots is 30 hours in 7 days
for domestic operations and 32 hours in 7 days for
international flights. But, air cargo pilots can fly up to 48
hours in a 6-day period, or 60 percent more than domestic
passenger-carrying pilots. No science exists to support
multiple sets of flight-time/duty-time limits. No rational
argument can be made for different fatigue rules for pilots
based on whether they fly passengers or cargo, domestic or
international. ALPA maintains that uniform rules are
indispensable if our industry is to truly address pilot
fatigue. Exceptions or carve-outs would kill long overdue
efforts to ensure all pilots are well rested. Worse, carve-outs
would undermine the one level of safety principle that must
remain our ultimate goal.
Finally, the new regulation must enable carriers to
transition to a fatigue risk management system, a
collaborative, nonpunitive environment, where management and
flight crews work together to ensure that crew members operate
alertly and safely under all circumstances. It is also
imperative that the FAA require air carriers to implement
fatigue education and training programs for their crews, their
managers, and their schedulers.
I'm very encouraged that we finally appear to be on the
verge of securing the modern, science-based flight- and duty-
time rules that we know are vital to enhancing aviation safety.
ALPA will continue to do all we can to carry on this momentum.
Seven ALPA pilots, representing all aspects of our industry,
worked on the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Committee. In October,
our executive board unanimously approved new policy that
reflects our values of science and the one level of safety for
all. And it ensures our vision for ensuring pilots are well
rested.
We look forward to evaluating the FAA's proposed rule, and
we applaud efforts to create a final rule by mid-next-year. The
current regulatory framework is a fabric-and-wire biplane
struggling to stay aloft in a supersonic age. I ask for your
help in giving the flying public a new consistent level of
safety by ensuring that every pilot in the United States starts
every trip alert and rested.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Prater follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain John Prater, President,
Air Line Pilots Association, International
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am Captain John
Prater, President of the Air Line Pilots Association, International
(``ALPA'') which represents 53,000 professional pilots at 36 airlines
in the United States and Canada.
ALPA appreciates this opportunity to discuss pilot fatigue because
we know that it is a significant flight safety issue. Pilot fatigue is
as important to flight safety as metal fatigue, wiring insulation
fatigue and other component fatigue.
The FAA has a statutory responsibility to prescribe minimum
standards to prevent all fatigue that impacts safety. While the agency
has been responsive to other types of fatigue, the FAA has not yet
fulfilled its responsibility regarding pilot fatigue.
Pilot fatigue has been a major issue for ALPA since it was founded
in 1931 and it has been particularly onerous during the difficult years
since 9/11.
The financial crisis in the airline industry has brought
bankruptcies and concessionary contracts which have resulted in pilots
being required to fly up to the legal limits without receiving adequate
rest. We receive daily reports of scheduling that causes pilots to be
virtual ``zombies.'' The domestic flight and duty rules were last
amended in 1985 with the promise that the FAA would revisit these rules
in 2 years. Twenty-five years later we are still waiting to review
them.
The current rules for International and Supplemental Operations
were promulgated in 1954 when the DC-3 aircraft was state-of-the-art.
At that time, it was not uncommon to carry a radio operator and
mechanic on the aircraft. Today, the Airbus 380 airplane carries 600+
passengers 8,200 miles at a speed of 560 miles per hour. Times and
equipment have changed but the flight and duty time rules have not.
They were not designed to address our modern environment and equipment.
The National Transportation Safety Board issued three
recommendations to the DOT in 1989 following several accidents
involving operator fatigue:
1. Expedite a coordinated research program on the effects of
fatigue, sleepiness, sleep disorders, and circadian factors on
transportation system safety.
2. Develop and disseminate educational material for
transportation industry personnel and management regarding
shift work, work and rest schedules, and proper regimes of
health, diet, and rest.
3. Review and upgrade regulations governing hours of service
for all transportation modes to assure that they are consistent
and that they incorporate the results of the latest research on
fatigue and sleep issues.
Since 1989, the Safety Board has issued more than 70 fatigue-
related safety recommendations which were the result of major accident
investigations, special investigations, or safety studies that
identified operator fatigue as a factor. This includes more than 15
significant accident reports or studies concerning aviation operations
conducted under Parts 91, 121 and 135 (see table).
Listing of Selected Fatigue-related aviation investigations and studies
conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board since May 1989
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Location of
accident or topic
of the study that Accident Date NTSB Report Number
identified fatigue-
related issues
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accident
investigation:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Molokai, Hawaii 10/28/89 AAR-90-05
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brunswick, Georgia 04/05/91 AAR-92-03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pine Bluff, 04/29/93 AAR-94/01/SUM
Arkansas
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guantanamo Bay, 08/18/93 AAR-94-04
Cuba*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kansas City, 02/16/95 AAR-95-06
Missouri*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cheyenne, Wyoming 04/11/96 AAR-97-02
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Everglades, 05/11/96 AAR-97-06
Florida
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Little Rock, 06/01/99 AAR-99-60
Arkansas
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nimitz Hill, Guam 08/06/97 AAR-00-01
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tallahassee, FL* 07/26/02 AAR-04-02
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Diego, CA 10/24/04 AAB-06-05
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kirksville, MO 10/19/04 AAR-06-01
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cleveland, OH 02/18/07 AAR-08-01
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Travers City, MI 04/12/07 AAR-08-02
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clarence Center, 02/12/09 Open (NTSB Preliminary ID No.
NY (Colgan 3407) DCA09MA027)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Investigation:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commercial space 08/17/93 SIR-93-02
launch incident,
Cape Canaveral,
Florida
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety study: Report Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight crew- 02/03/94 SS-94-01
involved
accidents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commuter airline 11/30/94 SS-94-02
safety
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation safety in 12/01/95 SS-95-03
Alaska
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Air Cargo accident.
In addition to the accident reports indicated above, the Board
acknowledged that fatigue can result in degraded performance in flight
crews and that disruption of the sleep/rest cycle may have played a
role in the Air Transport International (Swanton, OH) DC-8 cargo crash
on February 15, 1992 (AAR-92-05).
The Board has not made distinctions between reforms needed for the
rules applicable to passenger and all-cargo operations in its reports
and recommendations to the FAA; rather the Board has recognized that
the effect of fatigue is the same whether a pilot is carrying cargo or
passengers, or operating a scheduled or non-scheduled flight. Fatigue
is an equal opportunity killer.
Pilot fatigue has been on the Safety Board's list of Most Wanted
Transportation Safety Improvements since the list's inception in 1990.
Other, more specific, recommendations have followed. The Board's
current Most Wanted List (August 2009) specifies the following
objective to reduce accidents and incidents caused by human fatigue in
the aviation industry: Set working hour limits for flight crews based
on fatigue research, circadian rhythms, and sleep and rest
requirements.
I believe that there is universal agreement that there is an urgent
need for modern flight time regulations.
This brings us to ``what should a modern flight time regulation
prescribe?'' There are three basic principles for a new rule. One, it
must be based on science. Two, it must apply equally to all operations:
domestic, international and supplemental. There is no basis for any
``carveouts'' for air cargo or charter operations. Three, it must
include the ability for air carriers to transition to a Fatigue Risk
Management System, or FRMS.
First, let me address the science.
There is a large body of sleep science available and there are
several recent aviation fatigue studies. Over the past 60 years,
scientific knowledge about sleep, sleep disorders, circadian
physiology, fatigue, sleepiness/alertness, and performance decrements
has grown significantly. Some of this scientific knowledge, gained
through field and simulator studies, confirms that aviators experience
performance-impairing fatigue from sleep loss resulting from current
flight and duty practices. There are also several fatigue models
available. These models can analyze a schedule and predict whether the
pilot will have an adequate level of alertness to fly the schedule.
The International Civil Aviation Organization, (``ICAO''), a United
Nations organization, has 190 member countries including the United
States. Its role is to establish standards for the safe operation of
civil aircraft throughout the world. ICAO has mandated that flight
limitation rules be based on science and they have recently implemented
a new standard for flight time rules which states in part:
``For the purpose of managing fatigue, the State of the
Operator shall establish regulations specifying the limitations
applicable to the flight time, flight duty periods, duty
periods and rest periods for flight crew members. These
regulations shall be based upon scientific principles and
knowledge, where available, with the aim of ensuring that
flight crew members are performing at an adequate level of
alertness.''
The United States is bound to comply with this standard. Our
current rules are simply not based on science and therefore do not
comply with the ICAO standard.
Second, I will address the need to have one level of safety in
flight time limitation regulations. Scheduled passenger, all-cargo and
charter air carrier operations are no different when it comes to the
actual operation of the aircraft. All three types of operations use the
same aircraft, the same airspace, and the same airports in the same
cities. As such, there is no rational basis for cargo or charter pilots
to have different or more liberal fatigue rules than scheduled
passenger operations.
Domestic pilots who carry passengers under FAR Part 121 have a
flight time maximum of 30 hours in 7 days, while International (Flag)
passenger-carrying pilots are allowed up to 32 hours in the same 7 days
under the current FAA regulations. These current ``flight time'' limits
only account for the time pilots spend actually operating the airplane.
The current flight time limits do not account for the time pilots spend
in pre-flight and post-flight duties, the time spent at airports
between flights, the time spent going through security or traveling to
and from the airport to hotels, or the time spent in training and other
ground-based duties. Even with the existing 30- and 32-hour weekly
``flying time'' limits applicable to pilots carrying passengers, there
is widespread acknowledgement of the existence of serious pilot fatigue
problems throughout the industry and widespread acknowledgement that
reform of the rules based on modern scientific principles is long
overdue. On the other hand, charter and air cargo pilots flying under
today's supplemental rules can fly 48 hours in a six-day period or 60
percent more than domestic passenger-carrying pilots. We believe that
these supplemental rules significantly reduce available safety margins
and put all-cargo and charter operation crewmembers, passengers and
persons on the ground at risk. A uniform modernization of the flight
time/duty time rules including harmonized rules for the cargo industry
is long overdue, and needed to enhance safety.
Third, any new regulation dealing with pilot fatigue should provide
a method for carriers to transition to a FRMS. This is the gold
standard of pilot fatigue management to ensure that pilots have an
adequate level of alertness. Ideally it would be a part of a Safety
Management System, or SMS. However, FRMS can operate independently of a
SMS.
The purpose of a FRMS is to ensure that flight crew members are
sufficiently alert so that they can operate to a satisfactory level of
performance and safety under all circumstances.
A FRMS supplements prescribed flight and duty-time regulations and
competent, independent scientific research-based software scheduling
tools by applying safety management principles and processes to
proactively and continuously manage fatigue risks through a partnership
approach which requires shared responsibility among management and crew
members. FRMS can, therefore, only operate in circumstances where all
stakeholders--particularly the pilots--support the operation of FRMS.
Accordingly, an open reporting system and non-punitive working
environment is a prerequisite for FRMS because honest and accurate crew
feedback is an essential component of the program. A FRMS must specify
the prescriptive regulatory scheme upon which it is based. In the event
of suspension, termination or revocation of a FRMS, the carrier's
affected operations shall revert to the baseline prescriptive
scheme.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ALPA's White Paper on Fatigue Risk Management Systems (2008)
may be found here: http://public.alpa.org/portals/alpa/pressroom/
inthecockpit/FatigueRiskMSWP_6-2008.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the last 3 years, ALPA's Flight Time/Duty Time Committee has
developed guidelines for a flight limitation regulation that have a
rational, scientific foundation and also incorporate years of
operational experience. These guidelines are harmonized with ICAO and
the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association and deal
with seven major areas: duty limits, including block-hour limits, rest
requirements, extension of duty in irregular operations, cumulative
fatigue, augmentation rules that consider the quality of the on-board
rest facility, reserve rest requirements and rules for implementing a
FRMS.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ALPA's current guidelines for a scientifically-based flight
limitation regulation may be found here: http://public.alpa.org/
FTDTFightingFatigue/tabid/3370/Default.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These guidelines represent ALPA's views as to the minimum
requirements a regulation must have to insure an adequate level of
pilot alertness.
ALPA also believes that it is important that the FAA require air
carriers to implement a fatigue education and training program for
flight crew members. Such a program should include, at a minimum,
information on the detrimental effects of fatigue and strategies for
avoiding and countering fatigue. ALPA has implemented its own fatigue
training program and we have published and distributed to our members
The Airline Pilots Guide to Fighting Fatigue.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ http://public.alpa.org/portals/alpa/fatigue/MagazineInsert10-
2008_FatigueGuide.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In closing, I would like to say that I am encouraged that it
appears we will finally get new flight limitation rules. As you know,
FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt, in June of this year chartered an
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (``ARC'') to develop a new flight time
rule. ALPA along with other members of the industry participated in
this process. In addition to having an ALPA pilot, Captain Don Wykoff,
serve as a co-Chair, we had four members and two alternates serve on
the Committee who fly for domestic, international, cargo and regional
airlines. The ARC presented its report in early September to
Administrator Babbitt. Mr. Babbitt has publicly stated that he will
publish a NPRM on Flight Time by December 31, 2009. We expect a short
comment period and hopefully a final rule by mid-2010.
We badly need a new flight and duty-time regulation. While we have
been told it will be done in mid-2010, we have seen too many times in
the past that the FAA has not delivered on its promises with regard to
pilot fatigue regulations. We respectfully solicit Congress' active
support in ensuring that this new regulation becomes a reality.
Senator Dorgan. Captain Prater, thank you very much. We
appreciate your being here.
Mr. William R. Voss is the President and CEO of The Flight
Safety Foundation in Alexandria, Virginia.
Mr. Voss, welcome.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. VOSS, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION
Mr. Voss. Thank you. Chairman Dorgan, Ranking Member
DeMint, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank
you for giving us an opportunity to testify.
Fatigue in aviation has been in the headlines lately, but
it has been scientifically researched for decades, as you've
noted. In 1979, NASA first studied fatigue and decisionmaking
in simulators. Decades of research have followed by
institutions around the world. It has taken a long time and a
lot of data for the industry to reach consensus on this issue,
but the tragedy of the Colgan Air crash has pushed us along
toward a conclusion.
Regardless of how we got here, the Foundation supports the
FAA's current effort to develop rules that reflect a scientific
understanding of fatigue.
In writing these rules, the FAA is faced with a daunting
task. Human fatigue is too complex to deal with just the
classic approach of regulations and compliance. Ideally, we'd
implement a comprehensive fatigue risk management system across
the whole industry, but it's unrealistic to think that every
operator could adopt such an approach. So, the FAA will have to
write traditional, prescriptive rules, while also allowing
large operators to take a more comprehensive fatigue risk
management approach.
As a minimum, these prescriptive provisions should address
the relationships between assigned duty and time of day, the
cumulative effects of consecutive duty periods, and the effect
of multiple short-haul flights. These provisions will not be
perfect, but they will--and they will be a compromise; but, for
smaller operators, they'll be practical. And they will
significantly improve the level of safety.
Now, for those operators who are able, they should be
encouraged to go beyond the basic rules and adopt the fatigue
risk management system, or FRMS. FRMS addresses fatigue
systematically. It increases the responsibility of the operator
and its employees to jointly manage the risk.
Broadly speaking, FRMS offers three layers of protection
that include prevention, which is the proactive strategic risk
reduction, such as scheduling correctly based on science;
mitigation at the operational level, to make sure you execute
the plan you've put in place and you have a realistic execution
of that plan; and intervention, for when something goes wrong,
you still need to have the ability to intervene and reduce the
risk of a flight. No matter what you do, there will be times
things don't go right.
That brings me to the subject of one of the more
controversial interventions, and that's the controlled cockpit
rest or napping. No matter what rules are written, there will
always be times when pilots become fatigued. When that happens,
many countries have determined that safety is best served by
allowing and regulating rest in the cockpit. Regulations ensure
this is done safely, they specify what happens during the crew
rest, who's responsible for various actions, and a post-rest
briefing.
Of course, controlled rest cannot be used to replace
responsible planning and scheduling. Every flight must begin
with a well-rested crew. But, when things go wrong, controlled
rest is an important tool to keep things safe.
There are some other fatigue issues that deserve
consideration. Even though much research has been done, there
are still some gaps. More research is still needed in the area
of high-frequency/high-cycle operations. We understand the
Regional Airline Association is willing to conduct studies in
this area. The Foundation strongly supports those efforts and
calls on the FAA to consider these findings in the proposed
rules.
We focus so much on the flight crew that we often overlook
fatigue in the rest of the industry. Last year, the Foundation
published a long article about the danger of fatigue among
aviation maintenance workers. This has also been examined by
ICAO, which has cited several accidents in which fatigue among
maintenance workers has been a contributing factor. The
Foundation strongly urges the FAA to consider maintenance
personnel in future rules.
Finally, a concerted effort should be made by the FAA,
industry, and labor to educate the aviation safety workforce on
matters associated with fatigue risk. Countless operators are
in the process of developing fatigue training materials for
their workforce. If we pooled these efforts, we could do much
more, and do it quickly. Just as regulators, labor, and
industry came together 20 years ago to deal with the problem of
controlled flight into terrain, we can come together again to
deal with this threat. The Flight Safety Foundation is working
with the Regional Airline Association and others to make this
happen.
In summary, I'm gratified by the cooperation we're seeing
around this issue, and I'm optimistic that the FAA proposed
rules will be scientifically-based and will include all the
latest research and experience.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Voss follows:]
Prepared Statement of William R. Voss, President and CEO,
Flight Safety Foundation
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and distinguished
members of the Committee: My name is William Voss and I am the
President and Chief Executive Officer of Flight Safety Foundation.
Flight Safety Foundation is an independent, nonprofit,
international organization engaged in research, auditing, education,
advocacy, and publishing. Its mission is to pursue the continuous
improvement of global aviation safety and the prevention of accidents.
We have members all around the world representing every facet of the
aviation industry. On behalf of the Foundation, I appreciate your
providing me this opportunity to testify about the important issue of
fatigue, our views of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
potential recommendations, and other recommendations from the
Foundation.
The tragedy of the Colgan Air crash in Buffalo on Feb. 12, 2009,
like so many other accidents, need not have happened. While we cannot
bring back the victims of the Colgan Air crash, we can honor their
lives by using the knowledge we gained during this investigation to
revamp how we deal with fatigue management. We are pleased to see the
FAA and industry--with management working well with labor--addressing
this issue as a high priority, and pledging to apply the science we
know to bring about very soon practical and needed reforms.
My background in aviation is diverse. I've been a pilot, an air
traffic controller, a certified aviation mechanic, and a regulator and
standard-setter, both at the FAA and the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). I know firsthand how the issue of fatigue can
affect every aspect of this industry. We all know that fatigue affects
our performance, but normally our own drowsiness or lack of sleep does
not have catastrophic consequences.
Fatigue Risk Management Systems--The Preferred Approach
To cut to the chase, we recommend that civil aviation authorities
immediately adopt effective fatigue risk management systems (FRMS).
FRMS is a proactive approach to addressing fatigue in a systematic,
comprehensive manner that does not rely solely on adherence to a set of
prescribed hourly limits of duty and required time off. Instead, it
decreases the role of the regulator and increases the responsibility of
the operator and its employees to jointly manage the risk. In its
broadest interpretation, FRMS takes a systematic, three-pronged,
incremental approach to managing fatigue risk:
Prevention--This fundamental first step can be characterized
as proactive strategic risk prevention. It includes such
measures as scientifically defensible scheduling, suitable
hotels for sleep, crew augmentation, and education and training
about sleep hygiene and fatigue. We believe that this step
should also include medical identification and treatment of
sleep disorders, such as sleep apnea, which are known to
increase with aging; however, the FAA's annual medical
examination for air transport pilots (FAA Form 8500-8;
Application Process and Examination Techniques) has no
requirement to identify possible sleep disorders.
Mitigation--This second step encompasses risk mitigation at
the operational level. It includes such measures as responsible
trip planning, including pre-trip rest and commuting if
necessary, crew rest facilities (both at the airport and in
flight for augmented crews), meal planning, anticipation of
irregular operational events, and crew resource management
(CRM) training that addresses fatigue effects on crew
performance.
Intervention--This final step recognizes the inevitable fact
that crews sometimes experience significant fatigue despite
their and the operator's best efforts to prevent it. It
includes those actions that can be invoked to manage the risk
until the flight is safely concluded. This intervention can
include tailored procedural guidelines, enhanced CRM, timely
intake of caffeine, and controlled rest on the flight deck.
An FRMS's comprehensive range of safeguards is designed to control
the risk associated with both transient and cumulative fatigue. FRMS is
data-driven, monitoring situations in which fatigue risk occurs and in
which safety may be jeopardized. It then allows for generating new
scheduling solutions or other strategies to mitigate measured fatigue
risk. At the same time, FRMS provides operators with flexibility to
seek the most efficient safe crewing solutions to meet operational
needs.
An FRMS enhances the capability of prescriptive flight-time
limitation concepts to provide an equivalent or enhanced level of
safety based on the identification and management of fatigue risk
relevant to the specific circumstances. Use of an FRMS can allow
greater operational flexibility and efficiency while maintaining safety
by relying on in-flight measurements of sleep and alertness, including
subjective reports by crewmembers, to monitor how scheduling affects
flight crew and cabin crew alertness during flight duty.
Fatigue Management--Abundant Study, Not Enough Action
Flight Safety Foundation has worked on this issue for many years,
including creating the Ultra-Long Range (ULR) Crew Alertness Steering
Committee, which in 2005 published guidance for conducting flights that
last 16 hours or more, and the Fatigue Countermeasures Task Force,
which created the Principles and Guidelines for Duty and Rest
Scheduling in Corporate and Business Aviation in 1997. In addition to
these task forces, Flight Safety Foundation has written about the issue
of fatigue extensively in our publication, AeroSafety World, as well as
in older Foundation publications.
The problem of fatigue in aviation has been highlighted in the
headlines over the past year, but it is an issue that has been the
target of decades of scientific research. In 1979, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) undertook the first study
to examine the effects of fatigue on decisionmaking in an aircraft
simulator. Shortly after that, Congress directed NASA to undertake a
multi-year study to understand the impact of crew fatigue and jet lag.
This led to a collaborative study with laboratories in the United
Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan and produced some
outstanding results.
Federal Aviation Administration Actions
We are supportive of FAA efforts to establish new rules that
reflect a much better scientific understanding of fatigue. With the
announcement on November 24, 2009 of the withdrawal of the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking from 1995, we anticipate that new rules will be
proposed soon. The industry and regulators have been studying fatigue
for many years, and there has been gradual progress in finding a
consensus.
In writing this new rule, the FAA is faced with a daunting task.
Quite simply, human fatigue is too complex a subject to be dealt with
using the classic approach of regulations and compliance. To deal with
the problem of fatigue risk effectively, it is necessary to implement a
comprehensive fatigue risk management system. Many major operators will
do this, but it is unrealistic to think that every operator is going to
take such a sophisticated approach. For that reason, the FAA will have
to write a rule that has imperfect, but improved, prescriptive
provisions, but also encourages the use of fatigue risk management
systems where appropriate.
At a minimum, these prescriptive provisions within the new
regulation should address the relationship between assigned duty and
the time of day, the cumulative fatigue effects of consecutive duty
periods, and the effect of multiple short flights during the duty day.
These provisions will not be perfect, but for smaller operators,
simplicity is more important than perfection.
Another challenge the FAA will face is the fact that the fatigue
research, while extensive, is somewhat uneven. A great deal of research
has been done on the effects of ultra-long range flights, but
relatively little research has been done into the fatiguing effect of
frequent short flights. The FAA will have to find a way to put a
regulation in place quickly, while allowing for adjustments as new
information becomes available.
Global Examples--Useful Examples
Several airlines and civil aviation authorities have adopted FRMS.
One of the first airlines was easyJet, which began the system as a
research program to gather data on pilots' sleep and fatigue-related
performance. The research effort yielded revised work schedules,
continuing data collection and more information on fatigue risks, a
procedure for crewmembers to report fatigue within a just culture, and
a process for investigating the role of fatigue in all incidents. This
is a process that could be easily replicated and should be a part of
any FAA proposed rulemaking.
An FRMS is easily integrated into any safety management system
(SMS). This is the approach taken by Transport Canada. An FRMS is one
element of an SMS, while the just culture and non-punitive safety
reporting that are called for in FRMS are integral parts of SMS. Flight
Safety Foundation has publicly stated its support for Transport
Canada's embrace of safety management systems.
Canada is one of many countries that have determined that safety is
best served by allowing--and regulating--controlled napping in the
cockpit. This is a position that Flight Safety Foundation heartily
endorses and calls on the FAA to do the same. Of course, controlled
napping must never take the place of a good night's sleep and sensible,
scientifically defensible scheduling. But on occasion, a pilot may
unexpectedly feel extra-fatigued due to conditions out of his or her
control. In that case, it is far safer to have a procedure in place to
allow the fatigued pilot to sleep for a prescribed amount of time with
the full knowledge of the co-pilot and the rest of the flight crew. The
regulations developed by Canada outline a procedure that takes into
account all possible variables and leads to safer operations. It
includes requirements covering how napping shall be undertaken, what
happens during crew rest, and who is responsible for various actions as
well as a post-rest briefing.
The idea of controlled rest in the United States is, unfortunately,
colored by well-publicized episodes of uncontrolled rest. We hope that
the FAA will consider the science and the successful experiences in
many other countries to guide them on this aspect of FRMS, rather than
alarmist concerns from individuals who have not studied this issue.
Many countries and airlines allow for controlled napping, including
France, Australia, Singapore and Canada. The aviation safety records of
those countries speak for themselves.
The Foundation also urges the FAA to capitalize on its June 2008
fatigue management symposium and its ULR experience to further develop
and implement FRMS on a trial basis within the context of current
prescriptive flight-time limitations. As in other countries, close
cooperation and support among airline management, pilot organizations
and regulators will be critical to achieving success. In addition,
since ICAO is the appropriate body to establish mutually acceptable
worldwide standards and recommended practices for FRMS, the Foundation
strongly encourages the FAA's continued participation in and support of
ICAO's efforts to use FRMS as an alternative to flight- and duty-time
limits.
Other Fatigue Issues
We focus so much on the performance of pilots and possibly the rest
of the flight crew, we often overlook the rest of the industry when we
think about fatigue. Last year, AeroSafety World published a long
article about the dangers of fatigue in aviation maintenance workers
(April 2008). This has also been an issue examined by the ICAO, which
cited several accidents in which fatigue on the part of maintenance
workers was a contributing factor.
North of our border, the Canadians are working on initiatives to
incorporate FRMS for both flight crews and maintenance personnel as a
mandatory portion of an operator's SMS. Australia is also moving toward
implementation of FRMS in aviation maintenance.
Flight Safety Foundation strongly urges the FAA to include
maintenance personnel in its proposed rules addressing fatigue.
Another area that calls for more research is that of high-
frequency/high-cycle operations. An eight-hour work day means two
different things for the ultra-long range operator and the regional
operator. Multiple take offs and landings over that time period can
lead to a higher level of fatigue due to the higher work load
activities. We understand the Regional Airline Association has
committed to lead new studies to examine the relationship between these
types of operations and fatigue. Flight Safety Foundation strongly
supports those efforts and calls on the FAA to include these research
findings in the proposed rules. Broadening the research into the short-
haul flights is also a recommendation of the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB).
In addition to the recommendation on increased research on short-
haul flights, the NTSB has issued recommendations that address the
issue of undiagnosed sleep apnea and other sleep disorders. The FAA's
current guidance to aviation medical examiners does not include a
discussion of risk factors for sleep apnea, nor does the application
for an airman's medical certificate ask if there is a history.
According to the NTSB, other Federal agencies overseeing other forms of
passenger transportation already gather this sort of information or are
in the process of revising forms and guidance in order to do so.
Finally, a concerted effort should be made by the FAA, industry and
labor to educate the aviation safety workforce on matters associated
with fatigue risk. This doesn't require regulatory action, and would
have a significant positive effect in the near term. We can start
putting tools into the hands of those people who could make a
difference, including managers, schedulers, pilots, flight attendants,
maintenance technicians, and others. Countless operators are in the
process of developing fatigue training materials for their work force.
If we pooled these efforts, we could do much more, and do it quickly.
Just as regulators, labor and industry came together 20 years ago to
deal with the problem of controlled flight into terrain, we can come
together again to deal with this threat. The Flight Safety Foundation
is working with the Regional Airline Association and others to try to
make that happen.
The United States should be leading the world on fatigue management
as it has led the world on so many advances in aviation safety. Civil
aviation authorities all around the world are using the research
undertaken by NASA and ICAO to mitigate the risk that comes from a
fatigued aviation work force. The time is now for the FAA, the
operators, management, and labor to come together and develop a
consensus on this vital issue. I'm personally gratified by the level of
cooperation we are seeing and I'm hopeful that the FAA's proposed rules
will meet the challenges of being scientifically based and inclusive of
all the latest research and experiences.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today. I would
be pleased to answer any questions.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Voss, thank you very much.
Let me begin with you. I think, what I heard you say was
that there should be two different standards of regulations or
processes dealing with fatigue, one for the larger carriers,
which can do it more comprehensively, and then a separate
approach for the smaller carriers. That would not be very
comforting to a passenger that gets on an airplane that is not
one of the larger carrier planes, because--seems to me fatigue
is fatigue, no matter the size of the plane that--and that
people in the cockpit that are flying it. If they're fatigued,
there are risks. So, expand on that. You're telling us you
think there ought to be two standards?
Mr. Voss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Actually, to be very clear, what I'm trying to say is, is
that regulations have to be written in a way that can be
complied with. And sometimes you need straightforward rules, as
I believe we will be able to put together through this
regulatory process, to serve as the limit, as the safety net.
However, there is still an opportunity, here, to go beyond the
basics. We can ensure a strong level of safety, make a big
improvement in the industry, but we need to pay attention to
the fact that there are new processes out there, called fatigue
risk management, which allow us to take the data we get from
everyday operations and see where problems are developing and
implement things that even go beyond the rules.
And so, I'm saying that we need to put good rules in place.
We need to also make provisions for us to grow beyond the rules
that exist.
Senator Dorgan. But, again--maybe, Captain Prater, you can
respond to this--we have developed, in recent years, this
system of the large trunk carriers and then the regional
carriers. The regional carriers are a very important part of
our system. They have one-half of the flights and carry one-
fourth of the passengers every year. Let me say that again,
one-half of the flights and one-fourth of the passengers are on
regional carriers. They get on an airplane that has the
markings, in many cases, of the large carriers, but it's not
the large carrier, it's a regional carrier. And it seems to me
that the question of fatigue is a question that is not separate
by the size of the cockpit or the size of the airplane.
Captain Prater, you described fatigue--you used the term,
``dire''. What's your sense of whether there should be one
standard or two or--as Mr. Voss suggests. And I understand why
he suggests it. I have difficulty agreeing that we should move
in that direction. He says it would be more difficult for the
smaller regional carriers to comply to more comprehensive
rules.
Mr. Prater. Well, let me begin with--I'll restate. We
believe that there should be one set of strong underlying
regulation that creates the foundation, regardless of the size
of airplane or the cargo behind the cockpit door. That would be
the first. The second level, then, would say, How do we enforce
that? And how--and I think maybe Bill was alluding to--how can
we improve upon that level of foundation? But, the first
foundation, the regulation should apply to all equally. It
doesn't matter whether you've got one passenger or 500 in the
back of your airplane.
The FRMS would allow us to look at specific situations.
Just take one case, the ultra-long range. If I get into a 777
and go from Newark to Hong Kong, it's going to be about 16-and-
a-half hours. That exceeds the current regulation. But, with a
FRMS, we could come up with the rules on how to conduct a
specific flight like that. I think that's where Bill's trying
to go.
Senator Dorgan. Captain Prater, you said that the fatigue
rules in the U.S. do not comply with the ICAO standards. What
do you mean by that?
Mr. Prater. ICAO has called for the flight-time/duty-time
rules to be science-based. Ours currently are not science-
based. The future ones, when we get them done, as long as
someone doesn't try to delay this like they have the last
several attempts, will be science-based, which would bring us
into compliance with the ICAO provisions.
The last thing I would say on the first subject, sir, was
the controlled napping. Again, napping should not be seen or
viewed as somehow keeping pilots on duty even longer. In other
words, I can hear the scheduler now, ``Well, I'm pretty tired,
I shouldn't start this flight.'' ``Aw, don't worry, you can
catch a nap en route.'' No, that's not a sound strategy for
being alert on the other end. You are, once in a while, going
to be caught in a position where you need a nap, and you'll
coordinate it with your--with the other pilot. But, remember,
at that point, there's one pilot in the cockpit. Our system of
safety is based upon redundancy after redundancy. And now you
want to say, ``Well, only one pilot has to be awake.'' Well, I
can tell you right away, trying to come up out of a nap to make
a snap decision, or to make even a long-range decision, is
difficult. It has to be well planned.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Dorgan. Ms. Gilligan----
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir.
Senator Dorgan.--can you respond? What is the agency's
response to the difference between Mr. Barimo and Captain
Prater on the one-size-fits-all approach with respect to
fatigue? I think that the ATA argues that you don't want one-
size-fits-all. Captain Prater said, I think, that one-size-
fits-all is--ought to be the minimum standard. What does the
FAA say to that?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, sir, the ARC actually presented us a
framework recommendation that has one approach. And I think
what the science does indicate is that things that contribute
to fatigue are common across individuals, across humans, and it
has less to do, perhaps, with the environment.
There are some environmental issues that need to be
considered. You, yourself, mentioned multiple take-offs and
landings is a little bit different environment than long--than
the ultra-long-range flight, for example, that Captain Prater
referred to. And the rules need to acknowledge that.
So, the framework will be a common framework. But, I think
what you'll see in the proposal that the ARC put forward is a
bit of a sliding scale that allows us to take into account the
time of day that the schedule may encompass and the number of
take-offs and landings it may encompass, so that we can
properly balance the contributing factors to fatigue.
Senator Dorgan. I'm going to call on Senator Lautenberg in
a moment, but one final point. We will have Administrator
Babbitt in front of us--I think it's next week----
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir.
Senator Dorgan.--or the week after. Can you give us--give
us the timeline on fatigue. You're talking about the ARC and so
on, but, as I said when I started, this goes back 40 or 50
years, and then two aborted attempts in the----
Ms. Gilligan. Yes.
Senator Dorgan.--1990s to deal with this issue. What's the
timeline here?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, the Administrator had announced that we
would have a final--a proposal out by the first of next year.
Unfortunately, we have run into some additional analysis. What
the ARC provided was, as I said previously, a very good
framework. But, they did not provide specific recommendations
on particular elements of the rule. And we are now having to
fill in the blanks and analyze the effect, based on
recommendations that the ARC made, but, again, without their
specific agreement on what particular hours ought to be
included.
Senator Dorgan. Are you saying the first of the year is a
time deadline that has been sliding?
Ms. Gilligan. We will, unfortunately, miss the first of
next year. We have agreed with the Administrator that we will
complete all of our analysis by the end of January. And then
the rule will need to go through administration review.
Senator Dorgan. All right. I'm going to ask a series of
additional questions of you and others about this and--but I
want to have my colleagues have the opportunity.
Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And I must say that what we've heard from our panel here
today confirms the view, unanimously, that what it is now is
not adequate, and that we have to make changes. And it's--the
rules are antiquated, based on where the system is today, the
number of passengers that come, the different types of
aircraft.
And I would ask you this. Might we be looking at something
more than just the fatigue factor? There's a stress factor
that, even if there's adequate sleep, there are other things
that are--that can interfere with clear thinking, not the least
of which is income. Now--and I don't know how we get this
across, but there ought to be some standard.
What are the requirements now for a commercial pilot's
license, Captain?
Mr. Prater. About 250 hours of flight time, instruction
time in a single-engine airplane.
Senator Lautenberg. And how about--are there any other
educational requirements?
Mr. Prater. There are no other educational requirements for
even up to an airline transport pilot rating.
Senator Lautenberg. Are there any physical--what are the
physical requirements that must accompany the application for a
license?
Mr. Prater. There are solid physical requirements--
basically, good health, correctable vision to 20/20. And most
pilots, twice a year, have to meet those physical standards;
once a year, if--I believe, if you're under 35.
Ms. Gilligan. Forty.
Mr. Prater. Forty.
Senator Lautenberg. Are there any prohibitions about
alcohol use in advance of taking command or getting into the
pilot seat?
Mr. Prater. Yes, sir, very strict rules, both time-wise as
well as blood alcohol content. Those--that's not----
Senator Lautenberg. But, they're not--the pilot isn't--they
don't give a blood sample every time they go to----
Mr. Prater. No, but we are subject to random events. And I
will tell you that the--it's a rule that pilots take very
seriously, obviously. And some companies are--even have time
limits that exceed the safety limits that the FAA has
established.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, because, with all of these things
that do exist--and you get back to the starting pay for a pilot
or copilot, second to you--when someone is in that seat, are
they fully prepared, in your view, to take over command, if
necessary?
Mr. Prater. That is one of the responsibilities of command,
in fact, is to assess your fellow crew member. And whether or
not it was as a--cite--you cite the concern of alcohol--most of
us watch that very, very closely in each other. And I'm proud
to say that we have very, very good success in recognizing
those individuals that have a problem. And we have very good
success----
Senator Lautenberg. Well, the problem is--that doesn't
suggest that that's a long-time thing. It can be a single
episode----
Mr. Prater. Right.
Senator Lautenberg.--but the point I get to here is that
the requirements, if met even to the current standard, are
pretty heavy-duty things. But, still in all, we have these
outrageous examples of pilots not responding to a radio
inquiry. Should there be a list of infractions kept that says,
if a pilot doesn't answer a radio call in 5 minutes or 3
minutes or something like that, that that ought to be listed as
an infraction and a record kept on that?
Mr. Prater. Sir, I think we would quickly determine that
the airspace and flying an airplane is very complicated. And
the fact is, there can be either missed radio calls or
miscommunications, but we are very successful in trapping those
errors, either using other airplanes, whether it's monitoring
the emergency frequency of 1215, we do catch those errors. And,
in fact, we take it to the next level. When a professional
makes an error, under the ASAP systems, you turn yourself in.
You report yourself. To me, that's the height of
professionalism, because you want somebody else to not make
that same error. And those are the systems that we are trying
to protect, and they are working very well.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, when you hear a pilot say that,
``We were distracted,'' that's not sufficient reason to fly for
lots and lots of minutes, more than an hour--not quite--without
responding to the--to a tower or a station along the way. It's
shocking. And there should be a rule that's consistent with
rapid response on radio calls. It is crowded up there, and
equipment is moving more rapidly than it used to, so I think
there are rules that have to be established that demand of the
pilot certain behavioral things, so that the tower knows what's
going on and can respond.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Lemieux.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. LeMIEUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What we've heard today is pretty distressing about the lack
of sleep by some of these folks who are flying our planes. I
mean when someone walks onto a plane, onto an aircraft, you
know that they are entrusting their life to you. And I think
there's a larger issue here about fatigue that goes beyond
pilots. There is fatigue in society. And you only have to go to
the back of the plane to see--once the plane takes off, nearly
everybody on a plane, these days, is asleep. I think because
we're all under increasing demands where--you know, we're on
our BlackBerries all the time, we're staying up late with kids,
we're doing all the things that we have to do in life, and
everybody's tired. So, not only may you have DC-3 rules, you
also live in a world where people are a lot more tired. I mean,
I think the sleep studies show that America is one of the worst
nations in the world for how much sleep the average American
gets every night.
So, I'm encouraged that you're going to get these rules
done, and hope that you will get them done, and get them done
as soon as you possibly can, so that we have something that's
scientifically-based.
I want to bring up three things that occurred to me as
someone who's just a frequent traveler on airplanes and, in
Florida, have done a lot of these short-leg trips. On the
Continental planes, which were very similar to that crash that
occurred in Buffalo, there are a couple of things. One is, I
see that folks who are on airline crews oftentimes now commute
to their work--and I think this happened in Buffalo, where you
had a Tampa-based pilot. We're talking about being well-rested
for the start of the flight, not just being able to say, ``OK,
I can take a nap when I'm on the plane,'' if that's the way the
rule changes, but to be well-rested when the flight begins. How
important is it that the crew member spend the night before
they start on their leg, in their home, in their home bed? I
mean it worries me that we are flying people from Tampa to
Buffalo to go to work, and that that's the first part of their
segment, and then they're going to actually start flying when
they get to Buffalo or get to Atlanta.
I experience this all the time, in talking to crewmembers,
how many people don't live in Atlanta, for example. You know,
Delta has its base there. There are a lot of crewmembers who
fly to Atlanta to go to work. You know, is this something
that's going to be addressed--the initial getting-to-work,
commuting to your job, as a crewmember, which has to also
increase the wear and tear on the crew member? So, I'd like to
discuss that.
The second thing I'd like to hear some comment on is, what
availability for sleep rooms are there for pilots? How good are
those sleep rooms? Is this something that's being discussed as
providing places where pilots can sleep in between flights?
Something that's not going to be a place where they're sitting
in a lounge where they are not going to really get good rest,
but where they'd actually have an opportunity to get in a cot
or a bed and get some real sleep between flights.
And the third thing is, who's in charge? My sense, and
maybe it's wrong, is that the pilot is in charge. Are there
supervisors, that are at the airports, who are looking over
these pilots before they get on the plane? Maybe other senior
pilots--I don't know how it works--who would say, you know,
``Captain Prater's too tired, he just came in from Hong Kong.
He thinks he can go on this flight. I don't think he can go on
this flight. I'm going to tell Captain Prater has got to take
some time off, because he's not ready to make this flight.'' Is
there a chain-of-command that puts somebody in charge at the
airports to make these decisions?
So, traveling to destinations, sleep rooms, and
supervision. And I'll ask Ms. Gilligan if she would like to
start on that.
Ms. Gilligan. Sure. Thank you, sir. On the issue of
commuting, the Aviation Rulemaking Committee recommended that
the pilot be required to report to work fit for duty. That is
consistent with our regulations at this point. They did not
make a recommendation to change the regulation. However,
commuting is one of the areas that we are looking at as we
prepare our proposal, to see if there are additional
requirements that we want to include in that particular area.
So, that is something that will be addressed, and we will
certainly ask for comment on, in the proposal.
On the issue of sleep rooms, there are two things. First,
there are--especially for the cargo carriers, there are a
number of major cargo carriers who actually provide rooms--
temperature-controlled, quiet rooms for pilots to sleep. And
one of the recommendations from the ARC was to give
consideration to that kind of rest, and to perhaps add
additional time to the duty day. We will look at proposals in
that area and ask for comment on that, as well.
For the ultra-long flights, or the flights where we have
what we call ``augmented crew,'' there are sleeping facilities
on board the aircraft. The ARC recommended that the higher-end
facilities be given more credit than where an operator might
expect a pilot to sleep in a first-class seat, for example. The
proposal will look at those differences and ask for comment on
whether credit ought to be given in those areas, as well.
We are trying to address all of these various issues that,
while not the main issue of fatigue, certainly contribute to
helping the pilots better manage fatigue.
Senator LeMieux. What about supervision?
Ms. Gilligan. Ah, I'm sorry. In the last issue, the
regulations will likely propose that both the operator and the
pilot will have responsibility. The rule would say the
``operator may not allow'' and the ``pilot may not accept.''
Many of our rules are written in that way to have that shared
responsibility so that, as Captain Prater pointed out, we can
be sure that we have the checks and balances that we need
within the system.
Senator LeMieux. Captain Prater, can you talk to those
three points?
Mr. Prater. I'd be glad to, Senator.
First of all, I think we need to understand that commuting
is a fact of life. Whether I'm driving from Richmond to D.C.,
that might take me 3 hours, or whether I'm flying from St.
Louis to D.C., which would take me an hour and 45 minutes, I am
commuting to work. I'm starting my day ahead. It comes down to
the professional responsibility of, ``What do I have ahead of
me that day?'' If I'm just flying an easy trip, I'm flying one
leg to Florida, yes, I'll come up that morning. I'll be there
for several hours, and then I'll go to work and I'll feel fine.
If I'm flying an all-nighter, to Sao Paulo, I'll come up the
night before and get some rest during the day. Those are just
facts of--as you say, of the life we live in.
Now, you have to know your schedule. It's more difficult
for reserve pilots. Most reserve pilots are within 2 to 3 hours
of their duty station. But, even there, if you live in--on Long
Island and you're trying to get to Newark, it can easily take 3
hours. So, you do have to plan far ahead.
I do not see it as the problem. One of them that has been
cited so many times is that the first officer commuted from
Seattle to Newark to fly her trip. What should be said is--or
should be pointed out is, she could have flown that trip as a
pilot the night before and been legal to fly the trip to
Buffalo. So, it's not just commuting, it's the overall issue of
how our flight-time/duty-time rules work.
Who's in charge? Well, I think it starts and ends with the
captain, but the carrier does have responsibility. The
carrier's got a responsibility to accept my word, and they're
not going to fire me or discipline me if I say, ``I'm too tired
to go on.'' We still fight that problem. We call it ``pilot
pushing.'' Because if the airplane doesn't go, the revenue sits
on the tarmac. If they don't have enough pilots because they've
cut back so much, that trip is canceled. Those economic
pressures live every day. We have to fight them.
The last one is the sleep rooms--totally, wholly inadequate
at most airlines.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
I also wanted to acknowledge--I know that some of the
Colgan families are out there, from the crash. Thank you again
for being here and being a--just a moral compass for us as we
work on this important topic and try to get these rules down.
And I appreciate, Ms. Gilligan, your saying that these will
get done. I was just shocked to learn, at a hearing a few weeks
ago, that the deicing rules are 12 years old, that they haven't
even gone in the recommendations, and that, finally, actually,
I talked to Cass Sunstein, the Director of OIRA, and Secretary
LaHood, and they're finally out for public comment after
sitting there in some bureaucratic morass for 12 years. So, I
want to thank you for pushing on these, and encourage you to do
this as quickly as possible.
I think one of the things, to follow up with what Senator
LeMieux was talking about, was just this changing culture. And
I think that these rules that we have, the FAA's policies on
pilot fatigue, are something like a half-century old, and it
doesn't reflect new technologies, new ways of living, or new
information that we have about fatigue. And one of the things
that I've been very focused on is looking at fatigue, is what
Senator Dorgan was saying, what, half the flights are regional
and a--half the flights are national, and a quarter of the
passengers are regional, yet the rules seem to be different
with the regional and the national flights.
And, I guess, my first question was--I know that some of
the large carriers reimburse pilots for hotel costs so that
they can get some sleep between shifts. Do regional carriers do
the same thing? And would this be a solution to some of the
problems?
Captain Prater, do you want to start with that?
Mr. Prater. I would say most carriers do not provide for
the reimbursement of the expenses for coming to work, to be
well rested. So, they don't pay for hotel rooms where you start
and end your trip.
Part of the problem, Senator, is that the system doesn't
provide for a mechanism to provide the pilots with a decent
salary, because we have a marketplace system that we've had
over 160 failures of airlines. We keep seeing, in calling these
airlines something other than what they are--``regional
carrier,'' what does that mean? They fly from Canada to Mexico.
These are ``airliners.'' We need to get away from trying to
pigeonhole them because they're flying ``just'' 50 passengers.
Senator Klobuchar. Right. In fact, I know one of the things
we discussed--and maybe you want to comment on this, Mr. Voss--
is, arguably, the regional pilots, some of them are flying
shorter flights. Their flying time is more stressful because it
involves more take-offs and landings, and they're actually
doing more during that time. And I wondered, Mr. Voss, if--
should we take that into account, as opposed to just simply
looking at time in the air?
Mr. Voss. Yes, thank you, Senator. Certainly should take
that issue in account of the frequency of the legs and the
workload, and so on, that that involves. And it is interesting
that that area is--had probably the least amount of research
done to it. A lot of work has been done on ultra-long-haul and
time-zone shifts. More work is being done in that area, and I
think that's a critical area we need to take into account. And,
as I understand the rules that were described by the ARC, we'll
take this up-and-down factor into account.
Senator Klobuchar. And then. what do we do about learning
from what other countries have done? You know, I know one of
the things they've talked about is actually allowing for one
pilot to nap if the other one's awake, and they have done
things like that. Is that in the works? Does that controlled-
napping idea, does that make any sense for longer flights?
Mr. Voss. Yes, absolutely, we are supporting that very much
in the Foundation. Since 1994, I believe, is when the first
airline started doing this sort of controlled-napping, and it's
found to be a very effective countermeasure. When you try to do
everything right, but you still end up with a fatigued crew
because of weather or whatever happens, this is a last-ditch
effort. And it has proven to be a very safe procedure. And it
has been adopted in many countries around the world.
Senator Klobuchar. Ms. Gilligan?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Klobuchar. Just follow up on some of these
questions with the reimbursements, this idea of actually more
stress on pilots, whether we call them ``regional'' or not, but
that have shorter flights. And then, also this idea of, Should
we look at this controlled-napping?
Ms. Gilligan. As Mr. Voss indicated, the ARC did recommend
that we consider both the time of day when the pilot begins
their schedule, as well as the number of operations or segments
that they'll fly, as part of, sort of, a sliding scale of how
many hours of duty time and flight time they should be
permitted. However, the ARC did not agree on exactly how many
hours of flight time and duty time that ought to allow, and
that is what we are in the midst of now analyzing. But, the
framework that they presented, and that we will be putting
forward, will take into account the time of day. So, if you're
flying at night, what they call ``back side of the clock,''
that may reduce the number of hours that you're available. If
you have a high number of take-offs and landings, that may
reduce the number of hours. We will seek comment on all of that
to understand better how to accommodate those factors that can
contribute to fatigue.
On the issue of controlled rest, we have not issued
standards for that. We have not proposed to permit that. And at
this point, I do not expect that we will be proposing that. As
Captain Prater pointed out, we believe that the crew needs to
come to work prepared for the schedule that they are
undertaking. Additionally, we believe that we can manage and
mitigate their fatigue through the new regulations sufficiently
that they should be alert throughout that flight.
Senator Klobuchar. All right. Thank you very much, I
appreciate it.
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Snowe.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Gilligan----
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Snowe.--obviously, we hope that the FAA is going to
move expeditiously on this proposed rulemaking. I think it's
essential. It's obviously languished for more than a half a
century, and it has been on the National Transportation Safety
Board's Most Wanted List since 1990. So, clearly, this is an
issue that deserves immediate attention. And I think you've
given all the testimony that has been presented to this
committee in the factors of fatigue.
To follow up on the question that Senator LeMieux made with
respect to commutes, many of the regional airlines obviously
have pilots that commute long distances. In fact, one of the
regional carriers has, you know, a quarter of their crew that
commute more than 1,000 miles. How are you factoring that into
the rulemaking? Is that going to be something that's going to
be part of the rulemaking process next year in some way that--
and contributes to fatigue?
Ms. Gilligan. That is an issue that, as I mentioned, the
Aviation Rulemaking Committee did not recommend we make changes
to. They recommended that we continue to see commuting as a
pilot responsibility, as Captain Prater indicated. We are still
considering whether there are additional elements that we can
or should regulate. And that may well be a part of our
proposal. We've not yet completed that part of our analysis.
But, either way, we will be asking for comment on whether there
are additional regulatory requirements that should be put in
place related to commuting.
Senator Snowe. Captain Prater, how do you see the FAA
addressing this question--if at all? I mean, do you see it
essential to addressing this commuter issue?
Mr. Prater. If anything, I believe that--you know, as I
stated before, I do believe that it is a personal
responsibility thrust upon you by the circumstances. You could
live in your base, and the next day your base is closed, and
you're expected to fly out of New York instead of Cincinnati.
You've got three kids in school, you just can't do it
overnight. Most regional carriers don't pay for paid moves. I
know pilots who have had five base changes in 1 year. You just
can't move. So, it's not a whole lot different than many jobs
in our society, except on the other end of it, we have to be in
command of that cockpit.
So, it does start with personal responsibility. I think, if
anything, when those circumstances--the carrier must ensure
that the pilot is able to get to work with the least amount of
hassle at all. It's no different than flying from St. Louis to
D.C. to begin your workday here. It's the same thing for us.
But, it shouldn't take me 8 or 10 hours to fly from St. Louis
to D.C. to start that work.
So, there are things that could be done. But, I believe
it'll be done more--unfortunately, maybe--but in the
collective-bargaining arena, where we come up with the solution
with our employers versus a mandate by the FAA.
Senator Snowe. Well, do you think it's workable in what Ms.
Gilligan mentioned, about the pilot and the operator making the
decision, in terms of whether or not a pilot is fatigued, or
too fatigued, to make the trip?
Mr. Prater. I believe----
Senator Snowe. I mean, I see the operators are most likely
to resist the pressure from that situation, because obviously
they need the pilot. So, it seems to me they'd be most likely--
--
Mr. Prater. It's----
Senator Snowe.--to come and make the wrong decision in that
question, if a pilot is fatigued.
Mr. Prater. You know, it comes down to our physical, that
we take every 6 months. We have to determine, Are we fit to
fly, that day? It doesn't matter whether I've got a cough or a
cold or I didn't sleep last night because my baby cried all
night. I have to make that decision. All we ask is the
protection that the employer and--their responsibility under
the regulation should be, ``You will accept--when a pilot calls
in and says he or she is too fatigued to fly, you'll accept
that call.''
Senator Snowe. On another issue, I happened to run into an
airline pilot last week, for a legacy carrier, and he was very
much concerned about the lack of experience of pilots and
copilots on these regional aircraft, with the requirement of
300 hours of flight time compared to what he had, for example,
as a commercial pilot, 3,000 hours of flight time. In fact, he
was asked for some tips by the captain of one of these regional
carriers on one flight, and the copilot wasn't even familiar
with some of the issues that they were discussing. And he
described it as ``scary.''
So, I was wondering if I could have your views on that. If
you combine the issue of fatigue, low salaries, lack of
experience in the House of Representatives, for example,
there's a piece of legislation that's being considered, a 1,500
hours minimum requirement to become a commercial pilot--all of
these amount to a potentially dangerous situation for
passengers and pilots. Can you address that?
Mr. Prater. Yes, ma'am. We are fully supportive of H.R.
3371, and hope that the Senate will pick that up in the near
future. It does raise the bar. It raises the bar for experience
before a pilot can become an airline transport pilot in service
of carrying passengers.
Now, first of all, let me say, I believe that we're one of
the most critical professions, on ourselves. You never have
enough experience. The fact is that the captain--the senior
captain sharing and discussing issues with that crew is not a
bad thing. Two years ago, our economy was going in such a way
that pilots were being hired right out of flight school, with
250 to 350 hours. And it did show a crack. We can do better
than that. It takes a lot more training at the airline level.
But, again, training is expensive. Many airlines like to
cut costs at every corner they can. That's one we can't. In
fact, we need to expand some of the training requirements. And
much of that is covered in that House legislation.
Senator Snowe. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Snowe, thank you very much.
So, Ms. Gilligan, let me bear in a little on this question
of when, because, you know, the fact is, this issue has been
around--the NTSB has had this on its most-wanted list for 19
years. I appreciate the fact that you've started a process,
that--but much more important is that you end the process. And
you end the process with the kind of recommendations that are
science-based, and that can be implemented, and that we don't
have to have these hearings.
So, you indicated that the time is now sliding. Not unusual
with Federal agencies. But, disappointing in--given the
circumstances we now face and the urgency with which we had
communicated to the FAA that we want to move on this. Give me
your best judgment about when those of us who are waiting for
these recommendations and the implementation of new rules and
regulations dealing with fatigue--when we can expect action.
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir. The Administrator is finally
committed to completing this project. I need to make that
absolutely clear. I will certainly share that with you next
week, when he appears here, as well. He's also committed to
getting it right. This is an area in which he is personally
knowledgeable, given his own experience as a pilot. And as we
have presented to him the framework that the Aviation
Rulemaking Committee provided, and the kinds of detailed
specifics that we have to analyze, he has agreed that we need
some additional time in order to make sure we get it right.
We have committed to having our analysis completed by the
end of January, a month later than we had hoped to complete it,
and it will go into the final review, both within FAA and
throughout the Administration. We have commitment from the
Secretary to keep that review as short as we can keep it. And
we will be working with the Office of Management and Budget in
that same vein, as well.
So, I can assure you the Administrator is fully committed
to completing this notice and getting it out as quickly next
year as we can.
Senator Dorgan. But--thank you for the answer, but you have
just described the FAA, OMB, DOT, all agencies that would have
to take reasonably effective and expeditious action in order to
get something in place here. And I've had too much experience
with OMB, FAA, and DOT to believe that this works very well.
And, because I referred to two aborted attempts in the 1990s to
do this, and because I've referred to--I think--is it 19 years
of being on the most-wanted list--you know, we're just out of
patience here. So you're saying a month. This has slid a
month--because I--let me ask it a different way.
I assume that, when the FAA decided to embark on this and
set a deadline, it is set--it set a deadline based on their
judgment of doing it the right way. Now you're saying you need
more time to do it the right way, but my guess is you would
have set the deadline based on doing it the right way.
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir. That was certainly our expectation.
However, while the ARC gave us a good framework, they did not
give us all the specifics that need to be included in the rule
and that need to be fully analyzed so that we can present these
for comment. I think the ARC members would acknowledge that
they did not give specific recommendations, due to, to some
extent, the time limits, as well as how complicated and
difficult these issues are.
As the Administrator said at that time, we are prepared to
make these kinds of difficult and specific decisions. And those
are the decisions that he is facing right now. And that
requires some additional time.
Senator Dorgan. I don't disagree at all. They are
complicated, they are difficult. I understand all that. I
just--I think--when I started, today, by citing the number of
people who've lost their lives in the last 20 years or so
because of accidents related to fatigue, and then understanding
that we have this issue of fatigue in front of us and can't
come to closure, I'm--what I'm going to do is--well, I will
certainly ask the Administrator next week in some detail, but
I'm going to write an official letter--and I assume my
colleagues would join me on it--month after month as we go
along here to find out, Where is it? When is it going to
happen? Who has it now? How long do you expect them to have it?
I'm going to write them, as well--OMB, DOT. We need to move on
this.
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir.
Senator Dorgan. And we just need to get it done. It is
complicated. But, you know, it's not like sending a person to
the Moon. We can surely figure out what we need to do to
address what Mr. Prater says is a ``dire problem.'' I happen to
agree that it's dire, because--when I showed the charts over
here today, I--you know, we're talking about crew rest and duty
time, but I--also, my colleague Senator Snowe, I believe,
talked about commuting. I don't know what we should do about
commuting, but I think we should not ignore it. And I think,
Ms. Gilligan, you've just indicated that this process will
ignore commuting.
Well, you know, again, in the Colgan crash, someone that
flew all night long from Seattle, Washington, to finally get to
a duty station, and then to hang around the lounge for a couple
of hours, based on what we know--the investigation is not
complete--that is not a pilot that is well rested in the
cockpit. Aside from all the other questions, putting pilots and
the copilots in the cockpit that didn't know what--had never
trained on a stick pusher. Never trained on it, not even in--I
mean, it's unbelievable to me. So, at least the piece that we
can understand here, the piece that we can and should
understand, is fatigue, if nothing else, and try to move as
expeditiously as we can to address it.
Now, let me--I want to ask a couple of other questions.
This issue of napping.
Ms. Gilligan. Yes.
Senator Dorgan. The notion of solving the fatigue issue by
taking naps in the cockpit, you know, I understand why someone
might suggest that as an alternative. And perhaps some carriers
overseas use it. But, I also understand Captain Prater's notion
about this. And I have--I've flown airplanes very minimally. I
mean, I flew when I was younger. But--very few hours--but I
understand, in a cockpit, if you're napping and a bell or a
whistle or a light goes off as an--some sort of emergency, you
don't wake up from a nap, doing--just like that, to decide,
``Here are the actions I take as an experienced, professional
pilot with 200 people on the back. Here are the actions to take
right now, in an emergency to address this.'' That's not what
you do, waking up from a nap. You're drowsy. So, I don't
understand this issue about solving a fatigue issue by napping.
Mr. Voss. Mr.Barimo, you've advanced it, I guess.
Mr. Barimo. Yes, I'm glad to elaborate. We don't view
napping as a silver bullet for fatigue. It's one of the many
tools in that FRMS toolbox. So, airlines would not build
schedules that incorporate napping as a requirement to complete
a trip. It's a way to manage fatigue as it arises, on a real-
time basis. And it's, we think, a smarter approach, managing
that napping process, than allowing things to evolve the way
they have previously, where you run the risk, potentially, of
both pilots falling asleep. We think there's a way to do it. We
believe that NASA has done adequate research into this. And
Bill Voss is certainly the expert, but it is one of the many
tools that get factored into this new equation. And that's the
beauty of FRMS, it allows you to take tools like this, like
napping facilities on the ground, break rooms and sleep rooms,
and incorporate them all into a comprehensive program that
really helps you more effectively manage risk.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Voss.
Mr. Voss. Yes, thank you. I'm suggesting, again, there are
layers that have to be applied here. The first layer is, we
have to make the rules better in the first place so that people
show up to work--have the opportunity to show up to work--
rested. And people have to live up to their responsibility to
do so and show up to work rested.
Then, last, in the event that all of our best efforts are
spoiled by the realities of the world, weather and everything
else, and somebody needs to take a rest--you put one last layer
of defense in and have a controlled procedure where they can
obtain that rest. It would just be used as an exception, not as
a rule.
Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. I'm going to call on Senator Lautenberg,
but, Mr. Prater, you want to respond to that?
Mr. Prater. I think I addressed it adequately. Again, you
couldn't prevent a nap if a pilot is that tired, but it has got
to be a last-ditch effort so that you can at least feel good
enough on the other end. The trick we used to use, when I was
flying all-nighters, was, about 5 minutes before landing, to
bite into a fresh-cut lemon to give you such a jolt that you
would wake up and be able to apply it. That's pushing the human
body way too far. And we don't need that. That's what we need
the underlying rules for.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. Ms. Gilligan----
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg.--the Chairman's questions about when
the report might be done were questions that I was going to
talk about, as well. But, I think that ground has been covered.
The thing that I would suggest, when you talk to the
Chairman--talk to Mr. Babbitt--one of the things that we've not
discussed is safety, in totality. We're discussing a part of
what's required. Another part is to make sure that the towers
are in the condition that they should be. And when I look at
the schedules for manning, and I see Newark Liberty is--
staffing standard there is 40; they have 26, plus 8 trainees.
Kennedy Airport, 37 full time--24 are there, 15 trainees. And
so it goes. And I think that one of the questions that I'd like
us to review when Mr. Babbitt's here is, What are they doing in
contemplation of the retirements, et cetera, and including the
staffing levels right now?
The other thing, Mr. Barimo, do you think that $20,000 a
year is an acceptable salary for someone who has the
responsibilities of pilots?
Mr. Barimo. Senator Lautenberg, what I would say is that
seniority is king in the airline industry. And what that means
is that salary is negotiated between the union and the company.
It generally favors the more senior pilots. What we're talking
about is a pay scale that starts fairly low and ends fairly
high. There are certainly ways to level that out and have
pilots coming in earn more and pilots at the senior end earn a
little bit less. There are ways to do that, again, that's a
negotiated element. It's an issue that has certainly been at
the forefront of many discussions. But, again, it's an element
that's negotiated between the airline and the union.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, I know that. And I don't mean to
be impatient, but the simple question is whether or not someone
making $20,000 a year, and particularly with those that have to
commute distances--and I've met lots of pilots who drive 150
miles from their home to get to their flight--so that--the
question is whether or not--with the responsibility that is
inherent in the job, whether $20,000 is a decent salary.
Because many times there will be a second job that these folks
have to take in order to keep their heads above water, and that
plays a terrific role in establishing stress or fatigue,
whichever is the factor. But, it is an invasion of good
sensibility.
Mr. Barimo. Senator, what I'd offer is that airlines are
subject to the requirements of FAR Part 121, whether they're
commuter airlines or mainline carriers. There is one set of----
Senator Lautenberg. But, there's no--they don't--but, they
don't recommend their own salaries----
Mr. Barimo. There's one set of recommendations. Airlines
prepare pilots to operate the equipment that they're flying.
And it's irrespective of the amount of money that the pilot
gets paid.
Senator Lautenberg. OK. Well----
Mr. Barimo. It's the same requirement.
Senator Lautenberg. --you said something--you said
``seniority dictates.'' If I was home on a particular day, I
would have seen an airplane pass my window on its way to
landing in the Hudson River. That's--the building I live in, in
New Jersey, is right on the river, and it's about the height
that I live coming down from--where the pilot had to head for
lower altitude. Captain Chesley ``Sully'' Sullenberger, the
pilot for U.S. Airways flight 1549, known as ``The miracle on
the Hudson,'' said, in a hearing in the House earlier this
year, that his pay has been cut 40 percent in recent years, and
he started a consulting business to maintain a middle-class
standard of living. This was a guy with terrific experience
and, obviously, great skills.
So, I think we're at a point in time when we're going to
have to say that there are certain standards that must be met.
And I don't know how to implement them. That's not my job here.
My job is to make sure that, whatever we do, we have the safety
of the public protected as--to whatever extent we can possibly
do it. And again, we've all admitted that safety record's
pretty good. But, there are possibilities that are relatively
high risk that we should avoid.
And I would say this, when we're looking at salaries and we
look at what's happening in the regional, Captain Prater,
versus the majors, the regionals are doing pretty well, in
terms of profitability. SkyWest made $200 million in the year
up to 2009--2008-2009. American Eagle made $122 million.
Express Mesa made $16 million. Pinnacle Colgan made $76
million. So, what's to say that they should exert themselves a
little bit, in terms of trying to attract the best that they
can get, and, once they get them, to keep them alert and
satisfied with their job and paying attention to the minutest
detail that they have to. And now, at a--particularly when jobs
are too few, Mr. Barimo, that it simply can't be left to a
negotiation, I don't think----
Mr. Barimo. Right.
Senator Lautenberg.--between the union and the company,
because people want to work. But, their willingness to work has
to be accompanied by an ability to be as skillful, as alert,
and as in command as they can be. Do you agree?
Mr. Barimo. I certainly agree.
Senator Lautenberg. OK. I wasn't sure. There was the bit of
silence that I heard.
Mr. Barimo. The industry has taken a beating since
September. It has impacted every employee in the industry, not
just pilots.
You mentioned a few airlines posting profits. What I will
say is that the industry, as a whole, continues to lose
billions of dollars each year. So, I would be hesitant to view
a couple of data points that show up in the black, as an
indication that the industry is performing well.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, I'll tell you, when it's a
commodity like air travel, there may have to be a look-back at
where we were at one time in our history and say, ``Just
because you can raise some money to start a new airline doesn't
mean that you ought to be in the industry,'' when we are paying
for the whole infrastructure--the FAA and airport development,
et cetera, et cetera. So, we're not going to have time, nor the
ability, right now to examine that question in its entirety,
but it's one, in my view, that ought to be examined.
Thanks very much, to all of you. Very interesting
testimony, and valuable. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Lautenberg, thank you very much.
Let me ask a question about--Ms. Gilligan, let's assume
that your recommendations are done, OMB sees them come in the
door and says, ``You know what, we're going to work on this
quickly and move it out.'' DOT says, ``God bless you for all
your work. We see this, and we're a Federal agency, we intend
to get things turned around quickly.'' And all of a sudden, we
have this process complete.
Now, turn just for a moment to a circumstance that has
prodded us to do more work in this area. That is, the Colgan
crash. And the right-seat pilot flew from Seattle to Memphis--I
believe deadheaded on a--I think it was a FedEx plane--and then
flew to LaGuardia. And the pilot flew from Florida up to
LaGuardia. There's no evidence of either them having a hotel
room for rest purposes. There's evidence of both being in a
crew rest lounge of some type. Evidence that the left-seat
pilot was doing e-mails through a fair part of the night. So,
it appears to me, with respect to whatever caused that crash--
perhaps pilot/copilot not understanding what a ``stick pusher''
means--pulling the nose up and stalling the plane rather than
having that nose pushed down because of ice, and restoring your
airspeed and so on--it's entirely possible that a portion of
what caused that crash was fatigue. Assuming that everything
that you are doing is done, and we are all ready to announce
significant progress for the first time in many, many years,
how will it--or how would it have affected the circumstances of
the pilot and the copilot I've just described, both of whom
flew a fair piece across the country and without any evidence
of having rest prior to the flight on that regional carrier?
Ms. Gilligan. Sir, I think, as we've heard a lot, there
will always be a responsibility for the pilots to manage their
rest periods appropriately. The rule will offer an opportunity
for rest with sufficient time to sleep, consistent with what
the signs of fatigue tells us, which is that you should sleep 7
to 8 hours a night. At the end of the day, the pilots will then
have to take responsibility for assuring that they take
advantage of that rest opportunity in a way that prepares them
to report to work. They will always have that responsibility.
And the operator will have the responsibility to determine that
the crew member is, in fact, prepared to work at that time.
The regulatory framework can only set, just that, the
framework that allows for the operator and the pilot to
properly prepare themselves to provide safe transportation.
Senator Dorgan. I understand the responsibility of the
pilot. That's the responsibility of a professional to himself
or herself in the profession, and the responsibility to the
passengers they're transporting. What I don't quite understand
is, when we finish this whole process, nothing will have
changed with respect to the circumstances that existed in that
cockpit with respect to fatigue, if it existed as a part of the
cause of this crash, because--if we have the chart that shows
the Colgan commutes.
We know that something significant has changed with respect
to air travel in this country. And I'll describe it just this
way. In--if you'll put that down for just a moment--in North
Dakota, where I grew up, the airlines that served our capital
city were Republic, a regional carrier--but that--but, they
didn't fly small planes; they flew DC-9s and 737s, and so on--
Western Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and Frontier Airlines.
All of them flew jets--737s, 727s, and DC9s. And my guess is
that people in the cockpit, three--a three-member crew in the
727s by the way, and two-member crew in the others--my guess is
that there wasn't somebody in a right seat with any one of
those carriers, 30 years ago, that was being paid the
equivalent of today's $18,000 or $20,000 a year. It just wasn't
the case.
Then what happened is, our system morphed into something
different. Those carriers merged and merged and merged again,
became much larger, and then created a network of regional
carriers that flew smaller equipment and had a different system
for hiring outside of the trunk carriers. And so, we now have
developed a system where one-half of the flights and one-fourth
of the passengers are carried in circumstances where you have
less experience in the cockpit.
And one of the other things that has happened, especially
in the last couple of decades as we've morphed into this new
system, is this chart, which shows that everybody's commuting
everywhere.
Now, it shouldn't be lost on any of us, including Captain
Prater--you're a pilot--and it shouldn't be lost on us that
this chart is demonstration of a significant potential problem.
You've got people, whose work station is on the East Coast,
flying from all over the country just to get to a station where
they should go to work.
And, Ms. Gilligan, what you are saying, and what some
others have said, is, ``Well, you know what. It's their
responsibility.'' Well, let me ask the obvious question. Atlas
Air, for example, a cargo company, they were having problems
attracting qualified pilots, and so they instituted what was
called a ``Gateway Travel Program.'' Been very successful. They
actually pay commuting pilots to come to their duty station,
and they provide hotel accommodations overnight for them. And
they require them to be there for an overnight. This--that's
how one cargo company decided to do it.
If you're going to have people, living in Seattle or Los
Angeles, working out of New York, the question is,`` How do you
make that happen? How does that work?'' And my great concern
is--and I'm not suggesting that people shouldn't commute; I am
suggesting that if you're going to have this kind of
substantial commuting, you'd better understand that you're
going to have some problems related to it, with respect to
fatigue, unless the carriers and the pilots get there and have
rest and find a bed, go to sleep, and show up in that cockpit
fully rested.
That was not the case in the Colgan plane, with all due
respect. I've read the transcripts. I understand at least
enough of the facts to understand, neither of those pilots, I
believe--and I--again, and I feel bad, because they're not with
us and not able to defend themselves--but, it appears to me,
neither of them had a night's sleep. And I just--when we're
done with this issue, Ms. Gilligan, I don't think we will have
altered the circumstances that allowed that to exist. And
somehow, I think we must.
Ms. Gilligan. Well, sir----
Senator Dorgan. Your response?
Ms. Gilligan. --as I mentioned, the Aviation Rulemaking
Committee did not make recommendations in this area. It is an
area that we are looking at to see just how the Federal
Government might address this in a regulatory framework. As you
suggest, it can be difficult. As Captain Prater suggests,
people drive from Fredericksburg to work in Washington, D.C. at
DCA, and that's a long drive. That is not the same as flying.
How to approach it is hard. But, we know that we do need to
address it. And whether we should address it in the rule itself
or in guidance in training materials for the pilots and for the
airlines, we have not yet completely reached that conclusion.
But, we agree with you. It is a risk factor that must be
addressed, both by the airline and by the pilot.
Senator Dorgan. It just seems to me that would be a better
time, or a more appropriate or more required time, to do it
than now, when you're actually addressing fatigue in the
cockpit?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir.
Senator Dorgan. And, Mr. Prater, my guess is--you run a
pilots organization and you're going to want to say, ``You know
what, they have a right to commute wherever they want to
commute from. They have a responsibility to get some rest
before they fly.'' I understand all that. But, do you believe
that there's simply no issue here, no problem at all with this
substantial amount of commuting that is--that has morphed into
this--particularly the regional carriers, and the trunk
carriers, in recent decades?
Mr. Prater. I would not say there is not an issue, sir.
There is an issue. And I give you our commitment that we'll
continue to work with, not only the FAA, but with our
employers, to find the solution to these problems. This is the
reality. The reality is that the workforce has become very
mobile, none more so than ours. And the fact is that the
companies keep moving the flying around. I've said, they--the
regional carriers, especially, they lose a contract and all of
a sudden people who have lived in Cincinnati for 20 years,
flying out of their home base, now have to commute, overnight.
Those type of decisions are going on throughout our system.
So, we need to do a better job working with our carriers to
make sure that pilots, if they have to fly to get to work,
they're able to do so quickly, easily. It's a mirror image, if
you will, of the Atlas program that you identified. NetJets,
other operators, cargo operators, do the same thing. FedEx,
UPS, they get their pilots to where they pick up their flight.
It may be overseas, sir. So, there are systems out there, and
we can do a better job, both as a union and as our employers
and the associations that represent them, ensuring that the
pilots show up ready to go.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Voss, do you think the commuting is a
part of this issue?
Mr. Voss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, clearly, commuting
sets up a situation where things can go wrong. And we've seen
some things go wrong. And so, I think what we have here is a
problem. But, it's a difficult problem to deal with in a
regulatory format. Clearly, there has to be an obligation for
the airline to provide the opportunity for rest. And, of
course, then there's the--they have to take that opportunity
up.
I think the--a long-term way to look at this, though, is
the fatigue risk management system we talked about, but haven't
explained well. It puts a lot of sensors into the operation;
and so, tells you if you have a problem on a given set of
segments because of tired pilots or poorly trained pilots or
other things. You need to be able to look at the data from your
operation, and deal with it, and put in place the mitigations.
Maybe it's an improved rest facility and so on. But, those are
the type of things we need to do. That's why I am such a
supporter of the data-driven and more sophisticated approaches
that we can take in this industry.
Senator Dorgan. All right. Mr. Barimo, you have a response?
Mr. Barimo. I would just reiterate that, as Captain Prater
said, commuting is a part of the commercial airline business
today. We're much smarter today, and we're getting smarter each
day, when it comes to fatigue management. I think we have a
challenge before us in how to factor commuting into fatigue
management. I think we recognize that as an issue, and we're
committed to resolving it, however that turns out to be.
Senator Dorgan. But, you--in some ways, this is like
looking at a picture and not seeing it. You know, the three of
you suggest that commuting is a part of an issue here, part of
a problem. What Ms. Gilligan and the FAA is going to give us,
at some point, is something that doesn't address that. And it
just seems to me that all of these things relate to the
circumstances that we know cause additional risk.
You know, from the hearings I have held--I was on a
regional carrier a while back, and I happen to know, from the
hearings, of the type of training that particular carrier did
with their regional. They have identical training requirements,
and they own the regional, and they--so, I sort of felt, well,
this is an interesting carrier. Identical to the trunk carrier
in training in every respect. On the other hand, my guess is,
Captain Prater, if you fly regionals, you might get on one
sometime--and you know a little more about it than some
others--and see people in the cockpit that have a few hundred
hours, and wonder if they're able to handle this plane as well
as I am, speaking of yourself, with all the experience you
have.
A lot of things have changed, with respect to regionals.
They are a very important part of our air transportation
system. We need them. But, we need to make sure that we're
dealing with the issues that relate to--the issues that have
become self-evident to us in recent years.
The issue of fatigue is not just a regional issue. The
issue of fatigue relates to every cockpit everywhere and how we
address that.
Ms. Gilligan, I have not meant to ``heckter'' you, with
respect to----
Ms. Gilligan. No, not at all.
Senator Dorgan.--but, I do intend to in the future----
[Laughter.]
Ms. Gilligan. I'll look forward to it.
Senator Dorgan.--because it is very important. Randy
Babbitt is a new administrator with a great deal of promise, in
my judgment. He knows the industry. He has spent a lot of time
in the air, commanding airplanes. And I have high hopes for
some excellent work coming out of the FAA. And that will
include your work and many others. But, it is essential that we
consider these things urgent, based on what we now know--or
``dire,'' as the Captain indicated. And it's essential that it
be science-based. But, it's essential, after all of these
years, all of these many, many years and lives that have been
lost, it's essential that we get this done. And so, I'm going
to be--in my part of the country, we call it a ``bur under the
saddle,'' but I'm really going to keep pushing, because we need
to get this done.
I appreciate that--we've gone a little longer, but I
appreciate the fact that all four of you have come to testify.
We'll have the Administrator here next week----
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir.
Senator Dorgan.--and begin to reach, I think, some
conclusion on some of these issues.
And I hope, Ms. Gilligan--and I will write to the
Administrator--I hope also to talk at some length about
commuting, with the Administrator, in addition to the other
fatigue issues.
Let me thank you very much.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of the Cargo Airline Association
On December 1, 2009, the Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security
Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
held a hearing to examine the issue of pilot fatigue and the status of
the FAA Rulemaking on Flight Crewmember Duty and Rest Requirements.
The Cargo Airline Association (the ``Association'') \1\ did not
testify at that hearing, but, as a full participant in the FAA's
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) which was chartered to examine this
issue, is extremely interested in the outcome of this process. Several
comments made at this hearing, however, raise concerns that need to be
addressed.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Cargo Airline Association is the organization representing
the interests of the United States all-cargo air carrier industry. U.S.
airline members are: ABX Air, Atlas Air, Capital Cargo International,
FedEx Express, Kalitta Air and UPS Airlines.
\2\ The Association has no intention of repeating its comments made
to the FAA in the course of the ARC. Those comments are on file with
the FAA and have been provided to Committee Staff. Rather, the brief
comments below only relate to the testimony presented on December 1,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, in her written testimony, Margaret Gilligan, FAA Associate
Administrator for Aviation Safety, stated that ``. . . differing
regulations for different types of operations are inconsistent and
complex, and can be easily misunderstood, especially when a pilot can
be assigned to different types of operations. The different rules
developed over time, as the aviation industry changed and expanded.
While such variance in the rules may have been justified when they were
first adopted, these differences may no longer be valid in today's
operational environment. Our rulemaking will address this.'' Testimony,
p. 3.
While the Association recognizes the need to update the current
regulations which have been developed over a number of years and have
been subject to several legal interpretations, any implication that a
``one size fits all'' solution to pilot fatigue is simply incorrect. As
a practical matter, today's aviation marketplace is comprised of
various industry segments, with different operating characteristics
driven by the underlying business model and different opportunities for
crewmembers to rest. For example, the time it takes to sort and load
cargo onto an all-cargo aircraft at a hub facility allows time for
crewmembers to rest. Similarly, security concerns at certain foreign
airports would make it imprudent to schedule overnight stays; rest can
better be addressed through on-board rest accommodation and other
means. Those unique differences must be taken into consideration.
Indeed, FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt, at an ALPA Safety Forum on
August 5, 2009, specifically noted that ``In rulemaking, not only does
one size not fit all, but it's unsafe to think that it can.'' In
addition, during the course of the ARC, FAA representatives
specifically recognized the different characteristics of the all-cargo
industry and invited the Cargo Airline Association to submit a cargo-
specific proposal. Therefore, any notion that the all-cargo carriers
are asking for a ``carve out'' from the rulemaking is simply false.
Faced with these realities, all-cargo interests cannot be simply
subsumed into a ``one size fits all'' rule, but rather must be
separately considered, taking into account the operational
characteristics on this industry segment. That is not to say that the
FAA must have separate sets of regulations. Rather, the FAA can and
should apply a common framework to the rules to avoid confusion and
thus reducing the need to issue legal interpretations, but also
recognizing differing operational and environmental characteristics.
Another subject that generated significant comment at the December
1 hearing was the subject of ``commuting''. While everyone agrees that
flight crews must present themselves for service in a fit condition,
there appears to be significant disagreement on the FAA's role in
assuring that flight crews are not fatigued when they report for duty.
Although there were statements that the ARC did not recommend any FAA
action in this area, the Association submission (which was transmitted
to the FAA as part of the ARC recommendation) did, in fact, address
this issue. Indeed, an entire section entitled ``The FAA Must Address
Pre-Duty Required Rest'' was included in the Association proposal, with
the notation that ``. . . any regulations covering flight/duty
limitations and rest requirements must also address pre-duty required
rest of individual flight crewmembers and put teeth into the FAA's
enforcement of crewmember responsibility to report to work fit for
duty''. Association Submission, p. 26. During the hearing, the FAA
repeatedly said the delay in the rulemaking process and its subsequent
later than expected release was largely due to the ARC not addressing
commuting.
The Association appreciated the opportunity to participate in the
ARC process and looks forward to filing comments when the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking is issued. If the Subcommittee needs any further
information, please do not hesitate to contact us.
______
Prepared Statement of Ronald N. Priddy, President,
National Air Carrier Association (NACA)
The National Air Carrier Association (NACA), a member of the recent
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight and Duty Time Limitations
and Rest Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC), appreciates
the opportunity to present written testimony for the record of the
hearing on ``Aviation Safety: Pilot Fatigue'' which was held on
December 1, 2009.
NACA,\1\ founded in 1963, is comprised of 11 air carriers that fill
a unique niche in the air carrier industry offering low cost scheduled
air transportation as well as non-scheduled all-cargo and passenger air
transportation worldwide. While diverse in our operations, all members
operate under the same high safety standards and requirements as the
major scheduled airlines, 14 CFR Part 121. In addition to providing
significant, leading edge air transportation for customers and
commercial partners on most every continent, all of NACA member air
carriers are partners with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. We provide significant lift
capacity for our soldiers and their cargo in support of U.S. DoD
missions around the globe. On any given day, NACA member airlines are
providing the majority of the civil air transportation in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation. Iraqi Freedom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ NACA carriers include: Air Transport International, Allegiant
Air, Atlas Air, Miami Air International, North American Airlines, Omni
Air International, Ryan Air International, Southern Air, Sun Country
Airlines, USA3000 Airlines and World Airways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NACA member airlines support science-based changes to the FAA
flight, duty and rest regulations. We have participated in every
aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) on this subject since the early
1990s. We were instrumental in the changes that produced the cabin
attendant duty and rest regulations in 1994. Since then, we have
participated in each of the FAA duty and rest related ARCs. When
consensus in those ARCs did not materialize, the NACA Board of
Directors invited then FAA Administrator, Jane Garvey, to NACA's
offices in May 2002 and appealed to her to get on with the rulemaking.
We recommended fatigue mitigating regulations based upon flight duty
period limitations, not on flight time. We included deadhead time and
all non-commercial (Part 91) flying in our proposal, in addition to a
regulation for reserve crewmember duty and rest. We were disappointed
the SNPRM did not materialize, and we have willingly participated in
the current ARC efforts. Representatives from approximately half of our
member airlines participated as principals or as observers of one or
more ARC sessions.
However, we are particularly concerned to now have the FAA witness
in these hearings, Ms. Peggy Gilligan, state in her public testimony
that they are crafting a ``one-size-fits-all'' regulatory approach.
This is contrary to the recommendations of all the Nation's airlines in
strong written statements submitted as final ARC proposals from the Air
Transport Association of America, the Cargo Airline Association, NACA
and the Regional Airline Association opposing a ``one-size-fits all''
approach. This is also contrary to the public statements made by the
Administrator, in a speech delivered to the Air Line Pilots Association
Safety Forum in which, referencing the work of this ARC that was
underway and the rulemaking process in general, he stated ``Nil
rulemaking, not only does one size not fit all, but it's unsafe to
think that it can.'' See, ``We Can't Regulate Professionalism,''
remarks of Administrator Randy Babbitt before ALFA Safety Forum, August
5, 2009. His statement bears repetition for this Senate Subcommittee,
``one size does not fit all.'' While there was little consensus in the
ARC beyond a science-based regulation, ``one-size-fits-all'' is
contrary to the process and advice many participants represented in the
ARC. Not only is it ``unsafe to think that'', as the Administrator
stated, an inflexible set of FAA flight duty period and rest
restrictions, versus flexible regulations, threaten much of today's
nonscheduled all-cargo and passenger operations that are safely
operating under 14 CFR 121, Subpart S. Furthermore, it could have
significant impacts on national security, as all DOD commercial charter
air transportion must operate under the individual air carrier's full
DOT and FAA certification; its operation specifications; and the
incumbent safety and regulatory standards. More than 90 per cent of the
passenger capability and more than 40 per cent of the all-cargo
capability for defense mobility is supplied by U.S. air carrier members
of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Flexibility is critical. Unless the
``size'' is large and flexible, one-size-fits-all will only support
scheduled operations.
This is not about the cost of hiring more pilots or any other
financial consideration. This is about safely and prudently sustaining
the regulatory infrastructure to conduct these non-scheduled operations
on a worldwide basis. It is about continued leadership of U.S. airlines
in an extremely competitive environment, where we are already the
safest segment of the world's airline industry. It is also about
national security.
Concerning fatigue science, most fatigue scientists state that
prescriptive regulations are not the solution to fatigue mitigation in
air transportation. A number of those scientists worked together to
prepare a position paper for the American Medical Association. It
states, ``The prescriptive rule-making approach commonly used by
regulatory agencies to regulate crew rest and flight and duty times is
not derived from the foundational scientific research addressing the
interaction of sleep and circadian processes and their effects on
performance.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Caldwell, J. A., Mallis, M. M., Caldwell, J. L., Paul, M. A.,
Miller, J. C., Neri, D. F., Aerospace Medical Association Aerospace
Fatigue Countermeasures Subcommittee of the Human Factors Committee .
Fatigue Countermeasures in Aviation. Aviat Space Environ Med 2009;
80:29-59, p. 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NACA, with its commitment to resolving safety issues, including
those resulting from fatigue, supports a requirement for each airline
to have a FAA approved Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS). That FRMS
and strategy should be part of an individual air carrier's FAA approved
safety management system (SMS). To that end, NACA has hired world
renowned fatigue scientist Dr. E. Curtis Graber to advise us on those
strategies. To date, the program would include a commitment by senior
management, schedulers, dispatchers and pilots to FRMS. It would
include fatigue training programs for all involved; suggested personal
strategies for pilots for sleep and fatigue mitigation; crew scheduling
and dispatch strategies for assuring robust sleep opportunities;
cockpit resource management training tailored to fatigue mitigation,
including a recommendation to FAA to permit controlled rest on the
flight deck; and a continuous audit process for identifying fatigue
vulnerabilities.
Finally, we want to comment about commuting. We agree with the
Committee, that is the unknown in this whole discussion about pilot
fatigue. It was virtually taken off the table for discussion in the
ARC. We recommend it be formally addressed.
______
Prepared Statement of Captain Paul Onorato, President,
Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations
Chairman Dorgan, members of the Committee, on behalf of the 28,000
pilots who fly for the member associations of the Coalition of Airline
Pilots Associations (CAPA), we want to thank you for the opportunity to
comment on the issue of pilot fatigue. CAPA has been working on fatigue
and flight and duty time issues since its inception in 1997 and we
appreciate your holding this important hearing to lay the issues on the
table.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) puts fatigue near
the top of its most wanted list. ``The Safety Board has long been
concerned about the effects of fatigue on persons performing critical
functions in all transportation industries including flight crews.'' We
agree wholeheartedly with NTSB. The need to address pilot fatigue is
long overdue. There is no more critical safety issue before the FAA and
the time to address it is now.
CAPA recently held three seats on the FAA Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) on Flight and Duty time and Rest Requirements, which
focused on reducing fatigue for pilots in commercial aviation. As such,
CAPA supports the adoption of a science based approach to new
regulations on duty time, the primary factor in fatigue and flight
time, a secondary factor related to time on task and workload.
We have worked closely with the FAA on these issues and look
forward to seeing the new regulations shortly. While we have made very
specific recommendations to the ARC regarding flight and duty
limitations, one important principal stands out for the pilot members
of CAPA--An increase in the current flight or duty times in any given
block of time throughout the day is simply unacceptable. CAPA cannot
agree to any policy change that would claim to address fatigue by
allowing pilots to fly more hours in any in a scheduled duty day time
than current rules stipulate.
CAPA strongly supports a minimum 8 hour sleep opportunity in a rest
period that includes travel time. A rest period that includes travel
time should not be confused with actual sleep opportunity and needs to
be 11 to 12 hours at a minimum to provide a real opportunity for 8
hours of sleep. A minimum of 10 hours at the rest facility would be
another good way to define the minimum rest period. We also believe
that regulations that include adequate recovery rest after ``disruptive
duty'' which includes daytime rest, night flying, time zone crossings,
and circadian instability. Essentially, any work schedule that does not
allow a pilot to sleep during his normal sleep cycle is ``disruptive
duty.''
CAPA supports adequate prescriptive preflight rest for all
operations, which would include prescriptive rest for all reserve
crewmembers as well as relief pilot/augmentation guidelines that
consider the quality of the onboard rest facility in determining the
allowable extension to flight and duty times.
CAPA has thousands of cargo pilots amongst its members and does not
support any carve out for cargo operations. CAPA is firm in its belief
in ``One Level of Safety'' for all commercial flight operations and no
science supports different regulations based on what the aircraft are
carrying i.e., passengers or cargo.
CAPA does not support cockpit napping and believes that properly
regulated flight and duty time limits will eliminate the need for naps.
Complex commercial aircraft are certified for two pilots that require
more multi-tasking than one pilot can safely accomplish on a regular
basis. A second pilot is also part of the greatest safety protection--
redundancy. Everything on the aircraft has redundant back-up systems in
the event of failure and backup systems are not ``rested'' but are
ready to go at a moment's notice. In any emergency the flying pilot
continues to fly while the monitoring pilot accomplishes procedures
required by an emergency checklist including shutting down failed
engines in the event of fire or catastrophic failure. If a pilot is
needed to go from napping to performing, science has proven that
approximately 20 minutes is needed to overcome ``sleep inertia.'' A
napping pilot would not know if the other pilot has become
incapacitated.
The issue of commuting has come into the public's eye as a result
of the Continental Connection Flight 3407 accident investigation. While
commuting is an unusual situation to those outside of the aviation
industry, it has become an accepted and normal practice within the
industry. One of the root causes of the increase in commuting is the
result of the extreme instability of airline employment. A junior pilot
literally waits on each month's system bid to find out where he/she
will be based next. Moving every time the airline decides to change
your domicile is an impossible situation both from a financial and
practical viewpoint. Airline pilots have learned how to adapt to these
conditions. In CAPA's view, the perceived problem with commuting is
another symptom of the race to the bottom in pilot compensation,
qualification and experience. The primary reason commuting hasn't come
under fire until recently is that airlines have dramatically reduced
the qualifications and compensation of new hire pilots, and prior to
those economic measures, commuting was done by choice--not necessity,
and thus was not as widespread, nor as much of a problem. These changes
have brought inexperienced pilots to the industry who do not possess
the judgment, experience, or the means to self police their own rest
needs.
Rather than trying to legislate a new lifestyle for aviation
professionals, CAPA supports another approach. We strongly support the
requirement that all pilots working in Part 121 commercial aviation--
Captains and First Officers alike, have an FAA Airline Transport
Pilot's certificate (ATP). This would require a minimum of 1,500 hours
of flight time in a myriad of conditions and would assure that
professionalism is in the cockpit is increased. Senator Charles Schumer
has introduced S. 1744, which would require that all pilots have an ATP
as a minimum condition for employment with commercial Part 121
carriers. We strongly support Sen. Schumer's bill and urge this
committee to consider it as a part of the FAA Reauthorization package.
If we take such steps to ensure that professional pilots are flying in
both seats in the cockpit, we can solve the key problems with commuting
and many other issues within the industry.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Margaret Gilligan
Question 1. In what ways should the new flight and duty time rules
be changed to reflect modern fatigue research?
Answer. In developing the new flight and duty time rules, the FAA
tasked its Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) with considering current
fatigue science and information on fatigue, as well as international
standards for flight time limitations. The ARC considered human
physiology, including the biological requirement for sleep; the effect
of task-related factors, such as workload or duration of the duty
period, on fatigue; and the effect of circadian rhythm on fatigue.
Other international standards have already addressed these issues
and provided the ARC with examples of fatigue countermeasures that
address them. The ARC is specifically considering:
Structuring rest periods so crewmembers receive 8 hours of
sleep opportunity in each 24 hours;
Providing an extended rest period weekly to recover from
cumulative fatigue;
Limiting the length of a duty period;
Considering other duties that may contribute to fatigue as
part of the duty period;
Reducing the length of a duty period, based on encroachment
into a crewmember's Window of Circadian Low (WOCL) or the
number of flight segments flown during the duty period;
Extending the length of a duty period, based on the quality
of an in-flight rest opportunity;
Providing cumulative limits on flight time and duty periods
to prevent cumulative fatigue.
Question 2. Do you believe that training and repositioning flights
should count toward a pilot's flight time under the rule regulating the
number of flight hours a pilot may perform in a day?
Answer. Yes. Training and repositioning flights should count toward
a pilot's flight time under the rule regulating the number of flight
hours a pilot may perform in a day. Fatigue science identifies ``time
on task'' as one of the factors likely to affect a person's fatigue.
``Time on task'' is the length of time a person has been continuously
performing a job without a break. Additionally, ``time awake'' since a
last major sleep opportunity contributes to fatigue. Both ``time on
task'' and ``time awake'' could be affected by including training and
repositioning flights in a pilot's schedule. Other international
standards do consider other duties, such as training and repositioning
flights, toward total flight duty period or duty period limitations;
but not daily flight time limitations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to William R. Voss
Question 1. In what ways should the new flight and duty time rules
be changed to reflect modern fatigue research?
Answer. The rules should be updated in two specific areas. First
the rules have to reflect human performance and the time of day. We now
know that it is radically different dealing with fatigue when a pilot
is operating on the ``backside of the clock'' or his nighttime cycle.
Second, it is critical that the regulation address the overall work
period that may extend across several days. We now know for a fact that
fatigue is cumulative, so we must guard against cumulative effects of
things such as multiple early morning wake-ups and so on.
Question 2. Do you believe that training and repositioning flights
should count toward a pilot's flight time under the rule regulating the
number of flight hours a pilot may perform in a day?
Answer. Yes, fatigue is not tied to revenue. A pilot gets just as
tired when he or she is flying for free as when they are on the clock.