[Senate Hearing 111-493]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-493
AVIATION SAFETY: THE HUDSON RIVER MIDAIR
COLLISION AND THE SAFETY OF
AIR OPERATIONS IN CONGESTED SPACE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 15, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Acting Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota, JIM DeMINT, South Carolina,
Chairman Ranking Member
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK WARNER, Virginia
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 15, 2009............................... 1
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 3
Witnesses
Richard L. Day, Senior Vice President for Operations, Air Traffic
Organization, Federal Aviation Administration.................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 12
James K. Coyne, President, National Air Transportation
Association.................................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Edward Kragh, Certified Professional Controller, Adjunct to FAA
NY VFR Airspace Task Force, NATCA.............................. 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Appendix
Letter, dated August 10, 2009, to Hon. Byron L. Dorgan from Hon.
Frank R. Lautenberg............................................ 43
Craig L. Fuller, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association, prepared statement................................ 43
Ed Bolen, President and CEO, National Business Aviation
Association, prepared statement................................ 48
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Byron L. Dorgan
to:
Hon. Christopher A. Hart..................................... 57
James K. Coyne............................................... 57
Richard L. Day............................................... 58
Response to written question submitted by Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg to Richard L. Day................................... 58
Response to written question submitted to Edward Kragh by:
Hon. Byron L. Dorgan......................................... 58
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 59
AVIATION SAFETY: THE HUDSON RIVER
MIDAIR COLLISION AND THE SAFETY OF
AIR OPERATIONS IN CONGESTED SPACE
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L.
Dorgan, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. I am going to call the hearing to order. I
want to thank everyone for joining us today.
Senator Lautenberg, who had requested the hearing, is on
the floor of the Senate. He will be with us momentarily. And at
some point, Senator Lautenberg will also continue chairing the
hearing.
But I want to thank everyone for joining us.
The purpose of this hearing is to review the midair
collision of a plane and a helicopter over the Hudson River,
but more generally, as a result of that tragedy, to review the
issue of the safety of airspace where there is significant
aircraft activity which includes on-demand traffic. We do not
wish to diminish the value and the importance of on-demand
traffic. That is not the purpose of this.
But Senator Lautenberg had originally requested this
hearing. Obviously, the safety of the Hudson River airspace is
important to him and his constituents and it is important to
all of us as well.
On August 8, 2009, a helicopter and a private airplane
collided over the Hudson River killing both pilots, five
passengers on the helicopter and two passengers aboard the
airplane. That tragic accident should cause the FAA to review
the safety of what is known as the Hudson River Class B
Exclusion Area, as well as the more general safety of on-demand
aircraft. On-demand operators are subject to less oversight and
regulation than are scheduled commercial air carriers and they
tend often to operate in higher risk environments such as
flying at lower altitudes, departing and arriving at unfamiliar
airports, and conducting more takeoffs and landings. And as a
result, on-demand operators are more likely, much more likely
based on the data to have a fatal accident than commercial air
carriers, according to Government statistics that we have.
Many safety regulations applicable to on-demand operators
have not been updated since 1978. Since this time, the on-
demand industry has changed significantly, especially in light
of modern aircraft, new technologies, and new operating
environments.
While the NTSB has not finished its investigation into this
accident, they have, in fact, issued several safety
recommendations for the Hudson River Exclusion Area. In
addition, the FAA established a special panel following the
midair collision and also recently announced topics of new
rules it plans to implement for the Exclusion Area by November
19 of this year.
Generally, I am troubled that there has been very little
action over the years updating the rules for what is called
Part 135 operators like the helicopter involved in this
accident. In 2003, the FAA formed an Aviation Rulemaking
Committee to review Part 135 regulations and to make
recommendations. After 2 years of analysis, the ARC made 124
recommendations to improve the safety of on-demand operators.
To my knowledge none of the recommendations have been adopted
by the FAA.
I know that Administrator Babbitt plans to have the FAA
either adopt or issue responses addressing all of the many
outstanding NTSB recommendations, but 16 of the recommendations
of the NTSB for on-demand operators currently remain open.
Finally, I want to mention that we will significantly
improve aviation safety in the future by modernizing our air
traffic control system. It is unbelievable to me that we
continue to use ground-based radar. We need to pass the FAA
reauthorization bill through the Congress. It is out of this
Committee and we are working to try to get it to the floor and
to get a conference so that we can move up the date of the
transition to the next generation. And this will help us with
areas like the Hudson River where tall buildings in that area
prevent a reliable guidance of aircraft by radar.
Now, let me just point out I think most Members of Congress
very likely will have traveled in the area we are talking about
today. The Hudson River airspace is a very busy airspace. There
are special rules that apply to that airspace, and most of us,
including myself, have flown in that airspace.
I, too, have flown by myself and also with others in
charter planes in a different kind of airspace in North Dakota.
In the North Dakota airspace, using VFR flight rules, we do not
see a lot of traffic, and when we know of traffic that is
around us, it is pretty easy to spot it. So it is a very
different environment.
The Hudson River exclusion, the Class B Exclusion Area, is
an acknowledgement that that is a different environment too,
vastly different from what I just described as someone piloting
an airplane in North Dakota. So that exclusion is designed to
try to promote safety, and to recognize that there are
limitations with respect to radar coverage. And as I have read
and studied what happened on that day in that airspace, it
occurs to me that a number of mistakes occurred. We know, of
course, of an air traffic controller on the telephone at a
critical time. I should not begin to start even, but a number
of mistakes occurred. But in addition to the mistakes, we also
now understand, having worked through it some, that there are
just significant limitations in that area with respect to
ground-based radar capability.
So having said all of that, Senator Lautenberg had asked
whether we would convene a hearing, and I said I thought it was
valuable to do so. As I indicated, he will be with us shortly.
And we will be hearing testimony today from four witnesses:
Mr. Rick Day, the Senior Vice President of Operations at the
FAA; Mr. Christopher Hart, who is the Vice Chairman of the
NTSB; Mr. James Coyne, the President of the National Air
Transportation Association; and Mr. Edward Kragh, the Certified
Professional Controller, Newark Tower, National Air Traffic
Controllers Association. I appreciate all four of you being
here, and I will begin asking for testimony from Mr. Day.
Again, let me say that Senator Lautenberg will be here in a
while, and when he is here, I will have to leave and he will
chair the hearing at an appropriate point.
But I thank all four of you for taking the time to share
with us some of your thoughts and observations and provide
information about what I have just described.
Mr. Day, you and all of the witnesses should know that all
of your full statements will be a part of the permanent record,
and we would ask all four of you to summarize. And you may
proceed.
Senator Lautenberg has just come. What I would like to do,
before we hear from you, Mr. Day, I have Senator Lautenberg
giving an opening statement. I talked about your interest in
having us call this hearing and the value, I think, of having
an opportunity to discuss what happened with respect to this
tragedy and more generally the issues surrounding on-demand
flights. So let me call on you.
I did indicate further, as I call on you, that we are going
to have four witnesses and then at some moment I will have to
depart, and I have asked if you would be willing to chair the
panel as well.
So, Senator Lautenberg, thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. And I thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. I am sorry that this subject, with all of its
importance, had to be delayed because we had something on the
floor going about transportation. So again, I will just take a
few minutes so we can move things along.
Last month, in the middle of the travel and tourism season,
in the middle of the business day, there was a terrible tragedy
that took place over the Hudson River. It is an area, by the
way, that I live in right essentially alongside the Hudson
River in New Jersey.
A small, private airplane that took off from Teterboro
Airport in New Jersey--and also I used to be a Commissioner of
the Port Authority, so we had jurisdiction over that airport--
collided with a tourist helicopter that took off from New York
City. Nine people on the plane and the helicopter lost their
lives. Clearly, our first thoughts are with the victims'
families. What began as a day of anticipated fun and pleasure
and business also ended as a day of disaster and mourning.
But now our thoughts are also needed to look at the future,
preventing a tragedy like this from happening again. That is
the reason I wrote to Chairman Dorgan and asked that we convene
this hearing, and I thank him for agreeing and holding it here
today.
We both agree this deadly crash highlights major safety
concerns with largely unregulated and densely congested
airspace below 1,100 feet over the Hudson River known as the
``Exclusion Area.'' More than 200 aircraft fly through this
area every day and pilots must navigate the busy skies through
a tactic known as ``see and avoid.''
In this congested airspace, it is not enough for pilots to
simply look both ways. Everyone knows that the employment of
TCAS, or collision avoidance equipment, is now common
throughout the country in small planes, as well as commercial.
I sometimes sit in a second seat in an airplane, a single-
engine, and we have got TCAS. It really is a wonderful system.
Its mission is: avoid this kind of a thing from happening.
So, I applaud the Administrator, Randy Babbitt, for
convening the New York Airspace Task Force immediately after
this accident. The FAA Task Force and the NTSB have made
preliminary recommendations to better manage this airspace and
improve pilot and controller training. It is a good start, but
we need to do more.
We need to fully staff the overburdened air traffic control
towers in the New Jersey-New York region, the most congested
airspace in the country. We need technology to track all
aircraft operating in this airspace.
So, today, I am calling on the FAA to expedite the
implementation of NextGen air traffic control technology in the
New York-New Jersey airspace and work closely with air traffic
controllers throughout this transition.
We also have to address the general concern about on-demand
aircraft. On-demand aircraft receive less oversight from the
FAA and have more fatalities for flight movement than
commercial aircraft, according to a report issued by the
Department of Transportation's Inspector General last month. In
fact, on-demand aircraft are 50 times more likely to have a
fatal accident than commercial carriers, and unfortunately, the
FAA rules for on-demand aircraft have not been updated since
1978.
So, I look forward to learning what FAA intends to do to
address the safety of these planes and their passengers.
Mr. Chairman, the New York-New Jersey region is one of the
busiest in the country for travel tourism and economic
activity. We cannot stand by and permit people's lives or our
economy to be threatened by gaps in the safety of our aviation
system.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Lautenberg, thank you very much for
your leadership on this issue.
Mr. Day, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. DAY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
OPERATIONS, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Day. Chairman Dorgan, Senator Lautenberg, and Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to
discuss the very sad events of August 8, 2009 and what FAA is
doing to create a safer operating environment over the Hudson
River.
Mr. Krakowski and Ms. Gilligan send their regrets that they
cannot appear before you today. They do want me to express that
everyone at FAA grieves with the families over the loss of life
that occurred that day. When such events do occur, we redouble
our efforts to make the skies safer. My colleagues at FAA and
throughout the aviation industry approach this work with
seriousness and urgency.
Since the investigation of the accident remains under the
formal processes of the NTSB, I will not be commenting on the
specifics of the accident. I will, however, share with you the
immediate actions we have taken, as well as discuss some of our
longer-range plans to improve safety.
It is important to note that following the accident on
August 14, the FAA formed the New York Airspace Task Force,
made up of both internal and external stakeholders, to review
the current procedures for Hudson River operations with regard
to safety of flight, operations, and regulatory compliance and
to make recommendations to Administrator Babbitt no later than
August 28, just 2 weeks later. These recommendations are
available to the public and will be published in the Federal
Register tomorrow and we expect to be able to implement these,
following the public comment period, by November 19, 2009.
I will make use of some prepared slides to provide an
overview of these recommendations to the Committee. The first
two slides outlining the eight recommendations are contained in
your package, and we will, in the interest of time, pass over
those. They will be articulated as part of the presentation.
If we go to chart 1, chart 1 is a top-down view of the
accident location. It gives an orientation of the New Jersey
and New York airports, the Hudson River, as well as the Statue
of Liberty, and gives an overview of the area of the accident.
Chart 2 is a side view of the current airspace and
operations. I would like to draw your attention to the Class
Bravo airspace at the top of the slide. Class Bravo airspace is
airspace designed and regulated by rulemaking. Its purpose is
to contain air transport category-type operations in the
vicinity of air transport-type airports to protect the safety
of those flights and to assure that everyone in that airspace
is talking to a controller and is equipped with equipment to
make sure we have positive identification of that aircraft.
In this case, an examination of the Class Bravo airspace
shows the floor of that airspace fluctuates between 1,100 and
1,500 feet. This has an opportunity for coordination risks or,
in some cases, because of the different floor levels, a risk of
being on one frequency when you should be on a radio frequency
talking to another controller.
Below that airspace is uncontrolled airspace where pilots
operate under the ``see and be seen'' visual flight rules. This
contains a mix of both transit aircraft, over 200 per day, that
are flying up and down the Hudson River, as well as float
planes and helicopter aircraft maneuvering for their mission in
the vicinity of the Hudson River and along the sides of the
river.
Chart 3. This is a top view of the current airspace and
operations. I would like to draw your attention to the area of
the accident. Local and overflight traffic merge in this area
and because of the various missions, we have a high
concentration of aircraft frequently at 1,100 feet. I will
speak more to that in a moment.
Chart 4 is a side view looking from the New Jersey coast
toward Manhattan. Our recommendations from the Task Force
include the Class Bravo airspace floor which will be configured
at a consistent altitude of 1,300 feet. For those VFR aircraft
that wish to receive Class Bravo VFR advisories, they will
operate between 1,300 and 2,000 feet under the control of air
traffic controllers. Between 1,000 and 1,300 feet, the aircraft
transiting the area or on a VFR flyway will be contained at
those altitudes and on a common traffic advisory frequency. And
for that local traffic of float planes, law enforcement, Coast
Guard, et cetera, they will operate below 1,000 feet, and,
again, be on a common traffic advisory frequency.
If we could turn to chart 5, which continues with the
proposed recommendations: for those aircraft that are departing
under visual flight rules from Teterboro, rather than merging
in that high area of concentration I spoke to, they will be
instructed to depart east and join the corridor over the George
Washington Bridge. This is a much less congested area, and this
will give them an opportunity to exercise due caution operating
in that airspace. Likewise, for those aircraft northbound, they
will hug the east side of the Hudson River, and those
southbound, the west side, much like we do on the Nation's
highways.
In addition, those procedures that we have recommended to
date, which have been effective in assuring safety will be
mandated now to assure a higher level of safety and to be
responsive to the Board's recommendations. This required
aircraft to identify their aircraft type, color, and direction.
They will also have to have their collision lights on, as well
as their landing lights, and they will operate at a speed no
greater than 140 knots. They will also be required to carry a
set of new charts with them in addition to their sectional VFR
charts, and also those charts containing the operations of the
helicopter-type operations below, as well as the VFR transition
routes. Likewise, the helicopter and float plane operations
will have similar charts.
These proposed rules will be published in the Federal
Register with a 30-day comment period, and we expect to have
these ready for publication and implementation by November 19.
That ends my oral presentation. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Day follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard L. Day, Senior Vice President for
Operations, Air Traffic Organization, Federal Aviation Administration
Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the very sad events
of August 8, 2009, and what FAA is doing to create a safer operating
environment over the Hudson River. Everyone at FAA grieves with the
families over the loss of life that occurred that day. When such events
do occur, we redouble our efforts to make the skies safer. My
colleagues at FAA and throughout the aviation industry approach this
work with seriousness and urgency.
Since the investigation of the accident remains under the formal
processes of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), I will
not be commenting on the specifics of the accident. I will, however,
share with you the immediate actions we have taken, as well as discuss
some of our longer-range plans to improve safety.
The FAA's first action was taken on August 11. We issued a Notice
to Airmen (NOTAM) that reiterated our recommended best practices for
conduct of flight in the airspace of the Hudson River corridor. New
York airspace is very restricted by a large volume of ``Class B''
airspace, which is designed to provide positive protection of airliners
using LaGuardia, John F. Kennedy International, and Newark Liberty
International Airports. All aircraft within Class B airspace must be
under positive control by air traffic controllers.
There are areas known as ``VFR flyways,'' where we permit aircraft
operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) to fly within a defined
corridor and below certain altitudes without being under positive air
traffic control. These VFR flyways use ``see and be seen rules,'' where
pilots are responsible for maintaining safe distance from other
aircraft. In New York, this VFR flyway is commonly called the
``exclusion area,'' which has existed in some form since 1971, and is
bounded by the Hudson River and has a ceiling of either 1,100 feet or
1,500 feet. (See Figure 1.)
The August 11 NOTAM reiterated long-recommended practices for this
VFR flyway, including speed limitations (not exceeding 140 knots) and
taking precautionary measures (turning on anti-collision, position/
navigation, and/or landing lights and self-announcing their position on
the Hudson River frequency for all other aircraft to hear).
We recognized this was only the first step to assess and enhance
the safety of Visual Flight in this area. On August 14, 2009, we
chartered a New York Airspace Task Force to review the current
procedures for Hudson River operations, specifically with regard to
safety of flight, operations, and regulatory compliance and make
recommendations to Administrator Babbitt no later than August 28--just
2 weeks later. The Task Force consisted of FAA air traffic and aviation
safety experts, as well as air traffic controllers representing the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) who work in this
area. We also had input from key stakeholders--such as Helicopter
Association International, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association,
and the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey. The group delivered
these recommendations to Administrator Babbitt on time on August 28. We
thank the Task Force members for their efforts, particularly given the
short timeline. Because we believe that their recommendations will
enhance the safety of this airspace, we intend to implement their
recommendations via expedited rulemaking and revised letters of
agreement with the area airports and operators.
The Task Force recommended eight specific safety and operational
enhancements that would restructure the airspace, mandate pilot
operating rules, create a new entry point into the Hudson River
airspace from Teterboro, and standardize New York area charts and maps.
They also recommended developing new training for pilots, air traffic
controllers, and helicopter operators so they will be fully trained and
ready for implementation of the new rules. One of the most significant
changes would divide the airspace into altitude corridors that separate
aircraft flying over the river from those operating to and from local
heliports or seaplane bases. (See Figure 2.)
This new exclusionary zone would be comprised of three components:
It would establish a uniform ``floor'' for the Class B
airspace over the Hudson River at 1,300 feet, which would also
serve as the ``ceiling'' for the exclusionary zone. This
removes some confusing complexity that currently exists.
Between 1,300-2,000 feet, aircraft will operate in the Class
B airspace under visual flight rules but under positive air
traffic control and communicate with controllers on the
appropriate air traffic frequency.
Below 1,300 feet, aircraft must use a single common radio
frequency. Mandatory routes for aircraft flying up and down the
river will require them to favor the ``right side'' of the
river (i.e., the east side for northbound traffic and the west
side for southbound traffic) to provide horizontal separation
as well.
Coordination of traffic and handoffs between Air Traffic
Controllers at the Teterboro tower, Newark tower, and radar
control will be improved.
The new rules will mandate that pilots use two specific radio
frequencies--one for the Hudson River and the other for the East River.
It mandates speeds of 140 knots or less and the use of anti-collision
lights and landing lights in the VFR routes. The rules would also
require pilots to announce their position when they reach various
points up and down the river. Pilots would also be required to have
charts available in the aircraft and to be familiar with and comply
with the airspace rules.
The FAA also intends to propose standardized procedures for fixed-
wing aircraft leaving Teterboro to enter either the Class B airspace or
the exclusionary zone. The proposal would require that before an
aircraft planning to enter the Class B airspace takes off, Teterboro
controllers would request approval from the Newark tower for the
aircraft to climb to 1,500 feet. Aircraft from Teterboro that want to
enter the VFR flyway would be directed by air traffic control to fly a
special route over the George Washington Bridge, which would allow them
to enter the Hudson River airspace in a much less congested area.
The FAA expects the expedited rulemaking covering these issues to
be completed, and have all pilot and controller training completed in
time for publication of new charts and new rules by November 19.
The effort with New York airspace has wider implications for the
national airspace system. As we implement these changes in the New York
airspace and have an opportunity to analyze their effectiveness, the
FAA intends to examine the other major metropolitan areas and congested
corridors for similar airspace and operational risks to see if such
procedures would be appropriate elsewhere. We expect this larger effort
to carry well into next year.
Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint, and members of the Subcommittee, this
concludes my prepared remarks. I look forward to answering any
questions that you may have.
Senator Lautenberg [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hart, I think you are next, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. HART, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Hart. Good afternoon, Senator Lautenberg. Thank you
very much for the invitation to speak before the Subcommittee.
With your concurrence, I would like to begin my testimony
with a short summary of the NTSB's investigative actions to
date regarding the investigation of this accident involving the
midair collision over the Hudson River.
I want to emphasize that this is still an ongoing
investigation and that there is significant work left for our
investigative staff.
My testimony today will be limited to those facts that we
have identified to date, but I will not provide any analysis or
make any conclusions regarding what we have found so far.
Although we have identified some areas of concern that have
prompted us to issue safety recommendations, we have not
determined the cause of this accident or the role that any
individual mechanism or organization may have played in the
accident.
The Piper aircraft involved in this accident departed
Teterboro Airport and was going to Ocean City, New Jersey. The
aircraft was operated by a private pilot who requested a
clearance to an altitude of 3,500 feet and requested VFR radar
traffic advisory service. He elected to use the Hudson River
Class B Exclusion Area as part of the route, which necessitated
eventual coordination with controllers at Newark for
authorization to climb into the Class B airspace.
The helicopter involved in the accident departed the West
30th Street heliport, which is within the Class B Exclusion
Area, for a 12-minute sightseeing flight and was operated under
CFR Parts 135 and 136. The initial part of the tour was to be
flown below the Class B airspace so the pilot was not required
to contact air traffic control.
The Piper received a takeoff clearance from the Teterboro
controller at 11:48:30. At 11:50:31, the Teterboro controller
began a personal telephone call and continued to handle other
traffic. The Teterboro controller performed a verbal handoff to
Newark, which occurred at 11:52:20. The Newark controller
attempted to contact the Teterboro controller at about the same
time as the verbal handoff.
This map shows a radar ground track of the Piper up to the
point of the handoff to Newark. Teterboro Airport is noted at
the top of the slide, and the direction of travel is denoted by
the white arrow. Also the area shaded in red indicates where
the floor of the Class B airspace extends below the Piper's
current altitude.
The helicopter appeared on air traffic control radar at
11:52:27, after the Piper had been verbally handed off to
Newark. The Teterboro controller attempted to contact the Piper
at 11:52:48, and his personal phone call ended at 11:53:13,
which was 1 second before the collision. The Teterboro
controller then contacted Newark to ask about the airplane and
was told that the pilot had not yet called.
This plot shows the path of the Piper in yellow and the
helicopter in blue up to the point of collision, which occurred
at 1,100 feet. The departure heliport of the helicopter is
shown in the green circle, and the directions of travel are
indicated by the white arrows. Radar data shows that the
airplane was at a constant altitude and the helicopter was
climbing, at the time of the collision.
The collision was photographed by several witnesses, as
shown on this and the next few slides. This evidence is being
examined by Safety Board staff.
Next slide, please.
Senator Lautenberg, this concludes my presentation, and I
would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good afternoon. With your concurrence, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to begin my testimony with a short summary of the National
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) actions to date regarding the
investigation of the recent mid-air collision over the Hudson River. I
want to emphasize that this is still an ongoing investigation and that
there is significant work left for our staff. My testimony today will
be limited to those facts that we have identified to date, but I will
not provide any analysis or make any conclusions about what we have
found so far. Although we have identified some areas of concern that
have prompted us to issue safety recommendations, we have not
determined the cause of this accident or the role any individual,
mechanism or organization may have played in the accident.
On August 8, 2009, about 11:53 eastern daylight time,\1\ a
Eurocopter AS350 BA helicopter, N401LH , operated by Liberty
Helicopters, and a Piper PA-32R-300 airplane, N71MC, operated by a
private pilot, collided over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey.
The certificated commercial pilot and five passengers aboard the
helicopter and the certificated private pilot and two passengers aboard
the airplane were killed. The helicopter flight was a local sightseeing
flight conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) Parts 135 and 136. The airplane flight was a personal flight
conducted under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The airplane departed
Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey, about 11:49, destined
for Ocean City, New Jersey, and the helicopter lifted off from the West
30th Street Heliport about 3 minutes later, at 11:52. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plans were required
or filed for either flight. However, the pilot of the airplane
requested flight-following services from TEB air traffic control
(ATC).\2\ Neither aircraft was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder
or a flight data recorder, nor were they required to be installed. The
accident occurred in a relatively complex airspace where Class B
airspace meets the Hudson River Class B exclusion area.
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\1\ All times in this testimony are eastern daylight time and based
on a 24-hour clock.
\2\ The preliminary reports for this accident, ERA09MA447A and B,
are available online at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York Terminal Airspace
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has designated the area
surrounding John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Newark Liberty
International Airport (EWR), and LaGuardia Airport (LGA) as Class B
airspace. Class B airspace is intended to provide positive control of
flight operations near the Nation's busiest airports and to separate
aircraft operating under visual flight rules (VFR) from aircraft
operating in the airport terminal area. According to 14 CFR 91.131, all
aircraft operating within Class B airspace are required to obtain ATC
clearance before entry and to comply with ATC instructions while
operating within the airspace. Pilots who do not have ATC clearance to
enter must remain outside the Class B boundaries. Part of the New York
Class B airspace extends from the surface to 7,000 feet above mean sea
level in 4- to 8-mile radiuses around JFK, EWR, and LGA. Some other
parts of the Class B airspace begin at higher altitudes. This allows
aircraft to arrive and depart from satellite airports, such as TEB,
without obtaining Class B clearance. For example, the floor of the
Class B airspace overlying TEB is 1,800 feet. Thus, separation between
traffic at TEB and aircraft operating within the Class B airspace is
maintained by requiring aircraft without Class B clearance to remain
below 1,800 feet.
The accident occurred in the Hudson River Class B exclusion area,
which is a combination of Class E and Class G airspace \3\ that
provides a passageway through the New York Class B airspace. The Hudson
River Class B exclusion area permits aircraft to fly north and south
along the Hudson River between, approximately, the George Washington
Bridge to the north and the Verrazano Narrows Bridge to the south
without authorization from air traffic controllers. The Hudson River
Class B exclusion area extends from the surface of the Hudson River up
to and including 1,100 feet above mean sea level.
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\3\ Class E and Class G airspace each allow pilots to operate under
VFR without mandatory service from air traffic controllers. The main
practical difference between Class E and Class G airspace is the
minimum ceiling and visibility requirements for flight under VFR. The
Hudson River Class B exclusion area is Class E airspace from 700 feet
to 1,100 feet above mean sea level and Class G airspace below 700 feet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to the accident, the FAA had established voluntary procedures
for operating within the Hudson River Class B exclusion area that were
designed to minimize the risk of collision. These procedures are
described on the New York VFR Terminal Area Chart and the New York
Helicopter Route Chart. They state that pilots operating within the
Hudson River Class B exclusion area should fly at 140 knots or less;
turn on position lights, anticollision lights, and landing lights; and
self-announce their position on the common traffic advisory frequency
(CTAF),\4\ 123.05 MHz. Another accepted procedure for helicopter
operations, published in the New York Helicopter Route Chart, is for
northbound helicopter flights to follow along the Manhattan shoreline,
and for southbound flights to follow the New Jersey shoreline,
providing lateral separation between opposite-direction traffic flows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ CTAFs allow pilots to exchange traffic information while
operating near airports without operating control towers. CTAF
procedures may also be established in other circumstances where direct
pilot-to-pilot communications will contribute to safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent FAA traffic estimates indicate that over 200 aircraft a day
pass through the Hudson River Class B exclusion area. The Hudson River
Class B exclusion area and associated transition procedures have been
in use for more than 30 years, and until the accident, the safety
record for operations in the area had been good. The NTSB has no record
of previous collisions between aircraft operating in the Hudson River
Class B exclusion area. A review of the FAA Near-Midair Collision
(NMAC) database and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database revealed 11 reports of
NMACs between aircraft in the area since 1990. Only one report was
filed in the past 10 years. Although ASRS reporting is voluntary, the
number of reports received is very low relative to the number of flight
operations through the Hudson River Class B exclusion area.
Previous Recommendation Addressing New York Terminal Airspace
The NTSB previously addressed the conduct of VFR flights in the New
York Terminal Airspace following the investigation of the 2006 crash of
a Cirrus Design SR20 into an apartment building in Manhattan. The
aircraft, with two pilots onboard (one of whom was New York Yankees
pitcher Cory Lidle), had departed TEB at about 14:29 on October 11,
2006, operating under Part 91 with no flight plan filed. The pilots had
acknowledged to ATC that the aircraft would stay out of the New York
Class B airspace. After takeoff, the aircraft turned southeast and
climbed to an altitude of about 600 to 800 feet mean sea level. When
the flight reached the western shore of the Hudson River, it turned
south, remaining over the river, then descended to 500 feet. The flight
continued southbound over the Hudson River until abeam of the southern
tip of Manhattan, at which point, the flight turned southwest. The
aircraft flew around the Statue of Liberty, then headed northeast to
fly over the East River. About a mile north of the Queensboro Bridge,
the aircraft made a left turn to reverse its course. The aircraft
impacted a 520-foot tall apartment building 333 feet above street
level. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was
the pilots' inadequate planning, judgment, and airmanship in the
performance of a 180-degree turn maneuver inside the limited turning
space over the East River.
Two days following the accident, the FAA published Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) 6/3495 prohibiting fixed-wing operations (except amphibious
fixed-wing aircraft landing or departing New York Skyports Inc.
Seaplane Base) in the East River Class B exclusion area from the
southwestern tip of Governors Island to the north tip of Roosevelt
Island unless authorized and controlled by ATC. The NTSB strongly
supported the FAA's quick response and issued a recommendation (A-07-
38) that FAA make the NOTAM permanent. In an update to the NTSB in
early 2008, the FAA indicated that it was developing a rulemaking
project for a redesign for the New York and New Jersey airspace, a
rulemaking project it expected to take at least 2 years. Recommendation
A-07-38 is classified ``Open--Acceptable Response.''
The Flights in the Hudson River Accident
The pilot of the accident airplane contacted the clearance delivery
controller in the ATC tower at TEB about 11:40:01, requesting departure
clearance and VFR radar traffic advisory service en route to Ocean
City, New Jersey, at 3,500 feet. The pilot's requested route and
altitude required that the flight enter the Class B airspace overlying
TEB. The clearance delivery controller issued the pilot a discrete
transponder code. While the airplane was taxiing to the runway, the TEB
ground/local controller offered the pilot the option of departing TEB
over the river. The pilot elected to fly down the Hudson River, which
necessitated eventual coordination with controllers at EWR for
authorization to climb into the Class B airspace. Existing procedures
did not require TEB controllers to coordinate for Class B clearance for
the pilot, and the local controller did not do so.
The accident airplane departed TEB about 11:49 and was issued a
traffic advisory for a helicopter arriving at the airport. The pilot
acknowledged the traffic call. The local controller instructed the
pilot to remain at or below 1,100 feet, which is the ``top'' of the
exclusion airspace in that area. The airplane flew southbound until the
local controller instructed the pilot to turn left (southeast) and join
the Hudson River. About 11:52:20, the pilot acknowledged an instruction
from the TEB local controller to change frequencies and contact
controllers at EWR. The pilot read back to the controller an incorrect
frequency; ATC recordings do not indicate that the incorrect read-back
was heard or corrected by any air traffic controller. A preliminary
review of recorded ATC communications showed that the pilot did not
contact EWR before the accident. We are reviewing ATC tapes for other
frequencies to see if the pilot was attempting to contact EWR on the
incorrect frequency. In any case, about 11:53:17, approximately the
time of the accident, the TEB local controller contacted the EWR
controller to ask about the airplane and was told that the pilot had
not called. There are no known additional ATC contacts with the
airplane.
The accident helicopter departed from the West 30th Street
Heliport, which is in the Hudson River Class B exclusion area, about
11:52, for a 12-minute tour. The initial part of the tour was to be
flown below Class B airspace, so the pilot was not required to contact
ATC. Although the nature of any transmissions made by aircraft on the
CTAF is not known because the CTAF is not recorded, a Liberty
Helicopters pilot waiting to depart from the West 30th Street Heliport
reported that the pilot of the accident helicopter made a position
report on the CTAF just before the collision. The first radar target
for the accident helicopter was detected by the FAA's EWR radar about
11:52:27, when the helicopter was west of the heliport, approximately
mid-river, and climbing through 400 feet. According to recorded radar
data, the helicopter flew to the west side of the river and then turned
south to follow the Hudson River. The accident helicopter continued
climbing southbound until about 11:53:14, when the collision occurred
at about 1,100 feet.
ATC Procedures
After the accident airplane departed from TEB, the local controller
instructed the pilot to remain at or below 1,100 feet and to turn east
toward the Hudson River (to avoid the final approach course for runway
22 at EWR). A review of radar data shows that the accident airplane was
level at about 1,100 feet for about 2 minutes before the accident, and
that, at the time the airplane turned toward the Hudson River, there
were no apparent traffic conflicts that would have precluded the
airplane from climbing into the Class B airspace. Because there was no
coordination between TEB and EWR controllers regarding the pilot's
request to climb to 3,500 feet, the airplane could not expeditiously
enter the Class B airspace. Instead, the airplane continued toward the
Hudson River Class B exclusion area at about 1,100 feet. About
11:52:19, almost 4 minutes after departure, when the TEB local
controller instructed the pilot to contact EWR ATC, the airplane was
about 2 miles away from the point of collision with the helicopter.
Aircraft operating in the Hudson River Class B exclusion area
depend on CTAF reports to maintain traffic awareness. However, because
the pilot of the accident airplane was in contact with TEB ATC awaiting
further instructions and was then instructed to contact EWR, the pilot
may not have been making and monitoring the CTAF position reports.
Instead, the pilot likely expected to continue to receive flight-
following services from ATC. Making and monitoring CTAF reports while
remaining in contact with ATC would have required the pilot to be
actively transmitting and receiving on two different radios at the same
time, which is especially difficult in a busy ATC environment such as
the New York area. Even if the pilot had attempted it, his monitoring
of CTAF would likely have been hindered by his simultaneous monitoring
of ATC communications. Consequently, it is likely that the pilot did
not hear any transmissions from the accident helicopter, including the
helicopter pilot's self-announcement that the other Liberty Helicopters
pilot reported hearing. In addition, the pilot was not advised to use
the CTAF as he entered the Hudson River Class B exclusion area, nor
were such advisories required.
Before departure, the pilot of the airplane had requested radar
traffic advisories and was advised of ``radar contact'' by TEB after
departure, indicating that, workload permitting, the service was being
provided. According to FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control,
providing traffic advisories to VFR aircraft is an additional service
that, as the FAA order states, ``is required when the work situation
permits.'' After the initial post-departure traffic call, ATC did not
advise the accident airplane pilot of potential conflicts with other
aircraft ahead in the vicinity of the Hudson River Class B exclusion
area. Because the first radar target for the accident helicopter was
detected about 11:52:27, the helicopter was not yet visible on radar
when the TEB local controller issued the frequency change to the
airplane's pilot. Therefore, before the frequency change, the TEB local
controller could not have detected the impending conflict between the
accident airplane and the accident helicopter or issued a warning to
the airplane pilot about the accident helicopter. However, radar had
detected other aircraft in the vicinity of the Hudson River Class B
exclusion area that were potential conflicts at that time. The TEB
local controller did not advise the airplane pilot of the other traffic
ahead. The EWR tower controller observed the existing traffic in the
vicinity of the Hudson River Class B exclusion area and called the TEB
local controller to ask that he instruct the airplane pilot to turn
toward the southwest to resolve the situation. The call may have
overlapped the pilot's acknowledgment of the radio frequency change
instruction from the TEB local controller. The TEB controller did not
hear the EWR controller's instruction clearly and requested that it be
repeated. The TEB controller then attempted to contact the airplane,
but the pilot did not respond. The collision occurred about 1 minute
after the frequency change instruction and 26 seconds after the TEB
local controller's last attempt to contact the pilot.
Prior to the accident, there were no procedures or instructions
directing controllers to prevent, where possible, aircraft from
entering the Hudson River Class B exclusion area while remaining in
communication with ATC or to ensure, traffic permitting, that aircraft
requesting Class B clearances receive approval to climb before entering
the Hudson River Class B exclusion area. Effective communication on the
CTAF is a fundamental component of the safety procedures established
for VFR operations in the Hudson River Class B exclusion area. The NTSB
believes that New York area ATC facilities must account for the
importance of CTAF communications and ensure that aircraft operating
near the Hudson River Class B exclusion area are either cleared into
Class B airspace before reaching the Hudson River Class B exclusion
area or are directed to switch to the CTAF in time to engage in
effective communications with other pilots operating in the Hudson
River Class B exclusion area. Further, if circumstances require that an
aircraft in communication with ATC enters the Hudson River Class B
exclusion area, controllers should place a high priority on providing
the pilot with timely traffic advisories and safety alerts, as required
by FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, because the pilot is less
likely to be communicating on CTAF and receiving traffic information
directly from other pilots.
On the day of the accident, the TEB tower was staffed with five
controllers. At the time of the accident, there were two controllers in
the tower cab: one controller was working the ground control, local
control, and arrival radar positions and also acting as the controller
in charge of the facility; a second controller was working the flight
data and clearance delivery position. The two other controllers were on
a break, and the frontline manager had left the facility temporarily on
a personal errand about 11:45. The local controller initiated a
telephone conversation unrelated to his work about 11:50:31, about 2
minutes after he cleared the accident airplane for takeoff. The
conversation continued until 11:53:13.
NTSB Recommendations
Based on the data collected thus far in the investigation, on
August 27, 2009, the Safety Board issued five safety recommendations to
the Federal Aviation Administration:
Revise standard operating procedures for all air traffic
control (ATC) facilities, including those at Teterboro airport,
LaGuardia airport, and Newark Liberty International airport,
adjoining the Hudson River Class B exclusion area in the
following ways:
a. establish procedures for coordination among ATC
facilities so that aircraft operating under visual
flight rules and requesting a route that would require
entry into Class B airspace receive ATC clearance to
enter the airspace as soon as traffic permits,
b. require controllers to instruct pilots with whom
they are communicating and whose flight will operate in
the Hudson River Class B exclusion area to switch from
ATC communications to the common traffic advisory
frequency (CTAF) and to self-announce before entering
the area,
c. add an advisory to the Automatic Terminal
Information Service broadcast, reminding pilots of the
need to use the CTAF while operating in the Hudson
River Class B exclusion area and to self-announce
before entering the area, and
d. in any situation where, despite the above
procedures, controllers are in contact with an aircraft
operating within or approaching the Hudson River Class
B exclusion area, ensure that the pilot is provided
with traffic advisories and safety alerts at least
until exiting the area. (A-09-82)
Brief all air traffic controllers and supervisors on
the air traffic control (ATC) performance deficiencies
evident in the circumstances of this accident and
emphasize the requirement to be attentive and
conscientious when performing ATC duties. (A-09-83)
Amend 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 93 to
establish a special flight rules area (SFRA) including
the Hudson River Class B exclusion area, the East River
Class B exclusion area, and the area surrounding Ellis
Island and the Statue of Liberty; define operational
procedures for use within the SFRA; and require that
pilots complete specific training on the SFRA
requirements before flight within the area. (A-09-84)
As part of the special flight rules area procedures
requested in Safety Recommendation A-09-84, require
vertical separation between helicopters and airplanes
by requiring that helicopters operate at a lower
altitude than airplanes do, thus minimizing the effect
of performance differences between helicopters and
airplanes on the ability of pilots to see and avoid
other traffic. (A-09-85)
Conduct a review of all Class B airspace to identify
any other airspace configurations where specific pilot
training and familiarization would improve safety, and,
as appropriate, develop special flight rules areas and
associated training for pilots operating within those
areas. (A-09-86).
On September 2, 2009, the FAA announced plans to modify the
airspace over the Hudson River. The NTSB will review the changes, once
they are completed and published, and determine if they meet the intent
of our recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my presentation, and I would be
pleased to answer any questions.
Senator Lautenberg. Now to Mr. Coyne.
STATEMENT OF JAMES K. COYNE, PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION
Mr. Coyne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am James
Coyne, the President of the National Air Transportation
Association. NATA is a public policy group representing the
interests of aviation businesses before Congress and Federal
agencies and State governments. We represent over 2,000 member
companies that own and operate and service aircraft and provide
for the needs of the traveling public by offering services and
products to aircraft operators and others such as fuel sales,
aircraft maintenance, sales of aircraft parts, storage, rental,
airline servicing, flight training, Part 135 on-demand air
charter, fractional aircraft program management, and scheduled
commuter operations in smaller aircraft. NATA member companies
are a vital link in the aviation industry providing services to
the general public, to airlines and the general aviation
community.
I am also a member of the Flight Safety Foundation's Board
of Governors. The Flight Safety Foundation was founded 60 years
ago to address the problem of how to solve safety issues. The
founding members believed that the industry needed a neutral
ground where competitors could work together to share
information, ideas, and best practices. Today the Safety
Foundation's membership is over 1,100 and crosses into all
segments of the aviation industry.
In addition, I am President of the Air Charter Safety
Foundation, an initiative that was begun by NATA about 4 years
ago, and I will discuss that in a little bit more detail.
I am an active pilot, instrument-rated, ATP pilot, multi-
engine ratings with more than 35 years of flying experience and
over 6,000 hours of flight time.
While the tragic collision of two small aircraft over the
Hudson River was devastating to all of us--and I should point
out that the fixed-wing airplane departed from one of our
member companies where it had just been fueled in Teterboro
only a few minutes before the accident. So we were literally
the last people to see that pilot and his passengers. It is
especially painful for us whenever our customers and our
colleagues in aviation suffer a tragedy like this. NATA remains
concerned that the intense scrutiny, however, being placed on
airspace in which general aviation operate in the New York area
could lead to misrepresentation of the causes for this
accident.
The Hudson River corridor per se and Class B airspace in
general is an area, as you point out, of significant
congestion, but from what we can see of this particular
accident, both of the pilots were essentially doing that which
they had been instructed to do. They were following the
regulations both for the Part 135 regulations and flight
regulations that the helicopter pilot was expected to follow,
and the Part 91 pilot was following the regulations and
directions that had been given to him.
Of course, airspace is complicated, but the information
about this airspace is well known to pilots and the information
about these two aircraft was well known to the air traffic
controllers at the time.
The sad thing was, of course, that the information about
the impending accident was not available in the cockpit when
the pilots needed it most sincerely.
You have a technical background I know, Mr. Chairman. You
understand the importance of NextGen and upgrading our modern
air traffic control system, and there is no doubt that if
NextGen had been in place at the time of this accident, that
the information--and this is what is really most important--the
information about where the planes were would be in the hands
of the people who needed it most, the two pilots controlling
those airplanes. But unfortunately, that information could not
get into the cockpits at that time.
I fly in and out of Teterboro regularly, I think as you do.
In fact, we have met in your office and talked.
Senator Lautenberg. In my civilian days, it was often.
Mr. Coyne. Well, an occasional flight to Martha's Vineyard
hopefully or something like that.
But it is a wonderful airport that provides wonderful
service to the greater New Jersey and--as you notice, I said
``greater New Jersey'' metropolitan area, which is perhaps the
appropriate way to say it.
Several years ago, of course, there was a serious accident
at Teterboro, and it involved an aircraft that did not
adequately take off and went across the runway and collided
with a building. Several people were seriously injured and
killed.
After that, we decided to create something called the
``Teterboro Safety Initiative,'' which we launched with the
cooperation of the FAA, with the Teterboro Airport Management,
with the unions, with the controllers, with the Port Authority
of New York, working very closely with the late Bill Dakota,
who I am sure you knew well. And we came up with an initiative
for Teterboro to train pilots to a much higher level of
understanding of the complexities of that airspace.
The most terrifying thing for a pilot is to go to an
airspace or an airport that he has never been to before and
deal with an awful lot of new things for the first time. This
corridor along the Hudson River is one of those places. It is
complex. For a pilot who is used to it, it is not complex. It
is easy. For the helicopter pilot who was flying out day-in and
day-out on the tours, it is a routine place to fly. But for
many pilots coming there for the first time, it is complex. And
we think that there is a need in addition to the
recommendations coming from NTSB and the FAA, for enhanced
training for the pilots, especially those that are coming to
that environment, whether they are just flying to Teterboro or
to Newark or to the river approach, for the first time.
So that is why we have come up with a product. We are now
providing free to any aviator in this country, specific
training for Teterboro Airport online for anybody who wants to
go onto the Web and get the wisdom of experienced pilots,
experienced controllers and others who know the types of
mistakes that pilots and others can do in an unfamiliar area.
We have just begun this past week this same service for
Newark Airport, and we will be producing by the end of the
year, a brand new Newark Airport online pilot briefing program,
so that any aircraft owner or operator coming into that airport
for the first time will get far more advanced training than
they could get just by looking at approach plates and things
like that.
So, we think that this is the right way to go and we would
hope that this same kind of training could be made available
for pilots flying into the river corridor for the first time,
so that before they go there, they can go online and learn
everything that they can about this very special, important
piece of airspace.
Now, of course, in your comments, you raised the question
of Part 135 safety, and there is literally nobody you will ever
meet, Mr. Chairman, who is more interested in advancing Part
135 on-demand safety than I, and hopefully you, as well. We
have created the Air Charter Safety Foundation. We have
launched a program of auditing charter operators across the
country, something that has never been done before until this
past year. We are doing much more advanced training for pilots,
and we are working closely with the FAA to get the ARC
recommendations, which you alluded to, which we want to see put
into place as soon as possible and acted upon.
At the same time, we have met very closely with NTSB and
their Chairman and hope to implement these air charter safety
recommendations. But in this particular case, I think it is
clear that safety has been good.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Coyne follows:]
Prepared Statement of James K. Coyne, President,
National Air Transportation Association
Chairman Dorgan, Ranking Member DeMint and members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the Hudson River midair collision and safety of air operations
in congested airspace.
My name is James K. Coyne, and I am President of the National Air
Transportation Association (NATA). NATA, the voice of aviation
business, is the public policy group representing the interests of
aviation businesses before the Congress, Federal agencies and state
governments. NATA's over 2,000 member companies own, operate and
service aircraft and provide for the needs of the traveling public by
offering services and products to aircraft operators and others such as
fuel sales, aircraft maintenance, parts sales, storage, rental, airline
servicing, flight training, Part 135 on-demand air charter, fractional
aircraft program management and scheduled commuter operations in
smaller aircraft. NATA members are a vital link in the aviation
industry providing services to the general public, airlines, general
aviation and the military.
I am also a member of the Flight Safety Foundation's Board of
Governors. The Flight Safety Foundation was founded 60 years ago to
address the problem of how to solve safety issues. The founding members
believed that the industry needed a neutral ground where competitors
could work together to share information, ideas, and best practices for
safety. Today, the Flight Safety Foundation's membership is over 1,100
and crosses into all segments of the aviation industry. The Flight
Safety Foundation brings unions and management, regulators and
operators, and rival manufacturers to the table to work together to
find solutions. The foundation occupies a unique position among the
many organizations that strive to improve flight safety standards and
practices throughout the world. Effectiveness in bridging cultural and
political differences in the common cause of safety has earned the
foundation worldwide respect.
In addition, I am the President of the Air Charter Safety
Foundation, an initiative that I will discuss in more detail later.
I also appear today as an active pilot with instrument and multi-
engine ratings and more than 30 years of experience flying who is
acutely aware of many of the ongoing issues with uncontrolled airspace
corridors.
While the tragic collision of two small aircraft over the Hudson
River was devastating, it is important to note that these occurrences
are extremely rare. NATA remains concerned with the intense scrutiny
being placed on the airspace in which general aviation aircraft operate
in the New York City area. NATA would like to make the following points
regarding the Hudson River accident and Class B airspace.
Hudson River ``Corridor'' and Class B Airspace
John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Newark Liberty
International Airport (EWR), and LaGuardia Airport (LGA) are designated
as Class B airspace by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Class
B airspace is intended to provide positive control of flight operations
near the Nation's busiest airports and to separate aircraft operating
under visual flight rules (VFR) from aircraft operating in the airport
terminal area. Seventy-eight percent of all general aviation flights
operate under VFR, without radar control, which makes pilots ultimately
responsible for seeing and avoiding other aircraft. Flight under VFR is
only permissible when there is sufficient visibility and clearance from
clouds.
Pilots may not enter Class B airspace without explicit permission
from air traffic control (ATC). Although general aviation VFR flights
may request entry to the Class B airspace, such requests are often
denied by ATC for various reasons, forcing most VFR traffic in the New
York area into the same compact airspace known as the ``Class B
exclusion airspace.''
The FAA estimated that 200 aircraft fly through the Hudson River
Class B exclusion area each day. In addition, the Hudson River Class B
exclusion area and associated transition procedures have been in use
for more than 30 years, and the safety record for operations in the
area has been good, according to the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB). The NTSB has no record of previous collisions between
aircraft operating in the Hudson River Class B exclusion area.
NTSB and FAA Recommendations on Hudson River Corridor
The National Transportation Safety Board has already issued
recommendations to the FAA for modifications to how aircraft are
operated and managed by ATC in the areas. NATA agrees with the
recommendations of the NTSB to revise ATC procedures and the manner in
which general aviation traffic is managed in the Hudson River Class B
exclusion area.
In addition, the FAA has announced preliminary information on
regulatory changes to the airspace that generally coincide with the
NTSB recommendations. After reviewing the information made public by
the FAA, NATA supports the agency's plan to enhance safety for the NY/
NJ airspace in so much as the plan will include restructuring the
airspace, establishing pilot operating rules, creating new entry points
into the Hudson River airspace from Teterboro, standardizing New York
area charts and developing new training for pilots, air traffic
controllers and businesses that operate helicopters and aircraft in the
area. One of the most significant changes would be dividing the
airspace into altitude corridors that separate aircraft flying over the
river from those operating to and from local helicopter or seaplane
bases.
Modernization
As previously stated, the Hudson River Class B exclusion area and
associated transition procedures have been in use for more than 30
years, and according to the NTSB, the safety record for operations in
the area have been good. However, with air traffic reaching record
levels in both the commercial airline and general aviation sector, NATA
believes that modernizing the Nation's air traffic control system is
essential to keeping this vital transportation sector of our economy
strong. In doing so, it is important to accelerate the implementation
of technologies such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) and ensure those technologies availability to general aviation
operators during the upgrade to the Next Generation Air Traffic Control
system.
ADS-B is the advanced surveillance technology that combines a
satellite positioning service, aircraft avionics, and ground
infrastructure to enable more accurate transmission of information
between aircraft and Air Traffic Control (ATC). ADS-B uses information
from a position service, e.g., Global Positioning System (GPS), to
broadcast the aircraft's location, thereby making this information more
timely and accurate than the information provided by the conventional
radar system. ADS-B can also provide the platform for aircraft to
receive various types of information, including ADS-B transmissions
from other similarly equipped aircraft or vehicles. ADS-B is automatic
because no external interrogation is required, but is ``dependent''
because it relies on onboard position sources and onboard broadcast
transmission systems to provide surveillance information to ATC and
ultimately to other users.
While the FAA claims that VFR is the best approach for such
airspace as the Hudson River Corridor, every general aviation operator
should have the ability to purchase and receive radar positioning via
satellite. 21st century technology that is available in the U.S. should
be made readily available for general aviation aircraft.
Although the FAA supports modernizing its aging ground-based radar
infrastructure with satellite-based navigation onboard aircraft, the
agency isn't leading the charge to move forward with electronic mediums
that general aviation aircraft can access before a complete overhaul of
the National Airspace System (NAS) is complete.
Congress should also work with the FAA to make Teterboro Airport
(TEB) a priority in several technological improvements the agency is
implementing at airports throughout the country. For example, the
implementation of a new type of approach system, known as RNAV, would
allow aircraft a more direct approach into the airport, avoiding
lengthy circling above the highly populated surrounding.
Teterboro Airport Flight Crew Briefing
Because one of the aircraft involved in this accident departed from
TEB, the safety of the airport has come under investigation. NTSB
records show that over the last several years nearly every event
investigated was related to incursions.
Recognizing this concerning trend, in 2008 TEB became the first in
the Nation to implement a new airport-specific flight crew training
program, produced by NATA's Safety 1st program. Funded by a grant from
the FAA, the NATA Safety 1st Teterboro Airport Flight Crew Briefing is
a customized online training tool that gives pilots and other flight
crew members flying into and out of TEB access to critical safety
information about the airport, including its location, layout,
operations, regulations, and safety and security procedures. With
superb clarity and graphics, the Safety 1st briefing presents pilots
views of specific hot spots, scenarios for common pilot errors,
aircraft lighting configurations, take-off procedures, and other
information that is critical to safe aircraft operations at the
airport.
Since its implementation in June 2008, the Teterboro Airport Flight
Crew Briefing website has had more than 220,000 visitors. More
importantly, there have been no runway incursions at TEB in 2009, which
we believe can be partially attributed to the briefing. As a result of
the success of the Teterboro Briefing, NATA is developing a similar
tool for Newark Liberty International Airport that will be available by
the end of this year. This project is being funded by the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Air Charter Safety Foundation
I also have the privilege of serving as President of the Air
Charter Safety Foundation. The Air Charter Safety Foundation (ACSF) is
a non-profit organization dedicated to enhancing the safety and
security of air charter and shared aircraft ownership programs in the
United States and worldwide. Through research, collaboration and
education, the ACSF advances charter industry standards and best
practices, promulgates safety, security and service benchmarks, and
promotes the universal acceptance of safety management systems. The
ACSF also provides accurate and objective information about air charter
providers as one of the most important and versatile public
transportation resources. Membership in the ACSF primarily includes
Part 135 certificate holders, with the balance to include OEMs,
brokers, insurers, customers, airports, and safety professionals. Since
inception of the organization in June 2007, the ACSF has already made
great strides in improving the safety of operations.
Industry Audit Standard
Earlier this year, the ACSF launched an audit program, the ACSF
Industry Audit Standard. The Industry Audit Standard is a revolutionary
program built from the ground up by the ACSF to set the standard for
the independent evaluation of an air charter operator's and/or shared
ownership company's safety and regulatory compliance. The ACSF Industry
Audit Standard has been developed with the input and guidance of
leading safety auditors, charter operators, shared aircraft ownership
companies and charter consumers.
The ACSF Industry Audit Standard is the only audit program that
comprehensively evaluates both an operator's Safety Management System
(SMS) and its Part 135 regulatory compliance. With the deployment of
the ACSF Industry Audit Standard, the charter consumer can be assured
that audited and registered operators are compliant with the highest
standards of safety and compliance. The ACSF agrees with the NTSB that
the adoption of SMS is a key goal to improving safety. It is why the
Industry Audit Standard requires operators to adopt, implement and show
continuous safety management improvement. Operators and charter
consumers are enthusiastic about this independent evaluation. By the
end of the year, we will have completed 25 audits, including some of
the largest and most active air charter operators in the country.
AVSIS
The ACSF has also released a revolutionary safety event reporting
and tracking system known as AVSIS or Aviation Safety Information
System. AVSIS is targeted specifically to the on-demand air charter and
shared aircraft ownership program industries. This powerful software
program collects detailed safety event data for analysis, response
deployment and success measurement, and provides a tool for accounting
for the cost savings realized by interventions.
To encourage the wide-spread use of this safety-enhancing tool, the
ACSF has made the program available to all Part 135 on-demand operators
and Part 91K fractional program managers at no cost. Using AVSIS, or
similar tools, to collect safety event information is critical to
safety management system development and can also serve as the
foundation for an FAA Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP).
Safety Symposium
The ACSF also hosts an annual Air Charter Safety Symposium. The
symposium focuses on academic and scientific research pertaining to
aviation safety. The event brings together the leaders of on-demand and
fractional ownership operators to learn about new safety programs and
emerging safety concerns.
Air Charter Data
The ACSF has initiated a new effort to improve the activity and
accident data available in order to analyze Part 135 safety more
accurately. A program is being established to more closely collect,
analyze and report on Part 135 on-demand accidents and incidents.
Today, the industry's safety record is summed up by a single, all
encompassing analysis. But, the air charter industry comprises a wide-
variety of aircraft, with mission profiles that are almost too numerous
to name, including helicopter EMS and off-shore work, single-engine
piston-powered tour operations, just-in-time cargo carriers, and long-
range international passenger-carrying turbojets, just to list a few
mission profiles.
This variation presents a unique challenge when attempting to draw
safety conclusions. It is incredibly difficult to identify safety
issues, provide targeted recommendations and then measure the success
of mitigations if you can't determine the safety record for each of the
distinct aircraft types or operational categories.
The ACSF is committed to improving data collection and safety
analysis for the Part 135 on-demand air charter industry. The ACSF
believes that industry and government must work together to develop
enhanced data collection tools that will permit the NTSB to develop a
far clearer picture of the industry than is available today.
Conclusion
NATA appreciates the efforts of both the NTSB and the FAA to
produce thoughtful and targeted airspace, ATC and operational reforms
to enhance the safety margin for operations within the Hudson River
Class B exclusion.
Further, we believe that the adoption of new technologies for
airspace management will significantly impact safety and efficiency in
the national airspace system.
Finally, the efforts of NATA and the Air Charter Safety Foundation
to improve upon safety and offer unique training, tracking and system
safety programs are possible only because of the significant efforts
and commitment to safety of the operating community. We are proud to
recognize their work, and our industry looks forward to additional
government-industry collaborative programs that can have meaningful
impacts on safety.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much. Are you finished?
Thank you.
Mr. Kragh?
STATEMENT OF EDWARD KRAGH, CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL CONTROLLER,
ADJUNCT TO FAA NY VFR AIRSPACE TASK FORCE, NATCA
Mr. Kragh. Senator Lautenberg, good afternoon. Thanks for
allowing me to appear before you today. My name is Edward
Kragh. I have been an Air Traffic Controller for 22 years, and
I have been assigned to Newark Airport for 16 years.
I would like to, on behalf of the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association, NATCA, offer my condolences to the
family members of those who perished in this accident on August
8. It is a matter of personal anguish, having sought out so
many loopholes in safety procedures, that myself and the
colleagues I have been working closely with were not able to
see some of the flawed procedures that might have contributed
to this on that day.
But I am here today as NATCA's representative on the FAA's
New York VFR Airspace Task Force. We were charged with
examining the procedures in airspace surrounding Manhattan in
order to recommend changes that would help make the airspace
safer. My role in that task force was to serve as a subject-
matter expert on air traffic control procedures and airspace.
The FAA invited NATCA to be a part of the Task Force and worked
collaboratively with the union throughout, and it is our hope
that the agency will continue to follow through with its
commitment to include us in the completion of this project and
any future changes.
The August 8 incident occurred under visual flight rules
outside of Class Bravo airspace in the Class B Exclusion
Corridor, what we call the exclusion, during a handoff between
air traffic control facilities. Aircraft in Class Bravo
airspace are permitted to use VFR in clear weather but
separation in Class Bravo airspace remains the controller's
responsibility. No aircraft is permitted to enter Class B
without first receiving a clearance from ATC, and once inside,
pilots are required to then closely follow air traffic control
procedures.
In the exclusion, VFR aircraft are permitted to fly without
being required to communicate with air traffic control. The
exclusion is Class G, or uncontrolled airspace. As such, air
traffic controllers do not have jurisdiction over aircraft in
that airspace, and the burden of separation there is entirely
on pilots. Pilots flying Class G airspace are urged to monitor
and broadcast their positions over the common frequency and
they are expected to do so in order to effectively coordinate
the use of the airspace and uncontrolled runways.
Clearance from air traffic control is required to enter and
operate within Class B. Under the current procedures, Teterboro
controllers do not have the authority to climb VFR aircraft
into Class B airspace, and therefore, that transition into
Class B requires a handoff of control from Teterboro to Newark,
and when the Newark controller accepts that handoff, he climbs
the VFR aircraft into Class B. If he is unable to accept the
handoff, the aircraft must remain outside Class B airspace
until receiving air traffic control clearance.
On August 8, the Teterboro controller initiated a timely
handoff, which the Newark controller accepted. The Newark
controller was expecting radio contact from the Piper, which
unfortunately never came. Although controllers at both
Teterboro and Newark attempted to reestablish radio
communication with the pilot, they were unable to contact him.
At the time of the collision, the pilot was not in
communication with air traffic control at either Teterboro or
Newark.
Unfortunately, there has been a great rush to judgment
regarding the underlying causes of the August 8 tragedy. I
would note that, Chairman Dorgan, and also Mr. Hart, stated
that the NTSB has not yet completed its investigation into the
matter. However, the controllers on duty did utilize the
procedures that they had been trained to use which were
required by FAA orders to adhere to. The first day that the VFR
Task Force met, it was unanimously agreed upon that those
procedures, the current procedures, were flawed and that under
those flawed procedures, the August 8 accident could not have
been prevented.
Since the accident, a number of elected officials have
advocated for full control of the airspace around Manhattan, in
other words, eliminate the Class Bravo exclusion and require
that all aircraft flying in this region be under the direction
of air traffic control. NATCA and the Task Force recognize that
this drastic change would require significant resources because
present infrastructure is insufficient to handle these changes
and there are not enough controllers to handle the increased
workload that would result. The geography of the area with
densely packed skyscrapers prevents effective radar and radio
coverage. You may recall that when my colleague, Patrick
Hartin, testified before Congress earlier this year, he
described losing radio contact and radar coverage with U.S. Air
flight 1549 as that aircraft lost altitude and eventually
landed safely in the Hudson. Additional radar and radio sights
would be a necessity to safely provide ATC services in the
exclusion.
The FAA's Task Force recommended several changes to
training, procedures, and airspace structure. The union
supports these recommendations, and we agree that their
implementation will make this historically safe corridor even
safer. However, like the Task Force, we recognize that further
analysis is required before the recommendations can be
implemented. For instance, we agree with the recommendation
that encourages pilots to transition the Hudson using the Class
B airspace above the exclusion so they are under ATC control,
but an influx of VFR aircraft into Class B airspace may
significantly increase controller workload and generate a need
for increased staffing to meet the increased demands on these
positions.
Last, the FAA and air traffic controllers work best when we
work together. I would like to divert here and just say that I
find the Task Force was the model, for me in my career, of
cooperation between the union and the agency, and I implore the
agency to continue to use this approach on behalf of the safety
of the flying public.
That concludes my testimony. I look forward to answering
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kragh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward Kragh, Certified Professional Controller,
Adjunct to FAA NY VFR Airspace Task Force, NATCA
The National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) is the
exclusive representative of more than 15,000 air traffic controllers
serving the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of
Defense and the private sector. In addition, NATCA represents
approximately 1,200 FAA engineers, 600 traffic management coordinators,
500 aircraft certification professionals, agency operational support
staff, regional personnel from FAA logistics, budget, finance and
computer specialist divisions, and agency occupational health
specialists, nurses and medical program specialists. NATCA's mission is
to preserve, promote and improve the safety of air travel within the
United States, and to serve as an advocate for air traffic controllers
and other aviation safety professionals. NATCA has a long history of
working together with the NTSB, other government agencies and aviation
industry experts to make the National Airspace System (NAS) the safest
in the world.
August 8, 2009: Aftermath
On August 8, 2009, a Eurocopter AS350 helicopter collided with a
Piper PA-32R over the Hudson River. Nine people died in the collision.
This accident and loss of life has caused many aviation safety experts,
including NATCA, to examine the circumstances surrounding the incident
and search for ways to prevent the situation from repeating itself in
the future. To this end, NATCA was an active participant in the New
York Airspace Task Force which was chartered by the FAA in response to
this incident in order to recommend safety enhancements for the
affected airspace.
The incident occurred under a particular set of aviation rules and
procedures; both aircraft were operating under Visual Flight Rules
(VFR) in the Class B Exclusion Corridor, and the incident occurred in
the midst of a handoff between air traffic control facilities. Although
we believe that procedures were properly adhered to, the incident
forces us to examine the procedures themselves so that we may prevent
future incidents of this type. As an organization that prides itself on
its air traffic control expertise, NATCA has examined and will testify
about several aspects of aviation operations and procedures in effect
at the time of the incident.
Visual Flight Rules: See and Avoid
Both the aircraft involved in the August 8 incident were operating
under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). VFR rules are a set of specifications
governing the operation of aircraft under clear meteorological
conditions. The basic premise of VFR is that pilots maintain a safe
distance from terrain and other aircraft using a simple ``see-and-
avoid'' standard.
Conduct of VFR Flight: In the conduct of VFR flight, the
prevention of collisions (safe separation from other aircraft)
is solely the responsibility of the pilot-in-command (PIC) to
see and avoid.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ FAA Order 8900.1 Flight Standards Information Management System
Volume IV: Aircraft Equipment on Operational Authorization, Chapter 1
Air Navigation Communication and Surveillance.
A pilot choosing to operate under VFR has a variety of tools at his
disposal to assist him in maintaining situational awareness. Perhaps
the most important of those tools is the Common Traffic Advisory
Frequency (CTAF). Using CTAF, pilots communicate via two-way radio to
announce their position and intentions to other pilots in order avoid
conflict.
Air Traffic Control flight following can be another tool for VFR
pilots. While the onus of separation remains on the pilot, an Air
Traffic Controller can help the pilot to see and avoid (See section on
flight following for more information). In congested VFR airspace like
the Hudson River corridor, communication over CTAF is considered
preferable to communication with air traffic control. The high volume
of VFR traffic combined with the unreliability of Radar coverage in the
area makes CTAF the more effective option.
Seeing and Avoiding: August 8, 2009
The incident on August 8 was an example of one of the most common
types of VFR incidents: a high-wing, low-wing collision. A Piper 32A
has a low-wing design; the wings are positioned low relative to the
fuselage, making it difficult for the pilot to see aircraft flying at a
lower altitude. Conversely, helicopter rotors are positioned above the
fuselage, making it more difficult for the pilot to see aircraft flying
above. Therefore, if a helicopter flies below a Piper and ascends, each
aircraft may be in the other's blind spot.
This situation was a tragic illustration of the limitations of see-
and-avoid separation. Simply put, if pilots are unable to see
approaching aircraft it is extremely difficult to avoid them. Tools
like CTAF can save lives in these cases; they can make a pilot aware of
hazards outside of his immediate ability to see. In congested corridors
like the one in which the incident occurred pilots should be
particularly cognizant of the availability of CTAF and be required to
monitor that frequency and broadcast their position and intentions.
Airspace Classes
As previously stated, both of the aircraft involved were operating
under VFR, but the specific procedures governing proper utilization of
VFR are not fixed. They vary depending on the class of airspace in
which the aircraft is operating. The FAA breaks the National Airspace
System (NAS) into different classes of airspace; Classes A, B, C, D,
and E are all designations of controlled airspace, and Class G is
uncontrolled (Class F does not exist in domestic airspace). These
classes of airspace differ in the rules that govern them, the
obligations of air traffic controllers, the responsibility of pilots,
and the flexibility of aircraft operation.
Figure i \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Federal Aviation Administration Aeronautical Information
Manual: Official Guide to Basic Flight Information and ATC Procedures
2008 (with changes for 2009). Figure 3-2-1.
The most stringent rules apply to Class A, the airspace typically
designated from 18,000 ft above Mean Sea Level (MSL) to Flight Level
600. All aircraft operating in Class A airspace must utilize Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR); pilots must be equipped and trained to rely on
their instruments for navigational purposes. It is the responsibility
of air traffic controllers to maintain separation between aircraft in
Class A airspace.
The next most stringent class is Class B, which typically surrounds
the Nation's largest airports. The main purpose of Class B airspace is
to protect the area around a major airport so that larger passenger
aircraft can operate safely. As such, aircraft in Class B airspace are
permitted to use VFR in clear meteorological conditions, but it remains
the controller's responsibility to ensure separation according to FAA
regulations. No aircraft is permitted to enter Class B airspace without
first receiving a clearance from air traffic control. Once inside,
pilots are required to closely follow air traffic control instructions.
In airspace Classes C, D and E, air traffic controllers are
responsible for maintaining separation between IFR aircraft, but VFR
aircraft are allowed to freely travel through the airspace without
receiving clearances from air traffic control. In these cases, it is
the VFR pilots' responsibility to maintain separation by utilizing the
see-and-avoid method that is standard for VFR.
Class G, or uncontrolled airspace, operates entirely according to
VFR standards. Air traffic controllers do not have jurisdiction over
aircraft operating in Class G airspace, and the burden of separation is
entirely on the pilots. Pilots flying in Class G airspace are urged to
monitor and broadcast their position over CTAF in order to effectively
coordinate use of airspace and uncontrolled runways.
Class B Exclusion Areas
Class B airspace is designed to protect large passenger aircraft in
the areas surrounding major airports by providing positive air traffic
control separation. However, many of these areas also have a high
volume of VFR traffic. As a result, VFR aircraft would have had to fly
all the way around this Class B airspace, as it would be difficult for
an air traffic controller to safely handle such a high volume of VFR
traffic in addition to the IFR traffic that is their first-duty
priority without imposing restrictions on the flow of traffic.
Rather than require these VFR users to travel all the way around
the Class B airspace, the FAA implemented an alternative in several
metropolitan areas including New York, Los Angeles and San Diego. In
these areas there is a small corridor carved out of the Class B
airspace where VFR aircraft are permitted to fly without communicating
with Air Traffic Control. These corridors are considered Class G or
uncontrolled airspace. VFR pilots who wish to coordinate with air
traffic control may still request permission to enter Class B airspace.
The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) advises pilots in these
corridors as follows: ``Pilots operating in VFR corridors are urged to
use [the CTAF frequency] for the exchange of aircraft position
information.'' Pilots are therefore expected to communicate and
coordinate with other pilots in order to maintain self-separation.
Pilots monitoring that frequency are not in contact with air traffic
control and therefore do not receive flight following services.
Flight Following
VFR pilots who are operating in controlled airspace may request
flight following service. According to the Air Traffic Control Order JO
7110.65S, the manual for all air traffic control operations and
procedures, Radar Flight Following is defined as follows:
Radar Flight Following--The observation of the progress of
radar identified aircraft, whose primary navigation is being
provided by the pilot, wherein the controller retains and
correlates the aircraft identity with the appropriate target or
target symbol displayed on the radar scope.
An aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) appears on a
controller's radar scope with minimal information. Essentially, the
controller knows only that there is a VFR aircraft present and its
altitude (if the aircraft is properly equipped). He does not know
aircraft type, call sign, or flight plan. When a pilot requests flight
following, the pilot provides that additional information to the
controller, who then enters the flight data. The controller has his
computer automatically generate an identifier, which he instructs the
pilot to enter into his transponder--enabling a data block to appear on
the scope with all of the relevant information. This simple tracking
assists in the event that search and rescue services are needed.
If a pilot operating in Airspace Classes C, D or E requests flight
following, the controller will provide basic radar service to the VFR
pilot, workload permitting. According to the JO 7110.65S:
Basic radar services for VFR aircraft shall include:
1. Safety Alerts
2. Traffic Advisories
3. Limited radar vectoring when requested by the pilot.
4. Sequencing at locations where procedures have been
established for this purpose and/or when covered by a
LOA [letter of agreement].
These services can only be performed if the pilot continues to
monitor the appropriate air traffic control frequency. Under these
circumstances, the controller does not assume responsibility for
ensuring separation, nor does he give instructions to the pilot. He
simply acts as an ``eye in the sky'' providing surveillance and
advisories, workload permitting. It remains the pilot's responsibility
to maintain separation under VFR. A controller's first-duty priority is
to the aircraft receiving full radar service. A controller must only
provide flight following service to VFR pilots if his workload permits
Flight following in Class B is markedly different from that in
other airspace classes. An air traffic control clearance is required to
enter and operate within Class B airspace. Therefore, when a pilot
requests flight following from a controller responsible for Class B
airspace, it is understood that they are requesting permission to enter
the airspace, and that, if granted, they will be provided with full
radar service until they leave that airspace. The controller will only
grant the clearance to enter the Class B airspace if his workload
permits.
ATC Service for VFR Aircraft: Teterboro (TEB)
An aircraft departing TEB flies through Class D airspace. The AIM
describes the procedural requirements for aircraft departing an airport
with an operating control tower in Class D airspace as follows:
Two-way radio communications must be established and maintained
with the control tower, and thereafter as instructed by ATC
while operating in the Class D airspace.
The AIM goes on to say that ``No separation services are provided
to VFR aircraft,'' although a pilot may request flight following
services.
Because TEB is located in such close proximity to the larger New
York Area Airports that service passenger airlines, the Class D
airspace is located immediately adjacent to Class B airspace controlled
by Newark (EWR) and the Class B Exclusion Corridor along the Hudson
River. An aircraft departing from TEB and heading in the direction of
the Hudson River therefore has the option of entering uncontrolled
airspace or requesting to enter Class B. Controllers at TEB do not have
the authority to climb VFR aircraft into the EWR Class B airspace; only
EWR controllers can give them such permission. Therefore, the
transition into Class B airspace requires a handoff of control from TEB
to EWR.
ATC Service for VFR Aircraft: Newark (EWR)
If a pilot leaving TEB airspace wishes to remain in communication
with air traffic control as he continues southwest along the Hudson
River, control must be transferred to EWR. If the EWR controller
accepts the handoff, he will climb the VFR aircraft into Class B; if he
does not accept the handoff, the aircraft must remain outside Class B
airspace and utilize the Exclusion Corridor.
In EWR there are several different air traffic control positions
responsible for different aspects of the aviation operation around the
airport. These positions include a ground controller responsible for
taxiing to the runways, a local controller responsible for take-off and
landing, and a Class B Airspace (also known as Terminal Control Area)
Controller.
The Class B Airspace controller is responsible for the VFR aircraft
traversing Newark's Airspace, including those flying in the Class B
airspace above the exclusion zone. Unlike the local controller who
works mostly with large passenger aircraft, the Class B Airspace
controller is responsible mainly for helicopters, small fixed-wing
planes, and occasional military aircraft. Part of his job is to
coordinate airspace usage with the local controller in order to
maintain safe separation as he guides VFR aircraft through designated
VFR routes in the Class B airspace.
Handoff Procedure
A handoff occurs prior to an aircraft crossing an airspace boundary
when control of that aircraft must be transferred from one air traffic
controller to another. It consists of a radar transfer and a
communications transfer. In most cases, the radar transfer occurs via
Automated Information Transfer (AIT). For the purpose of this
description, Controller 1 will refer to the controller in control at
the beginning of the handoff and Controller 2 will refer to the
controller responsible at the end of the handoff.
Each air traffic control position has a position symbol, a letter
that appears superimposed on the radar target to indicate which
controller is responsible. The TEB position symbol is J and the EWR
position symbol is B (See Figure ii).
Figure ii
When an aircraft is approaching an airspace boundary, Controller 1
initiates a radar handoff by pressing a button on his console. By
pressing that button, Controller 1 causes a data block to flash on the
scope of Controller 2. Because of this, initiating a radar handoff is
colloquially referred to as ``flashing'' by controllers.
As Controller 1 ``flashes'' the aircraft to Controller 2,
Controller 2's position symbol appears in the second line of the data
block. Controller 1 remains responsible for the aircraft, but the
presence of this symbol means that the handoff has been initiated.
Figure iii
Controller 2 sees the flashing data block and hits ``Enter'' on his
keypad to accept the transfer, effectively completing the radar
handoff. Controller 2 has acknowledged that he sees the aircraft, its
identifier, altitude, and other relevant data and accepts
responsibility. By hitting enter, Controller 2 causes the corresponding
data block to flash on Controller 1's console, attracting Controller
1's attention. At this point, Controller 2's position symbol appears
above the target, confirming completion of the handoff.
Figure iv
Controller 1 then contacts the pilot and instructs him to contact
Controller 2 and provides him with the appropriate frequency. Once the
pilot has accurately read back the new frequency, the handoff is fully
complete, and Controller 2 assumes primary responsibility for the
aircraft.
Handoff: TEB to EWR
The Current air traffic control procedure does not require TEB
controllers to pre-coordinate a transition for VFR aircraft wishing to
travel through the EWR Class B airspace. The TEB controller simply
flashes the aircraft to EWR, where the controller can choose either to
accept him or request that the TEB controller instruct him to enter the
exclusion corridor.
In some instances, a pilot would have to change his plans if
controller workload did not permit him to enter Class B Airspace. The
pilot must therefore be ready to enter the exclusion zone, and should
be prepared to switch to CTAF and announce himself, should it be
necessary.
However, we do not believe that this occurred on August 8. It is
our understanding that the TEB controller initiated a timely handoff,
which the EWR controller accepted. The EWR controller was expecting
radio contact from the N71MC, which never came. Although controllers at
both TEB and EWR attempted to re-establish radio communication with the
pilot, they were unable to contact him. At the time of the collision,
the pilot was not in communication with air traffic control at TEB or
EWR, nor was he transmitting over CTAF.
Had the pilot contacted EWR as instructed, the EWR controller would
have issued climb instructions that would have taken N71MC above the
exclusion zone and into the Class B airspace. Because N71MC did not
successfully establish radio communication with EWR, he was unable to
receive that clearance; instead N71MC continued eastbound, where it
collided with the helicopter in the exclusion area.
This incident caused us to examine the procedures governing this
airspace, including handoff procedures. NATCA believes that
coordination between TEB and EWR prior to take-off would reduce
confusion at the airspace boundaries and make it less likely that a
pilot would unknowingly enter the exclusion zone and therefore fail to
switch to CTAF frequency. This will also allow EWR to notify TEB in
advance that the workload is too great to allow Class B entry so the
TEB controller may provide alternate routing options to the aircraft
prior to the departure.
Is Controlled Airspace A Viable Option?
In recent weeks there has been some discussion about eliminating
the Hudson River exclusion area and converting the airspace entirely
into Class B. Current infrastructure is unable to support the
conversion of this type. Before any such change can be implemented, the
following infrastructure improvements would need to be made.
1. Comprehensive Surveillance--With the current radar
infrastructure, radar coverage over the Hudson River is
unreliable. In much of that corridor, the height and density of
the New York City skyline prevents radar from reaching the low
altitude airspace, and information on aircraft flying in this
area often does not appear on a controller's scope. For
example, when Flight 1549 lost the use of its engines, the
aircraft disappeared off controller Patrick Harten's scope
after it lost enough altitude to be obscured by the buildings.
If the airspace were to be converted into Class B airspace,
this spotty radar coverage would not be sufficient enough to
ensure the safety of the users. Additional radar sites would
need to be placed in such a way so as to ensure continuous
comprehensive coverage of the area.
2. Comprehensive Radio Coverage--Just as the radar coverage is
obscured by the terrain of New York City, radio coverage is
similarly unreliable. The skyline often blocks radio signals,
and communication between controller and pilot might be
compromised. This would represent a significant safety risk if
pilots were relying on air traffic control for separation.
3. Air Traffic Control--The Air Traffic Control facilities that
would have jurisdiction over this airspace would need to be
restructured to accommodate control of new airspace. A new
control position would have to be added to each of the affected
facilities: EWR, John F. Kennedy International Airport Tower
(JFK), LaGuardia Airport Tower (LGA), and New York Terminal
Approach Control (N90).
4. Air Traffic Controller Staffing--Additional controllers
would need to be hired at each of the affected facilities so as
to ensure proper staffing for each of the new positions.
5. Effect on General Aviation--The elimination of the exclusion
corridor would severely restrict access to this area by general
aviation. An air traffic controller is naturally constrained in
the number of aircraft he can safely monitor and communicate
with, and even a properly-staffed position would restrict the
number of aircraft that could utilize the Class B airspace.
General aviation pilots who do not wish to coordinate with air
traffic control would be required to go around the Class B
airspace, without an option to cut through.
Is the Hudson River Class B Exclusion Zone Safe?
Following an incident of this severity, it is natural to question
the safety of the airspace. The fact that such an incident occurred
appears to be proof that the airspace is unsafe and needs to be fixed.
But one must also retain the appropriate perspective and regard this
incident in context.
According to the NTSB, the incident on August 8 was the first
midair collision in the Hudson River Class B Exclusion Area. The NTSB
further noted that ``a review of the FAA's Near Midair Collision (NMAC)
database and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database revealed 11 reports of
NMACs between aircraft in the area since 1990. Only one report was
filed in the past 10 years.'' This safety record is considered very
good; there are far fewer NMAC reports than one may have predicted
given that over 200 aircraft utilize this airspace per day.
Yet this incident did occur, and it has served to highlight the
weak points in the system. The incident has caused the aviation safety
community to scrutinize the procedures in place at that time and devise
ways of improving safety.
The New York Airspace Task Force
On August 14, the FAA charted a task force and charged it with
making recommendations to enhance the safety of the Hudson River
airspace area. NATCA was very pleased to be included as active
participants in this taskforce as we believe that our subject matter
expertise on air traffic control contributed substantially to the task
force.
The Task Force is recommending several changes to operations,
procedures, training and airspace structure. In general, NATCA supports
these recommendations, but we believe that the FAA must fully consider
the impact that these changes will have on other aspects of operation.
For example, we agree with the task force that encouraging VFR use
of Class B positively- controlled airspace would improve safety. But
the large influx of VFR aircraft into Class B airspace would
significantly increase controller workload and generate a need for
increased staffing to meet the increased demands on the Class B Area
position.
The task force made the following recommendations:
1. Modify Class B airspace to allow aircraft stratification in
the exclusion by mission profile for overflight versus local
operations--This recommends the creation of a uniform floor to
the Class B airspace at 1,300 ft to allow aircraft operating in
the exclusion to stratify by altitude. Transient traffic would
operate above 1,000 ft and local operators would remain below
1,000 ft. Under the current airspace structure the floor of the
Class B airspace is 1,100 ft in some places. NATCA is concerned
that raising the floor in these areas will cause VFR aircraft
receiving Class B services above the exclusion zone to
interfere with passenger jets landing at LaGuardia (LGA). In
some runway configurations, aircraft landing at LGA Runway 13
pass through this airspace at 1,500 ft. NATCA recommends that
the FAA examine this and other unintended consequences of this
recommendation carefully prior to implementation.
2. Review airspace delegated by New York TRACON (N90) to local
air traffic control towers adjacent to the Hudson River--In its
current state, there is some confusion about which tower has
jurisdiction over which airspace. The FAA has admitted that
there are overlapping airspace boundaries and airspace that,
though controlled by a tower, has not been officially
delegated. This recommendation would rectify this problem and
clarify the roles and delegated responsibility of air traffic
controllers in each facility. NATCA fully supports this
recommendation.
3. Revise procedures at TEB for VFR fixed-wing departures--This
recommendation would require air traffic controllers at TEB to
coordinate with controllers at EWR for aircraft wishing to
utilize Class B services. If workload at EWR is such that he
can extend Class B services to the aircraft, TEB would be
authorized to climb the aircraft to 1,500 ft and into Class B
airspace. This recommendation also would establish a
standardized route for aircraft departing from TEB and
intending to enter the exclusion that would limit the mergers
at the current point of entry. NATCA supports this
recommendation.
4. Develop a Class B VFR transition route over the Hudson
River--This would publicize and promote the use of Class B
services among VFR pilots traveling in the area. While NATCA
agrees that positively-controlled airspace is safer than
uncontrolled airspace, we have concerns about the effects of
this change. If this measure is successful in increasing the
use of Class B services among VFR pilots, it will represent a
significant increase in controller workload. At present, the
Class B Airspace controller position described earlier is often
combined with the local control position, particularly during
weekends. If this change is to be implemented, NATCA requires a
commitment from the FAA to provide the additional air traffic
control staffing necessary to fully staff this position at all
times, as this position should not be combined with other
positions while we determine the effects of the changes on VFR
traffic patterns.
5. Mandate pilot operating practices while operating in the
Exclusion--This would codify the voluntary procedures currently
recommended for pilots in the exclusion. This includes maximum
airspeed restrictions, announcing altitude and intentions on
CTAF, and flying along the west shoreline of the Hudson River
when southbound along the eastern shoreline when heading
northbound. NATCA fully supports this recommendation.
6. Enhance pilot communication and capability and reduce
frequency congestion on Hudson River CTAF--This would create
defined areas which would utilize different frequencies and
decrease frequency congestion. It would also standardize
phraseology to reduce confusion. NATCA fully supports this
recommendation.
7. Standardize and enhance multiple NY Area Aeronautical Charts
to assist pilot navigation--Currently there are several charts
covering the area, each of which contain different information
on the airspace. This would create a single chart with
standardized information. This recommendation also supports
recommendation four in that it would publicize the Class B
services available to VFR pilots. As previously stated, NATCA
requires full staffing of the Class B position, as changing or
clarifying the charts is intended to increase the usage of
Class B air traffic control services for VFR pilots.
8. Develop FAA and industry standardized training and education
plans for pilots, fixed-base operators, and air traffic
controllers--NATCA believes that comprehensive and effective
training of pilots, controllers and other aviation safety
professionals is integral to maintaining the safety of the
airspace. In the case of air traffic controllers giving
clearances to pilots in this airspace, we believe that training
can be improved. It is important for controllers to fully
understand the intentions of the pilot so that they can issue
clearances that do not need to be altered later. Again,
training requires proper staffing levels at the facilities. We
must be able to fully cover operations during the training
itself.
Air Traffic Controller Staffing at NY Area Facilities
Several of the recommendations offered by the taskforce and other
changes that have been considered will represent an increase in
controller workload at the facilities in the New York Area. Currently
the controller work forces at the facilities in this area are
understaffed, inexperienced, and operating with a potentially-dangerous
ratio of trainees to fully certified controllers. TEB is operating with
a number of certified controllers 42-percent below the staffing rate
jointly agreed to by NATCA and the FAA in 1998; N90, JFK, LGA and EWR
are 42-percent, 35-percent, 36-percent, and 32-percent below
respectively. Additionally N90, JFK and TEB have a trainee ratio of
over 35-percent, which had been considered the safe upper-limit by the
FAA. LGA is not far behind, with a trainee ratio of 34-percent.\3\ If
the safety of this area is to improve, and particularly if more VFR
pilots are to be encouraged to utilize Class B services, it will
require that the Class B Airspace control position be opened at all
times. In order to do so, the facilities must be properly staffed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Staffing statistics are based on payroll data provided to NATCA
by the FAA. They are current as of March 31, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NATCA Recommendations
1. The FAA Must Thoroughly Examine the recommendations offered by
the task force to determine their effect on the broader operation and
air traffic controller workload. This must be done in full
collaboration with NATCA. Only after this examination is completed and
any risks mitigated should these recommendations be implemented.
2. The FAA Must Collaborate With NATCA to continue investigating
ways to improve operations, airspace and procedures. The FAA must
formally and thoroughly include NATCA in all stages of reforming the
New York area airspace, from development through implementation.
NATCA's members are subject matter experts who deal with the realities
of this airspace on the front line and in real time each day. As such,
our Union should be regarded as a subject matter expert and be fully
engaged in developing and implementing any and all changes.
3. Proper Staffing to Cover Additional ATC Duties--Any change in
operations, procedure, or airspace structure must be evaluated as to
its effect on air traffic controller workload. Even small changes may
have a significant effect and must be evaluated cumulatively and
multiplied by the large volume of aircraft controllers handle at a
given time. It is imperative that all affected air traffic control
facilities and positions be properly staffed, including the radar
associate position, when appropriate.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, each one of you, for your
testimony.
Questions arise as a result of some of the things that were
offered. We are looking, Mr. Kragh, at having better equipment
available, better supervision available, and I ask you this.
And any one of you who might have a view on these questions,
please feel free to indicate that.
Do we have in the equipment larder right now enough
technology that that space could be covered with what is
presently being used throughout the aviation system?
Mr. Kragh. Senator, I am not familiar with all the
equipment that is in the future pipeline. However, I know that
the present infrastructure, because radar is a line-of-sight
system and radio signals are also basically line-of-sight, they
can be interfered with easily by tall buildings. So we
presently do not have the equipment infrastructure or the human
infrastructure, if you will, to control the Class Bravo
Exclusion Area at the level of service that is used right now.
I mean, the local helicopter operators run hundreds of
tours each day. Sometimes several of them are airborne at the
same time. We would certainly affect their business in some
way, shape, or form should we be able to eventually have the
infrastructure in place. I do not know if we could provide the
level of service that they provide for themselves on that
common traffic frequency.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, Mr. Coyne, would you volunteer a
view on it?
Mr. Coyne. Well, I think you really have two principal
technical resources to analyze with regard to the current
system, and that is radar and communications. As you know,
living along the Hudson River, both the New York side and the
New Jersey side of that river have very high palisades or
buildings. So to get coverage down below 500 feet or so with
radar becomes a very, very difficult technical challenge for
that area of space. You would have to put some very expensive
radar installations right down along the river base there.
Senator Lautenberg. Unless they were attached to the George
Washington Bridge.
Mr. Coyne. Well, that could certainly deal with the
northern part----
Senator Lautenberg. Because then you get the altitude----
Mr. Coyne. But I think the better solution may be to look
at the NextGen technology, which we are all moving forward to,
as you know. I do not think anyone is more of an advocate of it
than the people here in this room. And to have that kind of
non-radar-based position information would be far more
effective, far more costly, and far more consistent where the
rest of the country is moving because right now--I do not think
I can speak for the FAA, but clearly they are making plans to,
in the next 10 years, reduce the number of radar installations
in the country over the next 10 or 15 years. So at this point,
to make a commitment to radar would be not as opportunistic as
making a commitment to ADS-B or one of the other satellite-
based technologies.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Day, how do you see this? Do we
have enough equipment now--now--within a fairly reasonable
period of time, to be able to construct a safety parameter
around this zone? You know, I talk about the Washington Bridge
only because when the U.S. Air flight landed on the river,
literally, if I was home at the time, I would have seen that
airplane pass my window. When you see the kind of traffic
demand there is for that corridor, is there not equipment
available that could at least guarantee some communication?
I wrote legislation a long time ago that demanded the
transponder C requirement on all airplanes that flew in active
airspace. It has been in place for a number of years.
What is there that might be, if anything, right now, that
would be able to give better surveillance there and maintain a
larger measure of safety?
Mr. Day. Yes, Senator. A good part of the air
transportation system is dependent on shared accountability
around the issue of safety. So, first of all, we have a NextGen
implementation plan which includes those transformational
programs that will modernize the system, ADS-B being one of the
transformational programs and the one that is in deployment.
Mr. Krakowski and Ms. Gilligan are actually at a meeting right
now to disclose the recommendations from the RTCA Task Force 5,
which is a group of over 200 industry and agency leaders who
have prioritized and identified those operational improvements
that will help us transform the national airspace system.
We are also in the process, which began in April, of doing
a design review for ADS-B placement around the airports in the
New York-New Jersey area. We expect to have that final design
completed at the end of this month, then installation during
next year, with the commissioning of that equipment with the
automation at the end of the next calendar year. So we are on
track to put down that infrastructure which will be completed
nationwide by 2013.
In addition to ADS-B which not only provides surveillance
for the aircraft, looking to the future, there is a capability
which is called ADS-B IN, which you may be familiar with from
the Capstone Project up in Alaska. With ADS-B IN, we can put
displays in the cockpit which can provide to the crew,
information as to the terrain and traffic and weather so they
can have better situational awareness of traffic around them.
I think capabilities like the NextGen capabilities--ADS-B
would be one of the premier ones at this point--can make a
difference in the future to provide a higher level of safety
and situational awareness.
Senator Lautenberg. But I am looking for if it can be. I
recognize that there is a whole technology involved. There are
all kinds of not just systems and personnel. But to get
something in there that says with the present use of that
corridor, is there anything that can be done even on an interim
basis that would say, OK--and I do not know whether there
should be some stricter demands to pilots in the area about
radio contact. It was suggested that maybe the pilot of the
single-engine was not as attentive, might I say, to the radio
signals as might have been. Is there anything that we see?
Mr. Hart, do you have anything that you would want to add
to this?
Mr. Hart. Yes, Senator. I do not have an answer for your
question today, but I would note that one of the issues we are
looking at in relation to this accident is traffic avoidance
technologies, in addition to the regulations regarding the use
of those technologies in this airspace. We will be looking at
those issues in our investigation of this accident.
Senator Lautenberg. I think it is quite apparent that FAA--
and I want to tell you something--I doubt that FAA has any more
enthusiastic supporters than I. To me they are like a fifth
branch of our military, and their calls to duty are as rigid as
one might ask. They are being taxed in many ways by
understaffing. If we look at the condition that exists in
Newark, for instance, where 40 controllers are called for and
we have 26 there now, plus 7 trainees or 7 less-than-full-
performance people, is it possible that more sets of eyes and
ears might have made a difference there?
Mr. Day. Senator Lautenberg, we cannot say what the
causality of the accident is. That is up to the Board, but we
do take this seriously and we are approaching several of the
things that you pointed out. So, for example, we are
simplifying the airspace. We are going to common traffic
advisory frequencies. Mr. Kragh was part of that task force.
They made eight recommendations to the FAA on which they were
very firm that we needed to encompass all eight recommendations
to really get the enhanced level of safety that we all expect.
This included working with the radar facility, that is the New
York TRACON, to iron out and make sure we thoroughly stress-
tested the letters of agreement and the procedures among
controllers so we had that positive communications with the
flight crews and were trained and aware of everything that is
necessary to make sure every flight was successful.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Kragh, do you have any further
commentary about the population in the towers? If we look at
Newark, as I mentioned, it has an objective of 40 controllers
and we have 34, 7 of whom are trainees. If we look at
Teterboro, it is supposed to have 26. There are 23 but 8 of
them are trainees. LaGuardia has 36 required to fill all the
billets, and it has 35, just one difference. But the difference
comes in the fact that 12 of them are trainees.
I must tell you this. When I look at where we have been--
and I have been involved with FAA and aviation since I have
been in the Senate--no matter how many pleas we made for
filling the population, for having people trained--we face
enormous retirement possibilities, and we do not have the
population available to go into these slots and maintain the
kind of presence that we would like to see. You are aware of
that.
Mr. Kragh. Yes, Senator. Interestingly enough, Newark, even
though it is understaffed, as you just presented those numbers,
is the best of the four New York metro towers, and our ratio of
trainees to fully-certified controllers is the best of the four
towers. My professional opinion on the matter is that you
cannot have such a ratio of trainees to fully-certified
controllers. It just makes it very difficult to have an
efficient, safe operation when you are training that many
people at one time.
The other issue regarding trainees is that New York,
Kennedy, and LaGuardia are, for lack of a better term, the
major leagues of air traffic control towers. It is the busiest
airspace in the world. I would use a simple analogy of, let us
say, a med student. I would not want a med student performing
my heart surgery. In the same situation, we often see
controllers who have absolutely no background in air traffic
control coming to these towers to work as developmentals.
I think the agency was caught short-staffed when they did
not heed the union's warnings about the massive wave of
retirements. I believe it was 2004 when only 13 controllers
were hired nationwide. I might be wrong about that year, but
there was one year in recent history where only 13 controllers
were hired nationwide while the union was shouting from the top
of the mountain about the pending wave of retirements. And we
now have five senior controllers at Newark who can walk out the
door any day, and within the next 2 years, we will have three
or four more.
Senator Lautenberg. I think it must be made clear here that
our air traffic control system is the finest in the world. When
you look at the performance that goes on each and every day,
you marvel at the quality of the service, but it is at a
strain. There is a price that is paid for it. There is lots of
overtime. There is lots of stress on the individuals who are
doing it despite the fact that they do it so well.
Mr. Day, would Next Generation air traffic control
technology allow all aircraft in this airspace to be tracked?
Mr. Day. It is feasible with technology that, we can do a
lot of surveillance. It all depends on siting. As you know, it
is a complex environment from the skyline and the structures,
as well as the radio frequency interference, and that is an
engineering design challenge--but hypothetically we can surveil
quite a bit.
Senator Lautenberg. So we are not at a stage where we can
say, OK, we have got everything designed. We are ready for
manufacture or installation and so forth. We are not at that
point in our development.
Mr. Day. Again, sir, it is hypothetical without the
engineering work. The technology is there, but certainly from
an engineering standpoint, it would need additional study. We
are conducting site surveys up there right now for ADS-B
coverage. That is around the Kennedy-LaGuardia-Newark area, and
we will know later this month what we feel we can see in that
region.
Senator Lautenberg. How oversimplified am I being when I
say that perhaps the George Washington Bridge could include
some what would be onsite radar to be looking down that river
and giving us a lot of information?
Mr. Day. I do not think you are being oversimplified at all
but putting the 50-year-old radar technology in may limit the
possibilities for dealing with complex, high-density operations
in the future. We really need to move to high-update type of
surveillance systems like ADS-B, and capabilities like Data
Link. This is because with high traffic saturation, the
physical ability for the controller to talk individually by
voice with each aircraft may be a limiter in the level of
safety and efficiency that they can provide to the public in
that area. So it is not a simple solution.
We have got the task force together. NATCA has been part of
that. We are looking at, in the near term over the next 5
years, those types of capabilities that we can put into the
system.
In addition, I would like to mention that performance-based
navigation, RNAV and RNP, if you are familiar with that, is
another solution where we can segregate aircraft by mission
profile or destination to keep them separated from one another.
What has great possibility is redesigning the airspace, as well
as putting in the performance-based RNAV/RNP capabilities and
adding the surveillance and in the future the Data Link type of
communications that will make up our NextGen system.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Day, the New York Airspace Task
Force highlighted the benefits of good collaboration between
the traffic controllers and the FAA, something that seems to
not have been done in the past. So now, is FAA committed to
including the air traffic controllers in FAA projects,
including implementation of Next Gen and airspace redesign, to
make sure that we have the knowledge and the benefit of their
experience on the front line?
Mr. Day. Senator, we have had great experience in the Task
Force 5, as well as this recent task force that Mr. Kragh
participated in. Also, the New York-New Jersey-Philadelphia
airspace redesign went well over a decade, and had many
subject-matter experts, including controllers involved in that.
The Administrator recognizes and we believe that controller
participation and technician participation is a valuable asset
in deploying capabilities into the future. So, yes, sir, we do
believe in their participation.
Senator Lautenberg. That is your army and you have got to
know what the soldiers say, what the soldiers see when you are
designing a tactic or a strategy. Certainly I would recommend
that that be an integral part of any planning actions that are
taking place.
The Hudson River crash was, again, with an on-demand
aircraft. In 2005, an FAA special committee made 124
recommendations to the FAA to improve the safety of on-demand
operators. And the NTSB, Mr. Hart, has issued 16
recommendations to the FAA on this subject. Yet, none of these
recommendations have been adopted by FAA. When should we expect
FAA to finally act on these recommendations?
Mr. Hart. Thank you, Senator. Of course, we are always
pushing for implementation of all of our recommendations as
soon as possible, but I will have to get back to you with more
specific answers to your question. I am not conversant on those
recommendations as we speak.
[The information referred to follows:]
The NTSB does not know how quickly the FAA will implement our
recommendations, but we will continue to use every means at our
disposal to get them implemented as quickly as possible.
Our investigation into the Hudson River accident is ongoing, and
the NTSB has yet to determine if any of the outstanding recommendations
to the FAA regarding on-demand operations are applicable to this
accident.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Day, do you have any comments?
Mr. Day. Senator, unfortunately, Ms. Gilligan could not be
here, and she is the arm of the FAA that regulates those on-
demand types of operations. That is different than my
discipline. So I will have to take an IOU.
Senator Lautenberg. Will you see that I get a response to
that?
Mr. Day. We will. We will get that back, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Federal Aviation Administration Report AV-2009-066, dated July 13,
2009, stated that 16 National Transportation Safety Board
recommendations resulting from on-demand operator accident
investigations remained open. Those recommendations are listed below
with a brief synopsis of current activity, and categorized by the
bolded print. We continue to make an assertive effort to respond to all
the pending safety recommendations.
Flight Duty and Rest
A-06-12: Require all emergency medical services operators to comply
with 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operations specifications
during the conduct of all flights with medical personnel onboard.
NTSB Status: Open-unacceptable
FAA Status: The FAA has drafted an NPRM for air ambulance and
commercial helicopter operations that will have language addressing
Part 135 flight and duty time. We anticipate completion of the NPRM in
January 2010 with publication following clearance from the Department
and the Office of Management and Budget.
We have submitted this status to the NTSB and are currently waiting
on the Board's response.
Icing Conditions
A-06-42: Develop visual and tactile training aids to accurately
depict small amounts of upper wing surface contamination and require
all commercial airplane operators to incorporate these training aids
into their initial and recurrent training.
NTSB Status: Open-unacceptable
FAA Status: The FAA has tried to impress upon the NTSB how
difficult it is to provide visual and tactile training aids that can
represent the wide variety of aircraft and aircraft surfaces, as well
as types of contaminants that exist in various environments. The FAA
believes the best approach is for pilots to know what their specific
aircraft surfaces look and feel like in wet and dry conditions. The FAA
believes that pilots should be trained that any difference in
appearance or feel is unacceptable and the contaminant must be removed
prior to flight. The best training device to accomplish this is the
actual aircraft with visual and hands-on training on recognition of
contamination. The FAA has made several changes to various documents
which specifically recommend certificate holder's training curricula
include aircraft type-specific techniques for use by the flight crew
and other personnel for recognizing contamination on aircraft surfaces.
They also state that the flight crew and other personnel should use
these type-specific techniques while conducting preflight aircraft
icing checks, pre-takeoff checks, and pre-takeoff contamination checks.
It is recommended to all pilots to ensure that the aircraft's lift-
generating surfaces are completely free of contamination before flight
through a tactile check of the critical surfaces when feasible.
Since our last response to the NTSB, the FAA has developed InFO
09016 to again inform operators of the necessity of removing all
contamination from critical aircraft surfaces, no matter how thin,
patchy or where it is located. The InFO also provides guidance to
operators and pilots on how to conduct a visual and tactile inspection
and how to train a pilot to accurately conduct these checks. The InFO
is scheduled for publication in November 2009.
Crew Resource Management (CRM)
A-03-52: Require that 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135
on-demand charter operators that conduct dual-pilot operations
establish and implement a Federal Aviation Administration-approved crew
resource management training program for their flight crews in
accordance with 14 CFR Part 121, subparts N and O.
NTSB Status: Open-unacceptable
FAA Status: On May 1, 2009, the FAA issued the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM), Crew Resource Management Training for Crewmembers in
Part 135 Operations (74 FR 20263). The NPRM proposes a requirement for
all Part 135 certificate holders, both single-pilot and dual-pilot
operations, to implement FAA-approved crew resource management training
for crewmembers. We expect the final rule to be published in 2010.
We have submitted this status to the NTSB and are currently waiting
on the Board's response.
Cabin Safety
A-06-68: Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135
certificate holders to ensure that seatbelts at all seat positions are
visible and accessible to passengers before each flight.
NTSB Status: Open-acceptable alternative
FAA Status: The FAA agrees that a seatbelt must be visible and
accessible to support compliance with the regulations. Accordingly, we
issued SAFO 08004 to remind operators of this. We also revised
inspector guidance for surveillance of cabin interiors to include a
check of passenger seatbelts to verify they are visible and accessible
to passengers. This effort resulted in revisions to three sections of
FAA Order 8900.1.
We have submitted this status to the NTSB and are currently waiting
on the Board's response.
A-06-69: Require that any cabin personnel on board 14 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 135 flights who could be perceived by
passengers as equivalent to a qualified flight attendant receive basic
FAA-approved safety training in at least the following areas: preflight
briefing and safety checks; emergency exit operation; and emergency
equipment usage. This training should be documented and recorded by the
Part 135 certificate holder.
NTSB Status: Open-acceptable
FAA Status: FAA issued SAFO 08010, Accomplishing safety-related
Functions in Part 135 Operations, on March 20, 2008. This SAFO stresses
to pilots in 14 CFR Part 135 Operations the importance of: (1) clearly
identifying to passengers those crew members who are safety-qualified
and those who are not, and (2) accomplishing all functions relating to
passenger safety when no safety-qualified flight attendant is on board.
We have submitted this status to the NTSB and are currently waiting
on the Board's response.
Personal Flotation Devices
A-07-27: Require that all helicopters used in commercial air tour
operations over water, regardless of the amount of time over water, be
amphibious or equipped with fixed or inflatable floats.
NTSB Status: Open-unacceptable
FAA Status: The FAA issued Part 136, Commercial Air Tours and
National Parks Air Tour Management, which includes requirements for
additional emergency equipment for over water operations, including
life preservers and helicopter floats for all single-engine helicopters
and certain multi-engine helicopters. The FAA also published Operations
Specifications to address this issue. We consider that our actions
address the intent of this safety recommendation.
A-07-28: Evaluate the design, maintenance, and in-service handling
of personal flotation devices (PFDs) manufactured in compliance with
Technical Standard Order C13f to determine the reason that some
chambers fail to inflate when the inflation handles are pulled before
the PFDs have reached the manufacturer's recommended inspection
interval.
A-07-29: On the basis of the results of the evaluation requested by
Safety Recommendation A-07-28, ensure that personal flotation devices
manufactured in compliance with Technical Standard Order C13f remain
usable throughout the manufacturer's inspection interval.
NTSB Status: Open-acceptable
FAA Status: FAA agrees with the intent of these safety
recommendations and has stated that a program is being initiated to
identify the specific life preserver model having in-service inflation
failures and to determine the design, maintenance, and handling causes
leading to the failures.
Oversight and Training
A-06-52: Require records reviews, aging airplane inspections, and
supplemental inspections for all airplanes operated under 14 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, all U.S. registered airplanes
operated under 14 CFR Part 129, and all airplanes used in scheduled
operations under 14 CFR Part 135. This would include those airplanes
operated under Part 135 that carry nine or fewer passengers and those
that are operated in scheduled cargo service.
NTSB Status: Closed-unacceptable
FAA Status: In its letter of June 2009, the Board stated the 2006
Advisory Circular (AC) on Fatigue Management Programs for Airplanes
with a Demonstrated Risk of Catastrophic Failure Due to Fatigue, is
reactive. The AC however, provides guidance to address an unsafe
condition when there is a demonstrated risk of catastrophic failure,
rather than establishing an inspection program to discover serious
structural problems that threaten an aircraft's safety before a failure
occurs.
A-05-9: Develop specific criteria regarding the number of accidents
and/or incidents that would cause an increase in oversight of an
operator.
NTSB Status: Open-acceptable
FAA Status: The focus of the FAA's oversight program is to verify
that air carrier systems comply with regulatory standards and to
validate that those programs perform as intended. The FAA amended FAA
Order 1800.56, National Program Guidelines, which now requires
principal inspectors to consider accident/incident trends, patterns and
causal factors, as well as other types of safety data that may signal a
need for additional surveillance.
A-05-8: Review the procedures used during its oversight of Air
Sunshine, including those for the Surveillance and Evaluation Program
and Regional Aviation Safety Inspection Program, to determine why the
inspections failed to ensure that operational and maintenance issues
that existed at the company were corrected. On the basis of the
findings of this review, modify Part 135 inspection procedures to
ensure that such issues, including maintenance record keeping and
practices, are identified and corrected before accidents occur.
NTSB Status: Closed-acceptable
FAA Status: In August 2009, the Board classified this
recommendation as closed acceptable stating that Southern Region
Evaluation Services Office review and report and the resulting
revisions to Order 8900.1 complete the recommended action.
A-03-51: Conduct en route inspections and observe ground training,
flight training, and proficiency checks at all 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 135 on-demand charter operations as is done at Part
121 operations and Part 135 commuter operations to ensure the adequacy,
quality, and standardization of pilot training and flight operations.
NTSB Status: Open-acceptable alternative
FAA Status: The FAA has accomplished a number of actions to address
the safety intent of this recommendation. The FAA published Notice
8900.49, Work Program Development for Part 135 Helicopter Emergency
Medical Services (HEMS) Operators or Commercial Air Tour Operators on
September 10, 2008, which instructed assigned inspectors to use
Surveillance Priority Index (SPI) when planning their work programs,
and to document a specific national use code in the Program Tracking
and Reporting Subsystem (PTRS) when recording the results of en route
inspections. The FAA met with the NTSB staff in August 2009 to
demonstrate the use of the SPI to prioritize oversight activities.
Since the FAA issued Notice 8900.49, the FAA has also issued Order
1800.56J, National Flight Standards Work Program Guidelines for FY2010.
The work programs are risk-based and are created and adjusted based on
recurring safety assessments. Order 1800.56J requires inspectors to use
the Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS) for safety assessment,
surveillance planning, decision-making, certification, and
investigation, as appropriate.
General Aviation and Air Taxi Activity (GAATA) Survey
A-05-11: Develop, validate, and document an unbiased method for
generating and revising activity estimates based on nonscheduled 14
Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 and Part 91, Subpart K, operator
surveys or reporting.
NTSB Status: Open-acceptable
FAA Status: The Board's response of January 2006, commended the FAA
for its efforts in improving the credibility of data obtained by the
General Aviation survey. They also noted that the recommendations asked
that the FAA: (1) validate the newly obtained data with other industry
activity measures and (2) document the accuracy and degree to which the
new survey process captures industry activity. The Board classified
this recommendation as open acceptable. The FAA has taken several
measures to improve the accuracy of the reporting for nonscheduled
Parts 135 and 91. The sampling size for the survey has tripled and we
are now sampling 100 percent of all Part 135 operators. Results from
the revised 2004-2006 surveys show consistently improved data, which
has built a higher confidence among both government and industry users.
Once the preliminary survey data is received every September, the data
is sent to NTSB, GAMA and AOPA and several offices within the FAA for
validation. All parties have until October to concur with the validity
of the data and that becomes the official data for that year.
A-03-37: Require nonscheduled Part 135 operators to report activity
data on an annual basis to include total hours flown, revenue flight
hours, revenue miles flown, and number of departures by category/class
of aircraft; to identify for each aircraft the proportion of flight
time operations that are involved in sightseeing, air medical
transport, passenger transportation, and cargo only transportation; to
report for cargo operations freight ton miles available and freight ton
miles flown; and to report for passenger service operations seat miles
available and passenger miles flown.
NTSB Status: Open-acceptable
FAA Status: In an effort to get all operators to report their
activity data, the FAA looked for a way to reach out to all operators.
The FAA developed an independent data collection track for high-end,
high-use operators, as well as the acquisition and use of secondary
data sources for locating knowledgeable respondents. As a result, all
Part 135 operators receive a survey, and currently each Part 135
operator receives a single specially designed summary questionnaire to
allow reporting of their entire fleet of aircraft. The FAA also worked
closely with Part 135 associations, such as NBAA and NATA with outreach
activities to encourage their members to respond. Because of the
changes and the active assistance from industry and trade
organizations, the statistical validity of the nonscheduled Part 135
activity has significantly improved and at this time the FAA is not
pursuing mandatory reporting.
Cockpit Voice Recorder
A-03-63: Amend the current regulations for 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Parts 91, 135, and 121 operations to require all turbine
powered, nonexperimental, nonrestricted category aircraft that have the
capability of seating six or more passengers to be equipped with an
approved 2 hour cockpit voice recorder that is operated continuously
from the start of the use of the checklist (before starting engines for
the purpose of flight), to completion of the final checklist at the
termination of the flight.
NTSB Status: Open-unacceptable
FAA Status: On March 7, 2008, FAA published Final Rule, Revisions
to Cockpit Voice Recorder and Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR)
Regulations. The final rule includes a retrofit requirement for
existing turbine-engine powered airplanes operated under Parts 121 and
125. By April 7, 2012, these airplanes are required to have an approved
CVR that can record at least the last 2 hours of information and
operate continuously from the use of the checklist before the flight to
completion of the final checklist at the end of the flight. These same
requirements apply to newly manufactured airplanes operated under Parts
121 and 125 after April 6, 2010.
For Part 91 aircraft required to carry a CVR, the requirement for
the CVR to be operated continuously from the use of the checklist
before the flight to completion of the final checklist at the end of
the flight has been effective since October 11, 1991. The final rule
has mandated this same requirement for Part 135 newly manufactured
aircraft that are required to carry a CVR after April 6, 2010.
The final rule also has a requirement for the CVR to record at
least the last 2 hours of information for aircraft that are required to
have a CVR and operated under Parts 91 and 135. This requirement will
affect newly manufactured aircraft after April 6, 2010.
We have decided not to mandate the CVR retrofit requirements of
recording at least the last 2 hours of information and operating
continuously from the use of the checklist before the flight to
completion of the final checklist at the end of the flight for aircraft
required to carry a CVR operating under Parts 91 and 135. In responding
to comments received to the NPRM, we were not able to quantify or
justify the potential burden of the CVR retrofit requirements on these
operators and the requirement for retrofit was removed from the final
version of the rule.
We have submitted this status to the NTSB and are currently waiting
on the Board's response.
Senator Lautenberg. The recommendations from the New York
Airspace Task Force are supposed to take effect November 19 of
this year. Is the FAA going to meet that deadline?
Mr. Day. Yes, sir, we intend to. I think it is a credit to
the diverse task force that we put together. We built buy-in
for those recommendations by using the operators, as well as
the employees and the employees' labor representatives, in
fashioning these recommendations. So we believe that given the
public comment period, we will have buy-in and support and good
feedback on those recommendations. We will be able to implement
them on November 19. We will be ready.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Hart, I would ask you this. The
NTSB has repeatedly recommended to the FAA the importance of
pilots having sufficient rest prior to flights. Given the lack
of safety oversight on on-demand operators, how can the FAA be
assured that pilots are not fatigued and not getting the
appropriate time away before flying these aircraft?
Mr. Hart. That is a very good question, Senator, and
certainly we are looking at the question in relation to the
Colgan accident. We have not identified fatigue as an issue in
this accident, and we are doing quite a bit in that regard on
the Colgan accident which will come out in that report.
Senator Lautenberg. We are looking forward to your answer
there, because the very shape of the structure invites some
fatigue because a home base may be in one place and people have
to include that flying time to get to their operating station,
and also the fact is that so much time is consumed away from
direct pilot responsibilities but getting to and from work.
I thank each one of you for your testimony. We are going to
take the liberty of calling on you. We will keep the record
open for 2 weeks, and we will see if any of our other members,
who could not be here, have any questions.
We salute your efforts toward safety, but we have to make
sure that everybody who gets into an airplane has the feeling
that it is being supervised by the FAA or some other agency
that has responsibility for their safety and convenience.
Thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, August 10, 2009
Hon. Byron L. Dorgan,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Dear Chairman Dorgan:
I am writing to request that the Subcommittee on Aviation
Operations, Safety, and Security move expeditiously to hold a hearing
on the safety of ``on-demand'' aircraft--small, privately chartered
aircraft, including helicopters.
This past weekend. a small private airplane taking off from
Teterboro Airport in New Jersey and carrying three people and a New
York City tourist helicopter carrying six people collided over the
Hudson River, killing all nine people. This deadly crash highlights
concerns not only with the specific airspace above the Hudson River,
where pilots must navigate the busy skies through a tactic known as
``see and avoid,'' but also with on-demand aircraft safety more
generally.
According to a report issued by the U.S. Department of
Transportation's Inspector General (IG) last month, on-demand aircraft
receive far less oversight from the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and have far more fatalities than commercial aircraft. Moreover,
although the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has identified
a number of safety improvements related to small, privately chartered
aircraft, the FAA has failed to implement these improvements. For
example, following a 2005 accident in Teterboro, New Jersey, the NTSB
made recommendations regarding flight attendant training improvements
that could have mitigated the injuries during that crash; to date, the
FAA has not proposed any regulatory changes to address these
recommendations. In fact, the FAA's rules for small, privately
chartered aircraft have not been updated since 1978.
In light of Saturday's final crash and overdue safety improvements
for on-demand aircraft, I respectfully request a hearing to examine
this critical aviation safety issue. Thank you for your consideration
and please let me know if I can be of assistance.
Sincerely,
Frank R. Lautenberg,
U.S. Senator.
______
Prepared Statement of Craig L. Fuller, President,
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
My name is Craig Fuller, and I am President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), a not-
for-profit individual membership organization representing more than
415,000 members, nearly three-quarters of the Nation's pilots. AOPA's
mission is to effectively represent the interests of its members as
aircraft owners and pilots concerning the economy, safety, utility, and
popularity of flight in general aviation (GA) aircraft.
Although GA is typically characterized by recreational flying, it
encompasses much more. In addition to providing personal, business, and
freight transportation, general aviation supports such diverse
activities as law enforcement, fire fighting, air ambulance, logging,
fish and wildlife management, news gathering, and other vital services.
Each year, 170 million passengers fly using personal aviation, the
equivalent of one of the Nation's major airlines, contributing more
than $150 billion to U.S. economic output, directly or indirectly, and
employing nearly 1.3 million people whose collective annual earnings
exceed $53 billion. General aviation serves 5,200 public-use airports
as well as more than 13,000 privately-owned landing facilities. In a
poll conducted on election night last November, more than 60 percent of
American voters said they understood that general aviation (all flying
other than military or commercial airlines) is a vital part of
America's transportation system.
Controlled and Uncontrolled Airspace
The notion that we have uncontrolled airspace in the United States
may, at first blush, seem unusual. Despite official use of the term
``uncontrolled'', the reality is that all airspace in the United States
exists under some degree of control. Those of us who fly in the
airspace do so within a complex set of rules and regulations that
control where we fly and under what conditions. What is referred to as
``uncontrolled airspace'' is actually carefully depicted on charts and
is available to pilots only when very specific weather and visibility
conditions exist.
Figure 1: Uncontrolled airspace from the surface to 700, is charted
within the shaded magenta areas. Outside these areas uncontrolled
airspace exists from the surface to 1,200,.
In practice, different groups tend to refer to different types of
airspace as ``uncontrolled.'' Air traffic control (ATC) typically
considers airspace outside of the areas where controllers provide
positive control of all aircraft to be ``uncontrolled.'' This would
generally include any airspace that is not designated as Class A, B, C,
or D airspace.
The official FAA definition of ``uncontrolled'' airspace is
different, however. According to the FAA, uncontrolled airspace is
simply airspace with lower visibility and cloud clearance requirements.
It typically exists below 700 feet above the ground in the vicinity of
most airports and below 1,200 feet above the ground in most other
areas. In the Hudson River corridor, controlled airspace begins at 700
feet, meaning most traffic, including most all fixed-wing traffic, is
flying within controlled airspace. Most VFR flyways or ``corridors,''
including the Hudson River corridor, are actually within controlled
airspace.
Even though the airspace is technically ``controlled'', aircraft
choosing to operate under IFR are steered clear of such corridors, even
when weather is good. This ensures that instrument flights, whether
commercial or private, are kept separate from VFR flights operating in
designated corridors, flyways, and transition routes.
VFR Flying Is Controlled by Definition
Although they often are characterized as ``uncontrolled,'' flights
made under visual flight rules, or VFR, adhere to strict procedures
designed to ensure the safety of those in the air and on the ground.
VFR flight is governed by a defined set of FAA regulations and
``rules of the road'' covering operation of aircraft primarily by
visual reference to the horizon for aircraft control and see-and-avoid
procedures for traffic separation. VFR is used by more than 70 percent
of all flights; it is not, by definition, uncontrolled or out of
control.
All pilots, including those who fly exclusively under visual flight
rules, are required to undergo extensive training, be tested to
established FAA standards, and maintain proficiency at levels
determined by the FAA. Pilot qualifications must be reevaluated at
least every 2 years. In addition, pilots must adhere to regulatory
requirements for flight planning and follow regulations governing
factors including airspeed, direction of flight, altitude, weather
minimums, and communication.
The rules that govern visual flight, instrument flight, and
operations through airspace corridors are established precisely to
maximize operational safety. The rules are taught to all pilots, tested
over time, and refined as necessary, as we have recently seen from the
process of reviewing and revising the rules for flying in the airspace
over the Hudson River in New York.
Hundreds of thousands of safe operations have been conducted year
after year in corridors around the Nation. They represent consistent,
long-term evidence that VFR traffic can be safely and efficiently
accommodated even in the busiest airspace.
See and Avoid
Under FAA regulations, all pilots are ultimately responsible for
maintaining separation from other aircraft whenever visual conditions
permit, as they do at any time aircraft are operating under VFR. Even
flights that are being guided by air traffic controllers, either under
instrument flight rules (IFR) or VFR, are responsible for visually
scanning to see and avoid potential traffic conflicts. The see-and-
avoid principle is codified in Federal Aviation Regulation 14 CFR Part
91.113(b) as follows:
``When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an
operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual
flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person
operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.
When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-
of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not
pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.''
With the onus on all pilots to be vigilant for other traffic,
midair collisions are rare. For example, in 2007, there were 624,007
pilots in the United States along with 221,943 general aviation
aircraft. All told, pilots flew 21.4 million flight hours that year.
That same year, general aviation aircraft were involved in 10 midair
collisions, four of which were fatal. The accidents included a
collision between competitors rounding a pylon in an air race, and a
collision between two aircraft conducting a formation landing. Of the
remaining accidents, two occurred during flight instruction; three
occurred in the traffic pattern, including one at a towered airport;
two occurred during formation flight; and one occurred in low-altitude
cruising flight.
Corridors, Flyways and Transition Routes
The aviation community utilizes many terms, often in the wrong
context, to describe methods of transitioning either through or around
the Nation's busiest airspace, designated as Class B. Class B airspace
surrounds the largest airports in cities like Boston, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and New York, among others.
Class B airspace is designed to help manage the flow of high
volumes of airline traffic as these aircraft transition from the high-
altitude flight levels into the lower altitudes and eventually to the
airport itself and in reverse for departing aircraft. The airspace is
shaped like an upside-down wedding cake with concentric expanding
circles stacked on top of each other. The airspace and corresponding
shape funnels aircraft in and out of the main airport.
Figure 2: Class B airspace takes the form of an upside down wedding
cake, with the largest rings at the highest altitudes.
Most, but not all, Class B airspace extends from the surface to
10,000 feet mean sea level (msl) with the diameter of the largest and
highest sections often exceeding 40 nautical miles. Pilots must obtain
a clearance from air traffic control before entering Class B airspace
and then maintain radio contact with ATC. Aircraft must be equipped
with an altitude-encoding transponder.
Published VFR routes for transitioning around, under, and through
complex airspace such as Class B airspace were developed through a
number of FAA and industry initiatives. The terms ``VFR flyway'', ``VFR
corridor'', and ``Class B airspace VFR transition route'' all have been
used when referring to such routes or airspace.
Each type of transition airspace is slightly different, although
all share the goal of guiding VFR traffic safely in the vicinity of
busy, complex airspace.
VFR flyways are general flight paths, not defined as a specific
course, for use by pilots in planning flights into, out of, through, or
near complex terminal airspace to avoid Class B airspace. An ATC
clearance is not required to fly these routes. These routes are not
intended to discourage requests for VFR operations within Class B
airspace but are designed to assist pilots in planning flights that do
not actually enter Class B airspace.
VFR flyways are generally charted on VFR Flyway Charts found on the
reverse side of many Terminal Area Charts, but not all flyways are
charted. The route commonly referred to as the ``Hudson River
Corridor'' by pilots and the ``Hudson River Exclusion'' by air traffic
controllers is actually an example of an uncharted VFR flyway.
(Although it should be noted that the FAA plans to chart this route in
the future as part of the revisions planned following the recent Hudson
River midair collision.)
It is important to remember that these suggested routes are not
sterile of other traffic. The entire Class B airspace, and the airspace
underneath it, may be heavily congested with many different types of
aircraft. Pilots using flyways must strictly adhere to VFR rules.
VFR corridors are designed into some Class B airspace areas to
provide a designated space for the passage of VFR traffic. A VFR
corridor is defined as airspace through Class B airspace, with defined
vertical and lateral boundaries, in which aircraft may operate without
an ATC clearance or communication with air traffic control. A corridor
is, in effect, a ``hole'' through Class B airspace. A corridor is
surrounded on all sides by Class B airspace and does not extend down to
the surface like a VFR flyway. One example of a corridor can be found
in the San Diego Class B airspace just east of the airport between
3,300 feet and 4,700 feet.
Because of the heavy traffic volume and the procedures necessary to
efficiently manage the flow of traffic, it has not been possible to
incorporate VFR corridors in the development or modification of Class B
airspace in recent years.
To accommodate VFR traffic through certain Class B airspace, such
as Seattle, Phoenix and Los Angeles, Class B airspace VFR transition
routes were developed. A Class B airspace VFR transition route is
defined as a specific flight course depicted on a Terminal Area Chart
for transiting specific Class B airspace. These routes include ATC-
assigned altitudes, and pilots must obtain an ATC clearance prior to
entering Class B airspace on the route.
``Corridors'' Are Necessary and Enhance Safety
Since becoming president of AOPA 8 months ago, I have flown
numerous times into busy airspace around New York, Boston, Houston,
Dallas, and Los Angeles. In all cases, I flew using an instrument
flight plan. My approaches and departures were handled by air traffic
control, keeping me clear of the areas where aircraft could operate
under visual flight rules without contacting air traffic control.
Without the VFR corridors, flyways, and transition routes, air
traffic controllers would be forced to handle thousands of additional
operations in and around some of the busiest airspace in the country.
Delays would be inevitable and some aircraft would skirt the areas
requiring contact with air traffic control, making their precise
locations unpredictable. Corridors, flyways, and transition routes
create designated spaces for these VFR flights, easing controller
workload, and making it easier for aircraft to avoid one another in
crowded skies.
In the days since the Hudson River midair collision, I have heard
from many AOPA members who have safely used the Hudson River flyway and
similar routes nationwide for many years. Their comments consistently
note that such routes are efficient means of safely navigating through
busy airspace, adding that if these routes were lost, pilots would be
forced to fly many miles out of their way, significantly increasing
costs and imposing new safety risks associated with fuel usage and
weather considerations.
The Hudson River Corridor Working Group Recommendations
It is understandable that a tragedy like the one we recently
witnessed in New York brings calls for major airspace realignments.
While these calls are based on the best of intentions, it is important
to base action on careful calculations of risks and airspace
utilization. Even well-intentioned efforts to realign airspace are
likely to come with unintended consequences that could increase, rather
than reduce, hazards in and around busy airspace.
FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt on Sept. 2 announced steps the
agency will take to enhance safety in the Hudson River flyway--steps
AOPA believes are sensible and likely to have a favorable effect.
The plan is the direct result of a working group convened by
Babbitt just 2 weeks ago that was made up primarily of FAA staff from
diverse departments, including the air traffic organization, air
traffic controllers, airspace designers, and flight standards. The
panel also included AOPA and representatives of two other industry
groups to reflect the needs of airspace users. I believe this
cooperative effort is an excellent example of how to effectively
address safety concerns by considering the needs of all stakeholders.
The FAA is expected to implement the working group's eight
recommendations, which align closely with those developed independently
by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
The working group report suggests making current best practices
mandatory. These practices including flying with lights on and using
two-way air-to-air communication. The recommendations also include
developing flight rules and training for operations in the exclusion
zone. As noted previously, the FAA plan also goes beyond the NTSB
recommendations by adding improved charting to include VFR flyways,
which will give pilots more and better information.
Training and Education
Pilots are accustomed to making recurring training part of their
flying regimen. Pilots engage in both mandatory and voluntary training
programs aimed at improving safety. AOPA is actively assisting in
making additional training materials and programs available to pilots
through the AOPA Air Safety Foundation.
Earlier this week, AOPA Air Safety Foundation President Bruce
Landsberg went to New Jersey to host a training seminar focusing on
best practices for flying in and around New York. The seminar was
available both in person and via Web cast to maximize participation.
In addition, numerous mechanisms already exist to ensure that
training on the use of flyways, corridors, and transition routes is
integrated into ongoing pilot training. Options include making it an
area of emphasis for flight reviews, which are required of all active
pilots every 2 years, and practical tests, which are taken by all new
pilots as well as those who are upgrading or adding new certificates or
ratings. Information on using corridors can also be added to Flight
instructor renewal courses, which many flight instructors use to renew
their certificates every 2 years. Finally, the aviation industry can be
enlisted to communicate key training information through print and
electronic media such as magazines and newspapers delivered to pilots.
The FAA's FAAST Team provides another possible mechanism for
disseminating important safety and training information.
Conclusion and Summary
Safety is a top priority for everyone within the aviation
community, and history has shown that VFR flyways, corridors, and
transition routes are a safe and efficient way of moving traffic
through some of the Nation's busiest airspace.
Despite the use of the term ``uncontrolled'', virtually all
airspace is controlled to some degree, and pilots who fly in it must
strictly adhere to regulations and requirements governing everything
from their qualifications and the airworthiness of their aircraft to
weather and altitude.
By providing well-known routes through complex and busy airspace,
these ``corridors'' reduce the workload on air traffic controllers and
help controllers and other pilots predict the location of VFR traffic.
Eliminating such routes could have dangerous unintended consequences.
At the same time, as the recent Hudson River Corridor Working Group
demonstrated, there are opportunities to enhance safety while keeping
the airspace open by codifying best practices, improving charting, and
making additional training materials available to pilots. Identifying
such opportunities can be done most effectively when the FAA partners
with the aviation industry to identify the needs of stakeholders early
in the process.
______
Prepared Statement of Ed Bolen, President and CEO,
National Business Aviation Association
The National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) represents the
interests of over 8,000 member companies who rely on the use of general
aviation aircraft for a business purpose. General Aviation includes
diverse operations, with business uses that range from agriculture, law
enforcement, fire and medevac services, to varied government,
educational, nonprofit and business organizations. NBAA's members
operate in every type of airspace and airport across the Nation. We
appreciate the opportunity to provide the Subcommittee with our views
for the hearing today on the Hudson River Airspace.
Aviation remains the safest mode of transportation, bar none. The
number of safely completed operations continues to rise each year. This
impressive record is in large part due to the continued partnership
between the aviation community and the government to pursue new
technologies, enhanced procedures and implement new safety-based
requirements that further improve aviation's already impressive safety
record.
As we all know--tragically--aviation accidents do happen. When they
occur, the entire aviation community feels a sense of loss and pain.
Every accident investigation provides insight and lessons as to how we
can improve aviation safety. However, it is important to note that each
incident involves a unique set of situations, causal elements and
factors. In this area, the National Transportation Safety Board is
tasked with analyzing accidents and determining the cause.
Long History of Safety Partnership
NBAA and its member companies have a long, demonstrated history of
partnering with the FAA to address safety issues and mitigate risks. It
has been shown repeatedly, and again following the recent tragic midair
collision over the New York City-Hudson River, that engaging affected
parties to assist with the development of safety solutions produces
better results. We commend FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt for reaching
out to the aviation community in the days immediately following this
accident to identify cooperative steps that could be taken to enhance
air safety in this busy and vital air corridor.
Specifically, the airspace and radio frequency changes proposed by
the FAA will standardize existing procedures, provide greater knowledge
of those local procedures to transient aircraft, and increase
communication between FAA controllers overseeing those operations.
While we do not yet know all the facts relating to the causes of
the August 8, 2009, accident, NBAA believes that the actions proposed
by the FAA will further enhance aviation safety in the New York City-
Hudson River airspace. These announced steps take advantage of
established industry practices already in place and well known to
pilots that regularly operate within that busy airspace. The new safety
procedures in the low-level airspace over the Hudson River are
reasonable and workable and our members are committed to these efforts.
In addition to the important analysis work done on aviation
accidents and incidents, it is also vital that we continue to maximize
the vast operational data collected by the FAA, NTSB, aviation
manufacturers and operators to drive future safety enhancements and
improve accident prevention. This analytical data often contains trends
which are important in identifying risks and capturing behaviors which
can contribute to aviation accidents. This knowledge is vital in
assisting industry and government efforts to improve aviation safety.
Action Key to Improved Safety
The FAA will soon issue a detailed rulemaking proposal to
incorporate these airspace safety proposals into regulation. We look
forward to reviewing the proposed rulemaking and being an active and
constructive stakeholder in the regulatory process.
NBAA would also like to take this opportunity to urge FAA to
implement several pending proposals that we believe would further
enhance aviation safety.
Nearly 5 years ago, an industry working group (The Part 135 and 125
Aviation Rulemaking Committee) chartered by the FAA--and which I
chaired--submitted extensive recommendations for regulatory changes
that would update and strengthen safety for FAR Part 135/125 industry.
These recommendations covered a multitude of subjects including basic
requirements for flying commercially, updates to pilot duty and rest
requirements, enhanced training for commercial pilots, revised aircraft
maintenance requirements and role of very light jets (VLJs) in on-
demand charter operations--all of which that would significantly
improve safety. Unfortunately, the Agency has not acted on those
recommendations to date. A copy of those recommendations and the
transmittal letter are attached to my testimony.
Over the years, NBAA has consistently welcomed the opportunity to
support FAA efforts that seek to improve aviation safety. We have
committed significant time, energy and resources to these projects only
to have the products of our effort languish with no improvements in
safety. While we understand that the FAA faces resource limitations
like the rest of us, it is frustrating to continue to support these FAA
projects without any clear understanding whether the agency will
implement the final recommendations.
In the interest of continued improvement in aviation safety, NBAA
and our members will always strive to lead, not follow. We look forward
to working with this Subcommittee, and the other government and
industry stakeholders to keep safety as our number one priority. NBAA
appreciates the opportunity to provide our comments to the Subcommittee
today. Thank you.
Attachment One
Part 135 and 125 Aviation Rulemaking Committee,
c/o J. Hennig (GAMA),
Washington, DC.
September 7, 2005
Hon. Marion C. Blakey,
Office of the Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration,
Washington, DC.
Dear Administrator Blakey:
I am writing you as the Chair of the Part 135/125 Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (ARC) and as the representative of the diverse
group of close to 200 participants from the operator community, unions,
trade associations, government, and manufacturers who supported the
ARC. With this letter and the accompanying electronic material, the ARC
submits its recommendations to you.
During the 27 months which the ARC worked we came to recognize the
breadth of operations that are included in Parts 135 and 125 ranging
from traditional passenger charter flights, to operators that support
rural Alaska with fuel, those who transport professional sports teams,
all-cargo carriers, aeromedical flights, and more. Each of these
operations represents an important segment of the air transportation
industry, but also unique needs and requirements from a safety and
regulatory perspective. When reviewing the ARC's recommendations you
will see that we have accommodated all communities and provided
targeted safety improvements tailored to their operating structure,
aircraft, size and environment.
We also looked at the possible future operating environments. For
Part 135 this includes the entry into service of very light jets (VLJ),
use of advanced cockpit equipment to improve safety and enhance
aircraft utility, and the use of airships for transportation of cargo.
Our recommendations address the operation and certification
requirements to support the scenarios that are envisioned.
The ARC was also tasked with streamlining regulations. Our biggest
initiative in this area focused on training regulations. Our
recommendations provide an opportunity for the FAA to propose a new
process for timely updates of training standards to make them
applicable to current and future operations.
The ARC additionally provides a complete rewrite of subpart F,
which covers crewmember flight time and duty periods as well as rest
requirements. Unlike the scheduled environment, Parts 135 and 125
include dynamic operations with unique requirements to ensure the
safety of crews and passengers. We believe that our majority-endorsed
recommendation will accomplish our goal of improving the safety of on-
demand operations while providing both the operator and crew
opportunity to proactively manage fatigue.
Included with this letter you will find a CD which contains over
140 recommendation documents addressing Parts 1, 23, 25, 61, 91, 119,
125, and 135. These documents capture group discussion and decisions on
key issues affecting this industry. Additionally, the CD contains draft
NPRM documents which include preamble and proposed rule language to
support the recommendations.
I would also like to recognize the hard work and leadership of the
workgroup chairs. The groups and workgroup chairs are:
Aero Medical Workgroup, Ken Javorski of CJ Systems Aviation
Airships Workgroup, Ron Hochstetler
Airworthiness Workgroup, Walter Desrosier of GAMA, and Brian
Finnegan of PAMA
Equipment and Technology, Dick Solar of Honeywell
Flight Duty and Rest Subgroup to Operation, Doug Carr of
NBAA
Operations Workgroup, Dave Hewitt of NetJets, Inc.
Rotorcraft Workgroup, Mike Hurst of Petroleum Helicopters
Training Workgroup, Bill Campbell of CAE SimuFlite
Finally, I want to communicate that the members of the ARC are
available to assist you and your staff as you consider the material. I
would also like to thank you for again showing leadership in creating
this Aviation Rulemaking Committee to conduct a regulatory review of
Parts 135 and 125.
Sincerely,
Ed Bolen,
President and CEO, NBAA.
Enclosures (provided electronically): Executive Summary
Recommendation Documents
Draft NPRM Documents
Cc: Nicholas A. Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
AVS-1
James J. Ballough, Director, Flight Standards Service, AFS-1
Anthony F. Fazio, Director, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1
Katherine Perfetti, National Resource Specialist Part 135
Jens C. Hennig, ARC Coordinator/Manger of Operations, GAMA
Attachment Two
Part 135/125 Aviation Rulemaking Committee
Overview of ARC Process and Activities
The Part 135/125 Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) was chartered
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on February 3, 2003, when
the agency issued a Notice of Regulatory Review. The notice solicited
membership and also requested comments to be submitted to the docket by
June 3, 2003. In response to the first request for comments and
requests for membership 97 issue documents were submitted by the
public. On July 17, 2003, the FAA reissued the request for comment with
a deadline of November 18, 2003, for submission of comments to be
considered by the Aviation Rulemaking Committee.
The issues submitted to the docket were divided up among eight
workgroups organized around aeromedical operations (AER), airworthiness
and maintenance (AWG), applicability (APP), airships (AIR), equipment
and technology (EQU), operations (OPS), rotorcraft operations (ROT),
and training (TRA).
The ARC met as a full committee three times in 2003 and four times
in 2004. Each meeting lasted 3 days and took place in the Washington,
DC area. In addition to the full ARC meetings, a number of the
workgroups also held separate meetings. These meetings included
multiple meetings of the operations committee's subgroup on flight,
duty and rest; meetings by the airworthiness group addressing
certification standards for high-performance Part 23 airplanes; and
extra meetings by the applicability group to look at large airplane
operations in Parts 135 and 125.
The aviation rulemaking committee's work was facilitated by using
an online Knowledge Sharing Network (KSN) that enabled all ARC
participants to review and comment work performed by the ARC both
within its own group and in other group.
In addition to holding meetings in concurrence with each full ARC
meeting, the Steering Committee held a three-day meeting in February
2005. Following the final Steering Committee meeting, the workgroup
Chairs coordinated the final document during the spring and early
summer 2005 using E-mail and the KSN. The final documents were
circulated to the full ARC using the KSN and then submitted to the FAA
on September 7, 2005. The final recommendation included a letter of
submission from the ARC Chair and accompanying CD-ROM with the ARC
Recommendations and draft NPRM material.
ARC Tasking and Decisions
The tasking from the FAA to the ARC was to:
a. Resolve current issues affecting this part of the industry.
b. Enable new aircraft types, size and design and new
technologies in air transportation operations.
c. Provide safety and applicability standards that reflect the
current industry, industry trends and emerging technologies and
operations.
d. Address international harmonization and ICAO standards.
e. Potentially rescind Part 125 from 14 Code of Federal
Regulations.
Each workgroup submitted recommendations to the FAA which were
coordinated through the Steering Committee, which had final approval on
each document. Each recommendation received a vote which resulted in
one of the following recommendations:
1. full consensus recommendation: All committee members
approved of the recommendation;
2. a general consensus: All committee members approved or could
live with the recommendation;
3. no consensus: One or several committee members disagreed
with the recommendations and these committee members were given
an opportunity to provide a dissenting opinion to the
recommendation. All dissenting opinions were the responsibility
of the individual dissenting committee member to draft and
provide for inclusion in the final recommendation to the FAA.
Prior to the final submission to the FAA, the complete
recommendation package was distributed to the full Part 135/125
Aviation Rulemaking Committee for comment to ensure that all issues had
been properly captured and that all dissenting opinions had been
submitted.
A summary of each workgroups set of recommendations follows.
However, all decisions and discussions should be referenced to the
Recommendation Documents which hold the final and complete
recommendation. In this Executive Summary, the workgroups are listed in
order: Applicability, Aeromedical, Airships, Airworthiness, Equipment
and Technology, Operations, Rotorcraft, and Training.
Applicability Workgroup
The applicability workgroup was made up of over 60 active
participants. The Committee's main focus was the proposal to rescind
Part 125 and respond to issues concerning the type of operation
permitted in Parts 135 and 91.
One of the main tasks given to the ARC by the FAA was to determine
whether to rescind Part 125. The Committee started by familiarizing
itself with the type of operators that currently reside within Part
125. These include private operations of large airplanes (which often
operate under an exemption under 91), corporations flying large
airplanes for sports teams, companies that transport parts for
automotive manufacturers, fuel haulers in Alaska, and several other
unique communities. The applicability group determined that this
diverse group of operators does not fit into any other operating part,
which is similar to statements made in the preamble to the original
Part 125 rulemaking in 1978. Therefore, the applicability group
recommended, and the steering committee agreed, that it would not be
appropriate to rescind Part 125, but instead the applicability group
should define the applicability of 125 and improve the safety
regulations that apply. The resulting recommendation defines
applicability of Part 125 by providing set economic and scope limits to
private carriage for hire operations and provides changes to 91 subpart
F to accommodate completely private operation of large airplanes and
also provides targeted safety improvements for both sections.
The group also considered a proposal for increasing the payload
capacity of Part 135 cargo-only operations from the current 7,500
pounds to 18,000 pounds, which would enable moving certain current
operators from Part 125 into 135. A recommendation was developed for
increased payload capacity and is being submitted to the FAA without
full consensus.
The applicability group also considered the expected emergence of
very light jets (VLJs) as an important segment within the Part 135 on-
demand community and possibly even the Part 135 scheduled operator
community. Based on these two possible market entries, the
applicability group felt it important that it follow FAA's guidance to
the ARC and ``[e]nable new aircraft types, size and design and new
technologies in air transportation operations.'' The applicability
group provided a consensus proposal for the introduction of scheduled
turbojet operations by aircraft with less than 9 seats under Part 135.
However, there was no consensus on whether scheduled operations under
Part 135 in turbojet airplanes should by with a single or dual crew,
but a majority proposal was provided. The group did provide extensive
recommendations on how on-demand operations in very light jets should
be conducted single pilot, which is currently permitted under 135.105
regulations. Additional recommendations were provided by the
Airworthiness group on certification standards for Part 23 jets and
high performance airplanes.
The applicability group also worked to address the issue of brokers
acting as charter operators and define scheduled operations. The group
worked closely with the Department of Transportation (DOT) and based on
early recommendations by the ARC, the DOT issued broker guidance titled
``Notice on the Role of Air Charter Brokers in Arranging Air
Transportation'' on October 18, 2004.
Aero-medical Workgroup
The aero-medical workgroup defined the status of medical crew
during operations. The proper definition of medical crew is critical,
since one of the most common scenarios in aero-medical operations is
the transportation of patients from outlying hospitals to higher care
facilities for which helipads the industry has developed several
hundred private GPS approaches. With the exception of two of these
pads, none are served by an approved weather source. The generally
accepted method of accessing these facilities is for an air-ambulance
to depart the metropolitan area under Part 91 and conduct the GPS
approach to the hospital pad. (Part 91 does not require weather
reporting at the destination.) The air-ambulance then departs the
helipad with a patient under Part 135 utilizing exemption 6175
(permitting the departure to be made under IFR provided the pilot's
observations indicate the prevailing weather is above VFR minima). The
approach to the metropolitan area may be conducted to an airport with
approved weather reporting or more likely to a hospital helipad within
the Class D airspace of an airport with weather reporting and for which
the operation is approved by operations specification.
There are several current interpretations that require the outbound
leg to be conducted under Part 135 and thereby preclude the inherently
safer IFR operation. The aero-medical group's proposal would modify
119.4 to exclude from Part 135 air-ambulance operations without a
patient on board by changing the status of medical crew.
The group also expanded the applicability of eligible on-demand,
making it applicable to more air-ambulance operations, since most do
not support two-pilot crews. By the current definition, a single pilot
crew may not be considered as ``eligible''. For the same reasons as
stated above, the workgroup proposed to allow, under certain
circumstances, a single-pilot air-ambulance crew to be included in the
135.4 definition of eligible on-demand crew.
The Committee also believes that increased use Night Vision Goggles
(NVGs) in aero-medical operations will provide a significant benefit to
safety. Part 61 does not recognize ``aided'' as a condition of flight
nor does it impose any currency requirements on these operations. The
aero-medical group's proposal incorporates in Part 61 currency
requirements for the use of NVGs and defines in Part 135 the conditions
under which they may be used to meet the requirements of 135.207
(helicopter lighted surface reference) and 135.229 (lighted helipad
requirement).
Finally, the aero-medical group proposed a clarification to 135.128
for approved child restraint systems specifically applicable to air-
ambulance patients under the age of two.
Airships Workgroup
The airship working group provided a proposal for how airships can
better be integrated into the NAS and how those types of operations,
especially those by possible future large cargo airships should be
regulated by the FAA. The airship workgroup provided a complete set of
recommendations to Parts 1, 61, 91, 135 to enable these types of
operations.
Airworthiness and Maintenance Workgroup
The Airworthiness and Maintenance workgroup (AWG) was tasked to
review the maintenance regulations and airworthiness certification
requirements as related to Parts 125 and 135 for currency,
applicability, safety, and adequacy for ``large'' airplane operations
such as intercontinental business jets and airplanes with modified
payload capacity. It was also tasked to look at new airplane operations
proposed by the ARC such as all-cargo airplanes with payload in excess
of 7,500lbs and turbine-powered airplanes in commuter scheduled
service.
When reviewing current maintenance requirements, the AWG determined
that Part 125 and Part 135.411(a)(2) continuous airworthiness
maintenance program (CAMP) requirements for large aircraft are
appropriate and adequate based on their technical merit and the overall
safety record. However, the group determined that airplane passenger
seating configuration is no longer an appropriate method of
differentiating between complex and less complex airplanes. Current
business airplanes are not configured with the maximum passenger
seating potential and the correlation between aircraft size and
aircraft complexity is not likely to hold true as new technologies and
performance capabilities are introduced into a broader range of general
aviation airplanes. In addition, 135 accident data raises questions
regarding the adequacy of maintenance requirements for piston and
turboprop airplanes which are nearly all small ``less-complex''
airplanes. From a strategic perspective and considering the entire Part
135 regulation and scope of current and future operations, the AWG
recommends that a single flexible maintenance program standard for Part
135 be established which could address the multiple of levels and
factors that comprise aircraft complexity as well as operational
complexity. Since the membership of the 135ARC and AWG did not include
operators of small piston and turboprop airplanes, the AWG recommends
that FAA form a 135 Maintenance Aviation Rulemaking Committee (135MARC)
with the appropriate membership required to develop a new 135
maintenance program standard.
From a tactical perspective and to address the specific tasking to
consider maintenance and inspection program requirements appropriate
for ``large'' airplanes as well as new airplane operations proposed by
the ARC, the AWG recommends that all aircraft with a maximum take-off
weight (MTOW) of 50,000lbs or more be maintained in accordance with a
CAMP. The AWG also recommends that the two new types of operations that
the ARC proposes to introduce into Part 135; all-cargo airplanes with a
payload in excess of 7,500lbs and turbine-powered airplanes in commuter
scheduled service; be maintained in accordance with a 135.411(a)(2)
CAMP which is consistent with the requirements of equivalent operations
currently conducted under Part 121.
Regarding Maintenance Training Requirements--Part 135 operators
with a CAMP currently ``have a training program'' for persons
performing maintenance functions. However, current regulations and
guidance do not adequately establish the minimum standards for
maintenance training programs which have resulted in significant
variations in the level of training provided among operators. The NTSB
has repeatedly recommended that air carrier maintenance training
programs be approved by FAA to ensure that they are appropriate for the
type of aircraft and type of operation. The AWG recommends that all
Part 135 air carriers have a maintenance training program and that
operators with a CAMP must have an FAA approved training program. This
would be consistent with the recent re-write of Part 145 which requires
all repair stations to have an employee training program approved by
the FAA. In fact, a recent report supporting the new Part 145 training
requirement which discusses changes in the quality and background of
mechanics, changes in industry, changing technology and inconsistency
in FAA oversight would be equally applicable to Part 135 operations.
Finally, the group recognized that existing Part 23 regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for turbojet
airplanes which, up until now, have been addressed through special
conditions, exemptions, and equivalent levels of safety. The AWG
therefore recommends changes to Part 23 airworthiness standards
appropriate for turbojet airplanes with consideration of operation in
Part 135 commuter service and Very Light Jets.
Equipment and Technology Workgroup
The Equipment and Technology workgroup was tasked with making
recommendations regarding Part 135 and 125 equipment issues. The group
made recommendations in the following areas:
Regarding Mode S--The workgroup reviewed whether Mode S requirement
was still needed for efficient air traffic management. The workgroup
agreed that the FAA continues to make slow, but nonetheless, steady
progress regarding the use of Mode S in the future Air Traffic Network.
The workgroup initially considered eliminating the requirement for Mode
S in aircraft not required to be equipped with TCAS II, however, it
felt this position ignored the fact that the FAA is continuing to make
progress integrating Mode S into the ATN. The workgroup reached a
consensus that the current rules pertaining to Mode S should remain as
written. The FAA should continue to provide exemptions to operators of
aircraft not required to be equipped with TCAS II until such time that
Mode S/ADS-B is integrated into the ATN and can offer safety and
operational benefits to operators and the FAA.
The Equipment and Technology also group worked closely with the
Rotorcraft and Aero-medical groups to mature a recommendation on Night
Vision Goggles resulting in the consensus recommendation submitted by
the Aero-medical working group.
The Committee was also asked to review a request for use of
combination recorders CVR-FDR in rotorcraft instead of the current
requirement for dedicated (individual) CVR and FDR units. The workgroup
provided a proposal for permitting the use of combi-recorders on
rotorcraft.
The workgroup also conducted a thorough review of terminology. This
review showed that some of the terminology needed to be updated to
reflect current technology and operations. The Equipment and Technology
workgroup reviewed Parts 23, 25, 27, 29, 91, 121, 125, and 135 and
recommended changes as described in the recommendation document.
Finally, the Equipment and Technology workgroup was asked by the
Airworthiness workgroup to look into the feasibility of permitting
datalink weather information in place of traditional weather radar and
thunderstorm detection systems. Datalink weather is a rapidly growing
technology and in the future may offer the same level and quality of
weather information to the pilot as traditional weather radar and
thunderstorm detection systems. The workgroup proposed enabling
language in a recommendation item that would permit the use of datalink
weather systems in place of traditional weather radar and thunderstorm
detection systems.
Operations Workgroup
The Operations workgroup (OPS) was comprised of approximately 70
members at the beginning of the process and was well represented from
all facets of industry and also included several FAA personnel. The
workgroup considered 80 issue papers during its meetings and all but
one were resolved in some manner.
Regarding Flight, Duty, and Rest Requirements--This subject
required the development of a subgroup which held four meetings and
reaching majority approval of draft language to replace Subpart F of
Part 135. The proposed language permits three options to ensure that
crewmembers are provided adequate opportunity for sleep.
Option one is a prescriptive set of rules similar to those
currently in force. However, significant effort was made to modify
those rules, generally to be more restrictive in nature, and to
recognize the latest fatigue science and to close ``loopholes'' in the
current rules.
Option two is a rule set that permits the certificate holder to
vary when a duty assignment may be made but ensures that crewmembers
are given an opportunity for sleep at the same time every day. The
subgroup believes this is a significant breakthrough in how to treat
fatigue in a business that is by definition ``on-demand.''
Option three is an allowance for a certificate holder to develop
and implement an ``Alertness Management Program'' in lieu of the
requirements of Subpart F. The subgroup recognizes that no guidance
material exists to describe the requirements of this type of program
and recommends that a separate ARC be convened specifically for that
issue as it applies to Part 135 operations.
A minority opinion was provided to the flight duty and rest
proposal. The minority believes the proposal would unacceptably
increase the hours of availability and the hours of work assignable to
pilots employed by on-demand operators resulting in a degradation of
safety compared to the existing rule. The minority position is that
additional training on fatigue dangers provided to flight crews through
mechanisms such as ``Alertness Management Initiatives'' has the
potential to increase safety, provided that information and any such
procedures are used only as a supplement to prescriptive limits and not
as a replacement or means to extend or circumvent quantitative maximum
regulatory limits. The minority offered an alternative proposal for
Subpart F.
Regarding Part 135 Flight Attendants--The operations workgroup
recognized that the current Part 135 rules do not address current
practice by industry of the use of flight attendants (nomenclature
varies) in aircraft that are not required to have a flight attendant
per the rule. This has created a significant void on how to treat these
individuals from a regulatory perspective and has lead to diverse
interpretation by the FAA at the field level. To address this issue,
and to recognize the unique nature of the Part 135 industry and the
individuals involved, the operations workgroup proposes to create two
categories of crewmembers that are assigned duties in the cabin. The
first is a Cabin Safety Crewmember (CSC), a position that is analogous
to a flight attendant but specifically recognizes that individual's
safety contribution to a flight. The CSC must be trained and tested per
an approved training program. The second is a Passenger Service
Specialist (PSS). This individual would not be permitted to perform
safety related functions and training would be specific to the duties
assigned. The passenger briefing requirements of Part 135 would be
modified to require that the briefing include the status of a CSC or
PSS.
Regarding the Use of Child Restraints--With dissenting opinions,
the operations workgroup provided a recommendation that, for infants
under 24 months of age not provided a passenger seat, the parent or
guardian may utilize any kind of restraint (except the use of the same
seat belt) to assist in protecting the child. A great deal of quality
research was done regarding this issue and it is seen as an incremental
increase in safety with minimal cost. In short, some protection, while
not perfect, is far better than no protection at all. The workgroup
reviewed previous FAA positions on this issue, specifically the
``diversion principle'' and finds that this is not applicable to Part
135 operations. The necessity to restrain an infant will not result in
the child being transported by a less safe means (automobile) due to
the nature and expense of typical Part 135 operations.
The operations workgroup was asked to review an NTSB recommendation
regarding Part 135 activity reporting and provide a recommendation to
the FAA for its implementation. The primary barrier to resolution was
the detail required to be reported. Industry was quite concerned that
the requirements to report would become overly burdensome and result in
``guesstimates'' rather than useful data. Others felt that very
detailed data was required to produce a meaningful picture of Part 135
activity. All did agree on one thing--the level of detail proposed by
NTSB was overly onerous and reflected limited knowledge of the Part 135
industry. Therefore, the Committee recommended, with one dissenting
opinion, that the FAA require that operators provide total hours flown
to the FAA at a frequency of one time per year with some additional
fidelity of the type of operation.
Regarding the requirements for the ``exclusive use'' of an aircraft
currently prescribed in the regulations, the operations workgroup
recommended that this requirement be modified to allow an aircraft
management or lease agreement to meet the requirements of ``exclusive
use'' of an aircraft. The current rule was designed to inhibit new
certificateholders and is based on the business model of the 1970s
wherein certificateholders typically owned or exclusively leased their
aircraft. That is the exception to the rule in the current business
environment where most aircraft are owned by other companies and leased
to a Part 135 certificate holder for Part 135 flights.
Finally, regarding pilot oxygen requirements the workgroup
recommended that this rule be modified to bring it into harmony with
Part 91 and Part 121 requirements.
Rotorcraft Workgroup
The rotorcraft workgroup focused on all weather operations and
limitations specifically applicable to operations in helicopters. This
includes landing visibility minima, performance requirements for large
helicopters, and specific requirements for over water operations by
rotorcraft.
Training Workgroup
The training workgroup provided a set of recommendations regarding
key areas of how training and checking is currently conducted in the
Part 135 community and also introduced the concept of Qualification
Performance Standards (QPS).
The line check received the most comments from the public. Full
consensus was achieved on recommendations that would allow for greater
flexibility in the scheduling of the line check, less dependence on FAA
resources and more importantly, to encourage the conduct of line checks
as part of line operations. The final recommendations include:
extending the line check interval from 12 to 24 months; provided for an
alternative means of compliance for the initial line check in the form
of IOE; extended the authority for line check airmen to similar
aircraft for which they may not be qualified and providing for an
alternative means of compliance for recurrent line checks by using a
Line Observation Program.
Unlike Part 121, the tasks that must be trained and checked are not
currently defined in the Part 135 regulation. Reference must be made to
several areas of the 8400.10 handbook and the PTS. The workgroup was in
full agreement that the revised Part 135 rule should precisely define
the training and checking requirements, the frequency for the training,
the standards of crewmember performance and the minimum level of
aircraft simulation that used to accomplish training and checking. This
was accomplished by creation of a series of appendices to the rules in
the form of tables. These tables are titles Quality Performance
Standards (QPS). These tables are unique to the areas of operations
specific to Multiengine Airplanes, Single Engine Airplanes and
Helicopters. The tasks and standards proposed have been aligned, as
much as possible, with Part 121 tasks and standards though the
participation of three Part 135 training workgroup members who also
serve on the Part 121 N&O ARC. This coordination between Parts 135 and
121 will serve to create one single standard of training and checking
for commercial operators and thus continue to promote one level of
safety. Ground training requirements for pilots and cabin safety
crewmembers were also expanded and further defined by the creation of
Qualification Performance Standards (QPS) appendices. Details of ground
training currently residing in the rule would be moved to the
appendices. Ground training has been adjusted to include Crew Resource
Management.
The training workgroup also provided a proposal for changing the
rulemaking process with respect to training. The proposal would endorse
the rulemaking process presented in Part 60 with respect to QPS
appendices. The workgroup believes that the only assurance of a ``level
playing field'' is the existence of a regulation that sets out the
specific requirements for training, testing and checking and clearly
describes the level of training equipment in which these activities may
be accomplished. However, it was recognized that being able to revise
and/or update these regulatory requirements is essential to maintaining
the ability to be able to respond to analysis of incident/accident
data, as well as future aircraft and technology developments. The
proposal states that that incorporating input from representatives of
those whose interests are most directly affected by these regulatory
requirements is not only an appropriate way to proceed, it is an
essential component of maintaining effective regulatory requirements.
In the proposal, an outline of the process that provides the
flexibility, essential to achieve clarity and standards in regulating
training of the widely varied population of aircraft types, operations,
crewmember qualifications, and crewmember complements of Part 135
operations. However, the Steering Committee strongly encourages the FAA
to define and present in complete detail the process that would be used
to make changes to training and testing standards for Part 135 in order
to ensure transparency and recognition of safety and financial
realities of the operator community.
The Committee also introduced recommendations for expanded use of
advance simulation. This would encourage operators to most effectively
utilize simulator training time, the proposed rule would allow for the
use of training in lieu of checking every other cycle. This provision
is based on the prerequisite that approved simulators are utilized as
the basis for the training program. Additionally, due to the increased
crew qualification and experience requirements for eligible on demand
operators, the proposed rule would allow for the use of an extended
currency period for when utilizing simulators.
File Structure
The Part 135/125 Aviation Rulemaking Committee Requirements are
located in eight directories representing each workgroup. The
additional four directories contains: (1) draft NPRM Material, (2)
[this] Executive Summary and Letter, (3) WG Participants, and (4)
Additional Rulemaking material including the 1978 preamble language and
the Part 135 Air Taxi Operator Study.
Any questions should be addressed to:
Jens C. Hennig
Manager of Operations
General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA)
Washington, DC
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Byron L. Dorgan to
Hon. Christopher A. Hart
Question 1. I understand that one reason that air traffic control
service cannot be provided to aircraft in the Hudson River Class B
Exclusion Area is that our current ground-based radar cannot reliably
detect aircraft under 1,000 feet due to the surrounding buildings.
Would NextGen air traffic control technology change this?
Answer. The NTSB understands that the implementation of automatic
dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B), which is a key feature of
NextGen air traffic control (ATC), will greatly improve coverage
throughout the U.S., including within the Hudson River corridor.
Question 2. What are the capabilities of this technology and in
what ways could it improve air traffic coverage in the air space
surrounding New York City?
Answer. Because ADS-B is a satellite-based system, it does not have
certain limitations of radar-based systems, such as line-of-sight and
obstruction constraints. Additionally, through the use of ADS-B IN and
OUT, pilots will have greater situational awareness of other aircraft
operating in the same airspace. The adoption of this technology has the
potential to make better use of the airspace while increasing the
safety of aircraft operations. The use of ADS-B OUT provides capability
for aircraft to report their location to ATC. ADS-B IN provides a
method of sending information to pilots, such as clearances and runway
status, and the location of surrounding aircraft and ground vehicles,
generally providing greatly improved situational awareness for pilots.
I understand that on August 30, 2007, the FAA awarded the ITT
Corporation a $207 million initial contract to lead a team to develop
and deploy the ADS-B system.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Byron L. Dorgan to
James K. Coyne
Question 1. I understand that one reason that air traffic control
service cannot be provided to aircraft in the Hudson River Class B
Exclusion Area is that our current ground based radar cannot reliably
detect aircraft under 1,000 feet due to the surrounding buildings.
Would NextGen air traffic control technology change this?
Answer. As you know, NextGen is the modernization of ground-based
radar infrastructure to satellite-based navigation for aircraft. The
ADS-B system is an advanced surveillance technology that combines a
satellite positioning service, aircraft avionics, and ground
infrastructure to enable more accurate transmission of information
between aircraft and air traffic control (ATC). The system enables
equipped aircraft to broadcast information, such as identification,
current position, altitude, and velocity, continually. ADS-B uses
information from a position service, e.g., Global Positioning System
(GPS), to broadcast the aircraft's location, thereby making this
information more timely and accurate than the information provided by
the conventional radar system. ADS-B also can provide the platform for
aircraft to receive various types of information, including ADS-B
transmissions from other equipped aircraft or vehicles. ADS-B is
automatic because no external interrogation is required, but is
``dependent'' because it relies on onboard position sources and onboard
broadcast transmission systems to provide surveillance information to
ATC and ultimately to other users. Concerns continue to remain that
legislation to reauthorize the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
will continue to be delayed, further postponing the necessary funds for
NextGen.
Question 1a. What are the capabilities of this technology and in
what ways could it improve air traffic coverage in the air space
surrounding New York City?
Answer. NextGen is essential to ensure that all aircraft throughout
the country have a reliable system in which to operate in. Currently,
ground-based radar varies from airport to airport, including the Hudson
River Class B Exclusion Area, and it is dependent on numerous factors.
In the case of the Hudson River Class B Exclusion Area, satellite radar
would not be impeded by surrounding infrastructure making it safer to
fly more air traffic through the corridor.
Question 2. In your written testimony you state that the FAA is not
``leading the charge to move forward with electronic mediums that
general aviation aircraft can assess.'' Will you explain in what ways
you believe that FAA is not leading the charge when it comes to the
implementation of NextGen Air Traffic Control technologies for general
aviation.
Answer. NATA believes that general aviation aircraft should have
the ability, if an aircraft owner so chooses, to equip their aircraft
with technology that will allow a satellite feed of radar to view any
aircraft activity surrounding their aircraft. We have GPS in our cars,
why not have them in our aircraft? Currently, aircraft have the ability
to receive current weather information via satellite through a device
that reads weather related information from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The FAA is the reason for not being
able to access radar information.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Byron L. Dorgan to
Richard L. Day
Question. I understand that one reason that air traffic control
service cannot be provided to aircraft in the Hudson River Class B
Exclusion Area is that our current ground based radar cannot reliably
detect aircraft under 1,000 feet due to the surrounding buildings.
Would NextGen air traffic control technology, change this? What are the
capabilities of this technology and in what ways could it improve air
traffic coverage in the air space surrounding New York City?
Answer. ADS-B, a NextGen air traffic control technology, can
provide expanded and improved surveillance coverage for air traffic
controllers in the New York area. In order for the controllers to
provide enhanced ATC services, all aircraft operating in the airspace
will need to be equipped with ADS-B Out.
Additionally, in areas without radar coverage or in low altitude
uncontrolled airspace, ADS-B can also enhance the pilot's knowledge of
the weather, the national airspace system (NAS) status, and the
surrounding traffic, both in the air and on the airport surface. ADS-B
provides improved situational awareness by providing information about
nearby aircraft such as their heading, altitude, speed, etc. Aircraft
will need to be equipped with a cockpit display (ADS-B In) in order to
have the capability to display this information in the cockpit.
The FAA plans to deploy ADS-B in the New York terminal areas and on
the surface at LaGuardia, Kennedy, and Newark airports. ITT began the
design of these service volumes in April 2009 and completed initial
site selection activities in September 2009. Service Acceptance Test
(SAT) \1\ at these sites will be completed in the summer of 2010. These
sites will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for terminal
airspace and the airport surface by the end of calendar year 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ During Service Acceptance Test (SAT), the team will validate
that the installed ground stations meet key requirements outlined in
the contract with ITT. This will support the provision of surveillance
services for ATC separation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Richard L. Day
Question. The airspace around Newark is one of the most complex and
congested in the world. In 2006, the former FAA Administrator stated on
the record that the Newark Liberty Air Traffic Control tower needed at
least 35 controllers to move traffic safely, but right now there are
only 27 certified controllers and 7 trainees manning the tower. When
will the FAA fully staff the Newark control tower with certified
controllers?
Answer. With 34 employees at the Newark (EWR) airport tower, the
FAA considers the existing staff level fully capable of safely, and
efficiently, managing the airspace in and around the New York area.
Currently, the facility has 26 fully certified controllers and 8
additional controllers in training. With 34 controllers on board, and 1
new hire at the Academy, EWR is at the midpoint of its 31-37 staffing
range.
The FAA will hire four additional controllers in FY2010. This will
offset projected attrition and increase staffing at the facility. By
the end of FY2010, the FAA projects EWR will have 37 employees,
bringing it to the top of the staffing range.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Byron L. Dorgan to
Edward Kragh
Question. I understand that one reason that air traffic control
service cannot be provided to aircraft in the Hudson River Class B
Exclusion Area is that our current ground based radar cannot reliably
detect aircraft under 1,000 feet due to the surrounding buildings.
Would NextGen air traffic control technology, change this? What are the
capabilities of this technology and in what ways could it improve air
traffic coverage in the air space surrounding New York City?
Answer. In my everyday role as a working controller at Newark
Airport, I am not yet aware of the NextGen technology that you are
referring to. The FAA has not involved NATCA in the development of such
technology for the last several years. Assuming that such technology is
forthcoming though, one would then have to question whether the other
necessary infrastructure is in place for the FAA to fully control the
Hudson exclusion, i.e., new equipment and positions at the NY/NJ
control towers and expanded controller staffing and training to man
those positions.
The bigger question however, when one considers the overall safety
record of flights in this airspace over the past several decades vs.
the reduction in capacity of flights that would certainly occur if
controllers had to talk to every single VFR flight, is whether total
ATC control is even the safest and most expeditious option for this
airspace. Assuming that future technology would allow me to see and
talk to every aircraft down to the surface, I would certainly not be
able to talk fast enough to meet the existing separation requirements
for all the flights that currently use this airspace. Since pilots in
the Hudson exclusion currently operate using see-and-avoid (VFR) rules
while self-reporting their positions to one another, the capacity is
much less restricted than it would be in a fully controlled
environment. So ultimately once the technology will allow for total
control, the decision must be made whether to severely curtail the use
of this airspace by establishing total ATC control, or to allow for
continued unfettered access to the airspace by maintaining the status
quo as an uncontrolled VFR exclusion.
For the record, NATCA controllers have no particular preference at
this time for either option since enhanced surveillance is still a
theoretical prospect, and since the safety record of this airspace is
remarkable, given the sheer number of flights that have operated safely
there for decades using VFR rules.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Edward Kragh
Question. The New York Airspace Task Force demonstrated the
benefits of true collaboration between air traffic controllers and the
FAA, something the FAA has often failed to do in the past. How can the
FAA continue this collaboration with air traffic controllers on current
and future projects affecting the New Jersey/New York Airspace?
Answer. NATCA stands ready to participate in the current and future
projects of the New Jersey/New York Airspace redesign. The FAA can
continue and improve collaboration with air traffic controllers by
ensuring NATCA receives timely notification of the meetings. The Agency
should also assist with scheduling the participants with enough notice
so their facility is not forced to work with fewer controllers than
normal while attending the meetings.